MARGINS FOR MANOEUVRE IN COLD WAR EUROPE

THE INFLUENCE OF SMALLER POWERS

Edited by
Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson

Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe

The Cold War is conventionally regarded as a superpower conflict that dominated the shape of international relations between World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Smaller powers had to adapt to a role as pawns in a strategic game of the superpowers, its course beyond their control. This edited volume offers a fresh interpretation of twentieth-century smaller European powers – East–West, neutral and non-aligned – and argues that their position vis-à-vis the superpowers often provided them with an opportunity rather than merely representing a constraint. Analysing the *margins for manoeuvre* of these smaller powers, the volume covers a wide array of themes, ranging from cultural to economic issues, energy to diplomacy and Bulgaria to Belgium. Given its holistic and nuanced intervention in studies of the Cold War, this book will be instrumental for students of history, international relations and political science.

Laurien Crump is Associate Professor in Contemporary European History at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. She has published widely on multilateral relations in the Cold War on both sides of the Iron Curtain, based on multi-archival research in eight European countries.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

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Abbreviations

ABAKO	*Alliance des Bakongo* (The Alliance of Bakongo)
ANIC	*Arhivele Naţionale ale României* (Romanian National Archives)
BEB	*Buitenlandse Economische Betrekkingen* (Directorate General for Foreign Economic Relations)
BIC	Belgian Information Center
BKP	*Balgarska Komunisticheska Partiya* (Bulgarian Communist Party)
BZNS	*Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sayuz* (Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union)
CBMs	Confidence-building measures
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	*Centre d'Information et de Documentation du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*
CoCom	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DPC	[NATO] Defence Planning Committee
EC	European Communities
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERC	European Research Council
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRUS	The Foreign Relations of the United States
GDR	German Democratic Republic
G7	Group of Seven
ICAO	International Civic Aviation Organization
IEA	International Energy Agency
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
KKE	*Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas* (Communist Party of Greece)
KVP	*Katholieke Volkspartij* (Dutch Catholic People's Party)
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

MPT	Multilateral preparatory talks
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIG	*Nederlandse industrie groep* (Dutch Industrial Group)
N + N	Neutral and Non-aligned states
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSWP	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members
NWFZ	Nuclear weapon free zone
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCC	Political Consultative Committee
PPR	*Politieke Partij Radikalen* (Dutch Party of Radicals)
PvdA	*Partij van de Arbeid* (Dutch Labour Party)
PWO	Parliamentarians for World Order
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
UCD	*Unión de Centro Democrático* (Spanish Union of the Democratic Centre)
UKNA	British National Archives
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
WP	Warsaw Pact

Introduction

Smaller powers in Cold War Europe

Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson

Thirty years after it ended, this book tells the story of the Cold War from a perspective that both transcends and engages with the well-known dramaturgy of East versus West. While the conventional narrative features a superpower conflict that dominated the shape of international relations between World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall, this volume takes the aims and influence of smaller European powers as its point of departure. It challenges the classic image of a bipolar Cold War that determined the fates and scope for manoeuvre of smaller states all over the world, its course beyond their control.

In the vein of New Cold War history, researchers have questioned that bipolarity and called for more attention to the influence of smaller powers on Cold War dynamics, as well as the 'retroactive debipolarisation' of the Cold War.[1] This volume joins a burgeoning literature that highlights cooperative, multilateral and multipolar aspects of the Cold War, but it points to the roles played by smaller powers and non-state actors in a much broader thematic, chronological and geographical spectrum.[2] That endeavour emphatically includes perspectives from both sides of the Iron Curtain and beyond.

In spite of a renewed interest for small states in the Cold War era, the focus even of recent volumes on Cold War Europe tends to remain on particular themes, such as détente, European security or the end of the Cold War, instead of approaching the concept of smallness as a starting point.[3] Whereas some researchers have pointed to contacts across the Iron Curtain, even this focus tells the story of (bridging the differences between) East and West, rather than analysing the strategies of smaller European powers regardless of their alignment.[4] So far as monographs are concerned, when the role of Cold War Europe in particular has been covered, the work has not been based on primary sources.[5] And for all its other merits, Arne Westad's recent work on the Cold War focuses on the global perspective and contains little detailed analysis of individual players in Cold War Europe.[6]

Besides being about East versus West, the United States versus the Soviet Union, the Cold War is also a story of smaller versus big powers – on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This volume approaches international relations from the vantage points of the smaller powers. The aim is to examine and facilitate a comparison between the goals, strategies, and scope for manoeuvre of smaller European powers during the Cold War era empirically, without a priori assumptions about

limitations inherent to their East–West positions. Whether and how the super-power conflict had an impact on each smaller power's goals, strategies and scope for manoeuvre is posed as an open question, and so is whether and how the smaller powers' goals and strategies in turn influenced Cold War dynamics. The volume offers a thought-provoking survey of the diverse agendas as well as common denominators of smaller European powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain, including neutrals/non-aligned. It aims for a better understanding of European Cold War dynamics by considering the influence of a variety of factors and actors on the margins for manoeuvre of smaller powers.

Essential to the book's endeavour is a transcending of the East–West divide as well as the use of a shared conceptual approach. This volume suggests *margins for manoeuvre* as a common denominator that may help explain small state foreign policy behaviour, also providing a tool to discuss the interrelationship between system level, state level and individual level of influence on small state foreign policy. One of the advantages of the concept as an analytical frame is that it replaces a discussion of *power* with a term that better highlights the agency of smaller states. While power is easily associated with military strength and coercion, margin for manoeuvre leaves room for other strategies to maintain independence and pursue interests. Margin for manoeuvre also avoids the connotation to passivity or merely reactive behaviour suggested by a term like *defensive power*, which has been used to define the particular character of the power of small states as opposed to that of great powers.[7] Although it can be a useful concept, characterising small states' power as defensive by nature holds the risk of focusing attention on what they resisted rather than on what they pursued.

The idea to combine and compare studies on small states in the Cold War was born out of previous multi-archival research by the volume's two editors. In 2015, Laurien Crump showed that the smaller members of the Warsaw Pact had much more leverage over the Soviet Union than previously assumed, demonstrating the need to also analyse the aims and actions of the smaller powers within the Soviet bloc.[8] Simultaneously, a detailed comparison by Susanna Erlandsson of Dutch and Swedish security ideas and strategies in the 1940s revealed correspondences that were surprising in light of the fact that the Netherlands joined NATO while Sweden emerged as a staunch defender of neutrality.[9] While Crump pointed to diversity within a bloc generally considered monolithic, Erlandsson pointed to striking similarities between two countries with ostensibly diverging Cold War positions. Combining these insights made clear that the Cold War division of smaller European powers into the three categories – NATO, Warsaw Pact or neutral/non-aligned – fails to tell the whole story of smaller states' policies and possibilities, and, by extension, of the mechanisms of the Cold War itself. The results also seemed to suggest that a quest for the widest possible *margins for manoeuvre* might explain the choices made by different governments.[10]

This volume brings together twelve studies of a still wider range of European powers in the Cold War era in order to test and build on these tentative results. It is a unique joint effort to combine in-depth multi-archival historical research with ground-breaking conceptual work, which has been further consolidated by

an intensive roundtable workshop with the contributors in Utrecht in December 2017. It is an unprecedented endeavour not only because it includes leading young scholars of so many different nationalities, but also because the 'margins for manoeuvre' of smaller powers are not considered as a constraint but as a potential opportunity, which in turn sheds an altogether new light on their contribution to the Cold War era.

While it has not been possible to include all states of Europe, the case studies, many of which deal with more than one state, have been chosen so as to include as wide a variety of states as possible: states of different sizes and resources, and states from Northern, Southern, Western as well as Eastern Europe. Two important choices underpin the enterprise. One is the choice for a common conceptual approach highlighting states' margins for manoeuvre rather than framing the narrative as one of power relations. To avoid static categories, we have also deliberately chosen to speak of smaller rather than small powers, emphasising the variety and leaving it up to the individual authors to define the ways in which the state(s) they study are small.[11] Second, we have limited the scope to Europe to allow for a maximum of variety within a still somewhat cohesive unit of study. This is a way to avoid differences so big and contexts so diverse that the variables make a comparison and coherent narrative difficult. It does not mean that the approach would not be applicable to other areas of the world, or that Europe is more important as a Cold War arena. Ideally, this book will inspire further research and future comparisons, transcending other divides, as well as shedding a new light on Cold War Europe.

The conceptual and empirical contribution

This book straddles the divide between theoretical literature on small states and empirical literature on the Cold War. While many small state researchers have tried to list typical small state foreign policy behaviours, others have noted that such lists quickly become too long to be meaningful and act as any guide on behaviour. Moreover, compilations of small state behaviours include contradictions, like 'small states tend to choose neutral options' as well as 'small states tend to rely on superpowers for protection', so that whether they can generate any theory depends on scholars' ability to identify under which conditions small states choose which behaviour. Similar concerns hold true for attempts to determine whether the system level, state level or individual level is more important to small states' foreign policies: a ranking of levels explains little without an eye for how these levels interacted.[12]

As Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl have pointed out for the discipline of international relations in general, Cold War studies need to pay more attention to small states in terms of relations between states. Not only do minor powers by far outnumber great powers; great and small powers are mutually constitutive.[13] We have chosen to refer to the countries studied in this book as smaller *powers* rather than *states*. While thereby recognising that hierarchies between states exist – even highlighting the Cold War as a story of superpower versus smaller powers as well

as East versus West – the use of the relative form signals that the differences in power are not absolute but complicated and contextual. In the context of Cold War Europe, the term 'smaller powers' could in fact indicate all European states except the Soviet Union. The countries in our case studies all fall within the broad category of states that are not great powers. The ways in which a state is 'small' are a contextual and therefore an empirical matter. Although practitioners of small state studies in the 1960s and 1970s (and a few later cases too) went to great lengths to find objective criteria by which to define small states, later researchers in the field have advocated a less rigid and static approach, pointing to diverse, subjective and changing discourses.[14]

We believe that this open approach leaves more room for historical reality, while still allowing for conceptual comparison. Referring to the space within which smaller powers could manoeuvre and pursue their goals as a *margin* is also a conscious choice: besides connoting to a space beside the main narrative, margin associates to a certain flexibility. By leaving it to all authors to define how the state(s) they study was (were) small and by asking them to define the margins for manoeuvre in terms of goals, interests and influence, as well as explore the strategies to stretch those margins, this volume seeks to contribute valuable insights to the field of small state studies.

The volume also makes a significant contribution in empirical terms to New Cold War history. The product of a chronologically, thematically and geographically wide-ranging cooperation between leading young historians from all over Europe, it transcends the East–West divide as well as challenging the conventional superpower paradigm. Based on original archival – mostly multi-archival – research, the chapters highlight different aspects of small state strategies using different levels of analysis, under the common denominator of margins for manoeuvre, all exploring to what extent smaller powers succeeded in stretching their room for manoeuvre and as such contributed to shaping the Cold War in ways hitherto overlooked.

Three themes guide the outline of the volume. The chapters are clustered around these themes, which are not related to the East–West divide, but rather to common strategies and opportunities of smaller powers. The first part of the volume, *Manoeuvring through Multilateralism*, addresses how smaller powers used multilateral frameworks to increase their scope for manoeuvre during the Cold War era. Part II focuses on *The Margins of Superpower Rule*, highlighting how superpower rule not only constrained but also offered opportunities to smaller powers. Finally, under the heading *Identity as an Instrument*, the contributions of Part III examine how smaller powers fostered a particular kind of national identity as an instrument to increase their scope for manoeuvre.

Laurien Crump and Angela Romano usher in Part I by discussing multilateralism as a tool for smaller powers to challenge the straitjacket of the superpowers' Cold War and promote national foreign policy goals. Their chapter (Chapter 1) responds to the call of New Cold War History to investigate the role of smaller powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain, offering a unique analysis of Eastern and Western Europe simultaneously. It deals with the smaller powers' room for

manoeuvre in four different multilateral contexts, namely the Warsaw Pact, the European Community/European Political Cooperation, NATO and the overarching context of the European security conference/the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the period 1965–1975.

Chapter 2 deals with the Netherlands, the Benelux and the European Defence Community in the early 1950s. Trineke Palm examines Dutch strategies for exploiting the tight margins of manoeuvre in the negotiations over a European army (1950–1952). The chapter especially highlights the interplay of different multilateral security networks within the Western Alliance, emphasising the diverse nature of power and power struggles.

A different aspect of small states' manoeuvring through multilateralism in the Cold War is foregrounded in Chapter 3 by Aryo Makko, who uses a comparative approach to investigate whether NATO membership or non-alignment provided a wider margin for manoeuvre in the multilateral setting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Like Palm, Makko highlights how different multilateral settings interplayed. The chapter compares the policies of neutral Sweden and the NATO member state Norway in the CSCE and the making of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

In Chapter 4 Stefanie F. M. Massink examines the Dutch social democrats' attitudes and actions regarding the question of dictatorial Spain's accession to NATO. While NATO provides the multilateral framework within which the margins for manoeuvre of the Dutch government are examined, Massink adds a layer of complexity by analysing Dutch social democratic influence both when the party was in opposition and when it was later in power. That way, the contribution offers insights into how the influence of domestic politics on smaller powers' foreign policy interplayed with the margins provided by the multilateral setting (NATO).

Part II, *The Margins of Superpower Rule*, begins with a contribution by Suvi Kansikas, Mila Oiva and Saara Matala. Together, in Chapter 5 they examine Polish and Finnish traders' efforts to access the Soviet market in the 1950s and 1960s and in the 1970s and 1980s respectively. By analysing how the clothing industry of planned-economy Poland and the shipbuilding industry of market-economy Finland gained access to the Soviet market, the study sheds light onto foreign trade practices of smaller states seeking to increase their room to manoeuvre in a political situation of asymmetric trade. Kansikas, Oiva and Matala analyse the agency of the smaller powers in three phases of commerce: market analysis, marketing and political lobbying. Focusing on individual entrepreneurs and intermediate-level actors (Finland, Poland); private businesses (Finland) and state-owned foreign trade organisations (Poland), they offer a Cold War-long view of political, economic, structural, social and cultural margins for manoeuvring into the Soviet market.

The intertwining of economic and political issues returns in the discussion of the margins of superpower rule in Chapter 6. Elitza Stanoeva discusses socialist Bulgaria's parallel political and economic relations with the FRG and Denmark: their (re)activation in the early 1960s, peak around the mid-1960s, deterioration in the aftermath of the crackdown on Prague Spring in 1968 and subsequent efforts

at recovery. Assessing the bilateral relations comparatively, the chapter examines the different degrees of diplomatic autonomy that Bulgaria enjoyed vis-à-vis the FRG and Denmark as well as the divergent pressures that led to the post-1968 chill. Stanoeva's focus on the relations between smaller powers of different sizes and allegiances brings into view a complex interaction of aims and strategies of all involved, with a particular eye for how these influenced Bulgaria's margins and strategies for manoeuvre.

Moving to the West, Frank Gerits illustrates the margins of superpower rule through the case of Belgian colonialism. In Chapter 7 about the Belgian Information Center in New York, Gerits examines how the Belgian government tried to increase its influence in Washington, centring on the role of Belgian Congo in these attempts. By re-examining how the 'Congo factor' affected Belgian diplomacy, the chapter also re-examines the idea that the relationship between the United States and European empires was held together by the fear of Communist revolt in Africa.

Chapter 8, the final chapter of Part II, turns to yet another arena illustrating the margins of superpower rule: energy politics. Zooming in on the Urengoy pipeline crisis of 1981–1982, Marloes Beers approaches the role of the Dutch government from a political economy perspective and explores energy politics as an area that could have allowed the Netherlands to stretch its margins for manoeuvre in Cold War Europe. Distinguishing between the Dutch approach to Europe and to the United States, Beers analyses why it took the Dutch so long to attempt to translate its economic potential into geopolitical influence.

In Part III, *Identity as an Instrument*, Johanna Rainio-Niemi opens with a discussion in Chapter 9 of neutrality as an instrument of manoeuvring in the bipolar Cold War, focusing on how the understandings and conceptions of neutrality as an identity changed in the post-1945 period, especially as contrasted with earlier conceptions. Empirically, the chapter examines the two remaining European neutrals in 1945, Switzerland and Sweden, and two of the post-1945 neutrals, Austria and Finland. Using these empirical examples, the chapter looks at the 'new' post-1945 small state neutrality and places it in the broader national and international context within which it was formulated. It looks at neutrality's history as one in which national and international elements were profoundly entangled.

In Chapter 10, historical identity again plays an important role as Corina Mavrodin discusses Romania's initiative for creating a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Balkans in the late 1950s. Otherwise known as the Stoica Plan, Bucharest's call for inter-bloc cooperation on creating a 'zone of peace' was the first ever such proposal of the Cold War at a time when the global public was increasingly worried about the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. The chapter analyses the Stoica Plan within the complex regional and global contexts with an eye for the ways in which Romania used identity as an instrument.

A story of instrumental changing of identity is provided by Cristina Blanco Sío-López (Chapter 11), who addresses the parallel processes of transition to democracy and European Community (EC) accession of Spain. The chapter studies the margins for manoeuvre of Spain as a smaller Cold War power and its strategies

in retracing a way back to democracy and mainstream foreign relations as part of a paradigmatically convergent transitional Europeanism. It focuses on the entangled constraints and opportunities of Spain's catch-up convergence and 'Return to Europe' scenarios, which would have a later mirror in the case of the EU's Eastward Enlargement process.

The final empirical contribution (Chapter 12) sheds light on a neglected Cold War scheme: the 'Six Nation Initiative', launched in May 1984 by Greece along with India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden in order to halt what they called 'a rush towards global suicide' and to facilitate an agreement on nuclear arms control. Centring on the role of Greece, Eirini Karamouzi discusses how Andreas Papandreou built an identity as a peacemaker and became a figurehead for the Six Nation initiative. While most of the historiography has focused on the anti-nuclear rallies and the Cold War summits between Reagan and Gorbachev to deal with the Euromissiles escalation, Karamouzi examines the impact of this smaller power initiative on the discourse, framing and decisions on peace and disarmament.

The volume ends with a concluding chapter co-authored by the editors. This conclusion contains a comparative analysis of the individual chapters as well as the different parts, in which more general conclusions are drawn from the individual research findings. This chapter will evaluate to what extent the analysis of smaller powers' *margins for manoeuvre* has helped to challenge and nuance the view of the Cold War era as bipolar and dominated by the superpowers, provided a new prism for viewing the Cold War and contemporary European history at large, and contributed on a conceptual level to small state theory. By doing so it aims to shed a fresh light on European dynamics in the Cold War era, as well as setting a new agenda for future Cold War research.

Notes

1 Cf. John Lewis Gaddis, 'On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War', in: Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretation, Theory* (London 2000) 31. In the same volume James Hershberg calls for a 'retroactive debipolarisation' of the Cold War. Cf. James Hershberg, 'The Crisis Years, 1958–63', 304.
2 Poul Villaume, Ann-Marie Ekengren and Rasmus Mariager (eds), *Northern Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1990: East-West Interactions of Trade, Culture, and Security* (Helsinki 2016).
3 See for example Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nünlist (eds), *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75* (New York 2008); Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki To Gorbachev, 1975–1985* (London 2009); Frédéric Bozo et al. (eds), *Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990* (New York 2012).
4 Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965–1985* (Copenhagen 2010); Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana (eds), *Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989* (Lanham, MD 2014).
5 Mark Gilbert, *Cold War Europe: The Politics of a Contested Continent* (London 2015).
6 Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (London 2017).

 7 Since the mid-twentieth century, the power of small states has repeatedly been defined as a passive kind of power, i.e. the power not to do what others demand. Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago, IL 1959); Trygve Mathisen, *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers* (Oslo 1971); Hans Branner, 'The Danish Foreign Policy Tradition and the European Context', in: Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds), *Denmark's Policy Towards Europe After 1945: History, Theory and Options* (Odense 2000) 185–220.

 8 Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969* (London and New York 2015).

 9 Susanna Erlandsson, *Window of Opportunity: Dutch and Swedish Security Ideas and Strategies 1942–1948* (Uppsala 2015).

10 Erlandsson explained the diverging paths of Sweden and the Netherlands, in spite of their common security beliefs and world views, as the result of both governments making the choice that under different circumstances seemed to give them the widest margin for manoeuvre to keep pursuing their (very similar) long-term goals. Erlandsson, *Window of Opportunity*, 224, 236–241. See also Susanna Erlandsson, 'Rethinking Small State Security: Dutch Alignment in the 1940s Compared to Swedish Neutrality", in: Ruud van Dijk et al. (eds), *Shaping the International Relations of the Netherlands, 1815–2000: A Small Country on the Global Scene* (London and New York 2018) 117–139.

11 Cf. Christopher S. Browning, 'Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19:4 (2006) 669–684; Victor Gigleux, 'Explaining the Diversity of Small States' Foreign Policies Through Role Theory', in: *The World Thematics: A TWQ Journal* 1:1 (2016) 27–45; Ruud van Dijk et al., 'Conclusions and Outlook: Small States on the Global Scene', in: van Dijk et al. (eds), *Shaping the International Relations of the Netherlands*, 244.

12 Jeanne A.K. Hey (ed.), *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior* (Boulder, CO 2003) 5–6, 185–194.

13 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, 'Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?' in: Christine Ingebritsen et al. (eds), *Small States in International Relations* (Seattle, WA 2006) 21–23.

14 Browning, 'Small, Smart and Salient?' 669–684; Samuël Kruizinga, 'A Small State? The Size of the Netherlands as a Focal Point in Foreign Policy Debates, 1900–1940', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 27:3 (2016) 420–436, 421; van Dijk et al., 'Conclusions', 244. For historical attempts to define small states, see for example Amry Vandenbosch, 'The Small States in International Politics and Organization', *The Journal of Politics* 26:2 (May 1964) 293–312; David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (Oxford 1967); Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (London and New York 1968); Maurice East, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models', *World Politics* 25:4 (1973) 556–576; James Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods* (New York 1974); Tom Crowards, 'Defining the Category of "Small States"', *Journal of International Development* 14 (2002) 143–179.

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Part I

Manoeuvring through multilateralism

1   Challenging the superpower straitjacket (1965–1975)

Multilateralism as an instrument of smaller powers

Laurien Crump and Angela Romano

In this chapter we argue that most European governments – both East and West – came to see multilateralism as an opportunity to stretch their room for manoeuvre in a Cold War order largely dominated by the superpowers. Our analysis is based on the hypothesis that multilateralism offers small groups or even single countries the opportunity to either organise efforts at coordinating a position on international issues or even asserting their *individual* interests through using the multilateral mechanism as leverage over the superpower.

We use 'small' as a relative concept, which denotes all countries apart from the superpowers. Especially in the context of the Warsaw Pact (WP), all other members have usually been considered dwarfs in relation to the Soviet giant, regardless of their actual size. Accordingly, 'small' is not a matter of size, but rather of perception, in that the European countries under scrutiny have conventionally been regarded as subordinate and more or less subservient to either the Soviet Union or the United States. By 'margins for manoeuvre' we mean the scope these countries had to assert their own national interests.

In this chapter we will illustrate through key examples some actual steps taken by East and West European governments to increase the margins for manoeuvre within a multilateral framework. We will also report occasions in which multilateralism allowed small states to influence Cold War dynamics and examine what instruments and strategies they employed to do so. At the same time, we will assess to what extent the results matched the small states' goals and whether the latter changed overtime. If this was the case, we will analyse to what extent adjustments were due to the practical reason of group coordination or to a change of attitude resulting from the interaction with the other members in the group. In the conclusion we will compare the strategies of both Western and Eastern European actors in order to assess whether multilateral frameworks intrinsically generate scope for manoeuvre for small powers, regardless of their political/ideological affiliation – socialist or democratic.

Our analysis responds to the call of New Cold War history to investigate the role of smaller powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It is unique in explicitly assessing the strategies of small states to stretch their room for manoeuvre within the alliances and other forms of cooperation in Eastern and Western Europe simultaneously. We challenge the conventional image of the Warsaw Pact as a Soviet

transmission belt, while also offering a comparative analysis of surprisingly similar dynamics within the antagonistic blocs that defined the Cold War paradigm. As a starting point for comparison this chapter concentrates on the concept of European security and particularly the idea of a pan-European conference developed by the Warsaw Pact in the second half of the 1960s, which eventually took the shape of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). European security was a matter in which all European governments had an explicit stake, as many historians working on the CSCE and focusing on specific countries' policy, goals and actions have demonstrated in the last fifteen years.[1] We notice that the interests of smaller powers were often at odds with the interests of the respective superpower, and therefore the theme of European security offers an interesting framework to explore their action to widen margins of manoeuvre within their camp and internationally.

This chapter, which relies on multiple archival materials from both sides of the former Iron Curtain and draws from some of our published works, consists of two parts. The first analyses the way in which European socialist states used the initially Polish proposal for a European security conference to assert their own interests and emancipate themselves from the Soviet Union through the multilateral context of the Warsaw Pact. It thus shows the smaller allies' contribution to the European security conference in the second half of the 1960s, before it materialised in the CSCE from 1972 onwards. The second part of the chapter scrutinises how West European governments used the multilateral contexts of the European Community (EC) – particularly through European Political Cooperation (EPC) – and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to assert their interests and vision of East-West relations and shape Western preparation for and action in the CSCE. In this context, it shows West European governments' collective determination to challenge the US administration and their success in using multilateral fora to achieve their goals. The whole chapter thus deals with small powers' room for manoeuvre in four different multilateral contexts, that is Warsaw Pact, the EC/EPC, NATO and the overarching context of the European security conference (CSCE). It adds to the most recent historiography challenging the conventional bipolar Cold War paradigm that sees European security as shaped by the superpowers only, as it proves that small powers had an explicit stake and active role in the process of defining what security meant in the continent.[2]

Warsaw Pact initiatives on European security (1964–1966)

The initiative for a European security conference was first formulated within a multilateral setting, namely the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN), where Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, proposed to convene a multilateral conference on European security in December 1964.[3] This was a bold move, since the Polish leadership had not discussed it beforehand with the Kremlin and had thus confronted the Soviet superpower with a fait accompli. The UN setting had already provided the Poles with considerable margins for manoeuvre: with all other UN members as witnesses, the Kremlin had to seriously consider the Polish

proposal, which was duly tabled for the next Political Consultative Committee (PCC) meeting of the Warsaw Pact in January 1965. Although the Warsaw Pact had been dormant for the previous couple of years, primarily due to Romanian obstruction to even convene a meeting, the Polish proposal brought the Warsaw Pact back to life in January 1965.

The Polish government had a particular stake in a European security conference, since it strove for its borders to be recognised in a multilateral setting. This applied even more to the East German leadership, since the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was not recognised at all. Moreover, the East German leader Walter Ulbricht worried that 'West Germany [. . .] had had too much scope for manoeuvre with the socialist countries in the last couple of years', since the previous Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, had allowed the bonds between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and several Warsaw Pact countries to be forged and strengthened – mainly for economic reasons.[4] While Ulbricht was keen to widen the East German 'scope for manoeuvre' at West German expense, the opposite was the case for his Romanian colleague, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who wanted to tighten the relations with the FRG, because it needed its financial support: after becoming isolated within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Romanian economy was in such dire straits that it coveted a financial injection from the West. Moreover, Romania regarded a greater stake in European security as a means to free itself from the Soviet grip through rapprochement with the West.[5] These smaller members in particular had a vested interest in convening a European security conference, and they will therefore be central to this chapter.

The Polish leaders had cleverly identified a topic which was both in their own interests and in which all other members had a stake, too. They were already stretching their margins for manoeuvre by getting everyone to discuss their own proposal. Meanwhile, the alliance leader (the Soviet Union) could hardly object to a proposal on a European security conference – something which the Kremlin had proposed with less success ten years previously. Through this proposal, the Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, successfully sought 'to multilateralise the foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact', ensuring that this was no longer a Soviet prerogative.[6] Teaming up with the East Germans against the Romanians, Gomulka also succeeded in getting Gheorghiu-Dej on board, by arguing that '[i]f you do not want to participate, we will consult with those countries that want to'.[7] Even though the January 1965 meeting concluded in a stalemate on all other issues, such as nonproliferation and Warsaw Pact reforms, the WP members reached genuine agreement on developing a proposal for a European security conference. Its contents were, however, still subject to discussion. The Polish proposal thus provided an impetus for more meetings and also contributed to the so-called 'multilateralisation of the Warsaw Pact'.[8]

The discussion on European security received a further boost by a West German 'peace note', which was presented on 24 March 1966, in which the FRG government 'proposed to conclude bilateral treaties on a mutual renunciation of force' as well as its participation in a disarmament conference. This gesture of

West German rapprochement towards Eastern Europe was unprecedented but sowed discord within the Warsaw Pact: it was addressed to all its members except East Germany, since the FRG still claimed to represent the whole of Germany, and there was no mention of the recognition of the Polish Oder-Neisse border either. Despite East German and Polish discontent, Brezhnev was initially enthusiastic, since it was in line with his aim to further détente. The discussion on European security within the Warsaw Pact nevertheless made him realise that he should involve his allies in the reply, in particular the Polish leaders, since they had such a clear stake in the issue. He therefore sent the Poles the Soviet draft reply. Rapacki's furious rejection of the Soviet draft and the consequent Soviet move are testimony to the extent to which the Poles had already stretched their margins for manoeuvre. Rather than acting unilaterally, Brezhnev sent a reply that also met Polish objectives – such as the recognition of the post-war borders and the GDR – to the FRG government on 17 May.

The fact that the European security conference had been tabled within a WP setting compelled Brezhnev to convene the other first secretaries in a multilateral meeting on 7 April in order to discuss 'the problem of European security'. The meeting was also intended to discuss the agenda for the upcoming PCC meeting in July. The Romanian leadership was particularly pleased about this procedure, since 'for the first time since the Warsaw Pact exists we discuss the problems on time, as well as the agenda of the following session'.[9] Moreover, the approval of the Romanian proposal to host the next meeting in Bucharest illustrates that the more recalcitrant members of the alliance had also increased their scope for manoeuvre. Although nothing was concluded at the meeting in question, its contents spilled over to a meeting of the WP ministers of foreign affairs a month before the PCC meeting, in which a Soviet proposal for a 'Declaration on the Improvement of Peace and Security in Europe' would be discussed. In this proposal Brezhnev had also taken East German and Polish qualms to heart, by stressing the 'rebirth of revanchism and militarism in West Germany' and rebuking West Germany for its 'aggressive' stance vis-à-vis the GDR.[10] At the same time, he had further modified the Polish proposal by suggesting 'the convening of a *pan-European conference*' on European security in which all WP members should actively participate. The Romanian leadership strongly denounced the aggressive tone vis-à-vis the FRG and only favoured participating in a European security conference if it did 'not become a rigid platform that would hinder the initiatives and actions of every socialist state in European questions'.[11] It did, however, also realise that it was an opportunity 'for the multilateral development of normal relations between all European states'.[12]

The clash of interests on European security was, however, considerable. The Romanians presented an alternative draft in which they stressed the normalisation of intra-European relations that suited their purposes, which resulted in a divide between Romania and the other WP members. The smaller members thus clashed with one another rather than with the superpower. The issue was resolved by a secret meeting between the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Corneliu Manescu, and his Soviet colleague, Andrei Gromyko, who rewrote the Soviet

draft together in a more constructive tone. This did not only increase the Romanian scope for manoeuvre, but also served a Soviet purpose, since the Kremlin, too, was keen to improve relations with the FRG for the sake of détente. This draft also resulted in a compromise that was acceptable to the other WP members, satisfying the interests of each individual member. The scope for manoeuvre within the WP had increased in absolute terms. The multilateral context had compelled the alliance leader to take the interests of all its members into account in order to safeguard group cohesion.

The declaration on European security, which was on the agenda of the July 1966 PCC meeting, was accordingly an unprecedented success. All WP members agreed on the ultimate draft, which had been the result of East German and Polish input, as well as a secret Romanian–Soviet compromise. Highlighting the need to 'normalise intra-European relations' – a Romanian desire – it also stressed the necessity to recognise the 'actually existing borders', such as the Polish Oder-Neisse border, as well as the GDR itself.[13] The Warsaw Pact approval on a declaration on European security was considered 'the first serious initiative of Eastern Europe in institutionalising East-West relations', as well as 'the first important step on the road to signing the Helsinki Final Act in 1975'.[14] The document was inherently contradictory, because it combined a moderately aggressive stance to the West Germans and Americans with a plea for expanding East–West collaboration.[15] The smaller allies' attempt to stretch their margins for manoeuvre had nevertheless resulted in a concrete and important initiative.

Stretching the margins within the Warsaw Pact (1967–1969)

In the following period two developments further affected the ensuing discussions on European security. In January 1967 Romania established diplomatic relations with West Germany, even though the latter still refused to recognise its East German counterpart, which infuriated the East German and Polish leaderships and emphasised their different interests. Although the Kremlin paid lip-service to Ulbricht's and Gomulka's concerns, Brezhnev welcomed a further relaxation of tensions below the surface. The difference between Romania and the rest became all the more pronounced when Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country (other than Albania, which had already left the alliance *de facto*) not to support the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary on 21 August 1968, which was intended to stem the reforms in the wake of the Prague Spring.

The stakes for a European security conference had accordingly been raised, since the threat of the collapse of socialism in Czechoslovakia had made the Poles and East Germans all the more anxious for recognition of their borders and their country respectively. Meanwhile, the Hungarians joined the Romanians in considering the normalisation of intra-European relations of particular importance to salvage European détente in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the Romanian leaders now occupied the moral high ground, since they had single-handedly resisted alleged Soviet pressure to intervene. In actual fact,

both Ulbricht and Gomulka had put Brezhnev under considerable pressure to give the green light for an intervention, whereas the Hungarian leader János Kádár had been considerably more moderate.[16]

It was accordingly no coincidence that Kádár suggested to add 'an appeal on European security' to the agenda of a deputy foreign ministers' meeting in Budapest on 9 March 1969. Although the Kremlin had taken the initiative to convene a PCC meeting in Budapest on 17 March 1969, the Romanians had suggested to precede it by a preparatory meeting of the deputy foreign ministers. The Kremlin had drafted both the communiqué and an appeal on European security, but the Hungarians considered the draft of the communiqué 'so bad' that it was 'out of the question that it would be accepted and signed by the Romanians', since it was strongly directed against the West Germans. The Hungarian room for manoeuvre had increased to such an extent that the Kremlin 'agreed with us [the Hungarians] in everything letter by letter'.[17] The opposite applied to the East Germans and the Poles, whom the Kremlin 'considered the main problem' in the wake of the invasion in Czechoslovakia instead of the conventionally recalcitrant Romanians. Brezhnev endorsed the Romanian desire for a normalisation of relations with West Germany in order to salvage European relations.

As had been the case with the draft proposal in July 1966, the matter was resolved bilaterally. Gomulka and Ceausescu reached a compromise. The Romanian leader agreed to tone down his criticism of the Brezhnev Doctrine, although the proposal still stated that no European state should 'undertake actions that could serve to poison the atmosphere in the relations between states'. In return, Gomulka moderated his aggressive stance vis-à-vis West Germany. The result was a very constructive document, which served the interests of all allies, by *both* stressing the inviolability of borders and the necessity to recognise the GDR *and* the need for 'multilateral collaboration on a European level'.[18] The smaller allies had acquired such a taste for multilateralism that they wanted to export it to a pan-European context.

The March 1969 PCC meeting was accordingly successful in two different ways: first, the smaller members felt that their influence had significantly increased. The Romanian leadership concluded with satisfaction that the Kremlin had 'yield[ed]' to Romanian pressure, and Janos Kadar argued that both the Warsaw Pact and the relations between the WP members had 'consolidated'.[19] Moreover, Ceausescu had succeeded in stretching the margins for manoeuvre of the individual countries even further, by persuading the other WP members to sign the communiqué after the meeting in the name of 'the participating states' instead of the 'Political Consultative Committee'.[20]

Second, the Budapest Appeal for a European security conference was taken seriously by neutral and non-aligned and NATO countries alike. Already in May 1969 the Finnish president Urho Kekkonen offered Helsinki as a venue for such a conference. The Budapest Appeal was the first Warsaw Pact proposal for a European security conference that was seriously considered within the Atlantic Alliance. The decision at another PCC meeting in Budapest in July 1970 that the USA and Canada could also be included in such a conference paved the way for

NATO's green light, and in November 1972 the 'Multilateral Preparatory Talks' to design the 'Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe' began among delegations from 35 participating countries – including the US and Canada – except Albania. The WP initiatives on European security had resulted not only in increased room for manoeuvre for the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members but also in a still bigger pan-European, multilateral process that would prove of paramount importance throughout the second half of the Cold War. The next half of this chapter will be dedicated to the way in which smaller Western powers stretched their margins for manoeuvre – within both the EC and NATO – and thus defined the process that would culminate in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

The West: accepting the conference

The first collective discussion of the Budapest Appeal in the West occurred during the Atlantic Council of April 1969, convened in Washington to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. The US administration described the Warsaw Pact proposal as a mere propaganda tool, while most European governments considered the idea of a pan-European conference admissible.[21] Their views were in line with the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, approved in 1967, which introduced the notion of deterrence and détente. Interestingly, the Harmel Report had been part of an extraordinary exercise in consultation aimed at transforming the Alliance into a less hierarchical and more participatory forum that would give more voice and room to the superpower's allies.[22] The Washington final communiqué made no references to the Budapest Appeal or a conference but confirmed *détente*, i.e. cultivating bilateral contacts with socialist countries.[23]

The conference idea entered the diplomatic agenda when on 7 May 1969 the Finnish government sent all European states a memorandum to offer Helsinki as host and organiser of the pan-European negotiations. As more and more countries replied positively, the Atlantic Alliance had to take a clear position. The Belgian government, which had developed an intense diplomatic activity with East European states within the scope of its own détente policy, asked the NATO Council for an explicit mandate to engage in exploratory talks with the East about the pan-European conference. The majority of the allies considering it premature to signal openness to the idea of the conference, it was decided that the Belgians would act on their own behalf and then report to the Council. Only after receiving a complete dossier would the Atlantic Alliance express recommendations.[24] The Atlantic Council of 5 December 1969 accepted – in principle – the idea of a pan-European conference but set preliminary conditions: the signing of the *Ostpolitik* treaties, a quadripartite agreement on the status of Berlin and the beginning of negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe (MBFR).[25]

The White House had no interest in the CSCE and accepted the conference because most European allies favoured it. By supporting their exploratory contacts, the US administration intended to rein in European allies' readiness to convene the conference.[26] NATO members agreed on a three-phase procedure to

handle the question: they would first analyse and debate the Budapest Appeal; then the Secretariat would issue a list of questions aimed at orienting bilateral talks with the East European countries; finally, the Political Committee would report the results of the consultations to the Council.[27] Any further step in the East–West dialogue would need a decision of the Atlantic Council. Indeed, NATO allies reproached Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel for having gone too far when, on the way back from a visit to Belgrade, he affirmed that he considered the opening of the multilateral phase of talks likely to occur by the end of the year.[28]

Yet the Belgians did not cease to work for rallying support for the pan-European conference. Following the Hague summit of December 1969, the member states of the European Community (EC) initiated an intergovernmental mechanism to coordinate their foreign policies – European Political Cooperation (EPC). At the first EPC meeting in November 1970 foreign ministers debated East–West relations thoroughly, and the Belgian representative proposed to engage EPC in the CSCE question.[29] The EC partners endorsed the Belgian idea and established the sub-committee on CSCE, where national senior officials with expertise on NATO or Eastern Europe would investigate the political aspects of the conference likely to impinge on the Community.

On its first meeting on 1 March 1971, the sub-committee on CSCE agreed that delegates should report on five topics: the attitude of the Soviet Union, its allies and of the neutral European countries towards the Community (assigned to Germany); possible East European countries' initiatives at the CSCE (Italy); possible EC initiatives at the CSCE on economic matters (Belgium); CSCE duration and follow-up (France); the role of the Community at the CSCE (Netherlands). However, the sub-committee interpreted its mandate quite largely, once again thanks to the Belgians. Ambassador Pierre Forthomme, backed by Italian delegate Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, proposed to extend the debate to issues examined within NATO, in order to allow EC members to play a more active role within the West. The Luxembourg delegate remained silent; the West German representative adopted a neutral position, while the French was appreciative of the idea. By contrast, the Dutch delegate was lukewarm about actions likely to undermine the role of NATO. In a compromise they agreed that the written report would be limited to the selected topics, but the sub-committee would also debate on transatlantic works, harmonise the positions of the EC members and advise their delegations to NATO accordingly.[30] This was certainly a clear step to increase the EC members' margins for manoeuvre within the Western camp.

At the beginning of 1972 there were setbacks in transatlantic coordination. In January 1972 the EPC agreed on starting exploratory talks with Finland to prepare the conference. The US administration protested against what it saw as a violation of the NATO decision to wait for the signing of the Berlin agreements. The European allies defended their action and explained that they had simply engaged in bilateral contacts with the Finns in line with NATO recommendations. Yet the White House considered the Europeans too keen to start preparations for the conference.[31] Washington 'had no interest in a conference in 1972'; no decision on CSCE should be taken before the Nixon–Brezhnev summit, nor should

the multilateral phase start before the US presidential elections.[32] The superpowers bilaterally agreed on the schedule at their Moscow Summit of May 1972.[33] After the summit, a NATO ministerial meeting accepted the proposal of the Finnish government to meet in Helsinki in November for the multilateral preparatory talks of the CSCE.[34]

Hence the smaller European countries, particularly Belgium, had succeeded in putting the CSCE on the NATO agenda vis-à-vis a highly reluctant superpower; in talks with the British, Nixon explicitly affirmed that he had never wanted the CSCE and that the European countries had insisted on Western acceptance.[35] However, they could not coerce the US administration into speeding up preparations for the conference, as Washington relied on superpower agreement to set the pace.

Yet superpowers' entente would not be able to prevent, detour, or stop West European states from pursuing their goals at the CSCE, set the agenda, lead the negotiations and successfully extract concessions from the East. In the multilateral forum where states had equal rights and decisions were taken by consensus, small powers had a great leverage, and the EC member states – the 'EC Nine' – proved determined and well organised to use it.

The West, shaping the conference: the multilateral preparatory talks

In September 1972, the Americans informed the British that they would not take the lead on any issues of the conference.[36] The US administration regarded the CSCE as an element of the overall relationship with the Soviet Union: satisfied with Soviet cooperation on key matters such as Berlin, SALT treaty and the opening of MBFR negotiations, Nixon and Kissinger were ready to give the Soviets the conference they wanted and would not endanger détente by introducing elements of attrition such as freer movement and human contacts.[37]

In addition, the Americans were inclined to agree on the opening date of the conference, as the Soviets wished, rather than adhere to the European position of waiting for satisfying results before giving their assent. Kissinger put continual pressure on the allies in this sense. In March 1973, talking with Luxembourg Foreign Minister Gustav Thorn, Kissinger overtly accused the Europeans of being 'unhelpful' on the CSCE and MBFR and affirmed that they should let the Soviets have 'a short snappy conference with little substance'; he added that the question of freer movement, though of some tactical value, was unlikely to bring any practical results.[38]

The EC governments grew exasperated with the US stance, which ignored the importance of promoting contacts across the Iron Curtain. The EC states had developed a distinct collective approach to East–West relations: first, they aimed at gaining some form of recognition of the European Community by the socialist countries; second, they conceived of détente as a process to gradually overcome the Cold War divide in Europe and engender reforms and liberalisation of the socialist regimes. Crucial in this endeavour was the deepening of mutual interdependence

between the two halves of the continent through human, economic and cultural exchanges, political dialogue and cooperation in several fields.[39] Consequently, the Nine made promotion of *their* détente the main task of EPC at the conference. Not only did they formulate proposals and tactics for the CSCE, they also set procedures for coordinating their action closely within NATO in order to promote their vision and safeguard EC interests. The EC foreign ministers had decided, on 17 May 1971, to create another working body to deal with the economic aspects of the pan-European conference – the ad hoc Group on CSCE – which included officials of the EC Commission.[40] In February 1972 they resolved that EPC states' representatives to the NATO Economic Committee should participate in the ad hoc Group on CSCE meetings to receive detailed information about EC positions and inform EPC about the views of non-EC NATO allies. Shortly later, EC states established the *group of the Eight* (representatives of EC states) in the NATO Economic Committee; it would convene before the latter's meetings to harmonise EC members' positions and be more effective in expressing the interests of the Community.[41] As a matter of fact, important divergences had emerged between NATO recommendations and EC proposals for the CSCE. The former were generally lukewarm on offers towards socialist countries and in some cases advised against taking initiatives; on the contrary, EC states intended to table a genuine offer of economic cooperation. Moreover, NATO proposals referred neither to EC competence nor to its existence (*sic!*), a serious omission that could provide a hold to the socialist bloc's policy of non-recognition of the Community.[42]

The British government proposed to create a similar mechanism for political matters, arguing that the EC Nine should feel free to table proposals that might be unpalatable to Atlantic allies.[43] After months of discussion, a few weeks before the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) the EC states established another *group of the Eight* in the NATO Political Committee; it worked in close coordination with the EPC sub-committee on CSCE to harmonise national positions.[44] Any amendments to EC proposals resulting from NATO discussions would have to be submitted to EPC for approval before the Alliance could adopt a position.[45] Although the EC member states remained committed to working for Atlantic coordination, it is evident that, with the creation of their sub-groups within the NATO committees, they had shifted the emphasis from NATO to the EC, where they first agreed on common positions. As a collective entity speaking with a single voice, the EC Nine enlarged their margins of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the United States and strengthened their influence within the Atlantic Alliance, where the other members were not equally cohesive.

The enhanced role of West European states also materialised in the multilateral CSCE negotiations. The low profile of the US delegation at the MPT was counterbalanced by the firmness and cohesion of the EC states, which succeeded in elaborating and defending common positions and gathered the support of most NATO allies and neutral states. The sub-committee and the ad hoc Group on CSCE were on permanent session and supervised the negotiations; when important changes were required to the position of the Nine, governments stepped into and instructed the CSCE delegations accordingly.[46] In spite of the White House's preference,

the Nine refused to agree to an opening date of the conference until they gained satisfactory results at the MPT, namely a specific chapter on human contacts and clear mandates for the Commissions.

The CSCE negotiations phase in Geneva

The action of the US delegation in Geneva was also limited, especially since Kissinger became Secretary of State in September 1973. His numerous statements about the pointlessness of the Third Basket (cooperation on human contacts, information, culture and education) indicated that the US government did not endorse the West European approach to détente.[47]

For the EC Nine the conference offered an opportunity to change intra-European relations: they thought it possible to engage the Soviets and their allies in serious discussions by introducing specific proposals with reasonable argumentation and no polemics – the apparent weakness of the Third Basket provisions was the result of a conscious choice. What the Nine fought for was not an immediate change of the socialist regimes, but a locus standi for people in the East trying to promote reforms and some degree of liberalisation. The effort to encourage a wider circulation of people and information across Europe also permeated the EC proposals for economic, scientific and technological cooperation (the Second Basket).

The EC Nine set up procedures for coordination. Belgian delegate Étienne Davignon advocated a common position on each issue, as had been the case at the MPT. French delegate André Arnaud proposed a looser coordination that would leave delegations the possibility to express the national viewpoint on a single point of a proposal without affecting the common position.[48] The French thesis did not convince the partners; throughout the CSCE the Nine were even more aligned and organised to speak with a single voice. This was possible because the EC Nine had a common interest in preserving the EC and boosting its international role and shared the vision of détente as a process for overcoming the Cold War divide. Vested interests – as FRG willingness to preserve options for changing borders and hence allow future German reunification – were recognised and supported, because they were part of that same vision. National differences on some details and proposals were discussed and composed for the sake of reaching the common goals that had clearly been established within EPC.[49] The two committees on the CSCE worked on permanent session and sent instructions to the nine delegations in Geneva, which met daily to agree on tactics. The most pro-active and close-knit group at the CSCE, the Nine took the leadership of the West at the negotiations.

From the Helsinki MPT to Nixon's resignation, not only did the United States remain passive on human contacts, but it also pressed upon allies to speed up the negotiations and conclude the CSCE at summit level, despite the NATO-agreed position that only a satisfying outcome would justify consenting to a top-level finale.[50] For instance, Kissinger told the Dutch foreign minister that the summit had to be accepted, because 'Europe [could] not say no to the Soviets on this point'.[51] In March 1974 even the British admitted that they 'should not rely upon

the Americans to fight too hard against a summit however meagre the results of the second stage'.[52] Kissinger urged the Europeans to conclude the negotiations soon; he described the Geneva talks as 'over-bureaucratic' and said that Western delegations should not waste time chatting but rather present a list of essential and reasonable requests, the acceptance of which would lead to a final summit.[53] This position was reiterated in NATO meetings in July.[54] The White House clearly aimed at closing the conference by summer 1974. The presidential turnover did not change the US stance: the joint communiqué of the Ford–Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok in November 1974 called for the conclusion of the conference as soon as possible and at the highest level.

The EC Nine stuck to their requests and resisted all Soviet attempts to undermine or narrow the Third Basket provisions; they also slowed down the work of the other commissions to prevent the Third Basket negotiations from falling behind. Moreover, the Nine resisted US pressure and refused to agree to a top-level final phase until concrete proposals had been agreed on human contacts; they even threatened not to accept the concluding phase altogether had the Soviets persisted in refusing concessions.[55] The ground-breaking Helsinki Final Act, which was signed on 1 August 1975, endorsed the EC Nine's view of détente as a process, and one that involved the liberal concepts of human rights, centrality of the individual and promotion of contacts and exchanges beyond state-controlled activities. Moreover, they had asserted the role of the European Community as a political actor, epitomised by Aldo Moro's signature of the Final Act as president of the EC Council, which officially engaged the EC to the implementation of the Helsinki provisions in accordance with its competence and rules. This was *per se* also a change of the Cold War bipolar order in Europe.

Conclusion

As small countries strove to become more influential, they used multilateralism as an instrument to both bolster their foreign policies within the bipolar Cold War framework and alter the dynamics within their respective alliances. European security, which concerned small powers deeply, offers a perfect field for inquiry to assess their capacity to organise and assert their interests via actions in multilateral fora.

In the East, small European states used the multilateral forum of the Warsaw Pact to prevent Soviet unilateralism and to create a platform for their individual national interests. It soon transpired that the interests of the various non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members were more at odds with each other than with the Soviet Union, with East Germany and Poland representing one end of the spectrum and Romania the other. Their respective goals – recognition of the borders versus normalisation of intra-European relations – clashed to such an extent that the Soviet Union as alliance leader was often forced into the position of arbiter rather than initiator. This implied that, in order to guarantee WP cohesion, the Kremlin had to take the interests of all its allies to heart. As the Warsaw Pact provided the smaller allies with an instrument to make their voices heard, it began to convene

more regularly at the behest of the NSWP members. Rather than acting as a transmission belt of Soviet demands, the alliance began to serve as an instrument for initially formulating NSWP interests and eventually finding compromises that addressed their concerns.

In the West, the member states of the European Community used multilateral discussions within NATO to coerce a reluctant US administration into accepting the pan-European conference. They also created an additional multilateral forum – European Political Cooperation – to coordinate their actions on international issues, assert their vision and interests vis-à-vis the superpower ally and have a better chance to influence non-EC NATO members' positions. Rather than competing with each other, as was the case within the Warsaw Pact, the EC members increasingly closed ranks against US pressure. In the case of the European security conference, the interests of the Western superpower seemed to diverge more from the views of its smaller allies than those of the Soviet counterpart. By contrast, in the East all Warsaw Pact members were after all committed to a European security conference.

The Warsaw Pact *increased* the margins for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the superpower, since the NSWP members began to initiate meetings and table proposals, but it also *decreased* the scope for manoeuvre between the smaller powers, which had to learn how to compromise in order to salvage at least some of their interests. This would happen all the more strongly to the NSWP members in the course of the CSCE: desiring to present a united stance towards the West, the Soviet Union's smaller allies had less scope to assert their individual interests within the CSCE than they did in the period preceding the conference. The case in Western Europe differs in two ways. First, the main interests of the EC members converged. Second, by creating an additional layer for multilateral discussion among themselves – EPC – they increased their scope for manoeuvre by teaming up and then presenting a common front within NATO. To this aim, they also established their groups *within* NATO committees and assured their delegates to the alliance close links with EPC machinery and discussions in order to maximise the capacity of advancing the EC proposals. The downside of the close EPC coordination was that the EC members could see their individual margins for manoeuvre in relations with third countries *decrease*. The French government, for instance, had sought to loosen EPC coordination at the CSCE in order to be able to preserve a more visible role for itself in the East–West dialogue. Although not running against common interests, the French were clearly concerned to see their role disappear into the EC group. However, these were isolated attempts, which were more or less grudgingly brought back within an EPC position in order to strengthen the group's impact on the CSCE negotiations.

In both the East and West, the multilateral settings had provided smaller powers with a scope to increase their margins for manoeuvre, either vis-à-vis each other or vis-à-vis the superpower. The experience led to the institutionalisation of multilateral fora on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In the case of the Soviet allies, they began to consider the Warsaw Pact as the proper forum to prepare the European security conference, and, by consequence, as a platform for genuine

discussion in general. The impression of the Polish delegate after the PCC meeting in 1969, namely 'that his country's room for manoeuvre had increased', was illustrative for all smaller WP members.[56] In the case of Western Europe, the pan-European conference gave EPC a real boost and added to its raison d'être. When the MPT closed, the German Ambassador to the United States affirmed that the Nine were imbued with the idea that whatever they were doing in EPC had to advance Europe's identity (i.e. vis-à-vis the United States), because through the CSCE the Europeans had 'discovered that they could work with each other and produce results'.[57]

   Despite some differences, then, it is possible to affirm that smaller powers perceived and used multilateral fora as an instrument to widen their margins for manoeuvre on both sides of the Iron Curtain and that the opportunities of multilateralism transcended the constraints of specific ideological and political systems.

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2 Multilateralism as small power strategy

The Netherlands, the Benelux and the European defence community (1950–1952)

Trineke Palm

The early post-World War II years were characterised by great uncertainties. To overcome old rivalries and as a defence against new threats, new alliances and multilateral forums emerged. Both bigger and smaller powers were puzzling and powering over the build-up of a new European order. For the Netherlands it was a critical period in which it had to come to terms with its smaller power status and develop new strategies to maximise its room for manoeuvre. With its self-perception as a 'middle power', the end of both its policy of neutrality and its status as a colonial power, the Netherlands had to rediscover its role on the world stage by the end of 1949.[1] The Dutch had to do so against the backdrop of the bipolarisation of the world into two blocs, splitting the European continent. Different initiatives for a Western European and/or Transatlantic security architecture were launched. First, the Treaty of Brussels (1948), signed by France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux. Second, the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), which included the signatories of the Treaty of Brussels, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. Third, the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC, 1952), which was signed, but not ratified. The EDC would have established a common European army as part of the overarching European integration project including the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Although, eventually, the EDC treaty was not ratified in French parliament and thus did not enter into force, this episode was critical for the subsequent development of the European security architecture (predominance of NATO) and the European integration process (predominance of economic integration).

Touching upon the 'high politics' of security and defence, we may expect little room for manoeuvre for smaller powers in the negotiations over a European army. The margins were clearly set by the United States. Moreover, the Dutch 'attitude of adaptive acquiescence' vis-à-vis the US would make a move *beyond* the 'margins' very unlikely.[2] However, since the Netherlands was very discontented with the French proposal for a European army, which was supported by the US, I expect that there were strong efforts to exploit the margins of manoeuvre, namely to strategize for an outcome in line with Dutch preferences while accepting the boundaries set by the US. In particular, this chapter examines multilateralism as small power strategy. This adds to existing research on small power strategies that focus on neutrality or hedging strategies; it focuses not so much

on how smaller powers situate themselves between blocs but within an alliance.[3] This also fits with the 'new' Cold War history, that problematises the overemphasis on the power politics of the superpowers and points at the diverse nature of power and power struggles.[4] Mary Ann Heiss and Victor Papacosma examined the intra-bloc conflicts within NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, their volume does not address the role of smaller powers, nor does it examine the interplay among the different multilateral settings within the blocs that were both competitors and allies.[5]

Building on earlier research on the ebb and flow of Benelux-cooperation and Van der Harst's comprehensive study of the Netherlands in the EDC negotiations, this chapter analyses to what extent and how the Netherlands used multilateralism as a strategy to expand its room for manoeuvre in the negotiations over the European Defence Community.[6] Multilateralism not only refers to the forums in which the Netherlands found itself (e.g., NATO and EDC) but also to the alliances that were formed within these multilateral settings. Multilateralism as a strategy refers in this chapter to attempts to build alliances with other smaller powers. So, it is not a strategy of embracing 'smallness', but rather of projecting a bigger shadow by working together with other smaller powers.

While there are many conceptual issues with the concept of 'smaller powers', i.e., whether there are objective criteria or whether it is a relational concept, in the particular case of the Netherlands in the context of both NATO and the EDC negotiations this notion is rather uncontested.[7] Both the Netherlands and the combined Benelux are considered 'smaller powers', confronted with a 'Big 3' in NATO (France, the UK and the US) and in the EDC negotiations (France, Germany and Italy).

While there is extensive research on the failure of the EDC, particularly focusing on the role of France, the UK and the US or individual actors (such as Jean Monnet), relatively little research has looked into the significance of the EDC debacle in terms of the intra-bloc power dynamics between bigger and smaller powers.[8] Research primarily focused on the relationship between France and the US, showing how the interdependence between the two countries in the Indochinese war and the strong ties among their elites decreased the impact of the material asymmetry between France and the US.[9] Actually, it was the 'weakness' of France that made it strong. For example, as Creswell argues, it was the French weakness that torpedoed US troop withdrawal from Europe. Since the US could not afford to lose France as an ally it was locked into a relationship in which France often dictated the pace and scope.[10] It shows how power dynamics between countries within an alliance cannot be reduced to 'objective' material indicators but can be exploited by smaller powers to their advantage.

With its focus on small power-coalitions within the Western alliance, this chapter shows how 1) the Western bloc was not as united over the means to achieve shared goals as it is often portrayed, and 2) that smaller powers, though not having fundamentally changed the course of the big powers, did not 'wait and see' but could be relatively successful by acting multilaterally in the multilateral frameworks of NATO and European integration.

The analysis consists of a systematic assessment of the internal correspondence at the Dutch National Archive (NA) between the Dutch Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Stikker, his ambassadors and the key departments in the Ministry between August 1950 and June 1952.

This internal communication is ideally suited for studying, first, the way in which the Netherlands formulated its position on the EDC; second, the extent to which the constraints and opportunities of the Cold War-context were acknowledged; and third, the strategies that were discussed and/or implemented, whether successfully or not, to maximise the margins for manoeuvre. To this end, the analysis is structured along three time periods, which vary in terms of Dutch efforts of multilateralism. The first period (1948–50) serves as a prologue to situate the discussion on the EDC in the wider discussion over German rearmament which took place in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the political decision-making body of NATO. Moreover, it is in this period that the US 'set the margins'. The second period is the first round of negotiations among France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg from February 1951 until July 1951, when the Interim-Report was published. At this point the Benelux was divided, as the Netherlands did not participate in the negotiations but had an observer status. The third period runs from September 1951 until May 1952. During the second round of negotiations, resulting in the signing of the Treaty of the Defence Community in May 1952, the Netherlands changed its strategy to full participant, aligning itself with the other Benelux states.

