

Migration and Media

Discourses about identities in crisis

EDITED BY

LORELLA VIOLA AND ANDREAS MUSOLFF

DISCOURSE APPROACHES TO
POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 8



JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY

Migration and Media

Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture (DAPSAC)

ISSN 1569-9463

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Volume 81

Migration and Media. Discourses about identities in crisis
Edited by Lorella Viola and Andreas Musolff

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Amsterdam / Philadelphia



The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

DOI 10.1075/dapsac.81

**Cataloging-in-Publication Data available from Library of Congress:
LCCN 2018057358 (PRINT) / 2019004047 (E-BOOK)**

ISBN 978 90 272 0247 5 (HB)
ISBN 978 90 272 6270 7 (E-BOOK)



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Preface

Ruth Wodak

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It is truly an honor to be asked to write a preface for this timely and important volume.

Many debates about migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees continue to dominate headlines every day. Ever new problems with migrants are discussed, globally, nationally and locally. And, as elaborated across the many chapters which are concerned with different European countries and the US, similar patterns seem to emerge ubiquitously. In many cases, migrants are blamed for complex socio-political and economic problems, many fears result due to emphasis put on vague numbers, specific crime statistics, and rising unemployment numbers (Penninx, Spencer, and Hear 2008; Miller 2016; Wodak 2017). The categories of “migrant”, “asylum seeker”, and “refugee” are frequently being merged, into a concept of a dangerous “stranger”.

But who are these illegal or irregular migrants thus invoked? A recent study on the representation of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in British newspapers over a decade (1996–2006) provides evidence that the concepts of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are conflated into one large category of others, that is, strangers, in the media reporting of both tabloids and broadsheets (although less so in the latter) (Baker et al. 2008; KhosraviNik M 2010; Yilmaz 2016). These findings resonate with earlier studies on the representation of refugees and migrants such as post-1989 in Austria (Matouschek, Wodak, and Januschek 1995), where similar flood metaphors as well as *topoi of criminality, danger and burden* were identified. These findings allow us to conclude that much discourse about migrants and immigration seems to bear (several) almost universal features, throughout Europe and beyond, which can be explained by social theories about “othering” and the discursive construction of “the stranger” and “fear of the stranger,” as mentioned above. Border and identity/body politics converge to keep specific strangers out while letting others in. Moreover, poor and destitute insiders are suddenly defined as strangers and excluded. Simultaneously, *media panic* produces and reproduces strategies of blaming/denying and leads to narratives of decline, helplessness, rise or success, power or control as well as vehement rhetoric of scape-goating (Stone 2002; Wodak and Boukala 2015; Rheindorf and Wodak 2018; Krzyżanowski,

Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2017). These scape-goats, according to some hegemonic media constructions (and related policy proposals of some politicians), should be punished and suffer the consequences of their actions.

The President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee located in New York, David Miliband, summarizes the global refugee and migration movements in 2016 as follows:

[A]ccording to the UNHCR, in 2015 there were some 65.3 million people throughout the world who had been uprooted from their homes by conflict and persecution. Over 20 million of these people are refugees, i.e., they have fled from a well-founded fear of persecution, crossed a national border, and received refugee status from either the United Nations or a state. [...] Such large numbers of displaced people have not been seen since World War II: were they a nation, it would be the twenty-first-largest on earth, the size of California and Texas combined, the same as the United Kingdom. On average, 34,000 people were forced to flee their homes every day of 2015.¹

Miliband concludes, that fewer than one percent of the world's refugees could return to their countries of origin in 2015 (see also Triandafyllidou 2018). However, protracted conflict is the new norm. It is obvious that more of the most vulnerable refugees need to be relocated into richer countries. But – as has become obvious – most EU member states refuse to support the proposals suggested by the Commission (*ibid.*). According to statistics of the UNHCR 2017, 28.300 people flee every day worldwide,² by the end of 2016, 67, 7 million people were asking for help. This included people who have been forcibly displaced (refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons) and those who have found a durable solution (returnees), as well as stateless persons, most of whom have never been forcibly displaced.³

Since the peak of the so-called “refugee crisis” 2014/2015, renationalizing tendencies can be observed across many EU member states; a nativist body politics seems to be “celebrating” a revival, embracing the metaphor of *THE NATION AS BODY* (Musolff 2010; Wodak 2015). Increasing processes of securitization and militarization can be noticed not only at political levels but also at normative levels in what Vollmer (2017: 4) terms the “moralization of bordering”:

1. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/13/best-ways-to-deal-with-refugee-crisis/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NYR%20Trump%20refugees&utm_content=NYR%20Trump%20refugees+CID_cc9993fa564ff8be74e6d62d97655f40&utm_source=Newsletter&utm_term=The%20Best%20Ways%20to%20Deal%20with%20the%20Refugee%20Crisis

2. <http://www.unhcr.org/dach/at/services/statistiken> (accessed 8 March 2018)

3. <http://reporting.unhcr.org/population> (accessed 8 March 2018)

Moralization of bordering takes place when considering the balancing act of excluding a selection of people but at the same time standing on the high moral ground that the EU and its Member States stand for. This exclusionary practice has been morally legitimized over the years by an array of policy frames [...], but also by a narrative of deservingness, that is, by following the principle that “some people do not deserve to be treated equally or in the way we (the ‘host’ society) treat human beings.

Moralization of borders thus requires justification and legitimation. Territorial borders have become more than a means to provide security and control by also symbolizing social meanings that cut to the core of human life. For example, legitimation by authority takes place by reference to “the regulations” or “the law”, legitimation by rationalization (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 105) by reference to some form of common sense (“there are too many refugees”, “the boat is full”). Moral legitimation can be observed, justifying boundaries and borders in terms of health, leadership, public interest, and so forth. Obviously, there are people who deserve being saved, thus allowed to cross borders; and people who do not deserve to live a better life. Hegemonic discursive forms of inclusion and exclusion create an “imagined community” that does not comprise “others”: “those that are not worthy of becoming Europeans” (Wodak 2007: 651) and usually represented as “strangers” (Simmel and Wolff 1950; Bauman 1995), or even “enemies.” The appeal to “order” and “the rule of law” as universal and superordinate values thus produces a dehumanizing rhetoric, ultimately legitimizing the construction of a “Fortress Europe” in a paradoxical defense of liberal values.

At the same time, citizenship is to be perceived as a legal institution of the 27 (28) member states of the EU and one that determines who belongs or does not belong to the EU (Delanty 2011). Since 2000, many (most) European countries have required migrants to demonstrate proficiency in the national language of the host country to secure citizenship and integration (Extramiana, Pulinx, and Van Avermaet 2014; Wodak 2017). Such a revival in the importance of competence in the national language as a gatekeeping device leads to re/nationalizing tendencies which reintroduce the in-group of “us,” “European citizens,” and the out-group of “non-European others,” or “illegal,” “undocumented” or “irregular” migrants.

The debates surrounding the so-called “refugee crisis” do not only concern victims and perpetrators (be they individuals, parties, institutions, governments, or nation states) but even more importantly, they relate to struggles about hegemonic narratives (what has gone wrong) and to moral values (what is right or wrong) (Wodak and Angouri 2014). In this way, (Sher 2006: 16) argues that “if morality has a claim on us, then blame is in place; if we must view morality as having a claim, then we must resist the blandishments of a world without blame”. In this way, we can observe, as argued in this book, a culturalization of relevant issues, such as

inequality, poverty, and unemployment. In an ever more globalizing and globalizing world, the tendencies to close “our” borders to keep “them” out, are surprising.

As illustrated throughout the many studies in this book, there exists a nostalgic wish to return to homogenous nation states, a *status quo ante* which will never be implemented again. Nobody has ever argued that it would be easy to support the many refugees and to integrate people arriving from countries stricken by war and catastrophes. Moreover, no serious political party has ever argued that “everybody” should be allowed to enter without control or registration. Nevertheless, readers of this book will have to conclude that global problems require global and transnational answers in the interests of the migrants and refugees as well as of the host countries.

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Introduction

Migration and crisis identity

Andreas Musolff and Lorella Viola

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That present-day migrations have impacted significantly on public discourses and political cultures is a truism, given that they have by now ‘inspired’ a whole raft of new, mostly anti-immigration motivated, social movements and have dominated election campaigns, referenda and media debates in Europe, the United States of America and many other countries. Reflecting and interpreting the perceived upsurge in mass migration, public discourse has, in turn, also shaped the political context of migration through redefining, agenda-setting, and influencing relevant policy decisions (Freeman, Hansen, and Leal 2013; Hampshire 2013; Haynes, Power, and Devereux 2016; Wodak 2015). As a result, the socio-discursive landscape is characterised by a growing sense of crisis in both personal and collective identities, ranging from the imagined large-scale, national and even supra-national identities (e.g. “Europe”, “Western world”) through regional and sub-national groups and “communities of practice” (Holmes and Meyerhoff 1999; Wenger 2008) to the (im-)migrants themselves who have given up their previous ‘home’-identities, however fragile they may have been, and not (yet) gained new ones.

But the crisis that is at the centre of most public discourses on migration is that of ‘host’ societies that appear to some as being threatened in their core existence. How closely this threat is felt can be gleaned from the escalation of an imagined immigration scenario in a discussion thread (Excerpts 1, 2, and 3 below) on the British Broadcasting Corporation’s online forum “Have Your Say” (BBC 2010) (*italics by authors*):

- (1) Illegal immigrants [...] are not welcome here. ... *If I walked into someones [sic] home that I didn't know unannounced and said I was moving in I would expect to get filled in.* Obviously I'm not saying do that just deport them to wherever they came from.

- (2) So, what you are saying is that *if you live in a nicer house than I do, it is OK with you that I just move into your house, let you and your family live in one of the rooms while my family and I take over the rest, eat the food that you work and pay for, set the TV to receive only the channels that I want to watch, while forcing you to learn my language and observe only my traditions and customs? [...]* you would have a great deal of difficulty finding such a tolerant society that would put your views and needs above the views and needs of their own citizenry. I feel sure that many of us will be only too willing to wish you “Goodbye”!
- (3) OK so I to [sic] would like a better life for myself and my family [;] *so on this basis all I have to do is move into a multi millionaires [sic] home (with indoor swimming pool of course) expect the owners and servants to allow us to stay there, feed all of us for years, cloth all of us for years, tend to all our medical needs and not say a “Bigoted” word against us and in general give us anything we ask for why we do nothing or give nothing in return. Sorry it does not work like that!*

These are not ironical, inverse elaborations of a stereotypical ‘immigrants-as-home-invaders’ scenario, as one might suspect when reading the italicized passages in isolation. On the contrary, the explicit conclusions in the three consecutive postings leave no doubt that their authors compete in earnest for producing the most outrageous, grotesquely exaggerated depiction of the immigrants’ catastrophic impact on their home, complete with details of how the invaders take over control of TV, language, healthcare, swimming pool and even the definition of bigotry. The forum posters’ shared conceit of assuming the role of the home-invading migrant underlines how much of the authors’ own identities is at stake: they cast themselves in the role of the wrongdoer to convince themselves and their readers that condemnation and, following that, getting rid of the aggressors is justified. The escalation from the first, relatively simple home-invasion scenario to the wholesale takeover of a multimillionaire’s mansion shows just how fascinated the speakers are by their self-identification with the migrant-aggressor! In their online fantasies, they not just marginalise the previous, ‘rightful’ home-owners but take over their existence completely, like a super-parasite that survives even its host’s demise by taking over his very identity (Musolff 2012).

If one assumed that this was mere online rhetoric bravado, the electoral successes of politicians calling for “liberating” or “regaining” the home nation or “taking back control” indicate otherwise. Xenophobic home-invasion scenarios informed, to name but three examples, the 2016 “Brexit” campaign in Britain, US President Trump’s “Build the Wall” initiative and the electoral gains of the anti-immigration party, “Alternative for Germany” (AFD) in the federal parliament elections in Germany in 2017. At the height of the German election campaign, the AFD-leader A. Gauland, for instance, demanded that the federal government’s chief

immigration officer A. Özoguz who had Turkish family background should be “disposed of” (*entsorgt*) in Anatolia after she had dared to query an ‘essential’ German cultural identity beyond language-based definitions (FAZ 2017). Despite heavy criticism from all the other political parties in Germany, from Federal Chancellor A. Merkel (who disqualified his statements as “racist”, SZ, 2017) as well as from most of the media including the tabloids, Gauland did not retract any of his words and successfully triggered what Ruth Wodak has called the “populist perpetuum mobile” through creating a scandal that instrumentalises the media criticism to gain even more popularity (Wodak 2015: 19–20). Once again, the trick worked: Gauland’s party, which had not been represented in the federal parliament before, scored 12.6% of the national vote in the elections two weeks later (www.bundestag.de 2017). But it was not just Gauland’s media-savviness that helped to achieve such a result, its identity-defending message itself was clearly approved by his followers: to them he became the guardian of a national identity that appeared to be under threat from people like A. Özoguz and the whole history of post-World War II internationalisation in Germany and Europe that she stands and works for.

In the context of migration debates, the attribution of national/cultural identity is not only a matter of academic debate (where it is usually critically deconstructed, see e.g. Anderson 2006; Bhabha 2004; Billig 1995) but an essential means of socio-political orientation for parts of the public who feel *acutely* threatened by an aggressive Other that is seemingly taking over their home and their existence. For them, the alleged threat from (im-)migration has been there for a long time¹ – and so have probably been their xenophobic attitudes and feelings towards it –, but what makes it appear urgent and powerful is its perceived proximity, its supposedly immediate impact on the centre of their world(-view), i.e. the effect of “proximization” (Cap 2013, and in this volume). The speakers’ home identity is vulnerable and questionable; it is, in both senses of the word, ‘critical’: i.e. essential for its supporters’ identities, and at the same time in need of urgent re-assertion and active protection.

From this viewpoint, discourses about immigration are also always attempts at reconstructing the threatened ‘home identity’ of the respective host society. Through the construal of the (arrival of) the migrant Other as an imminent threat, as well as of the current situation as an existential crisis and the rejection of alternative concepts (such as “multiculturalism”), the home identity is re-asserted and discursively repaired. It is such attempts at reasserting identity-in crisis (due

1. For the long – if not continuous – tradition of post-WW II xenophobic anti-immigrant populism in (West) Germany see Becker (2015); Jung et al. (1997); Selfe (2017); in Britain see Charteris-Black (2006); Kushner (2003); Hart 2010; KhosraviNik, Krzyżanowski, and Wodak (2012).

to migration) that are the focus of this volume. It presents fourteen case-studies of varying sets of data (print media texts, TV broadcasts, online comments and debating forums, politicians' speeches, legal and administrative texts, oral narratives), drawn from discourses in a range of languages – Croatian, English (UK and US), French, German, Greek, Italian, Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovenian, Spanish, Ukrainian –, employing different discourse-analytical methods, such as Argumentation and Metaphor Analysis, Gendered Language Studies, Corpus-assisted Semantics and Pragmatics, and Proximization Theory. All chapters are corpus-based and guided by the “discourse-historical approach” pioneered by Ruth Wodak (2001), which aims at the integration of linguistic, social and historical data, so as to arrive at their in-depth “triangulation”, to understand language use in its full socio-historical context and its implied/implicated ideological intentions and effects. As a result, the findings are predominantly qualitative though some of them also make use of frequency counts of linguistic, especially lexical constructions. The book's main objective is not to prove one analytical model right (and others wrong) but the exploration of dominant discourse strategies and modes which construct the link between (im-)migration and threatened home identity so as to make it sound plausible, self-evident and (supposedly) consensual.

This emphasis on a multi-layered discourse analysis provides the structural framework for our volume: its first and second parts respectively study representational, especially lexical, framing devices and pragmatic, figurative/metaphorical and proximating strategies that characterise public discourse about migration, i.e. the linguistic means of constructing the ‘identity-in-crisis’ scenario. Part III widens the perspective further to multi-modal and multi-media analyses, including migrants' reactions to being discursively constructed and stigmatised by the home community, insofar as the latter is represented as a (supposedly) homogeneous entity. The final part questions exactly this supposition by analysing in detail online debates among the home community's members (e.g. readers' online comments and discussion forums). The analyses show that they are in fact *not* characterised by homogeneity but rather by complex and, in parts, creative processes of realignment, recontextualisation and meta-communication. They often use the statements by officially or institutionally entitled public voices, such as politicians and journalists or official spokespersons, as material for rhetorical escalation that can embolden or justify hate-speech, including the denigration of any Other-identity, but also for critical reflection and argument.

Part I of the volume explores a range of representational strategies used to frame migration as a crisis of identity. Chapter 1 investigates how the narrative of a threatened home identity is implicitly embedded in the use of the word *multiculturalism* in four languages, British English, French, German and Italian. Using Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis, Melani Schröter, Marie Veniard, Charlotte Taylor and

Andreas Blätte analyse corpora of newspaper articles covering the time span 1998–2012 in each language, collated from one conservative and one left-liberal national newspaper. Across the languages, the authors' findings show that the word *multicultural* is mostly descriptive of a state of affairs, typically without negative evaluation. *Multiculturalism*, on the contrary, is associated with abstract concepts and points to a more negative discourse prosody, indicated by collocates such as *failure*.

Also drawing on the discourse-historical approach, Lorella Viola in Chapter 2 investigates the linguistic means of constructing the 'identity-in-crisis' scenario within the context of the conflict between the Italian Northern and Southern regions' ideologies. By diachronically analysing texts from 1861 to 2016, the chapter investigates how this scenario has become linguistically apparent in the use of the discriminating words *polentone* attached to people living in the North and *terrone* referring to people from the South. The dataset consists of daily newspapers, magazines, periodicals, novels, short stories, essays, laws, decrees, judgments, web material. By identifying how such internalised cultural models manifest themselves in these two derogatory terms, the analysis provides an in-depth triangulation for understanding the long-established North/South dichotomy and unveils correlations between the discursive discrimination against Italian intra-migrants and the implicit ideologies circulated by governmental choices.

The representational, mainly lexical, framing devices that characterise judicial and legal forms of public discourse about migration are the focus of the final chapter of this section. From the analysis of a corpus of legislation and of information texts produced by the administrations of Spain and the United Kingdom during the period 2007–2011, Purificación Sánchez, Pilar Pérez-Paredes and Pascual Aguado highlight the different approaches to the construction of immigrants and citizens' representations that both countries seem to have favoured in the period analysed. Through the analysis of the collocation of targeted terms such as *immigrant*, *immigrante*, *citizen* and *ciudadano*, the authors explain how, while the British administration highlights control procedures for immigrants, the Spanish one concentrates on the necessity of integration.

The second section of the book features three chapters which share the focus on argumentation, pragmatic and figurative strategies that are used to frame migration as a crisis of identity. It starts with a chapter by Zeynep Cihan Koca-Helvaci addressing the topic of media representation of the European migration crisis. The chapter explores the nature of British media discourse focussing on two recent cases concerning migrants: the tragic death of the 3-year-old Syrian refugee Aylan Kurdi in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 and the sex assaults in the German city of Cologne on New Year's Eve 2015/16. While the images of Aylan Kurdi's washed up body stirred the conscience of the public, the latter caused alarm because of the influx of immigrants in Europe. Applying the Discourse-Historical Approach to the

analysis of the referential, predicational and argumentation strategies, Koca-Helvaci provides an analytical framework that provides explanations to understand the ideological intentions of discourse construction of migration in Britain and their possible effects on perceptions of the events in the general public.

The construal of the arrival of the migrant Other as an imminent threat and as a means to reassert and legitimise the home identity scenario is the focal point of Chapter 5. Using Proximization Theory, Piotr Cap investigates the discursive construction of closeness and remoteness in anti-immigration discourse in Poland and how the ‘emerging’, ‘growing’, ‘gathering’ threats – physical as well as ideological – are construed by the Polish right-wing government, so as to claim a right to oppose EU immigration agreements and pursue strict anti-immigration measures.

In the final chapter of this part of the volume, Liudmila Arcimaviciene discusses gender and metaphor correlations in media migration discussions. Through applying the “Metaphor Identification Procedure” (Group 2007) to media texts collected from the US and UK online media sources in 2015–2017 on the topic of the EU 2015 migration, the author examines the discursive manipulation of the Other and how the evoked frames of quantifiable and tradable objects, natural phenomena, crimes, war and terrorism contribute to suppressing positive emotions, related to empathy or compassion.

The third part of the volume revolves around the investigation of multimodality in crisis communication. Chapter 7 explores how identities of the Other, the threatened host and other dynamics of public frames are constructed in television discussions in Greece. In her analysis of twenty TV discussions from 1996 to 2016, Eleni Butulussi combines Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Practical Reasoning Theory and Metaphor Analysis to demonstrate how metaphors are used to strengthen specific arguments and conclusions, thus revealing the viewpoints, ideologies, intentions, feelings and desires of the different speakers as well as relations of power and common notions of right and wrong.

Chapter 8 is also situated within the context of multimodality. Through the analysis of the linguistic and multimodal instantiations of the WALL metaphor in Serbian media texts published in 2015, Nadežda Silaški and Tatjana Đurović identify the most frequent metaphor scenarios modelled around the portrayal of Europe’s migrant crisis in Serbia. Complementing the framework of Critical Metaphor Analysis with research on multimodality, the authors discuss the notions of marginalisation and non-belonging to the EU space, emanating from verbally and visually constructed images of both migrants and the Serbian nation.

Continuing the investigation of migration in the Balkan route, Chapter 9 portrays how discourses about immigration are implicit attempts at reconstructing the threatened ‘home identity’ of the respective host society. Tatjana Felberg and Ljiljana Šarić investigate similarities and differences in the representation of the

“refugee crisis” and of migrants in Croatia and Serbia by applying multimodal analysis of data from the online portals of Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters. By mainly exploring the representation of actors, the authors show how the “refugee crisis” reflected wider political discourses of Schengen and non-Schengen countries and of EU and non-EU countries’ towards migrants in the politically sensitive region of ex-Yugoslavia.

The effects of identity attribution by the ‘receiving’ society on migrants’ own identity construction and perception is at the centre of the last chapter of this part of the volume. Theresa Catalano and Jessica Mitchell-McCullough examine the representation of unaccompanied minor children fleeing Central America (Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) in U.S. online national news sources over a one-year period. Also drawing on interviews with children collected from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, the linguistic data are compared to the way these children talk about their own perceptions of migration and their motivation for moving. Using multimodal critical discourse analysis, the authors reveal a qualitative difference in discourse (e.g., use of metaphor, metonymy, deixis and visual elements) that varies depending on whether the sources are media reports or personal accounts from the children themselves.

The final part of the volume is concerned with the investigation of how the crisis about migration is experienced in online debates and it features four chapters. In Chapter 11, denigration of any Other-identity, threats to the home identity and stigmatisation are some of the notions emerging from Ludmilla A’Beckett’s analysis of online characterisations of refugees from the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine in Russian and Ukrainian. The chapter charts the semantic vectors of relevant texts and between these texts and discourse ideologies. The author concludes that the varying sets of abuses developed during the confrontation through Russian and Ukrainian social media reinforce the specifics of the respective national vision of the conflict development.

Chapter 12 demonstrates that even the notion of ‘home identity’ does not seem to be characterised by homogeneity but rather by complex processes of recontextualization. Using CDA and partially inspired by Text World Theory, Michael S. Boyd analyses a controversial *New York Times* editorial article and the relative readers’ comments. The analysis focuses on the strategies adopted by text producers to align themselves with or differentiate themselves from different discourse worlds and attempts to determine readers’ varying opinions about the European migration issue and how this reflects and/or diverges from the view(s) presented by the editorial.

Chapter 13 is also interested in Other-identity and its relationship with the concept of integration, with special regard to German society. Using CDA methods and feminist post-structural theory, Janet M. Fuller looks at discourses about immigration in Germany with a focus on policies and events in 2014–16. The analysis

unveils underlying ideological assumptions about immigration, i.e. that immigration and immigrants are seen as positive as long as they integrate but that even the most integrated 'migrant-background citizens' continue to be labelled as 'other', i.e., not German.

The final chapter by Andreas Musolff highlights the denigration of learning, speaking or just listening to other languages as a threat to the home identity in press media and Internet forums. Using argumentation theory, pragmatics and discourse-historical triangulation, Musolff explores expressions of popular skepticism towards multilingualism, multiculturalism and to (super-)diversity, which stand in contrast to their official endorsement and to socio-linguistic analyses of empirical language use in societies characterised by strong immigration.

Throughout the four parts and across the fourteen chapters of this book, we offer a multi-layered discourse analysis approach which, encompassing several methods, varying sets of data, and different discourse scenarios in a range of languages, is structurally coherent, methodologically solid, and comparatively rich. All chapters are guided by a corpus-based and discourse-historical triangulatory perspective so as to provide an empirical, broad, and in-depth understanding of the linguistic means and communicative strategies employed in public discourse to construct 'identity-in-crisis' scenarios. The book will appeal to linguists interested in social discrimination, rhetorical escalation, denigration of any Other-identity, but also to those focussing on contemporary public discourses of migrants and host communities in which identities are negotiated. More widely, the book is of interest for anybody concerned with ethnic studies, racism, especially for researchers, students and teachers of critical social sciences such as politics, anthropology, economics, sociology, social (economic, legal) history, media and communication studies.

Present-day mass migration patterns challenge the identity-construction and -performance for all communities. The present volume aims to contribute to overcoming such challenges for self- and other-understanding.

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PART I

Framing migration as a crisis of identity I

Representational strategies

A comparative analysis of the keyword *multicultural(ism)* in French, British, German and Italian migration discourse

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This chapter looks into discourses about migration in four European countries through the lens of cultural keywords (cf. Williams 1983; Bennett et al. 2005; Wierzbicka 1997); using Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis, it compares the use of the keywords *multicultural* and *multiculturalism*. The study is based on corpora from British, French, German and Italian newspaper articles covering the time span 1998–2012, collated from one conservative and one left-liberal national newspaper in each language.

Across the languages, the results show that the adjective *multicultural* is mostly descriptive of a state of affairs, typically without negative evaluation, and that the noun *multiculturalism* is associated with abstract concepts and points to a more negative discourse prosody, indicated by collocates such as ‘failure’.

Keywords: discourse, migration, cultural keywords, corpus-assisted discourse studies, multicultural(ism)

1. Introduction

In the following, we will explain our conceptualisation of Discourse Keywords and provide a rationale for using Discourse Keywords (DKW) for comparative discourse analyses.

Our understanding of DKWs is mostly informed by research in the area of cultural keywords (Williams 1983; Wierzbicka 1997, 2006, 2010) and conceptual history (following from Brunner et al. 1972–1997), even though it differs from such approaches methodologically (see Section 3 below). Williams describes cultural keywords as “a shared body of words and meanings in our most general discussions,

in English, of the practices and institutions which we group as culture and society” (1983: 15). Williams considers keywords as simultaneously reflecting and shaping reality (cf. Stubbs 2010: 24) and introducing a revised edition of Williams’ keywords, Bennett et al. (2005) emphasise the connection between (changes in) words and their meanings and the wider political, social and economic context, their characteristics of being significant in public discourse, and difficult in the sense that they are sites of struggles about meaning. These characteristics have also been recognised in Germanophone analyses of public and political discourse, where the interest in keywords has led to numerous publications, including lexicographically organised documentations of keywords across historical periods (e.g. Strauß/Hass/Harras 1989; Stötzel/Wengeler 1995; Felbick 2003). While these works need to be seen as part of the ‘cultural keywords tradition’, they are closer to our understanding of discourse keywords, as explained below. A few publications relating to the four languages under investigation here also focus particularly on keywords in migration discourse (Aprile/Dufoux 2009; Jung et al. 2000; Gallissot 2001). In Anglophone academia, Wierzbicka (e.g. 1997, 2006, 2010) contributed a body of work on cultural keywords that is particularly valuable in introducing a cross-linguistic and comparative perspective and by pointing out the culture-specificity of conceptualisations that are wrapped up in the semantics of keywords.

Despite the commonalities mentioned above, we can differentiate between the academic endeavours relating to cultural keywords and conceptual history on the one hand and DKWs on the other. ‘Cultural keywords’ capture more basic conceptualisations of publicly relevant social phenomena that can feature across a whole range of thematic discourses across time, such as *state, justice, citizen, freedom* (Brunner et al. 1972–1997), or *culture, work, civilisation, idealism* (Williams 1983). Wierzbicka points out the culture specificity of English words such as *fair, reasonable, experience, sense* (2006, 2010) and compares keywords such as *friendship* and *freedom* across a number of languages (1997). DKWs pertain more to the use of words in specific, thematic discourse contexts at certain points in time; “the emphasis is on those cultural keywords which have sociopolitical significance in a particular period” (Jeffries/Walker 2018: 4). Hence, the approach to their study differs also in the choice of data for analysis: Cultural keywords tend to have more of a diachronic dimension in studying the use of words in key texts (literary, academic or political), more often than not spanning more than one historical period, whereas “sociopolitical keywords” (Jeffries/Walker 2018: 4), or DKWs, are often studied using a range of media and political texts over shorter time periods, relating to more thematically specific discourses.

Based on the publications mentioned in this section, we can specify that DKWs in our understanding (Schröter/Storjohann 2015; Schröter/Veniard 2016) are first of all lexical items that occur frequently in periods of the salience of the

discourse they belong to. Secondly, they function as semantic nodes in discourses which, upon deeper analysis of their context of usage, unravel a part of the history and ideology of the underlying discourse. Thirdly, they are usually part of an ensemble of other lexical items that feature prominently in the same discourse; typically there are a number of DKWs that might be associated with certain points of view. Finally, they more often than not signify controversially debated issues; controversies can lead to the creation of concurring DKWs. Controversy entailed in keywords can refer to either the signifier, i.e. problematizing the choice of word (e.g. re-framing *illegal immigrants* as *illegalised immigrants*), or the signified, i.e. problematizing the phenomenon referred to (e.g. *austerity*). The use of DKWs is often accompanied by metalinguistic comments, e.g. distance markers or specifications of meaning.

Having said this, we do not suggest that the complex phenomenon of ‘discourse’ can or should be boiled down to the lexical level. However, it seems to provide comparable and replicable way to access discourses since the study of DKWs is a study of words in usage in certain contexts. Because they are semantic nodes in discourses, they allow insights into the discourses in which they occur (Mahlberg 2007; Née/Veniard 2012). Wierzbicka (1997: 16f.) captures this with the following metaphor:

Using ‘key words’ as an approach to the study of culture (or discourse, the authors) may be criticized as an ‘atomistic’ pursuit, inferior to ‘holistic’ approaches targeting more general cultural patterns. [...] A key word [...] is like one loose end which we have managed to find in a tangled ball of wool: by pulling it, we may be able to unravel a whole tangled ‘ball’ of attitudes, values, and expectations, embodied not only in words, but also in common collocations, in set phrases, in grammatical constructions, in proverbs, and so on.

So far, the study of cultural and discourse keywords has mostly been based on manual, qualitative-hermeneutic analyses of more or less substantial text corpora, the selection criteria for which have been made more or less transparent. The way that their salience has been determined was through noting their frequency (albeit with unreliable quantification), their occurrence over a range of texts, changes in meaning, their relation to other words in the same discourse, and the occurrence of metalinguistic comments which might indicate controversy. All of these aspects suggest that corpus linguistic tools could support such analyses very effectively. It is, however, at this point in time mostly in Anglophone academia, which so far displayed a lesser interest in the lexical dimension of discourse than e.g. Germanophone discourse studies, that corpus linguistic methodology has been integrated into (critical) discourse analysis (cf. Baker 2006; Partington et al. 2013) and thereby sparked a greater interest in the lexical dimension of discourse than it was previously apparent in Anglophone discourse studies.

Stubbs (2010), O'Halloran (2010) and Jeffries/Walker (2012, 2018) acknowledge the notion of 'cultural keywords' and the necessity to differentiate between this understanding of keywords and a different one within corpus linguistics which can, as they show, be combined. In corpus linguistics, keywords are determined based on statistical calculation and comparison; they are words that occur significantly more (positive keywords) or less (negative keywords) often in one text corpus than in another reference or comparison corpus (cf. Baker 2004). While this procedure could be used also to identify DKWs (cf. Jeffries/Walker 2018), it has a range of other uses as well. Jeffries/Walker (2018) differentiate between the notion of a cultural keyword as described above, and the notion of a statistical keyword in the context of corpus linguistics. In our project, a practical limitation of our research is that we cannot use reference corpora from the four languages to identify statistical keywords, because these are simply not available for use with one and the same tool. Therefore, we do not use the term keyword in the corpus linguistics sense of 'statistical keyword'. Despite not being able to use reference corpora for the process of identifying keywords, corpus-assisted methodology proves useful for us for a number of reasons: firstly, it is particularly supportive of lexically focussed research (cf. Mautner 2009: 124). Secondly, we think with Jeffries and Walker (2018)

that there is a place for research that uses the data-structuring advantages of corpus linguistics (...) guided by analytical frameworks, to add to our understanding of the ways in which language is used in smaller, well-defined and often time-limited corpora [and to use] the available resources of current software to find salient patterns of occurrence in the data and organize the results in order to facilitate detailed, co-textual analysis of whatever aspect of the data is under scrutiny (...) to help us understand the socio-political significance of any purely statistical result and pattern. (2018: 16)

Thirdly, because we are using the same corpus database and corpus analytical tool across four subcorpora in different languages, it also allows us to consistently undertake the same analytical steps for a systematic comparison, without relying too much on the adaptation of a methodological framework across a team of researchers who might over- or underemphasise certain findings. Corpus assisted procedures are also useful for empirical validation. On the one hand, researchers are more likely to see what they have not been looking for and patterns might emerge that are not visible without a corpus perspective. On the other hand, notable lexical patterns that might have aroused the attention of the researcher can be evaluated in terms of their frequency of occurrence. Last but not least, corpus linguistics and the study of cultural/discourse keywords share an understanding of meaning not as an abstract, cognitive or metaphysical entity related to a form, but as a fait social, as emerging from usage in (social) context(s): "[w]hat [...] lexical words [...] mean, is what we learn about them in the discourse"; "[a]ll that has been said

about a discourse object contributes to its meaning” (Teubert/Čermáková, 2007: 68; cf. Teubert 2010).

Such an understanding of of lexical semantics implies that we take discourse context into account, and for comparative analysis across languages, this could mean that lexical equivalence might not equate functional equivalence across languages/discourses. However, a comparative approach can take cognates as a starting point for problematising functional equivalence as a result of the comparative analysis. The advantage of using DKWs for comparative research lies in their salience, their frequency of occurrence across a range of texts in public discourse, their phenomenologically distinct form – as opposed to the analytical level of ‘strategy’ or ‘argumentation’ – as well as their ubiquity in that every thematic discourse will feature such lexical nodes. Thus, DKWs – whether or not they can be established as cognates or functional equivalents – can be identified across languages and discourses.

2. Background: Previous literature relating to *multicultural/ism* in the UK, France, Germany and Italy

Discourses about immigration have become salient in many European countries in recent decades, leading to at times intense debates. What is more, migration debates can occur at national as well as transnational level (cf. Wodak/Boukala 2015 for the EU). Migration discourses have mostly been investigated at national level (cf., e.g. Baker et al. 2008; Hart 2010 for the UK; Jung et al. 2000; Wengeler 1995; Jung et al. 2000 for Germany, Bonnafous 1991; Barats 1999 for France; Triandafyllidou 1999; Sciortino/Colombo 2004; Bond et al. 2015 for Italy). However, “[t]o date few comparative studies exist that make any form of systematic qualitative comparisons” (Maneri/Ter Wal 2005; unpaginated; more recent studies involve comparison, cf. Benson 2013; Vollmer 2014; Taylor 2017; Schröter/Veniard 2016).

Multicultural(ism) has been recognised as a keyword in the migration discourses within the four countries and languages that we included in our following analyses (Gallisot 2001; Jung et al. 2000; Aprile/Dufoux 2009; Bennett et al. 2005). It is interesting to note that a combined overview of existing literature on these keywords already points to a number of differences and commonalities across the four discourses in question that are related to their histories of immigration, including differing political responses to immigration. It should also be noted that *multicultural(ism)* in itself can ambiguously refer to the state of a society, to policies and more abstractly to a way of dealing with a diverse society, resulting from a process of immigration.

For the UK, Farrar (2012) notices how the meaning of *multicultural(ism)* was negotiated between concurring notions of ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ since the keyword has been introduced into British immigration debates in the late 60s. He

also observes that an anxiety of minorities undermining a nation's culture is an underlying theme for those who oppose the idea of multiculturalism from the political right, and that in the 1980s, multiculturalism has been questioned also from the left with a view on structural mechanisms of oppression and discrimination, including not only race but in particular also class. More recently, the political left defend multiculturalism as it continues to be challenged from the right. Farrar traces the problematisation of Muslim immigrants since the 1990s and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre as well as the 2005 London bombings as triggering criticism of multiculturalism and the invention of 'multicultural nationalism' since the 2000s which attempts to combine, similar to the German integration debate, 'British core values' with a 'celebration of diversity'.

In Germany, *Multikulturalismus* resp. the idea of a *multikulturelle Gesellschaft*, a multicultural society, has been problematised already from the early 1980s, decidedly so by the conservative parties, and has been increasingly dismissed as a naïve *laissez-faire* approach to dealing with immigration politically, in favour of the concept of integration which aims to strike a compromise between 'laissez-faire' multiculturalism and more rigid expectations of immigrants to assimilate culturally (Wengeler 1995). Here as in other European countries, the most problematised group of immigrants in the German integration debate are Muslims. Since 2000, the focus has been on integration policies, providing civic education and German language courses, whereas the engagement with such offers on the part of immigrants has been made increasingly mandatory and a purported lack of effort to integrate on part of the immigrants has been increasingly problematised.

Multiculturalismo is addressed in Gallissot et al.'s (2007) discussion of Italian and French migration keywords, but it is not itself listed as keyword, largely because it is considered an American term which has only recently come into Europe (Kilani 2001: 12) and because Italy is described as a country with a very weak secular tradition which is far from a position in which religious pluralism is socially operative. In surveying current dictionary definitions, we find the following two senses in the *Garzanti* and *Repubblica* dictionaries, and only the second in the *Treccani*: 1. belonging to or participating in more than one culture; 2. policies aimed at protecting cultural identities of ethnic groups. The academic discussion focusses on the latter meaning, but often to comment on the absence of policies in this area, as Allievi (2013: 730) argues:

the legislative process concerning migration has not really raised – much less solved – the problem of the ongoing process of cultural pluralisation of Italy, usually interpreted in the media arena with the slightly negative connotation of the term multiculturalism diffused in the political language in recent years.

With reference to the other countries in this project, it may be interesting to note that Triandafyllidou's (2002) paper on multiculturalism in the Italian context concludes that the Italian debate is similar to the French debate in its emphasis on assimilation, even though it is not based on the same tradition of republicanism. Similar to the British debate, she notes, is the recognition that the needs of Muslim communities have to be taken into account, but "the Italian understanding of the national civic culture is much 'thicker' than that predicated by the British liberal communitarian multiculturalism" (unpaginated; paragraph 4.4). She also notes that the conservative *Il Giornale* sympathises with the German conservative's stance on emphasising 'German core values' while the left-liberal *La Repubblica* avoids to take sides between the multicultural positions of the German Socialist party and the 'Germanisation' policy of the CDU. The bottom line of the Italian debate is that cultural and religious diversity have to be assimilated (*ibid.*).

As stated above, the situation in France presents some similarities with that of Italy. French identity and conception of the relations between the State and individuals stems from the 18th century Revolution and posits equality between all citizens, regardless of origin or religion. Thus, immigration policies have been orientated towards assimilation and then, more recently, towards integration. However, if there is no official policy of recognition of origins and cultures, there are in France *de facto* multicultural policies, which are justified by social, rather than racial, arguments (Schnapper 2015). Despite France's long history of immigration – France being *de facto* a multicultural country, the words *multiculturel* – *multiculturalisme* themselves are very recent (Aprile and Dufoix 2009). According to *Le Petit Robert*, a common dictionary, the modifier *multiculturel* dates back only to 1980. The noun *multiculturalisme* is just slightly older (1971). Both refer to the cohabitation of several cultures, as attested by one of the phrases given as example in the definitions, *société multiculturelle*.

Based on this review, it seems as though in all languages, *multicultural(ism)* refers broadly to the issue of immigrant groups preserving cultural identity and/or to the resulting cultural diversity in immigration countries, including how to deal with this diversity. It is a contested term in relation to concurring concepts of assimilation and integration, both of which can entail varying expectations regarding the degree of preservation of cultural identity or heritage by migrants in the different languages. The discussion above also seems to indicate an increasing problematisation, especially regarding Muslim communities, even where the idea of a multicultural society was initially (partly) embraced. Differences lie in the French and Italian focus on assimilation, in the duration over which multicultural(ism) was initially embraced in British discourse – but increasingly problematised, moving towards a stance that is more focused on creating more cultural homogeneity in a perceived need for social cohesion. In Germany, multicultural(ism) never gained

the currency that it had in the British discourse and was dismissed quickly, replaced by a remarkable consensus on integration as middle ground. However, this middle ground continues to be pulled at from a more liberal (multicultural) and a more rigid (assimilation) stance, arguably more successfully by the latter, which is reflected in integration measures becoming more obligatory for migrants.

Drawing on this previous literature, the following hypotheses for our analyses emerge; (i) that there is a (more) negative discourse of *multicultural(ism)* in France and Italy; (ii) that there might be ambivalence in the British discourse and (iii) that the German discourse is more indifferent regarding this particular term. However, we will also in the following look at the adjective and the noun separately to see if and how usage of these two differs.

3. Data & methodology

We collected a more general thematic newspaper corpus relating to Italian, French, German and British migration discourse. In the following, we will explain how the rationale of our research, moderated by practical feasibility, guided our choice of material. We chose a newspaper corpus for our comparative project despite some limitations of this material. In particular, news values (cf. Bednarek/Caple 2014), events and discourse interventions by powerful or influential participants make newspaper reporting likely to be a snapshot of hegemonic discourse that neglects the perspectives most crucially of migrants themselves. However, such a snapshot of hegemonic and influential discourse is likely to contain salient representations that are likely to be stable, i.e. not ad-hoc and often reproduced, i.e. not marginal, individual perceptions of issues and problems. Sales of hard-copy newspapers have seen a decline, but the availability of content online and the dissemination of news articles through social media still indicates a wide, if more fragmented, readership (Bednarek/Caple 2012: 30ff.). While there are existing analyses of representations of migrants and migration in newspaper discourse (e.g. Hart 2010; Baker et al. 2008; Gabrielatos/Baker 2008; Bonnafous 1991; Barats 1999; Jung et al. 2000; Niehr 2004; Wengeler 2003; Maneri 2011; Sciortino/Colombo 2004; Triandafyllidou 1999), there is scope for our project to add a systematically comparative perspective to this research.

Since it was our aim to analyse more than one DKW in our project and since some of the envisaged DKW were polysemous (especially *integration*, see Schröter/Veniard 2016), we firstly collected a thematic migration discourse corpus by using search words that we considered to be general and indicative of migration as a topic of the articles that were to be retrieved (see Table 1 below). The articles were retrieved partly from digital databases and online archives of the relevant newspapers

(see Table 1 below). Secondly, a snapshot of widely circulating, influential and hegemonic discourse does not preclude a certain spectrum of political orientations such as reflected in the biggest political parties of the involved countries, so that we strove to achieve at least a minimal spread of different political orientations. For this reason, we chose one conservative and one left-liberal newspaper from each country. Political orientation of newspapers can be determined by a number of factors, such as newspaper owners and stakeholders, voting behaviour of the readership, amount of coverage of certain political parties and/or policies as well as amount of space devoted to quotes from political actors of different orientations. Thirdly, we also wanted to be able to trace changes over time, so we chose the earliest year in which all of the selected newspapers were available digitally – the year 1998 – as the starting point for our data collection which took place in 2013, so that we collected data from 1998–2012 in all cases. The following table indicates the search words and newspapers that we used for each language as well as the databases from which the articles were downloaded manually, number of retrieved articles and total number of words in the four corpora:

Table 1. Sources, retrieval and size of the four newspaper corpora

	Newspapers	Query	Source	Articles	Words
French	Le Figaro La Libération	Immigration, immigré(s), immigrant(s)	Factiva Database	22.624	16.194.941
German	Die Welt tageszeitung	Einwanderer, Zuwanderer, Migranten, Einwanderung, Zuwanderung, Migration	Partly newspapers' online archives, partly LexisNexis database	13.874	6.006.912
English	The Times Guardian	Immigrants, migrants, immigration, migration	LexisNexis database	42.145	35.236.313
Italian	Corriere della Sera La Repubblica	Immigante/i, immigrati, immirazione/i, migrante/i, migrazione/i	Partly from LexisNexis, partly newspapers' online archives.	75.489	49.708.425

These four corpora were then uploaded to the Corpus Workbench database (Evert/Hardie 2011), where they were part-of-speech-tagged, annotated with metadata (source, year) and duplicates were removed. The Corpus Workbench is linked to the corpus analysis tool Corpus Query Processor (Hardie 2012), which allows for a range of queries, most of all collocations and their occurrence in terms of position to the left or right of the lexical item in question, concordances and dispersion (e.g. frequency in a certain source/over time).

For both the noun *multiculturalism* and the adjective *multicultural*, we first looked at the frequency of occurrence over time across all four languages in order to identify trends as well as differences and similarities in usage over time. In a second step, we retrieved the collocations of each *multicultural* and *multiculturalism* separately in each corpus. In doing so, we used the statistical measure of log likelihood and a collocation span of five positions to the left and to the right from the search word, as well as a minimum number of three occurrences of the collocate in the overall corpus. In a third step, we analysed the collocations. In order to do so feasibly, we first scrutinised the entire list of collocates, ordered by decreasing log likelihood values indicating the strength of the connection between two co-occurring lexical items. It firstly showed that the items at the top of the list can have very high collocation values, but that those values diminish rapidly not much further down the list. We therefore found that rather than including every item on the list of collocations in all four languages, a good cut-off point would be to only include the first 200 items on the list for every language. When discussing the results below, we do not indicate the log likelihood values for each collocate in order to avoid cluttering our presentation with figures. It should be noted that in the case of *multicultural*, collocation values of the 200 strongest collocates range from 1133.5 ('society') to 0.21 ('national') in English; for German from 1184.1 ('Gesellschaft') to 'jetzt' (0.19), for French 506.38 ('société') to 0.002 ('aussi'), for Italian 1505.65 ('società') to 1.471 ('altro'). In the case of *multiculturalism*, they range from 148.4 ('failed') to 1.4 ('Europe') in English; for German the only content word collocate has a log likelihood value of 53.7, for French from 80.9 ('métissage') to 0 ('France'), for Italian from 135.405 ('fallimento') to 0.152 ('volta'). To briefly indicate statistical significance, a log likelihood value of 10.83 corresponds to a probability value of 0.001, i.e. in this case a 99.9 percent probability that the co-occurrence of two words is not coincidental. The higher the log likelihood value, the lower the probability value, i.e. the percentage to which the finding is not due to chance (cf. e.g. Jeffries/Walker 2018: 27).

Secondly, we found that grammatical function words, especially articles, were not indicative of the sociopolitical context and could therefore be disregarded. However, we included all other collocating words as potentially relevant and found that they could be grouped into semantic categories which seemed relevant across all four languages, for instance words pertaining to institutions, (groups of) people, actions or places. This grouping is an interpretative step aided by checking the concordance lines for the way in which the collocate appears near our search word in cases of ambiguity. As a group of researchers, we discussed our understanding of these semantic categories and cross-checked each others' categorisation of the collocates accordingly. The main use of it is that it helps to further break down and organise the data (200 collocates for each language), and to describe and compare patterns of usage in a more fine-grained way, especially since we found that the collocational profiles and hence the usage of *multicultural(ism)*, seen through the

lens of our semantic grouping, shows some variation across the four languages. This interpretative step, including our highlighting in bold of negatively evaluating words among the collocates, pertain to the notions of semantic prosody and semantic preference. These are concepts emerging from corpus linguistics and refer to patterns which may be observed through collocation analysis. We may associate related words and evaluative meanings with words that are often not visible to the ‘naked eye’ or part of our conscious word knowledge but can be revealed through the large quantities of data that corpus linguistics affords and thus allows us to glimpse the discourse web that may be pulled upon by individual lexical items. To refer to an often quoted example for semantic prosody, Sinclair (1991) observed that *happen* shows collocation with words that denote unpleasant things and therefore semantic prosody indicates that a word entails attitudes or evaluations. Semantic preference relates to collocates that can be grouped according to semantic similarity or semantic field. “For example, if the collocates of *happen* turn out to be mostly from the field of natural disasters, then there is both a semantic preference and, since natural disasters tend to be evaluated negatively, a semantic prosody” (Jeffries/Walker 2018: 37f.). We endeavour to capture semantic preference in our analysis by sorting the collocates into different semantic categories.

4. Analysis

4.1 Frequency

First of all, we looked at the frequencies of the adjective and the noun across our four languages sub-corpora over the years 1998–2012.




Figure 1. Relative frequency of multicultural (adjective)

Somewhat against our hypotheses above, the graph shows that the relative frequency, i.e. frequency per million words, of the adjective multicultural is notably high in German over the years. German, while being the smallest corpus, also shows the most notable increases and decreases in the use of the word over time. It is similarly frequent over time in the other languages from about 2004. Before 2004, the frequency is higher in English than in French and Italian, but since then, frequencies in these three discourses are (a) remarkably similar to each other and (b) quite constant over time.




Figure 2. Relative frequency of multiculturalism (noun)

From a comparative perspective, the noun behaves differently from the adjective. Apart from the year 2000 with German peaking again out of line with the other languages, Figure 2 shows (a) a notably more varied frequency over time in all languages, (b) convergence between the languages with regard to increases and decreases, and (c) a general increase in frequency since 2004 across all languages, despite the drop in 2009.

Looking at the comparative frequencies of the noun and adjective in each language (Appendix A) overall confirms (apart from German) the tendency that from about 2004 the use of the noun is increasing and the use of the adjective decreasing, in particular in French and English.

4.2 Collocations

4.2.1 *Collocations of multicultural*

As stated above in Section 3, for the sake of not cluttering our table, we did not indicate the log likelihood values for each collocate, but indicated above the span of log likelihood values between of the collocates listed below. To provide a rough idea which collocates in the table below have higher and lower collocation values, those content word collocates that are among the first 100 on the collocation list (which appears along declining log likelihood values) appear in black, items 101–200 on the list appear in grey. Negatively evaluating words are highlighted in bold, which will become more relevant when comparing the use of the adjective with the use of the noun in Section 4.2.2.

Table 2. Collocations (content words only) of multicultural in the four sub-corpora

Semantic category	Related collocates: English	Related collocates: French	Related collocates: German	Related collocates: Italian
Descriptions	reality, successful, modern, today, now, tolerant, leftie, diverse, crap * new, cosmopolitan, part	échec, succès, ouverte, meilleur	Scheitern , Realität, gescheitert , Alltag, leben	fallito , aperta, coeso, pacifica, fallita , cosmopolita, tollerante, integrato, mondiale, nuova, moderna, numerose, tolleranza, convivenza, modernità, apertura, diversità, tolleranza, arie, sinistra, nostra, primi, contrario, buon, new, vecchio, forte, grande, nostro, diversi, nostre, diverse, internazionale, ricchezza, chiusura,
Geographical locations	Britain, London, England, UK, Europe, France, Australia, British	France, Canada, outremer, néerlandais, britannique, Suède, français, Pays-Bas, Europe	Frankfurt, Deutschland, USA, Berlin	Palermo, Roma, Montréal, Bretagna, Germania, Berlino, Gran, Londra, britannica, Olanda, Trieste, California, inglese, Francia, europeee, francese, Uniti, Europa
Generic places	City, environment, capital, cities, country, place, world, here, east	ville, pays, nation, monde	Metropole, Land, Stadt, Welt, hier	città, paese, metropoli, capitale, mondo, nazione

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

Semantic category	Related collocates: English	Related collocates: French	Related collocates: German	Related collocates: Italian
Institutions	programmes, programming, commissioning, foundation, Department, school, Centre			biblioteca, biblioteche, scuola, mercatino, laboratorio, radio, redazione, programmi, rassegna, corsi, incontri, media, comunità
Abstract concepts	society, societies, approach, affairs, experiment, model, arts, education, vision, development, history	société, modèle, sociétés, caractère, Providence, idéologie , vocation, République, vision, mondialisation	Gesellschaft, Angelegenheiten, Demokratie	società, modello, sfide, identità, idea, dottrina, progetto, acquisizione, realtà, esperimento, economy, illusione , carattere, festa, politica, politiche, promozione, sfida , mito, formazione, esperienze, centro, creazione, iniziativa, versione, spazio, riproduzione, dialogo, comunicazione, globalizzazione, costruzione, natura, obiettivo, civiltà, tradizione, problemi, sviluppo, scelta, confronto, democrazia, esperienza, tipo, futuro, storia
Related concepts	multi-ethnic, multiracial, melting + pot, mix, nation, backgrounds, community, tolerance, identity, diversity, communities, immigration, national	métissée, multi-ethnique, mosaïque , intégration, identité	Zusammenleben, Miteinander	multietnica, multireligiosa, multirazziale, multireligioso, integrazione, multietniche, multietnico, interetnico, interculturale, razzismo
People	Muslims, immigrant, population, black, white, group, immigrants, minister	partisans, immigrants, gens, enfants, On	Wir	Merkel, autori, direttore, cittadino, popolo, abitanti, Leader

Table 2. (continued)

Semantic category	Related collocates: English	Related collocates: French	Related collocates: German	Related collocates: Italian
Actions	creating, become, believe	devenue, devenir, limites, mutation, créer, attendre, veut, tente, développement, cause (in <i>remettre en cause</i> , criticize), doit, peut, faut, va		confrontano, viviamo, gestito, diventando, diventata, riconosce, riservata, rendere, costruire, attraverso, essere, diventare, dobbiamo
Religion				Islam
Intensification	most, increasingly, genuinely, very, especially, particularly	trop, très, plus		veramente, davvero,
Miscellaneous	nature, live, our, towards, proud, living, food, life	longueur, avance, base, serait, abord, aujourd'hui, est, étaient, avoir, Nouvelle, dire, tous, Mais, même, nous, aussi	wollen, heute, jetzt	dedita, Garzanti, predicazione, melting, pot, crocevia, basata, eccellenza, come, significa, sempre, presenta, perciò, più, ormai, propone, vista, stiamo, sostiene, quindi, senso, sarà, Eppure, Siamo, insomma, stessa, ultimi, sta, sarebbe, propria, altro

* The collocate 'crap' in English occurs in terms of absolute frequency only six times. A check of the concordance lines reveals that they occur in a specific quote and not as a genuine stance of the paper(s).

Following on from our initial characterisation based on existing secondary literature and on the comparison aided by the table above, a few points seem of particular interest here. Firstly, there are more content word collocates in English and Italian than in German, French being in the middle-range for that matter. This is particularly surprising in the case of German, since Figure 1 indicates that the relative frequency of the word is much higher in this sub-corpus than in the others. Indeed, the German corpus is the smallest of the four sub-corpora, but even a look at absolute numbers shows that the adjective occurs 654 times in German and 762 times in Italian, which constitutes the largest corpus, so the occurrence of fewer content word collocates, and fewer content words among them,

points towards a more scattered discourse in German and a more patterned and sustained discourse around *multicultural*, and hence to more salience of the DKW in the English and Italian migration discourses. Having said this, the number of collocates referring to other places and the occurrence of Anglicisms in the Italian sub-corpus might also point towards a notion that *multicultural* is something pertaining to elsewhere mostly.

Commonwealth di nazioni , iniziativa in sé multiculturale con una forte leadership **inglese** , che
 zione non è il modello **inglese** e olandese , multiculturale , ma quello francese laico dell ' integ
 tacco suicida . Le discussioni sulla politica multiculturale **inglese** , perciò , hanno una portata a
 pubblicò un articolo intitolato «Il modello multiculturale **inglese** in crisi» . , al dibattito si unì :

Figure 3. Concordances of *multiculturale* collocating with ‘inglese’

However, secondly, both English and Italian have also comparatively extensive reference to related concepts in common, such as ‘multinational’, ‘tolerance’, ‘communities’ and ‘mulireligiosa’, ‘integrazione’, ‘multietniche’.

Third, there is an absence of reference to particular ethnic minorities, and, considering the increasing problematisation of Muslim minorities, of reference to religion, which only occurs with one collocate in the Italian sub-corpus. This is in contrast to our preliminary findings for another keyword, *community* (cf. Veniard/Taylor/Blätte/Schröter 2016), where various ethnic minority groups are mentioned in English, French and Italian. Fourth, we highlighted the negatively evaluating collocations in the table above which show that a negative discourse about multicultural is specific to Germany, Italy and France. It should be noted in the German case, that 163 of 654 occurrences of *multikulturell** account for the phrase *multikulturelle Gesellschaft* (multicultural society) and that the collocates ‘Scheitern’/‘gescheitert’ [failure/fail] refer to this phrase.

sie haben sich eher das **Scheitern** der multikulturellen Gesellschaft auf ihre Fahnen geschrieben . I
 eralen , Schuld an dem **Scheitern** der multikulturellen Gesellschaft . Die Türken erscheinen so als
 mit Predigten über das **Scheitern** der multikulturellen Gesellschaft einen Politikwechsel voranzutr
 en . Wenn jetzt also das **Scheitern** der multikulturellen Gesellschaft verkündet wird , so wird hier e
 e um Ehrenmorde , das **Scheitern** der multikulturellen Gesellschaft , Zwangsheirat , das Erstarcken
 Gefährlich fremd ? das **Scheitern** der multikulturellen Gesellschaft? oder ?Nach den Kurden-Kraw

Figure 4. Concordances of *multikulturell** and ‘Scheitern’

In the French corpus, these negatively evaluating collocations are not compensated by positively evaluating ones, in contrast to the Italian corpus (cf. values such as ‘tolleranza’ [tolerance], ‘convivenza’ [coexistence/cohabitation], ‘apertura’ [open-mindedness]). Moreover, a positive collocate such as succès [success] refers, in the French corpus, only to other countries (the Netherlands and the UK). ‘Society’ (and equivalents in the other languages) is the strongest collocate across all sub-corpora, suggesting that *multicultural society* is a fixed phrase in all of the involved languages. This finding is supported by a look at positions; in the French corpus, in 81 out of 106 co-occurrences, ‘société’ occurs immediately to the left of *multiculturel**, in Italian equivalently 211 times out of 264 – in German, ‘Gesellschaft’ occurs immediately to the right of the adjective in 163 out of 179 co-occurrences and equivalently in English 158 times out of 170 co-occurrences. Beyond this, the use of *multicultural* as a modifier for other cultural/educational institutions is more common in English and Italian than in French and German. Fifth, however, the notion of a present multicultural reality seems to be shared mostly in English and German, where collocates like ‘reality’, ‘our’/ ‘Realität’ [reality], ‘Alltag’ [everyday life], ‘hier’ [here], ‘Zusammenleben’, ‘Miteinander’ [(living) together, togetherness] and reference to own geographical locations seems to indicate that *multicultural* relates to a fact of life in Britain and Germany.

, he is an embodiment of our	<u>multicultural</u>	ambitions . An immigrant , a west London boy
changed in recent years . Our	<u>multicultural</u>	society is now what makes up Britain . It is a pr
nnctions help shape our own	<u>multicultural</u>	society . Steve Brace Commonwealth Institute I
at will attack our multiracial ,	<u>multicultural</u>	society ? Will the contributions of , for example
ic diversity of our pluralistic ,	<u>multicultural</u>	society . One of the best new plays I 've seen th
conomic benefits , they like our	<u>multicultural</u>	society , and they often admire migrants . They
ice that faces our increasingly	<u>multicultural</u>	society . We can try to defend an ever growing :

Figure 5. Concordances of *multicultural* and ‘our’

A last noteworthy finding points to the notion that multicultural is considered a recent, modern, evolving or even increasing development. In English, the descriptions ‘modern’ and ‘new’ as well as the intensifiers ‘increasingly’, ‘genuinely’, ‘most’ and ‘very’¹ and the verbs ‘become’ and ‘creating’ point to this perception.

1. In more than half of the 29 co-occurrences, ‘most’ appears immediately left of ‘multicultural’; ‘the same goes for the 15 co-occurrences of ‘very’.

ons of what is happening today in	<u>multicultural</u>	, multi-ethnic Britain ; headlines denouncing
leader sprang out from behind the	<u>multicultural</u>	pieties . Today the tradition of tolerance was
ly empire . So did today 's vibrant	<u>multicultural</u>	society . The 400 West Indians who came to
be much more at home in today 's	<u>multicultural</u>	Bradford , " she says . " I've deliberately pro
al and educational glue in today 's	<u>multicultural</u>	, multiracial society , Alan Johnson , the Edu
alties of young Asians in today 's	<u>multicultural</u>	society -all these contribute to what Verma ca

Figure 6. Concordances of *multicultural* and ‘today’

In German, the collocates ‘heute’ (today) and ‘jetzt’ (now) seem to indicate this notion; it should be noted however, that in terms of absolute frequency, both co-occur only 5 times with *multikulturell** and among these, only 3 co-occurrences of ‘heute’ refer to multicultural as a phenomenon of ‘today’. In French and Italian, the idea of multiculturalism as being a process is expressed through the verbs ‘devenir’ and ‘diventare’ (to become) as well as ‘costruire’ [to build], ‘nuova’ [new] and ‘moderna’. However, for both it should be noted that a look at the concordance lines shows that some of these references pertain to other countries, and not so much to the here and now of France or Italy.

destinait la Suède à devenir une société	<u>multiculturelle</u>	. Pourtant , avec 22 % de sa population né
ondus , a de son côté cru que la " société	<u>multiculturelle</u>	" en devenir se suffirait à elle - même . De
el et religieux ont commencé à devenir	<u>multiculturelles</u>	, ces formations populistes ont intégré les
s voir le Danemark devenir une société	<u>multiculturelle</u>	. " Nous avons créé une des meilleures soc
Italie devenir un pays multiethnique et	<u>multiculturel</u>	" , l' actuelle campagne électorale ne s' est

Figure 7. Concordances of *multicultural** and ‘devenir’

Overall, it therefore seems that this notion of a recent and increasing phenomenon is specific to the English sub-corpus.

4.2.2 Collocations of multiculturalism

For the collocation analysis regarding *multiculturalism*, we proceeded in the same way as for *multicultural* above. Again, we did not indicate the log likelihood values for each collocate. It should be noted that in German, there is only one content word that collocates with *Multikulturalismus*, which is ‘Multikulturalismus’, as shown in the following concordance lines:

es Multikulturalismus zusammen . Was ist denn am	<u>Multikulturalismus</u>	zu beklagen ? <u>Multikulturalismus</u> hat
Was ist denn am <u>Multikulturalismus</u> zu beklagen ?	<u>Multikulturalismus</u>	hat in vielerlei Hinsicht den Platz des K
kulturelle Gesellschaft gegeben ? Was ist überhaupt	<u>Multikulturalismus</u>	? <u>Multikulturalismus</u> wird überall and
gegeben ? Was ist überhaupt <u>Multikulturalismus</u> ?	<u>Multikulturalismus</u>	wird überall anders verstanden . In Fran
die rassistische ?White Australia?-Politik durch den	<u>Multikulturalismus</u>	zu ersetzen . ?Der <u>Multikulturalismus</u>
k durch den <u>Multikulturalismus</u> zu ersetzen . ?Der	<u>Multikulturalismus</u>	ist für uns alle gut.? Australiens Protage

Figure 8. Concordances of *Multikulturalismus* and ‘Multikulturalismus’

For lack of items, the table below does not have a column for the German collocates. Within the individual categories, the collocates are again listed in the table such that the 100 content words with the higher log likelihood values the appear in black, those following on the list between 101–200 appear in grey. It is perhaps noteworthy that the collocational profiles were overall similar enough to the ones for *multicultural* so as to make the same semantic categories as shown in Table 2 above viable to provide an overview and comparison across the four languages. However, there is one category that we felt needed adding for the noun *multiculturalism*, which was not necessary for the adjective, and that is references to debate and controversy.

Table 3. Collocations of multiculturalism (content words only) in the four sub-corpora

Semantic category	Related collocates: English	Related collocates: French	Related collocates: Italian
Descriptions	failed, failure, divisive, deference* failures, concerns, true, divided, modern, threat, dead, good, great, better	Échec, faillite, bienfaits, échoué, réalité, différences	bello, creative, entusiasti, fallito , liberale, meticciano, superficiale
Geographical locations	Britain, British elsewhere: Germany, Dutch, European, Europe	canadienne, canadien, anglo, (Grande-) Bretagne, française, français, France	Tedesco, Occidente, Bretagna, britannico, Europa, Gran, inglese, Olanda, Francia, Londra, europei
Generic places	areas, country	Pays	strada, terreno,
Institutions	policy, state, political, national		libro, mercato

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

Semantic category	Related collocates: English	Related collocates: French	Related collocates: Italian
Debate/ controversy	Debate, doctrine , ideology , debates	doctrine , idéologie , débat, nom, non, question, contraire, sens, exemple	critica , dottrina , ideologia, ideologico, parola, parole, questioni , saggio, tema, teoria, versione, dibattito, polemica , risposta, temi
Abstract concepts	society, model, extremism , concept, difference, culture, fiction, liberal, issue, idea, relations, mass, social, right,** problems , national, problem , history	métissage, communautarisme , relativisme , politique, respect, doute, social, démocratie, valeurs	apertura, civiltà', concetto, contesto, crisi, democrazia, fallimento , idea, immigrazione, limiti, modello pericoli , politica, relativismo, rifiuto , prodotto, valore», sfida, società, comunità' cultura, difesa, direzione, diritto, fronte, identità', inchiesta, libertà, necessità, ragione, regole, sistema, situazione
Related concepts	immigration, integration, multiculturalism, diversity, tolerance, segregation , race, equality, identity, racism , multicultural, racial, ethnic, communities, cultural, different*** rights, immigrant (as adjective), migration	cultures, civilisations, diversité, communauté, immigration, identité	assimilazione, assimilazion-ismo, integrazione, monocultura, diversità', razzismo , tolleranza, Multiculturalismo, multi-etnica, multi-etnicità, Pluralismo, «Pluralismo
People	Muslims, Cameron, Merkel, Angela, Phillips, Muslims, critics, Britons, David	Huntington, Blair, (les) Verts, nous, gauche, gouvernement	Angela, Merkel, nemici , sostenitori, Rizzoli, Giovanni, Sartori, estranei, estranei» critici
Actions	celebrating, attacking , speech, promotion, declared, attack , criticised , creating, support, created, believe, report, become, saying	éloge, avènement, menace , choc, critique , voie, garde**** dénoncer , reconnaissance, reconnaître, remettre (en) cause, défendre, devenu, peut	funzionare, sostenendo, sostenere, rischia , denuncia diventato, dobbiamo,significa
Religion	Islam	Islam	laicità, Islam

Table 3. (continued)

Semantic category	Related collocates: English	Related collocates: French	Related collocates: Italian
Intensification	really	certain	
Miscellaneous	against, favour, led, makes, our, true, made, result, seen, often, recent, better, become, live, past, long	désigné, est, fait, choix, vient, aussi, manière, avons, comme, bien, grand, autre, avoir, ont	perchè, andato, che, ciò, corrispondente, cosiddetto, destra, dichiarato, esempio, fallimentare, nome, opposto, produrre, proposito, prova, basato, sarebbe, come, ormai, proprio, quale, ultimo

* Concordance lines confirm that the connection is 'deference to multiculturalism'.

** 'Right' occurs partly in the sense of 'entitlement', partly with reference to the political right wing and partly in the sense of 'adequate, correct'.

*** 'Different' is listed here because the concordance lines show that it mostly pertains to different culture, ethnicities and communities.

**** In the phrase 'mettre en garde' [to warn].

From a comparative point of view, again English and Italian show the highest number of collocates and therefore it seems as though the DKW was more salient in the two discourses as captured in the relevant sub-corpora, with French being again in the middle range as far as the number of content words among the collocates is concerned. Notably, in German the only collocating content word is the same as the search word.² The difference between the usage of the adjective and the noun becomes quite clear. Firstly, a new semantic category was added pertaining to debate and controversy and diverging points of views ('ideology', 'doctrine'; 'nemici' [enemies] v 'sostenitori' [supporters]; 'idéologie', 'critique').³

2. Concordances ignore sentence borders – the noun collocates across sentence borders in all cases.

3. In French, the use of 'aussi', 'comme' (also/though, as) as argumentative connectors is suggestive of argumentation.

ally , at a recent debate on	<u>multiculturalism</u>	I attended , a black member of the audience s
: the debate has changed .	<u>Multiculturalism</u>	came under attack in the Cantle report in 200
level of debate is around	<u>multiculturalism</u>	at our national theatre . " England People Ver
unded and open debate on	<u>multiculturalism</u>	. Survivors and relatives welcomed the court
UK race debate between	<u>multiculturalism</u>	and assimilation . What Phillips is saying is t
infected the debate about	<u>multiculturalism</u>	, manifested in the assumption that Muslims

Figure 9. Concordances of *multiculturalism* and ‘debate’

Secondly, there are notably more collocates that entail negative evaluations – highlighted in bold in the table above – in the case of the noun than in the case of the adjective. These indicate conflict (‘attacking’, ‘défendre’ [to defend]), problematisation (‘concerns’, ‘problem’, ‘criticised’, ‘threat’, ‘rischia’ [risks], ‘pericoli’ [dangers]; ‘menace’ [threat]) as well as division and lack of success (‘failure’).

bonne nouvelle de l' été : le	<u>multiculturalisme</u>	est désigné comme une menace pour la cohésion nat
les différences , pousse à un	<u>multiculturalisme</u>	qui est une menace pour la cohésion nationale . L' au
s pour tenter de répondre au	<u>multiculturalisme</u>	qui menace d' éclatement les États - nations et qui fa
Berlusconi serait rassuré : le	<u>multiculturalisme</u>	ne menace vraiment pas Caravaggio . Les immigrants
t mettre en garde contre " le	<u>multiculturalisme</u>	" qui menace le modèle " occidental et judéo - chréti

Figure 10. Concordances of *multiculturalism* and ‘menace’

It is interesting to note that ‘failure’ is a collocate in three of the four languages, and not only that; in English the collocate ‘failed’ has the highest collocation value, ‘fallimento’ [failure] the highest in Italian, and ‘échec’ in French the sixth highest.

, quando ha parlato di fallimento del	<u>multiculturalismo</u>	- cioè del mettere le culture aliene sullo ste
un anno i tedeschi sul fallimento del	<u>multiculturalismo</u>	e la mancata integrazione degli immigrati
la sfida delle libertà Il fallimento del	<u>multiculturalismo</u>	e il riformismo musulmano Il fundamenta
immigrazione dopo il fallimento del	<u>multiculturalismo</u>	inglese e dell ' assimilazionismo francese .
o quando si constata il fallimento del	<u>multiculturalismo</u>	La dichiarazione del cancelliere Angela M
o quando si constata il fallimento del	<u>multiculturalismo</u>	. Ciò che ovunque in Europa si teme è che

Figure 11. Concordances of *multiculturalisme* and ‘fallimento’

Therefore, our study confirms that the discourse about multiculturalism is a discourse about a failed multiculturalism (cf. Kymlika 2012; Ossewaarde 2014). The lack of a respective collocate in German does not mean that this discourse is absent in German, as the collocates ‘Scheitern’ and ‘gescheitert’ for the adjective in the phrase *multikulturelle Gesellschaft* as well as the use of *Multikulti* (see Section 4.3 below) show. There are more actions now associated in English, partly negatively evaluating (‘attack’ and ‘criticise’). Intensifications are now absent, places become less relevant, politicians become associated and in English and French there is more reference to religion, too (‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ for English). However, again in Italian there seems to be a reflection of (debates about) multiculturalism elsewhere and hence reference to the non-Italian nature of *multiculturalismo* through distance markers (‘cosidetto’ [so-called]) and reference to locations in Germany, France, Holland, UK). By contrast, in the French corpus, this debate about multiculturalism concerns primarily France, even if other countries happen to be mentioned (mainly Canada).

It seems notable that there is reference to the German chancellor both in Italian and English without an indication of much debate in the German sub-corpus. However, this co-occurrence is due to a speech by Angela Merkel in 2010 in which she declared multiculturalism as failed in Germany (instead embracing integration cf. Schröter 2013).⁴ However, Merkel used the short word *Multikulti* in her speech,⁵ and a look at the word forms in the next section might add more clarity.

4.3 Word forms in comparison

A search for *multicultural** in the English sub-corpus reveals that *multicultural* appears altogether 893 times and *multiculturalism* 976 times and that the only other word forms are *multiculturalist/s* (39 occurrences) as well as two compounds which are both unique occurrences, *multiculturalism-bashing* and *multiculturalism-is-compulsory*.

In the French sub-corpus, other word forms are also marginal compared to *multiculturel* (302) and *multiculturalisme* (294); *multiculturalité* occurs 7 times, and a few derived forms or neologisms can be spotted. The main one is *multiculturaliste* (31 occurrences) and its collocate with the highest log likelihood value is

4. Four of the six co-occurrences of *Merkel* and *multiculturalism* in the English sub-corpus are from articles published in 2010; eight of the twelve co-occurrences of *Merkel* and *multiculturalismo* in the Italian sub-corpus are from 2010.

5. Hence, Merkel is not a collocate of *Multikulturalismus* in the German corpus, but of *Multikulti*.

‘idéologie’, so it is clearly related to the policy-meaning of *multiculturalisme* and used with a negative semantic prosody to discard what it refers to. *Multiculturalité* (8 occurrences) mostly refers to Belgium. Two single occurrences of hapax close the list of morphological variants in French: *multiculturalatéle*, which is a neologism blending *multicultural* + *télévision* and *Multiculti*, which occurs once in a quotation in reference to the Netherlands.

In German, the picture is more varied. *Multikulturell** occurs 653 times and *Multikulturalismus* 186 times in the German sub-corpus. However, the search for word forms illustrates an interesting phenomenon for German, namely the frequency of the short word *Multikulti* (283 occurrences), as well as the multitude of hyphenated compounds that are created with the short word as a modifier, as the search for *Multikulti*-* reveals (171 occurrences). Unlike in the case of *Multikulturalismus* (Section 4.2.2 above), collocations of *Multikulti** are more varied and include ‘Radio’,⁶ ‘gescheitert’ (failed), ‘Begriff’ (term) and ‘tot’ (dead) as well as ‘Ende’ (end). However, these partly echo a negative discourse about *Multikulti**, but at the same time partly indicate distancing towards this discourse, as the following concordances illustrate:

eskanzlerin Angela Merkel hatte jüngst	<u>Multikulti</u>	für gescheitert erklärt . Unterdessen hat
Islam nach Deutschland ein . Wer sagt ,	<u>Multikulti</u>	sei gescheitert , redet Unsinn . Woran w
anzlerin Angela Merkel (CDU) erklärt	<u>Multikulti</u>	für gescheitert . Wie kommt diese Deba
Merkel (CDU) für ihre Aussage , dass	<u>Multikulti</u>	gescheitert sei : ?Man muss klarstellen :
Sarrazin-Debatte ? sagt die Kanzlerin ,	<u>Multikulti</u>	sei gescheitert , der Innenminister beißt
völkerung kam auch Merkels Aussage ,	<u>Multikulti</u>	sei gescheitert , gut an . Ich kann mit ein
chen Testat nichts anfangen . Wer sagt ,	<u>Multikulti</u>	ist gescheitert , kann auch behaupten , z

Figure 12. Concordances of *Multikulti* and ‘gescheitert’

A number of compounds that are created with *Multikulti* also reflect a discourse about multicultural(ism) as naïve: *Multikulti-Idylle* (idyll), *Multikulti-Träumereien* (dreams), *Multikulti-Illusion*, there is also one occurrence of *Multikulti-Bashing*. Given the absence of a collocational profile for *Multikulturalismus* in German (Section 4.2.2 above), it seems that in German, it is the short word *Multikulti* that indicates a similar contestation and debate as the collocational profiles of

6. Together with the collocate Funkhaus (broadcasting studio) reference to the Berlin-based radio channel “Radio Multikulti”. The channel stopped broadcasting in 2008. In *tageszeitung*, at least 45 of 355 occurrences of *Multikulti** are reference to the radio station in the set phrase “Radio Multikulti”.

multiculturalism/-isme/-ismo attest for the other languages. *Multikulturalist**, referring to people who purportedly support multicultural(ism), occurs 39 times in the German corpus.

Multicultruale/i occurs altogether 807 times in the Italian data and *multiculturalismo* 584 times. A third form, *multiculturalita'* (167 occurrences) is also present in the debates. This term, at least superficially, denotes a state of being rather than a concept or policy approach. It is perhaps interesting to note that this form is explicitly opposed to the noun form *multiculturalismo* in the one article:

Questo assimilazionismo senza assimilazione, questo multiculturalismo senza multiculturalità, rafforzato da un discorso pubblico intriso di retorica xenofoba e razzista, rischia di provocare, in un futuro non troppo lontano, seri problemi. Al confronto i fuochi delle banlieues parigine potranno sembrare solo illuminanti bagliori notturni. [This assimilationism without assimilation, this multiculturalism without multiculturality, reinforced by a xenophobic and racist public discourse, risks creating, in a not too distant future, serious problems. By comparison, the fires in the Paris banlieues will just seem faint glows in the dark.]

(Repubblica, 2009)

The fourth form which appears in the Italian press is *multiculturalist** (37 occurrences) which refers more to the policy sense of the term (the most salient collocates are 'modello' and 'assimiliazionista').

5. Discussion and conclusion

Our comparative analysis of migration discourses in different European countries indicates some commonalities across these discourses, but also differences between them. Our analysis shows that there are differences in the use and associated evaluations of two formally closely related keywords in migration discourses. Commonalities can be seen in the increase in use of the noun over the adjective and the negativity associated with the noun, especially if we accept that the phrase *multikulturelle Gesellschaft* and *Multikulti* in German can be used more interchangeably with the noun than in English, where the collocational profiles differ notably between the noun and the adjective. Places, (cultural and educational) institutions and geographical locations are also more associated with the adjective, whereas the noun is more 'politicised'; the collocations point towards debate, controversy and failure and include names of politicians.

