INTRODUCTION

Kearrin Sims, Nicola Banks, Susan Engel, Paul Hodge, Jonathan Makuwira, Naohiro Nakamura, Jonathan Rigg, Albert Salamanca, and Pichamon Yeophantong

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INTRODUCTION

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Following the emergence of ‘development’ as a global project some 75 years ago, many parts of the world have seen notable improvements in living standards. Poverty rates have declined, life expectancy has increased, formalized education has expanded, and new infrastructures have provided greater access to water, electricity and other social services. Yet alongside such ‘good change’ (Chambers 2004), the world has also witnessed new and enduring challenges, including rising socio-economic inequality, unsustainable resource depletion, new conflicts, democratic backsliding, and the rapid acceleration of anthropogenic climate change. Where parts of Asia have experienced exceptional economic growth and strong improvements in human development, in other regions such progress has been halting. Inequities and inequalities related to gender, race, ethnicity, place, religion, and other social categories remain pervasive, as do global health threats, more frequent and intense disasters, and a myriad of other challenges (UN 2015).

The above paragraph provides an unremarkable summary of where the globe is now in terms of ‘development’: the evidence is mixed, contested and geographically variegated. This, though, is also the nub of the matter. In 2019, Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo won the Nobel Prize in Economics (along with Michael Kremer) for their ‘experimental approach to alleviating global poverty.’ In Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty, they write:

Economists (and other experts) seem to have very little useful to say about why some countries grow and others do not. Basket cases, such as Bangladesh or Cambodia, turn into small miracles. Poster children, such as Côte D’Ivoire, fall into the ‘bottom billion.’ In retrospect, it is always possible to construct a rationale for what happened in each place. But the truth is, we are largely incapable of predicting where growth will happen, and we don’t understand very well why things fire up.

(Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 267)

Depending where – and, importantly, how – we look, there is every reason to avoid being sanguine about the prospects for development. Across and within countries we see enormous disparities in wealth, opportunity, and power. Depending on the criteria used, billions of people continue to live in absolute poverty, with projections that up to 150 million additional people will be pushed into poverty during 2020–2021 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (World
In addition to, and interrelated with poverty, 78 million people are affected by forced displacement globally (UNHCR 2020), and if the worst projections of global climate change are realized, the next few decades will bring widespread hunger, accelerating inequality and mass species extinction. Poverty persists, structural and systemic inequality are deepening in many places, and critical challenges are becoming more entrenched.

**COVID-19: global development amidst a global pandemic**

Global development challenges constantly evolve, such that as one is addressed, another seemingly emerges to take its place. Many global development challenges are also becoming increasingly complex. Since this Handbook was first conceived, the world experienced one of the most tumultuous periods since the end of World War II, with the COVID-19 pandemic generating social and economic turbulence around the world.

On 31 December 2019, the first signs of a new virus were detected in the Chinese city of Wuhan. One month later, on 30 January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak of a novel coronavirus (later termed COVID-19) a public health emergency of international concern. By 11 March, two days after Italy entered a national lockdown to curb its exploding cases of the virus, WHO declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. Less than a month later there were more than a million reported cases of the virus. In another two weeks there were 2 million cases, and by 12 May there were more than 4 million reported cases (including 280,000 deaths) across 213 countries. At the time of writing, the Johns Hopkins Resource Centre database (n.d.) records over 162 million cases globally, and more than 3.3 million deaths. The Economist’s (2021) model based on excess deaths provides a much higher figure suggesting that by May 2021 the pandemic had claimed between 7.1 million and 12.7 million lives, most in low and middle-income countries. While many countries within the Global South initially performed well in containing the spread of the virus, by early to mid-2021 second and third ‘waves’ were resulting in continued and widespread loss of life – most notably in India and Nepal, even as some countries began vaccination rollouts.

