Routledge New Security Studies

CHINESE MACROSECURITIZATION

CHINA'S ALIGNMENT IN GLOBAL SECURITY DISCOURSES

Juha A. Vuori

ROUTLEDGE

Chinese Macrosecuritization

This book provides a holistic picture of Chinese global security discourses, with a focus on macrosecuritizations.

The work examines how the People's Republic of China (PRC) has aligned itself within global security discourses. This is approached through the theory of securitization, specifically by using the notion of macrosecuritization as the lens for its analysis. The book offers the first full account of Chinese macrosecuritization discourses and alignments, and it aims to discern what security speech with referent objects such as humanity, civilization, or nature has done in the domestic and international politics of China. Specifically, the work focuses on the discourses of the Cold War, anti-nuclear weapons, climate change, and the Global War on Terror, which have all been postulated in the literature as macrosecuritizations. In addition, it examines discourses with global referent objects that have been put forth by the PRC to see whether its proposals for global security governance take the form of or are legitimated through macrosecuritization. The overall argument in the book is that the way contemporary China uses macrosecuritization discourses provides for ontological security as its position in relation to other major powers is undergoing transformation by allowing it to maintain a consistent narrative of its international self that abides by its own set of moral values and sense of worth.

This book will be of interest to students of critical security studies, Chinese politics and International Relations.

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Abbreviations

AMR	Antimicrobial resistance
AMS	Academy of Military Science
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUKUS	Australia, UK, and U.S. Alliance
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTV	China Central Television
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ETIM	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDI	Global Development Initiative
GIDS	Global Initiative on Data Security
GSD	General Staff Department
GSI	Global Security Initiative
GWoT	Global War on Terror
INF	Inrermediate Nuclear Force
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KMT	Kuomintang/Guomindang
MEE	Ministry of Ecology and Environment
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
MPS	Ministry of Public Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCGCC	National Coordination Group on Climate Change
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China
NFU	No-First-Use
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPC	National People's Congress
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NSC	National Security Commission
NTS	Non-Traditional Security
PAP	People's Armed Police
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PLARF	People's Liberation Army Rocket Force
PR	People's Republic
PRC	People's Republic of China
RSCT	Regional security complex theory
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCIO	Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
U.S.	United States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WPC	World Peace Council
WUC	World Uyghur Congress

Introduction

Securitizing Global Concerns

In this volume, I examine how the People's Republic of China (PRC) has aligned itself within global security discourses. I approach this theme through the theory of securitization (Buzan et al. 1998), specifically using the notion of macrosecuritization as the lens for my analysis (Buzan & Wæver 2009). I do this to discern what security speech with referent objects, such as humanity, civilization, or nature, has done in the domestic and international politics of the PRC. I specifically focus on the discourses of the Cold War, anti-nuclear weapons, climate change, and the Global War on Terror (GWoT) that have been postulated in the literature as macrosecuritizations. In addition, I examine discourses with global referent objects that have been put forth by the PRC to see whether its proposals for global security governance take the form of or are legitimated through macrosecuritization.

I used speech act theory to discern what macrosecurity speech on the above themes has done in the politics of the PRC in the analysis that I present in the present volume. In the analytical chapters that follow, I divide such forms of speech into the categories of macropoliticization, macrosecuritization, and macrodesecuritization. In my analysis, I looked at the official discourse in speeches of leading political figures, white papers, other statements by ministries, or leaked government documents. Indeed, the party-state uses a variety of media to distribute its official lines of policy that form the 'official discourse' (Krolikowski 2018: 916). I also considered discourses within epistemic communities and bureaucracies when I deemed them relevant to the case at hand. Indeed, while the premier leadership of the PRC still defines political lines and formulations that trickle down in the political order, the PRC can be characterized as a form of fragmented authoritarianism (Lieberthal 2004: 187), where parochial issues can work against the political lines formed at the centre. Furthermore, academic and other societal discourses may have a bearing on security issues, even though the PRC has the world's most efficient system of internet control, surveillance, and censorship (Vuori & Paltemaa 2015; Paltemaa et al. 2020). Finally, securitization can happen diffusely through the deployment of technologies, techniques, and rationales without the use of securitizing speech in high politics (Huysmans 2014).

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This type of investigation is relevant from the viewpoint of macrosecuritization too. Indeed, different actors, including non-state ones, can wield macrosecuritization, as it is not as strongly codified as national-level securitization tends to be. Macrosecuritizations often try to hide their 'author,' thereby providing legitimacy or moral clout for parochial claims and interests. When states wield it, macrosecuritization is a power-play for a major power position, which also means that it can have major power costs, irrespective of whether the moves succeed or fail. Making successful macrosecuritization moves as a state puts you in a top position. The question is whether other states are compelled to respond to your moves. This also means that such moves can fail.

My starting point for the volume was the notion of macrosecuritization within securitization theory. My overarching task was to discern whether the notion provides added value for securitization and China studies. Indeed, the literature on securitization in the PRC is growing (see Chapter 1), which makes it important to take a comprehensive look at its global security discourse. While intensive deep looks into securitization processes are important, it is also worthwhile to expand the view to show consistencies, tendencies, and patterns over longer times and across the topical fields of security. Furthermore, it is crucial to get a sense of how the multitude of official security issues that are present in contemporary security speech in the PRC relate, connect, and provide context to each other.

Such a broad view is timely, as the PRC has become the world's second-largest economy and military spender. It is also the world's largest trading nation that holds the largest foreign currency reserves. At the same time, it is the world's largest producer of greenhouse gases. Such facts make understanding the PRC's positions on global security of paramount importance for policymakers and scholars of security in Asia and elsewhere (cf., Feng & He 2019). This is quite relevant to gain a perspective on the assumptions about the PRC aiming to replace the United States (U.S.) as the leading state in the international order. Yet, such an understanding does not come about through the study of simple metrics and statistics. What is required is the study of the PRC's discourse on global security that includes the past. Grasping the PRC's alignments and positions in past and contemporary global security discourses is vital when assessing its future policies too. There is a need to gain a comprehensive view of the PRC's positioning in these issues that concern humanity. This is particularly evident from the PRC's recent initiatives in global governance that include the Global Development (Xi 2021a) (GDI) and Global Security Initiatives (GSI) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023a) (MoFA) (Chapter 7).

As such, all global problems could be considered issues of security (Hakovirta 2012). Yet only some of them reach the security agendas of states. Even fewer become macrosecuritized and dominate or overlay the agendas of most states in the world. Accordingly, in the present volume, I focus on the issues that have been macrosecuritized and explore the PRC's alignment within these global security discourses. This investigation has been guided

and was triggered by a set of questions that concern issues of theory and the politics of the PRC: First, how do the four candidates, or hypotheses, for macrosecuritization status postulated in the literature fare in the case of the PRC? Can the 'Cold War,' 'anti-nuclear discourse,' 'global climate change,' and the 'GWoT' be deemed overriding securitization discourses or themes in the PRC? Second, when and how has the PRC pursued macrosecuritization in its international politics, and when has it not done this even though it could have? Third, do such macrosecuritizations have domestic sources, and what are their domestic implications and functions? Finally, what does macrosecuritization do that is different from securitization, and what is the added value of studying macrosecuritization overall, particularly in the PRC?

There are several reasons why answering such questions is important. In terms of theory, while there is a growing literature on securitization in the PRC and particular macrosecuritization topics have already been discussed in regard to the PRC (see Chapter 1), macrosecuritization has not been systematically investigated in the context of the PRC. The variation in how it has adopted and reacted to the macrosecuritizations of other actors offers a rich set of cases with which to deepen the understanding of how macrosecuritization operates. At the same time, in general terms, beyond the PRC, issues like the GWoT, anti-nuclear discourse, or climate change have been the particular topics of studies (see Chapter 1). Yet, they have not been studied together to provide a holistic image of how they are used, adopted, or originated by a particular actor. The present volume fills this gap in the case of the PRC and provides the first comprehensive study of macrosecuritization by a major power.

Indeed, studying macrosecuritization in the context of the PRC enriches the existing literature on securitization in China and macrosecuritization overall. It allows for the assessment of this literature in light of the PRC's particular political contexts. The PRC provides an interesting locale for securitization in general, as the majority of the literature still tends to study securitization in democratic contexts. It stands apart in many ways: the PRC is a non-western state with the heritage of being among the most powerful empires in human history, a revolutionary socialist state that has transitioned from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism, a party-state with a nuclear-armed party military, a late modernizer of its military in relation to other major powers, and a rising power that is at the centre of most global concerns whether they be economic or environmental (see Chapter 2). While such attributes provide opportunities to enhance understanding, they also provide challenges for the theory of securitization that was developed in an entirely different political context to the PRC (Vuori 2008; 2011b; 2014).

Furthermore, the literature on macrosecuritization usually examines one macrosecuritization discourse at a time and within limited periods. In contrast, I examine all the macrosecuritization discourses that have been postulated in the literature. In addition, I do this over their duration rather than merely around limited-time events. This is needed to get a grasp of major changes in lines of policy. For example, the PRC's more assertive foreign policy stance

during the Xi Jinping administrations has been viewed as a significant strategic shift where the PRC has begun to shape the global governance system rather than merely navigating itself around it (Morton 2020: 161). To determine whether the PRC is becoming a macrosecuritization maker rather than a taker since it is becoming active in global governance affairs (Zhao 2018: 23, 31), it is important to take longer-term comprehensive looks at its global security discourses. These include its frames and proposals like the 'community of a shared future for humankind' (Xi 2017a) (人类命运共同体, *rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ*), and most recently, the GSI (MoFA 2023a).

Indeed, national and global security speeches have become more prominent in the PRC in the 2010s. Overall, the PRC has traditionally had less influence in the global governance of security-related issues. As its membership in international organizations has increased with the PRC expanding its foreign direct investments (FDI), so have the PRC's needs to affect global governance. Indeed, irrespective of whether the PRC's efforts at global governance take the form of or are justified by macrosecuritization, they are connected to the need to protect its interest frontiers abroad (Ghiselli 2021: 2). The PRC's expansion in diplomatic, economic, and cultural activities has been accompanied with an increased international military footprint (Saunders 2020: 181), for example, through the establishment of its first military logistics port in Djibouti.

Perhaps accordingly, the notion of 'development interests' (发展利益, *fāzhǎn lìyì*) has been launched to provide the People's Liberation Army (解放军, *jiěfàngjūn*, PLA) with missions other than war that go beyond the traditional task of guaranteeing the survival of the PRC's political order and maintenance of its territorial integrity (Ghiselli 2021: 31).[1] Such interests mainly concern 'non-traditional security' (NTS) issues and 'diverse kinds of threats' (ibid.: 32), like international terrorism and maritime piracy. Indeed, Hu Jintao noted how the PRC faces 'existential security issues' (生存安全问题, s*hēngcún ānquán wèntí*) and 'developmental security issues' (发展安全问题, *fāzhǎn ānquán wèntí*) abroad (Ghiselli 2021: 33). Xi Jinping expanded this notion to that of 'overseas interests' (海外利益, *hǎiwài lìyì*) (Information office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China [SCIO 2013; Ghiselli 2021: 36). These are threatened by 'international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics' (SCIO 2015a).

As such, national security is often thought to empower the state and provide it with additional resources, legitimacy, and enhance its sovereignty. Macrosecuritization, on the other hand, can also work against nation-states and undermine their sovereignty. This has certainly been the case for the anti-nuclear macrosecuritization discourse (Vuori 2010). Yet, prominent political realists like Morgenthau (1970: 260–261) and Herz (1976) have argued about the dangers of nation-states armed with nuclear weapons. What's more, the securitization of global problems beyond nuclear conflagration reveals the limits of state sovereignty: the magnitude and complexity of global problems require states to cooperate and even let go of some of their sovereignty to intergovernmental or transnational actors. Indeed, for Xi (2021b: 3): 'No global

problem can be solved by any one country alone. There must be global action, global response, and global cooperation.'

Accordingly, some Chinese scholars have labelled NTS issues as 'global problems' (Xia 2015: 169). These include terrorism, piracy, global warming, and environmental pollution. The PRC's official statements in the 2000s emphasized the shared and transnational nature of such new means to seek security: 'The September 11 incident has glaringly demonstrated that security threats in today's world tend to be multi-faceted and global in scope. Countries share greater common security interests and are more interdependent on one another for security' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002b) (MoFA). This trajectory has continued and expanded to the extent that the PRC's current 'holistic' (*Xinhua* 2014) concept of national security, which originally had 11 issues of concern, has since been widened to cover 16 named themes (see Chapter 2).

Like global problems, Chinese scholars view these issues as existing everywhere and relating to everyone. More crucially, though, 'they threaten the existence and development of humanity. So major powers should abandon Cold War mentalities and accept the new security concepts based on cooperative security and common security' (Xia 2015: 169). Premier Li Keqiang has noted how:

> We need to advance cooperation in non-traditional security fields to preserve common security. The increasingly acute non-traditional security challenges, from terrorism to climate change, cybersecurity to transnational crimes and illicit drugs, pose a threat to all countries. Such global challenges require collective responses. We must enhance dialogue and communication and actively pursue the new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.
>
> (Li Keqiang [2019])

This means that macrosecurity concerns are part and parcel of the PRC's contemporary security discourse, which makes it crucial to understand what they do in the PRC's politics and how the PRC aligns itself within its global constellations. Indeed, when it comes to security issues of global concern, the PRC cannot be excluded or counted out. The PRC is an interesting case here, as it has not always remained stationary when it comes to the various macrosecuritization constellations. Thereby, it is crucial for the study of global security and macrosecuritization to include the investigation of the PRC.

One of the main formulations Xi Jinping and his administrations have been using to present and promote the PRC as a responsible great power and a torchbearer for humanity has been 'a community of a shared future for humankind.' Such imaginaries and visions of a shared future for humanity with the PRC forging it demand an understanding of its views on global security issues and what they do politically. Xi's view of such a community consists of sovereign equality, inter-civilization dialogue, win-win cooperation, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. As such, this policy can be viewed as an evolution of

the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that the PRC still maintains (e.g., Xi 2017a). Securitization theory and its specific variant of macrosecuritization is a useful tool that places the PRC in a comparative setting. Indeed, there is a need to have comparative explorations of global security and its discourses within and without the PRC. In empirical terms, the study of Chinese politics tends to consider the PRC as a unique case that cannot be placed in a comparative setting. As the present volume shows, the PRC's political discourses can be studied through theoretical frameworks that allow comparisons with those of other states and societies. It is the first study that explores the PRC's global security discourse systematically and comprehensively from a theoretically informed critical security studies point of view, which allows for comparisons with other actors, and thereby opens a new avenue when integrating the study of the PRC into the general study of securitization within international relations.

At the same time, the volume highlights variations in how macrosecuritization discourses spread across state borders. The role of agency is vital here. I posit in the volume that actors have a menu of choice when they encounter such a discourse: they can adopt or translate the macrosecuritization into their policies, try to transform the discourse with concomitant implications for other actors, they can keep the issue on the agenda in non-security terms with macropoliticization, or they can aim to take the issue completely off the agenda through macrodesecuritization. Each of these is a different type of political move that allows for different kinds of room to manoeuvre in the games great powers play, and each has different kinds of political costs (e.g., raising the stakes of the issue to a principled level, various kinds of security dilemmas, as well as reputation and discoursive costs). Indeed, as the analysis in the volume shows, the PRC has behaved differently regarding the macrosecuritization discourses and has shifted in its position within some of them.

Finally, this examination allows for the exploration of the explanatory potential and value of securitization moves. The vast majority of securitization studies have focused on 'successful' securitization processes where issues have gained a security status. Although some research has been carried out on when such moves have failed,[2] there is a lack of investigation where no securitization discourse appears even though it could. To investigate such instances of 'no securitization moves' is important given the proliferation of academic 'securitization-speak' where almost any invocation of danger or threat is taken to count as 'securitization.' Yet, securitization does not appear everywhere, not even everywhere where it could. We can expect a securitization process to emerge – which may prove to be a false assumption; such a possibility of getting an empirical 'null result' increases the explanatory potential of the theory. From the viewpoint of theories of action, this also means that securitization is a choice and, thereby, an action; securitization is not deterministic but a (political) choice (yet not always a decision). At the same time, securitizations may emerge diffusely (Huysmans 2014) or become relevant despite the choices of securitizing actors. This may especially be the case for

superpower macrosecuritizations, which can become facilitating factors for the securitizations of political actors with fewer resources.

Structure of the Volume

I begin the volume with an introduction to the theoretical and methodological approach I use in my analysis of global security discourse in the PRC. I provide a brief overview of securitization theory and some of the elements of the various debates that it has sparked that are relevant to my analysis. I then move on to introduce the notion of macrosecuritization that has been developed to make sense of security speech that concerns referent objects beyond national and regional ones. I finish the chapter with a discussion on the theory, or conceptual travel, which the deployment of macrosecuritization in the study of the PRC also entails.

I then move on to introduce the political order of the PRC and various aspects of its security concepts. These include a discussion of totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism, the conceptual development of national security and its performative power, and the PRC's security-related bureaucracies and legislation. These provide the relevant context for the analytical chapters. The chapter shows how the conceptual evolution of national security is intimately connected to political theory and the transformation of the political order in the PRC.

I begin the analytical chapters with the discourse on the Cold War regarding the PRC. The PRC was a force multiplier for the international Cold War macrosecuritization, yet it did not remain static in its constellations. Indeed, the Sino-Soviet split was a key event in the vicissitudes of the ideologically based global antagonism and went at the face of many of its premises. In the post-Cold War era, the PRC has actively maintained the desecuritization of the Cold War to keep itself off the security agendas of major powers and to keep expanding its period of 'strategic opportunity.' The discourse on 'Cold War mentality' connects to views on polarity in world politics and is a crucial aspect of the PRC's identity politics.

The second analysis is on anti-nuclear macrosecuritization and its lack in the PRC. Indeed, looking for arguments that present nuclear weapons as a physical threat to humanity or human civilization produces a null result in the PRC. To make this estimation, I examine the views of leading political figures, doctrinal documents on deterrence, non-proliferation, nuclear diplomacy, and protest activity in civil society. While the PRC opposes nuclear weapons, promotes their abolishment, and criticizes the use of nuclear deterrence, this position is not based on anti-nuclear macrosecuritization. I relate this theoretically interesting finding to the PRC's nuclear logic and identity politics.

The third macrosecuritization discourse is about global climate change. As such, the issue of climate change in security studies has evolved from debates about environmental security. Also, on the level of practice, environmental concerns have a longer history than the specific macrosecuritization of

climate change. Accordingly, I relate the PRC's macropoliticization of climate change to its longer-view approach to the treatment and role of the environment in China. This shows how environmental concerns have risen high on the discoursive political agenda, yet how climate change is regarded more as an issue of international politics than national security in the PRC.

The fourth analytical chapter concerns the PRC's participation in the 'GWoT.' The focus here is on the perennial issue of unrest in Xinjiang. This issue was securitized as a threat of counter-revolution and separatism until its inclusion as terrorism when the PRC took up the macrosecuritization of the war on terror in September 2001. This securitization has had several functions domestically and internationally. While the initial phases of joining the macrosecuritization can be seen as opportunistic, it appears that the relevance of it has increased during the past decade as the PRC escalated its 'stability maintenance' in the region to the level of internment camps. This is also evident in its international counterterrorism activities, which have also been increasing.

I round up the analytical chapters by going beyond the four macrosecuritization discourses postulated in the literature to look at discourses that concern global referents in the PRC. These have the potential to become macrosecuritization moves promoted by the PRC and represent a new type of engagement in global security governance in the PRC. Xi Jinping has taken a new approach: previous post-Mao leaders took a low profile for the PRC internationally, whereas Xi has been interested in national and global security issues and politics. Indeed, the contemporary security discourse of Xi's administration has become quite global. Accordingly, the chapter looks at the political dictum of the community of a shared future for humankind, the infrastructure and investment programme of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the GDI and GSI. Such policy labels show how the numerous concerns of NTS are collated into the governance of a global future with the PRC as a torchbearer.

The final chapter concludes the volume by taking a synthetic view of all the discourses presented in the preceding chapters. The chapters form a themed history of the PRC's global security discourses that includes perspectives from epistemic communities and bureaucracies in addition to those of political leaders and branches of government. Interestingly, while many other processes of securitization in the PRC have produced contestation and resistance dynamics (Vuori 2011b), only the case of the GWoT has shown signs of this taking place in the macrosecurity ones. While the PRC has approached each of the international macrosecuritizations differently, its main push is towards the desecuritization of its relationships with other great powers using macrodesecuritization. This is the case with the maintenance of the desecuritization of the Cold War, yet its proposals for new types of global security governance based on the United Nations (UN) aim to do the same. My overall argument in the volume is that the way the contemporary PRC uses macrosecuritization discourses provides for ontological security as its position in relation to other major powers is undergoing transformations by allowing

the PRC to maintain a consistent narrative of its international self that abides by its set of moral values and sense of worth.

Notes

1 Chinese strategic literature points to three basic ways (基本方式, *jīběn fāngshì*) of using force (力量运用, *lìliàng yùnyòng*): war or warfighting (战争, *zhànzhēng*; 作战, *zuòzhàn*), military deterrence (军事威慑, *jūnshì wēishè*), and military operations other than war (非战争军事行动, *fēi zhànzhēng jūnshì xíngdòng*) (Shou 2013: 6). In the 2001 edition of *The Science of Military Strategy*, these included only warfighting and deterrence (Blasko 2017: 338).

2 The failure of securitization has actually been an interest of securitization studies from the start (Wæver 1989a; 1995), but the subsequent literature has had a bias towards successful securitization (Salter 2011).

1 From Securitization to Macrosecuritization[1]

I begin the examination of the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) alignment in global security discourses by presenting the theoretical framework deployed in this investigation. This consists of the theory of securitization that points the analytical attention to what speaking or doing security does politically (Buzan et al. 1998; Vuori 2011b; Vuori 2014). As such, the state and society are where most securitizations take place. Yet, there are also securitization moves that are about grander referents, such as human civilization or the planet. Such moves have received their concept of macrosecuritization (Buzan & Wæver 2009; Vuori 2010). I outline the main features of both of these concepts here and introduce some of the research conducted through macrosecuritization overall, securitization in the particular context of the PRC, and the issues involved in such conceptual or theory travel.

Securitization Theory

The notion of securitization captures the performative power politics of the concept of 'security' and has shown how issues acquire the status of security through intersubjective socio-political processes (Wæver 1989a; Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). Although many things can threaten the existence of valued referent objects, such threats do not come with labels – they require political action to gain the deontic rights, duties, obligations, requirements, and authorizations that come about by 'performing and getting others to accept' (Searle 2011: 85) securitization speech acts. The aim of securitization studies is to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who (securitizing actors) can securitize (political moves via speech acts), which issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why (perlocutionary intentions/how-causality), with what kinds of effects (interunit relationship), and under what conditions (facilitation/impediment factors) (Vuori 2011b: 7).

Securitization theory was an answer to the broadening and deepening debates about security in the late 1980s; it is possible to widen the study of security without rendering everything as security by fixing on the form of security speech and viewing security as a status and modality. For Ole Wæver,

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the original developer of securitization theory (Wæver 1989a; 1995), 'one could "throw the net" across all sectors and all actors and still not drag in everything with the catch, only the security part' (Wæver 2011: 469). This was achievable by focusing on particular speech acts, where securitizing actors claimed existential threats to valued referent objects so that audiences would accept, or at least not oppose, extraordinary measures that would otherwise not be acquiesced.

Such social construction of threats, and remedies for them, was considered an effective means to gain legitimacy for unpalatable policies that broke the rules of everyday politics. In this sense, the approach combines the study of what securitization does (what it 'triggers') with political constellations or who or what does securitization (what 'triggers' it) (Guzzini 2011: 336–337). The effects of securitization on society, process, and polity can be studied in three stages (Wæver 2015) where:

1) Aspirations of actors are related to societal conditions;
2) Political codifications that constitute particular relationships are analysed through speech act theory;
3) Effects on political, legal, and socio-psychological life are examined.

The theory of securitization models the way we have learned to understand what security is and what counts as security, as well as how something becomes security and what security does. The theory allows for different kinds of analysis of the distinct political move: the 'causal analyses of its consequences,' the 'sociological analysis of social patterns that condition political possibilities,' and the political theorization of 'life under different arrangements' (Wæver 2015). In this way, the notion of securitization denotes the process of creating social facts, statuses, and modalities of security. The model contains several important elements (Buzan et al. 1998): the general script or plot of security entails priority and the utmost importance of the particular issue; the existence of a valued referent object is at stake and under threat. The model, as such, has seven variables:[2]

1) A securitizing actor (that which or who makes the move towards a new or to alter an existing issue of security in accordance with particular conventions and grammars);
2) A referent object (that which is to be secured);
3) A threat (that which threatens the referent object);
4) An audience (the necessary relation needed to produce the deontic modality of security or those who have to be 'convinced' for securitization to be satisfied);
5) Felicity conditions (rules and conventions of the speech act and its consequences);
6) Facilitation factors (factors that can facilitate or impede the acceptance of the securitization move; social conditions that relate to social positions of the actor and audience as well as the threat);

7) Functional actors (actors that are neither the securitizing actor, the threat, nor the referent object but still have some bearing on the process).

The model has speech act theory at its core: the theory of securitization 'was built from the start on speech act theory, because it is an operative method' (Wæver 2014: 27). This is an opportune foundation for a theory of social construction, as speech acts are taken to be the basic form of human communicative interaction in speech act theory (Searle & Vanderveken 1985). The basic idea here is that people do things by talking and that they perform different kinds of acts by speaking (Austin 1975).[3] Language is not used merely to convey information; it is, for example, used to explain (assertives), order (directives), threaten (comissives), thank (expressives), and declare things, for example, war (declarations) (Searle & Vanderveken 1985). Such acts can be analysed through three types or aspects of speech acts (Austin 1975):

- Locutionary (an act *of* saying something with a sense and a reference);
- Illocutionary (an act *in* saying something);
- Perlocutionary (an act *by* saying something).

Speech act theory suggests that people interact with the language they use by infusing it with illocutionary forces, which are used to produce (perlocutionary) effects in other people that can affect the feelings, attitudes, and subsequent behaviour of the hearer(s). Such forces have broader universality across languages than certain verbs of a particular language. Yet, illocutions, unlike perlocutions, are conventional: they are done conforming to conventions that are historicized and dependent on social and cultural factors (Austin 1975).[4]

What Is Securitization?

Securitization as a keyword or notion has become very enticing, even to the degree that it is used in articles to do things without any references to the securitization studies literature. There seems to be something self-explanatory in the term, which may partly explain some of the confusion in the critical literature on it. Other alternative terms that engage similar phenomena, such as security framing or threat politics (Watson 2013; Eriksson 2001), do not appear to have the same appeal as securitization. Intuitively, securitization is about how security comes about.

As such, security means different things to different societies, as the core fears of any group or nation are unique and relate to vulnerabilities and historical experiences (Wæver 1989b: 301). Yet, despite this historical contingency, security tends to be portrayed as something 'good,' as being or feeling safe from harm or danger, which corresponds with its everyday (non-expert) meaning as something of positive value. Perhaps paradoxically, in international politics, security is often understood as a more negative concern since it is about blocking unwanted developments. Concomitantly, security arguments, in

effect, reproduce insecurities and represent an 'aporia' (Burke 2002); security arguments tend to promise more than they can deliver (Hietanen & Joenniemi 1982: 35–36).

Securitization and the 'Negative' Side of Security

Securitization studies have highlighted the negative side of security and elucidated how, rather than being positive or good for all, the increase in security for some means its sacrifice for others (Bigo 2008: 124). Some have suggested that this kind of critical view entails an 'escape' from security as such (McDonald 2012). Yet, the approach does not aim at a 'rejection' of security altogether, but merely to make security speech unable 'to function in the harmonious self-assured standard-discourse of realism' (Wæver 1989a: 38). Rather than a total escape from security, the point is to alter 'security' from the inside by unmasking its operative logic and stripping away its innocent appeal. Such a 'cynical' (Wæver 1989a: 52) or 'sceptical' (Wæver 2012a: 53) view of security turns security issues into political ones and makes their theorization 'critical.' The intention is to handle security problems by revealing their contingent nature and opening them up for the evaluation of political responsibility.

The normative push and political recommendation of such an approach is 'less security, more politics' and the development of 'possible modalities' for the desecuritization of politics (Wæver 1989a: 52): it is generally (which can only be assessed in practice though) more conducive to treat identities as identities, religion as religion, the environment as the environment, and so on, and to engage their politics through the particular modalities and rationalities of those fields rather than those of security.[5] However, this does not entail a preference for insecurity: security is a situation where there is a threat with measures against it, whereas insecurity is a situation where there is a threat and no certain measures to counteract it (Wæver 1995: 56). What is desirable is desecuritization, which leads back to (or keeps an issue within; Bourbeau &Vuori 2015) a security or non-security – a situation where there is no threat and thus no need for restrictive measures (see below).

Such preferences link up with visions of the political and of politics (Huysmans 2014). In terms of how politics is understood and what kinds of political effects the theory of securitization has, there have been multiple positions: those that take politics as the production of meaning, those that treat it as a modern institutional organization, and those that view it as ethical science (Gad & Petersen 2011). For Wæver (2011: 470), the theory of securitization combines a Schmittian concept of security with an Arendtian concept of politics, as it is 'strung between Schmittian (anti)political exceptions and an Arendtian co-creation' (Greenwood & Wæver 2013: 501). In other words, 'the political conception of securitization theory is inspired by Arendt, implemented through speech act theory' (Wæver 2015, emphasis in original). This means that while security tends to produce a depoliticizing effect, political and social contexts cannot close off securitization or desecuritization. While

many security issues and policies are path-dependent (Bourbeau 2014), there is always a possibility that something unexpected will occur. This is why scholars and theories should not explain away the openness and 'in-betweenness' of politics (Wæver 2015).

The preference for less security and more politics stems from the particular security politics of the late 1980s in Europe: to speak about national security did particular things that were problematic in light of democracy (and have continued to do so, even as the claimed threats have changed). Accordingly, part and parcel of securitization studies have been the genealogical study of how security has come to have such performative power (Wæver 1989a: 14; 2012b; Stritzel & Vuori 2016). Indeed, security has not had a uniform meaning or power even in Europe (see Chapter 2 for the Chinese conceptual history of security).

The contemporary international usage dates to the early-to-mid 20th century when 'national security' combined two favourable notions and became political vogue after WW2. In the United States (U.S.), 'reasons of state' combined with sovereign immunity meant that any state documents could be deemed secret, and there was no possibility of suing the state. By restricting state secrets to issues of national security, what the new illocutionary power of security did politically was to limit and specify state power. It is at this conjunction that 'speaking security' began to do things it had not done before (Wæver 2012b); the previous speech acts of 'national interest' and 'necessity' ceased to work as effectively while 'security' attained a new (illocutionary) force and entailed a new kind of status transformation with concomitant deontic rights, responsibilities, and political functions. It is because of such features that securitization (and not security as such) can be considered a 'speech act' (Wæver 1989a; 1995; Vuori 2011b). If securitization moves are successful, the speaker can 'break the rules' (i.e., the regular deontic rights and responsibilities of a particular field) that normally constrict behaviour and policies and shift the issue into the depoliticized area of utmost priority and urgency – to the high politics of survival.[6]

Successful Securitization and Its Consequences

What 'success' means has been one point of contestation within securitization studies. Views have differed between whether it is enough to garner potential support for security measures or whether actual measures need to be implemented.[7] An 'if {a,b,c}, then securitization happens, and with it the defined effects {x, y, z}, typically involving some exceptional measures' causal diagram of securitization (Patomäki 2015: 129) is, however, problematic in Wæver's (2015) view. This is because securitization is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve 'security' understood as a policy or some means to repel an existential threat: threat perceptions, securitizations, and security actions are indeterminate (see Vuori 2011b: 136–140 for the full argument). Yet, various combinations of these three variables entail different costs for decision makers or securitizing actors.

For example, security action without legitimization in the form of securitization may be costly in terms of trust or popular support. Indeed, securitization is akin to raising a bet (Wæver 1995: 80), not in the sense of betting being a speech act, but in securitization raising the political stakes of an issue to a principled level of survival or some other most vital interest (Wæver 1989a: 43). Even successful securitization has its costs: securitization is a 'political move because it has a price' (Wæver 1989a: 45). The difference between betting and securitization becomes apparent with the realization that it is impossible to make a bet without betting, but it is possible to do security without securitization speech acts. Thus, the core point of interest is the intersubjective establishment of the security status for an issue: threat perceptions, whether something is really a threat or measures to bring about security, are not the main concern even though they may be of interest in the overall investigation that follows an examination of securitization.[8]

This is why it is necessary to separate 'success' as the 'happiness' or 'satisfaction' of securitization speech acts (i.e., securitization moves) and the concomitant status transformation of an issue (if the moves have such an effect) from the 'success' of the politics of securitizing something: happy securitization and the establishment of a security issue may yet lead to very unfortunate or sad political outcomes. At the same time, securitization speech acts can always fail: securitization is 'equally constituted by its possible success and its possible failure – one is not primary and the other derived' (Wæver 1989a: 45).[9] Success relates to how the audience is conceptualized (Balzacq 2005; Léonard & Kaunert 2011).

In theoretical terms, securitization reconfigures the (necessary) relationship between the speaker and the audience (Wæver 2015: 122–123). Here, the audience has to be such that this reconfiguration can provide the speaker with what the particular strand of securitization (Vuori 2008; 2011b) seeks to gain in terms of deontological modalities and statuses: securitization can be about raising an issue onto the agenda, legitimating future or past acts, control, or deterrence.[10] In practical terms, successes and failures of such acts are on a continuum (as in speech act theory): it is highly unlikely that entire audiences will ever be fully and uniformly convinced by any political speech acts, including securitization. Indeed, the questions of what suffices to bring about a security status transformation and what counts as assuaging rhetoric that convinces people need to be distinguished. Someone (e.g., a leader of a social movement or opposition party) may convince thousands of the security status of an issue (with securitization moves to raise the issue on the agenda, Vuori 2008; 2010) yet fail to gain a deontic status transformation for it. Indeed, audiences that grant moral support for security policies may differ from those that can grant deontic powers (Balzacq et al. 2016).

Securitization Dynamics and the Notion of Desecuritization

As the literature on securitization theory has grown, so has the terminology regarding various aspects of the political dynamics of security. One focus

here has been the contestation of and resistance to securitization (Balzacq 2014), either by more or less equal political actors (Vuori 2015a) or between securitizing actors and the targets of securitization (Paltemaa & Vuori 2006). Such contests can also include co-securitization (Kim & Lee 2011). For the discussion, the notions of reverse- and counter-securitization (Vuori 2011a; Stritzel & Chang 2015) are most relevant. Reverse securitization discourses respond to other actors' securitization moves by reflecting them back at them in similar terms. By presenting their identities in the same terms as the opponent, they try to become a 'matched pair' (Buzan & Wæver 2009) in the contest and perhaps increase their social capital should such identities be accepted. Counter-securitization differs here in that in such a discourse, the opponents' securitization moves are not reflected, but securitizing moves draw from inner discourses, identities, and cultural reservoirs. In the Chinese context, an example of this is Falungong's securitization of the Communist Party (Vuori 2014).

Most crucial for the present volume, though, is the notion of desecuritization, which also plays the most common role in contesting security issues. As such, desecuritization is the negative corollary of securitization. Indeed, it has mainly been viewed as the unmaking of securitization (Huysmans 2006b) that comes about either as a fading away of the issue (Behnke 2006) or through initiation with active moves (de Wilde 2008; Donnelly 2015). In this literature, desecuritization has largely been understood in terms of the deconstruction of collective identities in situations where relationships between 'friends' and 'enemies' are constituted by existential threats (Roe 2004: 280). While the normative push of the original approach to desecuritization has been towards this kind of situation, the literature on it has been criticized for eschewing politics (Aradau 2004) and biasing desecuritization when it is not necessarily morally better than securitization (Floyd 2011). Some view desecuritization as akin to securitization: for Floyd (2014), desecuritization is a set of actions that can be morally evaluated as a time-limited event, while I have treated desecuritization as a counter-move to securitization in processes of contestation and resistance (Vuori 2011a; 2011b; 2015a). Others have favoured a return to the initial political purposes of the concept, like Hansen (2012), who has sought to recover the political status of desecuritization with an examination of the ontological and practical levels involved in the empirical investigation of desecuritization processes. Here, Donnelly (2015) suggests that desecuritization moves can be conceptualized as speech and other symbolic acts by examining how desecuritization moves can be accomplished after several decades of institutionalized securitization. Finally, I have suggested that desecuritization is about dismantling existing issues and can be actively used to retain a non-security status for an issue (Bourbeau and Vuori 2015).

Originally, for Wæver (1995), desecuritization is a process by which security issues lose their 'securityness' and are no longer restrictive by nature. He has outlined three options for this: (1) simply not to talk about issues in terms of security; (2) to keep responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create

security dilemmas or other vicious spirals; and (3) to move security issues back into 'normal politics' (Wæver 2000: 253). These options can follow objectivist, constructivist, or deconstructivist strategies in bringing about desecuritization (Huysmans 1995: 65–67). Indeed, the first discussions about desecuritization were about how it could be achieved (Huysmans 1995; Wæver 2000). In later developments, the literature on desecuritization has focused on three sets of questions: what counts as desecuritization (identification of the phenomenon), why should there be desecuritization (ethics and normativity), and how can desecuritization be achieved (transformative practice) (Balzacq et al. 2016).[11]

Most importantly for the present volume, beyond conceptualizing desecuritization as an option or a strategy, it has also been viewed from the viewpoint of political actors (de Wilde 2008: 597) and their political moves in games of contestation and resistance (Paltemaa & Vuori 2006; Vuori 2011a; 2015; 2018; Stritzel & Chang 2015; Topgyal 2016). There can be desecuritizing actors who evade, circumvent, or directly oppose securitizing moves by, for example, emphasizing competing threats (de Wilde 2008: 597). Security policies aim at desecuritization (the solution to the threatening situation). Still, desecuritization can also happen independently from the actions of securitizing or desecuritizing actors: the original security problem may be solved, institutions may adapt through new reproductive structures, discourses may change (e.g., with the loss of interest or audiences), and the original referent object may be lost (de Wilde 2008). As empirical studies of securitization and desecuritization dynamics (e.g., Kim & Lee 2011; Salter & Mutlu 2013; Lupovici 2014; Vuori 2015a; Donnelly 2015; Vuori 2018a; Sahar & Kaunert 2022) have shown, it is difficult to point to a definitive end-point for either securitization or desecuritization: political and social situations evolve.

Systematizing previous empirical studies on desecuritization, Hansen (2012: 529, 539–545) has identified four ideal type forms for desecuritization. Regarding its issues of concern, namely the status of enmity and the possibility of a public sphere, when a larger conflict is still within the realm of possibility, but when a particular issue is presented with terms other than security, we have an instance of (1) 'change through stabilization'; when another issue takes the place of a previously securitized issue, we have (2) 'replacement'; when the originally phrased threat is resolved, we have (3) 'rearticulation'; and finally, when potentially insecure subjects are marginalized through depoliticization, we have (4) 'silencing.' I have added 'pre-emptive desecuritization through rebuttal' to these (Bourbeau & Vuori 2015). For Wæver (2000: 254), securitization can be pre-empted or forestalled through silencing. Desecuritization can also be used actively to avoid the escalation of a contention (Bourbeau & Vuori 2015).

Indeed, as the securitization literature on securitization/desecuritization dynamics points out, political actors have a menu of choices when they encounter a security discourse: they can adopt or translate it into their policies, try to transform the discourse with concomitant implications for other actors, they can keep the issue on the agenda in non-security terms with politicization, or they can aim to take the issue completely off the agenda through

desecuritization. Each of these is a different type of political move that allows for different kinds of rooms for manoeuvre in the games great powers play, and each has different kinds of political costs (e.g., raising the stakes of the issue to a principled level, various kinds of security dilemmas as well as reputation and discoursive costs). Such plays can happen on a number of levels, including the most encompassing referent object of macrosecuritization and macrodesecuritization (Buzan & Wæver 2009).

Macrosecuritization

Buzan & Wæver (2009); see also Buzan (2006 and 2008) argued that at certain times securitizations of a higher order embed themselves into most political discourses and practices in a way that incorporates, aligns, and ranks more parochial securitizations beneath them. This was the case, for example, during the Cold War, when the struggle between both ideological camps overrode many other security concerns and discourses. For example, Buzan & Wæver (2003) argued that the Asian security complexes were overlaid by the dominant bipolar struggle during the Cold War, and the results of this can still be seen in the contemporary security architecture of the region. Indeed, it seems that macrosecuritizations and their consequently 'macro' desecuritization define, or at least provide, hegemonic labels for contemporary political eras, viz. the 'Cold War,' 'post-Cold War,' and the 'Global War on Terror' (GWoT). Perhaps consequently, Buzan & Wæver (2009) identified or 'postulated' four such higher-order securitization processes, namely 'Cold War,' 'Anti-Nuclear discourse,' 'Global Climate Change,' and the 'GWoT.' I examine these discourses in the context of the PRC and investigate whether there are Chinese candidates for additional macrosecurity discourses. While there are several ways to understand and approach discourse, the way I approach this notion here is as a consistent manner of presenting meanings that have political implications, as such texts allow and disallow possibilities, while structures enable and restrict them (Wæver 2005: 35).

Macrosecuritizations are like other securitizations in that they are a form of status transformation through speech acts voiced by securitizing actors to receptive audiences. It is the nature of the referent object and the threat that make macrosecuritization processes stand out from the most common forms of securitization. Indeed, security operates differently with the attribute 'global' than 'national.' With 'national security,' the threats tend to be such that they can be dealt with through national efforts alone or with allies. The notion combines two features that are generally thought to be positive values, national and security. This combination also leads to the belief that it is mostly about legitimacy towards domestic audiences, even if such securitization may have international implications and effects. Global or civilizatory securitization serves different kinds of tasks.

While states can address issues of national security on their own, global security issues tend to be the kinds of global problems that cannot be resolved

without global cooperation or entail the kind of inter-state competition that has system-level implications (Hakovirta 2012). For example, with the securitization of nuclear weapons, the resolution of the problem has been presented as the need to surrender state sovereignty and thereby alter the international system itself (Vuori 2010). Similarly, global climate change cannot be resolved by individual states but would require a global change in energy production and consumption or geoengineering on a global scale (Corry 2017). During the Cold War, the competition between both camps had system-level implications and structured much of world politics (Kaplan 1957; Waltz 1979; Buzan & Wæver 2003). In its turn, the GWoT was a move to show the dominance of the U.S. as a unipolar power in the international system (Buzan & Wæver 2009). Accordingly, this move required the mobilization of near-universal identity politics.

Overall, we can point to at least two features that distinguish macrosecuritization from securitization, which produce national security issues. First, global security is more open and 'political' than national security. Indeed, national security has become so strong in most states and even international institutions that it is codified into legislation and international conventions (e.g., the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950). Second, national security clearly points to a specific national interest. In contrast, global security discourse often *pretends* to have no particular 'author,' and thereby, no explicit national interest is involved in it beyond that shared by others.

Indeed, global security speech has not been codified into national legislation like national security has; national emergencies are a typical part of legal systems. However, global emergencies tend to remain without specific legislation, even if pandemic declarations by the World Health Organization could have such a potential. For example, international declarations of climate emergencies do not have the same effect as the declaration of a national emergency tends to have: such international declarations are more about recognizing the existence of a threat and emphasizing its seriousness than the automatic empowerment of state officials. Nevertheless, global security speech can imply national security, or it can subsume national security issues under its institutionalized watchwords, like 'communism,' 'imperialism,' or 'terrorism.'

The way this kind of subsumption operates can be theorized within the existing terminology of securitization theory as facilitation: from the viewpoint of specific securitizations, prevalent macrosecuritization discourses can be considered as facilitation and impediment factors. This, however, is not the only way macrosecuritizations can influence lower-level securitizations. Investigations of the practices and transnational fields of security professionals in Europe (Bigo 2002) have shown how various issues can be linked together into 'security continuums,' where one source of unease (e.g., 'terrorism') is used to produce the same effect on another (e.g., 'migration') without making specific arguments for this being the case. This kind of connection works by joining issues horizontally.

In a similar manner, issues can be joined vertically when macrosecuritizations provide parochial and local issues with a macro or even global significance. The use of broader referent objects makes such issues appear as more than just the security of the self. This facilitates claims of international implications and broadens interpretative communities. Such connections are more important for macrosecuritizations as they operate internationally and domestically and can involve multiple sovereign actors. Indeed, macrosecuritizations can be targeted and depend on reactions from international allies, great powers, the identified threat, and the domestic public (Wæver 2009: 7).

The internationality of macrosecuritization moves means that they need to draw on and produce securitization narratives that have a broader appeal and resonance than the vulnerabilities and historical experiences of singular societies. Carr (1946: 82) observed how peace and security were used to form an ostensibly shared interest for the international community. In a similar way, the ability to generate successful macrosecuritizations is not only dependent on power but also on the construction of a greater referent object capable of appealing to and also mobilizing the identity politics of a range of actors whose interests may be only loosely connected (Buzan & Wæver 2009; Wæver 2009).

Macrodiscourses can be identified through two dimensions (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 258). The first dimension is the character of the referent object: the referent of macrosecuritization moves should be beyond national or regional objects. The second dimension is the encompassiveness of the claimed threat in terms of sectors (e.g., niche, partial, or inclusive): macrosecuritizations are candidates for top-priority threats, even though they may not get this status. A third dimension of macrosecuritizations is the level of their acceptance by relevant audiences (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 258). This dimension is more about whether the securitization has been successful or powerful. This is partly what the present volume evaluates in the case of the PRC.

While macrosecuritizations label and may dominate security discourse, these larger constructions may also be vulnerable. This is evident, for example, in the failure to transform the dominant security discourse in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto. During the Cold War, the macrosecuritization of socialism in the 'capitalist camp' worked quite well in Indonesia, and the traditional 'vernacular' of security could be stretched to cover socialism as the representative of 'bad elements' working against the societal order there (Bubandt 2005). This was, however, not the case with the 'GWoT.' The new U.S.-led macrosecuritization did not work in the same way as the Cold War macrosecuritization, even though they were still framed in accordance with local traditions and resonant values. As Bubandt (ibid.) noted in the case of Indonesia, higher-level securitizations (e.g., the GWoT) do not always triumph over lower-level securitizations, be they national, international, or macro level. Indeed, no one is guaranteed success in securitization (Wæver 1995; 1997; 2000), not even global power macrosecuritizers.

Indeed, the GWoT works as an example of the difficulty in achieving domination overall. In terms of the distribution of capabilities and power

resources, the U.S. was clearly in the pre-eminent position in the early 2000s, yet it was not able to completely dominate. This situation of 'uni-multipolarity' meant that the U.S. had to use macrosecuritization to mobilize against the threat of terrorism (Wæver 2009: 6). These moves were very successful, and the U.S. achieved wide participation in its macrodiscourse domestically and internationally from allies, competitors, and even enemies. However, the politics that followed the success of securitization transpired to be less successful. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed the limits of U.S. dominance and showed that the U.S. was not a unipolar power. The public exposure of torture and surveillance practices had reputational costs even with the Allies. As such, securitization and the status transformations it brings about can produce opportunities for action, but it does not guarantee a positive result for the actions that are taken. Securitization can indeed bear costs.

The way macrosecuritizations create room for manoeuvre is through their ability to bind separate securitizations into durable sets (Buzan & Wæver 2009) and provide them with master signifiers and package legitimizers. The result can be the imposition of a hierarchy of securitizations. However, macrosecuritization may simply group and tie other securitizations together as facilitation factors without necessarily outranking a particular securitization. In either case, they can coordinate the interests of actors tied loosely together. To produce such coherence in security dynamics provides status for the securitizing actor: other actors are assumed to cooperate along the lines set by the shared securitization, and the securitizing actor can assume the lead in a constellation. Furthermore, such sets of securitizations that connect via a higher-order referent object aid in avoiding the tendency in research to view individual securitization moves in isolation. The concept of macrosecuritization instead points to the complex nature of securitization processes and the constellations of levels and sectors in terms of referent objects and actors that promote and react to them.

Just as securitization can entail costs for the initiating actor, abiding by or refusing another actor's securitization can also bear costs. Macrosecuritizations are characterized by claims of universality (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 260–261; Table 1.1): these consist of 1) inclusive (ideological beliefs of optimizing the human condition; e.g., Marxism and Christianity), 2) exclusive (ideological beliefs of superior rights for certain groups; e.g., Nazism and Japanese pan-Asian imperial doctrine), 3) existing order (claimed threats to universalist international institutions; e.g., transnational actors that threaten state sovereignty), and 4) physical threat universalisms (claimed threats to humanity or the planet; e.g., nuclear war, climate change, and pandemics). The referent objects in these discourses go beyond nation-states in that securitizing actors claim at least potentially the whole of humanity or 'civilization.' Accepting or rejecting such universalizing securitizations defines the side one is on and comes with concomitant costs: macrosecuritizations tend to shape policies even if one only subscribes to the threat statuses rather than the specific policies of the leading securitizing actor (Wæver 2009: 7). In this way, macrosecuritizations can have

Table 1.1 Elements of Macrosecuritizations

Macrosecuritization discourses	*Type of universalisms*	*Alignment in constellations*
The Cold War *Anti-nuclear* *Climate change* *GWoT*	*Inclusive* (ideologies on the optimal human condition available to all) *Exclusive* (supremacist ideologies of some groups over the rest of humanity) *Existing order* (threats to international institutions like sovereignty or human rights) *Physical threat* (threats to humanity or the planet)	*Comprehensiveness of issue hierarchy and sectors* (niche, partial, and inclusive) *Levels of referents* (individual, group, unit, civilization, international system, and global) *Securitizing actors, security interdependencies, and interunit effects* (non-governmental, state, international, and positive or negative)

Source: Buzan & Wæver 2009.

a bearing on international alignments in security constellations, but they can also affect domestic discourses and policies.

The final relevant feature of macrosecuritizations is the constellations they organize through sectors, levels, and actors (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003; Buzan & Wæver 2009; Guzzini 2011; Wæver 2017b). The interaction and interdependence of various individual securitizations bring such constellations about. The analytical term constellations aid in getting a grasp of larger social structures and formations that have a bearing on securitizations. While the majority of securitization studies have focused on the domestic effects securitization has, the investigation of constellations allows for a bigger picture of such effects on inter-state affairs (Dalaqua 2013: 93). The examination of political situations, histories, identities, and so on is crucial to understand individual securitization moves that draw on them. In this way, macrosecuritizations can be emergent and not only be declared by actors.

Previous Studies on Macrosecuritization

Although macrosecuritization has not been the target of the kind of criticism the general theory of securitization has been, there have been a few studies that have either used the notion heuristically or used it as a counterpoint for analysis. For example, the Cold War overlaid many of the security concerns in a number of regional security complexes (Buzan & Wæver 2003). The Canadian Arctic was one of these places, and macrosecuritization frames linked issues on various levels in the security dilemmas present there (Watson 2013). As such, the Arctic has continued to play a major role in Northern security

constellations even after the Cold War ended (Wæver 2017b). Overall, the macrosecuritization discourse and its desecuritization connect with the grand estimations of both international structures and the constellations of power within them (Wæver 2017a), including China's role in the Arctic (Anggraheni 2018; Andersson 2021a; Wang & Xu 2022).

Regarding the second macrosecuritization discourse postulated by Buzan &Wæver (2009), I have previously studied the anti-nuclear securitization of atomic scientists and their Doomsday Clock (Vuori 2010). The macro elements of securitizing nuclear weapons by non-state actors in the attempts to form a nuclear weapons convention in the 2000s have also been viewed from the macrosecuritization lens (Dalaqua 2013). Finally, I have also contrasted the macrosecuritization moves deployed by anti-nuclear movements with the human security discourse used in the 'humanitarian initiative' that eventually led to the establishment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Vuori 2016b; 2018b; see Chapter 4). As such, it appears that low-level humanitarian securitization was more effective here than the macrosecuritization of the higher-order of physical or civilizatory universalism.

Regarding climate change, it was for a long time macropoliticized rather than macrosecuritized (Buzan & Wæver 2009; Vuori 2011b; Vuori 2015b). This tendency has alternatively been framed as a form of macro-level climate 'crisification' (Paglia 2018). Even as the presentation of the climate threat has been viewed as becoming more apocalyptic, the suggested measures have largely remained within regular politics. Methmann & Rothe (2012) fleshed out how the logics and practices of security and risk interweave within the climate discussion. Indeed, many climate risk practices draw on macrosecuritization for legitimation, even if the form is more akin to the notion of crisis than security politics. As such, domestic concerns like development have also been explored through the securitization framework in the context of climate securitization in India (Sahu 2022) and China (Sahu 2021). At the same time, local environmental transformations have been macrosecuritized, like the melting of the Greenlandic glaciers (Kristensen & Mortengaard forthcoming).

The 'GWoT' is the most prolific macrosecuritization literature. Much of the focus here has been on the policies of the U.S. and its allies (e.g., Donnelly 2013). For example, the use of macrosecuritization in legitimizing drone use in the U.S. conduct of the War on Terror has been explored (Romaniuk & Webb 2015). Studies have also looked at how macrosecuritization operates in post-9/11 television dramas in the U.S. and the United Kingdom (UK) that securitize the threat of Islamic terrorism (Coskun 2012). The GWoT is also closely tied to the issue of securitizing religion (Laustsen & Wæver 2000; Sheiks 2014), and some include both religious and nuclear aspects of the securitization of Iran as representing a form of macrosecuritization (Thomson 2014). Beyond the U.S. and its allies, the PRC has also been the focus of increased attention regarding the GWoT. Here, its domestic and international concerns have been highlighted, particularly within the frame of counter-terrorism.[12] The macrosecuritization of the GWoT has also been viewed from the viewpoint of

contemporary great power management in the post-Cold War period of world politics (Lasmar 2015).

There have also been studies that propose new macrosecuritization topics beyond those postulated by Buzan & Wæver (2009). These tend to deal with global governance attempts that engage forms of 'new threats' to security. One such example is the threat of maritime piracy and the concomitant anti-piracy activities that have been analysed through the framework of macrosecuritization (Bueger & Stockbruegger 2013). The threat of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is another example here. This issue has been studied in the context of the PRC's discourse (Thomas & Lo 2020) and Asia (Lo & Thomas 2018). The internet has also been discussed and studied from the viewpoint of macrosecuritization, in terms of issues that relate to cyber governance (Kingsmith 2013) and hackers that use online measures and frame their activities through macrosecuritization (Fish 2018). I will return to these discussions in the context of the PRC in the following section (see Chapter 7).

Theory Travel with Macrosecuritization

While securitization studies, with their various frameworks and research designs, allow for great variation in questions and inquiries, it is important to maintain the corporate identity of the core theory. This can be achieved by keeping the philosophical (Balzacq 2011b) or illocutionary theory (Wæver 2015) of securitization as the core and by adding other elements (e.g., sociological approaches) into a framework of research that is guided by this theory (e.g., Vuori 2011a; 2011b). In other words, once we have thrown in the net of securitization theory to make our security catch, we can trace processes and examine effects. Still, these are part of the framework of particular studies that are guided by specific research questions and problems.

Securitization studies contain a number of relevant questions that may not all be answerable in every situation with the same research design: for example, not all political systems operate in the same way, which makes different actors relevant, and may have implications for the kinds of research materials that are available or can be produced for investigation (Vuori 2014). The theory has to be translated for each particular study as part of its framework. To use a theoretical model in empirical research is to contextualize it: 'all theories are analogues when applied to the world' (Kaplan 2014: 48), and no process of securitization is identical to another. Indeed, it does not make sense to include all the political and social situations in a securitization theory. This is why it is necessary for an applier of a general theory to take the initial and boundary conditions into account when the theory is used to do research. For example, so-called external facilitation factors are boundary conditions that cannot be pre-defined in the theory; 'Boundary conditions that limit the scope of a theory are not part of the axiomatic account of a theory' (Kaplan 2014: 62).

