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S. Irudaya Rajan *Editor*

Migration in South Asia

IMISCOE Regional Reader

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S. Irudaya Rajan
Editor

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Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India

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Part I
Governance and Mobility: Retrospect and Prospect

Chapter 1
Migration in South Asia: Old and New Mobilities

S. Irudaya Rajan

For ages, migration has been a cornerstone of South Asian civilization and economy, with individuals and communities dispersed over the globe. Countries within the South Asian sphere, comprising of the eight South Asian Council of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) members of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Bhutan form a large percentage of the world's population, and migration from the region have transformed communities not only in the home countries but also all across the world. Indeed, the South Asian diaspora is one of the largest in the world, with India having the largest diaspora in the world at over 17.7 million, with Bangladesh at seven million and Pakistan at about six million migrants also making the list of the ten largest diasporas around the world (IOM, 2022) (Table 1.1).

A majority of these migrants are labour migrants, travelling to different parts of the globe for mostly low and semi-skilled jobs. However, changes in migration trends throughout time have resulted in a great number of migrants from various demographics, educational levels, and languages traversing the world in quest of better futures. It is estimated that out of the 38 million South Asians worldwide, the majority are labour migrants. The 2012–17 period saw only Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan send between 46,000 and 71,000 workers annually (World Bank, 2022).[1]

When it comes to destinations, a large majority of migrants from South Asia reside in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. This migration corridor

[1] https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/making-migration-safer-and-more-productive-south-asia

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Table 1.1 Largest migrant population by countries of origin 1995–2020

1995			2020		
Country	No. of emigrants (In millions)	% of total population	Country	No. of emigrants (In millions)	% of total population
Russia	11.38	7.1	India	17.79	1.3
India	7.15	0.7	Mexico	11.05	7.9
Mexico	6.95	7.0	Russia	10.65	6.8
Ukraine	5.60	9.9	China	9.80	0.7
Bangladesh	5.37	4.5	Bangladesh	7.34	4.3
China	4.70	0.4	Pakistan	6.14	2.7
United Kingdom	3.61	5.9	Ukraine	6.04	12.2
Pakistan	3.33	2.6	Philippines	6.01	5.2
Kazakhstan	3.30	17.2	Poland	4.82	11.3
Italy	3.20	5.3	United Kingdom	4.62	6.4

Source: World Migration Report, IOM (2022)

has been a dominant one over the past few decades and has only increased over the years. In fact, the United Nations (2020) estimated that between 2000 and 2020, the largest growing migration corridor was that between Central and Southern Asia to the North African and West Asian countries – which grew by 13 million migrants in this. This is directly attributed to the large increase in labour migrants primarily from the countries of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (UN-DESA, 2017).

1.1 South Asian Migration: Changing Patterns and Dynamics

It was estimated in 2017 that there were just over 38 million people from the South Asian region living abroad, up from just over 23 million in 1990 (ILO, 2018) (Fig. 1.1).

When compared to national populations, it was estimated that around 13.58% of Afghans lived abroad when compared to the national population, with equivalent percentages for Sri Lanka and Nepal being 8.27 and 5.93% respectively (ibid.). When it comes to the gender distribution of migration from South Asia, traditionally migration from the region has been a male dominated one and has been studied from the same lens (Castles & Miller, 2009). However, feminization of migration has expanded, particularly in West Asia, with women primarily providing services such as nursing and domestic support (Siddiqui, 2008). This is in line with the increasing feminization of global migratory flows. These migrants contribute to develop their native countries in a variety of ways.



Fig. 1.1 Stock of South Asian Nationals living abroad 1990–2017. Source: ILO, 2018

Table 1.2 Top 10 destinations for South Asian Migrants

Country	Population
Saudi Arabia	6,138,131
United Arab Emriates	5,454,388
United States	3,126,216
Iran	2,353,001
Kuwait	1,946,680
United Kingdom	1,884,460
Oman	1,169,517
Canada	1,027,476
Malaysia	744,741
Australia	689,734

Source: ILO, 2018

The most popular destinations for migrants from South Asia were the GCC countries of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Kuwait, giving residence to almost 15 million people from the South Asian region. As mentioned before, a number of these migrants are those who migrate as unskilled and semi-skilled labourers in these countries. For decades, these labourers have been the backbone of Gulf economies, leaving an indelible mark on not only their economies but also their societies.

However, over the past few decades (as reflected in the Table 1.2), there has also been an increase of flows of highly skilled migrants and students towards developed western countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada (Khadria, 2005). India has the second largest student migrant population in the world, with a majority of students going the United States for higher studies, forming what Rajan and Wadhawan (2014) call "future disaporas". The largest flows among Indian nationals in 2016 to the developed Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was to the United States at over 64,000 people, followed by Australia and Canada. Bangladesh and Pakistan are experiencing similar developments, with Italy and the United Kingdom also being attractive destinations. (ILO, 2018). However, what is also interesting is the flows from nations such as Sri Lanka and Nepal towards East Asia. In fact, in the case of Sri Lanka, the largest migration flow among OECD countries was to the Republic of Korea in 2016 (Wijesooriya, 2017).

Another component of South Asian migration that receives less attention is mobility inside the region. There are an estimated ten million migrants within the South Asian region itself who hails from within the region. This is a significant number which has been on the decline since the 1990s, when the number stood at 13.81 million (Srivastava & Pandey, 2017). This is due to a variety of challenges stemming from historical and socio-political factors. This is also owing to the prevalence of irregular movement across borders, as well as a steady flow of refugees, both of which have been politicised for domestic advantage by political parties across the board. As this book shows, this hampers the potential benefits for development through migration in the region and constantly leaves migrants, refugees and other communities vulnerable and at the mercy of political whims.

And the benefits of migration are many, the most notable of which may be through the impact of remittances.

1.2 Remittances

South Asia is the largest recipient of remittances by a sub-region, being the largest source of foreign inflow – often by order of multitudes ahead of foreign direct investments and official development assistance combined (World Bank, 2022). India, in fact, is the largest recipient of remittances in the world at $ 83 billion in 2019 (before the commencing of the COVID 19 pandemic). On the other hand, the amount of remittances in Nepal is a staggering 23.5% of its GDP. The role of remittances cannot be overstated in the region. The role of remittances in making real change among individuals, communities and societies at large in the South Asian region has been highlighted at length in various studies. Migrants from the South Asian region send back large sums of money in the form of remittances, which can range from 3 to 23% of GDP (World Bank, 2022).

When it comes to the origin of these remittances, it is clear that the vast majority of them originate from the six GCC countries, who between themselves contribute to over 61% of all remittances into the region, with just the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia contributing to around 40% of all remittances into South Asia. Other major sources of remittances include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, who among them contribute to about 20% of total remittances into the region, reflecting the global reach of the South Asian diaspora (Fig. 1.2).



Fig. 1.2 Origin of remittances into South Asia as a percent of total remittances. Source: Molavi (2020). https://agsiw.org/economic-contraction-across-the-gulf-chokes-the-flow-of-remittances-to-south-asia/

During times of crisis, remittances might also serve as a buffer against sudden consumption shocks. Remittances are frequently found to be counter-cyclical in nature, meaning that during times of economic crisis and natural calamities, the number of remittances actually increases (Ratha, 2005). The role of remittances in providing relief to individuals and communities has been highlighted during the Nepal and the role that remittances played in the aftermath of terrible flooding in the southern Indian state of Kerala, which has a number of migrants settled abroad (Rajan et al., 2020). In fact this was seen even during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the flow of remittances stayed robust even during the affected period of 2020.

Despite the major role of remittances in South Asian society, mechanisms for assuring secure and cost-effective remittance corridors have remained scarce. Most transaction costs remain far higher than the 3% of total remittances as mandated by target 10 (c) the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This has led to increasing insecure and illegal forms of money transfers which, apart from undermining development goals of the countries of origin, also end up being more exploitative to the migrants and their families back home in the long run.

1.3 COVID-19 and Its Aftermath: Implications for South Asian Migration

Overall, the changing dynamics and patterns of migration from South Asia require a more cohesive and collective response from all the countries involved. This has become especially vital in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic and economic and

social changes it is likely to bring. Almost 3 years into the pandemic, we are already seeing much of the ramifications today as the pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities that South Asian migrants already faced. Initially emergency evacuations of people led to an immediate spike in return migrants to South Asian countries. It is estimated that the Vande Bharat mission of the Indian government repatriated around three million migrants from May to the end of 2020, with many more being repatriated since. The government of Nepal and Sri Lanka embarking on similar mass evacuation missions (IOM, 2022). Emigration out of these countries has also not picked up since. For example the World Bank (2022) found that the number of monthly outflows of migrants from Indian households reduced by 25% compared to pre-pandemic levels and inflows increased by about 50% because of massive return migration especially from migrant workers in the Gulf. The scenario was much the same in almost all the South Asian nations. However, this may yet be a temporary phenomenon as the pandemic imposed restrictions start ebbing away. While, surprisingly, remittance levels did not decrease with this flow, the social ramifications of this change in flow is yet to be fully addressed.

The vulnerabilities of migrant workers in the destinations was also put in full light with South Asian migrant workers facing instances of wage theft and the lack of a social safety net was clear in this case (Foley & Piper, 2021). The future of migration from South Asia is still unclear as the pandemic has raised barriers and costs for mobility at least in the near future for migrants for whom migration was a costly affair to begin with (World Bank, 2022). The role of migration in development and, as we have seen in the aftermath of the pandemic, on resilience is still a very real phenomenon, and it is imperative that routes of migration remain open and accessible in the time to come. Another feature of migration within South Asia is the increase of forced migration due to conflicts in the region, has led to the region one of the largest sources and destinations of refugee populations in the world. This is a feature which will need to be noted in the coming future (IOM, 2022).

So far the collectivisation of action to ensure that the process of migration occurs in a safe and orderly manner and more importantly, the fruits of migration are distributed equally amongst its beneficiaries. The urgent need is to identify migration-related concerns and devise creative methods to address them collectively, rather than individually, as has been the case thus far.. This series makes such an attempt through a collection of works from scholars, experts and practitioners on migration from the region. Through a mix of relevant and well-researched articles, this series aims at providing the reader with a nuanced understanding of the issues, challenges and opportunities that migration in South Asia provides.

1.4 Organization of the Reader

This reader is structured into chapters based on broad topical issues, ranging from South Asian migration policy to migrant health, migration trends and patterns, and climate change-induced migration. In addition, out of eight countries in South Asia,

except Sri Lanka, we have representation of different dimensions discussed in the remaining seven countries.

The second chapter, titled "Internal and Forced Migration and Economic Development In South Asia" by Mehdi Chowdhury and Syed NaimulWadood, examines the contemporary state of human migration in all of South Asia's eight countries. It covers the various forms of migration providing emphasis to internal and international migration. Internal migration is challenging to carry out owing to the paucity of identification and certification at both the origin and destination locations. Internal migration documentation and analysis in South Asian countries constitutes a barrier because it would not require traversing an international border or the filing of documentation. The neoclassical migration model, as proposed by Sjaastad, assumes that individuals will relocate to places that pay more for their work output less of migration costs which are asserted here. In addition, this chapter examines the data to assess the effect of migration on the economic growth of Southeast Asian nations and formalizes the relationship between economic development and immigration through the dual economic models. It is analyzed with the help of data from South Asian countries. By analyzing statistics from South Asian countries, the article also sheds light on the awful truth of forced migration, as well as its current and future position.

The phenomenon of non-traditional migration in South Asia is the focus of the next chapter by AKM Ahsan Ullah. Mallik Akram Hossain and Ahmed Shafiqul Huque Non-traditional migrants (NTM) are a unique type of migrant who leave their home nations and relocate to another country in order to protect the wealth they have accumulated in methods they are unwilling to reveal. As a result of poor administration, a small group of people accumulate large sums of money. To assure that their progeny inherit this money, they relocate to other countries. NTMs frequently chose Middle East countries and Europe as potential targets since such jurisdictions offer a variety of schemes that favour affluent migrants. This chapter focuses upon the key differences between NTM and conventional migrants. They distinguish them from the majority of their countrymen by living in a secluded neighbourhood not having to look for work, and not remitting finances to their homeland. It also explores initiatives like Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) and Citizenship by Investment, which is offered by various countries to NTMs. The accelerating increase in the number of NTMs is a concerning pattern that could have negative consequences for South Asian economies and necessitates additional investigation.

The fourth chapter by Hasan Mahmud examines looks at the political and economic view of international migration in Bangladesh. The chapter elucidates the socio-political-economic perspectives of migration trends in Bangladesh through various studies and theoretical underpinnings. It crystalises the twin concepts of 'origin states' and 'destination states'. The paper brings forth the significance of the destination state's role in shaping international migration and controlling migration pertaining to the wellbeing of citizens. The paper invites attention to the role of origin states in popularizing migration and justified it with examples of migration trends. It also spotlighted the historical trend in promoting migration, encapsulating

pre-partition and post-partition migration and migration in the 1970s owing to the Bangladesh Liberation war in 1971.The next segment classifies migration in terms of compositions and migration destinations. It also gives insight to the fact that the state actively promoted migration through state formulated laws and regulations, giving due attention to migrants in 5-year plans, actively involving in migration diplomacy like bilateral agreements and memorandum of understanding, setting labor welfare wings in different countries. It concludes by stating that further study on migration trends from an individual perspective should be done coupled with further research on the state's role, which will help in safeguarding migrants.

Labour Migration from Nepal: Trends and Explanations by Jagannath Adhikari, Mahendra Kumar Rai, Chiranjivi Baral and Mahendra Subedi, delves into the trend of Nepal's labour migration to different countries akin to different socio-political, economic facets that elicited labor migration and remittances on an upward swing after the 1990s. Before the 1990s, migration from Nepal was restricted to only India, a popular destination for migrants then. But the current trend exhibit migration pattern is changing from India to Gulf countries and Malaysia and even to developed countries. The principal causes are wage differential blend with a better standard of living. This chapter unearths the fact that the majority of migrants are circumscribed to India, Gulf countries, and Malaysia, while minor migrant population depends on developed countries and also emphasizes that women migration is less, mainly concentrated on domestic help. It further articulates the push and pull factors that drive Migration. The paper also emphasizes the detrimental impact of covid pandemic, which deadlocked the life of migrants. In the initial period of covid while many migrants returned to India despite the worsening covid pandemic situation due to poverty. The paper concludes by arguing that interpreting historical trends and their modern implications which require a more sophisticated approach.

India has always granted due consideration to the enduring correspondence between 'nation' and 'civilization'. Traces of Indian history characterize India's pursuit of owning the identity of civilizational nationhood. Samir Kumar Das through his article, Navigating between Nation and Civilization: Regimes of Citizenship and Migration under Bharatiya Janata Party, navigates the progress of India in recognising it as a self-contained civilization. With the entry of BJP in the political scenario with 'Hindutva' as the ideological base fuelled India's claims for civilizational nationhood. This generated new patterns of citizenship and migration in India. The paper discusses the relation between the twin elements of 'nation' and 'civilization' in India's context with the 'Hindutva' thinking. This ancient banner of 'Hindutva' is capable of accommodating a variety of elements to carry multifarious regimes of citizenship and migration in India. This elasticity and acceptance helps in enwrapping the alternative communities together which promotes expansion of India beyond its current territorial confinity. The assimilation of different communities and faiths into the common framework of Hindutva within the country and liberation of the unassimilated communities enriches the civilization regimes in the country. This understanding is crucial in perceiving the variations in citizenship and migration regimes brought by the initiatives of National Register of Citizens and Citizenship Amendment Act.

It is entrenched that temporary labour migration is one of the most significant livelihood strategies adopted by the poorest sections in developing countries including India. Such kind of migration is rural in nature and caste is one of the important determining factors as far as rural areas are concerned, hence, S Irudaya Rajan, Kunal Keshri and Priya Deshingkar examine the pattern and flow of temporary labour migration and association between caste and temporary labour migration using large scale data of Indian National Sample Survey, 2007–2008. Results suggest that the highest share of temporary migrants is found in rural to urban stream (63%) and there is a dominance of out of state migration, particularly from the underdeveloped states like Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh. Temporary labour migration rates are higher at the national level among the most disadvantaged social groups, namely Scheduled Castes (SC) and Schedule Tribes (ST) (45 and 24 per 1000 respectively) as compared to Other Backward Castes (OBC) (19 per 1000) and Others (12 per 1000). Among poorest of the poor temporary labour migration was found twice than any other caste group. Results suggest a noticeable predominance of caste as a determining factor of temporary migration in India.

Bhutan seated in the Himalayan foothills in South Asia has been experiencing refined migration movements. The country enriched with geographical variances has been distinguished by the complex patterns in migration; a combination of rural-urban, rural-rural and other patterns. The chapter by Mayur A Gosai and Leanne Sulewski sheds light on discovering the patterns of migration in Bhutan and the attracting (pull) and detracting (push) forces causing the nuanced migration patterns in Bhutan. The data from the Population Housing Census of Bhutan (PHCB) in 2017 and other sources projected a series of factors responsible for driving the population from places of origin to destination. Even though the push and pull factors are entwined; they produce disparate effects on the migrant population. The blend of economic and non-economic factors has resulted in temporary and permanent migration. The PHCB 2017 explained the paramount reasons for migration as education and employment, which attracts the population to the place of destination. Furthermore, the lack of market access, food insecurity, lack of water, agricultural and wildlife interfaces are the detracting forces working in the place of origin. The active involvement of these factors played a significant role in generating delicate and heterogeneous migration patterns with spatial variations.

The contribution of remittances, both international and domestic, to the GDP of various governments is one of the distinguishing characteristics of countries in South Asia. Pakistan is not exception to this trend, as the contribution from international remittances stood at 7.9% of the national GDP. The benefits of remittances in the socio-economic well-being of the receiving states have been well documented and studied. Hisaya Oda explores the impact of remittances on middle and secondary school enrolment of children in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province is a major base for internal and international migrants in Pakistan as the lack of employment opportunities drive prospective jobs seekers out of the province in search of better employment opportunities. The findings of the study are based on data collected among 13,752 children within the age group of 11–16 years from 7300 households. It was observed that international

remittances have a positive impact on the enrolment of male children. On the other hand, internal remittances do not show a positive impact on the enrolment of male children. At the same time, international as well as internal remittances do not tend to show any positive impact on the enrolment of female children. This affirms the need for better gender inclusion in the educational sector of Pakistan.

Chapter 10 looks at the impact of female migration on their children left-behind in Bangladesh by Sabnam Sarmin Luna. It is generally believed that female migration would lead to the overall well-being of the left-behind families as the remittances as a share of the earnings would be higher in the case of female migrants in comparison with male migrants. At the same time, female migration is also known to inflict social cost on the left-behind families, especially among the children of female migrants. The findings of this study are based on primary as well as secondary data. The primary data was collected in Bangladesh, from among 50 caregivers of children whose mothers had been abroad for at least 12 months. Although the study observed a general improvement in the well-being of the socio-economic profile of the left-behind families, the absence of mothers in the left-behind families showed adverse effects in the upbringing of their children. Thus, it is hard to posit conclusively as to whether the female migration has a positive or negative impact on their children as the economic benefits of migration are offset by its social costs.

Focusing on the issue of climate change induced migration, authors Kashif Majeed Salik, Mayum Shabbir and Junaid Zahid's chapter examine to see if there's a link amongst climatic severe occurrences, dislocation, and immigration in Pakistan. Harsh environmental occurrences, such as recurrent droughts and floods with extended periods, have become more common in recent years, wreaking havoc on people' basic subsistence holdings throughout the nation. As a result of this circumstance, episodes of migration in all directions and patterns have increased in the research area. In this paper, the authors use a conceptual method to investigate the connections among climate extremes and important population dynamics, mechanisms, and consequences. People's adaptation and response capacities are restricted, as per the report's results, in the midst of many problems provided by climatic change in their lives. When it comes to climatic variation and its effects on households, the research reveals that rural-urban and urban- urban migration is the most common reaction and coping mechanisms. Migration induced by climatic variation causes socioeconomic challenges along with settlement issues amplifying their vulnerability which is mentioned in this study. The research does, nonetheless, shed light regarding how migrant households' earnings increased significantly mostly as result of increased participation in informal companies and other commercial sectors.

The environmental changes causing potential impacts on the land and its people has been a problem of concern in many localities especially in low-lying island groups. Being an archipelagic state in Indian Subcontinent with low elevated lands and distinct environmental and social conditions, Maldives has been a victim of creeping environmental changes. The impact of environmental changes especially human-caused climate change is induced in transforming the natural structure of the island groups causing threat to Maldives' life and livelihood. Looking at the same

issue in the context of the island nation of the Maldives, Chap. 14 by Robert Stojanov and Ilan Kelman, presents the views of 15 local experts on the detrimental impacts of environmental changes in Maldives, collected through a qualitative survey conducted in August 2013. In their perception a number of environmental issues are faced by the Maldivian community like sea level rise, beach erosion, water scarcity etc. among which unpredictable climatic changes occupies a dominant position. The experts also proposed a set of mitigation and adaptation strategies in dealing with the dilemma. Even though migration to other countries is a potential adaptive measure when linked with other motives catalyzing resettling of the people, the experts doesn't support an immediate need of migration. The inferences from the survey delineate breaches in the possibilities and actions taken on the matter.

Refugees from conflict-affected countries are always at the centre of attention of the world. The final chapter by Khadija Abbasi and Alessandro Monsutti focus on Afghanistan and elucidates the unfolding of two terminologies- 'Muhajir' and 'Awara' amid large-scale displacement of Afghans in the late 1970s period due to continuous conflict in their homeland. The first section of the chapter traces the history of displacement, which began in the 1970s and is still ongoing. The chapter also annotates twin terminologies- 'Muhajir' and 'Awara'. 'Muhajir' indicates migration and often linked itself with the migration of Prophet Muhammad and his companions, while Awara associate with wandering, vagrancy, and homelessness. The authors shed light on the deeper aspect of the term 'Muhajir' from the viewpoint of few self-identified 'Muhajir', who exhibits their emotional attachment to the homeland and relates 'Muhajir'as forced displacement and 'Awara' as the chosen one. The authors also unravels the perspective of 'Awara' who suffered homelessness due to continuous displacement. The chapter also exposed that the refugees in Iran prefer to identify them with Awara rather than Muhajir and stated that Awara always feels connected to their homeland. The chapter concludes by expecting that the world will be more tolerant of migrants who faced discrimination and exclusion throughout their lives.

Mobility dynamics in South Asia are defined by transient migration of low-wage migrant labourers coordinated by middlemen and recruiting agencies. South Asian economy has benefited greatly from migrant labour. Migrant labour, for example, accounts for 10% of India's GDP. State policies and media rhetoric in the region, on the other hand, frequently neglect or stigmatise migrants, depicting them as disease vectors. Whereas the idea of immiseration have gained in popularity in past few decades, its relevance to identifying underlying paths by which conditions of ill-health are formed, particularly in the framework of South Asia's complicated migration trends, is unmapped territory. Chapter 12 by Anuj Kapilashrami and Ekatha Ann John offers an outline of the healthcare concerns that refugees and immigrants in South Asia experience as a result of the precariousness of their social, political, and work life. Work-based precarity illustrates how insecure agreements and agreement of service, as well as low income and working circumstances, contribute to feelings of anxiety and powerlessness. Another factor is precarity based on societal standing, which leads to marginalisation as a result of several hardships faced by migrants.. Migrants' temporary socioeconomic life associated with "lower"

citizenship, subject's people to estrangement from community and strengthens their disposability which is the status based precarity.

The last chapter is by S. Irudaya Rajan and Ashwin Kumar examines linkage between migration and development within the SAARC framework and towards a migration governance model of the future. While the emigration of migrant labourers from the South Asian regions has amply been documented and researched, the movement of people within the region has not been given considerable attention. Despite the fact that various migratory routes existed in the region before and before the British Raj, the region's split along religious lines and the governments' acrimonious political rhetoric have restricted free movement of individuals within the region. It documents an overall picture of the trends of migration within the larger South Asian region, tracing its history over the years and its present state. In this exploratory paper, the authors draw parallels between regional organisations like the European Union and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a collective whose objective is to enhance greater cooperation among the South Asian states. While this objective remains a distant dream, the scope for cooperation still looms large. The authors propose the establishment of a regional framework to enhance cross border movements so as to reap economic and social benefits from cross-border movements in the region.

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Chapter 2
Internal and Forced Migration and Economic Development in South Asia

Mehdi Chowdhury and Syed Naimul Wadood

2.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses internal migration and forced migration and the relationship between migration and economic development of a geographical region of the world, namely, South Asia (alternatively called the Indian Subcontinent, or the Subcontinent, this name is often applied to three countries in particular, these are, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, these countries obtained independence from the Great Britain, in August 14 and 15, 1947, as two independent countries, namely, India and Pakistan, whereas Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, obtained her independence in 1971). However, as considered now, the South Asia comprises of eight independent neighbouring countries of Asia, namely, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Within these South Asian countries, India is the largest in terms of geographical area (3.287 million square kilometres) (CIA Factbook (2021) and population size (1.4 billion at mid-year of 2020) (IOM (2021)). The next three large countries in terms of geographical areas are Pakistan (796,095 square kilometres), Afghanistan (652,230 square kilometres) and Bangladesh (148,460 square kilometres), whereas the remaining four are comparatively smaller in terms of geographical areas (CIA Factbook (2021)).

To contextualise the coverage of this chapter, it will be useful to provide a discussion on the issues of human migration. The word "migration' implies "movement". Human migration has always been part of human history, since the beginning of human history. Humans have always demonstrated to have a moving instinct, and it is quite fundamental in human nature. People have moved on from one place to

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another, over short distance or long distance, for short period of time, or a long period of time, have settled in new locations, for many reasons, such as food, shelter, freedom from persecution, escape from famine or war, natural disasters, and so on, or in search of higher income opportunities, better life, better education for children, and so on (see Ravenstein, 1885, 1889; King, 2012).

Though migration is of many types, the economic studies of it mainly has two branches: (1) internal (or domestic) migration and (2) international (or overseas) migration. Migration is also classified as, (1) voluntary migration and (2) forced migration. Refugees and asylum seekers fall into the category of forced migration, whereas other categories, involving presence of willingness of the migrants themselves, such as labor migration, family unification, high skilled migration, these can be classified as voluntary migration. There are some overlapping in these categories, such as a case of forced migration can be a case of internal migration (this case is of the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons)) or this can be a case of international migration (this case is of the refugees and asylum seekers). Among the causes of migration, the wage differential argument is most influential since Ravenstein (1885, 1889). There are other causes of migration such as family reunion or child-care requirements, marriage migration, student migration, retirement migration, high-skilled migration and brain drain, environmental and climate change-induced migration, as well as the issue of human trafficking and the sex industry, and also the cases of undocumented migration (op. cit.). Migration has been regarded as an investment in human capital (Sjaastad, 1962; Becker, 1962). Migration can also take place as a result of implicit contracts within households (Stark & Bloom, 1985).

The above discussion shows that migration theory is a complex phenomenon by itself. Not only the determinants but the consequences of migration also have been extensively covered in the literature. Migration has been treated as a vehicle of economic development in the 1960s and the 1970s through movement of labour (Lewis, 1954; Ranis & Fei, 1961; Harris & Todaro, 1970) from agriculture to industry, via brain drain or brain gain in the 1970s and lately around year 2000 (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012), through the remittances (Rapoport & Docquier, 2006; Yang, 2008). A recent review covering some of these above-mentioned theoretical issues is available in Chowdhury and Telli (2016).

This short discussion shows that an analysis of migration can be multi-faceted and the South Asian countries are not exceptions. The analysis of this chapter is constrained in three main themes. These are: Internal Migration, Migration and Development, and Forced Migration. Though there are other important issues which can be well addressed and has been addressed elsewhere (see Bastia & Ronald, 2020), we believe that the reader will find this chapter useful, specifically those who are looking for relevant macro level statistics of above. Keeping this in mind the chapter keeps the discussion of theory at minimum and focuses on the empirical aspects. There are many excellent reviews on theory that are available, such as King (2012), Chowdhury and Telli (2016) and the reader may consult them if required.

The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.1 introduces South Asia and has a brief note on the migration theory. Section 2.2 discusses internal migration of South Asia. Section 2.3 sheds light on some links between migration and

development in South Asia. Section 2.4 discusses forced migration. Section 2.5 concludes with some policy observations.

With regards to methodology and data analysis, this chapter is based on secondary literature review and summarization of the findings. As there are three topics to deal with, such as internal migration, economic development and forced migration, three different searches of literature needed to be undertaken. Online searches using the key words such as of "internal migration within South Asia", "internal migration of India", "internal migration of Bangladesh", "forced/refugee migration within South Asia", etc. were done and this turned out to be quite successful. In the case of general theoretical background of international migration literature and internal migration of South Asia, recent handbook and edited volumes were consulted and commonality among each South Asian country's experiences were sorted out and examined. Regarding time frame, the time period after 1947, and in particular, last 23 years in the twenty-first Century were given additional emphasis since the British Raj ended its rule in 1947 and form then onward, modern nation states evolved in South Asia, whereas the reader would be more interested to know the latest situation with regards to conflicts within South Asia. In the case of forced migration, the UNHCR documents were quite useful for within country comparisons and data analysis. The aim of reading and compiling for this chapter was to make the ideas reader-friendly while keeping in background the vast literature that is there on these topics.

2.2 Internal Migration Within Countries of South Asia

Unlike the case with international migration, internal migration is difficult to follow through because of the lack of registration and documentation at the point of origin as well as at the point of destination. Since internal migration does not involve crossing an international border and submitting documents in the borders at least in the South Asian countries, this remains a serious problem to have internal migration data and examine them. Whereas the international migration stock is recorded to be 280.6 million worldwide by the middle of 2020 (see Global Migration Data Portal, IOM (2021)), no precise assessment is there for internal migration figure at the same time, or for that matter, any other time. One specific note was the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report of 2009 (UNDP, 2009, pp. 21), and this mentioned that the number of internal migrants was almost four times larger than the number of international migrants, it was estimated to be about 740 million internal migrants in the world at that time (a conservative estimate), whereas the corresponding figure for international migrants was 214 million (3.1% of the world's population at that time). Therefore, most people actually move internally within the boundaries of their own countries. World Bank (2009) explains that this much higher number of internal migrants principally comes from the point of view of geographical economic growth differences, such that as economies expand, some geographical locations within a country achieves higher economic

growth, on the other hand, some geographical locations within the same country lags behind. People have incentives to move from the lagging behind regions to the more economically dynamic regions, in search of better jobs, education, health care facilities and better infrastructure. Rather than being a one-off movement, this can be seasonal or cyclical movement as well. Migration theory also predicts such movements from lagging behind areas to more advanced areas, as we can see in Bodvarrson et al. (2015, pp. 8), which presents migration as human capital investment, and mentions: "the notion of migration as human capital investment as a unifying theme that serves as the most fundamental idea underlying most current economic theories of migration." This migration decision considers the net present value of migrating to a new location as net present value of [wages minus cost of living at the new location] minus [wages minus cost of living at the origin location] and minus [the cost of migration] in Sjaastad's model (Sjaastad, 1962). Simply put, this neoclassical model of migration *a la* Sjaastad implies people would tend to migrate to locations offering higher wages for his/her labor effort, net of cost of migration.

With regards to the case of internal migration in South Asia, there are two recent publications which are quite useful for reading, both of them are edited volumes, one is Rajan and Sumeetha (2020) and the other one is Bell et al. (2020). The first one addresses internal migration of India in over fifty-six chapters, and the second addresses internal migration of several Asian countries in over nineteen chapters (including chapters on internal migration of India, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka) [India: Bhagat & Keshri, 2020, Bhutan: Gosai & Sulewski, 2020, Nepal: Samir, 2020 and Sri Lanka: Sunethra, 2020]. Other than these two edited volumes which cover four of South Asian countries, we examined some other publications for coverage of the other four countries, e.g., for Bangladesh (UNDP, Bangladesh (2013) and Afroze (2020), Pakistan (Ishfaq et al. (2019) and Naz and Khan (2021)), Afghanistan (Willner-Reid (2017)) and Maldives (IOM, Maldives (2018)). Based on examination of these recent publications, some summary points are presented below.

Internal Migration of South Asia, Some Summary Observations

Firstly, internal migration needs to be explained with reference to the political history, socioeconomic specificities of the nationals, physical and environmental geography of the country in question. Additionally, we note that because of common history, South Asian countries are closely linked with each other, this includes cases of internal migration to some extent. In the case of South Asia, particular reference needs to be mentioned for the case of 1947, when both India and Pakistan achieved independence from the British rule, and the Partition, a massive migration that took place in between India and Pakistan, involving millions from both sides of the border to cross over the new borders, and moving on to the other side. War and political conflicts affected Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Nepal for decades, and this shaped their respective internal migration cases as well.

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Secondly, cases of internal migration are often caused by macro features such as economic growth and regional disparities, and by micro features such as age and education of the household members, ethnicity, gender aspects, religion, caste and so on, and these can be triggered by environmental issues such as climate change features or river erosion.

Thirdly, the total fertility rate (TFR) has gradually reduced for the South Asian countries, from as high as 6 or above some decades earlier to almost the replacement rate of 2.2 for India in recent years, and similar things happened to other countries. In all the countries, the life expectancy at birth has increased by number of years, in recent decades. For example, in India, life expectancy at birth was 50 years between 1970 and 1975 and this has significantly increased to 68 years in between 2011 and 2015 (Bhagat and Keshri (2020), pp. 207). India now has a young population, with almost 60% in 15–59 age and a median age of about 24 years in the 2011 census. India exhibits large diversity between regions and states, and diverse patterns of demographic and socioeconomic changes all through out. Internal migration plays a key role in redistributing population, particularly young population, from economically lagging regions to economically advanced regions within India, and this is cheaper investment and less risky venture compared to the case of international migration.

Fourthly, as already mentioned above, the single most noticeable common feature of internal migration in South Asia is the movement of people from the economically lagging regions within the countries to the economically advanced regions within these same countries, respectively (see Bhagat and Keshri (2020) pp. 216–222, Samir (2020)). This includes rural-to-urban migration, rural-to-rural migration, urban-to-urban migration, as well. Economic growth does not occur over the entire geographical space within a country, and inevitably some regions are there where economic concentration takes place, and these can be considered as economically advanced regions (see World Bank, 2009). On the other hand, other regions tend to lag behind in terms of economic growth, business and employment opportunities, infrastructure facilities. In the case of India, four major economic, industrial, and commercial hubs emerged over time, such as the Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata and New Delhi (including their respective surrounding areas). These areas have become positive net migration areas (such as, population in-migrating outnumbers population out-migrating) over the last several decades. On the other hand, some regions have continued to remain as economically lagging regions, and they have become negative net migration areas (such as, population out-migrating outnumbers population in-migrating), e.g., the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Tripura, Nagaland, Meghalaya (op. cit.). Internal migration has occurred as people particularly young people, have searched better opportunities in terms of education, wage earnings, business prospects, better housing and living conditions and so on, and internal migration is one option or instrument for them to take for achieving higher standards of living for themselves and their families. Since internal migration is much easier and arguably less risky venture compared to international migration, internal migration is a more popular option.

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Fifthly, colonial history has set the stage for internal migration within countries. In the case of India, during the colonial rule, roads, railways, and port centres were created and plantation, mining and government administration were set in some regions. Regional disparities were intensified this way because of these new economic conditions and population movement was there towards these centres of trade, commerce, and business from surrounding, economically lagging areas. Hill stations and cantonments were also established by the British regime. New cities emerged as transportation hubs along the railways and new market towns appeared as export centres of agricultural produce to economically advanced regions. On the other hand, economically lagging regions continually lost young population. Migration has always been a self-selection process, less for internal migration and more for international migration, and mostly the young self-select themselves for relocation for improvement of their living conditions.

Sixthly, if we consider life-time migration records, we notice that males and females differ markedly in their migration patterns over lifetime. Females exhibit a sharp upward slope in around at the age of early 20 s, and then the graph flattens to a lower level (due to women's marriage and family formation). Males do not exhibit such a sharp upward turn in their early 20s, rather they exhibit some positive slope in their migration rates in around mid-20s (due to man's search for job or business opportunities) and after this a flat curve follows.

Seventhly, internal migration is strongly associated with high economic growth, urbanization, and expansion of the cities. Such has been the case with Bangladesh (Dhaka the capital city now contains more than 10% of the entire population of the country, with very high population density, and this continues to attract people from all throughout the country, and internal migration in this case also includes cases of seasonal or temporary migration) (see Afroze, 2020, pp. 18)).

Lastly, internal migration may take place as response to natural disasters, or climate change related phenomenon as well (such has been the case for Bangladesh and Nepal). Samir (2020, pp. 250) mentions that, in Nepal, natural disasters, such as floods and landslides occur regularly during the monsoon and this causes internal migration. UNDP, Bangladesh (2013, pp. 7) reports surveys of slum areas of the Dhaka City, where some respondents were migrants who came from the Coastal area districts and they reported environmental and climate change related issues as principal causes of their migration decision to the Dhaka City.

2.3 Migration and Economic Development in South Asia

The relationship between migration and economic development is well studied in the economic development literature. In this section we provide an evaluation of the impact of migration to the economic development of the South Asian countries by

looking at the data. A review of the literature is available in Chowdhury and Telli (2016) and Chowdhury (2018) which largely inform the proceeding discussions.

The relationship between economic development and migration was first formalized by the dualistic economic development models (Lewis, 1954; Ranis & Fei, 1961). The models state that economic development via industrialization is possible by the employment of rural surplus agricultural labor migrated to urban industries. Through the absorption of surplus labor and gradual reinvestment of accumulated profit, both agricultural and industrial sectors become developed.

This mechanism of economic development seems to have taken place to some extent in the South Asian countries. This section submits statistical evidence of such transformation of the South Asian countries in the last decades. Methodologically, this section (also the subsequent one) adopts descriptive analysis of the data as the focus is to evaluate the structural transformation instead of identifying any causal relations. Accordingly, Table 2.1 has been prepared using the data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, which is one of the most used internationally accepted data set. The table presents the statistics of agricultural employment to the total employment, the ratio of the agriculture, forestry and fishing to GDP and the manufacturing exports as the percentage of merchandise export. We look at the statistics from 1970 to 2019. For some countries, the data of 2019 are not available; hence the available statistics of the nearest year have been presented. If the transformation of the economy has taken place and the economies have become industrialized, then it is natural to assume that the ratio of agricultural employment and the contribution of agriculture to GDP would demonstrate a decline over time. It is also natural to assume that the contribution of manufacturing to the export would go up. Table 2.1 aims to provide that snapshot of the transforming economies, if such has taken place.

Table 2.1 clearly demonstrates that the South Asian countries have gone through significant transformations over the last 5 decades. For almost all countries, the contribution of agriculture to the economy has decreased by a large extent. For example, in Sri Lanka the share of Agriculture to GDP has decreased from 29% to 7%. On the other hand, the share of manufacturing export has increased from 1% to 68%. Only exception is Afghanistan, where the share of manufacturing export to total exports has decreased. The share of agriculture to GDP also seems stagnant. The case of Afghanistan seems quite peculiar and is likely to be due to the prolonged conflict that the country has been suffering from.

Table 2.1 also demonstrates that the industrial sector has overtaken the agricultural sector of the South Asian countries. The Lewis type dualistic economic development model indicates that the process should be accompanied by a substantial degree of urbanization which is to be achieved through rural to urban migration. To what extent this urbanization has taken place also is an important issue to consider and the Table 2.2 evaluates that.

Table 2.2 shows that Bangladesh, India and Nepal have experienced a rapid growth in urban population in largest cities during 1990 to 2019. However, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have experienced negative growth. All the

Table 2.1 Agricultural and manufacturing share in GDP and exports

Country	Series name	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015–19*
Afghanistan	Agricultural employment as % to total	..	..	..	66	55	43
	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing as % of GDP)	..	..	..	..	26	26
	Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports) *	11	..	..	..	20	3
Bhutan	Agricultural employment as % to total	..	..	..	67	60	56
	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing as % of GDP)	..	43	34	24	15	16
	Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports)	..	..	..	..	70	..
Bangladesh	Agricultural employment as % to total	..	..	..	65	47	38
	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing as% of GDP)	55	33	30	23	17	13
	Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports)	..	68	77	91	92	96
India	Agricultural employment as % to total	..	..	..	60	52	43
	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing as% of GDP)	40	33	27	22	17	16
	Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports)	52	59	70	78	63	71
Maldives	Agricultural employment as % to total	..	..	..	19	13	8
	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing as% of GDP)	..	..	..	..	6	5
	Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports)	..	..	..	46	0	0
Nepal	Agricultural employment as % to total	..	..	..	75	70	64
	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing as% of GDP)	67	58	49	38	33	24
	Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports)	..	30	..	67	72	68
Pakistan	Agricultural employment as % to total	..	..	..	43	43	37
	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing as% of GDP)	33	27	23	26	23	22
	Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports)	57	48	79	85	74	74
Sri Lanka	Agricultural employment as % to total	..	..	..	41	32	25
	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing as% of GDP)	29	28	27	20	8	7
	Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports)	1%	19	53	76	67	68

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2021) * between 2015 to 2019, the latest available one reported. The dots (..) represent missing data

countries have however, experienced an increase in the overall urban population. Table 2.2 therefore shows that the South Asia in general experienced urbanization, though in some countries the largest cities have experienced negative population growth.

In addition to shaping the growth of economies internally, migration in South Asia also is impacting the countries through remittances. The South Asian nations are the largest suppliers of labor in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE). About two-third of migrant workers working in those countries are from South Asia (Chowdhury and Rajan, 2018; Rajan, 2017, 2020). The remittances from migrants working in the Gulf are important source of foreign currencies of South Asia. In addition, the South Asian migrants are working in other countries of the rest of the World including other countries within the South Asia. In order to understand the dependence of South Asian countries on the remittances of migrant workers, we constructed Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 presents the bilateral remittances of South Asian countries and compares that with the remittances from the World for year 2017. The column (1) of the

Table 2.2 Urbanization in South Asia

Country	Series name	1990	2019	% change
Afghanistan	% of urban population in the largest city	58.941	41.992	−28.8
	Urban population as % of total population	21.177	25.754	21.6
	Urban population growth (annual %)	4.898	3.323	
Bangladesh	% of urban population in the largest city	32.392	33.259	2.7
	Urban population as % of total population	19.811	37.405	88.8
	Urban population growth (annual %)	4.888	3.130	
Bhutan*	% of urban population in the largest city	..	..	..
	Urban population as % of total population	16.388	41.612	153.9
	Urban population growth (annual %)	6.2778	2.885	
India	% of urban population in the largest city	5.538	6.241	12.7
	Urban population as % of total population	25.547	34.472	34.9
	Urban population growth (annual %)	3.028	2.306	
Maldives	% of urban population in the largest city	..	..	..
	Urban population as % of total population	25.840	40.238	55.7
	Urban population growth (annual %)	3.155	3.990	
Nepal	% of urban population in the largest city	23.775	23.868	0.4
	Urban population as % of total population	8.854	20.153	127.6
	Urban population growth (annual %)	6.065	3.908	
Pakistan	% of urban population in the largest city	21.714	19.695	−9.3
	Urban population as % of total population	30.576	36.907	20.7
	Urban population growth (annual %)	3.773	2.684	
Sri Lanka	% of urban population in the largest city	19.123	14.960	−21.8
	Urban population as % of total population	18.535	18.585	0.3
	Urban population growth (annual %)	1.186	1.200	

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2021). *The data are not available Bhutan and Maldives

Table 2.3 Remittances flows within the South Asian Countries. (million US$, Year 2017)

Sending countries	Receiving countries								
	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Bhutan	India	Maldives	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	World
Afghanistan	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	119.31 (69.27%) (0.60%)	0.00	172.24 (0.03%)
Bangladesh	0.00	0.00	0.00	114.45 (5.69%) (0.18%)	0.00	60.90 (3.03%) (0.92%)	0.00	0.00	2013.15 (0.35%)
Bhutan	0.00	0.07 (0.04%)	0.00	169.10 (94.60%) (0.27%)	0.00	1.41 (0.79%) (0.02%)	0.06 (0.03%)	0.12 (0.07%) (0.00%)	178.75 (0.03%)
India	0.48 (0.01%)** (0.11%)	4059.52 (71.40%) (29.94%)	2.52 (0.04%) (7.35%)	0.00	0.54 (0.01%) (14.23%)	971.02 (17.08%) (14.70%)	0*	524.41 (9.22%) (7.23%)	5685.45 (0.99%)
Maldives	0.00	67.29 (37.19%) (0.50%)	0.00	73.64 (40.70%) (0.12%)	0.00	0.00	0.41 (0.22%)	28.03 (15.50%) (0.39%)	180.92 (0.03%)
Nepal	0.00	0.88 (0.03%) (0.01%)	29.76 (1.01%) (86.65%)	2743.75 (93.25%) (4.37%)	0.00	0.00	33.58 (1.14%) (0.17%)	2.05 (0.07%) (0.03%)	2942.49 (0.51%)
Pakistan	131.35 (35.14%) (30.49%)	228.33 (61.08%) (1.68%)	0.00	0*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	373.82 (0.07%)
Sri Lanka	0.00	0.00	0.00	1150.99 (98.90%) (1.83%)	0.00	0.00	0.76 (0.07%) (0.00%)	0.00	1163.82 (0.20%)
World	430.84 (0.08%)	13559.36 (2.36%)	34.34 (0.01%)	62744.36 (10.94%)	3.83 (0.00%)	6606.80 (1.15%)	19761.00 (3.45%)	7257.36 (1.27%)	573551.28

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2021)

*According to State Bank of Pakistan, in FY16 outward remittances from Pakistan to India were $116,000 and inward remittances from India to Pakistan were $329,000

** The first figure in parenthesis is % of sending country to the world. The second parenthesis is % percentage of receiving to the world

Table shows the sending countries. The other columns present the data of receiving countries. For example, Afghanistan remits $119.31 million to Pakistan and $172.24 million to the world. The ratios are presented in parentheses. For example, Pakistan receives 69.3% of all the outward remittances of Afghanistan. The columns of the receiving countries present the remittances received by those countries. Pakistan received $19,761 million from the World in remittances out of which $119.31 million was received from Afghanistan. It was only 0.60% of the total remittances received by Pakistan as shown in the figure of the second parenthesis. The figures under the parenthesis for the World imply the total of the country with respect to the World remittances. For example, Afghanistan sends only 0.03% of the remittances of the World. With respect of receiving from the World the figure for Afghanistan is $430.84 million which is 0.08% of the remittances received by the World. The remittance flow for the world is $573,551.28 million.

