

ART, NONVIOLENCE, AND
PREVENTIVE PUBLICS IN
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

BRIANNE COHEN



don't
look
away

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For Nels,
Shannon,
and Rory

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acknowledgments

This book reminds me of the Mallos de Riglos in Spain, a body of rock formations at the foothills of the Pyrenees. Like the cliffs, both strong and subtle forces have shaped and polished the conglomerate rock and sand of this book over a long period of time. Over a decade in the making, this book would not have been possible without the innumerable colleagues, friends, and inspiring authors and artists whose ideas and support have helped me smooth its rough edges, offering me through the process joy, cruxes, and balance.

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Plate 1

Effi & Amir, *The Vanishing Vanishing-Point*,
2015, still image.





Plate 2a

Harun Farocki, *Deep Play*, 2007,
video installation at Documenta 12.
© Harun Farocki GbR. Photo: Julia
Zimmerman/documenta GmbH.

Plate 2b

Harun Farocki, *Deep Play*, 2007,
still image. © Harun Farocki GbR.



Italien

vs.

Frankreich

Italien-Frankreich_1fps_3HZ.txt
 First cycle: 0
 Actual cycle: 11981
 Last cycle: 22670

Cannavaro schießt!
 Toni ist im passiven Abseits!
 Passives Abseits Toni aufgehoben.
 Cannavaro verliert den Ball an Henry.
 Italien versucht, den Ball zu erobern.
 Henry schießt!
 De Rossi schießt!
 Toni ist im passiven Abseits!
 Passives Abseits Toni aufgehoben.
 De Rossi gibt ab an Materazzi.
 Pirlo schießt!
 Materazzi schießt!
 Pirlo gibt ab an De Rossi.

Motion Interpretation by Andrea Miene, TZI, Bremen, www.AndreaMiene.de

Load Data ...

Reset Data

Analyze next

Play & analyze

Pause

Close

Plates 3a and 3b

Harun Farocki, *Deep Play*, 2007, still images.

© Harun Farocki GbR.



Plate 4

Harun Farocki, *Deep Play*, 2007, still image.

© Harun Farocki GbR.



Plate 5

Thomas Hirschhorn, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*,
2009. Photo by the author.



Plates 6a and 6b

Thomas Hirschhorn, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*,
2004–5, video stills from *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*
Experience (2006).



Plates 7a and 7b

Thomas Hirschhorn, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*,
2004–5. Photos: Romain Lopez.



Plates 8a and 8b

Thomas Hirschhorn, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*,
2009, multimedia neighborhood installation.



Plate 9

Thomas Hirschhorn, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*,
2009, multimedia neighborhood installation.



Plate 10

Thomas Hirschhorn, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*,
2009, multimedia neighborhood installation.



Plate 11

Thomas Hirschhorn, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*,
2009, multimedia neighborhood installation.
Photo by the author.



Plate 12

Henry VIII's Wives, *Assassination of a Viet Cong*,
from the *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century*
photographic series, 1999. © Henry VIII's Wives.



Plate 13

Henry VIII's Wives, *Napalm*, from the *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century* photographic series, 1999. © Henry VIII's Wives.



Plate 14

Henry VIII's Wives, *The Lowest Note on
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Grown since 1730 = 8Hz/Subsonic* in front of image
from *Tatlin's Tower and the World*, installation at
the Contemporary Art Centre in Vilnius, Lithuania,
2005. © Henry VIII's Wives.



Plate 15

Henry VIII's Wives, *Tatlin's Tower and the World*,
2005, poster installed in London Underground. ©
Lucy Skaer and Sara De Bondt.



Plates 16a and 16b

Henry VIII's Wives, *Tatlin's Tower and the World*,
2007, views of installation at the Whitechapel
Gallery, London. © Henry VIII's Wives.

introduction

In the video *The Vanishing Vanishing-Point* (2015), an intertitle pleads with viewers, “Don’t look away” (plate 1). It hails a public into being, calling for an ethical act of vision based not only on sight but also on imagination. At this point in the video, viewers witness a dead tree. It is hardly a gruesome image in a conventional sense, yet the three simple words suggest a larger force field of violence surrounding its brittle branches. This is its story: as a Mediterranean olive tree transplanted to the heart of Brussels, in the European Union quarter (relocated like the Israeli-born artists themselves), it could not survive the harsh winters of northern Europe. An olive tree was chosen in order to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the murder of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, a controversial figure who strove for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Notably, olive branches, though a symbol of peace for many, are also fraught markers of the enforced uprooting of Palestinians from their homesteads. Furthermore, planted in Leopold Park, the tree recalls a long history of human and environmental atrocities and genocide committed by King Leopold II and the Belgian nation-state in its ex-colony, the Congo. In the video, Effi & Amir suggest that the olive tree acts as a kind

of “mirror tree” for them, since both they and it were “newcomers uninvited” to Belgium and Europe around the same time in 2005. The image thus also evokes the crisis of displacement and the politics of immigration, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, that have reached a boiling point in the European Union in recent years. With its plea, “Don’t look away,” the artwork aims to conjure a public that will not only notice one tree’s corpse but also attend to this more expanded web of structural violence surrounding it.

At the “heart of the heart of Europe,” as the video notes, Effi & Amir carefully capture the tree’s death over the course of many years through handheld video, and then through Google Street View and Google Earth. With a forensic lens, the pair asks, who is responsible for its death? The artwork, for instance, evokes the parable of the lost garden of paradise and Adam and Eve (aka Effi & Amir), suggesting the idea of original sin. How far back must we investigate in order to unearth culpability for this crime? Moreover, without Effi & Amir’s cameras, would we have even noticed its tiny death in the first place, represented as a mere blip on Google Earth? Initially, its removal is evident on Street View but not via satellite camera, making its absence seem even more discrepant and inconsequential. Ultimately, the artists set forth grave questions concerning not only the complicated social, political, environmental, and historical slow violence of this tree’s history, but also how our current mediatized public sphere registers and provides publicity for such acts of slow violence. With years of available digital imaging of the olive tree, situated right in the central, symbolic park of the EU, could a general public have preempted its unnecessary death? Realized its (physically and symbolically) inhospitable conditions and saved it before it was too late? Can such public awareness prevent violence in the first place?

Typically, ethical considerations of halting violence in the public sphere are raised after significant human rights violations and atrocities have been committed, involving mass bodies or spectacular disasters. Visual culture theorist Thomas Keenan, for instance, has produced invaluable scholarship concerning structures of visibility in relation to humanitarianism and extreme political violence around the world. Investigating the 1990s Bosnian genocide in terms of a new global optic of nonstop satellite and televisual surveillance, he observes, “Among the too many would-be ‘lessons of Bosnia,’ this one stands out for its frequent citation: that a country was destroyed and a genocide happened, in the heart of Europe, on television, and what is known as the world or the West simply looked on and did nothing.”¹ It is obvious that genocide should not have happened, least of all amid such full-on televisual




FIGURE I.1 – Effi & Amir, *The Vanishing Vanishing-Point*, 2015, still image.



FIGURE I.2 – Effi & Amir, *The Vanishing Vanishing-Point*, 2015, still image.

publicity. Yet, critically, Keenan goes beyond a mere question of shaming in order to probe the deeper ramifications concerning today's age of all-access information and atrocities that are now imaged in real time and in full view of a larger public sphere. For him, the more trenchant problem is how we still conceive of a traditional public sphere and, implicitly, the idea that once people have the relevant information, they will act, that things will change. The disastrous fallout of Bosnia was that this understanding of the public sphere "allowed or even produced an interpretative complacency," whereby an active public response was neutralized.² Around the world, from Bosnia to Somalia, Keenan focuses on the spectacular violence and new, unsettling speed and instantaneity of global tele-surveillance systems in the 1990s, yet Effi & Amir remind audiences of the slow violence that quotidian Google cameras now simultaneously register and collect through digital archiving.³ This is not to place speed and slowness in opposition, as Keenan himself warns against ("We cannot simply say, 'warning! slow down!'").⁴ Instead, it is to recognize that two decades later, the public sphere necessarily has a more developed understanding of, and relation to, global mediatization and that one should address interconnecting scales of violence, from drone warfare to everyday Google imaging via global satellites.

A recent group of activist visual and cultural thinkers/producers working on forensic aesthetics and forensic architecture has done groundbreaking work in this respect. Using all possible methods of visual analysis and reconstruction—mostly lens-based media and architecture—this dedicated group, including scholars such as Keenan and Eyal Weizman, aims to turn a forensic lens back onto states and corporations in order to bring mass events of violence to justice (e.g., genocide, human rights violations, environmental destruction).⁵ This means not only in actual courts of law—in literally helping to bring perpetrators of violence to justice—but also within wider public forums such as the mass media. In terms of the latter, and what civil action could arise from such forensic investigation, Weizman claims in an *October* interview, "We have learned that it's not enough to address an academic context or a general 'public domain,' and that to become political we need to think about available civil tools and institutions that can exercise political leverage."⁶ For him, their work is tactical, long-term, and not about "arguing with or critiquing the occupation [of Palestine]." Instead, they wish to "confront it," because "at present it is no longer enough to critique the politics of representation."⁷ Weizman in no way dismisses the value of contradiction, ambiguity, and uncertainty in forensic analysis—quite the contrary. Yet for

him, more direct political action will crystallize through the starting point of materiality, not the “politics of representation.” For any discussion of political aesthetics, in other words, it is important for Weizman not to “get lost in the solipsistic world of the subject or in endless meditations on the spectator.”⁸ The writings and actions of Forensic Architecture are impressive, and they have rightfully gained a tremendous amount of critical acclaim in recent years. However, I am wary of an approach that focuses primarily on materiality at the expense of the messier realm of human discourse and embodiment (even though in other writings Weizman is careful to stress their necessary imbrication). Frequently displayed in museum and gallery contexts, moreover, Forensic Architecture’s practice is also indicative of a growing lionization of artistic-visual work that attempts to affect direct, clearly quantifiable political change in the aftermath of social injustice or atrocity. Ultimately, their conceptual and practical aims are to map culpability and to adjudicate guilt, working with the consequences of clear, tangible violence.

Instead, I wish to transform a question of informed public action in the aftermath of violence to one of the informed public prevention of both direct and more indirect aggression. For this to occur, one must rethink temporality in two ways. On the one hand, publics gain a heightened sense of the power of accretive, more invisible forms of slow violence. On the other hand, questions of response and responsibility transfer from those of action in the aftermath to those of prevention in the first place. As Judith Butler warns in their analysis of the aftermath of 9/11 (September 11, 2001), this is arguably a much more difficult, though necessary, challenge: “Conditions do not ‘act’ in the way that individual agents do, but no agent acts without them.”⁹ In the case of 9/11, they challenge a public to not remain content with only condemnation, to not only isolate individual perpetrators in establishing the most direct, clear line of violence. Rather, publics must search for a larger explanatory framework and the conditions that set the groundwork for such violence to occur in the first place. How might one understand and thus arrest the conditions of violence that lay the foundation for future atrocity to occur?¹⁰

In the case of Europe, one might point to the massacre committed by Anders Behring Breivik. In July 2011, the right-wing extremist and self-described Christian crusader widely disseminated a 1,500-page manifesto, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence.” Breivik titled it thus to signal the four hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Vienna, as supposedly the last united European effort to repel Muslim forces. The manifesto calls for the violent erasure of Islam, immigrants, multiculturalism, and “cultural

Marxism”—all elements purportedly destroying European civilization—and he publicized his missive via social media accounts on Facebook and Twitter just hours before killing seventy-seven people in Oslo, Norway.¹¹ After exploding a car bomb in front of a downtown government building, he traveled to a nearby island and calculatedly shot down the next generation of Labor Party leaders and political activists at a summer youth camp, some no more than sixteen years old. Breivik’s act was singularly shocking, but perhaps more striking is the fact that his beliefs echo many widely held, if less radical, views today in Europe, regarding immigration, Muslims, and intercultural communities. Breivik’s murderous rampage and the onslaught against the World Trade Center, though both spectacularly devastating, are dissimilar in many ways. Yet Butler’s point about the need to investigate broader sociopolitical, economic, and historical conditions remains an important call. What modes of social activism or social imagining could condition a world where such horrific violence would not occur? What public conditions might form a future social imaginary bound by a horizon of nonviolence?

In their book *The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-political Bind* (2020), Butler further outlines the stakes of such a broader project—of crafting a new political imaginary based upon commitments to nonviolence and radical equality, as well as an understanding that vulnerability is not an individual attribute but rather a feature of social relations.¹² Although nonviolence is usually seen as passive, it is in fact an active commitment and project, if less immediately visible. And above all, it is anticipatory: “The task of nonviolence is to find ways of living and acting in that world such that violence is checked or ameliorated, or its direction turned, precisely at moments when it seems to saturate that world and offer no way out. The body can be the vector of that turn, but so too can discourse, collective practices, infrastructures, and institutions.”¹³

Don’t Look Away addresses the contours of what an anticipatory art activism—or the active creation and visualization of nonviolent modes of inhabiting the world—might look like in a twenty-first-century European social imaginary. In Butler’s decades-long analysis of sociopolitical precarity, key examples of nonviolent action include “ethical stylizations” of embodied, concerted assembly making, for instance, as human barriers in street demonstrations.¹⁴ Yet publicly engaged art making may serve as an equally powerful site for the prevention of violence through its active envisioning of nonviolent ways of being and living in the world. I employ the term *preventive public* to signal such art making, whereby art may imagine a discursively

bound web of strangers who self-critically recognize the conditions of their socially entangled and differentially distributed vulnerability. Indeed, I aim to emphasize the conditions, background, or more invisible violence framing publicly oriented art making in Europe. Such art makes publics aware of structural or systemic violence that endures through time in more latent or slower forms, which might become reanimated later in familiar-yet-different ways in a future conditional tense. And, crucially, it makes publics cognizant of the publicity-inducing forms and media that are entangled with such violence. In such a way, artists expose the slower or more invisible conditions of violence in the public sphere in order to hopefully anticipate and arrest such conditions as they could become aggravated even further in a future social imaginary.

This book addresses an aspirational horizon of nonviolence in Europe, riddled as it is with deep contemporary and historical violence, through the projects of artists critically engaged with different public spheres and the spatial and temporal complexities undergirding the formation of public life. The mainstream public sphere is now defined by mediatized imagery in an age of instant information and real-time visuals, and twenty-first-century artists have been adept in tackling this issue. It is the task of the following chapters to explore how principles of collective social vulnerability, plurality, and nonviolence might operate through a diversity of public artistic manifestations, both embodied and mass mediated. On the one hand, artists in Europe such as Harun Farocki, Thomas Hirschhorn, and the collective Henry VIII's Wives—whose practices constitute the case studies in this book—all address spectacular moments of visual contestation that have gone viral, such as the news images of burning cars during the 2005 riots in France. On the other hand, their work also speaks to the digitized slow violence of surveillance and data collection in response to 9/11 and fears of terrorism. Responding to these changing conditions, such artists overwhelm spectators with a deluge of information in their art installations, yet they provide them discursive tools and forms with which to explore common matters of concern through mediatized and embodied relationality among strangers. For instance, Farocki created massive, multiscreen panoplies with surveillance footage and machine-interpreted imagery, mirroring the construction of fear-based publics. His installations physically and conceptually centralize the role of viewers, however, calling on them to critically make sense of the data together as a diverse public of strangers, such as in *Deep Play* with the infamous 2006 World Cup and French Algerian Zinedine Zidane's violent headbutt due to a

racial slur. Hirschhorn fabricates temporary cultural centers in neighborhoods such as the banlieues of Paris or historically ex-colonial-immigrant housing projects outside of Amsterdam, bombarding audiences with information, from community workshops to streaming websites. Yet these neighborhood installations imagine preventive publics through a shared sense of plurality, differentiated vulnerability, and historical reflection. Lastly, Henry VIII's Wives solicited and curated "user-generated content" in both real and digital spaces. With this culled input and feedback, the group reworked iconic, charged images in the mass media such as the Twin Towers in order to also envision nonviolent, preventive publics across Europe.

Each of these art practices, similar to *The Vanishing Vanishing-Point*, implore audiences not to look away—to notice not only the broken branches but also the more hidden roots of violence in Europe today that could lead to deformed life in the future. This is an imaginative task, to envision a horizon of nonviolence where a grounded and historical vanishing point does not vanish but is kept in view. I wish to underline that the focus of this book is on cultural, discursive production. My evocation of a preventive public is not quantifiably or positively illustratable; rather, it centers on the power and critical importance of the imaginative in arresting slow violence. It is imperative to rethink hierarchies of vision and publicity among larger masses of strangers who unsettle clear-cut boundaries of territory, class, language, ethnicity, and so on. Here a charged field of politics transfers from a realm of sovereign, centralized powers or economy to the messy ground of cross-border civil engagement, crafted through culture and discourse. Thus, in the end, while a contemporary art-critical pendulum has swung in favor of a type of direct efficacy wrought by art activism, I remain committed to redefending the imaginative, poetic, often more elusive potential of art in changing mindsets and resisting violence.

Art, Publics, and Violence in Historical and Contemporary Europe

In his memoir, published posthumously in 2017, Stuart Hall recalls the fraught political climate of 1950s Britain.¹⁵ He speaks of the Windrush generation, or a pregnant moment of decolonization for the United Kingdom when half a million people moved from the Caribbean to Britain in response to labor shortages wrought by World War II. This occurred roughly between 1948 and 1970, and the country witnessed racist "white riots" in Notting Hill and

Nottingham in 1958 as well as a strongly populist, xenophobic backlash in the 1960s and early 1970s fomented by Enoch Powell and his anti-immigrant “Rivers of Blood” speech in 1968. Hall’s narrative eerily evokes today’s social atmosphere: “The newspapers were full of reports on the migrant ‘crisis.’ . . . The metaphors began to unroll, the moral panic to unfold. An unstoppable tide of black migrants, the public commentators prophesied, is headed in this direction! The British way of life would never survive the influx!”¹⁶ Indeed, his description uncannily foreshadows the UK’s decision by referendum (51.9 percent of those voting) to leave the European Union, largely viewed as a clarion response to a growing tidal wave of anti-immigrant sentiment evidenced by the rise of the extreme right-wing United Kingdom Independence Party in the early 2010s. Minus a few details, and ignoring the vastly different historical contexts, Hall might be describing here the current political temperature in the United Kingdom and, moreover, across Europe. My point with this limited example is that there are multifarious ways to enter the conversation with which this book wishes to engage, touching on moments that seem to circle back on themselves in different temporal flashes and longer periods from the late 1940s through the 2010s.

In art historical scholarship, one might index a long list of invaluable work addressing earlier, critical inflection points in art making and European public spheres during this stretch of time. This list would include—but by no means be limited to—innovative analyses concerning art, racism, primitivism, and globalization in the United Kingdom by figures such as Kobena Mercer, Rasheed Araeen, and Eddie Chambers.¹⁷ In regard to France, one could point to extensive work on the situationists by Tom McDonough, the visual culture of decolonization by Hannah Feldman, or quite recent work by Lily Woodruff on participatory art and institutional critique.¹⁸ Such scholarship grapples with the specificities of different nationalist frameworks within a European social imaginary and, in doing so, points to the breakdowns and tensions of those borders as well.

Mechtild Widrich’s compelling book, *Performative Monuments: The Re-materialisation of Public Art* (2014), as one example, reflects the typical fluidity of cross-border, multitemporal artistic publics during the second half of the twentieth century. It interpretatively moves from the 1960s to the present day, analyzing confrontational performances by VALIE EXPORT and the Viennese Actionists, feminist art making in former Yugoslavia, and the politics of memory and monuments in Germany. I am particularly sympathetic to Widrich’s methodological approach in its deft stretching of often-separated

categories—memorials, performance art, photography—across different temporal spans. Opening with a description of Thomas Hirschhorn’s *Bataille Monument* (2002), in fact, she coins the term *performative monument* in order to suggest the importance of temporal extension involved in audience-ship and the formation of publics.¹⁹ Such an extended or delayed audience, for example, realized via documentation or architecture that lives on for later publics, allows a “pointing to the past while carrying its political and aesthetic effects into the future.”²⁰ The performative monument thus emphasizes questions of history and commemoration by binding publics together critically through an approach of temporal elongation.

The formation of cross-border, temporally and spatially expansive publics in Widrich’s analysis resonates with this book’s use of the term *public*. Specifically, I draw from Michael Warner’s detailed definition of a public in his book *Publics and Counterpublics* (2004). Chapter 1 provides a much lengthier theoretical elaboration on questions of historical and contemporary public sphere formation in Europe, but for now let me provide a brief sketch of some of Warner’s main points concerning the term. According to him, a public exists as a “space of discourse organized by discourse,” self-creating and self-organized, and “herein lies its power, as well as its elusive strangeness.”²¹ In other words, a public exists only by virtue of being addressed and thus requires at least minimal participation, even if this means the mere act of paying attention.²² A public is organized independently from the state and could potentially be characterized as “stranger-relationality in a pure form,” theoretically uniting strangers through participation alone.²³ It does not select its members according to territory, identity, belief, or any positive content of membership; a constantly imagined strangerhood is its “necessary medium of commonality.”²⁴ In this way, theoretically (although not always in practice), it differs from a community or population, organized according to such positive criteria of belonging: “The existence of a public is contingent on its members’ activity, however notional or compromised, and not on its members’ categorical classification, objectively determined position in the social structure, or material existence.”²⁵ Key here is active participation rather than ascriptive belonging, where attention constitutes membership or, as Warner eloquently puts it, where “the direction of our glance [constitutes] our social world.”²⁶ Finally, as in Widrich’s analysis, not only texts but, critically, a concatenation of texts circulating through time create publics.²⁷ This distinguishes a fixed idea of public space or public art

from a temporally and spatially extended sense of public sphere formation (discussed more in chapter 1).

Of course Warner's abstract definition of a public holds more complex ramifications when thought alongside notions of art making, what might be considered an art public, and the formation of social imaginaries within specific sociohistorical coordinates in Europe. As chapter 3 addresses in depth, for instance, many critics argue that Thomas Hirschhorn's *Bataille Monument* (2002) exploits a lower-income, culturally marginalized community for the sake of exposing social inequalities for a more strictly understood art public. Hirschhorn, Farocki, and Henry VIII's Wives all create and exhibit work within the museum-gallery nexus, but Hirschhorn, in particular, often explicitly challenges the institutional art frameworks within which his artwork operates and makes claims on reaching broader, more plural and porously distributed publics.

In this sense, his neighborhood installations could be situated and addressed within longer histories of institutional critique, also concerned with the "old promise of the museum as a founding institution of the public sphere," as art historian Blake Stimson describes it.²⁸ In *Institutional Critique: An Anthology of Artists' Writings* (2009), coedited by Stimson and Alex Alberro, Alberro more explicitly connects the museum space to a Habermasian-like space of critique and debate, one "founded as a democratic site for the articulation of knowledge, historical memory, and self-reflexivity, and as an integral element in the education and social production of civil society."²⁹ In his view, most art practices following a trend of "historical institutional critique" from the late 1960s and 1970s have put "pressure on the disjuncture between the self-presentation of the art institution (as democratic and free of discrimination, partisanship, and plainly put, ideology) and the highly gendered, raced, and classed ideology that actually permeates it."³⁰ This echoes criticism of an idealized Habermasian public sphere (see chapter 1) and could also describe Hirschhorn's neighborhood installations. Furthermore, such artists—as well as Hirschhorn—have not attempted to jettison art public institutions or infrastructures, but rather have attempted to "straighten up the operation of this central site of the public sphere [the museum] and to realign its actual function with what it is in theory."³¹ In this way, an art historical line of institutional critique informs questions of public sphere formation within this book, yet it is not the focus of my analysis. As Stimson points out, institutional critique and institutions more fundamentally are bound to a matter

of authority, to centralized sites of top-down power.³² Instead, what I wish to stress interpretatively within this book is the decentralized, discursively dispersed, and “elusive strangeness”—to recall Warner’s description—of public opinion. As such, it is almost impossible to clearly delineate between a public and an art public, yet my specific chapter analyses of projects, such as Hirschhorn’s neighborhood installations, attempt to tease out the deeper, more specific consequences of addressing multiple publics with distinct commitments and modes of attention.

To return to a question of Europe, what I have seen less of within art historical scholarship is studies of contemporary art that, with sustained attention, connect histories of Holocaust violence with those of decolonization processes on the continent. In this regard, Hannah Feldman is right to reject the term *postwar* in her visual-cultural analysis of the period 1945–62 in France, for as she notes, “the history of war in France during the decades of decolonization would prove ongoing and perpetual.”³³ Making such connections is an urgent project for our historical moment and for thinking through the current tensions concerning migration, which affects every corner of Europe. Farocki’s classic film *Images of the World and the Inscription of War* (*Bilder der Welt und Inschrift des Krieges*, 1988), for instance, still speaks volumes today, with its juxtaposition of a forceful gaze by a Jewish woman in a Nazi concentration camp with the forced unveiling of thousands of Algerian women for identification purposes in a French internment camp (figure 1.3).³⁴ Although a sensitive area of scholarship—the relating of Holocaust studies to those of European imperialism—it is nonetheless burgeoning today in postcolonial and memory studies due to the fact that the scars of these imbricated histories still deeply etch the face of contemporary politics on the continent.³⁵

I approach these longer histories through the complexly historicized practices of Harun Farocki, Thomas Hirschhorn, and Henry VIII’s Wives. I focus on specific cross-sections of their oeuvres from approximately 2004 to 2009, which in turn reflect on a variety of flashpoints of violence and public formation from the end of World War II through the twenty-first century. With this analytical move, I wish to stress a certain type of temporal stretching and border crossing across the idea and geography of Europe. Following memory studies scholar Michael Rothberg’s methodological call for multidirectional memory, this book—with a commitment still to deeply hewn analyses—aims to traverse genres, nations, periods, and cultures.³⁶ It is crucial, for instance, to recognize the specificity of the Nazi genocide, yet a comparative, multidirectional analysis suggests that we must not cordon it off from



FIGURE 1.3 – Harun Farocki, *Images of the World and the Inscription of War* (*Bilder der Welt und Inschrift des Krieges*), 1988, film still. © Harun Farocki GbR.

other histories of collective violence (such as those of Indigenous, minority, and colonial genocide), which would be “intellectually and politically dangerous” in potentially creating a hierarchy of suffering and removing such violence from an intricately enmeshed historical field.³⁷ Such comparative thinking is not only productive in its fostering of new lines of sight and insight, but also important for enabling unexpected empathies, solidarities, and visions of justice to coalesce.³⁸ Following this impulse, this book’s three case studies traverse unique generational perspectives on a New Europe in the twenty-first century.³⁹ A comparison among them is fruitful for the different historical bearings that anchor each of their oeuvres: Farocki’s practice emerged at the height of ’68er social and artistic upheaval and with

a trenchant attention to the sociopolitical devastation of the Holocaust; Hirschhorn's came to maturity against the backdrop of 1980s community arts practices and fraught postcolonial politics throughout the continent; and Henry VIII's Wives developed their practice in a post-Maastricht Treaty moment of deeper Europeanization and hopes for transnational unity. These artists' various generational backgrounds and geographical positioning allow them unique vantage points through their art making, and they offer diverse approaches to questions of publicity and public making that resonate with the heterogeneity and heterochronicity of media in operation today.

Additionally, my focus on particular artworks of theirs from roughly a handful of years between 2004 and 2009 coincides with a fraught period in European public spheres concerning the EU's perceived public deficit, which I will return to later. This moment marked a heightened awareness and questioning of mass citizen-strangers throughout Europe regarding the proposed deepening and widening of the EU's powers. Indeed, it is a time when the idea of Europe became quite charged and increasingly prominent in different yet overlapping public spheres throughout the continent. The artists' oeuvres, however, do not aim to create a homogenized and bounded, reconfigured sense of belonging or unity. In this manner, their work does not fit within a more traditional understanding, or regular routes, of collectivizing, alliance-building artistic activism. Artwork during this "period of reflection," by figures such as Farocki, Hirschhorn, and Henry VIII's Wives, raises pertinent questions regarding "the people" of Europe and historically interwoven modalities of violence and vulnerability that thread through the frayed seams of this socially imagined construct.⁴⁰

The Time of Prevention

For some, the term *preventive* may trigger alarm bells. Does it not replicate the dangerous language of state security apparatuses that attempt to preempt non-compliant actions by citizens, to detect and prevent any possible threatening events in a future conditional tense? This is the logic by which governments and corporations advertise their "salutary" use of surveillance technologies: in order to discourage harmful behavior and promote the harmonious coordination of social space. I analyze this question of security in chapter 1. For now let me attempt to clarify what I mean by *preventive*, a term with tremendous potential but also maligned to a large degree, ensnared as it is in military and security discourses.

I wish to rehabilitate it in the metaphorical sense of preventive health, within a discourse of care, maintenance, and infrastructural attention.⁴¹ Preventive health care encourages thoughtful, sustained scrutiny of the invisible roots of latent diseases, both those chronic and those quickly ignitable. At least in the US health care system, far too much currency is still afforded to quick-fix treatment after the fact, not to habitual checkups and durational, salubrious living habits—exercise, nutritious diet, enough sleep, and so on—in an anticipatory fashion. This kind of bedrock labor is often much more difficult and unquantifiable, not so easily measured in terms of long-term investment (as well as simply less profitable for the medical and pharmaceutical industries). Preventive health care does not target a specific disease with clear impact, but aims for the vital yet amorphous, less tangible contours of general health.

Yet to extend the metaphor further, the ability to carry out such self-care life choices, and access to the institutional and environmental support necessary for them, are by no means equally distributed. It is too frequently and typically the case that the most vulnerable and disabled peoples have the least access to quality health care, alimentary food, clean air, untainted water, with the list going on and on. In this regard, preventive health takes on the guise of personal responsibility and dissimulates its collective, civic foundations. As many scholars such as Judith Butler and Laura Ann Stoler have stressed, precarity is differentially distributed. Health and harm fluctuate in densities and distributions according to many historical, intersectional factors of race, gender, sex, class, age, and disability.

In *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times*, Stoler proffers a concept of duress in order to signal such uneven distributions of care and injury, which, for her, result from colonial histories that live on in the present as multifarious “imperial formations” and “ruins.” In other words, duress demands an analytic vocabulary that unearths what artifacts recombine in the present in transfigured ways, ruins that often revivify in deeply affective or concretely material and bodily forms.⁴² For example, colonial histories often faintly but durably imprint the fabric of twenty-first-century life in the French banlieues in visceral ways. Sometimes these are more easily calculable, as with an unemployment rate among youth that has frequently stood at 40 percent, or four times the national average, yet often such duress is less obviously manifest in its clipping of the “health, livelihood, and psychic endurance” of particular groups.⁴³ In this sense, her work dovetails with the eco-postcolonial theorist Rob Nixon’s idea of slow violence, or aggressions that are slower,

more habitual, or historically sedimented.⁴⁴ Yet Stoler's concept of duress is particularly compelling for my analysis of violence in Europe in its attention to differentially distributed futures. For her, duress is a relationship of "actualized and anticipated violence."⁴⁵ Critically, she stresses how such slow violence will continue to propagate unequally for the most vulnerable, and perhaps even exponentially so, in future times.

Thus, borrowing from Michel Foucault, she insists on the need for a "'recursive analytics,' or history as recursion."⁴⁶ The receding and resurfacing ruins of the past are not over and are never repeated in the same way, and when imperial governance meets armatures of security, it prompts an "avid concern not only for what is but for *what might be* [original emphasis]."⁴⁷ Stoler's analysis of historical time is not based on simple continuities, ruptures, or cycles, but rather on uneven repetitions with difference, or a type of historical folding-back-on-itself that mines yet also replots topographies of violence. Such a historiographical method of recursive analytics, one attuned to both the actual and anticipated aggressions of colonial entailments, is valuable in helping to imagine a type of public sphere formation in Europe centered on violence prevention. For if the grand, unifying project of a twentieth-century Europe was one geared toward nonviolence, then its seams have since been continually unsewn and frayed by violent histories of segregations and killings that repeatedly manifest in similar yet uncanny ways, from its present-day immigrant detention centers to a fetishization of sartorial appearance for women.

Along a similar vein, literary scholar Paul Saint-Amour calls for scholarship in critical futurities. In an impressive study on modernist aesthetics and the anticipatory violence of war, he rejects conventional historiography (an underlying thread in this book, touching on work from Aby Warburg and Walter Benjamin to Homi Bhabha and Stoler), that is "uncritically premised on the future's openness," paying "scant attention to the shape of that opening, to the constraints on futurity's aperture."⁴⁸ Likewise, many contemporary artist-activists are working within this imaginative, speculative line of inquiry, recognizing a constricted "aperture of futurity" for many that should not and need not continue to be "just an extrapolation of present-day power."⁴⁹

In terms of artistic production, socially oriented art is also often described within contrasting temporal schemas of either rupture or continuity.⁵⁰ The historical avant-garde in modern art, for example, attempted to disrupt or break temporal continuity in order to promote novel, nonnormative ways

of thinking. Much artistic activism today, conversely, aims for greater impact through durational, lengthily researched art projects, often involving many other nonartist participants, whether these form a more marginalized community or an assembled cohort of boundary-crossing thinkers. Both are important modes of socially engaged art production; they just figure through time differently. One extolls immediate disruption, whereas another advocates longer-term commitment or temporal investment, in order to affect social attitudes.

However, another common temporal schema in art making could be named as well, one that, to my knowledge, has not been labeled as such: recursive artistic creation or intervention. This type of artistic activism would recognize the often slow and recursive (repeating yet different) aspects of violence that affect precarious peoples in inequitably distributed ways, leading to differentially injured futures. This is not to champion recursive socially engaged art making above art projects that stress immediate rupture or durational change. It is simply to highlight artists who think about the same sets of problems repeatedly but in varying contexts, according to densities and distributions of violence, both diachronically and synchronically. Farocki, for example, revisited the same problematics over and over again in his moving-image installations, working intertextually and intervistically to thread together disparate yet related histories of violence in Europe. Hirschhorn, likewise, creates recursively oriented neighborhood installations, always focused on questions of imperial duress yet in different locales. Finally, Henry VIII's Wives also produced work in a recursive manner, particularly returning to the same set of concerns with their campaign *Tatlin's Tower and the World*, yet always in altered spatiotemporal coordinates with each iteration of the project. I would argue that for these artists, in adopting such a temporalized mode of recursive artistic creation, violence prevention is an operative principle and driving force.

A recursive lens may provide a certain visibility to reanimations of aggression, both discursive and material, that are similar but always different. A stark example would be Denmark's recently passed set of laws, known as the "ghetto package," which literally labels people living in the country's twenty-five low-income and largely Muslim neighborhoods as "ghetto parents" and "ghetto children."⁵¹ Now beginning at the age of one, "ghetto children" in these areas (not other children until the age of six), for instance, must be separated from their parents for a mandatory twenty-five hours a week (not including nap time) for training at preschools in "Danish values," including language

and Christian rituals. Otherwise their welfare benefits could be stripped from them. This is only the tip of the iceberg for these laws: other proposals are much more punitive, involving prison time, curfews, and surveillance. Amazingly, such rhetoric and laws are popular among many Danish citizens, and issues of Muslim ghettoization do not recall for them the horrors of religious persecution, segregation, and encampment in Nazi Germany. In this example, what is lacking is not enough population management for violence preemption. Rather, it is a sense of collective, discursive expectation of perhaps more spectacular, recursive violence built upon slow violence, where both actualized and anticipated harm inhabit the lives of the most scapegoated and precarious. This is not to be alarmist, but to recognize, with a recursive-analytic lens, forms of violence that accrete and erode more latently. With just enough lived information from past realizations and experiences, an anticipatory-activist mode could recognize how such violence might manifest in order to attempt to predict and mitigate its deleteriously distributed, future pressures.

Ultimately, what I wish to stress here is a mode of artistic activism that not only attempts to address clear sociopolitical injustices in their aftermath, but also engages with the messier, less quantifiable work of imagining and preventing violence as it may recur in a future conditional tense. To halt one instance of violence in one place may not be enough for violence prevention, if one does not also analyze the potentially reanimating logic and symptoms of that violence and anticipate it in other future scenarios. To return to my metaphor of preventive health, this type of necessary but largely immeasurable work looks at densities and distributions of potential harm, armed with the insights of accrued experience and knowledge of past injuries, in order to attend to a better, more equitably apportioned, general public health for as long a future as possible.

One more point regarding time: such a proleptic mode of violence prevention would depend upon the self-reflexivity of publics as publics. I do not mean to glorify self-reflexivity as a principle derived from the modern avant-garde, which, again, worked to catalyze novelty and push beyond the status quo. Instead, I wish to stress self-reflexivity as a type of discursive cross-citatoriality that leads to a recursive, thoughtful analysis of public matters of concern. Cross-citatoriality sparks public awareness of a public's being through time, as Michael Warner asserts, and works against a reductive, historicist account of being in "empty, homogenous time," as Walter

Benjamin famously described it.⁵² The latter, a type of steadily progressing calendrical and clock time, allows for the formation of national imagined communities, as Benedict Anderson even more prominently borrowed the idea.⁵³ It might also lead to a type of dangerous, social chrononormativity, or temporal binding of individual human bodies for an end goal of maximum productivity, as Elizabeth Freeman eloquently contends in *Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories*. I more closely analyze the critically recursive time of self-reflexivity in chapter 3, but for now let me place it in relief against an idea of virality.

When images or texts go viral online, they move rapidly and reductively, never changing. Virality sparks an unintelligent jolt of publicity that moves through time, but that requires no self-reflexivity of publics and thus no recursive analytics of violence or possible violence prevention. This is not to equate virality with speed, to place speed and slowness in opposition, or to suggest that through a necessarily longer time and with more information, people will act and that violence will diminish, recalling Thomas Keenan's analysis of violence in a European public sphere. After all, terrorist cells could strengthen through slower, recursive practices of indoctrination, or non-violent, sentimental public attention could arise through the fast, viral dissemination of cute animal images online.⁵⁴ Again, key here is not a question of speed versus slowness, but rather that neither of these publics arguably move beyond a plane of superficial, one-dimensional public discourse, even if virality might ensure that an image reaches a large number of people. Viral movement does not create self-reflexivity in the sense that Warner describes it, where discourse is referenced, quoted, and repeated through a citational, contextual field that always morphs with each future iteration.⁵⁵ This builds a much more complex, overlapping social awareness of background conditions, causality, and effects—similar in some sense to what Eyal Weizman terms *field causality* in forensic aesthetics.⁵⁶ In its simplification of a field of attention, virality echoes the salutary violence prevention of surveillance and security operations. It would also notionally link to a moral panic, or lightning-quick spreading of fear, one that leans on questions of presumed morality in order to contain or preempt certain social behaviors.⁵⁷ Conversely, I employ the term *preventive* in order to think through a type of discourse and general social health that requires continual maintenance and care, checks and balances, collective labor, and recursive and self-reflexive calibrations.

The Idea of Europe

Contemporary Europe stands as an exemplary and urgent site for rethinking the formation of nonviolent publics. Europe is a compendious category that not only signifies almost limitless local variation but also runs across fractious lines of class, nation, ethnicity, race, gender, sex, religion, and generation, and the European Union, in some sense—“united in diversity” as its slogan reads—is perhaps the most politically and economically ambitious preventive project against violence ever to be conceived. Dating from the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the seeds of the EU extend even further to the end of the Holocaust and World War II, and the budding hopes for nonviolence in the wake of such devastation. In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), for example, was not only forged as an economic pact among six nations (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) but was also shaped by an implicit mandate to create peaceful, political coexistence on the continent. Coal and steel, after all, were vital resources for any nation wishing to conduct war. The preamble to the Treaty of Paris, which established the ECSC, states in lofty terms that the leaders of the countries were “resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforth shared.”⁵⁸ In 1957, the Treaties of Rome further solidified the economic ties of these six nations in establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the European Atomic Energy Community, commonly referred to as Euratom. The purpose of the latter was to pool nuclear resources together to develop a secure form of energy independence, used only for nonmilitary, civil, and peaceful means. Of course, aspirations for a federally or functionally reconstructed Europe were simultaneously mitigated by the political realities of the Cold War and competing ideological interests among nation-states (the United States foremost among them). Historiographies of this nascent period and subsequent reasons for growth of the European Union have been extensively analyzed elsewhere, and this book does not purport to examine the historical nuances of political integration of the continent.⁵⁹ My point is that the idea of Europe since the end of World War II and the Holocaust has gone hand-in-hand with hopes for the end of violence and the fruitful cooperation of a border-crossing community. Its last sixty-five years have been a tremendous, singular political and economic

experiment in its attempt to bring harmony and codependence to a region of historically warring nation-states.

Yet now the tendentiously labeled refugee crisis threatens to tear New Europe apart at its seams, with over a million impoverished and war-traumatized asylum seekers streaming across Europe's porous borders along the Mediterranean and the Balkans region. European membership in anti-immigrant political parties has ballooned, and their violent rhetoric has soared across mainstream and alternative media channels. Additionally, post-1980s neo-liberal values continue to chip away internally at the traditional European welfare state. Austerity measures, largely advocated by the new German pulse of European commerce, have put many national economies and communities at peril, including the most notorious case of Greece but also, less spectacularly, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and even France.⁶⁰ The fault lines of European unification have seriously jolted, as Greece's near exit and the UK's actual exit from the EU (leaving it with twenty-seven members), as well as the influx of global South refugees, have tested both the viability of Europeanization and the egalitarian credibility of a bureaucratically pacifist, public motto *In varietate concordia*, "united in diversity."

As such, Hannah Arendt remains a colossal figure for thinking through the politics and ethics of a European social imaginary. As she famously asserts in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, it is not the abstract human rights of freedom or equality that are the basis of humanity, but rather membership in political communities that are willing and able to guarantee these and any other rights in the first place. In other words, political affiliations are meant to safeguard rights of equality against a tremendous background of real, disquieting human differentiation—the "disturbing miracle" that each of us is "single, unique, unchangeable."⁶¹ The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was intended to deem certain human rights basic and inalienable, yet, in practice, human life is messy, unique, differentiated, and never fungible as part of a human race or species. Without a political umbrella in the first half of the twentieth century, without concrete ties to a specific state, minorities, refugees, and asylum seekers paradoxically lost the most abstract right to have rights in the first place. The modern figure of the refugee replaced the citizen, and, in the worst case, the internment camp became the "substitute for a nonexistent homeland," with the literal equivalence of a statistical body count replacing the abstract equality of citizenship.⁶²

According to Arendt, this was the unique effect of totalitarianism, which radically dehumanized people and designated them within a space of *what*

rather than *who*, a question that became central to her following book, *The Human Condition*. For her, the human condition, rather, describes one's capacity for speech and action within a web of plural human relationships, or one's ability to bring about change through newness and unpredictable events. In many ways, this book hinges upon Arendt's conception of the space of appearance—or the space that contravenes those of the concentration camp or detention center. In such a space of appearance, people may assert their differentiated subjectivities—their plurality—within a gossamer web of messy, mortal life.

Arendt's work has received tremendous scholarly attention in the last decades, her often unclassifiable and nonnormative writings recuperated for their timely and still relevant insights, yet her acumen was also tempered by the historical moment within which she wrote. Not least of all, her public-political space of appearance was conceptualized as one of heteronormative white male privilege.⁶³ And although many postcolonial scholars such as Edward Said and Homi Bhabha have also leaned on her critical work (not to mention that of other important German Jewish diasporic thinkers such as Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno)—in order to think through ours as an “age of the refugee, the displaced person, mass immigration”—*The Origins of Totalitarianism* is still decidedly Eurocentric in harmful ways.⁶⁴ Importantly, Arendt links anti-Semitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism throughout the tripartite structure of her book, shuffling between European and non-European terrain at a moment of increasing anticolonial struggle. Yet, as Holocaust and memory studies scholar Michael Rothberg claims, her account of African subjects is reductive and ultimately dehumanizing.⁶⁵ He contends, “Arendt is ahead of her time in grasping the specificity of what would become known as the Holocaust as well as in linking the genocide to European colonialism, but . . . she simultaneously falls victim to tendencies within colonial discourse that she otherwise unveils.”⁶⁶

Thus, while Arendt's hopes for a transnational European federation in the wake of extreme violence and her theorization of a liberatory space for public engagement create a through line for this book, it is more so through her sensitive interlocutors—such as Judith Butler and Ariella Azoulay, who rely extensively on Arendt's insights for their own analyses of public sphere formation—that I approach the question of twenty-first-century art making in a European public sphere. It is, however, also due to Arendt's deep commitment to an accounting of historical violence and collective social

vulnerability during the decades riven by the Holocaust and decolonization in Europe, as a theoretical project beholden to questions of plurality (with all of its flaws in mind), that I draw more inspiration from her ideas concerning the public sphere than those posed by Jürgen Habermas in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962). Published four years after *The Human Condition*, Habermas's seminal book is the cornerstone of public sphere theory for many in terms of Western Europe. It also builds from historical analysis and received much critical, renewed attention when it was finally translated and published in English in 1989. Yet, as chapter 1 outlines in further detail, his ideal model of a bourgeois public sphere based upon rational-critical discourse, along with his view of its decline in the twentieth century through developments such as the mass media, increased consumption, and the welfare state, speaks less directly to the entangled matters of plurality, violence, and social vulnerability upon which this book pivots. In the end, Arendt's hopeful allegiance to notions of newness, unpredictability, and promise—as opposed to Habermas's more pessimistic, midcentury view of the devolution of the public sphere amid advanced capitalism—imbue this book's utopian ideas regarding contemporary art making and the prevention of violence in a twenty-first-century European social imaginary.

Theories of a Social Imaginary: Antagonism, Cosmopolitanism, Vulnerability

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's post-Marxist book on democratic theory, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (1985), stands as a foundational text for thinking through questions of plurality and antagonism in the formation of social imaginaries. Crucially, Laclau and Mouffe contend that democracies arise not despite antagonisms, but because of them: "Indeed, we maintain that without conflict and division, a pluralist democratic politics would be impossible."⁶⁷ For them, antagonism arises from a realization that "the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself"; subject positions are both materially and discursively constructed and constantly shifting in relation to one another.⁶⁸ This, in turn, provides a limit to the social, as "something subverting [the social], destroying its ambition to constitute a full presence."⁶⁹ Laclau and Mouffe attempt to rethink the social field in light of 1960s and 1970s social movements in order to assert that orthodox Marxism can no longer claim class to be the funda-

mental antagonism of society. In this way, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy's* forceful critique has arguably helped pave the way for a more intersectional, liberatory politics to emerge.

It has also gained critical prominence within the discipline of art history, particularly in relation to an understanding of public and/or participatory art, including Thomas Hirschhorn's neighborhood installations, due to the work of scholars such as Rosalyn Deutsche, Claire Bishop, and Shannon Jackson.⁷⁰ In her 2004 *October* essay, "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics," for instance, written as a rebuttal to Nicolas Bourriaud's theory of relational aesthetics, Claire Bishop employs Laclau and Mouffe's ideas to promote Thomas Hirschhorn's neighborhood artworks as critically "antagonistic," in contrast to what she views as more "feel-good" socially oriented pieces by artists such as Rirkrit Tiravanija and Liam Gillick. In *Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics* (2011), in turn, Shannon Jackson lays out a nuanced critique of Bishop's use of the classic post-Marxist text, particularly questioning Bishop's emphasis on contextual social friction as the key to antagonism within art pieces by Hirschhorn and Santiago Sierra rather than a type of tensile force that would question a neutral social structuring of the art world to begin with.⁷¹ Jackson highlights the fact that despite Bishop's "own careful attention to the distinctions Laclau and Mouffe make between a physical concept of opposition (the 'car crash model') and a social concept of antagonism," her use of language such as "tough" and "excruciating" to categorize her championed artworks as antagonistic "risks framing antagonism as a quite intelligible—and marketable—crash between two opposing forces."⁷² Instead, Jackson reiterates Laclau and Mouffe's emphasis on antagonism as an integral limit to the social, as "something subverting [the social], destroying its ambition to constitute a full presence," or something that fundamentally undergirds and constitutes a politics of democracy and plurality.⁷³

What interests me in terms of such an artistic-social imaginary is how antagonism and plurality also necessarily include social vulnerability or, again, this realization that "the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself."⁷⁴ Rosalyn Deutsche, in her brilliant collection of essays, *Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics* (1996), also draws from *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* and its notion of antagonism, but her analysis often hinges it to a matter of social vulnerability as well. Written over the span of a decade, beginning in 1985, Deutsche's essays unpack and denounce a kind of masculinist, neo-Marxist discourse in cultural theory, art history, and urban geography studies that seriously misunderstood, or outright dismissed, the luminous

insights of feminist contemporary art and scholarship concerning the visual world. In attempting to include and listen to a wider diversity of voices against the dominant discourse, Deutsche points to encounters with Others not as an antagonistic recognition of lack, but as a realization of bountiful, and binding, social vulnerability. For her, public space is also a realm of “being-in-common,” where we are “presented with our existence outside ourselves.”⁷⁵ This breaching of a sense of individual self “is a condition of exposure to an outside that is also an instability within, a condition, as Thomas Keenan says, ‘of vulnerability.’ [The feminist-inspired exhibition] ‘Public Vision’ implied that the masculinist viewer’s claim of disinterest and impartiality is a shield erected against this vulnerability, a denial of the subject’s immersion in the openness of public space.”⁷⁶ Written in her aptly titled chapter “Agoraphobia,” the “openness” of public space suggests complex ramifications, explicitly tied to a theory of democracy posited by Claude Lefort, one based upon an “empty place” at the heart of society. Here social space holds instability at its core; there is no foundation of meaning or unity to society. Rather, the exercise of power is constantly interrogated, and political rights are declared.⁷⁷ Instability in this sense might presuppose endless contestation against the violence of power, or it might intimate an underlying social vulnerability and precarity in such an insecure, open yet volatile space.

In *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (2004), Judith Butler embraces vulnerability as a paramount means toward nonviolent, democratic public formation. Similar to Laclau and Mouffe, Butler imagines the basis for such political transformation in an encounter with the Other.⁷⁸ They also understand the formation of one’s self to be contingent upon such encounters, or one’s subject position to be in constant flux through the addressing of and by others, depriving one of one’s will in discourse and any solid, unitary ground of identification. Butler stresses the encounter as one of ethics and responsibility, laying the foundation for a nonviolent, democratic public sphere upon bedrocks of plurality and social vulnerability.⁷⁹ Exposure to others and the risk of violence may be reframed as the risk of losing our attachments, as cutting us off from socially constituted bodies. Thus, it is not only the bodily precarity of life but also the fragility of social relations with others—and how they “dispossess” us through grief, passion, rage—that may ethically bind people through difference and a sense of interdependence.⁸⁰ “This fundamental dependency on anonymous others is not a condition that I can will away. No security measure will foreclose this dependency; no violent act of sovereignty will rid the world of this fact.”⁸¹ Here,

of course, their theory poses a more concrete challenge to US policies after 9/11 that attempted to shore up borders, tighten security, and quell criticism in order to reconstitute an “imagined wholeness” for an American national subject and deny vulnerability at any cost, ultimately continuing to stoke the flames of violence.⁸² In *The Force of Nonviolence*, Butler extends this critique to the borders of Europe, where thousands of migrants have died and remained ungrievable in a European social imaginary.⁸³

In some sense, Butler’s *Precarious Life* builds on a discourse of cosmopolitanism that emerged in full force in the late 1990s and early 2000s, questioning possibilities for global affiliation or a mode of plural, political belonging that would acknowledge the lack of privilege, dispossession, and coerced movements for many in an increasingly transnational space. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Homi Bhabha, Sheldon Pollock, and Carol Breckenridge, in their introduction to their co-edited volume *Cosmopolitanism* (2002), mark their age’s need to demythologize the cosmopolitan as a universalizable figure of humanity or Kantian “citizen of the world.”⁸⁴ Instead, a reworked strand of postcolonial cosmopolitanism recognizes that refugees, migrants, and exiles “represent the spirit of the cosmopolitical community” at the turn of the century, characterized according to them by the three main concerns of nationalism, globalization, and multiculturalism.⁸⁵ Likewise, Bruce Robbins maintains in his coedited volume with Pheng Cheah, *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation* (1998), “The willingness to consider the well-being of people who do not belong to the same nation as you is not, in other words, something that is mysteriously pre-given by the simple fact of belonging to the human species.”⁸⁶ Rather, it must be laboriously crafted out of “imperfect historical materials” already at hand in an actually existing cosmopolitanism.⁸⁷ Butler’s theorization of a border-crossing social imaginary based on vulnerability echoes Robbins’s description of this actually existing cosmopolitanism (here echoing Nancy Fraser’s famous essay on “actually existing democracy”).⁸⁸ Robbins explains, “Another way to put the contrast is to say that instead of an ideal of detachment [or a universalizing citizenship of the world], actually existing cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance.”⁸⁹ It is such psychically and materially based, messy attachments to larger social bodies—based on precarity and the risk of violence to such attachments—that “may ethically bind people through difference and a sense of interdependence.”⁹⁰

In *The Force of Nonviolence*, however, Butler more explicitly underlines the problems with a discourse of “vulnerable groups” and a potentially uni-

versalizing discourse of vulnerability.⁹¹ Vulnerability cannot be isolated from other terms or serve as the sole foundation for a new politics: “In portraying people and communities who are subject to violence in systemic ways, do we do them justice, do we respect the dignity of their struggle, if we summarize them as ‘the vulnerable’?”⁹² Here Butler points directly to large numbers of dispossessed peoples abandoned by nation-states and the European Union. Yet, echoing Ariella Azoulay’s critique of the facile use of the term “refugee,”⁹³ they point to a paternalistic ease in categorizing “the vulnerable” for “protection” within systems that actually perpetuate material precarity and differentially distributed vulnerability:

What if the situation of those deemed vulnerable is, in fact, a constellation of vulnerability, rage, persistence, and resistance that emerges under these same historical conditions? It would be equally unwise to extract vulnerability from this constellation; indeed, vulnerability traverses and conditions social relations, and without that insight we stand little chance of realizing the sort of substantive equality that is desired. Vulnerability ought not to be identified exclusively with passivity; it makes sense only in light of an embodied set of social relations, including practices of resistance. . . . If our frameworks of power fail to grasp how vulnerability and resistance can work together, we risk being unable to identify those sites of resistance that are opened up by vulnerability.⁹⁴

In other words, Butler does claim the need for a new social imaginary, one based upon a recognition of the interdependency of lives and the avowal of vulnerability as a key feature of social relations, but they are careful to reject vulnerability as “an identity, a category, or a ground for political action.”⁹⁵ Instead, an active demonstration of nonviolent ties of social attachment and vulnerability—too often deemed passive—may serve as an important catalyst for solidarity against forms of affiliation built upon domination, mastery, “heroic individualism,” and an idea of strength “as the achievement of invulnerability.”⁹⁶

However, Butler’s larger corpus of thinking on vulnerability and precarity emphasizes, in the end, the physical body as a primary site of violence and nonviolence. Although *The Force of Nonviolence*, as well as their theorization of assembly in *Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly*, takes into account the importance of media circuits in establishing a larger sphere of appearance, they provide it less detailed attention.⁹⁷ Consequently, their understanding of bodily precarity and politicized gathering might seem more

applicable to one of Thomas Hirschhorn's neighborhood installations, for instance, but the following chapters aim to elaborate how both embodied and mass mediated artworks may actively envision a more democratic social imaginary built upon plurality and nonviolence.