As local economies ground to a halt to limit the spread of the virus, and as countries around the world closed their international borders to prevent the spread of the virus, the global economy tumbled into recession. According to Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates, in Asia alone COVID-19 may see as many as 167 million jobs lost, and more than 399 million people pushed into poverty (ADB 2019). In Bangladesh, for example, an additional 21 per cent of the population joined the pre-existing 20.5 per cent living under the poverty line, leading the government to announce a US$150 million social protection programme for the ‘new poor’ (Rahman et al. 2021). Around the world, support packages to deal with the social, economic and health costs of the crisis have led to huge expenditures even as fiscal revenues have shrunk.

Through the pandemic, old patterns of inequality between countries of the Global North and South have been reproduced. Regarding increasing poverty, modelling suggests that South Asia will be the worst affected region, with up to 57 million people being pushed into extreme poverty (World Bank 2020, 5). Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be the next most affected region, where up to 40 million additional people are predicted to fall into extreme poverty (ibid., 5). In both cases, these projections are based on the heavily criticized US$1.90/day poverty line, meaning poverty rates at higher thresholds will be much greater.

Existing patterns of inequality are also evident in the global vaccine rollout. As of 30 March 2021, 86 per cent of global vaccinations had been administered in high-income countries, with low-income countries accounting for just 0.1 per cent of vaccinations (Collins and Holder...
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By May 2021, it seems likely that children in some high-income countries will receive a vaccine before high-risk population cohorts in low and middle-income countries. Kenya anticipates that just 30 per cent of its population will be vaccinated by 2023 (ibid.). As the virus mutates, vaccination delays in one country may result in new strains that are resistant to available vaccines. Attempts to waive patents in order to provide affordable vaccines to low-income countries have faced resistance from pharmaceutical companies and their shareholders.

Under the leadership of President Donald Trump, the US showed disdain for a collective global response to the pandemic by withdrawing its funding from WHO and buying up (in early July 2019) the world’s supply of the drug Remdesivir – which research suggests could speed the recovery of coronavirus patients (Martin 2020).

The scramble to respond domestically to the virus has been accompanied by some concerning retractions in global development and humanitarian work and reduced international cooperation across critical socio-economic sectors. As of 2021, Australian aid reached a record low as percentage of GDP, despite its economy being comparatively less affected than other donor countries. Cuts to aid in the most recent budget continued a long trend of reduced funding, which has seen Australia shift from contributing 4.3 per cent of total OECD aid in 2012 to only 1.6 per cent in 2020 (Pryke 2021). In 2015, the UK enshrined in law its commitment to the Monterrey Consensus to provide 0.7 per cent of GDP in aid funding; this was slashed to just 0.5 per cent of GDP in 2020, justified due to the pandemic’s pressure on public finances. This occurred alongside the incorporation of the UK aid-administering body, the Department for International Development (DFID), into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – a move that has resulted in reduced autonomy and seen significant staff losses (Worley 2020). Such funding cuts and other effects of the pandemic have also seen many International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) under financial and operational strain, with Oxfam closing its operations in 18 countries and cutting 1,500 staff (Beaumont 2020).

Politically, an important correlation requiring further analysis regarding the pandemic is that, as of May 2021, six of the top seven countries for total reported COVID-19 case numbers have/had conservative populist leaders: Boris Johnson in the UK; Donald Trump in the US; Narendra Modi in India; Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey; and Vladimir Putin in Russia. Of course, there are major differences between these countries that bring caution to any generalizations, yet across the world the pandemic has unfurled alongside – and been shaped by – democratic rollback and more assertive forms of nationalism. In the US claims of election fraud by the outgoing President Donald Trump saw his supporters storm the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021, in what many considered a coup attempt in the world’s self-ascribed champion of global democracy. Less than two months later, another military coup occurred in Myanmar, a country long considered as one of the most authoritarian states in the world, but which had been making some notable progress on enhanced political freedoms. In Hong Kong, Beijing has imposed draconian new security laws after more than a year of ongoing protests, while in India President Narendra Modi’s government has suppressed public reporting on COVID-19 case rates.