Prologue and first proposals (1948–1950): from Benelux-cooperation to Dutch isolationism

Still recovering from the horrors of the Second World War, a new conflict emerged on the European continent. While the Treaty of Brussels, signed in 1948, was still primarily aimed at countering a re-emergence of the 'German threat', faced with the Czech coup and the Berlin blockade in that same year, the Soviet Union quickly came to dominate the threat perception of the Western bloc. It resulted in another security pact: NATO. Western Germany was increasingly seen as the lesser evil and even a necessary 'partner in crime' to protect Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. Especially with the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 the question of German rearmament gained urgency. This question was discussed initially in the North Atlantic Council, the decision-making body of NATO and subsequently further negotiated as part of a bigger project of European integration: the European Defence Community.

During the negotiations with France and the UK over a mutual defence pact which led to the Treaty of Brussels, the Benelux acted as one bloc.[11] Together they provided the UK and France with a draft Treaty and held separate preparatory meetings during the negotiations.[12] Acting as one bloc paid off as the smaller powers were granted access to the meetings of the US, the UK and France on Germany and were able to include provisions on economic and political cooperation in addition to military cooperation.[13] While the Netherlands had initially been more reluctant than Belgium to enter such an agreement, in March 1948 it conceived of the Brussels Treaty as an avenue for the Netherlands to directly influence the 'big powers'.[14]

However, little was left of this coordinated effort when proposals for German rearmament against a possible Soviet intervention were launched and discussed in the context of the NAC. Rather, this phase of designing Western Europe's security architecture was characterised by unsuccessful Dutch unilateral agenda-setting efforts. This may reflect the fact that from the start the Benelux had not acted together in NATO, as the Netherlands was more Atlanticist than Belgium.[15]

The US proposed to rearm Germany under NATO command at the NAC of 26 September 1950.[16] Not amused, in October the French presented a counterproposal for German rearmament, under strict conditions, in a European army – the Pleven Plan, named after its French President.[17] During this first round of proposals discussed in the NAC there was little evidence of Benelux cooperation. This did not mean that the Netherlands preferred to act alone. Rather, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stikker, aimed at a coalition with Canada and Norway. However, these two countries declined Stikker's invitation to jointly counter the Big 3: Canada's representative Pearson was not willing to take strong stand on a European matter, and Lange, from Norway, expressed that feelings about Germany were still too strong in Norway for him to take a leading role.[18]

The Benelux countries differed in their outlook on the French plans and the preferred strategy. Luxembourg and Belgium wanted to accommodate French concerns and be 'good neighbours'.[19] Hence, the Belgian Ambassador in Washington, Silvercruys, suggested not to isolate the French by means of criticising both the French and American proposal. However, the Netherlands joined the UK in a strong rejection of only the French plan.[20] Moreover, the Netherlands introduced a proposal of their own, in which the NATO High Commissioner would be responsible for all forces in Germany and look after German rearmament under the aegis of NATO.[21] This was far from a coordinated Benelux effort as the Dutch were frustrated about the Belgian 'weakness' and voiced distrust of Van Zeeland, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who showed little interest in the Dutch plans.[22]

The Dutch plan was not well received. While the US thought it was not 'thought through in any detail' and 'premature' to put before the Deputies of the NAC on 13 November, the plan was circulated on the 22nd and discussed during the meeting of the NAC-deputies on the 25th.[23] To the French it was not acceptable as an alternative to their proposal. Starkenborgh, the Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO, reiterated Dutch fears that the French proposal would not be sufficient to contain German forces and prevent resurgence of German militarism.[24] The German press and Socialist opposition leader Schumacher responded very negatively, arguing that similar to the French proposal it was driven by a 'politics of fear, resentment and distrust'.[25] It was this German opposition that led the British High Commissioner, Kirkpatrick, to advise the Foreign Office not to back the Dutch plan.[26] For the US, the plan was just one among other options.[27]

In the end, in the NAC of December 1950, a compromise was reached between the French and American proposal.[28] Spofford, chair of the NATO Council of Deputies, who had been tasked with crafting a compromise, emphasised the complementary nature of NATO and a European army.[29] Hence, France was

allowed to continue with its proposal for a European army – to the surprise of Starkenborgh who wondered why this was possible as no one really liked their proposal.[30]

In sum, in 1948, when the customs union of the Benelux became operational, the Netherlands gained positive experience of multilateral cooperation in multilateral negotiations over the Brussels Treaty and Marshall aid. Being able to counter UK–French dominance in both settings, the Benelux pushed the margins for manoeuvre. However, this did not translate in cooperation in the NAC. The Benelux was split over the French proposal for German rearmament in a European army. Whereas Belgium and Luxembourg felt more attachment to France and were less inclined to reject the French proposal right away, the Netherlands took a very critical stance. In addition to a different evaluation of the appropriate strategy, communication among Dutch policymakers indicated that there was a general distrust of the Belgium Minister van Zeeland. Not successful in finding new allies, the Netherlands aimed to steer away from the French proposal by coming up with a proposal of their own – to no avail. Nevertheless, the Dutch continued their battle as lonesome rider.

First round of negotiations (February–August 1951): making the most of Dutch unilateralism/isolationism

When the French organised the start of the negotiations for a European army in Paris, in February 1951, the Netherlands declined the invitation to participate in the negotiations and opted for an observer status, together with the UK, the US, Canada and Norway. It speculated on the failure of the French proposal. As Stuyt outlined in a memo to Stikker, the Netherlands did not belong in a 'purely continental group', which insufficiently took into account the interests of a 'maritime trading power'.[31] The Dutch observer status stood out as it was the only country negotiating over the European Coal and Steel Community not participating in the EDC conference. So, the countries participating in the EDC conference were: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg.

This choice for an observer status in the EDC negotiations was discussed extensively among Dutch policymakers. The primary concern was how the observer status would affect the Dutch relative influence in NATO. While some claimed that the Netherlands had more room for manoeuvre in NATO than in the EDC, others claimed the exact opposite. According to Starkenborgh, the Netherlands would have more room for manoeuvre in a NATO context, a forum in which the Netherlands could count on more support for its views.[32] However, Patijn (Director of International Organizations) and Kohnstamm (head of Bureau Germany) objected to the idea that smaller powers such as the Netherlands would have more influence in the NAC than in the EDC negotiations. Those preferring a more active participation in the EDC negotiations were rather sceptical of the influence of the Netherlands on the US altogether, whether in cooperation with the Benelux or not. However, they thought that the Netherlands, as part of the Benelux, would be able to influence the French.[33] Against arguments of the Dutch status as

a maritime trading power, Kohnstamm warned against a unilateral transatlantic stance:

> the Netherlands always looks for a position in between the Great Powers. [. . .] In the new constellation, the Netherlands won't be able to play this role on their own anymore. [. . .] As member of the continental group, as part of the Atlantic community, the Netherlands has the biggest chance to keep something of its 19th century position.[34]

So, the expectations of whether the room for manoeuvre was biggest in the NAC or EDC depended upon whether the US or France was perceived as the primary target of influencing strategies.

It was commonly acknowledged that it was the Dutch stance that prevented a common Benelux position. This partly reflected a different relation with France but also a Dutch self-perception as a rather autonomous middle power that feared being locked into a continental security architecture. While the Dutch felt that the Belgians regretted the Dutch observer status, there was still considerable distrust of the motivations of this regret; the Dutch expected that the Belgians would let them 'do the dirty work' of criticising the French plans if they would participate.[35] Moreover, Luxembourg was seen as actually supporting the French.[36] So, the Benelux had turned into a collective of disagreement and distrust.

In July 1951 the Interim Report on the EDC was already outlining the proposed institutional set up, financial and military arrangements, and transition provisions.[37] With the Interim Report, the EDC negotiations got to the next phase and could no longer be seen as another floating idea of the French. Moreover, by the summer of 1951 Monnet had convinced NATO Commander Eisenhower of the need for a European Army.[38] So, the costs of standing by increased. This resulted in a shift of the Dutch position, which is reflected in an interdepartmental note that was written based on discussions at the ambassadors' conference in August 1951 to reflect the pros and cons of the EDC. First, the note was more critical of the US, acknowledging that a common European effort could have a 'moderating' influence on the 'impulsive and imprudent' politics of the US. Second, although the French plan was still not seen as attractive to the Netherlands, the consequences of not participating were perceived as worse – in particular, the erosion of the Benelux. Although the note reflected a continued distrust of van Zeeland for his 'delusion of mystery and oratorical fireworks', it also pointed at the success of Benelux demarches over unilateral actions.[39]

The intergovernmental note left Schokker, who would become the head of the NATO and EDC Bureau at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1952 onwards, to conclude that, given Eisenhower's support for a European army, the Netherlands had no choice but to join the EDC.[40] Indeed, part of the shift in attitude may have resulted from the fact that the US had tightened the margins, calling on the Netherlands to 'seriously consider to participate'.[41] Acting within these constraints, Schokker advised to make Dutch participation conditional upon the Dutch proposal of November 1950 being discussed at the same level as the French

Plan. With their own plan at the table, the Netherlands could highlight that the French plan entailed much more than was necessary from a practical military point of view (e.g., a common budget) and cast doubt on the French proposal with the UK and the US.[42] To make sure that the Dutch proposal was not kept off the agenda, as it was in the NAC, the Dutch decided to go for publicity.[43] However, history repeated itself – there was no interest from the delegations in Paris for the Dutch proposal, nor from the US or the UK.[44]

In the meantime, Belgium kept a positive attitude towards the plans for a European army, referring to the fact that 'Germany has been prepared for the first time in history to voluntarily renounce its army as an instrument in international politics' and acknowledging that any remilitarisation of Germany would increase tensions with the Soviet Union.[45]

In sum, the Dutch strategy for an optimal room of manoeuvre during the first round of negotiations was to be an observer. This way it preferred unilateral action over multilateral action with the Benelux. It reflected the persistence of a self-conception among Dutch policymakers and politicians of the Netherlands as a middle power. By the time the Interim Report was adopted, it became apparent that this position was no longer tenable. However, the attempt to use the decision to participate as a leverage to get the Dutch proposal accepted on the agenda was not successful either. It underlined how the Dutch were limiting their margins for manoeuvre by still overestimating their small power influence.

Second round of negotiations (September 1951–May 1952): a coordinated effort of the Benelux

September–December 1951

Still negotiating over the terms of full participation and emphasising that it felt pressured to join the EDC, the Netherlands turned towards the Benelux. From September 1951 onwards, there was an increasing effort among the Benelux ministers to come to a common position.[46] Moreover, in its communication with France, the Netherlands already presented itself as part of the Benelux-bloc (rather than as an individual state) and referred to the negotiations for the European Coal and Steel Community to emphasise that the Benelux as a collective actor should be taken seriously.[47]

Nevertheless, there were still doubts on betting everything on the Benelux. So, at the explicit request of Dutch Prime Minister Drees, the Scandinavian partners Norway and Denmark were once more approached to form a coalition with countries outside the EDC negotiations. However, since these countries were not pressured by the US to join and decided to stay aside from the EDC negotiations, the only option for a multilateral effort left was the Benelux.[48]

On 8 October 1951, the Netherlands officially changed its position from observer to full participant. In December Stikker would reflect on this decision arguing that there had been three main reasons for becoming a full member: 1) the need for the inclusion of West Germany, 2) the danger for the Benelux if the Netherlands

would continue to stay apart, 3) the NAC resolution of Ottawa of September 1951 on the Atlantic Community, which established a Ministerial Committee to make recommendations on the development of non-military cooperation.[49]

In the instructions for the Dutch delegation in the negotiations, close Benelux cooperation was called for to maximise the room for manoeuvre (i.e., independent policy) of the Benelux: 'Regarding armament production, close consultation with the Belgium and Luxembourg delegations is called for to aim at a solution which allows for an independent policy of the Benelux countries as much as possible'.[50]

However, doubts were raised based on contacts with Belgian civil servants, on the commitment of the Belgian government to stick to the shared objections against the common budget and the common rearmament program.[51] After the first week of active participation of the Netherlands, a meeting with Belgium was organised to discuss possible common positions and share intelligence about the positions of the bigger powers. This meeting consisted of high-level civil servants from both countries. At the subsequent Benelux Ministers' conference on October 25, van Zeeland emphasised that the Benelux should not intervene in the negotiations as the Benelux bloc: 'At Paris, we should not intervene as a common Benelux bloc; let us be allies without calling it an alliance'.[52]

To the surprise of the Dutch, Belgium turned into the 'bad cop' in the EDC negotiations, arguing that there were overwhelming constitutional objections to a European army. The Dutch supported Belgium with 'appropriate moderation'.[53] Van Vredenburch warned against the tactical risks of supporting Belgium too much, as the hard bargaining of Belgium also meant a loss of credibility. The others would take note of the Belgian reservations, without having to discuss their views and look for a compromise. The head of the Dutch delegation to the EDC, van Vredenburch, favoured a more constructive avenue of submitting counterproposals to exploit the benefits of membership.[54]

The French chair of the conference, Alphand, blamed the increased Benelux coordination for the change of heart by Belgium. Although the leader of the Belgian delegation, Guillaume, argued that it was due to the domestic politics of Belgium that it was less enthusiastic of the plan for a European army, it was acknowledged that the negotiations in this second round could be characterised by a continuous opposition between the Big 3 and the Small 3.[55]

While participating in the EDC negotiations, the Netherlands did not stop voicing its concerns over the whole endeavour to the UK and the US. In conversations at both the ministerial and administrative level the Netherlands highlighted the fear of being dragged into the 'bad social and inflationary politics' of France and the importance of aligning the timespan of the treaty obligations of both NATO and the EDC.[56] While emphasising the need to strengthen the Atlantic Community and to integrate the EDC into this Atlantic Community as a way to restore the balance of power, Stikker became increasingly disillusioned with the prospect of the US and the UK taking their responsibility.[57] In contrast, the US put pressure on both France and the Benelux to agree upon a European army. It made clear that, without agreement, it 'would have to take another look' at its commitment to European security and rearmament.[58] At this point the asymmetrical relations

came to the fore explicitly and the Dutch were very much aware of who was actually setting the margins.

Acting together as Benelux, the Netherlands aimed at securing three issues to maximise the margins of manoeuvre in a future common European army: a strong relationship with NATO, a College of Commissioners rather than a single-headed Defence Minister and no common budget.

A single-headed Defence Minister would seriously threaten the position of the smaller countries. To convince France to go along with a College of Commissioners, the Netherlands referred to the Schuman Plan in which the High Authority consisted of a College of Commissioners as well. Moreover, in its opposition to a singled-headed commissioner, it did not shy away from using a Second World War frame, referring to the Dutch experience during the war with the *Reichskommissariat*.[59] The French were willing to accept a College of Commissioners. This probably also resulted from the fact that in this case the preferences of the Benelux aligned with those of Germany. Concerning the common budget and the relationship between the EDC and NATO, the negotiations were tougher.[60]

Regarding the common budget, the Dutch instructions were that sovereignty to decide on the amount spent on defence, wages and social politics should not be affected by the EDC.[61] To this end, the Dutch came up with a proposal of their own, emphasising the power of national parliaments and insisting, on behalf of the Benelux, on unanimity in the Council of Ministers.[62] A compromise was reached in which the Assembly of the EDC, which would be the same as for the ECSC, was given the right to advise concerning the content but not the amount of the budget.[63] So, whereas previous attempts of the Dutch to set the agenda by introducing proposals failed, acting together with the Benelux this strategy was more successful. In addition, the Netherlands wanted to limit the competences of the College of Commissioners regarding the common budget and the national contributions in particular. However, the French wanted to give the College 'the right to spend' immediately after the EDC Treaty would enter into force. Since the French were supported by Germany and the US on this, van Vredenburch advised to give in to the French on this point.[64] However, the more fundamental question underlying all this was the question of a political European federation. Alphand felt supported by Italy and Germany to put pressure on the Benelux, but the latter expressed doubts about joining a federation of six.[65]

Concerning the relationship between the EDC and NATO, Benelux cooperation was most visible outside the context of the EDC negotiations at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome during November 1951. The Dutch Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, Boon, characterised the Benelux cooperation in Rome as 'warm and familiar'.[66] The foreign ministers, Stikker and van Zeeland, formalised their cooperation with their first joint diplomatic positions. Moreover, they introduced a counter resolution to that of the US, which urged to finish the EDC negotiations quickly. Although the Benelux resolution, inviting the UK and Scandinavian countries to join the European army, was rejected right away, it did result in a moderation of the US resolution and allowed the Benelux to explicitly denounce any responsibility for a delay in the rearmament of Germany.[67] So, not

only in the EDC negotiations but also in NATO the Benelux-cooperation paid off. Taking the initiative to draft a counter resolution, they were able to achieve some modification of the original US resolution, which is a successful attempt to stretch the margins for manoeuvre.

January–May 1952: signing the treaty

Looking back at the Ministers' Conference in Paris of December 1951, Stikker was positive about the results achieved in Paris so far – the Benelux cooperation had paid off. The Big 3 had conceded on two principal issues: a College of Commissioners and a common budget that would be subject to the unanimous approval of the Council of Ministers and national parliaments, at least in the transitory period. According to Stikker this was the maximum that could be achieved and, hence, he instructed his delegation to look for compromises on other issues.[68]

In January, both Belgium and France got a new government. With the new short-lived Faure government the relations became tense. On the one hand, according to the Dutch, fear and distrust of the Germans led the French to develop a federalist EDC, thereby antagonising the Benelux. On the other hand, the French felt that the Benelux had loosened the federal structures of the EDC to such a degree that little was left of the intention to keep Germany in check.[69] Informal contacts between France and Benelux had to bring the positions together on the common budget.[70] In response to a 'personal proposal' of Alphand, van Vredenburch was quick to present a 'personal suggestion' as well. This way both ideas were distributed as unofficial documents.[71] Differences between Belgium and the Netherlands on the competences of the College of Commissioners were duly acknowledged but did not seem to hamper cooperation. The Netherlands looked for its Benelux partners to join forces against the French initiatives. For example, at the more unconventional occasion of a high-level funeral, the Dutch Foreign Minister asked his Benelux colleagues van Zeeland and Bech to take the opportunity to draw attention to the concerns of the Benelux regarding some recent changes the French had proposed.[72] Moreover, the Netherlands asked its Benelux partners to deliver a similar demarche at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to stress that if the unanimity rule in the Council of Ministers would be loosened concerning the common budget, it would seriously reconsider its participation in the EDC.[73]

Regarding the relationship between the EDC and NATO, a key issue was where to discuss the matter first. The first forum where the matter would be discussed was expected to bear a strong imprint on the way in which the relationship between the two multilateral organisations would be settled. To the French, the EDC was permanent whereas NATO functioned as a temporary common defence alliance against Soviet aggression. Hence, they wanted to discuss the matter first at the EDC negotiations in Paris and only afterwards at the NAC meeting in Lisbon in February 1952. For the Benelux this was a no go, as there would be more countries in NATO to balance the Big 3 of the EDC.[74] It aimed to use the multilateral framework of NATO as leverage over the EDC negotiations. The final communiqué of the NATO meeting in Lisbon referred to the EDC as working within

the framework of and reinforcing NATO.[75] As the New York Herald Tribune put it: 'the cart, which has been ahead of the horse since the panicky summer of 1950, was at Lisbon put back of the horse, where it belongs'.[76] As such, it reflected the preferences of the Benelux.

The continuous opposition of the Benelux against the Big 3 was a matter of concern to the US. The Netherlands kept emphasising in its communications with the US that the EDC entailed a serious risk of weakening NATO and that the US and the UK would need to take steps to strengthen the Atlantic community and establish a satisfactory relationship between the EDC and NATO to break this deadlock.[77] Increasingly Stikker showed a clear disappointment with the pressure of the UK and the US on the Benelux and their lack of understanding of the sacrifice that was asked of the Benelux: transferring sovereignty to an unequal and unstable EDC, lacking sufficient balance of power. The Dutch emphasised that they had gone to great lengths by accepting the majority principle at the College of Commissioners and, under certain conditions, a common budget and a common armaments programme. Hence, Stikker conceived of the pressure of the UK and the US as 'unfair', passing on their responsibility.[78]

So, not only in the relation with the French did the Benelux needed to cooperate, they needed to do so with reference to the US as well. The ambassadors exchanged on their meetings with Acheson, realising that to strengthen their position they had to use similar arguments.[79] Also more publicly, at the parliament Stikker highlighted the importance of the Benelux for the Netherlands in the EDC negotiations: when the Benelux adopted a common position there was more willingness on the side of the Big 3 to come to an acceptable solution to safeguard the interest of smaller countries.[80]

In sum, in the context of both NATO and the EDC negotiations, in relation to both the US and France, the Netherlands had come to recognise the Benelux cooperation as a positive experience. When the Netherlands introduced proposals on behalf of the Benelux, these were, at least, discussed and taken seriously. On 26 May, the Dutch Council of Ministers agreed upon signing the EDC Treaty, which took place in Paris the next day.[81]

During the ratification phase, some tensions among the Benelux emerged. The Netherlands wanted to ratify as soon as possible, while Belgium wanted to wait for France to ratify first. Old distrust reappeared as the Belgian Ambassador to the Netherlands observed that, in the framework of NATO, Stikker was back to his preferred coalition with Canada and Norway.[82] By spring 1954, the Benelux and Germany had ratified the treaty. However, in France strong opposition against a European army by the Gaullists, communists and more mainstream parties reduced the prospects of ratification. At the Brussels conference on 19 August 1954, President Mendès-France presented a protocol to his five colleagues, which removed the supranational character of the EDC.[83] As the other countries had already ratified the Treaty, they were not willing to accommodate the fundamental change as proposed by France. Scheduled to be discussed in the *Assemblée Nationale* on 30 August, a procedural motion on the treaty was adopted which rejected the treaty without substantive debate. Subsequently, German rearmament was arranged via

NATO. European integration continued in the field of economics – military and defence integration remained a taboo for the decades to come.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the ups and downs of the Dutch strategy over the course of the negotiations on a European Defence Community in three multilateral networks: NATO, EDC and the Benelux. It has analysed multilateralism as a strategy in different multilateral settings. This chapter has shown how defence integration was a hard case for smaller power influence. The shared threat-perception in the Western bloc of a Soviet intervention provided the critical impetus for proposals for a European army. The smaller powers of the Benelux were assumed to be part of this, which for the Netherlands was hard to swallow.

After realising that its preferred coalition with Nordic countries would not come to bear, the Netherlands initially preferred unilateral action over a coalition with Belgium and Luxembourg. This was partly the result of different positions and distrust, primarily of the Belgian Foreign Minister van Zeeland. The Dutch unilateral efforts to set the agenda were not successful. So, when the margins for manoeuvre tightened and the US expressed bluntly that it expected the Netherlands to join, the Netherlands had to adapt its strategy to maximise its influence. Once the Netherlands accepted the constraints imposed by the US and joined the EDC negotiations, it started to identify itself as part of the Benelux. As was noticed by the other members of the EDC negotiations, France, Italy and Germany, this changed the dynamics of the negotiations. Whereas the first phase of the negotiations had been characterised primarily by clashes between France and Germany, a new front emerged: the Big 3 (France, Germany, Italy) versus the Small 3 (Benelux). By acting together, the three smaller powers could no longer be ignored. With joint proposals, coordinated demarches and preparatory meetings the Benelux punched beyond their separate weights.

While the Benelux was not able to fundamentally change the common budget and common armament programme and make the EDC subordinate to NATO, it was able to guarantee for itself a seat at the table of the Board of Commissioners. This way it ensured that, would the Treaty have entered into force, the Benelux would still have been left some room for manoeuvre. They were not able to set or change the margins set by the superpowers, but they were able to maximise their room for manoeuvre.

Tracing the Dutch strategy for influence over a period of two years, this chapter has been able to compare the relative success of unilateral versus multilateral efforts. As such, it contributes to the small power literature, highlighting the strategy of multilateralism in multilateral settings. As this chapter has demonstrated, this strategy is not straightforward. Despite positive experiences with Benelux cooperation during the negotiations of the Brussels Treaty, the Netherlands did initially turn to unilateral strategies and other alliance-partners before it came to identify itself again as part of the Benelux. So, to maximise the margins of manoeuvre is a process of trial and error.

Moreover, the chapter nuances the Cold War literature that still tends to focus on the power politics *between* the two blocs.[84] The EDC negotiations draw the attention to the intra-alliance dynamics. Shared threat perceptions did not necessarily translate into similar blueprints of how to secure and protect Western Europe. The existence of different multilateral settings within the Western alliance provided a window of opportunity for the smaller powers to use one multilateral setting to constrain another. Their efforts, although not entirely successful, to encapsulate the EDC in NATO, are a clear case of venue-shopping.

Notes

1 Bert Zeeman and Cees Wiebes, *Belgium, the Netherlands and Alliances 1940–49* (Leiden 1993).
2 Anjo Harryvan and Jan Van der Harst, 'From Antagonist to Adherent: The Netherlands and the EDC', in: Michel Dumoulin (ed.), *The European Defence Community, Lessons for the Future?* (Brussels 2000).
3 Zivile Vaicekauskaité, 'Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World', *Journal of Baltic Studies* 3:2 (2017) 7–15.
4 John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford 1997) 283–284.
5 Mary Ann Heiss and Victor Papacosma, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Intrabloc Conflicts* (Kent State 2008).
6 On the Benelux see: Zeeman and Wiebes, *Belgium, the Netherlands and Alliances 1940–49*; Duco Hellema, Rik Coolsaet and Bart Stol (eds), *Nederland-België* (Amsterdam 2011); Albert Kersten, *Maken Drie Kleinen een Grote?* (Amsterdam 1982). On the EDC see: Jan van der Harst, *The Atlantic Priority. Defence Policy of the Netherlands at the Time of the EDC* (Florence 2003). See also, Harryvan and van der Harst, 'From Antagonist to Adherent: The Netherlands and the EDC'; Jan van der Harst, 'The European Defence Community and NATO: A Classic Case of Franco-Dutch Controversy', in: Margriet Drent, A. Van den Assem and Jaap de Wilde (eds), *NATO's Retirement? Essays in Honour of Peter Volten* (Groningen 2011) 83–94.
7 On conceptual discussion of 'small power', see: Christos Kassimeris, 'The Foreign Policy of Small Powers', *International Politics* 46:1 (2009) 84–101.
8 For a comprehensive detailed account of the EDC-negotiations, see: Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (London 1980); On the US, see: Ronald Pruessen, 'Cold War Threats and America's Commitment to the EDC: One Corner of a Triangle', *Journal of European Integration History* (1996). On the UK, see: Spencer Mawby, 'From Distrust to Despair: Britain and European Army, 1950–1954', *European History Quarterly* 28:4 (1998) 487–513; Kevin Ruane, *The Rise and Fall of the EDC. Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950–1955* (London 2000). On France, see Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, *France Defeats EDC* (New York 1957); Pierre Guillen, 'The Role of the SU as a Factor in French Debates on the EDC', *Journal of European Integration History* (1996) 71–84; Renata Dwan, 'Jean Monnet and the EDC', *Cold War History* 1:1 (2000) 141–160.
9 Michael Creswell, 'Between Bear and the Phoenix: US and EDC (1950–1954)', *Security Studies*, 11:4 (2002) 89–124; Jasmine Aimaq, 'Rethinking the EDC: Failed Attempt at Integration or Strategic Leverage?' in: Michel Dumoulin (ed.), *The European Defence Community, Lessons for the Future?* (Brussels 2000); Renata Dwan, 'EDC and the Role of French-American Elite Relations ('50-'54)', in: Dumoulin (ed.), *The European Defence Community*.
10 Creswell, 'Between Bear and the Phoenix', 123.
11 The Benelux also successfully countered British-French dominance during the Marshall-aid negotiations by acting together, cf. Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, 'Benelux', in: David Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe* (New Haven 1994) 178.

12 Nationaal Archief Den Haag (NL-HaNA), 2.05.43, inv. nr. 1248, Besprekingen Over Bevin Plan, 7 March 1948; West Europees Pact (2ᵉ overzicht), 13 March 1948. NL-HaNA, 2.05.43, inv. nr. 1252, Communique Beneluxconference, 29–31 January 1948; inleidende besprekingen Benelux, 29 February 1948. See also FRUS 1948, Volume III, Document 19, telegram Caffery to the Secretary of State, 19 February 1948.

13 Zeeman and Wiebes, *Belgium, the Netherlands and Alliances 1940–49*, chapter 3; see also van der Harst, 'Nabuurstaten of uniepartners?' in: E.S.A. Bloemen (ed.), *Het Benelux-Effect* (Amsterdam 1992), 129–141.

14 NL-HaNA, 2.05.43, inv. nr. 1248, Besprekingen over Bevin Plan, 7 March 1948.

15 Wiebes and Zeeman, 'Benelux', 182–186.

16 Council Document C 5 – D/11 (Final), 'Resolution on the Defense of Western Europe', 26 September 1950; FRUS 1950, Volume III, Document 238 – Paper Prepared by the North Atlantic Defence Committee, 26 October 1950. See also: NL-HaNA, 2.05.331_1, telegram Fockema 5, 20 October 1950.

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18 Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, 79.

19 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 1, telegram Van Roijen 293, 31 October 1950.

20 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 1, telegram Jacob 20, 31 October 1950; telegram Van Roijen 293, 31 October 1950.

21 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 1, Ontstaan en doel van het te Londen ingediende Working Paper. See also: telegram Celer, 22 November 1950; telegram Stikker, 19 November 1950; telegram Stikker, 24 February 1951. [Celer refers to: on behalf of Minister of Foreign Affairs in his absence].

22 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 1, Verslag bespreking Minister Stikker met Minister Van Zeeland, te Parijs op 1 December 1950; telegram Starkenborgh, 16 November 1950.

23 FRUS 1950, Volume III, Document 254, telegram Secretary of State to Spofford, 10 November 1950; FRUS 1950, Volume III, Document 274, telegram Spofford to the Secretary of State, 21 November 1950. The Netherlands proposal was circulated as D – D/191, 'Establishment of a NATO High Commissioner for Germany', dated 22 November, not printed (740.5/12–550).

24 FRUS 1950, Volume III, Document 276, telegram Spofford to Secretary of State, 25 November 1950.

25 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 1, telegram Booy, 8 December 1950; see also Booy 74, February 1951.

26 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 1, telegram Booy, 6 December 1950.

27 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 1, telegram Van Roijen 394, 6 December 1950. See also: telegram Stikker 449, 4 December 1950; telegram Van Roijen 329, 11 November 1950.

28 North Atlantic Council, Doc. C6-D/1 (also DC 29/1). Joint Report on German contribution to defense of Western Europe by NAC deputies and military committee to NAC and Defense Committee (Spofford Report), Brussels, 13 December 1950.

29 Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, 97.

30 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 1, Starkenborgh 38, 28 November 1950.

31 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 2, note Stuyt at Stikker regarding the meaning of French proposals for a European Army for the Netherlands, 18 February 1951.

32 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 2, Starkenborgh 128, January/February 1951.

33 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 3, memo Patijn at Stuyt, 12 March 1951.

34 Author's own translation. NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 3, Nota Kohnstamm. Bijdrage tot discussie over het Pleven Plan, March 1951. For response see: inv. nr. 6, memo DEU/WS, 15 June 1951.

35 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 2, note Stuyt at Stikker regarding the meaning of French proposals for a European Army for the Netherlands, 18 February 1951. This argument also features in an earlier memo, early December.

36 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 3, telegram Boetzelaer 231, March 1951.

37 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 9, Interim Report, 27 July 1951.

38 Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, 118/119.

39 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 7, interdepartementele nota betreffende een Europees leger, 16 August 1951. On the ambassadors conference, see inv. nr. 8, memo Boon aan Stikker, 20 September 1951; inv. nr. 7, samenvatting ambassadeursconferentie, 8–9 August 1951. On Benelux cooperation, see NL-HaNA, 2.05.117, inv. nr. 16877, memo DEU/BE aan Chef DEU, 31 August 1951.

40 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 7, Schokker to Stuyt, 21 August 1951.

41 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 7, memo De Beus 376, 15 August 1951.

42 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 7, memo Schokker aan Stuyt, 21 August 1951.

43 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 8, eventuele publicatie van het Nederlands voorstel inzake het Europese leger, c 1951.

44 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 8, memo embassy Paris to Boon, 9/5; communique tripartite discussion between Foreign Ministers of France, UK and US, 10–14 September 1951.

45 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 7, memo zaakgelastigde Brussel, 22 August 1951.

46 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 8, memo Staf aan Boon, 7 September 1951. See also: memo Harinxma 43, 24 September 1951.

47 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 8, memo Boon aan Stikker, 20 September 1951.

48 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 9, Concept nota aan de Ministerraad omtrent de recente ontwikkelingen inzake het Europese leger, October 1951. See also: Ministerraad 10/1951, memo ambassador Oslo, 27 October 1951.

49 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 11, Memo Stikker aan Secretaris Generaal, 21 December 1951. See also, FRUS 1951, Volume III, Document 379, US Delegation at 7th Session of NAC to the Acting Secretary of State.

50 Author's own translation. NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 9, Conceptrichtlijnen voor de Nederlandse delegatie bij de conferentie inzake het Europese leger, October 1951.

51 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 9, Concept nota aan de Ministerraad omtrent de recente ontwikkelingen inzake het Europese leger, October 1951.

52 Original quote: "A Paris même, n'intervenons pas comme bloc Benelux; soyons allies sans mettre a cette alliance une etiquette." Document 122, Verslag conferentie Beneluxministers, 25 October 1951, in Luc De Vos, *Belgische diplomatieke stukken 1941–1960. Deel II – Defensie* (Brussel: Koninklijke Academie van België, 1998).

53 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 9, telegram Boetzelaer 291.

54 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 10, telegram Boetzelaer 318; see also Celer 173, November 1951.

55 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 9, telegram Boetzelaer 293; see also inv. nr. 10, telegram Harinxma 60, 2 November 1951. Domestic politics refers to the opposition based on constitutional concerns mobilised by August-Edmund de Schryver (emeritus minister of the Belgian Christian democrats) and Frans van Cauwelaert (president of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives). On the distrust of France, see also: Document 99, memo Graeffe aan Van Zeeland, 6 November 1951, in De Vos, *Belgische diplomatieke stukken 1941–1960*.

56 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 10, telegram Boetzelaer 340, 15 November 1951; inv. nr. 11, telegram Boetzelaer 395, December 1951.

57 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 11, Memo Stikker at SG, 21 December 1951.

58 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 11, telegram Van Roijen 659.

59 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 10, telegram Boetzelaer 349, 16 November 1951; see also inv. nr. 11, Report Dutch Delegation, 24 November 1951 regarding the EDC-Conference.

60 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 10, telegram Booy 197, 24 November 1951.

61 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 10, Instructie voor Nederlandse Delegatie Conferentie EDG met betrekking tot de hoofdpunten op financieel en economisch Gebied, 16 November 1951.

62 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 10, Aide-memoire délégation Néerlandaise concernant le budget commun de la CED; telegram Boetzelaer 356, 21 November 1951.

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64 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 11, memo of DEU/WS aan de Minister, 6 December 1951.
65 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 11, telegram Boetzelaer 288, 4 December 1951.
66 NL-HaNA, 2.05.117, inv. nr. 16877, memo Boon aan DEU/BE, betreffende politieke Benelux-samenwerking, 3 December 1951.
67 FRUS 1951, Volume III, Document 406 & 407, US Delegation at 8th Session of NAC to Secretary of State; FRUS 1951, Volume III, Document 414, Briefing Knight on 8th Session NAC in Rome; see also, Feije Spits, *Naar een Europees Leger* (Den Haag: Nederlandse Raaad der Europese Beweging) 135–136; Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*.
68 NL-HaNA, 2015331, inv. nr. 12, memo Stikker 253, 7 January 1952.
69 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, notitie achtergrond Franse bezwaren tegen EDG, 14 February 1952.
70 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, memo Boetzelaer 455, 9 January 1952.
71 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, memo Boezelaer 458, 10 January 1952.
72 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, memo Celer 134, 14 February 1952.
73 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, memo Celer 305, 15 February 1952; Boetzelaer 535, 16 February 1952.
74 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, memo Stikker 7 January 1952.
75 North Atlantic Council Lisbon, Final Communiqué, 20–25 February 1952.
76 Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, 142.
77 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, memo Van Roijen 714, 5 January 1952; see also, telegram Van Roijen 728, 11 January 1952.
78 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, memo Stikker 470, 7 January 1952; on sacrifice see also Van Roijen 732, January 1952.
79 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, memo Van Roijen 731, 11 January 1952.
80 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, Regeringsverklaring, 7 February 1952.
81 NL-HaNA, 2.05.331, inv. nr. 12, Uittreksel notulen Ministerraad, 26 May 1952.
82 Document 135, Memo Graeffe aan Van Zeeland, betreffende Nederland en de EDG, 19 November 1952, in De Vos, *Belgische diplomatieke stukken 1941–1960*.
83 Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, 283.
84 As John Lewis Gaddis also argues in 'On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War', in: Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretation, Theory* (London 2000) 27–42.

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3   Small states, alliances and the margins for manoeuvre in the Cold War

Sweden, Norway and the CSCE

Aryo Makko

Sweden and Norway are two neighbouring and similar small states, but during the Cold War they found themselves in very different positions. Sweden was non-aligned with the intention of remaining neutral in the case of another war. Norway was a member of NATO. This chapter compares the similarities and differences in how Sweden and Norway reacted to the idea of a European security conference and explores the far-ranging opportunities that the actual Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) offered to small states.

The CSCE took place in Geneva and Helsinki between 1972 and 1975 and dealt with a variety of issues in three general areas (or 'baskets' as they came to be called): i) confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament; ii) cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology and the environment and iii) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. The participants also agreed upon ten principles guiding the relations between the participating states, eventually called 'the decalogue'. It was unique in that it brought together all European states (except Albania), the United States and Canada in a several-year multilateral conference setting where daily negotiations, limited attention from the broader public and the absence of official minutes of meetings created a particular environment that allowed smaller states to play significant roles. The participating states did not only operate along the lines of the bloc structure but also grouped together on the basis of other memberships or simply geography. Thus, there was not only NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the group of neutral and non-aligned states (the 'N+N') at the CSCE but at various points in time also the EC Nine (the members of the European Communities) and less significant groups such as the Berlin Group, the Mediterranean Group and the Nordic Caucus. Historians have developed a growing interest in the conference in recent years and produced a flow of publications that demonstrate the significance of the CSCE and its Final Act to the international development in the 1970s and 1980s and the end of the Cold War.[1] The scholarship on the CSCE points to human rights and soft power exerted by other states than the superpowers as well as by dissidents and activists as vital, challenging realist explanations of the end of the Cold War as a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union.[2]

The focus of this chapter is on Swedish and Norwegian perceptions of the idea of a conference and their positions on the most important issues treated at the CSCE. The aim is to analyse i) the perceptions and strategies of two very similar states that

acted from different positions in the same multilateral setting and ii) the opportunities that neutral Sweden and Norway as NATO member states were given. The overarching question addressed here is: were the margins of manoeuvre greater for small states participating in the CSCE – within or outside of the Western bloc? In this context, the margins of manoeuvre are defined as the extent to which Sweden and Norway were able to exert influence on the multilateral negotiations through their initiatives and actions by tabling proposals, participating in negotiations or offering mediation. The chapter will demonstrate that while the Norwegians viewed multilateralism as a means to stretch their margins, primarily through NATO, Sweden only reluctantly ended up in a similar position as a member of the N+N.

The chapter is based on official publications, reports from involved diplomats and secondary literature and with regard to Sweden as well as on archival documents of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The approach taken here is innovative in at least two ways. First, there has been very little research on Norway's role in the CSCE. Second, and more importantly, small states in the CSCE have usually been studied as part of one of the two alliances or as part of a group of states outside of the blocs, like the N+N. The definition of Sweden and Norway as small states used here is based on the self-perceptions and the historiographies prevalent in the two Nordic countries.[3] These national self-images are deeply rooted in a realist emphasis on military power and often ignore more recent definitions of power which take both economic aspects and soft power into account and tend to classify Sweden and Norway as middle powers.[4]

The fact that two historically, culturally, economically and socially similar countries such as Sweden and Norway ended up on different sides of the neutral-aligned divide makes them particularly interesting for comparison because an analysis of their strategies and policies generates new knowledge and allows for a contribution to the discussion on the opportunities of smaller states *within* and *outside* of the Cold War alliances. Marc Bloch, often described as the father of comparative history, described this method as 'a technical instrument, generally used, easily manageable, and capable of giving positive results' and argued that its perfection was one of the most pressing needs of historical science.[5] The American sociologist Charles Tilly later suggested that historical comparison is most useful for huge macro-level comparisons of states, social movements or classes.[6] More recently, younger scholars like Deborah Cohen have pointed out that while comparison most often does not illuminate unknown developments, it can lead historians to question overdetermined national narratives, engage with different historiographies and spark genuinely new interpretations – which is exactly what this chapter attempts to do by subjecting well researched archival sources on Sweden and the account of an important eyewitness as well as the existing literature on Norway to a comparative analysis for the first time.[7]

From union to sister state: a comparative approach to Sweden and Norway in modern history

Sweden and Norway are tied together by geography and share a common cultural and linguistic heritage. They even formed a dual monarchy with a common policy

of neutrality between 1814 and 1905. After Norway broke away and declared its independence, both countries maintained neutrality throughout the First World War. Sweden and Norway were also both among the founding members of the League of Nations.[8] Another important similarity is the longevity of social democratic governance after 1945. The foreign ministers Östen Undén of the Swedish Social Democratic Worker's Party (1945–1962) and Halvard Lange of the Norwegian Labour Party Arbeiderpartiet (1946–1965) maintained their offices for seventeen and nineteen years respectively.

It was Nazi Germany's occupation of Norway between 1940 and 1945 that created lasting disparity between the governments in Stockholm and Oslo.[9] In the spring of 1948, as a reaction to the looming division between Eastern and Western Europe, Undén initiated talks about a neutral Scandinavian Defence Union with Norway and Denmark. The discussions quickly revealed that the Norwegians rejected the Swedish claim of *neutrality* as Scandinavia's surest way to peace, arguing instead that *solidarity* with the liberal democracies in the West had to be the premier principle. The negotiations collapsed in early 1949 as a result of these differences. Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty and Sweden restated its national neutrality under a doctrine which the government on 13 October 1956 described as 'non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war'.[10]

Sweden responded to decolonisation and the emergence of the Global South in the 1950s and 1960s by adopting the role of an active critic of and mediator between the two superpowers and their alliances. Like other European small states, the Swedes viewed providing good offices as a means to exert influence on international politics.[11] Sweden's internationalist activism was more outspoken in the global arena than in European affairs where the country kept a lower profile in order to maintain as good a relationship as possible with the Soviet Union.[12] Norway on the other hand viewed its membership in NATO not only as a means of protection but also as an opportunity to exert greater influence internationally and play a more positive role than it would have been able to do had it stayed outside of the alliance.[13]

Despite their different positions in the Cold War, Sweden and Norway engaged in regional cooperation in order to maintain the so-called Nordic balance between the NATO member states in the West, neutral Sweden in the middle and Finland with its special relationship with the Soviet Union in the East. This cooperation included recurring meetings between the Nordic foreign ministers – which were used to channel information and support each other – and continuous cooperation in international bodies including the United Nations.[14]

In the Cold War era, the world also saw the return and breakthrough of multilateralism in the shape of the UN. 'At its core', writes the American political scientist John Ruggie, 'multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles'.[15] Both the CSCE and NATO applied decision-making by consensus. This does not mean that states like Sweden or Norway single-handedly could – or sought to – block negotiations arbitrarily. But this did put them and other participating smaller states in a position to exert influence. In the CSCE, smaller states usually tried to present their ideas and strengthen their positions and initiatives through cooperation with others,

both larger and smaller powers and sometimes even across political camps.[16] The anatomy of the CSCE, comprising several levels of committees, led to a more even distribution of power between the participating states than in most other forums. The role of small states in the CSCE confirms existing research on multilateralism, which argues that small states usually seek to strengthen multilateral institutions. The reason for this is that these institutions limit the ability of larger powers to coerce smaller powers through rewarding conformity to common rules and principles, based on the equal rights of states and by putting a cost to their violation.[17]

Window dressing or détente? Responding to the idea of a European security conference

The rising antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented a peace conference and the final settlement of European border issues. Instead, the world witnessed the fall of the Iron Curtain. The Paris Peace Treaties of 10 February 1947 settled a number of border issues with Italy, some of the minor Eastern European Axis powers such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania as well as with Finland. The German Question was not addressed, and by the end of the decade, there were two German states.[18]

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov first presented the idea of an 'all-European' conference at a meeting with the foreign ministers of the other victorious powers in Berlin in February 1954 as an attempt to gain the initiative over the most pressing border and security issues in Central and Eastern Europe. The idea was that the Europeans would convene without the Americans who at best would be granted observatory status. In a diary entry dated 15 February, Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén described the original proposal as interesting.[19] Most of his counterparts around Europe and particularly in the NATO member states were much more sceptical. To them, proposing such a conference was little more than an attempt to push the Americans out of European affairs. Therefore, it was not taken seriously in the Western camp even though Eastern European leaders would keep bringing it up in the following years.[20] There is no published record of Halvard Lange's immediate reaction to the original proposal, but it is well known that the Norwegian foreign minister was an influential figure within NATO and a conservative on security matters. Lange was part of NATO's 'Committee of Three', also known as the 'Three Wise Men', which developed a concept for deepened cooperation within NATO beyond military issues in 1956.[21] Their report touched upon areas quite similar to those addressed later in the CSCE: political, economic and cultural cooperation; cooperation in the information field and organisations and functions.[22] Despite Undén's personal interest in some of Molotov's original ideas, neither Sweden nor Norway issued any official statement in response. In the mid-1950s, with the first intensive period of the Cold War still fresh in mind, it seems unlikely that either of the two Nordic countries believed that Moscow's proposed conference would offer them any additional margins of manoeuvre.

It took a decade before politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain started considering the idea more seriously. It had been mentioned several times in the years that had passed but was only considered more seriously after a speech delivered by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki to the UN General Assembly in December 1964. The rising interest in the conference resulted from the growing engagement between East and West during the détente years that followed the Berlin and Cuban crises.[23] In July 1966, the Warsaw Pact states issued the Bucharest Declaration in which they called for a relaxation of military tension in Europe through a 'general European conference' where the most pressing issues such as disarmament and the status of Germany would be settled.[24] In the following three years, the Western European members of NATO came to consider such a gathering as an opportunity to realise goals of their own.[25] During those years, the Warsaw Pact developed from a cardboard castle into a multilateral alliance, as Laurien Crump has put it. This multilateralization allowed the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members to exert greater influence on both Soviet bloc foreign policy and the nature of the alliance and ultimately removed important obstacles on the road to the Conference.[26] Much to the dismay of US President Nixon's security advisor Henry Kissinger, the Western Europeans had their way, and NATO opened up for a European conference on security and cooperation.[27] This development allowed smaller states to voice their opinions and exert certain influence by taking part in the diplomatic exchanges and negotiations about a possible conference. The overall situation was less rigid than it had been in 1954, and smaller states were given larger margins of manoeuvre.

The Norwegian and Swedish responses to the renewed initiatives of the 1960s were quite different. Together with Belgium, Canada, Denmark and Italy, the Norwegians belonged to a group of smaller NATO states that favoured further negotiations between the blocs following the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of August 1963.[28] After three years of rapprochement between the two blocs, notably interrupted by the invasion of five socialist countries in Czechoslovakia as a consequence of the Prague Spring in August 1968, a breakthrough finally occurred in the spring of 1969. First, the Warsaw Pact states issued the so-called Budapest Appeal on 17 March 1969, in which they laid out the same principal goals mentioned while refraining from criticism against West Germany and from demanding the dismantlement of the two military blocs as a precondition for such talks. At the NATO summit in Washington two weeks later, Halvard Lange's conservative successor John Lyng was one of few who expressed his willingness to participate in a conference as proposed by the Eastern bloc. He met with resistance from not only the Americans but also from Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany. Only Italy's socialist foreign minister Pietro Nenni supported the Norwegian position.[29] Lyng had presented his position at the congress of the *Høyre*, Norway's conservative party, on 22 March 1969. His position was based on his predecessor Halvard Lange's definition of Norway as a state embedded in both the European and Atlantic spheres. Accordingly, Norway's security would thus be best served by linking the two dimensions together through cooperating with the United States and the NATO membership on the one hand and

negotiations with the Eastern Europeans on the other hand. Both Sweden and Norway considered US and Canadian participation as a precondition for a European security conference. According to the former Norwegian CSCE diplomat Leif Mevik, Norway's response to the idea of a conference was characterised by continuity and not affected by the change of government from Labour to *Høyre* in 1965.[30]

When the Finnish government finally offered to host the conference on 5 May 1969, several of the smaller NATO states diverted. Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy all sided with the Americans and the United Kingdom who were suspicious of Helsinki's invitation and believed it to be a Soviet move.[31] The Norwegians found this reaction too negative and sided with West Germany and the then foreign minister and later chancellor Willy Brandt, who viewed negotiations with Moscow and the Warsaw Pact states as an opportunity to further relations between the two Germanies.[32] Two years later, the *Stortinget* – Norway's parliament – voted unanimously for the government to actively work for a European security conference both within NATO and in bilateral talks. During a meeting with the EC in Paris, Lyng's successor Andreas Cappelen of the Norwegian Labour Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*) criticised the tendency in the Western camp to overemphasise possible negative consequences. Cappelen argued that the West should take a more positive approach and that the NATO member states should present their own constructive proposals. Cappelen, who only served as foreign minister for 18 months, believed that a conference could result in improved East–West-relations while allowing the inclusion of neutral and non-aligned states into these matters.[33] At that early stage, the Norwegians obviously considered their membership in NATO an opportunity – not a restriction – and were willing to explore the margins of manoeuvre given to them.

Sweden's reaction to the increasingly frequent and concrete calls for a conference was much more negative than that of Norway. Undén, who had been fairly positive about some elements of Moscow's original proposal and generally focused on avoiding tension with Moscow, left office in 1962. Under his successor Torsten Nilsson, Swedish foreign policy was less of a one man show and more of a team effort. Earlier overlooked by most Swedish voters, decolonisation, the Vietnam War and race discrimination in the United States moved foreign policy and international affairs to the centre stage of Swedish politics. Like in France or West Germany, the younger generation voiced its unhappiness with the state of things and leading Swedish social democrats feared that they risked losing younger and future voters if they didn't respond to this appropriately. Therefore, the Swedish government abandoned its cautiousness and developed a more active foreign policy comprising criticism against both superpowers and the provision of good offices. This change was mainly performed with regard to global affairs and the United Nations. In European affairs, however, the fear for the Soviets and the wish to preserve the status quo persisted. Therefore, to the surprise of many contemporaries, Sweden remained sceptical about the idea of a security conference for much longer than most other states. The Swedes viewed a conference as a vehicle of change, possibly reducing their margins of manoeuvre and therefore were not

particularly enthusiastic. In their opinion, only the superpowers could deal with major obstacles such as the status of Germany or unsolved border issues.[34]

When the Warsaw Pact states issued the so-called Budapest Appeal in March 1969, the experts of the Swedish foreign ministry were fairly positive about the balanced nature and moderate tone of the statement. Swedish diplomat Kaj Falkman summarised the Swedish position on a security conference as 'in general positive' so long as it was well-prepared and would be attended by all concerned states, including the United States and Canada.[35] The Swedes retreated to a cautious and reactionary position when Moscow tried to push them in April 1969. The Kremlin hoped for the neutrals to play a prominent part and wanted Austria, Sweden or Switzerland to table a proposal similar to the one that eventually came out of Helsinki on 5 May. This strategy proved counterproductive. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was dissatisfied with the Finns, although Prime Minister Tage Erlander had been briefed about the upcoming Finnish initiative by President Urho Kekkonen two days in advance. To the dismay of the Finns, Sweden ended up being one of the last countries to formally respond to their initiative. The Swedes also rejected any notion about Stockholm as a possible venue for one of the stages of a European security conference.[36]

In contrast, Norway continued its positive approach after the Finnish initiative had opened up the path. Oslo responded to the Finnish government earlier and in a more constructive spirit than the Swedes. Six months after the Finnish initiative, Norwegian diplomats explicitly criticised Sweden's 'remarkable passivity in the European security question'.[37] In June 1970, Norway attempted to put together a Nordic initiative in favour of the CSCE, but this never materialised although the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm responded with interest rather than reluctance.[38] Along with Belgium and Denmark, Norway was one of the smaller NATO member states trying to balance the United States and the United Kingdom, which displayed a much tougher attitude on the Warsaw Pact during that period.[39]

The road towards a conference proved long and complicated. At their May 1970 summit, the NATO states acknowledged the improved overall situation between East and West including constructive talks about the status of Berlin. Therefore, they moved on to defining concrete demands of their own for the realisation of the suggested conference. The final communiqué stated that the NATO states were ready to enter 'multilateral contacts with all interested governments' in order to prepare for a conference or series of conferences. At such a gathering, there would be discussion about principles that should govern relations between states, including the renunciation of force, freer movement of people, ideas and information, and co-operation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the field of human environment.[40] Once again, Norway played a constructive role, lending its support to Belgium, which led the effort to reorganise and broaden the conference agenda proposed by the Warsaw Pact states and proposed the start of multilateral negotiations against the will of the United States, France, West Germany and others.[41] With this, Norway helped in developing the proposed conference from a security conference into a conference on security and cooperation – the CSCE.

In 1971 and 1972, a number of breakthroughs, such as the Four Power Agreement on Berlin and the agreement on talks about Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), between NATO and the Warsaw Pact finally allowed for the convocation of multilateral preparations of the CSCE. During these two years and despite various shifts in positions and loyalties within NATO, Norway consistently continued to support the proponents of a conference within the alliance, most notably Belgium and West Germany.[42]

Membership in NATO was not restrictive in this context because the members of the alliance agreed to pursue bilateral talks with countries from all camps. Norway actively used this margin of manoeuvre in continued attempts to support the proponents of the conference, both in bilateral talks – most importantly with its neutral neighbours Finland and Sweden – within NATO or in the so-called 'Group of Ten' comprising Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia.[43] In the road to the CSCE, the policies of neutrality and of alignment in the form of membership in NATO had disparate effects on the perceived margin of manoeuvre. The Swedes feared being dragged into a role that would limit the country's freedom of action and compromise their neutrality, either individually by (co-)hosting the CSCE or by becoming part of some kind of formal group. The Norwegians, on the other hand, perceived their membership in NATO as a firm basis, which guaranteed their overall status in the international arena. Together with West Germany, whose new chancellor Willy Brandt maintained intimate ties with Sweden's prime minister Olof Palme, Norway's positive attitude ultimately helped Sweden to overcome its initial hesitance and adopt a more constructive line.[44]

When the participating states gathered for concrete preparatory talks at the Dipoli Congress Centre near Helsinki in November 1972, more than three years of intense exchange, not only between the two military blocs but also on bilateral and multilateral bases, had passed.

Coming together – and remaining apart: Sweden, Norway and the limits of Nordic cooperation at the CSCE

On 22 November 1972, the delegations of the 34 participating states gathered at the Dipoli conference centre in Otaniemi near Helsinki for the final preparations, the so-called multilateral preparatory talks (MPT). From this point on, the negotiations were carried out in a multilateral setting behind closed doors, without minutes of meetings and immediate involvement from the top level. This prepared the stage for unusual negotiations and unlikely heroes.

The creation of this particular setting for the negotiations, which also included the abovementioned consensus rule, marks an important watershed in the history of the CSCE. It generally increased the margins for manoeuvre for smaller states by allowing for the establishment of more intimate personal relationships than usual and because of the specific negotiation dynamics it created.[45]

The Swedes entered negotiations at Dipoli with cautious optimism and growing interest in the possibilities that the CSCE could offer although there were

worrisome reports from both Moscow and Washington, which claimed that the Soviets still hoped to use the upcoming conference as a means to diminish American influence in Europe while the Americans were critical of the conference's possible effects on disarmament talks.[46]

Norway's delegation under chief negotiator Leif Mevik was initially opposed to the formation of groups within the MPT but nonetheless aware that it would mainly operate in coordination with two groups of states – NATO and the EC member states. The doors to the latter platform were closed by the negative outcome of the 1972 Norwegian referendum on membership in the EC, which was held on 25 September, less than two months prior to the commencement of the MPT.[47]

At Dipoli, the effects of the particular setting kicked in. While Sweden cooperated well with neutral Switzerland and non-aligned Yugoslavia during the MPT, there was little cooperation with the Nordic states. On the eve of the MPT, the Norwegian CSCE diplomats reached out to their Swedish counterparts expressing hopes that the Nordic countries would keep in close contact during the conference. The Nordics did meet on a weekly basis, but substantial cooperation was not in the interest of any Nordic country due to the disparities in their interests and allegiances. Swedish diplomat Göran Berg noted, on human contacts, that 'the fact that Denmark presented the most controversial subject of the security conference, freer movements of people and ideas, and human contacts (i.e., reunification of families) ought to make Nordic cooperation impossible in this area'.[48] Norway's (and Denmark's) maximalist positions on human contacts were incompatible with Sweden's cautious and status-quo oriented approach and Finland's attempts to focus on its role as a host and stay out of controversies. It was instead acknowledged that formalisation or institutionalisation of cooperation of any kind would be rejected and that contacts would remain as informal as possible.[49] Also, the formation of other groups proved more important. At the same time, it was important to the Swedes that the absence of Nordic cooperation at the CSCE was not highlighted in public. Therefore, they reacted rather harshly when Leif Mevik stated in the press that there had been consultations with other members of NATO and even the EC Nine but not with the Nordic neighbours.[50]

In his evaluation of the first three weeks of the MPT, the Swedish head of delegation Ambassador Göran Ryding described in detail that the special dynamics of the negotiations had created political anomalies such as Spain siding with the Soviets rather than with the West during the first weeks. Norway and Finland, Ryding added, had 'not said a word' after their opening speeches and had been remarkably quiet.[51]

Thus, Norway and Sweden headed in different directions. The Norwegian delegation operated as part of the NATO member states, often as an internal bridge-builder and alongside other smaller members of the alliance like the Netherlands and Belgium. Their Swedish counterparts on their part took up the role of mediator together with other neutral and non-aligned states, most notably through chairing various committees during the negotiations.[52]

Both countries prioritised the negotiations about principles guiding the relations between the participating states. The Norwegians viewed them as an opportunity

to counter the Brezhnev Doctrine and create a new Magna Carta for Europe.[53] The Swedes also contributed but were more pragmatic about the topic and maintained the necessity to show consideration for the Soviet delegation. Against its own will, the Swedish delegation was increasingly drawn into cooperation with the other N+N states and towards a role of a mediator between the blocs.[54]

This does not mean that cooperation between the two Nordic countries did not occur at all or that they engaged in conflicts with each other but rather that they defined their interests and room for manoeuvre based on the setting of the negotiations comprising two alliances and a number of non-aligned states. Mevik states that, in the making of the concluding document of the MPT – the so-called 'Blue Book' – 'the NATO countries won on a broad front with their agenda, well supported by the neutral countries'.[55]

Priorities and pragmatism: operating in the three baskets

The *modus operandi* with various groups communicating across political camps was thus fully established by the time the conference moved on from the preparatory phase in Finland to the main negotiations carried out in Geneva from 18 September 1973 onwards. The Swedish and Norwegian delegations awaited instructions and possible changes resulting from the general elections held in both countries during that month.

