

Europe's Islamic Legacy: 1900 to the Present

*Proceedings of the Online Conference
Hosted by the University of Cambridge
on 20 October 2020*

Edited by

ELIZABETH DRAYSON



BRILL

Europe's Islamic Legacy: 1900 to the Present

Europe's Islamic Legacy: 1900 to the Present

*Proceedings of the Online Conference
Hosted by the University of Cambridge
on 20 October 2020*

Edited by

Elizabeth Drayson



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON



This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided no alterations are made and the original author(s) and source are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

The terms of the CC license apply only to the original material. The use of material from other sources (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may require further permission from the respective copyright holder.

Cover illustration: King Abdul Aziz mosque in Malaga, [iStock.com/hifografik](https://www.iStock.com/hifografik)

This publication is based upon work from COST Action CA18129 – Islamic Legacy: Narratives East, West, South, North of the Mediterranean (1350–1750), supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology).

COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) is a funding agency for research and innovation networks. Its Actions help connect research initiatives across Europe and enable scientists to grow their ideas by sharing them with their peers. This boosts their research, career and innovation.

www.cost.eu



The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at <https://catalog.loc.gov>
LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2023003875>

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISBN 978-90-04-51071-5 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-51072-2 (e-book)

Copyright 2023 by Elizabeth Drayson. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents

Acknowledgements VII

List of Figures VIII

Introduction 1

PART 1

Islamic Heritage and Cultural Politics

- 1 Turkey and the Politics of Memory
Consequences for Domestic and Foreign Affairs and Security in the Region 9
Karol Kujawa
- 2 The Legacy of the Ottoman (Turkish) Age in Slovakia in the
21st Century 29
Gabriel Pirický
- 3 Islamophobia, Orientalism and “Jihadist Radicalisation” in the TV Series
El Príncipe (2014–2016) 48
Carlos Yebra López

PART 2

Islamic Heritage and Architecture

- 4 Hybridity as an Appellation of Twentieth-Century Islamic
Built Environment 69
Nuno Grancho
- 5 Mosques and Cemeteries of the Polish Muslim Tatars as an Example
of Islamic Legacy in the Central Eastern European Landscape in the
21st Century 98
Agata S. Nalborczyk
- 6 Revisiting the Ottoman Period Mosques in Albania
A Critical Observation on Late Interventions 130
Edmond Manahasa

- 7 Monumental Heritage and Past Conflict
*The Ambiguous Role of Al-Andalus in Modern Spain and the Role
of Art History* 157
Elena Paulino Montero
- Index 179

Acknowledgements

The editor and contributors would like to thank European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) most sincerely for their generous financial assistance with the publication of this collection of essays. Thanks are also due to the editing and production team at BRILL Publishers, and to Antonio Urquizar Herrera and Borja Franco, for their help, support and encouragement in bringing this project to fruition.

Figures

- 1.1 President Erdoğan during the conference held onboard the Fatih drillship 17
- 1.2 Taksim barracks in the nineteenth century 19
- 1.3 The first football stadium in Turkey established in the Taksim barracks
“Taksim Stadium” 20
- 1.4 Taksim barracks before its demolition 20
- 1.5 Gezi partly established after demolition of the military barracks 21
- 1.6 The making of a square: Taksim 21
- 1.7 Taksim barracks reconstruction project instigated by the AKP party 22
- 1.8 Gezi protests in Taksim square, 2013 22
- 5.1 Mosque in Kruszyniany (1799) 114
- 5.2 Kruszyniany – gloriotta 115
- 5.3 Kruszyniany – the place for women – *babiniec* 116
- 5.4 Kruszyniany – *Muhir* on the wall 116
- 5.5 St. Michael Archangel Orthodox church in Trześcianka (1867) 117
- 5.6 The mosque in Bohoniki (1873) 117
- 5.7 Bohoniki – the interior of the mosque 118
- 5.8 The Tatar Cemetery in Warsaw (est. 1867) – main gate 118
- 5.9 The Tatar Cemetery in Warsaw – graves of Polish Tatars (20th century) 119
- 5.10 The Tatar Cemetery in Warsaw – grave of a Russian Muslim soldier (1913) 120
- 5.11 The Tatar Cemetery in Warsaw – grave of the last commander of the Tatar
cavalry squadron (the 13th Cavalry Regiment “Vilnius Ulhans”) 121
- 5.12 Kruszyniany – *mizar* (cemetery) 122
- 5.13 Kruszyniany – grave of a Muslim Tatar (1804) 123
- 5.14 Kruszyniany – grave of a Muslim Tatar in the rank of major (1864); Polish text
below Arabic religious inscription 123
- 5.15 Kruszyniany – graves of Muslim Tatars (family Półtorzycki) 124
- 5.16 Kruszyniany – grave of a Muslim Tatar 124
- 5.17 Kruszyniany – a modern grave of Muslim Tatars
(family Safarewicz – 1999) 125
- 5.18 Bohoniki – grave of an imam of the Bohoniki mosque 125
- 5.19 Bohoniki – Cyrillic script on gravestone 126
- 5.20 Bohoniki – modern graves of Muslim Tatars (family Szegidewicz –
21st century) 127
- 5.21 *Mizar* in Studzianka (closed) 127
- 5.22 Studzianka – Muslim Tatar grave (Polish text below Arabic religious
inscription – 1878) 128
- 5.23 Studzianka – Muslim Tatar grave (Polish text in Arabic script – the name of the
deceased ‘Aleksandrowicz’ – below Arabic religious inscription – 1820) 129

- 6.1 Actual image of Preza castle and Mosque after late restoration 133
- 6.2 Image of the Mosque from 1971, before restoration and after restoration 133
- 6.3 Murat Beg Mosque in the 1960s before minaret was broken and images after the 1990s before restoration 134
- 6.4 Image of the mosque after restoration, decoration at the women's *mahfel* and interior of main prayer hall 134
- 6.5 Image of Naziresha mosque in 1960s, in 2005 and after restoration in 2020 135
- 6.6 Interior of Naziresha mosque before restoration in 2005 and after the restoration 136
- 6.7 Interior of the Naziresha mosque after the restoration in 2021 137
- 6.8 Image of Mirahor İlyas Beg Mosque before the second World War and in 2005 138
- 6.9 Entrance façade in 2005 and after the restoration 138
- 6.10 The squinches in the interior part in 2005, the minbar and appearance after the restoration 138
- 6.11 Lead mosque after 1978 restoration and an image of main prayer hall in 2005 and after the restoration 2018 140
- 6.12 The women's *mahfel* in 2005, main prayer hall interior after the restoration in 2018 and iron stair added in entrance façade in 2021 140
- 6.13 The image of the mosque of Bayezid II transformed into a store in 1978 and its image in 2005 141
- 6.14 North-east façade of mosque of Beyazit II in 2005 and same image in 2021 142
- 6.15 Last prayer hall arcade in 2005 and last prayer hall after the restoration in 2021 143
- 6.16 Mihrab and minbar with southwestern inner façade in 2005 and after the restoration in 2021 143
- 6.17 Minor lateral octagonal domes and major wooden domes in 2005 and after the restoration in 2021 143
- 6.18 Wooden octagonal inner dome over women's *mahfel* in 2005 and a closer image of the same dome after the restoration in 2021 144
- 6.19 Image of harim and women's *mahfel* after the restoration in 2021 (Ministry of Culture of Albania) 145
- 6.20 Mosque of Beqareve in 2005 and after restoration in 2021 146
- 6.21 Qibla façade in 2005 and the same after restoration in 2021 146
- 6.22 Mihrab image in 2005 and after restoration qibla inner façade in 2021 147
- 6.23 Inner image of north-east wall in 2005 and after restoration in 2021 147
- 6.24 Last prayer hall in 2005 and after restoration 147
- 6.25 Main prayer hall after restoration 148
- 6.26 Minaret of Mosque of Beqareve before and after restoration 148
- 6.27 Image of Mosque of Bazar in Gjirokastra in 2005 and after restoration 2021 150

- 6.28 The dome of the Mosque of Bazar before restoration and after restoration 150
- 6.29 The stone slates on the dome in 2005 and precisely rectangular stones on the dome after restoration 151
- 6.30 Medallion at the centre of the dome with central floral motif, and olive leaves and tulip motifs in the outer ring 151
- 6.31 Painting decorations at the transitional part between squinches and dome after restoration in 2021 152
- 6.32 Inner Dome image in 2005 and after restoration in 2021 152
- 6.33 Mihrab of Mosque of Bazar in 2005 and after restoration in 2021 152
- 6.34 Last prayer hall in 2005 and after restoration in 2021 153

Introduction

Elizabeth Drayson

The essays in this volume form part of the international research project ‘Islamic Legacy: Narratives East, West, South, North of the Mediterranean (1350–1750)’ funded by COST European Cooperation in Science and Technology. Their aim is to investigate the enduring legacy of the medieval and early modern Islamic presence in certain European countries that has persisted beyond 1750 and continues to manifest itself in life today. They demonstrate the importance of a legacy that is crucial to European identity by exploring contemporary cultural, political, historical and religious references to medieval or early modern Islamic interaction and influence manifest in a number of European nations.

The idea that Islamic civilization and its legacy is part of European identity challenges the popular perception of a centuries-old clash between Christians and Muslims on European soil. Christian Europe’s first encounter with Islam arose through invasion and religious conquest, when Muslim armies arrived on the shores of the Hispanic peninsula in the year 711. The anonymous *Mozarabic Chronicle of 754* described that conquest as a cataclysm, a disaster akin to the fall of Troy, visited upon the Visigothic Christians of Iberia as divine punishment for their corruption. Early Christian notions of Muslims as inherently warlike followers of an aberrant form of Christianity contrasted with the ethos of their new Muslim rulers, who tolerated Christianity as a religion of the Book. Antipathy sprang from the quills of early medieval historians – the eighth-century Syrian priest John of Damascus refuted Islam,¹ and the Venerable Bede, who believed that Muslims allegedly were descended from Ishmael, the son of Abraham’s concubine Hagar, while Christians came from his lawful son Isaac. Bede referred to the prophecy relating to Ishmael in the book of Genesis XVI: 12, which condemned his descendants the Saracens to wander in the wilderness.² The point of Bede’s story of origins is that it rendered all Muslims illegitimate, while only Christians belonged to the legitimate blood line. This antagonistic attitude was pursued by later Arab and Christian writers who set the moral tone for centuries to come.

1 See the text on the heresy of the Ishmaelites in *On Heresies*, (John of Damascus, 1958, 153).

2 ‘Significat semen eius habitaturum in eremo, id est Saracenos uagos, incertisque cedibus. Qui uniuersas gentes quibus desertum ex latere iungitur incursant, et expugnantur ab omnibus. Sed haec antiquitus. Nunc autem in tantum manus eius contra omnes, et manus sunt omnium contra eum, ut Africam totam in longitudine sua ditione premant, sed et Asiae maximam partem, et Europae nonnullam omnibus exosi et contrarii teneant’, (Bede, 1995, 201).

The common history and belief in one God shared by the Abrahamic faiths of Christianity and Islam were engulfed by largescale European political and religious conflicts that reinforced the idea of a clash not only of religions but also of cultures. The crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the fall of the last Muslim emirate in Europe in 1492, the sixteenth-century Ottoman threat to Europe followed by Christian European colonialism from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, all fostered a narrative that pitted Islam against the West and fuelled the Islamophobia and anti-westernism so prevalent in contemporary politics and media.

When Spain came under Muslim rule in the eighth century, its Christian communities perceived Islam not only as a religious threat, but also a political and cultural one, despite the fact that Islam was generally more tolerant to its Jewish and Catholic subjects than Roman Imperial Christianity had been. Three centuries later, the Crusades intensified the antagonism between the two faiths, hardening both the Christian view that Islam was the religion of the sword, and the equivalent Muslim perspective on Christianity as the militant herald of western imperialism. Both sides saw the other in similar terms, as barbaric, violent conquerors and zealots. The fall in 1492 of the southern Spanish city and province of Granada, final bastion of Islam in Europe, to the Catholic Monarchs Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon was a watershed in European history. It marked the end of seven centuries of Muslim rule in Spain and led directly to the conquest of the New World by Columbus and the rise of Spanish colonialism.

Further east, the Muslim armies of the Ottomans conquered much of central and eastern Europe from the mid fifteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, including Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and parts of Hungary, Albania and Poland, all largely Christian. But as Ottoman power waned in the nineteenth century, the European colonialism of which imperial Spain had been the precursor began to expand. The Muslims, who had been conquerors and independent rulers since the eighth century, now found themselves dominated or ruled in turn by Christian Europeans. The French colonized north, west and equatorial Africa, Lebanon and Syria, the British took over Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian subcontinent, as well as what is now Peninsular Malaysia, while the Dutch occupied Indonesia. The challenge to Muslim power and identity posed by European hegemony in the nineteenth century led to much soul-searching, and a deep longing among many Muslims for the perceived lost paradise of medieval Islamic Spain. The repression of the Muslim world through colonialism has been seen to have its roots in the fall of Islamic Granada in 1492, an idea that fuelled political rhetoric after 9/11, when the US Bush administration spoke of the 'war on terror' as a crusade, countered by Bin

Laden's declaration that a global jihad against the west sought to reclaim territories that were lost in the medieval struggle for al-Andalus, from which the name of the region of Andalusia derives.

The notion of a war between Islam and the West was fostered by Samuel Huntington's influential book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, published in 1996, which argued that cultural and religious rivalries were the greatest threat to world peace, citing Muslim and Chinese challenges as a threat to the dominance of Europe. Since then, religious terrorism, Islamophobia and immigration have become crucial political and social issues, which have strengthened negative stereotypes. In the present phase of the long history of relations between Muslims and Europe outlined above, the media and many politicians still tend to describe Islam and Christianity, Europe and the Muslim world, in terms of opposition and conflict. Amid these political, religious and economic concerns, the great diversity of the Islamic world and the numerous fertile cross-cultural exchanges between Islam and Christian Europe past and present have been largely forgotten by those outside academic circles.

Europe owes a very great deal to Islamic culture and has been irrevocably shaped by it. One of the most ardent advocates of the inestimable and enduring importance of medieval Hispano-Arab and Sicilian culture in the intellectual, cultural and economic evolution of Europe was the independent American scholar S.H. Scott, who published his three volume *History of the Moorish Empire in Europe* in 1904. This lone scholar, working in isolation in the early twentieth century, created an erudite and extensive testament to the enduring glories of Muslim Spain and Sicily. His viewpoint of informed enlightenment turns much received wisdom on its head to formulate the most fulsome possible advocacy for the lasting influence of Muslim civilization in Europe, highlighting the rarely acknowledged debt owed to that great empire by modern Europeans. From early Islamic times, with the help of Jewish and Christian subjects, Muslims had collected the great books of science, medicine, and philosophy and translated them into Arabic from Greek, Latin, Persian, Coptic, Syriac and Sanskrit. These translations inspired educated Muslim thinkers and scientists to make their own contributions to philosophy, medicine, chemistry, astronomy, algebra, optics, art and architecture. We might think of the tenth-century Cordoban physician Abulcasis, known as the father of modern surgery, who invented the forceps and encouraged the knowledge of anatomy in surgical procedures, or the Andalusian polymath Averroes (d. 1198) who pioneered the study of optics and pathology. Later, in the translation schools of thirteenth-century Toledo, Arabic texts were translated into Latin, and disseminated throughout northern Europe, where this lost heritage was regained.

Muslim advances in philosophy, mathematics, medicine and science were taught at Paris university in the Middle Ages, including Averroes' controversial commentaries on Aristotle, which were banned by the Church. Many great medieval Christian philosophers and theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, Peter Abelard and Roger Bacon recognized their debt to Muslim learning, and Christopher Columbus used Arabic maps perfected by Muslim astronomers from Toledo. Without Jewish or Muslim expertise, Spain would not have become the greatest colonial power in sixteenth-century Europe, and western science would be incomprehensible without Islamic scholarship. This important history of cross-cultural influence has been erased, deliberately or not, by historical, political and economic conflicts. For Muslims and Europeans alike, the abiding memory tends to be of battles lost and won, not of cultural interchange and fertilization.

Yet the Islamic legacy in Europe is still very much alive in the present, as revealed by this volume of seven new essays, which help to provide a fuller understanding of past relations between Christianity and Islam in the contemporary European context, using a variety of approaches across a range of academic disciplines, and across a variety of nations. These essays explore a variety of themes that uncover the origins of contemporary references to Islam in European countries around the Mediterranean, as well as the form those references take and the reactions they arouse, in order to assess their cultural implications and significance. What is striking about this collection is its demonstration of contemporary Islamic cultural references in a variety of European countries that include not only Spain, but also Turkey, Slovakia, Poland and Albania.

The seven essays are divided into two sections, one which focuses on Islamic heritage and its role in cultural politics, and another which considers that heritage in relation to architecture. In the first part, Karol Kujawa presents the causes of the Ottoman revival in post-Kemalist Turkey and explores the tensions arising from the implementation of this historical policy. He shows how important historical figures such as Mehmed the Conqueror and Suleiman the Magnificent are used to revive Ottoman traditions in present-day Turkey and explores how they play a key role in a political discourse that legitimizes the power of the AKP. Gabriel Pirický also considers the continuing impact of the Ottoman legacy on identity, culture and politics, this time in twenty-first century Slovakia. His essay focuses on contemporary political references to the Ottoman period, on architecture, folk culture and language, as well as discussing how the Ottoman era has shaped contemporary views of Islam in Slovakia. In the third essay on Islamic heritage and cultural politics, Carlos Yebra investigates the popular Spanish TV series *El Príncipe* (2014–16), set in the Muslim

working-class district of that name in modern-day Ceuta. He examines how the presence of Islamophobic and Orientalist elements in the production influence the fictional recreation of so-called 'jihadist radicalisation' in the series, showing that while Islamophobic and chauvinist elements exist in the plot, *El Príncipe* remains a thought-provoking interpretation of the pressing contemporary issue of jihadist terrorism.

Part 2 centres on Islamic heritage and architecture and is headed by Nuno Grancho's wide-ranging study of how hybridity in contemporary Islamic architecture and urbanism goes hand in hand with the emergence and diffusion of Islam, the submission to Islam by people from different cultural backgrounds, and the mobility of Muslims. The essay also reflects on a definition of hybridity and draws parallels between architecture, urbanism and literary studies. Two essays focus on the architecture of the mosque. The first, by Agata S. Nalborczyk, looks in detail at the cemeteries and mosques of Polish-Lithuanian Muslim Tatars as examples of the Islamic legacy in the largely Christian territories of Poland in the twenty-first century. She shows how these elements of the landscape reveal traces of the co-existence of Muslims and Christians in these areas. In the second essay on mosque structure, Edmond Manahasa analyses the recent restoration of Ottoman period mosques in Albania, comparing those restorations with the originals to assess the nature and quality of the alterations made. He uses archival research, photographic documentation and site observation to investigate how the Turkish government implemented this restoration work, following an agreement with the Albanian government. Lastly, Elena Paulino Montero examines the way that different interpretative paradigms relating to the ambiguous role of al-Andalus in modern Spain were crafted by historians and Arabists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Through the lens of the iconic palace of the Alhambra in Granada she reveals how contradictory perceptions of aesthetic and historical identity emerged, as theoretical and practical approaches diverged.

This collection of essays is timely in its ambitions and in the issues it addresses, at a time when contemporary Europe, Islam and the West often appear to be at political, religious and cultural loggerheads. Immigration and terrorism are two of the biggest issues that will confront twenty-first century society both in Europe and worldwide, and the way in which the history and legacy of Islam in Europe and beyond is perceived will have a major impact on how those issues are resolved. In that context, perhaps the biggest question this volume of essays responds to is how we might consider Europe and Islam in terms other than a clash between civilizations, religions and cultures. In their apprehension of a wide range of cross-cultural influences and cross-fertilization in the arenas of politics, history, popular culture, art and

architecture, these essays draw attention to the vital presence of Islamic cultural heritage in the everyday life of diverse Mediterranean countries. Its presence betokens both change and continuity, embraces positive and negative views of the Islamic past, and elicits thoughtful reflections upon the significance of Muslim heritage in contemporary European life. That heritage is the latest manifestation of the non-violent interchanges between Europeans and Muslims that began in the seventh century and evolved via political diplomacy and alliances, trade, and cultural and scientific influence and interaction. The scholars who have contributed to this volume have unearthed a rich, complex history of varied relations between Muslims and Europeans which are both highly specific yet of universal importance. They show that alongside past conflicts, clashes and conquests, the close connection between Europeans and Muslims that began so long ago may still bear fruit, and pave the way for future dialogue and reconciliation, as Europe explores its true cultural and religious identity and reconnects with its Muslim legacy.

Bibliography

- Bede. 1995. *Commentarius in Genesim* [Clavis Patrum Latinorum 1344] Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 118A. Turnhout. Brepols.
- Graham-Dixon, Andrew, 2010. *The Art of Spain*, DVD (BBC Worldwide Limited).
- Huntington, Samuel P., 1996, 2002. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London. The Free Press.
- John of Damascus, 1958. *Saint John of Damascus: Writings*. Translated by Frederic H. Chase Jr. New York: Fathers of the Church Series. Vol. 37.
- Scott, Samuel Parsons. 1904. *History of the Moorish Empire in Europe*. 3 vols. Philadelphia. J.B. Lippincott Company.

PART 1

Islamic Heritage and Cultural Politics



Turkey and the Politics of Memory

Consequences for Domestic and Foreign Affairs and Security in the Region

Karol Kujawa

1 Introduction

For centuries, historical policy has served politicians to achieve specific goals. Through the tool of this policy, the authorities have the opportunity to shape the desired vision of the state and nation in the international arena. In domestic politics it helps to cultivate traditions and build identity, which is the basis of the security and development of each state and nation. The politics of history also causes a lot of controversy. It can be used to take revenge for injustice or to show strength, but it can also be used to silence uncomfortable facts and events. Turkey provides an interesting example of such a policy. For centuries, collective memory has been used there to mobilize and build the identity of the inhabitants of this country. After the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the new secular authorities strove to marginalize the Ottoman traditions in the lives of the inhabitants of Anatolia. The leader of this country, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, wanted to break with the past by providing his new nation with a new history that would give the Turks pride by showing that they were an ancient and civilized land. During his reign, two scientific disciplines became particularly favored: archaeology and prehistory. Research in this direction had provided the means to establish claims to a continuous Turkish presence in Anatolia, which was vital for the young state's self-assertion against territorial claims by Armenia and Greece.¹

The politics of memory, however, took on a completely different meaning in the early twenty-first century. Since then, Turkish authorities have slowly begun to return to Ottoman traditions and to form a new identity for Turks. Ottoman traditions censored in secular Turkey were a key element of this policy. In turn, Islam became an inseparable element of the domestic and foreign policy of the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party – AKP. During their rule, Islamic religious customs were promoted, but also Islamic warriors from

1 Copeaux Étienne, *Espaces et temps de la nation turque. Analyse d'une historiographie nationaliste 1931–1993* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1997), 50–51.

the time of the Ottoman Empire. The new authorities also supported the construction of new religious buildings, but also the reconstruction or renovation of those that played an important role in the Ottoman Empire such as Hagia Sophia or the Egyptian Bazaar. In addition, authorities organized historical festivals, holidays, and exhibitions. They also changed the names of streets, renaming them with reference to the Ottoman heritage. Not only religious customs, but also Ottoman traditions were revived. This policy has often led to clashes and social tensions. In 2013, the initiative to reconstruct military barracks in the Taksim square led to protests that spread throughout the country. Moreover, in 2020 the president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, decided to convert the iconic Hagia Sophia from a museum into an active mosque. Such policy had international implications and sparked a furore around the world.

The aim of this chapter is to present the causes of the Ottoman revival in post-Kemalist Turkey. In this context, I will refer to the policy of the AKP party in the last two decades. I will focus on the ways in which the ruling parties conduct and implement historical policy. Also, I will reflect on their awareness of their distinctiveness and consider the steps they have taken to protect and promote Ottoman traditions. Moreover, I will analyse the impact of the 'politics of memory' on domestic and international politics across Turkey, exploring how it influenced public opinion and politics in that country, and how this narrative affects the attitude towards other European countries. I will also consider what kind of tension it leads to and what relics of the past it tries to erase, and ask how Turkey attempts to influence its neighbors through politics of memory. This paper will also seek answers to the question: How is the Ottoman past regarded by the other groups living in Turkey (among others Alevis, Kurds, or secular Turks)?

The article is organized as follows: the first section presents the background and roots of the AKP party; the second section presents the main figures who play a key role in shaping the historical politics in the "new Turkey", and the issue of Ottoman nostalgia among Turks will be analysed. In addition, the author examines the attitudes of other groups living in Turkey and its neighbors towards the Ottoman heritage. How do they view Turkey today, and what is the role of Ottoman monuments in relations between Turks, Arabs, and Western countries? What sites is Turkey trying to revive and what is it trying to achieve? The verification of the main research questions is based on specific methods and techniques, and due to the nature of the topic, the author has used an analytical-descriptive research methodology. The first stage included collecting publications in scientific journals and books in English or Turkish. The information and data in the papers were collected from the national library in Ankara and Berlin. There was also a discussion on Turkish politics with

members of the COST group leading the project “Islamic Legacy: Narratives East, West, South, North of the Mediterranean”. Interviews with Turkish politicians were also conducted in 2019 and 2020. The material collected was also drawn from books and articles and analysed using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative means of analysis. This research metric allows an analytical approach to the topic and conclusions, which helps in the analysis of causal relationships in the context of European-Turkey relations.

In the second section, a content analysis of Turkish documents was conducted. Additionally, the research focused on the analysis of existing sources in foreign languages, especially official government documents. In order to verify the research objectives in the third stage, the author discussed the preliminary assumptions with experts at the Turkish Symposium: ‘Turkey in the Aftermath of the Failed Coup Attempt’ at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA (June 20–23, 2017). Moreover, in the fourth stage of the research, the author conducted field research in Turkey (Çanakkale, Ankara, Istanbul). During the study trips, experts and government officials, think-tank experts and academics from Turkey were interviewed. In this way, the methodological principle of the case study was fulfilled, according to which it is necessary to obtain comprehensive research material using a wide range of research techniques, in order to make a reasonably complete and insightful analysis. The methods thus adopted will allow for an interdisciplinary examination of the title issue and provide a basis for drawing conclusions about the impact of the past on current and future relations between Turkey and the Western countries.

2 Literature Review

The literature on the rise of the political Islam in Turkey is extremely rich. However, most researchers focus on the process of islamization of Turkey and Turkish foreign policy rather than on the political history.² One of the most important publications dealing with this issue is the work prepared by A. Carkoglu and B. Rubin, B. Hoekman, S. Togan, S. Aydın-Düzgit, A. Duncker,

2 E.g. Ayhan Akman, “Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey”, *The Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 31 (2004); Andrew Davison, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State? The Challenge of Description”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102 (2/3); Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* (New York, 2006); Erol Ülker, “Contextualising “Turkification”: Nation-Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005).

D. Huber, E. Keyman and N. Tocci.³ The works referred to are extremely valuable and deepen the discussion on the importance of Turkey in the region. However, there are a very few works dealing directly with historical politics in Turkey. Previous work has addressed the issue of cultural heritage in Turkey, although it does not address the role it plays in domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, it does not examine how historical politics drives or limits conflicts between states such as Turkey and Israel. This topic has received relatively little coverage by political scientists and historians. The issue of political memory is only addressed in Alan Mikhail's book "God's Shadow: Sultan Selim, His Ottoman Empire, and the Making of the Modern World" (Mikhail, 2020). This article, however, focuses on the role of Islam in shaping some of the most fundamental aspects of the history of Europe, the Americas, and the United States. The author also describes the importance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe's conquest of the Americas. Another important publication on this topic has been published by Esra Özyürek.⁴ However, a lot of time has passed since the publication of this very interesting work, so the problem of historical politics needs to be updated and looked at in a new way.

3 Importance of the Current Research

The current research on this subject should be regarded as insufficient, both in Turkey and in the European Union. The results of this study may prove very useful in the context of the ongoing academic debates surrounding the role of Turkey in the region, and will undoubtedly provide data on the Middle East dimension of Turkey's foreign policy. The study also shows the role of Turkey in the post-Ottoman region and how it has influenced public opinion and politics in those countries. The results of the project would also be very important from the perspective of security. It is very difficult to understand the current political phenomena and processes that are taking place in Turkey without knowing this topic. By understanding historical politics it will be easier to identify Turkey's ambitions and the role it wants to play on the international stage.

3 Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin, *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics* (London 2003); Ed. Bernard Hoekman, Sübidey Togan, *Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union* (Washington 2005); Ed. Senem Aydın-Düzgüt, Anne Duncker, Daniela Huber, Fuat Keyman, Nathalie Tocci, "Global Turkey in Europe: Political, Economic, and Foreign Policy Dimensions of Turkey's Evolving Relationship with the EU". *IAI Research Papers* (Roma 2013).

4 Esra Özyürek, *The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey*, (New York 2006).

4 Context

To fully understand the problem of Turkish historical politics, one must go back to the roots of the AKP party. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan played a key role in its formation. In 1994 he won the elections for the post of Istanbul mayor. In his speeches he repeatedly referred to the need to return to Islamic traditions. However, his statements were regarded as incitements to religious hatred. In 1998, Erdoğan was removed as mayor of Istanbul and sentenced to ten months in prison. After his release from prison in 2001, he strove to build a new political party that would succeed in elections and take power. The AKP party was founded in 2002. Initially its members came from different social backgrounds, including Islamic and liberal activists as well as representatives of ethnic minorities. The party accepted a Western lifestyle and cut itself off from radicalism. It also claimed that Islam could coexist with democracy. Erdoğan made it clear that an Islamic order was not possible in a multi-ethnic Turkey. Especially during his first term (2002–2004), he carried out a series of democratic reforms that opened the door for Turkey to join the European Union. However, as time went on, the Islamic faction began to marginalize the liberal currents within its ranks and the representatives of the Sufi Islamic current movement represented by Fethullah Gülen and to limit their role. It also stopped democratic reforms that would have brought Turkey closer to the EU. After removing them from leadership positions, Erdoğan took steps to adapt the environment to his goals, the aim of which was to de-secularize Turkish society and restore Ottoman traditions in Turkish public life. To this end, they glorified the Muslim heroes of the Ottoman Empire.⁵

5 Mehmed the Conqueror

One of the most important figures in the historical politics of the “new Turkey” is Fatih Sultan Mehmed Han (1432–1481), commonly known as Mehmed the Conqueror. He was an Ottoman sultan who reigned from 1444 to 1446 and then from 1451 to 1481, and he went down in the history of the Ottoman Empire as one of its most important figures. He conquered Istanbul at the age of 21 and made the Ottomans a world empire. The Sultan is also remembered as a cruel ruler. He was particularly obsessed with raw power and prone to tyranny during his reign. The figure of Mehmed has special significance for the ruling party. He

5 Taner Dogan, *Communication Strategies in Turkey Erdogan, the AKP and Political Messaging* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 1–3.

is a symbol of Turkey's return to Islamic traditions and is expected to increase the popularity of the ruling party and the Turkish president. This was perfectly evident during the 563rd anniversary of the siege of the Ottomans who captured Istanbul. The event, titled "Resurrection," was scheduled for May 29, 2015, and it took place a week before the country's 25th parliamentary elections. It was the largest propaganda campaign Turkish politics has ever seen. Tens of thousands of supporters of President Erdoğan took part. Fireworks, huge parties, and a public speech by the president were part of the anniversary celebrations. During this celebration, huge banners were set up with portraits of President Erdoğan and slogans in Turkish that read "Resurrection again, rising again". President Erdoğan used the occasion to condemn the US, Russia and Iran in a speech.⁶ Another major propaganda move by the Turkish government to boost its popularity among the Turkish people was the decision to convert the iconic Hagia Sophia from a museum into an active mosque. Initially, the Turkish president was skeptical of this decision. In 2016, he claimed that there was no need for it. However, the political situation changed dramatically in 2021, when sanctions were imposed on Turkey by the United States. Domestic pressures were also growing. The electorate demanded a rematch with the West. As a result, the Turkish president decided to restore the mosque. Shortly after announcing this decision, the Turkish president stated in a national address: "Thanks to this court ruling and the measures we have taken in accordance with this decision, Hagia Sophia has become a mosque again after 86 years, as Fatih, the conqueror of Istanbul, wanted".⁷

6 Selim I

The second person who played a special role in contemporary historical politics is Sultan Selim I (1470–1520), known as Selim the Grim, Selim the Steadfast or in Turkish Yavuz Sultan Selim. He was the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1512 to 1520 and was one of the main builders of the power and prestige of the Ottoman state and its position in the Islamic world. Selim's conquests shaped the political map of the Middle East for a long time. In part, their effects are still visible today. During his reign the empire expanded to include Syria, Palestine,

6 Cengiz Candar, "Erdoğan tries to rewrite history". *Al-Monitor*. May 29, 2015. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/05/turkey-erdogan-akp-alter-history-for-election-campaign.html>.

7 Daren Butler, Ece Toksabay, "Erdoğan declares Hagia Sophia a mosque after Turkish court ruling". *Reuters*. July 10, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-museum-verdict/erdogan-declares-hagia-sophia-a-mosque-after-turkish-court-ruling-idUKKBN24B1TI>.

Jordan, Egypt and Al-Hijaz. Since then, Mecca and Medina, as well as the holy city of Jerusalem became part of the Empire. He is also seen in history as a persecutor of the Alevis (a Shiite sect of Islam), who make up about 20 percent of the population in Turkey.⁸

The policy of Selim I is particularly appreciated by the President of Turkey. He has repeatedly visited his tomb during his time in office and prays there. President Erdoğan's visit to this place is often a political demonstration, in which many of his supporters participate. Another way to commemorate Selim I's accomplishments is to give his name to important squares and streets in Turkey. Apart from the president, many important AKP politicians take part in these ceremonies. Such an event took place, among others, in Ankara, where a boulevard was given the name of the Ottoman Sultan, and a bridge was built in Istanbul in his honour. It is the longest suspension bridge in the world with a width of 59 metres and a main span of 1,408 meters. The opening ceremony of this bridge in 2016 was attended by Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bakir Izetbegović, the President of Macedonia Gjorge Ivanov, King of Bahrain Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and the President of the self-proclaimed state of Northern Cyprus, Mustafa Akıncı. The opening ceremony was also attended by the head of the Punjab (Pakistan) government, Shahbaz Sharif, the Bosnian deputy prime minister of Serbia Sandžak Rasim Ljajić, the first deputy prime minister of Georgia, Dimitri Kumsishvili, and senior officials from Azerbaijan. Speeches were delivered by Turkish President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. However, the choice of the name of the bridge led to protests by Alevis in Turkey over the alleged role of Sultan Selim I in the Ottoman persecution of Alevis.⁹

7 Suleiman the Magnificent

The third historical figure who plays an extremely important role in Turkish politics is Suleiman I (1494–1566), commonly known as Suleiman the Magnificent in the West, and Suleiman the Lawgiver. Under his administration, the Ottoman caliphate ruled over at least twenty-five million people. Suleiman began his

8 Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, *The Kizilbash-Alevis in Ottoman Anatolia: Sufism, Politics and Community* (Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 2020), 198.

9 "How Many Years Was Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge Opened? What Happened During the Construction Process?". *Rayhaber*. August 26, 2020. <https://en.rayhaber.com/2020/08/yavuz-sultan-selim-koprusu-kac-yilinda-acildi-yapim-surecinde-neler-yasandi/>.

reign with campaigns against the Christian powers in central Europe and the Mediterranean, and also waged three major campaigns against Persia. In order to defend the places he took from the Christians and he adorned the cities of the Islamic world with mosques, bridges, aqueducts, and other public works. Moreover, he won several sea battles against Greece, Venice and Spain, which gave the Ottomans the naval initiative in the Mediterranean until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Finally, Süleiman transformed the previously Byzantine city of Constantinople into Istanbul, a worthy centre for a great Turkish and Islamic empire.¹⁰

This sultan has special meaning for President Erdoğan. The Turkish president uses Suleiman to strengthen the vectors of his foreign policy. It helps him build an image of a defender of Muslims in the world and revive the power of Turkey, as expressed during his appearance in 2018. At the opening of parliament President Erdoğan declared that Jerusalem is Turkish: "In this city, which we had to leave in tears during the First World War, it is still possible to come across traces of Ottoman resistance. So Jerusalem is our city, a city from us" Erdoğan said. He went on to say that "the current appearance of the Old City, which is the heart of Jerusalem, was created by Suleiman the Magnificent, with its walls, bazaar, and many buildings. Our ancestors showed their respect for centuries by holding this city in high esteem."¹¹ Turkish authorities are also trying to promote the image of Suleiman in the mass media. A special role in this process was played by the soap opera series *Magnificent Century*, which attracts an audience of up to 150 million people in Turkey as well as parts of the Balkans and Middle East. However, not all scenes from this series made the president happy. Scenes that showed Suleiman with women in the harem were not well received by him. Suleiman is portrayed in the show as an indulgent harem-lover, rather than as a proud conqueror.¹²

These three historical figures, Mehmed I (Fatih), Selim I (Yavuz) and Suleiman (Kanuni), have become the symbols of Turkey's ambitions in the

10 André Clot, *Suleiman the Magnificent* (London: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2012), https://books.google.pl/books?id=zzohBQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Suleiman+the+Magnificent&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Suleiman%20the%20Magnificent&f=false.

11 Tobias Siegal, "Erdogan: 'Jerusalem is our city, a city from us'". *The Jerusalem Post*. October 3, 2020. <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/erdoan-jerusalem-is-our-city-a-city-from-us-644306>.

12 Karol Kujawa, *Turkey and democratization in the Arab world: between an inspiration and a model. PISM*. 2011. https://pism.pl/publikacje/PISM_Policy_Paper_no_12_Turkey_and_democratization_of_the_Arab_world.



FIGURE 1.1
 President Erdoğan during the conference held onboard the Fatih drillship
 “TURKISH PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES MORE GAS RESERVES IN BLACK SEA”. *POST ONLINE MEDIA*. JULY 5, 2021. [HTTPS://WWW.POANDPO.COM /POLITICS/TURKISH-PRESIDENT-ANNOUNCES-MORE-GAS-RESERVES-IN-BLACK-SEA/](https://www.poandpo.com/politics/turkish-president-announces-more-gas-reserves-in-black-sea/)

Mediterranean and Black Sea basins. Three drillships of the state-owned Turkish gas company were renamed after them (Figure 1.1). Their goal is to search for energy resources at sea. The first resources were discovered in 2020 by drillship Fatih in Black Sea. This policy led to significant tensions with the European Union and the United States. However, the Turkish president did not intend to give up his ambitious plans and his policy in this region is supported by the vast majority of Turkish society. According to a poll conducted in 2020, 75.4 percent support Turkey’s seismic research in the eastern Mediterranean.¹³

8 Abdulhamid II

Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) known as “the Damned” or the “Red Sultan,” also has a special place in the historical politics of the “new Turkey”. Abdulhamid

13 “Kıbrıs halkı Mavi Vatan’da verilen mücadelenin yanında: Anket sonucu verilen çabaya büyük destek veriyor”. *Yenisafak*. August 31, 2020. <https://www.yenisafak.com/foto-galeri/dunya/kibris-halki-mavi-vatanda-verilen-mucadelenin-yaninda>.

dismissed Parliament and forced reform-minded intellectuals and journalists into exile or imprisonment. He skillfully ruled the Empire for over 30 years as a means to solidify his absolutist rule as well as to rally public opinion in the empire's outer dominions. The sultan also built a railway that allowed Muslim pilgrims to travel from Damascus to the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Essentially, Abdulhamid is one of the most controversial rulers of all thirty-six Ottoman sultans. Turkey's Islamists hail him as Ulu Hakan (Sublime Khan) – a pious autocrat who ruled the vast empire with an iron fist, standing up to infidels and keeping the Ottoman domains together through the skillful deployment of pan-Islamist ideology. For Turkey's secularists and Westernizers, Abdulhamid is Kizil Sultan (Red Sultan) decried for his tyrannical ways, obscurantism and bloody suppression of Ottoman Armenians.¹⁴

The sultan is a revered figure in Turkey at the moment as interest in the Ottomans has grown under President Erdoğan. He was commemorated on the centenary of his death with a series of events and tributes organized by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İMM). Moreover, the last years of Abdülhamid II's rule have also inspired a popular TV series *Payitaht* aired by a public broadcaster. Speaking at a public rally, President Erdoğan recently said young people should watch this movie to “understand our history” and “know what we once were.” Echoing Abdulhamid's social and political outlook, Erdoğan's political doctrine has often been referred to as “neo-Ottoman,” an attempt to recapture Turkey's historical and cultural Ottoman legacy. It represents a dramatic shift from the traditional Turkish secular worldview to one where Islam is a central theme in modern-day Turkey. In 2018, Erdoğan has introduced Quran classes in primary education and facilitated Islamic clerical training at middle school level. At the same time, Turkey's parliament passed legislation to restrict the sale of alcohol.¹⁵

In the last few years, the Turkish president has frequently referred to Abdulhamid's legacy in public. During a commemoration ceremony to mark the centenary of the death of Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II at the Yildiz Palace in Istanbul, Erdoğan said: “The Republic of Turkey, just like our previous states that are a continuation of one another, is also a continuation of the Ottomans. The Republic of Turkey is a continuation of the Ottoman Empire”.

14 See also Joan Haslip, *The Sultan: The Life of Abdul Hamid II* (Phoenix: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 2003).

15 “Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Tarihi bilmek için Payitaht Abdülhamid'i izleyin”. *TRT Haber*. December 31, 2017. <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/cumhurbaskani-recep-tayyip-erdogan-tarihi-bilmek-icin-payitaht-abdulhamidi-izleyin-345026.html>.

He added: “Of course, the borders have changed. Forms of government have changed ... But the essence is the same, the soul is the same, even many institutions are the same”. Erdoğan explained that this is why Sultan Abdulhamid is one of the “most important, most visionary and most strategic-minded” individuals to make his mark in the last one hundred and fifty years. Sultan Abdulhamid II, the son of Sultan Abdulmecid, died in 1918, and was the 34th sultan of the Ottoman Empire. “Some people insist that this country’s history starts in 1923. Some try unrelentingly to detach us from our roots and ancient values,” he added”.¹⁶

Another attempt to restore the memory of Albulhamid II took place in 2011. Istanbul authorities decided to rebuild the Ottoman barracks in Istanbul’s Taksim square, which had been destroyed during the 1909 fighting between the Young Turks and the Islamists (Figure 1.2). The Young Turks sought to secularize and democratize the Empire, while the Islamists wanted to restore the authoritarian rule of Albulhamid II and introduce Sharia law. The barracks continue to play an important role for the Turks to this day. For the supporters of the ruling AKP party, it symbolizes the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the revolution that led to the reduction of the importance of religion in public life, while for the opposition, it represents the last rebellion of Islamic fundamentalists loyal to Albulhamid II, who wanted to restore sharia. After taking power, the leader of secular Turkey, Atatürk, transformed the barracks into the Taksim Stadium in 1921, which became the first football stadium in Turkey, used by all major football clubs in the city, including Beşiktaş J.K., Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe S.K. (Figure 1.3). The stadium was closed in 1939, and finally demolished in 1940, during the construction and renovation works of Taksim Square and Taksim Gezi Park in accordance with



FIGURE 1.2

Taksim barracks in the nineteenth century

“TAKSIM ARTILLERY BARRACKS IN PHOTOS”. *HURRIYET*. MARCH 18, 2013. [HTTPS://WWW.HURRIYETDAILYNEWS.COM/TAKSIM-ARTILLERY-BARRACKS-IN-PHOTOS-43110](https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/taksim-artillery-barracks-in-photos-43110)

16 “History is not Only the Past of a Nation, But Also the Compass of Its Future”. *Presidency of the Republic of Turkey*. February 10, 2018. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/89379/history-is-not-only-the-past-of-a-nation-but-also-the-compass-of-its-future>.



FIGURE 1.3
The first football stadium in Turkey
established in the Taksim barracks
“Taksim Stadium”
WIKIWAND. 2020. [HTTPS://WWW
.WIKIWAND.COM/EN/TAKSIM
_STADIUM](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Taksim_Stadium)



FIGURE 1.4 Taksim barracks before its demolition
PHOTO FROM THE PUBLICATION “GÜZELLEŞEN
İSTANBUL” DATED 1944, SHOWING THE TOPÇU
MILITARY BARRACKS IN TAKSIM. THE BUILDING WAS
DEMOLISHED IN 1940 AS PART OF THE URBAN PLAN
OF HENRI PROST

the plans of French architect and city planner Henri Prost (Figure 1.4, 1.5, 1.6). It has since become a symbol of Turkey’s modernization and secularism.¹⁷ In 2011, however, Erdoğan wanted to reverse the course of history. His party’s activists decided to rebuild the structure, despite the area falling within the purview of green space protection ordinances (Figure 1.7). The proposed rebuilt barracks were intended to be a shopping centre incorporating cultural

17 “Taksim’deki Gezi Parki’nda futbol stadi vardı”. *Milliyet*. April 14, 2011. [https://www.mil
liyet.com.tr/cadde/taksim-deki-gezi-parki-nda-futbol-stadi-vardi-1377252](https://www.milliyet.com.tr/cadde/taksim-deki-gezi-parki-nda-futbol-stadi-vardi-1377252).