Scope and Method

Each case study in this book offers unique and rich ways, across genres and geographies, for thinking through some of the growing complexities of twenty-first-century public formation in a transnational European space. Within the fields of political science, international relations, media studies, and European studies, there is a vast, growing body of literature concerning the Europeanization of the public sphere in Europe and the European Union. Much of this scholarship, in contrast to this book, is grounded in empirical, quantitative research, although it often points to the conceptual groundwork laid by figures such as Habermas and Craig Calhoun. In one study, *Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media and Civil Society*, for instance, the editors even refer to their object of analysis with the monolithic moniker EPS, or European Public Sphere.⁹⁸ As a counterexample, Thomas Risse's work on the emergence of more robust and heterogenous, transnational public spheres (notably, pluralized) in twenty-first-century Europe—not in some “abstract, supranational space”—resonates more with the ethos of *Don't Look Away*.⁹⁹ Critically, Risse attends to nuanced distinctions and/or overlaps between a European community and a European public sphere, which is a key distinction I elaborate on in chapter 3.

Most importantly for this study, Risse and other experts such as political sociologist Jos de Beus contend that an age of “permissive consensus” in the European integration process has come to an end.¹⁰⁰ This is the idea that “a positive or neutral majority opinion of the public allows for elite autonomy and imagination in foreign policy, in particular public action toward the objective of European unification.”¹⁰¹ According to Jos de Beus, the first decades of European integration were achieved mostly through a cloak of secrecy and closure to mainstream public engagement.¹⁰² In later decades, since the end of the Cold War, the European Union has seen remarkable “deepening” with greater integration and strengthening of its supranational institutions, as well as “widening,” with increased membership, from twelve nations in 1990 to twenty-seven in 2007. Yet with such expansion, achieved largely through “the closed and secret geopolitics of European great powers,” Euro-

pean citizens have increasingly pushed back against a perceived “democratic deficit,” claiming that “thin, top-down communication on deals struck at European summits will no longer suffice.”¹⁰³ This was evidenced in 2005 by French and Dutch voters’ rejection of a draft constitution for a new Treaty of Rome, signed by all members of the European Council, which plunged the integration process into crisis. A revised Reform Treaty of Lisbon was then also rejected through an Irish referendum in 2008 but finally accepted in a second referendum in 2009. With these events and the scaling back of further constitutional deepening, many have questioned whether a public sphere deficit exists in Europe.¹⁰⁴ Concomitantly, calls for a European public sphere have strengthened. From 2004 to 2009, the European Commission even included the first commissioner ever devoted to institutional relations and communications, charged with enhancing “debate and dialogue” and improving the EU’s exchange and understanding with publics.¹⁰⁵ This multiyear “period of reflection” concerning the Europeanization of the public sphere, from approximately 2004 to 2009, coincides with the timing and installation of most of the artworks analyzed in this book.¹⁰⁶ (In 2009, the euro crisis began and dramatically changed a question of further integration or disintegration.) In brief, the idea of Europe became pronounced, politicized, and increasingly urgent during this handful of years.

In invoking Europe and its historical and contemporary hopes for non-violent alliance, I do not aim to offer an exemplum of humanities-based area studies.¹⁰⁷ Methodologically, I am instead compelled by literary scholar Julietta Singh’s critique of literary and area studies in her book *Unthinking Mastery: Dehumanism and Decolonial Entanglements* (2017). According to Singh, area studies scholarship often relies on a theory and practice of mastery—of languages, authors, bodies of text, areas—in order to convey a sense of authority and legitimacy, but this mode of discursive positioning denies the porousness of disciplined ways of knowing and the vulnerability necessary for expanding one’s limited viewpoint.¹⁰⁸ Rather, she advocates a practice of vulnerable reading, or listening—not to abandon a “skilled relationship to our intellectual fields,” but rather to reject mastery in order to acknowledge our vast dependencies on other discourses and peoples and to rethink our own entrenched frameworks of thought.¹⁰⁹ Her call echoes that of Butler in another context. Ultimately, it behooves us to radically unthink mastery in how we engage with texts, objects, and images, even if this might be an impossible, utopian project. With such an ambition, what I attempt in this book is a deep dive into discursive concepts, materialities, and social imaginaries

of a small number of artistic projects, which during a unique handful of years worked to confront questions of violence, social vulnerability, and plurality under the weighty heading of the European Public Sphere.¹¹⁰

Outline of the Book

In chapter 1, I raise critiques of the traditional bourgeois public sphere as theorized and historicized by figures such as Jürgen Habermas, Craig Calhoun, Nancy Fraser, and Bruce Robbins. I argue that we should revisit this idealized concept of the public sphere, not only as a potential model of civic engagement, but also as a potentially dangerous site of emotionally charged public opinion and slow, recursive violence. Instead of keeping national governments accountable, publics now need to keep themselves in check. Ariella Azoulay's work on "civil imagination," building off Arendt's notion of a public-political space of appearance, aids me in thinking through the social vulnerability and violence of pluralized publics in a twenty-first-century European context.¹¹¹ Furthermore, I elaborate on what I mean by preventive and securitarian publics, in terms of slow and spectacular violence, and I relate these ideas to a contemporary sociopolitical situation in Europe and a type of anticipatory art activism working to apprehend such violence. Numerous artists, curators, and art institutions in Europe—often funded by the managerial European Union itself—are attempting to imagine the nonviolent interrelation of mass strangers through more pluralistic and self-reflexive ways.

Chapters 2 through 4 offer in-depth analyses of particular art practices working along these lines, beginning with the recent moving-image work of German artist Harun Farocki. Farocki was a prolific, monumental figure in filmmaking from the late 1960s until his death in 2014, but I focus on his transition to large-scale video installations in the twenty-first century. With this shift came new strategies for engaging with mass audiences connected through a broader screen culture and global media industry. In chapter 2, I compare two of his works from 2007, a film, *Respite*, and a multiscreen video installation, *Deep Play*, which both signal the construction of securitarian publics in Europe, from the Nazi era to the contemporary moment, and the need for more pluralistic, boundary-crossing civil engagement in a visual realm. His pieces expose the dehumanization of stigmatized groups such as Jews, Roma, and French Muslims through optical technologies of surveillance, statistical numbering, and reductive televisual coverage. In his more recent work, he attempts to highlight reanimations of historically recursive

violence in order to mediate and envision stranger-spectator relations in more self-reflexive and nonviolent ways.

Thomas Hirschhorn's neighborhood installations constitute the central interpretative focus of chapter 3. These temporary cultural centers garner publicity for ghettoized, lower-income, and immigrant-based suburbs of major European metropolises. Not quite operative in the sense of counterpublics, as Michael Warner describes them, I argue that these projects, rather, attempt to envision preventive publics.¹¹² In his summer-long installations, diverse audiences—not communities in the traditional sense—interact through heterogeneous discursive forms and, in so doing, plant the seeds for plural and critically self-reflexive publics. The repetition-with-difference of these neighborhood projects in varying suburbs of major European metropolises recognizes the pernicious material offshoots of imperial violence that have historically and differentially affected many of the most vulnerable peoples on the continent.

Finally, I investigate artworks by the collective Henry VIII's Wives, which operated from 1997 to 2014. The group's six members worked together during this time but lived in different cities throughout Europe—in Germany, Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom. Little has been published about their work, but their practice is paradigmatic of emergent, multimedia-based artist collectives that engage with diverse audiences across territorial and disciplinary borders. I concentrate my analysis on their cross-genre, multiyear project *Tatlin's Tower and the World* (2005–14). This piece hailed preventive publics into being by challenging aggressive, recurring forms of iconicity and populism, working translocally with heterogeneous sites and popular associations in London, Belgrade, Bern, and online. Through these efforts, the collective aimed to relinquish discursive authorship to audiences and to lay the groundwork for nonviolent imaginaries in Europe.

More than ever, amid the ongoing political, social, and economic crises in Europe, we should reevaluate what it means to be a public in a mass mediated age and how to engage as a public with common matters of concern. How may plural publics—ever more distanced, mass strangers—come together and relate to each other in civil and ethical modes? This book seeks to explore creative propositions for such publics, ones that not only denounce spectacular violence in the wake of atrocity such as Breivik's massacre, but also attempt to apprehend a more attritional, habitual, and recurring violence that may shape the social imaginary and slowly poison the soil of human relations. The broken branches of Effi & Amir's olive tree reach out to us, imploring us to

keep looking, because the slow malnourishment and death of its roots might have been prevented. A more invisible field of violence surrounding it laid the historical groundwork for a constricted “aperture of futurity”—a vanishing vanishing-point—where such violence may easily deform in similar ways. Against this, it is the challenge of the following chapters to investigate how preventive publics might actively imagine a horizon of nonviolence through historically bound, publicly engaged artworks in Europe today.

PREVENTING VIOLENCE IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES

1

Imagine a vintage Mercedes, placed against a stark, black background, slowly burning for eight minutes. Similar to *The Vanishing Vanishing-Point*, Danish art collective Superflex's film *Burning Car* (2008) asks viewers not only to see, but also to stare at its destroyed object with an unusual intensity (figure 1.1).¹ Its burning car is a metaphor for twenty-first-century European public space, defined by social unrest and political instability on the streets of all major European metropolises, from the banlieues of Paris to the streets of Scandinavia. The film purposefully elongates a fraught image that otherwise circulates in the mass media in ten-second clips, and often in place of more in-depth, critical analysis of the social protests concerning xeno-racial discrimination, police brutality, and ghettoization that it reductively symbolizes. Particularly cognizant of the power of social, global media, Superflex has made *Burning Car* available for widespread internet consumption, streaming on their website as well as for free download on illegal torrent sites.² The art collective stretches the temporality of this compressed, violent icon in order to both encourage public attention on it—highlighting the complex, social-structural



FIGURE 1.1 – Superflex, *Burning Car*, 2008, still image.

violence hidden behind this icon—and to emphasize its typically rapid circulation in the mass media as another realization of slow violence.

I borrow the term *slow violence* from eco-postcolonial theorist Rob Nixon in order to highlight the necessity of thinking different, coexisting temporalities in terms of violence.³ Nixon employs it in another context: to distinguish between catastrophic, immediate, spectacular violence done to the environment and violence that is attritional, habitual, and less instantly visible or recognizable, such as global warming. The latter is often much more convoluted and durational, which for Nixon poses a problem in terms of representation. Cast in another light, it suggests a problem of publicity. How can artists and activists draw as much public attention to violence that slowly cuts across borders and generations (e.g., Islamophobia and anti-Semitism) as to spectacular, emotionally riveting forms of immediate destruction (e.g., the Paris and Brussels attacks)? Nixon's invaluable concept may be applied to many other large-scale forms of violence besides global warming, though perhaps on different timescales. And it may also be applied to the public sphere itself.

Burning Car, for example, shifts spectators' attention from accelerated to accretive, chronic, or inattentive violence, yet it is not enough to merely prolong an image of a burning car in order to signal urgent problems of sociopolitical violence and publicity in Europe.⁴ As opposed to the more multilayered *The Vanishing Vanishing-Point*, its form of vision is mesmerizing, even lulling. Indeed, the piece points to a problem of mass publicity but

does not begin to unpack the dangers of the contemporary public sphere, as other pieces such as *Handsworth Songs* (1986), by the Black Audio Film Collective, do much more successfully.⁵ Instead, it might update questions that still resonate from the time of *Handsworth Songs*: Does repetitive, negative publicity against black and Muslim immigrants, for example, continually represented as aggressive and foreign in a mainstream press and by radical right-wing politicians, reinforce the slow violence of discrimination and exclusion that has befallen multiple generations of immigrants in European countries? How does a cycle of hate-driven publicity itself, in other words, become entangled with different temporalities and intergenerational forms of sociopolitical slow violence? And finally, how may artists begin to disentangle the two: the original slow violence and the publicity that may inflame it?

At the core of this book is the idea that we need to prevent the slow violence of public opinion by fostering, through a sense of shared social vulnerability, the imagining of plural publics. Artists—invested in altering perceptions, attitudes, and possible futures—may assume a central role in this transformation of public opinion, and many artists working in the twenty-first century are attempting not only to mirror, subvert, and/or change public attitudes, but also to grapple with the very idea of the public sphere itself. Beyond *Burning Car*, a wide array of pieces and practices reflect this impetus, for example, with artists such as Bouchra Khalili, Yto Barrada, Ursula Biemann, Jonas Staal, Mieke Bal, Krzysztof Wodiczko, and Patrick Bernier and Olive Martin, to name only a few more, whose work ranges from publicly oriented, lens-based documentation to participatory art. Theirs is an imaginative task, though one grounded in concrete histories and inequitably differentiated futures for many in Europe. In this chapter, I circumnavigate the term *preventive publics* through the realms of public sphere theory, art history, visual culture, and socially engaged art making. I wish to chart an archipelago of thought concerning what it means to do a kind of anticipatory art activism in what many diffusely label as the public sphere. At a time when so many are abandoned to the seas on the outskirts of Europe, rethinking the ethical formation of cross-border publics and their attendant modes of publicity is a pressing project.

The Public Sphere: From Problem-Solving to World-Disclosing

Ideally, the public sphere is a linchpin of democracy. It serves to keep the state in check. As political theorist Nancy Fraser describes it, “Mobilizing the considered sense of civil society, publicity is supposed to hold officials accountable

and to assure that the actions of the state express the will of the citizenry. Thus, a public sphere should correlate with a sovereign power.”⁶ According to this traditional understanding of the public sphere in critical theory, originating in Jürgen Habermas’s *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (1962), public opinion—created through “rational-critical discourse” by “private persons” deliberating in concert in public—acts in a government-regulating capacity. Schematically put, this is how it is understood, for instance returning to Thomas Keenan’s analysis, in terms of the failure of public knowledge to instigate change in the Bosnian genocide. The situation became a cross-border, humanitarian, too-expansive crisis that no national-political entities claimed responsibility for in apprehending with military force. A transnational, mass-mediated public had no political sway over specific nation-states. This is also the point of Habermas’s rise-and-decline narrative of the model, eighteenth-century bourgeois public sphere: that it degenerated and succumbed to “refeudalization” in the twentieth century with the mixing of private/public realms and the almost unlimited growth of cross-border mass mediatization and consumption. Although not explicitly stated, his account necessarily ties the growth and decline of the public sphere to the form of the nation-state.⁷

Yet many subsequent scholars of the public sphere have also pointed to its critical function as “world-disclosing,” not only “problem-solving.”⁸ The most salient critiques of Habermas’s account follow this line of inquiry through different matrices of class, gender, sex, and race, highlighting a key issue: that the normative ideal of a bourgeois public sphere necessarily excluded and dominated vast segments of the population from the eighteenth century onward.⁹ It presumed equality, universality, access, meritocracy, and openness, but only vis-à-vis the bracketing of personal attributes that enabled such an abstraction in the first place (read: white, male, propertied). This bracketing of social and personal identities created a violent cut within the very fabric of the public sphere, generated in fact in order to preempt violence and to regulate the state, as “the site where struggles are decided by other means than war.”¹⁰ Thus, in Calhoun’s evocative terms, such an idealized public sphere did not in fact solve problems of the state and, in fact, contributed to them. Rather, one might view it as a potential vehicle for publics to disclose themselves, or to reconceive the world together, through an articulation or visualization of personal differences via a commonly, equitably constructed realm of discourse.

If we reconsider the public sphere as world-disclosing—displaying and highlighting plurality through common matters of concern—scholars agree

that we should retain some semblance of the notion for a democratic politics, even though historically it was premised upon a foundational type of violence. As Calhoun puts it, “Even if we grant that the problem-solving functions of the public sphere are being performed less well than in the past, this does not mean that public discourse has ceased to be at least as vibrant a source of understanding, including self-understanding.”¹¹ Bruce Robbins suggests that we might envision such an endeavor and salvage such a concept, which remains both “unacceptable and necessary,” as a phantom public sphere—by addressing questions of power more directly and moving from a national to an international scale in order to realistically grapple with the “possibilities of transnational democratic interchange.”¹² I echo the critical yet hopeful picture offered by Robbins and others such as Homi K. Bhabha, Carol Breckenridge, and Arjun Appadurai, whose work is reflected through a larger prism of cosmopolitanism, cross-cultural ethics, and transnational belonging (see the introduction).¹³ They posit that the public sphere might be refunctioned not only as an institution to steer and correct a traditional, nationally based politics, but also as a common ground for shaping and informing a cross-border social imaginary.

In suggesting the idea of a preventive public, I wish also to emphasize both the utopian and the more coercive or violent aspects of public sphere formation. And I stand in agreement with the broad, scholarly call to reconceive such public formations across national frontiers, in order to try to find less socially dominating modes of self-understanding among masses of strangers in a world riven by proximate and distant, slow and spectacular violence.¹⁴ It would be naive to claim that nation-states do not still organize a vast swath of contemporary life, but the function of the public sphere now extends well beyond the primary objective of holding centralized, sovereign powers accountable, as in a Habermasian ideal of the bourgeois public sphere. Cross-border publics should also become more attuned to the complex weaves of sociopolitical violence, both more visible and invisible, which fundamentally undergird their formation. Again, this is an imaginative task—not to establish modes of public regularization in the notional sense of Foucault’s biopower, as discussed in the introduction, but instead to perceive the gnarled branches and roots of public life in Europe and how its curtailed health might be prevented in the future. If this imaginative sensitivity is nurtured, preventive publics might come to hold a self-regulating, not a state-regulating, capacity, attuned to the authority and violence crafted through their own discursively and materially bound publicity.

Publics and Socially Engaged Art

In the 1990s, art historical discourse and criticism flourished regarding the contours and ethics of artistic engagement in the public sphere. This came on the heels of the belated translation of *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962) into English in 1989. Books such as W. J. T. Mitchell's edited anthology *Art and the Public Sphere* (1990) and Rosalyn Deutsche's *Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics* (1996) attempted to expand the idea of spatially based public art into a broader field and realm of the public-political, but their case studies often still focused on art placed in public space proper. This is perhaps due to recent controversies of the time, for instance, concerning the ethics of community art with Mary Jane Jacob's *Culture in Action: A Public Art Program of Sculpture Chicago* (1993) and, more pointedly, the removal of Richard Serra's *Tilted Arc* (1981–89) in New York City.¹⁵ With her edited collection of essays, *Mapping the Terrain: New Genre Public Art* (1995), and in dialogue with Jacob, Suzanne Lacy also attempted to enlarge an understanding of the public, political-public discourse, and artistic-social engagement. She employs the qualifier “new genre” in order to signal a process of art making that moves beyond the idea of sculptural pieces placed in public space. Instead, new-genre public art encompasses all kinds of media and forms and serves as a “process of value finding, a set of philosophies, an ethical action, and an aspect of a larger sociocultural agenda.”¹⁶ In short, public art shifted to become a much more expansive and inclusive, though amorphous and messy, idea in 1990s art historical and critical scholarship.¹⁷

In the twenty-first century, questions of the public transitioned to those of audience relations, yet I would advocate that we recuperate and renuance the term *public* in relation to socially engaged artwork as well, even though it often stands confusingly entangled with notions such as *community* (an issue that I tease out more in chapter 3).¹⁸ Beginning with the translation of Nicolas Bourriaud's *Relational Aesthetics* into English in 2002, terms such as *relational*, *collaborative*, and *participatory* have placed emphasis on the varieties of relations established in contemporary art making—as spectators, makers, participants, passersby, collaborators, and so on. This has been an important conceptual movement in writing about socially engaged artwork.¹⁹ Yet *public* is a term and concept that is beginning to receive critical favor again. Shannon Jackson, for instance, wishes to shift our attention to the necessary public, infrastructural support that often receives less critical notice than the starring relations of such socially engaged work.²⁰ As discussed in the introduction,

I also aim to stress the less noticeable conditions or background of violence that frames publicly engaged art making in Europe.

One of the debates that this book wishes to sidestep is how we judge relational artwork from the last two decades and thus, implicitly or not, how we can more readily classify and absorb it into an art historical canon. In *Mapping the Terrain*, Lacy is still quite attentive to the role of art criticism in evaluating new-genre public art, balancing in her analysis questions of beauty, innovation, artistic intention, modes of collaboration, and “concrete results” in the public sphere.²¹ Decades later, this type of discussion still dominates much art criticism and scholarship concerning socially oriented artwork, centered more and more around a dichotomous value judgment of art versus politics.²² In *Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship* (2012), Claire Bishop outlines this debate in full detail and importantly warns how participatory art (in her definition, where people constitute the central artistic medium and material) is often too frequently elided with an idealized version of democratic politics.²³ However, her account steers too closely toward an attempt to shore up art history’s borders as a discipline: one should grapple with the full complexity of socially oriented art projects “in order to render them more powerful and grant them a place in history.”²⁴ She claims that these value judgments are necessary “not as a means to reinforce elite culture and police the boundaries of art and non-art, but as a way to understand and clarify our shared values at a given historical moment.”²⁵ Yet whose shared values are these?

Grant Kester stakes an opposing perspective in the debate, arguing that collaborative, collectively oriented, dialogically based art should be judged through both artistic and ethical criteria.²⁶ His account is compelling and sympathetic with the aims of this book. The art practices that I examine in depth also attempt to work in ethically engaged and collectivist-oriented ways with diverse audiences, attending to the situational specificity of their art projects. Their attempts to imagine preventive publics do not privilege tactics of “discomfort, rupture, or an uncanny derangement of the senses” that attempt to patronizingly “lead” individual viewers to a more elevated consciousness.²⁷ Kester thoughtfully interrogates the underlying shared values of contemporary art discourse, yet, in another sense, he also attempts to recuperate collaborative, activist art—like Bishop’s study of participatory art—as a worthy line of art historical inquiry. Both investigate socially oriented artwork in order to supplement and nuance past, reductive discussions of artistic autonomy versus social intervention, though both, ultimately, do

so in order to advocate for their own respective, critical judgments of such work within an art historical discourse.²⁸

In the end, publicly oriented art is not tantamount to relationally engaged art. My primary case studies may and often do include such relations in their composition, but relations are not the main characteristic of this type of artwork. Harun Farocki, for instance, always worked with the medium of film or video—ostensibly not relational in character—yet much of his oeuvre is geared toward interrogating the possibility of creating self-reflexive, temporally recursive publics through a contemporary screen culture. Thomas Hirschhorn's and Henry VIII's *Wives' practices*, in turn, utilize almost every available medium and platform, from street interventions to online websites. For them and many others, *public* is an important term because it equally connotes the three cardinal aspects of socially engaged art: the people who give it attention, its manifestation to such people (in common, related space/place/time), and the issue or concern that motivates such a space of appearance in the first place. The term also critically regrounds us in the idea that politics are part and parcel of any artistic process and hopefully compels us beyond the notion that our priority as art professionals is to judge and categorize such art.

As the next section outlines, I wish to shift the focus from a political/aesthetic dialectic and its accompanying professional gaze of art to the matter of scopic regimes and an attendant practical gaze, in the words of photography theorist Ariella Azoulay. As she unpacks at length in *Civil Imagination: A Political Ontology of Photography*, the latter ambition, more in tune with a field of visual culture, stresses the power of scopic regimes to provide different frameworks “within which human beings act on the world.”²⁹ *Scopic regimes*, a term originally deriving from film studies, refers here to systems of knowledge/power that shape what we understand to be true in terms of seeing, representing, and subject positioning. Placing a practical gaze on such systems is crucial for both deconstructing and reimagining more ethical ways of co-inhabiting a pluralistic world.

Social Imaginaries through a Civil Gaze

The writings of Ariella Azoulay resonate with many of the ideas of this book. For her, when the nation-state fails to offer an avenue for change and the prevention of violence, then citizens must create a new, imaginative politics among themselves. In *Civil Imagination*, she asserts that spectators must

resist acts of atrocity through a civil gaze and a process of civil imagination, which, put simply, is “to imagine a civil discourse under conditions of regime-made disaster.”³⁰ In other words, what she makes a case for, yet does not explicitly label as such, is a critical reworking of the public sphere as self-regulating.

Basically, Azoulay breaks down the idea of the democratic public sphere (employing different terms) into two mutually dependent sides. First comes the ability for “political imagination,” whereby people can envision a political state of being that differs from an oppressive status quo.³¹ Yet this political imagining should not remain private, and it must not be dismissed (as in the case of much artistic judgment) as something merely political and thus unworthy of the full attention of citizens. Instead, political imagination must become civil, defined “in its own right as the interest that citizens display in themselves, in others, in their shared forms of coexistence, as well as in the world that they create and nurture.”³² In other words, imagination must be communicated in order to foster public discourse and transformation. Her shift in focus from the political to the civil is another way of challenging the Habermasian private/public divide, for, as Michael Warner critically observes in another context, civil rights advance a “strong vision of the public relevance of private life.”³³

Where Azoulay’s real contribution comes into play is through her argumentation concerning spectatorship and the central role of photography within this process. Most scholarly analyses of the public sphere, due to its eighteenth-century bourgeois origins as outlined in the work of Habermas, describe public discourse as firmly text-based, whereas Azoulay forcefully shifts the contemporary focus to a realm of the visual. For her, unequal citizenship arises when “the central right pertaining to the privileged segment of the population consists in the right to view disaster—to be its spectator.”³⁴ This is another method of bracketing personal differences. Privileged spectators may assume a universalizing position, able to gaze on others who have been marginalized, and those gazed upon are perpetually viewed as other, different, and outside of the contours of mainstream politics. Here Azoulay points to the fundamental role that visuality plays within such a process of public abstraction and exclusion, and in this respect her work echoes a wave of critical scholarship in visual culture, such as that of Nicholas Mirzoeff and Amelia Jones, regarding the power of scopical regimes to categorize, exclude, and marginalize. Additionally, in her theoretical analysis, Azoulay focuses on images that circulate largely outside of art institutions, but in her practice

as a curator and filmmaker, she does not cordon those images off from circulation within artistic arenas as well.³⁵ Despite her strident critique of art historical disciplinary methods, Azoulay embraces a broader understanding of a visual-social field that does not clearly distinguish between publics and art publics, echoing Warner's more capacious understanding of a discursively dispersed public defined through attention and strangerhood.

Azoulay reinforces her claims for the role of the visual within civil discourse through several maneuvers. First, her analysis closely aligns with, and builds on, Hannah Arendt's conception of the public sphere and political action, whereby politics only come into existence in public space with the communicative sharing of human beings, who must act and speak against an unpredictable backdrop of messy human affairs.³⁶ Yet action and speech are not enough: the gaze equally shapes human relations in a space of appearance, as Arendt evocatively yet vaguely terms public-political space in *The Human Condition*.³⁷ Moreover, communicative acts must also account for object-human relations, not only interhuman relations, such as cameras that operate upon humans as well.³⁸ Second, Azoulay emphasizes the paradigm-shifting field of visual culture within this (public) sphere, not since its institutionalization in the 1980s, but originating with the invention of photography in the mid-nineteenth century. The gaze has always structured power relations, but with the invention of photography, it suddenly acquired the possibility of giving and receiving practical information among citizens, when images could be fixed, copied, and mobilized. This radically altered the weave of social relations, the "coming-together" of humans, and implicitly (again, not explicitly stated by Azoulay), the operations of the public sphere.³⁹

Take for example the artistic project of German photographer Eva Leitolf, her *Postcards from Europe* series, or, as she terms it, an "open-ended archive" beginning in 2006.⁴⁰ In this project, she photographs the contested borders of Europe, from the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta in Morocco to Calais and Dover to the islands of Greece. She documents the plight of innumerable immigrants and refugees attempting to reach safety on the shores of European countries. This documentation does not come in the spectacular form of wounded or dead bodies, however, but rather suggests itself in the ghostly absence of these bodies at the border sites, resonating with Azoulay's important call to imaginatively address the undocumented, the photographs not taken of atrocity, such as with rape. The slow violence of disaster is often much more difficult to represent, or not even documentable. Moreover, its

typical depiction in mass media channels often does more harm to those already victimized by subjecting them to a gaze that automatically renders them second-class citizens, a category of people who are immediately other and different because they are not within the orbit of those who may look, of the universalizable public sphere. This gaze can be dangerous, whether mobilized for pity or hate. Instead, a type of civil imagination is needed, where publics recognize their own culpability in formulating categorical social attitudes and hierarchies, ones that in themselves often contribute to political violence when exacerbated through forms of publicity. Such a call for civil imagination holds true either for a general public exposed to undocumented atrocities in Palestine or an art public bearing witness to the dead and wounded not depicted in Leitolf's staged photographs. Leitolf's artwork might just arouse a greater degree of self-reflexivity and recursive historical analysis of such violence in the public sphere. Only with a self-reflexive, civil gaze can the prevention of slow violence begin to occur.

Key here is Azoulay's dual emphasis on the power of the scopic realm in a democratic public space, as well as the self-regulating potential for the civic (i.e., public sphere), not the political (i.e., nation-state). In facing acts of atrocity, direct and indirect, we should focus not only on what change can occur from state intervention in the aftermath, but also on what prevention of violence may occur through civil relations in the genesis of public attitudes and publicity. How do we alter the relations of spectators and participants in the public sphere to each other? Visual media has a significant role to play in this matter.

Beyond lens-based media, there are also other modes of physical, creative expression within public space to consider. This is implicit in Azoulay's idea of the "event of photography," stressing the way that the presence of cameras, for instance, may affect human behavior.⁴¹ Yet in order to rethink a contemporary public sphere, we should place even more emphasis not only on global lens-based media (besides text and speech) but also the performative relations of more local publics to each other within physical space. As Judith Butler warns, we must not lose sight of the valuable work of real, protesting bodies in public space, those that are, indeed, often not documented, whose safety is most immediately at stake.⁴² Global media is necessary in bringing attention to acts of atrocity, but acts of nonviolence often begin at the level of bodies in space together. In order to envision preventive publics, one should attend to both the slow and the immediate violence of the public sphere, as well as to a more local and global space of appearance.⁴³



FIGURE 1.2 – Eva Leitolf, *Orange Grove, Rosarno, Italy, 2010*, from the *Postcards from Europe* series. © Eva Leitolf. The postcard caption reads: “Orange Grove, Rosarno, Italy, 2010. In January 2010 the price obtained by Calabrian citrus growers for their Moro and Navel oranges was five euro cents per kilogram. They paid their mostly illegally employed and undocumented African and Eastern European seasonal workers between €20 and €25 for a day’s work. Depending on the variety and the state of the trees a worker can pick between four and seven hundred kilograms of oranges in a day. The business was no longer profitable and many farmers left the fruit to rot. During the 2009–10 harvest there were between four and five thousand migrants living in and around Rosarno, most of them in abandoned buildings or plastic shelters, without running water or toilets. On 7 January 2010 local youths fired an air-gun at African orange-pickers returning from work and injured two of them. The ensuing demonstration by migrant workers ended in severe clashes with parts of the local population, during which cars were set on fire and shop windows broken. Accommodation used by seasonal workers was burned and hundreds fled, fearing the local citizens or deportation by the authorities. On 9 January, under police protection from jeering onlookers, about eight hundred Africans were bussed out to emergency accommodation in Crotona and Bari. *A Season in Hell: MSF Report on the Conditions of Migrants Employed in the Agricultural Sector in Southern Italy*, January 2008; tagesschau.de, 10 January 2010; interviews with orange farmers and seasonal labourers, Rosarno, 27–29 January 2010.” Photography-now.com: <https://photography-now.com/exhibition/106080>.

Violence and Visuality in Europe

How can the EU accomplish the “transnationalization” of the political, where its primary concern is citizenship, not ethnic/cultural traits?⁴⁴ Étienne Balibar, in his collection of essays *We, the People of Europe?* (2004), foregrounds the question of who or what precisely constitutes the European people. For him, the issue of borders, both figurative and literal, is crucial. What is at stake are modes of exclusion and inclusion in European public spheres, in terms of representation as well as material circumstances.⁴⁵

Balibar claims that since the 1980s, Europe has witnessed a “recolonialization of social relations,” going so far as to compare it to the historical apartheid of South Africa.⁴⁶ For him, there undeniably exists a hierarchy of populations, where the “foreigners among foreigners”—people from the global South such as Africans, Arabs, and Turks—are situated at the bottom of the social strata.⁴⁷ Many of these diasporic immigrants straddle the border by producing on one side and reproducing on the other; they are insiders but officially considered outsiders. Three types of violence arise from this recolonialization: (1) institutional violence, barely legal; (2) reactive violence by victims of discrimination (not from undocumented workers, or *sans papiers*, because their situation is too vulnerable, but rather second- and third-generation young men who have been continually subjugated socially and professionally); and (3) ideological, physical violence, by nationalist groups against “foreigners.”⁴⁸ Perhaps most serious of all for Balibar—and recalling Azoulay’s stringent criticisms—is the constructed invisibility of these social problems in the public realm and their subsequent denial by the authorities in power. There is a whole class of “second-class citizens” under the arbitrary control of certain policing and administrative bodies, where civil servants frequently transform into “petty tyrants convinced that they ‘are the law’ over an inferior population (just as was the case in the colonial empire).”⁴⁹ Twelve years later in *Duress*, Stoler’s call for a recursive analytics of Europe’s concretely revived “imperial formations” and “ruins” strongly echoes Balibar’s still timely diagnosis.⁵⁰

Artists and cultural producers are in a unique position to critique and shape this violent social landscape, and they have received official support and funding to do so. The European Union, for instance, has launched massive campaigns to promote respectful cultural exchange and intercultural understanding within its territory. With the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 (in lieu of an official constitution), the European Commission dedicated

€400 million to projects and initiatives from 2007 to 2013 that would “celebrate Europe’s cultural diversity and enhance [its] shared cultural heritage through the development of cross-border co-operation between cultural operators and institutions.”⁵¹ The Culture Programme’s three main objectives were to promote cross-border mobility of “cultural actors” and artists, to encourage the transnational circulation of their work, and to foster intercultural dialogue. The program financed such projects as the European Capitals of Culture each year; EU prizes in cultural heritage, architecture, literature, and music; and a pilot project to catalyze transnational “artist mobility,” aiming to “enhance the cultural area shared by Europeans and encourage active European citizenship.” In 2008, the massive program also reserved €10 million of its budget for “The Story of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue,” for which each nation developed a program catered to its own unique histories and specific political climate.⁵² The government organ in charge of cultural sponsorship, the European Commission, also appointed an “Ambassador of Visual Arts” in 2008—Manifesta, a pan-European contemporary art biennial. The nomadic installation attempts to provide a networking platform for artists and cultural workers throughout the continent but has met with limited critical success due to its tremendous scope and aims.

Although the EU’s massive bureaucratic arm has pushed the vague theme of intercultural dialogue since the Treaty of Lisbon, its investment has often yielded self-reflexive, more critical exhibitions and artist projects. *Unpacking Europe* (2001–2), for example, was a prominent show hosted by the Boijmans Van Beuningen Museum after being conceived and developed during the Rotterdam Cultural Capital 2001. Curated by art historians Salah Hassan and Iftikhar Dadi, the project hoped to “show Europe as ‘the other’” by asking, “How European is Europe?” and included an impressive, accompanying volume of essays by scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rustom Bharucha, Rey Chow, Okwui Enwezor, Fredric Jameson, Naoki Sakai, and many more.⁵³ In line with the EU’s intercultural aims, though overtly critical of a type of cosmetic multiculturalism with “Benetton-like” advertising in the mass media, the organizers hoped to deconstruct the assumption of a prior, “pure” European culture and to recognize the cultural hybridity of an increasingly diverse populace on the continent.⁵⁴

The exhibition featured works by a wide array of internationally based artists such as Coco Fusco, Isaac Julien, Anri Sala, and Fred Wilson, among others. Yinka Shonibare exhibited his now-iconic *The Swing (after Fragonard)* (2001), a spoof on French rococo artist Jean-Honoré Fragonard’s

eponymous classical painting. Shonibare's installation dresses the headless mannequin female in "African" textiles—batik fabric believed to be of African origin but actually manufactured in the Netherlands, Britain, Indonesia, or other Asian countries—thus spotlighting the superficiality of "packaged" ethnicities in Europe.⁵⁵ Other artworks included Ken Lum's public billboards with images of speaking but statically captured, presumably immigrant figures alongside text ("Wow, I really like it here I don't think I ever want to go home!" or "I'm sick of your views about immigrants. This is our home too!"); Keith Piper's computer-generated mapping of the surveillance of black Europeans in *A Fictional Tourist in Europe*; Nasrin Tabatabai's chat room artwork based on the everydayness of religious beliefs; and Carmela Uranga's *Have a Seat* performance and video where stereotyped Roma musicians are disallowed from sitting at a table of European nations in their own game of musical chairs. Although aided by official support from the EU, *Unpacking Europe* not only focused on fostering intercultural dialogue or refuting immigrant stereotypes. It also critically examined the power dynamics behind the façade of creating a monolithic idea of Europeaness or the European people.

In 2004, with his book *We, the People of Europe?*, Balibar refers to the turmoil of the Balkan and Kosovo wars as the most pressing example of border violence, but in the last decade one would point to the plight of refugees streaming into Europe from war-torn countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. More than a million immigrants arrived in Europe within the span of a year, August 2015–16, and from 2010 to 2015, applications for European asylum increased from 287,000 to nearly 1.4 million.⁵⁶ Rubber bullets and tear gas have been used to detain camp refugees from crossing over national borders on their quest to move from poorer and refugee-overwhelmed countries such as Greece and Italy up north to Germany and Scandinavia.⁵⁷ German residents, as an exception, spurred on by Chancellor Angela Merkel, have welcomed a large proportion of those asylum seekers in an unusual display of *Willkommenskultur*, or "welcome culture," striking because the country has not traditionally had a reputation for immigration.⁵⁸ This unexpected turnaround came right after the fiftieth anniversary of the guest-worker program from Turkey, in 2011, when Chancellor Merkel declared that multiculturalism "has failed, utterly failed."⁵⁹ Concomitant with the sudden embrace of *Willkommenskultur*, the popularity of the new, extreme right-wing, anti-immigrant party has also risen—the Alternative for Germany party, whose leader suggested that German police "make use of firearms" if necessary in preventing further border crossings.⁶⁰ The question of immigrants and refugees

also powerfully fueled the fires of the Brexit vote, for many in the United Kingdom endorse the crossing of borders when it comes to European trade but not to the free movement of peoples. In the end, political responses to the extraordinary displacement have been mixed, but most agree that the European Union has not arrived at a successful plan for thoughtfully addressing the most recent influx of immigrants and displaced peoples seeking shelter and care across the borders of Europe.

Pan-European Populism and Islamophobia in a Visual Realm

Almost every national government on the continent, as well as the supranational EU, has grappled with not only growing hostilities toward “foreigners” but also the concomitant rise to power of radical right-wing parties that have successfully exploited the popular backlash and publicity against them. Although these parties are typically nationalist, their presence is pan-European, even in the traditionally liberal-leaning Scandinavian countries. The exhibition *Populism* (2005) interrogated the rising ubiquity of these extreme right-wing parties in Europe and their violent, xeno-racist rhetoric in transnational media. Moreover, the show was funded by the EU Culture 2000 program (2000–2006), the precursor to the one established by the Lisbon treaty, with a smaller albeit still significant budget of €236.5 million.⁶¹ Rather than highlighting the limits of Europeanness, as in *Unpacking Europe*, the curators of *Populism* more generally probed populist trends, particularly as they had propagated in Europe over the previous decade.⁶²

Indeed, curators Lars Bang Larsen, Cristina Ricupero, and Nicolaus Schafhausen hosted the show concurrently and transnationally in four different venues in order to highlight populism as a pan-European phenomenon. These sites included the Contemporary Art Centre, Vilnius; the National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design, Oslo; the Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam; and the Frankfurter Kunstverein in Germany. The exhibition’s artists tackled a wide array of issues related to the theme, for example, concerning protest movements, the dynamics of political parties, neo-Nazism, popular music, propaganda, border control, asylum seekers, modern Turkish women, and the mass media. A few notable artworks include Erik van Lieshout’s series of charcoal drawings *Pim Fortuyn Diary*, mimicking Dutch reactions toward the murder of right-wing leader Pim Fortuyn in 2002; Annika Lundgren’s *Blind Tour*, guiding tourists in a windowless bus around the streets of a “new Amsterdam” with “the potential reality of a progressive, prosperous and well-

functioning multi-cultural society”; and ESTO TV, an artist collective that parodied new nationalist tendencies in Estonian politics with the multimedia piece *Choose Order* (also the slogan of the Estonian right-wing party Res Publica).⁶³ Additionally, chapter 4 pivots around a project included in the show by Henry VIII’s Wives, *Tatlin’s Tower and the World*. Overall, the multisite exhibition offered a diverse array of projects and touched on a gamut of issues related to populist rhetoric on the continent, weaving through different contexts but threading together in form.

In his seminal and still widely influential book *On Populist Reason*, also published in 2005, political theorist Ernesto Laclau attempts to theorize the challenging and vague concept of populism. According to him, it is not a specific type of organization, ideology, or movement, but rather, more broadly, a political logic or dimension of political culture, proceeding out of a plurality of social demands and functioning as part of a larger, more amorphous process of social change.⁶⁴ Schematically put, populism attempts to break with the status quo and preceding institutional order in order to reconstitute a different, more ideal and just order where there was previously a source of oppression or “false totality.”⁶⁵ Laclau describes it as such: “In order to have the ‘people’ of populism, we need something more: we need a *plebs* who claims to be the only legitimate *populus*—that is, a partiality which wants to function as the totality of the community.”⁶⁶ In this sense, the political theorist defines populism as an aspect of community formation, or a totalizing social imaginary along the exclusivist lines of a national imagined community. He does not define *plebs* further but, critically, this antagonistic group breaches “the continuity of the *communitarian* space [emphasis mine]” to transform a plurality of democratic demands into popular demands.⁶⁷ Thus the construction of “the people” here is fundamentally different than the formation of a public. Theoretically, the former arises out of a set of popular demands, whereas the latter takes shape merely around nodes of attention. As Laclau further explains it, populism involves heightened emotions and circulating discourse through words and images, but it is also embedded in material practices that can acquire “institutional fixity.”⁶⁸ Publics also take shape through affect and discourse but do not concretize around institutions, group membership, or any positive content such as territory, belief, and so on. This is a point paramount to chapter 3’s discussion of Thomas Hirschhorn’s artwork *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*, as analyzed through the postcolonial theories of Homi Bhabha, even though Bhabha does not use the term *populism* per se.⁶⁹ Furthermore, according to Laclau’s linguistically inflected theorization, the

symbolic unification of the people, or an antagonistic group of plebs, crucially centralizes around the name of a leader.⁷⁰ Thus both populism and publics have historically been described as amorphous or vague, but the popular identity of the people coalesces symbolically through the empty signifier of a primary individual, unlike the discursively dispersed character of publics.⁷¹

Throughout Europe, a significant number of charismatic, radical right-wing demagogues (such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Jörg Haider in Austria, Christoph Blocher in Switzerland, Filip Dewinter in Belgium, and Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen in France, to name only a few) have dominated debates in the mass media concerning immigration and Islam with their inflammatory, emotionally charged rhetoric. They have played to citizens' fears concerning cultural otherness, unemployment, and the declining welfare state, scapegoating immigrants—and particularly Muslims—in order to shore up popular appeal. Put another way, they have challenged the presence of Muslims within the existing social imaginary and claimed a new legitimate, exclusionary plebs or *populus* (sans Muslims) as a more just or ideal “totality of the community.” At stake are not only these leaders' electoral success and any possible concrete policy changes, but also how their extremist demagoguery and violent rhetoric and imagery sway public opinion and simplify the terms of debate concerning who belongs in Europe.

In terms of a visual-social field, one cardinal concern has been the explicit targeting of Muslims by European right-wing populist leaders through a realm of architecture. Mosques have often borne the brunt of both symbolic and physical violence against Muslim groups. To provide one example, in 2008, the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) wished to build a larger, more visible mosque in lieu of an older one in Cologne, whose skyline is famously dominated by its gothic-style Catholic cathedral.⁷² In response, the local, radical right-wing party Pro Köln exploited its representation in the city council in order to incite international opposition, with the party inviting members of Belgium's Vlaams Belang, France's National Front, and the Austrian Freedom Party to join in anti-Islam rallies in the city center.⁷³ As another spectacular example, the following year in 2009, Switzerland banned outright the construction of minarets, or Muslim prayer towers, and members of the far-right Swiss People's Party were instrumental in advancing the change through popular referendum.

In response to such violence in an architectural realm, the art group *xurban_collective* began their *Evacuation Series* in Vienna in 2010.⁷⁴ For the installation *The Sacred Evacuation (Kutsal Tahliye)*, they reconstructed

the socially oriented space of a Turkish *mescid* (originating from the Arabic word *masjid*, or mosque), or small prayer room, in a white cube gallery space. These unassuming rooms for gathering are ubiquitously placed in many modern buildings, such as shopping malls, schools, hospitals, and commercial centers, around the globe. Conceived months before the Swiss referendum banning minarets, the piece nonetheless speaks to its popular approval. In the evacuated white cube, xurban_collective removed all overtly religious signifiers. *The Sacred Evacuation* asks what we make of a *mescid* prayer room: “Is it an intimidating site reproducing itself at every opportunity, or is it the mosque minus the minaret the Swiss majority wants?”⁷⁵ According to the collective, the piece satirically comments on the decline of the public sphere and democratic discourse in a “new global order.”⁷⁶ Their dull, empty installation reflects a lack of public discourse, or a violent sweeping-under-the-rug, concerning quite urgent problems of both Islamophobia in Europe and uninformed, hollow participatory politics, as with the case of the Swiss referendum.⁷⁷

Muslims are equally subject to symbolic and material violence in the French national context, with Islamophobia propagated by one of the most enduring radical right-wing, anti-immigrant parties on the continent, the National Front, founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen. Whereas his rhetoric was primarily anti-Semitic (“the Nazi occupation of France was not particularly inhuman”; the gas chambers were “a detail”; “the races are unequal”; and “Jews have conspired to rule the world”), the new leader of the National Front, his daughter Marine Le Pen, has particularly scapegoated Muslims (for example, comparing the French having to endure Muslims praying on their streets as if living under Nazi occupation).⁷⁸ Marine Le Pen purports to defend Jews, LGBTQ people, and women, insisting that her hard-line stance on Muslim immigration is not xenophobic but practical. Part of her success in the polls is not only her “straight-talking” image, but also her mixture of far-right nationalism with leftist economics, maintaining that the state be held accountable for health care, education, and so forth. Yet, as scholars like feminist historian Joan Scott attest, such material factors are inextricably linked with a symbolic, discursive realm as well.⁷⁹ France is the first country in Europe, for example, to impose restrictions on attire that some Muslims consider obligatory for their religion.⁸⁰ As recently as the spring of 2011, Islamic women are banned from wearing a full-face veil, or *niqab*, in public, and the controversy over women’s attire only exploded further with the *burkini*, or full-length swimsuit, with press coverage of four French policemen forcing

a Muslim woman to remove clothing on a beach in Nice.⁸¹ From architecture to fashion, anti-Islam sentiment circulates with strength in a visual realm.

Moreover, such fears cross borders throughout Europe. As a final example, the same Islamophobic trend exists in Germany, despite its profoundly racist past and subsequent institutional, social, and legal efforts to curb hate crimes and fascist movements. Within the same six months of Merkel's declaration in 2010 that multiculturalism had failed, then French president Nicolas Sarkozy and British prime minister David Cameron echoed such a belief. Similar to the situation in France, prejudice and discrimination in Germany have made it quite difficult for Muslims to acquire jobs, find housing, or pursue a better-than-mediocre education. Disregarding these structural roadblocks, however, a prominent German banker, Thilo Sarrazin, stirred controversy in 2009–10 by declaring Muslim immigrants genetically and intellectually inferior. In his best-selling *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (*Germany Abolishes Itself*, 2010), Sarrazin also blames Muslims for not integrating after exploiting Germany's social welfare benefits: "No other religion in Europe is so demanding, and no other migration group depends so much on the social welfare state and is so much connected to criminality."⁸² Far-right websites have reclaimed a Nazi-era slur—*Lügenpresse*, or lying press—in declaring a vast "cover-up" of the truth, that criminality among immigrants and asylum seekers, particularly rape, is rampant.⁸³ And despite a recent wave of *Willkommenskultur*, in 2017 the Alternative for Germany party became the first right-wing party to enter the Parliament since the end of World War II.⁸⁴

Numerous critics and journalists observe that in Germany and Europe since World War II, racist, populist rhetoric like Sarrazin's has become not only widely publicized, without precedent, but also socially acceptable.⁸⁵ Crucially, this is true in a visual realm, which depicts nontraditional Europeans as alarmingly alien in popular, contemporary culture. Historian Christoph Ramm, for instance, notes that whereas older images emphasized the ethnic and cultural "otherness" of Turkish Germans as *Ausländer* (foreigners), now the "increasingly heterogeneous German-Turkish community is being reduced to the vision of a Muslim collective living in 'parallel societies' and 'resisting integration.'"⁸⁶ He terms this the "Islamization" of German Turks: repeated images in the mass media subtly or overtly demarcate the "Turkish problem" with religious imagery, highlighting minarets or women wearing headscarves.⁸⁷ Public discourse about Islamic fundamentalism, multiculturalism, and immigration is staged most dramatically as visual problems: from



FIGURE 1.3
Swiss campaign poster by the Swiss People's Party (Union démocratique du centre, UDC), 2007, stating, "Guarantee our security finally! YES to the effective removal of criminal foreigners."

cartoons in Denmark to those of *Charlie Hebdo*, images of women in veils, brief television clips of burning cars in Parisian banlieues, or Swiss street posters illustrating “white sheep” kicking “black sheep” out of the country.