As tensions have mounted during the pandemic, public protests have occurred across multiple countries. Black Lives Matter protests against racial injustice in the US – spurred foremost by the murder of George Floyd Jr by an acting police officer – spilled over to other parts of the world, sparking a range of new social movements. In the UK, race-related protests were accompanied by monuments of former colonial figures being torn down. In Australia, attention was again drawn to the country’s abhorrent statistics on Indigenous incarceration and deaths in custody. Protests against racial injustice have been accompanied by climate change movements across multiple countries, tax reform protests in Colombia, and protests against police violence.
in Nigeria, and women’s rights protests in Pakistan, Paris and Turkey – to name just a few examples. Global crises generate politically charged environments and create the potential for the (re)emergence of conflict.

COVID-19 has both reinforced existing patterns of inequality and revealed the deeply problematic nature of binaries such as ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. Policy failures across the ‘Global North’ and commendable successes within the ‘Global South’ have further exposed ‘the falsity of assumptions that the Global North has all the expertise and solutions’ (Oldekop et al. 2020, 2). Failures of governance and social policies have been criticized across a range of countries, including the US, UK, Italy and Spain, leading to late responses in containing the virus, and in turn, high (and unevenly spread) mortality rates. The causal factors behind the high case rates in each of the above-mentioned countries are highly complex, and shaped by social, cultural, political, economic, demographic, and geographic forces. But it is notable that the US and UK have the highest levels of inequality within the ‘Global North,’ and were also ranked first and second in 2019 for pandemic preparedness (NTI et al. 2019).

The great (un)equalizer

Initial commentary suggested that COVID-19 might be a ‘great equalizer’ in terms of its effects; viruses do not discriminate between rich and poor, men and women, or other social or cultural cohorts. These claims echo those sometimes made about climate change which is said to be globally indiscriminate in its effects. What is ignored in such commentary, however, is that the effects of the pandemic – and climate change – are shaped by the pre-existing structures of power and privilege as well as by the discriminatory politics and policies of governments. Across the world, people have been unevenly exposed to the pandemic and its social and economic effects, including uneven access to health services and job security. Not only has COVID-19 brought forth many new forms of inequality and disadvantage, but it has also exposed and deepened sociopolitical and ethnocultural cleavages. It has produced new challenges for global development while amplifying and reworking existing challenges.

Wealth inequality grew dramatically during the pandemic, with already marginalized and disadvantaged groups being the most seriously affected. Globally, the pandemic has led to the worst setback on poverty reduction in decades (World Bank 2020). At the same time, some of richest individuals saw their wealth grow. Billionaire Elon Musk’s net worth grew by US$140 billion during the pandemic, just at the time when he was threatening to sue the government of California and relocate production to Texas in opposition to the state’s coronavirus restrictions (Siddiqui and Romm 2020). Similarly, Amazon’s CEO Jeff Bezos saw his wealth grow by US$70 billion at a time when Amazon employees were protesting unsafe working conditions exposing them to risks of COVID-19 (Sainato 2021). Surging share prices following the approval and production of COVID-19 vaccines has also created at least nine new billionaires (Ziady 2021).

Gender inequalities have also been shaped, and grown, during the pandemic. Globally, women have experienced greater exposure to COVID-19 due to their overrepresentation in frontline health sector professions and service industries, as well as their additional caring responsibilities in many households (World Bank 2020). Women have also experienced increased rates of domestic violence during pandemic lockdowns and have been more likely than men to step out of the labour force to cover additional caregiving or domestic work (ibid.). In the US, research has also demonstrated that transgender people have been disproportionately affected by COVID-19 due to their greater likelihood to be low-income, their higher rates of HIV and asthma, and the barriers that they experience in accessing healthcare (inequality.org n.d.).
In 2020-2021 COVID-19 dominated international news in such a way that other critical global challenges have, arguably, received insufficient attention – including other health threats. They have been pushed from news reports, out of world attention, and therefore off the globe. COVID-19 has also become a reason – and a justification, as noted above – for richer countries to scale back their Official Development Assistance commitments and to focus on the needs of their own populations rather than those in less prosperous places. The COVID-19 pandemic is unquestionably important in and of itself. But it also makes visible many long-standing and entrenched issues of global development, as well as revealing new ones. It provides a valuable antidote to the lazy notion that ‘things are getting better.’ For some, yes; but for many millions of others such generalizations are incorrect, if not insulting. To begin with, the pandemic shows the world to be truly – and deeply – interconnected – reflected in one of the aphorisms of the age, ‘No one is safe, until everyone is safe.’ But COVID-19 has also shown that poverty reduction can be thrown into reverse in a matter of months, that hundreds of millions are living just barely above the poverty line, wherever it is drawn, and that inequalities of all colours and stripes are enduring and sometimes deepening.