FIGURE 1.5 Gezi partly established after demolition of the military barracks
PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY ARCHITECT, HENRI PROST. *THE MAKING OF A SQUARE TAKSIM*. MARCH 3, 2021. [HTTPS://WWW.RESEARCHGATE.NET/FIGURE /THE-MAKING-OF-A-SQUARE-TAKSIM-PHOTOGRAPH-TAKEN-BY-HENRI-PROST _FIG3_285136310](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/THE-MAKING-OF-A-SQUARE-TAKSIM-PHOTOGRAPH-TAKEN-BY-HENRI-PROST-FIG3_285136310)



FIGURE 1.6 The making of a square: Taksim
PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY HENRI PROST, MARCH 3, 2021. [HTTPS://WWW .RESEARCHGATE.NET/FIGURE/THE-MAKING-OF-A-SQUARE-TAKSIM -PHOTOGRAPH-TAKEN-BY-HENRI-PROST _FIG3_285136310](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/THE-MAKING-OF-A-SQUARE-TAKSIM-PHOTOGRAPH-TAKEN-BY-HENRI-PROST-FIG3_285136310)



FIGURE 1.7 Taksim barracks reconstruction project instigated by the AKP party

DILEK ERBEY, *CHANGING CITIES AND CHANGING MEMORIES: THE CASE OF TAKSIM SQUARE, ISTANBUL*, JANUARY 2017. [HTTPS://WWW.RESEARCHGATE.NET/FIGURE/TAKSIM-BARRACKS-REVITALIZATION-PROJECT-16_FIG19_322595360](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Taksim-Barracks-Revitalization-Project-16_Fig19_322595360)



FIGURE 1.8 Gezi protests in Taksim square, 2013

"TURKEY GOVERNMENT FREEZES GEZI PARK PROJECT". *BBC*. JUNE 15, 2013. [HTTPS://WWW.BBC.COM/NEWS/WORLD-EUROPE-22902308](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22902308)

centres, an opera house and a mosque. The project led to a protest from the people of Istanbul and turned into anti-government protests and riots across the country (Figure 1.8). Among their opponents were supporters of secular Turkey and other groups. The protests were brutally suppressed and the initiative to rebuild the barracks was discontinued. However, the Turkish president does not intend to abandon this initiative. In 2016, he stated: "One of the subjects that we have to be brave about is Gezi Park in Taksim. I am saying it

here once again: we will construct that historic building there.” During this speech Erdoğan also said the project might include a corner where negative episodes from German, French or American history would be displayed, as a reaction against the German Parliament’s recent approval of a bill describing the 1915 killings of Ottoman Armenians as genocide: “Those in Germany have made a statement. We will reserve a corner for them in Taksim and introduce the world to what they have done. We will also reserve a corner for the French and introduce the world [to their crimes]. We will also reserve one for the Americans and introduce them too. The world should know them all and we should all see what they have done. Those who defame this nation should see this nation there [in Taksim]. We do not have a dark history; our history is unstained. People should realize this.”¹⁸

9 Atatürk

Another person used by the AKP authorities to legitimize their power is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). He founded the Republic of Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk served as Turkey’s first president from 1923 until his death in 1938. Under his leadership, he implemented reforms that rapidly secularized and westernized the country. The role of Islam in public life shrank drastically, European-style law codes came into being, the role of the sultan was abolished and new language and dress requirements were mandated. However, although the country was nominally democratic, Atatürk at times stifled opposition with an authoritarian hand. He closed down political organizations, suppressed leftist workers’ organizations and hindered attempts at Kurdish autonomy. Moreover, the new authorities have continued the Ottoman tradition of integrating and subordinating Islam to the requirements of the state. The Kemalists accommodated Islam into their nationalist ideology instead of replacing it.¹⁹

Atatürk’s political legacy continues to have a powerful effect on the hearts and minds of modern Turks. To his followers, he is the father of the nation. They believe that by creating a secular state, he saved the country from attack by Western countries. They also see him as a reformer who defended secular values from the influence of religious leaders. However, they believe that

18 “Erdoğan vows to ‘rebuild’ Ottoman military barracks in Istanbul’s Gezi Park”. *Hurriyet*. June 18, 2016. <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-vows-to-rebuild-ottoman-military-barracks-in-istanbuls-gezi-park-100645>.

19 Umut Azak, “Secularism in Turkey as a Nationalist Search for Vernacular Islam: Ban on the Call to Prayer in Arabic (1932–1950)”. *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée* 124: 161–179.

Atatürk was not an opponent of religion, but of what he saw as all the Ottoman religious and cultural elements that limited people's secular existence. In contrast, most AKP supporters see the period of Atatürk and his successors' rule as a dark period in their lives. Islam ceased to play an important role in public life. During his rule, important institutions of Islamic religious life such as madrasas, tekke and zaviyes were closed down. In addition, Muslims were forced to change their traditions. The authorities banned polygamy and introduced certain types of Western headgear or restrictive clothing for women. Moreover, the change from the Arabic script to the Latin alphabet severed the Turks' ties with their own history.²⁰

Atatürk's legacy remains a problem for the ruling party. Some AKP politicians have been highly critical of Atatürk's policies toward Muslims. During the opening ceremony of the converted Hagia Sophia mosque in 2020, Ali Erbas, head of Turkish religious directorate Diyanet, attacked Atatürk for converting the Islamic property into a museum. However, not all supporters of the ruling party see Atatürk's legacy as bad. Attachment to the legacy of Turkey's founder is expressed by some supporters of the ruling party. This is confirmed by research conducted by A&G Research on the loyalty index of voters who voted for parties who supported Atatürk's principles and reforms. The results of this research shows that 41 percent voters for the AKP were committed to Atatürk's Principles and Revolutions.²¹

The President of Turkey is well aware that cutting the Turks off from the Atatürk tradition completely would have serious internal implications: it would lead to significant social tensions as well as an outflow of its electorate. However, some adjustments were made to avoid this. In government propaganda they present him no longer as a person limiting the religious life of Muslims, but as respecting Islam and worshipping it. Also, the events in which he took an active part acquire a completely different meaning. An interesting example of this policy is the Battle of Çanakkale. In 1919, a battle took place there, in which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk played a key role. It opened the way to the rise of the modern, secular Republic of Turkey in 1923. Since then, the city has played an extremely important role in the martyrdom of the Turkish nation. Every year approximately 1 million Turks visit the battlefields each year, and an estimated 10 per cent of the Turkish population have at some stage

20 Sule Albayrak, "Religious Pluralism and Religion-State Relations in Turkey". *MDPI*. (January 2019), 1–4.

21 "Adil Gür'den son anket: Hangi partinin seçmeni daha Atatürkçü?". *Haber 3*. November 15, 2017. <https://www.haber3.com/guncel/adil-gurden-son-anket-hangi-partinin-secmeni-daha-ataturkcu-haberi-4896751>.

engaged in some kind of martyr tourism at Gallipoli.²² The Battle of Çanakkale has been depicted for decades largely as a non-religious campaign. However, in recent years that campaign become part of the culture wars in Turkey. It became more and more popular to give these events a more Islamist interpretation. President Erdoğan has been a central figure in linking the Çanakkale campaign with Islamic conceptualisations of the Turkish nation. To mark the 102nd anniversary of the sea battle of Çanakkale, the Turkish government released a video which interpreted the conflict from a strongly Islamist perspective. It depicts Turkey's 86,000 Gallipoli dead as 'martyrs', dying in a fight against Christian invaders. During the ceremony Erdoğan said: "The crusades were not [finished] nine centuries ago in the past! Do not forget Gallipoli was a crusade". Moreover, speaking at a campaign rally in the northern town of Eregli, he also criticized New Zealand and Australia for sending troops to Turkey in the World War I Gallipoli campaign, claiming their motive was anti-Islam-oriented: "What business did you have here? We had no issues with you, why did you come all the way over here?" Erdoğan said. "The only reason is: We're Muslim, and they're Christian."²³

This narrative is primarily intended to help the president maintain a sense of threat from Western countries. This was particularly evident after the failed putsch of 2017. Since then, AKP politicians have begun comparing July 15 to the Battle of Çanakkale. According to Erdoğan, what happened in Çanakkale happened on July 15: "It is not a random choice for the traitors of FETO who attacked our country on the night of July 15 to target the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. (...) We cannot allow any power to put new shackles on the legs of our democracy. I am honored to fight side by side in this Parliament, sometimes against terrorists and sometimes against world powers".²⁴

10 Conclusions

Since the beginning of its rule, the AKP party has sought to restore Islamic values in Turkish public life. A key tool to implement this doctrine is historical

22 Brad West, Ayhan Aktar, "Anzac Day: How a more divided Turkey could change the way we think about Gallipoli." *ABC*. April 21, 2017. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-21/anzac-day-divided-turkey-islam-and-gallipoli/8461828>.

23 Suzan Franser, "Turkey's Erdogan sparks diplomatic row with NZ, Australia". *APNEWS*. March 20, 2019. <https://apnews.com/article/ankara-turkey-international-news-recep-tayyip-erdogan-australia-90ed31dc81304280b4123227c04d2113>.

24 "July 15 ceremony in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey". *The Grand National Assembly of Turkey*. July 15, 2020. https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/haber_detay/2196.

politics. To achieve this goal, Islamic politicians have been restoring the memory of historical heroes from the time of the Ottoman Empire. Among the key figures who gained particular popularity among ruling party politicians were Mehmed the Conqueror, Selim I or Suleiman the Magnificent. By promoting Ottoman heroes, the Turkish president wants to strengthen his position in a country where Ottoman nostalgia is very strong. This historical policy also helps the Turkish president to promote his image as a defender of Muslims in the world. However, bringing back the memory of these heroes has led to many social tensions in Turkey. This was particularly evident during the 2013 protests over a project to rebuild Ottoman military barracks in the Taksim square. These led to the largest protests in the country's history. President Erdoğan does not intend to abandon his plans to build a 'New Turkey'. However, those plans are not based solely on Ottoman values. He is well aware that cutting Turks off from secular principles will lead to the loss of his electorate, which is also attached to the heritage of secular Turkey. To this end, he has not tried to completely eliminate the memory of the legendary founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, but to use it to his advantage. Atatürk's legend helps him not only to reinforce anti-Western sentiment in Turkish society, but also to legitimize his power. He claims that the Republic of Turkey was a continuation of the Ottoman Empire and not its negation. It seems that in the near future Erdoğan will reinforce this policy direction. This will lead to many tensions especially with Western countries. This does not mean, however, that Erdoğan will push for the full Islamization of the country or the introduction of Sharia. This project would not be welcomed in Turkey because the president's supporters themselves are not in favor of this solution.

Bibliography

- "Adil Gür'den son anket: Hangi partinin seçmeni daha Atatürkçü?" 2017. *Haber 3*, November 15, 2017. <https://www.haber3.com/guncel/adil-gurden-son-anket-hangi-partinin-secmeni-daha-Ataturkcu-haberi-4896751>.
- Albayrak, Sule. 2019. "Religious Pluralism and Religion-State Relations in Turkey." *MDPI* 10(1): 61. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10010061>.
- Azak, Umut. 2008. "Secularism in Turkey as a Nationalist Search for Vernacular Islam: The Ban on the Call to Prayer in Arabic (1932–1950)". *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée* 124: 161–179.
- Butler, Daren, and Toksabay, Ece. 2020. "Erdoğan declares Hagia Sophia a mosque after Turkish court ruling." *Reuters*. July 10, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk>

- turkey-museum-verdict/Erdoğan-declares-hagia-sophia-a-mosque-after-turkish-court-ruling-idUKKBN24BiTI.
- Cengiz, Candar. 2015. "Erdoğan tries to rewrite history." *Al-Monitor*. May 29, 2015. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/05/turkey-Erdoğan-akp-alter-history-for-election-campaign.html>.
- Clot, André. 2012. *Suleiman the Magnificent*. London: Librairie Artheme Fayard.
- Copeaux, Étienne. 1997. *Espaces et temps de la nation turque. Analyse d'une historiographie nationaliste 1931-1993*. Paris: CNRS Éditions.
- "Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Tarihi bilmek için Payitaht Abdülhamid'i izleyin". 2017. *TRT Haber*. December 31, 2017. <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/cumhurbaskani-recep-tayyip-erdogan-tarihi-bilmek-icin-payitaht-abdulhamidi-izleyin-345026.html>.
- Dogan, Taner. 2020. *Communication Strategies in Turkey Erdoğan, the AKP and Political Messaging*. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- "Erdoğan vows to 'rebuild' Ottoman military barracks in Istanbul's Gezi Park". 2016. *Hurriyet*. June 18, 2016. <https://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/Erdoğan-vows-to-rebuild-ottoman-military-barracks-in-istanbuls-gezi-park-100645>.
- Franser, Suzan. 2019. "Turkey's Erdoğan sparks diplomatic row with NZ, Australia". *APNEWS*. March 20, 2019, <https://apnews.com/article/ankara-turkey-international-news-recep-tayyip-Erdoğan-australia-90ed31dc81304280b4123227c04d2113>.
- Haslip, Joan. 2003. *The Sultan: The Life of Abdul Hamid II*. Phoenix: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- "History is not Only the Past of a Nation, But Also the Compass of Its Future". 2018. *Presidency of the Republic of Turkey*. February 10, 2018. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/89379/history-is-not-only-the-past-of-a-nation-but-also-the-compass-of-its-future>.
- "July 15 ceremony in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey". 2020. *The Grand National Assembly of Turkey*. July 15, 2020, https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/haber_detay/2196.
- Karakaya-Stump, Ayfer. 2020. *The Kizilbash-Alevis in Ottoman Anatolia: Sufism, Politics and Community*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.
- Kujawa, Karol. 2011. *Turkey and democratization in the Arab world: between an inspiration and a model*. *PISM*. February 12, 2011. 2021, https://pism.pl/publikacje/PISM_Policy_Paper_no_12_Turkey_and_democratization_of_the_Arab_world.
- Milliyet. 2011. "Taksim'deki Gezi Parki'nda futbol stadi vardi". *Mil liyet*. April 14, 2011. <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/cadde/taksim-deki-gezi-parki-nda-futbol-stadi-vardi-1377252>.
- Rayhaber. 2020. "How Many Years Was Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge Opened? What Happened During the Construction Process?" *Rayhaber*. August 26, 2020. <https://>

en.rayhaber.com/2020/08/yavuz-sultan-selim-koprusu-kac-yilinda-acildi-yapim-surecinde-neler-yasandi/.

Siegal, Tobias. 2020. "Erdoğan: 'Jerusalem is our city, a city from us.'" *The Jerusalem Post*. October 3, 2020. <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/erdoan-jerusalem-is-our-city-a-city-from-us-644306>.

West, Brad, and Aktar, Ayhan. 2012. "Anzac Day: How a more divided Turkey could change the way we think about Gallipoli" *ABC*. April 21, 2017. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-21/anzac-day-divided-turkey-islam-and-gallipoli/8461828>.

Yenisafak. 2020. Kıbrıs halkı Mavi Vatan'da verilen mücadelenin yanında: Anket sonucu verilen çabaya büyük destek veriyor. *Yenisafak*. August 31, 2020. <https://www.yenisafak.com/foto-galeri/dunya/kibris-halki-mavi-vatanda-verilen-mucadelenin-yaninda>.

The Legacy of the Ottoman (Turkish) Age in Slovakia in the 21st Century

Gabriel Pirický

This chapter focuses on areas that represent current responses to the events that happened between approximately 1550 and 1686 in what was then, roughly speaking, the territory of Upper and Lower Hungary in Habsburg possession and is nowadays Slovakia.¹ The first part deals with current references to that period by politicians and in politically-motivated discourse at the beginning of the 21st century.² As will become clear, these references are made especially by extremist and xenophobic politicians on the right, nationalists, various conspiratory websites and amateur “experts” on history. I have deliberately omitted more positive issues from the common Ottoman – Slovak (–Hungarian) past that are not well-known by Slovaks in general and certainly not instrumentalized by politicians. At the level of local politics, I concentrate on architecture and town planning where conflicting attitudes can lead to disappointment and frustration. This was the case with the proposal of the Turkish embassy in Slovakia to erect an Ottoman fountain of friendship in the city centre of Nové Zámky, the former Ottoman seat of Uyvar province (1663–1685), which ended with its rejection by the municipal council. In the final part, the focus will be on the discussion on Islam because the Ottoman era has shaped and still shapes the perception of this religion in Slovakia in many ways. The Ottoman Turks have long been the personification of the Muslim religion itself, and in

-
- 1 More precisely the Captaincy of Lower Hungary covering roughly today’s Western and Central Slovakia (often also referred to as the Captaincy of Mining Towns, its headquarters changed several times but it was mostly located in Neuhäusel and Komorn, today’s Nové Zámky and Komárno respectively) and the Captaincy of Upper Hungary centred on Eastern Slovakia, Carpathian Ruthenia and northeastern parts of the Great Hungarian Plain (also referred to as the Captaincy of Kaschau because of its seat in the present-day city of Košice). The Habsburgs initiated the creation of the Military Border (Ger. *Militärgrenze*) along the Ottoman-Hungarian frontier that mobilized a significant part of the population in local militias. The heavily fortified and militarized frontier regions on the Habsburg side were matched by similar efforts, measures and fortresses on the Ottoman side.
 - 2 The research for this article was supported by the Slovak Agency for Research and Development under contract No. APVV-15-0030.

some local languages the expression “turn Turk” signified, not so long ago, “to convert to Islam” (Slov. *poturčit’ sa*, Hung. *törökké válni*). The demonization of Islam even by Slovak mainstream politicians during the recent migrant crisis, for example, led to the officially proclaimed willingness to accept two hundred refugees from the Middle East, but only if they were Christians.

The study will approach all these issues at the intersection of several closely related fields: religious studies, history, anthropology, and political science. I will also make some cross-references in order to compare Slovakia’s responses and references to the Ottoman legacy with those of three neighbouring countries: Hungary, Austria and the Czech Republic. The Hungarian references are especially relevant because Slovakia at that time was an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary and the territories falling under direct Ottoman rule in Slovakia are/were populated mostly by the Hungarian minority. Unlike in Slovakia, and in spite of its being the occupying force in the 16th and 17th centuries, Turkey has a positive historical image in Hungary, largely because the Ottoman Empire supported Hungarian self-determination and later provided refuge to Hungarian national heroes such as Ferenc Rákóczi II or Lajos Kossuth.³ In recent times, this “friendship” has also been conditioned by the official Hungarian policy of the “Opening to the East” and membership aspirations to the Turkic Council, an intergovernmental organization of almost all Turkic countries.⁴ Furthermore, even the Hungarian far-right *Jobbik* party switched its anti-Turkish xenophobic stance and embraced pro-Turkish attitudes.⁵

The Islamist attacks of 9/11 in the US and elsewhere, as well as the European migrant crisis beginning in 2015 have once again revived interest in the Ottoman age in Slovakia. Both events in fact confirm that the legacy of the Ottomans in Central Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries has a continuing impact

3 Although at the same time much Hungarian scholarly writing and prevailing public opinion consider the Ottoman conquest to have been the trigger for “Hungarian destruction” (Hung. *magyar romlás*) in subsequent centuries.

4 According to the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary “preserves its language, culture, traditions, respects and nurtures its Turkish roots in the modern world,” so that it is the westernmost of eastern peoples and also part of the Turkish world. Although Hungarian is a Uralic and not an Altaic (Turkic) language, the country has an observer status in the Turkic Council that was founded in 2009 (*Index* 2018). In addition, both Hungary and Turkey often refer to the former territories that they ceded after World War I as the “lost homeland.”

5 More details in Musil and Mahfoud, eds. 2013. *Jobbik* also emphasizes that Magyars are heirs of the Huns and the only Western nation with Eastern roots, although the most recent genetic and genomic research confirms that these “roots” are negligible and Hungarians are today indistinct from Western Slavs (see also Önen 2005).

on Slovak identity, culture and even politics.⁶ The confrontation with the powerful “Muslim Turk” with whom Christian Central Europeans have been engaged in historical confrontation on their own soil has left a number of concepts, stereotypes, distortions and prejudices that influence relations between Turkey and Slovakia up to this day. The events of the past are nowadays often used in a targeted way, manipulated according to current needs or instrumentalized in a variety of ways by politicians, ordinary citizens, some intellectuals and religious figures as well. The overall instability in the Middle East in the wake of the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 or the formation of the Islamic state in Syria and Iraq is a contributing factor to the issues raised in this study. In 2014, for instance, a map showed the planned future expansion of the so-called Islamic state (or caliphate) with its northern borders reaching as far as Slovakia, a fact that generated a heated debate in the Slovak tabloid press (*Čas* 2014 and *Topky* 2014).

1 Frontier Orientalism in Slovakia

Similar to Austria where the siege of Vienna in 1683 turned out to be a topic that can be easily connected to contemporary religious, cultural and political arguments, the heroic descriptions of battles with the Ottomans/Muslims in Slovakia are also used to convey various agendas and messages for immediate political purposes. The Turkish immigrant community in Vienna/Austria is often confronted with the idea of the “third siege of the Turks”, which is regularly used in a derogatory way to highlight the fact that after two military sieges of Vienna in early modern history, this time the Austrians are threatened by their own Turkish immigrant minority.⁷ The politics of memory in Slovakia is also frequently full of ethnocentrism, anti-Islamic xenophobia and

6 For the most part of the Ottoman presence in the Kingdom of Hungary, today's Slovakia was divided between regions directly occupied (but not core Ottoman *sanjaks* in Hungary) or taxed by the Turks, and most of the territory was partially subject to frequent raids by both the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars. The territory of Slovakia in fact functioned as the heartland of Habsburg Royal Hungary, one of the three parts of the divided country (the other two being Ottoman Hungary and the Principality of Transylvania). This situation changed for a couple of years in the final period (1682–84) of Ottoman presence when a new entity, the Upper Hungarian Principality (Tur. *Orta Macar*) under the Ottoman sovereignty that was created under the leadership of prince Emeric Thököly, included most of Slovakia.

7 In 2002 Kurt Krenn, then diocesan bishop of Sankt Pölten in Lower Austria, in an interview with the *Oberösterreichische Rundschau* made the deliberately provocative remark: “[...] Two Turkish sieges have already occurred, we now have the third. Now it's just taking a different route” (Ertl 2002).

various propagandistic interpretations of the past that show scant regard for the rules of professionalism, but instead feed the readers with false and self-deceptive myths.

Until now it is probably fair to say that Slovak relations with the Ottoman Turks have only rarely been the subject of theorizing (Malečková 2021, 21).⁸ Therefore, in what follows I will use the methodological concept elaborated by Andre Gingrich, an Austrian anthropologist, who studied representations and images of the Turkish-Ottoman invasions in the popular consciousness in Lower Austria, Styria and Burgenland. Drawing on Gingrich's concept of *frontier orientalism* – a complement to or a challenging variant of Edward Said's Orientalism in general – as “a relatively coherent set of metaphors and myths that reside in folk and public culture” which are not present in all parts of Europe nor in America but which dominate in countries like Austria, Hungary, Croatia or Slovakia, I propose to look closer at how the historical struggle against the Ottoman-Muslim colonizing forces has been transformed in Slovakia into a “mytho-history” that has shaped our attitudes vis-a-vis both Turks and Muslims up to the present.⁹ Moreover, the Ottoman-Turkish “other” has been widely used since the late eighteenth century also by Slovak elites, historians and writers in order to create and strengthen Slovak identity, albeit (in this case) in relation to Hungarians, Austrians, and Czechs. The Ottoman Empire alias “the Turk” has been and still is the incarnation of the hegemonic and imperialist enemy, and cultural antipathy vis-a-vis the Ottoman Turks in Slovakia is observable even in more scholarly synthetic publications. The glorification of victories against the Turks – often with Christian symbolism – served in the process of national awakening and emancipation at a time when no one in Hungary had ever met a Muslim Turk with a sabre in his hand. Today's Slovak extreme right and nationalist politicians and movements still cultivate these hostile attitudes, and various forms of nationalism, both conservative and extremist, compete in developing similar narratives. Also, according to Gingrich this “dominant confrontational version of mytho-history negates or distorts the more creative and peaceful sides of Turkish interactions with central Europe during those centuries” (Gingrich 1996, 110).

8 The Turkish image in Central European literatures has been thoroughly studied by Sabatos 2020.

9 Like Lower Austria, Styria or Hungary, Slovakia also has its famous “anti-Turkish sites” dating back to the 16th and 17th centuries: these may be demolished or ruined castles and fortresses such as Filakovo (Hung. *Füleke*), but more often they are chapels on roadsides or in villages commemorating local events during the Turkish wars, or other times it may be the head of the punished (blinded) Turk on the tower of a church, as in Pukanec in south-central Slovakia.

This essay therefore explores the methodology of Gingrich's frontier orientalism to highlight how frontier history in regions adjacent to the Muslim periphery of past times still helps Slovaks to construct both their own identity and that of their "others," often labelled as national enemies. One is tempted to say that even today the long-gone struggle against the Ottomans simply gives Slovaks, or more precisely Slovak politicians, the right to exist and mobilize for the defense of their own interests.

2 The Surrogate Motif of a Cruel and Aggressive "Muslim Turk"

One of the typical fields of anti-Turkish imagery has to do with the Turk as invader and aggressor. This theme is instrumentalized in Slovakia for instance by the extremist right-wing nationalists led by Marián Kotleba, the leader of the parliamentary neo-fascist *People's Party – Our Slovakia* (ĽS-NS). In March 2012, the party held a rally near the fire-damaged Krásna Hôrka castle in Slovakia's Košice region. Krásna Hôrka, considered one of the best-preserved medieval castles in Slovakia, was severely damaged by fire on March 10, 2012 and according to a police statement the fire broke out after two local boys, who were identified as Roma, accidentally set fire to grass on the castle hill while trying to light cigarettes. The invitation to the rally posted on the ĽS-NS party's website stated that "[W]hat the Turks didn't accomplish in the 16th century, the gypsies did in 2012" (*Slovak Spectator* 2012). Although the castle itself had not been the target of direct Ottoman attack, it is obviously true that the Turks approached the castle hill when engaged in battles or on their raids in territories around the castle.

By using the comparison between Turk and Roma, the authors expressed their deepest contempt not only for the actions of the two boys, but in fact for the life-styles of the whole gypsy community. Strong anti-Roma rhetoric in Slovakia remains widespread among all non-Roma population groups. The inhuman image of the Turk who is always aggressive and violent finds its equal in the ranks of the "problematic" Roma minority, who are nowadays mostly perceived through crime rates and inappropriate behaviour. The surrogate motif of a cruel "Muslim Turk" is used here for a flat-out rejection of gypsies as human beings, indeed in accordance with the more general opinion about Romas as the most-unwanted minority in Slovakia. This image of a horrible Turk or Roma is the exact opposite of the romanticised view Slovaks have of themselves, their historical or/and contemporary achievements.

These trends can, however, also be observed within more mainstream political circles. The current chairman of the Slovak Parliament Boris Kollár (leader

of the *SME Rodina* or WE ARE Family party) – an unmarried father of eleven children with ten different women – declared during the debate on tightening the conditions for the registration of churches and religious communities in 2017 that “with this law we are helping to protect our traditions, our roots, our civilization and our way of life. We are protecting our country and we are protecting our people, we are protecting our families. Whether some like it or not, we have Christian traditions and a Christian history in Slovakia” (*IslamOnline.sk* 2017). He also noted that Slovakia is unable to deal with the Roma people, let alone Muslims.

Analyzing anti-Turkish imagery in the 21st century in the Slovak context confirms the fact that the Ottoman Turks often appear paired both with Romas and/or – even more frequently – with Hungarians. The national perspective is present on various fronts and the bias against the “Turk” can be coupled with a distance from or hatred of everything Hungarian. An example taken from essays on Slovak history written by the tendentious historian Marián Tkáč, a former vice-governor of the National Bank of Slovakia and director of the Slovak Matica (*Slov. Matica slovenská*) – Slovakia’s prominent scientific and cultural institution –, shows that selective reading of historical events and facts, together with a lack of expertise in more theoretical issues, can result in such self-affirming statements as “[T]he Turks stayed in Central Europe for so long thanks to the collaboration and a certain admiration on the part of Hungarians – finally, when they [Hungarians] arrived in Europe during the 9th century, they were also called Turks. This did not prevent Hungarian politicians from arguing in the future that they ‘saved Europe’ several times from the Turks!” (Tkáč 2019 and Tkáč 2018).¹⁰ Tkáč even referred to the work of another xenophobic Slovak author, Július Handžárik, who accuses the Hungarian nobility of playing the role of Turkish butlers and janissaries and of waging five partisan wars in the service of Turkey. Tkáč is obviously fundamentally mistaken in giving the impression that only Hungarians collaborated with the Ottoman Turks. In addition to Hungarians, the *natio Hungarica* (noble Hungarian nation) throughout the 16th and 17th centuries included nobles and clergy of various ethnic origins, for example Slavic in the case of Croats, but also Romanians, Szeklers, Saxons or others, and a number of them took part in political, economic and military activities, including cooperation with the Ottomans. Until the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of Hungary was not a

10 Popular non-scholarly works today still often employ the kind of emotional language that was typical of the 19th-century discourse on the Ottomans. For two shining examples of Slovak frontier orientalism see also the publications by Vontorčík 2018 and Tarabčáková 2015.

national state, but a multi-ethnic imperial political unit, although for current nationalist ideologues this fact goes unnoticed. The attempt to convince the reader that being part of the Hungarian nation in early modern times meant the same thing as being its member in the 20th century is fundamentally incorrect. In the meantime, from the late 18th century onwards the process of national awakening took place in the Habsburg monarchy in addition to social and economic changes, rendering the national language perhaps the most important qualitative feature of nationality in Central Europe. The cited example raises many questions but at least one thing is certain: being mentioned alongside a Turk is a sign of evil. Needless to say, both Tkáč and Handžárik look at Turks with 20th and 21st century emotions. Moreover, they interpret political developments in the 16th and 17th century as national phenomena and often completely disregard and underestimate the spread of Reformation (and later Catholic reformation) and processes connected with confessionalism.

3 Heroic Accounts and Monuments of Battles ... and Clashes or Skirmishes?

To return to Gingrich's notion of frontier Orientalism, its main characteristic is that it "encompasses elements of Catholic folk and elite cultures that memorialize and celebrate decisive historical (medieval, early colonial, late colonial) encounters with the Muslim world in supremacist and militant forms and metaphors. Frontier orientalism is the folkloristic glorification of decisive local military victories in past times, either against Muslims or together with Muslims, but serving present nationalist purposes" (Gingrich 1996, 123).¹¹ In recent years, there has also been an increased interest especially, but not exclusively, within Slovak conservative and nationalist circles, in promoting new themes in connection with the Ottoman conquest or building memorials to commemorate the victory of "Christians over Muslims." Significant monuments were built and memorial plaques installed in at least three places in Slovakia. In the capital, Bratislava, a memorial plaque installed by unspecified Slovak military in 1998 at the entrance of the Church of Our Lady of the Snows at Bratislava's Calvary commemorates the battle of Kahlenberg that ended the second siege of Vienna on 12 September 1683 and "Christian soldiers who saved also the Slovak nation from the Ottoman yoke." A monumental equestrian

11 Also, according to Gingrich, frontier orientalism differs from classic or colonial orientalism that is exclusively a facet of elite culture, because it is more connected with both an older Catholic elite and folk culture and relates to nearby territories (Gingrich 1996, 119).

statue of Polish King John III Sobieski was erected in 2008 with the support of both the Slovak and Hungarian governments in front of the Roman Catholic church in Štúrovo (Hungarian *Párkány*) to celebrate his 1683 victory over the Turkish armies in a battle fought, together with Charles V of Lorraine, against the Ottoman pasha of Buda Kara Mehmed. Finally, the Zsitvatorok Peace Monument in Radvaň nad Dunajom, a village inhabited by the Hungarian minority on the Danube river, was unveiled in 2006 to commemorate the 1606 peace treaty between the Habsburgs and Ottomans ending the Long Turkish or Fifteen Years' War (1591/1593–1606).

Building monuments and celebrating ancient victories is a noble thing in itself provided that at least two conditions are met. First, we need to make sure that we have sufficient credible and convincing sources in our hands in order to claim that events happened as we recall them. In addition, however, we must also be clear about the message that we want to deliver to society about the past times we are commemorating, and identify who specifically presents these messages. A specific and detailed discussion can perhaps better express the situation that should be avoided. In 1652 a rarely-mentioned Ottoman-Habsburg clash took place near Veľké Vozokany (Hung. *Nagyvezekény*) in today's western Slovakia. Christian troops numbering about 900–950 men blocked the way of approximately three thousand Ottoman raiders who had gathered from various castles and garrisons. The event was not really significant in itself as the size of the military involved was rather modest and the outcome did not change the overall situation in the region. What made it outstanding has to do with the fact that as many as four members of the Esterházy noble family lost their lives in the engagement, including László Esterházy, the head of the family. The commemorative bronze lion statue – breaking the Ottoman flag and the enemy's battle ornaments – commissioned by the Esterházy family was unveiled in 1897, but in 2013 it was damaged by vandals.¹² The statue has since been renovated and was returned to its original location in 2016 and it is said to be the only surviving historic monument in Slovakia commemorating the anti-Turkish struggles of a local population. Nevertheless, the real issue here is connected with the outcome and significance of the “battle” that is expressed in differing opinions concerning its nature. Until recently the engagement was often presented in Slovakia and Hungary as a significant battle both in scholarly literature and the broader community (Bátora and Drozd 2019, 677–97).¹³ Moreover, during the last ten years in particular, since issues concerning Islam

12 As early as 1734 the Esterházy family erected an obelisk at the same location.

13 A more balanced perspective is given by Trubíni and Lieskovský 2019, 91–107. See also *Emlekhelyek.csemadok.sk* 2017.

and the flow of migrants from the Middle East have become a topic of heated debates within the broader society, the historical event in Veľké Vozokany has started to be instrumentalized once again, mostly in right-wing and nationalist circles. Nowadays the memorial serves also as a meeting point for Slovak nationalists and local xenophobes who express their determination to defend the sovereignty of the Slovak homeland and Christian values against those fellow-citizens who allegedly support the imposition of foreign values, traditions and customs upon Slovaks.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the former chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, Alojz Hlina, has also organized memorial events at Veľké Vozokany to commemorate the fact that “Europe is Christian” thanks also to the “defeat” of the Turks at this place. On the left of the political spectrum, the former presidential candidate Eduard Chmelár has also promoted the idea of an important battle near Veľké Vozokany in 1652.

In the meantime, in 2006 the Hungarian historian Zsuzsanna J. Újváry, from the Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Budapest, published an important paper that fundamentally changed our knowledge about the event, but with which most Slovaks still seem to be unfamiliar. Working with previously unknown archival documents, the author provided a detailed analysis of the Ottoman-Hungarian engagement. According to Újváry, the sources quite clearly mention that “the engagement was a raid rather than a battle in the proper sense of the word and it was the Esterházy's who exaggerated the event's significance later” (Újváry 2006, 970). Also, she underlines the fact that it was the Hungarian troops that left the field after more than three hours of fighting, after losing some 100 men compared with 500 casualties on the Ottoman side. She further raised the issue of the responsibility of Ádám Forgách, the captain of Nové Zámky city-fortress (Hung. *Érsekújvár*), who took shelter with his unit behind a barricade formed by carts, and failed to help the right and left flanks attacked by the Turks. As the Ottomans withdrew in a relatively orderly manner, collecting many of their dead and wounded and taking Ferenc Esterházy's head as a trophy, the real victory remains questionable, argued the historian. The recent field survey by Slovak archaeologists also provided very little evidence that would confirm a large clash in the area, but the research work will continue (Drozd, Neumann, and Bátor 2020).

To summarize, then, it is probably fair to state that in the folk as well as the political perception “the bronze Lion” nowadays lives a life of its own notwithstanding historical truth or scholarly criteria. Needless to say, current studies in historical anthropology reject superficial patriotic and heroic accounts of war,

14 For details see *Hlavné správy* (Main News), a Slovak internet daily which usually ranks among the pro-Russian conspiratorial medias: *Hlavné správy* 2020.

as they understand wars primarily as the hard, immediate and transforming experience of the specific people who are involved in it.

4 Changing Ottoman-Turkish Traces in Slovak Vocabulary

The heritage of Ottoman times has also left traces in the Slovak vocabulary, as evidenced by terms such as *orgován*, *kefa*, *papuče*, *čičmy* or *baklažán* (lilac, brush, slippers, boots or aubergine) which became an integral part of the Slovak vocabulary.¹⁵ One example for all is the word *janičiar* (a janissary), whose neutral historical meaning is “a member of the elite infantry army, a soldier or worshipper in a different faith,” but at the same time there is a second meaning of “a renegade, a traitor” with an emotional charge. From the 1990s, especially after the establishment of independent Slovakia in 1993, this term began to live a life of its own in the Slovak language; it was militarized and in political jargon it became firmly established in the sense of “a renegade, a traitor to one’s own nation, one’s own political party, or one’s own group.” In an environment of constant finger-pointing and vilification, or even criminalization of political opponents, this word changed into a political weapon used mainly in nationally oriented circles, especially during the governments of Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar (1992–1998). This pejorative metaphorical meaning was addressed in a short study by the distinguished Slovak linguist Slavomír Ondrejovič, who, after analyzing the Slovak press, pointed to a certain revitalization of the word *janičiar* (Ondrejovič 2004, 126–32). According to Ondrejovič, the meaning “a soldier or worshipper of a different faith” receded completely and instead the meaning “enemy, traitor and defector from one’s own camp” came to the fore. In this form, according to Ondrejovič, the word *janičiar* nowadays contains something sacred in itself and has turned into an uncompromising expression of condemnation of the adversary as the greatest enemy of the opposite political camp, one who, in addition, has betrayed his own group or party. If we compare Slovak with other languages, we find that many of them – for example English, French, Russian, Italian, but also Hungarian – distinguish in principle only the historical meaning of the word janissary. In Slovak political slang, however, the word *janičiar* could currently

15 However, Ottoman Turkish often mediated words of Persian or Arabic origin into the south-Slavic or Hungarian vocabularies in particular. The Hungarian or Serbian (Bosnian, Croatian) languages have had a great importance as intermediary languages for Slovak linguistic borrowings.

be substituted by other synonyms: Judas, *quisling*, Iago, defector or secessionist (Ondrejovič 2004, 127–28).

The Ottoman occupation is still associated in scholarly literature, not to mention among politicians or amateur historians, with the frequent use of emotionally charged terminology that is not common when writing about other religious communities or ethnic and national groups. We may also allude to the titles of widely used scholarly monographs on the Ottoman Turks in the Slovak language to suggest that the Ottomans represent a permanent danger even one hundred years after the demise of the Ottoman Empire: *The Looting Turks (Rabovali Turci)*, *The Turkish Danger and Slovakia (Turecké nebezpečenstvo a Slovensko)*, *Slovakia in the Shadow of the Crescent (Slovensko v tieni polmesiaca)* and others (Horváth 1972; Kopčan 1986; and Kopčan and Krajčovičová 1983).

The use of the collective “*Turek*” (the Turk) instead of the plural “*Turci*” (Turks) to denote the Ottomans or someone synonymous with cruelty can be considered almost harmless (although it is an expression of contempt and aversion), but the frequent use of terms such as *horda* and/or *poroba* (horde and servitude, Ger. *die Horde* and *die Knechtschaft*) clearly distinguishes works on Ottoman Turks from any other actor in military confrontations with the local population, perhaps with the exception of the Tatars, Huns and Old Hungarians, who are mainly connected with the Early or High Middle Ages. At the same time however, the adjective “Turkish” – though never Ottoman – is associated in Slovak phraseology with various contrasting images of Turks, with both positive and negative meanings. It is sufficient to browse through the most famous collection of Slovak proverbs and sayings by Adolf Peter Záturecký to confirm this: You are as strong as the Turk at the castle of Uyvar (*Si silný ako Turek pri ufvárskom hrade*), Is the Turk running at your heels? (*Čo ti Turek beží za päťami?*), Smokes like a Turk (*Smolí ako Turek*), A Turkish renegade is worse than a Turk (*Poturčenec horší Turka*), Greets like a Turk (*Zdraví ako Turek*) and similar (Záturecký 1975). Finally, the widespread saying that “[W]henever the Turk robs our Hungarian land, /twice as much as the Turk, the German tortures it” is a notable example of this complexity.

There are also some rare instances when the “Turk” is considered to be useful, at least in some aspects. Slovak nationalist and patriotic circles, including amateur “experts” on history, give credit to the Ottoman Turks generally only in two cases: either when they highlight passages from Ottoman sources mentioning Slovaks as a distinct ethnic group or when they emphasize that migration movements as a consequence of the Ottoman occupation changed the national composition of northern Hungary in favour of the Slovak ethnic

group.¹⁶ Some politicians – e.g. Eduard Chmelár – follow the example of the Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi and quote him mentioning the Slovak people as *tot kavmi* (speaking about the land they inhabit as *tot vilayeti* or Slovak country)¹⁷ in his Book of Travels (*Seyahatname*).¹⁸

5 Remembering ... but not with My Enemy

In an international context suspicious feelings and widespread anti-Muslim attitudes sometimes harm even good intentions in the area of architecture and urban planning. An example concerns the town of Nové Zámky in south-western Slovakia that developed around an anti-Ottoman fortress on the site of an older settlement between 1573–1581. The huge new fortress was one of the most modern in Europe when it was built, a prime example of the star fortress which was considered to be adapted to the advances in artillery. Between 1589 and 1663 the fortress was the seat of the Captaincy of Lower Hungary. The Ottomans captured the fortress in 1663, and soon they turned it into the seat of the newly established Uyvar *vilayet* and it remained in their hands until 1685 when it was re-conquered by the Habsburgs. It should also be mentioned that during World War II the town was heavily damaged by Allied bombing and virtually all its historic buildings were damaged to such an extent that they had to be demolished leaving almost no traces of its tumultuous past.

-
- 16 It is probably fair to say that the Turkish threat strengthened patriotic loyalties and ethnic bonds in early modern Slovakia. In addition, Slovak mainstream historians never fail to emphasize that as a consequence of the Ottoman occupation, migration movements changed the national composition of Upper Hungary in favour of the Slovak ethnic group (Kopčan and Krajčovičová 1983, 7). In spite of this, among Hungarian historians, politicians and the wider Hungarian public this opinion is matched by a widespread consensus that the defeat at the battle of Mohács (1526) and the subsequent period of Ottoman rule caused huge losses mainly among the Hungarian population while at the same time ethnic minorities including the Slovaks gained ground. The famous Hungarian historian, the late Ferenc Szakály, in his article “Turkish roots of Trianon” (Hung. *Trianon török kori gyökerei*) – the peace treaty after WWI that split up the historical Kingdom of Hungary into successor states – summarized the widespread view that Mohács contributed to Trianon (Szakály 1990). Pál Fodor argues that it is “not without reason that some people detect in this period the roots of Hungary’s post-World War I dismemberment” (Fodor 2013, 407).
- 17 Although today outdated and derogatory, the word *tót* (pl. *tótok*) signified *Slovak*, *Slavon* and/or *Slovenian* in Hungarian well into the 20th century and that is why the Ottomans also used the term.
- 18 Evliya Çelebi *Seyahatnamesi* 2017, 161, 294, 295, 337, 338, 345 (see also Çelebi 1978, 191). The Slovaks were also sometimes called “Croats” (Tur. *horvatlar*) by the Ottomans and, together with Protestants (*kalvinlar*), they had been considered as leading anti-Habsburg groups in *Orta Madjar* (Veselá 1977, 21–22, 24).

In December 2019 the Turkish embassy in Slovakia offered to pay for the construction of a fountain on Majzon Square in Nové Zámky as a gesture of Slovak-Turkish friendship. The fountain with a height of 4.3 metres and costing 100,000 euros was planned to be built in the style of classical Ottoman architecture with marble cladding placed on a reinforced concrete frame. One of the facades of the building was to bear a verse from the Qur'an, mentioning pure water as the gift of God. According to Mayor Otokar Klein, the idea of giving Nové Zámky a gift had been suggested by the Turkish ambassador after visiting the city. "The gift was supposed to be a symbol that the Turkish side was aware of what their predecessors had done in our city. It was just a gesture by which they wished to express compassion and an apology for what went on here for 22 years," explained the mayor. Ladislav Borbély, a member of the local council, came up with a proposal to accept the 100,000 euros from the Turkish embassy, but he suggested building another symbol of Slovak-Turkish friendship for this money (Pastorek 2019). The city council, however, rejected the idea of the fountain as none of the deputies actually voted for it.

Subsequently, in addition to hardline supporters of the council's rejection, some forum members on the website of the SME daily newspaper commented on the event by pointing out the positive aspects of the Turkish offer: "I don't think such a gift should be refused. The council could consult with experts, they could so to speak negotiate with the Turks on the form, size of the fountain, the place and manner of its installation. They could involve citizens in the debate," argued someone under the pseudonym *sinepko*. "After Nové Zámky fell to the Ottomans, Christian soldiers were free to leave to Komárno and when the city was recaptured [twenty years later] by the Austrian emperor, it wasn't quite like that ..." added *sinepko*. In an attempt to compare Slovak and Hungarian praxis, the discussant Martin Droppa added: "... After all, go and see, for instance the purely Christian Hungary, go to the spa town of Eger – there is an ancient minaret and many buildings and monuments from the time of the Turks. The minaret and monuments serve as a tourist attraction, together with thermal waters." Notwithstanding similar opinions, the rejection has to be seen as a missed opportunity for a mutual rapprochement.

6 The Ottoman – Muslim Conjunction

Although the Kingdom of Hungary never experienced complete economic, legal and social control by the Ottomans, not even on territories occupied by the Turks, let alone any widespread Islamization, military clashes and wars along the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier brought much suffering and destruction and many casualties. In the early modern period, Central Europe had to defend

itself against the Ottoman-Muslim colonization project until the end of the 17th century, and this struggle against Istanbul's imperial plans also shaped the religious and ethnic identity of the Hungarian kingdom's ethnic groups (Slovaks, Hungarians, Germans, Croats, etc.) in the context of military and cultural resistance against the Ottoman armies.¹⁹ Central Europe simply experienced little of what is sometimes referred to in the Turkish narrative as *Pax Ottomanica*. The perception of Islam in the region is until today still marked by this unfortunate Ottoman-Turkish heritage that brought devastation and looting even to unoccupied borderland regions in Slovakia (Pirický 2013, 108–29).