Securitarian Publics

In order to underline such rising, anti-“foreigner” sentiment in the visual realm, Christoph Schlingensief staged a controversial, visibly spectacular installation in Vienna, Austria, in June 2000, *Bitte liebt Österreich: Erste österreichische Koalitionswoche* (*Please Love Austria: First Austrian Coalition Week*), otherwise known as *Ausländer Raus!* (*Foreigners Out!*). For the piece, Schlingensief housed twelve supposedly illegal immigrants in a shipping container in front of the opera house in the city center on Herbert-von-Karajan-Platz. For a

week the “foreigners” were surveilled and exhibited 24/7 on television and via the internet, à la *Big Brother*, a show quite popular at the time.⁸⁸ Viewers could read online tabloid-like biographies of the protagonists, who were characterized in exaggerated cultural and racial stereotypes.⁸⁹ The installation’s audience, moreover, was solicited to “participate” each day by voting out two detained aliens, who were then ostensibly deported. The remaining winner would win a cash prize or possibly Austrian citizenship through marriage, depending on the availability of a volunteer.⁹⁰

Schlingensiefel critically mimicked and parodied the creation of what I term a securitarian public (in contrast to a preventive public): one generated on the basis of fears of security and alterity. This type of public purports to promote security in controlling the publicity and visibility of unwanted peoples through strategies such as surveillance, statistical imaging, and physical containment, but its tactics ultimately exacerbate rather than prevent violence by categorizing and classifying peoples into rigid social hierarchies. Schlingensiefel staged his installation right at the height of heated reactions to neofascist



FIGURE 1.4 – Christoph Schlingensiefel, *Bitte liebt Österreich: Erste österreichische Koalitionswoche* (*Please Love Austria: First Austrian Coalition Week*), also known as *Ausländer Raus!* (*Foreigners Out!*), 2000, multimedia installation.

Jörg Haider's election to the government, and it sparked much national debate concerning the sensationalism and publicity (mimicked by Schlingensief) brought to bear on immigration issues by Haider and the mass media. On the front of the shipping container in Herbert-von-Karajan-Platz, for instance, hung a banner with the declaration, *Ausländer Raus!* (Foreigners Out!), which was supplemented a few days later with another banner, *Unsere Ehre heisst Treue* (Our Honor Is Called Loyalty).⁹¹ The latter is a Nazi SS motto forbidden in Germany and one that a member of Haider's right-wing populist FPÖ party purportedly used. The banners were soon vandalized with protesting graffiti statements such as *Widerstand* (Resistance) and *Kampf dem Rassismus* (Fight Racism). Angry crowds also denounced or supported the event in the central plaza amid parodic, staged performances by the protagonists, for instance, taking German language classes on the roof of the container or singing German cabaret songs with blatantly racist lyrics.⁹² Schlingensief spurred on the crowd's ambivalent reactions to these performances, satirically blurring the lines of fiction and reality and exploding any notion of security, containment, or control in his public event.⁹³ Spectators did not really know if the event was staged or not, and a speaker at the end of the event pointed out that the crowd could have been protesting an actual detention center just a few kilometers away on the outskirts of Vienna.⁹⁴ Instead, reactions to the parodic spectacle had escalated throughout the week from intense debate to verbal insults to physical violence with attempts at arson, attacks on the shipping container with acid, and a storming of the structure on its penultimate day by protesters to free the protagonists.⁹⁵ Schlingensief's spectacular installation led to an escalation of violence and effectively exposed the violent visibility measures of such a securitarian public to begin with, as well as the false reality of its claims on violence prevention.

Already two decades ago, political theorist Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp highlighted the silenced invisibility of the immigrant and asylum-seeker detention system, which is finally gaining more recognition in mainstream media today. For her, there is a growing ubiquity of "deterrence, regulation, settlement of populations in designated areas, bogus border closures, and incarceration" of immigrants throughout Europe, detention being the most acute phase and in "flagrant contradiction of the spirit of the 1951 Geneva Convention."⁹⁶ According to her, Europe has transitioned from a liberal democracy to a "defensive democracy," one that favors security over liberty, where, in Foucauldian terms, the "right to security" has become the "right to punish."⁹⁷ The expansion of the detention and imprisonment model attempts

to naturalize this type of violence.⁹⁸ “Aliens” are silenced and isolated, their material detention made invisible.⁹⁹ Such a securitarian mentality is a pan-European public phenomenon.

In placing securitarian publics and preventive publics in bold relief, it might help to distinguish between ideas of self-regulation and social regularization. As argued throughout, publics no longer primarily serve to regulate nation-states, as a traditional understanding of the public sphere suggests. Instead, they may hold a self-regulating function in order to prevent direct and indirect violence and actively envision the world in nonviolent ways. This follows in line with Azoulay’s call for a cross-border, civil imagination through lens-based art making. A public’s task of self-regulation would function through an imaginative, discursively diffused realm, not through any centralizing organization, institution, or state. I do not purport here to offer the idea of self-regulation as a delimitable phenomenon—mappable in terms of scale, typology, or effect—but rather as a suggestive alternative to the social logic of prevention theorized by Foucault. In the last of his series of lectures titled “Society Must Be Defended” (1975–76) at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault speaks of a new “power of regularization,” or biopower, distinct from the disciplinary mechanics of power that he was concurrently investigating and analyzing in books such as *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1975). According to Foucault’s analysis, this new regulatory power works in tandem with disciplinary operations to manage not only individual bodies, but also general biological processes.¹⁰⁰ Regulatory mechanisms are established (mostly by the state) in order to effect control over collective bodies, or delineated populations (such as Romani groups). These regulatory mechanisms include processes that coordinate, centralize, and normalize knowledge concerning mass bodies, for instance utilizing forecasts and statistics concerning birth rates, mortality rates, birth control practices, the duration and intensity of illnesses, and so on.¹⁰¹ Such a mode of public regularization—enabled through statistics and data-driven discourse—dovetails more with a type of securitarian, not preventive, ethos.

For instance, diverse Roma communities have been subjected to continuous visual, material, and structural violence through securitarian policies of surveillance, fingerprinting, encampment, and population management statistics. Political scientist Nidhi Trehan and sociologist Angéla Kóczé claim that since the fall of the Eastern European socialist governments, there has been an increase in the “spatial segregation” and housing evictions of Romani peoples.¹⁰² However, such violence has received little visibility. To combat

this, the European Union, Open Society Institute, World Bank, and United Nations Development Program are among a number of institutions that declared 2005–15 the Decade of Roma Inclusion, an initiative that aimed to advance Romani integration in nine countries in Central and Eastern Europe by addressing issues of education, employment, health and housing, and widespread discrimination.¹⁰³ Yet Western European countries such as Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark have also attempted to deport hundreds of Roma, or have actually done so, and physical violence and discrimination against Romani groups are still the status quo in Eastern European countries that are part of the EU, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Many critics have viewed the deportations as a breach of EU human rights laws. Quite spectacularly in 2010, French president Nicolas Sarkozy initiated a widespread crackdown on the country's approximately 400,000 Roma by destroying hundreds of encampments and expelling a large number of their inhabitants, many of whom were legal French citizens.¹⁰⁴ Even in Germany, in the process of repatriating thousands of Romani children and adolescents to Kosovo in 2010, officials continued with the deportations despite the fact that many of the Roma were born in Germany, had no Serbian or Albanian language skills, and expected to face "appalling," discriminatory living conditions in Kosovo.¹⁰⁵ In his film *Respite*, discussed at greater length in chapter 2, Harun Farocki connects the often nonremembered violence done to Roma during the Holocaust to such contemporary acts of their classification, deportation, and discrimination today. Such intergenerational, slow acts of violence against Romani communities have become regular and regularized in everyday European life.

Both securitarian and preventive publics are anticipatory, but each relates differently to structural and slow violence. Viewed in another light, should we also not attempt to regulate these types of regulating and regularizing, homogenizing, discursive and material practices, power, and violence? How might a public check in on, or calibrate, itself? Securitarian publics offer a type of controlled and neutralized "normalizing society" against which Foucault warns, envisioned through a confluence of disciplinary technologies and regulatory mechanisms of biopower. Counter to this, to recall Butler's words on the force of nonviolence, reliant in turn on Arendt's space of appearance (the space that contravenes the violence of the concentration camp or detention center): "The task of nonviolence is to find ways of living and acting in the world such that violence is checked or ameliorated, . . . precisely at moments when it seems to saturate the world and offer no way out."¹⁰⁶ Against

the efflorescence of securitarian publics in Europe today, we need more visions of ways out of this paradigm, of moving beyond images of container units and encampments to sights of ethically minded cohabitation and nonviolent futures for the most precarious peoples on the continent.

Conclusion

When I advocate for a creative imagining of preventive publics, I refer to a rapidly changing, transnational landscape of publicity and visibility in Europe in the twenty-first century, which has pushed publics to arise and morph in new, often violently unpredictable ways. In this sense, prevention is different from the deterrence of violence during the Cold War, which, in effect, relied on state management and military control, often leading to the construction of nationalist securitarian publics. Similarly, prevention as a term is done a disservice when utilized for programs such as one in the United Kingdom, Prevent, part of a governmental counterterrorism strategy.¹⁰⁷ Launched in 2007, Preventing Violent Extremism (its full title) aims to stop people from becoming invested in terrorist acts or ideologies at an early age. The initiative operates through schools, where teachers and nurses are required to report a student to the UK's antiradicalization program if they have any concerns that the student may have terrorist sympathies or intentions. Prevent has come under extreme criticism by many activists for singling out Muslim students in particular and for attempting to preempt dissent against the government in schools or, in other words, for fostering an "Orwellian realm of thought crime," spying against youth who express any beliefs at odds with "British values."¹⁰⁸ There is little evidence that the program works. Rather, independent studies appear to show that its main result is further discrimination against Muslims. As cultural theorist Arun Kundnani argues, Prevent's mission is not only counterproductive but also dangerous: "The great risk is creating an atmosphere of self-censorship—where young people don't feel free to express themselves in schools, or youth clubs or at the mosque. If they feel angry, or have a sense of injustice but nowhere to engage in a democratic process and in a peaceful way, then that's the worst climate to create for terrorist recruitment."¹⁰⁹ Rather, prevention as an idea should be reappropriated from security and counterterrorism operations premised upon segregation and fears of alterity, which, in the end, lead to securitarian publics.

A public is a slippery, amorphous thing. It is not a political position, a measurable community or audience, or any identifiably bound group of people

(as with populism)—but merely a density of attention or matter of concern bound together by discourse through time. This is both its promise and frustration as a concept, and in this chapter, I have attempted to trace the notion of a preventive public with full awareness of the limits of such “concept-work,” as Ann Laura Stoler warns.¹¹⁰ Drawing from Foucault again, she suggests that concepts “invite appropriation, quick citation, promising the authority that such invested affiliations are imagined to offer. They also invite unremarked omissions when their capacities to subsume are strained, a setting aside of what seems uneasily, partially, or awkwardly to ‘fit’ within the analytic repertoire of ‘cases’ that confirm both disciplinary protocols and ready analytic frames.”¹¹¹ Despite such limitations, I am nonetheless compelled by the belief that there can be generative ways of thinking with and through publics that, in our current moment and visually based world, particularly behoove us socially and politically. Many artists are already showing this, attempting to arrest differentially distributed, actualized, and anticipated violence through the imagining of publics that nurture a sense of plurality and social vulnerability among masses of strangers. Let us now turn to Harun Farocki’s artwork in order to begin tracing the hopeful origins for a nonviolent, transnational Europe as they arose from one of the continent’s most devastating chapters ever, the Nazi regime and Holocaust.

HARUN FAROCKI,
CIVIL IMAGINATION, AND
SECURITARIAN PUBLICS

2

In his book *The Information: A History, a Theory, a Flood* (2011), James Gleick identifies 1948 as a critical year for the onset of the Information Age.¹ It was the year the term *bit* was coined, thus auguring a new, transformative mode of relating humans, technology, and data. Half a century later, Gleick declares, “We can now see that information is what our world runs on: the blood and the fuel, the vital principle.”² It is this haunting body of information, so to speak, as a question in relation to specific historical and current representations of immigrants, refugees, and minorities in Europe, that undergirds this chapter. Simultaneously with the beginnings of the Information Age, as Gleick designates it, countless masses of people found themselves in the violent aftermath of two devastating world wars and the Holocaust, within the midst of a collapsing system of European-based global imperialism, and at the outset of an ideologically explosive nuclear age. In midcentury Europe, in other words, mass human objectification, displacement, and genocide were the backdrop to tremendous scientific advances in data collection, systematization, and application in all fields of collective social life. Cultural theorist Arjun Appadurai, rethinking the “fear of the minority” in the twenty-first

century (which I return to in the conclusion) points to the historical ties between processes of modernity and minoritization as they arose side by side with the nation-state in Europe and the development of statistics, censuses, representational democracy, and territorial classification.³ This violence is bound with the figure of the minority in Europe today, or the body that must still contend with not only national borders, but also a transnational, hyper-mediated infoscape of statistics, stereotyping, and surveillance.

It is also an info-saturated and -inflicted body that haunts Harun Farocki's moving-image work. Film historian Volker Pantenburg asserts that there are two conceptual loci in Farocki's extensive oeuvre, which includes over a hundred films, videos, and moving-image installations produced from the late 1960s until the artist's death in 2014. The first is the image: generated in film and art history, by computers, the military, corporations, and an endless array of human activity. The second is labor, or work: be it "physical, intellectual, affective, or therapeutic in nature."⁴ This claim certainly rings true. Yet I would contend that a third center characterizes Farocki's attention to the moving image: information. It is not only the image or its "algorithmic simulacra" that anchors Farocki's oeuvre.⁵ It is the flood of images, or raw data, that has increasingly characterized and tested contemporary society, and galvanized Farocki's practice. In generating numerous observational films, in utilizing an ethnographic lens, and in reframing found footage, Farocki questions a contemporary public's ability to navigate such an information-saturated world.⁶

It is no surprise that that the filmmaker turned to moving-image installations in the last decades of his career. His spatially and temporally expanded installations, including up to twelve screens, bombard viewers with more data than ever before. His last major piece, *Labour in a Single Shot (Eine Einstellung zur Arbeit, 2011–14)*, cocreated with Antje Ehmman, offers hundreds of short films from around the world for anyone with access to a web browser.⁷ Even more than his multiscreen panoplies, *Labour in a Single Shot* suggests an artistic-epistemic shift in his practice from the model of the archive (historical recuperation, distancing, and critical recontextualization) to that of the encyclopedia (cross-comparative, all-encompassing albeit ever-expanding knowledge dissemination), geared toward greater accessibility and publicness.⁸ This is the new screen-dominated terrain that confronts spectators today, and a primary objective for Farocki remained to test, or even train, viewers' abilities to critically filter and glean insights from such a flood of images and information. According to Farocki and Antje Ehmman,

spatialized art exhibitions may function as a “cutting room” or “laboratory” for cinema and offer something that single-screen, theatrical-proscenium-based cinema cannot.⁹

Attending this mass of information is a question of the public sphere. Will publics be able to take advantage of such an increasing wealth of information in a way that is not blind to its hidden ideological, economic, political, and social structures? It should go without saying that data is never neutral and does not speak for itself: people and publics always already encounter it through interpretative frameworks. In his practice, Farocki was keenly attuned to both the potential benefits and possible dangers of such mass information for plural publics. The latter—the potential menace—particularly weaves through a number of his pieces concerning the politics of cultural identification. These works evoke the threat of securitarian publics, or publics constructed through fears of alterity. Such insecurities lead to the genesis of publics that ostensibly prevent sociopolitical violence through the largely visualized discourse of surveillance, statistical imaging, and the stereotyping of minorities. This thread in Farocki’s work explores how historical processes of minoritization in Europe, as tied to social-national modes of information gathering, have become dangerously exacerbated in transnational, mass-mediated public spheres in the twenty-first century. In controlling the publicity and visibility of such marginalized peoples through methods of data gathering and dataveillance, slow violence becomes intensified in the public realm.

In this chapter, I offer in-depth analyses of two pieces, *Respite (Aufschub)* and *Deep Play*, both from 2007, as they grapple with related issues of data visualization and minoritization in Europe over the last century. The first is a silent essay film. It minimally edits twentieth-century found footage originally shot by Jewish inmate Rudolf Breslauer in a labor transit camp in the Netherlands in 1944. *Deep Play*, in turn, exemplifies Farocki’s transition into multiscreen museum display, in this case with twelve screens in a semicircular format. It depicts multifarious angles on the 2006 World Cup final game between France and Italy, from original television coverage and stadium surveillance footage to moving imagery with software-based analysis of the game. A comparison of these two—a single-channel film and multiscreen panoply—recognizes Farocki’s diverse attention to different types of screen-based publics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Furthermore, even though their subjects appear vastly different, one concerned with the Holocaust and another with a World Cup soccer game, juxtaposing an

analysis of them is fruitful for thinking longer histories of Holocaust violence alongside those of decolonization processes on the continent. Such comparative thinking, following Michael Rothberg's call for multidirectional memory (see introduction), may allow new insights and visions of anticipatory art activism to emerge.

Through the lens of purportedly neutral information, *Respite* and *Deep Play* each reveal an effective silencing of cultural differences in historical and contemporary Europe, showcasing instances concealed or normalized through a mainstream public propelled by the power of big data. *Respite* returns to the Nazi statistical classification of minority and stateless bodies during the Holocaust. It employs a forensic lens in order to reanalyze images that have already been viewed innumerable times in their seventy-five-year existence, pointing to a renewed currency for these images today. In particular, Farocki reframes Breslauer's original moving imagery in order to highlight a more forgotten history of Nazi violence perpetrated against Romani peoples. This is an urgent topic today amid resurgent, pressing violence against Roma and Sinti on the continent, and film and art historians have not adequately situated *Respite* within this twenty-first-century context and impetus. Thus beyond a forensic approach, the film also employs a type of civil imagination (discussed in chapter 1), an idea I borrow from Azoulay's work on the ethics of a borderless citizenry within the realm of photography. It challenges how publics may conceive of "the people," or who becomes framed or excluded within such an abstracted yet critical notion of participatory, plural politics.

In turn, *Deep Play* references French Algerian soccer player Zinedine Zidane's shocking headbutt of an Italian player for a cultural slur, signaling its cardinal importance yet obscured significance in the transnational, mass coverage of the 2006 World Cup in Berlin. Unusually, *Deep Play* has received scant in-depth interpretative consideration, despite the vast media prominence of the sports event and the arguable fact that Farocki's critical acclaim exploded in a contemporary art world (beyond a filmic one) after this piece was exhibited at *Documenta 12*. This lack of detailed analysis is perhaps due to the still unanswered question of what was actually said in the encounter between Zidane and Italian player Marco Materazzi, and the difficulty of contextualizing Zidane's silence about the (most likely) racist, sexist remarks within the largely "de-authored" realms of televisual and machinic coverage synchronized in the panoptic space of *Deep Play*. Ultimately, I contend that *Deep Play* stages and updates a type of Brechtian epic theater to portray the urgency of Zidane's violent gesture, or Brechtian *Gestus*, for mass audiences

trained as viewers within dehumanizing security apparatuses of surveillance and staticization.

In this chapter, I also argue that *Respite* and *Deep Play* both attempt to imagine preventive publics, despite the historical and contemporary dangers that they recursively analyze in the formation of securitarian public spheres. It is no coincidence that both pieces debuted at a time of heightened visual-cultural contestation on the European continent. Within the span of the three years prior to their release, 2005–7, for instance, riots in French banlieues reached a violent climax, the Danish cartoon crisis spread around the globe, and the construction of minarets in Switzerland was banned, to name only a few examples of highly visible and mediatized cultural conflicts concerning minorities and cultural identification in Europe. *Respite* and *Deep Play* respond to such a climate, attempting to highlight the slow, recursive violence also at work in such public making and publicity making, as it is propelled through the insidious proliferation of mass statistics, stereotypes, and surveillance.

Respite and the Roma Question

Farocki's film *Respite* (2007) edits ninety minutes of raw footage shot by Jewish prisoner Rudolf Breslauer in May 1944. The thirty-minute, single-channel film begins and ends with a simple framing device, a train entering and leaving the Westerbork Police Transit Camp for Jews in the Netherlands. Yet in between the trains, the film reveals a much more complex, transitional space for the inmates, who are confronted with forced labor as a type of respite from something unknowably worse for them: transportation to the concentration camps in the east, such as Auschwitz, where Breslauer died a few months after shooting the footage. Moving imagery of the departing train also appears halfway through the film, foreshadowing the deportees' ultimate departure and death.

Thus structured around key images of the dehumanizing boxcars and cattle cars, each half of the film presents a different perspective on the inmates' physical and psychological existence while waiting for their deportation from the transit camp. The first half focuses on the relatively good conditions that the inmates have in the camp, with an intertitle explaining, for example, that there is not much food, but enough. In the beginning of the film, arriving male inmates all appear to have shorn hair, and one man even attempts to conceal his face from the camera with his hand, perhaps embarrassed or

defiant of the camera's probing gaze. In contrast, the men and women who register the new arrivals for camp life, issuing IDs and ration cards, all have full heads of thick, healthy hair, with the men even wearing suits and ties. Later in the film, another intertitle explains that inmates constitute both the patients and staff at the camp's hospital, which was the largest hospital for a time in the Netherlands. The footage also focuses on a dental clinic, organized sports and recreational activities, and a concert with a full orchestra (boasting two pianos) and performers every Tuesday evening—notably following the departure of a train to the east every Tuesday morning. Performers are even allowed to remove their stigmatizing Jewish Star of David symbol from their clothes while on stage, and men and women, fleetingly humanized again, dance happily for the audience—including the intended spectators of Breslauer's footage—with smiles on their faces. Without knowing the inmates' actual feelings about their circumstances, the camera still projects a positive and normalized image of camp life.

The second half of the film then highlights the repetitive labor of the prisoners and suggests an underlying fear on their part that at any point they could be deported to the death camps, stripped of their temporary respite if their labor is not productive enough. Intertitles explain that, overall, about one hundred trains left Westerbork with about 100,000 people deported in total to Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, Theresienstadt, and in previous years Sobibor. *Respite's* intertitles further describe how professional images of dentists may evoke, retrospectively for contemporary viewers, the pulling of gold teeth from corpses at Auschwitz, or how the extraction of raw materials from old cables may recall the recycling of Jews' hair or the bones of their dead bodies. Moreover, moving imagery of resting, reclining bodies in a plowed field evokes the mass graves of the future dead. As several scholars have noted, such images only accrue pregnant meaning in the afterimage of a wealth of other Holocaust documentation, which is knowledge that *Respite* assumes viewers hold.¹⁰ As film historian Thomas Elsaesser rightly opines, *Respite* is not simply another film about the Holocaust. It is rather about a certain knowledge of Holocaust images, after the fact.¹¹ Yet Elsaesser does not sufficiently answer the question: Why return to this knowledge in 2007? I come back to this question later.

For now, what is noteworthy about *Respite* is both its forensic gaze and its imaginative approach to this already known material, for its investigative and thoughtful attention to a mass crime relegated as old history for many of a younger generation in Europe. In several ways, it echoes Georges Didi-Huberman's

interpretative approach in *Images in Spite of All: Four Photographs from Auschwitz* (2000).¹² The four photographs central to this book are the only existing images from the Holocaust to show the actual process of mass killings, which was a process prohibited from being photographed. In his analysis, precipitating Azoulay's lengthier theorization of a civil gaze and civil imagination, Didi-Huberman compels viewers to imagine the unimaginable of the Holocaust, by applying a practical, information-gleaning eye and vision, in spite of all, to photographs that are blurry and imperfectly captured due to the violence of the circumstances of their production. Although *Respite* investigates documentary imagery that was, in contrast, ordered and conscripted by the Nazis, it also adopts such a civil gaze toward Breslauer's footage. With the intertitles relating Breslauer's shots to future horrors (e.g., images of dentists conjuring the pulling of teeth from corpses at Auschwitz), the film asks contemporary spectators to revisit and imagine what pictures of atrocity are absent.

The film imaginatively leads viewers to such absent images with a forensic lens.¹³ *Respite* arrests and targets particular details of the footage in order to bring new information to light and to thread it to future knowledge of the concentration camps. For example, Farocki is able to precisely pinpoint the moving imagery of the film's departing train to May 19, 1944. He does this by freezing and zooming in on the suitcase of a sick or disabled woman who is transported by pushcart (figure 2.1). As an intertitle notes about the suitcase, "F or P Kroon can be read and the date 26? 82 or 92." The next intertitles reveal that the camp's transport list records the name of Frouwke Kroon, born on September 26, 1882, who was deported to Auschwitz on May 19, 1944, and murdered immediately upon arrival (figure 2.2). Throughout, *Respite* adopts a forensic lens in order to mine for more critical information beyond the superficially pleasant images of smiling inmates and dancing performers. This excavated information suggests to viewers an imagined and anticipated, more absent documentation of the future barbarity of the death camps.

In his artworks, Farocki frequently pays considerable, even obsessive attention to found footage, to images that already exist and circulate in the world. In working with already existent material, his practice acknowledges the fact that as an artist (some would even say an auteur), he cannot control the realm of the visible, "since photography is always an action taken in the plural," as Azoulay maintains. "No one can be the author of the photograph."¹⁴ Fol-



FIGURE 2.1 – Harun Farocki, *Respite (Aufschub)*, 2007, still image.
© Harun Farocki GbR.




FIGURE 2.2 – Harun Farocki, *Respite (Aufschub)*, 2007, still image.
© Harun Farocki GbR.

lowing a public screening of *Respite*, Didi-Huberman stresses in an interview with Farocki, “What you [Farocki] want to show first is that all these images don’t belong to you. . . . To my eyes, your starting point is that images don’t belong to someone. This is fundamental.”¹⁵ Thus, because the original footage from Westerbork is silent, so is *Respite*’s. And because the documentation is non-narrative-based, so is *Respite*’s. In mining and editing Breslauer’s footage, Farocki recognizes the plurality of the camera’s operations, contingent upon many different actors within the encounter of photography, including the photographer, photographed subject(s), contemporaneous and future spectator(s), and camera(s) involved. An intertitle suggests, for example, that perhaps a man helps shut his own train door and that people wave smilingly from their train windows due to the camera’s presence: What could be so bad if the Nazis were filming the departure? Farocki attempts to downplay his own authorial presence within the silent film—instead paying more heed to other actors within the event of photography—to highlight the many other pluralized interactions and subtle relations that Breslauer’s footage might bring to light. In this way, *Respite* demonstrates what it means to assume an ethics of citizenship within a citizenry of photography, which, according to Azoulay, seeks “to rehabilitate one’s citizenship or that of someone else who has been stripped of it.”¹⁶ *Respite* advocates a type of ethical citizenship that comes to “resemble the photographic relation,” where the principle of plurality keeps the domination, control, and violence of the visible realm at bay.¹⁷

The importance of plurality within the photographic or documentary encounter among strangers cannot be overstated. Azoulay borrows it from Hannah Arendt’s conception of political action (which I further elaborate on in chapter 3) in order to insist upon the definitively collective and uncontrollable quality of human action, speech, and, moreover, the gaze. A principle of plurality underlines the fact that no one will ever have sole authority or be able to maintain control over the photographic document or, in general, the unpredictable course of human events. The invention of photography allowed for a new mode of mass, civic sociality, or, put another way, a form of publicity and the public sphere not premised upon hierarchy, stratification, statistics, and territorialization, but rather upon a “borderless and open” citizenship.¹⁸ This type of civic spectatorship, one that acknowledges the integral plurality of strangers connected through discourse (textual and visual), is vital to a preventive public. Spectatorship in general may often be regarded as passive, but it can be just as constitutive of public-political participation as action and words and contribute to modes of anticipatory artistic activism. To be sure,

publics need not only be physically participatory—as in the case of Hirschhorn’s neighborhood installations—in order to imagine an ethics of collectively bound and nonviolent looking, discourse, and action in the public sphere.¹⁹

Counter to principles of plurality and ethical citizenship through spectatorship, securitarian publics imagine and visualize the classification of peoples into rigid sociopolitical hierarchies in order to alleviate fears of alterity and ostensibly to prevent violence. This is not unlike visual-cultural theorist Nicholas Mirzoeff’s conception of visibility, countervisibility, and the right to look.²⁰ In his compelling theorization of a broader visual-social landscape, Mirzoeff outlines different historical complexes (the “plantation complex,” “imperial complex,” and “military-industrial complex”) that have upheld authority through visibility. He describes visibility as a “discursive practice for rendering and regulating the real that has material effects”; it is “not composed simply of visual perceptions in the physical sense but is formed by a set of relations combining information, imagination, and insight into a rendition of physical and psychic space.”²¹ Furthermore, these complexes are created and managed through a series of three operations: social classifying, separating, and aestheticizing. Mirzoeff’s ideas concerning visibility strongly resonate with what I view as the effects of securitarian publics. However, whereas Mirzoeff focuses on the authority of visibility as implemented and perpetuated by figures of top-down leadership and power (e.g., symbolic figures of the overseer, missionary, and counterinsurgent), which undoubtedly occurred in Nazi Germany, what I wish to stress here is the complicit, decentralized, and amorphously dangerous character of public opinion. Whereas Mirzoeff’s notion of visibility assumes a kind of intentionality behind the disciplinary actions of classification, segregation, and aestheticization—even if they are discursive, dispersed operations—securitarian publics are dangerous precisely due to their lack of any centralizing self-reflection or self-realization.

As discussed in chapter 1, preventive publics accrue self-reflexivity through a recursive, cross-citational awareness of violence. In contrast, securitarian publics often form through a kind of viral circulation, which requires no critical referencing or recontextualization and thus no reflection on moments of historically recursive violence (again, recursion signaling the same but with difference). According to Michael Warner, the modern public in Europe developed, in contrast to the modern nation-state, already with a certain reflexivity. It gained awareness of itself temporally through citations, republications, and reviews, creating a cross-citational field of many heterogeneous participants with different, overlapping rhythms of

attention.²² Yet Warner's theory describes the slower temporality of newspapers and books, not the twenty-first-century, instantaneous temporality of digital imagery, which he minimally touches on in his seminal book, *Publics and Counterpublics*. The self-reflexivity of publics can no longer be taken as a given but will often depend on the means of distribution.

Two years prior to *Respite*, in 2005, for example, Farocki created another silent, single-screen work, *In-Formation (Aufstellung)*, which explored questions of varying times, technologies, and nonreflexive image virality. *In-Formation* mirrors the changing effects of a global media industry, in which, for example, caricatures published in a local newspaper might explode into the Danish cartoon crisis via televisual and internet publicity.²³ Both *Respite* and *In-Formation* function as informational films in some sense, focusing on the relation between European minorities and dehumanizing data. Yet *In-Formation*, unlike *Respite*, includes no recontextualizing commentary or investigative analysis, only an overwhelming, silent flood of archival, printed materials with stereotyped images of, and statistics concerning, immigrants (e.g., oppressed veiled woman or turbaned Muslim terrorists). In the 1960s or 1970s, the viral, superficial dissemination of such stereotyped images may have circulated slowly in limited, contained print networks. Yet now in the twenty-first century, *In-Formation* suggests, with its quickened visual pace, that they would propagate ever more insidiously through the faster temporality and wider distribution platforms of new media.

With regard to *Respite*, Farocki claims that he became unsatisfied with the simplified repetition of Breslauer's footage in Holocaust films that compiled decontextualized images of victims.²⁴ They did not reference any information from the original sources or establish the conditions or circumstances of their production, but rather reinforced a vacuous portrayal of victimization in general. As Azoulay asserts regarding such identification, distancing, and victim categorization, "The photograph does not put abstract concepts such as 'refugees,' 'stateless person,' 'citizen' or 'non-citizen' on display. Rather these are conceptualized within the *parameters of political thought* or through an act of rule that seeks to stabilize the legal or political status of the governed [emphasis mine]."²⁵ In other words, public attitudes create reductive categories such as migrants or refugees, not photographs themselves. For Farocki, the nonreflexive film compilation and categorization of Holocaust victims—effectively conceptualizing them as "other" for contemporary viewers and no longer a public matter of pressing concern—necessitated another

type of temporal and historical thinking and display, aimed at the prevention of differentially distributed violence in the future.

Thus, to reiterate, why return to this knowledge in the year 2007? In the end, *Respite* not only highlights the extreme vulnerability of Jews and suggests the continued need for violence prevention against them. It also, crucially, does so for Roma and Sinti, who often fit more abstractly and invisibly within categories of victimhood and statelessness during the Nazi regime. *Respite* historicizes and newly highlights the continued formation of securitarian publics around urgent questions of Romani assimilation in Europe. It foregrounds some key operating mechanisms of securitarian publics (surveillance, staticization, physical encampment), particularly as they catalyzed a historical turning point in a European social imaginary, but the film also works to envision a preventive public in present-day Europe. It recursively brings into public circulation and awareness questions of slow and direct violence for contemporary Romani peoples, a fact that has not received any in-depth interpretation in film or art historical scholarship. Without a historically self-reflexive attention to how publics have perpetuated such violence, it would arguably be impossible to begin the project of actively envisioning a pluralistic, nonviolent social imaginary in the future.

To be sure, the film begins with a specific emphasis on Jews in the camp but ends with a more open-ended focus on Roma. For instance, the film commences by interspersing still photographs of the camp and Breslauer behind his camera with intertitles denoting the prisoners specifically as Jews. This suggests a more historically static or fixed documentation of them. An early intertitle also makes a point of stating that the camp acquired the name “Westerbork Police Transit Camp *for Jews* [emphasis mine]” when the German Security Police took control of it in 1942. Following this opening sequence of still photographs, and for the rest of the film and edited footage, intertitles then switch to more frequently employ the terms *inmates* or *deportees*. With these more general terms, and the transition from still shots to moving imagery, the film implies a more fluid or unfixed categorization of its subjects. Finally, at the end of the film, *Respite* centralizes a question of Romani visibility with an iconic image of a Sinti child, Anna Maria—known as Settela—Steinbach, who appears exactly halfway into the film as well as in its final minutes.

This close-up shot of ten-year-old Settela Steinbach became a quintessential image of the Jews' subjugation in the Netherlands, but Steinbach was in fact Sinti. In Breslauer's raw footage, in his one and only close-up, she wears a white headscarf and a hollow look, her glassy eyes peeking out as the cattle car door is about to close on her face (figure 2.3). Following her deportation from Westerbork, she was quickly murdered at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Afterward, Dutch Jews widely embraced this haunting image as iconic of their experience and printed it repeatedly from the 1960s to the 1990s on book covers and posters.²⁶ However, in the early 1990s, journalist Aad Wagenaar began an investigation into the identity of "the girl with the headscarf" and determined that she was actually a German-born Sinti.²⁷ Cherry Duyns, additionally, created a television documentary about this famous realization, publicizing a lesser-known story about the genocide of Romani peoples by the Nazis.

FIGURE 2.3 – Harun Farocki, *Respite (Aufschub)*, 2007, still image.
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Respite powerfully rediscovers Steinbach's Romani identity at the end of the film. Exactly halfway through the film, Farocki displays the original footage of her framed face between the wooden train slats, but viewers do not yet know the identity of the child. The sequence begins with an intertitle: "On May 19, 1944 a train with 691 people left Westerbork." A footage clip then exhibits the side of the train and something handwritten on it: "74 Pers.," abbreviated from "74 Personen," or "people." Breslauer's camera subsequently moves left and upward to land forcefully on Steinbach's hovering, spectral face. Following this, another intertitle interrupts to state, "The camp administration was very careful with numbers." Next, the film visually reiterates the written number and then reveals through another intertitle and frozen footage that the number was altered to "75" before the train left the camp. Farocki's forensic lens halts the moving footage of the departing train and zooms in on the number "74," now crossed out and replaced with "75." The temporal proximity of this sequence right after Steinbach's silent close-up suggests that she was the silenced, added number to the punctilious ordering of Holocaust extermination.

Yet *Respite* only reveals her individual identity at the very end of the film, with a haunting recursion of her close-up image. An intertitle reiterates the date: "Only this one train was filmed, on May 19, 1944." Spectators view the clip of "74 Pers." once again, and another intertitle follows: "Only once does the camera look closely into a person's face," with the footage then sliding up again to Steinbach's visage. Much earlier in the film, one might argue that there was another close-up of a prisoner's face. One of the new arrivals, one of the men with recently shorn hair, sits across the table from a more seasoned inmate at the camp, giving her his personal information to type and record on identification and ration cards. Breslauer's camera does briefly focus on his animated face, but, perhaps recalling the aim of the footage and its purpose to convey efficiency, Breslauer quickly lowers the camera to instead home in on the silently clacking typewriter. Several clips then portray different angles on the typewriter—from the side, equal height, and above—reestablishing an emphasis on the orderliness of Westerbork's conscripted rituals and labor. Thus Farocki is right about Breslauer's unusual, perhaps dangerous lingering on Steinbach's face. After his intertitle asserts the singularity of her close-up, more commentary continues: "Ten-year-old Settela Steinbach, a Sinti, was murdered at Auschwitz / The fear or premonition of death can be read in her face / I think that is why the cameraman Rudolf Breslauer avoided any further close-ups." Another scene then cuts in

to show again the image of a prisoner closing the train car door on himself, and one more intertitle declares, “245 Roma and Sinti were deported to Auschwitz on this train.” Having learned earlier in the film that 691 prisoners were transported overall that day, it becomes strikingly evident that a large proportion—over a third of the deportees—were in fact Roma or Sinti, not Jews. Ultimately, *Respite* applies a forensic, recursive lens to Breslauer’s footage in order to challenge, like Azoulay, what differences become elided or lost in abstracted, static categories of victimhood—labeled as “Jew,” “refugee,” “stateless person,” and so forth. *Respite*’s midway and final focus on Steinbach’s ghostly face forcefully points to and centralizes a question of the historical and contemporary vulnerability of Romani peoples. “The premonition of death” on her long-misidentified face perhaps anticipates yet more violence against Roma to come in the future.

Indeed, as with the heightened visibility of the Jewish Question in the twentieth century, the Roma Question preoccupies European public spheres in the twenty-first century. As discussed in chapter 1, for example, the years 2005–15 were declared the Decade of Roma Inclusion by a number of cross-border institutions, including the European Union, United Nations Development Fund, Open Society Institute, and World Bank.²⁸ Yet since the fall of the Eastern European communist governments, sociologists argue, there has been a rise in the so-called spatial segregation and housing evictions of Romani peoples throughout Europe.²⁹ Against a stereotype of the traveling Gypsy, studies of their current situation also suggest that their nomadism aligns closely with regular migration patterns of Eastern Europeans searching for better economic possibilities abroad.³⁰ Today, most Romani peoples are settled, and most nomadic Roma only wish to earn enough income to be settled.³¹ In other words, nomadism today is often a matter of economic precarity and social vulnerability rather than a drive for personal freedom or autonomy. The icon of Steinbach’s face between the slats of a train evokes such associations of movement with Romani peoples. On the one hand, she represents the historical stereotype of the traveling Gypsy. On the other, she symbolizes the contemporary threat of stateless Roma migration in Europe. The cattle car door, about to close on her face and all that she represents as a compressed icon of disposable Roma peoples, both recalls and anticipates forms of their violent containment and dehumanization.

Even as powerful regional institutions launched the Decade of Roma Inclusion, a story of Romani genocide is often elided, dismissed, or tokenized in Holocaust narratives. Without greater recognition of this trauma and its

duress in contemporary forms, as Ann Laura Stoler describes it, the danger exists that Roma and Sinti will become even more racially targeted and segregated as an unwanted population group. Yesterday's Wandering Jew, in other words, could manifest as today's Traveling Gypsy. (This is not to suggest, however, that anti-Semitism is not still rampant throughout Europe.) In 2008, for instance, Italy declared a state of emergency over an influx of illegal immigrants and began racially profiling Roma by taking a census of them, fingerprinting and photographing all above the age of fourteen, and either expelling them by the thousands or relocating them to camps with tighter security and twenty-four-hour video surveillance.³² Italy is a clear instance where Romani communities are actively cordoned off from the rest of society and purposefully excluded from a larger, national imagined community. In France, likewise, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy also initiated a widespread crackdown in 2010, razing hundreds of encampments and expelling a large number of their inhabitants.³³ Farocki created *Respite* in 2007, the same year that Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union and stirred many fears concerning a flood of unwanted immigrants, specifically Romani peoples, into Western Europe. Although the European Union promises a utopian, borderless space for EU citizens, it is one effectively still denied to Romani peoples, viewed in the mainstream public's eye as a mass group of unwanted, stateless nomads.

There is tremendous heterogeneity among Romani communities.³⁴ Yet throughout Europe, in popular reportage, legal discourse, and even humanitarian projects, they have been reduced to the vision of a homogenous population that needs to be helped or expelled, assimilated or managed. Scores of fact sheets exist online concerning Roma demographics and movement in Europe, much of which has been created in order to study and hopefully help the situation of Romani groups in the EU, but this kind of publicly circulated, statistical classification threatens to reduce a question of Romani human rights to an issue of empty categorization rather than open and borderless citizenship.

In contrast, *Respite* calls on viewers to reimagine and recontextualize such homogenizing labels in the public sphere, and to discursively, self-reflexively envision their citizenship as one within a pluralized "citenry of photography" or, here, film. Following Azoulay, this entails, for viewers, acknowledging the inherent plurality and participatory aspect of the documentary encounter, assuming a civil position that seeks to rehabilitate dispossessed citizenship, and resisting the force of not only governing authorities but also securitarian publics in the dehumanizing control and management of vital

data through the visuality of the camera. *Respite* hails such a public into being, namely, with a juxtaposition between death-count statistics and Set-tela Steinbach's vulnerable-yet-still-vital visage, reframing Breslauer's shot as a revived space of appearance against the grave, technocratic management of the camp. Ultimately, *Respite* advocates the cross-citational imagining of a preventive public in 2007 in order to anticipate and hopefully resist a growing tide of both slow and immediate violence against contemporary Romani peoples throughout Europe. It actively envisions a more ethical, political-public way to inhabit the world through nonviolence—with a forensic lens and civil imagination, but also through a recursive analysis and awareness of historical violence against Romani peoples, one aimed at provoking an ethics of spectatorship in the present and the arrest of differentially distributed harm in the future.

Surveillance, *Deep Play*, and the Icon of Zidane

Debuting the same year as *Respite* in 2007, *Deep Play* similarly addresses questions of dehumanization, minoritization, belonging, and strangerhood in the social construction of a European imaginary. First exhibited at *Documenta 12* in Kassel, Germany, *Deep Play* manifested as a twelve-screen, semicircular installation, displaying a massive panoply of the 2006 World Cup final (plate 2a). At first glance, thinking through a film about the Nazi concentration camps alongside a large installation about a sports game may seem displaced, but, again, it may serve as an important starting point to consider interconnected histories of dehumanizing violence from the Holocaust with processes of decolonization on the continent, following Michael Rothberg's important call for multidirectional memory.

A comparison also serves to explore Farocki's recurrent interest in questions of mass spectatorship and how images may be reviewed and recontextualized for a plurality of strangers. Visitors in *Deep Play* became the panoptic observers of an extensive, horizontal tableau of all angles on the game, which had originally been conceived as a fully circular, twenty-four-screen installation without interruption by curtains.³⁵ Millions of spectators had also already followed the match on television and online throughout the previous year, just as for *Respite*, millions had already seen images from the Nazi concentration camps. Differing from *Respite* and Farocki's earlier works, however, *Deep Play* offered a seemingly impossible quantity of documentation to navigate—over twenty-seven hours of game footage and analysis. Additionally, spectatorship

in the installation, as opposed to *Respite*, also emphasized physical presence. The event is staged in a way that is impossible to reproduce for filmic or online viewing.

Despite its impressive coverage and popular subject matter, the installation and subject of *Deep Play*, titled only in English without a German translation, points to a specific set of theoretical references. For one, its circular space evokes the Panopticon, originally designed by philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham and famously theorized by Michel Foucault.³⁶ Simply put, in the rotunda of the Panopticon, a single prison guard is situated in a central inspection house in order to have lines of sight to all prisoners along an outer, circular perimeter. Inmates cannot know if they are being watched and thus are coerced to regulate their behavior.

For another, Bentham, in fact, coined the phrase *deep play*. Within gambling, it is the point in a game when the stakes become so high that it would be irrational for bettors to continue their wager. In deep play, according to Bentham, this is the case for both participants, when the net pain would inevitably exceed the net pleasure. In his tome *The Theory of Legislation*, however, Bentham only once mentions the phrase in a footnote, referring to it as the “evils of deep play.”³⁷ *Deep play* was not a significant term for Bentham (and not related theoretically to his insights regarding panoptic vision). Instead it is anthropologist Clifford Geertz who appropriated and fully developed the concept in perhaps his best-known essay, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight.”³⁸ Geertz borrowed the phrase in order to understand gambling in the Balinese cockfight less as a matter of economic utility and more as one of social significance. In his analysis, the stakes of the game are much more than material precisely because they are so high. Rather, they are bound up in esteem, honor, dignity, respect, and social status.

Whereas the 2006 World Cup final was televised as a live event, *Deep Play* is an object fixed in time, lending itself more to a synchronic reading, such as in anthropology, than to a historical, diachronic interpretation. The tremendous amount of video imagery is looped, enabling installation spectators to identify less as bettors or one-time observers of the game, and more as cultural interpreters or participants. Audiences are integral, in other words, to the interpretative fieldwork of this already renowned soccer game. In the Balinese cockfight, Geertz furthermore asserts, viewers still gamble in deep play because the event allows the audience an opportunity to tell a story about itself to itself, to better understand a moment of profound social meaning within Balinese culture. Likewise, visitors to *Deep Play* are challenged to

realize an event of deeper social significance within their own ritualistic game, and it is this recognition, just as much as any wager, monetary or social, that is at stake.³⁹

However, the stakes of *Deep Play* are not immediately evident, cached in the massive flood of data and imagery that it streams. The arena of the Balinese cockfight is strikingly inverted as a panoptic arrangement. Hence audiences no longer sit on the perimeter or in the stadium, looking in on the sports fight, like the soccer spectators. Instead, *Documenta* visitors are placed in the middle of the installation, looking out onto the perimeter of an overwhelming flood of data about the World Cup game. With this metaphorical, panoptic arrangement, a single guard no longer watches and regulates the field of prisoners (or players) merely through the central placement of his vision and supposed watchfulness (again, prisoners cannot know if they are being watched). Rather, a collective configuration of plural strangers takes his singular place, now charged with actively interpreting—not merely, theoretically, passively watching—an overwhelming stream of information. The role of audiences assumes central stage, and, flooded with approximately twenty-seven hours of looped game coverage, it is not immediately apparent why.

Additionally, diverging from his past film essay methods, Farocki de-emphasizes his own authorial hand in the artwork's production, providing no intertitles or voice-over—only diegetic sound of the cheering fans or television director's camera instructions. The sole exception to Farocki's diminished authorial presence, however, is the very first, split-screen channel on the left, which displays two screens in one (figure 2.4). On this channel, one screen displays a game analyst viewing the match, while the second depicts his hand annotating the footage. Providing a close-up of the analyst's hand in conjunction with his watching a screen, this channel recalls the self-referential editor, Farocki himself, in *Interface* (*Schnittstelle*, 1995). His first split-screen video installation, *Interface* is a Benjaminian self-reflexive gesture by Farocki concerning his own films (i.e., the author as producer), one that has been unpacked by many film scholars.⁴⁰ Beyond this nod to self-reflexivity with the one screen, however, Kassel spectators were faced with much less artistic direction, placed rather in a cacophonous, screen-dominated environment that might confront them in otherwise typical, everyday situations.

In *Deep Play*, the first channel also indicates that the task of the game analyst is to interpret players' movements as strategically significant actions, turning twitches into winks. According to Geertz, to note a mere twitch of the eye would be thin description, only transmitted data, but to understand a



FIGURE 2.4 – Harun Farocki, *Deep Play*, 2007, still image. © Harun Farocki GbR.

socially significant, polysemous wink would necessitate thick description on the part of a cultural analyst or ethnographer. For Geertz, the idea of culture is fundamentally semiotic, and ethnography works to discern the difference between twitches and winks, movements and gestures. This is the “interpretive turn” in anthropology that Geertz introduced and advanced, and his essay “Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight” perhaps best exemplifies this commitment to an interpretative method of thick description.⁴¹ With enough complex description, derived from long-term, quantitative and qualitative, highly participative, and microscopic observation, an ethnographer may essentially read another culture’s webs of social signification as texts.

Ostensibly, *Deep Play* presents more than enough information to develop a thick description of the World Cup final, but the quality of that information remains inferior to the statistical quantity. The eighth screen, for example, streams surveillance footage of a slow sunset over the Berlin Olympic Stadium (figure 2.5), but it lacks any hint as to the stadium’s infamous history and construction during the Nazi era for the 1936 Summer Olympics. Typically

05 : 14
1st Half



FIGURE 2.5 – Harun Farocki, *Deep Play*, 2007, still image.
© Harun Farocki GbR.

a slow sunset would also add pleasant ambience to an entertaining soccer match, in person or on-screen, but here it only induces a disturbing sense of the game's measured, top-down, and largely superficial oversight. Its emptied landscape sets both a boring/monotonous and an ominous tone. The twelfth and final screen also streams surveillance footage, capturing not only the fans but also the guards as they stand around the perimeter of the field and survey the crowds up above. Crowds are contained and abstracted, with every corner of the stadium supervised and controlled through visual access. The eighth and twelfth surveillance screens effectively heighten awareness of the panoptic infrastructure of both the game and installation space itself.

In the installation, banal dehumanization occurs on multiple levels. Twitches remain mere twitches, and the mass footage only transforms bodies into abstract material. The tenth screen, for instance, with ed-

ited live footage, reduces players to statistical numbers with corresponding, real-time miniature speed charts (plate 2b, plate 4). The seventh screen features the French and Italian coaches trapped behind virtual drawings on the screen surface, as if caged by their own strategizing chalkboards. And the third and ninth screens evoke individual players' vital signs, with line graphs, for rates of speed, mimicking medical heart monitors. Each change in their speed evokes the observing apparatus of a hospital room, the players' on-field power translated into a symbolic diagram of physical precarity. There is a clear violence in the representation of these figures through such stark visual abstraction.

Last, a number of other channels schematize the match as if it were a video game. In his description of his video installation *I Thought I Was Seeing Convicts* (*Ich glaubte, Gefangene zu sehen*, 2000), Farocki writes, "The fights in the yard look like something from a cheap computer game. It is hard to imagine a less dramatic representation of death."⁴² Here he refers to convicts fighting in a prison yard, with black-and-white surveillance footage of the fight rendering the shocking death of a man, William Martinez, scarcely visible. While under photographic surveillance, convicts at the Corcoran State Prison in California are also tracked on a computer monitor and represented by mere dots, physically and virtually shackled by electronic ankle bracelets. Similarly, a software analysis program, Ascencio, also reduces the soccer players in *Deep Play* to mere dots on a screen (plate 3b). The program creates interpretative text for the players' actions, making their movements appear diagnostic and inscribed rather than spontaneous. Any idea of a gamble in *Deep Play* vanishes, even though its charged title clearly signals a game, or a type of staged ritual, with inimitably high stakes, bound up in immeasurable social values such as esteem, honor, dignity, and respect. With no clear authorial direction from Farocki, for instance highlighting the shocking yet visually banal death of Martinez in *I Thought I Was Seeing Convicts*, spectators are left uncertain as to the ultimate point of their re-viewing the World Cup final in the first place. I return to a question of the stakes of *Deep Play* soon.

Farocki calls these types of images—ones that are technical and nonartistic, not meant for edification or entertainment—"operational images."⁴³ They are images that do not attempt to represent, but rather to present in an illustrative way. As Volker Pantenburg notes, to use the term *image* for them even seems paradoxical to some extent: "Indeed, the operational image emulates

the look and feel of traditional images, but on closer inspection, this turns out to be a secondary function, almost a gesture of courtesy extended by the machines: The computer does not need the image.”⁴⁴ Human vision no longer becomes necessary, and this is a key concern of Farocki’s. Operational images appear throughout many of his works, but perhaps most famously in his installation piece, *Eye/Machine I, II, and III* (*Auge/Maschine I, II, and III*, 2001–3), which depicts “intelligent” killing machines used in the 1990–91 Gulf War.