Table 2.3 shows that the South Asian countries are in general quite dependent on each other for remittances though it is somehow mixed. For example, India's receipt from South Asian countries was the highest from Nepal, however was only 4.37% of the remittances received. It implies that India received the largest amount of remittances from outside of South Asia. On the other hand, the ratios for some countries depict substantial dependence. For example, India sent $4059.52 million USD to Bangladesh which was 29.94% of the remittances received by Bangladesh. Interestingly, the remittances remitted by India to Bangladesh were 71.40% of the remittances from India. Similar high ratios are observed between Pakistan-Afghanistan, Bangladesh-India, Bangladesh-Maldives and Bangladesh-Pakistan, Bhutan-Nepal, India-Bhutan, India-Maldives, India-Nepal and India-Sri Lanka. The relationships between other pairs are moderate or low. This pattern is clearly reflective of the historical connectedness and the current patterns of the intra South Asian migration. For example, many Bangladeshi migrants work in the Maldives, resulting in high amounts of remittances moving from Maldives to Bangladesh. However, still the within flow of remittances can be quite low compared to what was received from the rest of the world. Bangladesh received about 34% of remittance from the South Asian countries. Hence the rest of 66% came from other countries of the world, specifically from the Gulf countries. Similar was the case of India. Though both countries ranked highly in receiving international remittances with India and Bangladesh receiving respectively 10.94% and 2.36% of the remittance flow of the world. Pakistan also ranked high by receiving 3.45% of the remittance flow. However, from South Asian countries, Pakistan only received about 3% of the remittances.

The discussion above concentrated on the two issues, there are: (1) the economic changes of South Asia through industrialization and urbanization, and (2) the remittances flow within the South Asian countries. However, there are other issues of migration and development this section has not provided detailed discussion of. One of them is the issue of the Brain Drain and the Brain Gain. These issues are likely to be not so influential in relation to the migration within the South Asia. Though the migration of high skilled people is observed within this region, the main destinations are usually the developed countries of the West. In term of

skill development, the South Asian countries also experienced some movement of students within the countries. It is however, still negligible compared to the flow of students to the West. The countries in South Asia also experienced some health-related migration especially India experienced a boom in the health care related tourism (CNN, 2019). These issues require extensive research and as far as known under researched. Our present chapter has not provided any coverage of these issues, on which hopefully, the future researchers will be able to provide further insights.

2.4 Refugees and Asylum Seekers in South Asia

According to the UNHCR, 79.5 million of people world-wide are *forcibly displaced* of which 26 million are *refugees*, 45.7 million are *internally displaced* and 4.2 million are *asylum seekers* (UNHCR, 2021a). The South Asian countries are also not free from forced migration, rather has observed one of the largest flows of refugees just after the Second World War which unfortunately is continuing. This section aims to provide a discussion and looks at data on forced migration in the South Asian countries.

2.4.1 Historical Contexts

Though recently, the South Asia do not feature much in the international media in relation to the refugee crisis issue except for the case of the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, historically this region observed one of the largest movements of refugees post-Second World War. The Indian Subcontinent which was ruled by the Great Britain for about 200 years became independent in 1947 forming two independent countries India and Pakistan. Pakistan constituted two parts, namely East and West Pakistan. The East Pakistan later became independent from Pakistan in 1971. The partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 in two countries was conducted on the basis of religion. The majority population of the country India were Hindus and in Pakistan the majority were Muslims. This division and other incidents during that period initiated an unprecedented flow of migration, i.e., Muslims from India to Pakistan and Hindus from Pakistan to India. It is estimated that the up to one million people were killed during the violence around 1947 and up to 20 million people suffered forced displacement (Zamindar, 2013; Banerjee, 2014, pp. 613). The migration impacted the socio-economic makeup of the three countries significantly (Banerjee, 2014, pp. 613) though the current statistics of displacement within the South Asia may not reflect that.

Since 1947, India as the largest country and with borders with almost all the South Asian counties continuously and continued to receive displaced people from

various South Asian nations as well as other neighbouring countries (Banerjee, 2014). One of the refugee groups is the 13,000 Tibetan refugees who initially arrived in upper Assam and later was settled in Kashmir. During the War of Independence of Bangladesh in 1971 (then East Pakistan), many took refuge in India, who later returned to Bangladesh. It is usually thought that about ten million people took refuge in India during the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. Similar mass migration was observed during the civil war in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and the 1990s. Since 1983, more than 150,000 Tamils sought asylum in other countries with the majority in India (Banerjee, 2014).

The other countries that have received significant number of refugees are Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan notably was a major destination of the Afghan refugees since the Soviet Occupation of 1980s. The UNHCR estimated that about 1.7 million refugees received shelters in Pakistan (Banerjee, 2014). Though many may have returned or moved to other countries, Pakistan still is one of the largest recipients of the Afghan refugees. Bangladesh on the other hand is the major destination of the persecuted Rohingya minorities of Myanmar. The Rohingyas have been seeking refuge in Bangladesh since the independence of Myanmar, however in 2017 an unprecedented influx resulted in about half a million Rohingyas seeking refuge in Bangladesh just in a month. Currently nearly a million Rohingyas are in Bangladesh and the majority live in a camp site named Kutupalong which is the largest refugee camp in the world (Chowdhury et al., 2022). About 40,000 Rohingyas also received shelters in India.

Interestingly, little is known to the outside world about the Lhotshamps refugees from Bhutan. In 1985, Bhutan passed a citizenship act denying the citizenship of Lhotshamps, which is of similar in nature that denied the citizenship rights of Rohingyas in Myanmar. It resulted in expulsion of about 100,000 Lhotshamps to Nepal from Bhutan. Some also received shelter in India (Banerjee, 2014; Ikram, 2005).

The proceeding analysis shows that the forced migration or refugee crisis is one of the major problems within the South Asian countries. Though it is not generally addressed in the media, this matter requires adequate attention as refugee crisis often impacts on the social political dynamics of countries in a manner that prohibits any economic cooperation and increases cross border tensions.

2.4.2 Existing Forced Migration Statistics

This sub-section presents some data on refugees and asylum seekers in the South Asian Countries. The data are available from the UNHCR and have been utilised to construct Tables 2.4 and 2.5 Methodologically, the section relies on descriptive analysis to enable obtaining an overview of the forced migration situation. The Tables are constructed by only looking at the data from 2019 to provide a recent picture though data from other years are also available. The discussion on the previous section has established that refugees have originated from South

Table 2.4 South Asian countries as origins and destinations of forced migration (2019)

Country	Refugees under UNHCR mandate	Asylum-seekers	IDPs of concern to UNHCR	Stateless persons	Others of concern
Afghanistan (Origin)	2,727,556	255,244	2,553,390	0	450,675
Afghanistan (Destination)	72,227	247	2,553,390	0	447,093
Bangladesh (Origin)	22,766	62,881	0	0	502
Bangladesh (Destination)	854,779	34	0	854,704	0
Bhutan (Origin)	6839	413	0	0	0
Bhutan (Destination)	–	–	–	–	–
India (Origin)	11,787	66,005	0	0	294
India (Destination)	195,103	12,385	0	17,730	0
Maldives (Origin)	75	11	0	0	0
Maldives (Destination)	–	–	–	–	–
Nepal (Origin)	8033	9940	0	0	345
Nepal (Destination	19,570	57	0	0	534
Pakistan (Origin)	136,902	66,391	100,680	0	2871
Pakistan (Destination)	1,419,596	8546	100,680	0	0
Sri Lanka (Origin)	110,341	16,066	25,110	0	10
Sri Lanka (Destination)	1041	361	25,110	0	0

Source: For data and methodology see (UNHCR, 2021b). Data of Bhutan and Maldives as destinations are nil

Asian countries. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 allow us to capture the current position of South Asian countries as both senders and receivers of refugees and asylum seekers.

The "refugees" under the UN Mandate include individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and the subsequent protocols and declarations (UNHCR, 2021b). Table 2.4 shows that in 2019, about three million refugees originated from Afghanistan, which is the highest within the South Asian countries. The other countries from which more than one hundred thousand refugees have originated were Pakistan and Sri Lanka. As for the destinations, leading in this unfortunate situation are India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This status of the South Asia is consistent to the historical development of the forced migration in the South Asian countries as stated previously.

Table 2.5 Forced Migration within the South Asian Countries (2019)

Country of origin	Country of Asylum	Refugees under UNHCR mandate	Asylum-seekers	IDPs of concern to UNHCR	Stateless persons	Others of concern
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	0	0	2,553,390	0	447,093
	India	7470	8300	0	0	0
	Nepal	15	0	0	0	0
	Pakistan	1,419,084	8424	0	0	0
	Sri Lanka	160	45	0	0	0
Bangladesh	Nepal	5	0	0	0	0
	Sri Lanka	0	5	0	0	0
Bhutan	Nepal	6396	0	0	0	0
India	Nepal	0	0	0	0	210
	Pakistan	0	5	0	0	0
Maldives	India	5	0	0	0	0
Nepal	Nepal	0	0	0	0	324
Pakistan	Afghanistan	72,191	138	0	0	0
	Nepal	176	30	0	0	0
	Pakistan	0	0	100,680	0	0
	Sri Lanka	800	284	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	India	59,428	0	0	0	0
	Nepal	20	6	0	0	0
	Sri Lanka	0	0	25,110	0	0

Source: For data and methodology see, UNHCR (2021b). Data of Bhutan and Maldives as destinations are nil

The "asylum seekers" are people who seek for protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined (UNHCR, 2021b). Table 2.4 shows that Afghanistan is again the leading origin country in South Asia while other countries registered a relatively low number of asylum seekers. As for destination countries, no South Asian country in 2019 registered one hundred thousand asylum seekers. The leading countries are India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who have nearly seventy thousand asylum seekers each.

The UNHCR also compiles data on conflict-generated "Internally Displaced Persons" (IDPs), defined as people who have been forced to leave or abandon their homes, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border (UNHCR, 2021b). The Afghan War has caused significant number of IDPs, which is also reflected in Table 2.4. The other country with more than one hundred thousand IDPs is Pakistan.

The "stateless persons" under the UNHCR definition come from two population groups, (a) persons who meet the statelessness definition in the 1954 Convention and (b) persons with undetermined nationality (UNHCR, 2021b). Bangladesh is the leading destination of these stateless refugees, mainly caused by the denial of citizenship of the Rohingya people in Myanmar (Table 2.4).

The UNHCR also present statistics on others of concerns, which implies the groups under UNHCR's protection but may not fall under any other categories

(UNHCR, 2021b). Table 2.4 also shows that Afghanistan is leading unfortunately in this respect, which is understandably due to the prolonged internal war.

Table 2.4 provided a general picture. However, in order to understand the flow of forced migrants inside the South Asian countries, Table 2.5 has been constructed. Table 2.5 shows that within the South Asian countries, the forced migration is relatively low, except for the case of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan, from Pakistan to Afghanistan and Sri Lanka to India. Interestingly, from Bhutan to Nepal, only about 7000 have been registered as refugees which implied that the largest number of Lhotshamps, who were forced to migrated have been moved out of the classifications by UNHCR.

In summary, the data show that the forced migration situation in the South Asia is of a nature of serious concern, though often not covered by the international media. It also shows that though since the Second World War, the refugees have moved from one country to another within the South Asian countries. Over time many have settled in the new country and moved out of the UNHCR classification of *refugees* and *asylum seekers*. However, it is likely that the socio-political environment of these countries is still getting shaped by the forced migration encountered by them in the past.

2.4.3 Present Situation and the Future of Forced Migration

Forced migration is an unfortunate reality, and we note that a current political turmoil in one country may result in forced displacement in the future. One such is the possible impact of the National Register of Citizens in Assam, India (BBC, 2019; Rajan, 2022). This act is similar in nature to what happened in Myanmar and Bhutan, based on producing 'definite' proof of residence before a time period. It has resulted in the possibility of about two million people becoming stateless. The impact of it is yet to be realised, however this may result in a large inflow of refugees to the neighbouring countries, as observed before in South Asia.

The climate change also may result in internal displacements, though not necessarily cross broader movements (Rajan & Bhagat, 2018). The global climate risk index (Kreft et al., 2017) identified Bangladesh and Pakistan within the top ten most affected countries since 1996–2015 due to the climate related issues. The low land of South Asia, specifically of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan are regarded as risky and likely cause of millions to be displaced due to the rise of the sea level. The country that is at most risk is however the Maldives, which is projected to lose 77% of the land area by the end of the century. If the sea level rises by 1 m, the country will be completely inundated under water (ADB, 2021; Moosa et al., 2020).

2.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In the chapter, we have provided an empirical investigation of the South Asian countries, covering *internal migration*, *migration and development* and *forced migration (refugees)*. The data analysis was of descriptive in nature, however was able to provide important insights on the migration situation and should be able to provide guidance to the academics and policy makers.

Though the chapter has not addressed extensively, several issues require further investigations such as the issue of student migration, health/medical tourism and impact of intra South Asian remittances. The issues of labour migration, family unification migration and human trafficking can be addressed. We hope that future research will be able to shed lights on these issues.

There is also a scope for policy coordination and cooperation among the South Asian countries with regards to internal migration, particularly data collection, collaborative research. Further research may identify the obstacles of realising the benefits from both internal as well as international migration, specifically the migration of human capital, and how the countries can work together to realise the full benefit.

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Chapter 3
Non-traditional Migration in South Asia

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3.1 Background

Migration is not a new field of scientific research. Human made their first move on various grounds thousands of years ago. According to Ravenstein (1885), human used to follow some certain principles about 200 years ago to migrate over. However, migration research has only recently been incorporated into academic research. Consequently, migration studies have subsequently been taken up by geography, political science, history, sociology, demography, international relations, public policy, and economics, which view migration through their own lens (Ullah et al., 2021).

The fundamental causes of migration are now recognised as two broad but typical factors: Push and Pull. However, these concepts seem to have become classical. Why are these components referred to as classical? For us, the concepts of push and pull diminish human agency, but there is still a degree of power in push and pull that can influence migration decisions. Push factors generally include negative influences such as unemployment, agricultural failures, drought, floods, conflict, river erosion, lack of educational opportunities, or lack of services and facilities. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the expectations that lead people to visit the destination country. These usually include positive factors such as job opportunities, a higher standard of living, personal security, and better education and health services (Ullah et al., 2021). Migration scholars have discussed many forms of migration

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that are context-dependent and region-specific (Skeldon, 2012; Cohen & Sirkeci, 2011; Faist, 2010; Castles, 2003; Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016).

Economists assume that migration is a function of supply and demand, while demographers believe that migration is a result of population pressure (Borjas, 1989; Ullah et al., 2015, 2021). Migration acts as a demographic equaliser by redistributing people from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas. Migration is also contingent, and a number of migration categories and subcategories have emerged. Many people make the decision to migrate, while others do not. These are voluntary migrants, with the majority being economic migrants (Bell, 2012; Platt et al., 2015; Skeldon, 2012; Alpes, 2014; Benson & O'Reilly, 2009; Carling, 2002; Castles et al., 2014). Other voluntary migrants are retirees who want to move to areas with a low cost of living and mild climate. However, many other people have no choice and are forced to change their place of residence. Their security is threatened due to wars, conflicts, political instability, or natural disasters, and they are forced to migrate (Ullah, 2014). These are the typical migration paths.

We refer to another type of migration as non-traditional migration. Non-traditional migrants (NTMs) do not leave their home country in search of a job, and they do not do so under duress. These people tend to leave the country to protect the wealth they have accumulated through means they do not want to give away in their own country. In this case, we distinguish between conventional and nontraditional migration based on differences in the desire to leave. The fundamental difference is that NTMs leave their own country to live in luxury with their hard-earned money in countries where they feel safe.

3.2 Setting the Scene

When governance does not work properly, the poor get poorer and the privileged get richer. Some individuals close to the ruling class take advantage of this failure to achieve wealth that causes a public stir. They want to ensure that their descendants can benefit from their wealth. This group uses emigration, as well as their wealth, as an NTM to hedge against these risks. This is one of the ways how inequality further widens in the world. Inequality can be both caused and induced by migration (Ullah et al., 2021). Some 2153 billionaires in the world are richer than the 4.6 billion people who make up 60% of the total population. Even more striking, the wealth of the world's 22 richest men exceeds that of all African women combined (Oxfam, 2020).

Most NTMs in South Asia typically choose Malaysia, Singapore, India, Canada, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and several Middle Eastern and European countries as destinations (Ullah & Huque, 2019; Nikki, 2020). The MM2H project (second home project) in Malaysia, the Thai elite residence programme for wealthy individuals (entrepreneurs), and the project for businessmen or investors in Singapore are among these programmes (Arcibal, 2019; Ullah & Kumpoh, 2019; Ullah et al., 2020). As a result, several South Asian countries are losing wealthy citizens who are leaving to take advantage of these programmes. A

Bangladeshi businessman with a fortune of $955 million was recently named among the 50 richest people in Singapore (Forbes, 2020). Last year in 2020, a Bangladeshi member of parliament was arrested in Kuwait on charges of money laundering and trafficking about 20,000 Bangladeshi workers to Kuwait, earning Taka 1400,0000,000.00 (Daily Ittefaq, June 7, , 2020b), equivalent to US$ 175,000,000.00 (Daily Ittefaq, July 14, , 2020a). A Bangladeshi businessman and former bank manager transferred Tk10,000 crore (US$12,500,000,000.00) to Singapore, Canada and India (Sakib, 2020).

The number of millionaires leaving the country is increasing (about 108,000 millionaires left the country in 2018, up from 95,000 in 2017) (AfrAsia Bank, 2020). In 2017, 10,000 super-rich Chinese moved away, including 799 billionaires (Romann, 2020). Other countries from which significant numbers of high-net-worth individuals moved away include Turkey (6000), the United Kingdom (4000), France (4000), and the Russian Federation (3000). (Business Standard, 2018). This means that it is now a global trend. The United States is the leading destination for Chinese billionaires. More than one-third of wealthy Chinese surveyed are "currently thinking about" moving to another country (Frank, 2018). Of course, we exclude Hong Kongers who want to go to the United Kingdom, as this movement can be classified as 'migration by invitation' (Ullah & Azizuddin, 2022).

Since 2014, many millionaires have fled India, ahead of China and France, with the crackdown on black money the most likely reason for flight (Times of India, 2019). From 2014 to 2018, about 23,000 millionaires left the country (Times of India, 2019). That year, 2.1% of India's super-rich left the country, compared with 1.3% in France and 1.1% in China (Morgan Stanley Investment Management, 2019). Dewan Housing Financial Company (DHFL), a nonbank financial company, diverted about 31,000 Crore rupees of public funds (Sil, 2019). The funds were transferred to shell companies under the guise of loans and advances but were used to acquire assets outside India (Sil, 2019). In 2018, the Supreme Court of Pakistan investigated a money laundering case and found that at least $400 million had flowed through fictitious accounts of thousands of underprivileged individuals (News 18, 2018; South Asia Monitor, 2020; Ullah et al., 2021).

The literature now includes a new migration category. This type of migration (NTM) is the result of governance and policy failures in their home countries. Our goal is to highlight the key differences between NTM and traditional migrants. There are several media and official reports confirming that these groups of people are leaving their countries and settling elsewhere. Therefore, we had to rely on the available media reports for the empirical study.

3.3 Theorizing NTM

Some of the drivers may be related to migration, but they are more related to the demoralisation that forces people to leave. Demoralisation eventually leads to an anxious and insecure atmosphere among citizens (Ullah & Huque, 2019). Migration scholars have thoroughly examined the traditional push and pull concepts of human

mobility (Castles & Miller, 1998; Lee, 1966; Massey et al., 2007). Faulty governance, however, has rarely been considered. With few exceptions, there is little reflection on the concept of feeling insecure, which is the basis for the fact that the relationship between migration and feeling insecure (Bank et al., 2017) leads to demoralisation. The relationship between demoralisation and migration decision is clear (Gibney et al., 1996; Ullah & Huque, 2019).

We do not want to attribute NTM primarily to weak governance. There is evidence that some people invest their legally acquired money somewhere of their own free will. However, this paper is about non-traditional migrants whose motivations are driven by their activities in acquiring wealth and for whom governance failure leads to the decision to leave the country for reasons of personal security and preservation of their wealth. Compared to other regions of the world, the state of governance in South Asia is exceptionally low (Riaz, 2019). Corruption becomes useful in governance through the widespread abuse of public office for personal gain (Mugarura, 2016). While money laundering is an attempt to hide stolen income, the money is the direct result of illegal behaviour (Ullah et al., 2021). The laundered assets are either proceeds of crime, or the process of money laundering is aided by bribery of law enforcement or officials in financial institutions such as banks to bring illegal proceeds of crime into the system (Goredema, 2003; Hellmann, 2017).

Bribery is the most widespread form of corruption (Mugarura, 2016; Asadullah et al., 2019). Many South Asian countries rank high in the Bribery Index. Bangladesh ranks 178th in South Asia, giving it the highest risk score. Afghanistan is ranked 177th, one place ahead of Bangladesh in terms of risk score. Bhutan, with the lowest risk score of 41, is ranked 52nd (Bhuiyan & Islam, 2019). According to the GFI, Bangladesh lost an average of $ 7.53 billion per year to trade misinvoicing between 2008 and 2017, representing 17.95% of Bangladesh's total international trade with all trading partners (Jamal, 2020).

The rapid increase in the number of the super-rich draws attention to a number of critical issues. They have accumulated enormous wealth. According to GFI (2018), the countries with the highest growth in millionaires, but the overall development metrics remain unchanged. This means that money is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of people. Bangladesh ranks third on the list of the world's fastest-growing countries in terms of wealthy population growth (World Ultra Wealth Report, 2019). According to Wealth-X, Bangladesh topped the list of countries with the fastest growth in the number of ultra-high net worth (UHNW) individuals, with a 17.3% increase between 2012 and 2017. The picture is no different in the other South Asian countries.

To avoid public attention, NTMs transfer funds to other countries such as Canada, the United States, and Australia as soon as they can (Kibria, 2020). On August 21, 2020, a student leader of Bangladesh's ruling party was arrested at the district level for money laundering for allegedly laundering Tk 20 billion (The Independent, August 21, 2020), which is equivalent to $235,846,980. This money could tempt these people to eventually move to the country where they hid the money.

According to Swiss Banks, Global Financial Integrity (GFI), and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), approximately US$84 billion (6 lakh

crore taka) has been laundered out of Bangladesh over the past decade (GFI, 2018; Ullah & Huque, 2019). In 2016, Bangladeshi citizens deposited Tk 5566 crore (US$661,489,156) in Swiss banks (GFI, 2018; Kallol, 2017). The speaker of the Afghan parliament has just received Cypriot citizenship (Amader Shomoy, August 25, 2020). This could be interpreted as a non-traditional migrant seeking a safer destination.

Between 2003 and 2012, $13.16 billion (Tk102,648) flowed out of the country, with $2.67 billion (Tk20,802) outflowing in 2006 alone (Ullah & Huque, 2019; GFI, 2006). According to the Swiss Central Bank, deposits of Bangladeshi nationals increased by more than 36% in 2014 compared to the previous year. (Ullah & Huque, 2019). They are willing to invest their money abroad even if they do not receive a return on it (zero interest), although they could earn large profits if they invested in their home country.

In Pakistan, the richest 40,000 people in the country had a total income equal to that of the lowest 18 million people (Burki, 2011; Ullah et al., 2021). The net worth of the military exceeds 10 billion pounds, which is about four times the total foreign direct investment in 2007 (Siddiqa, 2007). The top 100 military officials are estimated to have at least 3.5 billion pounds (Siddiqa, 2007). Even more revealing is the fact that the U.S. paid the Pakistani military $6.6 billion in direct support between 2002 and 2008, but only a portion of that (about half a billion) reached its intended recipients (Hodge, 2009). As the days went by, it became clear that these funds were transferred abroad. An organised fraud involving public and private banks was uncovered, with two fraudulent companies syphoning off nearly 1 billion rupees (Haider, 2020). At the end of 2015, Pakistan-related funds in Swiss banks totaled 1513 million francs (Economic Times, 2016).

On the list of largest depositors, India was 61st in 2014 and 75th in 2015, while Sri Lanka was 151st (Sri Lankan Mirror, 2017). In 2016, wealthy Sri Lankans deposited 307 million (49 billion rupees) in Swiss francs in a Swiss bank (Sri Lankan Mirror, 2017). According to other sources, Sri Lankan passport holders deposited over SL Rs. 7.8 billion in numerous countries with HSBC and Swiss banks (Manusheth-Derana, 2015).

Since it was difficult to determine the amount of money moved out of Afghanistan, we relied on the statement of the Deputy Governor (Bank of Afghanistan) that no less than Rs. 4.5 billion was moved in 2011. (Sidner & Mitra, 2012). However, another source gave the figure as $8 billion, which is almost double the country's 2011 budget (Sidner & Mitra, 2012; Ullah et al., 2021). International remittances and NTM are closely linked in that senders have already followed the money or are in the process of transferring it to new countries (Ullah et al., 2021).

In the last decade, about 88% of illicit financial flows from Bangladesh were due to trade mispricing (Habib, 2019; Ullah & Huque, 2019). Another popular method of sending funds is the Hundi trade. The super-rich NTMs establish a protected enclave in their destination countries. This community keeps a safe distance from its neighbours. Hence, in Canada and internationally, these communities are often referred to as Begum para (a Bengali term). Of course, non-Bangladeshis may not understand this metaphor (Ullah et al., 2021; Ullah & Huque, 2019).

3.4 Non-traditional Migration

According to Ullah and colleagues (2021), the pursuit of rapid accumulation and safe consumption of wealth has given rise to NTM. This suggests that countries that allow the entry and residence of ill-gotten money have contributed to the expansion of NTM. The emergence of NTMs has several dimensions. One group of them moves their assets to new countries because of their professional activities. This article, on the other hand, is about another group that takes advantage of poor governance to gain illicit financial benefits. Ironically, they take advantage of the shortcomings of the system to amass a fortune while being ready to leave the country at any time. They begin transferring money out of the country to their destination countries after realising that a change in administration or laws could herald the end of the favourable status that has allowed them to build a fortune. The fear of losing the opportunity to gain illicit benefits under the protection of the state, as well as the desire to enjoy the wealth they have acquired, drive NTMs to follow their money.

Singapore has introduced the Permanent Resident Scheme (PRS) for investors. PRS can be acquired through the Global Investor Programme, an investment scheme (GIP). With an investment of SGD 2.5 million, one can apply for themselves and their immediate family members under this scheme (Ullah et al., 2021). The GIP plan now offers two investment options. Option A requires a minimum investment of S$2.5 million in either a new business startup or the development of an existing business operation. Option B requires a minimum investment of S$2.5 million in a fund approved by GIP. Malaysia attracts wealthy immigrants through its "second home" programme Thailand attracts elite immigrants through its Thai elite housing programme for wealthy buyers and businessmen, while Brunei employs highly skilled foreigners (Arcibal, 2019; Ullah & Huque, 2019). This suggests that all of these countries attract elite/privileged migrants, but for different reasons and using different techniques (Ullah et al., 2021).

3.5 MM2H (Second Home)

The Malaysian government launched the MM2H (Malaysia My Second Home) campaign to market the country as an attractive location for potential residents from other countries (Khan et al., 2019). According to Live and Invest Overseas' list of "The World's Best Places to Retire in 2017" and International Living's most recent list of "Best Places to Retire Abroad" (Eisenberg, 2017), Malaysia is one of the few countries to appear in the top ten in both lists.

The MM2H programme, introduced in 2002, allows foreigners who qualify to stay in Malaysia as long as they want with a (renewable) social visit pass that is valid for 10 years. They are eligible for benefits such as the ability to purchase residential property in Malaysia that costs more than 119,000 Malaysian ringgit (MYR 500,000) or to purchase a vehicle. For many Asians, especially Bangladeshis,

MM2H is a popular investment technique. Since the programme began in 2002, a total of 4018 Bangladeshis have taken advantage of MM2H, accounting for more than 10% of all MM2H recipients (Ullah et al., 2021).

Tourist arrivals in the region increased steadily from 81.3 million to 108.9 million between 2011 and 2015 (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2016). While ASEAN countries accounted for 42.2% of total tourist arrivals in 2015, China accounted for 17.1%, followed by the European Union (8.8%), South Korea (5.4%), and Japan (4.3%). Australia, the United States, India, Taiwan and Hong Kong rounded out the top ten list of countries or regions from which ASEAN visitors came. More than 33,000 foreigners from 126 countries participated in the MM2H programme. Annual revenue from visa fees is MYR7.5 million (US$1.79 million), while fixed deposits total MYR4.9 billion (US$1.17 billion) and car purchases are MYR148 million (US$35.25 million) (The Malaysian Tourism and Culture, 2017).

In the north, the Royal Thai Government provided various 20-year visas to foreigners who purchased a unit in any housing complex in Thailand through the Ministry of Tourism. The collaboration between the Royal Thai Government and a private developer was similar to Malaysia's MM2H programme and was the first attempt of its kind in the Kingdom (Ullah et al., 2021). Indonesia, the largest ASEAN member by total population, had long reserved land ownership exclusively for Indonesians. Indonesian President Joko Widodo, on the other hand, issued Government Regulation No. 103/2015 on Home Ownership by Foreigners Residing in Indonesia, which allows foreigners legally residing in the country to purchase residential property based on an 80-year lease (Indonesia Investment, 2016). This means that Indonesia will also flourish as a destination country for non-traditional migrants.

3.6 Citizenship by Investment

Citizenship by investment is another way for nontraditional migrants to enter the country of their desired residence. Currently, many countries, including Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Turkey, Malta, Germany, Greece, Grenada, the United Kingdom, Cambodia, Moldova, and Jordan, offer citizenship by investment (Ullah et al., 2021).

Although economic powers such as the United States, China, and Japan account for the largest share of the world's wealthy, there are opportunities in some unexpected regions to create new millionaires (Ullah et al., 2021). Selected emerging economies in Africa, Asia, and Europe are poised to see the largest increases in their wealthy populations (Gilchrist, 2019).

Nigeria, a West African country, is one of the frontrunners, with its wealthy population projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 16.3% through 2023. Egypt is second at 12.5%, while Bangladesh is third at 11.4%. (CNBC, 2019). Even if China expects great growth, it would be much more difficult for established countries like the United States and China-with their respective super-rich populations of

8.7 million and 1.9 million-to achieve the same development rates (Ullah et al., 2021). Poland and Kenya, for example, are "surprising situations," according to the analysis, because they do not belong to the typical groups of leading emerging economies known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey). Bangladesh ranks third among the ten countries with the most migrants who have used the Second Home programme, behind China and Japan. Bangladeshi nationals currently make up 10.6% of the programme's participants. These nontraditional migrants have reportedly secured their families' futures by obtaining citizenship through investment visas or commercial migration programmes.

3.7 Conclusions

This chapter does not claim that NTM did not exist before or that it does not exist elsewhere. It did exist and it continues to exist. Growing inequalities, poor governance, the rise of nepotism, the desire to retain power indefinitely, and the excessive empowerment of patronage groups have led to a serious escalation of corruption in some countries. This has given certain individuals ample opportunity to illegally amass vast sums of money. They prefer to keep their illicit wealth in a safe country and use it to obtain a residence permit or citizenship. As a result, this group differs in every way from the traditional category of migrants. The golden standard by which they differ from the rest of their compatriots is that they live a luxurious lifestyle, especially in a gated community, they are not required to seek employment, and they do not remit money to their country of origin.

We contend that governance failures play an important role in promoting money laundering, and it is evident that South Asian countries are particularly vulnerable in this regard. Moreover, political instability, persecution of the opposition, lack of an exit strategy by those in power, and indifference to this situation contribute to the urge to secure illicit wealth elsewhere (Ullah et al., 2021; Ullah & Sagor, 2018; Bhuiyan & Hossain, 2019, 2020). Capital flight has become a visible and serious problem for South Asia, and nontraditional migration has exacerbated the situation. NTM is now a global phenomenon. However, its exponential spread is a worrying trend that may have consequences for South Asian economies. Further research on the origins, techniques, outcomes, and impacts of NTM activities could be beneficial. The issue deserves attention because extremely large amounts of money are at stake.

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Chapter 4
International Migration in Bangladesh: A Political Economic Overview

Hasan Mahmud

4.1 Introduction

Bangladesh has become a familiar name in the discourse of migration. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), there are approximately seven million Bangladeshis currently living abroad. Scholars recognize migration as a survival strategy of families experiencing resource constraints and uncertain economic prospects (Afsar, 2003; Rashid, 2016; Siddiqi, 2003; Sikder et al., 2017), which is consistent with a long history of research on household coping strategies in the Global South, especially in the context of population growth, rural development, and social change in agrarian societies (Grigg, 1980; Guest, 1989; Wood, 1981). Since the mid-1970s, Bangladesh has been undergoing massive social changes characterized by rapid population growth and an increasing presence of development. As one of the most densely populated countries globally, rural households in Bangladesh cannot find agricultural employment for all members and consequently turn to informal economic activity and migration to the cities and towns (Afsar, 2003; Chaudhury & Curlin, 1975). The conditions in home communities to 'push' the migrants to move abroad and find employment continuously strengthened with the worsening of adverse impacts of climate change, further increasing outmigration (Bernzen et al., 2019; Carrico & Donato, 2019; Islam, 2018). This, perhaps, results in a preference among migration scholars to approach migration in Bangladesh from economic perspectives (Siddiqi, 2003). Although it is true that people migrate first and foremost due to hardship in maintaining a comfortable and secure life in their origin community and search of better opportunities elsewhere, their migration inevitably involves a range of socio-cultural and political factors that decisively shape their actual migratory practices. As such, we need to focus on the non-economic aspects for an adequate understanding of migration. Moving away

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from economic approaches, I present a brief account of the political economy of migration in Bangladesh, highlighting the state's role in shaping migration.

Migration scholars have recognized the importance of the state in affecting migration, which is understood from a political economic perspective. In his paper "The Political Economy of Migration in an era of Globalization", Douglas Massey conceptualizes political economy as "policies that govern the number, characteristics, and terms under which foreigners enter a country have become salient policy and political issues worldwide" (Massey, 2009, p.25). International migration involves crossing the border and entering another country to work and earn money. Thus, a migrant inevitably encounters the destination state at its border, which exercises sovereign authority over whom to allow in and whom to stop from entering (Zolberg, 1999). Hollifield (2004) observes that the destination state is becoming inherently interested in regulating migration as much as maintaining the security of the state and the wellbeing of its citizens. Recognizing such a role of the state at migration destination is not new, though. For instance, Michael Burawoy (1976) observed how the destination state would directly regulate migration in a way that resulted in family separation by allowing only the economically functioning males and defining their migration as temporary by requiring them to repatriate once their employment ended for whatever reason. Despite separating the migrants from their families – Burawoy notes – the state necessitated interdependence between the migrants and their families across the border in an interesting way: the families depended on the migrants' remittance for subsistence while the migrants needed to maintain their membership in the family to which they would return due to inability to settle permanently in the destination country. This shows that migration, as well as their remittances, are outcomes of the immigration policy of the destination state.

Contrary to the generalized idea of migration as an economic endeavor popularized by the neoclassical economic theories of migration whereby different combinations of push and pull factors shape migration, world-system scholars recognize the origin of migration in the social, economic, and political transformations due to the penetration of capitalist markets into not-capitalist societies (Sassen, 1988). Given that the state remains one of the most potent arbiters in the era of neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2007), it is evident that the state continues to shape international migration. This role of the state was most explicit in the post-WW-II era labor recruitment programs in Europe and the US, whereby individual foreign workers were admitted legally for a certain period but had to return afterward (Abadan-Unat & Bilecen, 2020; Calavita, 1992). The state exercises its control over migration by various means. The destination states put in place extensive immigration and border control policies and practices that define the migrants as "permanent residents", who are allowed to settle in the country; "temporary worker" and short-term "visitor", who are allowed to stay for a certain period; or "undocumented" foreigners, who must evade the legal procedures upon entry (Castles, 2011; Munck, 2008; Neumayer, 2006). Another way for the states – particularly in the Middle East and East Asia – to shape migration is using immigration laws that attach migrants to a particular employer or job, house them in workers' colonies and restrict their labor market mobility, and prevent them from overstaying visa through frequent raids,

strict security checks and other measures (Khalaf, 2015; Seol & Skrentny, 2009; Shipper, 2002; Tseng & Wang, 2011).

Despite considerable attention to the role of the destination states in shaping migration, the role of state in the origin country remains relatively understudied. With the growing interest in migrants' remittances, a small number of scholars recently explored the origin state's direct participation in promoting migration to maximize foreign currency earning. For instance, Rodriguez (2010) recognizes what she calls "migrant citizenship" by which the Philippines state reconfigures nationalism by drawing migrants into the rhetoric of filial piety, thereby encouraging them to send remittances. Besides, Guevarra (2010) argues that the Philippines state works with a gendered and racialized moral economy, which bases the ideal behavior of migrant workers on remittances. Iskander (2010) looks at development policy more explicit in recognizing the state's role in migration and remittances. By adopting what she calls "interpretative engagement", the state of Morocco and Mexico formulate policies that channel remittances for investment in community development and enhance the migrants' efforts to improve the lives of their families and communities, and more broadly, their nation. These studies establish the role of the origin state in shaping migrants' employment abroad and sending remittances home, thereby demonstrating the need to move beyond the individualistic perception of migration inherent in the dominant economic approaches to a political economic approach migration.

This chapter explores the role of the origin state by looking at migration in Bangladesh. What follows is a brief historical account of migration in Bangladesh going back to the British colonial era to adequately understand how the state has been involved in migration in this region well before Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation state. Then, it presents an introduction to various types of migration from Bangladesh to different destination countries, the causes, and consequences of those migrations to recognize the role of the state in shaping migration contours.

4.2 Migration History in Bangladesh

Perhaps because of the inherent methodological nationalism in migration studies (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002), discussions of migration in Bangladesh often begin with the birth of the country in 1971 as an independent nation state. This is problematic as Bangladeshis have had mobilities within and across the national borders for centuries.[1] As Alexander et al. (2015) observe, there are two characteristics of migration studies in South Asia: first, a preoccupation with the diaspora overseas labor historians and sociologists looking at indenture labor, the establishment of

[1] Bangladeshis are ethnically from the Bengali people, living in both Bangladesh as well as Indian States of West Bengal, Tripura and parts of Assam.

South Asian diasporic communities, and more recently, anthropologists exploring cultural globalization; and secondly, the development of an idea about "the progressive 'sedentarization' and territorialization' of South Asia in the colonial period", which offers "a picture of a society in which internal migration had become rare and agrarian colonization an exceptional activity" (p.3). After identifying limitations in the conventional approaches to studying migration in South Asia, they argue that the study of migration in Bangladesh must begin with "the widespread mobility in the eastern India before the partition of 1947".

The pre-1947 partition migration can be seen as a continuation of larger migratory flows originated under the colonial world worder whereby the colonial empires would mobilize – first, thousands of migrants from the Europeans countries to settle in the so-called New World (e.g., North America, and Australia) (Bauman, 2011), and secondly, indenture laborer to work in the plantations in the colonized regions around the world (Connolly, 2018). Except for a small piece of land in the central part of Bengal, including Kolkata and Dhaka, accessible through navigation, the large portion of the Bengal delta was extremely difficult to move around due to being crisscrossed by hundreds of rivers, long rainy season, widespread piracy due to an absence of an effective central administration. While the Moghuls have been credited for the economic prosperity in Bengal brought about through agricultural expansion and establishing trade with Delhi and the outer world, it was concentrated only in the central zone leaving much of the delta unconnected and isolated. Such was the case until the mid-nineteenth century. As James Taylor (1840)[2] wrote in his travelogue, people could travel between Dhaka and Kolkata, the two most important cities of the British colonial Bengal, for only half the year, which involved twenty-two 'stages' and twenty changes of the ferry. That is, travel within the Bengal was dangerous and prohibitively expensive. The transfer of power to rule India from the East India Company to the British empire in 1857 initiated an internal transformation of the British Raj.

Alexander et al. (2015) note that a massive improvement in transportation systems involving the introduction of railways, steamships, and roads set the foundation for mass movements of people in and out of Eastern India, including Bengal. By the mid-twentieth century, Bengal was integrated with other parts of the British colonial empire in India and beyond. This was also when tea, jute and coal – three important commodities of the emerging industrial world system – were found in Bengal and its surrounding regions. This created a unique occasion for private capital to exploit natural resources and cheap labor or the region by investing in tea plantation, jute cultivation and processing and coal extraction. The government also found opportunities of increasing tax-income and consolidating imperial rule for the British colonial administration. These industries and transportation networks eventually connected Bengal with parts of northern Madras, the Central Provinces, Orissa, Eastern United Provinces, and Bihar, with Assam and Burma to the east and

[2] James Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca, Calcutta, 1840, in Roy, '"Where is Bengal?"', p. 128.

Nepal to the north. By the early twentieth century, the whole Eastern Part of British India was transformed into a vast, interconnected zonal labor market in which Bengal emerged as "an exceptionally intense zone of mobility" (Alexander et al., 2015, p.11).

In this historical context, we find how the British empire laid the foundation of contemporary migration in Bangladesh. The tea plantations, jute mills, and coal industries attracted thousands of migrant workers from the neighboring provinces. The local labor force was available only during the seasonal breaks in agriculture, encouraging the employers to turn to the workers coming in Bengal from outside, called pardesis (outsiders). The extreme exploitative working conditions in the tea gardens, jute mills, and mining sectors also would dissuade local agriculturalists from seeking employment in these sectors, allowing for in-migration. One noticeable emigration from Bengal involved the people from Sylhet (eastern part of Bengal), who would find jobs in the steamships at Kolkata dockyard commuting between Kolkata and various port cities in the British colonial empire around the world (Bald, 2013; Gardner, 1995).

While the penetration of capital in the Bengal region and subsequent migration is well-known, the role of the late-colonial state in promoting migration out of Bengal is less explored. As the British Raj continued to consolidate in India and annexed parts of the Eastern hill tracts and lower-Burma, the colonial administration grew exponentially. Many educated Bengalis took jobs at various levels of the colonial administration, which would often involve relocating to their workstations in faraway places from one's ancestral home. Famous Bengali novelist Sharat Chandra Chaterjee once took an office job and relocated to Rangoon.[3] He eloquently described in his writings about a Bengali professional community in Burma. The practice of getting some education and finding service jobs in various levels of public administration became so common that the educated faction among the Bengalese became well-known for their unwillingness to work in the farm or factory and preference for office works, which came to be called "babu-culture" with a negative connotation (Dutta, 2021). In fact, the trend gained such momentum that:

> Landed families would send sons to nearby towns and cities to attend Higher English schools and colleges. This pattern of movement by the educated between the ancestral village and the urban centres was so common that it became ingrained in the Bengali language: as Nirad Chaudhuri's autobiography recalls, the term 'basha' was given to the digs in the town, with the more emotive term 'bari' reserved for the ancestral village home. (Alexander et al., 2015, p.16).

So, there were two major trends in terms of migration in and out of British Bengal: one involved the immigration of workers from surrounding provinces into the jute industry, coal mines, and tea gardens, who gradually settled in certain parts of the Bengal delta over a few generations, and the other was an exodus of Bengalis who took jobs in government services in other parts of British India and beyond. This is why Alexander et al. (2015) argue that society in Bengal under the British role went

[3] the capital of Burma under the British colonial rule.

through simultaneous processes of stabilization (followed by integration) of working communities and large flows (i.e., mobility) of migrants.

The post-1947 partition migration is primarily understood in terms of the movement of the Hindus and the Muslims from their ancestral homes to India and Pakistan respectively (Bharadwaj et al., 2008; Roy, 2013). This was due to the widespread communal violence inflicted upon millions of ordinary people between the Hindus and the Muslims fighting for their separate independent countries out of British India (Zamindar, 2013). The ongoing internal migration within the British province of Bengal – now divided into the Indian state of West Bengal and the Pakistani province of East Pakistan – also changed along religious line whereby the Muslims from Indian territories moved in East Pakistan/Bengal (Bangladesh since 1971) and Hindus moved out of East Pakistan (i.e., Bengal) into India (i.e., West Bengal and beyond).

4.3 Migration in Contemporary Bangladesh

As noted above, Bangladesh has earned its name as a major source country of international migration and one of the top ten recipient countries of migrants' remittances. The literature on Bangladeshi migration has also grown considerably in recent years. Based on a review of the works, we can differentiate among four broad types of migration from Bangladesh in terms of their composition and migration destination:

First, the Bangladeshi diaspora is represented overwhelmingly by migrants from the North-Eastern region of Sylhet to the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Australia (Gardner, 1995, 2002; Kibria, 2011; Rozario & Gow, 2003; Siddiqui, 2004). The origin of this migration dates back to the British colonial era when young single male migrants from Sylhet would travel to find jobs on British steamships at Kolkata dockyard and sojourned to faraway seaports in the British colonial empire. Before the labor migration to the Oil-rich Arabian Gulf countries, this was the primary flow of Bangladeshi international migration (Adams, 1987; Choudhury, 1993; Gardner & Sukur, 1994; Gardner, 1995).

Secondly, the type of migration that familiarizes Bangladesh in the academic and policy discourses is the short-term labor migration from Bangladesh to the oil-producing Middle East and newly industrializing countries in the South-East Asian region. The majority of these temporary migrants are male workers who would go abroad for short periods and return after their employment contract ends. Among the destinations of these migrants, Saudi Arabia hosts the largest number, followed by the UAE; the other destinations are Malaysia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Libya, Singapore, and South Korea. Being a Muslim-majority country, Bangladesh has restricted migration by women (Belanger & Rahman, 2013; Oishi, 2005). As a consequence, only about 150,000 women left Bangladesh as temporary migrant workers from 1991 to 2010. Recently, Bangladesh has reformed its migration policy to encourage women's migration, with the result of a six-fold increase in the

number of women migrant workers, from 19,094 in 2007 to 121,925 in 2017 (BMET, 2018). Scholars recognize the source of this migration in rapidly growing labor demand in the destination countries: the rise of oil price in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973 and the development of mega-infrastructural projects in the Middle Eastern countries, and industrial agriculture (particularly palm and rubber gardens in Malaysia) and construction and industrial sectors in Singapore. Much like the Bracero program between the US and Mexico and the Gastarbeiter (guest worker) program between Germany and Turkey, governments of these destination countries took institutionalized recruitment initiatives to bring cheap labor from Bangladesh to satisfy the labor demand.

Thirdly, there is another type of migration from Bangladesh to neighboring countries, particularly to India. Given the organic nature of the borders between India and Bangladesh, this migration often involves unauthorized border-crossing and is considered 'illegal' by India, which results in severe diplomatic disputes and tension between the governments of both countries (Samaddar, 1999; Chatterji, 1999; Rahman and van Schendel, 2003; Ramachandran, 2003). The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) reports that in 2013, India was home to 3.2 million Bangladeshi residents who had migrated into the country and settled there. Not surprisingly, the Bangladesh government officially protested the report within 3 days of its publication, calling it "a carbon-copy of Indian media that had been claiming so over the past several years." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh admitted that some ten million Bangladeshis had crossed the border during the country's liberation war in 1971 but maintained that they had returned after 9 months. These migrants typically include people from poor rural areas in Bangladesh, who travel to India searching for casual works in large Indian cities, such as Mumbai, Delhi or Kolkata, and some find work in low-paid industrial and mining sectors (Gardner, 2012; Hussain, 2013).