Collectively, the mounting interrelated challenges discussed above point to the need for new thinking and practices in global development. Readers with familiarity in the field of development will likely have already noted the usage of the term ‘global’ in this introduction (and Handbook title), as opposed to some of the other common prefixes that are used to define different forms of, or approaches to, development: sustainable development, economic development, community development, and so forth. Such prefixes matter – they are more than academic wordplay. Of foremost importance to the chosen nomenclature of this Handbook is the distinction between global development and international development.

‘Development’ remains a heavily contested concept. Without rehashing a conversation that has been extensively examined elsewhere (Cowen and Shenton 1996, Rist 1997, Kothari 2005, Pieterse 2010), it bears noting that the study and practice of development extends across multiple fields. Development, albeit contested, encompasses two key sets of concerns. These have come to be known by the ‘Big-D/ Little-d’ (D/development as practice versus progress) distinction. The first are attentive to processes of social, cultural, ecological, economic and political change – be it through attempts to pursue progressive change, or through critique of uneven, contradictory and negative consequences of ‘d’development. The second are oriented towards the landscape of actors and surrounding ‘architectures’ that have been established to pursue ‘D’evelopment in its various forms. This landscape includes, to name just some examples, states, multilateral organizations, non-government organizations, multinational corporations, small-scale enterprises, community-based organizations, and local volunteers (DSAA n.d.).

One of the broadest and most widely accepted definitions of development is Robert Chamber’s (2004) framing of development as ‘good change.’ Yet even here there is the important question of what constitutes ‘good change.’ This remains highly subjective, contested, and embedded within power relations that privilege some perspectives and voices, while silencing others.

Until recently, international development has been the prevailing term used to describe efforts – typically by Western countries – to bring about ‘good change’ in countries around the world. Like any complex term, international development is interpreted in many different ways, but also has some commonly agreed-upon attributes. Examples include a focus on international aid and inter-state relations, attention to international development institutions (most notably multilateral banks and governance institutions and international non-governmental
organizations), and – perhaps most significantly – the idea that development involves high-income ‘Northern’ countries providing assistance to address development challenges that are limited to countries in the Global South (Oldekop et al. 2020) that are still ‘catching up.’ Debates in international development reach far beyond, and heavily critique, each of these three topic areas, and the diversity of the field(s) of study and practice(s) that fall under the heading of international development should not be ignored as a result of efforts to identify common themes. Nonetheless, international development is a term that carries a lot of baggage, and this baggage often establishes entry-points for thinking that limit the potentialities for thinking about global justice and wellbeing in new ways.

Global development offers an alternative language to international development that seeks to move beyond some of the more antiquated ways of thinking about global efforts to pursue good change. It seeks to be more attentive to development challenges in all (Northern and Southern) countries, as well as to collective challenges that transcend nation-state boundaries. This includes a questioning of former, problematic and poorly defined categories such as ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, which underpinned much thinking that has occurred under the conceptual umbrella of ‘international development’ (Horner and Hulme 2019).

Two notable advocates calling for a paradigm shift from international to global development have been Horner and Hulme (2017; 2019; 2020), who see the need for a global development paradigm as made most pertinent via: the global interconnectedness of contemporary capitalism; the global nature of sustainability and climate change challenges; and the increasingly diverse forms of global inequality which cut across North–South boundaries and present challenges in all countries. To these themes could also be added the global challenges of rising authoritarianism (witnessed in all world regions), the growing global interconnectedness of social movements, global debt, and the still-emerging global transformative effects of artificial intelligence and big data. If all of the above themes were not convincing enough evidence for the need to think about development through a global lens, COVID-19 has provided even further evidence of the global, collective, and connected nature of development: it is a development challenge that pervades all countries, and that will only be successfully addressed through a collective global response.