Film historian Martin Blumenthal-Barby has written compelling analyses of both this installation and another video installation, *Counter-Music* (*Gegen-Musik*, 2004), in terms of their use of surveillance and operational images.⁴⁵ As a “portrait” of Lille, France, *Counter-Music* particularly resonates with questions in this chapter because it exposes Lille as a “machine” city that runs on “the blood and the fuel, the vital principle,” as Gleick would attest, of data and surveillance technologies.⁴⁶ *Counter-Music* explicitly compares Lille’s network of urban surveillance with the human circulatory system, recalling the medical heart monitor imagery of *Deep Play*. Blumenthal-Barby makes the point that these installations, in relying primarily on operational images, may appear to be complicit with such systems of visual control, but that Farocki counters this through a strategy of what the artist terms *soft montage*, or the relating of images to each other through both succession and simultaneity, time and space.⁴⁷ Farocki uses the calculated repetition of identical images and the conjunctive placement of certain images, for instance, in order to denaturalize and reframe such mundane, machine-driven pictures. His is an image-based strategy of recursion, or repetition with difference, which may foster an anticipatory or preventive imagining of future violence. As Blumenthal-Barby aptly puts it, “While *Eye/Machine* is an installation about sightless vision, the performative response it precipitates is one of intense spectatorial sight.”⁴⁸ And by “intense spectatorial sight,” I would stress further that this demands an actively engaged, alternative visioning bound to the imagination, not only the physical eyes, of viewers.

To be sure, *Deep Play* requires many embodied eyes—or rather, minds’ eyes—to make sense of its tremendously complex, overlapping rhythms and citations of multiple angles on the game, to understand the concatenation of Geertzian twitches as socially significant winks. Typically, surveillance footage is not meant to be seen: only when something out of the ordinary and more immediately spectacular occurs, like a robbery, do humans view such footage. Yet even though surveillance imagery often does not involve what

could be conceived of as traditional human agency, in terms of authorship or reception, it facilitates a particular public attitude. In attempting to thwart violence and prevent crime through nonstop watchfulness and guardedness, such measures, in fact, create a social state that increases suspicion against others and fears about security. Thus, on the one hand, operational images in the form of surveillance are not preventive of violence insofar as they lead to slower forms of violence through social classification and stigmatization. On the other hand, surveillance should be conceptualized in terms that move beyond optics and the idea of individually reading sightless, banal images more thoughtfully. To be sure, the semiotic, embodied gesture of a wink requires public understanding of it as a socially constructed and socially significant act. Rather, what needs more emphasis, to push Blumenthal-Barby's analysis further, is the kind of dangerous, collective public attitudes that surveillance may foster, a kind of securitarian public sphere that forecloses open, democratic discourse concerning common matters of concern, and one that incites violence rather than quells it.

Deep Play may appear to suggest the space of a securitarian public through an onslaught of machinic data and images, yet, crucially, its cross-citational display of heterogeneous images concerning the game (i.e., soft montage), in tandem with its semicircular staging, works instead to centrifugally animate participatory public viewing aimed at violence prevention. For Farocki, a strategy of soft montage would not necessarily require textual supplementation (in contrast to views of photography held by Azoulay and Allan Sekula) because images may comment on images. Thus *Deep Play*'s surveilled footage of the Nazi-built Olympic Stadium informs video game-like pictures of dehumanized player movement, which in turn contextualizes the caged images of the team coaches, and on and on, as relayed throughout the circular arrangement. A mental picture of banal yet deeply sedimented violence begins to accrue through the many layers of spatially and temporally contiguous images—all seemingly innocuous on their own, but alarming when situated and referenced against each other in such an all-encompassing manner. Whereas *Respite* does not require this type of spatialized, multiscreen installation to germinate a preventive public, *Deep Play* arguably does because it lacks the same kind of forensic analysis and human, textual interpretation. Its video footage includes diegetic sounds (including human speech) and written words, but its discursive staging for a public is almost purely visual, based on Farocki's principle of soft montage. Ultimately, both pieces call for the discursive attention and imagination of plural strangers in order

to prevent recursive violence, yet *Deep Play*'s visual bombardment stages a physical sense of stranger plurality more overtly. It architecturally and symbolically inverts the disciplinary, all-eyes-onboard space of the Panopticon in order to place much more onus on plural publics to actively interpret and anticipate—with an imaginative, “intense spectatorial sight”—a larger field of social violence surrounding them.

What exactly is this social field? Instead of mundane statistical data, what most fans will remember from the World Cup game was French player Zinedine Zidane's headbutt of the Italian player Marco Materazzi (figure 2.6). The full-game fifth screen replays this moment several times. It schematizes the two men's bodies into lines and dots and isolates them in different replays, highlighting the movement of the abstracted figures as well as the fact that it can offer no substantive interpretation of the act itself. Furthermore, after Zidane receives the red card for misconduct, his representative bar in the lower graph of players' speeds transforms into a stationary red block. Because he no longer functions in the game, his involvement is neatly struck out, even though despite the offense, Zidane still won the Golden Ball award for best

FIGURE 2.6 – Television footage of 2006 World Cup.



player of the tournament. His ejection from the game also marked the end of a tremendously popular and successful soccer career.

Immediately after the match, there was widespread speculation about what provoked the act. Several media sites hired lip readers, with a couple announcing that Materazzi called Zidane “the son of a terrorist whore.”⁴⁹ Zidane’s family also suggested that the Italian player called him a terrorist or the son of a *harki*, a disparaging name for Algerians who sided with the French during Algeria’s war for independence.⁵⁰ Materazzi denied ever using a racial slur and claimed that he only insulted Zidane’s sister. Zidane, in turn, stated that several offensive remarks were aimed at both his sister and mother but were not racially inflected. The soccer governing body FIFA also officially proclaimed that the comments were “of a defamatory but not a racist nature.”⁵¹ In the end, the media was inundated with varying accounts and uncorroborated claims.

The headbutt footage went viral, so to speak, but the rapid speed of its empty movement could not explain the much larger, more complex set of historical and cultural questions and confusion surrounding it, deriving from France’s colonial past. Zidane has been continually confronted about his mixed cultural identity on the field and in the media, where he is commonly referred to as “Zizou.” The soccer player is an icon for his popular success as a national French Algerian, having grown up in a lower-income banlieue of Marseille after his Kabyle Berber parents emigrated before the start of the Algerian War.⁵² During the 1998 World Cup series, in a game against Saudi Arabia, Zidane was penalized for stomping on an opposing player after what a few people close to Zidane claim was a racial slur aimed against him.⁵³ After the French won the World Cup in 1998, however, with two goals in the final game by Zidane, his image was projected onto the Arc de Triomphe in Paris under the caption “Zidane Président,” thus “appropriating Zizou as a symbol of victorious France and an example of the success of the Republican model of integration,” as sports cultural theorist Cathal Kilcline portrays it.⁵⁴ Following this, the extremist right-wing leader of the National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, complained of the racial origins of the French team, specifically pointing to Zidane as “a son of French Algeria,” which in the media negatively implied the status of an Algerian-born colonial collaborator. Both Zidane and the national soccer team have advocated against the racist rhetoric of the National Front and Le Pen. Then in 2001, as a participant in the first-ever soccer match between France and Algeria in Paris, Zidane received much unwanted attention, even death threats. Posters derogatorily labeled

him “Zidane-Harki.”⁵⁵ The match ended early when hundreds of Algerian fans stormed onto the pitch, forcing the game to be discontinued. Otherwise reserved about his personal background, Zidane responded by publicly announcing to the press that his father was not a *harki* and by proclaiming pride in his Algerian heritage.⁵⁶

Many scholars have paralleled Zidane’s overall reluctance to discuss his charged personal identity in the media with the fact that it is still unclear what exactly was uttered in the violent World Cup encounter between Materazzi and Zidane.⁵⁷ In an analysis focusing on Douglas Gordon and Philippe Parreno’s film *Zidane, un portrait du 21e siècle* (*Zidane: A 21st Century Portrait*, 2006), released just weeks before the confrontation, French studies scholars Hugh Dauncey and Douglas Morrey describe Zidane’s “sphinx-like inscrutability” and his role within France as “a kind of cipher or hieroglyph.”⁵⁸ Although careful to note childlike caricatures of him in the media that are “never too far away from the paternalism of colonial discourse,” their emphasis on his hieroglyphic “sphinx-like inscrutability” dangerously repeats Orientalist language and imagery, and this in turn inflects their analysis of his violent headbutt, or *coup de boule*, at the famous Coup du Monde. In contrast, Grant Farred, scholar of Africana studies and English literature, offers a more nuanced account of Zidane as *voyou*, or elusive, state-vexing but “lovable rogue.” Echoing Stoler’s analysis of the living “imperial ruins” of France, Farred couches Zidane’s silence in terms of secrecy: “that every postimperial nation constitutes nothing less than a haunted dwelling, a place that can only—even in the moment of the European nation’s triumph (1998, 2000)—be dwelled in with difficulty—or in Zizou’s case, in a characteristic silence off the football field. . . . Zidane’s secret is, in this way, a remarkable accomplishment.”⁵⁹ Indeed, Farred ties Zidane’s silence on and off the soccer field to his overdetermined iconicity within the larger sociopolitical arena of the French nation-state.⁶⁰ For him, the exceptional soccer player, discovered and redeemed from a poor Marseillaise banlieue and lower-income *beur* living (as a French-born, second-generation Algerian who came of age in France), makes visible “the public secret of what is publicly known: not all *voyous* or banlieue residents are equal.”⁶¹

More than Italy’s victory, the headbutt is the moment that arguably defined the 2006 World Cup final. Zidane’s headbutt, otherwise a routine soccer movement like a Geertzian twitch rather than wink, was not only a shocking, visceral gesture. It was also a Brechtian, social *Gestus* in the sense that it

signified, and continues to signify, increasingly profound tensions in Europe concerning immigration, community, and cultural difference. Farocki's work is profoundly indebted to the theories and praxis of Brecht, and many scholars have analyzed the manner in which Farocki has redeployed and adapted Brecht's methods for a later, specific historical moment.⁶² Yet lacking in the scholarship is elaboration upon Farocki's specific use of the *Gestus*, or the combined bodily gestures and posture, tone of voice, facial expression, language, and habits that together reflect specific social, historical processes and relationships. Certainly Farocki's "observational films" from the 1980s and '90s, such as *Indoctrination (Die Schulung, 1987)*, *How to Live in the FRG (Leben—BRD, 1990)*, *What's Up? (Was ist Los?, 1991)*, *Re-Education (Die Umschulung, 1994)*, *The Expression of Hands (Der Ausdruck der Hände, 1997)*, and *The Interview (Die Bewerbung, 1997)*, all investigate microcosms of human gesture/language/mood in social situations. *Deep Play* draws from the same intellectual legacy and does so in order to reconceptualize the social significance of human *Gesten* amid a twenty-first-century flood of big data. *Gestus* does not translate as mere gesture, but rather as an adoption of particular behaviors and bodily attitudes that reveal broader social laws governing a collective, or characterizing a public.⁶³ These behaviors and language are alterable. Thus, while it may seem that the human species, at times, progresses according to an underlying, inexorable fate, the actual state of affairs, political and economic, is contrived—constructed by humans and, therefore, transformable by human behavior in its smallest acts. Brecht developed the epic theater in order to break this illusion of a natural human course and to point to the historical specificity, and the class struggle, of his own time. Among other methods, his actors were charged with demonstrating particular social *Gesten* through episodic interruption, or to show the showing of these *Gesten*. This encouraged a spectator to become an informed observer, rather than a hypnotized subject, by pedagogically displaying to her or him how to recognize, imitate, and change human behavior and ultimately, historical circumstances, in a quite material way.

In the broadest sense, *Deep Play* stages a Brechtian epic play to present a realistic picture of the world and to teach the greatest number of people about it. *Deep Play* does not exactly utilize the same tactic—to train audiences in the same manner—but rather aims to be world disclosing for mass publics, to stage a meta-interpretative Geertzian story about the importance of critical *Gesten* like the headbutt, or about how we must continue to conceptualize

and recognize their social significance as embodied albeit visually oriented publics. In the aftermath of the headbutt at the World Cup, for example, many scholars and journalists pointed to a stark contrast between the ethnic origins of the French and Italian teams. All but four of the fourteen French players had parents or grandparents originating from Africa, whereas the ethnically homogeneous Italian team, in one reporter's account, was "the whitest of the Western European teams at the World Cup."⁶⁴ Following Italy's victory, Rome's historic Jewish district was also graffitied with swastikas, and a former minister of the Berlusconi government openly declared success against a team of "negroes, communists, and Muslims."⁶⁵ The media's hyped coverage of Zidane's raw and instantaneous backlash against Italian player Materazzi's insults, disrespecting Zidane's family in racialized and/or sexualized terms, cut to the core of deep-seated divisions on the continent.

Whether or not a racial slur led to Zidane's headbutt, European postcolonial politics were anxiously and unanswerably referenced throughout subsequent television and internet coverage. Zidane's gesture incited a torrent of impassioned responses concerning race and cultural affiliation in Europe.⁶⁶ The mainstream public was jolted by the soccer player's extraordinary action, and footage spread like wildfire across internet and television platforms.⁶⁷ It was more of a violent street-fighting move within the carefully coordinated, peaceful scenario of a competitive soccer match. Yet the endlessly replayed footage, as well as the act's abstract schematization in *Deep Play*, only aid in making the headbutt appear natural, like any other normal soccer movement or twitch. No actor in this panoptic theater, not even the iconic Zidane, could intentionally perform it as a sign of growing cultural hostilities and discrimination in all European nations and the European Union against "foreigners." The World Cup final game, a symbolic international arena for the peaceful mediation of different cultural affiliations, and played between two major European nations in 2006 at the charged, Nazi-built Berlin Olympic Stadium, set the perfect stage for the thick significance of this violent *Gestus* to be revealed. The violence of the act contrasted strikingly with the supposedly friendly framework of an international sporting event. Yet within such a flood of informative replays and rumors, television cameras could only register Zidane's enraged head movement as thin description.

This is because we live in an age of security, as Foucault described it later in his life, or a society of control, as Gilles Deleuze characterized it, and what often inhabits such amorphous, invisible structures of control are fear-driven, securitarian publics.⁶⁸ According to Deleuze, this type of society is like a

“spirit” or “gas,” one that pervades systems of education, work, commerce, and so forth. The clear, disciplinary “sites of enclosure” like the prison, hospital, school, and factory (or, one might add, transit camp or sports arena) now give way to “ultrarapid forms of free-floating control” that operate on the principle of big data.⁶⁹ Think of financial derivatives, reservoirs of Facebook information on consumer “likes,” or the creeping adjunctification and corporatization of the university system. Evocative of *Deep Play*, Deleuze aptly states about this network, “Everywhere *surfing* has already replaced the older *sports* [original emphasis].”⁷⁰

Deep Play is a twenty-first-century update on the epic theater as Brecht would have intended it. The playwright stressed the need to reach and instruct as many people as possible, and the World Cup soccer game, in this sense, was a model arena, viewed by millions of fans around the world. Yet in *Deep Play*, a different apparatus of our own time—of panoptic surveillance, machinic observation, and increasingly a society based on control and security—strips actors/players of their agency to an unprecedented degree. They are the ones now symbolically placed on the perimeter of the viewing apparatus and controlled in an ever-monitored, prison-like social space. In Brecht’s time, the informed observer was needed to recognize class conflict and to incite the working class into appropriating and transforming an unjust means of production. In contrast, the larger stakes of this present-day, increasingly globalized, transnational theater is the ability not only to perceive an inequitable capitalist order but also to interpret human culture itself, above and beyond an omnipresent, machinic eye. In an age of information, control, and security, the multiple eyes of self-reflexive, plural publics are key to this process.

In a 2004 article introducing Farocki’s then-lesser-known art practice to an *Artforum* public, historian Hal Foster briefly makes a related point about Farocki’s *Eye/Machine* triptych, asking how a Brechtian alienation effect may contend with a world of “hyperalienation”: “*Eye/Machine* surveys a world of hyperalienation, not merely of [humans] from world, but of world from [humans]—a world of our making that has moved beyond our reach.”⁷¹ He even goes so far as to connect this to Hannah Arendt’s theorization of totalitarianism: “At one point in *Images of the World*, Farocki quotes Hannah Arendt to the effect that concentration camps were laboratories of totalitarianism that proved ‘absolutely everything is possible’ when it comes to human domination. In *Eye/Machine*, Farocki updates this proof.”⁷² In other words, when players in a prison fight, soccer game, or any other socially

ordered space are abstracted and stripped of the unique differences that mark them as human and socially bound by particular vulnerabilities, then publics must recognize a different type of alienation effect. Along a similar vein, film historian and filmmaker Chris Pavsek also worries that Farocki's later works register and mimic an increasing process of dehumanization in the larger visual field—that it suggests there are no longer collective subjects to catalyze amid the bombardment of a spectacular media culture.⁷³ Pavsek even suggests that Farocki's later installation pieces betray a deep-seated cynicism concerning twenty-first-century visual culture that completely fails to edify.⁷⁴

However, *Deep Play* does offer a kind of hope for self-reflexive agency and pluralistic imagining, one that implicates viewers in a new and transformative manner. Referring to Farocki's "direct cinema" of the 1960s and '70s, Thomas Elsaesser posits that "[the artist] has probably remained too much of an agitator-activist to create the openness that usually gives the viewer the illusion of entering into the ongoing events as a participant or co-conspirator."⁷⁵ Yet with his later shift to installation, Farocki's practice moved precisely in this direction, in that it often designated much more trust—or rather responsibility—to embodied spectators.⁷⁶ In *Deep Play*, with no epic actors (or authorial hand) to manifest the presenting of collective, historically specific human behavior, all that remains is the public, a mass of strangers, taking center stage in the elaborate twelve-screen panoptic mediascape. Plural publics—both in the micro, in the symbolic museum space, and in the macro, across broader televisual and internet platforms—are actively called on to self-reflexively recognize and actively envision what a field of nonviolence might look like in such a deeply charged, postcolonial social imaginary in Europe.

Conclusion: "The People" of Europe?

Both *Respite* and *Deep Play* attempt to foster preventive publics in order to analyze recursive, differentially distributed violence in a European social field and to hopefully prevent its recurrence in reanimated forms of duress in the future. In the case of *Respite*, more specifically, this means nonviolence for Romani groups, and, for *Deep Play*, the wider prevention of aggravated duress arising from processes of decolonization in Europe, as spectacularly instanced by the *Gestus* of Zizou in a French national and European social imaginary. All of Farocki's works address violence to some degree, but his

practice often specifically returned to questions of violence against minorities in Europe, and how their silenced and dehumanized, vital bodies became tied to a controlling apparatus of data. *Respite* and *Deep Play* demonstrate a commitment to violence prevention not only through their own recursively citational formats, in hailing more self-reflexive publics among strangers, but also through Farocki's larger, recurring oeuvre concerning the management of minoritized bodies in Europe. This durational aspect of Farocki's practice, invested over time in returning to key problematics concerning the formation of plural publics, is paramount as a preventive form of anticipatory art activism. *Respite* and *Deep Play* may seem quite dissimilar on first glance, but subtending both is a trenchant commitment to violence prevention, not security, for a more equitably distributed, European social field in the future.

The thorniest question that arises in a dual analysis of *Respite* and *Deep Play*, juxtaposed in relation to one another, is that of "the people." I mean this in both an aestheticized and politicized sense. *Respite's* audiences are filmic, movable to theoretically any location with a screen, whereas *Deep Play's* require a more purposively installed, physical assembly. Yet both (and this applies to all of Farocki's work) investigate the boundary-confounding possibilities of spectatorship in a contemporary world saturated with digital imagery—in terms of an ethics of mass, plural citizenship based upon un-authored, in fact unauthorable, lens-based relations. Although the idealized version of this citizenship, or "the people," would be borderless, a preventive public still critically acknowledges specific histories of borders, bordered identities such as "Europe," and all of the particularities of recursive violence and duress that have attended such division-ing and zoning. It is this recursive temporal attention to violence, distributed in differential ways, that may help spark a certain self-reflexivity by publics and their active imagining of the present conditions needed for a nonviolent horizon in the future.

Perhaps with *Deep Play*, Farocki attempted to make more explicit (in a traditional sense of face-to-face encounter) these possibilities for a "public" rather than a "population," as media theorist/art historian Kris Cohen has described it.⁷⁷ Farocki certainly experimented with different manifestations of public formation in the later decades of his career, eventually leading to his massive, web-based, Wikipedia-like collaboration with Antje Ehmann and dozens of filmmakers from around the world, *Labour in a Single Shot (Eine Einstellung zur Arbeit, 2011–14)*. With this work, Farocki became ever more committed to questions of data management and dehumanization. Along

this vein, in his book *Never Alone, Except for Now: Art, Networks, Populations* (2017), Cohen examines the assembly of group forms in more virtual spaces. On the one hand, there are publics that create a space of networked collectivity. On the other hand, there are less noticeable populations that run in parallel to these, as data aggregates (often for marketing purposes), which are “not built through acts of will, choice, solidarity, coalition building, or the ‘stranger intimacy’ of a public sphere.”⁷⁸ Cohen provocatively asserts that such populations may even exist in a space beyond the possibility for a critique of representation.⁷⁹ This may often happen in practice in today’s world, but Farocki’s oeuvre is a testament to the obverse, that such apparently machinic or algorithmic data aggregates can always be subject to the violence of representational logics, and thus critique.

In their book *Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly* (2015), Judith Butler similarly points to the importance of analyzing more virtual, digital spaces today but generally focuses on the physical space of assembly (think of recent occupation movements).⁸⁰ They signal a wide-ranging, important debate concerning questions of who “the people” are, including discussants such as Ernesto Laclau (raised in chapter 1), Jacques Derrida, Bonnie Honig, Jacques Rancière, and, most pertinently here, Étienne Balibar and his book *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (2004). Butler notes that each scholar stresses the boundary-erecting aspect of “the people,” its built-in inclusionary and exclusionary effects, and thus each also strives, in contrast, to highlight the “temporal and open-ended character of ‘the people.’”⁸¹ My attempt here is no different. My analysis of Farocki’s work and what the contours of a preventive public could look like inherently run against an ethos of empiricism. It is worth quoting Butler at length:

For the moment, I want only to underscore that we cannot simply rely on a snapshot to confirm the number of bodies that constitute who the people are. We cannot simply turn to aerial photographs taken by police charged with managing crowds on the streets to find out what the people want, or whether they really want it. Such a procedure would paradoxically rely on a technology that is meant to control populations, and that would make “the people” into an effect of demographic forensics. Any photograph, or any series of images, would doubtless have a frame or set of frames, and those frames would function as a potentially exclusionary designation, including what it captures by establishing a zone of the uncapturable. . . . Perhaps “the people” is that designation that exceeds any and every visual frame

that seeks to capture the people, and the more democratic frames are those that are able to orchestrate their porous character, where the frame does not immediately reproduce the strategy of containment, where the frame partially wrecks itself.⁸²

Here Butler poetically draws upon the documentary camera as a metaphor for visualizing both the desire and the impossibility of circumscribing “the people” of the public sphere, a pluralized sphere of relations—not circumscribed group membership according to any positive content—that might include committed activists or mere onlookers.

The impulse to capture an image or understanding of democratic involvement hinges upon a built-in mechanism of exclusion, one that fundamentally undergirds the formation of securitarian publics. Thinking about and through preventive publics in Europe is thus an intellectual challenge (some might say impasse) that recognizes the specificities of violence in the politically, socially, economically, and historically circumscribed idea and territory of Europe but also insists that “the people of Europe” are, in theory, a borderless, discursive construct premised upon mass plurality. Despite Farocki’s clear politics, preventive publics do not equal a form of leftist dissent, and they are also not an assembly in the way that Butler intends it. Rather, they are like any other public—a mode of organization arising purely through attention and discourse, not through any principles of membership based on ideology, territory, religion, skin color, and so on. This frustrates any attempt to quantifiably delineate “the people,” participants, audiences, or spectators who may help imaginatively engender a preventive public in one of Farocki’s pieces. I do wish to acknowledge space for a variety of reactions and levels of engagement with artworks such as *Respite* and *Deep Play* (or those in subsequent chapters), which is crucial for any democratically conceived public sphere. Rather, it is here more a question of shifting an amorphous, porous realm of public attitudes and perceptions concerning differentially distributed, recursive violence historically and in the present in order that the recurrence of such inequitable violence might be actively anticipated and abated in the future.

Too often analyses of socially engaged practices such as Farocki’s are kept separate within de facto medium-focused subfields, for example, photography or film studies or participatory or performance art. Yet more work like Farocki’s should be put into conversation with overtly participatory work like Hirschhorn’s or that of Henry VIII’s Wives. All three think through the

discursive formation of publics. The term *audience* is too vague to indicate the critical role of non-author/artist-centered engagement within their artworks, whether this be less visibly explicit, as in the case of *Respite*, or more so, with the spatialized, body-centric installation of *Deep Play*. The question of a more corporeally embodied public sphere, and all of its contingent issues concerning concrete space and bodies, leads us to an investigation of Thomas Hirschhorn's neighborhood installations.

THOMAS HIRSCHHORN,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES,
AND COUNTERPUBLICS

3

Thomas Hirschhorn's work provokes controversy. The artist's practice has been lambasted or lauded ever since his now famous *Bataille Monument* (2002) was installed at *Documenta 11* in a largely working-class, Turkish German suburban area north of Kassel. Much of the debate surrounds his authorial presence in creating socially engaged artworks in neighborhoods that are, for the most part, culturally, politically, and economically marginalized. The *Bataille Monument*, for instance, was a summer-long installation that included a large outdoor sculpture, a library and exhibition dedicated to the philosopher Georges Bataille's oeuvre, workshops, a television show, a food stand, and a website streaming images of the artwork online. It was a massive, expensive undertaking, and most of the labor for its construction and implementation came from Turkish German residents in the housing complex and youths from a local European Union-funded social project. At the time, the suburb Nordstadt had an unemployment rate of 25 percent, and Hirschhorn's engagement with a predominantly Turkish German neighborhood seemed calculated to incite controversy, considering Germany's

complicated, contentious history of *Gastarbeiter* and Turkish immigration in the country.¹ Hirschhorn lived in the apartment complex for six months, remaining before and during the exhibition, in constant contact with his neighbors.² Yet the choice of neighborhood was seemingly arbitrary in relation to his focus on Bataille, so some critics viewed it as a type of social project to educate local residents, to forge superficial ties between local and international communities, or to exploit cheap labor. The fact that Hirschhorn has claimed to be not a social worker, but rather an independent artist working in only one of many public spaces, has elicited questions from many.³

How can one reconcile his universalizing aspirations as an artist with the particular, uneven material and social conditions of his projects? Art historian Claire Bishop maintains that the *Bataille Monument* involved a productive element of antagonism between art visitors and local residents. In her well-known essay, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” she cites Hirschhorn’s project as a counterexample to artworks that fall under the rubric of relational aesthetics: as a project that did not offer a contained, necessarily convivial space for the same class of gallery goers to converse with each other. She emphasizes that Hirschhorn did not want a “zoo effect” with buses of tourists arriving at a peripheral area off the main circuit of an elite contemporary art scene.⁴ Instead, he aimed to construct the project with people in the housing complex in a way that would enable fruitful friction and engagement with heterogeneous voices and perspectives.⁵

Art historian Grant Kester, however, critiques Bishop’s emphasis on the disruptive, antagonistic aspects of Hirschhorn’s *Bataille Monument*. He points out that her analysis presumes a problematic, simplified understanding of identity and difference. It suggests that the critical impetus of projects like the *Bataille Monument* is to “engineer” a “corrective exposure to race and class Others.”⁶ In line with this notion, privileged *Documenta* visitors would productively realize cultural and economic inequality through a provocative disruption of cultural signs in the “real world.”⁷ Importantly, Kester recognizes the collaborative aspects of the *Bataille Monument*, including Hirschhorn’s close engagement with Turkish German youth, and highlights problems involved with reading this piece too easily as antagonistic. Yet it is unclear if his compelling critique of reductive cultural politics and “viewer activation” through disruption is ultimately reserved for Bishop’s analysis alone, or also for Hirschhorn’s involvement with the neighborhood. In the end, Kester’s interpretation of the project does not allow the space for that

which he so cogently argues: a “working through [of] the various ways in which . . . ambiguity is produced situationally, what effects it has in a given project and at a given site of practice.”⁸ Thus his critique sidesteps the messier question of the *Bataille Monument*’s more complicated and critical forms, techniques, and actions that engaged with the question of the neighborhood’s marginalization. This chapter aims to do precisely this, to provide more in-depth context and understanding of an evolving practice whose politics—despite their pronounced emergence as a locus of controversy—are not quite so legible or transparent.⁹

Previously, I argued that Hirschhorn’s neighborhood installations acted as counterpublics, according to Michael Warner’s definition, but now I believe this descriptor is inadequate.¹⁰ In Warner’s terms, a counterpublic creates an alternative, circulating discourse concerning a marginalized group in the larger public domain.¹¹ The artist’s neighborhood installations do attempt to transform a simplified, stereotyped image of banlieues—a derogatory French term for such suburbs—in the dominant public sphere.¹² However, Hirschhorn’s privileged authority and status as outsider in many ways—as a commercially successful Swiss, white, cisgender male artist who does not live long-term in these banlieue residences and who assumes artistic authorship of these artworks—ultimately forecloses the possibility of labeling these pieces as counterpublics in the sense that Warner intends it.

In this chapter, rather, I contend that Hirschhorn’s neighborhood installations attempt to counter the violence of such negative publicity for marginalized banlieues and, moreover, actively imagine a horizon of nonviolence through creative processes of self-reflexive public formation. Crucially, Hirschhorn’s socially engaged artworks address publics, not communities. This is evident, for instance, in his hybrid artwork *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* (2004–5), an installation set within a gallery instead of a neighborhood, yet still involving numerous activities and spaces for audience engagement. *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*’s parodic, cave-like installation deconstructed and reterritorialized the national imagined community of Switzerland, asking visitors to reconceive stranger relationality in terms of a transnational, plural public sphere. Similarly, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* (2009) emphasizes the working through of common concerns via multifarious discursive forms (a public), rather than the relating of strangers through commonalities such as language, territory, or group membership (a community). The peri-urban piece established a critical counterpublicity for the inhabitants of Bijlmermeer,

Netherlands, who have been stigmatized by mainstream public opinion for generations. Their ghettoization in the larger public sphere constitutes a powerful instance of duress, deriving from colonial violence and, as Balibar might contend, arriving as a form of racial apartheid in contemporary Europe. Acknowledging the living imperial ruins of such histories, Hirschhorn not only attempts to counter the violence of such negative publicity for marginalized banlieues, but, through his neighborhood installations, he also works to actively propose a nonviolent sphere of being in and inhabiting the world, one constituted by inequitable densities of harm that tend to recur and reanimate in patterned ways in the present and future.

With this in mind, Hirschhorn's neighborhood installations imagine an updated, Arendtian space of appearance in the twenty-first century for socially vulnerable, plural publics to emerge around common matters of concern, through messy, emotionally charged sociality, both embodied and virtual. The artist's many disorderly monuments, more broadly speaking, resonate with political theorist Hannah Arendt's call in *The Human Condition* for a political-public space that celebrates subjectivity amid an unpredictable, plural realm of human affairs. Her 1958 publication emerged in the aftermath of the devastation of World War II, the Holocaust, and her incisive critiques of totalitarianism and imperialism in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). It constitutes an avid attempt to theorize what makes humans ineluctably *human* against the backdrop of such a dramatically changing world. Crucially, she stresses the primary and critical—if unpredictable and dangerous—human qualities of plurality and action in a public realm, or “space of appearance,” as she terms it.¹³ Similar to Farocki's video panoplies, Hirschhorn's installations also overwhelm viewers with information. Yet it is chaotic information—not programmatic like surveillance, statistics, and stereotypes—and it is set in charged, uncontrollable environments. In creating precarious structures for the commemoration of publicly engaged individuals, Hirschhorn registers this socially based vulnerability while also attempting to provide support for such an idealized space of appearance. However, his monuments sited in specific banlieues do even more. They attend to the differentially constituted fields of violence that reanimate and recur from European colonial histories. His socially engaged neighborhood pieces call for the imagining of preventive publics, in which concretely historicized, social vulnerabilities—beyond the more universalized, dangerous unpredictability of human affairs—are recognized as, indeed, pluralized and foreseeably more harmful in the future for some than for others.

Monuments to the Public Sphere

Hirschhorn's sculptural materials symbolically relate and connect as much as they build volume: they enwrap, enfold, bridge, and bind. Additionally, the artist's signature use of cheap materials such as tinfoil, packing tape, and cardboard boxes marks his awareness of the waste of consumable objects, their manufactured obsolescence, and the ubiquity of their discarded packaging on a massive, global scale. Thus many art historians and critics have adopted a historical materialist or neo-Marxist lens to examine Hirschhorn's art practice.¹⁴ Art historian Benjamin Buchloh, with several essays on Hirschhorn's earlier work, has particularly advanced an understanding of Hirschhorn's practice in such terms, focusing on the apparent excess and disposability of these maximalist displays and materials as they may critique a capitalist order, or the "proto-totalitarian conditions" of consumer culture.¹⁵ According to Buchloh, Hirschhorn's art serves most uniquely as "a record of those advanced historical conditions of material accumulation where the subject that had once been conceived as the result of production has now been eliminated by it."¹⁶ Hirschhorn's gallery and museum installations, in particular, embody this deconstructive approach, but none of his installations have ever posited the death of the subject.¹⁷ His covering, binding agents—packing tape, tinfoil, cardboard—suggest precarious human interaction as much as wasteful material transience. Rather than the installations' disposable materialism, it is the materials' surrounding, encapsulated processes of human attention and discourse that illuminate the artist's claim to political action.

Central to Hirschhorn's work remains the human condition and how this may exist today not only economically, but also politically and socially.¹⁸ Similar to Arendt in her eponymous book, *The Human Condition*, Hirschhorn advocates an idealized model of public-making that recognizes the fragile and courageous humanity of acting and speaking in a messy realm of human affairs, within a space common among diverse members of a public sphere.¹⁹ Written seven years after Arendt's penetrating critiques of fascism and imperialism in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, *The Human Condition* was partially an outgrowth of her interest in those features of Marxist theory that had led to Stalinist regime atrocities.²⁰ However, her primary focus shifted to a concern that political action had increasingly come to be defined and dominated by economic issues in modern society, not least of all by Marxist theory. Marxism, for her, lacked stories of unique, mortal individuals. In

other words, it was a human history, rather, of a “collective life-process of a species.”²¹ For Arendt, Man does not make his own history: rather, “men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”²² No tidy, rational model could encapsulate political action because humans are, crucially, plural and capable of different perspectives and new, unforeseeable actions. Arendt recognized that this unpredictability, which can lead to a boundless chain of events, is also what makes the public realm dangerous. Thus there exists the need for frameworks and human support, for a durable world that may shield against the threat of incalculable and illimitable actions by humans.²³ First and foremost, tangible objects provide “interests” to bind and interconnect people with physical, material matters of the world.²⁴ She claims, “To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates [humans] at the same time.”²⁵ Merely discussing such objects and interests, however, results in an intermediary space where humans may reveal themselves as subjects. She further asserts, “for all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the ‘web’ of human relationships.”²⁶ Self-disclosure, positioning oneself, and newness/nativity—for example, always initiating new chains of events through speech and action—are integral to this sphere.

Hirschhorn’s practice echoes a belief closely aligned with Arendt’s position: that in a story of political action, a question of *who* matters more than that of *what*. His monuments, altars, and other ceremonial structures devoted to artists, writers, and philosophers particularly resonate with an Arendtian model of public-political action set amid a space of human plurality. The *Bataille Monument* is perhaps his most famous example of this type of project, but the artist has constructed similarly devoted “altars” to figures such as Piet Mondrian, Otto Freundlich, and Ingeborg Bachmann, as well as “kiosks,” for example, for Robert Walser and Fernand Léger. His four monuments—the most elaborate and developed of these types of discursive and devotional projects—include those to Baruch Spinoza, Georges Bataille, Gilles Deleuze, and Antonio Gramsci. Additionally, Hirschhorn discussed creating a monument for Arendt in Pittsburgh in 2008 for the Carnegie International but eventually reinstalled another piece instead. In 2004, Hal Foster situated Hirschhorn among a contemporary crowd of artists with a new and distinctive “archival impulse” to recover and reanimate seemingly outdated or forgotten historical materials.²⁷ According to him, such “archival artists” attempt to make

lost or displaced historical information physically present, most often with found materials in installation spaces. In this way, Foster suggests that these installations are “recalcitrantly material” and fragmentary and not only draw on archives but produce them as well, pointing to their constructed nature.²⁸ The artistic impulse to make such archival artwork derives from an intent to “offer points of departure” again, to craft “promissory notes for further elaboration or enigmatic prompts for future scenarios.”²⁹ As such, archival art is rarely cynical.³⁰ Hirschhorn’s devotional projects certainly echo such a noncynical and recuperative impulse, one aimed at future scenarios. To be sure, his monuments and altars reflect a concern that the dynamic stories of artists, writers, and philosophers will become extinguished from the contemporary affairs of a society that views such activities as unproductive labor.

Yet his sincere commitment exceeds the material, archival work of such figures. It is not necessarily the content of these figures’ works that deserves such respect. Rather, Hirschhorn’s artworks focus on the individuals for having had the courage to act, speak, and initiate a chain of events in an unpredictable public realm in the first place.³¹ Thus Hirschhorn offers a more capacious (if less rigorous) understanding of the public sphere than Arendt. His practice suggests that books, texts, and artworks can even stand in for humans as their acting/speaking agents. Simply put, their existence in a space of appearance can also reflect the political act of beginning and asserting, claiming their own kind of agential, unpredictable vitality.³² Hence his installations may include not only real books, but also material-figural replicas of books in cardboard or plywood, ranging in all sizes. They constitute libraries in his installations, as in the dramatically titled *Emergency Library* (2003); stand as human-sized cardboard cutouts, like a fan might own of a Hollywood celebrity; or even dominate the skyline of an entire installation, like Baruch Spinoza’s *Ethics* did in *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* (plate 5). Their publication or publicity, as bold insertions into an uncontrollable human realm, is what matters most.

However, it is striking that almost all of Hirschhorn’s devotional projects have been committed to the work of white, male Europeans, which recalls some of the critiques and more problematic aspects of Arendt’s work (see the introduction for more elaboration on this point).³³ This is a question that merits further attention yet goes beyond the scope of this chapter. What I do wish to focus on, for the purposes of my more limited investigation into his banlieue installations, is the centrality of white, male European figures for his neighborhood-based monuments in Europe in the first decade of the

twenty-first century: the *Deleuze Monument* (2000), *Bataille Monument* (2002), and *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* (2009).³⁴ It is noteworthy that his monuments are dedicated to philosophers, whereas his other devotional altars and forms celebrate artists and writers. It is also important to observe that Hirschhorn's practice developed conceptually within a French political and intellectual context after he moved to Paris and more specifically the stigmatized banlieue of Aubervilliers in the 1980s, with his arrival marked by a firm commitment to political transformation (I return to this later in the chapter).

According to Ann Laura Stoler, in France in the late 1980s and 1990s, racism was a pronounced topic of political analysis in scholarship and the media, but only in passing, where "few offered sustained analyses of how it mattered."³⁵ In fact, Stoler offers a resounding critique of decades of French scholarship, journalism, and politics that did not adequately acknowledge or grapple with matters of racism, colonialism, and the racialized foundations of the French state. She suggests that it was (and is) not a matter of amnesia regarding France's violent colonial histories and a contemporary question of immigration, but rather an issue of colonial aphasia in intellectual circles and a popular realm. She defines aphasia as an occlusion of knowledge—an active dissociation or blockage—not a question of ignorance, forgetting, or absence, and she particularly criticizes the French intelligentsia, or "fortressed French academe," one of the "global heartlands of critical social theory and the philosophies of 'alterity' and difference," for rarely turning its "acute analytic weapons to the deep structural coordinates of race in France."³⁶ In her view, this includes a long list of France's "cherished intellectual elite," including Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, Alain Badiou, Julia Kristeva, Pierre Nora, and many more, even though a number of this milieu were born and raised in North African colonies. Gilles Deleuze, with his magnum opus *Difference and Repetition* (1968), also comes to mind: "Even the philosopher Elisabeth Roudinesco, with her laser-like dissection of philosophy 'in turbulent times' never once asks why Gilles Deleuze, who so insisted on the 'fascism in us all,' left the racial architecture of France and its empire unaddressed."³⁷ In terms of Hirschhorn's artwork, Spinoza and Bataille do not fit neatly within this efflorescence of French post-structuralist theory, but their work significantly influenced it. Deleuze, for instance, drew heavily from Spinoza's philosophies (I return to Spinoza later in the chapter), and Bataille, one of the founding members of France's College of Sociology during the interwar period, had a tremendous impact on this wave of thought, his writings inspiring the work of figures such as Derrida, Foucault, Jean-Luc

Nancy, Jean Baudrillard, and more. One might also venture that Bataille's intellectual interests in communal experience and Indigenous cultures, such as with the idea of potlatch, fit within an earlier trend of colonial aphasia in the first half of the twentieth century. According to Stoler, only with the turn of the twenty-first century, and particularly the 2005 protests throughout France, have Anglophone postcolonial studies emerged as a belated node of intense debate within French academia due to this tide of colonial aphasia in French intellectual thought and scholarship.³⁸

Amid such a cultural and intellectual backdrop, it is significant that Hirschhorn provocatively installed his socially engaged monuments to the philosophers Deleuze, Spinoza, and Bataille in stigmatized, historically immigrant-based, peri-urban areas in Western Europe during this time. Accordingly, Mechtild Widrich is right to term the *Bataille Monument* a "performative monument." First of all, in line with her definition, the *Bataille Monument* reckoned with history through "temporal interaction with an audience that itself is no eternal public, but a succession of interacting subjects."³⁹ Second, it was also not merely a "bearer of information . . . theoretical or abstract"; it did "not 'tell' political facts, but [rather] engage[d] audiences in forming new ones."⁴⁰ Yet beyond this more general definition, Hirschhorn's carefully sited neighborhood monuments utilized a performative force to contextualize the historical problem of French intellectual colonial aphasia in the very material and psychic spaces that such a discourse had systematically occluded and dissociated itself from for decades. As Stoler emphasizes, it is critical to "underscore how many of those whose conceptual work we call on in colonial studies systematically have set their analytic work apart from the situated histories in which they were at least partly shaped."⁴¹ Hirschhorn's early twenty-first-century monuments disallowed this move through their charged, performative emplacement, and strategically did so at a time of heated debate in French scholarship, media, and political circles concerning race and postcolonialism.

Hirschhorn's monument installations, like Arendt's theory of political-public action in *The Human Condition*, may seem overly universalizing or idealistic, but at the heart of both projects lies a realistic, grounded commitment to plural forms of relationality and a trenchant awareness of histories of differentially distributed violence. He likewise recognizes the uncontrollability or often volatility involved in relating masses of diverse strangers, and it is no surprise that his neighborhood installations evolved dramatically in theory and practice after his first socially engaged, more

minimal banlieue-based installation, the *Deleuze Monument* from 2000. Set next to the social housing project Cité Champfleury outside the walls of Avignon, this piece did not involve much neighborhood interaction beyond its three-day opening and was uninstalled after only two months, rather than the planned four months. This was largely due to the fact that Hirschhorn did not stay on-site the entire time and maintain the installation.⁴² Thus he changed his strategy with the *Bataille Monument* two years later. Similarly, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, building on strident critiques and experiences from the *Bataille Monument*, came to include an extensive documentation center devoted solely to the neighborhood's history and residents. Increasingly throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, Hirschhorn's neighborhood monument installations came to physically and conceptually centralize issues of slow violence and imperial duress for different, historically and geopolitically specific, plural publics. Let me now examine more pointedly the question of "the people" and politics of Hirschhorn's banlieue pieces in concrete, sociohistorical terms.

Swiss-Swiss Democracy and the Violence of the National Imagined Community

If Hirschhorn is committed to an Arendtian model of political action in an unpredictable public sphere, privileging a heterogeneity of human voices and actions, how does he choose where to make such spaces of appearance? Why did he install the *Bataille Monument* in the largely Turkish German neighborhood of Nordstadt, his *Musée Précaire Albinet* in a ghettoized banlieue of Paris, or *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* in an Amsterdam suburb that has come to be known as the "first black town" in the Netherlands?⁴³ Again, many critics and scholars ask why he opts to locate his summer-long projects in these specifically lower-income, culturally diverse neighborhoods, interrogating his motivations for working with such marginalized communities. Yet these communities all have something in common: they are stigmatized outside of the sociopolitical imaginary of the nation-state. They are not just any suburbs set on the outskirts of European metropolises. They are also neighborhoods inhabited by multiple generations of ex-colonial immigrants and guest workers from the 1950s–70s onward. These are groups who came to Europe—often newly liberated from their colonial, subjugated status—in order to help rebuild the continent after the devastation of World War II. They are peoples, however, who have traditionally been minoritized in the national imagined

communities of Europe: Turks in Germany, northern Africans in France, and Surinamese in the Netherlands. Hirschhorn claims not to do social work in his banlieue installations, which could potentially imply an ambition to integrate or assimilate these residents in their respective, dominant national societies. Instead, he challenges who is relegated to second-class citizenship within the purview of “the people” or “the public,” as part of a culturally homogenizing national consciousness. Rather than fostering community, he is concerned with the very principle of community, and how a larger sense of community may lead to exclusion, marginalization, and minoritization.

In his now classic book, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1983), political theorist Benedict Anderson charts a number of discursive forms that emerged usefully in conjunction with the creation of national imagined communities in nineteenth-century Europe. These included, but were not limited to, the monument, museum, map, book, and newspaper, as they symbolically enabled a national, anonymous population to imagine themselves as belonging together. Such identities were imagined because the populace of even the smallest country would never know most of its fellow members, and they created a community because a “deep, horizontal comradeship” linked the circumscribed nation’s populace.⁴⁴ Hirschhorn has worked with the same forms in relation to issues of community affiliation. His installations confront the nationalist paradigm in particular, reinventing its homogenizing narratives from the ground up. In them, its centralizing discursive framework is tempered and restructured as contingent, heterogeneous, and precarious in order to include a more egalitarian and vibrant articulation of “the people,” otherwise a static category exploited by politicians in order to retain power. The danger inherent to a flat rendering of national identity is the exclusion and marginalization of economically and culturally scapegoated peoples.

Switzerland, for instance, continually registers on Hirschhorn’s radar for extreme national isolationism and xenophobia. Because it is his home country, the artist has produced numerous pieces spotlighting its conservative politics: *Time to Go* (1997), *Swiss Converter* (1998), *Gold Mic-Mac* (1998), *Swiss Army Knife* (1998), *Wirtschaftsland Davos* (Economic landscape Davos, 2001), to name only a few. Most of these artworks focus on the country’s dual militarism and banking/corporate wealth, with both symbolized in his installations by enlarged cardboard-and-tinfoil Swiss watches. Hirschhorn moved to Paris in 1984 to escape a situation where he had to serve prison time for refusing mandatory military conscription. Switzerland has not fought in a war since

1815, but in 2005, the country had “more soldiers per capita than any Western democracy.”⁴⁵ From 1977 to 1982, Hirschhorn participated in the mandatory service, but as he became more critical of the country’s paradoxical policy of “armed neutrality,” he refused to continue with the annual training and served four months in jail.⁴⁶ His most trenchant critique of a Swiss national community, however, took the form of a hybrid gallery installation and socially engaged artwork in 2004–5, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*.⁴⁷

Swiss-Swiss Democracy foregrounded a reactionary nationalist discourse that fictively homogenizes and essentializes its “people” for political ends. Open for two months, from December 4, 2004, until January 30, 2005, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* inundated the Swiss Cultural Center in Paris, covering every inch of its space with cardboard, printouts, packing tape, and numerous other packaging and informational materials.⁴⁸ Text and imagery were panoramically yet incoherently photocopied and pasted through the cavern-like space, further fragmented by Hirschhorn’s own scrawling graffiti missives. It was typical of his cynical, materially maximalist museum installations, overwhelming viewers with a chaotic environment. Added to the guerrilla terrain, however, were also spaces for human encounter and performance. Downstairs there was a theater auditorium, café, and media room, and upstairs there was a library and lecture hall. Similar to the *Bataille Monument*, Hirschhorn stayed on-site for the duration of the show, ten hours a day, facilitating a score of activities that turned an otherwise static, claustrophobic topography (like *Cavemanman* or the camouflaged *Utopia, Utopia = One World, One War, One Army, One Dress*) into a dynamic staging ground.

Instead of an inhabited residence in real space, like the Friedrich Wöhler-Complex in Nordstadt, Germany, or Cité Albinet in Aubervilliers, France, the installation engaged the imagined community of Switzerland. Nothing confirms this more than the extraordinary, instant reaction it provoked from the Swiss government. After ten days of impassioned debate, the parliament cut funding to the annual budget of Pro Helvetia, the government-subsidized cultural institution that owns the Swiss Cultural Center in Paris. They slashed its funding by over a million Swiss francs. Following a debate between the senate and lower chamber, the senate ultimately ratified the measure, twenty-two to nineteen, and further insisted upon the resignation of the center’s director, Michel Ritter, which the institution refused.⁴⁹ What purportedly incited the economic censorship? The mass media had widely misreported an incident in the exhibition’s theatrical, parodic staging of *William Tell*, in which an actor urinated on an image of the federal minister for justice and

police, Christoph Blocher, and then vomited into an election box. The staged gestures crossed the line of what the state considered to be civil, civilian behavior in the Swiss national imaginary.

A year prior, in 2003, Hirschhorn had declared that he would no longer exhibit in Switzerland, not as long as the newly elected federal councillor Blocher remained in power.⁵⁰ The artist made a similar declaration in 2001 with the election of Jörg Haider in Austria. Both Blocher and Haider were charismatic, populist leaders of radical right-wing parties in their respective countries, but whereas Haider's controversial election catalyzed diplomatic sanctions from countries throughout the European Union, Blocher's received less international response.⁵¹ His entry to the Swiss federal council came after the Swiss People's Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union démocratique du centre; SVP/UDC) accrued the largest number of votes in the national election and demanded another seat on the top-level, seven-person federal council. Blocher, a billionaire from the chemical industry, founded his political career on an anti-immigration and anti-EU platform. Only months after *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*, for instance, Blocher ardently called for the shoring up of Swiss borders in a national debate concerning the EU's Schengen-Dublin Treaty, intended to promote cross-border police cooperation and extend the free movement of labor.⁵² The SVP warned that accepting these treaties would leave the country vulnerable to criminal and itinerant foreigners.⁵³

Playing with such a discourse, Hirschhorn staged *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* extraterritorially, in line with his boycott on exhibiting within the borders of Switzerland. Clearly, however, the Swiss parliament still viewed Hirschhorn's installation as operating within its national horizon because it exploited a supplementary national space. The Swiss Cultural Center is owned and operated via Swiss government funding, with the mandate to promote Swiss cultural patrimony and a positive national image in a critical neighboring country, France. In this way, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* was an *unheimlich* (uncanny, or "unhomely") addition to the geographical borders of Switzerland, and similar to the phrase "an artist's artist," the doubled adjective *Swiss-Swiss* unequivocally marks the delimited insider social imaginary that this installation wished to address.

As a superficial, grotto-like enclosure, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* worked to territorialize its audience completely in a Swiss visual economy. Its primary aesthetic strategies, however—hybridity of forms, deformation, inversion,

masking, and mimicry—subverted any Swiss, essentializing discourse. For this reason, the space functioned ironically in the same manner as one of its many model train sets looping around through the tunnels of an artificial Alpine landscape. Brown, packing-taped couches became indistinguishable from fake mountain ranges that concealed miniature train tracks, exposed and hidden on different sides. The mountains and tunnels are famous national icons in Switzerland and, for Hirschhorn, represent a certain isolationism from world affairs, evident in the country's historical policy of diplomatic and militaristic neutrality. Numerous coats of arms also adorned the walls of the exhibition, representing the twenty-six cantons unique to the Swiss federation. Each canton was a fully sovereign state from 1648 until the nation's unification in 1848, and that legacy still bears with it a significant degree of regionalism in the country. General popular assemblies and ballots in the various regions denoted Switzerland's singular and quite elaborate system of direct democracy. In the installation, ballot boxes were encased by vitrines, which ethnographically displayed various Swiss paraphernalia such as coins, hats, and William Tell-brand beers. Yet each signifying object of Swiss nationhood was somehow deformed, for example, with cancerous-like protrusions.

Additionally, the three predominant colors on the walls—pastel blue, yellow, and pink—also territorialized and satirized the space as Swiss. Blue, yellow, and red refer to the colors of the Swiss National Guard, as well as the famous *William Tell Monument* (1895) in Altdorf by Richard Kissling. In the sculptor's best-known work, the bronze figure of Tell stands grandiosely in front of a serene Swiss landscape, enclosed and buttressed by a tricolored brick wall of red, blue, and yellow. The myth of William Tell, Switzerland's most celebrated national progenitor and folk legend, holds special significance for the country. The town of Altdorf hosts Kissling's sculpture of the rugged mountain peasant because this is supposedly where Tell resisted the Habsburg Empire's encroachment into the canton of Uri in 1307, enabled by the recent opening of a mountain pass (highlighting, again, the narrative of a weak border).⁵⁴ The story of William Tell has been repeatedly chronicled and adapted since the fifteenth century in text, in song, and on the stage, but it particularly gained popularity as a nationalist narrative in Switzerland in the nineteenth century with state unification. In *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*, however, the nationalistic, militaristic colors were diminished and tempered as pastel. The Swiss iconography of this installation was visually totalizing yet ultimately subverted through visual attenuation and satirical mimicry.