Finally, a final type of migration from Bangladesh is primarily towards Southern European countries. Originating in the wake of the first Gulf War, and increasing significantly in the last few decades to countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus, this migration includes young, middleclass, urbanized and educated (Knights, 1996; Zeitlyn, 2006; Mapril, 2007; Mapril, 2014; Morad & Puppa, 2019). In recent years, this migration flow came to world news media as a few hundreds of Bangladeshis migrated to European countries through clandestine processes. For instance, on May 5, 2017, the Independent published a report that Bangladeshis constituted the highest number among the refugees on boats to Europe. On November 25, 2012, BBC News reported that dozens of Bangladeshis and Burmese Rohingya Muslim refugees died every year trying to migrate to Malaysia by boat illegally. Another news report mentioned the arrest of 9 Bangladeshis who attempted to cross the Greece-Bulgaria border illegally.

Conventionally, we see migration as an economic strategy of the migrants and their families whereby they aim for access to additional income and better economic opportunities for their families. But studies have increasingly been recognizing how the state at migrants' destinations involve in managing international migration with its policies and practices that decisively shape migration and the experiences of

people moving across borders. Although somewhat implicit, the typology of contemporary migration from Bangladesh also alludes to an active role of the destination states by highlighting their capacity to regulate migration. We, however, are yet to see an adequate understanding of the role of Bangladesh – if any – in shaping migration.

The Bangladesh government sees international migration positively. For migrant remittances contribute more than 6% of its annual GDP and constitute the second-largest source of earning foreign currencies after the export of readymade garments. The steadily expanding mechanisms of migration governance in Bangladesh – for instance, the establishment of a new ministry of expatriate welfare and several other departments within the government dedicated to serving migrants – testify to this idea of the state's kin interest in migration like some other origin countries of international migration (suck as the Philippines) in the Global South that actively participates in promoting migration.

4.4 The Role of the State in Migration in Bangladesh

The active role of the state in migration in Bangladesh has been well-recognized now. But how does it shape the actual practices of migration? Ketty Gardner (1995) presents a vivid picture of how the state's policies affect actual practices of migration in the district of Sylhet: Gardner observed that it was the relatively affluent families that sent their sons to work on the British ships, and that many of these men ended up settling permanently in England. She noticed that the households in Sylhet were independent farmers and liable to pay the tax directly to the colonial administration, unlike those in other regions of Bengal, where farmers were tenants to the local Zamindars. In the face of increasing fragmentation of land and increasing tax burdens, these households would require additional income from outside their local and regional economy. Thus, they would invest substantial amounts of money in sending their young sons to work on the British ships and eventually migrate to England—sons who, in turn, would send remittance home. Finding this the most viable way to maintain and enhance social status in the village, most households adopted international migration as one of their primary coping strategies and for generations continued to send family members to England.[4] Similar socioeconomic processes can be observed during the post-liberation years of the 1970s, gaining momentum in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

During the second half of the 1970s, a new pattern of international migration emerged with the government actively engaging with the governments in the oil-rich Middle East countries. Although there had been a large migrant population from India and Pakistan in the Middle East, it included only a few Bangladeshis,

[4] Gary Hamilton (1978) observed similar role of falling social structure in China, which – Hamilton argued – encouraged the upper- and upper-middleclass families to send their sons to the United States during the California Gold Rush.

who entered the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as pilgrims and overstayed by taking employment. Their reputation for hard work, discipline, and productivity attracted the attention of Arab employers (WB, 1981), who began to send delegations to Bangladesh looking for more workers. Noticing this as a potential source of foreign income, the government of newly independent Bangladesh took steps to encourage and facilitate the migration of workers to the Middle East. The widespread malpractices in the private recruitment of migrant workers for Middle Eastern countries made the government realize a need for regulation.

Consequently, the government of Bangladesh established the Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (BMET). It formulated laws and policies to regulate and license the private recruiters, provided other necessary services to them, and occasionally sent delegations to Middle Eastern countries in search of employment opportunities for Bangladeshi workers. Since its beginning, the BMET has facilitated the temporary migration of Bangladeshis to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia, side by side with private recruiters. From 1976 to 2020, 32.11% of migrants went to Saudi Arabia and 18.09% to the United Arab Emirates. More than 25% went to four other Gulf countries combined: Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Malaysia and Singapore hosted another 14% (BMET, 2021).[5]

While the government has increasingly stepped in to facilitate overseas employment, its current share of labor migrants is only about 2%. About one-third (35%) are hired through private recruiters. In 2017, a total of 100,525 workers went abroad through official processing by the BMET, which covers all migrants who are actively recruited, either privately or by government bodies. The overwhelming bulk (63%) of foreign employment is procured by the migrants themselves and their families (International Organization for Migration, 2019). It is important to note that these numbers do not include thousands of other Bangladeshis who migrate to developed countries in North America, Europe, and Australia through family-sponsored immigration, higher education, and undocumented border-crossings. Thus, while the official narratives about migration in Bangladesh recognize the active participation of the government and commercial recruiters, international migration in Bangladesh is still a matter of the migrants and their families. So, it is obvious that the Bangladesh government plays its role in facilitating migration through a number of legal frameworks and supporting institutional infrastructures.

4.5 Legal and Institutional Mechanisms for Migration Management

The active participation of the state in managing migration in Bangladesh long precedes the birth of the country in its colonial past. The British colonial administration first introduced the Emigration Act of 1922, which the government of

[5] Source: http://www.old.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/stattisticalDataAction (accessed on 4 May 4, 2021).

Bangladesh amended in its Emigration Ordinance of 1982. The government introduced a number of additional laws, including the Recruiting Agents Code of Conduct and License Rules of 2002, the Overseas Employment Policy of 2006, the Sixth Fifth Year Plan of 2011, the Overseas Employment and Migrants' Act of 2013, which was amended in the Overseas Employment Policy and Rule in 2016 and 2017.

4.6 Laws

Intending to reduce irregular flows and increase the scope of regular migration, the Bangladesh government formulated the Overseas Employment Policy of 2006, which supported the aspiring migrants to choose standard employment and protect their welfare. The scope of this law extends to safeguard the rights of and safety for migrant workers while abroad and their families in Bangladesh. As evident in its aims, this law paid particular attention to prevent malpractices in the recruitment process by strengthening institutional infrastructure and personnel, who would effectively enforce the law. The actual practices of implementing this law involved educating the aspiring migrants with necessary information and training so that they can become competitive in the global labor market. The government, however, has so far failed to come up with a comprehensive action plan towards fully implementing this law. Instead, particular sections of the law would be enacted on an ad hoc basis with minimal monitoring or evaluation. Consequently, the government revised and formalized this law into the Overseas Employment and Migrants' Act, 2013.

A closer look at the Overseas Employment and Migrants' Act of 2013 reveals that the law primarily targeted the private recruiters in Bangladesh, who are infamous for adopting varieties of profiteering malpractices (Afsar, 2009; Deshingkar et al., 2019; Rahman, 2012). Notably, several sections of this law defined recruiting policies and practices with enforceable punishments if violated. For instance, section 9 specified a list of professional background and paper works necessary for anyone planning to enter the migrant recruiting business and apply for a license. By making the license mandatory for this business, this section effectively outlawed all intermediaries and sub-agents. This section also allowed the government to charge a license fee to the applicant to issue a recruitment agent license, thereby creating a source of tax income for the government. Section 10 of this act made it necessary for a recruiting agency to have at least 60% capital ownership by a Bangladeshi citizen living in the country. Section 11 made this ownership non-transferable and valid only for 3 years after which it must be renewed. Section 13 elaborated the reasons for potential cancellation or suspension of the license, while sections 14 permitted the recruiting agents to open branch offices should they want to expand their business. Section 15 defined the responsibilities of recruiting agents to ensure safe migration and protection of the workers' interests. Finally, a

performance-based grading system for the classification of recruitment agents by the government in collaboration with the IOM has been added to assess the recruiting agents' conduct.

The law has so far been limited in achieving the stipulated level of regulation over the recruiting agents, particularly to the strong opposition of the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA) – the national association of the recruiting agents.

4.7 Five Year Plans

Another area to look for the Bangladesh government's role in migration is its 5-year national development plans, particularly the Sixth Five Year Plan (published in 2011). This critical policy paper emphasized increasing the skills of the migrant workers. Given that the stock of Bangladeshi migrant workers was overwhelmingly in unskilled sectors, the government planned to enhance their skill level so that the migrants could find better-paying jobs and earn higher, which would significantly increase the remittances inflow to the country. Specifically, the goal of the new strategy is to expand overseas employment of skilled labor from 35% to 50% of the overseas workforce. In the following Seventh Five Year Plan (published in 2016), migration was included in the set of primary goals to reach foreign employment in the service sectors. While the goals in this policy paper were ambitious, there was hardly any clear pathway to achieve those devised by the government so far.

4.8 Migration Diplomacy

The Bangladesh government has been particularly active and considerably successful in migration diplomacy. The country is an active member of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and hosted the ninth GFMD Summit in 2016. Bangladesh is also a member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Council.

The government of Bangladesh uses two major diplomatic instruments to facilitate migration stipulating the terms and conditions under which Bangladeshi migrant workers are employed in a country of destination: bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding (MoU). As of 2019, Bangladesh has signed two bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) with Qatar and Kuwait and MoUs with the following: Cambodia, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Maldives, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, it has signed a memorandum of.

4.9 Cooperation (MoC) with Japan in 2018

Besides engaging with the governments of the destination countries of Bangladeshi migration, the government actively seeks cooperation from the diaspora and civil society organizations (CSO) within the country. The Ministry of Finance organized an international convention in early 2018, bringing together senior officials and experts from various departments to engage diasporas through what it calls a "PIE" approach (P for philanthropy, I for investment, and E for expert affiliation). Many Bangladeshi diaspora associations – already active in destination countries conducting socio-cultural activities and supporting Bangladeshi migrants abroad – had been invited. The Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment (MoEWOE) regularly engages the CSOs in national consultation processes on migration and development affairs.

4.10 Migration Governance Abroad

Bangladesh government has established an extensive network of the Labor Welfare Wing of diplomatic missions abroad to monitors the protection of rights and interests of Bangladeshi migrants. Currently, there are 29 Labor Welfare Wings in 26 countries among the destinations of Bangladeshi migrants. These offices assess the authenticity of recruiting contracts abroad, scrutinize applications for a work visa before the migrants embarking on the flights, ensuring security in the workplace, including adequate insurance to cover job hazards, and so forth.

4.11 Financial Services for the Migrants

To facilitate migration for the poor, the Bangladesh government has established a specialized bank named the Probashi Kallyan Bank (PKB). This bank provides collateral-free loans to migrant workers, provides loan facilities to returnees to begin income-generating activities, facilitates easier remittance transfers, and encourages Bangladeshi wage earners abroad to invest in the country. In addition, the government has been enacted the Wage Earners' Welfare Board Act (WEWB Act) in 2018, which extended welfare services to migrant workers abroad and their dependents. Moreover, the government and Central Bank actively promote formal remittance schemes through a Wage Earners Remittance Scheme introduced in 1974. The government included cash incentives on remittances the annual budget since the 2019–20 financial year to encourage financial inflows.

4.12 COVID19 Responses of the State

The COVID-19 pandemic had the most devastating impact on international migration. It directly impacted 13 million Bangladeshi migrant workers and 30 million dependents by intensifying numerous socio-economic crises such as joblessness, consumption of reserve funds by family members, and shrinking of the country's remittance inflow (Karim et al., 2020). According to the World Bank estimate, total remittances by migrant workers from Bangladesh would fall to $14 billion for 2020 – around a 25% decrease from the previous year. As an attempt to ease the financial strain the COVID19 incurred on the migrants and their families, Bangladesh government offered incentives to encourage expatriate workers to send their money through legal channels (Aneja & Islam, 2020).

Given the active role the state has been playing in facilitating international migration and the importance of migration to national economy and society in Bangladesh, policy experts suggested that the government designs and implements well-coordinated public–private migrant workers' inclusive policies and creating a supportive environment for the returnee migrant workers to overcome this crisis (Chowdhury & Chakraborty, 2021). These recommendations included initiating dialogues and negotiation with the employing countries to protect the jobs and workers' rights to restore the employment and remittances during and after the pandemic, facilitate the expansion of the labor market across borders, and harness the valuable remittances for the overall welfare of the country.

The actual responses of Bangladesh government, however, were far short of what experts suggested to deal with the impacts of COVD19 pandemic on migrants and their dependents. While the government offered a total of $100 billion in incentives to recuperate the economy, only about $200 million (one-twentieth) was allocated for the migrants (Kumar & Pinky, 2021). Besides, the government could do little to negotiate with the destination country governments regarding job restoration and return of the migrants. Still, migrants managed to go back abroad, and the inflow of remittances began to increase ($1092.96 million in April 2020 and $2598.21 million in July 2020), which resulted in the ever highest foreign exchange reserve ($38 billion) in Bangladesh according to the Bangladesh Bank Website.

4.13 Conclusion

Migration is generally seen as an individual's economic endeavor aimed at improving the livelihood of their families and themselves. A larger share of scholarship attention to migration is also oriented towards the financial consequences of migration evident in migration and development discourse. Another popular approach to migration is transnationalism, which celebrates the positive outcomes of migration for the individuals, their families, and communities in both the origin and

destination countries. While the state at migrants' destination receives increasing scholarly attention, the migration origin remains largely understudied. As this chapter shows, the origin state plays a vital role in migration. This is particularly true about poor origin countries in the Global South like Bangladesh, which depend on the remittance migrants send home from abroad. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis in studying individual's migration may be effectively applied to understand the state's role in the origin country. A Political economic analysis of the destination state has already produced necessary knowledge about how the governments in migration destinations (such as the USA and European countries) shape immigration by considering various economic and policy issues and negotiating these with the capitalists and the domestic working class. This has benefited in recognizing multiple problems and issues that allow for adequate policy responses to improve the experiences of the migrants. A similar exercise in understanding the role of the origin state may also offer important insights that would possibly help improve the migrants' experiences with adequate support from the state.

Bangladesh has developed several policy instruments, including laws, acts, and migration diplomacy with the states in the destinations of Bangladeshi migrants. Looking at each of those allows for assessing their success and challenges in achieving stated policy outcomes. The Bangladesh government's interest in promoting migration is clearly understood from its active participation in managing migration. The effectiveness of its policy instruments varies considerably with migration diplomacy, migration governance abroad and provisions for financial supports to the migrants shows promising outcomes while the acts targeting to improve recruiting system being stalled due to the opposition from organized pressure of the recruiters. Further studies are needed to adequately understand the state's role, which will potentially help formulate necessary measures to protect the migrants' rights and improve the overall positive impact of migration both for the migrants and their communities in the origin.

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Chapter 5
Labour Migration from Nepal: Trends and Explanations

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5.1 Introduction

Labor migration now has a significant influence in Nepal's society and economy. The migration of labor force and the resultant social and financial remittances have reshaped household livelihood structure and country's economy (Adhikari, 2021). Nepal received around $8.3 billion – equivalent to about 30% of GDP – remittance in 2018/19 (World Bank, 2019). Both migration volume and remittance inflow have been increasing at an accelerated rate since the late 1990s, even though there is slight fluctuation from time to time. There has also been profound increase in proportion of households receiving remittances. For example, only 23.4% households received remittances in 1995/96, which increased to 55.8% in 2010/11 (CBS, 2012). The volume of remittances received by remittance-recipient households also increased significantly in the last two decades; this increased from Rs 15,160 (per recipient household per year) in 1995/96 to Rs 204,782 in 2016 – increased by almost 14 times. Remittance contributed 26.6% of household income of remittance-recipient households in 1995/96, which increased to 62% in 2016 (CBS, 2012; IMF, 2020). The general migration pattern of Nepal changed drastically because of the Covid-19 pandemic, which forced many migrants working in India and Gulf countries/Malaysia return to Nepal. A significant proportions of these migrants faced various discriminations in the place of their work, while returning to Nepal, and then reintegrating to their societies (Adhikari et al., 2022).

This chapter analyses the changing trend in migration and then explains why such it is growing. It takes a historical approach, as there are different currents of migration at different periods as shaped by the changing circumstances of both

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internal and international social, political and economic situations. In addition, different groups of people (based on class, caste/ethnicity and gender, and geographical region) were affected by these circumstances differently influencing their migration patterns. The analysis clearly shows that a single theoretical lens is not enough to explain historical trend of migration or its contemporary nature. A nuanced analysis or perspective is required based on both internal and external political economy and internal social structure encompassing class, ethnicity, gender and regional perspective.

5.2 Nepal –Changing Trends of Migration

Although immigration of people from other countries was important for peopling of Nepal in the distant past, emigration to other countries for work started in the process of unification of the country since 1760s and in its aftermath (Adhikari, 2017a). Even during this process, influence from external forces, particularly British colonial/expansionist regime, had played some role in the emigration of Nepalis to work in other countries. In recent times, especially after 1990, however, the process of globalization that has opened up opportunities for the easily sourced and low cost workers in newly industrializing countries has contributed in the migration of individuals for contract work. This time period also coincides with political change in Nepal. The influence of this external and internal change can be seen in migration data as presented in Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.1, which show that since 1990, there is drastic change in the destination countries for the work. Now, it is clearly seen that an overwhelming proportion of Nepali migrants go beyond India (especially to Gulf countries and Malaysia) for work. In the past, this migration was confined mainly to India. Nepalis have also started going to developed countries for work even though

Table 5.1 Foreign migrant workers (absentee population; Figures in brackets are percent)

Year	Total population	Absentee POPULATION	Absentee as % of total	% Absentees in India	% Absentees in other countries	Male (%)	Female (%)
1942	6,283,649	87,722	1.4	–	–	–	–
1952/54	8,473,478	198,120	2,34	–	–	87.6	12.4
1961	9,741,466	328,470	3.37			–	–
1971	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1981	15,425,816	402,977	2.61	93.1	6.9	81.5	18.5
1991	19,149,387	658,290	3.44	89.2	9.8	83.2	16.8
2001	23,499,115	762,181	3.24	77.3	22.7	89.2	10.8
2011	26,494,504	1,921,494	7.25	37.6	62.4	87.6	12.4*
2021	29,192,480	2,169,478	7.43	–	–	81.28	18.72

Source: CBS (1986, 1992, 2002, 2011), Kansakar (2003) and CBS (2021) *65 did not identify the gender



Fig. 5.1 Volume of migration for work in foreign countries (other than India). (Source (www.dofe.gov.np), MoLESS (2020). Because of difference in fiscal year and chronological year, the data of 1994 is, in fact, of 1993–94, and so on)

this is still a minor stream. Therefore, now, Nepali migrant workers can be categorized into three main streams – migrants to India, migrants to Gulf countries (GCC) and Malaysia and other countries in Asia, and migrants to developed countries or what is called Wealthy Western and Asian (WWA) countries (Williams et al., 2020).

5.3 Migration to India

Migration of people from Nepal to India has a long history. Table 5.1 shows a trend of migration to India using the census data, which take absentee population as proxy for migration for work in other countries. As absentee population does not take into account the migration of less than six months, it underestimates the actual magnitude of migration; especially, it does not include seasonal migration of less than 6 months duration. Various studies reveal that there are anywhere between 1.8 million and 3 million Nepali migrant workers in India (Dixit, 1997). On the other hand, another study revealed that there are at the most 0.7–0.8 million Nepalis working in India (Kollmaire et al., 2006). Such inconsistencies arise because of 'open border' between Nepal and India as guided by the Peace and Friendship Treaty made in 1950, which allows peoples of both countries to freely cross the border and find employment without any restrictions. For many poor Nepali people, India has been an accessible and a popular destination for work to secure the livelihood of, or reduce the burden, on the family. Baral considers India as a 'safety valve' for Nepal (1992), i.e., whenever there is crisis, people move to India to earn their livelihoods. This was also true during the political conflict period (Maoist people's war in the period 1996–2006).

In recent times, the proportion of migrants going to India has declined drastically since they have started to move to Gulf States and Malaysia because of relatively

better income in these countries. For example, in 1981, about 93% of the migrants (absentee population) went to India; but by 2011 only 37.6% of the migrants went to India (Table 5.1). But, India is still a main destination for the poorer people. For example, migrants from the poorest regions of Nepal (Far-west and mid-west regions) go to India for work.

5.4 Migration to Countries Other than India (Mainly Gulf Countries and Malaysia)

Nepalis started going to other countries (other than India) mainly from the early 1990. Prior to that, the Nepali State had restricted citizens' travel to foreign countries (except for India). The political change in 1990 removed restrictions to travel to other countries and created an environment for the private recruitment agencies (RAs) to work effectively as business ventures. These RAs then facilitated people to find work in overseas countries. According to the Department of Foreign Employment (DoFE) that keeps record of migrants who have gone to other countries (than India) for work, about four million individuals have gone out for the work in a decade 2007–08 to 2018–19. The volume of migration since 1993, based on DoFE database, is presented in Fig. 5.1.

Nepal's government has given permission to its citizens to work in 128 countries as of 2018/19. After peaking up labour permits for foreign employment in 2016, there has been slight reduction since then. These migrant workers go abroad for work through the help of private recruitment agencies. The Government of Nepal also sends its people to work in Republic of Korea through Employment Permit Scheme (EPS); it sent around 59,000 Nepalis in a decade 2008/09 to 2018/19 – with an average of 7500 to 8500 a year. Foreign employment is still a domain of males – as female migrants accounted for only around 5% in the decade of 2008/09 to 2018/19.

In terms of countries of destination, most Nepali migrants go to Gulf States (Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) and Malaysia. In 2017/18, 92% of the migrants landed in these countries, and in 2018/19, this figure was 88%. This clearly shows lack of diversity in the migration. Among Nepali migrant workers, the Qatar was the major destination countries (32%) followed by Malaysia (24%), UAE and Saudi Arabia (17% in each) during the period of 2015–2019. For male migrant workers, UAE, Qatar, Malaysia, Jordan, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey were the major destination countries in the same period. Whereas for female workers, who work mainly as domestic help, the major countries of destination include UAE, Qatar, Malaysia, Kuwait, Jordan and Cyprus, which account for about three-fourths of the female migrants (IOM, 2019). Covid-19 made the lives of a large majority of migrants working in these countries difficult as they could not easily return to Nepal because of flight problem. On the other hand, job cuts and wage

cheating and other discrimination was also relatively high for these migrants (Adhikari et al., 2022).

5.5 Migration to Developed Countries

Migration to developed countries like the UK, North America, Australia many European countries, Japan, and Republic of Korea is a new trend, and participation in this migration stream is still small, but it is also growing faster. Migrants working in these countries derive higher income and are relatively better placed in terms of protection of human rights and labor rights. But these countries are accessible to people from relatively better economic and social conditions in terms of wealth and education. Student migration is a major pathway for this type of migration. The volume of student migration from Nepal to such developed countries has been increasing rapidly over the years representing 26,948 in 2009/10 to 63,259 in 2018/19, with Australia as the main destination country (57.4% in 2018/19) for Nepali students (Adhikari, 2019; IOM, 2019). A tendency of nurse migration to developed countries has also been growing in Nepal. A study has revealed that between 2000 and 2008, around 1000 Nepali nurses migrated to the UK (Adhikari, 2013). Nepal has also recently entered with formal agreement with UK[1] and Israel[2] Governments for the temporary migration of nurses. Most migrant workers in developed countries have no intention to return, and as a result, do not remit much.

5.6 Covid-19 Pandemic and Emigration from Nepal

Like in many parts of the world, Covid-19 also upended migration pattern in Nepal. The Government of Nepal estimated that about half a million migrant workers needed to be rescued from Gulf countries and Malaysia alone. About 200,000 Nepali migrant workers in India were reported to have returned to Nepal just before the national lockdown in March 2020, and many thousands of them were stranded in Nepal-India border after the lockdown was imposed (IoM, 2020). COVID-19 also put a halt in the process of migration of potential migrants. There were about 115,000 most potential migrants who had taken labour permits from the government but were not able to leave because of travel restrictions. About 328,681 aspirant migrants who had taken pre-approvals have also been halted due to this crisis (IoM, 2020). COVID-19 has created serious problems on those migrants who were undocumented, domestic workers, workers whose contractual period was over and

[1] https://kathmandupost.com/money/2022/08/23/nepal-and-uk-sign-deal-to-recruit-nepali-nurses-in-the-uk-healthcare-sector

[2] https://kathmandupost.com/national/2021/07/21/israel-set-to-start-taking-in-nepali-caregivers-soon

those who were already in exploitative situation during migration process (NHRC, 2020). A survey of these returned migrants had found that slightly more than half of them would like to return when it is safe and another half wanting to do something in Nepal (IoM, 2020). The impact was also seen among current migrants at the destination countries. Of the total surveyed participants, about 30% did not receive full salary whereas 29% did not receive salary on time during the period of COVID-19 (Blitz & Humanity United, 2022). During the first wave of COVID-19, only 32% received support from friends/relatives at destination country and about 25% were supported by their own company/employer whereas only 4.4% were supported by Nepali Embassy (Ibid).

But, after about six months (By September, 2020), many returned migrants from India (who happen to be mainly from Far-west and Mid-west Nepal, poorest regions in Nepal) started to re-migrate for work despite the knowledge that the COVID-19 problem in India was getting worse. These migrants reported that they could not sustain their livelihoods in their villages (Ayer, 2020). This clearly showed that poorer people are more worried about food and livelihood than the COVID-19 infection itself.

The case of wage theft was incidental at the destination country before the COVID-19, but the cases of wage theft had compounded among Nepali migrant workers during the period of pandemic. A study carried out by National Network for Safe Migration (NNSM) in 2021 reveals the fact that about 43% respondents received 20–40% less salary than agreed whereas about 10% received less than 90% less salary than agreed (NNSM, 2021). Similarly, about 24% respondents received 90–100% less payment of extra working hour whereas about 42% received 0–10% less payment of overtime work. During pandemic, nearly 32% faced the problem of 100% salary deduction due to complete closure of company and mobility restriction whereas 26% only did not face the salary deduction issue (Ibid).

Furthermore, duration of unpaid leave due to COVID-19 among Nepali migrants varies with country of destination and nature of work. The significant proportion of returnee migrants i.e. 61% came back to Nepal for 2–4 months period unpaid leave which is followed by 1–2 months (19.35%), 4–6 months (6%) and the least proportion (3%) of returnee who came to Nepal with more than 8 months period unpaid leave (Ibid).

5.7 Composition of Migrants in Different Streams

The class and social composition of migrants and their destination countries show a clear pattern. For example, most of the migrants are poor. Poverty and class categories in Nepal are defined mainly by the level of income. The latest survey in this regard was done in 2010–11 in the form of Nepal Living Standard Survey, which revealed poverty line as Nepali Rs 19,262 per capita per year, which was considered to be required to meet basic living (CBS, 2012) or what was called consumption expenses. The Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) 2010/11 data on migrants in

relation to consumption quintile demonstrate that the majority of the first and second poorest people (62% and 51% respectively) are believed to be outside the country (CBS, 2012).[3] As the volume of migration to India, where poorer people go for work, is still large, there is dominance of 'lower class' (first and second poorest people) in this migration flow. Another study reveals that migrants in the poorest group (defined by wealth-ranking exercise in the study) go to India, lower middle class to Malaysia and Gulf States, and upper middle class and upper class go to developed countries like USA, Europe and Australia (Adhikari, 2001; Gurung, 2014). Very poor people (bottom 20%) (Adhikari, 2001; CBS, World Bank, DFID and ADB, 2006) cannot migrate or even move to other parts of the country and they depend on whatever work is available within their villages and nearby places as they cannot pay the financial cost required for the mobility.

The migration streams by caste/ethnicity in Nepal yields unique feature. Of the diverse ethnic composition of the country (126 caste/ethnic groups), major groups include: Brahmin, Chettri, Dalits, Janajatis, Newars, Muslims and Others. Brahmins and Newars have the lowest poverty rates (around 10.5%) and are considered to be wealthiest in general, even though there is some diversity within each group. This is followed by Chettri (poverty rate about 23.4%), Janajatis (indigenous population – poverty about 27%), and Dalits (about 42%).[4] Dalits are the groups considered to be most disadvantaged socially and economically.

A study conducted in Nepal by Blitz Media Private Ltd. and Humanity United (2022) reveals the fact that out of total surveyed migrant participants, the highest proportion was represented by Brahmin/Chhetri (35.6%) and Pahadi (hill) Janajati/Indigenous Nationalities (29.2%). Whereas Madhesi (Terai) Dalit and Muslim represented the lowest proportion of respondents (i.e. 5.2% and 2.1% respectively). According to the proportion of respondents by provinces, the highest proportion of respondents in Sudur Paschim (far-west) and Karnali (mid-west) were Dalit (65.2% in Sudur Paschim and 64% in Karnali). Similarly, Pahadi Janajati/Indigenous Nationalities was found highest in Bagmati (60.6%) and Gandaki (46.4%) (Blitz & Humanity United, 2022).

A recent study on why people from different ethnic groups in Nepal migrate at different rates and to different destination has revealed that the historical legacy and human and economic capital are the key drivers of ethnic differences in out-migration. In this context, this study also revealed that contemporary discrimination may not be as important driver as the previous two (Williams et al., 2020). This seems to be obvious given that if discrimination was a major driver, Dalits would have migrated to a greater magnitude to a destination where such discrimination was not there. On the other hand, a large proportion of them migrate to India where caste-based discrimination is still there like in Nepal. Other studies also reveal this fact. For example, an longitudinal study conducted since the 1990 revealed that

[3] The per capita of the poorest group (1st consumption quintile) was Nepali Rs (NRs) 16,850, 2nd quintile (NRs 24,582, 3rd quintile (lower middle class) NRs 34,154, 4th quintile (upper middle class) NRs 44,184, and the fifth quintile (richest or upper class) NRs 95,172 (CBS, 2012: 27).

[4] There are also categories within these groups in terms of hill and Terai (plain).

historical legacies of hill ethnic groups like Gurungs led them to their larger scale migration to Hong Kong and UK, and then their larger income from their work in the armies also helped their children to migrate to other developed countries like USA and Japan (Adhikari, 2001; Seddon et al., 2022). The migration of Brahmins and Chettris to developed countries is basically due to human and economic capital – higher income/wealth, education and social network with relatives and friends who had already migrated in such countries (Williams et al., 2020). The consequences of this migration trend also mean that there will be persistence of, or rather increase in, economic inequality. Therefore, if migration is taken as a way of enhancing prosperity of all, policy changes are also necessary so that disadvantaged and discriminated people can also participate in remunerative migration pathways.

5.8 Explaining Migration for Work from Nepal

As discussed above, we see that there are three main streams of emigration from Nepal to foreign countries for work. These three cases have to be looked at differently based on who participates in such migration, why they participate, and regulation and governance of cross-border migration. These three streams are: open migration to India, contract work in Malaysia, Gulf countries and other middle income countries, and migration to developed countries – Europe, Australia, Japan, and North America. Until now, the third stream is still small but it is growing faster. These migration streams require different theoretical perspectives to understand them.

5.9 Push and Pull Factors

Looking at the three streams of migration, 'push and pull' theory is largely used to explain why Nepalis migrate for work in foreign countries. Generally, push factors are considered responsible for migration to India as poorer migrants and migrants from the marginal and food scarce regions generally go to India for work as long-term migrant as well as temporary and seasonal migrants to earn some income to supplement food produced at home. Two provinces (Karnali and Sudur Paschim) located in mid-west and far-west, respectively, are the most food insecure and poverty ridden Provinces, and migration to India is the dominant form of migration in these regions. In 2020, Human Development Indexes (HDI) in these two provinces were 0.538 and 0.547 (Nepal's HDI was 0.587). Poverty rate in these two Provinces – Karnali and Sudur Paschim – was 58.8% and 50.8% respectively in 2011, against the national average of 39.1% in that year. However, poverty rates estimated in 2014 showed some improvement in Sudur Paschim province (33.6%), but it was still 51.2% in Karnali. Nationally, it was estimated at 28.6% in 2014 (NPC, 2020: 26 Fig. 2.10). From these two Provinces, almost every household (except for a few

wealthy ones) has one or two family members having worked in India in the past or working now at least either as temporary migrant or as seasonal migrants. In fact, seasonal migration is very common here, which usually happens when there is slack in farm-work (Gill, 2001).

Poverty is also seen affecting migration. Even though, it creates a push factor for migration, a minimum income or economic status is also required for the households/people to initiate migration. Below that critical income, people cannot migrate. For example, a large study conducted in early 2000s revealed that poorest of the poor (bottom 20%) couldn't migrate to foreign countries including India (CBS, World Bank, DFID and ADB, 2006). The same conclusion was reached in another study conducted in the late 1990s (Adhikari, 2001). Even going to India requires some expenses (at least travel cost, communication cost, friendship network to host for the initial period and help in finding the work) even though it does not require other expenses like agent fees and cost of travel documents. So, very poor people cannot even migrate to India. This is seen in case of poorest people in Province 2, located in eastern Terai Nepal. As a Province, this is the poorest Province in Nepal with very low HDI of 0.51 in 2020 (NPC, 2020). But, this low HDI of the Province is a result of high level of inequality or disparity among different classes, and high level of gender disparity. High intensity of poverty among the poorer groups in this Province prohibited their migration to cities in Nepal or to India (Seddon et al., 2001). On the other hand, this Province also has higher level of migration to Gulf States and Malaysia, which is common among the middle-income groups.

Push factors also work differently for different groups of people. Role of poverty as a push factor and its inability to move people for migration when it (poverty) is critically high as discussed above is also revealed in another study (Shrestha, 2017). This study examined a shock to the push factors in the origin and its differential response to migration to various destinations. It revealed that such shocks in push factors affected different parts of the wealth distribution and different wealth group behaved differently in terms of their migration to different destination. The shock factors examined were increase in income due to rainfall (crop production) and increase in death due to political conflict. When the change in the first factor leads to an increase in income by $ 100, it increases migration to India by 54%, but it has no effect on migration elsewhere. An increase in conflict, which creates income loss and amenity loss for wealthier households, increased migration abroad (other than India), especially from urban areas. The study reports "an increase in conflict intensity by one death per 1000 population increases international migration from urban areas by 3.1 percentage points which is equivalent to the effect of increasing household income by US$ 420 in absence of conflict" (Shrestha, 2017: 3). The increase in growth in the construction and manufacturing sectors in the destination countries, particularly Malaysia and the Gulf countries was found to increase migration to these destinations (profitable migration) due to reduction in cost of migration. Therefore, 'pull' factors are important for initiating migration to profitable destinations for wealthier households, which take risks to take those opportunities.

For other two streams of migration, contract work in Malaysia and Gulf States and to developed countries, 'pull factors' are important. The migration to developed countries has been studied least because of small volume of migration. Until now, this has been a privilege of wealthy people because of high cost and higher professional (like nursing, medical and engineering) education required for migration. Studies have shown that income of migrants in countries other than India is significantly higher than what they would earn if they get a work. In case of India, the income is not that different than in Nepal in case people get a work. Therefore, there is no significant 'pull' effect. In other cases, a foreign migrant (Gulf and Malaysia) was found to earn Rs 34,871 per month (equivalent to $328) in 2016, whereas per capita GDP in that year was Rs 86,000 (IMF, 2020). This means that those working in foreign countries can get as much as five times the income in Nepal – provided they get the work, but there is already high unemployment within the country. In another study conducted by Nepal Rastra Bank in 16 districts, average annual income of a youth in Nepal was found to be Rs 90,521, and that of a youth working in foreign country, as reported by his/her family members, was Rs.532,000. This shows that the annual income of someone working overseas was more than five times that of someone working in Nepal (Adhikari, 2017b).

Even though push factors are primary cause of migration to India of people from 'lower' economic background and marginal regions, there are also proximate factors facilitating these migrations. Because of these facilitating circumstances like open border (political relation) and historical-cultural ties, this neo-classical 'push-pull' explanation does not fully explain this migration. If Nepalis were tempted to migrate solely because of poor economic conditions and lack of opportunities (push factors) in the country of origin, this same country (Nepal) has also attracted a large number of Indians for work. As a matter of fact, more remittance goes to India from Nepal, then from India to Nepal. For example, in 2017, remittance worth 3.02 billion USD was sent from Nepal to India. On the other hand, remittance worth 1.02 billion USD was sent from India to Nepal in that year (Pew Research Center, 2019). The different regional and cultural areas of India and Nepal are interlinked in different ways so that some regions (states) in India (for example Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and Orissa) are more interlinked to Nepal than in India and so poorer people from these regions come to Nepal for work. On the other hand, geographical regions of Nepal like mid-west and far-west are more interlinked to some of the Southern States in India (like Maharastra and Karnataka) and hilly regions in India (like Utter Pradesh hilly region; northeast hills, and Himalayan region like Laddakh, Jammu, Kashmir) than other regions within the country. These corridors of migration between these countries have been created and shaped due to historically evolved interpersonal relationships based on culture, trust and traditional migration. This historical/cultural legacy has created and perpetuated a belief that Nepalis are good for security related jobs. This has created a demand for them in India. On the other hand, because urbanization and industrialization has taken place earlier in India than Nepal, some modern skills in both technical and marketing sectors have been more readily available to Indians. They have found that they can work in Nepal to utilize those skills.

The 'open border' between these countries that facilitated migration is a product of political/cultural relations as discussed above. Thus, the emphasis on differential (expected) wage rates in push-pull theory (Massey et al., 1993) is not completely applicable in this case. To explain migration from Nepal to India, Subedi (1991) uses a framework with four clusters of variables shaping international migration – differential variables (differences in wage, employment and price of land), spatial variables (distance and transportation costs), affinity variables (religion, culture, language and kinship networks) and access variables (rules for entry and exit). In the past, Nepalis went to India not solely because of wage differentials but mainly in the search for arable land as poor Nepalis denied access to land within Nepal because of exploitative agrarian relations of that time.

5.10 Other Explanations of Migration

Looking at the political-economic perspective from labor demanding countries, 'dual labor market theory' is another theory of migration that seeks to explain international migration (Massey et al., 1993). The need for foreign labor arises because labor market in industrialized destination countries is segmented into a capital intensive primary sector, which employs local people, and a secondary sector of labor intensive physical and less prestigious work which is done by people from poorer countries. The 3-D jobs (dirty, dangerous and difficult) that Nepalis do, often with low wages, in foreign countries, can be explained by this theory. Foreign migrants perform such jobs for a number of reasons including the short-term and instrumental nature of their relationship with the jobs and the society. Once their goal is fulfilled (usually earning a certain amount of money), they leave the job. Therefore, these jobs do not form their identity.

There are also theories that explain why international migration is perpetuated. In Nepal's case, network theory and social capital theory have also been used to explain migration. Network theory explains that migration is perpetuated as migrants develop a network between labor sending and receiving countries, and those having a relation (through kinship, friendship, and shared community origin) with the migrant also migrate (Boyd, 1989). Therefore, every migrant is linked to non-migrants and this migration creates a pathway for others to migrate. For example, a study taking the case of Nepal reveals that the main outcomes of migration like increased financial capital, education of the children, migration specific knowledge, and increased social capital enlarges asset endowment and lowers both investment costs and risks involved in migration, which facilitates further migration (Thieme & Wyss, 2005; Wyss, 2004). Thieme uses the concept of 'social capital (networks of related persons)' to explain Nepalis migration to India, especially in determining where a migrant goes and what work he/she will do. Closely related to this argument is also a study that examined the relationship between ethnicity and migration pattern in Nepal (Williams et al., 2020). This study revealed that of the three mechanisms (educational and economic resources, contemporary

discrimination, and historical legacies of migration perpetuated through social networks) considered to explain the 'destination choice', first two were found to be important.

Considering that both private and government institutions (e.g. recruiting agencies, government departments, civil society, labor courts, welfare agencies, research agencies, policies etc. in both source and destination) are facilitating migration to other countries like Gulf States and Malaysia (where private agencies are crucial) and to countries like South Korea, Japan and Israel (where government also sends people as agreed between the governments), institutional theory (Massey et al., 1993; Massey, 2019) could also be relevant here. As Nepal's migration to Gulf countries and other developed countries increased rapidly after change in government politics in 1990 with the institutionalization of democratic governance, institutional theory seems relevant to the extent that the government policies and institutions helped in this process. But then there are also other drivers of migration like historical legacies and social networks that helped in migration through information, sponsorship, support and the like.

Migration from Nepal has been a continuous process. It has also rapidly changed in line with the change in economy and society or broader process of development. It is seen that as the country has progressively developed, migration for work has also grown rapidly and in different ways making it difficult to have a comprehensive theory to explain this, which is a case in migration pattern generally (Castles & Miller, 2009). In recent studies, the role of aspirations in migration and migrant's agency have also been emphasized (de Haas, 2021). It is because of this, a migrant makes many migration steps based on capability to reach an aspiration, which could also change along with development process. In this line, a recent study of Nepali migrants to Gulf countries revealed that migrants make many moves to reach to these countries (which are not desirable but affordable), and then this move again helps to move to other aspirational migration destination (Valenta, 2022).

5.11 Conclusion

Nepal has undergone a rapid shift in its migration pattern in the last three decades, which requires a complex set of theoretical perspectives to understand why migration for work in foreign countries have been taking place, and why this has been changing.

Even though, prior to 1990, Nepal's migrants went mainly to India for work – which was facilitated by unique sets of political, cultural and historical incidences, now increasingly, Nepalis go to other countries for work. There are now three broad streams of migration – migration to India, migration to Gulf States and Malaysia, and migration to developed countries. As of now, the second stream is dominant and Nepal gets huge remittances from this stream of migration.

Migration to Gulf States and Malaysia, which now accounts a larger proportion of Nepalis who work outside the country and a larger proportion of remittances

entering Nepal, has recently evolved – after 1990, which coincides with opening of Nepal to outside world through a political change in 1990 and creation of new job opportunities in these countries through waves of globalization and industrialization. The need for low-cost labor with less political power for union-making and bargaining to sustain those industries or enterprises was a major reason for allowing foreign workers to work in these countries. Even though these opportunities had emerged somewhat earlier like late 1970s, Nepal is a latecomer in this field because of closed politics that discouraged its citizens to work outside the country. The unique case of the Covid-19 pandemic and its impacts on migration and remittances reveal that these migration patterns can suffer serious challenge within no time if disasters like the Covid-19 pandemic hit the world.

Nepal's unique case of foreign labor migration over a period of about 250 years enriches our theoretical understanding of migration for work in foreign countries. The analysis clearly shows that a single theoretical lens is not enough to explain historical trend of migration or its contemporary nature. A nuanced analysis or perspective is required based on both internal and external political economy and internal social structure encompassing class, ethnicity, gender and regional perspective. For example, as this paper demonstrates different theoretical perspective is required to understand migration in these broad three streams of migration (to India, to the Middle East and Malaysia, and migration to developed countries). Similarly, it is seen that disasters of different types (like the Covid-19 pandemic) and how they shape migration are also to be integrated into theoretical perspective. Such attempts have been slow to come in migration research.

Understanding of why migration takes place and why certain migrants go to certain destinations and their problems and aspirations can help us in formulating policies that help these migrants to reach their aspirations in the migration process. As is seen in this paper, migrants face several challenges even though they constantly use their agencies to reach their aspirations in this regard. Problems like Covid pandemic and restrictive structure of the global order (like migration related policies and support for migrant workers) affected migrants and their movements. Removing those restrictive structures and increasing support mechanisms during difficult periods and crises would help migrants to fulfill their aspirations in their migration process.

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Chapter 6
Navigating Between Nation and Civilization: Regimes of Citizenship and Migration Under Bharatiya Janata Party

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The nation ought to be the master and not the slave of its own history.

V.D. Savarkar (1947/1909:XXIII, quoted in Sagar, 2014:249)

While disposing off a writ petition filed by Assam Public Works, Assam Sanmilit Mahasangha and others, the Supreme Court of India – India's apex court - ordered that an updated National Register of Citizens (NRC) for the Indian state of Assam be published as per the provisions of the memorandum of understanding that brought an end to the six-year long Assam movement in 1985. It may be noted that the movement keyed to the threefold demand for detection, disenfranchisement and deportation of foreigners, is considered, by all accounts, as one of India's most popular protests since the civil disobedience movement led by Gandhi in 1942. The Court order set off the massive preparations for updating the NRC under the direct supervision of the Court. More than 50,000 government employees were inducted into the process. Over Rs1600 crores[1] of public money had been spent. The entire state administration was reported to have come to a standstill. The final NRC released on 31 August 2019 left out the names of as many as 1906,657 persons.

Almost in quick succession, the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) 2016 was passed in Parliament in December 2019. The Act - known as Citizenship Amendment Act or CAA – and the NRC are closely interconnected in the sense that the latter aimed at re-citizenizing immigrants belonging to certain minority groups and communities on the basis of their religion otherwise decitizenized by the NRC and are facing deportation. The count of 'minority' refugees as per the CAA remains

[1] The Indian count of one crore is equal to 10 millions.

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restricted to the six communities of the Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Parsis and Buddhists who migrated to India from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan before 31 December 2014. The absence of Muslims – India's largest minority – in the list should not escape our notice. The Act seeks to remove the tag of 'immigrants' from six religious minorities and provides for their regularization as Indian citizens if they can prove that they (a) have been citizens of the three specified countries prior to their immigration; (b) have migrated to India on or before that date and (c) were forced to migrate from their respective countries for fear of persecution. Their identification as nationals of these countries, as refugees rather than simple migrants, and as minorities being the victims of persecution is essential for their regularization as citizens of India.

What bearing does the striking off of over 1.9 million persons from the NRC have for the evolution of the regimes of citizenship and migration in India? What does this twin process of exclusion and inclusion mean for India's nationhood? How is the inside of the nation filled with civilizational contents? What is the nature of these contents that go into the making of contemporary citizenship regimes in India?[2] Do both these trends of de- and re-citizenization signal any paradigm shift in the construction of citizenship in India? On the one hand, State policies are now redirected from exercising ever-stricter border control to cleansing the body politic of those who have already crossed the borders - the 'infiltrators'- and have been living here. The border is no longer considered as the reliable container of our nation. On the other hand, India is imagined as the 'natural' homeland of certain groups and communities so much so that persons belonging to these groups and communities but presently living in other countries have a right to migrate to and settle in India should they face persecution there. The explanation provided by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for exclusion of the Muslims is simple: The members of this community should be treated - not as refugees, but as 'infiltrators' – since their migration to India from any of these Islamic or Muslim-majority States is not induced by persecution of any kind – an essential qualification for claiming one's refugee status as per the international law. Rao, for instance, explains the rationale in greater detail:

> Even though Hindus make up a billion of the population, there is no Hindu State in the world. India is the only country with Hindu majority (except smaller Nepal) and the only homeland for adherents of Indic religions (except Buddhists). It goes without saying that it has civilisational responsibility towards adherents to Indic religions. It's an unfortunate reality that Hindus (which includes Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs as per Explanation – II of article 25) suffer religious persecution in some countries. They naturally look up to India for succour and refuge as they (except Buddhists) have nowhere to go (Rao, 2019:11).