Similarly, it is important not to stretch the concept of securitization. The theory was developed for specific purposes (desecuritization) in a particular

place (Europe) at a particular time (late Cold War), and it was intended for applications around the world (Wæver 1989a: 26).[13] The problem is that one cannot move from a general definition of securitization to the criticism of securitization in a particular society by simply adjusting for context: 'the meanings of the concepts that are employed depend upon how they are incorporated in a system' (Kaplan 2014: 98). If this is ignored, the original concept will become 'stretched.' The introduction of 'strands of securitization' (Vuori 2008; 2011b) that are derived from illocutionary logic that is the logic of the operative theory at the heart of securitization theory, have developed the theory of securitization (rather than present another framework) in a way that allows for broader empirical investigation without stretching the concept (Vuori 2014).

Neither the contexts nor the purposes of theories remain static; rather, they change with each application. The question is who initially developed a theory, for which purpose, and who uses it, where, and for what purpose? Theories have politics installed in their set-ups, but these become effectual in their application to particular instances (Wæver 2011: 469). This requires reflection and careful consideration from the part of the applier of a theory (Vuori 2014).

In the present volume, I conduct two kinds of travel. The approach I deploy in my investigation into Chinese macrosecuritization has been developed in Europe and has mostly been used to investigate politics in political orders that are more or less liberal–democratic (e.g., Watson 2013 and Romaniuk & Webb 2015). Thereby, the case of the PRC becomes interesting from a theory travel viewpoint, as the investigation happens beyond the 'limit' of liberal democracy in a post-totalitarian order that has evolved from the 'democratic dictatorship of the people' (see Chapter 2; Vuori 2014). In terms of political orders, the approach travels from liberal to non-democracy with a non-liberal political ontology (Pedersen & Holbaard 2012) of a revolutionary system. The other aspect of travel is cultural: the PRC is quite different in its societal and cultural institutionalization and practice than Europe. The question then is what does this approach do in terms of critique in such a political and cultural setting?

When we discuss theory travel, it is important to bear in mind that theories are developed in certain academic, political, and social contexts. This has been pointed out by a number of prominent scholars in various fields of critical investigation. For example, Gilles Deleuze pointed out that 'a theory is always local and related to a limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or less distant from it. The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance.' (Foucault & Deleuze 1980: 205–206.) In a fairly similar manner to Cox (1981: 128), 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time, and space.' This statement was an admonition for scholars to be critical regarding the development of theory in social fields rather than some realm free from human influence. Theories are developed to achieve certain goals: critical reflection should not take theories at face value but instead reflect on where a theory comes from, what it was designed to achieve, and the contexts where it was developed (Cox

2012: 19). These kinds of reflections are vital aspects of reflection in terms of theory travel (Said 1984; 1994): it is important to be aware of where a theory comes from and of what it does when it is applied or brought to new contexts, or perhaps employed for new purposes.

Indeed, for Wyn Jones (1999: 10), 'all intellectual work is rooted in a particular social and historical context, and as that context is gradually transformed, some elements of the work will lose their resonance and relevance, whereas others may come to appear more important than was initially the case.' Critical theorists should, therefore, 'not only outline how certain political rationalities and practices of government develop in Western contexts and subsequently travel to non-Western destinations' (Sigley 2006: 490) but take in what these new contexts do to the theories. Theory travel may also entail changes in the theory itself, at least when it is made to do something in a certain place and at a certain time (Sigley 2006; Holbaard & Pedersen 2012).

Despite the difficulties, if not dangers, when applying theories developed in a certain context to investigate a completely different one, there are a number of reasons for making theories travel. First, scholarly communities are generally not willing to accept the existence of phenomena-based on single sets of experiments or observations. Even the successful repetition of a test or observation will not always convince communities, as the test set-up may contain the same unexplained factor or idiosyncrasy that resulted in the data observed. Only when a phenomenon like macrosecuritization discourse is observed with a variety of (mutually independent) observations or arrangements will communities of scholars be convinced that the phenomenon indeed exists and is not merely the result of idiosyncrasies in the original set-up. Indeed, the notion of macrosecuritization has not always been taken up by scholars that have used securitization theory to study global security concerns.

Hence, scholars will seek to test and try out their hypotheses in various contexts and endeavour to produce improved or at least alternative data on the same phenomenon. This is one of the reasons for the present volume, as it aims to discern whether the notion of macrosecuritization makes sense and provides added value in the study of security in the PRC. Indeed, one criterion for a proper test for a hypothesis is that it must be performed on different samples to those that were used to devise the hypothesis (Laudan 1990: 62). This should be the case for macrosecuritization, as it is assumed to appear in many places around the world even if the level of its adoption is more a matter of evaluating success than a defining criterion for macrosecuritization (Buzan & Wæver 2009). Without this, macrosecuritization could hardly be thought to overlay or subsume lower-level securitizations.

It is at this stage where, in social sciences, things get tricky in terms of what Sartori (1970) calls conceptual stretching. Indeed, scholars will often seek to broaden their knowledge by the application of their models and hypotheses to a wider range of cases, which often results in the adaptation of categories to fit the new contexts. Sartori (ibid.) encouraged this conceptual 'travelling' (the application of concepts to new cases) but at the same time warned about conceptual

'stretching' (the distortion that occurs when a concept does not fit the new cases). For scholars to be able to test the generality of their findings, they have to establish that their concept has a sufficiently similar meaning in the context of the new cases. The merit of Sartori's approach is to encourage scholars to be attentive to context but without abandonment of broad comparisons.

Second, from a more political viewpoint, for Foucault & Deleuze (1980: 208), 'theory is by nature opposed to power. As soon as a theory is enmeshed in a particular point, we realize that it will never possess the slightest practical importance unless it can erupt in a totally different area.' This kind of approach to theory and critical practice suggests the necessity of travelling with our theories. Critical approaches to security can provide a varied toolbox, which can be used to conduct academic research in non-western contexts and to work for political critique and activism. As Foucault (1980: 62) noted, it is the task of intellectuals to construct intellectual tools for analysis. Indeed, it is not necessary for an academic to become organically active in what they investigate. Instead, they can hone intellectual tools for those intent on being active on the level of critical practice.

When such theoretical travel does occur, we have to be sensitive to the effects of changing contexts and uses of theories. Said's (1984 and 1994) critique focused on the imperialistic tendencies of universalizing claims. Said was not against universal or global claims as such. The question for Said was how to understand the global in ways that remain sensitive to particular contexts and perspectives (Biswas 2007: 130). Paradoxically, Said was critical of humanism in the name of humanism and simultaneously against universalizing claims when claiming himself a humanist (Duvall 2007: 89). Mufti (2005: 122) reasoned that Said was attempting to offer an alternative to Eurocentric thought by providing a general account of the role of the particular in universalizing processes. Said's answer was the 'contrapuntal' reading of simultaneous and mutually constitutive histories against linear and developmentalist narratives (Biswas 2007: 133). Said believed in the possibility of actively different locales, sites and situations without recourse to facile universalism or over-general totalizing (Said 1994).

While reflection is vital for all critical investigation, moving from one social and political context to another means that scholars have to be particularly sensitive to the variances in values and connotations in different contexts. If the values that guide research are not reflected upon, they may distort it. Furthermore, Collingwood (1938), quoted in Winch (2008: 97), stated that 'scientific' anthropologists often mask 'a half-conscious conspiracy to bring into ridicule and contempt civilizations different from our own; cultural anthropology has critiqued the belief of 19th and early 20th century anthropologists that human cultures develop from primitive to civilized cultures, the highest form being Victorian Great Britain. This is, in a way, what theories of 'colonial knowledge' also criticize. The dilemma of colonial or orientalist knowledge is a dilemma that shares many similarities with the normative dilemma of writing security (Huysmans 2002).

The question for a scholar writing about a society different from their own becomes how to mitigate this 'half-conscious conspiracy.' If I write it out here, will I become part of this conspiracy? Or is the true insidiousness contained in the conspiracy's half-consciousness; consciousness of the dilemma does not prevent participation in the conspiracy?

This avenue of thought seems to risk the portrayal of the societies under investigation as hapless victims and passive objects at the mercy of masterly scholarship. Indeed, there has been a tendency to overestimate the power of the 'West' to repress and colonize the 'East,' where the East is a mere passive recipient or victim (Hobson 2012: 133). This is, of course, not the case: studying the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PRC does not deprive either of their agency or identity.

Some of the universalism–culturalism debate prevalent in Chinese studies revolves around the dilemmas involved in the role of values and their evaluation across cultures and societies. Chinese studies are by no means unique in this regard: area studies, in general, and post-colonial studies, in particular, have engaged in discussion on 'cultural imperialism' and universalizing ethnocentrism prevalent in European and North American scholarship (e.g., Bubandt 2005, Kent 2006, Wilkinson 2007, and Tickner & Wæver 2009). Thus, is it justified to impose one's values or normative goals onto another culture or society, especially in light of the tendencies Collingwood (1938) identified?

Nathan (1997: 198) contends that values play a legitimate role in social science inquiry. This position is shared by most critical security scholars, whose interest in knowledge (Habermas 2007) is usually slanted towards emancipatory ideals: many critical studies of security are normative because they urge change in the social architecture of our world. Constructionists, in general, and critical scholars of security, in particular, are often explicit in terms of the normative goals of their research programmes. As a result, the issue of a normative dilemma in research on security becomes important. Similarly, in the discussions of cultural relativism in Chinese studies, it has been emphasized that no interpretation can be value-free or completely neutral (Buck 1991: 32). In addition, Kent (2006: 344) argued that all notions and practices of security were cultural and, as such, embedded in value systems, which often remain unquestioned; for them, any universal application of a particular definition of security is already a form of 'cultural colonialism.'

It is easy to confuse levels of abstraction and forms of social practice during debates on relativism and culturalism. Yet, cultural or value relativism (represented by the likes of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Peter Winch) does not equal epistemic or cognitive relativism (represented by Paul Feyerabend), and the reverse applies too: one can use the same epistemological methods to study different cultures without having to claim universal values among them. Indeed, to apply foreign analytical frameworks to the study of other cultures is not the same as to apply foreign value standards to other cultures (cf., Nathan 1997: 200). For example, the problems with the 'Westphalian straitjacket' (Wilkinson 2007) are about assumptions of, or preferences for certain morals,

values, and world-views, and not about the application of European analytical methods outside Europe as such.

The realization of the disparity between epistemic and cultural relativism does, however, not release the use of certain concepts from piggy backing values or biases: all scholarly work is political, but this is often distinct from 'the political.' Scholars have to be sensitive to this and thus reflect on the concepts used in their analyses. Describing one culture's values in another's language also leads to special problems involved in the translation and interpretation of concepts. This challenge, however, is one of translation in its broadest sense and not one of evaluation (Nathan 1997: 199, Berling et al. 2022). Yet, as the normative dilemma of writing security illustrates (Huysmans 2002), scholars face the same problems of value judgements and cultural relativity within the complexity of their societies, not just in the 'other' of China: as the more general debates among philosophers of science also show (e.g., Laudan 1990), the issue of epistemic and cultural relativism is by no means limited to 'area,' or 'post-colonial' studies. Just as in any comparative piece of scholarship, area and post-colonial studies need a shared framework of investigation to discover the points of divergence and convergence among human communities and their activities.

Like so many other aspects of research design, how relevant this reflection on values depends on the tasks and interests set for the scholarly endeavour that utilizes the framework. If the intention is to unmask, it would be reasonable to argue that one's society should not be studied, as the risk of making naturalist assumptions may be greater because a scholar may take too many things for granted in studying her own 'initial socialization,' for instance, scholars may tend to reify and retain doxa. Scholars should thereby examine other societies and travel with their concepts.

From such a vantage point, theoretical travel becomes a necessity. One solution that allows for the study of foreign societies is not to transport one's reifications, doxa, or even language games, or at least not to consider them somehow 'superior' to those of the society under study unless that is what is specifically intended to be argued (cf., Heyes 2003: 5). Indeed, as Fay (1996) noted, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to be a part of a social group undergoing scrutiny to understand it. Haraway (1988) similarly argues that the way towards objectivity is an acknowledgement of the situatedness and partial nature of all understandings, paradoxically also making an argument with universal scope. The position I take in the present volume also emphasizes the situatedness and relationality (yet not relativity) of knowledge claims: factual claims are partial, situated, and relational. Such a position does, however, not mean that one would have to succumb to a cognitive relativist position: cultural or value relationalism does not entail nor equal cognitive or epistemological relativism. Thereby, if our theoretical notions are artificial enough, we can use them to study various socio-cultural situations and contexts without succumbing to 'cultural colonialism.' As Žižek (2002 66) also emphasized, scholars should not assume or impose universal ideologies or values but understand universality

as a shared space of understanding among cultures that requires an infinite task of translation and reworking of one's particular position. Such a notion of universality is compatible with a pragmatist viewpoint to scholarship (cf., Laudan 1990: 109–111): one may transcend one's own culture in the evaluation of one's own and other's cultures, even when different cultures have different standards for the admissibility of ideas.

Securitization in China

One of the frequent criticisms raised against securitization theory has been the narrow European focus of its empirical applications (e.g., Walker 2007, Behnke 2007, and Salter 2007). For example, there has been a constant flow of articles and books that identify problems when applying the framework of securitization outside the European context in which it was originally developed.[14] While it has been rightly noted that such approaches are used and advanced outside Europe (e.g., Burke & McDonald 2007, Bilgin 2008, and 2012) and are indeed applicable to investigate politics beyond it (e.g., Vuori 2008 and Greenwood & Wæver 2013), the approach does have a European sensitivity in terms of the intellectual traditions and social theories it draws from. Indeed, the theory is not focused on norm construction and cynically unmasks its issue of concern, which may not be to the liking of liberal constructivists. It is too ontologically suspect in its approach and obtuse in its style for many political realists. At the same time, it does not directly serve any state or national interest (even if some scholars deploy it with this aim).

While features of the context of processes of social construction (see Chapter 2) that include security issues are important for empirical investigations, instances of speech acts of securitization constitute the point of departure for my analysis. This sets limits for what the approach can be used to study, and the framework requires some explication to apply to politics in the PRC without conceptual stretching, as discussed previously.

Securitization can be studied through discourse through a 'lens of security' (Buzan et al. 1998). While illocutionary logic provides the means to study the 'grammar,' or necessary culture-independent metalanguage for the cross-cultural study of securitization processes, I use identity frame theory to decipher the specific 'vocabulary,' the situated pools of resonant values, or the heuristic artefacts of the empirical cases under investigation (Snow & Benford 1992; Stritzel 2007; Balzacq 2011b). I use 'grammatical' models of securitization (Vuori 2008; 2011b) to identify relevant texts and discourse samples for analysis because it is necessary to discriminate and separate security from non-security issues (Wæver 2004: 9).

The possibility to study the political functions of security speech in the PRC's politics is based on the premises set by speech act theory, where language (as the ability) logically precedes different languages and cultures (Austin 1975; Searle 1969); if security issues are constituted through a process of speech acts, then they should also be constituted through the same mechanism in all

societies, even though not all societies or languages share the same particular types of speech acts. Austin (1975) argued that illocutions, unlike perlocutions, are carried out conforming to conventions. These conventions are historicized and dependent on social and cultural factors. However, even though security means different things to different societies because the core fears of a group or nation are unique and relate to vulnerabilities and historical experiences (Wæver 1989b: 301), the constitution and perlocutionary effects of security are based on the universality of the human capacity for speech acts. Securitization describes the process of creating social facts of security. Indeed, in philosophical terms, 'security' can be viewed as a 'Status Function Declaration,' whereby the social construction of 'security' brings about certain deontic powers. Transcribed in more general Searlean (Searle 2011) terms, an object X can have the status function Y (of security) and is thus able to perform function F in context C. In other words, speech acts of security create states of affairs with a new deontology of rights, duties, obligations, requirements, and authorizations that come about by performing and getting others to accept certain speech acts. The same applies in the case of macrosecuritization, even though the deontology may differ from, for example, that of national security in a specific context.

The previous philosophical stand raises the question of what the primary functions of 'security' are in real political terms. Through the illocutionary logic of speech acts, we can determine that 'security speech' can have a variety of political functions (Vuori 2008; 2011b). Such functions range from raising an issue onto the agenda of decision-making to legitimizing policies, deterring threats, and controlling subordinates. This kind of understanding allows for the study of the phenomenon of securitization without conceptual stretching.

Indeed, elsewhere (Vuori 2008; 2011b), I have argued that the explication of the concept of securitization via illocutionary logic increases the extension of the concept in a way that allows its application to a broader set of sociopolitical contexts, political orders, and types of actors (e.g., formal/informal authority and state/non-state) when still retaining its previous possibilities of application. In fact, such an explication was necessary to make sense of the various political functions that securitization arguments seemed to have in the PRC; not all were about legitimating a break from the rules that bind regular politics (Vuori 2011b).

Such an explication of the concept of securitization allows for the analysis of various types of securitization discourse in various social and political contexts. Indeed, at least five strands of securitization can be explicated: securitization 1) for raising an issue onto the agenda, 2) for legitimating future acts, 3) for deterrence, 4) for control, and 5) for legitimating past acts, or for reproducing the security status of an issue (i.e., post hoc securitization) (Vuori 2008; 2011b). I contend that the grammar of these various securitization moves is a means to infer certain political functions securitization arguments can exhibit. Thereby, the analysis of elementary speech acts can be used to infer the political function of complex speech acts of securitization. As a result, the theory

of securitization can be deployed in the type of conceptual analysis which, for example, Skinner (2002) promoted; the theory can be used to deduce what speech acts do, and thereby, it can be used to conclude what they mean. This concomitantly provides a means to analyse conceptual change as regards security rationales in different periods as well as between different socio-political contexts.

To sum up my main methodological argument, I reason that speech act logic and the explicated strands of securitization can be used to infer political functions of security speech, even in the absence of the word 'security.' A 'security rationale' (Huysmans 2006a) or 'security modality' (Hansen 2000), dependent on a fairly stable constellation of meanings, makes this possible. While this approach cannot be used to gain access to the 'true' intentions or the sincerity of speakers (as speech acts rely on conventional sets of rules and practices), once such relevant rules are apparent in a certain context, it is possible to conclude what the particular discourse sample means. An examination of what is entailed in the 'security rationale' may eventually allow assumptions of what the particular act of securitization was used for.

Certain caveats are in order, however. While illocutionary speech acts are conventional, perlocutionary effects are not; the same illocutionary acts may not always produce the same perlocutionary effects on different hearers or even on the same hearer in different situations. Moreover, illocutionary speech acts may have unintended perlocutionary effects. While the approach to the functions of security speech operates under the assumption of strategically behaving speakers, the situation of the communicative interaction is viewed as open. The speaker cannot decide what the hearer understands or interprets; for example, one person's reassurance remains another's threat. Yet, because the 'security rationale' is fairly constant, we can assume what the meaning of the speech acts is. It must be kept in mind that discourse samples containing illocutionary acts may not reveal much of the perlocutionary effects of such acts, as most types of acts of securitization do not have conventional consequences. The analysis of the perlocutionary effects of securitization requires means beyond the analysis of illocutionary speech acts, as does the analysis of the success of the politics of such moves. Yet, irrespective of the perlocutionary 'success' of illocutionary acts, the act in the utterance of an illocution may already transform a situation; a securitizing actor commits to a status transformation for the issue concerned in voicing 'security,' which on its own may already have consequences in certain social settings.

Theories of speech acts emphasize the linguistic and social aspects of language and its use. Accordingly, the research methods I have applied have combined linguistic and socio-political analyses necessary to understand the performative of securitization in real situations and contexts. The method of inquiry has been based on cross-cultural pragmatics (the study of how meaning is derived from the interaction of utterances with the contexts in which they are used) and not purely on semantics (the study of meaning) or universal linguistic rules (Wierzbicka 1991). Once I identified and collected the relevant

discourse samples, I could analyse them with speech act analysis and sociolinguistic means to broaden the analysis beyond the discourse samples into the historically situated socio-political contexts beyond the specific samples of discourse. I then narrativized this analysis into the case chapters that follow.

While my approach to studying the politics of security in the PRC has been pioneering (e.g., Vuori 2003 and Paltemaa & Vuori 2006), the study of securitization in China has subsequently become a strand of securitization studies literature. Much of this research has dealt with the political security of the Communist Party. Studies have examined securitization processes that have concerned the Cultural Revolution (Vuori 2011b; 2011c), the 1976 Tiananmen Incident (Vuori 2011b), the Democracy Movement (Paltemaa & Vuori 2006), the 1989 Tiananmen Incident (Vuori 2003; 2008; 2011a), the anti-Falungong campaign (Vuori 2011a; 2011b; 2014), self-immolation in Tibet (Topgyal 2016), and the 'Umbrella movement' in Hong Kong (Hui 2019). There has been research on the 'three evils' and the 'three illegals' (Plümmer 2020), securitization and desecuritization of frontier regions (Cui & Li 2011), specialization of security in urban spaces (Liu & Yuan 2019), the internet (Miao & Han 2022), and water (Xie & Warner 2022) from the viewpoint of securitization theory. Studies have also explored the dynamics of contestation and resistance in the form of de, counter, and reverse securitization moves by those targeted in the processes (Vuori 2011a; 2011b; Vuori 2015a; Topgyal 2016).

Beyond China's domestic security concerns, research has also focused on how China engages with the securitization moves of neighbouring states (Chin 2008; Wishnick 2008; Biba 2014; 2016; 2018; Danner 2014; Xie & Warner 2022), the securitization of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Jakimów 2019), and great powers (Vuori 2018a). Studies have also treated the securitization of particular macrosecuritization discourses, like climate change overall (Vuori 2015b; Nyman & Zeng 2016; Trombetta 2018; Joseph & Karackattu 2022) or in the context of the Arctic (Wang & Xu 2022), China's war on terror (Wayne 2008; Rodríguez-Merino 2019; Pistarini Teixeira Nunes 2020; Topal 2021; Liu 2021), and AMR (Thomas & Lo 2020).

Even though the Chinese literature on non-traditional security is extensive, securitization theory has not been that widely used to study the PRC's security issues in Chinese journals.[15] Topics in the securitization studies literature in Chinese journals that concern the PRC include various aspects of anti-terrorism (Hu 2018), religion (Xu & Zhang 2009), shared water resources, maritime areas, transboundary rivers (Wei et al. 2015; Zhang 2017; Hu 2019; Xing & Wang 2019; Li 2021), the securitization of China and its international relations (Yu 2004; Wang 2012; Wang 2016), public health (Wei & Zheng 2020), food security (Yu & Wang 2014), Chinese migration abroad (Pan 2020), economics and business ventures (Du 2010; Wang 2011; Xie & Liu 2014; Zou & Mu 2021; Zhao & Lang 2022), and aspects of culture (Ma 2010; Mao & Wang 2021). Like most of the scholarship on foreign and security politics in the PRC that tends to lean more towards policy than theory (He et al. 2019: 195), the discussion on securitization theory in Chinese journals follows the lines of the

'observers or advocates' debate within securitization theory literature of the 1990s.[16] For example, Yu & Xie (2015) point to the possible dilemmas of 1) the exaggeration of threats and insufficient desecuritization, 2) ignoring the actual security threats, and 3) establishing enemies that do not exist, which may be issues in the study of securitization in the Chinese context. Similarly, there have been calls for further explanations on why certain issues are securitized over others (Liu 2018). Securitization has also been viewed favourably in the Chinese debate because it can strengthen social integration and identification (Zhu 2003).

As a result of such studies, we know quite a bit about how desecuritization moves and discourses have been used in domestic political contexts, in regard to migration issues, how securitization is enacted as surveillance, control, and censorship online and in urban spaces, and how they are used in bilateral issues that concern neighbouring states and great power relationships. What is still missing, though, is a discussion of macrosecuritization beyond its deployment in singular cases, such as the securitization of climate change or the issue of terrorism. Before I present the full picture of macrosecuritization in the PRC, the nature and functioning of its political order needs to be introduced, and the overall conceptual history of security in China is laid out to make sense of how the macrosecuritizations fit into the PRC's politics.

Notes

1 Parts of this chapter have been adapted from Vuori, Juha A. (2017): 'Constructivism and Securitization Studies.' In Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*. London: Routledge, 65–74 and Vuori, Juha A. (2014): *Critical Security and Chinese Politics: The Anti-Falungong* Campaign. London: Routledge.

2 These formulations differ somewhat from the original ones (Buzan et al. 1998) and they represent a synthesis of various criticisms (e.g., Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; Vuori 2011b; Wæver 2015).

3 Yet the theory is not limited to speech: for example, non-verbal communication and visual images can also be used to commit speech acts. Accordingly, 'visual securitization' has become its own strand of investigation within securitization studies (for a review, see Andersen et al. 2015; Vuori & Andersen 2018).

4 Different interpretations and versions of speech act theory have a bearing on securitization studies debates too. Most prominently, Thierry Balzacq (2005), by drawing on Bourdieu and Habermas, presents securitization as a 'pragmatic' or strategic act that aims to influence audiences in favour of the securitizing actor, whereas Wæver (2011; 2014), drawing on Sbisá, considers securitization an illocutionary act that has conventional effects. Vuori (2011b: 164) argues that some strands of securitization have conventional effects or consequences while others do not.

5 Indeed, securitization and desecuritization can be either 'positive' or 'negative' (Cui & Li 2011: 147), which is not determined by theoretical fiat but the analysis of actual situations.

6 The more sociological approaches have emphasized the mundane everydayness of security practices and techniques (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006a; 2014) and

the possibility of security practice remaining below issues of survival (Balzacq 2011b; 2015).

7 See Buzan et al. (1998: 25–26), Jackson (2006), and Roe (2008) for discussion on success, and views on the 'stages' of securitization. Securitization dynamics have gained more nuance with notions such as 'resecuritization' (Åtland 2009) and 'securitization climax' (Lupovici 2016b), and the contestation of security issues has received more attention (Vuori 2011a; 2015a; Balzacq 2015).

8 For example, was securitization justified (Floyd 2011), what were its inter-unit effects (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006), or how can the process be traced within a polity (Léonard and Kaunert 2011).

9 Although securitization studies have been interested in the failure of securitization, for example, in the German Democratic Republic in 1989 (Wæver 1995), from the start, there has been a selection bias towards successful securitization in empirical investigations (Salter 2011).

10 On the connections between securitization and deterrence, see Vuori (2016a) and Lupovici (2019).

11 For varying views on these aspects see, Wæver (1995), Huysmans (1995), Aradau (2004), Roe (2004), Jutila (2006), Behnke (2006), de Wilde (2008), Floyd (2011; 2014), Vuori (2010; 2011b), and Hansen (2012).

12 See, for example, Wayne (2008), Vuori (2011b), Rodríguez-Merino (2019; 2022), Pistarini Teixeira Nunes (2020), Topal (2021), and Liu (2021).

13 The issue of 'theory travel' (Vuori 2014), and which kinds of problems the application of the approach to non-European socio-political contexts (e.g., Mabon & Saloni 2018) produces is another example of debates in securitization studies. Beyond the issue of theoretical application in different contexts (e.g., Holbaard & Pedersen 2012 and Mabon & Saloni 2018), the varying distal and proximate contexts of securitization (Balzacq 2011b) in terms of resonant values (Stritzel 2007), on- and back-stage discussions of experts (Salter 2008), and the translation of threat images (Stritzel 2014) have been discussed.

14 See, for example, Hansen (2000), Emmers (2003; 2004), Bubandt (2005), Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2006), Kent (2006), Jackson (2006), Wilkinson (2007), Barthwal-Datta (2009), Holbaard & Pedersen (2012), Lupovici (2014), and Mabon & Saloni (2018).

15 Buzan et al. (1998) was translated into Chinese in 2002 (see 巴瑞布赞, 奥利维夫, 迪怀尔德 2002).

16 Securitization scholars do not agree on how willing they are to take part in critical political agendas, and whether their objective is the achievement of 'real security,' 'normal politics' instead of 'security politics,' or to become freed or 'escape' from the concept and practices of 'security' itself. This was the essence of the 'observers or advocates' debate in the field too (Eriksson 1999); even critical approaches differ in whether they want to advocate some issue or understanding of security, or whether they merely want to examine what it entails when others do such advocacy.

2 Security in China[1]

The empirical study of security has to take into account the 'nature' or 'type' of the political order, for instance, the mechanisms through which politics and government are engaged in that order. Securitization can be affected by political orders and diagrams of power. In the case of the People's Republic of China (PRC), without knowledge of the role and functionality of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is not possible to comprehend politics in the PRC; it is important to realize how the power of the party has been constituted, and the PRC has been set-up as a diagram of power. Similarly important is to get a grasp of the conceptual evolution of security in the PRC and even China before it. I begin with the system-type of the PRC's political order.

Chinese Post-Totalitarianism

The nature and functioning of political orders have a bearing on how security and its politics play out. The PRC is a non-democratic party state that adheres to 'the people's democratic dictatorship' that is in the 'primary stage of socialism,' which currently translates as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.' It is, therefore, prudent to provide some sense of the structural logic of totalitarian orders and what post-totalitarianism entails. This will help comprehend how politics operate in the PRC and how securitization and security practices function there.

The classic totalitarian model encapsulated the idea of total control over individuals. Friedrich & Brzezinski (1956: 15–16) listed six features in their understanding of the totalitarian syndrome: 1) an elaborative transformative ideology, 2) a ruling single mass party led by one individual, 3) the use of physical and mental terror against enemies of the system, 4) 'a technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party or the government, of all means of effective mass communication, such as the press, radio, and motion pictures,' 5) 'a similarly technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of the effective use of weapons of armed combat,' and 6) central control of the economy. Guo (1998; 2000) refined this classical model of totalitarianism through a focus on the structure of totalitarian

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systems and by examination of the real system in the PRC. Guo's model makes a distinction between the hard core of the system and its other operational features. According to Guo, the fundamental features of the core have to be part of a real system for its totalitarian nature to be sustained. Thus, the hard core defines the limits of totalitarianism; if the core is compromised, the system loses its totalitarian 'nature,' which would equal system change. Different types of systems can do similar things, for example, deploy the same techniques of government, whereas it is the core that defines its system type.

The hard core of a totalitarian system in Guo's (1998; 2000) model consists of three elements (Guo 2000): 1) an absolutist ideology and inevitable goal, 2) ideological commitment, and 3) a dictatorial party–state system. In totalitarian systems, the core ideology is presented as the only correct and allowed worldview, and it defines the set objectives of the system. Therefore, ideology legitimizes the order; the actions and policies of the power holders are legitimate and correct because they aim to attain the objectives set by the ideology. A fourth feature is the protective belt of action means; in the PRC, the repeated and massive use of state and peer terror, mass mobilization, and control over information and media, education, culture, economy, means of production, military forces, and weapons. The construction of antagonistic others and the revolutionary legitimization of the prerogative state (Staniszkis 1992: 12–13, 79–82) are major features of the dynamics in totalitarian political orders. Having only one accepted ideology also legitimizes coercion in their protection.

The transition from Mao's China to post-Mao China may be viewed as a transition from revolution to the state, for instance, from constitutive power to constituted power. Here, the Four Cardinal Principles[2] form the core of such a post-totalitarian order that is maintained even today (e.g., Xi 2022a). Indeed, despite being at times mere lip service or 'autocommunication,' official ideology is still crucial for the legitimacy of a post-totalitarian political order and its control over society. Any threat to this core is a threat to the existence of the Party and the state; the full brunt of action can be brought to bear on whichever issue is deemed as a threat. However, the use of any action means and methods from the protective belt will be a form of special politics, not the norm. In a totalitarian system, all issues are politicized (Elo 2005), everything is within the purview of the state, but not all issues are securitized, and not all politics is about survival.

As a totalitarian system stabilizes after a revolution, it tends to lose its revolutionary momentum. This kind of loss, described by Tucker (1961: 284–286), is aptly captured by Havel (1992), who argued that the initial totalitarian order applied to most socialist states in Europe at the beginning of the Cold War was replaced with a post-totalitarian order as the new political systems settled. In post-totalitarianism, ideology no longer has any great influence on people but still plays its part in the system.

Ideology will still set some aspects of the public transcript (Scott 1990) of the 'powerful' as it binds what they can and what, conversely, the powerless sometimes must do and say. The post-totalitarian order aims for harmony and

peace, the obedience of its subjects in the system, without the overt use of coercion; the post-totalitarian order relies more on 'symbolic violence' (Bourdieu 1977). Thereby, to defy or otherwise exceed the expected conformity and discipline will be regarded as an attack on the system itself, for instance, on the core values of the system that defines its nature. The influence of individuals, even their 'lifestyles,' can be tolerated if they are in tune with the direction the order is heading. In this way, the forms and limits of the landscape of conformity may change, with top leaders defining the broad strokes and 'security professionals' modulating the limits of the allowed. This has taken extreme forms in Xinjiang since the late 2010s (see Chapter 6). In this case, citizens do not have to believe in the system but merely comply with it to a degree that will not jeopardize the 'official truth,' which remains rhetorically committed to the original ideology of the totalitarian order. Such 'rituals of complicity' become more important than the ideological zeal that may have driven the initial totalitarian stage. At this stage, the political order will no longer actively control all it can; it is sufficient to control what is necessary to perpetuate the system (cf., Foucault 2007). In China's post-Mao era, this has translated as 'maintaining stability and unity,' 'upholding the four cardinal principles,' and more recently, striving for a 'harmonious society' and the 'China dream.' Conformity is necessary for the system, because if too many subjects cease to comply, the symbolic order will crumble and lead to system change.

While totalitarian political orders are transformative and employ forced-draft methods to achieve their ideological goals at almost any human and social cost, post-totalitarian political orders have lost this momentum and thorough ideological commitment. Nevertheless, a post-totalitarian order may still cling to the forms of its totalitarian past, and its ideology remains the basis of its self-legitimization. Indeed, this transformative process can be seen in the PRC in many fields of life, for example, in the politics of technology (Paltemaa & Vuori 2009), propaganda work (Chan 2002; Brady 2008; Paltemaa et al. 2020), or even religion (Lai 2006).

The Party-State

Succinctly put, a characteristic feature of the PRC's political order is the 'party-state,' which refers to the parallel structures of the Party and the State at various levels of social organization. In this dual structure, the Party is dominant regarding the actual State organs, and Party structures penetrate deeper into society than state structures do. The same individuals will usually occupy the top positions in both structures, a practice which is called 'one organization, two labels' (一个机构两块牌子, *yīgè jīgòu liǎng kuài páizi*). In this way, the Party retains its control over the political order and can prevent the emergence of political competitors.

On the formal state side, the highest authority in the PRC is the National People's Congress (NPC), which convenes once every 4 years. The NPC delegates its authority to the State Council, which, effectively, is equivalent

to the cabinet of the PRC. On the Party side, the highest formal authority is the Party Congress, which meets infrequently. The Congress delegates its authority to the Central Committee, which in turn delegates it to the Politburo. In practice, the most authoritative Party, and thereby party-state organ, is the Standing Committee of the CCP. While the delegates in the Party and people's congresses number in the thousands, the Standing Committee has only 20 members. Such a dual structure of delegation is repeated in the lower levels of administration and governance (provincial, municipal, county, and township).

The party-state has been a characteristic feature of the PRC's political order. However, it has not been stable throughout the PRC era. The exceptionality of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is evident in the fact that the Party and State, in effect, fused into one, the exception being that it was the Party that was 'shut down' as ad-hoc 'revolutionary' committees seized power from Party bureaucrats. The post-Mao order, under the authority of Deng Xiaoping, resuscitated the Party. Since the late 1970s, the party-state has been a relatively stable diagram of power, with major changes happening at the level of personnel rather than the institutional structure of the system. Indeed, Xi Jinping's reforms on the state side, and the purge of other factions from the standing committee of the Politburo, are an indication of his exceptionally strong grasp of the political order.

In accordance with its vast size and complexity, the system has perhaps the most complex 'matrix' of bureaucratic relationships of authority. Some of these are formal, while many are 'informal,' which is another major characteristic of the PRC's political order. Such a situation has been termed a system of 'fragmented authoritarianism' (Lieberthal 2004: 187). Formally existing institutions are lumped together into informal bureaucratic systems, or *xitongs* (系统, *xìtǒng*), which work along vertical 'strips' (条, *tiáo*) and horizontal 'chunks' (块, *kuài*) within the bureaucracy; the relationship of authority between the vertical and the horizontal are not always clear, and informal personal connections may play a key role in how the system is managed. The general principle here is that the Centre decides on issues where authority is unclear, and decisions are delegated to the lowest administration level possible. When bureaucratic and political communication has been geared to flow from top to bottom, the system creates many difficulties for good governance. Lower-level administrators and politicians have an interest in falsifying information, and further, there is no trustworthy system to receive information from outside the bureaucracy 'matrix.'

While the bureaucratic system is immense, and the *de jure* authoritative Party and State decision-making bodies include a great number of people, the number of *de facto* leaders in the PRC is around 20–30. Accordingly, the study of politics in the PRC has largely consisted of the study of elite and informal politics, aptly called 'Zhongnanhaiology' after 'Kremlinology,' which concerned the outside analysis of elite politics of the Soviet Union. A common framework here has been 'factionalism' (e.g., Unger 2002). Indeed, inter-personal relationships are an important aspect of the PRC's factional

politics. It is, however, very difficult to characterize the various factions with descriptions such as 'conservative' or 'liberal,' as these may have confusing connotations derived from their use in other political orders and because such labels would not be consistent throughout different eras of the PRC's politics, for example, a 'radical' reformer of the 1950s could be labelled a 'conservative' in the 1980s, even though their proposals may have remained quite similar. This politicking has produced quite dramatic political infighting and purges, which have sometimes erupted into the public domain. Security discourse may become a battleground for such contestation, as happened with the student protests in 1989 (Vuori 2011b).

Chinese Security Concepts

The PRC established its National Security Commission (NSC; 国家安全委员会, *guójiā ānquán wěiyuánhuì*) in 2014. The PRC's media framed the initiation of this new commission as making its security governance model more in line with international standards and practices (*People's Daily* 2013). In accordance with this kind of normalization of security governance, the PRC's current official security concept abides by the comprehensive or broad understanding of security that is the international standard. In conjunction with publicizing the new committee, Xi Jinping also presented the 'Holistic Concept of National Security' (总体国家安全观, *zǒngtǐ guójiā ānquán guān*),[3] or 'Path to National Security with Chinese Characteristics' that listed 11 areas of concern. These included 'the spheres of politics, territory, military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear, and natural resources' (*Xinhua* 2014). The inclusion of politics and its position as the first category of security concerns is a particular feature here that still places the security of the revolution and the supremacy of the CCP in the premier position (Xi 2014b: 179; cf., Vuori 2003; 2008). This also shows how even though the security vocabulary has abandoned counter-revolution as the main threat to the PRC, political security remains the greatest concern even under the rubric of national security (Vuori 2011b; 2014).

Indeed, counter-revolution has been absent from the PRC's mainstream security speech for a quarter of a century now. National security, on the other hand, has become quite common. For example, after the second meeting of the NSC in April 2018, Xi pointed to four achievements that had been made through this new commission: 'the construction of main architecture of the national security system; the formation of the national security theory system; the implementation of the national security strategy system; and the establishment of a national security coordination mechanism' (Zhao 2020: 93). As this litany of national security systems suggests, the PRC has properly internalized the concept within its top leadership system.

Despite its current voluminous use, the concept of national security is a comparatively recent addition to Chinese political discourse. In contemporary China, 'security' usually translates as *ānquán* (安全). However, ancient Chinese

did not have the concept *ānquán* but used the concept *ān* (安; peace/peaceful). *Ān* was the opposite of *wēi* (危; danger/dangerous). *Ān* can also be understood as a verb: to make calm, to pacify. When Sunzi (2005), a Chinese classic on strategy, was written, *quán* (全) meant 'retaining immunity' or 'remaining unharmed' (Nojonen 2008). Other classical Chinese texts on 'security' emphasized that a leader should be prepared for calamities even during peaceful times (Nojonen 2008: 70–71, 230–231).

When we examine a historical, conceptual translation in China, it is important to realize the connotative differences between the term translation itself in English and Chinese.[4] In English, translation has etymological roots in Latin, where movement and transformation are prevalent connotations: translation can be, 1) a process of translating words from one language to another, 2) the conversion of one medium into another and, 3) the process of moving something from one place to another. In Chinese, however, translation is not about movement but about turning or flipping something over, just as in non-European languages like Finnish and Turkish. If a term or notion is translated, the sense is not about movement from one place to another but about turning something into something else or discovering another side of something.

There appears to be some sensitivity to how notions are translated from Chinese into English in the PRC. The notion of propaganda (宣传, *xuānchuán*) is a good example here. In China, propaganda does not have the negative connotations that are attached to it in Europe or North America. Indeed, the CCP still has a Propaganda Department. What is interesting, though, is that although the name of the department has not changed in Chinese (中共中央宣传部, *zhōnggòng zhōngyāng xuānchuán bù*), it has been translated into English as the Publicity Department since the 2000s (Tao 2007).

In light of this, the turn towards national security in the contemporary PRC is a different issue than translation into English for the benefit of foreign audiences. Indeed, the translation of counter-revolution first into state (1990s), and then national security (2010s) seems to suggest a more profound change in thinking. Although *ānquán* can be translated into English as 'safety' and 'security,' *ānquán* is the concept that is used in the PRC when national security is discussed (by using the abstract concept). For example, the Ministry for State Security is *guojiā ānquánbu* (国家安全部), whereas the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (i.e., the police) is called gōng'ānbù (公安部). In turn, the NSC is *zhōngyāng guójiā ānquán wěiyuánhuì* (中央国家安全委员会). In the context of national security, the characteristic attribute of security is the lack of peril (没有危险, *meiyǒu wēixiǎn*), even though *ānquán* has several uses in other contexts (刘跃进 2004: 43–45). As such, national security (国家安全, *guojiā ānquán*) is a concept that came into being only after other 'modern' concepts were introduced to China, for example, the 'nation-state.'

The use of *ānquán* may also become more comprehensible by having a view of a broader semantic network of related sayings and notions. For example, the saying 'safety first,' *ānquán dìyī* (安全第), has been quite prevalent in industrial workplaces. Signs that tell people to be mindful of safety, *zhùyì ānquán* (注意安

全) are still widely used. Some English words that do not use security but still connect to safety can have *ānquán* in their Chinese equivalent, like a hardhat (安全帽, *ānquán mào*) or a seatbelt (安全带, *ānquán dài*). While *ānquan* is used in notions that are about security, for example, in the case of the 'security situation,' *ānquán xíngshì* (安全形势), some words that have security in them in English do not use *ānquán*, like social security *shèhuì bǎozhàng* (社会保障, social/societal guarantee). Finally, words that concern national security do not necessarily use *ānquán*. For example, national defence is *guófáng* (国防), and a defence guarantee is *guojiā bǎofáng* (国家保防).

National security can be included in the 'asymmetric political concepts' (Koselleck 2004) that legitimize the use of force against those it targets (Vuori 2011c). Names and labels that we give to ourselves and others matter a great deal as they articulate people's relationships with others (Koselleck 2004: 155–157). The use of such master signifiers is an example of how 'asymmetric' classifications have been used in Chinese politics. For example, concepts like an 'erroneous line' of thought, action, or both exclude certain groups from the core of the Party and, thus, create unity within it. This serves the purpose of 'political and social singularisation' (Koselleck 2004: 156). For instance, labels, such as 'reactionaries,' 'class enemies,' 'bad elements,' 'splittists,' 'extremists,' and 'imperialists' have carried a national security connotation in the PRC, some domestically and others internationally. Counter-revolution has also been synonymous with national security (see Chapter 6) and institutionally securitized; for instance, security implications have followed 'automatically' from the term's authoritative use (Vuori 2011b). While such labels represent 20th-century security rationales *sans* the term, we have to look further back in history to find the entry of security into the Chinese political lexicon.

The Neologism of Safety or Security

The composite word of *ānquán* cannot be found in any historical Chinese materials published before 1915, nor has its etymology been seriously probed despite its highly frequent use in everyday life in the 20th century. As with many other European notions, security's entry into China happened via Japan. Indeed, Japanese has the same character for security that was transliterated as *anzen* (安全).[5] During the Meiji Restoration, Japanese scholars systematically adopted and absorbed European knowledge in many disciplines. They selected two kanjis from Confucius' *Book of Filial Piety* to form the neologism of *anzen*, as they introduced European ideas of safety and security to Japan (Uchida 1917). Rather than the contemporary understanding of security, the idea of safety was what initially fascinated Chinese scholars. China's defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1895 prompted Liao Qichao and his like-minded scholars to view Japan as a model for progress. They played a distinctive role in shaping the lexicons of modern Chinese when they borrowed hundreds of neologisms from Japanese that shared the same characters with Chinese in a

hastened attempt to enrich their knowledge of European philosophy, science, and technology (Chen 2019).

Japan suffered a shortage of skilled labour due to industrial accidents in the late 19th century. In response, Japanese entrepreneurs developed a catalogue of useful preventative measures, some of which are still implemented today (Gamo 1925: 11–12). Indeed, the regime of safe manufacturing, which contributed to Japan's speedy modernization that aimed to minimize the risk of accidents and maximize labour productivity, interested Chinese scholars and entrepreneurs alike. As a result, the word '*anzen*' was swiftly re-translated into Chinese in 1915 to denote objects with functions of ensuring safety, such as the Davy lamp for miners (Lu 1915). Later it was used to denote activities that needed care and precaution (Shu 1936). Eventually, it was celebrated as an industrial principle when reform-minded Chinese entrepreneurs in Shanghai inaugurated a Chinese version of the Japanese Association of Safety First (Sun 2020).

In 1919, Chinese commentators borrowed *anzen* again in the wake of Japanese diplomats' version of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the Covenant of the League of Nations in their reports on the Paris Peace Conference (Wu 1922). At that time, the term security was deemed synonymous with peace in the various post-WWI settlements (Carr 1946). It was this politically charged understanding of security that sowed the seeds for its successive conceptual developments. In the 1920s, though, *ānquán* had not yet developed into a political concept at any societal level that would be recognizable to International Relations (IR) scholars of the 21st century. It remained a descriptive label in the Chinese vernacular, normally associated with the industrial sector. As such, security did not have a particular political performative force in China.

In republican China, it was only in the 1930s that *ānquán* really made its debut in political parlance. In the context of a mutiny against Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) by the warlord Chen Jitang in 1936 (Xiao & Chen 2006), nationalists across China presented the mutiny as a moment of existential crisis for the newfound Chinese nation. They called for unity against the Japanese, who were seen as the force behind the mutiny. Nationalist delegates made direct reference to *ānquán* for the first time in the Declaration of the Second Plenary of the Guomindang's (Nationalist Party, Kuomintang/Guomindang (KMT)) Fifth Committee: they urged all Chinese warlords to trust and rally around the central government against a foreign enemy's tactic of 'divide and rule' (Central Regiment of Cadets 1939).

Here, security entered China's political discourse in response to an urgent need, namely, the defence of national unity. Nevertheless, it remained a descriptive label even though the survival of the Chinese nation was at stake. Soon after, when Britain and France declared war on Hitler's Germany in 1939, Chiang anticipated 'a great war of all against all.' He subsequently proposed a system of 'collective security' in the Declaration of the Sixth Plenary of the KMT's Fifth Committee in November 1939 (Central Regiment of Cadets

1939). The same proposal was made 2 years later by Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter. It was no surprise then that Chiang Kai-shek was involved in the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and won a permanent seat for China at the Security Council in 1945 (Meisler 2011). Accordingly, security became part of the international political lexicon in the Republic of China that escaped to the island of Formosa as the communists won the civil war on the mainland in 1949. This retreat also marked a break in the conceptual development of *ānquán* with the radically different political parlance of the PRC.

As previously noted, security means different things to different societies, as the core fears of any group or nation are unique and relate to vulnerabilities and historical experiences (Wæver 1989b: 301). Nevertheless, even though notions of security are historically contingent, security has often been taken as something good, as being or feeling safe from harm or danger. Security is particularly positively value-loaded in its everyday meaning in many contexts. This positive connotation is reflected in the origins of the word 'security' in the English language, which is derived from the Roman word '*securus*,' where '*se*' means 'without' and '*cura*' means 'worry,' 'care,' 'concern,' or 'anxiety' (Chilton 1996; Wæver 2008a). *Securitas* is the Roman version of the Greek *ataraksia* (ἀταραξία, impassiveness, calmness), which also begins with a negation; without its negation, *tarasso* (ταράσσω) meant 'to stir, trouble the mind, agitate, disturb' (Arends 2008: 264). Arends (2008: 264–265), however, argues that instead of *ataraksia*, the most important Greek root of security is *asphaleia* (ἀσφάλεια, steadfastness, stability, assurance from danger, personal safety) that was widely used in Homer and by Thucydides, and transported to English political philosophy by Thomas Hobbes who translated Thucydides.

There are two principal avenues to interpret *securus* (Mesjasz 2008: 46): in the first, the term is understood as being a state of being secure or of being free from danger, while in the other, the term is understood as being without unease or cares or worries. Both aspects have been emphasized differently in European history (for 14 developmental steps in conceptual history from 200 BC until today, see Wæver 2012b). Indeed, during its conceptual development, security has shifted on the axis of objectivity and subjectivity several times. Cicero viewed security as an absence of distress, upon which happy life depends (Cicero 1971: V. 14, 42, 466–467); for him, security was a negation, the absence of worry. From Cicero's perspective, the contemporary concept of insecurity might seem a meaningless double negative (Wæver 2004; 2008a), while the politicians and scholars of today are so concerned with it. Cicero would certainly disagree with the current dominant understanding of security as something objective, of which one can have correct or illusory subjective perceptions. Indeed, the contemporary concept of security is viewed as a quality we either have or do not have. Security is like a measurable mass, or a 'container' with an inside (which is safe, but where there has to be surveillance of the enemy within) and an outside (which is dangerous and has to be guarded against) (Chilton 1996).

As is the case in China, 'security' has not had a fixed meaning in Europe either (Stritzel & Vuori 2016), and the problems of translation are evident there as well. While an exact match for the word security may be absent from various languages and societies, there seem to be concerns that deal with the same problem as 'security.' In East Asia, while there was no shared concept for 'security' in the pre-20th century, the concept of 'disorder' (in Chinese, 乱, *luàn*) could function as an antonym for security (Radtke 2008: 204). The idea of such disorder or *luàn* is reminiscent of the Roman concept of a tumult. A tumult could be the result of either external or internal disorder (*tumultus* has the same root as tumour, which means 'swelling' or fermentation) (Agamben 2005: 42). Indeed, many East Asian societies and political orders have been concerned with issues of 'stability and unity.' Just as in contemporary Europe, where politicians may claim to serve the interests of security, many East Asian leaders have legitimized their activities with the prevention of 'disorder.' Indeed, a 'security rationale' may be manifest somewhere without the use of the word 'security' as such.

Institutionalized Security Signifiers in China

Politicians can proclaim to be maintaining 'security,' which is favourable compared with insecurity or outright chaos. Edelman (1972: 9) noted that governments that force unwelcome changes in their subjects' behaviour have the greatest need for reassuring symbols. Security as 'stability and unity' has been especially potent in China, where 'chaos' or 'turmoil' has been a recurrent fear throughout different eras of politics (Pye 1992: 12–16; Buzan & Wæver 2003: 140, 152), and has led to an overwhelming emphasis on ideological consensus. Indeed, the restoration of harmony (和谐, *héxié*) was of major importance in Confucian philosophy. In imperial China, many rituals and doctrines that dissented from the Confucian cosmological order became targets of government suppression; religious sectarian groups, beliefs, and rituals that the authorities deemed heterodox were a major governmental concern (Shek 1990: 87; Wasserstrom 2003: 263). Accordingly, China has experienced an impressive number of quasi-religious popular uprisings. In the 18th and 19th centuries, almost every popular uprising was in some way related to religious movements (Yang 1961). In addition to causing unrest and civil strife, these religiously justified uprisings questioned the cosmological order the imperial system was based on and, thereby, the whole political system of rule.

The contemporary use of 'stability maintenance' (维稳, *wéiwěn*) as local security practice since the late 1990s can be viewed as a continuation of this tradition. This has included the deployment of an extensive technological apparatus that has evolved from the use of security cameras to the use of big data analytics in geographically determined zones. These are used to respond to social unrest to maintain stability through concessions or repression (Wang & Minzer 2015: 340). Indeed, it has been targeted at sectarian unrest in Xinjiang (see Chapter 6).

For an issue to be securitized or to follow the logic of security, the word 'security' itself does not necessarily have to be used. Certain words or concepts (e.g., terrorism) automatically allude to the logic of danger, vulnerability, and fear; therefore, the necessity to combat them does not need to be argued every time. The use of such watchwords, or institutionalized securitization, as Buzan et al. (1998: 27–29) termed the phenomenon, reduces the need for elaborate arguments on the securityness of specific cases. Indeed, the continuous use of watchwords (e.g., 'counter-revolution,' 'socialism,' or 'terrorism') can be seen as an indicator of a successfully institutionalized securitization.

Indeed, while Mao's China is replete with security logic and practices, the notion of security was not used to characterize or legitimize them. The Chinese communists declared the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, having dislodged the main forces of the KMT from Mainland China. Mao's administration did use *ānquán* in the Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact of 1950, in the PRC's Constitution from 1953, and in the Conscription Act of 1954. Beyond such treaty and administrative uses, though, the term was not prevalent in Mao's China. Mao Zedong was probably one of the most documented political leaders in human history. His discursive collections boast over 20 million Chinese characters of materials (*The Youth Daily* 2013). Strikingly, this vast corpus only contains less than 70 uses of *ānquán* on formal occasions. These refer to safety or collective security arrangements abroad, such as the UN or the United States (U.S.)–Japan Security Alliance. In personal use, Mao never attributed any political significance to the term.

Rather than embracing security, Mao expressed suspicion and disdain towards the very idea that was being increasingly used by U.S. politicians since the 1950s. Poignantly, he called on his revolutionaries to wage a campaign in 1953 against the culture of 'Safety First' that was presented as having an imperialist root in the U.S. (Sun 2020). The only occasion where Mao made remarks on security was in 1965 when Mao's trusted U.S. journalist Edgar Snow tried to provoke him into answering a controversial question in an interview:

Snow: Is the current emphasis on indoctrination of students with revolutionary principles and manual labour practice intended primarily to safeguard the future of socialism inside China or to teach Chinese youth that security can never be guaranteed until socialism is victorious everywhere? Or are both aims inseparable?

Mao: [What] nation could really be said to have security? All the governments were talking about it and at the same time talking about complete and total disarmament. China herself had proposed general disarmament since a long time past. So had the Soviet Union. The U.S. kept talking about it. What we were getting instead was complete rearmament.

(Snow 1965)

Even here, Mao avoided answering Snow's question by pushing the notion of security into the international. This tendency can be made understandable

by delving into the irreconcilable contradiction between revolution and security. In the years between both world wars, Britain and France imbued the concept of security with conservative attributes, reflecting their desire for peace and the status quo (Wæver 2008a: 102). In contrast, a revolution is a collective act to fundamentally destabilize a political order. For several decades, Mao advocated 'continuous revolution' and mobilized millions of his followers into waves of 'mass campaigns' against a broad spectrum of perceived threats to the party (Vuori 2011b). The term counter-revolutionary, which was first used by Sun Yat-sen to describe feudalists in his KMT in the 1920s, was appropriated by the CCP with reference to class enemies.