Terms such as Muslim or Islam were unknown during the conflicts with the Ottomans, and the most common way of referring to the “exotic and foreign” faith was to call it the “Turkish creed.” Even in the nineteenth century, such terms as “Muslim” and “Turk” were quite frequently used synonymously throughout the region. In archaic Slovak or Czech, a person who converted from Christianity to Islam was often called a “*poturčenec*” (Turkish convert, renegade). Those who converted were considered to be “worse than a Turk” (Slov. *poturčenec horší od Turka*), which is a proverb still common in the Slovak language today.

In a somewhat bizarre twist, in 2016 the chairman of the Slovak National Party, Andrej Danko, came up with the idea that “Islamization starts with the kebab,” which is sold mostly by Turks in Slovakia (Kysel' 2016 and Chovanec 2017).²⁰ At a press conference on the “threat of Islamization in Europe,” the party chief promised that if his party entered parliament, it would try to push through three measures: a ban on the construction of mosques and minarets, a ban on burqas and the tightening of conditions for the registration of new religious communities and churches. All that in a country where the capital, Bratislava, is the last one in the EU without a single mosque.

Indeed, as Gingrich argued, in “frontier orientalism the metaphoric Oriental is first of all Muslim” and as Muslim it has to be naturally seen as an eternal enemy (Gingrich 1996, 120). In 2017, Dominik Duka, the archbishop of Prague, in an interview for the Slovak conservative journal *Postoj* (Attitude) when

19 Note that contrary to claims made by the post-colonial theorist Edward Said, author of *Orientalism* (Said 1978), who came up with the idea that there was only one kind of “Orientalism”, in the early modern period the image of the Orient and Islam in Central Europe did not justify colonial expansion, but on the contrary served as a means of preserving one's own existence and cultural identity by opposing the colonial project embodied essentially by the “Oriental Empire” on the Bosphorus.

20 There are about 5,000 Muslims in Slovakia according to *pewforum.org* 2017. “Europe's growing Muslim population”, November 29, 2017. <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/>.

responding to the question why he so openly talks about Islam when there is not even a significant Muslim minority living in the Czech Republic, argued: “Because it is our duty. We are a part of the world that has encountered the world of Islam. From the Middle Ages up to the 19th century we were part of the world that directly encountered states that professed Islam. Just before the battle of Vienna in 1683 a Franciscan preacher said that if we do not win, we are going to become slaves. He knew it. We also have this experience” (Daniška 2017). The archbishop then added that local experience with Nazism had been much more profound and grievous than the experience of fascism in Western Europe. Finally, he recalled the experience of Central Europeans with communism which was again unique and the West had not had to face this problem either, argued Duka. Therefore, according to Duka, it is “our duty to help the West ... because they are prisoners.” Consequently, as we can see, Muslims and Ottomans in extremist and ultra-conservative thinking are always in bad company, here lumped together with the Nazis and Communists. Paradoxically, the Czech lands had only very limited direct experience of Ottoman-Muslim plundering on their territory (in south-eastern Moravia).

We could quote many other examples that reveal how the events of the past connected with the Ottoman Turks are manipulated according to current needs, but two will suffice. The former dissident and Christian democrat František Mikloško (ex-chairman of the Slovak parliament) posed a rather xenophobic question several years ago when he asked what was the good of Vienna in 1683 if we are inviting the Turks here again (Chmelár 2005). In a similar spirit, the Slovak National Party MP Anton Hrnko claimed that Slovakia does not have to accept refugees, as French President Emmanuel Macron wishes, and he also used the Turkish threat as an argument: “It is written on the shield of the Ottoman warrior: We will conquer you. On the shield of the Slovak warrior there is the inscription: We will not give up. Yes, we will not allow anyone to force us to deny our entire previous history,” concluded Hrnko, who is a historian by profession, when conflating the Ottomans with the migration crisis after 2015 (*Parlamentné listy* 2017).

7 Concluding Remarks

I have taken contemporary references mostly from radical politics on national and local levels, debates on history and theorizing on the political right in order to show how the Ottoman/Islamic presence in the early modern period still influences life in Slovakia and beyond. Although many of these issues, arguments and discourses exist also without political instrumentalization, I have

focused on those that are “attractive” to certain politicians, jingoist undercurrents and extremist authors. We have seen that nationalism and xenophobia are patrons of the frontier orientalism that resides in Christian folk and elitist public culture.²¹ Some researchers even say that the convergence between cultures which began in the 20th century has now terminated, and medieval topoi are once again predominant. Though nowadays the Ottoman Empire in Central Europe represents a distant past, the examples mentioned in this essay show that the Ottomans of yesterday are easily associated with today’s Turks and the Turkish Republic established in 1923. In stark contrast with the contemporary Turkey of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan where the politics of neo-Ottomanism presents an almost exclusively positive reading of the Ottoman past and ignores darker issues and periods of Turkish history, the Slovak legacy of the Ottoman age seems to confine itself generally to negative aspects, thus reviving old fears of Muslim Turks (Yavuz 2020, 239).

Bibliography

- Bátora, Jozef, and Dominik Drozd. 2019. “Bojisko pri Veľkých Vozokanoch – poznatky a perspektívy ďalšieho výskumu.” *Archaeologia historica* 44, no. 2: 677–97.
- Chmelár, Eduard. 2005. “Netvárame sa, že Turecko leží v Európe.” *SME blog*, October 5, 2005. <https://chmelar.blog.sme.sk/c/22098/Netvarme-sa-ze-Turecko-lezi-v-Europe.html>.
- Chovanec, Štefan. 2017. “Odporca islamu Milan Mazurek: Cez deň bojuje proti moslimom, na večeru si odskočí do tureckej reštaurácie.” *Hospodárske noviny*, February 1, 2017. <https://slovensko.hnonline.sk/904084-odporca-islam-milan-mazurek-cez-den-bojuje-proti-moslimom-na-veceru-si-odskoci-do-tureckej-restauracie>.
- Čas. 2014. “Islamisti si brúsiť zuby aj na Slovensko! Čo nám reálne hrozí?” (Islamists have their eye on Slovakia! What actually threatens us?). September 28, 2014. <https://www.cas.sk/clanom/294741/islamisti-si-brusia-zuby-aj-na-slovensko-co-nam-realne-hrozi.html>.
- Čelebi, Evliya. 1978. *Kniha ciest. Cesty po Slovensku*, edited by Vojtech Kopčan. Bratislava: Tatran.
- Daniška, Jaroslav. 2017. “Kardinál Duka: Zvítazíme alebo budeme otrokmi.” *Konzervatívny denník Postoj*, April 2, 2017. <https://svetkrestanstva.postoj.sk/22576/kardinal-duka-zvitazime-alebo-budeme-otrokmi>.

21 Paradoxically, the Ottoman era had only a small influence on the cultural identity of today’s Slovakia, although in the area of sixteenth and seventeenth century politics or confessionalism the Ottoman influence was significant. See also Dobrovits and Ōze 2021.

- Dobrovits, Mihály, and Sándor Óze. 2021. *Ottoman rule in Hungary and the knowledge of Islam during the second half of the sixteenth century and the first three decades of the seventeenth century*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag and Budapest: Szent István Társulat.
- Drozd, Dominik, Martin Neumann and Jozef Bátora. 2020. "Contribution of Archaeological Prospection to the Research of an Early Modern Battlefield near Velké Vozokany." August, 2020. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343979433_Contribution_of_Archaeological_Prospection_to_the_Research_of_an_Early_Modern_Battlefield_near_Velke_Vozokany.
- Emlekhelyek.csemadok.sk*. 2017. "Nagyvezekényi Esteházy-emlékmű (Vezekényi orosz-lán)." December 28, 2017. <https://emlekhelyek.csemadok.sk/emlekhelyek/nagyvezekenyi-esterhazy-emlekmu-vezekenyi-oroszlan/>.
- Ertl, Josef. 2002. "Die dritte Türkenbelagerung." *Oberösterreichische Rundschau*, August 18, 2002. http://bischof-krenn.stjosef.at/index.htm?islam_ooe_rundschau_18082002.htm~mainFrame.
- Evllya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*. 2017. 7. cilt, 2. kitap. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
- Fodor, Pál. 2013. "Hungary between East and West: The Ottoman Turkish Legacy." In *More MODOQUE. Die Wurzeln der europäischen Kultur und deren Rezeption im Orient und Okzident: Festschrift für Miklós Maróth zum siebzigsten Geburtstag*, edited by Pál Fodor, Gyula Mayer, Martina Monostori, Kornél Szovák and László Takács, 399–419. Budapest: Argumentum Kiadó and MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont.
- Gingrich, Andre. 1996. "Frontier Myths of Orientalism: The Muslim World in Public and Popular Cultures of Central Europe." In *Mediterranean Ethnological Summer School*, edited by Bojan Baskar and Borut Brumen, 99–127. Piran: Institut za multi-kulturne raziskave.
- Hlavné správy*. 2020. "V nedel'u sa pri pamätniku víťaznej bitky pri Vozokanoch stretnú národovci, ktorí chcú, aby Slovensko bolo prosperujúce a slobodné." February 12, 2020. <https://www.hlavnespravy.sk/nedelu-sa-pri-pamatniku-vitaznej-bitky-pri-vozokanoch-stretnu-narodovci-ktori-chcu-aby-slovensko-prosperujuce-slobodne/2050073>.
- Horváth, Pavel. 1972. *Rabovali Turci: výber z kroník a listov zo 16. a 17. storočia*. Bratislava: Tatran.
- Index*. 2018. "Türk rokonokkal építi Orbán az új világréndet." September 5, 2018. https://index.hu/kulfold/2018/09/05/orban_viktor_kirgizisztanban.
- IslamOnline.sk*. 2017. "Poslanec, ktorý si hovorí posledný križiak, navrhol na Slovensku zakázať mešity." February 9, 2017. <http://www.islamonline.sk/2017/02/poslanec-ktory-si-hovori-posledny-kriziak-navrhol-zakazat-na-slovensku-mesity/>.
- Kopčan, Vojtech and Klára Krajčovičová. 1983. *Slovensko v tieni polmesiaca*. Martin: Osveta.
- Kopčan, Vojtech. 1986. *Turecké nebezpečenstvo a Slovensko*. Bratislava: VEDA.

- Kysel, Tomáš. 2016. "Začína sa to kebabom, vyhlásil Danko. Šéf SNS chystá bič na moslimov." *aktuality.sk*, October 4, 2016. <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/378223/zacina-to-kebabom-vyhlasil-danko-sef-sns-chysta-bic-na-moslimov/>.
- Malečková, Jitka. 2021. *"The Turk" in the Czech Imagination (1870s–1923)*. Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- Musil, Pelin Ayan, and Juraj Mahfoud, eds. 2013. *Public Portrayal of Turkey in Visegrad Countries: The Visegrad Report*. Prague: Anglo-American University.
- Ondrejovič, Slavomír. 2004. "Janičiar v historickom a metaforickom kontexte." In *Jazyk v komunikácii*, edited by Sibyla Mislovičová, 126–32. Bratislava: Veda.
- Önen, Niyaz. 2005. *İki Turan: Macaristan ve Türkiye'de Turancılık*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Parlamentné listy*. 2017. "Hrnko sa pustil do Macrona pre migrantov: Nie, my nemusíme nič! Takúto historickú skúsenosť s islamom má Slovensko." June 24, 2017. <https://www.parlamentnelisty.sk/arena/213084/hrnko-sa-pustil-do-macrona-pre-migrantov-nie-my-nemusime-nic-takuto-historicku-skusenost-s-islamom-ma-slovensko/>.
- Pastorek, Miroslav. 2019. "Turecká fontána v Nových Zámkoch nebude, nik z poslancov ju nechcel." *MY*, December 18, 2019. <https://mynovezamky.sme.sk/c/22286194/nove-zamky-turecka-fontana-v-meste-nebude.html>.
- Pirický, Gabriel. 2013. "The Ottoman Age in Southern Central Europe as Represented in Secondary School History Textbooks in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia." *Journal of Educational Media, Memory and Society* 5, no. 1: 108–29.
- Sabatos, Charles D. 2020. *Frontier Orientalism and Turkish Image in Central European Literature*. Lanham-Boulder-New York-London: Lexington Books.
- Slovak Spectator*. 2012. "Right-wing extremists rally at Krásna Hôrka and in Bratislava." March 19, 2012. <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20042882/right-wing-extremists-rally-at-krasna-horka-and-in-bratislava.html>.
- Szakály, Ferenc. 1990. "Trianon török kori gyökerei." *regi.tankonyvtar.hu*. <https://regi.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/historia/90-03/cho2.html>.
- Tarabčáková, Edita. 2015. *Dejiny Uhorska trochu inak: demystifikácia maďarsko-tureckých vzťahov*. Bratislava: Eko-konzult.
- Tkáč, Marián. 2018. *Neznámy slovenský príbeh*. Martin: Vydavateľstvo Matice slovenskej.
- Tkáč, Marián. 2019. "37. Časť Neznámych slovenských dejín: Imrich Tököli škodil Slovensku i Európe." *Hlavné správy*, April 21, 2019. <https://www.hlavnespravy.sk/37-cast-neznamych-slovenskych-dejin-imrich-tokoli-skodil-slovensku-europe/1733095>.
- Topky*. 2014. "Islamskí militanti zverejnili plán na globálnu expanziu: chcú ovládnuť územie až po Slovensko!" (Islamic militants published their plan for global expansion: they want to control territories all the way to Slovakia!). June 30, 2014. <https://www.topky.sk/cl/11/1407353/Islamski-militanti-zverejnili-plan-na-globalnu-expanziu-Chcu-ovladnut-uzemie-az-po-Slovensko->.

- Trubíni, Luboš, and Tibor Lieskovský. 2019. *História cisárskej pevnosti Vráble*. Vráble: FONTIS.
- Újváry, Zsuzsanna J. 2006. "De valamíg ez világ fennáll, mindennek szép koronája fennáll! A vezekényi csata és Esterházy László halála." *Hadtörténelmi közlemények* 119, no. 4: 943–72.
- Veselá, Zdenka. 1977. "Slovensko a osmanská expanze v 16. a 17. stol." In *Osmanská moc ve střední a jihovýchodní Evropě v 16.–17. století 1*, 8–54. Praha: Československo-sovětský institut ČSAV.
- Vontorčík, Emil. 2018. *Bitka pri Viedni 1683*. Nitra: Sobor.
- Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2020. *Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism*. Oxford: OUP.
- Zátarecký, Adolf Peter. 1975. *Slovenské príslovia, porekadlá a úslovía*. Bratislava: Tatran.

Islamophobia, Orientalism and “Jihadist Radicalisation” in the TV Series *El Príncipe* (2014–2016)

Carlos Yebra López

1 Propagandistic Discourses on “Jihadist Terrorism” in Contemporary Spain¹

The concept “jihad” derives its meaning from the third Arabic form of the trilateral root j-h-d, which denotes a struggle or an effort. What sets “jihad” apart from other forms of exertion and combat (e.g. *qital* -fighting-, *harb* -war-) is the fact that by definition, “jihad” implies a struggle in the path of God (*fi sabil Allah*) (Firestone 2002; Albarrán 2018; Bonner 2008). The way such exertion is articulated admits a whole continuum of possibilities, ranging from the deployment of violent, even military means (“lesser jihad” -*al-jihad al-asghar*-) to that of moral and spiritual betterment (“greater jihad” -*al-jihad al-akbar*-). It follows from this that there is no such thing as the doctrine of “jihad”, but rather a plurality of normative practices related to jihad whose capaciousness and diversity greatly exceeds doctrinal and juridical discourses on it, thus showing that these are neither the only nor the defining elements of “jihad” as meaningfully Islamic (Balbale 2014, 98, 102; Ahmed 2015, 444). Nevertheless, the understanding of “jihad” as a militaristic enterprise is predominant in both the origins of Islam,² and also in doctrinal and popular discourse (Streusand 1997; Esposito 2003). This is also the conceptualisation of “jihad” that underlies *El Príncipe*. From this perspective, and following the iconic attacks of 9/11, “jihadist terrorism” has come to refer both in public discussion and practice to a widespread form of modern warfare against liberalism. This contemporary trend is often referred to by conservatives as “modern jihadism” (Harris and Nawaz 2015, 42, 102) and “global jihad” (Harris and Nawaz 2015, 115).

1 In line with critical scholarship on terrorism (see Jackson 2016, 103), in this chapter, I will use inverted commas to underscore that the meaning of “jihad(ist)”, “(counter)terrorism” and “radicalisation” is not self-evident, but discursively mediated.

2 See Ahmed 2015, 317; Albarrán 2018, 138.

In Spain, to which “jihadist terrorists” often refer as “Al-Andalus”,³ this essentialism allows the State and mainstream media to reduce local “jihadist terrorism” to a security concern to be monitored and neutralised as part of the so-called “(Global) War on Terror” (De Arístegui 2006; Torres Soriano 2009; Reinares 2014; López Bargados 2016). According to this narrative, in Spain “modern global jihad” peaked shortly after 2003 when then-President Jose María Aznar made the highly controversial decision to involve Spain in the US invasion of Iraq. However, it did not take long for Al-Qaeda to retaliate against Spanish civilians via the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which yielded 2,050 non-fatal injuries and 192 deaths. These attacks redefined Spain’s overall security and defence strategy against “jihadist terrorism”, increasing its related staff and profiling, toughening the Spanish penal code and raising its “counter-terrorist” alert to level 4 out of 5 (*Ministerio del Interior* 2015). However, this process did not prevent an increase in “jihadist terrorist” activities in Spain, culminating in the 2017 Barcelona attacks carried out by ISIS.

The ideological reduction of Spanish “jihadism” to a security concern to be monitored and neutralised as part of the “Global War on Terror” has served to advance State surveillance and Spanish nationalism while depoliticising local “jihadist terrorist” attacks. First, it has allowed the Spanish State to overstate its attributions in a globalised context where these have shrunk, thus manufacturing a new social consensus that can then be instrumentalised for surveillance and compliance purposes (Anholt 2011; Reinares 2014). Key to this effort is the chauvinist framing of the Spanish nation as the “Good” and the “Us” within the theological and anthropological binary “Good/Us vs Evil/Them” (Brown 2017). As part of the latter, the Spanish State has dehumanised the Arab-Muslim Other as a permanent threat to an otherwise successful State, thus perpetuating its oligarchic structures while instituting a new strand of Orientalism, understood as the distorting stereotypes through which the white West observes the East, thus rendering the latter servile to the imperialistic interest of the former (Said 1978, 26–7). This new Orientalism conceptualises Spanish “jihadist terrorism” as a problem of public order, focusing the attention on the “jihadists” alleged rampant psychopathologies (Torres Soriano 2009), which in turn facilitates the disavowal of Spain’s (neo)colonial record and responsibilities (López Bargados 2016, 18).

3 Originally denoting medieval Iberia under Islamic rule (711–1492), for “jihadist terrorists”, its contemporary “reconquest” appears as a moral duty towards the consolidation and prosperity of an eventual universal caliphate (Torres Soriano 2009).

1.1 *What is “Jihadist Radicalisation”, Anyway?*

Based on the above, the contemporary label “jihadist radicalisation” is predicated on the reduction of “jihad” to “jihadist terrorism” against the “Western infidel”. In this context, “radicalisation” (neither irreversible nor necessarily conducive to “terrorism”) emerged as a mainstream term after the publication of a 2007 New York Police Department report called *Radicalization in the West*. The process known as “jihadist radicalisation” is best understood as a form of ideological recruitment by which an individual comes to accept the behaviour and beliefs that are characteristic of “jihadist terrorism”. According to Harris and Nawaz, “jihadist terrorist radicalisation” relies upon four elements: a grievance narrative (whether real or perceived), an identity crisis, a charismatic recruiter and an ideological dogma (“jihadist terrorism”). First, there is a specific grievance narrative, combined with an identity crisis. Second, upon recruitment by a charismatic leader, this narrative is fossilised by ideological dogma, whereas the identity crisis is alleviated by tribalism (i.e., high in-group loyalty happening at the expense of out-group hostility). Finally, those recruited embrace this dogma and adopt its propaganda to express themselves (Harris and Nawaz 2015, 10–11, 58).

In Spain, the most common profile of a recruited “jihadist terrorist” during the 2004-to-2016 period (while *El Príncipe* was recorded and aired) was a male under 30 years old who had been radicalised at home, on the internet, at his local mosque or in prison, for an average period of four to five years. Madrid, Catalonia, Valencia and Ceuta stood out as hotspots of “jihadist terrorist” recruitment and radicalisation (García-Calvo and Reinares 2013).

2 *El Príncipe: Amor sin Frontera*

El Príncipe: Amor sin Frontera (2014–6) is a hit crime fiction and soap opera that owes its title to the homonymous neighbourhood where the TV series is set, which lies in the south of the Spanish exclave city of Ceuta in northwest Africa. Easily discernible by its iconic, favela-like orography, *El Príncipe* stands as a (post)colonial remnant of Spain’s encroachment on Africa with 20,000 inhabitants, the overwhelming majority of whom are Arab Muslims.

Mohamed Laachiri (2012) showed that since the 1960s, *El Príncipe* has experienced a steady decline and deterioration, mired in petty crime, drug dealing, unemployment and more recently, “jihadist terrorist radicalisation”. Already in 2002, local Hamed Abderraman Ahmed claimed that “We are the forgotten ones. Not even the police dare to enter” [“*Somos los olvidados. Aquí no se atreve a entrar ni la policía*”] (as cited in Rodríguez 2015).

The TV series *El Príncipe* is best understood against this background. It spans two seasons for a total of 31 episodes, and its plot can be roughly summarised as follows:

- (i) The Spanish National Centre of Intelligence (CNI) has detected a "jihadist terrorist" cell, and now seeks to identify its local recruiters as a means of dismantling the cell in question: "We have confirmed the presence of a jihadist cell that is recruiting disaffected youngsters from El Príncipe neighbourhood, to turn them into suicide bombers (...) the goal is to identify the collaborators and deactivate the cell" [*Hemos confirmado la presencia de una célula yihadista que está captando a jóvenes descontentos del Barrio de El Príncipe, en Ceuta, para convertirlos en terroristas suicidas (...) el objetivo es identificar a los colaboradores y desactivar la célula*].]
- (ii) The mission leader is CNI agent Javier Morey, a secular, fit and bold young man who stands for Spain's postcolonial modernity. Shortly after landing in El Príncipe, Morey meets Fátima Ben Barek, the Orientalist embodiment of a green-eyed, slender Arab Muslim woman. When they first exchange glances, intense sexual chemistry ensues, as if both had met in a previous life. This tension operates as symbolic déjà vu of the Christian conquest of al-Andalus and the parallel onset of Spanish African colonialism. As Daniela Flesler has noted through Shahab Ahmed, "the recognition of an Other as a stranger (...) is constituted through an encounter in the present that reopens past encounters" (2008, 117).
- (iii) Morey and Fátima's sincere and desperate romantic desire for each other is held back by the repressive, backward forces of Muslim patriarchy and its prohibition of interfaith marriage. Fátima's older brother, Faruq, is a major drug dealer, while her younger siblings (Abdessalam and Nayat) get recruited by the local "jihadist terrorist" cell called *Akrab*. In addition, Fátima's family forces her to enter into an arranged marriage with her cousin, French Arab Muslim named Khaled Assour. While presenting himself as a successful businessman, Assour is actually the leader of *Akrab*.

As remarked by Flesler, the evocations of Moorish spectres in contemporary Spain serve a dual purpose, namely:

They symptomatically alert us to the openness of the past, how it is not solved (...) At the same time, the convocation of these ghosts attempts to dilute the most troubling ramifications of the past regarding the Arab identity of Spain, positing 'Moors' not as an intrinsic aspect of this identity but in a definable space of otherness (...) (2008, 124).

- (iv) Eventually, Morey manages to unmask Fátima's husband as the leader of *Akrab*, and also as a stereotypically repressive wife-beating Muslim, both of which are blatant Islamophobic tropes.
- (v) Morey and Khaled fight over Fátima, conceptualised as the trophy woman of neocolonialism (whether Spanish/secular or French/Muslim). In the end, Morey survives, but both Khaled and Fátima die. In other words, Spanish modernity prevails over both its enemies and its ultimate object of (neocolonial) desire.

While there has not been any comprehensive scholarly analysis of *El Príncipe*, the most relevant precedent is perhaps a brief article written by Yasmina Aidi in 2015 and published shortly after the first few episodes were aired. Aidi focuses on the extent to which this series reproduces and consolidates various forms of racist and sexist stereotyping while further contributing to the othering of Spanish Muslims. She makes the following claims:

- (a) The romance between the main characters (mainland Spanish Morey and Spanish Muslim Fátima) “recycles (...) vulgar, racist fantasies that white men have of Arab women”.
- (b) The casual use of the term “*moro*” (“Moor”) is racist and factually inaccurate.
- (c) The producers make it look as if all Muslims are potential “terrorists”.
- (d) Muslim men are portrayed as “domineering (...) patriarchs”.
- (e) The series is not well-researched.
- (f) The series “makes no effort to understand why youth may gravitate to gangs or religious extremism”.

Whereas I agree entirely with Aidi's central claim that *El Príncipe* “is perpetuating dangerous stereotypes” (e.g., Orientalism, Islamophobia), charges (c) to (f) are unwarranted. First, while there is too close an association between Islam and “terrorism”, not all Muslims are depicted as potential “terrorists”. This is evidenced by characters such as Hassan (Fátima's father) or the local imam, both sincere and vocal moderate Muslims who consistently oppose and condemn violence in general and “jihadist terrorism” in particular. Their anti-Islamophobic messages, which are particularly recurring in the second season, are compounded by the late appearance of Samy, a Muslim policeman whose parents were killed by the perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid bombings.

Second, despite the existence of apparent inaccuracies and prejudiced falsities, the TV series is on the whole well-researched. *El Príncipe*'s scriptwriter visited the homonymous neighbourhood several times before starting its fictional rendering (Rubio 2014). The settings, local institutions, traditions, costumes and prayers of the characters, plus the different divisions within the Spanish national security forces and their procedures, are all accurately recreated. There is also a meticulous reproduction of the linguistic conventions used in

the abundant “jihadist terrorist” material (videos, letters) and iconography featured in the series, some of which are shown directly in Dariya and Modern Standard Arabic.

Finally, and crucially to my overall argument, as I shall show in the following section, Aidi’s claim that “the series (...) makes no effort to understand why youth may gravitate to gangs or religious extremism” is unjustified.

3 The Path to Jihadist Terrorism as Recreated in *El Príncipe*

While each of the most relevant cases of “jihadist terrorist radicalisation” in *El Príncipe* is the archetypical representation of a different kind of recruit (e.g., the *mujahid*, the returnee, the *inghimasi*, described in Section 3), all of them feature the four core elements identified by Harris and Nawaz: a grievance narrative, an identity crisis, a charismatic recruiter and the ideological dogma of “jihadist terrorism”. What varies amongst the recruits is the presence or absence of aggravating factors: unemployment, lack of prospects, lack of education, love, power hunger, and resentment towards “Western” foreign policies.

3.1 *First Season*

The main thread is the disappearance and retrieval of Fátima’s disaffected brother, Abdessalam Ben Barek, also known as Abdu. His is the last in a long and dramatic series of “radicalisation” cases, to whose analysis I shall now turn, following the order of their presentation in the series.

3.1.1 The Original *Mujahid*: Tariq Basir

When he was just sixteen, Tariq blew himself up in Tangier in the name of “jihad” (hence “*mujahid*”, a person who fights a “jihad”), killing eleven. Although he is never seen on camera, we gradually learn that his influence in the “radicalisation” of other disaffected youngsters from El Príncipe is significant, and that he epitomises the figure of the charismatic recruiter. Indeed, Tariq recruited Abdessalam, and the former’s suicide inspires the youth from El Príncipe to follow suit.

3.1.2 The Suicide Bomber: Karim Basir

Tariq’s brother, Karim, is uneducated and poor. One day he accepts €1,000 in exchange for a dangerous assignment: getting rid of a member of the Ben Barek family. After Karim stabs his victim to death, the police put him in jail, where he discloses crucial information related to *Akrab*. Upon his release, the local *sheikh*, who has learned about Karim’s confessions, savagely tortures the

young whistleblower. With Karim's wounds still open, he is told that he has been "chosen by Allah" to blow himself up, and that this is his last chance to serve "The Cause". A classical *mujahid* speech ensues with the effect of encouraging Karim to become a suicide bomber. Eventually, Karim is persuaded and gets a bomb strapped to him.

Morey then arrives at the scene and begins to negotiate with Karim. This dialogue is highly symptomatic of the way the Spanish intelligence services conceptualise "jihadist terrorist radicalisation". Instead of adopting a traditional and authoritarian position, Morey drops his gun, opens his arms in a non-threatening fashion and offers himself up to Karim:

Let everyone go, Karim. I will stay here alone with you. You will bring an infidel to hell, and that way, you will reach heaven. For that's what you want, right? (...) Or is it? (...) You don't want to die, Karim.

Deja que se vayan todos, Karim. Me quedaré yo solo contigo. Te llevarás un infiel al infierno, y con eso llegarás al paraíso. ¿Porque eso es lo que quieres, no? (...) Tú no quieres morir, Karim.

By reducing the complexity of "jihadist terrorism" to an epiphenomenal form of ideological brainwashing specially designed to colonise the vulnerable minds of poor adolescents, Morey, who represents the Spanish security forces, disavows the sheer possibility that there might be some deeper cause to it. As proved by the denouement of the scene, this disavowal merely exacerbates the problem.

Unconvinced by Morey's condescending speech Karim answers back: "Enough is enough! Shut up. You're not going to convince me. It's too late. You're all going to die. Allah hu Akbar!!!" [*¡Ya basta! Cállate. No me vas a convencer. Es demasiado tarde. Vais a morir (...) Allah hu Akbar!!!*] only a fraction of a moment before blowing himself up.

3.1.3 The False Convert: Hakim

Hakim is an extrovert Spanish Arab police officer. At age sixteen, he was involved in petty crime, got arrested and ended up in a probation centre. At that point, a leading local police officer, Fran, persuaded him to become a policeman. One day, Hakim's girlfriend (her colleague Mati) realises that he features in an *Akrab* video. The next day, she confronts him, but Hakim denies the accusation and quickly removes the video from the server. However, the CNI finds independent proof that he had actually smuggled in the gun with which Tariq committed suicide and had tried to get rid of Karim while the latter was in jail. Hakim flees, but the local police manage to find him, and a

shootout begins. Another pre-suicide negotiation ensues with a leader of the Spanish security forces (Fran). Hakim exposes his condescending and tokenistic approach vis-à-vis Spanish Arab Muslims:

HAKIM: Don't talk to me like I'm a youngster. I'm a soldier of Allah!

FRAN: I made a policeman out of you!

HAKIM: Just because you needed to have a Moor in there (...) you've never taken me seriously!

HAKIM: ¡No me hables como a un niño, soy un soldado de Allah!

FRAN: ¡Hice de ti un policía!

HAKIM: ¡Porque te interesaba tener un moro allí (...) nunca me has tomado en serio!

Hakim is not particularly poor or ignorant. Nor is he best described as a religious zealot. Rather, his “radicalisation” process is mainly due to the perceived need to overcompensate for his everyday alienation as an Arab Muslim Other in contemporary Spain by finding a strong sense of identity in the ideological tenets of “jihadist terrorism”. Like Morey, Fran reduces the complexity of “jihadist terrorist radicalisation” to brainwashing and essentialised “terrorism”: “If you truly hate me, if you are actually a terrorist, shoot. I want to see just how much they have brainwashed you” [*“Si de verdad me odias, si de verdad eres un terrorista, dispara. Quiero ver hasta dónde te han comido el coco”*].

Hakim now realises he cannot escape from the kind of false exclusionary disjunct Fran is making explicit, i.e., one that perpetuates Islamophobia by narrowing down the diverse socio-cultural, religious and political allegiances of Spanish Arab Muslims to two options: Western secularism or “jihadist terrorism”. Unable to find the answers he was yearning for, Hakim shoots himself dead in front of Fran and Mati.

3.1.4 The Man in Search of Meaning: Abdessalam Ben Berek (Nickname “Abdu”)

The grievance narrative begins with Abdessalam’s “radicalisation” when he is denied a scholarship to study medicine in mainland Spain, which he perceives as unfair. Neither poor nor uneducated, it is at this point that he starts to distance himself from his girlfriend and family, seeking spiritual refuge instead in the local mosque and applying his academic skills to the exploration of the *Qu’ran*, alongside local “jihadist terrorists”.

At the beginning of the last episode, Abdessalam takes a bus to Ceuta. He plans to stow a bomb in the boot of the bus, wait for the vehicle to board the ferry and then detonate the bomb. However, the local policemen manage to

identify Abdu as one of the passengers. A whole security operation ensues, which mobilises plenty of troops and police personnel. As Fátima, her fiancé, his brother and Morey all learn about the situation, they rush to the port. Abdessalam decides to hold the remaining passengers hostage, threatening to kill them. A round of spontaneous one-on-one negotiations begins to deter him from detonating the explosives, or at least to allow some extra time for the police to deactivate the bomb.

Abdessalam's brother Faruq is first up. He gets on the bus and informs him that Fátima is getting married that same day, letting him know that the whole Ben Barek family looks forward to welcoming him back. To his bafflement, Abdessalam replies that he no longer feels any connection to this type of earthly celebrations, for he has chosen to embrace "Allah's path" instead. Faruq attempts to counter-argue these claims by reducing "jihadist terrorist radicalisation" to a matter of trivial ideological brainwashing, thus denying Abdessalam any agency in the process: "You haven't chosen anything. They have brainwashed you, and before you know it here you are, on a bus with a bomb, terrorising people" [*"Tú no has elegido nada. Te han llenado la cabeza de ideas y cuando te has querido dar cuenta estás en un autobús con una bomba aterrorizando a la gente"*]. Abdessalam frowns at Faruq's sweeping diagnosis and shoots him in the shoulder. Eventually, Faruq abandons the bus in hope of saving his own life.

Next up is Fátima Ben Barek, his sister. She adopts a less judgemental stance: "Abdu, what happened to you? Why did you flee?" [*"Abdu, ¿qué te pasó?, ¿por qué te fuiste?"*]. While previous negotiators were merely addressing the symptoms (i.e., the alleged brainwashing), Fátima lucidly understands that she needs to confront Abdu with the very fantasy that structures his "jihadist terrorist" *jouissance*, i.e., what drives him beyond the search for pleasure or material gain (Žižek 2012, 311). Abdu replies as follows: "I joined this fight to combat this type of empty life, so that Islam rules again over good Muslims" [*"Yo me uní a esta lucha para combatir ese tipo de vidas huecas, para que el Islam vuelva a gobernar sobre los buenos musulmanes."*] Fátima hugs him and takes advantage of the fact that Abdu is now off guard to take the gun from him gently. However, she fails to do the same with his phone detonator, to which Abdessalam holds fast.

Upon leaving the intimate isolation of the bus, Abdu opens his eyes to the outer world and gets increasingly anxious. Morey tries to calm him down by congratulating the youngster on his improvement while urging him to drop his phone detonator. As Abdessalam ignores Morey's requests, he spots a police agent actively trying to deactivate the explosives. At which point, he realises that his leverage will not last long. Abdu's whole self-narrative and identity as a

heroic, “enlightened jihadist” is about to crumble. He goes irreversibly berserk, and just a split second before he can blow himself up or the bomb gets deactivated, Morey despatches Abdu with a precise headshot.

In sum, what we learn at the end of the first season is that for the Ben Barek family, the return of Abdessalam was a much more complex situation than that of merely reclaiming a lost child. His ego had become so intractably linked with the narrative of “jihadist terrorism” itself that one could no longer remove his commitment to it without killing him.

3.2 *Second Season*

The final season of *El Príncipe* focuses on Morey’s slow but steady unmasking of Khaled Assour as the leader of *Akrab*. Along the way, Morey will come across other cases of “jihadist terrorist” recruitment, whose analysis will equip him with a deeper understanding of Khaled’s motives. I shall now discuss those cases, following their order of appearance in the series.

3.2.1 The Returnee: Tammam Naid Yasin

Yasin embodies the proverbial figure of the returnee, i.e., the foreign fighter that returns home after the conflict. A chemist in his country of origin, upon moving to France, he was forced to work as a street cleaner. Over the years, Yasin would experience a strong political disaffection towards Western Europe and alienation as a second-class citizen that will find in the ideological dogmata of “jihadist terrorism” a catalyst for “radicalisation”. Eventually, he enrolled in the Syrian War, from which he would come back to Europe and arrive in *El Príncipe*.

Already in Ceuta, Yasin is initially arrested, as he is accused of brutalising his wife and daughter, and involvement in “jihadist terrorism”. However, he manages to get away with denying both accusations. After being released without charges, he quickly rejoins fellow “jihadist terrorists” Khaled and Salman, Khaled’s uncle. Together, they start plotting an ambitious attack in *El Príncipe*. Yasin suggests they contaminate a major supply of water in the neighbourhood. By placing his experience as a chemist at the service of the “jihadist terrorist” cause, he is effectively mirroring Abdessalam’s manoeuvre in the first season: using his experience and skills against the very Western society that had previously judged these abilities insufficient to grant him first-class citizen status.

In their role as archetypal charismatic recruiters, Salman and Khaled are fully aware of this psychological need, as shown by the ease with which they take advantage of Yasin’s desperation to prove himself. They set him up for failure and then report him to the police in the hope of making the latter believe that they are both innocent and cooperative.

3.2.2 The Bait (Sergio Montes) & the Prospective Wife (Nayat Ben Barek)

Sergio Montes is a student at the civic centre of El Príncipe who works part-time in a local fruit shop. His is the story of a handsome, witty teenager trapped between an alarming lack of prospects and a solid ambition to overcome this predicament. This combination is a recurring breeding ground for the so-called “express radicalisation of *conversos*”, i.e. Spaniards with no Islamic background who convert to Islam while in Spain. After some weeks of consuming “jihadist terrorist” content through social networks and local institutions, Sergio embraces Islam, changing his name to Mohammed Fatah. At this point, a charismatic recruiter comes along, offering him the chance to join ISIS in the Syrian Civil War. In what is arguably too close an association between embracing Islam, on the one hand, and “terrorism”, on the other, Mohammed leaves El Príncipe in a matter of hours.

As it turns out, he will serve not only as a combatant but also as a bait for the prospective wives of ISIS’ soldiers, the recruitment of whom constitutes an integral part of ISIS’s propaganda (García-Calvo 2017). This aspect is fictionalised via a fleeting romance between Nayat Ben Barek, Fátima’s younger sister, and Mohammed himself. The night before leaving El Príncipe for Syria, Mohammed sends the following message to Nayat: “Nayat, I’m leaving, and I can’t say goodbye. But don’t be sad, for soon we shall see each other again. You’re very special to me. And I know you won’t forget me.” [*“Nayat, me voy y no puedo despedirme de ti. Pero no te entristezcas, porque sé que pronto nos volveremos a ver. Eres muy especial para mí. Y sé que no vas a olvidarme.”*] A subsequent investigation reveals that Sergio used his website to send similar love messages to many other girls.

A promotional video is then released, featuring Mohammed as the poster boy of “jihadist terrorist” proselytism:

My name is Mohammed Fatah. I was born in Ceuta (...) before coming to Syria to join the Jihad I had my friends, my family and my job ... I was just wondering how I could help others. In the end, I found all the answers in the *Qur’an*. Today, brothers and sisters across the world join our cause. We *mujahideen* are good people (...) What are you waiting for? Look around you and ask yourself one thing: Is this how you want to die?

Me llamo Mohammed Fatah. Nací en Ceuta (...) antes de venirme a Siria para unirme a la Yihad yo tenía mis amigos, mi familia, mi trabajo ... Yo lo único que hacía era preguntarme cómo podía ayudar a los demás. Y al final encontré todas las respuestas en el Corán. Hoy hermanos y hermanas

de todas las partes del mundo se unen a nuestra causa. Los muyahidines somos gente buena (...) ¿A qué estás esperando? Mira a tu alrededor y pregúntate una cosa: ¿es así como quieres morir?

The video is exposed as propagandistic by Fátima and the local imam at a lecture at the El Príncipe civic centre:

FÁTIMA: Ok, guys, this looks like a teaser trailer, right? (...) They are like bait. You only show the highlights, and hide the end [of the movie]

LOCAL IMAM: And in the end, this boy will die (...) being a good Muslim is not about that. It's not about taking up arms and killing those who don't think like you. This kid has been fooled.

FÁTIMA: Just like they fooled my brother Abdu.

FÁTIMA: *A ver chicos, esto se parece al video promocional de una película, ¿verdad? (...) Son como un cebo. Solo enseñas lo bueno, las mejores escenas, y te guardas el final.*

IMÁN LOCAL: *Y el final es que este chico acabará muerto (...) ser un buen musulmán no es eso. No es coger un arma y matar a los que no piensan como tú. A este chico lo han engañado.*

FÁTIMA: *Como engañaron a mi hermano Abdu.*

This oversimplification of the ideological allure exerted by ISIS on the vulnerable youth from El Príncipe fails to convince many of the (infantilised) students, amongst whom are Nayat and her friend Nasira. The instructors' attempt to make their students understand on a rational level that the video is propagandistic is futile, because the students already agree with that. What the instructors fail to realise is that the ideological pull exerted by the video lies in an argument from authority (i.e., in the status and looks of Mohammed). In other words, while the instructors think that their students are vulnerable to “jihadist terrorist” recruitment because they are subject to false consciousness (i.e., they do not understand that the video is propagandistic), what they are missing is that the students are actually subject to a more subtle form of ideology: enlightened false consciousness⁴ (i.e., they know that what they are doing is wrong, and yet they do it, because they cannot resist the allure exerted by the charismatic recruiter). As Nayat confesses to Nasira after watching the video

4 For a discussion of the difference between “false consciousness” and “enlightened false consciousness”, see Žižek 1989, 30.

and listening to the instructors' advice, "but he is so handsome ..." ["*es que es tan guapo ...*"]

In the end, both Nasira and Nayat travel to Syria, joining other young females to support ISIS's soldiers. As Mohammed enters the building, Nayat runs in desperation to hug him. Mohammed avoids her, eventually grabbing Nayat by the arm and reminding her of "the primary allegiance of the soldiers' wives", i.e., "serving Allah". The tragic end is served: eventually, Mohammed is shot dead, Nasira blows herself up, and Nayat is rescued in tears as she realises she had been used all along.

3.2.3 The *Inghimasi*: An Anonymous Squad

The term "*inghimasi*" refers to "jihadist terrorists" who venture deep into the territory of the enemy with no intention of coming back alive. In the last episode of *El Príncipe*, as the Spanish secret services and police become certain that Khaled is the leader of *Akrab*, they decide to go after him. Surrounded, Khaled reacts by making a phone call to an anonymous disaffected youngster from the neighbourhood, merely uttering the codeword "*inghimasi*". The message gets passed through three other local alienated teens. One after the other, they all grab their Kalashnikovs and head to the police station in defiant attitude. Upon their arrival, they open fire, shooting in an orgiastic frenzy. In this indiscriminate act, it is not difficult to see the manifestation of a previously frustrated desire to access power the proper way allegedly prescribed by Western/Spanish liberal modernity, i.e., by uncorrupted meritocracy expressed through civic structures (trade school, college, job market). Their outburst of subjective violence is best understood as the inverted specular image of the situation of objective sociopolitical and economic violence they had suffered daily in *El Príncipe*, the violent ideology of "jihadist terrorism" offering them a voice through which to express their grievance. Eventually, the Spanish elite "counterterrorism" forces (GEO) take the police station by storm, killing three *inghimasi* with surgical precision and arresting the remaining one, Hicham, Mohammed's brother, who had also converted to Islam.

3.2.4 The Avenger: Khaled Assour

Khaled Assour takes centre stage in *El Príncipe*'s second season as the ultimate villain. His is the figure of a "radicalised jihadist terrorist" and a recruiter, and is, in fact, *Akrab*'s leader. Born and raised as a French Moroccan, Khaled Assour presented himself as a successful businessman with exquisite manners and prestigious education during the first season. In the eyes of Fátima's family, Khaled struck the perfect balance between Muslim cultural proximity and the promise of higher living standards in glamorous Paris, far away from the troublesome everyday life of *El Príncipe*. At one point, they even get married.

The story of Khaled’s “jihadist terrorist radicalisation” begins in Paris, where he grew up as a disaffected immigrant, a second-class citizen. His frustrated desire to gain power and social status coincided with a significant presence of local “jihadist terrorists”, thus offering the breeding ground for his “radicalisation”. In *El Príncipe*, we learn that a substantial part of Khaled’s success and wealth comes from his involvement in *Akrab*. Not entirely in line with the traditional values to which he has been paying lip service, in reality, Khaled prioritises his lustful obsession for power and success above almost every other concern, including his family and Islam itself.

In the end, Morey exposes Khaled as being responsible for the indoctrination of Abdessalam and other local youngsters. This forces Fátima to decide between her husband and the one she truly loves, Morey, who represents Spain’s modernity. This struggle is best revealed in a heated argument between all three characters:

KHALED TO FÁTIMA: Go with him. Go with him! Do you know what awaits you? In this country, you’ll always be a second-class citizen.

MOREY: No, that’s not true. Moreover, you’re not talking about Fátima. You’re talking about yourself, what you went through when you were in Paris years ago. Back then (...) you just wanted to be like anybody else, but no matter how hard you studied, no matter how expensive your suits, your neighbours wouldn’t see you as one of them. You were a parvenu. All of a sudden, you learned from *Akrab* and you saw the perfect opportunity to avenge all your humiliations (...), right? But at the end of the day, you’re afraid to realise ... that you’re nothing ... nothing.