The Norwegian Social Democrats under former Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli regained power from the coalition government led by the Christian Democratic Prime Minister Lars Korvald despite achieving the worst electoral result since 1930 and appointed the 46-year-old diplomat Knut Frydenlund as foreign minister. One of the new cabinet's first tasks was to instruct the Norwegian delegation to the CSCE in Geneva. The instruction comprised two parts, a more general outline of basic positions and a more detailed set of regulations (*forskrifter*). It also defined a set of goals: the establishment of general principles on the relations between states, the creation of confidence-building measures including exchange of observers to military manoeuvres, addressing environmental matters and the monitoring of air and sea pollution as well as improved human contacts beyond the blocs.[56] The Norwegian government made it clear that it wanted the delegation to take the CSCE's bloc-to-bloc structure into account and stretch its margins of manoeuvre by maintaining its role as a driving force and broker from within NATO:

> The general attitude of the delegation must be a principally positive attitude towards the CSCE as an instrument for the continuation of the process of détente and negotiations in Europe. In line with this attitude, the delegation shall work within the consultations of NATO to ensure the positive development and the fastest possible progress of the negotiations. It shall furthermore contribute to a constructive attitude from the NATO countries through these consultations; maintaining the general aim of finding solutions that everyone can accept and thereby seeking to prevent the negotiations from getting gridlocked.[57]

On 16 September, the Swedish Social Democrats led by Olof Palme won 43.56 percent of the votes in the Swedish election. Defence Minister Sven Andersson joined the Foreign Ministry as Krister Wickman left for the position of head of the Swedish Central Bank. Richard Hichens-Bergström was appointed as head of the Swedish delegation to the CSCE. Hichens-Bergström was transferred from his post as ambassador in Oslo, where he had served for five years following a three-year stint as head of the ministry's political section. The meetings of the Swedish CSCE working and expert groups confirmed security issues in general – and disarmament and confidence-building measures (CBMs) in particular – as well as a certain say for the smaller states as the top priority. There was also consensus on maintaining distance from the topic of 'freer movements', which still was considered a potential threat to both the conference and the West's relations with the Soviets more generally.[58] At Geneva, the Swedes refrained from attempts to stretch their margins of manoeuvre and decided to stay on their cautious path. In contrast to the other neutrals Austria, Finland and Switzerland and several smaller members of the two alliances, including Norway, the Swedes refrained from maximalist positions in the first and third baskets and called for realism and an acknowledgement of the differences between the blocs where others pushed for the ideas and proposals that eventually allowed the CSCE to gain the significance ascribed to it by historians today. Unsurprisingly, the Swedish attitude attracted much criticism from both Western and neutral states. Diplomats at the British Foreign Office wrote that:

> the Swedish performance at the CSCE has been depressingly wet. Unlike the Swiss and Austrians, with whom they co-ordinate closely, they do not have the courage to stand up to the East on the most important matters. They are eager to appear as conciliators in matters of procedure, but would clearly like to see the Conference finish as soon as possible. . . . Though at an early stage in the negotiations the Swedes were keen to obtain effective confidence-building measures, in particular notification of separate naval and small scale land manoeuvres, they have of late made only token attempts to put pressure on the Warsaw Pact.[59]

This was partly because the Swedish interests were simply different from those of Norway but also because the Swedes lacked the powerful NATO allies that the Norwegians could use as leverage to make their voices heard by other delegations. Together with the British, for instance, the Norwegians took the lead on behalf of the West and pushed the East on confidence-building measures in late 1973 and early 1974.[60] They also teamed up with the Americans and produced texts on environmental matters.[61]

Over the course of the following two years, the two blocs engaged in intense and increasingly polarised negotiations. While Moscow strove for the acknowledgement of the post-war borders in Europe, the Western Europeans sought for increased human contacts and information exchange across the Iron Curtain. The modus operandi of the CSCE, decided upon at Dipoli, stated that all decisions

would be taken by consensus, which was defined as 'the absence of any objection expressed by a representative and put forward by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question'.[62] The working groups that dealt with the different subjects were also appointed by consensus and their chairmanship performed by rotation. Only in exceptional cases would the public be informed about the progress of the conference. These were important decisions reflecting the very nature of the CSCE. Secrecy diminished the threshold of inhibition and allowed the delegations to disregard public opinion.[63] The difference between the Western and Eastern approaches to the CSCE was that the West attempted to use it as a vehicle for *change* while the East was focused on the *preservation* of the conditions of the Cold War era. In this respect, Norway's ambition to explore the margins of manoeuvre through playing an active role within and outside of NATO was part of the Western approach whereas Sweden operated closer along the lines of the Eastern attitude.

As pointed out by historian Angela Romano in her study on the West in the CSCE, the Norwegian delegation was small but energetic and the most active of the smaller NATO states. The Norwegians stood firmly by the West throughout the negotiations and sided with the United States and Canada in order to counterbalance solely Western European initiatives.[64] The Swedes and Norwegians both displayed a sober attitude during the negotiations, citing the significance of realistic expectations. At the same time, Norway's definition of what was realistic went further than that of Sweden. The Norwegians continuously supported Western European ideas about increased human contacts, which the Swedes were sympathetic of but nonetheless perceived as far-reaching and out of reach. Before the Christmas break of 1973, the head of the Swedish delegation Hichens-Bergström wrote to Foreign Minister Andersson that it was actually the Eastern Europeans who had been realistic.[65] When the negotiations approached the final stages in 1975, the Norwegian delegation was instructed to put special emphasis on human contacts:

> With regard to extended human contacts, the delegation, in the framework of the mandates present, shall attach particular importance to measures of clear humanitarian nature. Gradual improvements in these areas will constitute an important element in creating better understanding and cooperation between the citizens of the participating states.[66]

The Swedes still disagreed. On 19 March 1975, as a reaction on the deadlock that the negotiations in the third basket had caused, Foreign Minister Andersson stated that 'when judging the results possible in this field it must be borne in mind that the Conference cannot eliminate differences due to political, economic or social systems'.[67] The Swedish delegation engaged further in the mediating efforts of the N+N but as pointed out by Thomas Fischer, 'of the four neutral countries, Sweden was the only one that did not produce a [. . .] key figure for the CSCE negotiations . . . [which] reflects the lower priority Stockholm gave to the CSCE overall'.[68] British reports mocked Sweden's fixation on its favourite topic; its 'disarmament hobby horse' as London put it.[69]

Conclusion

During the Cold War, Sweden and Norway were two very similar states in quite different positions. Norway joined the United States, Canada and nine Western European countries in the foundation of NATO while Sweden returned to its traditional policy of neutrality, viewing it as a means to create a balance between the two emerging blocs on the Scandinavian peninsula. By the time of the CSCE in the early 1970s, this Nordic balance, with NATO members in the West, neutral Sweden in the middle and Finland with its special relationship with the Soviet Union in the East, had gained overall acceptance. The rise of the United Nations, the establishment of two military alliances and détente between East and West brought the breakthrough of multilateralism, strengthening the position of smaller states in general.

Because of the particular setting of the Cold War, Sweden was especially concerned about its relationship with the Soviet Union and preferred the maintenance of the status quo in Europe over potentially risky changes. As a member of NATO, Norway's status as an opponent of the Soviet Union was clear. These differences also expressed themselves in the reactions of the two countries to the idea of a security conference as a substitute of the peace conference that never occurred. The procedures of the CSCE consisting of the consensus rule and the absence of minutes of meetings, as well as the absence of the press, allowed a greater margin for manoeuvre for smaller states. The longevity of the negotiations added to this, creating a culture based on close relationship between standing delegations. Norway used the opportunities offered by the multilateral structures of the CSCE and of NATO to stretch its margins for manoeuvre. Most notably, the Norwegians pushed the issue of confidence-building measures and human contacts together with other Western countries as a means to accomplish lasting change.

Sweden, on the other hand, remained cautious during much of the CSCE, staying away from controversial positions on human contacts and focusing on disarmament. Many contemporaries believed that Sweden could have played a more prominent role in the CSCE. Regardless of whether one agrees with the notion that the Swedes mistakenly perceived their margins of manoeuvre to be smaller than they actually were, one conclusion we may draw from the comparison made here is that membership in an alliance – or an affirmative attitude towards a group like the N+N – did not reduce but rather increased those margins.

Norway's cooperation with the delegations of other NATO member states, in particular that of the United States, helped the little Nordic country to exert an influence on the negotiations that exceeded its usual role in international affairs. Sweden also played a more prominent role when it cooperated with other neutral and non-aligned states – but only did so reluctantly as we have seen.

Notes

1 The latest additions are Michael Cotey Morgan, *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Princeton 2018); Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (eds), *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies*

and Human Rights, 1972–1990 (New York 2018). For a comprehensive review of the existing literature on the CSCE, see Morgan, *The Final Act*, 260 (note 23); Aryo Makko, *Ambassadors of Realpolitik* (New York 2016[c2017]), 1–9.

2 Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton 2001).

3 Ulf Bjereld, Alf W. Johansson and Karl Molin, *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred. Svensk säkerhetspolitik under kalla kriget* (Stockholm 2008); Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann (eds), *Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing* (London and New York 2014).

4 Eduard Jordaan, 'The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers', *Politikon* 30:1 (2003) 165. See also Cranford Pratt (ed.), *Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension* (Kingston 1990); Olav Stokke (ed.), *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden* (Uppsala 1989).

5 Marc Bloch, 'Toward a Comparative History of European Societies', in: Frederic C. Lane (ed.), *Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History* (London 1953) 495.

6 Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York 1984).

7 Deborah Cohen, 'Comparative History: Buyer Beware', in: Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor (eds), *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective* (New York and London 2004) 57–69. See also Susanna Erlandsson, *Window of Opportunity: Dutch and Swedish Security Ideas and Strategies, 1942–1948* (Uppsala 2015).

8 Alf Kaartvedt, 'Unionen med Sverige', in: Narve Bjørgo, Øystein Rian and Alf Kaartvedt (eds), *Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie: Bd 1, Selvstendighet og union: fra middelalderen til 1905* (Oslo 1995) 231–360; Roald Berg, *Bd 2, Norge på egen hånd: 1905–1920* (Oslo 1995); Mikael af Malmborg, *Neutrality and State-Building in Sweden* (Basingstoke 2001) chapters 3 and 4.

9 Wilhelm Carlgren, *Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945* (Stockholm 1973); Klas Åmark, *Att bo granne med ondskan* (Stockholm 2011); Jakob Sverdrup, *Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie: Bd 4, Inn i storpolitikken: 1940–1949* (Oslo 1995).

10 Kent Zetterberg, 'A Scandinavian Defence Union or NATO-Partnership? The Scandinavian Countries and the Formation of Security Policies, 1945–1950', in: Robert Bohn and Jürgen Evert (eds), *Kriegsende im Norden* (Stuttgart 1995) 233–240.

11 Ulf Bjereld, 'Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945–90', *Journal of Peace Research* 32:1 (1995) 23–35.

12 Aryo Makko, 'Sweden, Europe and the Cold War. A Reappraisal', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14:2 (2012) 23–35.

13 Kjetil Skogrand, *Norsk forsvarshistorie 4: alliert i krig og fred, 1940–1970* (Eide 2004).

14 See for example Norbert Götz, *Deliberative Diplomacy: The Nordic Approach to Global Governance and Societal Representation at the United Nations* (Dordrecht 2011).

15 John Gerard Ruggie, 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', *International Organization* 46:3 (1992) 561–598.

16 Morgan, *The Final Act*, 10 and 108.

17 Niels Nagelhus Schia and Ole Jacob Sending, 'Status and Sovereign Equality: Small States in Multilateral Settings', in: de Carvalho and Neumann (eds), *Small State Status Seeking*, 73–85.

18 Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York 2017) chapter 4.

19 See Östen Undén, *Anteckningar 1952–1966*, edited by Karl Molin (Stockholm 2002).

20 Morgan, *The Final Act*, 77–78.

21 Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (Brussels 2009) 166.

22 The other two committee members were Lange's Canadian and Italian counterparts Lester Pearson and Gaetano Martino. The group was officially called 'Committee on

Non-Military Cooperation'; its report is available at 'Report of the Committee of Three', *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_65237.htm. Accessed 27 September 2018.

23 Jussi Hanhimäki, 'Conservative Goals, Revolutionary Outcomes: The Paradox of Détente', *Cold War History* 8:4 (2008) 503–512.

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4 A critical ally (1949–1977)

The Dutch social democrats, Spain and NATO[1]

Stefanie F. M. Massink

This chapter examines the Dutch social democrats' attitude and behaviour regarding the question whether dictatorial Spain should be allowed to join NATO. In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was founded by the United States, Canada and ten Western European countries to collectively counter the threat from the Soviet Union. The Netherlands joined the Atlantic alliance from the start. Spain, at the time ruled by dictator Francisco Franco, was the only Western European country that was barred from joining NATO, despite its strategic location.

This case study focusses on the attitude and behaviour of two different but related actors regarding NATO and Spain. The stance of the Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid* – PvdA) will be examined from 1949, the year NATO was founded, until 1973, the year in which the social democrats gained control of foreign policy. The position of the den Uyl cabinet, named after the social democrat prime minister Joop den Uyl, will be explored during its term of office (1973–1977). By researching the attitude and behaviour of both actors, this case study will make an important contribution to existing scholarship on the margins of manoeuvre of small states, as well as the influence of domestic politics within small states on foreign policy. In addition, this chapter will advance the current knowledge on the Netherlands as a critical NATO ally.

Within the context of the Cold War, it is easy to consider the Netherlands as a small state compared to the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. However, the definition of smallness is relative to the particular context in which states operate. Scholars like Browning, Erlandsson and Hoffenaar point out that defining what constitutes a small state is next to impossible.[2] Moreover, Browning states that there is an unjustified 'tendency to equate "smallness" with a lack of power',[3] while Dijk et al. assert that 'small does not necessarily mean insignificant'.[4] Indeed, the influence of small states on international affairs should not be underestimated, especially in a multilateral setting like NATO, as this case study will demonstrate.

Existing scholarship indicates that the Netherlands was not just a powerless affiliate of NATO, at the mercy of larger member states, particularly the United States. Van Staden argues that from the beginning of the 1970s a more disapproving stance towards the United States and NATO emerged in the Netherlands. This

represented a shift from the 1950s and 1960s, when the Dutch mostly acted as a loyal ally.[5] Pijpers and Kennedy agree that the Dutch stance towards the United States and NATO changed in the 1970s.[6] A more nuanced perspective is offered by Hellema, who concurs that overall there was more continuity than change,[7] while van der Wijngaart argues that the Netherlands acted both as a loyal and a critical ally, depending on the particular issue at hand.[8]

This chapter shows that the question whether dictatorial Spain should be allowed to join NATO was one of those issues where the den Uyl cabinet acted as a critical ally. Some scholars have pointed out that this cabinet took a critical stance regarding Spain and NATO. Powell states that Prime Minister den Uyl disapproved of the American policy towards Spain, including the push for the accession of Spain in NATO.[9] Van der Wijngaart observes that the den Uyl cabinet acted as a critical ally, opposing the wish of the United States that Spain would become a member of the Atlantic alliance.[10]

While the observations of Powell and van der Wijngaart indicate that the den Uyl cabinet opposed a Spanish membership of NATO, their policy was not extensively investigated by these scholars. Hence, this case study contributes to the existing literature by further unveiling the den Uyl cabinet's motives and strategies regarding NATO and Spain, as well as assessing the results of its policies in order to demonstrate that, during the Cold War, a small state like the Netherlands could exert influence on international affairs.

Research on small state behaviour, however, should not only focus on the small *state*, but also on *actors operating within* the small state. Browning and Elman appropriately assert that there is an unfounded tendency in the study of international relations to deem domestic politics an irrelevant factor in the foreign policy formulation of small states. The foreign policy agendas of small states are often considered to be solely influenced by external dynamics.[11] However, the influence of domestic politics on the foreign policy of small states should not be overlooked.

According to van Staden, the critical stance towards the United States and NATO developed under the influence of left-wing political parties and public opinion. This was mainly fuelled by the disapproval of American foreign policy in Vietnam and Latin America as well as by NATO's focus on nuclear deterrence strategies.[12] This chapter will demonstrate that the PvdA played an important role in developing a critical stance regarding the question whether dictatorial Spain should be allowed to join NATO.

This case study is based on research in the Dutch archives, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers and Parliament, as well as newspaper archives. Although the Dutch perspective is leading, the digital archives of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum have been consulted to complement the research. Unfortunately, the archives of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been inaccessible for researchers since 2010, and as such they have been excluded from this research.

The first section of this chapter will provide the historical context on the Spanish Question. This is followed by an examination of the motives, strategies and

results of the social democrats' stance regarding NATO and Spain, before they gained control of foreign policy in 1973. Subsequently, the motives, strategies and results of the den Uyl cabinet's policy concerning the Atlantic alliance and Spain during the end phase of the Franco regime (1973–1975) and the transition from dictatorship to democracy (1975–1977) are examined. Finally, the research findings will be discussed in the conclusion.

The Spanish question

After the Second World War, the Allies contemplated how to deal with Spain, considering dictator Francisco Franco a pariah for his affiliation with the Axis powers. This issue came to be known as the Spanish Question.[13] The answer to this question came on 12 December 1946, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution 39 (I). This resolution encouraged member states to withdraw their ambassadors from Spain, while barring the country from participating in the United Nations (UN) and affiliated organisations 'until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain'.[14]

The international isolation of Spain soon became untenable, despite political objections against the Franco regime. It proved impractical to exclude Spain from UN specialised agencies, such as the International Civic Aviation Organization (ICAO), established to develop international safety standards for civil aviation. Therefore, on 4 November 1950, the UNGA adopted Resolution 386 (V), stipulating that maintaining diplomatic relations with Spain would 'not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of that government'. The recommendation of December 1946 to withdraw ambassadors from Madrid – and to exclude Spain from membership of the UN and affiliated organisations – was thus repealed.[15]

Spain's international isolation was lifted, but the doors to NATO remained closed. When NATO was established in 1949, UN Resolution 39 (I) was still in effect. This contributed to the exclusion of Spain from the Atlantic alliance. However, with the Cold War ascending, the United States considered Spain strategically important, wanting to pull the Iberian country into its sphere of influence to counter the perceived communist threat from the Soviet Union. The most practical solution would have been to incorporate Spain into the Atlantic alliance. Other NATO allies, however, rejected Spanish membership. In particular the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway considered the accession of dictatorial Spain irreconcilable with the democratic principles on which the Atlantic alliance was founded.[16] Hence, NATO had its own version of the Spanish Question, centring on the dilemma whether dictatorial Spain should be allowed to join the Western defence alliance to counter the communist threat. In the remainder of this chapter, the Spanish Question will refer to the context of NATO.

Although during the Cold War the United States may have been a superpower, it could not unilaterally decide to include Spain in NATO. Its margins of manoeuvre were restrained by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, stipulating that new member states could only join the organisation after 'unanimous agreement'.[17]

This meant that a small member state like the Netherlands could veto the accession of Spain. With the multilateral Western defence route closed to Spain, the United States decided to sign a bilateral treaty with the Franco regime. The negotiations started in 1950, and in September 1953 the Pact of Madrid was signed, allowing the United States to establish military bases in Spain in exchange for approximately one billion dollars in economic and military aid.[18]

During the 1970s, the strategic importance of Spain only augmented. Although during those years the Cold War entered a phase of détente in the East–West dimension, the situation in Southern Europe was far from relaxed due to political upheaval in all of the Southern European NATO states. The turmoil started on 25 April 1974, when the Carnation Revolution in Portugal swept away the authoritarian *Estado Novo*, which had ruled the country for forty years. This was followed by a coup in Cyprus on 15 July that was supported by the Greek Junta, leading to an invasion of the island by Turkey and the collapse of the Greek dictatorial regime. In the meantime, François Mitterrand was running for president in France on a joined socialist–communist agenda, while in Italy the communist party could count on the support of a third of the electorate.[19]

The fact that the elderly dictator Franco fell severely ill in July 1974 will only have increased American concerns about a possible communist takeover in Spain, which would further weaken the stability of the strategic Southern European belly. The admission of Spain to NATO still seemed a logical option to compensate the dwindling position of the Atlantic alliance in Southern Europe. However, it was unlikely that the den Uyl cabinet would support such a move. Before addressing their motives and strategies, the origins of the den Uyl cabinet's critical stance will be examined in the next section.

The origins of the critical ally (1949–1973)

The origins of the social democrats' critical stance against any rapprochement between NATO and Spain can be traced back to the year the Atlantic alliance was established. In July 1949, the Spanish Question was discussed during the debate in the house of representatives about the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. At that time, the liberal Dirk Stikker was Minister of Foreign Affairs. He took a formalistic stance, declaring that the entry of Francoist Spain in the Atlantic alliance would be incongruous with UN Resolution 39 (I).[20]

The social democrats agreed with this position but believed that the minister had not gone far enough. They urged Stikker to take a firmer stance against the Franco regime by showing an unambiguous 'democratic face' to the world.[21] The minister, however, did not make the desired public statement.[22] This can be explained by Stikker's general stance towards NATO. According to Bank, he was a pragmatic minister and a proponent of the Atlantic alliance. He considered the Dutch membership of NATO crucial for the survival of the Netherlands, although he did not always follow the Americans at the expense of Dutch interests.[23] During the debate in the house of representatives, Stikker did not give in to the pressure exerted by the social democrats. While the latter may not have achieved

their objective, they had made clear that they would oppose any rapprochement between NATO and Spain.

The Spanish Question remained dormant until 1950, when the isolation of Spain by the UN came to an end with the adoption of UN Resolution 386 (V). The social democrats were worried that this resolution would open the way for Spain to join NATO. Henk Oosterhuis, Member of the Senate, asked Stikker whether the government's position on Spain and NATO would change. Stikker replied that there would be no policy alterations. Waving away the issue, the minister further stated that a Spanish membership was not even under discussion within NATO.[24] As shall become clear, Stikker and succeeding ministers would regularly try to brush the issue off in this manner, maintaining a reserved position regarding the Spanish Question.

The next time the social democrats addressed the Spanish Question in the house of representatives was in 1951, in reaction to the bilateral American–Spanish talks that had started that year. In July, Jaap Burger urged Stikker to discuss with the Americans the social democrats' concerns regarding the potential closer ties between Spain and NATO. As had happened before, Stikker did not yield to the request. He merely stated that the American–Spanish negotiations were bilateral in nature and did not imply a Spanish membership of NATO.[25]

In December 1953, the PvdA expressed its concern regarding the recently signed American–Spanish Pact of Madrid. During the debate in the House of Representatives about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget for 1954, Marinus van der Goes van Naters acknowledged the military benefits of the American–Spanish agreement but declared at the same time that this would lead to a 'political debit', alluding to the absence of democracy in Spain. He called upon the Dutch government to make a clear statement on the relation of the Western democracies with the Franco dictatorship.[26]

By this time, Joseph Luns, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Catholic People's Party (*Katholieke Volkspartij*, *KVP*), had to face the scrutiny of the social democrats. He declined to make a public declaration, stating that political objections against the Franco regime would not necessarily need to exclude military cooperation between the United States and Spain.[27] Luns' reaction can be explained by his loyalty to the Atlantic alliance. According to Kersten, Luns considered it important to keep the NATO ranks closed, to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of any internal dissonance among the NATO allies.[28] Kersten's assessment provides a plausible explanation why Dutch ministers were reluctant to make public declarations about the Spanish Question.

In 1960, the concerns of a backdoor entry of Spain into NATO were stirred up once more, as a result of consultations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Spain. The FRG had joined the Atlantic alliance in May 1955 and was searching for military storage facilities outside of its national territory, further removed from the Iron Curtain. When Burger asked questions about these talks, Prime Minister Jan de Quay (*KVP*) declared that a bilateral agreement between the FRG and Spain would not include a membership of NATO. De Quay further stated that this issue was not a current affair.[29]

During the mid-1960s, the PvdA started to incorporate its opposition to a Spanish NATO membership in its election programs. In 1963, this was still formulated in general terms, stating that dictatorial states should not be allowed to join NATO.[30] Three years later, the New Left movement, which aimed to reform the PvdA, published the manifesto *Tien over Rood* ('Ten Past Red'). The authors took the radical position that the Netherlands should leave NATO in the case that Spain would become a member of the Atlantic alliance.[31] The party would not adopt this far-reaching stance, but the social democrats would continue to oppose any rapprochement between NATO and dictatorial Spain, an indication that the PvdA preferred to remain in the Atlantic alliance and use its membership to address issues like the Spanish Question.

In November 1968, as the United States and Spain renegotiated the Pact of Madrid, the Spanish Question was addressed by Max van der Stoel, a social democrat member of the House of Representatives, who in 1973 would become Minister of Foreign Affairs. He urged the government to oppose the membership of Spain as long as a dictatorial regime endured, pointing out that unanimity among the NATO members would be required to grant Spain membership.[32] Here, van der Stoel referred to the veto right stipulated in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, a sign that he was aware that the United States could not just push through a Spanish membership of NATO without the cooperation of the Netherlands.

This time, the social democrats finally achieved what they had been asking for during previous years. Since his appointment in 1952, Luns had never given in to the pressure by PvdA representatives to make public statements on the Spanish Question. Now, in reaction to van der Stoel, he declared publicly that the government would oppose a Spanish membership of NATO, as long as that country remained a dictatorship. He further emphasised that the issue was not even being discussed within the Atlantic alliance.[33]

Several months later, on 20 June 1969, the social democrat leader Joop den Uyl posed questions in the House of Representatives concerning NATO and Spain. His intervention came as a result of declarations made by Robert C. Hill, the new American ambassador in Spain. Dutch newspapers reported that the ambassador had declared his support for Spain's membership of NATO.[34] According to den Uyl, these statements could be interpreted as an attempt by the American government to promote Spain's membership of NATO. However, Luns denied that the United States had taken any initiative to promote the entry of Spain into NATO. He reminded the House of Representatives of his public statement on 20 November 1968 and – once again – declared that during the previous years the matter had not at all been deliberated within NATO.[35]

In the meantime, the Spanish Question had been discussed in the Senate during the debate about the 1969 budget proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Burger, now a member of the Senate, stated that the accession of dictatorial Spain to NATO would be 'the most fatal development' for the organisation.[36] Here, Burger alluded to the loss of credibility of NATO as an institution based on democratic principles if Franco Spain would be admitted. Once again, Luns repeated that the position of the Dutch government, as expressed on 20 November 1968,

had not changed. He further insisted that the issue was not at all under discussion, 'no matter what some ambassador may have said or whatever papers wrote about it'.[37]

The opposition in the Netherlands against relations between NATO and Spain did not go unnoticed. In August, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a report from the embassy in Madrid that the United States had informed the Spanish regime that the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark presented 'insurmountable obstacles'. This had led the US government to conclude that efforts to incorporate Spain in NATO were futile.[38] Evidently, the American and Spanish governments were aware that the margins of manoeuvre of the United States within NATO were limited by other member states, with the Netherlands being considered one of the countries preventing Spain from joining the Atlantic alliance.

During the following years, the PvdA continued its critical posture with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norbert Schmelzer (KVP). He succeeded Luns, who in 1971 was appointed Secretary General of NATO. Bosmans asserts that Schmelzer, compared to his predecessors, showed more consideration for public opinion and human rights.[39] Perhaps the decade-long pressure by the social democrats regarding the Spanish Question had finally reached the government level. According to Bosmans, the governing parties had agreed that the Netherlands should avoid closer ties with the authoritarian countries Greece, Portugal and Spain.[40] However, the parliamentary records indicate that, during his relatively short office term, Schmelzer did not maintain strict distance from the Spanish regime.

At the beginning of 1972, Schmelzer informally received the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gregorio López Bravo. This was the first time that a meeting took place on Dutch soil between a Dutch and Spanish minister of foreign affairs. The social democrats requested a statement regarding the government's stance on the Spanish Question. Van der Stoel asked if the government would continue to deny Spain's accession to NATO, including any informal rapprochement. Schmelzer replied that NATO had not been discussed during his meeting with López Bravo. In line with his predecessors, he stated that the relations between NATO and Spain were not even being discussed in the Atlantic alliance.[41] Although Schmelzer may have paid more attention to human rights and public opinion on international affairs compared to his predecessors, on this occasion he did not use van der Stoel's inquiry as an opportunity to publicly declare that the Netherlands disapproved of any close ties between the Atlantic alliance and Spain.

Looking back on the period 1949–1973, it can be concluded that domestic politics do matter as far as the foreign policy of small states is concerned. The social democrats actively maintained a critical stance regarding the Spanish Question, motivated by democratic principles. Their strategy mostly consisted of discussing the Spanish Question in parliament and asking the government to make public statements against the Franco regime. Overall, the government tended to act like a loyal ally by taking formalistic positions and remaining aloof. Nevertheless, the social democrats continued propagating the idea that any rapprochement between NATO and Franco Spain would encounter fierce opposition. Hence, the social

democrats contributed to limiting the margins of manoeuvre of the Dutch government, while also restricting the options of the United States and Spain. The next section examines how the social democrats translated their principles into practise, once they gained control of foreign policy.

'The United States is not the boss' (1973–1975)

In May 1973, the den Uyl cabinet came to power. For the 1972 elections, the PvdA had joined forces with two other progressive parties, the Christian–green Political Party of Radicals (*Politieke Partij Radikalen*, PPR) and the social-liberal Democrats 66 (*Democraten 66*, D66). Their common election program, 'Keerpunt 1972' ('Turning Point 1972'), specifically stipulated that the enlargement of NATO with non-democratic countries such as Spain would be rejected.[42] This reflected the social democrats' long-term opposition against any rapprochement between the Atlantic alliance and Spain.

With the den Uyl cabinet taking office, it was the first time in Dutch parliamentary history that the social democrats would control foreign policy. Max van der Stoel became Minister of Foreign Affairs. While he is generally considered a human rights advocate, Kuitenbrouwer points out that he was also a 'realistic idealist' and a proponent of the Netherlands as a 'critical and loyal' NATO ally.[43] Interestingly, Bleich mentions that van der Stoel considered it a challenge to stretch the limited margins of manoeuvre of Dutch foreign policy.[44] After having taken a critical stance regarding the Spanish Question as a member of the house of representatives, van der Stoel now had the opportunity to translate the social democrats' critical stance into policy.

The Spanish Question would not become urgent until 1975. In February of that year, President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and NATO's Secretary General Luns discussed developments in Southern Europe. They were concerned about a communist takeover in Portugal and the pressure such an event could exert on its neighbouring country Spain. Luns stated that the American government should support Spain. Kissinger agreed, declaring that 'the situation in Spain is very worrisome', to which Luns reacted: 'in the worst of the cases, we risk losing the whole southern tier'.[45] Hence, from the perspective of Ford, Kissinger and Luns, the stakes in Southern Europe were high.

It is important to note that Luns, as NATO's Secretary General, did not represent the Dutch government. It was unlikely that the den Uyl cabinet would support the aspirations of Kissinger and Luns to establish closer ties between NATO and Spain. Although the Netherlands could be considered small compared to the American superpower, there was no lack in confidence on the Dutch side. Van der Stoel declared in an interview with a Dutch newspaper that 'the United States may be the strongest partner in NATO, but they are not the boss. In NATO a decision is only possible by unanimity'. Here, van der Stoel again referred to Article 10 from the North Atlantic Treaty, as he had done when he still was a member of the house of representatives. He further stated that many topics needed to be discussed with the United States.[46] One of those topics was the Spanish Question.

The first opportunity to discuss the Spanish Question with the Americans took place on 14 May, when den Uyl and van der Stoel visited the White House to meet Ford and Kissinger. After some introductory small talk, the first topic the Prime Minister put to the table was the role of NATO in Southern Europe, an indication of the importance attached to this subject by the den Uyl cabinet. Den Uyl pushed Ford and Kissinger to pursue a different policy regarding NATO and Spain. The Prime Minister explained to his hosts that, compared to the 1950s, Dutch public opinion of America's conduct in the world had deteriorated, especially in the case of the younger generations, who wanted the Atlantic alliance to act like 'a force for democracy', to which he added that NATO should 'defend freedom and democracy'.[47]

With regard to Spain, den Uyl declared that American assistance to the Franco regime would damage NATO's credibility. When Ford asked, 'How much would have to change before you could see Spain playing a role in Europe?', den Uyl replied: 'Our standard is free elections. That is what counts'.[48] In other words, as far as the den Uyl cabinet was concerned, only a democratic Spain could join NATO, otherwise NATO's credibility as an organisation based on democratic principles would be compromised.

Two days later, the den Uyl cabinet's strategy regarding Spain and NATO was discussed at the cabinet meeting of 16 May, ahead of NATO's Defence Planning Committee (DPC), which was scheduled on 22 May. Vredeling, the Minister of Defence, was going to attend the DPC. His plan was to reject any proposition for closer ties between Spain and NATO. Van der Stoel agreed with this approach, confirming that the Netherlands would not accept relations between NATO and Franco-Spain.[49]

After the DPC, den Uyl informed his cabinet that the American delegation resisted the inclusion of a clause in the final communiqué, which would state that the American military bases in Spain were part of a bilateral treaty between the United States and Spain. This passage would explicitly exclude a direct link between NATO and Spain. In the end, the United States conceded to the pressure, resulting in the following declaration in the final communiqué: 'The United States Secretary of Defense informed his colleagues of the present state of the bilateral agreements on the use by the US forces of military facilities in Spain, it being understood that these arrangements remain outside the NATO context'.[50]

According to Vredeling, he had barely received support from other NATO members. Without elaboration on the positions taken by the other delegates, the minister declared that only his Norwegian and Danish colleagues fully backed the Dutch stance, an indication that these small member states also upheld a critical position. Den Uyl and Vredeling believed that the United States would continue to insist on closer relations between NATO and Spain. Van der Stoel, however, seemed more optimistic. He thought that the Americans were less tenacious, and he seemed convinced that they would not bring up the issue again.[51] A few days later, van der Stoel's assessment proved to be incorrect.

On 28–29 May, the NATO summit took place in Brussels. Afterwards, den Uyl shared with his ministers that there had been no surprises, except for one.

President Ford had remarked that the cooperation between NATO and Spain was crucial at a time of instability at Europe's Southern tier. Without entering into further details, den Uyl shared with the ministers of his cabinet that there had been resistance against the American position, especially by Harold Wilson. Apparently, the British social democratic Prime Minister of one of the larger NATO member states also had reservations.[52]

With regard to his own behaviour during the summit, den Uyl claimed that he had 'squarely opposed' any cooperation between NATO and Spain, effectively vetoing any proposal to incorporate Spain into NATO. This time he was convinced that the Americans had understood the message and that they would no longer insist on a rapprochement between NATO and Spain. He nevertheless expected that the Ford administration would still try to obtain some recognition for the contributions Spain was making to Western defence. However, even such a toned-down gesture was unacceptable as far as den Uyl was concerned.[53]

While the Netherlands fervently defended its margins of manoeuvre as a critical ally, the United States found itself forced in a position where it had to keep both the NATO allies and Spain happy. The den Uyl cabinet's opposition to close ties between the Atlantic alliance and Spain was primarily directed against the United States, in bilateral and multilateral settings from which the Spanish regime was practically excluded. It is nevertheless plausible that the Franco regime was well aware of the Dutch critical stance. Straight after the NATO summit, Ford and Kissinger paid a demonstrative visit to Madrid. In the Spanish capital, they talked with the Prime Minister, Carlos Arias Navarro and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pedro Cortina.

It is noteworthy that Ford's account of the NATO summit did not correspond with the previously mentioned interpretation of den Uyl. In Madrid, Ford expressed himself rather positively on the position of NATO members with regard to Spain. According to the President, the NATO allies had shown a slightly more constructive attitude. However, Cortina was not impressed: 'We think you should come up with a strong and specific statement of the relationship which would lead to some practical results. The Spanish people await such results'.[54] Clearly, Cortina had expected more promising results from Spain's most important ally.

That same day, Ford also met Franco. During the conversation, Ford again optimistically claimed that the allies recognised 'the fine military contribution' of Spain in the Western defence system through the bilateral agreements with the United States. Franco showed gratitude for American efforts 'to convince Europe of the important role Spain plays'. The dictator believed that the larger European countries understood this, contrary to smaller countries, stating that 'they appear to be victims of their own political sectarianism'. While the President told the dictator that the smaller countries took a disapproving stance towards Spain, he also stated that this would change. Franco reacted quite dramatically: 'When the moment of truth comes those smaller countries will face the dangers. They do not seem to have any fighting or defence spirit and I believe they are infiltrated by Communists'.[55] This last comment reflects Franco's life-long obsession with communism.[56]

Franco's remarks further indicate that he considered the smaller NATO member states responsible for obstructing Spain's membership of the Atlantic alliance. This supports the idea that small states can have an impact on international affairs. In any case, the dictator would not see any rapprochement between NATO and Spain in his lifetime. On 20 November 1975, six months after his meeting with Ford, the 82-year-old Franco died in a Madrid hospital. Prince Juan Carlos, who in 1969 had been appointed as Franco's future successor, was crowned as king and became the new head of state. Spain embarked on an uncertain transition from dictatorship to democracy.

Reviewing the period of 1973–1975, it can be concluded that during the end phase of the Franco regime the den Uyl cabinet acted as a critical ally as far as the Spanish Question was concerned, putting the social democrats' long propagated critical stance into practise. The cabinet was motivated by the idea that NATO should defend democratic values, making any rapprochement with dictatorial Spain impossible. In order to prevent any rapprochement between the Atlantic alliance and Spain, the den Uyl cabinet applied strategies from directly appealing to Ford and Kissinger to change their policy, to unequivocally opposing any rapprochement between NATO and Spain during meetings of the Atlantic alliance. By using its margins of manoeuvre, the den Uyl cabinet thwarted the pressure by the American government to achieve closer ties between the Atlantic alliance and Spain. The next section demonstrates that the den Uyl cabinet maintained its critical stance during the uncertain transition from dictatorship to democracy.

No cooperation during the transition (1975–1977)

The death of Franco, the crowning of Juan Carlos and the continuation of Prime Minister Arias Navarro heading the first post-Franco government did not change the position of the den Uyl cabinet regarding the Spanish Question. In a memorandum accompanying the 1976 budget proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, van der Stoel wrote that only a democratic Spain could become a member of NATO.[57] Evidently, van der Stoel took the stance that the death of the dictator did not make Spain automatically democratic. A successful transition from dictatorship to democracy was far from certain. Hence, van der Stoel continued his policy, insisting on democracy before membership.

In the meantime, the pressure from the United States to establish closer ties between NATO and Spain had subsided. The Dutch ambassador in Washington D.C., A. R. Tammenoms Bakker, reported that during the upcoming DPC meeting on 9–10 December Kissinger would not press for a rapprochement between NATO and Spain.[58] A plausible explanation is that, in October 1975, the United States and the Franco regime had signed a preliminary accord to renew the American use of military bases in Spain.[59] Thus, the American government had practically achieved its objective to maintain military bases in Spain, making the need to lobby for a rapprochement between NATO and Spain to please the Spanish government no longer urgent.

After the DPC meeting, Vredeling confirmed in an interview with a Dutch newspaper that the American delegation had refrained from exerting pressure. Spain had been discussed but not in such a way that Vredeling thought it necessary to intervene. Secretary general Luns, who at the beginning of 1975 in his conversation with Ford and Kissinger had stated that the Franco regime should be supported, now also seemed convinced that it was not the right time for closer ties between NATO and Spain.[60] As a result, there was no remark on Spain in the final communiqué.[61] This was in stark contrast with the earlier cited communiqué of May 1975, in which Spain was mentioned, albeit with the clause conceded by the Americans that the bilateral arrangements between the United States and Spain did not imply any relation with NATO.

While the pressure from the United States for a rapprochement between NATO and Spain subsided, the Arias Navarro transition government became more assertive in propagating a NATO membership. In an interview with *Newsweek* in January 1976, Arias Navarro declared 'there cannot be any further discrimination against Spain. Either Europe recognizes our role as its natural ally or Spain will have to limit the use of the bases strictly to US and Spanish needs'.[62]

In the United States, the Spanish assertiveness was welcomed. Tammenoms Bakker reported from Washington D.C. that the Country Officer Spain at the State Department had shown relief that the Spanish government expressed more openly the aspiration to join NATO. As a result, the United States was no longer forced in an 'ungrateful intermediary role' between Spain and the European allies.[63] The United States seemed to have experienced that even a superpower could have its margins of manoeuvre curtailed by smaller allies.

On 24 January, Kissinger and the new Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, José María de Areilza, signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Madrid. At the American embassy in Madrid, Dutch ambassador Jan Herman Odo Insinger was informed that the American government had been careful not to propose any commitments between Spain and NATO, including the obligation by the United States to arrange Spain's membership of the Atlantic alliance.[64] Apparently at the American embassy efforts were made not to provoke the critical Dutch NATO ally.

While the Americans refrained from lobbying strongly for a rapprochement between the Atlantic alliance and Spain, van der Stoel no longer seemed to be concerned about the Spanish Question. At the end of February, he stated in an interview with a Dutch newspaper that earlier attempts to forge closer ties between NATO and Spain had been averted, partly because of the 'resolute manner' in which the Netherlands had rejected such connections.[65] Van der Stoel seemed convinced that the Netherlands had played an important role in refuting any rapprochement between the Atlantic alliance and Spain. However, in June the issue would come up once more.

From 2–6 June, King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia paid their first official visit to the United States. In the Netherlands, Dutch newspapers reported that Areilza and Kissinger had declared that Spain should become a member of NATO.[66] Van der Stoel reacted swiftly, ordering the spokesperson of his department to release a

statement confirming that 'the Netherlands will not cooperate with the accession of Spain to NATO'.[67] In addition, van der Stoel asked the embassy in Washington D.C. to provide information regarding the declarations made by Areilza and Kissinger.[68]

In reaction to van der Stoel's instruction, ambassador Tammenoms Bakker sent the following quote from Kissinger's previously mentioned statement: 'we believe that Spain should become a member of NATO as soon as possible and we encourage all efforts to bring Spain closer to the European communities'.[69] This was an unequivocal declaration of support for Spanish membership of NATO. Insinger, however, reported from Madrid that the declarations by Areilza and Kissinger had been played down at the American embassy by stating that both parties had dealt cautiously with this topic. Besides, the Spanish government had indicated that it would not necessarily aim for a NATO membership.[70] Again, the American diplomats in Spain appeared to be very prudent not to cause problems with their NATO allies.

Meanwhile, during a reception at the Belgian embassy in Madrid, Insinger had been approached by the Spanish Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Marcelino Oreja. He expressed his 'deep disappointment' in the Netherlands, a country 'which only seemed to be able to criticize'. Oreja denied that Areilza had made any declarations with regard to Spain and NATO. He further stated that Areilza was 'personally aggrieved and offended by this unexpected stab in the back'. The Spanish minister deemed the statement by van der Stoel 'a gross discourtesy', considering it an 'unfriendly act toward Spain'. He insisted on a rectification by van der Stoel. When Insinger asked Oreja if he should report these strong words to van der Stoel, Oreja said that 'it was time that The Hague realizes what we think of its attitude'.[71] Evidently, the den Uyl cabinet's critical stance did not go unnoticed in Spain.

Interestingly, van der Stoel did not seem to want to harm the diplomatic relations with the Spanish transition government. An explanation may be found in the positive impression made by Areilza on van der Stoel, when the former had visited the Netherlands in February 1976 to clarify the transition process taking place in Spain.[72] Van der Stoel instructed Insinger to explain the Dutch position regarding the Spanish Question at the Spanish ministry of foreign affairs, emphasising that he had no intention to criticise minister Areilza, for whom the Dutch government – and he personally – had the utmost regard.[73]

Later that month, van der Stoel spoke with Areilza during a meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). According to van der Stoel, he had a fruitful conversation with his Spanish counterpart, during which they agreed to consider the incident a thing of the past.[74] Within weeks, though, there would be a change of government in Spain, with Prime Minister Arias Navarro and Minister of Foreign Affairs Areilza being replaced by respectively Adolfo Suárez and Marcelino Oreja, who only weeks before had not concealed his criticism of the den Uyl cabinet.

The Suárez government did not consider the accession to NATO a priority while facing more urgent challenges to accomplish the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Oreja stated in an interview with Spanish newspaper *Ya* that a

NATO membership required a thorough consideration, including the consultation of the Spanish people. He was not concerned with the question whether NATO would open its doors to Spain, as the Spaniards first needed to make up their own mind on the issue.[75] This was picked up by van der Stoel.

In September, during a briefing for Dutch parliamentarians preparing to visit a conference of the International Parliamentarian Union in Madrid, van der Stoel explained that the Suárez government did not consider a rapprochement to NATO a priority. Still, he pointed out that there would be negative reactions within NATO in case the Spanish government would submit a membership request.[76] One month later, in a memorandum on the department's budget for the year 1977, van der Stoel reiterated that Spain would not be allowed to join NATO until a democracy had been established. He also stated that the Spanish government was leaving the issue dormant.[77] A few days later, van der Stoel emphasised once again in parliament that the Spanish government was not contemplating a membership application, adding that Spain's accession to NATO was not a current issue.[78]

During the following months, the question of a possible Spanish membership of NATO remained dormant. On 15 June 1977, the first democratic elections since 1936 took place in Spain. The party of Suárez, the *Unión de Centro Democrático* (Union of the Democratic Centre – UCD), won the elections. While Suárez stayed on as prime minister to continue the democratisation project, the den Uyl cabinet's term finished by the end of 1977. At that time, the Spanish government still did not consider a NATO membership a priority, focussing its attention on consolidating democracy while addressing severe economic problems. It would take nearly five years for Spain to join NATO. On 30 May 1982, 33 years after NATO was founded, democratic Spain was finally welcomed in the Atlantic alliance.

Revisiting the period 1975–1977, it can be concluded that during the Spanish transition the Den Uyl cabinet continued to act like a critical ally as far as the Spanish Question was concerned. Still motivated by the principle that only a democratic Spain could become a member of NATO, the den Uyl cabinet maintained its policy to reject any rapprochement between the Atlantic alliance and Spain as long as no democracy was established. When Kissinger and Areilza stated that Spain should become a member of NATO, van der Stoel immediately made clear that the Dutch would reject such a move, an announcement which was not appreciated by the Arias Navarro government. The change of government in Spain did not alter the stance of the den Uyl cabinet. The Spanish Question was moved to the back burner as the Suárez government, during the transition and after the first democratic elections, did not consider the accession of the Atlantic alliance as a priority.

Conclusion

In this chapter the motives, strategies and results of the Dutch social democrats' stance and the den Uyl cabinet's policy regarding the Spanish Question were examined in order to shed light on the margins of manoeuvre of small states – and actors within small states – to pursue their own foreign policy interests during the

Cold War era. In addition, the notion of the Netherlands as a critical NATO ally has been addressed.

This case study has demonstrated that domestic politics are a relevant factor in the foreign policy of small states. In fact, the origins of the critical stance by the den Uyl cabinet can be traced back to the establishment of the Atlantic alliance. Long before the generally perceived shift from loyal to critical ally during the 1970s, the social democrats opposed any rapprochement between NATO and Spain. Driven by their aversion of the non-democratic Franco regime, the social democrats tried to influence Dutch foreign policy by discussing the Spanish Question in parliament and pressing the government to declare that only a democratic Spain could join the Atlantic alliance. Most of the time, the PvdA did not get what it asked for, with the government generally acting as a loyal ally, remaining aloof. Nevertheless, the social democrats left no doubt that the government could expect strong opposition if it agreed to closer ties between NATO and Spain. The social democrats thus played a role in limiting the margins of manoeuvre of the Dutch government, while indirectly also contributing to restricting the options of the United States and Spain.

This chapter has further shown that the influence of small states on international affairs should not be underestimated. The den Uyl cabinet definitely did not consider the Netherlands as a powerless member within NATO, at the mercy of the United States. With regard to the Spanish Question, the den Uyl cabinet unequivocally acted as a critical ally, motivated by the conviction that NATO should defend democratic values. This became most apparent during the end phase of the Franco regime, when the pressure by the United States for closer ties between NATO and Spain was at its height. The den Uyl cabinet directly appealed to Ford and Kissinger to change their stance on the Spanish Question and 'squarely opposed' any rapprochement between the Atlantic alliance and Franco Spain during the NATO meetings. Thus, the den Uyl cabinet used its margins of manoeuvre to prevent any rapprochement between NATO and Spain, thwarting the pressure by the American government to achieve closer ties between the Atlantic alliance and Spain.

During the Spanish transition, the den Uyl cabinet continued to oppose any rapprochement between NATO and Spain, motivated by the idea that the death of dictator Franco did not turn Spain into a democracy overnight. When Kissinger and Areilza in June 1976 stated that Spain should become a member of NATO, van der Stoel immediately made clear that the Dutch would reject such a move, a gesture that was not appreciated by the Arias Navarro government. When Arias Navarro was replaced by Suárez, the stance of the den Uyl cabinet did not alter. Meanwhile, the pressure from the United States and Spain to achieve closer ties between the Atlantic alliance and Spain subsided, as the Suárez government moved the issue to the back burner to face more urgent issues, among which was the consolidation of the newly established democracy.

Overall, the attitude of the Dutch social democrats and the den Uyl cabinet contributed to preventing dictatorial Spain from joining NATO. Evidently, small states – and actors within small states – can influence international affairs. It is important to note, however, that the Netherlands was not the only NATO member

to oppose close relations between the Atlantic alliance and Spain. Countries like the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark and Norway have been mentioned in this case study. Further research on the attitude and behaviour of other NATO members, especially the small states, would provide additional insight in the influence of small states on international affairs. Another opportunity for research would be to further disclose the Spanish side of the story, but this will require the opening of the archives of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Until that happens, historians will have to resort to archives in other countries to expand the current knowledge on the margins of manoeuvre of small states during the Cold War.

Notes

1 This chapter is based on research for my PhD dissertation at Utrecht University to be completed in 2019: *'The Dutch Will Give You Problems'. Nederland en de Spaanse transitie van dictatuur naar democratie, 1973–1977*. Note regarding this chapter: all translations from Dutch are the author's own, unless otherwise indicated.

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Part II

The margins of superpower rule

5 Manoeuvring into the Soviet market

Polish and Finnish Eastern trade practices during the Cold War

Suvi Kansikas, Mila Oiva and Saara Matala

For Poland and Finland, trading with the Soviet Union was a political necessity – but significantly, also a source of lucrative deals. However, the ways to find an advantage – a selling point – in the Soviet market changed greatly during the Cold War decades, because the market itself went through a rapid change: from the Stalin-era relative autarky of the 1940s and 1950s, to the technology-thirsty 1960s and 1970s, to the increasing economic rationality of the 1980s. Our chapter analyses Polish and Finnish traders' efforts to access the Soviet market. The two case studies shed light onto Cold War trade politics in general, and in particular, we offer new insights into the study of foreign trade practices of small states that seek to increase the room they have to manoeuvre in a political situation of asymmetric trade.

The analysis of the two cases – the 1950s and 1960s planned-economy Poland and the 1970s and 1980s market-economy Finland – is not a simple comparative approach, since the cases differ in many crucial aspects. Against the background of the case differences, we are interested in the similarities between them, because they will reveal patterns beyond traditional Cold War dichotomies and provide new theoretical openings on the study of small states.

To analyse market economy and planned economy trading practices together is a novel approach to Cold War trade that has been traditionally examined as the juxtaposition of two mutually exclusive economic models. With the asymmetric setting of our case studies, we can show that the simple capitalist-socialist dichotomy is not an adequate framework to study Soviet foreign trade policy. Another important category for studying Cold War era East–West trade is small state/ superpower, which we will refer to in this article as Poland's and Finland's use of their so-called 'power of the weak';[1] their ability to balance the power asymmetry by treating trade with the USSR as a high-priority foreign policy issue.

The time periods chosen for the case studies are also asymmetric: the Polish case analyses the starting phase of Polish-Soviet trade in the first post-war decades, whilst the Finnish case focuses on Finnish-Soviet trade in the latter half of the Cold War. Extending the period to encompass the whole Cold War era is crucial as it reveals how the Soviet economy and society changed and became integrated into the global economy after the isolationism of the Stalin era.[2] For the 1960s through 1980s, no systematic archival research has previously been

conducted on Soviet foreign trade policy. Here our contribution joins the burgeoning literature that seeks to 'de-marginalize the socio-economic history of Russia and the Soviet system'.[3]

The third asymmetry of the two cases is that for Finland, this chapter presents an analysis of the shipbuilding industry, which was labour, material and capital intensive.[4] It produced the so-called *hard goods* in the socialist lexicon. For the Polish case we focus on the ready-to-wear industry.[5] This was rather a *soft goods* industry, which required fewer production resources. With the study of both the shipbuilding and clothing trades, our article seeks to reassess the dichotomy between *hard* and *soft* goods that has prevailed from the socialist era literature following the ground-breaking study by Janos Kornai.[6]

In order to approach the similarities in the asymmetrical case studies analytically, we operationalised five dimensions for the margins of manoeuvre in our analysis. Our approach to Soviet foreign trade policy combines economic, social, political and cultural history to show the deep links to a capitalist way of trading that the Soviet Union cultivated during the Cold War period. We studied the agency of Polish and Finnish traders as well as the structures assisting or hindering access to the Soviet market. How did the traders analyse the ways they could improve their access to the Soviet market? And how did they manoeuvre for more export opportunities?

We analysed practices of trading in three phases of a sales transaction: 1) market analysis, which was needed to know what the demand was; 2) lobbying for a trade deal to create more demand and 3) networking the persons identified as decision-makers once demand and supply were certified. Therefore, outside the scope of this chapter are the more traditional approaches in the study of Soviet–East European relations such as 'who benefited more?' or 'was trade successful or not?'[7]

We define *manoeuvring* as an activity aimed at fulfilling one's own interests to the largest possible extent in a situation in which there is conflict in at least some of the negotiators' interests. We analysed manoeuvring on the Polish and Finnish part, because we define it as an activity that becomes necessary for the weaker parties in an asymmetrical trading situation.[8] The margins for this manoeuvring were created by the discrepancy between the economic plan and the reality in which trade took place. The Soviet regime was a centrally directed system, but it was not omnipotent. This type of economic system produced shortages and bottlenecks that created demand, which consequently provided room to manoeuvre for (informal) networks and hierarchies. Crucially, any sales transaction involved trade negotiations, which created room for manoeuvring.

The main primary sources of the Polish case consist of documentation of the Polish Association of Clothing Industries, the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade, the Soviet Chamber of Commerce, and interviews with Polish former foreign traders and fashion designers. The Finnish case utilises minutes and documents of the Finnish–Soviet company-level negotiations and correspondence with the governmental bodies involved in the trade: The Finnish Foreign Ministry, Government and the Central Bank.

Margins for manoeuvre in the Soviet trade

Selling to the Soviet market took place within a set of political, economic, structural, social and cultural margins for manoeuvre. These five dimensions form the analytical framework of our article. The limits of the room to manoeuvre in the field of foreign and security policy were clear and strict for Poland,[9] which was a member of the Warsaw Pact but also for Finland, which defined itself as a neutral country.[10] The economic limits ultimately were how much the Soviets could afford to buy in Poland and Finland. Trade policy also entailed security-related dimensions. As dependency on Soviet trade exposed Poland and Finland to Soviet economic warfare, the question was crucially about how dependent on Soviet trade, particularly energy, they wanted to become.

From the mid-1950s onwards, the international relaxing of tensions eased the pressure on the small Soviet neighbours. In the context of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, the question became whether it was possible to gain more room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis the USSR through trading. Poland's choice of trading partners was more restricted than Finland's, as it was bound by the socialist bloc structures; trading with the Soviet Union was a political obligation. For Finland, trading with the Soviet Union, and thus showing support to Soviet foreign policy endeavours, increased its trust capital, which gave Finnish policymakers leeway in their other trade relationships, particularly with Western European institutions.[11] Finland chose to increase its trade with its big neighbour for political and economic reasons, while simultaneously trying to limit the economic dependency on the Soviet Union through facilitating Western trade. After the USSR had used economic pressure to promote a change of government in Finland in 1958, Finnish-Soviet trade gradually became a means to foster the so-called special relationship with the USSR.[12]

In an economic sense, the margin for manoeuvre was the total volume of trade with the USSR. Market analysis was needed to find out whether the USSR bought from other exporters those products that the Finns and Poles wanted to sell or whether there in fact was no demand for them. The margins on the Soviet side for a sales transaction were related to a question of priorities, such as whether the Soviet Union preferred to import rather than produce something itself; whether it wanted to buy better quality or cheaper products, in which case it would search for other sellers and whether there were restrictions to its access to a product from other sources, such as the Western technology embargo established by the US-led Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom).[13] Like trade in general, the limits to trade with the Soviet Union were connected to the customer's willingness, need and ability to buy; the seller's domestic priorities, needs, resources and networks; the competitors' capabilities and aims and the market conditions. As the case studies of the chapter show, the Finnish and Polish domestic industries' interest was to sell to the Soviet market and get revenue or climb up the domestic ladder of important industries with the help of export production, whereas the Soviet government wanted to get the best deals with the Polish and Finnish exporters.

The structural margins were created by the socialist economic system, which had a state monopoly over foreign trade. Trade with a centrally planned economy, whether by market economy Finland or by Poland, which itself had such a trading system, was conducted in the framework of bilateral inter-governmental agreements. Therefore, the state was always involved in trade, even on the Finnish side. The other basic parameter was that trade was bilateral and based on a system called 'clearing', which implied that import and export volumes had to be balanced.[14] Therefore, all import and export decisions were linked together and had to be coordinated at the state level between the two sides. Whilst both Finnish-Soviet and Polish-Soviet clearing accounts allowed some flexibility, in general, neither country could export to the Soviet market more than they were willing and/or able to buy from the USSR. Therefore, ultimately, what the Soviet Union could produce for export and which imports its domestic market could absorb became the determining issues. The economic structure also imposed particular restrictions on Polish exports; the economic conditions, such as a continuous shortage of raw materials, hindered production.[15]

There were also social margins to consider: the foreign trade monopoly implied a hierarchical trade system, in which it was crucial to know who decided on purchases, how those actors could be influenced and what the system was able and willing to buy. A closed system also meant a limited circulation of knowledge. It required a lot of basic legwork to get to know the context. Crucially, also, information became one source of power or leverage. Therefore, a prerequisite for exporting was to use personal networks that provided an often informal but valuable social margin for manoeuvre.[16] Our case studies show that Poland and Finland sought to respond to restrictions in Soviet trade through market research, lobbying and networking. They needed to recognise how to play to the Soviet national interest, particularly its national security.

Finally, trade dealt with a set of cultural margins, because successful sales touched upon the issue of prestige or nation branding. Both Poland and Finland wanted to market themselves as technologically advanced and modern, which to some degree was associated with an imagined *Westernness*. Finland in particular promoted itself as a neutral state that engaged in cooperation with both blocs,[17] while Polish entrepreneurs sought to market their country and their industrial production as being *more Western* than that produced in the USSR.

Polish marketers reveal the Soviet demand for fashion in the 1950s

The post-Stalin years were a turning point in Soviet consumer culture. In 1955, the Soviet Union radically changed its foreign trade policy. It began to import more products, including consumer goods, than at any time since the October revolution. Yet, the volume of imports from the capitalist West at this point was still rather haphazard. Therefore, the Soviet import market radically increased the opportunities for East European countries to export.[18] This opened a window of opportunity for Polish entrepreneurs to promote their country and to increase the

revenues from exports. By the early-1950s, the Polish textile industry had recovered from the wartime destruction, and it managed to strengthen the industrial production of clothing. The opportunity to venture into the Soviet market with Polish fashion was suddenly available to Polish traders.

As a prerequisite for successful Polish sales to the Soviet Union, there needed to be a market ready to absorb Polish industrial goods. Also crucial was information on how they could be sold to the Soviet market. In the late-1950s, Polish trade and industrial organisations arranged two successful promotion events in the Soviet Union: a fashion show tour, *Pol'skie mody '58*, was organised in 1958, and the following year the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade organised an Industrial Exhibition in Moscow.[19] The events allowed both clothes producers and exporters to get a feel of the emerging market and to establish networks.

