

The Utopian Dilemma in the Western Political Imagination

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Chapter 8

Karl Marx and the Heroic Revolution

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8 Karl Marx and the Heroic Revolution

We have been following the development of opposing attitudes toward life and society, one for which the essence of happiness consists in achieving admiration and respect by means of a superior social position and another for which the competitive drive for status represents a fundamental irrationality at the heart of human nature, an irrationality to be overcome, if possible, only through radical social and philosophical reform. From the ancient world to the time of Rousseau and Smith, the struggle between these opposing attitudes, the heroic and the utopian, was confined to elite philosophical and literary writing; the only attempts to establish communistic lifestyles or instigate egalitarian reforms were made under the auspices of religion. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, however, the American and French Revolutions, each in their own way, opened new possibilities for the utopian impulse. The French Revolution in particular was an explosion that threw off particles of political and social energy in every direction. In the nineteenth century, we arrive at the age of practical, secular utopianism—dreams hatched in the Old World to be fostered largely in the New, in the “republic of North America,” the fancied realm of freedom, democracy, loose social control, and unsecured real estate. Wider cultural and economic trends played their part. The Romantic rejection of the civilized in favor of the simple, the natural, and the rural was an important contributing element, along with an ever-mounting cry denouncing the immiseration of industrial workers. Utopian Socialists like Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and Étienne Cabet each sought to develop scale models of an equitable and peaceful society that would allow individuals the fullest self-development. Many Utopian Socialists saw themselves as implementing a new Christianity in accord with the spirit of the Gospels. In America, the remarkable practical success of the Shakers made the utopian mode of life seem easily within reach, though the Shaker formula, based as it was upon pious self-discipline, proved hard to reproduce.¹

Karl Marx is universally considered a utopian thinker—indeed, among the greatest of utopian thinkers—and there can be no doubt that he is a genuine heir of the utopian tradition. He opposes the feudal-aristocratic class and envisions the solution of all social problems through the abolition of private

property, the quintessential utopian reform. His historical account of why this reform was bound to happen draws on the idealist philosophical tradition and it became among the most practically influential of all philosophical schemes. Yet Marx disclaimed both utopia and philosophy; throughout his writings, *utopian* is a term of contempt. He derided all forms of Utopian Socialism even while finding value in the critique of capitalism provided by Owen, Proudhon, Saint-Simon, and Fourier. Indeed, the label “Utopian” was one that he pasted on them permanently despite their own claims to be “scientific.”² Marx refused the utopian label because, unlike many of his interpreters, he recognized that his entire outlook was deeply incompatible with those essential elements of the utopian tradition which his socialist rivals shared with the Hellenistic philosophers and Thomas More. Unlike the socialist reformers of his day, Marx did not believe his ideal society could be realized with a change in thinking about social organization or by what he condemned as the personal, egoistic heroism of philosophers who considered themselves “superior to all class antagonisms.”³ Instead, Marx believed that a better world could emerge only at the end of a destructive process of violent struggle. The arrival of communism does not depend upon leveling class differences or withdrawing from the conflicts that undermine social harmony. It requires the intensification of conflict.

With his belief that struggle is the only vehicle of historical progress, Marx is following the lead of his master, Hegel, who wrote that “The History of the World is not the theater of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony—periods when the antithesis is in abeyance.”⁴ Only suffering and struggle are truly productive. This is a formidably anti-utopian form of idealism. As Leszek Kolakowski puts it, for Hegel,

Reason justifies history and condemns to vanity and ineffectiveness all arbitrary models of a perfect society. Even if these are in accordance with the just demands and rights of the individual, “the claim of the world-spirit rises above all particular claims.”⁵

History is equally careless of the miseries of its “Heroes,” those “World Historical Individuals” whose pursuit of their private interests and aims leads them unconsciously to advance the progress of “Spirit” (30–31). It is wrong, Hegel says, to take a psychological or satirical view of their turbulent passions and sufferings—to see Alexander, for instance, as guided by a “morbid craving” for fame and conquest (31). Such men are unconscious servants of the idea and in tune with the deepest needs of their time. Where Voltaire says that “No man is a hero to his valet,” Hegel repeats Goethe’s reply—“not because the former is not a hero but because the latter is a valet” (32). Critics of World-Historical Individuals are like Homer’s Thersites carping against Achilles in Book Two of *The Iliad*. Of their animus against great men, Hegel is willing to provide a psychological explanation—there

is an “underlying worm that gnaws” them with the knowledge that their “vituperations remain absolutely without result in the world.”