The model train sets, regional coats of arms, ballot boxes, and nationalistic colors all ostensibly created the topography of a Swiss *Heimat*, but their deployment in Hirschhorn's maximalist and "cheap" style rendered the encapsulated terrain *unheimlich*. *Heimat* is a polyvalent German term, not quite translatable in English, that signifies the home, homeland, landscape, regional identity, and local dialect all at once. In the modern era, the term came to register nostalgia for a rural, simple way of living on the land that still fostered intimate community relationships. Later during World War II, it was co-opted by the Nazis to suggest a natural *Volk*, or people, ancestrally rooted in the land, embodying a "blood and soil" ethos that rejected anything "foreign." Christoph Blocher and the SVP have explicitly utilized the visual signs of this provincializing discourse, arranging parades in small towns, for instance, with women in traditional dresses, men with alpenhorns and cowbells, and even their mascot billy goat in tow. Blocher has given speeches that compare a "fight for freedom" against the European Union to one against the Habsburgs, and thus the national story maintains its continuity and teleology.⁵⁵ *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* critically challenges any such interpretation of the *Heimat* with parody, mimicry, deformation, incongruence, fragmentation, and precarious materials—all strategies aimed at adulterating and revising this exclusivist national narrative.

An activist theater group, PublixTheatreCaravan, has done similarly parodic work in resisting such nationalist, exclusionary rhetoric. The group's English name, however, translated from the German VolxTheaterKarawane, does not capture the same connotations discussed above—of the *Volk*, or people ancestrally rooted in the land, as opposed to a public, a more amorphous and borderless entity created through discourse. Since 1996, they have focused on performing actions against any Fortress Europe imaginary, or the idea that Europe's external borders should become impenetrable in order to allow freer internal movement for those deemed properly European. Nicholas Mirzoeff has aptly called it "the anti-migrant regime of the present-day European Union."⁵⁶ With a similar view, PublixTheatreCaravan satirically called for "racist purity checks" with voluntary stool samples in front of the Hofburg in Vienna, or a "Great Border Protection Day," also in Vienna, in 1998.⁵⁷ Partly inspired by the election of extreme right-wing leader Jörg Haider to the Austrian parliament in 2000, the group also began experimenting with an "organized caravan" format, taking their antiracist, antifascist campaigns on the road to different sites.⁵⁸ Philosopher and art theorist Gerald Raunig

provides a compelling analysis of the theater caravan as a form of activism through nomadic movement and precarity. For him, it synchronizes with a Deleuze/Guattari concept of the nomadic as well as, more concretely, the No Border/No One Is Illegal movement in Europe.⁵⁹ PublixTheatreCaravan's art is intended neither as a romanticization of migrants nor a glorification of nomadism, but rather a thoughtful interrogation of precarity, with this as its most important aspect: "Creating situations in new places, rather than in familiar, well explored territories, means being forced to make quick decisions, often reducing complexity to a minimum, constantly having to readjust the goals of actions. Within this deterritorialization movement that tears a certain territory out of its familiar context, temporary nomadic terrains emerge, zones of experimentation for a smooth space without delimitations and striations."⁶⁰

Both PublixTheatreCaravan and *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* aim to foster more critical, self-reflexive publics through a contestation of borders and strategies of the *unheimlich*, as opposed to Christoph Schlingensiefel's arguably more satirically violent public piece in Vienna in 2000, *Ausländer Raus!* (or *Foreigners Out!*, also in response to Haider's election). Yet *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* worked through a slower, more "complicating" process of deterritorialization from the "inside out." Instead of "a war machine intervening in uncertain territories with its offensives," as Raunig describes PublixTheatreCaravan's actions, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* aimed to reimagine its bounded "people" with less agit-prop and more ambiguity.⁶¹

In his seminal essay "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation," postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha scrutinizes the rhetorical gesture of "the people," defined as a holistic cultural entity with supremacist nationalist claims.⁶² For Bhabha, "the people" are not simply a patriotic, political body but act as a double move in the narration of the nation. On the one hand, "the people" are an a priori historical presence, the pedagogical objects of a mythologizing, nationalist official discourse. On the other hand, they are the subjects of that process of signification. "The people," in other words, must also "erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity: as that sign of the *present* through which national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive process."⁶³ For Bhabha, this split process produces a tension in the temporality of imagining the national community. The na-

tion as discourse must include both a continuist, accumulative temporality in teaching the objects of its primordial past, as well as a performative time of repetition and recursion in the present, constantly stressing the reproductive, living element of “the people.” Critically, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* fused pedagogical and performative temporalities to display a motley, pluralistic embodiment of the Swiss “people.” The entire space was objectified and reified into rhetorical pie charts, informational newspaper articles, Swiss icons, and so forth, but the space was also enlivened by performing bodies every single day—Hirschhorn himself, the philosopher Marcus Steinweg, Gwenaël Morin, and numerous local and international visitors.

Nothing illustrates this temporal disjunction between historical, objectified pedagogy and contemporary, living performativity better than the clockwork staging of Gwenaël Morin’s *William Tell* (plates 6a and 6b). Morin adapted Friedrich Schiller’s 1804 classic telling of the mythic hero, a fixed narrative meant to demonstrate the succession and historical progress of a Swiss identity and community through the figure of William Tell, but did so in an exaggeratedly untraditional, satirical, recursive, and self-reflexive manner. The media’s reportage of the play was inaccurate. The actors did not literally urinate on Christoph Blocher’s image or vomit into a ballot box, although clearly their figurative staging was meant to elicit the same basic interpretation. These bodily functions, as well as the boisterous singing and clapping by fellow actors (a sample verse about secret, Swiss bank accounts states, “well hidden, well stashed away, a bunker to protect you, got your hands in your pockets”), contrasted starkly with the playing of traditional, classical (i.e., Western European) harpsichord music. At one point, actors even stripped down to their underwear and threw their clothes into the audience, who responded by tossing them back. Whatever integrity Schiller’s *William Tell* had before, as a nationalist pedagogical tool, Morin corrupted with taboo corporeal functions and nonnormative public behavior. At the end of each performance, Morin cynically declared, “We’re free,” and then he covered the sleeping troupe with a large, pedagogical sign: a laminated poster/bedsheet with William Tell’s heroic image. At the end of the play, the country’s “people,” once again in their rehearsed signification of Tell’s story, uncritically fell into an inert slumber. Following the reproduction and performance of the story with living, everyday subjects in a state of contemporaneity, the actors then reentered a symbolically objectified and dormant state, until the next day when the play would begin again at precisely seven o’clock in the evening. Morin’s parodic adaptation of *William*

Tell staged Swiss nationalism as a disjunctive temporal split between the pedagogical (i.e., nation as static sign) and the performative (i.e., nation as living subjects). Moreover, this temporal recursion of the “reproductive people” did not present a banal, ordinary picture of Swiss life, but rather a biting critique of such a “simple” life, exposing the violence undergirding it.

For Anderson, national time is a form of “homogeneous, empty time,” as Walter Benjamin termed it, measured by clocks and calendars and prescribing a clear spatial, social horizon.⁶⁴ In other words, it is a narrative of the meanwhile, or progressive, temporal coincidence. This type of temporality, symbolized by Hirschhorn’s motif of the Swiss watch, for instance, links anonymous people and activities by a steady synchronicity, allowing them to envision a form of collective cohesion. Furthermore, Anderson asserts that print capitalism—the emergence of books and newspapers as the first self-sustained, mass consumer objects—played a vital role in the particular social imagination of the nation-state.⁶⁵ Books, and their more extreme form, newspapers, enable a “meanwhile” temporality to bind together an anonymous people. Reading the newspaper diurnally at approximately the same time becomes a ceremonial ritual, where the world is imagined concretely in quotidian life.⁶⁶ For Bhabha, however, from the “place of the ‘meanwhile’ . . . there emerges a more instantaneous and subaltern voice of the people, minority discourses that speak betwixt and between time and places.”⁶⁷ This “betwixt and between” occurs in the “splitting” double narrative of “the people,” between the time of reified, nationalist pedagogy (*William Tell*) and its living, local subjects. This splitting “makes untenable any supremacist, or nationalist claims to cultural mastery, for the position of narrative control is neither monocular nor monologic.”⁶⁸ Instead, counternarratives and minority discourses emerge in the disjunctive cracks of the nation as double narration. Put another way, the duress of subjugated peoples in the national imaginary becomes manifest, through a recursive analytics of the narration and staging of “the people.”

Beyond the discordant performance of *William Tell*, a critical ritual in *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* was the release of the newspaper, printed on pink, pastel blue, and yellow paper (again, the national colors as diminished), at three o’clock every afternoon. The newspapers were an indispensable part of the exhibition and free of charge. A whole room was devoted to this ceremony, with a photocopier, two computers (with free internet access), past newspapers hung up with packing tape for reading, and each newspaper’s front page cut and collaged into a grid on the wall (plates 7a and 7b). Each

newspaper had a diverse array of content, generally including a transcript of the philosophical lecture from Marcus Steinweg that day, information concerning Hirschhorn's past artworks and life, contemporary news articles, commercial advertisements, collages, diagrams, poems, and excerpts from literary and theoretical texts. The journal from Thursday, January 6, for instance, juxtaposes multifarious references to the playwright Heiner Müller, Édouard Glissant, and Giorgio Agamben's *State of Exception*, with images of fashion photography and, not surprisingly, an idealized painting of William Tell.

The creation and circulation of these newspapers, like Morin's parody, enabled counternarratives of "the minority, exilic, marginal, and emergent" to continually fracture and supplement the territorialized, Swiss imagined community of the installation.⁶⁹ The paper from Wednesday, December 22, for example, highlights an outsider to the art historical canon: a Swiss art maker from the early twentieth century, Adolf Wölfli, a mentally ill patient who created a type of art categorized as *art brut*. The journal also includes an (at the time, week-old) article from a Swiss tabloid newspaper titled "EU Decides over the Admission of Turkey: Will All Turks Then Be Allowed in Switzerland?" The installation's newspapers repeatedly draw parallels among voices considered to be outside of a homogeneous, traditional Swiss community, and they do so in a chronologically nonlinear manner, suturing in outdated historical sources.

In particular, Switzerland's complicity with German Nazis during World War II is an overarching narrative that frays the margins of any supremacist account of "the people." Friday, January 7's newspaper depicts Hirschhorn's piece *Swiss Converter* (1998) at the Herzliya Museum in Israel, along with a review alluding to the then recent controversy concerning Swiss bank accounts during the war. In 1997, due to immense international pressure, major Swiss banks finally began to acknowledge their role as financiers to the Nazis during World War II. The banks processed billions of dollars' worth of gold and other valuables looted by the Nazis from Holocaust victims, transforming it all into paper money for the Germans' immense military campaign. The Swiss banks also finally published in 1997 an open list of dormant accounts from Holocaust victims in order for families to file restitution claims. In another *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* newspaper from Thursday, January 20, Hirschhorn includes a 1991 article by curator Stephanie Barron regarding the selling of confiscated "degenerate art" at an auction by Galerie Fischer in Lucerne on June 30, 1939. These distinctly nonneutral operations

by Switzerland during the war are still a matter of contention. Whereas Germany was forced to come to terms with its atrocities and still stigmatizes supremacist, nationalist expression to a tremendous degree, Switzerland's lack of post-World War II, self-reflexive discourse regarding its Nazi complicity continues to shape its often reactionary, jingoistic politics today.

Newspapers allow a community of strangers to imagine themselves as belonging contemporaneously in the world to a particular people with a common language and territorial horizon. They report on contemporary events in order to situate this discourse on a temporal axis of the meanwhile. Hirschhorn's newspapers, in contrast, continually highlight disjunctive temporalities and counternarratives, and recursive histories of violence, disallowing viewers to forget histories that disrupt a static, holistic category of the Swiss people. Originary genealogies demand that these ill-fitting narratives be forgotten. In contrast, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* exposed the illusion of a Swiss *Heimat* and shifted attention from the boundary "outside" to the "finitude 'within,'" as Bhabha terms it. A fear of cultural otherness, or the problem of policing the boundary against "outside" people, was restaged as a matter of plurality already within.⁷⁰

The bounded, cave-like, imaginary space of *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* bombarded a confined diversity of visitors with a profusion of jarring, discursive frameworks. "The people" had to navigate a complex network of pedagogical, informational avenues: books, newspapers, analytical texts, television screens, lectures on videotape, the internet, wall-graffitied slogans, propaganda posters, graphs and charts, diagrams, photographs, and more. Yet they had the time to do it, as a plural, live public, sitting in a café or on the packing-taped couches in the library, or among other audience members in the theater or lecture hall. The contained spaces and compressed temporalities in the exhibition—disjunctively staged—challenged visitors to recognize a heterogeneous, living people within the artificial constructs of a closed, Swiss frontier.

Scholars have not related this piece to Hirschhorn's socially engaged installations, but it helps illuminate the artist's choice to work with marginalized neighborhoods on the peripheries of European metropolises. In this instance, Hirschhorn boycotted creating such an artwork within the national borders of Switzerland. Instead, he established an alternative, hybrid, socially engaged art project in order to challenge directly the state's xenophobic rhetoric, one that would "derealize" the country's democratic façade, as Bhabha would attest. In my final example of a newspaper from the installation, one finds a text

from the *Documenta 11* catalog, Homi Bhabha's "Democracy De-realized," published at the time of the *Bataille Monument*.⁷¹ Juxtaposed alongside Bhabha's text is a long list of antidepressants. Both probably refer—as ameliorative devices—to the newspaper's content from the day before, which cites a Swiss referendum from September 2004. In that vote, 57 percent of the population, or just under 1.5 million people, elected to again prevent third-generation "foreigners" born in Switzerland from automatically becoming citizens. In his essay, Bhabha advocates a model of derealizing democracy in order to deconstruct such an exclusionary model of national affiliation and to recognize its "frailty, its *fraying edges or limits* that impose their will of inclusion and exclusion on those who are considered—on the grounds of their race, culture, gender, or class—unworthy of the democratic process."⁷² Like Arendt's model and Butler's ideas concerning nonviolence, he also recognizes the dangers of the public-political realm, and ultimately its frailty. However, Bhabha's theorization more explicitly links this social vulnerability to the recursive histories of violence within a postcolonial public sphere in Europe, with its essentializing models and categories of community.

Hirschhorn's socially engaged pieces do the same, continually registering this precarity, in order to resist the slow violence characteristic of a dominant, European public sphere that has been historically defined by exclusionary nationalistic policies and rhetoric. Although deconstructive and cynical, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* still aimed to imaginatively call into being a preventive public against such recursive violence. With such a splitting and fraying of the nationalist narrative, however, why would it not simply constitute a counterpublic? The crux of the matter hinges on Hirschhorn's authority in the construction of the piece. Similar to *Respite* and *Deep Play*, although geared toward the creation of a nonviolent social imaginary through discourse, Farocki's and Hirschhorn's pieces arise from a more singularly centralized point of artistic activism. Now let us turn to the artist's socially engaged artworks set in European banlieues, particularly *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, in order to tease out this distinction.

The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival and Nonviolence through Precarious and Plural Publics

Whereas *precarious* has become a trendy, diffused term in a subfield of participatory art in the last decades, for Hirschhorn, it is tethered to specific issues of stigmatization and ghettoization in banlieues. Hirschhorn's adoption

of the term and notion *precarious* refers to *précarité* in terms of labor, as a concept describing unstable market dynamics in a newly globalized service economy.⁷³ The *génération précarité* designates young people in this matrix, often immigrants, with no contracts or only partial employment benefits.⁷⁴ Hirschhorn's 2004 installation in the French banlieue Aubervilliers, *Musée Précaire Albinet*, for instance, registered a sense of precarity not only in its temporary, fragile structure, but also more profoundly in the work arrangements that Hirschhorn brokered between major French institutions and local Aubervilliers residents, particularly for the youths who interned at the Centre Pompidou.⁷⁵ Engaging deeply with questions of socioeconomic inequality, xeno-racism, ghettoization, and police brutality in banlieues such as Aubervilliers, the piece presciently spoke to complexly entangled issues that would contribute to the eruption of violence in 2005 with three weeks of rioting throughout the country.⁷⁶

In her lengthy fieldwork and analysis of such charged issues in France, anthropologist Beth Epstein importantly emphasizes the economic framing of such social inequality, which she argues has lost critical attention in recent decades. In her analysis, national debates concerning questions of social exclusion held sway in the 1990s. There was an implicit understanding that a category of people known as *les exclus* were constricted by entrenched socioeconomic inequalities in the banlieues.⁷⁷ However, since the early 2000s, a rhetorical shift has occurred to emphasize instead the values of *laïcité*, or state-sponsored secularism.⁷⁸ Similar to the polysemous term *Heimat*, *laïcité* is difficult to define succinctly, and its valence has morphed historically in France since the 1880s.⁷⁹ Essentially, however, in the words of French historian Joan Wallach Scott, it means “the separation of church and state through the state’s protection of individuals from the claims of religion. (In the United States, in contrast, secularism connotes the protection of religions from interference by the state.)”⁸⁰ Secularism and individualism together form the hallmarks of French republicanism and suggest that universal sameness should be the basis for equality. Historically and practically, this has meant that French assimilation entails the eradication of difference, not the negotiation of difference, for the purposes of national unity and social cohesion. As Scott pithily summarizes it, “From this perspective, discrimination does not exist, because differences of groups are not recognized; if differences don’t exist, how can there be discrimination?”⁸¹ Thus a dominant French public sphere has mobilized *laïcité* to justify the prohibition of headscarves in schools (“a sign of the inherent non-Frenchness of anyone who practiced

Islam, in whatever form”) and to steer a current debate concerning French “integration” and how to ensure more “lasting social peace” in banlieues.⁸² Epstein is not alone in calling for a twenty-first-century national debate to move beyond the more abstract values of French republicanism and identity and to return to an analysis of the complexly entangled socioeconomic and xeno-racist conditions in banlieues.

Crucially, this French context informs Hirschhorn’s work in stigmatized suburbs throughout Europe, but each installation also attends to the socio-historical specificity of its own unique national context as well. Hirschhorn’s employment of the term *nonexclusionary* to describe his installations, for instance, arguably derives from the French debate and “fight against exclusion” (*la lutte contre exclusion*) for *les exclus* in the 1990s, and I repeat this terminology in order to acknowledge and stress this discursive and historical specificity in my own analysis.⁸³ Yet the tremendous body of scholarship concerning French national unity and debates around banlieues goes beyond the scope of this chapter and, moreover, threatens to overdetermine and overwhelm an interpretation of Hirschhorn’s work in peri-urban areas throughout Europe.

What does bear stressing, however, is a kind of intellectual aphasia that Ann Laura Stoler diagnoses with regard to colonial and racial histories in France, specifically noting the high-rises of the banlieues as the “ruins of French empire,” where these are not “finished histories of a victimized past but consequential livid histories of differential futures.”⁸⁴ Hirschhorn’s banlieue installations recursively call attention to such differentially distributed histories and futures of violence: the scarcity of resources, the uneven allocation of access to them, the dispossessions that “saturate the subsoil of people’s lives and persist, sometimes subjacently, over a longer *durée*.”⁸⁵ For the artist, these colonial ruins persist throughout Europe in various metropolitan peripheries, not only in France and in Aubervilliers, where he has based his practice since emigrating from Switzerland.

In 2009, Hirschhorn created *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, for example, again establishing a makeshift “cultural center” in a racially and ethnically plural suburb of a major European metropolis, Amsterdam. For eight weeks, Hirschhorn and his crew lived in one of the local high-rises in Bijlmermeer, colloquially known as Bijlmer, and hosted an assortment of events each day, which attracted a multitude of types of onlookers, speakers, performers, inhabitants, and other public actors. The events included workshops, guest lectures and readings, a philosophical tract from Marcus Steinweg, a

theater piece written by Steinweg and directed by Hirschhorn, and a radio and television broadcast. There were also numerous spaces for congregation in the café, in the internet room, exhibition spaces dedicated to Spinoza and the neighborhood, and online via a streaming webcam. This time Hirschhorn had a larger team on hand: Marcus Steinweg, Vittoria Martini as the “Ambassador of Art History,” Alexandre Costanzo, who edited the daily newspaper (available online as well), and, though not physically in situ for the entire duration, Guillaume Desanges, who wrote the theatrical piece *Child’s Play*. Beyond this group, Hirschhorn collaborated closely with a residential family in the neighborhood, the Monsels. With training as a local primary school teacher, Muriel Monsels coached different children each week for *Child’s Play*, in which they would enact an assortment of canonical artworks by Martha Rosler, Vito Acconci, Marina Abramović, and others during a performance every Saturday. Her husband, Sammy Monsels, initially invited Hirschhorn to erect *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* next to his running track in the apartment complex, and the Monsels’s son, Reggae, was pivotal in helping construct and raise awareness about the project in the neighborhood.⁸⁶ The piece marks a noticeable shift ten years after the construction of Hirschhorn’s first public monument, the *Spinoza Monument* (1999), in the red-light district of Amsterdam. The earlier work featured only a provisional replica of Spinoza with a small library of books—quite a minimalist precursor to the elaborate media-attention-grabbing apparatus of his first (and as of now, only) “festival.”

As its title indicates, perhaps due to the *Bataille Monument*’s criticisms, this neighborhood project placed equal emphasis not only on the philosopher but also on the histories of this residential complex, which were elaborated on in the Documentation Center (plate 11). After World War II, the Netherlands, and Amsterdam in particular, had an enormous housing shortage, and the prefabricated estate in Bijlmermeer arose in response to this need in the 1960s, with thirteen thousand dwellings (thirty-one large blocks, ten stories high) erected between 1968 and 1975.⁸⁷ It was an idealistic, modernist project, envisioned in the style of Le Corbusier and the CIAM movement (Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne, or International Congress of Modern Architecture), with functional zoning (habitation, work, recreation), open green landscapes, numerous parking garages, and an elevated road system. The hexagonal grid layout was designed to foster collective living and neighborliness with communal facilities and social spaces, and it was geared toward attracting middle-income families who wished for a quieter suburban life. Yet the modernist vision of typically Dutch bourgeois collectivity in Bijlmermeer was never

realized: its monumental, anonymous high-rises failed to attract the desired tenants. Instead, following a flood of ex-colonials from Suriname in 1975 (the year of its liberation), the Dutch government ended up locating numerous Surinamese immigrants in the apartments. Bijlmermeer became known as the “first black town in the country.”⁸⁸ As of 2003, the apartments held about 40 percent people from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles, 40 percent from other countries, particularly in West Africa, and about 20 percent with continental Dutch roots. The complex now houses almost 100,000 people of over 150 nationalities. Over the decades, it has been stigmatized in the media for poverty, crime, and delinquency, and recently, the Dutch government has invested heavily in its revitalization, tearing down over half of its original blocks and subsidizing social programs in the neighborhood.⁸⁹ Sammy Monsels himself, who initially invited Hirschhorn to Bijlmer, comes from Suriname. He studied in the Netherlands between 1971 and 1975 before leaving to join the newly formed postcolonial government as a sports administrator. In 1972, he represented the Dutch in the Olympic games, and then again in the 1980s. Since finally resettling in Bijlmermeer, he has founded two sports clubs in the suburb and acts as a track coach to local youth. Nonetheless, a broad swath of the public would still classify him as neither Dutch nor European.

The exhibition on the neighborhood also documented the tragic incident known as the “Bijlmer disaster.” In 1992, a Boeing 747 cargo plane crashed into a couple of towers, killing forty-three people. It was an Israeli aircraft, El Al Flight 1862—which between the explosion of depleted plutonium from the plane’s tail and its cargo containing chemicals for the Israeli national defense department—caused grave, lasting health issues for many of the residents, who developed symptoms similar to those of the Gulf War syndrome. The event precipitated and instigated the city’s urban regeneration program, and the complex now includes a memorial for the victims of the crash. *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* not only employed local residents to run a Surinamese-food snack bar but also, more critically, included a full room devoted to this history of the neighborhood with videos detailing the disastrous event. The plane crash cannot help but recall 9/11, the fall of the Twin Towers, and the divisive global cultural politics that erupted afterward.

Similar to Farocki’s multiscreen installations, Hirschhorn’s participant-based projects do not aim to unite a people, but rather to mediate publics. To reiterate, by definition, publics are composed of strangers, similar to the national

imagined community, but they do not presuppose kinship or any kind of territorial, linguistic, racial, or other positive identification.⁹⁰ A public is based on volition, yet it is not necessarily a voluntary association in the sense of civic society. According to Michael Warner, it is more fundamental: if the attention of the public no longer exists, neither does the public. These are strangers who compose a virtual entity. Warner describes it memorably: “A nation, for example, includes its members whether they are awake or asleep, sober or drunk, sane or deranged, alert or comatose. Publics are different. Because a public exists only by virtue of address, it must predicate some degree of attention, however notional, from its members.”⁹¹ A public’s attention may be sustained and deep, or random, perfunctory, or cursory, involving casual onlookers or engaged debaters.⁹² Hirschhorn’s artworks overtly foster this overlapping of types of attention.

In 2009–10, Hirschhorn struck up a personal, though published, correspondence with philosopher Jacques Rancière in order to reflect more deeply on the type of public engagement involved in his neighborhood installations. In 2007, in an *Artforum* text, Hirschhorn had explicitly praised the banlieue youth who protested in 2005, symbolically connecting their burning of cars (“On the outskirts of Paris, a movement of urgent anger reignited the flame of equality”) to Rancière’s *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, as a manifesto for equality, for its declaration of the equal intelligence of all human beings.⁹³ Hirschhorn was clearly familiar with Rancière’s writings at the time: the philosopher’s term *sans-parts*, deliberately evocative of the *sans-papiers*, or illegal immigrants, is at the heart of his theorization of the “world of the sensible.” With this in mind, Hirschhorn asked Rancière to specifically respond to *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*. In his first letter to the philosopher, Hirschhorn stipulates that his neighborhood pieces should in no way be conceived as “community art,” “participatory art,” “educational art,” or “relational aesthetics.”⁹⁴ In his second letter, he explains that his intention with *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* was to create a form that would implicate “the other, the unexpected, the non-interested,” and the stranger as much as the neighbor. *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* became a matter of coexistence for him with a “non-exclusive public.”⁹⁵ Rancière responded positively to the piece, claiming that it particularly confronted the problem of an inequality of temporalities, or an inequality among those marginalized in society, saddled with too much available time or too little leisure time due to socioeconomic reasons. Set amid strangers and neighbors, in other words, the piece called for an “equality among heterogeneous times.”⁹⁶ It recognized inequalities in

a hierarchized sociopolitical system with privileged levels of time giving or time taking (e.g., with some continually waiting in limbo for a visa or asylum).

Yet the heterogeneous temporalities of *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, in line with Hirschhorn's principle emphasis on nonexclusion, also critically evokes Michael Warner's ideas concerning the formation of nondominant publics. These require not only the voluntary assortment of strangers but also a temporality of circulation. Similar to Anderson, who considers the development of the modern nation, Warner suggests that temporally structured forms such as newsletters were the key development in the emergence of modern publics.⁹⁷ The dissemination of newspapers, or the televisual news hour today, provides the sense that public discourse unfolds invariably in a predictable, rhythmic manner. Not only is this not a meditative timelessness, but it also reflects, crucially, a historical time with actual subjects.⁹⁸ Whereas Anderson describes the "meanwhile" of the nation-state as an abstracted "homogeneous, empty time," allowing a false sense of stable community to strangers who otherwise would never be aware of each other, Warner's depiction offers a more intricate theorization of the public's temporal dynamics. The steady, punctuated rhythm of dailies, almanacs, magazines, and books allowed the mediation of a modern public, but the public also developed a certain reflexivity through supplementary reviews, citations, and republications. (Of course, as noted in chapter 2, I believe that a matter of self-reflexivity can no longer be taken for granted due to changing technologies, formats, and speeds of discourse in the twenty-first century.) In other words, the modern public did not temporalize in a linear direction, but rather moved in a cross-citational field of many heterogeneous actors/onlookers with different, overlapping rhythms of intervention/attention.⁹⁹ Hirschhorn's public works, similarly, imbricate quite divergent rhythms such as the abbreviated news hour or more time-lagged, academic work—each of which may cite and review one other in a larger, contemporaneous public sphere.

Crucially, discursive cross-citatoriality over time is not tantamount to a public conversation or dialogue. Such metaphors, more akin to the genres of argument and polemic, reduce the complexity and heterochronicity of a "multigeneric lifeworld organized not just by a relational axis of utterance and response but by potentially infinite axes of citation and characterization."¹⁰⁰ The public may include voices that are agonistic or passive, involved or indifferent, or belonging to completely different genres (e.g., a catalog reader, video producer, or theater actor) who will never directly encounter each other but whose words are cited multidirectionally in different implicated

texts. Hirschhorn's maximalist installations, traversing numerous genres and audiences, are much more in line with this interactive imagining of a "multigeneric lifeworld." His works are participatory, but not necessarily so because a viewer can purchase a cup of coffee, sit on a communal couch, and begin a conversation with other disparate visitors. Rather, they are interactive because their structure is predicated on the self-reflexive attention of the audience as a complexly mediated, temporally overlapping, and cross-generic lifeworld.

All too frequently, however, publicly engaged works such as the *Bataille Monument* or *Musée Précaire Albinet* are categorized as two-party dialogues: between powerful institutions and ghettoized neighborhoods; the art world elite and an impoverished minority group; or the center and periphery. Metaphors of dialogue, monologue, discussion, debate, and conversation inexorably crop up in relation to the artist's socially engaged works. In her essay "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics," for instance, Claire Bishop crucially highlights the limits of Bourriaud's relational aesthetics model by stressing, "Who is the public? How is a culture made, and who is it for?"¹⁰¹ She contrasts Rirkrit Tiravanija's interactive *Pad Thai*—a work that is "political only in the loosest sense of advocating dialogue over monologue," one that presupposes a congenial, communal togetherness—with Hirschhorn's *Bataille Monument*, a different type of relational installation that emphasizes "the role of dialogue and negotiation" but does so "without collapsing these relationships into the work's content."¹⁰² For her, Hirschhorn's neighborhood installation, in other words, reveals contextually bound and politically charged, antagonistic relations, which is certainly more the case than in Tiravanija's piece. Yet she still couches this relational public space metaphorically in terms of a dichotomous, contentious debate between the "local inhabitants" or "local populace" and "art tourists" or the "art world." She writes that "the 'zoo effect' worked two ways"—"Hirschhorn's project made visitors feel like hapless intruders. Even more disruptively, in light of the international art world's intellectual pretensions, Hirschhorn's *Monument* took the local inhabitants seriously as potential *Bataille* readers."¹⁰³ Rightfully, she wishes to refute the impetus of the installation as "inappropriate" or "patronizing," yet she does so through a simplified discursive metaphor of dialogue or debate that reductively binarizes the *Bataille Monument's* complexly cross-citational field of diversely positioned public actors or viewers.

Such metaphors obscure the poetic elements of language and expressive bodies in public together. Rational discussion or debate alone does not and

cannot wholly describe communication in a public among strangers.¹⁰⁴ This is Warner's primary critique of Jürgen Habermas's seminal theorization of the bourgeois public sphere, one that is by now largely acknowledged and taken to task by scholars: his model is too universalizing in a discussion of "people's reason." The public sphere not only allows the staging of critical, democratic debates. It also constitutes in itself different vital forms of embodied social relations and contestation: again, in Craig Calhoun's terms, it is "world-disclosing."¹⁰⁵ Members of a particular public, for instance, might not only rationally argue for a more egalitarian set of gender or sexual relations, but rather physically instantiate those filiations through their bodies, vis-à-vis their differentiated styles, locutions, and habits.¹⁰⁶ Rational-critical dialogue in such a sphere, because of the very site of struggle (embodied discrimination), is not neutral and may not be characterized as a purely detached, cerebral procedure.¹⁰⁷ Warner elaborates on this in terms of heteronormative gender and sex politics. The same principles apply, however, in terms of racial, ethnic, or class divisions foregrounded in interpretations of the *Bataille Monument*. Put another way, a bourgeois art circuit questions if Turkish or Turkish German bodies would naturally frequent the spaces of museums and galleries or be engaged with philosophical work such as Bataille's.¹⁰⁸

A metaphor of rational-critical debate is not enough to describe the complexity of Hirschhorn's public-sphere works and, moreover, threatens to rehearse a preexisting, essentializing brand of public discourse that locates otherness in us/them terms. *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* was no exception, placed (to stress again) in a neighborhood housing complex with almost 100,000 people of over 150 nationalities. In some respects, the Bijlmermeer complex is isolated yet representative of a metropolis that ranked first for the most nationalities in 2007, even surpassing New York though one-tenth its size. Thus metaphors of debate or dialogue between audiences inadequately convey the world-disclosing quality of such diverse publics as in *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, garnered through not only rational-critical communication but also the expressivity and emotional charge of bodies in physical and virtual space together.

The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival maintained a fragile balance between Hirschhorn's universalizing aspirations to envision an Arendtian space of appearance and the artist's commitment to situating the differentiated particularities of plurality, imperial duress, and recursive social violence and

vulnerability within such a public-political space. Indeed, despite his attention to the neighborhood's heterogeneity and histories of marginalization, Hirschhorn still did not downplay his Arendtian commitment to the life and work of Spinoza. More so than the *Bataille Monument*, however, the inclusion of Spinoza connected with a certain regional cultural politics. *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* was included as part of a larger widespread effort throughout Amsterdam, My Name Is Spinoza, which featured fourteen art projects dedicated to promoting the values of tolerance and freedom of speech for which the oft-called "father of the Enlightenment" now stands. In 2006, the Circle of Spinoza was created to revitalize his memory and work in Amsterdam, where Spinoza himself was born a "foreigner," the descendent of Portuguese Jewish refugees from the Spanish Inquisition.

Not surprisingly, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* received funding from the Dutch government as well as the European Union at a time when intolerance and hostility toward outsiders, particularly Muslims, is pronounced. Only in 2004, the filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered bicycling on the streets of Amsterdam, almost decapitated for his criticism of Muslim immigration, and in 2007, the populist leader Geert Wilders, founder of the radical right-wing Freedom Party, called for the Koran to be banned in the country.¹⁰⁹ Many blame such extremism on a Dutch leftist policy of multiculturalism in the 1980s and '90s, which helped immigrant communities preserve the traditions and language of their homelands, "maintaining little Moroccos and Turkeys" instead of advocating greater integration.¹¹⁰

As the mayor of Amsterdam from 2001 to 2010, Labor politician Job Cohen championed a different kind of integration, offering a countermodel to Wilders's inflammatory, xenophobic rhetoric. Cohen's paternal grandparents died at Bergen-Belsen, and his parents spent World War II hiding from the Nazis. Top on his agenda were immigration and integration concerns, and he touted what he viewed as the most crucial Dutch value—freedom—advocating that newcomers study a "Dutch canon of important historical events and figures."¹¹¹ Obviously this includes Spinoza and probably explains the sudden increased attention to the seventeenth-century philosopher in Amsterdam during that decade. Cohen's official policy was one of "keeping things together," evocative of Hirschhorn's precarious, packing-taped structures.¹¹² In 2004, in response to Van Gogh's murder, Cohen gathered several hundred civil leaders—not police but rather aldermen, district leaders, and school principals—to walk the streets and to talk and listen to residents, in a tactic of gathering information about the social climate. Unlike

his predecessors, Cohen also worked to combat radicalism in the Muslim community by reaching out to the city's Moroccan alderman, Ahmed Aboutaleb, now the mayor of Rotterdam and the first Muslim mayor of a major Dutch city.¹¹³ In 2006, Cohen commissioned a report on what made certain Muslim communities turn toward violent radicalism and assessed that it resulted from social isolation. His antiradicalization plan assisted strong ethnic communities, or those that exchange ideas on a daily basis, because the report found that if a strong network is given support, its members will become more active participants in society. In 2010, the plan's main designer, Jean Tillie, claimed that whereas incidents of racial and religious violence still plagued other parts of the country since Van Gogh's murder, Amsterdam remained peaceful.¹¹⁴

All of this is not to say that Hirschhorn wished to do social work with *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, build a more cohesive community in Amsterdam, or tackle state politics of multiculturalism more broadly speaking. Although implicated with Dutch cultural bureaucracy, as one art critic suggests, he also went beyond it.¹¹⁵ Despite sponsorship by governmental cultural institutions, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* does not reflect a paternalistic mode of communication exemplified by 1970s American "plop" art, for instance, sculptures placed on public squares throughout major cities as an educational "gift" from the state to the people.¹¹⁶ A resident in the complex from 1983 to 2010, Jan van Adrichem, for instance, contrasts Hirschhorn's project with Spinoza statues erected in Amsterdam during the same time: "You can compare Hirschhorn's work to the five permanent sculptures in bronze that were set up in the center of Amsterdam that same year, commemorating Spinoza. They are vulgar. They were put up in five spots in town. I almost cannot look at them. And when all is said and done, if *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*—as part of the *Street of Sculpture* project—is an unforgettable experience, then it is something important. Hirschhorn's project is definitely something that a lot of people are not going to forget."¹¹⁷

According to local residents, the greatest value of the project lay in its attempt to refute or even transform a continually circulating, negative image of the neighborhood in the larger public domain. Henk van der Belt, for instance, a resident of thirty-nine years in the neighborhood, who organized the documentation center in the project, states, "People always have to defend themselves that they are living here, because the media are reporting a lot of bad news from here. And I must say that since the plane crash they have discovered the Bijlmer as an area rich in 'human interest stories.' But still, there's a lot unknown about the Bijlmer, there's a lot of misunderstanding, a

lot of strange ideas.”¹¹⁸ Similarly, the managing director of one of the housing corporations, Monique Brewster, who had lived in the complex for eleven years at the time, states, “I think the main impact was that when we started, a lot of people thought we were crazy: ‘You cannot do this in this neighborhood, it’s not possible, people will break things, put graffiti on it, you won’t get any money from anyone because no one will believe in art in this neighborhood.’ Because really this is one of Holland’s most infamous ghettos. So people were proud that this could happen in the neighborhood.”¹¹⁹ Residents stressed the positive, broadened publicity that Bijlmer accrued through the duration of *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*. In the end, Hirschhorn’s project proffered counternarratives to reductive modes of media coverage and us/them discourse concerning the contentious state politics of multiculturalism in Amsterdam and the Netherlands.

The Bijlmer neighborhood is pathologized, not on the map of traditional Dutch society. Identity automatically becomes a defining issue and trait, yet the complex is tremendously diverse, encompassing a multitude of strangers. Nonetheless, they are grouped because Bijlmer’s inhabitants do not fit the dominant public’s monocular vision: neither as Dutch nor as universalizable art spectators. As Warner theorizes it, a counterpublic arises not when a dominated group opposes the main social set in power, but rather when a dominated group attempts to re-create itself as a public and thus challenges the socially fabricated norms that constitute the dominant culture as the universal public.¹²⁰ The numerous residents of Bijlmer, Nordstadt, or Aubervilliers, in their respective unique contexts, self-reflexively embodied and mediated alternative, positive public spaces for heterogeneous stranger sociability, but these projects arose only through Hirschhorn’s cultural capital. This is why Hirschhorn’s pieces do not fit neatly within Warner’s category of a counterpublic. Beyond Hirschhorn’s privileged subject position (in terms of class, race, gender, sex, and citizenship), his singular authority also enabled these publics, even though his neighborhood installations thrive only with the sustained attention and organization of the local inhabitants.¹²¹ This is part of the controversy behind his banlieue installations and arguably why, despite the fame of these pieces, few art historians have tackled the contentious cultural politics of these pieces through more in-depth analysis and interpretation.

Hirschhorn’s neighborhood installations do important cultural work, but they imagine the formation of critical publics in ways that slip beyond the dichotomy of public and counterpublic. They are not easily classifiable.

Crucially, there should be more diverse ways to describe and unpack aspects of “world-disclosing” public spheres today that move past such an interpretative binary.¹²² The main impetus of works such as *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* is not to create a counterpublic, although, as noted by inhabitants of the Bijlmer residence, the de-stigmatization of such banlieues is arguably a side effect that occurs through the inhabitants’ own self-reflexive organization through the artworks. Rather, the driving force of these neighborhood installations is to imaginatively nurture a public sphere that actively calls for nonviolence through plurality and the recognition of differentially distributed social precarity (reframed from a notion of social antagonism) among masses of strangers. Indeed, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* envisioned a preventive public, in which a matter of recurring imperial duress and slow violence might come to the universal public’s critical attention. This awareness of historically specific, unequal densities of violence fostered a publicly self-reflexive, prophylactic imagining of a pluralistic, nonviolent future.

Conclusion: Inequitable Densities and Distributions

Hirschhorn’s banlieue installations recognize the dangers of public opinion and attitudes, which are primarily developed not through an idealized realm of rational-critical discourse but rather through emotionally charged visuality and sociality. His gallery and museum installations particularly mirror this fact. Museum-based pieces coeval to *Swiss-Swiss Democracy* and *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, such as *Utopia, Utopia = One World, One War, One Army, One Dress* (2005); *Superficial Engagement* (2006); and *Das Auge* (The eye, 2008) bombard publics with valuable information and visuals but do so in a tremendously violent and nightmarish way. Within them lies a viral, repetitious camouflaging, concealment, or violence done to the visual markers of both public discourse and cultural difference.¹²³ This includes disfigured mannequins sporting military camouflage in *Utopia, Utopia*; ubiquitous nails and screws drilled into the mannequins of *Superficial Engagement*; or the monocular eye and bloody color red that define *Das Auge*. Within these oppressive environments there are no organized, relational activities for visitors, but rather dismembered and scattered mannequin bodies, often superficially grouped by corporeal parts or afflicted with cancerous protrusions wholly covered and visually defined by fragile, brown packing tape. The tape becomes a kind of prosthetic marker of the violence done to their bodies. Moreover, their deformed bodies and environments exist out of time in

nonplaces, and the signs of their disfigurement travel virally and reductively through the installation spaces. Whereas packing tape symbolically keeps things together as a precarious framework in Hirschhorn's socially engaged, specifically sited installations, in these white-cube-based artworks, it suggests a type of inadequate, medical-patchwork taping of injured, inanimate, and out-of-time bodies, or a more universal covering up of social, economic, and militaristic violence in a mainstream public sphere. To be sure, contrasted with such infernal scenarios, it is Hirschhorn's socially engaged pieces that instead offer generative entry points for relating masses of strangers and, as Arendt or Butler would attest, for inserting oneself into a dangerously unpredictable, pluralistic public realm.

In the end, the controversy of Hirschhorn's neighborhood installations erupts around a question of community. At stake, however, is not how to imaginatively bind strangers through an empirical sense of membership (e.g., through territory, religion, language, etc.), but rather how to weave a nonviolent connective tissue among strangers through more amorphously perceived common matters of concern. Countries such as Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands are confronted increasingly with the issue of relating masses of strangers who do not fit the mold of their historically, homogenously imagined national communities. Likewise, the European Union now deals with this problematic on a larger territorial basis, negotiating not only how to mediate but also how to unify millions of people who do not necessarily hold any other positive source of collective identification. That is why Hirschhorn attends to the historical and geopolitical specificities of his neighborhood installations but also reprises this type of project across multiple sites in Europe, linking disparate, embodied, and virtual publics around such common matters of concern.

Through a cross-citational, recursive analytic tempo (which, again, is never a matter of mere repetition), Hirschhorn's preventive publics might recognize histories of violence that have led to the differential stigmatization, segregation, and exclusion of certain bodies from "the people" of Europe. It is not only an issue of historical awareness at stake, however, but also an examination of how these past injuries may reanimate, reassemble, and reconstitute in diverse, concrete ways in the present and, moreover, in the future. Both Farocki and Hirschhorn have touched on banlieue politics, for instance, in order to signal how colonial and racialized forms of dehumanization have endured and persisted in both psychic and physical ways, in contemporary rituals and living spaces.¹²⁴ Theirs is a kind of anticipatory artistic activism

keenly attuned, first, to historically specific environments of violence, and second, to how the unequal densities and distributions of these environments might be imaginatively, nonviolently reconfigured in the future. Such work is less quantifiable in the present, but arguably more meaningful in the long term, acting in a future conditional tense.

Let me now turn to an art practice that denaturalizes, disrupts, and reconfigures time in even more imaginative ways. Henry VIII's *Wives* attempt to circumvent artistic authority altogether and inspire new modes of nonviolent mass subjectivity through common matters of concern.

HENRY VIII'S WIVES, POPULISM,
AND PREVENTIVE PUBLICS

4

In 1999, the artist collective Henry VIII's Wives invited different religious representatives to gather at an airport control tower. Nine official figures agreed to meet at the recently closed and inoperative airport Fornebu, arriving from various religious centers located in Oslo, including Buddhist, Islamic, Sikh, Hindu, Jewish, Quaker, the Church of Norway, Church of Scientology, and the Bahá'í Community. The religious leaders then participated in a photo shoot on the control deck of the air traffic tower, from which one final image emerged, titled *Nine Reasons to Be an Optimist* (figure 4.1). The photograph's men and women stand united as moral figureheads in an elevated space, watching over global traffic. They symbolically congregate as the "nine reasons to be an optimist" today. Yet the photograph fragments, or at least highlights a crack within, the utopian staging of the project. The image of this assembled group, calmly and composedly gazing out and away from one another in the tower, is in fact cut and stitched together from two photographs. The ceiling is slightly misaligned due to the fusing of the two photographs, and a fragmentary shoulder of a ghostly tenth body jars the continuity of the picture (being in fact a doubling of the Sikh man's shoulder). The tower and airport,



FIGURE 4.1 – Henry VIII’s Wives, *Nine Reasons to Be an Optimist*, 1999, photograph. © Henry VIII’s Wives.

moreover, had just been retired from service, suggesting the impossibility and the built-in failure of this proposition. The uncanny photograph evokes several key themes or threads in the art collective’s practice from 1997 until 2014: plural and coexistent identities, irreconcilable temporalities, seemingly impossible utopian spaces, and, more concretely, the form of the tower.

In 1997, after graduating from the Glasgow School of Art, the art group, including six members—Rachel Dagnall, Bob Grieve, Sirko Knüpfer, Simon Polli, Per Sander, and Lucy Skaer—decided to form the collective as a way of still collaborating together as they individually relocated across Europe to Copenhagen, Berlin, Bonn, London, Glasgow, and Oslo. Their practice is paradigmatic of the efflorescence of global art collectives in the 1990s and early 2000s, yet no art historical scholarship exists concerning their oeuvre. During their artistic practice, they utilized a wide assortment of media:

photography, video and film installation, street posters, radio, the internet, and more. In their earlier works, the group experimented with different media in order to interrogate the power of icons, symbols, and popular and official narratives. These pieces suggest how the mass media may edit, distort, re-script, misinform, or elide contestatory representations into easily consumable, packaged stories and images—often a form of slow violence in itself. The resulting icons or popular stereotypes foment public opinion for certain political ends, for instance, by instilling a mass anxiety or fear of outsiders, as in the group’s video installation *The Returning Officer* (2007). This chapter elaborates on some of their earlier work in order to help establish context for their understudied art practice, but it mostly focuses on pieces of theirs from around 2005 to 2009, a periodization I outline in the introduction. Particularly, I investigate the group’s later shift to a lengthier, multimedia and multisited “campaign,” *Tatlin’s Tower and the World* (2005–14), which aimed to construct Vladimir Tatlin’s unrealized *Monument to the Third International* (1919–20) in pieces throughout the world. Their durational artwork debuted at the exhibition *Populism* (2005; discussed in chapter 1) and continued through various manifestations in places such as Belgrade, Bern, and London, imagining plural publics through translocal connections and a transnational, nonviolent horizon. As with *Nine Reasons to Be an Optimist* and their own cross-border collaboration throughout Europe, Henry VIII’s Wives worked locally with specific sites and people but aimed to cross grand political borders through their utopian vision.

Also echoing the hopeful promise yet disjunctive irreconcilability of the religious group in *Nine Reasons to Be an Optimist*, it is not surprising that the artist collective adopted the seemingly curious pseudonym of Henry VIII’s Wives. A popular mnemonic recalls the six wives of Henry VIII of England (1491–1547): “Divorced, beheaded, died, divorced, beheaded, survived.” The six wives of Henry VIII were a group of marginalized, discarded figures whose personal lives oddly shaped the backdrop for one of the most critical ruptures in European Christian history. According to the collective, what is important to note about the sixteenth-century king’s wives is that even though they acted temporally adjacent to each other in the famed story, not all knowing each other, they are still identified today as one entity. They represent a cohesive grouping, yet also an irreconcilable plurality. This is a central idea in Henry VIII’s Wives’ practice and artworks.¹

Furthermore, the artist collective assumed the name for themselves in response to Princess of Wales Diana Spencer’s car crash in August 1997.² Their

alias not only registers the repression of maltreated figures in an authorial historical narrative, but also signals a quite contemporary, mass-mediated phenomenon in Britain, or the “people’s princess.” The death of Princess Diana, a figure who updates the idea of the divorced, royal wife, dominated reportage at the time. According to one member of the artist group, public response was tremendously emotional and a “bit hysterical.” Her public funeral drew an estimated three million mourners and onlookers, with one million of them alone lining the four-mile route from Kensington Palace to Westminster Abbey.³ More than one million bouquets were also left for her at Kensington Palace, a scale inconceivable compared to Hirschhorn’s modest street altars.⁴ And 32 million British spectators watched her funeral on television.⁵ According to Michael Warner, public figures such as she become phantasmic images, or concrete embodiments of the “people-as-one.”⁶ She assumed an iconicity as Prince Charles’s divorced wife—the popular symbol of a more liberal, open British society—and could not recapture her personal life as Diana Spencer. As their name indicates, Henry VIII’s Wives embrace the same public anonymity in their work but also parody it, confounding the notion of a “people-as-one,” or how a mass subject is formed.

As demonstrated by Princess Diana’s tragic death, publics today have developed certain genres of collective identification that particularly visualize or publicize the vulnerability of bodies. As Warner suggests, “Whereas printed public discourse formerly relied on a rhetoric of abstract disembodiment, visual media, including print, now display bodies for a range of purposes: admiration, identification, appropriation, scandal, and so on. To be public in the West means to have an iconicity.”⁷ Such genres of mass identification also do not preclude violent acts of horror, assassination, and terrorism.⁸ Injury to the social body, in other words, may also engender the formation of mass subjectivities. This includes the car crash of Princess Diana, who came to symbolically embody the unitary people, as well as instances of terror such as 9/11, the public transportation bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), or Anders Breivik’s shooting. Through their unbridled media coverage, all of these events sparked a sense of public, collective identification.

With their recursive and long-term art project *Tatlin’s Tower and the World*, Henry VIII’s Wives aimed to create a sense of social identification through vulnerability but not spectacular shock value, through localized but transnationally networked, grassroots encounters in a longer campaign to build a more utopian symbol of unification. One might view their staged photograph *Nine Reasons to Be an Optimist* as an earlier, exploratory gesture

toward this much more elaborate, idealistic though tempered, and unrealized tower artwork. Following the October Revolution in 1917, the Russian constructivist artist Vladimir Tatlin (1885–1953) proposed his tower as the new headquarters for the Third International, or Comintern, the international organization of communist, socialist, and other leftist parties and organizations geared toward catalyzing revolution abroad (figure 4.2). It was conceived with a modernist ethos and intended to raise the highest, largest, most technologically advanced structure of its time in Petrograd, the birthplace of the revolution. More specifically, it was envisioned to outshine its rival capitalist icon, the Eiffel Tower in Paris (324 meters), as a 400-meter-high steel, glass, and iron double-helix tower. Beyond its physical preeminence, Tatlin's tower would also have become the ultimate template for communist order, totality, hierarchy, and technological prowess. It was designed to rotate kinetically with three segmented levels revolving at different speeds. This included the cube-shaped base, turning once a year and housing the legislative assembly house; the pyramid-shaped middle, hosting the politburo, or leadership, and rotating once a month; and the top, a cylindrical information center, issuing bulletins and propaganda via telegraph and radio from a half-sphere glass structure placed at its pinnacle, and circling once a day.⁹ The tower's temporal and spatial organization would have been perfectly synchronized.