With a view on our initial hypotheses, a particular negativity of the French and Italian discourses about multicultural(ism) can be confirmed for France on the basis of our data, but not for Italian. Ambivalence mostly emerges for English, but

also for Italian when comparing the use of the noun and the adjective: The latter shows few negatively evaluating collocates, but the former notably indicates negativity and controversy. Our analyses confirm previous research about the negativity of the discourse about multiculturalism (Ossewaarde 2014; Kymlica 2012), but it is important to notice that the adjective is used in a more neutral way, especially in English. Negatively evaluating collocates occur in German, French and Italian discourses, but among others that suggest that *multicultural* is indicative of a state of affairs that is not necessarily problematic. Only in Italian and English do we find recurrent positively evaluating collocates. The notion of *multicultural* as a recent development or evolving and increasing phenomenon is particularly pertinent in the English corpus, and limited to the use of the adjective.

In spite of the negativity and emphasis on multiculturalism as a controversial issue emerging from the French collocates, multicultural(ism) appears least frequently and hence yields fewer content word collocates than in English or Italian, which might suggest that it is less essential than other key-words to discourse about migration in the French press. In the German discourse, the lack of a distinct collocational profile despite high frequency could be interpreted as a debate that lacks intensity, in comparison to English and Italian. However, a look at different word forms points towards the shortened *Mulikulti*, and compounds with *Multikulti-*, as a node for the controversy that is indicated in the other languages through collocates such as ‘debate’, ‘ideology’, and ‘doctrine’. Since previous literature points to a detachment from multicultural(ism) in Italy, it is perhaps interesting to note the various indicators among the collocates to multicultural(ism) as something that is the case elsewhere. Given this, it is surprising that the collocates are numerous and varied in the Italian discourse, much like in English, where this could be expected, considering the salience of the keyword in the UK migration discourse (cf. Farrar 2012).

Overall, our analyses suggest that while there does not seem to be much difference in the semantic scope of *multicultural* and *multiculturalism* across the four languages, and not much difference in that it is part of a discourse about (im)migration, the salience of the keyword in the respective discourses might be different; it seems to be higher in British and Italian than in French and German migration discourses. In a shared European public sphere, discourses may develop around similar nodes (DKWs). In the context of this volume, the present chapter demonstrates that *multicultural(ism)* is a node of debates about host countries’ and immigrants’ national and cultural identities in public discourses about mass immigration used across different European countries and languages. However, a closer look at the use of DKWs in different European countries and languages reveals differences in their salience to the respective migration discourses as well as different contexts of usage, which to some extent point to different historical and political contexts that determine each countries’ way of dealing with, and talking about, migration.

Appendix A. Comparative frequencies of multicultural/ism per language



Figure 13. Relative frequency of multicultural and multiculturalism in the English sub-corpus




Figure 14. Relative frequency of multicultural* and multiculturalisme in the French sub-corpus



Figure 15. Relative frequency of multikulturell* and Multikulturalismus in the German sub-corpus




Figure 16. Relative frequency of multicultural? and multiculturalismo in the Italian sub-corpus

Acknowledgements

This article is a result of a collaboration initiated by a networking project, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, reference AH/J012386/1.

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Polentone vs terrone

A discourse-historical analysis of media representation of Italian internal migration

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This article explores how the internal conflict between the Italian Northern and Southern regions' ideologies is linguistically apparent in the use of the discriminating words *polentone* (literally, *polenta* eater) attached to people from the North and *terrone* (literally, person from the land) referred to people from the South. The research hypothesis is that, although at first these terms appear to carry a similar derogatory connotation, *terrone* is in fact more offensive. It is argued here that such difference may find its roots in the Italian central government political strategies which, by historically favouring one part of the country to the disadvantage of the other, have factually aggravated the production and reproduction of discriminatory prejudices against the South. By using the “discourse-historical approach” (Wodak 2001), the study triangulates linguistic, social and historical data to unveil correlations between the discursive discrimination against Italian intra-migrants and the implicit ideologies circulated by governmental choices.

Keywords: discriminating discourse, corpus-based CDA, Italian internal migration, identity, Othering

1. Introduction

This article explores how the internal conflict between the Italian Northern and Southern regions' ideologies is linguistically apparent in the use of the discriminating words *polentone* (literally, *polenta* eater) attached to people living in the North and *terrone* (literally, person from the land) referred to people from the South. The study diachronically investigates how such discursive discrimination has been represented in the media by analysing texts of daily newspapers, magazines, periodicals, novels, short stories, and web material from 1861 to 2017. The “discourse-historical

approach” (Wodak 2001) will be employed to triangulate linguistic, social and historical data. The aim is to understand language use – as manifested in the different semantic development of the two discriminatory expressions with *terrone* carrying a more negative connotation than *polentone* – in its full socio-historical context and as a reflection of its cultural values and political ideologies. More specifically, the research hypothesis is that the more offensive connotation carried by the word *terrone* may find its roots in the Italian central government political strategies which, by passively accepting the South–North migration and historically favouring one part of the country to the disadvantage of the other, have factually legitimised more aggressive discriminatory practices against Southerners.

This study draws from the results of an online survey carried out in 2009 (Tartamella 2016) which analysed the perceived semantic connotation of *polentone* and *terrone* over a sample of 2,615 Italians. Although at first these terms appear to carry a similar derogatory connotation, the results showed that they in fact carry a different socio-pragmatic force, with *terrone* being perceived as twice as offensive as *polentone*. Here lexicographic investigations paired with the quantitative and qualitative analysis of media texts data as well as the scrutiny of concurrent socio-historical events will be drawn together to find correlations between the semantic development of the two derogatory terms and the Italian historical and political events. A particular emphasis will be given to the role played by the Italian Government in shaping, representing and reinforcing the conflict between the two groups. The discourse-historical analysis will in particular show that the depiction of Southerners as dark, dirty, uneducated, backward and parasitic – later conveyed by the word *terrone* – has its origins precisely in post-*Risorgimento* Italy (Lampugnani 2002). On the contrary, with the meaning of a person from the North who belongs to a low social class, the word *polentone* only started to be used much later (around 1975, according to Migliorini 1975) thus showing the different socio-historical ramifications which will be unpacked through the linguistic analysis.

I will first provide an overview of the socio-historical and socio-cultural context surrounding the ideological conflict between the North and the South of Italy in Section 2; in Section 3, I will outline the methodology adopted in the study and provide a brief overview of the resources used for the investigations. I will then analyse the distribution of the two forms through the history of Italian by performing etymological, lexicographic, quantitative and qualitative investigations in Section 4. Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 5.

2. The socio-historical context of the North–South conflict

The dichotomy between the North and South of Italy became particularly apparent after 1861, the year in which, ironically, Italy became a unified country. In order to understand the true nature of this conflict, however, it is necessary to go back to *before* 1861 (Genovesi 1974: 3). Already in the 15th century, the economic gap between the northern and southern regions of Italy was remarkably wide; although the North was showing clear signs of decline, the economy was still strong; the South, on the contrary, was experiencing a period of economic stagnation. This economic gap was reinforcing the already existing wider political, cultural and linguistic fragmentation of the peninsula which was never fully bridged; even after the political unification took place in 1861, Italy never ceased to struggle to achieve a true sense of national identity. The words of Massimo d’Azeglio,¹ (1866) Prime Minister of Sardinia from 1849 to 1852, have become emblematic of the absence of an Italian national identity; in the aftermath of Italian unification, he wrote: “We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians”.² Indeed, profound cultural differences existed not only between North and South, but also from region to region and, even within the same regions, it wasn’t rare to find conflicts of some sort. The lack of a national identity was mirrored in and intensified by the lack of language unity; in so far, Italian had principally been a written language and therefore an exclusive prerogative of the literates who, in any case, were a minimum proportion of the population (Maiden 1995: 8) mostly concentrated in the North. Most of the illiterates, who were located in the South and in the islands which were not urbanized (De Mauro 2005: 431–32), would normally use a dialect, they were unable to speak Italian and most likely even to understand it. In this context, it appears clear how, whilst the concept of a national Italian identity of some sort was starting to be formed, Southerners were considered inferior by Northern Italians. Therefore, within the more general lack of Italian identity, Southerners’ identity status was in many ways more problematic than Northerners’; for instance, because of their darker skin they would often be marked as ‘Turks’ or ‘Africans’ (cf. Excerpt 6). In other words, they soon became the unwanted ‘Other’.

The rapid impoverishment of the Southern regions following the unification exacerbated the differences between the two groups, eventually escalating to what is known as *La Questione meridionale* (the Southern Question). During the *Risorgimento* – the period that paved the way for the unification of Italy – the

1. Recent works (i.e., Hom 2013) attribute the famous quote to Gabriele D’Annunzio (1915).

2. “L’Italia è fatta. Restano da fare gli italiani”. In this article, unless otherwise stated, all the translations are mine.

political unification had been presented to the South as the only chance for those regions to obtain both economic progress and the long-desired liberation from the Bourbons occupation (Mack Smith 2011). In reality, after the unification, things went differently. This was due to the fact that the majority of politicians in charge of making decisions on how to govern the newly born Italy not only knew very little about the South, but they were also wrongly convinced that it was richer than it actually was (ibid.). This erroneous belief led them to impose the Southern provinces a disproportioned tax system which completely paralyzed the already stagnating economy of these regions and made the economic gap between North and South even wider. When Southern politicians realised that the economic situation of the South had considerably worsened after the unification, they felt the disappointment for all the broken promises. The strongest reaction, however, came from labourers and farmers who organised themselves in groups of bandits to which the government put a firm stop by sending 120,000 soldiers (Di Fiore 2016: 218). Historians such as Candeloro (1975) and Villari (1974) agree that the roots of the modern hostility of the South against the central power are to be found precisely in the *Questione meridionale* and in the way the Italian Government dealt with it. Because of the post-unification worsening of the dramatic economic situation in the Southern regions, it is also in these years that the first mass migrating movements, not only to Europe and America but also towards the North of Italy, began (Rosoli 1978), which, in turn, caused a further impoverishment of the South, both economic and cultural.

It is for instance calculated that, from 1881 to 1976, the South experienced a net migration loss of 9 million people (Santillo 2010). The first important internal migration flow, however, took place after the First World War; the results of the national census of those years reported that in 1921, 4.9% of the population living in northern regions had in fact been born in the South (ibid.). The highest internal migration rate, however, was reached in the years 1951–1965, when it is estimated that 11.4% of the population (about 6 millions of Italians) migrated from the South to the North (Pugliese 2006), with 13.9% between 1960 and 1964 only (Santillo 2010). Although from the 1970s onwards, the South–North migration flow has never again reached the peaks of the previous decade, it is far from being concluded. A study carried out in 1999 (Casacchia, Natale, and Strozza) shows that since the end of the 1980s, the South has registered a net migration loss of an average of 50,000 units each year while from 1997 to 2008, about 700,000 people from the South moved to Northern regions (Svimez 2009).

Academics nowadays agree that the Italian economic integration in the international capitalistic system has triggered powerful mechanisms which have favoured the industrial development of the North of Italy to the detriment of the South, thus aggravating the economic delay of these regions (Santillo 2010). Already in the

1950s, for example, it was clear that emigration and unemployment were no longer national issues, but rather, problems that were affecting almost exclusively the South (Svimez 1954). In this respect, Barbagallo (1973: 181) affirms: “The economic boom and the mass migration from the South are the products of an imperfect mechanism of development which transformed one part of Italy into a modern industrial country and the other into a workforce tank”.³ Thus, if on the one hand the heavy migrating flows from South to North contributed to make Italy richer as a whole, on the other, they exasperated the country’s social and economic imbalances to the disadvantage of the South (Santillo 2010).

These considerations have important socio-cultural repercussions in discussions concerning the discursive discrimination against intra-migrants in Italy: as they show how its linguistic manifestation carried by the words *polentone* and *terrone* – with *terrone* being perceived as twice as more offensive than *polentone* – may have strong correlations with the Italian Government’s political choices. It is argued here that, by acceptingly justifying the South–North migration as fatalistically necessary to ease the demographic weight of the South whilst guaranteeing constant workforce to the Northern industries, the Italian Government implicitly admitted that the South was some sort of lost cause, thus *de facto* framing it as backward and underdeveloped. After more than a century of political lack of interest and neglect, it was only in 1969 that the Italian Parliament finally regarded the situation as an aberration and recognised that it was indeed the Government’s responsibility to gradually correct it (Degl’ Innocenti 1978). However, no efficient policies aiming at promoting a balanced development throughout the country have ever been implemented; a study carried out in 2001 (Svimez 2001) shows how Northern industries still consider more convenient to attract skilled human capital from the South rather than investing in the development of those regions.

Undoubtedly, the Italian Government’s political choices have shaped Italy as it is today; this study explores the hypothesis that such political orientation has had deeper cultural repercussions, the manifestation of which is also apparent in the stronger offensive connotation of the discriminating word *terrone*. In a time when the formation of a unitary concept of national/cultural Italian identity was starting to take shape, the Northerners’ view of Southerners as the unwanted ‘Other’ may be traced back to the Italian Government’s passive acceptance of the economic gap between the North and the South. In such a context, the stronger pejorative meaning of *terrone* may be seen as the result of a process by which the host society attempts to reconstruct its ‘home identity’ perceived as threatened by the arrival of

3. “Il boom economico e l’esodo migratorio dal Sud sarebbero il prodotto di un meccanismo imperfetto di sviluppo che avrebbe trasformato una parte d’Italia in un moderno Paese industriale, riducendo l’altra ad un serbatoio di manodopera”.

the migrant Other. The word *terrone* is then used by the host community to distance itself from the threatening Other and, at the same time, to re-assert and discursively repair the home identity (Musolff and Viola in this volume). Within the context of the conflict between the Italian Northern and Southern regions' ideologies surrounding the Italian migration issue, the discourse-historical analysis of the two terms aims to shed light onto the ways in which the use of the two words reflects the construction of this 'identity-in-crisis' scenario.

3. Methodology and resources

This article investigates the diachronic distribution of the discriminating words *terrone* and *polentone* in historical and contemporary Italian dictionaries as well as media texts from 1861 to 2017. The research hypothesis is that *terrone* collocates more strongly than *polentone*, not only in terms of frequency of use but also of carried socio-pragmatic force. It is argued here that such stronger offensive connotation may be understood within the wider context of the Italian central government's political decisions and measures which have historically perpetuated and aggravating the delay of the South, thus factually legitimising such discriminatory practices. The analysis will proceed in two ways; first, etymological and lexicographic investigations will be carried out over a range of historical and contemporary dictionaries to obtain information on the origin, recorded uses and evolution over time of the two terms. By tracing and contrastively analysing the use of the two labels over time, this step will provide us with preliminary data in support of the research hypotheses that (1) the dysphemistic use of *terrone* predates the use of *polentone* as an insult and (2) *terrone* carries a stronger offensive connotation.

Second, diachronic quantitative analyses will be conducted over two corpora of written Italian to account for the diachronic frequency of occurrence, distribution and contexts of use of the two terms which will contribute key findings to triangulate linguistic, social and historical data. More specifically, with the aid of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), excerpts will be retrieved from the corpora, analysed and discussed. The combined use of quantitative and qualitative analysis of corpus material aims to use documented linguistic data representative of the community of practice in question as the foundation for exploring how – with respect to the conflict between North and South – the threatening Other is discursively constructed and presented vis-à-vis the threatened home identity.

The lexicographic investigation makes use of three historical dictionaries; the *Grande Dizionario della Lingua Italiana* (Battaglia 1961-2002 henceforth GDLI), the *Dizionario Moderno* (Panzini 1942), and the *Appendice al Dizionario Moderno* (Panzini and Migliorini 1963). The GDLI is a historical dictionary of the Italian

language compiled between 1961 and 2002. It is divided in 21 volumes and analyses 183,594 Italian words investigated over 14,061 works of 6,077 authors of literature, poetry, press, bureaucracy and many other fields. The resource lists words which were obsolete at the time of the compilation up to the most recent neologisms, allowing the linguist to trace the history of each item through the many examples provided.

The *Dizionario Moderno* (Panzini 1942) is an atypical lexicographic work, not only for the remarkable amount of neologisms that gathers but also for its style, which is deliberately ironic and non-scientific. Thanks to the comments made by the author on terms derived from science, technology, dialect, and foreign languages, this resource can be considered as an encyclopaedia of the Italian language and culture at the beginning of the 20th century. Its linguistic and historical importance lies in its very comprehensive annotation of customs, traditions and values of the Italian bourgeoisie of the time.

The *Appendice al Dizionario Moderno* (Panzini and Migliorini 1963) is an appendix to the *Dizionario Moderno* and it incorporates about 8,000 new items. This resource shows new aspects of the Italian language of the decade 1940–1950, giving the linguist abundant material for investigating the origin of new words and expressions. Finally, a number of contemporary dictionaries is also used to compare the findings of the lexicographic investigations with findings of present-day Italian; *Il Sabatini Coletti* (Sabatini & Coletti 2017 henceforth, Sabatini Coletti), the *Grande dizionario di Italiano* (henceforth, Garzanti), the *Vocabolario Treccani* (henceforth, Treccani).

The corpora used for the investigations are the DiaCORIS and CORIS corpus (Rossini Favretti, Tamburini, and De Santis 2003), which gather authentic Italian texts from 1861 to 2017 (about 175 million words altogether). The CORIS Corpus is made up of 150 million words and it collects authentic written texts chosen by virtue of their representativeness of modern Italian covering the period 1980–2017. The DiaCORIS, made up of 25 million words, is a sub-corpus of the CORIS and collects texts from 1861 to 2001. The corpus is divided in five time slots: 1861–1900, 1901–1922, 1923–1945, 1946–1967, and 1968–2001; each time slot contains five million words. Both corpora collect texts taken from the following genres: press (daily newspapers, magazines, periodicals), fiction (novels, short stories), academic writing (essays), administrative/legal writing (laws, decrees, judgments), miscellaneous (web – CORIS only), ephemera (other).

These linguistic resources have been selected according to criteria of completeness, authoritativeness, and representativeness of diaphasic, diastratic, diamesic, diatopic, and diachronic variation and sample a broad range of authors and genres which may be considered to even out and provide a reasonably accurate picture of written Italian as a whole. Thus, findings on these samples may be generalised to

the larger population. Because the corpora used are different in size, the results of the quantitative investigations are presented in tables which show the number of occurrences in each corpus (raw frequency) and the corresponding proportions in parts per million (p.p.m.) for the whole corpus and for each time period, when applicable.

4. The analysis

This section presents the results of the linguistic analysis of the words *polentone* and *terrone*. The investigation will proceed in two ways; first, etymological and lexicographic analyses are carried out to obtain information on the origin, recorded uses and evolution over time of these terms (Section 4.1). Second, in Section 4.2 quantitative investigations for the distribution of *polentone* and *terrone* are conducted to access more accurate diachronic information, particularly bringing to light aspects of frequency of use and clusters of collocations over time. Following the quantitative results, excerpts will be retrieved and a qualitative analysis will be performed to explore the relationship between the two words and the ideologies and power they carry.

4.1 *Polentone vs terrone*: The lexicographic analysis

The term *polentone* (or *polendone*⁴) was originally used to describe someone as slow and idle (GDLI, Garzanti, Treccani, Sabatini-Coletti); literary records of such a use can be found for instance in Palazzeschi (1936: 275) in the excerpt below (1) (bold mine):

- (1) Che fai, gingillone? **Polendone!** Stai a grattarti le anche? Presto marmotta!
Lumacone!
What are you doing dawdler? Polendone! Busy scratching your hips? Hurry up lazybones! Slowcoach!

Later, the term became to mean somebody who primarily eats *polenta* (GDLI, vol. XIII: 732), a cornmeal dish typical of the North of Italy and known for being a simple and inexpensive meal. In this sense then, *polentone* would have been later employed to refer to somebody identified as being from the North, and by extension, to indicate the belonging to a low social class (Pell, 2010: 179).

4. A variant of *polentone* in regional Italian.

The example below (2) is the first literary record of *polentone* used to describe someone from the North. The excerpt is taken from the novel *Una vita violenta* by Pasolini (1959: 123) (bold mine):

- (2) Qualche santo l'aveva fatto incontrare uno, con una macchinetta fotografica, un **polentone**⁵ che faceva il militare al Forte
Some good soul had let him meet one, with a camera, a polentone who was doing the military service at the Fort.

In this passage, the narrator is describing how the protagonist Tommaso, a boy from a deprived Roman suburb, tries to escape his misery by stealing and prostituting himself. In the extract, the use of *polentone* is employed to simply refer to somebody from the North as it doesn't seem to carry any specific derogatory meaning. In particular, the mention of the camera possessed by the Northern soldier, certainly expensive at the time, indicates that the use of *polentone* here does not convey the meaning of belonging to a low social class. The same non-offensive use is again found a bit later in Migliorini (1975: 157) who, in his essay about the Italian language, observed (3):

- (3) I meridionali chiamano **polentoni** quelli del Nord, dove è frequente l'uso della polenta
Southerners call 'polentoni' people from the North, where the use of polenta is frequent.

Here it can be observed how the word *polentone* is again used as a neutral term, almost as a synonym for Northerner. The mention of the meal *polenta* does not indicate any reference to a low social status. Similarly, contemporary dictionaries (Garzanti, Sabatini-Coletti, Treccani) mention the use of *polentone* as an apithet used by Southerners to refer to Northerners, but the negative connotation of the word is not reported.

Polentone = Big polenta eater (esp. as an epithet used by Southerners to refer to Northerners)⁶ (Sabatini-Coletti)

Garzanti and Treccani, in particular, even report a playful use of *polentone* which reveals how the word does not carry a particularly negative connotation. These lexicographic data show that the word *polentone* is not acknowledged as a derogatory epithet; at best, the resources describe it as a joking way to refer to Northerners.

5. See footnote n. 2.

6. "Grande mangiatore di polenta (spec. Come epiteto rivolto dagli abitanti del sud Italia ai settentrionali)".

I will now move on to analyse the word *terrone*. The term seems to derive from the word *terra* ‘land’ (GDLI, vol. XX: 962) (though other interpretations have also been given⁷) and it used to indicate a landlord or a landholder. One of the first records of such a use is found in the *Lettere al Magliabechi* (Quondam & Rak 1978–1979) as shown in the following Excerpt (4) (bold mine):

- (4) Quattro settimane sono scrissi a Vostra Signoria illustrissima e l’informai del brutto tiro che ci fanno questi signori teroni⁸ di volerli scacciare (...)
Four weeks ago, I wrote to Your Lordship to inform you of the dirty trick these lords terroni play on us by wishing to send us away (...)
 (1660–1713, vol. I: 1277)

Similarly to *polentone*, the term was later used to indicate someone coming from the South (Excerpt 5 below) (bold mine):

- (5) Noi **terroni** tentiamo di abituarci alle strade di Milano
*Us, **terroni** try to get used to the streets of Milan.* (Marotta 1949: 187)

Excerpt (5) is taken from the collection of short-stories entitled *A Milano non fa freddo* (Marotta 1949), in which the reader follows the adventures of a Southerner migrated to Milan in search of a job. It is interesting to notice that here *terrone* is used by someone from the South – evident in the use of the personal pronoun *us* – to describe themselves. While its use seems to stress the contrast between Southerners and Northerners which would still reveal a self-representation of Southerners as Others, the example does not indicate any particular negative connotation of the term.

The description of the strong derogatory connotation of *terrone* is on the contrary found in the GDLI (vol. XX: 962):

Terrone = Term originated in and spread by the large urbanised areas of North Italy, carrying a strong derogatory and insulting connotation, which, similarly to other Italian or dialectal terms (cf. *Peasant, bumpkin, farmer, yokel*) means ‘serf’ and ‘day labourer’, (albeit as part of folk tradition) almost underdeveloped farmer and it was referred to immigrants from the Southern regions, notoriously characterised by a particularly backward agriculture.⁹

7. See the discussion in the online forum hosted by the *Accademia della Crusca* <http://www.accademiadellacrusca.it/it/lingua-italiana/consulenza-linguistica/domande-risposte/arriva-questo-terrone>.

8. A variant of *terroni* in regional Italian.

9. “Voce nata e diffusa dai grandi centri urbani dell’Italia sett., con connotazione fortemente spregiativa e ingiuriosa, che al pari di altri termini italiani e dialettali (come *villano, burino, contadino* e *cafone*) vale e ‘bracciante agricolo’ ed era riferita agli immigrati del Meridione, regione

The definition above provides a clear explanation of the ideological implications – typically found in dominant groups’ racist discourse – attached to the word *terrone* which negatively represent Southerners not just as Others but also as inferior Others (*serf, underdeveloped*). The finding appears to be even more significant when considering that the same lexicographic resource does not report any derogatory connotation in the section dedicated to *polentone*. The example below (6) is taken from Fenoglio’s novel *Primavera di bellezza* (1959: 13) and shows a literary record of such a use (bold mine):

- (6) I settentrionali, prima gli emiliani, attaccarono i meridionali, “**Terroni, sudici, terra da pipe, abissini!**”. E quelli reagirono: “**Polentoni, a cuornuti!**”
The Northerners, the Emilians first, attacked the Southerners, “Terroni, filthy, pipe soil, Abyssinians!”. So they reacted “*Polentoni, cuckolds!*”

The use of *terrone* in the excerpt shows the degrading connotation of the word, which semantically evokes the negative stereotype of being inferior, filthy (*sudici*), but which also refers specifically to the darker colour of Southerners’ skin (*terra da pipe, abissini*) and shares racist aspects with colonial insults (*abissini*) to explicitly express and enact the Northerners’ (*I settentrionali*) superiority. The example is also particularly relevant to the discussion as it shows, in contrast, the weaker derogatory connotation of the word *polentone* whereas a completely semantically unrelated insult (*cuckold*) is needed to make it more offensive. The overall derogatory force of *polentone* is however different from *terrone* in that the husband of an adulteress does not convey the ethnic connotations of inferiority attached to *terrone*.

Similarly, the consulted contemporary dictionaries (Garzanti, Sabatini-Coletti, Treccani) report the use of *terrone* as a derogatory epithet, thus indicating that, unlike *polentone*, its offensive connotation is acknowledged by Italian lexicography.

Terrone = Derogatory or joking epithet with which Southerners are described in Northern Italy.¹⁰

The preliminary lexicographic findings already show that the terms *polentone* and *terrone* are not at all equivalent. In the consulted resources, the dysphemistic connotation is only acknowledged for *terrone* while *polentone* is described as jokingly used by Southerners to refer to Northerners, or to simply describe somebody who eats *polenta*. It was also found that the use of *terrone* as an epithet predates in any

notoriamente caratterizzata da un’agricoltura particolarmente arretrata [...] considerati (sia pure a livello di folklore) quasi dei contadini sottosviluppati.”

10. “Epiteto spregiativo o scherzoso con cui nell’Italia settentrionale vengono designati i meridionali.”

case the same use of *polentone*, which would support the hypothesis that *polentone* was born in reply to *terrone* (Tartamella 2016).

I will now move on to the second stage of the analysis in which I will investigate the distribution of the two terms from 1861 to 2017. Following the quantitative investigations, relevant excerpts are extracted and discussed.

4.2 *Polentone vs terrone*: The corpus analysis

This section investigates the diachronic distribution of *polentone* and *terrone* in texts from 1860 to 2017 in order to assess which form historically collocates more strongly. The detailed account of their frequency of occurrence and diachronic trends together with historical discussions and a qualitative analysis of retrieved examples will provide us with valuable information relevant to the research hypothesis of *terrone* carrying a stronger derogatory connotation than *polentone*. The corpus results for written Italian are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below; following each table, excerpts are randomly retrieved and discussed.

Table 1. *Polentone vs terrone* – DiaCORIS results

DiaCORIS	Polentone	P.P.M.	Terrone	P.P.M.
1861–1900	0	0	0	0
1901–1922	0	0	0	0
1923–1945	1	0.2	0	0
1946–1967	1	0.2	14	2.8
1968–2001	0	0	2	0.4
TOT.	2	0.4	16	0.64

The results show that *terrone* collocates more strongly than *polentone* with an overall frequency of occurrence over eight times higher. It is interesting to notice that the peak of occurrences of *terrone* is found in the time slot 1946–1967, which not only is in line with the lexicographic records (GDLI), but it also shows significant correlations with the Italian socio-economic situation of those years. The country was indeed experiencing the highest ever recorded South–North internal migration rate, estimated at 11.4% of the population (about 6 millions of Italians) (Pugliese 2006), with 13.9% between 1960 and 1964 only (Santillo 2010). The Italian Government was working for rebuilding a nation devastated by the war; however, the majority of public works were taking place only in the North and it was soon clear that the industrialization of Italy and the so-called ‘Italian economic miracle’ were in fact processes that were interesting almost exclusively the North.¹¹ During

11. The expression “Triangolo industriale” *industrial triangle* was indeed coined to refer to the three most industrialized Italian cities; Milan, Turin and Genoa, all located in the North of Italy.

the years of the ‘economic miracle’, while the North was flourishing, the Southern industrial sector had in fact remained practically unvaried accounting for 14.9% of the national production in 1951 vs 14.6% in 1960, and so had done the third sector (23.4% in 1951 vs 23.0% in 1960) (Graziani 1972). The data show the great economic stagnation that only one part of the country was experiencing. This is explained by looking at the Italian Government’s economic strategy of the time which adopted what was called the *theory of emigration and industrialization complementarity*.¹² According to this theory, any forced industrialization in the South would have been counterproductive on the contrary it was economically more advantageous to favour the South–North migration through the implementation of effective internal migration policies. However, if in this way constant workforce was guaranteed to Northern industries, at the same time the said governmental strategy heavily drained the South, both economically and culturally, thus further exasperating the delay of those regions.

These considerations shed light onto the ideological repercussions that such governmental choices had on the Italian culture and society; by deciding not to foster a more balanced and evenly distributed development throughout the country, the message that was implicitly circulated may be seen as the public acknowledgement that the role of the South was to ‘serve’ the North, and by extension, that the South was inferior. From this viewpoint, the stronger derogatory connotation attached to *terrone* and the government’s policies appear to be closely related to each other.

I will now discuss Examples (7)–(9) retrieved from the corpus (bold mine).

- (7) Con la loro andatura e la pellegrina somigliano pure a San Rocco. E mangiano il **polentone**
Because of their gait and the pellegrina they wear, they even look like Saint Rocco. And they eat polentone. (Saggistica 1923–1945)
- (8) Bellissimo programma. C’era da aspettarsi scoperte di strani **polentoni**, di manicaretti ignorati
What a beautiful programme. Things were to be expected, like strange polentoni, unknown delicacies. (StampaPeriodica 1946–1967)
- (9) E dappertutto cautela, pregiudizio, timori nei loro confronti. “Andavo a mangiare in una cooperativa [...]; ma un giorno Angelo il mio amico disse che gli altri non volevano vedere **terrone**”
And everywhere caution, prejudice, fear towards them. “I used to eat in a cooperative [...]; but one day my friend Angelo told me that the others did not want to see terrone there”. (StampaQuotidiana 1946–1967)

12. La teoria della complementarità dell’emigrazione e dell’industrializzazione.

The examples above provide a clearer picture of the uses of *polentone* and *terrone*; Excerpt (7) is taken from the autobiographical work *Il sole a picco* (Cardarelli 1929) in which the author remembers the places where he grew up. In the passage, he is describing memories of his childhood spent in the *Maremma*, where farmers used to eat the *polentone* when on a break; the example shows that the word is not used as an epithet. Similarly, Excerpt (8) is retrieved from the weekly magazine *L'Europeo* in which Achille Campanile, a famous Italian journalist, was curating a column dedicated to Italian TV. In the passage, he is describing the low level of Italian TV programmes, particularly those ones dedicated to the discovery of exotic places, foods and traditions. The word *polentone* is once again used here to refer to the actual cornmeal dish, therefore no derogatory connotation is attached.

Excerpt (9) is taken from *Il pioniere rassegnato* (Bocca 1963), one of the five parts of the dossier *La fabbrica dei nuovi italiani* by Giorgio Bocca, an Italian essayist and journalist. The dossier is an in-depth analysis of Milan's immigrants in the years that followed the 'economic miracle'. Particular emphasis is given to the widespread discrimination that Southern immigrants were experiencing in factories, including exploitation and illegal labour, as well as in their day-to-day life, such as their exclusion by cooperatives and workmen's circles. In the passage, the journalist is reporting an interview with a Southern worker migrated to Milan who tells how he was not accepted to eat in the same place as Northern workers (*the others did not want to see terroni there*). The use of the word *terrone* here clearly addresses an inferior, unwelcomed Other, who, by simply showing up in those circles which were prerogative of the Northerners, was threatening their identity and undermining their rights to socialise outside the factory. Thus, if the forced proximity inside the factories may be accepted as a necessary evil, the intrusion of the Other outside working hours was not tolerated as it was seen as some sort of unbearable usurpation.

I will now move on to analyse the distribution of the two terms from 1980 to 2017 (Table 2).

Table 2. *Polentone vs terrone* – CORIS results

CORIS	Polentone	P.P.M.	Terrone	P.P.M.
1980–2017	23	0.15	151	1

The results from 1980 to 2017 mirror the previous findings, with *terrone* collocating more strongly (again, its overall frequency of occurrence is more than six times higher than *polentone*). Here below, Examples (10)–(19) show the excerpts of the contexts of occurrence of *polentone* and *terrone*; bold is mine in all the excerpts.

- (13) A Castel di Tora, un paesino tra Carsoli e Rieti, circondato dai boschi sulle rive del Turano, si festeggia la **Festa del Polentone**
Castel di Tora, a village between Carsoli and Rieti, surrounded by the woods and the Turano River, hosts the Polentone Party (MON2011_13)
- (14) **Sagra del polentone**. A Castel di Tora (Rieti) spettacolare festa con **polenta, aringhe, tonno e baccalà**
Polentone Festival. Castel di Tora (Rieti) hosts a spectacular party with polenta, herrings, tuna and codfish. (STAMPAPeriodici)
- (15) Tramarin diventa deputato per la Liga nell’83, un botto all’insegna del “Leon che magna el **teron**”. [...] L’ottanta per cento dei nostri elettori se ne fregava dell’ autonomismo, voleva solo cacciare i **terroni**
Tramarin is elected deputy for the Liga in 1983, a success under the motto “Lion eats terrone”. [...] Eighty per cent of our voters didn’t care about autonomy, all they wanted was to send terroni away (STAMPAQuotidiani)

Excerpts (13)–(14) retrieved from the corpus describe local events in which *polenta* will be served; they indicate once again that the word *polentone* is frequently used to refer to the food with no discriminatory connotation thus showing its overall weak offensive collocation. Excerpt (15) is taken from an interview to Achille Tramarin,¹³ the first national secretary of the *Liga Veneta-Lega Nord* party, the Venetian nationalist party. In the interview, the journalist reminds Tramarin of the Venetian slogan “Leon che magna el teron”¹⁴ ‘*lion eats terrone*’ used during the party’s political campaign. The journalist is implying that it was precisely thanks to this slogan that the newly born party could gain one seat in the Parliament, reaching 4% of the consensus. Tramarin himself admits that all 80% of their voters wanted was “to send *terroni* away”, showing again the use of the word as strongly derogatory. The example also shows how Southerners are perceived as threatening Others that need to be fought and sent away because that is the only way to reassert and repair the Northerners’ home identity in crisis. The aggressive slogan ‘*lion eats terrone*’ conveys the Northerners’ aggressive desire to destroy *terroni* by devouring them as a lion might do with its prey, and make them disappear for ever. It is worth noticing that the events discussed in the excerpt took place at the beginning of the 80s,

13. Tramarin is also famous for having given two speeches; the first speech was given during the party’s first official meeting on 9th December 1979, titled *Venetian Autonomy and Europe* and the second speech was given during the parliamentary vote of confidence to the Craxi’s Government on the 10th August 1983 and it was entirely in Venetian dialect as a linguistic statement of Venetian identity (see Musolff in this volume).

14. The ‘lion’ represents the Lion of Saint Mark, the symbol of the city of Venice.

about one hundred years after the Unification of Italy, and the image they portray is still that of a deeply divided country. The hostile and aggressive attitudes against Southerners linguistically apparent in the use of the offensive word *terrone* may be seen as the failure of the Italian Government to effectively intervene towards the even distribution and exploitation of resources. Whilst the national unification and identity have been imposed top-down, the social repercussions of biased political decisions have been internalized by citizens and translated into a cultural conflict between the two groups, with more hatred and dehumanizing attitudes against people from the South deemed as Other.

5. Conclusions

This article explored the research hypothesis that the internal conflict between the Italian Northern and Southern regions' ideologies – linguistically apparent in the different semantic development of the discriminating words *polentone* attached to people living in the North and *terrone* referred to people from the South – reflects viewpoints, ideologies, and intentions behind the Italian Government's political choices. By employing the “discourse-historical approach” (Wodak 2001), the study triangulated linguistic, social and historical data in order to understand if the said different semantic development of the two discriminatory expressions may be seen as the reflection of the cultural values and political ideologies of the Italian socio-historical context. More specifically, the research hypothesis was that the more offensive connotation of the word *terrone* may find its roots in the Italian central government political strategies which, by passively accepting the South–North migration and historically favouring one part of the country to the detriment of the other, have implicitly circulated the ideology of an inferior South, whose role was to serve a dominant and superior North.

The analysis proceeded in two ways; it first investigated the lexicographic accounts for both terms in historical and contemporary dictionaries. The results showed that the depiction of Southerners as dark, dirty, and inferior conveyed by the word *terrone* correlates with the first important migrating movements from South to North; on the contrary, the word *polentone* to refer to people from the North only started to be used much later. Interestingly, the derogatory connotation was only retrieved in the GDLI's definition of *terrone*.

Second, the distribution of the two terms was analysed in texts of daily newspapers, magazines, periodicals, novels, short stories, and web material from 1861 to 2017. Here occurrences of *terrone* as a discriminatory insult consistently outnumbered those of *polentone*; the overall frequency ratio was found 1: 8 on average, with *terrone* occurring more frequently. Finally, the qualitative analyses have shown that

the word *polentone* is mainly associated with the cornmeal dish and that its use as a discriminatory insult is rare. On the contrary, the specific derogatory connotation of inferiority and unwanted Other is mainly attached to *terrone*.

The discourse-historical analysis has shown how the Italian internal discrimination has manifested itself in the language as a tool to marginalize groups. More specifically, the different semantic development of the two discriminatory expressions paired with the analysis of concurrent socio-historical events has unveiled the crucial role played by the Italian Government's political decisions which, by legitimising the South–North migration and historically favouring one part of the country to the disadvantage of the other, have strongly contributed to shaping, representing and reinforcing the conflict between the two groups, aggravating the production and reproduction of discriminatory opinions, prejudices and stereotypes against the South which is labelled as a threatening unwanted Other.

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Featuring immigrants and citizens

A comparison between Spanish and English primary legislation and administration information texts (2007–2011)

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This study highlights the different approaches to the construction of immigrants and citizens that United Kingdom and Spain seem to have favoured in the period 2007–2011. A corpus of legislation (EN-1, SP-1) and another of information texts (EN-3, SP-3) produced by the administrations of both countries were compiled during the period 2007–2011 and the terms “immigrant”, “inmigrante”, “citizen” and “ciudadano” were profiled through collocation analysis. Regarding “immigrant” and “inmigrante”, our results show that while the British administration is interested in control procedures for immigrants, the Spanish one advocates their integration. As for “citizen” and “ciudadano” the first term is related to regulation of entry, registration and naturalization, whereas “ciudadano” appears mainly associated to the EU, residence and access to public services.

Keywords: immigrants, citizens, administration, information texts, corpus linguistics, critical discourse analysis

1. Introduction

Immigration is a constant phenomenon in almost all Member States of the European Union (EU). Europe is a vast, very attractive territory for immigrants, not only for the job opportunities and the prospect of a better life, but also because of the free circulation of people among all the European countries. Important immigration movements in Europe started at the beginning of the past century and have been the focus of several alliances among the states of the union, such as the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 which allowed the EU to legislate on immigration and civil procedures in so far as it was necessary to ensure the free movement of persons, which is one of the 4 core freedoms of the EU. This very fact can be the origin of

important changes in the social, economic and even geographic configuration of a new Europe, particularly after the Brexit. National administrations of the different countries have issued laws and published information to regulate and protect immigrants and to make clear to them different aspects related to their life in the country.

In any type of cross-cultural research, the different contexts of production must be considered, and the UK and Spain have very different backgrounds regarding immigration and emigration, although since the 1990s both countries have been under significant migratory pressures.

According to the briefing on Public opinion toward immigration (2016) immigration is unpopular, with approximately three quarters of the British public favouring reduced levels of immigration. In the report published by the migration observatory in November 2016 this topic ranked among the top five issues. In fact, 34% of those surveyed said¹ that it was the most important issue at that moment, followed by the European Union (31%), the economy (30%), National Health Service (30%) housing (22%) and the international terrorism (19%). Immigration consistently ranks among the top five issues in recent history.² In Spain, two thirds of the population consider that there are too many immigrants, many more than can be properly accommodated, and more that 50% of the population agree with allowing immigration only on the basis of a work contract.³

However, the United Kingdom has a long tradition in receiving immigrants. The first immigration controls were introduced in Britain in 1905. Balfour, Prime Minister at that time, justified the issuing of that law because “Without such a law, though the Briton of the future may have the same laws, the same institutions and constitution ... nationality would not be the same and would not be the nationality we would desire to be our heirs through the ages yet to come”.⁴ Two years before, the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration had expressed fears that newcomers were inclined to live ‘according to their traditions, usages and customs’ and that there might be ‘grafted onto the English stock... the debilitated sickly and vicious products of Europe’.

Along a century, things have dramatically changed in Britain and in Europe, so that there are striking differences between the justification of the first immigration Act of 1905 and that of 2009, which reads:

1. migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/up-content/uploads/2016/04/briefing-Public_Opinion_Immigration_Attitudes_concern.pdf

2. <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/>

3. <http://www.simplelogica.com/iop/iop14006-inmigracion-en-espa%C3%B1a.asp>

4. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/12/immigration-not-problem-hostility-migrants>

This act amended the rules so people from outside the European Economic Area had to have residential status for eight years before being eligible for naturalisation. Those seeking naturalisation through wedlock had to be married for five years first. The act also allowed immigration and customs officers to perform some of each other's roles and imposed a duty on home secretaries to safeguard children.⁵

Only recently immigration is the core issue for decisions that will affect all the states member of the European Union. David Cameron stated, "I want to see immigration come down. That's why we've taken all the steps that we have. It hasn't worked so far because of the large numbers coming from inside the EU."⁶ English people voted for leaving the EU in 2016, likely to avoid free movement or immigrants accessing the UK from the European Union.

The case of Spain as far as immigration is related is quite different. Spain's migration flows in the 20th century changed radically in two different ways. In the course of the past century, about six million Spaniards left their country of origin, and until the 1930s, 80% chose to go to the Americas. From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, however, 74% chose the countries of Northern Europe. However, in the last third of the 20th century, Spain evolved from its traditional role as a sending country and became a receiving country for foreign labourers, mostly from Northern Africa and Latin America, and for well-to-do immigrants from other EU countries, such as retirees.

The number of foreign residents in Spain increased significantly in the last quarter century. From 1975 to 1985, the increase was a moderate average of 2.2 percent annually. From 1985 to 1991 (which included the enactment of the *Ley de Extranjería*, the national immigration law, and the first extraordinary regularization process) the foreign population rose an average of seven percent annually. Immigration became an important demographic and economic phenomenon since 1990 in Spain. Between 2002 and 2014, Spain received an accumulated immigration inflow of 7.3 million, thus representing the second-largest recipient of immigrants in absolute terms among OECD countries, following the United States. This migration episode was largely concentrated during the first decade of this century, peaking in 2007. Hence, Spain went from having a total foreign population of 2% in 2000 to approximately 12% in 2011. According to Eurostat data, 1 out of 5 migrants that moved to the EU15 during 2002 and 2013 went to Spain.⁷

5. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/11/pdfs/ukpga_20090011_en.pdf

6. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/apr/14/david-cameron-immigration-speech-full-text>

7. <http://bruegel.org/2015/12/the-remarkable-case-of-spanish-immigration/>

Even considering that the traditions regarding immigration in Spain and the United Kingdom are very different, the current situation is rather similar as far as the immigration population in both countries; 11.3% in the UK and 12% in Spain.

Two main issues are at the heart of the current debate about immigration: the first is about the facts of immigration, the second about public perception of immigration. This article focusses on the way in which the public administration of the UK and Spain have considered immigrations and the manner immigrants and citizens are represented in legislation and information texts that have been published in both countries.

2. The language to construe the identity of immigrants

The identity of immigrants is construed through the language used to write or inform about immigration. People get their information about immigration through the general media, printed newspapers, information on tv, blogs or websites (van Klingeren et al. 2015). There are numerous studies on the treatment given to immigration in the Spanish and European media. Van Dijk (1997) reports that the media do not describe or register noticeable topics in a passive form, but on the contrary, they construct or reconstruct news actively. Blinder and Allen (2016) suggest that newspapers are important sources of information for the UK public. The construction of social identities, especially in relation with migration processes, is the result of the function of social mediation carried out by media, since they reconstruct the identities of migrants through journalistic discourse.

Numerous studies have been carried out on the treatment of immigration in newspapers in Spain. Igartua, Muñiz and Cheng (2005) and Igartua and Muñiz (2007) report that the treatment given to immigration in Spain in the media is clearly negative, linking immigration to crime or filling informatives on Tv with irregular entry of immigrants in “pateras”. In these cases, most of the negative news on immigrants are not conceptualised. Kressova et al. (2010) state that the most popular topic in the news regarding immigration is the access to borders and control of immigration, followed by crime, work and politics and legislation Pano Alaman (2011) carries out an analysis of the term “immigrant” in the Spanish press and reports that the term “immigrant” has negative connotations and it is associated with problematic situations, highlighting the existence of a clear opposition between them, immigrants, and us, nationals.

In general, the media focus on negative aspects of immigration events so that they do not encourage the peaceful coexistence among people with different cultural backgrounds. (Santamaría 2002a, 2002b; Granados 1998 and 2007; Bañón 2002, 2007; Retis 2006; Martínez Lirola 2013). The main topics associated with

immigration in the media in Spain are those related to violence, crime or prostitution, showing that the press discourse could be reductionist and excluding. According to Retis and Garcia:

Since 1986, when Spain became a member of the EU, Spain inherited from the EU the discourse of exclusion of immigrants from outside the EU. The political and police sources gained prominence in the media discourse, marking the widespread tendency of the media treatment of immigration associated to social conflict and defining in complex ways the narratives about the new “others”.

(Retis and García 2010: 139)

The expectations and attitude of Spanish people towards immigration has significantly changed since the last decade of the past century. Initial data from the “Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas” (CIS, 1996)⁸ indicated that most of the population of Spain saw immigration positively; however, ten years later (CIS, 2005)⁹ the opinions started to change and Spaniards considered immigrants as “too many” (59.6%); consequently, 84.7% of the surveyed also thought that only those with a work contract should be allowed in the country. The 2015 CIS¹⁰ report confirms that the people of Spain has kept and increased this negative perception towards immigration.

Regarding the situation in the UK, immigration is one of the most salient topics in the media. In August 2013, the Migration Observatory quantitatively examined how UK national newspapers portrayed immigrants, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from 2010 to 2012. Analysis over 58,000 items from 20 newspapers, totalling over 43 million words revealed many interesting patterns, including these. (1) By far, immigrants were most commonly described as ‘illegal’ across tabloids mid-markets and broadsheet newspapers, (2) Asylum-seekers were most commonly described as ‘failed’ across these three publication types and (3) Words focusing on conflict, nationalities, and movement – such as ‘fleeing’ – tended to appear alongside mentions of ‘refugees’ as compared to other groups.

In June 2016 the British decided to leave the EU, mainly due to economic and migratory reasons. According to the 2016 report of the Migration Observatory (<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk>) immigration, together with economy, is one of the “most important issues” facing the British public, with three quarters favouring reduced levels of immigration, which applies equally to both the EU and

8. www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?.estudio=1207

9. www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=4696&cuestionario=4949&muestra=9063

10. http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-archivos/Marginales/3100_3119/3119/es3119mar_01Andalucia.pdf

non-EU migration. Surprisingly, Spain and the UK show similar levels of concern about EU and non-EU immigration.

In Britain, the term “immigration” or “migration” did not appear in the press very often before 2011. However, when the government introduced some measures in order to keep a balance between the migrants entering and leaving the country, the number of published articles increased since 2012 onward, with the result that in 2014 the amount of articles mentioning immigration doubled those of 2011. The term “immigration” appears in the environment of “mass”, “net” and “illegal”, which agree with Taylor (2014) who reports that some groups of migrants are profiled in the British press as a potential menace for the UK contributor.

The terms “immigration” or “migration” have been not only the subject of articles in the press but also the focus of analysis by researchers in the field of critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics.

3. Critical Discourse Analysis and corpus linguistics

The methodology framework used in this study combines corpus linguistics and discourse analysis. Corpus linguistics is the study of language based on samples of language use. Critical Discourse Analysis provides insights into the relationship of language and ideology. The most consistent results are obtained when critical discourse analysis is combined with large corpora, so that reliable generalisations about language use can be made.

Baker et al. (2008b) examined the representation of asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants and migrants in the British press and they found that these terms were almost synonyms in their corpus; in their study immigrants are associated to entry and economic treat, whereas migrants have a wider range of associations, such as transit, entry, residence or legality; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery (2013) investigated the representation of Muslims in British newspapers and reported that Muslims were depicted as easily offended, alienated and in conflict with non-Muslims. Taylor (2014) explored the representation of immigrants in both the Italian and the UK press. Baker and Levon (2015) examined newspapers articles and found that Black men are found with some collocates which associate them with crime, whereas Asian men are more often associated to sexual grooming.

As described above, several studies have reported how immigrants are portrayed in the UK press. However, it is the administration that legislates, issues standards, provides texts regulating immigration and informs the immigrant himself on relevant aspects of his life in the host country. Pérez-Paredes, Aguado and Sánchez (2017) examined the collocational profile of “migrant” in the UK legislation and administration informative texts and found that the UK administration avoids an

explicit negative construction of immigrants. However, by ascribing them to tiers as a way of controlling them from a legal perspective, the term migrant “acquires an extremely subtle negative prosody” (ibid: 20).

Building on the findings in Pérez-Paredes et al. (2017), the present paper attempts to explore how immigrant identities are portrayed in the different types of legal and administrative documents issued by the British and Spanish administrations. Hence, we aim at shedding light on the following research questions:

1. How are immigrants represented in the legislation and information texts published in the UK and Spain during 2007–2011, considering a collocational analysis?
2. How are citizens represented in the legislation and information texts published in the UK and Spain during 2007–2011, considering a collocational analysis?
3. What are the main differences, if any, between both administrations?

4. Methodology

The data presented in this paper are part of a larger project on immigration and administrative language, LADEX, which involved the compilation of texts produced by the different administrations of four European countries (France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy), where immigration started to be considered as a problem. Integration, considered a key matter by the EU institutions, was therefore at risk. The main goal of LADEX was the compilation of corpora to explore terminology and discourse analysis in four languages (English, French, Italian and Spanish).

For the compilation of the different corpora in the four languages involved in the project a textual taxonomy was developed by the LADEX team after a previous and vast analysis of the Spanish administrative language. The corpus of every language of the project comprises texts from five different fields and is organised as follows: EN-1 and SP-1 (national immigration law), EN-2 and SP-2 (instruments such as letters, delivered by the Administration and addressed to individual citizens), EN-3 and SP-3 (information texts on immigration and immigration related procedures produced by the Administration), EN-4 and SP4 (documents produced by the Administration and submitted to administrative bodies and institutions) and EN-5 and SP-5 (documents, such as applications or claim forms, submitted by the citizen to the administration) (http://www.um.es/ladex/?page_id=151).

In this paper, we analyse the construction of immigrants and citizens in the UK and Spain in two of the sub corpora indicated above: laws on immigrations (LADEX EN-1 and SP-1) and the information texts (LADEX EN-3 and SP-3). The two datasets vary considerably in scope and size as shown on Table 1.

Table 1. Main components of the English and Spanish corpora under study

Components	Corpus Id	Number of words
UK immigration law and statutes	EN-1	392,180
Spanish immigration law and statutes	SP-1	1,222,172
Information texts produced by the UK Administration on immigration and immigration-related procedures	EN-3	1,151,884
Information texts produced by the Spanish Administration on immigration and immigration-related procedures	SP-3	343,599

Corpora EN-1 and SP-1 include all the legislation on immigration passed by the UK and Spanish parliaments from 2007 to 2011. As for corpora EN-3 and SP-3 they contain the information available on official websites of immigration published by official immigration-related agencies both in the United Kingdom and Spain during the same period (2007–2011).

For the analysis of the four corpora selected the methodology of Baker et al. (2008a), Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery (2008b) and Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery (2013) was applied. We used the English lemmas “immigrant”, “migrant” and “citizen” and their equivalents in Spanish, “inmigrante”, “migrante”, and “ciudadano”. The terms “citizen” and “ciudadano” have been selected to be analysed in the understanding that could be used by the Administration as a more neutral term to refer to immigrants. A combination of corpus-driven and qualitative methods (Baker et al. 2008a) has been used to gain insights on how immigrants and citizens are depicted in the texts analysed. In our case the qualitative methods applied involve the analysis of concordance lines and the identification of categorized collocates and themes.

The lemmas mentioned above were searched in the four corpora and Sketch Engine (Kilgarrif et al. 2014) was used to carry out both a preliminary collocational analysis and the generation of the word sketches (automatic, corpus-derived summary of a word’s grammatical and collocational behaviour), allowing us to capture the grammar relationship that a word or lemma exhibits in a corpus. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was used to better understand the uses of the lemmas “immigrant/migrant/citizen” in English and “Inmigrante/migrante/ciudadano” in Spanish exploring the ways in which other-presentation is manifested through the use of linguistic indicators, as stated by Baker et al. (2008a).

5. Results

The results of the analysis of the lemmas under study both in the UK and Spanish corpora will be detailed together with an analysis of the collocational and grammatical profiles of the lemmas “Immigrant/migrant/citizen” in English and “Inmigrante/migrante/ciudadano” in Spanish.

The raw results and normalized data for the lemmas “immigrant”, “citizen”, “inmigrante”, and “ciudadano” in UK and Spanish laws and informative corpora are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Frequencies of the terms searched in the EN-1, EN-3 and SP-1 and SP-3 corpora

Lemma	LADEX English (EN-1)	LADEX English (EN-3)	LADEX Spanish (SP-1)	LADEX Spanish (SP-3)
Immigrant	0 (0/M)	18 (8/M)		
Immigrants	0 (0/M)	14 (6/M)		
Migrant	1232 (1,232/M)	2742 (1170/M)		
Migrants	318 (272/M)	556 (237/M)		
Citizen	524 (448.2/M)	3272 (1397.1/M)		
Citizens	70 (59.9/M)	664 (-0.4/M)		
Inmigrante (Immigrant)			280 (199,3/M)	298 (728,4/M)
Inmigrantes (Immigrants)			430	322
Migrante (Migrant)			0 (0/M)	0 (0/M)
Migrantes (Migrants)			0 (0/M)	0 (0/M)
Ciudadano (Citizen)			564 (401,5/M)	300 (733,3/M)
Ciudadanos (Citizens)			436 (310,4/M)	222 (542,6/M)
Ciudadana (Citizen female)			48 (34,2/M)	4 (9,8/M)
Ciudadanas (Citizen females)			0 (0/M)	2 (4,9 M)

One salient feature of the results reported in Table 2 is the fact that there are not “immigrant(s)” in the UK laws (EN-1) and a very low number of occurrences of this lemma in the UK information texts (EN-3), whereas no occurrences of the lemma “migrant” appears in none of the two Spanish corpora under study. The over presence of “migrant” in the UK corpora and the absence of its equivalent in Spanish is a prominent peculiarity of both corpora (Pérez-Paredes et al. 2017). We will compare next the results of the lemma “migrant” in English and “inmigrante” in Spanish.

5.1 Collocations of “migrants” in UK legislation and information texts

The most frequent collocates of the lemma “migrant” of the LADEX EN-1 and EN-3 corpora ordered according to the logDice statistic are shown in Table 3. Only those collocates with a logDice of 9 or above have been included (Pérez-Paredes et al. 2017: 11).

Table 3. Most frequent collocates of the lemma “migrant” in LADEX EN-1 and EN-3

Corpus EN-1				Corpus EN-3			
Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice	Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice
Tier	405	9.551	13.539	illegal	122	8.676	11.58
General	46	8.621	11.25	skilled	94	9.344	11.428
Rule	91	7.043	11.174	worker	158	7.45	11.304
Temporary	35	9.652	11.071	employ	93	7.667	10.987
5	158	6.539	11.031	highly	58	9.361	10.823
Worker	36	8.874	11.01	Tier	169	6.562	10.789
Who	79	6.834	10.966	High-value	48	10.258	10.635
Entrepreneur	28	9.833	10.791	sponsor	110	6.216	10.355
Mean	76	6.438	10.688	mean	46	6.704	9.991
Respect	71	6.261	10.535	practice	33	7.665	9.89
Skilled	20	10.196	10.35	detect	27	9.427	9.805
Highly	20	10.196	10.35	1	124	5.248	9.686
Immigration	91	5.88	10.344	whom	26	8.203	9.666
System	20	9.058	10.283	entrepreneur	28	7.392	9.646
£	45	5.958	10.114	sponsoring	23	10.196	9.609
Study	17	9.891	10.113	granted	23	8.974	9.562
Post	17	9.891	10.113	Knowingly	22	8.673	9.484
dependant	24	6.935	10.109	who	80	5.085	9.42
4	126	5.437	10.051	under	89	4.889	9.303
Fee	61	5.639	10.025	general	30	5.625	9.188
Clearance	24	6.621	10	2	54	4.972	9.182
Investor	15	9.781	9.935	record	23	6.301	9.181
Points-based	15	9.295	9.913	leave	78	4.783	9.179
Make	83	5.277	9.828	investor	19	7.429	9.176
Work	14	8.833	9.791	number	18	7.798	9.148
2	136	4.906	9.585	sponsor	18	7.372	9.101
As	98	4.907	9.54	HSMP	17	7.438	9.036
Under	87	4.792	9.419	find	28	5.384	9.024
Refer	18	5.773	9.408				
1	124	4.657	9.345				
Kingdom	31	4.888	9.214				
application	49	4.571	9.113				

As shown in Table 3 the most common collocate of “migrants” in the UK law corpus is *Tier* followed by the numbers 5, 4, 2, and 1, which also premodifies that term (bold added).

- (1) The Secretary of State has in these Regulations specified fees for the following applications: (1) leave to remain in the United Kingdom as a Tier 5 **migrant** (regulation 4^a as inserted by regulation 2(4)); (EN-1)
- (2) “Tier 4 **migrant**” means a migrant who makes an application of a kind identified in the immigration rules as requiring to be considered under “Tier 4” of the immigration rules (EN-1)

In the case of UK information texts corpus, the most common collocate is *illegal* followed by *worker* in 87% of the cases (Pérez-Paredes et al. 2017).

- (3) Number of illegal **migrant** workers detected on whom the employer conducted no checks. (EN-3)
- (4) Avoid a civil penalty for employing an illegal **migrant** worker, in a way that does not result in unlawful race discrimination. (EN-3)

5.2 Grammatical categorization of “migrants” in UK legislation and information texts

In EN-1 the term “migrant” is the subject of the verbs *make*, *refer* or *mean* and the object of *mean* in 95% of the cases; is premodified by *skilled*, very often in the string *highly skilled migrant*, and post-modified by *under the immigration rules*. (Pérez-Paredes et al. 2017).

- (5) “Tier 1 migrant” means a **migrant** who makes an application of a kind identified in the immigration rules as requiring to be considered under “Tier of the ...” (EN-1)
- (6) (regulation 20B, as substituted by regulation 2(9)); © entry clearance as a Tier 2 **migrant** under the immigration rules ... (EN-1)

Regarding EN-3 “migrant” is the subject of *arrive* (in the UK with the objective of enter in 92% of the cases), *work* (associated with illegality in half of the cases), *come*, *settle*, *make* (applications) and *engage* (in highly skilled employment) and the object of *mean*, *sponsor* (the organization that supports their visa application) or *employ* (in the context of illegal immigrant). The term is premodified by *illegal* (87% in the context of work) and post-modified by *sponsors*, *worker*, *employment*, or *application*.

- (7) you will not have an excuse if you knowingly employ an illegal **migrant** worker, regardless of any document ... (EN-3)

- (8) If a UK organisation wants to sponsor a **migrant** under Tier 2, Tier 4 or Tier 5 (Temporary workers), they must apply to us for a sponsor licence. (EN-3)

There are important differences between the collocates and word sketches of “migrant” in EN-1 and EN-3. The most important collocates are *Tier* and *general* in EN-1. As for the word sketches, *mean* is the most prevalent object of “migrant” in the context of making it clear what are we referring to by using the Tier classification of migrants. The use of the terms *skilled*, *highly skilled* and *under the immigration rules* help the administration classify the migrants. The “migrant” portrayed in EN-3, is someone strongly associated to *illegal and skilled* who *arrives* to the UK, *makes applications*, *engages* in employment and can be the object of *sponsors* or *employment*.

5.3 Collocations of “citizens” in UK legislation and information texts

The most common collocates of “citizen” are shown in Table 4. Only those collocates with a logDice of 9 or above have been included.

Table 4. Most frequent collocates of the lemma “citizen” in LADEX EN-1 and EN-3

Corpus EN-1				Corpus EN-3			
Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice	Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice
British	525	9.765	13.079	British	3525	8.034	12.967
overseas	88	10.655	12.578	Territories	401	8.777	11.956
territories	58	10.929	12.382	Overseas	1203	7.229	11.495
naturalisation	86	9.332	11.230	Descent	194	9.102	11.396
Commonwealth	51	9.764	11.065	Become	249	8.659	11.268
Citizen	221	7.786	10.565	Commonwealth	182	8.542	10.754
Who	812	6.908	10.400	A	21592	5.358	10.716
union	40	9.377	10.380	As	6524	5.370	10.522
Registration	20	7.517	10.365	Registered	452	7.181	10.496
Citizens	33	9.392	10.152	Citizen	1247	6.65	10.360
right	189	7.137	9.791	Otherwise	240	7.785	10.348
national	240	6.908	9.749	Register	368	7.189	10.268
24	264	6.655	9.565	Was	1548	5.740	10.200
27	334	6.431	9.498	Dependent	83	8.811	9.975
He	684	6.018	9.447	If	4170	4.951	9.954
Under	3647	5.639	9.428	Who	2682	5.119	9.920
Not	1754	5.730	9.420	Became	94	8.573	9.906
Nationals	40	8.377	9.380	United	3255	4.993	9.890
Neither	7	10.629	9.289	By	4828	4.829	9.886
Describing	9	10.266	9.278	Than	1031	5.702	9.839
Enables	12	9.851	9.261	Citizens	284	7.065	9.836

Table 4. (continued)

Corpus EN-1				Corpus EN-3			
Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice	Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice
Sections	412	6.013	9.203	Kingdom	3093	4.947	9.821
18	417	5.995	9.193	Settled	319	6.869	9.760
Holder	84	7.307	9.180	Country	1213	5.406	9.679
As	3813	5.347	9.139	Parents	531	6.075	9.565
overseas	107	6.958	9.085	Were	782	5.604	9.488
				Automatically	127	7.723	9.463
				Subject	604	5.730	9.357
				Registration	605	5.694	9.322
				Born	515	5.856	9.313
				Or	15938	3.970	9.294
				I	1004	5.156	9.269
				are	7290	4.005	9.186
				Would	717	5.378	9.179
				Be	9713	3.911	9.156
				1983	264	6.452	9.133
				parent	731	5.314	9.133

As shown in Table 4 the most common collocate of “citizen” in the UK (EN-1) is *British* followed and often premodified by *overseas*, *territories* and *naturalization* in the context of naturalization and regulation of entry in the UK.

- (9) An application for registration of an adult or young person as a British **citizen** under Section 1(3), (3A) or (4), 3(1), (2) or must not be granted unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that the adult or young person is of good character (EN-1)
- (10) This fee is to be paid on submission of an application for naturalisation or registration as a British **citizen** or British Overseas Territories **citizen** or (EN-1)

In the case of the information corpus the most common collocate is *British* followed by *territories*, *overseas* and *descent* in the context of registration as a British citizen, and documentation and working in the UK.

- (11) In certain circumstances, your grandchildren would, if they were born stateless, also have an entitlement to registration as British Overseas **citizens** (normally within 12 months of their birth (EN-3)
- (12) Can an adopted person, who is a British **citizen** and who does not have a full birth certificate, prove their eligibility to work in the UK with their adoption certificate? (EN-3)

5.4 Grammatical categorization of “citizens” in UK legislation and information texts

Considering the word sketches of the lemma “citizen” in EN-1 is the subject of *have* and *be*, the object of *become* and *be*, pre-modified by *British*, *overseas*, *territories*, *union* and postmodified by *British*, *United Kingdom*.

- (13) This fee is to be paid on submission of an application for naturalisation or registration as a British **citizen** or British overseas territories **citizen** or for registration as a British overseas **citizen** or British subject, ... (EN-1)
- (14) This subsection applied to – (a) a British **citizen**, (b) a British overseas territories **citizen**, (c) a British National (Overseas), (d) a British overseas **citizen**, (e) a person who is a British subject under the British Nationality Act, 1981 ... (EN-1)

In EN-3 the lemma “citizen” is the subject of *be*, *have*, the object of *be*, *become*, premodified by *British*, *overseas*, *territories*, *Commonwealth*, and post modified by the *United Kingdom*, *British*, or *passport*.

- (15) Customs and travel. This explains how you can register as a British **citizen**, British overseas information territories **citizen**, British overseas **citizen**, or British subject if you are currently stateless. (EN-3)
- (16) The other referee must be the holder of a British **citizen** passport and either a professional person or over the age of 25. (EN-3)

In the case of “citizen” there are not important differences between EN-1 and EN-3. Both corpora share the most common collocates: *British*, *territories* and *overseas*; the difference is that in EN-1 one of the most frequent collocates, after those already mentioned, is *naturalization*, whereas in EN-3 one very common collocate is *descent*. *Be*, and *become*, are associated to the idea of being a British citizen or becoming a British citizen either by naturalisation in EN-1 or by descent in EN-3 as suggested by other terms such as *parents*, or *born*. The term *British* prevails in all possible associations and categorizations of “citizen” in both corpora as stated in Excerpts (13), (14), (15) and (16).

5.5 Collocations of “inmigrante” in Spanish legislation and information texts

The most common collocates of “inmigrante” are shown in Table 5 (Both the term in Spanish and the corresponding translation into English are offered). Only those collocates with a logDice of 9 or above have been included.

Table 5. Most frequent collocates of the lemma “inmigrante” in LADEX SP-1 and SP-3

Corpus SP-1				Corpus SP-3			
Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice	Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice
Refugiados (refugees)	114	11.460	12.378	Integración (integration)	182	9.201	12.379
Integración (integration)	576	10.123	12.259	Asociaciones (associations)	54	9.475	11.348
Asociaciones (associations)	172	10.451	11.765	Población (Population)	94	8.676	11.193
Social (social)	810	8.988	11.267	Personas (persons)	290	7.243	10.800
Personas (Persons)	822	7.932	10.216	Acceso (access)	146	7.555	10.528
Representen (represent)	20	11.293	10.093	Refuerzo (reinforcement/ support)	24	9.423	10.254
Humanitaria (humanitary)	88	9.418	10.061	Presencia (presence)	24	9.160	9.991
Llegada (arrival)	64	9.615	9.896	Educativo (educational)	92	7.484	9.978
Atención (attention)	286	8.133	9.855	Atención (attention)	98	7.393	9.956
Refuerzo (support)	10	11.971	9.820	Sociales (socials)	108	7.253	9.920
Vulnerabilidad (insecurity/ vulnerability)	18	11.123	9.781	Acogida (reception/ refugees)	118	7.125	9.885
Constituido (Constituted)	24	10.708	9.752	Administración (administration)	212	6.502	9.813
Costas (costs)	36	10.123	9.693	Numero (number)	158	6.704	9.752
Sociedad (society)	116	8.757	9.693	Participación (participation)	86	7.319	9.737
Organizaciones (organizations)	476	7.568	9.603	Solicitantes (applicants)	12	9.838	9.724
Acogida (reception)	246	7.935	9.546	Asilo (asylum)	24	8.838	9.669
Atracción (attraction)	6	12.293	9.425	Alumnado (student body)	36	8.253	9.616
Tripartita (tripartite)	8	11.878	9.415	Social (social)	210	6.294	9.596
Lleguen (arrive)	8	11.878	9.415	Mercado (market)	76	7.175	9.453

(continued)

Table 5. (continued)

Corpus SP-1				Corpus SP-3			
Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice	Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice
Asociaciones (associations)	14	11.070	9.385	Tanto (so)	198	6.116	9.368
Sociales (socials)	214	7.873	9.374	Situación (situation)	208	6.045	9.339
Irregulares (irregulars)	18	10.708	9.366	Autóctonas (native)	6	10.423	9.337
Lucha (fight/struggle)	58	9.020	9.184	Benefician (benefit)	8	10.008	9.328
Ceuta	74	8.668	9.117	Ser (be)	10	9.686	9.318
Melilla	74	8.668	9.117	Continuará (will continue)	10	9.686	9.318
Asilo (asylum)	76	8.630	9.109	Públicos (public)	114	6.590	9.313
				Ciudadanos (citizens)	218	5.977	9.311
				Animo (mood, spirit)	16	9.008	9.290
				Humanitaria (humanitarian)	18	8.838	9.281
				Lucro (profit)	18	8.383	9.281
				Jóvenes (young)	30	8.101	9.227
				Inmigrante (immigrant)	48	7.423	9.150
				Organizaciones (organizations)	50	7.364	9.142
				Irregular (irregular)	52	7.308	9.134
				Base (base)	52	7.308	9.134
				Servicios (services)	174	5.980	9.117
				Siendo (being)	58	7.150	9.109
				Como (as)	694	4.984	9.046

As indicated in Table 5, the most common collocate of “inmigrante” in the Spanish law (SP-1) corpus is *refugiados* (86%) followed by *integración*, *asociaciones*, *social* and *personas*.

- (17) dedicado a la recepción e integración de **inmigrantes**, así como al refuerzo educativo de ... (SP-1)
- (18) también ha de considerarse la representatividad en el caso de las asociaciones de **inmigrantes** y refugiados (SP-1)

In the case of the informative corpus (SP-3) *integración* (in almost 50% of the occurrences) is the most common collocate followed by *asociaciones*, *población* and *personas*.

- (19) ... Destinará 1 millón de euros a asociaciones de **inmigrantes** sin ánimo de lucro (SP-3)
- (20) ...en las próximas décadas la integración de **inmigrantes**, una de las prioridades del Gobierno... (SP-3)

5.6 Grammatical categorization of “inmigrante” in Spanish legislation and information texts

In the SP-1 the term “inmigrante” is the subject of *contar*, *corresponder* and *estar* (20% for each of the verbs), is modified by *irregular* in 75% of the cases, and modifies *asociación*, *integración* and *llegada*.

- (21) Proyectos para la integración social de los **inmigrantes**, así como el número de beneficiarios y... (SP-1)
- (22) Abordar la situación creada con la llegada de **inmigrantes** irregulares a las costas españolas... (SP-1)

As for SP-3 “inmigrante” is the object of *continuar* (1/3 of the cases), *venir* y *enviar*, is modified by *residente* in 100% of the cases and modifies *integración* (almost 50%), *asociación* and *presencia*.

- (23) integración y apoyo educativo a los **inmigrantes**. Población extranjera no comunitaria (SP-3)
- (24) comunidad autónoma y el número de alumnado **inmigrante** escolarizado en educación no universitaria (SP-3)

It is noticeable that *refugiados* is associated with “inmigrantes” in SP-1, usually under the expression *inmigrantes y refugiados*. The terms “refugiados” and “inmigrantes” have different statuses; the former is used for people who leave their country for political reasons and the latter when due to economic reasons. In one of the leading Spanish newspapers¹¹ UNHCR claims that the terms *refugiado* and *inmigrante* do not share the same meaning and that both terms should be used correctly. In our corpus, it seems that both groups appear associated in the context of receiving the same Government support as far as social integration, association rights, and representativity are concerned.

11. ABC, 12-9-2015.

Dispositions for the *asociación*, *llegada* and *integración* of immigrants seem to be the object of the Spanish law. Regarding SP-3 it appears that the information provided by official organisms in relation with “inmigrantes” tends to promote integration. Such word strongly collocates with *asociaciones*, *población* and *personas*, in an attempt to “humanize” the term “inmigrante”. In the SP-3 there are other terms that collocate with “inmigrante”, such as *educación*, *estudiantes*, and *social*, what can be interpreted as an additional attempt to integrate immigrants.

5.7 Collocations of “ciudadano” in Spanish legislation and information texts

The most common collocates of “ciudadano” are shown in Table 6 (Both the term in Spanish and its translation into English are offered). Only those collocates with a logDice of 9 or above have been included).

Table 6. Most frequent collocates of the lemma “ciudadano” in LADEX SP-1 and SP-3

Corpus SP-1				Corpus SP-3			
Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice	Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice
Estados (States)	462	8.788	11.355	Unión (union)	146	7.393	10.369
Unión (union)	994	8.208	11.277	UE (EU)	112	7.413	10.121
Miembros (members)	640	8.318	11.124	Rumanos (Romanians)	14	9.928	10.027
Electrónico (electronic)	172	9.500	11.120	Familiares (relatives)	194	6.621	9.859
Espanoles (Spaniards)	394	8.660	11.096	Argentino (Argentinian)	82	7.387	9.744
Miembro (member)	548	8.394	11.091	Australiano (Australian)	8	10.413	9.733
Publico (public)	336	8.282	10.579	Todos (all)	166	6.623	9.721
Acceso (access)	586	7.788	10.533	Búlgaros (Bulgarians)	12	9.828	9.715
Familiar (familiar)	838	7.429	10.405	Comunitario (member of the European Union)	36	8.243	9.715
Comunitario (of the European Union)	152	8.619	10.101	Europea (European)	194	6.135	9.374

Table 6. (continued)

Corpus SP-1				Corpus SP-3			
Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice	Collocation candidate	Frequency	MI	logDice
Familiares (relatives)	530	7.139	9.811	Registro (register)	28	8.191	9.227
Servicios (services)	1134	6.659	9.794	Inmigrantes (immigrants)	250	5.770	9.219
Estrictamente (strictly)	30	10.375	9.794	Residentes (residents)	150	6.185	9.186
Pareja (partner)	224	7.797	9.700	Países (countries)	270	5.658	9.167
Haga (does)	84	8.890	9.660	Asistencia (assistance)	172	5.987	9.117
Estado (state)	2736	6.186	9.634	Comunitarios (members of the European Union)	56	7.191	9.109
Tutela (custody/ protection)	180	7.960	9.631	Certificado (certificate)	64	6.998	9.077
Seguridad (Safety/ certainty)	554	6.869	9.574	Miembro (member)	68	6.911	9.061
Cargo (charge/ position)	510	6.873	9.516	Detenidos (under arrest)	76	6.750	9.030
Residencia (residence)	5872	5.693	9.279				
Institución (institution)	70	8.738	9.277				
Español (Spaniard)	1312	6.012	9.214				
Residentes (residents)	294	6.890	9.063				
Registrada (registered)	54	8.849	9.050				
Requieran (require)	64	8.604	0.27				
Electrónica (electronic)	198	7.238	9.011				

The most common collocate of “ciudadano” in the Spanish law corpus is *Estados* followed by the terms *unión* and *miembros* (which can refer to both the member States of the EU and also to the members of the citizens’ families) which also modifies that term.

(25) el derecho de residencia de los **ciudadanos** de la Unión y de los miembros de sus familias. (SP-1)

(26) la libre circulación y residencia en España de los **ciudadanos** de los estados miembros de la Unión Europea (SP-1)

In the case of the informative corpus (SP3) the most common collocates of “ciudadano” is *Unión* followed by *Comunidad Europea*.

(27) certificado de registro o tarjeta de familiar de **ciudadano** de la Unión (SP-3)

(28) entrada, libre circulación y residencia de los **ciudadanos** de la UE. (SP-3)

5.8 Grammatical categorization of “citizen” in Spanish legislation and information texts

In SP-1 the term “ciudadano” is the subject of *mantener* (80% of the cases), the object of *decir* (also in 80% of the cases) and *suscitar*, modifies *España* (in 1 out of 3 occurrences) as well as *familiar*, and is modified by *unión* (in more than 30% of the cases), *español*, *estados* and *comunitario*.

(29) derechos y servicios dados a ciudadanos españoles que viven fuera de España, así como ... (SP-1)

(30) ... competencias en materia de seguridad ciudadana y orden público, contendrá el informe... (SP-1)

In SP-3 “ciudadano” is the subject of *deber*, *ser*, *desear*, *decidir*, and *residir*, (the two first, *deber* and *ser*, with almost 17% of the occurrences), the object of *votar* (50%) modifies *familiar* (21.05%) *registro* (15.79%), *número* (10.52%), *pariente*, *proporción* *aportación*, *permanencia* and *detención*, (the last five terms with a 5.26%) and is modified mainly by *Unión*, *extranjero* and *UE* and also by *australiano*, *bulgario*, *comunitario*, *colombiano* and *argentino*.

(31) es importante recordar que cualquier extranjero, **ciudadano** de un país miembro de la UE (SP-3)

(32) A estos efectos, el cónyuge del **ciudadano** extranjero, sus hijos y los de su cónyuge... (SP-3)

In the SP-1 the term “ciudadano” is more strongly associated to *Unión* or to *miembros* or *estados*, than to *Español*. From this association emerges the idea that the Spanish law takes into account the fact that being a citizen of the EU, is similar to belonging to a supranation in the sense of transcending the established borders held by separate nations. The term “ciudadano” is also associated to *decir* in SP-1,

supporting the interpretation that gives a voice to the citizen of the member States of the EU. The rights allocated to these citizens are also valid for their families.