Pol'skie mody '58, held in Moscow and Leningrad in May 1958, showed a spring-summer collection including dresses, suits, light trench coats, swimwear and evening dresses.[20] The variety of clothing presented during the tour was also illustrated in a promotional article in perhaps the most important Soviet women's magazine, *Rabotnitsa* (Woman Worker) the following month.[21] In 1959, the Industrial Exhibition showcased Polish achievements to the Soviet audience. Its timing was also matched so that it would help Poland's trade negotiators lobby for an increase in the volume of light-goods industry products in the upcoming 1961–1965 five-year trade agreement.[22] The exhibition that ran for a month included four pavilions and hosted approximately one million visitors.[23] The Polish organisers noticed that the exhibition visitors, who were foreign trade and industry specialists and ordinary urban citizens,[24] were very interested in the pavilion that was displaying consumer goods and other items that Polish light industry had to offer. The ordinary citizens frequented those sections that had Polish furniture, fabrics, crystals and porcelain on display, whereas they would not show such enthusiasm for laboratory equipment and shipyard machinery, for which they did not have any need.[25]

For Polish foreign trade, the exhibition of 1959 was an important watershed, which provided crucial information on the changes in the Soviet market and on the increasing importance of the end-users, the Soviet customers. The burgeoning consumer culture, supported by the Khrushchev regime, had prompted Soviet planners to start recognising the citizens' demands for consumer goods.[26] The exhibition revealed that the Soviet market was becoming ripe for new trading strategies; Polish entrepreneurs realised that it was both possible and essential to advertise their products on the Soviet market. Soviet import decisions were based on information mediated by regional trade organisations on the popular demand. Therefore, Polish traders could exert pressure on the Soviet wholesale purchasers to buy Polish goods by marketing them directly to Soviet consumers. As the control over the Soviet market began to be loosened, the Polish exporters gained structural leverage.

After the 1959 exhibition, Polish foreign traders had good grounds to start promoting the image of a modern, well-developed Poland by referencing their fashionable ready-made clothing. From the late-1950s onwards, foreign exhibitions

became a more frequent and normal part of trading and essential meeting and networking points where most of the encounters between exporters, importers and the potential customers took place.[27] As the exhibitions extended from Moscow to other cities, Polish traders' level of market analysis improved. When they began to visit Soviet cities outside the capital, they could observe more effectively what interested people in several Soviet regions.[28]

Gradually, Polish clothing exporters collected first-hand knowledge of the local trends and needs in various parts of the country, as well as the shortages of those goods they were selling. By the end of the 1960s, there was already a market research coordinator working for the Polish Association of Clothing Industries who monitored the Soviet market.[29] The Soviet Union finally seemed to be ready to allow market research, advertising and country branding of foreign producers.

The Soviet consumer society becomes the Polish target market in the 1960s

The problems encountered by Soviet domestic clothing production, alongside the prestigious status given to generally all imported goods in the Soviet Union, helped to export and market Polish clothing. Between 1958 and 1965, around 50 percent of the overall Polish clothing production headed to the Soviet Union.[30] Simultaneously, the reputation of the Polish goods improved: they were considered fashionable in design, and 'almost Western'.[31] The Polish consumer goods were often not competitive in the Western market, but in the Soviet market the same goods became luxury products because of the value placed on 'exported goods' in the socialist system and the closer connections to Western fashion trends that Polish designers had.[32]

According to marketing theories that had been rapidly spreading in the US and Western Europe in the 1950s, a successful marketing strategy adjusted all steps from design, appearance, distribution, production schedules, financial budgets, credit facilities, storage, transportation, and packaging to the character and conditions of the market.[33] This sales strategy was adopted in Poland during the same decade. By the late 1950s, the Polish clothing entrepreneurs' repertoire had come to include various practices such as advertising in the foreign press. Their *reklama* (advertisements) aimed at creating a positive image of Polish clothes that would entice potential consumers to purchase them.[34]

In the spring of 1961, Polish manufacturers were ready to enter the Soviet market in a completely new way. Beginning in 1961, the Polish clothing industry started specialising for an exclusively defined market segment: a separate export collection for the Soviet market.[35] To manufacture a collection that would attract demand from Soviet consumers required collaboration across a range of sectors. Producers and traders needed to share their knowledge on the latest trends, preferences of the Soviet market and the export marketing methods. A governmental reorganisation in 1958 introduced a new forum for exchanging this kind of information: the Export Councils, which worked under different ministries.[36]

   By adapting their production to the needs of the Soviet market, the Polish clothing industry used their cultural capital to create more opportunities for sales. The market research gave them information on the customers' preferences and climate conditions in different parts of the Soviet Union. Depending on their destination, similar types of clothing were to be designed in 'various different cuts, from classical to fanciful, following the actual fashion trends and using a rich variety of fabrics and colours'.[37] According to some of the Polish designers, the Soviet collections were more colourful and classical than those intended for Polish customers.[38]

   While the Soviet collection was designed to demonstrate well-equipped, prosperous and stylish Polish clothes, it simultaneously revealed how the Polish exporters understood 'Soviet taste'. They expected Soviet purchasers and consumers to favour colourfulness and product variety. Moreover, their understanding was that modernist minimalism might not appeal to their Eastern neighbours. Operating in the cultural hierarchies of the fashion world of the early-1960s, the Polish clothing exporters considered that, compared with the Soviets, they had superior design and fashion knowledge. At that time, Paris was considered to be the centre of the fashion world,[39] and Warsaw's closer contacts to Paris gave it cultural leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. Polish fashion designers sought to follow Western trends and provide corresponding clothing to the domestic market. However, when they designed products for the Soviet market, they adjusted the designs corresponding to what they described as the Soviet more conservative way of dressing.[40]

   The Soviet Union maintained its position as the most important export direction of the growing Polish clothing industry.[41] At the same time, an awareness of the value of fashion gained prominence. The preparations of the Soviet collection convey how the Polish traders were intent on selling 'fashion' instead of simple ready-made garments. Soviet literature on advertising at the time deemed the so-called imaginary value of goods a 'capitalist practice',[42] whereas Polish advertising handbooks already acknowledged the link between consumers' willingness to pay more for a product that exhibited fashion trends and conveyed social appreciation.[43] This novel understanding transcended the practices of the clothing industry. The designs were supposed to add an 'imaginary', culturally and socially determined value to the Polish ready-made clothes: what was 'fashionable' cost more.

   In the allegedly equalitarian socialist world, the hierarchical level of the actors, both official and culturally defined, influenced their room to manoeuvre. With the creation of an attractive Polish collection – and by using fashion brands – the Polish clothing exporters sought to appeal to the tastes and cultural affinities of Soviet customers, thus making their products 'harder'.[44] They used their networks within the Soviet trade sector to create a social demand for Polish clothes. Other competitive negotiation tactics included inviting representatives of the Soviet regional consumer good trade organisations to the negotiations. These representatives wanted to secure more imported goods for their own regions and therefore their presence pressured *Raznoeksport*, the Soviet main negotiation organisation, to accept more attractive and expensive clothes than initially planned.[45]

The successful tactics nonetheless reached the boundaries of tolerable behaviour: in August 1961, the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw warned that the Polish clothing exporters needed to 'stop manipulating the Soviet market'.[46] Nevertheless, over the long term, the introduction of these marketing practices was the final step in entrenching a more open Soviet market.

Finnish industrialists probe the Soviet market in the 1970s

In the next decade, the limits of the Soviet market's flexibility and the best ways in which to sign business deals were tested by Finnish industrialists. The Finnish products, as opposed to Polish light-industry goods, were designed to play into the combination of Soviet preferences for high-tech and heavy industry. At the time, a typical way to secure business entry was to advertise products in the press.[47] Besides relying on marketing this way, Finnish shipbuilders took advantage of the networks they could access. They opted to use the existing bilateral networks created for preferential treatment of Finnish businesses to the Soviet Union: the bilateral intergovernmental Scientific-Technical Committee. Previously, the shipbuilding sector had shunned the committee because it had deemed this knowledge-sharing cooperation to be non-productive in a business sense.[48] In the 1970s, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries became interested in industrial, scientific and technical cooperation because the Finnish industrialists recognised it as a way to promote their competitive situation in relation to other Western countries and to develop new products for which there was no demand in Finland.

Thus, in the mid-1970s, a group of seven Finnish shipbuilding and manufacturing companies made a joint proposal to the Scientific-Technical Committee.[49] They suggested Finnish–Soviet cooperation in Arctic technology related to offshore drilling in the Soviet High North. They might have been consciously responding to the growing importance that the Soviet side placed on this kind of cooperation, but moreover, there was a more pertinent global development they were trying to counter.

In the first decades of the Cold War, Finland had been able to secure a satisfactory share of the Soviet shipbuilding market. The oil crisis that hit the global market in the 1970s affected both the economic and structural margins within which the Finnish shipyards were to negotiate with their biggest customer, the Soviet Union. First, the oil price hike increased the value of Soviet exports to Finland, consequently expanding export opportunities to the Soviet Union. Second, the shipyard crisis in the West constantly pushed more competitors to the previously protected Soviet market, which initially decreased the Finnish structural margin for price bargaining. However, the Finnish shipyards reacted with a manoeuvre that eventually enhanced their competitiveness.

The shipyard managers were able to find new production branches that were either strategic or sophisticated enough to eliminate cost competition and also to provide some agency to the Soviet organisations. Globally rising interest in hydrocarbon deposits under the ocean floor and especially the explorations in the North Sea had made offshore technology an attractive alternative for shipyards.[50]

A more direct Soviet need for this kind of cooperation had been discovered by the Finnish shipbuilders. They had been reading signals of Soviet interests in turning the focus of their oil and gas strategy from West Siberia to the Barents Sea offshore fields. Moreover, while the Soviet oil and gas technology was relatively advanced in onshore fields, it was reliant on imported Western technology on explorations and exploitations of hydrocarbons in the Arctic conditions.[51] Here, the Finnish businesses found their niche and made the proposal to start specialising in Arctic technology in a joint project with the Soviet Union.

The project was a manoeuvre to expand the structural margin by increasing the Soviet demand for the Finnish offshore technology. The Finnish businesses were first and foremost in search of new business opportunities. They had recognised a growing market in the Soviet arctic offshore and decided to use the Scientific-Technological Committee to improve their competitive position in the Soviet Union, to funnel research and development investments to Arctic technology and to enter into new markets. They also needed to show some benefits for the Soviet Union so that it would get on board. The Finns promised their long-time experience in ice-going vessels, their willingness to engage in long-standing cooperation and, ultimately, a possibility to channel Western technological know-how.[52]

Finland had no direct access to Arctic waters and it had no domestic offshore industry whose premises it could use to develop and test new products. The Finnish shipbuilders had experience in building ice-going vessels, but the ice conditions in the Baltic Sea were different from the multi-year polar ice in the Soviet Arctic. Even though Finnish shipbuilding companies, particularly the privately-owned Wärtsilä, had successfully developed ice-going vessels for polar environments, advanced ice research in the Soviet High North was not unproblematic because of the expenses and strategic sensitivity of the area.[53] Moreover, the Soviet Union had already initiated cooperative projects in oil exploration and pumping with American, French, Canadian and Japanese companies, whose expertise they regarded to be superior.[54]

Starting in the 1960s, the Soviet Union had increased its trade with Western countries to boost its economic growth.[55] In the competition with more advanced industrial countries such as West Germany, Finland had lost its position as the USSR's biggest Western trading partner. Finland was not the only possible channel available for the Soviet Union to obtain Western technology nor was it the most knowledgeable or experienced partner in the Arctic offshore. Yet, it was a very convenient collaborator for a long and extensive cooperation project. Finland had a long experience in dealing with the Soviets, and it had the bilateral state-level infrastructure tested and ready for intensive scientific–technical cooperation. The personal connections provided invaluable social margins in which the initiative could be negotiated without excessive bureaucratic constraints. In October 1976, the Soviet chair of the Scientific-Technical Committee, Dzhermen Gvishiani, specified that the Soviet Union would be interested in cooperating with Finland in generating more knowledge on ice mechanisms and ice physics as well as developing state-of-the-art equipment. Oil explorations the Soviets wanted to conduct by themselves. As Gvishiani told his Finnish counterpart, 'they had to be

careful with western companies – they all claim to know more than they actually know'.[56] Finland, it appears, was not counted in this category of unreliable business partners.

Eventually, the Finnish maritime sector was able to upload shipbuilding onto the Finnish–Soviet Scientific-Technical Committee's agenda. In 1977, for the first time, the protocol from a committee meeting recorded a significant number of studies that the Finnish side had initiated: propulsion in heavy ice conditions, physics and mechanics between ship hull and ice and winter navigation.[57]

Even though the project had been initiated to respond to domestic needs in Finland, it was indirectly boosted by international politics. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the CoCom embargo tightened the export control especially focusing on the export of oil drilling equipment and offshore technology.[58] At the turn of 1980s, Finland was the best political and economic compromise available for the Soviet Union to get access to Western offshore technology.

Last Finnish efforts to preserve the Soviet market, 1980s

Wärtsilä, the largest of the shipbuilding companies that had participated in the Arctic campaign from the 1970s onwards, was starting to feel the pressure of market access in the late-1980s. The company had longstanding networks in Moscow, but now shrinking Soviet resources decreased the economic margin; the loosening political coordination of trade decreased opportunities to employ the social margin, and the increasing number of Western competitors reduced the structural margin as they started to hamper the Finnish–Soviet ship business in a way that was unfamiliar to the experienced executives.[59] In the tight economic situation, the shipyard needed a project that would be too tempting for the Soviet buyer to reject or bargain down or be too easy for Western competitors to win.

The company's marketing focus turned from conventional ships to the politically and technologically exceptional vessels as the directors put their hopes in the continuation of the series of nuclear icebreakers. The company was currently in the process of completing two such enormous vessels for the Soviet Northern Fleet. The discussions of a possible continuation of such a project between the two countries began in 1987.[60] Politically, the high-technology cooperation was just what the Soviets had kept asking for throughout the Finnish–Soviet Cold War economic relationship. In economic terms, the profitability of manufacturing an icebreaker of this class contrasted sharply with the shipyard's other projects. A strategic service ship, without a clear market price, was a flexible object in political negotiations and provided an option to overturn economic restrictions.[61] Moreover, it had no Western competitors.[62]

The vast number of visits and the list of persons involved in the negotiations indicated the great significance of this nuclear icebreaker proposal. In December 1987 alone, Wärtsilä's subsidiary Wärtsilä Marine's negotiators had meetings with every Soviet organisation somehow involved in ship importing from Finland, from the end-user organisation, the Soviet Ministry for Merchant Marine, *Morflot*, to the Kremlin.[63] Several Soviet civil servants and officers confirmed

to Wärtsilä's representatives that the Soviet Northern Fleet was truly in need of another nuclear icebreaker to be used during the temporary maintenance breaks of the two shallow draft nuclear icebreakers that Finland had already sold to the Soviets. According to the Finns' understanding, the Soviet Union would place the order 'in the near future'.[64]

However, further discussions with the Soviets had also brought to light more contested points of view. The reorganisation of the Soviet economy had diminished the power of central coordination and made the Soviet icebreaker operator, Morflot, economically more independent of the government. Before, the central government had allocated resources for ship purchases which were included in the plans. Now, expected to be self-sufficient, Morflot had to re-evaluate new ship purchases in a restricted economic framework.[65] The Finns nonetheless continued to believe that the Soviet Shipbuilding Minister Volmer had the final say in the matter. Thus, they continued lobbying Minister Volmer regardless of Morflot representatives' counterarguments.[66]

As had been the custom in Soviet Eastern trade politics since the 1950s, to untie the deadlock situation Wärtsilä and its shipbuilding subsidiary tried to push the project forward through political channels. Wärtsilä's CEO Pekka Laine got the Finnish Minister of Trade and Industry Ilkka Suominen to invite the Soviet Shipbuilding Minister Volmer to Helsinki for negotiations in the near future.[67] Later in the year, Wärtsilä was promised that the sale was '95 percent sure'.[68]

However, within a few months, the confidence turned into uncertainty when the company heard that Gosplan, the Soviet Planning Agency, had reallocated a large proportion of the national shipbuilding budget from Morflot to fisheries.[69] While the social margin to negotiate with personal connections still existed, it no longer provided a short-cut to closing the deal. Now having to operate within a strict budget limit, Morflot needed to prioritise cheaper types of multi-purpose icebreaking ships.[70]

The company directors put their hope in the only remaining level of the Soviet hierarchy, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who was coming to Finland for an official state visit in October 1989. The Finns expected Gorbachev to be able, and according to some sources also willing, to bypass normal protocols and economic restrictions and to confirm the order of the third nuclear icebreaker. Wärtsilä was so confident in its appeal to Gorbachev that it built a model of the new generation Finnish–Soviet nuclear icebreaker to be presented during his visit.[71]

Indeed, the autumn of 1989 became globally memorable in many ways, but for Wärtsilä not in a positive sense. On 23 October, just days before Gorbachev's much awaited state visit began, Wärtsilä's shipbuilding subsidiary, Wärtsilä Marine, went bankrupt. The nuclear icebreaker project had been the last hope for the company, but now it could not avoid insolvency. The Soviet Union's own economic difficulties were also a major disturbance that the project would eventually have encountered. It seems that the four decades of Finnish expertise in navigating the hierarchical Soviet foreign trade policy mechanism could not be used in the changing landscape of perestroika-era Soviet Union. Venerable Soviet officials, committed to Finnish trade, had supported the project out of habit because it

fit so well with the political rhetoric of Finnish–Soviet cooperation and state-level agreements, but they no longer had the power to close the deal when perestroika changed the principles and practices of Soviet foreign trade. The Finns' room to manoeuvre in social and political margins within the Soviet system significantly decreased when requirements for economic responsibility replaced hierarchical planning.

Conclusions

This chapter has highlighted that selling to the Soviet market was an achievement that Polish and Finnish exporters needed to prepare carefully, whether it was selling fashion or technology. The experiences Polish textile producers and Finnish shipbuilders had in the Soviet market point to price-conscious buyers who knew good quality when they saw it but who also sought to get the best deal for the products they wanted. The Soviet Union, whose economic system has been labelled as a 'shortage economy', did not need to buy and certainly did not buy whatever its neighbours wanted to sell. The products had to have a competitive edge – they needed to be somehow technologically or design-wise advanced. This forced the smaller trading partners to concentrate on designing or re-designing their products to match the Soviet market. To achieve this, they needed to conduct extensive market research and build networks that provided access to key decision-makers. This knowledge of the market was used for bargaining with those Soviet actors who understood the added value of Western technology and fashion. Successful claims that the technology they manufactured and sold was apolitical gave industrial entrepreneurs access to lower-level Soviet officials and room to bargain for better prices for technology products. Social and cultural affinities and priorities such as prestige or brands were context-related and therefore gave room to negotiate a better price for the exchanged product.

   In their evaluation of whether to buy Finnish or Polish goods, the Soviet economic and trade decision-makers first evaluated whether there was a need for such a product. The next evaluation was whether they would import such product or try to produce it themselves. The competitive advantage the two small neighbours had over Soviet domestic producers was their ability to prioritise the Soviet market and their perceived 'Westernness'. While not even Finland belonged unequivocally to the capitalist Cold War West, both countries had far tighter contacts with the Western high-tech world than the Soviet Union. If the latter decided to buy, one key factor in deciding on the trading partners was geopolitical considerations: would they place the order in Finland or Poland or some other country, and would the purchase tip the balance in the trade relationship too far to the favour of either one? Here it was important for the Poles and Finns to 'work the system' – to know through which infrastructure and decision-making hierarchies to lobby for their products to the right people in charge of import decisions. Whereas the Finns tried to use the highest levels of decision-making, even the Soviet Communist Party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the Poles targeted the end-users: the fashion-thirsty Soviet consumers.

Our analysis was interested in the similarities between the two cases because they provide important insights beyond the trite capitalist–socialist dichotomy of Cold War trade politics. Crucially, our systematic evaluation shows that, in an asymmetric trade relationship, a smaller country is forced to compensate for its lack of economies of scale, to use its 'power of the weak' – its capacity to focus attention and resources on one objective, while the bigger must always divide its attention between multiple issues. The Poles and Finns conducted intensive market research to locate a niche – whether it be Western-like fashion or polar icebreakers. In particular, the Soviet Union's smaller trade partners needed to be agile and able to correspond to the latest trends and developments. They typically sought to interact with intermediate- and low-level actors and to frame their manoeuvres in the language of apolitical trade because that is how the Cold War-related high-politics were less significant factors in trade decisions. Occasionally, however, they also invoked the highest-ranking politicians and employed political arguments to push their trade through in a dead-end situation.

Cultural imaginaries also played a significant role in the small countries' trade with the USSR: Finland benefitted from the so-called good-neighbourly relations, as the Finnish traders were considered to be trustworthy in comparison with the 'bluffing' Western traders. Intangible assets, such as trust built upon long-term personal contacts, were invaluable when trading with the Soviets. Also, the reputation of Finland for producing advanced modern technology helped. Poland, while in the Soviet bloc, could nonetheless benefit from its greater openness to Western cultural influences. This allowed Polish exporters to build an 'almost Western' reputation for their goods in the Soviet Union.

As in any trade, it was important for the small-state exporters to know the market and the purchasers and to network with the decision-makers – who in the Soviet trade were usually not the end-users of the products. Yet, the more the Soviet Union became a consumer society, the more the customers' preferences affected decision-makers' choices. Knowing the market and with good networks, the traders could identify which loopholes they should target. The emerging consumer goods market for clothing, targeted by Polish clothing exporters, and specific shipbuilding technology collaboration, sought by the Finns, are examples of the developing loopholes that the exporters sought to exploit.

Ultimately, of the five dimensions of the margins for manoeuvre, the political, economic and structural ones were much more difficult for the Polish and Finnish exporters to widen, whereas the social and cultural ones were operational for small-state actors at the intermediate and lower levels of the trading hierarchy. The narrowing of their room to manoeuvre even in these fields towards the end of the Cold War period should be seen as a result of the narrowing of the gap between their 'Westernness' vis-à-vis the USSR. Simultaneously, the usefulness of the social capital accumulated through market research was reduced as the Soviet Union was also beginning to experience rapid economic change in an effort to fully integrate into the global economy.

This study has shed new light on Cold War trade politics by showing how trade dynamics functioned at the grassroots and intermediate levels. Our case studies

demonstrated that the Soviet economy was not a centrally top-down coordinated, rational machine. Therefore, non-state actors from weaker states, using their soft bargaining power, had agency in influencing the Soviet demand structure. The smaller powers and individual trade actors could manoeuvre successful trade deals for themselves, which also meant that the allegedly apolitical, small actors could influence Cold War dynamics.

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6 The imperative of opening to the West and the impact of the 1968 crisis

Bulgaria's cooperation with Denmark and West Germany in the 1960s[1]

Elitza Stanoeva

Exemplifying small-state diplomacy in the straitjacket of Soviet geopolitics, the foreign policy of socialist Bulgaria was a matter of precarious 'manoeuvring' – a word that Todor Zhivkov, head of state and party until 1989, often used to self-congratulate his political shrewdness.[2] Towards the West, his was a strategy of manoeuvring national interests in uncharted waters around the icebergs of super-power geopolitics.

While Cold War historiography usually emphasises Bulgaria's unfaltering allegiance to the Soviet Union, thereby dismissing its foreign policy as a reiteration of Soviet positions, the argument in this chapter is that Bulgaria's alignment in the Soviet sphere of influence acted as both a propeller and a brake for its ambitions towards the West. Fear of remaining more insulated than the other people's democracies in Eastern Europe propelled its engagement with Western countries and gave it a competitive urge vis-à-vis its allies. Being a smaller power – both in a geopolitical and an economic sense – shaped Bulgaria's foreign policy in terms of goals, opportunities and constraints – but also pressures to adapt, at times sacrificing ideological orthodoxy for economic benefits or vice versa, within the changing parameters of the Cold War.

While the party leadership manoeuvred along the fine line of national interests and Soviet allegiance, the operatives in the Bulgarian foreign services were trying to maintain their own room for manoeuvre against the interference of political dogmatism. Economic cooperation with the West, the primary engine of the Bulgarian diplomatic pursuits outside the Eastern bloc, allowed the foreign services to take the lead in the 1960s, a period when East–West relations made a shift from 'hostile confrontation to antagonistic cooperation'.[3] In this decade, when the party leadership was denied direct access to Western governments, the state administration was responsible for the initial diplomatic advances. Implementing Bulgaria's foreign policy towards the West, ministers and technocrats enjoyed enough room for manoeuvre to infuse this policy with their pragmatic priorities and to steer the nascent cooperation in directions that would still guide intergovernmental relations once the party took a more active role in the 1970s.

This chapter examines Bulgaria's parallel political and economic relations with two countries across the 'Iron Curtain', the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

and Denmark: their (re)activation in the early 1960s, peak around the mid-1960s, deterioration in the aftermath of the crackdown on the Prague Spring in 1968 and the subsequent efforts at recovery. This comparison has several important premises. First, while the FRG was by far the most important economic partner of Bulgaria in the West, Denmark in contrast was one of the smallest among the European nations. Comparing Bulgaria's foreign policy towards the two countries demonstrates how strongly the imperative of opening to the West shaped its outreach and how much the concerns of lagging behind the rest of the Soviet bloc steered its course. Second, while Denmark, an ardent supporter of East–West rapprochement, was at the side-line of the Cold War confrontation, the FRG was at the very centre of it. Therefore, Bulgaria's engagement with the two countries evolved within profoundly different constellations of opportunities and limitations for small-state diplomacy. Shaped by divergent considerations of costs and benefits, Bulgaria's overtures towards Denmark and the FRG differed both on the level of policymaking (in the degree of party oversight) and on the level of policy implementation (in the scope of autonomous initiative held by state operatives).

The comparison therefore exposes not only the range of Bulgaria's strategies for manoeuvre in its diplomacy vis-à-vis Western countries but also the range of interpretations of foreign policy objectives within its party and state apparatuses. Furthermore, it challenges the common assumption that the Bulgarian Communist Party, *Balgarska Komunisticheska Partiya* (BKP) and its general secretary held all decision-making powers in foreign as well as economic policy whereas the state institutions were demoted to a passive role.[4] This chapter's contribution to the existing scholarship, therefore, is to delineate the scope of Bulgaria's small-state diplomacy outside of Soviet tutelage and then to demonstrate that, by infusing it with the pragmatic objectives of economic cooperation, state institutions managed to diminish its ideological dogmatism.

Bulgaria's cooperation with the West was prompted by the post-Stalinist economic reforms which aimed to modernise the country's industrial base. While Bulgarian research focuses on the domestic impacts of these reforms, little attention is given to their links with Bulgaria's foreign trade and the entailed pursuits of economic partnerships abroad.[5] In fact, their success was tied, from the onset, to an increase of both costly imports of production equipment, industrial inputs and knowhow from technologically advanced Western economies and of high-value exports to capitalist markets that could replenish the hard-currency reserves.[6] This called for the expansion of trade volume and diversification of traditional economic partnerships. As much as it kept in line with a general reformist thrust across the bloc, this strategy also stirred competition with fraternal regimes over lucrative transfers of Western technology and access to the more demanding Western markets. In their competitive undertakings, the Bulgarian foreign trade service worked hard to restore ties with old partners like (West) Germany and to reach out into new markets like Denmark.

Through the prism of small-state diplomacy in the Cold War context, the following comparison aims to gauge the interests that motivated Bulgaria's opening to the West as well as the conjunctural opportunities and structural limitations it faced in carving out a foreign policy course against the backdrop of growing

pan-European cooperation.[7] This study is based on declassified documents from the Central State Archive of Bulgaria: Politburo resolutions and documentation compiled by the party's Department 'Foreign Policy and International Relations' – contained in the BKP repositories (fund 1B); bilateral agreements ratified by the Council of Ministers (CM, f.136); internal correspondence and memos of meetings with foreign officials as well as annual reports and other information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA, f.1477), the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT, f.259) and the Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation (f.1244). Reports of the Radio Free Europe research unit (Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archive) are also consulted to assess the repercussions of Bulgarian domestic and international activities in the West.

Mapping synchronous negotiations and comparable milestones in Bulgaria's bilateral relations with Denmark and West Germany and contextualising them vis-à-vis external geopolitical processes and internal agenda-setting facilitates more general insights about Bulgaria's diplomacy and its room for manoeuvre in a particularly dynamic period of the Cold War. Finally, investigating the parallel document trails of the party and the state apparatus (and multiple sub-levels) reveals less straightforward links between (party) decision-making and (state) policy-implementation than the 'party–state' paradigm suggests and brings to the fore a more ambiguous match of ideology and pragmatism than the 'Soviet satellite' perspective allows for.

Bulgaria's pursuit of bilateral contacts with Denmark in the 1960s

Under the imperative of opening to the West, Denmark – a country of minimal prior contact – entered the scope of Bulgaria's foreign-policy pursuits in the late 1950s. Distant not only politically but also geographically, Denmark would subsequently become a partner that would allow Bulgaria some room for independent foreign-policy initiatives, as bilateral contacts were safely detached from any sensitive geopolitical issue and hence developed under the Soviet radar. Yet, the opportunities it presented for Bulgaria's diplomacy were to a large extent secured because of their intrinsic limitations. In their entry into Denmark, the Bulgarian foreign services followed in the steps of East European countries with stable historical contacts there, particularly the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany. This simultaneously constrained the breadth of Bulgarian deals with Denmark as secondary in importance to other socialist regimes and infused the underlying cooperation strategy with competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the bloc.

In this strategy, foreign trade was both a means and an end. On the one hand, trade was anticipated to break the ice in bilateral communication. On the other hand, its growth alone was an incentive in light of Bulgaria's weak position in international trade. Denmark, for its part, was responsive to the Bulgarian advances inasmuch as they chimed with its foreign policy of rapprochement with the East.[8] While keeping the door open due to its staunch support for détente, the Danish government did not have much vested interest in the potential practical

gains of economic cooperation with Bulgaria. In Bulgaria's opening to the West, Denmark did not hold a top priority, but it was nevertheless an opportunity not to miss. The initial contacts were thus delegated to lower-level institutional entities. Although several tracks of fostering partnerships in Denmark were activated, each was developed by a limited number of individuals representing their respective state institutions. The small teams they formed could operate side by side in Denmark without disrupting each other's agendas.

First to break the ice in Bulgarian diplomacy towards Denmark were the foreign trade services. In 1960, the MFT opened a trade representation in Copenhagen (*Bultarg*).[9] At the time, Bulgaria still did not have a full-fledged diplomatic representation – as of 1957 the ambassador in Sweden was also accredited to Denmark and Norway.[10] Enjoying a degree of autonomy under loose ties to the Stockholm mission, the Bulgarian trade representatives in Copenhagen were tasked not only with building networks of economic cooperation from scratch but also with laying the grounds for intergovernmental contacts. Yet, for the envoys, expansion of economic relations would become their primary objective.

What characterised the overall diplomatic strategy of Bulgaria towards Denmark – opportunities to operate free of ideological pressures and economic competitiveness vis-à-vis allies – would shape also the operation of the Copenhagen trade office on the micro-level of the Bulgarian state apparatus. Its lower rank within the foreign trade sector allowed its employees greater autonomy from centralised oversight. But their office also had less political pull within the command chain of foreign trade. In the inevitable competition over high-quality exports resulting from Bulgaria's limited production capabilities, *Bultarg* Copenhagen was at a disadvantage compared to larger and politically prioritised missions as the one in West Germany. Accordingly, when the Copenhagen mission strove to convince the administration at home of the untapped potential of economic cooperation with Denmark, it partly acted upon its own micro-institutional stakes, trying to expand its own room for manoeuvre within the foreign-trade sector.

As Denmark did not open a reciprocal trade service and handled diplomatic relations with Bulgaria through its embassy in Warsaw, the Bulgarian trade envoys brokered and maintained contacts with private firms and state institutions in Denmark. The incipient partnerships were highly personalised and shaped by a shared business ethos, which, however, would often be challenged by the failure of Bulgarian enterprises to deliver upon agreed terms. In ensuing disputes, *Bultarg* Copenhagen tended to take the side of the Danish party: even in controversial cases it often blamed organisations at home when reporting to the MFT.

While the commercial exchange with Denmark might have been negligible (below 0.1 percent of Bulgaria's total trade volume), its growth was nevertheless an impressive accomplishment for the small foreign-trade service dedicated to the Danish market. Starting from zero, the commodity flow between the two countries accounted for 0.6 million USD in 1960, then doubled its value by 1962.[11] That year, a long-term trade agreement was negotiated with a validity of three years, subsequently renewed with an extended span of five years (1966–1970).[12] Under its arrangements, Bulgarian exports obtained a higher level of liberalisation and

trade grew swiftly reaching approximately five million USD by 1968 but also generating a stable trade deficit for Bulgaria.[13]

Another track of economic cooperation with Denmark was tourism. Soon after the MFT opened a trade mission in Copenhagen, the Bulgarian tourist administration created its own affiliate there.[14] Although Denmark was not the main provider of foreign tourists for the Bulgarian seaside resorts, its market was perceived as particularly promising due to Scandinavia's high standards of living, which rendered the expenditure of Scandinavian vacationers relatively higher than that of other Westerners.[15]

Just like initial economic partnerships were delegated to lower-ranking operatives with business expertise, the first political contacts between Bulgaria and Denmark were forged by peripheral actors with more discreet political profiles. In this area, the BKP lent the pioneering role to its subservient coalition partner, the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union, *Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sayuz* (BZNS). Void of any independent involvement in domestic policy-making, BZNS' international activities were encouraged under a tightly supervised mandate and targeted specifically Western political parties and organisations that the communists could not approach.[16] One of the testing grounds for this strategy was indeed the Scandinavian region, and the first official visits in Denmark were all done by BZNS delegations. In 1964, a leading figure at the BZNS, Lalyu Ganchev, was dispatched to Stockholm to serve as ambassador to all four Scandinavian countries – a post of unprecedented importance for the union.[17] As this proved to be a viable diplomatic channel, in 1965 the Politburo ratified BZNS' international outreach as an integral part of Bulgaria's foreign policy.[18] The same year, the first Danish governmental visit in Sofia was undertaken by the Minister of Agriculture.

Active under a limited diplomatic mandate, the BZNS nevertheless promoted its agenda in the early contacts with Denmark. The embassy in Stockholm saw Denmark as an agricultural country that in the post-war years had succeeded to mechanise its agriculture and transform its economy in a way that Bulgaria had long aspired and consistently failed to do.[19] As agriculture still held the major share of the exports of socialist Bulgaria, its economic cooperation with Denmark focused on a transfer of knowhow and technology for optimising Bulgarian farming and stockbreeding. Steering economic cooperation towards agricultural modernisation, the BZNS was in fact building upon the legacy of its activities in Scandinavia before the war.[20]

Bilateral contacts ascended further up the ladder in 1967 with an exchange of visits by the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivan Bashev, and his Danish counterpart Jens Otto Krag, who also held the post of Prime Minister.[21] The diplomatic accomplishments comprised an Agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation and an agreement for visa-free travel between the two countries.[22] The latter was anticipated to bring more Danish vacationers at the moment when international tourism became recognised as a key source of hard-currency income for the Bulgarian economy.[23] Further agreements for road transportation, consular services and cultural cooperation were put in preparation.[24]

In his meeting with Todor Zhivkov, Krag emphasised the need for de-escalation of tensions between East and West stating, reportedly, that the 'old thesis of peaceful coexistence does not satisfy the requirements of today, active mutual cooperation is needed'.[25] Despite the warm tone of the conversation with the party leader, the MFA placed at the top of its report to the Politburo the prospects for further economic cooperation and the pressing issues of the Bulgarian trade deficit. Although Krag acknowledged Bulgaria's troubles, he declined Zhivkov's request for bank credits, arguing that Denmark was itself an importer of capital.[26]

Finally, the talks between Bashev and Krag included arrangements for a visit of Zhivkov to Copenhagen – which would have been the first visit ever of a Bulgarian prime minister to a Scandinavian country.[27] His trip, moreover, was to include a second stop in Oslo. For the BKP, such a diplomatic breakthrough in the West was a PR stunt to bolster the international prestige of the country and its leader. From the viewpoint of the Bulgarian economic services, however, Zhivkov's forthcoming visit was perceived as much as a diplomatic accomplishment as an opportunity for further economic gains. The practical goals on his agenda for the trip contained several Bulgarian requests rejected by Krag (like the most-favoured nation clause).[28] Reports from the BZNS on their parallel line of communication also signalled that the moment was ripe for negotiating better terms of commerce. During yet another visit in Copenhagen in April 1968, their delegation was received at the Danish Parliament where the new Prime Minister Hilmar Baunsgaard emphasised the trade links between the two countries as a propeller of rapprochement.[29]

Bulgaria's responsiveness to the FRG's diplomatic overtures in the 1960s

Unlike its lack of prior contacts with Denmark, Bulgaria had a long history of binding its foreign policy to the German state. Before and during World War II, the Bulgarian economy was pegged to the German Reich. On the eve of the war, the bilateral commerce accounted for almost 70 percent of Bulgaria's exports and imports – a much greater economic dependency compared to the German neighbours in the East (Hungary – below 50 percent, Poland and Czechoslovakia – below 25 percent).[30] This legacy, though politically sensitive, made it only natural for Bulgaria to look towards post-war West Germany for a boost to its economy.

Economic ties between the two countries carried on after the war but their pronounced expansion occurred in the 1960s.[31] In contrast to Bulgarian–Danish cooperation where both the initiative and the institutional commitment resided mainly on the Bulgarian side, the FRG took the lead in Bulgarian–West German relations. And while the Bulgarian diplomatic strategy towards Denmark was limited in both the breadth of its goals and the resources it could mobilise to reach them, in its overtures towards Bulgaria, West Germany applied a cohesive diplomatic agenda with long-term objectives and sufficient incentives to pursue them. Yet, while Bulgarian–Danish bilateralism could develop outside of Soviet

interference, West Germany was at the centre of superpower politics, and its relations with the socialist states were under close Soviet supervision.

Although all socialist countries intensified their economic transactions with the FRG in the 1960s, diplomatic relations were out of the question. The erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 prompted the FRG to seek some form of rapprochement with the Soviet bloc instead of containment, yet the post-war status quo remained a thorny issue of no compromise.[32] A main vehicle of the ensuing probes was 'diplomacy through trade', a continuation of a long existing German tradition of *Osthandel*.[33] Intertwining diplomacy and trade, however, could not circumvent the unresolved questions concerning post-war borders and territorial integrity, war reparations and German minority rights. Unlike the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria did not have outstanding issues with West Germany, which opened an easier path for the latter's 'diplomacy through trade'.[34] In 1960, when the GDR urged the fraternal governments to release a joint declaration condemning West German military revanchism, the BKP's Politburo added a special note in its internal resolution in support of the proposal that Bulgaria (along with Romania) was 'not an immediate target of West Germany's territorial revanchist aspirations'.[35]

Bilateral commercial relations had begun to expand already in 1956 when the two countries signed a trade protocol. By 1960, the trade volume increased tenfold compared to 1950 when it stood at 4.7 million USD. Yet, at this peak, Bulgarian imports from West Germany twice surpassed the value of its exports, thereby causing a deficit of 18.7 million USD.[36] While the Bulgarian regime did not have much room for manoeuvre in its policy towards the FRG, it clearly recognised the economic benefits of possible relations. Over the next years, Bulgaria reduced its purchases from the FRG in a painstaking effort for a more balanced exchange, while keeping up its exports thanks to the goodwill of the West German authorities. As a result, for three consecutive years Bulgaria ran a trade surplus, though its total did not come anywhere near that of West Germany in 1960 alone.[37] In the same period, however, Bulgaria started generating huge invisible earnings on the German market through its program of international tourism.[38]

In March 1964, Bulgaria and the FRG ratified their first post-war trade agreement, which provided the legal framework for the reciprocal opening of official trade missions with consular functions in Sofia and Frankfurt, an expansion in size and status of already operational trade bureaus.[39] This move forward in bilateral relations was still within the bounds of acceptable contacts: in fact, Bulgaria was the fourth bloc member to exchange trade missions with West Germany.[40] In terms of personnel as well as weight within the MFT, the Frankfurt office by far surpassed the one in Copenhagen. Yet, it had neither the broad prerogatives of the trade team in Denmark in nurturing partnerships nor the opportunities to operate independently of political interference. Its work was conditioned mainly by political assignments, and it was political expediency that determined the nominations of employees, not economical expertise as in Copenhagen. Moreover, the executive oversight was shared by the MFT and MFA, which subordinated the activities of the mission to clashing institutional interests.[41]

In economic as well as diplomatic matters, the initiative remained on the German side, both in Frankfurt and in Sofia. While Denmark never opened a reciprocal service in Bulgaria, the FRG's foreign trade representatives stationed in Sofia would actively seek to expand their access to state institutions beyond the MFT and promote further cooperation in non-economic fields. Sensitive to the dangers of soft diplomacy, Bulgarian bureaucrats tried hard to prevent exposure without severing the communication. Following instructions from the party top, they systematically declined to stage West German cultural events in Bulgaria and were reluctant to facilitate scientific exchange under the scholarships offered by German academic foundations.[42]

By 1965, bilateral trade exceeded 100 million USD, and Bulgaria spiralled into a trade deficit that spiked to 91 million USD in 1966.[43] While this caused concerns within the foreign-trade services, profits from German tourists went through a comparable trend in reverse. Soon after the opening of trade missions, the Bulgarian tourist administration gave the green light to charter flights from the FRG, and both the number of tourists and the revenues quadrupled from 1963 to 1964.[44] For Germans separated by the Wall, Bulgarian resorts were a middle ground to meet in the holiday season.[45] In 1965 when the influx of foreign guests in Bulgaria reached one million, the two countries accounting for the highest numbers of visitors were the GDR and the FRG.[46] That year, the FRG also became Bulgaria's fourth biggest trade partner (after the Soviet Union, the GDR and Czechoslovakia) in addition to its top position among the capitalist countries.[47]

Meanwhile, various forms of economic cooperation developed bypassing the trade mission in Frankfurt: especially the joint ventures with Bulgarian majority rights.[48] Modelled on capitalist enterprises and operating outside of strict governmental control, these so-called 'trans-border firms' authorised at the party apex often went rogue and competed with the official foreign-trade organisations for export contingents. Between 1965 and 1968, ten Bulgarian firms were created in West Germany, an exceptionally high concentration. Not only did they keep the trade mission in the dark about their deals, thus violating their legal obligations, as the trade attaché would complain, but they also blemished the reputation of the Bulgarian commerce with shady business practices.[49] At the same time, important business negotiations with West German companies surpassed the level of the trade mission. Instead, they were brokered by high-ranking state officials and their conclusion often involved top political participation. In line with the West German strategy of *Osthandel*, such negotiations supplied corporate entities with opportunities to forge political contacts. For example, the concern 'Krupp' initiated its negotiations for the delivery of an entire factory in personal communication with Todor Zhivkov, and upon their successful conclusion in 1965 Zhivkov honoured the general manager with a protocol reception.[50]

While towing the Soviet line on diplomatic non-recognition, Bulgaria tried to preserve the *bon ton* at any cost, lured by the benefits of growing economic cooperation with the FRG. Chancellor Erhard's Peace Note of March 1966 stirred negative responses from other Warsaw Pact members, but Bulgaria and Romania kept silent.[51] At the 1966 International Fair in Plovdiv, Bulgaria's major forum for trade

negotiations, the FRG had the largest exhibition, surpassing even the USSR.[52] Rolf Lahr, undersecretary for economic affairs at the Foreign Office, visited Bulgaria during the fair and held talks with three members of government – Ivan Bashev and his colleagues Ivan Budinov, Minister of Foreign Trade and Lachezar Avramov, Minister without Portfolio.[53] Lahr pushed for concessions in the field of cultural exchanges on the back of expanding economic relations. He also handed Budinov an official invitation to Bonn which would have been the first Bulgarian governmental visit there. In press comments following his trip, Lahr underlined that he had not discussed diplomatic normalisation, but the MFA's internal reports construed the talks as a 'cautious probing for establishing diplomatic relations'.[54]

If in the early 1960s Bulgaria could extract high economic advantages from the FRG at small political costs, after 1966 when the Grand Coalition government formulated its *Neue Ostpolitik*, Bulgaria found itself in a more difficult position to uphold its economic interests while not yielding politically. In the eyes of the new West German leadership, Bulgaria (along with Romania) came up as a potential weak link in the bloc's line of resistance to its overtures for diplomatic normalisation.[55] The new government also stepped up the efforts to expand its economic footprint in Bulgaria. By 1967, the FRG was second only to the Soviet Union in Bulgaria's imports, responsible for ten percent of the total, and the single largest tourist provider, accounting for approximately 100,000 visitors per year.[56] In this area, the Bulgarian regime was also a bit too accommodating, to the annoyance particularly of the GDR. Vacationing in Bulgaria was one way for East Germans to flee into neighbouring NATO members, Greece and Turkey, and their fugitive attempts were often aided by West German citizens. The Bulgarian border patrols showed no mercy to intercepted fugitives creating a chilling death toll of 'tourist accidents' as such failed escapes were officially reported.[57] However, the Bulgarian authorities were quite lenient with West German passport holders, many recent refugees from the GDR themselves, who were quickly released. As a rule, Bulgaria declined the GDR's requests for extradition of its former citizens and sent detainees back to the FRG.[58]

In January 1967, Romania established diplomatic relations with the FRG in breach of the unified bloc stance, causing much havoc in the Warsaw Pact. A month later, the FRG proposed an identical treaty to the Bulgarian government via the trade mission in Sofia.[59] The risk of Bulgaria following suit raised concerns in Poland and the GDR and was countered by direct Soviet pressure on the Bulgarian establishment during the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' meeting in February 1967.[60] Two months later, the Politburo adopted a resolution formulating the acceptable scope of bilateral relations: delaying negotiations on diplomatic normalisation, yet 'searching for new opportunities and paths [. . .] for a favourable development of the economic relations between the two countries'.[61] Additionally, the Politburo approved a number of concessions proposed by the MFA: a green light for Budinov's visit in Bonn, permission for selected West German cultural initiatives in Bulgaria, better protocol treatment of the trade envoys, instructions to mass media to restrain from direct attacks on West German statesmen. Finally, the party leadership backed issuing official assurances that under no

circumstances would Bulgaria deport West German citizens to third countries.[62] Accordingly, the Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Tourism gave an interview to the West German media only to stress Bulgaria's refusal of extraditions to the GDR – in contrast to other socialist countries.[63] After Yugoslavia also resumed diplomatic relations with the FRG in early 1968, Soviet pressure on Bulgaria intensified.[64] Bulgaria got back in line, curtailing not just its diplomatic receptiveness but to an extent also its economic openness to West Germany.

The damage of 1968 on Bulgaria's bilateral relations

Whereas 1966–1967 marked a peak in Bulgaria's opening to the West, relations would soon deteriorate. The Czechoslovak events in the spring of 1968 terminated by the Soviet-led military intervention in August, which was vehemently supported by the Bulgarian regime, caused turmoil in Bulgaria's domestic and foreign policy.

Bulgarian–Danish relations suffered as a consequence of Bulgaria's participation in the invasion. Zhivkov's long-planned visit to Norway and Denmark scheduled to take place a month later was cancelled at short notice by the two Scandinavian governments in coordination.[65] The decisive governmental stance led to negative coverage of Bulgaria in the Danish press, which hurt ongoing economic negotiations with public visibility. This particularly affected tourism as Bulgaria's largest Danish partner annulled its entire program in the Black Sea resorts indefinitely.[66] As the tourist business was vulnerable to public opinion, the company announced its cancelation as a political decision. The boycott of Bulgarian organisations spread down the chain leading to further suspensions of economic deals.[67]

Facing the repercussions for its hard line, the BKP mobilised the diplomatic corps to mend the country's international image. As part of this recovery, in May 1969 the Politburo ratified a blueprint for Bulgaria's foreign policy that highlighted relations with small and neutral capitalist states in Europe, including the Scandinavian countries.[68] During the suspension of political contacts with Denmark, the Bulgarian regime fell back on tested approaches in building trust, like BZNS' participation in agrarian forums and political conferences and initiated negotiations in less politicised domains.[69] In May 1969, the two governments signed a cultural agreement fulfilling one of the commitments made during Krag's visit in 1967 as well as a protocol for cooperation between Danish and Bulgarian broadcasters.[70] The embassy in Copenhagen dedicated much effort to reschedule Zhivkov's visit, but the Danish government kept deflecting such approaches.[71] This historic event would ultimately occur two years after the initial date, in September 1970, only after Denmark resumed relations with the Soviet Union.[72]

Subsequently, the MFA declared Zhivkov's trip – with visits in Copenhagen and Oslo as originally planned and also Reykjavik – a glaring success. The ministry's summary report to the Politburo highlighted the proximity in positions, at times complete concord, between the Bulgarian leader and his hosts. Furthermore, it ascertained favourable conditions for enhancing bilateral relations in terms of

small-state diplomacy: 'In these countries, apparently, desire for greater [. . .] autonomy from the big Western countries is growing, fears of "the Eastern threat" are diminishing, and certain tendencies for greater activity in the relations with socialist countries are breaking through'.[73] This optimistic assessment was quite far from the concerns of the envoys in Copenhagen who were preoccupied with the threat of raising trade barriers as a consequence of Denmark's prospective membership in a customs union. New obstacles for Bulgarian exports were first flagged with regard to a Danish proposal for a Nordic customs union, 'Nordek' – which was eventually aborted – and then by Denmark's accession to the European Communities in January 1973.

Bulgaria's relations with the FRG also went through a downfall and a slow recovery. Yet, their deterioration was inflicted by the Bulgarian government under the growing pressure by its allies. In its change of tone, the party leadership took a cue from East Germany, which propped up its allegations of the FRG's revan-chist ambitions after the Prague Spring.[74] The Bulgarian establishment, weary of its own exposure to West Germany, took to heart this antagonist rhetoric and Todor Zhivkov became an energetic mouthpiece against the FRG in contrast to his earlier restraint. Unlike Denmark, West Germany was not bent on closing the door to Bulgaria, and even the press coverage in the aftermath of the invasion was not uniformly negative. Although bashing publications constituted the bulk of 'foreign-media propaganda on Bulgaria' that the trade mission in Frankfurt forwarded home, the envoys also flagged a number of articles speculating about subtle signs of Bulgaria's divergence from the bloc along the path of Romania and Yugoslavia. This, combined with the restrained positions of West German media close to the government and the business circles, led them to conclude that 'the federal government after all retains some room for tactical manoeuvres with regard to our country'.[75]

Despite Zhivkov's show of loyalty to Moscow, Bulgaria's official course towards West Germany did not undergo substantive modifications. Develop-ment of beneficial economic ties remained its primary rationale, while restraint in cultural contacts was reiterated.[76] What changed was tightening central control over all forms of cooperation, yet oversight was not carried directly by the party but was delegated to the MFA.[77] Bilateral trade was reduced, but this was moti-vated not so much by political expedience as by concerns over the growing trade deficit. Although the FRG lost its leading position among Bulgaria's capitalist trade partners to Italy, it remained the premier importer of Bulgarian production in the West.[78] Moreover, business with West Germany did not seem to be hurt by retaliatory actions and in fact 1968 saw an increase in tourism to Bulgaria: new contracts with large travel agencies were signed and a massive advertisement campaign for Bulgarian resorts was carried across the FRG. As a result, now the FRG alone accounted for half of Bulgaria's hard-currency revenues from interna-tional tourism.[79]

While not interfering directly in economic cooperation with West Germany, the BKP was nevertheless determined to sever any other contacts that could imply diplomatic normalisation. In addition to declining West German cultural activities

in Bulgaria, the Politburo disseminated confidential instructions for excluding the trade attaché from official events in Sofia. Yet, as the previous decade of economic advances had proven, diplomacy and trade could not evolve separately. Heinz Herrmann, the head of the West German trade mission, reported this breach of protocol, and his complaint entered the agenda of the bilateral session for ratification of the annual trade protocol in 1969.[80] A month later he was recalled, and the FRG delayed dispatching a successor for almost a year, leaving the mission under ad interim direction of Herrmann's deputy. The signal did not escape the attention of the Bulgarian foreign service and prompted them to push for recovery of the strained relations. In this period, a recurrent theme in reports and proposals from the MFA and the MFT would be their concerns of lagging behind the rest of the bloc in the cooperation with West Germany.

The party, seemingly tenacious in its hard line, was not as invested in defending the bloc's stance vis-à-vis West Germany as Zhivkov's rhetoric might have indicated. Although the BKP urgently instructed all state institutions to be on alert for any mention of West Berlin in their communication with the FRG, it also remained surprisingly oblivious to the significance of the heated issues related to the post-war status quo.[81] For example, in 1969 when Bulgaria was still under Soviet pressure to cool off political openness, a deputy prime minister sent a telegram addressed 'West Berlin, FRG'. The federal postal service redirected it to the trade mission in Frankfurt with a stamp 'wrong address', causing great embarrassment in the foreign service.[82]

After Willy Brandt became Chancellor in October 1969, West Germany stepped up its diplomatic pursuits in the Soviet bloc. Brandt's willingness for concessions on the unresolved questions with bloc members led to the successful conclusion of treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland in 1970, the GDR in 1972 and Czechoslovakia in 1973. During these lengthy and difficult negotiations, however, bilateral talks with Hungary and Bulgaria were put on hold. As neither country had outstanding issues with the FRG, their treaties with West Germany were rendered conditional on the successful conclusion of the more sensitive talks to give additional leverage to their allies on the negotiating table.[83] Thus, while hitherto the lack of outstanding issues placed Bulgaria in the fore of the West German diplomatic strategy towards the East, now it pushed her at the back of the line together with Hungary.[84]

The detrimental effects of this change were immediately noted by the Bulgarian foreign services. In December 1969, the West German trade attaché was received in the MFA upon his request to discuss a concert in Sofia of a West German symphony orchestra. During the conversation, he veered into a detailed expose of the forthcoming negotiations between his government and the other socialist regimes. The meeting's memo was subsequently appended with an unusually lengthy note by a high-ranking official at the MFA. Ordering the memo's broader circulation among economic ministries and party sections, he made a strong recommendation for concessions on the cultural ban. Arguing that relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG were warming up, his note concluded: 'We should avoid remaining the only passive country that shows no change regarding the FRG'.[85]

Under ministerial pressure, in early 1971 the Politburo moderated the guidelines for Bulgaria's foreign policy towards the FRG, also allowing cultural initiatives as long as they did not have 'mass and propaganda character'.[86]

While the foreign services were trying to ease the hard line to preserve the advantages of opening to West Germany, Todor Zhivkov kept his zeal in bashing the West German government. In international declarations, he often overstepped the line set by Moscow, leading Radio Free Europe to surmise: 'there have been occasions when Bulgaria's rigidity vis-à-vis the Federal Republic would appear to have been slightly embarrassing to her allies' rather than 'an enunciation of a common Communist stance'.[87] Such erratic improvisations by Zhivkov ran contrary to the endorsed governmental policy towards the FRG and caused much disarray among his own foreign services.[88] Whether he embraced the role of Moscow's 'attack dog' or simply lost track with the trend across the bloc, Zhivkov's antagonistic performance undermined not only the efforts of the state administration but also the decisions of his Politburo.

Backed by both party and state, at this point, the Bulgarian foreign services were working hard on a diplomatic breakthrough with Bonn. The impending signing of a new long-term trade agreement was planned as an occasion for the first governmental visit in Bonn by Minister of Foreign Trade Lachezar Avramov. During this visit in February 1971, he held a number of top-level meetings, including with Chancellor Brandt and Minister of Foreign Affairs Walter Scheel.[89] Part of Avramov's agenda was preparing the ground for future diplomatic relations.[90] During the preliminary negotiations, two issues caused disagreements: the insistence of Bonn to include West Berlin under the provisions, which Bulgaria did not feel at liberty to accept and the insistence of Sofia on the most-favoured nation clause. The compromise on the first issues was to define the territorial scope of the agreement monetarily by reference to the Deutschmark – thus covering West Berlin de jure without mentioning it explicitly. Such a solution was indeed to the satisfaction of the Bulgarian side because West Berlin also fell within its economic interests. Once this formulation was accepted, Bonn conceded the Bulgarian request for most-favoured nation.[91] And two years later, in December 1973, Bulgaria and the FRG finally established diplomatic relations.[92]

Conclusion

Throughout the 1960s, Bulgaria aspired to take its place in the process of pan-European cooperation as bridge building between East and West opened the path to détente. While not short of ambition, its room for manoeuvre in diplomatic pursuits towards the West was constrained by Moscow's superpower politics. Yet, the limitations for Bulgaria's small-state diplomacy also presented an opportunity: the opportunity for state officials with a technocratic rather than an ideological outlook to take the lead and subordinate the strategy of this opening to the pragmatic interests of economic cooperation. The interplay between economic exchange and interstate diplomacy took different shapes depending on how particular bilateral

relations with Western countries fit in the geopolitical constellation of the Cold War at a given moment, thus also determining the margins for manoeuvre of Bulgaria's economic interests vis-à-vis the bloc's political pressures.

The comparative study of Bulgaria's bilateral relations with Denmark and the FRG reveals these margins of manoeuvre in their full range: from an advance unburdened by Soviet scrutiny and party interference where lower-ranking actors of a mind to do business enjoyed initiative, to a precarious venturing into the minefield of the superpower confrontation where economic incentives would time and again clash with ideological allegiance. Being a small state itself, Denmark could offer few benefits to the struggling Bulgarian economy in contrast to the West German economic powerhouse. Bilateral relations with the FRG were not only far more asymmetrical, but they were actively shaped by the latter's 'policy of using trade as the narrow end of a wedge for opening Eastern Europe to West German influence'.[93] Consequentially, Bulgaria's interaction with the FRG carried much higher political risks than its bridge-building towards Denmark, but its economic incentives were also significantly larger.

In the nascent Bulgarian–Danish relations of the early 1960s, economic cooperation and foreign trade in particular emerged as a safe zone to launch bilateral contacts, contacts driven by Bulgarian economic interests and enabled by Denmark's support for détente. Although bilateral trade would remain negligible, its function surpassed economic pragmatism. Trade was instrumental in opening a channel for intergovernmental contacts and keeping it open when conventional diplomacy was hampered, as would be the case after the crackdown of Prague Spring in 1968. Conversely, in Bulgaria's initial opening to the FRG, economic cooperation was inevitably leading the Bulgarian regime to the hotspot of diplomatic normalisation where it would face the opposition of its allies. In its grasping for economic advantages, Bulgaria heavily relied on the West German diplomatic investment in the East-bound trade and its own foreign-trade services were denied much room for action.

The events in 1968 complicated the terrain of East–West cooperation, especially for a smaller socialist state like Bulgaria. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the approaches of its foreign services were stalled by both political retaliation from Western countries and ideological caution within the Bulgarian party apparatus. Although the pace of cooperation slowed, the internal bargaining between the party and the state apparatus – accordingly, political dogmatism and economic pragmatism – intensified. Ultimately, economic interests took the upper hand. Albeit with more precarious manoeuvring and less leverage, the Bulgarian foreign services not only regained access to both the Danish and West German governments in the early 1970s but signed ground-breaking treaties like diplomatic normalisation with the FRG. While the negotiations required much more persistence and adaptations on their side than earlier, the experience of bridge-building and the evidence of the economic benefits of bilateral contacts gained in the past decade certainly increased their readiness for concessions and determination to stretch their room for manoeuvre.