In providing a starting point for a global development paradigm, Horner and Hulme focus their attention on four key vectors. First, they note important geographic shifts from ‘poor people, poor countries and the global South’ to interconnected and shared issues across North and South, as well as tackling development challenges wherever they exist (Horner and Hulme 2017, 26). As Sumner (2012) noted a decade ago, geographies of impoverishment have shifted such that the majority of the world’s poor now live in middle-income countries. This shift to recognize that development is also a ‘northern’ issue is captured in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which call on all countries to report of their actions and progress towards the 17 goals. The turn to the global represents an important shift from the SDGs’ predecessor of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were focused much more firmly on development as a ‘Southern’ problem.

Spatially, and as discussed above, Horner and Hulme see the need for a shift in nomenclature of North–South and developed/developing countries to global convergences and national and sub-national differences. In both Northern and Southern countries, we see highly affluent neighbourhoods and low socio-economic neighbourhoods, and differential life outcomes that are shaped by gender, ethnicity and other common themes of disadvantage and privilege. Furthermore, rising middle classes across the Global South have expanded alongside the stalling, and backsliding, of many middle-class incomes in the Global North (Horner 2020).
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Conceptually, Horner and Hulme call for a shift from the technocratic and econocentric thinking on development that was so firmly entrenched within ‘international development’ to a greater focus on sustainability and social justice, as well as efforts to bring about good change that extend beyond poverty alleviation. As Horner notes, ‘poor countries’ and ‘poor people’ remain important to global development, but global development is about much more than poverty alleviation (Horner 2020). It is perhaps important to emphasize here that the call for a global development paradigm is not a call to shift focus away from the Global South, or from the needs of the world’s most impoverished, marginalized or persecuted peoples. Rather, it is a call for greater attentiveness to global interconnections. In March 2021, for example, the need to think more globally about development – as well as the interdependencies and fragilities of global trade – was exemplified by the grounding of the Ever Given container ship, which came to block the Suez Canal. Approximately 12 per cent of global trade passes through the canal, and consequently the grounding of a single ship caused daily trade disruptions of around US$10 billion and prevented the movement of goods between countries around the world in the midst of a global pandemic.

Finally, regarding actors, Horner and Hulme note a shift from both understandings of development as requiring charity and development aid from Northern to Southern states to more complex thinking about South-South cooperation, and a more diversified development practice landscape where South-South cooperation is increasing – and becoming increasingly influential in shaping global development norms and modalities. South-South cooperation has long been a – underexamined – feature of global development cooperation, but its increasing scale and influence over the past decade contributes to the need to think about global development in new ways.

Contribution of this Handbook

When development first emerged as a post-World War II and post-colonial project, there was much enthusiasm for the opportunities that lay ahead. Economic growth, coupled with technological modernization, was seen as a means to alleviate poverty and to bring widespread progress and prosperity for all. Since then, scathing critiques have challenged the idea that development can achieve widespread prosperity. Today, continued faith in business-as-usual (economic) development persists alongside pervasive scepticism, as well as expanding and increasingly complex development challenges. Calls for more and better development sit alongside demands for radical change.

This Handbook seeks to contribute to the global development turn through a contemporary analysis of emergent challenges and crises around the world, the relationships between them, and the persistent structural inequalities that continue to (re)produce forms of marginalization and disadvantage – as well as through the ways that we might approach these myriad issues in our teaching, research, and practice. A handbook on Global Development is overdue. Climate change and COVID-19 make the timing of this volume particularly important, but in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, we can expect future global crises.