In SP-3 a “ciudadano” is given rights: the right of *votar*, *decidir*, *deseñar* and *residir*, but he also has *deberes*, and they appear in the environment of terms related to family (*familiares*). Other nationalities such as *australiano*, *bulgaro*, or *colombiano* are specifically mentioned. One of the “negative” terms in this corpus is *detención*, possibly linked to crime.

In the samples of text shown above the term “ciudadano” can be synonymous for several terms: in (29) is synonymous for national of Spain, in (31) for national of a State member of the EU, and in (32) for immigrant.

6. Discussion

One major result that attracts our attention from a linguistic point of view is the difference between the findings in the English and Spanish corpora in terms of the presence of immigrants. No migrants are found in the Spanish legislation (SP-1) or the Spanish information texts (SP-3) while there are no immigrants in the English legislation texts (EN-1) or the English information texts (EN-3) as reported in Pérez-Paredes et al. (2017). However, the term “immigration” is a frequent collocate of migrants. There is immigration, but no immigrants in the English legislation and information texts.

The word immigrant is defined in the Oxford dictionary as “A person who comes to live permanently in a foreign country” and migrant as “a person who comes from one place to another, especially in order to find work or better living conditions”. In EN-1 and EN-3 immigration is a fact and migrants are its subject.

Still, the term “immigrant” has a high presence in the UK media as shown in studies exploring the representation of immigrants in the British press (Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2008b; KhosraviNik 2010) during the same period in which our corpus was compiled (2007–2011). It thus seems that the media refer to immigrants and the administration to migrants, probably because the latter term has quite a neutral connotation as suggested by Betts,¹² or since the language can be considered a neutral tool to transform problematic social inputs into aseptic institutional outputs (Maryns 2013).

British administration and border control agencies have a longer tradition in legislating and informing on different topics related to immigration than their Spanish counterparts. In this sense, they may go a step forward by using an unbiased

12. <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34061097>

term. However, in the last three years the term migrant is starting to be used mainly by NGO or academics when dealing with this topic in Spain.

In the next two sections, we will discuss the results obtained considering the research questions posed for this paper.

6.1 Representation of immigrants/migrants and inmigrantes in the British and Spanish legislation and information texts

Migrants in the British legislation texts are found associated to “Tier” in the context of the five Tier visa system to get into the UK. The picture which emerges from this categorization is that migrants should be classified according to whether they are trying to enter the country for different purposes and so concerned with rights, law and order.

- (33) The Secretary of State has in these Regulations specified fees for the following applications: (1) leave to remain in the United Kingdom as a Tier 5 **migrant** (EN-1)

In the case of the information texts, *illegal* is the term most commonly associated to migrant, followed by *worker* and again the term *tier*. Remarkably, the term *illegal* is also the term most frequently found associated to immigrants in the British press according to the Migration Observatory and to Blinder and Allen (2016).

- (34) Number of illegal **migrant** workers detected on whom the employer conducted no checks. (EN-3)

As far as the Spanish legislation corpus is concerned, the term “inmigrante” appears associated mainly with *refugiado*, *integración*, *social*, *personas* and *asociaciones*. So the Spanish law seems to try to promote social integration in a fairly explicit way. As for the use of the term *personas* so highly associated with “inmigrante” both in SP-1 and SP-3, Jones (2016) states that speakers construct their identities by emphasizing their difference to others. In this very case, it could be argued that the Spanish law lays the foundation for constructing the identity of *inmigrantes* by highlighting what they have in common with “us”, their condition of *personas*, in an attempt to soften the ideological boundary between “us” and “them” (Perrino 2015). The usual string *personas inmigrantes*, favours the integration with us, *personas no inmigrantes*. However, “complex integration is then not only facilitated by legal entitlements and services provided by the host societies but also by the sociability of individuals from diverse backgrounds, their encounters in transnational places and their networks of interactions and relationships” (Trenz and Triandafyllidou 2017).

- (35) relacionados con la integración social de los **inmigrantes** y refugiados. (h)
Cooperar con otros órganos (SP-1)

In SP-3, “inmigrantes” are again associated with *integración, asociaciones, personas, población, and acceso*. The “inmigrante” portrayed here is someone (workers, students, residents, relatives) who could come to Spain and continue here to be schooled, to work or to find asylum. Again the integration of immigrants appears to be the goal of the texts. This integration takes place when migrants and locals have professional or cultural exchanges and establish interpersonal relationships (Duru and Trenz 2017). Nevertheless, and according to the data provided by the CIS 2015, Spanish people have negative perceptions towards immigration, which will not probably favour the integration fostered by the Spanish law. In this sense, the legislation and information texts issued by the Spanish Administrations could be considered as an attempt on the part of the Administration to counteract these negative views of public opinion.

- (36) afirma que la integración de los **inmigrantes** continuará siendo una prioridad durante (SP-3)

The noun with the strongest association with “inmigrante” in SP-1 is *refugees*, which does not appear in EN-1 and EN-3. Also, the term *asylum* also shows a strong association with immigrant in SP-1. In SP-3 *refugees* does not appear, but *asylum* is also a prominent associate. *Asylum seekers, refugees* and *immigrants* have a different status, different motivation for immigrating and are usually subject to different processes for admission in a country. However, research on the social functioning of language in institutional setting (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004) has identified “an institutional drive towards homogeneity that is implemented discursively through standard information processing procedures” (Maryns 2013: 71).

The British administration pictures immigrants as subjected to administration procedures highly controlled (Pérez-Paredes et al. 2017) and informs on working possibilities and social actions, whereas the Spanish administration establishes the procedures for the integration and association of immigrants and informs on their rights, integration, residence and work. It seems that the UK legitimates the control of this group of people (Charteris-Black 2006), while the Spanish law advocates for integration.

6.2 Representation of citizens and ciudadanos in the British and Spanish legislation and information texts

In the UK legislation texts the term “citizen” appears clearly associated to British in most cases, and also to *overseas*, *territories* and *naturalization* in the context of entry in the UK. However, if we look in detail at the word sketches of “citizen” in EN-1, it is observable that in some instances the term British is modified by the string “is not” or “are not” as in.

(37) this Act relating to those who are not British **citizens** (EN-1)

in the context of regulation of entry and stay. Thus, what we have in EN-1 is a clear distinction between the rights given to British citizens and those who are not British, establishing a difference between both situations, and supporting the idea of a linkage between citizenship and belonging, with the consequent associated rights (Bhambra 2016). This distinction between being or not a British citizen is not observable in the rest of the most common collocates of “citizen” in EN-1, such as *oversees*, *territories* or *Commonwealth*.

(38) the Commonwealth **citizens** who have the right of abode in the Isle of Man (EN-1)

Other common collocates of “citizen” are *naturalisation* and *registration* which appear in the context of the legal dispositions for becoming a British “citizen”.

(39) naturalisation as a British **citizen** under the 1981 Act; (EN-1)

Regarding EN-3, *British* is again the most common collocate of “citizen” followed by *territories*, *overseas* and *descent* to the effects of registering as a British citizen (in 80% of the cases), having the rights inherent to this citizenship and for working in the UK.

(40) have become a British **citizen** automatically (EN-3)

(41) for registration as a British **citizen** is contained in leaflet B N12 (EN-3)

The contexts of use of *British* as associated with “citizen”, are, however, different in both corpora (EN-1, EN-3). In EN-1 the association takes place in the context of regulation of entry and stay, and in EN-3 in the context of registration. However, EN-1 and EN-3 have in common that “citizens” are concerned with rights, law and order, as in the case of “migrant”.

We selected the term citizen to be analysed assuming that citizen could potentially be used as a synonym of immigrant, but in the UK legislation corpus this does not appear to be the case. The term citizen is used to specify the opposite, to refer to British, European or national citizens.

In SP-1, the most common collocate of “ciudadano” is *Estados*, followed by *Unión*, *miembros*, and *españoles*, in the sense of giving the same rights to the citizens of states members of the EU and their families as those inherent to Spaniards.

- (42) tarjeta vive a cargo del **ciudadano** de un Estado miembro de la Unión Europea (SP-1)

These rights are given not only to members of the EU but also to their partners.

- (43) Espacio Económico Europeo, con la que el **ciudadano** de la Unión mantiene una relación estable (SP-1)

The term “ciudadano” appears very often modified by *libre circulación y residencia*, *familiar*, etc. Mobility is one of the key principles that allow EU citizens to travel, settle, study or work in any of the member states. The rights to free movement inside the EU make intra EU migrants interconnected so that immigrants have been defined as “mobile citizens” (Recchi and Favell 2009) within the Europe of free movement.

- (44) libre circulación y residencia en España de **ciudadanos** de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea (SP-1)

This seems to be the idea backing the laws to guarantee the rights of *arrival*, *stay*, *family unit* and *free movement* in Spain for members of the EU.

As for SP-3, “ciudadanos” appear associated to *Unión*, *EU* and *comunitarios* in most cases, in the contexts of the rights given to members of the EU.

- (45) Libre circulación y residencia en España de los **ciudadanos** de los estados miembros de la Unión Europea. (SP-3)

It is also associated to some nationalities, such as Romanians or Bulgarians, to give information on regulations or processes that immigrants from those countries need to know while living in Spain. In this respect, a great flow of irregular immigrant from Romania and Bulgaria took place in the first years of the XXI century which increased over time. In 2008 Romanian immigrants became the most numerous (Viruela 2008), which is probably the reason for specifically addressing these citizens.

- (46) De diciembre afecta exclusivamente a los **ciudadanos** rumanos y búlgaros que deseen tener autorización para (SP-3)

It looks like “ciudadanos” in SP-1 are concerned with the EU and associated to residence and access to public services and in SP-3 with the EU and other nationalities. In contrast, citizen in EN-1 is related to regulation of entry and naturalization and in EN-3 is associated with registration as a British citizen and naturalization.

The main goal when compiling the LADEX corpora was to profile immigrants in the five countries involved in this project. We considered then that the collocates of the term “citizen” should also be explored as a possible synonym for immigrant. We have not been able to discover any synonymy in EN- 1 and EN-3, but we have found that the term “ciudadano” could be used as a synonym for immigrant in some cases in SP-3.

- (47) A estos efectos, el cónyuge del **ciudadano** extranjero, sus hijos y los de su cónyuge... (SP3)

This suggests that the use of “ciudadano extranjero” is more neutral than “immigrant”. The Spanish law and information texts tend to soften the use of the term “inmigrante” by adding words such as *personas* or *population* both in SP-1 and SP-3. In the case of “ciudadano”, with the addition of *extranjero*, it appears to refer to immigrant in a more neutral form. It could be argued that the use of *extranjero* is being used as an antonym of *nacional*, but as we have already seen, in SP-1 and SP-3 “ciudadano” is highly associated to EU member states rather than to Spaniard(s).

Pérez Paredes et al. (2017) profiled the immigrant in the legislative and informative texts produced by the British Administration as someone subjected to control processes. Our study shows that the Spanish administration seems to favour the integration of immigrants.

According to Hoey (2005), it is not possible to fully understand the meaning of a word without considering its collocation priming. We hope that this work represents a contribution to shaping the prosody of the terms investigated in the contexts analysed and therefore to the lexicon of both languages and countries.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant FFI2011-30214: *Lenguaje de la Administración Pública en el ámbito de la extranjería: estudio multilingüe e implicaciones culturales*).

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PART II

Framing migration as a crisis of identity II

Argumentation, pragmatic and figurative strategies

A humanitarian disaster or invasion of Europe?

2015 migrant crisis in the British press

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This study sought to find out how language resources were employed to reflect the changing media attitude towards immigrants during the 2015 Migrant Crisis. Combining relevant analytical categories of the Socio-Cognitive Approach (Van Dijk 1991), the Discourse-Historical Approach (Wodak 2001) and the Social Actor Analysis (van Leeuwen 2008) with Corpus Linguistic techniques, it compared the British media coverage of two critical cases; the Death of Aylan Kurdi, and the Cologne Sexual Assaults. The findings show that in both cases, regardless of news content, immigration was problematized as a *crisis*, *controversy*, and *catastrophe*. The scale of the tragedy and the possibility of an immigrant influx to the UK deeply influenced the media representation of the immigrants.

Keywords: immigration, British press, media attitude, discourse topics, social actors

1. Introduction

Immigration has always been an area of concern for European society, which is apparent from the rising number of extremist movements like Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Pegida), the English Defence League (EDL) besides the increasing popularity of the far right political parties like the UK Independence Party (UKIP), Lega Nord and Front National (see Wodak, KhosraviNik and Mral 2013). However, it has become a much more pressing issue in Europe when the migrant crisis reached its peak in 2015, with a record number of immigrants¹ from war-torn areas like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan (UNHCR 2016). This moment was historically significant because the crisis had high news

1. The term immigrant was used to refer to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

value with its recency, negativity, and proximity for the media (Bell 1991). The British media reported on the crisis intensively, which can be seen from the spike in usage of the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ in the national newspapers of 2015 (Ruz 2015; Cranz 2016). Mc Cullagh (2002) explained that the media do not just present information about the events and issues but provide interpretative frames for the public to understand the reality in a specific way by means of careful selection and organization of the facts. The way the media represented the 2015 migrant crisis is of great importance because as the “principal institutions of the public sphere” (Curran 1991: 29), the media have immense influence on our understanding of ethnic relations (van Dijk 1987). Fairclough (1989: 54) stated:

The hidden power of media discourse and the capacity of the capitalist class and other power-holders to exercise this power depend on systematic tendencies in news reporting and other media activities. A single text on its own is quite insignificant: the effects of media power are cumulative, working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of positioning the reader, and so forth.

The media outlets are the main instrument of communicating formulations of ethnic prejudices which are not inherent, but acquired through exposure to predetermined configurations during socialization (van Dijk 1987; Baker et al. 2008). They offer a specific lens on reality through foregrounding or backgrounding certain aspects with the help of careful textual choices (Fowler 1991; Entman 1993). Previous research has shown that the media has had a rather negative stance towards the immigrants by framing them as a threat to the economy, security, national identity and culture (van Dijk 1988; Wodak 2001; Greenslade 2005; Gabrieleitos and Baker 2008; Rydgren 2008). By analysing the British newspapers’ coverage of the two cases from the 2015 migrant crisis, the aim of this study was to examine how language contributed to the framing of the immigrants by the media, which is known to influence readers’ attitudes towards these groups of people (Lido 2006). My work originated from the presumption that the media response to the immigrants differed greatly as both events triggered strikingly conflicting reactions from the public about the status of the immigrants in Europe (Borrud 2016). In terms of Chilton (1987), they were both critical discourse moments, as the first one was concerned with the coverage of the three-year-old Syrian child Aylan Kurdi’s death, while he was trying to cross the Aegean Sea with his family to reach Europe in the search of a better life. The iconic image not only showing his lifeless body on a beach but also epitomizing the hardship of the immigrants was screened 20 million times in only 12 hours and evoked an unmatched response from the public in a way that remarkably changed the debate on immigration (Vis and Goriunova 2015). The second case was about the media coverage of the New Year’s Eve mass sexual

assaults in Cologne, claimed to be committed by the immigrant males that came to Germany after Merkel's announcement of Germany's open-door policy to the refugees. The incident caused hardening of attitudes towards the immigrants in host cultures (Yardley and Wallace 2016). In the timeline of the 2015 migrant crisis, both cases were remarkable as the image of a three year old migrant child's washed up body stirred the conscience of the public about the tragedy of the immigrants, whereas the latter caused alarm about the difficulty of integrating huge numbers of immigrants from different cultures into the settled European societies. The media reporting on these two cases provides a rich database to observe in what ways language resources were exploited by media outlets to cast an attitudinal change towards the immigrants.

The newspapers chosen for the study are *the Sun*, *the Daily Mail*, *the Times* and *the Guardian*. The criteria for selection were the circulation figures, reporting style (quality press vs. popular press) and political affiliations of the newspapers. Only the texts including the search terms and those published within the one month span of each event's occurrence were downloaded from the NexisUK database. As discourse is considered to be an output of the bilateral interaction between ideology and language (Trew 1979), the newspaper coverage of both cases were studied within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) which "primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context" (Van Dijk 2001: 352). My analytical framework draws upon a combination of the analytical categories of the Socio-Cognitive Approach (van Dijk 1991), the Discourse-Historical Approach (henceforth DHA) (Wodak 2001) and the Social Actor Analysis (van Leeuwen 2008) to discover relevant discourse topics besides characteristics, features and qualities attributed to the immigrants. In order to reduce researcher bias and provide more objective results (Baker 2006), the Corpus Linguistic softwares Wmatrix (Rayson 2008) and Wordsmith 6.0 (Scott 2012) were used to analyse the data which was rather big for manual analysis. My research questions were: 1. Which discourse topics were associated with the immigrants in each case? 2. How were the immigrants as social actors constructed and represented linguistically in each case?

This paper has been divided into seven parts. Following this introduction, the second section reviews the major studies on immigration discourse whilst the third section provides information about the analytical framework. The fourth section offers a view on the historical background of the 2015 immigration crisis. The fifth section presents data selection and collection methods. In the Analysis, the corpus was examined with the help of Corpus Linguistic techniques within the CDA framework. Finally, the seventh section presents discussion and concluding remarks.

2. Previous research on immigration discourse

Critical discourse research on immigration has received increasing recognition and importance over the past decades following the rising number of displaced people and increasing hostility towards them in the host cultures. As discourse is “socially shaped, it is also socially shaping, or constitutive” (Fairclough 1995: 132), the CDA adopts a critical stance towards latent ideologies communicated and circulated through carefully structured language units in texts to understand, reveal and resist social inequality (van Dijk 2001). Although there are different approaches and methodologies in the CDA (Weiss and Wodak 2003), it is possible to say that the *us vs. them* dichotomy is the exact locus of any sort of textual research on discourse surrounding ethnic relations and immigration. Due to space limitations, only a few studies on the British media and political discourse over immigration could be covered in this section. As a part of the large scale RASIM Project (see Baker et al. 2008), KhosraviNik (2009) investigated representations of the refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants between 1999 and 2006 to compare how media reacted to the immigration in the Balkan Conflict (1999) and the British General Election (2005). Drawing upon the Socio-Cognitive Approach (van Dijk 1991), the DHA (Wodak 2001) and the Social Actor Analysis (van Leeuwen 2008), he examined the topics, topoi, micro-linguistic features and metaphors surrounding them. His findings showed that the distance of these groups of people to the UK and the extent of tragedy involved led to a relatively more positive representation of them as in the media coverage of the Kosovan refugees. However, a more negative stance was observed in the coverage of the political propaganda running up to the 2005 General Elections as they were widely identified with threat, danger, and numbers of an overwhelming mass. Within the RASIM Project, another study was undertaken by Gabriele Tos and Baker (2008) who adopted a corpus based approach to examine the discursive construction of the immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees in a 140 million word corpus. Analysis of the keywords and consistent collocates revealed that these groups of people were generally contextualised within negative semantic fields like terrorism, crime, economic burden, and security concerns through lexical associations like *bogus*, *illegal*, and *alien*. Another diachronic study was carried out by Lamb (2014) who investigated how articulations of race, nationality, and ways of representing the migrants and refugees have led to their marginalisation since the 1960s. Blending the DHA (Wodak 2001) and the Social Actor Analysis (van Leeuwen 2008), it was seen that migrants were appraised in terms of being a burden on social welfare and economic systems, disaster and numbers in all periods. Another striking finding throughout all periods is the text producers’ effort to show themselves as anti-racist while they were campaigning for stricter

regulations. In addition to the denial of racism, the categorization of the immigrants into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ was also observed.

Within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics, Charteris-Black (2006) analysed metaphors in the right wing political campaign in the 2005 General Elections in the UK. It was seen that to justify their anti-immigration policies, right-wing politicians employed NATURAL DISASTER and CONTAINER metaphors. Immigration was framed as a destructive flood or tidal wave. While talking about the country, the HOUSE metaphor within the CONTAINER schema was employed. In this way, the necessity to exclude the outsiders to protect the insiders was underlined. From an evolutionary perspective, Hart (2013) examined the cognitive aspects of the argumentation strategies adopted by the British media in their reproduction of discriminatory discourse against the immigrants. By means of the frequent use of the topoi of finance, burden, displacement and abuse, which led to the representation of the immigrants as violators of the social contract and welfare system, the media activated the cheater-detector and avoidance mechanisms. Despite employing different approaches to discourse, research mentioned in this section reveals that there was a consistent negative stance to the immigration in the British media and politics.

3. Methodology

In order to examine the role of language in the changing representations of the immigrants in between the coverage of the death of Aylan Kurdi and the Cologne Sexual Assaults, relevant analytical categories from several CDA approaches were adopted. For the analysis of the discourse topics, the Socio-Cognitive Approach (van Dijk 1991) was adopted as it draws attention to the power elites’ manipulation of the discourse topics in communication and circulation of a specific ideology over a contentious issue or a social group. van Dijk (1988: 35) stated that “Topics are crucial in the overall understanding of a text, e.g., in the establishment of global coherence; and they act as a semantic, top-down control on local understanding at the microlevel”. They function like frames (see Entman 1993) which highlight, downplay, exaggerate or obscure certain aspects of reality with the help of critical textual choices. As they present an issue in a way “to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993: 52), the strategic control of the flow and circulation of knowledge can be achieved through tightly orchestrated topic formation or selection about a social or political issue in accordance with the dominant ideology (Hall et al. 1980; Tuchman 1978; van Dijk 1987). As semantic macrostructures connected to social cognition, discourse topics channel the encoders to understand and evaluate social

actors and associated actions in a specific way by means of lexical and syntactical choices. Van Dijk's work has shown that they are generally associated with negative discourse topics such as crime, terror, and illegality (van Dijk 1991).

Considering the representation of the immigrants as social actors, a triangulation of the relevant analytical categories of the DHA (Wodak 2001) and the Social Actor Analysis (van Leeuwen 2008) was employed. The DHA advises investigation and evaluation of discourse events with reference to the historical resources and socio-political background. It aims to discover specific discursive strategies used to represent an individual or a group positively or negatively. The five types of discursive strategies, which are *referential* or *nomination*, *predicational*, *argumentation*, *perspectivization* and *intensification*, were offered to discover the formation of identities and justification of inclusionary or exclusionary attitude towards *them*. Only the first two strategies were focussed on in this study as they are more relevant to the Social Actor Analysis. *Referential* or *nomination strategies* are concerned with membership categorization devices such as biological, naturalizing, and depersonalizing metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 47), the way an actor is named "can serve many different psychological, social or political purposes [...] on the side of the speakers or writers". For instance, considering the case of Aylan Kurdi's death, labelling the child as a 'Syrian refugee', 'little angel' or 'economic migrant' has different effects on our understanding of his status. *Predicational strategies* which cannot be separated from *referential* or *nomination strategies* were described as "the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to people, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena" (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 54). They are about positive and negative evaluative attributions and help us identify social actors with reference to quality, quantity, space and time through predicative nouns, adjectives, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures.

Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Analysis (2008), which overlaps with these two discursive strategies, is a comprehensive socio-semantic inventory based on social, lexical, and grammatical categories to understand the way social actors are represented in texts. His categorization starts with the distinction between exclusion and inclusion, as text producers may opt to involve or ignore social actors in a way that serves their interests. Due to space limitations and purposes of the study, only the relevant categories of inclusion were explained in the following paragraphs. The first analytical category is activation/passivation which is concerned with the representation of the social actors as the dynamic, active agents or passive recipients of an action. Mills (1995: 143-144) argued that it "is about how actions are represented; what kind of actions appear in a text, who does them and to whom they are done". As Kress and Hodge (1993) stated, causality is tightly linked to the activation or passivation of an actor. The second category is individualisation/assimilation which

means the actors can be referred to as individuals or groups. Foregrounding an actor as an individual facilitates encoders' identification with him/her. Assimilation is later divided into collectivisation and aggregation. Collectivisation is instantiated through plurality and nouns showing a mass, while aggregation is realized in terms of quantification which represents social actors as statistics. Aggregation is useful for manufacturing consent as it provides legitimation through showing what the majority thinks or does (van Leeuwen 2008). The third category is nomination/categorization. As the name implies, nomination means referring to social actors in terms of their names and titles in a formal, semi-formal, or informal way. Nameless actors in a text lead to dehumanization whilst the way an actor is named affects our stance to them (Richardson 2007). On the other hand, social actors can be categorised in terms of their functions or identities. Functionalization depicts characters with reference to the actions they do while identification describes who they are. The latter divides into classification, relational identification, and physical identification. The first subgroup is concerned with categorizing people with regard to their gender, age, race, ethnicity, wealth, religious orientation, and social class. Relational identification classifies social actors in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relations with others. Finally, physical identification portrays social actors in terms of physical characteristics. Representing actors in terms of their function or identity influences our perception of them. For instance, describing someone as a 35-year-old Syrian doctor and father in contrast to a 20-year-old unskilled male would provide much more different perspectives about their status.

As my dataset is big for a detailed and objective manual analysis, I took advantage of Corpus Linguistic tools to examine discourse topics and representation of the immigrants. I used the USAS semantic annotation set within Wmatrix (Rayson 2009) to find out discourse topics associated with the immigrants. As semantic macrostructures (van Dijk 1988), topics are "construed by a probability distribution over a fixed vocabulary" (Murakami et al. 2017: 246) which means certain words are highly associated with certain topics. For instance, we are more likely to see words like *plight*, *flee* and *squalor* in the texts with the topic of immigration. Considering topics as "a recurring pattern of word co-occurrence" (Brett 2012), automated semantic tagging enables us to see the aboutness or the salient discourse topics of a text. The USAS automatic tagging system, which is based upon the Longman Lexicon of Contemporary English (McArthur 1981), is made up of a hierarchical system of semantic categories under 21 main discourse fields with 232 subcategories (see Archer, Wilson and Rayson 2002). Rather than single keywords which show statistically significant words in each corpus, this software enabled finding out grand semantic categories associated with the immigrants by grouping low frequency synonyms or semantically related words together which can be ideal to avoid repetition and thus excluded from the key word lists (Baker

2006). I also used Wordsmith 6.0 (Scott 2012) to observe linguistic tendencies in the collocations and concordances of the search terms ‘migrant(s), asylum seeker(s) and refugee(s). Collocational analysis is concerned with statistical determination of the consistent patterns in the co-occurrence of two words. It provides information about the most prevalent ideas engaged with a word (Baker 2006). Concordance analysis is the examination of a given word in its context on the left or right side (Gabrieletos and Baker 2008). As Hunston (2010: 9) noted, concordances group “many instances of a word or phrase, allowing the user to observe regularities in use that tend to remain unobserved when the same words or phrases are met in their normal contexts”. Seeing various instances of a word’s usage in a context would help to understand linguistic tendencies about it.

4. Background to the events

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (2016), approximately 12.4 million people were forced to move out of their homelands due to conflict and persecution in 2015. Whilst Europe has always been a haven for immigrants, the continent witnessed the greatest wave of migration in 2015 since the Second World War. A record number of 1.3 million people applied for asylum in the EU states, which is nearly as twice high as the migration into Europe in 1992, after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Connor 2016). The immigrants, mainly from the conflict-ridden countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria tried to reach Europe via perilous crossings in the Mediterranean Sea, some of which ended up in deadly accidents like the one in the waters off the Italian island Lampedusa with a death toll of 650. The rising number of immigrants heading towards Northern European countries after reaching Southern Europe increased the tension in the political and public sphere which led to strict border controls and violent clashes between the police and the immigrants. For the purposes of this study, two cases with historical significance in the timeline of the European Migrant Crisis were chosen. The first case was concerned with the death of the three-year-old Syrian child Aylan Kurdi, who drowned on the 2nd of September 2015 while trying to cross the Aegean Sea on a rubber boat with his family to reach the Greek island of Kos. The image of his lifeless body lying on the shore sparked an unprecedented international outcry which forced European leaders to review their migration policies (Smith 2015). The German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s announcement about the open-door policy to the displaced people from the war-torn regions not only caused a surge in the flow of migrants, but also fuelled the debate about the integration of the immigrants and the sustainability of free circulation within the union. The second case was about the mass sexual assaults and robberies that

were claimed to be committed by the male immigrants with a North-African and Arab origin in the German city of Cologne on New Year's Eve. Hundreds of sexual assaults, thefts and five rapes were reported to the police. Half of the suspects were reported to be foreign nationals that recently arrived in Germany (Noack 2016). The recent rise of sexual crime in Germany resulted in the passing of a stricter sexual assault law which facilitates the deportation of the immigrants involved in the related crime. Whilst the government and the media were severely criticized for trying to cover up the organized crime for the fear of awakening hatred against the immigrants, a few were badly attacked in several cities and far right groups such as Pegida organized rallies to protest Germany's open-door policy (Hume 2016).

5. Data

The data were collected from hard news, editorials, and opinion columns of four British dailies and their Sunday editions which are *The Guardian*, *The Times*, *The Sun* and *The Daily Mail*. While choosing the newspapers; reporting style, political affiliations, and circulation figures were taken into consideration. The former two are known as quality newspapers whilst the Guardian has a liberal left stance and the Times is conservative (Smith 2017). The latter two are both tabloids with conservative views (ibid.). The data were downloaded from the NexisUK database within the span of one month of both events. The newspaper articles on Aylan Kurdi's death were searched with the keywords 'Aylan Kurdi' and 'Alan Kurdi' between 2.09.2015 and 2.10.2015 whilst the data concerning the Cologne Sexual Assaults were browsed with the keywords of 'Cologne', 'New Year' and 'Sexual Assaults' between 31.12.2015 and 31.01.2016. Table 1 shows the size of the newspaper corpus concerning both events.

Table 1. The size of newspaper corpus

Newspaper	The Death of Aylan Kurdi		The Cologne Sex Assaults	
	Number of articles	Number of words	Number of articles	Number of words
The Guardian	68	65.500	42	39.191
The Times	35	29.788	34	20.516
The Daily Mail	18	17.729	39	25.415
The Sun	43	20.450	61	22.627
<i>Total</i>	164	133.467	166	107.749

When comparing the number of words in each newspaper corpus in both cases, it is seen that the tragic death of the three-year-old Syrian child Aylan Kurdi received

much more attention from the quality newspapers than the tabloids. On the other hand, the sexual attacks in Cologne on New Year's Eve which were reported to be committed by the male immigrants with Arab or North African origin had relatively much more coverage in the tabloids. Although the tabloids tend to have shorter forms of news texts than the broadsheets (Pennock 2000), both *The Sun* and *The Daily Mail* reported much more than *the Times* about the Cologne Sexual Assaults considering the number of words. The considerably larger volume of bad news about the immigrants in tabloids is not only a reflection of the tabloids' long term negative and accusatory stance to the immigration (Gabrieletos and Baker 2008; Baker 2010) but also an attempt to create negative mental mappings as reiteration of a particular topic in media reinforces its retention in collective consciousness (Fiske and Taylor 1991).

6. Analysis

Following Richardson (2007: 47) who noted "Words convey the imprint of society and of value judgements in particular they convey connoted as well as denoted meanings", my analysis began with finding out the most dominant semantic categories, therefore discourse topics with the help of the USAS (Rayson 2009). Only the first 50 key semantic categories were taken into consideration as they presented the most significant data. The concordances of each category were carefully read to discover lexis engaged with them. Figure 1 shows prevalent semantic categories and associated lexis in both corpora.

A general view of the data in Figure 1 reveals that the semantic categories, therefore discourse topics in both corpora were generally negative despite remarkably contrasting contextualisations. The semantic domains in the Aylan Kurdi corpus were concerned with the plight of the immigrants (difficult, sad, dead, weak, warfare, kin, quantities, time: new and young, trying hard) and the public reaction (helping, residence, ethical, money, wanted, emotional actions, states and processes, strong obligation, or necessity). The concordances of each semantic category reveal that there was wide public sympathy towards the misfortune of the immigrants and they were generally positioned as victims. In (1), while immigrants were portrayed as passive objects of persecution and a forced journey rather than volitional agents, collective empathy towards them was requested through highly emotive vocabulary (bold added in all examples).

- (1) **ONLY somebody with a heart of stone** could fail to be moved by the **plight** of families from Syria and other countries **desperately** making their way to the relative safety of Western Europe. (*The Sun*, 10 September 2015)




Figure 1. The key semantic categories in the newspaper corpora

On the other hand, the key domains in the Cologne Sex Assaults corpus were related to the deviance (relationship: intimacy and sex, damaging and destroying, law and order), conflict (unethical, no obligation or necessity, inclusion, worry, judgement of appearance) and political criticism towards the open door policy (no constraint and foolish). The immigrants were represented as aberrant and uncontrollable whilst the tone was rather distressing. In (2), words like Casablanca, North Africa and Maghreb not only show the geographic origin but also implied social and cultural incongruence of the immigrants through identifying them as distant and alien to the German culture. The possibility of social harmony was contradicted through crime related lexis characterising immigrants.

- (2) German police arrested 40 suspects in an operation codenamed **Casablanca** targeting **high levels of crime** by members of the north African community after the **sex attacks** on women on New Year's Eve. The raids in a district of Düsseldorf known as the "**Maghreb quarter**" were designed to show that there were **no "no-go" areas for police**, amid concern that **migrant crimes** were being overlooked. *(The Times, 19 January 2016)*

There were also common categories in both corpora which can be grouped as illegality (crime), threat (danger, fear/shock, violent/angry), problem (failure, evaluation: bad, no respect, size: big) and movement (moving/coming/going, location and direction). Immigrants were framed as unruly, and threatening masses that were streaming into Europe. In (3), the author portrayed them as a huge mob that should be kept out of the country.

- (3) Maybe I'm heartless. Maybe I'm mistaken. But I'm not convinced that the answer to the unfolding humanitarian disaster in Syria is to open our borders to **tens of thousands of refugees**. (*The Daily Mail*, 12 September 2015)

Subsequent to the overview of the key semantic categories and associated discourse topics, the analysis was furthered with a detailed examination of the concordances of the search terms that represented the main social actors of the migrant crisis which were migrant(s), asylum seeker(s) and refugee(s). The term 'immigrant' was excluded from the analysis as the search results showed rather rare uses of it throughout the corpus. Before discussing the data in Table 2 which presents the distribution of the search terms in both corpora, it is necessary to define migrant, asylum seeker, and refugee. According to the Oxford Dictionary of English (2003), a migrant is a person who moves from one place to another so as to find work or better living conditions. Asylum seeker is described as a person who has left home country as a political refugee to seek asylum in another country. On the other hand, a refugee is defined as a person who has to leave his/her country of origin to escape from war, persecution, or a natural disaster. It should be noted that being 'forced' is the key term in the distinction between migrant and refugee as the latter doesn't leave their country willingly but compelled to escape because of death threat or oppression. Refugees not only have legal status under international law but also awaken empathy whereas migrant is a rather neutral term as they are not urged to flee (Cranz 2016). The way major actors are named in the migrant crisis is of great significance as conflating the terms may "lead to problems for refugees and asylum seekers, as well as misunderstanding in discussions of asylum and migration" (Edwards 2016).

Table 2. The distribution of social actors in both corpora

	migrant(s)			asylum seeker(s)			refugee(s)		
	Aylan Kurdi	Cologne Sexual Assaults		Aylan Kurdi	Cologne Sexual Assaults		Aylan Kurdi	Cologne Sexual Assaults	
The Guardian	99	106		32	43		726	227	
The Times	86	150		29	39		266	66	
The Sun	72	151		11	45		150	73	
The Daily Mail	70	167		2	33		106	33	

As can be seen in Table 2, all newspapers used ‘migrant(s)’ and ‘asylum seekers(s)’ more frequently in their reporting of the Cologne Sexual Assaults than the coverage of the Aylan Kurdi’s death. On the other hand, the term ‘refugee(s)’ was more frequently used in the reporting of the drowning of Aylan Kurdi. Such a conspicuous change can be a result of the connotations of the terms as the term ‘refugee(s)’ is more emotionally charged than the other two terms and evokes much more sympathy.

6.1 Analysis of the corpus of the death of Aylan Kurdi

An overview of the collocations and concordances of the search terms, which are migrant(s), asylum seekers(s) and refugee(s), showed that all newspapers expressed concern and sympathy in varying degrees for the hardship of the immigrants through words like *plight*, *desperate*, *destitute*, *squalor*, and *vulnerable*. *The Daily Mail* had the most negative stance while the other three newspapers covered the immigrants more positively with a focus on humane aspects such as being tired, terrified, or sobbing with relief. In (4), a moment of affection was depicted to show that the immigrants were not callous mobs but individuals who had emotional intimacy like any of the readers.

- (4) Inside a small tent, at 8.40 in the morning, surrounded by squalor and exhaustion – piles of clothing, empty sleeping bags, prone and sleeping people – **a young refugee couple turn to each other, hug, and kiss.**

(*The Guardian*, 22 September 2015)

On the other hand, their onward progress was problematized in all newspapers through collocations of the search terms with *crisis*, *chaos*, and *catastrophe*. In addition, numbers showing large quantities and metaphorical phrases like *mass exodus*, *tidal wave*, and *an uncontrolled flood* were frequently used to underline the gravity of the problem. In accordance with previous research (Gabrieletos and Baker 2008; Baker 2010) all newspapers defined the immigrants’ progress as illegal. The validity of the immigrants’ motives was also heavily questioned through the phrases like *genuine asylum seekers*, *proper refugees*, and *economic migrants* in *The Daily Mail*. These phrases were used in quotation marks in *The Guardian* to express criticism towards such usage.

Considering the activation/passivation, the most striking frame was the depiction of the immigrants as the helpless objects of the oppressive people and hard circumstances as in (5) and (8). In (5), the misery was stressed by associating a child with lexis showing despair and poverty. Although ‘fleeing’ shows an action carried out by the immigrants, the movement was rationalized by referring to the causes of the forcible displacement. Legitimizing the movement through causality is a recurrent strategy in the corpus, as was the case in (5).

- (5) **Children like two-year-old Narien**, who stares **forlornly** from the **sweltering, fly-blown tent she calls home** in a refugee camp in northern Syria. Her short life has been spent **fleeing** men with guns, whether from President Assad's regime, which bombs its own people, or from the murderous IS.

(*The Sun*, 10 September 2015)

Despite frequently positive representations of the immigrants, there were also negative portrayals in which they were the agents of unmanageable and lawless behaviour such as "press forward against razor wire fences" (*The Daily Mail*, 19 September 2015) or else "smuggled themselves through the Channel tunnel" (*The Times*, 9 September 2015). In (6), they were framed as unpredictable and wild.

- (6) Coastguards and riot police armed with batons struggled to control around 2500 people, screaming "Keep back" at the crowds as they **surged** towards a government-chartered ship bound for Athens.

(*The Guardian*, 8 September 2015)

Regarding the categories of individualisation/assimilation, there was a general tendency to refer to the immigrants as a horde, which not only blurred the individual differences but also created a sense of a homogenous and faceless crowd. In (7), assimilation was realized through collectivization. The stark contrast between 'some' immigrants with legitimate motives and 'many others' with opportunistic ideals was underlined not only to generalize them but also to delegitimize their acts.

- (7) **Tens of millions of people** in the Middle East and Africa are bent upon quitting their native lands to make a new life in Europe. **Some** are indeed victims of war and famine. **Many others**, though, especially from West Africa, are trying to take advantage of the fact that our continent offers a vastly more promising future for them than they could have in their own countries.

(*The Daily Mail*, 4 September 2015)

There were also instances of individualisation throughout the corpus. While *The Sun*, *The Times* and *The Guardian* more frequently identified the immigrants as individuals, *The Daily Mail* only did it if they were involved in crime. When individualised, the immigrants were nominated and frequently categorised with reference to their familial bonds, age, nationality, ethnic origins, and occupation. In *the Guardian* and *the Times*, there were frequent references to the religious orientations of the immigrants whereas the other newspapers' avoidance from such reference could be an intentional move so as not to sound Islamophobic. As in (8), individualised immigrants were allowed to narrate their personal stories and motives in *The Sun*, *The Times* and *The Guardian*.

- (8) “The people in Germany welcoming the refugees encourage me much more to flee,” said **Mohammad Burhan, 30**, who was buying a ticket **with his pregnant wife, a teacher, his 15-month-old son and his 60-year-old mother**. The family fled their farm near the Syrian town of Zabadani, which **has been under siege by regime forces since the start of July**. He said that their fields were heavily mined and hundreds of fruit trees were dying. (*The Times*, 9 September 2015)

Analysis of the collocations and concordances of the search terms show that excluding *The Daily Mail* the newspapers in general adopted an empathetic approach by focusing on the causes of the immigration and detailed portrayals of the tragedy of the immigrants. Individuation and representation of them as family members also contributed to this relatively positive coverage.

6.2 Analysis of the corpus of the Cologne Sexual Assaults

A general view of the of the collocations and concordances of the search terms migrant(s), asylum seekers(s) and refugee(s) revealed that except for *the Guardian* which had a more neutral stance, there was a strong negative attitude towards the immigrants through lexical associations such as *angry*, *threatening*, *aggressive*, and *alien*. Immigration was identified with terrorism and crime, for immigrants were frequently portrayed as *gangs*, *thongs*, *thugs*, and *jihadists*. Contrary to the coverage of the death of Aylan Kurdi, there were nearly no references to the causes of immigration in *the Sun*, *the Daily Mail* and *the Times*. When mentioned, the motive for migration was simplified as opportunism. Similar to the findings of Arcimaviciene (this volume) and A’Beckett (this volume) immigration was also framed as troublesome and threatening through the use of numbers, water metaphors, and words like *crisis*, *controversy*, *debate*, and *illegal* throughout the corpus.

Considering the activation/passivation, it was seen that they were generally represented as active agents of violence, sexual offences, and anti-social behaviour such as *groping*, *robbery*, and *attacking* and *molesting* as in (9):

- (9) We had a grim warning of what this means on New Year’s Eve, when **gangs of hundreds of young men of North African or Middle Eastern appearance**, many of them apparently drunk and **speaking Arabic**, crowded around female revellers in Cologne and Hamburg, and **robbed** them while **committing vile sexual assaults** (*The Daily Mail*, 8 January 2016)

When they were represented in passive clauses, they were the objects of formal procedures, instructions or prohibitions by the officials to make them integrate or comply with the rules of the society such as “being given lessons in how to flirt” (*The Sun*, 24 January 2016) or “banned from a public swimming pool after women

complained of sexual harassment” (*The Times*, 16 January 2016). As for individualization/assimilation, there was a general tendency to collectivize the immigrants as masses of males with a focus on untamed behaviour, which was deemed “as a recipe for disaster” (*The Daily Mail*, 21 January 2016) or “demographic time bomb” (*The Times*, 7 January 2016). (10) exemplifies how all the immigrants were generalized as ‘men’ as if there were no female immigrants.

- (10) And above all it ensures that we do not face the demographic time bomb that Merkel has ticking at the heart of Germany – **a million plus young Muslim men** who care nothing about western values of freedom and equality.

(*The Sun*, 24 January 2016)

There were also a few instances of individualization through which a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants was noted. The former group was formed by the already assimilated or newly arrived immigrants who expressed their sympathy for the victims of the attacks. There was a common trend to individualize the ‘good’ immigrants whilst the ‘bad’ ones who upset the social harmony were collectivized as in (9) and (10). (11) shows individualization of a socially acceptable immigrant.

- (11) **Shackar Hassoun, 47, who arrived a year ago from Damascus**, said: “This sexual abuse was social terrorism. I fled Syria because of terrorism and I was very sad that it should happen here, especially on a special occasion.”

(*The Times*, 16 January 2016)

Except for *the Guardian*, there was an inclination to identify the immigrants with regard to their gender, age, geographic origin, ethnicity, and religious orientation as in (9) and (10). Contrary to the previous corpus, no sort of relational identification which shows social actors in terms of familial or professional relations were found. This created a sense of an aimless, rootless, and unskilled crowd which would be rather difficult to assimilate. *The Guardian*, on the other hand, adopted a more neutral stance through which the immigrants were continued to be identified in terms of their occupation and reasons for their escape. Consider (12):

- (12) To explain why, **Mahmoud Obed, a 27-year-old Syrian metal worker** newly arrived on Agathonisi, takes out his mobile phone. He flicks through his pictures **until he finds one of a destroyed house. This was his home, he says, bombed a fortnight ago by pilots from Russia**, which has allied with the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad.

(*The Guardian*, 12 January 2016)

There was an inclination to overgeneralize the immigrants as criminals in this corpus excluding *the Guardian*. Unlawful behaviour was linked with masculinity and Islamic background. Immigrants were generalized as mobs of primitive, intrusive and undistinguishable males. Through such depictions, the journalists held on

to the long-held misconception of *the crowd* identified with reduced intelligence, lack of control and violence (Reicher 2001). In addition, with frightening scenarios which pictured ‘those immigrants’ travelling freely to the UK, the tabloids and *the Times* reinforced the existence of a gathering threat. Here, the journalists took advantage of proximation (Cap 2014; Cap this volume) by means of which the encoder presents spatially or temporally distant events or state of actions as threateningly approaching to the encoder and the addressee’s shared deictic centre. This rhetorical pragmatic strategy justifies the encoder’s pre-emptive action to defy the envisaged threat. Considering the Excerpts (3), (7), (9) and (10), the construal of conflict was not only spatial and temporal but also ideological as immigrants were framed as an imminent threat with hostile ideologies approaching to the home territory.

The Times, *the Daily Mail* and *the Sun*’s considerably negative coverage of the immigrants through persistent foregrounding of adversities and backgrounding any sort of positivity is a reflection of these newspapers’ institutional stance towards immigration. Such textual silences or emphasis is ideological and tactical (Chomsky 1989; Jaworski 1993) as previous research on British press’ attitude towards ethnic relations has shown that the press intentionally select, organize and present events in a way which then contributed to the maintenance of “commonsense whiteness” (Law 2002: 77).

7. Conclusion

This study was designed to discover how language resources were employed to reflect the changing media attitude towards the immigrants in two contradictory cases from the period of 2015 migrant crisis. The comparison of the discourse topics and characteristics, features and traits attributed to the immigrants in both corpora corroborated the findings of the previous research (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Dijk 2008; Gabrieleto and Baker 2008; KhosraviNik 2009) which has drawn attention to the negativity surrounding the immigrants. Regardless of the news content, the association of the immigrants with numbers showing large quantities, natural disaster metaphors, and violation of law and order highlighted a repeated pattern in the news repertoire which showed that evaluative meanings are not idiosyncratic, but socially shared by a specific discourse community (Stubbs 2001). In terms of van Dijk (1989: 218), dominant ethnic stereotypes or prejudices cause representation of these groups of minorities as “problem people” which then led to a complication of the issue.

When the news content was considered, the most interesting finding was the tendency to make fallacious generalizations in the profiling of the immigrants. As

Reisigl and Wodak (2001) noted, judgements of isolated experiences with the individuals were transferred to the representation of the whole group of immigrants in both cases. That is to say, the immigrants were embodied as needy and defenceless war victims following the death of Aylan Kurdi, but were then typified as uncivilised young Muslim males in the second corpus. The divergence is noteworthy as the backgrounds and motives of the immigrants were nearly unchanged from the first incident to the second. Apart from the nature of the events, such a change can be a result of the reaction towards Germany's open door policy which enabled immigrants' travel to the UK. With regard to the Proximation Theory (Cap 2014), the possibility of an influx was presented in terms of a spatial, temporal and ideological threat to the home-identity. The linkage of a few immigrants to the assaults in Cologne seemed to reignite the immigrant-as-a- threat stereotype.

Another interesting finding was when the media were sympathetic towards the immigrants as in the first corpus, the immigrants were treated as credible sources that were either allowed to speak for themselves or else depicted in great detail with emotive vocabulary. Reading the news story from the perspective of a character results in identification and provides the readers' adoption of the character's goals and intentions (Hartung et al. 2016). Conversely, personal narratives or circumstantial portrayals were nearly absent when they were deprecated as in the second corpus, which can be seen as a subtle form of biased reporting. In addition to individuation, causality was also observed in the first corpus so as to evoke the readers' sympathy. However, lack of reference to the causes of immigration and depictions of immigrants as anonymous hordes of males in the Cologne Sexual Assaults dataset ended in decontextualisation, dehumanization and pathologisation (Reicher 2001). Jullian (2011) stated that such intentional choices have strong ideological implications. As the voices of the institutionalised communication who offer a "skewed and judged" (Fowler 1991: 11) version of the real world, the journalists contribute to the reproduction of the dominant ideologies (Hall et al. 1980). To fend off criticism about discriminatory discourse, in line with the findings of Lamb (2014), the newspapers based their arguments on the distinction made between 'good' and 'bad' immigrants in the second corpus. In conclusion, the results of the study indicate that the extent of the perceived tragedy which was epitomized by the harrowing image of Aylan Kurdi and the construal of threat which was evoked by the prospect of an influx into the UK determined the newspapers' stance towards the immigrants. The present study confirms previous findings and contributes additional evidence that suggests the mainstream media are the dominant voice of ideology and main source of the public's understanding of ethnic relations.

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Aspects of threat construction in the Polish anti-immigration discourse

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Proximization Theory (PT) (Cap 2008, 2010, 2013, 2017; among others) is a cognitive-critical model that accounts for the ways in which the discursive construction of closeness and remoteness can be manipulated in the political sphere and bound up with fear, security and conflict. This article applies PT in the domain of state political discourse in today's Poland, outlining strategies whereby anti-immigration stance and policies are legitimized by discursively constructed fear appeals and other coercion patterns. It demonstrates how the 'emerging', 'growing', 'gathering' threats – physical as well as ideological – are construed by the Polish right-wing government, who thus claim their right to oppose EU immigration agreements and pursue strict anti-immigration measures.

Keywords: anti-immigration discourse, Poland, Law & Justice Party, threat construction, legitimization, proximization

1. Introduction

October 2015 saw a major political change in Poland, marked by a landslide victory in parliamentary elections of the strongly conservative Law & Justice (L&J) party, which took over the legislative and executive powers after the eight-year-long rule of liberal government. The resulting policy changes have been enormous, including a dramatic growth of economic interventionism and central planning, serious constraints on the constitutional freedoms and independence of the judicial sector, as well as state control over the public media, among many others. No less radical have been the changes in foreign policy, reflecting the essentially anti-European disposition of the new government, whose nationalistic stance has been provoking continual tensions between Warsaw and Brussels (such as the recent vote over the renewal of Donald Tusk's presidency of the Council of Europe).

Alongside with these changes, L&J's government has been redefining Poland's position with respect to the most critical issues surrounding Europe and the EU, such as the Eurozone crisis, Brexit and, of course, the ever-growing problem of refugee migration into Europe. Regarding the latter, L&J and the new government have refused to implement the refugee distribution arrangement agreed on by the former cabinet, arguing that it realizes a 'German plan' at the cost of Poland's national interests. As of today, L&J's government not only challenges that arrangement, but openly refuses to participate in virtually all EU initiatives to manage the immigration crisis. While this kind of policy finds little understanding with most European partners, it enjoys relatively high popularity on the home front, among Polish people. This is due to a skillful rhetorical campaign, which not only legitimizes that policy, but also, and consequently, plays a key role in legitimizing the new government as a whole.

This paper is a critical-linguistic study of Polish government's discursive management of the refugee and immigration crisis, pinpointing the main strategies whereby L&J and their cabinet justify not only Poland's lack of political involvement but in fact their essentially negative attitude to the issue of immigration and even immigrants as such. The analysis demonstrates that migration of refugee groups into Europe, from mainly Syria, but also other countries of the Middle East as well as East Africa, is consistently conceptualized as a growing threat to Poland's national security. The threat is construed in ideological as well as physical terms, involving a strategic interplay of abstract and material fear appeals.¹ The construal of the threat rests on forced conceptualizations of a destructive impact of the apparently distant entities (immigrant groups from external territories – a symbolic 'THEM') on the home entities (Poland, and other European countries – a symbolic 'US'). The ominous vision of such an impact serves as a pre-requisite for legitimization of the anti-immigrant stance on the European arena as well as anti-immigrant policies at home.

The paper is structured in three main parts (Sections 2–4). Section 2 discusses the main theories – cognitive-linguistic, evolutionary, psychological – of threat construction and threat communication in political discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). I start from general issues of dichotomous (US vs. THEM) representations in political discourse, and go on to focus on how the external (THEM) parties are discursively constructed as threat elements endangering the central, or home (US), entities. In this vein, I present Proximization Theory (Cap 2013, etc.) as arguably the most viable model to capture the US vs. THEM opposition and conflict. In Section 3 I apply the proximization framework to analyze fragments of

1. Cf. Schröter et al. (this volume) for analysis of threat patterns implicit in the abstract term *multiculturalism*.

2015–2017 speeches by top politicians of the Polish ruling government and the L&J party. The data include public addresses and comments made by Jarosław Kaczyński (the L&J party leader), Beata Szydło (the Prime Minister in the L&J government), Witold Waszczykowski (the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Mariusz Błaszczak (the Minister of the Interior). In the final Section 4 I synthetically summarize findings from the analysis. It is argued that the threat construction pattern pursued in the speeches draws upon a unique combination of ideological and material elements, whereby the initially abstract threat turns gradually into a tangible, physical danger. The account of this regularity possesses not only empirical, but also theoretical value, adding to the explanatory potential of Proximization Theory and CDA as a whole.

2. Discourse space: Cognitive representations and the forcing of worldviews

Issues of threat construction based on discursive representation of conflict between the home group (US) and the antagonistic or enemy group (THEM) are among the most popular themes of today's CDA. This seems a direct consequence of CDA's growing interest in mechanisms of spatial cognition and conceptualization, underlying numerous interdisciplinary studies of ideologically motivated construals of meaning within different discourse domains (Cienki, Kaal & Maks 2010; Hart 2010, 2014; Dunmire 2011; Kaal 2012; Filardo Llamas 2010, 2013; Filardo Llamas et al. 2015; etc.). The cognitive-linguistic approach to CDA offers a disciplined theoretical perspective on the conceptual import of linguistic choices identified as potentially ideological. It thus affords a new and promising lens on persuasive, manipulative and coercive properties of discourse, worldview and conceptualization which have hitherto been beyond the radar of CDA (Hart 2014; Hart & Cap 2014).

Crucially, the cognitive-linguistic approach in CDA presupposes the fundamental role of spatial cognition in *relativization* and *subjective representation* of processes/attitudes that involve a deictic point of view to 'anchor' ideas (Werth 1999; Gavins 2007; Kaal 2012). All language use, and therefore also discourse, involves the (re-)construction of a mental space which functions as a conceptual frame for the representation of geographically, culturally and ideologically bounded social realities. These assumptions are operationalized in CDA in models which link thought patterns in the mind to their linguistic and discursive representations, revealing ideological meanings. Such models fall, roughly, into two groups. On the one hand, there are (cf. 2.1) theories which account for the US/THEM relation in the basic, 'center-periphery' arrangement of the Discourse Space (DS) (Levinson 2003; Chilton 2004, 2005; Gavins 2007). These theories can be regarded as 'formative' in the development of the cognitive approach to CDA. On the other hand, there are (cf. 2.2) more recent models such as Cap (2013) and Hart (2014), whose

focus is not just the basic, or initial, DS arrangement, but crucially, the dynamic re-arrangement of the Space, involving a discursively construed movement of the THEM-peripheral entity toward the US-center entity. As is claimed below, the latter seem to be better equipped to capture the threatening nature of such a movement.

2.1 Deictic Space Theory (DST)

Among the ‘formative’ cognitive-linguistic approaches to CDA, the Deictic Space Theory (DST) of Paul Chilton (2004, 2005) is arguably the most elaborate model, paving the way for later developments. In Chilton (2004: 57) a central claim is made that in processing any discourse people ‘position’ other entities in their ‘world’ by ‘positioning’ these entities in relation to themselves along three axes in three dimensions, ‘spatial’, ‘temporal’, and ‘modal’. This arrangement presupposes the primacy of the spatial dimension as the remaining dimensions involve conceptualizations in spatial terms. Specifically, time is conceptualized in terms of motion through space (‘the time to act has arrived’) and modality is conceptualized in terms of distance (‘remotely possible’) or (deontic modality) as a metaphoric extension of the binary opposition between the close of the remote. The origin of the three dimensions is at the deictic center, which includes the symbolic Self, i.e. *I*, *we*, etc. All other entities and processes exist relative to ontological spaces defined by their coordinates on the space (*s*), time (*t*) and modality (*m*) axes (Figure 1). This makes it possible, Chilton argues, to conceptualize the ongoing kaleidoscope of ontological configurations activated by text.

Figure 1 represents the basic interface of cognition and language shared by most of the cognitive models trying to account for the construal of discourse. At




Figure 1. Dimensions of deixis (adapted from Chilton 2004: 58)

the heart of the account is the concept of deixis and, what follows, deictic markers. The spatial markers, such as *I/we* and *they*, ‘located’ on the *s* axis are the core of the linguistic representation, which is a representation in terms of binary oppositions extending into all three dimensions. Typically, entities and processes construed as ‘close’ in the spatio-temporal dimension are assigned positive values within the deontic modal dimension, while those construed as ‘distant’ are at the same time (or as a result) assigned negative values. In models other than Chilton’s, the central status of the spatial deixis is reflected at theoretical and terminological levels, where ‘US-good/THEM-bad’ is more of a conceptual than linguistic dichotomy (cf. Text World Theory in Werth 1999 and Gavins 2007; see also Boyd’s TWT-inspired study in the present volume).

How do models such as DST work in studies of threat construction and fear generation?² In his study of discourse of the Kosovo war, Chilton (2004: 142) analyzes the following text, an excerpt from President Clinton’s TV address to the American nation on March 24, 1999:^{3,4}

(25) Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. (26) It is also important to America’s national interest. (27) Take a look at this map. (28) Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a major fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity. (29) To the south are our allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new democratic allies in Central Europe. (30) And all around Kosovo there are other small countries, struggling with their own economic and political challenges – countries that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo. (31) All the ingredients for a major war are there: ancient grievances, struggling democracies, and in the center of it all a dictator in Serbia who has done nothing since the Cold War ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious division. (32) Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. (33) World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region. (34) In both wars Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. (35) Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die. (36) We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. (37) The world did not act early enough to stop that war, either.

Chilton’s DST analysis can be summarized as follows. At the intersection point (the origin) of the three axes (see Figure 2 below; numbers refer to the sentences

2. Cf. Boyd (this volume) to see how threat-based discourse can be explored through the lens of another cognitive model, Text World Theory.

3. The day the NATO intervention in Kosovo began.

4. I have saved the original numbering of the sentences (25)–(37).

or [30'–31'] sentence parts responsible for a particular conceptual operation) is 'this map' (President Clinton is seen pointing to a visual aid). The map itself does not represent an objective reality; its task is to launch a reality space to be specified by the verbal commentary. A presupposition obtains: addressees must, in order to interpret the unfolding text as coherent, infer that (27) and the following sentences are intended to motivate (26) (that national interests are at stake) and (25) (that action is a moral imperative). On that presupposition, sentences (28), (29) and (30) can be regarded as setting up a 'map representation' space. This construal involves a conventional pragmatic function, by which cartographic images are taken to represent objective reality spaces (Fauconnier & Turner 2002). 'This map' in the studio (or 'in' the viewer's area) represents a conceptual space that is mutually understood as remote (viz. 'there' in [31]), but which the map presented 'here' and 'now' makes conceptually close. In the process of defining the map's conceptual projection space the use of 'could' ([30'] in 'countries that could be overwhelmed by a large new wave of refugees from Kosovo'), prompts the viewer/addressee to launch a space at the possibility point of *m* and in the near future zone of *t*. This is *not* part of the televised map picture; it is part of the conceptual 'picture' produced by the discourse, which conflates the apparently remote Kosovo space and the viewer/addressee space. The resulting proximity of the Kosovo space and its negatively charged entities (as opposed to the positively charged entities [President Clinton, his audience, allies in Europe] in the deictic center) allows transition to (31), which expresses a generalized likelihood of a major military conflict and thus threat to American interests. In (31), the positioning of the (31') embedded clause ('... who has done nothing since the Cold War but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious divisions') as syntactic and intonational focus furthers this likelihood by a metaphoric phrase: the 'flames of divisions' (refugees fleeing from Kosovo) will cause a major 'fire' in the region as they 'meet' with (more) 'gasoline'.

On the *t* axis, the geopolitical and historical space is extended 'backwards', metonymically, by reference to the spatial location 'Sarajevo' (32). Kosovo is linked to Sarajevo, and Sarajevo is linked metonymically to World War I, and World War I to World War II and the Holocaust. The links can be considered metonymic since the relation between Kosovo, Sarajevo and WWI is one of conceptual 'contiguity' in a geopolitical frame which holds events progressing from the remote past toward the present. 'Sarajevo' is used to evoke the whole WWI frame, and 'this region' (33) is used in the same metonymic fashion to evoke the WWII and the Holocaust frames. These discursively linked frames constitute the groundwork for two sets of generalizations: (31) relating to the geographical space conceptualized 'around' Kosovo, and (34)–(35) relating to a flashback historical space conceptualized in connection with Sarajevo. These generalizations are used in turn to wrap up the entire representation (36)–(37) and justify its initial point (25), that is a moral imperative to act.




Figure 2. Events located on spatial, temporal and modal axes (adapted from Chilton 2004: 144)

Looking at this analysis, Chilton's DST offers some excellent insights in the representation of entities in political discourse space. First, it recognizes the fundamental role of distance from the 'Self' entities (in the deictic center) in conceptualizing other entities and events in political/public discourse. Obvious as this may seem, it is a vital prerequisite for any further inquiry in linguistic ways of construing distant objects and happenings as close to the deictic center. Second, it acknowledges that the distance is relative and that it is symbolically represented through discourse. This in turn makes possible further explorations in how the symbolic representations can be evoked strategically, for pragmatic effects and, crucially, threat construction. Third, DST shows that 'distance' involves a number of mutually interactive dimensions, which make mental representations of entities and events arise from a combined activation of different cognitive domains such as spatial, temporal and modal.

Still, there are some clearly unattended issues. Just like other 'formative' cognitive-linguistic models of discourse, DST can be considered a theory of general,

initial, ‘fixed’ organization of entities in political discourse space. Its aim is to show how people’s mental representations are generally positioned with respect to three cognitive dimensions. It is clearly *not* to show how *people are made to establish representations* that would suit the accomplishment of specific discourse goals pursued by political speaker. The reason is that DST does not offer a systematic account of quantifiable lexico-grammatical items responsible for locating entities and events at different distances from the deictic center marking the intensity of pragmatic powers of these entities/events. While it recognizes ideological, legitimizing, coercive, etc. discourse roles of certain words and expressions, it arbitrarily assigns them a static position on one of the three axes, in fixed distance to/from the deictic center, as in Figure 2. Consequently, conceptual shifts from the DS periphery to the center, crucial for triggering threat effects, are hardly accounted for. There is little systematic way to determine which linguistic choices, in what numbers, and within which dimension, are the most effective in forcing a worldview upon the addressee. This deficit follows from DST’s conventional arrangement of the Discourse Space, which indexes entities and events by primarily nominal phrases and pronouns. At the same time, the role of verbal forms, a core element in the conceptual shifts between the remote THEM and the US central camp, is clearly underappreciated. This is of course a huge disadvantage when it comes to analysis of the threat element emerging from these shifts.

2.2 Proximization Theory (PT)

Paul Chilton’s (2004, 2005) DST can be considered the most important reference model for several later works (Cap 2008, 2010, 2013; Hart 2010, 2014) trying to revise and redefine the original account of DS conceptual operations in strictly linguistic (lexical and grammatical) terms. Most of these works employ the concept of *proximization* to determine specific linguistic items construing conceptual shifts in the service of forcing worldviews.

In its broadest sense, proximization is a discursive strategy of presenting physically and temporally distant entities, events and states of affairs (including ‘distant’ i.e. adversarial ideologies) – a symbolic THEM – as increasingly and negatively consequential to the speaker and her addressee (US). Projecting the THEM entities as gradually encroaching upon the US territory (both physical and ideological), the speaker seeks legitimization of actions and/or policies which she proposes to neutralize the growing impact of the negative, ‘foreign’, ‘alien’, ‘antagonistic’, entities (see Figure 3).

The term ‘proximization’ was first proposed by Cap to analyze coercion patterns in the US anti-terrorist rhetoric following 9/11 (Cap 2006, 2008, 2010). Since then it has been used within different discourse domains, though most commonly in studies of state political discourses: crisis construction and war rhetoric (Chovanec




Figure 3. Proximization in Discourse Space (DS)

2010), anti-migration discourse (Hart 2010), political party representation (Cienki, Kaal and Maks 2010), construction of national memory (Filardo Llamas 2010), and design of foreign policy documents (Dunmire 2011). Findings from these studies have been integrated in Proximization Theory (PT) proposed in Cap (2013). PT follows the original concept of proximization, which is defined as a forced construal operation meant to evoke closeness of the external threat, to solicit legitimization of preventive means. The threat comes from DS-peripheral entities, THEM, which are conceptualized to be crossing the Space to invade the US entities, the speaker and her addressee. The threat possesses a spatio-temporal as well as ideological nature, which breaks the proximization model down into three parts. ‘Spatial proximization’ is a forced construal of THEM entities encroaching *physically* upon US entities (speaker, addressee). Analogously to DST, the spatial aspect of proximization is primary as the remaining aspects/strategies involve conceptualizations in spatial terms. ‘Temporal proximization’ is a construal of the envisaged conflict as not only imminent, but also momentous, historic and thus needing an immediate response and unique preventive measures. Spatial and temporal proximization involve fear appeals and typically use analogies to conflate the growing threat with an actual disastrous event in the past, to endorse the current scenario. Lastly, ‘axiological proximization’ involves construal of a gathering ideological clash between the ‘home

values' of the DS central entities (US) and the alien and antagonistic THEM values. As will be shown, the THEM values are not merely abstract entities; they possess a crucial potential to eventually materialize within the US territory.

Compared to DST, Proximization Theory makes a new contribution at two levels, cognitive-pragmatic and linguistic, or more precisely, lexico-grammatical. At the cognitive-pragmatic conceptual level, PT revisits the ontological status and pragmatic function of deixis and deictic markers. Traditionally, deixis has been viewed as a merely technical necessity for the possible interpretability of all communication (Levinson 1983; Levelt 1989). Within the proximization approach deixis goes beyond this 'primary' status and becomes, eventually, an instrument for legitimization, persuasion and social coercion. The concept of deixis is not reduced to a finite set of 'deictic expressions', but rather expanded to cover bigger lexico-grammatical phrases and discourse expressions. As a result, all proximization operations, spatial, temporal and axiological, their intensity as well as their changes, can be described linguistically in terms of the interplay of various lexico-grammatical items drawn from these three domains. To abstract the items, PT uses three distinct frameworks – spatial, temporal, axiological – which classify the items in conceptual categories reflecting the US-THEM arrangement of the Discourse Space (cf. Table 1 depicting the spatial framework). This allows a quantitative analysis yielding the intensity of a specific kind of proximization (and thus the intensity with which a worldview is forced) in a specific discourse timeframe.

Table 1. Spatial proximization framework in the proximization model (abridged – cf. Cap 2013 for a full version)

Category	Lexico-grammatical items and phrases
1. Elements of the deictic center of the DS (US)	Noun phrases (NPs) marking US
2. Elements on the periphery of the DS (THEM)	Noun phrases (NPs) marking THEM
3. Conceptualizers of movement of THEM toward US	Verb phrases (VPs) of motion and directionality (<i>head, come, move, arrive, get close...</i>)
4. Conceptualizers of the anticipated impact of THEM on US	Abstract nouns and noun phrases (NPs) (<i>threat, danger...</i>)
5. Conceptualizers of the actual impact of THEM on US	Verb phrases (VPs) of action (<i>hit, flood, destroy...</i>)
6. Conceptualizers of the anticipated effects of the THEM impact on US	Abstract nouns and noun phrases (NPs) (<i>catastrophe, tragedy...</i>)

The general function of the three frameworks of proximization – spatial, temporal, and axiological – is to provide a linguistic representation of both the initial arrangement of the Discourse Space and its dynamic re-arrangement, following the impact of the THEM peripheral entities on the US central entities. Thus, for instance, the spatial framework above is supposed to capture not only the default architecture of

the DS (categories 1, 2), but also (and crucially) the shift leading to the THEM vs. US clash (3, 5) and the (anticipated) effects of the clash (4, 6). The third category, central to the entire design of the framework, sets the ‘traditional’ deictic expressions such as nouns and pronouns to work *pragmatically* together with the other elements of the superordinate VP. As a result, the VP acquires a deictic status, in the sense that on top of conventionally denoting the default DS entities (marked by (pro-)nominals), it also indexes their movement, which establishes the target perspective construed by the speaker. As a result, one can account for discursive sequences which represent both the THEM entity in its initial static position and, later, its growing encroachment on the US camp. For example, Cap (2013: 86) analyzes G.W. Bush’s (2003) warnings about the global terrorist danger in the aftermath of 9/11, such as: ‘Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks have set their course to confront us and our civilization’ (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-and-releases/02142003>). The analysis shows that the nominal deixis ‘Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks’ combines with the following verb phrase to form a complex deictic structure marking both the antagonistic entity and its movement toward home entities in the deictic center.

3. Threat construction in the L&J discourse: From ‘cultural unbelonging’ to ‘terrorist risk’

The part of the proximization model that is the most relevant to today’s anti-immigration discourse in Poland is PT’s handle on ideological rhetoric. Specifically, PT contains the ‘axiological proximization framework’ (Cap 2013), whose task is to account for ideological discourse choices and, crucially, the relation between the lexical items marking abstract entities versus those marking physical entities (see Table 2).

Table 2. Axiological proximization framework in the proximization model (Cap 2013)

Category	Lexico-grammatical items and phrases
1. Values of elements of the DS deictic center (US)	Noun phrases (NPs) marking US values
2. Values of elements on the DS periphery (THEM)	Noun phrases (NPs) marking THEM values
3. Linear logico-rhetorical patterns construing materialization of the antagonistic ideology of THEM in the form of THEM’s physical impact on US:	Discourse sequences comprising:
(a) <i>remote possibility</i> scenario	VP1 containing category 2 NP followed by
followed by	VP2 containing an NP marking THEM’s impact on US
(b) <i>actual occurrence</i> scenario	

As can be imagined, the key part of the axiological framework is its third category. Its main value is the ability to describe, in lexical as well as grammatical terms, a subtle transformation of the nature of threat posed to US entities by THEM entities. Initially remote and abstract in its conceptual appeal, the threat is gradually construed as imminent and, most crucially, material. This change is captured, at the linguistic level, in a specific sequence of verbal and nominal elements included in the category. That way, the third category of the axiological framework can successfully isolate and account for some of the most important language items and formulas which make up the L&J anti-immigration discourse.

3.1 The corpus for analysis

The data for this study come from a corpus of 124 addresses, statements and comments by the most prominent L&J politicians: Jarosław Kaczyński (the L&J leader), Beata Szydło (the Prime Minister in the L&J government), Witold Waszczykowski (the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Mariusz Błaszczak (the Minister of the Interior). Their timeframe is the 17-month period between November 1, 2015 (a week after the L&J electoral victory) and March 31, 2017. The speeches have been made at various public appearances of the politicians, such as parliamentary sessions, press conferences, media debates and interviews.⁵ Importantly, I have included only the addresses/statements/comments devoted solely to the issue of immigration and not dealing with any other issues at the same time. This has been done to make sure that all discourse items present in these speeches can be analyzed as integral elements of the (anti-)immigration narrative. The focus of analysis has been consistent with the idea and design of the PT model and, in particular, its axiological framework. Accordingly, my first goal was to account for elements of the US-central camp, then elements of the THEM-remote camp, and finally (and most importantly) for the threat construction patterns involving a symbolic invasion of entities of the latter camp on the former.

3.2 The US

A substantial part of L&J's anti-immigration discourse includes the description of US – Poland, Polish people, current Polish government – in deeply conservative, ideological-religious terms. References to traditional Polish values are plentiful, and they are construed as warrants of personal and economic well-being, as well as personal and national security. The discursive segments carrying such construals,

5. For the analysis of online debates on immigration, see the chapters in Part IV of the present volume.

seemingly unrelated at places to the main immigration theme, are vital for conceptual consolidation of the US camp and instilling a sense of social belonging and solidarity in the face of an outside threat. In addition, they reinforce trust and credibility of the rhetoric and its authors, by addressing commonly accepted, uncontroversial issues:

- (1) The safety of Polish families is this government's priority. Polish people deserve it. They deserve equal rights and social justice. They deserve to feel masters of their own house. They deserve to feel secure. They deserve peace, stability and economic progress. This is the true meaning of freedom and independence. We derive it from our Christian heritage, the values to which our nation has been committed for centuries and to which we are committed today. We stand firm by these values and our national sovereignty. We do not take foreign orders.
(Jarosław Kaczyński, May 9, 2016)
- (2) We refuse to sacrifice our freedom and security for political correctness. From the very beginning we have said that this issue [of immigration] should be resolved by assisting refugees outside the EU. We are staunchly against the European Commission proposal, which would force EU member states to pay millions of euros⁶ per refused refugee. Such a decision would abolish the sovereignty of EU member states. We do not agree to that, we have to oppose that, because we are and we will be in charge in our own country.
(Witold Waszczykowski, June 12, 2016)
- (3) As Christians, we are raised to be tolerant and respectful of other cultures. But we ask the same kind of respect from others. It is our right to decide whom we welcome to our own house. Because there are cultures, there are values, which simply cannot coexist.
(Beata Szydło, September 5, 2016)
- (4) We must reject the cheap slogans of 'multiculturalism' and 'enrichment'. We must reject political correctness and call things by their true names. Rather than shedding tears like [Federica] Mogherini or organizing marches that solve nothing, authorities should ensure the safety of citizens. Here in Poland, our predecessors⁷ were on track to commit the same mistakes as other Western countries. But the new government sets the priorities right. Our main responsibility is to uphold the freedom and security of our people. This has been our election promise and we will keep it. (Mariusz Błaszczak, July 20, 2016)^{8,9}

6. In fact, the EC proposal included the figure '€250,000'.

7. The Civic Platform party, ruling Poland between 2007 and 2015.

8. This statement was made 6 days after an Islamic terrorist attack, in which a truck was deliberately driven into crowds celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, France, killing 84 people and injuring 434.

9. These and forthcoming translations by P.C.

The claims in (1)–(4) consolidate the US camp in the common commitment of its members to some universally shared values – such as ‘freedom’, ‘peace’, and ‘security’ – which stem from a common cultural and religious background. At the heart of this rhetoric lies a strong appeal to the sense of ‘independence’, which serves to invoke core elements of the national heritage in order to define and legitimize the current and future responsibilities. As suggested in Kaczyński’s argument in (1), Poland’s ‘national sovereignty’ is and has always been dependent on the commitment of its people, whose dedication now calls for further active involvement and, possibly, sacrifice. While apparently posing an obligation, such an argument also fosters the spirit of exceptionalism, sanctioning claims of national uniqueness and the particular rights that go with it (‘they deserve...’). Overall, Kaczyński’s argument, as well as claims in the other examples, reflect the rhetorical principle of consistency in belief. The consistency principle (Festinger 1957, etc.; Jowett & O’Donnell 1992) says that the best credibility and thus legitimization effects can be expected if the speaker produces her message in line with the psychological, social, political, cultural, predispositions of the addressee (Jowett & O’Donnell 1992). However, since a full compliance is almost never possible, it is essential that the novel message is at least tentatively or partly acceptable – then, its acceptability and the speaker’s credibility are going to increase over time. In L&J’s rhetoric, the consistency principle lies implicit in the calls to, on the one hand, remain loyal to Poland’s legacy and thus actively partake in protecting the ‘own house’, and on the other, accept state policies which are meant to protect it institutionally. Both obligations are shown to follow directly from the ideals, values, and norms which have been found largely unquestionable throughout the Polish history, especially the commitment to national independence and sovereignty.

As can be seen from Examples (1) and (3), L&J’s discourse benefits a lot, at lexical level, from non-literal construals of the concept of HOUSE, especially the STATE IS HOUSE conceptual metaphor. The most direct benefits are of course the ability to assign the ‘inhabitants’ of the HOUSE, i.e. the nation, family values (Musolff 2016), and thus discursively strengthen the bond of solidarity and common belonging.¹⁰ But there are also less direct yet equally important conceptual advantages. In addition to connoting positive values and triggering positive, bond-tightening emotions, HOUSE is readily conceptualizable in terms of a ‘container’, and even more particularly, as a ‘rupturable container’ (Hart 2010, 2014). This means that the construal of state in terms of a house involves also a presupposition of damage, or destruction, from an external impact. The existence of such a presupposition is indeed crucial to the conceptual setup of the US camp, as it

10. See also this volume’s Introduction, in which Musolff and Viola discuss the legitimization potential of the ‘home-invading migrant’ scenario.

helps instill the aura of threat from a possible invasion of the THEM camp in the discursive process of proximization. Thus, even though the L&J's rhetoric in the examples above is mainly focused on the US group and mobilization of that group to accept the L&J leadership and the communicated policies, it simultaneously contains important technical elements, conceptual and linguistic, for the buildup of the threatening proximization scenario.

Finally, from the perspective of Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann & Thompson 1988), the discourse in (1)–(4) can be considered a macro-structural thesis in a thesis-antithesis macro-discursive sequence, aiming to pave the way for the negative interpretation of the 'antithesis' based on the enhanced appreciation of the preceding 'thesis' (Mann & Thompson 1988: 11). In less technical words, the more is accomplished by the speaker with regard to acceptance of her messages as well as her visions of the functioning of the US group, the more probable, later, an automatic rejection of any alternative visions. In this vein, by reinforcing the common principles and values, and recalling even those elements of life which have come to be taken for granted (as in '[Polish people] deserve peace, stability and economic progress'), the speakers in (1)–(4) seek to arrange for the later visions and scenarios to get immediately abhorred.