Notes

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7 Americanising the Belgian civilising mission (1941–1961)

The Belgian information centre in New York and the campaign to cast the Belgian civilising mission as part of the Point IV Programme

Frank Gerits

Introduction: the 'Congo Factor' in Belgian diplomacy

In 1941 three Belgian women toured the United States. They gave lectures in women's clubs on the Nazi occupation of Belgium. Particularly 'miss B'. who had 'rick blond hair and sparkling eyes' was so successful that Jan-Albert Goris, the director of the Belgian Information Center (BIC) in New York, wanted to hire her permanently. Goris managed Belgium's public diplomacy operation in the United States, a type of foreign policy that engages foreign publics through pamphlets, radio and film. Cultural diplomacy, an interaction with the public that relies on exhibitions, art and theatre was an important component of this effort.[1] Ambassador Georges Theunis, who had been sent to the United States (US) in October 1939 as a special envoy, however, doubted if 'miss B' was the right choice. She, together with the other female speakers, had been rumoured to have several extramarital affairs, since their husbands worked for different companies in the Belgian colony of the Congo. They earned the nickname 'Congolese widows' because they had the habit of swarming around every Belgian minister that visited New York in the hope of obtaining some news about their spouses.[2]

The story of the 'Congolese widows' highlights the extent to which the 'Congo factor' affected all aspects of Belgian diplomacy, including public diplomacy and the gossip at embassies.[3] BIC officials, documents from the foreign affairs archives in Brussels suggest, sidestepped the Cold War and instead utilised modernisation theory and the colonial development efforts in a public diplomacy campaign to increase their margins of manoeuvre with US officials. The relationship between the US and European empires, historians have argued, was held together by the fear of Communist revolt in Africa.[4] Comparatively little attention has been paid to the role of colonial interests in the Belgian efforts to acquire more influence in Washington. Belgian foreign relations scholars have claimed Belgian politicians never had a lot of interest in the empire that comprised Congo, Ruanda-Burundi.[5] Instead, the 1950s and 1960s are cast as the decades of Cold War consensus in which the Belgian diplomatic establishment came to support the US after a short detour during the immediate post-war period in which Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak had attempted to forge a good relationship with the Soviet Union and create

a 'third force'.[6] What motivated diplomats has been reduced to the safeguarding of economic interests, an interpretation rooted in the memoires of politicians such as Spaak and Paul van Zeeland who were welcomed at the State Department.[7] Summarising the post-revisionist scholarship, historian Vincent Dujardin writes that 'history' shows 'that if a small country such as Belgium wishes to have any international influence, it must be represented by an exceptional figure'.[8] The 'Congo Factor', as historian of the Congo Guy Vanthemsche termed it, only figures in the scholarship of Belgium's diplomatic history as a form of embarrassment or, alternatively, as a source of power, particularly since the US relied on the uranium supply from Congo.[9]

The BIC's public diplomacy activities, however, suggest colonialism was at the heart of efforts by Brussels to increase its influence in Washington. Moreover, the BIC office in New York was essential in this attempt to increase the margins for manoeuvre since, as Odd Arne Westad writes, 'no European elite after 1945 was in doubt that it needed US support in order to keep its influence in Africa and that it therefore needed to work with, and sometimes on the Americans'.[10] Although a lot of work remains to be done, it is clear that a colonial perspective on the Trans-Atlantic area sheds new light on the emphasis put on shared ideals and joint policy decisions.[11] In the 1960s Karl Deutsch and Hans Morgenthau already criticised the notion of an Atlantic Community that had been peddled by politically engaged historians and political scientists in the 1950s.[12] According to Deutsch, NATO could not be defined as a 'pluralistic security community' because for a community of this sort to develop there had to be a political community with widely spread shared values and communication as well as integration.[13] Similarly, Morgenthau developed his 'realist' alliance theory in 1959 which argued alliances were a 'community of interests' formed against a common enemy that crumble once the adversary has perished. In the course of the 1980s, however, liberal institutionalist IR scholars like Stanley Sloan, Wallace Thies and Beatrice Heuser revalued the 'shared ideas about man, government and society'. In Sloan's interpretation, for instance, the Atlantic Community was a bastion of common values that required protection from a hostile world.[14] The power of shared values has also seeped into Linda Risso's historical study of the NATO Information Service in which the dividing lines are drawn between US officials who felt cooperation was essential in the battle for hearts and minds and the European powers who wanted to retain their freedom of action. The question of colonialism is evaded.[15]

From the perspective of the BIC it becomes clear that colonialism complicated Trans-Atlanticism. Belgian public diplomats relied on a more intricate strategy in which a key concern of US foreign policy towards Africa and Asia, namely economic development and technical assistance, were targeted.

Roosevelt and the Belgian Congo as a war zone in public diplomacy for elites (1941–1949)

The BIC opened its doors in 1941, one year after the Office Belge d'Information et de Documentation was established in London to disseminate information in non-occupied countries. The consulate in New Orleans also organised conferences and

cooperated extensively with Henry Dutillieux, a BIC official responsible for radio
and cinema and Robert Goffin who authored radio scripts. By 1943 three Bel-
gian propaganda bureaus – so-called *bureau de propaganda* – had been founded
in Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles, and their activities were monitored
by the State Department, as required by US law.[16] Goris coordinated the public
diplomacy effort from his office in New York. He was a Flemish writer who, under
the pseudonym Marnix Gijsens, published books such as *Lucinda en de lotoseter*
in which the protagonist travelled the US. As the commissioner-general he had
been appointed by the government to set up the Belgian pavilion of the New York
World Fair of 1939, of which the building with Arthur Dupagne's bas-relief on the
Congo was resurrected at Virginia Union University, a historically black college,
once the fair was over.[17] Goris got the job because he frequented the same social
milieus as Belgian politicians. In 1926, for instance, he had visited the US as a
fellow of the Educational Foundation of the Commission for Relief in Belgium
together with later prime minister Gaston Eyskens.[18] From its inception, Belgian
colonialism played a crucial role in the BIC's war time propaganda which tar-
geted not only the US citizens and officials but also a Latin-American public that
received translated pamphlets such as *Noticias de Belgica*.[19]

   In those BIC pamphlets, Belgium was presented as a small country that despite
its occupation by Nazi Germany was still contributing to the war effort with the
help of its colonial resources. With pamphlets such as *The Belgian Campaign
in Ethiopia*, BIC officials sought to erect the Congo as a screen behind which to
hide the swift capitulation of Belgium after only eighteen days in May 1940. The
Governor-general in Leopoldville, Pierre Ryckmans, had declared his support to
the allies and turned his back on King Leopold II who had capitulated and refused
to follow his government into exile in London. Consequently, large companies
such as the *Union Minière*, the principal mining company in Katanga, as well as
the Belgian Congo's African army, the *Force Publique*, were presented as signifi-
cant contributors to the war effort. *The Grand Work of the Free Belgian Forces*,
which conquered Asosa and Gambela in Ethiopia, was shown at universities while
photos of Ryckmans's inspection of a scout car were widely disseminated with a
tag line which informed the reader that the Congo was an 'important source of
raw materials for the United Nations'. Additionally, the Congo also offered an
opportunity to showcase the tenacity of the Belgian resistance while the tensions
between the King and his government in exile were brushed over. A radio show
about a 'Belgian hero' who had faced the firing squad eleven times was produced
in 1942 while pamphlets such as *The Belgian Congo at War* and *We Suffer in
a Thousand Ways* were printed. A cartoon collection, *Belgian Humor under the
German Heel*, brought together drawings made by the resistance.[20]

   At the end of the war, disagreements about the need for an information program
in peace time emerged within the foreign policy establishment. In the *Belgian
Trade Review* of 1946, a periodical that had been popular during the war, Goris
argued that 'a country of Belgium's modest size' had to 'take the initiative to make
itself known'. Following the example of the 'Maison Français', which had been
established by the French government, he wanted to build a House of Belgium on

US soil where cultural, economic and political information would be on offer. Yet, Theunis viewed the state as a corporation that had to be effectively managed and did not understand how the BIC's work could increase the influence of Belgium in peace time and had wanted to dismantle the costly operation. On 23 October 1944 Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak therefore intervened by writing to the new ambassador in Washington, Robert Compte van der Straten-Ponthoz, who had also been unhappy with Goris, to convince him of the need to show 'the real face of Belgium' abroad.[21] Spaak, like his successor van Zeeland, believed in the importance of public diplomacy, urging NATIS to increase its efforts to combat Soviet propaganda while expressing concern about the impact Soviet propaganda was having during his conversations with the British ambassador in Brussels.[22] The distinction Spaak publicly made between the information-work done by the countries of the Free World, information that was supposedly objective, and the propaganda of the Soviet Union, which was believed to be made up of distortions, confused Goris. In 1947 Spaak spontaneously wrote to Goris to inquire about his sudden plans to leave New York. In his response Goris expressed surprise, because he believed Spaak did not support the BIC's mission. The foreign affairs minister had 'never hidden the repugnance' he had for 'propaganda' which had led him to conclude the BIC's mission, and his own position would be terminated.[23] Goris, however, claimed he understood Spaak's 'repugnance', which indicates both men believed they were engaged in presenting a fuller picture of Belgian colonialism, not propaganda. The semantic confusion about the methodology of public diplomacy led both men to be confused about each other's stance on the BIC.

During the war, Spaak and Goris had both come to realise that foreign affairs was a symbolic matter and public diplomacy an essential instrument of power. Goris admired Franklin D. Roosevelt's fireside chats, radio speeches in which the president directly addressed the US population. For Goris, these showcased the 'magic of eloquence' and brought home the importance of government-to-people communication.[24] In an effort to maintain his position as BIC director he stressed the BIC had mass appeal in cables to Brussels by referring to the circulation of 140,000 issues of *News from Belgium* and the 'razor-edged editorials' that had earned him a 'large following'. Goris also voiced his concern about how a dismantling of the BIC would be viewed as a lack of solidarity, particularly by the Netherlands and Luxembourg, with whom the BIC had cooperated within the context of the Inter-Allied Information Center. The centre had published material in which European values were promoted, such as a pamphlet on the storming of the Bastille and the French Revolution. The continuation of the BIC's activities was particularly important for Goris in light of the increased need to propagate the colonial achievements in the face of President Harry Truman's support for Indonesian independence from the Netherlands in August 1945.[25] Despite Goris' arguments about influence and colonial power, funding decreased from US dollar (USA) $78,000 in 1946 to $75,000 in 1951, *News from Belgium* was abolished and plans to establish a Ministry of Information were cancelled while the Office Belge d'Information was moved from London to Leopoldville in 1950 and converted into the Centre d'Information et de Documentation du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi (CID).

Contrary to the claims to mass-appeal, the BIC had focused on elites during the war and continued to do so after the German capitulation. The emphasis on colonial matters though, remained. *News from Belgium*, which collected paper clippings on the Belgian resistance and republished them in a little booklet, included footnotes to increase its 'scientific allure'. In April 1941 an exhibition of Flemish primitives in Gallery Knoedler was organised and an anthology of Flemish poetry printed.[26] In March 1945 Spaak approved a plan to establish a university chair in Belgian culture as *Modern Belgian Handicrafts*, *Portraits by Flemish Masters* and a book on the Congolese administration was printed in 1949. Charles Leonard, the consul in New Orleans, paid attention to the elite audience on the advice of his Dutch colleague in 1947 who had told him to aim for the highest societal levels. Even speeches at the Rotary Club and the Young Men's Business Club in his estimation were ineffective because those audiences were not influential enough.[27] Goris resisted plans to increase the number of variety shows in the broadcasts about Belgium because he felt those would harm the 'dignity of Belgium'. Instead, he participated in the Opera Victory Rally about Belgium and Luxembourg on the Blue Network, a radio roundtable discussion with opera music. While the first part on Belgian cultural achievements was edited out of the original script, his explanation about the relationship between Belgium and the Congo was maintained as BIC officials went to conferences and visited the Alliance Française and the Rotary Club to talk about Belgium and Congo, signalling that Goris' priorities lay with the colony, not Cold War antagonism.[28]

Integrating the civilising mission within the US foreign policy of modernisation through expertise (1949–1959)

In 1952 the BIC expanded its operation not in response to the Cold War heating up but as a means to address the challenge of Truman's Point IV, a technical assistance program spearheaded by White House aide George Elsey and State Department's Public Affairs Officer Benjamin Hardy. Truman raised this fourth point in his inaugural speech of January 1949, in which he told his audience that the US had to 'embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas' since 'our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible'. The Point IV aimed to increase the 'drama' of that day but also reflected the belief that through the exposure to technology dependent peoples would 'find out' that democracy was the cornerstone of technological advancement and economic growth.[29] Colonies were excluded from the technical assistance operation since imperial powers resented interference. Liberia and Ethiopia were the only African countries that received assistance.

Nonetheless the BIC wanted to defend Belgium's reputation, particularly since Goris believed Truman's speeches on Point IV and the propaganda put out by the State Department had created a 'dangerous atmosphere' whereby colonial peoples might feel encouraged to revolt.[30] Pamphlets, such as *The Point Four Pioneers: Report from a New Frontier* in October 1951, declared the US was committed to fighting the 'ancient enemies' of underdevelopment such as poverty, disease,

hunger and illiteracy. The publication was presented as a 'battle report', but what was particularly important was the 'human factor' since the pioneers in this pamphlet's story had worked with patience, courage and imagination to make development efficient. Frank Pinder, for instance, had made a trek into the remote areas of Liberia without waiting for supplies, had contracted malaria, fallen ill with dysentery and suffered from other tropical illnesses all the while having long talks with village elders before undertaking action.[31]

What bothered BIC operatives was the implication of this type of propaganda, namely that there was a need for assistance to begin with. Belgium – Goris believed – already possessed the 'knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people', as Truman phrased it in his inaugural address but instead was still perceived to be an exploitative colonial power engaged in the trade of 'red rubber'.[32] First-hand knowledge of Belgium's civilising work, delivered by an official who should be transferred from the Congo to New York, therefore had to reassure US audiences that Belgium was doing everything in its power to effectively develop its colonies.[33] The US threat to the colonial claims had already been a source of concern during the war when Ely Culbertson, a famous bridge player and advocate for strong international institutions, wrote about how the Belgian Congo could be given to the Nazi regime to fulfil their need for 'Lebensraum'.[34] To prevent these theoretical blueprints from acquiring political weight the BIC propaganda stressed the war had not resulted from a competition 'between "imperialisms"', but originated from Hitler's war against the Jewish people, as William Gardner wrote in his *Catholic Resistance in Occupied Countries* of 1942, a pamphlet published by the BIC. Press releases highlighted the surprise of US soldiers who had expected 'people fighting wild animals and living in miserable villages' but instead encountered a 'great and modern city' where the 'population is civilized and friendly' upon their arrival in Leopoldville.[35]

In March 1952 Minister of the Colonies André Dequae sent his predecessor Pierre Wigny to the US on a fact-finding mission to figure out why US public opinion disapproved of the European colonial powers and Belgium in particular. In Wigny's estimation these negative attitudes were not rooted in a sense of economic or political unfairness but were primarily philosophical and the product of a particular understanding of history. Americans believed their prosperity had begun after becoming independent from Great Britain and colonial peoples therefore deserved to be put on the same trajectory. Belgian civilizational ideologues, in contrast, justified treating indigenous groups differently since they were supposedly on a different developmental level. The fallacy in the US logic therefore was the over-appreciation of African 'youthfulness' as well as their tolerance for 'premature emancipation', the notion that colonies could become independent even without sufficient preparation. Negative attitudes were fostered through the old anticolonial literature that was still available in libraries and bookstores, such as Roger Casement's report from 1904 on the atrocities of the Congo Free State, which allowed King Leopold II to amass huge profits from the rubber extraction.[36]

At the same time, Wigny felt influential groups held more nuanced opinions since many read the work of modernisation theorists and development economists.

Development economics had originated with Colin Clark, an Englishman whose book *The Conditions of Economic Progress* became popular in Anglo-American academic circles in the 1940s. He was particularly influential for his 'discovery' of global poverty as a technical problem that could be solved. In the Council of Economic Advisers to the President, economist Walter S. Salant worked to integrate these academic insights into policy and advocated for the extension of capital to the underdeveloped world. He found a willing ear with the former press officer for Nelson Rockefeller at the Office of Inter-American Affairs who believed the US needed to introduce a global technical assistance program to reduce international economic and political instability. With Truman's announcement of point Four, Hardy and Salant's idea were translated into policy.[37]

Wigny and Goris believed US anticolonialism was rooted in 'sentimentality' not 'reason', and they therefore, together with Ryckmans, drew up a strategy that urged 'propagandists [. . .] to relentlessly present' Belgian 'actions from the angle of 'Point Four'", an easy task since Point IV in Goris' estimation was identical to the 'colonial idea'. Wigny believed the so-called 'Belgian thesis' was 'perfectly acceptable' for US public opinion if it was presented as offering 'equality of opportunity for everyone' and a rejection of 'discrimination'. This 'Belgian thesis' had been worked out by Ambassador Fernand Vanlangenhove and Ryckmans at the beginning of the 1950s and argued that colonial territories were not the only areas in the world where indigenous peoples were not represented by their government. It was therefore unfair, in their estimation, that only countries with colonies and not India or Brazil, were obligated to inform the UN about their activities. Even though this reasoning failed to garner support at the UN, Wigny had come away from his public speaking engagements at US universities with the impression that the thesis appealed to US audiences. Economic measures, technical assistance and social policies such as the provision of educational and medical services as well as the provision of political opportunities via mixed consultative councils all dovetailed with 'le point IV du programme de Truman'. By Americanising the Belgian civilizational work Goris wanted to make it more acceptable to the US public. To increase the country's 'moral credit' and consequently the margins for manoeuvre, the BIC personnel had to speak the language Americans understood, the language of 'public opinion'. Few elements of criticism could for instance be used to improve the effectiveness of the message because US target audiences distrusted official propaganda.[38]

Those strategic recalibrations, however, were difficult to implement, since US law required all foreign information agencies in the US to clearly communicate to readers who had produced the pamphlets. Wigny therefore recommended the creation of a research institution, an 'Institut belge d'Afrique', which would be able to cultivate an objective image of the Belgian civilising work in industry and agriculture while giving it an '*allure scientifique*'. Moreover, an institute could become a less obtrusive policy influencer because it would be able to work in an identical way to many of the other academic research centres that targeted the US government. Harvard and the MIT Center for International Studies were also populated by economists and sociologists like Daniel Lerner and Walt Rostow, who had researched ways to jumpstart the modernisation process and had become

advisers to Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1950s and 1960s.[39] By mimicking the language of expertise, Brussels tried to increase their manoeuvrability.

From 1952 onwards the Belgian operation to influence US publics and the US government focused on projecting the notion that Belgian colonialism was an undertaking aimed at improving the development of its colonial subjects in a way that was scientifically valid. The special issue of *The New York Herald Tribune* on the Belgian Congo of November 1951, a project that had been approved by Dequae, was hailed as a model because it included criticism.[40] Goris' note on the extension of Belgian colonial propaganda in April 1952, which dealt with the challenges of how to implement this policy of correcting what the 'average American' – 'l'Américain moyen' – knew about the Congo, concluded that the object of criticism often was not even Africa but the 'idea itself of colonialism'. Those negative ideas, the note went on, were fostered at schools where children had to read books on Leopold II's atrocities, such as Mark Twain's *King Leopold's Soliloquy*. Nonetheless, Belgium benefitted from the racial fanaticism in South Africa and the underdevelopment of French and Portuguese territories, which made the Congo look more favourable in comparison. What was missing was a reference work on the Congo with an '*allure scientifique*' – the term also used by Wigny – written for a wider audience. Getting development experts to publicly talk about the Congo also served to bolster the new scientific approach. During the war the BIC had sent radio programmes on the Congo to about 200 radio stations, but in 1952 it requested funding from Brussels to directly target political commentators on those radio stations.[41] Goris also accepted aid from the Ford Foundation, which organised an exchange program to allow scientists in the Congo and in Belgium to go to a US institution to do part of their research. He welcomed financial aid for the development of 'the science of man' and welcomed the donations to scientific libraries in the colony.[42]

In short, by providing expertise, influencing experts and accepting expert aid, Goris redefined the public image of the Belgian civilising mission in developmentalist terms. While this Americanisation approach was new, it drew strength from the elite focus that had already pervaded the war-time BIC. Keeping the US out of Congolese affairs – the original intention of the 'Belgian thesis' – paradoxically enough led Goris to involve the US in the Congo. Although Geir Lundestad famously concluded that the Western Europeans 'were so interested in involving the Americans in the affairs of their continent that it can be argued that they invited the Americans in', it is clear that, when it came to colonial empire, Belgium worked to create an illusion of invitation to avert US interference in its colonies of the Congo and Ruanda.[43]

Americanising developmental challenges: the Congo crisis and the return to primitivism (1959–1961)

Throughout the 1950s this strategy to increase the margins of manoeuvre through developmental expertise remained firmly in place. The BIC received pamphlets from Inforcongo in Leopoldville to disseminate in the US, and Goris sent

information to the foreign affairs department in Brussels to keep ministers up to date about the latest books that were published on the Congo in the US. In January 1959, Goris' integration strategy fell apart. Riots broke out in Leopoldville after a prohibited political demonstration organised by the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), one of the Congo's most important political parties, in Leopoldville, a city that had experienced a demographic explosion and a subsequent crisis in public facilities.[44] It led King Baudouin to declare in a radio speech that Belgium intended to 'assist the Congolese people on their path to independence, without delay, but also without irresponsible rashness'.[45] Echoing the 'magic of eloquence' he had already admired in Roosevelt's fireside chats, Goris concluded the King's statement had made 'an excellent impression' because the 'magic word of independence had been uttered'. Riots in Brazzaville, in the French colony at the other side of the Congo river, made Goris even happier since the unrest demonstrated 'the inability of indigenous populations to govern themselves'. These incidents would serve to temper what he perceived to be the US fervour for African nationalism.[46]

The communication strategy he outlined in April 1959 played up the so-called primitive characteristics of the Congolese, signalling a reversal of the development story that had been projected in the mid-1950s. The continuation of cannibalism in certain areas of the colony, a colonial myth, had to be stressed once more in all the pieces of communication as well as the difficulties that arose when trying to integrate 'primitive' people into a modern economy. Goris in effect reversed the narrative of Belgium acting as an effective moderniser. Since the press had been positive about the Congo trip that Minister of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Maurits van Hemelrijck had undertaken in June 1959, he felt confident that stressing the primitivism of African nationalists would not taint the Belgian reputation the BIC had worked hard to improve throughout the 1950s. *The New York Times*, for instance, reported how in Bukavu on 13 June 1959 Hemelrijck was cheered on by the African Congolese as the European settlers expressed their anger.[47] A communication plan that could further stretch the margins of manoeuvre in the future, Goris noted, had to therefore stress that the new Ten Year Development Plan approved in 1959 enjoyed the support of international organisations but was struggling with anticolonial demagogy that mischaracterised many of the facts the US public received.

Rather than Americanising the Belgian civilising mission to increase the impact of Brussels in Washington, BIC officials were now asked to invest time and effort in making the negative anticolonial attitudes towards the Belgian colonial government comprehensible to a US audience. Incorrect or inaccurate accusations, for instance about the number of deaths in Leopoldville, had to be corrected in pamphlets and radio shows. The BIC personnel, which had always avoided talking about Congolese primitivism to not give credence to 'accusations that' Belgium 'had not done more in 50 years', now took this step. The US public had to be informed about the large role played by the Belgians in the birth of democracy in the Congo. Rather than talk about the work of Belgian missionaries who had converted Africans, emphasis had to be put on something the US public

was supposedly obsessed over: the contrast between the introduction of savings accounts and salaries by the colonial government on the one hand and the indigenous idea that taxes were a form of theft committed by the state on the other hand. Lastly, the BIC also had to explain their resistance to Kimbanguism, a religious movement led by Simon Kimbangu that resisted colonial oppression through non-violent means. To explain the Belgian antipathy towards Kimbanguism, Goris urged BIC officers to compare the Congolese religious movement with 'Jehova's witnesses' who were seen as anarchists in the US[48]

By Americanising the dark sides of colonial government into propaganda the BIC was unknowingly creating a public relations disaster on Independence Day, on 30 June 1960. Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, took the stage that day after Baudouin had sung the praises of Belgian colonialism. He, in contrast, criticised the colonial regime: 'Morning, noon and night we were subjected to jeers, insults and blows because we were "Negroes"', he proclaimed. International broadcasters could pick up how the Prime Minister wondered: 'Who will ever forget that the black was addressed as "*tu*", not because he was a friend, but because the polite "*vous*" was reserved for the white man?'.[49] A day later mutiny broke out among soldiers of the *Force Publique* while the mineral rich province of Katanga seceded under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe with the support from the Belgian government and the Union Minière. Belgium now again turned into a country that had not sufficiently invested in modernising its colony and failed to increase its influence in Washington D.C. Inforcongo in Leopoldville transformed into a refugee agency that resettled returnees and give them financial support. The Inforcongo office in Brussels utilised its network to find work for the 'colons' who had lost their home and possessions. Incidents of rape and murder by Africans compelled others to leave their colonial existence behind on evacuation flights organised by Sabena, the national airline. The returned colonial officials together with the subcommittee for the coordination of Belgian publicity and propaganda campaigns abroad – created in May 1955 – pleaded with Eyskens in August 1960 to invest in PR. Spaak made sure the subcommittee remained involved with public diplomacy by giving the Belgian institute for Information and Documentation the responsibility over press releases on the Congo crisis in 1960. This non-profit, which had been created by the subcommittee and was known as Inbel, acquired official support in 1961 and became the main official public diplomacy institutions.[50]

Goris' office continued to work and remained independent. He initiated a six-point special information programme with the expressed aim of damage control. The first decision was the recruitment of a new assistant to respond to the flood of questions the office in New York was receiving via mail and telephone. Goris printed 5,000 copies of a brochure that reported on the Belgian realisations in the Congo. He also began to disseminate bulletins on the efforts to improve education facilities, economic structures and social services, the so-called *foyer social*. Pamphlets were published that countered the attacks on the Belgian colonial project. Lastly, BIC officials actively contacted and worked with American journalists to craft a favourable view of Belgium in the US press.[51]

By the end of the 1950s, Goris' office thus still worked to increase the influence Belgium had in the US, but rather than Americanising the Belgian civilisation project, he wanted US citizens to identify with the challenges the colonial project faced in the Congo. In both cases, however, the language and imagery of modernisation theory was relied upon because it tapped into the US understanding of the colonial world: a place where political unrest, hunger and disease could be tackled by development aid, a place in which Belgians had already done a lot of work that was not driven by imperial aims but by the same willingness to deliver on the promises of modernity.

Conclusion: creating the illusion of invitation through elitism, expertise and primitivism

In the post-war period, Goris worked to increase Brussels' margins of manoeuvre within the US-led world order by rewriting the Belgian civilising mission in the language of modernisation theory because this discourse permeated the US understanding of Africa and the wider Third World. The Congo was not veiled from international scrutiny as a diplomatic embarrassment by Belgian diplomats. The colony was also not explicitly played up as a major source of power, which was what the Portuguese strategy consisted of, nor presented as a site the Belgians insulated against Communist infiltration, a French and British approach.[52] Instead, the BIC, with Spaak's support, sought to sidestep the Cold War conflict and played on Truman's developmental concerns to increase the manoeuvrability of Brussels towards the US. Congo's utility as a story that could highlight Belgium's contribution to the war effort was abandoned in 1947 when the BIC constantly sought to present the Belgian civilising mission as aiding the US modernisation efforts in Africa. When independence riots broke out the Congolese were restaged again as subjects who refused to modernise.

The BIC's story points to the myriad ways in which decolonisation complicated the Trans-Atlantic relationship. A history of how information agencies utilised the idea of an Atlantic community of values in which the cultural heritage and political ideas were shared obscures how the fundamental ideological fissure between the US and Europe on the question of colonial rule was exploited by European empires on different levels.[53] On the level of goals the BIC's road to influence in Washington lay in equating what both the US and Belgium sought to do in Africa. Maintaining colonial rule was sold as being in the best interest of the modernisation project, a scheme US officials and the public wholeheartedly supported in a bid to remake the Third World. On the level of strategy, the Point IV Program rather than the Marshall Plan were on the minds of Belgian public diplomats during the early Cold War. In pamphlets and radio shows the civilising work that was executed by Belgians in the Congo was Americanised by presenting it as part of the Point IV efforts and by the end of the 1950s by making the argument that both Belgians and Americans were faced with the same challenges while executing their work in Africa. On a conceptual level the Belgian case highlights that the Cold War was not only exported to the Third World, but colonialism was

also brought into the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Belgium sought to create the illusion that it accepted US guidance in colonial matters in order to maintain empire and increase the country's leeway in the international system. Ultimately, however, it was the Congolese themselves that broke that illusion in the riots after independence.

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8   A gas giant in a small state's clothes (1981–1982)

A political economy analysis of the Dutch margins for manoeuvre during the Urengoy pipeline crisis

Marloes Beers

This paper focuses on small states' behaviour during the Cold War in the 1980s from a political economy perspective. It investigates if the Dutch government, being the third largest gas supplier worldwide, chose to search for a margin for manoeuvre in international politics by translating its strong economic potential into geopolitical instruments.[1]

The case of the Urengoy pipeline crisis (1981–1982) provides an excellent focus for this analysis.[2] It concerns the construction of a 4650 km pipeline from the Siberian Yamal Peninsula to West European countries. Mainly the European willingness to contribute to this project gave way to an open transatlantic conflict. On the one hand, the US government criticised essentially the assumed geopolitical risks of Western trade with the USSR. In December 1981, right after the Polish government had introduced martial law to end a period of progressive anti-governmental uprisings, the American president, Ronald Reagan, announced an embargo for the export of American technology. Six months later these restrictions also targeted European-based companies. On the other hand, governments of the larger European states were outraged and openly denounced the, in their perspective, American interference in their national affairs. They voiced a more nuanced opinion on how to deal with the Soviet Union than the Reagan administration, perceiving East–West trade more as a means to keep the door open for international dialogue and to improve the living standards in the Soviet Union. However, the Western governments did not approve of the political situation in Poland either. For instance, in March 1982 the Dutch government openly pleaded for an active investigation of the human rights situation in Poland at the United Nations in Geneva. Subsequently a research group was formed which would deal with this topic.[3]

This Dutch role as 'political entrepreneur', initiating international mechanisms for the monitoring and improvement of specific human rights issues, has been analysed before by researchers of human right politics.[4] However, these policies were never connected to the strong economic position of the Netherlands. One can imagine that the Dutch government would search for ways to push forward its ideas on human rights by using its strong international energy position. For instance, it might have considered discouraging the import of Soviet gas by

augmenting the supply of cheap gas to the other European countries in exchange for a change of the American attitude towards the Soviet Union. One other possibility would be that the Dutch government demanded a larger say in the European and transatlantic discussions concerning East–West relations because of its strong gas position.

In the literature on small states' behaviour, these states are not primarily considered to translate a strong economic position into geopolitical ambitions.[5] For larger states and international organisations, linking the geopolitical to the economic dimension of international energy politics is not an unusual feature. For instance, during the Cold War, the Arabic countries of OPEC embraced the oil weapon in the 1973 oil shock to gain support in the Middle Eastern conflict. Another example is provided by the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) by Western consumer countries a year later. Especially the American geopolitical ambitions were important in the creation of this cooperation.[6] However, concerning small states' politics, scholars assume that this translation of economic interests into geopolitical leeway would not be the daily practice of these governments. These states are believed to pursue their agendas principally via international organisations or cooperation. 'Bandwagoning' with larger states in defence of their national interests would be their natural strategy.[7] In relation to this behaviour, academics have made two assumptions that form the basis for the current research: first, governments of small states lack a structural interdepartmental design, which would facilitate quick joint decision-making by the economic and geopolitical departments. Second, as stated earlier, small states are considered to call upon international fora when these states search to influence international politics. Therefore, this chapter aims to explore both the governmental infrastructure and the policies towards the international organisations.

The case of the Urengoy pipeline was discussed at different international fora such as the summits of seven industrialised countries (G7), NATO, European Community (EC) and the IEA. Within G7 and NATO, the transatlantic dispute was clear and sometimes very intense between 1979 and 1982, but it is doubtful whether the Dutch government would have targeted these organisations if it would have searched for geopolitical leeway. First of all, the Netherlands was not (directly) represented at the G7 summits, and the emphasis on the geopolitical implications of the Urengoy pipeline within NATO did not give room to a small state to search for a margin of manoeuvre by emphasising its gas potentials.[8] This chapter proposes that, in the case of the Urengoy pipeline crisis, the Dutch government could have appealed to two forums to influence international politics, the EC and the IEA. Within the former, the process of developing cooperation on both foreign policy and energy politics did not always go without a hitch. The nine member states (ten member states after 1981) maintained quite different interests in energy policy, as they disposed of different natural energy sources in variable quantities. Moreover, the search for common grounds in foreign policy was challenging with this diversity of principles and interests. The Urengoy pipeline crisis was somewhat exceptional in this context. European heads of state openly attached large importance to European cooperation and the French, British

and German heads of state François Mitterrand, Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt explicitly referred to a joint European stance in their correspondence with Reagan. One might argue that this strengthening of European unity in the world could possibly have motivated the Dutch government even more to search for a margin for manoeuvre within this European cooperation.

The IEA transcended the European arena and included states such as the US and Canada amongst its members. It was effectively the most important Western international organisation in the field of energy politics. Historically the IEA – and its predecessors the Oil and Energy committees of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – were the international headquarters for the alignment of Western politics on energy and related international and financial affairs.[9] If ever the Dutch government had searched for a margin for manoeuvre to influence international politics via its position as gas giant, it certainly would have focused on the IEA.

The main focus of this paper is the question whether the Dutch administration considered to translate its energy position into possible geopolitical leeway in international politics. It is the first academic research on this topic. Did the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands search for a strategic policy wherein energy matters were linked to the political transatlantic conflict on the Urengoy pipeline (1979–1982)? If so, did the Dutch government search for a margin for manoeuvre in the international arena in an individual way or as a combined effort with larger states, for example through *bandwagoning*?

In the following paragraphs, the developments are treated in a chronological order, with particular attention to three periods: first the orientation phase of Euro–Soviet negotiations, broadly 1979–1980. Thereafter the phase wherein transatlantic tensions were rising (1981). The third period starts with the announcement, in December 1981, of the American embargo on the sale of technology for the construction of the pipelines, which only targeted US based companies. It also concerns the ice-cold transatlantic relations wherein the American government embargoed European companies after 22 June 1982. The research is based on archival research in the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Orientation phase

It seems paradoxical that, considering the transatlantic crisis of 1982, the project of the trans-Siberian Urengoy pipeline was in its origins an American–Soviet idea born from détente. It concerned the transfer of Soviet gas by pipeline from Urengoy to the Norwegian border at the Barents Sea where the gas would be shipped, in liquified form, to the US. This so-called North-Star project dated from the Nixon–Brezhnev era in the beginning of the 1970s but was abandoned with the return of Cold War tensions and the increasing unwillingness of the American Congress to develop trade with non-market economies, such as the Soviet-Union.[10] Thereafter the project disappeared from the international agendas, until,

in 1978, the project of gas extraction in Urengoy re-emerged in bilateral talks between Soviet and West European governments and companies. It was not the first time that Soviet gas would flow to European consumers, but the scale of potential supply overshadowed any previous projects. In technological terms as well, the enterprise was highly challenging as it aimed for extraction of gas in the hardly accessible regions of Siberia's Yamal Peninsula, something which was never accomplished before. Western credit loans and technology would facilitate the extraction of deep gas reservoirs and the construction of pipelines. This 'win-win situation' for both Western industries and the development of Soviet–European gas trade was soon to be described in Europe as the 'Deal of the century'.[11]

Gradually after 1978, the Euro–Soviet talks became more and more concrete on the construction of the pipeline and the possible future gas supply. Telegrams from the Dutch embassies in West European countries informed the home country of the developments.[12] An interesting observation of the correspondence from the Dutch embassies is that the telegrams were directly addressed to the Ministry of Economic Affairs with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only in 'cc'. It was the Directorate General for Foreign Economic Relations, *Buitenlandse Economische Betrekkingen* (BEB), that coordinated the foreign trade within the Dutch ministries on policies stipulated by the Council of Ministers. Part of the Ministry of Economics, the BEB was in a way an inter-ministerial section that aimed to get the different interested departments from the ministries of economics, finance and foreign affairs on the same page. As an exception to the diplomatic rule, the BEB maintained direct communication lines with the *chef de poste* at the different embassies and with the economic section, although it was formally not part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[13] The information about the talks on the Urengoy pipeline came directly from these economic attaches and was, not surprisingly, mostly economic in nature. It dealt with quantitative specifications on the potential future gas supply, the status of the possible upcoming agreements, lists of the companies involved and summaries of national energy situations.

In the first phase of the negotiations, however, the Urengoy pipeline was not central in international discussions. Concerns on energy policy were mostly related to the second oil shock, which had taken off in the autumn of 1978. Western consumer countries endeavoured to minimise the explosion of oil prices set off by the Iranian revolution. In May 1979 the world price of oil had risen by 30 percent. In the summer of 1979, the then nine member states of the EC agreed on a common stance on a joint freezing of the import quotas.[14] These agreements within both European Council and G7 in Tokyo were hailed as a large success for European energy cooperation and for a European common position in international economics in general.[15] After these summits, both in June 1979, energy remained high on the agendas of the international organisations. Within the EC and the IEA, talks concentrated on the desirability to relaunch the use of coal as source for electricity, the intensification of nuclear energy and the search for a more rational use of energy.[16] The Urengoy pipeline issue had not yet reached the agendas of the IEA or G7.

The international oil situation and the European targets for a more diversified energy supply certainly created a need for a larger gas supply from the Soviet Union. Vice versa, the Soviet government was looking for new contracts as well. By 1979, it had become clear that the turmoil in Iran had indirectly compromised an important 1975 project for the supply of Iranian gas to countries such as France, Germany and Austria via the transit of the Soviet Union. The commencement of this trilateral Euro–Soviet–Iranian contract would have started in 1981 if the political and societal climate had been more stable in Iran. So, in 1979 the Soviet government was therefore in the same position as European governments looking for alternative energy contracts.

However, despite the energy problems in 1979, the Dutch government did not propose an extension of gas export to its European friends. Quite the contrary, a preparational memo for the European Council of 21–22 June advised the Dutch delegation not to agree to an extension of its production and export when asked by their colleagues. The targets were already set for the next couple of years, it says.[17] A few months later, the Dutch gas exporting authority Gasunie, 50 percent state owned, would even raise the gas prices as an indexation correction relating to the oil prices. At that moment the oil prices had increased by no less than 60 percent and a correction on the gas prices would have sounded logical in economic – but not political – terms.[18]

Still, it is debatable whether the Dutch position was intended to be as blunt as these decisions imply. In fact, they perfectly illustrate the Dutch gas policy of the time. Since the first oil shock in 1973, the national energy policy focused on risk minimisation and the safeguarding of gas supplies. The high-quality gas from the enormous on-shore Groningen fields remained strategic reserves for use in times of high consumption or possible crises, while most gas extraction was conducted at the smaller and scattered fields in the North Sea. Moreover, after 1974, gas export to Germany, France, Belgium and Italy was gradually reduced in quantity. Simultaneously, the Dutch government had begun to import gas from Norway.[19]

The Dutch gas import policy explains why the Dutch government decided in 1979 to look for possible participation in the Urengoy pipeline project. Both industrial cooperation and possible gas imports were taken into consideration. On the one hand, a group of Dutch enterprises, the Dutch Industrial Group, *Nederlandse industrie groep* (NIG), chaired by Shell Director Wagner, discussed the selling of technological materials for the construction of the pipeline.[20] With the consent of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, they proposed the supply of turn-key products to the Soviet constructors. The latter declined the offer however, apparently less interested in ready-made delivery than local production at the construction site. The Soviets would go for better known producers primarily in Germany, France and Italy. The lack of success of the NIG caused envy within the ministries of economic and foreign affairs towards their German and Italian colleagues. The writer of the memo complained that 'the Netherlands has lost out'.[21] Economic gain, instead of a political widening of the margins for manoeuvre, seems to have been at the centre of Dutch concerns.

On the other hand, the exporting authority Gasunie had instigated a project on possible gas contracts with the Soviet Union with a first orientation meeting in May 1979. An international consortium was created where Gasunie was seated together with its French, German, Belgian and Italian counterparts.[22] Within the Netherlands, on 19 March 1980, the first inter-ministerial deliberation took place, and the different perspectives within the Dutch administration became crystal clear: for the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the motivation was threefold. First, it was less related to a need for gas than to conserve a reputation of a credible gas purchaser with its European partners. Second, the Soviet gas supply would suit the European policy for diversity of energy sources in order to minimise security risks. Potential contracts with Algeria and Nigeria had just 'vanished into air'.[23] Third, the gas contracts would also fit within the IEA and EEC targets for a much desired lower dependency on the oil supply.[24]

The Ministry of Finances nevertheless maintained serious objections against the purchasing project. It rejected the contracts in respect to the trade balance with the Soviet Union and the principal lack of necessity of any import: 'we dispose of more than enough gas'.[25] Employees at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed with their colleagues at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, although they repeatedly commented on the possibility that 'the Soviet Union could profit from a dependency for political aims'.[26] They pointed to the risks of making the Europeans compete with each other, for example over the setting of gas prices or guarantees for credits. In their opinion, this could weaken European unity, also in other fields such as in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was taking place in Madrid at that time. The Urengoy affair did not play a role in this meeting. But due to the overall developments of détente, finding common ground between East and West proved to be difficult during this second follow-up meeting, which had only recently started in November 1980 and would be concluded only three years later. In preparation for the European Council of 2 December 1980, the Council for Economic Affairs therefore advised the Dutch delegation to plead for a European stance in the negotiations with the Soviet Union.[27] In this way, safeguarding European unity in international relations seems to have been of a more primary concern than searching for Dutch room for manoeuvre in Cold War politics.

At the same time, however, their remarks on the vast Dutch gas reserves do imply that no real risks in terms of gas *security* were considered as real. Interestingly, the strategic potential of the Groningen gas fields was only discussed in terms of national use. Their potential for international geopolitics were not discussed or hinted at. It appears that the Dutch stance was related to the national strategic policy to preserve the gas reserves. The possibility of linking these reserves to geopolitical leeway had not crossed anybody's mind.

Dutch gas as fall-back

By January 1981, nearly all member states of the European Community were involved in negotiations with the Soviet Union related with either the construction

of the Urengoy pipeline or future gas contracts or both. In the Netherlands, the gas company Gasunie had officially started negotiations on possible gas supply after the formal green light of the Dutch government on 9 October 1980.[28] Following pressure from the Ministry of Finance, where support for these contracts was low, any potential contract should have been a package deal including Dutch export of technologies for the pipeline construction. However, these negotiations did not run smoothly, as we saw earlier and would eventually reach a dead end in April 1982, when both Dutch and Soviet parties could not agree on either technology supply or gas prices.[29] So, in the end, the Dutch government or business were not directly involved in any contract concerning the construction of the Urengoy pipeline or gas supply. It would, however, gradually be involved in the project in a more indirect way, via its European partners and the IEA. This would gradually take shape after January 1981.

In the meantime, other European member states were making more progress in their negotiations. For instance, already in spring 1981, German companies had obtained serious perspectives on potential orders and a Soviet purchasing office had been installed in Bonn to facilitate the process. From the beginning of October, European companies signed contracts for pipeline construction. Their number included the German conglomerate Mannesmann, British John Brown, Italian Nuovo Pignone and Creusot-Loire from France.[30] In November, the German government concluded an agreement for gas supply for the coming 25 years which would almost double the German dependency on Soviet energy.[31]

These developments were alarming for the American administration where opposition towards East–West trade had hardened in the last few years. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979 had triggered decisions such as the halting of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II and exports of American high technology.[32] As the then American President Jimmy Carter already said to the American people on 4 January 1980 in the run to the presidential elections: 'neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union'.[33] Ronald Reagan's reinforcement of this viewpoint would resonate through the transatlantic talks on the Urengoy project after he entered the presidential office in January 1981.

Until the establishment of martial law in Poland in December 1981 by the Polish First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski, the American position was still moderate with Alexander Haig as Secretary of State, despite important counter voices led by the Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger. Haig's emphasis on the necessity of a so-called safety net for the reduction of European dependency on Soviet gas, instead of a straight embargo, would still temper a transatlantic conflict.[34] The transatlantic diplomacy in 1981 was characterised by a moderate rhetoric where the American administration pressed its allies to use more alternative energy sources and be more cooperative in halting technological exports to the Soviet Union, which could assist Soviet military capability. So, the topic was hinted at during a bilateral discussion with the freshly elected French President Francois Mitterrand on 19 July at Montebello. It was a somewhat awkward meeting

between the republican American president and socialist French president, especially because a new, partly communist government was formed only four weeks before in France. But the French president explained that these contracts were vital for the French economy. Export of technology would give more equilibrium to their very imbalanced trade balance with the Soviet Union. At the same time, as there were problems with Algerian imports, alternative gas sources were more than welcome in France. In multilateral discussions, Reagan showed a comparably moderate position. At the meeting with Western leaders in Ottawa from 19–26 July 1981, Reagan asked his international colleagues to adhere to a more cautious approach to East–West trade. Specifically, he wanted them to exercise prudence in importing Soviet gas and towards the construction of the Urengoy pipeline, but he said he would not oppose it.[35]

The Dutch sources concerning this period do not mention any consideration of a strategic use of the Dutch gas reserves. However, the potential of the Dutch gas fields became an important French and German counterargument to the American position. On 20 March, Jacques-Alain le Chartier de Sedouy, director on European cooperation within the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informed a Dutch attaché at the Parisian embassy of a meeting a few days before on the risks of high French dependency on Soviet gas. At that moment, the French were thinking of enlarging the import from the Soviet Union from 13 to 30 percent of the national gas consumption. This heightened risk of economic dependency was one of the main American objections against the gas contracts and was therefore often the topic of transatlantic discussions. Apparently, however, at the French ministry of foreign affairs, visions differed on the degree of resolution within the Dutch government in case the Soviets would cut off the supply. André Giraud, at the time French minister of energy, would have announced that in that case 'other good friends, such as Norway and The Netherlands would help out'.[36] The quote sounded as if Chartier de Sedouy was exploring the Dutch opinion on this topic.

The same argument of a Dutch fallback was given by the German government in November 1981 as formal reply to American objections against the upcoming German–Soviet gas contract. At the IEA, the geopolitical risks of Soviet gas supply contracts were at the centre of discussions. The US delegation, represented by no one less than the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs of State Myer Rashish, expressed its concern for the geopolitical risks of such a gas contract. The American remarks were illustrated by many tables showing the dependence of West European countries on USSR gas.[37] Within the report, the German government recalled the geopolitical risks while insisting on the safety net that would already be in place to deal with the potential cut-off of the Soviet gas supply. The first of the four elements of this safety net was, following the report, 'flexibility of domestic gas production and gas deliveries from NL with stand-by capacities'.[38] The existing contract with the Netherlands would allow for flexible delivery in terms of quantity, it said.[39]

The references made by the German Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Dutch gas reserves are very important. In some way they give an international strategic status to these reserves, something that the Dutch had not done yet. As a matter

of fact, the contracts facilitated this kind of flexible supply (against higher gas prices). It was not only a strategic move for the German government but also a real assurance of gas supply. The IEA meeting was followed by telegrams for the Dutch embassy in Bonn wherein the Germans asked for confirmation of the assured gas supply in case of Soviet gas cut.[40] Together with the lack of Dutch discussions on this fallback position in the archival sources, this seems to reveal that the German emphasis on Dutch gas was a solo act of the FRG and that no inquiries with the Dutch had been made before the IEA meeting. It also indicates that the Dutch were not willing to confirm this fallback position immediately. One might conclude that, first, the Dutch gas potential came in handy for its European partners and was strategically used by them in transatlantic relations. Second, the Dutch were not *eager* to make use of their position. Maybe this strategic fallback position had not come to their minds until spring 1981, but they were certainly made aware of it by the French in March 1981, as we have seen. It is still surprising why the Dutch delegation did not mention their potential role in gas security at the IEA meeting in November. They could have assumed a more active role in these transatlantic discussions and possibly even in the developments.

A clear opening for political manoeuvre was staring the Dutch right in the face, but they did not take the opportunity. It gives the impression that their position was defined solely by the national policy of strategic gas conservation. In any way, this was the viewpoint of the American government when it considered a possible strategic use of Dutch gas to counter geopolitical dependence on Soviet gas. Several US reports questioned the potentials of Dutch gas supply to prevent gas contracts with the Soviet Union. However, the American analysis did not qualify the Dutch potentials as sufficient. The available Dutch gas was predicted to be exhausted by 1990 and would therefore not last as a long-term solution. By contrast, Norwegian gas was expected to have more potential.[41]

Embargo

The international political climate changed substantially in December 1981 when Jaruzelski introduced martial law in Poland. All Americans could learn of Reagan's consternation in his televised Christmas speech of 24 December wherein he urged the American people to light a 'solidarity' candle for the Polish people that evening. Inside the governmental debates on foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, the radical voice of Secretary of Defence Weinberger was gaining ground at the expense of Secretary of State Haig who would resign a few months later. On 29 December, Reagan imposed economic sanctions on the Soviets, including embargos on the execution of pipeline equipment contracts.[42]

The December 1981 embargo put further strains on transatlantic relations. The restrictions only applied to American companies in the US, but with their imposition the American government had adopted a hard line and it was not certain how this would develop further. At the NATO meeting of early 1982, a consensus was reached on the condemnation of the Polish crisis, but no firm agreement on economic and commercial relations was agreed upon despite fierce debate.[43]

It is possible that this had its consequences on European–Soviet relations. For instance, in spring 1982 both Belgian gas companies and the government inquired with their Dutch counterparts about the room for possible Dutch gas supply in order to replace the potential contract with Soyugaz in the Soviet Union. In that case, if the Dutch would take over this supply from the Soviets, the Belgians could withdraw from their negotiations with the Soviets. It is unclear, however, to what extent geopolitical motives did play a role in this Belgian decision. This did not concern a major agreement on a structural gas supply; the Soviet contract would only have concerned a *guarantee* of gas supply for the period 1986–1990 in the case of a lower supply from other, mostly Algerian, sources.[44] So one could reason that this topic should be understood outside the context of the Urengoy affair. Still, it is interesting that this inquiry suddenly popped up right after the embargo of December 1981 and at the time of tense transatlantic discussions within NATO. All involved must have been aware of the geopolitical concerns related to the Soviet gas supply, especially after the notorious embargo announcement of December. It is also significant that the Dutch government approved of the new contract although this countered all national policy lines on gas export. After deliberation by the ministerial council on 7 July, the Dutch Minister of Economics Jan Terlouw did send a letter of approval for supply in times of scarcity to the Belgian Secretary of State on Energy Etienne Knoops. This letter would ease the Belgian concerns and make them stop the negotiations with the Soviets.[45]

The Belgian switch of focus from Soviet to Dutch gas supply seems to indicate that the Urengoy pipeline was mainly an economic affair for the Dutch. That was not entirely the case for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the head of department on European cooperation blamed the BEB department for having failed to organise inter-ministerial deliberations on the topic while more than only trade related aspects were involved with extra gas supply to Belgium.[46] Indeed, other documents also show a frustrated Foreign Affairs which would have liked to have had a larger say in the international gas policies of the time. On 4 August, the same head of the department of European affairs reasoned that the absence of direct economic involvement in the Urengoy deal would leave the transatlantic conflict on the Urengoy affair a matter of notably political and legal nature. Therefore, 'the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take over the lead from Economic Affairs'.[47] This wish would not be honoured in the coming month, although deliberations at BEB were intensified in the coming months. A month later, though, the Dutch would overtly aspire for a more active role in the European stance towards the United States by joining the four involved countries in formulating a joint position.[48] However, delegates of the four large European states (maintaining the gas contracts with the USSR) did not grant their Dutch colleagues a substantial role in the decision-making. Apparently, Dutch input during the meetings on the US sanctions caused frustration on the side of the larger European member states, especially France and the United Kingdom and was therefore largely blocked. Sensationally, the British weekly magazine *City Limits* of 4 October quoted a leaked confidential briefing which had been written by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in preparation for the upcoming Council of Ministers on

20–21 September. Considering the American export restrictions, which were on the agenda of this Council, the briefing would have stipulated a British position that was 'to brief colleagues in general terms without taking the lead, to say that participation should be limited to the four countries with large contracts (France, Germany, Italy, US), thus excluding the Dutch'.[49] When the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Relations asked for clarity on this position, the British foreign office apologised for the leak but did not state a different position than quoted by the magazine.[50]

The overall emphasis on economic aspects of the Urengoy deal seems to have been a general perspective in Europe. A similar emphasis is retraceable in the viewpoints of other European governments. So, the first response of Prime Minister Mauroy in January 1982 was that 'it would be useless to add to the Polish drama an extra drama for the French of not being supplied in gas'.[51] Indeed, later, during an interview in 1985, Helmut Schmidt would explain about the European viewpoint on the pipeline construction:

> Maintaining economic relations with the East is an essential part of European policy. We have been trading with the Russians for hundreds of years; we are all part of an inter-European trade network. The bottom-line is simple: We will not let the United States dictate this aspect of our economic policy.[52]

In other words, the Europeans were conscious of the geopolitical bias of the Urengoy pipeline but prioritised the economic aspects of the deal.[53] This line of reasoning also resonates in an Italian decision to suspend its negotiations on Russian gas in January 1982. Although the American government was eager to proclaim that this showed the Italian consent on renouncing East–West trade, the Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini was very clear about its solely commercial reasons for the suspension: it preferred to take more time to arrange a better trade deal.[54]

The transatlantic tensions did not cease after the NATO meeting in January. Instead, the quarrels continued on all three aspects of the Urengoy deal. Concerning the credit issue, the Americans succeeded in forging a deal at the OECD wherein the interest rates for the Soviets were raised. But the European–Soviet contracts for both pipeline construction and future gas supply remained important matters of disagreement with a potential embargo hanging over the European heads. Therefore, the agreement reached by the industrialised countries during their summit in Versailles on 4–6 June 1982 was certainly a relief to the European governments. Reagan assured his European colleagues that the US would not block the pipeline construction in exchange for the allies' willingness to adopt more stringent export credit policies towards the Soviet Union.[55] But the agreement fell apart almost as soon as the summit ended. On 18 June 1982, President Reagan made his decision to broaden the embargo.[56] On 22 June 1982, Reagan announced the restrictions on the export to the Soviet Union of products produced with US technical data. He aimed at all exports related to the construction of the Urengoy gas pipeline, including the trade managed by non-American companies. From the European states, the regulations triggered indignant responses about the

American arrogance to try to prevent the fulfilment of contracts outside its juris-
diction. The European position was well articulated by the West German political
commentator and publisher Rudolf Augstein in the German monthly *Der Spiegel*,
'The Americans were treating us as if we were not sovereign states. We could not
sit still and let them run our lives for us'.[57]

The four involved governments of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and
Italy responded furiously to the regulations and quickly pursued legal action in
order to constrain the impact of the US regulations upon existing contracts.[58] Apart
from these national measures, the member states of the EC prepared for joint
responses to the embargo immediately after the announcement on 22 June. The
Council of Ministers and the European Commission each formally denounced
the embargo and asked for a withdrawal of the restrictions. Thereafter, they for-
mulated an extensive joint statement, which the presidents of both the European
Commission and the Council delivered on 15 August in Washington.[59]

In the Netherlands, the BEB department coordinated the Dutch contribution to
this European statement. The Dutch position on this matter was a full denounce-
ment of the embargo out of solidarity with the more concerned member states
and because of possible further inconvenience for Dutch companies.[60] No Dutch
company was directly involved in the pipeline construction, but some were indi-
rectly delivering products that were used in the construction. It was in the national
economic interest to smoothen the transatlantic conflict with the United States.
In this way, the Dutch contributed to the European deliberations by joining the
smaller European states in emphasising the need of a compromise and the opening
of an opportunity for the Americans to cancel the embargo without losing face. In
the end, the Americans would renounce the restrictions in November 1982 after
the release of Polish solidarity leader Lech Walesa and the agreement within IEA
to reassess East–West trade.

Conclusion

The analysis of the Dutch policy during the Urengoy pipeline crisis has offered
insights into the strategic choices of a small country with large economic poten-
tial. The deliberations on the Dutch gas policy changed during the period of
1979–1982. Initially, the emphasis was mainly put on the economic aspects of
the pipeline deal, but from 1980 gradually the geopolitical aspects of the matter
became more important. In 1981, the strategic potential of the Dutch gas reserves
was only stressed by foreign governments. But the embargo of 22 June 1982
seems to have acted as a wake-up call for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as these American regulations triggered a joint European stance in international
politics. After that moment, the Dutch foreign ministry, eager to have a say in
the European Community, started to occasionally point at their gas capacities.
Indeed, the prospects of a comfortable place at the European decision-making
table, amongst the larger member states, triggered from that moment a duality in
Dutch policy wherein not only the economic aspects mattered but also the impor-
tance of the position of the Netherlands within European cooperation. However,

the Dutch would probably have had more success with their European colleagues if they had started playing this game at an earlier moment, for example during the IEA meeting in November 1981 where the German government rebutted American criticism by playing the Dutch trump card.

The analysis clearly reveals a Dutch commitment to their national energy policy of conserving strategic gas reserves. The margins for geopolitical actions were limited by this essentially economic policy. Energy policy in the Netherlands was about trade, about the national treasury and about business. When oil prices exploded in 1979, the Dutch subsequently raised the price of gas in the export to their neighbours. There was no consideration of an alternative approach, such as enlarging export supply or maintaining the same price, which could have enforced their relationship with their European fellows and possibly enlarged their political leeway in European politics. When in spring 1982 the Belgium government asked for the assurance of Dutch supply, their wish was granted by their Northern neighbours but only with strong provisions. After the embargo of 1982, the Dutch position within the European deliberations at the Council and the Commission followed the logic that only a swift ending of the conflict would be beneficial for the Dutch economy. There was no direct economic involvement in the Urengoy affair, and the conflict could possibly have hindered Dutch export in general. That's why the Dutch supported a swift compromise with their American counterparts without them losing face.

The infrastructure between the three ministries of foreign affairs, economics and finance was not beneficial for a linkage of economic strength with possible geopolitical margins for manoeuvre. Dutch gas policy making was foremost located at the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Aspects of foreign affairs concerning these policies were first treated by the BEB. The location of the BEB within the Ministry of Economics (and not at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it would move to a few years later) assured an essentially economic approach of the Urengoy pipeline crisis. This caused frustration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Reagan's announcement of the embargo in June 1982. The swift change of approach by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs is remarkable. The moment when the opportunity arose to play a more important role in European decision making, the Ministry swiftly made the linkage between economic strength and geopolitical leeway. But still, one might question if this change of policy was not dominated by essentially economic factors. It was of Dutch economic interest to smoothen the transatlantic relations, and these relations were essentially jeopardised by the larger European states that were directly involved in the Urengoy affair.

The geopolitical relevance of the gas reserves seems difficult to miss. But still, until June 1982, no archival source shows a Dutch consideration of it. Geopolitical risks were only discussed in a passive way, at the level of supply security from Russia. Instead, the potential fallback role of Dutch gas was not discussed by the Dutch either in national inter-ministerial meetings or in the international context. Within the IEA it was not the Dutch government that showed off its strong gas position. Instead, the German and French delegates emphasised the Dutch

potentials as gas supplier (and the openings in the Dutch gas contracts), which would lower the geopolitical risks if the Soviets should stop delivering their gas. During the important November 1981 meeting at the IEA, this provided a strong argument for these delegates in a heated debate with the American counterparts. Interesting is the tone of surprise in the telegrams from the Dutch embassies in Berlin and Paris to the ministries of economic affairs and foreign affairs about these German and French positions in the preparation for the IEA meeting. It is clear that this had not been discussed at all with the Dutch counterparts.