Informed by this view of history, Marx then, like any hero of romance, sees himself and his followers as servants of the age, newly conscious of their mission, engaged on a grand quest, a violent adventure on a world-historical scale, working alongside the proletarian class which represents universal humanity. The goal is a distant but heroic one—the overcoming of all obstacles to human freedom and the disappearance of the distinction between the individual and society. This is Marx’s seminal and fateful imaginative contribution to modern culture, the philosophical crystallization of a *utopian but heroic* political stance—a phrase that would be an oxymoron in the terms of this study were it not that the utopian element of Marx’s scheme is postponed to an indefinite future while the heroic adventure is for today. It is the sense of rupture between the present order of division and the ultimate goal in which all divisions are overcome that keeps Marx from feeling the tension of the utopian dilemma and the paradox of heroic egalitarianism.

All of Marx’s complaints about the varieties of Utopian Socialism come from the heroic direction. In his contempt, he sounds like the feudal aristocrats he admired the bourgeoisie for having buried. Utopian schemes are rooted in vulgar “avarice” and “envy” and the “urge to reduce to a common level.” They would abolish private property but not property itself. “In negating the personality of man in every sphere, this type of communism is really nothing but the logical expression of private property” (82).⁶ Instead of abolishing capitalism, what the socialist—or “crude communist,” to use Marx’s term—really wants is capitalism for everyone. “In crude communism,” Marx writes, “the community becomes the universal capitalist.” The fact that this “annulment of private property” is not really an “appropriation” in the true sense is proved for Marx by the fact that it negates “the entire world of culture and civilization.” This negation of culture is a “regression” the pettiness of which reflects its source in the “unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it” (83). The “crude communist,” the “poor and undemanding man,” is historically retrograde, having not even reached the level of capitalist appropriation. He is a failed bourgeois and Marx’s patrician disdain for this creature is obvious. Further, the imagined sharing of women in “crude communism” is only another form of crass acquisitiveness extended to the public; it is intended to make women “the spoil and handmaid of communal lust” (83). All in all, Marx believes that communism of the “crude” utopian sort is just another expression of the “vileness of private property” (84).

As one would expect, Marx is also suspicious of the Christian affiliations of earlier socialists. Christian Socialism is but the “holywater with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.”⁷ Indeed, the rejection of asceticism in any form is one of Marx’s most passionate and

enduring attitudes. Asceticism is a vice that Utopian Socialism shares not only with Christianity but with capitalism itself. “Self-denial, the denial of life and of all human needs,” is the “cardinal doctrine” of the “science of industry.” Such self-denial moves Marx to bitter mockery. “The less you eat, drink and read books ... the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save.”⁸ Both capitalists and utopians, therefore, are pitiful connivers at their own repression.