3.3 The THEM

In L&J's anti-immigration discourse THEM is construed as culturally, socio-politically and ideologically alien and potentially antagonistic to the US party. Specifically, immigrants are construed to possess socio-cultural, religious, and even biological characteristics which preclude their inclusion in Poland and Europe as a whole, thus generating frustration and anger (cf. Fuller, this volume). Many of these characteristics stand in sharp contrast to conservative values of the US camp, particularly the traditional family values as discussed in Examples (1)–(4) above. Importantly, the incompatibility of the THEM values is endorsed discursively in analogies to previous events and previous or current states of affairs in Europe, which are construed as costly 'lessons'. The events recalled in these 'lessons' serve to make explicit the link between mass immigration, especially Muslim, and terrorist or other criminal acts:

- (5) We say no to those young healthy men who selfishly leave behind their wives and children to improve their own lives. We say no to those who choose to escape rather than fight for their country. (Beata Szydło, January 14, 2016)
- (6) We are not going to have the problems that Brussels or Stockholm have. We are not going to have districts where sharia law or any law other than Polish law reigns. Where there are no-go zones for police. And where every few weeks something explodes. (Mariusz Błaszczak, March 2, 2017)

- (7) Can someone tell me why, after 1000 women were assaulted in Cologne on New Year's Eve, Mrs. Merkel is still supporting the Muslim immigration in Germany? Didn't they have enough to see that Muslims do not integrate because they don't want to? (Witold Waszczykowski, April 23, 2016)
- (8) Have we forgotten that, in the past, migrants brought diseases like cholera and dysentery to Europe, as well as all sorts of parasites and protozoa, which while not dangerous in the organisms of these people, could be dangerous here. (Jarosław Kaczyński, December 19, 2015)

While these voices may differ in their radicalism, as well as plain rationality, they all contribute to a simple and consistent picture of immigrants and their values. Contrary to the Poles, they are selfish, unpatriotic, and guided by their individual economic interest. The areas they colonize quickly turn into lawless 'no-go zones' breeding crime and terror, as in 'Brussels or Stockholm' (Example 6). They refuse to *integrate*, sometimes for ideological and cultural reasons, and sometimes out of sheer calculation (cf. Fuller, this volume). Finally, it is their different physical, or rather biological, constitution that poses a threat, as Kaczyński's (in)famous words in Example (8) suggest.

Construed in these terms, immigrants make up a compact out-group, whose physical characteristics and ideological predispositions contribute some excellent conceptual premises for the construction of threat in the mechanism of proximization. There is, first of all, a massive and potentially growing THEM entity, whose outlines are unclear and movement unpredictable. The entity is inherently antagonistic and its antagonism had provoked confrontation and conflict (and often destruction) before. Finally, the THEM entity reveals determination to develop and progress. We have seen in Example (6), above, that such a characterization efficiently supports construals of an emerging threat which only grows if undealt with. There are two more examples to follow, which we take a closer look at.

3.4 The THEM against US proximization scenario

As has been mentioned, the discourse sequences construing proximization of the THEM impact on the US entities belong to the third category of the axiological proximization framework, which serves as an analytic handle on the interplay between discursive constructions of a potential threat and the actual materialization of that threat. Qualification in this category of the particular discourse items is subject to rigorous linguistic criteria, such as a specific order of verb phrase elements and the presence of nominal phrases marking respectively the US and THEM entities (cf. Table 2 above). That said, it is quite amazing to see in the L&J rhetoric so many discursive sequences that indeed qualify. The following

two excerpts have been taken from a pool of 79 discourse structures which belong in the category. The particular noun and verb phrases responsible for the transition from the ‘remote possibility scenario’ to the ‘actual occurrence scenario’ (cf. Table 2) are marked in bold:

- (9) Our position has been clear from the beginning. The issue of immigration from the Middle East should be resolved where it has originated. By advancing freedom and democracy in Syria and Iraq, we help end a cycle of **dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and frustration, and brings danger** and, one day, **tragedy, to our own people.**

(Beata Szydło, 3 October 2016)

- (10) To those who are happy to welcome immigrants at our doors, I have a suggestion: go and see the Suruç camp.¹¹ See the gangs and the riots. See the young Muslim criminals. See the **anger, violence, and terror.** It is there and **is ready for export.** This evil might not have reached us yet, but it **is well in sight.** And there is **no-one in Brussels who can protect us when it comes.**

(Mariusz Błaszczak, 13 February 2017)

In Example (9) Poland’s Prime Minister Beata Szydło sets up an explicit link between the social and political conditions which underlie lives of potential immigrants in their home countries (‘Syria and Iraq’), and the socio-psychological effects (‘misery and frustration’) which may bring about disastrous consequences later on, after the immigrants’ arrival in Poland (‘one day, tragedy, to our own people’). This argument helps Szydło legitimize the anti-immigration stance and policies of the L&J government, by strengthening the rationale for handling the immigration issue far away from EU/Polish borders. The argument unfolds in a linear manner, connecting the apparently remote visions with, eventually, closely happening events. At the lexico-grammatical level, nominal phrases are used to denote the US vs. THEM (ideological) opposition (‘our people’ vs. people living in ‘dictatorship and radicalism’), and verbal phrases (‘brings millions of people’, ‘brings danger’) are applied to proximize THEM’s anticipated impact. Altogether, the argument and the discursive transition from the ‘remote possibility scenario’ to the ‘actual occurrence scenario’ involve two nominal chunks and two verbal ones, as the axiological framework in Table 2 has it.

The same arrangement holds in Example (10), where transition between the two scenarios involves a change in modality of the text. While the first verbal chunk (VP1, in terms of the axiological framework) construes conditions for a possible/probable impact (‘is ready for export’), the second chunk (VP2) construes this

11. A refugee camp in Turkey, run by the UN Refugee Agency.

impact as under way and already visible from the US camp ('is well in sight'). Otherwise, in comparison with Example (9), the argument in (10) reveals some differences. Specifically, the origin, or source, of the threat is markedly different, in geographical and geopolitical terms. The (Muslim) immigrants are geographically closer, and they are construed as inherently evil, rather than negatively affected. The US/THEM opposition is thus more acute, the conflict more ominous ('anger, violence, and terror [are there] ready for export'), and the envisaged effects more destructive, partly because of the characteristics of the invader, and partly because of the vulnerability of the home camp ('no-one in Brussels who can protect us when it [evil] comes'). Such a radical stance can be seen in multiple speeches and statements of L&J politicians, and is often reinforced by examples of Western countries' negligence leading to tragic events. Błaszczak's comments in (10) come from a parliamentary debate on immigration and are a direct follow-up on a comment from another L&J MP, about identifying the perpetrator of the Nice terrorist attack (cf. note #8) as a Muslim refugee. This rhetorical strategy, concentrating upon the apparent lack of political responsibility of Poland's opponents in the European Union, complements the simple fear appeals that rest in descriptions of previous criminal acts committed by immigrants, such as in (6).

As has been mentioned, the analyzed corpus includes as many as 79 such complex discourse structures, in which specific lexico-grammatical items occur in a linear order to construe, within the space of 1, 2 or maximally 3 sentences, a subtle conceptual transformation of initially remote and largely abstract danger, into a concrete threat involving tangible consequences. This means that, in the entire corpus (124 texts), the structures in question occur in 1.56 per every two texts. This ratio may be staggering already, but there are further striking observations. In the L&J's anti-immigration discourse, threat element is construed only partly in micro-discursive structures, such as (9) or (10). In many cases it emerges from much longer, macro-discursive narratives, involving entire texts or even sequences of texts. There, far more space is devoted, first, to characterization of the home group (as in Examples (1)–(4)), then the antagonistic group (as in (5)–(8)), and only finally to conceptualization of the emerging conflict and clash.

Finally, it can be observed that threat construals in L&J's discourse differ in intensity over time, perhaps relative to the party's popularity with voters. This can be seen from analysis of the monthly occurrences of the above micro-discursive proximization scenario (Table 3).¹²

Apparently, the intensity of threat construals rises steadily in response to L&J's losses in opinion polls. While the L&J government used to enjoy a record-high

12. The corpus (124 speeches) includes between 6 and 8 speeches per month.

Table 3. Monthly occurrences of discourse sequences included in category 3 of the axiological framework

Month	Number
November 2015	1
December 2015	0
January 2016	2
February 2016	4
March 2016	2
April 2016	3
May 2016	3
June 2016	3
July 2016	5
August 2016	3
September 2016	5
October 2016	5
November 2016	9
December 2016	7
January 2017	9
February 2017	8
March 2017	10
Total in corpus	79

support of 47% at the beginning of their rule in November 2015, its current (March 2017) popularity is at the level of 29%.¹³ This results in a continual radicalization of the L&J anti-immigration discourse. It seems that L&J leaders are trying harder and harder to play the immigration card to avert negative trends at the polls and restore public trust and support.

4. Conclusion

L&J's anti-immigration discourse does not pose peculiar analytic challenges – it is far from subtle and its strategies are quite straightforward to identify. Technically, they involve recurring patterns of threat construction which link negatively-charged characterizations of the out-group, to possibilities of the out-group's growth and migration, and then to physically disastrous consequences for the in-group, that is Poland and Polish citizens. This scenario relies on the discursive narrowing of the conceptual distance between the two camps, which occurs in the process of

13. According to *Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej – Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS)*.

proximization. Most frequently used is the strategy of axiological proximization, since it allows for a unique combination of ideological and material elements of coercion, due to which the initially abstract danger turns gradually into a tangible, physical threat. The construal of the threat constitutes a pre-requisite for enacting strong, legitimate leadership.

Discourses such as L&J's anti-immigration discourse endorse the explanatory power of Proximization as a theory. Compared to earlier models, such as the DST model which we have looked at in Section 2, Proximization elucidates better the dynamics of the THEM entity in the bipolar, US vs. THEM discourse configuration. This is due to its linguistic underpinnings, such as the axiological framework, which make possible the abstraction of specific lexical as well as grammatical choices responsible for different conceptual projections. Such a possibility naturally benefits CDA research, as most of it involves issues of conceptual arrangement, as well as discursive re-arrangement, of dichotomous Discourse Space. This pertains to research in not only political discourse, but virtually all discourse studies – in identity, race, religion, gender, etc. – which take as their starting point the existence of physically, ideologically, culturally, biologically or otherwise opposite or just different social camps and entities.

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Gender, metaphor and migration in media representations

Discursive manipulations of the *Other*

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This study discusses the gendered use of metaphors in the media texts collected from the U.S. and UK online media sources in the time span of two years (2015–2017) on the topic of the EU 2015 migration. Using Metaphor Identification Procedure (Pragglejaz Group 2007), 88 media texts were analysed, following the criteria of topicality and gender. The findings reveal how the evoked frames of quantifiable and tradable objects, natural phenomena, crimes, war and terrorism contribute to suppressing positive emotions, related to empathy or compassion. It is also determined how the collective media voice is twisted by such underlying categories as competition, hierarchy and dominance that create an ideological opposition and relegate the collective migrant to the *Other*.

Keywords: gender, migration, media discourse, metaphor, evaluation

1. Introduction

This study focuses on metaphors used to describe migration into Europe in the U.S. and UK media sources in the time span of 2015–2017. The hypothesis is raised whether gender and metaphor can correlate in the mainstream media on the particularly sensitized topic of the so-called EU ‘migration crisis’. Despite the fact that migration has been under investigation for decades (Boswell 2007; Chambers 1994; Lambkin 2012), the current study will contribute to the on-going research by providing interdisciplinary insights that derive from both socio-cognitive and linguistic studies. This volume will only enrich critical understanding of how migration is socially construed via discourse and its realizations (i.e. in the case of this chapter it is systematic metaphor analysis) and how the perception of migration can impact societies, their needs and expectations by either limiting or deliberating

them. This is particularly due when migration is media-represented as an issue of indeterminate 'burden' that is both problematic and emotionally involving.

The growing concern has been expressed by the media representatives in response to a few factors of migration into the European mainland. First, the growing number of refugees seeking asylum on the European shores has been particularly noted by the media representatives in providing a lot of attention to the statistical data (i.e. by presenting charts of migration routes, numbers in much detail), raising social (i.e. assimilation problems) and political (i.e. crime and terrorism) concerns about this issue. This explains media decision to categorize migration news under a classified section of 'Europe migration *crisis*'. From the linguistic points of view, this framing immediately points out at a high level of concern initiated by the concept of 'crisis' with its underlying commonsensical perception of experiencing a disease in its 'turning point', thus being related to the critical state of one's health. Thus, the labelled category of migration news as 'crisis' creates a sense of insecurity, threat and a sort of danger to the European continent metaphorically represented as a person that is undergoing a 'critical state of being'. The concept of crisis is known for various metaphorical extensions, to mention but a few: military crisis, economic and financial crisis with the 'euro crisis' included, war crisis, emotional crisis etc. (Kövecses 2003; Lakoff 1991, 2003; Rohrer & Vignone 2012; Silaki & Durovic 2010; Charteris-Black & Ennis 2001; López & Orts Llopis 2010; Abdel-Raheem 2013).

Furthermore, the intensity of the topic is reaching its emotional heights when the heart-breaking images of drowned Syrian children start circulating on the front pages of media sources and social networking sites. The issue is becoming even more polarised, as it is no longer perceived as an external threat to the European continent, now it is an issue of ethical and humanitarian concern, especially considering the fact that the basic human rights to life and security underlie the general perception of what the European continent and its citizens value and are valued most in the global context of democratic well-being. As related to that, this study discusses the gendered migration metaphors in terms of their relative frequency, evaluative function and framing they provide of such sensitive and highly subjective experience in the mainstream US and UK media.

In the rest of the paper, some of the literature on migration, metaphor and evaluation, and gender and the media is briefly outlined. It is then the data and methods are introduced. Finally, the patterns of functions of gendered migration metaphors within the US and UK media context are disclosed and evaluated.

2. Migration, metaphor and evaluation

Despite the fact that migration is generally perceived both as a literal journey and a metaphorical journey, the Journey metaphoric extensions have far-reaching consequences for societies. It has been observed that the metaphorical representation of migration as a journey, despite its semantic neutrality motivated by ever-lasting human experience of movement and its conventionalised usage (i.e. in the sense of the Life Is a Journey metaphor), can still yield a more negative perspective on migrants (Ahmed 1999; Chambers 1994). The negativity is disclosed through the reluctance to accept a migrant and the expectation that a migrant is a sort of a nomad who has to “break barriers of thought and experience”, hence is treated as different and alien to the Self (Chambers 1994: 4). Furthermore, another underlying perception of the Journey metaphor is related to migrants’ aiming to accumulate wealth in a foreign land by simultaneously becoming a part of foreign ‘labour force’ (Boswell 2007; Cisneros 2008). This kind of attitude deeper entrenches the sense of indifference and alienation between local society and migrants, as the latter is viewed from the perspective of pure economic interests without considering a humane side of the issue. In that respect, metaphor and its extensions can help to disclose the underlying attitudes towards migrants and a kind of difficulties that are and can be experienced during their assimilation.

Metaphor is viewed here both in cognitive (as a part of structured neural activity motivated by bodily sensory-motor experience, i.e. Grady 1997; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Feldman 2008; Gibbs 1994) and linguistic terms (systematic use in discourse, i.e. Musolff 2006, 2007, 2016; Chilton 2004; Charteris-Black 2004; Semino 2008; Cameron, Maslen & Low 2010). The discursive analysis of metaphor and its systematic use reflect the evaluative aspect that tends to highlight a dominant view and exclude alternative perspectives (De Landtsheer 2009; Goatly 2007; Lakoff 1996; Maalej 2007; Ritchie 2013).

The previous research in the framework of cognitive linguistics and critical discourse analysis has supported the general trend of stigmatizing migration via metaphor use. For instance, O’Brien’s study (2003) confirmed the dehumanization of migrants via the degrading use of organism, object, natural catastrophe/war, and animal metaphors in the 1900s in the US immigration restriction debate. Likewise, Santa Ana (1999, 2002) provided more discourse data in terms of the IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS metaphor used in the *Los Angeles Times* in the 1990s. In the European context, Charteris-Black (2005; 2006) determines natural disaster and container metaphor that underlie the negative perceptions of migration and the formation of legitimacy in the right-wing political communication. From a different perspective, Musolff (2015) questions the unconscious nature of negative and dehumanizing migration metaphors in Weblogs and discussion fora

and mainstream newspaper coverage by proposing their more deliberate nature. According to Musolff (2016: 92), metaphors as deliberately chosen scenario elements both on the part of the speaker and hearer can be explained by the deliberate choice of a discourse scenario as a part of social and political responsibility undertaken by discourse participants 'to fit specific socio-communicative purposes'. Lambkin's (2014) discourse analysis of migrations studies has shown how migration studies are represented through the TIME metaphor, whereby the past/future is conceptualized both as a foreign country and as a lost/undiscovered world, and what kind of proposals should be made for reframing it.

Despite the variability of discourse communicative purposes, metaphor undoubtedly performs an evaluative function that can have far-reaching consequences in terms of creating a social reality that in the long term can be taken for granted and become a standard of social behaviour and morality.

The following subsection will overview another set of significant concepts for this study – gender and the media.

3. Gender and the media

The current study raises a hypothesis of a possible correlation between gender and migration metaphor use in the media. The hypothesis has been motivated by a few factors that will be discussed in more detail below.

First and foremost is the concept of gender that is agreed upon as a social construct that should not be entirely limited to and by human biological make-up¹ but rather achieved through psychological, social and cultural processes (West, Candace & Zimmerman 1987; Butler 1990). However, despite high expectations from society on constructing gender without any stereotypical boundaries, traditionally in many societies, social structures are organized hierarchically and social norms generally divide people into two classes of men and women. This division impacts gender construction in terms of expectations and evaluations assigned to men and women. Such ideas and more gave a lot of impetus to the study of language and gender or the way women and men talk (Cameron 2006; Weatherall 2002; Lovering 1995; Davies 2003; Zhang & Kramarae 2008). Moreover, there is a noticeable shift in gender research from the focus of what gender is to 'how gender emerges as an outcome of discourse in situated contexts and communities of practice' (Lazar & Kramarae 2011).

1. The universal biological divisions impact both sexes in varying degrees as most of medical research has shown so far (Payami et al. 1996); though cultural representation of gender via the social milieu is more deeply entrenched and can have far-reaching social, economic and political consequences.

In regard to the concept of gender as a social construct, a philosophical parallel of contingentism vs. essentialism can be drawn. The former represents a discursive subject, whether a man or a woman, whose identity is functioning in the network of social positions and dispositions (see Butler 2011, 1990/2007). In each specific instance of social positioning, a discursive subject is performing in accordance with one's prescribed economic and cultural "capital" or *habitat* (Bourdieu 1990: 13); nevertheless, predispositions towards gender are essentialised both politically and culturally through the network of power relations or so-called *cultural hegemony* (Gramsci 2005).

Thus, the very idea of gender as something contingent and discursively constructed can be naturalised and determined through certain fundamentalism, which has been and is defined by the male voice. As rightly noted by Žižek (2008: 663), one of the reasons why a social subject cannot be truly universal or gender-unbiased is due to the fact that "a sexualized division of labour still predominates that confers a male twist on basic liberal categories (autonomy, public activity, competition) and relegates women to the private sphere of women solidarity, liberalism itself, in its opposition to private and public." In other words, social relationships are built upon the dichotomy of *self* vs. *its other*, and in the context of gender representations the male dominance has been and still remains an essentialist category.

Despite that, the contingency of gender can be situated and appropriated in the context of media. It has been determined that the 'power femininity' is being established in the global media through the use of powerful language use and images, such as women as autonomous agents, who are active and control of their lives (Lazar 2006, 2007). At the same time, Lazar argues that this kind of powerful discourse can cause more social problems by promoting individualistic commodified empowerment coexistent with traditional perceptions of (non-feminist) femininity and opposed to social justice, social responsibility and social struggle. Koller's (2004) analysis of business media discourse has also confirmed the prevalent use of violent metaphors and its negative implications for (feminist) femininity, and how power relations are organized in the mainstream business reality.

One of the most elaborative insights to gendered power relations is provided by Wolf in her book "Beauty Myth" (1991). In Wolf's study (1991: 20) it is demonstrated how the 1980s media voice is dominated by the male narrative, where women are objectified and commodified and whose meaning is reduced to "formulaic and endlessly reproduced "beautiful" images". Paradoxically, it is also shown that women comitantly subdue themselves to that role and actively participate in the male created reality by wasting their energy, time and health on plastic surgeries and cosmetic implants to remain sexually attractive. Along similar lines, Lim (2009: 255) acknowledges that even women who enter a political space make no serious effort to negotiate "a 'masculine' demeanour" and accept their feminine

status as “vulnerable, weak and out of her league.” Self-disclosure studies (Cozby 1973; Hill & Stull 1987) confirm an idea that women can disclose themselves differently than men with the nature of sex difference being caused by such factors as role attitude, role identity, role norms etc.

Differently from the previous studies where the relationship between genders is observed and how they position themselves towards each other, this study aims to clarify how both genders relate themselves to the *other* – a migrant/refugee. More specifically, this study is testing the gendered media perspective on migration with the purpose to see whether the kind of relationship created with the collective migrant in the text is more male- or female- dis/positioned. By the former is traditionally meant,² a more competitive representation of migration, where the collective migrant is viewed as the *other* undermining or competing the *self*; while the female twist is expected to be more cooperative-oriented with the collective migrant becoming closer and more engaged to the *self*.

To be more specific, the aims of this study are twofold: (1) to identify the gendered metaphor use in the context of the 2015 EU migration discursively construed by the U.S. and UK male and female journalists; (2) to analyse and compare migration metaphors in terms of their content and intensity with the purpose of highlighting of what kinds of perspectives are offered by two genders. In the following section, the collected data and methodology are described in more detail.

4. Data and method

To achieve the above mentioned, eighty-eight media articles from the U.S. and UK media sources were collected in the time span of 2015–2017. The purpose of the collected data is to disclose a migration perspective offered by both male and female journalists and analysts. It should be noted that at the beginning it was intended only to cover the time period of one year between 2015 and 2016 (i.e. the most sensitive migration period); however, the collection process has revealed that the opinion is not equally distributed, as the migration media texts are mostly represented by the male. Thus, to achieve a greater balance of representation between two genders, the media texts published in 2017 were also included into the data set.

Overall, the final data set totalling 69,255 number of words consists of fifty-five articles written by the male (i.e. 43,801 words) and thirty-three (25,454 words) by the female. In addition, the goal was set to collect two gender voices from the same

2. Traditionally here refers to gender stereotypes when a specific gender is associated with certain behaviours. For example, masculine leadership is associated with assertiveness, competition with the focus on commanding the behaviour of others etc.; by comparison, the feminine style is linked with collaboration, participation and cooperation (see Nye 2008).

media source, and this also proved problematic, as in some cases the migration topic was only described by the male or vice versa. To provide a more specific detail, consider Table 1 below that summarizes the research data in terms of the media and gender aspects, as related to the total number of the collected articles.

Table 1. Data summary

Media source	Male	Female
<i>Associated Press</i>	1	–
<i>The Washington Post</i>	4	1
CNN	3	5
<i>The New York Times</i>	3	1
<i>The Telegraph</i>	6	–
<i>The Time</i>	–	3
<i>The Express</i>	4	2
<i>Bloomberg</i>	4	2
BBC	10	5
<i>Reuters</i>	7	8
<i>The Guardian</i>	8	3
<i>The Independent</i>	5	3
Total	55 (63%)	33 (37%)

As seen from Table 1, the migration topic is described by 63% of male journalists, as compared to the 37% of female representatives. In most cases, the number of male-written articles is twice as high as written by the female in the same media sources. Though, CNN and Reuters break the pattern by offering a more balanced representation in terms of gender.

Pragglejaz group's MIP (Pragglejaz Group 2007) was employed as a research tool to manually identify metaphorical expressions in the selected texts. According to this procedure, an expression is regarded as metaphorically used when (a) the contextual meaning differs from its basic meaning that is more physical and concrete (although not necessarily more frequent), and (b) the contextual meaning can be articulated in comparison to the basic meaning (e.g. the use of *flow* to describe the increasing number of migrating people as in 'migration *flow*' although its basic meaning refers to 'the steady movement of a liquid, gas or electricity'). Two dictionaries were used as a point of reference for the establishment of basic meanings: (1) the corpus-based Macmillan Dictionary Online (<http://www.macmillandictionary.com/>), and (2) the corpus-based Oxford Dictionaries online complemented by OED (<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/>). A number of metaphorical expressions, where the relevant contextual meaning was also included in the dictionaries, were also classified. For instance, the use of the noun 'crisis' in a highly conventionalized metaphorical expression 'migration crisis' suggests how

critical the current situation is. The relevant contextual meaning corresponds to one of the meanings listed in the dictionaries (“a time of intense difficulty or danger”, OED), but (a) contrasts with a more concrete basic meaning (“the turning point of a disease, when an important change takes place, indicating recovery or death”, OED), and (b) can be understood in comparison to the basic meaning. As will become clear in the discussion of the findings, this maximal approach to potential metaphoricity is particularly effective in discerning the implied ideological meaning and its contribution to myth creation.

The manual analysis of metaphorical expressions was carried out by highlighting and assigning semantic tags or labels corresponding to their literal meanings (e.g. Nature, Journey, War, Object, Crime etc.). After that, the tags were related both to ‘source’ and ‘target domains’ of Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory (1980) by using the formula A IS B (Kövecses 2002, 2004), where A stands for the target domain, while B refers to the source domain. Metaphorical expressions that shared the semantic tags were assigned to the corresponding source domains (e.g. Nature, Journey, Object Crime, War etc.). Finally, the ideological effects of the discerned conceptual metaphors were considered by using Charteris-Black’s (2004) Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA), whereby the pragmatic factors of metaphor use were taken into account, especially the evaluative aspect of metaphor use (positive vs. negative). This was complemented by Van Dijk’s (2011) approach to the ideological meaning of discourse and, in particular, its two strategies, legitimisation and delegitimisation, as related to metaphor use in this study. Finally, the ideological meaning of metaphor usage was linked to the overall underlying narrative line or scenario (Musolff 2016) that was found as dominant in the collected data.

5. Findings and discussion

The analysis of the collected data has determined that the content, intensity and frequency of metaphor use, despite the aspect of gender, seem to fall into a more similar rather than different pattern of how migration is evaluated and socially represented. The metaphor frequency and content are provided in Table 2 below.

As seen above, despite an insignificant difference of 31 expressions in the overall raw frequency across genders (i.e. 426 me used by men as compared to 395 used by women), the average frequency across 1000 words shows a clear trend of more metaphorical expressions used by the female media representatives (i.e. 15.5) rather than their male counterparts (i.e. 9.7). In addition to the frequency factor, the content and intensity of metaphor use have been compared. The analysis has shown that the three source domains are systematically used across the texts produced by both genders, i.e. Journey, Object and Nature (see Table 2 above); despite this factor, the

overall content of metaphorical expressions in terms of their implied evaluation and reproduced overall scenario, despite many similarities, has a few subtle differences that will be discussed in more detail in the two subsections below.

Table 2. Metaphor frequency and content across two genders

Media	Male		Female	
	No.	Prevalent SD	No.	Prevalent SD
Associated Press	23	Journey (11) Nature (4) Object (2)	–	–
CNN	48	Object (14) Nature (10) Journey (6)	48	Journey (14) Object (14) Nature (10)
The New York Times	52	Journey (20) Nature (8) Container (3)	25	Nature (11) Object (7) Journey (4)
The Telegraph	50	Object (22) Nature (7) War (7)	–	–
The Time	–	Nature (13) Object (12) Container (10)	46	Journey (17) Object (9) Nature (8)
The Express	46	Nature (13) Object (12) Container (10)	20	Threat/Evil (8) Journey (4) Container (4)
Bloomberg	68	Objects (20) Nature (17) Container (11)	17	Object (7) Nature (6) Health (2)
BBC	26	Object (9) Nature (4) Container (4)	92	Objects (35) Nature (18) Journey (13)
Reuters	33	Crime (10) Nature (9) Object (4)	52	Journey (11) Object (10) Container (9)
The Guardian	61	Nature (16) Object (16) Crime (9)	47	Object (18) Nature (8) Journey (6)
The Independent	19	Object (4) War (4) Crime (4)	48	Journey (22) Nature (9) Object (7)
Total	426	9.7 per 1000 words	395	15.5 per 1000 words

5.1 Migration metaphor use from the male perspective

Most male journalists express their negative evaluation of the 2015 EU migration through systematically evoking six source domains in the context of migration/migrants/refugees, as summarized in Table 3 below:

Table 3. Metaphor use by the male representatives

Source domain	No. of relevant metaphorical expressions	Relevant metaphorical expressions per 1000 words
Nature	127	2.9
Journey	80	1.8
Object	75	1.7
Container	47	1.1
Crime	39	0.9
War	25	0.6

The overall frequency of metaphorical expressions in the male data indicates that Nature, Journey and Object are systematically evoked concepts, with the Nature metaphor (i.e. 127 expressions in total) clearly dominating the evaluation frame. Also, it has been observed that the frequency of the Nature metaphor per 1000 words coincides with the female frequency of its use per 1000 words. The noticeable difference is observed in the evaluation frame disclosed by the frequency distribution. The male scenario tends to be negative in the overall evaluation, due to the fact that the three source domains of Nature, Journey and Object are systematically complimented by the source domains of Container, Crime and War.

The extracts below show how, according to the male journalists, migration is associated with natural phenomena and is lexically realised through the source domain of Nature.

- (1)³ a. But the bloc's arrangement with Turkey has shown that the best way of stemming migrant flows is to stop people taking to the sea.
(Associated Press, 15/1/2017)
- b. The Italians have refused Austrian requests to board trains heading north to stage migrant hunts.
(Washington Post, 8/5/2016)
- c. SID, Serbia – They arrived in an unceasing stream, 10,000 a day <... >
(The NY Times, 31/10/2015)
- d. The continued throng of refugees only increases pressure on European policymakers to do something about it
(CNN, 1/2/2016)

3. In these examples, lexically realised source domains related to the target domain of migration/migrant/refugees are underlined.

- e. But according to European officials, other migrants are traveling into the Nordic and Baltic States from Russia and are not fleeing the fighting in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather have been living in Russia and are being encouraged by the Kremlin to join the tide in Western Europe. (Bloomberg, 24/3/2016)
- f. Many of those improvements, incidentally, were driven by the aid programmes of the very European countries that now find themselves inundated with refugees. (Bloomberg, 8/5/2016)
- g. His remarks echo concerns in other European capitals that David Cameron's desire to hold a referendum as quickly as possible may come up against the threat that the EU will be in the middle of a full-blown crisis over refugees. (The Guardian, 25/1/2016)
- h. The Interior Ministry is aiming to open up about 16 more with at least 1000 more spots, the source said. (Reuters, 31/12/2016)
- i. The EU as a whole wants to regain control of events in this refugee crisis. (BBC, 6/3/2016)
- j. Those worried by a seeming endless flow of Syrian refugees are not reassured by the idea of swapping that reality for the possibility of open access to Turkey's 75 million people and dangling eventual EU membership in front of them. (BBC, 17/3/2016)

The Nature metaphor is the major conventionalised association that is used in reference to migration. Despite its conventionality, the ideological consequences and the implicit evaluation attached to its lexical representation are being politically and socially enacted by European governments in many different ways. For example, many European governments view migration as a threat to their sovereignty, cultural identity and social well-being, as reflected in government initiatives to 'otherise' migration by passing stricter policies of the 'admission procedure' by including national language and history exams, setting longer 'trial' periods and establishing 'migration centres' outside city centres/camps by thus immediately physically and socially distancing migrants and refugees from local communities.

This narrative line of 'critical' migration that has to be controlled is highlighted by the Nature metaphor, which use points out at the negative evaluation of the *Other*. By drawing a mental parallel of migration with a natural phenomenon (i.e. 'flow', 'stream', 'tide', 'wave' etc.), an image of the uncontrolled and massive natural force is being continuously reinforced. In addition, its intensity becomes even more pronounced when migrants are associated with animals through such lexical representations as 'throng', 'spots', 'hunts'. It can be argued that ideologically this metaphor plays a role of dehumanizing a group of people by thus creating a sense of 'crisis' and 'insecurity' caused by their 'massiveness' and 'unpredictability'. Ideologically the Nature metaphor correlates with the source domain of Object,

whereby migrants are objectified and whose identity is metaphorically represented through the exchange value of a commodity or a commodified object. The examples below are typical representations of this metaphor.

- (2) a. Mr Sutherland said the Italians were working hard, having saved 70,000 people from Mediterranean waters, and were taking in “huge numbers”.
(*The Independent*, 23/8/2016)
- b. All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece will be returned to Turkey. (BBC, 17/3/2016)
- c. In 2015, EU member states promised to relocate 40,000 asylum seekers from Italy to other countries over two years, but only 2654 have so far been moved. (Reuters, 30/12/2016)
- d. Tens of thousands of Syrian refugees will be taken directly from Turkey to Europe in a “one-for-one” swap with those on the Greek islands.
(*The Daily Telegraph*, 8/3/2016)
- e. Under a landmark agreement between Brussels and Ankara, sealed last summer, all migrants who make the sea crossing to Greece are sent back, with Europe taking in one genuine refugee from a camp in Turkey for every failed asylum seeker returned. (*The Express*, 5/1/2017)
- f. European Union member states agreed in July to take in more than 32,000 migrants to ease the burden on Italy and Greece. (CNN, 3/9/2015)

These examples show that the semantic domain of Object is lexically realised both syntactically (i.e. through the syntactic positioning in a sentence via an (indirect or direct) object in the sentence that undergoes action or passive forms) and semantically through the use verbs as ‘take in’, ‘move’, ‘relocate’, ‘send back’, ‘return’ that in their basic meaning imply an object undergoing an action of ‘transfer’ from one place to another. In addition, the Object metaphor is also realised through such typical phrases in direct reference to migrants as ‘huge numbers’ and ‘irregular numbers/migrants’ that in either case presupposes the conceptual pattern of objectifying a group of people that can be traded, as in ‘one-for-one swap’. Psychologically, the use of Migrants As Objects metaphor aims to simplify and at the same time neutralise a tone towards migrants. When migrants are objects, governments/countries or people in general are not expected to feel anything towards them, as migrants are represented via one big number without any distinct and individual features. As any object its value is represented through its functional use, and in this case it is represented negatively, as signified by the use of the noun ‘burden’.

The Journey metaphor is both literal and metaphorical at the same time. In the literal sense, migrants have to move in order to reach their chosen destination, but via the description of this literal movement the metaphorization of the *Other* is realised, as the provided examples below illustrate that blend of literal and metaphorically evaluative meanings.

- (3) a. Forced from their homes by war and economic deprivation, tens of thousands of migrants made the perilous journey to Europe last month.
(*The New York Times*, 3/2/2016)
- b. In 2014 – before migrants started choosing the easier route via Greece – Italy was the ground zero of Europe’s migrant crisis. Already, hundreds of migrants per week – most of them sub-Saharan Africans who first arrived at ports in Italy’s south – are again seeking to venture north through this majestic valley.
(*Washington Post*, 8/5/2016)
- c. Tens of thousands of people seeking better lives are expected to trek across deserts and board unseaworthy boats in war-torn Libya this year in a desperate effort to reach European shores by way of Italy.
(Associated Press, 15/1/2017)
- d. Serbia was a focal point for migrants last year, when hundreds of thousands fleeing wars and poverty in the Middle East and Asia traveled up through the Balkans to reach wealthy Western Europe. (Reuters, 29/12/2016)
- e. But Libya, plagued by fighting and crime, is a problem for the EU because it is a major transit country for migrants. (BBC, 9/9/2015)

Metaphorically, it is the ‘nomadic’ image that is construed and typically sustained by the use of such generalized Travel/Voyage/Journey expressions as ‘seek better lives’, ‘trek across deserts’, ‘reach shores’, ‘travel up through’, ‘reach’, ‘a focal point’, ‘seek the venture north’, ‘choose the easier route’ etc. The highlighted ‘nomadism’ is associated with economic and social benefits that migrants are ‘seeking’, for instance, as realised through the use of such metaphorical expression as ‘to reach wealthy Western Europe.’ Nonetheless, ‘nomadism’ is not perceived as a natural sequence of people’s lives, where movement is seen as a natural occurrence of events; in the context of migration, the metaphorisation of movement creates a deeper sense of crisis with its imminent danger (e.g. *Italy was the ground zero*) and the necessity to take actions against it (e.g. ‘Europe had a dream of a land without borders. Now that dream may be turning to dust’, *Washington Post*, 2/9/2015) extensively highlighted.

Finally, the feelings of fear and emotional detachment from the *Other* (i.e. migrants/refugees) are intensified by the overlapping use of three metaphors – Crime, War and Container. In many instance of male produced media texts, these metaphors were combined in their use in different patterns such as Crime, War and Container (a), Crime and Container (b, d, e), Crime and War (c), e.g.:

- (4) a. In March of last year, the Hungarian government declared a state of emergency in the country due to Europe’s refugee crisis and deployed an additional 1500 security personnel to the country’s Serbian frontier in a bid to deny refugees entry.
(*The Independent*, 21/8/2016)

- b. An MEP has proposed putting pigs' heads on Hungary's border fences to deter refugees trying to enter the country. (*The Independent*, 21/8/2016)
- c. Greece and Italy – on the frontline of the crisis in the Mediterranean – have been heavily criticised for allowing people to cross their territory unregistered. <... > (BBC, 3/5/2016)
- d. Italy will seek to deport more migrants who have no right to be in the country and will open new detention centers to hold them before their expulsion, according to a written directive and a ministry source (Reuters, 31/12/2016)
- e. ANGELA MERKEL today announced plans to deport 100,000 migrants who arrived in Germany last year as she continues to backtrack on her controversial open door asylum policy. (*The Express*, 27/11/2016)

As shown above, the idea of threatening and dangerous 'otherness' is metaphorically construed through the systematic use of metaphorical lexis related to war (e.g., 'on the frontline,' 'frontier,' 'deploy,' 'state of emergency') and crime source domains (e.g., 'deter,' 'expulsion,' 'deport,' 'detention centres,' 'unregistered'). In that context, the metaphor of Europe/European Country as a Container implicitly supports this attitude of excluding the *Other* (e.g., 'no right to be in a country,' 'deny entry,' 'controversial open door asylum policy' etc.) from the containment with the Self due to its highlighted criminal and military threats.

To summarize, the analysis of the complex interaction of six systematically evoked source domains in the male produced media texts has demonstrated a negative attitude towards migrants based on four specific features: (1) dehumanization and objectification (the Nature and Object metaphors), (2) exploitative nomadism (the Journey metaphor), and (3) motivated exclusion of the Other (the Crime, War and Container metaphors).

Despite the fact that both male and female narratives are based on similar source domains, their content and frequency across source domains can show both similarities and differences. The female view is discussed in more detail in the following subsection below.

5.2 Migration metaphor use from the female perspective

The first and important difference between two narratives is the frequency of the Journey metaphor in the female data, i.e. it is twice as frequent as compared to the male use of the same metaphor. Nonetheless, it has been determined that the female data is mainly characterized by three source domains: Journey, Object and Nature, and this pattern of description is very similar to the male storyline. However, the Health and Container metaphors are used with the similar rough frequency per

1000 words to the male use of Crime and War source domains. More specific detail is provided in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Metaphor use in the female narrative

Source domain	No. of relevant metaphorical expressions	Relevant metaphorical expressions per 1000 words
Journey	89	3.5
Object	87	3.4
Nature	75	2.9
Health	28	1.1
Container	27	1.1

The Journey metaphor use in the female narrative, differently from the male data, does not evoke an image of ‘exploitative nomadism’. It is rather associated with a more compassionate and less judgemental representation of migrants/refugees. Their ‘journey’ is described as a kind of pilgrimage grounded in painful and long-lasting experience and directed towards a long waited and pursued ‘dream’. The extracts below are typical representations of the Journey metaphor in the female data.

- (5) a. With money his brothers raised in New York and Israel, Girmay smuggled himself across the border, traveled thousands of miles through the Sahara, and made it across the Mediterranean to Italy. He arrived in Malmö, Sweden’s third largest city, in September 2015, one of nearly 35,000 migrant children to settle alone in Sweden that year. In many ways, the luck that buoyed him through his gruelling journey has endured.
(Reuters, 30 December 2016)
- b. This year, her family fled Syria, only to get stuck at Greece’s northern border with Macedonia in Idomeni, a town that had been the gateway to northern Europe for more than one million migrants from the Middle East and Africa seeking a haven from conflict.
(*The New York Times*, 13 August 2016)
- c. How those journeys end in the promised land of Germany seems to depend a lot on luck – how quickly their asylum applications is processed, if they are separated from their families, and whether they manage to find a new network of friends in Germany. (*The New York Times*, 9/10/2015)
- d. At its most intense, 14,000 people – mainly Syrians and Iraqis but also Afghans, Iranians, Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians – have converged on this boggy plain, all bound by a common dream to continue their journey into central Europe. (*The Guardian*, 17/3/2016)

- e. This year has become the deadliest on record for migrants crossing the Mediterranean for a better life in Europe, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), despite an overall decrease in the number of people making the crossing compared to 2015.

(*The Times*, 26/10/2016)

These examples show that, differently from the male ‘nomadism’, via the Journey metaphor female media representatives emphasize the challenging and complicated side of the movement (e.g., ‘gruelling,’ ‘get stuck’) aimed at higher life goals (e.g., ‘a better life,’ ‘a common dream,’ ‘seeking a haven,’ ‘the promised land’).

Despite this difference in the perception of Migration As a Journey, female media representatives follow the general trend of dehumanizing and objectifying migrants. Similarly, to their male counterparts, migrants are associated with moveable and countable objects that undergo actions performed upon them, as illustrated below.

- (6) a. And what of the legal implications of the EU exporting migrants en masse back to Turkey? (BBC, 8/3/2016)
- b. As more refugees flee countries with oppressive and violent regimes, the EU will either have to cut legal corners to send more of them back or stick to the law requiring it to accept a higher resettlement burden. (Bloomberg, 14/12/2016)
- c. Governments have made “unsatisfactory” progress following last year’s promise to share between them 160,000 migrants who have arrived in Greece and Italy, the European Commission said in a report published on April 12. (Bloomberg, 28/4/2016)
- d. The European Union is struggling to implement its 2015 agreement to share 160,000 refugees across 28 member states. Poland has refused to accept its quota of 7000 and Slovakia has called for the scheme to be scrapped. (*Daily Express*, 28/11/2016)
- e. As the refugee crisis stretches the struggling Greek government and rattles politics in Germany and beyond, Portugal’s willingness to share the burden isn’t getting a lot of attention. (Bloomberg 28/4/2016)

It is illustrated above how with the help of the Object metaphor migrants are described as exchangeable objects that can be ‘exported en masse’, ‘sent back’ and ‘shared’. Another similarity of the Object metaphor use with the male data is that migrants are represented via the concept of a ‘burdensome object’ (e.g., ‘share the burden,’ ‘refuse to accept quota,’ ‘a higher resettlement burden’ etc.).

In a similar pattern, the Nature metaphor is recurrent with the underlying conceptualizations of the same metaphor in the male data. The unpredictability and seriousness of the situation are transferred through the lexical usage of the Nature source domain, as illustrated below:

- (7) a. Chancellor Merkel isn't the only one desperate to solve the migrant crisis: The EU's credibility is crumbling, its members have never looked less unified and Greece, stuck with tens of thousands of stalled migrants on top of being saddled with crippling euro debt repayments, threatens to implode. (BBC, 8/3/2016)
- b. Many MEPs also worry about the EU potentially closing its eyes to Turkey's human rights record in haste to stop the flow of migrants. (BBC, 3/5/2016)
- c. Economic health gap may lead migrants to greener pastures. (Bloomberg, 28/4/2016)
- d. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently threatened to send a flood of refugees from Turkey into Europe. (Bloomberg, 14/12/2016)
- e. Merkel's trip followed an Oct. 15 summit in Brussels, where – for the fourth time in six months – European leaders grappled with the wave of migration headed towards the continent. (*The New York Time*, 19/10/2015)
- f. There are also concerns that the village, of around 350 people, would be unprepared to deal with hundreds of stranded migrants. (BBC, 17/5/2016)
- g. His family was crammed with 30 other people, including 11 babies, into a tiny container shelter. Nearby, Pakistani migrants lived outside beneath tarps held up with metal parking barriers – dark cages in the baking sun. (*The New York Times*, 13/18/2016)

The use of such metaphorical expressions as 'wave', 'flood', 'flow' implies a few similarities that were observed in the male use: (1) a large number of people that (2) is unpredictable and difficult to control. In addition, such metaphorical expressions as 'pastures', 'stalled' or 'stranded' describe migrants via the literal meanings of animals by thus dehumanizing them and offering a more negative evaluation. The Animal aspect of the Nature source domain implies migrants/refugees' lower moral status in the hierarchy of moral authority known as the Great Chain of Being (Lakoff and Turner 1989) in which human beings and animals are successively defined by rational thought and instinct, while natural phenomena are defined by natural physical things and behaviour. Though it should also be noted that the Animal metaphor serves also a purpose of victimizing migrants by describing their inhumane and animal-like conditions under which they have to survive (as in 44).

Finally, the analysis of systematic metaphors in the female texts has shown that the metaphors of Health and Container are used with same frequency per 1000 words to express fear and anxiety towards migrants. These are a few typical examples how these two metaphors are lexically realised in the female data.

- (8) a. Germany has come under strain after 1.1 m refugees arrived in the country – mostly Iraq and Syria. (*The Independent*, 17/8/2016)
- b. The timing of Merkel’s visit to Turkey, less than two weeks before snap elections in which Erdogan’s party hopes to regain a parliamentary majority after losing a vote in June, has therefore raised eyebrows among activists, who accuse European leaders of trying to buy off Turkey in order to relieve the migrant flow. (*The New York Time*, 19/10/2015)
- c. Europe needs immigration as an injection of youth and dynamism if in the decades to come it wants to address its workforce and pension problems. (*The Guardian*, 31/10/2016)
- d. Has the refugee crisis given Germans Merkel fatigue? (CNN, 4/9/2016)
- e. But as often happens with stopgap measures, once the immediate crisis had passed, the underlying problem festered. (Bloomberg, 14/12/2016)
- f. Girmay arrived in Sweden when the refugee crisis was convulsing Europe. (BBC, 30/12/2016)

The Health metaphor in these examples (e.g., ‘convulsing,’ ‘stopgap measures,’ ‘fatigue,’ ‘crisis,’ ‘relieve,’ ‘under strain’) represent a complementary part to the Nature metaphors and are used to express an attitude of non-acceptance and highlight the negative effects of migration. Though, there are a few instances of offering a more pragmatic approach to migrants as ‘young’ economic force that can be ‘injected’ (e.g., Example 8c) into the aging European society.

To summarize, it can be observed that the female perspective of migration in the mainstream media is systematically realised through the metaphors of Journey, Object, Nature, Health and Container, with first two domains dominating the story-line. This metaphorical narrative can be characterized by three specific kinds of scenarios: (1) movement as pilgrimage towards a dream, (2) commodified relationships with migrants/refugees, and (3) their dehumanization. Overall, it can be argued that the underlying evaluation is more negative than positive, though some specific attributes of highlighting the suffering, pain, and inhumane conditions imply a victimized status of migrants that can raise feelings of empathy and compassion towards the *Other* and tentatively create less proximity in the relationship between the *Self* and its *Other*. Nonetheless, such attempts are rather insignificant (Journey) and almost disappear in the generally invoked trend of rising fear (Nature), inciting danger and insecurity (Nature and Health), and thus creating emotional detachment (Object and Container).

6. Concluding remarks

In this study the gendered metaphor use in the mainstream media on the topic of the 2015 EU migration is discussed. It has been hypothesized that (1) metaphor use can be gender-specific, and that (2) the analysis of metaphors used by male and female media text producers can show more differences than similarities.

This study only partially confirms the first hypothesis, as it has been determined that both frequency and content of the prevalent metaphor does not fully correlate with the specific gender. Despite the fact that the migration issue is described by the male more frequently, the frequency of metaphorical expressions per 1000 words is higher in the female produced texts. To be more specific, although less women write about migration, they tend to use more metaphorical expressions per 1000 words (i.e. 15.5 by the female as compared to 9 by the male). In addition, the content of metaphor use tends to show more similarities than differences. Both genders evaluate migration and migrants/refugees more negatively through the same three recurrent source domains as follows: Nature, Object, and Container. In both cases, the Nature metaphor use creates a sense of immediate crisis and insecurity; while the Object metaphor is used to dehumanize and create emotional detachment from migrants and their problems, and the Container metaphor creates an illusion of containment where migrants are viewed as outsiders and perpetrators of the *Self*.

Nonetheless, despite the general trend, there are a few gender-specific differences that have been observed. The Journey metaphor has a different content representation across two genders. In the male data, via the Journey metaphor migrants are described as 'exploitative nomads' whose movement has to be limited if not diverted. This can be seen as a psychological factor of competitiveness between men in general, when the 'local' men view the 'new-comers' as potential contenders for employment, relationships and power in the long-term prospect. By contrast, women are positioning migrants as pilgrims suffering in inhumane conditions with the aim to reach their dream destination. Hence, with the Journey metaphor the male voice is becoming more competitive than the female whose attempts, by comparison, to be more understanding and compassionate to the *Other* can indicate some possible signs of cooperation.

Another difference lies in the source domains of Crime and War that systematically contribute to the male narrative of migration, whereby migrants are represented as an imminent threat to security and life. A similar evaluation, though more generalized in its content, is offered in the female storyline, and is evoked through the metaphor of Health, the use of which also creates a sense of insecurity and fear for one's 'healthy' sustenance and in few instances offers a more pragmatic approach to migration (i.e. as an economic necessity). Yet, the analysis has shown

that the Crime and War metaphors are more negative in their evaluative content and expressive power, as compared to the female use of the Health source domain.

This leads to the rejection of the second hypothesis that male and female media narratives can have more differences than similarities. The analysis has revealed the opposite to the raised hypothesis: men and women tend to speak in a more similar and unified manner about migration that is grounded in (1) the negative representation of the *Other* and (2) created sense of emotional detachment from another's pain and suffering, (3) polarization of society into insiders and outsiders and, most importantly, (4) the construction of 'reality' where hierarchy, competitiveness and violent acceptance of life have become a moral standard of legitimising xenophobic attitudes. This kind of essentialist approach to the *Other* construes a reality where the *Other* can only be and is being judged only from a subordinate position by both men and women. The possible philosophical underpinning of this subordination unfortunately dispositions women, who emulate the voice of the domineering over the dominant without questioning its essentialism.

This study admittedly has its limitations as the clarified results point at a tendency rather than a representative view. Methodologically, the data was analysed without using any corpus-based method for generating semantic domains (Deignan 2005; Stefanowitsch 2006), which might provide more empirical evidence for analysing semantic patterns of systematic metaphor use (Musolff, 2016) as well as for establishing more accurate narratives of disposition towards the *Other* (cf. Kopytowska, Grabowski & Woźniak 2017). Addressing these limitations will be the future goal of research on this topic.

Despite the above, analyses of migration metaphors used in the male and female media narratives can contribute to a greater awareness of the dominant view towards the *Other* (i.e. migrants/refugees) with the purpose of highlighting the necessity to reinterpret the current migration policy and mainstream attitude, and transform it to a noncompetitive, nonhierarchical and nonviolent reality, where differences between people are construed not as a part of something wrong but as a part of the unified human potential with an opportunity for both differences and similarities to be realised and expressed without fear of discrimination and harassment.

Finally, this study has confirmed the idea that the habit of dominance of one group of people over another is very difficult to change, whether across genders or social/cultural groups. One of the possibilities to do that is to reconsider our relationship with the *Other* by thus learning more about ourselves, in particular our preconceptions guiding our beliefs and actions.

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PART III

Multimodal crisis communication

Migration discourses across different media

Practical reasoning and metaphor in TV discussions on immigration in Greece

Exchanges and changes

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This article investigates the dynamic processes taking place in relation to the choice of specific fixed metaphors which function as framing devices by rival politicians to reinforce their proposals for action in the media immigration discourse of Greek TV discussions (1996–2016). In this research context a critical, integrated, multi-level metaphor analysis model is suggested which combines different methods (see Cameron 2008; Fairclough et al. 2012; Charteris-Black 2014; Musolff 2016; Semino et al. 2016) for a linguistic, conceptual and discursive-communicative-rhetorical analysis in the context of practical reasoning focusing on the framing power of metaphor. Results revealed that around these metaphors the different political ideologies are framed in agreement with the rhetorical tendencies (e.g simplification, bipolarization, hyperbole) of the political media discourse.

Keywords: metaphor analysis (critical, integrated, multi-level), frames, scenarios, practical reasoning, TV discussions, immigration

1. Introduction

Once known for its large-scale emigration until 1975, Greece has in the last twenty years turned into a host country for three different population movements: (a) from the Balkans (mainly Albania) since 1990, (b) from Africa, Asia and the Middle East since 2000 and (c) from Syria since 2015. Greece was unprepared to face such novel and demanding circumstances not only socially but politically and legislatively as well (see Skleparis 2017). Meanwhile, after a period of political and economic recovery (the fall of junta in 1974 and the accession to the Eurozone in 2001) the Greek economy started to shrink during the 2010s “under the weight of what is perhaps the country’s worst economic recession in recent memory” (Kasimis 2012,

see also Bickes et al. 2012). These changes created radical shifts and conflicts in the beliefs, values and practices of the Greek society and politics, which were expressed and constructed mainly through public discourse.

I started focusing on public immigration discourse in my teaching and research since the end of the 1980s due to the intense concern of the Greek society for the changes we experienced and mainly for the new forms of social coexistence and learning/teaching methods that had to be developed. In effect, the social and educational needs in Greece at that time led me to discourse analytic research and teaching which were problem-oriented, interdisciplinary and aimed to raise linguistic, cultural and political awareness (see e.g. Butulussi 1999, 2007). These starting points in the meantime merged with the main principles of CDA which became significant in my research and teaching. Thus, “discourse, language use in speech and writing”, is seen “as a form of ‘social practice’” (Fairclough et al. 1997: 258) and its critical analysis has a strong linguistic orientation but also emphasizes on the link among language, ideology and power, i.e. on the historical development of discourse and on interdisciplinarity (see Reisigl et al. 2009: 87–97).

The present study investigates snapshots in the development of media and political immigration discourse in Greece through the study of 20 TV discussions broadcast between 1996 and 2016. The focus is on metaphors used by politicians in the context of practical reasoning, i.e. when answering the question “what should we do now?” The metaphors analyzed refer to the concept of the *NATION-STATE* as an *ENCLOSED* or *OPEN SPACE* (see *CONTAINER*).¹

Why were TV discussions chosen for analysis? The TV discussions are a kind of political discourse which, together with other sub-genres (e.g. press releases, press conferences, interviews, round tables, articles/books, public speeches), belongs to the field of action “formation of public attitudes, opinion and will” (see Reisigl et al. 2009: 90–91). A large section of the population has access to this type of discourse and, for some, this is the only source of political knowledge and update. The TV discussions analyzed here belong to the issue-oriented format centered on current affairs (Haarman 1999a, in Richardson 2008: 387).²

The guests are mainly politicians of the leading parties who come prepared to express (in a few minutes) the positions, the suggested actions and ideology of their party on these current issues. The dynamic nature of conversation forces the speakers to take the listener’s perspective into account throughout the whole discussion and to quickly find the appropriate rhetorical manners to get out of

1. Small capitals indicate conceptual status; linguistic expressions are either in italics when given as generic examples or in quotation marks when relating to explicit quotations.

2. Another subtype of TV discussions is centered on social issues in a more personal or social group specific perspective (Richardson 2008: 387), but this is beyond the focus of the present study.

intense confrontations which in some shows are encouraged by the politicians themselves or the host of the discussion.³ The politicians' talk both as representatives of political parties and as individuals and "their speeches (...) contain a range of voices – usually those of the various audiences to whom they appeal." (Charteris-Black 2014: 85). The aim of the politicians in these TV discussions is to persuade the audiences and promote their party (see Wodak et al. 1999) rather than to find common acceptable solutions in cooperation with the other guests.

The analysis of the TV discussions, thus, and especially the metaphor analysis in the context of practical reasoning allows access to condensed political views and ideologies on current problems as they are expressed in public discourse as social practice.

2. Methodology of metaphor analysis

2.1 Linguistic, conceptual, discursive-communicative analysis

The publication of *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff et al. 1980) constituted the springboard of a prolific production of research studies and theoretical approaches (see e.g. the Conceptual Metaphor Theory) which do not view metaphor merely as an ornamental feature but highlight its significance for human thought and understanding and the construction of reality. According to Fairclough (1992: 194) when "we signify things through one metaphor rather than another, we are constructing our reality in one way rather than another."

A very large number of studies have also been devoted to the role of metaphor in the political discourse.⁴ Metaphors are used "as effective pragmatic devices to perform ideological articulation and sensationalization as well as emotional arousal" (Flowerdew et al. 2007: 275). The most recent studies aim to analyze metaphor not only conceptually but also linguistically and communicatively in various types of discourse.

For the aims of my research I devised a critical, integrated, multi-level metaphor analysis model which combines different methods (see Cameron 2008; Fairclough et al. 2012; Charteris-Black 2014; Musolff 2016; Semino et al. 2016) for a linguistic,

3. About the fragmentary, simplificational and infotainmental character of TV and the theatricalization of politics in media see indicatively Fairclough (1995: 10), Demertzis (2002: 281, 451), Meyer (2002).

4. The use of metaphors is very common in the political, but not in the diplomatic discourse (Wodak et al. 1999: 217).

conceptual and discursive-communicative-rhetorical analysis in the context of practical reasoning argumentation.

Initially I analyse metaphors in four stages following the model of Charteris-Black (2014: 174-176, 2004: 35–41) slightly modified in the 3rd and 4th stage (see below).

- 1st stage: Contextual analysis (research questions; collection and selection of texts) [see Introduction].
- 2nd stage: Metaphor Identification (description of the linguistic forms; what counts as a metaphor) [see Section 3].
- 3rd stage: Metaphor Interpretation (conceptual analysis; how metaphors are classified and organized by source or target domain etc.) [see Section 2.2 and 3].
- 4th stage: Metaphor Explanation (discursive-communicative analysis taking into account the socio-political context and establishing the ideological-rhetorical motivation) [see Section 2.3 and 3].

For a detailed conceptual and discursive-communicative-rhetorical analysis I subsequently specify the 3rd and 4th stages by incorporating methods and concepts from other relevant studies. In the 3rd stage emphasis is given to “metaphor levels” (see Kövecses 2017) and especially to the concept of ‘scenario’ according to Musolff (2016) while in the 4th stage a model of practical reasoning (see Fairclough et al. 2012) and some types of metaphor shifting in the dynamics of talk (see Cameron 2008) are employed tracing the rhetorical motivation of metaphor use and the ideological framing.

2.2 Conceptual analysis and Scenarios (3rd stage)

In the interpretation stage (3) we identify the metaphorical conceptual structures (Charteris-Black 2004: 38) and decide how metaphors are to be classified, organized and arranged (e.g. on the basis of shared lexical characteristics or by target or source domain etc.) (Charteris-Black 2014: 175).

According to Kövecses (2017: 321) “conceptual metaphors simultaneously involve conceptual structures, or units, on four levels of schematicity: the level of image schemas, the level of domains, the level of frames, and the level of mental spaces”. “An image schema is a recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience.” (Johnson 1987:xiv, xvi).

For example, the domain of BODY is based on the image schema of CONTAINER, OBJECT (Kövecses 2017: 324, 325; Hampe 2005: 2). Image schemas and domains can help us classify the metaphors collected in the corpus into categories in order

to highlight similarities and differences at a higher conceptual level. Domains are a kind of super frames in the conceptual levels that include multiple frames. For instance, the BODY domain can be seen as being elaborated by several distinct frames, such as PERCEPTION (see, for example, the metaphorical linguistic expressions *I see what you mean*). Together, they make up what is known as the generic-level metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY (see Sullivan 2013: 23–24).

A frame is according to Fillmore (1982: 111) “any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits”. These script-like conceptual structures describe a particular type of situation, object, or event and the participants and props involved in it (Ruppenhofer et al. 2010: 5 in Sullivan 2013: 18). Frames are “organized packages of knowledge, beliefs, and patterns of practice that shape and allow humans to make sense of their experiences (...)” (Fillmore et al. 2010: 314). Frames “represent knowledge at all levels of abstraction” (Rumelhart 1980 in Ziem, 2005: 4, see words, texts, discourses etc.).

Frames, scripts, scenes, mental spaces or scenarios (Musolff 2004, 2006, 2016) are related concepts. Mental spaces or scenarios are tightly linked to the discourse context and that is why they are particularly interesting here, i.e. in a corpus-based discourse analytic research. According to Musolff, a

discourse-based, culturally and historically mediated version of a source domain is what has been referred to as a ‘metaphor scenario’. (...) ‘Scenarios’ are a less schematic subtype of frame insofar as they include specific narrative and evaluative perspectives, which make them attractive for drawing strong inferences in political discourses as well as policy planning. (Musolff 2016: 30)

Based on Musolff’s understanding of scenarios Semino et al. (2016: 12) “use the term ‘scenario’ to refer to (knowledge about) a specific setting, which includes: entities/participants, roles and relationships, possible goals, actions and events, and evaluations, attitudes, emotions, and the like.” In political and media communication research is used the notion of framing:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (Entman 1993: 52)

These definitions show that the notions of scenario and framing can link the conceptual and the discourse-based level of metaphor and reveal its function in practical reasoning contexts.

In this way we proceed to the 4th stage: the explanation. Here we identify “the social agency that is involved in their production and their social role in persuasion” and “establish their ideological and rhetorical motivation” in the specific context they are used (see Charteris-Black 2004: 39).⁵

2.3 Discursive-communicative analysis, practical reasoning and metaphor shifting (4th stage)

Politicians’ actions are determined by ideologies which can be traced in the metaphor scenarios presented with different rhetorical ways in the practical reasoning contexts. The rhetorical and argumentative relevance of metaphors was highlighted long ago and in the recent years the analysis of argumentation already belongs to the basic components of critical analysis of the political discourse (see Aristotle 2002: 1356a: 140, 141 and for an overview of the bibliography Kienpointer 2017).

In this study the practical reasoning model of Fairclough et al. (2012: 25–26)⁶ was employed because the identification and analysis of practical reasoning argumentations reveals the organization of the scenarios constructed in the single TV discussions and the TV migration discourse as a whole. In the TV discussions, where many guests participate for 1–2 hours, we can observe that a guest may provide his counter argument long time after the argument he wants to refute⁷ (see Deppermann 2006: 14 for the difficulties in locating the components of an argumentation in discussions). Therefore, the emphasis on practical reasoning facilitates the location of the line connecting the dots among the speakers’ contributions and the components of the different scenarios, i.e. revealing the framing procedures.

Practical reasoning is directly linked to the theoretical (or epistemic) reasoning, which “is reasoning concerning what is or is not true” (Fairclough et al. 2012: 35). It seems, however, that the practical argumentation “is the primary

5. We can consider scenarios as ideology components as “ideologies consist of social representations that define the social identity of a group, that is, its shared beliefs” and “specify what general cultural values (freedom, equality, justice, etc.) are relevant for the group (e.g. social movements, political parties)” (van Dijk 2006: 116, 117)

6. In my previous work (e.g. Butulussi 2008) I focused (a) on theoretical argumentation by using Toulmin’s (1958: 97–98) classic model of argumentation (claim, data, warrants) and (b) on topoi which are characteristic in the immigration discourse e.g. the topoi of danger/justice/responsibility (see Reisigl et al. 2001: 69–85) understanding them as content-related realizations of an abstract scheme (see Charteris-Black 2014: 137, 139, 151). For a critical discussion about the topoi see Žagar (2010), Fairclough et al. (2012: 23–24) and Charteris-Black (2014: 133).

7. Toulmin (1958: 99–100) long ago highlighted the difficulty in distinguishing between data and warrants.

activity that is going on in political discourse, and analysis of argumentation can make a major contribution to strengthening textual analysis in CDA” (Fairclough et al. 2012: 85–86).

Fairclough et al. (2012: 21, 94) present a model in which they “show how representations (including metaphors and other forms of rhetorically motivated representations) provide premises in arguments for action, and how representation issues can therefore be integrated within an account of action.” The structure of practical reasoning according to Fairclough et al. (2012: 44–45, 91) can be described as follows: There is a hypothesis that action A might enable the agent to reach his goals (G). The speaker can start, e.g. from the circumstances (C), and in accordance with certain values (V), and under consideration of the consequences arrives to the presumptive claim that he ought to do A. The consequences can be positive or negative.

In the next section following the methodology presented here, metaphors which conceptualize the NATION-STATE as an ENCLOSED or OPEN SPACE are analyzed and, based on frames/scenarios and the context of practical reasoning, their ideological motivation is located. The politicians in order to express the ideological conflict between, for example, mono-culturalism, nationalism and multi-culturalism, answer modifying the metaphors used by their political opponents with metaphor shifting which is based on contrast, and/or relexicalisation, that is, use distant synonyms with elements of hyperbole (see Ritter 2010) and meaning expansion (Cameron 2008). In this way, their rhetorical motivation is also established.

3. Analysis

The corpus consists of a representative sample of very popular TV discussions broadcast with well known hosts/hostesses from 1996 to 2016 on Greek public and private television channels (e.g. (ALPHA (Makis Triandafilopoulos), ANTENNA (Elli Stai), MEGA (Pavlos Tsimas, Nikos Chatzinikolaou), NET (Giannis Politis, Konstantinos Zoulas)). In the TV discussions analysed there were 185 participants in total: journalists, politicians, immigrants, members of societies or associations, etc. Their total duration is 24 hours and the transcription amount to 242,781 words.

In the TV discussions we often encounter the concept of the NATION-STATE, exemplified by the lexical items *Ελλάδα* (*Greece*), *χώρα* (*country*), *πατρίδα* (*fatherland*), *έθνος* (*nation*), *κράτος* (*state*), to be the target. Some very common metaphorical linguistic expressions used as source are the following: (a) *ανοίξαμε τις πόρτες/πύλες* ‘we opened the doors/gates’, (b) *η χώρα μας είναι ξέφραγο αμπέλι* ‘our country is an unfenced vineyard’).

Both metaphors could be classified in the source image schema CONTAINMENT/CONTAINER⁸ although the lexical metaphors and respectively the source domains refer to different entities: (a) BUILDING (three dimensional object, e.g. *cup*) and (b) FIELD (two dimensional object, planar space, e.g. *plate*).⁹ But they both share the following common elements: ENTRY, IN-OUT, BOUNDARY, OPEN-CLOSE.¹⁰ The metaphor THE STATE IS A BUILDING exists in many languages and has been analyzed in the literature (e.g. Hart 2010: 134-144; Musolff 2016: 39-71; Kövecses 2017: 330-339). The metaphor THE STATE IS AN OPEN FIELD ('our country is an unfenced vineyard') has not been investigated in the literature so far to the best of my knowledge. Thus, the linguistic, conceptual (frames and scenarios) and discursive-communicative aspects of the metaphor *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* 'unfenced vineyard' are analyzed first and then the metaphors used by rival politicians in order to promote their own scenarios of action are identified and analysed accordingly.

First, the entries *ξέφραγο* 'unfenced' and *αμπέλι* 'vineyard' are investigated separately and as a phrase in dictionaries (see also Steen et al. 2010) and then their use in the specific contexts is considered to ensure that it is used metaphorically (see 2nd stage). The frame and the scenario of the phrase *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* 'unfenced vineyard' can be formed gathering additional information on the history and the conditions of vineyard cultivation from encyclopedias, interviews with vine growers and wine producers. This information will clarify why the phrase was standardized as such (rather than, for example, *ξέφραγο οικόπεδο* 'unfenced plot' or *ξέφραγος κήπος* 'unfenced garden' which are not used figuratively) for any space or field of action where anyone can do whatever they like or can operate unrestricted (see *Lexicon of Common Modern Greek Language* 1998) and which specific elements emerge through its mapping with the target domain STATE.

Subsequently, by contrasting the concepts of the two frames, e.g. the frame of *αμπέλι* 'vineyard' and the frame of NATION-STATE emerge the common concepts of SPACE, TIME and ACTION around which the frame and scenario are organised:

The frame of *αμπέλι* 'vineyard'

- SPACE: INSIDE, OUTSIDE, BORDERS: The vineyard covers a large area. It contains grapevines and especially in the past it seldom had a fence (see below the frame of *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* 'unfenced vineyard').

8. See Johnson (1987: 126), Hampe (2005: 2).

9. For a discussion about a skeletal image of verticality (e.g. trees, buildings, people) and of a flat bounded planar space (e.g. table, floors, plateaus) see Turner (1991: 57) and about the relational character of image schemas, their level of specificity etc. see Hampe (2005: 3).

10. "Following Lakoff (1987), Mandler characterizes CONTAINMENT by three structural elements: interior, boundary, and exterior." (Correa-Beningfield et al. 2005: 347).

- **TIME: LONG LIFE SPAN AND LONG HISTORY:** Grapevines are perennial plants with a long life span (about 100 years). Vine cultivation is first encountered in Persian and Indian ancestors in the Neolithic era and it marks the transition from nomadic life to permanent settlements. Wine was widely used in ancient Greece.
- **ACTION: COLLECTIVE AND TIRESOME CULTIVATION WITH VALUABLE ASSETS:** The cultivation and the vine harvest constitute a collective and tiresome task. The grapevine has very deep roots and, thus, it can be cultivated in dry areas and in drought periods offering valuable assets indispensable for human, physical, economic, but also socio-cultural, and mental well-being (e.g. grapevines were used as symbols in sculpture and paintings)

The above, concepts, slightly modified, are also contained in the frame of the NATION-STATE:

The frame of NATION-STATE

- **SPACE: INSIDE, OUTSIDE, BORDERS:** The nation-state extends over a large territory and always has borders. The nation-state is defined by its geographical area where its citizens enjoy permanent settlement.
- **TIME: LONG LIFE SPAN AND LONG HISTORY:** The nation-state extends from the past to the future and its national features are traced in the culture, religion, language etc.
- **ACTION: COLLECTIVE AND TIRESOME EFFORT WITH VALUABLE ASSETS:** Nation-states are created after long collective effort and offer valuable assets indispensable for human, physical, economic, but also socio-cultural, and mental well-being and development.

The frame of the literal meaning of *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* ‘unfenced vineyard’ can be described as following: In oral history (i.e. interviews) vineyards have always been without fences due to lack of money or because they were located in precipitous hills. Thanks to their deep roots, grapevines could be cultivated in the most barren and stony fields of the family. In the summer when vegetation was generally low, vineyards were often endangered by free-grazing livestock (sheep or goats), thus, causing frequent confrontations between vine growers and cattle breeders.

When politicians use the metaphor *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* ‘unfenced vineyard’ to characterize a nation-state the above elements are present or highlighted. The idea projected is that nation-states were established after wars and battles with the neighboring states and are in constant threat by them; that nation-states are considered as an attraction point for trespassers who destroy and occupy them without control. Consequently, immigrants are projected as trespassers who invade the nation-state (vineyard) and uncontrollably act over its valuable assets. These frames are further

concretized in specific scenarios constructed in the context where the expression *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* ‘unfenced vineyard’ is used, i.e. in practical reasoning contexts where the politicians argue for the actions that need to be taken. The rival politicians try to alter the above frames and the respective scenarios by choosing other metaphors during the verbal confrontation.

Against this backdrop, the rhetorical motivation and the different ideologies of the speakers can proceed combined with elements relevant to the historical, political background of the time such as they emerge in the context of discourses. The following are excerpts found in the TV discussions.

- (1) Δεν πρέπει να περιφρουρήσουμε αυτή τη χώρα; *Ξέφραγο αμπέλι* είναι κύριε Β.; ‘Don’t we need to guard this country? Is it an *unfenced vineyard*, Mr. V.?’
(Apostolos Andreoulakos (MP of ND¹¹),
Host: Nikos Chatzinikolaou (MEGA, 1998)

The above extract comes from the first immigration flow in the 1990s. The topics in TV discussions at the time are related to the illegal entrance mainly of Albanians and the criminal activities caused thereupon. The mass media present a wave of fear overwhelming the rural areas and gradually approaching urban centers. In the “what should we do now?” question, the most frequent answers, by conservative politicians, like in the above example, concern the guarding of the country so that it will not be an unfenced vineyard. In the specific scenarios created around this metaphor the following solutions (or claims for action) are suggested: the strict army patrol of the borders in order to prevent immigrants from entering the country or the so-called *επιχειρήσεις σκούπα* ‘sweeping operations’ in which all illegal immigrants, that have already entered, are arrested and deported.

- (2) Η ελπίδα απ’ τα κέντρα κράτησης είν’ ότι αν αυτός ο οποίος μπαίνει στη χώρα ξέρει ότι δεν θα μπει σ’ ένα *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* (δηλαδή δε θα του δώσουν το χαρτάκι και θα φύγει), δεν θα έρθει.

The hope with the immigration detention centers is that if whoever enters the country knows that they do not walk in an *unfenced vineyard* (in other words, they will not be given the documents and walk away), they will not come at all.

(Nikos Dendias (MP of ND), Host: Antonis Sroiter (ALPHA, 2012)

In the second immigration period further scenarios around the metaphor *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* ‘unfenced vineyard’ are created related to the new circumstances, i.e. the immigration detention centers for the new immigrants originating from Africa, Asia and the Middle East this time and gathered in urban areas (see Kasimis 2012), and the increasing bureaucracy for those who wish to travel through Greece to other European countries. These measures belong to a broader “counter-incentive

11. Member of Parliament (MP), New Democracy (ND): Right Wing Party

policy” scenario: This means that no aid should be given to the immigrants other than their return ticket home.

In both periods the goal of the conservative politicians creating these scenarios is to prevent Greece from becoming an unfenced vineyard and to increase the feelings of fear for the Greek people. The scenario of guarding the borders from the “invasion of the new immigrants, who are more dangerous” is repeated on a larger scale in the media discourse.¹² (Far)right-wing politicians now support that the borders are not possible to be monitored and suggest the construction of a fence in the borders with Turkey, which was actually completed in 2012. This signifies that the constructed fear of Greece being an unfenced vineyard led to building an actual fence in the Greek borders with Turkey.

The outbreak of the economic crisis in the 2010s aggravates the situation. Golden Dawn (the far-right party) is on the rise and there are frequent violent racist events in urban centers. The frequent Eurostat surveys indicate increasing xenophobic attitudes which are mentioned in the discourse of citizens and conservative politicians too (see Gazakis et al. 2014; Wodak et al. 2015: 253 and Wodak 2015: 196, 197).

Based on the above and following the Fairclough et al. (2012) model we can describe the components of practical reasoning argumentation supported by the frames and scenarios of *ξέφραγο αμπέλι* ‘unfenced vineyard’ metaphor used by conservatives’ politicians as follows:

- CLAIM FOR ACTION: Guarding the borders, immigration detention centers, counter-incentive policy, deportation etc.
- CIRCUMSTANCES: Increase in immigrant flows and subsequent feelings of danger, insecurity and threat for the national-citizens, attesting that the country has already become an unfenced vineyard.
- GOAL: Protection of the country; prevention of the unfenced vineyard situation.
- VALUES: The states should be responsible for the survival, safety and welfare for their citizens and preserve the national order in the country protecting the national-interests (like protecting the valuable assets of a vineyard).¹³

12. The right-wing politicians claim now that the new comers threaten Greece more because they come from distant cultural backgrounds, while the earlier comers from the Balkans have already been integrated as they came from neighboring and close cultures. But the study of the TV discussions reveals that the arrival of the earlier comers was also covered by intense alarmism and xenophobic statements (see Excerpt 1).

13. See Fairclough et al. (2012: 140) about the values of fairness, financial responsibility/sustainability, the national interest. See also Reisigl et al. (2001: 69-85, 74-75) about the topoi of justice/responsibility etc.

- CONSEQUENCES: If the above actions are not taken the nation-state will become an unfenced vineyard.

Other indicative metaphors also used in the context of the above practical argumentation, are the following: IMMIGRANTS ARE NOT HUMAN BEINGS (e.g. *αγρίμια* (*wild animals*)), IMMIGRATION IS A NATURAL DISASTER (*πλημμύρα* (*flood*), *τσουνάμι* (*tsunami*), *σεισμός* (*earthquake*)). These descriptions which exaggerate the dangers and bring about fear are the specific premises which lead to the claim of closing the borders, detaining immigrants in camps¹⁴ and deporting them from the country. Based on these specific premises the suggestions proposed constitute a reasonable conclusion and a “common sense” solution.

The rival discourse, i.e. the discourse with international, universalist¹⁵ orientation, reacts to the above scenario, which emphasizes the guarding of the physical state-space from the intervention of strangers, as follows: In the TV discussion prior to the first extract there was an intense confrontation between Apostolos Andreoulakos (Parliament MP of ND, on the one side, claiming that immigrants have increased serious crime rates and, on the other, Fotis Kouvelis (Parliament MP of SYN),¹⁶ and others, who provide evidence that the foreigner’s registered criminality depends mainly in the lack of legislation which bears the blame for their crimes as it hinders their legal register and integration in the society. Fotis Kouvelis states:

- (3) (...) πρέπει στην Ελλάδα να συμφιλιωθούμε με την έννοια ότι η χώρα μας δεν είναι ούτε οχυρό, ούτε στεγανό, κι ότι θα έχουμε μέσα από τις μεταβολές που συντελούνται στην ευρύτερη περιοχή, παρουσία ξένων πολιτών.
 ‘(...) in Greece we have to make peace with the idea that our country is not a fortress, it is not sealed and that through the changes incurred in the wider area there will be an increasing presence of foreign citizens here.’

(Fotis Kouvelis (MP of SYN), Host: Nikos Chatzinikolaou (MEGA, 1998)

Part of the confrontation revolves around the words *οχυρό* ‘fortress’, *στεγανό* ‘sealed’, and unfenced vineyard. The Left Coalition MP using the words *οχυρό* ‘fortress’ and *στεγανό* ‘sealed’ describes the consequences of the ND (Right-Wing Party) policy for closed borders. He implies that if the borders are closed, the country becomes a *στεγανό οχυρό* ‘sealed fortress’, a metaphor with negative evaluative frame elements, e.g. embarrassment or isolation.

14. In the recent years the “Fortress Europe has become the *concentration camp Europe*.” For a comprehensive analysis of the refugee crisis as it was faced in Greece in terms of social attitudes, government policies and mainstream modes of its representation see Kaitatzi-Whitlock et al. (2017).