KHALED A FÁTIMA: *Vete con él. ¡Vete con él! ¿Sabes lo que te espera? En este país siempre serás una ciudadana de segunda clase.*

MOREY: *No, eso no es verdad. Y además no estás hablando de Fátima. Estás hablando de ti, de lo que tú viviste cuando estabas en París hace años. Entonces (...) solamente querías ser uno más, pero por mucho que estudiaras, por muy caros que fueran tus trajes, tus vecinos seguían sin mirarte como un igual. Eras un advenedizo. De pronto alguien te habló de *Akrab* y viste la oportunidad perfecta para vengar todas tus humillaciones (...) ¿verdad? Pero en el fondo tienes miedo de darte cuenta ... que no eres nada ... nada.*

Here Morey’s seems to be able to grasp what the instructors at the civic centre of El Príncipe had missed, i.e., that ideological recruitment operates not only rationally, but also libidinally (i.e. based on irrational desire) (Žižek 2012, 11–30). Khaled did not become the leader of the local “jihadist terrorist” cell

due to his supposed commitment to the “jihadist terrorism”. Rather, he understood the inconsistencies of this ideological dogma but did not hesitate to use it as an excuse to first repress his personal frustrations (as in Khaled’s early struggle in Paris to conceal his humiliations as a second-class citizen) and then fill his inner void as an individual (that is, with the imprint of a new empowering identity, that of *Akrab’s* leader).

3.2.5 Coda: A Tragic End

In the last scene of the series, a shooting breaks out between Morey and Khaled over Fátima. Morey manages to hit Khaled, leaving him badly injured. Morey then runs away with Fátima. However, a struggling Khaled manages to chase them down with a Kalashnikov and shoots a continuous burst at both of them. After which, Morey and Fátima throw themselves in the water to save their lives, as Fran arrives at the scene and shoots Khaled dead from behind. Morey then emerges from the water and pulls Fátima out, but by now, she is barely breathing. Morey desperately tries to revive Fátima, who recovers consciousness for a brief moment, just long enough to declare her ultimate love for Morey, before dying in his arms. A panoramic view of both bodies lying at El Príncipe’s shore ensues, accompanied by poignant Orientalist music that further accentuates the Eastern quality of the sunset.

On the one hand, this final postcard would seem to convey the need to look at the bigger historical, political, economic and cultural picture to understand the personal dramas affecting Morey and Fátima in particular, and the inhabitants of El Príncipe at large. On the other hand, it would also seem to demonstrate just how Morey’s (modern Spain’s) obsession with its ultimate object of postcolonial desire (Fátima/northern Africa) was bound to destroy the latter right at the edge of romantic conquest, with love operating here as a sublimation of neocolonial victory.

4 Conclusion

In this essay, I have explained that the kind of conservative framing of “jihadist terrorist radicalisation” that underpins *El Príncipe* is rooted in the Islamophobic reduction of the doctrinal principle of “jihad” to military attacks of the “terrorist” sort against the perceived religious-cum-political enemy. In Spain, this essentialism allows the Spanish State and its conservative ideologues to reduce local “jihadism” to a security concern to be monitored and neutralised as part of the “Global War on Terror”. This helps the Spanish State strengthen its surveillance while engaging in the Orientalist dehumanisation

of the Arab-Muslim Other as a permanent threat to the country, while depoliticising Spanish “jihadism” as a public order problem chiefly motivated by the alleged rampant psychopathologies of “jihadist terrorists”.

I have shown that *El Príncipe*'s plot is deeply embedded in this ideology, which results in the undeniable reproduction of Islamophobic and Orientalist stereotypes that taint the fictional recreation of “jihadist terrorist radicalisation” in the Ceuta neighbourhood of El Príncipe. Chief amongst these are those previously mentioned by Aidi, namely: the romance between Morey and Fátima (which perpetuates Orientalist fantasies), the term “*moro*” (Moor), (which reproduces racist stereotypes), and the excessively close association between Islam and “terrorism”. To this, I should like to add, based on my analysis, a depoliticising over-reliance on psychological factors as the main rationale behind the “jihadist terrorist radicalisation” undergone by the characters.

Finally, I have shown that contrary to Aidi's view, the above does not need to imply the strawman that we should dismiss the TV series as a “silly television series” that “makes no effort to understand why youth may gravitate to gangs or religious extremism”. On the contrary, my analysis reveals that in *El Príncipe* the pervasive presence of Spanish chauvinist, Islamophobic and Orientalist elements coexists with a well-researched, open-ended and thought-provoking problematisation of the process of “jihadist terrorist radicalisation”, including its defining features (with a psychoanalytical focus), archetypal actors and underlying geopolitical logic, i.e., the century-old neocolonial dispute between Spain and France over Morocco. Potentially, one could even surmise that *El Príncipe* hints at the possibility that Spain's self-proclaimed modern progressive liberalism fails to account for the nature and causes of “jihadist terrorist radicalisation”, including its justifying ideologies. This is best illustrated by the ongoing inability of the State security forces and local institutions to deal with “jihadist terrorist radicalisation” in El Príncipe in an effective manner, precipitating the tragic end.

Bibliography

- Ahmed, Shahab. 2015. *What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Aidi, Yasmina. 2015. “Looking backwards at Muslims in Spain.” *Al-Jazeera*, October 13. <https://tinyurl.com/ux2ddnms>.
- Albarrán, Javier. 2018. “The Jihād of the Caliphs and the First Battles of Islam: Memory, Legitimization and Holy War, from Cordoba to Tinmal.” *Al-‘Uṣūr al-Wuṣṭā* 26: 113–150.

- Anholt, Simon. 2011. "Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations." *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy* 2 (1): 6–12. <https://tinyurl.com/xxwfe9uy>.
- Balbale, Abigail K. 2014. "Jihād as a Means of Political legitimation in Thirteenth-century Sharq Al-Andalus." In *The Articulation of Power in Medieval Iberia and the Maghrib*, edited by Amira Bennison, 87–105. British Academy. <https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197265697.003.0005>.
- Bonner, Michael. 2008. *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, Wendy. 2017. "El Neoliberalismo ha Convertido el concepto de Democracia en un Significante Vacío." *Público*, November 17. <https://tinyurl.com/3m3v6u44>.
- De Aristegui, Gustavo. 2006. *La yihad en España: la obsesión por reconquistar Al-Ándalus*. Madrid: Esfera De Los Libros.
- El Príncipe: Amor sin Frontera*. 2014–6. Directed by Iñaki Mercero et al.. Written by Benítez, Cesar, and Aitor Gabilondo.
- Esposito, John, ed. 2003. *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Firestone, Reuven. 2002. *Jihad: The Origins of Holy War in Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Flesler, Daniela. 2008. *The Return of the Moor: Spanish Responses to Contemporary Moroccan Immigration*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
- García-Calvo, Carola. 2015. "Las mujeres del Estado Islámico." *Real Instituto Elcano*, March 26. <https://tinyurl.com/4utyb4n7>.
- García-Calvo, Carola, and Fernando Reinares. 2013. "Procesos de Radicalización Violenta y Terrorismo Yihadista en España: ¿Cuándo? ¿Dónde? ¿Cómo?" *Real Instituto Elcano*, November 18. <https://tinyurl.com/2et67t4b>.
- Harris, Sam, and Maajid Nawaz. 2015. *Islam and the Future of Tolerance: a Dialogue*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Laachiri, Mohammed. 2012. *Un cine en el Príncipe Alfonso*. Dar Karaounies.
- Jackson, Richard, ed. 2016. *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies*. Milton Park: Routledge.
- López Bargados, Alberto. 2016. "La amenaza yihadista en España: viejos y nuevos orientalismos." *Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos* 21: 73–80. <https://doi.org/10.15366/reim2016.21.006>.
- "Nivel de Alerta Antiterrorista (NAA)." 2015. *Ministerio del Interior. Gobierno de España*, June 26. <https://tinyurl.com/3fchn393>.
- Reinares, Fernando. 2014. *¡Matadlos! quién estuvo detrás del 11-M y por qué se atentó en España*. Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg.

- Rodríguez, Jesús. 2015. "El talibán español." *El País*, November 25, 2015. <https://tinyurl.com/yntcdp5c>.
- Rubio, Salva. 2014. *El Príncipe*. Barcelona: Suma de Letras.
- Said, Edward. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Streusand, Douglas E. 1997. "What does Jihad mean?" *Middle East Quarterly* 4 (3): 9–17.
- Torres Soriano, Manuel. 2009. "Spain as an Object of Jihadist Propaganda." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32: 933–952. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903259977>.
- Žižek, Slavoj, ed. 2012. *Mapping Ideology*. London: Verso.
- Žižek, Slavoj. 1989. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.

PART 2

Islamic Heritage and Architecture



Hybridity as an Appellation of Twentieth-Century Islamic Built Environment

Nuno Grancho

we need to contaminate [...] to relocate it in the human cultural landscape. We should turn our attention away from a search for the authentic, the characteristic, the enduring and the pure, and immerse ourselves in the active, the evanescent and the impure, seeking settings that are ambiguous, multiple, often contested, and examining points of contact and transformation-in the market, at the edge, in the new and the decaying.¹



The recent tide of scholarship on architecture has helped to highlight the questionable divide between the architectural histories of the Western and non-Western worlds.² Entangled within this epistemological classification, we find the architectural historiography of the last centuries split along constructed distinctions between ‘western’ and ‘non-western world’ modernisms, postmodern and postcolonial struggles for cultural identity and networks of knowledge transfer. This brief analysis intends to open a discussion on the history of Islamic architectural and urban production within the critical framework of *Orientalism*, or, more broadly, within the framework of colonial and postcolonial studies.

This essay reassesses the Islamic built environment – architecture and urbanism – since the formation of the predominant discourse on that subject in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It identifies a shift in scholarship

1 Upton, Dell, 1993. “The Tradition of Change.” *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* 5, no. 1 (Fall): 9–15.

2 The research for this chapter has been funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 895924 and by the Danish National Research Foundation (DNRF 138). I am indebted and thankful to Doctor Elizabeth Drayson for her advice and critical reading of this essay.

from representations of Islamic architecture as Other that is traced to the formation of an influential discourse about Islamic architecture and urbanism by architects in the twentieth and twentieth first centuries. To do so, it privileges the paradigm of encounter to capture an entangled terrain of contemporary architectural practice and coexistent assertions of cultural difference.³ The most expansive sense of the term 'Islamic' contains secular and sacred architecture and urbanism, created by, for, in service of, or in regions under the rule of Muslims, historically or currently. Though referring to Islam, the term 'Islamic' aspires, especially in the learned and secular sphere, to encompass the entire cultural breadth of Muslim societies, rather than restricting itself to religion.⁴

Over time, in architecture and urbanism the Islamic themes evolved from a nationalist emphasis on finding the appropriate built environment for a place to finding the best expression for the present, that is, for the modern period. Within this context, Islamic thinking manifested itself in architectural and urban theories and histories, firstly, in developing typological theories tying each nation to Islam with its architecture and its cities – now with an emphasis on the mental attributes of a population in contrast to the earlier attributions to climate or environment. Secondly, it was apparent in narratives of architectural and urban histories premised on evolution, diffusion, and hybridization; and finally, in the arrangement of architecture and cities into historical, linear and developmental scales.

The architectural historian Ernst Grube expresses in *Architecture of the Islamic World* a contemporary discursive anxiety: "What is Islamic architecture?"⁵

-
- 3 "process of enunciation of culture as 'knowledgeable', authoritative, adequate to the constructions of systems of cultural identification," Bhabha, Homi. 2004. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 50. To put it simply: a culture may only be identified by its difference to other cultures. The 'cultural' has thus no inherent essence but is articulated in relations with an Other and its 'location' is found in the gaps between diverging subject positions.
 - 4 Oleg Grabar addresses this issue: "What I mean by 'culture' in this context is a broader series of very varied impulses and needs – social, intellectual, ecological, climatic, political, and of course religious – which were sufficiently constant over the centuries to explain the relationship to each other of such diverse attributes of monuments [...] All these creations, one can argue, must be seen and understood primarily as expressions of, so to speak, an anthropologically defined culture, tied together perhaps by the faith of Islam" in Grabar, Oleg, 1978. "Islamic Art: Art of a Culture or art of a Faith." *Art and Archaeology Research Papers* 11: 1. See also: Grabar, Oleg. 1973. *The Formation of Islamic Art*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1–18; Grabar, Oleg. 1976. "What Makes Islamic Art Islamic?" *Art and Archaeology Research Papers* 9: 1–3; Grabar, Oleg. 1978. "Islamic Art: Art of a Culture or art of a Faith." In *Art and Archaeology Research Papers* 11: 1–6.
 - 5 Grube, Ernst. 1978. "Introduction: What Is Islamic Architecture?" In *Architecture of the Islamic World; its History and Social Meaning*, ed. George Michell. London: Thames and Hudson. See also: Rabbat, Nasser. 2012. "What is Islamic Architecture, anyway?" *Journal of Art Historiography* 6: 1–15.

Grube addresses the formal landscapes of Islamic architecture differentiated as from a non-Islamic context. The consistency of Islam and the expectation of reliability in architecture and urbanism is stressed. Difference is attributed to the attrition of Islamic culture as “something has happened in Islamic culture in the particular region where such monuments were produced to indicate a general weakening in the ‘Islamicness’ of the specific architecture in question.”⁶ The architectural historian Robert Hillenbrand supports this awareness of compromise in Islamic built environment and culture, “a culture as self-contained as that of Western Europe – as to a faith.”⁷ In a persuasive outline of the difficulties of depicting Islamic built environment, Hillenbrand states it is the “accepted opinion that the best Islamic architecture dates from before the 18th century.”⁸ Furthermore, “Islam then found itself forced to come to terms with the West, and the experience was traumatic [...] Western influence was as destructive to indigenous modes [...] in architecture.”⁹

The art historians Finbar Flood¹⁰ and Gülru Necipoglu¹¹ and the architectural historian Sibel Bozdoğan¹² have stated from the early years of the twentieth century, that architecture and urbanism have devalued non-Western modern art and architectures, as they are obstinately left out from the study of both Islamic and modern architecture and urbanism.¹³ Nevertheless, this generates, on the one hand, a perception of an exaggerated breach between pre-modern and modern periods, thereby helping to perpetuate the understanding of modernity as Orientalist and a solely Western phenomenon, and on the other hand, the exclusion of recent periods from the fields of Islamic

6 (Grube, 1978, 10).

7 Hillenbrand, Robert. 1994. *Islamic Architecture: Form, Function and Meaning*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 8.

8 *Ibid*, 6.

9 *Ibid*, 6.

10 Flood, Finbar. 2007. “From Prophet to postmodernism? New World orders and the end of Islamic Art.” In *Making Art History: A Changing Discipline and its Institutions*. ed. E. Mansfield, London: Routledge, 31–52, puts forward that an uncontroversial category of Islamic art might consider its purview: 16th century artifacts from “the Ottomans of Turkey, the Safavids of Iran and the Mughals of India [...] then things get rather vague”.

11 Necipoglu, Gülru. 2012. “The concept of Islamic art: Inherited discourses and new approaches.” In *Islamic Art and the Museum: Approaches to Art and Archaeology of the Muslim World in the Twenty-First Century*, Benoit Junod, Georges Khalil, Stefan Weber and Gerhard Wolf (eds.), London: Saqi Books, 57–75.

12 Bozdoğan, Sibel. 1999. “Architectural history in professional education: Reflections on postcolonial challenges to the modern survey.” *Journal of Architectural Education*, 52(4): 207–216.

13 About the definition and historiography of Islamic Art, see, *inter alia*: Blair, Sheila and Bloom, Jonathan. 2003. “The Mirage of Islamic Art: Reflections on the Study of an Unwieldy Field.” *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 85, No. 1 (March): 152–184.

art, architecture and urbanism thereby blocking opportunities for equally significant studies on modern and contemporary architecture.

However, there is enough evidence to revise the past in a much more entangled means by foregrounding cross-geographical dialogues, even though the West and the East have been perceived as separated and made detached within a continuing process of hybridization. Simultaneously, it seems necessary to think about theories and concepts that will help us come to terms with these intertwined histories, rather than use oppositions between the foreign and the national, the Western and the Islamic.

1 Otherness and Hybridity

I will examine two concepts concerned with Islamic architectural and urban identities – ‘otherness’ and ‘hybridity’ – that have been applied to architecture and urbanism profusely and have been instrumental in postcolonial theory. ‘Otherness’ is a western philosophical concept that postcolonial theory has pursued, reviewed and rejected, while hybridity is considered a ‘product’ of postcolonial thought, a radical substitute for hegemonic ideas of cultural identity like racial purity and nationality.

The Other, politically and epistemologically, is a concept fundamental to contemporary concerns. Threat, responsibility, *alter ego*, and enigma to and of the self, have variously a major preoccupation of Western thought. The political philosopher Frantz Fanon (1961), the literary critic Edward Said (1978), and the postcolonial theorists Gayatri Spivak (1999) and Homi Bhabha (2004) are some of the authors of the western tradition that read or critique the Self in relation to the Other. They give more detailed attention to the postcolonial work that engages with the questions in examining the politics of representation, recognition and identity in architectural and urban theories and histories.

It would be important to take Said’s critique of West-East relations as an opening point, because our use of ‘otherness’ and ‘hybridity.’ Said’s theory of *Orientalism* was drawn on the philosopher Michel Foucault’s notion of power/discourse that theorises the East as a construction of the West in order to uncover the power patterns that have defined the relations between Europe and Asia. In *Orientalism*, Said extends Foucault’s critiques of the systematic acquisition of knowledge as a vehicle for power and dominance to the context of European imperialism. Said examines the reductive representation of Islam, associated with the Orient, as a distinct entity: “The boundary notion of East and West, the varying degrees of projected inferiority and strength, the range of work done, the kinds of characteristic features ascribed to the Orient:

all these testify to a [...] division made between East and West.”¹⁴ Said argues that the very “idea” of the Orient was complicit in the colonial mastery of the non-Western territory, resources, and peoples, that it allegedly represented.¹⁵ While by no means in-depth, other studies are indicative of an interdisciplinary shift away from polarised representations of Self and Other, that can be further traced to the work of Said. While Said’s *Orientalism* lays bare the power relations inherent to representational formations of Islamic architecture and Islamic urbanism, it exposes at the same time Europe’s reciprocal dependence on those whom it subordinated.

Correspondingly, Said and more recently the anthropologist Anne Laura Stoler, have shown that the European imperial colonies in the East were seen as laboratories in which ideological and disciplinary regimes were established previously being transported back to Europe to regulate metropolitan society.¹⁶ Questionably, the West was co-produced in and through their unequal interactions. This implies that Europe, while constructing its Other as an object of thought, was in fact constructing itself as a subject.

In the built environment analyses, the standing of hybridity is a neglected subject. To Bhabha, cultures are specific temporal groups, which to a large degree comprise elements that they share with others.¹⁷ This hybrid nature of social collectives makes any claim of hierarchical ‘purity’ of cultures as well as concepts such as syncretism, synergy and transculturation unsustainable. To understand Bhabha’s reasoning, it may be enlightening to remind his architectural metaphor of the house. A house may consist of some floors that are connected by a staircase. In order to move from the first to the second floor or vice versa, one needs to use the stairs. The staircase is thus allegorically speaking exceeding ‘certain binary oppositions’ such as high and low by opening a liminal space and a path between the extremes. The liminal space of the stairwell is, according to Bhabha, an ‘interstitial passage’ in a comparable sense that permits a social subject to move in and out of, for instance, different subject positions.

14 Said, Edward. 1995. *Orientalism; Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Penguin Books, 201.

15 Foucault, Michel. 1972. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books. The differences between *Orientalism* and Foucault’s methodology are analysed in Dutton, Michael and Williams, Peter. 1993. “Translating Theories: Edward Said on Orientalism, Imperialism and Alterity.” *Southern Review* 26, no. 3: 314–57.

16 Said, Edward. 1992. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage books; Stoler, Laura Ann. 1992. “Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule.” In *Colonialism and Culture*, ed. Nicholas Dirks, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

17 (Bhabha, 2004, 52).

Similarly, the writings of the anthropologist James Clifford are significant in drawing attention to the complexity of identity in the context of encounter and in re-thinking representations of Islamic architecture and Islamic urbanism. Encounters provoke assertions of cultural identity of Self and Other. We draw specific inspiration from Clifford's characterization of essentialist representations of culture using the metaphor of cultural roots to describe the pervasive tendency to represent the built environment as an expression of Islam, represented as a homogeneous religious and cultural entity. Clifford's alternative metaphor of cultural routes¹⁸ enables the conceptualisation of varied experiences of dwelling and travelling amidst global encounters.

This takes us to the anthropologist Bruno Latour's delineation of modernity¹⁹ as a continuous dispute between practices of translation that create hybrids and strategies of purification designed to articulate and impose the ontological difference that has been naturalized in many post-Enlightenment societies. By drawing attention to the reciprocated overlapping of conscious human subjects and inert architecture and city, we look at the constitutive relationships between human subjects, architecture, city,²⁰ and political formations, and the ways in which these relationships were implicated in processes of transculturation, a change unfolding through hybridity that can presuppose (if not produce) 'pure' original or related architecture and city(ies).²¹

The anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt recognises the reciprocity of encounter in the context of colonialism since 1750. Pratt theorizes the concept of 'contact-zone'²² in an effort to move elsewhere representations that carve

-
- 18 Clifford, James. 1998. *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature and Art*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- 19 Latour, Bruno. 1993. *We Have Never Been Modern*. Trans. Catherine Parker. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- 20 "As socially and culturally salient entities, objects change in defiance of their material stability. The category to which a thing belongs, the emotion and judgment it prompts, and narrative it recalls, are all historically refigured." Thomas, Nicholas. 1991. *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press, 129. See also, Appadurai, Arjun. 1988. *The Social Life of Things*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 21 Glick, Thomas and Pi-Sunyer, Oriol. 1969. "Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept in Spanish History." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, no. 2: 140. Lionnet, Françoise. 1989. "Introduction. The Politics and Aesthetics of Métissage." In *Autobiographical Voices: Race, Gender, Self-Portraiture*, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 15–17; Ortiz, Fernando. 1995. *Cuban Counterpoint, Tobacco and Sugar*. Trans. Harriet de Onis. Durham: Duke University Press, 102–3; Dallmayr, Fred. 1996. *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-cultural Encounter*. Albany: SUNY Press, 14–18.
- 22 Addressing the concept of "contact zone" defined by Mary Pratt in *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. Interactions between global and local, transnational and

cultural Otherness as: “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination-like colonialism, slavery or their aftermaths, as they are lived out across the globe today.”²³ Thus, she complicates European representations of Self and Other, prompted by travel writing. Hybridity offers a model of textuality idea that does not delete difference, but exposes the spaces where meaning-systems collide. The hybrid can be understood as a ‘contact zone’ or a ‘third space’ which is an overlapping of cultures that can generate “borderline affects and identifications.”²⁴

In *Empire Building*, the architectural historian Mark Crinson recognises that it was in “the second quarter of the nineteenth century that architectural Orientalism emerged as a distinctive cultural formation out of its two parent discourses. That this ‘new Orientalism’ did emerge at this moment had something to do with the discarding of classical paradigms and Picturesque theory. But it had much more to do with the appeal of the new human sciences, particularly ethnography, and the operative conjunction of rationalism and modernization”²⁵ with particular emphasis on Victorian scholarship and the representation of Islamic, Saracenic, Moorish or Oriental architecture in the writings of Robert Hay, Edward Lane,²⁶ Owen Jones,²⁷ James Fergusson,²⁸ Edward Freeman²⁹ and John Ruskin.³⁰ Crinson recognises the expectations to define architecture as an expression of Islamic culture conceived of as an ahistorical, similar and unrepresented object.³¹

In 2007, the Aga Khan Award for Architecture published *Intervention Architecture: Building for Change*, where thinkers and practitioners focused on contemporary buildings and landscapes located within the Islamic world. In its introduction, Bhabha identified an “ethic of global relatedness that reflects the

national, identity and difference, conjuncturalism and identity politics, space and time have become important areas of research as the study of culture, society, and power has become increasingly comparative, historical, and global in scope.

23 Pratt, Mary. 1992. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London: Routledge, 4.

24 Bhabha, Homi. 1996. “Culture’s In-Between.” In *Question of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay. London: Sage Publications, 54.

25 Crinson, Mark. 1996. *Empire Building: Orientalism and Victorian Architecture*. London: Routledge, 16.

26 *Ibid*, 16, 26–30.

27 *Ibid*, 30–36.

28 *Ibid*, 42–48.

29 *Ibid*, 39–42.

30 *Ibid*, 48–61.

31 Çelik, Zeynep. 1992. *Displaying the Orient; Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

ideals of a pluralist *umma* at the heart of Muslim societies which is repeatedly celebrated.”³² Further, addresses the incontestability of the award questioning the “contest between the east and the west, or between Muslim and non-Muslim societies. Such polarisations are quite out [...] to reflect the shifting and changing world of ‘Muslim realities’ that transform the global *umma*. [...] In a state of transition – or translation – you are caught ambivalently between identifying [...] ‘origins’ and ‘traditions’, while, at the same time, relating [...] revisionary values.”³³ Also, the architect Farshid Moussavi addresses architecture and cosmopolitanism with reference to the twentieth first century, making a case for hybrid or cosmopolitan identities perceived as expressing a postnational condition resulting from processes of globalization. Moussavi presented this stance as in contra-distinction to the standard historiography of Islamic architecture: “Instead of declaring that differences are un-combinable, the point is to identify differences that are singular, look for connections, define systems of negotiation and find larger areas of consistency among these differentiated entities that can produce new hybrid [...] the whole is grown out of the hybridisation of the parts, akin to the way hybrid identities evolve in individuals. Hybridisation transforms fixed architectural categories and [...] experimentation.”³⁴ This perception of hybridity matches a move also recognised by the anthropologists Pauline Strong and Deborah Kapchan in which “what was once considered ‘contaminated,’ ‘promiscuous,’ ‘impure’ [was] becoming the focus of postmodern analytical attention.”³⁵ Such derogatory appellations had long been identified with representations of the Islamic built environment.

Bi- and multilateral transportation of people, ideas, objects, technology, information, and images generates processes of hybridity, which takes place under any condition where there is a cultural flow from one place to another. It is the process of transformation during the act of flow in a ‘contact zone.’ Drawing from literary studies (Bassnett and Trivedi, 1999; Benjamin, 1968; Derrida, 1985, 1992; Niranjana, 1992; Spivak, 1993; Venuti, 1995, 2000),³⁶

32 Bhabha, Homi. 2007. “Architecture and Thought.” In *Intervention Architecture. Building for Change*, ed. Pamela Johnston. London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 7. For 2007 Aga Khan Award for Architecture.

33 *Ibid*, 9.

34 Moussavi, Farshid. 2007. “Cosmopolitanism and Architecture.” In *Intervention Architecture. Building for Change*, ed. Pamela Johnston. London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 166–167. For 2007 Aga Khan Award for Architecture.

35 Kapchan, Deborah, and Strong, Pauline. 1999. “Theorizing the Hybrid” *Journal of American Folklore* 112. 445: 239–253.

36 Bassnett, Susan and Trivedi, Harish (eds.). 1999. *Post-colonial Translation: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge; Benjamin, Walter. 1968. “The task of the Translator,” In

this theory treats translation as a conceptual metaphor for architectural and urban hybridity, while differentiating the specificities of the built environment practices.

2 From World War I, Up to the Present

I will discuss examples from the interwar period, through the Cold War up to the present, focusing specifically on cases from Turkey in the 1930s and 1940s, India, Iraq and Lebanon in the 1950s, Sri Lanka in the 1960s and 1970s, Kuwait in the 1970s, and the Gulf cities in the 2000s. Each example recognises a different construction as what I argue has stood for the locus of perceived hybridity in the Islamic built environment.

After the end of World War I (1918), the fall of the Ottoman Empire (1922) and the establishment of Turkey as a republic (1923), architects from Germany and Austria were invited to assist in a Westernization effort in the construction of Turkey's cities, buildings, and architectural schools.³⁷ The German architect and urban planner Hermann Jansen (1869–1945) designed a pre-war garden city model developed in Germany, which was not only supposed to be used as the master plan of Ankara, but also in other places of Turkey. The same archetype was used in collective housing, neighbourhoods for statesmen, and in residential villages to house people arriving from the Balkans. Governmental and higher education buildings in Ankara were commissioned to Austrian architects such as Robert Oerley, Clemens Holzmeister, Ernst Egli, and German architects such as Bruno Taut and Paul Bonatz. Houses for Kemal Atatürk

Arendt, Hannah (ed.), *Illuminations. Essays and Reflections*. Trans. H. Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 69–82; Derrida, Jacques. 1985. *The Ear of the Other*. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press and Derrida, Jacques. 1992. "From Des Tours de Babel." In *Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida*, ed. Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 218–227; Niranjana, Tejaswini. 1992. *Siting Translation: History, Post-structuralism and the Colonial Context*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Spivak, Gayatri. 1993. "The politics of Translation." In *Outside in the Teaching Machine*. London: Routledge; Venuti, Lawrence. 1995. *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation*, London: Routledge and 2000. *The Translation Studies Reader* London: Routledge.

37 Akcan, Esra. 2005. *Modernity in translation*. Ph.D. dissertation. New York: Columbia University; Akcan, Esra and Bozdoğan, Sibel. 2012. *Turkey: Modern Architectures in History*. London: Reaktion Books; Bozdoğan, Sibel. 2001. *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*. Seattle: University of Washington Press; Nicolai, Bernd. 1998. *Moderne und Exil: Deutschsprachige Architekten in der Türkei 1925–1955*. Berlin: Verlag für Bauwesen.

(president 1923–1938) and other official elites were designed most notably by Holzmeister and by the Turkish architect Seyfi Arkan, who had just returned from Berlin. Arkan had a tremendous impact on the Modern architecture of Turkey. Some authors attribute to him negative qualities, arguing that he was the architect of Atatürk and sided with the existing political powers to pave the path to professional success, but the majority acknowledge that his influence in mainstream architecture of Turkey during his lifetime and after. Arkan was accepted by the German architect Hans Poelzig as a trainee and lived in Berlin between the years of 1928 and 1933. This was his chance to observe and understand the Modern buildings and environment influenced by Bauhaus ideas. However, even in the most obvious examples of the official Westernization program, the results were never a direct copy of what happened in German Modernism but became significant hybrid architectural solutions like, for example, the Üçler Apartments, with a combination of oriels, an inseparable part of Ottoman and Anatolian houses, and reinforced concrete balconies which, besides resembling their Western counterparts are natural cantilevers of the structural system and do not require any specific craftsmanship.

The tripartite German-Austrian-Turkish co-operation was intensified after 1933, when the National Socialist party came to power in Germany. German and Austrian architects and planners including Ernst Reuter, Margarete Schiitte-Lihotzky, Martin Wagner and Taut were forced into exile. Most took part in the new generation's education and collaborated with local professionals. While in Turkey, some German émigrés, including Reuter, outlined the future of post-war Germany and came to influential posts there afterwards. Others like Egli returned to Switzerland and advocated a culture-specific theory of urban design. The prominent Turkish architect Sedad Eldem³⁸ built his career on the study of the Turkish House. No other person was as comprehensive, dedicated and productive as he was in bringing the traditional Turkish house back to life through his own architecture. The essential characteristics of this building type, and its possible variations depending on the site, represent the trait of Eldem's work and also his legacy.³⁹

38 Bozdoğan, Sibel, Süha Özkan and Engin Yenal (eds.). 1987. *Sedad Eldem: Architect in Turkey*. Singapore & New York: Concept Media.

39 (Bozdoğan, Sibel, Süha Özkan and Engin Yenal, 1987); Gallo, Antonella, 1991. "Un architetto aristocratico," *Phalaris*, vol. 16: 12–15; Tanyelleli, Uğur. 2001. *Sedad Hakkı Eldem*. İstanbul: Boyut Yayın Grubu; Tanyelleli, Uğur. 2007. *Mimarlığın Aktörleri, Türkiye 1900–2000*. İstanbul: Garanti Galeri, 162–171; Tanju, Bülent and Tanyelleli, Uğur. 2008. *Sedad Hakkı Eldem 1: Gençlik Yılları*. İstanbul: Osmanlı Balkası Arşiv ve Araştırı Merkezi; Tanju, Bülent and Tanyelleli, Uğur. 2009. *Sedad Hakkı Eldem 2. Retrospektif*. İstanbul: Osmanlı Balkası Arşiv ve Araştırı Merkezi.

Modernism itself may have had its own translatability to the whole world so that its technical and social merits could be shared globally. At the same time, building a sovereign nation-state out of the Ottoman Empire simultaneously demanded some revival. Among the constructed categories of national heritage, the 'old Turkish house' served as the common marker of architectural identity during this period, partly because unlike Ottoman monuments it was imagined to be 'authentically Turkish.' The regional, ethnic, and religious differences were overlooked for the construction of this unified category.

The Taslik Coffee House in Istanbul by Eldem's, was admittedly based on the Koprulu Amcazade Huseyin Pasa waterfront house on the Bosphorus. Eldem drew the first sketches during his travels to Europe where he was constantly negotiating between and hybridizing European Modernism and the old Turkish house. Bozdoğan points out that Eldem saw contemporary features in the traditional Turkish house: for him, this building type was remarkably similar to the concept of the modern house.⁴⁰ Full windows, lightness, transparency, the free plan and modular logic, all of which lent themselves to skeletal construction were reinterpreted in reinforced concrete in his designs.

Among the architects requested by Turkey, Taut's practice justifies a more favourable assessment precisely because he complicated and subverted the dominant Western/national dichotomy. In the building of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography in Ankara (1937), Taut used stones and tiles, unlike the modernist buildings of the period with stucco surfaces devoid of texture or ornament. On the exterior, he treated the front facade as a hard skin of stones and bricks interwoven by the system of composite masonry, a way of stone binding associated with early Ottoman communal buildings. Taut highlighted his intentions by designing subtle deviations from the stone of the front facade to the stucco of the side facade, refined details between the stones and the window frames, gutters, lamps, bent surfaces and expressive handrails. Taut used also a specific window detail admittedly inspired from the "old Turkish houses."⁴¹ Freed from classical plan conceptions, the main

40 Bozdoğan, Sibel. 2010. "The Legacy of an Istanbul Architect: Type, Context and Urban Identity in the Work of Sedad Eldem," *In Modern Architecture and the Mediterranean: Vernacular Dialogues and Contested Identities*, ed. Jean-Francois Lejeune and Michelangelo Sabatino, proceedings of the conference "The other modern: On the influence of the vernacular on the architecture and the city of the twentieth century," London & New York: Routledge, 131–146.

41 Bozdoğan, Sibel. 1997. "Against style: Bruno Taut's pedagogical program in Turkey, 1936–1938." In *The Education of the Architect: Historiography, Urbanism and the Growth of Architectural Knowledge*, ed. Martha Pollak. Cambridge: MIT Press, 163–192; Gasco, Giorgio. 2010. "Bruno Taut and the Program for the Protection of Monuments in Turkey

hall was designed as a collection of framed spaces within spaces. Evaluating his work on the basis of traditional construction techniques and architectural ornament, some argued that Taut was a supporter of nationalism, whereas his own purposes were formulated in his writings (1936, 1937, 1938).⁴² Taut disapproved of those who excluded foreign inspirations, yet supported “no false Internationalism, no uniformization of the world [...] but a hybridization that would “make both sides richer.”⁴³

After World War II, the fading of European countries and the rebuilding of Europe led to changes in Asia. In this context, the Iraqi Development Board was established in the early 1950s to plan, manage, and use subsidy from foreign creditors and revenue from the oil industry to modernise Iraq. Modern architecture was presented as a symbol and core element in the progression towards a modern lifestyle, represented through buildings capable of strengthening national identity.⁴⁴ The British presence in Iraq during the mandate period⁴⁵ had its impact on the built environment. Most markedly, James Mollison Wilson⁴⁶ and Harold Mason designed major governmental and civic buildings until 1935 (Memorial Hospital and Airport in Basra) and continued to exercise their influence in the design of buildings (Baghdad Railway Station).⁴⁷ Nizar Ali Jawak, the son of the prime minister under king Faisal II, convinced his father that as Iraq becomes a part of the modern world, the country should employ the best architects. Architects proposed included Frank Lloyd Wright,

(1937–38)/ Three case studies: Ankara, Edirne and Bursa.” *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture* (27:2): 15–36.

42 Taut, Bruno. 1936. *Japans Kunst*. Tokyo: Verlag Meiji Shobo; Taut, Bruno. 1937. *Houses and People of Japan*. Tokyo: Sanseido; Turk Evi, Sinan. 1938. *Mimari Bilgisi*. Ankara. *Her Ay*, 2: 93–94.

43 (Taut, 1936, 206).

44 Bernhardsson, Magnus. 2008. “Visions of Iraq: Modernizing the past in 1950s Baghdad.” In *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 81–96; Fethi, Ihsan. 1985. “Contemporary Architecture in Baghdad: Its Roots and Transition,” *Progress: architecture*, 58 (May): 112–132; Frampton, Kenneth and Hasan-Uddin, Khan. 2000. *World Architecture 1900–2000: A Critical Mosaic, vol. 5, The Middle East*. Wien: Springer; Nooraddin, Hoshidar. 2004. “Globalization and the search for modern local architecture: Learning from Baghdad.” In *Planning Middle Eastern Cities*, ed. Yasser Elsheshtawy. London: Routledge, 59–84.

45 Colonial mandates were formally granted in 1922, when the League of Nations gave Britain sovereignty over Iraq and Jordan, and France was given sovereignty over Syria and Lebanon.

46 Assistant of Edwin Lutyens in the design of colonial New Delhi, 1912–1930.

47 Crinson, Mark. 2003. *Modern Architecture and the End of Empire*. Burlington: Ashgate and Pieri, Caecilia. 2004. *Bagdad: La Construction d'une Capitale Moderne, 1920–1960*. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press.

Walter Gropius, Alvar Aalto, Josep Lluís Sert, Constantinos Doxiadis and Gio Ponti.⁴⁸ Looking to represent the new nation as a sophisticated, modernising member of the world community, the Iraqi Development Board invited the world's best to build signature projects in Iraq.

At the age of ninety, Wright, conceived an urbanistic proposal for Baghdad (1955–1958).⁴⁹ The master plan was more an Orientalist proposal than a depiction of the region's vernacular architecture that makes it hard to find a formal unity between appropriating or foreignizing tendencies in hybridity. The proposal contained ziggurats that hid parking lots, cascading spires, cut and pasted Arabic symbolism. The Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier was at the height of his career when in 1955 he was invited to design for Baghdad. On the larger question of where Baghdad fits into Le Corbusier's modernist oeuvre, technological innovation was integral to the design of his City of Sports (1955–1983). His innovative use of moving waves for the swimming pool, 'piscine à vague', reflected his appreciation of the Tigris River. Sketches and records of his meetings reveal that the gymnasium roof's sloping form was inspired by the Arabian tents.

Gropius was awarded the contract for the University of Baghdad Master Plan in 1957 and would oversee the project until his death in 1969.⁵⁰ Only a few of Gropius' designs survived into the final iteration of the campus. The project was praised for "setting aside [...] Bauhaus purity" to "make room for liberties of the vernacular,"⁵¹ thereby "avoid[ing] too much Americanism."⁵² Gropius

48 (Bernhardsson, 2008, 81–96); (Fethi, 1985, 112–132); (Frampton and Hasan-Uddin, 2000); (Nooraddin, 2004, 59–84).

49 Marefat, Mina. 1999. "Wright in Baghdad." In *Frank Lloyd Wright: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Anthony Alofsin. Berkeley: University of California Press and Stanek, Łukasz. 2012. "Miastoprojekt goes abroad: the transfer of architectural labour from socialist Poland to Iraq (1958–1989)," *The Journal of Architecture*, 17, 3: 361–386. Siry, Joseph. 2005. "Wright's Baghdad Opera House and Gammage Auditorium: In Search of Regional Modernity." *The Art Bulletin* 87, no. 2: 265–311.

50 Wisniewski, Katherine. 2015. "Baghdad Could Have Been a Mega-City by Frank Lloyd Wright." *Curbed*. March 05. Accessed May, 2021. <https://archive.curbed.com/2015/3/5/9985504/greater-baghdad-frank-lloyd-wright-corbusier>.

51 Rogers, Ernesto. 1960. "Architecture of the Middle East," *Casabella*, vol. 242, (August), vii. Quoted in Marafat, Mina. 2008. "The Universal University: How Bauhaus Came to Baghdad." *DC. Revista de crítica arquitectónica*, n. "Ciudad del Espejismo: Bagdad, de Wright a Venturi": 157–166. Marefat argues that Gropius was applying 'Bauhaus principles' and no regionalism in his design, although all the evidence is to the contrary, in particular this statement.

52 Gropius, Walter. 1958. "Planning a University," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9. Quoted in Marafat, Mina. 2008. "The Universal University: How Bauhaus Came to Baghdad." *DC. Revista de crítica arquitectónica*, n. "Ciudad del Espejismo: Bagdad, de Wright a Venturi": 164.

wrote “buildings are placed round patios of various sizes, which are filled with plants, water basins, and fountains [...] The interrelationship of [...] buildings and the land-scaped open spaces with their water fountains between them, as well as the shadow effects from the strong sunlight obtained by cantilevers and undercuts will cause a significant rhythm.”⁵³ The project incorporated concrete versions of *mashrabiya* – pierced grilled windows – and placed vaults on top of skyscrapers. Gropius also created a mosque in the form of a concrete dome supported on three points surrounded by a circular pool of water.

The Greek architect Constantinos Doxiadis was initially asked by King Faisal’s II administration to draw up a five-year plan for the entire country. He developed master plans for Iraq (1954–1958), Syria (1958), and Lebanon (1958), with the endorsement of the United States. The Baghdad master plan stressed housing for all and a foundation for long-term urban and regional growth. Doxiadis made it a point to distinguish his regionalist approach to planning from that of Brasilia and Chandigarh.⁵⁴ Doxiadis committed to diagnose each site’s specific local, regional needs and potentials rather than applying universal norms and standards.

At the time, Doxiadis was praised by the *New York Times* for eliminating empty and lonely urban environments that made dwellers susceptible to communism.⁵⁵ Doxiadis’s master plans sought to rectify the urbanization problems of post-war cities, such as housing shortages due to mass immigration from rural areas, slum clearance, and traffic congestion. Yet, he showed a heightened interest in researching built settings and environmental features. Convinced of the power of Ekistics, “the science of human settlements,” to “civilize” the world and provide the architecture of development, Doxiadis thought extensive visual surveys, scientific (i.e., empirically based) analyses, and candid diagnosis of present problems would deliver both universal progress and regional specificity. According to the scholar Panayiota Pyla,⁵⁶ “Ekistics proposed a corrective to Eurocentric modernism” and appealed to “post-colonial governments of the time [with] the promise that it would be more amenable to local cultural preferences.”

53 Gropius, Walter. 1959. “Universität in Bagdad,” *Bauen + Wohnen*, Heft 11: 392.

54 Doxiadis, Constantinos. 1959. “The Rising Tide and the Planner,” *Ekistics*, vol. 7, no. 39: 4–10 at p. 6. Quoted in Pyla, Panayiota. 2008. “Baghdad’s Urban Restructuring, 1958,” In *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 99.

55 Pyla, Panayiota. 2002. “Ekistics, architecture and environmental politics, 1945–1976: A pre-history of sustainable development.” Ph.D. dissertation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 63.

56 *Ibid.*, 21 and 57.

Josep Lluís Sert, the Catalan architect based in the United States, describes his Baghdad embassy's chancery, ambassador's residence and staff buildings (1955–1960), as a response to climatic constraints, that he considered “nature-given” hence “eternal” identifiers of a region. The buildings had a modernist taste in a landscaped oasis garden encircled by walls that contained a dyke and a canal as an allegory of the Tigris River. The chancery building was organized around a cooling courtyard which was an allusion to traditional houses and had three floors stepped back with cantilevered slabs to provide shades. The *brise soleil* surfaces for protection and ventilation were designed as two kinds of screens, one of white ceramic tiles and the other as metal louvers. There was a double roof made of a folded concrete slab which allowed air circulation in-between, protected the inner roof from excessive sun, and channelled down-pours through its folds. The wide use of concrete in addition to local tiles was in line with the aim of boosting the concrete industry in Iraq.⁵⁷

Many architects were interested in a climate-specific architecture and a regionalist foundation for their buildings. The invention of a new modern vocabulary with sun-protected surfaces and outdoor spaces, *brise soleil*, courtyards and umbrella roofs testifies to a pledge to climate as marker of identity. Despite the claims to regional sensitivity, all these Western architects were criticized for drawing Western forms.

In the 1970s, the rise of Kuwait marked the beginning of works by established architects.⁵⁸ The first include Kenzo Tange from Japan who designed the National Airport; Mohamed Makiya from Iraq for the design of the State Mosque; Alison and Peter Smithson from the UK for research into climate; Malene Bjorn from Sweden for the Kuwait Water Towers (1969–1976) where she provided “an Islamic symbol of the space age.”⁵⁹ Raili and Reima Pietilä from Finland after an invitation in 1969 to draw up an idea plan to modernize the old Kuwait town outlined an interpretation of Middle Eastern bazaars with the design of a covered pedestrian area. They were commissioned to design ‘new Arabic architecture’ with the administrative complex that included an extension of the Sief Palace, the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. George Candilis, Alexis Josic and Shadrach Woods, the French

57 Samuel Isenstadt interpreted this building complex as part of Eisenhower's United States embassies program and hence a balancing act during the Cold War. Isenstadt, Samuel. 1997. “Faith in a Better Future’: Josep Lluís Sert’s American Embassy in Baghdad.” *Journal of Architectural Education* 50: 172–188.

58 Stanek, Łukasz. 2012. *Post Modernism is almost all right: Polish Architecture after Socialist Globalization*. Warsaw, Museum of Modern Art.