But the greatest drawback of all utopian social schemes is not their pseudo-Christian asceticism but their petty, non-heroic, non-world-historical scale. Just as Bacon had greeted the modern age as the true agent of transformation, Marx sees history, with its chosen protagonist, the universal proletarian class, as the only true agent of transformation. Small-scale experiments lack the exhilaration and irreversibility of historical momentum. Marx has no patience for the founding of “isolated ‘phalansteries,’” “duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem,” all these “castles in the air” (499), because it is only the true Communists who “take care of the future” (500). The momentum of the future will not be advanced, only impeded, by “economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organizers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind.” Marx is no more friendly to such *hoi polloi* than he is to the *Lumpenproletariat*; there is only harm in those “complete systems” like Proudhon’s which have been worked out on a puny, humanitarian basis (496). The proletariat can only exist world-historically. Its emergence is an irreversible, global event. “Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples ‘all at once.’”⁹ To ameliorate the effects of this global dynamic would be to betray it. Outlawing child labor, for example, would be “reactionary,” an “empty, pious wish” and “incompatible with the existence of large-scale industry.”¹⁰ Even abolishing slavery would be nothing better than a damaging retardation of capital. “Without slavery no cotton; without cotton, no modern industry,” Marx writes, with truly Panglossian logic.¹¹ The point of communism is not to improve the capitalist system but to push it to its destined end. This is why, for Marx, the last word of social science will always be [quoting George Sand] “Combat or death: bloody struggle or extinction.”¹² The advocacy of violence is the most explicitly heroic and anti-utopian aspect of Marx’s thought.

It is to the proletariat that Marx looks forward as the great hero of his world-historical epic. Ironically, however, it is his own class, the bourgeoisie, which displays the true dynamism of emergent social and economic forces. Marx’s enthusiasm for the productive energy of the bourgeoisie is nearly boundless as it transforms nature and human relations in its own image. “It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.”¹³ It goes about its world-historical mission with demonic force, putting an end to “all

feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations,” stripping the “halo” from “every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe,” tearing away from the family its “sentimental veil” and drowning “the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation” (475–76). With its need for a “constantly expanding market,” it must “nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere” (496). With its “constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation,” it destroys all the relations that sustained the old personal, social, religious, and national boundaries, leading Marx to a famous sentence: “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind” (496). No one understood better than Marx and Engels what these accomplishments had cost the members of the industrial working class, but they still give the impression that the benefits of capitalism had already outweighed its costs, even before the proletariat could come into its own.

The heroic and self-consciously anti-utopian character of Marx’s program is clear. Instead of advocating a peaceful, philosophically motivated reorganization of society that will reduce inequality, poverty, oppressive labor conditions, and social tension, Marx aims to accelerate these tendencies toward their inevitable, violent resolution. Marx’s readers will also recognize the epic character of his rhetoric, which deals constantly with the clashes of eras and worlds, irresistible forces, and collective delusions. There is even a Gothic tinge, when Marx speaks of the “were-wolf’s hunger for surplus labor” or, even better, when he writes that “Capital is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.”¹⁴ Nothing could be farther from utopia than the Gothic sense of the way the past haunts and dominates the present. “The tradition of all the dead generations,” Marx writes, “weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”¹⁵ Only a violent solution could lift such a nightmare.

The great bulk of Marx’s work is directed at understanding the nature and dynamics of the heroic struggle between classes, while his portrayal of the utopian end-state of communism is abstract and vague. Communism will arrive gradually, after a period of the “revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.”¹⁶ Its essence will be the end of class struggle in the victory of the universal proletarian class, a class which, being universal, does not generate an antithesis and so has no opponent to struggle with. The end-state of humanity, therefore, will be perfect social unity—a world without heroes. What is the basis of this unity? It cannot be some universal truth; that would be a bourgeois illusion. Rather, the basis is simply the absence of any further term of the dialectic. Practice itself will produce no further need for difference. Politics and the state will wither away. Markets will be abolished. The proletarian victory will be final.