15. Van Dijk (2000: 97) distinguishes between the national, nationalist and the international, universalist orientation.

16. SYNASPISMOS (SYN): Coalition of the Left, and Movements of Ecology.

The ND MP's rebuttal claims that if the borders are 'open', the country becomes an 'unfenced vineyard'. Thus, the speakers take into account the concept of the metaphor used by their rivals (e.g. 'open country') and relexicalize or paraphrase it with a hyperbolic synonym (see Cameron 2008: 57),¹⁷ i.e. 'unfenced vineyard' or 'jungle'. Around the metaphor 'jungle' a different scenario is created where the negative consequences of openness are exaggerated, e.g. lack of control, brutal activities competitiveness, and extreme terrible feelings of threat, confusion, powerlessness etc. are evoked. Thus, a parallel is drawn between the absolute openness and the absolute closeness with all their negative connotations: 'unfenced vineyard' and 'social jungle' versus a 'sealed fortress'. That means that the speakers create a counter argumentative schema using metaphor shifting where the source domain develops by contrast and hyperbole.

In the TV discussions the politicians exaggerate in this way the differences of their parties in relation to their rivals. The confrontation is mainly between the leading party and the opposition in order to guide citizens to clearly decide for their specific political party. They choose metaphors in compliance with their ideology and in contrast to the opposition. Thus, the motivation for the choice of metaphors is as much ideological as it is rhetorical in order to match the metaphor used by the interlocutors in the dynamic of the talk. This dynamic often extends beyond the duration of a specific TV discussion and operates over the entire political discourse of immigration. This means that politicians are aware of what their political opponents accuse them of in other communicative circumstances (e.g. having turned the country into a 'sealed fortress') and even if the metaphor is not used in the specific discussion they answer by presenting its extreme opposite, e.g. the 'unfenced vineyard' (see inter-textuality, -discursivity).

A similar metaphor (STATES ARE OPEN – CLOSED CONTAINERS) used both in the first and second period of immigration is that of the 'communicating vessels' where the speakers support that it is impossible to block the route of multi-culturalism as it is a "natural" phenomenon and, thus, immigration flows between the countries are inevitable.

- (4) η ελληνική κοινωνία, όπως η γαλλική (...) είναι μια κοινωνία πολυπολιτισμική. Με πολλούς ξένους. (...) κανείς δεν μπορεί να φράξει αυτό το δρόμο. Η λειτουργία εκεί των *συγκοινωνούντων δοχείων*.

'The Greek society like the French one (...) is a multicultural society. With many foreigners. (...) nobody can block this flow. It is the communicating vessels function.'

(Alekos Alavanos (MP of SYN), Host: Pavlos Tsimas (MEGA, 1996)

17. See also Cameron et al. (2006) about "the emergence of metaphor in discourse".

Alekos Alavanos expands the primary metaphor *THE STATE IS A CONTAINER* and in the new conceptualization he suggests that countries are linked together in the same way that ‘communicating vessels’ are allowing liquids to flow from the one to the other.¹⁸ In this frame people moving from one country to another are a liquid flowing mildly and in a controlled way. In the metaphor of immigration as a ‘tsunami’ people are conceptualized as threatening liquids in a scenario in which they flow violently and uncontrollably destroying the country.

The metaphors of nation-states as ‘open countries’ or as ‘communicating vessels’ are used in the non nationalist universalist oriented discourses in practical argumentations with the following components:

- CLAIM FOR ACTION: Opening (and control of) the borders, changing the immigration legislation to allow immigrants to integrate into the country’s workforce legally, making bureaucracy less complicated (e.g. for acquisition of citizenship), researching efficient ways for the inclusion of immigrants in relation to the productive needs of the various areas etc.
- CIRCUMSTANCES: Entry of immigrants even if the borders are closed or strictly monitored because they live in very difficult conditions in their home countries. Immigrants are more exposed to penal repression as it is very difficult to follow the complicated bureaucracy which may render some of them temporarily illegal. Countries are communicating vessels as they are linked anyway mainly for financial reasons, i.e. transport of commercial, cultural goods. (So should it be for human beings, see GOAL).
- GOAL: Protection of the human and labor rights of immigrants, refugees and citizens in our/each country and elimination of the middlemen exploitation. Openness and cooperation of all countries.
- VALUES: The states should be responsible for the survival, safety and welfare not only for their citizens but for citizens of other states too who are in need. Fairness, solidarity, equal rights for all.
- CONSEQUENCES: If we close the borders, we become a sealed fortress which is negative for the development of the country and the immigrants as well. If we grant equal rights, crime rates will reduce and there will be no reason for increasing fear etc.

18. For a similar image schema, i.e. a “static compound image schemas” see Kimmel (2005: 290): “superimposing a connective CONDUIT (i.e., a FORCE moving an ENTITY through a LINK) onto the space between two CONTAINERS to create the well-known folk-model of communication.”

The above claims of action are implicitly or explicitly reinforced by the metaphors of an ‘open state’ or of ‘communicating vessels’ and in some other contexts by the metaphor ‘immigrants are brothers’.

In the above contrasting practical reasoning argumentations (of conservative and progressive politicians) different scenarios are created and different relationships between national citizens and the immigrants or between the different states are expressed or implied (see Semino et al. 2016: 2 about the framing of different relationships).

However, most of them are constructed around the notion of the physical, geographic or absolute space for which the goal is “homogenization” (for a critique of this see Lefebvre 1991: 341). As Wodak (2017: 1) points out “it seems that – in spite of an ever more connected and globalised world – more borders and walls are being constructed to define nation states and protect them from dangers, both alleged and real.” In the process of globalization the individual’s national identity suffers the conflict of enjoying increasing access to social networks, international travel and online information while having to bear the risks of globalized division of labour (see Demertzis 2002: 450).

These complicated and explosive situations (because of the wars in the Middle East and the global financial crises¹⁹) cannot be understood, explained and managed by thinking in old commonly accepted scenarios and using bipolar, dichotomic rhetoric as is the case of the TV discussions genre²⁰ which constitutes the corpus of the present study. More space should be provided for alternative scenarios from the field of social sciences²¹ or citizens’ initiatives.

Such an alternative scenario can be produced around a metaphorical conceptualization of the STATE offered by Agamben (1995: 118): “Leiden jar or Moebius strip: where exterior and interior are indeterminate.” He uses this metaphor in his older but very topical work “We refugees” (1995) to state that refugees should lead us beyond perspectives determined by geographically defined countries with threatening borders and goes on to claim that “European cities, entering into a relationship of reciprocal extraterritoriality, would rediscover their ancient vocation as cities of the world.” Explaining Agamben’s standpoints Loick (2016) suggests:

19. Because of the financial crisis over a million people emigrated from Greece alone in search of a livelihood abroad (see Triandafyllidou 2014).

20. See Meyer (2002), Gotsbachner (2010: 4), Musolff et al. (Introduction in the present volume) about the simplification and the colonization of politics in the media as well as the thread scenarios produced thereupon.

21. E.g. see Colleyer et al. (2015: 190) for the notion of “transnational spaces.”

Instead of talking about integration, there should be discussion of political participation independent of locality and of transnational public spheres that would make it possible for mobile people to govern themselves. This implies the possibility of several political communities existing in one and the same location, as well as the possibility of belonging to several communities at once (...) (Loick 2016)

Such an alternative perspective would not view integration of refugees and immigrants as the best and only solution but would also set other goals which would necessitate alternative scenarios in our minds and novel words and metaphors in our language. Promoting or processing alternative scenarios could be another small contribution of CDA research towards change in language, discourse, communication, education and the social-political world.

4. Conclusions

The critical, integrated, multi-level metaphor analysis model suggested here revealed how politicians interact in issue oriented TV discussions creating contrasting scenarios around metaphors referring to the target domain NATION-STATE in the context of practical reasoning argumentation in order to reinforce their proposals for action. Following the simplification tendencies of the political media discourse the politicians create counter scenarios using metaphor shifting where the source domain develops by hyperbole and contrast.

The 'open state' suggested by the progressive politicians is characterized by the opponents as an 'unfenced vineyard' or 'jungle' and the 'closed state' suggested by the conservative politicians is characterized by their opponents as a 'sealed fortress'. The motivation for the choice of metaphors is ideological and rhetorical as well as it is created in the dynamics of each TV discussion and of the immigration discourse as a whole (see inter-textuality, -discursivity).

More scenarios are produced to blame the opponents for absolute openness or absolute closeness and by extension for all the negative consequences, connotations and emotions they bring about. Fewer metaphors (encountered in the scenarios of progressive politicians), such as 'states are communicating vessels', 'immigrants are brothers', refer to closer relationships between national citizens and the immigrants/refuges and between the different states. Therefore, more elaborate alternative or novel scenarios are needed, if we (politicians, citizens alike) wish to deal politically/institutionally with the complicated global circumstances and efficiently act upon them.

In the issue oriented TV discussions politicians aim to exaggerate the differences of their parties and blame their opponents to "facilitate" a clear choice for the voters. In the restricted context (time, goals etc) of a TV discussion they are

not interested in offering or they are supposedly not allowed to offer complicate alternative scenarios suggesting really new solutions. Media people are aware of the above critical comments about their simplification, bipolarization, theatricalization rhetoric but they do not change their priorities, for fear of viewing rating changes.

Therefore, the revealing of and the reflexion on their rhetorical methods is the only way to mitigate their impact on people's way of thinking (Girnth et al. 2015: 1). Fortunately, there are certain TV discussions in the Greek state television channels, combined with news coverage reportage or documentary films which are socially oriented and give time and voice not only to politicians but also to (social) scientists, citizens' initiatives or social movements. They do not produce high ratings but they offer complex interpretations and alternative proposals which could contribute to the questioning of the widespread common sense scenarios which are framed around fearsome dichotomous, hyperbolic metaphors and lead to the construction of real fences and concentration camps.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Katerina Leoudi and my students for assisting in the transcription of the material. For bibliography and interesting discussions on issues of the conceptual level of metaphors I thank the members of the Cognitive Linguistics Research Group (School of English Language and Literature, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki) and especially the Professors Angeliki Athanasiadou (supervisor) and Maria Theodoropoulou. For information related to the history of vineyards in Greece I thank Kostas Kremmydas, vinegrower and wine producer from Limnos. And Argiris Archakis for his critical comments.

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The Great Wall of Europe

Verbal and multimodal portrayals of Europe's migrant crisis in Serbian media discourse

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Complementing the theoretical framework of Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black 2004; Musolff 2004, 2011) with research on multimodality from a cognitive viewpoint (Bounegru and Forceville 2011), in this chapter we deal with both linguistic and multimodal instantiations of the WALL metaphor in Serbian media texts published in 2015 in an attempt to identify the most frequent metaphor scenarios modelled around this concept in a critical period during the European migrant crisis. Two major metaphor scenarios (Musolff 2006) triggered by the WALL metaphor arise – FORTRESS EUROPE and BERLIN WALL, both appearing to be instrumental in communicating the notions of marginalisation and non-belongingness to the EU space, emanating from verbally and visually constructed image of both migrants and the Serbian nation.

Keywords: metaphor scenario, multimodality, migrant crisis, EU, Serbia, WALL metaphor, FORTRESS EUROPE scenario, BERLIN WALL scenario

1. Introduction

In order to prevent further illegal entries of migrants into its territory, in September 2015 Hungary constructed a 175 km-long barrier in the form of a razor-wire fence on its border with Serbia, leaving hundreds of refugees stuck in camps in “no man’s land” between Hungary and Serbia and making the latter, together with Croatia, a new migrant hotspot. The Hungarian construction of the fence, justified as a necessary measure to stop a surge in uncontrollable entry of migrants and asylum seekers on the EU outer borders hence to prevent damaging EU’s security, inevitably had a major impact on Serbia’s migrant policy as well as on the perception of Europe’s migrant crisis by Serbian citizens, which began to be closely modelled around the concept of wall that was literally constructed by the Hungarian authorities.

From a cognitive linguistic point of view, the topic of migrant crisis has convincingly been proved a fertile ground for research “due to its rich potential for polemical and emotional language as well as its socio-political and historical significance” (Musolff 2011: 7). Therefore, within the theoretical framework of Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black 2004, 2011, 2014; Musolff 2004, 2011; etc.), coupled with research on multimodality from a cognitive perspective (Bounegru and Forceville 2011; Forceville 2009), in this chapter we deal with both linguistic and multimodal (verbo-pictorial) instantiations of the WALL metaphor in an attempt to identify the most frequent metaphor scenarios modelled around this concept in a critical period of the European migrant crisis.

More specifically, we investigate verbal and multimodal realisations of the *FOR-TRESS EUROPE* and the *BERLIN WALL* scenarios activated by the WALL metaphor, where the given scenarios appear to endorse a construal of both migrants and the Serbian nation as belonging to the same outer EU-space. This is particularly accentuated and verified by metaphorical expressions used by Serbian discourse participants, who view this new development in getting a grip on the migrant crisis by the EU administration as a new obstacle to Serbia’s EU accession process. As metaphor scenarios “constitute an essential feature of metaphor use in public discourse registers” (Musolff 2006: 28) and “help to shape the course of public debates and conceptualizations of political target topics by framing the attitudinal and evaluative preferences in the respective discourse communities” (Musolff 2006: 28), our aims in this chapter are the following: (a) to establish the extent to which the literal construction of the Hungarian border wall influenced the metaphorical portrayal of the migrant crisis in Serbian media discourse, and (b) to show how metaphor scenarios, relying closely on discourse in which they occur, have the power to frame discourse participants in an evaluatively more emphatic manner.

2. Theoretical framework

There is a great deal of studies which bear witness to “how metaphor is employed persuasively to provide cognitive frames for perspectives on social issues” (Charteris-Black 2006: 565) such as migration and asylum (e.g. Charteris-Black 2006; El Refaie 2001; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Hart 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Musolff 2011, 2015; Neagu and Colipcă-Ciobanu 2014; Santa Ana 2002; etc.). Thus, the typical figurative characterisations of migration are “a natural disaster (hence the pervasive *FLOOD* imagery), and invasion of enemies, an epidemic, or the spread of disease-carrying, parasitic organisms” (Musolff 2011: 12; see also Musolff 2016), some of which have also been evidenced in Serbian media discourse on migrants and asylum seekers (see Đurović 2015). The theoretical framework of our analysis

in this chapter is provided by Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black 2004, 2011, 2014; Musolff 2004, 2011), which, drawing on one of the most important tenets of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), not only posits that the main role of metaphor is to make complex issues more intelligible, but also “aims to reveal the covert (and possibly unconscious) intentions of language users” (Charteris-Black 2004: 34), focusing its interest on the pragmatic and ideological characteristics of metaphor. This is in line with the main objectives in Critical Discourse Analysis as it is “primarily interested and motivated by pressing social issues, which it hopes to better understand through discourse analysis” (Van Dijk 1993: 252) by unveiling ideology and mostly negative evaluations hidden in a particular discourse. Since metaphors play an essential role in political and media discourses, which stems from their cognitive potential to become powerful markers of social and national identities, Critical Metaphor Analysis offers an apt theoretical framework for combining and analysing both cognitive and discursive facets of different social issues, Europe’s migrant crisis being a case in point in this chapter.

Similarly, in a number of studies which research media and institutional discourse both inside and outside the EU (e.g. Chaban, Bain, and Stats 2007; Musolff 2000, 2004, 2006; Silaški, Đurović, and Radić-Bojanić 2009; Šarić 2005; Šarić et al. 2010; Zbierska-Sawala 2004) it has been convincingly shown that highly abstract processes of joining and integration with the EU are effectuated by the linkages between language, cognition and reality, while metaphors, as a product of our conceptual system evidenced in language, become the most pervasive cognitive and linguistic devices for shaping and communicating conceptualisations of the given reality. Furthermore, several studies published so far (Đurović and Silaški 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014; Silaški and Đurović 2014; Silaški, Đurović, and Radić-Bojanić 2009; etc.) have documented that Serbian public discourse utilises similar or the same metaphors and metaphor scenarios for the conceptualisation of Serbia’s EU accession as those used in English (as attested by the studies that researched the English data), although these same metaphors may convey different evaluative content and rhetorical impact. This reflects Fairclough’s claim that “[w]hen we signify things through one metaphor rather than another, we are constructing our reality in one way rather than another” (Fairclough 1992: 194). As a fundamental cognitive tool for conceptualising the world around us, metaphor has a “central role in the construction of social and political reality” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 159), which can be related to the primary concern of Critical Metaphor Analysis that “[i]f language is a prime means of gaining control of people, metaphor is a prime means by which people can regain control of language and create discourse” (Charteris-Black 2004: 253). Thus, metaphors in this chapter are regarded as discursive means which aid in understanding certain social processes, more specifically the topic of Europe’s migrant crisis and Serbia’s EU

accession as well as the underlying notions of marginalisation, exclusion, and power differences.

Our analysis of Serbian media discourse focuses on the organisation of what Musolff (2006) calls *metaphor scenario*, which draws on Fillmore's notion of a conceptual "scene" (Fillmore 1975) as well as on Lakoff's definition of "scenario" as a subtype of idealised cognitive models (Lakoff 1987). Metaphor scenarios allow us to search "for recurring argumentative, narrative and stance-taking patterns in corpora of present-day metaphor use" and "to refine our understanding of the metaphors' degree of entrenchment in their sociocultural setting and the power to 'frame' its discourses" (Musolff 2016: 133). By *contextualising* conceptual metaphors, whose cognitive potential can thus be better assessed, metaphor scenarios are of central importance to our analysis of both verbal and multimodal metaphors in Serbian media discourse related to the topic of Europe's migrant crisis.

Finally, in this chapter we also employ the theory of multimodal discourse, following Forceville (2009), who argues that if verbal metaphors are *manifestations* rather than *reduplications* of thought, one of these manifestations may be non-verbal or pictorial. Unlike monomodal metaphors, such as the prototypical verbal metaphors, "non-verbal metaphors often have targets and/or sources that are cued in more than one mode simultaneously" (Forceville 2009: 24). The analysis of multimodality of metaphors in the chapter focuses on the genre of political cartoons. El Refaie (2009b: 184–185) defines a political cartoon as "an illustration, usually in a single panel, published in the editorial or comments pages of a newspaper" addressing "a current political issue or event, a social trend, or a famous personality, in a way that takes a stand or presents a particular point of view". On the one hand, political cartoons "tell an imaginary story about a make-believe world", while on the other, "they refer to real-life events and characters" (El Refaie 2009b: 186). This relationship between the real and the imaginary is metaphorical in nature, "inviting people to map properties from a more tangible area of reality onto one that is more abstract" (El Refaie 2009b: 186). This feature of political cartoon genre makes it prone to the analysis from a cognitive linguistic perspective. In order to interpret the intended meaning, the reader needs to be involved in the "metaphorical process of transferring meaning from the make-believe to the real world" (El Refaie 2009a: 174). In political cartoons this is "conveyed predominantly in the visual mode", although "most cartoon metaphors also rely to some extent on verbal cues" (El Refaie 2009a: 174), which makes this genre a prime example of multimodal discourse.

Therefore, we aim to determine how both visual and verbal instances of metaphors and other cognitive instruments pertaining to EU's migrant crisis depict this issue in political cartoons and confirm the evaluative content already established in the analysis of verbal metaphors alone.

3. Data collection and method

Our data collection used for the analysis consists of two parts. The verbal part contains examples of metaphorical expressions linguistically realising the WALL and the FORTRESS metaphor scenarios extracted from articles published in several Serbian political daily and weekly newspapers and magazines (*Politika*, *Večernje novosti*, *Blic*, *Novi magazin*, *Kurir*, *NIN*, *Vreme*) as well as on relevant news portals (B92, N1, RTS, Beta, Vesti online, Vesti.rs) during the second half of 2015. The data were gathered by conducting a Google search in which the queries were based on the combination of the following key words: *migrant* ‘migrant’, *Evropska unija* ‘European Union’, *zid* ‘wall’, *Mađarska* ‘Hungary’, *migrantska kriza* ‘migrant crisis’, *tvrđava* ‘fortress’, which enabled us to extract texts for the analysis. In order to clearly establish the presence of metaphoricity in the data counting around 100,000 words, we applied the procedure for metaphor identification (MIP) proposed by the Pragglejaz Group (2007). It is claimed to be a reliable method as it eliminates any subjective criteria for metaphor identification. Having established the presence of metaphoricity modelled on the MIP, we then extracted the parts of text containing those expressions which both of us judged to be metaphorical and were thus included in our data collection. Some of these will be used in the subsequent section of the chapter to present our points. Our goal is *not* to establish absolute or relative frequencies of metaphors or metaphor density in the data collection (for such efforts see, e.g., Schröter et al., this volume). We focus instead on the qualitative analysis of the examples of the FORTRESS EUROPE and the BERLIN WALL metaphor scenarios to examine their power to frame discourse participants in immigration discourse in Serbian in an evaluatively more pronounced manner.

The multimodal part of the data collection consists of five political cartoons published in the pro-government dailies *Politika*¹ and *Večernje novosti*,² in which the topic of the migrant crisis is either verbally anchored, in the caption and/or the accompanying textual message, or visually rendered by suggestive images or symbols which cued the topic under consideration. Some cartoons contain concurrent verbal and visual representations of the WALL and FORTRESS scenarios. Out of the five cartoons in total, two will be used in this chapter to illustrate our points. Both cartoons were published on the front page of the *Politika*’s Sunday edition and their author is Dušan Petričić. The metaphor identification procedure for this part of the data collection was conducted following the method suggested by Bounegru and Forceville (2011) and their clear criteria for the identification of metaphors in multimodal discourse pertaining to the global financial crisis.

1. Available at <http://www.politika.rs/scc/authors/satires/849>

2. Available at http://www.novosti.rs/dodatni_sadržaj/foto.110.html?galleryId=4#image_

4. Results and discussion

Musolff (2016: 82–83) identified four major metaphor scenarios in immigration discourse following his comprehensive analysis of a number of British newspapers and magazines (in the period 2003–2014) as well as online fora and blogs all related to this topic: the SPACE-CONTAINER, the MOVEMENT, the ACTION, and the EFFECT. According to Musolff (2016: 82–83; see also Musolff 2015: 45), the SPACE-CONTAINER scenario rests on a firmly established conceptualisation of the nation(state):

as a *container* with distinct *boundaries*, which separate those *on the outside* from those *inside*: immigrants are thus *outsiders* who want to *come/move into the container*. The *container* is often conceptualized as a *building* that has *doors* and other openings that can be *closed, open* or *half-open*; it is also seen as a vessel that has a *limited capacity* to include contents; if too many immigrants come in, this increases the *pressure* inside to *bursting point* and necessitates the erection of new *barriers*.

(italics in the original text)

The SPACE-CONTAINER scenario appears to be particularly pertinent to our analysis of both verbal and multimodal portrayals of Europe's migrant crisis in Serbian media discourse mirrored in the major conceptualisations stemming from this scenario and their highly evaluative implications. The analysis in the chapter centers on the verbal and verbo-pictorial instantiations of the WALL metaphor in our data collection, in which the wall is viewed as a boundary separating interior from exterior and thus as one of the structural elements of the pervasive CONTAINER image schema. The WALL metaphor gives rise to two major metaphor scenarios – FORTRESS EUROPE, in which the EU seems to have cemented its borders by means of the constructed wall on the Hungarian border thus turning itself into a secluded EU-space, closely guarded and surrounded by walls and fences, and the BERLIN WALL scenario, which clearly establishes strict borders between the EU and non-EU space. Both scenarios serve to frame the participants in immigration discourse in Serbian – immigrants together with Serbian citizens on the one hand, and the EU politicians and officials, on the other. More specifically, the former conceptualises the united EU space surrounded by the fence which cannot be broken into, while the latter conceptualises the strict separation of the EU from the rest of Europe, reminiscent of the wall that now does not divide the once divided city but the whole of the European continent into the countries belonging to the EU and those out of it. In light of the current Europe's migrant crisis and the erecting of barriers on the Hungarian border with Serbia that should protect the EU outer borders and deter moving into the EU *citadel*, the BERLIN WALL scenario in particular conveys the idea of the division of the two opposing CONTAINERS (STATES being conceived of as

CONTAINERS), the EU and the non-EU, and engenders in turn a host of ideological, religious and social dichotomies and polarizations such as *Us vs. Them*, *Civilisation vs. Barbarism*, *West vs. East*, *Christians vs. Others*, etc.

4.1 The FORTRESS EUROPE scenario

The FORTRESS EUROPE is a recurring metaphor scenario activated in times of increased mass population movement, the current Europe's migrant crisis being no exception. Originally, the FORTRESS EUROPE metaphor was used in media discourse and political rhetoric when the processes of the EU integration and enlargement were initiated.³ Thus Chaban, Bain, and Stats (2007: 85–86), analysing the Australasian news media coverage of the 2004 EU enlargement, write that “[t]he images of doors being closed and safeguarded evoked an interpretation of the ‘European building’ in terms of a fortress”. The authors add that the evidence shows that this heavily guarded *fortress* is portrayed as looking for any opportunities to *restrict* access to it. Similarly, Zinken (2007: 17) finds that the metaphor of the *European fortress* “expresses the impossibility for aspiring new members to enter into the European Union” and that this metaphor framed the public discourse on European unification in the 1990s. These findings are also corroborated in Serbian media discourse (Silaški, Đurović, and Radić-Bojanić 2009: 133) by the use of the SCHENGEN WALL metaphor, which leads to viewing the EU by Serbian citizens as a *fortress* and an exclusive and impenetrable space.

As the FORTRESS EUROPE metaphor “is commonly used by those who are ‘outside the fortress’ or by advocates for their rights” (Petrović 2014: 123), it is particularly apt in the criticism of the EU migration policy. The emotional and cognitive appeals of this metaphor do not only help to exclude outsiders but also to make a sharp distinction between insiders and those on the outside. Similar to the HOUSE metaphor, to which the EU is also pervasively likened (see Chilton and Ilyin 1993; Đurović 2013; Musolff 2000, 2004; Schäffner 1996; Silaški, Đurović, and Radić-Bojanić 2009; Šarić 2005), the FORTRESS metaphor, which also belongs to the BUILDING/EDIFICE metaphor, i.e. to the more comprehensive CONTAINMENT image schema, unequivocally underlines the difference between *us* and *them*, or between those *inside the house/fortress* and those *outside the house/fortress*. This explains Musolff's claim that there seem to be no essential meaning differences between the variants of popular *international* metaphors such as e.g. *fortress Europe* and

3. However, the term *fortress Europe* was first used for military propaganda in the Second World War and referred to Continental Europe occupied by Nazi Germany, as opposed to the United Kingdom across the Channel.

the *European house* (Musolff 1996). He adds that the widespread use of this and similar metaphors lies in their pictorial translatability into the universal language of political cartoons, which we will also try to show in the analysis of multimodal renderings of both the FORTRESS EUROPE and BERLIN WALL metaphors.

The selected examples below show that unlike some previous tendencies when the FORTRESS metaphor was not “present in discourses of EU officials and politicians of its member states, except in response to or denials of such criticism” (Petrović 2014: 124), the literal concrete walls or barbed-wire fences erected by the Hungarian authorities on the Hungarian-Serbian border, later followed by the same move of the Croatian government on a number of Croatia-Serbia border crossings, are perceived now by both Serbian and European discourse participants as barriers that defend the *fortress Europe* from everything viewed as non-European and foreign, hence hostile.⁴ Still, the evaluative content attributed to this metaphor differs between these two groups of discourse participants. The image of the fortress is usually equated with security, and for those inside, this confined space offers shelter from the threat and danger coming from the outside. Hence the FORTRESS EUROPE provides a neat conceptual and ideological pattern for legitimising activities of the EU officials aimed at ostracising immigrants, thus aliens in general. This logic of the *fortress Europe* as synonymous with security and dispelling fear of immigrants viewed as the threat triggers the logic of equalising Serbian people with immigrants. More precisely, the EU’s tacit permission given to Hungary to erect barriers and walls on its borders, with Serbia justifying this activity as securing the EU external borders, is viewed in Serbian media discourse as equating Serbian citizens with immigrants who will be thus prevented to come closer to the EU lest they should jeopardise the stability of the *EU fortress*. This is attested by several examples from our data collection related to the self-perception of discourse participants in Serbian media discourse on immigration emanating from viewing the EU as a FORTRESS.

- (1) Mađarski zid korak ka ideji „*tvrđave Evrope*” (headline, Vesti.rs, 18 June 2015) ‘Hungarian wall a step towards the idea of “*Fortress Europe*”’
- (2) Kako će se sve to odraziti na inače nestabilno socijalno-psihološko tlo Srbije, koja će onda biti ‘*prvo predsoblje*’ ove ‘*tvrđave*’. (Vesti.rs, 18 June 2015) ‘How will all this reflect on otherwise instable socio-psychological soil of Serbia, which will then become ‘*the fist antechamber*’ of this ‘*fortress*’.’

4. We are primarily interested in the FORTRESS metaphor as belonging to the CONTAINMENT metaphor. However, its conceptual and semantic content can also be equated to the WAR OR INVASION domain, or the more generic CONFLICT domain (Neagu and Colipcă-Ciobanu 2014: 210), the CONFLICT metaphors in turn being regarded as part of the higher level IMMIGRATION IS FORCE metaphor (Charteris-Black 2004; Hart 2011b).

- (3) Podizanje ograda i zidova tamo gde su 1989. nestali – ili nikad nisu ni postojali – loša je poruka koja dolazi iz „ujedinjene Evrope”. Stvaranje „*tvrđave Evrope*” povećava osećaj izolovanosti i nepripadanja kod zemalja kandidata.
(*Kurir*, 26 August 2015)
‘Erecting fences and walls in places where they disappeared in 1989 – or never existed – is a bad message coming from “the united Europe”. The creation of “*fortress Europe*” is increasing the sense of isolation and non-belongingness in candidate countries.’
- (4) Izgradnja „*tvrđave Evrope*”, gde bismo mi [narod Srbije] ostali *sa spoljne strane zidina*, zajedno sa migrantima – dalo bi za pravo onima koji su likovali kada su nas nazivali „barbarima”.
(*Politika*, 23 October 2015)
‘The creation of “*fortress Europe*”, where we [Serbian people] would remain *on the outside of the walls*, together with migrants – would justify those who crowed when they called us “barbarians”.’
- (5) Da li se, može biti, Nemačka i saveznici kriju iza Mađarske, koja obavlja prljav posao odbrane „*tvrđave Evrope*”?
(*Politika*, 19 September 2015)
‘Could it be that Germany and its allies are hiding behind Hungary, who is doing a dirty job of defending “*fortress Europe*”?’

Accepting the perception of the EU as a *fortress* by Serbian participants in immigration discourse reinforces the notions of isolation, alienation, and non-belongingness, as the Examples (2) and (3) accentuate. Trading on the imposed “OUTSIDER scenario” (Musolff 2010: 160), which stems from the most salient WALL metaphor, whereby both migrants and Serbian citizens are perceived as belonging to the same outer-EU space, Serbian politicians appear to be presenting Europe’s migrant crisis as yet another hurdle Serbia needs to overcome to eventually *enter the EU space* Example (3). Particularly suggestive is Example (4), which underlines the dichotomy between *Us, EU, security and protection*, and *humanity* on the one hand, and *Them, immigrants and Serbian citizens alike, danger and threat*, and *barbarism* on the other.

However, as the subsequent examples will show, the FORTRESS metaphor is not used only by those *outside the EU fortress walls* so as to criticise the EU’s stringent terms for the newcomers, but also by those *inside the EU fortress walls*, who by erecting literal hence mental walls around the EU tend to create the image of the EU as a jeopardised space which needs to be protected against a tumultuous lot. Adopting the FORTRESS EUROPE metaphor scenario by the EU officials should supposedly signal heightened taking care of the EU citizens’ protection, which could be efficiently achieved by fencing the EU from the rest of Europe with high walls. This is also viewed as the only way to allay the fear of immigrants perceived as the threat.

- (6) Ministarka unutrašnjih poslova Austrije Johana Mikl-Lajtner kaže ako se stanje sa izbeglicama ne stavi pod kontrolu biće neophodno da se izgradi *tvrđava Evropa*. (Tanjug, 23 October 2015)
 ‘Austria’s Interior Minister Johanna Mikl-Leitner says that unless the situation with refugees is brought under control it will be necessary to build *fortress Europe*.’
- (7) Laslo Torockai, gradonačelnik Asothaloma, pograničnog mesta koje je na prvom udaru najezde, traži i podizanje zida, kao konačnu *fortifikaciju Tvrđave Evropa*. (Politika, 13 March 2015)
 ‘László Toroczkai, mayor of Asotthalom, a border town exposed to the greatest migration pressure, calls for the erection of a wall, as the final *fortification of Fortress Europe*.’
- (8) *Evropa je tvrđava. Rupe na bedemima tvrđave* biće manje ili više delotvorno zatvorene... *Tvrđava Evropa* se još više učvršćuje – i to već skoro dvadeset godina. (Vesti online, 29 August 2015)
 ‘*Europe is a fortress. Cracks in the walls* will be more or less efficiently closed... *Fortress Europe* has been increasingly *strengthened* – for almost twenty years now.’
- (9) Imigranti [...] putuju dalje ka Nemačkoj, Francuskoj, Velikoj Britaniji ili Švedskoj. To dovodi do nemira unutar *tvrđave*, jer time enormno raste broj imigranata i izbeglica u Nemačkoj – kako se neprestano žali nemački ministar unutrašnjih poslova Tomas de Mezijer. (Vesti online, 29 August 2015)
 ‘Immigrants are travelling on to Germany, France, Great Britain or Sweden. This has led to anxiety inside *the fortress*, since the number of immigrants and refugees has risen enormously – as German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere has repeatedly complained.’
- (10) Oni su se koncentrisali na *dogradnju tvrđave*, ali se nisu pripremili na prijem sve većeg broja ljudi. [...] Vreme je da se unutar *tvrđave* pripreme da zbrinu sve više onih koji dolaze. [...] ako se pritisak u budućnosti poveća, moglo [bi] doći do toga da države požele ponovo svoj suverenitet na granicama kako bi čuvale svoju sopstvenu malu *tvrđavu*. (Vesti online, 29 August 2015)
 ‘They focused on *upgrading the fortress*, but they were not prepared to receive an increasing number of people. [...] It is time all inside *the fortress* got ready to take care of those increasingly arriving. [...] if the preassure is increased in the future, it might happen that states wish their border sovereignty back so as to safeguard their own little *fortresses*.’

The conceptualisation of the EU as a FORTRESS, i.e. a CONTAINER (via THE STATES ARE CONTAINERS) by those from the inside of the EU introduces two notions: the loss of control and the internal division, as suggested by the examples above

(6)–(10). “Security is closely related to control because something that is represented as dangerous is something that threatens our security because it is ‘out of control’” (Charteris-Black 2006: 576), attested here by Example (6) and the *complaint* by Austrian Internal Affairs Minister Johanna Mikl-Leitner. Against the backdrop of alarming rise in the number of immigrants wanting and waiting to enter the EU, as well as of those who have already stepped behind the fortress gate, “[t]he concept of a loss of control can be equated to the perforation of a container and penetration of a bounded area” (Charteris-Black 2006: 576), which in rhetorical terms provokes the fear of external danger. But the emotion of fear of immigrants from the outside gives rise, as the Example (10) exhibits, to divided opinions of the EU member states inside the EU over managing the pressure of a mounting number of immigrants. This internal division of the EU fortress may result, as it is suggested, in a tendency of further dividing the EU FORTRESS CONTAINER into several small FORTRESSES of respective EU member states. This image of small fortresses inside the EU serves, on the one hand, to justify the erection of walls and fences in both the EU and Europe thus reverting to drawing again the geographical borders inside Europe. On the other hand, it indicates that the EU needs to more energetically fortify its suprapstate against the force coming from the outside and prevent any cracks in the walls surrounding the EU now rather divided *citadel*. Thus negative evaluation of the FORTRESS EUROPE metaphor, imparted by the Serbian discourse participants, is in stark opposition to positive overtones attributed to this same metaphor by the EU discourse participants since building walls and gates is perceived as the protection of the EU-as-a-container against large movements of migrants and *Others* of any sort, conceptualised as a threatening force.

4.2 The BERLIN WALL scenario

As mentioned above, the most highlighted structural element in our data on Europe’s migrant crisis is the *wall*, which, together with doors or gates, functions as the dividing line between what exists inside the building – CONTAINER, and what exists outside of it in the real world. In cognitive terms, similarly to the FORTRESS, the WALL is a symbol of protection and security, a clear demarcation between *us* and *the external and hostile unknown*. The WALL metaphor, used to construct non-EU space with Serbia belonging to it, adds to the creation of the two types of identities, as emerging from the selected examples: self-identity of the EU as civilisation, culture, and the known versus identity of the non-EU countries as barbarism, non-culture, and the unknown.

The BERLIN WALL scenario, cognitively relying on the literal wall built on the Hungarian border with Serbia, is shown to be realised in language by means of a

host of linguistic metaphors which all conceptualise the wall as a literal and metaphorical obstacle to entering the EU-space. Cognitively speaking, the WALL divides the CONTAINER of the whole of the European continent into two parts, EU-space and Non-EU space filled, according to Serbian officials, with both migrants and Serbian citizens, equally forbidden to enter the EU-space.

- (11) „Vreme je da se Evropa izjasni da li je Evropa *zidova* prošlost ili budućnost. Ja sam mislio da je Berlinski zid pao, a sada se prave novi *zidovi*“, poručio je Dačić. Evropa bi, kako je rekao, trebalo da pokaže da li Balkan tretira kao deo EU ili kao prostor omeđen *zidovima*. (Politika, 25 June 2015)
 “It’s time Europe determined whether the Europe of *walls* is the past or the present. I thought Berlin wall came down, and now new *walls* are being erected”, said Dačić [the current Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs]. “Europe”, he said, “should show whether it treats Balkans as part of EU space or as a space surrounded with *walls*”
- (12) Mađari dižu „*kineski zid*” zbog azilanata. (Večernje novosti, 17 June 2015)
 ‘The Hungarians are erecting a “*Chinese wall*” because of migrants.’
- (13) Na koji način će Brisel sprečiti desničarsku vladu Viktora Orbana da usred Evrope podiže novi *Berlinski zid* ostaje nejasno. (Vesti online, 19 June 2015)
 ‘How will Brussels prevent Viktor Orban’s right-wing government from erecting a new *Berlin Wall* in the middle of Europe remains unclear.’
- (14) „Zašto onda Mađari podižu ogradu? Da li je mađarski zid u stvari *evropski zid*”? (Politika, 10 September 2015)
 “Why are the Hungarians erecting a wall then? Is the Hungarian wall in fact a *European wall*?”
- (15) Ograda koju Mađarska planira da digne zbog migranata na granici sa Srbijom nije ništa drugo do novi *Berlinski zid*, poručio Ivica Dačić svom mađarskom kolegi u Budimpešti. (Tanjug, 1 July 2015)
 ‘The fence that Hungary is planning to erect to stop migrants on its border with Serbia is nothing more than the new *Berlin Wall*, said Ivica Dačić to his Hungarian colleague in Budapest.’

Particularly loaded are expressions *the Chinese wall*, *the Berlin wall* and *the European wall* (Examples (12)–(15)), which are yet another evidence that the conceptualisation of the EU state is founded on the profoundly embodied CONTAINER schema and its structural elements – the interior, the exterior and the boundaries, where the misunderstanding of the other cultures and xenophobia is linguistically rendered via the expressions pertaining to raising mental barriers. Even though the reasons which led to the building of the Great Wall of China or the Berlin Wall are essentially different from those which initiated erecting a wall on the Hungarian-Serbian

or Croatian-Serbian borders, the conceptual likening of the latter walls via *the Chinese wall*, *the Berlin wall*, *the Hungarian wall*, *the European wall* to the former ones rests on the physical aspect of the wall as of something which separates space into two parts. On an abstract level, the wall thus becomes the symbol of dividing the two opposing containers and is used in Serbian public discourse to conceptualise the protection of external boundaries of the EU *fortress*, and, instigated by the migrant crisis, as a new obstacle to Serbia's joining the EU and becoming part of the EU inner space. Hence both the EU's *fortress* external walls and these walls dividing EU-space from Non-EU space are the boundary that keeps the self and others apart. Moreover, they are perceived by the Serbian discourse participants as another impediment which will make Serbia still wait *outside the EU gate* and prevent her from becoming part of the European self.

4.3 A multimodal portrayal of the FORTRESS EUROPE and BERLIN WALL scenarios

The selected cartoons feature Europe's migrant crisis by way of persuasive images accompanied with textual messages and symbols (cf. Felberg and Šarić, this volume). The similar evaluation patterns identified above in verbal data may be detected in the selected political cartoons in which evaluations are rendered by visual or by both textual and visual means. Yet, our data of political cartoons pertaining to the two metaphor scenarios of the central WALL metaphor seem to prove that, semantically and evaluatively, a more powerful message is being conveyed if visual images and symbols and verbal texts concurrently exist to cue the topic under consideration.

4.3.1 *The multimodal FORTRESS EUROPE scenario*

The first cartoon (Figure 1) with the caption *The United Europe* (dating from 1st November 2015) sets the FORTRESS EUROPE scenario and displays a very effective blend of visual and verbal renderings. The whole scenario may be more specifically verbalised as THE EU MIGRANT CRISIS IS THE EUROPEAN FORTRESS SURROUNDED BY A HUGE WALL AND PROTECTED BY CONCRETE AND RAZOR WIRE FENCES metaphor, while the connotations include *security*, *exclusion*, *(non)belongingness*, *threat*, *control*. The cartoon conceptualises the EU as a double-confined CONTAINER: it depicts the EU visually rendered by a high fortress wall, that is the space surrounded by a huge wall; this space is in turn protected by the EU member states, metonymically suggested by the images of a row of flags. But instead of the colours and symbols characteristic of a particular national flag, what is being visually represented is the WALL metaphor, complemented by a verbal cue, the caption *The United Europe*, as a figurative expression of the EU.




Figure 1. *Politika*, 1 November 2015

Caption: *The United Europe*

The FORTRESS EUROPE scenario is thus buttressed by the WALL metaphor since diverse forms of razor wire and concrete walls appear on these *flags*, thus representing, on both physical and conceptual level, “the outer border” of the protection of the EU FORTRESS CONTAINER, visually displayed by a great wall and metonymically shown with the two Latin letters, *EU*. Perceiving the EU as the space whose external borders are secured by the member countries with different fences and barriers against contextually invoked immigrants who are, via the visual representations of *flags*, collectively viewed as *illegal*, is integrated with the caption *The United Europe*. The caption *The United Europe*, in light of the current EU migrant crisis, conveys a strong ideological message and mirrors Europe that is united in perceiving “Others” as a threatening force against which the EU should be fended off by a giant wall. The corollary is that the EU should thus prevent not only immigrants but also all those *on the other side of the wall* from jeopardising the inner space of the EU CONTAINER conceptualised as a FORTRESS.

4.3.2 *The multimodal BERLIN WALL scenario*

The 21st June 2015 cartoon (Figure 2), which pertains to the BERLIN WALL scenario, is also an example of a multimodal metaphor. The CONTAINMENT and the related WALL metaphors are visually rendered by means of different forms of concrete walls and wire fences which all divide the space into two containers. The inner space is shown to be physically inaccessible and protected by huge barriers. The metaphor belonging to this scenario can be more specifically labelled as THE EU MIGRANT CRISIS IS A SERIES OF WALLS DIVIDING/SEPARATING THE NATIONS.

Unlike the previous cartoon, the people (migrants) are visually represented as being on the other side of *the Hungarian wall*. Thus the target domain is visually rendered. The verbal and visual instantiations of the BERLIN WALL scenario do not




Figure 2. *Politika*, 21 June 2015

Caption: *An unbroken chain of civilisation*

seem to be a random choice. *The Great Wall of China, the Berlin Wall, the Israeli West Bank barrier, the Hungarian wall* should thus reflect a myriad of dichotomies, *We versus Them, Civilisation versus Barbarism, West versus East*, and other ideological, religious and social polarizations. The topic of the EU migrant crisis depicted by the cartoon is additionally framed by the verbal realisation *An unbroken chain of civilisation*, which reinforces the message of the visual metaphor – the walls as physical hence mental images of separation mark every period of the history of human society. Our inability to determine when building the walls started or when it will end, underlined both verbally and visually, suggest that the structuring of social relations in this manner will continue in future. Furthermore, likening *the Hungarian wall* to *the Berlin wall* or some other examples of enclosure and separation serves not only as a reminder of Europe divided in the past, but possibly Europe and the European Union dividing in the future (see Chaban, Bain, and Stats 2007). Hence, similarly to the previous cartoon, which belongs to the *FORTRESS EUROPE* scenario, the mapped connotations are *exclusion, loss of control, threatening force, fear of others, division*.

Still, the effectiveness and legitimisation of the activities undertaken so as to stop the migrant movements is profoundly questioned not only by the examples of walls to which *the Hungarian wall* is being compared in conceptual terms, but also by potentially positive connotations of the *WALL* metaphor as an obstacle which people want to remove and demolish (see Charteris-Black 2004), symbolised by *the Berlin wall* (in both literal and figurative sense).

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, set against a backdrop of the Europe migrant crisis and methodologically based on metaphor scenario analysis, we have explored verbal and verbo-pictorial renderings of the two scenarios – FORTRESS EUROPE and BERLIN WALL, which are made coherent by the WALL metaphor. The analysis of both verbal and multimodal instantiations of the WALL metaphor has shown that this metaphor, instigated in Serbian media discourse by a literal event in the EU reality – the construction of the Hungarian border barrier – serves as a powerful means of conveying a negative axiological value and “the qualities of systematic Othering” (KhosraviNik 2014: 505). Thus the WALL metaphor, either couched in words and/or instantiated via persuasive images and symbols, proves to be very impactful in demarcating the *in* group from the *out* group. This is particularly blatant in the case of the BERLIN WALL scenario in which the highlighting of one component of a conceptual structure becomes instrumental in communicating the notions of marginalisation and non-belongingness to the EU space, emanating from verbally and visually constructed image of both migrants and the Serbian nation. By conceptualising the EU and its space as a FORTRESS protected by *the Berlin wall*, *the Hungarian wall* or any of the selected metaphorical expressions as well as multimodal portrayals relating to the CONTAINER schema, buttresses a positive cognitive construction of the EU’s Self and a negative cognitive construction of Serbia (in the light of the migrant discourse) as the EU’s Other with important repercussions on Serbia’s EU accession process. Hence the scenario-oriented analysis of the WALL metaphor in Serbian media discourse pertaining to the Europe migrant crisis has hopefully attested to “both metaphors’ communicative multifunctionality and their twofold significance for cognition: they are both the product of and a means to shape thought, emotion and social perception” (Musolff 2016: 137).

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Representations of the 2015/2016 “migrant crisis” on the online portals of Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters

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This chapter investigates the verbal and visual representation of migration and migrants in Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters' online portals during the “migrant crisis” in 2015/2016. The study shows that migrants are generally positively represented, which is congruent with the official policies of Croatia and Serbia. This positive representation was frequently used for positive self-evaluation of these countries' influential social actors, and negative evaluation of neighboring countries. The chapter employs macro- and micro-linguistic analysis within the theoretical framework of critical discourse analysis and multimodal analysis.

Keywords: migrant “crisis”, the Balkan route, Croatian public broadcaster, Serbian public broadcaster

1. Introduction and background

Migrations¹ within and through the Balkans are not unique in modern times. However, their intensity, type, and direction vary depending on global and regional politics. In the recent past, during and after the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s, there were large migrations, mostly from Croatia and Bosnia to Serbia; from Bosnia to Croatia; and from Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia to Western countries (Penev 2011: 16).

1. We use the term “migrants” to refer to all people traveling through Serbia and Croatia in 2015/2016 with the aim of reaching Germany and other Western countries, regardless of their legal status. We have adopted the term “the Balkan route” to refer to the geographical area that stretches from Greece via Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia to Slovenia.

The Balkan route has been used by migrants from the Middle East and Africa for some time now, and it became more accessible in 2012 after Schengen visa restrictions were relaxed (Frontex 2016). The number of migrants peaked in 2015 and turned into what is referred to as the “migrant crisis.” Despite the common EU migration policy (European Commission 2016), solving this migrant “crisis” turned out to be challenging. Some analysts differentiate among the three types of political approaches that the EU and its member states applied to the migrants: exclusion, fear, and humanitarianism (Župarić-Iljić 2014: 91). The politics of exclusion involves finding ways to exclude migrants from the territory of the EU; the politics of fear involves criminalization and stigmatization of migrants; and the politics of humanitarianism involves the development of measures that are less restrictive, more accepting, and aimed at regulating the status of irregular migrants.²

The increase in migration through the Balkans in 2015 caused internal political crises in the region, resulting in closing and opening of borders, erection of walls, and mutual accusations. This article focuses on a particular geographic segment of the Balkan route: Croatia and Serbia. We investigate the discursive constructions of migrants on the online portals of Serbian and Croatian public broadcasters, RTS and HRT, from August 2015 to March 2016. Croatia and Serbia are important countries on the Balkan route because they serve as the border between EU and non-EU countries and between NATO and non-NATO countries.

The policies of Croatia and Serbia regarding migrants have been influenced partially by Croatia’s status as an EU member state and Serbia’s efforts to become one and partially by the fact that Serbia and Croatia were merely transit countries on the migration path to other EU countries and an insignificant number of migrants decided to stay in these countries.³ Even though both countries have asylum laws, very few asylum seekers have been granted asylum, a fact that has been criticized by some human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch 2016a, b).

This political situation can be described as a “qualified humanitarian approach” (see Šelo Šabić 2017: 53) to the migrant “crisis”. The main focus of the analyzed

2. EU documents use the term “irregular immigration” to refer to people traveling without the necessary documentation and/or using unauthorized border-crossing points (see, e.g., [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/554202/EPRS_BRI\(2015\)554202_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/554202/EPRS_BRI(2015)554202_EN.pdf)).

3. Concentrating on the Balkan corridor and specifically on Croatia, Župarić-Iljić and Valenta (forthcoming) claim that “the state’s ‘public-face’ strategy of advocating human(itarian) approaches was, in practice, restricted to enabling a more humane ‘transit’ process rather than one of aiding ‘longer-term solutions.’” The authors (forthcoming: 7) also claim that “Croatia’s positive, welcoming, humanitarian stance must be viewed in terms of an overtly proclaimed aim, namely, to ensure that arriving migrants were being welcomed into the country on a temporary basis only.”

material is the plight of migrants (see also Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017: 1751)⁴ and not their illegality or crime. However, there are a few examples in our material that relate to the politics of fear, or a security-driven narrative (Šelo Šabić 2017: 53).⁵ Political relations between Croatia and Serbia have oscillated since the end of the war in 1995; because there are still some open questions related to the war, political relations are easily disturbed. The migrant “crisis” exacerbated old disputes between Croatia and Serbia as well as among other countries in the region. Political relations worsened when the migrants started entering Croatia via Serbia, changing their route after Hungary closed its borders in September 2015. Croatia accused Serbia of redirecting the migrants to Croatia on purpose, and Serbia blamed this on Hungary’s decision to close its borders and migrants’ desire to continue to Western Europe. Croatia responded to Serbia’s actions (transporting migrants near the Croatian border) by blocking freight traffic from Serbia. Croatian and Serbian politicians also engaged in a war of words, which was commented on by media outlets around the world (e.g., Bilefskysept 2015). The Balkan route was officially closed in March 2016.

Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters followed the “crisis” closely. Both had journalists reporting live from the field and claimed to be independent, neutral, and free of any political influence.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides remarks on the theory and methodology used, including macro- and micro-linguistic analysis within the theoretical framework of critical discourse analysis (Wodak et al. 2009) and multimodal analysis (van Leeuwen 2008; Kress and van Leeuwen 1996/2006). We mainly focus on representations of migrants, supplemented with an analysis of the representation of politicians that were influential in this particular context. The main part of the chapter is devoted to analyses of social actors and actions and the photographs accompanying news items. These aspects are interwoven and are separated for analytical purposes only (see Section 3). We complete our interpretation of representations of social actors and actions with some concluding remarks.

4. See also Župarić-Iljić and Valenta (forthcoming: 8), who claim that the attitude of media reporting in Croatia at the beginning of the “crisis” was mainly positive.

5. Župarić-Iljić and Valenta (forthcoming: 8) claim that the new Croatian government elected in November 2015 continued a discourse of responsibility and humanity, however, “gradually over time, and especially after Paris terrorist attacks and Köln harassments shifted more and more towards convergence with Slovenian, Hungarian and the Visegrad group’s securitisation discourse on preventing irregular migration.... and defending borders and presumed national interests.” We could not identify any clear discursive shift in our corpus.

The ideological framework of our material is defined by official state policies represented in the sources and specific features of the genre of the material: a condensed online version of TV news in which verbal information is accompanied by images and video clips. HRT items start with three to five still images and one or more video clips from the main news program, *Dnevnik*, whereas RTS includes fewer still images and one video clip per news item, which starts with a still image. We included this image in the study but did not analyze the videos. The chosen semiotic resources used by news portals reflect their own norms and expectations of how the reader should relate to migrants.

We focus on representations of discourse participants or social actors that are the main topic of the texts, and actions that these actors perform or do not perform. We pay attention to backgrounded and foregrounded social actors and actions as well as those that are excluded. Another category of social actors is those that directly or indirectly influence and/or produce representations, that is, framing of an event. These actors may be medium-external (e.g., politicians, policymakers, any city mayors) or medium-internal (e.g., journalists and editors), and some are both internal and external as they not only influence and produce representations but also are represented (e.g., politicians). We do not analyze the site, conditions (technical or otherwise) of discourse production, or discourse reception. Our primary concern is the migrants (the social actors that are the main topic of the material), although we also focus on the representation of some medium-internal and medium-external social actors and their actions if their voice is “visible” in the texts (e.g., politicians). These actors are considered in relation to the role they play in the representation of the migrants.

Our understanding of discourse follows that of van Leeuwen (2008) and Wodak et al. (2009): discourse is conceived of as a recontextualized social practice in which different semiotic means, including language, are used in order to represent certain aspects of the social world. According to van Leeuwen (2008: 7), “social practices enter into texts.” However, texts themselves are also social practices. We assume that discourse is influenced and constrained by various social factors, but it also influences them by supporting, questioning, or deconstructing (some aspects of) these factors. Discourse is a battlefield of a number of ideological options, although it may be dominated by a single one.

In this analysis, we employ the concept of “representation,” which implies the use of different semiotic means for what van Leeuwen terms “recontextualization.” In doing so, we follow Wodak et al. (2009); in their framework, recontextualization implies a transfer of, for instance, lines of argumentation from one context to another.

Multimodal texts in our material draw upon and transform certain social practices. Social practices of, for instance, taking care of migrants are represented by various semiotic means (e.g., verbal metaphor or visual metonymy). The choice

of certain semiotic means implies that others are consciously or unconsciously avoided. These means produce certain effects, such as particularization and individuation of certain social actors or generalization and aggregation (i.e., referring to some actors with numbers) (see van Leeuwen 2008). Over-aggregation (extensive use of numbers) is a striking feature of our material.

Using different means of personal reference (e.g., nouns, pronouns, or quantifiers to refer to individuals and groups) and attributions (e.g., positively connoted or pejorative) contribute to certain discursive strategies (e.g., positive or negative self- or other-presentation; see Wodak et al. 2009: 35–42).

We also focus on the role of metaphors in representing social actors and actions (see Musolff 2011; Zinken et al. 2008). Metaphors in discourse can be used consciously or subconsciously. In either case, they produce certain effects and their users can achieve certain communicative purposes (Musolff 2011; Šarić 2014).

A prominent feature of our material is over-spatialization (we use “spatialization” to refer to the use of various types of spatial expressions, such as spatial adverbials). In other words, great emphasis is placed on spatial locations, sources, and goals that are an intrinsic part of social actors’ and actions’ representation. Spatialization is reflected in numerous motion verbs.

The migration “crisis” as a social practice is linked to specific times and locations, about which the analyzed texts are very specific. In many cases, the texts’ overall topics are migrants’ arrival at or departure from certain locations or specific events taking place at certain locations (e.g., breaking of border fences). Spatial and temporal “landmarks” are thus represented with very specific terms. Compared to their degree of specificity, the representation of social actors differs greatly (see Section 3).

Representation can add evaluations to elements of social practice(s). As a rule, evaluation in texts is connected to legitimation (e.g., explanation or critique of certain actions). Van Leeuwen (2008: 21) emphasizes that evaluation in journalistic reporting is rare but can be direct or indirect. It is indirect, for instance, in the use of metaphors (see Section 3.2).

In the following section, we employ the main categories used by van Leeuwen (2008) to examine the representation of social actors and social actions.

3. Results and discussion: Representation of social actors and social actions

Van Leeuwen (2008) draws upon a socio-semantic inventory of ways of representing social actors and their actions that range from naming strategies to metaphors and include analysis of both verbal and visual representation.

3.1 Naming strategies, determination, and functionalization

Our data contain news items that provide “normative” suggestions for naming strategies and definitions of labels to be used in reference to people that are traveling through the western Balkans (e.g., *Damir Matković: Migranti, izbjeglice ili ljudi u nevolji?* ‘Damir Matković: Migrants, refugees or people in danger?’ HRT, September 7, 2015). Similar recommendations are also found in international media.⁷ In recommendations found in our material, C/S *migrant* (E ‘migrant’)⁸ is described as a general term used to refer to a person moving to a new area or country in order to find work or better living conditions, whereas C/S *izb(j)eglice* ‘refugees’ is a specific term referring to persons in danger that leave certain areas because of armed conflict. This term is further related to the official status some persons can acquire in countries in which they seek asylum. The official recommendations rely on the UNHCR’s definitions and international law.⁹ The root of the C/S word *izb(j)eglice* is *b(ij)eg* ‘escape’. Its nominal stem refers to the necessity of leaving, unlike the C/S word *migrant*. The C/S terms *imigrant(i)* ‘immigrants’ and *emigrant(i)* ‘emigrants’ are also occasionally used. The former refers to one who reaches a destination country, and the latter refers to one who leaves their country of origin. The route and “crisis” are qualified in C/S as *migrantska* ‘migrant’, *migracijska* ‘migration’, *izb(j)eglička* ‘refugee’, and, occasionally, *imigrantska* ‘immigrant’ (see Excerpts 1 and 2):

(1) ...*migrantska kriza nije samo problem Hrvatske...* (RTS, October 22 (a), 2015)
‘...migrant crisis is not just Croatia’s problem...’

(2) *Tzv. balkanska izbjeglička ruta od ponoći je i službeno zatvorena.*
(HRT, March 9 (a), 2016)

‘The so-called Balkan refugee route has been officially closed since midnight.’

7. For example, BBC (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286>).

8. The letters C and S refer to Croatian and Serbian, and E refers to English. E is regularly used after C/S. Due to the similarity of standard Croatian and Serbian, the terms used in the material are very similar or identical in most cases and are labeled C/S.

9. See, for example, the UNHCR recommendations (<http://www.unhcr.org/refugees.html>, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html>), and the recommendations published by HRT (September 7, 2015 and September 18 (a), 2015), and RTS (August 26, 2015 and September 2, 2015).

Reporting on a large number of people moving through Serbia and Croatia required rethinking of terminology related to migration. In some situations, journalists chose particular terms to provide information about the backgrounds and aims of the migrants. For example, in some texts discussing people from European countries that joined Syrians, the term *migrant* was used (e.g., HRT, March 20, 2016). However, we have not noticed any careful differentiation between the terms *migranti* and *izbjeglice*. These terms were largely used interchangeably in both Croatian and Serbian material (see Table 1). These terms were often alternated in article leads, and both were used as parts of noun phrases with numerals to report how many people entered Serbia or Croatia (Excerpt 3):

- (3) *Tijekom prošle noći u prihvatni centar u Opatovac pristiglo je oko 5.000 migranata i izbjeglica...* (HRT, September 25, 2015)
 ‘During last night, about 5,000 migrants and refugees arrived at the reception center in Opatovac...’

The adjectival qualifiers “economic” or “illegal”¹⁰ were occasionally used with the term “migrant.” As a rule, the term “refugees” was not accompanied by adjectival qualifiers, but the term appeared infrequently with the appositions *S deca* (E ‘children’) and *C/S beba* (E ‘baby’) (e.g., *deca izbeglice* ‘refugee children’, *beba izbjeglica* ‘baby refugee’; see also Table 1):

- (4) *... prva beba izbjeglica rođena je početkom listopada u zagrebačkoj Klinici za ženske bolesti i porode.* (HRT, November 5, 2015)
 ‘... the first baby refugee was born at the beginning of October at the Zagreb Gynecology and Maternity Clinic.’

RTS used the term corresponding to ‘migrants’ most frequently, followed by ‘refugees’, whereas HRT used the term for ‘refugees’ most frequently. The terms *azilanti* or *tražioc/trožitelji azila* ‘asylum seekers’ were rarely used, which is understandable because very few people applied for asylum in Serbia and Croatia (see Table 1).

All of these terms indicate different types of movement and different scenarios that cause it. These scenarios are either “neutral,” such as the one related to the C/S term *migrant* ‘migrant’, which implies a change of location for pragmatic reasons, or life-threatening, as in the case of *izb(j)eglice* ‘refugees’. In addition to these terms, the generic C/S term *ljudi* ‘people/humans’ was also used (see Table 1). Although it

10. In the Croatian material, the term *ilegalni migrant(i)* ‘illegal migrant(s)’ is used seventeen times. In addition, there are three occurrences of *nezakoniti* ‘illegal’ and *neregularni (i) migrant(i)* ‘irregular migrant(s)’. There was a regular pattern of labeling certain actions or locations as illegal (e.g., crossing the border). One text (HRT, September 18 (a), 2015) explicitly dealt with the terms and suggested that only actions can be illegal, not people. RTS used *ilegalni (i)migrant(i)* 35 times. A single occurrence of *ilegalne izbeglice* ‘illegal refugees’ was found in RTS.

implies a highly general categorization (van Leeuwen 2008: 42), this term allowed a different approach: humanization and individuation of the migrants. Consider (5)–(6), in which *ljudi* is followed by an attributive relative sentence:

- (5) ...*ljudi koji beže od rata na Bliskom istoku i siromaštva...*
 (RTS, November 11, 2015)
 ‘...people that are running away from the war in the Middle East and poverty...’
- (6) ...*ljudi koji su se odvažili krenuti na put tražeći bolji život za sebe i svoju obitelj.*
 (HRT, September 7, 2015)
 ‘...people who dared to set out on a journey, seeking a better life for themselves and their families.’

Using van Leeuwen’s (2008) classes of nomination (i.e., naming) and categorization, the social actors that are the main topic of the material are often simply categorized by the terms *migranti* and *izb(j)eglice*, which mark the identities they share with many others. In the great majority of texts, they are not named. The texts typically report on large groups of people crossing borders and transportation of these groups from one spatial point to another. Migrants are named in only a few cases, such as a newborn baby in (7):

- (7) *Dječak Abdul Rahman Al Oubeid...šesta je beba izbjeglica rođena u Slavonskom Brodu...*
 (HRT, February 24, 2016)
 ‘The boy Abdul Rahman Al Oubeid...is the sixth baby refugee born in Slavonski Brod...’

In contrast, the actors that “manage” the migrants – for instance, high-ranking state officials – are “nominated” and “titulated” (to use van Leeuwen’s terminology). As a rule, formal titles are used at first mention:

- (8) *Ministar odbrane Bratislav Gašić posetio je Prihvatni centar za migrante u Preševu ...*
 (RTS, August 23, 2015)
 ‘Defense Minister Bratislav Gašić visited the reception center in Preševo...’

If they are mentioned more than once, their name is abbreviated (e.g., *ministar Gašić* ‘Minister Gašić’ or *ministar* ‘minister’). Lower-ranking persons are occasionally named when individuated and quoted. However, as a rule, they are only categorized (*policija*, *policijski službenici* ‘police, police officers’):

- (9) *Policija je napravila dobar posao, i ja bi napravio isto, rekao je.*
 (HRT, September 23 (a), 2015)
 ‘The police did a good job; I would do the same, he said.’

The same is true for volunteers and humanitarian organization members, who are most frequently categorized as such (e.g., *volonteri* ‘volunteers’), and only occasionally named:

(10) “... sada delimo i mleko, voće”, priča volonterka Rafalea.

(RTS, October 9, 2015)

“...at the moment, we are also distributing milk and fruit,” says the volunteer Rafalea.’

In terms of functionalization and identification (classification and relational and physical identification), various state actors are referred to in terms of their occupation or role (e.g., *službenici Odseka za strance, predstavnici ministarstva* ‘officers of the Department for Foreigners, the representatives of the ministry’); that is, they are functionalized.

Relational identification of migrants is occasionally found (e.g., *majka iz Iraka* ‘a mother from Iraq’, RTS, August 27 (a), 2015; *majkama sa tek rođenom decom* ‘mothers with newborn children’, RTS, August 23, 2015). Physical identification—that is, reference to permanent physical characteristics—is rare. However, adjectives such as *iscrpljeni, umorni, povređeni, or bolesni* ‘exhausted’, ‘tired’, ‘hurt’, ‘sick’ were occasionally used to refer to the temporary state of the migrants. According to van Leeuwen (2008), social actors referred to by such terms are “appraised” out of pity and compassion.

Regarding (in)determination, as a rule, migrants are represented as unspecified and anonymous. Indetermination overlaps with categorization because simply categorizing people as migrants maintains their anonymity. Other signals of indetermination are pronouns such as *neki*:

(11) *Neki migranti kažu da je situacija toliko loša da žele da se vrate nazad u Srbiju ...*

(RTS, September 8, 2015)

‘Some migrants say that the situation is so bad that they want to return to Serbia...’

Social actors are named in some situations and/or determined by their country of origin:

(12) “...jako sam srećan kada sretnem nekog ko govori arapski i može da mi pomogne”, kaže Lijak Salah iz Iraka.

(RTS, August 27 (a), 2015)

“...I am very happy when I bump into someone who speaks Arabic and could help me,” says Lijak Salah from Iraq.’

Countries of origin are also mentioned in the few texts discussing the situation of refugee centers in which individuals are given a voice or in texts reporting incidents:

(13) *Hrvatska, albanski migrant kamenom gađao novinare*

(headline, RTS, September 17, 2015)

‘Croatia, an Albanian migrant threw rocks at reporters’

In the representation of the migrants, naming, determination, and functionalization occur together only in isolated cases:

- (14) *Student tehničkih nauka Muhamed iz Sirije rekao je da ide u Nemačku, jer je u njegovoj zemlji sada veoma opasno.* (RTS, September 5, 2015)
 ‘Mohamed, a technical sciences student from Syria, said that he was heading towards Germany because it was very dangerous in his country.’

Functionalization of migrants is rare. If the migrants are identified by classification, this is done in terms of a group membership, and the most frequent parameters are gender, provenance, and age (e.g., *slučaj dve avganistanske devojčice koje su bile seksualno iskorišćene* ‘the case of two Afghan girls who were sexually abused’, RTS, October 15, 2015). Classification by religion is rarely used:

- (15) *U raspravi u kojoj se pojavio predlog da se u državu puste samo migranti hrišćanske vere...* (RTS, September 3, 2015)
 ‘During the discussion in which it was suggested that only Christian migrants should be allowed to enter the country...’

The use of, for instance, proper names, functions, and relational identification all include the feature “human” and as such illustrates van Leeuwen’s (2008) personalization. The opposite category, impersonalization, implies either abstraction—that is, using abstract nouns in reference to humans (e.g., referring to humans as problems)—or objectification (e.g., different types of metonymic reference). Impersonalization does not play a significant role in our material. Occasional impersonalization of the migrants is related to some uses of the words *problemi* ‘problems’ and *izazovi* ‘challenges’. However, in most cases, these relate to the crisis situation and not to persons, although the two categories are hardly separable (e.g., *problem migrantske krize*; *problem migranata* ‘problem with migrant crisis, problem with migrants’):

- (16) a. *Migrantska kriza dugoročni je problem koji zahtijeva rješavanje korijenskih uzroka migracija, odnosno stanja u mediteranskom bazenu i na Bliskom istoku, a to treba učiniti iskorjenjivanjem siromaštva, nejednakosti, borbom protiv terorizma i ekstremizma IS-a i svih drugih skupina, rekla je novinarka predsjednica Grabar-Kitarović.* (HRT, October 7, 2015)
 ‘The migrant crisis is a long-term problem that requires resolving the root causes of migration—that is, the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East—and this should be done by eradicating poverty and inequality, and combating the terrorism and extremism of IS and all the other groups, President Grabar-Kitarović told reporters.’
- b. *Migranti su humanitarni, a ne bezbednosni problem* (RTS, December 17, 2015)
 ‘Migrants pose a humanitarian problem, not a security one’

Metonymic reference is widely used for Croatia and Serbia (see 15):

- (17) a. ...*Srbija jedina ozbiljno vodi evidenciju o migrantima.*
 (RTS, November 15, 2015)
 ‘...Serbia is the only one that keeps records of the migrants.’
 b. ...*Hrvatska dopušta prolazak migrantima ...* (HRT, September 18 (b), 2015)
 ‘...Croatia allows migrants to pass...’

Metonymic reference is vague in similar cases because the social actors responsible for certain actions cannot be easily identified. This kind of reference emphasizes collective responsibility and positions entire countries as more human or less human, as in (18):

- (18) a. *Mađarska suzavcem na migrante* (RTS, August 26, 2015)
 ‘Hungary uses tear gas against migrants’
 b. *Hrvatska je u migrantskoj krizi već pokazala svoje humano lice...*
 (HRT, November 2, 2015)
 ‘Croatia has already shown its humane face in the migrant crisis...’
 c. ...*Srbija treba da pokaže da je pristojna, dostojanstvena, humana ...*
 (RTS, August 27 (b), 2015)
 ‘...Serbia ought to show that it is decent, dignified, and humane...’

Representations of the “migration crisis” in our corpus are related to immigration policies in Croatia and Serbia as well as the broader context: social practices in Europe, especially practices by neighboring countries. The “crisis” involved a set of social actors in each country: the migrants and politicians from various offices directly responsible for immigration and security issues (e.g., ministers of internal affairs and the police). The internal social actors are most frequently included, whereas external (international) social actors (e.g., foreign prime ministers) are less frequently included. Some texts featured backgrounding (van Leeuwen 2008: 29), in which the social actors responsible for an action were mentioned in the text but not in each instance describing that action. Additionally, migrants are mainly conceptualized as groups, which are often implicitly or explicitly evaluated as much larger than expected; see Section 3.2.

- (19) ...*rekordnih 156.000 migranata ušlo je u Europsku uniju u kolovozu.*
 (HRT, September 15, 2015)
 ‘...a record 156,000 migrants entered the European Union in August.’

This “disproportion” initiated a prominent metaphor of moving water:

(20) *Skoplje je tjednima toleriralo masovan priljev migranata iz Grčke ...*

(HRT, August 22, 2015)

‘For weeks, Skopje has tolerated a massive influx of migrants from Greece...’

The assimilation subtype “aggregation” (van Leeuwen 2008: 37) occurs very frequently in our material. In the majority of texts, readers were confronted with numbers; the migrants were quantified and the readers learned how many people crossed a border on a particular day or a territory in a certain period:

(21) a. *Do juče je oko 260.000 ljudi prešlo preko srpske teritorije...*

(RTS, October 22 (b), 2015)

‘As of yesterday, approximately 260,000 people have passed through Serbian territory...’

b. *Mađarsko-austrijsku granicu jučer je prešlo više od 3.400 migranata.*

(HRT, August 28, 2015)

‘More than 3,400 migrants crossed the Hungarian-Austrian border yesterday.’

High-ranking national actors or elites (ministers, prime ministers, etc.) are individualized, as are some lower-ranking officials:

(22) *Ovih dana očekujemo dolazak oko 4000 izbjeglica, rekao je potpredsjednik Vlade i ministar unutarnjih poslova Ranko Ostojić.* (HRT, September 16 (a), 2015)

‘Around 4,000 refugees are expected to arrive these days, said Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Ranko Ostojić.’

Individualization of the migrants (i.e., focus on individuals) is much less frequent, although it is more frequent in RTS than HRT due to the size of the corpora. In addition, there are many fewer words but more images in the HRT material. The voices of various named individuals are occasionally heard, especially at the beginning of the “crisis”. For example, one text quotes Aja, who is celebrating her birthday (a culturally important event for which the parents hold a party for their child) and learning Serbian. Both elements in the story appeal to readers’ empathy:

(23) *Aja će svoj 14. rođendan možda proslaviti u Srbiji. Pre mesec dana je stigla iz Sirije i njen dom je trenutno u jednom Centru za izbeglice. “Ovde mi pomažu da učim srpski. Ako naučim, možda ću ići ovde u školu”, kaže Aja.*

(RTS, August 18, 2015)

‘Aja may celebrate her fourteenth birthday in Serbia. She arrived a month ago from Syria and her home at the moment is in a center for refugees. “Here they are helping me learn Serbian. If I learn it, maybe I’ll go to school here,” says Aja.’

Both HRT and RTS present the migrants primarily positively, as victims (of wars), explicitly expressing empathy:

- (24) *Mukama ovih ljudi nije bilo kraja, po mrklom mraku i hladnoći morali su preko rijeke Sutle kako bi došli do Rigonca.* (HRT, October 21, 2015)
 ‘There was no end in sight to these people’s miseries, they had to get across the Sutla River in pitch darkness and in the cold in order to reach [the village of] Rigonce.’

In both corpora, previous personal experiences of Serbs and Croats as refugees in the wars of Yugoslav succession are referenced:

- (25) *Ako smo uspjeli prebroditi 500.000 izbjeglica tijekom Domovinskog rata, ne vidim zašto bi to sada bio problem.* (HRT, August 21, 2015)¹¹
 ‘If we managed to deal with 500,000 refugees during the War of Independence, I do not see why there should be a problem now.’

Migrants are often presented as people in need of protection, and they are sometimes individualized: their occupations and ethnic backgrounds are specified and personal stories are told. In a typical example, a named person, Mohamed (indexing a Muslim faith) is given a voice. He is a journalist that had to escape Syria because it was forbidden to publish true stories. He is traveling with part of his family because some members are missing.

- (26) *Muhamed je u Siriji radio na televiziji i u novinskoj agenciji. Nije uspevao da prenese, kaže, prave informacije. “Zato što svako ko kaže istinu ubiju ga, svi oni, ili režim ili oni drugi”, kaže Muhamed. Muhamed putuje sa porodicom, neke članove familije traže. Razdvojili su se.* (RTS, October 6, 2015)
 ‘Mohamed worked on TV and for a news agency in Syria. He was not able to convey, he says, the right information. “Because everybody who tells the truth is killed, by all of them, either regime or the others,” says Mohamed. Mohamed is traveling with his family; they are looking for some of their family members. They have been separated.’

Similar passages resemble mini “human interest stories” that are embedded in a larger text. In both corpora, special emphasis is placed on children and their well-being (see Table 1).

11. Sociological research emphasizes experience of recent armed conflict and refugee movements of their own populations as a relevant historical and socio-economic factor that has framed specific responses to migration in Croatia and Serbia. The second factor is position in the EU and not being part of the Schengen zone. The third is experiences with catastrophic floods in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia in May 2014 (Župarić-Iljić and Valenta forthcoming).

As the discussion above shows, both sources analyzed present migrants primarily positively as victims. In most cases, migrants were categorized using the general terms corresponding to ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’, which imply identities shared by many. Although as a rule migrants were represented as unspecified and anonymous (in contrast to influential state actors), identification, naming, categorization, determination, and functionalization also occasionally occurred. The migrants were regularly conceptualized as much larger groups than expected. This is related to the moving water metaphors that are examined in the following section.

3.2 (Moving) water metaphors

The “migrant crisis” in our corpora is conceptualized as a flood. The movements of people are relatively often conceptualized as rivers and waves. All of these conceptualizations can be seen as instances of a broader WATER metaphor.

- (27) a. ...*slijevale su se rijeke izbjeglica u vojarnu* ... (HRT, September 17, 2015)
 ‘...rivers of refugees flowed into the military barracks...’
- b. *Veliki talas migranata u poslednja dva dana prolazi kroz Srbiju.*
 (RTS, August 24, 2015)
 ‘A big wave of migrants has been sweeping through Serbia for the last two days.’

The source domain of a flood imposes its structure on the target domain, migrants’ movement in space. Metaphors that people use are potentially linked to the way they think and can influence the way readers approach the target domain (the migrants’ movement). MOVING WATER and FLOOD metaphors in the corpus are reflected in expressions such as *talas migranata/migrantski talas* ‘migrant wave’ (five occurrences in RTS), *val migranata* ‘migrant wave’ and similar expressions with *val* ‘wave’ (66 in HRT), *bujica migranata/ljudi* ‘a flow/influx of migrants/people’ (two in RTS), *rijeka migranata* ‘river of migrants’ (five in HRT), and *priliv migranata/priljev migranata* ‘migrant flow’ (68 in RTS, 65 in HRT). These are often modified by the C/S adjectives *velik, najveći, ogroman, nekontrolisan, pojačan* ‘big, the biggest, enormous, uncontrolled, increased’ and are related to representation of certain actions (see Section 4). The MOVING WATER metaphor implies a series of mappings, including the following: receiving countries are containers, movement of people is dangerous water, and liquids are not easily stopped, nor are movements of people.

A flood is a natural disaster that implies danger and damage, usually depriving people of their homes and property. One would expect that the FLOOD metaphor is used to negatively represent the situation and warn readers of imminent danger. However, it seems that the metaphor was primarily used for other purposes (see

KhosraviNik, 2009: 486). In our case, it indicated logistical problems that both Serbia and Croatia faced and, accordingly, led to demands for more help from the EU. The contextual framing of migrants in transit made the effect of the flood metaphor less negative than it could have been.

The use of “flood,” “waves,” “influx,” and other similar terms in current discussions of migration and migrants worldwide (see, e.g., Neagu and Colipcă-Ciobanu 2014) reveal views that are so “normalized” that they do not seem dangerous at all. However, this is precisely why such language and metaphors, and the views they relate to, can be dangerous.¹² Researchers and activists emphasize the need to deconstruct and bring awareness to “the wealth of water metaphors in media discourses on migration” (Kainz 2016). As research emphasizes (e.g., Santa Ana, 1997: 221; Schrover and Schinkel 2015), the WATER metaphor is not a necessity, and other representation options also exist.¹³

Both HRT and RTS have employed moving water metaphors in this context to discuss logistical challenges faced by both Serbia and Croatia. These challenges are related to a few social actions represented in our material. The following section focuses on mediated representations of actions and reactions by migrants and political elites in Croatia and Serbia.