Did the Dutch government choose to search for a margin for manoeuvre in international politics by translating its strong economic potential into geopolitical leverage? Not really. The Dutch government sought to expand its room for manoeuvre in European politics, but this was mainly for strengthening its economic position and not essentially for geopolitical reasons. After all, even though acknowledging a certain strategic position, the Dutch gas giant remained a small state in international relations.

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3 38th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva 1982; Monique C. Castermans-Holleman, *Het Nederlands mensenrechtenbeleid in de Verenigde Naties* (The Hague 1992).
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6 Marloes Beers, 'The Oil Crisis, Lever or Barrier for the Development of a Common European Energy Policy? The Energy Policy of the European Community at the Time of the First Oil Shock' (Doctoral thesis, Université de Cergy-Pontoise. Cergy 8 January 2015).

7 Beers, 'Large and Small States', 230–236.

8 Walter Lippert, *The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma* (Oxford 2011) 137–172.

9 Marloes Beers, 'The OECD Oil Committee and the International Search for Reinforced Energy Consumer Cooperation, 1972–1973', in: Elisabetta Bini, Guiliano Garavini and Federico Romero (eds), *Oil Shock: The 1973 Crisis and Its Economic Legacy* (London 2016) 142–171.

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11 Lebahn, 'Die Jamal – Erdgasleitung', 256–280; Demidova, 'The Deal of the Century', 59–82; Blinken, *Ally vs Ally*, 3.

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Part III

Identity as an instrument

9 Neutrality as an instrument for small state manoeuvring and the globalisation of neutrality in the Cold War

Johanna Rainio-Niemi

In his account of the long-term contours of international history, *Diplomacy* (1994), Henry Kissinger writes that in the early years of the American republic the main instrument for the emerging and therefore still fragile nation's 'extraordinarily skillful maneuvering' between the bigger powers was neutrality. 'Just as many an emerging nation has since', the young nation was discovering 'the benefit of neutrality as a bargaining tool'.[1] Neutrality's main assets, according to Kissinger, were its versatility and ability to address international and domestic needs at once. Neutrality was used in the promotion of an aspirational international profile of the emerging nation. It was used to bridge potential domestic divergences within a heterogeneous and multinational society. The successful use of neutrality as a tool in international politics required internal unity over national principles.

Compared to the older images of neutrality as an instrument of manoeuvring – not only for an emergent nation, such as the young American republic but also for many greater powers in the long nineteenth century – the twentieth-century images convey a much more narrow image of the margins for manoeuvre. Regarding neutrality, mainstream international relations theory and history scholarship portray a policy that had been in steep decay since the First World War, the final blow having come with the outbreak of the Second World War. The maintream images of the post-1945 period have followed suit, being so dismissive and distorting that they have, according to Maartje Abbenhuis, skewed, among other things, 'our understanding of the high regard with which neutrality was held as a tool of diplomacy and statecraft' among the great powers in the 'long nineteenth century' (1815–1914).[2] That the neutral states of the post-1945 era consisted of mainly the smaller, weaker and more marginal states has not improved neutrality's standing in realist international relations scholarship.

This chapter focuses on how neutrality was understood among contemporary, mainly Western analysts, in the early decades of the Cold War (ca. 1948–1962). I will chart the booming of neutrality as a global phenomenon in around the mid-1950s and analyse the implications of this globalisation of neutrality for small neutral states in Europe, including the traditional neutrals Switzerland and Sweden and the newcomers Austria and Finland. The chapter sheds light on the the United Nations' role as the main platform and device for the small states' articulation and exercise of neutrality. It stresses the role of the nation's internal stability,

state capacity and national cohesion as key factors in the successful use of neutrality as an instrument and, relatively speaking, the 'extraordinarily skillful maneuvering' of small European neutrals in the international relations of the Cold War world. Contrary to the images that portrayed the declining relevance of neutrality, it remained an element of international relations history during the Cold War. Furthermore, because of the increasing popularity of neutrality since the 1950s (combined with the bipolar setting of the Cold War), the margins of manoeuvre available for those pursuing the traditional forms of neutrality seem to have widened rather than died away. Compared to the decades between the end of the First and the outbreak of the Second World War, the Cold War seems more favourable to neutrality as an instrument of small state manoeuvring.

Neutrality in Europe: from disapproval to compromises

In the formative years of the Cold War bloc-building (ca. 1947–1953), Switzerland's and Sweden's nonparticipation in WWII was fresh in memory, and the strategic necessities of bloc-formation generated little sympathy for neutrality. The big powers' public rhetoric against neutrality was harsh and rested on totalizing notions about a battle between 'good' and 'evil', which helped to polarise the Cold War.

In Sweden, the US encountered the Swedish initiative for a Scandinavian Defence Union (1948), whereby also Denmark and Norway would have restored their neutrality. The US priority in 1947–1949 was to have Norway and Denmark in NATO, possibly Sweden too, and the idea of a non-aligned zone, in a region where the Soviet Union was just about to conclude a bilateral security pact with Finland (1948), was not positively regarded. US–Swiss relations had declined in the post-1945 years, as a result of government commissions examining wartime movements of money, gold and of German and Jewish assets through neutral Switzerland. Switzerland, like Sweden, participated in the US-initiated multilateral programs of economic cooperation, but it was hesitant to approve control over its national economic and trade policies. Both also made explicit their wish to steer clear of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), 'the economic arm of the NATO'.[3] Finally, strong words about neutrality also addressed 'neutralist' sentiments that were not alien to war-battered societies of the US' allies France, Germany and Britain, either.[4]

There was traditionally little respect for neutrality as a (small) state policy in the Soviet state leadership,[5] yet the international communist movement had always sympathised with ideas of peace, disarmament and neutrality. On the eve of the Korean War, the idea of neutrality was more systematically seized by the Soviet Union as an instrument to discourage popular support for Western bloc-building. Soviet-supported campaigns for peace and disarmament were launched across parliaments in Europe where communist delegates used strikingly uniform language to denounce American imperialism and warmongering through its military-economic alliances, arguing that governments should invest in welfare instead of imperialist warfare.[6] In 1952, the Soviet Union also reactivated the idea

of a belt of neutral states in Europe from Finland to Yugoslavia and with a territorially reunified and neutralised Germany in the middle. The same recipe of internationally guaranteed demilitarisation was suggested to solve the division of other countries as well (Japan, Germany, Austria and the Free Territory of Trieste).

Until around 1953, the US systematically rejected the neutralisation idea. The main reason was, as Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it in 1950, that international agreement on neutralisation would obligate only those signatories that respected international law (the West), allowing others (the Soviet Union) to go on ever more unrestrictedly with 'infiltration tactics' from within. In the context of East–West tensions, neutralisation was therefore 'illusionary'.[7] From 1952–1953, the US started accepting more variation into notions of neutrality, however. This shift was first reflected on the treatment of the two European neutrals. Around 1952–1953, the previously 'stubborn' neutrality of Sweden and especially Switzerland turned into something that was no longer openly disapproved and barely tolerated but pointed out as *the type of neutrality* that the US was ready to respect. Very special emphasis was put on Switzerland's national consensus on neutrality, including nation-wide support to its armed defence.

This new attitude was embodied by the *National Security Council* report of 1951 that described Swiss neutrality as 'an article of national faith'. Any pressure on it would be counterproductive, and, hence, the US should from now on encourage this unique will for defence that was – without any doubt – orientated against 'the only potential aggressor in Europe' (the Soviet Union) and based on an 'overwhelmingly pro-Western and anti-communist' temper of Swiss government policy and public opinion. The risk of communism in Switzerland was minimal and 'a good Swiss citizen', by definition, could not be a communist.[8]

Since around 1952, the images of Swiss neutrality as a 'national faith' and the 'fighting spirit' circulated in leading Western newspapers. In 1952, the *New York Times* cited a Swiss diplomat saying that it was only now that the world was realising what the Swiss had long known: 'the will to protect yourself is more important than the number of divisions you have'.[9] In 1954 the same paper published another feature story illustratively entitled: 'How "neutral" is neutral Switzerland? A tiny country wants to retain her centuries' old "neutrality", but recognizes no moral "neutralism" as regards communism and democracy'.[10]

Characteristic of the more flexible US stance to neutrality was the very pronounced emphasis on the *armed* basis of neutrality and the deeply embedded defensive ethos not only among the conscripts but citizens across different layers of society. Indeed, during the inter-war period, (self-)images of small state neutrality were built on the ideas of the liberal internationalism, international law and an orientation towards peace.[11] In the 1950s, the baseline of credible neutrality was the capacity to provide armed territorial defence and a collective national will to uphold it. These were the main criteria for the US approval of Sweden staying outside NATO. Sweden was geographically more exposed and was seen to lag behind in comparison to the Swiss will to defend itself.[12] Switzerland – known as 'the everyman's dream of peace' – turned out to be a country of the 'warrior peasants', each male citizen being a member of the Swiss army 'twenty-four hours a

day, 365 days a year'. This was 'the oldest of all Western democracies' and 'the one place in Europe' where there was 'almost no "neutralism" in the moral sense as regards communism and democracy'.[13]

From the early 1950s the armed capacity to defend neutrality gained a whole new significance in Sweden, as did the formulation of methods for the management of the communist influences intended to undermine the existing model of democracy.[14] The latter had much in common with the 1930s battles against fascism, yet in the early 1950s the defence of democracy had a more or less open anti-communist undertone. A key element of the US approval of the continued existence of small states' neutrality in Europe was, indeed, that not participating in international struggles against communism by staying outside the Western alliance did not mean that a neutral country could be passive about communism at home. This type of rhetoric was most open in Switzerland but found resonance also among sections of the Swedish military, industrial, political and cultural elite. Simultaneously, the strong social democratic tradition was also setting limits to how much inspiration there was to be found in Sweden for Cold War-spirited anticommunism. Besides armed capacity, investment in the modern welfare state was seen as effective means for defending the existing model of democracy and neutrality.[15]

New neutrals in Cold War Europe and the models of neutrality

The model of neutrality that emerged in connection with the compromises on the continued existence of neutrality in Europe was first applied to the solving of the Austrian question. In the autumn of 1953, internal US position papers had still stated that Austria was geo-strategically too central to allow a solution 'in the model of Finland', yet was not seen fit to practice 'neutrality on the Swiss model' either.[16] Austria's political parties were seen to lack the necessary will to achieve neutrality and were therefore not able to act as unanimously as the pursuit of neutrality in the Swiss model required. By early 1954, however, neutrality in the model of Switzerland was the main goal. As John Foster Dulles noted in Berlin:

> a neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland had chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she has achieved a honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian state treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for itself to be neutral like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects its choice in the respect of the Swiss nation.[17]

The absolute priority for the US was that Austria, when adopting neutrality, would not turn into a military vacuum. In line with the recently reinvented Swiss model, neutrality did not necessarily require disarmament and passivity. Austria, in the opinion of the US, should have committed itself to the building up of a sufficient amount of military capacity that would allow them to suppress a domestic coup

and delay a potential attack from the East on the West. In addition, Austria should also be allowed to keep the ability to coordinate and cooperate with the Western military planning open regardless neutrality.[18]

When the US seemed ready to approve the idea on Austria's neutrality, the Soviet Union began to hesitate, but in 1955 the process was moving again. The West German integration with the West being unavoidable, the Soviet Union called off the earlier association it had tried to make between the neutralisation of Austria as a step towards a neutral Germany. Acting in a defensive hurry, it pushed for Austria's separate neutrality. The main priority was an *Anschluss* ban that would prevent the incorporation of the whole – or a part – of Austria to the West together with Germany. As a guarantee of the *Anschluss* ban, the Austrian diplomats offered the model of Switzerland that was approved by the Soviet Union. However, Austria's permanent neutrality was not mentioned in the four-power State Treaty but declared unilaterally by Austrian parliament.[19] Austria's neutrality, in this way, was not left to be conditioned by a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union – this being the case with neutrality of the other newcomer neutral in Europe, Finland.

Limitations notwithstanding, the first détente opened new options also for Finland's neutrality. The Soviet Union released the *Porkkala* naval base and withdrew its previous objection to Finland's membership in the Nordic Council. In connection with Austria's membership, the United Nations ended up with a de facto approval of the compatibility of membership and permanent neutrality, opening the way to a neutral Finland's and, soon thereafter, many other aspirant neutrals' membership.[20] Yet, in 1955, the bilateral security pact with the Soviet Union (1948) was extended for twenty more years. As it was to be extended two more times during 1971 and 1983, Finland's efforts to develop neutrality remained conditioned by this pact throughout the Cold War. This situation had no equivalent in other small European neutrals. Simultaneously, it was not an isolated case of neutrality either. Quite the contrary, by contrast to the models of neutrality represented by Switzerland, for instance, Finland was for Austria the model not to follow.

In 1953, as was noted earlier, the US viewed Austria as strategically too important to allow for a solution in the model of Finland. There was also a lack of domestic consensus. In Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had equated neutrality with 'Sovietization', and in Austria the Foreign Minister Karl Gruber published a book where he warned Austria of neutrality in the model of Finland as a way to Eastern dependence.[21] Yet for many Eastern European countries within the Soviet bloc, the position to strive for was – if not Austria's as the Hungarian crisis of 1956 soon proved – then, perhaps, that of Finland.

For Finland, the decisions of 1955 were welcome in any event. They marked a place outside the group of small Eastern European states where not identical, yet a similar type of bilateral pacts had led to the Warsaw Pact. In this context, the Soviet Union's recognition of Finland's neutrality (even if in this connection) opened a rare opportunity to try modelling its neutrality, as much as was possible, in the model of Switzerland and Sweden. This framework of neutrality was

what was historically familiar to Finland and had been preferred by many already before the war. Hence, all limitations and weaknesses notwithstanding, neutrality since 1955 was to be a tool for Finland to widen their room for manoeuvre beyond the otherwise very dominant relationship with the Soviet Union.

The global breakthrough of neutrality

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet focus moved from antagonism towards long-term, non-military, 'peaceful' competition between the capitalist and communist systems. Great emphasis was put on economic, propagandistic, and subversive means and, especially, in 'areas presently neutral or neutralist', as Arnold Wolfers, the head of the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, noted in 1962.[22] With the proceeding decolonisation, the number of areas 'presently neutral or neutralist' had grown since the mid-1950s. This changed the balance of power and the outlook of the United Nations, and in 1960 the majority of the members of the United Nations General Assembly were countries that had expressed their desire to stay outside the blocs and be counted as neutrals.

For many contemporaries this seemed like a resurgence of neutrality, a well-known policy from history, whereby the post-1945 'two-world order' was transforming into a 'three-world order' with the UN at the centre of the transformation. In May 1955, journalist Hanson W. Baldwin mapped, in the *New York Times*, the recent 'growth of what has been called variously neutralism, "the third force", nationalism, fence-sitting, or the restoration of a balance of power', picturing a phenomenon that reached from Northern Europe to Africa and through Asia to the Far East.[23] There a was recent reintroduction of neutrality in Europe (Austria and Finland), and in April 1955 the Bandung Conference had gathered together a wide variety of countries from the global South, (including Yugoslavia from Europe).

What united the heterogeneous group of Bandung countries was, as Baldwin described, their inspiration with neutralist, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist agendas. These countries, in Baldwin's words, were 'far-less antagonistic to communism than those in Europe'. 'Those in Europe' were, for Baldwin, Sweden, Switzerland and the newcomers Austria and Finland. Writing in May 1955, Baldwin noted that Austria's neutrality was still in the making, whereas Finland was 'economically tied to Soviet Union' yet 'politically non-communist'.[24] The latter remark, as we shall see later, was a signifier that marked the ultimate 'nature' of a country's neutrality and placed Finland in the same group with Sweden and Switzerland, regardless of its special ties to the Soviet Union.

The most topical question regarding the future role of neutrality was whether there was to be a wider 'neutral zone of Europe'.[25] Otherwise, Baldwin noted, the neutrals in or outside Europe would never be able to 'compare in physical power with either the communist states or the anti-communist group'. Even so, the mere appearance of a group of countries that wished to distance themselves from the 'two-world order' changed the global rules of the game by bringing in 'a third force' and pointed to a 'complete global realignment' that also had to be taken into account by the greater powers.[26]

Of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union was quicker to grasp the global rise of neutralist sentiment. After the introduction of Austria's neutrality, the previous ad hoc proposals on neutralization were replaced by a more systematic doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' in 1956. The open instrumentalization of neutrality to resist Western bloc-building ended and the focus was no more in Europe. The view was global and Austria's and Finland's recent neutrality decisions were voluminously utilised globally as prime examples of Soviet good will.[27]

From late 1955, the Soviet leadership toured India, Burma and Afghanistan and Indonesia in 1956. All, as was conspicuously reported, announced their 'neutralist' policies and, in exchange, the Soviet Union promised to provide economic and technological aid and assistance to emerging countries that had long suffered under (Western) imperialism and colonialism. By 1956, the Soviet public diplomacy had, according to Wolfgang Mueller, developed a full-scale 'neutrality myth'. Accordingly, by refusing (imperialist, Western) militarism a country would be able to enjoy the historical and present-day benefits of neutrality: instead of warfare and armament, the focus of investment could be on economic development and social welfare. Neutrality would bring along international prestige and open an option to act as a mediator in conflicts. Further, with its inherently anti-imperialist and anti-colonial agenda, the socialist bloc would be a natural ally for neutrals in world affairs and in the UN.[28]

The US had responded to the withdrawal of European countries from Asia, Africa and the Middle-East initially with the same recipe that it had used in post-war Europe: security and stability were to be achieved through multilateral organisations for economic and military co-operation with firm contacts with the Western world. The Bandung Conference – especially its timing – raised the question of whether this movement was to be an alternative to the Western-led schemes of cooperation. The US policy makers worried about the Soviet influence among nations that were seen to be weak, poor and 'underdeveloped' by the terms of modernisation.

In October 1956, Hamilton Fish Armstrong wrote in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs* that as the world was currently passing 'from the cold war into what the Soviets are calling competitive coexistence' with its strong focus on the 'underdeveloped areas of the world' and also that the US had to scrutinize the guiding principles of its foreign policy. The most urgent question was, 'what do we mean when we use the word neutrality and how are we going to react to those who have other definitions?' As the Soviet Union was suddenly making friends all over the world by talking positively about neutrality and about the neutrals' shared interests with the socialist bloc, the US too needed to reconsider its ways of talking.[29] The US leadership, as many experts suggested in these years, should stop mixing moral disapproval and ideological positions with the foreign policy and adopt a more pragmatic, realist standpoint. The many forms of neutrality and neutrals should be recognised 'not without quiet warnings that their actions may limit our willingness and indeed ability to help them, now or in the future, but without placing a moral stigma on peoples that are proud of their own moral teachings'.[30]

Traditional neutrals versus neutralists

Towards the end of the 1950s, the US stances to neutrality gained in pragmatism, realism and conceptual consistency. A key element in this development continued, however, to be the distinction drawn between the 'traditional' type of neutrality that the US was ready to respect and the other forms of neutrality. The basic distinction had been there since the formulation of the model image of (Swiss) neutrality and was reflected, still rather straightforwardly, on Vice President Nixon's statements in Manila in 1956 where he distinguished between the two main types of contemporary neutrality: neutrality and neutralism. The countries following the first type of neutrality shared 'the same principles which we share in common' and were prepared to defend them, even by arms when necessary. The other brand of neutrality, 'neutralism', made 'no moral distinction between the communist world and the free world'. With such neutrality the US had no sympathy.[31]

The ways of expressing this basic distinction grew more subtle and analytical towards the 1960s. Yet, the basic constellation remained, and as much as it came to disempower the efforts of those labelled as 'neutralists'[32] in the course of the Cold War decades, it began to empower the small European neutrals and neutrals that took efforts to model their neutrality according to the traditional (Swiss small state) model.

In 1962, Arnold Wolfers addressed the difference between 'the genuinely neutral countries' and the 'neutralists' in analytical depth. As Wolfers noted, the genuine neutrals did not belong to the US bloc, yet they could be trusted to 'withhold the support from the other camp'. The 'neutralists' followed policies with a 'more or less marked anti-western stance'. Further, the genuine neutrals were no particular problem to the US, but the latter were no 'neutrals in the traditional sense of the term'. They paid no heed to 'the age-old rules of neutrality'. While the 'old-time neutrals' were absolute 'status quo powers' and restrained in their external dealings, the neutralists lacked 'restraint in ideological fervor' and sought to play a transformative role in world affairs. Much of the neutralists' activity was not problematic to the US interests. Problems did arise, however, when 'anticolonial neutralists in their quest for peace' were disregarding 'international equilibrium' and neglecting 'the elements of defense' of their own society and the state.[33] Combined with the fierce Soviet competition over the influence among present-day neutrals and neutralists, this issue was becoming no less than 'the most arduous single problem that the West and the United States in particular, has had to face in the area of foreign policy since it first decided to contain Communist power proper'.[34]

The new US attitudes to neutrality as a global Cold War phenomenon were not only about replacing moralism and ideology with pragmatism and realism. To a very great degree they were about the notion that the US had 'hitherto paid excessive attention to the outward alignment of the new states, to the neglect of their inner stability'.[35] In the context of a global rise of new weak and vulnerable states, for the ones pouring 'out into the international community without any rational criteria for statehood',[36] the basic questions of the state- and nation-building

gained in urgency and relevance on a global scale. They were also seminally important for the attainment of a realist understanding of what was going on in world affairs: 'unless the omnipresent task of state-building is allowed to illumine the objectives and motives of foreign policy, it [the foreign policy of a new state] cannot be understood at all'.[37]

The character of the Cold War confrontation as an 'inter-systemic conflict' within which the conventional forms of rivalry were compounded by and legitimised in terms of a competition between fundamentally different political and economic norms was not a struggle *between* the states but very much *through* the states.[38] This stressed the importance of domestic resilience and resistance to the competitor's model. Whether the need for *internal strength* and will for defence was expressed in straightforwardly anti-communist terms (of the early 1950s) or in analytically more nuanced terms of modernisation, state capacity and cohesion, the issues at stake were basically the same.

Simultaneously, it was the weakness of the emergent states, rather than neutrality as such, that was seen as the main problem. Neutrality – when pursued in the model of traditional neutrality – was no problem but could, in fact, offer a cure to the problems created by a weak state. Weak states were identified to be troubled by an 'essentially feudal pattern' whereby internal factions were aligning with and receiving moral and material support from different outside powers. For 'weak states', neutrality, rightly understood, offered an effective cure. The isolationist bias of neutrality worked to insulate factional and regional struggles against the strains of outside interferences hence counteracting the feudalist tendencies and supporting national cohesion. In addition, by enhancing an emerging country's international status, the traditional model of neutrality would help to promote the authority of the 'state' at home as well.[39] Neutrality, quite simply, was at its best 'a device to rally an ill-assorted people and inject purpose and coherence into an embryonic state' and to 'provide focus for domestic cohesion'.[40]

Neutrals as mediators: strong and weak neutrals in the United Nations

The focus on state- and nation-building was something that also applied to the neutrals' role in the United Nations where the influx of new member states 'without any rational criteria for statehood' was seen by many, especially the Western conservatives, to endanger impartiality through an 'anti-colonial bias'.[41] In contemporary eyes, the UN was *the* arena for the various neutrals' collective and nation-specific influence on world affairs. Through the principle of equality – regardless of the size, age, wealth and colour of the state – the devices of the UN, the debates, the voting and the multiplicity of initiatives and actions, conferred influence, international visibility and capacities on smaller states that were otherwise beyond their reach.[42]

While the idea of neutrals as mediators and arbitrators in conflicts had already been an element of neutrality thinking, in the Cold War setting – because of the bipolarity – the 'third party' influence was prone to grow.[43] As Liska noted, the

smaller the margin of power that favoured either of two contending parties, the more relevant was the total power of a third party, however intrinsically weak it may have been.[44]

The third party influence could, of course, be used in different ways and this was where a small neutral state in the 1950s–1960s context faced a choice between being a 'mediator' or 'divisor'. The latter was neutral that in its 'general desire to profit from the Cold War' initiated or exacerbated conflicts rather than sought to mediate and reconcile.[45] Indeed, to be a mediator required inner-strength, capacity and a fair amount of self-restraint from a small state. A 'somewhat chaotic domestic situation' or a 'tendency to become thoroughly absorbed in the enormous tasks of domestic development', combined with a lack of basic diplomatic skills, knowledge and education did not promise success in extremely demanding (and honoured) mediation tasks.[46] As Henry Kissinger put in 1962, it was:

> not clear why nations said to be in need of assistance in almost all aspects
> of their national life, many of which have difficulty in organizing their own
> countries, should be presumed to be able to act with more wisdom in relation
> to the whole gamut of international problems.[47]

Whether said out aloud or indirectly, the requirements for a mediating neutral meant that 'the genuinely neutral countries' were better suited to this task than were the emergent neutralist states. The preference went back to the nomination of Sweden and Switzerland in 1953 to the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission (NNSC) at the end of the Korean War. This nomination was part of a series of compromises on the continued existence of neutrality in Europe and has even been seen as the confirmation of the two traditional neutrals' subsequent position as the 'supporting neutrals' of the West.[48] Yet, based on the longer tradition of mediation and arbitration as tasks assigned to neutral powers, the idea lived on not only among Europeans but also among (often Western educated) intellectuals in the decolonising countries.[49] While for many neutralists, the role as a mediator promised an escape – in very concrete terms – from the imposed passivity of the colonial status, the former were the ones who could reap the benefits of neutral 'bridgemanship'[50] in full through such UN-facilitated activities as peace-keeping, arms limitation initiatives and summit hosting and, in this way, use neutrality successfully as an instrument to extend a small state's margins of manoeuvre and enhance the relative power and authority of the state at home and abroad. This success did owe, perhaps more than is generally acknowledged, to the distinction between two types of neutrality and between the weak and the strong neutral, a distinction that was clearly favourable to the strong, small European neutrals.

Indeed, from the Western perspective, the branding of the traditional neutrals' model of neutrality was not meant to promote these countries' international images as such. Instead of just describing, they prescribed *the* type of neutrality that the US-led bloc was ready to respect and support. Further, the US benevolence towards nations that maintained 'a position of strict impartiality' could help attract 'neutralist countries towards a position of traditional neutrality' even if,

simultaneously, it had to be considered whether the reward of the move away from 'neutralist un-neutrality' towards traditional neutrality, would not add 'to lures of neutrality' among their own allies.[51]

Neutrality as nation-building in European newcomer neutrals

Perhaps nowhere was the wish to follow the Swiss and the Swedish models of neutrality more pronounced than it was in the 1950s–1960s Austria and Finland. In 1963, Peter Lyon presented a six-point classification of the various types of neutrality whereby Switzerland and Sweden were, unsurprisingly, 'a class a part'. Austria presented a rare example of 'historical neutralization', whereas Finland (together with Afghanistan) was an example of a small state interposed between two or more greater states.[52]

In the Cold War context, Finland, according to Lyon, was a historical buffer-state that had transformed into 'a buffer protectorate of the Soviet Union', its 'circumscribed brand of neutrality' clinging on 'a single phrase' in the preamble to the security pact treaty with the Soviet Union. Yet, as Lyon stressed, by the 1960s, Finland had taken serious efforts to develop a neutrality that would operationally (if not formally) be in line with the model of the other European small neutrals.[53]

In mid-1950s Austria, neutrality was still more openly opposed than supported. The fellow Cold War neutral – in terms of timing – Finland was widely seen as the model not to follow; references to *Finlandisierung* were used as tools to oppose Austria's new-born neutrality. Neutrality was definitely not seen as something that would later be described to have lent wings to Austria's 'self-assertion and a remarkably successful project of nation building' and become the widely shared 'identity of Austrians', 'the crux of the Austrian way'.[54] However, in both Austria and Finland architects of neutrality were looking at Switzerland and Sweden as *the* models in the building up of the national versions of neutrality. One of the most appealing notions regarding these models was the way in which the whole nation was seen to stand behind neutrality.

Concrete evidence for the role of the issues of state- and nation-building in contemporary understandings of neutrality can be found in the almost concurrent introduction of a policy of 'spiritual national defence' in both Austria and Finland in the latter half of the 1950s. These policies were a translation from the Swiss *Geistige Landesverteidigung*,[55] a policy that had been in operation in Switzerland since the 1930s. In a somewhat different, more social democratic form, it had also been pursued in Sweden to counteract the authoritarian influences of the time. They had been in operation throughout the war and been revitalised in a revised Cold War form in the early/mid-1950s.[56]

Being an element in the doctrine of 'total defence' – in itself a concept that aimed to respond to the challenges of 'total war' – the scope of what could most aptly be called the 'ideational' sector way exceeded the limits of what is conventionally understood as defence and security policy. The main aim was national opinion building, citizen education and public information, regarding what very

uniformly across these neutral countries were announced to be the 'core values' of the Swiss way of life: (armed) neutrality and (a Western/Nordic type of) democracy.

Finland and Austria introduced *Geistige Landesverteidigung* policies after a preparation period in 1960 and 1961.[57] Though the institutional set up and implementation of these policies varied from neutral to neutral, the basic paradigm and the phrases used were very similar and the involved actors cherished contacts with one another across the national borders. The shared view was that spiritual national defence policies were not to be understood as instruments of ideological *warfare* but as tools of *defence* against propaganda, subversion and the Cold War battles over the 'hearts and minds' of the people. The main 'weapon' in this defensive battle, in the model of Sweden and Switzerland, was the formulation of a distinctively own, national ideology that would rest on the widely shared core values of the national 'way of life'. This national thinking, as was openly stated, should have become the main guideline in public opinion formation regarding the commitments to neutrality and the (Western/Nordic) type of democracy. Through modern citizen education and information sharing, the old nationalist pathos would be replaced by an ethos of 'enlightened democratic patriotism' (Austria) and by sober 'national realism' (Finland).

In this context, too, Finland stands out from the other European neutrals. Whereas in the other neutrals, these nation-building policies went on throughout the Cold War decades, in Finland, the challenges from domestic communism and Soviet relations proved too hard. They did not survive the 1970s in such an openly 'Swiss' model.

Indeed, of the four neutrals, Finland was the only one with a substantial domestic communist movement that gained circa twenty percent electoral support since 1945. Anticommunist thinking was deep-seated in national traditions and in the 1950s many would have liked to spice up this thinking with more articulate Cold War anti-communism, whereas the Soviet Union had a keen eye on all types of anti-communism inside Finland.[58] Indeed, one of the main ideas during the 1960s when spiritual defence policies were most in operation was to replace the traditional and newer anti-communist streams in national thinking with a more markedly Swedish type of thinking, whereby modern welfare state policies were the main instruments for national cohesion-building. Accordingly, in modern Finland anyone – even communists – who wholeheratedly supported 'our own free democracy' and Finland's independence should be treated as a 'a good Finnish patriot'.[59]

Fully in operation, firmly institutionalised and highly regarded among the leading elites by the mid-1960s, Finland's version of these nation-building policies started to be criticised, first by the New Left – as also occurred in the other neutral countries – but, finally, ever more vocally by the most extreme, Soviet-loyal left from the early 1970s. These policies were, according to the extreme left and example of a bourgeoisie's ideological and psychological trench warfare, an indication of Western influence over Finland's neutrality and eroding the friendship between Finland and the Soviet Union. Following years of attempts to broaden

the circle of participants, the *Geistige Landesverteidigung* policies were finally officially terminated by a parliamentary committee in 1975 even though many of the key functions went on in different forms at the lower levels of governance.

The criticism against Finland's neutrality was substantial, the Soviet Union growing dissatisfied with the 'Western' influences within Finland's ways of conducting neutrality. The overt focus on armed defensive will and capacity was steadily criticised from 1965. While this phase, on the one hand, ended with the cessation of the nation-building policies *a'la* Switzerland, as a result, Finland, on the other hand, became the initiator of the (Soviet proposed) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In 1975, Helsinki was the venue for the signing of one of the major documents of the mid-1970s détente, the Helsinki Accords. This brought unforeseen visibility for Finland as a mediator in Western eyes. Altogether, the CSCE/OSCE process provides an illustrative example of how the two blocs of the Cold War were competing over the influence on the direction of neutrality. And, second, of how the neutrals – also in the field of good offices and summit hosting – played along as a 'third party', aiming simultaneously to extend their national margins for manoeuvre where possible, yet retaining an eye on the balance between the wider global and international neutrality agendas encouraged and discouraged by great powers.

Conclusion

Regardless of the wide-reaching neglect of neutrality in standard post-1945 international history and theory textbooks until these days, neutrality as a phenomenon and policy, in all its variety, was an integral part of how contemporaries viewed international affairs of the Cold War period. For sure, neutrality was not a 'highly regarded' part of 'great power diplomacy'. Yet regardless – or because – it was the policy desired by the majority of the smaller, the weaker and the more marginal powers in the world, it gained relevance in the bipolar Cold War constellation.

A key way that the West came to terms with neutrality, in its widely varying global forms, was the distinction drawn between the models of traditional neutrality and the new emerging forms of neutralism. While the former were strong, affluent and stable European small states – such as Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Finland – the latter were seen to be the weak states troubled by many issues of incomplete state- and nation-building. As this chapter has aimed to show, this inherently *global* context of giving meaning and understanding to the functions of neutrality and the suspected competition over 'spheres of influence', especially in those countries and territories 'presently neutral or neutralist', resulted in a situation that as a side effect greatly empowered those small states that were following, or tried to follow, the traditional model of neutrality, regardless of the initially very strong reservations of the US against neutrality.

The contrast to the very limited influence of the small neutrals on international arenas in the interwar decades (and especially after the end of US neutrality) is remarkable, pointing to the decisive role of a wider international support to the small states' successful neutrality. Had there not been the United Nations and

had there not been the Cold War, the virtuous images of the small European neutrals concerning their inner strength, capacity and skills as states, their unity as nations and their efforts as bridge-builders and mediators would have remained less well known internationally and nationally. On the other hand, the Cold War has been recently described as a story 'of boundaries, establishing the outer limits of each sphere of influence' and 'competing for those who had not yet pitched their tents in one camp or the other".[60] Although neutrality is not mentioned here, what would this story have been about had there not been the global interest in neutrality among the smaller, the weaker and the marginal powers?

Finally, the appeals of the traditional small state model of neutrality were clearly reflected in the ways in which the two Cold War newcomers with a Western type of democracy embarked on the path of neutrality-building. Both focused systematically on exactly those elements that seemed to provide keys to the extended margins and options for manoeuvre internationally and nationally. Despite challenges, these efforts were not in vain. By the end of the Cold War both small countries, even in the relatively troubled case of Finland, were widely recognised internationally as members of the group of European neutrals and both had been trusted with – and contributed to, many assignments as intermediaries, peacekeepers, summit hosts, 'bridge-builders' and, more generally, providers of good offices through the UN framework. The legacies of these ways to extend the margins of manoeuvre of a small state have persisted beyond the end of the Cold War even if neutrality in its Cold War form is no more there.

Notes

 1 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York 1994) 30.
 2 Maartje Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals. Great Power Politics, 1816–1914* (Cambridge 2014) 12–14.
 3 Jürg Martin Gabriel, *The American Conception of Neutrality After 1941* (Basingstoke 2002) 2, 112–122.
 4 On the rise of 'neutralist sentiments' in especially in France, see Peter Lyon, *Neutralism* (Leicester 1963) 33. It linked with war-weariness and opposition to the NATO alignment especially among intellectuals. It was 'however articulate' a concern of 'impotent cliques not of governments' see Lyon, *Neutralism*.
 5 See e.g. Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations* (Sussex 1988) 229–237.
 6 Johanna Rainio-Niemi, *The Ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland* (New York 2014) 42; Also see Marc Lazar, 'The Cold War Culture of the French and Italian Communist Parties', in: Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960* (London and Portland 2003), 213–224.
 7 Acheson 1950 cited in Gabriel, *The American Conception*, 108.
 8 *National Security Council Report* (NSC 199/1951); 'Swiss aide asserts, reds bloc peace', *New York Times*, 20 March 1953.
 9 'Swiss Neutrality Is Rugged, Related to Fighting Spirit', *New York Times*, 19 April 1952.
10 'How Neutral Is "Neutral" Switzerland?' *New York Times*, 14 November 1954.
11 See the chapters in Rebecka Lettevall, Geert Somsen and Sven Widmalm (eds), *Neutrality in Twentieth-Century Europe. Intersections of Science, Culture, and Politics After the First World War* (New York 2012)

12 E.g. Gabriel, *The American Conception*, 106–107.

13 'How Neutral Is "Neutral" Switzerland?' *New York Times*, 14 November 1954.

14 See Magnus Hjort, *'Nationens livsfråga'. Propaganda och upplysning i försvarets tjänst 1944–1963* (Stockholm 2004); Magnus Hjort, *Folk och Försvar och Kampen mot den Femte Kolonnen. En Studie av Framväxten av Övervaknings-Sverige under 1950-talet* (Stockholm 1998).

15 See e.g. Alf W. Johansson, *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget. Antikommunism och liberalism in Dagens Nyheter 1946–1952* (Stockholm 1995); Ulf Bjereld, Alf W. Johansson and Karl Molin (eds), *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred. Svensk utrikespolitik under Kalla Kriget* (Stockholm 1995).

16 For the official US views on the Austrian question, see e.g. *National Security Council Memorandum*, U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to Austria (NSC 164/1953). Also cf. Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besatzung Österreichs 1945–1955* (Wien 1998), 450–452, 602–605.

17 Dulles cited in, for instance, Günter Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War. The Leverage of the Weak* (London 1999) 139.

18 Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit*, 602–605.

19 Gerald Stourzh 'Der österreichische Staatsvertrag in den weltpolitischen Entscheidungsprozessen des Jahres 1955', in: *Der Österreichische Staatsvertragzwischen internationaler Strategie und nationaler Identität* (Wien 2005); cf. also John van Oudenaren, *Détente in Europe. The Soviet Union and the West Since 1953* (Durham, NC 1991) 31–32.

20 Switzerland stayed away from the UN. On compatibility of neutrality and the membership, see e.g. Bengt Broms, *The United Nations* (Helsinki 1990) 56, 110.

21 Karl Gruber, *Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreichs* (Wien 1953); Michael Gehler, 'From Non-Alignment to Neutrality: Austria's Transformation During the First East-West Détente, 1953–1958', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7:4 (2005) 104–136, 108, 114–115; Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit*, 452.

22 Arnold Wolfers, 'Allies, Neutrals and Neutralists in the Context of the US Defense Policy', in: Laurence W. Martin (ed.), in: *Neutralism and Nonalignment. The New States in World Affairs* (New York 1962) 152–164, 152–153; On the re-evaluation also see e.g. Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill 2007) 94–95; Wolfgang Mueller, *A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria, and Neutrality, 1995–1991* (Vienna 2011), 120.

23 Hanson W. Baldwin, 'Rise of Neutralism May Alter US Plans', *New York Times*, 22 May 1955.

24 Baldwin, 'Rise of Neutralism May Alter US Plans'.

25 Baldwin presented two options for a wider neutral zone in Europe. The smaller would consist of the existing four neutrals plus a neutralized Germany and Yugoslavia. The wider would include, not only neutral Germany and Yugoslavia but, also, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. These scenarios were possible only on the condition that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces in these countries in exchange for the US giving up the network of airbases in Western Europe.

26 'Rise of Neutralism May Alter US Plans', *New York Times*, 22 May 1955.

27 Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 102–103.

28 Mueller, *A Good Example*, 47–55.

29 Hamilton F. Armstrong, 'Neutrality: Varying Tunes', *Foreign Affairs* 35:1 (1956) 57–71. Armstrong referred to a series of neutrality statement of the US foreign policy leadership in summer 1956, revealing 'a discomforting degree of confusion'. For further calls for more realism e.g. Walter Lippmann's column 17 July 1956, *The Washington Post*; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago 1958) 186–187, 204–206.

30 Hamilton, 'Neutrality', 71.

31 'Nixon's Talk Warning Nations of Perils of Neutralism', *New York Times*, 4 July 1956; cf. also e.g. Morgenthau, *Dilemmas*, 186–187.

32 On the pervasively negative stance to neutralist efforts see e.g. Robert B. Rakove, 'The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961–6', *The International History Review* 37:5 (2015) 991–1013.

33 Wolfers, 'Allies, Neutrals and Neutralists', 152–164.

34 George Liska, 'The "Third Party": The Rationale of Nonalignment', in: Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, 80–92, 80.

35 Laurence W. Martin, 'Introduction: The Emergence of the New States', in: Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, xi–xxi, xviii–xix.

36 Francis O. Wilcox, 'The Nonaligned States and the United Nations', in: Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, 121–151, 122, 151.

37 Robert C. Good, 'State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States', in: Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, 3–12, 3.

38 Fred Halliday, *Re-Thinking International Relations* (London 1994) 170.

39 Liska, 'The "Third Party"', 88–89.

40 Martin, 'Introduction', xii.

41 Laurence W. Martin, 'A Conservative View of the New States', in: Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, 64–79, 71, 73.

42 Martin, 'A Conservative View', 71; Wilcox, 'The Nonaligned States', 122, 151.

43 Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals*, 148, 158–159; Lettevall, Somsen and Widmalm (eds), *Neutrality*.

44 Liska, 'The "Third Party"', 80–92, 80; Also see Oran B. Young, *The Intermediaries. Third Parties in International Crises* (Princeton 1967) 95–102; George Liska, 'Tripartism: Dilemmas and Stategies', in: Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, 211–238.

45 For a good overview of contemporary views see Young, *Intermediaries*, 98–100.

46 See Young, *Intermediaries*, 100–101.

47 Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York 1962) 346.

48 Gabriel, *The American Conception*, 123–124.

49 E.g. Young, *Intermediaries*, 97; Rakove, *The Rise and Fall*.

50 Lyon, *Neutralism*, 64–65.

51 Wolfers, 'Allies, Neutrals and Neutralists', 153, 157, 162–163.

52 Lyon, *Neutralism*, 61, 91.

53 Lyon, *Neutralism*, 91, 93–99.

54 Gehler, '*From Non-Alignment*', 136; Karin Liebhart, 'Transformation and Semantic Change of Austrian Neutrality: Its Origins, Development and Demise', in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Ruth Wodak (eds), *Neutrality in Austria* (London 2001) 7.

55 These policies were called *Geistige Landesverteidigung* in Austria and, as a direct translation from the German term, *henkinen maanpuolustus* in Finland. The term used in Sweden was *psykologiskt försvar* and a civilian part of the activities were carried out through the Folk och Försvar network. Initially, the broader state-ideological model seems to have been more appealing in Austria and Finland. For more detailed account on this this policy see Rainio-Niemi, *The Ideological Cold War*.

56 Cf. Hjort, *Nationens livsfråga*; H.A. Huber, 'Die geistige Landesverteidigung in der Schweiz. Theorie und Praxis', *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* (ÖMZ) IX:5 (1971) 326–339.

57 For a more detailed account: Rainio-Niemi, *The Ideological Cold War*.

58 E.g. Jarkko Vesikansa, *"Kommunismi uhkaa maatamme". Kommunisminvastainen porvarillinen aktivismi ja järjestötoiminta Suomessa 1950–1968* (Helsinki 2004).

59 Tuomas Vilkuna (ed.), *Urho Kekkonen. Puheita ja kirjoituksia II. Puheita presidenttikaudelta 1956–1967* (Helsinki 1967) 234, 497–500.

60 David C. Engerman, 'Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962', in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge 2010), 20–43, 33.

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10 Denuclearisation and regional cooperation

Romania's tactical approaches to escaping bloc rigidities[1]

Corina Mavrodin

On 20 September 1960 Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej arrived in New York with much pomp and pageantry on board *The Baltika*, the best ocean liner the Soviet fleet could offer. However, his visit to the United States – the first of a Romanian head of state since the beginning of the Cold War – was not primarily motivated by an objective to improve relations with the White House, but rather to gain global notoriety at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). As a 'messenger of the [socialist] wish for peace',[2] Dej had accompanied Nikita Khrushchev to New York to launch a proposal for a denuclearised zone in the Balkans within the UN framework. The Romanian initiative was meant to play a key supporting role in the worldwide Soviet campaign for 'peaceful co-existence', which Khrushchev intended to promote with renewed intensity at the historical UNGA session in the hope of charming Third World leaders attending in record number.[3] Dej's proposal therefore was not only intended as a potent illustration of socialism's ostensible pacifism, but it also represented the practical application of a global concept at a regional level: it called for complete disarmament, while at the same time promoted the 'peaceful coexistence' between the NATO and Warsaw Pact member countries in Southern Europe. The project, however, was not new. It was the reincarnation of a plan launched three years earlier, in 1957, when Bucharest had proposed the first ever international project for the creation of a nuclear-free 'zone of peace'.[4] Otherwise known as the Balkan Understanding or the Stoica Plan (named after its initial promoter and Dej's right-hand man, Prime Minister Chivu Stoica), up to that point the initiative had been proposed at the bilateral level with the national Balkan governments – Warsaw Pact member Bulgaria, NATO members Greece and Turkey and nonaligned Yugoslavia. After two failed attempts at the regional level – in 1957 and 1959 respectively – it was now time to take the proposal before a global audience, at the historic UNGA session of 1960.

This chapter will discuss the Stoica Plan within the regional and global context that conferred Romania, which had a previously obscure presence on the international stage, with one of the most important opportunities to strategically rise to international relevance in the late '50s. An analysis of Bucharest's quest to champion the cause of Balkan cooperation during this period allows for a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through which the small, Eastern European

country – economically enfeebled and geographically overshadowed by its super-power neighbour – was able to stretch the margins of manoeuvre conferred by the bipolar Cold War dynamic and to thus slowly carve out for itself opportunities for relatively more independence at a later stage. It will therefore explore in more detail a topic that has largely been omitted by recent historiography. While historians have mainly focused on Romania's later attempts to take the lead on regional cooperation, they have done so within the context of détente, when the country's exceptionalism had already been established onto the Cold War stage, and when its foreign policy was meant to defy, rather than endear the Soviet Union.[5]

In contrast, Romania launched the Stoica plan in 1957 from a position of weakness and obscurity, at a time when the country still seemed very much under Soviet influence. The Balkan initiative – which was not only encouraged by the Kremlin but may have well been 'inspired' by it – was therefore an ideal opportunity to prove sustained allegiance to the Soviet Union. Being entrusted with such responsibility in part because of its small (i.e. non-threatening) size, Romania could thus gain more of the Kremlin's trust as loyal junior partner – a preliminary and essential step in widening Romania's margins of manoeuvre. Unsurprisingly, seen from London or Washington, Bucharest's alignment to Moscow's foreign policy pointed very clearly towards a relationship of subservience. Unbeknownst to the West at the time, however, was the fact that this alignment also provided Romania with an unprecedented opportunity to gain access to, relevance among and political capital with the bigger communist powers – China and Yugoslavia, both of which Romania would later leverage to counterbalance Soviet influence. By 1960, the Stoica Plan would also confer upon Romania the opportunity to truly step onto the global stage for the very first time at the UN, thereby also gaining visibility among the newly decolonised countries in Asia and Africa. Despite its appearance of servility, Romania was thus slowly expanding its margins of manoeuvre away from Soviet influence.

This chapter will discuss this calculated first step onto the international stage within the context of Romania's slow but strategic move towards a more independent foreign policy at a time when such a prospect was not necessarily visible. This analysis will rely predominantly on recently declassified documents from the Romanian National Archives (ANIC), which shed new light onto Bucharest's decision-making process on this topic. In order to also gauge the Western view on Balkan developments during the period under discussion, this text will also lean on Foreign Office documents from the British National Archives (UKNA), as well as American intelligence and State Department records (CIA and FRUS, respectively).

This chapter will first consider the climate within the socialist world of the mid- to late 1950s which presented Romania with the opportunity to launch its plan for regional cooperation and denuclearisation in the Balkans in 1957. Within this context, it will discuss the dynamic among the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and China, among which Bucharest found itself conducting its first efforts at shuttle diplomacy in order to gain support for its project. The analysis will then shift to the regional dynamics in the Balkans, which Bucharest also had to navigate before

moving on to Romania's later attempts at reviving its initiative both regionally and globally, in 1959 and 1960, respectively.

Bucharest – between Moscow, Belgrade and Beijing

The 1950s were as turbulent as they were transformative for the Socialist Camp. If during first half of the decade it had been shaken to its core by the Secret Speech and the Hungarian Revolution,[6] during the second half it also experienced far more subtle, yet not less significant, shifts between its tectonic plates. After the Soviet intervention in Hungary in November 1956, the communist heavy-weights – the Soviet Union, China and Yugoslavia – found themselves in the rather uncomfortable and quite delicate predicament of re-negotiating their own position within the Camp and amongst each other. Seeking to regain legitimacy after its first armed intervention in a fellow socialist country, Moscow intensified its 'peaceful co-existence' campaign in an effort to not only consolidate its leading position within the Camp but also to restore its image and to gain worldwide support from a public increasingly worried about the rise of nuclear weapons. On account of this policy, among many other ideological and political differences, Beijing started challenging the Kremlin's self-appointed leadership role within the world of communism. And finally, Belgrade began to strengthen its delicate rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the wake of de-Stalinisation – a process that had been stalled by Moscow's intervention in Hungary and which had also become increasingly unpalatable to the Chinese.

Within this climate of fragile and uneasy camaraderie among the communist giants, Romania found its first opportunity to rise to international prominence. By playing on their conflicts, agendas and ambitions, Bucharest positioned itself between them as a reliable negotiator in order to gain more visibility, relevance and political capital. In so doing, it was able to start shedding its (admittedly deserved) image as one of Moscow's most subservient allies by playing an increasingly salient role – first regionally, then globally, even if modestly – within the context of the Cold War. Romania's tactful manoeuvring as a small but increasingly trusted partner between its socialist 'big brothers' brought it into the international limelight. By 1960 Bucharest had become the stage upon which, for better or worse, the Soviet – Yugoslav rapprochement as well as the Sino – Soviet conflict – two processes which had up to varying points developed quietly, behind closed doors – manifested themselves publicly.

Romania's role as mediator among the communist countries was due in large part to its initiative for Balkan cooperation, launched in 1957. That year had not begun as very promising for the relationships among the socialist powers. The Hungarian Revolution, just a couple of months prior, exacerbated already existing tensions between Moscow, Belgrade and Beijing. Yugoslav ruler Josip Broz Tito's protection of Imre Nagy, the leader of the Revolution who had sought refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, thus prompting the Soviets to stage his kidnapping, further embittered an already anti-Yugoslav Beijing. Chinese leader Mao Zedong had already considered Tito's brand of non-aligned communism as an

unforgiveable form of revisionism – his sympathy for the Hungarian leader only proved to Mao that Yugoslavia's solidarity to the communist bloc was questionable. Furthermore, the Soviet – Yugoslav rapprochement, which had been slow, but promising since Stalin's death in 1953, came to a screeching halt. Importantly, as the rest of the communist countries within the Eastern Bloc rallied to voice their staunch support for Moscow's military intervention in Hungary, they also joined in a chorus of renewed animosity against Belgrade's more measured position towards it.

Within this climate of heightened hostility, Romania quickly positioned itself as a negotiator between the communist giants. Sandwiched between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the small and economically weak Soviet ally had already played a significant part in their rapprochement within the context of de-Stalinisation.[7] Now it was in the ideal position to do so again. On the one hand, Romania's historically privileged relationship with Yugoslavia had significantly improved since 1953. In fact, as the rest of the Bloc was now shunning Belgrade, Bucharest was still quietly maintaining low-level, albeit critically important, ties with its neighbour.[8] Although they were subtle, Romania's efforts to preserve its relationship with Yugoslavia did not go unnoticed by the West, for they contrasted too sharply with the policies of the rest of the Bloc. By early 1957, British diplomats in both Moscow and Bucharest were reporting to London the hypothesis that the 'Roumanians [*sic*] may have been licensed by the Russians to pursue somewhat better relations than the rest of the bloc with Yugoslavia'.[9]

Such an observation was not without grounds. While Romania's relationship with Belgrade had miraculously managed to stay civil on the one hand, it had soared to new levels of trust and friendship with Moscow, on the other. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's unconditional support of the Soviet intervention in Hungary – complete with logistical aid and security assistance[10] – had earned him a significant amount of political capital with Khrushchev. Dej's political alignment with Moscow had not been disinterested; in fact, he was hoping to later bank on his newly earned credit by negotiating a Soviet troop withdrawal from Romania (which he managed only a year later).[11] For the time being, however, the Kremlin was already showing Bucharest its appreciation for the support provided in Hungary in economic terms, with a generous aid package to help it through a particularly difficult winter.[12] Politically, it seemed to also provide Romania with a new vote of confidence, by prompting it to initiate a Balkan Conference – creating a Balkan 'zone of peace' among the region's Warsaw Pact and NATO members. Not coincidentally, Dej's cordial relationship with Tito was instrumental in initiating the process, especially in a context in which the rest of the Warsaw Pact was not on the best of terms with Yugoslavia. 'The Romanians have been instructed by [the] Russians to keep the door open between Bucharest and Belgrade for their own ends,' estimated Western observers.[13]

Certainly, Khrushchev's long-term plans for Soviet–Yugoslav relations were undeterred by the temporary chill with Belgrade. The Kremlin had been pursuing a better relationship with Tito since 1953, though this had been slow to materialise. In the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution, Khrushchev was now looking

to legitimise his leadership and reconsolidate the Kremlin's marred image within the socialist camp and the world at large. Supporting an initiative to create a denuclearised 'zone of peace' at the crossroads of the two military blocs would at least partially restore this image. Beyond public relations, however, the initiative would have also been the ideal vehicle to pull Yugoslavia, which had been cultivating ties that were too close for comfort with regional NATO members, closer into the socialist fold.

Indeed, one of the more salient points of tension between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the time was Belgrade's membership in the Balkan Pact.[14] The tripartite alliance for military cooperation which Yugoslavia had joined together with NATO members Greece and Turkey in 1954, as well as the country's reliance on American aid, naturally represented 'an aspect of [Yugoslavia's] foreign policy, which pleased the Russians least'.[15] In a meeting on 17 June, Marshal Zhukov had 'clearly urged [the Yugoslavs] to refuse American military aid and to quit the Balkan Pact'.[16] Tito's explanation that Belgrade was no longer in need of the American aid, which could be stopped at any time, pleased the Soviets who 'appeared to be relieved'.[17] No such assurance, however, was given about quitting the pact.

According to Veljko Micunovic, the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow at the time, 'if Yugoslavia were to change policy in that way, it would [have found] itself in the lurch between two blocs and on bad terms with both of them'.[18] Instead, Belgrade cautiously opted for a policy of equidistance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, much to the discomfort of the Kremlin.[19] Moscow thus naturally viewed the Balkan Pact as 'a hindrance to [its] central leadership'[20] within the socialist camp but also as a potentially dangerous element, given its NATO affiliation through Greece and Turkey. Unable to persuade Tito to withdraw from it, the Soviet Union would now have to find a way to influence the makeup and dynamic of the regional alliance, and Moscow's seemingly subservient ally, Gheorghiu-Dej, would ceremoniously step up to the task.

There are several reasons why Bucharest was seen as the most logical choice to initiate the Balkan Conference. First, and crucially important to the context of this analysis, was its size; as a small and therefore conveniently non-threatening ally of the Kremlin, Romania was considered worthy to be entrusted with such an initiative. Supporting Bucharest to take the lead on this project also fell very much in line with Moscow's new military doctrine, according to which the smaller members of the Warsaw Pact were no longer seen as passive satellites but rather as 'junior partners'.[21] Moscow had therefore clearly identified the merits of allowing its 'little brothers' to take initiative. In this context especially, Romania would have clearly had more credibility to propose a plan for cooperation, as both a regional player and junior Warsaw Pact member in the Balkans. For the first time in the Cold War, Romania's size was therefore no longer a crippling handicap; instead, it was an advantage that would allow it to rise to regional prominence, thereby slowly stretching its own margins of manoeuvre within the constraints of superpower influence.

Second, Bucharest had an already established historical record for championing small-country cooperation in the region – an idea that was also very attractive

to Yugoslavia within the Cold War context, as will later be discussed. As early as 1888, Romania had proposed a plan for a Balkan Federation. Over the next decades – and especially during the interwar period – this project took several forms and was revived at different points. The core idea, however, had remained the same: forming a small-country coalition as a way of empowering the region and thus limiting the interference of the Big Powers in Balkan affairs.[22] The revival of this concept and its adaptation to the Cold War context was particularly appealing to Tito, who publicly blamed the superpowers for creating an international climate of heightened tensions and insecurity.[23] Romania's historical record as a regional negotiator for small-country cooperation would therefore add legitimacy to this renewed initiative within the post-war context. And finally, Bucharest had already proved its loyalty to the Kremlin and could therefore be trusted with such responsibility. As mentioned earlier, Gheorghiu-Dej's support of Moscow's armed intervention in Hungary, though motivated by calculated self-interest rather than faithful devotion, had earned him significant political capital with the Soviets.

If choosing Romania to lead the Balkan initiative was an easy decision, convincing Beijing to support the project would prove more complicated. Before reaching out to Yugoslavia with a formal proposal, it was essential that Bucharest secure China's backing to act on behalf of the Socialist Camp, and this would be no easy task. Tito's 'rehabilitation' after Stalin's death had been one of the main points of growing contention between Moscow and Beijing – a dispute that would soon erupt and shake the camp to its core. Mao's acerbic distaste for the Yugoslav 'revisionism' was no secret, and Belgrade's cautious dance between the East and the West represented nothing less than an affront to the Chinese leader's communist orthodoxy. After the events of 1956 in particular, Mao's criticism of Tito, whom he considered an 'interventionist provocateur [who] played a shameful role in the Hungarian counter-revolutionary rebellion'[24] would only grow more vocal.

By spring 1957 Beijing's hostility against Belgrade had reached such heights that it began pressuring Romania to completely break its ties with Yugoslavia.[25] In a context in which Bucharest had been cautiously cultivating its ties with Belgrade in the hope of gaining its support for the Balkan initiative, China's adamant position was clearly problematic. As Moscow's unofficial bridge to Belgrade, however, Romania had no choice but rise to the challenge of convincing Mao that it would be more strategically beneficial to draw Yugoslavia closer to the Communist bloc than to alienate it. Yugoslavia's position 'on the fence' between the two camps was 'unstable',[26] the Romanians conceded to the Chinese, but the Balkan initiative could be the ideal element of persuasion for Belgrade to abandon its ties to the West, as:

> the interests of the struggle for peace and socialism require that the differences with Yugoslavia should not be further exacerbated, but to continue to develop those things that unite us; our party pursues a consequential policy to draw Yugoslavia nearer, combating without noise those divergences that separate us. We hope [. . .] that Yugoslavia will abandon this middle ground . . . and will join the socialist camp.[27]

Mao was persuaded by this argument, at least temporarily. Following the discussion with the Romanians in May 1957, he publicly endorsed Romania's position on the Yugoslav question, voicing his conviction that Bucharest's initiative would have, 'without a doubt, a great importance to the defense of peace in Europe and the world'.[28] Romania's first attempt at back-channel diplomacy between the socialist powers was a success. By gaining Chinese support for its Balkan initiative Bucharest could now legitimately claim to act on behalf of the socialist camp in extending the formal proposal to Belgrade.