59 Gardiner, Stephen. 1983. *Kuwait: The Making of a City*. Essex: Longman, 124.

members of Team 10, designed residential neighbourhoods using *The Cité Verticale* design based on the traditional patio-dwelling. They took as starting point the Islamic tradition transition from private to public domain and, at the same time, united traditional elements with modernity such as multi-level buildings, technology, and contemporary collective amenities.⁶⁰ Two Danish architects, Arne Jacobsen and Jorn Utzon, designed the Central Bank and the Parliament Building (1972–1983).⁶¹ His building outlined an interpretation of the traditional souk. Thoughtful with an idea of “additive architecture,” in the design Utzon combined monolithic and additive elements by preparing the stage for new additions of modules if needed, while establishing a finished composition overall. The main concept was hence sun protection, which was materialized with the introverted character of the complex, as well as the use of repetitive courtyards, covered inner streets, and tent metaphors. For Utzon, the structurally tectonic expression of his buildings reproduced the “purity of Islamic construction.”

In Sri Lanka, a place whose purview is hegemonically Buddhist and Sinhala, where Tamil, Muslim, or any Other can only arrive as guest, the architect Geoffrey Bawa began to produce buildings in the 1960s that drew on his professional training and the influences of Modernism that he had been exposed to in Europe. Bawa was a leading architect of critical vernacularism and his attention to the study of traditional building form was manifest. He was commissioned to design the National Parliament. However, many of Bawa’s projects integrate existing dwellings or draw on Sri Lanka’s built heritage resulting from Portuguese, Dutch or British settlements. The hybridization of built forms over centuries through contacts, exchanges, subjection, and revival was a great source of inspiration for Bawa: “past and present good architecture in Sri Lanka as just that – good Sri Lankan architecture – for this is what it is, not narrowly classified as Indian, Portuguese or Dutch, early Singhalese or Kandyan or British colonial, for all the good examples [...] have taken the country itself into account.”⁶² The use of internal spaces provided a commonality among Islamic houses and established a difference from other Singhalese houses. Bawa’s work is pitched as an expression of national identity in the postcolonial context, “a new architectural identity that drew together the different strands

60 Avermaete, Tom. 2005. *Another Modern, The Postwar Architecture and Urbanism of Candilis-Josic-Woods*. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers.

61 (Gardiner, 1983).

62 Robson, David. 2002. *Geoffrey Bawa: The Complete Works*. London: Thames & Hudson.

of a complex ethnic weave and exploited a rich history.”⁶³ Hence, Bawa’s work is presented as an authentic response to Sri Lankan hybridity.⁶⁴

3 Global Currents

After the 1980s, an increased emphasis on cultural identity motivated a simultaneous and perhaps independent shift in secular circles of architectural and urbanistic cultures popularized ‘Islamic’ as the catch-all term, especially in Western publications and institutions, to designate building practice in Middle East and Asian countries. The shift from the category of the ‘regional’ into a reconstructed category of the ‘Islamic’ is a perceived identity-marker of hybridity. It is interesting to observe how contemporary architects after the 1980s relied on this field’s taxonomies, which aligned them with the rise of postmodern architectural style around the world and the new interest in making references to historical buildings.

Among the institutions that advocated modernization without detachment from cultural twitches was the Aga Khan Award Foundation exploring in its award “notions of architectural identity, of reliance on native rather than imported practices and talents, of an ideologically significant rather than merely antiquarian past, of technologies appropriate to each task [...] of pride in accomplishments of the past of the lands on which one builds, of locally inspired rather than imported educational objectives in professional schools.”⁶⁵ The secretary of the Foundation, Siiha Ozkan, while explaining its mission mentioned the ‘failure’ of modernism in the Islamic societies and in the Third World, because its proponents ignored the “existence of the cultural values in the built environment, continuity between past and present, a sense of identity, consideration of climate and need for user (or community) participation.”⁶⁶

63 Robson, David. 2001. “Genius of the Place: The Buildings and Landscapes of Geoffrey Bawa,” In *Modernity and Community: Architecture in the Islamic World*, ed. Philippa Baker. London: Thames & Hudson, 18.

64 Robson, David. 2001. “Sage of Sri Lanka,” *Architectural Review* 210, no. 1257 (November), 75.

65 Grabar, Oleg. 1994. “The mission and its people.” In James Steele (ed.), *Architecture for Islamic Societies Today*. (London: Academy Editions, Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1994), 7.

66 Ozkan, Suha. 1994. “Complexity, coexistence and plurality.” In *Architecture for Islamic Societies Today*, ed. James Steele. London: Academy Editions, Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 23–27.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Aga Khan Award for Architecture supported both canonical buildings by established architects, conservation projects and low-income housing, that dealt with the question of identity and those that were evaluated as balanced syntheses between modernity and tradition. The award canonized the past work of the Egyptian architect Hasan Fathy and valued projects as the Hajj Terminal in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1974–1982) or the National Commercial Bank in Jeddah (1977–1983), designed by the international team SOM as one of the first climate-specific skyscrapers that integrated historical references and environmental concerns and served as a model for future skyscrapers in West Asia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh, designed by the Danish architect Henning Larsen, a complex with a fortress-like stone-clad exterior, ceremonial entrance, a hierarchy of atriums, courtyards, internal streets and passageways.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the postmodern solution to the challenge of authenticity and continuity was to revert to selective replication of acclaimed historical models not mediated by stylistic rereading. This suited the attitude of the time in Islamic countries, some of which had belatedly gained their independence from colonial rule and were eager to establish an identity with roots in the past. The available display of Islamic architecture comprising collections of grand monuments, presented a streamlined set of imageries from identifiable historical anchors that influenced contemporary architects' designs. Historical models were 'sampled' to make up variations on these archetypes valued by a new class of wealthy and culturally traditionalist patrons. Consequently, most of the Islamic architecture of the 1970s and 1980s, and even later decades, was postmodern in spirit and appearance, even when it was cloaked in environmental or technological rhetorical arguments.

In the late twentieth century, big buildings design in Qatar and in the United Arab Emirates were authored by architects such as Rem Koolhaas (OMA), Jean Nouvel, Norman Foster, Zaha Hadid, Santiago Calatrava, Arata Isozaki, I.M. Pei, SOM, Kenzo Tange, the Rafael Vinoly, UN Studio and Legorreta+Legorreta. For the rebuilding of Beirut's destroyed by war, were invited architects such as Steven Holl, Jacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron, Jean Nouvel, Rafael Moneo, Norman Foster and Arata Isozaki. It is relevant to note how the Museum of Islamic Art in Qatar by Pei, was designed as a structure highlighting "simplicity" and "geometry" inspired partly on the Ahmad ibn Tulum Mosque in Cairo occupying an artificial island.

The Otherness of ornament is attributed to abstract pattern making and the proliferation of surface decoration (where figural representation and three dimensionality are purposefully suppressed to emphasise Otherness). As in the nineteenth century, the preoccupation with unity was identified with

the ahistorical discourse of Orientalism and the didactic studies of ornament aimed at a Western audience. For example, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai designed by SOM (2004–2010) is the world's tallest skyscraper to date and yet residues of postmodern and Orientalist fixations on Islamic identity have been used. Many architects use stylized and technologically reinterpreted versions to create compulsory identity markers. For example, *mashrabiyyas* have come to be perceived as one of the most easily identifiable markers of Islamic architecture, as in the Louvre Museum in Abu Dhabi by Nouvel, or the campus buildings in the Qatar Education City (2004–2008) by Isozaki.

4 The Islamic City

The Islamic City paradigm has a long history in Orientalist research.⁶⁷ Main attributes of Islamic cities as defined by authors such as Albert Hourani and Samuel Stern,⁶⁸ Janet Abu-Lughod,⁶⁹ Eugen Wirth⁷⁰ and Ludwig Ammann,⁷¹ include dense and unequal urban settlement patterns with long and winding streets, a separation between residential and commercial neighbourhoods, a subdivision of the residential neighbourhoods into smaller neighbourhoods,

67 In a seminal article, Janet Abu-Lughod (Abu-Lughod, Janet. 1987. "The Islamic City: Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19 (2): 155–176) traces the origins of the quest for the essence of Islamic cities back to an article published in 1928, 'L'Islamisme et la vie urbaine' by William Marçais, as well as to Jean Sauvaget's work on Damascus (1934) and Aleppo (1941). Another important source often drawn on to identify differences between European cities and those in the Islamic world is Max Weber's text *The City* (1958), originally published in 1921. From 1970 on, the generalising concept of the Islamic City was subject to critical reassessment. In spite of profound criticism, authors such as Albert Hourani (Hourani, Albert, and Stern, Samuel (eds.). 1970. *The Islamic City: A Colloquium*. Oxford: Bruno Cassirer & Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), Samuel Stern (Hourani, Albert, and Stern, Samuel (eds.), 1970, 25–50), Dale Eickelmann (Eickelman, Dale. 1974. "Is there an Islamic City?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5: 274–94) and Janet Abu-Lughod (Abu-Lughod, Janet. 1980. "Contemporary Relevance of Islamic Urban Principles." *Ekistics* 47 (280): 6–10 and (Abu-Lughod, 1987, 155–176) did not discard the concept entirely but rather attempted to modify and refine it. Until recently, urban historians, geographers, architects and town planners have used and reproduced it.

68 (Hourani, Albert, and Stern, Samuel (eds.), 1970, 9–24.

69 (Abu-Lughod, 1987, 160–173).

70 Wirth, Eugen. 2000. *Die orientalische Stadt im islamischen Vorderasien und Nordafrika*. Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 517–522.

71 Ammann, Ludwig. 2004. 'Privatsphäre und Öffentlichkeit in der muslimischen Zivilisation.' In *Islam in Sicht: Der Auftritt von Muslimen im öffentlichen Raum*, ed. Nilüfer Göle and Ludwig Ammann, Bielefeld: transcript, 93–95.

blind alleys and dead-end courts shared by the inhabitants of adjoining houses. Furthermore, Islamic Cities are described as lacking municipal organisation.

Since the nineteenth century, criticisms are directed at representations of the Islamic city as Other. Abu-Lughod, Raymond and Çelik identify the limitations of efforts to define urban form as a material expression of Islam.⁷² In three insightful essays they trace this tendency to French Orientalist scholarship, particularly the work of William Marçais, Georges Marçais and Jean Sauvaget.⁷³ The attitudes represented in this body of Orientalist scholarship are celebrated and summarised by architectural historian Gustave von Grunebaum.⁷⁴ Commenting on the tendency to represent the Islamic city with reference to French scholarship on North Africa, Çelik identifies “the fallacies of orientalist scholarship.”⁷⁵ Similarly, Raymond identifies the shortcomings of prominent Orientalist studies that define the city in terms of cultural stereotypes or faith, challenging “efforts to define an urban ‘doctrine’ from the fundamental texts of Islam.”⁷⁶ He argues that representations present the Islamic city as timeless and incapable of development. Raymond extends his criticism to studies that emphasise the formal hierarchy of the city consisting of religious institutions (mosque and madrasa) attached to the bazaar and distinct from residential quarters.⁷⁷

-
- 72 (Abu-Lughod, Janet. 1987, 155–176); Raymond, André. 1994. “Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Views,” *British Journal of Middle East Studies* 21, no. 1: 3–18; Çelik, Zeynep. 1999. “New Approaches to the Non-Western City,” *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 58, no. 3 (September): 374–81.
- 73 Marçais, William. 1961. “L’Islamisme et la Vie Urbaine.” In *Articles et Conférences*, Paris: Editions Adrien-Maisonneuve; Marçais, Georges. 1954. *L’Architecture Musulmane d’Occident*. Paris: Arts et Metiers Graphiques; Marçais, Georges. 1957. “L’Urbanisme Musulman,” in *Mélanges d’Histoire et d’Archéologie de l’Occident Musulman*, 2 vols. Algiers: Imprint Officielle, and Sauvaget, Jean. 1934. “Esquisse d’Une Histoire de la Ville de Damas,” *Revue des Études Islamiques* 4.
- 74 Grunebaum, Gustave von. 1961. “The Structure of the Muslim Town,” In *Islam: Essays on the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 141–158.
- 75 Çelik, Zeynep. 1999. “New Approaches to the Non-Western City,” *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 58, no. 3 (September): 375.
- 76 Raymond, André. 1994. “Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Views.” *British Journal of Middle East Studies* 21, No. 1: 16. For further discussion of representation of Muslim cities as an expression of a discrete Islamic culture and society, see the introduction to AlSayyad, Nizar. 1991. *Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- 77 The limits of representing an Islamic city typology, especially in the Mediterranean region and the Indian subcontinent, are further identified in *The Islamic City: A Colloquium*, edited by Albert Hourani and Samuel Stern, Samuel.

5 The Modernist Hybrid City

After India's independence, its partition and the ensuing movement of refugees across borders, the foundation of the nation, the allocation of cities to Pakistan, nostalgia, ambitions, imaginations and their paradoxes and struggles were all part of the plans and planning of Chandigarh. The national aspirations for the new city represented in Jawaharlal Nehru's (prime-minister 1947–1964) idea of India, divided between Hinduism and Islam, and the notions of modernity fostered by Punjabi officials had a profound impact on the design of Chandigarh.

Modernity, for Nehru, meant the hostile effort to catch up with the West. New cities, hydroelectric dams, steel and iron plants, were the order of his rule. Nehru's vision of 'new' India presented the opportunity of merging spiritual heritage with the 'scientific temper' of the West.⁷⁸ Nehru was certainly not limited to learning from India alone. Nehru placed himself within a hybrid and liminal thought in relation to the postcolonial context. He believed in India's aptitude to learn from others and to 'Indianize' elements and features borrowed. In Chandigarh, Nehru was in search of a way to renew it and use it to display an Indian modernity different from and free of colonial versions.⁷⁹ The Modernism of the postcolonial Nehruvian state was the mutual response of the colonized, the self-empowering act of dissolving contradiction by simultaneously rejecting and appropriating the unsolicited gift of colonization. Modernization, thus, was a mimicry of the colonial project. It is within this hybridity that Chandigarh was conceived by Nehru.

Two plans were prepared for the city, the initial awarded to American architects Albert Mayer and Mathew Nowitzkiin in 1950 and the subsequent supported by Pierre Jeanneret, Maxwell Fry, and Jane Drew. Le Corbusier was the author of the Master Plan, the Capitol complex, where the Secretariat, Legislative Assembly, High court and the unbuilt Governor's residence were located. He also set the guidelines for the commercial centre, built a museum and a school of arts. Chandigarh was formally inaugurated on October 7, 1953.⁸⁰ Beyond the Master Plan, the city's claim to modernity was settled through appearances: it could not look colonial, could not look Indian, could not look Hindu or Islamic, but had to look modern. The city is in some parts conceived

78 Chatterjee, Suparna and Kenny, Judith. 1999. "Creating a New Capital: Colonial Discourse and the Decolonization of Delhi." *Historical Geography* 27, 88.

79 Khilnani, Sunil. 1997. *The Idea of India*. New Delhi: Penguin, 130.

80 Kalia, Ravi. 1999. *Chandigarh: The Making of an Indian City*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 44.

as in a modern Garden city mould, and in others in one that is Orientalist and rural.

The planning of Chandigarh represents many other voices beyond Islamic and exclusive praise of Le Corbusier only echoes the scarcity of the discourse and its narrators. It is much more uncanny, hybrid, liminal, disorderly and diverse than its architectural discourse suggests. The Corbusier plan is a hybrid map of contested Hindu and Islamic imaginations. In a conference in Chandigarh in 1995, the postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak, made a case for colonial architecture free from the unhappy memory of colonization. She argued that the “mundane movement of the European colonies upon Indian soil [...]. The contemporary hybrid Indian, a product like us of history, has internalized the idiom of minor colonial architecture now.” In another publication Spivak states: “the invitation of Le Corbusier was part of that [...] triumphalist construction of the new nation as an hybrid. It is an irony that that planned hybridity did not work because of a failure in the transfer of the idiom (not a failure of translation).”⁸¹

6 Conclusion

The examples offered in this chapter illustrate that Middle East and Asian cities throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries were shaped by decisions “in-between” places that produce hybridization of identities: “it is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated.”⁸² Foreign and local architects should hence share not only the credit for the landmarks but also the criticism for the general urban outcomes. Foreign architect designs are marked by hybridity and assess the different qualities and ideologies of each specific example of architecture in which hybridity is manifest. Correspondingly significant is the negotiation between collaborating foreign architects and citizens, the sincere attention to local climates and architectural forms for those who could use their ethnographic expertise and cosmopolitan integrity to generate hybridity.

We think that hybridisation does not occur once and for all but is a continuous process. Bhabha, claims that “all forms of culture are continually in a

81 Spivak, Gayatri. 2019. “City, Country, Agency.” *Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism* 16, no. 2: 59–85.

82 (Bhabha, 2004, 1).

process of hybridity.”⁸³ The corollary is that the boundaries between hybridity and tradition, change and continuity, may dissolve.⁸⁴ It is an uneven, uni-directional, and forced hybridity that replicates the prevailing hierarchies of Modernity in the Islamic built environment.

Bibliography

- Abu-Lughod, Janet. 1972. “Disappearing dichotomies: First World–Third World, traditional – modern” *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, 3, 7–12.
- Abu-Lughod, Janet. 1980. “Contemporary Relevance of Islamic Urban Principles.” *Ekistics* 47 (280): 6–10 and 1987. “The Islamic City: Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19 (2): 155–176.
- Akcan, Esra. 2005. *Modernity in translation*. Ph.D. dissertation. New York: Columbia University.
- Akcan, Esra and Bozdoğan, Sibel. 2012. *Turkey: Modern Architectures in History*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Alsayyad, Nezar. 1991. *Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Ammann, Ludwig. 2004. ‘Privatsphäre und Öffentlichkeit in der muslimischen Zivilisation.’ In *Islam in Sicht: Der Auftritt von Muslimen im öffentlichen Raum*, ed. Nilüfer Göle and Ludwig Ammann, Bielefeld: transcript, 93–95.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1988. *The Social Life of Things*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Avermaete, Tom. 2005. *Another Modern, The Postwar Architecture and Urbanism of Candilis-Josic-Woods*, Rotterdam: NAI Publishers.

83 Bhabha, Homi K. 1990. “The Third Space – an interview with Homi Bhabha.” In Rutherford, Jonathan (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 211. Werbner, Pnina. “Introduction: the dialectics of cultural hybridity”, In Werbner, Pnina and Modood, Tariq, (ed.), *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multicultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism* (London: Zed Books, 1997), 1.

84 Indeed, some historians of architecture and urbanism have come close to suggesting that that is definitely the case. See Abu-Lughod, Janet. 1972. “Disappearing dichotomies: First World – Third World, traditional – modern” *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, 3, 7–12; King, Anthony. 2003. “Cultures and spaces of postcolonial knowledges”, In *Handbook of Cultural Geography* Anderson, K., Domosh, M., Pile, S. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publishers, 381–397; Roenisch, Rowan. “Vernacular as invented tradition” *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, 2000, 12–27; Upton, Dell. “Ethnicity, Authenticity, and Invented Traditions.” *Historical Archaeology*, vol. 30, no. 2, 1996, 1–7. (www.jstor.org/stable/25616452 accessed 20 August 2021).

- Bassnett, Susan and Trivedi, Harish (eds.). 1999. *Post-colonial Translation: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.
- Benjamin, Walter. 1968. "The task of the Translator," In Arendt, Hannah (ed.), *Illuminations. Essays and Reflections*. Trans. H. Zohn. New York: Schocken Books.
- Bernhardsson, Magnus. 2008. "Visions of Iraq: Modernizing the past in 1950s Baghdad." In *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 81–96.
- Blair, Sheila and Jonathan Bloom. 2003. "The Mirage of Islamic Art: Reflections on the Study of an Unwieldy Field." *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 85, No. 1 (March): 152–184.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel. 2001. *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel. 1997. "Against style: Bruno Taut's pedagogical program in Turkey, 1936–1938." In *The Education of the Architect: Historiography, Urbanism and the Growth of Architectural Knowledge*, ed. Martha Pollak. Cambridge: MIT Press, 163–192.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel. 1999. "Architectural history in professional education: Reflections on postcolonial challenges to the modern survey." *Journal of Architectural Education*, 52(4): 207–216.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel. 2010. "The Legacy of an Istanbul Architect: Type, Context and Urban Identity in the Work of Sedad Eldem," In *Modern Architecture and the Mediterranean: Vernacular Dialogues and Contested Identities*, ed. Jean-Francois Lejeune and Michelangelo Sabatino, proceedings of the conference "The other modern: On the influence of the vernacular on the architecture and the city of the twentieth century," London & New York: Routledge, 131–146.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel, Özkan Süha, and Yenal Engin (eds.). 1987. *Sedad Eldem: Architect in Turkey*. Singapore & New York: Concept Media.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel, Özkan Süha, and Yenal Engin (eds.). 1987. *Sedad Eldem: Architect in Turkey*. Singapore & New York: Concept Media.
- Bhabha, Homi K. 1990. "The Third Space – an interview with Homi Bhabha." In Rutherford, Jonathan (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990.
- Bhabha, Homi K. 1996. "Culture's In-Between." In *Question of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay. London: Sage Publications.
- Bhabha, Homi K. 2004. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Bhabha, Homi K. 2007. "Architecture and Thought." In *Intervention Architecture. Building for Change*, ed. Pamela Johnston. London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Çelik, Zeynep. 1992. *Displaying the Orient; Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Çelik, Zeynep. 1999. "New Approaches to the Non-Western City," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 58, no. 3 (September): 374–81.

- Chatterjee, Suparna and Judith Kenny. 1999. "Creating a New Capital: Colonial Discourse and the Decolonization of Delhi." *Historical Geography* 27, 88.
- Clifford, James. 1998. *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature and Art*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Crinson, Mark. 1996. *Empire Building: Orientalism and Victorian Architecture*. London: Routledge.
- Crinson, Mark. 2003. *Modern Architecture and the End of Empire*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- Dallmayr, Fred. 1996. *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-cultural Encounter*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Derrida, Jacques. 1985. *The Ear of the Other*. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Derrida, Jacques. 1992. "From Des Tours de Babel." In *Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida*, ed. Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 218–227.
- Doxiadis, Constantinos. 1959. "The Rising Tide and the Planner," *Ekistics*, vol. 7, no. 39: 4–10.
- Dutton, Michael and Peter Williams. 1993. "Translating Theories: Edward Said on Orientalism, Imperialism and Alterity." *Southern Review* 26, no. 3: 314–57.
- Eickelman, Dale. 1974. "Is there an Islamic City?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5: 274–94).
- Fethi, Ihsan. 1985. "Contemporary Architecture in Baghdad: Its Roots and Transition," *Progress: architecture*, 58 (May): 112–132.
- Flood, Finbar. 2007. "From Prophet to postmodernism? New World orders and the end of Islamic Art." In *Making Art History: A Changing Discipline and its Institutions*. ed. E. Mansfield, London: Routledge, 31–52.
- Foucault, Michel. 1972. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Frampton, Kenneth and Hasan-Uddin, Khan. 2000. *World Architecture 1900–2000: A Critical Mosaic, vol. 5, The Middle East*. Wien: Springer.
- Gallo, Antonella, 1991. "Un architetto aristocratico," *Phalaris*, vol. 16: 12–15.
- Gardiner, Stephen. 1983. *Kuwait: The Making of a City*. Essex: Longman.
- Gasco, Giorgio. 2010. "Bruno Taut and the Program for the Protection of Monuments in Turkey (1937–38)/ Three case studies: Ankara, Edirne and Bursa." *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture* (27:2): 15–36.
- Glick, Thomas and Oriol Pi-Sunyer. 1969. "Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept in Spanish History." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, no. 2: 140.
- Grabar, Oleg. 1973. *The Formation of Islamic Art*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1–18.
- Grabar, Oleg. 1976. "What Makes Islamic Art Islamic?" *Art and Archaeology Research Papers* 9: 1–3.

- Grabar, Oleg. 1978. "Islamic Art: Art of a Culture or art of a Faith." In *Art and Archaeology Research Papers* 11: 1–6.
- Grabar, Oleg. 1994. "The mission and its people." In James Steele (ed.), *Architecture for Islamic Societies Today*. (London: Academy Editions, Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1994).
- Gropius, Walter. 1958. "Planning a University," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9.
- Gropius, Walter. 1959. "Universität in Bagdad," *Bauen + Wohnen*, Heft 11.
- Grube, Ernst. 1978. "Introduction: What Is Islamic Architecture?" In *Architecture of the Islamic World; its History and Social Meaning*, ed. George Michell. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Grunebaum, Gustave von. 1961. "The Structure of the Muslim Town," In *Islam: Essays on the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 141–158.
- Hillebrand, Robert. 1994. *Islamic Architecture: Form, Function and Meaning*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Hourani, Albert, and Samuel Stern (eds.). 1970. *The Islamic City: A Colloquium*. Oxford: Bruno Cassirer & Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Isenstadt, Samuel. 1997. "'Faith in a Better Future': Josep Lluís Sert's American Embassy in Baghdad." *Journal of Architectural Education* 50: 172–188.
- Kalia, Ravi. 1999. *Chandigarh: The Making of an Indian City*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kapchan, Deborah, and Pauline Strong. 1999. "Theorizing the Hybrid" *Journal of American Folklore* 112. 445: 239–253.
- Khilnani, Sunil. 1997. *The Idea of India*. New Delhi: Penguin.
- King, Anthony. 2003. "Cultures and spaces of postcolonial knowledges", In *Handbook of Cultural Geography* Anderson, K., Domosh, M., Pile, S.. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publishers, 381–397.
- Latour, Bruno. 1993. *We Have Never Been Modern*. Trans. Catherine Parker. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Lionnet, Françoise. 1989. "Introduction. The Politics and Aesthetics of Métissage." In *Autobiographical Voices: Race, Gender, Self-Portraiture*, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
- Marçais, William. 1961. "L'Islamisme et la Vie Urbaine." In *Articles et Conférences*, Paris: Editions Adrien-Maisonneuve.
- Marçais, Georges. 1954. *L'Architecture Musulmane d'Occident*. Paris: Arts et Metiers Graphiques.
- Marçais, Georges. 1957. "L'Urbanisme Musulman," in *Mélanges d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de l'Occident Musulman*, 2 vols. Algiers: Imprint Officielle, and Sauvaget, Jean. 1934. "Esquisse d'Une Histoire de la Ville de Damas," *Revue des Études Islamiques* 4.

- Marefat, Mina. 1999. "Wright in Baghdad." In *Frank Lloyd Wright: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Anthony Alofsin. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Marefat, Mina. 2008. "The Universal University: How Bauhaus Came to Baghdad." *DC. Revista de crítica arquitectónica*, n. "Ciudad del Espejismo: Bagdad, de Wright a Venturi": 157–166.
- Moussavi, Farshid. 2007. "Cosmopolitanism and Architecture." In *Intervention Architecture. Building for Change*, ed. Pamela Johnston. London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Necipoglu, Gülrü. 2012. "The concept of Islamic art: Inherited discourses and new approaches." In *Islamic Art and the Museum: Approaches to Art and Archaeology of the Muslim World in the Twenty-First Century*, Benoit Junod, Georges Khalil, Stefan Weber and Gerhard Wolf (eds.), London: Saqi Books.
- Nicolai, Bernd. 1998. *Moderne und Extl: Deutschsprachige Architekten in der Türkei 1925–1955*. Berlin: Verlag für Bauwesen.
- Niranjana, Tejaswini. 1992. *Siting Translation: History, Post-structuralism and the Colonial Context*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nooraddin, Hoshiar. 2004. "Globalization and the search for modern local architecture: Learning from Baghdad." In *Planning Middle Eastern Cities*, ed. Yasser Elsheshtawy. London: Routledge, 59–84.
- Ortiz, Fernando. 1995. *Cuban Counterpoint, Tobacco and Sugar*. Trans. Harriet de Onis. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Özkan, Süha. 1994. "Complexity, coexistence and plurality." In *Architecture for Islamic Societies Today*, ed. James Steele. London: Academy Editions, Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 23–27.
- Pieri, Caecilia. 2004. *Bagdad: La Construction d'une Capitale Moderne, 1920–1960*. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press.
- Pratt, Mary. 1992. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London: Routledge.
- Pyla, Panayiota. 2002. "Ekistics, architecture and environmental politics, 1945–1976: A prehistory of sustainable development." Ph.D. dissertation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT.
- Pyla, Panayiota. 2008. "Baghdad's Urban Restructuring, 1958," In *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Rabbat, Nasser. 2012. "What is Islamic Architecture, anyway?" *Journal of Art Historiography* 6: 1–15.
- Rabbat, Nasser. 2008. "Baghdad's Urban Restructuring, 1958," In *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Raymond, André. 1994. "Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Views," *British Journal of Middle East Studies* 21, no. 1: 3–18.

- Robson, David. 2001. "Genius of the Place: The Buildings and Landscapes of Geoffrey Bawa," In *Modernity and Community: Architecture in the Islamic World*, ed. Philippa Baker. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Robson, David. 2001. "Sage of Sri Lanka," *Architectural Review* 210, no. 1257 (November).
- Robson, David. 2002. *Geoffrey Bawa: The Complete Works*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Roenisch, Rowan. "Vernacular as invented tradition" *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, 2000, 12–27; Upton, Dell. "Ethnicity, Authenticity, and Invented Traditions." *Historical Archaeology*, vol. 30, no. 2, 1996, 1–7. (www.jstor.org/stable/25616452. Accessed 20 August 2021).
- Rogers, Ernesto. 1960. "Architecture of the Middle East," *Casabella*, vol. 242, (August), vii.
- Said, Edward. 1992. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage books.
- Said, Edward. 1995. *Orientalism; Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Penguin Books.
- Siry, Joseph. 2005. "Wright's Baghdad Opera House and Gammage Auditorium: In Search of Regional Modernity." *The Art Bulletin* 87, no. 2: 265–311.
- Spivak, Gayatri. 1993. "The politics of Translation." In *Outside in the Teaching Machine*. London: Routledge.
- Stanek, Łukasz. 2012. "Miastoprojekt goes abroad: the transfer of architectural labour from socialist Poland to Iraq (1958–1989)," *The Journal of Architecture*, 17, 3: 361–386.
- Stanek, Łukasz. 2012. *Post Modernism is almost all right: Polish Architecture after Socialist Globalization*. Warsaw, Museum of Modern Art.
- Stoler, Laura Ann. 1992. "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule." In *Colonialism and Culture*, ed. Nicholas Dirks, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Stoler, Laura Ann. 2019. "City, Country, Agency." *Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism* 16, no. 2: 59–85.
- Stern, Samuel. 1970. "The Constitution of the Islamic City." In *The Islamic City*, ed. Albert Hourani and Samuel Stern. Oxford: Bruno Cassirer & Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 25–50.
- Tanju, Bülent and Uğur Tanylelli, . 2008. *Sedad Hakki Eldem 1: Genclik Yyllari*. Istanbul: Osmanli Balkasi Arşiv ve Araştı Merkezi;
- Tanju, Bülent. 2009. *Sedad Hakki Eldem 2. Retrospektif*. Istanbul: Osmanlı Balkası Arşiv ve Araştı Merkezi.
- Tanylelli, Uğur. 2001. *Sedad Hakki Eldem*. Istanbul: Boyut Yayın Grubu.
- Tanylelli, Uğur. 2007. *Mimarlığın Aktörleri, Türkiye 1900–2000*. Istanbul: Garanti Galeri, 162–171.
- Turk Evi, Sinan. 1938. *Mimari Bilgisi*. Ankara. *Her Ay*, 2: 93–94.
- Taut, Bruno. 1936. *Japans Kunst*. Tokyo: Verlag Meiji Shobo.
- Taut, Bruno. 1937. *Houses and People of Japan*. Tokyo: Sanseido.

- Thomas, Nicholas. 1991. *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press.
- Upton, Dell, 1993. "The Tradition of Change." *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* 5, no. 1 (Fall): 9–15.
- Venuti, Lawrence. 1995. *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation*, London: Routledge and 2000. *The Translation Studies Reader* London: Routledge.
- Werbner, Pnina. "Introduction: the dialectics of cultural hybridity", In Werbner, Pnina and Modood, Tariq, (ed.), *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multicultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism* (London: Zed Books, 1997), 1.
- Wirth, Eugen. 2000. *Die orientalische Stadt im islamischen Vorderasien und Nordafrika*. Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 517–522.
- Wisniewski, Katherine. 2015. "Baghdad Could Have Been a Mega-City by Frank Lloyd Wright." Curbed. March 05. (<https://archive.curbed.com/2015/3/5/9985504/greater-baghdad-frank-lloyd-wright-corbusier>. Accessed May, 2021).

Mosques and Cemeteries of the Polish Muslim Tatars as an Example of Islamic Legacy in the Central Eastern European Landscape in the 21st Century

Agata S. Nalborczyk

In the twenty-first century, one tends to search for the traces of Muslim heritage in the European landscape of countries such as Spain, Portugal, maybe Bosnia, or (less frequently) Bulgaria. While hardly anyone mentions Poland in such a context, there are also traces of the Muslim heritage in Poland's landscape. These are historic wooden mosques and gravestones with inscriptions in the Arabic script: a legacy of the presence of Muslim Tatars who settled on Polish territory in the seventeenth century.

1 The History of Muslims in Poland

The presence of mosques and Muslim cemeteries within the boundaries of the modern Polish state is linked to the history of Tatar settlement in the territories of Eastern Europe, and its origins date back to the fourteenth century. These mosques were erected, and cemeteries were established by Tatar Muslims who came from the Golden Horde, a state founded by the descendants of Genghis Khan who settled in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Golden Horde, whose rulers had been practising Islam since the thirteenth century (Borawski and Dubiński 1986, 15), at that time shared a common border with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), with which it was alternately at war or in an alliance against common enemies. Vytautas, Grand Duke of Lithuania, began to systematically settle the Tatars in the GDL territories in the fourteenth century (Tyszkiewicz 1989, 158n): mainly mercenaries (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 17), but political refugees from the Golden Horde and prisoners of war also reached his lands. Those who fought in the Lithuanian army against the enemies of the Grand Duchy were granted land as fiefs in return for their military service, and over time their socio-legal status was equated with that of the Lithuanian nobility. Tatars of lower social status served in the estates of

magnates or were craftsmen, gardeners, or translators of oriental languages (Konopacki 2010, 42n).

From 1386, a personal union in the form of a common king connected the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the then Polish state, i.e. the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland, and from 1569 both of these state organisms comprised the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the seventeenth century, the king of the Commonwealth, Jan III Sobieski, gave the Tatars land along with the obligatory military service in the territory of present-day Poland, in Podlasie, in exchange for the outstanding soldiers' pay, for which he did not have money (Sobczak 1987, 51–53). These Tatars arrived from Lithuania and brought their established way of functioning in local society, including religious freedom, and began building mosques and creating cemeteries. The Constitution of 1791 granted them full rights and made them completely equal with the nobility. When the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lost its independence in 1795 due to the partitions carried out by Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the lands inhabited by the Tatars were incorporated into the Russian Empire.

Poland regained its independence in 1918 and within its borders were territories inhabited by the Tatars, of whom there were about 5,500. Within the borders of the reborn Republic of Poland, there were nineteen pre-partition Muslim communities. In 1925, the (Sunni) Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland, one of the oldest Muslim organisations in Europe, was established, uniting Muslims in Poland and operating on the basis of local Muslim communities.¹ In 1936, the Act on the Relationship of the State to the Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland regulated the functioning of this organisation and provided official recognition of Islam as a religion, counting it among seven recognised denominations financed by the state (Nalborczyk and Borecki 2011, 347).

World War II brought great changes to the life of Polish Muslims – many material monuments were destroyed, and the NKVD arrested or deported practically the entire Muslim intelligentsia deep into the USSR to labour camps, where many of them died (Tyszkiewicz 2002, 147–149; Chazbijewicz 1997). Following the agreements made by the great powers at Yalta in February 1945, the borders of Poland were moved westwards. Consequently, only 10% of the areas of the traditional Tatar settlement remained within these borders. Most traditional Tatar settlements were incorporated into the USSR and located within the Lithuanian SSR, Belarusian SSR and Ukrainian SSR. A significant number of Tatars, as pre-war Polish citizens, were resettled in the so-called Western Territories, which had belonged to the Third Reich before the war but

1 For more details see: Nalborczyk and Borecki (2011, 346–348).

had been part of Polish state bodies in different historical periods. There they had to reorganise their religious life under the conditions of a socialist state (Nalborczyk and Borecki 2011, 348–349).

Since the 1980s, when students from Arab countries first arrived, the ethnic structure of the Polish Muslim minority began to change, and immigrant groups gained the majority: former Arab students, their families, newcomers from Chechnya, Bosnia, Turkey, South Asia and Arab countries. Still, Muslims remain a quantitatively small group in Poland, about thirty-five to forty thousand people (estimates), constituting 0.09–0.1% of the total population. After years of the socialist state's reluctant attitude towards religion in general, the changes of 1989 also brought about religious freedom and the unhindered establishment of religious organisation structures. According to the new legislation, new Muslim denominational organisations were registered: the Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Sunni), the Muslim Unity Society (Shi'a), the Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly (Shi'a) and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association.²

2 Tatar Mosques and their History

One of the manifestations of religious freedom that Muslim Tatar settlers enjoyed initially in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was the right to organise their religious life, including the erection of mosques (Borawski 1980, 43f). There are only two historical Tartar mosques in Poland today, but there were many more such constructions within the borders of the Polish state in the past.

2.1 *From the Beginning to 1918*

As Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school, the Tatars, enjoying the freedom of religion, practised Islam and erected mosques they called *dżamija* (Arab. *jam'iya*) or *mieczeć* (Arab. *masjid*) (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 166). The earliest mosques were built at the beginning of the settlement;³ in the seventeenth century, there were already about thirty mosques on the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian state.⁴ Local religious communities, usually organised around mosques, were called

2 For more details see: Nalborczyk and Ryszewska (2013, 16–18).

3 There is a record from 1558 on mosques in Lithuania *Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh* [1558] transl. A. Muchliński, In *Zdanie sprawy o Tatarach litewskich przez jednego z tych Tatarów złożone sultanowi Sulejmanowi w r. 1558*, z j. tureckiego przełożył i objaśnił i materiałami historycznymi uzupełnił A. Muchliński, *Teka Wileńska* 1858, 4. On the credibility of *Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh* as a historical source see: Konopacki (2010, 86).

4 For more details see: Borawski (1980, 44f) and Zakrzewski (1989, 140).

dżamiat/dżemiat or more rarely *ummiat* (Arab. *umma*), and their imams, religious leaders, were called *mołtna*, *małna*, *mołta* or *mułta* (*mulla*; Arab. *mawla*) (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 173–175). Assets, usually farmland, given as endowments (*waqfs*), were used to support the mosque and the imam (Konopacki 2010, 86–87).

The first written record of mosques in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania dates back to the sixteenth century and mentions wooden mosques in the plural. They were built in places where Tatar settlements were most dense; the first was in Vilnius in Łukiszki (Lit. Lukiškės⁵) (Kryczyński 1937, 13f), in Troki (Lit. Trakai), Dowbuciszki (Lit. Daubutiškės), Łosośna (Bielrus. Łasosna) near Grodno (Bielrus. Hrodna), Nowogródek (Bielrus. Nawahrudak; in Łowczyce [Bielrus. Lovchictsy] near Nowogródek⁶), in Sorok Tatarzy (Lit. Keturiasdešimt Totorių), Prudziany (Lit. Prudzianai) and Rejże (Lit. Raižiai) (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 160–1610). The mosques of Lithuanian Tatars were built from the funds of local communities, usually not very rich, although sources also record a case of a mosque founded by one rich Tatar family or its representative (Konopacki 2010, 110f). It is interesting to note that Christian magnate families founded the places of prayer for Tatars who served at the courts and in magnates' estates. The Radziwiłł family played a major role in this, as many Tatars served them, and on their estates there were mosques in numerous localities, for example in Birże (Lit. Biržai), Niemież (Lit. Nemėžis), Kojdanów (Belrus. Kojdanau⁷), Kleck (Belrus. Klieck), Mińsk (Belrus. Minsk), Mir (Belrus. Mir), Pleszewice/Pleszowice (Ukr. Plieševiči) (Borawski 1990, 331–336; Borawski 1991, 33f). Usually, the magnates not only donated the land on which the mosque was to be built but also a plot of land for the upkeep of the local imam, then called *mołta* (Konopacki 2010, 113).⁸ As can be seen, although the aristocrats were themselves Christians, they tried to provide their subjects with proper conditions for worship and spiritual care. The mosques were built by local Christian carpenters who were mainly involved in the construction of Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches; hence their appearance and construction differed little from the latter (see fig. 5.5 and 5.6), except for the minarets and crescents on top, which were rather modest and poor (Kryczyński 2000, 165–166; Drozd 1999, 16–17).

5 Place names are given as they were used in the period described, i.e. in Polish. The form currently used in the local official language is given in brackets. An exception is made for place names which have a form traditionally used in English.

6 In Nowogródek itself, a mosque was not built until 1796 (Kryczyński 1934, 16–17).

7 Since 1932 Dzierżyńsk.

8 Artur Konopacki (2010, 118) notes that half of the Tatar mosques were located in private estates.

We find evidence of this situation in a text from 1558, written in Turkish by an anonymous author, probably a Tatar. This short twenty-two-page text provides a considerable amount of information about Muslims living in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the mid-sixteenth century. It reads:

Describing our places of prayer, to those lucky enough to have seen the magnificent temples of the capital of happiness (Istanbul), it turns into a woeful obligation [...] here we have poor and low *mesdžyds* (from Tur. *mescit*), made of wood, in the form of mosques, without minarets, located in some villages of Rumelia. (*Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh* 1558, 15–16 [255–256])

There are great difficulties in erecting more majestic mosques: it is forbidden to build new ones without the government's authorisation. Who among us could even make them when only a handful of Muslims can build a meagre house of prayer? (*Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh* 1558, 17 [257])

According to many historians, including Stanisław Kryczyński (2000 [1938], 159–160), Jan Tyszkiewicz (1989, 289), Jacek Sobczak (1984, 102–104), these difficulties comprised the ruler's consent to the mosque's erection in a new place and even, according to some, the local bishop's consent. However, Andrzej Drozd's (1999, 14) and Artur Konopacki's (2010, 105f) analysis of the sources has shown that until the seventeenth century, there were no formal restrictions or requirements for the erection of Muslim religious buildings in force everywhere.

Regardless of this, in the document mentioned above, we read:

There are mosques in every major city, such as the capital of this country (Vilnius), and Kyrk-tatar (Sorok Tatar), Wakja (Waka), Jeni-shehir (Nowogródek), Turk (Troki), and others, and in these cities, there are larger mosques, and there may be more than a hundred mosques, including the smaller ones located inside the houses. (*Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh* 1558, 16 [256])

Once one gets permission to build a new mosque, it can only be built in neighbourhoods where the followers live. But now we enjoy more freedom in this regard because our king likes all faiths, and he especially likes us and showers us with his graces. (*Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh* 1558, 18 [258])⁹

9 The king mentioned in the text was Sigismund II Augustus (1548–1572).

It was not until 1668 that a restriction on the erection of mosques in places where they had not existed before officially appeared (Drozd 1999, 14), but cases of mosques being built in Kruszyniany, Bohoniki and Niekraszuńce, i.e. in the areas of new land endowments in Podlasie from 1679, indicate that this prohibition was not observed. However, the explicit freedom to build new mosques and renovate old ones was only approved by a constitution issued in 1768 and confirmed by one issued in 1775 (Konopacki 2010, 109). According to Stanisław Kryczyński (2000 [1938], 160–161), there were twenty-three mosques and five prayer houses in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania before 1795, most of them in the Trakai district, and the oldest of the *dżemiats*, or Muslim communities (which he called parishes, according to the Tatar tradition), dated as far back as the 15th century.¹⁰ Historical sources have not recorded any riots against the construction of mosques or acts of hostility against existing buildings (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 159), apart from the sole case of the demolition of the Trakai mosque by a fanatical mob in 1609. This mosque was never rebuilt.¹¹

During the partitions, the construction of mosques was subject to Russian law, and any renovation required the consent of the *guberniya* authorities (Drozd 1999, 14–15). The Taurida Spiritual Board (Muftiate) in Simferopol to which the Polish-Lithuanian Tatars were subordinate provided consent and financial support for Muslim communities (Tyszkiewicz 2002, 82). Sometimes, individual founders financed the mosques, e.g. in 1884, Countess Elfyra Zamoyaska founded a mosque in Iwie-Murawszczyzna (Belorus. Iwye) for the Tatars living on her estate (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 99–102), and in 1855, one was built in Nowogródek on the site of the former one, thanks to the efforts of Major Aleksander Assanowicz, a Tatar himself (Kryczyński 1934, 17).

2.2 *The Interwar Period*

In the interwar period, there were seventeen mosques and two houses of prayer within the borders of the re-established Polish state.¹² In the beginning, after the damage caused by World War I, many mosques needed renovation or reconstruction and thanks to the financial help of the Ministry of Religious

10 There were a few more mosques in Volhynia, which were incorporated into the Polish Crown in 1569 (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 160–161). The Turkish historian Ibrahim Paşa Peçevi (1572–1650) reported in his *Tarih-i Peçevi* that the Tatars had at their disposal sixty mosques in the seventeenth century (Kryczyński 1937, 17). But Andrzej Drozd (1999, 14) considers this number exaggerated, giving as probable a total of about twenty.

11 It happened during the Counter-Reformation, that is, a particular religious revival (Sobczak 1984, 104).

12 That is, a total of nineteen Muslim communities, known as parishes, and their separate sacral buildings (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 162–163).

Denominations and Public Enlightenment, as well as the help from Egypt (among others, the donation by King Fuad I [Drozd 1999, 16]) and the Tatar emigrants from the USA, it was possible to rebuild most of the mosques, such as the first ones in Kleck, Lachowicze (Belorus. Liachavičy) and Niekraszuńce (Belrus. Niekrašuntsy) (Miśkiewicz 1990, 88). Only the mosque in Studzianka, destroyed in 1916, was not rebuilt, as there was no longer a Tatar community there after World War I (Miśkiewicz 1990, 88).¹³ An interesting case was that of the mosque in Iwie-Murawsczyzna, for the reconstruction of which the local landowner, Count Tomasz Zamoyski, donated the building materials. It was the mosque founded by Countess Elfryda Zamoyska fifty years earlier.¹⁴ Except for the mosque in Mińsk, built of brick in 1902 (and funded by contributions from parishioners), all other mosques were wooden (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 100).