3.3 Representing social actions: Non-agency and conditional agency

Mediation of social actions in our material occurs on several levels: journalists represent themselves as active social actors interviewing other social actors (migrants, politicians, and “ordinary people”). Furthermore, journalists mediate actions by politicians and migrants for their readers and viewers. Politicians, in their own right, represent themselves and their own actions.

Migrants’ actions and reactions are represented differently depending on the context of the news items. For example, when migrants are represented as numbers or objects of actions they do not have agency, and when they are active in a limited way, such as when traveling, they have conditional agency (see Chouliaraki 2006: 119). When migrants are represented as objects, they are often the goal of transporting and placing processes (e.g., *C/S prevesti, sm(j)estiti* ‘transport, place’). Transport and placement verbs are often used in the passive:

12. See also <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/08/we-need-change-very-language-we-use-talk-about-immigrants>.

13. Metaphors found in other European discourses, such as *MIGRANTS ARE INSECTS* (see, e.g., <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/10/migration-debate-metaphors-swarm-s-floods-marauders-migrants>), were not found due to the specific nature of our corpus and genre.

- (28) a. *Izbjeglice će biti smještene u centrima u Ježevu, Dugavama, Kutini, Sisku i Tovarniku.* (HRT, September 16 (a), 2015)
 ‘The refugees will be housed in the reception centers in Ježevo, Dugave, Kutina, Sisak, and Tovarnik.’
- b. *Mnogi su spavali na otvorenom, u polju, na hladnim noćnim temperaturutama i nadali su se da će biti prevezeni u centar za registraciju ...*
 (RTS, September 8, 2015)
 ‘Many had slept outdoors, in a field, in cold nighttime temperatures, and had hoped to be transported to a registration center...’

Frequent use of these verbs has a dehumanizing effect because the typical objects of transport are goods, not humans.

Migrants are at the receiving end of social actions performed by politicians, the police, humanitarian agencies, and ordinary people. The Croatian and Serbian governments engaged in activities related to helping migrants continue their journey, such as registering them and offering food and medical help, but they also divided the migrants into groups and stopped some of them from continuing. When such actions are represented, the main social actors are very often active and named as representatives of some institutions or referred to as the Croatian or Serbian government:

- (29) *Vlada je odobrila isplatu 27,7 milijuna kuna iz ovogodišnje proračunske zalihe za troškove nastale uslijed prihvata i smještaja migranata...*
 (HRT, October 29, 2015).
 ‘The government has approved the payment of 27.7 million kuna drawn from this year’s budget reserves in order to cover the costs incurred during the process of receiving and accommodating migrants...’

In such representations, the migrants are passive recipients of help treated in a humane way. For example, they are lodged in tents and given medical assistance, food and water:

- (30) *...svi migranti koji su prošli kroz Šid dobili su hranu ...* (RTS, January 3, 2016)
 ‘...food was given to all of the migrants who passed through Šid...’

In situations in which the police or customs officers were exercising control (e.g., detaining people, sending them back across borders, letting them come in, and preventing them from entering the country), their actions were often represented euphemistically. Thus, illegal migrants are *C/S privedeni* ‘detained’, not arrested, and the migrants are *C/S pod policijskom pažnjom* ‘under police care’ and not in police custody:

- (31) a. ...*ilegalni migranti koji su privedeni pošto su isekli ogradu na granici sa Srbijom, treba da budu "kažnjeni za primer" ...* (RTS, August 7, 2015)
 ‘...illegal migrants who were detained because they cut through the fence on the border with Serbia should be arrested in order to “set an example”...’
- b. *Od momenta kada uđu u Miratovac do momenta kada izađu u Šidu oni su pod policijskom pažnjom.* (RTS, November 22, 2015)
 ‘From the moment they arrive in Miratovac to the moment they leave Šid, they are under police care.’

Such descriptions may reflect journalists’ or other social actors’ belief that these people should not be treated badly.

Humanitarian organizations, volunteers, and drivers perform practical tasks and are engaged in verbal and material processes. National elites are primarily engaged in verbal processes (announcing, commenting, and emphasizing; see 31a), whereas police and volunteers are mostly engaged in material processes (e.g., stopping, driving, preventing entry, following, helping, and bringing food; see 31b).

- (32) a. *Premijer je istakao da je izbegličke kampove obišao mnogo puta i da nije video nikakav problem.* (RTS, November 17, 2015)
 ‘The prime minister emphasized that he had visited refugee camps many times and that he had not noticed any problem.’
- b. *Crveni križ i UNHCR podijelili su u jutarnjim satima deke, hranu, piće, odjeću...* (HRT, October 19, 2015)
 ‘In the morning, the Red Cross and the UNHCR distributed blankets, food, drinks, clothing...’

When active, migrants perform a social action of purposefully moving from their own countries via the Balkan route toward their explicit goal: Germany or other Western countries. However, agency is not a clear-cut category, and it often implies action within certain restrictions (Chouliaraki 2006: 125). Thus, migrants act as free individuals while moving, but only in the space and time defined by others.

Migrants’ movements are represented by a set of verbs and verb phrases related to motion: *C/S hodati, prelaziti, prolaziti, dolaziti, ulaziti, nastavljati put, putovati, stizati, pristizati, skretati, okrenuti se ka* ‘walk, pass over, pass through, arrive, enter, continue journey, keep on arriving, travel, turn (towards)’. Which verbs of motion are used depends on the deictic position of the reporter (i.e., whether the reporter is on the arriving or departing side of a border or whether the reporter is traveling with the migrants). Almost all verbs are accompanied by adverbials representing the geographical points where the migrants are headed. These points can be general, such as “Western Europe,” or more specific, such as “the Hungarian/Croatian/Serbian border” or names of locations such as Đevđelija:

- (33) *Gotovo 10.000 izbeglica prešlo je granicu Grčke i Makedonije na prelazu Đevđelija u periodu između 1. i 6. septembra...* (RTS, September 8, 2015).
‘Between September 1 and 6, nearly 10,000 refugees crossed the border between Greece and Macedonia at the Gevgelija crossing...’

Continuity of movement is usually emphasized by the present tense, signaling that actions are taking place at the moment of speaking and giving the situation a sense of urgency. This sense of urgency is also conveyed by the use of verbs such as *C/S žuriti* (hurry). For example, migrants are represented as hurrying to reach their destination and avoid possible difficulties:

- (34) *Migranti su nestrpljivi, žure da što pre stignu do Mađarske ...*
(RTS, September 14 (a), 2015)
‘Migrants are impatient, they are hurrying to reach Hungary...’

Material actions are actions that can have a material purpose or effect, whereas semiotic actions are actions that do not have such an effect. All actions related to moving could be categorized as material actions because they have a material purpose or effect (van Leeuwen 2008: 59). On the other hand, examples such as *poručuju da se nikada neće vratiti nazad* ‘they [migrants] say they will never go back’ (RTS, November 24, 2015) illustrate semiotic actions that do not necessarily have a material purpose. Semiotic actions are usually indicated by indirect quotes. In our corpus, journalists quoted migrants both directly and indirectly. The migrants explained their feelings and intentions, provided evaluations of countries they traveled through, and expressed their wishes and demands:

- (35) *“Hoću da nastavim studiranje i normalan život”, naglasio je Rudi.*
(RTS, August 14, 2015)
“I want to continue with my studies and normal life,” emphasized Rudi.’

When the migrants perform the semiotic social action of talking to journalists, verbs are used in the present tense: *C/S poručuju, navode, kažu, tvrde* ‘saying, claiming, giving a message, citing’.

- (36) *Ondje će, kažu, radije umrijeti nego odustati...* (HRT, March 9 (b), 2016)
‘They would rather die there than give up, they [migrants] say...’

This may signal to the audience that their opinions matter.

Migrants are represented as subjects waiting for borders to open:

- (37) *...šestotinjak migranata iz Sirije, Afganistana i Iraka je na grčkoj strani granice, gdje čekaju ulazak u Makedoniju...* (HRT, January 20, 2016)
‘...around six hundred migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq are on the Greek side of the border, waiting to enter Macedonia...’

The action of waiting could be understood as a type of conditioned agency. It is usually caused by somebody other than the people that are waiting and because there is an absence of immediate action in the nature of the verb “wait.” However, waiting is described as a strenuous activity because it lasts for an unreasonably long time and involves vulnerable actors such as (pregnant) women and children:

- (38) *...povremeno se dešavaju manji incidenti jer izbeglice, među kojima su žene i deca, primorani su na višesatno čekanje.* (RTS, September 9, 2015)
 ‘...small incidents occur from time to time because refugees, among them women and children, have to wait long hours.’

Constant waiting at various borders and changes in policies regarding migrants often serve as a background for representations of the migrants’ aggressive actions and reactions. In this way, aggressive reactions are justified and are more understandable and acceptable.

- (39) *U Rigoncu se tijekom noći dogodio jedan incident – manja skupina ljudi se potukla, a jedan je čovjek uboden nožem. Ljudi su nervozni, izbijaju sukobi...*
 (HRT, October 22 (a), 2015)
 ‘There was an incident in Rigonce during the night—a small group of people got into a fight and one man was stabbed with a knife. People are nervous, conflicts are erupting...’

Actions and reactions by migrants that are stopped during their journey are represented dynamically or in an activated manner (van Leuween, 2008: 63), and the verbs are frequently in the present tense. There are several patterns of reactions, from less aggressive ones such as *S protestuje* (see (38a)), *C/S viču, legli su na put* ‘protest, yell, lie down on the road’ in to more aggressive ones such as *S seku ogradu, kamenuju voz, gađaju policiju kamenjem i bocama* ‘cut fences, throw rocks at trains, throw rocks and bottles at the police’ (see 40b).

- (40) a. *Oko 500 migranata, uglavnom Sirijci, protestuje ceo dan ispred stanice skandirajući “Nemačka, Nemačka” ...* (RTS, September 1, 2015)
 ‘Around five hundred migrants, mostly Syrians, have been *protesting* in front of the station all day, shouting “Germany, Germany”...’
- b. *Zahtijevaju da Mađari otvore granični prijelaz te gađaju policiju kamenjem i bocama.* (HRT, September 16 (b), 2015)
 ‘They [migrants] are demanding that Hungarians open the border crossing and are throwing rocks and bottles at police.’
- c. *Representing countries’ actions and views: protecting one’s own interests versus competing to be the most humane country*

Both Croatian and Serbian leading politicians presented themselves as treating the migrants best, describing their positive actions to deal with the migrant “crisis”. The public broadcasters contributed to that presentation by publishing many news items about these politicians and their views. There is a sense of competition about which country is the most humane (see 39). Most of the countries compared to Serbia and Croatia are neighboring countries, and some are Balkan and East European countries.

- (41) a. *“Mi smo najorganizovanija država na putu tih migranata”, istakao je Vulin ...* (RTS, August 25, 2015)
 “‘We are the most organized country on those migrants’ way,” emphasized Vulin ...’
- b. *Hrvatska je ocijenjena kao humana i civilizirana zemlja, za razliku od ostalih zemalja iz kojih izbjeglice dolaze. To je kompliment Hrvatskoj, rekao je Ostojić.* (HRT, October 6, 2015)
 ‘Croatia is rated as a humane and civilized country, unlike other countries that refugees are coming from. That’s a compliment to Croatia, said Ostojić.’

Croatia and Serbia distanced themselves from countries such as Hungary, Slovenia, and Macedonia, which were portrayed as less humane and more violent:

- (42) *Ministar unutarnjih poslova Ranko Ostojić poručio im je [Slovincima] da pokažu humanost na dogovorenim prijelazima [...] Tranzitirajte ih humano, bez bornih kola, pasa, žice na dogovorenim prijelazima, a ne na kapaljku pa da onda sami traže svoje putove. Toliko o humanosti, izjavio je Ostojić.* (HRT, October 22 (b), 2015)
 ‘Interior Minister Ranko Ostojić urged [Slovenes] to show humanity at the agreed crossings. ... Transport them humanely, no army vehicles, no dogs, no wires at the agreed-upon crossings, by transporting only a negligible number of them, you are forcing them to look for alternative routes. So much for humanity, said Ostojić.’

They also distanced themselves from each other when the other was represented as inefficient:

- (43) a. *Izbjeglice dolaze organizirano, autobusom, 100 metara od GP-a na kojem nema nijednog srpskog policajca, nitko ih ne kontrolira, samo ih se usmjerava na ovu stranu.* (HRT, September 23 (b), 2015)
 ‘Refugees come in organized groups, by bus, [at a distance of] one hundred meters from the border crossing where there is not even one Serbian police officer, nobody is supervising them, they are just pointing them to the other side.’

- b. *Hrvatsku je upitao i zašto je ćutala pet meseci tokom kojih su migranti išli ka Mađarskoj i gde im je evropska solidarnost, navodeći da je kroz Srbiju, bez ijednog incidenta prošlo 180.000 ljudi od početka godine, a da je Hrvatska zbog dolaska 8.000 njih doživela kolaps.* (RTS, September 24, 2015)
 ‘He asked why Croatia had remained quiet for five months, a period during which migrants had been heading towards Hungary. He also raised the question of their European solidarity, stating that 180,000 people have passed through Serbia without any incident since the beginning of the year, while Croatia has faced a collapse due to the arrival of eight thousand [migrants].’

Violent actions by the country’s police are justified as necessary security measures, and overall reporting seems to downplay police measures by presenting them in very general terms or euphemistically, as in (42), which presents the police as calming the situation down and even saving lives by using pepper spray.

- (44) *Ministar unutarnjih poslova Ranko Ostojić ističe da je policija ispravno postupila kada je naguravanje izbjeglica riješila koristeći “papreni sprej”. Štoviše, spasili su život toj djeci u naguravanju.* (HRT, September 23 (a), 2015)
 ‘Minister of Internal Affairs Ranko Ostojić stresses that the police acted correctly when they dispersed the pushing crowds by using “pepper spray.” Moreover, they saved the lives of those children from the pushing crowds.’

Representations of humane and efficient actions by Croatia and Serbia regarding migrants was constantly followed by addressing personal interests:

- (45) *Vlada Srbije će, rekao je Vulin, kao i do sada nastaviti da štiti interese Srbije i da svaku odluku koju donosi, donosi na prvom mestu u skladu sa interesima građana i potrebe da migranti bezbedno prođu kroz našu teritoriju, budu nahranjeni, medicinski zbrinuti ...* (RTS, January 20, 2016)
 ‘Vulin said that the Serbian government will continue to defend Serbia’s interests and every decision reached by the government shall be made primarily in accordance with the interests of citizens and the necessity to allow migrants secure passage through our territory, provide them with food, medical care...’

Both countries’ politicians stressed that they would not allow either of their countries to become hotspots or the migrants to stay. They stressed other countries’ responsibility, legitimizing migration control:

- (46) *To više nije naša odgovornost, oni su na teritoriji Mađarske i očekujemo od mađarske države da se prema njima ponaša kako dolikuje”, rekao je Vulin.* (RTS, September 14 (b), 2015)
 ‘“That’s not our responsibility anymore; they are on Hungary’s territory and we expect that Hungary will behave towards them appropriately,” said Vulin.’

The material includes examples of politics of exclusion discourse, explicitly referring to Hungarian policies:

- (47) *Orban je poručio da Mađari uprkos pritiscima neće pristati na promenu sopstvenih kulturnih obrazaca, jer ne žele neintegrisana, paralelna društva kakva postoje u nekim evropskim državama s velikim brojem migranata iz muslimanskih zemalja.* (RTS, October 26, 2015)
 ‘Orban has pointed out that, despite pressure, Hungarians will not consent to changing their internal cultural patterns because they do not want non-integrated, parallel societies that exist in some European countries with a large number of migrants from Muslim countries.’

3.4 Visual presentation of social actors and social actions

The photographs (see Table 2) that accompany various news stories mostly use perceptual realism as a mode of presentation. The photographs are still shots of the migrants performing various activities (e.g., resting or being given food) while the “crisis” was unfolding.

Table 2. Photographs: thematic categorization and percentages

Photographs	HRT	RTS
No. of photographs	887 (of these, 388, or 43%, show migrants)	284
Photographs showing migrants in groups	50% (of 388)	33%
Photographs emphasizing individuals (adult migrants)	18* (of 388)	7%
Photographs showing children	21% (of 388)	17%**
Mixed groups (e.g., migrants and police)	10% (of 388)	
Photographs showing politicians	11%	21%
Photographs showing other social actors	32%	16%***
Photographs with no visible social actors	11%	6%

* Some photographs within this category also show groups, but emphasis is clearly placed on individuals.

** Some photographs within this category show groups of migrants, but children are clearly the focus.

*** These photographs show different social actors together (for example, journalists and politicians) or groups of migrants with other social actors (for example, police officers or humanitarian workers and migrants).

The visual and verbal correspondence in most of the analyzed photographs is tight; the photographs and texts complement one another. This indexical meaning gives readers the impression that they are present with the migrants, following the unfolding tragedy, and it contributes to a sense of objectivity of the news.

We identified several types of photographs with regard to the social actors represented, including the following: (1) photographs of migrants in groups (of different size), (2) photographs of children (and their mothers or families) and photographs focusing on migrants as individuals, (3) photographs of politicians, (4) photographs of other social actors (police officers, journalists, and humanitarian workers), and (5) photographs with no apparent/visible social actors (see Figure 1).¹⁴



Figure 1. Examples of photographs

14. Sources: (1) RTS, 2015. “Budimpešta, scene očajja.” September 3. <http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/region/2026081/budimpesta-scene-ocaja.html>. (2) RTS, 2015. “Unicef: Neophodna adekvatna zaštita dece izbeglica”. September 18. <http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/10/svet/2042105/unicef-neophodna-adekvatna-zastita-dece-izbeglica.html>. HRT. (3) 2016. “Kovač: EU treba pronaći zajedničko rješenje za migracijsku krizu”. February 16. <http://vijesti.hrt.hr/322430/kovac-eu-treba-pronaci-zajednicko-rjesenje-za-migrantsku-krizu>. (4) HRT, 2015. “Makedonija se priprema za moguće postavljanje ograde”. November 15. <http://www.hrt.hr/308675/vijesti/makedonija-se-priprema-za-eventualno-postavljanje-ograde>

3.4.1 *Photographs of migrants in groups*

The largest group of photographs depicts migrants in groups and not looking at the camera. They are represented as active (walking through fields or alongside roads or waiting in lines to board buses and trains) and passive (sleeping or sitting in tents covered from the rain). In many of these photographs, long shots are used. In some, the viewers see the migrants from a bird’s eye view; they are “below” the viewer. Photographs of groups convey the idea of assimilation, which is often expressed through verbal means as well. In one subgroup of photographs, a medium shot is used, but the viewer cannot see the migrants’ faces clearly as they are not angled toward the viewer. In addition, many photographs show groups of people with their backs to the viewer, either standing or walking away. The social actors are clearly separated from the viewers; they do not face them, and there is no possibility of interaction with the viewers. The large distance in space communicates a lack of interpersonal relationships and social distance (van Leeuwen 2008: 138). If people are depicted from a considerable distance, one cannot perceive their individual characteristics, and in the photographs in which migrants do not look at the viewers, no social interaction is realized and the people are simply “offered” to the readers’ gaze (van Leeuwen 2008: 140).

Photographs of large groups of people convey the same information as texts that regularly mention large numbers. If headlines and/or leads use phrases such as “rivers of migrants,” a photograph using a long shot and showing large groups of individuals can be expected. The representation strategies of similar images are distancing and objectification. The migrants are not close and are objects for scrutiny. At the same time, large groups of people emphasize the scale of the aid needed.

3.4.2 *Photographs of migrant children (and their mothers or families) and photographs focusing on migrants as individuals*

These are very often photographs of children and mothers with small children and babies that are in news items they are part of described as vulnerable and dependent. Many photographs in which either a medium shot or close-up is used show children (see Table 2) and force individualization. In some photographs with medium shots or close-ups, the children do not look at the camera. These are “offer” photographs (in the terminology of van Leeuwen 2008: 140) because the children do not interact with the viewer. However, children (smiling or waving) establish eye contact with the reader in many others. Photographs with children convey the idea that migrants are in need of help. In the majority of photographs, mothers have headscarves and are passively sitting, whereas men, if portrayed together with women, are standing. There is an interesting exception: in some photographs, men are presented as the sole caregivers, carrying and holding children.

Both sources occasionally employ images showing individualized adults. These individuals are either alone or focused upon, “singled out” from the group of which they are part.

3.4.3 *Photographs of politicians*

A significant number of photographs (see Table 2) show national and international politicians talking either to the press or to each other and visiting migrants (e.g., at reception centers). A close-up is used in almost all of these photographs, focusing on politicians’ personalities and functions.¹⁵ The politicians are looking at the viewers and demanding “goods and services” (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006) from them. The most frequently photographed politicians in RTS are the Minister of Labor, Employment, and Veteran and Social Policy, Vulin; the Minister of Internal Affairs, Stefanović; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dačić. In HRT, the most photographed politicians are the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ostojić, and Prime Minister Milanović.

3.4.4 *Photographs of other social actors*

Other prominent social actors in RTS material are journalists, police officers, and humanitarian workers. All three professions are represented as doing their jobs: journalists are interviewing politicians in TV studios; police officers are keeping order, protecting borders, or physically engaging with migrants; and humanitarian workers are helping with logistics and health issues. The represented police officers are rarely Serbian and are often from neighboring countries. The same is true for the HRT corpus, in which a large share of photographs (285) shows other social actors (or foregrounds them). Of these, around 50% exclusively show or foreground journalists, around 25% exclusively show or foreground the police and army, and the remaining 25% show or foreground different experts, humanitarian workers, and citizens.

3.4.5 *Photographs with no apparent/visible social actors*

A prominent type of photograph in HRT (see Table 2) does not depict people, but vehicles, tents, border signs, meadows, plains, or railroads, sometimes with garbage. The contrast of photographs showing empty spaces through which the migrants have just passed with photographs of large groups of people has a powerful effect: the only trace left after so many people have gone through is the garbage on the ground. The problem of large amounts of garbage was discussed in several articles in both sources and was presented as a logistical challenge.

15. The same is true for photographs showing journalists and various specialists (e.g., political analysts).

There is a sense of artistic tension and melancholy in some of these photographs. In addition, photographs of nature (meadows, woods, and rivers near the borders) suggest the irregularity of the migrants’ movements. The artistic tension may emphasize the lack of state control over the borders and/or the desperation of people that are prepared to reach their destination at any price.

Fences are an important artifact in many photographs.¹⁶ Fences make control possible and are connected to notions of sorting those that can enter the country and those that cannot. Fences are stable when they are made of concrete and wire (e.g., at the border between Serbia and Hungary) or movable if made of metal or lighter materials and used to create lines for waiting. As clear symbols of power and control, fences often include barbed wire and razor wire. In some photographs, one can see people through the wires at a distance, and in others, the razor wire is the foregrounded element. Depending on the accompanying text, photographs with fences could be interpreted as either a plea for humanitarianism or support for the politics of exclusion. In the official discourse of both Croatia and Serbia, the plea for humanitarianism is foregrounded during the analyzed period.

As mentioned, many of the photographs in both sources show large groups of people, supporting the over-aggregation and over-spatialization expressed by other means. However, individualization (i.e., showing children and adults) is also present in both sources (see Table 2). Table 2 indicates that the percentage of photos showing politicians is higher for the Serbian material, whereas the percentage of photos showing no visible social actors is higher for the Croatian material. These differences necessitate further analyses of a broader sample.

4. Concluding remarks

The macrostructural context of transit migration through Serbia and Croatia influenced how migrants were constructed discursively in RTS and HRT online. There are no significant differences in the representation of the migrants in the online material from Croatian and Serbian public broadcasters. The migrants were

16. Some examples:

<http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/region/1997627/ograda-se-gradi-broj-migranata-se-ne-smanjuje.html>

<http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/drustvo/2109749/unhcr-srbija-i-makedonija-ogranicile-protok-migranata.html>

<http://vijesti.hrt.hr/323394/slovenski-parlament-odobrio-koristenje-vojnika-na-granici-s-hrvatskom>

<http://www.hrt.hr/305728/vijesti/video-na-sentilju-tisuce-migranata-koje-austrija-ne-moze-prihvatiti>

represented positively as people that need help, either because they fled war or want a better life. Both reasons were represented as equally legitimate.

This is in accordance with findings of social science studies emphasizing that, during the migrant “crisis”, the Croatian and Serbian public discourse was different from, for example, the Slovenian and Macedonian discourse, which was dominated by security concerns. The former was characterized by empathy, and humanitarian issues were most prominent,¹⁷ although these countries also shifted to a securitization approach after the “crisis” (see Šelo Šabić 2017; Župarić-Iljić and Valenta forthcoming).

The focus was often on children, mothers, and educated people, in line with what Chouliaraki (2006) terms “the mediation of suffering.” This victimization frame mirrors the humanitarian approach to the “migrant crisis” taken by both Croatia and Serbia. As in other European countries, there was a meta-discussion about the appropriate terms for referring to people passing through (e.g., refugees, migrants, or asylum seekers). However, as migration in this context was primarily focused on transit, the discussions were not connected to exclusion issues in Croatia and Serbia to the same degree as elsewhere (Šelo Šabić 2017).

Two prominent features of the analyzed material are over-aggregation (extensive use of numbers) and over-spatialization. The first feature relates to a dominant topic of the material – Croatia and Serbia having to host large numbers of people – and logistical challenges that political elites and humanitarian organizations faced in that context. Over-spatialization relates to another topic frequently represented in our material: physical movement of migrants. Both of these features feed into frequent use of the moving water metaphor, which in other contexts implies danger and damage. However, neither over-aggregation nor over-spatialization was used to represent migrants as an imminent threat. We claim that this is due to contextual framing of the migrants as merely being in transit and not at their final destination.

The migrants were often given the opportunity to speak for themselves in the media, and their suffering was mediated daily by journalists. Even though they were represented as active, the range of the migrants’ activity was restricted; they were actors first and foremost in scenarios involving physical movement. The most frequent actions and corresponding verbs were “enter,” “cross over,” “pass through,” and “walk.” Sometimes, the migrants were also active actors in actions such as protesting, breaking fences, pushing, and beating. However, in almost all of these cases, the migrants’ reactions were justified based on their right to move towards their desired destination.

17. “... on the grounds, of course, that refugees did not stay in their territories” (Šelo Šabić 2017: 68).

The analyzed photographs follow the verbal semiotic resources in that they usually present the migrants as groups. When the photographs showed individuals, they were not represented as specific people, but as general categories defined by age, gender, or family relations: “child refugees,” “adult migrants,” or “mothers with children.” Large groups of unnamed people, “the others” that one reads about or sees on TV moving, are ascribed less humanity (Chouliaraki 2006: 125) than an individual that one either reads about or sees in a close-up scene and who looks at the reader and explains his or her situation. In many cases, although the visuals suggested individualization, the accompanying verbal information did not.

We claim that the focus on positive representations of the migrants in both sources relates to political elites’ positive positioning; that is, strengthening one’s positive self-presentation (e.g., Serbia or Croatia as humane/serious/responsible because they help migrants) in contrast to negative positioning and evaluations of other countries (e.g., Hungary for erecting a wall, Serbia or Croatia for not cooperating in logistics, etc.). This positive representation aligned Serbia and Croatia with the EU (Croatia as a member and Serbia as an aspiring member). The portals mediated politicians’ non-aggressive language use when referring to the migrants. However, aggressive language use by the same politicians was present when referring to neighboring countries in connection with solving logistics problems. The intensive war of words between Croatia and Serbia in September 2015 revived the atmosphere of the conflicts of the 1990s and resulted in material actions such as closing of borders and causing many travelers to lose time and money.

Observed from another angle, the main focus of both public broadcasters shifted constantly between the plight of the migrants and political decisions about their fate. Both transit countries were afraid of becoming hotspots and having to host large numbers of people. Whenever this topic was in focus, the politicians were represented in the media as tending to their countries’ interests first, justifying the need for border controls and blaming higher powers for causing the “crisis”.

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Representation of unaccompanied migrant children from Central America in the United States

Media vs. migrant perspectives

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This chapter examines the representation of unaccompanied minors fleeing Central America (namely Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) in U.S. online national news sources over a one-year period and compares this to the way these children talk about their own perceptions of migration and their motivation for moving. Data collection consisted of online news reports on unaccompanied minors from Central America in the United States as well as interviews with children collected from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations. Multimodal critical discourse analysis reveals a qualitative difference in discourse (e.g., use of metaphor, metonymy, deixis and visual elements) that varies depending on whether the sources are media reports or personal accounts from the children themselves.

Keywords: unaccompanied migrant children, Central America, media discourse, multimodal critical discourse analysis

1. Introduction

Public discourse on migration tends to minimize, marginalize and dehumanize migrants utilizing multiple strategies to portray them as the “Other” (Santa Ana 2002). This chapter continues the book’s focus on media discourse and its impact on institutions, policy, and public view of migrants/migration. Not unlike the other chapters in this section, our analysis is multimodal, exploring migration discourses across different media. However, we address one particularly overlooked and understudied type of migrant: (unaccompanied or separated) child migrants. For the purposes of this study, we will use the umbrella term “migrant” to refer to unaccompanied children who are the focus of this chapter. The majority of these children are already or will be

eventually classified as refugees, but we adopt “migrant” as the over-arching category. Migrants are “individuals who are moving or have moved across an international border or within a state away from their habitual place of residence, regardless of: (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. (Garin, Beise, Hug and You 2016: 14). UNICEF defines refugees as:

individuals who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of their former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Santa Ana 2002: 14)

Given this definition and recognizing that the majority of the unaccompanied or separated children coming from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador are fleeing dangerous and violent situations that put them in danger of harm (see below: Background), there is no doubt that most of these children are refugees. Hence, we recognize that they will or should eventually be given the status of “refugee” but using the term “migrant” allows us to include children in similar situations as refugees with the same protection concerns but whose refugee status has not been formally ascertained.

According to UNICEF, in a report released September, 2016, children under the age of 18 make up “a disproportionate and growing proportion of those who have sought refuge outside their own countries” (Westcott 2016: para. 6), and consist of half of all refugees, despite being only a third of the world’s population. In 2015 alone, 100,000 unaccompanied children filed claims for asylum across 78 countries (Garin et al. 2016: 38). These children, traveling on their own, “risk some of the world’s worst forms of abuse and harm” (ibid: 3) and “are at great risk of exploitation and abuse by smugglers and traffickers” and until now, have been too often “relegated to the fringes of the world’s debates about migration and displacement” (Westcott 2016: para. 9).

This chapter seeks to examine this understudied population and its representation in media discourse focusing on one group of child migrants: unaccompanied minors fleeing Central America (namely, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) with the United States as their destination. We explore the way in which U.S. media discourse represents these children in public discourse, but also how the public discourse contrasts the way these children talk about their own experiences. In doing so, as in Butulussi’s work (Chapter 7, this volume), we reveal how metaphors, along with other elements, are used to reveal ideologies/viewpoint of different speakers as well as relations of power and agency.

2. Background

In October 2011, the U.S. government, as well as the governments of Belize and Costa Rica, documented a significant increase in unaccompanied and/or separated children traveling to their countries from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Since the start of 2014, this increase accelerated, and by the end of 2014, an estimated 77,200 children were apprehended at the U.S. border – most of whom were from Central America (Lind 2014). By the summer of 2014, so many migrants (many of them children) were arriving at the U.S. border that the issue garnered widespread national media attention and became a politicized topic in media discourse at the time, referred to by the Obama administration as a “humanitarian crisis” but often in media discourse as the “border crisis”.

According to Stinchcomb and Hershberg, reasons for the sharp increase in migration from Central America include lack of access to jobs and basic services which have fueled social exclusion and given increased power to gangs leading to extreme violence, family violence (resulting from social exclusion and family disruption, including parental absence and neglect), drug trafficking, and the inability of “resource-deprived and overburdened” police forces and judicial systems to protect children and families, often due to their “complicity with organized crime groups” (2014: 2). Many blame the United States’ involvement in Central America in the 1980s for “planting the seeds for the instability and turmoil” that started these problems and hence find it ironic that now the “chickens have come home to roost” (Corchado 2014) yet the United States government has not taken responsibility for creating the conditions for the crisis to occur.

Because of the sheer quantity of migrants (and particularly, children) arriving, and increasing political pressure, the Obama administration (and the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] in particular) attempted to initiate an “aggressive deterrence” strategy which consisted of a media campaign launched in Central America that emphasized the risks and consequences of attempting to migrate without legal authorization, an increase in the detention of women and children waiting for their hearings (instead of releasing them immediately on bond, as previously done), and an increase in border protection measures in the U.S. and Mexico (Hiskey, Córdova, Orcés and Malone (2016, para. 2). This seemed to work, as numbers decreased somewhat in 2015. However, as noted by Hiskey et al. (2016) men, women and children have found other ways to come and continue to make the trip. In fact, in January 2016, customs and border patrol apprehensions had increased 100% since the same time the previous year (Hiskey et al. 2016: last paragraph). This increase can be accounted for by the “unprecedented levels of crime and violence” that have overwhelmed this area and has “produced a refugee situation for those directly in the line of fire, making no amount of danger or chance of deportation sufficient to dissuade those victims from leaving” (ibid).

In 2016, due to the lack of success in deterring migrants from making the journey or protecting them on their journey once they arrive, the Obama administration announced a partnership with Costa Rica, as well as the United Nations, to help identify those who urgently need protection in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. These most vulnerable people (and particularly those who have no option to remain in the region until their applications are processed) were to be transferred to Costa Rica to undergo refugee “processing” to the U.S. or another country (Holpuch 2016). In addition, the Central American Minors program (CAM), which provided “qualified children in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras a safe, legal, and orderly alternative to the dangerous journey” (In-country Refugee/Parole Processing, 2016: 1) was expanded “to extend eligibility for the program to certain qualified family members” (Holpuch 2016: para. 9). Moreover, an agreement was reached with Mexico to increase its capacity to process asylum claims and for both countries to improve access to asylum for those fleeing violence in these countries. Finally, a number of U.S. agencies (USAID, DOS, DHS, MCC, and IAF) offered to provide assistance intended to improve the living conditions of youth and families.

Unfortunately, as the Trump administration has moved into power, many of these programs are in danger of being discontinued or have already been discontinued. Most importantly, President Trump’s executive order on February 1, 2017 halted the CAM program (Linthicum 2017). This order was later thwarted by courts, but the reduction in number of refugees admitted to the United States (from 110,000 to 50,000) was allowed. Most of those places for refugees have already been taken, and fewer than 12,700 slots remain (Robles and Semple 2017). Hence, unaccompanied children currently seeking refuge in the United States face an even more difficult path, especially because the administration is reconsidering the classification of these children (from refugees to undocumented migrants) which means if apprehended, they will face arrest, detention or immediate deportation instead of asylum (Gordon 2017).

For those children already in the United States, they face daunting obstacles such as the continual state of limbo many experience while waiting for their hearings, being without documents and the constant worries and fears that go along with this, poverty, and dealing with trauma from their journey. These conditions have been exacerbated by the Trump administration’s crackdown on immigration.

3. Relevant research

Unaccompanied child migrants in general are an understudied population, and hence there is not a large body of research on their presence and representation in media discourse. This is also because the greatest increase in child migration has

occurred only recently and hence there is research underway momentarily that has not yet been published. One important study that does focus on unaccompanied children from Central America is Antony and Thomas (2016). In this analysis of reader response to news about unaccompanied minors and the abuse they have encountered by the U.S. Border Patrol, the authors found the lingering presence of discourse traditionally used to talk about Mexican immigrants. This discourse (that responded to media reports of child migrants arriving at the U.S. border) featured the characterization of child migrants as a “drain on U.S. economic resources, disease-infested parasites, and the offspring of irresponsible families” (Antony and Thomas 2016: 14). Additionally, readers feared the children would provide “channels” for terrorists and criminals to infiltrate the U.S. and they expressed doubts as to the motives of the children (ibid.). Another interesting finding of the study was the way in which readers drew on the discourse of global compassion (which sought to advocate for the children) to do the opposite. That is, readers hijacked the language of compassion and used it as a basis to advocate for deportation and other harsh punishments for the children. The authors conclude that it is the job of immigration scholars to pay attention to how counter discourses (such as global compassion) are invoked and utilized in order to reframe dominant logics.

Another important study focusing on media portrayal of child migrants from Central America (from which this chapter builds on and expands) is Catalano (2017). In this study, the author examined one community’s media discourse about the Central American child migrants and found a local dialog that featured opposing discourses that both dehumanized and humanized the children, but unfortunately dehumanizing discourses prevailed. Metaphor analysis of the media discourse revealed dominant metaphors comparing immigration to dangerous moving water (e.g., flooding, pouring), in which scenarios the children themselves were the water. In addition, the author noted the use of deixis to “Other” the children and the reasons they came as well as images that marginalized activist voices speaking on behalf of the children. For a similar study that examines the same discourse across the U.S., see Strom and Alcock (2017).

What has been largely absent from research about unaccompanied children (with some exceptions, such as ethnographic work from Heidbrink 2014 and Terrio 2015) has been “the voices of unaccompanied migrants themselves” who have not often been given the opportunity to “craft and circulate their own narratives, thereby preserving the autonomy and dignity of the human experience” (Antony and Thomas 2016: 17). Hence, this paper seeks to fill this gap by augmenting analysis of media discourse with counter voices from unaccompanied or separated migrant children themselves.

4. Theoretical foundations

Critical discourse studies (CDS) is a “problem oriented interdisciplinary research movement, subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda” (Fairclough, Mulderrig, and Wodak 2011: 357). CDS “emphasizes the way in which language is implicated in issues such as power and ideology that determine how language is used, what effect it has, and how it reflects, serves, and furthers the interests, positions, perspectives, and values of, those who are in power” (Waugh et al. 2015: 72). Recent CDS scholarship has been increasingly influenced by the field of cognitive linguistics (CL), which is an approach that views the study of language as a mental phenomenon. One of the ways in which cognitive linguistic perspectives have merged with CDS has been in the area of critical metaphor analysis (CMA). This term was first coined by Charteris-Black (2004) and refers to analyses that consider the use of metaphor as tools of persuasion and manipulation and their role in shaping public opinion in media discourse (particularly in terms of minority/marginalized groups). Critical metonymy analysis has also emerged recently, focusing on how metonymy leads to metaphors that influence public opinion and become powerful rhetorical tools that are often echoed and repeated in mainstream media discourse (Portero-Muñoz 2011). Whereas metaphor refers to the comparison of two entities that are alike in one particular way, metonymy often motivates these metaphors to occur by forcing readers/viewers to go through the mental process (known as construal operations) in which one entity stands for another it is associated to or related to in some way. A good example of this can be seen in the discourse of Donald Trump Jr. in which he compared refugees to candy in the following quote, “If I had a bowl of skittles and I told you just three would kill you. Would you take a handful? That’s our Syrian refugee problem” (Horowitz 2016). In this logic, the reader/listener must understand first that “skittles” is the name of a popular candy in the U.S. in order to compare the way candy is eaten to the refugee vetting process. This understanding of skittles and the later metonymy of “Syrian refugee problem” motivate the metaphor REFUGEES ARE POISONOUS CANDY although the analogy is not correct, since refugees go through a highly selective and detailed vetting process (unlike when you scoop some skittles from a bowl into your mouth) but also because it compares refugees to food. It is this type of use of metaphor/metonymy (especially those that are less obvious) that need to be countered in CDS/CL analyses.

Additionally, we are interested in the way that public discourses are connected to each other over time and the way that metaphor/metonymy are used in political discourse to “(dis)qualify political developments, social groups or even individuals as threatening the identity or continued existence of a nation state” (Musolf 2012: 303). In this chapter, we conduct a diachronic analysis by comparing data

collected in 2014 (see Catalano 2017) with data from 2016 to see if the discourse has changed at all since migration policies have changed and a major election season (in which the issue was given a central role in political debates and candidate platforms) was underway. In Musolff's (2016) book *Political Metaphor Analysis*, the author demonstrates how diachronic corpus analysis can reveal origins of "metaphor scenarios" that draw on past historical contexts and utilize them in current contexts. Hence, breaking down and understanding the history of these metaphor scenarios in public discourse can aid us in understanding the way in which child migrants from Central America have been represented since they became a frequent topic in U.S. news reports in 2014, and the capacity for this representation to affect public opinion and political agendas.

Acknowledging the multimodal nature of our data, we recognize that meaning is communicated not just through language but through other modes such as visuals, gestures, materials, etc. and that often, these other modes are doing things that are different or have different effects than language could have. Hence, we also utilize social semiotics (Machin and Mayr 2012; van Leeuwen 2008) to analyze semiotic resources such as video and image. A social semiotic approach to CDS focuses on *describing* the available choices of signs used in communication so that we can understand better what it is that people are doing with them.

Finally, we draw on ethnography as a source of thick, rich description (Geertz 1988) contextualized through both language and culture (Agar 1996) that allows us to explain migrant experiences in multiple ways through the voice of the participants. We recognize the indispensable link between ethnography and CDS in contributing to a fuller analysis of societal issues (Krzyzanowski 2011), and exploring "the beliefs, values and desires" of participants (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 62). We believe that ethnographic sources are valuable additions to any critical (multimodal) discourse analysis because they contextualize the discourse through the conceptual systems of the people that are living those reported experiences and thus can supplement or contrast the way in which participants are represented in public discourse.

5. Method

In Catalano (2017), the author investigated how unaccompanied child migrants were represented in a local community in the United States in 2014, at the time when the increase in child migrants began to gain media attention. In this chapter, we build on this analysis, investigating how the children are represented in national news sources two years later (2016), when migration of unaccompanied/separated children began to increase again and gain renewed attention in national media discourse particularly due to the impending election.

Nine articles were found in Googlesearches using key words germane to this analysis (i.e., “migrant children”, “Central American children”). Criteria for selection included whether articles were published in national U.S. online news sources during the year 2016, and if they contained the topic of unaccompanied children from Central America. The articles were then assigned a text number (e.g., Text 1, Text 2; see Appendix A). Analysis occurred in three phases. First, the authors read through the file with all the nine articles found including nonverbal data and manually coded for ways in which migrant children were represented. After initial coding, the authors found that the use of metonymy and metaphor were dominant strategies used in the discourse, while deixis and visual data surfaced as secondary data. A text-only file was then created to examine and code the data, as well as count and categorize metaphors and metonymies. Finally, visual elements were examined for their interaction with the verbal texts and for the representation of child migrants.

The second data set consists of secondary data garnered from nine articles from the years 2014–2016 that feature interviews with unaccompanied child refugees done by humanitarian organizations such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Because this is a vulnerable population that is not easily accessed, we chose to utilize this less publicized data to bring forward the voices of child refugees and compare the way they talk about their migration experiences to that of the media discourse from our two other data sets. In particular, we examine the metaphors used by these children to help us understand their experiences better and compare these to the discourse found in national media reports. Because “within conversation a relatively small number of words are metaphorically used” (Steen et al. 2010: 85), we did not find enough metaphors in our small data set to conduct an analysis like that of the first data set. However, we selected the most prevalent for discussion in the next section.

6. Findings

6.1 National coverage (2016)

We will now address results from our corpus of national coverage in 2016. This data marks a second period (see Catalano 2017 for the first) in which child migrants from Central America have been in the national spotlight, hence many of the articles allude to the 2014 increase in child migrants. Table 1 reveals metaphors/metonymies similar to those found in Catalano (2017) with the addition of NUMBERS as an important secondary source domain. Similar to the 2014 data, our analysis also found most of the 2016 discourse to be negative and/or de-humanizing (85.3%)

Table 1. Metaphor and metonymy with target domain: Unaccompanied child migrants

Type totals	Source domain percentage (%)	Examples of motivating metonymies	
Dominant	DANGEROUS WATER 35.8%	<i>surge, pouring, flooded, swamped</i>	39
Secondary 17.4%	NUMBERS	<i>wave, stem the flow</i> (ACTION OF WATER FOR ACTION OF CHILDREN) <i>thousands, the numbers, the masses</i> (NUMBER FOR AGENT)	21
14.7%	-----	<i>vulnerable young people, well-liked kid, these children</i> , (ATTRIBUTE FOR ENTITY)	16
12.8%	CRIMINALS	<i>paroled, illegally, illegal</i> (ATTRIBUTE FOR ENTITY)	14
Occasional			
4.6%	BURDEN	<i>opening doors</i> (US is container, migrants are unwanted guests), <i>spending nearly a billion dollars on shelters</i> (COUNTRY FOR HOUSE, MIGRANT FOR UNWANTED GUEST)	5
4.6%	SOLDIERS	<i>fight, battle</i> (MIGRATION FOR MILITARY CONFLICT)	5
4.6%	OBJECTS	<i>processed, powerful magnet, political football</i> (OBJECT FOR AGENT)	5
3.7%	ANIMALS	<i>rounding up, corralling, catch and release</i> (ACTION OF COWBOY FOR ACTION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT)	4
Total	109	100%	

* Metaphors with less than 2 tokens were

whereas 14.7% represented the discourse of global compassion and humanization, slightly less than in 2014, in which it was 16.3%.

While we do not claim that our data represents all the national coverage on the issue during this time frame, comparing this corpus to the 20 texts examined in Catalano (2017) provides a representative sample of typical discourse about the child migrants in U.S. discourse between these two years at both the local and national level. As in Catalano (2017), Table 1 shows ample evidence of the dominance of metaphor scenarios in which child migrants are viewed as dangerous water. Below we provide a few examples from the discourse (bold added).

- (1) *Immigrants fleeing gang violence in Central America are again **surging across** the U.S.-Mexico border, approaching the **numbers** that created an immigration crisis in the summer of 2014. While the **flow of immigrants** slowed for much of last year, nothing the U.S. government does seems to deter the current **wave of travelers**.* (Text 4, May 31, 2016)

- (2) *Refugees from Central America are pouring into the United States, a trend from 2014 that seems to be resurfacing along the U.S.-Mexican border this year. Many of them are children, sent on the long journey alone.* (Text 5, June 7, 2016)
- (3) *The Obama administration has grappled with how to respond to an influx of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, which spiked in 2014 with the arrival of thousands of unaccompanied children streaming over the border in South Texas.* (Text 6, July 26, 2016)

In Examples (1)–(3), child migrants are represented in terms of *surging, flowing, streaming, pouring* waves that are *unregulated*. In addition, the use of aggregation in Examples (1) and (3), illustrate a view of migrants in terms of numbers (e.g., *thousands, the numbers*) and present the government as incompetent in deterring the children from coming. These findings align with A’Beckett’s study which examined metaphors in discourse from victims from the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine (Chapter 11, this volume) and found patterns of migrant representation in the British media such as *numbers* and *masses of water*.

In Example (2), the parents are implicitly blamed and judged as incompetent in the phrase *sent on the long journey alone*. This finding is similar to Antony and Thomas’s findings in which many online comments referred to parents of child migrants as *unfit* (2016: 6–8). Furthermore, this strategy of proving that parents are lacking in parenting skills and family values is commonly used in racist discourse as another way of showing how “they” are not like “us” (cf. Catalano 2014).

The title of Text 4 is “U.S.-Mexico Border Sees Resurgence of Central Americans Seeking Asylum”. The metonymy *resurgence* is particularly interesting because it draws on the original use of the term *surge* (found three times in Catalano 2017 and 11 times in the national data from 2016). Adding the pre-fix *re* (and suffix *-ence*) nominalizes the word and emphasizes that this is the second time around for this *surge* to occur. While appearing somewhat innocent, the term *resurgence* is ideologically loaded because it collocates with words such as violence, hate, and diseases such as yellow fever and tuberculosis, as well as military surges such as those used by the United States to increase military force in Iraq. Case and point, in Google search of the term, 61% of collocations of the word *resurgence* were found to be negative while 7% were neutral and 32% positive. Hence, the majority of the contexts in which the word is used is negative. This may seem like a logical term to use when talking about a re-occurrence of a particular event, but consider how the reader might perceive of the issue had the journalist referred to the repeated increase in unaccompanied child migrants as a re-occurrence, re-nascence, comeback or return? What is also surprising about these findings is that this same type of discourse appeared not only in conservative news sources such as *The New American*, but news sources that are considered to be progressive or liberal (e.g., *The*

Washington Post and *National Public Radio*) and hence supportive of policies that treat the children humanely and advocate for their rights. Yet, the same use of water metaphors occurs, demonstrating the naturalization of these metaphor scenarios (Musolff 2016) over time to the point that even people that work in the best interest of migrant children do not always recognize the danger of these metaphors in their own use. In Example (4), we see how border patrol agents express their frustration at not being able to do their job (bold added).

- (4) *While the **swelling numbers** don't seem to alarm the Homeland Security Department, its border officers are clearly frustrated. Two weeks ago, the agents' union president, Brandon Judd, testified at a congressional hearing. "What happens is if **you** are arrested in the United States and you ask for any sort of asylum, what we do is **we will process you**, and **we will walk you right out our front door**, give you a pat on the back and say, 'Welcome to the United States.' And **they're good to go**," he said.* (Text 4, May 31, 2016)

In this example, child migrants are first referred to as *you* (as in *if you are arrested... we will process you...*) to include the audience in the discussion and put them in the position of the child migrants but then after the union president gets to the part of the story where the migrants are released from custody, he uses *they*. This functions to distance the migrants as they are no longer the responsibility of the border patrol. In addition, child migrants are de-humanized with vague metonymies such as *process* (ACTION FOR RESULT) which "mask the actual events of the arrest (which may include handcuffing, fingerprinting, searching, photographing, and eventually filling out paperwork for deportation)" (Catalano and Waugh 2013: 420). In the next example (Example 5), we see the re-appearance of the IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS metaphor which according to Santa Ana has been replaced by IMMIGRANTS ARE CRIMINALS in discourse about Latinos and/or Latino migrants in the U.S., but we still find traces of this metaphor here (2002, 2013) (bold added):

- (5) *Chris Cabrera is a Border Patrol officer and union official in south Texas. He says all the families surrendering to seek asylum are distracting his member agents, when they should be chasing drug and human traffickers. "Our agents are so caught up with **rounding up** the ones that are turning themselves in, **corralling them** and getting them to the station, that we don't have adequate resources to get the ones that are trying to get away," Cabrera says.* (Text 4, May 31, 2016).

Above, this border patrol officer compares child migrants to animals that need to be wrangled, such as in the classic American Western. Example (5) supports Santa Ana's (2016: 95) findings that border patrol agents are portrayed (and portray themselves) as the "American cowboy archetype". According to Santa Ana, when journalists involve border patrol agents as protagonists in their news stories, they

evoke the American Western genre in which “the violent act can become morally right when it occurs within the confines of a code...in defense of one’s life and property” (Grant 2012: 60–63, as cited in Santa Ana 2016: 100). The basic narrative of this story archetype is that the border patrol agent is the hero who “stands outside of a society that is threatened by uncivilized villains. They can only be stopped if the hero moves with violent prowess to defend the town folk who live at the edge of civilization” (2016: 100). Hence in Example (5), the agent – as the “stoic warrior defending the patriarchal order” – (Santa Ana 2016: 111) is lacking the resources to keep the children from getting *away*.

This story-type of the cowboy Western in which the children are animals or non-humans is repeated in immigration legislation and policy such as the “catch and release” program (mentioned in Text 4), which refers to the releasing of people that have been arrested for not having legal authorization to be in the country (a policy, we might add, which the Trump administration is in the process of eliminating). This unofficial name for the policy comes from a similar policy applied to the conservational fishing policy in which after capture, fish are unhooked and let go. Thus, the well-known policy applied to animals has been applied to humans. In addition, the language of crime (which fits neatly into the cowboy scenario) has also been applied to immigration policy (which is repeated and was found in the data) in which the word *illegal* is over-used and immigration policies adopt criminal justice terms such as *parole* which even if they don’t refer to people being released after serving time, still evoke crime frames. Hence, besides providing evidence for movement scenarios related to the larger immigration discourse in the U.S., this data illustrates the American Western scenario in which violent outlaws (drug traffickers and people trying to enter the country without authorization that threaten the town folk) get away because the cowboys (border patrol) are distracted with *rounding up* the animals (e.g., child migrants) that are being *corralled* into the U.S. detention centers. The crime frame is not uncommon in media discourse on migration and can also be seen in Arcimaviciene’s work (Chapter 6, this volume). The following images (1–2) reinforce this frame of crime and law and order:

In Photo 1, which discusses the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) statistics related to recent apprehensions of child migrants, the children are seen behind a wired enclosure resembling a cage. The camera angle is equal, but it is a longshot and therefore we cannot see the faces of the children. The viewer only sees groups of children sitting close together and appearing to look down (except for one, who appears to look at the guard). The CBP officer in the photo is sporting a gun, which is aimed at the ground, and his body and gun are pointed toward the children and he is looking toward them as if watching intently what they are doing. The photo is interesting from a metonymic point of view as the officer’s uniform, gun and wired fencing could be easily placed in the genre of crime/prison scenarios. Yet, what is



Photo 1. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol's numbers indicate a *new surge* of Central American minors, according to a Pew Research Center analysis. (text, 3, may 9, 2016) – credit U.S. customs and border patrol (bold added). See original photo at: <http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/border-apprehensions-of-unaccompanied-minors-from-central-america-may-top-2014-levels-8277763>

being pictured are innocent children who have escaped violence in their countries looking for nothing more than a safe place to live. By introducing the topic with words such as *surge* and providing these type of images, a cowboy scenario is invoked once again in which the agents are the heroes protecting us from the *surge* that threatens our lifestyle.

In Photo 2 (see below), the headless, faceless children are referred to as *detainees* in the caption below it. While the word *detainee* technically refers to people being held in custody (usually for political reasons), it has largely been found in contexts such as Guantanamo (where the detainees were suspected terrorists), or other terrorist suspects and thus has a very negative connotation nestled in the frame of crime. Besides the caption, the photo shows a long line of children appearing to queue up for something. It is clear from the photo that these are children, yet de-humanizing terms such as *detainees* and *processing* along with the fact that we cannot see their faces do not allow us to empathize with them and their situation. Just as the accompanying article does little to humanize the children nor does it highlight their voices and perspectives, the photo does not help in any way to create empathy for their cause by allowing us to see and engage with the children in any meaningful way.

In addition to the dehumanizing way in which the migrant children were represented in the data, as in Catalano (2017), we did also find some discourse (14.7%) of global compassion which called on the morality and empathy of readers to look beyond political agendas and uses deixis to show spatial proximity to the children but as part of a strategy to make readers feel empathy and the need to act on their behalf. Unlike Antony and Thomas (2016), we did not find any examples of the language of



Photo 2. *Young detainees walk in a line in June 2014 at a border protection processing facility in Brownsville, Tex. The Obama administration is expanding a relief program created late that year.* (credit Eric gay/AP, text 7, July 26, 2016). See original photo at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-to-expand-refugee-program-for-central-american-minors/2016/07/26/242ab0cc-533f-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?utm_term=.9c88950b857e

global compassion used to advocate for deportation and other harsh punishments for the children. Example (6) is illustrative of the data we did find (bold added).

- (6) *With its partners, UNICEF said it is working to address the causes of migration. “We must remember that **children**, whatever their status, are **first and foremost children**,” Forsyth said. “We have a duty to keep **them** safe in a healthy and nurturing environment.”* (Text 9, August 23, 2016)

Above, readers who sympathize with the children’s cause are invited to be part of the ingroup due to the use of the inclusive *we* which denotes both the speaker and the addressee (Petersoo 2007) and connects the audience to the children emotionally, calling on their moral values to help readers decide to do the right thing. In addition, Example (6) highlights the fact that they are *children*. However, as Heidbrink notes (2014: 50), often humanitarian discourses (such as in Example (6)) utilize the language of vulnerability in order to increase children’s chances of obtaining asylum, but in the process, they are depicted as devoid of agency in the decision to make the journey (when this is often not the case). In addition, divesting the children of agency ignores the incredible courage and resilience they display in traveling on their own across national borders.

Despite humanizing images and verbal text that featured some individual stories as well as voices of humanitarian organizations and activists working on behalf of the children, powerful politicians, government agencies, and community

activists with anti-immigration agendas dominated the public discourse about the children with largely dehumanizing discourse that does not take into consideration or feature the voices of the children. As a result, this negative discourse has had more power in shaping public opinion about their plight.

6.2 Counter voices: Metaphors of migrant discourse

We now shift our focus to the voices of the children as found in a corpus of interviews (both transcribed from interviews and in video format) of child migrants taken from both national media coverage from 2014–2016, as well as interviews published on humanitarian organization websites, including the UNHCR and Unicef. In Example (7), the child interviewed utilizes the dominant metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY (and the submetaphor IMMIGRATION IS A JOURNEY) to explain his mother's decision to send him to the United States (bold added).

- (7) *The situations at home only promoted a feeling of death. [...] I think **this journey is seen as a journey of hope**,*” he said. *“It’s seen as a **journey of life**. It’s seen as a **journey of better opportunities** [...].* (Text 12, November 18, 2014)

Above, the *journey* is equated with *hope*, *life*, and *better opportunity*. A similar idea is expressed in Text 11 (in the video) featuring an unaccompanied minor from El Salvador expressing why he never wants to return (Example 8, bold added):

- (8) *La única que me espera a mí es **la muerte**.* [Death is the only thing waiting for me]. (Text 11, June 18, 2014)

Hence, backward movement (returning to the country of origin) is equated with *death*, which is personified, conjuring up chilling images of the Grim Reaper standing on an abandoned street corner tapping his fingers awaiting the arrival of the speaker. This metaphor is used effectively by the speaker (who is not named in the video) to show the dire circumstances in which children like him make the dangerous move to leave their country. Example (9) also illustrates LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which draws on larger orientational metaphors in which future events are AHEAD (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 16) and Event Structure submetaphors such as ACTION IS MOTION and DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION (Kövecses 2015: 4). In Example (9), *vida* ‘life’, is represented as *corriendo* ‘running/flowing’, an action that visualizes the forward movement as positive advancement on the JOURNEY (Example 9, bold added).

- (9) *Esta vida que estamos corriendo es lo más difícil, cansado con sueño.[...] Le digo a mis amigos que **no nos echamos par’ atrás**.* [This life that **we are living** (literally ‘running’) is the most difficult, tired, sleep-deprived. I tell my friends that we cannot **fall back**] (Text 15, July 15, 2016, from video)

Interestingly, the metaphorical linguistic expression *la vida que estamos corriendo* reveals a slightly different cultural entailment of the universal LIFE IS A JOURNEY than in English. The literal translation¹ – “the life we are running” – does not have an exact equivalent in English, but one can say one is “running for his/her life”, meaning that one is escaping a dangerous situation whereas in “the life we are running”, the interlocutor is not referring to one specific event, but life as a whole and the process of living, not escaping. However, like Kövecses (2015), we believe that this difference in metaphor (and our interpretation of it) is closely connected to the context in which the utterance was stated. Hence, interpreting the expression *la vida que estamos corriendo* as part of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is dependent on our understanding of the context of the interviewee. In this case, Gaspar Marcos is talking about his life in the United States after escaping from Guatemala when he was 13 and coming to the U.S. by himself. An orphan since age five, Gaspar must work to support himself, and sleeps three hours a night in order to work and go to school. During the video that films his daily life, he is shown running from school, running down the stairs to his job, and boarding trains to get to and fro. Hence, it is possible that Gaspar used this metaphorical expression because it fits with his life in which he did escape from a dangerous situation, but also the life he currently holds, which is extremely busy and in which he must move quickly from one responsibility to another. Thus, it is knowing Gaspar’s past experiences of escaping Guatemala, but also his present bodily experiences of running from one task to the next, and the effort he must put forth just to live day to day that allows us to interpret this correctly, as part of the IMMIGRATION IS A JOURNEY metaphor.

In the second part of Example (9), the JOURNEY metaphor continues with *no nos echamos par’ atrás* [we cannot fall back], which signifies that returning to their home countries would be backward movement that is viewed as negative. This again demonstrates the political reality of the unaccompanied minors and the choice they make to migrate to the U.S. While our limited data supports Catalano’s (2016) findings that when migrants talk about their migration experiences, the JOURNEY metaphor is dominant in their discourse, we showed earlier that this was not the case with media discourse, which often referred to migrants’ journeys, but not metaphorically.

A secondary metaphor commonly found within this data set are the metaphors GANGS ARE PREDATORS/MIGRANTS ARE PREY. Below Lucas Anderson describes the journey through Mexico on his way to Texas from Honduras (Example 10, bold added):

1. Translations originate from the video subtitles in the original articles, except in our discussions of literal meanings.

- (10) *It's like crossing the United States, with so much security, technology and, worse, criminals hunting us down as though we're animals.*

(Text 10, 2014 [no date listed])

In this example, the young man (age 20) reveals his perception of the criminals that live off migrants like him who participate in the *hunting* of migrant children. At the same time, he vocalizes the recursive way in which the criminals perceive of migrants to be *animals* as well. Positioning the criminals/gang members as predators and migrants as prey needing protection exposes the power dynamic in which powerful people take advantage of vulnerable people. In Example (11) (bold added), Edgar uses a similar metaphor, but refers to the gang members he escaped by staying in a shelter run by missionaries:

- (11) *I spent two months and 21 days there," Edgar said. "I needed to be there for my **protection**, because they [the gang] were **hunting** for me.*

(Text 13, March 26, 2015)

These animal metaphors in which migrants are viewed as prey reveal a perception of weakness, but also lack of control. In contrast, the gang members are both criminalized and given agency, as they are the social actors with power in this societal hierarchy. The connotation of this pairing of metaphors is clear in that it subordinates the child migrants to the gang members. While Santa Ana (1999: 201) has demonstrated how the IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS metaphor is used to justify "the denigration of certain groups of people" there is a nuance to the way in which the migrant children are using the animal-based metaphors here. Here, the use of animalistic prey/predator metaphors functions to underline the denigration that has occurred societally, in order to legitimate their reasons for escaping and seeking refuge in the United States. When *hunted*, the instinct is to flee. Another example of the predator–prey scenario can be seen in metaphors that migrant children use to talk about the infamous train on which many migrant children hitch a ride on in order to get to the United States (many do not make it or choose to stay in Mexico). This secondary metaphor is present in the data set as TRAIN IS PREDATOR/MIGRANTS ARE PREY. Below, Pedro talks about his journey from Honduras to the United States. He describes hitchhiking through Guatemala, sleeping on the streets, begging for food for several weeks, then finally crossing the border into Mexico, where he boards "la Bestia" [the Beast] as the train is often called.² In Example (12), Pedro describes the train in the following way (bold added):

2. In addition to "La Bestia", Heidbrink (2014: 91) notes that the train migrants take across Mexico is also referred to as "El Diablo" [The Devil], and "El Expreso de la Muerte" [Death's Express].

- (12) *It is a voracious creature who grabs you and pulls you down onto the tracks. If it gets a taste of the foot, it wants the whole leg. If it gets the leg, it wants all of you.* (Text 19: 33 [no date listed])

In this metaphor, the train is a *voracious creature* that seeks to prey on and eat the bodies of the migrant children. Through personification, Pedro provides a window into his view of the train as a powerful predator (and as a result, he reveals his own vulnerability as prey). At the same time, the metaphor reveals that he is fully aware of the precarious nature of transport available to him as he makes the journey north. In Heidbrink's (2014: 91) interviews with child migrants, she was informed by numerous youths of how the trains would "slow to fifty kilometres per hour allowing migrants to grab hold of ladders and pull themselves on top of the trains or stow away in open cars, risking losing a limb or worse". As one youth told the author (bold added):

- (13) *Your feet are just a snack. Your legs are dinner.* (Text 20, [no date listed])

This metaphor repeated in both Text 19 and 20 demonstrates that the children often characterize themselves as at risk, in this case, of disembodiment from powerful machines that at once serve as transportation to their end goal as well as potential for grave danger. However, the willingness of the children to flee in spite of the risk demonstrates a strong sense of agency in facing this predator in order to reach the final destination on their journey towards a better life. And, unlike media sources such as those described in this chapter, ethnographic interviews such as those above reveal that although child migrants do understand their vulnerability through the PREDATOR/PREY metaphors, they still demonstrate agency (not to mention bravery and resilience) in making the choice to undergo the journey.

7. Conclusion

As in Catalano (2017), this analysis of national news coverage two years later also revealed a dominance of water/movement scenarios which equate migrant children to dangerous water and present them as a threat, despite a small percentage of the discourse dedicated to global compassion and pleading on their behalf. In addition, we found evidence of media discourse that gives voice to border patrol narratives that harken to the classic American Western in which border patrol agents are cowboy heroes saving the townsfolk from the bad guys, e.g., criminals and gang members supposedly trying to enter the country, while wrangling up the cattle (e.g., children) that keep them distracted from their task.

Interestingly, the way that migrant children talk about their experiences in our data starkly contrasts that of the media, particularly in the use of metaphors. For example, while media discourse was dominated with water metaphors, no water metaphors were found in the discourse of the migrant children (albeit we cannot generalize this since our sample was small). Metaphors that did feature in their discourse included IMMIGRATION IS A JOURNEY and IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS (more specifically, IMMIGRANTS ARE PREY and GANG MEMBERS/BORDER PATROL/TRAINS ARE PREDATORS). Analyzing and understanding the metaphors used by migrant children as they tell their stories demonstrates the diverse conventions of social discourse that characterize power struggle and positioning of different groups of people within society (Fairclough 2015) and provides a way to begin to return agency to these children as they represent their own lives through their own language use, thus adding their viewpoint to the greater social discourse, and exposing their own choices and decision-making power as well as bravery and resilience in conditions when they are highly vulnerable and experience great fear.

It is hoped that by exposing metaphors that show how these children are dehumanized and contrasting them with the children's own accounts of the devastating reasons why they were forced to flee their countries, policy makers and law enforcement will be compelled to see these children as they are: children, and not detainees, or cattle to be rounded up. Additionally, by including the contextualized verbatim talk with rich description provided by ethnographic interviews, it allows for the return of compassion and empathy (Arcimaviciene, Chapter 6, this volume). This positions the children not as the metaphor, but rather as a human being using metaphor to make sense of the world around them. Through the point of view of the children, we offer a distinction in the way metaphor is used differently by different groups. This reveals how metaphor is often used to strengthen political ideologies while pushing back using the children's own language to provide a contrasting perspective that invites empathy to return to the greater discourse.

Furthermore, we hope that their dangerous stories of survival and journeys that equate return to their country to *la muerte* as well as their heartbreaking tales of survival in a life in which they are always *corriendo* inform readers of the challenges they face once they arrive in the United States as well as their important contribution to society. Aligning with this book's focus, we encourage more research that features migrant experiences and provides an alternative perspective that counters dehumanizing media discourse such as that found in this chapter, which has the power to shape public opinion about migrants and can result in devastating policy changes for them.

Appendix A. Texts used in the corpus

U.S. National Coverage 2016:

- Text 1: Eyder. February 25, 2016. "Why a Single Question Decides the Fates of Central American Migrants." *NPR.org*. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/2016/02/25/467020627/why-a-single-question-decides-the-fates-of-central-american-migrants> 08/09/2016
- Text 2: Hennessy-Fiske, Molly. March 10, 2016. "Central American Immigrants Fleeing Due to Violence, Poverty, and Now Fears of Trump's Proposals." *LA Times*. Retrieved from: <http://www.latimes.com/nation/immigration/la-na-immigration-children-families-20160308-story.html> 08/09/2016
- Text 3: Lemons, Stephen. May 9, 2016. "Border Apprehensions of Unaccompanied Minors from Central America May Top 2014 Levels." *Phoenix New Times*. Retrieved from: <http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/border-apprehensions-of-unaccompanied-minors-from-central-america-may-top-2014-levels-8277763> 08/09/2016
- Text 4: Burnett, John. May 31, 2016. "U.S.-Mexico Border Sees Resurgence of Central Americans Seeking Asylum." *NPR*. Retrieved from: <http://www.npr.org/2016/05/31/480073262/u-s-mexico-border-sees-resurgence-of-central-americans-seeking-asylum> 08/09/2016
- Text 5: Marizco, Michel. June 7, 2016. "New Surge of Central Americans Seen on Border." *Arizona Public Media*. Retrieved from: <https://www.azpm.org/s/39608-new-surge-of-central-americans-seen-on-border/> 08/09/2016
- Text 6: Hirschfeld Davis, Judy. July 26, 2016. "U.S. to Admit More Central American Refugees." *The New York Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/obama-refugees-central-america.html> 08/09/2016
- Text 7: Nakamura, David. July 26, 2016. "U.S. to Expand Refugee Program for Central American Minors." *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-to-expand-refugee-program-for-central-american-minors/2016/07/26/242ab0cc-533f-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?utm_term=.1a89ade51b8f 08/09/2016
- Text 8: Blake, Paul. August 16, 2016. "NC Community in Months-Long Battle to Bring Home Undocumented Teen, Despite Election-Year Controversy." *ABC News*. Retrieved from: <http://abcnews.go.com/US/nc-community-months-long-battle-bring-home-undocumented/story?id=41375119> 08/09/2016
- Text 9: Lederer, Edith, M. August 22, 2016. "UN: Thousands of Central American Children Seek to Enter U.S." *AP*. Retrieved from: <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/38b3d9fa838542e-ba277727160a358a2/un-thousands-central-american-children-seek-enter-us> 08/09/2016

Interviews with unaccompanied children:

- Text 10: Corchado, Alfredo. 2014. "Putting Brakes on a Dream." *The Dallas Morning News* Retrieved from: <http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/migrants/> 08/09/2016
- Text 11: "Update on the Status of Refugee and Migrant Children: The Impact of Philanthropy." June 18, 2014. *GCIR: Grantmakers concerned with immigrants and refugees*. Retrieved from: <https://www.gcir.org/childrefugeesmigrants> 02/10/2016
- Text 12: Brekka, Kira. November 18, 2014. "Migrant Defends Mother's Decision to Send Him Unaccompanied to the U.S." *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/18/unaccompanied-minor-crossing-us-border_n_6178694.html 02/10/2016

- Text 13: “Closed Doors: Mexico’s Failure to Protect Central American Refugee and Migrant Children.” March 26, 2015. *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved from: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/03/31/closed-doors/mexicos-failure-%09protect-%09central-american-refugee-and-migrant-children> 02/10/2016
- Text 14: Phippen, J. Weston. October 15, 2015. “Young, Illegal, and Alone.” *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/unaccompanied-minors-immigrants/410404/02/10/2016>
- Text 15: Carcarino, Cindy. July 15, 2016. “Nearly 1 in 4 Students at This L.A. High School Migrated from Central America – Many Without Their Parents.” *LA Times*. Retrieved from: <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-belmont-%20high-school-20160710-%20snap-story.html> 02/10/2016
- Text 16: Ramirez, Tanisha Love. July 18, 2016. “A Glimpse into a Day in the Life of an Unaccompanied Minor.” *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-glimpse-into-a-day-in-the-life-of-unaccompanied-minor_us_578ce366e4b0a0ae97c2a93f 02/10/2016
- Text 17: “The Quiet Crisis of Central America’s Unaccompanied Migrant Children.” August 23, 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/honduras_86561.html 02/10/2016
- Text 18: Garin, Emily, Beise, Jan, Hug, Lucia. and You, Danzhen. September 7, 2016. “Uprooted: The Growing Crisis for Refugee and Migrant Children.” *UNICEF*. Retrieved from: <http://www.unicef.org/emergencies/childrenonthemove/uprooted/> 02/10/2016
- Text 19: Terrio, Susan J. 2015. *Whose child am I?: Unaccompanied, undocumented children in US immigration custody*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Text 20: Heidbrink, Lauren. 2014. *Migrant youth, transnational families, and the state: Care and contested interests*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

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PART IV

Online debates about migration

Virtual crisis experience

Displaced Ukrainians

Russo-Ukrainian discussions of victims from the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine

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This paper compares several discourse representations of migrants in the British media with the data on Ukrainian displaced people from the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine. The comparison shows that mainstream media in Russia and Ukraine attempt to depict displaced Ukrainians sympathetically, to win the hearts and minds of the people from the disputed conflict zone and to evoke approval from the international community. Participants in online debates in both countries actively use different techniques of negativisation of the images of migrants. They often either rely on a novel vocabulary for abuses or adapt old disparaging expressions activating cultural prejudices. The paper concludes that Russian and Ukrainian sets of abuse developed during the confrontation reinforce the specifics of the national vision of the conflict development.

Keywords: humanitarianism, negativisation, numerical elements, scroungers, catastrophe scenario, Russia, Ukraine, social media, official media, stereotypes, disparaging expressions

1. Introduction

In 2014, a so-called 'hybrid war' was launched in Southern and Eastern Ukraine (cf. Konoplyov & Urbanskiy 2015). The on-ground hostilities between unidentified militants, citizens or "home guards" and Ukrainian law-enforcement and military regiments were followed by Russian annexation of the Crimea and the independence proclamations of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Lugansk People's Republic (LPR). As a result of this political and military confrontation, a large number of Ukrainian citizens were driven from their homes. In December 2017, the number of internally displaced persons¹ in Ukraine reached 1,800,000 people

1. Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) is the term used for refugees who do not cross international borders. In this paper, the two terms are used interchangeably as participants in discussions are not always aware of their differences. See Section 2.

(UNHCR 2017b). From the beginning of the conflict in south-east Ukraine by mid-2017 over 1 million of Ukrainians had sought different forms of legal stay in the Russian Federation (UNCR 2017a).

The conflict evolved as a dispute over the cultural and political identity of residents in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The internal division between the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian populations was strengthened by Russian media campaigns and military assistance. The antagonism among Ukrainian citizens had a mostly symbolic implication at the beginning but its development forced the population of the “disputed” lands to seek refuge among parties whom they called “the occupants”.²

Russian and Ukrainian politicians made prominent announcements that taking care of refugees was a matter of national dignity (TASS 2014, Rozenko 2015). Many voluntary humanitarian organizations were formed to assist people fleeing the conflict zone. International humanitarian organizations extensively praised the efforts of volunteers (Gienger 2015). Yet, the attitude toward refugees has not been overwhelmingly positive. Social media in Russia and Ukraine often encourages discussions about the negative impact of the policy of refugee support. State media sometimes echo these concerns but counterbalance them with the opinions of experts: psychologists, political analysts and emergency workers. Both state and public media in the two countries also accommodate the voices of refugees. Displaced Ukrainians often admit in mainstream media and online discussions that they found themselves in very complex relations with the host communities.

Investigations of the discourse of immigration in Europe revealed that racist sentiments are a common source of prejudice against refugees (Van Dijk 1991; Wodak 1996; Wodak and van Dijk 2000; KhosraviNik 2010; KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, and Wodak 2012; Burroughs 2015; Engstrom 2015). If racism is defined as an interethnic prejudice which results in social discrimination then the notion can be relevant to this study although the people fleeing from the conflict zone and their host communities belong to a similar or the same ethnic group identified as Eastern Slavs (cf. Subtelny 1994: 21; Magocsi 1996: 73). One participant of the Russo-Ukrainian online debates succinctly described the absence of apparent differences between Russians and Ukrainians: “It is next to

2. Pro-Russian residents of Eastern Ukraine claim that Ukrainian nationalists came to impose their values on them, whereas pro-Ukrainian residents object to Russian military assistance to separatists. Olena Stepova, a Ukrainian blogger, argues: “For those who believe in the Russian world we are enemies and occupants. For us, Ukrainians, the enemies are those who called war to our land and raised over heads the cursed three-coloured banner (the Russian flag-L.A.)” (My own translation of Stepova 2016).

impossible to distinguish a Ukrainian from a Russian judging from their appearance. It is not like you deal with Uzbeks or Tajiks”.³

The displaced persons are either speakers of Russian or Russo-Ukrainian bilinguals. Moreover, Russians and Ukrainians used to live in the same country, the USSR, which disintegrated not so long ago. There would be minimal religious differences if any, since migrants and their hosts are mostly Christians. Nevertheless, online fora in Russia and Ukraine and occasionally the official media portrays the displaced people as “others”. Several textual and lexical patterns of negative representation of Ukrainian migrants emerged in discourse repertoire of Russians and Ukrainians.

The analysis in this chapter targets primarily textual patterns that are indicative of relations between migrants and host communities. It draws on representations of “others” that were collected from investigations of the discourse of immigration in Europe (KhosarviNik, Krzyzanowski, Wodak 2012; van Dijk 2012; Pohl and Wodak 2012; Musolff 2011, 2012, 2015). The investigation also seeks to locate some culture-specific ways in representation of ideological opponents which are relevant for portraying refugees from the conflict zone.

2. Data and method

A corpus of texts of about 113.479 words has been compiled in order to analyse Russian and Ukrainian attitudes towards the escapees from the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine. The time frame has covered the period from April 2014⁴ to March 2016. The corpus includes Ukrainian and Russian media articles as well as four Ukrainian blogs and six Russophone discussion fora and in which different nationalities participated. Two out of six discussions were launched from Ukrainian web spaces, three were placed in the Russian sites and one was opened on Facebook. The texts were retrieved by Google searches using keywords such as *беженцы из Украины* ‘refugees from Ukraine’ and *переселенцы из АТО* ‘displaced persons from ATO’. The additional filters *Донбасс/Донецк/Луганск* ‘Donbass’, ‘Donetsk’, ‘Lugansk’ have been applied to ascertain relevance of texts. Preference in the selection of publications was given to the widely-circulated Russian newspapers *Rossiyskaia gazeta*, *Argumenty i fakty*, *Komsomol’skaia*

3. My own translation. The public discussion of the article “Political migrants from Ukraine: Here we are illegals but jail is waiting for us in homeland”.

4. The Antiterrorist Operation (ATO) in Ukraine was launched in April 2014.

pravda, *Pravda.ru*, *Izvestia*,⁵ along with the major Ukrainian analytical newspaper *Zerkalo nedeli*, and online papers *Censor.net* and *Ukrainskaia pravda*.⁶ Some Ukrainian regional media outlets, e.g. *Kievaskaia pravda* (Kiev) and *MTM news* (Zaporozhe) were also included.