Having been marginalized in the CCP's leadership in the late 1950s, Mao adopted a radical stance on communist ideology (Barnouin & Yu 1993: vii-viii, 2). He and his supporters always emphasized that counter-revolutionaries, many of whom were possibly inspired by the Soviet leader Khrushchev, were hiding among the party leadership and plotting to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat, thereby endangering the fruits of revolution and putting the CCP at risk. Millions of people, from the highest echelons of the CCP down to village communes, were arbitrarily labelled as counter-revolutionaries based on mere suspicion, and many were subsequently executed without a trial (Vuori 2011b). The sense of terror and paranoia in the PRC reached a climax during the Cultural Revolution when factions violently campaigned against each other on who abided by Mao's thoughts most ardently. Even the security apparatuses, like the police and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), joined the fray. Class war was fought on the streets. By the time Mao's greatest disciple Lin Biao fled, the PRC was again on the brink of a civil war (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008).

Mao's continuous revolution and the Leninist theory of the state that applied to his thinking would eventually lead to the withering away of the state once all contradictions had been resolved in China (Vuori 2014). Governments seem to prefer to operate under the cloak of legality so that, as an alternative to the suspension of law, violent actions of state apparatuses conducted under 'emergency conditions' are legalized on the grounds of necessity and in the name of security (Neocleous 2007: 14). Indeed, it would appear that even in political orders where the state is ideologically legitimized as an exception before it 'withers away' (Lenin 2004: 13–18), the adherence to laws, decrees, and other norms remains necessary when legitimizing the use of force once the initial stage of the revolution has been accomplished. After this point, the use of force may be read as a sign of weakness.

In the PRC, the Party is inside and outside the legal order through its prerogative power. Indeed, in socialist revolutionary states, the referent object tends to be the revolution rather than the state, which is to wither away (Holbaard & Pedersen 2012). At times, Mao even gave special powers to the people rather than the state. For example, during the Cultural Revolution, Mao effectively closed down the Communist Party as he mobilized the Red Guards to 'bombard the headquarters' (Mao 1974b; 1966). Mao seemed to want the continual renewal of the *nomos*, for instance, the pure immediacy of

rule unmediated by law, rather than subject to the settling down of the state (Vuori 2014). This was what his doctrine of continuous revolution was about. The continuation of the revolution was what was to be guaranteed, as the main threats in Mao's rationale were pre-eminently counter-revolution and the counter-revolutionaries committing it.

Mao was cultivating chaos at the expense of order and stability, an act that constituted a revolution against the notion of security or stability in the Chinese tradition. From such a viewpoint, it makes sense to see security as an ideological weapon for the hidden counter-revolutionaries in the party leadership to hijack the people's revolution with the hope of a peaceful transition to bourgeois dictatorship. Indeed, his continuous proletarian revolution required constant destruction of the stability that had always privileged the bourgeois class. Revolution was a referent object of the PRC's state security, the polar opposite of the idea of stability and order, as contemporary observers would claim. Logically, the notion of security was a threat to Mao's continuous revolution and, therefore, a threat to the existence of the PRC as a dictatorship of the proletariat. The survival of the revolution depended on the negation of security discourse in a mutually constitutive formation. This thinking, inspired by revolutionary principles, would later shape the PRC's conceptual development of security for the next 50 years.

Still, despite the distaste for stability, the overall logic of 'national security' – that of threats, enemies, and exceptions – as we came to know it in the 20th century was quite evident in Mao's thinking. This logic can even be found in the opening words of his Selected Works: 'Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution' (Mao 1926). Institutionally, after the revolution had been realized, Mao needed a strong, effective, and loyal apparatus when using force to purge Mainland China from all sorts of counter-revolutionaries, even after the civil war was effectively won. Although the PLA could deal with insurgencies, it was not equipped to police. While the Soviet Union was considered a model to follow, Mao anticipated the risk of secret police running a state within a state since he argued that the CCP should control both the gun and the police. As a result, the MPS (公安部, *gōng'ān bù*) was established to police the PRC under the supervision of the CCP's Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC), which also controlled the court system, labour camps, prisons, and fire brigades (Lieberthal 2004: 224; Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 63). The PRC only had a proper legal system from the 1970s. This made the CCP's internal disciplinary systems crucial. Each administrative layer across the PRC's vast territory had the same institutional structure.

Although these torturous and protracted revolutionary campaigns were certainly driven by security imperatives, and Mao's form of securitization wielded the ultimate power in the PRC (Vuori 2011b), an official concept of security had not developed in the PRC's political discourse in this period, despite security's conceptual development gaining momentum in the West and elsewhere. As such, *ānquán* did not wield particular political performative power,

as counter-revolution was used to perform what security speech tended to do internationally (Vuori 2011b).

After Deng Xiaoping gained supremacy in the power struggles following Mao Zedong's death in 1976, there has been a gradual shift away from counter-revolutionary threats to those that 'jeopardize national security.' This has been a part of an overall normalization of the PRC in most arenas of politics, like nuclear weapon policy (see Chapter 4). Regarding security, Premier Zhao Ziyang was the first to make direct reference to the idea of state security in the political discourse of the PRC in his Annual Governmental Report in 1983 (Liu 2014: 118; Ghiselli 2021: 20). Still, the pursuit of the idea at the time was limited to diplomacy and defence.

Deng mobilized the discourse of security for the first time when he transformed the Central Investigation Department (中央调查部, *zhōngyāng diàochá bù*) into the Ministry of State Security (国家安全部, *guójiā ānquán bù*) in 1983 (Eftimiades 1993). Deng's disciples in the CCP's Central Party Academy continued to develop his ideas about security into a proper political concept in the early 1990s. This conceptual development entailed political guiding principles as well as referent objects. Essentially, this marked the birth of a new concept of security within the politics of the PRC.

In a nutshell, Deng (1993a) stipulated the basics of the PRC's security thinking: 1) sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRC are indivisible and non-negotiable under any circumstance, 2) stability, upon which the success of the Reforms and Opening Policy depends, stands above everything and requires the rule of the CCP to bring about, 3) only economic development can offer the basis for stability, as support for the socialist regime grows with people's wealth, 4) the PRC must strive against hegemonic order to maintain peace among nations, as the country needs 50–70 years of peace to reach its developmental goals, 5) the PLA must serve economic development, and 6) in the age of Reform and Opening, the socialist proletariat must guard socialism against liberal capitalists and their peaceful subversion.

Deng (1995a: 174) had operationalized the core values of the CCP's political order that the basics of security were safeguarding when he promulgated the 'Four Cardinal Principles' (四项基本原则, sì xiàng jīběn yuánzé) in 1979. These principles could not be violated, while almost any other principle of the Party was sacrificeable for economic growth. They consisted of four phrases or slogans: 1) keeping to the socialist road, 2) upholding the 'people's democratic dictatorship,' 3) leadership by the Communist Party, and 4) Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong thought. These principles concur with the features of a totalitarian order, and they have been consistently referred to whenever the authorities have framed certain issues as a political threat to the PRC; they have been a consistent referent of political security in the post-Mao era (Vuori 2011b) and were still present in Xi's report to the Party Congress in 2022 (Xi 2022a).

Through the list of security goals, Deng reintroduced the concern with stability that had been a cornerstone of China's security logic for centuries.

However, his use of the label of security was primarily limited to the realms of defence and diplomacy, as if security was only relevant in discussions about the imperialist West. Even his Ministry of State Security targeted foreign threats as a counter-intelligence agency and relied on the police to carry out arrests. Mao's securitization of peaceful subversion was reflected in Deng's views as well. Deng was a pioneer in the development of a new concept of security when attempting to shift the focus from revolution to stability as part of his drive for modernization. Accordingly, the development of national security is intimately intertwined with the modernization and normalization drive and with the establishment of the PRC as a state rather than a continuous revolution.

A major law reform in the 1980s limited the applicability of counter-revolutionary crimes and restricted capital punishment for crimes committed 'under particularly odious circumstances' or for those that caused 'particularly serious danger' to the state (Baum 1995: 84). The connection of counter-revolution and national security became explicit, and to a legislative end with the 1997 reformulation of the former 'counter-revolutionary' penal code, originally adopted in 1951, that now refers to crimes of 'jeopardizing national security' (He 2001: 121; Dutton 2005: 271). In the original penal code, counter-revolutionary crimes, such as counter-revolutionary rumour mongering or counter-revolutionary murder, were defined as acts to overthrow the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system or otherwise jeopardizing the country. This represented a drastic reduction in the performative power of counter-revolution and an increase of the power of security speech in its stead: contemporary crimes that 'jeopardize national security' have retained the same maximum penalty of death. The new vocabulary was applied first in the context of the 'strike hard' campaigns against 'separatists' in Xinjiang in the latter half of the 1990s (Jackson 2006; see Chapter 6) and on a national level in the anti-Falungong campaign starting from 1999 (Vuori 2014).

Chinese Security Concerns

Beyond institutionalized security or the various watchwords for it, 'Chinese security' can be examined as a historical narrative. Such a narrative demonstrates the persistence of certain preoccupations that stem from 'Chinese experiences' and the effect of general developments in the PRC's international environment. As the present volume shows, this narrative is closely connected to the macrosecuritization discourses (Buzan & Wæver 2009) of the latter half of the 20th century.

One of the founding speeches of the PRC forms an appropriate point to begin an introduction of its national security concerns. In it, Mao (1949a) listed the main 'security goods' the Communist Party, and the People's Republic (PR) should strive for: he was concerned with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the newly founded state. China would rise from its century of shame under the foreign domination of imperialists. To achieve this, he

aligned the PR with the Soviet Union and the 'New Democracies' to secure the homeland and in accordance with the emerged global pattern of the Cold War (see Chapter 3). Politically, the 'people's democratic dictatorship' had been the means to achieve the PR, which was to be maintained.

The 'concept' of security during the entire PR era has consistently relied on this set of basic considerations introduced by Mao; that is, the basic fears and vulnerabilities of the PRC have remained fairly constant (Ong 2007; Deng 1998; 2008). Although the official security concept has undergone changes in its content and implications for policy, it has retained a preoccupation with sovereignty, territorial integrity, maintenance of the political order, and a realpolitik stance in foreign affairs. Although the PRC's security discourse is influenced by different perspectives, official security viewpoints are dominant (Liu 2012: 73). The threat of a major war subsided in its national security analysis by the mid-1980s. Still, official security documents and statements started to reflect broader understandings of security beyond the military and political sectors only in the 1990s.

In the context of the general discursive stability of security preoccupations in the PRC, the communist era can be divided into a number of periods or stages. The Cold War era can be divided into four phases: the pro-Soviet period (1949–1957), opposition to both superpowers (1958–1970), the united front of counter-hegemony (1971–1981), and the non-aligned security stance (1982–1991) (Wu 2001). The PRC's foreign policy in the same period is usually divided into three periods: alignment with the Soviet Union (1949–1960), revolutionary self-reliance and confrontation with both superpowers (1961–1972), and participation as a swing player in the strategic triangle (1972–1989) (Nathan & Ross 1997: xiii). The post-Cold War period's foreign policy has emphasized the drive for a multipolar world (1992–), with an emphasis on a new concept of security (1992–2001), the idea of a harmonious world (2001–2012) (Liu 2012: 80–86), and the community of a shared destiny for humankind (2012–).

Ideological rectification campaigns have had less frequency and intensity in post-Mao China. Yet, with the absence of grand and salient external challenges since the mid-1980s, domestic stability has become the main 'security good' pursued by the contemporary CCP (Swaine 2004). This has become even more pronounced with the emphasis on stability maintenance. Concomitantly, the contemporary CCP confronts more threats than the state in the PRC, as the security of the CCP and political security of the state (i.e., existence of the political system in China as the PRC) are intertwined (Wayne 2008: 65). This partly explains why threats to the CCP have also been presented as threats to the PRC and to the stability and unity of society: the greater the threat, the greater the 'prize,' be it measured in terms of legitimacy or social control. The leaders after Mao have emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the PRC's international environment, too; Xi Jinping has been the first since Mao to begin a more assertive stance in its foreign and security policy (Mattlin et al. 2022).

Despite the contemporary tensions in the PRC's relationships with the U.S. and its allies, since at least the mid-1980s, internal threats have been an overbearing concern. The preoccupation with domestic stability is also evident in the PRC's position on a 'multipolar world' in the post-Cold War era (see Chapter 3). In this period of foreign policy, ideological differences have been considered less important and national interests, especially of the economic kind, became central. All in all, while non-traditional security (NTS) issues are today seen as intertwined (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023a) (MoFA), the longer-term shift in focus has been away from the military–political sector and towards economic security. Indeed, political realists in the 1990s tended to emphasize economic and technological development over pure military force in the PRC (Deng 1998: 314–315). Economic security is understood as measures to ensure the country's economic stability and sustained development and, therefore, to guarantee its 'comprehensive national strength' (综合国力, *zōnghé guólì*), which is taken to be the measure for success in interstate competition. Economic security is relevant for the national economy and entails societal and individual safety. However, economists in the PRC tend to insist that economic issues have security implications only when they affect the security of society, national sovereignty, and military or diplomatic capabilities (Wu 2001: 279).

Transitioning from Comprehensive to Holistic Security

In the post-Cold War period, the PRC emphasized that it was working under a 'new concept of security' that was introduced in the initiation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (then the Shanghai Five) in 1996 (Deng 2008). The new concept was a departure from previous notions in that what the PRC pursues is, to a large extent, the security of its 'sustained development,' or its 'comprehensive national strength' on a range of battlegrounds (inter alia in military, political, economic, and technological areas). Indeed, things like environmental disasters were included among 'increasingly prominent' issues in China's national defence white paper for 2008 (SCIO 2009a), and climate change was included in a list of 'security threats posed by … global challenges' for the first time in 2010: 'Security threats posed by such global challenges as terrorism, economic insecurity, climate change, nuclear proliferation, insecurity of information, natural disasters, public health concerns, and transnational crime are on the rise' (SCIO 2011a).

Jiang Zemin was interested in the U.S. National Security Council and moved towards establishing the same organ in Beijing after his U.S. tour 1997 (Pao 2013). He was not successful in establishing one in the PRC, however. Still, the Foreign Affairs Supervisory Team on Foreign Affairs was renamed National Security Supervisory Team (Meng 2013: 6). Jiang made another attempt to establish a National Security Council for China when preparing for the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002 (Chu 2013). This move was unsuccessful as well.

Irrespective of his failure to form a National Security Council in China, Jiang succeeded in transforming the PRC into a post-revolutionary state through extensive legal reforms. Under his leadership, the CCP largely abandoned Maoist politics and even incorporated the old enemy, capitalists, into the core of the party (Jiang 2002). Deng Xiaoping's post-Mao analysis of the Chinese society and state had already suggested that the PRC operated in a 'normative interregnum' (cf., Huysmans 2006b: 14) where the pre-PRC order was no longer valid. However, the communist order had not been born; for Deng, the state could not wither away until the PRC could move on from the 'primary stage of socialism,' which he said would take 'a hundred years' or 'a very long time.' At this primary stage, more freedoms were allowed even under the rule of the CCP. At the same time, there was a move away from counter-revolution as the pre-eminent threat, even in the use of language and institutions like laws and security agencies. The party-state had settled into a diagram of power of longer duration; it had become post-revolutionary or post-totalitarian (Vuori 2014).

Indeed, in the official discourse, the CCP was no longer a 'revolutionary Party' (革命党, *gemingdǎng*) but a 'ruling Party' (执政党, *zhizhengdǎng*) (Ying 2006: 349–350). This represented a transition from Mao's constant renewal of the *nomos* (constituting power), in terms of exceptional politics, to settling the state down and ruling it through law (constituted power) (cf., Agamben 1998: 41–42). The removal of this ideological burden opened a wide array of possibilities for security discourse to enter the PRC's political landscape. The PRC continued to become more constituted in the form of its legal system becoming more extensive and predictable; the CCP still retained its potential of prerogative. With this overall political development, security thinking too was allowed to become more comprehensive than just being about international affairs and territorial sovereignty in conceptual terms. It also allowed the PRC to be more pronounced in international discourses of security. Dissidents in Xinjiang and practitioners of Falungong had already felt the new brunt of the performative power of national security speech. The war on terror in the 2000s continued this trend bringing terrorism into defence policy white papers, too (Wayne 2008; see Chapter 6).

Jiang's successor Hu Jintao seemed far more successful in championing a Chinese understanding of security in the international arena. At numerous leadership summits, he advocated for joint and comprehensive actions to advance mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and collaboration against common threats that were increasingly global and diverse, such as terrorism and climate change (Liu 2014: 123). His view on international security, which was officially endorsed and theorized as the so-called 'New Security Doctrine' in 2002, reflected Deng's principle of international solidarity against hegemonism. Throughout his rule, Hu kept security as largely an international matter. Unlike his reformist predecessor, he did not attempt to legislate or institute the field of national security (Ji 2016).

For Hu, sustained development was seen as a guarantee, or even a necessity, for the other national security objectives of a more traditional type. The Scientific Outlook on Development, which was one of the major policy dictums of the Hu-Wen administration, presented 'comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development as its basic requirement' (Hu 2007; Kopra 2016b: 118). While Chinese leaders have included the rhetoric of sustainable development in such policy lines (see Chapter 7), notably, sustained development has still taken priority over sustainable development. This was explicitly stated by Premier Li Peng (1995): 'rationally develop and utilize resources and protect the ecological environment to achieve a coordinated and sustainable economic and social development.' Still, environmental concerns were rising in Chinese politics (see Chapter 5).

In contemporary political thought in the PRC, this kind of sustained development required opening up and interactions with the outside world, which brought more attention to the interrelationships between internal and external threats. This security concept reflected an increased awareness of the risks of accommodation to international regimes. The increased interaction and dependence on foreign influence in Chinese society and the economy have blurred the boundaries of the PRC's 'interests.' As a result, it became more supportive of multilateral approaches in international security activities. Taking part in multilateral fora reduces the likelihood that these organizations could be used 'against' the PRC (Johnston 2003).

Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has projected his charisma through sweeping reforms across all areas of politics. Having described the PRC's security apparatus as 'no longer fit for purpose' after a number of violent incidents in China and abroad (see Chapter 6), Xi announced his decision to strengthen the leadership in the governance of security at the Third Plenary of the CCP's Eighteenth Committee in 2013. This kick-started the PRC's first institutional, conceptual, and legal reforms in security governance (*People's Daily* 2013).

A vehicular attack at Tiananmen Gate in Beijing in 2013 (see Chapter 6) was pivotal in giving impetus to Xi to accomplish what Jiang had attempted after his visit to the U.S. National Security Agency. On 24 January 2014, Xi inaugurated the CCP's NSC, which would serve as a permanent platform for top leaders to deliberate policies, make decisions, and coordinate inter-ministerial collaborations in the area of security on a national level, especially in response to emergencies (Meng 2014: 131–133; Ji 2016).

The NSC proved effective in bridging the military–civilian divisions in Xi's military reform. As a forum, it has enabled top military commanders, police chiefs, border guards, custom officials, judges, diplomats, and a host of other officials to formulate joint responses to issues of security (*Xinhua* 2017). More importantly, they are now held responsible for their part of the implementation process by the NSC under the supervision of the CCP's Politburo. The establishment of the commission reflects the institutionalization of national security within the PRC's security bureaucracy, therefore, making security

speech more routinized than its more exceptional implementation in specific campaigns against this or that threat. At the same time, the notion of national security has become very broad and comprehensive in official security speech.

For the Xi administration, development and security are major concerns (MoFA 2023a; see Chapter 7). For example, in his statement after the first meeting of the Central National Security Committee in 2015, Xi Jinping emphasized that 'China must pay attention to both development and security because only a prosperous country can have a strong military, which in turn can protect the country' (*Xinhua* 2014b). Sustained development is a security objective and a means for security. Indeed, according to the revised Party constitution (2017): 'The Party shall pursue a holistic approach to national security and resolutely safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and development interests.'

While configuring the PRC's new security apparatus, Xi underpinned the operations of the NSC with a guiding principle to ensure its survival in the long term, as various government agencies might return to their old ways of governing security individually once the tide of imminent threat had ebbed. In a speech to his fellow leaders in the NSC, Xi (2014b) contended that the concept of national security had evolved rapidly and substantially: 'with its essence and ramifications richer than ever, its temporal-spatial parameters are broader than ever and its internal and external factors more complex than ever.' Therefore, he called on all cadres of the CCP to 'stay vigilant in times of peace, and resilient in times of turmoil…. Strive for objectives of development, reform, and stability domestically, and promote principles of peace, collaboration, and collective benefit internationally.' Finally, he promulgated the following: 1) national security governance must take place under the CCP's firm leadership, 2) the national security apparatus must serve the people and depend on the people, and 3) traditional and non-traditional types of security are of equal importance.[6] Nevertheless, there is a structural hierarchy within the national security concept in regard to the tasks and roles set for each type of security, with national security as the 'bedrock of national rejuvenation' and 'social stability' as the 'prerequisite for building a strong and prosperous China' (Xi 2022a; see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 The Hierarchy of Security Types in Xi Jinping's Speech at the Party Congress 2022

Type of security	*Function of security*
People's security	'Ultimate goal'
Political security	'Fundamental task'
Economic security	'Our foundation'
Military, technological, cultural, and social security	'Important pillars'
International security	'A support'

Source: Xi 2022a.

When introducing his notion of holistic national security, Xi listed 11 referent objects for security: politics, military, territory, economy, society, culture, technology, information, ecology, natural resources, and nuclear capability (Government of the PRC 2014). Since 2014, Xi's long list of referent objects has been under constant review.[7] In the National Security Law of the People's Republic of China (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 2015), the referent object of information was quietly replaced by cyberspace, and three other more planetary places emerged on the list: polar regions, deep oceans, and outer space. While broadening security to new widths, he also preserved the thinking of all his predecessors in connection with their cherished referent objects and perennial threats to them. For example, Mao's concern about national survival was addressed through military security, Deng's fear of liberal capitalism was addressed through economic security, Jiang's anxiety over social stability was addressed through societal security, and Hu's insistence on technological superiority was addressed through technological security. In essence, Xi's endeavour ultimately represented a structural integration of all the concepts of security developed since 1949, even though some of them did not carry the label of security before the 1990s to preserve a distinctively Maoist rhetoric of 'Service to the People.' Therefore, it is appropriate to call Xi's holistic concept of security an Integrated Concept of National Security.

Security and Surveillance Bureaucracies

The PLA is a prime example of how the Party exercises control over the political order and Chinese society. While there is a state Central Military Affairs Commission and a Party Military Affairs Commission, the latter is dominant. The Party's control over the 'gun' was an essential aspect of Mao's political views. Accordingly, the Party and the PLA have developed a symbiotic relationship so that political loyalty to the Party has, at times, been considered vastly more important than military expertise. Red was better than expert in Mao's China. After the revolution, most leading party figures were veterans of the anti-Japanese and civil wars, which fused the Party and the military even more strongly. This symbiotic relationship is similarly evident in that the PLA has formal quotas of representatives in political organs. The PLA is the final practical guarantor of the CCP and, as such, has at times, been called in to deal with threats in a 'brute' manner. Major refusals on such occasions by the PLA would quite likely mean the collapse of the CCP or at least of the factions attempting to mobilize the PLA.

Jiang Zemin, the first Party leader in the PRC who did not have military experience, effectively followed Deng Xiaoping's line when making professionalism better than merely being 'red' in the military. Jiang worked towards separating the civilian and military aspects of governance. Despite his lack of military experience, he managed to gain control of the PLA by deploying the principle of 'reign but not rule' (Ji 2002). He also used more traditional ways of gaining influence through the continued increase in military spending,

promotion of retiring generals, favouring his supporters, and improving the conditions for regular troops.

With Hu Jintao, the policy line of professionalization continued, and he did not display a particular interest in military affairs. In contrast, Xi Jinping instigated major reforms in the military on an unprecedented scale. Accordingly, the military has been instrumental in Xi's concentration of power into his hands in the form of new central-level commissions (Hernandez & Misalucha-Willoughby 2020). The military has also been a specific focus of Xi's anti-corruption campaign, where 13,000 officers have been targeted (Zhao 2020).

It seems that even though various politicians have at times used the PLA for their machinations, which may have increased the political clout of the PLA, there does not appear to be a tradition of the PLA inserting itself into politics beyond the bureaucratic interests of the various branches of the armed forces. Still, as some of the most severe domestic crises, like the Cultural Revolution and the suppression of the student movement in 1989, have shown, the PLA has been actively called in to 'protect the motherland' against even domestic enemies. One of its main tasks is to provide strategic deterrence (战略威慑, *zhànlüè wēishè*) where nuclear weapons are the 'core capability' (Jiang 2006b: 585). In less 'exceptional' situations, the PLA is mostly tasked with protecting the PRC from foreign threats. For more everyday domestic armed situations, there is also the People's Armed Police (PAP) (武警, *wǔjǐng*) and the People's Militia. Yet, domestic security is mainly a task for the MPS (公安部, gōng'ānbù), the function of which is to plan and implement security work, 'guide investigations of cases of sabotaging stability and harming state security… and … coordinate the action against serious cases and turmoil and major public security incidences' (China.org 2013). Beyond armed and regular police forces, there are also city guards under the City Urban Administration and Law Enforcement Bureau (城管, *chéngguǎn*), private security guards (保安员, bǎo'ān yuán), and neighbourhood watch volunteers or 'red armbands' (红袖章, *hóngxiù zhāng*).

The PRC began to develop counterterrorism forces in the early 1990s. The first unit was the Shanghai Special Weapons and Tactics Force (特警部队, *tèjǐng bùduì*), which combined a special weapons and tactics force, the armed police, and military special forces (Reeves 2016: 830–831). The PAP formed a special unit for counterterrorism called the snow leopards in 2002 that is used if Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units are overwhelmed. In 2001, the MPS formed the National Counterterrorism Working and Coordinating Group that coordinated related activities of the PAP and PLA. The MPS also established a centralized bureau for counterterrorism, Bureau 27, which has been responsible for counterterrorism intelligence work and operations since 2002 (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 40–41, 65).

The Ministry of State Security (国家安全部, guójiā ānquán bù) is in charge of foreign intelligence gathering and counter-espionage (Eftimiades 1993; Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 66). Its main tasks include 'safeguarding state

security' by performing counter-espionage, working against activities that endanger 'China's state security and interests,' 'defending state security,' and 'maintaining social and political stability, guaranteeing socialist construction, publicizing and educating Chinese citizens to be loyal to the motherland, maintaining state secret, state security and interests' (China.org 2013).

The PRC decided not to adopt the Soviet system of secret police that would have become a state within a state. For Mao, the Party should control the gun and the secret police: security organs are under the control of territorial Party Committees, and the security organ one level above. The political and legal affairs *xitong* has been charged with running the court system, prosecutors, labour camps, prisons, fire departments, border guards, police in uniform and in secret, passports, and computer security (Lieberthal 2004: 224, China.org 2013). The Party's internal disciplinary systems were vital as the legal system was severely underdeveloped. On the state side of the party-state, the MPS was often charged with implementing the punishments for Maoist mass campaigns. The surveillance conducted in human and bureaucratic forms penetrated down to work and housing units.

While security organizations conduct surveillance in 'traditional' ways, online developments have resulted in the establishment of new bureaucracies. The Internet Bureau of the Party's Publicity Department (former Propaganda Department) and the Internet Propaganda Administrative Bureau of the State Council head the propaganda and media censorship effort for internet-based media (Tao 2007: 4–6). These bureaus represent both aspects of the party-state and have been assigned to survey, analyze, and report events and trends on major internet sites, state-run and commercial, to the Party Central Committee and its Politburo. These form an evolving and constantly updated body of administrative guidelines (entitled 'information advisories') and orders on allowed online content. In addition, there are special reports on major incidents as they emerge. Like the ideologically raw Reference News of the Mao period, these reports keep the leadership aware of developments, which allows quick responses when necessary.

Security Legislation

The CCP has been trying to govern the PRC through law since the end of the revolutionary era as the state has become more settled. Accordingly, Xi has strived to codify his concept of security into law to ensure that his legacy could live on after his currently unspecified reign. The media has dubbed this the 'legal great wall' that safeguards the national security of the PRC (*Xinhua* 2022). Even a brief glance at the PRC's legislative landscape in the early 2000s would have shown that there was a legal lacuna in security on the national level. Indeed, no laws governed how to deal with terrorism, no organizations for coordinating such efforts, or specialized police bureaus when implementing operations; international cooperation in counterterrorism was also non-existent (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 38).

The National Security Act, which was ratified in 1993, was largely designed for the mission of counter-espionage (*People's Daily* 2014b). There were no attempts to pass any new laws on security matters partly because many legislators viewed the penal code as sufficient. Although five laws and 28 executive charters with the label of security had been promulgated by regional authorities by 2013, they were primarily intended to assist the implementation of the National Security Act from 1993 on a regional level by regulating the use of state resources on surveillance missions (Bi 2014: 138). For example, the PRC's authorities could not prosecute any terrorists under Article 120 of the Penal Code because the crime of terrorism was not clearly defined. The PRC's legislators had been calling for a new national security act (Yin 2008: 12–19).

In November 2014, the NPC repealed the old National Security Act when ratifying the Anti-Espionage Act (*People's Daily* 2014b). This signalled a renewal of the legislative initiative in a sensitive area of policymaking. The NPC ratified the new National Security Act on 1 July 2015. It represented a milestone in the PRC's security legislation. Designed to 'guarantee national security, safeguard the socialist proletariat, protect the fundamental interests of the people,' the new National Security Act enshrined most of Xi's ideas about holistic security and emphasized the importance of food security, which was a key issue in the 1990s. It also reflects an objective understanding of security found in ancient China by defining the term as 'a state in which the sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable economic development of the PRC, as well as the welfare of the Chinese people, are not in danger, and the capabilities to preserve such state are not compromised' (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 2015).

The PRC began to deploy laws in its processes of securitization to justify the activities of its security personnel in the anti-Falungong campaign (Vuori 2014). Laws such as the National Security, Criminal, Criminal Procedure, and Counterterrorism Laws and the Regulations on Religious Affairs have been evoked when legitimizing the escalation of counterterrorism in Xinjiang (SCIO 2019). Indeed, judicial institutions in Xinjiang have had a significant role in the campaigns against the three forces of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 69).

Article eight of the 1994 National Security Law's bylaws for implementation was the first attempt at a legal definition of terrorism in the PRC, which was followed by the 1997 Criminal Law that separated terrorism from terrorist crime as it was defined previously (Reeves 2016: 831; Rodriguez-Merino 2019: 31). There were further moves towards forming an anti-terror law in 2001 and 2011 (Reeves 2016: 832), yet the problem that confronted prosecutors in not being able to charge terrorism as a crime was resolved when the NPC ratified the Counter-Terrorism Act in 2015 that also provided a definition that counted as terrorism (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 38–39). The international criticism of the law focused on how the definition included 'advocacy' in its definition: 'advocacy or behaviour (主张和行为, *zhǔzhāng hé xíngwéi*) which is aimed at realizing political or ideological objectives through means of

violence, destruction, intimidation, or other methods or creating social panic, endangering public safety, violating persons or infringing property, or coercing state organs or international organizations' (National People's Congress 2015). This meant that almost any form of contestation could be included as advocacy of terrorism.

As political activism beyond the remit of the Party is considered a threat to its prerogative of rule, the media and online communication are controlled, surveilled, and censored (Vuori & Paltemaa 2015; Paltemaa et al. 2020). The government announced in its White Paper on the Internet that it pursues the establishment of a 'healthy and harmonious Internet environment' (SCIO 2012: 229) and that censorship is conducted to 'curb dissemination of illegal information online.' Such illegal dissemination falls into the following categories:

> [information] being against the cardinal principles set forth in the Constitution, endangering state security, divulging state secrets, subverting state power and jeopardizing national unification, damaging state honour and interests, instigating ethnic hatred or discrimination, and jeopardizing ethnic unity; jeopardizing state religious policy, propagating heretical or superstitious ideas; spreading rumours, disrupting social order and stability; disseminating obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, brutality and terror or abetting crime; humiliating or slandering others, trespassing on lawful rights and interests of others.
>
> (SCIO 2012: 243–244)

Similar categories can also be found in Article 12 of the 2016 Cyber Security Law (Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People's Congress 2016) and, for example, in the 2019 '*Guidelines for the Management of Online Ecology*' by the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (2019), which also lays out instructions for positive censorship for online content providers. These include propagating Xi Jinping Thought, the Party's ideological line and important decisions by the Party Centre, as well as the 'bright points of economic and social development' (ibid.).

Epistemic Communities

While researchers do not always agree with each other, even in the PRC, they have various avenues for impacting policy as epistemic communities. Traditionally, Chinese scholars had two main tasks: to educate policymakers and to evaluate policies (He et al. 2019: 198). The influence of researchers and think tanks on policy has been seen as having increased since the period of opening up (Glasner & Saunders 2002; Liao 2006; Zhu 2012). This is perhaps the reason why contemporary research in the PRC tends to be more policy than theory-oriented (He et al. 2020: 195). Scholars of foreign and security policy are estimated to have at least four ways to influence policy: 1) being

active in an epistemic community, 2) producing intellectual products in the marketplace of ideas, 3) testing and communication of policies before they are made public, and 4) the reflection of transformation of domestic and international society relevant for foreign and domestic politics in their research (Feng and He 2019: 4). On rare occasions, scholars can even rise in politics to the Politburo Standing Committee.

Chinese scholars have indeed had an impact on the evolution of contemporary conceptualizations of security in the PRC. While the majority of security research in the PRC concerns military issues and other forms of traditional security Liu (2021), Lu (2003), Wang (2004: 32–35), Yu (2007: 30–33), and their fellow academics pioneered an alternative approach to national security in the PRC. Largely inspired by social constructivism, they advocated for non-military forms of threats to nation-states, with reference to the acute issues that had been internationally securitized since the 1990s. Their aim was to broaden and deepen the conceptual horizon of national security despite the challenges of planting European ways of thinking into the PRC. European scholars, such as Barry Buzan (Buzan et al. 1998), whose work was translated in 2002, had made significant contributions to this process. Still, Chinese academic figures realized that they needed a brand that was politically neutral. Accordingly, they adopted the term non-traditional security (非传统安全, fēi chuántǒng ānquán; NTS), originally brought to the PRC by Wang (1994: 39–44).

Built on existing grievances already reported in the media, proponents of NTS gained political relevance, which was visible in the increasing number of times the notion has been mentioned in the *People's Daily* (Liu 2021). For example, concern about the PRC's economic security in anticipation of the country's entry into the World Trade Organization gained traction among some of the CCP's top leaders, who had been guarding the socialist economy against the pernicious influence of liberal capitalism themselves. The outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 was a real game-changer. However, the subject of national security could no longer hide in the military realm when a virus was killing military personnel and civilians across the nation (Wang 2003: 25–27). Having waged a war against a microscopic virus, Hu Jintao appeared to appreciate the theoretical contributions of leading figures of NTS. Furthermore, he foresaw that NTS would play a greater role because, in a world of rapid interconnectivity, threats of a global and diverse nature that could put the PRC's national security at risk in unexpected ways required non-traditional thinking and response (Ghiselli 2021).

The ultimate endorsement for the political legitimacy of NTS came in 2006 when Hu made direct reference to the ideas of NTS in his Decision to Build a Harmonious Society in 2006 (Liu 2014: 128). Even more remarkably, this official document placed the issue of security in the section on social governance, not in the sections on defence or foreign policy as before. This indicated that applying the label of security to a domestic issue of the PR was no longer a counter-revolutionary crime. With such developments, the PRC's concept of security caught up with the international standard.

Notes

1 Parts of the chapter have been slightly modified from Vuori, Juha A. (2014): *Critical Security and Chinese Politics: The Anti-Falungong Campaign.* London: Routledge.
2 'The Four Cardinal Principles are keeping to the path of socialism, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought' (Xi 2022a).
3 While Xi's approach to security, 总体国家安全观 (*zǒngtǐ guójiā ānquán guān*) is generally translated as a 'holistic' concept of national security, as his notion brought together conceptualizations of his predecessors, it can also be considered an integrated concept of national security (as follows).
4 On the translation of security issues, see Stritzel (2014) and Berling et al. (2022).
5 The modern Japanese term for security, Anzen-hoshō (安全保障), translates as a security guarantee, or the safeguarding or ensuring of security. Similarly to the Chinese, Anzen on its own means safety or freedom from damage, while hoshō means guarantee (Okamoto & Okamoto 2008: 235).
6 This initial formulation has evolved into the 'five adheres' (五个坚持, *wǔ gè jiānchí*): 1) 'adhere to the absolute leadership of the Party,' 2) 'adhere to safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity and to maintain stability and order in frontiers, borders, and surrounding areas,' 3) 'adhere to secure development and to promote a dynamic balance between high-quality development and high-level security,' 4) 'adhere to total war, coordinating traditional security with NTS,' and 5) 'adhere to the path of peaceful development and to promote the coordination of self-security and common security' (Yuan 2022: 2–3).
7 In 2021, the national security system was characterized through the 'five coordinations' (Feng 2022: 2): 'coordinating between development and security, between opening up and security, between traditional and non-traditional security, between China's domestic security and the common security of the world, and between safeguarding national security and creating conditions conducive to it.'

3 The Cold War Then and Now[1]

The Cold War and its security constellations that formed their enmities through ideological divisions is the oldest and most paradigmatic case of contemporary macrosecuritization (Buzan & Wæver 2003; 2009). The People's Republic of China (PRC) was deeply involved in the vicissitudes of this ideological and great power contest and changed its position within the constellation several times. Indeed, the PRC was of great interest on both sides of the bipolar division and operated as a force multiplier in the contestation. With the end of the Cold War, ideological contestation was desecuritized globally. The PRC has been particularly adamant in maintaining this desecuritization actively, as its power resources have been increasing in the post-Cold War period. Avoiding a return to the 'Cold War mentality' (as follows) has been one of the slogans the PRC has used in its attempts to keep itself off the security agenda of major powers (Vuori 2018a). This means that it is vital to pay attention to securitization and desecuritization through Cold War terminology as the PRC's rise shifts the international power structure, which provides the prospect of the return of a bipolar confrontation among great powers with the PRC as a new pole. Accordingly, discussions regarding multipolarity, bipolarity, and the role given to Cold War mentality within the PRC's political discourse are important indicators to watch outside China. I will begin this examination with the PRC's entry into the Cold War.

China Enters the Cold Macrosecuritization

Overall, the Cold War is the paragon of Buzan and Wæver's concept of macrosecuritization (cf., Buzan's 2006: is the GWoT the new Cold War?). As such, the Cold War overlaid security dynamics worldwide and structured many lower-level securitizations (Buzan & Wæver 2003). Formative speeches and documents in both the Soviet Union and the United States (U.S.) after WW2 laid the foundation of the bipolar constellation between the victors of the war (e.g., Stalin 1950 [1946], Kennan 1946, and Gaddis 2005: 30–31). Despite their alliance in WW2, there could be no peace between the hostile

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camps of socialism and capitalism (Stalin 1950 [1946]), whereby 'nearly every nation' had to 'choose between alternative ways of life' (Truman 1963 [1947]: 178–179).

Eventually, the U.S. and the Soviet Union became superpowers in the bipolar global security constellation by having security interests and influence in the security dynamics of most regional security complexes worldwide (Buzan & Wæver 2003). Despite their power resources that far superseded regional and even great powers, so-called 'new Cold War history' suggests (e.g., McMahon 1994, Gaddis 2005, and Lüthi 2008) that the macrosecuritization structure of the bipolar constellation allowed smaller powers, at times, to set the agenda of the camps on both sides of the conflict: clients were able to present their patron superpower with the securitization argument that they could not afford the fall of this or that regime. President Eisenhower's (1960 [1954]: 383) influential metaphor of falling dominos captures this logic quite well: 'You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and … the last one … will go over very quickly. So, you could have … a disintegration that would have the most profound influence.' In accordance with this logic, such 'dominos' could influence those with a vested interest in the particular domino not to fall.

Although not a small power by any account, the PRC could use the macrosecuritization constellations of the Cold War to its advantage and had a major impact on them. Although it did not appear so at first, the PRC was a key player in the Cold War. Indeed, it became 'a target of influence and enmity for both' camps (Nathan & Ross 1997: 13). A key factor here was the rhetoric of world revolution, which 'dramatically enhanced the perception of the Cold War as a battle between "good" and "evil" on both sides' (Chen 2001: 3–4). In effect, the PRC became a force multiplier for the macrosecuritizations of the superpowers.

The PRC entered the Cold War in the Soviet camp to secure the 'fruits of victory,' which became crucial referents of its security discourse. While it was not self-evident, for example, in the U.S., that the PRC under Mao would inevitably follow the Soviet Union, neutrality was not an option for Mao. Indeed, the U.S. was considering the diplomatic recognition of the PRC and moving its embassy to Beijing. Still, for Mao, 'All Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.' (Mao 1991: 225–232.) He made clear to which side the PRC should lean in his speech to the first Central Committee in preparation for the declaration of the PR:

> Internationally, we must unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples, and first of all with the Soviet Union and the New Democracies, so that we shall not stand alone in our struggle to safeguard these fruits of victory and to thwart the plots of domestic and foreign enemies for restoration.
>
> (Mao 1949a)

After his meeting in Moscow 1949–1950, Mao expelled U.S. diplomats and Sino-U.S. diplomacy was carried out via intermediaries until the Nixon shock of the 1970s. The PRC's siding with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) sparked debate in the U.S. about who had 'lost' China. Indeed, as a stage for the Cold War, Asia came only second to Europe. This was also stated by Liu Shaoqi:

> The world today has been divided into two mutually antagonistic camps. […] On the one hand, the world imperialist camp, composed of American imperialists and their accomplices, the reactionaries of all countries of the world, on the other hand, the world anti-imperialist camps, composed of the Soviet Union and the New Democracies of Eastern Europe, and the national liberation movements in China, Southeast Asia. […] American imperialism has become the bastion of all reactionary forces in the world; while the Soviet Union has become the bastion of all progressive forces.
>
> (Liu Shaoqi [1948: 32])

After the victory of the Communists and the declaration of the PR in 1949 (Mao 1949b), mass campaigns like the peace signature campaign of 1950 and the promotion of peace as a propaganda term worked to justify the international political actions of the new people's republic (Forster 2020). Despite the emphasis on peace, the PRC took part in the Korean War as a very new state. The people's volunteers fought the United Nations (UN) forces changing the course of the war. The PRC's current promotion of the UN and its security council as the most important means of global security governance in the 2020s (e.g., Xi 2017a and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023a [MoFA]) is in stark relief to the waging of war against it in the 1950s.

Beyond the war that was fought by the 'volunteers,' the People's Liberation Army (PLA) focused on internal issues for the rest of the decade: it engaged remnants of the Guomindang, took Hainan Island, 'secured' Tibet, and took part in violent campaigns against 'class-enemies' (e.g., landlords), 'rightists,' and 'counter-revolutionaries.' During 1954–1955 and 1958, the PRC bombarded islands in the Taiwan Strait. Mao launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957, after first 'drawing out the snakes' with his 'Hundred Flowers Campaign.' The mass campaign in 1957 reminded the collective leadership in the 'first front' that Mao should not be counted out. During the even more encompassing 'Great Leap Forward' in 1958, the PLA was ordered to prevent people from leaving the famine-stricken areas in mainland China (Nathan & Ross 1997: 139–140).

As the previous shows, in the late 1940s, the PRC (e.g., Liu 1948 and Mao 1949a) structured the world into two opposing camps, which supports the structuring power of the early macrosecuritizations of the era. Domestic security was legitimized with ideological threats connected to the Cold War ideological division and the Soviet camp. The unity of the Communist bloc and Soviet assistance was seen as the guarantors of the PRC's international

security until the regime could be consolidated and the PRC would rise from its 'century of shame' (Callahan 2004).[2] Friendly relations with the Soviet Union did not last for very long, however.

Indeed, while macrosecuritizations can label and may dominate security discourse, these larger constructions may also be vulnerable (Buzan & Wæver 2009). The PRC's alignment in the Cold War actually demonstrates how vulnerable macrosecuritizations can be. It has even been argued that 'no other event during the Cold War contributed more to changes in perceptions of the Communist powers than did the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance' (Chen 2001: 49). For example, U.S. perceptions of Mao's China ranged from optimistic views of Mao as an Asian Tito, to the PRC being a monolithic satellite of the Soviet Union, in need of a pre-emptive nuclear attack, to finally an ally in the triangular politics of the Cold War (Christensen 1996; Scott 2007; MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008).

China Modifies Its Macrosecuritization

The PRC was not merely a passive recipient of the Cold War macrosecuritization. Rather, the PRC was active in how it modified its domestic and international security discourse and placed itself in the global constellation. Such shifts in Mao's Cold War policy lines show that higher-level securitizations do not always triumph over lower ones, be they national, international, or macro-level (e.g., Bubandt 2005). Accordingly, Buzan & Wæver (2009: 257) utilized the Sino-Soviet split as an example of the capacity of 'parochial' securitizations to become disaffected by or even be withdrawn from dominant macrosecuritizations. Indeed, newly available Cold War era documents suggest that it was the Chinese side, in effect Mao Zedong, which was more active in the pursuit of ideological conflict in the Sino-Soviet split (Lüthi 2008: 2). As such, there have been at least five lines of explanation for the soured relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union: 1) conflict of national interest, 2) the strategic triangle between the U.S., USSR, and PRC, 3) domestic politics, 4) ideology, and 5) the PRC being under threat. Yet, these are not altogether convincing in view of the new documents that are available (Lüthi 2008: 3–14). Christensen (1996) emphasized how Mao exploited international crises, particularly escalating the conflict over Taiwan, to mobilize the people for domestic campaigns. Chen (2001: 9), in turn, suggests that the split was not so much about conflicting national interests as the different interpretations of the same ideology. Lüthi (2008) emphasized both explanations.

During the 'polemics' between both Communist Parties, it was quite evident that Soviet and Chinese securitizations were pulling away from both inclusive universalist macrosecuritizations of the Cold War (Chen 2001; Lüthi 2008). Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) blamed Khruschev of being a revisionist who aimed at restoring capitalism in the Soviet Union:

> On the pretext of 'combating the personality cult,' Khruschev has defamed the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system and thus in fact

> paved the way for the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. In completely negating Stalin, he has in fact negated Marxism-Leninism which was upheld by Stalin and opened the floodgates for the revisionist deluge
>
> (*Central Committee of the Communist Party of China* 1965: 439)

The PRC presented itself as the true representative of the Cold War macrosecuritization, as

> under the signpost 'peaceful coexistence,' Krushchev has been colluding with U.S. imperialism, wrecking the socialist camp and the international communist movement, opposing the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations, practicing great-power chauvinism and national egoism and betraying proletarian internationalism.
>
> (*Central Committee of the Communist Party of China* 1965: 440)

Indeed, *The Polemics* included a security argument in the form of a 'black vision of a possible liquidation of Communism' (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008: 12). It was later used to legitimize the Cultural Revolution:

> As long as imperialism exists, the proletariat in the socialist countries will have to struggle both against the bourgeoisie at home and against international imperialism. Imperialism will seize every opportunity and try to undertake armed intervention against the socialist countries or to bring about their peaceful disintegration. It will do its utmost to destroy the socialist countries or to make them degenerate into capitalist countries. The international class struggle will inevitably find its reflection within the socialist countries.
>
> (*Central Committee of the Communist Party of China* 1965: 422–423)

In addition to the history of purges within the Party, these kinds of statements based on Lenin's theories would provide the necessary resonance for the manner in which the securitization of specific party representatives took place in the Cultural Revolution from 1966 onwards (Vuori 2011b).

The split was also visible in Mao's 1962 talk to an enlarged Central Working Committee (Mao 1974a [1962], 181): 'Abroad, the imperialist [i.e., the U.S.] curse us, the reactionary nationalists curse us, the revisionists [i.e., the Soviet Union] curse us.' Furthermore, Mao linked the revisionism he identified in the Soviet Union to that which he also securitized domestically: not even the success of the revolution could guarantee that Chinese ideological differences were in the past – they could only be solved through class struggle (Vuori 2011b). Accordingly, Mao identified and securitized a great danger for Communism: class struggle 'decides the fate of a socialist society' (*Central Committee of the Communist Party of China* 1965: 423); history has shown 'a number of examples in which proletarian rule suffered defeat as a result of armed suppression by the bourgeoisie' (ibid.: 468); whether the emergence

of Khrushchev's revisionism will be prevented 'is an extremely important question, a matter of life and death for our Party and our country' (ibid., 478).

As if in accordance with the grammar of securitization, the argument of the ninth polemic was that the downfall of socialism was not inevitable, nor insoluble: 'the restoration of capitalism in the socialist countries and their degeneration into capitalist countries are certainly not unavoidable' (*Central Committee of the Communist Party of China* 1965: 470). The polemic also provided a 'way out' of this perilous situation in the form of Mao Zedong's 15 theories and policies (ibid.: 471–479). The threat discourse legitimized Mao's policies, which were otherwise mainly concerned with domestic issues. Indeed, Mao apparently retained a perception of a constant danger of capitalist restoration that even approached a form of paranoia: the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to 'combat and prevent revisionism' (反修防修, *fǎn xiū fáng xiū*), for instance, the prime objective was to expose and eliminate enemies within the Party (Barnouin & Yu 1993: 22–23).

The threat of Soviet revisionism was part of the wider macrosecuritization patterns of the Cold War. Indeed, John Foster Dulles proposed the doctrine of 'peaceful evolution' as the most appropriate means to effect regime change in Communist states for the U.S. The PRC used this in the conflict with the USSR. Indeed, the PRC was against this principle from the outset, just as Mao was against Khrushchev's 'peaceful coexistence' with the U.S. As such, 'peaceful evolution' (和平演变, *hépíng yǎnbiàn*) has remained a major concern and a threatening subject even in post-Mao China (see the following).

The cultural revolution worsened Sino-Soviet relationships. The high point of the split was in 1969 when there were armed conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border, and the Soviets asked about U.S. reactions to the use of nuclear weapons against the PRC (Kissinger 1979: 183). On the Chinese side, the army was on high alert, and Mao argued that the PRC should be prepared for war physically and psychologically (Mao 1974c [1969]: 285). Lin Biao issued a directive ordering all military activities to be guided by the imminent threat of war. The PRC's leadership did not see the USSR as genuinely forthcoming in the border conflict negotiations in October 1969 but assumed them to be a smoke screen for a surprise attack. Accordingly, the PRC prepared for war by putting the air force on high alert and actually evacuated the political leadership as the border talks approached. The situation was deemed severe, as even city dwellers were evacuated, and military units moved to the field. (Barnouin & Yu 1998: 93–95.)

The PRC's turn away from the Sino-Soviet alliance did, however, not mean that it leaned to the other side of the constellation. Instead, the PRC began to 'hit with two fists'; for instance, it waged a struggle against the imperialist superpower (meaning the U.S.) and the social imperialist superpower (meaning the Soviet Union) and looked for company from the 'intermediate zone' between them (meaning in today's international terminology the global south). Indeed, anti-American rhetoric retained its strength in the PRC even during the heights of the Sino-Soviet split when the Soviet Union was formally declared as the PRC's greatest enemy (Barnouin & Yu 1998: 98); the notion of

'peaceful evolution' remained among the top threats in the PRC's discourses right up to the end of the Cold War. This was evident, for example, in Deng's (1993c) speech in 1989:

> The West really wants unrest in China. It wants turmoil not only in China but also in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The United States and some other Western countries are trying to bring about a peaceful evolution towards capitalism in socialist countries. The United States has coined an expression: waging a world war without gun smoke. We should be on guard against this. Capitalists want to defeat socialists in the long run. In the past they used weapons, atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs, but they were opposed by the peoples of the world. So now they are trying peaceful evolution. The affairs of other countries are not our business, but we have to look after our own. China will get nowhere if it does not build and uphold socialism. Without leadership by the Communist Party, without socialism and without the policies of reform and opening to the outside world, the country would be doomed. Without them, how could China have gotten where it is today?
>
> (Deng 1993c)

In this avenue of thought, the PRC could not be allowed to succumb in the way the Soviet Union had fallen apart in the 1990s. The notion and its danger are still being maintained by the Party's left-wing conservatives in the 2020s (Li 2019; Chen 2019). The U.S., however, turned out to be the lesser evil when Mao began a rapprochement with Nixon and improved Sino-U.S. relations as a balance against the USSR in the 1970s.

In addition to wresting free from the Soviet lead macrosecuritization with its anti-imperialist emphasis against Soviet revisionism, Mao developed his form of macrosecuritization. In this structure, the PRC and other revolutionaries represented the countryside of the world that would envelop its cities or the industrialist, non-socialist states worldwide. The line of supporting a world revolution took different forms as 'the third force,'' the intermediate zone,' and finally 'the third world.' The PRC and the revolutionary movements would form a common front against imperialism and colonialism.

In practice, though, the PRC abandoned even Maoist guerilla movements in exchange for its recognition in the UN (Van Ness 1970). Indeed, the PRC was not really in alignment with the macrosecuritization constellation of its political theory of the intermediate zone: Sino-Indian relations were strained at best after the late 1950s and the occupation of Tibet, actually boiling into an armed border conflict in 1962. The foreign policy fervour of the Cultural Revolution further worsened Sino-Indian relations as the non-alignment that India represented was not appropriate as the political line of the intermediate zone when the PRC was leading a socialist world revolution. Indeed, the PRC presented a formal statement to the effect that the people of India were ready to rise in revolt against the Congress Party (Barnouin & Yu 1998: 73–74).

Mao's ability to have ideological disagreements with the Soviet Union and use a real-political calculus with the U.S. demonstrated that the PRC was indeed engaged in Cold War macrosecuritizations and that it was a major threat for both camps at various stages. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this constellation changed again, and the 1990s became a period of, at times, very tense Sino-U.S. relations while Sino-Russian relations improved (Wishnick 2001). In line with new studies on Cold War history, it seems that the PRC could, on the one hand, manipulate the Cold War macrosecuritizations of the U.S. and USSR to its advantage. At the same time, Mao wrested free from both to pursue his line of alignment with the intermediate zone. Higher-level macrosecuritizations provided Mao with leverage in more parochial domestic securitizations, most strikingly in the initiation of the Cultural Revolution (Vuori 2011b). Despite lofty referent objects, interests in the political regime, or even personal level power-plays affected how Mao used macrosecuritization as part of his politics.

Macrodesecuritization and the End of the Cold War

Sino-Soviet relations began to mend in the 1980s with the removal of a number of political obstacles and the intensification of the conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Wishnick 2001; Voskressenski 2020); the reduction in tension across their shared border led to the largest arms reduction in the Cold War. Yet, it was only with the fall of the Soviet Union that we could see an overall desecuritization in the form of 'rearticulation' (Hansen 2012: 542–544) taking place in Sino-Russian relations. For the overall socialist macrosecuritization of the Cold War, though, the transitions away from socialist orders in Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the loss of its referent object (de Wilde 2008).

The Sino-Soviet split had largely been waged in ideological terms and had been driven by Mao (Lüthi 2008). With Mao's passing, the PRC shifted once more to a more pragmatist line in its foreign policy pronouncements. There were moves towards rearticulating the Sino-Soviet relationship on both sides. In his speech in Tashkent, Brezhnev acknowledged the PRC as a socialist state, opposed the two China policies of the U.S., promised not to threaten the PRC, and offered negotiations on the border issue (Wishnick 2001). In turn, the PRC no longer demanded a common front against Soviet hegemony. Deng also emphasized the PRC's non-aligned security policy position and its independent foreign policy of peace (Wu 2001). In effect, the PRC no longer hit with either fist. This was part of the process towards world multipolarization that would benefit more states than just the U.S. and the Soviet Union, according to Chinese viewpoints (Zhou 2020). Gorbachev continued to improve relations with the PRC, which culminated in his state visit to Beijing in 1989 during the protests of the Democracy Movement. This was the first state visit at this level to the PRC since 1959.

After the end of the Cold War, Deng Xiaoping promoted the line of not taking the lead in international affairs. He summed this principle up in 24

Chinese characters in November 1991: the PRC's maxim was to 'observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capabilities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.'[3] Such principles meant that the PRC should not engage in international conflicts. It should work towards 'world multipolarization' (世界多极化, *shìjiè duōjíhuà*) and not shy away from being a pole in world politics irrespective of whether 'the world structure is tri-polar or quad-polar or penta-polar' (Deng 1990). Jiang Zemin contextualized Deng's principles in relations with the U.S. as 'enhancing confidence, reducing troubles, expanding cooperation, and avoiding confrontation' in his first meeting with President Clinton in 1993; striving towards a multipolar world meant 'learning to live with the hegemon' (Zhao 2020: 89).

The multipolarization drive was exemplified by the PRC and Russia agreeing to a bilateral no-first-use (NFU) policy on nuclear weapons in September 1994 (Xia 2015: 181; Pan 2016: 66), forming a 'strategic partnership' in 1996 and a 'Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation' in July 2001. The PRC and Russia even shared the same 'threat package' of 'terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism' (the 'three evils,' see Chapter 6) within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Jackson 2006: 310; Plümmer 2020) – a form of shared securitization between the PRC and Russia that is distinctly apart from those of the Cold War. The partnership and the new shared securitization package showed how both states reformed their identities away from Sino-Soviet antagonism. Even though both states have since engaged in cyberoperations against each other, they have also formed a code of conduct for information security (Austin 2018; Davis 2021; see Chapter 7). In the overall Sino-Russian state relations, we can see a rearticulative desecuritization tactic at play on both sides. Ever since the early 1980s, the PRC's policy towards the Soviet Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation rather than reciprocal securitization. Instead, there has been a shared threat package since the late 1990s.

The Cold War has also been actively desecuritized in the PRC when there have been estimations of a return to such sustained conflicts. The 2001 treaty of good-neighbourliness represented the true dismantlement of 'Cold War mentality' (冷战思维, *lěngzhàn sīwéi*)[4] for Jiang Zemin (Voskressenski 2020: 241). The term 'Cold War' was first used by Zhou Enlai in 1956 in the context of the first Taiwan crisis. It was not favoured by Mao or Deng, but Jiang Zemin used it frequently after 1991.

The notion of Cold War mentality has been retained for the past two decades in Chinese commentaries on international affairs. For example, the PRC has used it in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) security dialogues to promote 'mutual trust:' 'mutual trust means that all countries should transcend differences in ideology and social system, discard the mentality of Cold War and power politics and refrain from mutual suspicion and hostility' (MoFA 2002b). In the context of rising tensions between Russia and the European Union (EU) due to the Ukraine crisis, a comment in the

People's Daily (2014c) emphasized that 'The political, economic and security theories that belonged to the Cold War era still dominate many people's minds nowadays. […] [O]nly through breaking the shackles of the Cold War mentality can we avoid unnecessary confrontation.' In the Asian context of the U.S. 'pivot' and discussions of a new Cold War in Asia (Keck 2013; Legvold 2014), Chinese reactions have voiced the need to suppress the space of Cold War mentality. Xi (2021c) also called for the 'abandonment of Cold War mentality' in his comments at the Davos Agenda dialogue in 2021. The announcement of the Australia, UK, and U.S. (AUKUS) alliance was similarly characterized in terms of a Cold War mentality (*Xinhua* 2021b; 2021c). Comments such as these indicate that the PRC aims to keep the Cold War macrodesecuritized and the rising China off the security agendas of great powers (Vuori 2018a).

Post-Cold War multipolarity came to a head in 2022 when Russia escalated its invasion to the scale of a city-levelling war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met in Beijing during the 2022 Winter Olympics just weeks before Russia's intensification of its invasion. Their joint statement emphasized multipolarity and the transformation of the overall world structure and global governance, where power in world politics would be redistributed in a new manner (Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation 2022). The statement (ibid.) concerned many foreign policy positions of the PRC and contained its terminology, but it also criticized North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and recommended the avoidance of Cold War mentality:

> The sides oppose further enlargement of NATO and call on the North Atlantic Alliance to abandon its ideologized Cold War approaches, to respect the sovereignty, security and interests of other countries, the diversity of their civilizational, cultural and historical backgrounds, and to exercise a fair and objective attitude towards the peaceful development of other States
>
> (Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation 2022)

The statement also opposed the block structures forming in the Asia Pacific region. In accordance with the PRC's statements regarding nuclear weapons (see Chapter 4), other nuclear weapon states were recommended to 'abandon the Cold War mentality and zero-sum games' and to 'reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies' (Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation 2022).

Even though the statement went through shared stands on many issues of international relations, the most acute concern of Russia was present in only one sentence: 'The Chinese side is sympathetic to and supports the proposals put forward by the Russian Federation to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe' (Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation 2022). To balance this, the statement emphasized many typical

diplomatic formulations of the PRC regarding issues like respecting state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Although the statement expressed close Sino-Russian relations, it remained far from a formal alliance, and the PRC's support for Russia remained at the level of sympathy (ibid.):

> The sides call for the establishment of a new kind of relationships between world powers on the basis of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. They reaffirm that the new inter-State relations between Russia and China are superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era. Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no 'forbidden' areas of cooperation, strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.
>
> (Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation 2022)

At the time of writing, the PRC has not directly supported Russian actions after it invaded Ukraine in 2022, yet the PRC has also not condemned Russia's military action. Chinese domestic propaganda has followed the Russian line, but the PRC's international statements have been more qualified. This kind of balancing has made it possible for the PRC to gain benefits without becoming targeted by sanctions by the West or Russia. During the first meeting between Putin and Xi since the escalation of the conflict in 2022, the PRC once again suggested that the U.S. should relinquish its Cold War mentality. The *People's Daily* also emphasized that the PRC remains vigilant regarding U.S. attempts to bind the PRC and Russia into a political and military alliance and place a wedge between both states and the rest of the world (*People's Daily* 2022.) In his statement at the same meeting of the SOC, Putin stated that he appreciated the balanced approach to the issue: 'We appreciate our Chinese friends' balanced position in connection with the Ukraine crisis' (Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation 2022). The PRC's balanced approach has also been apparent in its condemnation of nuclear threats in the context of Ukraine (*Global Times* 2022; MoFA 2023b) in accordance with its nuclear policies (see Chapter 4), yet vote against Russian war reparations in the UN general assembly (Psaledakis 2022). Perhaps tellingly, when Xi and President Biden met in late 2022, Xi did not use the notion of Cold War mentality in his remarks but recommended that both states 'should take history as a mirror and let it guide the future' (Xu 2022). Subsequent moves towards the U.S. were at least momentarily deflated by the 2023 spy balloon incident. In the PRC's position paper on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis (MoFA 2023b) at the time of the conclusion of the first year of the escalated war, the PRC once more promoted the abandonment of the Cold War mentality and opposed the expansion of military blocks.

Rebutting the China Threat

As I noted previously, the fall of the Soviet Union meant the end of Chinese block politics in Cold War terms. Instead, the PRC promoted a 'fair international order' and 'world multipolarity' (Deng 2008) in its descriptions of ideal international relations. Such maxims have aimed to keep it away from the securitization threshold of other states and detach the PRC from great power antagonisms. The PRC does not appear to favour a return to antagonistic macrosecurity constellations. Indeed, developments like AUKUS could be phrased in securitizing terms, yet they are framed with the desecuritizing watchword of Cold War mentality. Even in the war on terror, the PRC aligned with the U.S. (Wayne 2008; see Chapter 6). Similarly, the PRC has stated that it will not form alliances with other states nor use ideology as a yardstick to determine the nature of its relations with them (SCIO 2011b). Even the close ties with Russia in 2022 fell short of an alliance. The Global Security Initiative (MoFA 2023a; see Chapter 7) emphasizes the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in global security governance.

Indeed, in the post-Cold War situation, the PRC found itself in a new situation: Russia had half the power resources of the Soviet Union, and the PRC kept increasing its own. The ideological macrosecuritization structure was also gone (Buzan & Wæver 2009). The PRC was on the rise in international politics. This raised worries worldwide, especially after the violent crackdown on its citizens in 1989 (Vuori 2003). Assertive moves in the South China Sea and Taiwan increased impressions of a bellicose PRC. Prominent Chinese military figures spoke of its need to expand its maritime defences and 'living space' guided by principles such as 'sea as national territory' and 'survival space.' Even coastal defence was transformed into offshore defence. This situation fuelled the flames of the 'China threat theory' (中国威胁论, *zhōngguó wēixiélùn*) in the U.S. (Vuori 2006; Chang 2020).

The contemporary discussion of China as a threat to the U.S. has its origins in 1992 (Vuori 2006; Deng 2006: 192; 2008). This discourse presented the PRC as a military and economic threat to the U.S. (e.g., Bernstein & Munro 1997, Timperlake & Triplett 1999, and Mosher 2000). These elements of military and political security were soon joined by societal aspects, as the PRC, as the last major socialist state, was propped up as an affront to liberal-democratic values. This 'China threat theory' predicted that an economically and militarily strengthening PRC that voiced expanding territorial claims and had an authoritarian political order would increase its demands and eventually challenge the international order, for instance, the U.S., on a global level.

The China threat discussion fed a critical response in the PRC, which was most discernible in nationalist circles. The 'patriotic education campaign' launched in response to the events of 1989 had already amplified the pre-existing nationalist sense of injustice in world affairs regarding China's experiences and its current position (e.g., Hughes 2006: 73–76; Wang 2008). There had been a clear change of tune in the nationalist discourse: while in

the 1980s, nationalists had criticized the backwardness of Chinese culture, science, technology, and economy (e.g., the 'River Elegy' television series), in the 1990s, the U.S.–China threat theory was tackled head-on. This was explicit in the publication of books, such as *China can say no* (Song et al. 1996; see also Li et al. 1996), which aroused lots of attention abroad. Such nationalist texts admitted China's weaknesses, but at the same time, they condemned the 'baseless demonization of China' in the West, particularly in the U.S., and thereby the justification to subjugate the PRC. Such a sense of demonization of the PRC abroad has remained, irrespective of the factuality of how the PRC has actually been covered in news items (Aukia 2017). In turn, these nationalist writings were shunned outside China and were used as evidence of a China threat (e.g., Bernstein & Munro 1997). Thereby, the two national 'threat literatures' fed each other and served domestic functions of identity reproduction (cf., Callahan 2005: 708–712). As Callahan (2005: 712) noted, the China threat rebuttal texts are problematic for their authors in the sense that they keep reproducing the very threat discourse they are rebuking, a point which has been pointed out in the 'normative dilemma of writing critical security' debate within securitization studies (Vuori 2011b).

Beyond the 'nationalist' response, analysts in the PRC had picked up on the U.S.–China threat theory by the mid-1990s (e.g., Yee & Storey 2002 and Deng 2006). They directly addressed the securitization claims of their U.S. counterparts (e.g., Bernstein & Munro 1997): titles, such as 'True threat comes from those trumpeting "China Threat"' (Da 1996) and ' "China Threat" theory groundless' (Wang 1997) exemplify the interaction between unofficial securitization moves in the U.S. and mirrored desecuritization moves in the PRC. Such articles can be viewed as an interactive desecuritization discourse that contests the claims made in the securitization moves that have targeted China as a threat (e.g., Yee & Zhu 2002 and *People's Daily* 2006).

Many Asian states have their own China threat discourse (Yee 2002), and the PRC has reacted to them too. Discourses in Japan and Taiwan have been most poignant here (Deng 2006: 187). An interactive securitization/desecuritization dynamic has also been at work in the PRC's positions on the issues of Chinese migration to Russia's far east being securitized in Russia as part of the 'China threat' (e.g., Lukin 2002 and Wishnick 2008), the securitization of human smuggling across the Taiwan Strait (Chin 2008), the issue of transboundary rivers (Biba 2014; 2016; 2018; Xie & Warner 2022), and the island dispute with Japan (Danner 2014). The PRC has deployed desecuritization in all these issues.

In the biggest game in town, though, the U.S.–China threat securitization moves (Chang 2020), and Chinese nationalist responses were exaggerated: instead of the multipolar world desired by the PRC's foreign policy, 'unipolarity' seemed to be more prevalent in view of the military might of the U.S. displayed first in the Gulf war of 1991, and later in Kosovo 1999 (Zhou 2019). Irrespective of the PRC's military modernization programme since the 1980s, the PLA lagged far behind U.S. capabilities (Shambaugh

2003). Thereby, military assertion was not a viable option for the PRC in the 1990s. This was also discernible from official and unofficial responses to the securitizing discourse of the China threat in the U.S. and from the PRC's foreign policy actions since the late 1990s: the PRC's emphasis on multilateral diplomacy (e.g., being the head of the SCO), activity in international organizations (e.g., joining the World Trade Organization), and other deeds to strengthen complex interdependence (e.g., the world's largest foreign currency reserves) was unprecedented in its previous foreign policy behaviour (Johnston 2003).

Reaction to the China threat theory was not limited to popular writers or political analysts: major figures of the PRC's political leadership took part. Li Peng and Jiang Zemin commented directly on the views that expressed China as a threat in the late 1990s: 'China will not pose a threat to any other nation, nor will it invade or oppress other countries' (Li 1996; see *Xinhua* 1994 and *People's Daily* 2000b); 'A developing and progressing China does not pose a threat to anyone. China will never seek hegemony' (Jiang 1997a); 'A developed China will play a positive role in maintaining world peace and stability and will by no means constitute a threat to anybody' (Jiang 2000a). As if harking back directly to the cottage industry of U.S. books on the threat of China, Li and Jiang proclaimed that the PRC did not strive for hegemony and that it would never be a threat to any nation. High-level representatives disclaimed the China threat; for example, General Chi Haotian (1996: 64) remarked that 'there are still some people around the world who keep spreading the fallacy of the "China threat".' Even the first National Defence White Paper (SCIO 1998) proclaimed that China sought to 'lead a peaceful, stable, prosperous world into the new century.' Similarly, the 15th Party Congress emphasized 'handling relations among great powers' (处理大国关系, *chǔlǐ dàguó guānxi*), where the PRC would work towards building peace (all the while its regional behaviour was considered quite expansive in the mid-1990s). Subsequent White Papers by the Hu and Xi administrations have continued this cooperative 'operational code' (Yang & Keller 2017). Indeed, during the Xi Jinping administration, the PRC characterized itself as a responsible great power and aimed to create a so-called new type of great power relationship (新型大国关系, *xīnxíng dàguó guānxi*) with the U.S. (Xi 2013; see the following section).

The securitization discourse of the China threat during the 1990s had stemmed mainly from private actors in the U.S. For example, President Clinton had campaigned on a strong anti-China stance, but by his second term, he had taken a more pragmatist stance on China. In his last China speech, he called for engagement with the PRC with an open hand rather than a clenched fist. The mainly private moves, however, resulted in desecuritization moves by the private and public actors in the PRC. Such moves worked towards countering and disclaiming the threat claims present in securitization moves. While this was done by even the most prominent politicians in the PRC and was present in white papers, the foreign policy maxims remained the same. In the 2000s, desecuritization discourse was inserted into them as well.

Desecuritization has, however, not been the only move put forth in the PRC. When U.S. securitization moves have been on the non-state level, there has been an opportunity to do respective reverse-securitization moves by equivalent Chinese actors in a similar way as in disputes with Japan (Danner 2014). Here, the U.S. was presented as a threat to the PRC, and particularly as 'a thief crying "stop the thief"' (贼喊捉贼, *zéihǎnzhuōzéi*). Even some official statements have echoed such views. For example, China's first White Paper on National Defence (SCIO 1998) has a taste of reverse securitization, albeit in an implicit fashion as to its targeted threat: 'hegemonism and other power politics remain the main source of threats to world peace and stability. […] Some countries, by relying on their military advantages, pose military threats to other countries, even resorting to armed intervention.' The mirroring effect has also been evident in articles by the *People's Daily* (2002): 'the "theory of the China threat" has been spreading like a pestilence […] in fact, [the] real threat comes from the creator of the "theory of threat."

Desecuritizing China's Rise

The 1990s were a difficult decade for Sino-U.S. relations. It seemed as if the PRC was being propped us as the next big competitor for the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. This was the case in U.S. academic discussions as well. Renowned political scientists such as Huntington (1996: 313–316) and Mearsheimer (2001) presented the PRC as the key competitor state for the U.S. in either civilizational or real-political terms. The presidency of George W. Bush also began in dire circumstances: the spy plane incident in 2001 was the first international crisis of the Bush administration. However, talk of 'Cold War 2' was soon replaced with the war on terror after the events of 11 September 2001. The PRC became an immediate partner in this global macrosecuritization (see Chapter 6), and the U.S. reciprocated with an unofficial presidential visit in October 2001, and eventually by adding the East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) onto the UN terrorist organization list (Wayne 2008; see Chapter 6).

Even though the China threat discourse was tuned down in the U.S., the PRC continued to rebut it and institutionalized its position. In late 2003 the foreign policy idea of 'peaceful rise' (和平崛起, *hépíng juéqǐ*) (*Xinhua* 2003) was hotly promoted and briefly became the leading slogan of the new Hu Jintao administration (Zheng 2005; Deng 2006; Glaser & Medeiros 2007). It is as though the maxim of the peaceful rise was a direct rebuttal of the U.S.-China threat discourse. Many of the securitization moves of the China threat discourse were premised on theories and beliefs of international relations that suggest rising powers eventually led to conflict and even major war.[5] The foreign policy slogan of peaceful rise explicitly counters this avenue of thought: it is as if the maxim had been developed to work against theories of hegemonic wars. Thereby, it can be read as a tactic that aims to keep the PRC off the acute security agenda of concerned states. Indeed, Chinese observers have been attuned to non-state and state discourse (Deng 2008: 113), and the stance

aims to limit such views to the non-state level. Indeed, the PRC has deployed non-state actors in the securitization of its island dispute with Japan, which has subsequently been desecuritized by official actors (Danner 2014). The principle of 'peaceful rise' argues that the PRC is not a threat to other states' security, although its 'comprehensive national strength' (see Chapter 2), which consists of economic, political and military elements, and the PRC's capabilities to project it even militarily, are increasing. If the securitization discourse in the U.S. broke out of the 'private sector' and was adopted by public securitizing actors, this could lead to containment policies against the PRC. In this context, the official maxim can be read as a move to avoid the China threat discourse becoming official U.S. policy; the concept of the peaceful rise of the 2000s seemed to be a 'pre-emptive desecuritization move' (Bourbeau & Vuori 2015).

By the summer of 2004, the initially very active study of the new notion of peaceful rise died down as it was deemed too optimistic and even counterproductive (Deng 2006: 200): even peaceful rise could be read as a threat by those whom the PRC was gaining on. As the peaceful rise principle was shot down, the Hu Jintao administration adopted the slogan of 'Peaceful Development' (和平发展, *hépíng fāzhǎn*) in 2005 (e.g., Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China [SCIO 2005]), and the maxim of a 'Harmonious World' (和谐世界, *héxié shìjiè*) (e.g., *Xinhua* 2005). While not as explicitly in response to political theories of hegemonic wars, both principles contained the same notion: the PRC's increased strength should not be considered a threat because it is working towards peace and harmony. Such maxims seem to be aimed at keeping the PRC's relationships with major powers on a desecuritized footing. Accordingly, Hu focused on domestic stability, maintaining the status quo by averting crisis so that the 'period of strategic opportunity' (战略机遇期, *zhànlüè jīyù qī*) could be extended and the PRC could retain its modernization programmes unhindered (Zhao 2020: 89).

Holistic Security and China as a Responsible International Actor

As the PRC has become more involved in global governance, it has emphasized itself as a 'major and responsible country' that works towards 'a community with a shared future for humankind' (Xi 2017a; see Chapter 7). Major projects like the 'Belt and Road Initiative' and activity in global governance frameworks continue efforts to present China's rise as an unthreatening development. Such efforts have not been without their success. For example, under Barack Obama, the U.S. and the PRC found each other begrudgingly on the issue of climate change (The White House Office of the Press Secretary 2014; see Chapter 5), as they had with the war on terror under George W. Bush (Wayne 2008; see Chapter 6). Obama (e.g., White House 2015) also stated many times that 'the United States welcomes the rise of a China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in global affairs.' Such statements show how the PRC's foreign policy dictums have been picked up by other major powers.

On the Chinese side, Xi has kept pace with American theories of power transition. He has explicitly denied the existence of a 'Thucycides's trap,' put forth by Allison (2017). The notion refers to the stresses that result from one power declining and another gaining strength, which has many times led to wars between major powers. For Xi (Xinhua 2015), though, 'There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.' To avoid such miscalculation, the PRC seeks 'non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation' (Xinhuanet 2015) in its foreign policy with the U.S. – in other words, to produce stabilized desecuritization (Hansen 2012).

Indeed, the U.S. and the PRC put forth the idea of a 'new type of relationship between great powers in an innovative and active way to serve the fundamental interests of the two peoples and promote the development and progress of human society' in 2013 (Xi 2013). This 'new type of great power relationship' (新型大国关系, x*īnxíng dàguó guānxì*) has remained part of the PRC's foreign policy vocabulary. It consists of three elements: 'no conflict of confrontation, mutual respect (for core interests), and win-win cooperation' even though the U.S. has not been as forthcoming after the initial statement (Saunders & Bowie 2019: 93–94). Chinese scholars see four factors that make the Sino-U.S. relationship different from the Cold War superpower relationship: the PRC's nuclear deterrent is on a lower rung than that of the U.S. (see Chapter 4), the economic interdependence between the countries is very strong, they share a number of security interests like fights against terrorism, climate change, and pandemics, and there are close social and cultural Sino-U.S. connections (Chen & Liu 2019: 71). Such views suggest that the PRC and the U.S. are aligned within macrosecuritization discourses and at the same should remain to be the case in the maintenance of the Cold War macrodesecuritization. Some Chinese scholars argue that the U.S. should assure the PRC that it is not trying to undermine its basic political order under the Party or to hinder its economic development; at the same time, the PRC should provide assurances that it is not trying to replace the U.S. as the world leader or to push it out of East Asia (Da 2013: 69). Such confidence building would keep the relationships on a desecuritized footing.

The election of Donald Trump brought with it the greatest challenge yet when maintaining this kind of desecuritized state of affairs in Sino-U.S. relations. Indeed, while Trump made several gaffes regarding the established diplomatic practices (e.g., taking a call from the president of the Republic of China), the greater issue was with the worldview of Trump's adviser Steve Bannon, where the PRC was presented as expanding at the cost of the Judeo-Christian West. Accordingly, in March 2016, Bannon predicted that 'We're going to war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years […] there is no doubt about it' (Bannon 2016). Indeed, it is as if the authors of the 1990s China threat literature were now directly advising the president. In such a situation, the PRC faced the stark probability that previously unofficial securitization speech would become

official policy. As with foreign minister Wang Yi, desecuritization was viewed as the rational line here: 'Any sober-minded politician, they clearly recognise that there cannot be conflict between China and the United States because both will lose, and both sides cannot afford that' (*The Guardian* 2017). Luckily for the PRC, Bannon was included in those dismissed from the Trump White House in 2017, and Joseph R. Biden was elected president in 2020.

It appears that Biden is making a return to Obama's pivot to Asia, as suggested by the AUKUS arrangement. Still, the PRC has remained in its desecuritized stance about a new Cold War, even during the intensification of the war in Ukraine in 2022. There was much international speculation that the PRC and Russia might be in league, and the PRC could use this as an opportunity to invade Taiwan. Although the visit of the U.S. Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan in 2022 was the pretence for the largest military exercise the PRC had conducted in the theatre, it does not appear to be following the plot of the international speculations. Even President Biden is unaware of any immediate intentions of invading Taiwan (*The New York Times 2022*). Indeed, by the time of writing, the PRC's approach to the Ukraine war had been fairly careful or 'balanced' as President Putin phrased it (Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation 2022).

Even though Sino-Russian relations have become closer as part of the post-Cold War Sino-Russian-U.S. triangle politics, the situation is still not akin to the triangular relations during the Cold War, even in the context of the war in Ukraine. The PRC has been measured in its approach by not condemning Russian actions beyond its threats of nuclear use while, at the same time, suggesting that the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) let go of their Cold War mentality (MoFA 2023b). The meeting between Xi and Biden at the G20 meeting in late 2022 seemed to show some weak signs of rapprochement in Sino-U.S. relations, at least in terms of the choice of words in statements.

The PRC's balancing approach can be made understandable through general opportunism and practicality, yet its positions are consistent with its longer-term principles of international politics. The PRC can still be seen as attempting to expand its 'period of strategic opportunity' despite the worsened relations with the U.S. and the apparent Russian miscalculations in the Ukraine war. Indeed, in his report to the Party Congress in 2022, Xi (2022a) still emphasized the importance of the period of strategic opportunity but stated that it coincided with 'risks and challenges.' Accordingly, the PRC should be 'ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms' (ibid.).

Polarized World Structures and Macrosecuritization

As such, the Cold War macrosecuritization has intimate connections with overall estimates of the world political situation and the division of power resources within it. In the study of international politics, this has been conceptualized as the international structure (Kaplan 1957; Waltz 1979;

Mearsheimer 2001), and regional security complex theory (RSCT) views complexes in terms of power divisions (Buzan & Wæver 2003). Chinese scholars have discussed the 'international structure' and, later, the 'international situation' of great power relations, at least since the 1980s. In accordance with Deng's emphasis on world multipolarization in 1990, Chinese scholars noted how this understanding of the world structure benefits more states than both superpowers because it strengthened state sovereignty and independence. In these discussions, bipolarity was equated with power politics and military force, whereas multipolarity allowed for moral principles and economic and scientific development. As such, bipolarity served the interest of both superpowers when multipolarity benefitted most countries (Zhou 2019: 23–24).

Chinese scholars viewed 1991–1999 as being 'post-Cold War,' which was characterized by a transition in the international structure (Zhou 2019: 27). During this period, the trend towards multipolarity was emphasized in political statements too. For example, Jiang Zemin (Zhou 2019 noted how 'the world structure is accelerating toward multipolarity' in the late 1990s. In the 2000s, though, the U.S. was increasingly seen as the only superpower and its national security as unassailable by state actors in the U.S. and PRC (Ikenberry 2002; Buzan & Wæver 2003). After the 'unipolar moment,' the world security structure has also been viewed as 'uni-multipolarity' (Wæver 2017a). For Hu (2016: 90]), 'the contradictions and struggle between unipolar and multipolar are more and more intense.' The global economic recession 2008 appeared to make the situation such that 'the prospect of multipolarization is more promising' (Hu 2016 [2009]: 234). For Xi (2014a), 'the progressing of multipolarization will not change.'

As such quotations show, the official line has not wavered from the goal of multipolarization. Some Chinese scholars have similarly remained optimistic about world multipolarization throughout shifts in the global structure (Zhou 2019: 28). The policies of the Trump administration changed U.S. views in this regard, and the end of the 'liberal order' became a hot topic in the late 2010s (Ikenberry 2018). In the 2010s, Chinese scholars discussed the prospect of the world structure transitioning from having one superpower and several great powers (1 + X in RSCT terms) to a new bipolarity with the PRC as the other pole (Zhou 2019: 30). Such views vary regarding what kind of power is relevant when appraising the distribution of resources. For example, Chen (2013), deploying a Marxist analysis, sees three layers where economic, military, and ideational forms of power are all relevant. Here, the world is more multipolar in economic terms and still unipolar in military terms. The official line in the PRC has been to firmly denounce and oppose bipolar characterizations where it would be considered a pole (Zhou 2019: 37), even as the PRC has become more assertive in its foreign policy statements and positions. For example, Hu (2016: 238) disagreed with the notion of the U.S. and the PRC forming a 'G2' as 'it violates the multipolar trend of the world.' The stakes of such discussions are high because if China is presented as the second pole, this would imply that

the PRC could be a hegemonic power, which goes against the oldest line of its foreign policy. Bipolarity is close to the 'Cold War mindset' that is equated with competing for world hegemony (Chen & Liu 2019: 70). The PRC has continued to oppose 'Cold War era' alliance thinking as well as 'hegemony' in its foreign policy statements and principles (Hoo 2017: 3), and its strategic partnerships and treaties of friendship fall short of formal alliances with specific commitments beyond codes of conduct. The PRC's commitment to the NFU of nuclear weapons is also part of this position (Pan 2018; see Chapter 4). Viewing the international power structure in multiple dimensions makes sense from this viewpoint, as it allows the PRC to keep gaining positions while keeping a hold of its anti-hegemonic stand.

During Deng's period, the PRC 'opened its door,' for instance, making it possible to invest in and trade with it, irrespective of states' official ideologies. In the 2000s, the PRC began to 'go out' (走出去战略,*zǒu chūqù zhànlüè*), for instance, to make investments outside China, project military power, and protect its interests more vocally. This shift in policy has also meant a growing interest in 'soft power' (Aukia 2017). Hu used the concept in his speech at the Party Congress in 2007, but it has become more prominent during the Xi administration (Shambaugh 2020a). Indeed, the standing committee of the Politbureau that was chosen in 2017 included someone who had made their career in the academic world: Wang Huning is considered to be the main ideologue of the Party, and he published his first article on soft power-related matters in 1993 (Breslin 2020: 140; Lanteigne 2020: 36). Wang was one of the few party leaders reselected into the Standing Committee in the 2022 Party Congress. Xi's interest in soft power is so great that some see the PRC as developing a 'soft power great power identity' (Breslin 2020: 143). At the same time, the emphasis on soft power can be seen as reflecting a disappointment with the level of respect and status the PRC has internationally (Li Mingjian 2019).

Soft power can appear as a non-zero-sum type of resource (Nye 1990). For so-called 'nativist' Chinese intellectuals (Shambaugh 2011), 'discourse power' (话语权, *huàyǔquán*; e.g., *The People's Daily* 2016b) and soft power are fields of struggle.[6] Perhaps accordingly, some Chinese left-wing scholars see soft power as an ideological struggle among states (Li Mengjian 2019: 48). This is in line with the longstanding fear of 'peaceful evolution' that the U.S. has deployed as its approach to converting China into a capitalist and liberal-democratic state (e.g., Li 1990 and Deng 1993b). Accordingly, the competition over soft power is viewed as a life-or-death struggle for the PRC's political order that is fought without guns on the battlefield of ideas and values. Therefore, the PRC needs to counter the Western assault on its ideological and cultural security by enhancing its means of soft power (Li Mengjian 2019: 48) Westernization and the creation of social divisions within the PRC are taken here as threats to its sovereignty (Chen 2019: 89).

Discursive power is viewed as a crucial form of soft power in such discussion. As such, the PRC has a need to control the international narrative about its rise (Breslin 2020: 142). Even *The People's Daily* has been used to promote

the 'power of discourse in telling Chinese stories' (Liu 2019). Accordingly, it has launched a number of news stations abroad and has begun to produce Chinese content for international news outlets as part of its 'going out' strategy (Burgh 2020). For example, *China Daily* and the *Global Times* are published in English, the *Xinhua News Agency* sells content to 130 countries, and *China Radio International* produces programming in local languages. *China Central Television* also produces content in five languages. At the same time, there has been a mission to develop Chinese theories on international politics (Zhao 2006; 2008; Puranen 2020). Both are viewed as ways to enhance the PRC's discursive power in traditional and new media and academic discussions. They can also be included within the concept of comprehensive power (综合实力, *zònghé shílì*), which represents a multifaceted understanding regarding great power competition. The cultivation of cultural soft power also serves the goal the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (中华民族伟大复兴, *zhōnghuá mínzú wěidà fùxīng*, as it supports 'national prosperity, national rejuvenation, and people's happiness' (Li Mengjian 2019 : 48). Despite its gained prominence, the PRC's soft power does not compare with those of the U.S. or many European states. However, China's history and tradition provide great potential for it. Viewing soft power as an arena of ideological great power competition and how it is approached accordingly has an impact here, as it often results in the repetition of the PRC's official political line on most matters. Indeed, China could have great stores of soft power if the Party would just get out of its own way (Shambaugh 2020b).

Viewing soft power from the viewpoint of ideological and political security entails that ideology plays a 'core and dominant' role in cultural forms of soft power (Li 2019: 56). This means that Chinese discussions about bipolarity and soft power are places to look for shifts in the treatment of the Cold War macro(de)securitization. Soft power is also about international recognition (Honneth 2005; 2012; Vuori 2014) and all that it brings with it. Humiliation and a lack of recognition of the PRC's status have been longstanding features of Chinese nationalist narratives and emphasized by the Party. As the PRC's power resources increase, the securitization of ideology and the position of the Party may have the potential to go beyond the level of national security and be once again framed in macro terms. This is particularly so, as leftist conservatives have gained the upper hand within the PRC's politics. This makes such discussion indicators to watch for possible changes in the discourse. How the 'Cold War mentality' is treated and used here is vital in such assessments: is it a tool for maintaining the macrodesecuritization of the 20th century Cold War, or is it deployed to justify the PRC's position as an ideological pole of power in the international structure.

Analysis: Keeping Away from a Bipolar Macrosecuritization

How the PRC has aligned itself in the Cold War macrosecuritization has had close connections with Chinese estimates of the international structure and

divisions of power within it. Mao used the PRC's alignment in this constellation as part of his domestic competitions and securitizations. His line was to present the PRC as part of the intermediate zone or later Third World, where it would never seek a leadership position or hegemony. While most other aspects of Mao's politics have faded away from the PRC's contemporary political lines, the aversion towards hegemony has been maintained. This is evident in how Chinese political leaders and academics have approached and formulated their positions on world multipolarity and the potential of the PRC becoming the other pole in a new bipolar power division. In such viewpoints, the international structure is divided along multiple dimensions, where the military division is only one. Accordingly, the PRC's strength as a pole and the number of poles are viewed differently along such dimensions like military, the economy, and cultural or soft forms of power. Keeping a hold of the multipolar view works towards keeping the PRC off the security agenda of other great powers. This is also emphasized in the continued desecuritization of the Cold War by using the notion of 'Cold War mentality' to criticize power politics and policy lines that are negative toward the PRC's interests.

As such, the Cold War was an all-encompassing form of securitization in Mao's China, in that it did not matter how badly its deployment in international discourse hurt the PRC's relationships: PRC nationals and diplomats all propagated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the 1960s (Paltemaa & Vuori 2012). However, real political approaches won over when diplomatic recognition of the PRC was on offer. The PRC changed its alignment in the constellation of the macrosecuritization from the initial stage of being in the Soviet camp in the socialist versus imperialist division to one of anti-imperialism versus imperialism in its split with the USSR. The PRC deployed securitization in its conflict with the Soviet Union, which was presented as having betrayed the inclusivist macrosecuritization it had promoted after WW2. After the Cold War ended, the PRC has been vocal in maintaining its desecuritization to prevent a new conflict formation with the U.S. This maintenance is also part of the PRC's view on polarity: the post-Cold War world should not return to bipolarity but become truly multipolar. Indeed, the PRC presents itself as non-aligned in the post-Cold War constellation (Table 3.1).

While the Cold War was macrodesecuritized, and this desecuritization has been maintained by the PRC, it is also important to note that the underlying ideological division has not gone away, nor has it been desecuritized. Indeed, the hard core of the PRC's political order is still committed to its ideological origin. The presentation of soft and discursive power as contemporary battlefields show how the issue is still relevant. Furthermore, while the PRC's statements call on the West to 'abandon its ideologized Cold War approaches,' they also emphasize that 'the sovereignty, security and interests of other countries, the diversity of their civilizational, cultural and historical backgrounds' should be respected (Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation 2022). The latter elements maintain the securitization of the ideological core of the PRC. Indeed, even the PRC's new visions for global security governance,

Table 3.1 Macrosecuritization Elements of China's Cold War Discourses

Macrosecuritization discourse	*Types of moves*	*Type of universalism*	*Alignment in constellations*	*View on polarity*	*Bureaucratic logic*
The Cold War	Securitization and desecuritization	Inclusive	From socialist versus imperialist to anti-imperialist versus imperialist to non-aligned	Bipolar; multipolar in the maintenance of desecuritization	Security, diplomacy

while emphasizing the UNSC, also maintain this element (MoFA 2023a; see Chapter 7). This line also allows the PRC to retain its identity politics that emphasize its peaceful and harmonious intentions and character.

Crucially, the Party's left-wing conservatives maintain the securitization of the PRC's political order regarding 'peaceful evolution,' where cultural soft power is seen as a contemporary battlefield. Should such views become the norm in the PRC's domestic politics, this discourse could be extended into international fora and become the basis for a new bipolar Cold War macrosecuritization. Although it has become more forthcoming in presenting its economic and political model as something to emulate, the PRC cannot yet be considered to be exporting its post-totalitarian political order (Paltemaa & Vuori 2009; Vuori 2014) in the same manner as the Soviet Union did. It can be hypothesized that the PRC could begin to export its system more actively, and some already see Xi Jinping's strategic shift regarding the PRC's view on global governance as already resulting in the promotion of authoritarian norms in international governance by Chinese elites (Morton 2020: 162). If this trend continues, it could become the basis of a new civilizational macrosecuritization outside of the PRC, as already suggested by some U.S. political realists (Kagan 2008). Should this happen, it would be the definitive feature of the global political and security order of its era.

Notes

1 Parts of this chapter have been modified from Vuori, Juha A. (2018a): 'Let's just say we'd like to avoid any great power entanglements: desecuritization in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy towards major powers.' *Global Discourse*. DOI: 10.1080/23269995.2017.1408279.

2 The 'Century of Shame' refers to the period when European powers forced China into a system of semi-colonialism and to sign a number of 'unequal treaties.' This was a major impetus for Chinese reformers and eventually lead to the first revolution and the establishment of the Republic of China.

3 冷静观察 (*lěngjìng guānchá*): observe dispassionately.
站稳脚跟(*zhàn wěn Jiǎogēn*): stand firm.
沉着应付 (*chénzhuó yìngfù*): cope calmly and deliberately.
韬光养晦 (*tāoguāngyǎnghuì*): avoid the limelight, cultivate obscurity.
善于守拙 (*shànyú shǒu zhuō*): focus on remaining humble.
决不当头 (*jué bù dāngtóu*): in no way take the lead.
(Freeman 2020: 46)

4 冷战思维 (*lěngzhàn sīwéi*) is generally translated as a 'mentality,' but 思维 (*sīwéi*) can also be translated as 'thinking' or 'thought.'

5 For a critical review of the applicability of various models on power transition and major war to the Chinese case, see Chan (2008). Graham Allison (2017) has been the most recent scholar to point out the dangers of the power shift in the PRC's favour.

6 Discourse power could also be translated as discursive dominance. The notion is about which ways of speaking are dominant or even hegemonic. Indeed, the translation of hegemony (霸权, *bàquán*) uses the same character.

4 Anti-Nuclear Discourse in China

The securitization of nuclear weapons as a physical threat to humanity differs from most forms of either macro or plain securitization in that it works against the sovereignty of states by limiting their possession of nuclear weapons or even puts the very existence of sovereign states into question. Accordingly, it has been driven by non-state actors, even though there have been state-based plans and proposals for either controlling nuclear weapons or abolishing them altogether. As a more recent development, non-nuclear weapon states have established the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (United Nations 2017a) that bases its anti-nuclear stance on the catastrophic humanitarian effects rather than the totalizing destruction for humanity that a nuclear war would bring about. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an interesting nuclear weapons state in that it continued to promote their abolition even after it procured them in the 1960s. It is also exceptional in having an uninterrupted no-first-use (NFU) pledge as the basis for its nuclear doctrine. Therefore, the PRC should be attuned to the anti-nuclear macrosecuritization too. However, this is not the case, as we will see in the following text, which poses an interesting issue for securitization theory. I begin the analysis here with a look at the overall macrosecuritization of nuclear weapons.

Anti-Nuclear Macrosecuritization by Non-State and State Actors

Nuclear weapons were a cause for major concern for the scientists involved in their development. This concern eventually formed a – mainly non-governmental – anti-nuclear movement (Wittner 1993; 1998; 2003). The securitization of nuclear weapons as a threat to humanity has been one of the guiding principles for this movement (Vuori 2010), which still carries on in international conferences for disarmament (Dalaqua 2013). Succinctly put, this movement has exhorted that all nations 'live in imminent danger,' that 'an untoward event tomorrow may trigger a tense world to erupt in flames of atomic or thermonuclear warfare,' and that 'there will be "no place to hide" for the great masses of civilized mankind' (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1953).

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Despite such urgent identification of a shared danger for humanity, the anti-nuclear movement has not been successful in achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons, even though the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons came into effect in 2021 (United Nations 2017b). Indeed, the expanded Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought nuclear weapons and nuclear threats back into the headlines worldwide. While the level of the claimed threat of major nuclear war has been global and all-inclusive, a form of physical threat universalism, the relevant audiences in the leaderships of the nuclear states have not been convinced to a sufficient degree to relinquish their nuclear weapons (Vuori 2010).

In contrast to the current situation in the nuclear disarmament field, where bilateral treaties have been disbanded or 'suspended,' and multilateral arms control is also in difficulty, the Cold War witnessed major successes in limiting nuclear arms, especially in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The successes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (United Nations 1968) (although the PRC acceded to it only after the Cold War in 1992; Fan 2016), the Partial Test Ban Treaty (United Nations 1963) (which the PRC has never joined), and various limitation treaties between the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union. The role of civil society and the anti-nuclear peace movement cannot be discounted in the 1970s and 1980s discussion of the placement of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The failure of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritization, though, is evident in that three decades after the end of the Cold War, none of the five NPT-recognised nuclear powers has relinquished nuclear weapons (France and the UK, for example, legitimized their arsenal with terrorist threats in the 2000s, e.g., Blair 2006), three states have carried out nuclear tests (India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]), and Israel is commonly believed to possess nuclear weapons. The U.S. unilaterally relinquished the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and is building missile defences, and the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty has also been abolished (Heginbotham et al. 2019: 545). The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not been ratified by the U.S. or China (which would do it 'the next day' after the U.S.; Xia 2015: 181), and the NPT-renewal process has also run into difficulty with the 2015 and 2022 review conferences failing to produce a final document. Similarly, the New START Treaty[1] did not actually reduce the number of nuclear arms, but only those on active duty. In 2023, President Putin announced that Russia was 'suspending' its participation in the treaty (Diaz-Maurin 2023).

The Obama administration raised the hopes of a new direction vis-à-vis nuclear arms reduction treaties, but they failed to produce actual results. Indeed, the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy has become a partisan issue after the Cold War (Heginbotham et al. 2019: 545). Here, Democratic presidents have aimed at reducing the role of nuclear weapons, whereas Republican ones have even tried to develop new categories of weapons and increase the nuclear weapons budget. However, both have emphasized the need for life extension

and nuclear stewardship programmes. Russia too has been engaged in nuclear modernization, and President Putin's new type of nuclear speech has been a cause for concern, as it has been seen to hint at the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

The most important treaty that concerns nuclear weapons is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was established between nuclear and non-nuclear states in 1970. China acceded to the treaty in 1992 after decades of criticizing it. This treaty's text emphasizes the entirety of humanity as its referent object:

> Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.
>
> (UNODA 2015: 3)

The review conferences of the NPT became the most important multilateral forum for non-proliferation, although there are states that possess nuclear weapons outside of the treaty.

Representing a crucial transformation in the anti-nuclear security discourse, the final document of the 2010 NPT review conference expressed its 'deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons' (United Nations 2010). The humanitarian effects of nuclear explosions became the most significant issue in the preparatory conferences for the 2015 NPT review conference, and support for the so-called 'humanitarian effects' initiative kept building momentum.

The final document of the preparatory committee of the 2015 review conference emphasized the catastrophic humanitarian consequences as the reason for the necessity of disarmament (United Nations 2014a). Still, there were macro referent objects in the statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (Bird 2015: 1–2): 'the horrific consequences for humanity that would result from a nuclear weapon detonation or a terrorist attack involving fissile material. … It is in the interests of the very survival of humanity that nuclear war must never occur.' Referent objects beyond the humanitarian effects were also present in statements during the preparatory conference. Despite such securitization moves by non-nuclear states and the activity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 2015 review conference failed to produce a final document (United Nations 2015).

Like with the treaties to ban landmines and cluster munitions, the humanitarian initiative was part of a campaign to stigmatize nuclear weapon possession (Krasno & Szeli 2021: 66). Rather than the deployment of a macrosecurity argument like with previous anti-nuclear movements; the emphasis was on nuclear threats to human security and survival, and the immorality of such weapons. Furthermore, compared with previous generations of anti-nuclear

discourse, the discourse on the humanitarian initiative has been more emotional and effective (ibid.: 70) and eventually managed to wrest free of a strict military and national security framing (ibid.: 89). In line with the purposes of macrosecuritization, the use of human security 'democratized' the issue of nuclear possession and turned nuclear disarmament into 'a global public good' where states are on 'equal footing' irrespective of nuclear possession (ibid.: 144). In other words, the humanitarian initiative politicized the issue of nuclear possession in a Rancièrian sense (Vuori 2018b).

The humanitarian initiative was crucial in the eventual formation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Indeed, the main argument of the initiative is included in the preamble of the treaty (United Nations 2017a). The treaty is mindful of how the risk of even accidental nuclear detonations 'concern the security of all humanity and that all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons,' and cognizant of their 'grave implications for human survival' (ibid.). Rather than providing outs of moral obligations through national security interests, the treaty frames nuclear disarmament and a 'nuclear-weapon-free world' as 'a global public good' as 'serving both national and collective security interests' (ibid.). Still, the treaty does allow for withdrawing from it if its subject matter has 'jeopardized the supreme interests of its country' (ibid.).

While the treaty text emphasizes the importance of the NPT, the new treaty was the result of contested multilateralism (Morse & Keohane 2014; Vuori 2018b), and the nuclear weapon states have continued their opposition to the new treaty. While the war in Ukraine was the principal reason why the 2022 NPT review conference failed to produce a final document, the issue of the new treaty was also an issue that would have been difficult to overcome. It is too early to say what the eventual impact of the treaty will be on nuclear disarmament, especially as the renewed nuclear tensions in the context of the war in Ukraine have taken centre stage in the global nuclear discussion.

The securitization of nuclear weapons as a threat to humanity has included very radical propositions like the establishment of world governments or, at least, the drastic reduction in state sovereignty to prevent the possibility of nuclear war. Even though macro referent objects like humanity or life are still used, the lower-level referent of human security appears to have been more successful in producing political outcomes in the form of international treaties (Vuori 2016b). Accordingly, the emphasis has shifted to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear explosion and how no state would have the resources to handle the humanitarian suffering caused by a nuclear explosion. As such, there has been a move from demands for the fundamental transformation in the international system to the application of pre-existing international laws to nuclear weapons. Therefore, the suggestions of anti-nuclear securitization have become less 'extraordinary.' At the same time, NGOs have been joined in the securitization by enough non-nuclear states to ratify the ban treaty.

The question relevant to the present volume is, what has been the PRC's alignment in the anti-nuclear macrosecuritization, mainly operated by Western NGOs and the transnational networks they have been able to construct? What is the PRC's stance on nuclear weapons and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons today?

Anti-Nuclear Securitization In and Towards China

As an NPT-recognized nuclear power since 1992, the PRC has been a key audience for the securitization of nuclear weapons. Yet, despite warnings of the danger of nuclear annihilation, the PRC acquired nuclear weapons in 1964 because its leadership assumed that its alliance with the Soviet Union did not guarantee the PRC's security (Lewis & Xue 1988; Freedman 2003). They also deemed it necessary to develop a self-reliant dissuasion strategy through nuclear deterrence to counter 'nuclear bullying' or attempts at nuclear compellence (Fravel 2019). Nuclear deterrence seemed a more viable option for the PRC than deterrence through defence or conventional force due to the resource constraints it faced at the time (Johnston 1998a; Liu 1999; Pande 2000). Chinese scholars also point to the role of French scientist Jean Frédéric Joliot-Curie, who headed the World Peace Council (WPC) (Forster 2020: 253), and advised Mao that a state that wants to oppose nuclear weapons has to have them (e.g., Xu 2016: 23). It is, however, unclear when Mao actually received this advice, and whether it had an impact on the decision to pursue nuclear weapons (Fravel 2019: 248).

Yet more incentives for procuring nuclear weapons were the implicit and explicit nuclear threats from the U.S. and later the Soviet Union. For example, during the second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Eisenhower hinted at the possibility of using nuclear weapons (Dulles 1958). Displaying too much restraint from Mao's point of view, the Russians hesitated in backing the PRC with their nuclear umbrella when the PRC was shelling Quemoy; Khrushchev made a nuclear threat to the U.S. only after the crisis had in effect subsided (Freedman 2003: 264). This hesitation pushed the PRC towards even more concentrated efforts of constructing their bomb, which exacerbated Russian perceptions of Chinese recklessness in the question of nuclear war. Later, the Soviets indicated the possibility of a 'surgical strike' on the PRC to some European Socialist states in the 1960s (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008: 313; Gaddis 2005: 150; Babriaz 2015: 431). These musings eventually reached China, as noted by Zhou Enlai in his meeting with Alexei Kosygin in 1969: 'I heard that the Soviet Union is planning to execute a preemptive nuclear strike on China's nuclear bases' (Liu 2016: 155). Such threats were partly provoked by the PRC's stated views on nuclear war.

As with most aspects of the PRC's politics, Deng Xiaoping's taking charge in a pragmatic vein was quickly reflected in nuclear and missile technologies. While nuclear weapons were left out of various rectification campaigns during

the Cultural Revolution, Mao's emphasis on red being better than expert negatively affected the PRC's engineering (Paltemaa & Vuori 2009; Babiarz 2015). It also slowed down the development of Chinese capacities for a credible assured retaliatory strike (Fravel & Medeiros 2010; Sun 2016: 83; Fravel 2019). In 1975, the PRC conducted a series of successful satellite launches, which culminated in the successful launching of the PRC's intercontinental ballistic missile Dongfeng 5 in 1980 (Lewis & Xue 1988: 213–214). While the PRC achieved a credible second-strike capability around this time (Sagan & Waltz 1995), official threat assessments were reduced in 1975. Even though a world war between the superpowers was still deemed inevitable, the PRC being involved within the next 3–5 years was considered unlikely (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008: 388–389).

Deng placed the military in last place among the 'four modernizations.' The force reductions that this modernization entailed had some impact on the nuclear field. More than 40 development programmes for advanced weaponry were postponed or cancelled in the 1980s (Huang 2004). This was characterized as 'dropping off the horse.' The PRC's nuclear scientists argued that its nuclear technology was decades behind the U.S. for instance, obsolete and useless, the threat of nuclear war was diminishing in the international situation, the previous preparation for nuclear war in the 1970s had been extremely costly, funds were needed in other development projects, and a nuclear build-up would not help to keep the PRC's relations with neighbouring countries on a good footing (Zhang 1997).

Indeed, the role of nuclear weapons is not restricted to pure military calculations and deterrence. This was poignantly evident in Mao's talks on nuclear war. In addition to the security objectives of nuclear states' deterrent strategies, a significant political objective exists: the status linked to the possession of nuclear arms is an important element in international influence and diplomatic prestige. Space, ballistic missiles, and nuclear technologies are perceived as reflecting the overall greatness and international standing of a state (Eskelinen 1991: 7). In the PRC, *The Science of Military Strategy* that concerns its military strategy states that nuclear weapons 'embody and reflect a country's comprehensive national power and its level of science and technology. … Nuclear weapons have continuously served as an important mainstay supporting China's position as a major country, and in the future, they will still be an important mark and symbol reflecting China's international position and image' (Shou 2013: 230–231). Before the publication of its military doctrines, PRC leaders often affirmed that nuclear weapons have always been more political than real military weapons. For example, foreign minister Chen Yi stated in the 1960s that 'Producing atomic bombs, missiles and supersonic aircraft would put me, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a better position!,' and that 'without that bomb I cannot be very firm at the negotiation table' (quoted in Ji 1999a: 85 from Wang 1978: 2–5). Mao's comment, 'I hear that with such a big thing, if you do not have it, then others will say that you do not count. Fine, we should build a few' (Mao 1999: 374) illustrates the acknowledgement of the political power of nuclear weapons, yet is in contrast to the worries of anti-nuclear macrosecuritization.

Accordingly, Mao had a consistent view that nuclear weapons were not as terrifying as they were made to be by state and non-state actors. In late 1954, for example, he noted to the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, that the socialists would survive a nuclear war while the imperialists would be wiped out (Zhai 1994: 8–11). In a similar vein, Mao's speech at the 1957 Moscow Conference suggested that a nuclear third world war would lead to the victory of socialism (Mao 1986): 'the imperialists will be hit completely, [and] the whole world will become socialist.' This speech was not received well by Khrushchev, who deemed Mao's views on nuclear weapons as naive and dangerous. Subsequently, Khrushchev recanted the secret agreement to supply the PRC with a nuclear bomb in 1959. Concomitantly, the world's largest technology transfer programme ended with the withdrawal of 1,400 Soviet experts in 1960 (Paltemaa & Vuori 2009). Smaller socialist parties voiced their disagreement with Mao's view, too: the smaller socialist countries would be destroyed in a nuclear war, even if some Chinese might survive (Khrushchev 1974: 256).

The difference in Mao's view on nuclear weapons becomes even clearer when his position is compared with Soviet pronouncements. Stalin was impressed and worried about the power of the atomic bomb on a macroscale: 'Atomic weapons can hardly be used without spelling the end of the world' (quoted in Montefiore 2005: 601). Georgii Malenkov, a member of the Triumvirate after Stalin, warned that a world war fought with thermonuclear weapons would entail 'the end of world civilization' (Holloway 1996: 336–337). He was subsequently dismissed for such defeatism. Yet, when it was his time to be on the hot seat, the prospects of nuclear war worried Khrushchev to the extent that he was unable to sleep until he came to the resolution that nuclear weapons could never be used. To an American peace envoy in 1962, he noted, 'If we do not have peace and the nuclear bombs start to fall, what difference will it make whether we are Communists or Catholics or Capitalists or Chinese or Russians or Americans? Who could tell us apart? Who will be left to tell us apart?' (quoted in Cousins 1972: 45–46). Indeed, in Khrushchev's view, 'Marxist-Leninists … cannot think to build a communist civilization on the ruins of the world's cultural centres' (quoted in Richter 1992: 287).

In contrast to most other nuclear leaders (Tannenwald 2007), Mao had a consistently cavalier attitude towards nuclear war. Indeed, while the PRC has been officially against nuclear weapons, the basis for the viewpoint goes against anti-nuclear macrosecuritization. The criticism of nuclear weapons by the PRC has been more about nuclear weapons as tools of imperialism rather than as an existential threat to humanity. In the words of Mao:

> The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it is not. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.
>
> (Mao 1969 [1946])

Even though Mao identified banning nuclear weapons as the will of all humanity, he did not base this will on the negative consequences of nuclear war. Even if the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) would be destroyed, humanity would prevail:

> If the U.S. or other imperialists refuse to reach an agreement on the banning of atomic and nuclear weapons and should dare to fly in the face of the will of all humanity in launching a war using atomic and nuclear weapons, the result will be the speedy destruction of these monsters. … On the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create with extreme rapidity a civilization thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves.
>
> (*South China Morning Post* (SCMP) 2788: 32)

Statements such as these showed that Mao did not present nuclear weapons as leading to the destruction or extinction of humanity (Xu 2016: 21, 25). In his speech at the Moscow Conference in 1957, Mao (1986) stated that foreign politicians think 'that humans will become extinct if an atomic war were to break out. I said, in an extreme case, half of the people will die, but there would still be another half of them.' Even in conjunction with its first nuclear test (*Xinhua* 1964a), the PRC stated that it

> is developing nuclear weapons not because it believes in their omnipotence nor because it plans to use them. On the contrary, in developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Indeed, this position is closer to desecuritizing the danger of such weapons as a threat to humanity or civilization.

This attitude did not go unnoticed in the U.S. either. Indeed, Mao's comments on and reaching for the 'bomb' also worried President Kennedy, who made inroads into possible joint U.S.-USSR action against the PRC at the Vienna summit in 1961 (Scott 2007: 47). The PRC was also a hastening factor in bringing about the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 that was viewed there as being aimed at 'limiting China's nuclear-weapons development' (*People's Daily* 1962). Kennedy asked to insert nuclear weapons into the mix of planning action against the PRC's nuclear plans in 1963, as China's developing nuclear weapons would be 'potentially a more dangerous situation than any we have faced since the end of the Second World War, because the Russians pursued in most cases their ambitions with some caution' (MacFarquhar 1972: 200). Such views are also exemplified by a statement of the U.S. assistant secretary of state for the Far East in 1963 (Hilsman 1964: 309): The PRC 'remains wedded to a fundamentalist form of Communism, which emphasises violent revolution, even if it threatens the physical ruin of the civilized world. It refuses to admit there are common interests which cross ideological lines.' President Johnston,

however, dropped the plans for preventive military action in 1964, even though Chiang Kai-Shek's wife suggested strikes against the Communists before their capabilities would become too strong (Scott 2007: 49). The U.S. turned instead to the planning of missile defences that would block the PRC's nuclear attacks (Freedman 2003: 266–267), which is still a source of acrimony on the Chinese side today (e.g., Zhen 2001, Xia 2015: 169–170, and Lu 2016: 138–139).

Especially after the Cuban missile crisis, the political leaderships of the U.S. and Soviet Union were acutely aware of the dangers of the nuclear Damocles sword over their heads. In that sense, they were at times aligned with the anti-nuclear macrosecuritization while still not making it their policy beyond setting up guardrails to prevent the accidental outbreak of a nuclear war. Mao, though, remained adamant in dismissing nuclear war as a disaster for the PRC. Mao's belittling of nuclear weapons was in accordance with the people's war (人民战争, *rénmín zhànzhēng*) strategy, which instead emphasized the value of the PRC's vast resources of labour ('rifles plus millet'). As morale and political indoctrination were of utmost importance for the strategy, Mao had to make an effort not to let the people give in to fatalism that would be caused by an overemphasis on the destructive force of nuclear weapons. Indeed, when the destruction brought by nuclear weapons was played up in the *Jiefang Daily* in 1945, Mao admonished the paper for the political error of producing an atmosphere of terror (Liu 2016: 151).

In fact, warnings of a nuclear world war destroying the world were considered reactionary in 1960s China (Powell 1965: 61). This meant that the anti-nuclear macrosecuritization discourse was actually institutionally securitized. Nuclear blackmail and threats were countered in Mao's strategy through denial, as the PRC had no credible second-strike capability for a long time. In such a situation, emphasizing the force of nuclear weapons could have demoralized the population a situation where the PRC could not do much about it (Ryan 1989: 17). Indeed, in 1961, Chinese military leaders maintained that the PRC could not be defeated by long-range nuclear weapons even if combined with chemical and biological weapons (Powell 1965: 59).

Such examples show how the PRC's official anti-nuclear views have gone against the premises of international anti-nuclear macrosecuritization. Indeed, looking for anti-nuclear macrosecuritization in official discourse or collected works of key politicians produces a null result. It is, therefore, prudent to examine views on other nuclear weapon issues in the PRC to see how their logic and argumentation proceed there.

China's Nuclear Weapon Policies

The nuclear policies of nuclear weapon states consist of multiple elements. To be able to discern the logic and rationales of such policies, we need a quick overview of the PRC's position on non-proliferation and nuclear ban treaties, its multilateral non-proliferation diplomacy, its views on nuclear deterrence, its unique NFU pledge as an NPT-recognized nuclear weapon state, and the

bureaucratic logic in the nuclear weapon field. Because the PRC has stated that it promotes the abolishment of nuclear weapons, it makes sense to look for anti-macrosecuritization moves from such places. This overview will show, however, that while in line with the end goal of anti-nuclear macrosecuritization, nuclear weapons are not considered threats to humanity here either. Furthermore, the PRC's stance on nuclear weapons and their perennial possession has become normalized.

Non-Proliferation and the Nuclear Ban Treaty

Even though nuclear weapons are recognized as status symbols and are admired in some countries, they have nonetheless been perceived as hegemonic in the non-industrial world and, accordingly, the NPT has been bitterly criticized for its discriminating 'have and have-nots' nature, especially by India, and the PRC before Deng Xiaoping took over (Guo 2016; Fan 2016: 200, 204–205). Indeed, the NPT was presented as 'part of a joint anti-China conspiracy' … 'to limit China's influence' by the superpowers (*People's Daily* 1966). Similarly, the PRC has argued that it developed nuclear weapons precisely to counter hegemonic aspirations, the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers, and that it supports the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. In the words of Zhou:

> Our doing this (developing nuclear weapons) is to break the nuclear monopoly and blackmail. We want to have the two superpowers feeling constrained. Ideally, we hope our effort to succeed so as to stop nuclear war and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. […] Nuclear weapons in our possession are not for scaring people, therefore it is not the more the better. Still, we need some quantity, some quality, and some varieties.
>
> (Zhou [1998: 661])

In its nuclear disarmament policies, the PRC is still officially in line with the anti-nuclear stance with its call for the abolition of nuclear weapons: 'The complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear weapon free world is the common aspiration of the international community and an unswerving goal for China' (Pang 2013). While not using a macrosecuritization argument, official statements present the abolishment of nuclear weapons as being in the interest of the whole of humanity: 'Eliminating the danger of nuclear war, and ultimately the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the attainment of a nuclear weapon free world, serve the common interests and benefits of humankind' (United Nations 2017c). Furthermore, the PRC promotes 'the principles of "maintaining global strategic balance and stability" and "undiminished security for all;"' nuclear disarmament should 'be pursued in a step by step manner' (United Nations 2017c; see also China & France & Russian Federation & United Kingdom & United States 2015 and Fu 2019). Furthermore, states should pursue a minimal deterrent role for nuclear

weapons in national security strategies (Pang 2013) or even stop relying on nuclear deterrence based on first use altogether (United Nations 2017c).

Indeed, the PRC's official view on nuclear disarmament has followed the logic of first establishing a system of NFU of nuclear weapons, which would work as the foundation for a system of no-use of nuclear weapons. Once such arrangements would have diminished the role of nuclear weapons in states' strategies, they could eventually be abolished and destroyed through a negotiated process. The PRC also emphasized that both superpowers should take the lead in nuclear disarmament. (Wang 2016: 104–105.) As even the first step of this staggered approach has failed to materialize, the PRC's efforts have been rather stymied in nuclear disarmament. Irrespective of its success, this line still allows it to maintain its moral position on the issue.

This is perhaps why the PRC did not oppose the United Nations (UN) general assembly mandating the negotiation of a nuclear ban treaty like the other NPT-recognized nuclear states but abstained from the vote together with India and Pakistan (Zhao & Wang 2017: 1; Ruff 2018: 236). While the PRC remained outside the negotiations as such, even the statement of this decision followed the long-term line of supporting the abolishment of nuclear weapons: 'China consistently upholds and actively advocates a final comprehensive ban on and destruction of nuclear weapons, which is fundamentally in line with the purposes of negotiation on the nuclear weapon ban treaty' (MoFA 2017b). This statement abides by the PRC's position that it will retain nuclear weapons as long as other states keep them (Liu 2018: 499) and that the responsibility for nuclear disarmament is on the states that have the largest nuclear stockpiles (United Nations 2017c).

Accordingly, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted that 'China also believes that realizing disarmament, which cannot be achieved overnight, must be pressed ahead in a gradual and incremental way following the principle of safeguarding global strategic stability and compromising the security of no country' (MoFA 2017b). This position has been reiterated in joint statements of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states when presenting their opposition to the nuclear ban treaty (e.g., Permanent representation of France to the Conference on Disarmament 2018 and Fu 2019). Indeed, despite its decades-long call for disarmament and the abolishment of nuclear weapons, the PRC is acting in accord with the other nuclear states in emphasizing the maintenance of strategic stability based on nuclear weapons, even if it is less vocal in doing so individually (Krasno & Szeli 2021: 124). This discrepancy may present a new dilemma for the PRC in nuclear disarmament, where it has previously presented itself as standing with the non-nuclear states (Pan 2018: 134).

Indeed, the PRC has begun to stand closer to the nuclear states group in other policy matters. For example, the 'strategic balance' that is favoured in Perm-5 (the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council [UNSC] statements) became part of the PRC's discourse on nuclear disarmament in 2009, when it was connected to the PRC's position of promoting NFU pledges from all nuclear weapon states. This notion was later appended with

'strategic stability' and 'undiminished security' for all, where nuclear deterrence should remain stable. (Lu 2016: 128–130.) Like with many other aspects of the PRC's nuclear discourse, the adoption of this terminology and position represents the normalization of nuclear weapons into its international relations and the PRC's positions in such constellations. The normalization also works against nuclear macrosecuritization.

China's Multilateral Non-Proliferation Diplomacy

The PRC had not been a vocal opponent of proliferation before joining the NPT. Accordingly, the nuclearization of the DPRK had not been a grave concern in the PRC, as North Korea was not considered a threat, and its nuclear weapons would not be aimed at the PRC. A nuclear DPRK might provoke proliferation in South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan though, which would be a grave issue for the PRC (Chu & Lin 2008: 31.) To show its new commitment to the NPT, deploy its 'new concept of security' (see Chapter 2), and be a 'responsible great power' in a multilateral setting (Paltiel 2007: 97), the PRC hosted the six-party talks that aimed at curtailing the DPRK's nuclear ambitions in the early 2000s. Indeed, stabilizing the North Korean situation would have been a great step towards a 'harmonious world' that was the foreign policy lead of Hu Jintao's administration. As the concern of the talks was non-proliferation, they are among the possible stages where anti-nuclear macrosecuritization could be found.

Although the PRC and the DPRK had been close comrades since the Korean War, domestic views in the PRC on how the nuclear issue should be handled were not uniform. At one end of the spectrum, there were views that suggested abandoning the North to have regime change there, to use this new position to enhance relations with the South and, thereby, reduce the influence of the U.S. on the peninsula. At the other end were views where a nuclear North Korea was seen positively as a hedge against the U.S., particularly on the issue of Taiwan. The official line was more accommodating of the status quo and relied on the U.S. providing security guarantees for North Korea in exchange for denuclearization (Paltiel 2007: 98–99).

The talks that were hosted in Beijing consisted of several rounds. The fourth one in 2005 produced a joint statement 'for the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia at large' (BBC News 2005). The statement affirmed the commitment of the parties to the denuclearization of the peninsula, the promotion of peace and sovereignty of the DPRK together, with the promotion of security cooperation in Northeast Asia. As such, the nuclear issue was considered a regional concern in the joint statement.

When the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, despite its commitments to the talks, the PRC's reaction was stark and condemning. The PRC was explicit on both states not having a military alliance despite their previous half-century of 'comradery' (Chu & Lin 2008: 32). The PRC even joined the vote for sanctions against the DPRK in the UNSC (2006). The spread of

nuclear weapons, in general, was declared 'a threat to international peace and security.' In contrast, the North Korean instance of it was declared a danger 'to peace and stability in the region and beyond' and 'a clear threat to international peace and security' (UNSC 2006). These are textbook examples of how the UN securitizes issues. As is usual for the UN, the referent was international peace and security, not the physical survival of humanity (Bothe 2008).

As such, while the six-party talks were a showcase for the PRC's new multilateral form of diplomacy that deployed its new foreign policy dictums and altered the tradition of PRC-DPRK relations, no anti-nuclear macrosecuritization moves were evident in the talks, Chinese views on the issue, or even UNSC resolutions.

China's Deterrence Policies

The PRC's approach to nuclear deterrence has baffled many, mostly U.S., observers and scholars that adhere to the idealistic expectations of Political Realism in regard to how nuclear weapons states should behave (e.g., Christensen 2012 and Johnson 2019). It is, however, consistent with the PRC's overall political lines not to copy the nuclear policies of the 'imperialists.' There is a distinction in the PRC between nuclear policy (核政策, *hé zhèngcè*) that sets the parameters for the PRC's nuclear strategy and forces, and nuclear strategy (核战略, *hé zhànlüè*) that deals with operational questions and abides by the tenets of the policies set by the political leadership (Fravel 2019: 254). Accordingly, the PRC's overall nuclear policy has had three main impacts on its nuclear strategy (Fravel 2019: 255): 1) nuclear policy defines the political goals and purposes of nuclear weapons, 2) the policy lines on nuclear weapons contain clear guidelines for the nuclear strategy, like the NFU pledge that has had constraining effects on the PRC's nuclear force posture, and 3) the policy has resulted in an overriding emphasis on the survivability of the PRC's ability to strike back after having been hit by a first strike. Indeed, according to *The Science of Military Strategy* (Shou 2013: 235): 'being able to carry out an effective nuclear counterstrike is the foundation of effective nuclear deterrence.' This has led some to conclude that 'assured retaliation' captures the essence of China's strategic position better than different notions of deterrence (Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 51; Fravel 2019: 238).

In academic discussions, the PRC's deterrence policy has often been characterized as minimum deterrence (Lewis 2007) or, more controversially, limited deterrence (Johnston 1995a). In both accounts, it is seen as belonging to the camp where deterrence is thought to be easily achievable with only a relatively small number of nuclear weapons. Still, while there is a large literature that keeps on speculating on the PRC's nuclear weapon prospects, Chinese notions of deterrence as such have received scarce attention (Blasko 2017: 335).

The PRC's stated goal is to develop a 'lean but effective' nuclear deterrent (Li 2016: 13; Fravel 2019: 261; Saunders 2020: 185). Leanness here is thought to refer to a small number of weapons and their high quality. In contrast,

effectiveness is thought to refer to their ability to achieve deterrence (Sun 2016: 84). The PRC has called on other states (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna 2012), particularly the U.S., to 'abandon its nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons' (e.g., Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna 2017). Similarly, the PRC's nuclear forces are presented as not being a part of any arms races but as being the means to have an 'assured retaliation' (Li 2016: 13) or the 'minimum means of reprisal' (Sun 2016: 83).

Theories and concepts of nuclear deterrence derive from U.S. academic discussions, and for a long time, Chinese practitioners have avoided using the concept of deterrence entirely (Lewis 2009: 198). Instead, terms like 'dog-beating stick' (打狗棍, *dǎ gǒu gùn*) (Liu 2018), 'minimum means of reprisal' (Nie 1988: 702), 'gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck' (后发制人, *hòufā zhìrén*) (SCIO 1998), and 'the power to strike back' (还手之力, *huánshǒu zhī lì*) (Liu 2018: 496) were favoured in the PRC's discourse.

It was only in the 2000s that deterrence became a common term in nuclear and conventional strategic discourse in the PRC. This was also when the use of deterrence shifted from the point of criticism to a description of its nuclear and conventional strategy (SCIO 2000). Beyond white papers on the PRC's national defence, editions of *The Science of Military Strategy* (Peng & Yao 2001; Shou 2013) contain authoritative views and thinking on nuclear deterrence and policy and their place in military strategy (Chase 2017: 142, 146).

Deterrence has its etymological roots in the Latin verb *deterre*, to frighten (someone) from (something) or away (Freedman 2004: 7). The sense of scaring someone off with a purpose that is contained in the English notion is an important aspect in some translations of the term too (e.g., *Abschreckung* in German or *pelote* in Finnish). The Chinese translation of *weishe* (威慑, *wēishè*), to threaten and subdue carries this element as well.[2] In the 2000s, Chinese military publications emphasized the comprehensiveness, or integration, of the military (军事威慑, *jūnshì wēishè*) or strategic deterrence (战略威慑, *zhànlüè wēishè*). Still, in the early 2000s, deterrence was defined as 'the military conduct of a state or political group in displaying force or showing the determination to use force to compel the enemy to submit to one's volition and to refrain from taking hostile actions or escalating the hostility' (Peng & Yao 2001: 213). Such definitions show how, like in the PRC's diplomatic discourse on deterrence, it was conflated with compellence and was characterized as an 'invasive expansion strategy' (Chase 2017; Blasko 2017).

Indeed, in the 2000s, the diplomatic uses of deterrence changed to make it possible for the PRC to use the notion to describe its policies and reduce its use as a point of criticism (compare SCIO 1998 and SCIO 2006). Accordingly, the 2013 edition of *The Science of Military Strategy* (Shou 2013: 134–135) does not include compellence in its definition of deterrence: 'The fundamental purpose of deterrence is to prevent the other party from doing something harmful

to oneself. Deterrence is intended to convince the adversary that the costs of its actions will outweigh the possible benefits.' Deterrence is also viewed in the sense of an overall or integrated deterrence (整体威慑, *zhěngtǐ wēishè*),[3] and it is a tool for countering hegemonic pursuits rather than for dominating others. This transformation of meaning allowed the PRC to use it as part of its strategy of defence.

Scholars in the PRC have considered nuclear deterrence from the viewpoint of intimidation (Li 2016: 9) and hegemony (Pan 2016: 57). Accordingly, they too have tended to conflate the notions of deterrence and compellence (Schelling 1966; Sechser & Fuhrmann 2013; 2017; Anderson et al. 2019) that are generally kept separate in academic and strategic discussions outside China. This conflation has prompted some to suggest 'coercion' as a better English term for what is meant by how Chinese scholars and diplomats use deterrence (Chase & Chan 2016: 4; Blasko 2017: 341). Irrespective of English academic terminology, this conflation makes it understandable why the PRC eschewed the use of deterrence to describe its policies, why it has criticized the role of nuclear deterrence in the strategies of other states, and why it took so long for it to begin to phrase its conventional and nuclear military capacities in terms of deterrence. Indeed, the criticism of nuclear deterrence has been directed at nuclear compellence and its connection to hegemonic tendencies (Li 2016: 10; Pan 2016: 57; see Chapter 3).

Chinese scholars often emphasize that the U.S. uses its nuclear weapons to threaten and blackmail non-nuclear states (Pan 2016: 57). Recent studies on compellence (Sechser & Fuhrmann 2017; Anderson et al. 2019) have been inconclusive, though, on whether nuclear weapons can be shown to have a compelling effect in conflictual state relations. Some Chinese researchers also point to the difficulty when determining which side of a small-scale conflict first challenged the status quo (Li 2016: 10), whereby deterrence and compellence are considered akin. Still, some see the reason for the conflation of compellence and deterrence in Chinese academia as attributed to 'the shallowness and confusion in understanding the relevant issues' in nuclear strategy internationally (Xu 2016: 41).

The evolution of the PRC's deterrence speech has normalized nuclear weapons in and their possession by the PRC, even if that is in a lean and efficient manner. This suggests dire prospects for the adoption of an anti-nuclear macrosecuritization stance in the future. Still, a distinct feature of its deterrence policies has been the PRC's pledge not to use (NFU) nuclear weapons first. How does this policy appear from the viewpoint of anti-nuclear macrosecuritization?

NFU of Nuclear Weapons by China

The PRC declared that it would 'not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances' when it announced the successful completion of its first nuclear test (*People's Daily* 1964). The PRC is the only Perm-5

member that has given such a consistent unilateral pledge of NFU and non-use against non-nuclear states and has maintained the pledge within the NPT (Zhao & Wang 2017: 3).[4] The PRC has also been trying to get the other Perm-5 to agree to a similar pledge. Still, the others have not been susceptible to the PRC's initiatives[5] (e.g., Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna 2012 and Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna 2017). The origins of this call also go back to the announcements of the PRC's first atomic detonation when it proposed:

> to hold an international summit attended by state leaders, to discuss the issue of comprehensive ban and thorough elimination of nuclear weapons. As the first step, this summit should yield an agreement in which all nuclear and nuclear-developing states commit to not be the first to use nuclear weapons, not to use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon-free states and NWFZs, and not to use nuclear weapons against each other.
>
> (*People's Daily* 1964)

The PRC called on the U.S. and the Soviet Union to give NFU commitments when it joined the UN (Pan 2018: 126). The PRC also brought a set of nuclear disarmament proposals to the UN general assembly in its second special session on disarmament in 1982 (Pan 2016: 66):

> all nuclear states should reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Before reaching this agreement, each nuclear state should unconditionally undertake the non-use of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states and nuclear-free zones; and no-first-use of nuclear weapons on each other at any time and under any circumstances.

After the PRC joined the NPT, it also called for 'security assurances' by nuclear states for non-nuclear states within the NPT process (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations 1995; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland 2006; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna 2012; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna 2017; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations 2017). These too have not been successful.

The NFU is claimed by the PRC to be in line with China's strategic culture, which is presented as defensive by nature (Pan 2016: 56, 58),[6] and to legitimize the PRC's nuclear forces as they are purely defensive by nature (Babiarz 2015; Lu 2016: 131). This concurs with the PRC's position on alliances (see Chapter 3), as it has not extended its deterrence policies beyond its territory. It

is also said to provide the PRC with the moral high ground on the nuclear issue (Pan 2016: 62.) Its decision not to manufacture or deploy the neutron bomb (Sun 2016: 84) is similarly presented as being in line with the NFU policy (Li 2016: 7).

U.S. analysts, especially of the PRC's nuclear policies, have questioned the veracity of its NFU pledge (Pan 2018), interpreted academic and military debates as indications of changing the pledge (Johnston 1996; Ji 1999b), characterized it as a guideline rather than a rule (Christensen 2012: 454), or dismissed it altogether as mere propaganda (Schneider 2009: 244, 256). Such viewpoints find the PRC deviating from the idealistic expectations of how nuclear states should behave and fashion their policies (e.g., Christensen 2012 and Johnson 2019). The continuous complaints about the PRC's no-first-use policy in U.S. and Chinese military publications suggest that the pledge remains firmly in place (Lewis 2009: 205). Indeed, unlike other aspects of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), nuclear doctrine and policy have remained in the hands of civilian leadership and have not been integrated with conventional military strategy (Fravel 2019).

There has been a debate within the PRC on whether it should retain its NFU pledge since its resources and interests have expanded concomitantly with U.S. missile defences. Here, there have been a number of rationales for why the NFU is a problem for Chinese interests and why it should be relinquished. Such debates could logically contain anti-nuclear macrosecuritization.

Some argue that the unconditional adherence to the pledge emboldens the PRC's enemies to use advanced conventional weapons to defeat it (Xu 2016: 38). Other reasons for putting the NFU pledge in the past have included U.S. containment of the PRC, improving its security by standing up to the U.S., and improving the PRC's deterrent in a conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan (Pan 2018: 132). Such viewpoints agree with the nationalist vein in the PRC that has presented its foreign policies as too accommodating and are blatantly against the macrosecuritization view.

In contrast, some Chinese researchers in the 1990s and 2000s argued for the PRC abandoning nuclear weapons altogether to enhance its moral standing and security interests (Pan 2016: 68). Furthermore, such viewpoints have pointed out that international competition has shifted from military to economic forms, the maintenance of nuclear weapons wastes national security resources, and the PRC would become a moral example by abandoning nuclear weapons, which would also enhance its image as a peace-loving nation (Pan 2016: 69; Pan 2018: 130–131). Scholars that have argued for retaining nuclear weapons and the NFU pledge have argued that the PRC's commitment to this line has strengthened the nuclear taboo, kept it out of unnecessary nuclear arms races, and made it unnecessary to keep the PRC's nuclear forces in a constant alert status[7] (Pan 2016: 63–64). Of interest, none of these viewpoints presents nuclear weapons as a threat to humanity and does not argue for the PRC to abandon its nuclear weapons with a macrosecuritization argument.

What is the situation within lower levels or branches of the Chinese party-state, could there be some bureaucratic logic that would abide by anti-nuclear securitization?

Bureaucratic Logics in China's Nuclear Policies

Sagan (Sagan & Waltz 1995 49) noted that the biases, routines, and parochial interests of military organizations rather than the 'objective' interests of the state influence even nuclear policy in states where the military has a powerful effect on the civilian leadership. Indeed, deterrent policies can have other political goals (Freedman 2004: 59), like the justification, burdening, and prevention of political moves (Lupovici 2010: 723), the rationalization of defence decision-making structures and budgets (Dillon 1989: 96), or even the maintenance of a self-identity (Lupovici 2016b).What seems to be the case in the PRC, and how much of an effect does the PLA have on the PRC's nuclear security policy?

While the U.S. military industrial complex has been the focus of many studies, there is no comparable study of the internal drivers of the PRC's nuclear weapon policy (Heginbotham et al. 2019: 539). Nevertheless, it appears that the nuclear arm of the PLA has had a different dynamic from the overall development of party–military relations. Indeed, nuclear policy, and thereby, the constraints and limits of nuclear strategy, have remained more strongly within the premier leadership (Fravel 2019). This has remained so even when the general trend has been to make the PLA more professional, whereby its influence on overall military strategy has increased (Ji 2002).

The earliest bureaucratic involvement in nuclear affairs in the PRC was in the form of special commissions (the National Defence Industry Special Commission, 国防工业专门委员会, *guófáng gōngyè zhuānmén wěiyuánhuì*) that oversaw the development of nuclear energy and the PRC's weapon programmes. In the 1950s, this special commission had three members, but in the 1960s, it was expanded to 15 to deal with weapon development, which later included missiles, satellites, and submarines (Sun 2016: 80; Heginbotham et al. 2019: 548–549). While Mao held the overall reigns of the PRC's early nuclear policy, Zhou was specifically in charge of the Central Special Commission (中央专门委员会, *zhōngyāng zhuānmén wěiyuánhuì*).

After Zhou passed away, Hua Guofeng took over the leadership of the Special Commission in 1976 (Sun 2016: 81). The highest political leadership has since reduced its role within the Special Commission. It has instead regulated nuclear weapon issues through the PLA (Heginbotham et al. 2019: 550). However, the lines adopted in the 1960s have not changed and have remained remarkably consistent to date: nuclear weapons have a limited utility that mainly concerns symbolic power politics and countering nuclear coercion. This has also meant that assured retaliation has been deemed sufficient as a policy, and nuclear weapons have not been integrated with conventional fighting strategies (Fravel 2019: 237).

The CTBT negotiations in the 1990s, together with the PRC joining the NPT, required new types of expertise on nuclear-related international issues, which catalyzed the development and eventual publication of the PRC's nuclear policies beyond comments by the top leadership (Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 72–73). This culminated in the 2006 White Paper on National Defence that comprehensively outlined the PRC's nuclear doctrine publicly for the first time (SCIO 2006). The CTBT process also exhibited some internal positions within the bureaucracies, as the MoFA and PLA had different viewpoints on the relevance of the treaty for the PRC.

The responsibilities of the PLA and MoFA have been distinctly separated, but the increase in the grey area between foreign and military affairs has also led to some political battles and deadlocks (Swaine 1996; Zhang 1999). The attitudes concerning signing the CTBT were roughly divided between the 'political' and 'military' lines. The civilian officials contested that signing the treaty was in the long-term interests of the PRC (beneficial for the NPT, creates a better international environment for economic development, could lead to further arms reductions in the U.S. and Russia, and would contribute to the PRC's positive great power image) even though it would put constraints on the development of the PRC's deterrent forces. On the other hand, the military was troubled about the constraining effects of the treaty (Zhen 2001: 46–47). In effect, the PRC continued testing throughout the deliberation process and made demands that slowed the process down. After its last test, the PRC dropped its demands, which suggests that the political decision to sign had been made in the initial phases. (Johnston 1998a: 279; Gill & Medeiros 2000: 43.)

The bureaucratic interests of the MoFA and PLA collide in the PRC's arms control policies overall, as the MoFA has to deal with the negative diplomatic effects of arms sales, and the PLA gains funds and influence. The trend in arms control has gone in the MoFA's direction, though, with the establishment of a special department for arms control in the ministry in 1997. The transition period in arms control and non-proliferation policymaking – which was characterized by debates, tension, pluralization, and organizational change – led to a situation where there were no clear lines of authority. In this situation, the PLA retained a powerful influence due to its expertise in the field, even though the formal decision-making power shifted to the civilian side.[8] Despite this trajectory, it would appear that the PRC's non-proliferation policies are currently driven more by economic, political, image, prestige, and relative security gain considerations rather than narrow technical, military, or absolute security gain considerations (Fan 2016: 196).

The overall goals for nuclear policy are defined by the premier leadership; however, the actual implementation is the role of the PLA. Different sections of the military have shown greater demand for and effect in bureaucratic influence. The main dispute has been between the General Staff Department (GSD) and the Navy (PLAN). The Second Artillery that oversaw the PRC's nuclear forces was not a strong bureaucratic factor (Fravel & Medeiros 2010; Fravel

2019). Still, the Second Artillery may not have had to exert great pressure, as it received favoured budgetary treatment ever since its inception (Ji 1999a).

Nuclear deterrence remains the foundation that the PRC's security policy rests on. The Second Artillery, or Strategic Missile Forces (People's Liberation Army Rocket Force [PLARF]) since 31 December 2015, when it was elevated from a military branch to a military service (Heginbotham et al. 2019: 55), continues to receive favoured treatment in military budgets. This transformation made the PLARF its own service level military branch. In his announcement of the creation of the PLARF, Xi noted that 'The Rocket Force is our country's core strategic deterrent force; it is the strategic support for our country's major power status; and it is an important foundation for safeguarding our nation's security' (*People's Daily* 2016*a*). During an inspection of the forces later in 2016, Xi stated that they were the 'core of strategic deterrence, a strategic buttress to the country's position as a major power, and a cornerstone on which to build national security' (*Xinhua* 2016). Indeed, PLARF has continuously increased its importance and position within the PLA, which has been reflected in the promotion trend of its generals (Heginbotham et al. 2019: 548, 551).

Other leading PLA defence policy organs that influence nuclear issues include the GSD, the Academy of Military Science (AMS), and PLAN (Swaine 1998: 51). There is not a lot of information on the specific views and influences on nuclear weapons policy, however. Still, none seem to follow the logic of anti-nuclear securitization either.

Anti-Nuclear Sentiments in Chinese Civil Society

The international anti-nuclear macrosecuritization discourse has mainly been driven by NGOs and retired nuclear politicians. Have there been such movements in the nascent and constrained civil society of the PRC?

As such, the anti-nuclear stance has not been prominent in Chinese civil society. This is understandable, as the international anti-nuclear movement and its arguments beyond peace propaganda were considered reactionary in the 1960s (Powell 1965). In the 1950s, though, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did organize three peace signing mass campaigns (和平签名运动, *hépíng qiānmíng yùndòng*) that opposed war and the use of atomic bombs. Yet, even these were against nuclear weapons because they were imperialistic rather than threats to humanity, as indicated by the slogans of the 1955 campaign: 'Oppose U.S. imperialist hegemony; Oppose the use of nuclear weapons' (看得见的历史 2020).

There were three 'peace signature campaigns' in 1950, 1951, and 1955 that responded to the call of the Standing Committee of the World Congress for the Defence of Peace and the WPC 'to sign signatures for world peace' (Zhang 2019). The WPC was established by Poland in 1948 but was soon taken over by the Soviet Union as a propaganda tool. The call for signatures was initiated by the Stockholm Appeal of the WPC, which proposed the ban on nuclear weapons (Forster 2020). The overall theme of the PRC's

campaigns, which were operated by the Chinese Committee of the Council for the Protection of World Peace (中国保卫世界和平大会委员会, *zhōngguó bǎowèi shìjiè hépíng dàhuì wěiyuánhuì*),[9] concerned 'opposing war and banning nuclear weapons' (看得见的历史 2020). The stated aim was to prevent 'the outbreak of new large-scale wars of aggression and the use of atomic bombs' (Zhang 2019). The emphasis on aggressive war, which was part of the propaganda directives of the campaign, was a modification to the Stockholm Appeal that focused more on banning nuclear weapons (Forster 2020: 260). The *People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao* 1950) was deeply involved in the campaign that collected over 200 million signatures (Zhang 2019) (even if many were faked) (Forster 2020).

As such, the 1950s anti-nuclear propaganda was against imperialism and war rather than against atomic weapons as threats to humanity. Indeed, the campaign and Mao's belittlement of nuclear weapons could be seen as efforts to alleviate the fear of nuclear weapons, or at least to turn their terror into manageable fear (cf., Oakes 1994; Davis 2007 on the U.S. means to achieve this). Indeed, the 1955 campaign included slogans to this effect: 'We are against war, but we are not afraid of war, we are against the use of nuclear weapons, but we are not afraid of nuclear weapons either' (看得见的历史 2020).

The first non-governmental and non-Party anti-nuclear protests took place in Xinjiang in the 1980s in response to the PRC's atmospheric nuclear tests (Burns 1985). The PRC conducted its airburst nuclear tests in a site named Lop Nor in Xinjiang. These were carried out between 1964 and 1980, even after the U.S. and the USSR had set up the Partial Test Ban Treaty that banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. Protests in 1982 presented the claim that Uyghurs were being exterminated, as evidenced by the nuclear tests (BBC Summary 1982). In 1985, some 2,000 students protested in Urumqi with questions about 'the possibility of pollution caused by the nuclear tests in Xinjiang,' the improvement in minorities' education, and the PRC's family planning policies (*AP News* 1986). Uyghurs protested the issue in Beijing, Shanghai, and Xinjiang (Burns 1985). In 1989, a group of students demanded an end to the test, among other demands, in the Great Hall of the People in Urumqi (Rodríguez 2013: 136–137). The authorities did not have a stark response to the protest but merely reassured the protesters that the tests did not have any harmful effects on the people or their health. Once again, the protests were not about nuclear weapons or their testing or as a threat to humanity that would entail macrosecuritization moves but about legitimate local health concerns.

The PRC has not conducted nuclear tests since 1996. Still, nuclear tests have been the topic of protest more recently, when the 'China Civil Anti-Nuclear Club' staged a protest outside the Consulate General of the DPRK in Shenyang in February 2013 (中国人权双周刊 2014). The director general of the NGO had written a protest letter in support of UN resolutions that demanded Kim Jong-Un to immediately cease nuclear testing. This letter was followed by a placard demonstration outside the consulate. There was a further

event in Guangzhou that protested against the North Korean testing and 'nuclear blackmail against China and the world' (中国民间反核俱乐部2013; 中国人权双周刊 2014).

After these, protesters were arrested on charges of illegal assembly, the Chinese Civil Anti-Nuclear Club demanded the immediate and unconditional release of anti-nuclear activists and called on all people to protest against North Korea's nuclear blackmail and the authorities' suppression of anti-nuclear activists (中国民间反核俱乐部2013). The testing was presented as 'bringing unpredictable and disastrous consequences to the lives and health of the people in Northeast China and the production and living environment of the people in Northeast China,' which was considered 'a blatant provocative act and nuclear terrorist activity' (中国民间反核俱乐部 2013). The Anti-Nuclear Club has since become censored online on the mainland.

Ta Kung Pao also published an article that was critical of the PRC's position on North Korean testing in the spring of 2013. It argued that 'North Korea's nuclear weapons not only pose a threat to regional security' but that an accident caused by a nuclear test 'is enough to have a disastrous impact on China's ecological environment and people's health' (沈旭晖 2013). These protests and critical articles were not based on anti-nuclear macrosecuritization but on more locally based concerns and referents.

In contrast to the sporadic and suppressed protest against nuclear testing, there have been more consistent and successful anti-nuclear energy protests in the PRC. Overall, the government positions and media presentations of nuclear energy have been positive, and nuclear energy has been offered as one solution to combat climate change (Wang et al. 2014; Sheng 2019). This may be why anti-nuclear concerns in mainland society were negligible until the 2010s, even though there had been such movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong (Grano and Zhang 2019). The PRC's first nuclear power plant went into operation in the mid-1980s; by the mid-2010s, it had 17 plants in operation, 30 under construction, with the goal of reaching 100 by 2020 (Sun & Zhu 2014; Fan 2016; Grano and Zhang 2019). The fast expansion in nuclear facilities, coupled with the Fukushima nuclear disaster, resulted in a number of anti-nuclear energy protests in the 2010s. Some of these were successful in cancelling the nuclear project under protest (Huang & Sun 2016; Sheng 2019; Grano and Zhang 2019).

The anti-nuclear energy campaigns utilized a combination of online opinion and mobilization (Huang & Sun 2016) with street protests and petitions (Sheng 2019). The argument for protest concerned mainly environmental (pollution), economic (reduction of tourism and reduced real-estate value), safety regulation (too near populated areas), individual concerns for safety (radiation hazard), and a general lack of trust in the capacity of local officials (corruption) (Huang & Sun 2016). As such, the protests were more about individual projects in a particular place rather than about nuclear energy in general (Sheng 2019). Similarly, the risk frames used in the discourse have been personal and local rather than national or general (Huang & Sun 2016). Indeed, the protests were

more akin to the 'not in my backyard' phenomenon (Sun & Zhu 2014), albeit not in my 'greater area' rather than my *hutong*. No macro-level arguments have been presented in the anti-nuclear energy discourses either. Like many other forms of protest, the focus is on local issues. Furthermore, unlike in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the protests have not been linked to any demands or movements towards democracy (Grano & Zhang 2019).

Accordingly, 'it will be difficult to create a nationwide anti-nuclear movement in China' (Sheng 2019: 390). This includes nuclear weapons, as even academics who have argued for the PRC's unilateral relinquishing of nuclear weapons have been criticized by the general public to the degree that the scholars have disappeared from public view; 'advocating that China unilaterally abandon its nuclear weapons is highly unpopular domestically' (Pan 2016: 70). Even the threat of nuclear proliferation for international security is not strongly stated within Chinese academia (Guo 2016: 178). Such general attitudes suggest that nuclear weapons have been firmly normalized in the PRC.

Analysis: No Anti-Nuclear Macrosecuritization; Rather, the Normalization of Nuclear Weapons

Overall, nuclear weapon states have retained lower-level securitizations at the top of their agenda. This has meant that the universal characteristics of anti-nuclear macrosecuritization suffer, in a way, from the 'tragedy of the commons.' Indeed, achieving success in macrosecuritization is not only dependent on power but the construction of higher-level referent objects for security. Such referent objects need to be able to appeal to and mobilize the identity politics of a range of different actors. It seems that it is more difficult to mobilize actors around a unity of positives than a unity of negatives; for example, the blame for the initiation of a nuclear holocaust is easier to pin on 'them' rather than 'us' (e.g., Kroenig 2018). As such, the absence of a 'matched-pair' in the anti-nuclear securitization discourse has been an impeding factor in this process. Furthermore, many anti-nuclear securitizing actors have lacked the formal capacity to bring about or decide on security policies.

While the overall securitization of nuclear weapons has failed in its goal of abolishment, even though the treaty on their prohibition is in effect in the UN, the PRC's case is more peculiar than most other nuclear weapon states. The PRC opposed nuclear weapons before it procured them itself, maintained this stand in its statement on its first nuclear test, and still promotes their abolishment. The PRC has also opposed the reliance on nuclear deterrence, the main legitimation for nuclear possession in most nuclear states. This persistent position should make the PRC the most anti-nuclear macrosecuritization-prone nuclear-weapon state.

Despite such obvious potential, irrespective of whether we looked at the official discourse on nuclear weapons, aspects of nuclear weapon policy like non-proliferation, multilateral nuclear diplomacy, concepts of deterrence, the pledge of NFU, or bureaucratic logic involved in the nuclear field, we only

find instances of belittlement or even desecuritization of nuclear weapons as a threat to humanity. No moves towards securitizing them were found. Rather, nuclear weapon possession has become normalized in the PRC, which is becoming more in line with other nuclear weapon states, despite the maintenance of its NFU pledge.

We cannot find anti-nuclear macrosecuritization arguments or discourse even in the PRC's civil society, whether in the form of Mao-era mass campaigns that opposed the atomic war or anti-nuclear test student protests in the 1980s or NGO protests in the 2010s. Indeed, taking an anti-nuclear stand was reactionary in Mao's China, and the 1980s and 2010s nuclear testing protests are censored online in mainland China today. Interestingly in light of this, protest against nuclear energy has been more prevalent, is not censored, and has even been successful in halting planned projects. Yet even here, the anti-nuclear argument does not abide by the macro discourse but by local and individual concerns.

In the PRC's discourse during the Cold War, the abolishment of nuclear weapons would have served the inclusive-universalist constellation of anti-imperialism (Table 4.1). In the 2000s, though, this position shifted to one of the existing order universalism where the maintenance of global strategic balance and undiminished security is seen as vital for nuclear disarmament. Both positions have been against the physical threat universalism promoted by the anti-nuclear movement. Indeed, instead of securitizing nuclear weapons as threats to humanity, the PRC's opposition to them has been based on their presentation as the ultimate weapons of hegemony and imperialism. The anti-hegemonic stand (see Chapter 3) has trumped military strategic goals and other concerns, as the nuclear policy that dictates nuclear strategy has remained in the hands of the civilian leadership, unlike the rest of the PRC's military strategy. Accordingly, I would like to argue that even the PRC's nuclear deterrence policy is part of its identity politics.

It has been argued that a state's deterrence speech can become so institutionalized that it becomes part of its self-identity, and deterrence failures become sources of ontological insecurity (Lupovici 2016b). In the case of the PRC, the institutionalization of its deterrence speech has been about anti-hegemony. Furthermore, the conflation of deterrence with compellence or coercion formed peculiar forms of deterrence speech in statements by the leadership and military publication. The PRC's persistence in presenting itself as defensive, peaceful, and non-hegemonic kept the notion of deterrence away from its identity politics for a long time as it was taken as a tool of hegemony when the PRC's identity insisted on anti-hegemony. The normalization of nuclear weapon possession and deterrence into nuclear and conventional military strategy indicates a transformation in the PRC's identity. While still sticking to the anti-hegemonic line, the current discourse also emphasizes notions like strategic balance and stability and the importance of nuclear deterrence when maintaining them. Indeed, the position of nuclear deterrence speech has moved within the PRC's nuclear weapon discourse. This

Table 4.1 Macrosecurity Elements of the PRC's Nuclear Policies

Macrosecuritization discourse	*Types of moves*	*Type of universalism*	*Alignment in constellations*	*View on polarity*	*Bureaucratic logic*
The Anti-Nuclear Movement	No moves	From inclusive to an existing order	From anti-imperial versus imperial to the maintenance of global security balance	From bipolar to multipolar	Security

also indicates that it is less likely that the PRC would, or allow NGOs to, make anti-nuclear securitization moves in the future.

The vast majority of securitization studies, whether of macro or micro referents, have concerned 'successful' securitization moves. There is also a smaller amount of literature on failed securitization moves. The present chapter is the first securitization study where no securitization moves are found, even when they are looked for in the most likely places they could be present over 70 years. Anti-nuclear macrosecuritization in the PRC effectively produces a null result.

I would like to argue that, from a scholarly and theoretical point of view, the existence of this kind of 'silence' on possible 'security issues' like the one analyzed here is positive for the theory of securitization overall: securitization does not appear everywhere, not even everywhere where it could. Regarding theories of action, this means that securitization is a choice and, thereby, an action. In other words, securitization is not deterministic but a political choice, among other possibilities. We can expect a securitization process to emerge, which may prove to be a false hypothesis. Such a possibility of a kind of 'falsification' of securitization assumptions, in my view, increases the explanatory potential of the theory.

Notes

1 The acronym is short for the treaty between the U.S. and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START).
2 Here, the threat of 'overwhelming military force' (威, *wēi*, cf., 威胁, *wēixié*, threaten or imperil) is thought 'to intimidate' (慑, *shè*; cf., 慑服, *shèfú*, to submit because of fear) 'an adversary into submission' (Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 71).
3 Interestingly, the Biden administration's National Defense Strategy also emphasizes integrated deterrence (U.S. Department of Defense 2022).
4 India's draft nuclear doctrine also provided an NFU pledge, even though the official one from 2003 extends nuclear retaliation to attacks with other types of weapons of mass destruction.
5 China and Russia 'have concluded an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other' (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland 2006) though, as part of their 'Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation' from 2001 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (MoFA) 2001).
6 The majority of literature on Chinese strategic culture describes it as defensive, limited, and political by nature. This is due to the Confucian tradition of enculturation rather than occupation or extermination as a security guarantor, as well as classical strategic texts exemplified by Sunzi (2005). Iain Johnston disagrees with the 'pacifist bias' and claims that the Chinese strategic culture is similar to the 'para bellum' nature of strategic culture dominant in the West. Johnston claims that the PRC leadership has a realist world view which could be compared to French Gaullists and American Republican isolationists and that the post-1949 leadership

has applied a non-zero-sum concept of conflict, which has reduced pressures to escalate. Furthermore, the leadership has shown an ability to preserve a strict hierarchy of political goals in the midst of conflict. (Johnston 1998; Burles & Shulsky 2000: Appendix.) Interestingly, the only other NFU nuclear power, India, also bases its pledge on the defensiveness of its strategic culture (e.g., Kanwal 2001).

7 The PRC has a three-tier alert system for its nuclear forces, keeps its warheads separate from their launch platforms, and does not operate space-based early warning systems (Hooda 2020).

8 For a description of the inner and outer constraints on the PRC's non-proliferation policies, see Gill & Medeiros (2000).

9 Strikingly, this committee was eventually in charge of the propaganda effort in the Korean War when it became the Chinese People's Committee for the Protection of World Peace and Resistance against American Aggression (中国人民保卫世界和平反对美国侵略委员会, *zhōngguó rénmíng bǎowèi shìjiè hépíng fǎnduì měiguó qīnlüè wěiyuánhuì*) (Forster 2020: 258).

5 Climate Security with Chinese Characteristics[1]

Global climate change is the third macrosecuritization discourse identified by Buzan & Wæver (2009). As such, climate change can be included as a subset of environmental politics. While some forms of environmental degradation can be catastrophic locally, they may not be of global concern. At the same time, some emissions that contribute to climate change may not be an issue locally yet may end up having global repercussions. Such features have made the securitization of climate change a contentious issue in many places worldwide. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is currently the world's largest source of carbon emissions into the atmosphere. It has been actively engaged in international climate diplomacy but has not been a vocal securitizing actor. The role of environmental protection has gained its position on the political agenda during the Xi Jinping administration. Still, the issue of climate change has its particular trajectory in the PRC. I will begin the examination of the PRC's climate politics with a quick look at the international securitization of climate change.

Macrosecuritization of Climate Change

Environmental issues, in general terms, are among some of the most discussed sectors of 'broadened' or 'new' concepts of security. Not everyone has agreed that the environment should be dealt with in security terms (e.g., Deudney 1990, and Buzan et al. 1998). Perhaps appropriately, environmental security has been a topic of debate in the securitization theory literature (e.g., Trombetta 2008, Floyd 2010, and McDonald 2012). This literature has also explored the relationship between threat construction and risk-based government (e.g., Rothe 2015 and Dietz et al. 2016).

Indeed, some have argued in these debates that climate change is transforming notions of security (Trombetta 2008), while others have contrasted the logic of risk and security (Petersen 2012). Corry (2012) identified the logic of risk in how the problem of climate change was discussed and coined riskification as a concept that distinguishes the logic of defence and deterrence from that of risk in the climate field. Despite this conceptual innovation, research on

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riskification remains scarce (Odeyemi 2021). Even though lighter in its effect than securitization, riskification may still result in forms of depoliticization (Lucke et al. 2014). Risk policies emphasize precaution, risk reduction, and the mitigation of the consequences of the realized risks (Corry 2012). These aim to make the identified magnitude of adversity they face tolerable, which immediately begs the question: tolerable for whom (Diez et al. 2016).

For many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are concerned with global problems, global climate change has been included among the major threats to human civilization. For example, atomic scientists have included it as a major impetus for turning the Doomsday Clock closer to midnight (Vuori 2010): 'the nature – if not the effect of doomsday has changed' (Board of Directors 2007). The mid-2000s showed many indicators of the issue rising onto international security agendas. Examples here include the 4th Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the tabling of climate change on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the awarding of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC and Al Gore (Buzan & Wæver 2009). In addition, the Pugwash process focused on 'broader global security issues' in the post-Cold War era. Global climate change was also considered a major threat there too (Hero's Stone Productions 2007).

Indeed, climate change has been advocated as a global, or in some places, national security issue by numerous NGOs, as well as by the 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2007. For the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2007: 6), 'the battle against dangerous climate change is part of the fight for humanity.' It seems that the IPCC estimates of the likely effects of climate change have given impetus and plausibility to the discourse of climate change as a security issue, whereas previously, the environment was mainly politicized rather than securitized (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003). Climate change has also been on the agenda of the UNSC, where 'everyone's future' was claimed to be at stake (UNSC 2007: 35; Bothe 2008; for development in the UNSC, see Hardt et al. 2023). It even flashed in the 2008 U.S. presidential election, for example when Barack Obama, in his second debate with John McCain on 7 October 2008, stated that energy and climate change should be considered a national security issue. States and institutions vary in how they view and value issues like climate change. For example, global climate change is a security agenda item first and a developmental concern second for the European Union's (EU's) external action service (Odeyemi 2021). In contrast, for the PRC, climate change is an issue of development first and security second.

Indeed, the PRC was less inclined to phrase climate change in security terms in the 2000s. Indeed, it has been against dealing with the issue within the UNSC, favouring the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) instead. For a long time, the PRC refused to bind itself with international emission reduction commitments. However, both positions changed in the latter half of the 2010s, and care for the environment has become a core feature of Xi Jinping's ideological thought. While the environment and climate

change are separate issues in the PRC, it is prudent also to have a longer view of how environmental politics have evolved in the PRC. As such, climate change has mainly been macropoliticized rather than securitized. To get a complete picture of the PRC's alignment with the issue, we must look even further back into the environmental politics of Mao's China.

Climate Politicization in China

Chinese philosophy and many imperial-era rulers revered nature. Indeed, their 'mandate of heaven' was connected to favourable natural phenomena, whereas natural disasters were an indication of the revocation of the mandate to rule (Harris 1976). This connection and reverence are reflected in traditional Chinese architectural forms, such as the Temple of Heaven in Beijing. In contrast, Mao Zedong's approach to the environment was quite militaristic: rather than something to be protected, nature was to be conquered (Shapiro 2001: 3–4). There were many mass campaigns that targeted aspects of nature, like sparrows and insects, for eradication. Massive dams and other infrastructure projects deployed the masses in manual work in brigades that sought the goal of victory over floods or drought to reclaim land for farming or industry. Indeed, Mao can even be characterized as having waged a domestic 'war on nature' (Shapiro 2001). The goal was to increase China's population and harness natural resources to serve national reconstruction and improve the PRC's standing worldwide.

Despite the warring stance domestically, Mao's China did take part in early international environmental politics. This started in 1972 with participation in the UN Conference on the Human Environment, which was the first UN conference where the People's Republic represented China. The PRC's position was to consider environmental degradation the result of imperialism and capitalism, emphasize the industrialized or developing nation dichotomy, and be adamant that international agreements could not jeopardize the PRC's sovereignty or economic development. For example, the delegate at the 1972 UN conference pointed out the main reason for pollution as 'the policy of plunder, aggression and war carried out by imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist countries, especially by the superpowers' (UN 1972: 63). The PRC also opposed the linking of population growth with environmental degradation and food shortages and began promoting its longstanding stance of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' between developed and developing nations regarding the environment (which was still present in the PRC's statement at the UNSC in 2019). This initial meeting is where the PRC's long-term policy line was formed: developing nations should guard their independence and not allow environmental issues to hamper their development goals (Kopra 2016b: 158).

As with many other aspects of the PRC's politics, this two-pronged Maoist legacy informed its environmental and climate politics in the reform era. Indeed, economic growth largely trumped other concerns in the environmental

and, later, climate field. Like in many other policy areas in post-Mao China, a gradual change in the political leadership's approach to the environment is discernible.

At the highest level of political line formation, Jiang Zemin (1997b) was the first to mention the environment in a report at the Party Congress in 1997 and to finally recognize the connection between environmental strain and population growth that Mao's China had denied. While it was soon abandoned, in 2004, Jiang also tried out a system for calculating a 'green GDP' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the PRC that would have monetized the cost of environmental damage in economic production (Pan et al. 2015). Jiang's successor, Hu Jintao (2007), set the building of an 'ecological civilization' as a goal at the 17th Party Congress in 2007. The notion was added to the constitution of the Communist Party at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, and environmental damage and ecological benefits were made assessment criteria in the career development of state officials (Hu 2012). A further step was the establishment of the Environmental Police as a watchdog department under the Environmental Protection Bureaus for the enforcement of environmental protections (Joseph & Karackattu 2022).

Xi Jinping has continued promoting an ecological civilization in the PRC as a major strategic goal, with green development as crucial. The green GDP was relaunched in 2015 (Pan et al. 2015) as part of the policy line of a 'new era of socialist ecological civilization.' More importantly, climate change has been incorporated into the main policy line that has become the mainstay of Xi's ideological formulation of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' that entails many societal aspects by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)

> We must prioritize ecological development and incorporate it into the "five in one" arrangement for socialism with Chinese characteristics, which includes economic, political, cultural, and social development, with a focus on promoting green, cyclical and low-carbon development. These actions will increase the strategic position of combating climate change in China's overall economic and social development.
>
> (NDRC 2013: 2)

In other words, environmental concerns should be included in all aspects of the ideal of Chinese society, economy, and politics, into the main ideological concept of Xi Jinping's thought: protecting the environment and harmony between humans and nature are part of socialist civilization in this new ideological formulation. In this vision, nature is to be guarded rather than fought against, and indicates that the Maoist tradition regarding the environment has been abandoned since the 2010s, and the PRC under Xi has continued to emphasize a 'community of a shared future of humankind' (Hu 2012; Xi 2017a; see Chapter 7). However, climate change is a separate concern that relates to development.

As such statements indicate, there has been a significant change in terms of politicizing nature in the PRC. In Mao's China, nature was to be conquered for economic and other development. In contrast, today, 'harmony between human and nature' (Xi 2017b: 20–22) is an essential part of the current ideological formation that guides the Communist Party and the People's Republic. Indeed, this position and commitment to green development and 'harmony between humans and nature' were reiterated in Xi's 2022 report to the Party Congress as well (Xi 2022a), even if it was not the main thrust of the report.

China's International Climate Politicization

In succinct terms, the PRC's long-term position within the international field of environmental politics can be described as the supremacy of sovereignty, development first, and emphasis on the industrialized or developing nation dichotomy (Chen 2012). The PRC became a net oil importer in the early 1990s, which made energy security more important. Dependence on oil imports has been a perennial cause for concern ever since, as imports exceeded domestic production in 2009 (Nyman and Zeng 2016: 303; Ghiselli 2021: 75–76). This combination of concerns produced the paradoxical situation where the PRC was against internationally binding emission cuts when it made major strides in the development and deployment of emission-reducing technologies and increased the supply of non-fossil fuel energy (Chen 2012; Dent 2014).

As the world's second-largest economy, the PRC consumes much of the world's energy. As it lacks oil reserves, the PRC has grown reliant on foreign oil since the 1990s. At the same time, much of the world's oil comes from volatile regions where the PRC has no real military influence (Marketos 2009). Even the PRC's maritime supply route for Middle Eastern oil exhibits vulnerability, despite the PLAN's efforts to control the South China Sea (Metelitsa & Kupfer 2014). These pressing factors spurred the PRC to seek self-sufficiency in energy production as part of its efforts to reduce its reliance on foreign oil. Realpolitik and green goals aligned.

The leadership formulated responses to this challenge in the 1990s. For example, they commissioned the construction of gigantic hydro dams along the Yangtze River, which was then partly carried out by the Hydroelectric Corp of the People's Armed Police (PAP). Since the 2000s, the leadership has directed vast amounts of investment towards renewable energy. For example, they provided subsidies for firms that manufactured solar panels, prompting a major trade dispute with the EU (*The Guardian* 2012). At the time of writing, the PRC is now the world's top producer of renewable energy (China Central Television [CCTV 2023]). Satellite images have revealed many enormous solar and wind farms across the Gobi Desert. Chinese companies now dominate the global market for solar panels and wind turbines (UNEP 2022). Such developments signal a strong commitment to green politics. Yet, Chinese state companies have announced controversial decisions to expand the use of coal in

energy generation in 2023 (Bloomberg 2023). This would indicate that energy self-sufficiency still trumps concerns for the shared future of humankind.

Still, despite the lacklustre beginning of its international environmental policies and Maoist legacy of warring with nature, post-Mao China has sometimes been quick to ratify some environmental agreements. In accordance with its overall opening up and internationalization policies (Johnston 2003), the PRC has participated in the Montreal Protocol that has aimed to curb ozone depletion since the late 1980s. The issue of climate change rose to prominence in the international arena in the early 1990s, which was a time when the PRC found itself in relative diplomatic isolation after the violent events in 1989 (Vuori 2003; 2018a). This is a partial explanation for the PRC's signing and ratification of the Kyoto Protocols, something that has been described as a triumph for its foreign policy from the viewpoint of its national interests (Chen 2008: 150): the protocol only required emission cuts from developed states, which the PRC was not included in. With the ratification of this major climate policy treaty, the PRC could provide some credibility for its campaign to present itself as a 'responsible great power' (Kopra 2016b).

Beyond its diplomatic success, China's participation in the climate change regime has been a mixed bag in terms of benefits and potential costs. In terms of benefits, the PRC has managed to negotiate its position well regarding economic gains that have followed from emission trade and technology transfers (Chen 2012: 11, 35). Yet, the uncertain future of such commitments has also been viewed as a possible hindrance to the economy: the PRC's per capita emissions are already at the level of the EU (Kopra 2016b: 227) and will likely continue to grow in the future, even as the PRC's economic production model moves away from basic manufacturing. The PRC's heavy reliance on coal in its energy production is another hindrance. In this situation, for a long time, the PRC pushed for only voluntary cuts for developing states and focused on bilateral cooperation agreements that could bring economic benefits.

The Paris Climate Agreement 2015 was a major turning point here, as the PRC committed itself to binding cuts for the first time in a multilateral agreement (Kopra 2019: 110). In preparing for this transition, the PRC made efforts to turn its climate policy into a benefit for the economy rather than a drag. These have aimed to decouple emissions and economic growth (Hernandez & Misalucha-Willoughby 2020), and some even see this as the securitization of economic development (Sahu 2021). The PRC's lead in the production of wind and solar energy power plants is an indicator of success in this policy line. The PRC's changed position regarding its international commitments can be made sense of by examining how it has approached climate security.

Chinese Views on Climate Security

The PRC's discourse on climate change has gradually shifted from developmental concerns towards considering the issue in terms of security. Still, in 2007, the NDRC framed the issue in terms of 'impact' and 'development:'

'climate change has caused some impacts on China,' which included sea level rise, glacial retreat, and changes in seasons; 'climate change is a major global issue of common concern to the international community. It is an issue involving both environment and development, but it is ultimately an issue of development' (NDRC 2007).

In 2008, the white paper on climate change (SCIO 2008) indicated that the PRC was more willing to align itself with the general international trend on issues of climate change by phrasing the issue in terms of threat rather than impact. Yet, while the issue was expressed as a major concern for humanity, the proposed means to tackle it were closer to macropoliticization than macrosecuritization (Buzan & Wæver 2009; Vuori 2011b). In other words, the issue was raised as one of concern but not one of survival that required drastic action. For example, in the foreword to the white paper, the issue is presented as a global 'concern:' 'global climate change and its adverse effects are a common concern of mankind' (SCIO 2008). However, the reason for this challenge to the survival and development of society is placed on the activities of developed nations (SCIO 2008), as was carried out in Mao's China (Kopra 2019). The PRC was depicted as a developing nation, which is adversely affected by climate change that threatens its 'natural ecosystems as well as the economic and social development' (SCIO 2008).

The issue was presented as important and urgent: '[f]ully aware of the importance and urgency of addressing climate change,' and as one having negative impacts on Chinese society in the form of 'augmented threats to the safety of life and property, and to the normal order and stability of social life,' the PRC implemented a national plan to cope with climate change (SCIO 2008). Still, the suggested measures were not extraordinary or exceptional in the way security politics tends to be understood (Buzan et al. 1998) and were in accordance with the then prominent foreign policy line of 'harmonious development' (Vuori 2015b):

> resources conservation and environmental protection, control greenhouse gas emissions and enhance the country's capacity for sustainable development, center on securing economic development and accelerate the transformation of the pattern of economic development, focus on conserving energy, optimizing the energy structure and strengthening eco-preservation and construction, and rely on the advancement of science and technology, increase international cooperation, constantly enhance the capability in coping with climate change, and make new contribution in protecting the world environment.
>
> (SCIO 2008)

Thereby, the authorities did not advocate or strive to legitimize any 'breaking of rules' of international politics via the issue of global climate change. 'Actively participating in worldwide efforts to address climate change' and 'adapting' to climate change (SCIO 2008) could not be considered 'special

politics' beyond the regular bargaining of international relations. Indeed, emphasis was put on the UNFCCC and the Tokyo Protocol as 'the legal foundation for international cooperation in dealing with climate change' that also 'reflect the common understanding of the international community' (SCIO 2008). In terms of securitization theory, these kinds of formulations can be considered politicization rather than securitization.

Documents like the white paper (SCIO 2008) raised the urgency of the climate issue. There was also a broad range of government measures, projects, tax relief, and legislation, and international cooperation and awareness-raising took place (e.g., the 12th Five Year Plan for Environmental Protection [State Council of the People's Republic of China 2011]). Yet, the final boost beyond being an urgent political issue to national or global security was still not part of this formulation. As such, even though climate change was recognized as a major concern for humanity, it was not considered one of security. According to the authorities, a solution to the issue required international economic, technological, and legal cooperation rather than uni or multilateral security measures.

However, 2012 was significant in the PRC, with Hu Jintao stepping down as General Secretary and Xi Jinping taking his place. It was also a crucial year for the PRC's climate politics. The PRC identified the dire effects of climate change on its domestic situation and presented itself as among the states most vulnerable to the adverse effects (NDRC 2012; 2013): 'weather and climate disasters have impacted China's economic and social development as well as people's lives and property in a large degree' (NDRC 2012: 2). Such impacts indeed were not minor, as 'in 2011 alone, natural disasters affected 430 million people and caused direct economic losses of 309.6 billion yuan' (ibid.). Accordingly, the government attached great importance to the issue in the 'mid- and long-term plans for economic and social development.' It made domestically binding decisions to 'reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 percent, cut CO_2 emissions per unit by 17 percent, and raise the proportion of non-fossil fuels in the overall primary energy mix to 11.4 percent' by 2016 (NDRC 2012: 2).

These were not hollow promises, as the PRC had leaped to the leading position in the manufacture and deployment of, for example, wind and solar energy power production (Chen 2012: 51–54). Still, the measures were not legitimated with security logic. Still, with an emphasis on a reduction in the 'negative impact of climate change on economic and social development, production and the people's welfare' (NDRC 2012: 11). Accordingly, in international climate change forums, the PRC's line was still the promotion of the 'principles of fairness and "common but different responsibility"' and to actively safeguard the interests and legitimate development rights of developing countries (NDRC 2012: 24). In the domain of South–South cooperation in the mitigation of climate change, the PRC claimed to operate 'based on the principle of "mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, and being practical and effective"' (NDRC 2013: 60).

In 2013, the PRC under Xi Jinping continued with the line of emphasizing the need to mitigate the dire impacts of climate change without making it an explicit matter of 'security' on the international level:

> the global impact of climate change has become increasingly prominent and posed the most severe challenge to the world. As the global awareness of climate change is gradually increasing, it has become the common aspiration of all nations to tackle climate change.
>
> (NDRC 2013: 3)

The U.S. position was particularly important here. While the PRC and the U.S. were on the opposite side of the development divide, their policies had been fairly similar: avoid constraints on their domestic economy that binding commitments to emission reductions would bring (Nyman 2018).

The similar tones among these states in their climate policies were also evident in their joint declarations on climate change: 'the United States of America and the People's Republic of China recognize that the increasing dangers presented by climate change measured against the inadequacy of the global response require a more focused and urgent initiative' (State Department of the United States of America 2013); 'The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have a critical role to play in combating global climate change, one of the greatest threats facing humanity' (White House Office of the Press Secretary 2014). Yet, even here, the means promoted to deal with this danger fell within overall international politics, not the realm of security, even as the PRC was, for the first time, committed to cuts in its CO_2 emissions. Indeed, rather than an urgent issue of security, 'tackling climate change' was seen to 'strengthen national and international security' (White House Office of the Press Secretary 2014).

The PRC's foreign policy in the 2000s has consistently aimed to avoid the impression that it would be a threat, even as its power resources increase (Vuori 2018a; see Chapter 3): 'China's development does not threaten any other country. No matter what stage of development it reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion' (Xi 2017b: 53). The environment has not been an exception here: the assurances that the PRC does not pose an environmental threat to the world have been part of the PRC striving to present itself as a responsible great power (Kopra 2016a: 20). It seems that states' international images are an important facet of their climate policy: action to curtail climate change by the U.S. and China is crucial to set a 'powerful example that can inspire the world' (State Department of the United States of America 2013). From the viewpoint of the PRC, climate change as foreign policy combines the issues of soft power (image as a responsible power in the climate field) with harder forms of power (economic growth cannot be jeopardized) (Chen 2012: 106; see Chapter 3).

These joint efforts were an augur for the success of the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, where the PRC also committed itself to emission cuts for the first

time without external impositions (Kopra 2019: 110). President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement allowed the PRC to enforce its image as a responsible great power. While its commitments were not at the level of, for example, Europe, the PRC retaining its line with the U.S. withdrawal provided for a positive image, nevertheless. The PRC had previously changed its policy in tandem with the U.S., which had empowered the PRC, raised its standing, promoted the status of a responsible great power, and had not weakened its economic standing in relation to U.S. industries. The embodiment of the climate line here was part of Xi's overall policy line of the PRC as a responsible great power.

Indeed, as Trump initiated the U.S. withdrawal process from the Paris Agreement, Xi Jinping described the PRC's role as a 'torchbearer' in the global response to climate change in his speech at the 19th Party Congress (Xi 2017b). In the 2019 report on China's climate change policies, the PRC supported 'the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement' (MEE 2019: 29). Yet, while the PRC departed from the U.S. position in this regard, it did not quite manage to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. by making new initiatives in international negotiations (Zhang & Orbie 2019: 20; Kopra 2019: 148). Furthermore, the Biden administration returned the U.S. to the Paris Agreement and appeared to be taking a more climate-friendly stance overall compared with the Trump administration. This may be why the U.S. and the PRC made a new joint statement during the climate summit 2021 (Department of State of the United States of America 2021).

The PRC's transition towards binding international commitments was first evident in the domestic discussion, where climate change was presented as a direct threat and as having implications through its indirect effects in other security-related fields, such as social stability, which was already under stress from the major health issue of air pollution. This was a major impetus for Premier Li Keqiang's declaration of a 'war on pollution' in 2014 (*Reuters* 2014). As such, ecological security was included in the national security system for the first time in the first meeting of the Central National Security Commission (*Xinhua* 2014a). In its entirety, Xi's 'holistic,' integrated, 'overall security outlook' or 'national security path with Chinese characteristics' listed 11 issue areas of concern: 'the spheres of politics, territory, military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear, and natural resources' (*Xinhua* 2014a; see Chapter 2).

The connection between the effects of climate change and the PRC's domestic security concerns was also vocalized in the PRC's report of its actions to the UNFCCC:

> To act on climate change in terms of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing climate resilience, is not only driven by China's domestic needs for sustainable development in ensuring its economic security, energy security, ecological security, food security as well as the safety of people's life and property and to achieve sustainable development, but also driven

> by its sense of responsibility to fully engage in global governance, to forge a community of shared destiny for humankind and to promote common development for all human beings.
>
> (NDRC 2015b)

The National Climate Change Plan (NDRC 2014b) has a similar tone, as it states that 'climate change has a bearing on the overall situation of China's economic and social development, and is essential for maintaining China's economic security, energy security, ecological security, food security, and the safety of people's lives and property.'

Xi solidified the line of the 'beautiful China initiative' and emphasized 'global ecological security' in the 19th Party Congress in 2017 (Xi 2017b). Indeed, noting the progress made in building an ecological civilization was among the first categories he reported on in the speech. Beyond its domestic efforts, Xi noted that the PRC has taken the 'driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change' and 'become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavour for ecological civilization' (Xi 2017b: 4). Furthermore, 'ensuring harmony between human and nature' is a part of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era,' as is a 'holistic approach to national security' that includes elements, such as 'traditional and non-traditional security, and China's own and common security' that aim to 'foster new thinking on common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security' (Xi 2017b: 20–22). Climate change is also listed among the common uncertainties and destabilizing factors that humanity faces (Xi 2017b: 52): 'unconventional security threats like terrorism, cyber-insecurity, major infectious diseases, and climate change continue to spread.' To 'build a community with a shared future for mankind,' 'we should be good friends to the environment, cooperate to tackle climate change, and protect our planet for human survival' (Xi 2017b: 53; see Chapter 7).

While ecology and conservation of nature and the fight against various forms of pollution were mentioned in several sections of the speech, national security and military issues had their sections. Indeed, the presentation of the most vital national security issues does not explicitly contain the climate:

> We must put national interests first, take protecting our people's security as our mission and safeguarding political security as a fundamental task, and ensure both internal and external security, homeland and public security, traditional and non-traditional security, and China's own and common security.
>
> (Xi 2017b: 20–21)

Xi (2022a) continued to emphasize the holistic concept of national security in his 2022 report to the Party Congress. The climate was not part of the explicit elements of national security here either: 'We must take the people's security as our ultimate goal, political security as our fundamental task, economic security as our foundation, military, technological, cultural, and social

security as important pillars, and international security as a support.' While the climate is included within 'non-traditional security,' it is covered in the report in its non-security section

> We will take coordinated steps to ensure external and internal security, homeland and public security, traditional and non-traditional security, and our own security and common security. … We will strengthen the safeguards for ensuring economic, major infrastructure, financial, cyber, data, biological, resource, nuclear, space, and maritime security.
>
> (ibid.)

Accordingly, climate change was presented as a concern for shared human survival, not so much as a direct threat to the national security of the PRC:

> China is committed to building a world of lasting peace through dialogue and consultation, a world of universal security through collaboration and shared benefits, a world of common prosperity through mutually beneficial cooperation, an open and inclusive world through exchanges and mutual learning, and a clean and beautiful world through green and low-carbon development.
>
> (Xi 2022a)

This indicates that climate change is recognized as a security issue. Still, the referent object is humanity more than the Chinese nation, and, therefore, the ways to tackle it falls on international efforts where the PRC is also increasing its leadership role. The PRC's national security focuses on political security, separatism, and terrorism (see Chapters 2 and 6). At the same time, environmental civilization has become an integral part of the overall ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. While this may result from security-oriented thinking, it is not legitimized with national security speech. The shift in position and emphasis on international security is also evident in the PRC's position on climate change at the UN.

China's Position on Climate Change at the UN

When the issue of climate security was raised on the agenda of the UNSC for the first time in 2007, it was presented there as concerning 'everyone's future' and 'our collective security' (UN 2007: 35). While the discussion framed climate change as a 'threat multiplier,' the PRC opposed the presentation of climate change as a security issue at this meeting. Instead, the PRC considered it a matter of 'sustainable development,' which meant that the UNSC did not have 'professional competence' (UN 2007) when dealing with the matter. The council did not make a decision on climate change in this first debate (Scott 2012: 226), and the PRC suggested there should be no follow-up to the discussion (UN 2007).

The matter was discussed as possibly having security implications at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2009; however, the PRC retained its position that the issue was one of development and that the UNFCCC is the key instrument for dealing with it (UNGA 2009). The UNSC returned to the debate in 2011, which resulted in a presidential statement that presented climate change as a threat multiplier (UNSC 2011). This has been seen as largely due to the pressure provided by small island states on the U.S. to change in its position (Scott 2012: 226). The PRC retained its stance on development as the fundamental issue and noted that the UNSC does not have the 'means and resources' to address it even here (UNSC 2011). In 2013, together with Russia, the PRC boycotted the issue being discussed at the UNSC altogether (Kopra 2016b: 180).

Just as in the climate negotiations proper, the PRC opposed policy lines that would tie it down internationally and circumscribe its sovereignty. Its position changed in climate negotiations and at the UNSC in the latter half of the 2010s. Indeed, at the UNSC meeting 2019, the PRC's representative explicitly framed the issue as undermining peace and stability (UNSC 2019). Specifically, he stated that 'climate change is a major challenge that affects the future and destiny of humankind' because it 'induces natural disasters, wreaks havoc in many parts of the world and poses grave threats to food security, water resources, the ecological environment, energy, human life and property' (UNSC 2019). Poignantly, these issues were 'disruptive factors in certain regions' that were 'undermining peace and stability' (UNSC 2019). Accordingly, the suggestions made by the representative were legitimized by the need to maintain 'international peace and security' (UNSC 2019), which is a clear departure from the PRC's previous positions on the issue. The PRC leaned more towards macrosecuritization than national security by presenting the issue as a shared concern instead of solely for the Chinese nation. Indeed, the PRC underlined the necessity to 'uphold multilateralism and foster a sense of community and shared future for humankind' (UNSC 2019) rather than try to go at the issue alone. Sustained development should inform the readjustment of development imbalances, which should be addressed 'through common development' in climate change-related issues, such as 'food insecurity, humanitarian crises and mass migration' (UNSC 2019). Finally, the PRC promoted upholding the Paris Agreement and emphasized the role of the UNFCCC while retaining 'the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (UNSC 2019). Such efforts work towards what the PRC's representative framed as 'a world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness – a world that is clean and beautiful' (UNSC 2019).

The UNSC held a keynote debate on climate change and security in 2020. In this discussion, the PRC maintained its long-term line in the UNSC in relation to climate change: the issue should be resolved through international cooperation where countries have common but differentiated responsibilities and work within the UNCFCC framework (UNSC 2020). Furthermore, the

PRC's representative framed climate change as an issue of development rather than security: 'Climate change is, in essence, a development issue rather than a security issue; there is no direct linkage between the two. The solution to climate change lies in sustainable development. Progress on the development front is conducive to effectively addressing climate change and security risks exacerbated by climate change' (UNSC 2020). Still, the PRC's representative suggested that the UNSC could consider climate change as a security issue for individual countries:

> The Security Council, as the organ handling international peace and security issues, should act in line with the mandates of the relevant resolutions, analyse security challenges and the security implications of climate change for the countries concerned and discuss and handle relevant issues on a country-specific basis.
>
> (UNSC 2020)

The PRC's line remained the same in the 2021 UNSC high-level debate, where it also emphasized its commitment to achieving its national CO_2 emissions peak by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 (UNSC 2021), a decade after the EU's goal of 2050. This suggests that despite the significant change in the 2019 meeting, where the PRC was willing to let the UNSC examine climate change as a security issue on a country-by-country basis, its overall line on climate change and international security within the UNSC was to keep the issue away from security terminology and maintain it within the frame of international cooperation and bargaining.

As such, the proposals that the PRC has made are still not 'extraordinary' and fall within regular international agreements, institutions, and diplomatic practices. In other words, it is not proposing any 'breaking of rules,' or drastic security measures internationally or in its domestic context. What is different, though, is that the issue of climate change is no longer presented purely in terms of development and economic issues but as an issue of security and stability – for some countries.

Chinese Climate Security Bureaucracy and Societal Actors

The politics of security does not only concern discourses in high politics. Indeed, how security is produced in the PRC is affected by bureaucratic practice and the techniques and technologies deployed (Vuori 2014). Huysmans (2014) showed how exceptionalist and diffuse forms of securitization operated differently; bureaucratic enactment has securitization implications. From such a technocratic viewpoint, the PRC's climate security story largely remains the same as the one based on policy statements: the bureaucratic rationales involved have not concurred with security logic until very recently.

Climate-related bureaucracies have followed the gradual shifts in the overall attitude towards the environment at the highest policy level. The PRC

established a leading group for environmental protection under the State Council in 1971 when it joined the UN, launched its first environmental regulations in 1973, set up an Environmental Protection Office in 1974, and included environmental protection in the constitution in 1978 (Ross 1999: 298–299). Article 26 of the current Constitution of the PRC (2018) reads: 'The state protects and improves the environment in which people live and the ecological environment. It prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.'

Climate change was initially considered a technical and scientific issue, which was reflected in the establishment of the National Coordination Group on Climate Change (NCGCCS) under the State Council's Environmental Protection Committee in 1990 to provide support for the negotiation of the UNFCCC. This group was instrumental in forming the PRC's position in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocols. It made the link between energy consumption and climate change, which turned the issue into one of development and strategic energy interests, as the PRC became a net oil importer at the same time. The national group gained more prominence in 1998 when it was renamed the National Coordination Group on Climate Change Strategy and moved to the State Development Planning Commission, that later became the NDRC in 2003. In 2004, the NCGCCS was elevated to the National Leading Group on Climate Change headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. (Qi & Wu 2013: 303.) In 2008, the State Environmental Protection Administration was deemed the Ministry of Environmental Protection, which in 2018, became the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE).

At the central level, the PRC's policy has been guided by the National Leading Group for Addressing Climate Change (formerly the National Coordinating Committee on climate change) and administered by the NDRC (NDRC 2013: 5–6), which also handles energy security related matters since 1993 (Nyman & Zeng 2016: 303). Indeed, while there have been many ministries and state bureaucracies involved in handling the issue, none of these include those generally thought to deal with matters of security. The only exception is the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which revised the National Emergency Plan on Natural Disaster Relief. This plan focused on early warning systems, drought relief, transition relief, and emergency response systems (NDRC 2012: 15; 2013: 27–29). The China Meteorological Administration has raised the climate issue in terms of 'climate security' at least since 2014. Yet, the NDRC maintained an upper hand on the status of the issue as one of development (Bo 2016: 104–105). The MEE is a new addition to the bureaucratic mix and has gained more prominence for it, and it is in charge of publishing the reports on the PRC's climate policy and actions. The law enforcement capabilities given to the Environmental Protection Bureaus in the form of the Environmental Police aimed to remedy the gap between the environmental protection law and its implementation (Joseph & Karackattu 2022). The PAP had a Hydroelectric Corp and a Forestry Corp until 2016. The former built dams, and the latter guarded national parks.

The PLA is the Communist Party's military, and even though it has undergone continuous modernization and professionalization since the mid-1980s,

it is still led by the Party leadership (see Chapter 4). Xi Jinping has instigated major reforms in the military. Military and climate politics have been included in Xi's concentration of power in the form of new central-level commissions (Hernandez & Misalucha-Willoughby 2020). The military has had an expert committee on climate change since 2008 (Bo 2016: 105) that consists of experts from the NDRC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology, China Meteorological Administration, State Bureau of Oceanography, and National Natural Sciences Foundation Commission (Freeman 2010: 21), it has not been very vocal beyond disaster relief issues (Brzoska 2012). Indeed, the PLA has been explicit in not linking climate issues and national security (Freeman 2010: 22) and resisted the inclusion of other non-traditional security issued within its remit until the early 2010s (Ghiselli 2021). The military has a role in dealing with major natural disaster relief efforts and has been tasked with planting trees to fight desertification and climate issues (Joseph & Karackattu 2022).

Civil society and NGOs are also active in the environmental field. Indeed, the PRC's first environmental NGO was established in 1994; today, they count in the thousands. The China Civil Climate Action Network is an umbrella organization that brings them together. (Kopra 2016b: 237.) While these associations are important when raising awareness about climate change and other environmental issues, their political capacity is limited, as with other NGOs. Indeed, while there is a 'green public sphere' in the PRC, its effect on climate policies is very limited and international environmental NGOs are under state supervision (Zhang & Orbie 2019: 7–10). Traditional and new media are crucial for the dissemination of views from this public sphere. Both remain effectively censored (Vuori & Paltemaa 2015; Vuori & Paltemaa 2019; Paltemaa et al. 2020), which partly explains the limited role public opinion has had on policy formation to date (Zhang & Orbie 2019: 8–9).

For example, a study of Weibo, the largest microblogging service in the PRC, during the Paris Climate negotiations showed that institutions, state media, and international actors were the prime posters, and Chinese NGOs and intellectuals were mostly absent. Urban areas dominate the discussion, and awareness rising regarding climate change is the main point of discussion. In terms of threats, climate change appears as a global one that has hardly any connection with the PRC's national context. (Liu & Zhao 2017.) Still, a significantly larger proportion of Chinese college students accepted anthropogenic climate change and supported entering into an international agreement combating it than their U.S. counterparts in a comparative survey (Jamelske et al. 2015). A survey (Yu et al. 2013) on the Chinese public's attitude towards climate change showed that some were willing to act individually against climate change and trusted that the government was handling the issue, while others were not willing to commit to acting themselves.

When it comes to the effect of epistemic communities, some Chinese academics have raised the issue of climate change in their publications. Most of this discussion has been engaged in by meteorologists (Freeman 2010), yet

international politics has also been featured here. For example, Zhang (2010) has suggested that climate change presents four national security concerns of the PRC: rise in sea level, endangerment of livelihoods, national defence and strategic projects and construction, and international climate commitments circumscribing sovereignty. The Chinese academic discussion on energy as a security issue is fairly recent, and the main concern here has been about the survival of the PRC (Nyman & Zeng 2016: 305) rather than global, environmental, or human security concerns. Accordingly, the risks the reliance on oil imports brings for the PRC in terms of geopolitics is the greatest concern in this literature (Trombetta 2018: 190). However, the connection between fossil fuel consumption and the threat of climate change is becoming more widely discussed (Nyman & Zeng 2016: 306).

The division between domestic environmental and international climate politics is quite evident in the academic discussion, which specifically focuses on environmental security issues. A worry is that the international securitization of climate change may work to contain the PRC geopolitically and undermine economic development. Domestic concerns focus on issues such as the sustainability of environmental systems and food and water security (Nyman & Zhang 2016: 307). Overall, the role of such academic discussions has been to provide the 'vague' political concepts developed at the highest echelons of the Party with more concrete interpretations, which provides some potential for an impact on the level of implementation (Zhang & Orbie 2019: 8). The securitization of the climate issue at the level of high politics can also be seen in the increased power of the issue in the bureaucracies involved in handling it domestically.

Climate Change and China's Great Power Politics

While the U.S. and the PRC have not been allies, as such, and have been on the opposite sides of the development divide within the climate talks, they have avoided external constraints on their economies that binding commitments to emission cuts would cause. Indeed, during the Obama and Biden administrations, they put forward joint declarations of their bilateral commitments, goals, and positions. They both recognized that they had a critical role in addressing climate change, which is an urgent and increasing danger that has potentially catastrophic impacts. Still, the issue is not explicitly framed in terms of security but with logics that come closer to risk management and resilience.

The PRC's reluctance to bind itself to international commitments in the climate field is understandable, as it coheres with the country's overall approach to international politics over the last 40 years. The PRC's leaders have emphasized the PRC's need to concentrate on its internal development and the creation of a peaceful zone around its borders. This has enabled China's rise and return to being a major power in world politics and has been called 'the period of strategic opportunity.' As the PRC has become more affluent, and the end of the Cold War ended block politics in the PRC (see Chapter 3), multilateral diplomacy has become the norm in its international politics. The aim here has

been to ensure that international organizations are not used against the PRC's interests and that it can affect the creation of international norms, which is termed 'discourse power' by its leadership (e.g., *The People's Daily* 2016b; The State Council 2017; see Chapter 3). As the PRC is dependent on foreign oil imports, it has been more concerned with energy security and sustained development than with the growing issue of climate change. As its overall foreign policy line has shifted towards recognizing the PRC as a major power with 'responsibilities' (Kopra 2016b; 2019), the international approach to climate agreements has also changed.

Sovereignty, development, and energy concerns have trumped climate security in the PRC. Since the mid-2010s, the PRC has committed itself to internationally binding climate actions if they are not externally imposed. This has happened in tandem with a change in the PRC's overall foreign policy stance, where it is portraying itself as more of a responsible great power than a developing nation. It still maintains the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities respective to capabilities when responding to climate change, as it did in the most recent UNSC debates in 2020 and 2021. Still, the PRC has performed more climate actions domestically than it has committed to internationally, and it made domestically binding decisions on emission cuts before doing them internationally. Environmental damage and recovery are criteria in the evaluation of state officials. Unfortunately, the central policies may be more progressive than what is implemented locally due to the prevalent issue of corruption.

Analysis: From a War on Nature to Harmony Between Humans and Nature

In the PRC's current policy documents, climate change is listed among a number of issues that challenge human survival on a global scale. Environmental and climate security are part and parcel of the current overall security outlook that emphasizes collective and universal security that includes 'human security' with Chinese characteristics (Breslin 2015). Regarding national security, political security, terrorism, and separatism are the main concerns (see Chapter 6). Climate change affects human security in terms of social development, lives, and property. Yet, 'harmony between humans and nature' goes beyond security because it is a vital aspect of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era,' which is an essential part of Xi Jinping's thought. The climate issue is also beneath the umbrella conceptualization of the community of a shared future for humankind (see Chapter 7).

In light of both dimensions of macrosecuritization (Buzan & Wæver 2009), the referent objects for the danger of climate change include national and global levels (Table 5.1). In addition, for the second dimension, the danger is an encompassing one, where some of the PRC's most crucial national interests may be endangered. In terms of political moves, the PRC seems to be promoting the macropoliticization of global climate change and has infused the climate issue within the core of its political agenda, albeit without legitimizing this with national security. The most recent development suggests that

Table 5.1 Macrosecuritization Elements of China's Climate Change Discourse

Macrosecuritization discourse	*Types of moves*	*Type of universalism*	*Alignment in constellations*	*View on polarity*	*Bureaucratic logic*
Global climate change	Politicization	Physical threat (and economic problem)	Developing states versus industrialized nations; responsible great power	Multipolar	Environment, diplomacy, and economy

the PRC is willing to recognize that the issue can be a national security concern in some parts of the world, even within the UNSC. As such, the PRC's discourse presents referent objects at national and global levels in terms of physical threat universalisms in various forms. At the same time, the danger is framed as an encompassing one, where some of the PRC's most crucial national interests may be endangered. As seen elsewhere (Buzan & Wæver 2009), physical threat universalisms as macro issues appear less effective in political mobilization than the universalisms that produce a matched pair.

The issue of climate change is part of the PRC's identity politics in two ways. First, the way the PRC has emphasized the common but differentiated responsibilities of industrialized and developing nations in handling the issue has maintained the line the PRC adopted in international environmental politics in the 1970s: environmental protection, and later the mitigation of climate change, cannot encroach on either the development of the PRC or its sovereignty. The early stage of international climate politics also allowed the PRC to maintain its identity as a developing nation, even though many indicators indicated something completely different. Second, climate politics have allowed the PRC to promote its new identity as a 'torchbearer' or a new kind of 'responsible great power' that is great but not an irresponsible and aggressive imperialist like the great powers during the Cold War.

Beyond issues of identity, the PRC has developed a resilience strategy when combating natural disasters (Ministry of Emergency Management 2022). This suggests that the response to the challenge of climate change could take the form of mitigation rather than prevention in the PRC. Still, resilience can evolve into securitization (Bourbeau & Vuori 2015). Accordingly, it is possible that the PRC's resilience strategy could lead to the securitization of climate change on a national level, especially when scientists link the flooding of rich regions along the Yangtze with melting glaciers on the plateau.

The measures that the PRC has proposed internationally are not extraordinary or exceptionalist. This is so even after it conceded that climate change could undermine peace and stability and that it concerns the UNSC from the viewpoint of peace and security. Rather, the measures the PRC has proposed emphasize cooperation, multilateralism, development, and peace. While the PRC's current emission reduction goals are not overly ambitious, environmental issues, including climate change, have become more and more prominent in its overall policy doctrines and ideology since Hu Jintao's administration and are even more deeply integrated into Xi Jinping's ideological guidelines. As Xi Jinping has removed term limits from his leadership positions, this trajectory will most likely continue with him as leader.

Note

1 Parts of this chapter are modified from Vuori, Juha A. (2015b): 'Climate Politics in Chinese Foreign Policy'. In Joseph Yu-shek Cheng and Marita Siika (eds.), *New Trend and Challenges in China's Foreign Policy*. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 227–250.

6 China's War on Terror

The fourth macrosecuritization discourse concerns the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) initiated by the United States (U.S.) in 2001. While terrorism was not a major theme in the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) security discourse in the Cold War era, terrorism has been presented as a threat to its internal stability, economic development, and national security in the PRC in the 2000s. Accordingly, the PRC has responded to the terrorist issue at the global, regional, and national levels. On the global level, the PRC has been involved in military exercises that have focused on counterterrorism (Odgaard & Nielsen 2014: 551–552) and military operations that have targeted piracy. Its regional approach has mainly been driven by activities in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Nationally, it has deployed its security forces, economic development policies, ethnic policies, and legislation. (Hoo 2017 14–15; Kam 2017). The combined use has been termed 'integrated social engineering' and 'stability maintenance.' I begin the chapter with an overview of the international macrosecuritization of terrorism and then move on to examine the PRC's discourses before and after the international securitization of terrorism.

Macrosecuritization of the 'Global War on Terror'

The public securitization of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001 happened through President George W. Bush's (Public Broadcasting Service [PBS] 2001) televised speech after a cabinet meeting on 12 September 2001. President Bush claimed that 'the deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country, were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.' This claim alone raised the issue under discussion to a top priority. However, Bush underlined the gravity of the events by warning that 'freedom and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced.' This warning entailed that if the 'American people' did not act, freedom and democracy – the oft-repeated core values of the U.S. – would be in jeopardy: 'This enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the

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world.' To deal with such threats demanded extraordinary efforts: 'This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve.'

The final segment of the President's speech (PBS 2001) described how the U.S. was mobilizing its resources to combat the threat. Accordingly, the speech was an attempt to gain legitimacy for future acts that were not 'business as usual' but went beyond it: 'The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy.' The element of the future was pre-eminently present: 'This battle will take time and resolve, but make no mistake about it, we will win.' The sense of emergency was also emphasized:

> The federal government and all our agencies are conducting business, but it is not business as usual. We are operating on heightened security alert. America is going forward, and as we do so, we must remain keenly aware of the threats to our country.
>
> (PBS 2001)

These elements of the speech set the founding for the legitimacy of future acts:

> This morning, I am sending to Congress a request for emergency funding authority so that we are prepared to spend whatever it takes to rescue victims, to help the citizens of New York City and Washington, D. C., respond to this tragedy, and to protect our national security.
>
> (PBS 2001)

The prevailing self-image of the U.S. facilitated the request for legitimacy: 'This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail.'

President Bush's speeches on 11 and 12 September 2001 defined the mood of world politics for the first decade of the 21st century. The claimed threat and the warning were used to legitimize extraordinary measures in the U.S. (e.g., the U.S. Patriot Act 2001) and the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the rendition of suspects and the detention of 'enemy combatants' at Camp Delta in the Guantanamo naval base (including some Uyghurs), in violation of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war (Vuori 2022). The claims and warnings of these initial speech acts and their numerous maintenances were expanded into the macrosecuritization discourse of the 'Global War on Terror' (Buzan & Wæver 2009). These speech acts formed the basis for the legitimization of various extraordinary measures and similarly had major inter-unit effects both domestically and internationally.

Indeed, President George W. Bush (CNN 2001) aimed for universality in his macrosecuritization moves: 'You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists.' These were quite successful, as U.S. allies soon joined the securitization of terrorism. For example, the press releases and statements

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secretary general Lord Robertson invoked Article Five of the Washington Treaty (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949) for the first time in the history of NATO in response to the attacks on 11 September 2001. The initial statement of the secretary general (NATO 2001a) on 11 September 2001 claimed that the attacks were directed against democracy and that the international community and the members of NATO needed to unite their forces to fight terrorism: 'These barbaric acts constitute intolerable aggression against democracy and underline the need for the international community and the members of the Alliance to unite their forces in fighting the scourge of terrorism.' In another press release (NATO 2001b) on 11 September 2001, the secretary general stated that 'if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.'

NATO statements relied on the institutionalized securitization of the need for NATO as a form of collective defence, even in the post-Cold War era. This institutionalized basis was the foundation for the securitization of terrorism:

> The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.
>
> (NATO 2001c)

By invoking Article Five, NATO gained the power to compel and require its members to act in accordance with its decisions without the possibility of refusal. This securitization process within NATO was part of the broader securitization of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the U.S. It demonstrated how the same 'event' can be securitized with various functions and with various effects.

The early international securitization process of the GWoT also included the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1377 (UNSC 2001c) that concerned 'threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.' The resolution referred to three previous resolutions (UNSC 1999; UNSC 2001a; UNSC 2001b) that also dealt with the issue of terrorism. Resolution 1368 (UNSC 2001a) presented the 11 September 2001 attacks as acts of terrorism, which were a threat to international peace and security:

> The Security Council […] unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security
>
> (UNSC 2001a)

Resolution 1377 (UNSC 2001c) reaffirmed this claim. It warned of the dangers of international terrorism to individuals, states, and global stability and prosperity: 'The Security Council […] [u]nderlines that acts of terrorism endanger innocent lives and the dignity and security of human beings everywhere, threaten the social and economic development of all States and undermine global stability and prosperity.' The claim already made in previous resolutions and the warning reiterated here was the justification for the declarations that formed the crux of the resolution.

> The Security Council […] [d]eclares that acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century, [and] [f]urther declares that acts of international terrorism constitute a challenge to all States and to all of humanity.
>
> (UNSC 2001c)

While calling and inviting states and the Counterterrorism Committee to do things, the declarative nature of this securitization act also served the function of deterrence: by declaring acts of terrorism to constitute one the most serious threats to international peace and security and by imbuing the attacks of 11 September 2001 with this political status, the Security Council indicated its willingness to act and thus makes it a 'political fact that has consequences, because this securitization will cause the actor to operate in a different mode than he or she would have otherwise' (Buzan et al. 1998: 30). While authorizing states to do things, it was also a signal to state and non-state actors to desist from further such acts or 'face the consequences.' These resolutions were part of the basis for the invasion of Afghanistan and an important aspect of the GWoT macrosecuritization discourse.

The GWoT had major impacts on the policies of states in the Asia-Pacific, where, in many instances, the discourse was used for parochial interests. The strongest supporter of the U.S. position and line on terrorism was Australia under the Howard administration, which used the discourse to legitimate its pre-existing hard line against asylum seekers (Burke 2007). At first glance, Japan appeared as an equally avid supporter of the war on terror as Australia. Prime Minister Koizumi was quick in his response to the 11 September 2001 attacks and pledged Japan's support. Japan, however, did not share the same goals or threat perceptions as the U.S. nor the U.S. view on how to solve the issue of international terrorism. It has been argued that the GWoT has merely functioned as a fortuitous camouflage for Japan to implement reform in its security policy and to legitimize its more parochial security concerns regarding North Korea and the PRC (Hughes 2007).

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) similarly voiced its support for the war but did not follow suit with legislative requirements (Emmers 2003). The response of individual member states varied greatly in terms of policy implementation. For example, Indonesia had different problems than Malaysia, the Phillippines, and Singapore: Mahathir portrayed

the Islamic Party of Malaysia as a party of militants; Arroyo described Abu Sayyaf as an international terrorist movement and accepted U.S. military assistance after U.S. military bases were dismantled in the 1990s; Singapore was quick to contribute to U.S. campaigns, as an Islamic attack was feared to decrease confidence in Singapore as a haven of business; Megawati Sugarnoputi had to balance between U.S. and neighbouring pressure while appeasing moderate Muslim organizations opposed to a political response against Islamic groups. Even further away from support were states such as Vietnam and Laos, which were very wary of any policy lines that could allow increased U.S. troop presence in the region. Particularly, the case of Indonesia shows how global security concerns may not always override local issues; the GWoT has not been as successful as the Cold War was in using traditional 'vernaculars' to present new threats as the representative of 'bad elements' that work against the societal order in Indonesia (Bubandt 2005).

The PRC was very supportive of the macrosecuritization of terrorism and has remained an avid proponent even as the global discourse has ebbed and flowed with world events, and even despite the U.S.'s cessation of using the label of a war on terror during the Obama administration. In the 2020s, the PRC is perhaps the most ardent proponent of the GWoT. The initial introduction of securitizing terrorism in the PRC was swift and sudden, as the examination of its previous approach to unrest in Xinjiang shows.

Securitizing Splittism and Religious Extremism

The territorial integrity of China has been a major security concern throughout the history of the PRC. The north-western autonomous region of Xinjiang has been a perennial issue in this regard. Indeed, there have been independence movements in Xinjiang. During the Cold War, the greatest PRC-era spouts of violence and unrest in Xinjiang correlated with unrest throughout the PRC, namely the Great Leap Forward, the Democracy Wall Movement, and the suppression of the Student Democracy Movement (Millward 2004).

The post-Cold War bursts of political violence in Xinjiang have largely been explained as reactions to the PRC's policies vis-à-vis the practice of religion and indigenous culture in Xinjiang (Finley 2019b). Policies on 'regional autonomy' (Bovigndon 2004) and developments in the neighbouring region (Wayne 2008) have also been suggested as sources of unrest: the 'success' of repelling the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the independence of Central-Asian states provided Xinjiang separatists with a 'positive model' in the 1990s (Bovigndon 2004: 9–12). Indeed, there were a number of separatist movements in Central Asia, like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Turkistan, and the Islamic Party of Turkistan (Cui & Liu 2011: 150).

That is perhaps why the 1990s saw renewed violence in Xinjiang. In the aftermath of the securitization of the Democracy Movement in 1989 and the declaration of martial law in Beijing, local officials called for measures to prevent a 'counter-revolutionary rebellion' in Xinjiang (*Straits Times* 1990). When

a large protest cum uprising happened in Baren in 1990, it was securitized as a 'counter-revolutionary armed rebellion' (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1990a; 1990b). Like the unrest in the early 1980s (Rodriguez-Merino 2019), the securitization of this incident followed the script that deployed counter-revolution rather than threats to national security as its referents (Vuori 2011b; see Chapter 2).[1] A macro element was not really present, even though counter-revolutionary threats drew from the Cold War constellation of ideological antagonism (see Chapter 3). Indeed, terrorism was not yet really considered to be something that took place in the PRC (Reeves 2016). When something that would internationally be considered to be terrorism took place, it was dealt with as a form of violent crime rather than mass political campaigns and security measures. Indeed, the international terrorism database includes nearly 40 Chinese instances in 1984 (Xie & Liu 2021: 993–994). The was also an airplane hijacking in the 1980s (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 8). Still, none of these were labelled as terrorism in the PRC. Even the bombing of two buses as late as 1992, which was publicly claimed by an organization called the Islamic Reformers Party (Rodriguez-Merino 2019: 32), were sentenced as 'Islamic counter-revolutionaries' (BBC Summary 1995). While the criminal law did not yet recognize terrorism as a crime (see Chapter 2), the security discourse on terrorism had also not yet developed.

A major event in the early 1990s was the Baren uprising of April 1990. It is generally presented as beginning with a protest against family planning, weapons testing, and oil exploration staged in a mosque. The escalated uprising involving at least 200 men answering a call to arms disseminated through mosques and utilizing religious rhetoric is often deemed the initiation point of open insurgent and anti-insurgent activities in contemporary Xinjiang. (Rodriguez 2013; Tanner & Belacqua 2016.) As such, it is also at the cusp of national security becoming established in the PRC's political language and use of force.

The 1990 Baren uprising was followed by a series of bombings during 1991–1993 (Pokalova 2013: 287). As the number of bombings increased in 1996, Chinese authorities reacted to them with the 'strike hard' (严打, *yándǎ*) campaign that was launched in April of that year as a nationwide crackdown on crime (*Renmin Ribao* 1996). The campaign was an innovation in the PRC's security speech and formed a new security continuum (Bigo 2002) in its statements. Still, the authorities' reaction to the violence was largely military and paramilitary (Reeves 2016).

The security continuum of the campaign presented threats that legitimated the militarized actions in it. It predates the initiation of the SCO's 'threat package' (Jackson 2006) in emphasizing 'splittism' or 'separatism.' The strike hard campaign targeted escaped criminals, underworld gangs, criminal communications, drug trafficking, prostitution, pornography, gambling, illegal firearms and other weapons, and public order (*Renmin Ribao1996*). While the report on the campaign published in the *People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao* 1996) named a number of criminal activities, its real focus was directed at unofficial

political organizations and separatist activities in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang (Dillon 2004: 84–85). The role of religion in this securitization process that had social stability and the modernization of Xinjiang as its referents was presented as masking the true aim of ethnically based separatism: The people of Xinjiang should 'resolutely unmask and crack down on those individuals who engage in ethnic separatist activities and undermine the motherland's unity in the name of religion' (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1997a).

Unlawful religious activities are a particular feature of the PRC's political order that links with state security. The Constitution (Constitution fo the Peoples Repubic of China 1982: chapter 1, article 36) from 1982 guarantees that Chinese citizens 'enjoy freedom of religion' and 'the state protects normal religious activities.' However, religion is not allowed to be used to 'engage in activities that disrupt social order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination' (ibid.). A state of emergency is not required to limit the practice of religion: 'Where anyone makes use of religion to engage in such illegal activities as endanger State or public security […] a crime is thus constituted' (State Council of the People's Republic of China 2004: article 40). In the strike hard campaign, Islam was singled out as the greatest religious threat to national stability when compared with Christianity, Buddhism, and Daoism (Dillon 2004: 90). Xinjiang was a particular focus, as Muslims in other parts of the PRC, like the Hui, were presented as models to follow rather than separatist threats (Gonul & Rogenhofer 2019). The Hui are ethnically closer to the Han than the Uyghur.

Xinjiang was identified as the most serious threat to the stability and territorial integrity of the PRC in a leaked classified Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo paper titled Document Number 7 in 1996 (Central Committee of the CCP 1996). The international threat was about support for counter-revolutionaries: 'The main problem is that international counter-revolutionary forces led by the United States of America are openly supporting the separatist activities inside and outside of Xinjiang' (Central Committee of the CCP 1996). Domestically, the issue was about illegal religious activities and terrorist activities:

> Within our national borders, illegal religious activities are widespread, sabotaging activities such as the instigation of problematic situations, the breaking and entering of party and government offices, explosions and terrorism are occurring sporadically. Some of these activities have changed from completely hidden to semi-open activities, even to the extent of challenging the government's authority. … If we do not increase our vigilance and strengthen work in every respect, large-scale incidents might suddenly occur and confusion and disruption could break out and affect the stability of Xinjiang and the whole nation.
>
> (Central Committee of the CCP 1996)



Figure 6.1 The Domestic Horizontal Security Continuum of the Strike Hard Campaign and Its Connection to Chinese International Concerns in the 1990s.

Source: Author's creation.

The document is an example of how Xinjiang was securitized internally in the late 1990s (Figure 6.1).

The strike hard campaign in Xinjiang was finally even linked to the struggle going on in Chechnya at the time (Dillon 2004: 85), to the protection of the western border (e.g., BBC Summary 1996d), and the hostility of the 'West': 'Unwilling to see China become unified and strong, international hostile forces have persisted in pursuing a policy of "westernization" and "disintegration" towards China' (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1996e). Wang Lequan, the CCP secretary of Xinjiang, maintained the continuum in late 1997: the main task of military servicemen in Xinjiang was resistance to 'western hostile forces, ethnic splittist forces and religious extremist forces both in and outside the country' and their support for holy war and ethnic hatred (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1997i; Dillon 2004: 108). This formulation was already presaging the three evils campaign that would follow.

While separatism was the security concern of the 1990s, one instance was publicly framed as terrorist violence. Three buses exploded in Urumqi mere hours after the funeral of Deng Xiaoping in February 1997. Unlike another incident in the 1990s, these were called a 'premeditated act of violence carried out by a terrorist organization' by the local government (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 19–20). In the aftermath of Deng Xiaoping's death, the Central Military Commission set the Xinjiang area to the highest alert level. It warned the armed forces to be on their guard against foreign hostile elements (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1997c). 'Hostile foreign forces' were portrayed as taking advantage of the situation in Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union and trying to 'split' China (BBC Summary of

World Broadcasts 1997c). The intensification of the conflict also led to the further strengthening of the continuum of violent crime and political crimes in Xinjiang in the 'spring strike-hard campaign to improve order' in 1997 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1997e). This was followed by a renewed 'intensive special campaign' aimed at 'national separatists and religious extremists' (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1997f). Wang Lequan further defined the issue of striking hard against the continuum of security threats in terms of the hard core of the Chinese political system: Xinjiang should adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles. Maintenance of public order and striking hard at violence and terrorism were defined as the essential conditions for assuring stability (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1997h). The proposed solution was an education campaign that would publicize the positive achievements of the CCP, promote model units and individuals, strengthen grassroots education, rectify separatist and extremist propaganda, find practical solutions, and strengthen local party leadership.

These educational suggestions were followed by a warning of ethnic conflict in other countries leading to 'division and incessant wars'

> Before and since the founding of New China, separatist forces at home and abroad have never stopped for a minute their separatist activities in Xinjiang. The struggle between separatism and anti-separatism has always been a concentrated expression of class struggle in Xinjiang. […] Cadres and people of all nationalities must have a sober understanding of this, be on the alert and prepare to fight a protracted war.
>
> (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1997g)

The strike hard campaign in Xinjiang contained many elements of threats, referents, and benefits. Hostile forces internationally and within were 'colluding in jeopardizing Chinese unity and social stability', thereby endangering social development (cf., Wayne 2008: 23). The acts of the Chinese authorities were working towards repelling these threats and, thereby ensuring the PRC's border (and sovereignty) and ensuring that economic development and social progress would continue. Another report on the results of the campaign stated that after the crackdown, the growing trend of serious crimes seems to have slowed; public order has been restored in most regions; the people now feel more secure.' The possibility of continued insecurity was however retained even in these celebratory reports:

> Progress of the 'strike hard' campaign has been uneven across the region. Some localities and units have fallen short in action; sometimes they strike hard, but other times they are too lenient. […] A handful of areas are still marked by public disorder.
>
> (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1997b)

Another example of how security had been achieved by stating that the threat had been repelled can be found in a report on the 'steel wall' of the military and the construction corps working in Xinjiang:

> The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is a reliable and important force in safeguarding Xinjiang's social stability and in building and protecting the border. The existence and development of the Corps constitute an insurmountable obstacle to international hostile forces and national splittist forces in and outside the country in their attempts to "split" Xinjiang. Over the last 40 years, the one million cadres, workers, and staff members of the Corps have made indelible contributions to reclaiming lands, to building Xinjiang, to safeguarding the border, and to bringing about Xinjiang's economic development and social progress.
>
> (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1996d)

Indeed, the situation in Xinjiang had calmed down by the beginning of the 2000s, which was also how it was presented in official Chinese statements (Millward 2004: 10–11).

As the emphasis on splittism and religious extremism in the strike hard campaign's securitization also shows, terrorism had not been a term that was widely used to characterize the PRC's domestic politics before the 2000s. It was present in the Sino-U.S. communique in the 1990s in conjunction with issues like international narcotics trafficking and organized crime (e.g., State Department of the United States of America 1997). Terrorism was part of the initial Shanghai Five threat package of separatism, terrorism, and extremism in 2000 (*People's Daily* 2000a; Jackson 2006). It was also present in classified documents as part of a litany of criminal activities targeted by the 'strike hard' campaign (Central Committee of the CCP 1996). Still, there was only one incident in the 1990s that was noted as a violent terrorist case in public (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 18–19; Rodriquez-Merino 2019: 31). The 2000 White Paper on National Defence (SCIO 2000) was the first to mention terrorism, but it was merely in passing. Jiang (2000b) also referred to 'violent terrorist incidents' rather than terrorists when he securitized 'ethno-nationalist separatist elements' in his January 2000 speech. However, terrorism would take centre stage in the public security discourse starting from 2001.

Securitizing Terrorism as a Part of the Global War on Terror

In light of the development of the situation in Xinjiang in the late 1990s and 2000, the Chinese response to the U.S. macrosecuritization moves, and adoption of the GWoT discourse is striking. As global security discourse witnessed its most important shift since the desecuritization of the Cold War a decade earlier, the authorities linked the insurgency in Xinjiang to the international campaign against terrorism. Xinjiang separatists were renamed terrorists virtually overnight. Previous unrest was also reframed as terrorism in white papers and other statements (e.g., SCIO 2002).

The Chinese official response to the 11 September 2001 airline hijack attacks in the U.S. leaned towards the macro level straight away. Jiang Zemin described terrorism as a 'common scourge' for the international community in his immediate public response to the attacks (*People's Daily* 2001). Chinese

representatives at the October 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shanghai identified 'Eastern Turkistan terrorist forces' as a part of the global terrorist movement that the U.S. and its allies were fighting. They specifically claimed that Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang had connections with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Similarly, in a May 2002 position paper, the Chinese authorities noted that international terrorist activities like the 11 September 2001 incident 'constitutes a real threat to regional and international peace and is becoming an important factor of uncertainty affecting the security situation' (MoFA 2002b).

A white paper from the Information Office of the PRC State Council (SCIO 2002) was a crucial instance for securitizing separatist resistance and organization in Xinjiang. This paper, and the increased flow of official information on violent incidents in Xinjiang that followed it, demonstrated the practical effects of the GWoT macrosecuritization in the PRC's official policies. In accordance with the new global trend of security speech, 'East Turkistan terrorists' were now presented as a security threat to international society rather than a separatist threat to the homeland. What was at stake was not only the security of the PRC, but the security and stability of related countries and regions, the stability of society, and the lives and property of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang (SCIO 2002): 'Terrorism is a big public hazard in the world today, posing an enormous threat to the peace, security and order of the international society.'

The origin of the Xinjiang separatist problem was placed on 'old colonialists' and foreign 'anti-China forces' in addition to a 'handful of people within the borders' who 'have been on the lookout for every opportunity to conduct splittist and sabotage activities' (SCIO 2002). The insurgency in Xinjiang was explicitly linked to Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the international campaign against terrorism. The insurgent activities in Xinjiang were also placed into a security continuum containing an international element: 'under the influence of extremism, separatism and international terrorism, part of the "East Turkistan" forces inside and outside Chinese territory turned to splittist and sabotage activities with terrorist violence as the main means.'

The formal political organizations established by Uyghurs in newly independent Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that sent books, magazines, and tapes to Xinjiang and propagated international attention for the movement (Bovigndon 2004: 11) provided a degree of plausibility for the Chinese authority's claims. To credit this claimed threat further, the white paper (SCIO 2002) listed the evidence of violence and terrorism perpetrated by 'East Turkistan Organization,' which were categorized into numerous types: explosions, assassinations, attacks on police and government institutions, crimes of poison and arson, establishing secret training bases and raising money to buy and manufacture arms and ammunition, and plotting and organizing disturbances and riots, and creating an atmosphere of terror. The paper further claimed:

> The ironclad details of these bloody facts are irrefutable proof of the nature of the "East Turkistan" forces as a terrorist organization that does not flinch

> from taking violent measures to kill the innocent and harm society so as to achieve the goal of splitting the motherland.
>
> (SCIO 2002)

However, listing these various types of evidence together can be problematic, as creating a security continuum between violence with terror intentions and mass protest may end up securitizing the voicing of legitimate concerns.

The claimed threat and the evidence provided worked towards providing post-hoc legitimacy (Vuori 2003) for the crackdown the authorities were conducting in Xinjiang:

> In order to protect the lives and property and common interests of the people of various ethnic groups, maintain the stability of China's Xinjiang and the surrounding regions, safeguard national unity, social stability and the smooth progress of the modernization drive, the Chinese government has resolutely cracked down on the violent activities of the "East Turkistan" terrorist forces in accordance with the law.
>
> (SCIO 2002)

Like with most other cases of securitizing social disturbances in the PRC (Vuori 2008; 2011b; 2014), the document stated that the authorities would 'crack down' on 'only a few core members and criminals' while 'the majority of the people involved, who have been hoodwinked into bearing a part in some of the activities […] the Chinese Government […] welcomes them back to the true path.' This was also the position the authorities had taken in the anti-Falungong campaign since 1999: those who recanted their beliefs were allowed to join the fold of patriotic citizens (Vuori 2014).

While the threat of terrorist organizations was claimed to continue, the activities of the authorities were deemed effective in addition to legitimate:

> although there are still a handful of "East Turkistan" terrorists both at home and abroad, it is impossible for them to fundamentally affect Xinjiang's excellent situation, in which the society is stable, the people of all ethnic groups are united, the various undertakings are making progress and people's lives are constantly improving.
>
> (SCIO 2002)

Indeed, there had not been major violent incidents in Xinjiang when the shift in the security discourse took place.

Such examples indicate that the securitization was undertaken by the highest possible authorities in the PRC and that it represented the official line. These documents were published by the State Council and the Foreign Ministry, and Jiang Zemin and other leading figures in the PRC were voicing similar views. In terms of felicity conditions, the securitization moves abided by the new concept of security and followed the convention of presenting something as a

threat to the state and society. Indeed, the referent objects of security in such moves were plural and on various levels of social organization. They ranged from 'innocent individuals,' the societal, ethnic, and economic progress and stability of Xinjiang, the unity of the homeland, peace and stability of states in the region, to the entirety of international society, humanity, and civilization. The threat was 'East Turkistan terrorism,' which was operating in conjunction with anti-China forces in the region and outside the PRC. The audiences of securitization moves were similarly plural. They included the threat, local citizens, party members, and the international community. The securitization of terrorism was facilitated by a number of factors. Domestically, Xinjiang had a history of unrest, which had been previously presented as 'ethnic splittism.' This made the new campaign seem like a continuation of previous ones. Internationally, the securitization of terrorism by the U.S., NATO, and the UNSC analyzed previously facilitated the securitization: the PRC was joining the international struggle against terrorism (Vuori 2011b). The securitization reconfigured the deontology of the crackdown in Xinjiang into that of national security and international struggle.

Indeed, what made this securitization of the situation in Xinjiang different from previous occasions was the internationality of the threat and the struggle against it. While it had been common to speak about anti-China forces in and outside the country, the securitization of 'East Turkistan terrorists' stood apart from the previous securitization of counter-revolutionaries and separatists (Vuori 2011b). At the same time, the PRC was able to use the GWoT macrosecuritization to bring domestic 'problems' (e.g., Taiwanese, Xinjiang, and Tibetan separatists, and even the Falungong) into the global discourse. The campaign against the 'three evils' (e.g., separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism) issues beyond Islamist terrorists could be linked within the same constellation (Jackson 2006; Plummer 2020). This horizontal continuum was now linked to the vertical continuum of macrosecuritization (Figure 6.2). For example, Wang Lequan, the Party Secretary of the Uyghur Autonomous Region, framed the crackdowns in Xinjiang as being 'part and parcel of the international anti-terrorist struggle' and as 'conducive to security in neighbouring countries and regions as well as stability in the world' (BBC Summary 2002). In the case of 'extremism,' the 'international struggle against cults' has been utilized for the same purpose in the anti-Falungong campaign (Vuori 2014).

Maintaining the Securitization of Terrorism in the 2000s

The campaign and government activities appeared to have stemmed from separatist and terrorist activities (Wayne 2008). Still, despite the lack of attacks, the authorities maintained the securitization of terrorism throughout the 2000s. Yet, after about a decade without significant violence, there were attacks in conjunction with the 2008 Olympics, riots broke out in 2009, and there was a vehicular attack on Tiananmen Square in 2013 (Tanner & Bellacqua 2016).



Figure 6.2 The Domestic Horizontal Security Continuum of the Three Evils and Its Connections to the International Vertical Security Continuums.

Source: Author's creation.

In response to the 2009 incident, the local Xinjiang government declared martial law in the area and called upon the People's Armed Police (PAP) to handle the situation (Odgaard & Nielsen 2014: 545). The declaration of martial law is a rare occurrence in the PRC. It can be declared at local, regional, or national levels. The first occurrence of such a declaration was in Tibet when the death of Panchen Lama in the spring of 1989 resulted in riots (Baum 1996: 299–300). The order for martial law in Tibet was given by Li Peng and was overseen by Tibet's then Party secretary Hu Jintao (BBC Summary 1989a). The securitization of the situation that culminated in the declaration connected anti-China forces in and outside the country to the separatist threat of Tibetan restoration (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1989b). The second time martial law was declared was on a national level in response to the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Vuori 2003; 2011b).[2]

The securitization of Tibet and Xinjiang in the late 1980s and early 1990s abided by the same securitization script of counter-revolution, anti-China forces, and separatism. The effect of the macrosecuritization of terrorism is evident in how the unrest in Tibet has been securitized in a different manner to that of Xinjiang since the 2000s. While both represented a separatist threat, the Uyghur issue was linked to the macrosecuritization since 2001. In contrast, Tibet has been deemed an 'entirely internal issue of China': 'Our conflict with the Dalai clique is not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, nor a human rights problem. It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland' (Hu 2008).

In 2009, some 14,000 paramilitary personnel had to be flown in from 31 provinces in response to the 2009 violent riot in Urumqi (Greitens et al 2020: 23), which took too long from the viewpoint of the local Han people. Indeed, Xinjiang's security budget was close to the national average at the time and police presence per capita was also not high. The number of police officers was increased by 5,000, and a new system of surveillance cameras was introduced (BBC News 2010). This represented a doubling of the police presence in Xinjiang. The total of security-related recruitments also doubled from about 8,500 during 2006–2008 to over 17,000 during 2009–2011 (Zenz & Leibold 2019: 332).

This indicates that, despite the adoption of the GWoT, Xinjiang had not been high on the national agenda of security priorities. Indeed, even with the expansion of the security presence, the issue was considered more regional than national. During the 2008 unrest in Tibet and the 2009 violence in Xinjiang, provincial Party leaders used the language of securitization, while the central level used more moderate formulations. Some have viewed this as a form of desecuritization in the context of the Olympics (Cui & Li 2011: 154). This tactic signalled that the issues were severe, and the local securitization allowed the use of security measures and that the measures could become more severe; the provincial securitization of the issues functioned as control and deterrence. The contrast in the regional securitization of terrorism is evident compared with the national anti-Falungong campaign that was present everywhere (Vuori 2014). Furthermore, although securitization was maintained, the practical campaigns were more sporadic.

The security continuum continued in conjunction with dealing with the renewed unrest. For example, the 2009 riots were framed within the continuum of 'terrorism, separatism and extremism' by Deputy Foreign Minister He Yafei (BBC Monitoring 2009). China also published a white paper on 'Development and Progress in Xinjiang' (SCIO 2009b) that maintained the securitization of the three evils in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 attacks. 'East Turkistan' forces had 'plotted and organized a number of bloody incidents of terror and violence, seriously jeopardizing national unification, social stability and ethnic unity, thus seriously disrupting Xinjiang's development and progress.' The 1990s struggle against the three evils was maintained, and the macrosecuritization of terrorism was used to facilitate the securitization: 'The terrorist nature of the "East Turkistan" forces was eventually recognized by the whole world.' Once again, the securitization was used to legitimate authorities' activities in the region: 'After the eruption of the riots, [the authorities] took decisive and powerful measures to stop the violence in accordance with the law, to quickly bring the incident to an end and restore social stability in Urumqi.' Finally, the issue was presented as a Chinese problem undermining the stability in the region and as a threat to humanity.

> "East Turkistan" forces pose a threat to regional security and stability. […] East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) [has] carried out actions in

> Central and South Asia over a long period of time, creating many bloody incidents of terror and violence, including assassinations, arson and attacks on police.
>
> (SCIO 2009b)

Not only that, 'Terrorist activities organized by the "East Turkistan" forces […] are serious crimes of violence against society and humanity.'

The 2009 riot in Urumqi that targeted Han people was named the 7/5 incident in the PRC. It also caused an unprecedented outpouring of Han anger towards the Xinjiang Party Secretary, Wang Lequan, who had remained in the position for an exceptionally long period and had been in charge of the strike hard campaigns. He was removed from his position in 2010 and replaced by Zhang Chunxian. (Cliff 2012.)

Playing Down the Campaign in the 2010s

The PRC retained terrorism as a macro threat through the 2000s and 2010s. Still, there were also instances when the threat of terrorism was played down. Despite the renewed attacks in 2012–2013 (e.g., a plan to hijack a plane in Hotan, a deadly altercation with the police in Lukqun, and a vehicular attack in Beijing; Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 29–30), the effect of the Xi Jinping government was evident in the tone of the securitization. A new element was the emphasis on anti-corruption activities by the authorities in Xinjiang, which was presented as a measure to 'safeguard state security and social stability.' In contrast to the 'gangs' of the strike hard campaign, 'white-collar crimes,' such as embezzlement and acceptance of bribes, were described in detail. The emphasis was on the success the authorities have had regarding the securitized issues in Xinjiang: 'Most terrorist groups have been knocked out at the planning stage' and 'the tendency of frequent eruptions of violent and terrorist attacks in Xinjiang has been somewhat checked' (SCIO 2015b). The lessening of the severity of the securitization is also evident in the headings used in the white papers. The section of the paper where the issue of social stability is presented changed from 'Safeguarding National Unity and Social Stability' (SCIO 2009b) to 'Maintaining Social Harmony and Stability in Accordance with the Law' (SCIO 2015b).

The three evils were still present (*China Daily* 2012; SCIO 2015b; Plümmer 2020). These 'forces' that have operated 'from bases both inside and outside China' were presented as 'a great and real threat to ethnic unity and social stability in Xinjiang.' The White Paper argued that extremism leads to terrorism, as ideas such as 'martyrdom' and 'holy war' turn 'some individuals into extremists and terrorists whose thoughts are controlled and who are manipulated to frequently perform acts of violence and terrorism and kill innocent people of all ethnic groups.' Like terrorist activities, religious extremism was presented as being part of an international struggle: 'Suppressing religious extremism […] is also an important part of the international response to religious extremism.'

Indeed, the paper puts more emphasis on religious extremism, which 'has developed into a real risk that has endangered national and ethnic unity, undermines religious and social harmony, menaces Xinjiang's lasting social stability and threatens the life and property safety of people of all ethnic groups.' Yet, even here, the success of the authorities was emphasized: 'Religious extremism has been firmly curbed in accordance with the law.'

Crucially, from the viewpoint of maintaining the global nature of the struggle, Xuekerat Zakir, governor of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, used macrosecuritization during the press conference to publish the white paper.

> Violent and terrorist crimes go against humanity, society, and civilization. It is recognized worldwide as excrescences which we will resolutely crack down on in accordance with the law. We will not condone such crimes to exist in our country, in our hometown. We will firmly curb such crimes to maintain social stability.
>
> (CRIENGLISH.com 2015)

The 'Chinese dream' and building a 'beautiful Xinjiang' include participation in the international struggle against terrorism (SCIO 2015b).

Escalating the Campaign in the 2010s: A Securitization Climax

The U.S. tuned down its discourse of the 'war on terror' during the Obama administration, even though the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan were ongoing. However, the PRC doubled down on its war on terror during the Xi administration. In 2013–2014, there were several violent incidents that transformed the popular perception of the issue of terrorism within the PRC. A bomb was detonated at Beijing Airport; there was a vehicular attack at Tiananmen Gate, a bombing in Shanxi outside the party headquarters, an attack at a police station in Xinjiang (Reeves 2016: 827), and a knife attack in Kunming at a railway station that caused 29 fatalities (BBC News 2014). A bombing at a market in Urumqi killed 31 in May 2014 (Martina 2014), and an attack at a coal mine killed 50 Han workers in October 2015 (Blanchard 2015).

Xi Jinping made several public pledges to respond to these events forcefully (e.g., *Xinhua* 2014a). He equated 'national security' and 'social stability' that should be maintained even through the threat of terrorism (Xi 2014c): 'Countering terrorism has a direct bearing on national security, the people's immediate interests, and reform, development and stability.' The referents were national and macro: 'Terrorism denies basic human rights, tramples on humanitarian justice, and challenges the shared norms of human civilization. It is not an issue of ethnicity, nor an issue of religion. Terrorists are the common enemy of people of all ethnic groups.'

Xi also emphasized 'ethnic unity' and 'de-extremization' in Xinjiang to produce social stability and 'enduring peace' (长治久安, *chángzhìjiǔ'ān*) (Kam & Clarke 2021: 630; Chen 2021). Another campaign to strike hard against

violent terrorist activity was launched in 2014. It contained a small element of 'transformation through education' (教育转化, *jiàoyù zhuǎnhuà*). It targeted about one percent of the population in Xinjiang for detention that lasted for a few weeks (Greitens et al. 2020: 15). Zhang Chunxian declared a 'people's war on terror' (反恐人民战争, *fǎnkǒng rénmín zhànzhēng*) in May 2014 (*China Daily* 2014) that aimed to: 'promote the eradication of extremism, further expose and criticize the "reactionary nature" of the "three forces," enhance schools' capacity to resist ideological infiltration by religious extremism, and resolutely win the ideological battle against separation and infiltration.' According to Zhang, 'Violent terrorist attacks have become the most immediate and realistic peril to social stability in Xinjiang. … Safeguarding stability should become a matter of prime importance and a long-term task for the work of Xinjiang.' This people's war obliged citizens to participate in counter-terrorism (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 45) through the 'partnership of stability' (Xie & Liu 2021: 994).

Officials framed acts of terrorism in other countries as part of the shared struggle that the PRC was engaged in. Indeed, an incident in Marelbashi in 2013 was linked to the recent Boston marathon bombing (Rodriguez-Merino 2019: 36). In reaction to the attacks on the editorial office of Charlie Hebdo in Paris in 2015, terrorism was presented as 'the common enemy of all human societies,' and as 'a threat to the whole international society' (*Xinhuanet* 2015). The presentation of international acts of terror that did not concern the PRC or its citizens directly enforced the sense of the PRC participating in a GWoT that is a shared threat to civilized humanity. Such attacks were prominently featured in the media. The 2019 paper on 'vocational education and training centres' in Xinjiang (SCIO 2019) pointed to attacks in 'in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and other countries and regions.' Accordingly, and in line with the macrosecuritization of terrorism, 'World peace is under serious threat, and the future of humanity is overshadowed. … The fight against terrorism and extremism is a global challenge' (ibid.).

While there were attacks against PRC nationals outside the country in the 1980s and 1990s (Tanner & Belacqua 2016; Liu & Yuan 2019), the mid-2010s saw an increase in such incidents. In 2015, Chinese tourists were targeted in an attack at a Buddhist shrine in Thailand (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: i; Greitens et al. 2020: 31). A Chinese hostage was also killed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2015 (Wu 2015; Tanner & Belacqua 2016: i), a hotel bombing in Mali killed Chinese citizens (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: ii), and ISIS claimed responsibility for kidnapping and killing two PRC nationals in Pakistan in 2017 (Masood 2017). A car bombing occurred outside the PRC embassy in Kyrgyzstan in 2016 (Putz 2017).

There were also arrests of Uyghurs in the Philippines in connection to the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and in Indonesia in connection with the Mujahideen Indonesia Timur; Uyghurs were also killed in armed conflicts in Indonesia (Greitens et al. 2020: 31–32).

Islamic militants praised attacks in the PRC (Fishman 2011). Some Uyghurs also fought in Syria (Greitens et al. 2020: 32).

These violent events and increased international activities with Islamic militants, together with the domestic attacks outside Xinjiang, worked to escalate the PRC's campaign in Xinjiang (Greitens et al. 2020): the terrorist activities had expanded in their geographic reach, they were maximizing rather than minimizing casualties, they were more frequent, and of higher sophistication (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 32). The international context was also experiencing a new wave of securitizations of terrorism and Muslim immigration in Europe and in the U.S., as there were several terrorist attacks and millions of asylum seekers were trying to reach a haven in Europe and the U.S. (Moreno-Lax 2018; Eroukhmanoff 2018).

This international spirit of the age resulted in the rise of right-wing authoritarian leaders in many parts of the world. President Obama had failed in handling the Syrian civil war, and ISIS managed to establish its Caliphate. President Trump was vocal against Muslim migrants even though he denied it (Eroukhmanoff 2018). Xi Jinping had given his condolences to European leaders as France and the UK were hit with major terrorist attacks. This may have created the impression that the U.S. would show indifference and European countries sympathy if the PRC would escalate its campaign against terrorism. Indeed, the UK added ETIM to its list of terrorist organizations in 2016 (Reuters 2016). This international environment, together with the increased targeting of PRC nationals abroad and the increased effect and reach of domestic attacks, facilitated the securitization climax (Lupovici 2016a) that turned the anti-terror campaign from a reaction to attacks into its preventive mode that eventually included the use of internment camps.

The new securitization climax of the terrorist threat shows how macrosecuritization discourses connect to very micro-level security practice that securitizes urban spaces (Liu & Yuan 2019: 30). Not only that, previous Muslim minorities that had been considered models for other minorities to follow (Gonul & Rogenhofer 2019) were also targeted by the new policy that considered most forms of displaying Muslim religious faith as a form of extremism that could result in several years in 're-education.' Indeed, the escalation of the campaign in 2017–2018 entailed a 'shift from individual to collective detention and re-education' (Greitens et al. 2020: 11).[3]

The implementation of the escalation of the campaign was headed by Chen Quanguo, who took the leadership position in Xinjiang in 2016. He was the one who had introduced a new grid-based security and surveillance system in Tibet that quelled the earlier unrest there (Kam & Clarke 2021: 634). For him, 'social stability' was the 'general goal' (一个总目标, *yīgè zǒng mùbiāo*) for the CCP in Xinjiang (Chen Hong 2021; Greitens et al. 2020: 16). To achieve this, he established a system of 'convenience police stations' (便民警务站, *biànmín jǐng wù zhàn*) and a 'grid-style social management' (社会网格化管理, *shèhuì wǎng gé huà guǎnlǐ*) surveillance system of an unprecedented scale that utilized big data analytics; the system had been tried out in Beijing and Shanghai in the 2000s, and implemented in Tibet after the unrest there in 2008–2009 (Zenz &

Leibold 2019 333). Once the systems were in place, there were security checks every 300–800 metres, and security cameras every 20 metres in major cities in Xinjiang. The goal was 'to form an escape-proof net that has no blind spots, no gaps, and no blank spaces' (Chen 2017; Chen Hong 2021). Budgets for security spending increased more than ten-fold surpassing the national average two to three times; accordingly, police recruitment also increased 12 times to what it had been in 2009 (Greitens et al. 2020: 16). The surveillance system shifted from the use of cameras to the analysis of big data. Despite such massive increases in societal control, Chen Quanguo (2017) estimated that it would take 20–30 years to have the desired effect.

International reporting indicates that from 800,000 to three million, mainly Uyghur, Muslims have been interned in 1,200 camps in Xinjiang (Finley 2019a: 2; Greitens et al. 2020: 10; Baker-Beall & Clark 2021: 427). The PRC initially claimed that there were no such camps but eventually acknowledged them as 'vocational education and training centres' in a published white paper (SCIO 2019). These 'concentrated transformation-through-education' centres were part of the campaign of 'de-extremification' (去极端化, *qù jíduān huà*) that aims at 'comprehensive stability' (全面稳定, *quánmiàn wěndìng*) in Xinjiang (SCIO 2019; Greitens et al. 2020: 17). Like in the anti-Falungong campaign (Vuori 2014), people have been detained in these camps through extra-judicial internment (Greitens et al. 2020: 17).

The use of the camps was legitimized with the macrosecuritization argument in the very opening of the paper on 'vocational education and training in Xinjiang': 'Terrorism and extremism are the common enemies of humanity, and the fight against terrorism and extremism is the shared responsibility of the international community' (SCIO 2019). Indeed, the international community has taken efforts to prevent and combat 'terrorism and extremism,' and 'Xinjiang is a key battlefield in the fight against terrorism and extremism in China' (ibid.).

The escalation of the campaign indicates that the issue had risen on the security agenda. Indeed, on the level of practice, the deployment of security in the frame of anti-terror and stability maintenance normalized the 'exception' of the previous singular campaigns and reactions into the form of the most intense garrison security state since the German Democratic Republic of the 1980s; in the words of Chen (2017), 'we must put stability in our hearts, grasp it in our hands, and implement it in our actions.' Even though some aspects of control have loosened somewhat after Chen left office in 2021, the systems he initiated are still in place. A look at the bureaucratic logics of the macrosecuritization of terrorism also aids in comprehending the transformations in the security policy and practice in Xinjiang.

Bureaucratic Logics in the Anti-Terror Campaigns

As I noted previously, terrorism was not considered a domestic threat within the PRC by epistemic communities, law enforcement, or political discourse in the 1980s. Accordingly, the PRC's counterterrorism architecture was

underdeveloped compared with many other states (Reeves 2016: 830). This also meant that the response to incidents was not a nuanced form of counterterrorism practice but relied on the use of force through paramilitary or military means.

On the level of practice, the PRC's response to the insurgency in Xinjiang since the 'Baren Uprising' in1990 evolved into a 'four-in-one approach' consisting of the PLA, PAP, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (兵团, *bīngtuán*), and the people (*Xinhua* 2003). Wayne (2008) describes how the PRC's anti-insurgent operation evolved: the initial use of PLA force was replaced with an emphasis on the PAP and the Bingtuan.[4] Wayne saw the success of the PRC's anti-insurgency activities in the 2000s as resulting from unique cultural, political, and other situational factors but also from the emphasis on bottom-up techniques. The authorities used a mixed set of hard and soft power ranging from eliminating insurgent leaders to co-opting groups and integrating ideas into the 'core' of Chinese society. The 'develop the West' infrastructure and investment campaign of the 1990s has also been viewed in terms of working at the root causes of terrorism (Cui & Li 2011).

The late 1990s and early 2000s were a period of centralization in the PRC's counterterrorism policy (Reeves 2016: 831). In 2001, it established the National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group that later became the National Anti-Terrorism Leading Group (PRC Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 2013); while these groups were targeted against domestic and international forms of terrorism, they were focusing on operations within the PRC's border (Ghiselli 2021: 29). The MPS also established a centralized body for counterterrorism intelligence work (Reeves 2016: 831). Internationally, the PRC took part in establishing the SCO's anti-terrorism structure in Tashkent in 2004 (Lanteigne 2020: 106). The SCO maintained that it is part of a security community of cooperation within the international 'war on terrorism' (反恐战争, *fǎnkǒng zhànzhēng*) (Lanteigne 2020: 106).

During the Cold War, popular uprisings in the PRC were considered counter-revolutionary (Vuori 2011b; see Chapter 2). With the transition to national security from considering societal instability in those terms, the notion of terrorism also entered the vocabulary, practice, and eventually legislation of the PRC. Today, security specialists in the PRC distinguish four levels of uprisings: disturbances in society (i.e., unorganized disturbances of law and order), violence (i.e., threats or individual instances of violence), armed uprisings (i.e., large-scale violent acts), and terrorism (i.e., violent acts like explosions or hijackings) (Odgaard & Nielsen 2014: 544).

In response to the 2009 attacks, the recruitment of security personnel was increased, and local Uyghur communities were embedded with security and party officials (Greitens et al. 2020: 15). With such embeddedness, the security response in Xinjiang eventually transformed from a militarized reaction to one that emphasized prevention (Liu & Yuan 2019: 33). While there were still campaigns to strike hard, stability maintenance became to main approach. Deradicalization followed the practice of 'integrated social engineering' (综合

治理, *zònghé zhìlǐ*) that aims to deter, punish, and prevent crime by integrating law enforcement with other means like culture and economics in establishing social stability (Liu & Yuan 2019: 33). Accordingly, 'permanent order' and 'stability maintenance' became the key goals and means when dealing with the threats in Xinjiang (Finley 2019a: 9–10). Indeed, stability maintenance was on par with the anti-terror in the people's war in Xinjiang (Kam & Clarke 2021: 625). This suggests that while the initial securitization of terrorism was in an exceptionalist manner, the transition to stability maintenance worked to normalize the exceptionality into a more permanent mode of security governance.

A new feature was the 'Survey Households, Enrich Livelihoods, and Foster Unity' (访惠聚, *fǎng huì jù*) programme[5] that was followed by the 'bonding as relatives' programme, where Party officials went to stay at people's homes without an invitation for a week every 2 months starting in 2015 (*China News* 2014; Finley 2019a: 3–4; Kam & Clarke 2021: 632, 635; Baker-Beall & Clark 2021: 446). Officials used this opportunity to observe people's religious and political behaviour, which was subsequently used to dole out extrajudicial sentences of re-education based on how their untrustworthiness had been estimated regarding the level of their religiosity, attitude towards the Party, and connections with the mainland. The official line categorized those imprisoned as 'people who were incited, coerced or induced into participating in terrorist or extremist activities' that: 1) 'were not serious enough to constitute a crime,' 2) 'posed a real danger but did not cause actual harm, whose subjective culpability was not deep, who acknowledged their offences and were contrite about their past actions and thus do not need to be sentenced to or can be exempted from punishment, and who have demonstrated the willingness to receive training,' and 3) 'were convicted and received a prison sentence for terrorist or extremist crimes and after serving their sentences, have been assessed as still posing a potential threat to society' (SCIO 2019). Only a small fraction of those who were estimated through tests of how religious and how connected to the motherland a family was managed to avoid incarceration. Even a low skill level in Mandarin could result in internment.

The escalation of the campaign to include grid-based surveillance, convenience police stations, and eventually the use of internment camps was hidden under the cloak of international practices of preventing radicalization and extremism (SCIO 2019). The legal basis for such actions, which largely consisted of extra-judicial incarceration, was presented as two local Xinjiang regulations,'the Measures of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Implementing the Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, and the Regulations of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Deradicalization' (SCIO 2019).

The macrosecuritization of terrorism, its maintenance, and eventual climax have mattered. Some have argued that the language and practice of security have been mutually constitutive in the securitization of the Uyghurs in the PRC (Baker-Beall & Clark 2021: 431). Yet, it was the transition from splittism to terrorism and then stability maintenance that ushered in the escalation

of the practice. Indeed, while some stages of escalation can be attributed to increased violent incidents, securitization does not always follow suit. Only looking at security practice would leave this out, and, for example, the Baren 1990 uprising and the developments in the 2010s would not have a different character if the justifications for the practices were left out.

Like in previous stages of securitizing terrorism, and even with the securitization of splittism before it, the deployment of the systems for stability maintenance has been presented as effective: 'religious extremism has been effectively eliminated'; 'the social atmosphere has taken a marked turn for the better'; and, 'the overall situation in society continues to be stable. No terrorist incidents have occurred in Xinjiang for nearly 3 years since the education and training started' (SCIO 2019). Beyond such official estimates, a broader look at the uses and effects of macrosecuritization should be taken.

Effects and Uses of Securitizing Terrorism in China

As Buzan and Wæver (2009) noted, it indeed seems that the selection of which terms are elevated to top official status as security issues is an international and domestic concern. The GWoT discourse was, in this way, empowering for the PRC, as its Western partners in the 'war' could not as easily criticize it for its domestic campaigns against 'terrorists.' Macrosecuritizations can be utilized for local concerns and repressions, too (Wæver 2009: 8). In terms of theory, alignment with existing order and inclusive universalisms can provide vertical legitimacy for domestic policies and concerns. In the GWoT discourse, the PRC went along with the existing order universalism and the constellation of civilized states versus terrorist and religious extremist organizations. Yet, in the U.S., the GWoT macrosecuritization operated as an inclusive universalist discourse; the PRC took part in a battle against a 'common scourge' of humanity and the entirety of international society but not in a war against the opponents of freedom or democracy. Sovereignty in the form of ideological security was maintained, even through aligning with the GWoT.

Beyond aligning in international constellations and participation in universalisms, the securitization of 'East Turkistan terrorism' as part of the GWoT had a number of other effects. I divide these up into international and domestic uses and costs.

International Uses for the Macrosecuritization

Internationally, the PRC was able to get the ETIM on the U.S. and UN international terrorist organization lists in 2002. The adoption of macrosecuritization resulted in a number of policy actions. The PRC supported many U.S. initiatives, backed the UN Resolution 1373 (UNSC 2001b), ratified its accession into the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism.[6] (Wayne 2008.)

The price of joining the U.S. coalition fighting terror was explicitly stated in a January document:

> The Chinese government opposes terrorism in any form; at the same time it opposes the application of double standards concerning the anti-terrorism issue. Any tolerance or indulgence toward the "East Turkistan" terrorist forces will not harm China and the Chinese people alone. Today, as the international community becomes more clearly and deeply aware of the harm brought about by terrorism, we hope that all peace-loving people throughout the world, regardless of ethnic status or religious belief, region or country, political or social system, will fully recognize the nature of the "East Turkistan" terrorist forces and the serious harm caused by them, see through all their disguises, and jointly crack down on their terrorist activities, leaving not a single opportunity for them to exploit to their advantage. (SCIO 2002)

After the initiation of the GWoT, the PRC emphasized the need to combat the 'three evils' (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism). As a sign of international success, this continuum has remained the SCO's main 'threat package', and has been used to securitize human trafficking by linking it with terrorism (Jackson 2006: 310). The GWoT was a facilitating factor here, as the concern about splittism, ethnic exclusion, and religious extremism without terrorism was present in the first statement of the meeting in 1996, which has retroactively been nominated as the initial meeting of the SCO (formally named so in 2001). The SCO's counterterrorism cooperation and operations also allowed Russia and the PRC to conduct military exercises without raising international alarm or condemnation.

In bilateral relations with the U.S., aligning with the GWoT discourse warmed Sino-U.S. relations that were on a bad footing in the late 1990s: the Taiwan crisis 1995–1996, the 'China threat' discussions in the 1990s, the Belgrade embassy bombing, the Bush comments on China as a 'strategic competitor,' and the spy plane incident of 2001 were put on the back burner on both sides (see Chapter 3). After adopting the macrosecuritization, the PRC allowed a U.S. aircraft carrier to make a port call to Hong Kong in November 2001 and did not protest the finding of bugging devices on a U.S.-made airplane intended to be Jiang Zemin's private jet (Malik 2002: 17). On the U.S. side, the George W. Bush administration no longer referred to China as a 'strategic competitor,' and ETIM was added to the U.S. terrorist organization list. The thaw in Sino-U.S. relations was not permanent, however, as was evident in the characterization of the PRC in the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (Arkin 2002). Similarly, the U.S. did not repatriate the Uyghurs it detained at Guantanamo Bay as 'enemy combatants' despite Chinese requests and demands to this effect (U.S. Congress 2009). The tuning down of the war on terror and U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan raised the PRC's position on the U.S. agenda (see Chapter 3).

The adoption and transformation of the GWoT have also been useful as a tool to criticize the West as part of China's foreign policy. The notion of 'double standards' has been crucial here. A Foreign Ministry spokesman brought this issue up on 18 September 2001 (quoted in Malik 2002: 7): 'The United States has asked China to provide assistance in the fight against terrorism. China, by the same token, has reasons to ask the United States to give its support and understanding in the fight against terrorism and separatists.'

The GWoT was initially used to justify the suppression of the separatist activities in Xinjiang by linking them to the global discourse through a new terrorist frame that was also used retrospectively. However, since the mid-2010s, the discourse on the GWoT has been used as a vehicle for the legitimization of the PRC's expanding international footprint in the PLA's mission other than war (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 72; Duchâtel 2016). Furthermore, the PRC has framed itself as 'a responsible member of the international community' and as supporting 'the United Nations in playing a leading and coordinating role in international cooperation against terrorism' (SCIO 2019). Indeed, the macrosecuritization of terrorism by the UN allowed the PRC to take legitimate measures deemed excessive by the West. The PRC has also become a member of many international conventions and agreements that concern cooperation in counterterrorism within the UN, the SCO, and ASEAN (Tanner & Belacqua 2016; Duchâtel 2016; SCIO; Banlaoi 2021).

The escalation in the PRC's domestic counterterrorism in the form of stability maintenance coincided with an increased push for international cooperation in counterterrorism from the side of the PRC. Indeed, the PRC has some form of counterterrorism cooperation or discussions with about 40 countries. The PRC has also been active in multilateral and bilateral counterterrorism exercises (Tanner & Belacqua 2016; Duchâtel 2016; Yau 2022.)

The push and goal of international cooperation in counterterrorism have even been codified into the counterterrorism law that was promulgated in 2015 and amended in 2018 (National People's Congress 2015). The law has five articles regarding international cooperation in counterterrorism: cooperation based on international treaties with other nations, regions, and international organizations; policy dialogues and exchanges of intelligence information, enforcement cooperation, and international financial monitoring; people's governments in the border regions at the county level or above can initiate counterterrorism exchanges; the judicial assistance, extradition, and transfer of sentenced offenders of terrorist activity is based on laws; the Public Security Department, national security department, the PLA, and armed police forces may send out people on counterterrorism missions and; materials acquired through international cooperation on counterterrorism can be used as evidence in administrative punishment and criminal proceedings. As such, the macrosecuritization of terrorism resulted in the codification of international security cooperation into legislation.

Beyond formal cooperation, while the policy of internment camps has raised a lot of international criticism by human rights organizations and

governments, there have also been instances of success in the international securitization of terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang. For example, in 2019, 37 ambassadors signed a letter to the UN Human Rights Council to laude the PRC's human rights record in Xinjiang. They also took 'note that terrorism, separatism and religious extremism has caused enormous damage to people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang' (France24 2019). Furthermore,

> faced with the grave challenge of terrorism and extremism, China has undertaken a series of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang, including setting up vocational education and training centers. … The past three consecutive years has seen not a single terrorist attack in Xinjiang and people there enjoy a stronger sense of happiness, fulfillment and security.
>
> (*Xinhuanet* 2019)

'Now safety and security has returned to Xinjiang' (France24 2019). Such statements indicate that the PRC has had success in its international securitization efforts in regard to authoritarian leaning governments (Gonul & Rogenhofer 2019: 51). Uyghur organizations operating outside the PRC have, however, resisted the securitization (see the following sections).

Domestic Uses of the Macrosecuritization

Some view the securitization of Tibet and Xinjiang as a form of fully-fledged colonialism (Anand 2019: 130, 135), which 'renders the colonialized inferior, dangerous and always already suspicious, and thus a subject that must be securitized, domesticated, controlled or eliminated' (ibid.: 136). In a similar vein, the various campaigns that have securitized the Uyghurs have also been deemed to contain racist elements, where an intersectional analysis shows different Muslim minorities that were initially treated differently (Gonul & Rogenhofer 2019: 35). Uyghurs have even been considered an 'almost biological threat infecting society' (Baker-Beall & Clark 2021: 447). This element is also present in how Uyghurs have been treated differently in their re-education and forced secularization in internment camps. The mostly Han people who adhered to Falungong were released if they recanted their beliefs (Vuori 2014). However, doing so as an Uyghur Muslim did not reduce the internment period. The escalation in the campaign to cover the entirety of Muslim religious practice shows a shift from racist securitization to that of religion as such (Gonul & Rogenhofer 2019: 35).

Irrespective of such possible motives or systemic forms of racism, the authorities had a number of uses for securitizing separatist activities in the PRC's 'periphery.' Alignment with the GWoT alleviated worries about the use of 'human rights' as legitimization for multinational interventions that had taken place in the 1990s and early 2000s (Bovigndon 2004). The interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were particularly worrying for the leadership as something

similar could perhaps happen in Xinjiang. The PRC's value as a partner in the GWoT dampened such fears and hopes.

Indeed, the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq worked as 'negative models' for insurgents in Xinjiang. While the U.S. was perceived as a force against the PRC's authorities, Islamist rhetoric and violence after 2001 worked against U.S. support for the pursuit of independence of religious states. The resulting chaos in Afghanistan, some other Central-Asian states, and Iraq showed that insurgency could drag on and have dire consequences for society. Even the reduced status of Russia compared with that of the Soviet Union had a negative effect in terms of perceiving insurgency as a positive in Xinjiang. Wayne (2008: 151) reported that his Uyghur informants thought along such lines. The authorities have also echoed this point: after the 2001 attacks in the U.S., 'East Turkistan forces […] are distressed by the destruction of the bin Laden terrorist forces and Taliban terrorist training bases by U.S. missiles,' but they are forced 'to express their support for the U.S. military retaliation, attempting to distance themselves from the bin Laden terrorist forces' (SCIO 2002).

At the same time, the securitization also worked towards motivating the Han majority against separatist movements, which increased the authorities' legitimacy and possibilities to deal with insurgency and separatism (Wayne 2008). The public acceptance of the ramping up of the campaign increased after attacks outside Xinjiang (Tredaniel & Lee 2018: 188). The graver the securitization, the graver the threat, and the more the authorities are endowed with legitimacy or approval for the actions they take to deal with the claimed threats. Strikingly, after the securitization of Uyghur terrorism as part of the GWoT, the authorities retroactively labelled incidents in the 1990s that had previously been considered ethnic unrest as having been conducted by 'East Turkistan terrorists' (Pokalova 2013: 288). Indeed, the first mention of ETIM was in November 2001 (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations 2001).

The securitization of first splittism and then terrorism has, at times, taken paradoxical positions. The threat has been presented as dire, requiring extraordinary responses like the declaration of martial law, the deployment of the PAP, and, eventually, the use of internment camps. At the same time, some reports and statements have emphasized the success of the anti-terror and anti-radicalization efforts and presented the situation as having calmed down. While, at times, the securitizing statements have been in reaction to violent events, they have not always followed the situation in the region. Indeed, the initiation of the GWoT took place after a period of relative calm.

This apparently paradoxical situation has been clarified by pointing to the dual needs that authorities and bureaucracies have in Xinjiang (Cliff 2012). On the one hand, there is a need for 'instabilization' to attract funds for the security apparatus and for development programmes that have been used in the anti-radicalization policies. This also includes the promotion of careers, as success in counterterrorism is part of cadre evaluation, which has resulted

in branding any form of unrest like civil disputes as instances of terrorism and other forms of subverting the official security speech to their benefit (Xie & Liu 2021: 994–996, 1000, 1003). This makes playing up the threat sensible, even in situations where there had not been recent uprisings or violent attacks. On the other hand, there is, at times, a need to downplay the level of instability to attract investment and promote business. Like in the overall 'aporia' of security and insecurity (Vuori 2011b), the aspiration for stability is inextricably connected to the threat of instability that remains an ever-present possibility (Cliff 2012).

Domestic Costs and Resistance Dynamics of the Securitization

The general pattern in government interventions in Xinjiang tended to follow increases in the number of protests and violent attacks in the region until the late 1990s. The adoption of the GWoT macrosecuritization seems to have produced a clear exception here. Before the mid-2010s, the largest number of violent incidents happened in the 1990s, yet the greatest number of interventions was in the early 2000s when the number of incidents was low (Pokalova 2013: 288). Accordingly, the securitization that was viewed as excessive by the local population has been deemed to have resulted in a vicious cycle that has escalated violent resistance to the PRC's policies and the implementation of anti-terror measures within the frame of stability maintenance (Xie & Liu 2021). This cycle has also been noted by Uyghur activists:

> Dilxat Raxit, spokesman [sic.] for the exiled World Uyghur Congress, said the government's violent response and continued repression could only make things worse. "If Beijing does not change its policy of extreme repression, this could lead to even more clashes," he said in comments emailed to Reuters.
>
> (Blanchard 2014)

For Kadeer (2016), who has been the president of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), 'China's heavy-handed policies toward Uyghurs are creating instability and desperation among the Uyghur people. These policies have become self-fulfilling in some respects, as some Uyghurs have become radicalized in their effort to oppose China's oppression.'

There is little evidence that the Han people would have opposed the securitization of the Uyghur (Gonul & Rogenhofer 2019: 34) or the three evils overall (Cui & Liu 2011: 150). Furthermore, the 7/5 attacks and those outside Xinjiang had a supporting effect on the securitization (Tredaniel & Lee 2018: 188). The exposure to international news of attacks in Europe in Paris, Nice, and Manchester further facilitated the securitization of terrorism in the PRC.

Uyghurs lack a clear political leader, like Li Hongzhi in the case of Falungong, or a movement like the Student Democracy Movement of 1989 that would operate inside the PRC. Indeed, the Uyghurs are not a politically

homogenous group. Those who have been identified as or declared themselves to be leaders of the ETIM have been killed in U.S. military actions outside the PRC (Pokalova 2013; Rodríguez 2013; Tanner & Belacqua 2016). The WUC is an organization outside the PRC that supports Uyghur independence. While it is difficult to access dissident discourse within Xinjiang (e.g., Bovigndon 2002), there have been public statements in the form of invited testimony on the Uyghur situation in, for example, the U.S. Congress and the EU parliament. The WUC separates itself from terrorist acts by noting that those appearing on terrorist videos are unknown to them (U.S. Congress 2009). However, they recognize that some people have responded to the PRC's repressive policies through violent resistance (Rodríguez 2013; Kadeer 2016). In the public hearings, WUC representatives have responded to the claims of terrorism by PRC authorities in the form of desecuritization and counter-securitization.

Uyghur activists have denied that the U.S. securitization of the GWoT would apply to them, as their form of religious practice does not abide by that promoted by Al-Qaeda, and as the struggle in Xinjiang is one for an independent state rather than a religious one:

> So our struggle is not religious struggle. We are not seeking a religious state. Our struggle is precise, like the Tibetans, all the other people who are suffering. We want freedom. Yes. We did talk about religious persecution and our demand for religious freedom, but that is not what inspires us to peacefully struggle.
>
> (Kadeer [U.S. Congress 2009])

There have also been moves that have worked against the acceptance of the PRC's securitization

> Uighurs must assimilate or face extinction. Wang Lequan, the Xinjiang party's secretary, has called the subjugation of the Uighur people a life and a death struggle. Since 9/11, the Chinese Government has used our Islamic faith against us and labelled the Uighurs as terrorists to justify crackdowns and security sweeps as part of the global war on terror.
>
> (Kadeer in U.S. Congress 2009)

Desecuritizing moves have suggested that the securitization by Chinese authorities should not be accepted

> Furthermore, the incoming [Trump] administration should exercise extreme skepticism regarding China's narrative that increased militarization and securitization in East Turkestan are justified in fighting radical Islam. The repression that accompanies security measures enables China to keep firm control of the region and suppress legitimate Uyghur claims for greater political, economic, social, and cultural freedoms.
>
> (Kadeer 2016)

Beyond desecuritization moves, there are also instances of countermacrosecuritization (Tohti 2011): 'China is now a leader of exporting authoritarianism and dictatorship to other countries around the world and posing great threat to world order and stability.' The physical well-being of individuals has also been securitized

> Physical security for Uyghurs in East Turkestan is almost non-exist or very low with long continued and non-stopped strike hard campaigns intensified since 1991, and also repeated incidents of violent crackdowns on the peaceful population culminating in the 1997 Ghulja and 2009 Urumqi massacre, and most recent Hoten and Kashgar suppression.
>
> (Tohti 2011)

Other moves have been more in the sector of ontological cultural countersecuritization (Kadeer 2016): 'The Trump Administration should understand the situation in East Turkestan in similar terms to Tibet. It is a struggle for cultural survival in the face of formidable assimilative actions by the Chinese state.'

Such desecuritizing moves have had some success outside the PRC. Indeed,

> in June 2007 the House passed a resolution, H.R. 497, that acknowledged that China had, and was using, the war on terror to oppress the Uighurs. The resolution states that the Chinese Communists had, and this is the language of the resolution, manipulated the strategic objectives of the international war on terror to increase their cultural and religious oppression of the Muslim population residing in the Uighur Autonomous Region.
>
> (U.S. Congress 2009)

The plight of the Uyghurs has also been recognized to the extent that the innocent detainees in Guantanamo Bay could not be repatriated to the PRC:

> it is indisputable that the Uighurs have been a persecuted minority in China and if they were returned there would have undoubtedly faced torture and possibly death. That would be a stain on our national honor, particularly in the light of those words of George Washington.
>
> (U.S. Congress 2009)

In 1990s Xinjiang, there was a general feeling that Uyghur independence might happen and that the PRC might split apart like the Soviet Union; still, most forms of resistance took the form of infra politics and hidden transcripts (Bovigndon 2002). Art and various forms of culture have also been used as means of resistance (Finley 2013). It appears that the most common coping mechanism or silent form of resistance in the 2010s has been to circumvent security and stability maintenance measures in a non-confrontational manner by, for example, avoiding contentious places like state-constructed mosques

(Xie & Liu 2021: 994, 997, 1001). The discourse on stability maintenance also recognizes the issue of silent resistance even among those who feign cooperation by using the label 'two-faced persons' (两面人, *liǎngmiàn rén*) to refer to such practices (Chen 2017; Xie & Liu 2021: 1004). The issue of 'wild imams' (野阿訇, *yěāhōng*) who are not recognized by the authorities has also been identified as a target for suppression (Chen 2017).

That there have been instances of planned violence is an indication of overt resistance. Indeed, the Turkistan Islamic Party claimed responsibility for bombings in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics by posting a series of online videos (Cui & Li 2011: 153–154). The authorities played these down, as they did not want to jeopardize the smooth running of the games. Whether this resistance justifies itself by countering the securitization of religion or the Uyghurs is unknown. In 2017, a purported ISIS video declared that rivers of blood would flow in China in response to its oppression and that 'we will certainly plant our flag over America, China, Russia, and all the infidels of the world' (Martina & Blanchard 2017). Such instances indicate that the PRC is securitized as part of the overall securitization of insults and injustice directed at Muslims.

Xinjiang and Tibet activists, in addition to democracy dissidents, operate online to garner domestic and international support and attention. However, the effect of this 'online dissidence' or 'cyber-separatism' is difficult to gauge. Wayne (2008: 104) notes that, for example, in the case of exiled Xinjiang activists, exaggeration and inaccuracy are prevalent in foreign statements, which has resulted in the creation of a wedge between local populations and outside dissidents. Similarly, Millward (2004) and Bovingdon (2004) argued that while Uyghur organizations and groups outside China have provided international visibility, evidence of any actual influence on Xinjiang politics seems scant, notwithstanding some Uyghur leaders' boasts and authorities' claims. Regardless of its effectiveness vis-à-vis its target audiences, this online activity provides a degree of plausibility for the authorities claims of 'anti-China forces operating both within and outside China.' Some international militants were killed in the PRC in the 2000s showing a connection to outside militants (Pokalova 2013; Tanner & Belacqua 2016).

The adoption of the anti-terrorist discourse and the concomitant hard crackdown in the 2000s did not stop the use of violence by targeted groups. In fact, it may have radicalized the separatist movement (Pokalova 2013: 281): 'We, the members of the Turkestan Islamic Party, have declared war against China. We oppose China's occupation of our homeland of East Turkestan, which is part of the Islamic world' (Wong 2008). A similar dynamic happened with the securitization of the Falungong, albeit without the use of violence (Vuori 2014). Like with the Falungong, the securitization of religion has been considered counterproductive in light of its stated aims in managing the unrest in Xinjiang (Finley 2019b; Baker-Beall & Clark 2021).

Indeed, there appears to have been a vicious cycle as a result of securitizing religion as a whole (Gonul & Rogenhofer 2019; Finley 2019b: 82). The interactive nature of increasing violence in the region following the expansion of

'state nationalism' was noted even within the Party's academic discussion (e.g., Xin 2014). Irrespective of such warnings, the shift to the mass re-education, deradicalization, and preventive counterterrorism policy starting from 2017–2018 diffusely securitized (Huysmans 2014) 'most areas of cultural, religious, and educational life in Xinjiang' as underlying causes for the threat of social instability in the form of religious extremism and violent terrorism (Greitens et al. 2020: 44). This shift included the introduction of predictive measures that supplemented post-hoc interventions with a pre-emptive approach (Xie & Liu 2021: 998). The secretary or the Party committee in Xinjiang, Chen (2017), phrased the goal of such practices as 'deterrence through military and police presence' that would let 'the masses have a sense of security.' This entailed a move from securitizing ethnic identity into the securitization of religious practice, which meant that there was not as strong a distinction between Uyghur Muslims and Muslims from other ethnic groups (Gonul & Rogenhofer 2019: 32). As such, this blanket securitization can be considered a form of reverse fundamentalism: fundamentalism securitizes faith as its referent object, whereby it moves away from religion into politics (Laustsen & Wæver 2000); the CCP's securitization of faith as a threat reverses the process, yet is as fundamental in its nature.

International Costs of Securitization

While PRC nationals were targets of violent acts outside the PRC before the GWoT (Tanner & Belacqua 2016), there has been a vicious cycle during it internationally. Attacks on nationals increased in the mid-2010s, and the PRC was included in listings of hostile states by Islamist militants. The PLA even engaged in a historic evacuation operation from Syria via Yemen. While international anti-China forces have been a nebulous phrase in the PRC's securitization discourse since at least the 1960s (Vuori 2011b), international terrorist acts have not taken the form of peaceful evolution and Westernization that has been the main target of the securitization. Indeed, participation in the GWoT had the price of nationals being included in target lists outside the PRC.

While the GWoT was a boon for the PRC that opened up a period of strategic opportunity in the 2000s and allowed for new and enhanced forms of international cooperation in the military realm, the escalation in the use of internment camps has had a negative impact on the PRC's relations with the West. For example, the U.S. has taken legislative action against the PRC's use of camps in Xinjiang. These include the proposal for the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act in the U.S. Congress. The issue has been sent to the UN Human Rights Council. (Greitens et al. 2020.) There have also been boycotts by companies and other non-governmental campaigns against the camps, which has resulted in the U.S. banning the use of cotton from Xinjiang (*The Guardian* 2022). The U.S. also sanctioned companies that have been involved in surveillance activities in Xinjiang (*The Independent* 2019).

The revealing of the camps also produced difficulties in the expansion of the PRC's counterterrorism cooperation (Greitens et al. 2020: 46). For example,

Israel had been a long-time partner in training the PRC's counterterrorism forces (Evron 2016; Efron et al. 2019). For obvious reasons, Israel has distanced itself from cooperation that could be portrayed as promoting the internment of religious minorities into camps. Attempts at enhancing cooperation with the U.S. was difficult because of the line of the Trump administration. Mike Pompeo even removed the ETIM from the U.S. list of terrorist organizations in 2020, as there was no credible evidence that the ETIM had continued to exist for a decade (*The Guardian* 2020). Strikingly, the UK has not withdrawn its designation of the ETIM as a terrorist organization.

Analysis: Climactic Macrosecuritization of Terrorism

The discourse on the GWoT initiated by the U.S. fits well into Buzan & Wæver's (2009) concept of macrosecuritization: it has a high level of aggregation and a high degree of inclusiveness. The U.S. was clearly in the pre-eminent position in the early 2000s, yet it was not in a position to completely dominate. This situation of 'uni-multipolarity' meant that the U.S. had to use macrosecuritization to mobilize against the threat of terrorism (Wæver 2009: 6). Indeed, 'civilized' states were, in practice, forced to toe the line of this discourse. However, The practical effects of participating in the discourse have varied.

The partial successes and failures of the instances of securitization within the GWoT suggest that horizontal and vertical security continuums can be used to facilitate securitization moves worldwide. Indeed, it is easier to securitize some types of issues than others. Linking some issues into a continuum of prevalent security issues provides a sense of plausibility for the claims of the securitizing actor who is intent on labelling a new issue or token as a security problem. The securityness of one issue can be 'grafted' onto another. It seems that most states that actively participated in the GWoT used the macrosecuritization discourse to promote their parochial security policies, which may or may not have been driven by sincere threat perceptions of terrorism.

This certainly seems to be the case with the PRC, which clearly supports the existence of macrosecuritization as an organizing force in global security discourse. How China 'translated' the GWoT into its domestic campaigns displays in detail how the 'high' status of global discourses can be used to elevate domestic or even local concerns. Even though such discourses promoted by major powers may force most states to take them into account, states may still use them creatively and operate in various constellations they produce in accordance with their interests. Producing an operatively successful macrosecuritization may still bear major costs for the securitizing actor.

While the U.S. has eventually wound the discourse of GWoT down while retaining its practices, the PRC maintained macrosecuritization that eventually also saw a securitization climax. Even though the PRC's discourse has had different referents than the U.S., the mode of universalism has been the same in maintaining the existing order of civilized states that are threatened by terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism (Table 6.1). While the

Table 6.1 Macrosecuritization Elements in the Chinese Discourse on Terrorism

Macrosecuritization discourse	*Types of moves*	*Type of universalism*	*Alignment in constellations*	*View on polarity*	*Bureaucratic logic*
Global War on Terror	Securitization	Existing order	Civilized states versus terrorism and religious extremism	Multipolar	Security

U.S. initiated macrosecuritization to shore up its unipolar position in world politics, the PRC has used the discourse to work towards its goal of world multipolarization. This can be seen in how it has increased its cooperation and exercises in counterterrorism multilaterally within the SCO and bilaterally with individual states in mainly Central and Southeast Asia. This effect of macrosecuritization has been codified into the 2015 counterterrorism act, which was modified in 2018. This is part of the responsible great power identity of the PRC.

The way the PRC has used the GWoT points to the responsibilities involved in the initiation of macrosecuritizations. The revealing of the camps, which the PRC initially denied being there, is an equivalent excess of the GWoT in the PRC that the deployment of torture and rendition was for the U.S. Still, the reputational costs for the PRC have mainly been accrued in states that were skeptical of the PRC before the camps came to light. Furthermore, despite international protests and boycotts, the international response has been muted compared with what happened in response to the Chinese use of force against its own citizens in 1989 (Vuori 2011b). At the same time, more authoritarian states have supported the PRC in its heavy-handed approach to counterterrorism.

The securitization of the 9/11 attacks in the form of the GWoT legitimized the invasion of Iraq, which eventually led to the rise of ISIS. The securitization of GWoT in the PRC eventually led to increased international activity by Uyghur militants and connections to ISIS. The unprecedented scale of the extra-judicial internment of Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang may also lead to even further radicalization of resistance, even though the goal of the heavy-handed security practice is the opposite (Baker-Beall & Clark 2021: 449; Xie & Liu 2021: 1000). Irrespective of such potential dynamics in the future, the adoption of the GWoT discourse and its maintenance has made the domestic security issue of unrest in Xinjiang an international source of insecurity for the PRC and its citizens. The escalation in securitization in the form of internment camps has also resulted in difficulties in the PRC's international counterterrorism cooperation (Greitens et al. 2020: 46).

Despite the international and domestic uses for macrosecuritization discourse, the incorporation of the Xinjiang unrest into the GWoT has been a balancing act for the CCP. In addition to the usefulness of the international legitimacy the macrosecuritization constellation provides, the authorities did not want to 'internationalize' Xinjiang or its other 'separatist hotspots' beyond the usual rhetorical tie-ins to 'anti-China forces' 'in and outside the country.' The PRC had to emphasize its 'own' terrorist problems, as only supporting U.S. operations could have been interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; the authorities remain extremely sensitive to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in their domestic affairs (see Chapter 3). The question of intervention has become increasingly prevalent in the post-Cold War era, as the U.S. and other 'coalition partners' have had quite a free hand in intervening in various parts of the world, in effect creating

new states in the process (e.g., Kosovo). Indeed, the PRC was critical of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and blamed the escalation in international terrorism on interventions like it (Duchâtel 2016).

The expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) places more expatriate nationals at risk in areas adjacent to or within the operational reach of militants (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 8, 97–99; Duchâtel 2016: 2–5). This requires the PRC to provide protection for the workers operating in the BRI. This may also normalize the presence of Chinese military or paramilitary forces beyond their deployment in UN peacekeeping missions. While the PLA's power projection capabilities do not yet allow for a global military presence, missions other than war that include counterterror operations give it a reason to increase its presence (Tanner & Belacqua 2016: 72). Indeed, traditional and non-traditional security issues are seen as intertwined in the Global Security Initiative (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023a).

Notes

1 Even academic research on terrorism stopped using the label of 'counter-revolution,' as terrorism was considered to be 'anti-state, anti-society, anti-humanity' (反国家反社会反人类, *fǎnguójiā fǎnshèhuì fǎnrénlèi*) (Reeves 2016: 837), yet not counter-revolutionary (反革命, *fǎngémìng*).
2 Martial law was also declared in a section of Henan province in 2004 to quell unrest of the Hui minority (*New York Times* 2004).
3 'Reform through labour' (劳动改造, *láodòng gǎizào* or *laogai*) was a form of conviction through court proceedings established in the 1950s. 'Re-education through labour' (劳动教养, *láodòng jiàoyǎng* or *laojiao*) was an administrative penalty and internment system established in 1957. *Laojiao* did not require legal proceedings, and even high-level party leaders were subjected to it when they had to 'learn from the masses' during the Cultural Revolution. (Mühlhahn 2009.) The anti-Falungong campaign introduced 'transformation through education' (教育转化, *jiàoyù zhuǎnhuà*) in 2000 (Tong 2009).
4 The *Bingtuan* were originally set up to counter and possibly fight the Soviet Union that had a strong influence in Xinjiang during the Republican era and the 1950s (Bovigndon 2004: 9–12).
5 The programme is often translated as 'visiting the people, improving the people, and gathering the people.'
6 In December 2003 the Chinese Ministry of Public Security released its own list of terrorist organizations, which contained even further organizations (Millward 2004: 14; Tanner & Belacqua 2016). These were, however, not picked by the U.S. or other Western countries. The inclusion of the WUC and the East Turkistan Information Center has been particularly criticized internationally, as they are not seen as affiliated with violent forms of separatism but work towards unveiling the PRC's oppression of the Uyghur.

7 Potential Chinese Macrosecuritization Issues

In particular, the Xi Jinping administrations have been more prolific in deploying concepts that concern global governance issues regarding security. Slogans and policy projects like the 'community of a shared future for humankind' and the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) are prominent examples. Beyond such specific proposals, issues labelled under non-traditional security (NTS) in the People's Republic of China (PRC) are often considered global problems in international academic discussions. These include climate change, international terrorism, migration flows, and transnational crime (Hakovirta 2012). Indeed, the macrosecuritization discourses examined in the present volume could be considered global problems. Xi's administrations have signalled an interest in playing a more active role in the efforts to govern such issues, and the notion of NTS has been used in the PRC to innovate global governance systems to accord with its initiative (Liu 2021). It is, therefore, important to consider whether these concerns could become macrosecuritization discourses that would be promoted by the PRC. I begin my analysis of such potential macrosecuritization topics with the 'community of a shared future for humankind.'

Community of a Shared Future for Humankind

The community of a shared future for humankind is among the most prominent foreign policy slogans of the Xi Jinping administration. It represents an expansion of NTS concerns within the political discourse of the PRC. It can be counted among the signals that the PRC has used to indicate its interest in contributing to the system of global governance together with dictums, such as being a responsible great power. Indeed, Chinese commentaries on the proposition frame it as 'a natural extension of China's national governance' (Ding & Cheng 2017: 3) and as 'a transition of Chinese strategic posture from "hide-and-bide" one to a global activist one' (Zhao 2018: 24). The proposition *per se* is presented as 'an intellectually coherent analysis by the Chinese leadership of global affairs' (Zhao 2018: 24).

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The notion was first introduced at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 (Zhao 2018: 24). It also featured in Xi's speech at the United Nations (UN) in 2015 (Xi 2015). The speeches that finally canonized its formulations was Xi's 2017 speech at the UN (Xi 2017a) and his speech to the National Party Congress in 2017 (Xi 2017b). With these, the proposition became an integral part of Xi's ideological formulation of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era. Since the 2017 speeches, most Chinese academic discussion on global governance (全球治理, q*uánqiú zhìlǐ*) has promoted or engaged the 'community of common destiny for humankind' (Andersson 2021: 39).

Xi's (e.g., Xi 2017a) speeches on the community note how the current era is replete with risks and challenges, where, for example, 'Cold War mentality and power politics still exist and non-conventional security threats, particularly terrorism, refugee crisis, major communicable diseases and climate change, are spreading.' However, for Xi, win-win development is the proposed way out of such predicaments. This can be achieved if the community is built on international principles like the UN charter and by actions that 'promote partnership, security, growth, inter-civilization exchanges and the building of a sound ecosystem.' International security is relational, as 'no country in the world can enjoy absolute security. A country cannot have security while others are in turmoil. … All countries should pursue common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security.' However, some macrosecurity issues persist, as 'terrorism is the common enemy of mankind. Fighting terrorism is the shared responsibility of all countries.'

As the plethora of such issues shows, the notion forms 'an umbrella of security for people around the world' (Xi 2017a). Indeed, beyond the macrosecuritization discourses I have previously analyzed, the umbrella covers several other potential macrosecurity topics. I will begin my analysis of them with the BRI.

Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative is the most ambitious, implemented foreign policy programme of the PRC. While the PRC has a number of concepts that engage with discourses of global governance, the BRI is an enacted practice that has guided its foreign direct investments on an unprecedented scale. This has been seen as a geopolitical expansion; however, it also alleviates the pressure from the PRC's massive infrastructure enhancement capacity that has become idle.

In his speech on the community of a shared future, Xi (2017a) framed the BRI in terms of 'win-win and shared development,' where over 100 countries are supporting it and its 'public goods to the international community.' Commentaries have also connected the BRI to the development of Xinjiang (e.g., Chen Hong 2021: 5). The BRI has various sub-projects like the Maritime, Digital, and Arctic Silk Roads (Heidbrink & Becker 2022; Andersson 2021a). These include 'a healthy silk road,' 'a green silk road,' and 'an innovative silk road' (Chen & Wang 2022: 3).

While Chinese commentaries celebrate the BRI, it has been a cause for concern in, for example, the U.S. and parts of Europe (Jakimów 2019; Heidbrink & Becker 2022). In accordance with its overall desecuritizing stance in its major power relations (Vuori 2018a; see Chapter 3), the PRC has deployed desecuritization to counter worries about its increasing impact and influence (Jakimów 2019). By emphasizing topics like the economy, culture, and non-interference, the BRI is effectively desecuritized by not voicing or repeating the concerns that, for example, the EU has raised regarding the dependencies that the PRC's model for investments is seen to produce (Jakimów 2019: 374). Indeed, the PRC has aimed to desecuritize or even depoliticize the initiative.

Overall, this tactic and the concerns raised regarding the effects and possible motives behind the initiative are more about national or regional security than macrosecurity. The new type of great power relations that the PRC has promoted works towards the goal of overall desecuritization in its foreign relations. Indeed, securitization based on geopolitics has led to the PRC withdrawing from investment projects in, for example, Greenland (Andersson 2021). The desecuritization has not been fully successful in Central and Eastern Europe either, as the 17+1 platform initiated to manage the BRI in 2012 has reduced to 14+1 at the time of writing after the Baltic States left the cooperative platform with soured relations with the PRC.

While the BRI has been viewed in geopolitical terms outside the PRC, Xi's (2017a) notion also refers to new domains or frontiers where major states engage in geopolitical competition.

New Frontiers: Polar Regions, the Deep Seas, Outer Space, and Cyberspace

For Hu Jintao, by 2006, the economic development of the PRC had 'gradually pushed the national interests beyond the traditional territorial water, and air space borders, towards the oceans, the space, and the electromagnetic space' (Chinese Communist Party [CCP] Central Literature Editing Committee 2016: 259), which meant that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was directed to secure its 'development interest' (发展利益, *fāzhǎn lìyì*) in addition to its survival interest (Ghiselli 2021: 30). This new concept referred to the expansion of the PRC's interests in the oceans and outer space (Ghiselli 2021: 31). Its increased role in the UN and its peacekeeping operations was, in turn, framed as working for global security as part of the PRC's peaceful development (SCIO 2011b).

The notion of strategic new frontiers has been promoted as a testing ground for the PRC's model for global governance (Andersson 2021b: 74). The main thrust here has been to desecuritize, or at least demilitarize these frontiers: 'Guided by the principle of peace, sovereignty, inclusiveness and shared governance, we should turn the deep sea, the polar regions, the outer space and the internet into new frontiers for cooperation rather than a wrestling ground for competition' (Xi 2017a). Still, despite the overall win-win approach, the new frontiers are considered domains where the great powers

engage in geopolitical competition over strategic resources and influence (Andersson 2021).

The PRC has had several labels that present the Arctic in global terms: 'global common' (全球公域), 'shared heritage of mankind' (人类共同遗产), 'window for observing global warming' (全球变暖的窗口), and 'treasure trove of resources' (资源的宝库) (Andersson 2021a: 22). The new frontier in the context of the Arctic has been used to link particular issues into the PRC's global governance discourse to enhance the issue's foreign political influence (Andersson 2021b: 77). Despite the increasing role of the Arctic for trade and military security, it is not really framed in macrosecurity terms in the PRC's discourse.

The main maritime issue that has raised concern outside the PRC has been its encroaching activities in the South China Sea (Curtis 2016). Beyond the issue of maritime territories, the PRC is concerned with its access to the deep sea and its lawlessness. Deep seas have rich natural resources and strategic value, especially in terms of nuclear deterrence. In 2016, China's Law on the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exploration and Development of Resources in Deep Seabed Areas (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 2016) was passed to promote the peaceful use of deep-sea resources. According to the law, Chinese developers must seek permission from the National Administration of Oceanography and the International Seabed Authority before any exploration begins (*Renmin Wang* 2016). The discourse on the deep seas is more about securing national interests through demilitarization than macrosecuritization.

In the case of outer space, the PRC promotes the 'equal right of all countries to use outer space peacefully' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023a) (MoFA). It also rejects the 'weaponization of an arms race in outer space' and supports 'the negotiation and conclusion of an international legal instrument on arms control in outer space' (ibid.). Even though outer space is seen to have a growing relevance in military deterrence (Pollpeter 2020), the PRC aims to demilitarize it rather than macrosecuritizing outer space.

When it comes to the realm of information networks, the PRC can be counted among the top three in the great power deployment of cyber capabilities in their military strategies and intelligence activities. Its brand in cyber espionage has been gathering industrial and other economically viable information for the benefit of its military complex and other branches of industry (Austin 2018; Davis 2021). Cybersecurity has been part of the PRC's international security statements, at least since the 2002 Joint Declaration between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China on Cooperation in the Field of NTS Issues (Liu 2021).

The PRC's position has been to emphasize state sovereignty over information networks. It has been promoting the establishment of a new international treaty that would codify a code of conduct on information insecurity. The PRC, together with Russia, put forth such proposals at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 2011 and 2015 (Morton 2020: 173). Within the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), the targets of cybersecurity have been identified as terrorism, secessionism, and extremism, for instance, the 'three evils' consistent with security threats in other realms.

The community of a shared future for humanity also applies to the cyber world in Xi Jinping's political line (Morton 2020: 174). In his speech at the Asian-African summit in 2015, he said cybersecurity was among the continuum of security issues and global challenges to be jointly dealt with to build a community of a shared destiny (*People's Daily* 2015). Li (2019) also included cybersecurity among the continuum of common NTS issues that pose a threat to all countries that require collective responses as global challenges.

As such, the PRC's principle of cyber sovereignty may have a major impact on how the internet is governed globally. Here too, the PRC's goal in its global governance efforts is to shore up the security of the Communist Party and the nature of its political order. Indeed, cyberspace sovereignty is mentioned in the National Security Act 2015 (Liu 2021). The PRC's cybersecurity strategy white paper also emphasized that 'Cyberspace is a new frontier as important as any other. Cyberspace sovereignty is an important part of state sovereignty' (State Council PRC 2016). The bottom line is that cybersecurity and ideological security are connected: 'we must protect cybersecurity and ideological security, strengthen internet security management, maintain a combination of offence and defence, and strengthen positive voices on the Internet' (Chen 2021: 4).

This bottom line of domestic security has included the development of the world's most efficient surveillance and dataveillance system directed at the PRC's citizens. These systems deploy facial recognition and wide-scale censorship activity and target potential violent terrorist activities and political dissidence (Vuori & Paltemaa 2015; Paltemaa et al. 2020). While the PRC is connected to the worldwide internet, it also can isolate itself from it and prevent most of its netizens from accessing information freely. These systems are in place to guarantee the security of the Communist Party; however, they have also made online China doubly vulnerable. As citizens cannot be allowed to have secure communication without the potential for intervention, Chinese citizens and small businesses have very low levels of cybersecurity systems in place. The PRC's cybersecurity education, industry, and culture are underdeveloped (Austin 2018). This has made it very vulnerable to international cyberattacks and espionage.

Indeed, severe weaknesses in the cybersecurity of the PRC's cyber operations were revealed in the form of the Mandiant Report (2013) and the Snowden leaks. These prompted President Xi Jinping to produce a cyberstrategy for the PRC and set cyber defence as its branch of the PLA among the large-scale military restructuring, which he oversaw. There have also been legislative reforms that have had a bearing on the PRC's cyber policies domestically and internationally. These have included legislation regarding cybersecurity and terrorism. (Austin 2018; Davis 2021.)

In 2020, the PRC made the Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS) (State Council PRC 2020). In it, the development of information technology was

framed as 'exerting far-reaching influence over the social and economic development of States, global governance system and human civilization,' which bears 'on security and economic and social development of States.' Despite the global nature of the issue, it still concerned national level development and security: 'We call on all states to put equal emphasis on development and security, and take a balanced approach to technological progress, economic development and protection of national security and public interests.' Indeed, due to its weaknesses generated by its domestic security needs, the PRC will likely maintain the demilitarization of cyberspace beyond interference and espionage in peacetime.

Indeed, as the GIDS shows, the PRC's policies and statements regarding cyberspace and cybersecurity do not represent macrosecuritization. Like in most other countries, cybersecurity is a global problem in the sense that it concerns most states and societies, yet it is not presented as a threat to humanity or civilization as such. Such a discourse could entail threats to the internet that would persistently make global communication impossible through, for example, a self-replicating and evolving artificial intelligence-based virus. Such visions are still within the realm of dystopian cyberpunk science fiction. At the same time, the position of the PRC is not a desecuritizing move either, even though digital aspects are part of its Global Development Initiative (GDI). Indeed, the position of the PRC is closest to the demilitarization of cyberspace.

Health Security: Pandemics and Microbial Resistance

Xi (2017a) included 'pandemic diseases such as bird flu, Ebola and Zika' among issues that 'have sounded the alarm for international health security.' The global aspect of health security was similarly present in the promotion of the role of international organizations in handling such issues: 'The WHO should play a leadership role in strengthening epidemic monitoring and sharing of information, practices and technologies' (Xi 2017a).

While not present in Xi's 2017 speech at the UN, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has also been a health security concern in the PRC. Indeed, the ability of microbes to become resistant to drugs that have previously worked is a global problem that has also been macrosecuritized as an existential threat to humanity (Lo & Thomas 2018; Thomas & Lo 2020: 361). As such, officials, state media, and bureaucracies have all supported global efforts to deal with the issue in the PRC (Thomas & Lo 2020: 362). Xi's speeches that included issues of health security worked as a catalyst in the securitization of AMR. Still, lower-level actors have not implemented practices that would abide by securitization (ibid.). Indeed, the practices that have produced AMR are lucrative, while the threat remains a risk.

While the macrosecuritization of AMR has been ineffectual in the implementation of preventive measures, the securitization of Covid-19 resulted in the most draconian suppression measures of the global pandemic. The PRC deployed extensive surveillance measures that its pre-existing digital

infrastructure allowed to curtail the spread of the contagion (Tan et al. 2022). Mobile phones were used to control people in a way that ensured that they continually had a recent negative test. While some countries required proof of vaccination to enter, for example, restaurants, the PRC required constant proof of negative tests. Even a few cases in a city of millions resulted in lockdowns for all citizens that could last for months. Anti-Covid vaccinations were politicized in many countries along domestic political lines. In the PRC, though, the politicization happened internationally, as only using a Chinese vaccine became a matter of national pride. Providing vaccines for other countries was framed as contributing to global health and development (Xi 2021b).

While the security measures against Covid-19 were severe, the securitization they were based on was not one with humanity as its referent but the health of individuals. In his report to the Party Congress in 2022, Xi (2022a) lauded the success of the line he had chosen for dealing with the pandemic: 'In responding to the sudden outbreak of Covid-19, we put the people and their lives above all else, worked to prevent both imported cases and domestic resurgences, and tenaciously pursued a dynamic zero-Covid policy.' Like in so many other campaigns that draw from security logic, the struggle against Covid-19 was characterized as a people's war (Xi 2022a): 'In launching an all-out people's war to stop the spread of the virus, we have protected the people's health and safety to the greatest extent possible and made tremendously encouraging achievements in both epidemic response and economic and social development.' The struggle against Covid-19 has also been framed in militarized rhetoric as 'the people's war, total war,' and a battle of interception (Yuan 2022: 3).

As such statements show, the referent object was the life and health of Chinese individuals, not humanity. Still, Xi (2022a) emphasized how the PRC had been a responsible power in the international fight and cooperation against the virus: 'We have demonstrated China's sense of duty as a responsible major country, actively participating in the reform and development of the global governance system and engaging in all-around international cooperation in the fight against Covid-19.' While hindering the investigative efforts of the World Health Organization, Xi has also pointed to its vital role 'in building a global community of health' (Xi 2021b: 4). The GDI was also framed as building 'a global immune barrier and a community of health for mankind' (Center for International Knowledge Development 2022: 4). In other words, even though the referent object of security in the PRC's campaign against Covid-19 was not humanity, the PRC was according with the principles set out for the community of a shared future for humankind (Xi 2017a).

Poverty Alleviation and Development

Mao's China positioned itself in the 'intermediate zone' or later 'third world,' which represented developing countries that were separate from both superpowers and the industrialized states in their bipolar camps during the Cold War. The aim of the PRC was to achieve world revolution by having

this 'countryside' envelop the 'cities' whereby the world would follow its model of national revolution. This political fervour that was at its peak during the Cultural Revolution was, however, not followed through in practice, as the diplomatic recognition of the PRC and gaining a seat at the UN were higher on the real political agenda at the time (Van Ness 1970). Deng Xiaoping replaced the language of world revolution with 'peace and development' in his formulations of the PRC's foreign policy goals (Zhao 2018: 25–26). The PRC still counted itself among developing nations, though and denied aiming to take a leading position in its peer group. Accordingly, putting development first has been a major feature of the PRC's climate diplomacy (see Chapter 5).

Related to its development goal, the PRC has raised the largest number of people out of abject poverty in the shortest period in human history. Indeed, in the last 40 years, the PRC lifted 800 million people out of poverty through economic development (World Bank 2022). Xi Jinping noted that he spent most of his time on poverty relief throughout his career (Xi 2020a). On his first day in office in 2012, he pledged to eliminate abject poverty in the PRC by 2020. He set up the Poverty Alleviation and Rural Development Management Group in the State Council to oversee inter-ministerial efforts of this mission (*Renmin Ribao* 2018).

Xi declared a final great battle against poverty that would concern 70 million people in 832 counties that had been registered as being in abject poverty between 2012 and 2015 (gov.cn 2015). The battle entailed sending nearly 3 million Party cadres from agencies and state-owned enterprises to rural villages to serve as their first secretaries for 2 years. In addition to doctors and professionals, the State Council offered subsidies and relief to support the development of businesses. Infrastructure was also improved.

Xi declared victory in this struggle just in time with his schedule for overcoming it. The UN was also impressed with the efforts of the PRC. General Secretary António Guterres congratulated Xi as the PRC accomplished the targets on poverty reduction set by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations 2021). For Xi, 'Poverty reduction is a shared duty for mankind' (Xi 2020b). This campaign and the PRC's previous efforts within the World Bank and UN have provided the PRC's diplomats with expertise and connections in these international organizations. Concomitantly, they are poised to export the PRC's model of poverty alleviation to other developing countries, using the BRI as a vehicle. Indeed, the PRC has already taken its Poverty Alleviation Programme to 80 countries in the form of the transfer of skills in agricultural technology (*Renmin Ribao* 2020).

In Xi Jinping's approach to development, it 'not only refers to economic development, but also includes the comprehensive development of politics, society, culture, and an ecological civilization' (Chen 2021: 5). These are part and parcel of his canonized ideological 'thinking' about Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era. Here, development and security are considered equal, and the line is the 'simultaneous planning of development and security' (统筹发展和安全, *tǒngchóu fāzhǎn hé ānquán*) (*Xinhua* 2021a). In

addition to being part of the main ideological line, the PRC has emphasized the importance of development in the context of the UN and promotes the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations General Assembly 2015) as an important means for achieving its global development goals (e.g., MoFA 2023a). Indeed, Xi unveiled his GDI at the UN in 2021.

Global Development Initiative

Xi Jinping proposed the GDI at the UN General Assembly in 2021 that advocates 'peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom, which are the common values of humanity,' and rejects 'the practice of forming small circles or zero-sum games' (Xi 2021a: 5). The GDI is presented in Chinese commentaries as a continuation of the BRI in the PRC's efforts to solve 'development problems and development deficits' (Chen & Wang 2022: 1). Not only that, the GDI is intertwined with 'the harmonious coexistence of man and nature,' and 'the construction of a community with a shared future for all mankind' (Chen & Wang 2022: 3). These are stated to aim for the enhancement in a 'sense of happiness, benefit and security,' and to 'achieve well-rounded development' (Xi 2021a: 3).

The GDI concerns 'poverty reduction, food security, pandemic control and vaccines' (Center for International Knowledge Development 2022: 3). These are framed as the basis for enhancing 'all round development' that works to better people's lives and their human security. Beyond working against the root causes of conflict, commentaries on the GDI also work towards desecuritizing the PRC's relations with other major powers by 'refuting the West's containment, suppression, attacks, and smears' (Chen & Wang 2022: 5). Indeed, Xi (2021a: 5) presented a typical desecuritization move in his initiative: 'The Chinese people have always celebrated and striven to pursue the vision of peace, amity and harmony. … China is always a builder of world peace, contributor to global development, defender of the international order and provider of public goods.' The UN is presented as vital in the task of providing global or universal security: the UN should serve 'as the central platform for countries to jointly safeguard universal security, share development achievements and chart the course for the future of the world.' Indeed, the UN has a central place in the PRC's Global Security Initiative (GSI).

China's Global Security Initiative

Xi Jinping introduced the GSI (全球安全倡议, *quánqiú ānquán chàngyì*[1]) in his keynote speech at the Boao Forum in April 2022 (Xi 2022b). It was also briefly featured in his report to the Party Congress in 2022 (Xi 2022a). A concept paper from the MoFA in 2023 established the initiative more extensively (MoFA 2023a). Commentaries on the initial formulation of GSI frame it as the PRC shouldering its responsibility towards maintaining world peace and for being a major country because challenges to humankind must be taken

seriously (Chen et al. 2022) and as having 'great value in guiding global security practices' (Feng 2022: 2).

The GSI immediately presents security as a shared concern for humanity: 'The issue of security bears on the well-being of people of all countries, the lofty cause of world peace and development, and the future of humanity' (MoFA 2023a). This kind of security is military and entwines traditional NTS forms. Accordingly, 'world peace and security' should be upheld, and 'global development and prosperity' should be pursued by all. This would 'eliminate the root causes of international conflicts' and 'improve global security governance' on 'global challenges such as terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity and biosecurity.' The hierarchical structure of security elements in the GSI (see Table 7.1) connects with the overall national security outlook by enriching its 'world chapter' (世界篇, *shìjiè piān*) (Chen et al. 2022: 5). The goal is to 'build a world that is free from fear and enjoys universal security' (MoFA 2023a).

Commentaries on the GSI framed it in desecuritizing terms by promoting the abandonment of Cold War mentality, opposition to unilateralism, and refrainment from block politics and confrontations between camps (Chen et al. 2022: 4). At the same time, 'the principle of the indivisibility of security' should be upheld (Chen et al. 2022: 4). This is a Russian notion and shows the awkward position the PRC is in while it refrains from directly condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and all the while it promotes abandonment of Cold War mentalities and non-confrontational politics.

The PRC emphasizes the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 'as the main platform for global security governance' (MoFA 2023a). Xi (2021b: 3) has even macrosecuritized the rules-based international order founded on the UN:

Table 7.1 The Conceptual Structure of Security within the Global Security Initiative

Structural function	*Conceptual elements within the GSI*
'Conceptual guidance'	'The vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security'
'Basic premise'	'Respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries'
'Primary benchmark'	'Abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter'
'Important principle'	'Taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously'
'Must choice'	'Peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation'
'Inherent requirement'	'Maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains'

Source: MoFA 2023a.

> The Charter of the United Nations is the basic and universally recognized norms governing state-to-state relations. Without international law and international rules that are formed and recognized by the global community, the world may fall back to the law of the jungle, and the consequence would be devastating for humanity.
>
> (Xi 2021b: 3)

While the GSI macrosecuritizes issues like terrorism, it works in line with the notion of the community of a shared future for humankind to aspire towards the desecuritization of the international relations between major powers. It is also the next item in the gallery of initiatives or proposals towards global security governance.

Analysis: Linking Non-Traditional Security Concerns Globally to Achieve Desecuritization

The Xi Jinping administrations have taken unprecedented steps in introducing proposals and principles for global security governance. This newfound role comes on the heels of incorporating NTS into the official national security concept (see Chapter 2). Indeed, many of the concerns listed as part of that concept have been deemed global problems in the academic literature internationally and within the PRC. The introduction of the notion of the community of a shared future for humankind also coincides with the initiation of the BRI as a geopolitically oriented foreign direct investment scheme of wholly new proportions.

The initiation of the BRI was followed by a series of other global initiatives, like the GIDS, GDI, and GSI. These proposals are collected under the conceptual umbrella of the community of a shared future and connect to the overall national security outlook. This umbrella covers the macrosecuritization discourses I have analyzed in previous chapters and includes further themes prevalent in the literature on global problems and NTS. While some of these are specifically securitized, politicized, or demilitarized, they collectively work towards desecuritization of the PRC's relations with major powers.

Indeed, the community of a shared future for humankind is an aspirational institutionalized security governance signifier. It is not about legitimating specific exceptions to rules or practices of international politics but for guiding and collating the security agenda of the diverse forms NTS takes in the discourse of the PRC. It is used to legitimize a departure from Deng's tradition of keeping a low profile in the PRC's international politics: the PRC is taking a more active and visible position regarding issues of global security governance. This change is presented as a continuation of the PRC's domestic politics and its ancient culture, whereby it does not violate its long-term identity politics. Even though the PRC is more present and vocal, this is framed as being in service of world peace, security, and development. Indeed, while some of its subsets work towards securitization, the overall slogan works towards

Table 7.2 Macrosecuritization Elements in the Chinese Discourse on the Community of a Shared Future for Humankind

Macrosecuritization discourse	*Types of moves*	*Type of universalism*	*Alignment in constellations*	*View on polarity*	*Bureaucratic logic*
Community of a shared future for humankind	Desecuritization overall (securitization, politicization, and demilitarization in some sub-areas)	Existing order	Peace and development versus rule of the jungle	Multipolar	Diplomacy

desecuritization in the affairs of great powers. Such desecuritizing moves are evident in Xi Jinping's statements on global problems (Xi 2021b: 3):

> The problems facing the world are intricate and complex. The way out of them is through upholding multilateralism and building a community with a shared future for mankind. … To build small circles or start a new Cold War, to reject, threaten or intimidate others, to willfully impose decoupling, supply disruption or sanctions, and to create isolation or estrangement will only push the world into division and even confrontation. … We must not return to the path of the past.
>
> (Xi 2021b: 3)

The key to the future for Xi is the achievement of well-rounded development on a global scale.

The overall function or macrosecuritizing move of the community of a shared future is one of desecuritization, but as previously shown, there is variance in how its various subsets, themes, and initiatives make their moves (see Table 7.2). Indeed, issues like terrorism are fully securitized, while other themes like cybersecurity are demilitarized and climate change politicized. Together, these moves work to maintain the existing order as its form of universalism, where the constellation consists of the community that represents peace, development, and the rules-based international order that is opposed to the rules of the jungle and its concomitant power politics. The community is envisioned as being multipolar and a democratic form of international politics, even as its members maintain their unique forms of political orders.

As such, the notion of a community of a shared future for humankind maintains the PRC's post-Mao form of identity politics while at the same time justifies its increased presence and footprint in global security governance. In addition to hanging on to even Mao-era ideas of resisting hegemony and promoting cooperation, the notion also works to justify the PRC's increased military and security presence in missions other than war beyond the PRC's immediate surroundings. It is an international identity avowal of the PRC's new type of great power politics. It works to enhance its discoursive power by telling Chinese narratives of itself and the ideal form of non-confrontational international politics.

Note

1 倡议 (*chàngyì*) could also be translated as 'a proposal,' although 'initiative' is the official translation.

8 Making Sense of China's Alignment in Security Discourses with Global Referents

The present volume has been the first full account of Chinese macrosecuritization discourses and alignments. It could aid in efforts to understand changes in the PRC's positions regarding global security and its potential of becoming a global security norm maker rather than a norm taker. To do this, it is good to take one final view of the overall image of macrosecuritization with Chinese characteristics that appears when we combine the narratives from the previous chapters: what have the discourses done domestically and in terms of foreign policy, and what makes the evident choices understandable? What have been the relevant elements and features of Chinese macrosecuritizations (see Table 8.1)? Finally, has the deployment of macrosecuritization provided additional value in the study of the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) global security discourses?

Synthesis of the Macrosecurity Discourses

Using the notion of macrosecuritization guides the researcher's analytical view to different arenas and discourses than the deployment of national securitization. Indeed, my previous studies of securitization in the PRC were guided by a sectorial lense that focused on political security (e.g., Vuori 2003 and 2008 and 2011b and 2014). Approaching securitization in the PRC through grander referents beyond the Party opens different vistas for analysis. It also allows for a sense of how topical securitizations or types of security are collated into larger wholes, as in using the community of a shared future and its connection to the overall national security outlook. Macrosecuritization allows for a zoomed-out view that is distinct from most securitization studies that zoom in on their focus of interest.

This overall view has shown that the four macrosecuritization discourses postulated in the literature have been used or reacted to differently in the PRC. Indeed, the Cold War was initially used to position the newly founded PRC within the world political constellation. The PRC was not bound into place by the discourse, however. Rather, Mao used it to his advantage in shifting the PRC's placement within the triangular superpower politics and to promote the

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Table 8.1 Elements of China's Macrosecuritization Discourses

Macrosecuritization discourse	*Types of moves*	*Type of universalism*	*Alignment in constellations*	*View on polarity*	*Bureaucratic logic*
The Cold War	Securitization and desecuritization	Inclusive	From socialist versus imperialist to anti-imperialist versus imperialist to non-aligned	Bipolar; multipolar in the post-Cold War desecuritization	Security
The anti-nuclear movement	No moves	From 'inclusive' to 'existing order'	From anti-imperial versus imperial to the maintenance of global security balance	From bipolar to multipolar	Security
Global climate change	Politicization	Physical threat (and economic problem)	Developing states versus industrialized nations	Multipolar	Environment, diplomacy, and economy
Global War on Terror	Securitization	Existing order	Civilized states versus terrorism and religious extremism	Multipolar	Security
Community of a shared future for humankind	Desecuritization overall (securitization, politicization, and demilitarization in some sub-areas)	Existing order	Peace and development versus rules of the jungle	Multipolar	Diplomacy

PRC as a leader of the intermediate zone. Mao also connected the macrosecurity divisions of world politics with domestic ideological securitizations and his polemic with the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the macro division was desecuritized and has been used to actively keep the PRC off the securitization agenda of other states. The notion of multipolar politics was coined during the Cold War when the PRC was reducing its conflict with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and has been maintained in the post-Cold War era. This is a way to keep hold of the notion of anti-hegemony even as the PRC's power resources have increased for several decades. This, together with the insistence on the possibility of cooperation and peace, works to maintain non-conflictual relations with major powers and to expand the era of 'strategic opportunity' further. Accordingly, the PRC has been an active securitizing and desecuritizing actor in the Cold War discourse.

In stark relief, while intimately connected to the Cold War, the anti-nuclear discourse is interesting theoretically, as it cannot be found in the PRC. This is interesting because other nuclear powers have non-governmental movements that have maintained the discourse. Even some nuclear leaders have acknowledged the threat of nuclear weapons to humanity, even if their policies have not abided by its implications. However, the PRC opposed nuclear weapons as weapons of hegemony and imperialism before they had any and belittled their significance for the survival of humanity. This line has been maintained even after the PRC obtained nuclear weapons. Indeed, the PRC still supports the abolishment of nuclear weapons and has argued for the reduction in their role in deterrence policies. Stating that nuclear weapons are a threat to humanity was, however, considered reactionary, and thereby it was securitized. Anti-nuclear demonstrations have been few, and those that have taken place are censored in online China. During the last two decades, the PRC has normalized its nuclear weapon possession. This has also happened for the concept of deterrence, which is now a function of its military rather than a point of criticism. Maintaining the goal of abolishment when, at the same time, modernizing its nuclear forces is part of the line of anti-hegemonism and striving for a multipolar world. However, not supporting the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons may impede the success of keeping this line with non-nuclear states that promote nuclear disarmament. As such, the PRC has belittled, if not desecuritized nuclear weapons as a threat to humanity's physical existence.

Global climate change represents another form of physical threat universalism. In this instance, the PRC has preferred macropoliticization over macrosecuritization in its approach. This is in line with its long-term position within international environmental diplomacy, where it has emphasized the common yet differentiated responsibilities of developing and industrialized nations when handling environmental and climate issues. Going along with the macrosecuritization might have placed outside restrictions on the PRC in terms of its development and sovereignty. The place of care for the environment and concern over the climate have risen on the political agenda in recent

decades, yet this has not been legitimized with security arguments. Rather, they have been incorporated into the main ideological formulation. This approach has allowed the PRC to maintain its identity of a developing nation while transitioning towards being a new type of responsible great power. As such, the PRC has been a macropoliticizing actor in its climate politics to present itself as a responsible great power.

Responsibility appears in a different form in the securitization of terrorism by the PRC. Indeed, with the Global War on Terror (GWoT), the PRC has been fully engaged in the securitization of terrorism as a scourge for all human societies. It has, however, used other referent objects in this rather than those of the initiating macrosecuritization moves of the United States (U.S.) and its allies or even the United Nations (UN). The initial stage of securitization empowered the PRC by providing international legitimacy for the suppression of its ethnoreligious separatist issue. Indeed, the threat in the previous securitization of this issue transformed virtually overnight into the international struggle against Islamist terrorism. Despite the usefulness of this new frame, the issue was not the primary concern of the security field. Indeed, security resources deployed in Xinjiang did not surpass the national average. In the context of the international anti-asylum seeker mentality, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the expansion of attacks within the PRC and towards its citizens abroad, the PRC intensified its securitization to a new climax. This expanded the security resources to an unprecedented scale in Xinjiang and transformed the enacted security practice from a (para) military reaction to prediction and prevention. At the same time, the programme was expanded to cover almost any form of Muslim religiosity. Major cities in Xinjiang became the most surveilled and controlled garrison security cities worldwide, and perhaps millions of people were interned in re-education camps. Internationally, the PRC was able to present itself as a responsible partner in the global struggle against terrorism and to increase its international cooperation in the field. As such, the PRC has been an active securitizing actor in the GWoT, even though it has criticized the interventionist policies of its original initiator.

Unlike other macrosecuritizations, the community of a shared future for humanity is one that has been put forth by the PRC. It is a newly institutionalized aspirational security governance signifier, which does not denote a single security discourse for legitimation but works to bring the multiple security concerns of non-traditional security (NTS) together. Within the politico-logical structure of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) current ideological formulations, the holistic concept of national security and its overall security outlook is connected or coordinated with the notion of the community, for example, through its Global Security Initiative (GSI). Indeed, while the community is the aspirational goal, the various global initiatives are the PRC's proposals for enhancing global security governance that includes issues like development. This is the PRC's approach to the root causes of conflict that leads to security threats like terrorism and maritime piracy. Like with

the variety of options on the menu of securitization, the PRC approaches themes under the rubric of the community in various ways that range from securitization to demilitarization and even depoliticization as is the case with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The overall push of the notion is towards desecuritization and non-conflictual relations among the great powers.

Synthesis of the Bureaucratic Elements of the Macrosecuritizations

The bureaucratic elements involved in each case are quite relevant for the synthesis or overall estimation of Chinese macrosecuritization. Indeed, exceptionalist and diffuse forms of securitization operate differently (Huysmans 2014), even in macrosecuritization. Accordingly, bureaucratic enactment has securitization implications. However, from such a technocratic viewpoint, the story remains the same as the one based on policy statements.

First, with the Cold War, all the main strings were in the hands of Mao Zedong, as was the possibility of adjusting the PRC's line. Despite its fragmented authoritarianism, the Party has controlled the gun even after Mao's passing. The Cold War was at the very top of Chinese high politics, and the enactment of its policies involved the Chinese population (Christensen 1996; MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) – even in the form of warfare with the Soviet Union.

Second, regarding the anti-nuclear case, the nuclear field was among the very few groups of experts who were not severely subjected to rectification campaigns in Mao's China. The PRC's arms control bureaucracies have been involved in promoting its disarmament and no-first-use (NFU) policies (Lewis 2007). At the same time, no non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could have promoted an anti-nuclear position independently from the PRC's high-political disarmament policy establishment. While the military has had more influence on the overall development of the PRC's military doctrine regarding nuclear policy and doctrine, the civilian leadership has remained in control.

Third, the GWoT appears strongly as a security operation from a technocratic viewpoint. Initially, the PRC's anti-insurgent operations evolved into a 'four-in-one approach' consisting of the PLA, People's Armed Police (PAP), the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and the people. As the operation went on, the initial use of PLA force was replaced with an emphasis on the PAP and the *bingtuan* (see Chapter 6). This operation consisted of a mixed set of hard and soft power tactics, ranging from eliminating insurgent leaders to co-opting groups and integrating ideas into the 'core' of Chinese society. In the 2010s, the campaign escalated. Xinjiang now has the greatest number of police and security personnel per capita within the PRC, and large numbers of people have been placed in re-education camps. While there were campaigns to strike hard, stability maintenance became the main approach with the shift to preventive measures. Deradicalization followed the practice of 'integrated social engineering' that aimed to deter, punish, and prevent crime by integrating law enforcement with other means like culture and

economics in establishing social stability. Stability maintenance was on par with anti-terror in this new people's war. This suggests that while the initial securitization of terrorism was exceptionalist, the transition to stability maintenance worked to normalize the exceptionality into a more permanent mode of security governance. The bureaucracies involved in the securitization of terrorism have also had international cooperation in the form of expanding international exercises.

In the previous three cases, the bureaucracies involved signal security rationales of the highest order. In contrast to their high politics and security bureaucracies, the bureaucratic rationales involved did not concur with security logic on the issue of climate change. Indeed, many ministries and state bureaucracies have been involved in dealing with the issue; none include those that are generally thought to deal with matters of security. The ones that come close are the Environmental Police, which is a branch of law enforcement under the Environmental Protection Bureaus, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In light of this situation, the international level seems to include more security-related institutions. For example, the PRC has discussed the issue of climate change and cooperation in its mitigation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and in the ASEAN Regional Forum, which mainly deals with issues that pertain to international security matters.

Universalisms and Constellations of the Macrosecuritizations

We can also get a sense of the security formations involved in the macrosecuritizations when we examine the constellations and types of universalisms involved in each of them. As the previous chapters have shown, the PRC's position has fluctuated regarding the general trends in macrosecuritization discourses. In the case of the Cold War, the PRC moved within its constellations several times. The PRC initiated itself within the inclusive universalist discourse of the Soviet Union but moved away from the constellation first to its position of promoting anti-imperialism against both superpowers and then against the Soviet Union. As such, the Cold War mentality goes against the referent and goal of the shared future for humankind. Indeed, the mentality and the block politics it creates are framed as a threat to the community. This discourse produces a constellation of a rules-based international order that the community represents and the rules of the jungle that confrontational power politics represents.

With the issue of securitizing nuclear weapons as a physical threat, the PRC had a different viewpoint. Initially, it promoted a constellation of inclusive universalism in the form of anti-imperialism, which would be served by the abolishment of nuclear weapons. However, This position has shifted to one of existing order universalism, where maintaining global strategic balance and undiminished security is seen as vital for nuclear disarmament. Both positions have been against the physical threat universalism promoted by the anti-nuclear movement.

For global climate change, the PRC has been active in the dichotomous constellation of developing and industrialized nations on the side of putting development first. However, it recognizes the physical threat universalism and the economic problems involved. However, how these should be handled is closer to macropoliticization and resilience than security in their modalities. Indeed, they are part of the ecological civilization within socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.

Finally, in the GWoT discourse, China has gone along with the existing order universalism and the constellation of civilized states versus terrorist and religious extremist organizations. The shift here has been from using this to justify the suppression of separatists by rebranding them to signalling the will to take a leading position in the global struggle against terrorism.

Macrosecuritizing Actors and Dynamics

As we have seen, none of the macrosecuritization discourses have quite worked as they do in the U.S., for example. This raises the question of how security discourses are mobilized in the PRC and how they operate.

Who or what is driving an international macrosecuritization seems to count here. The PRC did not initiate any of the four established macrosecuritizations. It has adopted the ones that have been promoted by superpowers, which has not been the case for those instigated by NGOs and epistemic communities. The macrosecuritizations have been facilitation factors for domestic and international Chinese securitization processes, and the ones that have been adopted have empowered them.

The PRC, under Xi Jinping, appears to be more active in using macrosecuritization terminology in its issues of concern. However, these have not really been picked up by other actors, which indicates that it is not yet at the level of a superpower as a macrosecuritizing actor. Beyond projects like the BRI and its investment schemes, the PRC would still seem to lack the soft power capabilities required to mobilize the identity politics of a range of actors. Indeed, except in the case of the Cold War, the PRC has not sought to challenge the international order established in the macrosecuritization but merely reinterpret them or take the lead when others are veering off. Indeed, the GSI and other global security governance proposals of the PRC emphasize the role of the UN and other pre-existing international institutions. As such, this is part of the desecuritization of China's rise.

These observations are in line with general interpretations of the PRC's foreign policy rhetoric, which tends to be more radical when the PRC is in a weaker position, and more diplomatic when China has been on the rise. They also concur with views that present the PRC's behaviour as following a 'realpolitik' rationale (Van Ness 1970; Johnston 1995b). At the same time, the PRC's refusal to openly challenge the post-Cold War macrosecuritizations fits the PRC's overall strategy to avoid being seen as a threat to the Western international order. Indeed, the PRC's proposals claim to be improving existing

institutions. As such, they are not a form of 'contested multilateralism' (Morse & Keohane 2014), as the PRC is not proposing alternative institutions.

Beyond international securitization dynamics, macrosecuritization can also concern domestic ones. Previous studies have shown how domestic securitizations since the 1980s have often resulted in contestation dynamics within the Party leadership and resistance from those targeted by the securitization (e.g., Vuori 2011b, 2015a, and Topgyal 2016). It appears that the macrosecuritization discourses have not had this type of securitization dynamic within the PRC. Indeed, only the securitization of the Uyghur has resulted in resistance internationally and the form of violent acts domestically. Literature that is critical of the PRC's policies in Xinjiang tends to present the securitization of the Uyghur as having been exaggerated, which has led to a vicious cycle of violence when the security practice encroached on legitimate religious practice. Human rights organizations and Uyghur activists have also noted that the war on terror should not be used to justify domestic repression towards political opponents and minorities. There have also been instances of counter-securitization by leaders of the Uyghur independence movement that disavows the use of violence even though it acknowledges its presence in the PRC. The discourses of violent militants likely also contain counter-securitization of the PRC but access to such discourses is difficult for research.

As such, the securitization climax resulted in the securitization of most forms of Muslim religiosity. This could lead to further intensification of the vicious cycle even though there have been no major incidents after the initiation of the preventive turn in security practice in the form of stability maintenance. As with the Falungong, the excessive securitization of religion has also been deemed counterproductive regarding its stated goal in Xinjiang.

Ontological Security, Recognition, and Identity Politics in China's Macrosecuritization

How the PRC has used and reacted to macrosecuritization discourses could be read as opportunism and realpolitik. There is, however, a different way to make sense of the PRC's approach here. Indeed, I have referred to the notion of identity politics as an avenue for this in my previous analyses in the above. This interpretation can be made deeper by approaching it through the notions of ontological security and recognition.

The notions of ontological security and insecurity originate from the work of Laing (2010 [1969]), particularly his book *The Divided Self*. While Laing was a practitioner of psychoanalysis who treated conditions such as schizophrenia, his approach was also explicitly political in that he viewed mental disorders as the result of biological and social factors (Rossdale 2015: 370). Ontologically, insecure individuals have lost a temporally consistent sense of themselves and their identity and feel that the content of their character cannot be guaranteed to be genuine, good, and valuable. For such individuals, even everyday life can appear as existentially threatening (Laing 2010 [1969]: 49). This makes

it difficult to realize which difficulties and dangers are worth confronting and which are not (Mitzen 2006: 345). However, ontological security is not about the security of physical survival but about the security of the self, of the subjective sense of who one is.

Ontological (in)security has not been widely used in the study of the PRC's politics or international relations overall. Much of this literature has focused on collective memories in Sino-Japanese relations (Gustafsson 2014) or the PRC's activities in the South China Sea (Curtis 2016). However, a few studies have taken a more comprehensive view. These have concluded that the PRC as a state does not behave in accordance with assumptions about the tendencies of ontologically insecure people, despite the maintenance of a set of historical traumas like the 'century of humiliation' and anti-Japanese sentiment (Krolikowski 2008).

There have been domestic traumas too. The revolutions and other forms of upheaval in the PRC while under the prerogative of the rule of the CCP have been sources of intense personal trauma. Indeed, a society's cultural horizon may elevate the esteem of individuals when their activities accord with values of worth within this network of solidarity. However, such horizons may also relegate the esteem of individuals and groups if their activities or views are taken to go against appropriate values or are inferior to them. If such relegation takes place, individuals can no longer attribute social worth to their actions that may have previously endowed them with a sense of worth. Social devaluation means that the previous form of life no longer has a positive significance within the larger community, whereby the self-esteem of disrespected individuals may become undermined (Vuori 2014).

The tumults and rectifications of Mao's China are obvious sources of trauma. Yet, the period of modernization and opening up has been a source of ontological insecurity for groups of people too. Indeed, there was a clear shift to a more individualized basis for social esteem with the reform policies of the 1980s that gradually shifted the PRC's economy and society towards neoliberal practices. Various forms of competition and competitiveness were introduced into society, and success in them could also become a source of individualized self-esteem, whether it be success in work-life, sports, or beauty pageants. It was no longer better to be 'red' than 'expert,' as in Mao's China but quite the opposite. With the sense of individualized worth through achievements rather than class status, socialist values began to weaken overall. This was very evident in the crises of trust, belief, and faith of the 1980s (Chen 1995). Such a transformation also meant that older adults who had gained their sense of worth from their class status began to look for alternative value groups to provide them with self-esteem as they could not compete in the new status groups. This is a partial explanation for the rise in the popularity of Falungong and other styles of *qigong* in the 1990s (Vuori 2014).

Shih (2005: 757) periodized such dramatic shifts in the Chinese identity within the PRC, which also connects with the macrosecuritization analysis in the present volume. At the start of the Cold War, 'socialist China'

allied itself with the Soviet Union internationally while going through the violent land reform that Mao oversaw. When the Sino-Soviet split shifted the macrosecuritization, 'revolutionary China' was internationally antagonistic towards both superpowers while it underwent the chaos of the Cultural Revolution domestically. The 'experimental China' of Deng Xiaoping aimed at multipolarity and an independent foreign policy of peace. At the same time, internally, the PRC went through a process of decentralization and loosening of social mores. Under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, 'normal China' looked for international partnerships and became a member of international organizations while internally transformed the system of state-owned enterprises. As Shih (2005: 757) notes, 'all these changes have required a new theory of the world.' The Xi Jinping administrations have ushered in yet another new world with its emphasis on stability maintenance and development internally and the growing interest in global security governance internationally as a 'responsible great power.'

Indeed, while the Party is the source of many traumas and societal transformations that negated people's previous sense and source of worth, it has also provided structures and narratives to maintain ontological security and a sense of meaning through ideological interpretations (Krolikowski 2018). As such, governments that force unwelcome changes in their subjects' behaviour tend to have the greatest need for reassuring symbols (Edelman 1972: 9). Indeed, the demand for social stability can be seen as a means for precisely maintaining a narrative of the self. With the PRC's rise internationally, its foreign policy discourse has also been viewed as a demand or struggle for recognition rather than material gain (Chavoshi & Saeidabadi 2021). At the same time, the Party keeps providing individuals with historical, cultural, and ideological resources with which to construct a narrative of becoming through the societal upheavals its projects of social engineering keep producing. Indeed, development is the twin of stability in the current ideological formulation.

As such, ideological imaginaries can produce filters through which to observe the world, and their emotional appeal can be one reason why they are able to grip and take hold of particular subjects (Kinnvall 2018). They allow new eyes to see but may also produce a blinding effect when relied on too much. While the origins of ontological (in)security as an approach to research are within psychology, Anthony Giddens is credited with bringing the idea within the realm of sociology. Giddens (1991: 38–39) stated that ontological security is about a person's fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a basic trust in other people.' It is about the 'security of being,' about 'confidence and trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be,' including a sense of self and social identity (Giddens 1984: 375). Losing this sense of trust in oneself and the world is a source of 'existential anxiety' (Giddens 1991). As such, ontological security implies confidence in the world to be what it appears to be, in the story told of the 'self' as being good, and that these identity avowals are also recognized by other individuals and communities of worth (Honneth 2005). Ontological security is about maintaining 'a consistent feeling of biographical continuity' (Kinnvall 2004: 746).

As the previous chapters have shown, many macrosecuritization discourses have worked to maintain a number of continuities in the PRC's narrative of itself, whether that concerns anti-hegemony, anti-imperialism, or the representation of developing nations. At the same time, these narratives maintain a sense of sovereignty and the upkeep of the core of the PRC's political order. Even though the ideology has been transformed and previously securitized segments of society have been invited into the Party, such narratives maintain that the ideological essence and morality remain. Revolution and its upheavals have been replaced with normalization and the maintenance of stability, which is also reflected in the transformation of security concepts and practice. The general outlook of national security is connected to the stability and development of all human societies within the community of a shared future for humankind.

Security studies have subsequently picked up the notion of ontological (in) security and used it to study the political dynamics of populism, conflict, and post-colonialism, to name a few examples (Mitzen 2006; Kinnvall 2004; 2018; Steele 2008). A key concern has been the idea that 'agency requires a stable cognitive environment' (Mitzen 2006: 342) and that a sense of constant anxiety can be replaced with the securitization of the ontological subject (Kinnvall 2004). Here, trauma too can be a source of ontological insecurity, whether the trauma is personal or a collectively 'chosen' historical 'wrong;' at the same time, 'glories' of the past can be a source of ontological security even when the current circumstances suggest otherwise (Kinnvall 2004: 755). This is part of the appeal of nativist populist discourses (Kinnvall 2018) that are also prevalent in the PRC. 'Normative threats' have also been presented as jeopardizing established moral self-affirmations of communities and thereby undermine societal trust and upset the sense of agency in the world (Mälksoo 2019: 366). It appears that the PRC deploys the maintenance of its traumas and the emphasis on continuity in its ideological formulations to bolster its self-affirmations. The Chinese stood up with Mao and have become strong with Xi at the helm (Xi 2022a). This is reflected in the way macrosecuritization has also been used.

While some of the earlier literature on ontological security within security studies has been criticized for relying too much on Giddens and the idea of the necessity for having a constant and stable identity (i.e., conflating the subjective sense of self and social identities), ontological security can also be viewed more reflexively as a permanent process of becoming in an intersubjective social environment (e.g., Rossdale 2015 and Browning & Joenniemi 2017). This can be connected to Laing's (2010: 25) approach to reconstructing a psychiatric 'patient's way of being himself in the world.' In the PRC, the political order has been in an interregnum and a state of becoming for several decades. The primary stage of socialism is ongoing, even though Xi has declared that the goal of a 'moderately prosperous society in all respects' has been achieved (Xi 2022a). The next step is to make the PRC a 'modern socialist country in all respects' and then a 'great modern socialist country in all respects' (ibid.). The community of a shared future for humankind and the various initiatives under

it are a means for achieving the same rise in development for humanity. They are international identity avowals that the PRC expects the other major powers to recognize to have a complete sense of self that has truly gone past its century of shame and humiliation at the hands of major colonizing powers.

Securing a Shared Future for Humankind by Desecuritizing Great Power Relations

The present volume has demonstrated that how the PRC has used macrosecuritization is entwined with its identity politics and maintenance of ideological and ontological security. The PRC only really securitizes terrorism among the macrosecuritizations postulated in the literature and even there with its Chinese versions of global referents. It prefers and moves towards desecuritized politics for all the other macro terms.

Indeed, the PRC uses Cold War desecuritization actively in many aspects of its diplomacy. This also means that how the discourse and its uses develop is an indicator of the PRC's stance and position in the great power constellation. The PRC skirts the anti-nuclear securitization even if it supports the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons have been normalized, and the PRC's discourse on deterrence and strategic stability is becoming more like those of other Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)-recognized nuclear weapon states. It is unlikely that this trajectory will change as the PRC keeps modernizing its nuclear forces. The PRC has preferred to macropoliticize climate change as a shared challenge that should be resolved for the community of a shared future for humankind. Nevertheless, it has shifted its position closer to macrosecuritization. There are also signals that the PRC is adopting a resiliencificating (Bourbeau & Vuori 2015) stance rather than preventive security. This could eventually be transformed into macrosecurity. The PRC securitizes terror in a manner that does not present democracy and freedom as the referent objects. As the PRC had a securitization climax in the mid-2010s, it is likely that the policy of stability maintenance will continue to be legitimized through the macrosecuritization that the PRC has shown indications of wanting to lead. The community of a shared future for humankind is a desecuritizing umbrella notion. It works to make global security governance operate in terms of international diplomacy rather than power politics. The emphasis on pre-existing international norms creates a constellation where those in the community represent an institution-based form of international politics. In contrast, those outside it represent the rules of the jungle and power politics.

As such, these are ways to maintain the PRC's state sovereignty and political order in a world of ever-increasing interdependencies and global problems, where the PRC is increasing its presence worldwide. While macrosecurity discourses like the securitization of nuclear weapons as a threat to humanity have the potential to subvert state sovereignty, this has not been the case with how the PRC has used macrosecuritization in its political lines. Instead, the

PRC has used the macrosecuritization discourses in its identity politics and the maintenance of sovereignty in a world of global problems that affect the PRC too. Nevertheless, the PRC's approach recognizes that the issues cannot be solved by single states or actors but require international cooperation.

The PRC has maintained its political core and even made it ideologically stronger after decades of undermining Mao's ideological principles on the altar of development. This is a continuation of 'opening up' but in the form of 'going out.' The desecuritization of great power relations can be read as opportunism. Yet, it can also be a way to maintain the ontological security of the Chinese socialist self, even as the PRC is transitioning from a developing nation to a 'new type of great power' that is 'responsible,' 'harmonious,' 'peaceful,' and that wants to share its achievement of social stability and development with the rest of the world. Even as the PRC has achieved 'moderate prosperity' and is venturing forth to become a socialist great power, its macrosecuritization discourses maintain its anti-hegemonistic identity politics.

Macrosecuritizations deal with the types of issues that require global cooperation in their resolution or entail inter-state competition that has system-level implications. Accordingly, the most powerful discourses are put forth by great powers and require a reaction from smaller states. States, however, have a variety of options in the counter-moves they make towards the macrosecuritizations of others: they can abide by or translate the securitization, they can make moves to keep the issue on the agenda by politicizing it as a non-security issue, or they can try to remove it completely with desecuritization. Indeed, despite the power capacities of great or even superpowers, smaller states have always been able to navigate their interests by inviting the great powers into their regional dynamics. The case of the PRC shows that global security politics is more complex than the hubris of viewing international relations purely as the playground of European or spin-off European great powers has suggested. This also needs to be taken into account when deciding whether to securitize something: macrosecuritizations can have unintended and empowering consequences for others.

The case of the PRC also indicates that the study of global security issues requires a systematic approach to macrosecuritizations; it needs to pay attention to the politics involved in the social construction of global security issues. There is a need to empirically investigate what 'global' or 'civilization' do in conjunction with 'security' and whether the logics and rationales differ from the 'national' variant prevalent in the lower levels of referent objects. Global security studies should pay heed to the power politics of its main concept.

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