The Act of 1936 also regulated the legal status of Muslim sacred buildings. Mosques received the same tax allowances and exemptions as religious buildings of other officially recognised denominations (Art. 41), also “concerning military accommodation in peacetime, and war benefits in kind, under the applicable legal provisions” (Art. 42). Historic mosques were subject to “relevant regulations on the protection of monuments” (Art. 39). However, no new mosque was built during this period, although plans were to build them in Vilnius and Warsaw. In Vilnius, the Tatars had a wooden mosque in the Łukiszki district (Kryczyński 1937, 13), which was not very stately. Before World War I, they had set up a committee to build a new brick mosque, designed by an architect of Tatar origin, Professor Stefan Kryczyński.¹⁵ They had managed to raise 20, 000 roubles for this purpose. However, the money was lost along with the rest of the municipality’s funds during the turmoil of war (Kryczyński 1937, 20). As a result, the construction plans were not realised until 1939 (Miśkiewicz 1990, 89). However, the Vilnius mosque was regarded as one of the most important in Poland: in 1930, President Ignacy Mościcki paid a visit there (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 98–100).¹⁶

13 The first mosque was built here in the eighteenth century; it was renovated in 1817 (Węda 2009, 4–5).

14 The ceremonial inauguration of the renovated mosque took place together with the unveiling of a commemorative plaque to honour the founder of the mosque, Countess Elfryda Zamoyska, on the anniversary of its opening (Miśkiewicz 1990, 88).

15 Lecturer at the Institute of Civil Engineers in St. Petersburg (Miśkiewicz 1990, 88). He was also the author of the design for the mosque in St. Petersburg (Kryczyński 1937, 20).

16 This was not President Mościcki’s first visit to a mosque: the first one took place in Nowogródek on September 22, 1929, a year earlier. The President was to pray with the congregation for the prosperity of the country (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 110).

In Warsaw, the state capital, the Muslim community differed from the eastern, predominantly Lithuanian-Polish Tatars. The capital's Muslim community consisted mainly of refugees, former prisoners of war from the Russian army, or former Russian officials who did not want to return to their homeland, which was part of the USSR.¹⁷ The community had no place of worship, and there had already been plans to build a small mosque in Warsaw before World War I. However, due to the war, the construction did not take place (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 103). Due to the presence of diplomatic representatives of Muslim countries in the capital, there was an idea to build a stately mosque for the local community and the needs of foreign Muslims (Miśkiewicz 1990, 92f). In 1925, the Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland (MZR), a religious organisation of Polish Muslims, officially recognised by the state authorities, was founded. In 1928, the Mosque Building Committee was established (Kołodziejczyk 1987, 135–150), which was independent of the authorities of the MZR. In 1934, the Committee was granted land in Warsaw, and proceeded to make a site plan for future construction. A year later, there was a competition for the mosque's design. The winning design was selected, but construction did not start until the outbreak of World War II, as the funds were insufficient.¹⁸

2.3 *After 1945*

After World War II, the traditional areas of Tatar settlement were located partly in Poland but mostly in the USSR (Lithuanian SSR, Belarusian SSR and Ukrainian SSR).¹⁹ In the Lithuanian SSR, two out of six mosques were destroyed (in Vilnius and Winksznupie [Lit. Vinkšnupiai]), as were six out of eight mosques in the Belarusian SSR (in Dowbuciszki, Lachowicze, Mińsk, Niekraszuńce, Osmołów [Belrus. Asmolava] and Widze [Belrus. Vidzy]), and in the Ukrainian SSR no mosques remained.²⁰ Currently, there are three

17 They were Azeris, Circassians, Crimean Tatars, and representatives of various Caucasian peoples (Tyszkiewicz 2002, 118).

18 Polish diplomatic missions in Muslim countries participated in searching for funds to build the mosque in Warsaw. However, they did not manage to raise large sums of money, and Mufti Jakub Szynkiewicz even went to India in 1937, but this expedition did not bring the expected results either (Kołodziejczyk 1987, 148).

19 Mosques in Miadzioł (Belrus. Miadziel), Kleck, Mir were destroyed during World War II. In Studzianka, the mosque had already been destroyed during World War I and was not rebuilt (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 161), contrary to the mosque in Widze, rebuilt in 1930–32, in Niekraszuńce, rebuilt in 1926, or in Miadzioł, rebuilt in 1930 (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 162–163).

20 In the Ukraine, in Volhynia, Tatar mosques existed in Ostróg (Ukr. Ostroh; 1565–1659), destroyed at the end of the eighteenth century, in Juwkwowce (Ukr. Yuvkivtsi; est. 1681),

purpose-built mosques of Muslim Tatars in Poland: two wooden mosques in Podlasie: in Kruszyniany from the eighteenth century and in Bohoniki from the nineteenth century (Drozd 1999, 15),²¹ and a new brick mosque in Gdańsk, opened in 1990.

In Gdańsk, the Tatars formed a completely new community after 1945 and therefore had no place of prayer in the city, so they met in private houses. In the 1980s, the Committee for the Construction of the Mosque was established, collecting funds mainly from donors – co-religionists from abroad (including the Grand Mufti of Lebanon), diplomats, and Muslim businessmen (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 104). The brick mosque was designed by a Polish architect, Marian Wszelaki, in Turkish style. The laying of the foundation stone took place in 1984 and the opening in 1990.

Until recently, the largest Muslim community in Białystok, MZR, only had a prayer room in the wooden communal house owned since the 1970s; before that, it housed a public library.²² Funding of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (*Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı* – TİKA) was used in 2020 to rebuild the prayer house in Suchowola. TİKA financed works conducted in 2020 in the mosque in Gdańsk,²³ the prayer house at the Tatar cemetery in Warsaw,²⁴ and the prayer house in Białystok. The last project included the restoration of the wooden façade, the addition of canopies and an orangery. A minaret constructed in Turkey was added to the Białystok prayer house – converting it to a regular mosque.²⁵ The interiors of buildings in Białystok and Warsaw were covered with Turkish ceramic tiles by Turkish specialists, which gave them a completely Turkish appearance. In 2020 works

destroyed in the middle of the nineteenth century, and in Niemirów (Ukr. Nemyriv; Podolia) from the seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 161).

- 21 At the end of the twentieth century, a plan to enlarge the existing mosque emerged in the Bohoniki municipality, but it encountered disapproval from both the majority of the municipality's members and the conservation officer (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 106).
- 22 In the 1960s, the possibility of building a mosque in Białystok was considered (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 104). However, the believers were not interested in it, probably because of the proximity to the historical mosques in Kruszyniany and Bohoniki, where many Muslim festivals and celebrations occur.
- 23 <http://mzr.pl/spotkanie-gwarancyjne-w-meczecie-w-gdansk/> (accessed 10 February 2021).
- 24 <http://mzr.pl/remont-sali-modlitwy-przy-musulmanskim-cmentarzu-tatarskim-w-warszawie/> (accessed 10 February 2021).
- 25 <http://mzr.pl/budowa-przebudowa-i-rozbudowa-domu-kultury-musulmanskiej-w-bialymstoku-3/>, <http://mzr.pl/remont-domu-kultury-musulmanskiej-w-bialymstoku/> (accessed 10 February 2021).

financed by *TİKA* were also conducted in the mosque in Gdańsk.²⁶ Turkish artists painted the interior of the mosque in Gdansk to resemble Turkish mosques. The minbars and mihrabs in Gdańsk and Białystok are wooden, and also imported from Turkey. In no way does the appearance of the renovated buildings inside and outside relate to the traditional construction style and appearance of Tatar historical mosques in Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus.

3 The Design of Tatar Mosques

The Tatars from the Golden Horde who appeared in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were primarily warriors, soldiers of various ranks and craftsmen (mostly tanners or gardeners). They did not bring with them skills such as the construction of buildings, so they employed local carpenters to erect mosques. Thus, the mosques are similar to the Orthodox churches they also built (see fig. 5.1 and 5.6).²⁷ Additionally, as mentioned above, the local *dżemiats* were rather poor; hence the mosques erected by their members were simple and small. Built of wood, they were easily destroyed, mainly by fires, but also due to warfare. Therefore, it was not uncommon to erect successive mosques on the same site, and those that are there today are already successive mosques. Their form stems from local conditions and the shape of buildings observed during visits to Muslim countries, especially Turkey.

Tatar mosques are built on a square or rectangular plan. The most common form is a building on a square plan, covered with a hipped pavilion roof and topped in the centre of the roof with a gloriette dome (see fig. 5.2) as a residual form of a minaret: and such is the shape of the mosque in Bohoniki (see fig. 5.6).²⁸ The mosque in Kruszyniany, on the other hand, is built on a

26 <http://mzr.pl/spotkanie-gwarancyjne-w-meczecie-w-gdansk/> (accessed 10 February 2021).

27 For example, the mosque in Kruszyniany is similar to the Orthodox church in Trześcianka, while the non-existent mosques in Mir and Kleck (now in Belarus) were similar to the Orthodox Church of the Transfiguration of Christ in Komotowo (also in Belarus). More such similarities can be found. Stanisław Kryczyński (2000 [1938], 165) claims that some mosques like the one in Osmołów, however, were built by Jewish carpenters, so it rather resembles a wooden synagogue.

28 The oldest Tatar mosque of this type, with a tiered roof, is located in Sorok Tatars (Lithuania) and dates back to 1815. Another one, from 1884, is in Iwie-Murawsczyzna (Belarus), which has a tower added instead of a gloriette. In Łowczyce (Belarus), the gloriette is in the middle of the ridge in the pyramidal roof. The mosque in Niemież (Lithuania) from 1902 has a similar form, but a dome above the entrance and a pyramidal roof.

rectangular plan,²⁹ with a gabled roof and a gloriette on the ridge (see fig. 5.1). However, what distinguishes it is two minaret towers on either side of the entrance to the female section, which many architectural historians associate with church towers.³⁰ Each mosque has a metal crescent on top of the gloriette (see fig. 5.2) and every tower, if there is one, a strictly Muslim element visible from a distance. The walls, made using corner-notched log construction, are boarded from the outside, painted green or brown, and the windows with white frames often have pointed arches.

The division into one section for men and another for women (called *babiniec*, as in synagogues) has been characteristic of Tatar mosques for a long time, already in existence in the 16th century, as we read in the *Risāle*:

In some local mosques, there is a separate room for women in the shape of a chamber, separated from men. Men are not allowed to enter so as not to violate the law prohibiting praying with women. (*Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh* 1558, 17 [257])

The women's section usually has a separate entrance, separated from the men's section by a wall with a longitudinal window at the height of about 1.5 m, covered by a curtain (see fig. 5.3). This division in Kruszyniany and Bohoniki runs along the transverse axis, but it can also be alongside the longitudinal one (e.g., Sorok Tatar or Rejże). At the back of each section, there are benches for the elderly and non-Muslim visitors. Both mosques have a mihrab, a recess built into the wall like an apse (see fig. 5.1), and a wooden minbar (see fig. 5.7).³¹ In the nineteenth century, the wooden walls were already adorned with *muhirs*, i.e. paintings or embroidered fabrics with Qur'anic verses or prayers, made by local Tatars (see fig. 5.4); there were also *muhirs* printed in Kazan (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 103). Nowadays, large-scale photos of Islam's holy places, the Al-Ka'ba or the Prophet's Mosque in Medina, and devotional decorative fabrics or prints brought from Muslim countries replace them more and more often (see fig. 5.6). Carpets donated by wealthy members of the community lie on the floor.³²

29 The preserved mosque in Rejże (Lithuania), built in 1886, has a similar form.

30 For example, by Ignacy Tłoczek (Tłoczek 2020, 79).

31 The traditional Tatar word for minbar is *mumbier* or *minber* (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 167).

32 These used to be shrouds made of green cloth, decorated with the name, family name, the deceased's date of death and offered to the mosque by his family (Miśkiewicz and Kamocki 2004, 102).

4 Muslim Tatar Cemeteries

The Muslim legacy in the Polish landscape also includes Tatar cemeteries called *mizar* (*miziar*; from Arab. *mazar* – ‘place of visit’ most probably through Tur. *mezar* – ‘grave’) or *zireć* (from Arab. *ziyarat* – ‘visit’). Within each Muslim local community, *dżemiat*, there was a cemetery, one or even several.³³ The sixteenth-century document already mentioned says:

As observed in Istanbul, we have our graves by the mosques, but beautiful inscriptions, reminiscent of the deceased and this world’s instability, do not adorn our tombstones. (*Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh* 1558, 18 [258])

Initially built around the mosques, cemeteries were sometimes moved outside the settlement due to lack of space, usually to a hill. There are still four historic Muslim cemeteries used in Poland: one in Kruszyniany and one in Bohonki (both outside the villages), and two in Warsaw.³⁴ There are separate sections reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in Gdańsk, Wrocław, and Poznań – these are places of post-war Tatar settlement without historical burial sites. The two Muslim cemeteries in Warsaw, namely the Muslim Tatar Cemetery at 8 Tatarska Street and the Muslim Caucasus Cemetery at 60 Młynarska Street, were both established in the nineteenth century for Muslim soldiers in the Russian army, mostly of Tatar origin (see fig. 5.10), Muslim merchants, or officials working for the Russian imperial administration (Kołodziejczyk 1998, 43). The initiative of Warsaw’s imam Seifetdin Chosianov Sinnajev resulted in establishing the Muslim Tatar Cemetery in 1867 (see fig. 5.8 and 5.9).³⁵

Some historical cemeteries are no longer in use. The one in Lebiedziewo-Zastawek is one of the oldest Tatar cemeteries preserved in Poland, and its creation dates back to the end of the seventeenth century. The cemetery has preserved fifty-three graves from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. It belonged to the “parish” in Studzianka, where another *mizar* is no longer in use (see fig. 5.21) – the last grave is from 1927 (Drozd 2016, 17).

Traditionally, Tartar graves were surrounded by field stones (see fig. 5.15) and had two gravestones: a smaller one over the deceased’s legs and a larger one

33 For example, there are three cemeteries in Sorok Tatar, the oldest around the mosque.

34 Until World War II, there were sixty-eight Tatar cemeteries within the borders of Poland, thirty-five of which were in use (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 225).

35 It has been under the care of the Provincial Monument Conservator since 1984. In 2014, the cemetery and five other necropolises forming a complex of historic religious cemeteries in the Powązki district were declared a Monument of History. The Tatar Cemetery is administered by the Muslim Religious Union.

at the head, with inscriptions on the outside of the stone. According to *Risāle*, until the sixteenth century, the tombstones of Tatars were devoid of inscriptions; the oldest tombstones with inscriptions date from the mid-seventeenth century (Kryczyński 2000 [1938], 227). However, Andrzej Drozd (2016, 9) recorded a gravestone with inscriptions as early as 1626. Initially, even stones with inscriptions were small and contained only the details of the deceased, often without dating; from the eighteenth century onwards, larger stones with richer information and dating appear. On these gravestones, we find preserved inscriptions in Arabic, Polish, and sometimes Turkish. Until the nineteenth century, the Arabic alphabet was also sometimes used for writing the text in Polish (see fig. 5.23).³⁶ Initially, the Arabic script was used to record religious formulas and the deceased's details; only the date was in Latin script (Drozd 2016, 17). In the nineteenth century, the deceased's details were in Latin script (often with an officer's rank added – see fig. 5.14), and only religious formulas used the Arabic alphabet (Drozd 2016, 19). Typical Muslim elements on the tombstones include *shahada*, *basmala*, and various Islamic invocations – for example, *ya Allah* (Arab. 'Oh God!'), *Allah rahmet* (Tur. 'God's mercy'). From the second half of the nineteenth century, a crescent was used (see fig. 5.22) to signify the deceased's religious affiliation (Drozd 2016, 35–41).

From the second half of the nineteenth century, because of Russification (the lands inhabited by the Tatars came under the Russian Empire), inscriptions in Russian began to appear on the tombstones (see fig. 5.19). With time, tombstones, made by the same stonemasons, started to resemble those in Christian cemeteries, became larger, and were made of carefully shaped stones. In the twentieth century, even images of the dead began to appear (see fig. 5.16), just as on Christian tombstones during this period. In the twenty-first century, due to globalisation and contacts with the wider *Umma*, a "re-Islamisation" of tombstones occurred. Thanks to the use of computers, rich inscriptions in Arabic appear, quotations from the Qur'an often painted with gold paint, arabesque ornaments, metal crescents on tombstones (see fig. 5.17).

5 Conclusions

As Kim Knott (2005, 21) notes, if religion emerges in a given space, it begins to influence that space, transforming it as a result of its socio-religious character, that is, creating places of worship and other sacralised spaces. A religion operating in a given place therefore shapes the space and sacralizes it, but

36 The Tatars wrote their religious texts in the Arabic alphabet from the sixteenth century onwards and developed its modified version adapted to Polish phonology.

also cultivates it, since “a sacred space is not merely discovered, or founded, or constructed; it is claimed, owned, and operated by people advancing specific interests”, i.e. its followers (Chidester and Linenthal 1995, 15). The presence of a religion in an area is reflected in the landscape, yet the landscape is not just the space itself, but also “a construction and the need to acknowledge the centrality of ‘symbolic landscapes’ which produce and sustain social meaning” (Cosgrove and Jackson, 1987, 96). Adherents therefore regard certain areas of this space as sacred or sacralize them themselves through the erection of sacred buildings or the establishment of cemeteries, for the sacralization of space requires “the cultural labor of ritual, in specific historical situations, involving the hard work of attention, memory, design, construction, and control of place” (Smith 1978, 88). Graves, in turn, play a special role in the anchoring or the rootedness of a religion and its adherents in a given place, for, as Lily Kong (1999, 3; 2001, 215) stresses, “communities emphasized symbolic and religious meanings of graves as focal points of identity, expressions of relationships with the land and as crucial to the practice of religious beliefs and rituals”. It was no different in the case of the Polish-Lithuanian Tatars.

Their centuries-long presence was not only the reason for the appearance in the local, central and eastern European landscape of such Muslim elements as mosques and gravestones with Muslim inscriptions in Arabic script, i.e. sacred places planned, erected and cultivated by Muslims. In this space there have also appeared symbols, such as crescents on mosques or on gates leading to mosques or cemeteries, and even the inscriptions ‘Muhammad’ and ‘Allah’ on the wall around the Tatar Cemetery in the Polish capital, Warsaw (see fig. 5.8), visible to all who visit the largest and oldest Catholic cemetery in that city, which is located opposite.

These traces are Islamic, but at the same time one can notice local influences, mainly coming from the Christian environment – local materials were used to build mosques, the same as those used to build Catholic and Orthodox churches. The mosques were built by local carpenters, mainly Christians, and their design bears a striking resemblance to local Christian churches (and perhaps even synagogues). Tombstones in Tatar cemeteries are built facing Mecca and according to Turkish tradition have two gravestones, but the Arabic alphabet was also used to write Polish text on them. These gravestones are also proof of a common fate and a shared history: at the same time as in Christian cemeteries, the Russian language appears on them as an expression of widespread forced Russification of the nineteenth century. Over time, tombstones made by local stonemasons began to resemble those in Christian cemeteries, taking a similar form except for the crescent and the *shahada* instead of the cross or Christian formulas. Muslim Tatars have also adapted the local custom of visiting the graves of relatives but have islamised it and call it ‘giving *sielam* (Arab. *salam*)’ to the deceased.

Thus, Tatar mosques and cemeteries in the Polish landscape in the twenty-first century constitute traces of the cultivation of local space by elements, both material and symbolic, of Islamic legacy, but at the same time this legacy has been clearly embedded in the landscape and local society for centuries; it is not alien, but familiar and settled.

Acknowledgment

The article was prepared within the framework of project no. 2bH 15 0156 83 from the programme of the Minister of Education and Science called “National Programme for Humanities Development” (2016–2023).

Bibliography

- Borawski, Piotr. 1991. “Tatarzy ziemianie w dobrach Radziwiłłów (XVI–XVIII w.).” *Przegląd Historyczny* 82 (1): 33–49.
- Borawski, Piotr. 1990. “Struktura społeczna Tatarów w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim.” *Acta Baltico-Slavica* 19: 311–340.
- Borawski, Piotr. 1980. “O sytuacji wyznaniowej ludności tatarskiej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w Polsce (XVI–XVIII w.).” *Euhemer–Przegląd Religioznawczy* 118 (4): 43–53.
- Borawski, Piotr, and Aleksander Dubiński. 1986. *Tatarzy polscy, Dzieje, obrzędy, tradycje*. Warszawa: Iskry.
- Chazbijewicz, Selim. 1997. “Tatarzy polsko-litewscy w latach II wojny światowej”. In *Meandry cywilizacyjne. Kwestie narodowościowe i polonijne*, edited by Andrzej Chodubski, 91–98. Toruń: Wyd. Adam Marszałek.
- Chidester, David and Edward T. Linenthal. 1995. “Introduction”. In *American Sacred Space*, edited by David Chidester and Edward T. Linenthal, 1–42. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,.
- Cosgrove, Denis and Peter Jackson. 1987. “New Directions in Cultural Geography.” *Area* 19 (1): 95–101.
- Drozd, Andrzej. 2016. *Corpus Inscriptionum Tartarorum Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1 *Studzianka*. Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Orientalistyczne.
- Drozd, Andrzej. 1999. “Meczety tatarskie.” In *Meczety i cmentarze Tatarów polsko-litewskich*, edited by Andrzej Drozd, Marek M. Dziekan, and Tadeusz Majda, 14–19. Warszawa: Res Publica Multiethnica.
- Knott, Kim. 2005. *The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis*. London-Oakville: Equinox.
- Kołodziejczyk, Arkadiusz. 1998. *Cmentarze muzułmańskie w Polsce*. Warszawa: Ośrodek Ochrony Zabytkowego Krajobrazu.

- Kołodziejczyk, Arkadiusz. 1987. "Komitet Budowy Meczetu w Warszawie 1928–1939." *Kronika Warszawy* 1: 135–150.
- Kong, Lily. 2001. "Mapping 'New' Geographies of Religion: Politics and Poetics in Modernity." *Progress in Human Geography* 25 (2): 211–233.
- Kong, Lily. 1999. "Cemeteries and Columbaria, Memorials and Mausoleums: Narrative and Interpretation in the Study of Deathscapes in Geography." *Australian Geographical Studies* 37 (1): 1–10.
- Konopacki, Artur. 2010. *Życie religijne Tatarów na ziemiach Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego w XVI–XIX w.* Warszawa: Wyd. UW.
- Kryczyński, Leon Mirza. 1934. "Historja meczetów w Lowczycach i Nowogródku." *Przegląd Islamski* 3 (3–4): 15–17.
- Kryczyński, Leon. 1937. *Historia meczetu w Wilnie. Próba monografii.* Warszawa: Przegląd Islamski.
- Kryczyński, Stanisław. 2000. *Tatarzy litewscy. Próba monografii historyczno-etnograficznej.* Gdańsk: Rocznik Tatarów Polskich (1 ed. 1938).
- Miśkiewicz, Ali. 1990. *Tatarzy polscy 1918–1939.* Warszawa: PWN.
- Miśkiewicz, Ali, and Janusz Kamocki. 2004. *Tatarzy Słowiańszczyzną obtaskawieni.* Kraków: Universitas.
- Nalborczyk, Agata S., and Monika Ryszewska. 2013. "Islamic organizations in Poland: from monopoly to pluralism." In *Islamic Organizations in Europe and the USA: a Multidisciplinary Perspective*, edited by Matthias Kortmann and Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, 16–21. Basingstoke-New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nalborczyk, Agata S. and Paweł Borecki. 2011. "Relations between Islam and the State in Poland: the Legal Position of Polish Muslims." *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations* 22 (3): 343–359.
- Smith, Jonathan Z. 1978. *Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions.* Chicago-London: Chicago University Press.
- Sobczak, Jacek. 1987. "Tatarzy w służbie Rzeczypospolitej w drugiej połowie XVII i w XVIII w. Studium historyczno prawne." *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* 39 (1): 41–69.
- Sobczak, Jacek. 1984. *Położenie prawne ludności tatarskiej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim.* Warszawa-Poznań: PWN.
- Źłoczek, Ignacy. 2020. "Architektura sakralna islamu w Polsce." *Rocznik Muzułmański* 11: 76–81.
- Tyszkiewicz, Jan. 2002. *Z historii Tatarów polskich 1794–1944.* Pułtusk: WSH.
- Tyszkiewicz, Jan. 1989. *Tatarzy na Litwie i w Polsce, Studia z dziejów XIII–XVIII w.* Warszawa: PWN.
- Węda, Łukasz Radosław. 2009. "Parafia muzułmańska w Studziance—zarys dziejów (1679–1915)." *Przegląd Tatarski* 3: 4–7.
- Zakrzewski, Andrzej B. 1989. "Osadnictwo tatarskie w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim—aspekty wyznaniowe." *Acta Baltico-Slavica* 20: 137–153.



FIGURE 5.1 Mosque in Kruszyniany (1799)
ENTRANCE TO THE MEN'S PART AND MIHRAB ON THE RIGHT (NALBORCZYK)



FIGURE 5.2 Kruszyniany – glorietta
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.3 Kruszyniany – the place for women – *babiniec*
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.4 Kruszyniany – *Muhir* on the wall
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.5 St. Michael Archangel Orthodox church in Trześcianka (1867)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.6 The mosque in Bohoniki (1873)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.7 Bohoniki – the interior of the mosque
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.8 The Tatar Cemetery in Warsaw (est. 1867) – main gate
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.9 The Tatar Cemetery in Warsaw – graves of Polish Tatars (20th century)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.10 The Tatar Cemetery in Warsaw – grave of a Russian Muslim soldier (1913)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.11 The Tatar Cemetery in Warsaw – grave of the last commander of the Tatar cavalry squadron (the 13th Cavalry Regiment “Vilnius Uhlans”) NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.12 Kruszymany – *mizar* (cemetery)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.13 Kruszyńniany – grave of a Muslim Tatar (1804)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.14 Kruszyńniany – grave of a Muslim Tatar in the rank of major (1864);
Polish text below Arabic religious inscription
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.15 Kruszyniany – graves of Muslim Tatars (family Półtorzycki)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.16 Kruszyniany – grave of a Muslim Tatar
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.17 Kruszyniany – a modern grave of Muslim Tatars (family Safarewicz – 1999)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.18 Bohoniki – grave of an imam of the Bohoniki mosque
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.19 Bohoniki – Cyrillic script on gravestone
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.20 Bohoniki – modern graves of Muslim Tatars (family Szegidewicz – 21st century) NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.21 *Mizār* in Studzianka (closed) NALBORCZYK




FIGURE 5.22 Studzianka – Muslim Tatar grave (Polish text below Arabic religious inscription – 1878)
NALBORCZYK



FIGURE 5.23 Studzianka – Muslim Tatar grave (Polish text in Arabic script – the name of the deceased ‘Aleksandrowicz’ – below Arabic religious inscription – 1820) NALBORCZYK

Revisiting the Ottoman Period Mosques in Albania

A Critical Observation on Late Interventions

Edmond Manahasa

1 The Current Situation of the Existing Mosques Built during the Ottoman Empire Period in Albania

The heritage of Ottoman period historical buildings in Albania includes castles, bridges, mosques, tombs, hammams, tekkes and traditional houses. During the socialist period, most of the historical civic buildings were given monument status, and as a result they were protected by law. The same thing cannot be said for the religious buildings, which due to the so called “cultural revolution” in 1968, were demolished in large numbers following the ban on religious activities. Only a few religious buildings were not demolished, due to the “stoic” efforts of the local Institute of Monuments of Culture. In some churches, due to the basilica layout, it was easier to transform them into cinema halls, giving them a chance of survival. This possibility in the case of mosques was virtually impossible to implement. In some cases, there was partial demolition which destroyed only the minaret, as in the mosque of the King in Elbasan, or other buildings like Naziresha Mosque in Elbasan, the mosque of Murat Beg in Kruja or Mehmet Pashe Bushatlliu mosque in Shkodra. A more tragic case is the mosque of Abdurrahman Pasha in Peqin, whose harim was demolished, and only the arcaded last prayer hall that was kept, was transformed into a coffee shop. Other mosques which had a quintessential meaning and symbolism for the image of their city like Et-hem Beg Mosque in Tirana, the mosque of Beqareve in Berat, the mosque of Bazar in Gjirokastra, or the mosque of Muradije in Vlora were not damaged during this period. In certain rural settlements, such as the mosque of Gjin Aleksii in Rusanj village close to Delvina town (strangely, bearing a Christian name which reflects the flexibility of Albanians in terms of religious identity), Allajbegi mosque in Burim (village of Peshkopia), or the mosque on Sopot castle in Borsh (village in Vlora), these were not demolished.

The fall of communism in 1992 in Albania brought democracy, which made freedom of belief and religious activities possible. On this basis, a process of returning the existing mosques to their original function, and their consequent

reconstruction by local means began. The same approach was adopted in relation to the interior of the buildings. During the site observation conducted by the author in 2005, the same approach is visible also in relation to the interior spaces and decorations of the historical mosques. This was particularly visible in the Mosque of Bazar in Gjirokastra, Mehmet Pashe Bushatliu in Shkodra and Naziresha in Elbasan, which the Muslim believers had adapted to make them functional using local means. In addition, on the sites of the mosques which were demolished in 1967 during the “cultural revolution”, totally new buildings were constructed. In the case of the mosque of Abdurrahman Pasha in Peqin and the Kubelije mosque in Kavaja, the new domed harim was added to the existing last prayer porch, while the mosque of Pasha in Elbasan was constructed from scratch.

1.1 *Mosque Design after the 90s in Albania*

From the 1990s to the present, there has been a strong presence of Middle Eastern/Arabic investments in mosque construction in Albania. The mosques built by investors from these countries are present not only in urban settlements, but also in the most remote villages of the country. However, due to the weakness and incompetence of local urban governing bodies and other reasons related to local aesthetic features, their architecture in majority of the cases is of poor architectural quality. In certain cases, the mosques are Middle Eastern/Arabic replicas, or poor imitations of Ottoman mosques. Only in rare cases after 2010, such as the Mosque of Ballije in Elbasan (designed by Jurtin Hajro) or the Mosque of Bamatat in Delvina (designed by Martin Shameti), we see designs in a contemporary architectural style.

1.2 *The Influence of Turkey in Mosque Restorations*

After the rise in power of the AKP party in 2001, there developed a growing interest of Turkey in the Balkans, which was based on the political ambitions of that party. In fact, those ambitions were openly expressed by ex-prime minister Davutoğlu (2014). The two common grounds used to realize their ambitions in Balkan countries with Muslim presence, were Islam and Ottoman empire. In this framework, a major role was played by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), which operated as a Turkish institution that focused on humanitarian help projects in the Balkans, Middle East, and Middle Asia. TİKA undertook the process of restoration of ten Ottoman period mosques based on an agreement made with Institute of Monument of Culture (IMK), which is the national institution responsible for the conservation and restoration of historical buildings. Once the restoration projects were finished, local scholars gave their reactions to the quality of the restoration

(Margjeka, 2020). The issues raised in these responses varied. There were reported minor discrepancies from the original in the interior decorations in some cases and heavy interventions in the building's volumes in other cases (Forumi per Mbrotjen e Trashëgimisë Kulturore, 2014; 2020).

1.3 *Materials and Methods*

This study aims to evaluate, through critical observation, the restoration work carried out on the historical mosques built during the Ottoman empire in Albania that were subject of the aforementioned agreement. It examines the quality of the restorative work in relation to the authenticity of the buildings. To achieve this aim, the methodology used includes visual documentation from different periods of the selected buildings to be used for comparative analysis, on-site visits, interviews with experts engaged in the projects and experts in the field who were not engaged. Finally, it uses a comparative descriptive method to evaluate the restoration work.

2 **Late Period Architectural Interventions**

The restoration of the Ottoman period historical mosques undertaken by TİKA was conducted on the basis of two agreements, signed with İMK in May 2012 and February 2018. The first agreement included the restoration of the Mosque of Preza Castle, Murat Beg in Kruja, the Mosque of Naziresha in Elbasan, Mirahor İlyas Beg in Korça and the Lead Mosque in Berat. The second agreement included the Bayezid II Mosque, the Mosque of Beqareve and Halveti Tekke, all in Berat, Et-hem Beg Mosque in Tirana and the Mosque of Bazaar in Gjirokastra. Apart from the others which are currently completed, the Et-hem Beg Mosque in Tirana is still under restoration, and together with Halveti Tekke, they are not included in this study.

2.1 *The Preza Castle Mosque*

The Preza castle mosque is built by the Ottomans after the fall of Kruja. This mosque is built over the castle gate (Figure 6.1). Papajani (1974, p. 175) does not give a precise date of construction but refers to the second half of the fifteenth century. Kiel (1990) mentions that it was restored by the Ottomans between 1528–1547. In the 1966 restoration (Figure 6.2 – left), the conservation works on the castle walls, towers, and clock tower are depicted, but not the mosque whose minaret was torn down in 1967.

The restoration process, which started after 2012, included reconstruction of the minaret, renovation of the roof, reconstruction of ablution and toilet



FIGURE 6.1
Actual image of Preza
castle and Mosque after late
restoration



FIGURE 6.2 Image of the Mosque from 1971 (left, Luce Institute), before restoration (middle-Kreshnik Merxhani) and after restoration (right-Ministry of Culture of Albania)

space, conservation of the exterior and adjustments to the building interior. Overall, the restoration works are positive, except for some aspects which are the subject of discussion (Figure 6.2 – middle & right). In comparison to the original one, the new minaret looks as if it has been designed on the basis of classical Ottoman models, which are typical of centre of empire, Istanbul. In the original minaret, the part over the balcony and the conical cap are thinner than the lower part of its body, whereas the new one is all the same. The details in the *şerefe* (balcony) apparently reflect the İstanbul model. Although the original roof was tiled using hand-made local dark brown clay tiles, after the restoration the new tiles used are clearly manufactured and more reddish. After the restoration, the exterior looked more polished, and the rubble stone pattern more strongly emphasized.

2.2 *The Murat Beg Mosque in Kruja*

This building locally known as the Great Mosque was built in 1533/34 by Murat Beg, who is stated to be the son of Nasuh Beg, that Kiel (1990) describes as the Ottoman commander of the castle. Its inverted-T layout shares similarities



FIGURE 6.3 Murat Beg mosque in the 1960s before minaret was broken (left) and images after the 1990s before restoration (middle and right, KMSH)



FIGURE 6.4 Image of the mosque after restoration (left), decoration at the women's *mahfel* (middle) and interior of main prayer hall (right-KMSH)

with the mosques of Beyazit II and *Beqareve* in Berat. It is of considerable size and includes a prayer hall and a last prayer hall. Its minaret was demolished during the cultural revolution in 1968. After the 1990s its minaret was reconstructed. However, the new one appears to be higher and is made of reinforced concrete and white-washed plaster (Figure 6.3).

The restoration process which started after 2012 included the building exterior, roof renovation and interior decoration (Figure 6.4). The original façades of the building were in rubble stone which were painted white. The restoration shows that the façades are cladded with plaster and painted white. Similarly, the local clay dark brown roof tiles were replaced with manufactured, reddish tiles. These interventions appear to be minimal, when compared to the interior. The interior restoration includes the renovation of the wooden parts of the ceiling, the balcony of the women's *mahfel* and the minbar. While the first two elements do bear some relation to the original forms, the same cannot be said about the minbar, which appears to be brown wood and imported from Turkey. Decorative paintings composed of floral motives in green and blue tones are applied to the window frames and to the inward curvilinear surface which connects wall to the ceiling (Figure 6.4 – middle). The same motifs are used to frame eight medallions within the interior of the main prayer hall. However,

these motifs are used in nineteenth-century mosques in Istanbul and do not bear any relation to the local architectural values of the mosque. In addition, the new lighting fixtures also are imported from Turkey (Figure 1v – right). This kind of circular fixture is in common use in the newly built twenty-first-century mosques in Istanbul.

2.3 *The Mosque of Naziresha in Elbasan*

The mosque of Naziresha was built in 1599 (Buharaja, 1968) and is dedicated either to a daughter or a sister of a *nazir* (minister in Ottoman). Scholars (Kiel, 1990 & Müller, 1944) do not agree on the identity of the minister, although Nosi mentions that he was Nazir Kejvan Beg. This mosque is fabricated using neatly cut cloisonné technique (alternating stones with bricks). The mosque is very monumental and differs from other mosques in having a dome originally covered by polygonal tiled roof. Kiel (1990) visited the building during the socialist period (Figure 6.5 – left), and its condition was the same when I photographed it in 2005 (Figure 6.5 – middle). The last prayer hall porch was missing, and the balcony and the conical cap of the minaret were demolished.

The restoration works that started after 2012 included interventions in the exterior and interior of the mosque (Figure 6.5 – right). In addition, the minaret was completed, and the dome was renovated. We should say from the beginning that the restorative interventions in this building have been the most invasive ones. As seen from the comparison of the three images before and after the restoration, the drum of the dome and its covering material are not true to the original one. In the octagonal drum, which was composed of two different wall masonries, the upper white one was removed, consequently reducing the height of the drum, thereby negating the monumentality of the



FIGURE 6.5 Image of Naziresha mosque in 1960s (Kiel-left), in 2005 (Manahasa-middle) and after restoration in 2020 (right)

mosque. In addition, the form of the new dome has been changed compared to the original one, which was polygonal in shape and clad with tiles. The changes were made not only to the form, but also to the covering material. The new dome is circular, and it is covered in lead plates, applied to the same triangular shoulders that were covered with tiles. Also, the new cornices of the triangular shoulders were in diagonally laid brick rows, while the new ones are not laid diagonally, but are straight. The completion of the minaret includes the removal of the whole old part from the cornice of the şerefe to the base of minaret. The newly constructed minaret trunk respects the original one. The polygonal cylindrical volume between the şerefe and the conical cap is built in red bricks, not using cloisonné technique. The last prayer hall porch has been reconstructed from scratch using wood with a covering of tiles.

The interior before the restoration, was very poor in terms of decorations, consisting only of mihrab stucco niches and some muqarnas stucco decoration in the squinches (Figure 6.6). After the restoration, the window frames were transformed using a compositional pattern which consists of circular and quasi-elliptical elements and partial bluish and yellowish stained glass (Figure 6.7). The lighting fixture is similar to the Murat Beg Mosque in Kruja, but in the case of Naziresha mosque, it sits better due to its higher inner spatial qualities.



FIGURE 6.6 Interior of Naziresha mosque before restoration in 2005 (left) and (right-Manahasa)



FIGURE 6.7 Interior of the Naziresha mosque after the restoration in 2021 (Manahasa)

2.4 *Mirahor İlyas Beg Mosque in Korça*

This building is the oldest existing Ottoman period Mosque in Albania, built in 1495/6 (Manahasa, 2005) by Mirahor İlyas Beg. He was the tutor (*lala*) of sultan Beyazıt II and husband of princess Hundi Hatun, daughter of Murat II. His name Mirahor is derived from a given title *Emir-i Ahur* (master of the stables in Ottoman). It is due to him that the basilica of Studion in Istanbul was transformed into a mosque and given the name Imrahor. Kiel (1990) thinks that unlike other buildings in Albania, it reflects features of the classical Ottoman Mosque, especially from façade point of view, in which the windows are placed at a sequence of two in the lower level, three in the middle and two more in the upper level (Figure 6.8 – left). Also, the transitional parts and the octagonal drum have high vertical proportions, which create a monumentality similar to the case of Naziresha mosque.

During the earthquake that hit Korça in 1961, the minaret and the clock tower were destroyed. When the author visited the building in 2005, its exterior was in poor condition (Figure 6.8 – right & Figure 6.9 – left), whereas the interior was good (Figure 6.10 – left).

The restoration which was conducted after 2012 included the reconstruction of the minaret, clock tower, and the renovation of the square in front of the mosque transforming it into a public space (Figure 6.9 – right). Also, work was carried out on the domes and in the interior of the building. The reconstruction of the minaret can be considered successful, as the stones used were taken from local quarries, creating harmony with the newly constructed clock tower, which reflected the proportions of the original one. Also, the cloisonné masonry was polished, thereby revealing its aesthetic qualities. Prior to the



FIGURE 6.8 Image of Mirahor İlyas Beg Mosque before the second World War (left-) and in 2005 (right-Manahasa)



FIGURE 6.9 Entrance façade in 2005 and after the restoration in 2021 (Manahasa)




FIGURE 6.10 The squinches in the interior part in 2005 (left), the minbar (middle-Manahasa) and appearance after the restoration (2018-KMSH)

restoration, the fenestration consisted of two windows, one in the inner and the other in the outer part of the façade. After the restoration, the exterior window was removed and was substituted by classical Ottoman hexagonal honeycomb-like gypsum frames. Prior to the earthquake of 1961, in the octagonal drum there were windows framed by pointed arches, but in 2005 the windows are round. After the restoration, these windows were restored to the

original form. The lead plates in the main dome and the smaller ones over the last prayer hall were also renovated.

The interior of the mosque after the restoration reflects a different atmosphere compared to the original one (Figure 10 – left, middle and right). The whole existing wooden elements of the interior, which were painted in turquoise green colour are changed with newer ones, which are in natural polished wood appearance. This approach is reflected in the original minbar (verified by a photo of 1917), which is substituted with another one which is similar to those used currently in Turkey and the women's *mahfel* is enlarged and renewed. The pulpit is removed at all. The inner window wooden shutters also are renewed in the same natural wooden material, eliminating the turquoise-green colour. The gypsum window frames which originally were with colourless glass now are decorated with stained glass in pink, and purple colours. The cleansing of non-original dye after the restoration, has revealed partial fragments from the original paintings of the dome, which I was able to perceive. These fragments of paintings are in Ottoman Neo-Baroque style and show similarity to Ortaköy mosque in Istanbul.

2.5 *The Lead Mosque in Berat*

The building is the only domed mosque in Berat and is locally named as the “Lead Mosque”, due to the lead cover on its dome. It was constructed by a local nobleman called Uzgur Ahmet Beg. Babinger [1978, p. 292] refers to a certain Uzguroğlu Isa Beg of Albanian origin, whose name came from Skuraj family. Based on the salname¹ of the vilayet of Yanya [Kiel, 1990, p. 122], he attributes the mosque to the brothers Uzgurzade² Mehmet and Ahmet. The mosque was built by Ghazi³ Uzgurlu in 1553–1554, according to the inscription given by Buharaja (1968, pp. 81–85).

The mosque was restored successfully in 1978 (Figure 6.11 – left) by İMK specialists and Kiel rightly defines the building as “the most important Ottoman structure preserved in Berat and Albania” (1990, p. 65). When I visited the mosque in 2005 its exterior was in good condition (Figure 6.11 – middle), whereas the interior was plain without any decoration, and was painted in a yellowish colour. The recent restoration included the renovation of the lead plates of all the domes, including the four smaller domes of the last prayer hall (Figure 6.11 – right). In addition, unlike the original state in which the bases

1 Salname: Annual book for activities held in Ottoman Empire, quasi similar to almanac in the west which started to be published in 1847.

2 Uzgurzade Mehmet and Ahmet: meaning Mehmet and Ahmet sons of Uzgurzade. Apart for meaning son, was also associated with nobility connotation in the Ottoman Empire.

3 Ghazi: is a title which was given to soldiers or war veterans during the Ottoman Empire.

of the dome and the triangular shoulders over the squinches were covered by tiles, after the restoration they were also covered by lead plates. The lead plates of the conical cap were also renovated. All these restorative interventions can be considered as positive, apart from the new *alem*,⁴ whose height is greater than the original one and has an impact on the proportions of the different elements of the minaret.

The interior has been painted in a lighter colour compared to the previous yellowish tone, making the space more serene and noble (Figure 6.11 – left and right). However, the new minbar and the pulpit are ordinary, probably imported from Turkey. The gypsum window frames are decorated with stained glass in cyan, pink, and purple. The lighting chandeliers are the same as those used in the previous mosques, but we must say that here it stands out better, due to the inner space's height. Overall, the interventions in this building are appropriate and balanced.



FIGURE 6. 11 Lead mosque after 1978 restoration (left-Dashi) and an image of main prayer hall in 2005 (center-Manahasa) and (right) after the restoration 2018 (KMSH)




FIGURE 6.12 The women's *mahfel* in 2005 (left), main prayer hall interior after the restoration in 2018 (middle-Ministry of Culture of Albania) and iron stair added in entrance façade in 2021 (right-Manahasa)

4 Alem: the crescent and the star symbols of Islam on top of a minaret.

2.6 *The Mosque of Bayezid II in Berat*

The mosque of Bayezid II is known locally as the King Mosque. This mosque has two phases of construction. Although there is no inscription left today, (Kiel, 1990) Evliya Çelebi attributes this building to Sultan Bayezid II, who might have ordered its construction during the Albanian campaign in 1492. Evliya Çelebi [1999, p. 693] describes the mosque in the Berat section of *Seyahatname*,⁵ depicting it as located in the very centre of the town and possessing the largest congregation. The second phase of the construction of this building relates to a bombardment the building was subjected to during a military campaign by the Ottoman army to suppress the Albanian rebellion in 1830–31. During the campaign, the mosque was ruined and Grand Vizier of the Empire Mehmed Reşit Paşa commissioned the reconstruction of the building from the foundations (Kiel, 1990). The inscription gives the reconstruction date as 1832–22 (Frasheri and Dashi, 1988, p. 122).

This building represents the best example of Baroque influence on the mosques built during the Ottoman empire in Albania. The Baroque features are reflected in particular in the interior decorations of the main prayer hall dome and the stucco decorations of the mihrab. Unfortunately, the building was transformed into municipality store and the last prayer hall arcade was closed rendering it unrecognizable (Figure 6.13 – left). After the 1990s the last prayer hall was restored to its original form (Figure 6.13 – right).