India – Rao reminds us – does not harbour any 'civilisational responsibility' whatsoever towards the persecuted minorities of 'non-Indic' religions. Christians, Shias, Ahmedias and such other minorities – nevertheless persecuted in the neighbouring

[2] We refrain from entering into the debate that began with the publication of B. D. Chattopadhyay's *The Concept of Bharatavarsha* (2017) which contests the Hindutva understanding of Indian civilization.

countries – as per this line of argument – have the option of seeking refuge and citizenship in any of the Christian or Christian-majority and Islamic countries of the world. Only Hindus have nowhere to go. Nepal has ceased to be a Hindu Kingdom now. BJP in its Election Manifesto (2014) promised: "India shall remain a natural home for persecuted Hindus and they will be welcome to seek refuge here."

Implicit in this twin move of de- and re-citizenization through NRC and CAA respectively, nation and civilization seem to occupy the same discursive space. While the nation(-state)[3] is invested with what is described as 'civilizational responsibility' in order to be filled with it, civilization correspondingly needs a nation within which it is to be contained and at whose behest the 'responsibilities' are to be discharged. Civilization cannot sustain itself unless the nation performs its 'responsibilities' towards the civilization.[4] Nation, in short, is both the living embodiment and the supreme agent of civilization. Let us call a nation that is summoned to perform its civilizational responsibilities, a 'civilizational nation'.

6.1 Civilizational Nation

In a paper published in 2011 (Das, 2011: 39–65), I pointed to the travails and roadblocks in India's search for autonomous nationhood, that is to say, a nationhood that would no longer be bound by its 'civilizational responsibilities'. Strange but true, India finds it extremely difficult to come to terms with the reality of autonomous nations and states of the post-War world. In the same paper, I tried to identify at least three moments in this long, arduous and unending journey towards autonomous nationhood. These moments, I wrote, are to be taken less as chronological stages of history and more as determinate configurations of forces much in the same sense in which Hegel had used the term in his writings. First, India began her journey post the Independence by defining civilization as a continuum of nation(-states) spreading from West Asia to South East Asia. It makes hardly any difference for a nation if a citizen actually resides in it or in any other nation-state as long as these nation-states are organized within the same civilizational continuum. The second moment is marked by the idea of slowly settling her within the nation even when she is in a religious or ethnic minority there and ensuring her safety and security. Thirdly, the reality of the nation is better recognized insofar as the nations within a civilization are redefined as 'neighbours' and not simply as a continuum of substitutable nations and states. In the same paper, I also showed how almost persistent

[3] The integral nature of 'nation' and 'state' in this discourse is only too evident to be explained here. A nation without a state is inadequate at its best while a state without nation is an oxymoron at its worst. We will have occasion to return to this dissonance later.

[4] Hindtutva thinkers in this sense are in line with many of the modern Indian thinkers who are driven by the anxiety of restraining the excesses of nation by way of constantly subordinating it to the imperatives of civilization.

attempts at filling up the inside of the nation with civilizational contents even in the period preceding BJP's ascension to power at the Centre in 2014 produced only grotesque results. This paper however restricts itself to the period following BJP's coming to power in 2014.

By all accounts, the coming to power of BJP in 2014 is accompanied by India's powerful claim to civilizational nationhood. The claim is backed stoutly by its legitimating ideology of Hindutva. The point is not so much that such a claim has never been made before. In a paper published in 2012 – 2 years before BJP came to power, Blarel informs us that Indian diplomats are seen to be increasingly clutching on to civilizational tropes and metaphors and invoking the 'familiar' nature of India's culture "since the last decade" (Blarel, 2012:29). But, the power ('muscular nature') that is invested in the making of this claim is of course unprecedented and signifies "a departure" (Ganguly, 2015:10; Vaishnav, 2020). Thus, the shift that is now taking place, according to Macaes is "arguably deeper and more radical" (Macaes, 2020).

By contrast, Amitav Acharya in a recently published paper warns: "...[C]ivilization ...is closely tied to the regime party of the day and therefore should not be taken for granted as a permanent phenomenon' (Acharya, 2020:144). While summing up a forum of essays Gupta et al. argue that Prime Minister Modi's 'foreign policy engagements' are driven more by his 'pragmatist' concerns than by the civilizational imperatives (Gupta et al., 2019:6). In a certain variation of the theme, it is argued that the 'ideas get formed and acquire traction only under certain conditions' (Sagar, 2014:255) as much as the exercise of freedom 'entails bricolage, that is, improvising with influential and institutionalised ideas rather than without them' (Chatterjee Miller & Estrada, n.d.:5).

In simple terms, the debate on India's foreign policy and relations seems to have been shuttling between the twin extremes of viewing them essentially as an extension of what is otherwise taken as the ideas and values of Hindu civilization and looking for the leeway that the State extracts while conducting foreign policy and relations without being necessarily constrained by the civilizational imperatives. Viewed thus, the debate is defined in mutually exclusive terms and has hit a stalemate. This paper proposes to break free from the stalemate by way of turning the focus away from how the Hindutva understanding of civilization is governed by the foreign policy imperatives or whether at all, to an understanding of how Hindutva keeps open a variety of alternatives that allows the foreign policy elite what Savarkar calls 'the mastery over history' as cited in the epigraph – perhaps the relative freedom of conducting India's foreign policy and relations. The paper in that sense intends to mark a transition from viewing Hindutva as a closed ideology without allowing any freedom of action in the international affairs to an open one accounting for a range of alternatives and options that may be combined and reassembled in a variety of ways and exercised while lending legitimacy to particular regimes of citizenship and migration. Mastery over history is to be taken not as violent closure of historical options – as is commonly understood, but as keeping each of them open so that it does not constrict one's freedom of action. The mastery over history lies not in appropriating and 'monopolising' history but in finding out if it could provide 'anything other than the object of textual interpretation', with its autonomy and

'featureless plasticity' (Iser, 1993:ix–xi ff). Savarkar and others had to do it with great effort 'beyond the power' of existing interpretations, beyond its given shapes and features. What Iser tells about literature and Literary Anthropology is also true of history in this context:

> It [literature] even incorporates into itself the inauthenticity of all the human patterning it features, since it is the only way it can give presence to what otherwise would remain unavailable… If literature reveals that human plasticity is propelled by the drive to gain shape without even imprisoning itself in any of the shapes obtained, clearly it can bring to light a good deal of anthropological makeup (Iser, 1993:xi).

Translated into our context, it first of all implies that history must be restored to its state of plasticity and featurelessness in a way that can obviate the burden of the dominant shapes and features. By the same token, mastery over history also calls for making available all those shapes and features that were hitherto discarded as 'inauthentic'. Hindutva – more than being a history of closure – is also the history of possibilities, the art of narrating it in a way that keeps open these possibilities.

This paper seeks to understand the complicated nature of the relation of 'nation' to 'civilization' and vice versa in order to understand the recent shift in the regimes of citizenship and migration as marked by the NRC and CAA mentioned above and most importantly the implications that these relations have for the evolution of official citizenship and migration regime/s in India since the 2010s.

6.2 Nation's Civilizational Base

While nation, according to the Hindutva thinking, cannot be empty and vacuous, it requires a determinate body of people with its distinct civilization as its base to grow and flourish in the comity of nations. The interior of the nation will have to be filled with civilization.

6.2.1 Land and Its People

It is the civilization that hyphenates land to its people. According to Savarkar, the term 'Hindutva' is understood to 'denote all religions of the Hindus under one ancient banner representing a common race and a common civilization' (Maratha/Savarkar, 1923:95). Significantly the term embraces all 'those who inhabit the land they adore, the land of whose forefathers is also the land of their Gods and Angels, of seers and Prophets: the scenes of whose history are also the sources of their mythology' (Maratha/Savarkar, 1923:123). Golwalkar described the land as 'one natural unit'. As he puts it:

> [W]e find that this great country of ours, extending in the north form the Himalayas-with all its branches spreading north, south, east and west, and with the territories included in those

> great branches-right up to the Southern ocean inclusive of all the islands, is one great natural unit... This society has been living here for thousands of years. This society has been known, especially in modern times, as the Hindu Society (Golwalkar, 1939:108).

How does he propose to establish the link between the 'land' and the 'people' inhabiting it? First of all, this land is their 'birth-place, the Matribhu [motherland] and the Pitribhu [fatherland] (Maratha/Savarkar, 1923:98). Secondly, they are tied to this land by 'the blood of the ancient Sindhus [the Indus] and the race that sprang from them in [their] veins'. They, in short, are the 'descendants of Hindu parents and are of their seed' (Maratha/Savarkar, 1923:98). The bond of blood is so strong that it is they who 'shed their blood in defence of the land's sanctity and integrity (Golwalkar, 1939:108).

The land constitutes a natural unit as much as it is to be treated as 'a complete whole'. Anyone who has successfully established one's link with the land one inhabits through the bond of blood can hardly agree to 'bargain' it away, let alone 'mutilate' and partition it, as was done in 1947. For Golwalkar, the land of the civilization is indivisible:

> [H]ave we never heard of children cutting up their mother saying that she is their common property? What depths of depravity! Motherland has verily become an object of bargaining ... The tearing away of the limbs of our mother and the gory blood-bath of millions and millions of our kith and kin is the price that we have paid for that ignoble attitude. Even today the tragedy of Partition has not come to a close. Kashmir has been partitioned. And now it appears Nagaland is well on the way (Golwalkar, 1939 87).

While land as 'a natural unit' is elevated into the Hindu territory through the bond of blood, the people inhabiting the land are called upon to successfully preserve its sanctity and integrity. Hindutva's territorialisation implies this double bonding of blood – the blood of the ancestors of this land that flows into our veins and corpuscles and the blood that must flow out and be shed for its preservation and protection.

6.2.2 The World Outside

How is the outside world viewed by the philosophers of Hindutva? The world outside, according to them, exists in two concentric circles: while the innermost circle may be defined as the present-day India albeit enclosed by her 'artificial' boundaries thanks to the Partition and reorganization of States in the region, the immediate outer circle called 'Mahabharat' or 'Greater India' points to its civilizational expanse. India must strive for expanding herself beyond her present-day territorial confines to encompass the entire civilizational land expanse. It is the unification of land with civilization that transforms the former into a territory. The outermost circle encompassing the entire earth constitutes her world of mutual exchanges and transactions that will only help enrich her as much as the others.

Savarkar makes a distinction between what he designates as 'a conceivable expansion of our Hindu people' and 'enrichment of the people that inhabit the earth

from Pole to Pole'. While expansion involves 'labour in founding a Greater India, a Mahabharat', and most significantly no farther, the Hindus 'wherever they live' have the abiding obligation of 'contributing to the best of their capacities all that is best in their civilization to the upbuilding of Humanity' (Maratha/Savarkar, 1923:206). On the one hand, India, according to him, will not have any colonizing mission beyond its 'conceivable expansion', beyond 'Mahabharat' – mainly though not exclusively – limited to the neighbouring countries of the Indian subcontinent. The people living in these expanded territories are in essence Hindus and they will therefore be recognized as citizens of Hindustan insofar as they are an organic part of Hindutva and are linked to the land through the bond of blood without having to migrate to the present-day territorial confines of India. "[T]he essentials of Hindutva", Savarkar reminds us, are "also ideal essentials of nationality" (Maratha/Savarkar, 1923:124). Hence, they are *ab initio* the citizens of Hindustan.

On the other hand, while 'the first essential of Hindutva is not that a man must not reside in lands outside India', a Hindu is urged to 'enrich the people that inhabit the earth with their virtues and let them in return enrich their own country and race by imbibing all that is healthy and true wherever found' (Maratha/Savarkar, 1923:106). Enrichment, Savarkar tells us, does not imply 'turning the land [being enriched] into part of Hindustan' (Maratha/Savarkar, 1923:106). The distinction between expansion and enrichment thus coincides with the one between a potential citizen of Hindustan living in the territory of expansion and a Hindu cultural messenger spreading across the teachings of Hindutva in the rest of the world. The cultural messengers are quintessentially the citizens of Hindustan fanning out to the outside world beyond the expanded area without however any colonial intent of expansion. Thus Hindutva thinking, according to Basrur, hardly speaks of any 'expansionist perspective' (Basrur, 2019:8).

6.2.3 The Unassimilable Other

Territorializiation of Hindutva, according to Savarkar, is possible only through 'assimilation' of a host of faiths, groups and communities into one Hindu stream of consciousness. Golwalkar echoes the same point: "Even to this day, the basic life-pattern of many of those people is Hindu. They bear Hindu names. We find so many Hindu faces all over there, proud of their Hindu heritage, even though many of them are now Muslims by religion" (Golwalkar, 2017: 18).

Hindutva thinking distinguishes Hindutva from other Semitic and proselytizing religions insofar as it does not have any 'single institution at the head of a command structure or a single holy book of doctrinal orders were the very antithesis of Hindu thought' (Madhok, 2005:6). In simple terms, despite the tolerant nature, there is a limit to how much Hindutva would be able to include within its fold. As Golwalkar cautions against sections of 'Mohammedan or Christian countrymen' who, according to him, do not qualify as 'Hindus':

> It is our misfortune that this all-embracing aspect of our dharma has been lost sight of today.... in the case of some of our Mohammedan or Christian countrymen who had originally been forcibly converted to Non-Hindu religion and who consequently have inherited, along with Hindus, a common Father-land and greater part of the wealth of common culture – language, law, customs. Folklore and history – are not and cannot be recognized as Hindus. For, though Hindusthan to them is Pitribhu as to any other Hindu yet it is not to them a Punyabhu [Holyland] too. Their Holyland is far off in Arabia and Palestine. Their mythology and godmen, ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently their names and their outlook smack of foreign origin. Their love is divided (Golwalkar, 2017: 100).

How can one 'who is intolerant of other faiths' qualify as a Hindu? Golwalkar has the answer:

> He cannot be a Hindu at all who is intolerant of other faiths. But the question before us now is, what is the attitude of those people who have been converted to Islam or Christianity? They are born in this land, no doubt. But are they true to their salt? (Golwalkar, 2017:110-11).

He blames the creation of Pakistan on our leaders' ineptitude, the Hindus themselves who lack the 'race-spirit' (Golwalkar, 1939:48) and 'the Muslim desire of domination' (Golwalkar, 1939: 149), notwithstanding that the death-knell of their Kingdoms was sounded across the globe. The followers of the Semitic religions, according to this line of argument, are not the natural citizens of Hindustan unless proven otherwise through assimilation. They must offer the proof of their assimilation. Civilizational citizenship is predicated on the thick distinction between the already assimilated and the yet unassimilated – but potentially assimilable - on the one hand and the obstinate and the permanently unassimilable on the other.

Hindutva thinking defines the world in binary terms: One is either a Hindu or one is not. Hindutva thinking, in its classical form, thus rules out any category of minorities who want to be recognized as an entity separate from the Hindus with a claim to some form of autonomy whether from within India or without. The concept is held as preposterous on two counts: For one thing, the creation of special provisions in the Constitution has only 'hardened' their resolve towards separatism thereby 'turning them into a dreadful source of disruption of our body-politic' (Golwalkar, 1939:133). Any assertion of their status as a minority could only be a threat to the sanctity and integrity of the nation. On the other hand, emboldened by their instance, many fringe groups earlier recognized as Hindu are now 'vying between themselves' for these loaves and fishes of these special provisions by declaring them as 'non-Hindus' (Golwalkar, 1939:97). The concept of citizenship, unlike what the multiculturalists would have us believe, does not account for any graded definition of citizenship. Either one is assimilated or one is not. The binary between them squares with that between a citizen and a non-citizen. A nation cannot contain the minorities within itself. A nation that contains them is a contradiction in terms and is destined to destroy itself.

6.3 Nationalizing Civilization

While civilization constitutes the base of a nation and draws from it, much of today's tragedy – according to the philosophers of Hindutva – lies in the Hindus' inability to organize their great civilization into a nation. As Golwalkar reminds us:

> To our mind, that is the genesis of the present day ignorance of true Nationality. The same ignorance, the same lack of the National sentiment of the right sort, is the root of our troubles. All through the centuries, since the Moslems first tread upon this land, it is this want of National Consciousness, which has been the cause of our ills (Golwalkar, 1939:125–6).

It is the civilization that thinks through the nation. What happens to the civilization when the nation abdicates its 'civilizational responsibilities'? Who is to be blamed for this? In a spirit of self-criticism, he observes:

> So we say that it is no use cursing the external aggressors as being responsible for our degeneration and destruction. After all it is in the nature of predatory nations to overrun, plunder and destroy other weaker countries. If a serpent bites a person, that is not its fault. That is in its very nature. The fault lies with the person who does not exercise caution and protect himself against the possible attack. Unfortunately, during the last one thousand years of our history, even after repeated experiences of disgraces and disasters, we failed to learn the basic lesson that we alone are responsible for our downfall and unless we eradicate that fatal weakness from ourselves we cannot hope to survive as a nation (Golwalkar, 1939:171).

How do we nationalize the Hindu civilization? How is a civilization of thousands of years to be contained within a modern nation? Nations in history are much younger than the Hindu civilization. By all accounts, their emergence in Europe is not more than 400 years old. While it is important for the Hindus to brush off ignorance and 'the ashes of self-forgetfulness', it is also important to inculcate within them what Golwalkar calls 'a bitter sense of wrong invoking a power of undying resistance especially in India that had under the opiates of Universalism and Non-violence, lost the faculty even of resisting sin and crime and aggression'. All that we share with our 'foes' and is common with them only weakens us and we need to 'cut off even a semblance of a common worship – a common church, which required her to clasp the hand of those as her co-religionists who had been the very hand that had strangled her as a nation' (Golwalkar, 1939: 22).

6.3.1 Assimilation/Liberation

It appears that the unassimilated others who also do not have the will to assimilate into the Hindu civilization are trapped as it were within a land that does not belong to them. Insofar as the link of the people with their land is inextricably established through the bond of blood, the contours of the land they inhabit are both given and unalterable even if it exists only in imagination. Partition and the consequent

reorganization of international borders are thus rendered 'artificial' and are considered to be in need of being done away with and corrected. As Golwalkar observes:

> The first and most cruel blow to the professions of 'One country, One Nation' was dealt by the acceptance of the unhappy partition of our mother - Bharatabhoomi. It meant an acknowledgement that the Muslims formed a distinct and antagonistic national community, which had been tied down to live in this land with the Hindu Nation and which won for itself a distinct state by vivisection of the country in which they had originally come as invader and where they had been trying to settle down as conquerors (Golwalkar, 1939:178).

What options are we left with? One option is to force them to assimilate, if they refuse to. If they do not assimilate they must be forced to do so much in the same way as Rousseau would have the people preferring to stay back in the state of nature join the civil or political society and become free. While 'reunification with Bharat' is the only answer to right the historical wrong of Partition, forcing them to assimilate into 'the single, democratic and unified Bharat', according to Golwalkar, is the only way to 'liberate' them.

> Emigrants have to get themselves naturally assimilated in the principal mass of population, the National Race, by adopting its culture and language and sharing in its aspirations, by losing all consciousness of their separate existence, forgetting their foreign origin (Golwalkar, 1939:103–4).

Assimilation, in other words, is not a matter of choice, but a necessity for them if they were to live within Hindutva's civilizational land expanse. One should not miss the point that assimilation must be preceded by a complete erasure of their past separate existence and fullest deculturation that does not leave any residue of their past separate identity.

6.3.2 Deferred War of Civilizations

The other option is to take lessons from history and prepare for the inevitable war with them. Invoking Huntington's famous essay on 'The Clash of Civilizations', Balraj Madhok argues:

> . . . the Muslim problem has once again become the biggest threat to peace, unity and security of our country. It is unfortunate that in spite of this long bitter experience the political leaders, historians and opinion makers of Hindu India have failed to learn the lessons of history and educate the people about the real character of Islam and its fundamentals. As a result India may have to face a new and may be still bloodier civilisational conflict with Islam along with the rest of the world in the days to come (Madhok, 2005:5).

The anxiety shared by the philosophers of Hindutva is that we need to learn lessons from history before we are overtaken by it. Remember Savarkar who advises us to learn from history in order to exercise mastery over it. History does not allow us to exercise mastery over it on its own. One has to do it by restoring to history its plasticity and featurelessness. A war at home, according to Madhok, has the potential of aligning the existing nations and states along civilizational fault lines and involving many others.

6.4 Citizenship Regimes

Unlike most others who prefer to view Hindutva as a closed philosophy, this chapter traces the elements of openness and plasticity within it that allow the political elite albeit relative freedom of making policies and putting in place regimes of migration by combining and reassembling them in a variety of ways. Our task in the chapter was to prise open the possibilities that the Hindutva thinking offers to the policy making elite and sets in motion different regimes of citizenship and migration.

As one carefully sifts through the pages of Hindutva writings, one can identify the elements that may be put together and reassembled in a variety of ways to bring a variety of regimes of citizenship and migration into existence in India. First of all, we have a relatively small cluster of citizens who by virtue of their bond of blood with the Hindu civilization and living within the present territory of India are the real custodians of citizenship. Citizenship, unlike the commonplace Western Theories, is more a duty than a right in this line of thinking. For, it implies that one feels at one with the civilization and defends it, if necessary, with blood and 'cutting off even the semblance of commonness with the foes'. The citizen's relation to the civilization-nation-state continuum is by no means contractual. It is affective.

Secondly, we may refer to those who do not live within the present territory of India but are tied to the wider land of the immediate outer circle that represents the Hindu civilization through their bond of blood. They are the potential citizens of India compelled to live in a foreign country thanks to the 'artificial' Partition of the land. While 'reunification' of this land and restoring it as 'a complete whole' is the only way to their entitlement to citizenship in India, India has the twofold obligation of protecting their interests in their respective countries and letting them migrate to the partitioned and 'truncated' India pending the reunification of their land.

Thirdly, while the first two clusters may be called citizenship by blood and will double up as cultural messengers of Hindutva to the outside world, we may refer to another cluster of citizens who are not tied to the land by their bond of blood but whose entitlement is contingent on their successful fulfilment of the obligation of 'assimilation' and coupled with it the complete erasure of their separate and distinctive identity. If they do not assimilate on their own volition, they must be forced to do so. In short, their citizenship entitlement will have to be earned by their unconditional assimilation into the Hindu civilization. This is the new category of citizenship by assimilation that the philosophers of Hindutva have introduced to the vocabulary of citizenship.

Fourthly, there will be a remainder of people who are neither tied to the land and its civilization through their bond of blood nor through complete assimilation. They must be offered a 'take-it-or-leave-it' option in the sense that they will have to be forced to assimilate, if necessary, by risking a war involving the respective civilizational allies. They will be stripped of their citizenship status and rendered stateless insofar as they are left here and have nowhere to go.

Any particular regime of citizenship and migration under the current political dispensation involves a variation in the assemblage of the above elements. But the

policy making elite is not entirely free to effect the variations in the way it likes. The freedom it enjoys is limited by 'the high costs that any conflict imposes by strategic and economic interdependence in the world' (Basrur, 2017:14) and by the alternative understanding of civilizational values propounded by 'other intellectuals and civil society actors' (Hall, 2019:12). Thus to cite an instance, even the idea of Mahabharat has drawn what Basrur calls, 'little interest from contemporary votaries of Hindutva'. In December 2015, when Ram Madhav, the general secretary of BJP, made public reference to it, his colleagues in the Party took no time 'to downplay it'. (Basrur, 2017:8). Pending the accomplishment of Mahabharat, the persecuted minorities of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan have a right to migrate to and settle in present-day India. India will be the natural sanctuary of the persecuted minorities in these neighbouring countries. While NRC threatens to take away citizenship from certain sections of the people living in India, CAA offers the mechanism of regularizing some of them as citizens. Once the final goal of Mahabharat is accomplished, they will feel safe and will not be subjected to persecution as they are now and will not have to migrate to India in order to become Indian citizens. The limited scope of this paper does not allow us to delve into the technologies of combination and re-assemblage of the elements mentioned above and how these elements are governmentalized into regimes of citizenship and migration and with what effects. Hindutva, as I argue in this paper, is not a closed philosophy.

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Chapter 7
Understanding Temporary Labour Migration Through the Lens of Caste: India Case Study

S. Irudaya Rajan, Kunal Keshri, and Priya Deshingkar

7.1 Introduction

As the foremost motive behind migration is employment, several theories have been put forwarded to understand the diverse economic, geographical and social factors behind this (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Massey et al., 1993; Todaro, 1976). It is well established that temporary labour migration is one of the most significant livelihood strategies adopted by the poorest sections of the society across a variety of developing country contexts, including India (Rajan, 2011; Asfaw et al., 2010; Brauw, 2007; Deshingkar, 2006; Deshingkar & Grimm, 2005; Ha et al., 2009; Keshri & Bhagat, 2013; Lam et al., 2007; Pham & Hill, 2008). It has been given various nomenclatures, for instance, circular migration, short-term migration and seasonal migration (Rajan & Sumeetha, 2020; Coffey et al., 2015; Deshingkar & Farrington, 2009; Haberfeld et al., 1999; Hugo, 1982). The recent outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, followed by lockdown driven migration crisis which affected temporary migrants bitterly (Bhagat et al., 2020; Rajan et al., 2020b). It really enhances the need to understand the different aspects of labour migration which can help sensitise policy makers and government agencies towards the problems of migrants, which really had no hint of the magnitude of migrant labours staying in the urban areas.

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Several studies have delved into the factors which are associated with temporary labour migration, such as age, sex, educational attainment, caste/social-group, religion, size of land possession and poverty in different parts of India (Coffey et al., 2015; Dodd et al., 2016; Keshri, 2019; Sucharita, 2020). In the Indian context social factors, especially, caste is very important determinant of any kind of migration as economic condition is determined by the caste of the person. The origin of caste system is assumed to be more than 2000 years ago. A caste is an endogamous social group in India that governs the status of an individual born into it. It has been evolved out of the four-fold *Varna* categories with *Brahmins* at the top followed by *Kshathriyas*, *Vaishyas*, and *Sudras* at the bottom (Bhagat, 2006). Understanding the historical injustice experienced by the *Sudras* and Adivasis (tribal communities) after independence, the Indian Constitution designated some castes and tribes at the bottom of the caste hierarchy as Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), and after 1990, a group of castes whose position was better than the SCs and the STs, but worse than the others were designated as Other Backward Classes (OBCs). Reservations and quotas in education and employment are available to all of them as a kind of affirmative actions. Several studies have looked into the relationship between income disparity and caste divisions using large scale survey data (Deshpande, 2011; Desai & Dubey, 2011; Subramanian & Jayaraj, 2006; Zacharias & Vakalubharanam, 2011; Rajan et al., 2020a, b). For instance, despite absence of reliable data on caste Deshpande (2011) tried to dig out facts using the National Sample Survey and the National Family Health Survey shown that how the social identity matters in the private sector jobs and relationship between caste and wage gaps in the urban areas.

In various research, caste has been demonstrated to be a key factor in determining migration patterns (Abraham & Subramanian, 1974; Chandrasekhar & Mitra, 2018; Kumar et al., 2009; Vartak & Tumbe, 2020). Some village-level studies have also attempted to comprehend the caste-migration relationship (Fuller & Narasimhan, 2008; Jain & Sharma, 2019; Rogaly et al., 2001; Srivastava, 1989; Vartak, 2016). Deshingkar and Farrington (2009) found in their study that the caste-based discrimination is one of the important push factors which force migrants from rural India. Kunduri (2018), further, adds other domain of caste and migration relationship based on her field work that SCs cannot get better jobs due to their caste identity even after migrating to cities and they have no choice but to do the menial jobs of sweepers and cleaners. In addition to this, in a recent study based in the Indian capital city Delhi, Agarwal (2022) has found that migrants could not escape discrimination in their urban destination too as due to its presence they face lot of difficulties in accessing the benefits of welfare schemes of Government. In their regional migration survey in Eastern Uttar Pradesh and Northern Bihar, which was based on more than 4000 households, Roy et al. (2021) found caste as a significant predictor of migration and the prevalence of seasonal migration in population was found disproportionately higher among SCs than other caste groups, though OBCs and general caste people had comparatively higher percentage as far as permanent and international migration were concerned.

Nonetheless, we cannot identify a recent study that has used nationally representative large-scale survey data to analyse temporary labour mobility through a caste lens. Using large-scale data from the Indian National Sample Survey, this chapter attempts to explain the pattern and flow of temporary labour migration, as well as the relationship between caste and temporary labour migration, at the national and state levels in India.

7.2 Data and Methods

The present study employed the Unit Level Data of the 64th round (2007–08) of the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS). This large-scale nationally representative household survey was conducted in all the States and Union Territories during 2007–2008, which is the only recent national and state level survey on temporary labour migration available. The survey covered a sample of 1,25,578 households and 5,72,254 persons. The 'Employment & Unemployment and Migration Particulars' Schedule was used to collect data on several different aspects of migration (National Sample Survey Office, 2010).

Information regarding temporary labour migrants was collected by enquiring whether a household member had stayed away from the village/town, during the last 365 days, for employment or in search of employment for a period of 30 days to 6 months. We identified temporary labour migration streams (rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to urban, and urban to rural) by looking at the destination for the longest spell (a spell was defined as a period of staying away from the village/town for 15 days or longer). The destination could be in the same district (rural or urban), in the same state but in a different district (rural or urban), or in a different state (rural or urban). Migration rates were calculated to study the intensity of migration. Migration rates for any specific category of people was estimated by dividing the number of persons migrating of that specific category from that region and during the specified period of time by 1000 persons of the specific category in that region.

The main independent variable –caste,[1] has been categorised into Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Others, following the definitions used in the earlier studies (Bhagat, 2006; Zacharias & Vakalubharanam, 2011). The information on monthly per capita consumer expenditure (MPCE) has been used to understand the association between economic status and temporary labour migration disaggregated by caste. For all the analyses, the working age group (15–64 years) has been considered and we have used Stata 12 statistical package for this.

[1] Due to the way that the NSS data are organised, under caste we include not only the four *varna* castes but also the Schedule Castes which includes Dalits as well as the Scheduled Tribes which are technically not included in the caste hierarchy.

7.3 Results and Discussion

7.3.1 Pattern of Temporary Labour Migration

Streams of temporary labour movement across key states are provided in this section to help understand migration patterns and flows (Table 7.1). Overall, the rural to urban stream has the biggest proportion of temporary labour migrants (63 percent), and the rural-to-rural stream the second most important stream of migration (with 30 percent of the migrants), while the urban to rural and urban to urban streams have a small share of migrants (2 percent and 5 percent respectively). The vast majority of migrants seeking a better life in cities came from the rural hinterland (Agarwal, 2016) and they work in the informal sector in cities, such as construction sites, brick kilns, transportation, and as casual labour, whereas rural to rural migrants work in agriculture, plantations, quarries, and fishing (Chandrashekhar & Mitra, 2018; Deshingkar & Akter, 2009; Rogaly et al. 2002).

The break-up of temporary labour migrants by streams of migration across the states shows large deviations from national average in several states. For example, in Chhattisgarh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh, more than three-fourth of the temporary labour migrants belong to rural to urban stream (82%, 81%, and 80% respectively). In Assam, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal, the share of rural to urban stream is higher than the national average of 62 per cent. The plausible explanation

Table 7.1 Per cent distribution of temporary labour migrants according to streams of migration across the major states (age-group 15–64 years), India, 2007–2008

States	Rural to Rural	Rural to Urban	Urban to Rural	Urban to Urban
Andhra Pradesh	47.9	47.8	0.6	3.6
Assam	22.0	67.3	2.7	8.0
Bihar	16.7	80.7	0.3	2.3
Chhattisgarh	15.7	81.6	1.4	1.4
Gujarat	45.3	47.0	5.1	2.7
Haryana	54.4	33.4	6.4	5.7
Jharkhand	37.2	62.1	0.2	0.5
Karnataka	26.6	57.8	5.9	9.8
Kerala	39.3	48.3	2.0	10.4
Madhya Pradesh	32.5	61.5	0.3	5.7
Maharashtra	61.1	30.3	4.1	4.5
Odisha	41.0	54.2	0.8	4.0
Punjab	83.2	6.1	8.7	2.0
Rajasthan	33.0	59.2	3.9	3.9
Tamil Nadu	19.2	50.1	8.3	22.4
Uttar Pradesh	13.9	80.2	0.5	5.3
West Bengal	30.3	63.2	1.1	5.4
India	30.1	62.5	2.1	5.3

Source: 64th National Sample Survey 2007–2008, unit level data

of such kind pattern is that most of these states are backward and less urbanized which leads to seasonal unemployment (Datta, 2023; Kumar & Bhagat, 2017; Sucharita, 2020). On the other hand, in Kerala and Odisha, minor differences are found in rural to rural and rural to urban streams, while in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat almost equal proportion of migrants are found in both the streams. Interestingly, in some southern states, namely, Tamil Nadu and Kerala more than 10 per cent of the temporary labour migrants belong to urban-to-urban migration stream, which is at variance with the general pattern. This may be due to higher level of urbanization in these states.

As we know that temporary labour migrants generally travel short distances for work, however, if there are already established social networks then they do not hesitate to migrate to longer distance destinations and even to the other states. Therefore, we have tried to comprehend the within state and out of state flow of temporary labour migration by place of residence which is presented in Table 7.2.

Among the underdeveloped states like Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh, out of state migration is more than two-third of the total temporary labour migrants (83%, 74%, and 61% respectively), while in Chhattisgarh and Punjab, out of state migration is slightly more than half (56% and 57% respectively). On the other hand, in most of the developed states, namely, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, more than three-fourth of temporary labour migrants circulate within the state (97%, 84%, 77%, 73%, and 70% respectively). However,

Table 7.2 Per cent distribution of temporary labour migrants according to destination within state and out of state (age-group 15–64 years), India, 2007–2008

	Rural		Urban		Total	
States	Same state	Other state	Same state	Other state	Same state	Other state
Andhra Pradesh	77.9	22.1	66.2	33.8	77.4	22.6
Assam	82.1	17.9	91.1	8.9	83.1	17.0
Bihar	16.9	83.1	33.6	66.4	17.3	82.7
Chhattisgarh	43.4	56.6	66.9	33.1	44.2	55.8
Gujarat	98.2	1.8	79.0	21.0	96.7	3.3
Haryana	59.6	40.4	28.7	71.3	55.7	44.3
Jharkhand	25.5	74.5	57.1	42.9	25.7	74.3
Karnataka	75.9	24.1	84.6	15.4	77.3	22.7
Kerala	78.5	21.5	41.3	58.7	72.8	27.2
Madhya Pradesh	59.2	40.8	70.1	29.9	59.9	40.2
Maharashtra	84.0	16.0	80.0	20.0	83.6	16.4
Odisha	54.2	45.8	79.2	20.8	55.4	44.6
Punjab	43.8	56.2	37.4	62.6	42.8	57.2
Rajasthan	50.5	49.5	75.1	24.9	52.5	47.6
Tamil Nadu	69.9	30.1	71.6	28.4	70.4	29.6
Uttar Pradesh	39.5	60.6	32.5	67.5	39.0	61.0
West Bengal	56.8	43.2	61.1	38.9	57.1	42.9
India	53.6	46.4	63.3	36.7	54.4	45.6

Source: 64th National Sample Survey 2007–2008, unit level data

Assam may be an exception as it is a backward state with roughly similar results (83%). In rural areas the results are almost identical to the overall figures, yet in urban areas some deviations can be observed. This pattern is supported by the fact that inter-state temporary labour migration, which is mostly a livelihood strategy and governed by the economic development and variations in the demographic transition of states (Srivastava et al., 2020). Also, among the states, migration is more prevalent among the developed states which have ample employment opportunities in the cities for their migrants.

7.3.2 Caste as a Determinant of Temporary Labour Migration

Results suggest that high temporary labour migration rates are observed at the national level among the most disadvantaged social groups, namely the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes (45 and 24 per 1000 respectively) while it is comparatively lower among the Other Backward Classes (19 per 1000) and the Others (12 per 1000). In rural areas steep differences across caste have been observed, which are absent in urban areas mostly because the intensity of this kind of migration is less in urban areas, and also because caste is less important in urban life (Fig. 7.1).

Moreover, variations across the states are noteworthy. To elaborate, in Gujarat, the temporary labour migration rate is 160 migrants per thousand among STs, which is the highest in any of the Indian states (Table 7.3). This high rate is due to the presence of some hilly and tribal districts in Gujarat which are historically known for the seasonal migration (Breman, 2007). It suggests that even after many decades of independence of India tribal population is living in abject poverty even in economically developed state like Gujarat. It is followed by similar migration rates among the STs in Madhya Pradesh (71) and West Bengal (58). Further, there is a high migration rate among SCs in Jharkhand (65), Bihar (58), Madhya Pradesh (45), Rajasthan (35), and Chhattisgarh (32). In Bihar, earlier studies have also found a similar pattern of migration among SCs as these people use migration as a strategy to break away from the oppressive caste system (Deshingkar, 2006; Kumar & Bhagat, 2017; Datta, 2023). It is also worth noting that the OBCs have a substantially high migration rate in Bihar, with 51 migrants per thousand. Bihar has a typical pattern of seasonal out-migration, in which non-land-holding OBCs' living conditions are very bad due to the tiny scale of the agriculture economy, due to which they travel to different regions of the country for better livelihood (Kumar & Bhagat, 2017; Roy et al., 2021).

Furthermore, variations due to place of residence could also be observed across the states (Table 7.3). Results suggest that among STs, temporary migration rate is the highest in the rural areas of Gujarat (176), which is more than twice the migration rate of the second ranking state Madhya Pradesh (75). It is followed by West Bengal (62), Andhra Pradesh (44), and Jharkhand (43). Among SCs the highest migration rate is observed in rural Jharkhand (73) which is followed by Bihar (61), Madhya Pradesh (56), and Rajasthan (41).



Fig. 7.1 Temporary labour migration rate (migrants per 1000) according to caste categories by place of residence (age–group 15–64 years), India, 2007–2008. (Source: 64th National Sample Survey 2007–2008, unit level data)

Table 7.3 Temporary labour migration rate (migrants per 1000) according to caste Categories by place of residence in major states (age–group 15–64 years), India, 2007–2008

	Scheduled Tribes			Scheduled Castes			Other Backward Classes			Others		
Major states	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
Andhra Pradesh	43.9	0.0	39.8	22.7	3.9	19.3	19.6	2.7	15.2	5.0	1.4	3.5
Assam	18.4	14.8	18.3	18.4	16.0	18.1	9.0	28.9	10.4	22.7	14.8	21.7
Bihar	36.1	15.1	35.1	60.7	12.9	58.2	55.7	12.4	51.3	42.8	10.7	36.4
Chhattisgarh	13.5	4.1	13.0	39.6	10.1	31.7	22.5	1.3	19.1	40.1	1.9	18.6
Gujarat	176.4	1.3	160.5	7.0	2.9	5.3	23.1	15.4	20.9	7.7	3.4	5.0
Haryana	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.6	5.5	9.5	6.2	3.5	5.6	3.6	0.9	2.6
Jharkhand	42.6	0.5	39.8	73.2	1.1	64.7	39.8	1.7	32.6	23.6	1.0	12.9
Karnataka	23.6	0.5	20.0	24.8	11.3	21.7	13.1	6.6	11.2	11.6	4.7	8.3
Kerala	12.3	0.0	11.9	4.3	4.4	4.3	8.4	3.9	7.1	5.3	3.8	5.0
Madhya Pradesh	74.6	13.7	71.1	56.3	10.5	45.1	28.9	13.4	25.1	7.6	1.1	4.4
Maharashtra	25.5	3.7	22.4	21.3	4.0	13.6	20.3	1.5	14.4	7.5	2.2	4.5
Odisha	32.7	6.5	31.7	24.5	7.6	22.5	13.0	3.5	11.9	13.1	6.9	11.1
Punjab	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.6	0.3	9.9	4.3	2.4	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4
Rajasthan	36.4	4.9	33.4	41.2	9.7	34.8	20.8	10.0	18.6	14.5	2.6	8.3
Tamil Nadu	3.8	1.4	3.2	20.2	13.8	18.5	14.8	7.0	11.2	10.2	13.0	12.3
Uttar Pradesh	32.3	4.7	26.6	30.8	9.5	27.6	22.7	5.5	19.2	18.6	2.7	12.6
West Bengal	62.3	1.7	57.6	29.6	6.4	25.3	28.6	4.4	23.2	38.1	8.4	28.8
India	49.0	6.5	45.2	29.9	6.7	24.8	23.9	6.5	19.5	18.0	4.3	12.2

Source: 64th National Sample Survey 2007–2008, unit level data

Interestingly, among the OBCs, higher migration rate is noted in rural Bihar with 56 migrants per thousand respectively, which are comparatively higher than that of the other states. Other states with high migration rate among OBCs in rural areas are Jharkhand (40), Madhya Pradesh (29), West Bengal (29), and Gujarat (23). Among others, the highest migration rate is observed in Bihar (43), Chhattisgarh (40), West Bengal (38), and Jharkhand (24). In urban areas migration rate is relatively very low in all the social groups in most of the states with some exceptions like, Assam where the migration rate is 29 migrants per thousand among OBCs and almost 15 migrants per thousand among each of the STs and others. This pattern could be explained by the fact that in urban areas migrants mostly migrate on permanent or semi-permanent basis rather than temporary basis.

We also tried to figure out how caste and migration relate to gender, and the results are intriguing. Despite the fact that female participation in temporary migration is lower, ST women and girls are three times more likely to migrate than the other social categories, indicating the deprivation of the former (Fig. 7.2). It could also be explained by the fact that women who do not own any agricultural land migrate more (Heyer, 2016), which is a regular occurrence in tribal areas. It has also been discovered that the majority of women from the SCs and STs engage in circular migration (Mazumdar et al., 2013).

To further investigate the trade-off of income with migration, we have used MPCE quintiles as a proxy for the indicator of income. The prevalence of temporary labour migration among the impoverished social groups of STs is nearly two times greater than the other social groups among lower income categories, especially the lowest and lower quintiles (Fig. 7.3). The gradient of change in prevalence, on the other hand, is not very steep in the medium, higher, and highest quintiles. It once again emphasises the relevance of caste in migratory decisions.



Fig. 7.2 Temporary labour migration rate (migrants per 1000) according to caste categories by sex (age–group 15–64 years), India, 2007–2008. (Source: 64th National Sample Survey 2007–2008, unit level data)



Fig. 7.3 Temporary labour migration rate (migrants per 1000) according to caste categories by MPCE Quintiles (age–group 15–64 years), India, 2007–2008. (Source: 64th National Sample Survey 2007–2008, unit level data)

7.4 Discussion and Conclusion

Internal labour migration has remained inevitable despite the recent impact of globalization and enhancement of transport facilities between countries. It is entrenched that temporary labour migration is one of the most significant livelihood strategies adopted by the poorest sections in developing countries including India (Rajan, 2020a, b; Keshri & Bhagat, 2012; Keshri & Bhagat, 2013). Several village-level studies have established that temporary labour migration is rural in nature and caste is one of the important determining factors as far as rural areas are concerned, however we do not find any recent study which has attempted to understand temporary labour migration through a caste lens at the national level. Therefore, this chapter is an important contribution towards this aspect of migration research. Overall, the rural to urban migration stream has the biggest proportion of temporary migrants, indicating a lack of employment possibilities in India's undeveloped regions, particularly the forested, hilly, and tribal areas, from which people are forced to migrate to other states in quest of work. It is also reflected in the results from the underdeveloped states like Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh, out of state migration is more than two-third of the total temporary labour migrants (83%, 74%, and 61% respectively). Roy et al. (2021) have found that temporary labour migrants from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, apart from push factors at origin, also find some support from their existing social networks in form of their friends and relatives who are already settled in the destination states, it really helps them in deciding their first move.

Higher prevalence of temporary labour migrants are observed at the national level among the most disadvantaged social groups, namely the STs and SCs (45 and 24 per 1000 respectively) while it is comparatively lesser among OBCs (19 per 1000) and Others (12 per 1000). Among the major states in Bihar temporary labour

migrants was highest among SCs (58.2 per 1000) similar kind of results have been observed in a recent study from Bihar (Datta, 2023; Roy et al., 2021). Even in industrialised states like Gujarat, the situation of STs in rural areas is poor, as they are forced to relocate within the state in quest of work. This is found mostly hilly and tribal districts in Gujarat which are historically known for the seasonal migration (Breman, 2007). It suggests that even after many decades of independence of India tribal population is living in abject poverty even in economically developed state like Gujarat. It is important to note that in rural areas caste is found to be an important determining factor but in urban areas we do not find any significant deviation on the prevalence of temporary labour migration as far as caste is concerned. Among women, overall temporary labour migration is less but among STs women it is significantly higher as compared to women of other castes. It is noteworthy that among the poorest of the poor section of the society, temporary labour migration is twice that of any other caste group. Results suggest an obvious predominance of caste as a determining factor for migration in India.

These results can be useful for policymakers particularly during formulation of the social protection schemes for temporary labour migrants in urban areas. As we already know that the recent outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, followed by lockdown driven migration crisis which affected temporary migrants bitterly (Bhagat et al., 2020; Rajan et al., 2020b). It has been found that measures of social protection and rehabilitation schemes during COVID-19 did not reach to the needy, even the portability of ration card in the developed states like Delhi could not be implemented as found in a recent study in Delhi (Agarwal, 2022). Several studies have found that temporary migrants have suffered in the urban areas during the lockdown and particularly the poorest of the poor and people belonging to disadvantaged caste groups (Mishra et al., 2020; Rajan et al., 2020b).

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Chapter 8
Attraction and Detraction: Migration Drivers in Bhutan

Mayur A. Gosai and Leanne Sulewski

8.1 Introduction

Bhutan is a small country, approximately the size of Switzerland, secluded in the foothills of the Himalayas, nestled between China to the north and India to the south (Fig. 8.1). Administratively, Bhutan is subdivided into 20 dzongkhags, which are structurally analogous to states in the United States and, at present, 205 gewogs, which are structurally analogous to counties in the United States.

The Population Housing Census of Bhutan (PHCB) has conducted two 100% censuses since 2000, one in 2005 and one in 2017. The 2017 census found a total of 727,145 people residing in Bhutan, an increase of 54,720 people from the 672,425 people enumerated in the 2005 census. The most populous Dzongkhag is Thimphu, which houses the capital city of Thimphu, with an overall population of 138,736, accounting for almost 20% of the country's total population. The least populous is Gasa, the northernmost Dzongkhag, with a population of 3952.

8.2 Literature on Migration Drivers

Characterizing and understanding migration and its drivers has been a line of research in geography and demography since Ravenstein's pivotal work in the 1885s providing the "Laws of Migration." For its strengths and weaknesses, this work helped set the tone for a variety of related research.