Part 1, ‘Changing development configurations,’ brings attention to shifting geographies, spatialities, actors and modalities of development. It sets some of the key context for contemporary development debates about structures and configurations that shape the sector and provides multiple entry-points for rethinking development as global. This includes a focus on the harmful effects of globalization and possibilities for more progressive alternatives, the expansion of retroliberal modes of development (Ch3), global debt relations (Ch5), and
regional development challenges within Northern countries (Ch4). Further chapters consider changes within the ‘traditional’ donor landscape (Ch6), the ways in which South–South cooperation (and associated research) have shifted in recent years (Ch7), the growth of new development financing and activities through philanthropy and social enterprise (Ch10, Ch11), and the enduring tensions that exist in efforts to ‘localize’ Northern funding within Southern contexts (Ch9).

In Part 2, ‘Sustainability and the environment,’ chapters examine the many tensions around the relationship between environmental sustainability and development. It looks at the notion of planetary boundaries (Ch13), the Anthropocene (Ch14) and the collective global challenges of natural resource management (Ch18, Ch20, Ch21, Ch23), extractivism (Ch17), climate change/crisis, food systems (Ch22), the plastic crisis (Ch24) and mass extinction (Ch19). The pandemic has seen a partial – but temporary – slowing of global emissions, but global emission reduction targets remain far off-track. In June 2020, parts of Siberia reached astonishing world record temperatures of 38 degrees Celsius (Gardner 2020), and by 2030 the World Bank (2020, 1) projects that up to 132 million people may fall into poverty due to the manifold effects of climate change. Thus, ‘taking climate change into account makes the case for a global development approach inescapable’ (Horner and Hulme 2019, 497). More-than-human approaches (Ch15), caring economies (Ch16), and creative ways of teaching sustainability (Ch25) are needed to resolve the sustainability dilemmas that the current development paradigm has imposed on the planet.

In Part 3, ‘Inequality and inequitable development,’ attention is given to the multi-scalar and multi-sectoral challenges that inequality presents for global development. Inequalities of global development exist at the local, national, and global scales, and across and within different genders, classes, ethnicities, religions, age groups, levels of education, and other demographic cohorts. In considering these wide-ranging and often intersecting challenges, the contributions to Part 3 consider different approaches to understanding and measuring poverty (Ch27), structural inequalities within the global financial system (Ch28), and the widespread injustices of global extractive industries (Ch29). Further chapters explore spatial distributions of inequalities within countries (Ch30), global land grabbing (Ch31), forced displacement and resettlement (Ch32; Ch33), and inequalities in gender and education (Ch34; Ch35; Ch36). A final case study chapter considers how new ambitions to remake global development via China’s belt and road initiative (BRI) is bringing new forms of ‘violent’ development (Ch37).

Part 4, ‘Game changers,’ considers some highly significant global shifts that are taking place across the world, and the implications of these shifts in presenting opportunities and challenges for the global population, national and internationally. Chapters explore the game-changing nature of the pandemic and how COVID-19 (Ch39), disability and other health threats intersect with social determinants of wellbeing (Ch40; Ch41), as well as the different development needs of young and ageing populations (Ch48; Ch49). Urbanization and housing accessibility are also explored, through case studies that draw out commonalities and shared lessons across Northern and Southern contexts (Ch42; Ch43). Regarding game-changing dynamics in global development and mobility, contributors examine questions of equity in global value chain governance (Ch44), complexities of forced, voluntary and involuntary migration (Ch45; Ch46), and the need to better understand intersections between conflict and development (Ch47).

Finally, Part 5, ‘Reimagining futures,’ asks what the re-imaging of global development futures might look like, and how development students, educators, researchers and practitioners are contributing to such reimagining. Contributors offer a range of practices, orientations and methodologies that current and future people working in the vast and changing field of development might do well to consider and take on as part of reimagining development futures.
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beyond what we have come to know. A strong thread working through all of the chapters is the importance of attending more deeply to the people, knowledges, and non-human kin relations that have for far too long been relegated to development’s margins. Each chapter makes a case for why development, in the diverse contexts within which the authors are writing, needs to change and what this change might encompass, leading to more equitable, creative, and nourishing human/more-than-human futures. Contributors explore more-than-human kin relations (Ch51), curriculum and activism (Ch52), Indigenous-led pedagogy (Ch53), decolonialism and gender (Ch54), service learning (Ch55) capacity building in development education (Ch56) and poetry as a form of decolonial practice (Ch61). In addition, attention is also given to adaptive programming (Ch57), southern research methodologies (Ch58), community economies (Ch59) and geonarratives and countermapping (Ch59).