Unless human beings are suddenly to acquire a Houyhnhnm's rationality, this state of perfect agreement—presumably on a democratic basis—is hard to imagine, and the replacement of dialogue with simple unity has doubtful antecedents. The appeal of Hobbes's Leviathan is that the reigning power, being single and indivisible, will put an end to all arguments simply by having its own way, the right of individuals to defend their own interests being more trouble to the commonwealth than it is worth. Rousseau's general will operates by a similar collective individualism, freedom consisting in obedience to a law one has given (collectively) to oneself. To remember Rousseau's chilling statement, those who disagree with the *general will* would have to be "forced to be free." And Hegel's dialectic also ends with the annihilation of difference. The subject of Absolute Spirit progresses by constantly recognizing, whenever it faces what seems like an object external to itself, that it is facing only its own creation. In the final state, every seemingly objective limit has been transcended and Absolute Spirit recognizes nature and the history of the world as nothing but the expressions of its own development. Consequently, the opposition of freedom and necessity dissolves. And for Marx, too, the arrival of the end-state, communism, depends upon the abolition of social otherness and indeed of all otherness and division. Communism is "the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (ie., human) being." Communism is humanism and naturalism at once. Communism

is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.¹⁷

As a description of communism, these words of the young Marx, not published during his lifetime, have never been superseded. They envision the total overcoming of human limits by the collapse of all ontological and social distinctions. Marx's correspondence shows how little interest he had in speculating further about the nature of the coming transformation.¹⁸

The specific form of otherness that distinguishes capitalism is the alienation brought about by the division of labor and the creation of value through exchange, referred to by the early Marx as "alienation" and by the later Marx as "commodity fetishism." In communism, the opaque, thing-like objectivity of the economic system and its operations will cede to the perfect transparency of the universal class. The human personality will become fully itself in relations that are unalienated and social, being entirely dependent upon people and not at all upon things. The contrast with Rousseau is striking. Where Rousseau, despairing of rational discussion, hopes to escape the battle of wills among human beings by an entire dependence

upon things, Marx, trapped in a world of hostile social relations disguised as things, hopes to escape the hidden battle between classes by an entire dependence upon other people—people whose difference, whose otherness from each other, has completely been overcome. In either case, the social other has disappeared, dialectic is over, and freedom and necessity are one.¹⁹

When Marx thinks about what communism, based upon the fully rational control of the means of production, would actually be like, it is not the increase in productivity that engages him, nor the overcoming of poverty, but this reunification of the alienated human being. In a communist society, the division of labor will not be necessary. “Nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes.” This is possible because “society regulates the general production.” Marx believes that rational planning will obviate the specialization which Adam Smith saw as the key to modern productivity. Communism will make available to everyone the choice and variety of occupations that in Marx’s day belonged only to the aristocratic man of leisure. And Marx carries his vision of liberation even further, to the point where “Man appropriates his total essence in a total manner, that is to say, as a whole man” (87).

Marx’s vision of communism, then, is utopian but in a grander and more heroic key than offered by classical utopias. It is not so much a solution to the social problem as an abolition of the entire dimension of the social as a sphere that contains human beings with interests different from one’s own.²⁰ At the same time, the social ills it seeks to overcome are not true ills but necessary evils, stages of the struggle toward the final realization of humanity. That being the case, Marx has none of the reservations about art and its disturbing power that trouble other utopians. He looks with rueful irony on the fact that capitalism has destroyed the conditions under which epic literature could thrive. “What chance,” he asks, “has Vulcan against Roberts & Co., Jupiter against the lightning-rod and Hermes against the Credit Mobilier?”²¹ Marx can never be convicted of nostalgia, of preferring imaginary to real mastery. He cannot regret that capitalism has undermined the mythological foundations of Greek art just as it has undermined other idols of the past—the family, the nation, and eternal ideals.²² But Marx is sensitive, nevertheless, to the weakening of art as a baleful effect of modern technology. “Is Achilles possible,” he asks,

with powder and lead? Or the *Iliad* with the printing press, not to mention the printing machine? Do not the song and the saga and the muse necessarily come to an end with the printer’s bar, hence do not the necessary conditions of epic poetry vanish?²³