According to art historian Maria Gough, Tatlin's *Monument to the Third International* "remains to this day the most widely known work of the Soviet avant-garde," despite the fact that it was never built.¹⁰ It never materialized into the multimedia agitational center for the revolution that it was supposed to be, but it did successfully become an "icon of Communist spectacle."¹¹ Art historian James Nisbet further connects its perpetual, multilayered movement and focus on mediatized communication to a new notion of the monument as living, processual, and future-oriented.¹² As the new head of Moscow's division of the IZO Narkompros, the fine arts branch of the People's Commissariat of Education and Enlightenment, Tatlin was charged with advancing Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda (1918) to replace Russia's old monuments with sculptural works that, in his own words, would "appear like street rostra from which living words should fly to the mass of the people, stimulating minds and consciousness of thought."¹³ Rather than commemorating the past, as Nisbet points out, Tatlin's model and proposition signaled a "life of potentiality" and an "*idea* of a monument available to myriad communities [original emphasis]."¹⁴ In this spirit, and recalling Widrich's concept of the performative monument, Henry VIII's Wives did not appropriate the symbol



FIGURE 4.2 – Vladimir Tatlin, model of *Monument to the Third International*, 1920.

of the tower to champion communist or socialist ideology, content that never appears explicitly in the artwork. Rather, they drew on it to think alongside a radically mobile, media-focused icon of collectivity, drawing on its potential to be reimaged differently—aesthetically and politically, as well as nonviolently—as a more productive image of affiliation and assemblage.

Henry VIII's Wives could never have actually built the tower, so why raise the specter of Tatlin's ideologically charged tower now, almost a hundred years after the fact? The campaign speaks to the circulation of images of the falling Twin Towers on 9/11, as the most divisive, inflammatory cultural icon, or iconotype, as art historian Terry Smith describes it, of a newly globalized era.¹⁵ According to Smith, architectural iconotypes such as the World Trade Center (also still built with a modernist ethos) crystallize broad public discourses in contained symbols of power and conflict, leading to a starkly reduced world picture seized upon by radicals such as Osama bin Laden or Anders Behring Breivik. These assemblages are disseminated in all mass media, but particularly online through blogs and social media, spreading like wildfire with anonymity, indeterminacy, and decontextualized repetition. With the *Monument to the Third International*, Henry VIII's Wives appropriated a grandiose, utopian symbol of international, egalitarian leftist ideology at a time when extremist right-wing parties throughout the continent were exploiting violent icons such as the Twin Towers in order to dangerously propagate and exacerbate fears of Muslims and "foreigners." Recalling Breivik's manifesto, his text also included a call to vanquish "cultural Marxism" in Europe.

Tatlin's Tower and the World utilized the utopian, socialist icon in order to critique a discourse of fear and a clash-of-civilizations public attitude sparked by the fall of the Twin Towers on 9/11. On the one hand, it parodied the assemblage of a totalizing icon that would represent a world based upon such reductive, sharply divided ideologies. On the other hand, and unlike the group's earlier work, it generatively envisioned a preventive public, imaginatively sewing a social weave of nonviolence into the future through the relating of mass strangers in diverse, present-day contexts and historically informed, temporally recursive configurations. Each iteration of the project attempted to explore broader sociopolitical conditions in various parts of Europe that might result in such post-9/11, us/them mentalities, and to actively propose alternative conditions for a less violent, vulnerably bound social imaginary in a utopian future. In this way, *Tatlin's Tower and the World* reflects Butler's more challenging albeit necessary call to interrogate and resist slower,

social-structural forms of violence that lay the groundwork for more spectacular violence such as 9/11 to occur.

Whereas my analysis of Farocki's practice focused on securitarian publics and the possibility of self-reflexive, affiliative spectatorship, and my interpretation of Hirschhorn's installations investigated counterpublics and the role of artistic authority in their formation, this chapter concentrates on the temporally recursive aspect of *Tatlin's Tower and the World* in imagining transnational and translocal publics. All three art practices highlight matters of time in the active prevention of violence. In this chapter, I specifically borrow from Georges Didi-Huberman's reflections on the circulating temporality of images in his book *The Surviving Image: Phantoms of Time and Time of Phantoms: Aby Warburg's History of Art* (2017), to chart Henry VIII's Wives' use of anachronisms and anticipatory, artistic-activist strategies. Didi-Huberman's impressive homage to the art historical methods and concepts of Aby Warburg offers compelling insights today for thinking through how instances and images of historical violence—or those gestures and stories that have become repressed, marginalized, and excluded through linearly historicist chronologies—may uncannily return or become revived in contemporary afterlives. Particularly Warburg's notion of *Nachleben*, or the survival of images (as Didi-Huberman explicates them), helps to inform my analysis of Henry VIII's Wives' nine-year campaign to anachronistically reprise the icon of Tatlin's tower in the twenty-first century. The discursive, temporal relay of the art collective's project—manifested in diverse, local contexts—negated the violence of the *Pathosformel*, or “emotive formula” of Tatlin's tower, as a potential analog to the Twin Towers. At its core, the artistic campaign worked to upend fears regarding cultural difference and to prevent spectacular and slow violence through creative, pluralistic public discourse.

Early Photography and Video Installation: Anachronisms and Survivals

Early in their career, Henry VIII's Wives began to playfully subvert and temporally recontextualize iconic images and narratives. This included a staged series of photographs titled *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century* (1999). In the series, elderly pensioners pose as historic figures, reenacting some of the most well-known images captured on camera in the twentieth century. In one of their photographs, for instance, two British octogenarians stand

in a banal suburban street (plate 12). The two men look identically innocuous with their white hair and large-framed glasses, except for the fact that one raises a pistol to the other's head. A roofline of buildings behind them forcefully echoes the shooter's line of sight, the pointing gun, and the victim's front-facing, closed eyes, with the vanishing point leading to the gun. The image clearly references Eddie Adams's famed photograph of the assassination of a Viet Cong member in Saigon in 1968. The black-and-white original depicts the Viet Cong victim wearing a plaid button-down shirt, whereas the updated color photograph displays his stand-in wearing a plaid shirt incongruously thrown over his thick winter blazer, more suitable for the cold English climate. More poignantly, the senior citizen's grimace cannot begin to replicate the Viet Cong victim's look of terror. Yet the photograph does emphasize the act of violence, one bound to an act of vision: it slightly departs from the original photo's composition, pivoting from a focus on the victim's contorted countenance to the through-line of sight/violence from one bespectacled face to the next. Our own viewing—enabled but also cut off by the unreciprocating, closed eyes of the victim—participates in that violence.

Similarly, in *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century—Napalm Attack*, a group of five elderly men and women face the camera on an empty and desolate street, artificially re-creating the Pulitzer prize-winning photograph by Công Hùynh Út (who goes by Nick Ut) of the “Napalm Girl,” also chosen as the World Press Photo of the Year the following year, in 1973 (plate 13).¹⁶ The background in *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century—Napalm Attack* appears highly incommensurate with the original image, depicting a typically overcast, British sky instead of the smoke-filled ruins of the Vietnamese landscape. It also shows an empty neighborhood playground, evoking the missing children from the earlier image. Three elderly women stand in for the five fleeing children in the original image, and two male senior citizens replace the four soldiers. These two figures stand comfortably in their winter coats and loafers, wearing oversized helmets that exaggerate their weak, nonmilitaristic bodies. Furthermore, the centrally placed, petite elderly woman pretends to scream, yet as with the re-created photo of the Viet Cong assassination, her altered expression and rigid pose strike one as bad acting, perhaps a Brechtian, alienating gesture emphasized by her winter coat. Or perhaps her role-play is just impossibly suited to the task of re-creating the horrific image of nine-year-old Phan Thị Kim Phúc, otherwise known as the “Napalm Girl,” fleeing naked on the road after being burned on her back by a napalm attack. In Ut's photograph, a Vietnamese soldier stands directly behind and oddly su-

perimposed above Phan Thị Kim Phúc's screaming face and exposed, running body, heightening the brutality of the scene. In Henry VIII's Wives' version, in contrast, a piece of the suburban English infrastructure—a metal street lamp—bisects the elderly woman's head from behind. It suggests a different kind of quotidian violence, dramatized by the ominous gray clouds above the bland English housing units. Additionally, Henry VIII's Wives again slightly alter the perspective of the original here to more forcefully centralize the locus of assault. In the original iconic photo, Phan Thị Kim Phúc's face is off center, but the art collective's updated version positions the elderly woman's visage at the heart of a pyramidal composition, created by the four other figures and the pinnacle of the street lamp. Like their Viet Cong reenactor for Adams's photo, the elderly woman disallows any reciprocal gaze, instead confronting viewers with her tightly shut and shielded, bespectacled eyes. Henry VIII's Wives' reenactments tie a question of historical aggression to a contemporary violence of spectatorship and vision.

Indeed, *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century—Napalm Attack* emphasizes the resonant scream of the “Napalm Girl,” yet it clearly fails to replicate the gruesome violence that catapulted the Pulitzer prize photograph to the forefront of ideologically charged debates concerning American global militarism. It is exactly this evacuation of meaning that the series strikingly illustrates with these absurd, inadequate restagings by elderly people. Their banal re-creations underscore the photographs' dulled significance, due to their oversaturation and iconicity in the mass media. Other images in the series include reenactments of the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald; the Yalta Conference with Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin; Pope John Paul II granting forgiveness to his almost-assassin, Mehmet Ali Ağca; the raising of the flag on Iwo Jima; and Jesse Owens receiving a gold medal at the 1936 Olympics in Berlin. Henry VIII's Wives frame all of their updated versions at slightly oblique angles to the originals, making viewers more cognizant of incongruities with the originals and their own misaligned, skewed points of view.

The same set of elderly actors also recurs throughout the different photographs, linking them in a superficial way that disavows the photos' historical specificities and reinforces a sense of temporally condensed iconicity created through visual repetition. Senior citizens figure prominently in many of Henry VIII's Wives' earlier artworks, generally representing a link to the past for the group. They mark a sense of historical, experienced, and embodied time. Yet their spurious staging in this series cannot convey the gravity or

specificities of the original moments of violence that they attempt to personify and emphasize. Reenacting images in the living room of a communal retirement home, for instance, Henry VIII's Wives make the idea of the Yalta Conference or Jesse Owens at the Olympic Stadium in Nazi-era Berlin accessible for publics, but they also strip these events of their charged significance (figure 4.3). Indeed, their reenactments appear as events commensurate with the everyday entertainment—such as snooker, bingo, sing-alongs, and cookery—marked on the retirement home's plan of activities (as evidenced in the Yalta reenactment photo). Put another way, the elderly actors have lived through a fair amount of history, yet they are clearly retired here and ensconced in a complacent way of life, perhaps even waiting for death. It is appropriate that they stand in for the iconic—that is to say, visually tired and retired—moments in the historical imagination of publics, and, in doing so, their staging suggests another dimension of violence tied to the lackadaisical viewing of the original photographs underlying this series.

Much of Henry VIII's Wives' oeuvre involves anachronisms, temporal discontinuities, and heterochronous states (as their name suggests). With this in mind, I wish to link it, while perhaps taking a few liberties, to Georges

FIGURE 4.3 – Henry VIII's Wives, *Yalta Conference*, from the *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century* photographic series, 1999. © Henry VIII's Wives.



Didi-Huberman's analysis of art historian Aby Warburg's career in *The Surviving Image: Phantoms of Time and Time of Phantoms: Aby Warburg's History of Art*. Written in French in 2002 and translated into English in 2017, Didi-Huberman's book provides a quite detailed examination of the intellectual history of Warburg's work and his concepts of *Nachleben* (survival), *Pathosformeln* (emotive formulas), and the symptoms evident in the art historian's *Mnemosyne Atlas*, encompassing thousands of photographic images montaged together on black screens in his famous library. According to Didi-Huberman, Warburg's epistemological concerns "were directed toward the phenomenon of survivals (symptoms, delays, agitated origins [*origins tourbillons*])"—or to the "untimely" and the "anachronistic return into our memory."¹⁷ *Nachleben* is an idea that suggests survival, but also afterlife or living afterward. The notion of "survival *disorients history*, revealing how each period is woven with its own knot of antiquities, anachronisms, present times, and tendencies toward the future."¹⁸ Didi-Huberman recuperates Warburg's untimely historicizing methods via a diverse intellectual constellation of figures: Burckhardt, Nietzsche, Freud, and many more. Of course, Warburg's focus was the art of the Renaissance and how it was imbued, or "haunted," by forms and artistic details from earlier artistic moments. Yet the art historian's methods and concepts resonate in a particularly timely way today, as evidenced by Didi-Huberman's committed and lengthy unpacking of Warburg's ideas.

Didi-Huberman elaborates compellingly on the phantasmic or "strange time" of *Nachleben*—as a temporal recursion of imagery or images, a recursion as repetition with difference—*vis-à-vis* the work of the aforementioned historical figures as well as Gilles Deleuze's *Difference with Repetition*.¹⁹ Similar to a recursive analytics advanced by Ann Laura Stoler, it is this conception of time that resonates fittingly with Henry VIII's Wives' practice. Whereas Stoler's advocacy of a recursive analytics places more emphasis perhaps on duress and histories of violence, however, Warburg's terms stress the recurring role of the visual. Both are critical to think through and with, in terms of a discursive-aesthetic imaginary of a nonviolent public sphere. *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century*, for example, explores the recontextualization of iconic photographs (often of spectacular violence) that through their decontextualized reproduction and dissemination in the mass media have become violently stripped of their original impact and meaning. In restaging these charged moments, Henry VIII's Wives draw attention to this fact. Granted, Warburg's ideas concerning *Nachleben* emphasize the details—the drapery,

small gestures, the clothing—that anachronistically perturbed the official art of the Renaissance, and Henry VIII's Wives here foreground wholesale, mechanically captured images and icons that carry through different social times. Yet this question of the strange, recurring temporality of certain imagery, as a challenge to dominant, linear historicist models—as Didi-Huberman eloquently explicates through Warburg's work—contains within it certain insights for many of Henry VIII's Wives' artworks.

In Warburg's terms, the Freudian *unheimlich* (broached in chapter 3, and to which I return in the next section) is like the unearthing, or the survival of, something primitive—a *Leitfossil*.²⁰ Didi-Huberman describes this concept of the *Leitfossil* as a “key” or “guiding” piece of excavation: “Fossil movements or fossils in motion. Here again we are doing no more than speaking of the symptom in the Freudian sense of the term. When a symptom emerges, it does so as a fossil—a ‘life asleep in its form’—which awakens completely unexpectedly, and which moves, becomes agitated, tosses about, and disrupts the normal course of things. It is a chunk of prehistory suddenly rendered present; it is a ‘vital residue’ suddenly become robust [*vivace*].”²¹ Such a metaphor is quite suggestive for Henry VIII's Wives' practice, which continually attempted to uncover and reanimate the forgotten, marginalized, or repressed lives and bones of history. The *Leitfossil*, as both leitmotif and reanimated fossil, for example, particularly resonates with an early sculptural, multiscreen installation that the collective created in 2002, *Light without Shadow* (figure 4.4). This installation included a complete, life-sized model of the Neolithic settlement Skara Brae (ca. 3100–2500 BCE). Discovered in 1850 on Orkney Island, off the coast of Scotland, Skara Brae is now a UNESCO World Heritage Site and considered to be the most perfectly preserved Neolithic settlement in Europe. The settlement included a workshop space and could house approximately fifty people in its seven modest residential quarters, each forty square meters on average and sunk into the ground with a central hearth, stone beds set into the walls, a few shelves, and a roof with a chimney. Henry VIII's Wives' minimalist yet labyrinthine replica, created with medium-density fiberboard, filled the entire space of Glasgow's Tramway Gallery, an old, deindustrialized tram depot. Moreover, its *unheimlich* staging of the inhabitation was filled with artifacts, moving imagery, and meandering voices that rendered this “chunk of prehistory” again vital and alive in a haunting way.²²



FIGURE 4.4 – Henry VIII's Wives, *Light without Shadow*, 2002, multimedia installation. © Henry VIII's Wives.

Within the barren rooms, Henry VIII's Wives include two separate, multiscreen video installations. Each video triptych displays a disjointed conversation among three different actors, with each person filmed on a different screen, although camera movement indicates that the participants in each respective group share the same space. Similar to earlier multiscreen video installations by the group, the actors do not speak their own thoughts or words. Instead, Henry VIII's Wives conducted interviews with local residents in Glasgow and reconfigured their statements into a script for each group. For the younger actors' lines, Henry VIII's Wives interviewed members of a retirement home and people in a courthouse. For the elderly set of actors' text, they visited people at a local hydroponic tomato farm and an acting school. On the one hand, the collective gathered material like ethnographers, and they used lines from their faithfully transcribed interviews for their video scripts. On the other hand, they asked leading questions in order to acquire particular types of comments and then scrambled the order of those statements. Like the former inhabitants of Skara Brae, the lives of Glasgow locals thus inform the installation but remain anonymous and spectral, played out by strangers. Although their interviews served as a kind of oral documentation,

Light without Shadow does not attempt to represent the current community of Glasgow, which is temporally distant from, yet spatially near, the Scottish site of Skara Brae. Instead the artwork subtly implicates local voices in its orchestrated conversation, as it does the bodies of nonlocal viewers in the fake architectural space. Like *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*, it suggests the assemblage of a contingent public of strangers rather than a territorially bound community.

Light without Shadow also hinges on notions of temporality and historicization. In fact, the key element that binds the video conversations is time, rather than any clear content or narrative. The three younger actors speak in the past tense, whereas the three elderly ones discuss matters in the future. The environments in the two triptychs also change subtly, disrupting the temporal continuity of the spaces: the backgrounds shift from dark to light and vice versa. Sunlight in the younger trio's room oscillates between light and shadow, despite the artwork's title. In the older actors' space, Henry VIII's Wives intentionally painted different shades or tints of blue on the walls for separate shots. The historical space and bones of Skara Brae suddenly acquire a life again, its "vital residue" animated by the videos, but it is an afterlife revived through temporal discontinuity, not historical linearity.

In one triptych video installation, the three younger speakers offer incomplete, disjointed statements about memory and temporality as they move around a dilapidated house. The first actor initiates the conversation: "I remember a sunny day . . .," and only much later in the conversation incongruously returns to the ellipsis: "That was a sunny day and I can remember it and that." Another man states, "I can't remember, so yes I am positive," and the one woman suggests, "The man was too far in front of his time." Despite their correct grammar, the assertions are ambiguous and nonsensical in context, suggesting a connection among the people but simultaneously disallowing it. A fuller segment illustrates a general impression of time and memory as the content of the conversation:

#3: And in the real world it happens that people aggressively dislike each other. . . . This is for some of you, for sure, the first time. . . . Are you on fairly close terms?

#2: You are happy enough to pass time together? . . . Do you remember this house at all?

#1: There was a plaque on the wall down there, they stripped it, took it down, there was a wall down there with a plaque on it.

Each statement alludes to temporality, remembering, or markers of time, such as the plaque. The three participants appear to relay comprehensible thoughts to one another, but in the end, their communication breaks down as indeterminate or reiterated unnaturally.

In terms of location, the three young actors are also filmed between interior and exterior spaces, and the environment and mood suggest a tension between containment/control and openness/uncontrollability. A forest scene frames the video installation, but the footage primarily focuses on a modern domestic space, abandoned and derelict, like the quarters of Skara Brae. Awkwardly holding domestic props such as a ceramic vase, the three actors describe the interior of a house and its rooms, but they also mention uncontrolled spaces, such as a fun-fair park that was mobbed, “visits of contamination,” and crowds. Their space includes a wild horned owl at one point, suddenly appearing and disappearing on a stool, in contrast to two caged magpies that also make an appearance. Overall, the actors convey an anxious tone concerning borders, inside and outside spaces, and who or what is contained or knowable within those walls.

The three-channel video installation evokes the general unknowability of Skara Brae’s prehistoric community as an object of inquiry. Why did the inhabitants abandon the settlement? How did they live on a day-to-day basis, and why did their community fall apart? The borders of the site dissolved somehow, either from internal or external pressures. The younger actors recollect and recount thoughts, but their discombobulated memories offer no answers or understanding in a present time.

The elderly actors, in contrast, tend to discuss a future time in positive terms of love, beauty, relationships, and fruition. Their remarks, instead of recalling the past, often assume an imperative form, advising action in the present or future. The statements are still paradoxical and vague: “You have to be opposite”; “Be more or less aggressive”; or “Just stop, that’s absolutely right.” Much of the advice also concerns time, including at what pace thought or action should occur: “Give yourself the time to have that thought”; “I’ve no problem with that but we can do it more slowly”; or “Have the thoughts but have them sooner.” To be sure, although the advice suggests a certain wisdom coming from the symbolically blind, older actors, it only provides inadequate, empty proclamations. There is more left unsaid and still unknown in this strange Skara Brae replica than what the actors are able to offer with their vacuous statements.

Furthermore, despite the future orientation of their imperatives, the older actors sit amid archaeological objects in a bare room. Henry VIII’s Wives

borrowed the objects, including a sword, vase, jewelry, and an Egyptian amulet, from a public gallery, an antique shop, and the Ministry of Defense. The camera captures the blind elderly as they physically handle the objects but ignore them in their discussion. Here Henry VIII's Wives employ blind, older subjects in order to suggest (perhaps a little heavy-handedly and crudely) historical bearing and a search for the truth. According to cultural theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty, analyzing archaeological objects as markers of a past life involves a type of historical "eye-witnessing."²³ Similar to ethnographic observation, the process includes a shuttling back and forth between the roles of participant and observer, the eye being simultaneously engaged and distant. These particular discussants, however, are blind. The objects are visually inaccessible to them. As the woman remarks, "Why does he say there is something in his eye? Why?" Any question of witnessing these objects historically or ethnographically is denied, and the elderly participants remain just as ignorant and alienated from their surroundings as their younger counterparts.

Light without Shadow, as its title and grotto-like space indicate, refers to Plato's cave allegory. Plato's tale is an originary parable that warns against the domination of reason and thought by images, opinions, and representations. In the underground cave, the prisoners can only see their shadows and a distorted, refracted reality. Likewise, *Light without Shadow* signals a search for the true reality of its original, mythical peoples through the objectivizing disciplines of historiography, ethnography, and archaeology, yet every element is mediated, refracted, reconstructed, and represented. Henry VIII's Wives offer a simulated, fiberboard architecture of a prehistoric time. They include video footage of alienated, generationally separated subjects unable to connect or communicate with each other. And they fill the sound-space with rescripted words from a proximate yet detached Glaswegian community. Audiences must navigate, in other words, a confusing labyrinth of multiple temporalities and imagined lifeworlds that fill the architectural void. This is a contemporary space inundated with anachronisms, survivals, and repressions—filled with "fossils in motion."²⁴ The installation, moreover, contrary to its claim on truth or light, is all shadow. It is defined by representations, mediations, and artifice.

Skara Brae, in some sense, symbolizes the origins of European peoples and civilization on the continent, as its most perfectly preserved Neolithic settlement. Yet in *Light without Shadow*, the artist collective highlights its story as obscured and inaccessible, demythologized and deconstructed, and

they call into question the interpretative methods used to discover its past. At a time when numerous political leaders on the continent are offering primordial, essentialized accounts of “the people” in order to shore up borders and scapegoat those outside the original community, Henry VIII’s *Wives* portray the manipulation and construction of such imaginary histories. Viewers are invited not into the architecture of a folkloric, pure community, but rather into a disjunctive space of incongruous times and a social-visual field that is mediated and uncanny.

The Returning Officer: Spreading Uncanny and Indeterminate Fear

Henry VIII’s *Wives*’ three-screen installation *The Returning Officer* (2007) also offers an uncanny historical narrative, one haunted by simultaneous, seemingly irreconcilable temporalities. Instead of video, however, the group created the material for this piece with 16 mm film footage and installed the projection screens with old-fashioned musical accompaniment from an organ. Two screens stood back-to-back, an organ lying visibly underneath and inside the partition wall, and the third screen sat perpendicularly to this arrangement. Unlike *Light without Shadow*, there was no dialogue, only eerie organ music. Outside the installation, furthermore, in the entrance hallway, there was a trailer for the three-screen film. A professional editor created a one-minute piece from Henry VIII’s *Wives*’ footage, which formerly was available on YouTube. It begins, typically, “Coming soon . . .,” a “Film in three parts.” The polished clip suggests an exciting, easily consumable drama. Within a mere sixty seconds, theatrical, operatic singing invites the viewer through a climax and denouement of imagery. The three-screen installation, however, offers a much more complex juxtaposition of seemingly unrelated narratives and visuals.

Similar to the group’s previous works, the piece features elderly figures once again as historical recounters or recollectors. They are not blind, but the artist collective solicited their participation from a residential home for those who suffer from dementia. Figuratively representing historical time as elderly pensioners, they lack the necessary mnemonic ability for accurate recollection. Although clearly concerned with the disorientation of historical time, the group’s employment of elderly people is here, as in *Light without Shadow*, less convincing or fitting than in *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century*. (Although they were treated well, their employment is ethically

questionable.) Nonetheless, the elderly figures assume a leading role in *The Returning Officer* and symbolically present their weak, aged bodies as exposed to indeterminate, repressed violence in the narrative.

One of the main sites filmed in the artwork, the Legacy House in Belgrade, Serbia, evokes diverse stories of violence and death, both real and rumored. At the time of the film shooting, the Legacy House was in the process of being handed over to the Museum of Contemporary Art. It had previously served as a casino and brothel during former Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milošević's era. Officially known as the "Legacy of Milica Zorić and Rodoljub Čolaković," the villa housed a prominent Communist Party leader who amassed an impressive art collection during the 1930s and bequeathed it to the museum after his death.²⁵ In the 1980s, the museum lost control of the premises when it was leased to the Montenegro Harvest company and then subleased to A. D. Koleseum, as "a symptom of the Milošević-era transition," and run as a semiprivate restaurant (i.e., a casino and brothel). Its mafia operator, Darko Ašanin, was killed in a gunfight in the villa's yard in 1997, and his wife continued to manage the business until the museum successfully reclaimed the site in 2004 through court battles. Additionally, when Henry VIII's Wives shot their footage there, local residents recited to them a local legend of an unsolved, violent murder. As the story goes, an officer from World War II returned to his villa, the Legacy House, during the last days of the war and was brutally shot in the back by an illegal squatter. According to one Wife, the group knew nothing of this narrative, yet locals continually repeated it to them on different occasions. The tale kept returning to them in the form of rumor or gossip. *The Returning Officer* reenacts, so to speak, this violent shooting, also evocative of Darko Ašanin's assassination. In the film, an elderly man attempts to fix a chandelier in his home, oddly hanging it with no light in an empty room, then walks out to his garden, and mimes being shot. No weapon or assassin is in sight. Daytime suddenly transforms into night, and dissonant organ pipes play an unsettling soundtrack for the spoof murder. The overall effect is uncanny, creating the sense of a ghost story or a horror film. *The Returning Officer* registers the general anxiety concerning the Legacy House's violent past yet does not attempt to reconcile conflicting stories of local gossip versus legally documented accounts.

According to Freud, the *unheimlich*, regularly translated as the uncanny, is a paradoxical conflation of feelings of great anxiety with great familiarity. It is something terrifying that leads us back to "what is known of old and long familiar."²⁶ Sometimes these feelings arise from repressed infantile

complexes. Much more often than not, however, they result from “primitive” superstitions that we believe we have surmounted, that somehow play out in life again in disturbing ways: “As soon as something *actually happens* in our lives which seems to confirm the old, discarded beliefs, we get a feeling of the uncanny [original emphasis].”²⁷ Freud gives the example of wishing someone dead, only to have that person fall dead unexpectedly soon thereafter.²⁸ In literature, according to Freud, it is harder to achieve such an uncanny wish-fulfillment effect because of the fictive basis of the form, yet once the writer “pretends to move in the world of common reality” (i.e., “real life”), then readers react again as if to real experiences, susceptible to the anxiety of uncanny scenarios.²⁹ *The Returning Officer* creates such an effect of the uncanny through its merging of rumor with real-life scenarios, bringing together legendary tales of murder with real violence perpetrated during the Milošević era. It elides these ghostly stories to create a pervasive yet amorphous sense of anxiety, one that might recur in familiar yet newly terrifying ways.

Moreover, the multiscreen film installation creates a general unease of the *unhomely*, as curator Okwui Enwezor poetically translates the *unheimlich* (see chapter 3 for a more thorough discussion of the connotations of *Heimat*, related to *das Heim*—home, asylum). The odd re-creation of the Skara Brae settlement in *Light without Shadow* certainly conveys a general sense of un-homeliness, but *The Returning Officer* takes it one step further in emphasizing the familiar-yet-terrifying violence that may cross increasingly proximate transnational spaces. Enwezor gave the title *The Unhomely: Phantom Scenes in Global Society* to his 2006-curated exhibition, the 2nd International Biennial of Contemporary Art of Seville, which was a large-scale and prominent biennial that included artworks from Farocki and Hirschhorn, among many others. Enwezor does not define the term in his catalog essay, only suggesting it evocatively, but in a review of the show, art historian T. J. Demos rightly describes the term as one “projected onto the field of geopolitics as a means of reflecting the oftentimes violent tensions accompanying globalization.”³⁰ In a 2008 essay, Enwezor goes on to define the condition of un-homeliness as a type of unboundedness common to contemporary artistic practice and its multiple locations, “partly the result of a widescale global modernity of peoples, goods, and ideas permanently on the move, in constant circulation, reconfiguration, tessellation.”³¹ For him, it is an activist, politically engaged art that tends to work transnationally and for a global public sphere, “being out of tune with the established order” and in line with “the feeling and consciousness of being elsewhere, in exile, dislocated, displaced or rootless.”³²

The Returning Officer reflects an unhomely sense of transnational, artistic and political unboundedness by moving beyond the local rumors and histories of the Legacy House to an anxious, cross-national European space. The first two, back-to-back screens portray not only the Legacy House in Belgrade, Serbia, for example, but also an organ builder's house and workshop outside of Vilnius, Lithuania. The third exhibits the elderly figures in England, as well as a fourth-generation-owned poppy field in Austria. Each site is also a location where the group had worked together before, threading their own border-crossing collaboration obliquely in the piece's narrative. For the Vilnius footage, for instance, Henry VIII's Wives returned to an organ maker whose services they had previously engaged. They filmed the quotidian process of fabricating organ pipes and commissioned a miniature one for the installation. According to the art collective, the organ serves as a metaphor for Christianity, as a traditional vehicle used for "mass psychedelic communication." Put another way, it represents a type of propaganda. In the installation space, in a classically Brechtian sense, Henry VIII's Wives reveal this apparatus of mass illusion in their process of production. In the third video, the elderly group only sits and observes, as if witnessing the action that takes place in the poppy field, where a boy suddenly becomes dazed amid a vast landscape of poppies and either falls asleep or loses consciousness. The dissonant organ music begins at this point, and an armed group of men and women begin running through the field, ostensibly searching for the young child. The narrative is disjointed, however, even switching between two different sets of searching, unhomely families (figure 4.5). Although the rising dissonance and volume of the organ suggests an emerging, fearful drama, the narrative lacks any coherent structure or content. Its different locations across Europe are only loosely connected through the "mass psychedelic communication" of the organ.

To film in a poppy field invites diverse associations. On the one hand, it could suggest the remembrance of soldiers' deaths in World War I and later World War II, made famous by the poem "In Flanders Fields," perhaps evoking the officer returning to the Legacy House. The poppy is still a charged symbol of military remembrance in Britain: a Muslim man incited controversy by burning poppies in the UK in 2004.³³ On the other hand, the Austrian poppy field might refer to the production of heroin from large opium poppy fields in Afghanistan. A pressing issue today, it was estimated in 2011 that 90 percent of illegal heroin originated from Afghanistan's fields.³⁴ According to one Wife, forces such as the CIA are "toying and trying to predict



FIGURE 4.5 – Henry VIII’s Wives, *The Returning Officer*, 2007, still image.
© Henry VIII’s Wives.

the elections of other countries, and trying to kick off certain developments elsewhere that don’t develop the way you thought,” such as a massive global drug trade. The “returning officer” might suggest continued processes of militarism, but it also denotes an agent responsible for overseeing elections in various parliamentary systems throughout the world. Stabilizing the Afghan government and economy has been an urgent international concern. The elderly figures in the film appear to watch over a multiplicity of conflicting stories and symbols, local and transnational, that all occur simultaneously and disjointedly as symptoms, in a Warburgian sense, in the spoof horror film.

Indeed, *The Returning Officer* is a film of symptomatic angst and displacement, expressed by visually dramatic scenarios and emotive sound, in which, as Didi-Huberman puts it, “the displacement . . . allows a ‘repressed’ element to make a *return*.”³⁵ He compares Warburg’s theorization of a visual “symptom” that survives through culture—or “a symbol that has become incomprehensible”—with Freud’s understanding of unconscious memory.³⁶ What the temporality of the *Nachleben* attempts to grasp is the temporality of the symptom, a “memory-bearing formation.”³⁷ Didi-Huberman explains, “It means that in Freud’s view the symptom acts in the same way that

the image acts according to Warburg: as a constantly new and surprising ensemble of ‘vital residues’ of memory—as a crystallization, or a formula expressing a survival.”³⁸ The “vital residues” of memory in *The Returning Officer* are indeterminate, and a generally alienating and anxious tone results from the bizarre mixture of sound, imagery, and temporal disjunctions. Specific histories transform into vague, fearful scenarios and histrionic, cinematic moments for local peoples, such as traditional organ builders and fourth-generation farmers. An old veteran is apparently shot in his garden, or a young child loses consciousness in a field of flowers. The mnemonically disabled elderly historians, who observe it all from a distance, are incapable of effectively articulating these stories into a more coherent picture.

In the end, the installation’s disjointed presentation mimics how fear and anxiety may spread through misinformed, abbreviated, decontextualized, and overwrought stories in the mass media—all for the sake of a packaged, dramatic story line. Even the sixty-second trailer is purposefully misrepresentative, including footage not presented in the actual installation. *The Returning Officer* confounds broadly pressing, worldwide concerns (religion, continued warfare, globalization) with popular local tales, situating them in a transnational Europe in order to expose an irrational, emotive fear that increasingly propagates from a contemporary mass media apparatus. This is not unlike history told through the lens of rumor, and with each mediated version, a chain of signifiers leads further to an uncanny, unhomely, and indeterminate sense of fear. As in *Light without Shadow*, Henry VIII’s Wives demonstrate here a largely deconstructive impulse, not yet propositional or anticipatory in terms of violence prevention.

Populism and the Mass Media

The speed and pervasiveness of rumor holds particular political value, similar to propaganda as a deliberate discursive strategy. In fact, Homi Bhabha describes the force of rumor as potentially revolutionary.³⁹ It is because its temporality is iterative and indeterminate that it yields such potential, populist power. *The Returning Officer* points toward this possibility, but another set of artworks by Henry VIII’s Wives, created for the exhibition *Populism* (2005), specifically work to highlight the politically geared, populist dynamic of emotive, rumor-based communication. As detailed in the introduction, the pan-European exhibition occurred in multiple venues: at the Contemporary Art Centre in Vilnius, Lithuania; the National Museum of Art, Architecture

and Design in Oslo; the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam; and the Frankfurter Kunstverein from April to September 2005. Instead of traveling in sequence, the show took place concurrently, with some of the same artworks and some different in each location. Its message, however, was cohesive throughout. It aimed to raise and debate themes of populism, particularly in relation to the rise of populist parties in Europe over the preceding fifteen years, “insofar as they can be isolated from discussions of a global character.”⁴⁰ In the catalog introduction, the curators define populism as “not only rhetorical but also a refusal to accept the complexity of public affairs.”⁴¹ The scope of the exhibition intended not merely to categorize contemporary populist movements in Europe, but also to explore the forms and reductive imaginary spaces of populism in larger public spheres.⁴²

Henry VIII's Wives created three new pieces for the exhibition, including a three-channel video installation, *Mr. Hysteria*. In preparation for this video artwork, the artist collective asked friends for personal recollections of situations related to mass hysteria. A couple of people gave accounts of the fall of the Berlin Wall, for example, or their experience at the massive Glastonbury outdoor rock festival. These statements, similar to the group's past works, were recorded word-for-word but rearranged for *Mr. Hysteria's* script, and the resulting three-screen conversation takes place in four different locations, among four different pairs of actors.

These locations are a police station in Vilnius, as well as the inside of the stock exchange, a newspaper archive, and a hospital maternity ward in Berlin. According to Henry VIII's Wives, each place is one where reality is negotiated. They are also all transitional spaces. The police station, for example, is a site where opposing perspectives encounter each other, where cases are resolved between different versions of a story. Furthermore, the stock exchange negotiates fluctuating monetary values as both concrete and abstract realities, and the newspaper archive is a site for collected stories, both official and unofficial narratives that are refereed on a daily basis. As inspiration for the piece, Henry VIII's Wives also looked to histories of the controversial medical diagnosis of hysteria itself, a discourse that extends from Hippocrates to the present, and which peaked in intensity during the nineteenth century. The womb was considered the cause of hysteria in the nineteenth century, as a neurosis unequivocally particular to women and gendered as female. The title *Mr. Hysteria* playfully upends this idea, and the video installation portrays a maternity ward in order to signal this history. The locations, however, besides being spaces of negotiated reality, also



FIGURE 4.6 – Henry VIII’s Wives, *Mr. Hysteria*, 2005, still images.

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represent Foucauldian sites of institutionalized power and social control. According to this line of thought, bodies are increasingly managed and administered through rationalizing systems that operate ever more ubiquitously in society. The emotional reverberation of hysteria is here paralleled with the social instrumentalization of bodies. Both operate and propagate via a particular indeterminacy and all-pervasiveness.

Another contribution to *Populism*, *The Lowest Note of an Organ = the Length of a Human Fingernail Grown since 1730 = 8Hz/Subsonic*, also suggests this bodily connection. The sculpture, an organ pipe (made by the workshop filmed in *The Returning Officer*) was displayed only in the Vilnius iteration of *Populism* due to its massive size.⁴³ It played a note so low that it was virtually inaudible to the human ear, supposedly only perceptible after time through vibrations caused in the body (one Wife claims that the museum staff complained of nausea for the duration of the show). According to one Wife, such pipes were used during the Middle Ages in order to “induce the experience of physical hysteria or elation during religious ceremonies.” Thus the piece was installed in a quasi-church-like space with long, stained-glass windows. Here Henry VIII’s Wives link traditional Christian ideology to a body-based, almost imperceptible populist discourse over historical time—the length of the pipe being equal to “a human fingernail grown since 1730.” Hysteria, rumor, social reverberation through populist ideology, religion, or disciplinary structures—by whatever category here—should always be connected back to physical bodies and subjectivities, despite their apparent imperceptibility or indeterminacy. Relating the organ specifically to *Populism*, moreover, if the circulation of populist ideology relies on speed and anonymity, its “intersubjective, communal adhesiveness [nevertheless] lies in its enunciative aspect,” as Bhahba insists.⁴⁴ In other words, real bodies

lie behind the movement of populist discourse, even if they are anonymized through the virality and indeterminacy of populism's circulating discourse.

The video installation *Mr. Hysteria* mimics this enunciative indeterminacy in the discursive form of empty, viral rumor, connecting all four sets of anonymous couples in its different locations through blurred articulation and staging. The rumor begins in the womb, so to speak, displaying a newborn baby in the maternity ward. The nurses, and then a younger man and woman in the police station, repeatedly voice a certain anxiety about crowds and a need for temporal quickness. In the police station, the man and woman stand in front of a cell, speaking casually, yet precisely and slowly in a Brechtian manner, as officers move prisoners in the background (figure 4.6):

MAN: People and people and people.

WOMAN: It's charged, shouting, the noise gets louder and stronger, the sound. And it feels like pressure.

MAN: Too many people. No way back. Moving forward. This might be it. I'm running. I'll just make the train.

After the scene at the police station, the young man's voice carries over into a new location, the newspaper archive. There, his words are picked up by yet another man, who in a moment is revealed to be standing in the space of the archive. The scene crossover marks an acceleration in the time of the conversation. In the newspaper archive, two more voices of a different man and woman begin to overlap and confuse what is being said, or in what sequence. The discussion shifts to one of an ominously described, concrete object: "You can use it for many, many things"; "It's a rope"; "It has been knotted tightly"; "Heavy and rough." Yet it maintains an abstract anxiety about it:

JOURNALIST #2: It makes me nervous.

JOURNALIST #1: Is it a real one?

#2: And . . . what's the word?

#1: Insecure. [Pause.] It is dangerous. And it makes me nervous.

#2: It makes me nervous.

#1: . . . And that's all.

#2: It feels heavy in my hand.

Following the archive, the three-screen installation then juxtaposes the locations of the police station and the stock exchange, confounding their boundaries. On the left- and right-hand channels, the young woman and man from the police station stand, respectively, while in the center screen, another young woman and man mimic their positions and dialogue in the stock exchange. The couples act as body doubles, and their voices overlap more and more. The installation ends with shots of the stock exchange, police station, and archive, suddenly vacant of all the actors but still narrated by their voices. A reiterative theme of anxiety and speed (“It’s strong!”) builds to a crescendo with several simultaneous voices asserting during the last seconds of the installation, “It’s like frozen time”; “It’s a flash in time.” *Mr. Hysteria* represents a viral chain of communication, a type of contagious rumor that is born in one location and time and that becomes exacerbated through anonymous, everyday voices until it pervades all spheres of activity. The circulated rhetoric of anxiety or fear effectively transforms into an indeterminate social panic or hysteria in a temporal flash. This process, moreover, transpires through the mediating apparatus of multiple video screens, suggesting a connection between socially constructed fears and the mass media.

Harun Farocki’s *Videograms of a Revolution* (1992) offers a compelling parallel in this regard, documenting the populist uprising against Nicolae Ceaușescu and the role or work of the camera during the revolution. Like *Mr. Hysteria*, the film also begins in a hospital, but rather than giving birth, the woman on-screen is wounded from gunshots, and calls for revolution against Ceaușescu’s regime. She testifies as a witness to the government crackdown in Timisoara, where popular anticommunist demonstrations soon led to rioting and violence. Several days later, graphic images of mass graves near Timisoara were aired internationally but not domestically.⁴⁵ Information about the riots and deaths reached citizens via word of mouth and through these external media sources. Speculation about the number of casualties varied greatly. It soon became apparent that the corpses may not have been linked directly to the uprising, but, as film historian Benjamin Young highlights, the circulated images and casualty estimates reverberated with a real and imagined terror in Romania, the numbers attesting to “the amplified paranoia and sense of loss” that characterized the fall of Ceaușescu’s one-party rule.⁴⁶ In this case, the force of rumor did have a revolutionary impact, as Bhabha would attest. Similar to *Videograms of a Revolution*, *Mr. Hysteria* attempts to display the communicative structure of this mass collectivizing

impulse, this unquantifiable spreading of fear, rumor, panic, and/or information by and for “the people.”

Yet whereas *Videograms of a Revolution* depicts this communicative chain in a specific historical instance, *Mr. Hysteria* attempts to expose the abstract, underlying affect of such virality and populist rhetoric. The words of the different sets of actors in *Mr. Hysteria* all become confused with each other, sometimes even overlapping. Their conversations are derived from real people but reordered so that their original content is indiscernible. Instead, an emotive mood or attitude emerges, one of anxiety, which the video editing heightens through temporal acceleration. In effect, it does not matter what the everyday, anonymous people say. Through visual, mediated staging, their conversations—and, symbolically, public discourse—become reduced and morphed into an emotionally charged tone of anxiety. This in no way imagines a future of nonviolence. Rather, like *The Lowest Note on an Organ = the Length of a Human Fingernail Grown since 1730 = 8Hz/Subsonic*, *Mr. Hysteria* attempts to suggest the visceral, reverberating charge of empty and exacerbating, populist communication.

The Nachleben of Tatlin's Tower and the World

Up until this point, I have elaborated on Henry VIII's Wives' earlier exploration of various media and formats, from their photographic series *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century* to the grotto-like architectural piece *Light without Shadow* and their uniquely staged and articulated, multiscreen video installations. What these all have in common is a certain skepticism toward totalizing historical narratives, packaged images, and reductive modes of discourse. These works attempt to denaturalize such forms, and they often do so in the context of transnational European histories and publics, and questions of violence. Beginning in 2005, however, Henry VIII's Wives began a much more ambitious project, one more utopian, anticipatory, and propositional than deconstructive—about how to actively imagine a worldview built upon nonviolence, plurality, and a shared sense of social vulnerability.

Tatlin's Tower and the World (2005–14) was the third piece included in the exhibition *Populism*. The group launched their website for this project (www.tatlintowerandtheworld.net; no longer operational) during its debut in the show, setting out their proposal to construct Tatlin's unrealized *Monument to the Third International* in fragments around the world.⁴⁷ In the

following years, they erected one actual piece of the tower in Belgrade, Serbia, and they participated in several other exhibitions throughout Europe that took a more speculative turn. More than the artifact of the tower, the piece worked to temporally and spatially scaffold a translocal, plural public. Through its varied, cross-citational discursive platforms in different sites around Europe—both embodied and virtual—it aimed to foster a nonviolent social imaginary among masses of strangers, in stark contrast to the type of securitarian, populist-based public conceived in *Mr. Hysteria*.

In their artistic contribution to *Populism* in Oslo, Henry VIII's Wives created a large wall image measuring and comparing the unrealized height of the tower to the different heights of the Eiffel Tower, the Statue of Liberty, and the "Gherkin" skyscraper in London (plate 14). Here *Tatlin's Tower and the World* reflects a Warburgian understanding of the structure of the tower as a patriarchal and hegemonic visual symptom, or a *Pathosformel* (emotive formula), which temporally endures and repeats with difference as various afterlives of dominance in our present day. On the one hand, the image highlighted an ideological end game for verticality and phallic dominance in the city skyline. On the other hand, it also helped visually demonstrate a Warburgian "iconology of the interval," or the rhythmic recurrence of *Nachleben*, not an oscillation that repeats consistently and identically but rather a type of cyclic time rendered "impure, perforated, multiple, residual."⁴⁸ According to Didi-Huberman's interpretation, "[The interval] is the interface of the different strata of a thick archaeological layer. . . . It is the *contretemps* [literally, a countertime, something acting against time], the grain of difference in the mechanism of repetitions."⁴⁹ Put another way, the phallic form of the tower retains the same violent connotations, in a kind of "primitive" manner, no matter the diverse contexts within which it operates historically. Often this visual recurrence signals more spectacular moments of political, social, or economic crisis, from the Bolshevik Revolution to the collapse of the World Trade Center. The unending and decontextualized mass-media repetition of the falling of the Twin Towers signaled the widespread social shock over its emasculating destruction.

Thus, how could Henry VIII's Wives offer the *Monument to the Third International*—arguably a totalizing and homogenizing emblem—as an effective counterexample for envisioning nonviolent, plural publics? Would the project not merely reinforce the *Pathosformel* of the tower—patriarchal, hegemonic, aggressive—for more contemporary publics? The answer lies in Henry VIII's Wives' recursive, artistic-activist strategy, which anachronized,

fragmented, and (in Didi-Huberman's language) "perforated" the totalizing icon through diverse, ground-up public forums, both virtual and embodied. Transnational masses of strangers began to encounter each other through cross-citational, self-reflexive discourse, with the campaign focusing more on the recursion of this dynamic, plural public discourse rather than a static, empty mode of belonging based upon one temporally fixed, pure origin.

Indeed, Henry VIII's Wives' durational campaign resonated with a Warburgian iconology of the interval. Didi-Huberman discusses Warburg's unusual phrasing in terms of montage and the *Mnemosyne Atlas*, where the black, blank spaces framing the historical images are an "in-between" silence, or latently connective time.⁵⁰ The intervals act as a "network of figural hinges," or that "which makes it possible to effectuate a passage—between heterogeneous orders of reality that one nevertheless has to mount together as an ensemble."⁵¹ This is also the type of heterochronous, pluralistic "ensemble" that Henry VIII's Wives attempted to "mount" through the memory—"an excellent *assembler* [*monteuse*]"—of Tatlin's tower.⁵² The key idea that I wish to draw out here is that of the recursion of time. Instead of the vacuous, repetitive time of the falling Twin Towers' image reproduction, *Tatlin's Tower and the World* operated as an iconology of the interval, highlighting not only the spectacular imagery and violence of such an emotive formula, but also the latent, slow violence connecting such moments.

Both despite and because of its disparate locations and heterochronous realizations of this ongoing piece (Oslo 2005, Bern 2006, Belgrade 2007, and London 2008–9), *Tatlin's Tower and the World* brought together a nonviolent and precarious, unified "ensemble" or horizon of different "orders of reality," which would counter the divisive, incendiary worldview wrought by the vertical *Pathosformel* and fall of the Twin Towers. Each iteration of the project, to which I now turn, allowed diverse strangers and followers of their campaign—its growing, utopian, assembled public—to better perceive and understand, through more localized, connected forms and histories of violence, the imperial ruins and differentially distributed duress across transnational European public spheres.

This process began in 2005 when Henry VIII's Wives launched their website for *Tatlin's Tower and the World*.⁵³ The website (again, no longer operational) was structured by three different basic temporalities and weblinks—past, present, and future—mimicking the threefold division of the tower itself.

The past page, for instance, featured an assortment of digital text clippings piled haphazardly. Users could browse among them and discover explanatory cut-out messages such as this: “If the ascending spirals of Tatlin’s Tower exemplified and contained the processes of resolving conflicts and decisions, so too did its dynamic lean indicate a will to action. Here was a social alembic: the evolution of human history was to be determined here, and corporate will condensed, purified and transformed into the energy of action. With its committees in session the tower would have comprised the nerve centre of intended world government.” The past section laid out the provocative history of the tower and its concomitant, utopian aspirations for an “evolution of human history” and the consolidation of a “corporate will.” These quotations, however, were signaled as outdated—collected and archived—and incongruously portrayed as HTML-based text clippings. The future page, in turn, was minimalist, depicting only a screen-sized megaphone with the imperative, “Talk to us,” and a link to email the group. In 2010, Henry VIII’s Wives were receiving emails as frequently as once or twice a day. Finally, the present page was more complex, offering many possible weblink directions. It displayed a brown cardboard box stuffed with quotidian objects. Clicking on these items sent the site’s users to descriptions of the group’s various exhibitions and initiatives for *Tatlin’s Tower and the World*. The box acted as a type of hands-on map for the larger campaign.

This included not only documentation of the exhibitions but also examples of the emails that they received, originally solicited on the future page. For instance, an interior designer in London wrote, “I’ve just been looking at the website and would like to know what stage you are at in the project, what kind of team you have at the moment and what skills you are missing. It’s just that tower has always been so incredible to me and I really would like to be a part in its realisation, at any level.” Another woman, additionally, emailed the group with advice for attracting capital and interest: “Surely for such an innovative idea, you could make the site more appealing to artists, people interested in the background of the project, and investors? Overall, this is a good and curious concept that appears to be so badly executed I fear it will fail. You can do better than this. Promote yourselves with clearer information which is well channeled and well designed!” Jono Podmore, a British composer, sound engineer, and professor at a conservatory in Cologne (Hochschule für Musik und Tanz Köln), also wrote to offer his services for the project and then sent Henry VIII’s Wives an unsolicited composition, which they used subsequently as an “anthem” for the campaign, as they describe it. The website effectively

launched the *Tower* into a mass virtual public, recruiting people to help build up its public image and even contribute to the project.

These diverse strangers probably heard about Henry VIII's Wives' campaign and their new website from a poster that appeared in random locations throughout the London Underground network for several months in 2005 (plate 15). Collective member Lucy Skaer and designer Sara De Bondt collaborated on it for the Platform for Art program. The black-and-white poster overlies a dominating sculptural model of Tatlin's tower over ghostly white silhouettes of the Eiffel Tower, the Statue of Liberty, and the famed "Gherkin" skyscraper in London, recalling Henry VIII's Wives' opening show for the piece in *Populism* and the iconic, phallic *Pathosformel* of the tower. The poster of the image in the London Underground helped generate initial interest for *Tatlin's Tower and the World*, inspiring random strangers, in diverse fields from design to music composition, to actively begin reimagining what this unbuilt tower could stand for in early twenty-first-century Europe.