The difference in the search words reflects the fact that the status of refugee can be granted only to persons who escaped war by moving into the territory of a foreign country. Some publications emphasise and explain the difference, but the inconsistent labelling is also very common. Moreover, not all Ukrainian escapees have obtained the status of refugees in Russia. Many of them have remained temporary residents with undetermined prospects and thus have frequently become the main subject of discussion in publications. Table 1 shows subcategories of the analysed materials.

According to the Constitution of Ukraine 1996, the state or official language in Ukraine is Ukrainian. The mass media releases the news in Ukrainian, although the information is often available in Russian which still functions as the language of interethnic communication among Post-Soviet nations. Many Ukrainians actively participate in Russian public fora. The profile of these discussants reveals that they reside in Kiev, Cherkasy, Zaporozhe, Dnepr and other Ukrainian cities.⁷

This investigation adopts entry-level analysis of discourse topics. The entry-level analysis “covers contents and related ‘surface’ aspects” whereas discourse topics were defined as “units summarising the meaning of entire texts or their selected passages” (KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, and Wodak 2012: 286). Repetitive topics mirror areas of concerns and aspects of public interest (Van Dijk 2012: 22). The topics also encapsulate beliefs and experiences and they map the ideological, communicative and conceptual landscape of the discourse.

Samples of discursive representations of migrants provided by KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, and Wodak (2012) were used as a basic guide for extracting textual

5. *Rossiyskaia gazeta* is a Russian government daily newspaper, *Argumenty I fakty* is the weekly newspaper with the largest circulation in Russia, *Komsomol'skaia pravda* is the second largest tabloid, *Pravda.ru* is an internet newspaper which has a similar name with the broadsheet published by the Communist Party of Russia, *Izvestia* is the biggest daily broadsheet. See BBC monitoring (2008).

6. *Censor.net* and *Ukrainskaia pravda* are internet newspapers. *Zerkalo nedeli* is a weekly newspaper in Russian and Ukrainian. The English version of the newspaper is offered online. BBC (2006) listed it as the most influential analytical newspaper in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the Google search did not bring samples from the newspapers *Segodnia* and *Den'* among the first 100 results. Even though these newspapers are very popular among Ukrainians, they were not included for this analysis.

7. I use an English transliteration of Russian place-names rather than Ukrainian ones as the data was collected through search of Russian words.

Table 1. Origins of the analysed materials and abbreviations in the chapter

Russian sources		Ukrainian sources	
Public fora	Central media	Public fora	Central and regional media
1. To V.V. Putin: Stop the flow of refugees and the squandering of the Federal treasury on them (TVVPSTFR)	<i>Komsomol'skaia pravda</i> (KP) <i>Rossiyskaia gazeta</i> (RG) <i>Pravda.ru</i> (PR)	1. Displaced persons from the ATO zone: Are they arrogant spongers or unfortunate people? (DPFTAZ)	<i>Zerkalo nedeli</i> (ZN) <i>Ukrainskaia pravda</i> (UP)
2. Ukrainian refugees – are they unfortunate people or parasites? (URATUPOP)	<i>Argumenty i fakty</i> (AiF) <i>Izvestia</i> (Iz)	2. Ukrainian refugees – “cotton padded jackets” – were sent to the Republic of Komi, the next destination is Vorkuta (URCPJ)	<i>Censor.net</i> (CN) <i>Kievskaiia Pravda</i> (KIEVP) <i>MTM news</i> (MTM)
3. A comment section in <i>Komsomol'skaia pravda</i> , public discussion of the article “Political migrants from Ukraine: Here we are illegals but jail is waiting for us in our homeland”(KPCS)		Blogs:	
4. A Facebook discussion ‘I received a phone call: We are refugees from Ukraine’ (FB)		1. Refugees from the ATO zone: Are they infiltrators or hostages of circumstances? (RFAZ)	
		2. IDPs: Welcome or unauthorised entry is prohibited? (IDPWOUeIP)	
		3. Parasite refugees demand spinning rods and do not want to work. Not all displaced persons from the ATO zone behave adequately (in the places) where they were received with a broad mind and open heart. (PRDSR)	
		4. Be careful, “the rescuers of Donbass”! (BCROD)	
20.709 words	44.336 words	20.076 words	28.358 words
Total 65.045		Total 48.434 words	
Grand total:		113.479 words	

patterns in arguments of Russians and Ukrainians. Two aspects of content analysis were deployed for the identification of such patterns. On the one hand, the study relied on locating specific lexical choices that were used for depicting migrants and aspects of their life. The paper focused on the metaphoric themes that were already recognised as tools of dehumanization and de-individualisation, i.e. metaphors of “masses of waters” and of bio- and socio-“parasites”. At the same time, some culture-specific labels have been found through analysis of patterns representing ordeals of refugees/IDPs and their persecutors.

The assumption was made that the contextualisation of similar concepts can vary in different cultures and types of textual organisation. KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski,

and Wodak (2012: 293) argue that the same discursive strategies can produce different meanings when they are amalgamated by different macro-contexts. The paper explores how texts in Russian incorporate previously recognised metaphoric themes and how these metaphoric themes reflect the values and beliefs of the discourse community which in their turn form the discourse ideology. This paper follows the research tradition of topical analysis which is broadly used for discovering the hidden premises of argument (Wodak and Meyer 2001; Wodak 2011; KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, Wodak 2012; Borroughs 2015). Topoi are content-related warrants which invoke ideas of “danger and threat”, “economic burden”, “humanitarianism”, “numbers” (KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, Wodak 2012: 287, 291, see also Felberg and Saric this volume).

The task was to check whether the correlations between lexical choices and topoi that were identified in the British press are the same in the Russo-Ukrainian data. The assumption was that the main ideology of support which permeates official Russian and Ukrainian publications could provide unexpected renditions of, and inferences to, some recognised modes of representations. The paper provides a qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis and aims at reconstruction of the collective identities attributed to the Ukrainian “refugees” in Russian and Ukrainian media.

3. “Numbers”, “figures”, and “masses”: Are they perceived as a threat?

3.1 Numbers and figures

The analysis of representations of migrants in the British press has revealed that the negative representation of the issue of migration was frequently achieved through the incorporation of the topos of numbers (aka aggregation). It was argued that human features are backgrounded when numerals are applied. “New arrivals” of migrants and “numbers” are commonly used to de-individualise people who are coming to the country. The numerical representation of migrants as much as the portrayal them as “masses” was linked to the *topos of danger and threat*. These discursive patterns are usually suggestive of the danger to the host society which can be overwhelmed by the arrival of masses of strangers. The opposition of “us”, the hosts, versus “them”, the migrants, is frequently constructed through the use of this discourse strategy (KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, and Wodak 2012: 289–291).

The data from the Russian and Ukrainian media shows that the conceptualisation of migrants in terms of figures, numbers and masses is also very popular. The mainstream newspapers accommodate this pattern extensively while social media incorporates such fragments with the references to official information. The surprising aspect of using “the numbers and figures” topoi in the official press is

that the threat to the host community has not been implied. On the contrary, the numerical information is usually followed by a statement of support and some claims about a duty of care. The dichotomy *us* and *them* is also encountered but it involves *us* – people who are able to help and *them* – people who need help (Examples 1, 2). The following fragments exemplify this trend in the Russian and Ukrainian newspapers.⁸

- (1) *По данным Федеральной миграционной службы, 144 тысячи человек из этой страны обратились за помощью. Всего ... в России находится около двух миллионов украинцев. – Люди бежали от войны.., – начал совещание Медведев. – Они пережили потрясения, многие из них – настоящее горе, потерю близких. В России они ищут защиту и поддержку. Наша задача – отнестись к ним внимательно, оказать всю необходимую помощь. Уже сейчас работает 400 стационарных пунктов временного размещения, где проживают 26 тысяч человек. Едой, водой, вещами и медпомощью люди обеспечены...*

‘According to the Federal Migration Service, **144 thousand** people from this country asked for help. There are nearly **two million** Ukrainians in Russia... in total. “The people have escaped the war...”, (with these words) Medvedev began the meeting, “**they** have experienced trauma and many of them – a real disaster and loss of loved ones. **They** seek from Russia protection and help. **Our** task is to take care of them and provide all the necessary assistance. Right now **400** stations of temporary housing are in operation where **26 thousand** persons have been accommodated. People have been provided with food, water, clothing and medical supplies”...’ (КР)

- (2) *Оккупация Крыма и война на востоке заставили тысячи украинцев покинуть свои дома и переехать в мирные города Украины. По данным УВКБ ООН по состоянию на конец апреля число переселенцев в Украине превысило 1,2 миллиона человек. Большинство из них, почти 800 тысяч, решили не уезжать слишком далеко от дома и переехали на территорию неоккупированного Донбасса, Харьковской, Днепропетровской и Запорожской областей. Эти люди бежали к нам от преследований и военных действий. Для государства, которое ранее не сталкивалось с этой проблемой, работа с переселенцами была экспериментом. Большую часть работы взвалили на себя волонтерские организации....*

‘The occupation of Crimea and the war in the east forced **thousands** of Ukrainians to flee their homes and to move to peaceful cities in Ukraine. According to the information from UNCR, **the number** of internally displaced people in Ukraine exceeded **1.2 million** people. **Most of them**, almost **800**

8. In this chapter, the targeted lexis is marked bold.

thousand people, decided not to move far from their homes and settled in the territory of unoccupied Donbass, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe regions. These people fled to us from persecution and hostilities. For a state, which never experienced this problem before, the practice of dealing with displaced people has become an experiment. The bulk of the work has been done by volunteer organisations.' (UP)

Examples (1) and (2) show that the use of deictic pronouns and verbal forms create a dichotomy between *us* (representatives of the host community) and *them* (refugees). However, the Russian pattern does not agree with the model of negativisation and dehumanization of *them* analysed by KhosraviNick, Krzyzanovski and Wodack (2012: 288, 289). Their examples allude to limited resources and reluctance of the host community to accommodate for more migrants: “the number of new arrivals is now so great that we cannot hope to integrate them...” (KhosraviNick, Krzyzanovski and Wodack 2012: 290). In the Russo-Ukrainian data, a representative of “us”, usually a public officer or a volunteer, draws public attention to the plight of a big number of people who are in need for protection. The authorial voice links *us* with “Russia” (Example 1), with “the country which never experienced this problem before” and residents of the listed regions. (Example 2), with “Russia” and “thousands of ordinary citizens who hurried to shelter them” (Example 4) and with “Russians” (Example 7). These representatives of the host community express a collective judgement and refer to the whole group of refugees but they do it to stress their point that there many people are still waiting for an urgent response from the host society or that there will not be any conflict between the host society and refugees (Example 7).

The aggregation technique has been adapted to accentuate the scale of the disaster and in this way it can be interpreted as an appeal for empathy. Only Example (12) from a public forum can be viewed as a representation of the traditional model of *our community* threatened by arrivals of different and dangerous “*them*” – *the others*.

Felberg and Saric (in this volume) in their analysis of Croatian and Serbian discourses of migration also come to the conclusion that the “aggregation” of refugees can be deployed to accentuate noble efforts and the resilience of the nation in dealing with the refugee problems. Colaterally this technique also puts public officers in a good light and allows them to request EU financial assistance.

3.2 Masses of water

The representation of migrants as a mass of people often draws on “moving water/masses of water” metaphors, e.g. *волны* ‘waves’, *поток* ‘flow’, which *хлынули* ‘surge’, ‘pour’. The research tradition usually treats the *masses of water* metaphor as a means of evoking fear among members of the host community who can anticipate

a destructive “flood” ruining and destroying their “civilisation” (Musolff 2015: 45; Pohl and Wodak 2012: 206; Van Dijk 2012: 26).

However, Russo-Ukrainian data show that Russian language or at least, data from official Russian and Ukrainian media, provide samples of deviation from the observed trend of using the masses of water metaphor. Russian contexts of the metaphor play down the default assumptions about the devastating impact of natural disasters. They foreground the idea of capable people who can defy destructive forces. *Waves, floods, tides* and *flows* can be endured. The stories with these metaphorical vehicles are unfolded as an account about the heroic efforts of brave people who resist the devastating impact of unregulated masses of water. These stories highlight the mobilisation of the community in face of a calamity or provide a narrative on how more room inside the container was made (Examples 3, 4, 16).

- (3) *По данным УВКБ ООН в Украине, на 5 августа количество вынужденных переселенцев уже перевалило за 117 тысяч. Уменьшения потока переселенцев с востока в ближайшее время ожидать не приходится... Множество неизвестных простых украинцев помогают переехать, обустроиться почувствовать себя как дома часто незнакомым людям, волей обстоятельств вынужденным покинуть оккупированную территорию ...*

‘According to the UNHCR in Ukraine, the **number** of IDPs has already exceeded **117 thousand** on the 5th of August. We cannot expect any reduction of the **flow** of migrants from the East in the near future... Many ordinary Ukrainians who remain anonymous help strangers to move, settle, and feel at home as they were forced to leave the occupied territory by circumstances.’ (ZN)

- (4) *Россия оказалась в состоянии принять такое количество беженцев благодаря самоотверженности российского общества. Когда хлынули первые потоки, тысячи простых граждан спешили приютить, накормить, согреть спасавшихся от войны. Недавно в фильме “Возвращение” мы услышали, как поэт Бродский,... говорит, что в России живет удивительный народ: чужую беду люди принимают как собственную и готовы поделиться последним.*

‘Russia managed to take so many refugees thanks to the dedication of the Russian society. When the **first flows came** (lit. poured), **thousands** of ordinary citizens hurried to shelter, feed, and warm those who fled from the war. Recently, in the film “The Return”, we heard how the poet Brodsky... said that amazing people live in Russia: the people take misfortunes of **others** as their own and are ready to share (their) last (breadcrumb).’ (RG)

It can be argued that in such contexts, the portrayal of migrants in terms of pouring/surging masses of water emphasises the scale of the catastrophe and builds a parallel between the forces of nature which move the people away from their dwellings, on

the one side, and the war, man-made devastation, on the other. The metaphoric episode of natural disaster can be developed in texts either into a horror story of destruction or a narrative about people's response, i.e. how they adjust and cope with the crises. The Russian/Ukrainian discursive adaptation of the metaphor tends to unfold the latter.

In this way the metaphor represents an episode in a megascript on the noble and brave responses from the hosts. Non-metaphoric lexis enacts a positive outcome of the dramatic story. It seems that the representation of displaced people in numbers and masses is aligned with the goal of praising the national efforts to accommodate migrants and to encourage more of communal and government activities. The textual patterns exemplify the *topos of humanitarianism* (cf. KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, Wodak 2012: 292).

In the official media, the connection between the topos of threat and masses or numbers has not been frequently enacted. However, in some public discussions, the metaphors of *masses of water* are linked to *the topoi of threat and economic burden*, e.g. *В.В.Путину: Остановите поток беженцев и разбазаривание федеральной казны на них* 'To V.V. Putin: Stop the flow of refugees and the squandering of the Federal Treasury on them'.

4. Agents of evil as activators of *topoi of economic burden and threat*

4.1 Use of "parasite"-terminology

The conceptualisation of migrants in terms of *numbers, figures, and masses of water* foregrounds similarities between a natural disaster and man-made catastrophe and also portrays refugees as both victims and possible instruments of ruthless fate. If the idea of deliberate harmful actions needs to be emphasised, then the discourse participants invoke *agents of evil*, e.g. *scroungers* and *parasites*. The use of *scrounger* and *parasite* imagery is linked to *topos of economic burden* and *topos of danger and threat*. Musolff (2015: 46) argues that depiction of migrants as *bio-* or *social parasites* can lead to a default interpretation that migrants *suck, drain* or *bleed* the country *dry, aim for freebies* and *live off* or *sponge from* the host community. It was also argued that the portrayal of immigrants as *parasites* infects readers with the perception of a "polluted environment" which represents a danger or a threat (Cisneros 2008). *Scroungers* and *parasites* are agents that bring harm and sometimes even annihilate the host community.

The mainstream Russian and Ukrainian media refrains from using this conceptualisation. It is interesting to observe that *parasites* is deployed by the Russian official media when reporters comment on the refugee crisis in Europe but they thoroughly avoid such labels in references to Ukrainian refugees. The task of the

official mass media is to emphasise the commonality between migrants and the host community and, this intention is incompatible with the use of stigmatising vocabulary. Nevertheless, social media accommodate the abusive language along with the xenophobic sentiments.

It was argued that *scroungers* in English are represented either as bio- *parasites* or as socio-*parasites*. Bio-parasites, e.g. *leeches*, *vermin*, *rats*, aim for the ultimate destruction of their hosts by way of complete resource-consumption and infecting the host with fatal diseases (Musolff 2015: 52). Socio-parasites, e.g. *scroungers*, *free-loaders* are just lazy, selfish and insensitive individuals who drain the communal resources and deprive the local community of opportunities.

The two groups of *parasites* may point to two different topoi. The socio-parasites are an indicator of *economic burden* whereas bio-“parasites” signal *threat* which may lead to an ultimate destruction of the host. The group of socio-parasites is represented in the corpus by words *тунядцы* (lit. ‘free’ + ‘eaters’), *нахлебники* (lit. Close to the meaning of ‘consumers of someone’s bread’, ‘scroungers’) or *халявщики* (etymologically are most likely derivatives of an obsolete meaning of the word *халява* ‘jaws’, ‘mouth’ and in modern Russian referring to “freeloaders” who aim for “freebies”). The words invoke an assumption that socio-parasites do not want to work and feel free from any social commitment. Hence, socio-“parasites” are an economic burden for the society.

The vocabulary for bio-parasites in Russian includes the words like *вши* ‘lice’, and *паразиты* ‘parasites’. Hence, the difference between bio- and socio-“parasites” should account for the following semantic factors: a dehumanising attitude is relevant exclusively for bio-parasites, who are perceived as destructive proponents constituting a threat to hosts similar to terrorists, saboteurs and provocateurs whereas *scroungers* are just lazy people who reduce resources of those who provide for them. The next Examples (5)–(6) can illustrate this difference.

- (5) *Работать совсем не хотят. Основная масса из них (украинцев) – отпетые тунядцы и алкоголики ...*

‘(Ukrainians) don’t want to work at all. The majority of them are inveterate **scroungers** and alcoholics...’ (TVVPSTFR)

- (6) *На Майдане наскакался и в Россиюшку подался! Он (беженец) сидеть здесь будет вошью, делать вид, что он хороший, но сигнал как будет дан- в твоём городе Майдан!!! Предлагаю манифест! Ограничить чтобы въезд! Поддержите пацаны! Для спасения страны.*

He (a refugee) hopped a lot at Maidan and then he came to Russia. He will be sitting here as quiet as a **louse** and pretending to be good but (then) there will be a signal (to organize) a Maidan in your city!!! I suggest a Manifesto! To restrict entry! Guys, give me your support! To save the country.’ (TVVPSTFR)

It is not always easy to differentiate the *topos of economic burden* from the *topos of threat* purely on the basis of the word occurrence. For instance, several dictionaries recommend translating Russian names for socio-parasites such as *туняядцы* 'free-eaters or freeloaders', and *нахлебники* 'spongers', as 'parasites'. Furthermore, the application of parasites to the group of migrants as a whole does not usually forge solidarity and agreement in the discourse community. Such claims are mostly ignored or attract replies as below.

- (7) *Русские, украинцы – один народ ... Пусть приезжают к нам, работают, растят детей. Среди любой нации есть туняядцы и есть созидатели.*
 Russians and Ukrainians are the same people. Let **them** come to **us** to work and rear their children. Among any nation there are **scroungers** and doers.
 (TVVPSTFR)

In the corpus "Displaced Ukrainians" the bio- and socio-parasites can be perceived as pointers to negative experiences and the danger for hosts in dealing with migrants. Both types of "parasites" can flag the worst opinion about them and this highly negative perception is contrasted with the view that migrants are just innocent victims.

- (8) *Беженцы из Украины – несчастные люди или паразиты?*
 Ukrainian refugees – are they unfortunate people or **parasites**? (UFATUPOP)
- (9) *Переселенцы из зоны АТО: наглые нахлебники или несчастные люди?*
 Displaced persons from the ATO zone: Are they **arrogant spongers** or unfortunate people?
 (DPFTAZ)

The examples above show that bio- and socio- "parasites" frame countervailing positions, invoke conflicting pieces of evidence in debates and challenge political correctness. The two poles "unfortunate people" and "parasites" invite discussants to elaborate on the negative aspects of humanitarianism by the host community along with observations on the tragic intervention of fate into the life of poor wretched migrants.

It can be also pointed out that *parasite*-terminology delivers overt insults mostly in contexts referring either to a group as a whole or a particular representative of the group. In sentences that describe some representatives of a group and refer to some unpleasant facts, the "parasite"-terminology may foreground despair of hosts and the inadequateness of behaviour among those migrants.

- (10) *Беженцы-паразиты требуют спиннинги и не хотят работать Не все переселенцы из зоны АТО ведут себя адекватно там, где их приняли с широкой душой и открытым сердцем.*
 'Parasite refugees demand spinning rods and do not want to work. Not all displaced persons from the ATO zone behave adequately (in the places) where they were received with a broad mind and open heart'.
 (PRDSR)

- (11) *Есть беженцы, а есть нахлебники. В большинстве случаев люди, спасавшиеся от смерти, оказывались довольны и приёмом, и участием, которое они чувствовали со стороны россиян. Однако, как и везде, встречались и такие, которым всё было плохо, которые считали, что Россия обязана их возить ... на мерседесах и кормить икрой.*

There are refugees and there are **scroungers**. The majority of people who escaped the death were pleased with the reception and sympathy they received from Russians. However, as everywhere, there were those who disliked everything. They believed that Russia owed those (refugees) Mercedes rides and must feed them with caviar. (RG)

The examples above highlight the vulnerability of the host community. Contexts with bio-parasites more often invoke topics of “criminal activities by migrants”, e.g. assaults and battery, robberies of host families, vandalising cultural symbols, blackmail of local communities and the like. Their authors do not claim that all refugees are ungrateful but, nevertheless, try to warn “Good Samaritans” about the “unexpected rewards” for their humanitarianism.

4.2 Russian stereotypes about Ukrainians

Russians and Ukrainians have long-rooted stereotypes about and prejudices against each other. Hamilton and Sherman (1994: 15) define stereotype as a set of beliefs which is “stored in memory as a cognitive structure and can then influence subsequent perception of, and behaviours toward, that group and its members.” It has been argued that stereotypes represent a crude approximation of the reality at best (Gordon and Holloran 1994).

The stigmatised vision of Ukrainians was enacted in jokes (see Raskin 1885) and abusive words which were in circulation before the conflict, e.g. *хохол* ‘khokhol’ (singular), *хохлы* ‘khokhly’ (plural) and *бандеровцы* ‘Banderites’. A perjorative slang word *khokhol* which refers to the Ukrainian hairstyle featuring a long fringe and shaved back of the head has been used by Russians for the derogatory purpose (Reid 1997: 31). See in Example (12) the perjorative use of *khokhol*.

- (12) *Хохлы есть –хохлы. Я, еще при СССР, 3 года с ними работал, и всегда у них были разговоры, что они нас кормят, что без нас они бы жили лучше и т. д. Народ поганый, у них в генах записано: « Не съем, так надкушу». А при тех гадостях, что они на нас вываливают, мы еще им какие-то уступки делаем....*

They are “**khokhly**” people. At the time of the Soviet Union I used to work with **them** for 3 years and **they** always complained that **they** fed **us** and that **they** could live a lot better without **us** etc. These people are rotten, they have this vileness recorded in their genes: “If you can’t eat something, then bite into it.” And with all the filth that **they** are throwing at **us** (Russians), **we** are still making concessions for **them** ... (CSKP)

At the same time, the Ukrainian negative perception of Russians is often stimulated by the very Russian mockery and imperialistic rejection of the Ukrainian national identity. The traditional name which encapsulates an aversion for Russia is *москалі* 'Muscovites'. Many proverbs with this word enact the negative perception of a "Muscovite" but also activate the Ukrainian stereotypical "treachery" and "perfidity": "He is a good man but a Moscovite!", "Be friendly with the Muscovite, but keep a stone under your coat!" (Reid 1997: 69). This abusive word appears in appeals to Russian participants of online discussions. Some Ukrainian discussants also blame the stereotyping in terms of *Muscovites* and *khokhly* for causing confrontation in Eastern and Southern Ukraine:

- (13) *Мы (беженцы) заплатили слишком страшную цену, чтобы теперь самостоятельно нести ответственность за все, что происходит в Украине Началось все гораздо раньше. Со слов «западенец» и «донбасер». С анекдотов о «хохлах» и «москалях» как представителях социальных групп в пределах одной страны – Украины. Это считалось нормальным, «добрым юмором», им полны народные юморески и даже детские сказки. Началось с национальной нетерпимости на территории одной страны.*

'We (voices of IDPs) paid a terrible price to be held solely responsible for everything that happens in Ukraine now Everything began much earlier. From the words "a Westener" (a resident in Western Ukraine – L.A.) and "a Donbaser" (a resident in Dobass, the word is an agglutination of the name "Donbass" with a Russian verb for defecation – L.A.). From jokes about "Khokhly" and "Muskovite" who represented social groups within the sole country – Ukraine. This was considered a normal "good humor" which filled folk wisdom stories and even tales for children. It began with national intolerance in the territory of one country.'

(IDPWOUUEIP)

Russian participants in online debates show a tendency to substantiate their prejudice against Ukrainian refugees through use of the disparaging labels *khokhly* and *Banderites*. Russian participants in online debates show a tendency to substantiate their prejudice against Ukrainian refugees through use of the disparaging labels *khokhly* and *Banderites* (see *khokhly* in Example 12, a *Banderite* in Examples 19 and 24).

On the other hand, the term *Muscovites* has not been actively deployed by Ukrainians in online discussions since new words for admirers of Russian values and traditions were coined recently to refer to victims of Russian propaganda. Overall, the stereotyping of *Muscovites* versus *Khokhly* has a discourse history similar to *polentone* versus *terrone* in Italy (see Viola this volume).

The Russian official media also actively applies the old disparaging label *khokhly* in references to refugee persecutors. The official media in both countries uses stigmatizing neologisms when it comes to elaborating the scenarios of the conflict.

4.3 New names for terrorists and victims of propaganda

In the discourse of displaced Ukrainians, novel labels of stigmatisation resurfaced and gained prominence. On the Russian side, some groups of Ukrainian people were attributed with malicious intentions and named *майдауны*, *майданутые* ‘Mai-downs’, ‘Maidan bonkers’ and *укропы* ‘dills’. On the Ukrainian side, the believers in Russian propaganda and supporters of the Russian government were dubbed *вата* ‘cotton buds’, *ватники* ‘cotton padded jackets’ and *ватный мир* ‘the cotton Universe’.

Mai-downs is an agglutination of two words: “Maidan” as the place of public protests in the Ukrainian capital Kiev and “down” as a reference to “Down’s syndrome” which is manifest in intellectual disabilities. Hence, *Mai-downs* are supporters and participants of the pro-EU and anti-Yanukovich protests in Ukraine who, in the perception of many Russians, suffer from madness. There is another version of this term *майданутые* “Maidan bonkers”. The semantics and textual patterns of *Maidan bonkers* is the same as those of *Mai-downs*.

Mai-downs, *banderites* and *dills* are ideological adversaries and “malicious proponents of the anti-Russian causes of action”. Together with bio-“parasites” and “khokhly”, they are clandestine agents of destabilisation in Russia who can carry out diversionary or terrorist activities. The semantics of these words also accommodate aforementioned Russian stereotypes about Ukrainians who are portrayed in the Russian jokelore as unrefined dumb people plotting against their neighbours (see Raskin 1985: 182, 186, 189). The attitude of Russians to displaced Ukrainians often hinges on their view on the identity of Eastern Ukrainians, i.e. whether the residents of Eastern Ukraine are just subspecies of Great Russians or are of the same stock as malicious *khokhols*. Example (14) demonstrates the perception of Ukrainian patriots as malicious and violent *Mai-downs*.

- (14) *Нет, ну понятно, что майдаунов не просто в Россию нельзя пускать – а арестовывать, как военных преступников (т. к., они несут ответственность за все последовавшие события..) Но самих-то майдаунов явное меньшинство.*

It is clear that **Mai-downs** should not be allowed into Russian territory and, moreover, (they) should be arrested as war criminals (as they are responsible for all subsequent events). However, **Mai-downs** are the minority. (TVVPSTFR)

Another neologism “dills” is a new nickname for Ukrainians as dill ‘укроп’ and Ukraine ‘Украина’ start from the same letters in Russian укр/ukr and thus form a pun (see Example 24). The word is often understood as a Russian equivalent of “being a dill” and simultaneously an acronym for “Ukrainian patriots”. The latter is ambivalent as Russians attribute to the concept a negative value while Ukrainians

receives it with pride. They accommodate this abusive Russian word into their vocabulary as a positively charged label and adapt it as the name of a political party.

If refugees are characterised by any of names such as *Mai-down*, *dills*, *khokhly* and *Banderites* in online discussions then the flow of the discourse could follow two major directions: either a denial that migrants from DPR and LPR represent “malicious Ukrainians” or a corroboration of the wicked nature of all Ukrainians including residents of Eastern Ukraine.

On the other hand, Ukrainians coined new words in their objections against the spreading “Russian world”, i.e. the ideology which brings together all people who hold Russian language and culture dear. A special agency *Русский мир* “Russian world foundation” was created in 2007 to promote Russian cultural values, counterbalance Western initiatives and exert Russian influence globally. Russian TV channels play a big role in creating a common bond between Russia and speakers of Russian in other countries. The “Russian world” represents a soft power since love for the language and culture has been used to reintegrate Russian speakers into an “intellectual union” with the centre in Moscow and to assert Russian political and economic interests all over the world. Hence, persons who are willing to become a part of the “Russian world” and believe in Russian cultural and political superiority were called *вата* ‘cotton buds’, *ватники* ‘cotton padded jackets’ or *ватный мир* ‘the cotton world’ or ‘the universe of cotton buds’ (see Examples 21, 22, 23). The nickname “cotton padded jacket” was introduced as a meme character at a Russophone network service *V kontakte* in 2011. The term gained popularity during the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. For nationally conscious Ukrainians names “cotton buds” and the like in references to their compatriots denote not only primitive thinking and adulation of the Russian cultural and political heritage but also high treason and collaboration with aggressors.

The new repertoire of abuse activates old fears of intercultural dealings between Russians and Ukrainians. Russians are afraid of brutal vindication on behalf of Ukrainian nationalists and the destabilisation of their country while Ukrainians are afraid losing their sovereignty and becoming a Russian province swamped with bureaucracy and poverty.

5. Representations of victims and aggressors

5.1 Refugees as victims

The plight of displaced Ukrainians is not different from the experience of unarmed civilians in other conflict zones (KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski and Wodak 2012: 293). The devastating situation in Ukraine is frequently presented in terms of bomb explosions, gunfire, and the advance of tanks. However, the sympathetic

IDP in Ukrainian discussions is presented differently to the sympathetic Ukrainian refugee in the Russian media. People who caused suffering to civilians are identified differently in the Russian and Ukrainian sources accordingly, as their interpretation of the conflict diverges.

The typical IDP in the Ukrainian press was repressed and suffered for his/her loyalty to Ukraine from Russia-backed separatists (Example 15)

(15) *Мы с мужем там в расстрельных списках, потому что поддерживали луганский Майдан.*

‘My name and my husband’s name are on the list of those who are sentenced to execution since we supported Maidan in Lugansk’. (UP)

The positive representation of IDPs in the Ukrainian press is oriented toward the macro-topic–Ukraine is united in its attitudes toward aggressors. It also suggests that IDPs appear in Ukraine as a result of separatist activities, separatists are a group of traitors backed by Russians, and protests in Maidan square are a matter of national pride.

On the other hand, the Russian positive representation of Ukrainian refugees requires casting them as victims of *фашисты* ‘fascists’, a *хунта* ‘junta’ and *каратели* ‘chastisers/punitive squad’. The compulsory component for a sympathetic picture in the Russian media is the refugee suffering from an “evil regime” and “radical nationalists” (Examples 16–18).

(16) *Карательная операция киевской хунты на Донбассе продолжается, поэтому поток беженцев из зоны военных действий увеличивается. Большинство, разумеется, уезжает в Россию.*

The **punitive operation** of the Kievan **junta** in Donbass continues and, therefore, the **flow** of refugees from the operation zone grows. The majority, undoubtedly, move to Russia. (PR)

(17) *...ввиду угрозы в случае эвакуации попасть в нацистские концлагеря, беженцы из охваченного карательной операцией укрофашистов регионов предпочитают двигаться в Российскую Федерацию.*

Because in the case of evacuation there would be a threat of being placed into **Nazi** concentration camps, refugees from the regions where **Ukrainian fascists** carry out a **punitive operation**, would prefer to move to the Russian Federation. (PR)

(18) *Мы (беженцы) больше не в силах мириться с засильем в правительстве Украины предателей, агентов иностранных спецслужб, фашистов и националистов, которые истребляют народ и ведут страну к краху.*

We (voices of refugees) cannot be reconciled with the fact that the majority of the Ukrainian government are traitors, agents of foreign intelligence services, **fascists** and nationalists that massacre people and lead the country to disaster? (RG)

It can be argued that the terms like *junta*, *fascists* and *punitive operation* represent intertextual metaphors which “are culturally grounded”. Zinken (2003: 509) suggests that intertextual metaphors “are originated in semiotic experience: stereotypes (1), culturally salient texts, films, pieces of art (2), school knowledge (3) and so forth.” Indeed, the Russophone population of the former Soviet Union tend to visualise *fascists* as Germans in WW2 carrying *punitive operations* in the occupied territory of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia as it was presented in the Soviet school textbooks and films. The use of words *fascists* and *punitive operation* builds a parallel between WW2 and contemporary Ukraine, which suggests “inhuman” treatment of people from eastern Ukraine by nationalists and extremists in power.

At the same time, former residents of the Soviet Union usually associate the word “junta” with the military dictatorship in Chile from 1973 to 1990. Correspondingly they transfer from the source domain “Chile” to the target domain “Ukraine” such activities as “the removal of the legitimate president”, “atrocities of militants” and “violations of human rights”. Some speakers sincerely believe that the situation in Ukraine resembles the one in Chile, while others use these words for persuasive effect. As a result, a large proportion of the Russian population is convinced that Ukraine has been ruled by extremists who adopted the ideology of the German Nazis.

The metaphors *fascists*, *punitive operation*, *punitive squads/chastisers*, unlike *lice* and *parasites*, are grounded in historical events, and theoretically cannot be called “dehumanising”. However, these metaphors evoke a strong emotional response from the audience as many speakers and readers solidarize with *victims of fascists*, adopt the metaphors uncritically and continue arguing through a further elaboration of this thematic group.

5.2 Blending victims and persecutors

In the Russian data, some statements depict refugees as a part of the nation whose main ideology is Nazism. Xenophobic anti-Ukrainian claims can cast either the entire population of Ukraine or some groups of Ukrainians as *fascists* or *Mai-downs*. Such statements can remove sympathy for refugees since they share responsibility with the nation for nurturing *fascists*.

- (19) *К сожалению, есть некоторое число довольно молодых людей, которые демонстрируют проявления фашизма и бандеровщины, которые по заданию или по собственной воле приезжают в Россию, как правило, чтобы нагадить.*

Unfortunately, there is a certain number of young people who show symptoms of *fascism* and (sympathy for) *Bandera*, who are on assignment or on their own, to come to Russia and, as a rule, to play dirty tricks (to shit here – lit.). (PR)

(20) *Предатели – это вы, нацистские недобитки (украинцы), предавшие сначала свою советскую Родину, а теперь превратившиеся в отбросы даже для ваших покровителей из Фашингтона. Иуды.*

Traitors – that are you (Ukrainians), the Nazi rabble, who firstly betrayed your Soviet homeland, and now turned into the scum even for your patrons from Washington (lit. Fascist + Washington). Judahs. (CSKP)

Example (20) represents a trend in Russian public fora to portray Ukrainians collectively as collaborators of Nazi Germans and Russophobes. Ukrainian migrants are treated as representatives of a “degraded nation” which tolerates or even encourages extremists. In the minds of many Russians, contemporary Ukrainian leaders who support the veneration of Bandera represent political extremism.

The official media in Russia depicts refugees as victims of atrocities of their compatriot-“fascists” (Example 19). Some participants in public fora (Example 20), however, are disposed to blame all Ukrainians for the conflict and see the majority of refugees as provocateurs and saboteurs. In such instances, migrants are portrayed as representatives of Ukrainians who are known to Russians as “notorious for their Russophobia and troublemaking” (see 4.2).

In response, Ukrainians build counter-narratives calling the believers in the “Ukrainian fascism” derogatory names, e.g. “cotton buds”, “a cotton padded jacket” and “the universe of cotton buds”, “Down-bassovites”, “Lugansk-condoms”.

5.3 IDPs as supporters of the aggressor

Cognates of the word *cotton* have been used in public discussions to denounce “victims” of Russian propaganda. The official Ukrainian media also reflects the common usage of these terms.

The term *ватник*, in its literal sense, referred to the cotton padded jacket commonly worn by Russians in winter. This outer garment has a very simple cut and was made of a coarse fabric. In the mind of the metaphor users the simplicity of its design mirrors the primitive way of thinking of its owner. This way of thinking is attributed mostly to Russians who uncritically receive information from official sources. *Ватник* “cotton padded jacket” is a derivative from *вата* “cotton” – the material for its lining. Some metaphor users attribute an inability to think to “a person in a cotton padded jacket”, since he or she uses cotton instead of the brains in his/her head. There are several trajectories for metaphoric mappings; i.e. material as an indicator of the mental capacities of the referent person and the simplicity of the style as a reflection of the personality who wears this clothing. It can be also argued that the “quilted/cotton jacket” is a metonymy which names the piece of clothing for a person who wears it.

Cotton padded jackets are usually Russian citizens or someone from the former Soviet Union who admires Russian values and government, i.e. the ideology of the Russian world. As such, some migrants from the DPR or LPR wait for their “salvation” from Ukrainian “fascists” by Russia. Some typical features of quilted jackets include servility and stupidity.

- (21) *Кто смотрит взахлеб Киселева, НТВ и первый канал? Кто верит любому адову бреду, что б ящик ему ни сказал? Это – ватники!*

Who enthusiastically watches Kiselyov (a Russian TV presenter), NTV (a Russian channel) and Channel One? Who believes in any nonsense from hell delivered by an (idiot) box? They are **cotton padded jackets**. (CN)

- (22) *Ватник – это раб ... А посему каждый из нас, кто слепо следует чувствам или авторитетам, кто сильно напуган или безоглядно очарован – ватник ровно настолько, насколько он во власти у врожденной склонности стадного животного подчиняться силе.*

The **cotton padded jacket** is a slave. That is why any of us who blindly follows authority and (its) instincts and who is very scared or charmed, is a **cotton padded jacket** as much as he/she is in the power of an innate willingness of a herded animal to be subjugated by force. (ZN)

Residents of Donbass and Lugansk are often named *cotton buds* or *cotton padded jackets* as they are perceived by some Ukrainians to be the driving force in the conflict.

- (23) *Социальные сети пестрят сообщениями, в которых украинцы проклинают жителей Донбасса. Всех жителей называют «ватниками», «быдлом» и «даунбассовцами», «лугандонцами».*

‘Social media is full of messages in which Ukrainians damn residents of Donbass. All the residents have been called “**cotton padded jackets**”, “**cattle**”, “**down-bassovites**” (another incorporation of the Down’s syndrome but for Donbass residents) and **Lugansk-condom** (agglutination of Lugansk+ condom).’ (RFAZ)

The extended context of the Example (23) describes the danger of using new words for stigmatising residents of the separatist regions and opposing them to the rest of Ukraine. Many voices in the press argue that enemies of Ukraine, i.e. those who dream about the disintegration of Ukraine, can benefit from such insults and accusations (see also Example 13 and 24).

- (24) *И нужно перестать раскалывать общество, рассказывая о том, какие плохие переселенцы или “бандеровцы”, “ватники” или “укропы”.*

We “need to stop dividing society by talk about bad IDPs and “**banderites**”, or “**cotton padded jackets**” and “**dills**” (ZN)

The word *cotton padded jackets* carries a strong defamatory force, even though it does not have a long history of usage and, unlike *dill*, does not derive from the biological source domain. It ascribes a certain way of thinking and behaving to a person and casts him/her as a primitive *other*.

A novel abusive word for a resident of Lugansk “Lugan-don/Lugansk-condom” can be explained as either an agglutination of the two words “Lugansk” + “condom” or as a reference to a mythological country “Luganda” whose name comprises components “Lugansk” and “Uganda”. A similar pattern was reserved for Donbass in the abusive name “Donbabwe” which comprises “Donbass” and “Zimbabwe”. The latter was not sported in the discourse analysed. The references to the African countries highlight that people from Lugandon and Donbabwe live far away from Ukraine, do not share the EU aspirations which triggered Euromaidan and point to separate social formations of non-Ukrainians.

6. Conclusions

This chapter has studied characteristics of Ukrainian displaced persons and refugees in Russian and Ukrainian official and social media by looking at contextualisation of tokens and topics that were analysed by researchers of the British press and online discussions. Of particular interest for us have been comparisons between Russian and Ukrainian texts, official publications and online discussions as well as contrasts between British texts and their counterparts in the Russian language.

Mainstream publications in both countries align micro-topics with their global goals. In the Russian media, the global goals are to glorify the nation, to show cooperation between Ukrainian refugees and the population of Russia, and to condemn the Ukrainian extremists who unleashed the conflict. Hence, it is almost impossible to find in the mainstream media any representation of “parasites”, “ticking time bombs” and even “destructive waves and floods” in reference to Ukrainian refugees.

Ukrainian goals are Russian objectives reversed. The Ukrainian official media praises Ukrainians for their selfless assistance to IDPs, shows the integration of IDPs into local communities and condemns separatists, Russian backing and their gullible believers. The mainstream media in both countries frequently claim that they are the best when it comes to assisting refugees and that they deal with refugees even better than the EU. They also condemn each other for a lack of humanitarianism.

There is qualitative difference between the use of some strategies in the British, and Russian and Ukrainian official media. For instance, *numbers, figures* and

masses, which are commonly used by the British press as an indication of threat and danger, are rarely exploited as a tool of negativisation by the Russian and Ukrainian press. Recontextualisation of the over-aggregation of refugees in the mainstream Russian and Ukrainian media has been used to glorify heroic deeds and humanitarianism of the host community (cf. Felberg and Saric this volume). However, social media in both countries provides platforms for many Internet users who disagree with the official line on humanitarianism. Moderators of discussions often put antagonist terms (e.g. *parasites*, *scroungers*) in a countervailing position to an acceptable positive label for migrants (e.g. *victims*) in order to invite expressions of opinions which challenge conventions and boundaries established by the official media.

In Russia, the prominent lines of objection have been formed around the old stereotype of Ukrainians as an artificial formation of people who do not differ much from Russians but claim to be different in order to create problems and counterbalance Russia on the international scene. In some ways, the long-established Russia versus Ukraine opposition and its linguistic representations are similar to those which exemplify the internal conflict between South and North Italians (see Viola, this volume). Other problems with migrants include the overall poor state of finances in Russia, schemes for abuse of the state reserves, personal flaws in the character of some migrants combined with their malicious “intentions” to destabilise Russia.

Challenges to the official humanitarianism have also been expressed from the Ukrainian online platforms. Two major lines of criticism emerged in these discussions. The first one appeals to the fact that the residents of break-away regions brought the war to other Ukrainians. In such instances a novel vocabulary for abuses was deployed, e.g. words like *cotton padded jackets*, *cotton buds*, *Lughansk-condoms/Luganda*, *Dawn-bass* and others. The second trend incorporates statements of those that internally displaced people try to avenge the host community for their woes and misfortunes. The migrants represent threat as they are psychologically unstable, wrongful and the most dangerous are those who are on payroll from the Russian government try to destabilise trouble-free regions of Ukraine.

The difference in the vocabulary for abuse in Russian and Ukrainian texts can be attributed to a difference of political opinions, i.e. whether a discussant agrees that a Russian revanchism created the problem in the first place or whether the conflict was a product of Ukrainian nationalism and extremism. In Russian narratives the aggressors are *Mai-downs*, *Banderites*, *dills* and *Ukrainian fascists*. In Ukrainian narratives, the conflict was aggravated by gullible and primitive people, e.g. *cotton padded jackets*, *cotton buds*, *Down-basses*, *Dumb-asses* and *Lughansk*

condoms/Luganda who took seriously the Russian stories about the danger and threat from *Mai-downs, dills, Banderites* and *Ukrainian fascists*.

This investigation unearthed complex correlations and connections between mainstream media publications and social media discussions. There are multiple channels which connect authors and voices from the mainstream media with groups of online participants of discussions. The mainstream media is not “ashamed” of incorporating neologisms forged during heated public discussions. At the same time, some novel expressions, e.g. Ukrainian fascists, were coined by Russian TV presenters and then became tropes. The mainstream press also acknowledges and dismisses laymen concerns expressed in online debates. In its turn the social media accommodates statements and publications released by the official media as an issue for acceptance, rejection, elaboration or contestation.

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Preaching from a distant pulpit

The European migrant crisis seen through a *New York Times* editorial and reader comments

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On 18 September 2015, in the midst of the greatest movement of refugees and migrants that Europe has seen since the Second World War, *The New York Times* published an editorial entitled “Europe should see refugees as a Boon, not as a Burden.” Not surprisingly, the article received well over 450 comments from readers reflecting the myriad of opinions about the complex issue of (European) migration and refugees. This paper is interested in the discourses about (European) migration that emerge from both the editorial and reader comments. Partially inspired by Text World Theory (Werth 1995), the study attempts to determine readers’ varying opinions about the issue and how this reflects and/or diverges from the view(s) presented by the editorial.

Keywords: 2015 European migrant crisis, editorials, Critical Discourse Analysis, Text World Theory, new media, Corpus Linguistics

1. Introduction

On 18 September 2015, in the midst of the greatest movement of refugees and migrants that Europe has experienced since the Second World War, The New York Times published an editorial entitled “Europe should see refugees as a Boon, not as a Burden” (The Editorial Board 2015). As common in today’s online newspaper environments, registered users had access to the commenting function for a limited period of time and were able to share their opinions about the article and the topics expressed therein. The ability to post such comments is an integral part of today’s online media ecology and features afforded by the web make it possible for (registered) users to share their ideas and opinions about current issues and news stories, as well as to debate these issues with other commenters and, ostensibly, the original text and text producers themselves. In this particular case, the text generated over

450 comments, which reflected a myriad of opinions about the complex issue of (European) migration and refugees.

Through such comments users have the ability to react to or interact with the opinions expressed by the editorial, express their own personal opinions about important issues, and interact with other comments and commenters. This study is particularly interested in the role of the editorial in propagating points of views and influencing its readership. Traditionally, in fact, editorials have been used by news organizations to promote a certain ideology (espoused by the newspaper), to propagate the corporate view (of its owners) and to induce support and agreement from its readership (Moon 1994). Yet, we should not underestimate the changes that have occurred over the past 10–15 years: the way that newspapers function online has dramatically altered the way that readers consume newspaper texts mainly through the convergence of new forms of interactive media (Johansson 2014). This view is informed by the notion that readers' participation in such interactive features as commenting can help to gauge the values and opinions of text receivers in the news process (Boyd 2018). Thus, the discourses that emerge from reader comments can provide insight into how discourses about migration are perceived and recontextualized by a wider readership. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that such comments can also serve as a yardstick for the degree to which they concur or contradict the view expressed in the editorial news genre. More generally, the chapter is also interested in measuring the role that text comments might play in media discourse in general.

The discussion is underpinned by two theoretical strands: first, in the spirit of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the work embraces the notion that news producers influence public discourse and “reinforce beliefs” among readers (Richardson 2007: 13) and, second, news texts and the issues and discourses portrayed in them are received by the wider public “in ways which correspond to the concerns, priorities and goals of the current stage (of the news cycle)” (Fairclough 1995: 48). As we shall see in what follows, it must also be recognized that in many ways the traditional direct, top-down, and one-to-many model of traditional media text flow is being upended by an apparently interactive and participatory model fostering many-to-many participation schemes (KhosraviNik and Zia 2014). The work is also inspired, in part, by Text World Theory (TWT) (Gavins 2007; Werth 1995a, 1995b) and its claim that discourses result from “a deliberate and joint effort on the part of producer and receiver to build up a ‘world’ within which the propositions advanced are coherent” (Werth 1995b: 95). Such an approach can be useful in explaining the linguistic construction of multiple representations of society (Filardo-Llamas 2014) inherent in new media phenomena. In both of these theoretical constructs, however, although hypothetically they claim to be equally interested in aspects of both production and reception, they are mostly focused on the former with very little attention paid to understanding the role played by text

receivers in text consumption on a larger scale. Therefore, the chapter can also be seen as an attempt to open up both CDA and TWT to the importance of reception factors in new media environments.

In the next section (2) the theoretical bases for the study will be introduced with a focus on (new) media and the genre of editorial. In (3) the framework and methodology will be discussed and the corpora introduced. Crucial to the approach is a quantitative and qualitative corpus-based analysis of the empirical data (the editorial and reader comments), which is aimed at demonstrating the various representations of society inherent in online newspaper discourse. In particular, the analysis focuses on the linguistic means adopted by text producers to align themselves with (proximization), or differentiate themselves from (distancing), different discourse/text worlds presented in the editorial. In 4 the data will be analyzed and in 5 preliminary conclusions will be provided.

2. Theoretical background

2.1 CDA and media discourse

In traditional CDA descriptions of media discourse, powerful news producers dominate positions of power in a top-down relationship between production and reception. This view mirrors the arguably dichotomous nature of discourse as both a product of social interaction and a powerful force in reshaping social practices (Fairclough 2010; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Richardson 2007; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Van Dijk 2001). While few would disagree that news producers play a powerful role in society and as such they are in a powerful position to shape important issues and public discourse as well as to “reinforce beliefs” amongst readers (Richardson 2007), as already mentioned, this relationship has been upended by the new media paradigm. Thus, in traditional print and broadcast media text consumers had few opportunities to respond to a topic that they felt strongly about if not in the form of a letter to the editor which was in no way guaranteed publication. Today, users can react immediately to an article or to other users commenting on the same news story through the comment section, they can share an article they feel strongly about and news – both real and fake – can be spread about the same topic through social media. Such phenomena give Critical Discourse Analysis a chance to observe and examine, on the one hand, the role played by text receivers in text consumption, and, on the other, the position now occupied by seemingly dominant news producers.

There are a number of reasons why (new) media discourse and specifically the editorial genre offers fertile ground for CDA. First of all, by analyzing media discourse we can discover the ways in which existing power structures are legitimized

as a reflection of underlying social, economic and ideological values, strongly influenced by “cognitive constraints” (Van Dijk 1998). Second, CDA claims to be interested in both the production conditions of (media) discourse and text and the various factors that influence reception and how these are reflected in social and discourse practices (Fairclough 1995; Fetzer and Johansson 2008). The interactive features widespread in today’s online news media can thus provide analysts with an inside view into the ways that texts are received by a wider public and the extent to which some text receivers, namely those who engage in writing comments in response to a given article, concur with or differ from the views – be they corporate, ideological, liberal, etc. – expressed through the newspaper’s official mouthpiece, that of the editorial.

2.2 New(s) media and the editorial

At this point we should look at some of the most salient aspects of traditional news discourse vs. new media discourse. First, we should underline that the production and reception of news involves a wide range of participants: from the writers, readers and subjects of news reports and analyses to the producers and corporations interacting through a number of genres such as news reports, special topic reporting, reviews, opinion articles, editorials, etc. (Tardy 2009). Online, participation is further determined by the convergence of new forms of interactive media prevalent online as a result of the transformations brought on by the so-called Web 2.0; this has radically changed the way that users receive and consume news (Johansson 2014). In this paradigm text receivers are also known as ‘prosumers’ because they are “not only viewers of creative content and advertisements but also the co-creators and co-distributors of the very content themselves” (KhosraviNik and Unger 2016: 208). Herring (2013) sees such textual environments as examples of Discourse 2.0 because they combine user-generated content, social interactivity, co-creativity, multimodality, and converged media platforms. In the present study, the user-generated content takes the form of comments by a group of readers (i.e. those who engage in commenting), who decides to post comments about a particular news story in an online newspaper, a process which not only encourages “citizen engagement” (Weber 2014: 942) but also creates what Ziegele et al. (2014: 1112) call “media-stimulated interpersonal communication.”

To understand these transformations, however, we first need to review some of the factors inherent in traditional, pre-Web 2.0 media discourse, focusing specifically on the role played by the editorial. As noted above, in CDA news is not to be seen as a mere product of society due to the fact that news producers play a significant role in determining and (re)shaping social practice, a view which is summed up by Richardson (2007: 13):

Through its power to shape issue agendas and public discourse, it can reinforce beliefs; it can shape people's opinions not only of the world but also of their place and role in the world; or, if not shape your opinions on a particular matter, it can at the very least influence what you have opinions on; in sum, it can help shape social reality by shaping our views of social reality. (Richardson 2007: 13)

The opinions conveyed and perpetuated by the media are “manifestations of more complex, socially shared, and dominant ideological frameworks that embody institutional relationships and power” (Van Dijk 1991: 126). Yet, on the other side of this relationship lie those who consume the news, i.e. readers who are the main target or intended audience of news discourse and, crucially, reflect the news values that are the result of social, economic and ideological values. These values exploit and are exploited by readers' mental categories which are further exploited by the media (Fowler 1994). Bell's (1991) notion of ‘consonance’, i.e. presuppositions about the social group or country where the news actors come from, is also important to understand how certain news stories take precedence over others. However, news texts can also challenge people's preconceptions especially if they validate “our negative schemata” about people and places and “the perspective of description is consonant with these schemata” (Van Dijk 1998: 122). It can be argued here that discourses about migration may indeed validate such schemata and it is through comments that the role comment(er)s play in the overall media production-reception scheme emerges.

The specific genre of editorial is well-known for its ideological role in forming and formulation public opinion as well as criticizing, supporting and advising authorities (Van Dijk 1991). In the US, for example, the editorial is often used to express support for a particular candidate in political elections. In editorials the ideology of the newspaper comes to the forefront as it is “clarified and re-established, reasserted in relation to troublesome events” (Hodge and Kress 1993: 17). Such a view is well summarized by Moon (1994: 133).

The editorial by its very nature promotes an ideologically grounded perspective: its purpose is to evaluate events, to establish the corporate view and to elicit the support and agreement of a readership – at the very lowest level, for financial or political reasons – and it uses lexis as well as structure to achieve this end.

Unlike news reports which generally retell and assert what readers already know, editorials provide a manifest evaluation of often troublesome events aimed at garnering the support of readers as well as the establishment (Henry and Tator 2002; Moon 1994; Van Dijk 1991). In traditional Anglo-American paper media the editorial page is located in the middle part of the newspaper to signal its difference from the rest of the news: “whereas the other pages are dedicated to reporting news as accurately and dispassionately as possible, the editorial page offers views and opinions of the newspaper” (Bhatia 1993: 302). Thus, while news reports generally

have the function of “assertion”, editorials can also have a clear persuasive which may include an “accusation” or “recommendation” (Van Dijk 1991) from the newspaper editors and owners. Henry and Tator (2002: 93) claim that editorials are clear evidence of “the interlocking structures of any given society” due to the fact that they address not only a general reading public but the power structure and elite.

But what exactly are the linguistic/stylistic features that define the editorial genre? According to Bhatia (1993: 302–4) the most striking feature of this genre is the specific use of certain discourse-linguistic features in order “to create favourable or unfavourable bias.” He argues that the genre generally employs a four-move discourse structure consisting of case, argument, verdict and action (Bhatia 1993: 302–4). Similarly, Bolívar (1994) proposes a three-part structure of editorials, borrowing analytical terminology from spoken exchanges and applying the term “triad” – Initiation (Situation); Response (Development); Follow-up (Recommendation). Bolívar further emphasizes the importance of certain lexico-grammatical and syntactic realizations such as tense, mood and modality which are specifically exploited in editorials to create meaning and stance (1994: 280). Features mentioned by Bolívar (1994: 286–7) include a predominance of present tense, the use of time adverbials and discourse adjuncts for topic introduction and contextualization (to evoke agreement or disagreement), and modal forms to express certainty and/or truthfulness about the issue at hand. Pronouns can also play an important role in establishing and maintaining an institutional voice of the newspaper, creating closeness and solidarity with readers, giving more authority or as a way “to signal explicitly to the readers that they have switched from fact-based reporting to purely opinion writing” (Bonyadi 2010: 334). As we shall see below in the corpus-based analysis, evaluative lexis also plays an important role in defining the editorial and/or commenting genre.

A possible reimagining of the flow of information in traditional print vs. Web 2.0 online newspaper environments has been provided in Figure 1. As we can see in Figure 1 the online media ecology creates more possibilities (in the form of interactive features) for users to interact with the original text, or ‘platform monologue’ (Levinson 1988). As already noted, in print newspaper environments there are few possibilities for readers to interact with the media: mainly this occurs through letters to the editor, which in no way are guaranteed publication, and even when published the letters result extraneous to the original text. Furthermore, the flow of information in traditional media is one-way, unless the editors decide to publish a response. In online newspapers, interactive features appear directly on the page with the original (con)text. All of these textual strands (original article and comments) – at least in the case of the *nytimes.com* – remain accessible online even to non-registered users. In Figure 1, the arrows are meant to represent the flow of information, with the dotted lines representing possible interaction. It is important




Figure 1. Offline vs. online news text commenter response

to stress that not all readers employ the interactive features either because they are not registered or, even if registered, they decide not to engage in these activities. The further set of dotted lines that links the comments is aimed at representing possible interaction among comments and commenters.

2.3 Text World Theory

Text World Theory (TWT), first introduced by Paul Werth (Werth 1995a, 1995b) and later expanded by Joanna Gavins (2007), has mostly been applied to the study of literary texts. To a much lesser extent, it has also been applied to other fields including advertising (Hidalgo-Downing 2000), political discourse (Chilton 2004; Filardo-Llamas 2014), face-to-face discourse (Van Der Bom 2016) and media discourse (Browse 2016). The paucity of interest in TWT by other fields is surprising, as Werth's original formulation of the theory envisaged a robust model that could be applied to all forms of discourse (Gavins 2007: 174). One of the goals of this work is to demonstrate the ways in which some aspects of TWT can be applied to (new) media discourse. Before describing how this may be done I will introduce some of the most important concepts from TWT.

Firmly entrenched in cognitive linguistic approaches, TWT sees discourse as both a dynamic and deliberate activity by at least two participants who are implicated in creating a 'world' which contains coherent propositions (Werth 1995a;

Werth 1995b). This discourse-world can also be seen as a sort of ‘reality’ which is retained by a speaker or writer “or meta-represented by the speaker as being someone else’s believed reality” (Chilton 2004: 54). This is based on the assumption that knowledge is actively constructed in the communication process by participants (Gavins 2007). The main tenet behind TWT is that language use determines the types of conceptual world that a hearer or reader creates, and this has a direct effect on the conceptual processes which are exploited in the comprehension of meaning (Van Der Bom 2016). Similar to CDA, TWT is interested not only in the ways a text is built but also the ways in which the context(s) surrounding a text play a role in its production *and* reception (Gavins 2007: 8, italics my own). According to a recently published collected volume on TWT, Gavins and Lahey (2016: 4) stress that researchers who embrace the concepts of TWT are interested in representing “the precise relationship between specific linguistic features and the worlds they create, while at the same time situating this understanding in the discourse-world environment which shapes all language production and reception.”

The preceding observation introduces one of cornerstones of TWT, i.e. the separation of discourse into two conceptual levels: the discourse-world and the text-world. While the former relates to the immediate context within which speakers are situated in the act of communication, the latter is related to the construction of mental representations as speakers participate in communication (Gavins 2007: 9). The discourse-world level precludes “the conscious presence” of participants (including one or more speakers and one or more listeners), objects, background and personal knowledge, without which the discourse-world would not exist (Gavins 2007: 9). At the same time there is usually a spatial and temporal dislocation between text producer and receiver. In the case of online environments, such as those in web versions of newspapers, I would argue that this disjunction is even more prominent due to the fact that these features are much less important in the definition of online discourse spaces. What they share, however, is the (original) platform text (here the editorial) – the text world(s) – which represents the main source of information from which knowledge can be supplemented (Gavins 2007: 26). Texts and text producers, however, are not static: they continuously create new scenes and possibilities as well as shift their opinions about important issues. When this happens, according to TWT, new text worlds are created and text receivers consequently have to adjust their mental representations of a text “in order for the dynamism of the incoming information to be accommodated and understood” (Gavins 2007: 11). To create such representations of the world certain linguistic elements are used, called ‘world-building elements’ in TWT, which consist mainly of deictic and referential means (Gavins 2007: 36–8).

Recognizing the importance of both text production and reception, in her analysis of advertising discourse, Hidalgo-Downing (2000: 76) notes that TWT can

be useful “for an account of how receivers of advertisement construct versions of fictional worlds represented in the advertisements, and how they are related to the ‘real’ and ‘fantasy’ worlds of the receivers.” Van der Bom, furthermore, argues that TWT accommodates “the idea of identity of both discursively *constructed*, and conceptually *represented* in text-worlds” (2016: 92, italics in original) of participants. Yet, such claims are based almost exclusively on the researcher’s impression (and bias, we might add) of a given text and the linguistic cues provided therein, rather than on the basis of how real-world participants perceive and interpret text- and discourse-worlds. In this way, both production and reception factors are reflected through the lens of, generally, an individual researcher. It is argued herein that user comments provide real-world evidence for the existence of (new) text worlds. Since text worlds are created through language, we should test how such worlds are recontextualized in user comments focusing on certain linguistic forms. In the process, however, text commenters also create their own text worlds based on their own mental representations. Using TWT as a framework for analysing text comments can also help us to understand how new media users recontextualize certain dominant discourses in their text creation. We will discuss some applications of TWT in the next section.

3. Data and methodology

The empirical data for the study, illustrated in Figure 2 along with information about the reference corpus (3), are drawn from two corpora: the editorial (1) (The Editorial Board 2015) and the 455 user comments (2) that were published in response to the editorial. A methodological approach combining elements from CDA, TWT and Corpus Linguistics was adopted.

Corpus	Texts (type)	Words	Tokens
(1) NYT Editorial	1 (editorial)	541	618
(2) NYT Editorial Comments	455 (comments)	46,857	56,363
(3) Reference: EnTenTen 2013	ca. 37 million	19.7 bil.	22.7 bil.

Figure 2. NYT migration editorial and reference corpora

Although the modest number of words in the editorial (1) which formed the basis for the study might appear too small to make general conclusions about the nature of the text and the genre, it was decided that a limited focus on a single text and the comments it generated would allow for a more detailed analysis of the text from both a CDA and TWT perspective. Such an approach was also deemed necessary as an attempt to determine the actual role played by the original platform text on

the comment(er)s as well as commenters' varying opinions about the issue(s) and how this reflects and/or diverges from the main ideas (or text worlds) presented by the editorial.

In the first round of analysis, after close reading of the editorial, elements of TWT were applied and a visual representation of the text worlds was tentatively mapped out (Figure 3 below). Subsequently, a quantitative corpus-based analysis was aimed at determining specific lexical use in corpora (1) and (2) in Figure 2. Word frequencies were generated using the Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff et al. 2014). Next, keyword lists were generated to determine the most salient linguistic patterns and lexical items using the massive EnTenTen 2013 as a reference corpus. These analyses were interested in determining the linguistic elements that can be employed to signal a world-switch in TWT, such as deictics, referential terms, modality and tense changes, contrastive lexical choice and negation. Finally, a sample containing the first 50 comments from (2) were analyzed qualitatively, focusing primarily on the opinions expressed in the comments, whether they agreed or disagreed with the editorial, and the *topoi* about (im)migrants and (im)migration were examined.




Figure 3. Possible text worlds for NYT editorial (roughly based on Gavins 2007)

Before proceeding to the discussion the data, we should point out some salient features of commenting in new media with a specific focus on the *nytimes.com* platform. While the possibility to post comments ostensibly creates a sense of community, many newspaper sites tend to employ forms of gatekeeping as “a necessary filter” in order to “separate the relevant information from the irrelevant as the information load becomes immense” (Ihlebak and Krumsvik 2014: 473). At the *New York Times* (2015) comments are seen as a forum for readers to express “articulate, well-informed remarks that are relevant to the article (...) where readers can exchange intelligent and informed commentary that enhances the quality of our news and information.” Yet, it is the editorial board and/or moderators who have the final say in deciding which articles are opened for comments and which comment(er)s are acceptable in a certain comment thread. According to the guidelines set out on the site, the *New York Times* (2017, Capitals in original) “personal attacks, obscenity, vulgarity, profanity (including expletives and letters followed by dashes), commercial promotion, impersonations, incoherence and SHOUTING” are to be avoided. Finally, it should be noted that comments on the *nytimes.com* are open for approximately 24 hours after an article has been published online, but they remain consultable.

4. Data analysis

4.1 Editorial analysis

The first part of the analysis consisted of a close reading of the editorial and an application of the most salient aspects of TWT. Figure 3 presents the proposed text worlds in the editorial together with the linguistic categories that may signal a world-switch.

As we can see in Figure 3, Text world 1 encapsulates the main point of view expressed by the editorial, i.e. that immigration in Europe should be seen as a positive development rather than as a burden. Implicit in this text world we can find at least two parts of Bolívar’s (1994) triad: ‘situation’ (the European migrant crisis) and ‘response’ (immigrants to Europe should be seen as an economic boon). In Text world 1, which depicts the situation at the time the editorial was published (September 2015), two main arguments supporting the main opinion are provided: the presence of “numerous scientific studies” that concur with the editorial’s viewpoint and Germany as an exemplary case of a country that has welcomed migrants. Past tense shifts are used to invoke world-shifts (Text worlds 3 and 4 in Figure 3) thereby providing further support for the main point of view. They refer to a previous study

(“a working paper published last year (2014)”) and a study in Denmark in the 1990s which provide concrete examples of what they see as good practices to give more import to the vaguer “(n)umerous studies” of the second paragraph (The Editorial Board 2015). The main argument is further strengthened by the use of other linguistic/syntactic means such as contrast, negation and modality. The editorial, in fact, begins with a phrase (“Many European leaders have described the refugees who are risking their lives to get to the Continent as a burden”) that serves as the basis for what is depicted as Text world 2 in Figure 3, the opposing view adopted by many in Europe that immigrants should be seen as a burden. This sentence, however, is immediately rebutted by the phrase “But there is good reason to believe” with a contrastive conjunction and the epistemic lexical verb *believe* which is further enhanced by the presence of the evaluative adjective + noun phrase *there is good reason to believe*. These contrasts serve to strengthen the main arguments implicit in Text world 1 further praising Germany as a model of what immigration in Europe should look like according to the editorial board.

If we take a closer look at what I have called Text world 2 in Figure 3 the contrast becomes even more evident. The editorial attributes negative imaginary attributes in the form of “rather than being a drain”, “does not mean” to further discredit the anti-immigration stance implicit in the view of “many European leaders.” I would argue that two other text worlds (5 and 6) stem from this Text world: the former represents the point of view of “some officials in Europe” and especially those in Britain, while the latter includes a time shift to 2010 when David Cameron promised to reduce net immigration in the UK. From this view emerge two other text worlds whose main protagonists are “some officials in Europe” and former UK PM David Cameron. The focus on Britain not only serves to provide a contrast to the positive aspects of the German experience, but also, I would argue, to bring the topic closer to home – as the mainly US readers of the *New York Times* are more likely to be familiar with the UK than countries in continental Europe – and introduce the “combined text world.” This combined text world could arguably be viewed as the ‘solution’ of the editorial (Bolívar 1994), in which the US and specifically Republican lawmakers are the main protagonists but that is soon extended to include the West. First, Republican lawmakers are criticised because they “have thwarted” efforts to pass a comprehensive immigration plan even though a “Congressional Budget Office report in 2013” the GDP would be raised (modality) by increasing immigration. This view is expanded to include the entire West and through contrast and negation the main point of view advocating a pro-immigration position comes through. Thus, the editorial states that even though advocating such a view “has become politically difficult in the West”, the points of view expressed by these “opponents” of immigration are based on “false arguments.” As we have seen, TWT helps the analyst in mapping the main worlds present in the text and how

these worlds reflect the traditional parts of the editorial. Much more interesting, however, is to try to understand if the points of view expressed in these worlds are embraced by certain readers and reflected in their comments.

4.2 Comment analysis

The next phase in the research was aimed at determining word frequencies and keywords in the comment corpus (2 in Figure 2). It was hypothesized that such data would – at least in part – substantiate the main themes and Text world divisions presented in the previous section, so the lemma frequency data for both the editorial (1) and the editorial comments (2) were compared (Figure 4) focusing on verbs, modals, pronouns and words that might indicate comparison or contrast (*as, than, but*).

N	lemma (1)	Freq	N	lemma (2)	Freq
1	<i>immigrant/immigration</i>	14	1	<i>have</i>	527
2	<i>Have</i>	13	2	<i>they</i>	456
3	Job	8	3	<i>immigrant/immigration</i>	408
3	<i>European /Europe</i>	8	4	<i>Europe/European</i>	360
5	<i>More</i>	7	5	I	294
6	Benefit	6	5	their	294
6	<i>As</i>	6	7	<i>as</i>	286
8	Worker	5	8	<i>country</i>	270
8	Than	5	9	<i>will</i>	238
10	Britain	4	10	<i>refugee</i>	230
10	Germany	4	11	or	228
10	<i>Country</i>	4	12	people	227
10	Population	4	13	but	203
10	Government	4	14	you	184
10	Find	4	15	can	169
10	Study	4	16	we	168
10	<i>They</i>	4	17	<i>more</i>	166
10	<i>Will</i>	4	18	if	161
10	<i>Refugee</i>	4	19	migrant	152

Figure 4. Word frequency in NYT editorial (1) and NYT editorial comments (2)

A cursory glance at the data in Figure 4 shows that there are a number of commonalities. In fact, half of the items are shared among the two corpora (in italics) although often with different frequencies. Furthermore, if we take a closer look at the frequency list for (2) we find that all other items that appear among the most

frequent lemmas in the editorial corpus also have a relatively high frequency in the comments, but were not among the top 19 items. Thus, following their order in corpus (1) we can find the following frequencies (in parentheses) in (2): *job* (93), *benefit* (123), *worker* (56), *than* (117), *population* (92), *government* (44), *find* (52), *study* (53). The only item in (1) that does not have a high frequency in (2), interestingly, is *Britain* (11). Yet, we should also note that there are a number of items in (2) that do not appear in (1) (in bold) which include *I*, *or*, *you*, *we*, *if*, *migrant*. While the fact that *or* and *migrant* do not appear in the platform text, but appear in the comment corpus, may just be a question of the editorial's brevity, the presence of the other words might have a different explanation. First, *if* demonstrates a high incidence of conditionals by commenters, which according to Ford and Thompson (1986) perform various functions such as proposing options for possible future scenarios, creating a contrast with what has been said, giving examples and making inferences based on certain assumptions made by others (especially in the editorial but also among other commenters). Concordance data would appear to substantiate such use, in which commenters propose various options or challenge what is stated in the editorial.

The presence of the first- and second-person pronouns (*I*, *you*, *we*) would appear to indicate a high level of personal participation (Boyd 2014, 2018) and commitment by commenters on a platform that at least to some extent reflects a conversation. Nevertheless, a closer look at some concordances may shed some light on the pronominal use, especially in the case of *we*, the meaning of which depends on the speaker's alignment with hearers (in this case either the editorial board, other commenters or other readers who do not comment) and who precisely they are including in their reference. A sample of the concordance data for *we* demonstrates a number of shifting meanings from 'we Americans' (*We have an enormous amount of problems here*) to 'we liberal Americans' (*we need to fight back against right-wing extremism*).

If we take a look at some of the examples in Figure 5 a number of different *we*-groups are apparent: first, there is the American *we* group (*we have ... problems here*), which may imply alignment to different points of view such as the liberal one expressed in *we need to fight back against right-wing extremism*. Further examples in the concordance appear to confirm that this is the most widely used *we*-group. Other uses include 'we-Europeans', 'we-migrants', 'we-general' and even 'we-the New York Times'. The latter can be found in a comment in which the writer is excluding him/herself and attributing responsibility to the views expressed in the editorial: *we put too much reliance on economic studies*.

At this point in the research the lemmas in the comment corpus were compared against EnTenTen13 reference corpus to compile a list of keywords. Such elements, it should be recalled, can help to better understand the specific context(s) and

racist, nor does it make us Trump voters. *We* have an enormous amount of problems here
 food stamps ever. And yet despite this, *we* still spend 4 billion of taxpayer money
 maintain the strong political coalition *we* need to fight back against right-wing extremism
 against right-wing extremism and oligarchy. *We* should try harder to overcome them.
 displaced persons in Europe/mid east, if *we* add them to the 11 million migrants we have
 if we add them to the 11 million migrants *we* have from Latin America things here will
 only 10,000) in the next fiscal year) that *we* created, by our fraud war on Iraq, untenable
 no where mentioned in our Constitution, *we* preach it but practice it not our selves
 rights only of their 24% minority kind. *We* in this country and UK have double standards
 customs etc. It is a sorry sight when *we* allow these right wing, hypocrite Sunday
 of expression, barbarism. Welcoming those *we* fear. All because it's good for business
 Assuming they aren't that stupid as *we* like to think, they probably know that
 The reason I'm bringing this up is because *we* have international policies that welcomes
 policies that welcomes war refugees and *we* are allowed to send back the economic migrants
 terrorists to bomb other Muslim people, *we* should at least think about it. If we would

Figure 5. Concordance lines for *we*

linguistic choices of the commenters by focusing on the statistically relevant words compared to a larger reference corpus (Baker, Hardie, and McEnery 2006: 97). While it was hypothesised that most of these words would reflect the contents of the original platform editorial, the analysis was focused on ascertaining both similarities and differences. Certain words were excluded from the results: those which appeared fewer than 10 times in the comment corpus, those words which referred to the original text web platform (such as *hyperlink*) and user names (e.g., *Renant*). The keyword data can be found in Figure 6.

Although a number of the words in Figure 6 reflect the frequencies found in Figure 4 – *immigrant*, *immigration*, *Europeans*, *Germany*, *refugee* – there are a number of important differences. First, many keywords appear to demonstrate a focus on (im)migration in both positive (*assimilate*, *assimilation*, *asylum*, *migration*) and, possibly, negative (*influx*, *flee*) ways, as well as the apparent qualities of (im)migrants (*unskilled*, *uneducated*, *culturally*, *economically*). Second, many of the top keywords refer to nations and nationalities, of which only some appear in the editorial and comment frequencies. Interestingly, while *Germany* appears in both the frequencies (Figure 4) and keywords (Figure 6), *Britain* is lacking from the latter and appears a mere 11 times in the comment corpus. The commenters, instead, focus on what they consider to be the key participants in the 2015 migrant crisis, countries like *Germany*, *Denmark* and *Sweden*, the latter receiving no mention in the editorial. We might deduce from the use of these words that the commenters were more interested in the actual situation at the moment of publication, i.e. the influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants in continental Europe. Other keywords

N	Lemma	Freq	Freq/mill	Freq ref.	Freq ref/mill	Score
1	Migrant	152	2696.8	141273	6.2	373.9
2	Editorial	40	709.7	28319	1.2	316.4
3	Refugee	230	4080.7	287294	12.6	299.2
4	Boon	52	922.6	51276	2.3	283.7
5	Immigrant	267	4737.2	421793	18.6	242.3
6	Unskilled	24	425.8	22627	1.0	213.9
7	Assimilate	44	780.7	64811	2.9	202.9
8	Editorial	142	2519.4	269769	11.9	195.8
9	Immigration	141	2501.6	430254	18.9	125.6
10	Assimilation	15	266.1	34324	1.5	106.4
11	Europeans	21	372.6	70322	3.1	91.3
12	Uneducated	10	177.4	30248	1.3	76.5
13	Influx	18	319.4	78243	3.4	72.1
14	Syrian	34	603.2	206067	9.1	60.0
15	Europe	266	4719.4	1784052	78.5	59.4
16	Sweden	35	621.0	228943	10.1	56.2
17	Denmark	18	319.4	140886	6.2	44.5
18	Flee	38	674.2	332513	14.6	43.2
19	Germany	99	1756.5	920514	40.5	42.3
20	Asylum	13	230.6	102197	4.5	42.1
21	Muslim	78	1383.9	737275	32.4	41.4
22	Migration	25	443.6	250682	11.0	37.0
23	Arabia	16	283.9	162339	7.1	35.0
24	Culturally	10	177.4	93418	4.1	34.9
25	Economically	15	266.1	156393	6.9	33.9

Figure 6. Keywords in NYT editorial corpus vs. EnTenTen13

point to reference to the migrants themselves. Thus, we can find *Arabia* collocates exclusively with *Saudi* and upon closer examination is used only negatively to stress Saudi Arabia's unwillingness to aid directly the migrants. While the original editorial mentioned *Syria* only once, *Syrian* together with *Syria* feature quite significantly in the keywords. Finally, the presence of the word *Muslim* would appear to bring to the fore a(n) (anti-)religious element.

4.3 Comment analysis

The last phase in the empirical study was a qualitative analysis of a sample of first fifty comments in the Editorial comment corpus. The main goal was to determine to what extent these comment(er)s agreed or disagreed with the main tenets

presented in the editorial as well as ultimately to gauge how much the results of the quantitative analyses might substantiate these views. The most striking observation to emerge from the initial reading of the sample was that almost all of the comment(er)s (49/50) show some degree of disagreement or disapproval with the views expressed in editorial. Although a full discussion of the contents of these comments is well beyond the scope and space limits of this chapter, the main *topoi* to emerge from this sample are: an economic boon should not be conflated with cultural issues/differences; the *New York Times* (editorial board) is completely out of touch with its readership and with reality; if the NYT advocates acceptance of immigrants in the EU they should do the same for the US; it is easy for the privileged class (represented by the NYT staff and readership) to preach since they don't have to deal with direct results of immigration; the arguments set forth in the editorial are based on questionable sources and are one-sided.

We will now examine in more detail some of the individual comments. Comment Sample 1 demonstrates a number of features common to the other comments involving strategic use of pronouns to create different spaces and alignments.