Though the social conditions under which Greek art and epic poetry arose have vanished, “they still afford us artistic pleasure and that in a certain respect they count as a norm and as an unattainable model” (246). Communism will never surpass them. But the ascetic spirit that would reject

the “unattainable model” of heroic art because it does not accord with the modern spirit of progress is entirely alien to Marx’s thinking. The historical consciousness that comes at the end of the dialectic has already assimilated all of its former stages, and nothing is now foreign to it. “Why should not the historic childhood of humanity, its most beautiful unfolding, as a stage never to return, exercise an eternal charm?” This is the Promethean grandeur of Marx’s imagined end-state, the aesthetically and sensuously responsive assimilation of the entire history of humankind. It will never repudiate the heroic imagination. The early Marx glimpsed the logic by which philosophy is transformed into action when he wrote that “as the world becomes philosophical, philosophy also becomes worldly,” that “its realisation is also its loss,” and that “in its very struggle it falls precisely into those defects which it fights.”²⁴

Marx was not the first, of course, to combine utopian hope and revolutionary violence. But it is with him that we see the full and decisive reclamation of heroic violence in a utopian context, even though the postponement of the utopian dimension to an indefinite future beyond the reach of idealizing philosophy protected Marx from feeling the tension between his utopian dream, with its collapse of social difference, and his heroic mission. It was an ironic return to feudal weapons turned against the capitalists so admired by Marx for demolishing the feudal mode of production. Anarchism was to take a similar stance, often adopting violence even more directly, without the concern to follow the developmental path of history. Heroic rhetoric and heroic thinking became so much a possession of the Left that it could fall prey to Nietzschean anxiety about the softening effects on the human character fostered by modern utopians. The French Marxist Georges Sorel, in his *Reflections on Violence*, provides a striking example. He calls for utopian intellectuals, who would steer the working-class movement in a conventional political direction, to get out of the way so that the working class can discover its own path. The essential instrument of the working class is the violence of the general strike, a catastrophic expression of myth with the potential to effect a total transformation of society. For Sorel it is revolutionary violence that sharpens the distinction between classes and stokes the engine of history; without it, the future looks vague and indeterminate. “Proletarian violence,” he writes,

exercised as a pure and simple manifestation of the feeling of class struggle, thus appears as a beautiful and very heroic thing; it is at the service of the primordial interests of civilization; it is not, perhaps, the most appropriate method for obtaining immediate material advantages, but it can save the world from barbarism.²⁵

Sorel’s rejection of intellectualist utopianism and his return to ancient notions of heroism is unequivocal. “Let us salute the revolutionaries,” he urges, “as the Greeks saluted the Spartan heroes who defended Thermopylae

and helped maintain the light of the ancient world” (57). The idealistic and sublime spirit of war, not resentful envy toward the rich, must animate the working class as it performs deeds which are “purely and simply acts of war” (80). It is to this martial spirit of violence that “socialism owes the high moral values by which it brings health to the modern world” (253).

Sorel shows no philosopher’s embarrassment in seeking the renewal of an “entirely epic spirit” (252). Philosophers should seek to learn from art rather than trying to control it. The “catastrophic notion” of the general strike has the character not of idea but of myth, “the myth in which socialism is entirely enclosed” (95). Myth, according to Sorel, is “an arrangement of images capable of instinctively evoking all the feelings that correspond with the diverse manifestations of war engaged by socialism against modern society” (95). Instead of trying to tame this myth, modern socialists must stand aside to let the proletariat develop its own new ways of organizing society in the spirit of war inculcated by the general strike. “The strikes have engendered in the proletariat the most noble, most profound, and most energizing feelings that it possesses” (96).

Sorel did not believe that a bloodbath would be necessary to overturn capitalism. The moral force of the strike would achieve that transformation through exemplary acts of sublimity like the deeds of the Christian martyrs. Sorel must be one of the few socialists to have seen the same predatory spirit in Nietzsche, Andrew Carnegie, and Theodore Roosevelt—and he approved of it. He is an eccentric in the socialist tradition and has often been ranked among the fascists, though, in spite of his enthusiasm for ancient heroism and myth, he does not read like a fanatic. His intuitive and mythic conception of the strike owes as much to Bergson as to Nietzsche. Nevertheless, Sorel highlights the heroic, anti-utopian character of the resources needed to bring about the social revolution he saw prophesied in Marx.