In 2007, two years later, Henry VIII's Wives successfully fabricated a small piece from the middle of the original tower, the only segment actually constructed throughout their campaign (figure 4.7). Erected in Belgrade, Serbia, the artwork stands in contrast to the totalizing, hegemonic structure of the tower. It is commanding but unwieldy, weighing in at a sizeable eleven tons of steel and concrete, eight meters long and two meters wide. It lacks the elegant, spiraling height of Tatlin's *Monument to the Third International*, and its blocky, grounded heft counters the violence of the phallic form. Moreover, Henry VIII's Wives realigned the piece from the tower's original, proper axis. They humorously tipped the odd block on its side. To be sure, the only physical instantiation of the tower offers a laughable incarnation of part of the imposing tower, even satirically memorializing its inelegant creation with an official plaque. Already effectively destroyed in its first erection, then, the piece becomes a benign public art sculpture, its ideological current diffused.

Sitting on a green square between its host museum, the Museum of Contemporary Art, and the former headquarters of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party (now the Ušće Business Centre), however, the sculpture also pointedly speaks to the specific local environment and history of that area. According to art historian and curator Branislav Dimitrijević, former Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milošević and his wife used the latter building in the 1990s as a type of political/informational media headquarters. In 1999, NATO bombed it heavily but failed to destroy it completely.⁵⁴ Milošević himself gained power through a 1988–89 populist movement that



FIGURE 4.7 – Henry VIII's Wives, *Tatlin's Tower and the World*, 2007, installation in Belgrade, Serbia. © Henry VIII's Wives.

ousted the former Communist Party leadership in Serbia and helped propel his political position as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia soon dissolved into separate, warring states in the early 1990s. Although the Belgrade segment of *Tatlin's Tower and the World* appears innocuous, tipped on its side and dissociated visually from the iconic power of Tatlin's tower, its local siting still evokes the violent history surrounding the populist rise of Milošević, indicted ultimately for crimes against humanity and ethnic genocide. Rather than an empty, diffused signifier for the *Monument to the Third International*, it might just as well resemble a piece of concrete debris from the bombed Yugoslav Communist Party headquarters.

For another iteration of the campaign at the Kunsthalle Bern in 2006, Henry VIII's Wives reconceived the propaganda section of Tatlin's tower, or the top third that would have rotated once a day and continually disseminated communist ideology. The Bern installation included campaign posters and

T-shirts hung on the wall, a computer to access the internet, an answering machine to take messages from viewers calling in to the installation's own private line, search lights to mimic those that would have been placed on top of Tatlin's tower, and a radio channel broadcasting propaganda. The group rented the radio frequency 106.8 MHz (a playful allusion to Henry VIII's six wives) for the duration of the show, which was able to transmit ten kilometers toward the parliament building from an antenna attached to an unused Kunsthalle flag post. Unlike the static, blocky middle section of Tatlin's tower, represented by the art collective's Belgrade sculpture, the Kunsthalle Bern's symbolic top section of it took on a more communicative function with broader publics.

To begin with, *Radio Tatlin* combined a paradoxical layering of different elements, drawing from both international and local soundscapes. Its sounds included Jono Podmore's anthem, or atonal, instrumental music; a radio voice, in both German and Swiss dialect, describing Tatlin's unrealized *Monument*, asking listeners to call in with opinions, and repeating the phrase, "Tatlin's tower: yes or no"; and spoken interviews with Bern residents on the Bundesplatz (federal square) concerning the possible construction of a tower segment on the square. The latter were collected by soliciting random passersby on the street to comment on a computer-generated image of a fully constructed tower in front of the Swiss parliament building in Bern. The postcard image is bizarre. It depicts a monolithic, spiraling piece of metal frame standing squarely on top of the central fountain, with unwitting people milling about below. According to the collective, public opinion about the proposed project varied: "it would be nice," "too modern," or the economically minded "if the Bern tax payers have to pay, it's a bad idea, but if all Swiss pay for it, it's a good idea." The radio interviews and call-in option ("Tatlin's tower: yes or no") satirized the numerous popular referenda that operate in Switzerland's system of direct democracy, as well as the propaganda posters to vote "yes" or "no" on controversial issues such as citizenship or immigration. Recalling *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*, *Radio Tatlin*'s inclusion of Podmore's atonal anthem helped dissolve any pure representation of Swiss residents in the parliament's local airwaves.

In the end, Henry VIII's Wives' referendum parody was quite prescient, considering a popular vote that banned the construction of minarets, or Islamic prayer towers, throughout Switzerland in 2009. Of participating voters, 57.5 percent could not imagine the construction of this type of tower amid a Swiss architectural horizon.⁵⁵ Of course this ban had more to do with growing fears and hostilities toward an Islamic way of life, perceived as counter to

Swiss tradition, rather than the aesthetics or function of such towers in the urban landscape. When the referendum passed, only four minarets even existed in the country, hardly a threat to Swiss territory. Not allowing the towers' construction was meant to preempt a certain "non-Swiss" way of life, but in the end it enabled another form of slower social violence. The more violent and spectacular emotive formula and issue of the tower recurred in the media after another interval of fomenting more latent discrimination and aggression against Muslim peoples in the country.

Henry VIII's Wives suggested the construction of the *Monument for the Third International* to Bern citizens in order to query a set of issues related to public fears of cultural difference, slow violence, and how to effectively build a space for productive stranger relations again after traumatic, spectacular events such as 9/11. Besides the installation, they also hosted a conference titled "Feasibility" (*Machbarkeit*), foregrounding the issue of "negative space." Invited speakers included a professor from MIT, Takehiko Nagakura, who leads the project UNBUILT in developing computer graphic visualizations of unrealized early modern architecture (including, of course, the *Monument to the Third International*); the writer Zoë Strachan, who wrote a fictional work, *Negative Space*; the architectural blogger Geoff Manaugh, who posts on BLDGBLOG; as well as recorded interviews with members of the Friends of Tatlin's Tower group, which included gallerist Rudolf Springer, actor Hans Zischler, and photographer Folke Hanfeld.⁵⁶ "Feasibility" focused not so much on the actual, physical possibility of erecting a piece of the tower on the central plaza, but rather on what the idea of building it would mean for local, national, and transnational publics. Whereas Henry VIII's Wives' black-or-white, yes-or-no polling on the streets of Bern parodied the often simplistic, uninvolved act of voting on popular referenda, their conference attended to the problem of assemblage and assemblies with a much more complex, interdisciplinary discursive platform. It created a forum for various publics to imagine the charged icon of the tower in a contemporary space, and how its fraught architecture might, instead, engender informed discourse, enrich public opinion, and nurture a sense of affiliation among a diverse array of strangers.

In 2008–9, the artist collective experimented with another piece of the *Monument to the Third International* at the Whitechapel Gallery in London. Moving on from a top-level, airwaves perspective from the communications apex of the tower, they now crafted a ground-level, street-front iteration of its lobby (plates 16a and 16b). Moreover, rather than create the lobby themselves, they commissioned it. Almost every item in its sleek yet bland, mod-

ernist, corporate-looking space was specially ordered, including the layout itself, which was designed by a professional.⁵⁷ For the show's opening, visitors could indulge in unique Tatlin-themed cocktails and receive assistance from gallery attendants operating the concierge desk. These employees donned tower-shaped felt hats and posed next to a tower-themed bouquet of flowers, arranged by a local florist, and a tower-shaped concierge bell. The latter was notably commissioned from the Whitechapel Bell Foundry, the same company that produced the iconic Liberty Bell and Big Ben. The space also included two fake elevator doors, supposedly in order to ascend the tower, and Podmore's anthem once again filled the soundscape. In the center of the area, visitors could rest on a batik-upholstered sofa. These complemented the gallery attendants' batik-designed uniforms, stitched by a batik dressmaker in the Spitalfields Market around the corner. The specially commissioned fabric, however, displaying a recurring pattern of the tower's spiraling image juxtaposed next to Tatlin's portrait, was actually produced by a cloth designer in Italy. The artist collective is not unaware of the global trade politics of batik fabric, highlighted by contemporaneous artists such as Yinka Shonibare, and they purposefully signaled the fabric's uneasy, complicated commodity status here.

Henry VIII's Wives also commissioned a tea set for the lobby from a woman in China. Whereas they attempted to fabricate their own set for an earlier exhibition in Berlin, here they requested Zhang Ling Yun to manufacture a new unit. In their specific instructions, the primary aim was to "illustrate the idea of the Tower in pieces," mimicking again the overall aspiration for *Tatlin's Tower and the World*. On the one hand, in a proper constructivist sense, the tea set is an object that can be mass produced for everyday, popular usage, serving both aesthetically and functionally.⁵⁸ Tatlin himself designed ceramics, though never in the shape of the tower. On the other hand, the art collective's "china" set follows a European convention from the eighteenth century onward of commissioning made-to-order ceramics from the East Asian country. This practice is known as *Chine de commande*. Artist Ni Haifeng, for instance, in the same *Unpacking Europe* (2001–2) show mentioned in chapter 1—which also featured Shonibare's batik mimicry of Fragonard's *The Swing*—poignantly displayed photographs of his Chinese body inscribed with porcelain designs for a Dutch market. Ni's series *Self-Portrait as Part of the Porcelain Export History* not only revisits an earlier history of European imperial exploitation but also questions the current trade in "foreign" bodies, legal and illegal, in the Netherlands and Amsterdam, where the artist lives.⁵⁹

Ultimately, beneath the smooth veneer of the professionally designed, corporate-like lobby installation, one quite near the financial heart of London, Henry VIII's Wives uncannily connected a number of raw cultural and economic histories regarding past imperial trade routes to movements in a twenty-first-century, globalized world. The exhibition occurred as part of Whitechapel's year-long *Street* series, and the *Lobby* specifically invoked its location near Brick Lane, with its local market historically attracting an array of Jewish, African, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi peoples for exchange. Henry VIII's Wives' commissioning and production of the *Lobby* highlights the fact that London's business world is deeply imbricated not only in the global economy, via its ex-colonies and imperial past, but also in this quite local yet international market. How long will it be until neighborhood development overtakes the eclectic neighborhood and liquidates its cultural richness into purely corporate, financial profit? As Smith explains in his analysis of the World Trade Center, part of its notoriety as an iconotype accrued from its earliest erasures of the local environment in Manhattan.⁶⁰ In the late 1960s, before the demolition of twelve blocks for the tower's foundation, there existed a quite active, internationally known bazaar, the Syrian Quarter. This neighborhood brought together immigrant communities, for instance, from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. Also affected by the razing was Radio Row, a lively cluster of blocks dedicated to the manufacture and retail of electronics, textiles, garments, and dry goods.⁶¹ There is a striking parallel here with London's East End, home to a tremendous diversity of international immigrants and a famous textile industry, but also a site that has become attractive to commercial investors for its cheaper waterfront land. This is the type of culturally heterogeneous "glocal" neighborhood that must live and work peacefully together on a day-to-day basis, which the corporate transnationalism of a World Trade Center or a communist, Third International *Monument* would threaten to stamp out.

In line with this idea, Henry VIII's Wives originally wished to stamp a footprint of the full-sized *Monument to the Third International* in the neighborhood, with the gallery/lobby centered within its footprint. The artist collective proposed to drill bronze studs into the pavement to designate the footprint, but they were unable to acquire permission from the city planning commission. Henry VIII's Wives also wanted to cast manhole sewage covers with images of the tower, but again, the local authorities rejected their request. Their proposals evoke the tremendously difficult and sensitive project

of reconceiving “Ground Zero” in Manhattan. For all of the varying ideas for a new building, each design consecrated the Twin Towers’ exact footprint, threatening to “quarantine” two large sections of the site and arbitrarily foreclose possibilities for more organic urban growth.⁶² The footprint of the tower in London, however, marked by bronze studs in the pavement and manhole covers, would not have impeded such city transformation. Rather, it would have functioned similarly to the present-day demarcation of the fallen Berlin Wall, suggested in the streets by a double row of cobblestones and bronze plaques inscribed with “Berliner Mauer 1961–1989” (Berlin Wall 1961–1989). Of course, the symbolic charge of the Berlin Wall, the Twin Towers, and the *Monument to the Third International* varies to a great degree, and the first two were actually destroyed in real space. If Henry VIII’s Wives had succeeded in stamping the footprint of the tower in the East End, they would have not only memorialized the *Monument* before its construction, once again signifying its inherent ideological charge as a *Pathosformel*. But as part of that anticipatory remembrance, the project would also have insisted upon its reformulation as an act of street-level, culturally diverse exchange and encounter.

For its multiyear pluriform campaign, *Tatlin’s Tower and the World* worked to imaginatively transform a potentially totalizing icon into a self-reflexive, preventive public.⁶³ Their *Populism* launch of the project in Oslo in 2005, along with their website and postering in the London Underground, attempted to garner initial excitement and publicity for the artwork through the popular, utopian image of the *Monument to the Third International*. Yet it is through their various iterations of the campaign across specific sites in Europe—the top of the tower in Bern, the middle of it in Belgrade, and its base in London—that the growing, pluralized public for this project managed to heterochronously rotate or pivot together as a more self-reflexive social imaginary within Europe. Each manifestation of the campaign pointed to specific histories of duress and slow violence that continue to harmfully unravel the social weave of more localized places and peoples, pointing for instance to differentially distributed social vulnerabilities arising from genocide, Islamophobia, and neoliberal, metropolitan development across the continent. Yet, mounted together through an iconology of the interval, in a Warburgian, temporally recursive sense, the disparately assembled yet unbuilt tower actively proffered a vision of nonviolent public formation for a plurality of strangers in a future conditional tense—against the abstracted, symbolic, and emotive violence of the icon of the Twin Towers.

Conclusion: The Anticipatory Echo Chamber of *Tatlin's Tower and the World*

Tatlin's Tower and the World parodied forms of populism that led to slow and spectacular violence, forms that dominate European political discourse and recur in social and mass media outlets today. Populism operates chiefly by its sheer vagueness and emotional resonance, be it mobilized through religious faith, economic inequality, or cultural identification. Today the issue at hand is the increasing influence of populist right-wing leaders, such as Marine Le Pen or Geert Wilders, who attempt to stand in for a homogenous “people” via the demonization of immigrants and “foreigners.” They play on fears of the declining welfare state, job insecurity, crime, and cultural differences, which all become hyped in social and mass media through distortion, misinformation, editing, and simplistic rhetoric. In response, for instance, debates in Europe have even sprung up about whether to monitor online chat groups more stringently. Some experts believe that this would be nearly impossible, but the German government passed a new online hate speech law, the Network Enforcement Law, which took effect January 1, 2018, and appears to have promising results so far.⁶⁴ It recognizes that violently charged images in the media have tremendous power as vehicles of populist, affective, and affiliative persuasion.

More than just a parody, however, *Tatlin's Tower and the World* was also a campaign to counter through contretemps a visual field exploited by demagogues to propagate a clash-of-civilizations mentality and to spread fears, for example, of immigrants and Muslims. The spectacularized images of the falling Twin Towers, indeed, signaled an explosion of this type of viral and empty, fearmongering discourse. The afterlife, or *Nachleben*, of *Tatlin's Tower and the World*, in contrast, attempted to operate through and with the interval of “the *Nach*—the ‘after’ or the ‘according to’—and its *Leben*, this past ‘vivacity’ [‘vivre’] to which it grants a delayed, and different, existence.”⁶⁵ Henry VIII’s Wives’ campaign worked to imaginatively counter a reductive social-visual field and to actively anticipate the formation of nonviolent, plural publics, relating masses of strangers through a vernacular yet cosmopolitan ethos.

From 1997 to 2014, Henry VIII’s Wives consistently attempted to expose popular narratives, icons, and symbols as complexly mediated and negotiated in broader public spheres. As art historian W. J. T. Mitchell suggests, the “power of idols over the human mind resides in their silence, their spectacular impassiveness, their dumb insistence on repeating the same message (as in

the baleful cliché of ‘terrorism’).”⁶⁶ Instead, Mitchell advocates a “sounding” of the idols as a way of “playing upon them,” retuning and “transforming [the idol’s] hollowness into an echo chamber for human thought.”⁶⁷ From their series *Iconic Moments of the Twentieth Century* to *Tatlin’s Tower and the World*, Henry VIII’s Wives attempted to do precisely this—to reconceive how such idols, icons, and symbols could be sounded out and recontextualized through an intervallic time.

Tatlin’s Tower and the World proposes a more locally grounded alternative for a nonviolent horizon of stranger sociability. It takes up Judith Butler’s challenge not only to point fingers at clearly identifiable perpetrators of atrocity such as Anders Behring Breivik, but also to excavate and not exculpate the broader, slower conditions of social-structural harm that lead to more spectacular moments of violence, as in the case of 9/11. As increasingly expansive, diverse publics, we should learn to become more attuned to this social-visual field of violence in order to listen to and anticipate its unequal reverberations and repercussions in the future. This is a more difficult and imaginative, if perhaps utopian or impossible, task. Nevertheless, with *Tatlin’s Tower and the World*, Henry VIII’s Wives attempted to traverse this field and, in doing so, actively refunction the connective strategies of populist communication in order to allow heterogeneity and plurality within a more complexly attuned echo chamber for thoughtful, mass stranger relationality.

conclusion

On January 7, 2015, a terrorist attack on the Parisian offices of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* polarized public opinion. People were either “with Charlie” or not. More, they either “were” Charlie or not, claiming not only connection to, but also oneness with, the victims. *Je suis Charlie* emerged as the definitive rallying cry for solidarity with the twelve killed and several injured in the shooting.¹ Although a more deadly terrorist attack was perpetrated in Paris less than a year later, killing 130 people, the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre, like Anders Behring Breivik’s atrocity, stands out for its striking entanglement of violence with visibility and publicity in Europe. The hashtag #JeSuisCharlie was tweeted as many as 6,500 times per minute and became one of the most popular memes in Twitter history.² It recirculated 3.4 million times over the subsequent twenty-four hours.³ However, *Je suis Charlie* was also designed as much to be a logo or brand as a slogan, to be recognized not only for its linguistic content but also as a visual sign (figure c.1). The artistic director who created the original tweet, Joachim Ronchin, at the French edition of *Stylist*, a weekly women’s magazine, used the magazine’s house font for the phrase *Je suis* and retained the typographical form of the magazine

Charlie Hebdo's title for the word *Charlie*.⁴ Ronchin starkly placed the sentence against a black background in order to evoke connotations of mourning. As some have noted, even though the phrase morphed visually as graffiti across the streets of Paris, this is the image that concretized in the public's mind.⁵ Adopting the logo en masse, then, also seemed to enact a too-facile and ego-centric, popular consumption of a branding of the tragedy in the public sphere.

Furthermore, the slogan was quickly refuted by many with the antistatement of *Je ne suis pas Charlie* because the French government embraced the original as a way of asserting French national values of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, and *laïcité* (secularity) in the wake of the terrorist attack.⁶ The government orchestrated a demonstration four days after the attack—which animated 1.5 million in Paris and another estimated 2.5 million throughout France—where *Je suis Charlie* plastered the streets with placards.⁷ Although the impetus for the march was sincere, the demonstration transformed into a mass-mediated spectacle, with the state televising the walk from the

FIGURE C.1 – *Je suis Charlie*, January 11, 2015, Place de la République, Paris.
Photo: Olivier Ortelpa.



symbolically charged Place de la République to the Place de la Nation. The people were steered along a boulevard named after Voltaire, a figure that had resurfaced days before in public discussions as an indication of France's important role in establishing the Enlightenment principles of freedom of speech and civil liberty.⁸ In fact, showing support for the victims of the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre soon became tethered with an aggressive call for freedoms of speech and the press. Thus the state-sponsored demonstration also drew criticism for its hypocritical inclusion of many international governmental representatives—from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, for example—whose states routinely jail journalists and abuse the human rights of minority groups.⁹

The prominent French newspaper *Le Monde* boldly claimed that the *Charlie Hebdo* attack was “le 11-Septembre français” (the French 9/11).¹⁰ Yet this comparison risked reinforcing a fear-based, jingoistic social imaginary. As one critic opined at the time, “To buy in to the fear that we might all be slaughtered like the *Charlie* cartoonists is to buy in to the same hyperbolized dread that followed 9/11 (and, indeed the Cold War)—our paranoid national security state was built on such fear and needs no further bolstering.”¹¹ The violent spectacle of the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre, like 9/11, and its subsequent, inflamed publicity regarding national unity, threatened to quickly transform the call for solidarity into a fear-driven, securitarian public. Although different in many respects, the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre also resembles the Danish cartoon crisis, when many lionized the freedoms of speech and the press at the expense of intercultural awareness, sensitivity, and respect. The French magazine was targeted for its often insulting, irreverent depictions of Muslims and the Prophet Muhammad. In the end, the identification *Je suis Charlie* was a mode of mass subjectivity that many in the public sphere could not adopt. On the one hand, it identified with those who dealt in derogatory stereotyping, and, on the other hand, it connoted a homogenous, nationalist ethos that could have easily tipped toward fears of alterity and security, as happened in the aftermath of 9/11.

Ultimately, the act of terrorism came to be linked with the nonintegrated, non-French inhabitants of the banlieues. Government officials and media pundits repeatedly stressed the banlieue origins of the terrorist attackers, emphasizing the idea that these peripheral neighborhoods foster such violence and radicalism.¹² According to many in this official media sphere, young *banlieusards* have not properly integrated into society or adopted the French values of liberty and secularism. Not surprisingly, many *banlieusards*, in

particular, did not echo the call for national unity encapsulated by the *Je suis Charlie* banner, which, though seemingly all-inclusive, in fact denied certain marginalized, stigmatized groups access to the French social imaginary and a more pluralistic public sphere.¹³ As described in chapter 3, Thomas Hirschhorn's installations have long attempted to draw attention to the slow violence of such stigmatization in the banlieues. However good-willed in its attempt at solidarity, *Je suis Charlie* reductively mirrored a homogenizing and exclusionary, nationalist discourse.

Tribute to the Fallen

In contrast to the state-sponsored, spectacular march organized in Paris for the casualties of the Paris attack, Daniela Ortiz's smaller-scale, walking performance, *Tribute to the Fallen* (2012), garnered publicity on the streets of Madrid for "foreigners" who have fallen victim to Spain's exclusionary national infrastructure.¹⁴ Enacted three years earlier than the *Charlie Hebdo* demonstration, her walking protest, in collaboration with Xosé Quiroga, attempted to create a space of appearance for the barely visible deaths of "illegal" immigrants in Spain. On October 12, 2012, Spain's National Day, Ortiz walked on a specific route through the city: from Plaza de Colón (Columbus Square) to the former apartment of Congolese politician Moïse Tshombe (1919–69) to the Center for the Internment of Foreigners (Centro de Internamiento de Extranjeros de Madrid, or CIE de Aluche), and finally to the October 12 Hospital (Hospital 12 de Octubre) (figure c.2). The path symbolizes the maltreatment of and disregard for the life of Congolese refugee Samba Martine, who died in the October 12 Hospital on December 19, 2011.

In the video documentation of Ortiz's journey, spectators view the artist walking through the streets of Madrid with a simple protest poster: one side displays a black-and-white headshot of Martine, while the other side states in Spanish, "Samba Martine, after 38 days detained at the Center for the Internment of Foreigners of Aluche died at the October 12 Hospital." The video's Spanish intertitles explain that Martine was arrested in Melilla and taken to Madrid for deportation. She had arrived as an asylum seeker amid the dire political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Yet her place of origin was listed inaccurately as the Republic of the Congo, and an asylum report was never filed for her in Melilla.¹⁵ Instead, due to overcrowding in the CETI (Centro de Estancia Temporal para Inmigrantes, or Temporary



FIGURE C.2 – Daniela Ortiz, *Tribute to the Fallen*, 2012, still image of documentary video.

Immigrant Stay Center) in Ceuta and Melilla, she was transported to the CIE, a location usually reserved for people with a criminal record or those previously detained without documentation. While in custody at the CIE, Martine complained more than ten times about the state of her health, and only once did an interpreter assist in her examination. Her health deteriorated, and on December 19, 2011, an outsourced police officer in the complex noticed her ailing condition and helped take her to the medical center, where she was subsequently transported to the hospital via police car, not ambulance, severely hyperventilating (figure C.3). She died shortly thereafter of respiratory failure. Later it was realized that her death, initially attributed to meningitis and later changed to pneumococcal pneumonia, was most likely caused by an HIV-derived infection. She was never considered a serious patient at the CIE, as the video documentation of *Tribute to the Fallen* highlights. Yet she was, in fact, HIV positive. The video concludes at the site of the hospital with intermingled, nondiegetic sounds of a funereal trumpet and helicopter (evoking the military and surveillance), followed by a full marching band and choir. Text at the end dedicates the piece not only to Samba Martine but also to Idrissa Diallo, Osamuyia Akpitaye, Jonathan Sizalima, Mohammed Abugi, and the “thousands of fallen at the borders,” describing the harrowing deaths of



FIGURE C.3 – Daniela Ortiz, *Tribute to the Fallen*, 2012, still image of documentary video.

these other CIE inmates from 2007 to 2012, all prematurely deceased in their early twenties due to neglect, dereliction, and/or physical violence by guards.

Daniela Ortiz's *Tribute to the Fallen* not only underscores recursive histories of violence against “foreigners” in Spanish and European social imaginaries. Her embodied walk and video documentation also attempt to hail into being a preventive public in order to arrest the slower, more invisible violence of a state-military security apparatus and its normalization through a mainstream public sphere. Her route, for instance, began at the central Plaza de Colón, named after Christopher Columbus (Cristóbal Colón) and adorned with a grandiose column and statue of him. The beginning of the video depicts Ortiz emerging from the Plaza de Colón metro station to face the rising sun of the Fiesta Nacional de España, or Spain's National Day on October 12. This is the day that Columbus first landed in the Americas (also celebrated as Columbus Day, or resisted and reinstated as Indigenous Peoples' Day, on the second Monday in October in the United States). Of course the date also refers to the hospital where Samba Martine died. The camera frames and juxtaposes Martine's poster headshot next to the plaza statue of Columbus, highlighting a much longer genealogy of European colonialism and violence. A police officer then approaches Ortiz and explains to her that it is

National Day and that she may not make any demonstrations on the plaza, that she needs to move on to a different location. Her point is not to stay and occupy, however, but rather to walk and animate a trajectory of violence in the city. Her performance mimics and contests, for instance, the National Day's military parade typically held in Madrid, which culminates in this plaza. The video even documents a television set that relays mainstream coverage of the national armed forces as they march down one of the city's grand boulevards. Her walk also draws attention to numerous passersby on the street who, unwittingly or consciously, regularize the day's celebration of such violent histories of imperialism. Viewers witness several groups of mostly adolescent men, for instance, carrying large Spanish flags. The camera switches to slow motion when capturing their surprised or confused reactions to Ortiz's protest poster. Rather than speak, they stare curiously for long stretches, disarmed by Ortiz's display, and such arrested movements signal a slight change in their perception, suggesting that a nascent, preventive public might begin to emerge along Ortiz's journey.

Tribute to the Fallen opens with this much longer history of imperial violence, symbolized by the figure of Columbus, but it soon moves to mid-twentieth-century European histories of colonialism and massacre. From the plaza, Ortiz walks to a residential street where the Congolese politician Moïse Tshombe lived as a political exile. (Ironically, this street is named after Alexander Fleming, the Scottish physician and scientist whose discovery of penicillin, winning a Nobel Prize in 1945, has saved millions of lives.) Tshombe was involved in the murder and disappearance of Patrice Lumumba, an important leader and first prime minister of the DRC, who helped the Congo transition from a brutalized Belgian colony to an independent republic.¹⁶ Tshombe was a political rival who led the province of Katanga in seceding from the Congo and asked the Belgian government for military support in doing so. Lumumba, in turn, was taken prisoner by Belgian and Congolese officials and eventually executed in Katanga in 1961. Although Tshombe briefly served as prime minister of the DRC in 1964–65, he was soon forced to flee and granted political asylum by Spanish dictator Francisco Franco until his death and burial in Brussels in 1969. Tshombe's political asylum and complicity in the assassination of Lumumba stand in stark contrast to Samba Martine's contemporary exodus from the DRC and search for health and security. Ortiz's video once again juxtaposes her grainy, mug shot–like photograph in the sky against the apartment where Tshombe comfortably lived his last years.

Following this destination, Ortiz walks to the sites where Martine's life was effectively taken from her by the state: the CIE and the October 12 Hospital. Moving away from the residential neighborhood, where Ortiz handed out informational flyers to individuals and families on the street, she then finds herself on an empty sidewalk next to a six-lane freeway. According to the video's intertitles, the windowless CIE may hold three hundred people, who reside in cells with bars, in segregated areas for men and women, and even in isolation units. No physical contact is allowed with family members, yet the CIE is still not considered a penitentiary center. Moreover, it is located on the site of the former Carabanchel prison, built by political prisoners during the Franco dictatorship and eventually closed in 1998. Neighbors petitioned to establish a center for historical memory at the prison, but instead it was razed in 2008, making way for the construction of the CIE. Ortiz's subsequent stop at the hospital also signals ties to the violence of Franco's regime. The hospital, one of the largest in the country and opened in 1973 by Franco, was originally titled the October 1 Hospital, marking the date that Franco took control of the government in 1936. In 1988, its name was changed to associate it rather with the nationalist icon of Columbus. Again, Ortiz stops in front of these destinations and frames Martine's fragile and plastered, moving-yet-static image against the monumentality of their imposing architecture. Her performance recursively points to histories of colonial violence that have been built, materially and psychically, into that architecture and made figures such as Samba Martine particularly and differentially vulnerable to its enclosures.

As with the #JeSuisCharlie march in Paris, *Tribute to the Fallen* became both an embodied and virtual reflection of tremendous violence affecting publics in Europe today, but that is where any similarity ends. Both ostensibly worked to offer solidarity with victims of sociopolitical, cultural, and material aggression via a symbolic journey through the public streets of European national capitals. Yet the *Charlie Hebdo* image and slogan became stultified as a type of homogenizing, corporate logo, falsely universalizing in its viral identification with the victims of the Paris massacre. The state's performance of identification with the journalists worked to bolster an exclusionary nationalist imaginary and French values such as *laïcité* (described in chapter 3). There was little room in the mainstream public sphere for discussion of the conditions that lay the groundwork for such a brutal act in the first place, similar to Judith Butler's diagnosis of post-9/11 discourse in the United States: "Conditions do not 'act' in the way that individual agents do, but no agent acts

without them.”¹⁷ As longtime journalist and writer in the Middle East Robert Fisk reported in strident terms in the aftermath of the Paris attack, asking which histories and stories were not being told at the time: “However Cherif and Said Kouachi [as perpetrators of the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre] excused their actions, they were born at a time when Algeria had been invisibly mutilated by 132 years of occupation. Perhaps five million of France’s six and a half million Muslims are Algerian. Most are poor, many regard themselves as second-class citizens in the land of equality.”¹⁸ To return to questions that I posed in the introduction: What modes of anticipatory artistic activism could condition a world where such horrific violence might not occur? What public conditions might bind a future social imaginary through a horizon of nonviolence?

Tribute to the Fallen did not presume identification with Samba Martine or all of the more invisible “thousands of fallen at the borders,” whose deaths do not register as fully human in certain European nationalist contexts. The artist, for instance, retained Martine’s photographic likeness and contextualizing information on a protest placard, in contrast to the *Charlie Hebdo* protest signage, which created a vacuous, virally circulating text through a type of specially designed branding. The former humanized an act of atrocity, and the latter depersonalized it, instead bolstering falsely universalizing conceptions of freedom of speech and the press. Furthermore, Ortiz placed Martine’s flattened and low-resolution, mug shot–like visage on a pole that would stand out above the crowds and confuse the normative, public perception of Madrid’s National Day, both staking out Martine’s individual significance while highlighting the more collective violence of carrying her disembodied face on a pole amid the Spanish flags of military men and passersby. Such an act highlighted the vulnerability of nonconforming, gendered (as a type of *flâneuse*) and racialized immigrant bodies (the artist is an immigrant from Peru) within the Spanish national imaginary.¹⁹

In the end, *Tribute to the Fallen* reflected both Martine’s human difference and sameness, as Arendt would attest. Moreover, the piece aligns with Azoulay’s critical reworking of Arendt’s ideas concerning political action and a space of appearance. Such a politicized space, above all, takes shape not only via the purposeful speech and action of individuals courageous enough to insert themselves within an unpredictable realm of human affairs, but it also manifests distinctly in a visual realm, enframed and enfolded collectively through a civil gaze held by plural publics. Crucially, such publics exist today in both embodied and virtual coordinates, and *Tribute to the Fallen* acknowledges this, with its full video document freely available online for

viewing. *Tribute to the Fallen*'s walking performance underlined the vulnerability of Martine's and others' pathologized bodies—those often literally deceased due to inequitable, derelict care in state health systems—and its video documentation allows the performance to live on and affect even more virtual publics in the future.²⁰

Pathologized Minorities, Critical Futurities

Art can have a critical role to play not only in challenging injurious public discourse but also in actively reconceiving the groundwork of more ethically self-reflexive, pluralistic public spheres. At stake is the possibility of relating strangers across physical and virtual borders, of connecting them around pressing matters of concern, and of arresting historically recursive violence that not only affects certain peoples more inequitably in the present but that will also continue to do so differentially and probably exponentially in the future. At stake, in other words, is the present and future general health of such plural, vulnerably bound publics. State and military discourses may have co-opted violence prevention as an idea and term, but this book argues that its critical currency may yet still be recouped and that we should follow Paul Saint-Amour's important call for work in critical futurities.²¹

My final focus on *Tribute to the Fallen* and the refugee crisis demonstrates an ostensibly new moment of deep politicization on the continent regarding who may inhabit its political-public imaginary *à l'aise*. Yet one has only to recall Arendt's crucial work or Stuart Hall's evocation of a 1950s United Kingdom ("An unstoppable tide of black migrants, the public commentators prophesied, is headed in this direction!") to recognize a recursion of violent publicities that foreshorten the "aperture of futurity" for Europe's most vulnerable, pathologized peoples.²² Relatedly, in one of his last major works, *Strangers at Our Door* (2016), sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman importantly argues for a more ethical approach in welcoming the innumerable refugees knocking at Europe's borders. He rebukes the violent rhetoric and tactics employed by extremist right-wing leaders such as the prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, who spouts dangerous dictums like "all terrorists are migrants."²³ Bauman advocates, "Whatever the obstacles, and however immense they might seem, conversation will remain *the* royal road to agreement and so to peaceful and mutually beneficial, cooperative and solidary coexistence simply because it has no competitors and so no viable alternative."²⁴ His appeal is critical, yet it does not account

for the rapidly changing forms and platforms of public sphere formation in the twenty-first century. His call assumes a conventional basis for public spheres, reliant upon “rational-critical discourse” and based solely upon “dialogue” and “conversation.”²⁵ What his account lacks is a more nuanced understanding of the role of visual and virtual pathways in generating connections among masses of strangers today. In terms of the current influx of migrants in Europe, Bauman pits a “seductive” and escapist online realm against a more “real,” “complex,” and “challenging” off-line world, one that, unlike the online world, is “heterogeneous, heteronomic and multivocal.”²⁶ He recognizes the dangers of virtual engagement, but he also disregards its necessary, contemporary role in mass stranger identification as well as its potential in engendering more plural publics.

Instead, when violence traverses political and cultural borders, and both embodied and virtual spaces, publics must follow suit in order to realize a more pluralistic, multiperspectival understanding of pressing concerns. In his book *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger* (2006), cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai offers a less cynical, slightly more encouraging analysis of large-scale violence in the twenty-first century. According to him, terror has emerged since 1989 as a key symptom of globalization and, more specifically, of the blurring between “vertebrate” and “cellular” models of organization.²⁷ Nation-states constitute the largest system of vertebrate organization because they still operate along a “central spinal system” of alliances, treaties, and international cooperation. Other forces, however, such as speculative capital, information technologies, the mass media, and even the circulation of refugees function within a cellular model, “whose parts multiply by association and opportunity rather than by legislation or design.”²⁸ Within this confluence of conflicting systems of organization, the nation-state can no longer act as a guarantor of a traditional social order.²⁹ The European Union is an example of this par excellence, reflecting these tremendous structural changes globally from the 1980s until the present.

This simultaneity of structural models, vertebrate and cellular, and the alarming disjunctures that it often creates, is by now largely acknowledged in political and economic analyses of globalization. What Appadurai’s investigation offers here is insight into concomitant social changes spurred on by a “fear of small numbers”—not only the mainstream public’s fear of technocratic/wealthy elites or fundamentalist terrorists, but also minorities. Minorities are still classic objects of fear and rage in the twenty-first century: “Why kill, torture, or ghettoize the weak?”³⁰ According to Appa-

durai, processes of minoritization are historically tied to modernity, arising side by side with the nation-state through the development of statistics, censuses, representational democracy, and territorial classification.³¹ Chapter 2 elaborated on some of these processes in terms of Farocki's work. So what makes the pathologization of minorities different in our contemporary moment, in a hybrid vertebrate-and-cellular world? Ultimately, they are "the major site for displacing the anxieties of many states about their own minority or marginality (real or imagined) in a world of a few megastates, of unruly economic flows and compromised sovereignties. Minorities, in a word, are metaphors and reminders of the betrayal of the classical national project."³² It is precisely because of the uncertain admixture of vertebrate and cellular global systems that minorities have become objects of heightened fear once again. They come to stand for the marginality and insecurity of the nation on a globalized stage. Indeed, they become scapegoats for the socially bound vulnerability that majoritarian publics feel, upended by a feeling of little or no control over larger political and economic events and outcomes.

Alongside these more frightening, cellular forces, however, Appadurai reminds readers of the more "utopian cellularities" of transnational and translocal forms such as grassroots social movements and activist international groups.³³ Publics are not activist organizations in this sense, but if nurtured through creative art that works to relate strangers self-reflexively and pluralistically, across virtual and physical borders, a public sphere may serve to prevent more accumulative, slower forms of violence from chronically poisoning the well, so to speak. It bears stressing that politics continually unfold not only in a more official network between states and individuals, but also in the less tangible, less visible public relations, affects, and attitudes that circulate in a civil realm.

Speaking to yet also expanding upon Appadurai's and Butler's broader claims concerning violence, artistic "utopian cellularities" may also act to draw a horizon of nonviolence. We should not forget this type of necessary though unquantifiable work. Contemporary art in Europe today, particularly against a vast backdrop of reductive media coverage and political propaganda, has the potential to reinvest such public spheres with more ethically minded modes for mass stranger relationality, ones bound by a shared social sense of vulnerability. Historically, Europe has been a grand, if fragile, idea for violence prevention. Now more than ever, it needs further transnational and translocal creative efforts in order to move from insecurity to collectivity, from fear to affiliation.

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notes

INTRODUCTION

- 1 Keenan, “Publicity and Indifference,” 18–19.
- 2 Keenan, “Publicity and Indifference,” 36.
- 3 For further analysis, see Cohen, “*The Vanishing Vanishing-Point*,” 1–17.
- 4 Keenan, “Publicity and Indifference,” 37.
- 5 See for instance Weizman, *Forensis*; Weizman, *Forensic Architecture*; and Keenan and Weizman, *Mengele’s Skull*.
- 6 Bois et al., “On Forensic Architecture,” 140.
- 7 Bois et al., “On Forensic Architecture,” 140, 120.
- 8 Bois et al., “On Forensic Architecture,” 120.
- 9 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 11.
- 10 In the same interview, Weizman observes a shift to “predictive forensics, turning the direction of analysis from the past to the future, so to speak.” Such predictive forensics works with mass data to identify patterns in people’s behavior in space and time, and thus, for instance, pinpoint where people might mostly likely be targeted (by missiles) or intercepted (as sea migrants). Forensic Architecture developed a software, Patrn, to crowdsource

- and anonymize uploaded, geo-tagged data in order to map out such relations. The group's shift toward violence prevention is notable, yet it subscribes to the use of empirically bound, data-driven measures, rather than cross-citational discursive efforts, in an attempt to mitigate the vulnerabilities of the public sphere. This is quite different than what I propose. Additionally, its understanding of violence is limited to a realm of the clearly concrete and physical. Bois et al., "On Forensic Architecture," 136–37.
- 11 "Breivik Manifesto: What Does '2083' Mean?," *International Business Times*, July 27, 2011.
 - 12 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 201.
 - 13 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 10.
 - 14 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 22.
 - 15 Hall, *Familiar Stranger*, 182–86.
 - 16 Hall, *Familiar Stranger*, 183–84.
 - 17 See for instance Mercer, *Travel and See*; Chambers, *Black Artists in British Art*; Bernier, *Stick to the Skin*; and Aikens and Robles, *The Place Is Here*. For an insightful historical contextualization of Rasheed Araeen's important work as an artist, curator, and writer, see Martin, "Rasheed Araeen, Live Art, and Radical Politics," 107–24.
 - 18 See for instance McDonough, "The Beautiful Language of My Century"; McDonough, *Guy Debord and the Situationist International*; Feldman, *From a Nation Torn*; and Woodruff, *Disordering the Establishment*.
 - 19 Widrich, *Performative Monuments*, 4–5.
 - 20 Widrich, *Performative Monuments*, 8.
 - 21 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 68–69.
 - 22 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 71.
 - 23 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 75.
 - 24 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 75.
 - 25 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 88.
 - 26 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 89.
 - 27 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 90–94.
 - 28 Stimson, "What Was Institutional Critique?," 35.
 - 29 Alberro, "Institutions, Critique, and Institutional Critique," 7. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, however, Habermas does not discuss the space of museums or their historical ties to nationalizing, civil discourses in Europe. For another useful anthology on institutional critique, see Raunig and Ray, *Art and Contemporary Critical Practice*.
 - 30 Alberro, "Institutions, Critique, and Institutional Critique," 12.
 - 31 Alberro, "Institutions, Critique, and Institutional Critique," 8.
 - 32 Stimson, "What Was Institutional Critique?," 22.
 - 33 Feldman, *From a Nation Torn*, 3.

- 34 For excellent analyses of these gendered, racialized images, see Silverman, *The Threshold of the Visible World*, 146–54; and Alter, “The Political Im/perceptible in the Essay Film,” 165–92.
- 35 In his book *Enlightenment in the Colony*, for example, Aamir R. Mufti delves into genealogies of Enlightenment thought on alterity, which were bound to the Jewish question on the continent and then propagated and disseminated throughout the world as part of the imperialist project. According to him, the unique status of the Jewish question within the Enlightenment intellectual project—and the striking restrictions on secularism, nationalism, and citizenship that it justified—also spread to governance that suppressed freedoms in the European colonies. Relatedly, Michael Rothberg’s *Multidirectional Memory* serves as a critical intervention in terms of comparative memory studies between the violence of the Holocaust and twentieth-century liberation struggles for formerly colonized nations.
- 36 Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*.
- 37 Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*, 9.
- 38 Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*, 5, 19.
- 39 I use the term *New Europe* broadly to refer to a deepening and widening sense of European identity on the continent in the twenty-first century, particularly around the European Union’s enlargement in 2004 and 2007. The term originally arose in response to a charged statement by Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 regarding European support for the US war in Iraq, when he flippantly referred to Germany and France as “Old Europe.” Yet it has taken on numerous layers of meaning since then, used ubiquitously in literary, filmic, and artistic representations as well as scholarship. Often the term comes to signify more specifically the inclusion of Eastern Europe in a New European imaginary, as in Veličković, *Eastern Europeans in Contemporary Literature*. See also Domínguez’s discussion of the term in his introduction to *Cosmopolitanism and the Postnational*, 4–5.
- 40 I borrow this phrasing from political sociologist Jos de Beus in his essay, “The European Public Sphere,” 21.
- 41 There is an emergent, growing body of literature around issues of care. See for instance the Care Collective, *The Care Manifesto*; TallBear, “Caretaking Relations, Not American Dreaming”; and Hobart and Kneese, “Radical Care.”
- 42 Stoler, *Duress*, 5–6, 353.
- 43 Stoler, *Duress*, 131, 377–78.
- 44 I return to this notion in chapter 1. Nixon, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*.
- 45 Stoler, *Duress*, 8.
- 46 Stoler, *Duress*, 26.
- 47 Stoler, *Duress*, 25–27, 31.

- 48 Saint-Amour, *Tense Future*, 24.
- 49 Saint-Amour, *Tense Future*, 23.
- 50 For an insightful unpacking of these schemas, see the chapter “Autonomy, Antagonism, and the Aesthetic” in Kester, *The One and the Many*, 19–65.
- 51 Ellen Barry and Martin Selsoe Sorensen, “In Denmark, Harsh New Laws for Immigrant ‘Ghettos,’” *New York Times*, July 1, 2018; John Graversgaard and Liz Fekete, “Denmark’s ‘Ghetto Package’—Discrimination Enshrined in Law,” *Institute of Race Relations*, November 21, 2019, <http://www.irr.org.uk/news/denmarks-ghetto-package-discrimination-enshrined-in-law/>.
- 52 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 94–97.
- 53 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
- 54 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
- 55 I employ the term *virality* here in a general sense, without referencing quite specific, quantitative analyses of media concepts such as “structural virality.” See for instance Goel et al., “The Structural Virality of Online Diffusion,” 180–96.
- 56 Weizman describes it as a “thick fabric of lateral relations, associations, and chains of actions between material things, large environments, individuals, and collective action. It connects different physical scales and scales of action. It overflows any map that seeks to frame it because there are always more connections and relations to be made in excess of its frame.” Weizman’s notion of field causality resonates with my analysis, but again, it places more emphasis on questions of material analysis and culpability in the aftermath of violence. *Forensis*, 26–29.
- 57 I would like to thank another anonymous reviewer for this observation.
- 58 “Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, 18 April 1951 (Treaty of Paris),” in Blair, *The European Union since 1945*, 121.
- 59 For a concise synopsis of such historiographical literature, see for instance Dinan, *Europe Recast*, 10–19. Other primers on the topic and related scholarship can be found in Dedman, *The Origins and Development of the European Union*; and Blair, *The European Union since 1945*.
- 60 The financial landscape of Europe, however, may shift dramatically after the COVID-19 pandemic and calls to centralize Europe’s recovery plan. Matina Stevis-Gridneff, “A €750 Billion Recovery Plan Thrusts Europe into a New Frontier,” *New York Times*, May 27, 2020.
- 61 Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 296.
- 62 Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 284.
- 63 Many feminist scholars, such as political philosopher Seyla Benhabib, have pointed to the fact that Arendt’s theory of political action in *The Human Condition*, inspired by the Greek *polis*, necessarily excluded “large groups of human beings—like women, slaves, children, laborers, noncitizen residents, and all non-Greeks” whose labor made possible the “leisure for politics” that the elite few enjoyed. Benhabib, “Models of Public Space,” 75.

- 64 Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, 174.
- 65 Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*, 58, 61.
- 66 Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*, 37.
- 67 Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, xvii–xviii.
- 68 Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 111.
- 69 Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 113.
- 70 See Deutsche, *Evictions*; Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” 51–79; and Jackson, *Social Works*.
- 71 Jackson, *Social Works*, 50–57.
- 72 Jackson, *Social Works*, 56.
- 73 Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 113.
- 74 Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 111.
- 75 Deutsche, *Evictions*, 286.
- 76 Deutsche, *Evictions*, 202.
- 77 Deutsche, *Evictions*, 272–74.
- 78 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 130.
- 79 See in particular their preface and chapters “Violence, Mourning, and Politics” and “Precarious Life” in Butler, *Precarious Life*, xi–xxi, 19–49, 128–52.
- 80 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 20, 24.
- 81 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 19.
- 82 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 40.
- 83 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 192.
- 84 Breckenridge et al., *Cosmopolitanism*, 1–14.
- 85 Breckenridge et al., *Cosmopolitanism*, 2, 6.
- 86 Cheah and Robbins, *Cosmopolitics*, 6.
- 87 Cheah and Robbins, *Cosmopolitics*, 6.
- 88 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere.”
- 89 Cheah and Robbins, *Cosmopolitics*, 3.
- 90 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 20, 24.
- 91 Butler does so to some extent in *Precarious Life* (see 185–87, 192) but largely focuses on this question in their last chapter of *The Force of Nonviolence*, “Postscript: Rethinking Vulnerability, Violence, Resistance,” 185–204.
- 92 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 186–87.
- 93 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 222–26.
- 94 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 192.
- 95 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 201.
- 96 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 197, 201.
- 97 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 202. See particularly their chapter “Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street,” in *Notes toward a Performative Theory*, 66–98.
- 98 Bee and Bozzini, *Mapping the European Public Sphere*.
- 99 Risse, *European Public Spheres*, 3.

- 100 Risse, *European Public Spheres*, 13; de Beus, “The European Public Sphere,” 23.
- 101 De Beus, “The European Public Sphere,” 23.
- 102 De Beus, “The European Public Sphere,” 17.
- 103 De Beus, “The European Public Sphere,” 29; Risse, *European Public Spheres*, 3.
- 104 As de Beus writes, “Does a public sphere deficit of sorts exist in the EU? That is the leading question of the research presented in this book” (“The European Public Sphere,” 14).
- 105 De Beus, “The European Public Sphere,” 25. As Cristiano Bee and Emanuela Bozzini elaborate, “Between 2005 and 2009 the European Commission initiated an impressive series of concrete measures, targeting journalists and civil society. Codes of conduct, guidelines, training courses for journalists and workshops for civil society actors were organised in order to enhance dialogic interactions and to put Europe on the public agenda. Furthermore, the improvement of the *europa.eu* website and the interactive structures that were set up (for example thematic blogs and fora, the Your-Voice in Europe portal, the CIRCA website *Communication and Information Research Centre Administrator*) aimed to give people a say on political matters concerning the EU, and was an attempt to develop a strategic and comprehensive approach to public communication” (*Mapping the European Public Sphere*, 3).
- 106 De Beus, “The European Public Sphere,” 21.
- 107 For a provocative call to combine the expertise of area studies with a new comparative literature, with all of their historically attendant problems, see the chapter “Crossing Borders,” in Spivak, *Death of a Discipline*, 2–23.
- 108 Singh, *Unthinking Mastery*, 136. Singh connects a more socially positive conception of mastery, or the skilled acquisition of expertise and knowledge, to historical forms of violence, particularly colonialism. For her, mastery lies at the foundation of anticolonial writings and postcolonial studies, for instance, as figures such as Gandhi and Frantz Fanon had to assume “masterful” positions—linguistic, emotional, psychological, material—to credibly oppose and confront colonial violence in its different manifestations, rooted in the pernicious power of Eurocentrism (8–9).
- 109 Singh, *Unthinking Mastery*, 17, 90–91, 139.
- 110 Like Freeman in *Time Binds*, I strive for the unfolding of “slowly, a small number of imaginative texts rather than amass a weighty archive of or around texts” (xvii) with the addendum that I wish to substitute or supplement visuals for or with textual documents as well.
- 111 For her analysis of Arendt’s theoretical work, see particularly the chapter “Rethinking the Political,” in Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 29–124.
- 112 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*.

CHAPTER ONE. PREVENTING VIOLENCE IN EUROPEAN
PUBLIC SPHERES

- 1 Founded in 1993, the group is composed of Jakob Fenger, Rasmus Nielsen, and Bjørnstjerne Christiansen. They are particularly committed to exposing global economic structures through participatory and video work.
- 2 One may view the artwork at Superflex, *Burning Car*, 2008, https://superflex.net/films/burning_car.
- 3 Nixon, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*.
- 4 For a more in-depth analysis of this piece, see Cohen, "Burning Cars, Caricatures, and *Glub*," 190–202.
- 5 This is one reason why the 2016 snapshot of Ai Weiwei in the same pose as the famous photograph of three-year-old Syrian refugee Alan Kurdi lying dead on a Greek beach received stark criticism.
- 6 Fraser, "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere," 9.
- 7 Fraser, "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere." As many observe, this is perhaps one of the book's greatest strengths: its historically specific delineation of different institutional bases and practices that led to the cultivation of government-regulating public spheres during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, within the specific, nationalizing contexts of England, France, and Germany. See for instance Calhoun, "Introduction," 1–48.
- 8 These are not standardized terms, but I value Calhoun's evocative descriptors here ("Introduction," 34).
- 9 This line of critique includes Alexander Negt and Oskar Kluge's *Public Sphere and Experience* (1972), which examines class politics and an oppositional, proletarian public sphere; numerous feminist, historically revisionist critiques (including Rosalyn Deutsche's) and the work of scholars such as Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, who focus on overlapping questions of gender and sex within realms of mainstream and counterpublicity; and pressing issues of racial exclusion within such an "ideal" configuration of rational-critical discourse in the public sphere, for instance, by Houston A. Baker Jr. Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*; Deutsche, *Evictions*; Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*; Berlant and Warner, "Sex in Public," 547–66; and Baker, "Critical Memory and the Black Public Sphere," 3–33. See also W. J. T. Mitchell's critical edited volume, *Art and the Public Sphere*, a compilation that arose in response to Habermas's book being published for the first time in English in 1989.
- 10 Oskar Kluge, as quoted by Miriam Hansen in the epigraph to her foreword in Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*. Fraser argues not only that personal characteristics were not, in fact, historically bracketed during this time period, as demonstrated by feminist revisionist historiography, but also that Habermas in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*

fundamentally “misplaced faith in the efficacy of bracketing” to begin with. She contends that bracketing usually works to the advantage of dominant groups and does not foster participatory parity. The cultural values of subordinated groups are unequally respected and their contributions marginalized or minimized. Moreover, in material terms, subordinated groups often lack equal access to structures that would support and circulate their views, such as media apparatuses. For Fraser, in other words, the idea of bracketing is not enough: participatory parity requires the outright elimination of systemic social inequalities (“Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 109–42).