The restoration of this mosque is part of the second agreement between IMK and TİKA which was conducted in 2018. The restoration process differs from the previous five mosques and was undertaken by Albanian specialists,



FIGURE 6.13 The image of the mosque of Bayezid II transformed into a store in 1978 (left-Kiel) and its image in 2005 (right)

5 *Seyahatname*: meaning “Book of travels”, it refers to the travel notes by the Ottoman Turkish traveller Evliya Çelebi (1611–1682).

among others Aleksander Meksi, one of the most important figures involved in historical Islamic architecture in Albania. Thus, the restorative interventions are more professional compared to the previously explained mosques, although some of them could be a subject of discussion. The restoration started in 2018 finished in February 2021 and included exterior masonry treatment and interventions in the interior space decoration. Prior to the restoration, the façades of the building were covered by a yellowish plaster, over which white rectangles are painted neatly (Figure 6.14 – left/Top). These rectangles give the impression of neatly cut blocks and are also recognizable in the image from 1978. After the restoration, the plaster was removed from the walls, except a smaller fragment, which was left at the northeast façade (Figure 6.15 – right). Thus, the new façade is left in bare masonry, polished, and treated from the structural point of view. This technique is also used in the arcade of the last prayer hall and in the piers of the main prayer hall which also had their plaster removed (Figure 6.15 – left & right).



FIGURE 6.14 Northeast façade of mosque of Beyazit II in 2005 (top-Manahasa) and same image in 2021 (bottom-Manahasa)



FIGURE 6.15 Last prayer hall arcade in 2005 (Manahasa) and last prayer hall after the restoration in 2021 (Manahasa)



FIGURE 6.16 Mihrab and minbar with southwestern inner façade in 2005 (left and middle-Manahasa) and after the restoration in 2021 (Ministry of Culture of Albania)



FIGURE 6.17 Minor lateral octagonal domes and major wooden domes in 2005 (Manahasa) and after the restoration in 2021 (Ministry of Culture of Albania)

As regards the interior of the mosque, which is organized into a main prayer hall and women's *mahfel*, the restoration focussed on finishing works which included plaster and carpentry work.

The mihrab and the minbar prior to restoration were painted in a greenish colour, which was evaluated as not original by the restoration team (Figure 6.16). Likewise, the brown frames of the upper arched windows, were assessed as not original. Based on this, the interior of main prayer hall was painted in white. The mihrab of the mosque is a splendid example of Ottoman Baroque Albanian architecture. Before restoration, it featured exuberant gilded floral motives and paint of a blood-red colour. However, after restoration the red colour was changed to a wine brown. Moreover, the whole decoration is placed within a rectangular frame, painted in the same colour.

The paintings on the wooden domed ceiling of the mosque were also restored. Before restoration, the ceiling was predominantly reddish brownish, with greenish elements in a secondary presence. However, after restoration the green elements are much stronger, generating a more balanced, colourful composition (Figure 6.17). New chandeliers have been hung, whose new metallic fixture is circular and designed in a quatrefoil pattern, whose relation to Islamic symbolism remains unknown and unusual to the author (Figure 6.19). Apart from the restoration of the pulpit in the left corner of the qibla wall, the wooden quadratic ceiling in the last prayer hall has also been improved, although its colour changed from reddish brown to grey blue after restoration. On a positive note, the new roof tiles are similar to the original ones, and also respect the original colours. The roof eaves are clad with cherry-coloured wood panels in the lower part, the only change being the colour (Figure 6.14).



FIGURE 6.18 Wooden octagonal inner dome over women's *mahfel* in 2005 (Manahasa) and a closer image of the same dome after the restoration in 2021 (Ministry of Culture of Albania)



FIGURE 6.19 Image of harim (left) and women's *mahfel* (right) after the restoration in 2021 (Ministry of Culture of Albania)

2.7 *The Mosque of Beqareve in Berat*

The mosque of Beqareve is situated within the historical Mangalem quarter of Berat, close to a street. The mosque was built in 1243 AH (1827/28) by Sulejman Pashë Vlora, but locally is known as “Mosque of Beqareve”. It means the mosque of Bachelors in English. Ekrem Bej Vlora (1911) explains that “bachelors” were an organization of unmarried men who had carried out military duty, whereas Zija Shkodra [1968, p. 83] states they were a union of unmarried craftsmen who maintained the security of the bazaar. The mosque fortunately was not demolished during the cultural revolution. This building is positioned on a sloping site; to achieve a platform, the ground was dug out to create a building on two levels (Figure 6.21). The lower level which opens to the street is covered by three barrel vaults and is used for shops, which are entered via an arcade formed of four stone columns. On the upper level there is the main prayer hall and the last-prayer hall, which is entered from the north-western façade. The qibla façade of this mosque is very important because it verifies the historical layers of the Bayezid II mosque. This façade is organized into three levels: i. the shopping arcade under the prayer hall built with white stone; the middle section is plastered with grey-yellowish mortar, painted in regularly cut blocks; and the upper parts of the walls under the eaves have murals of imaginary Ottoman cities, mosques, and floral motifs. Similar decorative paintings were also applied to the interior of the main prayer hall and last prayer hall wall adjacent to it. However, when the author visited the mosque in 2005, the paintings in the main prayer hall were in poor condition, as many fragments had been destroyed and in some parts were painted over (Kiel, 1990).

It is important to mention that essential restorative work has been carried out in this mosque. The restoration process was completed in January 2021 and included intervention in the exterior, interior, and in the reconstruction of the



FIGURE 6.20 Mosque of Beqareve in 2005 (left) and after restoration in 2021 (right-from KMSH)



FIGURE 6.21 Qibla façade in 2005 (left) and the same after restoration in 2021 (right-Manahasa)

roof of the mosque. Apart from the replacement of old wooden structural elements, the roof was renovated using tiles of the same colour. The painting on the façades of the main prayer hall were also renovated (Figure 6.20 – right & Figure 6.21 – right).

The interior murals have been painted over, without accomplishing the previously demolished fragments, aiming to keep the existing situation (Figures 6.22–6.23–6.25). A new wooden minbar has replaced the previous one, which looks



FIGURE 6.22 Mihrab image in 2005 (left) and after restoration qibla inner façade in 2021 (right-KMSH)



FIGURE 6.23 Inner image of north-east wall in 2005 (left) and after restoration in 2021 (right-KMSH)



FIGURE 6.24 Last prayer hall in 2005 (left) and after restoration (right-KMSH)



FIGURE 6.25
Main prayer hall after
restoration



FIGURE 6.26 Minaret of Mosque of Beqareve before (left) and after restoration (right-Joni Margjeka)

like a Turkish import, with no relation to special local features. The plaster in the inner part of the arcade of the last prayer hall has been removed. In comparison to the mosque of Bayezid II, this removal does not look particularly aggressive, since the exterior part of the arcade was already bare masonry (Figure 6.24).

Before the restoration, the minaret was plastered with grey-yellowish mortar like the middle row of the qibla façade, but without rectangular pattern. After the restoration, the mortar was removed, and the minaret was left in bare masonry. According to Kallfani (2021) this decision was taken during the restoration process as the restoration team realized that the mortar was not original. In addition, it was revealed that in a previous restoration conducted by IMK, the body of the minaret was clad in an imitation of cloisonné, hence the decision was to leave the structure of the minaret unplastered (Figure 6.26). After restoration, the appearance of the minaret showed a mixed structure composed of stones and bricks. It is important to mention that the new image of the minaret after restoration appears to lack unity and it is composed of a mixed pattern, suggesting that its original form might have been plastered.

2.8 *The Mosque of Bazar in Gjirokastra*

The mosque of Bazar in Gjirokastra is situated on an incline, under the city castle, which is known locally as the ‘neck of Bazar’ (Figure 6.27). The building was built in 1754–55 as stated in the inscription over the entrance door. Kiel (1990, p.141–42) explains that it is not known who built it, but based on the style and material of construction, he attributes it to local masters. This building is part of a group of mosques, which are constructed according to a technique typical of the vilayet of Janina, which Ottoman Empire Gjirokastra (Ergiri)⁶ was a part of. The restoration works undertaken by a Turkish company “Kale Restorayon” started in August 2018 and finished in July 2020. They included interventions in the exterior and interior of the building including renovation of the dome and the minaret. Furthermore, there were also interventions in the decoration within the main prayer hall and in the octagonal tomb which in recent years was transformed into an ablution space.

The dome and the roof of the last prayer hall of the mosque were originally covered in a grey stone slate typical of Gjirokastra, which is also used in its traditional house architecture. After restoration, the dome was covered by white precisely rectangular stones fixed with mortar. This intervention destroys the authentic aspects of the mosque (Figures 6.27–6.28). Similarly, the existing

6 Ergiri: was the Ottoman name for Gjirokastra.



FIGURE 6.27 Image of Mosque of Bazar in Gjirokastra in 2005 (left) and after restoration 2021 (right)



FIGURE 6.28 The dome of the Mosque of Bazar before restoration (left- FMTK) and after restoration (right- FMTK)

plaster was removed from the exterior façades and were left bare. In addition, the joints between the stones were filled with a white grout, giving the wall pattern a totally different visual quality, indisputably different from the original (Figure 6.29).

This approach was also used in the octagonal tomb and in the body of the minaret, whose conical cap was reconstructed. The new conical cap was covered by lead plates and was reconstructed in different proportion to the existing one. However, proportionally the new one looks better compared to the older one. Finally, the last prayer hall plaster was also removed and left bare (Figure 6.34).



FIGURE 6.29 The stone slates on the dome in 2005 (left- Manahasa) and precisely rectangular stones on the dome after restoration (right-KMSH)



FIGURE 6.30 Medallion at the centre of the dome with central floral motif, and olive leaves and tulip motifs in the outer ring

The interior of the main prayer hall was also restored. The mihrab plaster was removed and left bare (Figure 6.33). Oddly, the same technique was used for the squinches in the transitional parts of the dome. When the author visited the mosque in 2005 the dome was painted in a light reddish colour and the original decorations were covered over, apart from a circular medallion which was left uncovered (Figure 6.30). After restoration, the dome and the interior were painted white, and eight smaller circular medallion motifs were uncovered (Figure 6.31 and Figure 6.32). The triangular surfaces created in the transitional part between the dome and the squinches were also uncovered by removing the plaster and being repainted.



FIGURE 6.31 Painting decorations at the transitional part between squinches and dome after restoration in 2021 (KMSH)



FIGURE 6.32 Inner Dome image in 2005 (left-Manahasa) and after restoration in 2021 (right-Merxhani)



FIGURE 6.33 Mihrab of Mosque of Bazar in 2005 (right) and after restoration in 2021 (right-Merxhani)



FIGURE 6.34 Last prayer hall in 2005 (left) and after restoration in 2021 (right-Merxhani)

3 Concluding Remarks

The study provides a critical observation on the historical mosque buildings which were subject to restoration between 2012 and 2021 in Albania. These mosques were built during the Ottoman period and represent the historical architectural values of their period of construction. This investment in the restoration of the mosques was based on two agreements between the Institute of Monuments of Albania (IMK) and the Turkish agency of cooperation and development (TİKA), of which the latter provided the financial support. The first agreement was conducted in 2012 and included five mosques, whereas the second one included four mosques and one tekke. The restoration works on the mosques in the first agreement were conducted by Turkish companies, whereas Turkish and Albanian companies/experts were engaged for the second restoration phase. Based on on-site observations and personal communications the author conducted with experts both engaged and not engaged in the restoration, the study reveals that the restoration qualities of the buildings in relation to their authentic values are different for the first agreement and the second agreement.

Obviously, it can be said that the restoration works in the mosques included in the first agreement (Mosque of Preza Castle, Murat Beg in Kruja, Mosque

of Naziresha in Elbasan, Iljaz Bej Mirahori in Korça and the Leaden Mosque in Berat) are only partially true to the original buildings. The exterior of three mosques shows problematic aspects relating the materials of their covering structures. The most serious issue occurs in the dome of the mosque of Naziresha, in which not only the form of the dome has been changed from a polygonal domed roof to a perfect dome, but also the height of the drum has been reduced, which has a negative effect on the monumentality of the building. In addition, the new dome is covered by lead plates, unlike the original which was covered by tiles. Whereas in the mosque of Preza castle and Murat Beg Mosque in Kruja the new roof tiles were reddish instead of the colour of the original ones made of local brownish clay. Another problem occurs in the refurbishment of most of the mosque interiors, relating the use of standard routinized elements such as red carpet, a minbar and lighting fixtures or chandeliers which are imported from Turkey.

Only three mosques restored during the second phase has been evaluated in this study. It is important to mention that the Bayezid II mosque and the Beqareve mosque have undergone good restoration. In these buildings the restoration has adhered to the original architectural values, including the interventions on the roof cover and interior. Apart from that, the decision to remove the plaster in the last prayer hall of the Bayezid II mosque and leave bare masonry is disputable. Since the joints of the masonry are clearly not composed of neatly cut stones, it suggests that originally this space was plastered, although the experts involved in the restoration claimed that the pre-existing plaster was not original. The similar decision taken for the minaret of the Beqareve mosque is also disputable because after restoration the body of the minaret does not look uniform and appears to be a mixed structure composed of limestone and bricks, which is not constructed with a sense of logic. These two buildings were constructed at a similar time (1827/8 and 1830/1) and the usage of the yellowish-grey plaster painted in neatly cut rectangles in both mosques is an argument to suggest that this pattern is an original historical layer of their façades. The same positive things cannot be said for the mosque of Bazar in Gjirokaster, which has also been subject to inaccurate restoration. This relates in particular to the substitution of the local traditional dark-grey stone slates for square stones fixed with mortar which has transformed (quasi-metamorphosed) the dome of this building. In addition, the grouting applied to the joints between the stones in the exterior masonry pattern of the mosque and the tomb in the vicinity was also an unprofessional decision. The case of mosques of Beyazit II and Beqareve in Berat could be the subject of more detailed analysis, including more interviews with experts engaged in the process, however that is outside the scope of this research. Further

research is also needed on Et-hem Beg Mosque in Tirana and the mosque of Mehmet Pashe Bushatlliu in Shkodra, in which the restoration process is still ongoing.

Bibliography

- Babinger, F. 1978. *Mehmed the Conquer and His Time*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Buharaja, V., 1968. *Mbishkrimet turko-arabe te vendit tone si deshmi historike*, 2nd Conference of Albanological Studies, 81–85. Tirana-Albania.
- Çelebi, E. 1999. *Seyahatname-Albania Section VIII*, İstanbul: Engin Publications.
- Frasheri, Gj. and Dashi, S., 1988. Fillimet e Artit Islamik ne Qytetin e Beratit, *Monumentet*, no. 1: 97–131.
- Kallfani, E. 2021. Ex-Director of Directorate of Monuments in Berat (engaged in the restoration process of mosques included in the study), Personal Communication in 02/07/2021
- Kiel, M. 1990. *Ottoman Architecture in Albania 1385–1912*, Istanbul: Research Centre For Islamic History, Art And Culture.
- Manahasa, E. & Kolay Aktuğ, I. 2015. Observations on the Existing Ottoman Mosques in Albania. *A|Z ITU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture*, 12, no. 2: 69–81
- Manahasa, E. 2005. "The Existing Mosques Built During Ottoman Empire Period in Albania." Master thesis, Istanbul Technical University.
- Merxhani, K. 2021. Restoration expert, Personal Communication in 18/08/2021.
- Müller, J. 1944. *Albanien, Rumelien und die Österreichisch-Montenegrinische Gränze*, Prague: Wentworth Press.
- Papajani, L. 1974. Kalaja e Prezes, *Monumentet*, 7–8: 167–182.
- Shkodra, Z. 1968. Problemi i kallfes ne sistemin e esnafeve shqiptare, 2nd Conference of Albanological Studies, 83. Tirana-Albania.
- Tüysüzöğlü, G. 2014. Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 25, no. 2: 85–104.
- Vlora, E.B. 2003. *Ditar: Nga Berati ne Tomorr*, Translated by A. Koci. Tirana: Kost Publications.
- <https://www.fmimages.net/falsifikimi-i-monumenteve-nga-tika/> accessed in 08/09/2020.
- <https://sot.com.al/kultura/p%C3%ABrurrohet-xhamia-e-pazarit-n%C3%AB-kruj%C3%AB-forumi-p%C3%ABr-mbrojtjen-e-trash%C3%ABgimis%C3%AB-denoncon-restaurimin> accessed in 07/06/2020.
- <https://www.balkanweb.com/restaurohen-tre-objekte-te-rendesishme-te-besimit-islam-ne-berat/> accessed in 07/09/2020.

<https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/monumentet-kulturore-nis-projekti-br-i-restaurimit>
accessed in 07/09/2020.

<https://abcnews.al/ministria-e-kultures-firmos-marreveshjen-per-restaurimin-e-5-xhamive/> accessed in 08/09/2020.

<https://www.dunyabizim.com/soylesi/murad-bey-camii-nasil-restore-edildi-h16960.html> accessed in 07/09/2020.

Digital Archive of KMSH (Muslim Community of Albania)

Digital Archive of Ministry of Culture of Albania

Digital Archive of "Forumi per Mbrotjen e Trashegimise Kulturore" FMTK

Digital Archive of Kreshnik Merxhani

Monumental Heritage and Past Conflict

The Ambiguous Role of Al-Andalus in Modern Spain and the Role of Art History

Elena Paulino Montero

In December 2018, the Spanish far-right party Vox entered the Andalusian parliament after unexpectedly obtaining a high number of votes in the regional elections. In May of the following year, it obtained multiple victories in local elections across Spain and entered the Spanish parliament as a powerful new political force. Between these two dates, and among other changes to their communication strategy, the party increased the use of historical references – medieval to be precise – in their campaigns. In 2019, the leader of Vox, Santiago Abascal, launched his presidential campaign in front of the statue of Don Pelayo – the legendary nobleman who represents the link between the Visigothic and Asturian royal lineages – in the town of Covadonga, the mythical location of the first battle in the so-called *Reconquista* or war of Reconquest. Abascal framed his new political campaign in terms of ‘reconquering’ the country. By means of advertisements in the media and tweets containing a variety of references to visual culture, including *The Lord of the Rings*’ soundtrack and clips from the TV period drama *Isabel*,¹ Vox aligned its identity with the Christian – Visigothic – Roman tradition which had been carefully crafted as part of the national-Catholic discourse since the nineteenth century.

Reframing current political issues in terms of popular medieval precedents is not new. Since the early modern period,² the Middle Ages have been revisited, mythologised, decontextualised and assigned new meanings. The colonial and Eurocentric implications of medievalism have been pointed out by Kaufman (2010), Altshul (2020) and others. The crusades, the Spanish Reconquest, Joan of Arc, the Vikings or the Templars are common examples of what Elliot (2017) has called ‘mediated medievalism’ in today’s world. This form of medievalism is neither a quotation – however inaccurate – of the medieval context, nor an attempt to point out the cultural otherness of a bygone age. It is a space for

1 https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1080418155992940545 [accessed 01/07/2021].

2 For a study of some of these early modern visions of the past in the context of the Iberian peninsula, see Arciniega, 2013; Urquizar, 2017.

identification and assimilation whose effectiveness relies on its significance to a certain audience that can use it to criticise the present (Kaufman 2010, 5; Elliot, 2017, 15–16). This is not a unidirectional process. Modern aspirations, anxieties and desires have been projected onto the study of the past throughout history, while intellectuals, antiquarians and historians of every period have actively taken part in the creation of what Pierre Sorlin (2001, 38) has called ‘historical capital’: the basic knowledge of our historical culture which we then use to anchor our notions of identity and tradition, our sense of self and our perception of the other.

A couple of months after the 2019 elections, one of the newly elected councillors in Cadrete, a small town in the province of Zaragoza, decided to remove a bust of Abd al-Rahman III, founder of the local castle. The statue had already been vandalised by far-right groups and its removal was one of Vox’s electoral promises in its regional election campaigns as a token of the *Reconquista* spirit. The decision had an impact on public opinion at national level. The councillor declared that only symbols ‘with which all residents could identify’ should be exhibited in the main town,³ an obvious indication of his party’s refusal to recognise al-Andalus as part of its own past. Other political parties accused the mayor of historical negationism, arguing that the statue symbolised a piece of Cadrete’s history.⁴ The statue had been installed in 2016 in the wake of a celebration recreating the foundation of the castle by Abd al-Rahman III, with the aim of actively fostering the integration of that historical period into the town’s civic identity.

As historians entered the debate, one declared to a newspaper that ‘Vox knows nothing about history. Abd al-Rahman III was more Spanish than the Visigothic kings. He was the son, grandson, great-grandson and great-great-grandson of Spaniards.’⁵ Others pointed out that Abd al-Rahman was an educated monarch who owned a vast library full of Arabic and classical texts and transformed Cordoba into the cultural capital of Europe at the time. Blogs and editorials, sometimes illustrated with Orientalist nineteenth-century paintings, recalled Abd al-Rahman’s notable contribution to the political and cultural history of Spain, his red hair and his Basque blood.

This case is significant because it shows how the main narratives institutionalised in the nineteenth century about the role of al-Andalus in Spanish

3 https://elpais.com/politica/2019/06/18/actualidad/1560861185_830478.html [Accessed 01/07/2021].

4 <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20190618/cadrete-retira-una-estatua-de-abderraman-iii-por-orden-de-un-concejal-de-vox-7511322> [Accessed 01/07/2021].

5 https://www.eldiario.es/aragon/alguna-vox-abderraman-iii-visigodos_1_1494350.html [Accessed 01/07/2021].

history are still with us today, both in academic discourse and in popular opinion. These narratives, developed by historians and Arabic scholars, can be grouped into three essentialist models: The *Reconquista* paradigm, the integrative paradigm and the *convivencia* paradigm (García Sanjuan, 2012; 2016; 2017; Manzano, 2009 and Viguera, 2009).

The *Reconquista* paradigm claims that Spain has always been fundamentally Catholic, Visigothic and Roman, and that al-Andalus was an anomaly, an invasion by a foreign power, which came to an end with the conquest of Granada in 1492. The integrative paradigm was largely developed by the pioneers of Arabic studies in Spain – a scholarly circle whose work mainly focused on the study of the Iberian past and the history of al-Andalus. They championed the idea of a ‘Muslim Spain’, highlighting the pre-Islamic roots of political and cultural organisation in al-Andalus, a territory which was both culturally and biologically dissociated from the rest of the Islamic world (Domínguez, 2021). Nowadays these two models seem to be diametrically opposed and have been incorporated as such into the historical capital of different political parties, but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries they were shared by both liberals and conservatives. For instance, the historian and republican minister Claudio Sánchez Albornoz and the Franco regime used one or the other paradigm at their convenience (García Sanjuan, 2017b).

The integrative discourse engendered a third paradigm in the second half of the twentieth century. The *convivencia* myth of a golden era of tolerance and harmony in which the arts, sciences and literature flourished, made a deep impression on the political discourse of the left, as well as on tourism advertising and, as the Cadrete example shows, on popular opinion. Conversely, the right-wing parties dissociated themselves from the integrative model and have since capitalised on the *Reconquista* paradigm, revisioning it under the umbrella of the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse in the twenty-first century (García Sanjuan, 2020: 147–163).

The case of the Cadrete statue is significant in a further sense. The removal of the statue undoubtedly sparked a debate, but it was a modern debate focusing on the mediated and contemporary views of al-Andalus, embodied by the bust, rather than on the historical past, let alone its physical remains.⁶ The castle of Cadrete itself and its management were never the subject of political discussion. This lack of discussion around monuments from the al-Andalus period is far from exceptional. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the potential ambiguity of Spain’s monumental heritage posed a challenge for

6 This is an example of what Kaufman defined as ‘medievalism doubled up upon itself’ (2010, 4).

the clear-cut interpretations developed by historians and orientalists.⁷ The presence of such works in particular urban landscapes, their daily use, their meanings to local people and their significance to foreign travellers went far beyond scholarly theoretical constructions.

Prominent buildings, such as the Alhambra in Granada, or small reminders, such as the mosque of Bab al Mardum in Toledo, have been part of Spanish everyday life from the Middle Ages to the present day, and have always mediated the memory of the past. The visibility, accessibility and even the state of conservation of these monuments has changed greatly over time, and those changes have been deeply entangled with political and historical debate, local identities and locally produced historical discourses.

As Urquizar has pointed out, theories on the role of al-Andalus in Spanish identity developed from the early modern period and were closely linked to discourses on art and architecture, but this debate took place only within the sphere of history, to the exclusion of any other scholarly fields (Urquizar, 2017: 191–192). This situation changed in the nineteenth century as new disciplines – especially Arabic studies and modern architectural theory – engaged in heated arguments around the significance of al-Andalus and its monumental heritage to the modern Spanish nation. Paradoxically, the emerging discipline of art history remained on the fringes of the debate.

In this article, I explore the question of how the main discourses generated by historians and Arabic scholars were progressively dissociated from their counterparts in the fields of art history, restoration and cultural management in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Through the paradigmatic example of the Alhambra of Granada, I analyse how different disciplines handled the potential ambiguity of monumental heritage, and how contradictory perceptions of aesthetic and historical identity were built. As one of the most important preserved monuments of al-Andalus, the history of the reception, management and study of the Alhambra in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been researched in depth.⁸ It therefore provides a particularly appropriate context in which to question why such monuments posed a conflict for theoretical constructions in the art history field and how the multi-layered meanings associated with these works drew theoretical and material approaches apart.

7 For the long history of tensions created by the ambiguity of Islamic heritage in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Rodríguez-Mediano 2009; Urquizar 2017.

8 Among others, see Calatrava, 2008 and 2014; Barrios, 2008 and 2016; Rojo, Muñoz and González, 2016; Giese and Jiménez, 2021.

1 The Place of Al-Andalus in Nineteenth Century Intellectual Discourse: Towards a Disciplinary Differentiation

It is a well-known fact that the Romantic appreciation of the Alhambra by foreign travellers altered its perception and management in the 1800s (Barrios, 2016). But beyond this Romantic gaze, the former Nasrid palace sparked new scientific interest at the end of the century. In 1834 Owen Jones and Jean Goury had travelled to Granada with the goal of contributing to the contemporary debates about oriental architecture, ornamental taxonomies and the role of polychromy in buildings (Ferry, 2007, 239). However, the work they published as a result, *Plans, elevations, sections and details of the Alhambra ...*, offered a new approach to the palace in its attempt to extract general conclusions about its structural and compositional design (Calatrava, 2010 and 2011). The book, published between 1842 and 1845, not only was revolutionary in the realm of architectural theory but also contained insights relevant to the Spanish vision of al-Andalus. Its foreword by the Spanish scholar Pascual de Gayangos provided an abridged version of his *History of the Mohammedan Dynasties*, focusing on the Nasrid dynasty, who had built the palace complex. Gayangos also translated many of the inscriptions that populated the Alhambra and were included in the text with their illustrations. The inclusion of translations from the Arabic suited Jones's British language-based approach to oriental studies. To the Spanish mindset, however, the translation of Arabic sources in connection not only with the study of the building itself but also with the historical analysis of the Nasrid kingdom, was an innovation. Indeed, Gayangos is considered the founder of Arabic studies in Spain (Álvarez and Heide, 2008), but his interest in the language was directly linked to his work on medieval history and to his wish to encourage a scientific approach to the field. Even so, his writing was criticised by some positivist scholars (Marín, 2008, 76–69, Santiño, 2018).

Gayangos also wrote about art history. He was the author of the article on Moorish architecture included in *The Penny Encyclopaedia*, published in 1839. In this work he adhered to the old eighteenth-century discourse which connected the origin of Gothic to Islamic architecture through the link of al-Andalus. In the 1850s, Gayangos visited several cities and monuments on behalf of the Spanish Royal Academy of History. Although most of these journeys were 'literary travels', for the purpose of locating and preserving the documentary legacy of dissolved monasteries, he also inspected several archaeological sites and briefly participated in the excavations at Medina Azahara (Álvarez Ramos, 2018, 196–199). Gayangos exemplifies the intellectual change that came about among Spanish scholars, who were increasingly interested in the history of

al-Andalus and in gradually incorporating the study of written Arabic sources into historical analyses of medieval Iberia.⁹ These two elements – written sources and historical analysis – played a crucial role in the positive reassessment of Andalusí art and architecture. The study of the Alhambra and other representative monuments was part of a long journey towards new contextualised studies and positivistic approaches which had started in the eighteenth century. The insertion of Islamic heritage in historical settings was indeed an innovation and departure from the traditional non-historical treatment of this legacy.

In 1789 and 1804 the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando had published the two volumes of *Antigüedades Árabes de España*, clearly showing that anybody with an interest in the national heritage must not neglect the Islamic legacy, although it was not well understood and had never been analysed within its own logic (Calatrava, 2008, 69). In 1829 Ceán Bermúdez published his well-known *Noticias de los arquitectos y la arquitectura de España*, ten years before Gayangos' article for *The Penny Encyclopaedia*. Despite Ceán's limited interest in these buildings – he did not attempt to study or contextualise them – their inclusion as part of the national patrimony, as 'one of the eras of Spanish architecture', signalled a conceptual shift in scholarly approaches to Islamic architecture (Cera, 2019, 210–225). The Enlightenment idea that a nation's progress was linked to the defence of its artistic heritage – an idea Gayangos fully shared at the middle of nineteenth century – forced Spanish intellectuals to face the material remains of al-Andalus. After Gayangos' death, however, Spanish orientalists rarely directed their studies to the field of Islamic art, focusing instead on history, literature, philology and law. A case in point is one of Gayangos' disciples, Francisco Codera, who pursued the study of the history of al-Andalus because of its connection to his work of translating written sources but, since his main concern was political history, he did not include the arts in his studies (Viguera, 2004). His work on epigraphy focused mainly on numismatic sources for historical research purposes (Viguera, 2009, 29). By the middle of the nineteenth century, Arabic and art history scholars had begun to develop separate paths.

Francisco Codera is considered the founder of the modern school of Spanish Arabic studies, having charted a course that was followed by his disciples until the final decades of the twentieth century. As several scholars have pointed out (Manzano, 2009; Viguera, 2009), oriental scholars in Spain have traditionally

9 The growing interest in al-Andalus among European orientalists, particularly French but also from other regions, and their relations with Spanish scholars are explored in Martínez Gros 2009; Marín, 2009; Marín, 2018.

been more motivated by the Islamic presence in the Iberian Peninsula than by the colonial contemporary agenda, although the latter should not be neglected (González Alcantud, 2010; Marín, 2013–2014). As a consequence, Arabic scholars tended to steer their studies towards the history of al-Andalus, while medieval historians focused mostly on the Christian kingdoms (Manzano, 2000; Viguera, 2009). This disciplinary split in the study of the history of Spain brought about two apparently contradictory ways to negotiate Iberia's Islamic past: the *Reconquista* ideal, based on the Christian notion of the Spanish nation, and the integrative paradigm of Muslim Spain defended by Arabic scholars.

The study of Andalusí art and architecture was the realm of the Real Academia de Bellas Artes. By the mid-nineteenth century, several scholarly publications, such as *Monumentos arquitectónicos de España* or the journal *Boletín Español de Arquitectura*, revealed a renewed nationwide interest in the legacy of al-Andalus (Schweizer, 2021, 134–141). At the heart of such publications was a small group of polymaths, including Manuel de Assas and José Amador de los Ríos, both of whom participated in the debate on history, culture and Spanish identity which was to mould new interpretations of the artistic legacy of al-Andalus. Assas and Amador de los Ríos coined the term 'Mudéjar style' (Nistal, 2014, 200–2007) which sat at the crossroads between the *Reconquista* and integrative paradigms and the art-historical interpretation of medieval monuments. The term *Mudéjar* was fully incorporated in artistic vocabulary after Amador's acceptance speech as a new member of the *Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando* (Amador de los Ríos, 1859). The term was used to define monuments built by Christian patrons using Islamicate ornamentation and was praised by Amador de los Ríos as the authentic 'national style', without parallel among other European nations (Ruiz Souza, 2009, 279–280). It merged the *Reconquista* and integrative models, taking pride in the heritage of al-Andalus while establishing Spain's artistic identity as essentially Christian (Urquizar, 2009–2010). The idea of *Mudéjar* art shaped public perception of Spain's visual identity (McSweeney, 2018), but it was never integrated into the debates of historians and Arabic scholars.

In the meantime, other thinkers, such as Gayangos' son-in-law Juan Facundo Riaño, devoted themselves to the study of Islamic architecture in al-Andalus. Riaño, a student of Arabic himself and a professor of history of art in Madrid, published *Orígenes de la arquitectura árabe, su transición en los siglos XI y XII y su florecimiento inmediato* in 1880, and *Palacio árabe de la Alhambra* in 1882. In these works, he argued for a new positivist approach to Islamic architecture, which should be studied as a separate artistic tradition with its own evolution and temporal scale (Isac, 2017, 60–62; Schweizer, 2021, 145–149). This positivist approach was very much in tune with his contemporaries' ideals of history and

philology and was quickly incorporated in the theoretical discourse on Islamic art both in the Academia and the universities. However, restoration practices and eclectic architectural theories, as well as certain ambiguous discourses on national and local identity attached to the physical monuments themselves, followed a different route. The art historical discourse was only one of several divergent conceptualisations of Andalusí heritage.

2 The 'Genuine' Alhambra: Orientalist Restorations and Visual Identities

In 1847, two years after the publication of *Plans, elevations, sections and details of the Alhambra*, Isabella II, queen of Spain, appointed Rafael Contreras as *restaurador adornista* (ornamental restorer) of the Alhambra. After two hundred years of neglect, the Crown's interest in the Alhambra had been growing since Isabella's mother, María Cristina de Borbón, brought a new cultural sensibility – more attuned with the European Romanticism of her time – to the Spanish court (Panadero, 2020, 201). The 1830s were a momentous decade for the Alhambra. A budget was allocated for repairs to the palace, Washington Irving published his *Tales of the Alhambra*, and decorated in Orientalist-fantasy style for the occasion, it welcomed the royal princes on an official visit (Barrios, 2008b, 138–143). The new interest awakened by the Alhambra, coupled with its superintendents' concerns about the condition of the building and the critical remarks of foreign travellers, prompted the Crown to commission structural repairs to the monument. At this point, the Queen's main consideration was the preservation of the Crown's patrimony (*the restoration of this glorious monument property of the kings of Spain*),¹⁰ as well as to respond to the accusations of backwardness and lack of cultural sensitivity aired by some foreign travellers. As a result, the works did not follow a systematic plan and failed to develop the Alhambra's potential role in the creation of an external image of the nation.

This state of affairs changed in the 1840s thanks to the growing Romantic sensibility among intellectuals both in Granada and Madrid, and even within the royal family, together with the Alhambra's increasing popularity as a destination for European travellers. Several restoration plans were designed in Granada and sent to Court in Madrid for approval and funding. The plans, which were only partially executed, evinced an intention to rebuild rather than limit the intervention to conservation, and an extremely aggressive attitude to the original remains (Barrios, 2008b, 145 ff.; Barrios, 2009, 69–70). For instance,

¹⁰ AGP, Administraciones Patrimoniales, Granada, C.º 10938/9. Cited in Panadero, 2010: 201.

in 1846 the newly appointed architect, Salvador Amador, suggested demolishing the *Patio de los Leones* and rebuilding it from the ground up (Barrios, 2009, 48). He also proposed the addition of small domes onto the pavilions in the *Patio de los Leones*, which proved to be a highly successful idea, as we shall see below.

The tear-down-and-rebuild approach was not exclusive to the Alhambra or to Spain at the time, but the former Nasrid palace was in a class of its own due to certain peculiarities. Unlike interventions in Gothic castles or cathedrals, which could rely on in-depth knowledge of their architectural features, this kind of know-how was unavailable in the case of the Alhambra. Architects lacked specific training and as mentioned above, few works in the field of art history had addressed the palace. Given the dearth of systematic academic literature until the 1920s, the positivist approach to the study of the monument was scarcely more than wishful thinking during the second half of the nineteenth century. The lack of a theoretical foundation for the works, combined with the new Romantic ideals and expectations about the monument among both local and foreign audiences, paved the way for an 'ornamental' intervention.

These architectural and social trends reached a climax in 1847, when Rafael Contreras was appointed as 'ornamental restorer' and ordered to work shoulder to shoulder with Amador, the architect in charge. Rafael was the son of José Contreras, who had managed the previous round of works. In his efforts to secure the Queen's patronage, he had given her a model of an ideally reconstructed *Sala de Dos Hermanas*, which pleased her (González, 2017, 36) and led to a commission for an Alhambra Room (*Gabinete Árabe*) to be built by Contreras in the royal palace at Aranjuez (Panadero, 1994). She also encouraged him to combine his new restoration work with the production of small-scale replicas of the Alhambra, which he soon transformed into a lucrative business, in tune with the photographic studios targeting the new tourist market (Piñar, 2006).

Isabella II made an interesting speech when she appointed Contreras as the Alhambra's restorer urging him

[...] to endeavour particularly to restore the ornaments of that most beautiful of Spanish memorials to the exact form they had at the time of the conquest [...] when the Catholic Monarchs waved the standard of the Cross [...] It is Her Majesty's pleasure that, as her illustrious ancestor Isabella I was the conqueror of the Alhambra, Isabella II be known to posterity as its restorer.¹¹

11 Archivo General de Palacio, Personal, caja 16808, exp. 2. Cited by Gonzalez, 2017: 30.

In her speech, Isabella II added an extra layer of national pride to the preservation of the Alhambra by aligning her discourse with the *Reconquista* paradigm, in which monuments like the Alhambra were considered spoils of war and as such embodied the Catholic Monarchs' victory. Her speech, however, contains internal contradictions which can also be perceived in her decisions regarding the management of the palace. From Isabella's point of view, the original shape of the Alhambra was its Christianised form – the only possible ideal deserving to be recovered, but for her it was not a fortress, origin of a military victory, but a palace in which the oriental decoration was the defining element. While the Orientalist reconstruction of the original Alhambra might have a war booty connotation, the model of the *Sala de las Dos Hermanas* and the *Gabinete árabe* in her Aranjuez palace showed a clear mismatch between the Queen's aesthetic appreciation and her nationalistic rhetoric, which singled out the Christianised identity of the Alhambra as the only valid option. Her aesthetic preferences were shared by the Spanish aristocrats who refurbished their palaces at the time and should be seen in a wider context including the Moorish revival in Europe (Giese and Jiménez, 2021, 216–217).

Contreras's actions and discourse display similar inconsistencies. He worked on the monument for over forty years, first as *restaurador adornista* (ornamental restorer) and from 1868 as director of works (Rodríguez, 1998, 49–55). Although his work evolved over the years,¹² his approach to the Alhambra remained unchanged, prioritising decoration over structural repairs and aiming for the ideal of 'image reintegration' (Orihuela, 2008, 136–141). While his work on the *Sala de las Camas* and the *Patio de los Leones* was strongly criticised in the following decades, it was also highly appreciated by both foreign and local visitors, who enjoyed the orientalisised image of the monument he had created, with highly charged polychromy, small domes, and coloured tiled in a Persianate fantasy style (González Alcantud, 2008, 265). Contreras reified this image of the Alhambra in Europe through his production of souvenirs, plaster casts and models (González, 2018), and at local level his restorations were very well received. Subsequent replicas of the Alhambra, both at home and abroad, included the domes added by Contreras and soon the image he created of the *Patio de los Leones* became the 'genuine' image of the Alhambra (González Alcantud, 2018, 265–268).

Interestingly, Contreras's actual interventions contrasted sharply with his written work. In his *Estudio descriptivo de los monumentos árabes de Granada, Sevilla y Córdoba* (1878), he stated that, to truly appreciate the remains, they should be analysed on their own and 'oriental fantasies' should be eliminated

¹² For a comprehensive study of Contreras interventions see Rodríguez, 1998.

(Calatrava, 2008, 87–88). He encouraged a positivistic and rational approach to the architecture of the Alhambra based on the study of its geometry and plans, and he explicitly claimed that this approach was the basis for his restoration works. The reality of his material interventions, however, proved otherwise. Theoretical discourse on restoration, national identity and heritage management was immersed in the same debates as historians and Arabic scholars. In the meantime, material practices, aesthetic appreciation and the development of national and local visual identities took a divergent path.

3 Aesthetics and Archaeology in the First Half of the Twentieth Century: Scholarly Approaches Clash with Local Identities

In 1907 Modesto Cendoya was appointed to succeed Rafael Contreras and his son Mariano – who had only been in post for a few years – as the architect in charge of the Alhambra. The new century had also ushered in a new scientific debate about restoration. The theories developed as a result not only conditioned the work of both Cendoya and his successor, Torres Balbás, but contributed to redefining the respective roles of art history, archaeology, history and Arabic studies in the study of Andalusí heritage. Cendoya's works were highly controversial. He was in communication with art historians and restorers such as Vicente Lampérez, and advocated the 'restorative' – that is, reconstructive – approach to the Alhambra. In contrast, the official institutions defended the so-called archaeological approach, which limited intervention to a minimum and focused on structural conservation of the remains (Álvarez Lopera, 1977, 56–82).

Cendoya had local public opinion in his favour, but eventually fell from grace on account of his inability complete his interventions and his endless archaeological explorations (Álvarez Lopera, 1977, 67). Nevertheless, he was able to retain the endorsement of certain sectors of the press and local public opinion because his traditional approach supported the restitution of lost elements, following the previous 'ornamental' restorations, which were considered part of the visual identity of the monument. At this stage, a new element entered the scene. The profits of the tourist trade added a new level of complexity to society's perception of the Alhambra and, from that point forward, the historical heritage of al-Andalus. The Alhambra had been a very early focal point for the tourist market, and photographic studios and printing workshops had become an important source of income since Contreras's time (Piñar, 2006; González, 2017, 282–318). In 1911, the Crown issued regulations for visiting the monument and introduced admission fees.

Local identities, traditional ornamentalist restoration practices, new theoretical debates, national image and business profits had contributed to the resignification of the Alhambra since its rediscovery in the late eighteenth century. As we have seen, this combination of factors increased the Alhambra's presence both in the public mind and in academic discourse from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards and reached a turning point in 1927 with the appointment of Leopoldo Torres Balbás as Cendoya's successor. Torres Balbás' restoration works and theoretical background have been analysed in depth.¹³ He is well known for developing a scientific approach to the Alhambra based on his own studies as an architect, archaeologist, and researcher with an interest in methodological innovation in the international arena (Henares Cuéllar, 2013, 344–348). His interventions changed the perception of the palace among tourists, local agents and academics and still determines its image to this day. Although his restorations have been praised by modern historiography for their modernity, accuracy, respect and scientific foundation, they were at the centre of a bitter controversy in his time because they clashed with the visual identity that had been built around the monument.

The newly appointed architect criticised Contreras's work and dismantled some orientalisising features that had no scientific basis, such as the tiled domes that crowned the pavilions in the *Patio de los Leones* since the previous century. Rafael Contreras's interventions had enjoyed strong support in Granada. He had consolidated his own vision of the Alhambra by multiplying it in the form of photographic souvenirs, plaster casts, lithographs and models, raising expectations about the monument among foreign travellers and local audiences. The Spanish pavilion at the Brussels Universal Exposition held in 1910 was modelled on the Alhambra, showing how official institutions used this monument – as an embodiment of al-Andalus and the Islamic past – to fashion the international image of Spain (McSweeney, 2018). The pavilion was built by Modesto Cendoya and included one of Contreras's domes, a motif Cendoya used again in the Alhambra Palace Hotel, built a few years later.

The people of Granada were outraged when Torres Balbás decided to remove the Alhambra's cupolas on the grounds of his own research, to the point that he had to fight back in the local press (González Alcantud, 2018, 265–271). He also demolished two hubs of *Alhambriismo* culture and social life in Granada: the Siete Suelos Hotel, which partially overlooked the homonymous gate, and the tavern belonging to Antonio Barrios, alias 'El Polinario' (González Alcantud, 2016). While the aim of these demolitions was to recover the Nasrid palace and

13 See Vílchez, 1988; Muñoz, 2014; Martín, 2008 or Villafranca, 2013.

its space in the urban landscape, the decision clashed with the local population's identification processes and memories surrounding the monument, not to mention the financial profits derived from a commodified Orientalist image of the building complex.

Torres Balbás' position as restorer of the Alhambra came to an end with his removal by the Franco regime after the Spanish Civil War. As was often the case, national politics aligned with local issues to prevent his return to Granada due to the antagonism of the local elite. The new appointee was Francisco Prieto-Moreno, one of Torres Balbás' disciples whose work largely followed the guidelines laid down by his predecessor. It is worth noting that the main feature of Islamic period archaeology and heritage management during the Franco regime was continuity (Lorenzo, 2017, 222–223). Regarding the place of al-Andalus in history, National Catholicism adopted both of the nationalist paradigms crafted during the previous century – the exclusivist model, which celebrated the *Reconquista*, and the integrative (García Sanjuan, 2017). Archaeological findings and monumental remains could lend material reality to an idea of 'Spanish Muslims' that might suit the purpose of shaping an image of national grandeur and originality, with the extra potential for interpretation linked to the ideas of *Reconquista* and victory in war. This ambiguous potential was especially important in the case of the Alhambra on account of its increasing ideological significance since its rediscovery (Hertel, 2016, 44–58).

4 The Heritage of Al-Andalus in Scholarship during the Franco Dictatorship and its Aftermath: An Uncomfortable Place for Art History

After his removal as restorer, Torres Balbás continued to develop his two other lines of work, as a professor of art history at the School of Architecture in Madrid, and as a researcher in collaboration with the Arab Studies Department at the newly founded Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. The so-called Beni Codera – a group of Arabic scholars who had followed in the footsteps of Francisco Codera – were his contemporaries. They refined the integrative paradigm, developing the idea of 'Hispano-Muslim' culture and advocated the incorporation of al-Andalus as a period of Spanish history. Their research focused on cultural history and literature and many of their publications were devoted to highlighting connections and exchanges between al-Andalus and the Christian kingdoms, as well as their mutual roots in the

classical world (Viguera, 2009, 68–70). Torres Balbás collaborated in their journal *al-Andalus*, which published his research on the subject as well as his reviews of European – mainly French – publications on Islamic art.