It is not surprising that modern scholars have found little attraction in Sorel’s Nietzsche-inflected concept of the path to utopia. Their thinking about utopia has been influenced by later Marxists such as Ernst Bloch and Fredric Jameson who, in contrast to Sorel’s heroic vision, advocate conceptions of utopia with a deep connection to everyday life.²⁶ They are able to discern, embedded in art and in all sorts of everyday phenomena, glimpses and glimmers of an ideal future which is unthinkable under present conditions and which can only be made concrete by historically efficacious praxis. From this perspective, the obstacles to utopia are not widely observed traits of human behavior but constraints of thought and language generated by the totality of the capitalist order, constraints which make the potential utopia only fleetingly detectable. The ability to detect such fragile harbingers of the future depends upon the providential scheme which makes them intelligible as utopian. The result is a fertile but very abstract hermeneutic. It is interesting that Bloch recognized heroic narratives as the antithesis of what he considered the more utopian and future-oriented genres like the fairy tale. He understood that the epic connection to the past

and its sense of destiny run counter to utopian aspirations.²⁷ Bloch saw the concreteness of epic, and even the level of detail found in utopian fiction, as incompatible with utopia, reducing its open-ended, multivalent, and hopeful character.²⁸ This strain of Marxism makes the future attractive, but the fact that utopia is best imagined in brief, fleeting glimpses is evidence of its highly ambiguous appeal and its tenuous connection to life, while heroic culture makes an unabashed appeal to the imagination.

Notes

- 1 Chris Jennings, *Paradise Now: The Story of American Utopianism* (New York: Random House, 2017), 52.
- 2 Darren Webb, *Marx, Marxism and Utopia* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 13–15.
- 3 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 498.
- 4 Hegel, Introduction to *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), 26–27.
- 5 Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), vol. 1, 73.
- 6 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 83.
- 7 *Manifesto*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 492.
- 8 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 95.
- 9 *The German Ideology*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 162.
- 10 *Critique of the Gotha Program*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 541.
- 11 Letter from Marx to P. V. Annenkov, December 28, 1846, quoted in Andrzej Walicki, *Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 16–17, from Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1969), vol. 1, 523–24.
- 12 *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 219.
- 13 *Manifesto*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 476.
- 14 *Capital*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 367 and 362–63.
- 15 *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 959.
- 16 *Critique of the Gotha Program*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 538.
- 17 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 84.
- 18 Webb, *Marx, Marxism and Utopia*, 66.
- 19 As I have argued elsewhere, Hobbes’s Leviathan and Rousseau’s Social Contract similarly depend upon establishing a unity which abolishes otherness and difference. See John Farrell, *Paranoia and Modernity: Cervantes to Rousseau* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 270.
- 20 As Steven Lukes has pointed out, the “anti-utopian utopianism” of Marx and Engels is less akin to the classic utopia based on legal and institutional reform than to millennial thinking, visions of the Land of Cockaigne, or aristocratic moral reforms leading to an ideal commonwealth, types delineated by J. C. Davis. See “Marxism and Utopianism,” in *Utopias*, eds. Peter Alexander and Roger Gill (London: Duckworth, 1984), 155.
- 21 *Grundrisse*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 245–46.
- 22 *Manifesto*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 487–88.
- 23 *Grundrisse*, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, 245–46.
- 24 “The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophies of Nature,” *Marx-Engels Reader*, 10.

- 25 Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence* (Paris: Librairie de “Pages libres,” 1908), 57. My own translation.
- 26 See Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, 3 vols. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), and Fredric Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions* (New York: Verso, 2005). Jameson interprets utopian texts with a typological scheme modeled on St. Augustine’s. See chapter one.
- 27 See Fredric Jameson, *Marxism and Form* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 130. For a critical assessment of Bloch, see Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 3, chapter 12.
- 28 Jameson, *Marxism and Form*, 145–46.

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