Series of factors are taken into considerations regarding internal migration: factors at the origin, factors at the destination, intervening obstacles in between, and personal considerations (Lee, 1966). Researchers may be intimately aware of the

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Fig. 8.1 Administrative boundaries of Bhutan

factors at the origin, both positive and negative, attracting and detracting, that can urge residents to stay or encourage them to migrate. The factors at the destination are not as familiar to researchers, thus the migrations may be influenced by a perception of these factors. While origin and destination factors certainly influence decisions to migrate, there are also a variety of steps in between the origin and destination, such as mobility, and of course personal considerations that also weigh into the decision to migrate. Migration thus is part perception and part empirical evidence. Human capital models also seek to explain migration drivers, suggesting that migrants experience tradeoffs of costs and benefits associated with moving from one place to another, with the expectation of a net return in moving to their destination. These models mostly indicate that the chief motivator of migration are real and perceived economic advantages (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1980).

Dorigo and Tobler (1983) took Lee and Ravenstein's (1885) work further by quantifying and proving a formulaic representation of push and pull factors, using distance as a proxy for obstacles between the origin and destination. Even with this quantification, Dorigo and Tobler recognized that true estimates of push and pull factors would be impossible. These pull (attracting) and push (detracting) forces are intimately intertwined; however, impact migrants differently. While employment and economic factors have a large impact when considering migrating, there are also non-economic factors. Some migrants may be more interested in a particular destination due to the attracting forces, and thus may not necessarily be responding to detracting forces at their origin. Conversely, there are migrants who are motivated

to migrate more by the detracting forces at their point of origin than by the attracting forces at their destination. This dichotomy represents a highly nuanced and individual preferences throughout the decision-making process for migrants.

More recent migration literature explores some of these non-economic factors; however, majority of these studies focus on motivations in the developed world. Despite this focus on the developed world, many insights can be gleaned, such as Halfacree's (2004) call for placing migration more heavily in a cultural context and exploring the multiple motivations for migration. Halfacree explores the idea that questionnaires that only allow one reason for migration overemphasize the economic reasons for migration instead of allowing for the highly intertwined nature of rationales surrounding migration. Morrison and Clarke (2011) sought out micro motives for migration, looking at social, education, housing cost, housing size, environment, and other reasons for internal migration in New Zealand, and found most internal migrant's primary motives for moving were not primarily employment. While the reasons for migration in a developed nation like New Zealand may differ from developing countries, this research incorporates these cultural motives together with employment-related motives.

Other researchers have examined the drivers of migration by comparing direct and indirect connections. These connections may represent complex multidimensional composition of economic, political, social, and other inequalities and events that dynamically change migration motivations and options for different groups of people. By examining empirical studies Czaika and Reinprecht (2020) identified 24 categories of factors influencing migration processes and decision-making, they outlined the drivers of migration by developing a simple classification scheme consisting of 24 driving factors and grouped them into nine categories: demographic, economic, environmental, human development, individual, politico-institutional, security, socio-cultural, and supranational. Of the nine categories they found economic and socio-cultural as the most cited drivers of migration, the two categories accounting for 47%. The economic drivers of migration included two major categories that were cited the most, labour market and employment conditions, which coincides with other historical studies by Sjaastad (1962) and Lee (1966). This may support the claim that some attracting and detracting forces are historic in nature however, an in-depth review of the geography of migration in current literature is needed to understand if the phenomena is historic or contemporary.

8.2.1 Internal Migration in Asia

Internal migration is often characterized as a major flow of people in Asia, especially South Asia (Deshingkar, 2006). Recently, one type of internal migration "circular migration" has emerged as a trend in internal migration in Asia, where migrants from rural areas go to urban areas to find jobs in the informal sector (Deshingkar, 2006). Efforts to compare internal migration patterns within the countries of Asia have often met with difficulties in data collection and comparison (Charles-Edwards

et al., 2016). One effort to compare the internal migration in Asian countries, Charles-Edwards et al. (2016) compared the Migration Effectiveness Index and Aggregate Net Migration Rate across the countries of Asia, finding variations within the countries, but also some similarities. Countries such as Bhutan, Armenia, Mongolia, Nepal, Timor Leste, and Turkey appear to exhibit characteristics of rural-urban migration. They also found that countries such as Cambodia, China, and Thailand have migration to urban areas as well as to rural areas representing a more complex flow of movement. Other Asian countries, such as India, have lost populations in the densest areas. Other research has identified the rural-urban migration trends in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, while also recognizing the urban-urban migration that also occurs in India (Haque, 2005). The IMAGE project also sought to conduct both macro and micro-levels of analysis in internal migration in Asia, comparing the countries among each other, but also providing micro-level analyses detailing patterns unique to each country (Bell et al., 2020). Each research recognizes the nuances within each country, making general trends amongst the countries difficult to associate.

8.2.2 Internal Migration in Bhutan

Bhutan has widely been cited as one of the countries with the highest rates of internal migration in Asia (Choda, 2012). Studies of internal migration in Bhutan have mostly examined data within the administrative boundaries of Bhutan at the dzongkhag (Gosai, 2009; Gosai & Sulewski, 2020; Ura, 2013) and gewog levels (Choda, 2012; Gosai & Sulewski, 2014), with few focusing on individual communities.

Migration in Bhutan can also be characterized as either permanent or temporary. Literature on temporary migration in Bhutan is sparse, as data on these patterns tends to be difficult to obtain. Temporary migration in Bhutan includes seasonal, circular migration, such as winter labor migration in the rural areas of Bhutan (Chand, 2009). Chand (2009) studied seasonal labor migration in a rural gewog: Lauri, where 80% of those studied migrated during the winter to other areas of Bhutan. Yak herders are another group in Bhutan who migrate seasonally, including alpine meadow grazing in the summer and winter grazing near villages (Wangda, 2016).

Permanent internal migration in Bhutan has more data, and thus is studied more widely (Gosai, 2009, Ura, 2013, Gosai & Sulewski, 2014, NSB, 2018a). There is generally an east-west dichotomy with regards to migration in Bhutan, with larger net out-migration from the eastern part of the country and larger net in-migration to the more populous eastern part of the country (Fig. 8.2). Eleven dzongkhags (55%) exhibit net negative lifetime migration rates, with Trashigang on the far east of the country experiencing the largest net out-migration. Of the 11 dzongkhags exhibiting net negative lifetime migration rates, seven (63.6%) are in the eastern part of the country. Nine dzongkhags exhibit net positive lifetime migration rates, with Thimphu dzongkhag (the location of the country's capital city) exhibiting the

Fig. 8.2 Net positive and net negative lifetime migration by dzongkhag

largest net positive migration rates. All nine dzongkhags are located in the central or eastern part of the country. In addition, the age profile of migrants tended to be around the working ages (Choda, 2012; Ura, 2013).

A similar pattern emerges when examining the recent (within five years of the 2017 census) gewog migration rates. Of the 205 gewogs, 138 (64%) are experiencing net negative migration rates for recent migrants (Fig. 8.3). A notable difference is that only approximately 42% of the gewogs with net negative recent migration rates fall within the eastern part of the country. In the central part of the country, approximately 38% of the gewogs have a net negative recent migration rate, leaving only 20% of the gewogs in the western part of the country having a net negative recent migration rate. While different from the dzongkhag patterns, the gewog data for recent migration exhibits a similar east-west dichotomy, with the greatest percentage of gewogs with net negative recent migration rates being in the eastern part of the country, less so in the central part of country, and the least in the western part of the country. Those gewogs with a net positive recent migration rate exhibit a different pattern. Only 28% of the gewogs in the eastern part of the country exhibited net positive recent migration rates, 38% of the gewogs in the central part of the country, and 32% in the western part of the country.

The 2017 PHCB sought to explain these trends by asking migrants their reasons for migrating. The top three reasons in 2017 included familial moves, employment, and education (NSB, 2018b). Other less prominent reasons for migration include resettlement, natural disasters, and security. This research seeks to identify the geographic variables that could help explain the attracting and detracting forces in different regions of Bhutan to help further explain and validate the cited rationales for internal migration in Bhutan.



Fig. 8.3 Net positive and net negative lifetime migration by gewog

8.3 Discussion on Migration Drivers

8.3.1 Attracting Forces

Historically, economic declines in rural areas have led to internal migration to urban areas while national economic downturns have resulted in regional and seasonal migration from countries surrounding Bhutan. There are a variety of forces that would attract migrants from point of origin to move their residence. The PHCB 2017 identified several reasons for migration, education and employment being most predominant. Those locations with educational and employment opportunities would be more attractive areas for migration than areas that lack such opportunities. Conditions such as educational and employment opportunities at the current residence might be deteriorating making these the attracting forces if in receiving areas show promise and pull people to migrate to urban centers.

8.3.2 Educational Opportunities

With approximately 8 percent of migrants identifying educational opportunities as the rationale for migration, one might postulate that areas with advanced educational opportunities would receive more inward migration than outward migration (Fig. 8.4). There are sixteen known institutions of higher education spread across the country of Bhutan, with the majority (11) located in the more populous western



Fig. 8.4 Educational opportunities with net recent gewog migration

part of the country. Most of these institutions (70%) are in geogs that have experienced positive net rates of migration within the last five years. This includes geogs in the eastern part of the country that are generally surrounded by areas of high rates of outward migration. For example, Kanglunggeog, located in the far east of Bhutan in Trashigang Dzongkhag, is home to two colleges, Sherubtse College and Yonphula Centenary College, and has the highest positive net migration rates for Dzongkhag. For context, Trashigang Dzongkhag has the highest levels of lifetime net out migration in the entire country. While the PHCB does not have data on international moves for educational opportunities, the age (primarily young adults between the ages of 20 and 29) of emigrants and 2016 Australian immigration data suggests that employment and educational opportunities may be the rationale for emigration (NSB, 2018b).

8.3.3 Employment Opportunities

Employment opportunities are often cited as a major reason for moving for Bhutanese internal migrants, and this is echoed throughout the literature on internal migrants, especially in developing countries (Todaro, 1980). Quantifying this motivating factor can be difficult, as this is partly based on the perception of available employment opportunities and not necessarily actual employment opportunities. Examining unemployment data may also not provide the whole picture, since recent migrants may be within the unemployed category while seeking out employment in their destination. One proxy for employment opportunities could be a subset of

points of interest from the OpenStreetMap (OSM) database. This spatial database is created mostly by volunteers, and thus is not a complete selection of potential employment opportunities. Despite its shortcomings, this dataset could be indicative of areas of interest to individuals for a variety of motivations.

The points of interest layer in OSM includes several features not necessarily of interest when considering employment opportunities, so the data was subset to include such features as hotels, restaurants, convenience stores, and similar establishments. Features, such as benches and viewpoints, were removed from the analysis, as their purpose is likely not employment related.

The points were analyzed at both the dzongkhag and gewog level, both yielding different results. At the dzongkhag level, 87% of the selected OSM points of interest were in dzongkhags with a greater number of lifetime in-migrants than out-migrants and were mostly located in the western and central part of the country. Additionally, the dzongkhags with over 20 selected features, 80% of them are also in net positive lifetime migrant areas. Thimphu dzongkhag, which has the highest number of net in-migrants in the country, also overwhelmingly has the largest number of employment related features.

While this is also true at the gewog level, one of the gewogs containing Thimphu also has overwhelmingly the largest number of features, a different pattern emerges when examining the data at the gewog level. Of the gewogs with more than 20 employment related features only 40% were in gewogs with a net positive recent migration rate. However, when examining those gewogs without any employment related features from OSM, 78% are located in net negative migration rate gewogs.

While the data at the dzongkhag level may indicate that migrants are indeed seeking out areas where employment opportunities seem more plentiful, the gewog level patterns may actually indicate that the lack of employment opportunities at the local level may be a more powerful driver to explain recent out-migration.

8.3.4 Detracting Forces

Neoclassical migration theory, based on Sjaastad's (1962) cost-benefit model, suggests that migrants evaluate the costs and benefits of moving to alternative locations. Similarly, Lee's (1966) push-pull model of migration suggests that individuals migrate due to economic opportunities, such as employment, at the destination and/or lack thereof at the origin in hopes to find better conditions. There are a several reasons that would detract migrants from leaving their residence. Lack of market access, food insecurity, lack of water, agricultural, and wildlife have been identified by the PHCB 2017 as reasons why people move. Naturally locations that lack market, water, and food access would be less attractive and considered detracting forces for migrants seeking better opportunities.

8.3.5 *Lack of Market Access*

One detractive force in various areas of Bhutan is lack of market access, as described in surveys of those in agricultural professions, including yak rearing (NSB, 2018b; Wangda, 2016). The PHCB in 2017 collected data on how far a household must travel to get to a main road, which is available at the dzongkhag level (NSB, 2018a). In most dzongkhags, most households stated that they were within 30 minutes of a road. However, the dzongkhags with the greatest number of households that were greater than 30 minutes away from the nearest road were predominantly within dzongkhags where the net lifetime migration was negative (Fig. 8.5). Eleven dzongkhags had greater than 9 percent of households indicate that they had to travel more than 30 minutes to the nearest road. Of those 11 dzongkhags, 9 (82%) were dzongkhags where net lifetime migration was negative. The dzongkhags where the greatest percentage of respondents indicated that their household was less than 30 minutes away from the nearest road were Bumthang (98%), Thimphu (98%), and Paro (96%) dzongkhags. Thimphu and Paro dzongkhags are in the populous western part of the country, the location of capital city Thimphu and the nation's only international airport in Paro. Bumthang dzongkhag, located in central Bhutan, is one of the most historically significant dzongkhags in Bhutan, with some of the nation's oldest temples.

Another potential proxy for market access is the length of roads in each gewog. Of the 205 gewogs, 164 gewogs have documented roads within them, according to the International Steering Committee for Global Mapping data from 2016, obtained from the Bhutan Land Commission (ISCGM 2016). Of the 41 gewogs without



Fig. 8.5 Known roads with net recent gewog migration

documented major roads in them, 35 (85%) have a net negative migration rate for recent migrants. While the presence of roads does not necessarily portend net positive recent migration rates, fewer roads does appear to coincide with net negative recent migration rates. Of the gewogs that have less than 20 kilometers of roads within their borders, approximately 78% of them exhibited net negative recent migration rates. Of the gewogs with less than 30 kilometers of roads within their borders, approximately 83% exhibited net negative migration rates. The reverse was not necessarily true. Of the gewogs with greater than 60 kilometers of roads within their borders, approximately half (54%) exhibited net positive recent migration rates. This pattern could indicate that lack of roads is a proxy for reduced access to markets, thereby considered a detracting force; however, it is important to note that the presence of lengthy road networks is not necessarily an attracting force for migrants.

8.3.6 Food Insecurity

Food insecurity may also be indicative of a lack of market access. PHCB collected data preceding the 2017 census on the number of households in each dzongkhag who have experienced food security within the 12 months. The dzongkhags that experienced the highest food insecurity are also identified as dzongkhags with the greatest number of lifetime out-migrants. Of the ten dzongkhags that have greater than 6% of households indicating that they have experienced food insecurity in the 12 months prior to the census, 70% have experienced net negative lifetime migration patterns. The dzongkhag with the lowest percentage of households reported having experienced food insecurity is Thimphu, with less than 3% of households. As noted earlier the dzongkhags where households are less than 30 min away from the nearest road were Bumthang (98%), Thimphu (98%), and Paro (96%) dzongkhags.

8.3.7 Lack of Access to Water

Another detracting force that survey respondents cited was a lack of access to water in their origins. The PHCB in 2017 collected data on several aspects related to access to water including what the main source of drinking for households, how long it takes for households to reach the nearest water source, and whether the water source was reliable. This data was provided by the PHCB aggregated to the dzongkhag level.

There are a variety of different water sources described by the PHCB, but for the purposes of this study, they are divided into water that is piped into the dwelling and other water sources (including water that is piped outside of the dwelling). Dzongkhags where greater than 60% of the households do not have piped water

inside their dwelling exhibited predominantly net negative lifetime migration patterns (77%). Access to piped water inside the dwelling may be considered an attracting force for migrations, as the dzongkhag with highest net positive lifetime migration rate is also the dzongkhag with the largest percentage of households reporting piped water inside their dwellings: Thimphu (76%). In addition, of those seven dzongkhags with greater than 40% of the households reporting piped water inside the home, only one exhibited net negative migration rates.

While the water sources appeared to exhibit patterns that indicated that it could be a detracting force, possibly encouraging out migration, how long it takes for households to reach the nearest water source does not exhibit the same patterns. The majority of households in all of the dzongkhags (97% or greater) are within 30 minutes or less of the nearest water source. The dzongkhags with the highest percentage of households that have to travel greater than 30 minutes to reach the nearest water source did not exhibit an overall net negative migration pattern; it was a mixture of dzongkhags with both net positive and net negative lifetime migration rates. The reliability of the water source exhibited similar patterns to the considerations for the time it takes to reach the nearest water source. Households in all dzongkhags indicated that the water sources are between 73% and 88% reliable. Seven dzongkhags exhibited less than 80% of households describing their water source as reliable, and of those seven five (71%) exhibited net negative lifetime migration rates. Those dzongkhags where greater than 80% of households described their water source as reliable were relatively evenly dispersed between net in and net out lifetime migrants.

The examination of various water access related variables indicated that perhaps reliability and distance are not as large of a detracting factor as perhaps the type of access that migrants have at their origins. Data collected at the gewog level may demonstrate different patterns; however, data at gewog administrative level was not available for this study.

8.3.8 Agricultural/Wild Interface

A survey of migrants described animals destroying crops as a reason to seek employment opportunities outside of rural agricultural areas, and perhaps even migrate to seek better conditions and opportunities (NSB, 2018b). This agricultural-wild conflict could be a detracting force, urging migrants to leave their residence and jobs in search of better opportunities.

The presence of national parks and wildlife corridors could be an indicator of potential conflict between wildlife and agricultural areas. Out of the 205 gewogs in Bhutan, 87 have National Park or wildlife corridors running completely or partially through them (Fig. 8.6). Approximately 66% of all of the gewogs that have national parks or wildlife corridors within them have a negative net migration rate for recent migrants. Thirteen gewogs have greater than 90% of their area covered by national parks, of those nine (69%) have net negative recent migration rates. Similarly, 47



Fig. 8.6 Dzongkhags with protected natural land

gewogs have over half of their area covered by protected land, and 33 of those (70%) have recent net negative migration rates.

8.3.9 Other Considerations

While many of the reasons for migration can be characterized as attracting and detracting forces, there may be other considerations that migrations must weigh. For example, some migrants are relocating as dependents. Those migrating as dependents are predominantly children and female migrants (NSB, 2018a). Another consideration in attracting and detracting forces of migrations are due to changes in marital status. These include migrating to get married, migrating due to a divorce, or migrating due to being widowed (NSB, 2018a).

8.4 Impact of COVID-19 to the Study Area

The global pandemic caused by COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) was discovered in December 2019 in Wuhan, China according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States. It is very contagious and quickly spread around the world including Bhutan. As of early 2021 there were only 337

physicians and less than 3000 health care professionals serving a population 760,000 however, Bhutan weathered the COVID-19 pandemic far better than wealthier developed nations (Drexler, 2021). As of October 2022, there have been 62,380 infections and 21 coronavirus-related deaths reported in the country since the pandemic began according to Johns Hopkins's Coronavirus Resource Center. The Ministry of Health has administered approximately two million doses of COVID vaccines so far with at least 2 doses per person (MoH, 2022a).

Research is just now emerging on how Bhutan was able to better manage the global pandemic, through diligent and conscientious leadership that provided provisions and financial means to their citizens on health guidance and a shared responsibility Bhutan was able to achieve and maintain low death rates throughout the pandemic (MoH, 2022b). As the World Health Organization was announcing "a pneumonia outbreak of unknown cause" in December 2019 Bhutan was drafting its National Preparedness and Response Plan and began a strict screening policy at various points of entry affecting the movement of people both internationally and internally. There were other measures in place that restricted the migration of people such as a national mandate to quarantine for 21 days and the establishment of disaster-relief zones that relied on local population for support.

8.5 Conclusions

Census data can only go so far in helping to explain the drivers of migration, as they often only collect limited information, and thus may conceal more nuanced drivers of migration (Todaro, 1980). The 2017 PHCB identified familial moves, employment, and education as the top three reasons for migrating (NSB, 2018a). While other data collected by the PHCB in 2017 combined with data explored from a variety of different sources including OSM generally reflect these rationales. However, surveys conducted with regards to migration in Bhutan by the NSB (2018b) indicate some more nuanced rationales, including lack of amenities at the point of origin. While the results for these amenities (lack of market access, lack of water access, and the interaction between the rural communities and wildlife) vary, it is clear that these variables may play a role in the decision of a Bhutanese person to migrate. It is also clear from this study that the geographic scale of analysis plays a role; while trends at the dzongkhag and gewog level are similar, there are also some distinct differences. As programs to increase amenity access and create employment opportunities across the country increase and are completed, it is likely that the migration patterns in Bhutan will continue to become increasingly more complex with rural-urban, rural-rural and other patterns of migrants becoming more prevalent. Greater availability of gewog level data would likely provide valuable insights to migration related research in the future as these complex migration patterns may make dzongkhag level and regional analyses less relevant.

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Part II
Family, Health and Demographics

Chapter 9
An Analysis of the Impact of International Remittances on Child Education: Evidence from Pakistan

Hisaya Oda

9.1 Introduction

With the acceleration of globalization and the widening income gap between high-income countries and so-called developing countries, migration from the latter to the former is inevitable. In 2019, the estimated stock of emigrants worldwide was 271.6 million, with India being the largest migrant-sending country, recording an overseas population of 17.5 million (UNDESA, 2020). Due to the current COVID-19 pandemic, as of the end of April 2021, the migration stream has almost halted; however, it will certainly resume once the situation improves.

Since international migrants, particularly labor migrants, are the source of international remittances, the large stock of migrants abroad is naturally translated into the large amount of money sent back to their home countries.[1] In 2019, the total size of remittances worldwide was US$714 billion,[2] of which US$554 billion was sent to developing countries. India and China, which not only dispatch many migrant workers overseas but have also established a vast overseas human network, are by

[1] The definition of remittance in this study follows the World Bank's definition: the sum of "personal transfer" and "compensation of employees." (https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114950-how-do-you-define-remittances).

[2] Remittance data were downloaded from the World Bank's web site on migration and remittances: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data. GDP data were obtained from the IMF's website: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD.

Throughout this paper, remittance data and GDP figures are from these websites unless stated otherwise.

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far the largest remittance-recipient countries, followed by the Philippines and Mexico.[3] India and China received remittances of US$83.1 billion and US$68.4 billion respectively in 2019. South Asia is the largest remittance-receiving region, accounting for 25.1% of the total remittances to developing countries in 2019. The size of remittances to developing countries is equivalent to 1.55% of the combined GDP of all developing countries. This number may seem insignificant; however, in many developing countries, such remittances account for more than 10% of their GDPs. For example, in 2019, they comprised more than 30% of the GDPs of countries such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyz, Tonga, and Nepal, which constitutes a significant contribution to these nations' economies (KNOMAD, 2020).

Remittance flows to developing countries have been steadily increasing, and the incremental rate has accelerated since the early 2000s. They have exceeded the amount of official development aid (ODA) to developing countries since the early 1990s. In 2019, the total volume of remittances was more than three times the size of ODA (US$167.8 billion in the same year)[4] and has surpassed the size of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries for the first time since the beginning of 1990s (KNOMAD, 2020).

Pakistan has been recognized as one of the most active migrant-sending countries. The stock of Pakistani emigrants was estimated to be 6,303,286 as of 2019 (UNDESA 2019), the eighth largest in the world. In 2019 alone, 625,203 Pakistanis left the country to work abroad through official channels, mainly to oil-producing countries in the Gulf region, such as Saudi Arabia (ILO, 2019). Due to this large volume of overseas migrants and the continued flow of labor migration, the remittance flow to Pakistan reached US$22.5 billion in 2019, representing roughly 7.9% of the nation's GDP. This amount of remittances was the 8th largest in the world.

Remittances from overseas migrants impact the macro and micro economic and social dimensions of recipient countries in several ways. At the macro level, remittances are an important source of foreign exchange and contribute to the stability of the balance of payments. At the micro level, remittances are also important sources of income for recipient households and ease the credit constraints they face. Remittances are spent variously according to household needs. Because of their importance, numerous studies have examined how remittances are used and their impact on the well-being of households in developing countries.[5]

This chapter examines the impact of remittances on children's school enrollment in Pakistan. Since developing the human capital of children is almost the only way

[3] Remittance data here are derived from official records of remittance flows made through formal channels, such as banks. However, it is well known that many migrants use informal modes of transfer such as *hundi* and *hawala*. In addition, money and goods, such as jewelry and gold, can be carried by migrants when they return home. If these were recorded, the size of remittances would far more exceeded the amount of FDI to developing countries (see El Qorchi et al., 2003).

[4] The ODA figure is from the World Bank's website: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD

[5] See, for example, World Bank (2006), de Haas (2007), Yang (2011), Khan et al. (2019)for a review of the literature on the impact of remittances on the wellbeing of recipient households.

for poor households to escape poverty in a sustainable fashion, it is crucial to analyze whether remittance-financed expenditures on education have increased child enrollment. Several studies have traced the effects of migration and remittances on child education in Pakistan. The evidence from these studies is mixed: some find that remittances affect child education positively, while others observe negative or no impacts.

Analyzing the 2000–2001 Pakistan Socio-Economic Survey, Arif (2004) shows that the impact of foreign remittances is positive for girls' school enrollment but insignificant for that of boys. Mansuri (2006), using data from the Pakistan Rural Household Survey 2001–02, concludes that temporary migration has a positive and significant impact on child education. Remittances from migrants increase investments in child schooling, especially for girls. Based on a field survey in rural Chakwal, Punjab province, Oda (2007) reports a positive influence of internal remittances on school enrollment but an insignificant impact of international remittances. Ahmed et al. (2010), using data from the Household Integrated Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005–06, find that the share of expenditures on education increases with the availability of remittances for migrant households, but the increment was only 2.9%. Khan and Khan (2016) use the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) Survey2010–11 and show a positive impact of remittances on child school enrollment, in particular, on girls' enrollment.

In contrast, Nasir et al. (2011) have analyzed household data from four cities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and report a non-significant effect of migration and remittances on the school enrollment of children belonging to migrant households. They argue that the positive impact of remittances on school enrollment is countered by the negative impact of the absence of fathers or other close relatives due to overseas migration. A similar result is also observed by Hassan et al. (2013), while Arif and Chaudhry (2015) find otherwise. Focusing on a set of Punjab household data, Arif and Chaudhry (2015) show a significant positive influence of overseas migration on the school enrollment of younger children and explain that the positive income effect of remittances outweighs the negative effect of parental absence as a consequence of migration.

The current study aims to add new insights and knowledge to existing studies by investigating the issue from different perspectives. The study differs from existing studies on the relationship between remittances and school enrollment in several dimensions. First, school enrollment in this study considers attendance at middle and secondary (matriculation-level) schools but not primary schools. Middle and secondary schools in Pakistan correspond to an age range of about 11 to 15 years old (middle school: 11–13 years old; secondary school: 14–15 years old). Previous studies have typically examined the impact of remittances on enrollment at the primary school level or on enrollment regardless of the grade level. However, given the differences in the nature of primary and post-primary schooling, this study focuses on middle and secondary school enrollment. Post-primary education is essential for skill development and higher income generation, whereas primary education is limited to providing students with basic knowledge and skills. Secondary education is also effective for narrowing the income gap in society (Abdullah et al., 2015).

Middle and secondary school enrollments are considerably lower than primary school enrollments in Pakistan. The net enrollment rate at the primary level (ages 6–10) was 66%, while the rates at the middle level (ages 11–13) and the secondary level (ages 14–15) were 38% and 27% respectively in 2018–19 (Government of Pakistan, 2019). Analyzing this trend could potentially increase our understanding of it and provide policy implications.

In addition, this study considers the school enrollment of relevant age children. That is, only children in middle or secondary schools within the relevant age range were counted as enrolled. It is clear from the gap between gross enrollment rates and net enrollment rates that overage schoolchildren are common in Pakistan. One extreme example in our dataset was a 15-year-old child who was enrolled in Grade 1 (the grade for six-year-olds). These were counted as enrolled children in many previous studies. Lastly, remittances are categorized as either internal (received from a source in Pakistan) or international (sent by migrants abroad). The nature of these two kinds of remittances is the same, as they comprise money, but the characteristics of senders and receiving households tend to differ, and the volume of overseas remittances per household is usually higher. Thus, it would be inappropriate to conflate these two types of remittances.

In this study, rural household data on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, taken from the PSLM Survey 2014–15, are examined. As Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is underdeveloped and rural areas have limited job opportunities, remittances are considered important sources of additional income for rural households in this province.

The organization of this chapter is as follows: The next section briefly presents the situation of overseas migration from Pakistan and the trends of international remittance flows to Pakistan. The following section analyzes household data and estimates the impact of two types of remittances on middle and secondary school enrollments of relevant age children. Then estimated results and findings are presented. The last section concludes.

9.2 Migration and Remittances in Pakistan

Pakistan is the 8th largest emigration country in the world. According to UN data, the number of Pakistani out-migrants in 2019 was around 6.3 million (UNDESA 2019).[6] In regional terms, the largest concentration of Pakistanis is found in the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain, which host 3.3 million Pakistanis. Out of these, 1.4 million are in Saudi Arabia, and nearly 1 million are in the UAE. As of 2019, other major destinations are the United Kingdom (with a Pakistani population of 605,016), the United States (406,509), and Canada

[6] This figure includes 1,082,917 Pakistanis who migrated to India at the time of Partition. Even if these migrants are excluded, Pakistan remains one of major migrant-sending countries. Moreover, the number would be higher if those who illegally migrated overseas were included.

(215,409). The majority of Pakistani migrants in the GCC states are labor and temporary migrants, which means that they return to Pakistan when their working permits expire. Conversely, the majority of migrants in Western countries, such as the UK and the US, are mostly permanent and naturalized in those respective countries.

Large-scale labor migration from Pakistan started with the economic boom in the Middle East after the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC countries in 1973.[7] The number of Pakistani workers who went overseas through formal channels was 3534 in 1971, which increased to 140,445 in 1977.[8] With increasing oil revenues, the Gulf countries embarked on development projects that created a huge demand for labor. In particular, manual workers were in high demand on construction sites. Because of surplus labor and the prevalence of poverty in rural areas, particularly in rain-fed farming areas in the northern parts of the country, Pakistani workers flew to the Gulf countries to grab these new job opportunities. Geographical and religious proximities were also factors that influenced their decision to migrate.

This trend continues today. In 2019, 625,203 Pakistanis left the country to work overseas.[9] The number of outflows of Pakistani workers increased from 382,439 in 2018 but declined from the peak of 946,571 in 2014. In 2019, 53.2% migrated to Saudi Arabia and 33.8% to UAE. If labor migrants to Oman and Qatar are included, these four countries received 95% of Pakistani migrant workers (ILO, 2019). Among the four provinces in Pakistan, most labor migrants came from Punjab province, followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In 2019, migrants from Punjab constituted 50% of all labor migrants, and migrants from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa constituted 29.8% (ILO, 2019). In terms of migrants per million inhabitants, the figure is 5925 migrants for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 2860 for Punjab.[10] As for the origin of labor migrants, Swat and Lower Dir of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are recorded as the most and the second-most migrant-sending districts among all districts in Pakistan. Thus, such evidence verifies the significant migration activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that this chapter examines.

Since international migrants, particularly labor migrants, are the source of remittances from abroad, the large stock of Pakistani migrants is naturally translated into the large number of remittances sent back to Pakistan. The remittance flow to Pakistan has been constantly increasing since the beginning of the 2000s (Fig. 9.1). It was US$22.5 billion in 2019, representing roughly 7.9% of the nation's GDP, the eighth largest in the world. Remittances from Saudi Arabia were largest in 2017,

[7] See Arif and Irfan (1997), Arif (2004), and Oda (2011) for a brief history of Pakistani emigration.

[8] Data on the number of workers headed overseas are from the website of the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE), Government of Pakistan (http://www.beoe.gov.pk/).

[9] Interpreting this number should be done with caution, as not all migrating Pakistanis register with government agencies. They are not counted in official data. This is particularly true of migrants heading to non-GCC countries (Wazir & Goujon, 2019).

[10] The numbers of labor migrants from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were 321,439 and 186,176 in 2019, respectively. The estimated provincial populations of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were 112.38 million and 31.42 million, respectively, in 2018 (Government of Pakistan, 2020).



Fig. 9.1 Trend of remittance flows to Pakistan. (Source: World Bank Remittance and Migration data https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data)

amounting to US$5.78 billion, followed by the UAE with US$5.67 billion and the UK with US$1.689 billion. Remittances from the six GCC countries constituted around 70% of all remittances to Pakistan in the same year.

Internal labor migration (i.e., migration within Pakistan) also forms an important dimension of mobility in the country. Data regarding internal migration are not easily accessed, but it is possible to trace internal remittances from household surveys. Here, the PSLM Survey 2014–15, conducted by the Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, is employed to see how many households receive internal remittances by province and urban–rural classification, together with information on international remittances (Table 9.1).

Several characteristics of internal and international remittances in Pakistan are observed in Table 9.1. First, more households receive internal remittances than international remittance. As shown in the Table 9.1, 10.6% of the households are recipients of internal remittances, while 5.9% are recipients of international remittances. Second, rural households receive more internal and international remittances than urban households. In rural Pakistan, 11.5% of the households receive internal remittances, and 6.2% receive international remittances. Meanwhile, in urban Pakistan, the corresponding percentages are 6.2% and 4.9% respectively. Third, most of the remittance flows in Pakistan are concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces. It would be worthwhile to investigate such concentration of remittance flows as rural Sindh and Balochistan are as underdeveloped as rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Fourth, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has the highest percentage of households that receive remittances in all categories, showing their high dependence on remittances.

Table 9.1 Internal and international remittances by province and region from the PSLM survey 2014–15

	Internal Remittances			International Remittances		
	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa						
No. of recipient households (HHs)	2888	127	3015	1951	166	2117
Total No. of HHs	11,898	1184	13,082	11,898	1184	13,082
Ratio of recipient HHs	24.3%	10.7%	23.0%	16.4%	14.0%	16.2%
Average remittances in Pakistani rupees (PKRs)	135,137	102,024	133,743	211,489	251,633	214,636
Punjab						
No. of recipient HHs	4389	651	5040	1847	475	2322
Total No. of HHs	29,465	7106	36,571	29,465	7106	36,571
Ratio of recipient HHs	14.9%	9.2%	13.8%	6.3%	6.7%	6.3%
Average remittances (PKRs)	128,498	144,951	130,623	262,028	287,341	267,206
Sindh						
No. of recipient HHs	89	65	154	53	35	88
Total No. of HHs	14,336	4399	18,735	14,336	4399	18,735
Ratio of recipient HHs	0.6%	1.5%	0.8%	0.4%	0.8%	0.5%
Average remittances (PKRs)	60,304	121,077	85,955	158,962	259,943	199,125
Balochistan						
No. of recipient HHs	91	23	114	135	12	147
Total No. of HHs	8971	1276	10,247	8971	1276	10,247
Ratio of recipient HHs	1.0%	1.8%	1.1%	1.5%	0.9%	1.4%
Average remittances (PKRs)	128,231	163,522	135,351	135,348	171,667	138,313
Total (four provinces)[a]						
No. of recipient HHs	7457	866	8323	3986	688	4674
Total No. of HHs	64,670	13,965	78,635	64,670	13,965	78,635
Ratio of recipient HHs	11.5%	6.2%	10.6%	6.2%	4.9%	5.9%
Average remittances (PKRs)	130,252	137,357	130,991	231,630	275,314	238,060

Source: Calculated by author from the PSLM Survey 2014–15
[a]Data on Islamabad are not included

9.3 Data and Estimation

This study utilizes the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement (PSLM) Survey 2014–2015 to investigate the effect of remittances on children's middle and secondary school enrollment. The PSLM contains data on 78,635 households and 513,945 individuals from four provinces and from Islamabad. Of these, the rural household data of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province are used for estimation. Located in the western part of Pakistan and adjacent to Afghanistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is known as the home base for internal and international migrants. Because of the lack of industries other than agriculture, migration has been an important source of income for families in this province. Migration from rural areas is common where employment opportunities are limited.

Middle and secondary school enrollment is used as the dependent variable for this study. In Pakistan, the relevant age range for middle and secondary school students is 11 to 15 years old. For this study, the upper age limit is extended to age 16, allowing a one-year delay of schooling. A total of 13,752 children within this age range of 11 to 16 years old (male: 7616; female: 6136) and their households (7300 households) in rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are chosen for estimation. Children whose ages range from 11 to 16 but are enrolled in primary school are not counted as school-enrolled children; 2729 children fall into this category. Eliminating these children and 4756 children who never attended school or received less than one year of education in that age range results in 6267 school-enrolled children (45.6%) for this study, of which 4439 are males and 1828 are females. The number of households with school-enrolled child/children is 4211.

A total of 1834 households received internal remittances. The mean value in Pakistani rupees (PKRs.) was PKRs. 160,166 per recipient household. As for international remittances, 1346 households received them and its mean value was PKRs. 224,000 per recipient household. Among the recipient households, 153 received both internal and international remittances.

A probit estimation technique is applied to estimate the impacts of two types of remittances on the middle and secondary school enrollments of school-age children. The dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates a child's school enrollment; it is assigned a value of 1 if the child is enrolled in a middle or a secondary school and a value of 0 otherwise. Remittances are classified into two categories: internal and international. These are included as dummy variables. Thus, the households are categorized as either households that receive internal remittances, households that receive international remittances, or households with no remittances. If a household receives both internal and international remittances, it is categorized as a household receiving international remittances. The reference category for remittance dummies is households that receive no remittances.

Other explanatory variables used for estimation consist of the gender of a child, the number of household members, the age of the household head, the gender of the household head, and the education level of the household head. Age, the number of household members, and the education level of the head are continuous variables, whereas the others are all dummy variables. The reference category for the gender of a child is female, and for the gender of the head, it is male. Table 9.2 provides the descriptive statistics and definitions of the dependent and independent variables.

9.4 Estimated Results and Findings

The estimated results are reported in Table 9.3. Marginal effects and corresponding standard errors (in parenthesis) are shown. Three models are estimated. Model 1 uses the enrollments of both male and female children. Model 2 considers male children only, and model 3 utilizes female children only.

Table 9.2 Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard deviation
Enrollment	If a child is enrolled at a middle or secondary school, the value = 1 and 0 otherwise.	0.456	0.498
Gender of child	If the gender of a child is male, the value = 1 and 0 otherwise.	0.554	0.497
Household size	Number of household members.	9.078	4.323
Age of head	Age of the household head.	47.844	11.575
Years of education of head	Years of education of the household head.	3.345	4.659
Gender of head	If the gender of the household head is female, the value = 1 and 0 otherwise.	0.172	0.378
Internal remittances	If the household receives internal remittances, the value = 1 and 0 otherwise.	0.223	0.416
International remittances	If the household receives international remittances, the value = 1 and 0 otherwise.	0.196	0.397

Table 9.3 Probit estimation of the impact of remittances on school enrollment: marginal effects

Variables	Model 1 (Male & Female)		Model 2 (Male)		Model 3 (Females)	
Gender of child	0.3016	***				
	(0.0083)					
Household size	−0.0059	***	−0.0042	***	−0.0073	***
	(0.0011)		(0.0015)		(0.0016)	
Age of household head	0.0046	***	0.0041	***	0.0045	***
	(0.0004)		(0.0006)		(0.0006)	
Years of education of household head	0.0284	***	0.0253	***	0.0272	***
	(0.0010)		(0.00137)		(0.0013)	
Gender of household head	0.1759	***	0.1682	***	0.1589	***
	(0.0141)		(0.01699)		(0.0211)	
Internal remittances	−0.0624	***	−0.0474	***	−0.0702	***
	(0.0120)		(0.01597)		(0.0152)	
International remittances	0.0277	**	0.0453	***	0.0021	
	(0.0129)		(0.0162)		(0.0173)	
Number of observations	13,752		7616		6136	
Pseudo R2	0.107		0.041		0.065	

Note: *** and ** show statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Figures in parentheses are standard errors

In models 1 and 2, the marginal effects of receiving international remittances are positive as expected. The marginal effect of model 1 is 0.027 when both male and female enrollments are used, meaning that the probability of school enrollment increases by 2.7% if the household receives international remittances. The school enrollment increases by 4.3% when the household receives international

remittances for model 2. The results indicate that international remittances help households finance schooling for their children, particularly for male children, and increase the probability of these children's school enrollment. In fact, education is free at government schools for primary up to the secondary level of education under Article 25-A of the Pakistani Constitution. However, schooling is not free. It costs expenditures related to schooling, and the opportunity cost of a child going to school should also be considered a cost of schooling. International remittances ease the burden of such costs by increasing the income of the recipient household.

On the other hand, the positive impact of international remittances disappears for model 3, in which only female enrollments are considered. Once gender is considered, the effect of remittances vanishes for female children. This implies that international remittances increase the gender gap in school education instead of reducing it. This result contradicts the findings of Arif (2004), and Khan and Khan (2016), who found a positive influence of remittances on female enrollment. There are several interpretations for this difference. First, the dependent variables differ. The current study uses the middle and secondary school enrollment of children in a specific age range, whereas, for example, Arif (2004) uses primary school enrollment. Second, the difference can be explained by the parental preference for male children over female ones. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the cultural norm of male domination still exists in society. Given budget constraints, parents prioritize male education. This tendency would be stronger for middle and secondary levels of education or higher. Third, as argued by Nasir et al. (2011), and Hassan et al. (2013), the impact of remittances and migration is the balance between a positive remittance effect and a negative migration effect. Female children may be affected more negatively by the absence of their parents because of overseas migration. As a result, the positive impact of international remittances might be canceled out by the negative impact of migration.

The marginal effect of internal remittances is negative for all three models. Receiving internal remittances reduces the probability of school enrollment by 6.2% in model 1, by 4.7% in model 2, and by almost 7.0% in model 3. The probability of school enrollment for female children declines more than that of male children. There are several possible explanations for this. One is that the size of internal remittances is about 70% of that of international remittances, on average. Internal remittances may not be sufficient for some recipient households to send their children to school. For households having difficulty in making both ends meet in rural areas, migration is a strategy to get out of poverty. Overseas migration is preferred because of higher remittances. However, as (Oda, 2007) argues, overseas migration opportunities are not available to every household, as they involve high direct and indirect costs. Based on his survey in Chakwal, Punjab province of Pakistan, he also finds a relatively high incidence of poverty among internal migrant households and concludes that migration within a country does not necessarily improve the economic conditions of migrant households. This is also the case for our results. Internal remittance-receiving households just spend on their daily needs, such as food items, leaving little for education. They are struggling for survival and do not have the luxury of sending their kids to middle or secondary school. As there is a

tendency for parents to prioritize male children over female ones, female children are disadvantaged, and the probability of their middle and secondary school enrollment is lower than that of male children. Again, this contributes to widening the gender gap in education. This finding is consistent with Arif (2004), which notes that the gender gap persists within the migrant households.

All other explanatory variables significantly influence the probability of children's school enrollment. Among those, gender significantly affects school enrollment. First, as the results indicate, the marginal effect of the gender of a child is 0.3. As the reference category is female, the probability of a child going to school increases by 30% for male children. A large disparity in education between males and females exists in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in Pakistan, overall. The gross enrollment rates in middle and secondary schools for males in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are 82% and 68%, respectively, and the same rates for females are 46% and 31%, respectively (Government of Pakistan, 2019). In our sample, 1828 out of 6136 female children aged 11 to 16 years old are enrolled in a middle or secondary school, whereas 4339 out of 7616 male children of the same age range are enrolled. The former figure corresponds to 29.8%, and the latter corresponds to 57.0%. This huge gap indicates parental preference for the education of sons over daughters and that females' access to education is still limited compared with males in rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Second, interestingly, the marginal effect of the gender of the head is 0.174. As the reference category is male, this means that a household headed by a female has an increased probability of her child/children going to middle or secondary school by 17.4%. Generally speaking, mothers tend to care more about their children. Given autonomy in household decisions as the heads, they tend to spend more on the education and health of their children (Durrant & Sathar, 2000; Eswaran, 2002; Maitra, 2004; Chakraborty & De Prabal, 2015). The result is supportive of the findings of Mahmood et al. (2017). Mahmood et al. (2017) finds a positive impact of female headships on child school enrollment in Pakistan.[11]

9.5 Conclusion

This study has examined the impact of internal and international remittances on middle and secondary school enrollment in the rural Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The estimated results have indicated that (1) international remittances influence male school enrollment positively but do not affect female enrollment, and (2) internal remittances reduce the probabilities of school enrollment for both male and female children; in particular, females' probability declines much. While international remittances increase the income of recipient households and help

[11] Contrary to Mahmood et al. (2017), Mansuri (2006) demonstrated, using household data of Pakistan, that female headship has no additional impact on school enrollment for either male children or female children.

finance the education of their children, such positive impact is not visible for female children's enrollment. These findings imply that remittances exacerbate the gender gap in middle and secondary school education that already exists.

Educating females is important in every aspect of the economic and social development of the country. For example, education allows females to work outside and earn income for their families. In turn, females are empowered and become more autonomous, which increases their intra-household bargaining power so that they can participate in household decision making (Dyson & Moore, 1983). As is well known from the findings of existing studies, these positive impacts of female education eventually lead to lowered mortality and fertility rates, reduced child labor, more educated children, and so on (Caldwell (1979), Dyson and Moore (1983), Luz and Agadjanian (2015)). Educated mothers are taking more care of their children. Unfortunately, as the current study has argued, females are not given priority for middle and secondary education in rural Pakistan. There is much space for Pakistan to improve this situation so that it can further develop as a country.

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Chapter 10
Female Migration and Stay-Behind Children in Bangladesh

Sabnam Sarmin Luna

10.1 Introduction

Labour migration has been a common livelihood strategy. Moreover, migration of women is not a new phenomenon, although it has recently begun to be more widely recognized as a result of the decentralization of industrialization from developed countries and the growing demand for low-paying workers from developing countries. Globally, the proportion of female migrants accounted for 48%, although there is considerable regional dissimilarity. The proportion of female migrants is higher in Europe (51.9%) and lower in Africa (41.6%) and in Asia (45.6%) (Le Goff, 2016). In the 1960s and 1970s, migration theories often assumed that migration is a male phenomenon and that women started migrating just to depend on their husbands and fathers abroad. Recently, ideas have shifted enormously in favour of female migrant workers (Carballo et al., 1998). Worldwide, the increase in female migration was only 0.2% in the 1960s, and after that, within four decades (1970 to 2010) the share increased by 2% (Sultana & Fatima, 2017).