Torres Balbás was a prolific researcher, with over 300 articles and 13 books, most of them on the art and archaeology of al-Andalus (Almagro, 2013, 33–35). He had studied archaeology with Manuel Gómez-Moreno, and the two of them can be considered pioneers in the study of the material heritage of al-Andalus (García Cuetos, 2011). However, the institutional changes implemented by the Franco regime contributed to a fragmentation of disciplines that progressively divided the field of art history. During the Republic, the Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios (JAE) and its Centro de Estudios Históricos (CEH) had a marked multidisciplinary orientation which allowed Gómez-Moreno to develop a theoretical foundation for his research on medieval Iberian architecture and the material interconnections between al-Andalus and the Christian kingdoms (Rodríguez Mediano, 2013, 41; Moreno, 2020). This multidisciplinary approach was lost in the aftermath of the Civil War as the JAE was abolished and replaced with the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC).¹⁴

The Department of Art History and Archaeology at the JAE, led by Elías Tormo and Manuel Gómez-Moreno, became the Instituto Diego Velázquez de Historia del Arte (Cabañas, 2007; Pasamar, 1991). A new Instituto de Filología was created which included a department of Arabic Studies, with an Arabic Art and Archaeology section. Thus, the art and archaeology of al-Andalus were integrated into the academic sphere of Arabic studies but severed from other areas of art history research and were absent from theoretical debates in the field. After the death of Gómez-Moreno, who had continued to work as an honorary researcher at the Instituto Velázquez, all research on material culture in al-Andalus was linked to the department of Arabic Studies. Torres Balbás' publications are a good example of this split: while all his works on medieval Christian art were published in *Archivo Español de Arte y Arqueología*, the journal of the Instituto Diego Velázquez, his studies on Islamic art and archaeology appeared in *al-Andalus*, the scholarly journal published by the department of Arabic Studies at the Instituto de Filología (Almagro, 2013, 351).

Although this artificial separation could sometimes be overcome by personal bonds between scholars, these exchanges could not replace institutionalised multi-disciplinarity. The study of al-Andalus had developed through both architectural and archaeological approaches and it was not until the final decades of the twentieth century that other avenues emerged which led to the

14 About these changes and their repercussions in the realm of medieval studies see Escalera, Jular and Alfonso, 2017.

incorporation of the different theoretical paradigms developed in the field of art history over the past hundred years. The split also affected the development of Art History, both in terms of research and teaching. It also explains the inertial use of obsolete terminology as late as the early twenty-first century, including terms such as 'Hispano-Muslim art', which belonged in the integrative model abandoned by Spanish Arabic scholars in the 1970s and 80s (Viguera, 2009, 80); or *arte mudéjar*, a term so loaded with ideological connotations that it cannot be understood outside the nineteenth century debate on national religious identity (Urquizar, 2009–2010).

In the twenty-first century, the field of medieval history has been criticised for its residual use of the *Reconquista* paradigm (García Sanjuan, 2016; Rodríguez Mediano, 2020, 25–26), while the integrative model of Muslim Spain has disappeared from academic discourse. Arabic scholars and a new generation of art historians dealing with al-Andalus have shown their interest in new research fields that do not necessarily engage with the reductive problem of al-Andalus and Spanish identity (Viguera, 2009, 26). This evolution is exemplified by the history of the Museum of the Alhambra. Although artworks and archaeological artefacts belonging to the Alhambra had been exhibited in the palace since the mid nineteenth century, no systematic attempts were made to create a coherent collection for public viewing until the twentieth century (Marinetto, 2017, 283–285). In the early 1900s, Manuel Gómez-Moreno and other members of the Patronato de la Alhambra promoted the creation of a *Museo árabe español* (Hispano-Arab Museum). This idea was then transformed into a project for a *Museo de arte islámico español* (Museum of Spanish Islamic Art). The museum finally opened in 1962 as the *Museo Nacional de Arte Hispanomusulmán* (National Museum of Hispano-Muslim Art) following the rhetoric of the Beni Codera group. In 1994, the museum was refurbished and reopened with the more neutral name *Museo de la Alhambra* (Museum of the Alhambra), which also exhibited artefacts from other areas of the Mediterranean (Marinetto, 2017, 295).

The Alhambra illustrates how the essentialist interpretations of monumental heritage dominant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are no longer considered appropriate from the institutional and academic points of view. Nevertheless, the Alhambra still embodies the ambiguous status of Islamic heritage in Spain. Economic interests, local identities, nationalistic constructions and historical concerns are at odds with each other and have not always been aligned with scholars' theoretical models for interpreting the past. For the past two centuries, local identity and political discourses have never abandoned the Christianised reading of the Alhambra, from Isabella II projecting herself as the successor of her fifteenth-century namesake, to the

video-illustrated proposal by the far-right party Vox to adopt the anniversary of the conquest of Granada as Andalucía's regional holiday.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the visual identity of the city and the monument has been established as Islamic for centuries and frequently orientalist. As Jesús Bermúdez – former director of the Museo de La Alhambra – remarked, the Alhambra's successful image is not necessarily based on archaeology, but on aesthetics and historical imagination (González Alcantud, 2018, 273).

Bibliography

- Almagro Gorbea, Antonio. 2008. "Leopoldo Torres Balbás, investigador." *Papeles del Partal: revista de restauración monumental* 4: 71–77.
- Almagro Gorbea, Antonio. 2013. "Estudios islámicos de Torres Balbás." In *Leopoldo Torres Balbás y la restauración científica: ensayos*, edited by María del Mar Villafranca Jiménez and Román Fernández–Baca Casares, 349–360. Granada: Patronato de la Alhambra y el Generalife.
- Altshul, Nadia. 2020. *Politics of Temporalization. Medievalism and Orientalism in Nineteenth-Century South America*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Álvarez Millán, Cristina and Heide, Claudia, eds. 2008. *Pascual de Gayangos. A Nineteenth-century Spanish Arabist*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Álvarez Lopera, José. 1977. "La Alhambra entre la conservación y la restauración (1905–1915)." *Cuadernos de arte de la Universidad de Granada* 14: 7–238.
- Álvarez Ramos, Miguel Ángel. 2018. "Pascual de Gayangos: A Scholarly traveller." In *Pascual de Gayangos. A Nineteenth-century Spanish Arabist*, edited by Cristina Álvarez Millán and Claudia Heide, 85–204. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Amador de los Ríos, José. 1859. "El estilo mudéjar en arquitectura." In *Discursos leídos ante la Real Academia de Nobles Arte de San Fernando en la recepción pública de don José Amador de los Ríos (19 de junio de 1859)*. Madrid: Imprenta de Manuel Tello.
- Arciniega García, Luis. 2013. "Miradas curiosas, temerosas e intencionadas a los vestigios del pasado en la Valencia de la Edad Moderna." In *Memoria y significado: uso y recepción de los vestigios del pasado*, edited by Luis Arciniega, 61–94. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia.
- Barrios Rozúa, Juan Manuel. 2008. "La Alhambra romántica (1813–1849): gobernadores, maestros de obras y arquitectos." In *La Alhambra: lugar de la memoria y el diálogo*, edited by José Antonio González Alcantud, 29–60. Granada: Universidad de Granada.

15 <https://m.facebook.com/VOXespana/videos/399743101351578>.

- Barrios Rozúa, Juan Manuel. 2008b. "La Alhambra de Granada y los difíciles comienzos de la restauración arquitectónica (1814–1840)." *Academia: Boletín de la Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando* 106–107:131–158.
- Barrios Rozúa, Juan Manuel. 2009. "Una polémica en torno a los criterios para restaurar la Alhambra: Salvador Amador frente a Narciso Pascual y Colomer (1846–1849)." *Reales Sitios: Revista del Patrimonio Nacional* 180: 42–70.
- Barrios Rozúa, Juan Manuel. 2016. *Alhambra romántica: los comienzos de la restauración arquitectónica en España*. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada.
- Cabañas Bravo, Miguel. 2007. "La Historia del Arte en el Instituto Diego Velázquez del CSIC entre 1939 y 1975." In *Tiempos de Investigación. JAE-CSIC cien años de investigación en España*, edited by Miguel Ángel Puig-Samper Mulero, 333–345. Madrid: CSIC.
- Calatrava Escobar, Juan. 2008. "La Alhambra como mito arquitectónico, 1750–1910." In *La Alhambra: lugar de la memoria y el diálogo*, edited by José Antonio González Alcantud, 61–94. Granada.
- Calatrava Escobar, Juan. 2010. "Owen Jones y el Alhambra Court de Sydenham, 1854." In *Owen Jones. El patio de la Alhambra en el Crystal Palace*, edited by Juan Calatrava, and Tito Rojo, 7–40. Madrid: Abada.
- Calatrava Escobar, Juan. 2011. *Owen Jones y la Alhambra*. Granada: Patronato de la Alhambra y el Generalife.
- Calatrava Escobar, Juan. 2014. "Paradigma islámico e historia de la arquitectura española: de las exposiciones universales al manifiesto de la Alhambra." In *Las exposiciones de arquitectura y la arquitectura de las exposiciones. La arquitectura española y las exposiciones internacionales (1929–1975): actas preliminares*, 27–36. Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra.
- Cera Brea, Miriam, 2019. *Arquitectura e Identidad Nacional en el siglo de las Luces*. Madrid: Sociedad Española de Estudios Dieciochistas.
- Contreras, Rafael. 1978. *Estudio descriptivo de los monumentos árabes de Granada, Sevilla y Córdoba*. Madrid: Imprenta y Litografía de A. Rodero.
- Domínguez, Juan Pablo. 2021. "De 'España árabe' a 'España musulmana': Al-Andalus bajo el prisma antisemita (1847–1945)." *Al-Qanṭara* 42–1. [<https://doi.org/10.3989/alqantara.2021.005>].
- Elliot, Andrew B.R. 2017. *Medievalism, Politics and Mass-media: appropriating the Middle Ages in the 21st century*. Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer.
- Escalona Monge, Julio, Cristina Jular Pérez-Alfaro, and María Isabel Alfonso Antón. 2017. "El medievalismo, lo medieval y el CSIC en el primer franquismo." In *El franquismo y la apropiación del pasado: el uso de la historia, de la arqueología y de la historia del arte para la legitimación de la dictadura*, edited by Francisco Moreno Martín, 159–188. Madrid: Fundación Pablo Iglesias.

- Ferry, Kathryn. 2017. "Owen Jones and the Alhambra court at the Crystal Palace." In *Revisiting al-Andalus. Perspectives on the Material Culture of Islamic Iberia and Beyond*, edited by Glaire Anderson, and Marian Roser-Owen, 225–245. Leiden: Brill.
- García Cuetos, María Pilar. 2011. "La renovación de la Historia de la Arquitectura y del Arte en las primeras décadas del siglo XX: Manuel Gómez-Moreno." In *Lecciones de los maestros: aproximación histórico-crítica a los grandes historiadores de la arquitectura española*, 125–158. Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico.
- García Nistal, Joaquín. 2013. "La incorporación del término mudéjar en historiografía. Un mérito compartido." In *Actas del XII Simposio Internacional de Mudéjarismo*, 199–211. Teruel: Instituto de Estudios Turolenses.
- García Sanjuan, Alejandro. 2012. "Al-Andalus en la historiografía del nacionalismo españolista (siglos XIX–XXI). Entre la España musulmana y la Reconquista." In *1300 años de la conquista de al-Andalus (711–2011): historia, cultura y legado del Islam en la península Ibérica*, 65–104. Coquimbo: Altazor.
- García Sanjuan, Alejandro. 2019. "La persistencia del discurso nacionalcatólico sobre el medievo peninsular en la historiografía española actual." *Historiografías* 12: 132–153.
- García Sanjuan, Alejandro. 2017. "Al-Andalus en la historiografía nacionalcatólica española: Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz." *eHumanista* 37: 305–328.
- García Sanjuan, Alejandro. 2017b. "Al-Andalus en el nacionalcatolicismo español: la historiografía de época franquista (1939–1960)." In *El franquismo y la apropiación del pasado: el uso de la historia, de la arqueología y de la historia del arte para la legitimación de la dictadura*, editd by Francisco Moreno Martín, 189–208. Madrid: Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
- García Sanjuan, Alejandro. 2020. "Weaponizing historical knowledge: the notion of Reconquista in Spanish nationalism." *Imago Temporis Medium Aevum* XIV: 133–162.
- Giese, Francine, and Alejandro Jiménez Hernández. 2021. "Reproducing the Alhambra. Monument conservators and Artisans in Granada." In *Mudéjarismo and Moorish Revival in Europe. Cultural Negotiations and Artistic Translations in the Middle Ages and 19th-century Historicism*, edited by Francine Giese, 212–234. Leiden: Brill.
- González Alcantud, José Antonio. 2010. *La invención del estilo hispano-magrebí: presente y futuros del pasado*. Barcelona: Anthropos.
- González Alcantud, José Antonio. 2018. "La reinención "persa" del Patio de los Leones. Los laberintos atropo-imaginarios del restauracionismo." In *Leones y doncellas. Dos patios palaciegos andaluces en diálogo cultural (Siglos XIV al XXI)*, edited by José Antonio González Alcantud, 247–276. Granada: Universidad de Granada.
- González Pérez, Asun. 2017. "Reconstructing the Alhambra: Rafael Contreras and Architectural Models of the Alhambra in the Nineteenth Century." *Art in Translation* 9.1: 29–49.
- González Pérez, Asun. 2018. "Rafael Contreras and the Re-Shaping of the Alhambra in the 19th Century." In *The Power of Symbols: The Alhambra in a global perspective*, edited by Francine Giese, and Ariane Varela Braga, 165–178. Bern: Peter Lang.

- Henares Cuéllar, Ignacio Luis. 2013. "Don Leopoldo Torres Balbás y la historiografía del arte." In *Leopoldo Torres Balbás y la restauración científica: ensayos*, edited by María del Mar Villafranca Jiménez, and Román Fernández-Baca, 339–348. Granada: Patronato de la Alhambra y el Generalife.
- Hertel, Patricia. 2015. *The Crescent Remembered. Islam and Nationalism on the Iberian Peninsula*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
- Isac Martínez de Carvajal, Ángel. 2017. *Eclecticismo y pensamiento arquitectónico en España. Discursos, revistas, congresos*. Granada: Universidad de Granada.
- Lorenzo Jiménez, Jesús. 2017. "Arqueología de al-Andalus durante el franquismo." In *El franquismo y la apropiación del pasado: el uso de la historia, de la arqueología y de la historia del arte para la legitimación de la dictadura*, edited by Francisco Moreno Martín, 209–234. Madrid: Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
- Manzano Moreno, Eduardo. 2000. "La creación de un esencialismo: la historia de al-Andalus en la visión del arabismo español." In *Orientalismo, exotismo y traducción*, edited by Manuel Fera García, and Gonzalo Fernández Parrilla, 23–38. Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La-Mancha.
- Manzano Moreno, Eduardo. 2009. "Desde el Sinaí de su arábiga erudición: Una reflexión sobre el medievalismo y el arabismo recientes." In *Al-Andalus/España. Historiografías en contraste: Siglos XVII–XXI*, edited by Manuela Marín, 213–230. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez.
- Marín, Manuela. 2008. "Scholarship and Criticism: The Letters of Reinhart Dozy to Pascual De Gayangos (1841–1852)." In *Pascual De Gayangos: A Nineteenth-Century Spanish Arabist*, edited by Cristina Alvarez Millan, and Claudia Heide, 68–86. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Marín, Manuela. 2013–2014. "Reflexiones sobre el arabismo español: tradiciones, renovaciones y secuestros." *Hamsa. Journal of Judaic and Islamic Studies* 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.4000/hamsa.855>.
- Marinnetto Sánchez, Purificación. 2017. "Museo de la Alhambra: origen y evolución a lo largo de la historia." *Boletín del Museo Arqueológico Nacional* extr. 35: 282–302.
- Martín Céspedes, Miguel Ángel. 2008. "La intervención de Torres Balbás en la Alhambra." *Papeles del Patal: revista de restauración monumental* 4: 63–70.
- Martínez-Gros, Gabriel. 2009. "De Reinhart Dozy à Évariste Lévi – Provençal ou de l'ère des révolutions à celle de l'islamologie." In *Al-Andalus/España. Historiografías en contraste: Siglos XVII–XXI*, edite by Manuela Marín, 51–65. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 51–65.
- McSweeney, Anna. 2018. "El mudéjar y el alhambresco: Pabellones españoles en las exposiciones universales y la invención de un estilo nacional." In *Leones y doncellas. Dos patios palaciegos andaluces en diálogo cultural (Siglos XIV al XXI)*, edited by José Antonio González Alcantud, 203–228. Granada: Universidad de Granada.
- Moreno Martín, Francisco. 2020. "Arqueología, Arquitectura e Historia del Arte altomedieval: Gómez-Moreno y el reto de la interdisciplinariedad en el Centro de Estudios

- Históricos." *Veleia: Revista de prehistoria, historia antigua, arqueología y filología clásicas* 37: 95–119
- Muñoz Cosme, Alfonso. 2014. "Leopoldo Torres Balbás y la teoría de la conversación y la restauración del patrimonio." *Papeles del Partal* 6: 55–82.
- Panadero Peropadre, Nieves. 1994. "Recuerdos de la Alhambra: Rafael Contreras y el Gabinete Árabe del Palacio de Aranjuez." *Revista Reales Sitios* 122: 33–40.
- Panadero Peropadre, Nieves. 2010. "La restauración de la Alhambra y la Corona (1830–1846)." *Boletín del Instituto y Museo Camón Aznar* 16: 199–216.
- Pasamar, Gonzalo. 1991. *Historiografía e ideología en la posguerra española. La ruptura de la tradición liberal*. Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza.
- Piñar Samos, Javier. 2006. "Turismo emergente y mercado fotográfico en torno a la Alhambra (1842–1915)." In *En la Alhambra. Turismo y fotografía en torno a un monumento*, edited by Javier Piñar Samos et al. 13–49. Granada: Caja Granada.
- Rodríguez Mediano, Fernando. 2009. "Al-Andalus y la lengua árabe en la España de los siglos de oro." In *Al-Andalus/España. Historiografías en contraste: Siglos XVII–XXI*, edited by Manuela Marín, 1–20. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez.
- Rodríguez Mediano, Fernando. 2013. "Culture, Identity and Civilisation: The Arabs in the History of Spain." In *Islam and the Politics of Culture in Europe. Memory, Aesthetics, Art*, Edited by Frank, Peter, Sara Dornhof, and Elena Arigita, 41–60. Bielefeld: Verlag.
- Rodríguez Mediano, Fernando. 2020. "Al-Ándalus y la batalla del presente." In *Hispania, al-Ándalus y España: identidad y nacionalismo en la Historia*, edited by María Isabel Fierro Bello, and Alejandro García Sanjuan, 23–32. Madrid: Marcial Pons.
- Rojo, Sandra, José Muñoz Jiménez, and José Antonio González Alcantud. 2016. *La Alhambra, mito y vida. 1930–1990. Tientos de memoria oral y antropología de un Patrimonio de la Humanidad*. Granada: Universidad de Granada.
- Ruiz Souza, Juan Carlos. 2009. "Le « style mudéjar » en architecture cent cinquante ans après." *Perspective*, 2009.2: 1–11.
- Santiño, Santiago. 2018. *Pascual de Gayangos. Erudición y cosmopolitismo en la España del XIX*. Pamplona: Uergoiti.
- Schweizer, Christian. 2021. "Spanish Intellectuals of the 19th century and their role for knowledge exchanges across Europe." In *Mudejarismo and Moorish Revival in Europe. Cultural Negotiations and Artistic Translations in the Middle Ages and 19th-century Historicism*, edited by Francine Giese, 133–150. Leiden: Brill.
- Sorlin, Pierre. 2001. "How to look at an "Historical Film." In *The Historical Film: History and Memory in Media*, edited by Marica Landr, 25–49. London: Continuum.
- Urquizar Herrera, Antonio. 2009–2010. "La caracterización política del concepto de mudéjar en España durante el siglo XIX." *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma VII. Historia del Arte* 22–23: 201–216.

- Urquizar Herrera, Antonio. 2017. *Admiration & Awe. Morisco Buildings and Identity Negotiations in Early Modern Spanish Historiography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Viguera, María Jesús. 2004. "Al-Andalus prioritario. El positivismo de Francisco Codera" In Francisco Codera, *Decadencia y desaparición de los almorávides en España*, IX–CXXXVI. Pamplona: Urgoiti.
- Viguera, María Jesús. 2009. "Al-Andalus y España: Sobre el esencialismo de los Beni Codera." In *Al-Andalus/España. Historiografías en contraste: Siglos XVII–XXI*, edited by Manuela Marín, 67–81. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez.
- Vílchez Vílchez, Carlos. 1988. *La Alhambra de don Leopoldo Torres Balbás (obras de restauración y conservación) 1923–1936*, Granada: Editorial Comares.
- Villafranca Jiménez, María del Mar. 2013. "Leopoldo Torres Balbás y la Alhambra: criterios de intervención y propuestas de museología aplicada" In *Leopoldo Torres Balbás y la restauración científica: ensayos*, edited by María del Mar Villafranca Jiménez, and Román Fernández–Baca, 75–100. Granada: Patronato de la Alhambra y el Generalife.

Index

- Aalto, Alvar 81
Abascal, Santiago 157
Abd al-Rahman 111 158
Abdulhamid II 17–23
Abdulmecid 19
Abulcasis 3
Abu-Lughod, Janet 87–88
Aga Khan Award for Architecture 75, 86
Aga Khan Award Foundation 85
Ahmad ibn Tulun Mosque 86
Ahmed, Hamed Abderraman 50
Aidi, Yasmina 52
Akinci, Mustafa 15
al-Andalus 3, 5, 51, 158–163, 167–171
 historical approach to 161–164
 in nineteenth century intellectual
 discourse 161–166
 narratives about 158–160
 convivencia paradigm 159–160
 integrative paradigm 159–160, 163,
 169
 Reconquista paradigm 159–160, 163,
 166, 169, 171
 scholarship about
 during the Franco regime 169–172
Albania 2, 4–5, 130–133, 137, 139–145, 153
 ban on religious activities 130
 cultural revolution 131
 demolition of religious buildings
 130–131
 mosques
 Allajbegi Mosque (Burim) 130
 Bayezid II Mosque (Berat) 132, 145,
 149, 154
 Et-hem Beg Mosque (Tirana) 130,
 132, 155
 Halveti Tekke (Berat) 132
 Kubelije Mosque (Kavaja) 131
 Lead Mosque (Berat) 139–140, 154
 Mehmet Pashe Bushatlliu Mosque
 (Shkodra) 130–131, 155
 Mirahor Ilyas Beg Mosque
 (Korça) 137–139, 154
 Mosque of Abdurrahman Pasha
 (Peqin) 130–131
 Mosque of Ballije (Elbasan) 131
 Mosque of Bamatat (Delvina) 131
 Mosque of Bayezid II (Berat) 141–144
 Mosque of Bazar (Gjirokastra)
 130–132, 149–154
 Mosque of Beqareve (Berat) 130, 132,
 145–146, 154
 Mosque of Gjin Aleksi (Rusanj) 130
 Mosque of Muradije (Vlora) 130
 Mosque of Preza Castle 132–133, 154
 Mosque of the King (Elbasan) 130
 Mosque on Sopot castle (Borsh) 130
 Murat Beg Mosque (Kruja) 130,
 132–135, 154
 Naziresha Mosque (Elbasan) 130–131,
 135–136
 Ottoman period mosques
 current situation 130–132
 late period architectural interventions
 132–133
 reconstruction 131–132
 post 90s mosque design 131
Alevis 10, 15
Alhambra (Granada) 5, 160–169, 171–172
 artworks and archaeological artefacts
 171
 as a spoil of war 166
 as a tourist destination 164, 167–168
 replicas 165
 restoration 164–166
 reconstructive vs. archaeological
 approach 167–168
Alhambra Palace Hotel 168
Amador, Salvador 165
Ammann, Ludwig 87
Ankara 10–11, 15, 77, 79–80
Antigüedades Árabes de España 162
anti-Hungarian sentiments 34–35
anti-Turkish imagery 34–35
anti-westernism 2
architectural Orientalism 75
architectural theory 161
architecture, climate-specific 83
architecture, Islamic 5, 70–71, 73–74, 76,
 86–87, 142, 161–163

- architecture, Islamic (*cont.*)
see also al-Andalus
see also Albania, mosques
 breach between pre-modern and
 modern 71–72
 modern, Iraq 80–83
 modern, Kuwait 83–84
 modern, Sri Lanka 84–85
 modern, Turkish 77–80
 traditional Turkish house 78–79
Archivo Español de Arte y Arqueología 170
 Arkan, Seyfi 78
 Armenians, Ottoman 18, 23
 Assanowicz, Aleksander 103
 Assas, Manuel de 163
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 9, 19, 23–24, 77–78
 as father of the nation 23–24
 current societal view of 24
 reforms 23–24
 Australia 25
 Austria 30–32, 77, 99
 Averroes 3–4
 Aydın-Düzgüt, S. 11
 Aznar, Jose María 49
- Baghdad 80–83
 Barek, Fátima Ben (fictional TV character)
 51
 Barrios, Antonio 168
 basilica of Studion (Istanbul) 137
 Battle of Çanakkale 24–25
 as a crusade 25
 Battle of Kahlenberg 35–36
 Battle of Lepanto 16
 Bauhaus 78, 81
 Bawa, Geoffrey 84
 Bayezid II 137, 141
 Beirut 86
 Belarus 107
 Belarusian SSR 99, 105
Beni Codera 169, 171
 Berat 130, 132–133, 139, 141, 145, 154–155
 Bermúdez, Ceán 162
 Bermúdez, Jesús 172
 Beşiktaş J.K. 19
 Bhabha, Homi 72–73, 75, 90
 Białystok 106–107
 Bin Laden, Osama 3
 Birze 101
- Bjorn, Malene 83
 Bohoniki 103, 106–109, 117–118, 125, 127
 Bonatz, Paul 77
 Borbély, Ladislav 41
 Borbón, María Cristina de 164
 Borisov, Boyko 15
 Bosnia 2, 15, 98, 100
 Bozdoğan, Sibel 71, 77–79
 Brasilia 82
 Bratislava 35, 42
 Brussels Universal Exposition 168
 Bulgaria 98
 Burgenland 32
 Burj Khalifa 87
 Bush administration 2
- Cadrete 158–159
 Calatrava, Santiago 86
 Candilis, George 83
 Carkoglu, A. 11
 Çelebi, Evliya 141
 Çelik, Zeynep 88
 cemeteries, Tatar (*mizar*) 109–110
 inscriptions 110–111
 Cendoya, Modesto 167–168
Centro de Estudios Históricos (CEH) 170
 Ceuta 5, 50–51, 55, 57–58, 63
 Chandigarh 82, 89–90
 Charles V of Lorraine 36
 Chmelár, Eduard 37
Christian Democratic Movement (Slovakia)
 37
 Christopher Columbus 4
Cité Verticale design 84
City of Sports 81
*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
 the World Order* 3
 Clifford, James 74
 Codera, Francisco 162
 collective memory 9
 colonial architecture 90
 colonialism 2, 51, 74–75
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
 (CSIC) 169–170
 Constantinople 16. *See also* Istanbul
 Contreras, José 165
 Contreras, Rafael 164–165, 167
conversos (converts to Islam) 58
 Cordoba 158

- cosmopolitanism 76
 COST 11
 Covadonga 157
 Crinson, Mark 75
 cross-cultural exchanges 3
 crusades 2, 25, 157
 cultural heritage in Turkey 12
 Czech Republic 30, 43

 Danko, Andrej 42
 Davutoğlu, Ahmet 131
 Delvina 130–131
 demonization of Islam. *See* Islamophobia
 discourse (political) 4, 29, 34, 48, 69–70, 72, 87, 90, 157, 159–161, 163–164, 166–168, 171
 ‘clash of civilisations’ 159
 Don Pelayo (statue) 157
 Dowbuciszki 101, 105
 Doxiadis, Constantinos 81–82
 Drew, Jane 89
 Drozd, Andrzej 102, 110
 Duka, Dominik 42–43
 Duncker, A. 11

 Egli, Ernst 77
 Egypt 15, 104
 Egyptian Bazaar 10
 Ekistics 82, 87
 Elbasan 130–132, 135, 154
 Eldem, Sedad 78
El Príncipe: Amor sin Frontera (TV series)
 4–5, 48, 50–53, 57–63
 encounters, notion of 74
 Erbas, Ali 24
 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 10, 13–21, 23, 25–26, 44
 as defender of Muslims in the world 26
 neo-Ottomanism 18
 Érsekújvár 37
 Esterházy, Ferenc 37
 Esterházy, László 36
Estudio descriptivo de los monumentos árabes de Granada, Sevilla y Córdoba 166–167
 European Union (EU) 12–13, 17, 42, 69

 Faisal II 80, 82
 Fanon, Frantz 72
 Fathy, Hasan 86

 Fenerbahçe S.K. 19
 Ferdinand II 2
 Ferenc Rákóczi II 30
 Fergusson, James 75
 FETO 25
 Flesler, Daniela 51
 Flood, Finbar 71
 Forgách, Ádám 37
 Foster, Norman 86
 Foucault, Michel 72
 fountain, Ottoman 29
 France 57, 63, 80
 Franco regime 159, 169
 Freeman, Edward 75
 frontier orientalism 32–35, 42, 44
 Fry, Maxwell 89
 Fuad I 104

 Galatasaray 19
 Gallipoli 25
 Garden city 90
 Gayangos, Pascual de 161
 Gdańsk 106–107, 109
 Genesis 1, 88
 Genghis Khan 98
 German Modernism 78
 Gingrich, Andre 32–33, 35, 42
 Gjirokastra 130–132, 149–150
 globalization 76
 Golden Horde 98, 107
 Gómez-Moreno, Manuel 170–171
 Goury, Jean 161
 government policy, historical 9–25
 Granada 2, 5, 159–161, 164, 166, 168–169, 172
 Grand Duchy of Lithuania 98–103, 107
 Grodno 101
 Gropius, Walter 81–82
 Grube, Ernst 70–71
 Grunebaum, Gustave von 88

 Habsburg-Ottoman peace treaty (1606) 36
 Habsburgs 29, 36, 40
 Hadid, Zaha 86
 Hagar 1
 Hagia Sophia 10, 14, 24
 Hajro, Jurtin 131
 Handžárik, Július 34
 Hay, Robert 75
 Herzog, Jacques 86

- Hillenbrand, Robert 71
 Hispanic peninsula 1
 'Hispano-Muslim art'. *See also* *al-Andalus*
 171
 'Hispano-Muslim' culture. *See also*
al-Andalus 169
 'historical capital' 158
History of the Moorish Empire in Europe 3
 Hlina, Alojz 37
 Hoekman, B. 11
 Holl, Steven 86
 Holzmeister, Clemens 77
 Hourani, Albert 87
 Hrnko, Anton 43
 Huber, D. 12
 Hundi Hatun 137
 Hungary 2, 29–32, 34, 36, 39–41
 Captaincy of Lower Hungary 40
 Kingdom of Hungary 30
 self-determination 30
 Huntington 3
 hybridity 5, 69, 71–77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87,
 89–91, 93, 95, 97
- Iberia 1
 identity
 collective, national 9, 111, 158, 167, 171
 cultural 69–74, 83–87
 European 1
 jihadist 50, 52, 55–57
 Muslim 2
 Slovak 31–33
 Spanish 160, 163–164, 171
 Turkish 9
 imperialism, European 72
 independence (from colonial rule) 86
 India 71, 77, 89, 105
inghimasi (jihadist terrorists, fictionalized)
 53, 60
 Institute of Monument of Culture (IMK)
 131–132, 139, 141, 149, 153
 Institute of Monuments of Culture (Albania)
 130
Instituto de Filología 170
Instituto Diego Velázquez de Historia del Arte
 170
Instituto Velázquez 170
 Iraqi Development Board 80–81
- Iraq war (2003) 31, 49
 Irving, Washington 164
 Isaac 1
 Isabella I 2, 165
 Isabella II 164–165, 171
 Ishmael 1
 ISIS. *See* Islamic state in Syria and Iraq (ISIS)
 Islamic City (architecture/urbanism) 87–88
 Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP)
 4, 9–10, 13, 15, 19, 22–25, 131
 Islamic state in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) 31, 49,
 58–60
 Islamophobia 2–3, 30–34, 48–49, 51–53, 55,
 57, 59, 61, 63, 65
 Isovaki, Arata 86–87
 Israel 12
 Istanbul 11, 13–16, 18–20, 22–23, 42, 78–79,
 102, 109, 133–135, 137, 139
 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM)
 18
 Ivanov, Gjorge 15
 Iwie-Murawszczyzna 103–104, 107
 Izetbegović, Bakir 15
- Jacobsen, Arne 84
 Jan III Sobieski 36, 99
 Janina (*vilayet*) 149
 janissary (*janičiar*) 38
 Jansen, Hermann 77
 Jawak, Nizar Ali 80
 Jeanneret, Pierre 89
 Jerusalem 15–16
jihad 3, 48–50, 53, 62
 jihadist terrorism 5, 48–50, 52–55, 57, 60, 62
 Joan of Arc 157
 Jobbik party 30
 John of Damascus 1
 Jones, Owen 75, 161
 Josic, Alexis 83
Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios (JAE)
 170
- Kale Restorayon 149
 Kapchan, Deborah 76
 Kazan 108
 Kemalism 23–25
 Keyman, E. 12
 Khalifa, Hamad bin Isa Al 15

- Kizil Sultan*. See Abdulhamid II
 Kleck 101, 104
 Klein, Otokar 41
 Knott, Kim 110
 Kojdanów 101
 Kollár, Boris 33–34
 Konopacki, Artur 102
 Koolhaas, Rem 86
 Koprulu Amcazade Huseyin Pasa 79
 Korça 132, 137, 154
 earthquake 137
 Kotleba, Marián 33
 Krásna Hôrka castle 33
 Kruja 130, 132–133, 136, 154
 Kruszyńniany 103, 106–109, 114, 122
 Kryczyński, Stanisław 102–103
 Kryczyński, Stefan 104
 Kumsishvili, Dimitri 15
 Kurdish autonomy 23
 Kurds 10
 Kuwait 77, 83
 Water Towers 83

 Laachiri, Mohamed 50
 Lachowicze 104–105
 Lajos Kossuth 30
 Lampérez, Vicente 167
 Lane, Edward 75
 Larsen, Henning 86
 Latour, Bruno 74
 Lebedziewo-Zastawek 109
 Le Corbusier 81, 89–90
Legorreta+Legorreta 86
 Lithuania 98–103, 107–108
 Lithuanian SSR 99, 105
 Ljajić, Sandžak Rasim 15
 Long Turkish War (1591/1593–1606) 36
 Łosośna 101
 Louvre Museum (Abu Dhabi) 87
 Łowczyce 101
 Lower Austria 31–32
 Łukiszki 101, 104

 Macron, Emmanuel 43
 Madrid train bombings (2004) 49, 52
Magnificent Century (soap opera series) 16
 Makiya, Mohamed 83

 Marçais, Georges 88
 Marçais, William 88
mashrabiya (pierced grilled windows) 82
 Mason, Harold 80
 Mayer, Albert 89
 Mecca 15, 18, 111
 Mečiar, Vladimír 38
 medievalism 157, 159
 Medina 15, 18, 108
 Medina Azahara 161
 Mehmed, pasha of Buda Kara 36
 Mehmed Reşit Paşa 141
 Mehmed the Conqueror 4, 13, 26
 as a symbol in Turkish politics 14
 Meksi, Aleksander 142
 Meuron, Pierre de 86
 migrant crisis of 2015 30
 Mikhail, Alan 12
 Mikloško, František 43
 Mińsk 101, 104–105
 Mir 101
 Mirahor İlyas Beg 137
Modernist Hybrid city 89–90
 Moneo, Rafael 86
 Moorish revival in Europe 166
 Moravia 43
 Morey, Javier (fictional TV character) 51
 Morocco 63
 Mościcki, Ignacy 104
 Mosque Building Committee (Poland) 105
 Mosque of Bab al-Mardum (Toledo) 160
 Mosque of Bachelors. See Albania: Mosque of Beqareve (Berat)
 mosques, Tatar 100–108
 after 1945 105–107
 design 107–108
 the interwar period 103–105
 until 1918 100–103
 Moussavi, Farshid 76
Mozarabic Chronicle 1
 ‘Mudéjar style’ 163
 Murat Beg 133
 Murat II 137
Museo de la Alhambra 171–172
Museo Nacional de Arte Hispanomusulmán (National Museum of Hispano-Muslim Art) 171

- Museum of Islamic Art (Qatar) 86
 Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland 99, 105
 Muslim Tatar Cemetery (Warsaw) 109
- Nagyvezekény 36
 Nasrids 161, 165, 168
 Nasuh Beg 133
natio Hungarica 34–35
 National Catholicism 169
 National Centre of Intelligence (CNI, Spain) 51
 National Socialist party 78
 Naziresha 130–132, 135–137, 154
 Nazir Kejvan Beg 135
 Necipoglu, Gülru 71
 negationism, historical 158
 Nehru, Jawaharlal 89
New York Times 82
 New Zealand 25
 Niekraszuńce 103–105
 Niemież 101, 107
Noticias de los arquitectos y la arquitectura de España 162
 Nouvel, Jean 86–87
 Nové Zámky 29, 37, 40–41
 Nowitzkiin, Mathew 89
 Nowogródek 101–103
- Oerley, Robert 77
 Ondrejovič, Slavomír 38
 Orientalism 31–32, 35, 42, 48–49, 51–53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 69, 72–75, 87
 Orientalist scholarship 88
 Osmolów 105
 otherness 51, 72, 75, 86, 157
 Arab-Muslim “Otherness” 49, 55, 63
 of ornament 86–87
 Ottoman Baroque Albanian architecture 144
 Ottoman Empire 2, 10–14, 16, 18–19, 23, 26, 30–34, 36–37, 39–44, 71, 77, 79, 130, 132, 139, 149
 Ottoman-Hungarian collaboration 34–35
 Ottoman-Muslim conjunction 41–43
 Ottoman revival 4, 10
 Ottoman traditions 4, 9–10, 13
 Ozkan, Siha 85
 Özyürek, Esra 12
- Pakistan 15, 89
 pan-islamism 18
 Paris university 4
 Párkány 36
Patio de los Leones 165–166, 168
Patronato de la Alhambra 171
Pax Ottomanica 42
Payitaht (TV series) 18
 Pei, I.M. 86
People's Party – Our Slovakia (LS-NS) 33
 Peşin 130–131
 Peter Abelard 4
 Picturesque theory 75
 Pietilä, Raili 83
 Pietilä, Reima 83
 Pleszewice 101
 Podlasie 99, 103, 106
 Poelzig, Hans 78
 Poland 2, 4–5, 81, 98–100, 104–107, 109
 cemetaries, Christian 110
 cemetaries, Tatar (mizar) 109–110
 Islam in
 Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly 100
 Ahmadiyya Muslim Association 100
 history of Muslims 98–100
 Muslim League in the Republic of Poland 100
 Muslim Unity Society 100
 recognition as a religion 99
 Tatar Mosques 100–108
 Kingdom of Poland 99
 religious freedom 100
 Republic of Poland 99
 Russification 110
 Western Territories 99
 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 99–100
 political Islam in Turkey 11–13
 politics of memory 9–10, 31
 Ponti, Gio 81
 Portugal 98
 postmodern architecture 85–87
 power, notion of 72–73
 Poznań 109
 Pratt, Mary Louise 74–75
 Prieto-Moreno, Francisco 169
 propaganda, political
 ISIS 50, 58
 in Turkey 14, 24
 Prost, Henri 19

- Prudziany 101
 Prussia 99
 Pyla, Panayiota 82

 al-Qaeda 49
 Qatar 86–87
 Qatar Education City 87

 radicalisation, jihadist 5, 50
 Radvaň nad Dunajom 36
 Radziwiłł family 101
 Rafael Vinoly 86
 Raymond, André 88
Real Academia de Bellas Artes 163
Reconquista 157–159, 163, 166, 169, 171
Reconquista paradigm 159, 166, 171
 Reformation 35
 Rejže 101, 108
 Republic of Turkey 9, 18–19, 23–24, 26
restaurador adornista 164, 166
 Reuter, Ernst 78
 Riaño, Juan Facundo 163
 Ríos, José Amador de los 163
Risāle-i Tātār-i Leh 100, 102, 108–110
 Riyadh 86
 Roger Bacon 4
 Roma 12, 33–34
 comparison with Turks 33–34
 Romanticism, European 164–165
 royal palace (Aranjuez) 165–166
 Rubin, B. 11
 Ruskin, John 75
 Russia 14, 99

 Said, Edward 32, 72–73
Sala de Dos Hermanas 165
Sala de las Camas 166
 Samuel 3
 Sánchez Alborno, Claudio 159
 Saudi Arabia 15, 18, 86, 108, 111
 Sauvaget, Jean 88
 Schütte-Lihotzky, Margarete 78
 Scott, S.H. 3
 Sert, Josep Lluís 81, 83
 Shameti, Martin 131
 Sharif, Shahbaz 15
 Shkodra 130–131, 145, 155
 Siete Suelos Hotel 168
 Simferopol 103

 Sinnajev, Seifetdin Chosianov 109
 Skuraj family 139
 Slovakia 4, 29–36, 38–43
 Turkish immigrants 31
 Slovak identity 32–33, 39–40
Slovak Matica 34
Slovak National Party 42
 Slovak vocabulary 38–40
SME Rodina 34
 Smithson, Alison 83
 Smithson, Peter 83
 Sobczak, Jacek 102
 SOM 86
 Sorlin, Pierre 158
Sorok Tatarý 101–102, 107–109
 Spain 2–5, 16, 49–51, 55, 58, 61–63, 98,
 157–159, 161–165, 168, 171
 see also al-Andalus
 Arabic studies in Spain 161–164
 Arab identity of Spain 51–52
 history
 Catholic 157–159
 Christian kingdoms 163, 169–170
 Muslim 158–160
 Roman 159
 Spanish Civil War 169
 Visigothic 157–160
 Spanish Royal Academy of History 161
 Spivak, Gayatri 72, 90
 Sri Lanka 77, 84–85
 Stefan Kryczyński 104
 Stern, Samuel 87
 Stoler, Anne Laura 73
 Strong, Pauline 76
 Studzianka 104
 Štúrovo 36
 Styria 32
 Suchowola 106
 suicide bomber 54
 Suleiman the Magnificent 4, 15–16, 26
 as a symbol for Turkish foreign policy
 16–17
 image in the mass media 16
 Sulejman Pashë Vlora 145
 Syria 2, 14, 31, 58, 60, 80, 82
 Syrian Civil War 58

 Taksim Gezi Park 19–23
 Taksim square 10, 19–23, 26

- Tange, Kenzo 83, 86
 Taslik Coffee House (Istanbul) 79
 Tatars. *See also* Poland 5, 31, 39, 98–101,
 103–108, 110–112, 119, 122–124, 128–129
 cemeteries (mizar) 109–110
 mosques 100–108
 Taurida Spiritual Board 103
 Taut, Bruno 77
 Templars 157
 Thomas Aquinas 4
 Tigris River 81, 83
 Tirana 130, 132, 155
 Tkáč, Marián 34
 Tocci, N. 12
 Togan, S. 11
 Toledo 3–4, 160
 Tormo, Elías 170
 Torres Balbás, Leopoldo 167–170
 Trakai mosque 103
 Troki 101–102
 Turkey 4, 9–27, 30–31, 34, 44, 71, 77–79, 100,
 106–107, 131, 134–135, 139–140, 154
 democratic reforms 13
 de-secularization 13
 education in 18
 foreign policy 9, 11–12, 16–17
 ambitions in the Mediterranean and
 Black Sea basins 16–17
 modern architecture 78–80
 ‘New Turkey’ 26
 policy of history 9–10, 13–25
 putsch of 2017 25
 sale of alcohol 18
 secularism 18–19
 use of Latin alphabet 24
 Turkic Council 30
 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination
 Agency (TİKA) 106–107, 131–132, 141,
 153
 Turkish presence in Anatolia 9
 Tyszkiewicz, Jan 102

 Újváry, Zsuzsanna J. 37
 Ukrainian SSR 99, 105–106
 Ulu Hakan. *See* Abdulhamid II
 United Arab Emirates 86
 United States 12, 14, 17, 82–83
 UN Studio 86
 urbanism 5, 69–74
 US embassy in Baghdad 83
 USSR 99, 105
 Utzon, Jorn 84
 Uyvar province 29
 Uzgur Ahmet Beg 139
 Uzguroğlu Isa Beg 139

 Velké Vozokany 36–37
 Venerable Bede 1
 Vienna siege (1683) 31, 35–36, 43
 Vikings 157
 Vilnius 101–102, 104–105, 121
 Visigoths 1
 Vlorë 130
 Vlorë, Ekrem Bej 145
 Vox (Spanish political party) 157–158, 171
 Vytautas 98

 Wagner, Martin 78
 Waka 102
 Warsaw 83, 104–107, 109, 111, 118
 Widze 105
 Wilson, James Mollison 80
 Winksznupie 105
 Wirth, Eugen 87
 Woods, Shadrach 83
 World War I 16, 24, 40, 102–104
 World War II 9, 40, 99, 105
 Wright, Frank Lloyd 80
 Wrocław 109
 Wszelaki, Marian 106

 Yalta 99
 Yanya 139
 Yavuz Sultan Selim I 14–16, 26
 Yıldız Palace (Istanbul) 18
 Yıldırım, Binali 15
 Young Turks 19

 Zamoyska, Elfryda 103–104
 Zamoyski, Tomasz 104
 Zaragoza 158
 Zátarecký, Adolf Peter 39