- 11 Calhoun, “Introduction,” 34.
- 12 Robbins, “The Public as Phantom,” ix–xii, xxi–xxiv. Robbins critiques the Habermasian ideal as “frankly hostile to cultural difference” and thus also “differences of ethos.” Yet the political-participatory thrust of his “republican virtue” model and publicity, recontextualized within a more complex realm of media and aesthetics today, might enhance the “making, exchanging, and mobilizing of political opinion” in salubrious ways. For instance, Robbins praises Carol Breckenridge and Arjun Appadurai’s launch of the transnational journal *Public Culture* in 1988 for its ambitiously expansive and tremendously diverse coverage of cross-cultural, public discussion around the globe, against a traditional narrative of the decline of the public sphere. He also cites Homi Bhabha’s aspirational hope, for instance, that such a phantom public sphere might be a “conversation we have to open up,” one that would work to centralize “the complex, often incommensurable fate of the migrant as the basis for a redefinition of the metropolitan public sphere.” See also Nash, *Transnationalizing the Public Sphere*.
- 13 Cheah and Robbins, *Cosmopolitics*; and Breckenridge et al., *Cosmopolitanism*.
- 14 Calhoun, “Introduction,” 34.
- 15 For important discussions of these artworks, see Kwon, *One Place after Another*.
- 16 Lacy, *Mapping the Terrain*, 46.
- 17 For a thoughtful reevaluation of these terms with regard to graffiti and street art, see Bruce, *Painting Publics*.
- 18 For an in-depth analysis of site-specific public art in relation to questions of community, see Kwon, *One Place after Another*.
- 19 This includes, not least of all, texts such as Adair Rounthwaite’s *Asking the Audience: Participatory Art in 1980s New York* (2017), which pays important methodological heed to the specificities of (nonuniversal) audience construction and involvement in such artwork.
- 20 Jackson, *Social Works*.
- 21 Lacy, *Mapping the Terrain*, 45.
- 22 For instance, I do not wish my interpretative analyses to fall into such a divide as Tom Finkelpearl describes, which leaves little space for the ambiguities or interweaving of scholars’ different positions regarding artistic activism:

“Critics who champion activist, cooperative art practices look to theorists like Habermas and Freire as well as to the dialogical practices of activist political organizations for their theoretical horizons. On the other hand, writers like [Miwon] Kwon, [Rosalynd] Deutsche, and [Claire] Bishop have attacked the political theoretical legitimacy of this position, often in the name of European postmodern writers like Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière, and Jean-François Lyotard.” See Finkelppearl’s important book, *What We Made*, 47–48. For an astute discussion of this debate in another context, see Enwezor, “Documentary/Vérité,” 62–102.

- 23 In Bishop’s view (*Artificial Hells*, 11–40), the difficulty of judging such artwork—frequently nebulous in form, experimental, and interdisciplinary—is often resolved injudiciously by resorting solely to ethical criteria: “Consensual collaboration is valued over artistic mastery and individualism, regardless of what the project sets out to do or actually achieves.” For her, art should be judged as art, not for the social change it effects in positivist terms, for its “demonstrable impact” for communities or persons (18–20). She most persuasively argues her point when tying it to a recent, neoliberal instrumentalization of the creative arts, particularly in the United Kingdom.
- 24 Bishop, *Artificial Hells*, 8.
- 25 Bishop, *Artificial Hells*, 8.
- 26 Kester unpacks a long intellectual history of art criticism and judgment, from that of Friedrich Schiller to the modern avant-gardes to a wave of scholars indebted to post-structuralist theory, which has undermined any attempt to examine and judge collaborative, activist art in alternative ways (*The One and the Many*, 54).
- 27 Kester, *The One and the Many*, 35.
- 28 One last point regarding their debate: Hirschhorn’s neighborhood projects have become a central node of contention concerning the judgment of socially engaged art, and I find both Bishop’s and Kester’s accounts inadequate in their interpretation of these projects. The *Bataille Monument* (2002) and particularly the artist’s subsequent neighborhood projects do not fit neatly within a category of “relational antagonism” or a post-structuralist-influenced, highly authored project of artistic “rupture.” I elaborate on this in chapter 3.
- 29 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 63.
- 30 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 1.
- 31 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 3.
- 32 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 5.
- 33 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 31.
- 34 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 2.
- 35 A few examples of art venues/exhibitions (among many) that have displayed her work, curated or created, include *Errata* (Haus der Kulturen der Welt

- and Fundació Antoni Tàpies, Barcelona—the latter cocurated with Carles Guerra—2019–20); *Potential History of Photography: Co-Lab-Photo-Box* (in collaboration with photographers Wendy Ewald and Susan Meiselas, Professor Leigh Raiford, and Professor Laura Wexler at the Ryerson Image Centre, 2018); and *Act of State Archive in Cher(e)s Ami(e)s* (Centre Pompidou, Paris, 2016).
- 36 See chapter 2, “Rethinking the Political,” in Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 29–124.
- 37 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 207–12.
- 38 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 100–101.
- 39 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 64–65.
- 40 Eva Leitolf, “Postcards from Europe,” interview by Camilla Boemio, *Landscape Stories*, December 2011, <http://www.landscapestories.net/interviews/eva-leitolf?lang=en>. For a more in-depth interpretation of this series, see Haeckel, “An Aesthetic of Absence,” 45–56.
- 41 Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 21.
- 42 Butler, *Notes toward a Performative Theory*, 66–98.
- 43 Nicholas Mirzoeff has published an illuminating book, *The Appearance of Black Lives Matter*, concerning the violence against, and “non-space of appearance” for, Black people in the United States.
- 44 Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, viii.
- 45 Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 4.
- 46 Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 41.
- 47 Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 63.
- 48 Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 46.
- 49 Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 64.
- 50 Stoler, *Duress*, 5–6, 26, 353.
- 51 European Commission Culture, “Culture Programme: A Serious Cultural Investment,” July 7, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc411_en.htm (no longer available).
- 52 European Commission, “The Story of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008,” August 6, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc415_en.htm (no longer available).
- 53 Introduction to Hassan and Dadi, *Unpacking Europe*, 12.
- 54 Introduction to Hassan and Dadi, *Unpacking Europe*, 9, 12.
- 55 Hassan and Dadi, *Unpacking Europe*, 18, 396–401.
- 56 Liz Alderman, “Macedonian Police Use Tear Gas to Stop Migrants at Border,” *New York Times*, April 10, 2016; James Angelos, “The New Europeans,” *New York Times*, April 6, 2016.
- 57 Alderman, “Macedonian Police.”
- 58 Angelos, “The New Europeans.”
- 59 Nicholas Kulish, “Norway Attacks Put Spotlight on Rise of Right-Wing Sentiment in Europe,” *New York Times*, July 23, 2011.

- 60 Angelos, “The New Europeans.”
- 61 European Commission, “Culture 2000: Presentation,” accessed August 5, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/culture/archive/culture2000/cult_2000_en.html (no longer available).
- 62 Larsen, Ricupero, and Schafhausen, *The Populism Catalogue*.
- 63 Larsen, Ricupero, and Schafhausen, *The Populism Catalogue*, 28.
- 64 Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 14, 117.
- 65 Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 94, 122–23.
- 66 Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 81.
- 67 Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 93, 82. See also Arditì, “Populism Is Hegemony Is Politics?,” 490. For an insightful, contemporary reappraisal of Laclau’s *On Populist Reason*, see the special issue of *Theory and Event*, Beltrán and Ferguson, “Perspectives on Populism,” 734–833.
- 68 Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 106, 110–17.
- 69 In his preface and first three chapters, Laclau discusses the difficulty of fixing any definition of populism, in part due to a variety of terms and concepts in the literature that have informed and could shed light on the phenomenon. For instance, he begins with a discussion of nineteenth-century mass psychology and relevant intellectual concepts such as “the crowd” or Freud’s work on group psychology in the 1920s. Bhabha’s work, similarly, thinks through aspects of “the people” without utilizing the term *populism* proper.
- 70 Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 99–100.
- 71 Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 96.
- 72 Kober, “Introduction,” 9.
- 73 With counterdemonstrations planned, the police eventually banned the right-wing rally in order to prevent violent clashes.
- 74 xurban_collective was founded in 2000 by Güven Incirlioglu and Hakan Topal, who worked together until 2012. See their website and project description, *Evacuation #1: The Sacred Evacuation*, March 2010, <http://xurban.net/scope/thesacredevacuation>.
- 75 *Evacuation #1*.
- 76 *Evacuation #1*.
- 77 For another quite compelling artistic project related to this topic—Azra Akšamija’s *Wearable Mosques*, or “pieces[s] of clothing that can be fashioned into a minimal prayer space”—see Akšamija, “Dare to Wear—a Mosque!,” 25–44.
- 78 Russel Shorto, “Marine Le Pen, France’s (Kinder, Gentler) Extremist,” *New York Times*, April 29, 2011.
- 79 See for instance Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*.
- 80 Steven Erlanger, “France Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public,” *New York Times*, April 11, 2011.
- 81 Angelique Chrisafis, “French Burkini Ban Row Escalates after Clothing Incident at Nice Beach,” *Guardian*, August 25, 2016.

- 82 Michael Slackman, "With Words on Muslims, Opening a Door Long Shut," *New York Times*, November 12, 2010.
- 83 Angelos, "The New Europeans."
- 84 Angelos, "The New Europeans."
- 85 Michael Slackman, "Right-Wing Sentiment, Ready to Burst Its Dam," *New York Times*, September 21, 2010. The growing acceptability of his rhetoric in the public sphere partially stems from a decade-long, polarized debate concerning Turkey's possible accession into the EU. As Turkey made significant progress in meeting its candidacy criteria and demanded accession negotiations in 2002, it met strong resistance from a plethora of voices in Germany. The renowned Social Democratic historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, for example, published an article, "Das Türkenproblem" (The Turkish problem) in a German liberal weekly, stressing Turkey's "non-European" character with a long-rehearsed, stultified narrative: "The Muslim Ottoman Empire was almost incessantly at war with Christian Europe for about 450 years; once its armies even stood at the gates of Vienna. These events have been deeply inscribed into the collective memory of the peoples of Europe, but also Turkey. Therefore there is no reason why this incarnation of an antagonism should be admitted into the EU." Once again, a debate concerning the inclusion or exclusion of diverse Turkish Germans into a European or German community becomes couched in essentialist terms, recalling the simplistic manifesto widely disseminated by Anders Behring Breivik, "2083: A European Declaration of Independence." Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Das Türkenproblem," *Die Zeit* (2002), as quoted in Ramm, "The 'Sick Man' beyond Europe," 105.
- 86 Ramm, "The 'Sick Man' beyond Europe," 109.
- 87 Ramm, "The 'Sick Man' beyond Europe," 106.
- 88 Weiss, "Recycling the Image of the Public Sphere in Art," 60.
- 89 Jestrovic, "Performing Like an Asylum Seeker," 164.
- 90 Christoph Schlingensiefel, "Please Love Austria: First Austrian Coalition Week," *Schlingensiefel*, June 2000, http://www.schlingensiefel.com/projekt_eng.php?id=t033.
- 91 Weiss, "Recycling the Image of the Public Sphere in Art," 60.
- 92 Jestrovic, "Performing Like an Asylum Seeker," 166.
- 93 Schmidt, "Christoph Schlingensiefel and the Bad Spectacle," 30–32. See Paul Poet's documentary of the artwork, *Ausländer Raus!*, which captures many of the public's immediate reactions.
- 94 Jestrovic, "Performing Like an Asylum Seeker," 169.
- 95 Schmidt, "Christoph Schlingensiefel and the Bad Spectacle," 32.
- 96 Caloz-Tschopp, "On the Detention of Aliens," 166.
- 97 Caloz-Tschopp, "On the Detention of Aliens," 166–67.
- 98 Caloz-Tschopp, "On the Detention of Aliens," 168.

- 99 The artist collective Wochenklausur responded to this situation in the mid-1990s with their artistic-activist project *Intervention in a Deportation Detention Facility* (1996) in Salzburg. According to the group, conditions in the immigrant detention center were worse than in any prison. Inmates lived in inadequate quarters, were habitually denied information about their rights, and were not allowed media of any kind (books, radio, television, etc.). Wochenklausur effected concrete changes in the detainees' living conditions by organizing productive conversations among the Salzburg Police Detention Center, Interior Ministry, local churches, media outlets, and other aid organizations. Unfortunately, their project did not draw as much publicity for these conditions in Austria as Schlingensiefel's piece did six years afterward. See Kester, *Conversation Pieces*, 100.
- 100 Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended," 249.
- 101 Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended," 243.
- 102 Trehan and Kóczé, "Racism, (Neo-)Colonialism and Social Justice," 54–55.
- 103 Trehan and Kóczé, "Racism, (Neo-)Colonialism and Social Justice," 51.
- 104 Leigh Phillips, Kate Connolly, and Lizzy Davies, "EU Turning Blind Eye to Discrimination against Roma, Say Human Rights Groups," *Guardian*, July 30, 2010.
- 105 Phillips, Connolly, and Davies, "EU Turning Blind Eye."
- 106 Butler, *The Force of Nonviolence*, 10.
- 107 Homa Khaleeli, "'You Worry They Could Take Your Kids': Is the Prevent Strategy Demonising Muslim Schoolchildren," *Guardian*, September 23, 2015.
- 108 Khaleeli, "'You Worry They Could Take Your Kids.'"
- 109 Quoted in Khaleeli, "'You Worry They Could Take Your Kids.'"
- 110 Stoler, *Duress*, 17–20.
- 111 Stoler, *Duress*, 8–9.

CHAPTER TWO. HARUN FAROCKI, CIVIL IMAGINATION,
AND SECURITARIAN PUBLICS

- 1 Gleick, *The Information*, 3.
- 2 Gleick, *The Information*, 8.
- 3 Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers*, 50.
- 4 Pantenburg, "'Now That's Brecht at Last!,'" 143.
- 5 Pantenburg, "'Now That's Brecht at Last!,'" 143.
- 6 Thomas Elsaesser's edited volume *Harun Farocki: Working on the Sightlines* remains an invaluable resource regarding Farocki's earlier oeuvre, as well as the artist's own extensive writings.
- 7 See *Eine Einstellung zur Arbeit Labour in a Single Shot*, accessed August 3, 2022, <https://www.labour-in-a-single-shot.net/de/filme/>.

- 8 For a more in-depth analysis on this shift, as well as Farocki's critical interest in early, silent cinema as it relates to historical and present-day issues of visualizing information and his pieces *On the Construction of Griffith's Films* (*Zur Bauweise des Films bei Griffith*, 2006), *In-Formation* (*Aufstellung*, 2005), and *Labour in a Single Shot* (*Eine Einstellung zur Arbeit*, 2011–14), see Cohen, "From Silence to Babel." Relatedly, valuable resources on this topic include Ernst and Farocki, "Towards an Archive for Visual Concepts"; and Gunning, "Early Cinema as Global Cinema."
- 9 Ehmann and Farocki, *Cinema Like Never Before*, 17.
- 10 See for instance Lindeperg, "Suspended Lives, Revenant Images"; Elsaesser, "Holocaust Memory as the Epistemology of Forgetting?"; and Alter, "Dead Silence."
- 11 Elsaesser, "Holocaust Memory as the Epistemology of Forgetting?," 65. Sven Kramer also thoughtfully addresses an "ethics of reading" these images from the Holocaust, stressing the "reiteration" of rereading and interpreting them in a present-day moment: "The priority here is given to rereading as reading differently, and [the film's] statement is directed at the changes affected in the repeated reading of the archival material" ("Reiterative Reading," 50).
- 12 This book was published in French in 2000 and translated into English in 2008.
- 13 About Farocki's larger oeuvre, Eyal Weizman states, "Farocki's work on machine vision and operative images opened up the sensibility within which we [Forensic Architecture] operate." He notes that Farocki became interested in Forensic Architecture's work after viewing their exhibition *Forensis* in Berlin. Farocki even began constructing a new film related to it only months before he died. Bois et al., "On Forensic Architecture," 124.
- 14 Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography*, 144.
- 15 "Harun Farocki in Conversation with Georges Didi-Huberman at Tate Modern 2009," Vimeo, video, 1:15:24, posted by Louis Henderson, accessed August 1, 2018, <https://vimeo.com/channels/561237/102407717>.
- 16 Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography*, 117. For an insightful analysis of the artwork of Farocki, Allan Sekula, and Trevor Paglen in relation to Azoulay's call for the "imagination of a more egalitarian world" (68), see Van Gelder, "Reclaiming Information, Rebuilding Stories."
- 17 Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography*, 25, 85.
- 18 Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography*, 97.
- 19 For more on this idea, see Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*.
- 20 Mirzoeff, "The Right to Look."
- 21 Mirzoeff, "The Right to Look," 476.
- 22 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 95.
- 23 I have published extended analyses of *In-Formation* in Cohen, "From Silence to Babel"; and Cohen, "Burning Cars, Caricatures, and *Glub*."

- 24 “Harun Farocki in Conversation with Georges Didi-Huberman.”
- 25 Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography*, 225.
- 26 Elsaesser, “Holocaust Memory as the Epistemology of Forgetting?,” 59.
- 27 Romedia Foundation, “Settela Steinbach: A Nearly Forgotten Sinti-Roma Story from WWII,” July 31, 2012, <https://romediafoundation.wordpress.com/2012/07/31/settela-steinbach-a-nearly-forgotten-sinti-roma-story-from-wwii/>.
- 28 Trehan and Kóczé, “Racism, (Neo-)Colonialism and Social Justice,” 51.
- 29 Trehan and Kóczé, “Racism, (Neo-)Colonialism and Social Justice,” 54–55.
- 30 Pusca, “The ‘Roma Problem’ in the EU,” n.p.
- 31 Pusca, “The ‘Roma Problem’ in the EU,” n.p.
- 32 Anthony Faiola, “Italy’s Crackdown on Gypsies Reflects Rising Anti-immigrant Tide in Europe,” *Washington Post*, October 12, 2010. Riccardo De Corato, the city’s vice mayor in charge of handling the camps, explained concerning the deportations, “These are dark-skinned people, not Europeans like you and me.”
- 33 Leigh Phillips, Kate Connolly, and Lizzy Davies, “EU Turning Blind Eye to Discrimination against Roma, Say Human Rights Groups,” *Guardian*, July 30, 2010.”
- 34 For more information, see Schulz-Forberg, “Cosmopolitanism or Ethnic Homogeneity?”
- 35 Farocki had originally hoped to exhibit this piece as twenty-four screens around the Hercules monument in the Wilhemshöhe park, but due to funding issues and curatorial decisions, it was placed in the Fridericianum’s central rotunda. See Harun Farocki, “Auf zwölf flachen Schirmen: Kaum noch ein Handwerk,” *New Filmkritik*, December 16, 2007, <http://newfilmkritik.de/archiv/2007-12/auf-zwölf-flachen-schirmen>; and Probst, “Harun Farocki *Deep Play*.” Although I focus on *Deep Play* as it was installed at *Documenta 12*, the piece has subsequently traveled to different exhibition sites. In a review of the piece in its iteration at the Greene Naftali Gallery in early 2010, for instance, Tom McDonough connects the piece to Clifford Geertz’s essay (more on this shortly) but considers it ironic. McDonough, “Harun Farocki at Greene Naftali,” 186.
- 36 See particularly Farocki, “Controlling Observation”; as well as Blümlinger, “Harun Farocki”; and Verwoert, “Production Pattern Associations.”
- 37 Bentham, *The Theory of Legislation*, 106n.
- 38 Geertz, “Deep Play.”
- 39 Beyond metaphor, I would further highlight that the Balinese cockfight is not only a game to bet on or a socially significant ritual for the Balinese people. It is also a public arena, repeated over and over, that violently takes the lives of subjugated, caged animals.
- 40 For one of the best examples, see Blümlinger, “Harun Farocki.”

- 41 Geertz, “Thick Description.” In an interview with Ursula Maria Probst, Farocki discloses the fact that he read Geertz’s theory of thick description during the production of *Deep Play* and even considered titling the work *Dichte Beschreibung* (Thick description). Probst, “Harun Farocki *Deep Play*.”
- 42 Farocki, “Controlling Observation,” 290.
- 43 These are often referred to as either operational or operative images, but I use *operational images* throughout this book.
- 44 Pantenburg, “Working Images,” 49.
- 45 Blumenthal-Barby, “‘Cinematography of Devices’”; and Blumenthal-Barby, “*Counter-Music*.”
- 46 Gleick, *The Information*, 8.
- 47 Farocki elaborates on the idea of soft montage in “Cross Influence/Soft Montage.”
- 48 Blumenthal-Barby, “‘Cinematography of Devices,’” 347.
- 49 “Read My Lippi,” *New York Times*, July 12, 2006.
- 50 Jason Diamos, “A Mouth Shouldn’t Run Too Far,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2006.
- 51 Diamos, “A Mouth Shouldn’t Run Too Far.”
- 52 Andrew Hussey, “ZZ Top,” *Observer*, April 4, 2004.
- 53 Tony Karon, “The Head Butt Furor: A Window on Europe’s Identity Crisis,” *Time*, July 13, 2006.
- 54 Kilcline, “‘They Are French, We Are Marseillais,’” 73.
- 55 Hussey, “ZZ Top.”
- 56 Hussey, “ZZ Top.”
- 57 Among this body of literature, see for instance Rowe, “Stages of the Global”; Dauncey and Morrey, “Quiet Contradictions of Celebrity”; and Farred, “Zinedine Zidane.”
- 58 Dauncey and Morrey, “Quiet Contradictions of Celebrity,” 304, 318.
- 59 Farred, “Zinedine Zidane,” 119.
- 60 French-Algerian artist Adel Abdessemed has also created a larger-than-life sculptural rendition of the violent act between Zidane and Materazzi, titled *Coup de tête* (2012). Jacques Rancière describes Zidane’s iconicity in this work in dramatic terms: “what the statue represents is the fall of a hero at the very height of his glory, the twin failure of the example offered to immigrant children and of the dream of a nation united by and around their exploits” (“The Head Butts and the Image Strikes,” 109).
- 61 Farred, “Zinedine Zidane,” 139. For a more up-to-date, journalistic analysis of the cultural-racial politics of soccer, or football, in the banlieues, see Rory Smith and Elian Peltier, “Kylian Mbappé and the Boys from the Banlieues,” *New York Times*, June 7, 2018. “Success in sports is the hidden side of a widespread social failure. The pond of talent in soccer shouldn’t hide the drought of opportunities for the youth there.”

- 62 Thomas Elsaesser, in his essay “Political Filmmaking after Brecht,” provides one of the most nuanced analyses of Farocki’s interest in the playwright’s work, contextualizing it within a 1970s European filmmaking discourse.
- 63 Brecht, “On Gestic Music,” 104–6.
- 64 Karon, “The Head Butt Furor.”
- 65 Karon, “The Head Butt Furor.”
- 66 Brecht provides a compelling example in the theater that resonates with Zidane’s unbridled act: “Woman in a play has not gotten compensation for a hurt leg in a traffic accident: *Working without the A-effect, the theatre was unable to make use of this exceptional scene to show the horror of a bloody epoch. Few people in the audience noticed it; hardly anyone who reads this will remember that cry.* The actress spoke the cry as if it were something perfectly natural. But it is exactly this—the fact that this poor creature finds such a complaint natural—that she should have reported to the public like a horrified messenger returning from the lowest of all hells. To that end she would of course have needed a special technique which would have allowed her to underline the historical aspect of a specific social condition. Only the A-effect makes this possible [emphasis mine].” Brecht, “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting,” 98.
- 67 Furthermore, large-scale sociological studies were undertaken in order to analyze this hyped media coverage, such as Denham and Desormeaux, “Headlining the Head-Butt”; Jiwani, “Sports as Civilizing Mission.”
- 68 Annie Ring, in “System Error,” offers a compelling reading of Farocki’s observational films in terms of Foucault’s later *Security, Territory, Population* lectures at the Collège du France, as well as Deleuze’s “societies of control.” Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*; Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” Farocki references Deleuze’s essay in “Controlling Observation,” 318.
- 69 Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” 4–5.
- 70 Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” 6.
- 71 Foster, “Vision Quest,” 161.
- 72 Foster, “Vision Quest,” 161.
- 73 Pavsek, “Harun Farocki’s Images of the World.”
- 74 Pavsek, “Harun Farocki’s Images of the World.”
- 75 Elsaesser, “Harun Farocki,” 14.
- 76 This is not to suggest that every museum or gallery installation will include the same strategy or set of formal elements for engaging visitors. *In-Formation* (2005), for instance, has only one channel but challenges the viewer with a complete absence of authorial intertitles or commentary, whereas *The Silver and the Cross* (2010), a double-screen installation, does include a woman’s instructive voice-over. Each piece speaks to a different set of issues and, consequently, will call for uniquely innovative design layouts.

Yet with Farocki's shift to spatial displays, there is a clear move to experiment with implicating embodied viewers in new and complex ways.

- 77 Cohen, *Never Alone, Except for Now*.
- 78 Cohen, *Never Alone, Except for Now*, 4, 36.
- 79 Cohen, *Never Alone, Except for Now*, 126–28.
- 80 Butler, *Notes toward a Performative Theory*, 90–94.
- 81 Butler, *Notes toward a Performative Theory*, 164.
- 82 Butler, *Notes toward a Performative Theory*, 164–65.

CHAPTER THREE. THOMAS HIRSCHHORN,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES, AND COUNTERPUBLICS

- 1 Hirschhorn, *Bataille Maschine*, 246.
- 2 Hirschhorn, *Bataille Maschine*, 228.
- 3 Ariane Kristina Braun lays out the *Bataille Monument's* criticisms of the artwork clearly in her book about the exhibition, which is an excellent resource. Braun, *Thomas Hirschhorn's Bataille Monument*, 40–45.
- 4 Bishop, "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics," 76.
- 5 Bishop, "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics," 83.
- 6 Kester, *The One and the Many*, 62.
- 7 Kester, *The One and the Many*, 62–63.
- 8 Kester, *The One and the Many*, 61.
- 9 For an excellent, relevant discussion of "difficult" artworks rather than "controversial" pieces, see Doyle, *Hold It against Me*, 15–21.
- 10 Cohen, "Burning Cars, *Eternal Flame*," 19–31.
- 11 See his chapter "Publics and Counterpublics," in Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 65–124.
- 12 I employ the term *banlieue* not only to refer to stigmatized *cités* in France, but also to peri-urban neighborhoods throughout Europe that have experienced similar (if always different) histories of state marginalization and precarity. In each instance, I attempt to tease out the sociohistorical specificity of each site, while also utilizing the charged umbrella term in order to connote comparative conditions. The French term more evocatively implies the stigma of such spatial arrangement and histories in postcolonial Europe (*ban* meaning banishment and exclusion, *lieu* = place), rather than the English word *suburb*.
- 13 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 198–99.
- 14 For instance, James Rondeau, in his discussion of the art piece *Jumbo Spoons and Big Cake* (2000), defines at length the "profoundly economic" ramifications of Hirschhorn's *Big Cake*, which must be understood as a critique of globalism and "the new world order." Alison Gingeras, similarly, describes Hirschhorn's project in terms of the "sign-values of Capital," specifically

- pointing to the “poorer, weaker” materials constituting his art. Rondeau, “*Jumbo Spoons and Big Cake*,” 13–14; Gingeras, “Cheap Tricks,” 137.
- 15 Buchloh, “Detritus and Decrepitude,” 53.
 - 16 Buchloh, “Thomas Hirschhorn,” 47.
 - 17 For a more recent, compelling reading of Hirschhorn’s *Utopia, Utopia = One World, One War, One Army, One Dress* (2005) in terms of commodities and new materialisms, see the introduction and chapter “Apparel” in Faris, *Uncommon Goods*, 3–20, 95–99.
 - 18 Hirschhorn repeatedly uses this phrasing himself. Hirschhorn, *Thomas Hirschhorn*, 120.
 - 19 For important critiques and additions to Arendt’s universalizing conception of public-political action, one should refer to the work of Judith Butler, Nicholas Mirzoeff, and Ariella Azoulay, the last of whom insists that not only speech and action but also the gaze are central to the space of appearance. Azoulay, *Civil Imagination*, 29–124; Butler, *Notes toward a Performative Theory*; Mirzoeff, *The Appearance of Black Lives Matter*.
 - 20 Canovan, introduction, xi.
 - 21 Canovan, introduction, xii.
 - 22 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 7.
 - 23 Canovan, introduction, xiii.
 - 24 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 182.
 - 25 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 52.
 - 26 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 182–83.
 - 27 Foster, “An Archival Impulse,” 3–22.
 - 28 Foster, “An Archival Impulse,” 4–5.
 - 29 Foster, “An Archival Impulse,” 5.
 - 30 Foster, “An Archival Impulse,” 6.
 - 31 Thus Hirschhorn declares himself a “fan” of philosophers while not necessarily having even read much of their work, let alone being an expert in it. About *The Human Condition* itself, for example, Hirschhorn states, “I want to fight with it, I want to struggle with it, I want to reach it and I want to get the energy, the work, the complexity and the love who is in the book!” Thomas Hirschhorn, email message to author, May 29, 2005.
 - 32 Hirschhorn, *Thomas Hirschhorn*, 113.
 - 33 In terms of women, writer Ingeborg Bachmann received both an altar and a kiosk, and Hirschhorn created kiosks for artists Meret Oppenheim and Lyubov Popova as well. Finally, Raymond Carver is the one American on Hirschhorn’s list, his life and writings celebrated with an altar.
 - 34 Notably, I am not addressing the *Gramsci Monument* from 2013, set in the Forest Houses housing complex in the Bronx, New York. This socially engaged work was also organized in a marginalized neighborhood and addressed many of the same conceptual questions regarding the public sphere,

- but its specific histories and local forms of minoritization differ substantially from those of Hirschhorn's banlieue installations in Europe. My analysis of preventive publics in a historically European, postcolonial context is different enough from the conditions of the *Gramsci Monument*—more tied to issues of racialized division and violence in a North American context—that I have sidestepped an explicit comparison. However, in light of Ann Laura Stoler's argumentation in *Duress*, a strong case could be made for a comparative analysis of a similar set of “imperial ruins” and duress across the Atlantic.
- 35 Stoler, *Duress*, 166.
- 36 Stoler, *Duress*, 128, 133, 157. As Nicholas Mirzoeff bluntly puts it, “The French thinkers so widely studied now were for the most part not racist, except insofar as they ignored race, racism, colonialism and white supremacy, which they mostly did” (“Empty the Museum, Decolonize the Curriculum, Open Theory,” 16).
- 37 Stoler, *Duress*, 164.
- 38 Stoler, *Duress*, 146–47. This was still a contentious flashpoint in 2021, with French politicians, high-profile intellectuals, and journalists recently blaming US-based universities for importing an “American-style Black question” and progressive ideas on race, gender, and postcolonialism. Even President Emmanuel Macron, courting the political right ahead of the 2022 elections, weighed in, blaming American universities for encouraging the “ethnization of the social question” and effectively “breaking the republic in two.” Norimitsu Onishi, “Will American Ideas Tear France Apart? Some of Its Leaders Think So,” *New York Times*, February 9, 2021; and Norimitsu Onishi and Constant Méheut, “Heating Up Culture Wars, France to Scour Universities for Ideas That ‘Corrupt Society,’” *New York Times*, February 18, 2021.
- 39 Widrich, *Performative Monuments*, 6.
- 40 Widrich, *Performative Monuments*, 9.
- 41 Stoler, *Duress*, 140.
- 42 Dezeuze, *Thomas Hirschhorn*, 17, 33–35.
- 43 Helleman and Wassenberg, “The Renewal of What Was,” 5.
- 44 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7.
- 45 Lee, “The World as Figure/Ground,” 11.
- 46 Lee, “The World as Figure/Ground,” 11.
- 47 For a compelling reading of how this piece critiqued the idea of democracy (rather than the nation-state), see Gardner, *Politically Unbecoming*, 149–91.
- 48 My subsequent analysis draws primarily from video documentation provided to me by the artist, as well as archival research conducted at the Swiss Cultural Center in Paris, which houses all of the printed newspapers from the exhibition.
- 49 Alan Riding, “Dissecting Democracy, Swiss Artist Stirs Debate,” *New York Times*, December 27, 2004.

- 50 Blocher lost his seat on the federal council in 2007. Hirschhorn has exhibited in Switzerland since then, even representing Switzerland in the fifty-fourth Venice Biennale with *Crystal of Resistance* (2011).
- 51 Hirschhorn compares the Swiss public's muted domestic reaction to Blocher's election with the outcry against Jörg Haider's rise to power in 2000: "There was no movement like in Austria. There was no common cry. I think it's because—and this is one of the problems—because in Switzerland, the people became objects of democracy, not subjects." In Nicolas Trembley's video documentary artwork, *Swiss-Swiss Democracy Experience*.
- 52 About the referendum, the minister stated in July 2005, "Whoever wants to dissolve borders should not wonder if not only those borders dissolve, but also the whole state with them" (Wer alle Grenzen auflösen will, muss sich nicht wundern, wenn damit nicht nur Grenzen, sondern der ganze Staat aufgelöst wird). Christoph Blocher, *Zwanzig Minuten*, June 5, 2005.
- 53 In one of the installation's daily newspapers (January 7, 2005), Hirschhorn even printed a highly inflammatory remark concerning the exhibition, which was posted December 29, 2004: "Jerome" states, "Thomas Hirschhorn must be cool with all this (1.1 mil slashed from 40 mil budget). But when the Muslims run Europe, not only will he be out of a profession, as the new culture ministers laugh in scorn at his every proposal; he will be *redefined* as a lower form of human. Duct tape won't help him then." The statement reflects the high degree of vitriol that is often found on blogs, for instance, when anonymity replaces public accountability.
- 54 As the myth goes, Tell defied the Habsburg bailiff in Altdorf by refusing to bow before his hat posted on a pole in the central square. As punishment, the officer Gessler demanded that Tell shoot an apple off of his own son's head, but as an accomplished marksman, Tell easily did so with the first arrow. When Tell then revealed to Gessler, however, that if the first arrow had pierced his son, the second would have killed Gessler, the officer condemned Tell to life imprisonment in his castle's dungeon. In the end, after escaping, Tell was able to utilize the second arrow to assassinate Gessler in the woods near his estate.
- 55 See this *Spiegel* article for a brilliant description of the party's propagandistic performances: Mathieu van Rohr, "White Sheep, Black Sheep: Bringing Rancor to a Swiss Election," *Spiegel Online International*, October 17, 2007.
- 56 Mirzoeff, "Artificial Vision, White Space," 4.
- 57 Raunig, *Art and Revolution*, 217.
- 58 Raunig, *Art and Revolution*, 222–23.
- 59 Raunig, *Art and Revolution*, 226–28.
- 60 Raunig, *Art and Revolution*, 229.
- 61 Raunig, *Art and Revolution*, 229.
- 62 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 139–70.

- 63 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 145.
- 64 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 24.
- 65 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 33–36.
- 66 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 35.
- 67 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 158.
- 68 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 150.
- 69 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 149.
- 70 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 150.
- 71 Bhabha, “Democracy De-realized,” 347–64.
- 72 Bhabha, “Democracy De-realized,” 349.
- 73 See for instance Haidu, “Précarité, Autorité, Autonomie,” 215–37; Foster, “A Grammar of Emergency,” 162–81; or “Editorial: Spinoza and Precarity,” 1–7. Refer also to Hirschhorn’s statement “Restore Now” (2006) on his website, Thomas Hirschhorn, <http://www.thomashirschhorn.com/restore-now>. For an analysis of the way in which Judith Butler’s concept of “precarious life” resonates with Hirschhorn’s practice, see Cohen, “Thomas Hirschhorn’s *Utopia*, *Utopia*,” 20–27.
- 74 Haidu, “Précarité, Autorité, Autonomie,” 215–16. This term is widely used internationally to describe unstable employment. See for example Ross, *Nice Work If You Can Get It*. It has also been taken up as a theme in the journal *Open*, which includes an essay on the existence of “precarious art” (Bourriaud, “Precarious Constructions”).
- 75 For a more in-depth analysis of this piece and the specificity of banlieue politics in a French national landscape, see Cohen, “Burning Cars, *Eternal Flame*.”
- 76 There is a prolific body of critical scholarship on this event, but see for instance compelling analysis by Didier Lapeyronnie with his essay, “Primitive Rebellion in the French Banlieues,” 22–46.
- 77 Epstein, “Promise Postponed,” 68–69.
- 78 Epstein, “Promise Postponed,” 64.
- 79 This occurred with the introduction in the Third Republic of the Ferry laws, which effectively banished religion as a subject from school classrooms and removed priests and nuns from teaching. The aim was to limit the power of the Catholic Church. Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 99. For an extensive and insightful explication of *laïcité*, see “Chapter 3: Secularism,” 90–123.
- 80 Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 15.
- 81 Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 118.
- 82 Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 15; Epstein, “Promise Postponed,” 64.
- 83 Epstein, “Promise Postponed,” 68. For further reading on this subject, see Epstein, *Collective Terms*; Messu, “L’exclusion,” 147–61; and Paugam, *L’exclusion*.
- 84 Stoler, *Duress*, 377–78, 349.

- 85 Stoler, *Duress*, 343.
- 86 Much of the following description comes from my own visit to *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* in June 2008 and discussion with Hirschhorn and his collaborators.
- 87 Helleman and Wassenberg, “The Renewal of What Was,” 5.
- 88 Helleman and Wassenberg, “The Renewal of What Was,” 5.
- 89 Helleman and Wassenberg, “The Renewal of What Was,” 9.
- 90 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 87.
- 91 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 87.
- 92 Hirschhorn states, “This is and has always been my guideline: to create—through art—a form which implicates the other, the unexpected, the uninterested, the neighbour, the unknown, the stranger.” Thomas Hirschhorn, “Six Concerns about Bijlmer,” Stadt Zürich Kunst im öffentlichen Raum, 2009, 2, http://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/content/dam/stzh/zed/Deutsch/oeffentlicher_raum/Kunst/Publikationen_und_Broschueren/Symposium09/06_Hirschhorn.pdf.
- 93 Hirschhorn, “Eternal Flame,” 268.
- 94 “Entretien,” 131.
- 95 “Entretien,” 133–34.
- 96 “Entretien,” 131.
- 97 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 94.
- 98 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 96.
- 99 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 95–97.
- 100 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 91.
- 101 Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” 65.
- 102 Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” 68, 70.
- 103 Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” 76. Grant Kester signals this problematic rhetorical gesture and its potentially essentializing implications (stating “all Documenta visitors are ‘tourists’ whose relationship to a working-class Turkish community is necessarily inauthentic and voyeuristic”), but his brief description of the piece does not offer a more nuanced reading of the intercultural dynamics of the *Bataille Monument*. The “Turkish community,” for instance, would be better described as “Turkish German.” Kester, *The One and the Many*, 62.
- 104 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 115.
- 105 Calhoun, “Introduction,” 34.
- 106 Calhoun, “Introduction,” 54.
- 107 Calhoun, “Introduction,” 51.
- 108 Buchloh presses Hirschhorn on this point in an interview, and one can see Hirschhorn attempting to reframe the problematic, that certain forms of discourse (even if well-intended) often reinforce normative exclusion. Hirschhorn states, “First, I didn’t want to exclude anyone. I find that anyone

- who thinks that local Muslim kids could not get involved with Bataille makes a huge mistake. I reject that strongly. That would mean that someone was excluded from the outset, for what reason I don't know. Why should they be shut out? Why would anybody say they can't handle it? I don't buy that. Sadly, it is precisely this argument that frequently comes from a leftist position. If I say I want to make a work for a *collective* public, then I am obliged to, and it is my desire to make a work in which I don't ever exclude anyone." Buchloh, "An Interview with Thomas Hirschhorn," 86.
- 109 Russell Shorto, "The Integrationist," *New York Times*, May 28, 2010.
- 110 Shorto, "The Integrationist."
- 111 Shorto, "The Integrationist."
- 112 Art critic Sven Lütticken also draws a connection to Hirschhorn's aesthetic: "Especially against the background of Dutch debates about the supposedly failed 'assimilation' of Islamic communities and socially 'explosive' suburbs, Hirschhorn's familiar, brown duct tape guaranteed formal as well as social cohesion" ("Taped Together," 151).
- 113 Shorto, "The Integrationist."
- 114 Shorto, "The Integrationist."
- 115 Lütticken, "Taped Together," 154.
- 116 Kwon, "Public Art as Publicity."
- 117 The following testimonies are taken from interviews that Claire Bishop conducted with residents at *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, in "And That Is What Happened There," 36.
- 118 Bishop, "And That Is What Happened There," 23.
- 119 Bishop, "And That Is What Happened There," 42.
- 120 Bishop, "And That Is What Happened There," 112–13.
- 121 For instance, Brian Holmes asks about these projects, "How can anyone be sure of [their] success, when the reception is dominated by his proper name?" in "Liar's Poker: Representation of Politics/Politics of Representation," *16beaver*, May 9, 2004. <https://muzeu.blogspot.com/2017/06/liars-poker-representations-of-politics.html>. Anthony Gardner is even more critical of Hirschhorn's "self-authorizations" as potentially "the very kind of authoritarianism for which he has derided democracy" (*Politically Unbecoming*, 189).
- 122 Among others, Lauren Berlant has written about an "intimate" public sphere, and Mark Seltzer has explored a "pathological" public sphere. See for instance Berlant, *The Queen of America*; and Seltzer, "Wound Culture," 3–26.
- 123 The parodic doubling of many of Hirschhorn's titles for artworks in white cube spaces (e.g., *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*, *Cavemanman*, and *Utopia*, *Utopia = One World, One War, One Army, One Dress*) might also be said to mimic the violence done to public discourse and cultural difference through textual form.

- 124 Drawing on Giorgio Agamben's theories, French and Francophone scholar Hervé Tchumkam goes so far as to explicitly compare the banlieue with the space of the camp, "in so far as it becomes a space inside which, ceasing to be a state of exception, the state of exception becomes the rule" (*State Power, Stigmatization, and Youth Resistance Culture*, 11).

CHAPTER FOUR. HENRY VIII'S WIVES, POPULISM,
AND PREVENTIVE PUBLICS

- 1 Information about Henry VIII's Wives and their artworks can be found at their archived website, <http://h8w-archive.net/>. Unless otherwise noted, my information about the group's practice has come from this website, documentary materials provided by the group, and interviews with Sirko Knüpfer (February 12, 2010; April 1, 2010), Lucy Skaer (April 22, 2010), Bob Grieve (June 7, 2010), and Rachel Dagnall (October 29, 2011). See also Cohen, "Interview with Henry VIII's Wives." In my subsequent analysis of their work, I do not reference individual members' accounts because Henry VIII's Wives worked as a collaborative entity.
- 2 The next year, they even attempted to re-create Princess Diana's crashed car in Glasgow for the exhibition *Host*, in Tramway Gallery.
- 3 "The Funeral," Diana One Year On, Sights and Sounds, BBC Online Network, accessed July 25, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/diana_one_year_on/sights_and_sounds/the_funeral/default.stm.
- 4 A study was even published detailing the extraordinary rise in cases of suicide and self-harm during the four weeks following her funeral compared to the previous four years in England and Wales. According to its authors, this was apparently caused by an "identification" effect, particularly among women in her age bracket. Hawton et al., "Effect of Death of Diana," 463–66.
- 5 Torin Douglas, "Tracking 30 Years of TV's Most Watched Programmes," *BBC News*, January 22, 2012.
- 6 Warner, *Public and Counterpublics*, 172.
- 7 Warner, *Public and Counterpublics*, 169.
- 8 Warner, *Public and Counterpublics*, 176–77.
- 9 For a comprehensive resource on this subject, see Lynton, *Tatlin's Tower*.
- 10 Gough, "Model Exhibition," 9.
- 11 Gough, "Model Exhibition," 11.
- 12 Nisbet, "Material Propositions on the Individual/Collective," 123.
- 13 Nisbet, "Material Propositions on the Individual/Collective," 123. Gough, "Model Exhibition," 12.
- 14 Nisbet, "Material Propositions on the Individual/Collective," 123.
- 15 Smith, *The Architecture of Aftermath*, 27.

- 16 For an excellent analysis of the historical and cultural specificity of these two iconic images from the Vietnam War, see Phu, *Warring Visions*.
- 17 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 16, 214.
- 18 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 48.
- 19 See his first chapter, "The Image as Phantom: Survival of Forms and Impurities of Time," and more specifically, Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 103–5, 203–7.
- 20 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 228.
- 21 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 217–18.
- 22 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 218.
- 23 Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 239.
- 24 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 217.
- 25 Branislav Dimitrijević, accessed September 6, 2011, <https://www.oktobarskisonline.org/47/pages/solakov.html>.
- 26 Freud, "The Uncanny," 220.
- 27 Freud, "The Uncanny," 247–48.
- 28 Freud, "The Uncanny," 239.
- 29 Freud, "The Uncanny," 250.
- 30 Enwezor, "The Unhomely"; Demos, "The 2nd International Biennial."
- 31 Enwezor, "Documentary/Vérité," 66.
- 32 Enwezor, "Documentary/Vérité," 66–67.
- 33 Lauren Collins, "England, Their England: Immigration and Resurgent Nationalism," *New Yorker*, July 4, 2011.
- 34 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, "Russia Blames Nato for Drug Surge," *BBC News*, February 27, 2010.
- 35 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 195.
- 36 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 196.
- 37 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 175.
- 38 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 199.
- 39 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 203.
- 40 Larsen, Ricupero, and Schafhausen, *The Populism Catalogue*, 16.
- 41 Larsen, Ricupero, and Schafhausen, *The Populism Catalogue*, 16.
- 42 Included in *Populism* was Nicolas Trembley's documentary about Thomas Hirschhorn's *Swiss-Swiss Democracy*.
- 43 Henry VIII's Wives decided to dramatically commemorate their dissolution as a group in 2014 by playing this organ pipe while burning it. It burned throughout the night at Hospitalfield in Arbroath, Scotland.
- 44 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 200.
- 45 Young, "On Media and Democratic Politics," 245.
- 46 Young, "On Media and Democratic Politics," 258.
- 47 The structure has served as inspiration for many artists, including, for instance, Norbert Kottmann, with his *Baut Tatlin* campaign in 1993 to have

- the tower constructed on the no-man's-land of Potsdamer Platz in Berlin, as a parliamentary building to house the "United Nations of Eurasia." Henry VIII's Wives, additionally, interviewed members of the Friends of Tatlin's Tower group, which was founded by curator Harald Szeeman with the idea of constructing the tower at Tempelhof Airport in Berlin.
- 48 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 327, 332.
- 49 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 332.
- 50 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 327.
- 51 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 328.
- 52 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 329.
- 53 *Tatlin's Tower and the World* website, <http://www.tatlintowerandtheworld.net/>. This site is no longer operational.
- 54 Branislav Dimitrijević, accessed September 6, 2011, <http://www.oktobarskison.org/47/pages/solakov.html>.
- 55 Nick Cumming-Bruce and Steven Erlanger, "Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques," *New York Times*, November 29, 2009.
- 56 Curator Harald Szeeman organized this group with the hope of constructing Tatlin's *Monument to the Third International* at Tempelhof Airport in Berlin.
- 57 The only item not commissioned was a framed photograph of a maquette of the Belgrade sculpture, dramatically unveiled by actors at the state theater in Belgrade.
- 58 For an excellent resource on this topic, see Kiaer, *Imagine No Possessions*.
- 59 Hassan and Dadi, *Unpacking Europe*, 332–37.
- 60 Smith, *The Architecture of Aftermath*, 99.
- 61 Smith, *The Architecture of Aftermath*, 99.
- 62 Smith, *The Architecture of Aftermath*, 181.
- 63 Henry VIII's Wives also created an iteration of it for the Moscow Biennial in 2012. For this, they cast small parts of the tower and distributed them around the same museum, the State Tretyakov Gallery, which actually houses a model of Tatlin's *Monument to the Third International*. They also remade the poster that they had originally displayed in the London Underground, but this time translated it into Russian. Henry VIII's Wife, email message to author, July 21, 2017.
- 64 Nicholas Kulish, "Shift in Europe Seen in Debate on Immigrants," *New York Times*, July 27, 2011; Katrin Bennhold, "Germany Acts to Tame Facebook, Learning from Its Own History of Hate," *New York Times*, May 19, 2018.
- 65 Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image*, 331.
- 66 Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want?*, 26–27.
- 67 Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want?*, 27.

CONCLUSION

- 1 Another five people, including a policewoman, were killed in a related incident at a kosher supermarket in Paris.
- 2 Moran, "Terrorism and the *Banlieues*," 317.
- 3 Welch and Perivolaris, "The Place of the Republic," 286.
- 4 Welch and Perivolaris, "The Place of the Republic," 286.
- 5 Welch and Perivolaris, "The Place of the Republic," 288.
- 6 Moran, "Terrorism and the *Banlieues*," 318.
- 7 Welch and Perivolaris, "The Place of the Republic," 280.
- 8 Welch and Perivolaris, "The Place of the Republic," 282.
- 9 Natasha Lennard, "'Je Suis Charlie' and 'Je Ne Suis Pas Charlie' Are Both the Wrong Response to the Paris Massacre," *Vice News*, January 14, 2015.
- 10 *Le Monde*, January 9, 2015, as cited in Moran, "Terrorism and the *Banlieues*," 316.
- 11 Lennard, "'Je Suis Charlie' and 'Je Ne Suis Pas Charlie.'"
- 12 See Moran, "Terrorism and the *Banlieues*." Highly publicized were these facts: Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, born to Algerian parents, were raised in an HLM (habitation à loyer modéré, or "housing at moderate rent") near the northeastern limits of Paris, and, at the time of the attack, Chérif Kouachi was living in Gennevilliers, a banlieue in the northwest. Amedy Coulibaly, the shooter in a related incident, killing five people at a kosher supermarket in Paris, grew up in one of the most iconic social housing units in France, the Grande Borne estate in Grigny, south of Paris. His parents were originally from Mali. Welch and Perivolaris, "The Place of the Republic," 285.
- 13 Moran, "Terrorism and the *Banlieues*," 318–19.
- 14 To view the artwork, one may visit the artist's website: Daniela Ortiz, accessed July 7, 2020, <https://daniela-ortiz.com/homenaje-a-los-caidos>. In 2022, as this book goes to press, the website is down for renovation.
- 15 Monica Ceberio Belaza, "Los médicos del CIE descartaron nueve veces la gravedad de la interna fallecida," *El País*, January 25, 2012, https://elpais.com/diario/2012/01/25/espana/1327446018_850215.html.
- 16 There is a large body of scholarship concerning the early years of Congo independence, but for a relatively recent, in-depth account as it relates particularly to global politics, see Kent, *America, the UN and Decolonisation*.
- 17 Butler, *Precarious Life*, 11.
- 18 Robert Fisk, "Charlie Hebdo: Paris Attack Brother's Campaign of Terror Can Be Traced Back to Algeria in 1954," *Independent*, January 9, 2015.
- 19 Ortiz's walk through the city evokes a long, critical discourse concerning the flâneuse. See for instance D'Souza and McDonough, *The Invisible Flâneuse?*
- 20 For insightful analysis concerning artistic responses to the "disposability" of migrant lives in European contexts, see Steyn and Stamselberg, *Breaching Borders*.

- 21 Saint-Amour, *Tense Future*, 23.
- 22 Saint-Amour, *Tense Future*, 23; Hall, *Familiar Stranger*, 183–84.
- 23 Bauman, *Strangers at Our Door*, 31.
- 24 Bauman, *Strangers at Our Door*, 116.
- 25 Bauman, *Strangers at Our Door*, 112–15.
- 26 Bauman, *Strangers at Our Door*, 103–7. He polemically states, “Loners in front of a phone, tablet or laptop screen, with only ‘viral’ others present, seem to put reason together with morality to sleep, letting the normally controlled emotions off the leash” (*Strangers at Our Door*, 108).
- 27 Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers*, 129.
- 28 Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers*, 129.
- 29 Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers*, 33.
- 30 Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers*, 49.
- 31 Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers*, 50.
- 32 Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers*, 43.
- 33 Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers*, 137.

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