Collectively, the contributions to this Handbook demonstrate the need for heavily contextualized studies of, and responses to, global development challenges. It provides multiscalar analyses that are attentive to local, national, and global development challenges. Case studies focused on Singapore, Australia, the UK, and others treat the minority world as a subject of development, while chapters examining Cambodia, Sri Lanka, China, Nairobi, Chile, the Philippines and elsewhere ensure a wider, global focus. Across all parts of the Handbook, there has been an attempt to capture development challenges that transcend ‘North-South’ or ‘Majority-Minority’ boundaries. Where it is necessary for the purpose of analysis to construct a binary between country groupings our preference is for Majority-Minority world, which seeks to overturn previous framings of development that place a small-number of high-income countries as a global norm for development to aim for and aspire to. However, in recognition of the multi-disciplinary nature of development, contributors have each used the terminology that speaks best to their disciplinary audience.

There has also been an attempt to capture new thinking, and to read development through lenses of sustainability and social justice. While notions of ‘progress’ sit uneasily with many development scholars, development continues to be about the pursuit of varying forms of good change. What has changed from earlier years is the widening of voices and interpretations regarding what progress means, its different forms, as well as how it is best pursued. Development has become more critical. The Handbook emphasizes that processes of development have influenced people’s lives in both positive and negative ways, drawing attention to structural inequality and disadvantage alongside possibilities for positive change.

The call for a global development paradigm is, in our view, also strongly connected with efforts to decolonize development studies and development practice. While it calls for more attention to development challenges within high-income countries, this should not result in a recentring of the West (Horner 2020). It is not a call for universalism, but for the recognition of a greater plurality of voices and ideas. Accordingly, in this Handbook we have sought to include a broad representation of authorial voices from across the globe, with particular effort to seek contributions from Majority world countries. Producing the Handbook in the context of COVID-19 created some challenges for this aspiration, but we have seen some success. An editorial team situated across five countries similarly reflects the global reach of development as an area of study.

In addition to Majority world authorship, the Handbook has sought contributions from highly established and emergent scholars, and from development researchers (and educators) and development practitioners. We hope it will serve as a resource for mutual learning and associated collaboration across North and South, and between academics and practitioners.

Finally, a critical aim of this Handbook is to strengthen the nexus between development research, theorizing, practice, and pedagogy. It is not sufficient for discussions of development
to exist only within an academic vacuum, and as such, there is a need for critical reflection on how development research and theorizing can inform and is also informed by development pedagogy and practice. To this end, all of the authors who have contributed to this volume have, in various different ways, thought through the pedagogical implications of theories and debates in their fields of study. Critical engagement across disciplinary boundaries here is a reoccurring message, alongside the fact that a process of ‘unlearning’ is as important as learning, for students to look beyond the traditional (predominantly Western) theories and models that have dominated thinking and practice in the field of international – and now global – development.

Of course, and despite its breadth, this book is anything but exhaustive. Some notable omissions that we would have liked to include are chapters on Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, further contributions on activism and social movements, more attention to race and racism, and more on China’s expanding presence within global development – most notably via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What these omissions reflect is the exigent need for constant interdisciplinary dialogue between ‘development scholars’ and experts in other fields. This Handbook represents a collective attempt at encouraging and broadening such dialogue, as its contributors hail from a variety of disciplines, but clearly more still needs to be done in this space.

There is one matter which the shift from international to global development can sometimes hide, and which remains central to everything that this book surveys: deep and enduring unevenness in living standards and prospects for the future, within and across countries. While the debate is becoming increasingly ‘global,’ this unevenness has a spatial signature that is yet to be erased. The poorest people on the planet live in low-income countries, which remain as poor today as they were 75 years ago at the start of the age of ‘international development.’ But while the popularity of Development as an idea, a project or a set of interventions may have waxed and waned, the need for development as the pursuit of positive change and social justice has not disappeared.

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