The consequences of male and female migration remittances on the stayed behind family members may not be similar. Le Goff (2016) stated in his study that compared to men, women are more likely to stay connected with the family and try to remit more than their male counterparts. A study on the advancement of women, conducted by the United Nations International Research and Training Institute, shows that Bangladeshi female workers in the Middle Eastern countries remit on average 72% of their earnings to their home (INSTRAW and IOM, 2000). Kabeer (2007), in her study stated that Bangladeshi female workers working in Middle East countries remit on average 77% of their income. It is therefore clear that the saving and spending priorities of both male and female migrant households are distinctly

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different. This may be largely explained by the fact that women are more determined to devote themselves to their children than men.

There is an increasing focus on research related to the impacts of female migration on their left-behind[1] (*sic*) children and families (for example, Parrenas, 2005; Gamburd, 2005). Female's independent migration not only contributes profit to themselves but also to their family members who remain behind in the countries of origin (Drakakis-Smith, 1993). According to UNFPA (2006), remittances sent by female migrant workers are usually spent to satisfy hungry stomachs, clothing, health care, children's education (Yang, 2008), and a good job. Their remittances also play a crucial role for their children and also themselves, such as improving children's health, reducing infant mortality due to the ability to spend more on good food and medicine (McKenzie, 2006), child education and improving the standard of living of loved ones left at home (Ukwatta, 2010), and redeveloping the concept of gender role within and outside households (Sylvia et al., 2011).

On the contrary, some studies have shown that the absence of a mother has a more serious adverse effect on unaccompanied children's education (McKenzie & Rapoport, 2010; UNICEF, 2008), vaccination (McKenzie, 2006), behaviour and emotional wellbeing (Ukwatta, 2010; IOM, 2008). The study carried out by Pinto-Jayawardena (2006) added that long-term disconnection of women usually results in harmful consequences for families and children. The study conducted by Shen et al. (2009) revealed that small children who are left behind are also vulnerable to injury. In addition, maternal migration sometimes leads to the early marriage of young girls in the family (IOM, 2008).

This paper is a contribution to this literature. This study explores everyday family care issues with a particular focus on these unaccompanied children's education, health, and psychosocial well-being. Similarly, this study examines how the stay-behind family members assist in the upbringing of unaccompanied children in the absence of their mothers. Finally, the research discusses the long-distance mothering of female migrants and the implications of the mothers' absence on the children who stayed behind.

10.2 Methodology

The paper was based on both primary and secondary data. Secondary data comprises published and unpublished materials collected from various organizations like the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), Refugee and Migratory Movements Research (RMMRU), Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) etc. Singair Upazila of Manikganj district was initially selected for primary data

[1] A number of studies use the term Left behind 'for the stayers whose family members migrated leaving them alone at home. However, the term left-behind 'has a negative connotation that is, this sounds like they are abandoned. So, this study will use the term stay-behind for the non-migrating family members/children who are living in their home country.

collection due to its highest concentration of female migration (45%) compared to the national proportion of female migration (10%) in the last 15 years between 2004 and 2018 (author's compiled data collected from BMET office). Finally, two villages named Medulia and Jaigir from Singair Upazila were selected for the questionnaire survey. Fifty samples were selected for a detailed household survey. The caregivers of the migrants' children were chosen as respondents. Our sample is restricted to children whose mothers have been working abroad for at least 12 months. Since there was a lack of an appropriate database on female migrant workers in Bangladesh, the snowball technique was used for selecting the respondents.

10.3 Female Migrants: Socio-demographic Profiles

In Bangladesh, international migration officially started in 1976, but after 15 years, female migration showed a substantial existence in 1991 (Islam, 2015). Also, the number of female workers until 2002 did not give us any trend; rather, it fluctuated for more than a decade from 1991 to 2002 (BMET, 2021). In 2003, there was a slight increase in female migration due to the professional amendment specified by the government from only skilled workers to unskilled and semi-skilled with a minimum age of 35 years. The age limit for domestic and garments workers in 2006 was again reduced to 25 years from 35 years. In the case of female migrant workers, the occupational category was restricted during that time and, following the lifting of the veto, female migration from Bangladesh further increased (Sultana & Fatima, 2017). Official figures show that 902,481 Bangladeshi women travelled abroad in search of employment between 1991 and 2019 (BMET, 2021). However, this figure only describes officially recorded numbers, while the total number of undocumented Bangladeshi migrant women workers would be significantly higher (Siddiqui, 2003).

In the study, female migrant workers were massively concentrated in the age group of 31 to 40 years (about 60%) while 36% of migrants belonged to 21 to 30 years age group. Only 4% of migrant women belonged to the age group above 41 years. Regarding education, about 40% of female migrants had no formal schooling experience. Majority of them (56%) had experience of primary education. Only 2% passed secondary school and 2% had experience of higher secondary school respectively.

The study reveals that 52% of female migrants come from nuclear families and the percentage of extended and joint type families was about 48% (42% extended and approximately 6% joint family), which was higher than the national proportion. So, in the extended families, the presence of more members in female migrant households could indicate that other caregivers in the family matter for the female migration decision for households of this survey. Because in absence of mothers, it is sometimes difficult for fathers to take good care of their unaccompanied children. The survey result shows that, in female migrant households, the average family

member was 3.38 persons, whereas the ratio of male and female members was 56% and 44%, respectively. However, a large number of female members were found among children, who are between 0 and 18 years old, whereas the ratio of girls was 61% compared to 39% boys.

10.4 Wages and Remittances of Female Migrants

The study found that female migrants were really less-skilled and most of them worked as domestic workers (84%) and the rest were also low-end service providers like cleaner, cook, caregivers etc. That is why female migrant workers' income was also lower. The Bangladesh government fixed the minimum wage for domestic aid for female migrants at US$ 150 per month. However, the respondents reported that 20% of female migrants earned less than US$ 150 (equivalent) per month, about 27% of female workers earned between US$ 151 and US$ 250 (equivalent) and 44% earned between US$ 251 and US$ 350 (equivalent). About 9% of female migrants have been identified from a relatively larger income-earning group with an income of US$ 351 and US$ 600 (equivalent) per month.

Unlike males, in the case of females, the frequency and amount of money being sent are lower. Because usually, females get low wages than male migrants for their less-skilled work patterns. So, they try to gather their income for a couple of months and send money less frequently. Besides, it is difficult for them to go outside to send money, as they are always under the command of employers for the domestic responsibilities that are typically assigned to them. However, my study shows a different image of female migrants. More than half (52%) of the female migrants could send money every month. Almost 28% usually sent money once in 2 months, and the remaining 20% sent money less frequently, like every 2/3 times in a year. The existing studies also supported that women are more likely to stay connected with the family than men and try to remit more than their male counterparts (Le Goff, 2016). Another research done by IOM also claimed that though women usually earn less than men, they send a higher portion of their income (IOM, 2008). It is evident from another study that the proportion of sending wages is 0.69% more for female migrants compared to male migrants (Rahman, 2013).

The study found that more than 90% of women sent their money through formal channel, either the bank or bKash (money transfer app). This is because of getting profit for using official channels in money transfers from abroad. According to the Government of Bangladesh, banks are allowed to provide 2% cash incentive to beneficiaries directly in BDT for each transfer of remittances.

It is evident from the study that, on average, every month, 42% of female workers were able to send remittances between US$ 151 and US$ 300. Approximately 36% of female migrants sent between US$ 50 and US$ 150, 17% between US$ 300 and US$ 400 and 5% between US$ 401 and US$ 500 per month. Since, in most cases, female migrant workers were employed as housekeepers; they were given the opportunity to live in the homes they serve abroad. So, they do not have to spend

any extra money on their accommodation and maintenance, rather the employers bear the cost. They can therefore remit their entire earnings to their respective families.

The recipient of the remittance is a vital indicator for understanding the dependence of women in the country of origin. About half of the total remittances are collected by women worldwide (IOM, 2008). However, as a remittance sender, to whom do women migrants prefer to send money? In this study, the respondents reported that (46%) of women sent remittances to their husbands, and 54% did not send them because of their little faith on their husbands. Among this 54%, about 22% sent money to their mothers, 10% sent remittances to their father, another 10% sent to their sisters, 8% sent to their mature son/daughter and (4%) sent money to their father-in-law and brother. Women migrants clearly preferred to send money in a way and to someone who ensured that the money was spent for their children's wellbeing and household purpose.

There is another actor who is in charge of remittance or who decides how the money sent by migrants is spent. Study found that about 40% of migrants' husbands enjoyed the authority to use these remittances. Respondents reported that 24% of female migrants decided where to spend money by themselves, and in 16% of cases, remittances were spent by the joint decision of husbands and wives. Furthermore, about 16% of migrants' parents and 4% of migrants' brothers had the chance to control remittances.

Remittances sent by female migrant workers to their home are used for various purposes as mentioned in multiple responses by the respondents. For instance, food consumption (92%), better education for children (50%), treatment (42%), house construction or repairs (24%), repayment of debt (16%), purchase of land (4%), and other purposes such as assisting husbands in business, child marriage expenses etc. Existing studies have also supported that women are more likely to spend money on food, nutrition and education, while men prefer to spend money on business or profitable sectors (Sylvia et al., 2011).

10.5 Caregiving to Unaccompanied Children

Why women migrants left their children at home can be explained by two theoretical factors: macro-system factors and micro-system factors (Tong et al., 2019). Macro system discusses the broader reason such as work contracts, conditions and laws between the country of origin and destination, visa restrictions, etc., that do not allow mothers to bring their children with them and assign their husbands and children to stay home (Rashid, 2016). The microsystem discusses the family nature of migrants, their socio-economic status, the travel and living cost of children, the age of children, etc., which often decide the choice for leaving children at home. However, the ecological theory argues that children do not grow up in isolation; rather they develop themselves within an affiliation arrangement consisting of the family and the community (Bronfenbrenner, 1986).

When a mother decides to travel abroad, she first thinks about her children's safety and care. She tries to keep them in a safe place with a reliable family member, either her in-law's side or parents' side. The study found that 48% of migrants kept their children with children's grandmother (mother's side), thinking that the place would be more secure for their children and the children will be happy to live there and obtain extra care. Women who were aware of their husband's behavior that they were engaged in drugs and alcohol did not keep the children with their husbands. Only 20% of women migrants transferred the childcare responsibilities to their husbands. Another 16% of migrants kept their children in charge of their grandmother (father's side). Also, those who had no opportunity to keep children with their in-laws because of their illness or age kept their children with their sisters (12%), the child's aunt. In a few cases (4%), the grandfather kept their grandchild in the absence of their mothers.

The study shows that most of the caregivers kept the stay-behind children in their initial living place. However, the children were later moved to caregivers' living place after migration of their mother. Moreover, the remaining 8% of caregivers moved to the children's living place to take care of them. In particular, migrants' sisters who are unmarried and young, moved to migrants' houses to care for their children.

Considering the bonding between children and caregivers, 44% of respondents reported that stay-behind children had a very good relationship with their caregivers and the caregivers provided significant emotional care to the children. The stay-behind children also liked to exchange thoughts and feelings with their caregivers. In particular, stay-behind children had good relations with their grandmothers and aunts. Because, they were able to express their wishes and demands to their grandmothers or aunts. The respondents also mentioned that the reason for building good relationships with grandmothers was that grandmothers could tell them bedtime stories. Unfortunately, because of workload, children's father could not give quality time to them, and sometimes they also ignored the children's responsibility, thinking that childcare duty is a mother's task.

10.6 Educational Attainment of Unaccompanied Children

Remittances sent by mothers are good support for better education for children, especially for their better schooling, good tutoring, adequate learning materials, etc. In this study, regarding gender distribution of the school-going children, 63% were girls and 37% were boys. The study found that the percentage of primary level students was 53%, secondary level students 42% and graduate level students were only 5%.

Types of school was categorized into government and private here. The study found that 54% of female migrants' children were enrolled in government schools and 46% in private schools. This is also interesting to mention that to respondents, private school means better school where educational output and education care are

better than government schools. Respondents reported that private school is costly, and only those who can afford the cost can study there. Caregivers of children mentioned that due to the availability of remittances, the educational outcome of children was better. Because, 78% of children got better schooling, approximately 69% had a private tutor and 72% had adequate learning materials (Table 10.1).

Table 10.1 Caregiver opinions about a different section of education of migrant's children

Impact on education	per cent
Sex of children who are currently enrolled in education	
Male	37
Female	63
Current ongoing education level of female migrants' children	
Primary	53
Secondary	42
Graduate	5
Types of an educational institution	
Government	54
Non-government	46
Accessibility of better schooling among migrants' children	
Yes	78
No	22
Facility of private tutor among migrant's children	
Yes	69
No	31
Accessibility of adequate learning materials among migrants' children	
Yes	72
No	28
Attendance of school/college among migrants' children	
Regular	87
Irregular	13
Passing status of all subject in class examination	
Yes	84
No	16
Causes behind failure among the children of migrant (multiple answers)	
More day absence	70
No one helps them	58
Has household task	20
Status of dropout cases among the children of migrant	
Yes	9
No	91
Causes behind dropout among the children of migrants (multiple answers)	
Work at home	49
Work outside home	48
Due to illness	12
Not interested in education	4

Among school-going children, the school attendance rate was regular among 87% children and irregular among 13% children. The main reported reason for irregular attendance was that no one enforced the children for their study. About 84% of migrants' children recorded pass in class examination, while 16% of them could not pass all subjects in class examination. For those children who could not pass all subjects, 70% of them were irregular in class, approximately 58% did not receive any help from family members regarding their homework given by the school teachers, and 20% were engaged in household chores which prevented them from going to school and studying regularly. The study also reveals that the dropout rate of female migrants' children were 9% and the leading causes reported by the respondents were household work (49%), burden of outside work (48%), illness (12%), lack of interest in study (4%) (Table 10.1).

10.7 Healthcare of Unaccompanied Children

Accessibility of remittances helps the children to get proper food, nutrition and healthcare. According to caregivers, the food intake status of stay-behind children improved after migration of the mother. They mentioned that the children are taking balance diet including fish or meat, eggs, milk, vegetables, fruit, sugar, etc. for daily meals after migration of their mother compared to the previous times. Caregivers of children reported that the food intake status of children improved for 48% of children, food intake remained same among 44% of children and worsened among 8% of children. The leading causes for worsened food intake status after mother's migration was that 62% of children did not maintain mealtime, 20% did not maintain a balanced diet, 32% took less food and 52% took junk food (Table 10.2). It was also found from the caregivers' answers that total 58% of migrant families spent more money for the food intake of stay-behind children after their mother's migration.

The caregivers reported the frequency of illness among the stay-behind children that 11% of children got sick more often, 58% got sick sometimes and 31% hardy got sick. For the treatment of children, the caregivers reported that approximately 45% visited local doctors, 24% visited government doctors, 20% visited private clinics and, 11% visited a specialist (Table 10.2). They preferred going to the local doctors more because they are familiar with the local doctors, who are usually from the same locality. The local doctors here are those who are not formally certified. Regarding government hospitals, the respondents said the treatment cost is low there, however, there is a long queue for visiting a doctor. The caregivers also mentioned that the doctors were usually selected according to the diseases. They visited local or government doctors for cold, cough, fever, stomachache, and headache. However, for complex diseases they visited to a private clinic or pediatricians. In this case, they need to go to the city to get a specialist doctor since the paediatricians are hardly available in the rural area.

Table 10.2 Caregiver perceptions regarding impact on health of migrant's children

Impact on health	Per cent
Caregiver perceptions of food intake status of stay-behind children after migration of mother	
Improved	48
Same	44
Worsened	8
Reason for worsened food intake status due to the absence of mother (multiple answer)	
Do not maintain food time	62
Do not take balanced diet	20
Take less food	32
Take junk food	52
Have extra budget on children's food after their mother's migration	
Yes	58
No	42
Incidence of illness among children	
More often	11
Sometimes	58
Hardly	31
Sources of treatment for migrants' children	
Govt. Hospital	24
Local doctor	45
Private clinic	20
Specialist	11
Accessibility of health care for children to caregivers in absence of mothers	
Difficult	16
Not difficult	84

In my survey, the caregivers were asked whether they experienced difficulties in caring for the health of stay-behind children due to the absence of their mothers. About 84% of caregivers reported that it was rather easy to access health care facilities because as of now medical services are available everywhere and the migrant mother regularly sends remittances. However, 16% of caregivers reported difficulty in providing medical service due to the mother's absence since, the other household members were too busy with other tasks.

10.8 Psychosocial Impact on Unaccompanied Children

Though it is acknowledged that the reason for women migration is for the betterment of the family; however, due to the foremost male-controlled social norms, society does not accept this positively. About 68% of the respondents acknowledged that society takes female migration negatively. According to the community, after going abroad the women engage in criminal activities and do not communicate with

their stay-behind family. The remaining 32% acknowledged that the society takes female migration positively or as a normal thing. Because female migration is a source of income for the family and it is also empowered women (Table 10.3). Besides, migrant women can improve their lifestyle which ultimately improves their social status. They can also help other family members.

Not only the society but the family member and even the children also do not accept their mothers' migration positively and are unhappy with it. Caregivers can understand the children's view about their mother's absence as they are attached to them. Approximately 40% of respondents reported a negative relationship between mother and children due to migration, because the children desire to live together as a full family. They miss their mother and did not take it lightly that their mother had to go abroad leaving them behind. The caregivers reported that the stay-behind children also felt that after going abroad, their mother rarely communicates with them and hardly sends money for their upkeep. However, as reported by caregivers, 60% of children took their mother's migration positively and were happy to have a migrant mother. They were in constant communication with their mother (Table 10.3), usually through video and audio calls daily or once in 2/3 days, which reduced the distance between mother and children. The children received financial support from their migrant mother. They were able to buy new clothes regularly and buy food according to their desires. Migrant mothers sometimes send gifts to their children like clothes, mobile, cosmetics etc. Thus, many of the mothers are not restrained but keep taking care of their children from abroad. So, the children can appreciate their mother's sacrifice for the well-being of their family. Mother's migration also indicates a chance for mature children to migrate abroad.

The mother is the primary caregiver for her children and she knows each response or reaction of her children's activities closely. The absence of a woman in the household commonly leads to changes in traditional gender roles. Often, the burden of

Table 10.3 Caregiver perceptions regarding psychosocial impact of mother's migration on their children

Psychosocial impact of mother's migration	Per cent
Social perception about female migration	
Positive	32
Negative	68
Perception of mother's migration to children	
Positively	60
Negatively	40
Psychosocial impact of the absence of mother on the children (multiple answers)	
Sadness	60
Depression	44
Loss of interest in normal enjoyment activities	22
Addicted	14
Aggressive	12
Insecurity (abuse, bullying, beating, sexual harassment)	6
Low self-esteem	2

family care falls on other female household members who might be too old to care for others or too young to assume the responsibilities of an adult. In such a situation, the impact of a woman's migration on her family is not optimistic due to the stereotypical gender role allocations in the household. On the other hand, children also do not feel secure and happy, they become annoyed and exhibit irrational behaviours, sometimes they get involved in crimes. Table 10.3 shows that the absence of mother might make the children sad (60%), feel depressed (44%), lose interest in regular activities (22%), become addicted (14%), become aggressive (12%), expose the children to insecurity like abuse, bullying, beating, sexual harassment (6%), and low self-esteem (2%). The caregivers reported that being deprived of family care and lack of proper supervision often make children get involved in such activities.

10.9 Conclusion

The study attempted to identify the female labour migration and its impact on their stay-behind children in Manikganj district of Bangladesh. Conceptually, the study describes the socio-demographic profile of migrants and their families, utilization of remittances and causal effects of mothers' migration on three different dimensions (education, health, and psychological well-being) of their children who remained home in Bangladesh. The volume and uses of the remittances sent by female workers showed a very positive approach to the family's well-being. The migrant women were always careful to choose the right person to whom they should send remittances, bearing in mind the proper use of money for their children and households. They also wished to control money by making decision on the areas of various household matters. This approach indicates a reshaping of gender relationships in their families.

Mothers' migration has long-lasting and incompatible effects on children. Many conclusions have been drawn on the impacts on unaccompanied children. Clearly, the mother always tends to migrate to improve her family rather than her own freedom. At first, the study stated that the education status of stay-behind children had improved, such as accessibility of learning materials, good tutoring and better schooling. There were some cases of not going to school, failures and dropout of school for stay-behind children. This was probably due to the absence of the mother and lack of care. Secondly, the medical care status of the stay-behind children had also upgraded. Food and nutrition were another important elements here. The caregiver admitted that the food intake status had improved a lot as the mother regularly sent money, so they could spend more money on food. For the treatment of children, they went to the local doctor mostly, as it was familiar to them. Few of them brought the children to the government hospital, private clinic and pediatricians, depending on the complication of the diseases. Visiting the local doctor is not always advised and is least preferred among all the options mentioned here. However, it was only for the easy accessibility, low cost and avoiding the long queue of the government hospital that children were brought to them. Thirdly, the psychosocial issue was

more sensitive to the children. The children had both positive and negative views of their mother's migration. The research shows that for some reasons, children were positive about their mother's migration, such as mothers sending remittances for their well-being, children receiving foreign gifts, ability to buy food and new clothes according to their desires, receiving regular phone and sometimes video calls from mother which reduces their distance. There are some cited reasons why children could not take their mother's migration easily, such as missing their mother, feeling sad, depressed, losing their self-esteem in their mother's absence, losing interest in regular work, and sometimes engaging in crime and drug addiction.

It is not easy to conclude that the influences of mother's migration on unaccompanied children are merely positive or negative. This research found mixed outcomes of positive and negative impacts. In this case, economic benefits compensate for social costs. Remittance sent by the mother helps the children to get better education, food, health and recreation. Social costs, on the other hand, overshadow economic benefits. To children, being with their mother is a great cost than wealth; besides, a mother's affection cannot be replaced by anyone.

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Part III
Forced Migration

Chapter 11
A Threat or an Opportunity? Internal Migration in the Context of Climate Extremes in Pakistan

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11.1 Introduction

The impact of climate change on human society is widely experienced particularly in rural areas where livelihoods are mainly climate sensitive (Pörtner et al., 2022). An increased body of research on climate change risks and vulnerability has shown the tendency to influence adversely on livelihood resources and strategies that are associated with the well-being of individuals, households or communities (Sengupta & Samanta, 2022; Adger, 2010). Livelihood resources that include natural (land and water), human (health, skills, education), social (relationships, networks, institutional support), physical (household assets and housing), and financial (income, savings, remittances) are expected to alter significantly (Guragain & Doneys, 2022; Hallegatte et al., 2011). Meanwhile, livelihood strategies that account for the ability to respond or adjust to (climate) stresses are mainly limited in rural settings (Sargani et al., 2022; Adger, 2010). For instance, the ability to cope or adapt depends on social, economic, and human capital and technical capacities to diversify (agricultural) income, increase knowledge and awareness, and access to government support.

In this regard, it is important to understand how climate extreme events impact livelihood resources and in turn, consider migration as a livelihood strategy to achieve better or sustain the well-being of families (Shahzad et al., 2019; Singh & Nair, 2014; Pagnani et al., 2021). Furthermore, viewing migration in the context of climate change via social and financial remittances is also important for understanding the adaptation potential of rural areas. For example, do remittances help to improve the well-being of migrants' families left-behind through increased feelings

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of safety, more savings, better housing, better social networks, skills and so on, thus reducing their vulnerability to climate change? The availability of services in rural areas such as education and health needs to be taken into consideration, given they are an important reason why people migrate (Fischer et al., 2021; Deshingkar, 2006). Further, how can migration help to improve the well-being of rural households to overcome environmental and climate change risks and vulnerabilities?

There is a large gap in the migration literature in Pakistan regarding the understanding of climate change and migration interactions, as well as the role of migration as a response strategy, particularly in internal migratory movements. Addressing this gap is important because migration in Pakistan has so far mainly been studied as an economic phenomenon, where the focus has been on the economic reasons for migration, individual characteristics of migrants, and the effects of remittances on people and the economy (Salik et al., 2020; Gazdar, 2003). Such studies have used human capital models and employed macro-level data to understand individual-level human capital (such as education or health), the role of remittances in asset accumulation, savings and consumption behaviours, and impacts on poverty dynamics and income inequalities of the sending regions.

A handful of studies have examined the links between migration and climate change (Mueller et al., 2014; Saeed et al., 2016; Qaisrani et al., 2018). For instance, Mueller et al. (2014) provide a household-level analysis of the impact of climate variables on-farm production and incomes with rural out-migration rates in Pakistan. However, the study does not provide any information on social and economic situations during and after the climate-induced migration and how male out-migration could affect the well-being of migrants' families left-behind in the context of climate change. Against this background, this study will focus on the understanding of potential associations between climate extreme events and migration with to migration decisions, processes, and outcomes in Pakistan.

The chapter consists of six sections including the introduction. The second section represents a short literature review on climate change and migration relationships. The third and fourth section present methods and study area descriptions, and the fifth section provides discussion. The last section furnishes conclusion.

11.2 Migration and Climate Change Relationship – Literature Review

Evidence of environmental and climate change factors influencing migration decisions and outcomes is widely acknowledged (Black et al., 2013; McLeman & Smit, 2006; Murphy, 2015; Kelley et al., 2015; Gray & Wise, 2016). The most quoted environmental and climate change 'push' factors that likely stimulate migration include droughts and floods, land degradation, loss of ecosystem services, climate extremes (such as heavy rainfall variability and temperature fluctuations) and sea-level rise (Afifi, 2011; Mueller et al., 2014).

However, the complexity and unpredictability of climate-induced migration are also highlighted because of the heterogeneity in individual and collective responses of society to climate change (Klaiber, 2014; Adger et al., 2015). The occurrence of climate change events is reported as characterized by slow-onset and fast-onset changes and associated with different migratory behaviours. Slow-onset climate changes relate to the gradual loss of agricultural productivity and ecosystem services through spatial shifts in cropping zones, increased crop water requirement, and degradation of soil and land fertility (Black et al., 2013). Fast-onset climate events such as floods, extreme rainfall variability and heatwaves, may reduce sudden access to livelihood resources, crop failure, damage to life and property (Black et al., 2013). As a result, many climate change stresses are linked to livelihoods resource degradation and to harm the well-being of an individual or a society (Adger, 2010).

Migration is a process shaped by both (migrant's) agency and structure (social and institutional actors) that form a space for making decisions to migrate and improve well-being, according to the changing socio-economic, environmental and political conditions (de Haas, 2010). Concerning climate change, several empirical studies note that the most common response of vulnerable people is to migrate elsewhere (Black et al., 2013; Warner & Afifi, 2014). People may move temporarily or permanently to adapt or recover from climate change events or impacts (Black et al., 2013; Warner & Afifi, 2014). For instance, Mueller et al. (2014) find in rural Pakistan that an increase in winter temperature (heat stress) gradually affects farm and non-farm incomes, which is associated with long-term male out-migration to cities and towns.

However, given the complexity of migration and environmental or climate change interactions, scholars warn against drawing any deterministic or linear relationship between climate and environmental factors and migration (Faist & Scade, 2013; Black et al., 2011). More specifically, slow-onset climate changes rarely act alone to drive migration (Neumann & Hilderink, 2015). Rather, a multi-causality approach is required to understand the migration and environment links, because migration is a complex phenomenon encompassing non-environmental aspects such as social, economic, political, cultural and demographic factors (Black et al., 2011).

In this regard, there has been only limited progress in understanding how environmental and non-environmental drivers of migration interact (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010). This becomes more important when migration is broadly considered a risk management strategy (de Haas, 2010) and a lack of understanding of these interacting factors may hinder well-being and development efforts. Moreover, it is important to better understand how migration decisions are made under different types of environmental stresses, as well as the role of family and migration networks and the provision of funds to manage migration costs. This also requires a contextual understanding of how the decline in well-being (including poverty, inequality, and economic opportunities) can influence migration decisions and outcomes through the potential to cope or adapt to the impacts of climate change.

11.3 Data Collection

The study was carried out in Muzaffarabad District in Punjab and Tharparkar District in Sindh province during October and November 2019. The selection of villages (the sending rural areas) was made based on its exposures to climate vulnerabilities such as floods and droughts. Whereas the selection of urban centres (the destination areas) was based on the discussion with the rural respondent (of selected villages) that highlights the most common destination areas of rural migrants or displaced populations.

A total of 10 semi-structured were conducted, five each from rural and urban areas. In Muzaffargarh, three semi-structured interviews were conducted with migrant households located in urban areas and three from rural areas including one non-migrant. In the case of Tharparkar (Methi), a total of four semi-structured interviews were conducted, two each from rural and urban areas, with the sample also including two from female household members. Questions in the interview are mainly focused on basic household characteristics (such as age, gender, education, occupation, etc.) social and economic capital, impacts and outcomes of climate extreme events, causes of migration, changes in livelihoods and access to basic facilities at destination compared to origin areas, migration duration and social or migrant network support.

Furthermore, a total of 9 focus groups discussion (FGDs) were conducted to identify the role of migration and climate, gendered impacts and vulnerabilities, situation of left-behind family members in the sending areas as well as migrant families in the destination areas. In Muzaffargarh, four FGDs were conducted two each for rural and urban areas. Whereas five FGDs were conducted in Tharparkar, including one urban (female migrant household members), and four in rural areas (including two each for non-migrant and migrant male and female household members.

The interviews and FGDs were conducted in local languages i.e., Punjabi, Sariki and Sindhi, which were then translated and transcribed into the English language for the analysis. The data was then coded for identifying themes using NVivo 12 software.

11.4 Study Areas

As mentioned above**,** Muzaffargarh and Tharparkar were selected for this study based on their key social, economic, political, and environmental trends and challenges. *Muzaffargarh* is located in the south of Punjab province at the confluence of two main rivers i.e., the Indus and Chenab Rivers. Its location between the two rivers is associated with high flood risks causing multiple livelihood challenges to the population (Jamshed et al., 2020). Agriculture is a mainstay of rural Muzaffargarh is not only impacted by floods but also by other climatic factors such as heavy

rainfall, hailstorm and droughts. Such climatic threats imply serious risks to agricultural productivity as well as increased vulnerability to the already poverty-ridden rural population. Although large-scale industry has been established in Muzaffargarh including thermal and coal power plants and oil refinery, however, due to a low human capital base, such development fails to generate alternative livelihoods for the local population (Naveed et al., 2017). The only options available to them to opt for daily wage jobs as a laborer in the informal sector elsewhere in the district or country to avoid the consequences of floods to farming, income losses and displacement. This occupational shift is more common among small landholding farmers and the landless rural populations (Jamshed et al., 2020). Such circumstances lead to temporary or permanent migration in the district which enables them to adapt to shocks from floods for reducing poverty and hunger, recover from physical and economic loss (such as the reconstruction of houses or livestock, etc.) and enhance family income through remittances (Imran et al. 2018; Jamal & Ashraf, 2011).

The district *Tharparkar* is situated in the south of Sindh province. The topography of the district is dominated by three important features: (1) cultivable fertile plain areas mostly irrigated by canals surface water, (2) hilly areas which have sweet groundwater that is mainly utilise for crop production, and (3) desert areas making up major part of the district, where livelihood mainly depend on livestock rearing (Akhtar & Jariko, 2018). Drought is the main climate hazard in the area, which become more frequent in the recent past (Siddiqui & Safi, 2019). Tharparkar district is the most socially deprived and ranked lowest among all district of Sindh province (Bengali et al., 2003; Channa et al., 2020; Qurat-ul-Ann & Mirza, 2021). It shows a high development lag of the district in terms of economic opportunities, education, housing quality and housing services (Bengali et al., 2003). Social inequality in Tharparkar is based on (old Hindu dominated) caste and the feudal system has declined over time (Hasan, 2010). During the war with India in 1971, the serfdom system was disrupted due to the migration of most of the Hindu upper-caste to India. The situation created more freedom (of mobility) for the lower (Hindu) artisan caste (Hasan, 2010). This enables them to migrate to urban areas such as Mithi, where they can earn based on their skills and develops social and human capital for their children and have access to better health and housing facilities (Hasan, 2010; Qurat-ul-Ann & Mirza, 2021).

11.5 Results and Discussion

11.5.1 Climate Extremes Events – Who Migrates and Why

The analysis shows that people are on the move due to several reasons and in different ways. The most common reason for migration is the loss of livelihoods due to natural calamities i.e., frequent floods and droughts which are common in the study areas. Moving with the whole family or sending male members to urban areas is the

one way to deal with such adversaries. The most common economic losses that lead to displacement and migration in Muzaffargarh district are livestock loss, damage to businesses (shops, poultry sheds, kiosks, etc.) that were swept away in floods and loss of jobs and labour in the farms which destroyed due to floods, whereas cultivation was abandoned in Tharparkar districts due to intense and frequent droughts.

This was exacerbated by the government's lack of preparedness and early warning. When floods occurred, people were unable to access roads; houses, fields, and schools were destroyed; livestock were lost; drinking water became contaminated; and it was difficult to move the disabled and elderly to safety. According to Rukhsana,[1] a women participant of FGDs from the Muzaffargarh district's Ajab Arian area:

> …All our houses were sunk (due to flood) and we (whole family including children) were taken out (from the village) through a truck. In 'Taabay' (the elevated place where most of the rescue camps were mostly established) we were sitting…our (women's) honour was not safe there…there was no arrangement for 'purdah'. how many days one can stay? So, we stayed there for fifteen days. Meanwhile, my husband got labour work in a mill, and we move (permanently) to 'Rasoolabad' (suburbs of Muzaffargarh city).

Most of the participants of focus group discussions in rural areas mentioned the impact of extreme climatic events on crop and livestock production. Mostly, the relationship is direct such as floods destroyed businesses, property and people that lead to different types of mobility patterns like displacement, and temporary or permanent migration. Such type of relationships is mentioned in climate-migration literature as fast-onset climate impacts on mobility pattern (see Cattaneo et al., 2019). Whereas, in some cases, the relationship is indirect that mainly due to slow-onset climate impacts which lead to a loss in (agriculture) productivity and profitability and turn lead to increase indebtedness of farmer and ultimately they have no other options to abandon agriculture and migrate elsewhere. Such a situation is less evident in Mazafargarh but prevalent in Mithi, Tharparkar, where frequent droughts causing acute water shortages for agriculture, livestock, and livelihoods. Kareem, (50), a farmer from Darelo Paro in Islamkot, Mithi said:

> …During the famine I lost my farm job, and my animals were starving. Livestock fodder was scarce, and it was expensive to bring some from the barrage area (irrigated areas where canal water is available for cultivation). This situation affected my children's education also.

Most of the migrant household member highlights that poor health and lack of health facilities, pursuing better education for children in urban areas, food insecurity, debt and poverty, and lack of infrastructure were also major reasons for their migration. Climate extremes also impact indirectly on public services delivery functions (such as water supply, education, and health facilities) as well as caused to decline in social relationships and support mechanisms in the study areas. This caused people to migrate elsewhere for better livelihood perspectives. Mubashir (36), one of the male participants of FGDs from Mithi, Tharparkar mentioned:

[1] pseudonyms names in order to protect the participant's identity.

> We migrated from the village due to unavailability of job or work, (drinking) water, hospital and education facilities that mainly affected due to drought. No one supports us, even relatives. Here (in destination areas) our children are getting an education and have good employment opportunities.

We find that climate-induced migration is largely common among landless farm labour in rural areas. The outcome of climate events i.e., floods or drought is the migration (as well as displacement) of rural small businesses and farm labour (see Mueller et al., 2014; Janjua, 2009). Climate events may displace landowner and landless in a similar manner but return to origin (rural) areas aftermath of floods or droughts are found more among landowners compared to landless and non-farm households. In most cases, migration (among landless farm labour and non-farm households) is initially carried out by one or more male family members, which is followed by whole family members once migrant member(s) are able to secure employment at the destination and manage finances for the whole family migration.

Moreover, our analysis also revealed that increasing food insecurity situation and debt-burden trigger migration due to frequent flood or drought conditions in the study areas. Rural landless and sharecroppers are most vulnerable during these conditions. The declining crop yields, farm incomes and abandoned agricultural lands under water-stressed conditions caused reduced farm labour requirements and wages. This not only increases food insecurity but also the financial resources of the rural poor in the study areas. Such circumstances compel rural landless and sharecroppers to take loans from landlords. However, when these households decided to migrate elsewhere in search of alternative livelihoods, they have to repay the loans to the landlords. Mostly, under these situations, the migrant families agreed on bonded contracts in which the landlord at the destination area pay-off family's debt in return for hiring them for discounted wages. This situation further adds to the socio-economic vulnerabilities of migrant families. Rahim (35), a farmer from Darelo Paro village in Islamkot, Mithi described as:

> We do not apply fertilisers to barren or water-stressed land because there is no guarantee that the seed will grow after fertilising this land." Most farmers owe about PKR100,000 (USD 900) to the landowners on whose land they work. The only option under these stressful conditions is to abandon the land. Our landowner, on the other hand, stated that if we do not work on his land, we must return his money. So, we went to another landowner to borrow of PKR 150,000 (USD1350) to repay the first landowner.

11.5.2 Climate-Induced Displacement and Migration Typologies

In terms of migration typologies, the analysis reveals that rural-urban internal migration predominates in the study areas. People migrate from flood or drought-affected rural areas to other secure rural areas or urban centres. In Muzaffargarh, migration is, however, followed by displacement of the rural population due to floods. One or more members of the household migrated to cities or nearby towns to earn livelihoods and struggle to manage to finance for whole family migration.

In this regard, the outcome of displacement and migration is largely based on migrants' social and human capital, which defines the typology of migration i.e., either it is temporary, permanent or circular migration.

Also, migration is carried out by one or more members of the household. Whereas the close family member (such as parents, wife, and children) stayed in the (rural) origin areas. These left-behind family members mainly receive financial remittances that crucially support the daily living expenses and provide a safety net during time of hardship or climate hazards. The 'migrant' in this case has the intention to return home when enough financial resources are capitalized that are envisaged by the family for future well-being or situations when the migrant was not able to earn any longer due to old-age or loss of a job at the destination.

We also find a stepwise migration pattern in study areas. People who have enough financial and social support to move to adjacent local towns once they are displaced by floods or droughts. Due to frequent or megafloods, these adjacent areas are also vulnerable to floods. In these circumstances, families once displaced and migrated again move to more secure places which in most cases large cities. Hasnain (35), a migrant from Tibi Hussainabad in Muzaffargarh said:

> …In 1992 we migrated to Rawaywala due to floods and moved again after the 2010 mega flood, migrating to Rasoolabad (a town near Muzaffargarh city). We then migrated to Sheikhupura (a large city near Lahore) after the 2014 flood…

In case of Tharparkar district, migration is primarily by rural-to-rural within or across the district. People migrate from flood-affected rural areas to other secure rural areas primarily because of their social networks and the support available to them, which is primarily based on kinship and close tribal relationships. Permanent migration from rural areas across Tharparkar to Mithi town and other urban centres such as Karachi, on the other hand, is increasing. The migration of landless farmers to other rural areas is difficult in terms of financing their journey, which is often done with their entire family and livestock. Migrant families' mobility is frequently restricted by landlords with whom they have contracts to work on their farms.

We find that most of the migration is internal and permanent. People have no intention to return to the area of origin once they are established in (urban) destination areas. In Tharparkar, although migrants are well-settled in destination areas they do connect to their (rural) areas of origin. The connectivity is for either sowing of crops, business or managing social ties to their fellow left-behind villagers and relatives.

11.5.3 Climate-Induced Migration Outcomes – Threat or Opportunity?

Understanding migration outcomes in terms of increasing economic and social opportunities for migrants and their left-behind families as well as exploring remittances flows and usage are also necessary. Our findings suggest that migration has significantly improved the income of migrant families in destination areas.

Although in some cases, migrant families mentioned difficulty in meeting daily household expenditures, however, showed agreement that their incomes are much better and, in some cases, it is four times multiplied compared to origin areas. Few migrant families are successful in establishing a small business or improving business connections for generating funds and sometimes get better jobs in multinationals, and access to microfinance and other government support programs such as the Benazir Income Support Program. In this way, migration helps to diversify income sources that enable them to educate their children and build better and secure houses in destination areas.

In terms of the level of satisfaction of access to basic services such as health care, water supply, shelter, privacy, sanitation, and food are mixed for migrants in destination (urban) areas. In the case of health care facilities, the worst situation is mentioned by migrant and their families at the destination as well as at origin areas. In urban areas, migrants faced issues of lack of access to proper health care due to the poor condition of the public hospital (more patients per doctor) and the unaffordability of private hospitals. Whereas, in rural areas, health care is either non-existent or inadequate as migrants' left-behind family members also report a similar lack of satisfaction with health services as a migrant member(s) at the destination.

Our finding suggests that the flow of remittances to a left-behind family member is less evident during the initial period of migration. Migrant members are not able to send remittances due to a prolonged period of unemployment, low income, and high expenditure in destination areas. Which causes left-behind family members to face health and income risks. Our findings also pointed out that migrant members took loans to manage migration costs, so remittances are also used for such repayments, this significantly shrinks the economic well-being of left-behind family members. The left-behind family members also feel migrant absence and passed through psychological traumas.

Migrant member or households in destination areas show their satisfaction with regard to housing conditions. Social network support from friends and family causes people to feel better-off regarding housing as they mostly share relative's houses (by paying rent) or relief camps which are monitored and managed by government institutions such as police and armed forces.

We find that the majority of respondents mentioned that they could not get any support either from the government or any other organization. The most pressing needs were food, drinking water, medicine and shelter which were mainly managed by utilizing their savings or selling valuables such as ornaments and livestock. The shelter provided by the government is mostly a small tent or a room in government buildings such as schools and Masjids. Sometimes migrants also get supported by family and friends on the relief camps and are offered rooms in their houses and support them to start a small business or to get a job/labour on daily wages.

Another important factor for migrants is the lack of trust between the local population and migrants. It makes it difficult for migrants to find a place to live or a room to rent. Furthermore, even if a migrant wishes to start a business in the destination area, it is extremely difficult to gain the trust of local suppliers in order to obtain goods on credit.

For instance, Ali Shah (35), who had permanently migrated to Muzaffargarh city, said:

> In the 2010 floods, my tea hotel was completely destroyed, and I had no other way to support my family. I moved to Muzaffargarh city to earn an income, but I am now facing a lot of challenges finding suitable accommodation, setting up a business and earning some money to sustain my business and household expenditure.

Furthermore, we find that migrant households experienced lack of access to water, particularly for drinking in Tharparkar district. The lack of accessibility of water affects migrant families both at the destination and in the origin areas. People mostly drank bottled water, which is expensive and difficult to obtain. Women are particularly affected by climate-induced migration. For a migrant woman fleeing floods or drought, health is the most pressing concern. During the migration process, pregnant migrant women face a variety of mental and physical health issues. Migrant pregnant women are not only vulnerable while Women also share the consequence of unsuccessful migration movements and standby their family. Sakina, a women respondent of FGDs, Mithi, Tharparkar described as: 'I worked in the field to harvest cowpea, and millet, which led to the loss of my 6 months' pregnancy'.

11.6 Conclusion

Climate change impact on human society is evidently increasing with each passing year. The impact is particularly severe in rural areas of Pakistan, where about 132 million population is dependent upon climate-sensitive livelihoods. The well-being of households and communities is deeply linked to the sustainability of livelihood resources and strategies. We have shown that climate change as one of the important factors behind declining livelihood resources and strategies, particularly within rural community, which has a direct co-relation to people migrating in search of livelihood opportunities to other rural areas, cities, or provinces. In this regard, migration may potentially provide an alternate source of livelihood or survival strategy for the vulnerable population. Alternatively, we have also highlight climate-induced migration may increase many challenges for the poor, resourceless migrating families that exacerbates food insecurity, social oppression, and indebtedness. Climate-induced migration is an unpleasant phenomenon for women impacting their health, increasing their work burden and mental stresses.

We have shown that displaced rural communities were least prepared to cope with frequent floods and severe droughts. In origin areas, people lack training and knowledge of risks and have no information regarding the expected loss of life and livelihood assets. People have limited adaptive and response capabilities to face multiple challenges posed by climate change to their lives, livelihoods, and property. Moreover, institutional preparedness and capabilities are inadequate to counter the challenges posed by extreme climate events and their immediate and long-term impacts. Such circumstances compel vulnerable communities to migrate

permanently under different migration patterns such as rural-to-rural, rural-to-urban, urban-to-urban, international, and seasonal migration.

In this regard, climate-induced migration poses many challenges for the (landless) poor, resourceless migrating families like food insecurity, social oppression, and indebtedness, particularly affecting women impacting their health, increasing their work burden and mental stress. Our evidence suggests that if proper public support is available then significant improvement in climate migrant families' socio-economic conditions may occur over time. Migrant families can establish small businesses, improve business connections for generating finances, have better opportunities to get private and government jobs through improved access to microfinance and other government support programmes.

Our results highlight different climate-induced displacement and migration issues among stakeholder concerned, particularly, Ministry of Climate Change of Pakistan and can contribute ongoing process of national and provincial climate change adaptation planning. Some key recommendations include: (1) develop the risk assessment and monitoring capacities of provincial and local administration to identify location-specific climate change adaptation priorities; (2) focus on (internal) migration planning and management, considering the potential social and economic challenges and opportunities for the migrants and their families in areas of origin and destination; and (3) implement a migrants registration system across different administrative boundaries by the government to gain insights regarding internal migration flows and patterns for informed policy decisions and implementation. This would also help improve federal to local level institutional support for aid distribution and resettlement.

We recognise, however, that migration is a highly complex phenomenon. There are still significant uncertainties that this study cannot address, such as how climate change interacts with various social, economic, political, and demographic migration factors, not only defining broad migration patterns but also affecting the well-being of migrants and their families on a societal scale. Furthermore, it is critical to understand why some people (from the same social and economic class) do not migrate while others do during extreme weather events – a better understanding can provide an in-situ adaptation potential of rural populations in origin areas. Similarly, how vulnerable communities might experience migration outcomes coupled with climatic and non-climatic extremes such as COVID-19 pandemic.

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Chapter 12
Local Expert Perceptions of Creeping Environmental Changes and Responses in Maldives

Robert Stojanov and Ilan Kelman

12.1 Introduction

Maldives is a country comprising atolls and thus has low-lying elevation. It has long been recognized as being particularly affected by potential impacts of human-caused climate change which is one example of creeping environmental changes affecting local-to-global scales (Glantz, 1994a, b). The combination of low elevation, comparatively small island size, and its environmental and social conditions and trends makes Maldives often claimed as being among one of the most vulnerable countries to impacts from creeping environmental changes, although other analyses describe some aspects of successfully dealing with vulnerabilities, especially regarding the environment and livelihoods (e.g. Knoll, 2021).

Maldives is an archipelago of around 1190 islands, grouped into 26 low-lying coral atolls. Around 200 islands are currently inhabited and over 80 more are used as tourist resorts. In recent years, tourism accommodation has been permitted on inhabited islands leading to guest house businesses (Chia & Muiz, 2021). The country's total land area is approximately 298 km^2 and no island is larger than 10 km^2. Most islands are usually flat and on the order of 1 m above average sea level. The highest natural point is indicated as being on a golf course in Viligili in the Addu Atholhu at 5 m above mean sea level (CIA, 2021). Maldives has a tropical climate and some agriculture, but the Maldivian economy depends strongly on tourism and

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fishing, making it highly dependent on imports of goods and services (CIA, 2021; Ghina, 2003; Malatesta et al., 2021).

This study focuses on local expert perceptions of creeping environmental changes facing Maldivians and possible responses to them, discussion of which is often dominated by projected climate change impacts and suggested adaptation measures to climate change. Specific focus tends to be devoted to the role of migration, which is highlighted as playing a significant and essential role in adaptation to climate change, although plenty of scientific discussions provide alternative viewpoints and point out difficulties with the climate change migration discourses (Nicholson, 2014; Santos & Mourato, 2021). There is typically inadequate differentiation among migration, resettlement, relocation, and displacement, especially in terms of trying to differentiate climate change impacts from inadequate responses to climate change impacts. Nonetheless, due to the popularity of assumptions regarding climate change and migration intersections (deconstructed by Nicholson, 2014; Santos & Mourato, 2021 among others), migration features prominently in local expert views, including in this study.

In particular, migration has always been a human phenomenon with long-standing migration and mobilities research not always factored into climate change studies despite the work placing climate change into wider contexts of migration (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2016). Here, migration is critiquingly examined in terms of local expert perceptions of whether migration can or should be framed as a form of responding to creeping environmental changes, including but not limited to climate change, for Maldives. The importance of local experts is that many other studies tend to ask either locals in an affected place or else external experts, although Sovacool (2012a, b) are examples of exceptions by asking Maldivian experts. All contributions from interviewees have validity and importance, irrespective of different types of expertise or assumed level of being 'expert'. The focus on general populations or external experts can leave a lacuna in determining the understandings and viewpoints of experts directly from and living in an affected location. This approach is, in effect, highlighting local elites rather than non-elites (keeping in mind the critical literature on elite capture when seeking a representative sample) or external elites (whose views can be disproportionately accounted for, especially in many climate change studies).

12.2 Methodology

The core of this study is empirical research dealing with local expert perceptions of creeping environmental changes, challenges emerging from impacts, and responses or actions to these problems, with discussion frequently dominated by climate change. Research was completed through semi-structured interviews with local experts. Fifteen local experts from environmental, development, governance, business, and political fields completed interviews in August 2013, representing a reasonable sample within the capital city and comparatively nearby islands of a small

country (e.g., for Maldives, Chia and Muiz (2021) had nine interviewees which was deemed sufficient for their analysis while Shakeela and Becken (2015) used twelve interviewees). The interviewees here covered a wide range of opinions, backgrounds, interests, and employers (Table 12.1). They were selected, on the basis of their expertise through online searching and their professional position, especially in decision-making roles. Others were selected based on respondents' recommendations (snowball sampling). Diversity and availability also played roles. The sampling strategy was identifying possible experts online, contacting them via email, conducting these interviews face-to-face on-site (hence, the availability criterion), and then using them to recommend others (the snowballing component).

Representativeness is hard to determine verifiably, but when experts start recommending each other, then either saturation is close or else the selection process is trapped within a specific clique or bubble. The key is that diversity was achieved across numerous parameters (Table 12.1) since the possible interviewee cohort cannot be large within a country with a small population.

Table 12.1 List and characteristics of interviewees

Code	Expertise	Gender	Location	Sector	Job position
M01	environment, conservation	F	Vilingili Island	non-profit organization	project manager
M02	environment, conservation	M	Vilingili Island	non-profit organization	project manager
M03	environment, conservation	M	Malé	non-profit organization	project manager
M04	environment	M	Malé	non-profit organization	consultant
M05	education	F	Malé	Private	director
M06	climate change	M	Vilingili Island	Public/state	environmental analyst
M07	energy	F	Malé	public/state	project officer
M08	environmental management	M	Malé	private/academic	lecturer
M09	computer specialist	M	Hulhumalé Island	Private	entrepreneur
M10	politics	M	Vilingili Island	Public	member of parliament
M11	tourist sector, management	F	Vilingili Island	Private	public relations manager and marketing
M12	history, national heritage	M	Malé	Public	head of department
M13	history, national heritage	F	Malé	Public	institutional officer
M14	environmental management	F	Malé	Public	lecturer
M15	environmental management	F	Malé	Public	lecturer

A semi-structured interview guide was used, but not always adhered to rigidly in order to let the interviewee take their own direction and highlight their own topics of importance in their own way. This approach is key to achieving in-depth interviews, ensuring that the interviewer has enough material to seed ideas without directing or leading the interviewee. The main clusters of discussion areas within the guide were:

1 Perceptions of environmental change, covering creeping environmental changes including climate change.
2 Knowledge and evaluation of climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation strategies, as well as their evident overlaps.
3 Migration patterns (internal and external) alongside attitudes towards migration as a potential adaption measure for creeping environmental changes of which sea-level rise from climate change is notable.

Interviews were conducted in English, as all experts were fluent in the language as well as their native Dhivehi.

12.3 Results

12.3.1 Environmental Changes

Respondents indicated awareness of a variety of creeping environmental changes (Table 12.2).

These issues are illustrated by quotations from respondents, such as M01 and M02 discussing water scarcity, food insecurity, overfishing, and lack of fish (tuna,

Table 12.2 List of mentioned environmental changes

Environmental issues	Number of respondents
waste management	6
Air pollution	2
Water pollution and management	6
Water scarcity	4
Food insecurity	1
Overfishing and lack of fish	3
Lack of space / overpopulated island / overcrowded Malé	3
Sea level rise / inundation	8
Beach erosion	7
Shift of seasons	6
Coral reefs destruction	5
Natural resources exploitation	1
Traffic (cars, motorbikes)	4
Tsunami	6
Tree cutting	2

in particular) along with unequal development of various part of Maldives. The seriousness of Malé being overcrowded was highlighted along with the implications for resources:

> T*he most important issues is pollution of environment. Ground water is exhausted and contaminated, sewage is going to see, nothing is done. Water is not treated, it goes directly to the sea, almost near the beach, it destroys coral reef and sea lif*e.

Similarly, M03 talked about water management and water security:

> Water management is serious issue especially for other islands (besides Malé), which harvest the rain water. They do not have enough water to filter it and use it. Every island does not have desalinization plant … [Moreover] rain water is not safe, it is full of toxins.

Regarding fishing, M03 mentioned:

> Fisheries are getting smaller, migration patterns are changing (due to acid rain, temperature higher)… and it can be also cause due to overfishing. Fisherman have to go much further to get the same amount of fish, fish are more expensive.

M12 illustrates climate change and related issues, such as perceptions of sea-level rise and beach erosion as major creeping environmental changes:

> Sea level rise – it is slow process, but it something we need to be aware of this.

On the topic of seasonality, M06 and M09 in particular expressed experience of perceived trends in weather patterns, namely delayed arrival of the wet season, more drier periods, and more weather which they termed as being unpredictable. M11 explained about weather:

> T*iming is very different, it looks like that it is not going to be rain, but it suddenly rains … it is more surprising … before we used to know about it, but now we cannot expect when rains come or not.*

Similarly, M03 commented:

> We have to re-evaluate monsoon patterns, we indicate more days of drought.

The implied conflation of numerous topics—from the environment even when influenced by society and from society only, as well as from local to global—is representative of taking a wide viewpoint, recognising the interactions and influences among topics. Notably absent is mentioning that the oceans are acidifying and warming, although these points could be subsumed within coral reefs destruction, water scarcity, food insecurity, sea-level rise, and other topics.

12.4 Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies

Climate change dominated perceptions of responses and actions, focusing on mitigation and adaptation as separate issues without much recognition of their overlaps and connections (Table 12.3). While most respondents agreed on the need to depend less on fossil fuels and to use renewable energy more, most of them evaluated a Zero

Table 12.3 List of mentioned mitigation and adaptation strategies

Mitigation strategies	Number of respondents	Adaptation strategies	Number of respondents
Car restrictions	3	Land reclamation / artificial islands building	3
Using renewable energy sources	8	Safer islands concept	4
Zero Carbon strategy	5	Water security	1
		Controlled population movement	1
		Sea walls (barriers)	6
		Tanks for water	1
		Adapted house construction	1

Carbon Strategy as mainly public relations from the former president, rather than being a realistic plan. They perceived gaps between promotion of strategies and practical implications of implementing them, despite some examples of good practice existing, which they discussed. Suggestions to reduce energy consumption were notably absent, considering that this action is the most important for tackling overconsumption especially with regards to fossil fuel use by the shipping and aviation sectors, on which Maldives depends.

For climate change mitigation, M03 mentioned:

> I*t is important to claim that if Maldives become carbon neutral, nothing will change, but it is good to became a good example that is worth to follow for other countries.*

Yet M02 explained:

> Every island has own diesel plant. On Vilingili, 25% energy comes from solar power. Solar energy is increasing.

M06 added:

> 34% of GDP is spent for importing of fossil fuels from Middle East. This is a huge amount. … We need to achieve more energy security.

M01 illustrates similarly:

> Here was the government plan to achieve a zero carbon society: use of solar energy and other environmentally friendly sources. For example, on Vilingili, vehicles are restricted. On Malé, there are second-hand cars. On other islands, they increased tax for imported cars having a 400% tax higher than the value of car.

For climate change adaptation, M06 highlighted tools perceived to be necessary for protecting beaches in Maldives, as they are deemed to be of high importance as key for local populations and tourists:

> Insurance, building restrictions, sand banks, sea walls, plant trees and shrubs…we should try many things. Mangroves are very few on islands and they are not located on the beach, but inside the islands.

It was not clear how much the notion of "beaches" was conflated with or a subset of "coasts". Not all shorelines around Maldives are beaches, including much of the capital Malé which is enclosed by an wall. Beach or coastal protection is also different from beach or coastal management, since the latter accepts that the water-land interface is dynamic and ever-shifting. Although not stated explicitly, there seemed to be an assumption that islands would be static and should be maintained as such. Compared to the focused approaches to mitigation, diverse attitudes were seen regarding adaptation strategies. Environmental activists were especially suspicious of engineering-related adaptation measures such as land reclamation (see Duvat, 2020 for a summary of land reclamation and expansion in Maldives) and the concept of "safer islands", in which the population would be settled on islands deemed to be more robust to environmental changes (Sovacool, 2012b). The environmental activists articulated worries about damage to and possible destruction of the environment (also noted by Duvat, 2020). They pointed out unequal development of selected parts of Maldives, especially around Malé which included adaptation measures (e.g. M01 and M02). On the other hand, government representatives explained that the country cannot afford to protect all Maldives, so they felt that their attitudes were more sober or realistic and they were also willing to consider engineering-related idea such as artificial islands (e.g. M10).Since the data were collected, reclamation has continued around Maldives and a bridge for driving has been built connecting Malé with the country's main international airport, Velana International Airport. These changes impact perceptions and realities of human impacts on coasts and the marine environment, the desirability of staying in Maldives, and the ease of getting to the airport in order to leave—or arrive. Certainly, before the bridge, the plethora of boats crossing between the airport and the capital left little delay in transport between them. Yet a "fixed link" such as a bridge can make the journey appear or feel to be easier, irrespective of the actual situation (Baldacchino, 2007).

12.5 Climate Migration?

One of the most prominent perceptions of respondents was their awareness of climate change induced sea-level rise leading to suggestions of the potential submergence of Maldives, yet they would not link this narrative to an actual need for outmigration to other countries. They prefer adapting on existing islands, accepting that it would be feasible, with migration perceived as being a last resort, to be implemented only after all other possibilities are assumed to be exhausted and islands are presumed to become uninhabitable.

Placing potential climate (change) migration in context, most respondents mentioned that many people already migrate for several reasons, mainly education, better paid jobs, and generally better livelihood possibilities and overall living conditions (Table 12.4). They stress the voluntariness of migration for individuals or families moving, rather than subscribing to recountings of community relocation or forced displacement.

Table 12.4 List of mentioned migration drivers

Migration drivers	Number of respondents
Coastal erosion	2
Sea-level rise	2
Better education	6
Jobs	6
Tsunami	1
Rural-urban migration	1
Health care	1

M03 illustrates:

> People have to do strange things when they are in danger … If we emigrate due to sea-level rise, we lose our nation, our history… But, at one stage in future, we may have to leave…People do not move out of Maldives because of the impact of climate change or sea-level rise, but due to social things – better education, job, facility.

M01 points out the complications of creeping environmental changes interacting with the population's safety:

> I have heard about one island, where some local people have to leave due to beach erosion, but I do not think is climate change. Maldives islands are very fragile, that sand is moving.

M12 echoed many others by stressing Maldivian identity:

> We believe sea-level rise is a risk. But I do not think we would be under water now … but no matter where we live, we need to be prepared. Being Maldivian is our identity. We should know about these thing, maybe something may happen that force me to leave, but it is important for everyone to know the roots of his country. No matter where we live, we are still Maldivians.

M15 expressed likewise:

> Migration alone is not solution for us, we have to take into account all these social aspects, it create so many conflicts, our culture will be lost.

M06, as a public office representative, agreed, noting the willingness and expectation to stay in Maldives as long as possible:

> Migration is not an option. We do not want to leave our islands. We want to stay here.

The member of parliament, M10, supplemented this tendency to stay:

> We should still try to remain here, unless they find that damage is so serious and islands are getting uninhabitable.

This discussion is in line with explorations into Maldivian migration (Simonelli, 2016) in that migration reasons take on a variety of forms. The experts reflect this understanding, identifying the richness of reasons to move and not to move—especially that possible threats do not necessarily supersede love of home and identity. These sentiments did not inhibit speculation about possible migration related to creeping environmental changes, even where it ostensibly contradicted the baseline

of expecting to migrate for many reasons. M03 indicated awareness and acceptance that:

> At one stage we have to leave.

Similarly, M10 expressed the opinion:

> Any government of Maldives should have a greater concentration on the process of moving Maldives into another place, either it's Australia, India or whatever. The bilateral talks have to be completed.

M11 admitted with respect to the assumption of not needing to migrate that:

> Maybe two or 3 or 5 years later, my opinion will change.

12.6 Discussion

The results demonstrate, overall, little difference between the viewpoints of local experts determined here and previous discussions by other Maldivians and by external experts. Three main points emerge from combining the three categories of results:

1 Creeping environmental changes are recognised across scales and causes.
2 Responses and actions tend to be focused on climate change, rather than on a wider range of identified creeping environmental changes.
3 Migration is not perceived to be driven primarily by creeping environmental changes.

The first pattern is that the local experts recognise creeping environmental changes across scales and causes and they are connected to creeping social changes. This point is seen in the wide variety of changes mentioned alongside the high proportion of respondents mentioning several of them. The quotations further indicate links among the issues, not conflating or confusing them, but accepting the diversity of issues which interact. This result is not surprising, instead being in line with long-term understandings within island studies (Baldacchino, 2018) including for Maldives (Ghina, 2003; Malatesta et al., 2021; Sovacool, 2012a, b).

Also of importance is the experts' focus on local influences. They accept climate change impacts within creeping environmental changes, highlighting sea-level rise and seasonal shifts in particular, thereby not accounting for other climate change impacts and creeping environmental changes such as ocean acidification (Doo et al., 2020) and salinity intrusion (Jaleel et al., 2020). They also note that many of the changes can and should be attributed to local activities with direct impacts on day-to-day life, such as fishing and pollution. This attitude is helpful to avoid blaming external forces, such as human-caused climate change, for all problems and thereby seeks a balance, recognising that some actions could be achieved locally. The viewpoint from Maldives is line with analyses from other low-lying island countries such as Marshall Islands (Rudiak-Gould, 2013).

Many of these actions, however, are focused on climate change, as per the second overall point. This is not saying that climate change was considered exclusively with regards to responses and actions. It does note that much of the vocabulary from climate change entered into proposed ways forward, namely "mitigation" and "adaptation". Additionally, suggested actions were separated into mitigation and adaptation categories which is how the IPCC (2021–2022) has typically approached the topics. This separation occurs despite long-standing science explaining the importance of connecting mitigation and adaptation, especially why they should not have been viewed as being different in the first place (Kane & Shogren, 2000).

For adaptation, the majority of suggested strategies focus on large-scale, top-down actions. Engineering-related measures were popular, with sea walls of especial interest which is a typical local and expert viewpoint irrespective of studies explaining how relying on structural flood risk management induces increasing flood risk over the long-term (Etkin, 1999; Tobin, 1995). Conversely, Maldives might have little choice given its low elevation. Knowing that sea-level rise is happening and that waves do inundate the islands (Amores et al., 2021), major infrastructure changes are required to either live with saltwater flooding, raise the islands, or build walls around the islands. The latter two were referred to by the experts, but none considered the (albeit difficult) possible of living with regular sea flooding.

If engineering-related, top-down strategies are not accepted or successful for responding to and acting on creeping environmental changes, then an option continually raised for Maldives is migration. Much outside rhetoric focuses on topics such as "climate migration" and "climate change refugees", even though extensive scientific publications contest those terms while challenging the inevitability of forced migration due to climate change (Nicholson, 2014; Santos & Mourato, 2021). Similarly, viewpoints expressed by Maldivians have usually de-emphasised population movements related to creeping environmental changes including climate change, while discussing other reasons, including the 2004 tsunami, education, and livelihoods (Gussmann & Hinkel, 2020), as corroborated by the experts interviewed here.

Yet individual decisions regarding where to live now or in the future are rarely straightforward or clear-cut. The ambiguities evident in the respondents' views here are corroborated by other work (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2016), including for Maldives (Gussmann & Hinkel, 2020). They recognise that people generally are not moving due to climate change impacts, presumed climate change impacts, or expected or perceived climate change impacts. Such scenarios might be possibilities for the future within the context of other creeping environmental changes, creeping social changes, and individual and collective interests. Fundamentally, as migration and mobilities science explains—exactly in line with the respondent views here—human population dynamics are influenced by multiple factors with human-caused climate change being one factor, but rarely dominating, at least for now (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2016).

One recent example is the restrictions on migration imposed by responses to the COVID-19 pandemic that started in 2020. Maldives, as with many other countries, implemented local lockdowns and border restrictions, temporarily curtailing

movement including migration (Pooransingh et al., 2022; Sarkar et al., 2020). These forms of sudden restrictions can have differing impacts. Some people who might have been considering migration recognise the advantages, or just the reality, of their situation and elect to stay. Others who might not previously have been concerned about considering migration feel trapped and look forward to the opportunity to leave. In a sense, the rapid response imposition might bring movement options to the forefront due to lack of movement options, since the issue is acute and immediately present, in contrast to the long-term and slow-movement effects of creeping environmental changes. These points are all possibilities—mere speculation without cultural context. A suitable extension of the research here would be to re-interview the experts and others, including non-experts, discussing topics of non-migration as well as migration within the different contexts of various slower and faster changes.

As with other Maldivians and external experts, the respondents here (representing local experts) express important suggestions and identify key issues, particularly with respect to creeping environmental changes impacting their lives alongside responses and actions which people implement and could implement. These discussions accept that not all decisions are related to the creeping environmental changes, nor should they be. At times, divergence appears between their suggestions and other well-known possibilities not considered by the respondents here. Examples are reducing energy demand and considering non-structural strategies for flood risk management. The aspects which are not considered tend to match those which others also typically downplay, indicating a good match between the results here and previous work, in terms of both what is mentioned and what is not mentioned.

12.7 Conclusion

This work has contributed to filling in a continuing research gap by considering local expert views typically representing elites, decision makers, and other main stakeholders, rather than people in communities or external experts. The focus was on possible impacts from and actions in response to creeping environmental changes affecting Maldives. The results and interpretation identify some dissonance in understandings of possible impacts and resultant actions, in terms of recognising what might happen to the country, yet not fully considering the action-related implications. This dissonance differs little from similar studies of other cohorts, including for Maldives, challenging the notion that experts necessarily understand more than non-experts.

In comparing the work here to other studies, this overarching conclusion holds even for local compared to non-local experts. Consequently, policies and actions for creeping environmental changes should not make elites of experts, instead examining and applying different knowledge forms to accept that expertise appears in many ways in many forms (e.g. Williams et al., 1998). This approach to managing the impacts for creeping environmental changes is further important for ensuring

that people affected by decisions are able to provide knowledge and viewpoints for the decision-making.

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Chapter 13
From *Muhājir* to *Āwāra*: Figures of Migration and Exile Among Afghans

Khadija Abbasi and Alessandro Monsutti

13.1 Afghan Refugees: Decades of Displacement

Afghans experienced large scale displacement from the late 1970s as the conflict in their country of origin ebbed and flowed. Using ancient migratory routes, millions of people sought refuge in neighbouring countries during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the eighties and the protracted factional fighting that followed in the nineties. Over time, Afghans have developed transnational networks based on the continuous circulation and dispersion of the members of domestic units (Monsutti, 2005). In 1990 there were 6.22 million Afghan refugees, in their huge majority between Pakistan and Iran, forming at that time the largest group of displaced persons in the world, accounting for 40% of the people of concern falling under UNHCR's mandate. And there were up to an estimated 1.5 million internally displaced people. Large numbers repatriated after the Soviet withdrawal (1989) and the capture of Kabul by resistance forces (1992), but over the following years this trend reversed as more outward flows accompanied the new outbreaks of violence. The invasion of Afghanistan by US-led forces and the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001 caused a renewed wave of optimism. From 2002 to 2014 some four million Afghans repatriated mainly from the neighbouring countries of first asylum (UNHCR, 2014). However, the Afghan democratic government established since then has proven incapable of tackling insecurity and violence, poverty and inequality. Increasing numbers of asylum seekers tried their chance to Europe, North America, and Australia (Monsutti, 2021; UNHCR, 2020). After the partial withdrawal of NATO forces in 2014, people were massively leaving again, including urban families who have lost protection and fear to be the target of retaliatory action for their supposed connivance with foreign troops.

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In May 2021, US and NATO troops started a full withdraw from Afghanistan. The Taliban did not wait to launch an offensive and rapidly took control over most of the national territory, capturing Kabul on 15 August. While land borders with Pakistan and Iran were difficult to cross, the US troops have organised an aerial evacuation that has benefited to some 120,000 people. The consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic on an already vulnerable population are likely to be serious but difficult to evaluate due to the lack of reliable data. Moreover, the sanctions imposed on the new regime by the United States and their allies has made the economic crisis worse with widespread food insecurity, further deterioration of public health systems and rampant pauperisation (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Since summer 2021, cities do offer less job opportunities due to the departure of many humanitarian and development organisations. Many people are leaving the cities and go back to their villages of origin in the countryside, adding more demographic pressure on lands with limited resources. The options open to Afghans may seem significantly different than they were during the anti-Soviet jihad. The strategic context has changed and Afghan refugees encounter an increasingly adverse protection environment and a gloomy economic situation in Afghanistan's neighbouring countries. Nowadays Afghans do not leave for Pakistan or Iran like in the 1980s and part of the 1990s. In spite of ever stricter border controls, Afghan candidates to migration strive to find new destinations and many – including those already living as refugees in Peshawar or Quetta, Tehran or Mashhad – try to reach Europe. Indeed, new generations of Afghan refugees are forced to move due to comparable factors as their parents, but they are compelled to seek protection in more distant places and resort to even riskier routes (Monsutti & Balci, 2014).

During these four decades of conflict and forced displacement, self-designation among Afghan refugees and migrants has evolved. While terms such as *muhājir*, "refugee," with a religious connotation, *panāhenda*, "refugee" in more generic sense, and *mosāfer*, "traveller," were used by Afghans in the 1980s and 1990s, they no longer have the favour of younger people who might have grown up in Iran or Pakistan and often aspire to try their chance in the West. New generations tend to describe their situation with words such as *āwāra*, *sargardān*, *dar-ba-dar*, which generally convey the idea of "wandering," "vagrancy," "homelessness," "lack of purpose." This evolving terminology suggest that exile has lost the religious and political significance it might have had during the anti-Soviet jihad, on the one hand. It also can be interpreted as a quest for meaning in life, an assertion of agency in an effort to define their place in an open world, beyond the narrow limits of nation-states, on the other hand.

13.2 Evolving Terminology: The Figure of the *āwāra*

In the eighties, Afghans who took refuge in Pakistan and Iran tended to designate themselves by the term *muhājir* (plur. *muhājirin*), an Arab word referring to the Prophet Mohammed and his companions who migrated from Mecca to Medina in

622 CE (a journey called *hijra*). Beside its religious connotation, *muhājir* was also translating the term 'refugee as defined by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Edwards, 1986; Centlivres, 1988; Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont, 1988). This designation was valorising. Afghans were people who left their infidel-ruled country, justifying their decision by reference to the life of Mohammed, while the populations of their host countries were called *ansar* (originally the inhabitants of Medina who welcomed the Prophet and his companions). The used terminology also included *mujāhed*, "fighter," who wages the *jihād*, or in some contexts *panāhenda*, the general Persian word for "refugee," or even *mosāfer*, "traveller" in the sense of "migrant."

Progressively, this terminology, without disappearing, has become less and less predominant. Social media and the myriad of blogs run by Afghans increasingly mention notions that have a very different connotation and express precariousness and unpredictability more than forced displacement per se. The related terms *āwāra*, "vagrant," "wanderer," "homeless," and *āwāragi*, "vagrancy," "wandering," "homelessness" are particularly interesting due to their long history associated with the language of mystic love in classical Persian poetry. Jalal ad-Din Rumi (1207–1273) famously wrote for instance:

I swear to God that without you the city is like a prison to me,
*I long for vagrancy [*āwāragi*], mountain and desert.*[1]

Amir Khusrau Dehlavi (1253–1325) echoes the great Sufi poet. *Āwāra* is used to express the solitude of the lover's heart, whose thirst for the beloved cannot be quenched:

*My heart became vagrant [*āwāra*] when it fell in love, it may become more vagrant!*
My body became helpless without heart, it may become more helpless![2]

Much more recently, Ahmad Zahir (1946–1979), a popular Afghan crooner active in the seventies, was singing:

Free me from pain and loneliness,
From the infinite burning,
From the autumn storm.
From the red tears.
*Vagrant [*āwāra*], helpless,*
My heart is in hundred pieces.[3]

We collected our empirical material about the use and perceptions of the terms *āwāra* and *āwāragi* among Afghans who live in Western countries, some with a recognized status and some in transient situations.[4] Our interlocutors tend to be educated and active on internet. They represent a newer generation of mobile people who increasingly use some words and refer to some labels that were vague to their

[1] https://ganjoor.net/moulavi/shams/ghazalsh/sh441/

[2] https://ganjoor.net/khosro/gozide/ghazal-khosro/sh5/

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyhwTsj0-Sc

[4] All original names have been changed in the text.

mothers and fathers in the 1980s and 1990s. Each of them had his or her own understanding of *āwāragi*. The common feature is that *āwāragi* is an unfortunate and undesirable situation, although it might paradoxically open some spaces of agency and express some forms of hope in a better, more inclusive world.

13.3 Who Is Comfortable with the Term *muhājir*?

Afghans who came to West directly from Afghanistan and without the long-time experience of refugee life in Iran or Pakistan tend to avoid using the term *āwāra*. They often have experienced only one important move in their lifetime. They are more likely to have left Afghanistan when they were young adult. These people are more comfortable with the term *muhājir*. Anisa, for instance, grew up in Kabul. She has not lived in Iran and has only been briefly in Pakistan. She came to France through a scholarship and settled in Paris after claiming for asylum. She is married to a French man and is working for an organisation focusing on refugee rights. She feels in exile and part of her identity is far from her. Coming from an urban background, she insists however that she is not an *āwāra*. She comments: "I am a *muhājir*, because part of my identity, part of my memories, part of me, part of my soul have been left in Afghanistan. This is something I have not chosen." In her view, the terms *āwāra* and *dar-ba-dar* (literally "door to door") are depreciative and can apply to a person who has not been forced to leave his or her country of origin. She gives example of rough-sleepers, homeless alcoholics, those who do not have a residence and live in streets, beggars or Roma. All people with whom she does not feel to be minimally associated.

Anisa's point of view illustrates how the terms *āwāra* and *āwāragi* may have a negative connotation for some of our interlocutors, even if their meaning is fluid and may evolve over time. Anisa considers herself to be a *muhājir* and she will always remain a *muhājir*. She feels like a person who is combining the East and the West, Afghanistan and France. She is not from there nor from here, she is an in-between person. To summarise her viewpoint, she quotes a poem by Rumi: "I am not of the East, nor of the West, nor of the land, nor of the sea […] My place is the placeless, my trace is the traceless."[5]

Generally speaking, Afghans who have come to the West legally by air are also likely to be comfortable with the term *muhājir* rather than *āwāra*. Some of them have come to Europe thank to a work visa, some with a diplomatic visa or a student visa. Maryam, whose husband works for BBC Persian, came through family reunification. She feels closer to the word *muhājir*, which expresses that she has moved through official channels from one place to another and started a new life in the West. She keeps a bond with both her country of birth (Iran) and country of origin

[5]The full poem can be found here: https://blogs.harvard.edu/sulaymanibnqiddees/2012/11/06/rumi-i-do-not-recognize-myself/

(Afghanistan). But she sees herself as a migrant like thousands of other migrants in this world, not much dissimilar from people born in Western countries or any other country who go to another place to experience a different existence. She admits that being a migrant (she says *muhājir*) had a different feeling at different times in her life. For example, in Iran, despite growing up and studying there, she saw herself as a person who never had a full sense of belonging and citizen rights. But in London, she does not consider herself different from other people with migration background and has a sense of responsibility for the common good. She does not consider herself to be a second-class citizen the way she was in Iran.

Another of our interlocutor, Afsana, was born and grew up in Iran. She went to the United States through a Fulbright scholarship and eventually settled there. She systematically uses the word *muhājir* to describe her situation and sees no religious connotation in it. She concedes that her circumstances and destiny have forced her to stay away from the country of origin of her family. But she does not see herself as *āwāra* or *sargardān* ("vagabond"), as for her those terms refer more to mental dispositions than legal status. In her view, one can be without homeland and not *āwāra* or *sargardān*, while one can be in her or his homeland and be psychologically *āwāra*. Alia equally feels the term *muhājir* reflects better her current condition. She is originally from Herat (Afghanistan) and was a few years old when her family moved to Mashhad (Iran). She grew up in Iran and found in a radio a job focusing on refugee life. She moved to London early 2000s and is now working for BBC Persian as a TV presenter. As an established and reputable journalist, she does not feel connected to the experience of most Afghans in the United Kingdom:

> *Here in London, I came through work visa, I am accepted at my work place, I went to university here, I have made deep and long friendship here. These all make me feel home in London.*

Our sampling is obviously too limited to allow us to draw general conclusions. The term *muhājir* was the most widely used as a self-designation among Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran in the 1980s and 1990s. With its religious connotation, it was considered as valorising. Refugees were making sacrifices in the name of their faith. But it was also used in reference to the international refugee regime. Nowadays, it seems to still have the preference of people who came to Europe through official channels, quickly got a protection status, a resident permit and were able to integrate into the job market.

13.4 *Āwāragi* and the Experience of Iran

Afghan refugees who spent time in Iran are more likely to use and connect with the term *āwāragi*. Indeed, the documents issued by the authorities allowing them to reside in Iran (Adelkhah & Olszewska, 2007) were popularly called "Blue Cards" but officially intitled "Identification Card and Visa for Afghan Āwāras."

Sima is Hazara. The Hazaras have long experienced socio-economic and political marginalisation in Afghanistan. Being in the majority Shiites, they were more likely to migrate to Iran after the political upheaval in Afghanistan in the late seventies. In the Islamic Republic, the Hazaras were deemed in low-skilled and low waged jobs with limited and sometime no access to basic services. Sima became conscious of her lower social status compared to her Iranian age peers. She always wanted to study art but that was not possible as an Afghan refugee. This experience of exclusion has shaped her perception of the country where she was born and grew up. She did environmental studies instead and has taught herself art. She addresses the emotional costs of feeling homeless:

> *In terms such as* āwāragi *and* dar-ba-dari*, there has never been immobility and it will never exist. In situation of migration, people move from point A to point B.* Āwāragi *expresses something else, wandering, a sense of not having a place, a sense of being suspended in the air without having an A or B points in life. The term* muhājir *irritates me when I hear it. We people, who were born and grew up in Iran, who were born in migration, are really* āwāra *and* dar-ba-dar*. We have never experienced such thing as homeland [*watan*]. From the beginning, we were born into a* sargardāni *that continues till now. Even if we have managed to come to Europe and live in the West, we still deal with that feeling of belonging nowhere. It is hard to say what I feel is missing? I mean I wonder what I long for? Homeland? But I do not have one.*

13.5 She Proceeds

> ***This status of not having a place makes one's emotions tense; people like me always have been*** dar-ba-dar***, always had to be*** darajechand ***[lowest social class/status], we were born*** darajechandomi ***and whatever we do, we cannot change it. If we go back to Afghanistan or Iran, we would still be*** darajechandomi***. We can never go beyond that, it is a fundamental problem and there is no solution for it.***

Mohsenwas a child when his family left Daykondi (central highlands of Afghanistan) for Iran. He is from a ***sayyed*** family (descendants of the Prophet Mohammad through his daughter Fatima). He started his artistic work as poet, photographer and painter in Iran. Thanks to a resettlement programme, he was able to move to Australia where he studied art at the university. He has published several poetry books and organised several exhibitions. His experience as refugee in Iran is strongly visible in all of his works. He explains what the terms ***muhājir*** and ***āwāra*** means to him:

> ***Personally, I am not very comfortable with the word*** muhājir***, but I have used it many times, mostly because this word is ingrained and conveys the general meaning. I migrated to Iran as a child and after a few years, I was no longer a*** muhajir ***psychologically, because I could reproduce the exact vernacular of that city, I had close friends and I was much more familiar with that environment than my hometown in Afghanistan. But in Iran, this feeling of being 'in-between' is always with us. That you are neither from that land nor from this land. Sometimes, you are reminded that you are not from here, and this gives a sense of emptiness and otherness, of being suspended. Maybe words like*** bewatan ***["homelandless"],*** bekhāna ***["homeless"] and*** āwāra ***are close. However, one can see the world*** āwāragi ***in two ways. First, as it was especially considered in Iran, as a person who has lost everything, is helpless and seeks refuge. Indeed, our refugee blue***

card mentioned "for Afghan āwāra***." I was not comfortable with that word. Then, when I came to Australia, I was referring in another way to the word*** āwāra***. I found it poetic and at the same time sharp and painful. That is, I saw less of the humiliation in this term compared to my time in Iran.***

Mohsen used to be uncomfortable with the label ***āwāra***, but in Australia where he has settled, he accepted that it was expressing his experience of continuous mobility. Having lived in Iran, being sometimes born and raised there, was a decisive experience that has brought up the emergence of novel ways of defining themselves among the Afghan younger generations. From a bureaucratic label perceived as inherently derogatory, the notion of ***āwārargi*** has been progressively reinterpreted and reappropriated to the point of assuming a potentially liberating dimension.

13.6 Why Not *muhājir*, *mosāfer*, *panāhenda*?

Although many of our interlocutors keep using the terms *muhajir*, *mosāfer* and *panāhenda* as self-designation, *āwāra* and *āwāragi* are increasingly read on blogs and heard in the mouth of many people who are reaching Europe, North America and Australia, especially those who have spent time in Iran. These labels have different connotations and semantic fields, forced displacement between two locations on one hand, continuous mobility on the other hand.

Halima defines the *āwāra* as a person who was forced to leave the homeland against her/his inner desire to seek protection. It is not a positive and desirable situation. Fariba recalls: "when I was a child in Iran, *āwāragi* meant my refugee card and the Palestinian refugees who were constantly shown on the television. I thought *āwāragi* meant miserable, poor and homeless. Little I knew that *āwāragi* would stay with me for the rest of my life, that I would be homeless forever."

Adela has spent most of her childhood as a refugee between Pakistan and Iran. Her father was one of those 'boat people' who went to Australia, where he was able to bring his family some time later. Adela settled and studied law. She married with a well-known Pakistani Hazara artist. Beside serving refugees through her legal works, Adela is a social activist in the Hazara community and has recently launched a campaign criticizing a Shia centre in Australia. She posted videos in which kids were segregated. She comments:

> Muhājir, mosāfer *and* panāhenda *are about a temporary state.* Āwāragi*, and* dar-ba-dari*, however, is a permanent state. In the former state, there is a hope for return to the place one has been uprooted from. But in the latter state, there is no hope. For me, as a second-generation refugee, I see no hope and prospect in going back to Afghanistan.* Āwāra *are those who lost everything back home, while* muhajir *and* mosāfer *may hope to return as they have something left for them. I think that rupture from the string and freedom is* āwāragi*.*

In Adela's comment, *āwāragi* is characterized by feelings of loss of hope for return, but being detached from the homeland eventually comes with novel opportunities. Adela goes as far as talking about freedom.

Abbas was a child when his family left Afghanistan and took refuge in Iran. He studied agronomy but taught himself philosophy and social sciences. He met his wife, Begum, in Mashhad. Both moved to Kabul and were active in academia. Begum found a job in Paris and the couple moved there few years ago. Through some of his Facebook posts as well as direct conversations, it may appear that Abbas came to Europe reluctantly. He hoped to stay in Afghanistan and serve the 'subaltern people.' Politically engaged, he is going to begin his PhD in France on the oppression and daily resistance of the Hazaras. He believes that:

> Muhājirat, āwāragi *and* tab'id *["migration, vagrancy, exile"] are close to each other in terms of meaning and one can use them interchangeably.* Muhājirat, *beyond its religious meaning, contains a sense of authority, willingness and agency. For example, those who have left their home country in search of better life or better economic situation are* muhājir, *like many Iranian middle-class families who could stay in their home country but decide to migrate to the West. I think* āwāragi *and* tab'id *are different. There is an involuntary element in it, in which one is forced to leave due to war, insecurity, poverty, discrimination (religious, ethnic, linguistic…).*

Sima, who is quoted in the previous section, got a job in the International Organization for Migration after the 2001 international intervention in Afghanistan. She moved from Iran to Afghanistan while her family stayed behind. The high salary from IOM was a key factor that her family agreed for her to leave and live alone. She felt hopeful in the beginning but the systematic gender and social discrimination disappointed her. All of her friends in her art circled progressively left Afghanistan. She was able to get a scholarship in London and eventually settled there and never returned to Afghanistan or Iran. She is working for the BBC Persian Website and beside this job, she is slowly opening up her own art studio. She explains why in spite of her trajectory she sees herself as an *āwāra*:

> *I do not like the term* muhajir, *or actually it is not about liking, it just does not seem relevant. I feel* muhājir *implies peace and tranquillity. Once one becomes* muhājir, *she/he moves form on place to another. I mean there is an immobility point before and after being* muhājir. *You're in an immobile status, you decide to migrate to another place and there you become immobile again. That's why I think this term cannot do justice to our sufferings and trajectories.*

Karim is on a student visa in India and soon will migrate to the United States. For him, the destination of his life keeps changing as his situation keeps changing. That is why for him, the term *āwāra* is reflective of his continuous mobility:

> *When my family left our village in Daykondi in search of a better life, the constant concept of home and living disappeared from my life. From this city to that city, from this alley to that alley and from this country to this country … from here to there and from there to other places. We have been displaced and scattered in search of a place to live. It has been for decades now but we still do not have a fixed destination and place to live and we do not know where the next destination is. Which city and country will be next? We buried my father in one city, my aunt in another city and my uncle in another country. That is why the concept of* āwāragi *and* bewatani *["homelandlessness"] for me means the lack of a fixed place and destination to live and settle. It is like a leaf cut from a stem, the wind blows it wherever it wants.*

Adela, Abbas, Sima and Karim do not see themselves as *muhājirin* who were compelled to leave their country fleeing adverse conditions but hoping to get back one day, how distant it might be. Not having a home is not a transient experience, being brought from one place to another is their life and there is nothing beyond that. In a sense, they all inhabit mobility. With poignant eloquence, they evoke an *ontology of displacement and mobility*.

13.7 Going West

As already mentioned, those Afghans who had the experience of refugee life in Iran and are now settled in the West are more likely to refer to themselves as *āwāra*. This seems an even more marked tendency among people who returned even briefly to Afghanistan in-between. Many of our interlocutors are activists advocating for social and political justice. In their works, which can range from a piece of music, a painting, an article in non-mainstream media, a Facebook post, they do not talk only about the painful experience of migration. They often criticize the warring parties in Afghanistan, but also elements inside the national government and more generally the country's conservative social order.

Ahmad seems to be one of the first individual who has widely used the word *āwāra* in his writings. He has studied philosophy in Iran and lived many years in Afghanistan before having to flee for his life to Sweden. With the emergence of the social media, he used his Facebook account as a platform to advocate his ideal of social justice and equality. He became quickly popular among the youth but disapproved by some political and religious leaders in Afghanistan. He describes his arrival in the West with mixed feelings:

> *When* āwāra *people arrive in the West, initially it is a sentimental period. They are filled with emotions. Refugees are attracted by the Western way of live. However, gradually, reality hits and one starts to deal with differences and get entangled in Western institutions. Then, you try to position yourself. At some point, you realize this society is too complicated for you to understand. Differences are more serious than what you thought. This experience makes you being reflexive. You start to understand yourself. This process brings you back to the square one, where you wanted to try to be part of this society, then you get aware you will never be able to be part of this society. The degree of how much you feel* āwāra *depends on how much you try to understand yourself. The more you observe societies and yourself, the more you see the differences and perceive what* āwāragi *means.*

Abbas expresses the feeling of having been expelled from his country of origin (Afghanistan), the country where he became an adult (Iran) without considering comfortable in the country where he eventually took asylum (France). He reflects on his current life in Europe:

> Āwāragi *and exile is a situation with restlessness, regret and anxieties. While it is practically about getting detached and thrown out of the motherland, but mentally and emotionally, the mind is constantly involved with it and one does not feel peace of mind in the host society.* Āwāragi *and exile are associated with great sufferings. It is like being in limbo. It*

> *is about getting uprooted from a context and not getting established in a new environment. This is the least common situation for most people who are forced to leave home as adults. I think I am experiencing the same situation. I consider myself a wanderer, a wanderer and an exilé who has lost many things and is in a state of suspension between two cultures and two societies.*

However, Abbas does not deny that migration may bring new opportunities and benefits to some people depending on their degree of emotional attachment to one's homeland, education, skills and cultural and social capital:

> *Cultural integration and the formation of multicultural identity is one of the consequences of migration. Even migrants and refugees unknowingly spread cultural elements in the new society. They carry symbols of identity and transfer them to other regions. They even challenge officially accepted forms in the world, such as the concept of border and nation-state. These are aspects of the agency of refugees and exilés.*

For Ahmad and Abbas, reaching the West and settling down there did not bring an end to their moral vagrancy. For them, longing for the lost homeland comes along with being politically engaged, feeling estranged in the host country opens novel opportunities and forms of action (also see Bittel & Monsutti, 2022).

13.8 A Non-parochial Sense of Belonging

The notion of *āwāra* appears in classical Persian poetry to express the condition of the lover who is away from his/her beloved, God in the context of Sufism. Employed as a bureaucratic label in Iran, it is acquiring new meanings when our interlocutors use it to designate themselves. Blogs as well as rap songs express the idea that being an Afghan refugee is not merely a parochial identity related to specific circumstances, to violence and conflict, the loss of the place of origin, or the lack of social inclusion in the country of asylum. Being an Afghan refugee opens, albeit painfully, broad horizons; forced displacement and exile is progressively universalized to mirror human condition (Abbasi & Monsutti, forthcoming). Let us refer to Fariba for instance. She is a writer and an active blogger. The term *āwāragi* appears in many of her posts. Here is a translation of one out of many of her thoughts:

> *"Human is not a bird to feel at home wherever it flies". It has been a long time, years, that this piece of poetry has lost its meaning for me. We are wingless birds that we fly wherever we could, homeless birds. I was born in a place where I waited every moment to be told "to gather your belongings and leave," and "this is not your home." We were Afghan refugees, on our blue card it was written boldly Afghan* āwāra*. I thought* āwāragi *was bad,* āwāragi *meant* khāna ba dush *["house on shoulder", like a snail or a turtle]. But we actually did not have a home. We carried with us whatever we had. We were always ready to leave. I went to Afghanistan, I came here [the United States], I took this constant feeling of* āwāragi *with me. I like it more here, but I know here too my home is on my back, like a snail which takes its house with it wherever it goes.*

Fariba draws on her personal experience to question the current global order in which we live. She wonders in which direction the world is going as the number of

āwāra people is increasing every day. She has settled down in the United States but feels connected to homeless people who flee their so-called sweet 'homeland' in search of safety and better life. Her feelings of *āwāragi* stay alive by witnessing the conditions of many other people:

> *The seas are full of corpses of people who wanted to find a better home. The refugee camps are full of children who do not know the meaning of home. The borders, these narrow lines on the map, how big they get when you just try to cross them! You may pass or you may not pass. A piece here, a piece there, who collects our pieces? Who will pull me out of the mouths of fish and sharks? Who will pull me out of the glaciers? Who will pull me out from under the wheels of the train? When will this constant* āwāragi *leave me?*

Our interlocutors are in a quest for personal autonomy and social recognition (Scalettaris et al., 2021). Their constant mobility has made them develop a non-parochial sense of belongings. They had their loved ones dispersed around the world. They develop multi-local social and emotional ties, they do not have the sense of being linked to a particular place. Maryam comments:

> *I actually do not have feelings of belonging to any particular place and I think it is because I have migrated so many times in my life and I had to live in different countries with different cultures. Also, it is because my loved ones are also scattered around the world. My heart is everywhere but I do not feel rooted in a specific location. I even do not feel too much attached to Afghanistan.*

Nadia was born to a Hazara refugee family in Iran. She has never seen Afghanistan. She believes her situation is worse than that of her parents, who knew were they came from and who they were. Her parents had first-hand experience of life in Afghanistan, while she has no personal connection to the country of origin of her family. She speaks of herself as *sargardāni* and *behowiati* ("without identity") but makes her best to consider in a positive light such feelings:

> *I try to turn my face away from those feelings. I try to use terms such as 'global citizen,' 'multinational' or 'multicultural' instead of expressions such as 'burnt generation,' 'wandering generation,' 'displaced generation,' 'identity-less' or 'identity confusion' and 'rootless generation.' The feelings of belonging nowhere is painful. I prefer to be from everywhere.*

This feeling of belonging nowhere may lead to the contestation of the nation-state. Several of our Hazara interlocutors are deeply mistrustful of the Afghan state. They present it as a Pashtun state, which excluded other populations that were systematically produced as 'minorities.' Ahmad is particularly emphatic, but he builds on his perception of Afghanistan's past and present to develop a broad critique of the nation-state as the entity organising globally social and political life:

> *When a state is established, minorities all become* āwāra*, no matter if they migrate or not. I felt* āwāragi *in my so-called homeland Afghanistan too. States are bordered. In these bordered states, one is welcome and the other is not. The whole world is full of bordered states. Today's world is a mosaic of bordered islands that include some and exclude others. Now the question is to which island you belong? Some live on a good island and some do not. But some people have no place in any of these islands. These are the* āwāra *people. States speak to states. Stateless people are invisible.*

For some of our Hazara interlocutors, *āwāragi* means moving from being an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in Afghanistan to the status of being a refugee in Iran or Pakistan. Once back to Afghanistan, the returnee label adds on their already deep feeling of marginalization. Migration to the West does not help them to go beyond their predicament. In Ahmad's view, states are inevitably established on the basis of a particular identity, be it ethnic, religious or linguistic, as a result they produce social and political exclusion. *Āwāragi* is created not by conflict and displacement alone but by the fundamental principles organizing international relations. According to him, the only hope and solution is a world without states. *Āwāragi* can be seen here as a testimony of the immorality of the global national order of things, it becomes a political act subverting classical forms of state territoriality and belonging (Monsutti, 2018).

13.9 *Āwāragi*, Towards Cosmopolitanism from Bellow?

The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s provoked one of the world's largest forced displacements of population since World War II. Some twenty years later in 2001, another intervention – this time lead by the United States – had produced further turmoil. Despite hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign aid money, Afghanistan still ranked at or near the bottom of many human development indicators, including infant mortality, life expectancy, and indices of societal violence. The urban population continued to swell, while rural areas were not able to integrate more people due to demographic pressures and limited agricultural potential. The failure of the reconstruction and democratisation process promoted since 2001 by the international community has led to the fall of Kabul to the hands of the Taliban in August 2022. The little-known implications of Covid-19 and the lack of response of past and present authorities to the pandemic, the collapse of the job market related to the international presence, the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies on the Taliban regime have exacerbated the vulnerability of large segments of the Afghan population. Unfortunately for the Afghans, their options may seem significantly more constricted in 2022 than they were during the anti-Soviet jihad or between 2001 and 2021. The strategic context has changed and neither Pakistan nor Iran are ready to welcome new flows of Afghan refugees anymore, a worrying situation. Concomitantly, more and more Afghans are trying their luck embarking upon an hazardous journey towards Europe, North America or Australia.

To the dramatic developments in Afghanistan and this reorientation of migratory destinations corresponds an evolving terminology. In the eighties and nineties, Afghans in Pakistan and Iran tended to use the word *muhājir* to designate themselves. If this reference did not disappear, the notions of *āwāra* and *āwāragi* are increasingly used since 2001 on social media and blogs among the younger generations. For them, exile has lost the religious and political significance it might have

had for their parents. *Āwāragi*, which may also be rendered in English by 'itinerancy,' comes with the idea of being without home and without work, vagrant and idle. Various forms of itinerancy, expressing global inequalities and power relations, take shape around Afghanistan. Indeed, not all itinerants are *āwāra*. The outflow of Afghan refugees is matched by the inflow of experts, who, fresh from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestine or East Timor, come to exercise their talents in Afghanistan. The latter circulate from north to south to promote supposedly universal social and political norms. The former travel from south to north and, through their mobility, make visible inequitable access to global wealth and security (Monsutti, 2021). The term *āwāragi* used by our Afghan interlocutors to describe their own situation offers a testimony of the unequal rights to circulate. It also expresses how mobility – beyond the hardship it entails – may subvert and contest classical forms of state territoriality.

In a classical article, James Clifford (1994) proposes to think about the changing global conditions of today's world outside the dominant norms of the nation-state. He takes the term *diaspora* as "a signifier, not simply of transnationality and movement, but of political struggle" (1994: 308). Furthermore, Edward Said (2000) considers that aesthetic references to exile in literature tend to obscure how much the experience is horrendous, caused by human being on other human beings in context of political violence, in an age of imperialism and totalitarianism. He quotes Hugo of St. Victor, a twelfth-century German monk, who wrote these haunting lines (2000: 395)

> *The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his* (Said, 2000: 395).

Āwāragi should not merely be equated to diaspora or exile, but this quote expresses strikingly the aspiration felt by our interlocutors to transcend national boundaries and parochial limits. Beyond the suffering and feeling of loss, the partial shift from the notion of *muhājir* to that of *āwāra* is the expression of an ontology of displacement and mobility. The writings and discourses of many young Afghans echo Clifford's and Said's considerations. Indeed, the term *āwāragi* allows to conceive human mobility beyond the classical distinction between voluntary and forced migration, to decentre our perspective from a polarization between a place of origin and a place of destination, between exile and return. Our interlocutors evoke ongoing displacement and suffering, experience of discrimination and exclusion, but acute distress coexists with the capacity of resistance and the hope for a more open and tolerant world. They disrupt linear narratives of migration, take distance from their country of origin and dissociate themselves from the nation-state as the political model organising human life. Here lies the empowering paradox of *āwāragi*, which ultimately elicits a form of cosmopolitanism from bellow.

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Chapter 14
Health Beyond Borders: Migration and Precarity in South Asia

Anuj Kapilashrami and Ekatha Ann John

14.1 Introduction

In 2020, COVID-19 disrupted all forms of human mobility through the closing of national borders and halting of travel worldwide. However, the impact of the pandemic and policy responses to it wasn't equal across populations and regions – in resource-poor contexts in South Asia, the ban on movement within countries and across national borders and suspension of transport at short notice left millions of migrants stranded. For instance, the closure of the Nepal-India border left hundreds of workers returning to Nepal stuck in crowded temporary shelters at the border (Down to Earth, 2020b). Covid-19 also disrupted migration patterns, increasing the risk of concentrated outbreaks in areas of return, a majority of which were ill-equipped to offer even general care (Kapilashrami et al., 2020). Nearly 117,145 undocumented Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan in the first 2 weeks of March 2020 alone (IOM, 2021).

When the pandemic struck, sectors such as tourism, construction, and service sectors, which employ millions of migrant workers, closed overnight. By early May 2020, 30% of families in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh engaged in these sectors had lost all their income (UNICEF, 2021). In India, closure of work sites and eviction forced 10.4 million domestic migrant workers to return to their home states (Down To Earth, 2020a); many undertook weeks-long journeys on foot, with no provision for their food, shelter and health. As reports emerged on their state of hunger and assaults, it became clear that the physical and mental health impacts of the lockdown would be "potentially worse than the threat of the virus itself."

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(Kapilashrami et al., 2020; Kapilashrami and John, 2023). Furthermore, targeted sanitising and quarantining measures in countries like India stripped low-income internal migrants of their civil and political rights making them "subjects of charity, objects of (mis)governance and bodies of disease and stigma" (Deeksha in Samaddar, 2020:124).

Even before the pandemic, the framing of migrants as disease-carriers has long been central to public policy discourses (e.g. as target groups for HIV/AIDS interventions), mainstream media portrayals (John & Kapilashrami, 2020) and scholarship (with disproportionate focus on infectious diseases and migrants' health). Responses to the pandemic merely intensified these views. However, the pandemic simultaneously made visible migrants, and the precarious conditions in which they live, work and move. Low-wage migrant workers in South Asia frequently find themselves caught in a cycle of precarity that spans contexts of destination and origin as both are characterised by poverty, informality and insecurity of work. Precarious work often goes hand in hand with intermittent access to basic services (Babu et al., 2017), widespread discrimination and ill-treatment (Sharma et al., 2021; Samaddar, 2020), combined with an inability to demand rights and justice, and poorer health outcomes (Kusuma & Babu, 2018).

This chapter presents an overview of the health status and healthcare access of low-income migrants, including internally displaced people (IDP) and refugees, in South Asia. We draw on the findings of a scoping review (Munn et al., 2018) of literature on migrants' health and determinants to examine how their health is linked to their social, work and political lives. This scoping review is part of a larger body of work undertaken by the research team of the Migration Health South Asia (MiHSA) network to examine the volume, scope, nature and trends in migration health research in South Asia. Authors utilised the Scopus database to retrieve documents in peer-reviewed journals from 2000 to 2019 using the search words "health" along with several migrant categories (e.g. IDP, internal migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers, labour migrants). We extended the scope of the review by undertaking a further rapid review of literature from 2019 to 2021 on the health of migrants in South Asia as well as South Asians migrating to regions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries and Singapore. Within this literature, we analysed discussion on the factors and processes that underlie poor healthcare access and outcomes.[1]

14.2 Migration in South Asia

Rural to urban migration and forced displacement from conflicts, persecution, disasters and neoliberal economic development projects have a long history in South Asia. In 2019 alone, the region reported 498,000 new IDPs fleeing conflicts

[1] See 'Pandemic, precarity and health of migrants in South Asia: Mapping multiple dimensions of precarity and pathways to states of health and well-being' paper for more developed methodology for review.

and violence (IDMC, 2020). The region also hosts one of the highest refugee populations in the world, including more than 700,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2019) and 1.4 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Mobility patterns in South Asia are however defined primarily by temporary migration of low-wage migrant labourers within national borders (inter-state as well as rural-urban intra-state) as well as across countries in the region, brokered by middlemen and recruitment agencies (World Bank, 2020). In India, there's an estimated 100 million internal migrants (Economic Survey of India, 2017) and a million Nepalis who migrate on a circular basis for work (World Bank, 2020). South Asians also constitute the largest expatriate population in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Jain & Oommen, 2017).

South Asian economies benefit extensively from migrants' labour. Internal migrant workers in India, for example, contribute 10% of the country's Gross domestic product (GDP) (Deshingkar, 2020), forming the backbone of various sectors, including construction, domestic work, agriculture, garment, mining, among others. In Nepal, around 30% of the country's GDP comes through remittances, mostly from the Gulf States and Malaysia (Sharma, 2018), while in Pakistan and Bangladesh, these figures stand at 7.9% and 5.8% respectively (World Bank, 2020).

14.3 Migrants' Health and Its Determination

The conditions in which migrants work, live and travel influence their health and well-being. In our scoping review, we identified three overlapping determinants of migrants' health in South Asia – work conditions, intersecting social inequalities, and migrant status and associated restrictive governance. We describe these below alongside an examination of the pathways through which these determinants affect health and the corresponding states of ill-health they produce.

14.3.1 Migrants' Work and Health

Low-income migrants in South Asia populate the informal economy, which accounts for nearly 80% of total employment in the region (ILO, 2018). The informal sector is characterised by precarious employment, exploitative employment practices, poor remuneration and social protection, and hazardous conditions created as national labour markets became globalised and incorporated in a neoliberal capitalist economic structure.

In our review, studies examining the health of migrant workers in the construction sector in India (Adsul et al., 2011) and the garment/textile sectors in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Solinap et al., 2019; Senarath et al., 2016) report that a majority develop respiratory problems, jaundice, gastro-intestinal illnesses, kidney ailments and musculo-skeletal problems. These effects were attributed to dangerous working

conditions and poor safety standards observed. For example, the authors observed that these migrant workers worked long hours without protection or adequate training – in the construction sector, they routinely suffered from falls and, in the garment and textile sectors, workers struggled with health conditions caused by repetitive tasks and difficult sustained postures. A survey of repeat migrants[2] in India (LSHTM, 2018) reported 83% worked in dusty, smoke-filled rooms with inadequate ventilation, 42% worked without safety gear, and a quarter were in contact with potentially infectious and dangerous materials on a daily basis. Working in hazardous conditions like these can cause injuries and illness that result in long-term disabilities, which may in turn force the children of these workers into entering similarly hazardous work (LSHTM, 2018). Another study among internal migrants in India found that those with a history of migration is twice as likely to have diabetes, hypertension and cardiac complaints compared to those with no history of migration (Hameed et al., 2013). The authors identified employment-related stressors as a risk factor. Exploitative employment terms and conditions, such as longer work hours without break and inability to change one's place of work or to take leave, can also result in poor physical health. Studies on the work conditions of Nepali migrants in the Gulf States note that working long hours in the sun were significantly associated with dehydration and heat stroke (Simkhada et al., 2018; Pradhan et al., 2019). Albeit limited, studies also report association with poor mental health. For instance, Akhter et al. (2017) studied women migrant workers in the Bangladesh's garment sector and found that a majority of them suffer from anxiety, stress, restlessness and thoughts of suicide due to the work burden, exacerbated by separation from their children and family support. In all three studies, researchers found that migrant workers' access to health-care was limited by their long work hours and minimal or absence of medical services at the workplace. Lack of contracts and social protection measures, which is common to the unorganized sector in South Asian countries, can also limit access to employee benefits such as health care or sick leave (Bhattacharyya & Korinek, 2007).

Where existent, legislative measures to protect migrants' health are poorly enforced. For example, in India, internal migrant workers are protected by the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Services) Act 1996 and the Unorganized Workers' Social Security Act 2008, which provide social security benefits for work-related injuries, sicknesses, maternity, and pension for those above 60 years (Ministry of Law & Justice, 2018). In addition, the Workmen Compensation Act of 1923 provides a list of diseases which, if contracted by the employee, will be considered an occupational disease liable for compensation (NCEUS, 2007). However, a survey by Aajeevika Bureau (2014) across three employment sectors in Rajasthan found that migrants are routinely blamed for accidents and are immediately laid off. In the rare instances where employers paid for basic medical treatment, the amount was deducted from

[2] A term used by authors to refer to a mode of migration undertaken by the poorest and most illiterate sections in rural India.

the workers' monthly wages. Contractors and employers refuse liability for deaths, and families rarely receive compensation (Prayas, 2009). Poor enforcement of regulations is also reported in other countries in the South and South East Asia region, including Myanmar (Tanaka et al., 2015) and Cambodia (Oka, 2010). Other barriers to healthcare access reported in the above studies include language and cultural differences, discriminatory attitude by healthcare workers, and fear of job loss (Simkhada et al., 2018; Pradhan et al., 2019; Akhter et al., 2017; Bhattacharyya & Korinek, 2007).

14.3.2 Social Inequalities and Health

Attention to social divisions (based on gender, nationality, caste, ethnicity, among others) and structural conditions associated with these (e.g. poor housing, food insecurity, lack of education and other opportunities) is critical for migrants' health in South Asia, where they represent diverse caste, ethnic/indigenous groups, and class. Class relations, defined by rigid hierarchies of social structures like caste and tribe, steer patterns of labour migration, which, in turn, influence the health and wellbeing of migrants and their families. Albeit limited studies explicitly examine these inequalities and their effects on migrants' health, there is evidence to suggest inequalities determining migrant health and their differential health experiences across migrant groups. A study in the Indian state of Rajasthan, tribal status was found to be strongly related to poor nutritional outcomes and being a tribal from a high outmigration area adds to the vulnerabilities faced by these families (Mohan et al., 2016). In a study of seasonal migrants in three Indian states, Shah and Lerche (2020) found the low-caste and tribal migrant labour from central and eastern India to be the most exploited migrant workforce. These populations take up work that local populations, including marginalised groups, were moving away from. Within the migrant groups under study, there was a qualitative difference between the working and living conditions of *Adivasis* (tribal) and *Dalits (historically marginalized 'untouchable' caste)*, and that of other backward castes and Muslims; with the former relying exclusively on piecemeal daily wages. Almost all these workers had contracted malaria at one point or the other in destination states and incurred mounting debts in meeting their medical expenses. Most of the health expenses went to treatments by *Shamans* and medicine from quacks.

Gender emerged as a critical determinant of mobility and work and the resulting differences in health risks and vulnerabilities. Mazumdar et al. (2013) reports a distinctive gendered pattern in migration across India – most women migrants are in the paid domestic and garment sectors, and male migrants dominate services and industries. While this increases men's risk to accidents and injuries from heavy machinery work, women migrants face a double burden of occupational hazards along with gender-based discrimination (including wage differences), sexual harassment, and lack of privacy for sanitation (Tiwary & Gangopadhyay, 2011). This pattern is also visible at the community level – In Bangladesh's Cox Bazar, for example,

women and girls among Rohingya refugees were found to be at high risk of multi-dimensional gender-based violence at the household and community level, exacerbated by displacement (UNHCR et al., 2020). Transgender people in this community were worse affected as they, in addition to these risks, also had to circumvent social exclusion and discrimination based on their gender, which impeded access to even basic healthcare services.

The impact of gender inequalities on migrant workers' health is mediated by other aspects of their position in social hierarchies. Mazumdar et al. (2013) found that a majority of migrant women workers from historically and socially disadvantaged communities (*Adivasis* and *Dalits*) are more concentrated in short-term and circular migration – generally involving hard manual labour. Studies from India have shown that women engaged in such sectors suffer from multiple occupation health hazards such as body ache, sunstroke, skin irritation, and poor maternal health, and experience harassment, poor housing facilities, and depression (Bhattacharyya & Korinek, 2007; Jatrana & Sangwan, 2004).

14.3.3 'Migrant' Identity, Transience and Health

Vulnerabilities associated with and arising from the status of 'being a migrant' is shown to impact on migrants' health. Studies associate these vulnerabilities primarily with the transient nature of migrants' social and economic lives that translate into a range of domains; namely, lack of documentation as well as information about their entitlements and location of healthcare facilities, non-portability of entitlements (such as health insurance); thus impeding their access to healthcare and resulting in poorer outcomes (Babu et al., 2017; Borhade, 2011). Even where elements of welfare, such as education and health, are framed as universal and grounded in rights-based legal frameworks, providing proof of domicile/residence is a prerequisite to access a majority of schemes, especially those run by the state. For example, Nepali migrants in India, most of whom work as daily-wage labourers, struggle to access healthcare services in India without an *Aadhar* card (an Indian identification card linked to individual biometrics) (Adhikary et al., 2020). Such exclusion is also evident among interstate migrants (Lone et al., 2021). Employers also try to cut cost by hiring migrants in an irregular situation to avoid providing health coverage. The Aajeevika Bureau survey (2014) in India found that a majority of migrant workers were unable to avail full benefits under various state legislations as they were rarely registered officially by contractors or employers. As a result of this during Covid-19, the severely delayed furlough schemes and benefits that were offered to factory worker failed to reach internal migrants who suffered job losses.

Research on immunization patterns in rural–urban migrant populations in India (Kusuma et al., 2010) revealed isolation faced by migrant families in a new socio-cultural environment as a key reason for lower vaccination uptake among recently migrated and temporary migrant families. The temporariness and the 'outsider' status to a locality exposes them to widespread abuse and ill-treatment from local

residents, landlords, authorities "that comes with their work but rarely ends with compensation and justice" (Sharma et al., 2021). The 'outsider' status also drives the perception of migrant workforce being 'disposable'. This was evident in the early days of the pandemic-related lockdown in 2020 in Qatar, where migrant workers from Nepal were deported under the pretext of Covid-19 testing, after being detained with inadequate food or water in overcrowded quarters (Budhathoki, 2020). While governments in GCC countries provided financial relief to businesses to maintain workers' salaries and jobs, foreign workers were excluded from these programmes, and from overall Covid-19 policy responses (UNICEF, 2021). Many in low-skilled employment in construction, retail, and other labour-intensive occupations continued to stay in overcrowded living conditions, even as public health messaging emphasised strict physical distancing; areas subsequently recognised as Covid-19 hotspot (Cornwell, 2020).

Statelessness continues to characterize the lives of million in South Asia. Worldwide, studies report that this leads to social and biopolitical exclusion, which often translates into adverse living and working conditions, poverty, the perpetual fear of arrest and deportation, chronic stress, and other factors that interact to heighten vulnerability to illness and injury (Berk et al., 2000; Fassin, 2008; Willen, 2005). Such biopolitical exclusion became apparent in India as migration became highly politicsed with contemporary political developments. In 2015, the Supreme Court of India directed Assam, a North Eastern state that shares a border with Bangladesh, to update its National Register of Citizens by requiring people to produce documents of ancestry in order to be enlisted as Indian citizens. The final list of "citizens", published on August 31, 2019, excluded nearly 19 lakh residents of Assam, many of whom belonged to economically vulnerable sections with no documents to prove their nativity (Karmakar, 2019). During Covid-19, these populations struggled to access healthcare over lack of documentation and fear of deportation, while those in detention centers weren't given access to work or appropriate healthcare and were kept in cramped quarters (COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund Consortium, 2021). Even where formally recognised as citizens, migrants are often treated de facto as non-citizens (Mander & Sahgal, 2008), invisible to planners and public policy makers in destination cities.

Migrants are also subjected to surveillance based on their sociability, guided by the temporariness of their livelihood, and perceived disposability. Assumptions underpin frames of threat to security (national or local area) as well as to public health, as migrant bodies are deemed as carrier of infections (Samaddar, 2020; John & Kapilashrami, 2020). The pandemic crisis, Samaddar (2020: 62) observes, effectively transformed a labour migrant from a "productive body" providing capital to families and communities to a "body of disease". This notion prompted selective quarantining measures and state actions to disinfect migrants, ostracization and vigilantism of return migrants during COVID, as well as deportations following routine screenings for other infectious diseases. In the GCC countries, which hosts 15 million migrants from South Asia, migrants are subjected to compulsory periodic medical examinations and face deportation without diagnosis and treatment, if found to be HIV positive (Wickramage & Mosca, 2014).

14.4 Discussion

The conditions in which migrants move, live, and work carry exceptional risks to their physical and mental well-being (Zimmerman et al., 2011). This chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of the different determinants of migrants' health, which reflect conditions of precarity, and how these in-turn affect healthcare entitlements and well-being. We take stock of the limited regional evidence on the health of migrants – internal and international – and identify how these relate to the different aspects of precariousness and marginality that defines their lives.

The concept of precarity has received much attention in recent scholarship. Rooted in the analysis of a set of labour conditions, the term denotes the "social positioning of insecurity and hierarchization, which accompanies the processes of Othering" (Puar, 2012: 165). Viajar (2018) in her study of migrant domestic workers in Malaysia, explores three dimensions of precarity – the devaluation of their work which reproduces the "productive-reproductive and formal-informal labour dichotomies" (Work-based precarity); deportability of migrants (Status-based precarity); non-recognition of domestic work which prevents workers from enjoying labour rights such as fair wages (National-based precarity). Viajar observed these dimensions engender and reproduce disempowerment, disposability and exclusion of migrant workers. Drawing on our findings, we build on this framework in relation to migrants' health, identifying the process of social determination, i.e. pathways through which states of ill-health are produced among migrants.

Judith Butler explains precarity denotes a "politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence and death" (Butler, 2009: 25). Precarity has been examined largely in relation to labour conditions, thus overlooking dimensions of precarity exercised in the socio-cultural and political lives of migrants (e.g. othering in communities, omissions in public policy and planning, everyday violence outside their workspace).

Our examination of the determinants of migrants' health examined in migration health literature in South Asia revealed reveals three broad dimensions of precarity: (i) *Work-based*, concerned with insecure, hazardous and disempowering work conditions, (ii) *Social position-based,* pertaining to exclusion resulting from the intersecting multiple oppressions faced by low-income migrants, (iii) *Status-based*, derived from vulnerabilities arising from the mobile and transient nature of their lives and livelihoods, as well as illegality or inferiority framed in formal policies and informal governance procedures that disenfranchise migrants.

Examining work as a determinant of migrants' health, we reveal how restrictive contracts and terms of employment, poor wages and work conditions create insecurity and disempowered states of being. While migrants exercise agency in the choices they make and the daily negotiations in their workspace, this is within a rather restrictive environment created by the neoliberal Market-State complex that actively functions to dispossess them of their social-economic rights. Ferguson and McNally (2014) view this as a deliberate strategy to keep them vulnerable and

controllable as they become "cheap labour" and thereby profitable. Their disempowered state precludes them from being able to negotiate safer workspaces leaving them stuck in precarious jobs for their entire work-life span, exposed to different health risks and occupational hazards, and abuse without compensation or recourse to justice. The precarity they face at work is exacerbated by insecure legal and residential status (Piper et al., 2017), and results in poor mental and physical health.

A second determinant of mental health, and dimension of precarity identified is social inequalities deriving from diverse identities and aspects of social location (e.g. gender, nationality, ethnicity, caste, geography, class) that characterise migrants in South Asia. These factors interact to create and reinforce a social hierarchy on the basis of which some migrant groups cluster in low-dignity and insecure work and face greater 'othering' and exclusion. Social and biopolitical exclusion often translates into adverse living and working conditions, poverty, the perpetual fear of arrest (and/or deportation), resulting in chronic stress and heightened vulnerability to illness and injuries. Systematic exclusion also results in erosion of trust in public services (including health) resulting in lower uptake of preventive interventions such as immunisation, and avoidance of healthcare (Kusuma & Sivakami, 2017). Kapilashrami and Hankivsky (2018) remind us that migrants are not a homogenous group with uniform health and healthcare seeking experiences, and framing them as such masks differential risks and precarities resulting from migrants' unique social position at different stages of their journeys. Studying this multi-dimensional socioeconomic ordering can provide valuable insights into how different axes of power intersect with each other to place migrants in different situations of discrimination and disadvantage as well as advantage and leverage, potentially guiding more targeted and effective health policies (Kapilashrami & Hankivsky, 2018).

A third dimension relates to the status of 'being a migrant' and its effects on health. The effects of migrant identity on health are constituted via two pathways. First, displacement/dislocation and (re)adjustment in a new environment can cause significant psychological stress, which is aggravated by the insecure and exploitative nature of their livelihoods as well as ill-treatment by employers and authorities. Even internal migrants often refer to their destination states as 'foreign' (Rogaly et al., 2002), and struggle to access elementary citizenship rights and entitlements (Sharma et al., 2021). The resulting insecurity and stress has been associated with substance abuse, domestic violence and physical and mental health problems (Borhade, 2011, Mander & Sahgal, 2008). While these vulnerabilities are common to other marginalised groups (e.g. urban poor), the precarity linked to mobility and migrant status produces excess burden on health. Second, the transient nature of migrants' social and economic lives, and the attached 'non' or 'inferior' citizen status exposes them to alienation and othering from the society and reinforces their disposability. Active vilification from media and pathologizing in health policy discourses (as seen in the case of COVID, and pervious pandemics) makes them particularly prone to abuse, violence and subjects of invasive interventions. This disposability not only affects their physical and mental health but erodes trust in public services, thereby limiting their interaction with health systems and uptake of services.

In conclusion, the pandemic was a wake-up call of sorts for governments in South Asia as it exposed the structural neglect and violence faced by mobile populations in origin and destination contexts, and centre-staged policy concerns around their social protection. Policy and media discourses in South Asia have tended to frame the sudden public visibility of migrants during the enforced lockdown as a 'migrant crisis'. Having taken stock of the evidence on migrants' health and its determinants we argue that this is a 'development and governance' crisis that failed to account for and redress the multiple systematic production of precarity that puts migrants at great risk of poor health in destination contexts. While there's mounting scholarship on migration in South Asia, migrants' health continues to be a neglected area, in research and policy. Notably, epidemiological studies that report on migrants' health status, tend to be stripped off an analysis of the socio-economic and political determinants and the pathways through which their health states are produced. In addressing these gaps for more migration-aware and migrant-sensitive public policy response, we call for more nuanced analysis of differences within differently situated migrant groups, and an explicit adoption of an intersectional lens.

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Chapter 15
Migration, Development Within the SAARC Framework: Towards a Migration Governance Model of the Future

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The ILO (2018) estimated that around 15% of the 164 million total workforce in the world comes from South Asia. For a region comprising of a massive 1.94 billion people (UN-DESA, 2020) and eight countries- namely India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan and the Maldives, that may constitute only a small fraction of its population. But this is also a highly important demographic dimension contributing to the development of their home regions and the destination countries in a number of ways. Indeed, the South Asian region has been the highest recipient of remittances over the years, being immune and resilient to a number of shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic[1] (Rajan, 2012). Migration from the region has been one of the most important facets of the development of these countries, especially at the micro-level, with the benefits of migration going to households themselves, uplifting a number of people out of destitution in a region where poverty and unemployment is rife. Over the years these countries have tried to harness the potential of this demographic dividend by enacting a number of policies and incentives to keep this trend going.

Remittances into South Asian countries have flowed in at a constant rate over the [ast few decades, ranging anywhere from about 1% of total GDP in the Maldives to about 25% of total GDP in Nepal. India has consistently been the largest recipient of remittances in the world for the past decade. Remittances also form the largest share of foreign incomes in these countries, cementing the major role that migration has played in contributing to the countries.

[1] See:https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/12/defying-predictions-remittance-flows-remain-strong-during-covid-19-crisis

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While emigration from South Asia has been studied and deliberated over a number of years, an aspect that has been covered far less is the magnitude of migration within the region itself. The United Nations- Department of Economic and Social Affairs has estimated that there are about 13.9 million workers within the South Asian region, out of which 10.9 million reside within the region itself (UN-DESA, 2020), which is a significant number whose migrationisto be discussed in detail (Rajan, 2017, 2020) However, whenever it is discussed, it is often in terms of the negatives. The socio-political history of the region makes it complicated to imagine the cross-border mobility. This, however, is a misnomer and one that needs to be looked over in order to envisage a better future for the region. However, in order to get there, it is necessary to unpack the foundation of this complication.

15.1 History of South Asia: A History of Mobility

Migration within the region is something that has been the norm over the course of history, given thecontiguous nature of the nations in the region. A number of civilizations and kingdoms in the region meant that populations over the years have moved about and mingled with each other throughout the ages. Mass emigration from India has also been a historic process, with labourers leaving the shores of what was previously the British India, which encompassed all the countries which currently constitute the South Asian region. Jain (1989), estimates that around 30 million people emigrated to British colonies all around the world. This is important to note as this is the foundation of labour migration out of the region.. For example, a number of Tamil workers from what is now the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu emigrated en-masse to plantations in what is now Sri Lanka and Myanmar (Naujoks, 2009; Rajan et al., 2021). Migration from Nepal has always been constant in the region. Similar migrations have taken place throughout the region with workers travelling across what was a historically contiguous region. Scores of people travelled through the South Asian region during the British Raj, establishing livelihoods and residences in the region, as part of what Tumbe (2018) calls the "The Great Indian Migration Wave" of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Migration within the South Asian region, thus, cannot be dis-entangled from the colonial experience. These migration routes have continued throughout history, a process that was halted by the exit of the British from the region and the violent partition of the Indian sub-continent.

The partition of the sub-continent saw the emergence of a new sovereign order in the region and a redrawing of the borders along religious lines, an event which led to one of the largest and the most rapid mass migrations of people in history, involving an estimated 14.5 million people (Bharadwaj et al., 2008; see also, Fig. 15.1). These borders have come to define the regional mobility that was once freewhich suddenly came to a halt. Borders drawn almost overnight were responsible for dividing countries, communities, households and individuals who shared close cultural and kinship ties with one another. While there was an initial churn of people in decades in the wake of the partition, migration from within the region slowly reduced and mostly in the last few decades.



Fig. 15.1 Remittances as a percentage of GDP in South Asia, 2022. Source: World Bank inward remittances flow data, 2022

Table 15.1 Migrant population stock within South Asia, 2019

Countries of destination	Countries of origin							
	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	Nepal	Afghanistan	Bhutan	Maldives
India	N.A	1,024,721	2,324,893	143,161	223,552	7259	5491	1493
Pakistan	1,532,902	N.A	N.D	464	N.D	1,723,293	N.D	N.D
Bangladesh	7204	N.D	N.A	N,D	5222	N.D	N.D	N.D
Sri Lanka	22,147	86	5	N.A	3	N.D	1	8
Nepal	101,830	886	43	44	N.A	N.D	8065	N.D
Afghanistan	N.D	4576	N.D	N.D	N.D	N.A	N.D	N.D
Bhutan	17,317	10	16	8	220	N.D	N.A	N.D
Maldives	523	43	893	2359	N.D	N.D	N.D	N.A

Source: United Nations- Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migrant Stock 2019.
Notes: *N.A* Not Applicable, *N.D* No Data

But has mobility within the region come to a complete stop? As we see in Table 15.1 this is not the case. There is still some mobility among the countries in the region (Fig. 15.2).

We find that, unsurprisingly, given its relative geographical, economic and population size, India emerges as the largest hub of migration within the region – hosting significant numbers of migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Nepal and India, in fact, share an open border with free movement of people on either sides, which has been in force since the signing of the bilateral Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1950. This Table 15.1 also depicts the fact that despite having relatively hard borders with one another, there have been certain corridors of migration within the region. Apart from the Indo-Nepal corridor, there has been open borders between India and Bhutan, signed as part of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1949; and a corridor between Bhutan and Nepal through the Indian state of Sikkim, which has been made



Fig. 15.2 Migrant stock within South Asia 1990–2015. Source: Srivastava and Pandey (2017)

through various bilateral treaties. Another notable figure is the number of citizens from Afghanistan who reside in Pakistan, which we will discuss later in the chapter.

These numbers however, are likely to be severe undercounts as well, as the absence of proper frameworks have made a large number of migrations within South Asia irregular in nature, which is the main point of contention withinthe region. The lack of a comprehensive legal framework for migration within the region also leaves a large number of these migrants vulnerable to exploitation as well as to the vagaries of political rhetoric, which often uses them as a crutch to further divisive political agenda (see also, Chap. 6 in this volume). A case in point is of Bangladeshi workers in India, who constitute a large share of the migrant population in India. While initially comprising of Hindu refugees escaping war and persecution in the period before the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, migrants from the 1990s onwards have been mostly economic migrants (Srivastava & Pandey, 2017). This has led to Bangladeshi migrants often being looked at suspiciously and more often contemptuously asa "burden"on the Indian economy. Similarly, while it is estimated that there are around one million Nepalese workers in India, that number is likely to be around 2 or three million as there are no official records of Nepalese citizens in India or vice versa (Samuels et al., 2011; NIDS, 2010).

However, a deeper look intothese communities depicts a picture of the socio-political turmoil in the region.

15.2 Refugees, Forced Migration and Undocumented Migration in South Asia

It is well known that a large number of refugees find refuge in the neighbouring countries. This is especially evident in the case of South Asia, which houses 2.5 million refugees[2] – one of the largest refugee havens in the world (Table 15.2). In fact, Pakistan houses the fourth largest refugee population in the world, who are

[2] As calculated from the UNHCR refugee data finder at: https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

Table 15.2 Refugee populations in South Asia

Country	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Afghanistan	Sri Lanka
Refugees	195,043	1,438,955	866,534	72,278	1013

Source: UNHCR Data Finder, 2021

mostly refugees from Afghanistan, escaping decades of conflict in their country (see also Chap. 15 in this volume).

Bangladesh has seen a major rise in its refugee population in the recent years with the Rohingya community escaping persecution in the neighbouring Myanmar. Similarly, India has had a long history of accommodating a number of refugee communities fleeing persecution in the neighbouring countries – Tibetans from China, Sri Lankan Tamils escaping civil war in Sri Lanka, Pakistani Hindu refugees as well as other communities such as the Chakmas from Bangladesh and also recently the Afghan refugees (Rajan, 2022). Given this movement of refugee populations across the border throughout the decades, there has never been a refugee policy in place in these countries, let alone one for the region. Socio-political turmoil is not something new in the region, so what would explain this reluctance on the part of the governments to put in place any common framework for refugee movements? A look at this issue, would in fact, highlight the challenges in getting a common framework for movement in South Asia.

Another issue that keeps coming up is the issue of undocumented migration and human trafficking. Irregular migration in particular is prevalent inthe corridors of Bangladesh and India; India and Pakistan and also Afghanistan and Pakistan (Srivastava & Pandey, 2017). This is always a source of major political and social tension in the region, where migrant workers are intentionally targeted for ulterior gains. Additionally, South Asian countries are the source, transit and destination for human trafficking for various reasons. The UNODC's Global Trafficking of Persons report in 2016 reported that 88% of trafficking victims detected within South Asia originated from within the sub-region itself. (UNODC, 2016).

However, while a major flow of migration in South Asia is through the movement of irregular migrants, trafficked persons and refugees, there are also a number of other migrants within the region who migrate for many different purposes, and through many different channels. It is always this issue, though, which captures the imaginations of policymakers and the public alike whilediscussingmigration within South Asia, which presents significant challenges for envisioning movement among the countries.

15.3 Challenges to Free Movement in South Asia

Given the fractious socio-political history of the region, cross-border migration has always been a point of contention within these countries. Cross-border migrants are often seen with suspicion, especially citing national security reasons. While almost

all South Asian Countries have laws, institutions and elaborate processes that regulate emigration out of the country, they have not been implemented with the objective of creating a window for more migration within the region itself. Historically, co-operation amongthe countries in the South Asian region hasbeen tenuous at best. India, being a dominant entity in the region, the formation of a regional body, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation or SAARC, has done little to better this situation. A number of reasons have been cited for its failure from the internal politics of its member states; the lack of a conflict mediation and resolution mechanism to the asymmetry between India, which is by far the largest member in terms of economy, geographic size and population, and suspicion among the rest of the membersonIndia's intentions with SAARC. South Asian countries have rather opted for bi-lateral treaties to deal with their issues (Bhattacharjee, 2018).

Even when it comes to the topic of migration, which is such a vital issue among all South Asian countries, there is little co-operation amongthe member states as to how to facilitate migration within the region. Most of the countries have their own elaborate legal frameworks and institutionsto regulate emigration. (Table 15.3).

While these regulations are in place to make migration more orderly and regular in nature, they often end up causing barriers to free movement within the region. More importantly, none of these institutions work with each other in order to ensure a smoother flow for potential migrants within the region. Migration within South Asia remains a largely irregular movement of people, which causes a number of

Table 15.3 Emigration infrastructure in South Asia

Country	Institution	Legislation
India	Ministry of External Affairs, Protectorate of Emigrants (earlier, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2004–2016)	The Emigration Act, 1983 (proposed an Emigration Bill in 2021)
Pakistan	Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE)	Emigration Ordinance, 1979 (amended in 1994 and 2009) and Emigration Rules, 1979
Bangladesh	Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment (MEWOE), The Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET)	Overseas Employment and Migration Act, 2013 (Replacing Emigration Ordinance, 1982)
Sri Lanka	Ministry of Foreign Employment (MoFE), Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Agency (SLFEA)	SLBFE Act no.4, 1994 (amended in 2009) (amended from SLBFE Act no.21, 1985)
Nepal	Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE), Department of Foreign Employment (DoFE) Foreign Employment Promotion Board (FEPB) Foreign Employment Tribunal (FET)	Foreign Employment Regulation, 2064, 2007 (Replacing Foreign Employment Act, 2042, 1985) Foreign Employment Regulation, 2008
Afghanistan	Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD)	Labour Code of Afghanistan; Regulation for sending Afghan workers abroad

issues for the migrants themselves. South Asia, with its enormous size, potential and issues should be a hub for movement of not only goods and services but also for the movement of people. There have been a number of instances where free movement of people has resulted in the net benefit of countries and its people.

15.4 Opportunities and Challenges to Free Movement: the EU, ECOWAS and Mercosur

The World Trade Organisation, through its General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), puts forward that, services can be traded in "four modes" – namely, cross border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence of services in one country and in another; and the presence of natural persons among WTO member states. Mode 4 maintains that the presence of natural persons from one member state in other member states is an essential pillar of maintaining free trade.[3]

However, it is often seen that allowing free movement of people is a much more combative issue when compared to the flow of goods and services. The borders are considerably harder for people than it is for goods and trade, which often turns into an issue of socio-political contention. Developing countries especially have a greater interest in the liberalisation of the movement of natural persons as a service, as they have the comparative advantage in human resources – especially when it comes to the abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled labour (Brown & Kingston, 2003; Dey, 2007; Rajan, 2018, 2019).

However, this does not mean that there have not been attempts made at achieving free movement within specific sub-regions. The most prominent and recent example is that of the European Union.

The free movement of people across the EU member states is enshrined as a fundamental principle of the EU Treaty as given in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and developed by EU secondary legislation and the Case law of the Court of Justice. As such, EU citizens are entitled to the right to:

- look for a job in another EU country
- work there without needing a work permit
- reside there for that purpose
- stay there even after the employment has finished
- enjoy equal treatment with nationals in access to employment, working conditions and all other social and tax advantages.[4]

In addition, the EU citizens may also avail medical and social security coverage which is transferrable across the member states.

[3] See: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mouvement_persons_e/mouvement_persons_e.htm

[4] See: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=457

The free movement of people within the European Union has led to significant gains in overall employment and productivity in the region. In fact, in 2017, it was estimated that free movement of people within the EU-28 countries led to a collective boost of around 106 billion Euros in the region. Unemployment rates in the region also fell from 9.6% to 6.7% from 2010 to 2018. This correlates very closely with the increasing number of 'mobile EU-28 citizens' residing in other EU-28 countries (Müller, 2019). This has, in turn led to a larger share of revenues through remittances and taxes in the region. The European Union has benefitted tremendously from the free movement of its citizens.

A similar phenomenon and one that is close to the South Asian experience is seen in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, which consists of 16 member countries.[5] Given similar histories of colonialism and newly demarcated borders, the ECOWAS serves as an important example for co-operation among post-colonial states. Article 27 of the ECOWAS treaty puts forward the need for economic integration, which entailed not only a free flow of goods and services, but also of people across the sister states. This was further reaffirmed by the passing of the 1979 Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, and the Right of Residence and Establishment, which was passed in 1986 (Adepoju, 2015). Its provisions included the following:

(i) The Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of the Member States;
(ii) The right of entry, residence and establishment is to be progressively established in the course of a maximum transitional period of fifteen (15) years from the definitive entry into force of this Protocol by abolishing all other obstacles to free movement of persons and the right of residence and establishment; and
(iii) The right of entry, residence and establishment which shall be established in the course of a transitional period shall be accomplished in three phases.

The ECOWAS had a great many difficulties in operationalizing the protocol, with member states often reneging on the basic tenets of the protocol (Yeboah et al., 2021). However, despite these difficulties, the protocol did achieve a level of success in ensuring movement within the region – evidenced by the fact that by the early part of this century, a large number of immigrants in the region came from ECOWAS member states itself (Agyei & Clottey, 2007).

A similar free movement zone exists in South America through the Mercosur. The 2002 Residence Agreement granted the right to free movement across the five sovereign member states of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela and six associate member states.[6] It provides that the nationals of Mercosur Member States—a group that expanded to include Bolivia and Venezuela—and the Associate Member States Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname, may reside

[5] The ECOWAS consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo

[6] The Associate member states include Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname.

and work for a period of 2 years in another Member State if they can prove citizenship and a clean criminal record. This was incidentally achieved almost independent from the commercial and economic agendas of the member states (Brumat, 2017).

Given that the driving force behind the formation of the treaty was, apart from the economic integration of the region, the regularization of migration corridors within the sub-region; the treaty also provides a number of rights to these migrants, including the right to equal working conditions, family reunification, and access to education for their children. After 2 years, the permit may be transformed into permanent residency (Acosta, 2016). The idea is, not only to integrate, but also to reinforce national identities within the region, maintaining country distinctions (Brumat & Acosta, 2019). This treaty has completely changed the mobility regime of the region, providing benefits and real integration among its member and associate states, although the progress has stalledin recent years, especially with regards to a Mercosur citizenship.

15.5 A Way Forward Through SAARC

The economic integration of sub-regions has been done and within the already existing legal frameworksin different parts of the world. There is no reason why South Asia cannot think of a similar future for their region?. And it can be addressed through an already existing framework of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which can be seen through its charter itself. The SAARC, which consists of eight full members[7] was founded in 1985 with the following goals, as defined in its charter:

- Promote the welfare of the people of South Asia and improve their quality of life.
- Accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region by providing all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and realise their full potential.
- Promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia.
- Contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems.
- Promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields.
- Strengthen co-operation with other developing countries.
- Strengthen co-operation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interest; and
- Cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

[7] The full members of the SAARC initially included Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan later joined in 2007 as the eighth member.

The member states have agreed to co-operate on a variety of areas ranging from agriculture and rural development, education and culture, trade and finance, tourism, science and technology and cultural exchange. This mandate forms a perfect foundation for the emergence of a free movement zone. However, with such a broad mandate, it is curious to note that the issue of mobility within the region has seldom been taken up and has always been scuppered due to the internal fighting of its members. As we have seen with examples of the EU, ECOWAS and Mercosur, mobility among regional members is not only possible, but also leads to a number of benefits for the citizens of the region.

The prevalence of migration from the region has been discussed at length in the past. For example, the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in 2014 led to the adoption of the SAARC Declaration regarding the protection of migrant workers abroad. It recognized labour migration as an issue in need of collective action in order to protect migrant workers and other vulnerable populations abroad.[8] However, there has been no such movement in the case of migration within the region.

The SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport Study had recommended multilateral agreements permitting free movement of goods, services and people across the border by road and rail, which was initially endorsed by the member countries. The 18th Summit also saw progresses made in the passing of the SAARC Motor Vehicles Agreement and SAARC Regional Railways Agreement. However, Pakistan refused to sign these agreements, citing a 'lack of preparation' (Mishra, 2015).

This instance provides a glimpse into the issues plaguing the SAARC to begin with. The SAARC was set up with the express objective of improving economic, social and cultural ties among its member countries. It must be said, that on the available evidence, it has so far failed in that objective. The formation of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 1993 has not led to any great gains in trade among the member countries. Protectionist measures, inefficient and lengthy border and customs arrangements and poor infrastructure in the member countries have made gains in multilateral trade ambiguous and, if present, spread unequally among some countries (Raihan & Razzaque, 2014). Internal squabbling, particularly given the fractious nature of domestic and international policies of the member states, has made any further gains difficult.

However, a push to integrate the people of the region through movement channels may just be the best method to re-invigorate the association, and by extension, the region. The example of, particularly, the European Union has shown that a free movement of people has definite benefits to the macro and micro development of the region. The overall increase on regional wages and, as a result, on remittances in the case of the European Union is indicative of the fact that, while it may not yet be possible to envisage a migration corridor for long-term labour migration in the region, visa-free entries for 90 days to start with, like in the case of ECOWAS and Mercosur is certainly a start to facilitate safe and orderly migration of people in the

[8] See: https://mfasia.org/mfa_programs/advocacy/south-asian-association-for-regional-cooperation/

region. Ensuring, through the SAARC charter, the protection and rights of these migrants will create a legal framework to tackle with irregular migration and human trafficking.

To begin with, it is vital that a committee be set up under the auspices of the SAARC to estimate and account for cross-border migration that is already happening. Without a proper understanding of the type of migration and its attendant issues and challenges, migrants within South Asia remain at the mercy of political vagaries. It is also vital that a legal infrastructure be set up for the protection and welfare of refugees within the region, with member states contributing to it in the form of financial and infrastructural aid. This model can be one to be emulated in countries all over the world in the coming years.

The SAARC's mandate of improving people-to-people and improving social, cultural and educational ties is an important one. This is vital in a region with a common history and similar cultures, but which has seen political tensions over the years. However, this also depends on the free movement of people across borders.

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