'A good halfway house'

By summer 1957, the climate within the socialist world had reached new heights of hostility towards Yugoslavia. True to form, Romania's approach to its Southern neighbour once again stood out – this time, in even sharper contrast to the rest of the Eastern Bloc. While other socialist countries were voicing acerbic criticism against Belgrade, Bucharest abandoned its subtle approach of quiet cooperation with Yugoslavia and turned instead to open praise. Having secured both Soviet and Chinese support for his Balkan initiative, Gheorghiu-Dej was now increasing his efforts to openly cultivate a better relationship with Tito. By June, he began publicly referring to Yugoslavia (and Albania) as 'socialist countries in [the Balkans] who represent a powerful peace factor'.[29]

Neither Dej's declarations nor his more formal initiatives towards Tito regarding the Balkan Conference, however, would have been effective without an official rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow. Not coincidentally, Romania was the official stage upon which, on 1–2 August 1957, Tito and Khrushchev met for the first time since the events in Hungary nearly a year before. In this context, both the meeting between the two communist leaders and its location in Snagov were deeply symbolic. Nearly a decade prior, the very small town just outside Bucharest had been the setting where, on 28 June 1948, the Cominform had passed the infamous resolution to expel Yugoslavia. Belgrade's unceremonious dismissal from the Soviet camp, on Stalin's orders, had represented 'the first strategic realignment'[30] between the two blocs, as Tito consequently sought a warmer relationship with the West. By meeting Tito in Snagov in the summer of 1957, Khrushchev was therefore signalling a complete reversal of Stalin's policy – the formal rehabilitation of Yugoslavia back in the Soviet camp.

The timing for the August meeting in Romania had also not been coincidental. Only one month earlier, at the end of June, Khrushchev had successfully weathered an attempted coup. The consequent removal of the masterminds behind it – Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich – dramatically improved the conditions for a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. First, the 'Stalinist' group within the Soviet leadership had been a significant obstacle to the improvement of relations between Moscow and Belgrade.[31] Second, now that Khrushchev had successfully eliminated his competition within the Kremlin and had consolidated his position, he wanted to organise in Moscow an all-party plenary to do the same within the socialist camp at large – Yugoslavia's participation would have been vital to its successful outcome.[32]

For Belgrade, it is very likely that the reconciliation with Moscow was perceived – as both London and Washington suspected[33] – as an opportunity to encourage smaller countries within the Eastern bloc to pursue alternative pathways to socialism. Indeed, it seems that Yugoslavia was already considering Romania as potentially more independent. On Romania's National Day (23 August) – and three weeks after the meeting between Tito and Khrushchev in Snagov – the main Yugoslav newspapers, *Borba* and *Politika*, ran 'most fulsome' leaders after 'word clearly went out [. . .] that the Romanian National Day should be made the occasion of extra special outburst of camaraderly [*sic*] and good-neighbourly sentiment'.[34] The article in *Borba*, especially, appreciated the 'Romanian specific path of socialist development in which she has made full use of experience made by other countries'.[35] Belgrade was thus not only trying to show the rest of the Camp as well as the West that relations with Bucharest were now friendly and strong but was also hinting that Romania was perhaps also gently seeking an independent path to socialism. Western observers, however, were still sceptical about such a notion. 'If Gheorghiu-Dej has sympathy for and envy of Tito's independence, he would, of course, be too wise to show it,' suspected British diplomats in Belgrade.[36] Indeed, the Romanian leader was still very much cautiously walking a tightrope – showing unshaken loyalty to the Kremlin, while subtly stretching Bucharest's margins of manoeuvre away from Moscow's influence. And the initiative for the Balkan Conference was an ideal opportunity to do so, by slowly bringing Romania out of obscurity and consolidating its presence onto the international stage.

'Dispelling the spirit of the Cold War in the Balkans'

Little is known about the talks between Tito and Khrushchev in Romania in early August 1957, except that 'they were smoother and more friendly than any [they had] had' up to that point.[37] What can be assumed, however, is that the two socialist leaders did discuss and agree on the merits of an inter-bloc alliance in the Balkan region, which would soon be championed by Bucharest. Indeed, the plans for such a project were quickly underway. On 29 August, Gheorghiu-Dej sent his most trusted emissaries to Belgrade to discuss the details of the arrangement. Having already gained Soviet and Chinese support for the initiative, it was now time to take concrete steps towards ensuring that the main socialist power in the Balkans would not only accept it but would indeed champion its cause.

Tito received the Stoica Plan with enthusiasm. First, it resonated well with his very strong and public opposition 'to the division of the world in military blocs, and to blocs in general'.[38] In fact, Yugoslavia's membership in the Balkan Pact since 1954, whereby it had committed to military cooperation with NATO members Greece and Turkey, was already being perceived by Belgrade as an association with the West that was too close for comfort. Now that relations with Moscow were warming up to a degree where the Kremlin was no longer seen as a potential military threat, Tito was looking to return to a more neutral foreign policy. The Stoica Plan was therefore seen as the perfect opportunity to 'help [Yugoslavia] to

get rid of the Balkan Pact, to eliminate the military clauses, while at the same time maintaining a framework of friendly collaboration'[39] in the region. Second, the proposal for a denuclearised zone provided an answer to what Tito saw as a 'disquieting' situation in the world at the time, in which 'means of destruction unparalleled in military history, such as atomic and hydrogen weapons [were] being feverishly created'.[40] Third, the creation of an inter-bloc alliance between both NATO and Warsaw Pact member states was the ideal application of the principle of 'co-existence', which Tito had been actively promoting as a system in which 'states with different social systems should actively cooperate in all questions of mutual interest and settle differences regarding them by peaceful means'.[41]

Finally, and importantly to the purpose of this analysis, the Stoica Plan was meant to shift focus away from big power politics. As mentioned earlier, the Yugoslav leader was a staunch critic of the superpower rivalry, which he blamed for creating the climate of tension and heightened insecurity. The Romanian initiative was therefore seen as a way to potentially diffuse big power influence in the Balkans by empowering the region's junior actors through complete demilitarisation and closer cooperation. Indeed, Tito met the idea for a small country coalition with a level of enthusiasm that might have perhaps surprised even the Romanians, saying that:

> the proposed action is important and necessary. It will show that not only the large countries, but the small ones as well can actively contribute to the strengthening of peace. This action is not just a simple gesture, but a real action; there are real possibilities for its success. Of course there will be resistance, so this should be seen as a long-term task. We have to find the best tactics to initiate it. From the beginning, it shouldn't be given a propagandistic character, we shouldn't make too much noise; we have to pursue real results.[42]

Tito was indeed very well aware that the Balkan Understanding would most likely been seen by the West as 'a camouflaged Soviet action' and therefore be dismissed as little more than propaganda, which would have naturally jeopardised its success. But he was keen on trying to ensure the project would at least be considered by the region's NATO members if Belgrade endorsed it. 'You'll be suspected to have initiated this at the suggestion of the USSR',[43] he told the Romanians. 'From this perspective, and keeping in mind how Yugoslavia is presently seen, it will be important that your action should be supported by Yugoslavia in the beginning'.[44] Tito's support for the Stoica Plan, in fact, went far beyond the offer to publicly endorse it; the Yugoslav leader committed to actively champion the Romanian initiative within the broader international context. As a step forward, he not only offered to approach each potential member of the Balkan Understanding, but also to leverage his influence with both the West and the non-aligned countries in order to prepare the ground. He estimated that the UK would be 'more neutral' about the proposal than the United States, while he hoped that by enrolling Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser in his efforts he might also be able to persuade Turkey to

participate, which he thought would otherwise be 'hard'.[45] Indeed, it was unlikely that Ankara, which up to that point had been resisting sustained Soviet pressure to reject increasing American presence (through NATO), would have agreed to Romania's proposal.[46] Greece was expected to have the same position.

On 10 September Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica formally invited the governments of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to sign an Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Non-Aggression. He promoted the initiative not only as a pathway to fostering regional cooperation between countries with long-standing historic issues but also as a platform for denuclearisation in the context of growing military tensions. Indeed, at face value the Romanian proposal was an important initiative towards peace within the Cold War framework. As the nuclear arms race was not only rapidly intensifying but also becoming more pervasive through technology sharing among bloc allies the Stoica Plan was the first to propose the establishment of a nuclear-free region composed of both Warsaw Pact and NATO member countries. Romania, which had historically taken similar initiatives for Balkan cooperation in the past, was now renewing its calls for assuaging some of the historical tensions that had plagued the region over the last many decades. Within the context of the Cold War polarisation, however, Bucharest's initiative was far more calculated. According to a secret document sent to Moscow just a few weeks prior, the Romanians assessed their initiative to be a double-edged sword and thus successful regardless of whether or not Greece and Turkey would participate: if they agreed, the Stoica Plan would act as a limiting factor to NATO influence in the region, and if they refused, the communists would be seen as the promoters of peace in the face of Western hostility.[47]

Indeed, shortly after Stoica launched the initiative, both Ankara and Athens unofficially indicated they would not participate – a stance both NATO members would consistently share over the next two years, despite the Romanians' best efforts to convince them otherwise. Unsurprisingly, American observers were sceptical about the Stoica Plan, which was deemed to be 'Soviet-inspired' from the very beginning.[48] In fact, such perceptions about the Balkan project also significantly affected Yugoslavia's relationship with the West, and especially with the United States. Washington saw Tito's 'prompt and unconditional' support for the Romanian initiative as a clear signal of Belgrade's sharp pivot towards Moscow.[49] Indeed, the Americans calculated that during their meeting in Romania at the beginning of August, Khrushchev had 'done a real selling job' in pulling Tito closer to the Kremlin.[50] This assessment was not entirely off mark. Apart from Belgrade's keen support of the Stoica Plan in September, over the next couple of months Yugoslavia's foreign policy seemed to align closer than ever before to that of the Soviet Union – the Balkan country was the only non-Bloc state to recognise East Germany. As mentioned earlier, Western intelligence reports estimated that Tito's rapprochement with Moscow had to do in part with his intention to inspire a greater degree of independence among the Soviet satellites but also in part with his ambition to rise to the same level of power and influence as Khrushchev and Mao within the Socialist camp. Regardless of the motives behind Belgrade's new Moscow-leaning policies, the West did not appreciate them. In fact, they led to

an almost immediate cooling of relations, with Washington ceasing its aid to the Balkan country and with Bonn cutting diplomatic relations with it. Such a state of affairs brought Yugoslavia's relations with the West to 'their lowest point' since the 1953 Trieste crisis.[51]

The plan to instate the Balkan Understanding was stalled in part because of Greece and Turkey's refusal to participate and in part because of renewed animosity between Belgrade and Moscow. By the end of 1957, although the plan 'remained on the table', it did not 'seem to be actively pursued' and no concrete steps had yet been taken towards establishing the regional alliance. Forced again to walk the tightrope between Moscow and Belgrade, 'in foreign policy, Roumanian [*sic*] public statements [. . .] followed Moscow as closely as ever'.[52] Despite such setbacks, however, the Yugoslavs still seemed to hold the Romanian initiative in high esteem, even if they suspected that it could have been prompted by the Kremlin, as the Yugoslav ambassador in Bucharest explained to his British counterpart before leaving the post in January 1958.

> [The Yugoslavs] were satisfied that Romanian intentions towards them were reasonably good. So far as the proposed Balkan Pact was concerned the Roumanians [*sic*] were not going to press forward in an unreasonable or unrealistic way, but they did intend to do bit by bit what they could to improve relations in the Balkans along the lines proposed. It did not matter much whether the initiative came originally from Moscow or from Bucharest. Certainly Moscow and perhaps some of the other Communist countries must have been consulted before the proposal was made. But attempts to create better relations in the Balkans were an old Romanian tradition, and were not confined to the present Government. What really mattered in any event was the content and intention of the proposal. The Yugoslav Government found them good, and believed that the project would be pursued in a realistic way and not as a means of attempting to separate Greece and Turkey from their Western friends.[53]

It still remains unclear whether it was indeed Khrushchev who prompted Gheorghiu-Dej to take this initiative in the hope of using Romania to gain influence within the Balkan Pact and with Belgrade or whether Dej proposed the plan after consulting the Kremlin. For the purpose of this analysis, however, this question is less relevant. What remains important is the fact that Dej was willing – and at least partially able – to undertake a leading role in the regional politics and to gain Tito's support for doing so. Working under the assumption that the initiative for the Balkan Conference could have originated at the Kremlin, Tito still appreciated Romania's role as an indispensable bridge to Moscow, as well as Gheorghiu-Dej's potential for relative independence from the USSR, despite his public image of servility to it. This duality within Romanian foreign policy was obvious not just to Tito but indeed to all upper diplomatic levels in Belgrade. In a confidential meeting between Nikola Vujanovic and his British counterpart, the Yugoslav ambassador noted that 'the steady but unspectacular Roumanian [*sic*] cooperation with

Yugoslavia argues some sympathy with the idea of separate paths to communism [. . .] although it is too much to believe the Roumanians [*sic*] capable of such independence'.[54] Indeed, with the Soviet troops still firmly and legally planted on Romanian soil under the aegis of the Warsaw Pact, while at the same time making overt friendly gestures towards Yugoslavia, Dej was somewhat precariously walking a tight rope.

The Stoica Plan therefore remained mostly dormant until 1959, when Bucharest's position vis-à-vis Moscow as well as the political climate in the Balkan region prompted Romania to resuscitate it. First, improved relations between Greece and Turkey following negotiations on Cyprus hinted towards a friendlier climate for renewing the bid for cooperation in the Balkans.[55] Second, Turkey's acceptance to place American intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on its soil prompted Moscow to renew its 'peace offensive' – this time perhaps even more forcibly than before. If just one year prior, in 1958, Khrushchev had proposed a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,[56] now that IRBMs were to be placed within such close range of the Warsaw Pact member states, he began calling for disarmament and a nuclear test ban.[57]

It is within this context that Romania revived the Stoica Plan, ostensibly in an effort towards 'dispelling the spirit of the Cold War in the Balkans'.[58] This time around, even the West considered that Bucharest was 'the logical choice' for relaunching this initiative, having already proposed twice before a Balkan Conference on denuclearising the region.[59] More important, however, was the fact that a year prior Romania had successfully negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It was now therefore better placed to make such proposal without rousing more suspicions of acting under Soviet influence and to thus co-opt leftist influences in both Greece and Turkey to exert more pressure on their respective governments to accept the invitation for a Balkan Summit.[60] Both countries once again rejected these overtures, even if for different reasons.[61]

Having unsuccessfully campaigned for the initiative with the national governments in the Balkans, a year later Romania brought the proposal for the Balkan Conference within the framework of the United Nations. Indeed, the 1960 General Assembly would come to have a historical significance for Third World affirmation – a fact that the Soviet Union was not only well aware of but had been greatly anticipating. Breaking his own rules, Nikita Khrushchev decided to attend the gathering in New York and sent letters to all Third World leaders to do the same.[62] At the same time, he also called upon all Eastern bloc heads of state to join him at the UN in order to bolster his efforts in extolling the merits of socialism.

Romania's debut on the world stage was therefore part of Moscow's carefully orchestrated and quite flamboyant self-promotion campaign. Yet it was the perfect opportunity to gain both visibility and recognition in a truly global context and to thus further enhance its margins for manoeuvre. After increasing its relevance within the world of socialism by conducting shuttle diplomacy among Moscow, Belgrade and Beijing, and after raising its regional profile by (repeatedly) initiating the Balkan Conference, it was now time for Bucharest to make itself visible to an international audience at the UN. Indeed, Romania did not disappoint in its

'important mission in the Soviet peace campaign'.[63] Throughout the two-week long session, Bucharest reached out to the sensibilities of the Third World and non-aligned members of the UN by sponsoring two initiatives within the General Assembly. While neither was expected to be successful, they were both meant to shame their capitalist opponents by exposing their hypocrisy and therefore prove the merits of socialist benevolence.

Thus, a new version of the Stoica Plan for Balkan cooperation was proposed as a UN General Assembly resolution. It was hoped that an initiative for a demilitarised and denuclearised inter-bloc regional alliance would win the sympathy of Third World leaders keen to maintain distance from bipolar tensions. By exposing the 'unpeaceful' nature of the capitalist countries to a global population that had become highly sensitive and nervous about the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, the socialist leaders were seeking to gain public support at the cost of political achievement. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Dej had made the gambit clear: Khrushchev had already graciously given his approval for the Warsaw Pact countries in the region – Romania and Bulgaria – to join the Balkan Pact; he now expected NATO to do the same for Greece and Turkey.[64]

Indeed, Bucharest's last push for a Balkan Understanding was most likely little more than a propaganda stratagem to promote Moscow's peaceful co-existence campaign. First, had the initiative been meant as a genuine effort towards cooperation among NATO and the Warsaw Pact members, it would perhaps have been more appropriate as a direct proposal within the NATO framework, not the UN. Second, there was no reason to believe that either Greece or Turkey, both of which had consistently rejected invitations to participate in the talks over the last three years, would suddenly shift their positions. '[T]he communist plans for peace, even when they are limited to a certain region, only serve the Soviet expansionist interest' responded the Greek conservative newspaper – and government mouthpiece – *Kathimerini* to the Romanian resolution.[65] Last but certainly not least, Yugoslavia – which had been a keen supporter of the Stoica Plan in its initial stages – had since adopted a considerably more reserved stance towards regional cooperation, as its own relationship with Moscow again cooled. In response to Romania's promotion of the plan within the UN, Belgrade this time responded only with a polite acknowledgement.[66]

Conclusion

Although the Stoica Plan never effectively translated into a project, it can arguably still be considered politically successful. It allowed Gheorghe-Gheorghiu Dej to raise first his regional, then his international profile and to therefore widen Romania's margins of manoeuvre vis-à-vis Soviet influence. In this context, it is perhaps less important whether or not the plan actually materialised. More important for the purpose of this analysis are the avenues of diplomacy that this 'plan' created for Romania and the tactical manoeuvres that Dej employed in the context of intra-Camp and global politics in order to carve for Romania a higher – even if secondary – role on an international stage dominated by superpower dynamics.

Over the next decade, Romania's increasingly divergent foreign policy would not only be recognised by the United States – which extended Bucharest with a preferential treatment under its policy of differentiation among Bloc members[67] – but would indeed earn it the international title of 'maverick'. From this position of strength, Romania would revive the Stoica plan and continue championing for regional cooperation and disarmament during (and well beyond) détente in defiance of the Soviet Union.[68]

This chapter has shown, however, that Bucharest's attitude towards these same issues in the late 1950s did not necessarily indicate complete subservience to Moscow. Alignment with the Kremlin's interests – in this case, its peace offensive – was an essential first step in gaining the trust of the superpower, and it was thus a preliminary necessity to widening Romania's margins of manoeuvre. Political complementarity therefore did not necessarily amount to blind servility. To the contrary, Romania leveraged the Kremlin's need to delegate the Balkan peace project – an initiative it could not have credibly taken itself – in order to gain both visibility and credibility. The Soviet need to prove its ostensible pacifism on the global stage therefore conferred Romania with a perfect opportunity to take advantage of both its location and its size – both of which up to that point had been considered weaknesses in the Cold War context – and to apply the Kremlin's principles on peaceful coexistence and disarmament at a regional level. Within this context, Romania's size especially represented a considerable advantage which was recognized by both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, albeit for different reasons. While Khrushchev recognised the merits of delegating initiative to its junior partners for added credibility, Tito saw the project for small-country cooperation as a way to deflect superpower influence in the Balkans.

On a practical level, the Stoica Plan undoubtedly conferred upon Romania opportunities it would not have otherwise had to widen its margins of manoeuvre. First, the initiative allowed Romania to act as mediator between the bigger powers within the Socialist Camp and thus increase its political capital with the Soviet Union, China and Yugoslavia – all three of which would later be instrumental in Bucharest's strategy of detachment from Moscow. By advocating for Tito's participation in the Balkan Understanding with Mao, Gheorghiu-Dej was able to show the Chinese leader that he could play a constructive role in promoting socialist cooperation. Also, by leveraging its privileged position with Belgrade, Bucharest was able to act as a bridge between the Balkan country and Moscow at a critically important time in their relationship. Within the context of intra-Camp dynamics, it is also perhaps worth noting that the larger powers recognised and encouraged the merits of letting a small country such as Romania champion an international and inter-bloc initiative.

Second, the Stoica Plan to denuclearise the crossroads between the Warsaw Pact and NATO blocs helped Romania to substantially increase its regional profile. Such a project, which was helped in part by Bucharest's historic record in initiating plans for regional cooperation, allowed Bucharest to rise to a certain degree of prominence in the Balkans. By co-opting Yugoslavia to endorse its project, Bucharest managed not only to increase its regional relevance, but also to

indirectly signal to the West its potential for a more independent path to socialism. Indeed, Romania did thus set a precedent and revive the Stoica Plan later in the Cold War when it had already gained its image as a 'maverick' within the context of détente.

   Last and very importantly, the initiative provided Romania with an ideal platform to eschew its previous obscurity and to thus gain visibility and some degree of notoriety on the international stage. By taking the Stoica Plan to the UN, even if only as a propagandistic stratagem, Bucharest managed not only to gain favour within the Third World – where it was already seeking to expand its influence – but also the international stage at large: the Stoica Plan was the first ever proposal to propose regional denuclearisation in a world plagued by the escalating arms race. It thus set a precedent for other, similar proposals, most of which gained more impetus after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Notes

 1 For a broader discussion on this topic, see Corina Mavrodin, "A Maverick in the Making: Romania's de-Satellization Process and the Global Cold War (1953–1963)", thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, February 2017. The present chapter is based, in part, on topics discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
 2 Presentation by comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej regarding the activities of the Romanian delegation at the 15th session of the UN(GA). Arhivele Nationale Istorice Centrale ale României (hereafter: ANIC), fond CC of the RWP (RWP CC), Foreign Relations, 52/1960.
 3 Alessandro Iandolo, 'Beyond the Shoe: Rethinking Khrushchev at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly', *Diplomatic History* 41:1 (January 1, 2017) 128–154, doi:10.1093/dh/dhw010.
 4 Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, 'Denuclearization on NATO's Southern Front: Allied Reactions to Soviet Proposals, 1957–1963', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14:4 (2012) 197–215.
 5 See, for example, Cezar Stanciu, 'A Lost Chance for Balkan Cooperation? The Romanian View on "Regional Micro-Détente", 1969–75', *Cold War History* (November 13, 2018) 1–19, doi:10.1080/14682745.2018.1524878; Effie G.H. Pedaliu, 'The US, the Balkans and Détente, 1963–73', in: *The Cold War in the Balkans* (London 2017) 197–218; Paschalis Pechlivanis, 'Between Détente and Differentiation: Nixon's Visit to Bucharest in August 1969', *Cold War History* 17:3 (January 26, 2017) 1–18, doi:10.1080/14682745.2016.1267144.
 6 Nikita Khruschev's Secret Speech in February 1956 denounced Stalin's crimes and the cult of personality, hinting towards room for political reform within the Eastern Bloc. Hungarian efforts for such reform resulted in the Soviet armed intervention in October – November 1956, the kidnapping (and, later, murder) of the Revolution's leader, Imre Nagy; and the instauration of the Kremlin-sponsored Kadar regime.
 7 Between Stalin's death in 1953 and the events in Hungary in October 1956, Khrushchev and Tito had initiated their rapprochement by meeting halfway, in Romania.
 8 Low-level visits between youth, women and writer's groups continued throughout the spring of 1957. See UKNA, FO 371/128912, Telegram from A. Dudley, British Legation in Bucharest to Foreign Office, Northern Department, 10 July 1957.
 9 UKNA, FO 371/128912, Internal review of Yugoslav-Roumanian Relations in Yugoslavia, Northern Department, undated, 1957.

10 The Romanian government facilitated the movement of Soviet troops over Romanian territory into Hungary; it also 'hosted' the imprisonment of Imre Nagy, who was placed under house arrest and interrogated in Romania following his kidnapping from the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest.

11 Laurien Crump, 'The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: Inquiries into the Evolution of an Underestimated Alliance, 1960–1969' (PhD thesis, Utrecht University. 2014).

12 Due to a poor harvest in the fall of 1956, Romania was poised to face a very difficult winter, which was politically delicate both for Bucharest and Moscow. The Kremlin thus rewarded Bucharest with a very generous aid package, both to show its gratitude for the support in its campaign in Hungary and also to 'soften' its image to a Romanian public already vocally discontent with Soviet presence on its territory. See ANIC, RWP CC, Chancellery, 135/1956, Minutes of the Meeting of the CC of the RWP on 5 December 1956, 4–5.

13 UKNA, FO 371/128912.

14 Kourkouvelas, 'Denuclearization on NATO's Southern Front'.

15 Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary* (London 1980) 63.

16 Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, 250.

17 Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, 251.

18 Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, 250.

19 Kourkouvelas, 'Denuclearization on NATO's Southern Front'.

20 Zbigniew K Brzekinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA 1967) 124.

21 Crump, 'The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered', 34.

22 H.L., 'The Balkan Pact', *Bulletin of International News* 10:16 (1934) 7.

23 Josip Broz-Tito, 'On Certain Current International Questions', *Foreign Affairs (Pre-1986)*, New York 36:1 (October 1957) 68.

24 *Op cit* in Mihai Croitor, *Romania Si Conflictul Sovieto-Chinez (1956–1971)*, 2nd ed. (Cluj-Napoca 2014) 163.

25 ANIC, RWP CC, Foreign Relations, 23/1958, Note Regarding the Meetings Between M. Dalea, Romanian Ambassador to Moscow and Members of the International Department of the CPUS, June 1957.

26 ANIC, RWP CC, Foreign Relations, 41/1957, Report Regarding the Visit of the Romanian Parliamentary Delegation to China, 30 April–13 May 1957.

27 Report Regarding the Visit of the Romanian Parliamentary Delegation to China.

28 Report Regarding the Visit of the Romanian Parliamentary Delegation to China.

29 UKNA, FO 371/128912, Telegram from the British embassy in Belgrade to Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Office, 19 June 1957.

30 Svetozar Rajak, 'The Cold War and the Balkans, 1945–1956', in: Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 1, Origins (Cambridge 2010) 200.

31 CIA, NSC Briefing on Soviet Yugoslav Relations, 30 September 1957. All CIA documents cited hereafter can be accessed at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/historical-collections.

32 Dan Catanus, *Tot Mai Departe de Moscova . . . Politica Externa a Romaniei 1956–1965* (Bucharest 2011) 183–185.

33 CIA, NSC Briefing on Soviet Yugoslav Relations, 1–2.

34 UKNA, FO 371/128912, Telegram from F. Roberts, British Legation in Belgrade to Foreign Office, Northern Department, 24 August 1957.

35 Telegram from F. Roberts.

36 Telegram from F. Roberts.

37 Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, 288.

38 Broz-Tito, 'On Certain Current International Questions', 71–72.

39 ANIC, RWP CC, Foreign Relations, 35/1957, 21, Programs, Speeches, Reports Relating to the Visit of the Yugoslav Parliamentary Delegation, May 1957.

40 Broz-Tito, 'On Certain Current International Questions', 69.
41 Broz-Tito, 'On Certain Current International Questions' 74.
42 ANIC, RWP CC, Foreign Relations, 35/1957, 21.
43 ANIC, RWP CC, Foreign Relations, 35/1957, 20.
44 ANIC, RWP CC, Foreign Relations, 35/1957, 20.
45 ANIC, RWP CC, Foreign Relations, 35/1957, 22.
46 FRUS Volume XXIV, 368, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, October 27 1957, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v24/d368. Accessed August 2018.
47 Kourkouvelas, 'Denuclearization on NATO's Southern Front', 203.
48 CIA, NSC Briefing on Soviet Yugoslav Relations.
49 CIA, Central Intelligence Bulletin, 4 June 1959.
50 CIA, NSC Briefing on Soviet Yugoslav Relations.
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11 Transitional margins to re-join the West

Spain's dual strategy of democratisation and Europeanisation

Cristina Blanco Sío-López

This chapter analyses the parallel processes of Spain's transition to democracy – and its accession to the European Community (EC) – as part of the power asymmetries of the Cold War.[1] More specifically, it addresses the margins of manoeuvre for Spain to reintegrate into Western democratic institutions after the hiatus of the Francoist authoritarian regime. Thus, the chapter focuses upon the risks and potential opportunities that arose from this integration. This process would later be viewed as a paradigmatic example from which the accession criteria for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) were formulated. The case of Spain is especially significant given the efficiency with which it was able to domestically transform in line with the requirements of the European Community. In doing so, it achieved its main Cold War objective, namely to reintegrate into mainstream Western democratic organisations after forty years of authoritarian governance. More than the case of the CEECs, Spain's experience was used as a model for reconciliation, modernisation and simultaneous democratisation and regional integration for post-dictatorial states, for instance in Latin America.[2]

First, this chapter focuses on the period from 1969–1977, which is marked by important milestones regarding the transition process, followed by two key turning points: the general election and the general amnesty Council of Europe in 1977 and the fundamental change implied by the victory of the Socialist Party (PSOE) in 1982.

Second, it addresses the subsequent period, from 1982–1986, which will be defined by the European Community (EC) accession negotiations. By proceeding in this way, it will be possible to retrace the genesis of Spain's dual strategy of democratisation and European integration. Such a strategy was intended to optimise its post-authoritarian objective of realignment with Western democratic powers: primarily Western European democracies, with the secondary strategic reinforcement of the United States (US). For this reason, this article will also focus on the evolving perceptions of a Cold War superpower, the US, towards a modernising Spain, in connection with the game-changing dimension of *Europeanisation*.

The main primary sources for this chapter consist of personally conducted oral history interviews with key decision-makers, focusing upon the parallel transition and EC accession developments, both at the European institutional and domestic

level. These interviews will be compared and contrasted with written archival sources for corroboratory evidence.[3] From 2009 to 2015 I directed the research project 'Spain and the European Integration Process: Vectors of Convergence, Cohesion Factors and Shifting Paradigms,' which enabled access to sources which are currently restricted, as is the case of the Archives of the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry (AGMAE) in Madrid.

Other relevant archival sources come from the Spanish General Administrative Archives (AGA) in Alcalá de Henares, the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) in Florence and the Spanish Secretariat of State for EU Affairs Archives (SEUE) in Madrid. These sources offer a grasp of the priorities of successive leaders within the Spanish government, while facilitating the search for interrelated documents in the realm of Spanish foreign affairs as a smaller Cold War power. In this way, it is possible to retrace not only Spanish initiatives to reintegrate in Western democratic supranational institutions as a chief 'normalisation' strategy but also the perceptions, responses, issues at stake and evolving arguments of the international organisations' counterparts.

The case study of Spain and its dual strategy of democratisation and Europeanisation

The analysis of a particular case study, through the filter of the 'margins of manoeuvre' concept, offers the chance to illustrate the challenges and opportunities offered to a smaller Cold War power from the achievement of major domestic and foreign policy goals. Smaller powers have a diverse degree of impact over events in bilateral and multilateral politics. Nevertheless, they have traditionally been approached as objects of international relations, rather than as subjects in their own right.

This chapter argues that there is a need to enquire not only whether a smaller Cold War power such as Spain exerted any influence at all in the international arena but also through which channels and means it implemented its impact as a returning political culture shaper. International organisations can offer unparalleled leverage to smaller powers. They serve as a sort of balancing act and multiplying factor in terms of margins of manoeuvre. Hence, supranational organisations such as the European Community (EC) are seen as a foreign policy anchor ensuring the necessary stability through established procedures, while averting more powerful states' excesses by implementing common rules. As a matter of fact, smaller powers cannot aspire to become norm-shapers across the spectrum of all relevant policies. For this reason, they must select particular areas of influence.

In the context of Spain, changing leaders were often subjected to particular circumstances that did not equate to their own priorities or those of their supporting constituencies. The fact that the EC – the pivotal point for the aspirations of transitional Spain to reintegrate in the international system – maintained unanimous decision-making on key structural policy areas played a highly impactful role in its Cold War margins of manoeuvre. This was related to the tendency that smaller powers could not utilise their veto as freely as more powerful states and only as

often as the rules permitted. Blocking a collective political decision within a bipolar global context could detract political capital that the smaller powers needed to use in an efficient, energy-saving and strategic way. Hence, even after Spanish EC accession, national political leaders normally restricted their veto use to policies that directly addressed new post-transitional national interests.

Taking into account these aspects, the margins of manoeuvre available for Cold War Spain fell in line with domestic transition and European accession. In terms of acquiring a wider international impact, post-Francoist Spain tried to regain a leading voice in three key areas of influence which coincided with pre-Francoist diplomatic priorities: its integration in 'Europe', a regained salience in policy proposals with regards to Latin America, and a renewed convergence with a Mediterranean axis (coinciding with France) from the mid-90s onwards. This would later be expressed in Spain's push for the Euro-Mediterranean 'Barcelona process', as opposed to the German attention to Central and Eastern Europe, an area of influence to which Spain was closer during the transition and in relation to Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. The transition to democracy in Spain has been defined as the institutional process that allowed the transit of Franco's dictatorial regime to a representative political system. Against this backdrop, the analysis of the joint democratisation – Europeanisation strategy of Spain's 'Return to Europe' and to world politics – is based on the understanding of its transition process as a transactional pact of peaceful transformation. This entailed the development of a viable long-term democracy, underpinned by a willingness to change and a sense of responsibility for all actors in this process.

From a domestic perspective, the Spanish transition to democracy focused on the acknowledgement of fundamental freedoms for the citizenry and upon the establishment of a representative political system. From a foreign relations viewpoint, the (re)-insertion of Spain in the international scene, by means of its integration in the key Western European political, economic and socio-cultural cooperation organisations, was related to the guiding concept of catch-up convergence and of 'returning to Europe'. The latter would strongly re-appear during the European Union (EU)'s Eastward enlargement process, especially referring to a mechanism of normalisation of foreign relations on behalf of post-dictatorial states.

From a more general perspective we could consider Spain a smaller power – despite its relatively large territory and population – given its post-WWII isolation from any sort of international or European decision-making 'core,' because of its authoritarian government and its lack of economic development as a result of isolationist policies (e.g. in terms of GDP, market size and socioeconomic cohesion deficiencies across the country). Conversely, despite an apparent shortage in resources and capabilities, Spain repeatedly sought to compensate for these shortcomings via issue-specific power, for example, its post-Francoist determination on a process of Europeanisation and image-building through its transition to democracy, considered by many as exemplary, albeit not without lingering questions.

Additionally, Spain attempted to influence the workings of the Cold War international system by cooperating with others, as in the case of a coordinated EC

accession with Portugal, even if such support was stronger and more committed on the Portuguese end.[4] This margin of manoeuvre had fruitful effects in terms of coalition-building and image-building, thus overriding the apparent limitations of smaller Cold War powers. Indeed, this can be seen in the reaction of the then president of the European Commission, Roy Jenkins, who spoke in these terms on the inevitability of integrating Greece, Spain and Portugal in the EC:

> A straight refusal would be a severe blow to the fragile democratic regimes which have emerged with the open encouragement of the Community and which are already to some extent dependent on us. Moreover any reply which, while pretending to be positive, tied the opening of the negotiations to complete solutions to problems which have long perplexed the Community would constitute a tacit refusal and would be so interpreted by the applicant countries.[5]

This pathway was explained by new political leaders as an outer reinforcement of an inner development, as the democratic systems of Western Europe were politically seen, and socially presented, as a model of stability and development. Their influence on the new Spanish post-Francoist political parties would be notorious, particularly concerning the strengthening of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE).[6]

In this context, Spain's strategy of stretching its margins of manoeuvre in order to reinsert itself in the Western democratic international system would be implemented through a series of key external anchorage points centred on the membership of the Council of Europe, the European Communities and NATO.

This strategy to optimise the margins for manoeuvre was not exempt from domestic controversies, which implied a need to consider complex debates around two main complementary positions. These are related to the fact that, on the one hand, the relative success of the political, economic and social transition was essentially based on endogenous factors. On the other hand, the previously mentioned anchorage points acted as an essential and *sine qua non* factor of democratic consolidation.

Spain's EC accession as a key strategy to 're-join the West'

Spain's accession to the European Communities served as an outer reinforcement of the domestically achieved transition. As a matter of fact, the intention of any negotiations with Brussels from 1976 was none other than accession.[7] The clear Spanish objective of re-integrating in the Western democratic international institutions[8] was not exempt from the criticism of EC interlocutors. Such critiques were particularly strong in the case of José María de Areilza, Minister of the Monarchy, who in 1976 had controversially asked to be merely judged by his 'democratisation intentions'.[9] This affirmation overstretched the margins of trust of Spain's European counterparts. However, the European Commission then stated before the European Parliament (EP) that Spain's democratisation was showing significantly positive signs, including the amnesty of political prisoners, the suppression of anti-terrorist laws, the freedom of the press and assembly,

the freedom of association and the freedom of formation of political parties. The EP also announced the advisability of restarting trade negotiations, retaking the milestone of the 1970 Trade Agreement.[10] In view of this, an adjustment to this trend was requested by representatives of the British Government in 1976. They proposed the establishment of a list of 'democratic criteria and objectives to be attained'[11] by Spain, before receiving the support of the United Kingdom for its possible accession to the EC and to NATO. This move marked the genesis of the 'accession criteria' concept, which would have long-standing implications to successive EC/EU enlargement processes, culminating with the launch of the 'Copenhagen Criteria' in 1993.[12] This challenge to Spanish accession was concluded by the EC interlocutors' response, which stated that it was up to the Spanish democratic opposition to verify and confirm the existence of a real democracy beyond a formal democracy in Spain.[13]

Nonetheless, domestic developments also critically shaped the ways in which post-Francoist Spain tried to stretch its margins for manoeuvre in foreign relations. Two main domestic developments can be summarised as follows: first, the critical reformist public attitudes of the Spanish citizenry against the institutional and legal continuity of the old Francoist regime and second, the re-emergence of a Spanish civil society.[14] Other essential factors include: the legalisation of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) – with 'Euro-communism' becoming mainstream –[15] and the discussion around joining NATO.[16]

Spain's EC accession prospects constituted a substantial return to the international scene used to legitimise and validate the power of 'Europe' both in the eyes of international actors and across the citizenry. The EC was presented by the Spanish transitional political elites as a guarantee of stability and further modernisation opportunities but also as a sort of 'supervisory conscience' laying the foundations of an actual, consolidated and durable democratisation. These objectives became increasingly articulated in the face of the unwillingness of some EC member states to allow Spain's accession. That was especially the case of Giscard's France, mainly because of electoral reasons, channelled through arguments based on agricultural and fisheries negotiations.

However, this reluctance was also expressed by Denmark and the Netherlands, through manifold narratives of resistance and prejudice towards the accession of the poorer post-authoritarian countries of Southern Europe.[17] This contentious context became even more challenging due to the complexities of the EC negotiation process for Spain, with a deadline for the first time since 1970. In this respect, the fundamental turning point was marked by the focus of the Suárez (the new Spanish President) and Oreja (the new Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister)[18] on the need to consolidate internal democratisation reforms before moving towards accession, in contrast with the previous Arias and Areilza governmental team. The culmination of this determination came on 10 October 1976 with the promulgation of the *Law for the Political Reform*, which confirmed the concept of popular sovereignty as well as elections by universal suffrage.

As the transition process was being domestically deepened, the new political elites centred on reinstating Spain in the international system, with a close linkage

between the political transition process and the accession to the European Communities. Indeed, this was considered a paradigmatic case of a 'two sides of the same coin'[19] strategy well before the reunification of Germany. This strategy was successively amplified through political communication and public discourse.[20] Furthermore, this was a conscious strategy, taking into account that the Spanish economy had entered a phase of growth deceleration after the 1973 international oil crisis, and thus incoming resources based on remittances, tourism, foreign investment and technological imports had dramatically started to fall.[21]

Moreover, at the time the transition process was in motion after Franco's death in 1975, Spain's model of industrialisation 'based on protectionism, tariff barriers and considerable state intervention, had become out-dated'.[22] These daunting economic conditions also had a determinant influence in linking the strategies of democratisation and Europeanisation both as a material and as an intangible heritage investment in a stable future. However, even if such a margin of manoeuvre strategy encountered some favourable ground, it also met some significant hindrances. The main two opposing visions came from the United Kingdom and France. In the case of the United Kingdom, Anthony Crossland, the Secretary of the Government of James Callaghan, favourably stated that the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal entailed a political sense of consolidation of transitions to democracy and of stabilisation of the South of the continent. This is consistent with decades-old British support of the EC/EU enlargement processes as they seemingly constitute to dilute deepening (with all its alleged sovereignty implications) in favour of widening. Conversely, the case of France presents a highly critical outlook, particularly voiced by Louis de Guiringaud, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Prime Minister Raymond Barre. They maintained that before proceeding to the inclusion of a new EC member state, it would be necessary to carry out an internal reform of European institutions. Such an attitude also bears an interesting similitude with the 'absorption capacity' concept used again by France in 2005 regarding an eventual accession of Turkey to the EU.[23]

Elections, parties and the external agency of a re-emergent pluralism

An important turning point among the divergent vectors marked by these discussions was constituted by the first democratic elections of 15 June 1977 in Spain. These elections made evident Spain's strategy of domestically-driven change in which an external element of support meant a reinforcement – but not a trigger – for a shift of direction. That was the case of the mounting importance of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), which was developed from an inner core of members of the internal clandestine opposition in discussion with former members coming back from the exile.[24] The PSOE was supported by the German SPD[25] within a larger context of *Ostpolitik* and *Wandel durch Annäherung* (transition by convergence). This would also strengthen the 'European option' adopted by the new rupturist party leaders, derived from internal clandestine movements (as opposed to the historic Socialist leaders returning from exile).[26] This rupture took place in

the PSOE congress of Suresnes in 1974, which changed the political and ideological orientation of this party shortly before the transition to democracy was set in motion (a path then accelerated due to Franco's death in 1975). The rupture was, above all, generational in relation to the older historic Socialist leaders in exile. This entailed a new leadership, epitomised by Felipe González, centred on young Socialists who were born and lived in Francoist Spain and were aware of the daily difficulties of the country.

These young leaders were in opposition to the historic leaders in exile by reason of their distance to the most practical realities implied by the dictatorship. Furthermore, they aspired to wrest power from the PCE, which dominated the leftist opposition to Franco's regime. In sum, this new generation born from the clandestine opposition to Franco within the country aimed to have a decisive influence on the transition to democracy and to bring the PSOE to power during the transition. Against this backdrop, the so-called European option for Spain consisted of the belief that only a progressive Europeanisation of the internal system would allow for democratic normalisation whilst avoiding traumas. Also, the PCE was moderated by Eurocommunism as an adaptation to the 'European option'. Conversely, the Spanish right seemingly went through a progressive moderation through reformism. The resulting re-emergent pluralism was based on an aspiration to consensus-building through the very process of transition.

In this respect, post-Francoist Spain's strategy of optimising the margins of manoeuvre to re-enter mainstream Western democratic institutions brought together two compelling elements: the search for a break with the past together with a 'back to Europe' foreign relations re-orientation. This strategy explicitly meant that this transition was conveyed to the citizenry as a forward-looking process. Meanwhile, the 'return to Europe' via the application for EC accession was a return to the 'real' roots of Spain as part of the history and politics of the continent, understood as forcibly denied during the hiatus of Francoism. The EC then considered the Spanish membership application acceptable only after the consolidation of a constitution homologous to that of Western democratic countries, which was promulgated in December 1978.

It is also fundamental to take into account four different trajectories of external influence within this remit: first, the value given to the political and institutional systems of the democracies of Western Europe, which the new Spanish political elites wished to emulate; second, the acceptance – on behalf of all Spanish transition players – of a very remarkable degree of interventionism and outer leverage to benefit an overall approach that could function and be accepted only as a collective commitment; third, the impact of the exchanges between the parties born of the transition and its European counterparts and, fourth, the consensus on the need for an internal and external mainstreaming of Spain at all levels. This last factor of influence bears clear concomitances with the idea of the 'Return to Europe' in the EU's Eastward enlargement.[27] More particularly, these factors combined in an orchestrated convergence of all parties across the political spectrum to consolidate the advancements of the transition process and to make possible EC accession as a touchstone of Spain's reintegration in the key Western democratic foreign policy

organisations at all levels. From a practical point of view, the multi-party meetings to build a constitutional process had provided the blueprint for consensus-building in issues beyond the national realm.

Challenges to strategic margins of manoeuvre in transitional Spain

Against this backdrop, some particular challenges repeatedly distanced Spain from EC accession. Indeed, the main juxtaposition of this period was the gap between the domestic construction of the 'State of Autonomies' as opposed to a more European federalist model. However, a significant element was the permanent background of continued terrorist actions by ETA.[28] Simultaneously, there was a background threat of regression hazard[29] – namely, the perception of a potential risk of the political regime sliding back into totalitarian residuals and modalities – linked to the effects of the coup attempt in 1981. The 1981 Spanish *coup d'état* attempt led by Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero brought 200 armed civil guard officers into the Congress of Deputies during the vote to elect a prime minister. This risked a return to a military regime and, hence, it constituted a window of opportunity for domestic regressive forces. However, it was thwarted, and the reaction to it remains as a benchmark in setting up the direction of the transition towards the objective of democratisation. This challenging context generated a sense of alarm in the citizenry about the fragility of the new democracy and, therefore, also a stronger adherence to the state resulting from the transition process.[30]

As indicated earlier, there was an absolute consensus of all new political forces on the objective of accession and European homologation as two sides of the same coin, thus focusing on this direction as a primordial strategy for Spain's re-integration in the international system of Western democratic institutions. This vision was directly linked to Fernando Morán's interpretation of 'the metapolitical value of membership', as it represented the external manifestation of the consolidation of democracy in Spain[31]. Actually, such an analysis also corresponded to the understanding of EC (and also of NATO) accession as synonyms of homologation and modernisation as opposed to the isolation represented by the old authoritarian regime. This direct conceptual connection between Europeanism and modernisation in the eyes of Spain's new political elites encompassed political change and democratisation but also an economic dimension, including technological modernisation, as well as industrial reconversion and development.

Spain's determination to re-join Western democratic foreign relations structures was also influenced by the fact that the country had been fully excluded from European supranational institutions during the post-WWII period because of its authoritarianism. However, Spain perceived this fact as a double standard given that other Southern European dictatorships were able to become members – or to articulate close association agreements – with such institutions. For instance, 'Portugal was allowed to join both NATO and EFTA, while Greece, which was a member of both the Alliance and the Council of Europe, also enjoyed a closer relationship with the EC on account of its association agreement of 1962'.[32]

By the late 1970s, the EC membership applications and negotiation processes with the post-authoritarian democracies of Greece, Portugal and Spain were also being positively valued by this highly sought-after institution and its member states (despite the blockage towards Spain by some states, chiefly France). This constituted a great incentive for post-Francoist Spain, as the future accession of these countries in transition – which had recently emerged from authoritarian rule – were being considered 'by both the Community institutions and the member state governments as a vital means of strengthening their young democracies and of preventing them sliding back into dictatorship'.[33]

From Spain's eyes, the aim of EC accession now felt particularly attainable. It also enjoyed the unwavering support of all major political parties, including the PCE, while in other post-authoritarian Southern European democracies, such as Portugal and Greece, 'it failed to attract the unanimous support of either their parliaments or their people'.[34]

As José María Gil-Robles – former President of the EP – affirmed, the key objective of Spain in the post-Francoist era was based on the notion of re-alignment with Western European democracies. But this was not an isolated purpose, as it was necessary to acknowledge that multiple European political movements and parties aided this willingness to converge:

> In Spain, the transition was the first step towards European integration. [. . .] The transition was therefore a fundamental step to align the Spanish political system with the other European political systems. But Spain has been supported in this sense by great European political democratisation movements. The Spanish transition has been supported by all the European political parties as political movements.[35]

In the eyes of the late State Secretary for Relations with the European Communities and Head of the Negotiating Team for Spain's Accession to the European Communities (1982–1985), Manuel Marín, the nature of Spain's strategy to re-alignment – epitomised by the EC – was both political and economic. Nonetheless, its underlying ambition and results lie in the realm of defining and empowering political values:

> In Spain, many debates revolve around this question: 'Was it a political or economic operation?' In fact, both, but above all a political operation, because Spain, a long-time European country and closely linked to European history, has only now returned to its natural *ensemble*, Europe. [. . .] We have attached ourselves to a system of values, as Europe is, above all, a system of values.[36]

Also, the former Secretary General of the Council of Europe (1984), Marcelino Oreja, referred to Europe as a common realm of democratic values, which were then conceived as the only conceptual compelling force able to conjure the paralysing eventuality of political instability and regime relapse. In this respect, Oreja identified the accession of Spain to the Council of Europe as a legitimising

benchmark. In his eyes, this turning point also meant a democratisation threshold towards a Western European re-alignment point of no return.[37]

In short, the most visible effects of the transition process in Spain were constituted by: the definition and implementation of the state's decentralisation, the development of the welfare state in Spain, the impact of the return of Spanish emigration abroad, military reforms, the progressive consolidation of a social dialogue between trade unions and employers, the way towards a 'European homologation' together with a democratisation consolidation as 'two sides of the same coin' and the consensus of all post-Francoist political forces on the objective of accession to the EC as the main way to reintegrate in the Western system of international relations. From a strategic viewpoint, we could argue that the goal of EC accession constituted the key tool to stretch Spain's margins for manoeuvre towards its larger objective of re-joining the Western system of international relations.

The US foreign policy dimension: American impact and American perplexities

The US exerted a clear influence in the modalities of Spain's democratisation, remaining supportive, yet perplexed, by Spain's EC fixation, which was non-fully concomitant with broader US security architecture priorities. In short, this section aims to illustrate the nuances of such a deep connection between Spain's willingness to democratise after the hiatus of Francoism and the aspiration to join the European Community as a source of nearly existential legitimisation in the case of a Spain in transition.

Unlike EC institutions, especially the European Parliament, Washington initially avoided a public pronouncement on the proposed transition reforms of the first governments of the monarchy (1975–1977). Nor was a public assessment made on whether these would help lead the country to an authentic democratic transformation.[38] This American approach was in line with the decision to not openly oppose any agreement between post-Francoist Spain and the EC, as this could jeopardise negotiations for the renewal of the agreement on American military bases in Spain; this was a key strategic priority for the US in the Mediterranean.[39] As Spain's talks with the Community moved along, Washington supported, although did not play any role in, Spain's approach to the EC.[40] Indeed, Spain's margins of manoeuvre during the transition to democracy showed not only a willingness but also a surprising capacity to surpass bilateral bounds with the US, in order to progressively consolidate more regional (European) preferences.

In this context, the US Ford administration supported a change towards an 'orderly regime', which would not endanger the access of American soldiers to the military bases in Spanish territory. This simultaneously facilitated Spain's transitional objective of a 'definitive' incorporation into the Western bloc.[41] Also, the American Ambassador in Madrid, Wells Stabler, advised the US Government to also consider the perspective of other Western European countries, since it was in the American national interest that Spain managed to forge closer ties with NATO and the EC.[42] Indeed, the Ford administration equally showed a willingness 'to do

everything possible to make the European Community be more accommodating with Spain'.[43] Against this backdrop, the Ambassador explicitly recognised that, to guarantee its stability, the link between Spain and the West should be consolidated via multilateral organisations, such as the European Community and NATO and not through their bilateral relationship with Washington.[44]

At the same time, Washington upheld a 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation' with Spain, which would help lay the foundations for Spain's eventual incorporation in NATO; tangible progress in the approach of Spain to the European Community and the future stability in the Gibraltar Strait, which implied avoiding potential conflicts to be caused by the Spanish claim to Gibraltar or by Morocco's demands in relation to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.[45] Stabler assumed that, upon the signing of the 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,' the new Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelino Oreja, would focus his efforts on relations with the European Community, striving to overcome existing problems with the Vatican and with the normalisation of bilateral relations between Spain and other countries, such as some Eastern European countries, Mexico and Israel.[46]

The US Government expressed its perplexity in several instances over how Spain showed a persistent preference in joining the EC rather than NATO, but gradually the new democratic leaders of Spain achieved a nuanced mutual understanding with the US over this issue. From a more general viewpoint, Stabler reiterated the support of the US to the new parliamentary democracy, to the King Juan Carlos I and to 'a stable process of evolution that would lead to a democratic system compatible with those of the rest of Western Europe'.[47] Thus, this mirrored Spain's chief foreign relations aspiration, to re-join Western European democracies at all levels, through democratisation and Europeanisation.

Regarding Spain's 'European' aspirations, US representatives recognised the special difficulties resulting from the reluctance of Southern French voters, who were especially worried about the agricultural competition of Spain as a future Community member. That is why they were very appreciative of Giscard d'Estaing's apparent support of the Spanish application for accession to the EC only after the French legislative elections of 1978 would be held. However, Washington was puzzled to see that this was a commitment that Giscard would not fulfil.[48] In the eyes of American political leaders, this would force the postponement of a necessary form of stability that Spain (a key geopolitical piece in the Mediterranean puzzle) should attain via EC and NATO accession.

Despite this positive American outlook towards Spain's eventual EC and NATO accession as a crucial step forward for the 'normalisation' of its foreign relations in the post-Francoist era, some American actors feared those developments. More particularly, they were concerned about the fact that Spain's membership in the alliance would decrease the key connection of Spain with Latin America and the Arab world. Furthermore, Washington acknowledged – not without perplexity – that for Spaniards it was much more important to accede to the European Community than to NATO. This was explained by the new Spanish leaders in terms of economic benefits but, primarily, by reason of the legitimating effect that EC

accession would provide, given that unlike the alliance it had always imposed the condition of Spain's democratisation before membership.[49]

The leaders of EC member states then commented to their American counterparts that there was still suspicion towards Spain in some European countries, especially with regard to the authenticity of its democratisation process. However, the German Chancellor at that time, Helmut Schmidt was optimistic, echoing US perceptions on this matter. The accession of Spain to the European Community seemed, nonetheless, more complex, mainly due to the reluctant attitude of France.[50] Having signed the 1976 US–Spanish Treaty with a post-Francoist government, the US Government indicated that Spain 'is not a major political problem nowadays'.[51] Against this backdrop, Carter expressed his support to Suárez for the accession of Spain to the European Community and NATO, but he also remarked that it was the Spaniards who had to take the initiative in this realm. From a different viewpoint – more consonant with overarching Cold War security priorities – Washington continued to worry that Madrid had no intention of signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), since Spain could choose to import nuclear reactors from France and Germany, which were not as demanding as the United States in this field.

In sum, Washington expressed a willingness to contribute to 'a democratic and stable Spain, allied to Western Europe and capable of cooperating with the US in strengthening security, in the promotion of Western prosperity and in the defense of democratic ideals in international relations'.[52] Interestingly enough, this self-stated US objective for Spain gave traction to Spain's own overall aim of re-joining the mainstream organisations of the Western European democracies. Suárez benefitted from this margin of manoeuvre during his visit to Washington, which came to show mirroring ways of achieving the post-Francoist Spain's chief objective of re-entering the Western democratic mainstream organisations. Upon receiving Suárez in the Oval Office, the Carter administration expressed a preference for European democracies to have the leading voice in any project aimed at re-launching the Spanish economy. This partly explained America's newfound enthusiasm for the accession of Spain to the EC.

Concomitantly, Spain's hesitation towards NATO accession contrasted sharply with its impatience to accede to the EC, an objective shared by the whole Spanish political spectrum. Following such determination, Foreign Affairs Minister Oreja presented the membership application in Brussels on 28 July 1977.[53] In spite of this, the American Embassy in Madrid noted that the minister took advantage of his trip to the Belgian capital to meet with the Secretary General of NATO, Joseph Luns, who had always been a supporter of Spain's NATO accession.[54] Washington's interest in achieving the integration of Spain in the Atlantic community was indirectly translated into a strong support for its entry into the European Community and directly expressed 'although without pressing to the Spaniards in favor of an immediate decision'.[55]

In short, the Carter administration supported the accession of Spain to NATO, although it possibly did so with 'a certain distrust', believing that 'with a multilateral agreement within Europe' a new role for a democratic Spain would be more

fundamentally ensured than via a bilateral relation with the US.[56] It is also impor-
tant to note that the Carter administration directly indicated that Spain's NATO
membership would 'vary the content of the negotiation of the treaty with the
United States in its definitive aspects', while considering that its adherence to the
Alliance would not require the holding of a referendum but just a large domestic
parliamentary majority.[57] This possibly explains the moment chosen by Foreign
Affairs Minister Oreja to make his position public, since despite recognising that
the European Community and the NATO were 'different issues', he affirmed that
'a European attitude unsupportive towards Spain would not allow the presence of
our country in the Western defensive organization'.[58]

Spain joined NATO in 1981, during the Calvo-Sotelo UCD (Union of the Dem-
ocratic Centre) Government, even if in 1986 the Socialist Government of Felipe
González (which achieved an absolute majority with the PSOE in the elections
of 1982) convened – and won – a referendum on NATO. González would later
criticise this referendum, considering it an utter strategic mistake.[59]

Overall, Washington found it difficult to understand that, for Spain, NATO
accession could hardly have an influence comparable to the accession to the Euro-
pean Communities. This is mainly explained because many Spaniards perceived
NATO as a mere instrument of American foreign policy. Paradoxically, despite
being a long-cherished objective by the United States, the new Reagan adminis-
tration could not foresee these nuances when re-addressing the US–Spain bilateral
relationship.[60]

In any case, the United States would support the democratisation process
because only a Spain that fulfilled the political requirements required by NATO
and, above all, by the European Community, would allow its full and defini-
tive anchoring in the Western block.[61] That is why it should not be surprising
to find a lack of interest by the American government on the precise contours
of the political system they wished to see installed in Spain after the death of
Franco, an attitude which sharply contrasted with that of certain Western Euro-
pean actors.[62]

Conclusion

The case of Spain's dual democratisation and Europeanisation in a Cold War set-
ting reveals the effectiveness of externally reinforcing an endogenously triggered
transition to democracy.[63] In the studied period, many criteria set as guarantors of
a consolidated democratisation process were re-adjusted to the new challenges
posed by Southern European post-authoritarian states. The salient case of Spain
included the following additional democratic criteria: the existence of a demo-
cratically representative government resulting from free elections; the fact that
this government had, *de facto*, the ability to generate new policies and that the
executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy did not
share their particularly differentiated powers with other bodies.

The Spanish case and its margins of manoeuvre strategies to re-enter the West-
ern democratic international system are inscribed in newly developed theories on

the 'three types of transition to democracy', as explained by Share and Mainwaring.[64] The first type corresponds to the case of Portugal, characterised by a succession of collapse, explosion and pressure from the bottom to the top to reach transition and political change. The second case is epitomised by Uruguay and defined by self-exclusion. Finally, the third case is represented by Spain and its paradigmatic 'transition via transaction'[65], which entails a succession of the following elements: implosion, a simultaneous top-down pressure with a trigger from the bottom up and a focus on the concept of 'transaction' as a model of negotiated reform and rupture with the past.[66] Spain constitutes a prototype of a 'third wave' transition processes,[67] namely, one initiated and driven by reformist elements of the authoritarian regime in question, which are, in theory, more stable in their development and have more possibilities of success than those launched from the bottom up. However, such a model results in a seeming impossibility of achieving retroactive transitional justice[68] and blocks inter-social dialogue on historical memory[69], resulting in explosive long-standing taboos and conflictive identity eruptions in the medium and long term.

Regarding the power asymmetries of the Cold War, it is important to keep in mind the factors analysed in the section on American views of a Spain in transition. Indeed, seen in hindsight and due in part to its tendency to contemplate the European Community through an almost exclusively economic prism, Washington did not understand the political and psychological meaning of Spanish accession. To a large extent, until 1986, post-Francoist Spain had integrated itself into the Western world through the bilateral relationship with the United States, to which it granted an unusual importance; thereafter, however, Spain would prefer to re-join the mainstream Western democratic arena through the European Community, which became its main foreign policy referent.[70]

From this perspective, Spain's political reintegration in Western democratic institutional structures, through a dual strategy of transition to democracy and EC accession, seemed to be an optimal choice. This is linked to a narrower economic dimension of Spain's EC accession impact, as explained by Manuel Marín:

> We have received a great deal from Europe: Community policies have been extremely helpful to us in becoming a modern country, the Structural Funds have allowed us to develop beyond our potential, thanks to Europe we have the stability we have and that is good. For Spain, entry into the Common Market of the time, into the European Community, was the most profitable external policy decision we ever made.[71]

However, as a result of widening gaps in the Spanish institutional system and decisions which caused unsustainable models of governance, Spain subsequently neglected the potentialities offered by EU cohesion policy.[72]

Indeed, we could argue that the attempt to de-peripheralise after the transition to democracy created a lingering 'entrapment' for a never-ending sense of 'catch-up convergence': first, in later efforts to become one of the first countries to reach the third stage of the European Economic Union and be part of the 'hard core' of

the single currency and second, in its continuous attempts to overturn the perception that Spain was once again in the periphery, following the 1995 Northward enlargement of a Union, which was also beginning to look Eastwards through the decade of the nineties.[73]

In the emergence of the currently ongoing multilevel crisis – in which the measures to tackle it are themselves causing the social tragedies of austerity against fundamental socioeconomic rights in the South of the continent, 'hybrid regimes' in the East of the continent and an overall degradation of the 'quality of democracy' – it is high time to question the long-term effects of transitional and enlargement policy modalities perpetuating 'instrumental peripheries', especially in the South and in the East of the continent.

Perhaps a breakthrough could come from a recovery of the notion of 'community' itself. Above all, the EU can be a political and economic community, a community of laws, principles, and norms. It can be also be a community of interests but above all a community of values and of common, interactive memories. These are capable of binding key players through solidarity, the aspiration of a shared inclusive identity and the enhancement of coordinated international cooperation and integration.

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12 'At last, our voice is heard in the world'

Greece and the Six Nation Initiative during the Euromissile crisis

Eirini Karamouzi

As 1979 drew to its close, the future seemed ominous. Along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the possible introduction of the Neutron bomb, NATO's 1979 'dual-track decision' not only aggravated the fear of 'limited nuclear war' in Europe but, significantly, dealt the coup de grâce to the spirit of superpower détente.[1] NATO's 'dual-track' decision of 12 December 1979 provided for the deployment of advanced, new generation long-range theatre nuclear forces – 108 Pershing II launchers and 464 Gryphon ground-launched cruise missiles – as a reaffirmation of the US security guarantee to NATO and a pressure mechanism for the Soviets to limit SS-20 missiles targeted towards Western Europe.[2] The mobilisation against the deployment of US Pershing and Cruise missile atomic warheads was a watershed moment in the recent political history of Western Europe. In Great Britain, 400,000 people turned up at Hyde Park in October 1983 opposing missile deployment whilst the Federal Republic of Germany was swept up in anti-nuclear fervour, with more than one million joining the anti-missile demonstrations.[3] The same year, Rome, Madrid and Athens followed suit with thousands of citizens marching for peace, disarmament and freedom.[4]

Understanding the rising popularity of the peace message requires a thorough reading of global, regional and domestic political and cultural developments as well as high politics. There was a strong interplay between government, nuclear strategy and peace movement mobilisation. The 1980s was a decade of revolution in world affairs moving from the resurgent antagonism of the Second Cold War to the peaceful resolution of 1989. Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981 as a tough talking anti-communist, denouncing the Soviet Union as an evil empire and launching an unprecedented defence build-up of the American arsenal, only to finish up his second term taking significant steps towards a nuclear free world. In this direction, his cooperation with General Secretary of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev was invaluable. The summits in Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington ultimately led to the signature of the INF Treaty that saw the abolishment of intermediate-range nuclear forces.[5]

But it was not only the superpowers that attempted to defuse nuclear tensions and launch a policy of peace. Greece, along with India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden, launched the 'Six Nation Initiative' in May 1984 to halt what they called 'a rush towards global suicide' and to facilitate an agreement on

nuclear arms control. This chapter will shed light on this completely neglected initiative that brought together such a diverse group of countries in an effort to transcend Cold War boundaries and touch upon a policy issue of the nuclear arms race that used to be exclusively confined to the superpowers or the five nuclear countries of the time.

Examining this initiative will allow us to explore how small powers such as Greece were able to exert influence on the state of international relations and unveil a strategy that, albeit serving domestic nationalistic purposes, spoke to international concerns of nuclear proliferation. It also unearths how the fear of nuclear devastation and the call for disarmament rose in popularity in the 1980s and formed a central part of peace mobilisation but also high-level policy activity. The concepts for peace and disarmament were historically and culturally bounded. Therefore, looking at the Initiative of the Six allows us to see how the smaller countries involved made sense of these concepts and how they communicated them to their people and fellow policymakers in order to speak to a diverse set of national, social, political and religious backgrounds. Original material from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Reagan Library, the CIA and Mitterrand, as well as the Andreas Papandreou Foundation archives along with international and domestic press will illustrate the international and national developments that influenced Greece's peace policy and its role in the Initiative of the Six in the first half of the 1980s. Most importantly, it will show how these six peripheral countries – and Greece in particular – had an impact on the discourse, framing and at times decisions on peace and disarmament, illustrating the margins for manoeuvre of small states and their potential influence on Cold War dynamics.

Greece and the policy of peace

Despite its peripheral status, Greece and its leader Andreas Papandreou were able to earn the reputation of the peacemaker – or for some of his allies the brand of the troublemaker – during the Euromissile crisis of the 1980s.[6] It is important to understand the political background against the rising popularity of the message of peace in Greece. It is inextricably linked to the changing political context that brought Andreas Papandreou's socialist party of PASOK to power.

The October 1981 elections saw the rise to power of Greece's first socialist government, a radical break with the past, pointing to a period of change in domestic and especially foreign policy.[7] PASOK won with an overwhelming majority on a nationalistic and socialistic agenda, declaring Greece a victim of the imperialist design of the West in the form of NATO and the EEC. In foreign policy, PASOK stood at first for non-alignment based on hostility to Turkey, distrust of the USA, rejection of Greece's identification with the West and closer links with the Arab world and Greece's Northern neighbours in the Balkans. Papandreou also fully supported – and for some time became the poster child for – the anti-nuclear movement in Greece. As he got closer to power he moderated his message, and in private he was much more forward in keeping Greece within the Western

alliance.[8] Papandreou's underlying hostility to NATO and the EEC was tempered by a realistic appraisal of where Greece's real interests lay.

Indeed, in the aftermath of PASOK's landslide victory, the new prime minister and his government were faced with the harsh reality of geopolitics. The populist and nationalist rhetoric during the electoral period had significantly nurtured anti-American sentiment for the majority of the Greek people, but Papandreou and his ministers were well aware that Greece could afford neither to withdraw from NATO nor to break its relations with the US. The Turkish threat loomed large in the Greek public imagination and dictated the foreign policy direction while committing considerable resources to defence. Papandreou had repeatedly made clear that Ankara was viewed as the main foe:

> We really have a unique problem in Greece, which really you do not meet in any other country member of the alliance. We sense a threat from an ally on our east, Turkey. One of the major problems in Greek defence the last seven years has been preparation of defence in case Turkey, beyond words, decided to actually make good on its claims.[9]

According to Mitterrand's advisor Jean-Michel Gaillard:

> more than ever, the actions of neighbour Turkey in the region determines the foreign policy of Greece. Devoting 6.7% of its GDP to its defence, it cannot go further or face north and east simultaneously. . . . So Mr. Papandreou remained in NATO and signed an agreement providing for maintenance of American bases for a minimum five years against a 'rent' of $500 million per year to purchase US military equipment.[10]

Several months after their victory in the polls, the Socialists' credentials were questioned, especially in the realm of foreign policy. The country's terms of membership to NATO and the EEC had remained unchanged, despite proclamations to the contrary, and negotiations over the American bases had produced the opposite result to the one promised during the elections. Papandreou's simultaneous active support for the anti-nuclear movement both in Greece and abroad was – among other things – a means to satisfy the anti-American feelings of the Greek public and its desire for national independence in a way that would not shatter the delicate Greek–Turkish regional balance. Papandreou's peace initiatives and his government's heavy involvement in the peace mobilisation could bolster his country's independent stance and his own popularity without posing a danger to the country's security.[11] Indeed, by embracing the anti-nuclear movement, he could score domestic and foreign policy goals: he could mollify the Greek Communist Party (KKE) in opposing US 'aggressiveness'. While PASOK had firmly established itself as the hegemonic party of the left, there were concerns about KKE's growing influence. As the British embassy was reporting from Athens:

> two factors have been brewing since 1981 that could help the KKE increase its influence: Firstly, the climate of openness to the Soviet Union makes the

party look more respectable and the disappointment at PASOK's lack of progress in implementing change and at times going off with pre-electoral commitments.[12]

Outbursts of ultra-nationalism, dominant in the peace discourse, mobilised public opinion, silenced left-wing critics within this party and appeased the KKE.[13]

But there were not only domestic concerns at play. Papandreou's aim was to put Greece on the map internationally by playing the troublemaker. His obstructionist acts, famously known as the 'policy of footnote', such as the close ties with radical Arab states and the refusal to condemn the Soviet Union for the Polish crisis, were extremely popular at home.[14] Indeed, in the central committee of PASOK that met for the first time since the elections on 27 March 1982, Papandreou struck a celebratory tone, taking every opportunity to emphasise Greece's independent voice. He made a virtue out of the negative stance in NATO and European Political Cooperation (EPC) consultations. He cited as another success the Greek refusal to accept sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union arguing that it was comical for a small country to impose an embargo against a superpower. Moreover, for him, the whole affair was cynical:

> We in Greece, had seven years' dictatorship and no one neither Washington, or Bonn, or London set out to condemn the dictatorship by imposing sanctions. And how can you persuade the Greeks that sanctions are truly imposed because of the violation of democratic institutions, when next to us in Turkey in which what is taking place is literally genocide.[15]

With one statement, Papandreou was playing to all the demands of the peace movements for national independence, a stronger stance in international affairs, the promotion of democracy and the fight against nuclear armaments.

On 18 August 1983, the Greek government disclosed, in a letter to NATO members, the country's concerns about the deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and suggested that deployments be suspended for a six-month period 'in order to give the Geneva negotiations the breathing space they certainly need'.[16] While worried about the growing isolation of Greece from the line of the Western institutions, the Western partners downplayed the possible impact of such an action. The troublemaking may have been gratifying to the Soviets, but the maverick behaviour of Greece was not posing such a serious threat as the actions of the FRG or the Netherlands, which would end up hosting the Euromissiles.[17] That did not discourage the Greek Prime Minister. Intent upon emphasising the role of Greece as master of its own destiny, not to be taken for granted by anyone, in September 1983 Greece vetoed a collective strong EEC condemnation of the Soviet Union for the accidental shooting down of a South Korean airliner. Defending his country's position, Papandreou proclaimed:

> We, like other countries, are entitled to our own foreign policy, which is shaped by our own interests. We're partners in the Community but are not obliged to accept the views of others. In the matter of the airliner, we were

concerned by the general hysteria. As things stand now, it is clear that the Soviet Union did not know it was a passenger plane. The Russians can't say so, because that would be an indication that their reconnaissance system is very weak. Political cooperation within the EEC [. . .] was a voluntary activity, in which there is no unanimity.[18]

The intensification of Cold War tensions in the 1980s had nurtured division not only between East and West but also within the Atlantic alliance over the best strategy forward, most importantly within individual member states. A handful of countries like Denmark and especially Greece struggled with maintaining a balance between 'alliance solidarity and political autonomy', posing a major challenge to the Western alliance.[19] Besides differentiating their stand or using dissent as a political instrument – even if it was inconsequential – these peripheral countries reframed and reconfigured the Cold War narrative, emphasising much more their own national needs and resorting to local vernaculars to bring their message home. Despite his rhetorical tone of dissent and several obstructionist policies that did challenge the prestige and cohesion of NATO and EEC strategy, Papandreou during the period in question remained in NATO, renewed the agreement on American bases for five years and quietly dropped the issue of unilateral removal of US nuclear warheads from Greece. No matter how irritating his initiatives might appear to the West, he was able to project himself and his country as sincere advocates of peace and as independent actors, without essentially risking an actual confrontation with his NATO allies. For the Greek people, defence of national independence, relaxing foreign strings and rejecting the Cold War straitjacket was the absolute guarantee for peace and the only popular and legitimate way forward for the country.

The Initiative of the Six

Several prominent leaders from around the globe and peace activists across Europe who shared his views endorsed Papandreou's policy of peace, despite its strong domestic angle and deep nationalistic tone and the headache it was creating in several Western capitals.[20] Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau for instance, had launched his own high level peace initiative aimed to revive arms control negotiations during the same period.[21] Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme had publicly supported Greece's initiative for a Balkan nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) and the two prime ministers complimented each other in speeches on 22 August 1983, when Palme visited Athens. Palme and Papandreou, who had developed strong personal ties, were in full agreement on the urgent need 'to intervene since the two superpowers already have a nuclear arsenal, capable of destroying one another more than fifty times'.[22] The two countries were on the same page on several issues. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that on 22 May 1984, Andreas Papandreou joined five other heads of state and government – India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, Mexico's President Miguel de la Madrid, Argentina's President Raul Alfonsin and President

of Tanzania Julius Nyerere – to launch the 'Six-Nation Initiative' for Peace and Disarmament.[23] Explaining Greece's role in such a global initiative, Papandreou noted: 'I believe that the prevention of nuclear war is not an issue that concerns only superpowers. It is of direct concern to all of us since it threatens our lives'.[24]

The idea was originally promoted in mid-1983 by the Parliamentarians for World Order (PWO).[25] PWO was an international network of more than 600 legislators in 33 countries, created in 1980 with a unique access to every level of political system, from the upper echelons of government down to the grass-roots, able to coordinate simultaneous legislative action on a global scale. PWO, with an international secretariat in New York and funded by foundations, corporations and national parliaments, was committed to working together on the twin fronts of disarmament and development. The 1970s were proclaimed by the United Nations as the decade of disarmament – yet, although some steps were taken to succeed towards that goal with the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) agreements, in the early 1980s the arms race competition was again on the rise with worsening relations between the two superpowers.[26] From the 370 billion dollars spent on armaments in 1970, an astonishing increase to 500 billion dollars had been reached by 1980; 43 percent of which was nuclear armament of NATO, 27 percent for the Warsaw Pact, 15 percent for the Third World, 10 percent for China and 5 percent for the remaining countries.[27] As Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, a founding member of the Six Nation Initiative, stated, there was an 'organic link between armament expenditure and economic reconstruction. A token reduction in armament expenditure and its diversion to economic assistance to developing countries would produce dramatic results'.[28] The wasteful diversion of capital, trained manpower and natural resources to the arms race undercut all attempts to fight poverty and promote development throughout the world. The PWO felt that in the early 1980s the political climate had changed, with the movement for peace gaining rapidly in power and momentum. Ordinary people in many countries were crying out to their governments for action towards peace. Given that all nations were equally at risk from a nuclear war, many felt it was irresponsible just to leave it in the hands of the two countries who were largely responsible for creating it.

Many parliamentarians rooted for a bold new initiative that would break the deadlock on disarmament and capture the public imagination that already was experiencing angst about the possibility of nuclear holocaust.[29] Among the parliamentarians who participated behind the scenes for the launch of the Six Nation Initiative were Olafur Grimsson, MP from Iceland; Douglas Roche, MP from Canada and John Silkin, MP from the UK. Starting in mid-1983, they met with a select group of government leaders in order to discuss proposals for joint action. In complete secrecy, the officers for PWO travelled the globe, carrying drafts and opinion papers and consulting with each of the leaders. At the same time, the heads of government were in direct contact with each other to exchange ideas on the possible form of action. When approaching the leaders of the six nations, the people of PWO underlined the important role that small countries could play in the Cold War dynamics, working towards a possible breakthrough on the issue

of disarmament. It is telling that initially the scheme was called the 'The Middle Power Initiative'.[30] In a letter to Andreas Papandreou, Nicholas Dunlop, General secretary of the PWO stated:

> [W]e come to you because you share our concerns. We believe that an initiative by the heads of government would have a tremendous impact both on arms negotiations and the public opinion. A creative, dynamic role by middle power leaders in the negotiating process would help to cut through the reefs of mutual suspicion and antagonism which so often paralyse the superpower negotiations today. Perhaps most important of all, your efforts would provide a rallying point for those millions of ordinary people around the world who look on with horror at the mounting preparations for nuclear war and who feel totally helpless to influence the seemingly endless and unproductive negotiations between the USA and USSR.[31]

Indeed, the Parliamentarians felt that the Initiative of the Six would create a third organised political force between West and East, effective enough to partake in the discussion on the arms race. Because nuclear disarmament was not chiefly a technical problem but a political one, it required political experience and understanding that the members of the initiative had in abundance. As Professor Roger Fisher, head of the Harvard Negotiations project, founded in 1979, noted, 'what is unique about this initiative is not just the content of the proposals but the process of which they are a part. It's already a success because it is changing the structure of the nuclear debate'.[32] It was the first time that non-nuclear states were collectively acting at the highest level in a field long considered the exclusive domain of the nuclear powers.

   Leaders like Indira Gandhi understood that it was vital to 'bring a sense of urgency. Everybody's talking about nuclear war as [though] it is just another problem. It isn't. It is the crucial problem of today'.[33] President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere proclaimed that:

> those of us who have been involved in the Six Nation Peace Initiative were each approached by the Parliamentarians for World Order as individuals known to be personally concerned to promote nuclear disarmament. I believe that the fact that all six leaders are heads of government has helped our efforts to get greater publicity.[34]

It was a kind of Contadora group for disarmament but on a worldwide scale, with the geographical diversity becoming one of the scheme's strengths.[35] Moreover, three of the involved countries, Argentina, India and Sweden, were technologically capable of building nuclear arms, so that the effort could not just be dismissed as a protest of the powerless.[36] A number of considerations led the Parliamentarians to propose the idea to Andreas Papandreou. 'Greece is a NATO ally', US congressman and PWO member Thomas Downey admitted in an interview.

> Papandreou has close ties to other Americans, not in the Administration; he has a working relationship with the Soviet Union and his initiatives for a

nuclear free Balkans and for a delay in the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles separate him from your typical European leader.[37]

The Six Nation Peace Initiative issued a declaration in May 1984 and handed it to the UN secretary-general Javier Perez de Cuellar, who characterised the initiative as a reinforcement of his own effort and that of the UN to promote some agreement on control of nuclear armaments. The declaration called on states with nuclear weapons – the Soviet Union, USA, China, Great Britain and France – to halt what the document called 'a rush towards global suicide' and to facilitate an agreement on nuclear arms control. It urged the five nuclear powers 'to stop testing, production, and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and to undertake substantial reductions in nuclear forces'. It concluded that 'progress in disarmament can only be achieved with an informed public applying strong pressure on governments'.[38]

The statement attracted broad attention in the media and national parliaments in Western Europe. Even Pope John Paul II offered his encouragement for this initiative in May 1984, and a large number of peace organisations endorsed it.[39] Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain, Trudeau of Canada and Sorsa of Finland added their support.[40] The Secretary general of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Bruce Kent, called it the most significant move in the peace issue in the last 25 years and stressed the importance of the fact that the six leaders did not limit themselves to just a declaration but were determined to proceed with a concrete proposal for nuclear disarmament. However, there was not much political bandwidth within the club of the Western nuclear powers. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher showed a clear lack of enthusiasm and added that her government desired a reduction of armaments but on the condition that reduction was simultaneous on all sides and ensured military balance. She went on to add, 'this is a more urgent and worthwhile task than freezes or bans which cannot be sure of being able to verify and which would therefore not increase mutual confidence'.[41] The Americans and French were dismissive of the appeal, with the latter objecting to the freezing of nuclear testing and doubting that the Six possessed the necessary mediums to check nuclear testing.[42]

The Western alliance deemed it troublesome – and even hypocritical – that three countries out of the Six, namely Argentina, Tanzania and India, had not signed the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968, that entered into force in 1970 and sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. India had refused to sign the treaty on the grounds that it was a biased legal instrument that divided the world into 'nuclear haves' and 'nuclear have nots'.[43] New Delhi criticised the treaty for aiming to prevent proliferation at the 'horizontal level' while 'the nuclear powers not only won't give up the production of atomic weapons, but would not even undertake to cease the production of those weapons [. . .] in the future'. India moved even one step further invoking 'the psychological effects of the Chinese nuclear program' as justification for not wanting to 'give up the option of nuclear weapons if the NPT is not a step towards total nuclear disarmament by all nations'.[44] A representative of India's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 'this treaty [. . .] creates discriminatory conditions for

its aims at disarming the unarmed', while President Nyerere admitted that Tanzania was not in a position to build nuclear weapons. On the other side, the Soviets published a statement pointing out that the declaration was in the same direction as Soviet proposals for a nuclear freeze. The Soviet newspaper *Pravda* noted that the Six leaders represented one fifth of the population of the globe from diverse parts of the world, and that their gesture was therefore 'exceptionally symbolical', reflecting the opinion of the majority of humanity.[45]

Greece was the only NATO country to sign the declaration, and Papandreou justified this by stating that 'NATO is a democracy and we have the right to disagree with some of the over-all initiatives'.[46] Papandreou launched an attack on the US, claiming that it was 'Reagan's emotional desire to regain the military superiority which America had possessed before détente which lay behind the current arms spiral [. . .] while in the Soviet Union there was a deep-rooted fear of a holocaust'.[47]

After his mother's assassination, Rajiv Gandhi continued to promote the initiative and made his debut as an international political leader by hosting a further meeting of representatives of the six countries in January 1985 in India. The conference issued a communiqué – the Delhi Declaration – which called for an immediate ban on testing nuclear weapons and a halt to their development, especially of space weapons.[48] It was a manifesto for peace, where the Six proposed suspension of all nuclear tests for a period of twelve months that could be extended or made permanent. They did acknowledge that 'the problems of verifying the suspension would be difficult but not insurmountable'. In fact, they proposed measures to facilitate the establishment of effective verification arrangements: 'Third party verification – on our territories – could provide a high degree of certainty that the testing programmes have ceased'.[49]

The leaders of the six countries offered to undertake the task of verifying such a test ban, in an effort to remove doubts about compliance and possible violations.[50] The Soviets appreciated their efforts but insisted on the simpler measure of the declaration of a moratorium that would not allow any kind of nuclear testing; the Soviet Union had unilaterally halted nuclear testing on 6 August 1985 and had called upon the American government to follow suit.[51] Such a message, with this emphasis on a theme already trailed by Gorbachev, came at a good time for him in his approach to Geneva. It should offer a useful opportunity to reinforce his image of reasonableness, and the apparent unwillingness of the Americans to respond to international demands for an end to nuclear testing.[52] In the run up to the next round of Soviet–American talks, the British Foreign Office thought that the 'Soviets are likely to attach importance to any initiatives that give further support to their own positions, especially if one of those behind any such initiative is member of NATO'.[53]

Following the New Delhi meeting, three of the leaders – Alfonsin, Nyerere and Palme – flew to Athens to attend a meeting on 31 January 1985, hosted by Papandreou with some 50 leaders of non-governmental organisations as well as prominent legislators and personalities, anti-nuclear campaigners and intellectuals supporting the Six Nation Initiative. Prominent former prime ministers

and other politicians were present, such as Edgar Faure, Pierre Trudeau, Joop den Uyl, Bruno Kreisky and Egon Bahr as well as Venezuela's former president Carlos Andrés Pérez. Intellectual figures, like economist John Kenneth Galbraith, and the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadruddin Aga Khan, also attended, while Willy Brandt and the Greek poets Yannis Ritsos and Nobel prize winner Odysseas Elytis gave their full support.[54] International media lauded the gathering in Athens for the impressive participation of personalities. This was no accident, as Papandreou was eager to further reinforce his global appeal as the politician of disarmament and his country at the forefront of the politics of peace that had gained such prominence during that period. His main train of thought seems to have been that even a small country could and should follow an active foreign policy away from the ubiquitous Cold War exigencies, no matter how unpleasant it could be for its allies. Papandreou wanted in Athens to promote 'a crusade for peace' that started in New Delhi and observed that 'the battle of the streets has become the battle of the governments'.[55]

The Six were quick to defend themselves against charges of making an empty gesture. They saw the Delhi Declaration as a rallying point for an international movement embracing governments, parliaments and peace groups.[56] Gandhi claimed that 'we are defending ourselves by building up public opinion'. President Nyerere claimed to speak for the Third World when he condemned 'the iniquity of using such a large proportion of national and world resources on nuclear weapons and other sophisticated instruments of death' and reminded the advanced countries that 'our priority of action makes nonsense of that struggle against world poverty and destitution to which we regularly recommit ourselves'.[57]

The New Delhi and Athens meetings therefore were bold in their conception, looking to change the politics of nuclear disarmament. Their biggest advantage was that they came at a critical point of time, as two months later the world's attention would focus on the Geneva nuclear arms control talks. The whole point of the Athens initiative was to break down the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers.[58] The key to achieving a breakthrough of the resistance of the nuclear powers lay in the mobilisation of civil society. In Athens, there was the hope that the leaders of NGO's and influential private individuals would further activate public opinion in their respective constituencies and bring pressure to the superpowers to negotiate seriously, as the Cold War narrative that had justified a nuclear arms race was losing legitimacy amongst an increasing number of civilians. However, worries about the next steps persisted, especially the fear that unless new initiatives were taken and unless someone of the Six demonstrated a strong sense of leadership, the initiative would atrophy and come to nought. As emphasised by American peace and human rights activist Stanley Sheinbaum in a letter to the Greek Prime Minister,

> in the nuclear game, so to speak, 'we' do not have many chips, but you all have created one here that has enormous potential in it. You have already carved out the nuclear issue as one of which you are making a stand.[59]

The six leaders pledged to convey the Initiative's message to the two superpowers and the other three nuclear powers (the UK, France and China), and soon Papandreou had the opportunity to put forward the cause of nuclear disarmament during his subsequent talks with the Soviet and Chinese leaderships.[60] Moreover, during an official visit to Sofia in July 1985, the Greek prime minister declared that 'small non-nuclear states have not only a right but a duty to participate in the struggle to promote détente and to prevent the militarization of space'.[61] During 1986, the Six Nation Initiative continued to call for the halt to all nuclear testing and the development of new nuclear weapons. The Group of Six held its second meeting in Ixtapa, Mexico, on 6 August 1986 and reiterated its plea for a ban on nuclear testing and the abolishment of the SDI/Star Wars space defence project, to be followed by the conclusion of a US–Soviet arms reduction treaty. It also repeated its readiness to offer its good services to verify compliance when a US–Soviet test ban treaty was eventually signed.[62] Leaders of the Six would underwrite the cost of the verification plan, establish monitoring stations in both countries and provide personnel to operate it. PM Rajiv Gandhi of India noted that 'our geographical reach, technological competence and independence of bloc rivalries should command acceptance'.[63] The search for practical measures had led to a focus on observation and verification. The Six were aware they could not force the hand of the USA and Soviet Union to reach any agreements but were bent on making it harder to refuse the verification process or the option of a global peace alert system.[64]

   The next summit took place in Stockholm on 21–22 January 1987, several months before the leaders of the USA and Soviet Union would meet in Washington to sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which was to abolish a whole category of fully operational nuclear weapons and for the first time led to the reduction of nuclear arsenals. At the time, the Six claimed to have played a crucial role in that upcoming breakthrough in nuclear disarmament mostly by influencing world public opinion and making its demands felt. It is true that, when the Initiative took off in 1984, the dialogue between the leading powers was almost silent. Moreover, they felt that the 1987 signing of the treaty, despite its crucial importance, was not enough. Pressure should continue for further disarmament and it was vital to continue to voice the concerns of the citizens of the non-nuclear nationals over the threat of nuclear war.

Conclusion

Despite the public proclamation of success, it is quite a stretch to causally link the Initiative of the Six with the breakthrough in the second nuclear age of the 1980s. However, examining this initiative along with Greece's role in it offers a window in a broader trend of international affairs during the Euromissile crisis that has been ignored in the literature. Instead of solely focusing on peace movements and their impact on policymaking or the superpowers and their ongoing negotiations on disarmament, looking at these high-level peace schemes offers an alternative history of the Second Cold War. It showcases how different governments in

peripheral states responded to the anxieties of worsening Cold War relations, the diffusion of technologies that made proliferation harder to stop and the concerns of everyday citizens about a fear of a nuclear war.

Quite rightly, there was widespread agreement that the initiative faced enormous odds. The challenge for the Six Nation Initiative could not be denied as the Six were aiming to mobilise public opinion around a policy issue that was, for the most part, inaccessible to public preview, even at times within the parliamentary sphere. The details of the arms race and defence were discussed behind closed doors and within the defence establishment at a national and global level. It is within this context that one must assess the progress and success of such initiatives. The Initiative of the Six was a success for its inspirers as it fulfilled their three main goals: to run a fair, informed and objective public information campaign for parliamentarians around the world and their respective executives; to educate the world public opinion about the state of the global arms race and to simultaneously address three different audiences which tended to exclude each other, namely the nuclear powers, the peace movements and independent scientists. Each of the nuclear powers presented their own point of view and sometimes concealed information from the public. Peace movements lacked the necessary scientific expertise to track and analyse the armaments and the scientists – who could provide the relevant information – were treated with scepticism by the public.

In contrast to the peace movements, the advantage of having heads of states on board meant that they were considered not just visionaries but doers and pragmatic as well.[65] It cannot be denied that the six countries took an increasingly visible role in the nuclear disarmament issue since they first appeared in 1984. 'Traditionally, nuclear disarmament issues have been a spectator sport for the nonnuclear countries' said Ólafur Ragnar Grimsson of Iceland, the president of PWO. However, 'with this initiative the nonnuclear countries for the first time are taking a role in the arms control process'.[66]

The benefit of studying the Initiative of the Six speaks to several scholars' call to bring into a fruitful conversation the global history of transnational and international advocacy groups, with the state based story of non-proliferation, for a better coverage of nuclear history.[67] Moreover, the tale of the Six and Greece's prominent role showcases that despite the peace movement's sceptical view of political leaders there were key players 'who succeeded in developing particularly high profiles with regard to certain issues' of peace and disarmament, even if they were from a small country.[68] Papandreou proved to be such a protagonist and reached celebrity status for the cause of peace. The Greek Prime Minister capitalised on the Initiative to wield personal influence as a regional or even global peacemaker and mediator and enhance Greece's prestige – especially in the Third World. Papandreou felt that his country's participation as a NATO country in this scheme was a nuisance to his Western allies. But he preferred to be known as a troublemaker than being ignored. This was extremely useful at a time when Papandreou was forced – in the face of the looming Turkish threat – to drop the electoral pledges to leave NATO and the EEC and to remove the US bases from

Greece. Peace projects, such as the Initiative of the Six, not only had transnational links but their global appeal was important to infuse a sense of pride to a small historically dependent country. It did not matter if it yielded any concrete objective benefits for the country as the fervent rhetoric that accompanied these moves was offering its own texture of reality. The strength of his peace message embraced and reproduced a particular worldview, contributing to the de-legitimisation of the Cold War division while legitimising the constant quest for national independence and pride. In other words, small countries like Greece were able to transcend the Cold War rigidities, pursue at times an autonomous policy from their respective alliances and play a role in issues that proved of a global concern, thus stretching the country's margin of manoeuvre.

Notes

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15 UKNA, FCO 9/3524, Quoted in a Letter by M. Llewellyn Smith to FCO, Athens, 30 March 1982.

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Conclusion

Shedding a new light on Cold War Europe

Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson

This volume has shown that smaller powers' position vis-à-vis the super powers often provided them with an *opportunity* rather than merely representing a *constraint*. It thus defies the Realist assumption that small states are *not* driven by a search for power and national interest but argues instead that smaller states successfully searched for ways to stretch their margins for manoeuvre in pursuit of their own interests. Examining the strategies of fourteen different European countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain, as well as neutrals, the volume has also provided a wealth of new empirical evidence to reinterpret the Cold War as well as an unusually wide spectrum of themes, ranging from energy politics to technology and the economy, which deserve further consideration in New Cold War History. In this conclusion we will therefore address not only how this contributes to the literature on smaller powers but also to what extent it sheds a new light on Cold War Europe, as well as setting the agenda for further research.

Discussing the parts in turn and comparing the individual chapters within each part, we seek to transcend the particular questions per chapter by offering a more general approach towards Cold War Europe at the end of our conclusion. Starting with the part on 'Manoeuvring through Multilateralism', it is safe to conclude that the hypothesis that Crump and Romano posed in their chapter equally applies to all other contributions, namely that 'multilateralism offers small groups or even single countries the opportunity to either organise efforts at coordinating a position on international issues or even asserting their *individual* interests through using the multilateral mechanism as leverage over the superpower' Chapter 1 (Crump and Romano), P. 13. Having analysed seven multilateral fora in total, the WP, NATO, the EEC/EPC, the Benelux, the NNA-group, the CSCE and the UN, all authors conclude that without any of these multilateral mechanisms the smaller allies would have been far less powerful in the face of the superpowers. It is therefore no coincidence that the smaller powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain and beyond increasingly acquired a taste for multilateralism.

Crump and Romano convincingly show that the opportunities of multilateralism thus seemed to transcend the constraints of individual political systems, since both the Warsaw Pact countries and the countries within the EC used their respective fora – the WP and the EPC – in order to increase their scope for manoeuvre and pre-empt superpower unilateralism. Despite the differences imposed by two

radically dissimilar political contexts, it is striking that smaller powers perceived and used multilateral frameworks as an instrument to widen their margins for manoeuvre within two antagonistic blocs. The same also applies to the Neutral and Non-Aligned (N+N) countries. Makko shows in his chapter on the strategies of Sweden and Norway in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that 'membership in an alliance – or an affirmative attitude towards a group like the N+N – did not reduce but rather increased those margins' Chapter 3 (Makko), page 61. Palm, too, concludes in her chapter on the Benelux and the European defence community that the smaller countries – in her case the Benelux – did not have 'a strategy of embracing "smallness" but rather of projecting a bigger shadow by working together with other smaller powers' Chapter 2 (Palm), page 33. In that sense the Benelux cooperation within the EDC negotiations starkly resembled the European Political Cooperation within the CSCE, which Crump and Romano explore within their chapter.

In all of these cases, there are different multilateral levels at play. The Benelux worked as a smaller multilateral grouping to assert its interests within the bigger EDC-group *and* vis-à-vis NATO. The EPC functioned as a coherent unit to circumvent American pressure within NATO and achieved its aims within the multilateral CSCE context at large. The Norwegian NATO membership gave that country greater leverage within the Pan-European framework of the CSCE, while Sweden reluctantly had to rely on strategies within the N+N group to maximise specific goals. Whereas the Benelux was too small a grouping 'to set or change the margins set by the superpowers', but 'maximise[d] their room for manoeuvre instead' Chapter 2 (Palm), 43, as Palm argues, the EPC framework offered its participants a means to withstand American pressure altogether and sometimes even act against American interests, as in supporting the CSCE process, which the Americans did not even endorse.

The case for the smaller Warsaw Pact countries was a little different, since they had to manoeuvre within the framework of their alliance leader, rather than having an alternative *without* the superpower, such as the E(P)C on the Western side. The alliance did, however, also provide the smaller Warsaw Pact members with a platform to make their voices heard and even influence the agenda, as was already strikingly the case with the Polish proposal to convene a European security conference in the first place. The same applies to the Norwegian role within NATO, which Makko discusses: the Norwegian leadership did not have an alternative multilateral platform to the one led by their superpower either, but its 'cooperation with the delegations of other NATO member states, in particular that of the United States, helped the little Nordic country to exert influence on the negotiations that exceeded its usual role in international affairs' Chapter 3 (Makko), 61. Like the other countries discussed in this part, the Norwegians, too, 'viewed multilateralism as a means to stretch their margins' Chapter 3 (Makko), 50, as Makko argues.

The same applies accordingly to the Netherlands, which we have already seen to maximise its margins for manoeuvre through Benelux cooperation, as Palm has shown. Like Sweden in the case of N+N collaboration, as Makko proves, the Netherlands did so reluctantly, after it had experienced that going it alone

did not provide an opportunity to exert any influence whatsoever. In Massink's chapter, the Netherlands plays a central role too, namely in its strategy to prevent the Americans from admitting dictatorial Spain to NATO. This chapter shows multi-layered dynamics of a different kind from the other three chapters; Massink concentrates on the way in which, initially, the Dutch Labour Party and eventually the den Uyl Cabinet (led by a Labour prime minister), influenced the Dutch stance vis-à-vis Spain within NATO. Instead of problematising the concept of multilateralism by introducing different layers, she problematises foreign policy itself by showing the different interests at stake within one particular country. She interestingly concludes that '[t]he social democrats thus played a role in limiting the margins of manoeuvre of the Dutch government, while indirectly also contributing to restricting the options of the United States and Spain', since 'the attitude of the Dutch social democrats and the den Uyl cabinet contributed to preventing dictatorial Spain from joining NATO' Chapter 4 (Massink), page 81. They even '"squarely opposed"' Chapter 4 (Massink), 76 this from happening in meetings of the Atlantic alliance, and as such stretched the margins of the Netherlands as a NATO member in a very concrete manner, by determining on which grounds another country could or could *not* join the alliance whose framework it had used to increase its own room for manoeuvre. Twenty years after its reluctant collaboration within the Benelux to influence the negotiations on an EDC treaty, the Netherlands had learnt how to withstand American pressure within NATO itself.

The success in transcending the bipolar superpower paradigm thus became increasingly concrete in the course of the Cold War: in the 1950s the Netherlands succeeded in maximising its scope for manoeuvre through Benelux cooperation and at least 'guarantee[d] for itself a seat at the table of the Board of Commissioners', Chapter 2 (Palm), 43 as Palm shows. The Netherlands had thus ensured a certain degree of influence if the EDC Treaty had ever materialised. In the 1960s several smaller Warsaw Pact members were successful in increasingly influencing the agendas of Warsaw Pact meetings by first tabling the proposal for a European security conference and then influencing the proposal to meet the interests of individual countries. In these two decades, the scope for manoeuvre of the superpowers themselves became increasingly contested. In the 1970s the results of smaller powers' attempts to stretch *their* margins for manoeuvre were still more remarkable: within the CSCE both the EPC countries and Norway succeeded in shaping the 1975 Helsinki Final Act by both promoting human rights and, in the Norwegian case, also the issue of confidence-building, as well as endorsing the Pan-European conference altogether in the face of a reluctant US.

The fact that the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu succeeded in signing the 1969 WP Communiqué in the name of '"the participating states"' Chapter 1 (Crump and Romano), page 18 and the Italian prime minister Aldo Moro similarly managed to sign the 1975 Helsinki Final Act on behalf of the EPC is an interesting echo of the same principle: the smaller European powers increasingly began to distance themselves from the superpower and their status as individual countries or as participants in an alternative multilateral framework, such as the EPC,

became recognised as such. At the same time, the success of the Dutch strategy to exclude dictatorial Spain from NATO up to the late 1970s shows that smaller powers even got a stake in defining the parameters of the multilateral forum in which they participated.

This part has accordingly shown that the smaller powers successfully manoeuvred within and outside the constraints of the bipolar Cold War order, increasingly challenging the superpower paradigm and offering alternative visions of shaping the international arena instead. Stretching their margins for manoeuvre was not simply a strategy to survive in the superpower shadow, but it increasingly yielded concrete results, which in turn influenced the course of the Cold War. All of the multilateral fora under consideration were increasingly shaped by the smaller powers – or in some cases, such as the Benelux and the EPC exclusively so. The findings of this section do not only straddle the East–West divide – since they show similar tendencies regardless of the position vis-à-vis the Iron Curtain – but also show how the conventional bipolar Cold War order slowly began to crumble in the face of the interests of smaller powers. By the end of the 1970s the superpowers did not determine the international arena on their own. With European détente increasingly overshadowing superpower détente, the smaller European powers got a larger stake in defining the Cold War theatre. This volume adds an important analytical layer to the rise of European, multilateral détente by showing how the smaller powers on either side of the Iron Curtain and beyond increasingly began to use multilateralism to assert their own interests and as such inadvertently also provided an alternative to the bipolar Cold War order. In fact, one could see the Helsinki Final Act not merely as a triumph of human rights, as is so often the case but also as the fruit of the smaller European countries' push for multilateralism as an alternative to Cold War bipolarity. This tendency in itself would also provide a challenge to the Cold War as such. It is therefore safe to conclude that multilateralism did not only provide the smaller European powers with more room for manoeuvre but also that the smaller European powers' quest for stretching their margins for manoeuvre resulted in an altogether new means of conducting the Cold War, namely multilaterally. European détente could as such be seen as a direct consequence of the smaller powers' quest for a greater stake in the international dynamics which affected them all.

The East–West dichotomy is further challenged in the second part of the volume, called 'The Margins of Superpower Rule'. Kansikas, Oiva and Matala question the conventional divide between market and planned economy by comparing Finnish and Polish trade with the Soviet Union, while Stanoeva concentrates on trade between a socialist country (Bulgaria) and two capitalist countries (Denmark and the FRG). Meanwhile Gerits and Beers move beyond the Cold War divide altogether by showing how Belgium used its colonial past as an asset vis-à-vis the United States and examining to what extent the Dutch capitalised on their status as an energy provider respectively. As in the first part, so the second part starts with a chapter in which the two systems – socialist and capitalist – are being compared, showing strikingly similar strategies of the Polish and Finnish traders

in the chapter by Kansikas, Oiva and Matala. The chapter is also innovative in that it 'combines economic, social, political and cultural history' Chapter 5 (Kansikas et al.), page 92 in a way that is illustrative for this part as a whole: ranging from Finnish, Polish and Bulgarian trade to Dutch energy and the Belgian colonial ideology, this part also stretches the margins of the conventional themes within Cold War history and adds an extra thematic dimension which further responds to the call of New Cold War history.

Central to all the chapters is the asymmetrical situation between the countries under consideration and their respective superpower and the way in which the 'power of the weak' is explored to make a virtue out of necessity. The chapter on Finnish and Polish trade with the Soviet Union convincingly shows that '[t]he competitive advantage the two small neighbours had over Soviet domestic producers was their ability to prioritise the Soviet market and their perceived westernness' Chapter 5 (Kansikas), 102. In part, their finding is in line with what small state researchers emphasising small states' 'passive power' have said since the 1950s: they had an intrinsic advantage *because* of their smallness, namely the fact that they could afford to 'focus [their] attention and resources on one objective' rather than dividing it 'between multiple issues' Chapter 5 (Kansikas), 103. In addition, however, the authors point to the fact that both countries had an asset that the superpower did not have, as 'both countries had far tighter contacts with the Western high-tech world than the Soviet Union' Chapter 5 (Kansikas), 102. This demonstrates that the 'power of the weak' was not only about being able to stand up to a greater power in spite of its greater resources but also about actively exploiting resources that the superpower lacked because of the Cold War antagonism. Ironically, Gorbachev's perestroika in the second half of the 1980s limited the Finnish room for manoeuvre, since 'economic responsibility replaced the hierarchical planning' Chapter 5 (Kansikas), 102 and along with it the Soviet officials who had supported Finnish–Soviet trade. This also proves how the Finns had turned a potential Cold War constraint – the rigid Soviet hierarchy – into an opportunity to increase their margins for manoeuvre. Moreover, it shows how the ostensibly *apolitical* nature of trade had contributed to transcending the Cold War divide, which Gorbachev attempted to overcome. It created as it were a safe space in which the different systems did not matter so much anymore.

The same applies to Stanoeva's chapter, in which she shows through a very unorthodox comparison – Bulgarian trade with Denmark and the FRG – how Bulgaria, usually considered the most servile Soviet ally, could stretch its margins for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by 'infusing [its diplomacy] with the pragmatic objectives of economic cooperation', which allowed state institutions 'to diminish its ideological dogmatism' Chapter 6 (Stanoeva), 111. Thus problematising the 'ambiguous match of ideology and pragmatism' as well as the 'party-state paradigm' Chapter 6 (Stanoeva), 112, Stanoeva's chapter also offers us a new lens to interpret the Cold War. This chapter thus also proves 'the power of the weak', since 'the limitations for Bulgaria's small-state diplomacy also presented an opportunity [. . .] for state officials with a technocratic rather than an ideological outlook to take the lead and subordinate the strategy of this opening

to the pragmatic interests of economic cooperation' Stanoeva (chapter 6), 122. The comparison between trade with little Denmark and the FRG, so pivotal in the Cold War order, is therefore also a very fruitful one, since it highlights how much more the margins for manoeuvre could be stretched in the Danish case than in the West German case, where the Soviet Union attempted to keep a close watch. Either way, the economic rapprochement to the FRG also led to ground-breaking treaties on political normalisation with the FRG, even in the wake of the WP five invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The safe space of economics had thus provided Bulgarian politicians an instrument to open up to the West in a more enduring way and thus also paved the way to the European détente of the 1970s.

The chapter by Beers on the extent to which the Dutch used their status as energy provider to increase their margins for manoeuvre provides an interesting comparison with the previous chapters. Strikingly, unlike the Eastern European countries we have just discussed, the small Western European country did not seize the opportunity to use its economic capital as energy provider to stretch its political margins for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the United States. Within the Dutch infrastructure, the economic and political realms seemed two parallel universes, and the Dutch did not capitalise on their economic resources for political gain. This is particularly remarkable, since we have seen in the previous part in the chapters by Palm and Massink that the Dutch did attempt to increase their leverage over the American superpower on other occasions. In fact, the Dutch attempt to prevent Spain from entering NATO only preceded the Urengoy Pipeline crisis by a few years. The Dutch failure 'to translate its strong economic potential into geopolitical instruments Chapter 8 (Beers), page 147' can also be attributed to the fact that it was simply not a Dutch priority. Where it concerned human rights, as in Massink's chapter, the Dutch could afford to act as a bigger player thanks to the veto right; on the issue of European defence, as in Palm's chapter, it did so reluctantly, because it had to give up some sovereignty in order to act as a unit with the Benelux; and where it concerned energy, it ultimately only did so on a European level and not vis-à-vis the American superpower. In this case, pragmatism played a role, too, since the Dutch wanted to retain energy reserves in Groningen for their own use. Moreover, the domestic structure of the ministries also influenced the margins for manoeuvre of the Netherlands, as well as the way priorities were made and how those margins were perceived.

The chapter by Gerits shows that the opposite could also be the case: where the Dutch did not seize the fairly obvious opportunity of its enormous energy supply, their Belgian neighbours succeeded in using public diplomacy regarding the Belgian so-called civilising mission in the Congo as leverage over the Americans. This is again an interesting instance of the 'power of the weak', since the Belgians explored the American concerns over colonial rule to their advantage. Innovatively employing the perspective of the Belgian Information Center in New York, Gerits shows how the Belgians 'sought to sidestep the Cold War conflict and played on Truman's developmental concerns to increase the manoeuvrability of Brussels towards the US' Chapter 7 (Gerits), page 140. Reframing colonial rule as part of a modernisation project, the Belgians turned a 'diplomatic

embarrassment' into a shared value with the US administration, which greatly coveted 'to remake the Third World' Chapter 7 (Gerits), 140. Raising the stakes of modernisation, the Belgians thus attempted to move beyond the bipolar Cold War paradigm altogether in order to escape from superpower rule.

In fact, we have seen that the smaller powers explored the margins of super-power rule in all chapters by 'sidestepping' the Cold War. The Poles, Finns and Bulgarians turned economic leverage into political gain, using trade as a means to perforate the Iron Curtain and presenting economic issues as separate from politics. In all cases personal relations played an important role in doing so. The chapter by Kansikas, Oiva and Matala adds a particularly thought-provoking dimension by analysing the interplay between social, political, economic and cultural margins. The absence of this interplay marks the Dutch case, where eco-nomic strength was not translated into political leverage. It seems as though the officials responsible for the Dutch energy policy had sidestepped the Cold War to such an extent that they failed to appreciate that economic strength could be used to influence the superpower politically. In the Belgian case, there is however a clear interplay between these margins, since public diplomacy was also used for geopolitical gain – i.e. increased Belgian scope for manoeuvre in its colonial project. Just as the shared economic interests in the first two chapters created scope for manoeuvre for the smaller powers, so did the Belgian reframing of their colonial rule as a modernisation project, which they shared with the Americans, stretch their margins for manoeuvre. This part accordingly shows how the smaller powers could redress the asymmetrical relations with the superpower by concen-trating on aspects that were not central to the political Cold War, such as trade, modernisation and energy – although the Dutch case is an exception in that it only ultimately stretched the country's margins on a European level. In all their varie-ties, the contributions of this part all demonstrate how attention for what smaller powers pursued (and how and why) gives us a much richer and more nuanced picture than focusing on their ability to resist greater powers, as much small state research traditionally has.

The third part on 'Identity as an Instrument' shows how various nations used their identity in order to stretch their margins for manoeuvre within the Cold War framework. In the first chapter in this part, which deals with neutrality, Rainio-Niemi argues that neutrality began to boom exactly because it provided smaller powers with an instrument to escape from the bipolar yoke, providing an alterna-tive to choosing sides. In the second chapter Mavrodin shows how Romania wid-ened its margin for manoeuvre by launching a plan on regional denuclearisation, which served Soviet interests as well as raising the Romanian profile by claim-ing to offer a bloc-transcending peaceful alternative to between-bloc antagonism. In the third chapter Sío López shows how post-authoritarian Spain attempted to increase its scope for manoeuvre by its simultaneous strategy of democratisation and European integration. While its identity remained tied to the Cold War order, Spain served to align itself more strongly to the Western camp by emphasising a Western, democratic identity, which in fact weakened its bipolar ties to the Ameri-can superpower. Last but not least, Karamouzi shows in the fourth chapter how

six smaller powers, most notably Greece, explored public concerns about nuclear proliferation to widen their own margins for manoeuvre through the so-called Six Nation Initiative.

Rainio-Niemi sheds new light on the history of neutrality as an element of international history of the post-1945 period and the Cold War, pointing to the intertwining of domestic and international elements. After World War II, much of the scholarship dismissed neutrality as a fundamentally unsustainable and therefore transient phenomenon of the small, weak and otherwise marginal powers, and neutrality was often described in negative terms connoting failure, death and immorality. However, Rainio-Niemi shows that a serious interest of the superpowers in neutrality as an element of domestic stability and predictability in fact restored the uses of neutrality as an instrument of manoeuvring in the bipolar Cold War. As a global phenomenon, neutrality opened unprecedented options for the small "traditional" neutrals in Europe, allowing them to use their type of neutrality as an instrument of manoeuvring internationally and nationally. By the early 1950s, Swedish and Swiss neutrality – exhibiting a strong national unity and a commitment to an armed independent defence – had become '*the type of neutrality* that the US led bloc was ready to respect' Chapter 9 (Rainio-Niemi), page 171. The two post-war European neutrals, Austria and Finland, sought to model their policy on the two traditional neutrals. Rainio-Niemi shows how expressing in almost identical terms democracy and neutrality as their two 'core values', or 'way of life' Chapter 9 (Rainio-Niemi), page 180, emphasising long traditions of defending neutrality and democracy against authoritarian currents, allowed for 'virtuous images of the small European neutrals concerning their inner strength, capacity and skills as states' Chapter 9 (Rainio-Niemi), page 182.

Mavrodin's chapter analyses how Romania too widened its margins for manoeuvre by emphasising its value to the superpower, making references to its national characteristics and historical role. Mavrodin provides a very interesting nuance to Romania's image as maverick, by tracing a period in the late 1950s in which Romania was still considered the Soviet Union's loyal ally when it already began to explore stretching its margins for manoeuvre within and beyond the Soviet bloc. In order to do so, the Romanian leadership exploited its image as loyal ally by aligning its interests with those of the Kremlin through launching a plan to denuclearise the Balkan zone. This was fully in line with Khrushchev's peace policy but also allowed Romania to establish contacts with the Turkish and Greek NATO members, as well as non-aligned Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China. Romania could thus use the fraught relations among the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and China in order to position itself as a mediator and raise its international status simultaneously. The plan in itself was less important than the diplomatic opportunities it created for Romania, culminating in its presentation of the plan at the UN General Assembly in 1960. Mavrodin thus shows how Romania's perceived loyalty to the Soviet Union in fact paved the way for its transformation into the maverick, which it would become in the 1960s.

Sío-López' chapter on 'Spain's Dual Strategy of Democratisation and Europeanisation' is also an interesting case of entanglement between international and

domestic issues that shows how an apparent adaptation to certain superpower values and interests could in fact yield wider margins for independent manoeuvre. Since authoritarian Spain hardly represented the Western values during the Cold War, post-authoritarian Spain was all the more eager to integrate in the Western camp by joining the European Community as well as democratising. In fact, it needed the integration into the EC to 'externally reinforc[e]' Chapter 11 (Sio-Lopez), page 217 its transition to democracy, as Sío-López argues. This in itself meant a shift away from the American superpower, to which it had previously aligned itself, to the European Community. In its strategy to 're-join the mainstream Western democratic arena through the European Community' Chapter 11 (Sio-Lopez), page 216, Spain had thus set a precedent for the Central and Eastern European Countries after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Using the EC as the gateway to democracy, Spain not only redefined its own identity but to a degree would also define post-Cold War Europe. Moreover, by prioritising EC accession over its tight allegiance to the US, Spain had also succeeded in stretching its own margins for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the superpower. Rather than transcending bipolarity, the Spanish case adumbrated what Europe would look like *after* the Cold War.

Karamouzi's chapter in turn approaches the Euro-missile crisis in the early 1980s from an entirely novel perspective. She shows how Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, along with five other state leaders, launched the Six Nation Initiative in order to influence policy-makers, scientists and the general public during the Euro-missile Crisis. In a show of opposition to the bipolar Cold War order, Papandreou teamed up with leaders from India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden in order to stop the '"rush towards global suicide"' Chapter 12 (Karamouzi), page 231 and pave the way for a nuclear arms control agreement. They thus already presented an alternative to the Cold War, which did not revolve around ideologies or zones of influence but around the quest for peace. At the same time, the image of global peacemaker and mediator reinforced both the prestige of the Greek prime minister and of his country. His subsequent image as a 'troublemaker' Chapter 12 (Karamouzi), 235 in NATO only proves that his quest to delegitimise the Cold War divide was successful, as was his zeal for national independence. The Six Nation Initiative thus presented an alternative to Cold War bipolarity and nuclear competition, which regardless of its success raised the profile of the participating countries. Karamouzi's observation that 'it did not matter if it yielded any concrete objective benefits for the country' Chapter 12 (Karamouzi), 236, could also apply to the Romanian case in Mavrodin's chapter. What *did* matter in both cases was the increased prestige and room for manoeuvre on the international scene of the countries in question.

All these chapters show how smaller countries found possibilities to pursue wider margins for manoeuvre *in relation* to the Cold War, by profiling themselves as critics of the Cold War or, in the case of Spain, as supporters of Western camp values. The smaller countries under consideration used a particular concept – whether it be neutrality, denuclearisation or European integration – in order to either transcend the bipolar world order or anticipate a post-Cold War order.

Appropriating a project or a stance that suited their purposes, the smaller powers in question also created room to redefine the Cold War in accordance with their own interests. This part accordingly also challenges the image of the Cold War as a bipolar world order dominated by two superpowers. Whereas the previous part already showed that there were many more issues at stake than are usually considered within a Cold War framework, this part proves that those smaller powers, which managed to manoeuvre by offering an alternative to the superpower paradigm, succeeded in shedding the constraints of Cold War bipolarity and explored the opportunities of an increasingly globalising world instead. The Cold War was accordingly no longer determined by the superpowers alone. Instead, the Cold War began to unravel as smaller powers stretched their margins for manoeuvre at the superpowers' expense.

As a whole, this volume has provided new insights into both small state literature and Cold War scholarship. In terms of small state theories, it has shown that most constraints could be turned into opportunities, since 'the power of the weak' often exposed the weakness of the superpowers. Whether it be through multilateralism, through transcending and thus denying the bipolar Cold War order or through using an identity – as a peaceful country, as a neutral country, as a European country – to raise international prestige, we have seen that countries ranging from Bulgaria to Belgium, from Finland to Poland and from Sweden to Spain succeeded in contributing to Cold War dynamics in ways hitherto unobserved. Substituting the term 'margins for manoeuvre' for 'power', with its military connotations, all contributions have shown that these margins were much greater than often considered. Indeed, some smaller powers also succeeded in limiting the margins of the superpower. At the same time, the margins were more varied and allow for a much broader analysis of the Cold War: analysing social, economic, cultural and political margins, the authors have proved that the Cold War did not revolve around high politics and international diplomacy alone. Instead, issues such as public diplomacy, trade, energy and tourism played an important role, too. At the same time, other developments often crossed the Cold War divide, such as decolonisation, European integration and democratisation.

Having read all the chapters, it becomes increasingly difficult to actually define the Cold War. The picture painted in this book is much more messy and complex than the neat bipolar superpower paradigm. Moreover, several other aspects affected important Cold War developments, such as the interplay between domestic and international politics, the many different levels at which foreign policy is shaped and the interaction between different multilateral fora. In fact, this volume shows that this bipolar image has gradually become obsolete, as other developments also took a firm hold on the international world order, such as decolonisation, denuclearisation, democratisation and European integration. Sometimes it is hard to disentangle these developments from the Cold War context, but this volume proves that smaller powers often used such developments in order to escape from the superpower grip or at least widen their own margins for manoeuvre. Their attempts are interesting in themselves, since they pose a deliberate challenge to the Cold War order, but they also often had an effect. Ranging from

preventing Spain's accession to NATO or the influence of smaller powers on the CSCE in the first part, to influencing trade with the Soviet Union or between smaller Eastern European powers and the West, as well as shaping the American modernisation programme in the second part, to striving after a nuclear free world in the third part.

The contribution of this volume in terms of New Cold War history is accordingly threefold. First, it offers a uniquely wide range of empirical evidence, encompassing a total of more than twenty European countries – East, West, neutral and non-aligned – which sheds a light on hitherto understudied topics, such as the Dutch role in the European Defence Community, Bulgarian relations with Western partners and the pacifying Greek role in the Euro-missile crisis. In all cases the chapters are based on multi-archival research, covering or comparing various countries, often in multiple political or multilateral layers. Second, it shows that the international history of the Cold War goes far beyond traditional diplomacy. Public diplomacy, cultural ties, trade, energy, intelligence, transnational networks and other less conventional themes are explored in this book. The margins for manoeuvre perspective accordingly shows not only that smaller powers often sought to expand their scope for manoeuvre in less conventional arenas but also that the Cold War was shaped and overcome by a much wider range of issues than often realised. Third, all chapters argue in some way or other that the relation between smaller powers and the superpowers was much less rigid than has often been assumed. On either side of the Iron Curtain and beyond smaller powers sought ways to turn the Cold War constraints into an opportunity – and often with success. This has been argued by New Cold War historians, but never proved so conclusively in one volume. Moreover, there is no clear-cut difference between East and West in this sense.

And this, in itself, is an important contribution to Cold War scholarship. The East–West dichotomy did not dissolve suddenly with the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, exactly 30 years ago. It eroded over time. The attempts of smaller powers to stretch their margins for manoeuvre and challenge the superpower paradigm is very important in this respect. Considering the wealth of materials in this volume, there is still more scope to research the role of smaller powers in bigger developments on a still wider range of themes. We have seen in this volume that the comparative, multi-archival and often transbloc approach can yield very thought-provoking results, which sheds a new light not only on the influence of the smaller powers in question but also on the image of Cold War Europe. Further research on smaller powers beyond Europe is likely to provide equally interesting insights to further nuance Cold War historiography. We hope that this volume will inspire more studies that focus on margins rather than power, acknowledging that even a hierarchical world order is not static but a dynamic process that only exists in the context of a relationship. A more multifaceted approach towards the Cold War can also help to interpret the post-Cold War order in which we find ourselves today.

Index