Comment Sample 1. EastCoast25 Massachusetts September 20, 2015

NYT Editorial Board:

Your reporting on the migrant/refugee crisis has been largely one-sided to your readership. It's clear where you stand on this issue.

No one argues that there aren't any upsides to immigration. But many people have growing concerns about open door policies and want to restrict asylum for legitimate reasons. Take a look at your reader comments to find some of them. This doesn't make us racist, nor does it make us Trump voters.

We have an enormous amount of problems here at home in America: debt, homeless veterans, dwindling middle class, crumbling infrastructure, public school failings, the greatest amount of people on food stamps ever. And yet despite this, we still spend 4 billion of taxpayer money on humanitarian aid worldwide.

Any country has a right to question the sanity of bringing in thousands of people from countries that have not lived within a democratic society. I'd like to see NYT bring additional perspectives on this crisis to its readership including those of Rep. Michael McCaul, Chair of the Homeland Security Committee to share the national security challenges that absorbing large numbers of refugees from the Middle East presents. 16 Recommend.

First, *you/your* is used to address directly the editorial board thereby simulating dialogue and, here, creating distance from their *one-sided reporting on the migrant/refugee crisis*. Before switching to the proximizing first-person pronouns, the author uses the vaguer *no one* and *many people* to stress *concerns about* (the) *open door*

policies supported by the editorial and the *New York Times* in general. The latter also appears to trigger a world-switch through which the commenter includes her/himself among the *reader comments* that the editors should be looking at which is further extended through the use of the inclusive *we*. This *we* group would appear to include those Americans who do not completely disagree with immigration and is concerned about *open door policies* and the *enormous amount of problems, spend(ing) 4 billion of tax payer money on humanitarian aid*. This group also includes the US and other countries in the same situation (*any country*), which the commenter uses to justify his/her main argument, i.e. the *right to question the sanity of bringing in thousands of people from abroad that have not lived within a democratic society*. Finally, the commenter takes full responsibility for the points of view expressed in the comment by using *I* in the last sentence which also encourages the editors to reconsider its own point of view on the matter (*I'd like to see the NYT bring additional perspectives on this crisis*).

In Comment Sample 2 the writer (Jordan) use irony to recontextualize one of the main points of the article's ideology – i.e. *studies show* – to criticize the scientific validity of the editorial board's *cherry picked* approach to the data.

Comment Sample 2. **Jordan Melbourne Fl. September 20, 2015**

ah yes “studies show” without any more specificity, i can only imagine how cherry picked these “studies” are, and no mention at all of the cultural suicide the EU will be committing by letting all these young men in (and the inevitable terrorism) – give it a rest NYT 19 Recommend.

The commenter here also addresses the editorial board directly through the use of the imperative form (*give it a rest NYT*). In this sample the commenter immediately takes responsibility for his/her point of view with *i (sic)* in order to highlight the negative aspects of the migrants, which according to the commenter will lead to *cultural suicide* in the EU and *terrorism*. We should also note that this comment was recommended 19 times, which would appear to demonstrate that at least some of the other readers agree with the commenters point of view.

Finally, Comment Sample 3 continues with the criticism of the studies of four economists that editors' apparently cherry picked use.

Comment Sample 3. **Jussmartenuf dallas, texas September 20, 2015**

So you found four economists who said more immigration is better for Europe. So what? It won't take but a second to find four who will say the opposite. Economists are limited by which school they attended. Are they Keynes or Hayek? Some believe the best way to help an economy is to starve it through austerity, others believe to feed it by stimulating it with cash.

You say jobs are not finite? Then you mean infinite? If low paid Europeans have their jobs taken by unskilled immigrants that is a boon that forces them up the ladder? i don't think so.

There are 11 million displaced persons in Europe/mid east, if we add them to the 11 million migrants we have from Latin America things here will get better? Tax receipts will increase over expenditures?

What are you smoking? This is illogic of the first degree, selective, wrong headed and not worthy of the NYT. 19 Recommend.

This comment, in fact, focuses on the negative economic consequences of (im)-migration: the commenter does not agree with the argument that migrants are needed to fill *low paid jobs*. Interestingly, the commenter appears to use a similar argumentation scheme to that used in the editorial placing the *11 million displaced persons in Europe/mid east (sic)* on the same plane as the *11 million migrants we have from Latin America*. Thus, similarly to the editorial the migrant crisis in Europe is equated with the situation of (im)migration in the United States without much regard for the historical aspects. The last sentence in Comment Sample 3 continues to use irony to criticize the editorial view (*What are you smoking?*) stressing the *illogic (sic)* nature of the editorial and the fact the views they adopt are both *wrong headed* and *not worthy* of the newspaper (editorial board) itself.

Despite the limited number of comments discussed in this section, they reflect a number of the most salient features and *topoi* found in the other comments. The comments generally disagree with the points of view expressed in the editorial and beckon the editors to both listen to their readers and commenters and reconsider their points of view about the migrant crisis and immigration in general.

5. Discussion and preliminary conclusions

The main goal of this work was to provide an analysis of the ways that comment(er)s reacted to a specific editorial about the 2015 European migrant crisis. Tools from TWT were adopted to offer an interpretation of a seemingly influential media text such as the editorial, while those from Corpus Linguistics were embraced in an attempt to quantify and to qualify how proposed text worlds are reflected in online comments. If we return to the possible text worlds proposed in Figure 3 a number of points need to be made. First, we should remember that although text worlds are meant to capture the multiple representations of the world present in texts, as noted, such worlds, although based on linguistic cues, are generally mapped out by the researcher. Figure 3 was aimed at capturing the various text worlds of one editorial about the 2015 European migrant crisis based on such

linguistic cues. Nevertheless, we cannot forget that these text worlds are limited to the interpretation of the present author and cannot be considered as complete. At the same time, however, we also have real-world data in the form of individual comments that offer various interpretations of the editorial and the possible text worlds proposed in Figure 3. Due to the difficulty and, quite possibly, impossibility of mapping out text worlds for all of these comment(er)s various corpus-based tools were also consulted. We should now try to ascertain to what extent these tools were able to confirm both the existence of the proposed text worlds and the importance of the genre of the editorial in influencing some of its readers, namely those who engage in commenting.

The frequency data presented in Figure 4 and the concordance data (as, e.g., those found in Figure 5) present a rather conflicting picture. Thus, even though a number of linguistic forms occur in both corpora, the frequencies appear to demonstrate different focal points. While the commenters seem to reflect in their lexical use the arguments present in the 'central' text world (see, e.g., Gavins 2007: 99–100) as well as those in Text world 2, evidence of Text worlds 5 and 6, which focus on the supposed negative example of Britain and former PM David Cameron, is less prevalent in the comments, with *Britain* being mentioned a mere 11 times. There are indeed many more references to continental Europe in general, which is not very surprising if we consider that at the time of the publication of the editorial (September 2015) it was continental Europe, and places like Germany, that were having to deal with the influx of *migrants* and *refugees*. Among the other differences between the two corpora we should also note the high frequency of first and second person pronouns in the comments, which implies high participation by the commenters in the text reception process and possibly in the interpretation of the various text worlds laid out in the platform editorial. As we have seen, the data for *we* reflect the different alignments created by commenters through the use of personal pronouns. Furthermore, the high frequency of both *or* and *if* is also to be noted again, as such use could possibly be linked with world-switches among the commenters and their attempts at creating contrast and proposing alternative worlds to those set out in the editorial.

The keyword data offer more insight into the possible worlds reflected in the comments. Once again, and not surprisingly, certain words that belong to proposed Text world 1 in Figure 3 can be found among the keywords. Based on the data, however, many of the comments are focused on defining, either negatively or positively, (im)migration and the purported characteristics of (im)migrants. Rather than focusing on Britain, the keyword data tend to point to a focus on Germany as well as Denmark and Sweden. While Sweden was not specifically mentioned in the editorial, it was a well-known destination for many of the migrants

and refugees during the 2015 crisis. Finally, the presence of (*Saudi*) *Arabia* and *muslim* points to the presence of discourses about the Arab/Muslim world in the comments. Based on these keywords together with the data in the frequency lists, the commenters would appear to be both responding to the editorial and creating their own portrayals (and, presumably, worlds) of the migrant crisis. Thus, commenters exploit certain linguistic forms that are indicative of modality, contrast, negation, etc., which could all be signals of world-switches. Commenters also make wide use of personal pronouns as part of “ongoing discourse-world creation” (Wales, 1996: 26) to establish alignments and to engage in dialogue with both the editorial (and editors) and the comment(er)s. These pronominal distinctions help the commenters to create distance from the views/worlds presented in the editorial and proximization with alternative views about the migrant crisis, migrants and immigration. A cursory look at some of the comments helps to determine certain *topoi*, which were generally critical of the *New York Times*’ ostensibly one-sided reporting about the migrant crisis and immigration in general. Such data would appear to demonstrate that although commenters recontextualize topics and arguments from the original editorial they are also willing to express disagreement or add new discourses to the debate.

The most surprising detail to emerge from the various phases of analysis, however, is the fact that an overwhelming majority of the commenters disagrees with the tenets set forth in the editorial. One might ask then what exactly is the role that the editorial played in ‘clarifying’ and ‘reasserting’ the newspaper’s ideology in relation to the complex events of (im)migration (Hodge and Kress 1993). On the basis of these comments, while the editorial has certainly opened up a debate in which commenters express their own opinions and challenge those of the editors and other commenters, it is not clear if the opinions presented by the editors wields any power over the commenters. Moreover, it is not always clear to what extent the text worlds mapped out in the editorial are reflected in the comments. While certain lexical items and grammatical forms are repeated in the comments new discourses are also created by the commenters. We could tentatively conclude on the basis of these limited data that text commenters are actively engaged in text-building and Text-world creation with multiple representations of the migrant crisis. More detailed qualitative research on the comments presented here, as well as both quantitative and qualitative analyses about other editorials and comments are necessary to determine what role, if any, the editorial plays on certain readers. The fact remains, however, that commenters use the commenting function in interesting and innovative ways: on the one hand, they recontextualize and comment on the views and points of view in the editorial; on the other, comment(er)s overwhelmingly disagree with the main tenets of the platform demonstrating a tendency to disregard the

evaluations and opinions expressed by the editors. Whether commenters' views are based on "unexpressed premises' not strongly supported by evidence" (Richardson and Stanyer 2011: 19) remains to be seen. Other methodological tools should be embraced to determine what influence the editorial may play on all readers, not just on the small percentage of readers who engage in commenting.

As a final consideration, we need to ask what precisely is the added value of the combined methodological approach adopted in this chapter. Both CDA and TWT are grounded in the notion that production and reception factors are crucial in understanding discourse practice. Yet, the accounts in the literature tend to focus almost exclusively on the production end of the process with the researcher most often imagining the role of the receivers. Affordances available on online newspaper platforms such as the one studied in this chapter provide the researcher with almost endless empirical data to study what happens textually on the reception end of the paradigm and to test whether the traditionally assumed dominant role of the media is being upended through technological change (cf. Boyd 2018). The methodological tools in TWT provide a powerful representational device to map out text worlds in discourse and seemingly powerful genres like editorials, but its application to media discourse has been lacking as has its application to new media textual practices. While TWT provides a useful tool to map out the text worlds in the editorial discussed in this chapter and could most likely be applied to other editorials in the future, it remains unclear whether such representations can be applied to user-generated data such as text comments. Does each comment give rise to a completely new representation, or is the original representation such as that presented in Figure 3 modified to reflect the new worlds created by commenters? Finally, CL allows the researcher to deal with large amounts of data and to test certain hypotheses. In fact, here, the corpus-based analysis made it possible to determine the presence of lexis from the proposed text worlds in Figure 3 as well as to find any similarities and differences in the different corpora. It would be interesting in future research to determine whether tools from CL can aid in mapping out text worlds in different kinds of text. Such an approach may indeed help us to determine whether editorials play a less important role in forging public opinion than previously claimed.

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Discourses of immigration and integration in German newspaper comments

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This chapter employs a critical, constructivist theoretical perspective to address how online commenters on articles in the liberal newspaper *Die Zeit* characterize immigrants, integration, and German identity. While the formerly dominant ethnonational ideology about German identity is now in the minority, there is nonetheless a strong tendency to categorize and characterize immigrant background residents according to ethnonational and religious criteria. A hierarchy of immigrants has emerged, with a discourse that positions Muslims in general, and Turks in particular, as the unintegrated Other. Because Germanness is defined in opposition to Muslim practices, integration for such residents is impossible. However, the presence of competing discourses is significant; through voices that point out discrimination and view integration as a two-way process, social change may be enacted.

Keywords: immigration, integration, ethnonational ideologies, German identity

1. Introduction

Over the last decade, Germany has become the country with the second highest migrant population in the world (United Nations 2015), with 21% of the population classified as having migrant background (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017). This development has led to changes in citizenship policies and understanding of national belonging. This chapter will address discourses which circulate in print media – specifically, in *Die Zeit Online*, the internet arm of a weekly newspaper which has a largely educated and liberal-leaning readership. From an examination of online reader comments, I develop thematic categories of attitudes about what it means to be German, what it means for immigrants to be integrated into German society, and whether past immigrant groups have or have not been successfully integrated. These ideas about how integration has worked thus far in German society – involving the behavior of policy makers as well as immigrants and non-immigrants – play a role

in ideologies about immigrants and accepting refugees into Germany. These ideologies are the product of the history of immigration into Germany since WWII, but especially including increased immigration after German reunification in 1990 and the influx of refugees beginning in 2015. Understanding these ideologies is essential for addressing attitudes and political agendas regarding immigration in Germany.

2. Background: German immigration, citizenship policy, and integration

In this section, I will outline some salient points about the history of immigration into Germany, laws regarding citizenship, and the government's focus on integration. This is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of German political history regarding immigration; rather, it highlights past events that are referenced in the contemporary discourse analyzed in this chapter.

Most discussions about immigration in Germany make frequent reference to the *Gastarbeiter* ('guest worker') program. Beginning in 1955, treaties were made with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey and Portugal, and then later Tunisia, Morocco and what was then Yugoslavia, inviting workers to come to Germany. The discourse about this program usually focuses on Turks in particular, as Turkish-background residents continue to be the largest group of immigrant background inhabitants of Germany. As is discussed by the commenters in these data, one origin of problems of integration is that since the original plan was not for the workers to stay or bring their families and raise children, there was no initial strategy to either help them integrate or promote acceptance within society. Guest workers ceased to be invited to Germany in 1973, and this also marked the beginning of the recognition that many of the guests were staying, and their families were joining them. Despite this, there was little official focus on integration until decades later.

Skipping ahead to German reunification in 1990, another category of 'migrant' became a salient part of German society: the *Spätaussiedler*, (literally, 'late resettlers') who were 'ethnic Germans' from the former Soviet Union who came to live in Germany. They were automatically awarded German citizenship, but not as automatically integrated into German society. Called *Russlanddeutsche* ('Russian Germans') in colloquial speech – which is a misnomer, as many were not from Russia but other areas of the former Soviet Union, although they were largely Russian-speaking – they were often discussed as a social problem (Dietz 2006). The difficulties with integration of these 'ethnic Germans' made it apparent that being German was about shared culture and language, and not ethnicity, thus contributing to the subsequent shifts in citizenship policy as well as public discourse about national belonging.

With an increased number of people with migration background living in Germany, in 2000 citizenship laws were changed to make it easier for those born and

raised in Germany to gain citizenship. Although prior to this, naturalization had been made somewhat easier by policy reforms in 1991 and 1993, the new policy enacted in 2000 entitled those born in Germany to foreign parents German citizenship (with the caveat that they had lived there legally for eight years), without the requirement of identification with German culture that had marked earlier naturalization processes (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010). Such German citizens were not, however, allowed dual citizenship, as was possible for those who could claim German citizenship because of German ancestry; at the age of 23 they had to choose either German citizenship or the citizenship of their parent(s). This changed in 2014, when it was decreed that dual citizenship was allowed for all German citizens (*Zweite Gesetz zur Änderung des Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes* ‘the second law for the change in the citizenship law’).

Recognition of Germany as a land of immigration was reflected in the 2004 *Zuwanderungsgesetz* (‘in-migration law’) but was preceded by what has been called the *Leitkultur* (‘guiding culture’) debate. This discourse revolved around the idea that there is a dominant culture in Germany which must be preserved (Pautz 2005). While this explicit focus on culture allows for recognition of people with immigrant background as German, it also firmly establishes integration as unidirectional, an issue which is discussed in this analysis. Although the word *Leitkultur* is never used in the data analyzed here, the issue of diversity in Germany, and to what extent a homogenous German culture existed and should be preserved, is at the core of these discussions.

In 2007, German Chancellor Merkel introduced a National Integration Plan to provide a federal framework for the implementation of integration programs. A primary focus of this was language learning (Stevenson and Schanze 2009). The discourse analyzed here addresses both this focus on language as well as the effort undertaken to help immigrants integrate and whether it has been effective.

Complicating the discourses about immigration has been the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees into Germany since 2015, which is part of a European-wide refugee crisis with roots in civil war in Syria, although people seeking asylum in Germany from other countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq have also contributed to the large numbers. According to the German Ministry of the Interior, 745,545 people submitted applications for asylum in 2016 and 476,676 in 2015 (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2017). As will be discussed in this analysis, the discourse about refugees is distinct from the discourse about immigrants.

H. Williams (2014), in her analysis of the discursive scripts produced by political elites from 2000–2010, notes a shift away from an ethnonational understanding of German identity toward more liberal attitudes about immigration and integration. While she notes that there continue to be debates about integration and the *Leitkultur*, both policy and discourses have shifted dramatically. The present

analysis builds on her findings by looking at the more nuanced aspects of discussion of integration. Central to my analysis, and in keeping with the other chapters of this volume, is the recognition of competing discourses. As noted by D. Williams (2013), there are different ideas about what constitutes Germanness and citizenship within the migrant background population as well as within the majority. Wilpert (2013: 125–6) notes that for many people with migrant background, citizenship is viewed pragmatically, as a means to a more secure legal status; and for the majority of the population it has given rise to not more acceptance but more discourse about the inability of Muslims to integrate. These themes are reflected in these data.

2.1 Terms: A rose by any other name

The terminology used to categorize people in official contexts, as well as the content of these categories, are a significant indicator of what the societal norms and values are regarding national identities. The official term used by the Federal Office of Statistics is *Personen mit Migrationshintergrund* ‘Person with migration background’, is a term which creates a category based on the background of the individual regardless of citizenship (Kaya 2013). It is defined as people who have themselves come to Germany from outside of the country’s border, or have at least one parent who was not born in Germany; it encompasses residents with citizenship in other countries as well as naturalized citizens and those born with German citizenship.

The term *Personen mit Migrationshintergrund*, first used in 1998 (Scarvaglieri and Zech 2013: 205), in its official capacity seems to be aimed at categorizing people with a non-German linguistic and cultural background. It replaced the term *nicht deutscher Herkunft* (not German background) to include the ‘ethnic Germans’ who came from the former Soviet Union (the *Spätaussiedler* mentioned above). It nonetheless carries a racialized connotation: it is often contrasted in everyday speech with the term *Biodeutscher* (‘bio[logically]-German’) (Fuller 2018). Scarvaglieri and Zech 2013 have examined the use of the term *Migrationshintergrund* in a newspaper corpus and concluded that its use serves to construct this segment of the population as ‘Other’. This research found that the term was largely used in contexts where negative characteristics were assigned to people with migrant background, describing them as criminal or disadvantaged.

Terms used for those with Turkish background also illustrate that they are viewed as not really Germans. In the comments I will discuss, they are mostly simply referred to as *Türken* (‘Turks’), in some cases explicitly including people with German citizenship. Also common in the media is the term *Deuschtürken* ‘German Turks’; significantly, this term categorizes them as Turks, not Germans.

It is relevant to notice the difference from the term *Russendeutsche*, for ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, which linguistically classifies them as Germans. Williams (2013) notes that the second-generation migrant background people he interviewed had internalized such distinctions: “Those who did identify as German qualified their identities, stating they were not “real” Germans.... it still appears to be difficult for the second generation to imagine a Germanness without descent” (Williams 2013: 44). The issue of ethnicity in German belonging will be addressed in this analysis.

3. Theoretical background

This analysis employs a critical, social constructionist framework to analyze the discourses of immigration, integration, and national belonging found in these comments on newspaper articles. I use the term ‘discourse’ in the sense of Gee (1992), not just conversation but as language in use combined with beliefs and practices which construct social categories and the characteristics and values of their members. Thus a central concept is that social categories are not fixed but are constructed through discourse and may change over time (Baxter 2010). I use a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective to analyse the comments on selected newspaper articles, looking at the underlying ideologies and bringing them to light to address issues of inequality in this context (Fairclough 2013; Wodak 2002, 2015). In particular, I am concerned with how social exclusion is reproduced, justified, and challenged in these discourses. The essential category here is that of ‘German’, and this is in part defined through discussion of what makes certain subjects Other. Through these contrasts, the boundaries are drawn through discourse about what it means to belong in German society.

Research on integration has been discussed as a ‘politics of difference’ (Flubacher and Yeung 2016). In their introduction to a special issue on integration, Flubacher and Yeung outline three processes central to the analysis of current regimes of integration. The first, which will be the major focus here, is the process of categorization. Discourse about integration necessarily creates two groups, the rightful citizens and those who need to be integrated, but can also construct more categories of desirable and undesirable immigrants.

The second process discussed by Flubacher and Yeung, selection, is closely related to categorization and involves access to a state and its resources. Who is entitled to residency, citizenship, or being recognized as belonging to society? These categories are official, but also discursively constructed, in particular in terms of national belonging.

The final process is that of activation, which refers to the responsibilities of immigrants to the state which they must perform to be legitimate recipients of benefits. Although there are legal aspects to this, in this analysis I will address ideologies about how those benefitting from the German welfare state should, in return, display particular features of integration. Proficiency in German is an often-cited criterion upon which integration is judged. A further theme in the discourse is that integration is discursively constructed as being in opposition to perceived traits of particular immigrant groups, thus making successful integration and maintenance of religious or cultural practices deemed foreign impossible; this theme is also noted by Ehrkamp (2006) in her research.

This brings us to a definition of integration, which takes on many forms. Ehrkamp (2006) discusses different conceptions of integration, noting that for the Minister of the Interior, integration is successful if the immigrant has knowledge of the German language and accepts the German constitution and political culture. The Commissioner of Integration defines integration in a more complex way, and not as an individual's achievement but as a societal process, noting the role of nonimmigrants in its success. Although there is generally a distinction made between assimilation and integration, the Christian Democratic Union party (the party of the current Chancellor) specifically mentions living by the values of a Christian occidental culture as inherent to integration into German society.

Research on integration in Europe shows that attitudes about integration vary, but there are clear themes across national borders. Antonsich (2012) found that very few of the local elites interviewed in Italy, England, France and Finland felt that integration was a two-way process. Expectations for integration included knowing about the culture and language, participation, accepting, respecting and appreciating the host culture, but also behavior and identification. For some, any behavior that made immigrants appear different from the majority indicated lack of integration; such attitudes in particular target Muslim immigrants who participate in religious activities outside of their homes or wear garments which index their Muslim faith. For a small group of interviewees, integration required to identification with the country.

Discourses about the role of language in integration include attention to linguistic proficiency in the national language in various ways which involve practical and ideological aspects (Hansen-Thomas 2007). It is most frequently discussed as necessary for communication, which underlies the creation of social cohesion and participation in society. Ideologically, it is also a symbol of shared social norms and values and indicates a willingness to integrate and to adapt to, or appreciate, the host culture (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015: 342).

With several generations of immigrants in Germany, and citizenship accessible to many of these people with migrant background, the issue of what it means to be

German arises, and is discussed explicitly in these data. One aspect of German national identity to be examined is to what extent is it ethnically defined. Korteweg and Yurdakul (2009) note that discourses about honor killing reinforce the boundary between the majority population and immigrants of Muslims/Turkish background in Germany, and focus on the distinction as an ethnonational difference in addition to a religious difference. However, there are clearly competing ideologies about the role of ethnicity in national identification. Miller-Idriss (2006) notes that among the working-class Berlin youth in her research, there was a strong trend of defining German belonging in cultural terms. Earlier research with pre-teens in German-English bilingual programs also shows this trend among Berlin youths (Fuller 2013).

Central to a national identity is the concept of the 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991). Although we cannot possibly know everyone in our nation, members are conceived of as a set of culturally similar people who can be distinguished from members of other nations through these national traits. When this schema of the national character is built on the idea of a shared history which has led to a set of cultural practices (Wodak 2002), this can exclude immigrants for generations. However, Wodak notes the important role of discourse in the production and maintenance of such narratives about national identity; discourse can serve to produce, justify, and reinforce the status quo, but it can also challenge and transform it. In the following analysis, I will examine how these discourses about integration into German society construct social categories which serve to establish the boundaries of national belonging.

4. Data and methodology

The data for this analysis consist of the comments on three articles from the liberal German newspaper *Die Zeit* which appeared in the online version in January and February of 2017. These data were selected not only because the articles focus on integration of immigrants and national identities in Germany, but also because a preview of the comments showed that these topics were indeed brought up by the contributors. There were 80 reader comments on the first article, 506 on the second, and 274 on the third. This sample was selected to provide qualitative representation of the competing discourses on this topic. It is, clearly, a far from random sampling of members of the German society. The commenters are not just a self-selected group in that they are those who choose to take the time to comment on the articles, but they are also readers of *Die Zeit*, which is widely read by educated liberals. The data must be interpreted as underrepresenting the views of more working class and conservative members of society.

The three articles selected for this analysis are as follows. The first article, titled *Flüchtlinge in Italien: Integration nach deutschem Vorbild* ('Refugees in Italy: a German Model for Integration') (Scheffer 2017) gave rise to a spirited discussion about whether Germany is a good model for the integration of immigrants into society. The second article, *Lamyia Kaddor: "Ich werde nicht die Klappe halten"* ('Lamyia Kaddor: "I'm not going to shut up"') (Schenk 2017) discusses the views of a woman who teaches Islamic religion in German schools, and who is also an author of a recent book which maintains that successful integration requires willingness to accommodate on both sides – that of the immigrants and that of the members of the host society. The roles, and the past participation, of both of these groups are hotly debated in the comments following the article. Last, I examine a discussion which shifts the focus to a definition of what it means to be German. The article titled *Nationale Identität: Sprache ist wichtiger als Herkunft* ('National Identity: Language is More Important Than Background') (Zeit Online 2017) summarizes an international survey about national identification and is followed by contributions which explicitly address who is considered German.

To carry out the analysis, categories of ideologies about particular themes emerged from the data, and the comments were coded according to how they fit into these rubrics. Not all comments on any of the articles spoke to the themes being analyzed here, so quantification only includes the subset of comments which address the ideological stances which are the focus of the analysis.

5. Integration in Germany: Themes

There are four themes in these data which will be discussed. First, I will look at assessments of the success of integration in Germany to date, which are largely negative. A second theme is who is responsible (i.e., who has failed) for the process of integration. One answer which emerges from these data is that immigrants alone are responsible for integration, and some have been more successful than others. The next section thus addresses the third theme, categories of immigrants. Fourth and finally, ideas about what it means to be German are examined for how they contribute to the issue of what immigrants must do to integrate.

5.1 Dissatisfaction with the state of integration in Germany

In the first article, I focused on the 29 comments which addressed the issue of how successful the integration of immigrants has been in Germany. There were three major positions taken relating to the topic of integration: integration has not

worked because immigrants have not been willing to integrate; integration has not worked, but the reasons for this lie in German society; and integration has been a success in Germany. The last position was only taken six times, while the other two positions, had 12 and 11 tokens each.

Table 1. Has integration worked in Germany?

No, because immigrants won't integrate	Yes, integration has worked here	No, but the reasons for lack of integration lie in German society
12 (42.8%)	6 (21.4%)	11 (39.2%)

This distribution of comments illustrates the breadth, and polarization, of viewpoints about the integration of immigrants into German society. There are six comments which state the viewpoints that integration has worked well in German society. The other 23 comments voice strong sentiments about social dissonance, but can be further divided into two viewpoints. On the one hand, there are people who have a lot of resentment against immigrants, who they see as disrupting social harmony. On the other hand, there are people who feel that many in their society discriminate against immigrants and in that way work against having an open, tolerant, peaceful society. Both these positions indicate the perception of a divided society.

The first comment on the article, given in Example (1) below, is illustrative of the first category of comments: immigration has not worked in Germany, because immigrants don't integrate. It is telling that the commenter refers to Hungary as being a better model for the treatment of immigrants, as Hungary has been known for limiting immigration, favoring ethnic Hungarians for citizenship, fortifying its borders and being reluctant to accept refugees.

- (1) *Was hat bitteschön in Deutschland geklappt? Wir haben es nichtmal geschafft die Gastarbeiter zu "integrieren". Die sind teilweise 40 Jahre hier und sprechen immer noch kein deutsch. Es ist grotesk sich an Versagern zu orientieren. Italien sollte lieber nach Ungarn schauen. Die haben den richtigen Umgang mit Migranten schnell gefunden.*

'What, if you please, worked in Germany? We didn't even manage to 'integrate' the Guest workers. Some of them have been here for 40 years and still don't speak German. It's grotesque to orient yourself on a failure. Italy should look to Hungary for a model. They quickly found the right way to deal with immigrants.'

(Translation here and for following examples by the author)

Another comment from this category illustrates very clearly that the blame for this lack of integration lies with the immigrants themselves and not German society, as the argumentation is that immigrants also have not integrated into English, French

or Swedish societies. Even more pointed is a comment stating that it is ‘ignorant and arrogant’ to ignore that Arab and African immigrants have not integrated into Swedish society, either, implying that they are destined not to integrate well in Germany. Another commenter who is disparaging of the integration of Turks adds that even worse are the *Araberclans* (‘Arab clans’), who work against ‘us’ in their tribal and family gangs. These comments, which identify specific immigrants as the problem, are in the minority in the comments on this article, but come to the forefront in the comments in the next article.

Example (2) is an excerpt of the first response to the original comment in (1), and is an example of a commenter who maintains that integration has been successful. This commenter notes the participation of both the immigrants and the society as a whole; of the five other comments that say integration has been successful, two focused primarily on the success of society in fostering integration and two focused on the successful integration of the immigrants themselves, while one did not place the source of success on either of these sides.

- (2) *Natürlich ist der größte Teil der Gastarbeitergeneration hier mittlerweile integriert. Das es darunter unbelehrbare Idioten gibt ist auch Wahr, aber diese Gruppe macht nicht alle zu nicht Integrierten Wir müssen schauen wo und wie die Integration geklappt hat und daraus Rückschlüsse ziehen, wie wir die Integration zukünftig gestalten.*

‘Of course most of the Guest Worker generation has integrated by now. That there are untrainable idiots among them is also true, but this group doesn’t make all of them unintegrated...we need to look where and how integration worked and from that draw conclusions about how we can shape integration in the future.’

The final position, that the lack of integration is due to the lack of acceptance of immigrants in society, is illustrated in Example (3). This is the final section of the comment; the preceding text criticizes the argumentation of various previous contributors who discuss how immigrants don’t integrate. This commenter ends with this list of reasons for the lack of integration, all of which focus on the role of the host society in fostering integration.

- (3) – *Gettoisierung der ersten Einwanderergruppe (Gastarbeiter)*
 – *beide Seiten gingen von einer Rückkehr am Anfang aus (also keine Sprachkurse im Angebot keine Nachfrage durch die Gastarbeiter)*
 – *Jahrelange Weigerung des konservativen Lagers überhaupt anzuerkennen das wir ein Einwandererland sind (das hat jegliche Integrationsmaßnahmen über Jahre verhindert)*
 – *Eine Linke die verblendet vom Dogma alle sind gut Jahrelang jede Subkultur als Gewinn angepriesen haben*

- *man bekommt bis heute mit Türkischem Nachnamen schlechter einen Job eine Wohnung (gleichzeitig beschwert man sich darüber das die alle auf einem Haufen wohnen)*
- ‘Ghettoization of the first immigrant group (Guest workers)
- Both sides assumed return to their home countries in the beginning (thus no language courses were offered and no request for them from the guest workers)
- Refusal by the conservative camp to recognize that we are a land of immigration for many years (that prevented all integration measures for years)
- A leftwing dogma that for years praised every subculture as a profit
- To this day one has worse chances for a job or apartment with a Turkish last name (while simultaneously people complain that they all live in clusters)’

These comments set the stage for the themes addressed in the second article, which address the roles of the host society and the immigrants themselves in the process of immigration.

5.2 Whose responsibility?

The article titled *Lamya Kaddor: “Ich werde nicht die Klappe halten”* (‘Lamya Kaddor: “I’m not going to shut up”’) sets the stage for a debate about the process of integration, and the role of the immigrants and the majority population. Of the 140 comments which address this topic, 56 (40%) agree with Kaddor that German society has an obligation in the process of integration, and 47 of these comments specify that the obligation is to accept immigrants into society and not discriminate against them.

The opposite position is taken in 84 (60%) comments, in which it is maintained that the majority society does not have an obligation, or at least not one that is has not already fulfilled with the social welfare system. Thirty of these commenters say explicitly that the problem is not with the main culture but that certain immigrants – named as either Muslims or Turks – do not integrate. An additional 19 go further to say that the immigrants in these groups not only do not integrate, but make demands in ways that other immigrant groups do not. These 140 comments are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Who is responsible for integration?

Germany (host country) does not have an obligation in the integration process	35 (25%)
It is the obligation of immigrants, but Muslims/Turks won’t integrate	30 (21.4%)
It is the obligation of immigrants, but Muslims/Turks make many demands, not like other immigrants	19 (13.6%)
Germany (host country) has an obligation	9 (6.4%)
Specifically, Germans need to accept immigrants	47 (33.6%)

These data echo the data analyzed from the first article and show that there is a divide in opinions about the process of integration and who is to blame for its failure. Further, they speak to different ideas about what integration means, and how categorizations of immigrants emerge. These topics are covered in the next two sections.

5.3 What is integration?

Descriptions of the lack of integration can be categorized in four main rubrics. First, not speaking German is a sign of the lack of integration. There are many complaints about the fact that people who have been in Germany for forty years or are third generation Turks and do not speak German; although there is occasional denial that this is a widespread phenomenon, such claims are largely uncontested. One commenter stated that Thai or Chinese people are less criticized for not speaking German because they are not criminals; Turks, in contrast, are more violent and sexist, and thus their lack of German skills are judged more harshly. This comment illustrates that there is certainly awareness of prejudice against Muslims, and also of the heterogeneity among Turks and Arabs (the commenter hastens to say that of course all Turks and Arabs are not that way), but nonetheless the stereotype of Muslim as criminal, poorly educated and unemployed is not just accepted but treated as a fact which justifies discrimination.

Secondly, not pursuing typical German activities makes an immigrant unintegrated. Mentioned here is, for instance, not allowing girls to go on class trips; this example shows that the value associated with this activity (allowing girls freedom) is the underlying issue.

Thirdly, not having contact with non-Turks/Muslims is viewed as a lack of integration and something that is initiated by the Turks/Muslims, not the members of the majority society. In one example, a commenter complained that Turks spoke Turkish and did not welcome non-Turks into their businesses (which he described as *Teestuben*, *Sishabars*, *Supermärkte und Dönerläden* 'tea shops, hookah bars, supermarkets and schwarma stands'), thus not just isolating themselves but treating Germans as second class citizens.

Fourthly, some commenters said that many Turks do not identify as German, calling themselves Turks or German-Turks, thus indicating a lack of identification with Germany. One commenter rebuts this position by noting that most countries are multi-ethnic, and the problem is there is no distinction between 'German' as an ethnic category and as denoting a citizen of Germany. This comment supports the position that ethnic background is not a determining factor in German belonging.

The word *ausgrenzen*, which can be translated as ‘exclude’ but also as ‘ostracize’ or ‘segregate’, is often used in the discourse about lack of integration. This term is used both by those who say that there is frequent discrimination against Turks and that is why they are not integrated and by those claiming that Turks/Muslims segregate themselves.

A strong theme in these data is that practicing Islam in any noticeable way is not being integrated, and this includes such Muslim-indexing practices as prayer and wearing a hijab as well as identifying as Turkish or supported the Turkish president Erdogan. Further, association with majority-background Germans and participating in all of their customs is necessary; for example, Muslims not being willing to marry Christians or celebrate Christmas are cited as signs of lack of integration. With this definition, it is clear that integration is not possible if one is Muslim or maintains cultural practices from outside of Germany (aside from eating foreign foods, which are considered a contribution to society). Illustrative of this is the comment in Example (4), in which a commenter is responding to a previous comment promoting a multi-faceted society.

- (4) *Naja, wenns um Döner geht oder Kuskus von mir aus. Die Facette eines rückwärts gewandten Islam brauch, zumindest ich, nicht.*

‘Well, if it’s about Döner [shawarma] or couscous, fine with me. The facet of a backwards-turning Islam I, at least, do not need.’

This comment represents the common attitude that Islam is unwelcome in Germany. Although it is framed as being about fundamentalist practices in particular, the implication is that the Islamic traditions brought to Germany are objectionable.

5.4 Good immigrants and bad

As shown in Table 2, many commenters place not just the responsibility for integration solely on immigrants, but they also insist on that the problem is that certain immigrants – named as either Muslims or Turks – don’t integrate; in some cases, there is also discussion of the ‘demands’ that are made by Muslim or Turkish-background immigrants for acceptance. In this discussion, there is often comparison of different types of immigrants. Usually the named group of unintegrated, demanding immigrants is Muslims, and the well-integrated comparison groups named here are Eastern Europeans, Asians, Italians, Greeks, Spaniards, Poles, Vietnamese and Thai, as well as one reference to Huguenots (French protestants who fled persecution in the 1600s). Significantly, this comparison is not exclusively about how these other immigrant groups have integrated, but rather that these other immigrant groups do not complain about being discriminated against.

- (5) *Wer hier einwandert sollte sich anpassen und nicht Anpassung von anderen fordern. Abgesehen davon frage ich mich, warum ich derlei Anpassungsforderungen stets nur von Muslimen vernehme, nicht jedoch von Osteuropäern, Asiaten oder anderen Zuwanderern?*

‘Whoever immigrates here should adapt and not demand the adaption of others. Aside from this I ask myself why I see these demands for adaption always just from Muslims, and not from eastern Europeans, Asian or other immigrants?’

This post is countered with the point that Muslims demand acceptance because they are less accepted than other immigrants, and this theme of (in)equality is relevant to our understanding of the discourses of integration. A number of the comments denying responsibility of German society in the integration process draw comparisons to other countries, claiming that other countries do not accommodate, in some cases citing personal experience with living outside of Germany. These arguments are meant to illustrate that the German society has no obligations to immigrants, with the theme of fairness being evoked: when Germans go to other countries ‘no one accommodates them’, so German society need not accommodate those who come to Germany. This argument rests on the idea that everyone is equally positioned to integrate, and that their attempts to integrate are accepted in the same way in all cases. There is no distinction between white, educated and Christian-background people moving to countries which are majority white and Christian, and Muslim people of color moving to these same countries. These commenters do not recognize that immigrants from Germany are unlikely to be stigmatized if they immigrate to, for example, the USA, whereas there are many negative stereotypes about Turks in Germany that must be overcome. Thus, there is erasure of differences in terms of the ability to navigate the integration process and the likelihood of being treated well by most members of their new host society.

Taken together, then, these comments both underline and deny difference. Muslims/Turks are depicted as different from other immigrants because they do not integrate. However, these differences are not recognized as positioning them any differently for successful integration.

A final note about categories of immigrants concerns discourse about racialized categories. In these data, physical appearance is rarely mentioned, and no comment on racial or ethnic background has been found in relation to integration, with the exception of the term ‘Arab’ (and derived words). In one comment, for example, the commenter notes that Ms. Kaddor ‘looks Arabic’ (*arabisch aussieht*), his point being that this is simply a fact which distinguishes her from other Germans. There are no comments that state that particular phenotypic characteristics (e.g., ‘looking Arabic’) makes a person less integrated or less likely to integrate. However, the issue of racial profiling is noted in several comments by those who argue that integration has failed because of lack of acceptance by the mainstream culture. Racial or ethnic

difference is not mentioned by those who complain about the lack of integration of groups they refer to as Turks or Arabs or Muslims; instead, religion and culture are stand-ins for race and ethnicity, and it is seemingly acceptable to negatively stereotype based on religious/cultural background. Aside from this, however, the concepts of race and ethnicity are largely missing from this discussion – and, also from the discussion on what it means to be German in the comments of the third article, to be analyzed in Section 5.6.

5.5 Refugees

It is significant that these articles, which address issues of integration, not only do not focus on, but barely mention, the recent/ongoing refugee crisis and how these newcomers adapt to German society. These data indicate that the discourse about refugees is largely distinct from the discourse about immigration and integration. In the twelve comments that addressed the refugee situation in these articles, six were found in the comments about the first article about Italy using Germany as a model for integration, and six occurred in the comments on the articles about who is responsible for the integration process. There were no comments about refugees in the comments about the article on national identity.

Of these twelve comments, only two of them echo the discourse about immigrant responsibility for integration. One of these states that refugees are entitled to asylum but not cultural accommodation, and the other simply states that refugees must integrate. The other ten comments focused on the policies and practices surrounding refugees in Germany. Explicit in two of the comments and implicit in the other eight was a differentiation between immigrants and refugees, noting differences in terms of their reasons for coming to Germany as well as the refugees' greater need for assistance. An example of this is given in (6). This text comes from the middle of this comment; previous text notes how the refugees are not offered much institutional help and that it falls on other citizens, and it is followed by a list of complaints of behaviors of unintegrated Turks.

- (6) *Hier hätte allerdings Frau Merkel eine Bringschuld, nicht lauter Menschen, die gar nicht gefragt worden sind, ob sie sich in ihrem Alltag um diese Neuankömmlinge (die nichts dafür können) kümmern wollen. Anders sehe ich das bei vielen Deutschürken hier im Viertel. Warum bloss werden die nicht wie "normale Deutsche" behandelt?!*

'Here Ms. Merkel would have an obligation, not the people that weren't asked if they wanted to take care of these newcomers (who aren't to blame) in their everyday lives.

I see that differently for the German Turks here in this neighborhood. Why aren't they treated like 'normal Germans?'

This forum does not lead to a detailed debate of policy in this matter, but there are criticisms of both the policies of taking in large numbers of refugees and the ways in which they have been treated in Germany. However, there are no comments parallel to the ones about Turkish or Muslim immigrants or immigrant-background residents in Germany; that is, in these data no one indicates that there is a problem with the lack of integration of refugees and that the refugees are to blame for this.

I do not wish to make too much of the discourse, or lack thereof, about refugees in these comments. However, there is indication here that the post-2015 refugee situation has not become the focus of the societal discourse about integration. It has not shifted the focus of complaints about diversity away from Turks. Further, these few comments about refugees further enhance one strong theme in of the discourse about immigrants: immigrants, unlike refugees, have chosen to come to Germany, and thus they are responsible for their integration into German society.

But what, exactly, are the characteristics of that society? This will be addressed in the next section.

5.6 What does it mean to be German, anyway?

The discourses represented in the comments of the third article should be recognized as reacting to the article's claim that in many countries, where one is born is less important than whether one speaks the national language. There were 91 comments which addressed factors in national identity; the number of factors tallied in Table 3 is 104. Forty-nine comments mentioned language, with 23 of these agreeing with the main claim in the article, that speaking a language is the most important aspect of national belonging, while 26 said it is necessary but not sufficient. The other factors listed were adhering to the laws or constitution of a nation, cultural norms and practices, and self-identification. One person mentioned religion, specifying that Islam should not be a part of German identity, and nine comments addressed ethnicity.

Table 3. What makes someone German?

language is necessary but not sufficient	26
language is the only / most important thing	23
law, constitution, etc.	10
Culture (norms and practices)	25
Self-identification	10
Religion	1
Ethnicity	9

Most of the comments citing cultural norms and practices being central to Germanness made general references to ‘shared values’ or ‘everyday practices.’ This reference to a unified culture was in some cases objected to by other commenters who pointed out that there was a great deal of diversity in Germany, including regional traditions, social class distinctions and varying political alignments as well as ethnic and national origin differences. The few specific practices mentioned were examples of what did NOT belong. In every instance, these were practices linked to Islam, and in most cases practices seen as discrimination against girls and women (e.g., wearing Burkas).

The comments about ethnicity present views that are potentially critical: if ‘German ethnicity’ is required to be German, then it is impossible for immigrants to integrate.

The first comment asks if the survey discussed in the article asked about *Abstammung* ‘descent, ancestry’, and goes on to say that place of birth is not important as Germany does not have *jus soli*. (It should be noted that response to this comment points out changes in legislation which grant citizenship to those born in Germany; both these claims are somewhat incorrect, as citizenship based on place of birth contains restrictions, as discussed above). This comment is echoed by the second comment about ethnicity, which says that the survey should have asked about being of the same ethnicity. Because the phrasing of both of these comments is focused on criticism of the survey more than on a strong statement of their own views, neither of these comments clearly indicates that these particular commenters themselves feel that ethnicity is part of national identity. However, they do clearly indicate that this is a factor which is deemed part of the discourse about national belonging.

Another comment related to ethnicity is a response to a comment that claims that the word *Deutsch* ‘German’ is a reference to language; in response, another commenter says that *Deutsch* is defined as *zum Volk gehörig* ‘belonging to the people’, with the word *Volk* being unambiguously about descent, not culture or region. Again, although this comment again does not necessarily endorse this understanding of German identity, it includes ethnic belonging in the discussion of what it means to be German.

There are three comments which are unambiguously in reference to ethnicity as being the sole factor in national identity: one, which was later removed by the newspaper editors, spoke of *das Recht des Blutes* ‘the right of blood’, a second made reference to *Sippe* ‘kin, clan’ and a third used a metaphor about ‘a cat living in a horse stall still being a cat, not a horse’. Two other comments which made reference to ethnicity combined it with culture and language – one saying simply that ‘culture and ethnicity defined one’s national belonging’, and the other saying that ‘someone is German if they are raised by German parents who teach them the language and

culture'. The final comment that mentioned ethnicity acknowledged that this is part of perceptions of German national identity, but that the idea of ethnicity should be abandoned.

Thus, only eight comments included ethnicity as part of German identity, and only five of these unambiguously endorsed this view. Significantly, the most extreme of these comments, *das recht des Blutes*, was responded to with outrage by one commenter and resulted in a back and forth in which the author of this comment (who identified as someone with a migrant background) claimed to simply be discussing constitutional definitions. Also, the comment about having German parents teaching you the language and culture was questioned with the response, what if you have non-German parents, but are raised with the German language and culture?

This discussion of the role of ethnicity in national belonging indicates a clear move away from ethnonational ideologies in these data. Although the view that Germanness is related to ethnicity is present, it was found in only a minority of the comments, and is often contested. These findings support H. Williams' (2014) claim that public opinion is shifting toward more liberal understandings of German belonging, and D. Williams (2013) observation of the multiplicity of voices in the understanding of Germanness.

6. Discussion

These data show competing discourses about immigration, integration and national identity in Germany. There is a clear trend away from explicit identification of Germanness as being linked to ethnic background; while this ethnonational ideology is mentioned, it is rejected by most (although not all) commenters in these data. As these commenters presumably represent a liberal segment of the population, we would expect the conservative views about German identity to be somewhat more widespread in the general population, to the extent that changes toward more acceptance of immigrants in German society correlates with being politically liberal. With that caveat, these data support other analyses that public opinion about German identity has shifted along with more inclusive citizenship policies. However, the consequence of this is that the stronger the claim that it is not ethnicity but culture which determines whether one is properly German, the stronger the need to exclude those who deviate in any way from ethnocentric ideas about Germanness.

The focus of German identity, then, rests on social and political practices. While this is potentially inclusive, there are troubling aspects to the discourse about integration. One aspect involves language. Speaking German is paramount in the discourse of belonging, with both practical and symbolic justifications: not only

it is necessary to speak German to participate in Germany society, but unwillingness to learn German is seen as rejection of German culture. This analysis does not address the more complicated question of whether speaking other languages in addition to German in the home and community negates the positive effect of speaking German (see Musloff, this volume, for a discussion of attitudes about multilingualism). In other words, is it enough to master German, or must one also give up immigrant languages?

Defining Germanness according to cultural practices requires an understanding of exactly what those practices are. In these data, while there is specificity about socio-political behavior and norms – abiding by the laws of the land – other aspects of cultural behavior are usually only vaguely defined or defined in the negative, that is, practices that are not German are noted. There is a strong ideology that Muslim practices do not belong to German society. In some cases, this is phrased not as an objection to being a Muslim *per se*, but to attitudes towards women associated with Islam. However, there are many comments which state that Muslim beliefs and practices do not fit in German society. Further, there is the oft-repeated claim that Turks/Muslims isolate themselves from the majority. Thus, the objection to Muslims is framed as objection to their behavior, but since any behavior associated with Islam is categorized as unintegrated, this makes it impossible for Muslims to fulfill the criteria for being German. Thus, while a move away from an ethnic criterion for Germanness appears to be inclusive, it opens the door for very exclusive definitions of cultural belonging. The dominant discourses serve to exclude those practicing Islam from being viewed as ‘real’ Germans, and to reproduce stereotypes about Muslims/Turks as the unintegrated Other.

However, an important finding here is the competing discourses. There are many voices which point out ways in which immigrants and immigrant-background residents and citizens are made to feel unwanted and that this is a source of their lack of integration. There are also voices that not just tolerate or accept but appreciate the diversity of the population in Germany. Further, there are some commenters who note the existence of cultural hybridity, and refute the claims that speaking Turkish or identifying as a Turk means to be less German. It is through competing discourses that social changes occur. First a hegemonic discourse must be challenged, and through this a competing discourse may gain more precedence and become widespread enough to supplant the previously dominant ideological stance.

These findings, while focused on past immigration and integration policy in Germany, have also relevance for the ongoing acceptance of refugees, especially from majority-Muslim countries. Somewhat surprisingly, the discourse about refugees in these data contains almost nothing negative about the refugees themselves (although plenty of complaints about the refugee situation), and avoid blaming them for their situation. Further analysis of emerging discourse about the presence

of refugees will show whether the the ideology that Muslims do not integrate into non-Muslim societies is relevant when considering the acceptance of large numbers of refugees into German territory. At present, many members of society feel that integration in Germany has failed, and this discourse of discontent may continue to play a role in social practices as well as policy decisions with far-reaching impact.

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“They have lived in our street for six years now and still don’t speak a work [!] of English”

Scenarios of alleged linguistic underperformance as part of anti-immigrant discourses

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Whilst sociolinguistic superdiversity is often viewed as an almost irreversible global development, there may be a question mark over whether the ‘mix of cultures’, which mass migration allegedly fosters, does in fact lead to an acceptance of multilingualism and/or multiculturalism in the respective societies. On the basis of public discourse data from press media and Internet forums, this paper explores popular attitudes the effects of mass immigration, which appear to express an endorsement of monolingual/monocultural societies. Using methods of argumentation theory, pragmatics and discourse-historical triangulation, the article argues that findings of a global rise in superdiversity as regards usage data need to be complemented by studies of divergent perception patterns at local/national levels.

Keywords: computer-mediated communication, culture mix, immigration, migration, multiculturalism, multilingualism, on-line forums, scenario, superdiversity

1. Introduction

One of the most productive discussions of present-day sociolinguistics is the debate about the concept of “superdiversity”, which is closely related to the effects of globalised migration patterns:¹ Jan Blommaert and Ben Rampton, two of its most ardent proponents characterise it thus:

1. For an overview (by no means exhaustive) see Arnaut et al. (2015a, b, 2016); Blommaert (2010, 2013a,b, 2015); Blommaert and Rampton (2015); De Fina et al. (2017); Goebel (2015); Meissner (2015); Meissner and Vertovec (2015); Pavlenko (2014a,b); Rampton (2016); Silverstein (2015); Reyes (2014); Vertovec (2007); Toivanen and Saarikivi (2016).

Due to the diffuse nature of migration since the early 1990s, the multiculturalism of an earlier era [...] has been gradually replaced by what Vertovec (2007) calls ‘superdiversity’. Superdiversity is characterised by a tremendous increase in the categories of migrants, not only in terms of nationality, ethnicity, language, and religion, but also in terms of motives, patterns and itineraries of migration, processes of insertion into the labour and housing markets of the host societies, and so on.

(Blommaert and Rampton 2015: 21–22)

Using as an illustrative example an accommodation advert in a shop window in the Belgian city of Antwerp, scripted in two Chinese script conventions, Blommaert highlights the fact that “in superdiverse environments (both online and offline), people appear to take any linguistic and communicative resource available to them [...] and blend them into hugely complex linguistic and semiotic forms” (Blommaert 2013: 8). For Blommaert, superdiversity requires a paradigm shift across socio- and contact-linguistics that includes epistemological and methodological changes in the conceptualisation and scientific investigation of home or ‘native’ languages, multilingualism and foreign language acquisition (Blommaert 2015).²

Beyond these wider theoretical aspects, empirical studies have shown that language diversity itself has become ‘much more diverse’, so to speak, especially in centres of immigration such as, in Britain, London or Southampton.³ But even in less ‘cosmopolitan’ areas of Britain, such as, for instance, the county of Norfolk, more than 80 languages are used across local communities and need to be catered for by a language-service provider called “INTRAN” that works in liaison with police, courts, health services etc. (INTRAN 2018). Thus, though perhaps not amounting to pervasive superdiversity, the extensive practise of multilingualism and provisions for institutional translation and interpreting services are the rule rather than the exception in present-day Britain, and they are widely discussed in the media, in politics and, predictably, in educational contexts.⁴ In 2016, for instance, the then

2. Blommaert’s (2015) demand for a paradigm shift that helps to transcend ‘traditional’ concepts of *multilingualism* on account of linguistic and cultural superdiversity, casts an ironic light on the fact that multilingualism itself has only relatively recently been elevated to an object of academic research and an institutional and political goal in Europe. From the 19th century onwards and reaching far into the twentieth century, *monolingualism* was an ideologically and institutionally safeguarded ideal (for English, see Bailey 1991; Barbour 2000); the multidimensional paradigm shifts resulting from its partial demise are still to be explored in full, cf. Jostes (2010).

3. See e.g. Cadier and Mar-Molinero (2014); Duarte and Gogolin (2013); King and Carson (2016).

4. See e.g. Balabanova and Balch (2010); Balch (2015); Balch and Balabanova (2014); Blackledge and Creese (2010); KhosraviNik (2010); KhosraviNik, Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2012); Musolff (2015); UK Department for education: National curriculum; <https://www.gov.uk/national-curriculum/key-stage-3-and-4>, (accessed 10 May 2017), House of Commons 2012.

Prime Minister David Cameron announced that a £20m public fund would be created to “provide classes for all women struggling with English”, targeted at an estimated “38,000 Muslim women who could not speak the language and 190,000 with limited skills in it”, and that those who did not pass the obligatory test after two and a half years in the country would face having to leave (*The Guardian*, 18 January 2016). During the following days, a public row erupted over whether such an initiative would be fit for purpose or, on the contrary, might stigmatise the intended target groups even further.⁵ In one of the comment articles in the right-wing tabloid *Daily Mail*, the well-known columnist Katie Hopkins stated that compelling immigrant minorities to take language classes was fine but should not be funded by the taxpayer:

- (1) I’m totally behind asking Muslim women to learn English but asking me to pay for it is a liberty in any language. [...] I am just another idiot British taxpayer paying tax at the top rate in order to fund the endless list of things migrants need me to pay for to make their segregated lives easier. And if it’s not free English classes, it’s translation services. [...] Unless you learn our language, how can you hope to fit in? And if you aren’t seeking to fit in, integration was never top of your agenda. In which case you aren’t migrating into Britain, you are colonising it. (Hopkins 2016)

Hopkins evidently had no problem with the compulsion aspect of the envisaged test but still compared migrant minorities’ lack of competence in standard English with her own lack of foreign language skills as a tourist in Greece, “the locals hardly expect me to have learned the language” – this, she claims, is fine because “I have paid to holiday in their country and have no intention of outstaying my welcome” (*ibid.*).

In the run-up to the “Brexit” referendum about whether the United Kingdom should withdraw from the European Union, the ‘migrant language’ question became again prominent, with Brexit proponents promising tough legislation to ensure that migrants “spoke good English” (*The Daily Telegraph*, 1 June 2016). After the referendum vote in favour of Brexit and the subsequent resignation of Cameron, the envisaged plans for legislating on and enforcing migrant language compliance seem to have been shelved but remain a potent issue.⁶

Such prominence cannot come as a surprise given the fact that the impact and cost of language policies targeted at immigrants have become topics of high political and social significance (Bastardas-Boada 2012; Duchêne et al. 2013; Krumm 2012).

5. See e.g. *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *Daily Express*, *The Times*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Telegraph* 17–19 January 2016.

6. See e.g. *The Guardian*, 14 March 2018: “People in the UK should learn English. But without free classes, they can’t.”

However, we may ask, what status do such questions have outside the spheres of academic research and political debates, and their echo in the mainstream media? Is the question of immigrants' language competence (or lack of it) at all an object of interest and/or concern for the general public, and if yes, what role does it play in the debate about immigration? This chapter provides an exploratory study of postings to the BBC's *Have Your Say* (HYS) discussion website that articulate popular attitudes towards multilingualism, which point in the direction of strongly felt resistance to (super-)diversity. Like Hopkins., they allege that migrants do not wish or try to acquire (standard) English, question the necessity of language mediation services (such as translation and interpreting) for foreign language speakers and suggest that a monolingual national community is the primary or even ideal form of social coherence. Following data presentation and analysis, we discuss the question how the apparent discrepancy between superdiversity in actual usage and its perception and (largely negative) evaluation in the community can be resolved.

2. Data and methodology

Data from internet discussion forums provide a chance to study the development of popular attitudes towards topics that are of public concern, even though the opinions expressed cannot be taken simply at face value but have to be critically compared with other media data and qualified for the specific types of computer-assisted communication (CMC) (Giltrow 2013; Herring et al. 2004). Even within the CMC subgenre of internet forums, there is a wide variety of different sub-types, ranging from maximally open forums with hardly any restrictions regarding messages or 'netiquette' through those managed and controlled by an official monitor such as a specific news organisation or even a public authority to more or less closed chatrooms or Blogs, where a specific "community of practice" (Holmes and Meyerhoff 1999) communicate mainly among themselves.

The advantage of the more open forums such as *Have Your Say* is that they allow a glimpse at opinion-building in the internet using part of society; however, they still cannot be viewed as representing the whole public sphere. Forum posters constitute a subgroup of the general public, with their own group-specific characteristics (Johansson 2015; Korenman and Wyatt 1996). Nevertheless, especially when analysed in comparison with further data, forum-based CMC can reveal the extent to which discourse contributions of prominent public voices (politicians and other opinion leaders, including mainstream media but also marginal voices), are taken up, repeated, changed and reinterpreted by the wider public.

Originally designed to investigate figurative language use in British immigration debates from such a comparative angle, the corpus used here comprises three

media sub-genres, i.e. a press sample,⁷ a sample of three online discussion forums that were maintained on the BBC under their *Have your say* website and Internet weblogs (Blogs) with readers' comments (as far as these have been kept accessible by the Blog managers). For the purposes of this chapter, we will concentrate exclusively on the forum data. This means that due to the lack of comparison with other media, our analysis can only lead to tentative results which need further testing and corroboration. The *Have Your Say* sample consists of three discussion strands (for convenience called HYS 1–3), which were elicited by the BBC from April–June 2010 in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the 2010 general election as responses to the questions: (a) “Should politicians be talking about immigration?”, (b) “How should immigration be tackled?”, (c) “Are immigration rules fair?” (BBC 2010a–c).⁸ They generated altogether 2473 postings (566, 881, and 1026 for the respective discussion strands), which amount to 333.518 tokens. The forum is actively monitored by the BBC, which means that aggressively polemical and/or inflammatory postings are removed and that such exclusions are explicitly indicated: in our case 81 postings were removed from the three discussion threads.

The main topical forum questions on *Have Your Say* were all followed up by explanations that specified some of their implications and referenced current prominent debates, as in the case of the third question, “Are immigration rules fair?”, which explicitly flagged up the language issue:

- (2) Immigrants marrying UK citizens will be asked to prove they have a command of English under new rules. *Should immigrants to any country have to prove they have a command of the language?* The measures will apply to partners coming to the UK from areas outside the EU, such as South Asia. *Home Secretary Theresa May wants to “help promote integration”, but campaigners say the plans are discriminatory. Will the rules promote integration and remove cultural barriers? Are they discriminatory? Will you be affected by the changes?*

(HYS 3, italicisation by AM)

Prompted by the language-focused elaboration of *Have Your Say*'s guiding question, 809 postings, i.e. 81% of the altogether 1026 comments in the third thread included explicit arguments about immigrants' perceived lack of language skills, whereas

7. The press sample was drawn from the following newspapers and magazine: *Daily Express*, *Daily Mail*, *Financial Times*, *The Guardian/Observer*, *The Independent*, *The Scotsman*, *The Spectator*, *The Sun*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times/Sunday Times*. It includes 278 articles amounting to 220.756 word tokens. The K. Hopkins article cited in example (1) is part of this sample.

8. Since 2011, the question-based format (see <http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/haveyoursay/>) has been changed to a news story-based version: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/have_your_say (last accessed 18 March 2018).

in the two other *Have Your Say* threads only 10–15% touched on this subject. In the following section we will introduce the main argumentative *topoi* associated with the language issue in all three discussion threads and then try to explain their function within the wider figurative-narrative ‘scenarios’ of immigration perception in Britain, as represented in the *Have Your Say* forum.

3. Arguments about and scenarios of immigration to Britain

Whilst not always being explicitly raised, the alleged lack of immigrants’ language skills provides a background assumption for most postings. One main *topos* associated with it is the explanation that immigrants do not want to learn English because it isn’t essential for their well-being in Britain. The following examples are typical of such arguments (spelling and formatting have been left unaltered in all quoted examples).

- (3) I live next door to a woman from Malaysia – sweet, generous and kind but very difficult to understand when she speaks. However she is easy compared to the Turkish family just across the road. They have lived in our street for six years now and still neither mother or father speak a work [*sic*] of English
(“thomas”, HYS 3)
- (4) I have come across too many people during my job from EU who can’t speak or understand single word of English
(“TrueChange”, HYS 3)
- (5) there are those who have spent over twenty years in this country without making efforts to speak local tongue
(“Enny2012”, HYS 3)
- (6) An 18-year-old student, son of immigrant parents but himself born in this country, told me that his mother did not have a word of English. When I asked him how she coped with day-to-day life, he said she just sat at home and watched foreign-language TV – other family members who had taken the trouble to learn to speak English had to do everything for her, even the shopping. That kind of idleness is unacceptable.
(“Megan”, HYS 1)
- (7) it hurts seeing immigrants sticking together, refusing to learn English, to socialize with the british neighbours, refusing to eat british food and ignoring british history and culture
(“Cesarina”, HYS 2)

Despite the fact that these statements are presented as descriptions of the forum member’s own everyday experiences, the presence of hyperbolic formulations (“can’t speak or understand single word”, “not have a single word of English”) and of overgeneralisations (especially in Examples (5) and (7)) underline the stereotypical nature of the notion that immigrants have ‘no wish to learn English’. It is highly

implausible that the forum posters have reached their conclusions on the basis of systematic observation; at best they have encountered a few cases of communication difficulties, which are often extrapolated to long-term conditions (e.g. lasting for 6 or even 20 years) and then moralizingly judged (cf. “[immigrants] refusing ... ignoring”, “That kind of idleness is unacceptable”). The responsibility for the alleged lack of English language competence is firmly allocated to the immigrants themselves, often comparing their alleged idleness with the forum poster’s own readiness to learn another language:

- (8) I don’t even go for a week’s holiday somewhere without learning enough of the language to be polite (please, thank you, may I have ... etc., go a long way!); and as my long-term plan is to retire to Greece in 10–15 years’ time I am already making headway in Greek well beyond that. (“Megan”, HYS 3)

“Megan” concedes later on in her comment that “a panicked asylum-seeker who may have had to do a runner with little notice from wherever he feels under threat may not have had time to learn any English” (ibid.) but still insists that any migrant’s “preparations” should include “learn[ing] at least a little English” (ibid.). The majority of migrants are conceived of as being almost on a par with a Western tourist visiting another country at their leisure and following the convention to speak enough of the ‘local lingo’ to be “polite”. The dismissive presentation of “a panicked asylum-seeker” as “doing a runner”, which is normally associated with fugitive criminals, and as only “feeling” under threat makes it clear that even concrete impediments to learning English are doubtful by “Megan”.

As the immigrants ‘have only themselves to blame’ for their lack of competence in English, the provision of language services (multi-language signing in public places and documents, translation, interpreting etc.) is seen as principally superfluous and especially infuriating on account of being paid for by the public purse. Many forum members therefore take a similar stance as Katie Hopkins (Example 1), namely in favour of advocating cutting all or some such services:

- (9) Why is bankrupt Britain allowing local councils to waste vast sums of taxpayer’s money on translations services ...? (“Pure Evil”, HYS 3)
- (10) It’s totally ridiculous that the fire service have to be issued cards with phonetic spellings of terms like “Get out of the building because it is on fire”. (“AGnomeCalledJimmy”, HYS 3)
- (11) I do not see why the Tax Payers of this country should fund a service that provides translators for those that will not make the effort to assimilate. You only have to walk into a doctors [*sic*] surgery to see how many notices/leaflets are published in foreign languages. Benefit Offices provide Translators and so does the legal system all at the expense of the Tax Payer, where else does this happen? (swerdna, HYS 3)

In a few cases, forum members seem to assume that British schools have to teach all the migrants' languages or that they systematically tolerate complete ignorance of English among most of their pupils:

- (12) What will be the consequence of schools where children do not speak English and teachers have to accommodate 50 different first languages – its totally insane! How are local authorities to cope in places like Peterborough, London, Manchester or Birmingham? I like cultural diversity – but places like Birmingham no longer resemble English cities at all! It's like a vision of Babylon (“The Ghosts of John of Galt”, HYS 2)
- (13) What about our Children who go to schools where 90% of the children cannot speak English. This is England, if I moved to Spain then I would expect to learn Spanish and I would expect the Spanish to expect that I would.
(“Nina”, HYS 3)

Whilst there are some *Have Your Say* posters who acknowledge that learning a foreign language to a good level of proficiency takes considerable time and who self-critically compare their own or British tourists and ex-pats' foreign language achievements to those of migrants,⁹ there is little evidence of any trust in the British education system's ability to teach English to migrant children. Moreover, provision of foreign languages translation and interpreting by public institutions (police, courts, fire service, health system, social services) is exclusively associated with immigrants' needs and hardly ever considered in the context of fostering 'inward' tourism, businesses and international cooperation between British and public institutions of other countries (e.g. international law enforcement). The language services appear in the forum postings as a grotesquely expensive luxury that serves no other function than to make life in Britain easier for lazy migrants. The debilitating effects that a withdrawal of such language services would have for the working of the UK's institutions are not at all discussed on the HYS threads in question.

Instead, any evidence of of foreign languages being used in everyday situations is considered a threat to national cultural identity, as highlighted in a third major argumentation strand for this topic, e.g. in examples such as the following:

- (14) some parts of out [sic] country doesn't even feel English/British any more! last Christmas the decorations in my town were ALL in well what looked like Urdu nothing in English! how is that right? it's first class segregating.
(“It's all pants”, HYS 2)

9. On the other hand, there are also those who like “docthebiker” assume that “average people can learn a foreign language within 3 months” (HYS 3).

- (15) Sit on a London bus, and you'll hear very little English spoken. What's the point of multiculturalism, when you can't understand each other?
(“Argonaut”, HYS 2)
- (16) In Manchester we hear so many foriegn [sic] languages on the streets, the city has really changed in the last 5 years and I do not necessarily think that this is a good thing.
(“wisp”, HYS 3)
- (17) Yes, hearing someone talking in English is almost becoming a novelty in many parts of the UK, and in London particularly
(“Wu Shu”, HYS 3)
- (18) One of the most annoying things apart from ignoring the main religion of the UK (Christianity) is the non ability to speak English and wherever we go people around us take no notice and gabble away in whatever language they speak. UK children are being held back due to the large number of children who cannot speak english in the schools.
(“2squirrels”, HYS 3)

Again, hyperbole and overgeneralization are apparent in the claims that English is “not” or “very little” used in British cities, on buses or in the streets. The sheer occurrence of any foreign language in everyday life is viewed as an imposition on or a threat against the collective British-English ‘Self’. This ‘protective’ posture concerning English is combined with an aggressive and dismissive attitude towards all foreign “gabble” or illegible symbols (“what looked like Urdu”). In the rhetorical question-part of Example (15) multilingualism is implicitly treated as a contradiction of multiculturalism, which to forum poster “Argonaut” seems acceptable only when it is formulated in English. London’s cosmopolitanism in particular, which features prominently in London’s own tourism marketing,¹⁰ is seen in this perspective mainly as a loss of identity, not in any way as a desirable phenomenon.

This last argumentation strand links up with a larger narrative *topos* across all three forum threads, i.e. a supposedly exemplary account of how the respective speaker realised that Britain as a nation has lost (or is fast losing) its cultural identity as a result of mass immigration from other cultural contexts. Supposedly based on their everyday experiences, forum members express a feeling of fundamental alienation when they ‘step out in the street’:

- (19) When I walk down the street these days I think I am in a foreign country. Even 5 years ago in the city where I live this was not the case. Britain as we have known it, along with its established culture, is in danger of disappearing completely
(“ITMakesense1”, HYS 1)

10. See e.g. praise of London as European and global metropolis in the “Cultural tourism vision for London 2015–17”, commissioned by the then Mayor and later Brexit proponent Boris Johnson, at https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/cultural_tourism_vision_for_london_low_res_version.pdf (last accessed 18 March 2018).

- (20) they came in here in droves and changed our once settled and BRITISH cities into the streets of Bombay and Karachi (“jack”, HYS 1)
- (21) I visited a town in leicester last week and it was like coronation street had been moved to Pakistan! (“J Workerbee”, HYS 1)
- (22) Why are all todays migrants so intent to make us adopt their culture and rescind ours – after all we didn’t make them come here (“EvilPandora”, HYS 3)

These examples show that the perception of immigrants’ alleged lack of English language competence not only tends to overgeneralise and to rely on stereotypes but is often framed by figurative-narrative “scenarios”, which border on fantastical constructions, such as visions of the British TV soap opera “Coronation Street” moving to Pakistan or the “streets of Bombay and Karachi” moving to Britain.¹¹ What is expressed here is not just the fear of the exotic ‘Other’ as such but of it getting ‘too close for comfort’ or, in Cap’s terminology, of it being “proximated” into the “home zone” of the speaker’s we-group.¹² “Karachi”, “Bombay” or other metonymic indications of migrants’ origins delimit an imaginary scenario of CULTURE-MIXING that is endowed with feelings of fear, repulsion and ethical disapproval. This MIX scenario, like the other main scenarios of immigration discourse, such as CONTAINER, MOVEMENT, INSIDER (RE)ACTION, GAIN, SCROUNGE (Musolff 2015), tells a story of immigration in terms of supposedly self-experienced changes in one’s home environment that affect the speaker’s identity.

The formulaic localisation ‘in the street’ functions as a signal of authenticity and typicality at the same time; it could be paraphrased along the following lines, ‘When(ever) I go into the street(s) these days, I am confronted with an unacceptable change in my home environment: ...’. Hearing, reading or just vaguely noticing other languages being used is one of the key-changes which are experienced as identity-threatening, regardless of whether the speakers explicitly renounce “multiculturalism”. In fact, postings that defend this ideal *in principle* are not infrequent on HYS and form a substantial minority of 25–30%, but such disclaimers seem to be no obstacle for speakers declaring their hostility to foreign languages. The forum threads show very few counter-narratives or -arguments that question the scenario of CULTURE-MIXING.¹³

11. For the partly phantasmagorical nature of immigration in British public in Britain see Kureishi (2014). For figurative-narrative “scenarios” as a subtype of conceptual frames see Musolff (2006).

12. See Cap (2013, 2014 and in this volume); for the construal of immigration as a threat to the ego-center physical and social deixis see also Hart (2010, 2011a,b).

13. One of these exceptions is a refutation of a post by “Dave666” on HYS 3 endorsing compulsory “retrospective” (!) language tests for immigrants after the author had allegedly “recently

Such evidence from the HYS forum (which is a closely monitored and ‘politically correct’ web forum by comparison with more polemical and ideologically biased forums and blogs dealing with migration) puts the public awareness of linguistic and cultural (super-)diversity in sharp relief. The global and national spread of multi-culturalism and –lingualism and its present-day acceleration and intensification through globalisation and mass migration is regarded by sociolinguists as an empirical fact whose practical linguistic consequences, i.e. increasing code-, language- and dialect-switching and -mixing, are not in themselves good or bad and demonstrate the infinite human capacity for cultural adaptation and creativity (Auer 2011; Trudgill 2011; Blackledge and Cress 2010; Bhatia and Ritchie 2012). In the context of the immigration debate, on the other hand, at least those parts of the public that participate in the HYS forum appear to suspect cultural and especially linguistic (super-)diversity as a symptom of social disintegration and as an imminent threat to their collective identity. They conceive of monolingualism as the ‘gold standard’ of cultural identity as expressed in the admirably concise, if linguistically and politically dubious formulation by one forum participant: “one country, one language” (“Kevr”, HYS 3)! Clearly, the two perspectives are not just opposed but they seem irreconcilable. What, then, are we to make of such a contradiction?

4. Conclusions and tasks for the linguistic investigation of attitudes towards migration-related language issues

It would be too easy to simply dismiss foreign-language hostility such as that expressed on HYS as being factually erroneous and/or distorted by nationalist or xenophobic ideologies. Of course, linguistic xenophobia fits well with the rise in fear of and hostility to migrants and migration as a threat to ‘home’ identities, as highlighted in most chapters of this volume, but it also makes a specific contribution by setting up monolingualism as the ‘gold standard’ for cultural loyalty. This quasi-taboo on migrants’ (and other foreign) languages taps into a stock of long-standing, highly persistent “language myths” of monolingualism as ‘normal’ linguistic behaviour and multilingualism being an extraordinary burden on individuals and society (Andersson and Trudgill 1990; Bauer and Trudgill 1998; Watts 2011). Whilst being falsifiable on account of their transparent *non sequiturs*, overgeneralizations and lack of reliable data, the denigration of foreign language competence goes largely unchallenged and is believed and reinforced among the

passed a family with young Children using either Pashtun or Urdu in the street”. Another forum member, “Jokimoto” polemically proposed: “For those of you complaining about hearing “Pashtun or Urdu” *in the street*, may I suggest earplugs?”

forum community in the form of exemplary stories that are allegedly based on authentic experience. They provide ‘explanations’ for the perceived communication problems between the host society and immigrants by presupposing (1) the migrants’ lack of desire or need to adapt to British culture and learn English, (2) the uselessness of language provision by the state and (3) an alleged disappearance of English language from public life in Britain as part of an ongoing CULTURE-MIX in Britain at the expense of the British-English home culture. When read in isolation, especially in the hyperbolic examples, these arguments may seem implausible or fantastic; however, as part of a coherent narrative of a once great (British-English) culture succumbing to the onslaught of an alien culture-mix they reinforce each other to the point of ‘making sense’ in an informal, everyday logic that is apparently convincing for the majority of forum members.

There is one further important reason to take such pseudo-arguments and narratives seriously: not only do they help to entrench xenophobic attitudes among the ‘home’ population but, as Piller and Takahashi (2011: 595) point out, “in the absence of the recognition of [...] coherent language strategies, [transnational migrants] often blame themselves for their social exclusion and internalize their communication difficulties”. Indeed, a (small) number of forum posters identify themselves as migrants and while they obviously refrain from polemical xenophobic rhetoric, they in fact *share* many of the language myths expressed by the ‘home’ speakers, such as the aversion to “paying for language services for new immigrants” through their taxes.¹⁴ As a result, forum readers might be forgiven for assuming that there is almost a consensus across their community that trying to tackle immigration-related language issues through fostering multilingual literacy is a waste of public resources.

In view of the discrepancy between popular resentment of multilingual and –cultural competence and any policies that might enhance them on the one hand and sociolinguistic theories of (super-)diversity as sketched above, research on migrants’ language practices and the acquisition of the majority society’s language faces a massive challenge to engage in demystification and information work. Both the public and the migrants should be helped by a research culture that connects detailed description of linguistic diversity with the experiences and narratives of the

14. See e.g. a posting on HYS-3: “I am an African immigrant and live in the Borough of Brent. I have noted that Brent Council is very hot on offering a variety of translation services to those who cannot speak English. And who is paying for it? Me – the council tax payer! [...] If I went to Thailand, Spain or any other country, and I could not speak the language, I would not be (a) allowed to enrol on a course that was paid for by the Council at tax payers’ expense; and (b) I would not be offered the free services of a translator!

languages users themselves so as to combat the repetition and further entrenchment of xenophobic language myths. Data from public internet forums such as those from HYS provide a good starting point for assessing popular migration-related attitudes beyond mainstream political, institutional and mass media voices.

Acknowledgement

The research leading to these results has received funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme under REA grant agreement № [609305].

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The socio-discursive landscape surrounding the migration debate is characterised by a growing sense of crisis in both personal and collective identities. From this viewpoint, discourses about immigration are also always attempts at reconstructing the threatened 'home identity' of the respective host society. It is such attempts at reasserting identity-in-crisis (due to migration) that are the focus of the volume *Migration and Media: Discourses about identities in crisis*. This four-part book explores the representational strategies used to frame current migration debates as crises of identity, collective and individual. It features fourteen case-studies of varying sets of data including print media texts, TV broadcasts, online forums, politicians' speeches, legal and administrative texts, and oral narratives, drawn from discourses in a range of languages – Croatian, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovenian, Spanish, and Ukrainian – , and it employs different discourse-analytical methods, such as Argumentation and Metaphor Analysis, Gendered Language Studies, Corpus-assisted Semantics and Pragmatics, and Proximization Theory. Such a diverse range of sources, languages, and approaches provides innovative methodological and theoretical analysis on migration and identity which will be of interest to scholars, students, and policy makers working in the fields of migration studies, media studies, identity studies, and social and public policy.

ISBN 978 90 272 0247 5



JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY