Cinema and the Festivalization of Capitalism

The Experience-Makers

by Ann Vogel

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If the economic impulse in itself is universal, it is an interesting question as to the relations under which it becomes rationalized and rationally tempered in such fashion as to produce rational institutions of the character of capitalistic enterprise.

General Economic History, MAX WEBER (1924)

Introduction: Aims of the Book

Immersive environments such as arts theatres, festival curations, flagship stores, and amusement parks are an essential ingredient of 'aesthetic capitalism' (Böhme, 2017). With the rapid development of the twenty-first century's global digital economy (Böhme, 2017; Elder-Vass, 2016; Hamilton et al., 2011; Joyce & Navarro-Remesal, 2020; Staab, 2019; Tapscott, 2015; Zuboff, 2019), their spread and 'atmospheric charge' impacting human wants and routines remains still little noticed by social scientists beyond a minority of scholars (Böhme, 1993). The study of cinema provides a fertile ground for closing this gap. Paralleling the refinement of the immersive powers of the moving image, the immersive environment made its first appearance as aesthetic-industrial design to induce individual and collective experiences by Walt Disney (Chytry, 2012), but has disproportionately received attention by cinema industry analysts who focus on the medium of film. This book puts the immersive environment center stage, examining film festival organizations as one of its major producers and as to their role in the larger socioeconomic environment. In this analysis of cinema, late-modern capitalism, and the politics of culture I call them 'experience-makers' because their business is the curation of presentations that further film cultures as aesthetic and social endeavor, doing so within the setting of instituted screen culture, where art is consumed by 'unstructured publics' (Jarvie, 1970). Film festivals promote a variety of independent and mainstream cinema art production, seeing their mission in keeping alive cultural alternatives to mass-marketed art consumption such as television and 'blockbuster' movie production (Stringer, 2003).

Film festivals are a world-wide cultural network phenomenon of well over thousand seasonal event productions (De Valck, 2007; Vogel, 2015). Festive events are now cases of a 'conventional mode of cooperation for the collective pursuit of art' (Becker, 1974). What makes them special is that they are non-profit organized sites of art quality construction (Beckert & Musselin, 2013; Lampel & Meyer, 2008), and for precisely that reason attractive settings for industry and policy makers aside from artists seeking valorization. Their fast spread toward the end of the twentieth century represents nothing less than the 'eventization' of the cinema field, paralleling and foreboding similar change in other fields of arts/cultural production. As such, festivals and their events are exciting objects for a sociological investigation into the dynamics of contemporary, global capitalism which, according to Gernot Böhme (2017), is dependent on 'show value' and supported by the platform economy (Srnicek, 2020; Zuboff, 2019) where show value circulates globally and unlike much

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other value, quite evenly—reaching even poor communities and affecting them. Festivals like those in the service of cinema are a small population in the universe of formal organization and their events are aesthetic-social formats among many other event types. Yet, their location in the structure of capitalism, and the cinema field in particular, warrants attention for their role in the reconfiguration of economy and society. This suggests a reconstruction of the relationship between the widely observed role of aesthetics in the contemporary cultural emphasis on novelty, surprise, and uniqueness and the specific role of the curatorial art of experience-making (Ventzislavov, 2014) on one hand and the rationalization processes that have furthered western capitalism to become global on the other hand (Reckwitz, 2020; Weber, 1978). The perspective adopted here is that there is an investigable social process of festivalization, which this book explores based on observations on transformations in cinema and the significant cultural value bestowed today on 'the experience'.

'Manufacturing' cultural diversity and creating affordances for pro-social atmospheres, organizing the conditions for charismatic moments, exuberance, and valorization in local event settings and adjacent media environments, film festivals have gained trust over the decades of their existence, showing capabilities of creating some feel of certainty, hierarchy, and symbolic value for aesthetic goods (De Valck, 2016). A set of them has been successful in attaining a quasi-fiduciary status, safeguarding cinema's diversity and collective cultural memory, watching over cinema's central role in broader culture, cultural-policy and heritage portfolios. No wonder then that cinema's 'art worlds' (Becker, 1982) have embraced them as democratic institutions which mobilize art interest and galvanize art production. With the growth of both organizations and events, however, critical voices from within the community of film professionals and curatorial artists have increasingly gained track. Querying the nature of the economy arising from the seasonal reproduction of festival events and their relentless co-production of cinematic novelties, film festivals have been accused to function as bottlenecks and elitist events rather than gateways for independent cinema art and communal participation. Looking at grants and subsidies perhaps more closely as competition for them has risen, some have argued that economic success is not shared more equally. In the academic quarters of festival observers and practitioners, festivals have been critically viewed as undergoing 'commodification', 'commercialization', and 'economization' during the neoliberal age (Cousins, 2012; De Valck, 2007; Gass, 2012a).

Others have suggested that while film festivals have remained close to their democratic missions as civil-society organizations defining 'issues' concerning a global population (for global cinema see Wagner, 2015), they have become

'repositories and archives of failed revolutions' (Elsaesser, 2005). Such views are particularly interesting in light of cinema manifestos (MacKenzie, 2014), constituting an archive of hopes for aesthetic and social change that spans over one-hundred years and attesting to lineages of modern artist generations' will for more autonomy and power—away from capital, market, patronage, and a censoring state. These criticisms suggest a few things:

In light of the ubiquity of cultural things, festivals have been suspected as accomplices in the 'oversupply of art and artists', festivals can challenge us to rethink Howard Becker's claim that art which does not get distributed, will not get made (1982, pp. 94–95). Experience-makers such as these festivals appear to ensure that their exhibited art gets made largely without economic returns, directing our attention towards alternative economic practices which are institutionalized yet may have weakened legitimacy as they continue to mature. What appears to keep most cinema artists embracing film festivals for their cultural services away from gainful economic work seems to be an investigable 'economic world reversed' (Bourdieu, 1983). Time may be of the essence, as film and many other arts/cultural events are now exposed to the digitization of event culture that accelerated with the global COVID-19 pandemic (De Valck & Damiens, 2020; Rankine & Giberti, 2021). Nothing less than this pandemic and related health-policy measures have led to a breakdown of an entire industry at the core of the 'experience economy' (Christensen, 2009), putting creative and cultural work into more precarious situations than ever before, with governments paying little attention to independent artists' social needs.

The history of film festivals entails an observable intermediary function and a rather ubiquitous choice of eventive nonprofits for symbolic value creation, which goes for many creative/cultural production fields (Moeran & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2011), calling for a deeper analysis into the purposes and benefits of arts-nonprofit organizations in economic activities and economic coordination. Some, like Ragan Rhyne (2009), have advocated the study of power relations that they see as basis of 'a global non-profit festival sector', involving 'stakeholders' and particular forms of money, and also a cultural division of labor, distinguishable by a disproportionately volunteered workforce and minimal core of professional workers that bear the marks of highly flexibilized work organizations (Lang et al., 2006; Loist, 2011).

The civil-society dimension is important to the following analysis of these 'entrepreneurial' nonprofits and their contingents of cultural workers, seeking a clearer view of the institutional complex that drives the productions of artistic novelties and reputational contests as facilitated by film festivals. I thereby take a step back from the specter of neoliberalism while keeping the focus on festivals as economic actors rather than occupants of a non-profit sector. Just

like for enterprises in the 'formal economy' (Fligstein, 2001, pp. 10–15), there are rules and types of structures pertaining to arts-festival organizations, their event productions and their organizational and institutional environments. There are governments and elites, which are essential co-productive agents in maintaining social and economic order. There are observable dynamics by which markets are created and stabilized, with dynamics unfolding among markets pertaining to cinema and other media; finally, the relations between market dynamics and the 'internal life of organizations' can be studied . Unlike many economic sociologists who keep to studying the 'real economy', analyzing firms and markets (cf. Swedberg, 2003), my investigation takes a look at how charitable phenomena happen to do well not just on the perimeter of that 'real' economy but play in locations that render a structural role for them in market formation, stability and transformation, which is fully economic.

Festivals are not just 'cultural phenomena'; they offer rather strategically and bound forms of opportunities for field actors who seek to manage their risks in highly uncertain social, and mainly economic, environments. The uncertainty of aesthetic goods—which are produced with cultural meanings of novel and unique, or making an experience—is typically regarded as essential to the goods themselves. An example is the motion-picture industry which, as a leading aesthetic-economic industry, continues to discursively construct its own history as a natural market forces account (Wasko, 2007).

Uncertainty, however, is perfectly social in make, primarily traceable to an instituted western conception of art and creativity (Becker, 2017), socially existing diverse taste preferences in audiences and consumers—which have grown in their instability as consumption offers have increased tremendously (Karpik, 2010; Schwartz, 2004)—, and being incorporated into entrepreneurial strategies in order to succeed in a wide variety of the most common form of the market, i.e., consumer-goods markets (Petrovic, 2005; Zukin, 2004), including more narrowly defined but ever-widening offers of aesthetic-economic and aesthetic digital goods. In this book, I will construct arguments addressing these patterns, including mixed economies, with two frameworks I deem particularly suitable for the study of economic coordination. These are 'grants economics' (Boulding, 1973) and the 'economics of singularities' (Karpik, 2010). Together with a set of empirical investigations into aspects of film festivals as cinema-field participants, these frames will aid mobilizing new tactical viewpoints that help interrogate the still taken-for-granted status of nonprofit organizations in today's economy and the convenience this status presents for governments under the pressure of 'performing' austerity while keeping people engaged in experience economies (Schulze, 1992). My analysis—performed in a number of steps and across micro, meso, and macro entities and associated

arguments provided by other scholars aims to bring to light some evidence for the following larger argument about the social process of festivalization:

1 Eventization and the Hidden Hand of Economism

Firstly, contrary to economic (and mainstream economic-sociological) conventions which treat nonprofits as substitutes for inevitably failing state and market action in the face of minority demands, I address the overwhelming choice of non-profit entities in the coordination of cultural goods circulation. The paradox of experience-making emerges as a central social force to attract a paying audience and industry attention while relying heavily on a nonprofit distribution channel. My analysis shows the value of nonprofit-art circulation and subsistence by non-profit means—including volunteered time, grants, and irregular income from sponsorship deals—for experience economies and shows which roles creative individuals and immersive environments play in the reproduction of this pattern. I argue that festival nonprofits—far from being the representatives of Adam Smith's Invisible Hand (1981)—provide economic mechanisms which ease the translation of cultural value into economic value, thereby serving artists, audiences, and elites. Their presence in arenas of aesthetic-economic activity co-creates constant streams of ideas alluding to creativity and cultural diversity which governments have found useful to propel in an era in which major economic power has been accorded to corporations, structurally challenging the sovereignty of nation-states. Governments try to counter with a soft-power approach which, firstly, legitimizes them as protectors of unique cultural value, secondly, provides meaningful work for cultural producers, and thirdly, gives business opportunities for profit-seekers in the realm of creative value extraction.

2 Elites, Postmodern Heroes and Attention

Secondly, I argue that the accelerated expansion of post-traditional fest culture (Giorgi et al., 2011) arises from the intended and non-intended consequences of the pursuits of projects by 'strategic elites' (Keller, 1968) by which elites aim to realize their goals and visions associated with a particular condition of society theorized as aesthetic capitalism (Reckwitz, 2017b, 2020). For their visions—often of society writ large—elites seek stable environments which appear to turn out highly uncertain frames for action. The provision for many cultural and social policy goals in the period of the 'austerity' state points to

the shift from a Keynesian welfare state pattern to a Post-Keynesian Welfare State (Jessop, 1999).[1] The associated understanding of 'good governance' entails the abandoning of legacy redistributive policy in the western world and its hindrance of emergence in developing countries under pressure by market fundamentalism at all levels of governance since about the 1980s. Workfare regime and the privatization of cultural and social policy goods characterize this so-called neoliberal governance. This investigation seeks to understand the experience-making presence of festival nonprofits in the environment of a Post-Keynesian Welfare State (Jessop, 1999).

Examining the arts-nonprofit workforce invites a broader institutional perspective on the conditions of arts entrepreneurialism. In the cultural and creative economy, there is a little examined role for philanthropy, a role relating to the justification of self-appointed stewardship of culture by wealth elites. Adopting a larger frame, we can understand contemporary philanthropy in its endeavor to do what Max Weber as theorist of western capitalism deemed unthinkable, namely to rationalize the 'charitable impulse', a project that is discernible in nonprofit management and grant-making patterns and traceable to wealth elites and their foundations (Hwang & Powell, 2009). Philanthropy has been largely left out of theories of capitalism despite powerful critiques of philanthropic wealth and its influence and relationship to nonprofit activity and inequality (McGoey, 2016; Shipman et al., 2018). The rationalization of the charitable impulse in times of the emergence of a creativity discourse and its hegemonial manifestation (Reckwitz, 2017b) provide an opportunity to understand why arts nonprofits have become so relevant to today's aesthetic-economic dynamics of capitalism.

3 From Charity to Benevolent Competition—Collusion of Philanthropy and Political Elites

Thirdly, the transformation of the welfare state (the focus of critics of neoliberalism) has been observable in the 'hire' of nonprofit organizations, to enter and co-create policy arenas deemed relevant as areas of governance. This reliance on 'civil society actors' is part of a broader transformation of the welfare-state into a 'taxation state', whereby governments have allowed corporate and social wealth elites to exempt themselves from the state's monopolistic hold

1 For Jessop, national state in contrast to a nation-state refers to formally sovereign territorial states that preside over a 'national' territory (1999, p. 381). I adopt the term throughout the book.

on taxation (and, to some degree, from regulation). Establishing themselves as visionaries, managers, and grant-makers of charities and backed by a powerful cultural imaginary known as 'the third sector', such elites have been offered a compact in which nonprofit activity as rationalized charity is allowed to engage in economic activities and help deliver policy goals—goals which may originate in 'grassroots' movement activism but can also spring from various political and economic elites' strategies which may align with middle-class and professional elite groups' interests in the implementation of their conceptions of the welfare of a society—conceptions that would resonate with the pluralistic and democratic expectations the socializing of which would historically have been the achievements of the Keynesian welfare state.

This shift in allocational paradigms is in no obvious way associated with the sustained advocacy of what has been enthusiastically called the 'renaissance' of the civil society—a cultural imaginary that has been co-produced by philanthropic, academic, public-intellectual, and public-policy elites, nearly replacing the critical discourse of public sphere. This pattern of unelected elites coming to unprecedented power and their alliance with creatives whose 'economic impulse' (Weber, 2003) they aim to mobilize (Giridharadas, 2019) entails the powerful idea that civil society mediates conflicts between a constraining state and a market that must be freed.

4 The Renaissance Ideology

Fourthly, this analysis cannot do without an inquiry into the contours and consequences of the renaissance ideology of a world-spanning 'global civil society' (Powell, 2007) which is too easily subsumed under market critique and thereby weakened. Theorists of late-modern capitalism have focused much of their critique on the activation policies in the austere Post-Keynesian welfare state (e.g., Dörre et al., 2015) without expanding their critique to 'culturalization' (Reckwitz, 2020). The expansive adoption of meritocratic competitions for 'attractive' cultural offers, which may replace social policy or simply overwhelm it with creativity ideology (Reckwitz, 2014b), and 'event power' by a global civil society are roped in for solving problems 'innovatively' which rise from the conduct of neoliberal economic policies (Rojek, 2013). This shift characterizes the end of a strong Keynesian state and the activation via 'culturalizing' strategies in which economic coordination between for-profits and nonprofit organizations seems natural.

Renaissance civil-society ideology has provided for many cultural goods and is spread across public spheres in a process of cultural globalization. Still,

I argue, it is a dangerous idea, harboring a long-term shift in political values associated with justifications for the retraction of citizenship entitlements, a hidden contract by which an exchange of citizen entitlements for more 'active' citizen participation in the shaping and materializing of societal welfare goals has been offered.

5 'Festivalization of Capitalism' and the 'Benevolence State'

Fifthly, 'festivalization of capitalism' is a conjecture about the rationalization of the associational realm in ways historically specific to postmodern capitalist society across which creativity has become a global norm for both wealth creation and life orientation (Reckwitz, 2017b). Max Weber's theory of capitalism, which has shaped the perspective of many generations of social scientists on the economy, invited us to understand how the economic impulse, wherever it occurs, can be rationalized or rationally tempered, and examine the drivers of rationalization (Weber, 2003). With my study of experience-making I offer a thesis addressing our times of capitalism, hundred years in time removed from Weber's vantage point and spanning the globe in unprecedented ways.

Weber believed neither in artists nor charitable enterprise as forces of capitalism. Indeed, festival entrepreneurs and the artists they promote are routinely in tensions between the aesthetic realm of the arts on one side and profit-making imperatives of a market-dominated society, grants-economic resource dependency, and the cultural-economic policies, providing constraints and frames for action, in line with socioeconomic development for global competitiveness. Still, the industrialization of art and artists is nearly completed as a global project of capitalism, as creativity is hegemonial and crops up as ideology within ever more fields demanding the production of 'show value' (Böhme, 2017). I maintain that a major paralleling development has been the rationalization of the associational realm, dependent for resources on funding and the exchange token of stewardship by wealth elites and political elites which control goals, reserves, and standards for public direct and indirect subsidies. Especially under the guise of a new managerial class, actively promoted by philanthropic elites and institutions (Hwang & Powell, 2009), the rationalization of artistry and civil society activism has been smoothly integrated in fields where they can be put into the service of highly risk-prone market environments. Addressing Weber by asking about the relations under which the economic impulse of today's artists and creatives becomes rationalized, I will suggest that we need to trace the power of an 'affective governmentality' (Reckwitz, 2012) specific to this age of capitalism, and which I locate in a

structure that I will tentatively call 'the benevolence state'—a state affected by the institution of philanthropy.

The major perspectives assisting the analysis of 'festivalization' are the New Institutionalism, the theory of singularization and the creativity dispositif, and the Economy of Conventions, covering works by American, French, and German sociologists (Böhme, 2017; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b; Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007; Karpik, 2010; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Reckwitz, 2017b). These theories capture important social transformations in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first century. Because their conceptual toolboxes (except for the school of New Institutionalism) do not directly facilitate analysis of organizational phenomena, additional frames of analysis have to be enrolled. The following section outlines the chapters, pointing out the empirical and theoretical routes it takes and some basic methodological provisions.

6 Chapter Overview

6.1 *Part 1: Affordances*

> What are the major empirical patterns and theoretical claims about film festivals? How can findings from past research be turned into sociological knowledge claims? Is the 'theory of the creativity dispositif' by Andreas Reckwitz (2017b) a suitable explanatory frame for further analysis of the festival as an experience-maker in the postmodern art field? Can economic sociology support this cultural-sociological explanation by analyzing the festival as an 'arranger' which curates a stream of 'affordances' (Gibson, 1977) for the pursuit of immersive, creative valuation?

After introducing organizational population characteristics, Chapter 1 identifies the site of knowledge production in cultural studies and shows still persisting gaps, such as a sociology of work and labor and an explanation of the legitimate ubiquitous nonprofit form in cultural-production fields. Using the heuristic of 'artistic/social critique' (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b), I offer a critique of film festival research, arguing that, with very few exceptions, the current literature has taken the disenchanted perspective on the artist. The discussion underlines why a social critique is needed. Chapter 2 outlines Reckwitz's theory of the creativity dispositif, discussing its applicability to the empirical material, situating the festival as an 'arranger' in Reckwitz's terms, and formulating hypotheses for an organizational study of the festival's role in the postmodern art-field as well as an economic-sociological perspective.

The arranger, a postmodern artist-subject, is a collective actor that can be situated vis-à-vis the structural principles of economization, mediatization, and rationalization claimed to be at work by Reckwitz in their interactions with aestheticization. Chapter 3 provides a historical narrative for the emergence of film festivals, focusing on the relationship between 'arranging' and aesthetic-social format appeal. The chapter demonstrates the significance of the postmodern process of aestheticization as well as the importance of core concepts defining the Affective and Spatial Turns for cultural-sociological and economic-sociological studies. The critique of the festival format at the end of the chapter, by those who co-produce it in reality, helps to emphasize the structural force and resource quality of aestheticization in market competition which, as already Joseph Schumpeter related, has never been just about price. These three chapters introduce the festival as an immersive environment organizationally produced, and theorized as driven by a strong creativity norm.

6.2 *Part 2: Devices*

> Aided by organizational-fields theories and sociological institutionalism, can we account for the structural role of nonprofit-organized festivals in fields such as cinema? What explains the observed isomorphic tendency in the organizational population which, according to cinema researchers, have fostered within-population competition among festivals? Can we construct an argument that nonprofit festivals actors reside in value chains of cinema and, if so, what does this tell us about market-economic explanations for capitalist processes?

This part takes the cultural-sociological inquiry in the first three chapters to an economic-sociological investigation into the asserted market-intermediary function and the suggested format isomorphism which paradoxically produces cultural diversity (observable in 'infinite variety' of cinema goods). Chapter 4 begins this inquiry by examining the field-configuring event hypothesis (Lampel, 2011; Lampel & Meyer, 2008), the first middle-range theory addressing eventization and its role in creative industries. While this hypothesis offers a plausible account for the diffusion of innovation, this knowledge claim remains a pursuit in business analysis that is silent on nonprofit events. Returning to an earlier hunch provided in this line of theorizing about organizational fields, I inspect the proposition that in nonprofits "legal barriers to collusion do not exist" (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 72). I argue that events such as studied by Lampel and fellow-researchers are not by coincidence

overwhelmingly nonprofit organizations organized cyclically. I argue that nonprofit law may provide rational legitimacy but not the social incentives for 'collusion', and that the role of eventive nonprofits cannot be understood fully without the discourse of 'social capital', for which Margaret Somers's critique of social capital as discursive formation (2005) offers a robust interpretation of the capability of non-profit organizations such as arts/cultural festivals, especially when brought together with a contemporary theory of current capitalism that suggests a 'connexionist world' (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b). This argument leads to a clearer idea as to how formalization of associational activities came to congeal into rationalized forms of activities, including the festival form which sits in the center of economic coordination where creativity and innovation are concerned. Both New Institutionalist arguments on 'rational institutional elements' (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and isomorphism provide a theoretical conjecture about the festival format as 'rational institutional element', mimetically diffused in and across organizational fields through weak professionalism. The complementarity between the social processes of aestheticization and rationalization (A—R, as proposed by Reckwitz) is observable in the intertwining of practices related to 'social capital' and those pertaining to the craft of immersion. Chapter 5 considers the film festival organization and its format as economic properties in the circulation of complex creative goods. Utilizing Karpik's framework of 'regimes of economic coordination' (2010), it seeks to illustrate the festival as a 'device world', an affordance to which valuation interests attach themselves, 'dragging it' into various economic environments—well-beyond the more narrowly suggested terrain for art-cinema valorization. Karpik's work and exploratory empirical discussion of film festivals facilitates the subsequent discussion of the global value chain of cinema. Chapter 6 provides a statistical test of the 'device power' of festival exposure frequency, addressing a major idea of a 'festival effect' emanating from festival-intermediary power. The analysis of the chapter confirms a positive effect for particular movie genre as well as a deterrence effect for frequent festival participation by movies. This chapter concludes the systematization, modeling, and testing of the various festival-research claims set out in Chapters 1 and 2, allowing to shift to work, labor, and the grants economy observable in the social process of festivalization.

6.3 *Part 3: Justifications*

> Why do even resource-strong festivals operate with high volunteer contingents? In what sense do cultural workers and creatives constitute nonprofit labor and how do nonprofit workers blend in with creatives?

> Does their work constitute' professionalization' and 'managerialization' as suggested by film festival scholars (e.g., De Valck, 2007)? What explains the commitment to festival-event work in absence of remuneration or presence of scant pay? Drawing on the Economy of Conventions school (Diaz-Bone & Salais, 2011; Thévenot, 2002), what kind of justifications do actors draw on to formulate the worth of festival work? Have charitable worlds been influenced, if not transformed, by what Reckwitz (2017b) identifies as the hegemony of creativity ideology?

Chapter 7 introduces this part of the book through a brief discussion of 'sector' research and survey work on festival workforce patterns. It then explores suitable frames for understanding charismatic-rational organizational patterns which can be utilized for the study of film festivals as actors in uncertain institutional environments and eventive, project-based productions (Biggart, 1989; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b; Koppetsch, 2006). Continuing from Chapter 4's organizational sociology into a sociology of work, studying event production offers new insights into the debates over social forces of de-professionalization (Abbott, 1988). Chapter 8 explores the relationship between creative/cultural labor markets and temporary event production, showing festival workers' serious engagement with the craft of event production and their various motives. Applying the 'hypothesis of risk-spreading behavior' used to explain arts-occupational choices (Menger, 1999), the chapter demonstrates festival organizations as a significant career stop in creative/cultural labor markets pertaining to cinema and beyond. Chapter 9 offers a view of the institutional forces furthering festivals as work sites. It identifies higher education and nonprofit law as important influences. While higher education is shown to be one of the 'brokers' for unpaid work forms, the comparative study of some segments of German and UK nonprofit and employment law—laws which furnish such work forms and workplaces—provides insight into inter-institutional linkages and the role of law in the facilitation of economic agency by civil-society organizations and societal beliefs regarding worth of compensation of economically valuable labor. Chapter 10 switches from institutional conditions to individual motives and the conduct of life, a Weberian concept ('*Lebensführung*') (Müller, 2003). Drawing on concepts such as 'actors' critical capacity' and 'regimes of justification/orders of worth' (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, 2007), the chapter dissects notions of the common good in volunteers' beliefs specific to labor compensation. Confirming a plurality of orders of worth present in festival worker's justifications and what appears to be a 'compromise' structure in volunteer identity (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007), the chapter rejects a binary structure of beliefs (in its variants utilitarian/hedonistic, egoistic/altruistic or

commerce/art) common to the discourse about cultural labor and the cultural economy.

6.4 *Part 4: Adjustments*

> Is eventization, as an acceleration of experiencing and experience-making, inevitably destructive of collective and individual cultural memory, as suggested by Reckwitz (2017b,2020)? Or, can the festival be conceptualized as an 'affective order' which suggests social stability and survival of cultural value? What is the interdependence between the practices and structures rendering experience-making, the politics of festivals, and the grants-economic support of eventive culture? If festive event production rests on a grants economy of public and private subsidies, can we identify a new allegiance between private and public elites? Does philanthropy, the core institutional logic of this grants economy, embody a new 'regime of justification' (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007)—possibly of 'benevolence' (Silber, 2011)? Does tentative evidence of the festival grants economy provide a plausible conjecture that philanthropy, like 'the state and the professions', makes a 'great rationalizer of society' and late-modern capitalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)?

This part of the book takes the findings on eventization in the cinema field to the theoretical debates on late-modern capitalism, engaging with key propositions across recent works. The chapters discuss the lack of affect and emotion in theories on rational capitalism; the meaning of 'economic'; and inequality in relation to civil-society discourse influential in the Post-Keynesian Welfare State. The three chapters return to Reckwitz's creativity-dispositif theory to show its relevance to macrosocial phenomena such as the state, and to provide an alternative explanation for 'affective positivity culture'. The chapter builds the argument of a 'benevolence state' by discussing macrosociological actor conceptions addressing affect and emotions and relating them to forms of authority and power. Chapter 11 specifically discusses how new knowledge from affect studies and on experience culture can be incorporated into classical sociology on action types (Weber, 1978). It draws on event critiques (Roche, 2011; Rojek, 2013) to underline the role of grants-economic structures and societal importance of event culture as sites of 'affective order'. The argument of this chapter utilizes Peter Baumann's identification of 'power of persuasion' as a missing piece in Weber's classification of power and authority and their mutual relationship (1993b). The chapter discusses why new forms of organized rationality such as festive events call for a theory of grants-economic

support and make an argument for 'elite capture' of creativity-inducing environments. The last two chapters develop this argument further, with Chapter 12 attending to the 'culturalization' claims (Reckwitz, 2020) and applying them to festivals as producers of novelties and cultural diversity of significance to both the global trade regime for cultural goods and services (Wagner, 2015), and policy makers' need for the 'soft power' of culture (Nye, 2004). I support my arguments with an exploratory outline of subsidization patterns for arts nonprofits and cultural producers in the context of cultural-policy goals. This preliminary view of the complex grant-economic reality of cinema—typically staged as 'business'—also demonstrates the specific interests of political and business elites as important festival 'stakeholders' (Rhyne, 2009). Using sociological analysis of the 'state formation at the state/culture nexus' (Steinmetz, 1999), I posit private and public subsidization as a manifestation of a philanthropic logic as underlying dimension to 'culturalization' and as legitimacy for cultural patronage by elected and non-elected elites in creative/cultural economies. Chapter 13 puts this argument into the broader context of welfare-state transformation and postmodern civil-society discourse to expound the social process of the 'festivalization' of capitalism as grounded in the diffusion of the logic of philanthropy into state and civil society. This last chapter examines the concept of the 'regime of benevolence' (Silber, 2011) as suitable framework for philanthropy's power of persuasion. Ilana Silber's addition to Convention sociology (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007) offers a way to understand the artistic critique by film festival research, presented in Chapter 1, in light of the current shape of civil society. I argue that the 'regime of benevolence' eclipses the Civic Polis, providing a compromise that is up for critique of the intertwined ideologies of civil society and creativity empowering aesthetic capitalism and the festivalization of economy and society.

The *Conclusion* looks back at the analysis's efforts to construct the grounds for a social critique which should tackle the creativity-philanthropy nexus rather than the economization of creativity alone.

The reader may choose to follow the arguments in the order presented or by staying on the festivalization course, starting with the population survey, continuing with Chapters 1–3 towards Chapter 5 and 6 into Chapters 7–10, leaving out at first the theoretical debates.

7 Cases, Data, Methods, and Some Conventions

I approach the film festival event as an organizationally produced social space where 'art worlds' (Becker, 1982) perform and reproduce themselves in spatially

and temporally concentrated social encounters culturally constructed as unique and extramundane. This post-traditional festival space (Giorgi et al., 2011) is marked by high density and frequency of subject-subject and subject-object relations, a joyous atmosphere fostering pro-social behaviors in a setting of aesthetic-economic practices directing participants' attention towards discoveries, novelties, and surprises (Böhme, 2017; Gebhardt et al., 2000; Hutter, 2011; Reckwitz, 2017b). This site of meanings, identities, and activities emerges from curatorial practices, labeled in this book as experience-making. Like Reckwitz, I use the sociological concept of a field to refer to a fairly bounded set of actors sharing a 'going concern' (Hughes, 1993).[2] Data for the narrative construction of the 'cinema field' had to be shaped from several sources, including UNESCO and European Commission agencies, national agencies or associations such as the British Film Institute, the National Theatre Owners Association of North America, Datamonitor and the Independent Movie Database (IMDb). The bewildering amount of analytic and research reports on national industries and global cinema provides mainly partial and non-representative descriptive information, which is also true for exhibition history and curatorial cinema practices (the focus of Chapter 3), so that I ended up choosing material from the United States and local histories of cinema in Germany, reasoning in methodological terms that both countries had by the middle of last century already developed sizeable cinema value chains and had registered the most cinema seats after WWII, when International film festivals began to spread. Furthermore, works on curation of immersive environments, local narratives of film society movements, and cinema architecture, found in a slim literature dominated by practitioners' manuals, were included.

Most film festival research has focused on the category of the 'International Film Festival' and the elite film fests of the world. However, surveying the broader population, as I do, gets us 'around the hierarchy of credibility' (Becker, 2011) as well as provides empirical scope for this book's central claim of festivalization as a social process. The study of the dynamics, parts and components of such a vast and uneven trend was conducted by collating diverse materials to form primary and secondary data and thenceforth matching with the most suitable methods. These include ethnography, survey, organizational history, participant observation, and statistical description and inference. Some chapter discussions must make do with exploratory data and small N, while others

2 Reckwitz passes by the entire Bourdieusian vocabulary of fields, actor struggles for capital, habitus, and the pole concept. 'Social field' simply denotes a complex of specialized and differentiated practices (Reckwitz, 2014b, p. 54, footnote 51).

profit from systematic sampling given information and access, permitting for large(r) N.

The lack of comprehensive public records on the cinema economy, the need for extensive triangulation of secondary data, and data collection in friendly, hospitable workplaces in nonetheless 'lean-and-mean' resource-poor organizations made this research unusually labor-intensive, even where I could rely on enthusiastic research assistants, which required additional time for training in exchange for interviewing and transcribing. To protect my interviewees' identity belonging to an intensely networked art world, I decided to strongly anonymize quotations in this book even if this goes against the convention of qualitative research. My minimum requirement for case inclusion (Goertz, 2006) has been that a film festival as a public or nonprofit actor attracts and produces goods desirable by others—or else there would be no transfer and nothing to mobilize in terms of actors, objects, and meanings as film festivals do.

In the course of several years, enhanced by opportunities coming with workplace change and institutional research support, I went to slightly over thirty film festivals. Together these form a convenience sample based on interviews in Australia, China, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. Based on this cross-variety observation and other researchers' ethnographies, I am confident about the high similarity with non-observed festivals elsewhere. While not neglecting the substantial stratification in this population, my interest has been to combine empirical observation with new theoretical gains which can produce grounds for a social critique of the event/project logic manifesting itself in such obvious ways in the creative and cultural economy and as facet of cultural globalization. While Reckwitz's theory (2017b) discusses the hegemonialization of a creativity dispositif in the western world, I have explored its empirical manifestation in a global festival population, which intersects with well-known phenomena such as global (cultural) consumer goods markets, global production networks, global media, and the networks of 'global civil society'. Festivals smoothen hurdles for flows between poorer and richer parts of the world as they do more generally between more and less powerful individual and/or social units (Dirlik, 2007; Drori et al., 2006). Finally, synthesizing theoretical frameworks which differ by language (English, French, and German), disciplinary and paradigmatic belonging provides challenges for both author and readers. To ease reading, I tried to stay with the specific theory's vocabulary as long as it elucidated the arguments but

switched to more general language that an informed public would more easily be able to follow. I have refrained from assigning occupations to authors ('the economist', 'the cultural economist', and so on), as these could be looked up if required.

Film Festivals, Introducing a Global Population

Richard Caves's basic economic properties for "complex creative goods" apply to phenomena such as films, opera, dance, music, and other expressive forms. They are the uncertainty of demand, the tendency to create art for art's sake, the non-substitutable creative work team, the 'infinite variety' of highly differentiated goods, the A list/B list property of art, the significance of temporality, and the long-term valorization of the product or performance (Caves, 2000, pp. 1–10). They capture the nature of the movie as an experience good while also extending to the making of immersive environments. Especially, 'infinite variety' and 'A list/B list' lend themselves to introducing population characteristics.

Vertical differentiation occurs through ranking (the 'A list/B list' property), which is a typical strategy of uncertainty reduction (Karpik, 2010). Festivals provide many opportunities for this type of strategizing, as I explore in the second part of the book. 'Infinite variety' refers to the fact that comparisons between aesthetic entities of some similarity turn out to be difficult—in Caves's phrasing, "… everyone might agree that the leading actor's performance was better in film B than in A, but some people like A better for other reasons" (Caves, 2000, p. 6). 'Infinite variety' is at the core of constructing uniqueness (Reckwitz, 2020). An extraction from Sydney's list of film festivals demonstrates the 'infinite variety' of this population:

> The First and the Last Experimental International Film Festival, the Mardi Gras Film Festival, the Antenna International Documentary Festival, the WOW Film Festival, the Short Soup International Short Film and Food Festival, the A Night of Horror International Film Festival, Sydney Underground Film Festival, the Stinkwater! International Short Film Festival, the Harmony International Short Film Festival, the Flickerfest International Short Film Festival, the Sydney Film Festival …

This list evidences that festivals categorize their identity and related goods by non-comparable dimensions and can be illustrated with the British Council's *Film Festival Directory* (2016), listing over 1,200 film festivals across twenty-four genre categories. The International Izmir Short Film Festival, for example, is a short film festival, which uses additional labels such as 'Animation, Asian Cinema, Black Cinema, British Films, Digital, Documentary General' (and more) to describe itself. Although this suggests a variety of cinema genre, festivals are only loosely related to genre, which is the major aesthetic system of

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cinema. Genre "include systems of expectations, categories, labels and names, discourse, texts and corpuses of texts, and the conventions that govern them all" (Neale, 2000) and "takes advantages of cultural competencies that are generated over time, habituations that give viewers a common language through which to appreciate and connect films" (Miller, 2001, p. 121). Festivals' participation in this system may be described as 'doing genre work' with the goal of "put[ting] their own stamp on film culture" (De Valck, 2007, p. 210).[1]

Stable categories have emerged, although these can be 'mixed and matched' for further identification of uniqueness, for example 'horror film' in genre, 'independent cinema' in film culture, 'short film' as movie type, political and social resonance with cultural meanings such as 'Chinese Cinema', Black filmmaker', and 'Anarchist'. Additionally, 'infinite variety' grows around hybrid arts and media (e.g., cinema and culinary pleasure or 'mixed media'). Finally, 'infinite variety' grows around the unresolved tensions over what constitutes cinematic representation, e.g., in cultural-political constructions such as 'Arab cinema' or 'Asian festivals' (Stringer, 2016).

Only two comprehensive survey works, by Stephen Follows (2013) and myself, provide systematic evidence of the size and growth of the population. Unfortunately, Follows's dataset includes a high number of one-off events that highly likely got advertised but never staged.[2] Table 1 shows how one can arrive at a better estimation—by making the assumption that one-off events are evenly distributed organizational failures within the country of their indicated location. This approach results in an estimate of a global total of over 5,900 film festivals operating over some or all years during 1998–2013.

My survey (2015) excludes mixed-art festivals, awards ceremonies without curated film performances, the online-festival, and any one-off event. A second edition had to occur the following year or, for biannual fests, one more year later. I made 2012 the last year of my enumeration, including biannual festivals taking place in 2011 and confident to re-open in 2013, based on third-provider event information from various sources (e.g., festival reports on the

1 Different from film theory, I use 'genre' as a constructed category or symbolic boundary. Using the example of ballet, a dance genre or style by a fellow sociologist, genre "is at once a ritual classification for balletomanes, a commercial classification for performing-arts promoters, and an administrative classification for public agencies that fund the arts" (DiMaggio, 1987).

2 According to festival professionals (Edwards & Skerbelis, 2012), a US American festival needs to run at least five years to qualify for grants. Even well-planned events can fail within one festival period and exit the field with large debt (Stevens, 2016, p. 1). Another meaning of one-off cultural productions exists for events such as summits or similar non-recurrent events (see Leca et al., 2015).

TABLE 1 Global film festival population, 1998–2013 (Follows, 2013)

Location	In percent	Full sample	One-time festival	Adjusted sample[a]
Rest of world	13.9	1,349	526	823
Brazil	1.1	107	42	65
Spain	1.3	126	49	77
Germany	1.7	165	64	101
France	1.7	165	64	101
Italy	1.7	165	64	101
India	1.9	184	72	112
Australia	3	291	114	178
United Kingdom	5.5	534	208	326
Canada	5.5	534	208	326
United States	62.6	6,076	2,370	3,706
Total	99.9	9,706	3,785	5,921

a My calculations in this column are based on 3,785 festivals playing only once.

Internet).[3] Bias may occur but should be small, given biannual events being in minority. My procedure resulted in nearly four-thousand (3,983) film festivals which operate with different time spans between 1932 and 2012/2013 and are close to my adjusted total of Follows's 5,921.

During 1997–2010 the population had doubled, but founding numbers dropped to the level of 1997 in 2011 and halved again in 2012. This finding supports festival practitioners' observations of a growth spurt and a cooling-off period after what they think was a period of more intense competition. Finding 1,274 festivals in 2011 and 1,641 in 2012, a mean of 1,457 film festivals suggests itself as the number of annual events for the end of the observed period.

Matched on UNESCO classification, the nearly four-thousand organizations (3,983) across time in my sample point to predominantly European and Northern American locations (3,385, or 85 percent). About 1,300 US film festivals, over 400 in France, nearly 300 in Great Britain, and about 200 organizations in Italy, Germany and Canada respectively form dominant national

3 There is a subpopulation that performs in multiple cities. To include them, I fixed them on their headquarter country or city unless there was real independence in the diverse locations.

clusters. Among the Northern America's festivals, an 88 percent perform in the US. While observations for the other world regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania) are potentially undercounts, a gap with the western-countries' figures should be marginal.[4] Despite much concentration in the western countries more nuanced center/periphery patterns exist. World regions, as defined and published by UNESCO, don't express meaningfully within-country differences, as cities, not countries, are event locations. Regional categories, however, help somewhat in breaking down the global pattern. In Oceania, 85 percent of the film festivals in my database are Australian events—a plausible majority.

Within Europe alone, the majority of the festivals, or 42 percent, are located in Western Europe, while 27 percent are in the Southern region (including the Balkans), 21 percent in Northern Europe as well as 9 percent in Eastern Europe, including Central Europe and the Russian Federation. When applying a cut-off at 10 percent, the largest film festival populations happen to exist in countries with long histories of a cinema industry and its surrounding culture, which are France (22 percent), Great Britain (15 percent), Italy and Germany (each 11 percent). Table 2 shows that 15 cities account for 20 percent of all film festival organizations worldwide.

This ranking illustrates that festivals are located in capital cities and urban centers of creative/cultural-economic concentration. Given the cut-off at rank 15, the table conceals the quantitative differences that are quite small, as a longer extraction would put Mumbai, Seoul, Athens, Bucharest, Buenos Aires, Istanbul, Tokyo, and many more well-known cities across the world in view. Excluded would still be the many large cities from African and Asian regions and the festival locations in smaller states and island regions.

If one adds to the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Canada, (which make up roughly two thirds of the enumerated population) the festivals of Spain, Australia, India, the Netherlands, Brazil, Belgium, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, and Japan, already a near majority of film festivals is reached. Still, there are very few countries that do not have at least one film festival in their cultural history, which makes a case for a global network. There can also be 'interrupted' festival history, such as that of the Moscow International Film Festival, operating first in 1935 and performing continuously only since

4 An undercount may result from collection-side language barriers (despite doing the work with a multilingual researcher team), lack of website presence, and overrepresentation of anglophone organizations in the film festival directories used for enumeration. However, my French festival data do not lend support for bias through third-party data providers.

TABLE 2 Top locations across film festival history (Vogel, 2015)

Rank	Film festival location
1	New York
2	Los Angeles and Hollywood
3	London
4	Paris
5	Toronto
6	San Francisco
7	Sydney
8	Rome
9	Berlin
10	Barcelona
11	Montreal
12	Amsterdam
13	Chicago
14	Philadelphia
15	Washington, D.C.

1959. Across time, the data attest to the population's waxing and waning. The first film festival event, the Venice Film Festival, started in 1932, with a set of International film festivals following. From the 1980s onward, the population grew more rapidly than ever before (see Figure 1 (a)). By world region, the boxplot-based comparison shows Europe as the origin of film festival culture, but the following boxplots show a more global film festival spread beginning around the 1970s.

The following pages present historical population growth by world-region: Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America as well as Australia and New Zealand (for Oceania) (Figure 2); Eastern Asia, South-Eastern Asia, South-Central, and Western Asia (Figure 3); Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Europe (Figure 4). For each world region, frequencies of foundings, festival closings, and the 'festival span', as my simple measure to capture the sustained presence of the event in a given location, are presented. Starting with the broad tendencies in the data, I compare the world regions or within-region where exploratory data analysis is meaningful. The inspection provides evidence that foundings are more frequent around the year



FIGURE 1 The global film festival population historical emergence (a) and by world region (b), based on first event (Vogel, 2015)

2000, especially in Latin America, Australia and New Zealand, and some, but not all of the regions of Asia and Europe. A decrease in the more recent years (up to 2012) in the western and southern regions of Europe, the United States and, to lesser extent, in East Asia can also be detected. The second column in each of the figures shows the frequency of organizational closings, marked by 'last event-year' in the graph, on a time line. The histograms should be read as follows: the last bar, marking 2012, reveals the relative frequency of events operating (they are an approximation of the nearly 3,000 film festivals that Follows was able to count for the past two years of his survey). To compare organizational mortality, i.e., festival closures by world region, we look at the spread *excluding* the frequencies represented by the 2012-bar. In most of the regions, a trend of closings occurs only after the millennium. But in Eastern Europe, the closings go back to the 1970s, as they do for Northern America and Western Europe in the 1980s, and Australia in the 1990s. Overall, however, most frequent closings match up with the intense foundings after the millennium and possibly indicate the uncertain business of event production.

The observed span, proxying the organizational age and resilience (measuring simply the distance between the first and the last edition of the case) reveals a global population mean of twelve years and a spread in organizational age from two to over eighty years. Very old organizations are in a minority while being a world-wide phenomenon. Using the total event spans (not displayed) rather than the organizational spans, the cultural magnitude of festival events appears more clearly. Europe alone provides more event-years or events (in total nearly 26,000) than Northern America (ca. 15,200), followed by Asia (ca. 3,200), Latin America (ca. 2000), Oceania (over 1,200), and Africa (nearly 600). This statistic shows that regions with the most organizations need not have the most sustained or most compacted film festival culture as a matter of active cultural experience-making. What remains, however, is the western concentration of formal organizations in the data.

If we assert, plausibly, something of an existing national film culture, the data can be used to express the relationship between national festival exhibition by these arts nonprofits with commercial cinema exhibition and production. As official statistics on national cinema production (typically registering feature-film production only) lack observational continuity, a narrower correlation exercise must suffice (see further below in the section on 'film culture by country'). Commercial exhibition is usually gauged by counts of cinema theatres and audience attendance. Commercial business data, however, focus on the number of screens on which movies play (cf. Swami & Eliashberg, 1999) rather than social spaces (theatres) that also festival-event productions. Another common but not consistently collected factor is national film



FIGURE 2 Film festival characteristics (1932–2012) for the four world regions of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania (presented for Australia and New Zealand)—a. first events, b. closing events, and c. span of event activity in years (from left to right) (Vogel, 2015)

production. Overall, measures at the global level such as UNESCO spreadsheets permit only simple assessment. Based on these, I calculated Pearson's correlation coefficients, using the number of screens and attendance per capita for the year of 2005 and a measure for feature film production.[5] For each country I simply added up the number of festival organizations as a rough proxy for presence of a cultural tradition, ignoring their finer temporal development and dispersion. Because of data quality, I present a 2005-comparison between Europe as a traditional and highly concentrated film festival region ascertained

5 I inspected these variables for the years 2006 to 2012 and found similar associations with the festival variable. For datasets see the UNESCO's website (http://uis.unesco.org/en/topic/feature-films-and-cinema-data).



FIGURE 3 Film festival characteristics (1932–2012) for the four world regions of Asia—a. first events, b. closing events, and c. span of event activity in years (from left to right) (Vogel, 2015)

further above with a selected group of non-western countries that exemplify a representative group in terms of film culture.

Across these other countries for which observations exist (around 35 depending on the calculation discussed), there are strong positive, and statistically significant coefficients (above 0.30) between the measure of 'festival tradition' on one hand and attendance per capita and number of commercial screens (both in 2005) on the other hand (all are Pearson's r and $p < .05$). The results suggest that non-European countries with more compact festival traditions also have a strong commercial cinema culture in 2005, a year in the founding-boom window mentioned. Furthermore, using the total count of feature film production between 1970 and 2012 provided by UNESCO, I proxied industrial film production tradition (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009). For



FIGURE 4 Film festival characteristics (1932–2012) for the four regions of Europe—a. first events, b. closing events, and c. span of event activity in years (from left to right) (Vogel, 2015)

this larger number of countries (those excluding Europe) I observe a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship. Certainly, these patterns have to be treated with caution because of the gaps in data-reporting to UNESCO, but also with respect to a one-time point observation (= 2005). There are 21 countries across the world, small ones in terms of resident population, such as the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, mid-size ones like Peru as well as large ones, such as Malaysia and India, all of which are commonly assumed to have their own, old or revived, cinema cultures (cf. Barrow, 2016; Ganti, 2012; Khoo, 2006). Together, and as analyzed above, they also show some tendency between commercial cinema attributes and event culture.

Finally, the population can be quantitatively explored by looking at the sub-field level. Representing an 'A list/B' list phenomenon, festivals accredited by FIAPF (International Federation of Film Producers Associations, 2008), a

TABLE 3 Comparative magnitude and strength in cinema cultural patterns, expressed in Pearson's r, based on author's data and public records (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009; Vogel, 2015)

	Film festival tradition	
	European countries (n = 30)	**Country group (n = 21)**
Attendance per capita (2005)	0.36	0.6
Screens (2005)	0.91	0.83
Feature production (1970–2012)	0.92	0.48

powerful regulatory body, can be summarized for 2006 and 2008.[6] In 2006, 47 member festivals (of a total 49 FIAPF-registered that had submitted their data to the lobby organization) showed a total of 10,562 films, offered 1,252 movie premieres and 800 international premieres. There were 28,131 attending media representatives (a fifth was from abroad) and 10,834 attending sales representatives (a third was from abroad). Additionally, 775 foreign distributors and 40,717 so-called market participants attended. Altogether, the festivals used 513 exhibition sites, measured by the report also as total of 263,836 cinema seats, and sold 4.6 million tickets for screenings (International Federation of Film Producers Associations, 2008). While this report cannot be straightforwardly compared to statistics for commercial theatrical exhibition, it shows the centrality of this festival group. Moreover, it resonates with what International film festival-researchers have been observing as a working "formula of premieres, awards, and stars [that—A.V.], a normative constraint on any festival that wants to keep attracting large numbers of media representatives" (De Valck, 2007, p. 126). Regarding the 'A list/B list' property, it should be noted that the FIAPF-festivals make up about 0.01 percent in the survey data. There is a grouping into specialty themes by FIAPF, which combine properties of horizontal and vertical differentiation—hardly lending itself to practical comparisons. Only the top of these festivals has arguably a categorical presence, including the International film festivals of Cannes, Venice, and Berlin—a troika

6 The organization counts as non-transparent and closed to academic researchers (Stringer, 2016, p. 41). For a case study on divergent interests between FIAPF and a festival see (Stevens, 2016, pp. 32–40).

that the North American 'factions' try to revise by communicating Toronto International Film festival and Sundance Film Festival as important additions to 'the circuit'.

The summary characteristics for the global festival population provide evidence for a center/periphery pattern in festival culture and its concentration in metropolitan areas. The population is marked by 'infinite variety' and a powerful elite of festivals of national and global fame. Film festivals can be assumed to thrive next to or in exchange with cultural institutions and community-based organizations which are traditionally associated with more permanent art forms, such as museums. Further surveys of film festival culture should include observations at the program level and the qualitative cultural supply, which film festival research has tackled mainly by ethnographic method (see next chapter). One major result of this festival population is the co-creation of 'independent cinema', an elusive term simultaneously denoting a discourse, a genre, a movement and an aesthetic format (Berra, 2008; Goodell, 1982; Khoo, 2007; Nornes, 2009). I want to end my introduction with a brief discussion of this meaning:

'Independence' should be approached with some sense of semantic variance; and the concept includes allusions to economic dimensions such as resource, linkage to distribution, formal film training, and more. In the industry, there are also so-called independent producers and distributors, i.e., firms that operate in some relation and hardly fully independent from the very big companies (Crisp, 2015; MacDonald, 2008; Squire, 2004). Often applauded for safeguarding authenticity and autonomy (instituted signs of an artistic inspiration, see Chapters 1, 10, and 13 for a sociological approach), the idea of independence rejects the type of creativity associated with industrialized film production while not completely abandoning it. As an aesthetic vision, independent cinema must also be differentiated from the so-called avant-garde, a further important reference for festival analysis (Hagener, 2007), summarizing a cross-disciplinary arts and intellectual movement located in European cities and, as to cinema, organized in film clubs and societies, having its own media outlets and facilitated discourses in metropolitan centers. Post-WWII, the center of the movement had shifted to New York, known for experimental and underground filmmaking with its own institutions. It was influential in the 1960s and 1970s with a post-colonial critique, Third World cinema.[7] John Berra treats independent cinema as a 'polite social critique', 'a mirror image of the audience it caters to, crowed seeing novelty and quality' but not "necessarily

7 Similarly de Valck (2007, pp. 25–27).

looking for the extremes, the provocation which would lead it to reevaluate its social-political values" (2008, p. 89). In sociological terms, today's independent cinema resembles a 'new social movement' that constitutes itself through boundary-making, a key process in 'contentious politics' (cf. Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 170). Overall, film festivals engage in both boundary-making and producing ambiguity observable across cultural productions (e.g., Coman & Phillips, 2018). Despite pending threats from the digital economy to venue-based events with a different version of screen culture altogether (Elsaesser & Hoffmann, 1998; Rankine & Giberti, 2021), they so far have maintained a presence nonetheless as well as have provided an experience-economic format that has spread globally.

As a regular consumer of cinema and modern dance festivals, I got interested in film festivals when I noticed the passion some people in my English friendship circles had for these events, certain movie directors, maintaining a certain style of talking about film. By the time I got to know about the film festival research literature, I had already interviewed people in International film festivals, documentary, short, women's, LGBTQ, children/youth, and anti-capitalism festivals. The choice of fieldwork cases on which many of the following chapters in this book draw, was influenced by a first survey effort (Lang et al., 2006), followed by the global database (Vogel, 2015) that forms the basis of this chapter.

Do these global-level patterns constitute preliminary evidence for the theoretical claim of 'festivalization'? I believe that they 'put a floor under' under studies of the dynamics of cultural globalization as well as the key position of urban centres in media culture. Widening our view to the existence of global and transnational cultural production networks (Brodie, 2016; Christopherson, 2006; Curtin, 2016; Halle, 2002; Lim, 2006) we can locate film festivals in these constellations as co-producers of a global image culture (Lim, 2012), while also situating national specificity in that context of transnational interactions and structural densification. Following global modernity scholars, we can think of festivals as border phenomena, combining both informal elements and formal structural formation pertaining to world society, where informal structures may be suggested to solve problems of incomplete formal structuration (see for this suggestion Boris Holzer in Schwinn, 2006, pp. 259–279). Keith Wagner (2015, pp. 232–233) encourages us to 'break free of the center/periphery model' based on notions of partial globality argued by Sassen, Jay and Moretti as to lived experiences and the hypermobility of cultural texts, non-western texts linking into a global orientation of genres, styles and so forth, and not last the flows of people. Film festivals contribute to this partial globality by exhibiting foreign movies as 'world cinema', a category furthering a certain discourse,

which offers opportunities for aesthetic and scholarly re-considerations, not last because global cinema produces knowledge of relevance to a world population, de-nationalizing global image flow in form of 'multiethnic and transnational' story (Suner, 2006; 2015a, p. 239) and as part of a broadening media availability (see for example Ghannam, 2002). For making the local and the national relevant in a global frame cinema since its inception has been the perfect medium (Faccioli, 2012), especially when coupled with the mechanisms of the aesthetic-digital economy but also with a cosmopolitan 'affective positivity culture' present in extramundane event-settings, to which I will return in Chapter 2. Following is Chapter 1, which provides the qualitative perspective on cinema and its festivals as well as attends to theoretical meanings and propositions related to them.

PART 1

Affordances

CHAPTER 1

Film Festivals and Festivalization

1 Film Festival Research in the Cinema Field

Coinciding with the phase of 'world cinema turning into global cinema' starting around 1989 (Wagner, 2015, p. 236), there has been a growing self-help and guidebook literature for film festival, suggesting to fill a need for the industry novice and practitioner (e.g., Adelman, 2004; Gore, 2009; Holland, 2009; Tuttle, 2006). Prior to it, festival observations made their appearance through 'conference reports', suggesting another format of experience. These reports do still exist, but have largely moved to the Web in form of 'blogs'. In this century, industry guidebooks have adopted increasingly the routine of including a chapter and a list of festivals deemed 'relevant' (Epstein, 2010; Erickson et al., 2005); historical studies on festivals have mainly focused on the Cannes Film Festival (e.g., Beauchamp & Béhar, 1992; Hardy, 1992; Turan, 2002), with some curators turning into authors on 'their' festivals (Marshall, 2005).

In the social sciences, industry analysis in business and management studies, economics, film performance analyses, organizational sociology, and political economy has excluded festivals from their models (Bhalla & Lampel, 2007; Bordwell et al., 1985; Christopherson & Storper, 1989; De Vany, 2004; Ganti, 2012; Goldsmith & O'Regan, 2005; Guback, 1969; Hadida, 2010; Jarvie, 1970; Mezias & Kuperman, 2001; Moul, 2007; Pendakur, 1990; Scott, 2004, 2005; Simonton, 2009; Staiger, 1995; Vogel, 2007). With rare exceptions of the few short mentions (Caves, 2000; Scott, 2005; Wasko, 2003) even studies of extra-commercial assessments for cultural goods and services don't fill the gap (Gemser et al., 2008). Where they have become relevant, however, is the managerial perspective on innovation related to creative/cultural economic activity (Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Mezias et al., 2011; Rüling, 2009), while business analysis still keeps events outside of conventional industry analysis (for the opposite see Gross & Zilber, 2020; Hadida et al., 2021). Sociology's silence, indeed on cinema more broadly, seems even more surprising given the growth of interest in cultural phenomena, globalization, the Iconic Turn, and mediatization (Lim, 2012; Schroer, 2008, p. 10), and the interdisciplinary interest in classics on cultural production and film (Benjamin, 1963; Kracauer et al., 2012). Here, the lack of interest in Emily Altenloh (1914)'s first socioeconomic analysis of the movie industry may be telling. Sociologists, however, tend to study cinema's gendered labor markets, work regimes, and network phenomena (Baker

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& Faulkner, 1991; Bielby & Bielby, 1992; Blair et al., 2003; Lincoln & Allen, 2004). An exception is Shyon Baumann (2007)'s study of extra-commercial assessment resulting in what he sees as 'intellectualized' Hollywood. In one of the first studies that make film festivals a matter of organizational theory, Joshua Gamson (1996)'s study of New York's LGBTQ film festivals already analyzes the influence of grant-making on film festivals as a complex organizational and institutional process.

Paralleling the festival population spread a scholars/practitioners network has emerged. It is maintained mainly by academics in cultural, communication, and film studies, and identifiable by 'seminal writings' and the attempt to build a curriculum for media studies (De Valck et al., 2016). According to some of its seminal authors, the research "has moved beyond its initial descriptive and taxonomic phase" (Burgess & Kredell, 2016, p. 160). Other senior voices claimed still a few years earlier that "little evidence of much mutual influence or a theoretical/intellectual lineage" seems to exist (Iordanova, 2013, p. 13). For the following review I have read and extracted this third strand of literature as widely as I could, keeping my eyes on the more systematic writings with empirical evidence for the propositions made about them. As this literature has no paradigmatic structure indeed, I grouped it into themes rather than knowledge claims as is typical for reviewing social-science literature. Finally, many of the analyses and writings are motivated by a critique of festivals as 'arrangers' in an oligopolistic field structure, I will show that they represent an 'artistic critique' (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b), a circumstance opening up possibilities for sociological inquiry into the 'festivalization' of capitalism.

1.1 *Propositions for Film Festivals*

The most frequently cited essay—on International film festivals—by Thomas Elsaesser (2005, pp. 82–107) makes a number of propositions which film festival researchers have tackled over the years with case study, serving empirical evidence or counter-evidence: according to Elsaesser, film festivals are 'cost-effective mechanisms' to create demand in firms, workers, and tourists for the creative city. Writing on the 'film festival network', he proposes that internal competition drives members toward resemblance and ever new curatorial fads, while aiming to 'optimize locational advantage'. He also asserts that the European network is 'a porous and perforated' ranking system, with some external actors trying their luck to stratify it more strongly, but to little avail. Festival curations are proposed as planned yet spontaneous encounters and maintained by an 'informal lexical stability'. The most cited claim by Elsaesser is perhaps that the film festival circuit "holds the key to all forms of cinema not bound into the global Hollywood network" while also providing "an interface

with Hollywood cinema and industry" (2005, p. 88). This, he argues, should be explained by festivals' own need of supply for novelties for their curations rather than market demand. In the following I address the empirical research.

1.2 *Historical Origins*

Wagner (2015, p. 236), based on Dudley Andrew's work, sees the history of the moving image developing into a powerful global culture as matter of five turning points (or phases, as he calls them): the cosmopolitan phase (1918) followed by a national phase (1935), a federated phase (1945), the world cinema phase (1968), and the making of global cinema as mentioned (1989). Film-festival history maps onto this cinema field development, but names three crucial phases (De Valck, 2007, pp. 19–20). The first phase—between 1932, the founding of Venice, and the culturally symbolic year of 1968—is organized by a national-cinema paradigm (second in Andrew and Wagner). Juries are already a core element, while representatives of national film funds (for the US, its trade organization) 'call the shots'. In the 1960s, associated with rising policy maker, intellectual and academic interest in cinema, filmmakers protest against prestigious festivals which they see neglecting the autonomous artist in various ways. Eventually, the ensuing conflicts give way to a paradigm of film-programming autonomy from about 1970 onward (Segale & Blumauer, 2011, pp. 162–168). The Cannes Film Festival is not only the site of initial protests but also becomes the reform model. De Valck calls this phase the 'age of the programmer', for it symbolizes the arrival of the 'auteur' (related to the French New Wave) and a turn toward discovery of talent instead of national cinema promotion by government bodies (Gonzalez Zarandona, 2016, p. 8).[1] Festivals would become "an alternative model for commercial theatrical exploitation of films in which the principal of the box office was substituted for culture values" (De Valck, 2007, p. 167). Festivals started to strategize and specialize around and thematic programming elements and particpate in the idea of world cinema (the fourth phase in Andrew's and Wagner's terms) and play a part in new aesthetic movements. During this time, diversity and volume of cinematic-art production increased substantially. De Valck's third period is recognized as global diffusion of the festival format and its attraction for urban and cultural policy makers. Around the 1980s and onward, there has been a widespread adoption

1 "Never before had they had so much freedom to pursue their cinephile and critical agendas without being restrained by national politics or economic interests. Never again would programming be as pure and unaffected by audience expectations or the final side of event management that would eventually become increasingly important during the 1980s" (De Valck, 2007, p. 168).

of prize competitions. De Valck identifies a comprehensive power shift in the area of arts (extra-commercial) assessment: from 'national film fund officials' (her first phase) to 'festival programmers' (second phase) to 'festival directors' (third phase). She judges that 'professional management' and 'visionary leadership' help the contemporary festivals to survive as a "well-oiled, professional organization", which meet the demand of "responsible economic management in addition to feasible objectives" and "networking skills" deemed "indispensable" (2007, pp. 192–194). Somewhat disagreeing with this assessment, Skadi Loist characterizes this still ongoing phase as one of cultural and economic interlocking agendas grounded in 'neoliberal logic' and puts emphasis on the intermediary function of the festival in the cinema field (2016, p. 58), which has been followed up by a recent study (Carroll Harris, 2017).

A few writings explore the origins of the event model which Elsaesser had located in Europe. Kirsten Stevens, however, maintains in her Australian study that the diverse events did not emerge from the "desire to replicate the template set by the early geopolitically motivated European events, but rather responded to the needs and conditions of their local environment" (2016, p. 26). She emphasizes film society movements as a parallel trajectory of festival development, partly in reaction to the Hollywood cinema import (constituting about ninety percent of commercial exhibition in 1942). Christel Taillibert and John Wäfler (2016)'s study on Venice's film festival as a predecessor to Cannes sees two influential patterns conditioning the shape of early International film festivals: "the competitive dimension, of course, but also a social aspect with a very popular character, a strong link with the needs of the film industry, local integration, and also broad media coverage" as well as the proximity to music festivals, which they argue popularized the festival as form of aesthetic sociality (2016, p. 10). European festival culture was marked by a "mistrust toward a merchandizing of culture" and "a deep attachment to the notion of freedom" (p. 13). The 'music festival model' appears to have diffused to other art worlds, but with a declining influence by the 1920s (on music festivals see Frey, 1994). Although "the launch and success of the Cannes Film Festival immediately after the war can be considered as the definite fixing of that terminological construction" (Taillibert & Wäfler, 2016, p. 17), the authors emphasize that there was a public cinema fest culture in place that reportedly differed from ciné-club cinephilia by elements such as an 'international scope for world cinema and regularized aspects of the format such as duration, number of films, competition, ceremonies, audiences, and the agenda of elevating public taste in cinema'. This finding underlines Andrew's and Wagner's setting of a cosmopolitan beginning of cinema festivities (Wagner, 2015, p. 236). Another set of studies on population history also focuses on European festivals, elaborating

the 'national phase' in terms of state propaganda and post-WWII diplomacy (Ostrowska, 2016, pp. 20–21) as well as US movie import and the relaunch of the French industry as motivators for government-backing of the Cannes Film Festival (Segale & Blumauer, 2011).

1.3 *Contemporary State-Festival Relationships*

Cultural policy-making's relationship to film festivals has been a continuous research object, as "[w]ithout having to engage in geopolitical negotiations, the ideational borders of the nation-states are being redrawn through new production, distribution, and screening policies", according to Randall Halle (2002, p. 7), who exemplarily deals with the fictious construction of national cinema that seems to lend legitimacy to continued national relevance of film industries embedded in transnational industrial structures. Similar to Elsaesser, Halle identifies the opportunity for non-mainstream cinema as national cinema symbolically "becomes quasi synonymous with oppositional, marginal, or subaltern cinema". Maria Paz Peirano's analysis of Chilean festivals provides evidence for Halle's interpretation based on German data, tracing interest in festival intermediation to the Chilean government's audio-visual policy agenda (Peirano, 2016, pp. 125–126). Sarah Barrow's case study of the Lima Film Festival in Peru's capital (2016) also confirms Halle's assessment as well as resonates with global modernity and cultural globalization scholarship already discussed at the end of my survey report. It is a fascinating account about how national-cinema appreciation has been stably produced in the aftermath of a civil war and in absence of a national industry, being 'held together' by participation in a transnational economic structure and networks of meanings and formal organizations, which together create the conditions for production, exhibition, and consumption of Peruvian culture.[2]

1.4 *Within-Population Differentiation*

A major methodological theme is the 'festival network' or the 'circuit'—two nearly interchangeably used terms describing the coordinating aspects and stratification in the festival population. Several typologies have become conventions, including Mark Peranson's notion of the festival as a political actor that is "subjected to pressures from interest groups and [...] in a constant struggle for power" (2009, p. 25). The 'business festival' is characterized by traits absent from the typical 'audience festival': such as film markets, high budgets,

2 On the topic of national cinema and the function of 'new waves' in a global era see for a more general discussion (Menne, 2007).

a premiere orientation, a large industry and sponsorship base, prestigious award competitions, and some 'Hollywood presence'. In the business festival the prominent participant roles are industry actors (distributor, buyer, sales agent), whereas the audiences and the sponsors dominate the audience festival. Peranson ranks sponsors and governments (such as actors on audio-visual policy) somewhat closer to the middle for each festival type, while critics are placed at a low rank. The bottom rank is taken by the filmmaker regardless of audience or business type. Peranson declares collusion between festival management and industry actors, which he sees manifest in the movie-sales agent's role that has replaced the government's previous central buyer function (Peranson, 2009, pp. 27–28). As a further development, de Valck offers four tiers, with the business festival occupying the upper three tiers. On the top tier, one finds the 'global players' with international markets and prestigious competitions. Festivals with specialized services for cinema co-production markets and cinema finance (cinema funds), festivals with a strong independent filmmaker scene, or, alternatively, festivals deemed innovative and specialized by their core attendees occupy the second tier. The third tier is occupied by regional festivals that facilitate "major meeting site[s] for local professionals" (De Valck, 2014, pp. 47–48). The last tier is the place of Peranson's audience festival type. This typology seems to suggest patterns of within-network circulations: movies premiere at the first-tier festival and eventually find their way to the lower tiers. In my view, it could be read alternatively as proposition on state-industry configurations. Other writers (Loist, 2016) attempt further refinement, addressing the many possible movements of subjects and objects (films and filmmakers, the event sequence, money, etc.) that form 'circuits'. Others, like Dina Iordanova, contest the concept of the network, as the festival population lacks a "central organizing body" and "coordination among festivals is less systematic than all the metaphors have asserted" (Iordanova & Rhyne, 2009). More recent study seems to confirm the network structure in combination with a political will, as discerned in the European setting (Krainhöfer, 2019). Several case studies support the idea of festival-network dynamics. For example, soon after becoming one of the most influential Asian festivals, the Pusan International Film Festival allegedly suffered from its own success, as the new filmmakers who were 'made at Pusan' abandoned the festival after being visible enough as successful artists to curators of Europe A-list festivals (Ahn, 2009, p. 83). Stevens observes that between 1979 and 2010 the number of Melbourne film festivals has gone up from 1 to 30 festivals, leading her to wonder about how this network sustains itself given the "heterogeneous array of formats and agendas" and concluding that it must be the diversification that minimizes conflict among the city's festivals (2011, pp. 141–143). Thus, a few

empirical investigations support Elsaesser's claims on competition and institutionalization of particular ways of festival-event production and the relationship with government and industry patterns.

1.5 *Center/Periphery in the Cinema Field*

Another major theme concerns critique of the western gaze in both reality of cinema production as well as in scholarship. James English, for example, provides a postcolonial critique, which relates film festivals to "a world space of hierarchically situated publics [...] a global field of cultural prestige and power" (English, 2011, p. 64).[3] English opposes the influence of western aesthetics in African cinema, the political prioritization of diaspora cinema made in France by African filmmakers, the western disregard for Nigerian cinema (known as 'Nollywood') because of its (highly successful) performance on television (see Austen & Saul, 2010; Dovey, 2015, p. 25). This tendency of western influence comes with a neglect of local production and skilling despite the flowering festival culture focused on African cinema both in diaspora locations as well as in several countries of Africa (Bisschoff, 2009; Dovey, 2015, p. 25). Critiquing the now widespread co-production policies (which often involve festivals as awarding sites for project funds), English sees reinforcement of "the consecratory itineraries of the most powerful festivals" (2011, pp. 74–75) but no true support for national production on the continent. Researchers also critically view the role of western experts across the festival regions (De Valck & Soeteman, 2010, p. 302), including questioning of the notion of 'discovery', a tactic by film festivals to claim movies as part of a so-called 'new wave' (Martin, 2013; Neupert, 2006; Stringer, 2001, 2016).[4] Chia-chi Wu's detailed analysis of the highly successful art stream within Taiwanese and Chinese cinemas suggests the existence of tactics resulting in reductionist representations of cultural diversity. In the international division of labor, she asserts, Taiwanese filmmakers remain "subcontractors of international art cinema" (2007, pp. 85–86).

In more recent years, the center/periphery theme has been carried further by historical scholarship on socialist cinema. Dunja Jelenkovic (2016)'s study of Yugoslav film culture documents the early adoption of film as propaganda by socialist government and socialist festival culture, finding that restricted viewing opportunities existed for political, social, and professional elite groups, which permitted interconnectedness with international film culture. With the

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3 On post-colonial France in the African cinema field see (Burgin et al., 2014). On European hegemony in Asian cinema festivals see (Nornes, 2014).

4 Note that the term 'East Asia' is a cultural construct. At present it refers to East and Southeast Asian countries' cultural production (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008).

disintegration of the former Yugoslavian Federation and in the wake of the Balkan wars, the socialist multinational ideology of the state was replaced by Serbian nationalism during Slobodan Milosevic's patronage over the festival she studies (2016, p. 85), showing how nationalist value supersedes cosmopolitan value. The festival's relations to cultural-funding policies are the focus of a study about Greece's reputed national event, the Thessaloniki Film Festival. According to Lydia Papadimitriou, its organizers were able to resist for a long time the policy makers' drive toward program diversification away from the focus on Greek cinema. Such policy-driven 'internationalization' would allow for secured external funding, a conflict that was eventually won by cultural-policy makers of 'liberal-right leaning', as the study reports. This turned the festival focus on 'the auteur' and specialized competitions. As Balkan countries had to suspend their festivals because of the war, Thessaloniki's festival was able to develop a Balkan cinema program that served to attract an international audience (2016, pp. 104–106).

1.6 *Festivals as Counter-Culture and Sites for Identity-Politics*

Essays on identity and community-based film festivals typically aim to formulate the festivals' relationship with the publics. Identity-based festivals are tackled with concepts of civil action, human-rights and identity politics, looking at activism and possibilities of articulating injustices in these festive spaces and cinema niches (Kim, 2007; Perspex, 2006). The common trend across the literature is to regard festivals as mandated with achieving balance between artistic and commercial interests. De Valck maintains that the avant-garde in cinema did not meet this challenge of 'a crisis of film', because these artists challenged the 'the commercial film system and Hollywood's hegemony' (De Valck, 2007), while the International film festivals cooperate with the commercial system, fostering values of cultural enlightenment and the legitimacy of non-commercial cinema (2007, p. 24). Elsaesser (similarly see Wagner, 2015) formulates an 'agenda-setting power for diverse social causes, identity politics and protest' and calls festivals "repositories and virtual archives of the revolutions that have failed to take place in Europe over the past 50–60 years, but whose possibilities and potential they keep alive merely" by the participating audiences (2005, pp. 103–104). In more activist spirit, B. Ruby Rich looks at the film festival as "the last place where a true participatory discourse can prevail and where persons of deep-seated convictions and open minds can come to exchange views, surrender control, and be changed forever by what goes by on screen" (2013, p. 165). Few studies, however, discuss counter-cultures (see Wong, 2016). From the angle of cultural and political diversity, Roya Rastegar

(2016) tackles the already mentioned western gaze in aesthetic evaluation but does so in terms of industry-based festivals acting as gatekeepers on films that allude to diversity and marginality (e.g., movies by women of color are Rastegar's case).

1.7 *Film Festivals and Urban Interests: Place-Making and City Circuits*

Film festivals' importance to urban and cultural policy interests and relations with other cultural and educational institutions form yet another thematic corpus (e.g., Gupta & Marchessault, 2007; Larkin, 2008; Rangan, 2010; Véronneau, 1994). Eren Odabaşi (2016, p. 160) shows with a mobile festival (a rarely investigated case), the Gezici film festival (which operates across Anatolia), that the lack of a fixed place-identity negatively affects the capability to succeed in public grants-acquisition. The positive relationship between place and funding support as well as the configurations of business, political, and professional alliances in festival finance are revealed by Carmelo Mazza and Jesper Strandgaard Pedersen (2008) on new festivals in Copenhagen and Rome fully planned by business and political elites in the early 2000s. Rahul Hamid (2006)'s study of the early years of the New York Film Festival (during the early 1960s) documents that urban policies have been influential in festival policy and program before the ascent of the global city (see Stringer, 2001). Hamid specifically examines how urban elites emulate the European film festival in the process of a gentrification project which shifts cinema festivity from small theatres and municipal museums into a mixed-arts complex (the Lincoln Center) designed for upper middle-class audiences.

The Hong Kong International Film Festival has been the object of many studies. It is of particular interest because of the political transformations and impact on local decision-making (Hong Kong was brought under China PRC's control as a Special Administrative Zone in 1997) and because of South Korea's more recent Pusan International Film Festival receiving strong government support for a Pan-Asian agenda of cultural production. Ruby Cheung and Cindy Wong (Cheung, 2009, 2016; Wong, 2011) respectively track the transformation of the festival, the consequences for program content, the influence of business and administration, and the arts-communal history that co-facilitated the prestige of the event and its standing in the region (see also Shapiro, 2010). Cheung and Wong observe a cultural-value shift from European arts tastes to East Asian aesthetic values but also its relation to the business-policy alliance which surrounds the remaking of the city as 'launchpad' for Asian blockbusters (Wong, 2011, p. 192). These studies have been supported by findings from multiple-case analyses (Stringer, 2016; Vogel, 2012).

1.8 *Festivals as an Attention-Economic Space and Temporal Order*

Resonating with cultural-intermediary studies (Smith Maguire & Matthews, 2014), film festivals have been identified as value-adding mechanisms with respect to media attendance (De Valck, 2007, pp. 125–128), which FIAPF-reporting reveals as large (see the preceding section surveying the organizational population). Fame for artists, art, and supply artists are related to the phenomenon of the 'buzz', which arguably can result from the confluence of participative performances, including the audiences, the journalists, the organizers, the industry, and other participations, first described by Daniel Dayan (2000). These spaces are found to emerge from the production of 'hybridized performances'—arrangements for "the right atmosphere in which news items may be born and value can be added through mediation" (Burgess, 2020; De Valck, 2007, p. 133). Janet Harbord regards the significant potential of festival events to "make time matter, to give urgency to the viewing of film in an historical context in which the public release of film is no longer a necessarily compelling event of itself" (Harbord, 2009, p. 44). As cyclically repeating events, festivals enable transformation of the event into structure, while as structures, the events are proposed to "contain happenings that are singular and unrepeatable" (Harbord, 2016, p. 70). Researchers have also examined how such fleeting organizations are involved in the 'making of classics' and production of memory (e.g., Van Hemert, 2016). Jose Antonio Gonzalez Zarandona (2016)'s essay critiques the gap between expert-driven definitions of classics on one hand and the festivals' self-promotion as democratizing force in the cinema field. Heritage, he proposes, results from a collective process of meaning-making, occurring either as 'heritage control' or 'heritage commemoration'—a view that resonates with Holzer's conception of globalizing spaces as simultaneity of informal and rationalized processes (see the preceding section). Heritage control is exercised via policy action frameworks at European and global-governance level, such as the UNESCO Memory of the World Programme, whereas heritage commemoration manifests itself in strategies pertaining to festivals' performance of classics.

With respect to public audiences, there still are surprisingly few studies aside from student theses surveying festival-going behaviors. In a qualitative study, Motti Regev observes across four Israeli arts/cultural festivals (one of them being a film festival) that they enable 'cosmopolitan omnivore' behavior and serve as locations for 'aesthetic cosmopolitans' who "seek constantly to be updated with the most recent stylistic trends and cultural innovations, especially those praised by the global institutional patterns of cultural value as expansion of existing experiences" (2011, p. 111). De Valck's 'preliminary taxonomy of cinephiles' (observing the Rotterdam International Film Festival

audiences) captures the different motivations to join the festival as an audience. Her fifth type is the 'volunteer', who trades some access to movie performance for work to gain inside-experience (two subtypes are the hardcore cinephile and the young event-seeker). De Valck suggests that festival professionals and artist need not fear the influence of popular audience taste as the surveyed audiences turn out to be "quite open to the experts' selections", therefore giving festivals a role in taste cultivation (2005, p. 107). An audience survey and structural-equation model using Chile's Valdivia International Film Festival (Báez-Montenegro & Devesa-Fernández, 2017) proposes the relationship between festival audience and location as matter of 'destination loyalty'. Strong motivation to return to the festival positively impacts event satisfaction and loyalty for audiences identified as cinephile, but not for leisure-seekers or professionals attending the festival. Similarly, a study of Naples's documentary film festival aims to understand what sustains this Italian event series. Running since 1995, socioeconomic factors relevant to the Naples festival, do not explain the intensity of attendance, but latent motivations jointly with cultural consumption do (Ercolano et al., 2017).

1.9 *The Film Festival as an Organizational Intermediary*

Intermediation has moved to the center of the literature (Carroll Harris, 2017; De Valck & Soeteman, 2010; Mezias et al., 2011). Clemens-Charles Rüling and Jesper Strandgaard Pedersen (2010, p. 320) claim quite generally in a brief review article that festivals "play an important market-making role in allowing industry actors to develop an acute sense of developments in formats, technology, categories, aesthetics, etc.". Prior to that, Rüling (2009) revealed such processes in his study of the major French animation festival in Grenoble. Diane Burgess's comparative analysis of the Vancouver and Toronto International film festivals (2010) examines 'the relative positioning of stakeholders negotiating the hierarchies of cinematic value' by approaching the empirical material as a Bourdieusian 'field of forces'. Exploring Canadian film policy as an institutional environment, Burgess traces how the government positions the festivals as 'hybrid public-private institutions' in charge of bolstering Canadian Anglophone cinema distribution (challenged by Hollywood-dominated Northern America, with the neighboring US industry treating Canada as a domestic market). Burgess emphasizes the festival as a value-chain element rather than merely an exhibition actor while simultaneously opposing the idea of festivals as marketing devices. Rather, the 'festival program is invested with symbolic capital which mediates the cultural value of the movie' (Burgess, 2010, pp. 43, 69). De Valck and Mimi Soeteman (2010) scrutinize valorization processes pertaining to jury decisions at the International Documentary Film

Festival Amsterdam. They argue that currently existing prize 'inflation' is due to event specialization and differentiation of creative roles in the overall film-making project (as many roles can get prizes). Recognition by means of the award leads to "media exposure, best of fest screenings and better distribution" and "opens the door to documentary film canons", providing grounds to articulate the festival as case of "credential and cultural systems" in which, following Bourdieu (1999)' cultural capital is institutionalized through festival-site consecration (2010, pp. 291–294). While such competitions can be understood as democracy-inspired valorization, the film professionals' career transitions that are catalyzed by awarded prizes seem to be constrained by the fact that prizes reflect the 'festival hierarchy' (p. 303)—an observation that resonates with De Valck's aforementioned festival-tiers conception.

Stephen Mezias and co-authors present the rare statistical analysis on film festival intermediation, finding out that the three most prestigious festivals of Berlin, Cannes, and Venice, which they study, provide a range of values: social value in industry-participant relations, technical knowledge for specialized participants, opportunities for information exchange across festival participants, the "prestige and status ordering for participants and the world to see", valorized aesthetic worth for prize winners, educational value for filmmakers, and finally, social capital and reputational resources transferrable to other contexts (Mezias et al., 2011, pp. 175–180). The authors find what I call a 'festival effect' in Chapter 6 of this book: movies winning in festivals, and especially 'Best Picture' winners, will have more audiences; nominations at Cannes will also lead to more audiences than those for the other two festivals in this elite set (the status-ordering effect). The authors find no status-ordering effect regarding the total "prize-wins" of a movie.

1.10 *Festival: Labor and Work*

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the work in festivals. In Elsaesser (2005)'s seminal essay, the section on 'how festivals work' merely discusses the power of festival directors over the cultural-capital seeking filmmaker. Rhyne formulates film festivals as having remained invisible "in terms of the material conditions of their management, the day-to-day practices of cultural administration and the government and private bodies that fund them" (Rhyne, 2009, p. 18). Burgess and Kredell, seven years later, acknowledge the "significant amount of cultural work performed at film festivals that remains hidden from the attendees" (2016). Alex Fischer (2013)'s study of the Brisbane International Film Festival's operational structure surprisingly ignores the day-to-day tasks in his study of how the organization works. De Valck's aforementioned taxonomy includes the 'volunteer' who offers her services in exchange for access and

'inside experience' but is a very quick summary of the volunteer identity (2005, p. 105). To me, Toby Lee's shift in approach seems somewhat symptomatic for this neglect:

> I quickly realized that I was less interested in what would usually be considered the 'center' of the institution—the offices, the core staff, the work of the festival director, programming decisions—and more interested in what might be considered its 'periphery' where the festival interacts with other institutions, businesses, and individuals, and with its public. [...] In the late 2008, in the context of the economic, social, and political crises that were begging to unfold in Greece at the time, the goings-on inside the festival offices seemed of less relevance than how the festival was functioning in a broader social and cultural field.
>
> LEE, 2016, p. 124

Interestingly, her results reveal that the intraorganizational negotiations over the narration of the festival's history through a project of anniversary publications was located at the intersection between internal organization and environment. Only a few studies have embraced the study of festival work and done so within the currently influential paradigmatic fame of 'immaterial' and 'affective labor' (Hardt, 1999; Lazzarato, 2009). Robert Peaslee and co-authors fieldwork in a Texan fantasy-film festival (2014) finds two types of 'media labor'— volunteered and 'fan labor'. These are observed as converging into one kind of volunteer because fan communities are now integrated into media-industry products at large scale, as analyzed for the digital economy (e.g., Voss, 2020). The authors also question the authenticity of volunteers' altruistic reasons and pragmatic pursuit of education and network ties as to genuine reciprocity, while they do note on positive community feelings outlasting the event. Liz Czach (2016), a scholar and practitioner in the film festival studies-network, reflects on a post she held as a 'programmer', a privileged role that nonetheless comes with the seemingly quotidian task of deciding over submitted film art, most of which needs to be rejected. Czach frames what she calls her own 'affective labor' in terms of the broader debate on precarity, but specifying hers as a 'different kind of experience of precarious labor in the same organization' (2016, p. 207). Perhaps Loist's article (2011) is the only contribution to date which directly and in focused manner tackles the problem of precarious festival labor. Drawing on participant observation in two typical small-to-midsize film festivals in the city of Hamburg, Loist reflects on the relationship between the valorization agency of festival organizations and the problem of remuneration for work that supports it. Documenting a mismatch

between wages and the specialized skills which the festival workers bring to their jobs (which are also compensated at lower level than their counterparts in film and television industries), she points to public funding as rarely permitting equitable pay for core professionals. Job insecurity and high turnover exists on all levels of the observed organizations.

1.11 *The Arts-Nonprofit Mission*

Despite the obvious existence of a nonprofit logic, culture research has remained largely disinterested in this aspect of film festivals. Daryl Chin and Larry Qualls discuss a circulation trajectory starting with film programs at nonprofit arts centers, continuing with reviews and resulting in movie circulation in media nonprofit centers around the country. Their finding: "quality (of any sort) is no guarantor of finding a distributor, let alone a release" (2001, p. 35). Earlier, Gamson (1996)'s aforementioned study of queer New York festivals identifies the conditioning of collective-identity formation and mobilization by institutional environments offering film-cultural specific resources for the fests' agendas. With similar funding pressure (he essentially records the changing landscape of public subsidies which shifts to increase in philanthropic support by foundations and the wealthy), both organizations arrive at different organizational outcomes, as their cultural-organizational strategies follow respective economic resources without being determined by them. Gamson demonstrates the relevance of public funding's waning and private subsidies' waxing for the consolidation of cultural productions, Queer Film Studies and a growing niche market of LGBTQ cinema and festivals. Rhyne's study of the Queer Cinema niche reports that "[e]conomic activity in the third sector as it is institutionalized through nonprofit regulation and cultural policy—philanthropy for one but also volunteer labor, paid labor, corporate sponsorship, fundraising, service provision—is a necessary function for producing ideal consumers and citizens within modern capitalism" (Rhyne, 2007, p. 50). Rhyne's impressive study addressing this reality has not been taken up as potential general theoretical model. Private-public partnerships are mentioned by Sarah Barrow (2016) but remain unanalyzed structural supports for festival operations. Cheung (2009)'s study of the Hong Kong International Film Festival accounts for the process of 'corporatization', by which she addresses transformation of a mainly publicly funded to a mainly commercially sponsored organization. Her portrait of resources and control mechanisms (notably, the only non-growth item in the financial sheets of the Hong Kong festival has been labor cost) renders a picture familiar to many arts-nonprofit domains and provides support for the global scope Rhyne claims (Rhyne, 2009).

Tamara Falicov (2016) scrutinizes the growth of film festival funds starting in the 1990s. These initiatives include training for talented directors, funding,

providing space for work and networking, and post-production initiatives such as film funds, co-production funds and markets as well as post-production competitions. Her empirical exploration of some funds provides first ideas on how valorization by festival activities may be linked to various stages of the cinema value chain. Many more writers emphasize the complex configurations between governments, industries, filmmaking milieus, and urban policy makers but do not move on towards a theoretical or generalizing project. Some comment on the subsidy system of the European Union, which may be the largest of such government funding programs in the world, and on which De Valck comments that the "artificial support system" of subsidized arts non-profits has "not resulted in the creation of a stable, financially-independent industries for such films, and have, arguably, even prohibited initiatives for economic independence" (2007, p. 205).

1.12 *Summary*

This literature must be appreciated for providing first-time evidence of the global scope of cinema-field 'festivalization' and the complex interdependencies that emerge through activities in which festivals are involved. While research is overwhelmingly ethnographic and frequently involves participant observation, this adoption from the methodological toolbox of the social sciences has apparently not motivated the majority of researchers to pursue more general knowledge claims. Senior scholars have criticized this situation. As maintained by Rhyne, for example the field has yet to develop "a viable and sustained theory of how [the festival—A.V.] actually functions and why it has developed according to the economic model it has" (Rhyne, 2009, p. 9). Ethnographic research must be seen as an accomplishment of leaving behind the mode of film-text analysis common to cinema studies (cf. Dovey, 2015, p. 17; Miller, 2001). What unites this literature as a collective effort is a shared sympathetic interest in providing research that helps independent-art practitioners to be true to their ideals while also providing for their livelihoods.

2 Sociological Resonance

2.1 *Experience-Making and Valuation Sociology*

The interest in intermediation makes this literature potentially interesting to the economic sociology of valuation (valorization and evaluation being alternative terms used across this research domain) and the production of uniqueness ('singularization'). Overall, the evidence from the cultural studies and humanities seems to suggest that in the course of their history some share of the film festival population has been participating in various segments of the

cinema industry chain and a variety of smaller and bigger audience markets, and that there is a 'squeeze' on purely contemplative events to embrace a format that is essentially postmodern experience-economic (Ha, 2005; Harvey, 1990). The literature's interest in market-making, field-configuring events, and cultural intermediation provides incentives to study the changing conditions for 'market organization'. Research on field-configuring events (Lampel, 2011) has yet to explain why organizations which help structure inputs into economic circulation of highly uncertain product are overwhelmingly nonprofit organizations, a phenomenon that can be tackled by taking an economic-sociological perspective (Karpik, 2010). The observation of isomorphic tendencies (Elsaesser, 2005) provides an opportunity to corroborate the findings by engaging with isomorphism theory, a still widely debated sociological knowledge claim by New Institutionalism, which says that isomorphic processes prevail as organizational-change drivers, emanating from 'professions and the state as rationalizers of society' rather than market competition (Beckert, 2010; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

2.2 *Experience-Making and Urban Sociology of the Creative City*

Festival research has provided evidence for the rather systematic appearance of urban philanthropy and elite players in relation to funding and cultural-programmatic decisions, making film festivals relevant to resource dependency studies and urban sociology. The discussed research also shows that the world inhabited is quite 'boundaryless', being seemingly filled with elites, masses, experts, and bureaucrats. This calls for a study of interests in the film festivals, especially the function for elites and their role in the furthering of festivals over funding of permanent art forms that resist eventization. The sociology of the fest (Delanty, 2011; Gebhardt, 1986; Maurer, 2008) has particularly paid attention to the role of events in cultural-policy frames, asking who benefits from these events. Within a larger re-conception of the economy, a grants-economic framework as suggested by the interdisciplinarian and economist Kenneth Boulding (1973) facilitates both the study of policy as well as of its institutional environments, but must engage with elite sociology in order to avoid a positivist view on philanthropic elites in cultural domains and valorization processes.

2.3 *Globalization Studies and Cultural Economization/Economic Culturalization*

Film festival researchers are deeply interested in de-nationalization and transnational formation. The breadth of their studies shows similar configurations of business, political, and creative-professional elites around the globe, being

specific to the insertion of festival and cinema industries in the larger global-economic trajectories of the twentieth and twenty-first century and being shaped by colonialism and political independence movements. The festival scholars have found and debated local variety to the original European format for festival curations and their economic support. These observations are useful to sociologists interested in 'world models', which have been argued to explain social change at lower levels of social organization (Drori et al., 2006). The insightful postcolonial critiques about 'governance at distance', essentially bringing film artists to the attention of their country's citizens only via the international festival circuit, is a related instance and can be examined further within the debate of 'global modernity' and 'multiple modernities' (Dirlik, 2007; Eisenstadt, 2002). For economic sociology, the international network of film festivals offers empirical observations on the intersecting forces of soft-power diplomacy, industrial policy and trade regimes pertaining to the media field and cultural product more broadly (Chalaby, 2009). Related to that is the highly visible role of festivals in urban and regional economies of post-industrial society and in advanced economies of more recent make, which aim to profit through insertion in creative-knowledge production (Bathelt, 2002). This economic interest has to be understood in its dynamic interrelationship with societal shifts including multiculturalism and 'governing by culture' of urban spaces (Kim, 2009). All these themes suggest a shifting role of the state, which is a key concern of economic sociology, capitalism theory, and governmentality research.

2.4 *Integrating the Insights: Sociology of Art and Culture*

Film festivals make inhabitable spaces for what Bourdieu has called the 'disinterested artist'. In Bourdieu's conception of the art field, the artist is located near the autonomous pole as daring risk-taker and willing to pursue her individual emancipation projects against all the odds of success and social conventions (Bourdieu, 1983, pp. 62, 67–68). Surviving the struggles in the field, then, are affluent artists who can outlast competitive pressure while the marginal artist accepts living a despondent life. Observations on festival workforce from sociological perspectives on work, labor, and professions can be utilized to e-examine this claim, providing insights into the contemporary conditions of professional (and creative) middle classes and their strategies and opportunity spaces. Sociologists have called for retreat from conceptual work with binaries to capture value pluralism (e.g., Eyal, 2013; Zelizer, 2004); new frames such as the 'orders of worth' by representatives of the sociological Economy of Conventions school (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999) can be engaged in this regard, as I will demonstrate. This may be of interest particularly because

Bourdieu's work itself has become a convention in the study of the contemporary abundance of cultural phenomena. Especially 'field' and 'capital'—classical tools of Bourdieusian analysis—and cultural intermediation provide a conduit for many festival scholars to scrutinize their empirical material for signs of 'economization'. Some researchers, however, have stated disagreement with Bourdieu. De Valck, for example, realizes that "although imbued with 'autonomous' values, the system in which art cinema is produced and circulated doesn't sit squarely with Bourdieu's 'autonomous' category of small-scale or restricted production" (2014, p. 41). Similarly, Bourdieu's high/low culture assumptions provide difficulties for scholars who aim to grasp the cinema in its fullest variety rather than exclusively thinking about the gatekeeping role formulated for festivals (De Valck, 2007, pp. 127–129; De Valck & Hagener, 2005; Elsaesser, 2005, p. 95). For Bourdieu, the widening of an art form's consumption to ever larger, so-called 'mass audiences' results in a symbolic discredit, while contemporary scholars of festival culture understand the organizations positively as an enabling mechanism for wider participation in cultural consumption by what they accept more or less as legitimately heterogeneous audiences. Even more so, there is the purposive production of bestsellers, a heightened emphasis on sensational novelty, and a marginalization of art criticism put forward by Bourdieu as undermining the autonomous art field (Müller, 2014, pp. 224–225). Given these divergences, it seems that film festival research could benefit from an engagement with the debates about Bourdieu's methodological and theoretical positions (Bottero & Crossley, 2011; Diaz-Bone, 2011, pp. 332–336) as well as findings which contradict the cardinal thesis on culture as instrument of class (on arts-nonprofits see DiMaggio, 2006; for an overview see Lamont & Molnár, 2002, pp. 172–174), including new theories that tackle the global production of experience goods and, indeed, experiences (Schulze, 2013).[5]

To address the diverse knowledge claims and patterns of economic-sociological interest, I bridge the findings by film festival researchers and theories of capitalism by adopting Andreas Reckwitz's theory of the dispositif of creativity (2017b) as a meta-frame. Reckwitz's theory, which I will outline in Chapter 2, offers an analysis of the postmodern condition of western society and the emergence of a centrifugally situated postmodern art field, which

5 On the disappearance of class see also (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b, pp. 296–319). For an honest critique of Bourdieu's 'field of forces' which highlights the clash between two titans of sociology see Becker & Pessin (2006), and for a critique of both Becker and Bourdieu see (Bottero & Crossley, 2011). On audiences and reception see (Dovey, 2015, pp. 4–5; Zahner, 2011).

provides many resources for experience-making. As Reckwitz is profoundly interested in the consequences of processes of eventization and their relation to creative work, the empirical phenomenon of film festivals provides a suitable set of observations and meanings which can be put in dialogue with this theory. As I will show, this sets the scene for an economic-sociological perspective that explains the relevance of festivalization for contemporary capitalism. I now turn to the last section of this chapter—on arts and critique of contemporary capitalism.

3 From Artistic to Social Critique for Art Production's Sake

In their treatise titled *The Third Spirit of* Capitalism (2005b) Boltanski and Chiapello argue that as much as critique of capitalism is historically specific, it also is intrinsic to capitalism, serving as a force of renewal. Capitalism, they claim, is in need of commitment, as it requires the mobilization of large numbers of people to cooperate in accumulation. To find such supporters, capitalism must be justifiable and 'assuage anxiety' among people exposed to it. They must "find the moral supports it lacks and to incorporate mechanisms of justice whose relevance it would otherwise have no reason to acknowledge" (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b, p. 25). Critique emanates from experiences of suffering, which leads to indignation, and which potentially finds its way to an articulated critique where indignation combines with arguments drawing on universalizable values. In my view, the reviewed literature on film festivals provides an articulated critique, which I now inspect as to their propensity of what Boltanski and Chiapello call 'artistic' and 'social critique' respectively. I begin with a very brief outline of the poleis framework by Laurent Thévenot and Boltanski, which underlies this typology and is used in later chapters where more detail on this elaborate idea will be provided.

Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) concede an essential 'critical capacity' to the human actor. Indignation about phenomena such as social asymmetries will lead to actors' wanting to justify their thoughts and action. When doing so they always reference 'orders of worth' which are phenomena of historical emergence (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007). These orders (defined for the scope of western philosophy, moral discourse, and science) are regarded as macro structures which simultaneously function as cognitive resource on the actor level. Orders of worth are also known as 'poleis' and are called Inspirational, Domestic, Reputational, Civic, Commercial, and Industrial polis respectively. Boltanski and Chiapello add a seventh which presumably is only emerging

TABLE 4 The artistic and the social critique, based on (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b)

	Artistic critique	Social critique
Affective and ideological sources	(a) disenchantment, inauthenticity [antimodernist] (b) oppression and subjection, loss of meaning, loss of value [modernist]	(c) poverty, excess, inequalities [modernist] (d) opportunism, egoism, refusal of solidarity [anti-modernist]

Note: [...] = should be read as a tendency

through the dynamics of what they call the connexionist world (2005b, pp. 23–24). This Project polis—a core argument of this theory—is of great interest to the analysis of event production, as I will show in Chapter 7.[6]

Disputes, and battles in light of justifications presented, result most frequently in compromises between these worlds according to this theory. Different stages of capitalism can be characterized by particular configurations of such orders of worth. This provides the link to the typology of social and artistic critiques based on the poleis framework: According to Boltanski and Chiapello, artistic critique principally rejects “the loss of sense of what is beautiful and valuable” (2005b, p. 38). Artistic freedom, from any kind of form of labor in fact, is its central demand. While this critique concentrates in the humanities, the social critique has been furnished by socialist and Marxist intellectual movements as well as across the social sciences more broadly. Anti-capitalist views are associated with the sources of indignation about disenchantment, oppression, poverty, inequality as well as opportunism and egoism. These emotional and ideological components have proven difficult to combine into one unitary framework by real-world actors (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b, p. 37). Some historically observable tendencies, however, can be discerned:

6 Capitalism as dynamic system is also characterized by ‘compromises’, a claim to which I will return in Chapter 13. The spirit of capitalism “simultaneously furnishes a justification” to counter the radical challenges it meets, also providing “a critical fulcrum making it possible to condemn the discrepancy between the concrete forms of accumulation and normative conceptions of the social order” (2005b, p. 36).

Both types of critique can evaluate each other's respective values and social manifestations. For example, the social critique can attack the artist as an egoist, making the critique look anti-modernist from the viewpoint of common class or status-group interests. Within social critique, a leftist and conflict-sociological critique, as it has defined the discipline for large periods of the twentieth century, can be said to be modernist, whereas communitarian thought, which has defined the rise of civil society studies, is an anti-modernist critique. Historically, the critiques have also collaborated, especially in the 1960s-1970s in a unified attack on the bourgoisie by both workers' and artists' movements. With this short schematic introduction to a complex historical narrative I now turn to the examination of the festival scholarship's criticisms, looking at the broader strokes of the arguments I already presented.

As a result, I find festival research quite directly addressing capitalism as a problem for artists rather than facilitating uncritical perspectives celebrating creativity as basis for innovation (an acclaimed driver of 'aesthetic capitalism'). For example, when formulating that the festivals' "commercial/economic role transforms the festival into an instrument of capital" (Gonzalez Zarandona, 2016, p. 4), or when considering festivals as an "itinerant base of the new cinema merchants" (Quintin, 2009, p. 52), researchers take sides with artists that presumably seek autonomy. That being said, very few works address social justice and social inequality issues; where they do, they tend to retreat to post-colonial critique and focus on cultural producers such as filmmakers rather than the entire set of cultural workforces involved in the cinema field including themselves as knowledge workers. Only Loist's study (2011) voices concern over labor-market related injustice and phrases the latter as a problem of creative-labor precarity. Only Rhyne's essay directly charges at the incorporation of festival dynamics into the capitalist economy and society, asserting that the festival phenomenon (festivalization in my terms) at the institutional level "link[s] cultural labor, governance and commerce toward a common goal" (2009, p. 15). There is a hint of a social critique in de Valck's claim that filmmakers have become "trapped in a cultural ghetto by becoming dependent upon subsidies and festival prestige" (2007, p. 208), but the social critique historically would phrase social support as enabling rather than constraining.

Most of film festival research engages the artistic critique, rejecting dependence on commercial forces while remaining watchful of the political bureaucracy meddling in arts and cultural affairs. Artistic critique is also detectable in the literature's uncritical adoption of the cinema field's 'auteur' discourse. This discourse essentially references the Inspirational polis as the legitimate order. According to this polis, a person is 'Grand' when not depending on money

or opinion.[7] Is the intention of film festival organizers to promote the independent arts a genuine and uncompromised one, is a question many scholars have asked indirectly (Falicov, 2016; Kaufman & Plotkin, 2007; Peranson, 2009). And, has it been standing up as "the last refuge of democracy" (Rich, 2013) despite lack of economic power? Writing in the 1980s, Paul Willemen approaches film festivals as "thinly disguised markets", in which movies and media-representative accreditation are sold "under the pretext of consumer guidance" (2013, p. 19). Discovering this literature a few decades later, I have found this to be the most 'radical' article among what film festival researchers consider their seminal formulations. Willemen, one of the organizers of the Pesaro Festival, calls for freedom from both 'the industry' and the media, which must be encountered in artistic and pacifist ways, namely with film theory and education. Contrasted with the 1969-manifesto by the Argentinians Solanas & Getino, titled *Towards a Third Cinema: Notes and Experiences for the Development of a Cinema of Liberation in the* Third World (1970), this may sound less radical than this earlier outright rejection of art-house cinema as handmaiden of Hollywood capitalism (see also MacKenzie, 2014). To understand these layers of criticisms we have to account for transformations in capitalism and its societies, including perhaps, too, the rise of anti-intellectualism across society and replacement of contemplative culture with creativity ideology, as I conjecture in this book.

De Valck's work, I believe, can be seen as exemplary for what Boltanski and Thévenot call the 'compromise' of critique. As a keen observer of the shift in film festivals' attention to the audiences, providing for the plurality of tastes in cinema, she has judged this new service orientation "primarily as a weakness", while immediately rejecting her observation as something that in "the contemporary situation can also be considered a smart (and necessary) move on the part of the festivals that increases the reach of their agenda-setting powers" (2007, p. 212). This expresses a compromise between the Inspirational polis and the Opinion polis. The latter holds room for the notion of third-party evaluation, reflected also in festival productions. That, however, can never be 'Grand' in the Inspirational polis, which favors autonomy and authenticity. Stating it as a 'weakness' in the perspective of the autonomous field, it looks incredibly

7 In the Inspirational Polis, "people are creative when they are separated from others, withdrawn into themselves as it were, into their internal being—the only place where they can enter into direct relationship with a transcendent source of inspiration (the supernatural)—or buried into the depths of the psyche (the unconscious) …" (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b, p. 125). This definition provides the key artist role of the autonomous bourgeois art field introduced in the following Chapter 2.

'smart' from the Opinion polis. If one looks into the past of this literature, taking note of de Valck's work as fairly recent, one can find a sense of a softening critique that leads to justified compromise ("… [b]ecause festivals depend on many other actors for their survival they necessarily have to compromise" (2007, p. 207)). Similarly pragmatic is Peranson's piece on business and audience festivals. While counting as fairly radical, his analysis is also compromising when rejecting the sales agent as market entrepreneur while advocating for more 'big promotional budgets and tourism-marketing' for festivals (2009, pp. 23–24). This example also suggests that careful reconstructions of direct and embedded justifications are needed to understand implications in scholarly argument.

In sum, film festival scholarship overwhelmingly features elements of the artistic critique while suppressing simultaneously antimodernist social critique as well as passing by core social critique of inequality and lack of solidarity. In film festival research, there is a sense of skepticism about the politics of International film festivals and the suspicion that they may fail to materialize, or compromise on, justice goals (Elsaesser, 2005, pp. 103–104; Rhyne, 2009). At the same time, still too few studies have tackled event curations as part of social movements, especially anarchist, anti-capitalist and other dissenting film festivals (see also Rastegar, 2016), which the history of film manifestos—mainly critiques of the conditions of cultural production—puts central to the discourse on the condition of cinematic art in capitalism (MacKenzie, 2014).

CHAPTER 2

The Experience-Maker

As I prioritize Reckwitz's theory of the creativity dispositif theory[1] as an aesthetic-economic meta-framework, this chapter is solely dedicated to outlining this relatively recent theory of late-modern capitalism. In Reckwitz's *Die Erfindung der Kreativität* (Reckwitz, 2014b) (English translation: *The Invention of* Creativity (2017b)), creativity is evidenced as credo, dogma, ideal and ideology across broad sectors of society. Creativity is defined as a product of the social (vs. innate human property), and a "very specific social and cultural constellation", which he claims is hegemonial at this time (2014a, p. 23). The following outline will be concluded by placing the festive event into this theory and generating a few 'working hypotheses' about the festival as arranger, an experience-maker that can be represented by this theory. For brevity's sake, I mostly suppress mention of the various works drawn on for evidence, restricting the account to the broader strokes of Reckwitz's historically detailed genealogical narrative.

1 Of Norm and Desire: The Ideal of Creativity

As common to dispositif methodology, Reckwitz sets out to describe a complex web of discursive and non-discursive practices, institutional mechanisms, subjectivities, and artefacts, which together will make creativity the major social and universal form. The occurrence of such a creative form includes individuals, social entities, practices, and objects broadly defined. Common to all is a related or inscribed imperative to act in terms that society calls creative or believes induces creativity. In its historical form, creativity is related to sensual-aesthetic perception and to a social process of aestheticization:

> Sensual-aesthetic perceiving encompasses the subject's specific affectedness by an object or situation, sensitivities or agitation, and enthusiastic, concerned, or calm way of feeling.
>
> RECKWITZ, 2014a, p. 28

1 According to Foucault, the dispositif is a 'heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions' (Foucault & Gordon, 1980).

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Creativity as dispositif attains power as a social force by being coupled with a late-modern regime of the novel that defines novelty as surprise and unique ('the regime of aesthetic novelty', see further below on 'N3'). It also is embedded in a governmentality that is positive in outlook, having a certain power of persuasion to maintain this perception against counter-forces, among them centrally critique and social reality. This interlock of expressive creativity, novelty as surprise, and exuberant positivity replaces, according to Reckwitz, the former 'affect deficiency of modernity' associated with rational capitalism as industrial and organized (Scaff, 1991). One of the major shifts implied in the rise of an 'affected' late modernity is the transformation of the bourgeois art field into a postmodern one. Certain social movements and new expert knowledge in the arts and beyond (e.g., economics, psychology, education) contribute in the last third of the twentieth century to new viewpoints on affect and emotion, with a transforming art field playing a key role in this society-permeating shift.[2] Reckwitz could have labelled the new capitalist era 'affective', yet notes that it is more aptly 'aesthetic', as the arts and aesthetics are always already affective. Additionally, aesthetics and creative forms attain a significance which provides for sweeping societal changes, as explored in decades of cultural, economic, and social research.

Reckwitz maintains that the creative-aesthetic complex 'does not reflect a particular institution or a particular function system, value or normative pattern respectively', operating as a dispositif (Reckwitz, 2014b, p. 49). In this book, I will argue that Reckwitz provides strong evidence and impetus for further research on hegemonial tendencies of this dispositif,[3] while not explaining what in essence stabilizes this dispositif or institutionally creates conditions for the maintenance of this network of practices.[4]

In my view, creativity-dispositif analysis provides a powerful way to theorize the experience-making qualities demonstrated by the crafting of immersive environments for the art worlds. Reckwitz discusses eventization and the parallel process of musealization as located in the 'creative city' and as relevant to

2 Affects are evolved survival mechanisms. Psychology treats emotions as more complex and socialized (see also Chapter 11).

3 Reckwitz also rejects the older label of 'cognitive capitalism' (see on the concept Moulier-Boutang, 2012) because 'symbol production' has not included affect.

4 Neither Reckwitz nor Fabian Heubel provide an account for how 'aesthetic rationality' inserts itself into the realm of instrumental rationality. Heubel merely cites, as condition for interpenetration (I borrow this term from Talcott Parsons (cf. Beckert, 2006a)), aesthetic rationality's capacity to intensify social phenomena. I argue in Part 4 that this intensification is legitimized by the diffusion of the culture of philanthropy and its institutionalization as alternative to the welfare state.

cultural planning. The structural role of the arranger emerges in the interaction between artists and curators and in a new context of audience relations determined by the imperative of co-creativity (see on curation as art Ventzislavov, 2014). An arranger will 'select, modify, combine, and present' whatever attains meaning as art, and will channel the art performance into the media system as well as bring it more broadly to the attention of the various support roles for the arts (the great variety of patrons and stakeholders). An arranger is therefore also a curator, aiming to mobilize the 'affect map' of the creativity dispositif, as put by Reckwitz, while performing as a 'project manager' (studied, for example, by Hitzler & Niederbacher, 2010).

As I see it, there are four major structuring gambits to Reckwitz's argument, especially the macrosociological construction of the argument in which the empirical study of experience-makers must be placed. Firstly, he provides discussion of four social processes (also called structural principles), which are aestheticization, economization, mediatization, and rationalization (AEMR), by which he pinpoints the dispositif's location in general societal theory. Secondly, he produces the historical account from secondary literature, focusing on three particular intense spaces where he recognizes the dispositif at work: aesthetic economy, creative city, and media/star system. Thirdly, he inserts a time line, identifying four phases of the creativity dispositif: 'preparation' from about the end of eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, 'dispersed formation' from 1900 until the 1960s, 'crisis-driven densification' in the 1960s and 1970s, and 'hegemonialization' starting in the 1980s (2014b, pp. 52–53). Finally, Reckwitz tells modern history by ideas of time and progress, capturing the rise of the dispositif in terms of three society-level regimes that impose a certain concept of what's deemed 'novel'. In the following, I will structure my outline of Reckwitz's argument around these four major frames.

1.1 *Aestheticization*

Reckwitz reconstructs how modernity's affect deficiency associated with industrial capitalism 'reverses' in 'experience society' (Schulze, 1992).[5] The

5 A reader familiar with Gerhard Schulze's work on the experience society will realize quickly that Schulze's milieu of 'self-realization' is essentially the creative class's social space. Reckwitz, however, does not restrict his dispositif theory to a particular class, even if seeing the creative class (Florida, 2002) at its core. Reckwitz and Schulze are d'accord, however, where they think of this particular historical creativity as boundary-transgressing because Schulze records the milieu's expansion as starting in the 1990s, concluding that it cannot be called a coherent group any longer. In a reprint of 2005, he maintains maturation of the

creativity dispositif emerges from an intensification process (‘*Verdichtung’*) of a particular historical process of aestheticization, circumscribed by five ‘agents’ which ‘together [are] combining as motor of aestheticization’ (2014b, p. 300). These are, firstly, the expansionism of the arts catalyzing the transformation of the bourgeois art field; secondly, the media revolution transforming patterns of sensual perceptions and related behaviors; thirdly, an emergent ‘aesthetic capitalism’, at the core of which is the heightening of aesthetic production of objects and subjects and the growth in ‘immaterial labor’ (Lazzarato et al., 2017); fourthly, the increasing volumes of ‘worlds of things’, which includes images, sounds, flavors, and smells; finally, the subject’s tendency to design the self’s ‘interiority’, specifically its affects and perceptions directed at experiences. A continuing source and site of these changes is the art field, which he asserts has transformed from a ‘bourgeois’ to a ‘postmodern art’ field. The postmodern art field is proposed as ‘centrifugal’ in relation to the other social fields. The postmodern art field is also at the forefront of the new ‘social regime of novelty’.

Only in the postmodern art field the curatorial role evolves as a structural role, while artists take on the ‘performer’ role. For a theory of change that I see in Reckwitz’s account, the claim of a centrifugal postmodern art field is central, because in nearly all societal-theory it is the economy and polity that are ‘at the center’ of society. Here, however, it is the arts being a vast resource for other fields to interlock with the dispositif of creativity. Important to my engagement with Reckwitz’s theory is that he places emphasis on the ‘format’ as something that facilitates boundary transgression between fields driven by different logics. In Reckwitz’s account it helps to explain how art, which was once at the margin of (bourgeois) society, has become a major input in other fields as aforementioned. Art overwhelms, the formats of the postmodern art field providing an ‘aesthetic sociality’, which works like a blueprint (‘*Grundriss*’) that can be implemented elsewhere. The following Chapter 3 immediately inspects this proposition. The narrative of the art-field transformation provides detail on how the various aesthetic movements challenged the status of bourgeois art rules, how the field gradually loses its autonomy (and inter-field status achieved in bourgeois modernity), as well as on how the artist as a marginal identity metamorphoses into a versatile identity of a mundane, novelty-seeking, habitualized creative.

As Table 5 shows, the postmodern configuration of the art field and its components entails the loss of the singular, autonomous ideal of the artist, calling

self-realization milieu (Schulze, 1992, p. 493), which can be read as congruent with Reckwitz’s hegemony assertion.

TABLE 5 Comparison of social forms pertaining to modern and late-modern art fields, based on (Reckwitz, 2014b, pp. 124–126)

	Bourgeois art field	**Postmodern art field**
	Autonomy Early-modern	Centrifugality Late-modern
Central subject	Artist	Creative, individual and collective
Aesthetic objects	Aesthetic objects	Objects, spaces, and bodies
Audiences	Aesthetically educated	Aesthetically activated
Work	Art objects	Art objects, inter-object relations, events
New	Creative act as radical break or aesthetic innovation	Rearrangements, appropriations, reinterpretations; relativization of new (novel)
Attitude toward the aesthetically old	Rejection or veneration	Re-appropriation techniques (pastiche)
Producer-recipient relationship	Artist logic: l' art pour l'art vs. audience logic: populism	Logic of expectation of surprise; non-normative scandals
	Scandalization logic of the avant-garde	Artist and audience as accomplices (regime of aesthetic irritation)
Legitimacy	Classification	Dissolution of genre and media-format boundaries
Boundary-making	Exclusivity, hierarchy	High tolerance toward simultaneous art styles

for a new artist-audience relationship surrounded as well by a heightened significance of objects and their interrelations as well as relations with subjects. While bourgeois art stages the artist as gifted, her talent instilling awe in the audience, the postmodern audience becomes a co-creative player—associated mainly with art education, community arts, a 'creativity' focused museum pedagogy and so on. Audiences themselves become more heterogeneous, breaking up the relationship between aesthetics and class seminally analyzed

by Bourdieu (1984), rendering highly subjective modes of aesthetic-sensual appropriation which diffuse bounded 'taste classes' (Zahner, 2011).[6] Not only artists can surprise, audiences become unpredictable consumers. More generally, postmodern audiences are principally equipped with self-reflexivity—approached as such by the culture industry—and, as stressed by Reckwitz, 'affected' (inspired) just like artists. This postmodern audience must obviously pose a challenge to the experts (ideal-typically, 'the critic'). The widespread transformation of the audience as a consumer of aesthetic products is evident in marketing-practitioner literature, which Karpik has revealed as change in consumer images, providing attributes for the 1960s/1970s and the start of the millennium:

> In the first period, the consumer was "'controlled', 'conditioned', 'manipulated', 'alienated'", whereas in the second observed period, the consumer is "'active', 'experienced', 'demanding'.
>
> KARPIK, 2010, p. 103

Reckwitz's genealogy is important because it emphasizes a change in the art-field configuration which enables co-creativity in the arts and the ever-widening imagined sphere of culture. In the blueprint of the postmodern art field, three structural roles coordinate their actions, all equally equipped with inspirational capabilities. These are the producer/'performer', the audience, and the arranger. Festivalization, based on Reckwitz, means that eventive forms provide the frame for immersive environments so that the artists as 'performers' and co-creative audiences can meet in collectively and individually consumed experiences. Film festival organizations provide the rational-organizational framework for affective-aesthetic experiencing. Reckwitz emphasizes the value of performativity—therefore, of the eventive form—as a historical outcome of processes of normalization and the proceduralization of artistic processes as commanded and performed by aesthetic movements. When art becomes more performative, it also becomes more mobile; an object placed simply before an admiring audience will find practically

6 Reckwitz and Schulze, each providing seminal comprehensive general theory on the creative eocnomy and its society, reject Bourdieu's high/low-semantic of an art field. For Schulze, this value order is still relevant to the '*Niveaumilieu*', its social groups using high-art to distinguish themselves (1992, pp. 142–150). A study about Norwegian students demonstrates that the relationship between 'high class' and 'high-brow culture' still exists among young people, but performs more as a strategy to command social recognition rather than evidencing a strong belief in superior types of art (Gripsrud et al., 2011).

less resonance with co-creative audiences. This permits an additional observation: what Reckwitz discovers in the collectively perceived boredom of art galleries lining up the masters in 'non-eventful ways' is nothing less than the further secularization of art temples away from the religious worshipping of idols on an altar. While museums have opened up to a wide range of objects of the mundane world, they have also become collections that can be incorporated into event formats.[7] The cinema field, for example, has intersected with museums through installation and video art, which museums have integrated into today's canons (see Chapter 3). While being a 'shrine' for the venerated artist during the bourgeois-art period of the museum, the shaping of mundane objects into extramundane phenomena is a curatorial process, involving a co-creative audience, being a key characteristic of postmodern art organizations (Reckwitz, 2017b, p. 194). The reception culture of the bourgeois art field is marked by what Hans-Georg Gadamer celebrated as 'tarrying' ('Verweilen') (1977; see also Ross, 2004). With the transformation the audience switches from being passive/receiving to active/co-creating, from being in awe to *demanding* co-creation.

Bringing to attention the vast number of objects and the importance of immateriality and atmospheres (cf. 'glamorous materials' in Thrift, 2010), the account of the transforming art field also renders the insight that proceduralism and the making of object worlds are materials for experience-makers to design the 'affective space' (Reckwitz, 2012). The legitimacy of unfinished art works—an embrace of randomness and lack of perfection—and proceduralization enable the rise of curators who will design atmospheric environments assembled from formats.

Proceduralization contributes to the dispersal of creativity, by positively evaluating the competencies and practices of a creative producer while deflating notions such as innate creativity of genius and the gifted. It is an unchallenged assumption today that potentially any group of people (including those historically stigmatized as non-creative) can be creative.[8] Through proceduralism, art also takes on the character of 'work' already in the 1960s and 1970s (2014b, pp. 90–93 and 97). Part 4 will discuss how notions of talent are mainstays of the philanthropic milieu which allow elites to restructure art worlds

7 In the theory of the enrichment economy, the incorporation of permanent collection and eventive performance format represents an intersection between what its authors call the 'collection form' and the 'trend form' (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020).

8 Aesthetic-philosophical discourses become the material for the psychological and pedagogical models of the creative self in the 1950s. The bohème serves as inspiration for the lifestylizations of several social groups of the 1960s' counter culture and more recent generations.

that are characterized by relentless, boundaryless creativity—seemingly not discernible from creatives' work environments.

1.2 *Surprise Value in the Postmodern Art Field*

Modernity is a cultural complex having its basis in anti-traditionalism, therefore being equipped with vocabulary that encourages novelty in "politically, economically, scientifically, technically, and artistically" ways and forms (2014b, p. 25). Paul de Man equated the core experience of modernity with the 'interplay between deliberate forgetting and an action that represents a new origin' (Quie, 2000, p. 280). Reckwitz's incorporation of a typology of modern novelty is an important heuristic, which I present in the following table. Each depicted regime comprises concepts, beliefs, mythology and so on with respect to societal change. The idea of change, therefore, must be grasped in its historically specific formations.

Regime N1 concerns orientations such as the 'perfecting of the old, as if it was the everlasting new', marking ideas of direction of change in terms of 'progress and rule'. Quantitative growth and qualitative leaping are characteristic of regime N2, contrasting with N1's revolutionary breaks as images of change.

TABLE 6 Reckwitz's typology of the social regimes of novelty, based on (Reckwitz, 2014b)

	N1	N2	N3
Structural kind of orientation toward the new as	Stage	Heightening and surpassing	Stimulation
Model of modernity	Modernity of perfection	Modernity of progress	Aesthetic modernity (Modernity of surprise—A.V.)
Normative aspect	Rule and rights- oriented model	Improvement as an infinite sequence	Infinite improvement carries over, but value of novel becomes normatively neutral
Social phenomenon of interest	Political revolution	Technological and business innovation	Event (affect-laden and aestheticized)

The typology serves Reckwitz's claim that aesthetic capitalism is fundamentally oriented by an interlock of N2 and N3. N2 comprises the belief in gradual progress: "improvement [is] inherent in every single act of the new, and at the same time, by the infinity of the sequence of improvements" (Reckwitz, 2014a, p. 26). N2 gains its legitimacy from the social forces of economic, scientific, and technological innovation, resulting in a 'dogma of permanent innovation' (Reckwitz, 2014b, p. 141). Indeed, there are many knowledge fields that feed the legitimacy of this novelty regime (see King et al., 2019). The type of N3 allows us to pinpoint the event in terms of ideas of novelty. Based on Reckwitz's work, I call N3 the 'regime of surprise' for it shares "a semantic field with the interesting, the surprising, and the original" (2014a, pp. 26–27), and surprise is associated with proceduralism and affective power:

> The dynamic production of an infinite sequence of new acts remains, whereas the value of the new ceases to be normative. The new does not gain its value by its integration into a sequence of progressive steps anymore, but by its current aesthetic stimulus, which is always getting supplanted by the ensuing sensual-affective quality. Not progress or superseding are now the matter of interest, but the movement itself—the sequence of stimulating acts.
>
> RECKWITZ, 2014a, p. 26

If originality characterizes the art field, then the question is how 'surprising' goes beyond 'being original'. The fine difference can be understood by focusing on uncertainty. Both N1 and N2 work in terms of structural breaks (that is, discernible stages or grades), which involves predictability. N3, however, appears to give up predictability of the novel in the production of surprise as central category (see also Wenzel et al., 2020). In this way, the aesthetic economy becomes what Karpik calls an economy of singularities, legitimizing 'arrangers' as experience-makers who create surprises. In fact, in a more recent book Reckwitz describes the same society for which he argued a creativity dispositif as a society of singularities and focuses his analysis on the 'unique vs. the general' (2020). In conventional anthropological and sociological theory (Sewell, 2005), structures allow us to make probabilistic assumptions, for example about careers; while switching trajectories are explained by claiming causality in events (such as illness affecting career success). Reckwitz's aesthetic-capitalism theory thus describes a profound change, which I call eventization, and which is the tendency of acceleration in eventive forms over structural stabilization—but not necessarily over 'order', as I argue in Chapter 11. This allows us to formulate singularities—the core goods and

services of experience-economic societies—as essentially marked uncertain states.[9]

However, this is not only about the fabrication of goods and services. It concerns the social construction of identity to which I will return in Chapter 12, where I tackle the thesis of 'culturalization' (Reckwitz, 2020) with respect to cinema cultural policy. N3, legitimized by proceduralism as suggested action format, encourages (seemingly random, surprising) deviations from a standard. Such deviations are valuable when they can be comprehended as aesthetic surprise and appear as non-calculable in the sense a 'permanent innovation'. In N3, what is new is normatively neutral—whatever the form in which novelty finds expression as a surprise. N3 can therefore encourage an infinite number of manifestations of aesthetic uncertainty encapsulated in apparently unique attempts at improvement—observed by many sociologists with respect to postmodern identities as 'life project stylization' (Röcke, 2021; Schulze, 1992), but also as the 'infinite variety' (Caves, 2000).

Reckwitz also provides a specification for the relationship between N3 and cultural forms—the form of 'pastiche'. Postmodern theorists reject the human ability "to experience time as coherent and integrated totality" (Quie, 2000, pp. 272–273), rejecting knowledge that could secure the narrative of improvement. Frederic Jameson (1991) seminally formulates pastiche and collage as paradigmatic forms of postmodernism rejecting narration. Thus, pastiche is the answer to the avant-gardists 'rhetoric of forgetting', as in pastiche the past is collated from a vast collection of images –all styles of the past being potentially 'open to allusion'. The postmodern pastiche also concerns the social emerging around notions of diversity and cultural pluralism. Just as pastiche is the major expressive format of creativity so is postmodernity's 'perpetual celebration of difference'. And, importantly, as noted by Reckwitz, even 'failed revolutions' (Elsaesser's concerns regarding the unaccomplished mission of the film festival—see Chapter 1) can be re-used. Being botched attempts for change, they provide a significant reservoir of materials to produce novelties when future conditions are ripe for them. Locating pastiche in N3, Reckwitz offers a plausible argument as to why not only the mundane creativity productions that surround contemporary inhabitants of aesthetic capitalism exist and have the potential propensity to attain unique value, but also why social movements, identity politics, and justice campaigns follow a logic of the surprise and the ideal of performativity rather than being grounded in

9 This perspective resonates with the conception of 'risk society' and statistical knowledge on the dynamics common to the postmodern economy (e.g., Adam et al., 2000; De Vany, 2004; Menger, 1991; Taleb & Ochman, 2019).

group characteristics that provide foundation for a social critique (see end of Chapter 1). I am concluding this brief outline of the regimes of novelty by pointing out that aestheticization is non-compatible with rationalization (A—R), precisely because one follows the logic of the unique whereas the other embodies the logic of the general, as associated with the uniform, predictable, or simply 'the standard form' (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020; Reckwitz, 2020).

2 Unassuming Positivity and Affective Governmentality

There is also a sociology of power and authority in Reckwitz's theory of the creativity theory, which is grounded in Foucault's classical work on governmentality (Bröckling et al., 2000; Burchell, 1991; Krasmann & Volkmer, 2007; Rose et al., 2006). Arguing against Foucault that all governmentality has an affective side, he still needs to explain the 'seemingly unlimited positivity' in the designs of subjective expression, experiences, admiration and stimulation that comes with a sense of entitlement (Reckwitz, 2014b, p. 330; 2017a, pp. 166, 251). Reckwitz presents as his explanans a cultural imaginary which creates positivity—in response to, or as victory perhaps over, rationalization, industrialization, objectification, and relentless technological progress (2014b, p. 31), and as outcome of a 'release from affect deficiency' for which the art-field transformation is a major historical condition. Using a sociological convention which grasps western capitalism as a sequence of bourgeois, organized, and disorganized formations, Reckwitz marks the trend at the level of three subjectivities corresponding somewhat with types of governmentality, such as the self-disciplined, 'prudent and thrift' self-made man (bourgeois phase), followed by the 'normal biography' of an individual oriented by peer-group of organized modernity, and which is in late-modern capitalism superseded by 'the creative self' (2014b, pp. 315–316).

Reckwitz follows Foucault quite closely in arguing that late capitalism has eliminated Weber's '*Berufsmensch*' (cf. Heubel, 2002), an issue that is reflected in the sociological debates about de-professionalization (Kurtz, 2005) and echoed by aesthetic scholarship on the replacement of critics by amateurs (McDonald, 2007). The 'creative self' can be understood in terms of a never achieved full-term rationalization of society (in my view, the potential completion of Weber's Iron Cage as life form, although on a different note). Because even in highly organized modernity, aesthetic-affective elements have remained alive or even flourished in society's many niches as counter-forces, which a dispositif can call on. This is possible when a dispositif is posited as a transversal, assembling itself from sources external to it (2014b, p. 49). Affect

resides even in economic knowledge, such as seen in Schumpeter's notion of a passionate entrepreneur—and quite the opposite of the bourgeois subjectivity Weber associated with the spirit of capitalism. The re-use of Schumpeterian thought, which has resulted in the institutionalization of an entrepreneurship model (Bröckling, 2007) and format transgression of 'innovation', 'entrepreneurship' beyond formal market econnomics and economies to a vast array of fields such as charity, art, higher education, social work, and many more, can be understood against Reckwitz's proposition of an interlock of N2 and N3, which finds its core subjectivity in the 'creative entrepreneur', a format that can be filled with many aesthetic and social materials.

Returning to Reckwitz's critique of Foucault which highlights the latter's omission of assigning 'social affectivity' to all governmentalities (a dispositif finds actors and causes passionately aligned with them, and forms provided by the dispositif having appeal), we can connect the work to earlier arguments about affordances (Gibson, 1977). Reckwitz seeks to describe the 'cultural imaginary' specific to the creativity dispositif that promises fascination and satisfaction in exchange for committed participation, and does by providing a powerful affective stimulus (2014b, p. 51).[10] The cultural imaginary (Simonis & Rhode, 2014, p. 5) is not sufficiently discussed other than in terms of 'corresponding concrete cultural artefacts' that support the imaginary's social efficacy and may be associated with what Reckwitz theorizes elsewhere as 'affective spaces' (2012). He also points to the development of a particular affect structure across the vast social territory with certain forms that can be reconstructed in historical analysis, all of which interconnect the dispositif into an assemblage that turns into an order. This affect structure, he maintains, is directed at 'permanent activation' to produce infinite instances of surprises and a compulsive dispersion of subjective attention.

Still, these formulations do not render a plausible explanation for why today people, actions, and objects are oriented to heightened affectivity produced in aesthetic form. In my view, Reckwitz basically fails to tackle the question of how an affective relationship is not only committal but also exuberant or optimistic. In extension, one must ask how the creativity dispositif eliminates critique, addressing among other things concerns over socio-psychological problems

10 In the original German version: "Damit es [das Dispositif—A.V.] sozial angenommen wird und sich durchsetzt, ist neben reinen Herrschaftseffekten entscheidend, dass es ein kulturelles Imaginäres aufspannt und die Teilnahmen an ihm Faszination und Befriedigung, das heisst einen dauerhaften affektiven Reiz, verspricht" (Reckwitz, 2014b, p. 51). This thought resonates with the general 'historical spirit' idea developed by Boltanski and Chiapello, who formulate the spirit in terms of commitment.

apparently stemming from the oversupply of aesthetic choice (Schwartz, 2004), or what we can call an 'excess of culture' based on the creativity dispositif. Reckwitz actually moves into a comparison with religious and political forces and their appeal, maintaining that modern affect deficiency has been tackled through universalization of creativity. Surely, these conserving forces could have equally re-affected society, as he argues, but while the argument does lend indirect support for evidence on post-traditional festivities being more important to postmodern, aesthetic capitalism, it does not, I must persist, offer an explanation for the legitimacy attained by creativity as ideal and ideology. To develop further this fascinating theory as well as arguments resonating with praxeological theory, especially the Affective Turn,[11] I will construct an argument about philanthropy as important new institution, backing it by a the theory of the creativity dispositif and the thesis of the power of persuasion (Baumann, 1993a).

Finally, there is a change in 'regimes of attention', which relate to the way the new is perceived by a society. Promoted by the regime of N3, experimentation, arrangement, and co-creative work result in short-term forms of art expressions, often escaping their own recording for longer-time appreciation or appreciation by outsiders. In dispersed attention (Reckwitz, 2014b, pp. 112–113), such as provided by immersive environments, time and objects come together in combinations which then provide for novelties to appeal to the senses (Burgess, 2020; Harbord, 2009). This also changes the mode of reputation accrual from slow to fast; recognized as process in the cinema field by the non-sociological concept of 'buzz' (Reckwitz, 2017a, pp. 160–165).

2.1 *Field Boundaries and the Role of Formats*

Formats and field boundaries form one of the most interesting areas of Reckwitz's creativity dispositif analysis but there is little detail to both. As they are relevant to my own arguments, I will explore them with two illustrations from self-help literature on creativity as well as the eventization of poetry, which is of the oldest art forms. The notion that art has never 'formed a bounded social system, but instead has been systematically working toward its transgression in the moment where it wants to be radically modern' (Reckwitz, 2014b, p. 59) must still be grasped in its historical accuracy. *Steal like an Artist* (Kleon, 2012) illustrates the postmodern significance of pastiche as a versatile social technique of recombination and re-appropriation, which provides for

11 The Affective Turn captures the situation of "heightened interest in the non-verbal, non-conscious dimensions of experience" as "a re-engagement with sensation, memory, perception, attention and listening" (Blackman & Venn, 2010).

a different artistic or creative subjectivity. This book, as its jacket says, offers assistance for readers wanting to "discover their artistic side and build a more creative life". Its subtitle *10 Things Nobody Told You About Being Creative* emphasizes inclusivity (rather than giftedness and originality). Styled as a self-help book (exuding positivity with 'anyone can do it'), Kleon skillfully positions his audience as a resource: someone who is already creative but might not know quite yet, or seeking 'sophistication' of her life project. It is a non-authoritarian source of self-styling which underscores the assumption that all that needs to be done is 'poking' the individual to unleash creativity. In this sense, it not only is a "New York Times Bestseller" but a paradigmatic example of the subjectivity Reckwitz theorizes. Its content also serves to highlight erosion of bourgeois art values and the location of N3-creativity in the 'creative city', a complex Reckwitz explores in detail, giving evidence of the governmentality that corresponds with the creativity dispositif. To illustrate the importance of space, difference, and pastiche as co-creative arrangements:

> It helps to live around interesting people, and not necessarily people who do what you do. I feel a little incestuous when I hang out with only writers and artists, so I enjoy the many filmmakers, musicians, and tech geeks who live in Austin. Oh, and food. The food should be good. You have to find a place that feeds you—creatively, socially, spiritually, and literally.
>
> KLEON, 2012, p. 96

This passage from Kleon's book illustrates a prevailing convention of the artist (Sherwood & McCormick, 2016, p. 96), while alluding simultaneously to the transgressive character of the postmodern art field, including culinary services and high-tech sectors of society. The creative subject calls on the imagery of experience-seeking to gain more experiences and to seek social capital as a major resource in creative pursuits. In the management texts examined by Boltanski and Chiapello's theory of a third spirit of capitalism (discussed in Chapter 7), the predisposition to optimize social encounters and investing in social ties is reflected in phrases such as "being a radar" and a "plunderer of ideas" (2005b, p. 113). The passage also emphasizes another aspect of the transformation that the art field underwent, namely the liberation of the artist from a marginalized or niche position, either pathologized, tolerated, and rejected as a provocation to the manners of bourgeois society. The normalization of the postmodern artist-subject started with the bohemian's modification into the creative class (Friebe & Lobo, 2007; Shkuda, 2016; Weston, 2019). The bohemian as a transgressive phenomenon has been formulated by Bourdieu (1999, p. 96), as an identity originating in France at the end of the eighteenth century and

spreading as social identity into the mid-twentieth century city. The bohemian is symbolic of the idea that with postmodernity and the development of an aesthetic economy, the art field has shifted to the center of society, becoming a resource for boundary-transgressing creativity.[12] Kleon's book alludes to the role of formats of subjectivity, objects, relationships within object worlds as well as with subjectivities (taste expressions originate in these) and spaces or settings which may engender more creativity or help it into particular shapes.

Reckwitz asserts that the creativity dispositif flattens the boundaries between fields and their institutions and that the format plays a role in this process. As a reminder, formats of aesthetic sociality are presented as basic building blocks of the social. The notion of format refers to 'aggregate forms of the social', by which he means practices, discourses, artefact systems or subject-object constellations, as well as subjectivization modes (2017b, pp. 205–207). Furthermore, formats take on networks of heterogeneous practices and discourses and homogenize those (Reckwitz, 2014b, pp. 49–50 and footnote 43). While keeping it short, Reckwitz in my view makes an incredibly challenging claim which he requires for the assertions of the centrality of the art field as well as the hegemonial form of creativity. Format diffusion is offered as an understatement while actually being argued as a crucial mechanism in inter-fields exchange processes calling for further investigation. As he focuses on the art field, Reckwitz's own analysis of format and boundary transgression belong to the internal art field. However, taking three environments (economy, city, and media system) into his historical narrative, he can also show the high translationality between forms as seemingly different as a creative worker and a gentrified neighborhood. In the following, I illustrate this versatility of the creativity format with 'slam poetry' (a postmodern art) which has enabled poetry to enter the area of science.

Poetry slam started in the club and bar culture of the 1980s in large US cities. Already shaped as a competitive performance, it eventually diffused to other artist spaces as format of interactive art and co-creative audience juries. Historically significant for the hegemonialization thesis is the transfer of eventive poetry to the university sector, as poetry slam became the format in which science would find new expression. Science slams do a number of things for academic institutions, most importantly coping with information overload by

12 Later, Reckwitz (2020) associates today's secluded artist idiosyncrasy, e.g., the particular disposition of so-called 'nerds', which is socially legitimate only when idiosyncrasy serves to display singularity. This description finds it's a plausible empirical representation in the social ascent of the software engineer to the peak-role of creative entrepreneurship (see also Chapter 4).

packaging scientific communication—hardly understood as eventive—into performance forms that carry the dialogue between 'nerds' (see the previous footnote) and the audiences that are experts, non-experts and the media circuits. The format also relaxes science's behavioral norm of 'concentrated attention', presenting science as positive and of 'infinite variety', also allowing the idea that science needs to be curated if it wants to speak to a demanding public. The language of 'classical' science is, of course, scientific, but with the rise of public relation specialists (who are an invention of the early twentieth century), science can become a creative resource. Clearly, future investigation must bring out how creativity ideology is fused with the prevailing older logic of meritocracy, accounting for this format transgression as indicative for the broader change that is commonly criticized as 'neoliberal university' or, alternatively, celebrated as 'entrepreneurial university' of the permanent-innovative type. Extending on this potential investigation, one may propose that the intellectuals' attack on neoliberalization and managerialization of the university will remain unsuccessful as long as that stays in the frame of 'cognitive capitalism' (Moulier-Boutang, 2012), not including a critique of creativity-ideology driven aestheticization. 'Entertain or exit' and 'Publish or perish' are just as symbolic of the university in the postmodern age as are science slams or so-called university nights. To return to the cinema field, it remains to be seen how festivalization has emerged as a matter of format transgression and shifts in attention regimes as well as ideas of the novel, and to what extent film festivals provide support for the hypothesis of a hegemonic dispositif of creativity.

2.2 *Postmodern Experience-Making and the Arranger*

An arranger is a result of the proceduralization of art, legitimizing 'unfinished' art, and open space for co-creation and affective experiencing in atmospherically charged creative zones. As my book is concerned with the organizations rather than their directors, I apply the concept of the arranger mainly to the organization. The arranger enters the art field on equal terms; it can perform a brokering relationship between artists and audiences. Impresario, arts administrator, and arranger are individual and collective roles (see also Peterson, 1986).

In my investigation, I see festivalization reflecting important dimensions of this postmodern condition of art, and the festival being 'in charge' of creating 'show value' (Böhme, 2017). To demonstrate this claim, I use Reckwitz's dispositif as meta frame for analysis, synthesizing and extending where necessary. To look at the specific aesthetic sociality in the cinema field, the organizational reality of a particular historical version of experience-making still has to be broad into the framework of what Reckwitz calls structural principles (AEMR).

My hunch then is to position the festival as an experience-maker—which in Reckwitz's choice of terms is the arranger—in the configuration of AEMR. Before I do so further below, I need to outline the arranger's qualities and its differentiation from other roles pertaining to the postmodern art field.

The arranger is a postmodern artist-subject. Historically earlier, in Reckwitz's account, the 'performer' is represented as a de-differentiated artist-subject. The performer has a synthesizing task: initiating atmospheres and assembling a 'total work of art' (the *Gesamtkunstwerk*) (Reckwitz, 2017b, pp. 71–73).[13] The arranger results from further de-differentiation of the performer, emerging as structural role during the 1970s, reflecting the rising dogma of performativity and active co-creation, which demands that artists stage themselves.[14] A contrast with earlier formulations of art-support roles—perhaps signs of emerging interest in arranger functions—such as Howard Becker's 'impresario' (1982) and Richard Peterson's 'arts manager' (1986) can help illuminate the specificity of the arranger. Becker's impresario is an entrepreneurial role in the performing arts, typically an art dealer and gallery owner—an individual who "invests time, money, and energy in assembling materials and bringing them to potential audiences" (Becker, 1982, p. 119), but this role is mainly conceived of in business and technological terms and specific to the small art production. Peterson contrasts the impresario with the arts manager, emerging around the 1960s in tandem with the institutional complex that involves nonprofit organization, specialized funding organizations, tax legislation, and formal accountability as an instituted norm (1986, pp. 166–171). In my view, Reckwitz's postmodern arranger is neither entrepreneur nor non-profit bureaucrat. He focuses this role on a specific part of the division of labor in the arts. The arranger, firstly, collaborates and competes with the artist while, secondly, also working to combining, modifying, and presenting the art and the artist to media and arts supporters. The arranger's skillset is broader than that of the 'performer', as it ought to produce a 'spatial, atmospheric, and intellectual pattern' which should 'spill over' into the performance's environment (Reckwitz, 2014b, pp. 115–122).

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13 The goal of *Gesamtkunstwerk* is attributed to Richard Wagner and the famous Bayreuth music festival (Fischer-Lichte, 2010); for an example in exhibition architecture and on Bruno Taut see (Gutschow, 2006).

14 A novelist might be validated as creative subject by her peers, but a *traveling* book presentation which *performs* the book and its creator has higher legitimacy and, in fact, commercial use value. This seems to suggest anti-contemplative ideology, which Reckwitz rarely discusses. I suggest that anti-intellectualism should be investigated as immanent to the postmodern art field rather than, as suggested by many scholars, as a destructive influence solely attributable to market forces.

Based on this outline I frame the festival as an experience-maker of observable interventionist capability in art and artistry as well as art circulation: using the accessible event structure to develop curatorial power and operating, to heighten and arrange art works, within a mode of attention dispersal. It should be observable as 'a coordinator of existing forms, a manipulator of signs' and working toward aesthetic mobilization (Reckwitz, 2014b, pp. 114–119). If the film festival format epitomizes such a role then its format must be shown to be capable of intensifying aesthetic practices and episodes, participatory opportunities--assembling an array of resources for creativity to be actively produced in its own space. The advantage of the theory of the creativity dispositif is that it permits festival-related observations to be described within a single analytic framework and generate further hypotheses on experience-making and postmodern eventization in late-modern capitalism.

3 Festivalization of Media, Urban and Market Spheres

Interestingly, Reckwitz mentions eventization as typical of the postmodern creative city, where it competes with the more permanent art forms and is part of what he terms the process of 'aesthetic and semiotic culturalization' (2014b, p. 270). This process marks a well-established research area on the transformation of cities (Böhme & Engels-Schwarzpaul, 2017; Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020; Ho & Hutton, 2012; Sassen, 1991; Zukin, 1995). Reckwitz does not take up eventive forms when addressing opportunities for immaterial labor as previously formulated (Hardt & Negri, 2001; Lazzarato et al., 2017). Given all the work the arranger does, it is surprising that this creative subject is not reflected as structural component in Reckwitz's aesthetic economy. Eventive forms can also be detected in the media/star system. Reckwitz essentially treats postmodern media as eventive.

Overall, the convertibility between different star types and creative types as transfers of creative competencies from and to other fields make the exploration of the media/star system interesting (Reckwitz, 2014b, p. 265). Stars, using media, stage themselves as surprises, working as 'work star' and performing their creativity (Reckwitz, 2014b, pp. 239–2452), which always involves the goods and services of the aesthetic economy. The media/star system highlights the significance of boundary transgression (via formats) possible in the 'age of' creative aestheticization. A cinema star, for example, can enlarge her status by adopting different creative formats in the sense presented by Kleon's self-help bestseller. She can enlarge her aura as star who can also cook, be charitable with starving children, or be in the center of important societal topics

such as by ‘hanging out’ with a top political office-holder. Where the creativity dispositif has taken hold, stars are immediately subject to imitation and incorporation by creative others in search for materials that help experiencing and self-styling (Ferris & Harris 2010; Rojek, 2012). The competitive nature of postmodern pastiche and mimetic-adoption practices entails that a star continuously pursues to remain the most relevant person in this set of creatives, and can, in my view, be understood best as legitimated by hyper-performances of the creative and connexionist self (see also Ch. 14 Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020). As late-modern “society is not ruled by the aesthetic principle alone” (Reckwitz, 2017b, p. 214), my final section will position the arranger in the diagram of AEMR.

4 Festivalization and the AEMR Model

Aestheticization, economization, mediatization, and rationalization—AEMR—are ‘non-aesthetic principles’ (large social processes). EMR can put limits around aestheticization when dominating, such as for example in times of modernity’s affect deficiency or in particular pockets of industrial production where aestheticization has not placed its hold (my Chapter 4 elaborates this point). Economization denotes development according to historically specific market and capital models; mediatization denotes the diffusion of media-technological formats; and rationalization the spread of instrumental-rational behavioral models. Reckwitz argues homological relationships for A—M and A—E. For A—R, he argues that these can only be complementary phenomena. Reckwitz leaves undefined E—R, E—M, and M—R. In the following, I try to ‘insert’ the arranger in the AEMR scheme.

A—E refers to an emerging structural homology of the social form of the market and the aesthetic sociality identified for postmodern art fields. What they have in common, according to Reckwitz, is that they place central emphasis on objects presented to an interested audience the attention of which they seek. In the creativity dispositif, marketization and aesthetic sociality are coupled and supportive of each other, as market objects become primarily aesthetic objects and are subjected to aesthetic innovation, or the manufacturing of surprises. Modern markets contribute to the proliferation of aesthetic sociality. Retailers such as the well-known IKEA, for example, strategically resource from the postmodern art field to provide ‘experience offers’ (Schulze, 1992); commercial cinema markets proliferate contemporary art produced as experience and surprise goods. Both markets and art spaces exhibit, and both provide for suggestive experimentations that motivate consumers to engage in

experience consumption and creative self-styling. A—E has been explored in many studies pertaining to market-making, global consumer goods markets, and aesthetic consumption. The argument extends to the proposition that an A—E coupling accelerates participation in processes of economization, namely in form of creative experiences, attractive in a way unknown for rationalized market worlds, which have been subjected to *'Versachlichung'*, or neutralization of affect, according to classical capitalism theory in Weber's path (Scaff, 1991; Weber, 1978).

A—M, too, denotes a structural homology. Mediatization "delivers the technical means for a *sequential* production of bundles of signs—i.e., for texts, images, etc. over times" (Reckwitz, 2017b, p. 217), which promise novelty in form of synchronic and diachronic occurrences, thereby defining what becomes the past. While media novelties can be purely cognitive, the A—M homology describes the shift from cognition or information-centered communication to affective-sensual experience, such as illustrated for the 'science slam' in education news. A heightened surprise format is the so-called 'breaking news'. Media practically stimulate the interest in aesthetic events and also provide outputs that are consumed primarily as aesthetic experiences.

A—R is argued to be a 'structurally incommensurable' relation, simply because, for all that's been outlined in this regard, aesthetic practices are opposite of 'rules and purposes'. The latter marginalize sensuality, having no use for audience and novelty. Reckwitz also maintains that the A—R antagonism "begins to break down in the creativity dispositif": "Rational purposive formats develop which attempt to create the systematic preconditions for aesthetic labor and aesthetic experiences" (Reckwitz, 2017b, p. 218). This 'aesthetic rationalization' is presented as A—R's 'reciprocal support', generating institutional stabilization of the aesthetic, while the aesthetic provides a new motivational force for the making of more formal structure (2017b, p. 219).

As mentioned, Reckwitz suppresses arguments for E—M, M—R, and E—R in his account. To start with the last, E—R seems to be met by Weber's theory of capitalist markets ('*Versachlichung*'). Similarly, M—R may be argued to capture 'organized modernity' and standardized news as part of standardized culture. E—M expresses a shared similarity in the competition for attention. Festivalization then provides for the investigation of processes that go beyond these unaffected social forms and relationships.

'Aesthetic rationalization' appears to capture well the location of the arts-nonprofit organization. Nonprofits are rationalized social forms of collective arts activity and formal bureaucracies, while at the same time providing a 'vessel' and formats for the type of creativity elaborated by Reckwitz as profoundly postmodern. In this compelling 'sequel' to the theory of the creativity dispositif

(2020), the A—R relationship is not formulated as matter of 'reciprocal support'. Instead, the 'mechanisms of formal rationality switch to the background of front-stage singularization'; they become infrastructure for the systematic production of singularities' (I discuss this in Chapter 4). While this relationship also makes for complementarity, thus offsetting a collision between the two logics of the unique and the general, it makes for a different argument altogether. More importantly though, the formulations of A—E and A—M do not hold much purchase for understanding where the preference of the nonprofit logic originates, which is also not represented by any of the four processes. Not just a 'supporting infrastructure', the nonprofit organization appears to me as a crucial element in the elimination of affect deficiency, most obviously in the politics of a 'global civil society'.

This is why in extension of the creativity dispositif theory, the logic of philanthropy at the heart of this dispositif must be shown in this study of 'festivalization'. Film festival research presented in Chapter 1 has only asserted the marketization of the festival (A—E) and a specific version of A—R, i.e., 'managerialization' (including but not theorized the 'professionalization' of the rather informally or, in some of the organizational cases, market-sanctioned role of the festival curator).

Overall, I will argue that philanthropy (as an order of worth in the perspective of a sociology of conventions, see Chapters 10–13) provides a major stimulus for the stabilization of late-modern creativity presented by Reckwitz as hegemonic dispositif. Its logic catalyzes the social construction of individual and collective positivity, and the practices of philanthropy grounded in its peculiar logic of wealth redistribution and societal progress ideology arguably blend with the aesthetic sociality described by Reckwitz, taking precise strategic form in the A—R relationship, attaching itself to the media/star system, which provides the space for inter-field elite connections and resource for legitimacy claims, as well as the economy for creative innovation, entrepreneurialism, and formats of market competition. To conclude, a theory of the culture of creativity needs to be incorporating the historical process of the rationalization of charity (Hwang & Powell, 2009), adding also a working conception of the grants-economic relationship which is the resource of A—R in the case of festivalization.

The creativity dispositif can rely on particular affect structures, especially those developed in discourses of contemporary civil society (see Chapters 11 and 13), therefore marking potentially boundary transgression. One key observation of late-modernity is that the grants economy is an enlarging area of economic activities and that economic and cultural policy are initiators of grants-economic processes. For this, Reckwitz provides no description, possibly

because he focuses on market-based forms of exchange when describing the aesthetic economy. Therefore, the aesthetic economy demands a new conception and more attention on the role of nonprofit phenomena in the formal economy of late-modern capitalism. In the following, I examine the format of cinema in the historical perspective of aesthetic capitalism, which leads to Part 2's concentration on the aesthetic economy of cinema where festivalization plays an important role for the economy but also society and its polity.

CHAPTER 3

Alternative Exhibition

1 Cinema Format and the Curation of 'Affective Spaces'

Cinema, antecedent to the contemporary aesthetic economy, is one of the oldest experience-economic phenomena, making surprises since the invention of the moving image. Theatrical exhibition (which I call the classical format) strategically embraced audience expectations for public and panoramic spectacle fostered in public event formats typical of the outgoing century (Hetherington, 2007, pp. 9–15; Ohmann, 1996), trying to fine-tune film and presentation formats in order to sustain the attraction and grow the profit margins. Over hundred years on, the focus is on how it happened that festival events become more entertaining than classical entertainment in movie exhibition, or—to put it to the arranger—how can the experience qualities associated with Hollywood and its common attributes such as 'entertaining', 'dazzling', 'creative', and 'original', be superseded by the festival. looking at exhibition formats, "an analysis of particular exhibitions sites may profitably start and end with the question of how and why they display their attractions, as well as how and why those attractions are perceived in the ways they are by observing publics" (Stringer, 2013, p. 63). In this chapter, I analyze formats by drawing on new concepts such as 'affective space', 'atmosphere', and 'affordance' to understand their power as public viewing orders which then compete for attention by audiences and entrepreneurs.

Recalling the format's definition (see Chapter 2), the meaning of format addresses 'forms of sociality such as social practices, discourses, types of subjectivity, and subject-artefact relations, either single or in certain historical configurations' (Reckwitz, 2014b, pp. 49–50). Formats can take on model character; they can be imitated and diffused outside the space from which they are originating. We can examine exhibition design and practices as representative of format changes that in turn indicate the rise of the creativity dispositif. Based on the outline of the arranger in the cinema field, we would expect to see crucial changes to the conceptions of the novel, the audience, the creative capabilities, the mode of attention. We would expect historically older formats to be used in pastiche later on. In sum, if the creativity dispositif theory applies, we should find meaningful difference between the exhibition formats as well as in the practices and discourses surrounding them, and be able to point crucial difference's relationship to a creativity ideology. The following

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investigation makes full use of Reckwitz's analytic tool box pertaining to the 'basic structure of the creativity dispositif' (2014b, pp. 319–333) and elaborate these by drawing on the 'Spatial' and the 'Affective Turn' in cultural studies (e.g., Clough & Halley, 2007). The film festival format can be identified in terms of the three properties of aesthetic sociality, aesthetic mobilization, and attention to novelty, which combine in the 'affective space' (Reckwitz, 2012).[1]

The exhibition segment of the cinema value chain is a site of experience-making that has rarely been analyzed by movie experts who focus on the performance of movies, with 'Hollywood economics' shrinking the segment to 'number of screens' (Moul & Shugan, 2007). This omission represents a 'productionist bias', in that exhibition is conceived of as a consumption rather than a production space where co-creativity as productive trait can be discerned. This blind spot is partly interwoven with the idea that nonprofits are not formal-economic actors, a theme which I scrutinize in the following Parts of the book.

1.1 *Assumptions about Festival Format: Towards Analysis of Affective Spaces*

'Aesthetic sociality' is composed of creators, audiences, objects, and the institutional frameworks which regulate attention. Aesthetic mobilization applies to systematic encouragement of individuals, groups, and organizations to become active and self-mobilizing creative subjectivities. In Reckwitz's account, the creative city is the major site of aesthetic mobilization but affective space can be explored at any scale, thus also for exhibition sites. Historically sensitive discussion of formats should reveal a shift from concentrated to dispersed attention, i.e., from 'tarrying' (Gadamer, 1977) to co-creative production. Aesthetic mobilization focuses on the making of positive affects and emotions rather than on the political-ideological struggle of artists for autonomy and authenticity. A comparative-historical discussion of formats might reveal how conflict transforms into the 'less' revolutionary version of scandal, contemplative culture retreats into niches and become peripheral as the creativity dispositif takes over.

The Affective and the Spatial Turns are relatively recent paradigm shifts in philosophy and the social sciences (Gieryn, 2000). They are important discourses for the argument of a postmodern sociality of art, which is asserted in its core as the making ('*Verfertigung*') of sensual, semiotic, and affective

1 For a comprehensive handbook on affective orders published recently see (Slaby & Scheve, 2019). For an article on the role of affective orders in film performance see (Burgess, 2020).

stimuli directed at audiences. The arranger is an initiator of atmospheres and creates the space for aesthetic mobilization (2014b, p. 114 and 303). According to Reckwitz,

> … new technological and architectural constellations do not determine affective structures in a strict sense. They rather provide quite incalculable incentives for building novel atmospheres, which in the long run might help to develop new affective cultures and a different affective habitus.
>
> RECKWITZ, 2012, p. 256

From this perspective the atmosphere describes "an affective mood produced by a spatial arrangement of people and things as perceived by the senses and interpreted with the aid of cultural schemes. *Aesthetic* atmospheres are atmospheres experienced for their own sakes" (Reckwitz, 2017b, p. 198). Philosophers like Michael Hauskeller (1995) see atmospheres determining individuals' relations to their environments and shaping a sense of belonging in natural and social worlds.[2] Atmospheres are therefore at the heart of understanding immersive environments as products of cultural event production. Atmospheres affect individuals by calling on their affective and emotional registers and, as Hauskeller suggests, can be identified with the feeling of others in a given situation. Atmospheres make it difficult to not share such feelings, underlining their importance to the making of pro-social behaviors as well as facilitating subject-object relations (1995, pp. 19–20). Atmospheres resonate in individuals as momentary states and have a spatial dimension that is irreducible to geometric form. Whether individuals are affected depends on degrees of empathy, self-autarky and a habitual distancing to the oscillations of moods. This meaning of atmospheres made central in the current literature is already reflected in ideas of cinema held by both art and business writers. For economist Harold Vogel, the cinema experience is "total, isolating, [and] hallucinatory" (2007, p. 9); for the famous avant-garde activist Amos Vogel cinema was "the place of magic where psychological and environmental factors combine to create openness to wonder and suggestion, an unlocking of the unconscious." Vogel describes cinema as "a shrine at which modern rituals rooted in atavistic memories and subconscious desires are acted out in darkness and seclusion from the outer world" (Vogel, 2005 [1974], p. 9). Similarly, contemporary film critic Roger Ebert refers to 'darkness' as a major element

2 On the atmospheric influence of the English weather on art work see (Harris, 2015).

of the theatre atmosphere, which is reduced in television and online cinema consumption. Ebert notes on social dispositions, a habitus of cinema-viewing (Cochrane, 2013) when writing that:

> … [m]ost of us have our first movie going experience at a young age, and our responses to the movies often echo that first orientation. We sit passively in the dark and are told a story.
>
> EBERT, 1984, p. IX

In this sense, the festival as an arranger is always an affordance for cinema consumption. The concept of the affordance (Gibson, 1977) has been applied to music and museum sociology (Griffero, 2014; Griswold et al., 2013, p. 348) and highlights the extraordinary meaning of our largely expanded object worlds owing to global consumer goods markets. Affordance highlights some of the 'compacted culture' of our worlds of things, as formulated by Aida Bosch (2010, pp. 25–26), but there is also the blurring of the material and immaterial boundary through aesthetic practices which add immaterial objects to the possibilities of affordances:

> … the sheer weight of the aesthetic machinery of public intimacy that is now available, the result of the preponderance of information technology, new materials that allow new surfaces to be produced, and new means of making connections, is currently of such a consequence that it does more than intermediate.
>
> THRIFT, 2010, p. 294

This short discussion underscores the new emphasis on affect and materiality and the lessening of rule-bound behavior (rather than the presence of a Foucauldian 'docile subject') where immersive environments are in abundance (Bosch, 2010, pp. 23–24; Joyce & Navarro-Remesal, 2020; Reckwitz, 2002, p. 212). Exemplarily, Nigel Thrift clarifies the obvious challenge to older sociological paradigms:

> I am not arguing that these lifelike objects are considered to be alive, but neither are they considered to be mere evocations. They are allowed a psychology (Turkle 2005). And because of their uncertain status, they are able to fascinate, that is to stimulate explorations of their nature and character because they are able to arouse repeated interest or stimulate curiosity.
>
> THRIFT, 2010, p. 296

Thrift's qualification conveniently provides for attention to the fact that, for similar reasons, business formats have caught the interest of economists and economic sociologists (including those studying science and technology), which has been a solid foundation for the study of 'qualification', i.e. the plurality of processes through which qualities come to be attached to objects and stabilized (Beckert & Musselin, 2013). In the economy, Michel Callon and co-authors argue, actors "devote a large share of their resources to positioning the products they design, produce, distribute or consume, in relation to others" (2002, p. 201). An important historical study of retail formats (Petrovic, 2005) relates positioning to market-making, illuminating how aesthetic formats form the basis for the largest type of today's markets, the consumer goods market. Design experts create 'scenic value' through poly-sensorial atmospheres, economists arguing that scenic value expands the power of the use and exchange value of the goods so arranged (see Hasse, 1994, pp. 350–351), which was more recently theorized by Böhme as capitalist paradigm (2017).

In the business literature of cinematic entertainment similar narratives can be found, as exhibition entrepreneurs have developed many aesthetic-affective practices, using mass-design elements (e.g., the bill boards or the highly symbolic red carpets) and other place design that will help the experience-seeking subject to formulate its relationship to the experience. Affordance is just important as the object central to it, as a US American theatre-chain owner says when formulating that the "key to success will be providing patrons with new and exciting experiences they cannot find elsewhere in an environment as compelling and entertaining as the movie itself" (Redstone, 2004, p. 400).

1.2 *Empirical Material*

For the purpose of this chapter I describe major formats known around the world, which are theatrical exhibition (the classical format), the art-house theatre as variant of the classical format, the film club, and the film festival. Together they cover major types of public viewings and examining them contributes to the understanding of what is postmodern in an art field that has never been a fully legitimate art in the western canon and experience-economic from the very start and across the world (Schneppat et al., 2009).

As systematic or comparative research on global exhibition history did not exist at time of the investigation, I use Douglas Gomery's exceptional US cinema business history (1992) and Barbara Wilinsky's study of art-house cinema (2001) to present my major line of argument, as told with reference to the culturally most influential cinema industry to date. Using the history of exhibition for local scenes and towns in Germany and other materials on European cinema exhibition, which were more accessible than other exhibition histories,

I combine these with heritage studies to offer additional material from a powerful but smaller industry at the start of cinema format differentiation.

2 The Classical Format

While cinemagoing no longer constitutes a primary mode of consumption, the classical format is still the major way we understand screen culture. Exhibition history starts with a seated publics when the French Lumiere brothers screen for the first time a moving image in 1895, which lead to a rapid round of innovations and fierce competition surrounding them (Mezias & Kuperman, 2001). For about a decade or so, the early exhibition entrepreneurs struggled to find their clients in an already saturated public entertainment environment, meeting the surplus of sensational fare with entrepreneurial experimentation in viewing formats. During about 1905–1910, the stand-alone, movie-only exhibition became the viable business practice and exhibition format, a change also observed in European countries (Glaß & Knaack, 1998; Klein-Wiele, 2006; Mezias & Kuperman, 2001, p. 216). Early movie performances were placed in converted shops and adjacent rooms of pubs and, certainly in the United States, movie shows were parts of amusement park programs.

The traveling exhibition as the major mode in the early years made use of existing public-cultural sites like town halls and opera houses as well as tents and circuses. Amusement parks put a ceiling on profit goals because of their seasonal limitations. While starting with a double function of providing sensations and disseminating national and global news, the movies could not compete with the live attractions of the so-called vaudeville theatres by the first decade of the twentieth century (Gomery, 1992, p. 17).[3] The business formula of the 'nickelodeon' changed that: ten-thousand such cinema sites had emerged across the United States by 1910. As makeshift theaters, often converted retail stores and restaurants with hawkers to the latest entertainments, 'small and uncomfortable and emulating the vaudeville theatre ambience' (Mezias & Kuperman, 2001, p. 216), they also attest to an early emulation of the department store with low-priced products sold at large volume, as argued by Gomery. Nickelodeons could serve as working- and middle-class leisure

3 As specialized theatres later on, newsreel houses only went out of business when television became a household normal. As a business practice it was first introduced by Pathé Company of France. Newsreel firms had their own photographers, such as Fox News in 1922, with over a thousand of such staff placed around the world and especially concentrated in European capitals.

attraction in rural and urban locations, with concentrations in big cities. This created the audience base for cinema as a popular art.

For Germany, on which we can collate findings from various ethnographies and other sources, cinema historians find a rapid spread during roughly the same time. In 1900, only two cinemas (in Hamburg und Würzburg) existed. The history of Ruhr cinema reveals that by 1908 the popular art venue of vaudeville had been vacated by cinema entrepreneurs (Klein-Wiele, 2006, p. 27). In 1910, for example, 480 exhibitor firms had spread over thirty German cities, 119 firms alone in Berlin, with at least one cinema theatre in operation (Altenloh, 1914; Filk & Ruchatz, 2007; Werth, 1910).

According to Mezias and Kuperman (2001), some nickelodeons experimented with programming because multi-reel films and serials were already available. Wanting more sustained attention, however, venue operators turned toward the appeal of the viewing space and, depending on economic and other factors, ventured into larger and bigger formats, inventing the 'movie palace'. They did so often by converting former performance theatres and aiming for interest from the middle classes by opening up neighborhood theatres, decorating them in a way that would appeal to leisure seekers. This public entertainment space would be restructured once again when entrepreneurs would explore profit opportunities through foreign-film export in the 1920s, which lead to the art-house cinema theatre.[4] Inviting people to engage with 'serious art' (as was the meaning of European film) as value to metropolitan middle-class dwellers, these theatres were in Wilinsky's view 'the most significant precedents' of post-WWII art-house exhibition (2001, pp. 41–56). For the cinema field they may also be the earliest signs of a format differentiation that constitutes in essence an aestheticization of class in Bourdieu's meaning. Gomery observes art house as a contrast with mass-entertainment focused movie palaces (on the celebrated Chicago DeLuxe theatres see Schiecke, 2005), namely as "combined format allusions to European cinema atmosphere and bourgeois culture" which "created atmospheres in theatres of exclusivity" (1992).[5]

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4 Exhibition entrepreneurs also strategized around foreign-film import through an ethnic neighborhood approach, hoping to make profit from immigrant diversity and emotional ties to former homelands. These strategies proved particularly successful in the 'ghettoized' parts of large cities. Foreign film presentation was ultimately not a sustainable profit-making strategy.—Black Americans were the only ethnic group forced to have their own movie houses. Separate cultural-consumption patterns in the cinema field lasted well after segregation and the 1964 Civil Rights Act because Blacks went to downtown first-run theatres after the 'white flight' to the suburbs.

5 The International Film Arts Guild, founded in 1925, illustrates this strategy. To retain momentum, Symon Gould, the Guild's founder, recombined proven elements, such as concession

Called 'sure seaters' at their time (Wilinsky, 2001), art-house theatres offered subscription in exchange for commitment to the art, marked and marketed as unique experience due to freedom from censorship through incorporation as membership organizations. Art-house cinema shaped lifestyle and leisure-consumption ideas, introducing Sunday screenings and other art shows fitted around the main film-programming schedules. Uncertainty of movie exhibition business drove entrepreneurs to more format experimentation and new marketing tactics, including specialized theatres based on fan ties to genre, such as western and action, or in fan clubs such as, for example, the Mickey Mouse Club (this character was 'born' in 1928) and, through entertainment programming for the resorts for the wealthy, notably spaces in which early International Film Festivals had sprung up.

Many of these practices and formats still exist today but none of them has achieved consolidation in form of an *organizational* population such as the film festivals, which also provide a unique public viewing order. This festival format co-evolved with combined efforts of film business and government elites to promote national film business (Taillibert & Wäfler, 2016), while also having its roots in film clubs and societies which were the intense focus of the avant-garde (e.g., the famous *Cinema 16* (1947–1963), founded by Amos Vogel).

As movie supply rose and diversified, US exhibition history provides evidence that entrepreneurial strategies were increasingly two-pronged rationalization and aestheticization efforts. Trying to standardize, just like the production companies the industry analysts have observed in detail (Bordwell et al., 1985; Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; Wasko, 2003), they organized in chains. Exhibitors like the legendary Balaban & Katz of Chicago innovated by embracing the 'chain store revolution' (Hamilton et al., 2011) and Scientific Management (Taylor, 1911). Their business model also made the movie-going experience the attraction, because the company could not access the top Hollywood product when starting their business.

Gomery and Wilinsky's exhibition analyses raise an interesting point for art and valuation sociology, as the convention is to tell about modern art history in terms of art vs. entertainment or high versus low art. Format history shows that these taste-makers are quite flexibly shifted by entrepreneurial vision and the quest for experience-making around singular product whose consumption cannot be guessed much ahead. It also points to various roles of 'creation' in

aestheticized by the coffee-lounge format (Gomery, 1992, pp. 173–175). Programming experimentation and spatial-design experimentation went hand in hand.

the arts, with arrangers recognizing quite early that art attains meaning in a multi-dimensional environment. As Balaban and Katz formulate:

> We cannot afford to build up a patronage depending entirely upon the drawing power of our feature films as we display them. We must build in the minds of our audiences the feeling that we represent an institution taking a vital part in the formation of the character of the community.
>
> as cited in GOMERY, 1992, p. 43

Community in Balaban and Katz's meanings references the American national values and particular outlook at the world, including their own of the 'American dream'. At the same time, cinema entrepreneurs tried to invoke 'community feelings' through tactics such as employing young people fascinated with the medium. Offering training and experience in exchange for low or no pay for these students, this created an early group of cultural workers.[6]

Gomery's analysis of Balaban & Katz's business development identifies five factors of success for pre-WWII exhibition entrepreneurs: suburban spread of cinema venues that 'drove home' cinema as an all-American past time and in an advertised thirty-minute distance from homes; a building style appealing to tastes; a service model emulating the department-store quality of 'customer-pampering'; relatively affordable pricing; and, finally, technological 'wonders' such as air-conditioning which associated the experience with progress and comfort. There was also a managed system of audience survey, similar to the one adopted by contemporary festivals today. As an early innovation in the cinema field, it helped create the idea that audience opinions were a validated element of the cinematic experience. Cinema as an audience art was also underscored by the notion of cinema-hall construction in the service for a fairly equal view of the screen. Spatial forms helped appealing to belief in equality of access to (popular) culture through a format detail that historians of cinema culture have rarely commented on. Still, there were notions of exceptionality in in the messaging about consumer democracy and access to it:

6 Only a few occupations in exhibition, mainly those overseen by the unions, can count paid employment. Notably, contemporary North American exhibition owners have been lobbying through their National Association of Theatre Owners against the introduction of a minimum wage, citing social values, including experiences and exposure related to cinema and cultural work. While non-artistic staff in production is called 'below the line' in movie accounting, the exhibition staff does not exist in this roster.

> Balaban & Katz had a stated policy of treating the movie patron as a king or queen. Theatres offered free child care, attendant smoking rooms, foyers and lobbies lined with paintings and sculpture, and organ music for those waiting in line.
>
> GOMERY, 1992, p. 49

This strategy did not preempt profit-making tactics by using temporal qualification for price differentiation, such as that the longer a customer waited to see a new movie, the cheaper the ticket would become. This in turn attached a sense of urgency to the new that cinema routinized.

Finally, food-vending must be mentioned. This business idea originated from the fact that the powerful Hollywood studios, the producers, could not share the revenue from these extra earnings. The introduction of popcorn and culinary (fast-food) products by exhibition companies serves as an excellent example of how objects become integral to immersive environments, prompting the query of the relationship between screen fare and food. The embrace of this 'cultural technique' fueled maize cultivation in US agriculture and prepared the global success of cola-based products as lifestyle brands, illustrating that cinema like many other cultural products and services may serve as an element in larger and at times seemingly unrelated value chains. Another example is the fad of the drive-in cinemas after WWI in the US. Essentially an industry-niche, it served to blend the new automobile culture and the suburban choice of residence into one life-style model. In the early 1950s, a quarter of box office came from drive-ins; by the 1960s, one out of five spectators chose the drive-in. Ultimately, this format failed because land value appreciated so much that it drove out this popular form of entertainment, during which one could even get their laundry cleaned in a collaborating business (Gomery, 1992, p. 92). Already by the 1950s, moviegoing was appealing as a 'way of life', routinized in the logic of public viewing realized through the classical format. That way of life was, of course, the American way of life.[7]

3 Palace, Theatre, Mall Cinema and the Multiplex

Heeding profit considerations and stiff business competition, exhibition entrepreneurs would try out many formats, including what I summarize as

7 Business tactics like these were widely recycled throughout cinema's global history, see (Tröger, 2005) for East German cinema. Outdoor cinema has not gone away entirely and has been revived in the early 2000s as instrument for urban communal engagement.

a retail and a theatre (sub-) format to mark the crucial differences. Whereas the retail format would be a business built into a shopping landscape or complexes with residential living and office space, the theatre format was more typically related to a stand-alone structure. Both sub-formats are still classical in the sense that they guide a concentrated attention through the classical seating order. The first, however, moves the extraordinary experience in cinema closer to the mundane consumption space, while the theatre format aims to appeal to 'higher emotions'. These formats aimed to capture different audiences without necessarily differentiating by class. In Germany, the theatre format emulated the so-called Wilhelminian theatre building (Klein-Wiele, 2006, p. 32); the retail format arrived in Germany via the American department store model. Earlier conceptions of the extraordinary related to the production of the 'exotic', with Orientalist décor. The Egyptian Theatre, a style in its own right (Schiecke, 2005), would eventually be protected as cultural heritage, following the logic of the enrichment economy (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020).

Postmodern pastiche is nothing new in the cinema field. The artist Fernand Léger, as cited in a study of Zurich's cinemas, captured the American cinema palaces in 1931 as 'a battle of styles: incredible conglomerates of all sorts of European and Asian style, the more voluptuous the better, designed to compete with the house on the other side of the street, staircases without a purpose, legions of personnel' (Bignens, 1988, p. 2). Palaces and bourgeois theatres not only address different 'cultural imaginary' (Simonis & Rhode, 2014) but also affect different moods. Palaces are meant to be spaces of exuberance and phantasy, whereas the theatre is a place for nuanced connoisseurship, cultivation and commemoration. Palaces and theatres symbolize different ideas of 'festivity' (Gadamer, 1977, 2002).

In the 1970s, the "new suburban theatre emerged from a radical transformation in American retailing, from the modern shopping center in the 1960s to the shopping mall in the 1970s" (Gomery, 1992, p. 93). The multiplex originated in the retail format, which radically shifted the notions of novelty toward a pluralization. It also assigned novelty to a multiple and maybe incommensurable index of singularity, as consumers had to decide between novelties within the same art form or leisure experience which were offered in simultaneous supply. In my understanding, the multiplex appears to tilt the battlefield of formats toward 'permanent aesthetic innovation' (Reckwitz, 2017b). Before the multiplex would come to epitomize commercial cinema exhibition, Hollywood experimented with a number of things that would sustain attention on cinema, including television performance in the theatre and screening live sports games and alike (including in the arts-house lounges of the 1950s).

More format evolution occurred when the 'small screen' (television) proved to become a major competing format in the product world. In the 1950s 'widescreen', or classical exhibition, still aimed for 'bigger and better', but cinema producers had to give way eventually by selling films from film libraries to television, which created new financial capital for technological innovations as well as a new product line of cinematic formats for television (Chalaby, 2016). The second change to the industry allowed for televised film critics, some of whom like Roger Ebert and Gene Siskel came to fame, as studios understood them as third-party information providers who would "tell the viewer straight off whether to see the film or not" (Gomery, 1992, p. 258). The film festival format would later incorporate such provider roles, exactly by *arranging* a space for critics and other types of judging experts in its immersive environment.

Cinema exhibition majorly contributed to art consumption by lower and middle classes, embedding them into a nascent aesthetic economy. The concept of the enclosed shopping center (the first was in Minneapolis, built in 1956) commenced with the mall-architecture movement in the 1960s. The aesthetic designs by exhibition entrepreneurs played with the boundaries between art and commerce, resulting in eclecticism in the cinema landscape rather than boundary-drawing as in the bourgeois art. Like postmodern art, it borrowed and mixed and created hybrid images to produce novelty. The play of grandeur would return in form of architectural trends again and again, such as observable in the multiplex cinemas associated with blockbuster product designed to keep people focused on theatrical exhibition (Hadida et al., 2021; Stringer, 2003). Fragmentation of the audience tastes seriously continued but did so within the classical format. Multiplex cinema (first introduced conceptually in 1963 when a twin-screen theatre opened in a Kansas City shopping center) shifted the management of attention by tying novelty to audience dynamics. The proven formula for the multiplex business is (and has been) 'to open' on as many screens as possible to cut back with waning popularity—"[m]aneuvering auditoria was perfected to a science" (Gomery, 1992, p. 107).

That, however, did not result in an exit from format experimentation. During the 1970s, the retail format illustrates modernity's 'affect deficiency' to which a following phase of aesthetic innovation responded with complexes such as the Cineplex Odeon theatres in 1979, a Canadian-owned chain enterprise whose first cinema in Toronto was nothing less than a building of eighteen auditoria. With this, Odeon campaigned for a "better movie going experience", trying to lure audiences away from the mall theatres by designing theatres which people would enjoy as 'extraordinary'. This move effectively demonstrates the shift to the postmodern era in cinema, as the chain of "vast complexes of whimsical, postmodern 'picture palaces' offering a seemingly boundless

number of different cinematic choices to the public" provided for immersive environments which were "carefully crafted, postmodern Xanadus of pleasure, reminding film buffs of the glories of the 1920s movie palace era" (Gomery, 1992, p. 105). Odeon became a model emulated well into the 1990s. These entrepreneurs, writes Gomery,

> taught the world that architectural splendor, careful monitoring of costs, a multitude of films, and restaurant-like concession stands with trendy snack foods, all in convenient locations, would lure millions away from their television sets to the fun of going out to the movies, [with concession areas having the "size of basketball arenas this—A.V.] only made the experience of going out to the movies that much more special. (1992, p. 113)

This postmodern model of an immersive environment needs to be contrasted with cinema architecture of the 1950s and 1960s, which still aimed to extinguish the sensational aesthetic of cinema. Following the architect Louis Sullivan's famous credo 'form follows function', Paul Bode's architectural textbook (1957) exemplifies this commitment for German cinema architecture. Dismaying advertisements covering the façades, the heavy ornamentation of the buildings, and the 'light shows' (i.e., the light bulbs on the street side façade of cinema buildings of the earlier years), Bode's influential modernist aesthetic rejected glamour materials that characterized the inter-war architecture of public leisure and retail houses. His designs are also carried by the idea of defeating television by better technology and the perfecting of a 'zone of illusion', which resonated with cinema theory's concept of 'full immersion' (Bignens, 1988, p. 57). Notably, a local-cinema historian quips that Bode's theatre in the German city of Duisburg was no longer a theatre that could be recognized by anything other than its seating configuration (Klein-Wiele, 2006, p. 123). But cineastes like those supporting similar architectural and design taste pertaining to the Film Guild theatre of New York and written about by Wilinsky "believed [this—A.V.] to be the proper environment for film viewing, in which all lines directed the eye to the screen, discouraging audience distraction" (2001, p. 52).

Bode writes that 'the cinema of tomorrow will make the projectionist a co-creating performer', suggesting an occupation for experience-making capacity. Today's vantage point allows us to see this idea as averted and little suggesting that cinema architecture has gained the level of prestige assigned to architecture of high-brow art forms and even sports stadiums for 'mega events' (Horne, 2015; Roche, 2006). Given the dearth of literature, one must be prepared to

speculate whether it was the association with the 'lowly' business of mass entertainment or a more self-made fate encouraged by the elimination of the space. Overall it is fair to say that the modernist theatre design was increasingly out of step with what Reckwitz would call the activation of affect cultures and spaces and the economic emergence of an experiencing society (Pine & Gilmore, 1999; Schulze, 1992). This shift toward immersive environments that become subject-object networks is illustrated in theatre owners' reflections as seen in the following quotation:

> At National Amusements, we began to work on our own upscale movie going experience years ago, believing that it should be as wonderful if not more wonderful than the movie itself. Our patrons were becoming increasingly sophisticated, with higher expectations (and lower patience) than ever before. [...] We wanted to exceed those expectations with luxury ambience and service, including reserved seating, online ticketing, a concierge desk and other amenities.
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> REDSTONE, 2004, p. 398

4 Art Cinema as a Distinct Format

Art-house cinema was certainly a commercial-business strategy before being marked as provision of 'non-entertaining' cinema and a strategy that would secure the 'sure seater' as subscription business model:

> The art house of the late 1940s differed considerably from its mainstream competitors, even beyond the difference in the source of films. Art houses presented a single feature, while Hollywood theatres continued with the double feature began a decade earlier. Art houses did not hawk popcorn; if any food was sold it was coffee, tea, cakes, or light sandwiches. The seats were new and the ushers stressed politeness and seriousness; no talking was permitted during the screening of a serious art film. And for this art theatres charged the highest prices of any movie theatre, prices equal to (and sometimes higher) than those found on Broadway. The wealthy patrons of the average art theatre could easily afford it.
>
> GOMERY, 1992, p. 186

What were the incentives for the art-house theatres to emerge and spread? Firstly, European movie production (in which the US invested due to economic

postwar negotiations) was back and provided imports. Secondly, the format addressed the auteur movement, which spilled over to North America from Europe at that time. Thirdly, after the war many more young people attended college and university, forming a consumption group with distinctive tastes. Finally, the decades of art-house emergence were prosperous economic times with US citizens having discretionary income for leisure consumption. Setting up or converting theatres in the large cities with university communities resulted in over thousand art-house venues with relatively stable audiences. The business model illustrates traits of the early culturalization of the bigger city, as illustrated for a New York theatre by the French Pathé group opening in 1948:

> The lounge of the new Paris [theatre-A.V.], placed beneath the foyer-lobby area, was a simply appointed home-like room of modern furnishings. Tea, coffee, bouillon, and little cakes were served at no extra charge. Patrons were also encouraged to use the room to play bridge, chess, or backgammon or to inspect the products of French industry in glass-enclosed cases. The auditorium of the new Paris was grey in tone, exuding a tasteful Bauhaus style not to be confused with the garishness of the Roxy or Paramount movie palaces only blocks away. This was a posh house—the entrance vestibule was set into a limestone façade with a marble base—set in one of the most upscale locations in New York City.
>
> GOMERY, 1992, p. 184

The patrons were the early bohemians of the twentieth century (discussed in Chapter 2). Gomery's observations suggest a shift away from the contemplative culture of the intellectuals:

> Generally, audience studies found that art theatres attracted persons of above-average education, more men than women, and many solitary movie-goers. This was the crowd who attended the opera, theatre, lectures, and ballet. They continued to listen to radio for its classical music, while not even purchasing a television set. They read the New Yorker, Harpers, the Atlantic, and the Reporter as well as many newspapers and publications devoted to fine arts and literature. Their favorite paper was the New York Times, even if they did not live in New York. These were professionals, managers, or aspiring 'eggheads'. Indeed, one of the constants of the art cinema of the 1950s was the painting gallery in the lobby.
>
> GOMERY, 1992, p. 189

Art-house was included in early gentrification strategies and was co-conditioned by more relaxing censorship rules, art-movie production, and the newly established film studies departments which all helped cinema to institute itself as an art (Baumann, 2001).[8] The format was regarded as non-profitable from the 1970s onward, which marks a time of heightened social, political, and aesthetic movement activities. Gomery, who solely focuses on commercial cinema, writes that "New York City continued to set trends, and by the late 1980s that trend was art films playing nearly exclusively in nonprofit venues" (Gomery, 1992, pp. 193–195). Observing art-house cinema moving into nonprofit arts organizations, which were frequently associated with the strategies of the counter-culture (MacKenzie, 2014), the development does not mark the decline of the format but a different logic of exploitation, which eventually, through eventization, would return to the cinema value chain. At the format level, the nonprofit-configured served as an affordance for individuals and collectives to move into an environment that fostered art for art's sake attitudes and aesthetic practices, while circulation involved more heterogeneous actors and sites, such as museums, educational centers, university auditoria and culture-diplomacy organizations (e.g., Japan Society, Alliance Française and the Goethe Institute).

Through this, the art-house format became dissociated in business history from business itself but not necessarily from economic and entrepreneurial pursuit, as manifestos concerned with commerce, circulation, and financial income and support evidence (MacKenzie, 2014). During this period, de Valck calls it 'the age of the programmer', film festivals start spreading more intensively, beginning to arrange, in collaboration with aforementioned actors the art of the counter culture and in many spaces, the postcolonial critique which accompanied it. An important source for attention on cinema was the repertory film movement which provided access to 'film classics', thus aiding canon formation and building recognition in the sense that makes art engender permanent forms for its circulation. Small enterprises, more generally, were at that time economically extinguished with the spread of home-video technology (Gomery, 1992, pp. 193–195). This technology, however, also paved the way

8 With regard to education, several factors play a role: growth of education levels; returning soldiers from Europe demanding European movies based on their acquired tastes overseas; and the move of the avant-garde from Europe to New York. Art film also proliferated as foreign film, under European laws encouraging Hollywood to set up local production in European countries following trade and financial remittance regulations. Film critics, who became the new gatekeepers, see the excellent analysis by Shyon Baumann (2007).

of cinematic art into the museum through spawning installation and video art, which the classical format of exhibition could not handle.

5 Clubs and Fests

Small event spaces are places where enthusiasm is spread par excellence. If we were to continue with Gomery's insightful business history we would have had reached the end of format analysis:

> This book is a business history. […] As a consequence, readers seeing information and analysis of nonprofit institutions need to look elsewhere. That is not to say that such sites for film presentation are not important. They are. But consideration of them would constitute a separate book, one not grounded in business history but in the social history of art.
>
> GOMERY, 1992, p. XVIII[9]

This suggests that non-profit organizers cannot be savvy entrepreneurs and also neglects the reality of cross-sector format emulation. The US American art-house format, for example, was part of a larger ecology for cinema in which "[l]ittle cinemas, ethnic theatres, newsreel theaters, upscale sub run theaters, and private film venues (such as film societies and museum showings) all influenced the growth and shape of the art house movement" (Wilinsky, 2001, p. 56). In this section, I describe some key characteristics of film clubs and film societies and their relation to festivals. Clubs and societies provide spaces for the associational world, which has seen little documentation that would help us with a deeper understanding of the institutional arrangements between clubs, cultural policy offices and industry actors. At the Cannes Film Festival in 1947, film societies formed the Federation Internationale des Ciné-Clubs (FICC). Today, there are still many regional and national associations of film societies and film clubs, yet little appears to be published about and by them, including by film festival scholars. From the few available sources I gather that some of the origins of these organizations can be found in private film clubs, which as membership organizations could be commercial or non-profit and have the permission to show films in uncensored version. Clubs and societies

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9 Industry guidebooks typically limit the notion of exhibition to "commercial presentation of a film for the public" (Levy, 2013, p. 286), sometimes displaying a rough list of 'important' film festivals. In exceptional cases, the film festival appears at equal footing with movie marketing and market research (e.g., Montal, 2004).

fall across the spectrum of entertainment (associated with niche tastes) and education. The earliest film societies were established in Paris and London in the 1920s. Art societies have been run more generally by many different roles in the art worlds; today they seem to be associated frequently with educational institutions, especially universities and museums. In many instances, film societies provide the point of origin for events as well as the organizational cache for them, including governance and membership support. The few sources of systematic discussions that I found can illuminate the question of format.

For France, Colin Crisp (1993, p. 228) shows ciné-clubs emerging from discussion groups by filmmakers, critics, and other artist and intellectual groups in the early 1920s, many of which appeared to be international collaborative gatherings. While in the 1920s the format opened to non-artist audiences for the purpose of public film education, in the 1930s it started the ciné-club movement. 'Social art' presentation and discussion formed a bulk of such activities and were left untouched by the authorities as long as the uncensored movie consumption was not seen as serious threat the mass market.[10] A study on film clubs in East Germany (Becker & Petzold, 2001) shows that the nation-wide movement lasted about twenty decades longer than its West German counterpart, where the number of clubs started to decline around 1971, a time when the umbrella association was dissolved and when communal cinemas adopted the film clubs' mission in interchange with a new grants-economic design for support of public arts. East Germany had 73 clubs in 1956, continuing with 500 in 1989. The movement was killed off not only by post-1989 consumption changes but was disrupted by the privatization of the entire former public cinema sector encouraged by a government decree. Film club movements are niche cultures and as such less visible than eventive forms.

Notably, both art-house theatre and film clubs are formats which 'arrangers' can easily insert into other formats, a circumstance that confirms Wilinsky's point about format versatility. This can be seen in multiplexes where one or two small theatres are reserved for cinema understood as art or 'difficult', and associated with a cinephile group atmosphere. Film clubs provide for social encounters around informal groups and spontaneous and regular get-togethers. Festivals' cooperative relationships with film societies and clubs have included the provision of awards for festival-exhibited art. Film societies and clubs are affordances for cinephiles to come together to watch and discuss movies. As formats of art connoisseurship, they seem to provide to festival arranger's an

10 In the mid-sixties, the French association of ciné-clubs sold tickets that made roughly a share of three percent of total commercial exhibition a year.

important element being absent from art-house cinema, which is their specific notion of being an experience space for several co-creating roles, albeit in a contemplative setting. In clubs' operations there is a co-presence of art object, audiences and artists (the status of which depends on the resources of the club) sharing the experience. This arrangement is conducive to art consecration in a mode of concentrated attention, favoring intellectual encounters and focus on film. Here lies the difference between the public viewing order of the club format vis-à-vis the classical format.

6 The Arrival of the Festival Format

This last section is by necessity a rough outline of major format modifications, neglecting national and regional differences which film festival research scrutinizes. This outline should suffice to show that comparative analysis of arrangers provides valid observations for the asserted shift in the social regime of the novel to the combined regime of N2 and N3, as explained in Chapter 2. I proceed in comparative manner, summarizing the specifics of the already discussed formats, thereby shaping the specificity of the festival format.

Starting with the classical format, its underlying early aesthetic sociality generates a two-way artist/art object-audience relation, represented ideal-typically by the bourgeois theatre form. The asymmetry pertaining to this relationship includes a passive but focused audience holding expectations for surprises ('sitting in the dark') rather than expectations for co-participation. Audience surveys serve to improve the 'service' as optimizing strategies. Aesthetic mobilization is muted; attention to the aesthetically novel is guided by the notion of 'originality' and 'novelty' under a fairly simple time regime of 'not seen before'. Price discrimination tactics, where they exist, involved the temporalization of novelty ('the later you watch the less you pay'). The multiplex, resting on a strategy of reading differences into the public, will later fine-tune the match between products and group-specific tastes and address the 'omnivore taste' that has become a sign of postmodern consumption. The key exhibition space is the public viewing room regardless of the experimentation with 'exotic' facades and other props to enhance atmospheres. Later-twentieth century practices of exhibition entrepreneurs targeted the interior as an experience space. Earlier business models lured audiences into theatres by providing cues to connect to other cultural consumption experiences, but the overall mode of attention was that of concentration on the presented art.

The major shift towards 'dispersed attention' began with the multiplex—a postmodern building style (Klingmann, 2007) and an interior which open up

the cinema space for a heterogeneous audience with tastes to simultaneously appeal to as well as to shape. Demands for co-creativity focused on what was surrounding the cinema experience rather than building the latter into the immersive environment. Still, it moved cinema as art form closer to the global practices for consumer goods (for current exhibition geography and modes see Hubbard, 2002; Klinger, 2006).

Looking at the art-house format, we find a similar aesthetic sociality, ensuring concentrated attention while variegating the 'cultural experience' around the notion of educated taste and display of the arts rather than just the cinema experience. This sub-format of classical theatre also competes with other public and community organizations for audience attention, thereby suggesting an organized domain of art experience-producing organizations. Today we recognize this environment as a mature arts-nonprofit division of labor. Utilizing Reckwitz's general outline we can observe film clubs as formats providing some co-creative space, introducing singular goods while also activating the audience as an engaged and knowing one in the discourses about art and artist. Film societies and clubs were the products of democracy-demanding movements in the arts and contrast with the classical and original art-house format in that film screenings would be typically accompanied by film introductions and post-screening discussions in the space of the theatre. Their common concern is, however, the 'restricted art', which film clubs and societies valorize by a temporality that differs from the commercial-circuit schedules: concentrating on discovering the canon and the classics and intentionally contributing to the nurturing of a film distinctly as 'culture' rather than a novelty, which marks them as participants in the long-term valorization of art.

The incorporation of film-club format elements into film festivals awaits further investigation as to how it came about, but with the available material we can tentatively say that the trend appears to be gradual, from the early 1960s onward, with film societies providing programs (called specialized and thematic) and eventually de-linking the notion of celebration from the solemnity of an intellectual hobby and a certain kind of "academism" (Leca et al., 2015, p. 180). Film festivals, writes de Valck, "instead of ciné-clubs and film societies flourished. Meanwhile, avant-garde films, experimental movies, and political cinema would re-emerge at these events as 'specialized' and 'thematic programming', particularly from the early 1960s onward" (2007, p. 26). When compared to art-house and classical exhibition, clubs and societies must be recognized as identity-based organizations aiding communal and fan sentiments, while the earlier discussed formats for sociality are based on the reference group as underlying logic of sociation. While many festivals are still organized by membership organizations, the criterion of membership is

secondary to experience-making for the general public, just as membership has become less central to other associational activity (Putnam, 2000).

In film festivals, civic audiences are considered as necessary but not sufficient. The curation is aimed at the production and verification of the presented novelty. As the media crucially expands and starts to represent the audiences, paralleling their expectations on surprises, the format is distinctly configured by the logic of dispersed attention. Audiences, critics, and the media link are resources for others made available by the arranger. Mediatization takes film festivals perhaps farthest away from the classical formats, as it bundles the novelties that media can exploit. This relationship (A—M in Reckwitz's terms, see Chapter 2) is articulated in the following:

> Festivals that contain this thrill of local experience are still with us; but what has, for the most part, vanished in many places are festivals that are only local, and tailored specifically to the characteristics of such a (usually grateful) reception of world cinema.
>
> MARTIN, 2009, p. 100

Format difference can be sharpened further by drawing on Reckwitz's notions of aesthetic episodes and aesthetic practices. Aesthetic practices "always hold—frequently implicit—aesthetic knowledge and cultural schemes that predispose the production and reception of aesthetic events" (Reckwitz, 2014a, p. 29). Cinema formats with a fixed or 'disciplining' viewing order are geared toward episodes; aesthetic practices require an activated audience. The festival not only tends to rely on predefined 'taste groups', it also mobilizes curatorial capabilities associated with its 'arranger' function for the activation of audiences in a life setting. This does not exclude the various practices of cultivating audiences throughout the year but the efficacy of the format derives from a confluence of social and aesthetic forces represented in diffuse audience diversity (Dayan, 2000, p. 49).

Although both aesthetic episodes and practices are important for the festival as an arranger, it is possible to formulate the classical format as weighing in on the episode whereas the festival curating aesthetic practices and being, of course, a set of aesthetic practices as an occupational form. Festivals also aim to make the movie an object accessible as a social space, a mise-en-scène that captures 'the people behind the movie' by 'inserting' them in interactive spaces.[11] Paul DiMaggio refers to the spontaneous, more temporal and informal

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11 To illustrate with fellow researchers' observations: "Here the festivalgoer, whatever his or her status, is confronted with a vast array of art works, with heterogeneous cultural

although public and semi-public performances of the many "unincorporated associations" of the art worlds as "minimalist organizations" (2006, p. 433).

Film festival curation incorporates such spontaneity through curatorial work, importantly so without diminishing the immersive properties of the cinema experience. As work stars, as performance stars, and in form of aesthetically-oriented audiences, the experience of creativity and experience-making participation can be asserted in a participative culture, such as in workshops for the co-creative and creative which recycles the tradition of experimental and avant-garde cinema without necessarily incorporating or mobilizing the associated political values. Performed acts of creativity include what elsewhere would be mundane industry work, such as when film festivals put on filmmaker competitions in form of '48-hour challenges' and alike. This feature of eventive aesthetic practices resonates with the emergence of a theorized creative subject in the period of the creativity dispositif. Via play, actions take on the same urgency salient to the industry, which, described by 'time flies' as a property of creative goods production, characterizes the festival as much as the 'infinite variety' does (cf. Caves, 2000).

The format of film festivals has a precursor in Walt Disney's amusement park design. As shown by Joseph Chytry (2012), Disney designed the movie-production studio site as an 'immersive environment', expanding to the famous theme park, and aiming for the making of a larger experience economy, drawing educational institutions and urban developments into the effort. Wanting to create the conditions for 'emotional communities', offering fuller immersion than the classical format could accomplish, Disney's theme park is no less than the attempt of total immersion, the movie literally taking over the entire (curatorial) space. Related to the founder's ideas and mission, Disneyland is centered on certain positive values such as optimism, excitement, happiness, etc., all of which he deemed of great importance to childhood and adolescent-youth experience—but not separable from profitable amusement.

The comparison with the format of the film festival underscores that an activated creative subjectivity can be a deep and variable resource. Building immersive environments should be associated more broadly with the mission

references and cinematographic codes, with stars, unknown performers, directors and critics. What we call 'Cannes' is the simultaneous presence of a selected group of films, representative of the whole cinema, of peculiar forms of sociability and of certain celebratory rituals" (Fabiani, 2011, p. 97). Sociologists have argued that contemporary festivals are 'more open' spaces which de-traditionalize the arts and provide opportunities for enactment of a cosmopolitan identity (Giorgi et al., 2011) but also conspicuous display of that identity (Regev, 2011).

of arrangers to craft or curate a *Gesamtkunstwerk* that can provide singular experiences. Applied to festival curators, the organizer—qua ingenuity, creativity, and learning from others— will map out this imagined space by giving the event a name, picking genre and film style, and substantiating this imagined 'zone of appearances' by layering it with programmed events. Event production aims for a number of interrelated events which are established elements of cinema practice and, more recently, of social media culture, while not excluding hospitality forms outside the art field. In festival-event space everything seems possible: the performance of cinema manifestos (MacKenzie, 2014), the validation of specific film tradition (e.g., in master classes), the provision of 'the right kind of' atmosphere for creative production (e.g., young talent workshops), educational segments for children, and much more. As much as these are curatorial designs, there is a quality of mimetic adoption and recombination of a range of resources, which will be combined into an affordance for others to discover novelties (cf. Edwards & Skerbelis, 2012), a phenomenon I tackle in Chapter 4.

Finally, there is an important temporal dimension to the format of festivals, articulated by Janet Harbord as "condensed structure" making the "here and the now of viewing crucially important". According to her, the festival "give[s] urgency to the viewing of film in an historical context in which the public release of film is no longer a necessarily compelling event of itself".[12] Contingency "affords a singularity to the experience" (Harbord, 2009, p. 44). This, in essence, describes the dynamics of the associated experience-economy as set in motion by the seasonal return of festivals as experience-makers, combining what Boltanski and Esquerre call collection and trend forms (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020), but doing so with the means of curated immersive environments. Festivals, in fact, highlight the importance of the trend form which these sociologists actually make quite secondary to the collection form (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020). In light of contingency and urgency as markers of festivals' atmospheric charge, particularly film clubs appear as disconnected from the experience-making business, being on their own 'intellectual' time and looking more narrowly to repetition and repertoire, rather than the novelty and the moment afforded by the 'mixing' of collections and trends, as done in successful and resource-richer film festivals, a population that definitely varies as to the emphasis its organizations place on temporal characteristics in relation to cinema as an experience good.

12 Harbord detects resistance to the "oppressive rationalization of experience as knowable, linear and recordable" in the festival.

7 The Cultural Technique of Cinema

In this last section I want to address scholars' appraisal for their 'critical intervention' (Jim McGuigan) in relation to format traits, such as similarity drawn with a Greek amphi-theatre (Fabiani, 2011)(see also MacKenzie, 2014). Art practitioners, among them festival directors, however, have also attacked the festival format as suboptimal, where promotion of independent cinema as economically viable art is concerned. The vocal critic Henrik Gass, festival director of the Oberhausen International Short Film Festival, calls the festival an 'institution in crisis' (Gass, 2012a), festival researcher Stevens similarly suggesting the phenomenon is "nearing a crisis point" because of "dropping standards, increased commerciality and a confusion of competing and colluding events" (2011, p. 141). Gass calls for a cinema museum in order to rescue cinema as a cultural technique (see Bismuth et al., 2008). The former artistic director of the Edinburgh International Film Festival, Mark Cousins, even flagged the issue in a one-page manifesto, in which he disparaged "too much competition, prices, and entertainment" and wished for a format without 'red carpet, limos, and VIP rooms' as well as advocating a return to communal festivity (Cousins, 2012). Gass related his critique in a number of media articles and a long essay (Gass, 2009, 2012a, 2012b), emphasizing that theatrical exhibition (the classical format) has become a mere 'window of commercial exploitation' before the movie circulates in what formerly were the ancillary markets (mainly home entertainment). Critiquing home entertainment as corrosive to cinema as the established public viewing order, he remarks that a film 'which I can manipulate individually any time so that it can be at my services, has entered a new economy of consumption altogether' and is no longer controlled by the artist (Gass, 2012a, pp. 33–34). The charge is somewhat obfuscated by the fact that he must acknowledge video's contribution to film (history) preservation; yet, his point about the interaction between format and audience behavior (television creating a 'voter economy') resonates with art-sociological critique (Bourdieu, 1984). Gass's insights resonate with Reckwitz's claim that formats are embedded in logics of the new and certain modes of attention. Both Cousins and Gass admonish the inflationary and elitist tendencies of festivals as failed curatorship and latter's willful loss of the extramundane or 'the sacred'. Furthermore, such failing festivals 'create consumption groups' rather than unstructured groups (Gass, 2012a). Where they differ is Cousins's wish for a communal format and the values of associational society supported by a curated history, which contrasts with Gass's wish to musealize cinema to exploit the logic of the museum for the artistic and commercial gains of cinema. Yet, Gass is made to realize in his own discussion that the museum, the white cube which

contrasts with cinema as black box, may not provide the right setting for the appreciation of cinema as distinctive art:

> What cinema has to learn from the museum again is basically the possibility of verbal exchange and a critical discourse; what the museum has to learn from the cinema again is the experience of a collective gathered and absorbed by the image.
>
> Gass in BISMUTH et al., 2008, p. 159

In the larger report on cinema museums where Gass reveals these ideas (Bismuth et al., 2008) we can discern empirical observations for differences between bourgeois and postmodern art fields as argued by Reckwitz: concentration vs. distraction in curated space, active vs. passive audiences, mobility vs. immobility of art, and the format of the black box vs. the white cube. Museums de-link the image from the specific medium from which they originate. This is a dilemma the debate does not seem to have solved in the course of the 2007 seminar (happening at the Oberhausen festival). Ultimately, Gass appears to want to rescue the cinema by musealization (Gass, 2012a, 2015), which increases the potential to curate collections but decreases the potential to intervene by shaping trends, which the film festivals has mastered to do. At the same time, his argument suggests the problem elsewhere, namely in the economic logic of the festivals run on grants-economic support,[13] leading to what he and others have attacked as 'ghettoization of cinema' (De Valck, 2007). The tragedy of the moving image as a dying public art is a seriously held collective belief supported by a grants-economic structure which may adjust to the global pandemic scenario, in which festivals were forced online as events, thereby deleting some of the immersive features that provided competition to other formats as special form of sociation, not just 'spectacle' (De Valck & Damiens, 2020). Do festivals offer a 'bazaar' of cinema or engage in 'quality programming'? This I have to leave for Gass's colleagues to judge, but his is certainly an artistic critique that aims to engage with the vital economic issues of artistic production, calling for an economic-sociological perspective on festivalization.

13 As Frodon writes on festivals as economic phenomenon: "To top it all off, there now arises the fact that festivals are being turned into markets—not markets to sell film rights, a some of them became since the late 1950s, but direct income sources for rights owners. [...] it has become apparent that festivals, together with other alternative distribution tools, may economically support the worldwide artistic dynamism of cinema" (2013, p. 205).

Conclusion of Part 1

I presented the major findings of film festival research, including the results of qualitative case studies and the quantitative description of the global film festival population. A population marked by organizational heterogeneity with respect to various indicators, including high concentration in particular world regions and depth of relationships with other actors of the cinema field, can be shown to exist as first empirical reference of festivalization in the cinema field. The analysis of theatrical exhibition provided further evidence that formats are involved in festivalization and that in the broader process of the aestheticization of society as supported by a creativity dispositif these formats are superior to other formats for characteristics associated with the postmodern art field. In this sense, they are also established as typical structural roles in an art field that is connected to the dispositif of creativity. I also showed that the analytic interest in the phenomenon is quite recent, and that social science can contribute to explaining eventization in organizational fields with creativity being of key economic and social value. To this end, I provided the outline of a meta-theoretical framework as furnished by Reckwitz's work on aesthetic capitalism.

I also addressed the existing literature on film festivals in terms of its own criticisms. While often intended to address inequality concerns, it takes the shape of an artistic rather a social critique. This leads me to emphasize that that sociological research can produce the conditions for a social critique, granted that empirical gaps such as the systematic study of work and valuation processes are approached with suitable analytic tools. The outline of the creativity dispositif theory aimed to show that the theory works well to explain the eventive character of the phenomenon but not so well in terms of situating the arranger' role as part of a division of labor and with respect to the explaining that needs to be done with respect to the arts-nonprofit organization. Looking at Reckwitz's discussion of governmentality and the cultural imaginary, I have briefly addressed the lacking explanation for the legitimacy of this order as well as the aura of positivity that is not nearly as well explained as the reversal of modernity's affect deficiency. I suggested that this gap can be closed by developing a tentative theory of philanthropy as the driver of this historically specific positive affectivity, an argument that this book seeks to construct in the course of several steps and within the framework of a capitalist theory that takes into account nonprofit logic and grants-economic processes.

My empirical exploration by means of secondary literature also reveals that social relationships transform across formats for public exposure to art,

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facilitating different configurations of the human group and the understandings of the publics. In this sense, format variation results in variability in sociation, constrained or enabled by certain environmental dimensions including material and immaterialities. The formats which give expression to a focused or concentrated mode of attention ideal-typically arrange the inspirational quality of the single object. Those that disperse attention may have been altered intentionally or non-intentionally bringing other values into play. Eventization in cinema exhibition may be understood as phenomenon of critical transition in field evolution, when film clubs strategized for various reasons to adopt a festivalesque format. Yet, why were film clubs, quite similar with respect to festivals' social dynamics, moved into the background of cinema activities? Why has the festival format become such a dominant part of cultural organization? For both empirical and further theoretical analysis of such shifts, the distinctions Reckwitz's analytic construct (not its history—which is rich and compelling) furnishes are too basic. Therefore, I will also introduce the theory of the third spirit of capitalism to address the plurality of value orders, their conflicts and compromises in interaction, and which I believe can support this study of valuation (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b). This framework ('orders of worth') will be presented in Part 3 and applied in chapters of Parts 3 and 4.

In the following Part 2, I engage with festival researchers' propositions of intermediation and isomorphism in the film festival. I make the explicit shift to tools of economic sociology and institutional-organizational analysis, moving from praxeological understandings of the studied art phenomenon to matters of economic coordination. The goal is to pinpoint the role of nonprofit experience-making in economic coordination, thereby giving Reckwitz's arranger a role in the real economy. Some have argued (Stevens, 2011, p. 143) that the organizational population sustains itself by ongoing aesthetic differentiation but I will add to it that the eventive nonprofit serves as an important structural mechanism in the process of aestheticization.

PART 2

Devices

CHAPTER 4

Mimetic Adoption and Social Capital

This chapter prepares the ground for valuation-sociological and economic-sociological perspectives on film festivals as participants to economic coordination. Exploring questions such as how one can conceptualize intermediation by arts nonprofits producing seasonal events, how the upsurge of such organizations in many industries can be explained, and how the 'infinite variety' of film festival productions can be made sense of, the chapter starts with the introduction of the first organizational hypothesis on events (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). Providing an opening for the connection between this institutional approach and poststructuralist theory (Moebius & Reckwitz, 2018), it shows how 'aesthetic rationalization' can be grasped at the level of art worlds and arts nonprofits by engaging formal organizational analysis. The chapter demonstrates that mimetic processes and the production of social capital are related to the spread of nonprofit events according to a logic of 'cultural economism' (Reckwitz, 2017a, pp. 150–151). Marketization occurs across many practices while the market form has changed, which Chapter 4 discusses with respect to the ubiquity of the eventive nonprofit form. This conceptual shaping of the organizations of Reckwitz's aesthetic capitalism leads to the discussion of their economic behaviors and functions in Chapter 5, where I present Karpik's framework (2010) as a means to illuminate the market form of film festival intermediation and its arranger qualities. Chapter 6 adds further to analysis, by putting the intermediary hypothesis (see Chapter 1) to a statistical test. Combining a movie-performance model for festival participation with a sample of US movies participating in film festivals, I provide evidence for a 'festival effect'. Moving from cultural sociology to economic and organizational sociology, the chapters ascertain Reckwitz's claim that the postmodern art field has indeed become the resource-rich center of society.

1 Festival Events and Field Configuration

The concept of the 'field-configuring event' (abbreviated to FCE hereafter) originates from Joseph Lampel and Alan Meyer's essay (2008) and is incorporated in further work by Lampel on 'value negotiations' in cultural-economic contexts (Moeran & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2011). The FCE hypothesis, the study of phenomena such as conferences, business conventions, award

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ceremonies, professionals' associational gatherings, technology contests, festivals, and trade fairs are brought into an organizational-sociological perspective. The hypothesis follows upon earlier discussions of 'industry events'. Third parties (Lampel & Shamsie, 2000) are formulated as 'industry institutions' emerging in response to high consumer (buyer) uncertainty. They are credible as actors facilitating market exchange in situations of 'contestable quality standards' because they allegedly are not self-interested. Events provide unstructured opportunities for direct, social interaction, include ceremonial elements, foster information exchange and collective sense-making. They also 'generate social and reputational resources that the participants can take away with them' (Lampel & Meyer, 2008, p. 1026). The authors see a weak role for government despite the empirically observable presence of government actors in many of such events, including founding, financing and promotion. As will be addressed further below, Lampel and Meyer deviate from the older New Institutionalism, the foundation for their implicit model, as the state has a specific role in organizational fields (Jepperson & Meyer, 1991; Meyer et al., 1997; Poggi, 1978). Chapter 12 further below elucidates state participation in FCE activities more fully through the lens of 'culturalization' (Reckwitz, 2020).

Whereas business research conventionally explains innovation activity and rise of technologies, markets, industries, and professions by 'institutional imperatives', FCEs are presented as an alternative structuring mechanism which give 'greater scope of interaction' and provide for a space in which rules structuring mundane business contexts are purposefully relaxed, in part by aestheticizing practices. The event is portrayed by Lampel and Meyer as one that selects the outputs of all the "novel products, ideas, or actions that come to be valued within the field" and that the social space is "structured in conformity with the institutional logic of the field" (2008, pp. 1028–1029). This suggests the FCE as something like a resource for the 'learning organization' for creative entrepreneurs, or a 'commons for creativity' (Potts, 2019). According to the authors, the social presence of 'institutional entrepreneurs' (Kaghan & Lounsbury, 2011) and their tendency of mimicking established fields fosters the emergence of events. Lampel and Meyer propose field evolution as a consequence of interactions with lose or no commitment apparently involved ('meet', 'converse', 'explore', 'develop'). Whether an event can truly configure a field depends largely on the position of the event in the field. Either it has 'a mandate' to organize a field or is just a weakly legitimated organization that serves as a 'network hub'. Events are characterized by "overlapping circles, cliques, and groups" (Lampel & Meyer, 2008, pp. 1027–1028). These descriptions identify events as network phenomena (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b)

among other market-organizing actors (Ahrne et al., 2015). Empirical studies on film festivals can illustrate the various claims:

Charles-Clemens Rüling's study of the French Annecy Film Festival (2009) charts the transformation of this, originally, amateur festival into a later industry event. Starting as arts-communal event, the Annecy festival caught the attention during a particular era of television, when more animation inputs were needed for programming, of industry interests when the television industry came to demand more animation inputs. In response, the festival tilted more to the industry constituency while retaining the format of an art festival. Eventually becoming a broker for a global market of animation, it still does not control the generic classification, as animation categories are largely constructed by media-industry professionals (p. 203). EU Media Programme and other government organizations' activities mentioned illustrate that government is not just an 'external actor' (see on this festival more recently Leca et al., 2015).

A second case study is provided by Mazza and Strandgaard Pedersen (2008)'s study of the respective foundings of the Copenhagen International Film Festival and the Festa del Cinema di Roma in what were already well-developed national festival sectors. Unlike Rüling, who works with the FCE hypothesis, they address a different institutionalist argument, examining organizational behavior of 'late adopters'. The Italian festival is strategically audience-oriented festival and meant to become a civic fest in connection with a city politicians' patronage, whereas the Danish festival is the brain-child of an industrial policy initiative. Both cases show that festival foundings are oriented toward their institutional environments and mimetically adopt the International film festival format. Furthermore, the great variety of actor groups in the relatively uncertain founding of such festivals in competitive environments, including the state, is demonstrated and reflect what Lampel (2011) refers to as a uniquely 'open play of economic, social, and symbolic resources', including state, business, professional-associational and philanthropic organizations (Lampel, 2011).

Finally, Jonathan Dawson's study of Australia's Brisbane International Film Festival (1998) documents the growing thicket of policy bureaucracy pertaining to Queensland film culture as well as the industrial needs of a global 'off-shore' film industry. The festival becomes the format for organizing market-related activity (see also Van Hemert, 2016).

The first two studies are of theoretical interest as they show field structuration in action. Lampel and Meyer emphasize 'configuration' over 'structuration', which is the process of field emergence in the works of the original New Institutionalism in sociology and organizational analysis (Powell & DiMaggio,

1991, p. 65).[1] Lampel and Meyer want to emphasize field-formation processes as 'discontinuous and localized', with events providing critical thresholds for emergence. This resonates with cultural-sociological arguments on attention-regime dynamics specific to 'aesthetic capitalism' (Reckwitz, 2020). Meyer and Lampel retain the New Institutionalism's model of a field formation process as conditioned on community building and the growth of a 'common meaning system' and similarly argue the shift of institutional-entrepreneurial work toward activities fostering field replication in maturing fields (Lampel & Meyer, 2008, p. 1029).

Lampel rejects structuration as he wishes to emphasize entrepreneurial agency, which puts social capital into view (Lampel, 2011). An event participant in his perspective is more like 'an investor coming to present her resources and seeking out opportunities that allow her to exchange some of the resources at highest possible return conference-goer who has alienable and attached resources, the latter referring to symbolic and social capital'. Adopting an 'event habitus' while being able to distance herself for strategic activities is crucial for successful event immersion (Lampel, 2011, p. 341). This suggests an interpretation of Bourdieu's concept of the habitus which deviates from the intention of capturing a longer-term socialized disposition—cultural capital—in order to critique stratification and instituted elite power. In my view, Lampel's event entrepreneur has more cultural affinity with the 'project worker' of late-modern capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b) (see more in Chapter 7), as well as with Bourdieus's social capital (Bourdieu & Margareta, 2005, pp. 63–70). It reflects the trend that reputation value has shifted—albeit not completely—from cultural capital to social capital, and that the 'exchange rate' of conversion between cultural and economic capitals is based on a new formula in network capitalism (Castells, 1996).

While raising awareness about the event and adjusting institutional thinking about field formation, Lampel and Meyer have not laid open the institutional foundations that make event culture spread so widely and rapidly in our contemporary times. The assumption that there is continuity rather than an increase in events as theorized by the FCE hypothesis is not uncommon (e.g., Aspers & Darr, 2011). Compare (Aspers & Darr, 2011). But the way they spread today, their high similarity and pervasiveness, deserves special attention. Events have cropped up across organizational fields, virtually including

1 Structuration results from four processes: the increase in interactions among relevant actors, the formation of hierarchies as well as coalitions, a marked increase in information that must be processed by the field actors, and an emerging awareness of a common enterprise of sorts among the field participants.

anything from software and the car industry to retail and the markets for military equipment—even including government authorities (European Commission et al., 2016). The instrumental value of nonprofits defined as legitimate locations for seekers of social capital is not exclusive to fields of cultural production but a standard element in making markets, as the various literatures on economic development, national innovation policy, and global governance show (OECD, 1999).

The rise in festivals and other eventive formats of social action are also more than sites of exchange for social capital, as their 'relaxed rules' (Lampel, 2011) are not simple illicit offerings but take on the traits associated with affective positivity culture (see Chapter 2). What, then, happens if rules, behaviors and presumably attitudes and communication are simultaneously relaxed? In the following, I examine the conditions for events to provide 'open play of economic, social, and symbolic resources' and for the valuation and mutual conversion of such resources (or capitals) as something that can happen 'more directly than in markets and firms without being considered illegitimate' (Lampel, 2011). I begin with the view from Europe, a host of many events.

2 Collusion and Conviviality in Field-Configuring Events

Toward the end of the twentieth century, representatives of 250 film and media film festivals from 25 EU member-states came to form an association (ca. 1995–2006) on the basis of a commonly held belief that festivals serve small production companies as meeting points across national industries, to "allow the interchange of ideas and the old corridor culture that existed in some of the large production houses" (see European Coordination of Film Festivals & OPTEM, 1999, p. 91). This association was not sustained, as the European Commission turned toward a different policy agenda, which included the encouragement of collaborative networks (Krainhöfer, 2019) of the kind that have developed in many industries as knowledge exchanges, contrasting with organizational field emergence as professionalization projects (DiMaggio, 1991).

In such fields, which include many social services and creative/cultural industries, collective bargaining associations have been notably absent (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020; Moeran & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2011). As common historical forms of sociation, they aim promote the common interest that the members of associations define collectively and stifle direct competition (Scott & Meyer in Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 127). Petitioning the European Commission, the grant-maker, proved unsuccessful—a conflict between film professionals and policy makers that has yet to be studied. With a critical eye,

festival researcher Rhyne detects the strong interest of the state in festival promotion, writing that a festival is an

> … administrative structure that replaces direct government control with more subtly regulatory features and allows corporate interest to capitalize on festival events with a minimum of investment, all the while creating a network of organizations that manage themselves through a competition for resources and prestige.
>
> RHYNE, 2009, p. 20

This contrasts with the view that nonprofits arise where markets cannot handle minority needs and wants (Weisbrod, 1988). In a society of singularities (Reckwitz, 2020), however, public subsidization observably concerns the support of a large variety of minority and majority demands that may not be economically successful but culturally legitimate (Martinez-Ruiz, Jimenez-Zarco, & Alvarez-Herranz, 2011). Event nonprofits differ from common associations for industry and trades (Ahrne et al., 2015) by being longer peripheral to the exchanges themselves. Instead, they are at the center of valuation as fundamental uncertainty-reducing processes, a phenomenon that attracts business scholars to their study in the first place (Rüling & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2010). This suggests a change in market formats (Reckwitz, 2017a, p. 151). The understanding of nonprofit activities as opportunity spaces for 'capital conversion' leads to a strong alternative explanation.

Lampel's observation on the special opportunities for entrepreneurs resonates with Powell and DiMaggio's observations that in "the nonprofit sector, where legal barriers to collusion do not exist, structuration [of the organizational field—A.V.] may proceed even more rapidly" (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 72). These New Institutionalists observe shared board membership between arts and grant-maker organizations as an outcome of professional field-level mobility. They see them as central to fields, serving as active or passive models, while their "policies and structures will be copied throughout their fields", with career mobility reinforcing further structuration (cf. Giridharadas, 2019). This goes beyond 'community-building and symbolic meaning-making', stressing professional group behavior (DiMaggio, 1991) as a central force, which they conceptualize as 'normative isomorphism'.

Boltanski and Esquerre have recently shown for France that the event sector has a labor force of precariously living cultural workers with various degrees of professionality and professionalisms involved (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020, p. 447). This raises the question as to whether the thesis of normative isomorphism as driver of field formation still applies in the same way in an age of

eventization, as curated events seem to induce a specific form of social capital—'instantaneous social capital' of the kind that potentially increases trust through shared cultural encounters but will not necessarily result in generalized trust, as the social encounters are ephemeral in nature (Attanasi et al., 2013). To recall, FCEs are "arenas in which networks are constructed, business cards are exchanged, reputations are advanced, deals are struck, news is shared, accomplishments are recognized, standards are set, and dominant designs are selected" (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). Providing 'instantaneous social capital', they arguably are alternative mechanisms to normative isomorphism.

In his critique of the isomorphism thesis and the taken-for-granted character typically assigned to the processes of organizational (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), Joseph Galaskiewicz observes two types of collusion in corporate philanthropy, his case study pertaining to developments in the 1980s. These are 'contagion by cohesion' involving personal contact and, 'cohesion by structural equivalence' involving peer contacts. Reading Powell and DiMaggio, Lampel and Alan Meyer, and Galaskiewicz together, allows us to regard strategically placed nonprofit events banking on the eventful 'open play of actor resources' as offers of opportunities for collusion through high inter-connectivity shared by professionals and elites. This points to a historically specific dynamic between state, associational and market actors in late-modern capitalism.

Paul DiMaggio (2006, pp. 10–38) lists three types of explanations for the emergence of nonprofits which take us even closer to the formulation of why nonprofits are 'event animals' par excellence. Firstly, they emerge in the wake of market failure of interest in certain goods, including those that are public-private mixed goods (the classic explanation in nonprofit economic theorizing, see Weisbrod further up). Secondly, they arise due to a close identification (perhaps a homophily) between art and not-for-profit norms and values, and thirdly, because of naturalized expectations about how things get done (see for the arts also Chapters 14 and 15 in Caves, 2000). But the first seems to leave open why event nonprofits are seen everywhere regardless of the consumer demand, and the second does not reason the suggested affinity, which I believe must inspect the proposition for all types of art.

The third (as well as the second) addresses institutional models and logics, such as perhaps shown in art patronage which supports the 'disinterested artist' (Berra, 2008). In fact, here the affinity between arts and nonprofits emerges as the 'economy reversed' (Bourdieu, 1983, pp. 62, 67–68), as altruistic volunteering and grants-economic support for artists and arts nonprofits enable eventization and capacity to act as field-configuring mechanism.

From Susan Rose-Ackerman (1997)'s summary of reasons for actors choosing the nonprofit form, the following seem relevant to our discussion: Firstly,

'sanctified' by legal treatment, the profit motive is encouraged by tax exemption as a positive, thus encouraging sanction. Secondly, nonprofit organizers have 'strong and particular beliefs', experimenting with ideas that may be unpopular but still legitimate and in pursuit of societal goals. Thirdly, individuals who want that their 'ideas outlive them' are often nonprofit entrepreneurs, as can be seen in elite philanthropy. Finally, altruistically motivated workers will prefer lower pay in exchange for freedom to pursuit ideational goals, which means that a 'quality advantage turns into cost advantage' for those who hire them. These earlier formulations observe nonprofits just as the eventization of nonprofits and the economy of global connectivity unfold.

The societal theories of 'aesthetic capitalism' are better equipped to make the late-modern ubiquity of these phenomena plausible. Nonprofit and charitable action share with creative forms the affective positivity culture, but have not been 'aestheticized' until quite recently. Indeed, many nonprofits are still more prone to do 'project' rather than curated 'event work'. Film festivals are among the arts nonprofits that aesthetically heighten social activities of more routine forms and formats, bringing out 'show value' (Böhme, 2017). If the creativity dispositif thesis of a spreading dogma and ideal of creativity is correct, we should find ever more aestheticized versions of nonprofits belonging to an economy of 'emotional care' shaped by modernity framed by affect deficiency. The key lies in understanding what drove charity to rationalize and nonprofits to become eventive.

In the following, I will argue that two structural forces were instrumental in institutionalizing the event-producing nonprofit as capable actor in economic coordination regimes. The first is related to the privatization of welfare functions (including both cultural and social policy) and concerns configurations in the nonprofit-organizational population more generally. The second concerns the transformation of cultural meanings altering opportunities for organizations to adopt economic-coordination roles, among them eventive cultural intermediation.

The first structural force emerges from extensive analysis of nonprofits in the San Francisco Bay Area, in which Hokyu Hwang and Walter Powell (2009) account for observable formalization of associational activities that came to replace 'charitable do-gooders' with 'enterprising individuals'. Formalization is encouraged by a change in funding logics, which in the Post-Keynesian Welfare State means the shift toward measures of tax exemption and subsidization (away from outright allocation, (Polanyi, 1957)). Concomitantly, large-scale diffusion of business models into the world of nonprofit activities, leading to nonprofit management as academic and professionalized set of practices, was set in motion. Film festival studies have contributed evidence for this trend,

relating it to donor influence and curbing of grassroots democracy as well as artist and curator autonomy (e.g., Gamson, 1996). Hwang and Powell not only observe opportunities for certain occupational groups from these changes but also the growth of the nonprofit sector, evident in the rise of a renumerated, employed workforce and the emergence of specialized labor markets. They note that this formalization has blurred sectorial lines between economic forms (see also Brandl & Bullinger, 2009; Maier et al., 2016). Based on local data, they effectively observe the making of administrative structure and find out about processes, which we can see even more sharply today across the global nonprofit world, including professional strongholds such as social work (Zavirsek, 1995).

Hwang and Powell do not neatly separate the 'rationalization of charity' from a 'rationalization of philanthropy', which are intertwined processes brokered by professionalized fundraising consultants and other professions (Vogel, 2002) . While governments may reap the benefits of such transformed organizations, as they help to realize important welfare goals (see Chapter 13), Hwang and Powell actually find that philanthropic foundations and their 'program assessment requirements' encourage formalization. Nevertheless, this must be seen in the context of legal-rational activities by the state, such as in nonprofit law and taxation.

Today, the rationalization process is globally visible in the processes pertaining to 'global civil society', a cross-regional spread of nonprofit organizations and international non-governmental organizations which emerge around particular formats of philanthropic and charitable action (Vogel, 2006). Hwang and Powell's study is a historical reference to the emergence of a nonprofit sector often theorized as 'neoliberal', thereby passing over the role of grants-economic processes, visible in the presence of philanthropic elites and their administering foundations. The study provides a more general hypothesis for the transformation of former grassroots events such as cinema clubs and fests into managed organizations and the increasing power of financial and technical professions over what they call 'substantive' professionals and the encouragement of professionalism rather than group-bounding professionalization, but not for the workforce structure and the related convivial culture of 'fan labor' (see Chapter 3 above and Chapter 7 below).

The second structural force can be derived from Margaret Somers's analysis of social capital as now instituted 'epistemological good', which entered the public domain in the 1990s. Somers traces the ascent of this concept back to several discourses that developed in many political corners of intellectual and policy realms (in brief: neoliberalism, neo-conservatism, the social sciences and academic communitarianism, and the post-Washington Consensus

extolled in global governance organizations). Her fine historical analysis must be briefly summarized as to the major trajectory in which the idea of civil society became a concept known worldwide as 'social capital'. According to Somers, the post-1989 transformations in several countries provided for a historical moment of celebrating the idea of civil society as revolutionary and future reality. Very soon, however, the civil society discourse shifted away from leftist and social-movement semantics, turning toward the embrace of the notion of social capital, comprising in an important and indirect way the diffusion of the market as phenomenon by which all social life can be explained and managed. Somers critiques that in this form of social capital, civil society cannot be discerned any longer.

A main point of critique is that capital is not a thing but an "intentional investment decision" (vs. to consume), a mental state (p. 240) and not a 'social tie' which can be attained, and yet it is precisely this set of aspects which undergird its powerful status as an 'epistemological good'. Social capital as an idea promoted relentlessly by communitarians and economists set the ground for the expansion of utilitarian ideas as generalizable to all spheres of life and for the eventual emergence of a powerful neo-utilitarian project which could be diffused to any policy level, as the birth of global civil society shows (see also Powell, 2007). The essence of a civil society as a political concept in public-sphere theorizing is lost, according to Somers, and so are values such as group solidarity.

The theory of the third spirit of capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b) traces the historical emergence of this epistemological good in another way, i.e., through the emergence of the 'reticular world' and the formation of a new action type, 'the project worker' (introduced in my Chapter 7). The FCE hypothesis is an example of the version of social capital attacked by Somers, seeing it as an entrepreneurial and organizational good of great exchange value. As told by Somers, social capital (she cites Joseph Stiglitz), entered this 'market conception' when it could be staged as "composed of nonmarket relationships that individuals bring to bear to cope with the inevitable risks of market imperfections associated with asymmetrical knowledge between contracting agents" (p. 248). Based on that, it is possible to argue that social capital is a necessary condition, a criterion of eligibility in some way, for the nonprofit to participate in market organization, able to attain a role in economic coordination as seemingly disinterested party to exchanges (see Lampel's work further above). Even movement-based nonprofits (such as formerly unruly or marginal associational organizations) could be incorporated in market-entrepreneurial environments (Elsaesser, 2005; e.g., Gamson, 1996; Leca et al., 2015; Mazza & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2008; Peranson, 2009). In eventive spaces, social capital

circulates more rapidly, and therefore such organizations provide important conditions for the structural expansion of the network world.

Accordingly, collusion, as raised by Powell and DiMaggio with respect to a 'nonprofit sector', is an observable feature of contemporary environments to which it has transgressed without losing its licit character. Eventive nonprofits provide an important condition of the rapid field structuration (or configuration) that we see in contemporary spread and differentiation of industry. As sites aestheticized and marked as extramundane and affected (Reckwitz, 2012), they also incorporate in a society that is marked by an affective positivity culture. Event productions have a role to play in the acceleration of field emergence (Gross & Zilber, 2020) but also in the acceleration of formats for dispersal more generally. Festival nonprofits, or at least the more powerful and renown among them, have attained legitimate status in the cinema field, participating in the institutional myth-making of social capital as important to creativity, innovation, and economic growth. Thus belonging to a more general class of organizationally framed activities, they deserve further examination, addressing the festival researchers' observations on high resemblance among the 'infinite variety' of cinema events which occurs in the presence of intense 'copying' activities around curatorial demands for event competitiveness and unique event value (Elsaesser, 2005).

3 Formats and Isomorphism

Having addressed the blurring of boundaries with respect to nonprofits as market participants offers the opportunity to expand on Reckwitz's notion that in postmodern capitalism, formats aid boundary transgression (Reckwitz, 2017b). Reckwitz understands by the format various 'aggregate forms of the social such as "practices, discourses, artefact systems or subject-object constellations, as well as subjectivization modes', and formats taking on networks of heterogeneous practices and discourses, homogenizing them (Reckwitz, 2014b, pp. 49–50). The following discussion will underline the postmodern character of events, which can be detected by going back to the 'old' New Institutionalism, specifically scholarship that tackles the blurring of sector lines (Bromley & Meyer, 2017; Hwang & Powell, 2009).

Among the original formulations that once lent significance to New Institutionalism as a novel sociological paradigm was the axiom that formal organizations typically arise in highly institutionalized contexts. Fields and inter-organizational structures are seen as horizontally and vertically connected in a kind of 'architecture of modernity'. Somewhat obscured by its

emphasis on 'environments', the theory also asserts that organizational fields and state fundamentally interconnect in a super-tectonic of 'world society' in (Meyer et al., 1997). With these insights being adopted by an interdisciplinary organizational scholarship, the major presence of the state in the economy was sidelined in favor of management sciences' focus on entrepreneurial action. Still, Meyer and fellow-researchers' idea of the state 'in the field' is inextricably linked to the notion that formal organizations incorporate practices and procedures 'defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society'. Another major statement was offered by Meyer and Rowan on 'rational institutional elements' (1977), which, according to their view, organizations adopt in a ceremonial manner from their environments to stabilize their field interrelations, remain competitive or simply improve the odds of their survival. Rational institutional elements carry the myths of the environment—a thesis that intentionally sits oddly with any rational-choice assumption. The New Institutionalists offered a number of elements that organizations would ceremonially adopt, such as 'professions, policies, and programs', which they saw as created alongside the products and services (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

New Institutionalists specifically argue that adopting myth from the environment helps organizations to interact with others in the field while shielding off their actual operations. This led them to formulate two types of environments (or sectors) in which organizations were either guided by efficiency criteria or legitimacy-seeking. These key claims have been borne out by contemporary reality in the sense that organizational entrepreneurs approach organization-building with formats and do so globally, thereby showing that 'world models' do exist (Drori et al., 2006). Related to formats, it is worth pointing out that this theoretical perspective can capture professions not just as groups but as a bundle of collective expertise formats, and "cognitive and normative frames that shape [professionals'] perspectives on regulative goals and the likely means to achieve them" (Beckert, 2010, p. 156). In times of economization, the claims to professionalism are rampant, while professional power has been declining (cultural devaluation process, *Entwertung*) while mimetic bundling of competencies ready-made for modular occupations (see Damarin, 2006) is ubiquitous. Reckwitz describes the availability of creativity formats in late-modern capitalism. Similarly, Meyer and Rowan formulated the observable rational institutional elements as 'littering the landscape of society' (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Still, they did adhere to a differentiation-theoretical view which led them to proposing a typology of technical and institutional environments, with the tendency to attribute 'myth and ceremony' to the activities pertaining to the second type, observed in hospitals, educational organizations, travel,

and in essence organizational fields with high concentration of non-market economic forms.

Importing and adopting myth from the organization's environment was a gambit to suggest that legitimacy rather than efficiency was the source of motivating action. In organizational fields oriented towards technical environments, efficiency goals and organizations with clear means-ends designs (aiming to buffer their operations from environmental influences) dominate, while in organizational fields oriented toward institutional environments the organizational goals seemed fuzzy and criteria guiding operational efficiency soft (if at all present). In retrospect, we may say that the New Institutionalists tried to make sense of the ubiquity of nonprofits and growing public authorities, for which standard economic theory could not account. They also tried to give an account of organizational behavior in highly uncertain environments characterizing late-modern capitalism.

In yet another way they also tried to make sense of something Reckwitz and others would theorize within the frameworks of 'cultural economism' and 'aesthetic capitalism' (Böhme, 2017; Reckwitz, 2017a, p. 151), but were not yet looking over the horizon into a more matured aesthetic capitalism. Still, the expansion of the realm of organizations and organizational fields associated by Meyer and Scott with the institutional environment may arguably be nothing less than the realm that Reckwitz and others tried to capture as an aesthetic economy and the general social process of aestheticization, promoting a late-modern capitalism, increasingly dominated by the digital economy (Tapscott, 2015) which thrives on media formats as core inputs, for which festivalization of screen-related goods and services provided by the cultural industries is close to an attractive value proposition.

The conception of these two environments was a persuasive argument at its time, delivering broadly a critique of rational-choice theory by instating the institutional environment for market and quasi-market actors. At the same time, however, the technical environment deserves attention for theoretical and historical reasons. The expansion of institutional environments goes hand in hand with the making of uncertainty-enhancing environments driven by financialization. Financialization removes security from uncertainty-reducing environments, especially by forcing large firms (controlled by creditors or shareholders) to deliver higher and more consistent returns, eliminating risk-spreading and cross-subsidization. Turning financial instruments designed for market stabilization into instruments that are used for speculation—the film industry is a case in point (Anderson, 2004). The development of devices to govern uncertain environments actually lies in both types of environments, as both entail specialized evaluation practices and third-party information providers.

Daniel Spulber's (1996) seminal intermediation thesis still pinned intermediation on either buyer or seller in an economy modelled on the standard market, certainly not upsetting the prevailing orthodox market conception.

In this context it is interesting that Powell would later call Scott and Meyer's typology 'unfortunate' because it creates a myth of actors in institutional environments being passive, their work lacking substance, and workers shunning task performance and lacking output orientation. Powell's intervention (probably based on his study of non-profits throughout his career) can be turned onto the technical environment, asking whether market fundamentalism is not the myth of this environment. Powell illustrates this point well with the stock market as being normally assumed to be 'purely market' exchange but cannot exist without heavy government regulation and rule-enforcing agents for its functioning (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, pp. 183–185). He omits, however, the many devices of non-governmental and non-business type that have grown tremendously over the following decades (see Chapter 5 on devices).

Anticipating the sociology of valuation (Callon et al., 2002; Callon et al., 2007), Meyer and Scott cite the presence of relevant 'tests' for technical utility in technical environments and illustrate with accreditation a 'test' typical for institutional environments. This illuminates Powell's critique because credit-rating agencies are deeply connected to financial markets, which market fundamentalism would characterize as technical environments, whereas accreditation is mainly institutional-reputation based. Qua this environment typology, the New Institutionalists have turned our attention to devices and intermediaries typical of economic coordination contexts, which I will show can be studied more effectively with Karpik's regime typology (see Chapter 5).

This leads to the conjecture that uncertainty in economic contexts has increased across organizational fields to such high levels that adoption of 'myth and ceremony', and by means of format, has become a major economic practice. The process of aestheticization seems to encourage this tendency. The growing world of experience products and the rise of valuation techniques, devices, and intermediaries has been a disproportionately growing space around the core cultural and creative industries, which also undergo rapidly further internal heterogenization. This trend is observable across global consumer goods markets and in domains of public-oriented service organizations; it contrasts with organizational fields of the technical environment, associated with standardized and homogeneous goods production and related services (cf. Beckert, 2011). Film festivals are an example of organizational populations that seek myth from their institutional environments, as borne out by festival ethnography and history presented in Chapter 1. They comprise a growing

number of intermediaries, providing the setting for intense device work to make sense of uncertainty.

Moving toward synthesis, I claim institutional environments as the precursors of social and economic space incorporated into the dispositif of creativity (Reckwitz, 2017b). One may go even further and conjecture that the space identified as technical environment must be shrinking in a society and economy that prioritizes singularities in subjects, objects, relations and environments, even if their prevailing myth of market fundamentalism—present today in a more radical form perhaps—may not. I will come back to this point toward the end of the chapter where I consider the late-modern relationship between rationalization and aestheticization.

Why then, we may ask, did the New Institutionalism, located in the heart of Silicon Valley academically affiliated with Stanford University, make so little of the entrepreneur whom Lampel emphasizes as a creative capital-seeking actor having acquired a disposition toward the event as her resource? As suggested above, the formation of creativity-based regime of accumulation was impossible to experience first-hand in its magnitude and shape. Another clue is provided by the shift from a knowledge economy (so understood before the millennium) to the aesthetic-digital economy of today. Back in the time of original writings by Meyer and others, Silicon Valley as a regional economy cannot be said to have been exposed strongly to creativity ideology. And perhaps it should be considered as squarely outside of it because while being already a significant hub of the computing-related industries, its practices had not yet acquired the aura of the creative.

In Silicon Valley, there was space for the idiosyncratic individual (Bronson, 1999), but it was 'the nerd' who was the key actor in this industrial development which would turn into contemporary platform capitalism (Srnicek, 2020), finally making itself useful in providing the general infrastructure for the growing production of singularities (Reckwitz, 2017a, pp. 229–234). This conjecture can be illustrated with the profile of the Apple entrepreneur Steve Jobs, who was known for performing a scandalizing personality and at the core of Silicon Valley as industrial location (Isaacson, 2011). Apart from his experiential life style, which spawned an entire 'creative ethos' of being an innovative entrepreneur, he was also known for forcing the idea of total design control with respect to the end-user experience sellable in large consumer-goods markets worldwide. Jobs was ahead of his time, aiming for the aesthetic control of the experience consumption (see also Elder-Vass, 2016, pp. 118–123). Jobs also innovated with formats such as eventive business summits that would include the prop of the cheerleading CEOs as charismatic leader in innovation—a

standard format for organizing market entry, heavily mediatized market strategy, market product renewal, and more today.

The FCE hypothesis (Lampel, 2011; Lampel & Meyer, 2008), concentrating on entrepreneurial action, makes quite little of the isomorphic tendencies that can be found in the object world of events, including the remarkable similarity of elements that go into the production of these immersive environments. Formats are also a component of the New Institutionalist theory of isomorphism. To recall, the 'littering of the societal landscape' refers to rational institutional elements such as 'programs, professions, and policies', which Reckwitz's theory of the creativity dispositif expands on by a wide variety and scale of creativity formats. Film festival research has provided evidence for adoption of such organizational elements, often following from resource dependency on cultural-policy programs rather than professional-groups' licensed expertise (De Valck, 2007; Stevens, 2016; Taillibert & Wäfler, 2016). In following Schumpeter, economists and economic sociologists maintain that formats can "coexist simply because the basis of competition is not, strictly speaking, just about price" (Hamilton et al., 2011). Formats such as found in festival curation, and even the formal-organizational format itself, are significant elements in institutional environments which today are incorporated in the aesthetic economy. Chapter 3 demonstrated that film festivals can be found among the vast number of organizations which confront and drive "competition amongst and within market formats" (Hamilton, et al., 2011, p. 42). Based on that, I want to suggest that mimetic isomorphism has become the major mechanism of integrating practices into the sites of the creativity dispositif.

In a review of the isomorphism argument, Beckert (2010, pp. 157–159) draws on empirical studies to show that organizational change can entail both homogenization and heterogenization—producing similarity and diversity.[2] He adds competition as fourth mechanism to coercive, normative, and mimetic

2 There appears to be some confusion across this text over whether something divergent in the past or diverging in the future is discussed, which for me weakens the argument. Mimetic adoption would imply to converge on something, and it is hard to see how at least strict copying something can *lead* to divergence without some other conditions involved. Here Reckwitz's theory (N3) seems superior, as copying is connected to recombination (the metaphor being the postmodern 'pastiche'). In Beckert, it takes two actors (one wanting the copy, which the other resists). Beckert presents it as an internal conflict in institutional entrepreneurs as to whether to imitate or not. This does not fully address the fact that mimetic adoption occurs exactly the way the New Institutionalists had penned it (see Beckert, 2010, p. 159). A better explanation for diversion from scripts (or formats) is Howard (Becker, 1995)'s concept of inertia and the recognition that mimetic adoption may fail to stabilize the desired outcomes if not assimilating the practice to a local context (see also Sallaz, 2012).

processes, which he relabels as power, attraction, and mimesis. He therefore claims that competition is also an explanation of why formal organizations become "more common and more elaborate" (Meyer & Rowan in Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 45). Powell and DiMaggio on the other hand see state and professions as "the rationalizers of society" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), deprioritizing standard-market competition, and perhaps the answer lies somewhere in the middle as all forms of isomorphism can be competitive in practice. This is in accordance with an example given by Beckert, stating that competition can turn into a 'race to the bottom', even involving imitation of certain laws and standards that can be credited to the mechanism of competition which is about cost (Beckert, 2010, p. 160). This occurs where product differentiation is impossible or not the chosen firm's strategy (or market culture-specific rules).

Beckert regards 'mimesis' as similar to 'attraction' but as different by lacking embedding in socialization and professional networks. It is "a much simpler form of imitation through which actors react to uncertainty with regard to the effects of institutional rules", especially describing a mechanism that allows actors to cope with the lack of "optimal institutional solutions", impossibility to rationally anticipate outcomes and therefore serving as a kind of compensation for lacking rationality and also "a protective shield for the institutional entrepreneur in case of failure" (Beckert, 2010, pp. 157–158). The actor is disoriented, rather than convinced of the superiority of the model. The creativity dispositif revalidates this situation legitimizing what Kleon (see Chapter 2) advocates with 'steal like an artist' (Kleon, 2012). It cannot be denied that mimetic adoption has become a major form of social practice, used for distinction and to nudge social change. Many social actors, including professionals have shifted toward imitation ('Best practice'). Beckert notes that this is common where institutional entrepreneurs want to conceal their agency or interests (Beckert, 2010, p. 158).

Yet, implied is that normative isomorphism suspends the role of the scientific knowledge base, and accreditation agencies tend to play a role, as responsibility can be shifted to such rarely transparent agents, neither democratically nor peer-elected. This also suggests that authorities, commonly associated with rule-making, move as actors out of coercive mechanisms, 'hiding' behind devices (institutional environment), as Beckert writes. In some sense, downplaying responsibility means to not care about accountability, which is the accusation political elites confront today.[3] This is evident at the level of expert

3 Citing a study by Claus Offe on post-1989 East European transformation, Beckert writes that politicians "portrayed the proposed institutional models not as their own creations but either as imitations of institutions from their own society's distant but glorious past or as

labor, where in the process of rationalizing charity, formal professions start to dominate substantive professions (Hwang & Powell, 2009). Their study shows that mimetic and normative, that is imitating behavior and training-based action, are intertwined.

Film-festival organization and curated event culture more generally are products of imitation. Rona Edward and Monika Skerbelis write that the 'organizational elements are simple designs to incorporate', requiring special knowledge about social interaction, sociation and status gain—precisely the elements of the social capital discourse. Their advice resonates with Ann Swidler (1986)'s toolkit metaphor and shows how event production is both aesthetic and administrative practice (call for entry, entry fee, deadline system, and procedures for media communication), and networking. This handbook regards volunteers as a structural element (Edwards & Skerbelis, 2012, p. 221). The arranger has a hybrid capability. Curatorial creativity is distinctive from that of the artist without challenging that role (Ventzislavov, 2014), which is also evident in elite festival directors' occupational biographies.

It is the nonprofit element which fuses the bureaucratic dimension, affecting it with specific social value while seemingly relaxing some of the bureaucratic rules (limited reporting requirements for resource-poor organizations being one aspect only). Rather than seeing 'professional worth' celebrating the expertise, the consultancy literature for arts/cultural nonprofit-organizing is full of instances of mimetic adoption of formats available at low or—provided as wisdom on the Web—no cost. Put bluntly, what counts as professionalism is the skillful creation of immersive environments based on toolkit approaches rather than professional knowledge in the original sense, while social capital-related competencies have been turned into a diversity of occupational forms (public relations, fundraising, etc.).

For mimetic isomorphism it has been plainly assumed that business actors engage in imitating behavior. Mimetic behavior is extremely pervasive in competitive environments and, presented as 'myth and ceremony' (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), also a possible uncertainty-reduction strategy in institutional environments. Mimetic isomorphism provides for the possibility of synthesis between the creativity dispositif theory and the New Institutionalism. In my view, the early New Institutionalism retains its relevance in theorizing late-modern society because it helps understanding how formats contribute to the growth of aesthetic environments and, according to Reckwitz are key drivers in the transgression of field boundaries, connecting singularity production

models based on an institutional template from another country that enjoyed high prestige because of its values and its functional record." (Beckert, 2010, p. 158).

across all social forms, including our postmodern selves, to mimetic processes for which the digital economy and its global society seems an infinite resource (Voss, 2020; Zuboff, 2019).

The New Institutionalism offers once again a way of approaching this matter. While its scholars do not concentrate on inter-field mobility of formats—as they aim to explain organizational behavior within fields in correspondence with particular institutional logics and myth-harboring institutional environments—their propositions don't seem to stop at inter-fields mobility of 'rational institutional elements' that can be globally adopted (for recent critique of elite actor-level practices see Giridharadas, 2019). According to Reckwitz, during the hegemonic phase of the dispositif of creativity, formats move across such bounded fields, borne out by studies of organizational practices (on emulation of institutional templates see Beckert, 2010, p. 163; Bromley & Meyer, 2017; Maier et al., 2016). Hegemony is observable in the high and rapid translatability of forms, repeating itself at the macro level, such as in the homology between economization and mediatization with aestheticization (A—E— M; compare Chapter 2). The 'flattening of boundaries' clearly supports the claim of hegemonialization.

It is in this sense that we can expand the argument toward proposing that we would expect a historically high amount of mimetic adoption, especially mimetic behavior resonating with what Reckwitz has called the regime of N3. At the same time, the creativity dispositif theory provides the opportunity to examine mimetic adoption in relation to professionalization claims and outstanding substantive investigation for these claims. As our empirical context is the nonprofit/for-profit interchange, mimetic adoption must extend to the processes specific to aesthetic and network capitalism. And with Beckert we may suggest search for the causal mechanisms, i.e. which conditions favor boundary transgression. In Chapters 12 and 13, I will conjecture about how the logic of philanthropy becomes a major support structure for the creativity dispositif in form of a shared cultural semantic that layers across the rationalization forces of both the professions and the state—offering an alternative hypothesis to the still common notion, provided seminally by Max Weber, that "the dominance of bureaucratic forms in modern capitalism (which is a homogenizing process) is primarily market driven" (Beckert, 2010, p. 162).

4 Aestheticization and Rationalization—an Irresolvable Tension?

Understanding the event non-profit in its historical specificity as I have tried to further in my engagement with influential sociological theories on capitalism

allows us to finally revisit Reckwitz's claim of A—R complementarity, arguably resulting in 'aesthetic rationalization'. This claim can be read, I believe, as somewhat of an attempt to bypass the question of whether art can be or has been 'colonized' by modern rationality, but the aesthetic economy undoubtedly refers to an industrial incorporation of the aesthetic realm along the lines suggested by Weber. In his General Economic History, Weber wrote that

> [i]f the economic impulse in itself is universal, it is an interesting question as to the relations under which it becomes rationalized and rationally tempered in such fashion as to produce rational institutions of the character of capitalistic enterprise. (2003, p. 356)

Reckwitz's 'aesthetic economy' is based on a historical rise of the Post-Fordist economy, the principal components being permanent innovation, aesthetic-surprise goods and creative practices, the tendency toward 'design', a post-romantic occupation and work model as well as aesthetically oriented consumer-subjects (2017b, pp. 85–126). My discussion in this chapter suggests some of the components of rationalized motivations, ideas and practices included in the capitalist production of aesthetic environments. The eventive arts nonprofit represents the formal-rational organization ('rationalized charity') as a supporting infrastructure for creative goals and processes. In essence, this is the mandate of festivals for cinema. Barriers to collusion are low in curated events, aiding rapid structuration, allowing for contagion by cohesion involving personal contacts as well as cohesion by structural equivalence involving peer contacts (Galaskiewicz, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 2001) and attention-generating devices.

Not just the arts, but arts nonprofits are at the center of aesthetic economy, arts moving by organizational-format means into it. This suggests a second look at the relationship between aestheticization and rationalization (A—R), which Reckwitz in his subsequent theory of the 'singularization of society' (Reckwitz, 2020) elaborates as tension between singularization and rationalization, these two social processes being antagonistic due to their respective logics of 'the unique' and 'the general'. I take A—R and U—G as versions of the same theoretical proposition (Reckwitz, 2017b, p. 24), focusing on Reckwitz's claim that the antagonism between A and R subsides during the reign of the dispositif of creativity, leading to complementarity despite structural difference between these two social processes: "Rational purposive formats develop which attempt to create the systematic preconditions for aesthetic labour and aesthetic experience", seeking "to ensure the constant and systematic production and distribution of aesthetic events" (Reckwitz, 2017b,

pp. 218–219).[4] Festivalization, as I have argued, represents a model case of A-R, lifting the antagonism by creative nonprofit events and conditions of aesthetic and affective labor.

The claim of an 'aesthetic rationalization' has met its critics in a reviewing panel (Soziopolis, 2017–2018) that underlines the significance of Reckwitz's heuristic for the study of current capitalism. Firstly, the book critics have launched several arguments, such as that sectors producing standardized goods and services are not as affected, thus doubting the generalizing scope of the argument, as Claudia Koppetsch does. This seems to be a weak intervention as aestheticization includes the policy-driven making of creative industries, including ever more occupational and industrial fields. But if one switches from sectors to global value chains, which is a more appropriate model for understanding economic globalization, one may recognize that aestheticization may work on some parts of the chain and not on others, while eventually leading to 'contagion'—a claim that needs to be borne out by more empirical research which would also confront the western-centric approach. To take an example, the agricultural produce of coffee, at first sight, coffee being coffee, a matter of low product differentiation, is an instance of this, as some parts of it are affected with creative entrepreneurial, fair-trade discourse (Brown et al., 2010). But creative services can be incorporated in the older industries, thereby encouraging weak to strong processes of aestheticization, or turn industries toward 'upgrading' into value chain segments that connects them to the cultural/creative industries and service industries or the digital economy (Daly & Gereffi, 2019; Gereffi, 2001).

Secondly, there is the claim, also by Claudia Koppetsch, that formal rules are still expanding, bureaucratization and legal-rational authority being firmly in place. Reckwitz's aesthetic capitalism theory does not stand in the way of this argument, adding rather interesting possibilities for interpretation. In many sectors that we habitually associate with the firm collective belief in formal rationality, we presently observe a change in communication: from allusions to normative rule to formats for positively expressed (formal and informal) rules and authority. In a general sense, this resonates with Lampel's notion of events as 'sites with relaxed rules'. The slow but steady convergence in public-authorities' communication on social media-type communication marks a

4 Die Moderne "setzt sich von Anfang an aus zwei gegenläufig organisierten Dimensionen zusammen: aus der rationalistischen der Standardisierung und aus (der) kulturalistischen Dimension der Wertzuschreibungen, Affektintensitäten und Singularisierung" (Reckwitz, 2017a, p. 18).

process of affective aestheticization. Two examples from Germany can illustrate this.

Bending to the demands of powerful neoliberal policy-making and outright fear of losing global competitiveness, the German university sector has been exposed to state-driven singularization, resulting in a remarkably short time in a winner-take-all market structure of the university field, at the core of which is the new regime of 'Entertain or exit' for the academic professions (a group of 'substantive' experts once leading the universities). The format of 'science slam' (presented in Chapter 2) constitutes a case of secular knowledge coming under the demands of creative aestheticization, one of which is eventization. Traffic rules also illustrate for larger parts of society the making of affective positivity culture in bureaucratic context. Consider the mixing of messages in present-day German highway construction, where car-driving is both sanctioned by traffic rules (resulting in painful reduction of speed over many kilometers for drivers used to unlimited speed) while being simultaneously encouraged to 'stay positive'. This is done by emoticons intended to cheer up impatient riders. On the surface, a 'smiley face' coupled with subject-oriented messaging of being 'almost done' driving at snail's pace may suggest mutual empathy between riders and construction-involved sides, but it may also be read as positive sanctioning of drivers that are potentially deviant, aiming at persuading rather than punish them. Even the road signs alerting drivers to radar control ahead of them serves to persuade people, thereby providing learning opportunities for rational behavior such as planning and calculating. This form of power is the focus of Chapter 11. One may read such communication styles as tempering of rational formats, showing great scope of applicability through visualized culture understood by a world society beyond its cosmopolitan and creative strata. A variety of 'rational occupations', including civil servants, have come to accept emojis (a Japanese ideogram culture surfacing in the late 1990s), especially the 'smiley face', as legitimate means for sympathetic expression in formal communication, which contrasts starkly with all previous accounts of 'faceless' bureaucracy by seemingly giving a benevolent face to coercive measures.

A third reviewing remark, by Wolfgang Knöbl, is worth citing because it suggests that the creative economy is potentially small given that production in the global frame contains many more rationalized processes than Reckwitz admits. This is correct because industrial advanced economies outsource such lower-labor cost production to the Global South—the quantity of which is largely concealed by social distance while being communicated in media when scandals like factory fires and alike 'hit the radar' of the concerned liberal sections of societies. At the same time I disagree with Knöbl because

I see two forces at work that involve creative-aestheticization processes: firstly, global consumer goods markets, which also provide eventive forms for display and persuasion; secondly, the expansion of 'global civil society', however ill constructed in political terms (see Chapter 13), which fuses positive value orientations across large populations regardless of national culture and religious orientation. Knöbl's criticism of Reckwitz as prematurely claiming an 'epochal' transformation seems unfounded, as there is a growth in what to the New Institutionalists are institutional environments, occurring together with significant increase in aesthetic elaborations, which flip the relationship between the logic of the general and the logic of the unique. Basing market power on 'show value' as driver in competition (Böhme, 2017) cannot be denied as to its attack on affect-deficient forms of rationalization.

5 Conclusion

This chapter 'injected' organizational sociology into the study of festivalization, leading the theory of the creativity dispositif into a dialogue with institutional theorizing. I started with the only available organizational-theoretical conjecture on eventization of fields. I also identified gaps and suggested arguments, on social capital and the potential of collusion offered by nonprofits, not just elite organizations and groups. I identified the role of festivals and other formally-organized event productions as one that smoothens over antagonistic logics, allowing elites and professionals to move more easily across domains in fields but also between fields. As I have tried to identify in this chapter, formats (homologous to 'rational institutional elements' while weakly legitimized in New Institutionalism's terms) are decisive in breaking down boundaries claimed by differentiation theory, encouraged by widely spread practices of creative appropriation and mimetic adoption.

Lampel and Meyer (2008) correctly set up the FCE as network-society organization, but adding Somers's work is fundamental in moving beyond valuation-sociological perspectives that tend to keep intermediaries like events outside 'the market' as well as expanding on Bourdieu's ideas of social capital. While the coming into place of a 'reticular world' enables social capital by elites to be accepted in public goods-projects, including infringements of sovereign rights by other countries, the heightened potential of collusion for the diversity of elites can also be theoretically argued. As western democracies have never freed themselves from such collusion (Etzioni-Halevy, 2005), late-modern capitalism appears to have inverted norms in that regard, as 'elite connections' play out in the open now (McGoey & Thiel, 2018) and, in fact, do so,

often, in day-light contrast with highly mediatized inequality, poverty, and precarity. How come that such socially broad approval has been given in light of the many failures of the actors of global civil society claiming to root out social problems, to provide security of livelihood, and to create democratic conditions for true citizen participation worldwide? And, what mitigates the many raised demands for radical democracy and alternatives to the neoliberal economy to avert further social and environmental crises? Expanding business-organizational analysis into a fuller sociological analysis of the conditions of celebratory events and, more generally, the fast-paced growth and versatility of social space constructed as extramundane and implemented across a diversity of fields of organized activities may get us some answers.

CHAPTER 5

Festival Devices

> Consumers will look at 'the leaves' and buy, even if they don't know shit about the festival.
>
> Hong Kong festival manager

The original proposition that film festivals partake in 'value-adding process' mainly emphasizes reputation-making and the formation of cultural capital through festival intermediation processes (De Valck, 2007, pp. 125–128), with researchers only recently advocating more strongly more research on this phenomenon as part of a larger scenario, the cinema value chain and value-adding processes (Burgess, 2020). This chapter proposes film festivals as active in market organization which builds around the production of singularities. Singularities are the essential goods and services of the aesthetic economy and, as discussed in Chapter 4, require extra-commercial assessment. An example are the laurels bestowed in many festival award ceremonies on films and cultural producers. Festivals thus aid economic coordination, which can be approached systematically by taking a valuation-sociological perspective. The chapter's exploratory analysis of festival intermediation is aided by the comprehensive typology of 'regimes of economic coordination' (Karpik, 2010), which permits us to go not only beyond the reputation-making proposition but to go beyond the global value chain framework (Gereffi et al., 2005) in the study of valuation. Whereas mainstream economics regards the market price as the principal organizing process of capitalist economies, valuation scholars take a broader look at market organization. They see economic coordination involving the "social organization that brings consumers and experts into communicative exchange to discuss the objects for sale" and "the faculty to attribute to object's qualities that exist only in the imagination" (Beckert, 2011, pp. 112, 119), which, as Chapter 4 showed, also pertains to events in organizational fields. Karpik's 'economics of singularities' offers a theory about goods and services coordination that the market of mainstream economics cannot handle. These goods and services (goods hereafter, unless the service phenomenon becomes relevant to specific discussions) are not standardized (homogeneous) and

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differentiated goods. They are aesthetic-economic goods, which valuation sociologists in their efforts of specifying these have variably called experience goods, surprise goods, and singularities. Common to them are the attributed unique value and the process of quality construction for complex goods that effectively require some interpretation in order to exchange hands. Böhme's 'show value' (2017) provides an important additional specification by pointing out the aesthetic-performative dimension of such goods, which can be generalized as singularities. What surrounds these goods is, furthermore, the high uncertainty which, relatively speaking, standardized and (to a lesser degree) differentiated goods do not have. Market-making firms (Hamilton et al., 2011) have emerged to coordinate goods that require marketing expertise, but uncertainty remains in the light of consumers not knowing what they want—an observation that lead to the first societal theory of consumption and market description as an 'experience society' in the 1990s (Schulze, 1992). From this perspective, uncertainty reduction appears as a pragmatic practice which has quickly broadened into a field, and indeed entire industries, of valorizing organizations (see Chapter 4's suggestion that these have historical continuity with institutional environments). While offering uncertainty reduction through their activities and especially their 'devices', valorizing organizations arguably produce more uncertainty. Thus, ever new devices keep proliferating, building up an economy of endorsement, aided by the aesthetic-digital economy and related creative processes, which Schulze called experience-making and experience-seeking (see the discussion further below).

Karpik asserts that singularities, like films, are culturally produced through a specific class of devices, which he calls 'judgement devices', and which applies to the function of film festivals, critics, selective programming, award competition juries, and so forth. Film festivals are specific because they co-produce movies as singularities, which are "structured, uncertain, and incommensurable" goods (Karpik, 2010, p. 10), but do so, as I maintain, mainly as experience-makers. Cinema industry analysts consistently interpret the movie as an experience good as illustrated by the following quote:

> Moviegoers always want something different. They want to be taken where they haven't been before. They want fresh situations, plots, and characters—not a rehash of last week's hit. Consequently, the movies that do best are often those that are distinctly original. Star Wars was a breakthrough film because of its wonderful special effects, unusual setting, and fresh characters. Moviegoers had never seen anything like that before.
>
> LITWAK, 2009, p. 6

This description is reflected in curators' views on the complexity of film festivals as services:

> Well, we are the largest lesbian and gay film festival [...] We are getting to the point where we're remembered and considered as one of the big guns in the country, like, if you look at the map of the US, the ones that people usually identify are Philadelphia, New York City, San Francisco, L.A., and Miami, that's whole another story that I could tell you about. [...] I want us to be recognized with San Francisco, L.A., New York, ... [Q: And what makes these so highly recognized? Is there an esteem indicator that you are talking about or is it because it's the biggest in terms of the ticket sales or the biggest in terms the sponsorship, or –?] It's the size, the sponsorship, the cache, the number of films and the notoriety and the recognition. [...] The past of couple of years, and before I came here too, [our city] is a cool city so people want to come here [...].
>
> US American festival manager

Judgement devices "authorize the comparisons without which consumers would be limited to random choices" (2010, p. 44). Singularization and the search for the 'good' or 'right' type to purchase or consume have to be understood as social process at the core of an economy that favors 'quality competition' over 'price competition' and judgement over calculation. Karpik's theoretical fundamentals which lead him to the formulation of regimes of economic coordination can be summarized as follows:

Cinema is a good illustration of the process of singularization leading to singularities. Although movies were early experience goods (see Chapter 3), the movie's worth was measured in length of the actual film material in the early years before it became common to singularize the good, a process called 'intellectualization' for the Hollywood industry (Baumann, 2007), which does not capture the creative aestheticization dimension raised by writers like Böhme, Reckwitz, and Schulze. In the process, partial realities of a given phenomenon are constructed, such as when, for example, movie representatives decide into which type of film festival they enter a movie for competition, aiming for a more politically or intellectually oriented film festival as valuation device, or a festival that has a tradition in valorizing goods for entertainment targeting broader audiences (Dietmar Güntsche in Jacobs, p. 76).

In the early formulation of market organization, intermediaries fall to one or the other side of the buyer/seller relationship (Spulber, 1996), whereas in the 'economics of singularities' devices are elementary to the social structure of markets, being "simultaneously consumers' representatives, cognitive aids,

TABLE 7 Karpik's typology of frames of action for economic choices, derived from (Karpik, 2010, pp. 36–43)

Decision (homo economicus)	**Judgement (homo singularis)**
Homogeneous and differentiated goods	Singularities
Calculation	Qualitative choices, secondary: calculation
Objective information	Knowledge and interpretation
Actors share the same world	Particular viewpoints for particular actors sharing them
Price, a generalized-equivalence system	Numerous systems of equivalence
Choice of alternative means dictated by utility maximization and/or profit	Unstable goals, their relation with means cannot qualify a general form of action
The same judgement criterion or the same configuration of judgement criteria	Multiple evaluation criteria

active competitive forces, trust supports, axiological operators, and the main qualifiers of the singular products" (Karpik, 2010, p. 97). Judgement devices are a non-hierarchical phenomenon, doing 'teaching, educating, and persuading' rather than representing rule and prescription. They are therefore tools of persuasion, having both a cognitive and affective-aesthetic dimension. Before I turn to Karpik's regimes of economic coordination, I locate his influential work within the broader literature on singularities (Beckert & Musselin, 2013), illustrated by formulations of 'surprise goods' and experience goods.

1 The Experience-Market Model and the Stabilization of Value

Hutter's notion of the surprise good (2011) resonates with the empirical reality of film festivals as experience-makers, which goes beyond reputation-making mentioned at the start of this chapter. Hutter emphasizes surprise goods' potential to trigger a powerful transitory, positive emotion of 'amazement'. Surprise goods are a continuous flow (the production of an 'infinite variety' in

(Caves, 2000)), with cultural producers aiming at the avoidance of repetition, thereby producing irregularities. Schulze's experience good is at the center of experience-making, for which he provides an elaborate experience-market model. This model supplements Reckwitz's theory of development, the history of creativity-dispositif formation, and underscores the distance Karpik and other valuation sociologists' conceptualizations of market organization has gained from mainstream economics.[1]

Schulze's experience market model, which has been translated into English (Schulze, 2013), focuses on the economic coordination problem arising from encounters between those who 'make' experiences and those who seek them. The providers cannot easily know the values, dispositions, feelings, and past experiences of experience-seekers, therefore being unable to rely on stable means-goals designs. The quality of experience goods, according to Schulze, cannot be known, judged or interpreted with the degree of precision typical of markets with highly homogenous goods or digitized financial markets. The experience market with its overabundance of experience goods is essentially presented as an affordance, as it assists individuals in shaping their personal 'life-style projects' by making creative purchases. The experience-seeker ultimately faces disappointment because all such goods may have a 'necessary ingredient' resonating with the promise they make and the hopes by the consumer. Because of the existing quality uncertainty related to experience as vague idea, the experience-seeker's behavior can only be spontaneous vis-à-vis the market offers trying to sell the experience through goods and qualification of goods. It is important to emphasize that Schulze's account (1992, p. 431) relates to aesthetic episodes rather than aesthetic practices emphasized by Reckwitz's theory, which sets up the role for aesthetic-economic intermediaries which can be studied through market organization. Schulze underlines the experience-seekers' impossibility of finding a stable search algorithm, resulting in failure of the unfulfilled promises, a claim borne out by psychological research (Schwartz, 2004). Given the expectations of high failure, Schulze offers two understandings of stabilization of market coordination. The first is his proposed 'experience rationality' (a concept which I will discuss in Chapter 11), capturing methodical experience search, the second adjustment on the experience-providers' side. Experience buyers/consumers and sellers/producers meet with another, representing a 'symbiosis of incommensurable rationalities' based on opposite interests. Buyer/consumers' strategies are

1 Perhaps most radical as a paradigm shift among economic sociologists is the earlier valuation sociology around Michel Callon (MacKenzie et al., 2007).

those of 'aesthetic correspondence, abstraction, accumulation, variation and auto-suggestion' to which experience sellers typically react with strategies of 'schematization, profiling, alteration, and suggestion'. These patterns mutually stabilize each other in the form of strategic knowledge and routines (Schulze, 1992, p. 24). While the experience seeker cannot influence the overwhelming reality of the experience market, the production of information about experience potential seems always to the advantage for sellers who can keep adjusting. To connect to a point which I raised earlier in the chapter, this is one of the reasons why valorization agency basically adds to uncertainty as much as it tries to reduce it. The result is the well-known excess in experience goods.

The experience-market model resonates with research on global consumer goods markets and their protagonists of persuasive marketing and market-structuring in highly uncertain environments (cf. Petrovic, 2005), but differs from it by being more aligned with the writings on aesthetic capitalism focusing on the postmodern time regime favoring surprises (see Chapter 2), the cultural performance of goods, the affective dimension of market-organizing processes as well as the imperative to be creatively experience-seeking associated with life-style consumption. Schulze's merit in my view is the early contribution of a societal theory to creativity-driven aestheticization later theorized by Reckwitz. Yet, it fails to identify aesthetic practices next to aesthetic episodes, which are important to analyzing the permeability of boundaries in organizational fields, and it offers a more general conception of market-organizing processes based on the buyer/seller binary of the standard-market model by mainstream economics, which does not problem-solve the role of devices. Related to that, Schulze cannot account for phenomena such as consumer-protection organizations and alternative movements which have led to new formulations of alternative-economic models, involving precisely experience goods (Elder-Vass, 2016, Gereffi et al., 2001). In Schulze's market, so it seems, the consumer can never learn anything, i.e., never be 'ahead of the market', 'guessing it', or succeed in learning anything about her relevant needs related to life-style consumption and strategies to contain their open-ended character. This contrasts strangely with the experience seeker's otherwise acute imperative to be creative.

Returning to Hutter, there is a similar attempt of parsimonious modelling, as he distinguishes between two valuation modes, price (the matter of equivalence, with valuation occurring in the exchange process) and praise, which introduces external criteria to valuation (such as, for example, critical reviews of a movie). Hutter, illustrating his point with the critic, claims that 'praise' (a positive emotion) enables stable valuations of ranges in price and praise,

as praise in the long run ensures values being kept relatively stable even in the case of surprise goods (2011, p. 207). Socialized into an epistemological setting and being member to what Karpik calls 'personal networks' (see further below), the critic's assessment will already be grounded in an existing 'order' of value. Hutter points to the institutionalized role of the critic, distinguishing her from 'other experts' and 'amateurs' (presumably the co-creating audiences of the postmodern art field). He proposes the operation of a so-called 'infinity anchor', serving ideals against which praise is articulated and involves the activity of groups (rather than unstructured groups such as cinema audiences exemplify). While this is plausible as to the critics' institutionalized role, it cannot explain the structuring of valuation activities around unstructured groups, such as is normal today in the digital economy that feeds on 'behavioral surplus' in valorizing contexts (Voss, 2020). Moreover, while artistic goods are at the core of surprise goods, the production of such goods is much broader, also involving popular culture and the appropriation of 'popular attention' by subsequent expert valorization (Reckwitz, 2017a, p. 170). Hutter cannot explain why the contemporary critic has lost some of its social status and exclusivity, as audiences have been equipped with communication tools, their opinions being taken seriously and produced continuously through devices along many value chains that make up the global consumer markets which the market-making literature highlights.

Schulze's work has been criticized as being too pessimistic (Hutter, 2011, p. 203). Edging in from a Durkheimian perspective, Beckert argues that experiences are promises for "an imaginative salvation by providing access to intangible ideals" (Beckert, 2011, pp. 123–124). This, however, seems to underline promises as potentially remaining unfulfilled even when being accepted as salvation. The critics seem to ignore Schulze's point that uncertainty resulting from market-participants' strategizing is as much part of these markets as is the continuous flow of novelties observed by Hutter. Schulze, moreover, contributes to the debate on inequality and the importance of class. 'Why should I not get that too?', a response to the lure of experience markets. Market actors and their specialist technologies effectively insinuate consumer freedom and thereby—without the need of confrontational communication—freedom from a class constraint at least as to consumers' perception, which is fully agreeable with Marx's proposition that a class exists only to the extent as to having a resonating class consciousness. Despite his verdict on failure, Schulze's model inevitably entails the notion of affective positivity that makes experience seekers return to the experience market. With this preparatory discussion of alternative conceptions of singularization we can now turn to Karpik's work.

2 Regimes of Economic Coordination

To my knowledge, Karpik's framework is the most systematically developed analytic tool in economic sociology. Central to his approach is the regime of economic coordination, a social entity which

> … combines a particular qualification of the singularities, a particular form of the intervention of judgement devices, a particular form of consumer commitment and a particular form of global logic governing the matching between these elements.
>
> KARPIK, 2010, p. 129

As tools of persuasion, judgement devices are further specified by Karpik's differentiation of 'captation' (hereafter: channeling) and 'capture' as two broad types of strategies to tackle economic coordination problems. Capturing denies "the possibilities of choice without which the singularity cannot exist." Channeling, in contrast, describes the majority of all the device activities targeting the "countless human drives—curiosity, self-interest, pleasure, passion, distinction, persuasion, seduction, ethics" (2010, p. 53). Similarly to Schulze, Karpik highlights increasing diversification, which involves technology and device-side strategy, including techniques such as "the rationalization of supply, the codification of relational work, or practices to ensure customer loyalty" (Karpik, 2010, p. 53). The goal is mobilization of customers and consumers, a kind of 'audience management' which resonates with Reckwitz's understanding of a homology between aestheticization and economic processes (see Chapter 2 for the A—E relationship).

Channeling has also been theorized from a moral-economic perspective for the digital economy and its gifting components (Elder-Vass, 2016). In this context, it is important to note that channeling is a common governance mode, known under the theoretical perspective of 'governmentality' (Rose, et al., 2006), relating to the self-conduct of individuals in late-modern society. In Chapter 11, I will make this theoretical link part of my discussion of affective orders. Here, I focus on regimes of economic coordination which place emphasis on persuasion by judgement devices. Karpik's seven regimes are grouped around distinguishable device activities according to his regime definition presented above (2010, pp. 96–128). Karpik's regime typology is based on a first layer of a taxonomy which separates the wealth of devices into impersonal and personal devices. This taxonomy follows from two logics presented in the following table.

TABLE 8 Originality and personalization models, summarized from (Karpik, 2010)

Originality model	Personalization model
Pure form embodied by the work of art	Pure form embodied by the service relation
Qualities of originality, incomparability, and uniqueness don't need to be embodied in singularities simultaneously	Singularities are tailor-made for clients
Unique works, rare works, limited series	Professional and expert goods and services
Aesthetic criteria	Criteria of excellence

The four regimes operating on the 'logic of originality' presented in the left column of the table are further divided by differentiating substantial from formal device activity. For film festivals as reputation-makers we would expect a disproportionate number of substantial devices, i.e., devices that qualify goods by knowledge. We also would expect formal devices to be present, as these attribute relational patterns (ranks, ratings) to a good or service. Such devices operate variably in small to large markets, a further binary introduced by Karpik. Small markets (pertaining to the originality model) are associated with critical devices, whereas large markets typically emerge around commercial devices. The four regimes are the 'authenticity regime' and the 'mega regime' (each with substantial devices) as well as the 'expert-opinion regime' and the 'common-opinion regime' (which operate on formal devices). The right side of the table above describes the 'personalization model' which Karpik sees as the foundation of three further regimes. These regimes refer to device activity based on social ties—therefore called the 'network market'. Originality-model based regimes center on the question of cultural and symbolic capital, whereas the personalization-model based regimes aim to elaborate social capital as device. Karpik's framework offers an alternative and, indeed, high potential for finer-grained systematic analysis of the event as theorized by the scholars of the field-configuring event hypothesis discussed in the previous chapter. In the following brief summary of the regimes of economic coordination I begin with impersonal devices to then turn to the conceptualization of social connectivity-related devices (personal devices) in valorization processes.

2.1 *The Mega Regime* (*Impersonal Device*)

Regarding cinema and film festivals, it makes sense to start with the 'mega regime'. The three subtypes (empirically observable market reality) are mega-film, luxury brand, and mega-brand—names that already suggest the tendency in the entailed processes of singularization. I focus on the 'mega-film regime' for the introduction of this type of economic coordination. Here, commercial devices (e.g., marketing) dominate, while critical devices (e.g., experts) have a presence. The mega-film regime is based on Karpik's study of the Hollywood industry's business model (2010, p. 148). Commercial devices alert actors in the cinema field to a cinematic novelty, neutralizing the influence of the critical devices, which are characteristically autonomous judgement processes "embodied in worth of mouth, criticism, and the cultural complex".

Resonating with my historical exploration of cinema spaces in Chapter 3, Karpik sees competition as mainly based on exhibition format and, in fewer instances, based on pricing, which still relates to the performance of the movie rather than the quality of the good (e.g., late night shows, screenings with stars as guests, etc., see also (Kehoe & Mateer, 2015)). Karpik follows Arthur de Vany's well-known cinema market analysis, which claims that "nothing in movie markets is predictable, no costs, no performance value, no revenue" (De Vany, 2004, p. 267). De Vany conceptualizes qualification of a movie as singularity in terms of 'information cascades' building from successive theatrical-audience behaviors which will ultimately guide the film-performance outcome toward 'hit' or 'flop'.[2] Unique to the statistical argument (using Hollywood movie data) is that nothing else (e.g., star factors, advertising, movie director's reputation, reviews, etc.) will drive the dynamics.[3] Karpik derives from this work that 'word-of-mouth' (audience opinions) is the core device by which quality is constructed in each instance of a movie. Still, commercial devices like advertising and marketing tools are at work regardless of De Vany's results. They include the strategizing ahead of movie exhibition, ensuring that the movie is passed on to exhibitor 'territories' with the highest potential. Given the industrial structure,

2 The information cascades correspond with two forms of communication, the 'word of mouth', which is oral communication between moviegoers in our case, and 'word of mouse', an Internet age-term for the same, now mediatized, phenomenon.

3 De Vany's theory does not challenge the economic sociology of devices. An immense amount of work goes into the tailoring of a mainstream movie into the 'right kind' of product. The use of previewing audiences is but one tool to optimize the movie, deleting 'not working sequences' from the art work. 'Maneuvering the screens and the movie' are science-based qualifications of the good. This basically shows that devices are qualified along the value chain.

they therefore include both capturing and channeling, but at different points of the value chain. The information is based on what is known about territories but ultimately works as a bet on the 'buzz' generated in the first weeks of the run and an opening weekend.

From within this regime, festival events and their disproportional 'gathering' of critical devices can threaten the formation of positive quality and future profitability (or at least, a return on investment), as critics may communicate positively but define quality in the process of festival-event dynamics. Still, film festivals participate in the film-mega regime, as distributors will select festivals which they trust to not destroy the formula discovered by de Vany. Festivals can also appear at a later stage in the value-chain process, when commercial devices are exhausted, profits are secured, and festivals can help qualify films as classics. Festivals not only provide the bundled access to critics; importantly, they give the stage to movie celebrities. My interviews illustrate the attention paid by event organizers to stars—and to getting as many as possible—when they can reckon with an 'industry presence'. Event curators also carefully choose which stars should be invited to match their own 'festival brand', as illustrated by an organizer's reflection on the invitation of a well-known Scottish actor:

> He has a quality aspect of his work, which reflects the ethos and the brand. You know you don't want to go out of character, because that would undermine your brand value. But it's all pretty instinctive. But we all know we like stars; we are not in any kind of denial about that. — British festival director.

Film festivals can also participate in the other two subtypes of the mega regime, luxury and mega brand, and mostly do so when prestigious. Here, the focus is not on the movie but on the larger landscape of goods the film world and curators have cultivated. This concerns things such as the clothes and jewelry that movie stars wear and display on the red carpet and brands associated with 'blockbuster' movies and their related toys sold in retail, or large companies that are perceived to represent the values of the aesthetic economy such as creativity, discovery, and innovation. Such companies may also appear as sponsors of the fest, demanding recognition for brand attachment.

2.2 *Authenticity Regime* (*Impersonal Device*)

The authenticity regime epitomizes the function of reputation-making while also representing some aspects of the postmodern art field. Typical for this regime are small markets and moderate profit expectations. Goods qualified

in this regime have "an indefinite number of particular interpretations" which are maintained by this regime (Karpik, 2010, pp. 18–19). The wine market, the major example chosen by Karpik, points to the closure of the gap between wine experts as embodied knowledge, narratives, arguments, views and proofs and a lay public which he says are typically ignorant of the criteria developed in the corresponding field (Garcia-Parpet, 2011; Paschel, 1999). Even with such a mass-consumed good, price is a second consideration (Karpik, 2010, pp. 137–139).

In the cinema field, festivals can arguably be said to occupy the center of the authenticity regime, partly replacing critics in the way that allows them to compete with them while also using them as judgement devices. Juries provide one form of major assessment, giving films attention through competitions and awards ceremonies. Elsaesser calls film festivals "the ante-chamber of re-classification and exchange, as well as the placeholder for filmmakers not yet confirmed as *auteurs*" (2005, p. 83). The major devices of the authenticity regime are 'appellation, cicerone, and confluence' (a fourth device kind is ranking).[4] The perhaps most well-known appellation maintained by festivals is the festival logo. Cicerones "embody a soft, symbolic form of authority" (Karpik, 2010, p. 46). As emphasized by a festival curator, festival organizers know that they do not fully control it as a means:

> [Programming consultants] … 're just people in whose abilities I have faith. I call them in. We have submission viewers […] but they all feed back to me. My belief is in having the stamp of one personality on the films chosen, so it's my call. That sounds more megalomaniac than it should—it's just a tenet of faith for me, that it speaks with one voice […] A friend once called me a taste-maker, which I thought was funny. No, I don't have power at all, nor should I have. The festival is only two weeks a year, though hopefully within that it brings work to people's attention. I just run a small cultural event in a small town.
>
> British artistic director

The notion of the confluence both refers to and goes beyond 'techniques to channel buyers such as location choice, spatial (and temporal) organization, display and selling skills' (Karpik, 2010, p. 46), as Chapter 3 has demonstrated with atmospheres, affective spaces, and affordances.

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4 Karpik introduces a device classification which does not exactly match the boundaries between regimes.

2.3 *Expert-Opinion Regime* (*Impersonal Device*)

Art prizes (awards), concept stores, and quasi-markets are devices characteristic of the expert-opinion regime.[5] Karpik illustrates this regime with the French literature prizes. Belief in expert opinion tends to be associated with markets of limited range, and the regime is a hybrid because in this regime, formal devices use substantial criteria: an expert opinion serves a substantial judgement which receives wide public attention. This judgement is based on a collective comparison, the result of which communicates a collective choice, a genealogy of winners, and an identifiable jury (Karpik, 2010, pp. 202–206). These prizes cannot create a market, as Karpik maintains, but they channel the flow of attention in a seasonal fashion. Their attraction for audiences and consumers is in the little time they have to invest in comprehending quality differences.

Across film festivals prize competition is overabundant, resulting from an increase of awards and juries which produce judgements as well as attention for the festivals where they set up, across the organizational population as well as within the individual organizations. Some prizes have a long history and vary in prestige. Festivals manage awards by critics, the press, the audiences, and juries made up of cinema-field experts. For example, as my interviews and others' research in Asian festivals revealed, the Asian Awards at the Hong Kong International Film Festival was strategically invented to regain competitive power after the Pusan International Film Festival received priority attention from Asian and European cinema-field actors.

2.4 *Common-Opinion Regime* (*Impersonal Devices*)

For the last regime emerging from the logic of originality, examples of typical devices are box-office hit lists, the top-twenty bestselling novels, and pop charts. They comprise low-cost tools for audiences, which generates passive consumption (Karpik, 2010, pp. 210–216). Constituted from consumers' aggregate opinions and are basic ranking and rating exercises. Returning to the mega-film regime we will notice an overlap. According to Karpik's description, opinion travels in networks of moviegoers, but box-office charts, are also hugely present in the mega-film regime, designed to channel heteronomous audiences' attention to the search for what they deem the 'right' film for

5 The 'concept store' sets fashion trends by recombining groups of goods so that they appear as symbols of something novel. Quasi-markets are exemplified by quality assessment for public institutions, e.g., higher education. Quality assessment is a standardizing phenomenon, but quasi-markets can become singular markets when several evaluation criteria are made to compete with each other (Karpik, 2010, pp. 207–209).

themselves (see the discussion of the experience market above and the discussion of audience types further below).

While Karpik offers ideal-typical mechanisms of market qualification, several regimes can be involved in the qualification of goods and services, as shown here. The interviewed festival organizers rarely communicated rankings. An extract from a conversation with an artistic director of an internationally reputed fest with relatively little prize money tied to its awards illuminates how ranking exercises succumb to the presented festival worth as incommensurable:

> … I'd say within the short-film world we're probably on the, or used to be anyway, on the ten-top list. But there're so many, I mean compared to ten years ago, there's so many short-film festivals, that has sort of leveled the playing field in some ways. But still, I mean, renown-wise, people still want to get definitely to [our festival].[Hesitates] There's two things we're balancing, in my opinion, I think, I always have a sort of inferiority thing against other short-film festivals, because I see that they have lots of different awards, and the industry sort of really goes there, but then again, I mean, if you compare [ours] to most other festivals, we have quite a large amount of industry people coming, and we are a prestigious festival, so it depends on what day, what mood I am in. I think we're quite important internationally. And nationally, the reputation has really built over the years, because ten years ago people really didn't care that much about our festival, and now it's sort of, parallel with the boost for short film in general, there's been a boost for the festival and also, I mean, more professionalism, work-wise and content-wise.
>
> Swedish artistic director

For independent cinema, many lists of movies are available, mainly so on the Internet. These are less likely the product of commercial devices (and not just because commerce has relatively less interest in them), being made by representatives of the critical devices as part of their active engagement with the art. This leads us to the way Karpik typologizes consumers (customers, audiences), illuminating how he conceives of Reckwitz's co-creating audiences in the postmodern art field.

2.5 *The Audiences of the Creativity Dispositif and Their Participation in Device Worlds*

The complex festival audience dynamics can be illustrated by a curator who scouts novelties for her own program by visiting other festivals:

> Last year we showed [a certain movie] and some people thought it was a masterpiece, and others thought it was like watching paint dry. So, you have to have those for cinephiles who are following the latest of the generally acknowledge masters of contemporary cinema. There's an interest in their new work regardless of how successful it may or may not be. In fairness we're trying to keep up with that because they're not always going to get released anyway and so you look to go and see those. [Q: But there are many of these, right?] Yes, so, there are some that I saw that are really terrific. Just 'must-haves'.
>
> Australian artistic director

The experience-seeking theatrical audience in the festival is of great significance. Its enthusiasm and quantitative appearance help qualify a festival as a positive unique experience and provide 'proof' of the unique qualities of the experience-maker.

Being information, devices can filter out and construct value according to their own functions. The associated qualification processes are linked with festivals' survival, reputation, enhance their reputation-making capacity and can help stabilize resources, including financial support, labor, device-relevant elements such as stars and movies of certain quality—as well as status, which can attract industry actors' attention. If valued in terms of industry importance, festivals can potentially have a field impact (see Chapter 4). This sets festivals up for tension, as the following quote on festival 'programming' shows:

> I feel sort of answerable to the audience, not everyone, actually, if they don't like what I do, I get upset, and also to the industry as well. It's like a push-pull thing, I feel like we do a selection that is, should, that people should take seriously, but also, we don't want to make a selection that doesn't make sense at all to the people that are actually making the films, or buying the films, but we also want to sort of guide them, to say, this is what is good.
>
> Swedish artistic festival director

Karpik (2010) aligns typical audiences with regime types: in the authenticity regime, the audience is autonomous and active (co-creative); in the mega regime heteronomous and active (i.e., relying completely on external judgement). In the expert-opinion regime, the audience is autonomous but passive, and in the common-opinion regime audiences are heteronomous and passive. Among festival directors, there has been concern with the popular appeal attained by a number of film festivals. Translated into Karpik's perspective, they

perceive a threat to the authenticity regime by the common-opinion regime, arguing that substantial device power has been diminished in its autonomy.

Yet, such fears of art being diluted by 'the masses' may not have been borne out by the data. Film festival curators are often active in film education, which is a stable source of income where they can shore up the resources to run programs in the first place. This way they groom their future audiences, taking seriously their responsibility of an arranger, as the following illustrates:

> Once you put something in the context of a festival, I think audiences are prepared to take risks. That—they would never do outside that context. I like the way the community gets motivated into the arts, the way a well programmed festival motivates into the arts. That can be very profound and life-changing even in terms of what they choose to see in the future [Q: So, festivals are for you about getting people into the arts?] Yeah, and engaging them and in the arts in an active way not just seeing a film and then going home. But talking about it, thinking about it and arguing about it. I think festivals kick-start those conversations.
>
> Australian festival director

Similarly, a Finnish representative articulates that without film festivals "our films would not be circulating as they do, people simply would not know that Finnish films exist" and would not be sold commercially outside Finland (European Coordination of Film Festivals & OPTEM, 1999, p. 86). De Valck offers a more in-depth investigation into the postmodern audience of cinema, which the following table summarizes and connects to Karpik's audience typology (see last column).

Observed in one festival, the 'lone list-maker' appears as the only audience type external to the device worlds of the festival environment while perhaps not being fully autonomous in light of the fact that she relies on prior knowledge from other sources appropriated for this role. Furthermore, the table establishes a correspondence between empirical festival research and Karpik's audience taxonomy regarding the festival as a device in the self-marketing cultural city. As shown by festival scholarship in Chapter 1, there is a two-way qualification process involved, in which festival curators can decide to focus the event on a particular local or regional culture and factors like demographic audience change (e.g., Van Hemert, 2016).

This section completes the outline of Karpik's regimes involving impersonal devices and the originality logic, shifting to personal devices and the personalization logic.

TABLE 9 Festival audiences according to De Valck (2005)

Cinephilia type	Typical motives	Typical devices	Regime(s)
Lone list-maker	Planning to follow up their own interest,exhausting available options	Pre-planning and distancing from devices available in the festival space	Autonomous and active
Highlight seeker	Seeking out 'the hottest hits'	Looking for suggestions by others, relying on established values, and guided by pre-festival publications which highlight what's 'hot'	Heteronomous and active
Specialist (often professional)	Seeking out what's novel within one's range of interests	Aided by curated windows of special programs and other pre-defined festival categories	Autonomous and active/passive
Leisure visitor	Looking for available choices—often in groups	Selects based on available offers, including last-minute deals	Heteronomous and passive
Social tourist	Seeking social time and private-group experience in public setting	A guiding member of the group will choose for all (common taste)	Heteronomous and passive
Volunteer	Seeking accreditation and insider-restricted experiences	Directly accesses most valuable information through organizations and social networks; film choice depends largely availability and others' suggestions	Autonomous and passive

2.6 *The Network-Market*

The three last regimes center on the service relationship and expands on research regarding the production and exchange of social capital in intermediation processes, which I highlighted in Chapter 4 with respect to facilitation by nonprofits as reputation-makers and taste-makers in creative/cultural fields. Festival events are rich sites for social-capital seekers (Lampel, 2011) and

symbolic-value generation (Burgess, 2020). Karpik's conceptualization goes beyond adoption of 'capital convertibility', by aligning device and regime-type analysis with the theoretical knowledge on contemporary network society (Castells, 1996).

The festival format (see Chapter 3) is probably the most exposed to the activities of network-based regimes, which, of course, must be borne out by empirical research on the multifaceted character of the interactions of festivals with the aesthetic-digital economy (see Chapter 4). But even as a local phenomenon, its much noted party culture, the atmospheres created for audiences and guests to 'have a good' time, including social encounters in parties, bars, crammed spaces that focus attention on something that 'cannot be missed out on', the incorporation of famous musicians and other non-film artists into the event space, and even the more intellectual encounters potentially doable in 'master classes', 'Q&A' sessions, and so on, are signs of a typical format of the network society. The 'relaxation of rules' (Lampel, 2011) goes hand in hand with the creation of leisure spaces for festival professionals and audiences. The service relationship for industry guests includes affordable, chauffeured airport rides, food and drink coupons, city tours, dining with patrons, travel-support grants for artists, etc. The 'affective space' of the event is an affecting space, resting on a broad conception of the service relationship and its materialization well beyond glitz and glamour.

Where personal devices are the major qualifying agents, the regime adopts the generic form of what Karpik calls the 'network-market'. He then further differentiates into the 'reticular network', the 'trade network', and the 'practitioners' network' which hold the key to specific social ties: in the same order, personal friends/family, trade/industry actors, and professionals. The service relationships unfold in interactions regarding the objects they qualify, such as therapy session, special music instruments craftwork, exam tutoring, and legal practice (Karpik's examples). Together they constitute a special type of uncertainty, conceivable as non-institutional forms. Each good constitutes a singular instance, creating so-perceived unique relationships on which, as Karpik stresses, publicly-generated information is available—e.g. information typically produced by impersonal devices (e.g., lists of 'best exam tutors' and related price ranges), which still cannot help overcome uncertainty completely as to the singularities involved. Hence, only symbolic forces which "neutralize distrust and opportunism" make the network market a durable one. Karpik demonstrates these insights with the reticular coordination regime and professional coordination regime.

The reticular-regime conception addresses value circulation among kin, friends, and close colleagues, pertaining to social networks of any size and

information emerging residing in "[s]tories, personal experiences, evaluations, names, prices and advice" (Karpik, 2010, p. 184). In what sense though does this constitute a case of singularization? Karpik would argue that personal networks amplify the information, making decision outcomes costly and less straightforward than a search in those networks may look like at its start (Karpik, 2010, pp. 184–185). They are a good example of how uncertainty gets reproduced the moment it is tackled as a problem. The reticular-regime conception introduces the problem of shared convictions (e.g., in the right kind of music instrument) and the belief in 'miracle workers' (e.g., for children who might not pass the exam without their help). Karpik describes a further network—the 'trade network'—as a further shared symbolic reality from which mutual trust arises, but there is no network regime or example given for a ubiquitous form of interactions, the buyer-seller relations that exist in markets of any size, including the standard market that he excludes from his economics of singularities, and which have been discussed by economic sociologists with respect to development of trust over time. 'Advance on trust' refers to the social reputation emerging over time and is empirically observable in trade networks, which Karpik does not elaborate. The professional-coordination regime centers on the practitioner/professionals networks and their mobilization of information such as "anecdotes, information, rumor, criticism, invitations, electoral campaigns, mobilization, and so forth" which allow its participants to form beliefs in 'realistic comparisons' (Karpik, 2010, pp. 186–187).

The three types of networks are observable across the festival event population. Festivals are sites for socializing (and service relationships to begin, unfold, or for being appreciated) for many members of the art worlds. Professionals, sales agents, filmmakers, volunteers, festival organizers and workers, association officials, critics and media professionals, venture capitalists, distributors, buyers, performance artists, etc.—all of these are present and literally define the space as eventive through their social dynamics (Burgess, 2020; Dayan, 2000).

In Chapter 4, I provided a theoretical analysis of how collusion by nonprofit organizations can be a major asset to events' legitimacy and relative power in a given organizational field, adding at the outset of this chapter that events as device worlds can be observed more precisely as providing input for different stages of the value chain rather than in one location as field theory would assume, understating their true socioeconomic dimension. Further below, I illustrate this point with the example of film funds over which some festivals have fiduciary duty. The literature on film fests and the cinema industry has demonstrated in many ways that the festival provides the space for a network-market which combines, depending on the mission, resources, and governance,

network features in different combinations. High-ranking festivals will have more features common to trade and practitioner networks than the 'audience festivals' (discussed in Chapter 1). Across the board, however, the reticular network is present and a major format element as expressed in a handbook for independent filmmakers presenting their work in festival programs:

> What is the one thing I must know when going to a film festival? Be nice, I'm not kidding—being nice to people will pay off more than you ever dreamed. The indie film world is a fluid one and the assistant this year may be the festival director next year, so it's important to be cool. Just like Fonzie.
>
> interviewee in GORE, 2009, p. 70

This handbook for professional filmmakers suggests making "lots of new friends" (… "And I mean real friends, not just industry friends, there is a big difference"), throw a party, attend parties, send thank you notes, give out promotional items, and more (Gore, 2009, p. 118). The festival event is thus a true workspace for creatives, providing support for Lampel's ideas on field-configuring events.[6] This also illustrates what Galaskiewicz (see Chapter 4) calls 'contagion by cohesion', i.e., a strategy in absence of peer contacts and normalized in network capitalism. Filmmakers are encouraged to use their festival performance to market the film, prepare opportunities for post-festival screenings, collect press and review items about her movie and explore other festivals as showcases of works by peers (Gore, 2009, pp. 118–119).

The festival emerges as an affordance for less costly search mechanisms and a way for future distributors to hedge their marketing costs. This all suggests less of a spot-market in which capital convertibility operates, insinuating that events are embedded in networks that also structure entire social fields. The network-market also socializes emerging talent in the cinema field (as well as volunteers, see Part 3) around its rules of conducting business, as conveyed by this interviewed manager:

> No, it's purely philanthropic; I mean we give them a bloody good service. We are starting out a lot of people, and they learn how festivals work,

6 In another source, Steve Montal (2004, p. 323) tells filmmakers to itemize the festival cost in the movie budget including resource needs such as "publicist, travel, applications, shipping, telephone and promotional materials". Presenting one's movie in ten film festivals, he states, requires about 15,000 US dollars. For good reason, Montal's essay is placed in the marketing section, equal to other essays concerning mainstream production in the handbook.

> because [this festival] gives them basically an individual tutorial, … it's also interesting to learn how people don't use the services because they don't read anything they get in their packs, they won't pass the office, they don't investigate, and then they turn around and say 'Wouldn't it be good if you did this?' two years later. And then you go 'We've been doing this for ten years'. That's all very frustrating.
>
> British festival manager

Market participation in form of movie distribution is therefore not solely mediated by accrual of cultural capital (De Valck & Soeteman, 2010), the work of impersonal devices. As trade magazines reporting on festivals repeatedly voice, there is no direct translation between a movie's high status attained in a film festival and commercial identification as a sellable item. Even for highly recognized movie directors, research found that social ties, creative 'renewal', and protecting one's creative freedom does play a role in maintaining the career but they are not reliable when it comes to predicting success. The careers inspected show "a great deal of serendipity, taking chances, first experimenting and later reflecting, as well as some professional and personal incidents that deviate a lot from 'rational human behavior'" (Mainemelis et al., 2016, p. 278).

Creating what the distributor calls a 'strong identity' involves much networking, aided by a festival event space that even includes a business format, the 'sales pitch', by which filmmakers can create attention for their ideas. This confirms arts nonprofits as actors that aid boundary transgression as well as their role in value creation, an issue raised in Chapter 4 (see also Bromley & Meyer, 2017).

Beyond the issue of social capital for industry participants, festival organizers are engaged in networks beyond the field, maintaining partnerships with government and influential arts organizations and festival organizations similar to them, as these are resource partners. They also maintain links with media resource centers and government agencies, which are only superficially external to their spheres of activities, including policy actors from areas such as economic development, education, environment, and heritage. These networks provide specific and necessary resources that festival directors need to utilize to their own ends. With Karpik's extension on capital convertibility, we can thus see the weakness of population typologies like business vs. audience event (Peranson, 2009) and a need to explore the more recent typologies which I introduced in Chapter 1, dealing with the event as a more complex site of roles, qualification processes, and interactions. Richard Freeman's observation of stakeholders as actors who "in some way can affect the achievements

of organization", a notion reintroduced in management science in the 1980s in response to institutional environments notably becoming more dense (2018), is informative and in support of the festival-stakeholder conception (Rhyne, 2009).

The arranger in Reckwitz's creativity dispositif is precisely the role that organizes these actors into a common temporary space, as it applies both aesthetic and interdisciplinary social-science knowledge to the craft of the curator. This involves grant-making relationships as I will now discuss.

3 Festival Film and Grant-Makers' Devices

Grant-makers play an important role for arts nonprofits which cannot acquire their main resources through a for-profit business model relevant to their own enterprise. Funds allocated through the festival can illuminate this situation. Rarely studied in detail, Tamara Falicov (2016)'s essay provides insight into such funding patterns on which I base my discussion in this section. Since the 1990s, major film festivals, especially European ones, perform an intermediary role in grants-economic contexts. Falicov highlights the support for filmmakers of the Global South who hardly receive government-funding for movie production and the access to the film festival circuit. The rise of such film funds represents the expansion of film festivals to activities of production and sales/distribution precisely by grant-making for activities such as training (including script-writing, networking, work in transnational structures, and business behavior), workshops with peers, production support, co-production support, and participation in post-production competitions. The funds vary by magnitude and cover many professional areas, including mentoring and patronage relationships that Falicov labels 'close to in-house production'. Her research describes in more detail the arts nonprofit as part of a global division of cultural labor, as suggested by Rhyne.

Film funds exemplify the grants-economic provision for cinema arts, through resources derived from government (tax) sources, foundations, and, in some countries, the national lottery scheme. The emergence of these funds is closely associated with the incorporation of cultural objects and services into the global trade regime, an arena fraught with conflict among national interests. Broadly speaking, the grant-makers goal is to secure cultural diversity, a UNESCO mission since the 1980s, which has accompanied the globalization of cultural production and media agglomeration (see more in Chapter 12, where I more closely inspect 'culturalization'-related policies). The cultural-diversity strategy works not to regulate distribution quota to curb the Hollywood import

(as on and off attempted by governments overwhelmed by Hollywood's sheer trade power) but to put in place essentially positive-sanctioning measures that keep Hollywood and other regional cinema powers in the vicinity of weaker countries in check. From an economic point of view, funds for Global-South filmmakers also provide development aid, which so far has not challenged the neoliberal trade regime and the oligopolistic structure of the global cinema field. How does the film fund fit into Karpik's taxonomy? To recall the definition, a regime "combines a particular qualification of the singularities, a particular form of the intervention of judgement devices, a particular form of consumer commitment and a particular form of global logic governing the matching between these elements" (Karpik, 2010, p. 129).

Looking at film funds as devices, Falicov's results, firstly, reveal that they tend to encourage mimetic tendencies of driving production toward art recognizable by a generic 'festival film' format. Critically called 'poverty porn', observed Global-South filmmakers are urged to write stories that the on-average wealthier viewers will find 'authentic', resonating with their ideas of the developing world. Still, such films mostly do not achieve larger circulation despite the immense focus on urgent social issues (Falicov, 2016, p. 218) as well the filmmakers' compliance with a western format. Expressed differently, the works appear to film experts as following from a 'world model' which expresses diversity as cultural representation rather than the real-world diversity. Secondly, the grant criteria reflect a number of structural elements that support funders' goals to create a transnational product, such as inclusion of co-production partners from the funding countries in some cases, and expectations of successive successes leading to search for private finance in the film markets that perform in parallel to some of the A-list film festivals. This confirms the relevance of such funds and their distributing organizations in places along the value chain. Grant-based film funds do not come close to tackle the economic subsistence issue for cinema artists raised at the end of Chapter 3. They do work, however, as appellations (serving in the authenticity regime) and provide plenty of potential for network-market based regimes to operate. Tentatively, we can formulate them as devices battling the might of commercial devices in the cinema field, thereby marking film funds, festivals, and governments as protectors of cultural diversity.

4 Nonprofit Actors in Value Chains?

Some sociologists have argued that a chain model is not suitable for the cinema and many other fields, due to lacking linearity and the way cultural

production works (Fligstein, 2001; Lash & Lury, 2007; Pratt, 2008). According to Scott Lash and Celia Lury, boundaries as to what can be understood as cultural have dissolved, stressing that "products move much through accident as through design, as much by virtue of their unintended consequences as through planned design …" (Lash & Lury, 2007, pp. 3–7). Still, the sequence of major production stages—production, distribution, and exhibition (in short, P—D—E)—works well enough to summarize the scope of film festival operations along the value chain of cinema (Kehoe & Mateer, 2015) and take it into dialogue with Karpik's economics of singularities. Festival organizers are also aware of the amount of work they do for the cinema field. For example, the San Sebastian International Film Festival advertises itself as a node in the value chain, stating that it

> aims to cover every stage of the film production value chain with its industry activities: the Co-Production Forum, Films in Progress and Glocal in Progress. It is also a Festival well known for its support to new directors: first or second films are programmed in all sections, in addition to hosting initiatives aimed at fostering new talents.
>
> Source: https://cineuropa.org/en/nl/did/3368/

Can nonprofit organizations collaborate in value chains, or can the 'capital converted' in such spaces and, assumed to be of portable nature (Lampel & Meyer, 2008), be of use in markets at distant places? I argue that nonprofits are full-time actors in the economic coordination activities pertaining not only to the cinema value chain, but also those that 'crisscross' with this chain, including chiefly other entertainment industries as well as food and beverage production, toy makers, etc. (Sassen & Roost, 1999). This points to the movie as a deep resource for the cultural economy and creative industries, which must be explored further.

The capacity for nonprofits to act in value chains has already been demonstrated by social movement research, showing that activists supply market actors with market devices in form of direct dissemination rather than only through educational functions in the public sphere, narrowly focusing on changing behaviors or moral codes in the population. They have been demonstrated as actors introducing new principles for valuation or comparison between goods, while also at times relying on classical marketing tools (Dubuisson-Quellier, 2013, p. 688; Gereffi et al., 2001). In a study on art auctions (Pardo-Guerra, 2011) the question of how 'entangled objects'—a term suitable for films—become 'disentangled commodities', precisely when the movie is represented in form of box office income, addresses the question of how art

can remain art while being sold. The auction is the final point in a long process of institutional framing and calculations. The key process in the performance of the economic conversion is that of decontextualizing, dissociation and detaching—enabling the possibilities for trade. On from there, the market is the price-setting mechanism. Yet, the goods keep being qualified further along the chain, as Karpik showed, for example, with the mega-film regime.

These questions can be explored further with empirical data through specifying festivals and processes of qualification in their respective locations. We can conceptualize these locations tentatively as sites of governance (cf. Gereffi et al., 2005), with regimes of economic coordination helping to pinpoint the finer dimensions of this complexity. I take these studies as indicative that non-profit action can potentially occur in market organization. This is partly supported by Falicov's study of film funds distributed in film festivals which, far from being charity for struggling artists, involve a complex representation of valuable activities along the value chains. Carroll Harris (2017) understands the position of film festivals in the cinema field as specialized exhibitor for small and midsize budget movies.

As shown for Canada's cinema field, business and policy makers as stakeholders are well aware of the value chain proposition and actively engage with it (Burgess, 2020). There is an interesting thought here by Burgess who speculates that film festivals have not been termed 'a consumption platform' in research and industrial reporting because they do not provide for direct return of investment. Still, the tickets sold in a festival may not matter in their pecuniary terms for business generation although they may cover costs, especially for smaller films and thus support segments of the industry, especially those in early career stages. Screening fees are also relevant in this discussion. Again, it may not be in the interest of value-chain analysts to include grants-economic phenomenon, but stakeholders take grants-economic phenomena such as festivals and related resource allocations extremely seriously.

Overall, it is a widely accepted notion that these shared live experiences generate attention—known as 'buzz'—entering the value-chain calculations for profiteering actors and policy makers who seek legitimacy for their spending on film culture and the film industry (Attanasi et al., 2013; Burgess, 2020; Vogel, 2021). Finally, there is also the specter of digitization which requires more research on actual technological impact (see on the 'downside of digital' by Baumgärtel, 2012, pp. 141–149; Elsaesser & Hoffmann, 1998).[7] Regarding future

7 As filmmaker Khavn de la Cruz put it in a recent cinema manifesto, "A minute of celluloid film including processing costs around P1500. A minute of digital film costs around P3. Do the math. A galaxy of difference." (in Baumgärtel, 2012, p. 123)

festival research, the regime typology applies economic-sociological knowledge of valuation processes to the cultural-sociological program that allows us to understand festivals' capabilities linked to immersive-environment production and curatorial arrangements as part of macrosocial environments.

5 Conclusion

In this chapter I explored the value-adding proposition by film festival scholars in a valuation-sociological perspective. There are many further questions, such as the intersecting of value chains of mainstream and independent cinema, the regime application to the festival scholars' festival tier model, the valuation dynamics on the circuit, and the study of valuation to address real-world economics, including development economics in the cinema world, the politics of culture as traded good, interlinking subsidies and grants for business and artists. Chapter 5 continued on Chapter 4 by showing how the regimes of economic coordination can more precisely tackle the problem of capital convertibility, perhaps eventually leading to more qualitative and quantitative analysis, and how the network-market specifies the collusion potential New Institutionalists detected in nonprofit organizations. The chapter also showed that labor market value is subject to device worlds, an observation that must be extended to the study of the film festival organization, as I do in the following Part 3, where grants-economic questions are considered by observing volunteers and badly compensated professionals giving their time for this powerful intermediary, but also the people and activities that benefit from it. In the last chapter of Part 2, I provide a performance model for film festival participation of movies which estimates the value-adding proposition statistically and offers a second study of 'the festival effect' (for the first see Mezias et al., 2011).

CHAPTER 6

Examining the Festival Effect

1 Studying Device Power: The Festival Effect

Does it, as de Valck's claims, become easier for a movie which "has been selected for a festival program, screened in a competition or perhaps even honored with an award" to be sold to cinemas and ancillary markets, because of its increased cultural value (2007, p. 38)? Like many film festival researchers introduced in Chapter 1, guidebook authors have been no less assertive of this 'film festival effect', writing about festivals possibly making the difference in getting distribution and movie screenings raising the profile of the filmmaker (Erickson et al., 2005, p. 340; Parks, 2007, p. 67; Tuttle, 2006, p. 189). This relationship between movies and film festivals will be explored in this chapter, adding to Chapter 5's qualitative inquiry about economic-coordination participation by film festivals a systematic analysis of valorization by spectacle and buzz production (Reckwitz, 2017a, pp. 162–171).[1]

To this end, a random sample of 299 US American-released movies (all in 2006) which were subsequently screened in film festivals (hereafter: festivals) is entered into an intermediation analysis of festival participation's impact on artistic reputation and commercial success for both art works and artists (movies and their directors). To keep the chapter slim, I have incorporated the presentation of data-related and methodological strategies, specifically the sampling procedure, the variables' designs, and the choice of statistical techniques in the Appendix at the end of the book. The chapter starts with an overview of film performance studies, which are the relevant methodological reference, and looks at the role film festivals play in those studies. After this I describe five quantitative models which will be used to analyze the effect from film festival participation of movies. The rest of the chapter presents the findings and offers interpretations with respect to the value-adding potential of festivals as intermediaries.

1 To ease the reading, I omitted most of the references to the relevant literature, which has already been provided in the previous chapters.

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1.1 *Film Performance Study*

Allègre Hadida's (2008) comprehensive review of performance studies for cinema reflects the interest by applied sciences to understand more of the determinants of box-office outcomes—the effects of the classical format (see Chapter 3). Among these 135 reviewed studies, published between 1977 and 2006, only five articles combine analysis of artistic with commercial movie performance. The review usefully identifies the major and broad concept groups, i.e., film factors, organizational factors, audience characteristics, and third-party information. Film factors (e.g., artistic reputation) and organizational factors (e.g., track record of a producer) are inputs that can be controlled by industry-side actors, but third-party information, such as critical peer review and 'word of mouth' (shared audience opinions) are the work of judgement devices (see Chapter 5).[2] In her own study, Hadida argues that artistic and commercial dimensions are distinct, and artistic value can potentially be prioritized regardless of the mutual reinforcement of artistic and commercial values (2008, p. 75). Still, performance studies are hardly interested in artistic award ceremonies (with the exception of the US American Academy Awards). Therefore, performance studies say little about the film festivals as participants in the authenticity regime (Karpik, 2010), even though festivals dominate by volume and diversity the awards architecture and certainly provide valuation in both mainstream and independent production (Baumann, 2007). In more recent years, the performance literature has been enriched by the study of non-festival awards and reviews (e.g., Gemser, Van Oostrum, & Leenders, 2008). Reviews have been studied as to whether they 'influence' or 'predict' movie success, as art-house audiences pay attention to reviews, which can be negative but not deter them from seeing the movie anyway, whereas mass audiences are assumed to pay no attention to experts as sufficiently credible sources, going instead by what other audience members make of the quality (Gemser, et al., 2008). These studies corroborate Karpik's formulation of the mega-film and the authenticity regimes (2010). Despite the lacking attention on film festivals, these mainly US-industry focused studies are still informative. Festival operations include a variety of third-party information providers investigated in the literature, and therefore they mediate in specific ways between past prizes and future commercial or artistic success. This hypothesis of the festival effect is consistent with Gemser and colleagues' finding that the

2 To add a second concept for third-party information to the models performed in Chapter 6, one of the most sensible measures of critical expert review external to film festivals, the RottenTomato.com's t-meter (Holbrook & Addis, 2008), was collected but could not be used because of causal measurement conflict.

'Oscar's' have significantly lesser impact on the performance of independent movies when compared to 'the average expert-selected award' (2008, p. 43), which may be associated with the high volume of festival awards. Regarding these authors' finding that audiences of independent cinema follow the critics' reviews (2008, p. 28), we can understand festivals as spaces for autonomous and active audiences, albeit not exclusively so, as discussed in Chapter 5. In addition to audiences' educational background as significant predictor, the festival—by being a site for critical devices—directly engages audiences, curating their encounters with educated views and potentially influential peers, which may stimulate future taste in a variety of cinema.

1.2 *Device Impact for Prestigious Film Festivals*

The festival effect, as I call it, has been studied by Stephen Mezias and co-authors (2011) with a sample of movies premiered in the A-list festivals of Berlin, Cannes, and Venice during 1996–2005 and including the outcome dimension of audience uptake (measured conventionally in ticket sales) in subsequent theatrical exhibition across European cinema. The study examines whether elite festivals produce attention which will generate further attention and whether this follows a status order within these three film festivals. Similar to Lampel, discussed in Chapter 4, Mezias and colleagues argue that collectively shared perceptions and information will be transformed into 'product performance' based on social and reputational resource located in competitive spaces. They conceptualize the effect in terms of 'superior product identity' bestowed by prize wins, which in turn will help find bigger audiences in subsequent circulation. They also hypothesize that prize-winning movies in which producers and directors win prizes will have bigger audiences than those with stage actors' prizes and that the aforementioned festival events' prestige differentials will attach themselves to the festival prizes won and therefore produce a hierarchy of value in the outcome.[3] The study finds no effect from best director-prize and no differential effect on the audience-demand in terms of all prizes won at a festival. It finds that movies winning in festivals, and especially Best-Picture winners, can attract more audiences; nominations at the most prestigious film festival of the world will also attract more audiences in theatres, but there is no status-ordering effect regarding the total prize wins of a movie. Furthermore, when a movie has achieved a number of wins at a festival, the festival prestige (its distinct identity) is secondary to the audience demand.

3 I use the term 'stage actor' when I refer to artists, as I use the term 'actor' for sociological formulations throughout the book.

It seems remarkable that whether a movie director gets recognized as outstanding or not (best-director award) has no effect on the audiences in the way this is measured here. Overall, this first analysis of a festival device effect is significant for the economic sociology of experience-making, as it demonstrates the relationship between film festival dynamics and movie consumption.

2 Operationalization and Conjectures

The following analysis seeks to model the effect of festival participation on movies and their artistic producers. Assuming that festival awards and participations are generally influential, my analysis aims to capture status differences of a greater width by a broader sample and, furthermore, introduces measures to gauge the festival effect for different movie types, which I simply call 'genre' in the rest of this chapter.[4] How is the device quality of the film festival translated into a feasible quantitative model? The current perception among experts, discussed at the end of Chapter 3, is that the circuit has become 'crowded' with competition and movie oversupply. Device effects in form of basic attention-signaling mechanisms, as we have to assume in this study, are conceptualized at singular-event and circuit level respectively. Each film festival provides its own competition for reputation. A simple inclusion/exclusion binary works at the most basic level, as permission to screen in front of a public festival audience constitutes already an achievement.

This study cannot operationalize all the complex competitive dynamics emerging from the curations, such as relative positioning of movies in the event program, which exposes films differently to judgement devices (e.g., opening night, premiere, catalog display, interpretive communication, press conferences, seminars for artists, prize competitions, etc.), and which definitely deserve attention in future studies despite the foreseeable compromise on representativeness. This complexity increases in the sense Karpik defines singularities (see Chapter 5), as on the circuit level festival locations and length of run arguably render signals that potentially alter movie identity. One must emphasize that in this particular art world valuation occurs on all ranks of the festival world. The data I collected in preparation of the empirical analysis show that only about half of the annually recorded global cohort of movies in the used database (IMDb, see the Appendix) gets to participate in festivals,

4 The major distinctions are feature, documentary, and shorts. Rather than selecting from the 'infinite variety' (e.g., drama, fantasy film, comedy, thriller, etc.), the study aims to include the breadth of cinema by selecting on movie type.

with most of them screening only in one festival and without any further distribution in theater and ancillary markets.[5]

Festival managers have been observed to influence the opportunity structure, making deals with other festivals and industry actors to screen particular movies as well as through the micro dynamics of scheduling and programming of festival screenings and media events, as aforementioned. In the analysis, this complexity has to be black-boxed around a few assumptions, which are, firstly, that outcomes of movie participation in festivals, which we are just beginning to understand, reflect some of this dynamic and that, secondly, festivals strategically develop the capacity to attract certain types of art works in correspondence with their missions and their organizational reputations.

Until now, no systematic evidence about micro-level strategies by filmmakers with respect to creating their participations is available. The interviews undertaken for this book, however, suggest that these strategies are constrained by film factor and resources and that the behavior is 'satisficing' (Simon, 1957). It makes sense to assume that at the aggregate level (the circuit) any effects from micro-level submission strategy patterns of film makers are greatly diminished by the overwhelming power of devices.[6] The major variable reflecting film festival participation is the 'festival run'. The driving insight behind this dimension is that the sum of them operationalizes the collective impact of devices collected in film festivals. The following section introduces the five conjectures (denoted by 'C') for the festival effect, which are translated into quantitative models.

2.1 *C1: Film Festival Participation Increases the Odds of a Movie Attaining Theatrical Revenue*

Model 1 examines the impact of the festival in commercial terms. The hypothesis captures the wish of the festival-participating filmmaker to gain reputation leading to paying audiences, which permits remuneration for some part of past efforts. As audiences face 'infinite diversity', they will read movies with many festival logos (a sign of a substantial festival run) as proven quality and promise of entertainment. We can expect prestigious-event participation by

5 The timing of events on the festival circuit is inextricably linked to the product cycle of the industry, which corresponds with the industry seasons for cinema and television. Premiere status follows from two attributes: the first public screening of a movie and the ability of the festival to claim an organizational status as premiere festival.

6 Even where cronyism or legitimate promotion of talent exists (see Falicov, 2016), the effects of such interventions may have, just like attention from first awards and first-time awards, an effect on early outcomes while eroding over time substantially.

a movie to have a positive effect on revenue and a positive effect from playing in festivals that have been accredited by industry associations. The conjecture promises a positive effect from movie performance in a 'domestic territory' due to a 'negative cultural distance' effect, which has been studied in earlier performance models (Hadida, 2010, p. 72). Given the specificity of a US movie sample, performance in festivals located in and around Los Angeles and the Hollywood industry locations should contribute to a positive effect, in line with agglomeration scholars' description of a positive network effect (Scott, 2005). The stated hypothetical relationships are more likely to hold for feature films, the major genre of commercial cinema exhibition. Two controls for crucial commercial factors, the movie's budget and its film market participation, are added to the models. Since large budget size is typically a function of immense spending on market-making such as advertising and marketing, larger movie budget makes box-office outcome more likely (Hadida, 2010, p. 73). When movies are entered in film markets, we expect an effect from social interactions of the movie representatives with sales agents and distributors (Lampel & Meyer, 2008), but also, in case of festival-fair alignment, from distributors' study of festival audiences' first reactions and the response by press and media.

2.2 *C2: Film Festival Participation Increases the Odds of a 'Deal' for the Movie*

Model 2 examines whether festival participation affects future movie distribution and which genres are to benefit from festivals providing for distributor attention. More frequent festival participation, performing in more prestigious festivals, industry accreditation, and geographic proximity to Hollywood will positively affect the odds of distribution. Positive signals from participation in specialized circuits such as community-specific festivals as well as domestic exposure—concentration ratio of US American festivals in the festival run—are expected to raise the odds of a deal. Control for movie budget as investment into the project which instills trust in the 'worth of the game' is included as are control for past production achievements (past theatrical movies called 'Wide Screen', and television works, called 'Small Screen') and also for audience achievement (past prizes) for the filmmaker of the movie, as past achievements have been shown to influence movie revenue in Hadida's review. The model includes a control for signals from the ancillary market for DVDs, which may influence distributor attention either way. Similar to Model 1, control for film market participation is included to capture potential effects from the provided opportunity for contacts and facilitations for distribution deal-making.

2.3 *C3: Film Festival Participation Increases the Odds of a Film Artist Making Future Movies*

Model 3 captures the effect of festival participation on different types of future creative production (movies directed by the filmmaker). The dependent variables are set up so that directing future features (Model 3a) and future shorts and documentaries (Model 3b) acknowledge the different dynamics and identities associated with movie types. As most movies play in only one festival, it is hypothesized that circuit exposure can have an overall positive effect, but that more is gained by more frequent festival participation, leading to higher visibility, increasing the odds of reputation wins, and therefore creating more future project opportunities for perceived talent. One can also expect a modest positive effect on the filmmaker's future productivity from having had their work screened in festivals with particular status identities, such as prestige, community (here the variable chosen is participation in LGBTQ festivals, see the Appendix for more), festivals in the vicinity of Hollywood, US/domestic festivals and industry-accredited festivals. The models include controls for a number of organizational and film factors, such as budget, Small Screen-track record and Wide Screen-track record by genre as well as the movie director's past prizes. Furthermore, a control for film market participation, as argued for Model 1, is included. The model tests the industry belief in a mobility pattern from shorts to features-making.

2.4 *C4: Film Festival Participation Increases the Odds of a Film Artist Receiving Any Future Prizes*

Model 4 hypothesizes that festival participation leads to future prizes for the filmmaker. For movies with smaller odds of future commercial exhibition (most of independent cinema by past experience), devices governing the authenticity and the expert-opinion regimes are crucial. This has been studied with peer and expert reviews (Holbrook, 1999). Festival signals bundle such device effects which potentially generate the 'buzz' needed for a clear 'breakthrough' in artist, but this effect is expected to be on the smaller side, being part of a longer-trend Matthew effect (Merton, 1968), and more likely to occur when the movie is presented in top-tier festival, or industry-accredited festivals as well as longer on the festival circuit.[7] The festival effect is separated from other effects by analyzing those potentially stemming from past directed works as well as prizes for the artists received before and during the time of the movie's festival participation. Finally, as gender hierarchy has been established for industry

7 The Matthew Effect is the well-known theorem of accumulated advantage.

creatives (Lincoln & Allen, 2004) and as women directors have been under-represented among top industry accolade recipients, the filmmaker's gender is included to study if this pattern is observable in festivals, too. Festivals are by their profiling as agents of cultural diversity assumed to 'correct' the problems of the industry.[8]

2.5 *C5: Film Festival Participation Increases the Odds of Prizes Awarded to a Movie*

Model 5 hypothesizes a positive effect on the movie's artistic recognition from circuit participation. Longer or more frequent festival participation can potentially result in more prizes of any type of recognition. Festivals are the places in which such opportunities are abundant and devices of the authenticity regime perform their diversity. One would expect a stronger positive effect from festival runs containing festivals with formal and media-attended competitive elements, like A-list and industry-accredited events. Positive effects from playing in community-based festivals and also, as in the previous models, from playing in festivals near Hollywood and domestically are expected. I control for filmmaker's past directing achievements, past Small Screen-career influence as well as the effect of artists' past prizes on a movie's reputational future, and gender as in the previous model. Finally, because commercial outcomes and artistic outcomes can influence each other, the outcome variable of Model 2 is entered as a control for film-distribution outcome.

3 Statistical Results

This section presents the statistical results listed in Tables 10 and 11 below.

Four of the six outcome variables were significantly related to genre (feature, documentary, and short) in the bivariate analyses. More than twice as many features had a box-office income compared to documentaries, whereas shorts had no box-office income. Over twice as many features as documentaries have a listed distributor (64.3 percent vs. 30.8 percent), and only 8.5 percent of shorts found a distributor. Among future directed works, the genre difference is statistically significant for feature-directing. Artists with a feature in festivals directed four times more features in the future than their counterparts with

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8 In 2010, Kathryn Bigelow became the first woman in history to win an Oscar for best directing. In 2015–2016, Hollywood artists, both women and men, accomplished to create media awareness for the gender discrimination in the industry, which may lead to more opportunities of women filmmakers in the future.

shorts, but also about two and a half times more than their counterparts with documentaries. The test for movie's future prizes by genre reveals a statistically significant genre difference. Features garnered over three and a half times more prizes than shorts and roughly one third more prizes than documentaries. Difference by genre in the artist's future prizes proved not statistically significant. For the major predictor variable, festival participation (circuit exposure), there was no statistically significant difference by genre. The Fisher exact test for the categorical variable (not included in Table 10) confirms this result. Participation in a FIAPF-accredited festival was strongly related to genre: features were approximately six times more likely to participate than shorts (17.1 vs. 2.7 percent) and nearly four times more likely to participate than documentaries (4.6 percent). The statistically significant result for the mean ratio of US domestic festival participation indicates that documentaries (97.7 percent) and shorts (96.2 percent) were mainly screened in domestic festivals, and that features (90 percent) were more exposed to the international circuit.

Among the film and artist factors, I find a statistically significant genre difference for movie budget, with the average budget for the feature being 3.86 US million dollars, compared to 10,000 for shorts and 60,000 US dollars for documentaries.[9] Artists presenting their features in festivals had directed ten times more features in the past than those with shorts on the circuit, and one and a half times more past features than those with documentaries participating. More than a quarter of the film artists had prior experience in Small Screen work, a finding not significantly different by genre. Among artists' past prizes, there is only a statistically significant result for prizes won before the movie's festival participation started: directors presenting features had received roughly five times more past prizes than those who presented shorts or documentaries. Finally, among the model-specific controls are statistically significant genre differences for ancillary-market participation and director's gender. Nearly all DVD premieres turn out to be features. Women directors turn up statistically significantly more frequently in the participation of documentaries (36.4 percent) than in shorts participation (18.4 percent) and even more so regarding features (12.9 percent).

The multivariate models are presented in Table 11. They are logistic regression and Poisson regression models, leading to outputs in form of odds ratio

9 Many budget values had to be imputed, as most were missing and could not be obtained from the movie producers in correspondence. Mezias and co-authors' first version of their study reports a mean of four million U.S. dollars (see Mezias, et al., 2008). Montal's suggested sample budget is 15,000 US dollars, recommended for an "indie film with the goal of going to ten major festivals" (2004, p. 323).

TABLE 10 Characteristics of the 2006-movie sample by: movie genre, means, percentages and statistical significance (n = 299)

Overall		Feature	Short	Documentary	Test statistic[a]	Statistical significance
Sample N	299 100%	70 23%	185 62%	44 15%		
Outcomes:						
Box office revenue[b]	6.0%	18.6%	0.0%	9.1%	° $\chi 2\ (2) = 33.78$	$p < 0.000$
Future distribution[c]	23.9%	64.3%	8.5%	30.8%	° $\chi 2\ (2) = 64.44$	$p < 0.000$
Artist's future movies—directed features	0.16	0.36	0.09	0.14	$F = 11.11$	$p < 0.000$
Artist's future movies—directed shorts & documentaries	0.62	0.31	0.75	0.55	$F = 4.65$	$p < 0.102$
Artist's future prizes	0.21	0.31	0.15	0.30	$F = 1.09$	$p < 0.338$
Movie's future prizes	0.52	1.06	0.29	0.66	$F = 6.40$	$p < 0.012$
Festival Circuit Participation:						
One festival	61.0%	50.0%	66.0%	56.8%	$\chi 2\ (2) = 5.77$	$p < 0.056$
Two-three festivals	20.0%	24.3%	19.5%	18.2%	$\chi 2\ (2) = 0.885$	$p < 0.642$
Four or more festivals	19.0%	25.7%	14.6%	25.0%	$\chi 2\ (2) = 5.548$	$p < 0.065$
Sundance	4.0%	7.1%	3.2%	0.0%	$\chi 2\ (2) = 4.150$	$p < 0.126$
FIAPF accredited festival	6.0%	17.1%	2.7%	4.6%	$\chi 2\ (2) = 18.08$	$p < 0.000$
Queer-community festival	3.0%	4.3%	2.2%	4.6%	$\chi 2\ (2) = 1.201$	$p < 0.549$
Festival near Hollywood	12.0%	12.9%	13.5%	6.8%	$\chi 2\ (2) = 1.49$	$p < 0.475$
Ratio US festivals to total festival run	95.0%	90.0%	96.2%	97.7%	$F = 4.81$	$p < 0.009$

TABLE 10 Characteristics of the 2006-movie sample by: movie genre, means, percentages and statistical significance (n = 299) (*cont.*)

Overall		Feature	Short	Documentary	Test statistic[a]	Statistical significance
Film and Artist Factors:						
Movie's budget ($million US)	0.92	3.86	0.01	0.06	$F = 20.71$	$p < 0.000$
N of artist's prior Widescreen works—directed shorts & docs	0.66	0.51	0.71	0.64	$F = 0.64$	$p < 0.527$
N of artist's prior Widescreen works—directed features	0.40	1.00	0.11	0.66	$F = 11.24$	$p < 0.000$
Artist's past Smallscreen works	28.0%	35.7%	25.4%	27.3%	$\chi2\ (2) = 2.689$	$p < 0.261$
N of prizes before festival run	0.42	1.07	0.22	0.23	$F = 11.37$	$p < 0.000$
N of prizes during festival run	0.47	0.69	0.37	0.55	$F = 1.38$	$p < 0.252$
Controls:						
Ancillary market premiere (DVD)	0.29%	1.9%	0.01%	0.05%	$\chi2\ (2) = 56.92$	$p < 0.000$
Participation in film market	2.0%	4.3%	1.1%	2.3%	$\chi2\ (2) = 2.67$	$p < 0.263$
Female movie director	20.0%	12.9%	18.4%	36.4%	$\chi2\ (2) = 9.987$	$p < 0.007$

Notes:

a Chi-Square Tests and One-Way ANOVA with F-Tests

b Box office revenue: for sub-sample n = 114 and ° $\chi2\ (2) = 1.91$, $p < 0.167$

c Future distribution: for sub-sample n = 260 and ° $\chi2\ (2) = 72.90$, $p < 0.000$

TABLE 11 Logistic regression of commercial outcomes and negative binomial regression of artistic outcomes for movies and filmmakers participating in film festivals on festival circuit, film and artistic factors, and controls (n = 299)

	Commercial outcomes		Artistic outcomes			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3a**	**Model 3b**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
	Box office revenue	**Future distribution**	**Artist's future features**	**Artist's future shorts/docs**	**Artist's future prizes**	**Movie's prizes**
	Odds ratio (C.I.)	**Odds ratio (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**
Festival circuit participation:						
Playing in two or three festivals (Reference: one festival)	0.49 (0.04–5.6)	0.53 (0.2–1.7)	0.42 (0.2–1.1)	1.71* (1.09–2.7)	0.59 (0.2–2.3)	1.96 (0.9–4)
Playing in four or more festivals (Reference: one festival)	1.4 (0.2–10)	1.93 (0.7–5.5)	0.21** (0.07–0.7)	1.44 (0.84–2.5)	1.68 (0.4–7.3)	4.98*** (2.4–10.4)
Playing in Sundance Film Festival	3.03 (0.2–60)	0.28 (0.01–8.4)	1.99 (0.4–10.4)	0.20 (0.02–1.6)	1.22 (0.05–28)	1.74 (0.5–6)
Playing in a FIAPF-accredited festival	14.46* (1.6–132)	2.75 (0.2–41)	1.28 (0.4–4.6)	0.45 (0.13–1.6)	1.30 (0.0–3.3)	1.32 (0.4–4)
Playing in a Queer-Community festival	—	8.94* (1.4–55.7)	2.95 (0.87–10)	1.66 (0.6–4.5)	—	—

TABLE 11 Logistic regression of commercial outcomes and negative binomial regression of artistic outcomes (*cont.*)

	Commercial outcomes		Artistic outcomes			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3a**	**Model 3b**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
	Box office revenue	**Future distribution**	**Artist's future features**	**Artist's future shorts/docs**	**Artist's future prizes**	**Movie's prizes**
	Odds ratio (C.I.)	**Odds ratio (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**
Playing in festivals near Hollywood	5.01	0.99	2.31	1.02	0.32	0.82
	(0.6–41.4)	(0.3–3.4)	(0.85–6.3)	(0.6–3.8)	(0.05–2.2)	(0.3–2)
Playing in U.S. American festivals	0.98	0.21	0.42	1.60	0.63	0.59
	(0.07–14)	(0.04–1.2)	(0.2–1.2)	(0.7–3.8)	(0.07–5.5)	(0.2–1.9)
Movie category:						
Short film	(a)	0.07***	0.28***	1.82*	0.70	0.61
(Reference: feature film)		(0.03–0.2)	(0.14–0.6)	(1.07–3.1)	(0.2–2.6)	(0.3–1.3)
Documentary film	2.28	0.27*	0.44	1.25	0.94	0.72
(Reference: feature film)	(0.4–13)	(0.09–0.8)	(0.2–1.4)	(0.6–2.5)	(0.2–5.1)	(0.3–1.9)
Film and artist factors:						
Movie's budget	1.21***	1.02	—	—	—	—
(in million U.S. dollars)	(1.1–1.4)	(0.95–1.1)				

TABLE 11 Logistic regression of commercial outcomes and negative binomial regression of artistic outcomes (*cont.*)

	Commercial outcomes		Artistic outcomes			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3a**	**Model 3b**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
	Box office revenue	**Future distribution**	**Artist's future features**	**Artist's future shorts/docs**	**Artist's future prizes**	**Movie's prizes**
	Odds ratio (C.I.)	**Odds ratio (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**
Artist's past Wide Screen works (All)	—	1.12 (0.9–1.4)	—	—	—	—
Artist's past Wide Screen works (Shorts/Docs)	—	—	1.27** (1.07–1.5)	1.35*** (1.18–1.6)	1.49 (1–2.2)	1.08 (0.9–1.4)
Artist's past Wide Screen works (Features)	—	—	1.16* (1.01–1.34)	1.08 (0.9–1.3)	1.00 (0.6–1.6)	0.90 (0.7–1.2)
Artist's past Small Screen works	—	1.00 (0.42–2.4)	0.67 (0.31–1.42)	0.78 (0.5–1.2)	0.73 (0.24–2.3)	1.28 (0.7–2.4)
Any prizes received before festival run	—	1.19 (0.76–1.9)	1.04 (0.86–1.27)	0.61* (0.42–0.9)	1.11 (0.74–1.7)	1.06 (0.8–1.4)
Any prizes received during time of festival run	—	—	—	—	1.77* (1.1–2.8)	—

TABLE 11 Logistic regression of commercial outcomes and negative binomial regression of artistic outcomes (*cont.*)

	Commercial outcomes		**Artistic outcomes**			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3a**	**Model 3b**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
	Box office revenue	**Future distribution**	**Artist's future features**	**Artist's future shorts/docs**	**Artist's future prizes**	**Movie's prizes**
	Odds ratio (C.I.)	**Odds ratio (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**	**IRR (C.I.)**
Model-specific controls:						
Ancillary market premieres (Model 2)	—	11.94* (1.3–110)	—	—	—	—
Participated in film market (Model 2)	4.24 (0.21–86)	19.48* (1.4–276)	—	—	—	—
Gender of movie director (Model 4)	—	—	—	—	2.11 (0.6–8)	0.77 (0.3–1.7)
Distribution status outcome (Model 5)	—	—	—	—	—	1.37 (0.6–2.9)
Pseudo R-Square	0.40	0.37	0.17	0.07	0.10	0.10
N	114	260	299	299	299	299

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).
Note: C.I. denotes the 95-percent confidence interval.—(a) Shorts are excluded due to invariance in the dependent variable.

and incidence rate ratio respectively (see Appendix at the end of the book on modelling strategies). In the following, results for statistically significant, independent effects in each model are reported in the order of the variable groups in the table. As borderline significance is suggestive of a relationship in this small sample, p-values smaller than .10 are reported, too, although this will be in a separate discussion to highlight that these results do not meet the conventional limits for statistical significance while indicating possible future research avenues.

Starting with the commercial outcome models, there is a positive effect on box-office performance from FIAPF-festival participation (OR = 14.46, p = .018) in Model 1. Movies exhibited in FIAPF-accredited festivals have about 15 greater odds of making box office revenue than movies without FIAPF-festival participation. A one-unit (or one million-dollar) increase in budget is associated with a 21-percent increase in the odds of making box-office income (OR = 1.21, p = .001).

In Model 2, movies exhibited in LGBTQ-community festivals have about 9 greater odds of finding a distributor than movies not participating in these festivals (OR = 8.94, p = .019). Genre appears as an important predictor of distribution: compared to features, both shorts (OR = .07, p = .000) and documentaries (OR = .27, p = .016) have slimmer odds of distribution. Finally, movies with an ancillary-market premiere have about 12 greater odds of getting a distributor than those without the DVD premiere (OR = 11.94, p = .029), while movies participating in film markets have nearly 20 greater odds of getting a distributor than those not presented in film markets (OR = 19.48, p = .028). Model 2 also shows an effect with borderline statistical significance: more exposure in US festivals may be associated with lesser odds of getting distribution than festival movies showing in festivals abroad (OR = .21, p = .08).

Turning to the findings for the artistic-outcome models, Model 3a indicates that filmmakers with comparatively longer circuit exposure (category: four or more festival participations) direct about 80 percent fewer features in the future than those who had their movie entered in just one festival (IRR = .21, p = .008). Short-filmmakers with longer circuit exposure of their movies turn out to direct about 70 percent fewer features in the future than those with only one festival participation (IRR = .28, p = .000). Furthermore, each additional short or documentary in the artist's track record was associated with about a 30 percent-increase in future features (IRR = 1.27, p = .005,) while each additional feature in the artist's accomplished work history was associated with roughly a 20 percent-increase in future features (IRR = 1.16, p = .03). There are also two effects with borderline statistical significance in this model: firstly, a large positive effect from artists screening their festival movie in one or more

LGBTQ-community festivals (IRR = 2.95, p = .082); secondly, a substantial negative effect of documentary (as participating movie) on future feature-directing (IRR = .44, p = .092).

In Model 3b, artists whose movie participates two or three times in festivals are found to have directed roughly 70 percent more future shorts or documentaries than those whose movie participates only once (IRR = 1.71, p = .02). Similarly, artists who presented their shorts directed about 80 percent more shorts and documentaries in the future, compared to those whose features screened on the circuit (IRR = 1.82, p = .028). Furthermore, each additional directed short or documentary on the artist track-record was associated with a 35 percent-increase in future shorts and documentary-directing (IRR = 1.35, p = .000). Each additional prize garnered by the artist in the past was associated with a 40 percent-decrease in future shorts and documentary directing (IRR = .61, p = .014).

In Model 4, the only effect on future artist prizes emerges from prizes the artist won during the movie's festival run. Each additional prize won in that performance window was associated with a 77 percent-increase in future artist prizes (IRR = 1.77, p = .014). An effect with borderline statistical significance for past shorts and documentary-directing, discerned from the raw result outputs, indicates that each additional past artist production was associated with about a 50 percent-increase in future artist prizes (IRR = 1.49, p = .056).

In Model 5, movies with four or more festival participations won nearly five times more future prizes than movies with one festival performance only (IRR = 4.98, p = .000). In addition, movies with two or three festival participations potentially garner double the prizes of movies shown in only one festival (IRR = 1.96, p = .08).

Based on the statistically significant findings, which together reveal a number of independent effects associated with festival participation, C1, C2, and C5 conjectures can be partly accepted, whereas C3 can be partly rejected and C4 fully rejected. The next section offers an interpretation of the findings in relation to the other Chapters of this book. The last section offers thoughts on the limitations of this modeling approach in light of future research, which this chapter hopes to encourage.

4 The Festival Effect

This statistical analysis is based on a statistically representative sample of the large product world of movies made in the United States and performing in film festivals around the world at least one time. The goal was to test whether

there was any effect from film-festival participations on commercial and artistic outcomes. It also aimed to corroborate the found festival effect for some outcomes and only for movies submitted to the top-tier European festivals (Mezias et al., 2011). My sampling strategy purposively made no such difference, *aiming to find out about more differences in festival participation-effects across circuits and tiers*.

Overall, there is strong evidence for a festival effect. The odds of a festival-participating movie to be shown to audiences is bigger when a festival performs in a FIAPF-festival as part of its festival run. Regardless of that, Hollywood's big-budget movie strategy paying off is also confirmed among these festival-participating movies, independent of the length of exposure to qualifying devices present in film festivals. As of 2015, FIAPF as the umbrella organization of producer associations worldwide had accredited 47 festivals. In my survey ahead of Chapter 1, I summarized the 'industry and media might' collected in accredited festivals. Among all festivals in the world, this category of festivals is the only one that may be securing audiences for classical-format exhibition. The second model that measures the effect on commercial movie circulation, this time using 'deals' for distribution being made, shows that regardless of the festival type, features submitted to festivals have better odds of getting distribution deals than shorts or documentaries. Festival identity with respect to being US domestic vs. international, and LGBTQ-community festival also increases the odds of a deal. Film market participation and premieres in the DVD market increase the odds for distribution. Together these two commercial-outcome models provide some first evidence that festival participation, if played strategically, can 'add value to the chain', the topic of Chapter 5. The models suggest a number of qualifications by which the movies as singularities can enter the market.

Participation in festivals also increases the odds of gaining reputation by critical devices (as phrased by Karpik, see Chapter 5), but only with a good amount of 'staying power' on the festival circuit. Of all prizes garnered by this sample of movies, 84 percent were festival prizes. More circuit visibility should predict more prizes (as suggested by film festival researchers), and the bivariate analysis suggests that it is the features and documentaries that get such prizes to greater extent than shorts do. Results from a follow-up analysis with only non-circuit prizes show that festival participation has no statistically significant, independent effect, but that there are independent significant effects from participation in LGBTQ-community festivals (IRR = 17.25, $p = .012$) and Sundance participation (IRR = 5.88, $p = .093$), while the borderline significant effect for shorts (IRR = .20, $p = .065$) suggests potentially

lesser incidence for non-circuit prizes when compared to features playing in festivals.[10]

The fact that no other variable in the full Model 5 (all the movie's prizes) gauging artist factors has a statistically significant effect could be interpreted as a sign for past achievements having potentially little to do with the 'buzz' which a long festival run can potentially create independent of other traits that could be equally evaluated. The finding may speak to a general strength of critical devices operating in film festivals, as distribution status makes no difference in this model. Similarly, and that concerns prizes for movies and filmmakers, the gender of the filmmaker makes no difference.

The notion that festival participation with a movie increases the odds of future movies being made (operationalizing creativity and productivity) is only partly borne out by the data, as a lengthy exposure to festival devices seems bad for future feature-filmmaking but good news for future shorts and documentaries-making. This result confirms industry knowledge with respect to feature financing and production being in a different world compared to shorts and documentary-making. But it also gives reason to understand more of the grant-making patterns of the film funds (Falicov, 2016), which at least in part work as mechanisms by which artists can build a career from small grants for small projects to big finance outside the festivals for bigger movies—a pattern of sequential merit competition typical for the grants economy inspected in Chapter 13. This result could potentially mean that a festival effect, modelled by grants-economic participation in festivals, might not carry through or under conditions that still need to be specified. Fully rejected by this modeling exercise is the notion that more festival participation leads to more prizes for the artist in the future. There seems to be no 'simple' exposure effect on the future reputation of the artist, and other mechanisms modelled here cannot be discerned other than that a reputational career accomplished prior to this festival participation has a positive effect on the future ability to garner prizes.

No effects appear to exist related to movies playing in the top-independent cinema film festival Sundance, from playing in festivals in the proximity of Hollywood, and the disproportionately higher participation in domestic festivals. The first null-finding is surprising given the productivity of this festival in artistic, commercial, and grants-economic terms.

Overall, the results show that the festival network for movies has consequences for movies, positive ones for all types with respect to prize-winning

10 Due to space limit, these results are not reported in Table 11.

and for the future productivity of shorts and documentary makers, but also negative consequences for features traveling on the circuit. Whether this is a 'ghettoization' effect as suggested by several cinema scholars (see end of Chapter 3) must be examined further.

Finally, identity effects pertaining to film festivals can be discerned not only for FIAPF-festivals, the dynamics of which need further study, but also for LGBTQ-community events, which have been studied already intensively (Loist, 2013; Richards, 2017; White, 1999). The finding of this LGBTQ-festival effect for distribution confirms past research (Rhyne, 2007) and interviews done with festival organizers in preparation for this book. Especially my interviews with a community-support organization met in Hollywood, Los Angeles and Park City (the site of the Sundance festival) provides evidence for a well-structured niche field of cinema, the active market-making activities such as sponsor stewardship, networking summits at Sundance and Berlinale film festivals, web-based subscription networks, skilling of film makers, pitching arranged for filmmakers with distributors and financiers, creation of awareness for the cinematic good, reaching out to broader audiences at non-community festivals, a film library held by the oldest film festival of the community, grant-making constituencies, and specific awards (the most famous being the 'Teddy' which is awarded as a major prize at the Berlinale).[11]

By the start of the millennium, LGBTQ-themed movies have become a sizeable product world, with many of them having found larger audiences and winning mainstream awards, as they can have so-called crossover potential (Leung, 2010). 'Queer Cinema', a film movement, circulates in over two-hundred film festival organizations belonging to the community (Loist, 2013; Richards, 2017). LGBTQ-cinema festivals exist all over the world, combating stereotypes around the world and providing social and art worlds for people to join (Kim, 2007). Less visibility of Queer Cinema can be found in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa, and, with the lone exception of Israel, the entire Middle East. Such patterns speak, of course, to the negative sanctioning of alternative sexualities, state- and religion-side cultured homophobia, populist movements' influences and existing heteronormative gender expectations.

Loist, who reflects on the achievements of Queer Cinema circulation into broader (mainstream) performance possibilities, notes that the LGBTQ-festival circuit can be lucrative for low-budget movies and that the cinema moves from

11 A first-ever lesbian and gay film market for distributors, sales agents, and independent film producers is associated with the San Francisco International Lesbian & Gay Film Festival and started in 1995.

a community spectrum closer to the center, but that there are many auteur films not engaging in community politics, which she critically regards as 'anti-identarian ideas of sex and gender'. A major issue concerning the device potential of film festivals is the existence of specialized producers and distributors, some of which do not want to have movies playing in community film festivals despite some LGBTQ identity in themes or biography of the filmmaker, in order to prevent what they see as mainstream's negative cultural identification response. Crossover into mainstream cinema is a principal issue as it serves as one measure of the acceptance of sexuality not corresponding with prevailing gender norms.[12] This study shows that social change is happening and that cinema plays a major part in it (Lee, 2000; Yue & Leung, 2015).

Prior to this final analysis, exploratory search for Black (African-American) film festivals did not render a similar community effect (the corresponding categorical variable prepared was therefore excluded). This may be so because Black-community film festivals in the sample were world-wide incidences, with some festivals being on the African continent, or because there are different community dynamics, including market-organizational networks, which need to be discovered to make sensible hypotheses (Dovey, 2015). The LGBTQ-community festivals were more concentrated in the United States, many of which are part of a well-established sub-circuit and highlight events in cosmopolitan cities (Loist, 2013). The findings for the LGBTQ-film festival effect suggests that community-building and market-organization can go hand in hand, without associational forms having to give up their specific collective identity. Finally, historians on documentary filmmaking have commented on more uptake by commercial exhibition upon festival attention increasing in the early 2000s (Ellis & McLane, 2008, pp. 341–342). The odds for distribution are much slimmer than those for features, as Model 2 has revealed, and the lack of positive effects on artistic outcomes also warrants more conjecturing and systematic research.

5 Limitations and Methodological Challenges to Device Studies

Together with the literature used in Chapter 5, this study's findings open up new theoretical, empirical, and methodological research avenues for

12 An often cited example of a popular 'crossover' product is *Brokeback Mountain* by director Ang Lee (2006), which won a prestigious prize at Venice film festival and became a global audience success.

understanding market participation by arts nonprofits. Discussing limitations of this study may assist in defining next directions.

The limitations incurring from the sample size, with the small N rendering disproportionally large effects that may not mean much to filmmakers and other industry professionals who seek clear answers about the magnitude of the effect, owes to efficient research work with labor-intensive media data, which in film performance research, where large N gives more power to detect smaller effects, has probably been a deterrence to work with festival data. As this still appears to be the first statistical analysis aiming to understand how festivals of any prestige level and type intervene in movie and artist future success or failure, the small sample facilitated important explorations for modeling options and aided consultation with industry insiders of emerging data patterns. Future research should also oversample features and documentaries to improve statistical power for evaluating differences within and between these groups and understand the device agency of festivals in such product worlds subjected to many regimes of economic coordination.

Future research should include a control group of movies not participating in festivals. This first study translated scholarly concerns about festivals into models for their device power, seeking to understand how different art productions and differently successful artists and movies get a lift (or not) through festival participation. A challenging limitation, for which effective designs are needed, lies in the measurement of the film festival run as well as in the festival prestige variables, which may require sequence-analytic modeling to account for the various dimensions of differences in these participations.[13] Here the currently available typologies discussed in Chapter 1 may not suffice as foundations for measurement ideas and more work on these conceptions arising from the research perspectives in communication studies is needed. Finally, having performed the analysis with a national sample, it is possible that for other national populations of movies this festival effect and its underlying micro dynamics vary. Moreover, such a study of national differences tied into an international division of labor concerning market-making could bolster the pursuits of post-colonial argument on cinema and the interdependencies of independent cinema with the Hollywood hegemony (Chan, 2008) and media more broadly (Kapur & Wagner, 2011; Wagner, 2015).

13 In further work, film festival sequences must also be hypothesized in terms of festivals' relationship to the industry and big-awards calendars for strategic device work (Berra, 2008, pp. 26–77).

Conclusion of Part 2

In Part 2 I used organizational analysis and economic-sociological perspectives to specify further the role of nonprofit experience-making in economic coordination, thereby giving the arranger a role description in the real economy of cinema. Turning to market-making literature in Chapters 4 and 5 for a powerful and more global perspective on cultural intermediation, I approached the film festivals' arranger qualities as a case of 'market revolution', a process that designates the redefinition of the market process rather than the market outcome (Shipman, 2002). In Chapter 4, I showed how organizational theory understands the event series film festival organizations represent and argued that their strong deployment in organizational fields is largely due to their versatility of as low-risk strategies for eventive dynamics that need to rely on network phenomena. While Spulber (1996) still had to defend his viewpoint that such intermediation is 'normal' in the frame of the standard market, research on the contemporary economy faces what Karpik (similar to Alan Shipman above) calls a "growing intervention of market professionals" that shifted competition from a "comparison of products to comparison of judgement devices" (Karpik, 2010, p. 52).

Examining the field-configuring events hypothesis by Lampel and fellow-researchers as well as its root in New Institutionalism, I found that institutional environments, which according to this sociological school, should be regarded as the 'unaffected', not yet aestheticized environments that Reckwitz highlights as central to the theory of the creativity dispositif. With aestheticization becoming a major force, these environments of high uncertainty have begun to proliferate and operate according to the singularization principle from the 1980s-1990s onward, a process that can be traced by observing the historical inclusion of a growing number of devices, and particularly judgement devices, in the external environment of organizations. This process also accelerated mimetic adoption in the sense of competition among formats, which we know has been a source of concern among film festival researchers. This elucidates the need for the arts as well as the diversity of the arts, which we find at the center of economies that are based on inputs of creative, imaginative, or aesthetic value into both products and market organization. Valuation sociologists argue that devices make market exchange possible for singularities. Applying this insight to film festivals, I have found a wealth of both singularities and devices beyond the narrower result of previous research on participation in what Karpik calls authenticity and mega-regime. Film festivals, as formulated by Rhyne, "are situated at the intersection of international rights discourse,

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national artistic production, international exchanges of cultural texts, international markets for film, national tourist economies, and local economic development coalitions" (Rhyne, 2007, p. 202).

Utilizing Karpik's taxonomy of economic-coordination regimes, I have applied to this and similar propositions a systematic heuristic which, with more empirical research in the future, can probably elucidate historical and comparative study of incorporation of nonprofit actors into the value chain of cinema as well as sharpen organizational-fields as well as field-configuring events analysis, raising the potential for the study of actual, measurable effects. Finally, I ran models of festival participation by movies to account for the commercial and reputational-capital effects voiced by festival researchers. The study concludes tentatively that a number of such effects exists and that festival studies should continue in this path. Part 2 validates the festival researchers' conjectures of a market-making role, providing arguments for the festival being an economic asset in its own right.

As argued further, exactly those markets also operate based on social connectivity, which—based on arguments provided by Powell, DiMaggio, and Somers—I deducted with respect to a historically specific structural role for nonprofit organizations in organizational fields. Thus, intermediation agency by festivals is legitimate collusion, but as social capital is a powerful social fiction, which still has to be explained within theories of capitalism, including, as I suggest, grants-economics and the rising order and societal reality of the connexionist world.

As once argued by Caves, product differentiation is the major source of high entry barriers, and there could be no industry with extensive differentiation but low barriers of entry (Caves, 1977, p. 33). The rise of the aesthetic economy, however, shows that some of the contemporary economy provides for a remarkable shift in economic patterns: high differentiation, and more specifically the immanent trend toward singularization, where, among other firms and nonprofit organizations, festivals and fairs do provide the conditions for 'low barriers of entry' in cheap ways for entire industries. This phenomenon will be explored further in Part 3.

PART 3

Justifications

CHAPTER 7

Film Festival as Charismatic Organization

> If you're thinking of running a film festival: don't. It will ruin your life. It will clean out your bank account. It will drive away your friends. By the first fabulous day of your event, you will wish you were dead. Everyone around you will be buying tickets and smiling and laughing, and all you'll be able to think is: 'Do you know how much it costs to FedEx a print from Seoul?'
>
> HENDRIX, 2005

> No, it's obviously insanely full time. It is nuts that you are working all year to do something for only twelve days. It's insane, actually. But lots of people do it, you know, there are lots of festivals all over the world. I think people like enormous explosions of a range of activities, they let steam off and it all comes from, you know holidays and festivals, in the true sense of the word. So, it's an interesting sort of social phenomenon as well. And it always comes from a sort of passion and that's why this is [… it's] the film they are passionate about. Yes, and that's why people are up for it.
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> British festival manager

The four chapters of Part 3 examine work organization and commitment (Chapter 7), work histories, career motivations, and labor market relations (Chapter 8), inter-institutional linkages between education and the law (Chapter 9) as well as the justifications given by festival workers for accepting little or no compensation where volunteers provide a sine qua none condition for events' operational capacity (Chapter 10). Studying a seasonally returning and resource-poor organization like the nonprofit arts festival holds many

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challenges arising from the way the work is performed.[1] Noting upon the organization of sports events, Bourdieu grasped the structural significance of the volunteer, judging this role as an "extremely economical means of mobilizing, occupying and controlling adolescents", which is "predisposed to become an instrument and a stake in struggles between all the institutions totally or partly organized with a view to the mobilization and symbolic conquest of the masses and therefore competing for the symbolic conquest of youth." (Bourdieu, 1978, pp. 117–131). A glimpse into a daily report from one of our interviewers in the field sites illustrates the economic character of the volunteer as a work role:

> Both young women didn't think that they could leave their posts for 45 minutes or an hour to do an interview—they work 5-hour shifts, they said, so couldn't take such a big chunk of time away, and both work other jobs as well (so don't have free time after or before their shifts). I will see if other people working at the centre have similar or different schedules, but have to admit that their situation seems hard.
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> Project field notes, August 2005

Information collected from film festivals offers a first systematic insight into cultural work which in its diversity and often transitory existence is lacking from most national statistical accounts, as it does not adhere to an occupational form, an industrial convention basic to the way the modern economy is measured. I trained all my research assistants conducting the interviews personally in communications based on what I learned in graduate school (Becker, 2011), some fine anthropological studies (e.g., Bestor, 2008), methodology books (Abbott, 2004) and by studying and listening to publicity professionals like Barbara Walters (1971) and Sue MacGregor (2003). The basis of these field trips was a set of two modular questionnaires that could be applied anywhere anytime a person was willing and able to talk about their festival work. The first questionnaire with closed and open-ended questions was for managers, i.e., the top positions of general manager and artistic director (which could be combined in smaller fests, where roles could even be bundled across further functions), and the second for workers such as paid staff and

1 Sometimes, the constraints were on the investigators' side. For example, a condition to a very generous support grant for fieldwork in two East Asian cities was that I flew from one city to the next for interviewing. The grant administrator could not be convinced that these two prestigious festivals are temporally far apart in the festival calendar and, more importantly, that asking curators who travel extensively between the events, to view and acquire cinema novelties for the next edition, to shift would be a tall order.

volunteers, including heads of department and core work areas, people with supervisory functions, and volunteers who spread across all the jobs from paid to unpaid and high to low skill labor. This second questionnaire also aimed to profile the way the festival fitted into workers' lives, career and educational projects, their motivations and affective attachment to the organizations they worked for, their background in volunteering, plans to use the work as stepping stone and their observations about aspects of the work organization, including workplace conflict and compensation questions. Given the makeshift character of the field site, interviewers had to be able to handle going through the 53 questions at various speed, filtering out those that did not apply and those that had to be asked no matter what, while being eloquent in peer-to-peer conversation. This instrument led to thousands of pages recording the festival experience, showing a remarkable consistency across the data.

Part 3 aims to demonstrate that festivals create opportunities for workers and creative subjects at the intersection of charity and creativity, two powerful 'orders of worth' that converge in festival work activities. Theories of capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b; Reckwitz, 2017b, 2020) provide the interpretive frames for the discussion of the empirical findings. Festival organizations should carry all the signs of transformed work worlds and meanings and the signs of creative work as socially valuable and individually fulfilling (Reckwitz, 2017a, pp. 181–223).[2] According to Reckwitz, 'heterogeneous collaborations', identifiable by flattened hierarchies, affect density, and a short duration of sociality, are typical (Reckwitz, 2017a, p. 107, p. 262) These forms are observable as embedded elements in local clusters and broader networks, the de-formalization of work, the emphasis on intrinsic motivation as realized by the organizational culture, the hedonistic nature of the work and the relaxation of formal qualifications in light of emphasized training and skill bundles which are characteristic for the post-materialist work ethos and individual self-realization promoted by co-creative team work. Resonating with well-known economic-sociological research on Post-Fordism (for a critical review see Lovering, 2020; Vidal, 2011), Reckwitz's cultural-sociological approach observes crucial structural change, but the role of the nonprofit work organization has to be additionally constructed, similar to the task in Chapters 4 and 5. This will be done in the remainder of this chapter, where the main focus is to examine suitable frames for the study of aesthetic-economic organizations. Unlike the typical nonprofit research perspective on examining qualitative or

2 'Cultural-economization' creates the unique as sacred, contrasting with the profane of the more common form. On the meanings of creativity see (Becker, 2017).

quantitative volunteer and charity-worker motivation, this chapter provides for the view that the phenomenon of commitment has to be related to problems of social organization specific to curated event production.

I begin with a brief overview of conventional frames for nonprofit studies and cite a few new insights that are of relevance to the study of festival nonprofit work. Following this, the chapter summarizes workforce patterns obtained through surveying efforts. The rest of the chapter discusses three frames of analysis, such as 'charismatic capitalism' (Biggart, 1989), 'creative ethos' (Koppetsch, 2006), and 'project citizen' (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b). All these authors provide arguments for organizational commitment in absence of an occupational form as known from organized modernity, generating ideas as to how commitment can be organizationally produced, be grounded in a special guardian role in society's value system (Koppetsch), or are engendered by the dynamics of the reticular world. Finally, studying commitment in seasonal organizations and the specialized work people do for them provides an opening for a more focused discussion of the meaning of professionalization in 'economized' work contexts, a matter raised in Chapter 4 regarding the formalization of charitable business and the making of an employed class of charity workers.

1 Nonprofit Workforce and Labor Markets

Festival is a 'flexible contingent' which is mainly mobilized as volunteered labor during the time of the produced event (e.g., Leca et al., 2015, p. 181). In nonprofit research, volunteering has been typically understood as a specific form of leisure, politically motivated activism, or, simply, charitable work, excluding the remarkably huge economic value stressed by Bourdieu, which recent studies have found to be as high as 75 percent of the total value of charitable and philanthropic gifts being made to the nonprofit organizations in seven countries under study (Salamon et al., 2007, p. 9). For the period of 1990–1995, researchers on nonprofits found that nonprofit-organizational employment had growth rates of 20–30 percent across a number of national sectors, and much above the growth rates for for-profit employment (cited in Anheier, 2004). Laura Leete (2010) demands research on volunteering to investigate the practice's relationships with taxes, subsidies, and government expenditures.

Apart from the relative magnitude, there has also been an observable sociodemographic shift, which has raised concern over the future of charity, as volunteers display motivations that represent 'portfolio tactics' contrasting with the altruistic commitment believed to define the work form (Manatschal &

Freitag, 2014). There is a trade-off in it, as the demographic broadening of the volunteer participation base somewhat buffers the damages from overall declining membership. Volunteering is discussed as 'more professional today', associated in self-accounts and research conceptions with promises such as pursuit of self-interest, hedonic experiences, responsibility as well as additional education, perhaps even in form of a formal career trajectory (Eller, 2013; Rochester et al., 2016). Especially relevant for the study of festival work is Eller (2013)'s study, which stresses the impact of recent economic recessions giving nonprofit organizations the opportunity to benefit from the negative consequences for labor markets of recent graduates. Chapter 9 below will take this pattern into focus, when discussing the contributions of higher education and certain aspects of rational law to it. Volunteers are shown to be distinguishable as roles connected to organizational management styles (program management versus membership management) and client orientation (such as big events versus local clubs); they arguably represent ideal-types of transactional and relational 'psychological contracts' (Nichols, et al., 2013, p. 990), which provide for variance in the concept of charitable work. The critique of the 'rationalization of volunteerism' observable in processes of systematic skilling, formalization, and professionalization according to notions of active citizenship (e.g., Neville, 2016, p. 731) can be related to earlier research on the charitable sector, specifically the study by Hwang and Powell (2009) on the 'rationalization of charity' (see Chapter 4). Austerity research (Cunningham et al., 2016) discusses shrinking public funding for nonprofits, the instability of organizational resources and the subsequent privatization of risks on the workers' side as well as the work intensification and narrowing space for workers' resistance and collective action. Many studies aim at understanding more reliance on nonprofits by the state and sustained inadequate funding, to which volunteer recruitment is an organizational response. Linking this empirical tradition of nonprofit research with the theoretical debates on civil society and critique of the related discourse on public sphere and democracy, as I do in Part 4, is necessary to interpret the legitimacy of the festival volunteer from within a theory of capitalism.

A literature relevant to this investigation is the study of the fading 'standard employment relationship' in developed societies (Kalleberg, 2000), as volunteering is now part of the middle classes' extension of the young-adult period, injecting a time characterized by temporary and part-time jobs at the start of occupational trajectories. Related is the detected reorganization of labor's 'numerical flexibility' beginning in the 1980s (Ackroyd, 2002, p. 117), involving temporarily hired workers and activities doing short-term contracting or freelancing. Especially Arne Kalleberg's work which highlights the polarization in

employment in terms of a pattern of 'good' and 'bad' jobs (2013) provides for perspectives by which to scrutinize the volunteer work role as well as the practice of internships in organizations and careers across a vast number of sectors and workers.[3] Having to fit volunteering and internship into one's career raises the question of whether volunteering is voluntary and how it relates to social class membership and closure in work and career opportunities in countries like Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland (Eller, 2013; Manatschal & Freitag, 2014; Sanghera, 2018).[4] The following presentation introduces what we know so far about festival workforce patterns.

2 Festival Workforce Patterns

Festival work is not included in national classification work or hard to filter out from cultural work statistics. Unsurprisingly, those interested in the workforce pattern had to draw on membership surveys in associations. Two surveys of this kind were undertaken by the Oberhausen Short Film Festival and the European Coordination of Film Festivals at Brussels (ECFF) in the 1990s, and probably designed around collecting information on the festivals' benefits for the local or regional economy. Both surveys suffer from low response rate.[5] The 'Brussels study' of 64 European organizations (representing population variance with respect to key characteristics such as age and income) comprises information across their total of 1,390 workers, finding for an average of 2.1 permanent full-time workers, 2.3 permanent part-time workers, and 25.8 temporary workers in a festival. For every permanent full-time position, the average festival has 1.1 permanent part-time and 12.2 temporary workers. No hours-amount was indicated and volunteers were not gauged separately. The authors suggest benefits from temporary wage work such as additional source of income, first-time exposure

3 How widespread this practice has become is borne out by a 2020 survey of UK and Irish university graduates (n = 72,000) revealing that 43 percent participants had done an unpaid internship during or after studies. (Source: https://cibyl.com/research/uk-and-ireland-graduate), last accessed on 14 August 2022.

4 These studies report on nonprofits in different countries, including Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland.

5 The 'Oberhausen study' (surveying during 1995–1997) preceded the ECFF study (what I call 'the Brussels study' to keep them apart) executed during 1998. The Oberhausen investigators focus on the smaller-income festival members; the Brussels study concentrates on the more affluent of the ECFF members in the countries discussed (European Coordination of Film Festivals & Internationale Kurzfilmtage Oberhausen, 1999, p. 7).

to cinema for young workers and a modest support for the 'young jobless'.[6] The 'Oberhausen study', which draws on the same membership base but ends up with a different sample, reports on workforce by using different measurements. Among the study's final 38 responding festivals, only 7 are reported to have five or more permanent workers, whose hours are not indicated. Only 4 festivals operate without any permanent positions, and it is mostly the older festivals that employ workers permanently while hiring substantially more temporary workers. The average freelancer-hire is 10 and the average volunteer workforce size is 26. More than half of the workers have a higher-education degree; over half of the permanent workers are women. Nearly half of the interns are university graduates. Older festivals are reported to offer more training opportunities, an observation probably reflecting a now suspended film festival staff-exchange program organized at the European level.

My research team's own study is based on the motivation to build the first sampling frame. Countries were selected into the sampling frame based on the size of their festival sector, drawing on criteria followed by the producers of the British Council's database *Directory of International Film and Video Festivals*, which at that time was the only database confirming that its administrators exclude one-off events and include inaugurals when the next edition is already planned, a strategy that I would adopt for my later global surveying effort.[7] This produced a case set of 588 festivals, which rendered 140 valid responses from organizers (Lang et al., 2006). Among these, 81 percent of responses came from countries with the biggest film festival populations (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and France). The study switched to a more adequate measurement of nonprofit labor contracts in event productions, as these are hardly permanent (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020). The workforce dynamics are better gauged by observing 'year-round' vs. 'seasonal' jobs, and 'full-time' vs. 'part-time' based on self-reported actual working hours as well as 'paid staff' vs. 'volunteer' (with interns falling into either one category dependent on the case-by-case internship agreement). A better measure is also the median because of the high variance of organizational size and budget in the festival population, which makes the arithmetic mean less meaningful. As size and budget also highly correlate with workforce variables, measures of dispersion (median, minimum and maximum) were adopted. The following table summarizes the results of the survey.

6 These are the same reasons which the early cinema entrepreneurs cited for not paying the needed service personnel in exhibition venues (see Chapter 3).

7 Conversation by research assistant Shuting Wee with Tim Ackroyd of British Council, 9 October 2006 (Author's fieldwork notes).

On average, film festivals in this survey have only up to three full-time contract staff. The median of 1 worker can reasonably be assumed to represent the director or curator (or both where combined into one role). On average, there is also one part-time staff (=1.3), which according to field observations would be one of the most specialized functions that needed to be maintained permanently (e.g., fundraising or programming specialist). The lower part of the table shows that workforce investment typically occurs around the seasonal hire of full-time and part-time volunteers and, to smaller degree, of full-time and part-time paid staff. The comparison of the maximum values in this sample of 140 organizations between year-round and seasonal workers in each of the four categories shows that there is a pattern of numerical flexibility that is associated with the seasonality of the festival organization.

In festivals of the anglophone countries (Canada, United Kingdom, and United States), there is a strong positive association between seasonal/volunteer and seasonal/paid workforce, absent from French and German patterns, and possibly an indication of different nonprofit logics. Field interviews underline that the volunteers are deemed essential to operations of festivals, regardless of organizational size and age:

TABLE 12 Labor force patterns of film festivals (n = 140), 2005/2006 (Lang et al., 2006)

	Year-round full-time paid staff	**Year-round part-time paid staff**	**Year-round full-time volunteer**	**Year-round part-time volunteer**
Median	1	1	0	0
Mean	2.8	1.3	0.6	6.3
Minimum	0	0	0	0
Maximum	64	8	15	200
	Seasonal full-time paid staff	**Seasonal part-time paid staff**	**Seasonal full-time volunteer**	**Seasonal part-time volunteer**
Median	1	1	0	6
Mean	10.5	7.4	17.6	80.9
Minimum	0	0	0	0
Maximum	300	750	750	1,178

> Well, Rotterdam has three-hundred, how many volunteers you have depends on how many venues you have that need to have festival people at them and how many, uhm, functions need to be fulfilled by people who don't need to have an enormous amount of knowledge and training, so that's really what controls the number of volunteers you have. So, Rotterdam has many more volunteers because they have many more locations than we do.
>
> British festival staff

> As far as volunteers we have two different categorizes of volunteers. There are volunteers that we call shift volunteers or just regular volunteers and they come on board for the festival, there's about 300 of them, and they just do shifts during the festival, like taking tickets, ushering and so forth, and we have about 900 different shifts that need to be filled and about 300 people to take that on. Then during the year, we have what we call volunteer staff positions, and they fulfil larger roles, like planning receptions and organizing hospitality for film makers and visitors, helping out with sponsorship, with membership, with fundraising, they're more skilled volunteer positions … I would say.
>
> US American festival manager

The study also found festival age to correlate positively with budget. Submitting the data of the UK and Canada, which had sufficient case load on the variables of interest, to regression analysis, the authors found a positive effect of budget on workforce size in Canadian festivals but not for the British festivals, where age determined workforce size. This means that either organizational age or festival budget may potentially explain independently total workforce size. Asking about board size, the study found a positive association between organization age and festival board size for US and UK organizations, whereas in France the board size was associated negatively with organizational age. Boards of film festival organizations or their parent organizations are important actors in organizational strategy (for case-related insights see Leca et al., 2015). While the study is not representative, it shows that there is some variation in funding logics and traditions and that many festivals are small employers.

Festival organizations cannot be mapped easily onto flexible workforce models for Post-Fordist for-profit firms (Vallas, 2015). While 'core flexibility' (the special and highly regarded skill) is surrounded by numerical flexibility attained seasonally through volunteer recruitment, it is also possible to have highly skilled people working for free in economically and industrially

significant festivals (Loist, 2011). As many interviews indicate, having obtained the position already constitutes a reward, a circumstance quite unthinkable in the wage-labor world. At the same time, there is economic rather than charitable logic at work, when annual or specialized tasks, important to the day-to-day operations but without 'creative content', are paid out of necessity, as the following quote from an interview shows:

> [Q: Would you say that seasonality in the organization presents a challenge to the effective management of it?] Yeah, because, well, I think it is a good thing, because you have to motivate the people for that amount of time, and it's a good thing that it's not for the whole year, because I think you actually need that break, I think. To sort of get them on board. They need the half year off from [the festival—A.V.], to be willing to work with the event for a half year, so I think the seasonality is exactly what basically I think secures the volunteers of that scale. Sometimes I think it's also a downer because, of course, people forget about it, do something else, the bond might not be as strong. But then I think it also depends on the people, how much they get involved emotionally.
>
> German festival manager

This manager is not alone in regarding the motivation of the volunteers as strongly related to the eventive character of the work and providing a transactional opportunity (Nichols et al., 2003). In the following section, I preliminary apply some conceptions of creative and charismatic work worlds to the festival settings.

3 Charismatic Capitalism

'Immaterial labor' and 'affective labor' (Hardt, 1999) are important components theories of Post-Fordist capitalism.[8] Nicole Biggart's insightful study of 'charismatic capitalists' (1989) is useful here because it shows that 'affective labor' and corresponding exploiting organizations have emerged in 'economic niches' long before the aesthetic economy would contribute to normalizing affective labor. Biggart's study on US American direct-selling organizations

8 Quality and quantity of labor in late-modern economies are organized around immateriality, with collective learning processes occupying a strategic role in production. Immaterial labor is immediately collective and affective as it exists in the social, not confined by 'the four walls of the factory' (Lazzarato in Virno & Hardt, 1996, p. 146).

(hereafter: DSOs) shows traits similar to postmodern affective labor, thus offering a possible frame for festival work as creative-ideological and phenomenon of quasi-professionalism as a historically younger phenomenon. DSOs are familiar to many consumers, as they peddle beauty and other home products, 'Tupperware', insurances and more types of household goods before online commerce and large retail business included these into their standard inventory. In 1984, these organizations provided gainful employment to five percent of the entire US workforce.

Working with Weber's concepts, she aims to show how the value-rational basis of organization manifests itself in organizational routines such as an active encouragement of emotional expression and attachment which are strategic business-related goals and means. About 80 percent of the DSO entrepreneurs were women. DSO leaders discouraged competitiveness despite a clear profit-goal orientation, grooming a corporate image of care, including for peer distributors in need. Biggart observes the lack of formal recruiting procedures and a welcoming culture embracing 'anyone willing to try'. While DSOs had charismatic leaders, these early network organizations relied on kinship networks and operated with very little supervision, fostering a self-entrepreneurial model and charismatic leadership which could be earned through business success. As 'affective labor', DSO entrepreneurs reached via kin and social ties directly into the homes of both sellers and buyers. The entrepreneurs were encouraged to adopt a holistic belief system, in which 'both the products and the actions of sales manifest a superior 'way of life''. Product ideologies (elements of the 'brand') manifested the espoused ideals.[9]

Biggart observes that "value rationality, expressed as belief in entrepreneurialism and the transformative powers of products, provides a viable basis for organizing large-scale enterprises" (1989, pp. 98–99). She identifies as 'charismatic capitalism' a governance approached based on 'personalistic controls' which contrast with formal-rational means epitomized by 'corporate America'. These personalistic controls (14 in total) aimed to produce commitment in workers, a collective feeling and belonging among them and provide dimensions of affective labor in charismatic organizations.

Using illustrations from interviews with managers and staff, the remainder of this section applies this heuristic of 'soft controls' to observable governance problems in festival workplaces, providing tentative evidence about the

9 Looking back at Chapter 5, one may plausibly suggest that DSO networks were embedded in an emerging brand/luxury regime and the reticular regime of economic coordination (cf. Karpik, 2010).

TABLE 13 Types of control found in DSOs (Biggart, 1989, pp. 134–159)

Class of control	Types of controls
The new self	Self-transformation, confessionals, spiritual differentiation, institutionalized ideology, leadership, and guidance
Celebration of group membership	Institutional completeness, compartmentalization, homogeneity, common efforts, regularized group contact, ritual
Stakeholder claims	Sacrifice, investment

organization of irregular and casual workforce (see Chapter 9) into goal and output-oriented patterned activities.

Firstly, 'the new self' is accomplished by a 'charismatic association' with the current workplace, as recruits are socialized into the special culture of the workplace as eventive. Although there are some differences in the work sites of DSO entrepreneurs and cultural workers, some controls are obvious in contemporary event productions. These are especially the general positive and optimistic attitude, the contribution to the larger community, and the sharing of affective stories about festival time. As a middle manager reflects:

> … there's the sort of internal mythology and the story of this particular film festival, that people learn, that you carry with you, that you take outside into the outside world, and then there's how to do the practicalities of your particular job and what you get when people have been here for some time is the combination of the two, which is particularly effective after somebody has been here for more than one year if they've come back, because they're carrying that sort of culture and mythology of the particular festival and then they've got the skills that go with it as well.
>
> Managing staff at British festival

Some festival event productions involve handbooks for volunteers for first orientation, but like Biggart's network entrepreneur, volunteers mostly learn on the job and by switching work roles year by year. There are also more formal educational aids for festival organizers (e.g., Edwards & Skerbelis, 2012), so that

anyone with ambitions and professional attachment to film can potentially establish a film festival.

Secondly, group membership is celebrated, thus positively sanctioned. In DSO networks, the work community functions as a "substitute for extra-organizational social relations" (Biggart, 1989, p. 149), and such controls would be more ritualized and safeguarded in strongly charismatic-leadership focused organizations. But for secular organizations like arts nonprofits we can assume with New Institutionalist theory that weaker controls exist and are embedded in institutional environments where the myth of the public mission is central. 'Rituals' of the kind the art worlds are known for can be grasped by 'common efforts', 'regularized group efforts', and work team encouragement. This is supported by interviewees' frequent indication of the great respect they have for team efforts.

As resource-poor festival organizations must 'shoot down' threats from contingencies produced by organizational operations and the external environment, represented by funding and participating stakeholders, the organizational leaders emphasize cooperation and try to diffuse corresponding feelings and values throughout the organization, as the following quote illustrates:

> I think that there's an awareness of all the people fitting together, so, I think [the personnel manager] is very aware, or she deals with it. She speaks to all the managers about how to put the teams together and we are very aware of who would work well with each other, and you know, in terms of career development for people who have worked with us before, you can see people who have formed really good friendships, but maybe they wouldn't work well together, the next year, so we try not to put them, we try and shift people around.
>
> British festival staff

Group membership does require semi-autonomous action and individual responsibility:

> But what I wanted to do was to give people a job, whether they were paid or not—give them a job description. And, therefore, they were being managed they were guided, they were learning, they had self-respect, they did have something that they could say about 'I did this' by the end of it. [...] And but give them a job, and a job description, and the deal is 'you get all this and you will give us your time and your effort and your commitment and your enthusiasm'. And this is all very great. [...] But the

> fact that we only really ever had one person a year over the last ten years dropping out is miraculous. And there are people who simply have not been listening to the deal. Or, how can they turn up at eleven for three days in a row when they are supposed to be in at nine o'clock?
>
> British festival director

Many more observations from the interviews provide evidence for sense of place that emphasizes high individual responsibility, such as in the following quote:

> And there is a huge sort of feeling of team effort, even if this means a night of bitching about what a bloody awful place this is, or whatever, we still got someone to do that! And, workplaces … that's something I am quite grown-up about it, […] whatever the word is. Sort of used to it, you know, actually, I go 'if people want to bitch or moan, they will do that anywhere'.
>
> British festival director

More generally, these observations suggest that charisma tends to be diffused in the organization rather than crystallized in a leadership position (Shils, 1982). In some festivals either the general manager or the artistic director can be seen as having attained high status as an admired role model, a 'personal hero', who is equipped with an unyielding enthusiasm. The festival's organizational culture can also promote the formation of a temporary 'new self' (Giddens, 1991), which can evoke the feeling of exclusion as shown with the response by a pregnant worker:

> [Q: In your opinion, do the festival workers form any kind of community?] I think they do during those two weeks, or during the month, it is a really tight-knit community […] I've seen people who have really difficulties with their partners at home, because they just have no idea of what we're going through and that's essentially pathetic, but you know, as such a close team, and we are all working towards this thing, and the deadlines are so tight, and sometimes you have incredible amounts of stress and all the people … … and they really form really good relationships, and, so lots of really good friendships, but quite often, you know, it's like when you go to festivals to watch stuff, you know, two weeks later, you may never see these people again. I think when we all come together, it's a really good thing because I wasn't going to the parties and I wasn't able to stay up late, and I wasn't drinking, so yeah, and I wasn't putting as much into it, so

> I wasn't getting anything out of it, and I felt quite left out sometimes, and that was just my choice, really, but I think those people who come into the festival, whether they volunteer or they're paid people, they really throw themselves at it, you know, to get as much back.
>
> British festival staff

Giving and attending parties is an important soft control, but unlike in Biggart's one cited case, where the top reward is a pink Cadillac, the parties are for socializing across frontstage and backstage productions and there to thank the volunteers. While this standard element of festival workplace culture confirms organizational membership as important soft control, parties can also evoke normative regulation:

> Yes, that's one of the things that's emphasized in training and in some of the written literature as well about, well, behavior at parties, because people can't be seen to be so drunk, but some people just get drunk very quietly, but it could affect them the next day. Well, it's amazing how responsible people are. I mean they still drink lots maybe, but I'm pretty amazed by how people do function so well the next day, but I think it's sheer, just will power, because they do, I mean it did this to me the festival, having worked for [a broadcasting company], where you never had much of a sense of personal responsibility because you are so detached from really any ownership. You come to the festival where you are all made to realize how it's so crucial what you do to actually make the event happen, that you do have …, most people do experience a great sense of pride when it's happening.
>
> British festival recruiter

At the same time, as the quote shows, parties allow managers to emphasize the importance of each individual in the division of labor.

Finally, the last class of soft controls concerns the phenomenon of commitment on a third dimension, called 'stakeholder claims' by Biggart. Applied to festival work and the interview data, we must look for meanings related to sacrifice and investment which tactically aim to bind worker commitment to the community. The following quote shows understandings of sacrifice as an imperative, interestingly permeating boundaries between nonprofit and for-profit business worlds:

> I just talked with someone who works in that kind of business and earns money, and she said, well, actually her position is, 'if it's volunteers,

> people actually have to be 200 percent, if they work, it's 100 percent, it's fine, because they get their money, but if they are volunteers, I expect a 200 percent commitment'. Because if they weren't, you know, why would you be in a team, or join the team, if not for your commitment, so 'don't give me that crap, if you start being unreliable, leave!' Because there are other people who actually really want to do it.
>
> German festival manager

While this expectation of sacrificial commitment appears as more prevalent where organizational resources are disproportionally low, it should be understood against the context of established volunteer culture. In some of the visited East Asian festivals, all volunteers are paid because there would be no worker supply otherwise. However, this pattern—justified with the larger 'strong commercial culture'—cannot be generalized to festival nonprofits observed in that region. Indeed, what I found in the European and North American interviews, largely shows up in festivals that follow the more 'purist' nonprofit organizational ideology and the focus on 'recruiting passionate people'. An example of investment, the second type of stakeholder claim-control, can be garnered from the standard interview question asking what a worker would lose if she had to quit all of a sudden. The majority of the given answers shows concern for the loss of newly won friends, a community and an inspiring work experience, demonstrating that film festivals are quite successful sites of experimentation with enculturation of people into almost instantaneous communities. Interviews demonstrate the felt uniqueness of the individual and collective experience in the biographies they narrate.

To summarize this effort of applying Biggart's heuristic, the charismatic capitalists a few decades ago may arguably provide a format for today's work in similarly charismatic organizations. Biggart herself highlights this, discursively extending her findings to soft controls of the for-profit environment such as quality circles, notions of autonomous work teams, and other conventions, which have their epistemic roots in the academic fields of organizational behavioral psychology and management sciences rising to influence from the 1980s onward. Boltanski and Chiapello observe these as fundamental to the formation of a third spirit of capitalism, which I discuss further below.

Biggart speculates that firms have "begun to reach the limits of rationality as a strategy for controlling workers" (p. 169), a finding that corresponds to Reckwitz's claim that affect-deficient culture has exhausted itself. Her study is valuable as it shows that the industrial convention has found entrepreneurial opposition, creating 'affective niches' that do away with the occupational form and affect-deficient labor culture. Another important finding is the rise of the

'organizational culture' that replaces professional culture as element in the industrial order. The new focus on group membership seems to quietly replace the group membership pertaining to associations and trade unions, thereby also shifting the focus away from hierarchies and inequalities, and onto guiding conventions such as belonging, inclusion, and respect for oneself and the work group. Governance by affective controls observable in curated event production includes the making of communal forms of association underlined with 'lots of love in the room' and 'lots of positive energy' (Richards, 2017, p. 133).

This discussion of a charismatic capitalism opens up the opportunity to scrutinize affective labor in the professional division of labor and de-professionalization (Abbott, 1988; e.g., Toren, 1975), highlighting the negative relationship with strong professional culture. Professionalization is typically seen as case of 'social closure' (via licensing, expert specialization, and social ties in professional communities) and implies symbolic and social boundary-drawing by status-based and occupational culture (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). The meaning of professional, however, "has become synonymous with the qualifications, for a particular role, independent of any conventional distinction based on training or certification and is increasingly bound up with a goal to improve one's capabilities" (Hwang & Powell, 2009, p. 269), and the cinema field and its event culture provide some evidence for that trend.

4 Commitment, Project Worker, and Creative Ethos

While sociologists have already observed de-professionalization in the 1960s (Hughes, 1993, pp. 292–293), the 1980s seem to provide a clearer picture as to how this relates to the structure of organizations. Andrew Abbott's work is of particular interest here, as it formulates the puzzle that "professionalism itself competes with alternate forms of structuring expertise, in particular, with commoditization and organization" (1988, p. 324). Abbott is mainly concerned with technology challenging professional work, such as when, for example, tax-filing software replaces the need for hiring a tax accountant. Abbott sees here the encoding by contemporary formal organizations of "professional knowledge in the structures of organizations themselves", with organizations being "either overtly heteronomous or governed by professionals more or less openly identified as professional administrators" (1988, p. 325). Before Hwang and Powell, he arrives at the insight that administrative occupations weaken the power of substantive occupations, specifically high-skill, typically licensed professional labor. Concurrent is the spread of professions across industrial sectors, diffusing the power of professional identity based on occupational niches.

With the rise of information society and loss of public trust in professions (often linked to scandals) and related ideas that professional groups' self-regulation is weak (Martin, 2017; O'Neill, 2002), professional groups have been increasingly subjected to managerial and formal controls by administrators and finance specialists—a trend that is narrowly described by 'economization' but more adequately addressed, in my view, with the problem of the creativity dispositif and the rise of network society, as I will now discuss.

Aesthetic-economic sites of production and consumption tend to be promote workplace and organizational commitment over occupational commitment.[10] Theories of singularization (Karpik, 2010; Reckwitz, 2020) and digitization (Mau, 2019) provide another significant observation for Abbott's puzzle, which is the erosion of strong professional networks by impersonal devices such as opinion-based and expert-based regimes elaborated in Chapter 5. In the related social settings, mediatized processes challenge the personalized model-based work, the genuine service relationship in Karpik's terms. From this perspective, Abbott correctly concludes that competition between organizational and professional formats involves changes to "essential qualities of professionalism, not merely accidental attributes" (1988, p. 325). To this, it can be added from festival-work observations that there is widespread spatial-temporal reconfiguration of work activities from work in organizations to projects and even to events, which are projects with a charismatic-temporal format, offering opportunities for social immersion.

While postmodern organizations incorporate 'myth and ceremony' into their formal structures, they also reproduce challenges to professionalization as defined further above. Anna Damarin's study of Internet software developers, for example, shows the release of work and workers from permanently assigned task areas, the introduction of eventful team work and the socialization of a modularized 'occupational self' (2006, p. 431). Providing similar insights from studying new-media project work, Susan Christopherson finds that these highly individualized careers tend to be unable to gain public profile or respect (2002, p. 2011). Damarin's discussion is exemplary in its focus on the lack of an occupational ethos defined by the practices of professionally licensed groups and its cultural production through soft controls and organizational culture which worker identities must resonate with. In late-modern organizations, network rather than exclusive occupational-group relations

10 Affective labor materializes through communication and interaction. The phenomenon cannot be conflated with 'care work', where it also exists to some degree. It is about the manipulation of affects, which many industries rely upon (Hardt, 1999).

become relevant to the management of work and labor, including also skill profiles such as 'transferrable skill' and psychological profiles emphasizing traits such as conviviality, enthusiasm, and 'networking' (Gandini, 2016).

Festival work and employment provide typical occupational-culture productions identifiable for the aesthetic-digital economy, where high-skill professions remain at the core but not the at the helm of the average organization. The shift in organizational language from moral-economic phenomena such as ethos to commitment signals this trend, which involves the managerial task of socializing the 'broader committed person' (Monahan et al., 1994). This is reflected in hiring practices at festivals as the following quote shows:

> [Q: So, what kind of skills do these people you recruit from the university have ad minimum?] [...] The first thing, and maybe the most important thing, is that it should be a person that I can rely on, a person that I think would work in the festival team, not to make everything be the same, but to make it possible that everyone can work together, and then, of course, when I try to place people in different working areas, I look at what they've done earlier. That is for me also one really important thing, that they have to be really interested in what they do, and that makes it, if they have the interest and really want to do something, I think it's easier to make some demands and really make them do everything that should be done in the area.
>
> Swedish festival manager

The interviewed festival managers and recruiters repeatedly indicate their aim to secure commitment, partly by offering 'an experience' that involves teaching a particular skillset. This can be considered as a legitimate practice in reflection of an institutional environment which has normalized the 'learning organization' and its related societal idea of 'life-long learning' (Monahan et al., 1994).[11] In this context it is worth reflecting on the meanings of charitable work as care work and work of benevolence rather than a creative sense of experimentation with work, such as 'trying out of a job' in a 'real' setting. It is, however, this feature, which makes arts nonprofits such as film festivals

11 "Training—often extremely vaguely defined—is dramatically presented as a virtue, as an investment in a highly progressive vision of the future, and as a core ideal. [Organizations] only rarely define specific needs for training and design programs to meet those needs; they rarely evaluate the concrete and local benefits of their training programs or rely on assessment methods that go beyond obtaining survey feedback from course participants." (Monahan et al., 1994, p. 263).

a postmodern workplace and a legitimate training institution for mainly the middle classes.

Boltanski and Chiapello (2005b) addresses the question of what commits people to late-modern capitalism in what they have identified as a 'reticular' (also translated from French as 'connexionist' world). Boltanski and Chiapello approach the question of commitment by workers in capitalism by studying justifications to comply with capitalism. These justifications—interpretative accomplishments by modern actors (Knoll in Engels, 2012, p. 47)—are empirical referents of what they call 'conventions' or 'orders of worth', and which are also translated as 'poleis'. Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot's preceding work found that in the western world six such poleis made up the repertoire of conventions (Inspirational Polis, House Polis, Civic Polis, Opinion Polis, Market Polis, and Industrial Polis, see in more detail the application to volunteer compensation questions in Chapter 10).[12]

Boltanski and Chiapello at a rising seventh convention—emerging around imagery and practices pertaining to a 'reticular world'—which I will refer to for brevity's sake as Project Polis. While organized modernity, corresponding with the second spirit of capitalism, is a compromise between Market and Industrial Polis, late-modern capitalism, a phase of disorganized modernity, is marked by the incorporation of the artistic critique into capitalism as a system (see end of Chapter 1). At the heart of third-spirit capitalism is the 'project worker'—contrastingly strongly with Weber's original theory of the (first) spirit of capitalism, epitomized by the Protestant ethos. The project worker (which is a general case of roles like event curators and volunteers in our context) is associated with key such as 'activity', 'project', extension of one's 'network', and the proliferation of 'connections':

> In a reticular world, social life is composed of a proliferation of encounters and temporary, but reactivatable connections with various groups, operated at potentially considerable social, professional, geographical and cultural distance. The project is the occasion and reason for the connection. It temporarily assembles a very disparate group of people, and presents itself as a highly activated section of network for a period of time that is relatively short, but allows for the constitution of more enduring links that will be put on hold while remaining available.
>
> BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, 2005b, pp. 104–105

12 There is no unified language in the original works, in the larger school of Economics of Convention, and in the research literature. I have settled on the terms that make most sense with respect to my own theoretical ideas for the study of festivalization.

Commitment and investment are linked to the basic idea of an 'activity', which is the general equivalent by which the status of social entities, individuals and objects are measured:

> What matters is to develop activity—that is to say, never to be short of a project, bereft of an idea, always to have something in mind, in the pipeline, with other people whom one meets out of a desire to do something.
> BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, 2005b, p. 110

Common forms where activity unfolds typical within this frame, such as flexible organization, project organization, network-based forms of work, and flattened hierarchy (2005b, p. 165), all of which provide the project worker with opportunities to acquire and bestow reputational and social capital, such as discussed for field-configuring events in Chapter 4. The project is a powerful format capable of muting (or softening) the critique of capitalism:

> Capitalism and anti-capitalist critique alike are masked. Utterly different things can be assimilated to the term 'project': opening a new factory, closing one, carrying out a re-engineering project, putting on a play. Each of them is a project, and they all involve the same heroism.
> BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, 2005b, p. 111

In their view, the essential quality of projects having natural ending points contributes to the socialization of individuals and collective entities (all being 'project workers' according to this perspective and its unusual terminology) as subjects that will engage in whatever they try to accomplish 'without an affecting enthusiasm', which allows them to switch without much emotional baggage, as they seem to say, between projects and groups of people, thus free from 'social glue' and the making of emotional bonds in their relentless pursuit of 'network value' which will define their perceived status in the reticular world.

Success is defined by persons displaying criteria such as 'enthusiastic, involved, flexible, adaptable, versatile, having potential, employable, autonomous, not prescriptive, knows how to engage others, in touch, tolerant, employability' (2005b, p. 112). The contrast is provided by the miser, a 'refusenik' who rejects the idea of social capital formed through the practices associated with the connexionist world. Film festival work ethos reflects the subjective traits formulated for the project worker, as this quote indicates:

> [Q: Do you think that, when you were a volunteer here, or more generally, when people volunteer here, it helps get a better job in the paid-work

> world?] Yeah, definitely! [Q: Why do you think that?] Because I kept my eyes and ears open the whole time I was volunteering, and I got a pretty firm idea of what a paid job entails, and the people here that are high above me [...] the people that are heads of [areas], I got to know them, and to kind of, on various levels of communication, to find out exactly what they do, and how their day is organized, and how the people underneath them can support them. [...]. So huh, just to give you an idea. [...] On the technical side of it, I learned a lot, video projection, a lot about projectors, a lot about audio-visual industry, ... and sound and light, so, yeah, I learned a lot about the job I have right now, last year in volunteering.
>
> British festival staff, formerly volunteering

The theoretization of the third spirit of capitalism has been criticized by Reckwitz and Claudia Koppetsch (amongst others), who have stressed creative aestheticization in different ways. For them, a project worker also commits based on her 'affected enthusiasm' rather than what is commonly called the 'higher emotions' (see my discussion of Max Weber's ideas on affect and emotions in Chapter 11). Koppetsch (2006)'s work is interesting as it aims to explain how occupational commitment works in third-spirit capitalism.

Her study of creative advertisers in Germany and the United States illustrates what Everett Hughes called an occupation without "a name, a license, and a mandate, a recognized place in the scheme of things" (1993, pp. 292–293). It identifies the dimensions of a 'creative ethos', combining the individual impulse to be creative and devoted to creative activity, a felt need for externally-sought inspiration, and self-articulation of a life project shaped as expressing creativity. Creativity is perceived by her interviewees as charismatic, devoted, and passionate. Inspiration draws on a variety of sources and advertisers display a methodical non-conventionalism (2006, pp. 145–149) that resonates with Schulze's experience rationality and Reckwitz's creative subjectivity (see Chapters 5 and 11). The creative ethos can be detected in responses by festival managers who reflect on what it needs to participate in event curation and production:

> I think you have to be able to deal with the psychological effects of seasonality. I think there are some people who like to do the same things week in week out or have a peak of activity at the end of each term. You have to have a certain type of mind set to cope with something once a year. It's like having huge pre-menstrual tension it's like a having a huge

> period once a year and for those around you is kind of driven mad by that.
>
> British film festival director

Related to that, the most sensible—both intangible and 'transferrable' skill—is presented by calling on passion:

> And then, well, they are doing this for, I think for the people in a way where everybody who is working let's say honestly within the field of arts, is that you have this passion and you have the, you would like to enable other people to share what you do what you get in a way, so it's for that and caring about the medium of cinema, is the thing. And of course, one should always remember that if you are working in a place where you don't get paid that much you are doing it also for yourself, and the other people who are doing it.
>
> Finnish artistic director

The creative ethos of the festival worker is associated with the structural role of arranging, the curator's work, challenging the artistic self-identity by claiming it, while keeping to the search for novelties, co-creation, and audiences (Reckwitz, 2017b, p. 74; Ventzislavov, 2014). The following interview portion reflects a deep insight into the creative ethos common to both artists and supply artists:

> I would have the view that a film festival is an artistic entity, I have curated something, which has, I think a lot of people think this is a bit of a strange way of looking at it because they think the things in it are the artistic entities, which indeed which they are of course, but the actual program is my art, and I would sort of, I know this sounds a bit grand, an artist, with a small a, I'm an artist with a small a, I think you're propelled by certain things, one is that you're always looking, if someone phones you up and says, shall we do this, you always go, ooh yes, because you are interested in things that are new and interesting and especially if the person you are working with brings some energy and creativity into the product, into the thing that you're organizing then you can kind of get incredible value added work, working with creative people as well. So that's always really good and that kind of makes things grow, you want to grow because one of the measures of a film festival is how many people come, it's a question people always ask you, how many people come? […] So, it's a natural

> propelling thing that you make your event bigger and that of course just means more work.
>
> British festival director

The interviews also reflect the 'trials' of the devoted volunteer, as illuminated by the response of an experienced staff person who reflects on his former volunteering experience:

> … And also, as a volunteer, in your mindset, constantly, you're thinking, 'Why am I doing this? I'm not getting paid for this; why am I doing this?' No matter how much you need it, or how much you want it, you can't stop thinking that. Because you're not being rewarded, and you don't see the rewards of it immediately. You only see them when you get a job that you got based on the fact that you did volunteering. It says a lot about people's character when they can volunteer, especially for a long period of time.
>
> British festival staff member

The embodied commitment includes distancing from the 'normal' organization and the 'standard employment' relationship, voiced by an unpaid full-time festival manager:

> I like working in a smallish organization that is not-for-profit, that is interested in the arts really, I mean I couldn't stand working in an insurance company. In the global scheme of things, it's a brilliant job.
>
> British festival manager

Creative ethos is socialized and reproduced in cultural work common to festival and other creative work. It is characterized by the lack of specific occupational forms, strong professional projects, experimental work, weak (if any) collective representation, and team work based on permeable task areas. Festival workers embrace values of charisma, creativity, flexibility, adaptability, authenticity, and self-realization, as found in creative advertisers (Koppetsch, 2006, p. 109).

The source of legitimization, according to Koppetsch, is the function of a fiduciary in a world that is increasingly shaped by aesthetic-digital expertise, for which she draws on Talcott Parsons (2014). Parsons saw professionals at the core of the fiduciary sub-system of modern society, ensuring the reproduction of system-conform cultural values. Parsons already located a nascent shift from legitimacy by knowledge and grounding in scientific claims to expressive value and persuasion (Beckert, 2006a), which in current debates on 'fake news'

has been highlighted as problematic for trust in public systems (Goering & Thomas, 2018). Parsons took his lead from value pluralization, which he saw as requiring circulation of value and adjudication, quite similar to Karpik's work on judgment devices. For Koppetsch's empirical study, this translates into a 'fiduciary status' based on professional knowledge and affected expressive value communication related to life style (2006, pp. 120–133). In this way, she argues that creative ethos substitutes for professional identity and a bounded occupational form. Given the ubiquity of creative practices and the fast expansion of the aesthetic-digital economy, one may question the validity of this argument as robust source of legitimization, as new occupational work areas may be replaced by others without having achieved fiduciary status as social-status groups.

The discussion in this section demonstrated that there is a traceable historical process of incorporation of charismatic and affective value in formal-rational structures pertaining to contemporary organizations and the rise of a creative subjectivity open to charismatic workplaces and corresponding with the emergence of a creative ethos. With respect to Biggart's work, Reckwitz's claim that postmodern art eventually 're-appeared' from 'affective niches' of society to become the driver of a postmodern society governed by the creativity dispositif can be supplemented by pointing to another niche during affect-deficient modernity, which can be summarized as care and charitable work—a conjecture that awaits careful historical reconstruction.

5 Festival: Project Work in a Charismatic Pro-social Workplace

In this last section, I will synthesize the various debates opened up by the cited works, returning to Abbott's emphasis on the loss of professional power in the face of ever new projects of professionalism.

Film festivals are typical collective entities and sites of creative subjectivity according to Reckwitz's postmodern art field, as both its organizers and workers display ambitions associated with a contemporary understanding of professionalism, without pursuing professionalization projects and vying for power as status groups. In this way, nonprofit-work organizations may be seen as potentially threatening higher-educated, licensed, and status-group based professionalism. Yet, as Chapter 9 will show, higher education is implicated in this trend. Furthermore, while festival work and labor are cases of flexibilization, they are not exactly outcomes of neoliberal policies. More likely they are a 'by-product' of the welfare state's austerity and the outsourcing of functions of cultural and social services to nonprofit organizations or fields in which

for-profit and nonprofit forms mix with state-side organizations, the latter taking mainly a regulatory function.

Festivals are an example of how little regulation is possible under the mantle of charity. Fieldwork interviews document the scarcity of resources and the commitment of arts nonprofits to experimentalism typical of creative and cultural industries and backed by institutionalized values such as 'practical learning', 'experiential learning' and other elements that provide conditions for occupational forms without occupational projects to arise. Not all of that can be explained by changes in the welfare state, flexibilization as Post-Fordist principle that resonates with the creative practices in the postmodern art field, and the changes to values held by nonprofit workers, as research cited at the start of this chapter has illustrated.

Current film festival studies suggests that a process of the 'rationalization of charity', as found by Hwang and Powell (2009), discussed in Chapter 4, has partly been underway in these arts nonprofits, where grant-making organizations (mainly private philanthropic foundations) impose rules of spending and reporting, shifting governance models toward procedural formality and more centralized financial decision-making. As shown, they also provide normative-isomorphic impulses for the managerialization and formalization of 'nonprofit knowledge' which attains standardization in business models and, decades later, is observable across the world. Fundamental to this change is also the integration of fundraising practices and skills in charitable organizations, and even the recruiting of volunteered skills through strategic board of trustees-recruiting. As highlighted by festival scholars, there was a distinct switch from an 'age of the festival programmer' (De Valck, 2007) that marked the artistic director as the key expert (succeding film bureaucrats) to the 'age of the festival director' which underlines the value preference for general managerial skills, financial prowess, and a talent for fundraising. In film festivals, models for professionalism cover the roles of director and fundraiser positions and are embedded in the convention to pay for media professionals rather than the volunteered contributions across the event production. This new kind of professionalism must therefore be seen as the constructed reality by managerial-knowledge imports, contrasting with the traditional professionalization model, which includes the formalization of occupational trajectories, an assumption of professions as full-time occupations, the collective gathering in professional association with some regulatory powers pertaining to the making of a professional field, state sanctioning, accreditation, the setup of training institutes, and the groups' self-regulation by codes of ethics (Hwang & Powell, 2009, p. 273).

The discussion of the alignment of creative with charitable work allows us to supplement Boltanski and Chiapello (2005b)'s emphasis on the changes resulting in a third spirit of capitalism in relation to the rise of the managerial sciences and the rise of consultancy firms. The discussion shows that this is not restricted to the for-profit world. Hwang and Powell's observed nonprofits are still those that have standard-employment trajectories, which then serves as key factor for spreading new-professionalism ideology. Recalling Abbott's concern that organizations take over the jurisdictions of professional groups, we can respond based on Boltanski and Chiapello's work that increasingly two further processes are involved, i.e., the systematic reorganization of organizational activities into teams and projects that can be abandoned (Blair, 2001; Damarin, 2006) as well as the eventization of work and organizational formats (including projects and groups), which are legitimized weakly by a charismatic culture and, based on Reckwitz, the imperative of creativity.

From this perspective, festival work is ubiquitous rather than a small niche in the art worlds, where temporary forms of creative expression and organization are brought to the forefront of activities that provide much of the novelties and singularities serving as input to the aesthetic-digital economy. This suggests that normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) is probably a weaker force than New Institutionalism scholars deem typical of work-organizing features of society at time of writing.

6 Concluding Discussion

Drawing on puzzles presented by sociologists on work and professionalism, film festivals were articulated in this chapter as postmodern work organizations. Charismatic capitalist, creative ethos, and project worker comprise rejections of standard expert knowledge of rational society, rendering emphasis network-based occupational activity which relies on social capital (including an affected form, as demonstrated by the discussions of Koppetsch and Biggart's work on charismatic work organizations). Festivals are typical as far as their organizers and trustees do not expect commitment to a more narrowly defined, explicit and formal contract, encouraging instead 'exercise of judgement and initiative' (Koppetsch, 2006, p. 103), offering workplace-based trainings, and trading remuneration for an array of non-financial benefits, which I examine further in the next three chapters. Social capital in a connexionist world contrasts with jurisdictional boundaries drawn around protected expert regimes—indeed breaking down those boundaries. Profession status appears

to be significantly in the way of project citizens' commitment to gather experiences that they can creatively assembly into personally profiled occupational trajectories.

Event production may play a role here, as it potentially accelerates the accumulation of such experiences and network ties one can collect in much shorter time. Professionalization negatively correlates with formalization, as individuals tend to have higher needs for autonomous agency, with professional jurisdiction working as something like an anti-bureaucratic strategy of control (Schluchter, 1980, pp. 203–205). But with the new, creative professionalism, the relationship seems to reverse, as creativity ideology treats traditional professionalism as aligned with bureaucratic and technocratic formalism, which contradicts the 'creative impulse' (cf. Lohr in Röcke et al., 2019), while offering life-style projects the tools that are typically highly standardized formats adopted in pastiche-like works of the self (Kleon, 2012).

Following Abbott, organizations incorporate professions, which scatter their expert power, make them vulnerable to external criteria, and weaken their collective bargaining powers. Based on Boltanski and Chiapello, this conjecture can be expanded to the acceleration of this trend, as not only organizations incorporate professions, but projects incorporate organizations (including occupational skills while abandoning any form of ethos obtained from group-identification projects). In the reticular world, expertise has required a whole new meaning, as experts do enjoy high status in terms of cultural capital but not because of consolidated group power. What makes them a requisite is their skillset that projects modularize and recombine what are essentially past experiences in a postmodern context rather than relatively stable truth confirmed by scientific method. Expert knowledge is no longer 'standardized' but appears as personal, integrated experience, unique to the person how was a good investor in social capital rather than sticking to 'what's known'. Put in terms of charismatic leadership in the reticular world by Boltanski and Chiapello, the "project head is precisely the one who proves capable of making connections between very different zones of expertise" (2005b, p. 116).

Both eventization and the arranger can be discerned in this scenario. Highly valued qualities in postmodern organizations, such as those of sharing to keep networks 'afloat' provide for the need of devices such as mediators, brokers, third-party partners or roles more generally associated with search and filtering mechanisms, commonly described as intermediaries (see Chapter 5) and of the kind that 'seek out diverse people and put them into contact with each other'. This role has been identified by the sociologists discussed in this section, related as arranger, curator, project worker and network citizen. Though fundamental to the contemporary economy, these intermediation spaces

can involve systematically a mix of unstable work positions and high esteem for people absorbing the risks the organizations and their environments provide—thereby essentially privatizing risks to cultural workers.

Eventization provides an additional 'spin' to this pattern as events accelerate the transition from one project to the next (involving often the switch from one organization to another, 'based on projects'). In an age articulated as relentless progress of science and professional expertise as well as the management of risks, it seems not intelligible why high-status professions experience long-term downward mobility. But this can partly be explained by the expansion of the applied sciences especially in the humanities (including the vastly increasing number of media-expert degrees) and the social sciences, which provide in shorter amounts of time 'portable' knowledge that's considered 'practical' and 'immediately', apparently immediately applicable to tasks in highly uncertain environments which are safeguarded by devices such as accreditation agencies external to the organizations.

One explanation is Reckwitz's notion of the social regime of Novelty (N3). Broadly based on his outline of this regime (see Chapter 2), we can conjecture that the subordination of professions under the organizational imperative and the incorporation of organizational form into the project makes for a fast process of expertise that must be quicker than traditional professionalism has allowed. A good example of that is the economization of medical doctors with an extremely special skillset, who not even in times of pandemics, which potentially gives them unsurmountable power to topple the regime of their pressed work conditions, will join together in a full scale of conflict and rebellion—because medical professions are bound by their own occupational ethos which makes them vulnerable to public resentment and state-side sanctioning if they abscond their duties to save lives to protest managerial power.

Project formats appear to solve such and other highly explosive social conflicts, and eventive formats accelerate knowledge formation in from of novelty and singularity. Eventive organizations that can respond to such new ideas of expertise—or help disseminate them as the ubiquity of 'further training' events around the world in about any work area shows. What has been the 'PowerPoint' debate of the 1990s, with higher-education scholars opposing the template as opposing on their professional sense of knowledge dissemination (and their understanding of being in charge of the latter, resisting New Public Management), has not yet become an equally necessary and equally unsuccessful debate on eventization, where a format rules much of late-modern organization of work and life, production and consumption, accelerating affective-expressive forms over science-based expertise.

What film festival researchers have hinted at as professionalization and managerialization of the 'festival sector' is essentially a process of 'nonprofitization' of certain activities associated with cinema (McGimpsey, 2017). In absence of all that constitutes professionalization in the sociological sense, it remains to be stated that mimetic, rather than normative processes, are at work and can be observed across many dimensions pertaining to creative/cultural work worlds. The following three chapters examine some crucial dimensions, which are labor markets, education, law, commitment to volunteered work.

CHAPTER 8

Spreading the Risk: Film Festival Work and Creative Labor Strategies

This chapter examines the value of film festival work for those taking on seasonal jobs as waged employees or volunteers. It aims to contribute systematic analysis of precarious employment patterns which the benefits of creative team work in an experience-economic workplace cannot offset for all. This concerns both supervisory and non-supervisory workers as well as managers, as presented by Loist, who have "not a full-time job, but an all-the-time-job" and make a living and a career by engaging in multiple jobholding (2011, p. 207). In the following I examine what among labor market researchers is known as 'risk-spreading'. Risk-spreading has been found in artistic careers as a typical strategy to alleviate the risk of earning little or just intermittently. According to Everett Hughes, a "[c]areer involves, at each stage, choices of some rather than other activities in one's economy of effort. A career consists, in one sense, of moving—in time and hence with age—within the institutional system in which the occupation exists" (1993, p. 296). This chapter examines festival work's position in occupational plans, not only for 'the few permanent' workers, but across the typical festival organization. I hope to demonstrate that festival work is not simply charitable work done in arts nonprofits, as outsiders to the cinema field often assume, but offers opportunities for qualifications which have a direct relationship with the film festival as market and industry participant.

Unlike studies on artists which select from occupational forms (e.g., Alper & Wassall, 2000), I use the work histories of individual festival staff and volunteers for reasons given in Chapter 7. In contemporary arts/cultural occupations, formal education holds little purchase, and people tend to generate career trajectories from project work, part-time jobs and multiple jobholding (Alper & Wassall, 2006; Menger, 1991). Multiple jobholding is known in artist studies as 'moonlighting', a term referring to the quintessential artist who creates art after having worked the regular, income-generating day job, presumably at night.

> Anecdotal evidence suggests that most artistic skills can indeed find wider application. Typical examples include: novelists who also work as editors or journalists; actors who run corporate training workshops; craft

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> practitioners who develop new materials for use in architectural hardware; visual artists who design websites for commercial firms; dancers who instruct yoga or Pilates classes; musicians and composers who work in advertising; and many more.
>
> THROSBY & ZEDNIK, 2011, p. 10

The contemporary job patterns illuminated by the field interviews are possible in an economy and society in which creativity takes on many forms. It is here were festival work information holds potential for understanding a wider range of jobs. The chapter begins with a summary of relevant studies on precarious cultural work to then turn to the discussion of multiple jobholding as approached in labor economics. Finally, it applies labor sociologist Pierre-Michel Menger's risk-spreading hypothesis for cultural work to a sample of festival workers' trajectories. The chapter then concludes on the discernible value of festival work for future and present jobs of those who volunteer or work in festivals.

1 Creative Labor and Precarity Research

In her study on German festival programmers, directors, and publicists, Loist underlines the contrast of the "increasingly professionalized nature of work on the film festival circuit" with the relative underpay (when compared with similar industry positions), the likelihood of multiple jobholding to support oneself economically, lack of social benefits standard in other industries, high turnover in directors' positions, and flight of highly skilled staff. As she writes, "beyond the high demands on time and energy, volunteer workers are required to work in an increasingly professionalized fashion without any direct reward, save for the pleasure of having pulled it off against the odds" (2011, p. 271).

A recent study on TV and film workers in the German media industries provides support for her findings as it reveals that paid positions, which Loist mentions for contrast with underpaid festival professionals, are just as precarious. Furthermore, only a third of the workers in this study's large sample receive compensation at tariff level, the industry has a sizeable share of trainees filling regular (thus potentially waged) positions and thereby seem to substitute permanent employment (Langer, 2015, p. 15 and 22).

More generally, such conditions of work and employment have been reported for decades, showing cultural workers as "increasingly casual, part-time, freelance, and relying on a 'portfolio' career with many jobs and employers" (Hartley, 2005, p. 29). Others have seminally underlined the structural

backdrop of this work, including "a new partnership between arts and business with public sector support" and government's role in the "more rapid capitalization of the cultural field", which for many occupational groups entails "a decisive break with past expectations of work" (McRobbie, 2002, p. 517) and seized up the precarious workplace conditions (Gill & Pratt, 2008), the self-exploitation of artists that starts with the socialization in arts schools (Oakley, 2009, pp. 287–288; Ross, 2008), and a "marked absence of workplace politics" (McRobbie, 2002, pp. 518–519). Others have warned of overgeneralization, pointing to the subjective positive meanings held by cultural workers (e.g., Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2008).

Regardless of the critique, these patterns do reflect what has emerged about contract insecurity, weakening contractual terms for even permanent workers, risk shifting to employees, work intensification, relaxed assumptions on pay for extra working hours and flexible labor patterns pertaining to the Postfordist economy (Kalleberg & Hewison, 2013; Prosser, 2015, p. 2). Within this debate, criticisms have been made about the standard employment relationship having been served as the gold standard rather than an exceptional situation that excluded much of women and migrant workforce—and the majority of the world population (Prosser, 2015; Siegmann & Schiphorst, 2016).[1]

Governments in search for foreign capital and technological investment and participation in the value chain are incentivized to make 'flexible labor' policies part of a package deal, including access to markets and materials and tax advantages (for a film industry study see Conor, 2015). In the global perspective, casualization meets flexibilization in employment "redefined by employers and put to use by them in new contracts of production and in ways that cheapen the cost of labor, increase flexibility, and, perhaps not coincidentally, reduce labor's capacity for organization" (Kalleberg & Hewison, 2013, p. 271). In a comprehensive analysis of 1970–2000 US employment data, Kalleberg reveals a pattern of 'good [and] bad jobs' (2013), as mentioned in Chapter 7. This pattern, variance allowed, can be found in many countries and is indicative of not only inequality at the workplace but the consequences for the increasing polarization of societies (Piketty, 2015).

What in Loist's study may still be deemed a 'good job' even if sub-optimally compensated at the location of work, turns out to be a 'bad job' in Kalleberg's study as well as Boltanski and Esquerre's 'enrichment economy' (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020), characterized by lack of social benefits and intermittent

1 What was once the informal economy thought exclusive to the Third World has spread as informalization to advanced industrial societies during this neoliberal era (Arnold & Bongiovi, 2013, p. 290 and 296).

availability as condition for work. Both aspects make seasonal event production possible. The question therefore is whether an unpaid or low-pay skilled job, which adds nothing or little to current income may in some way be a 'good job' potentially reduce future income risk and raise lifetime earnings. A typical assumption in that regard is that skills allow creative workers to switch into more lucrative jobs regarding income substantive content. Boltanski and Chiapello see the switching from one to another job as part of contemporary capitalism:

> As opposed to the type of job security that was on offer during the 1960s, involving a meritocratic approach that welfare state based on the achievement of negotiated targets, careers are now viewed as a series of fulfilled projects. Job security is now predicated on the employability that a person develops as he or she gains experience.
>
> BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, 2005b, p. 166

Multiple jobholding research offers the opportunity to explore this claim for the experience-seeking cultural worker but also to inspect the non-standard occupational trajectory and its normal occurrence in cultural workers' lives with respect to nonprofit-event productions.

2 Multiple Jobholding and Risk-Spreading

2.1 *Multiple Jobholding Research*

The literature on multiple jobholding emerged from queries into second-jobbing with general labor force surveys and non-creative occupations (for a review see Averett, 2001), turning only later to cultural work. This small niche of labor economics and sociology started in the 1970s. Its development as knowledge field constitutes historical evidence for how researchers have come to terms with the observable decline of standard employment and the rise of non-standard work. Studying multiple jobholding is a reflection of that trend and the intellectual occupation with it.[2] For a long time, multiple jobholding was at best something associated with extraordinary occupations, artists who moonlight, and poor people trying to make a living (Ehrenreich, 2001).

2 For ease of reading, I use the term 'employment', which dominates this literature, for both paid and unpaid (volunteered) labor.

Inquiry into multiple jobholding is complicated because surveys often don't collect information on unreported income potentially gained through additional jobs, explicit motivations, and whether jobs are held simultaneously. An empirical specification of job conditions such as an hours-constraint and other factors of interest are usually missing. The early labor economics typically focuses on income as the sole motivating factor and differentiates between a main and a second job based on the working hours. It tends to reject risk-spreading, arguing that once a worker had worked all the hours available on the main job, additional income could only be generated by taking additional jobs, at lower rates of pay (Dickey et al., 2011). This hours-constraint assumption, which is central to the literature, treats as irrelevant the content, remuneration, and appeal of the second job as well as of the first. Subsequent modelling addressed moonlighting based on insecurity related to the cases' main job, but such motives could still be related to income maintenance. In yet another turn, when the 'portfolio career' was formulated as sense-making concept, the literature starts to include non-pecuniary motivations as a variable (Averett, 2001, p. 1392). In a core study, Heather Dickey and fellow researchers found that British offshore oil and gas workers (the seemingly perfect employees whose working conditions including a regulated hours-constraint on the main job, long-term tenure and high salary) use a second job "to gain experience in a different occupation or build up their own business" apart from income security-strategies (2011, p. 3771). Now framing the matter as 'heterogeneous multiple jobholding', the various studies by economics still held on to the first-job hours-constraint assumption, continuing to discount risk-spreading as the main motivation for multiple jobholding.

Studies on creative and cultural work, such as the study of Australian "serious, practicing professional artists" by David Throsby and Anita Zednik, adopt a different approach by starting with job content. With their 2007–2008 sample, they show that respondents of their working time reportedly spent on average 53 percent on their arts-focused work, 27 percent in arts-related work, and a further 20 percent in non-arts work. Non-arts work turns up as most income-generating for these 'serious artists' (2011, pp. 9–10). In this sample, the hours-variation in non-art work ranged from zero to over 90 percent, and the dominant reason given for non-art jobs was the lack of sufficient income in the artistic job. The sample analysis also reveals that work experience just as formal training, albeit to a lesser degree, can reduce the need for non-arts work. Interestingly, in the model the artist's reputation appears to have no impact on the volume of non-arts work, and the employment status has no significant effect on the volume of non-arts work either (pp. 11–13). This study with a representative sample of Australian artists suggests that in times of 'hegemonic

creativity', as issued by Reckwitz, there is still no full occupation with the artistic work (as maximization of creativity and singularity), but that the constraints and possibilities regarding arts-related and non-arts work need to be better understood. It may well be that the results express the need for creativity to be spread across different work scenarios for reasons that must be explored. Looking into the non-arts jobs, the authors find that a third of the sample have paid jobs and that those jobs are mainly "in government, social and personal services", which may have been "deliberately chosen by artists as providing a new and stimulating way in which their creativity can be expressed, or as a more attractive source of additional income than driving a taxi" (Throsby & Zednik, 2011, p. 17). Non-arts jobs are mainly found among freelancers and emerging artists and the pattern varies by artist occupations, with higher prevalence among performing artists, writers, and visual artists. With respect to skilling, the results also suggest that careers in creative/cultural employment that can reduce income-seeking activities elsewhere exist, and that standard assumptions on occupational status (prestige and robust employment) seem to have little meaning in the postmodern art worlds despite the central position of art and culture in late-modern capitalism.

Carlos Casacuberta and Néstor Gandelman (2012) examines leisure time, arts and non-arts work in Uruguayan musicians, who happen to be affiliates of a performing-rights society. They find that the non-arts wage results in reduced or unchanged hours spent on music-making, which shows that increase in non-arts income resists decrease in artistic endeavor or, if reducing time spent on it, the result is more leisure. In the sample, a small but statistically significant decrease in arts-work hours occurs when the non-arts wage rises. Here the results, however, suggest that the sample contains musicians who are first of all non-arts workers seeking to increase their income, and stopping doing so when the non-arts job pays enough. Arts-occupational study conventionally assumes that a non-arts skilled worker might be expected to react to a rise in non-arts job income by seeking more leisure, whereas the artist would still be devoting more time to the arts when gaining more non-arts job income. Still, the same pattern might also be argued to occur in lower-class workers who use musical performance to supplement their wages and who can reduce music-making hours when the wage rises. This study is relevant because it demonstrates that occupational status may provide little information on the creative activity of an individual engaged in multiple activities. Perhaps of less relevance to the art worlds is whether the main job held would be the 'bread job' or the 'career job' when entered in public surveys. The sociology of work transformation provides many arguments as to why such a distinction should have declining significance in people's lives. Studying non-standard labor may

therefore demand unconventional approaches to generate more insight and hypotheses for empirical work worlds that are ubiquitous but have little public attention bestowed on them.

2.2 *Observing Multiple Jobholding in Festival Workers*

The following analysis observes the entire range of film festival workers' work history as well as the subjective and objective 'weight' of a particular activity (which must be bounded as a recognizable artistic practice in relation to work and career plans), including working hours and subjective meanings of choices. Across the data, an individual 'work history' is not only constituted from sequences but also overlapping arrangements of main jobs, side jobs, paid jobs, unpaid jobs, and no-work spells. Job duration varies greatly within worker biographies, to the extent that festival workers had to be asked repeatedly to verify the sequential arrangement of their projects and jobs. They could also be fairly vague on what they considered a job.[3] Social acceleration theory (Rosa, 2017) claims that individuals experience a more rapid 'cycling' through jobs within their life time, as such intensity meets demands for self-realization by the experience-seeking individual. This should manifest itself in more jobs in shorter time relative to the parental cohort, but in the reticular world and aesthetic capitalism in which eventization has occurred, there should also be observable shortening of job periods. Paradoxically, acceleration not only intensifies experiences in a particular life-time period but has effects on subsequent stages where youth employment and entry to the labor markets in question are concerned: the more 'work experience' people accrue as part of studies and post-study, the further income generation and savings will be delayed, potentially without a catch-up option. Without having an employment contract or a formal apprenticeship with income-generating potential, people still enter the work worlds, but do so within the frame of 'getting an experience'. All this suggests that there is a relationship between 'festivalization' and social acceleration which future research can help specify. The film festival therefore a suitable site for the study of accelerated work worlds.

In the interpretation of the examined fifty festival workers' career foci and work histories, the emphasis is not on the qualitative combination but the recognizability of a trajectory, assuming that job choices are treated in light of

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3 Such impressions are particularly relevant to younger festival workers who increasingly lack familiarity with the standard employment relationship. This creates challenges for labor-market entry studies that need to determine what to count in and what out (e.g., holiday jobs, internships) (Gebel, 2010).

career intentions as direct or indirect ways of creating one's life-work project, and that there is value to film festival work that can vary with the location in the trajectory. Furthermore, measurement of multiple jobholding in this sample includes all the work that someone does for reasons that exclude leisure or charitable work for individuals (e.g., informal care work). The overall discussion is guided by the risk-spreading hypothesis, which the next section introduces.

2.3 *Spreading the Risk*

The analysis adopts the tripartite classification of artistic jobs as arts, non-arts, and arts-related (hereafter: A, NA, and AR) provided by Menger. AR "includes the various activities within the observed art world which do not contribute directly to producing artist product, but still rely on the skills and qualifications possessed by the professional artist", with common jobs being arts teaching and arts management (Menger, 1999, p. 563). As already highlight in the final part of the literature review, the degree to which artists cease to do artistic work when employed outside a conventional artist setting must be judged contextually in the data. To illustrate, an artist who works part-time for an advertising agency might regard this as being artistic in a new setting, while another (otherwise identical) artist treats the same job as purely expedient to her goal of financing her artwork in her studio. Following Menger, each unit of job (which can be a formal project) is considered as associated with a different risk level pertaining to making a living. The highest economic risk is the artistic practice for full-income generation, but is likely improbable for the average artist. Therefore:

Risk of Arts (A) > Risk of Arts-related (AR) > Risk of Non-arts (NA).

NA-work is not assumed to be inherently less precarious than AR-work, as it may involve more specific skills and barriers to labor markets; but a combination of A with NA-work appears as less risky than A and AR-jobs combined. This is consistent with multiple jobholding studies which show that the arts are a precarious way to make a living, for those not firmly established and 'in demand' as producers or performers. AR-work still carries risk because it depends on public demand for creative outputs (e.g., jobs in art administration). Multiple jobholding confined to artistic jobs (A & A) carries the highest risk. The combination outside the arts (NA & NA) carries the least risk, but turns arts pursuit into a form of leisure. Given the conventional understanding that NA-jobs create more economic security, combining arts with non-arts activity (A & NA) is less risky than combining A & AR, while (AR & NA) is less

risky than (A & AR). This leads to five conjectures (put in italic font below) for the work-history patterns pertaining to festival workers.

Firstly, and partly informed by the workforce pattern discussed in the previous chapter, festival workers will typically show (i) *multiple jobholding occurring across a range of A, AR, and NA-jobs*. Secondly, the subset of workers observable as 'seriously creative' will hold multiple jobs to spread the risk incurred from creative focus. 'Occupational risk diversification' is just one motive for multiple jobholding, which is why the second conjecture refers to only a subset of workers. *Thus,* (ii)*, there may also be a strategic or long-term element in the festival-volunteering decision that leads to multiple jobholding*. An A or AR-second job will be evaluated for its possible contribution to future career opportunities and earning power as well as its present financial rewards and intrinsic interest. The decision by most festival volunteers to work without remuneration, in jobs they know to be seasonal and temporary, rules out the idea that they are primarily seeking the art volunteer experience to supplement current income.

Thirdly, festival workers' explicit artistic occupational interests and degree of commitment to an arts career may be mediating (though not necessarily eliminate) risk-spreading motives. Festival workers should show different degrees of 'career directedness', ranging from those firmly committed to one type of arts work to those who have only casually or experimentally moved into the arts. More specifically, (iii), *greater career directedness within the arts may mean lower willingness to extend multiple jobholding outside the arts, despite the risk-spreading that this would allow*, because doing so reduces the time and attention that can be given to the creative experience and the art worlds. Fourthly, (iv) *the extent of risk-spreading via multiple jobholding will vary inversely with the degree of arts-career motivation*. For example, seriously motivated artists and aspirants might take low-pay or no-pay second jobs in arts administration or art teaching (AR) rather than higher-paid second jobs in, for example, retail sales or taxi-driving (NA).

By choice of research design, the direction of risk-spreading, (v), can be gauged in this sample in a way not usually possible with large-scale surveys. Among those who hold multiple jobs to spread risk, some will have diversified *towards* the arts from a main job outside them: beginning with the low-risk strategy of keeping a strong foothold outside the arts; then, if the experience is good, abandoning NA-activity in order to spend more time in A or AR-activities. The reason for this argument is suggested as *falling risk aversion* (Menger, 1999, p. 563). Others will diversify *away from* the arts into arts-related or non-artistic activity: for example, beginning with the high-risk strategy (A-A) and going on to reduce their risk (taking NA or AR-jobs and/or making this

their main job) when regular income or job security become more important. *Increasing risk aversion* may be the more common path, as few successful artists become immediately successful enough to live entirely on arts-generated income, while income requirements also tend to rise over time in relation to family founding, old-age security planning and lifestyle choices. The opposite can also be found, namely that people compromise on their private life to stay competitive in the arts and live up to their 'bohemian ethos'—as observed in German theatre artists see (Eikhof & Haunschild, 2007, p. 531).

2.4 *Data and Sample*

Fifty interviews from one British film festival of the International-type and spread across typical festival work roles (e.g., volunteer organizer, box-office services assistant, senior programming assistant, guest coordinator, and marketing manager, front-of-house staff, print-traffic coordinator, and information-desk assistant) render information on staff and volunteers, excluding first-time volunteers from the analysis to focus on rich accounts for the work-history analysis. While interviewees had stable roles, within the event production period, there were shifting project arrangements for a minority of workers, e.g., shifting an individual from full-time to part-time within the same project period but not implying a contract switch. To simplify the data structure and avoid arbitrary case-by-case decisions, the information on work content is taken from the most current festival job. Workers are differentiated by contracts vs. volunteer agreements, as full-time vs. part-time, and as paid vs. unpaid. Full-time and paid positions are the most desirable jobs, associated with prestige communicated throughout the work organization. Authority in the workplace is gauged by an observable three-level hierarchy that is typical in creative team formats and 'flattened' by peer culture rituals. The positions are head of department/managerial function, coordinator at the second level, and assistant jobs at the lowest level. The study observes loyalty to the organization with a simple binary measure of repeated work with the same festival. The following table presents the sample characteristics.

The average worker's age is 29, a value which describes well the central tendency in the data, given that the younger half is just over twenty and the other half is concentrated on the mid-thirties (maximum age value = 50). The sample contains 3 women for 2 men; the big majority has a full-time engagement with the festival (which may be biased due to interviewing in the middle of the ongoing event); roughly half are paid while the others are volunteers (thus unpaid). Well over half of the sample represents the supervised volunteer. The sample includes many repeat-workers and a substantial number of students next to a tiny number of interns.

TABLE 14 Sample characteristics for UK film festival workers, n = 50 (author's data)

		n	Percent
Age group	Youngest	12	24
	Young	15	30
	Mid-age	20	40
	Senior	3	6
Gender	Men	20	40
	Women	30	60
Work hours	Full-time	39	78
	Part-time	11	22
Renumeration	Paid Staff	24	48
	Unpaid Volunteer	26	52
Hierarchy	High	8	16
	Middle	13	26
	Low	29	58
Repeat-Worker	Yes	19	38
	No	31	62
Student	Yes	7	14
	No	43	86
Intern	Yes	3	6
	No	47	94

Note: 74 percent of the interviewees are British, 8 percent other European citizens, and the rest from other countries.

2.5 *Concepts and Measures*

The analysis of risk-spreading is done parsimoniously with two basic measures, the number and type of jobs (work history) and 'subjective career directedness'. These two independently inform about workers' occupational choices and strategies.[4] Career directedness is a social-psychological construct, reflecting three dimensions labeled as motivational direction, career insights and

4 The analysis does not assume a close correspondence or causal link between the two patterns of career directedness and multiple jobholding. Motivation may push an individual in a certain direction, but actual work experience and capability to gain career-suitable jobs influence such motivations and the plans that emerge from them—reinforcing, modifying or even completely substituting them with other plans and career identification.

resilience, and the arousal and persistence of career motivation (London, 1983). The semi-structured interviews provide two sufficiently matching questions for data load on this construct:

> "When, if at all, did you start thinking of yourself as working toward a career in the arts or the cultural industry?" and
>
> How much awareness do you have about yourself as having a career or working toward a career?

The responses to these two questions were substantiated and further verified by the information given throughout the entire interview. The typology of career directedness is informed by the data pattern, which could be organized into five groups to which obvious labels were attached: 20 Film careerists, 7 Arts careerists, 17 Experimenters, 4 Non-arts careerists, and 2 Drifters.[5] These are listed with descriptive identification in the following table.

The second measure collects the multiple jobholding patterns in the data into four sequence formats, presented in the table below. As with the first measure, these data were examined for clarity against the entire interview, but were additionally subjected to four coding rounds, involving three fellow researchers.

Sequence *A* reflects within-area diversification (strong *A*); *B* reflects diversification within cultural-work areas that may include arts-related work (strong AR). The two other sequences *C* and *D* express tendencies in the respective work histories of the workers: *C*, those who have diversified *away from* the arts-related towards a non-artistic additional job; and *D* those who have diversified *towards* the arts from a main job outside them. Distinguishing *A* from *B* facilitates better examination of artists able to focus on artistic work. Through partitioning out *B* and *C*, the trends of diversification and precarious work experiences can be better observed. The allocation of cases to these four patterns was done by first identifying the major activity (or main pursuit, as in the case of students, who may also study part-time) and second to count and evaluate the other activities or jobs. Joblessness was treated as diversification outside the arts, on the grounds that if they were culturally-focused, workers would have

5 Not excluding the first-time volunteers would have resulted in more drifters. Where higher-education institutions have agreements on volunteering students with festivals, Drifters should not be more present because students must be assumed to be self-identified Arts or Film careerists.

TABLE 15 Typology of film festival workers' career directedness (author's measure)

Worker type	n	Type	Empirical definition
Film careerist	20	I	Directed within film: either doing it or, while still students, expressing firm intention to pursue it
Arts careerist	7	II	Directed within arts/cultural industries more broadly: either doing it or, while still students, expressing firm intention to pursue it
Experimenter	17	III	Trying out jobs and tracks, from the starting-point of being in cultural job already, in a non-cultural job already, still a student, or outside the labor market (e.g., full-time parenting)
Non-arts careerist	4	IV	Directed outside arts/cultural industries: involved in festival but with no intention of leaving their non-culture career track
Drifter	2	V	Drifting, i.e., no expressed or identifiable career plans or explicit about not having any

TABLE 16 Film festival workers' multiple-jobholding pattern by individuals' work history (n = 50)

Multiple-jobholding category	n	Multiple-jobholding pattern	Empirical description for a typical work history within the category
Film art-focused sequence (9)	9	A	Work history is narrowly focused on film-industry specialism
Focused cultural work sequence (14)	14	B	Diversified within cultural occupations (e.g., publishing)
Mixed cultural work sequence (15)	15	C	Mainly in cultural occupations but diversified into non-cultural (e.g., catering)
Mixed non-cultural work sequence (12)	12	D	Mainly in non-cultural occupations (e.g., accounting), but diversified into cultural

used it as an opportunity to do something creative, and not openly described it to the interviewer as unemployment.[6]

The multiple-jobholding pattern reflects robustly the specific patchwork pattern of the jobs and projects pursued by people working, amongst other organizations, in film festivals. Because career directedness does not gauge actual labor participation (which work history does), the study can utilize two independent measures of labor market identity. One way to establish construct validity for career directedness is to argue that those strongly directed in their careers toward film or other arts should be holding specialized festival jobs conducive to their overall career goal. That is so because film festival work mainly offers skilling and networking experience, and therefore those who are career-oriented would be less inclined to take a normal volunteer job in menial or lower service skill areas. The validity of the second measure is strongly connected to the overall thesis, with multiple jobholding being spread across careers from relatively young age onward.

2.6 *Findings and Interpretation*

The analysis reveals combinations of simultaneous and sequential jobholding. Multiple jobholding, as mix of A, AR, and NA-jobs, is a common feature except for the rare cases of those with full-time, and permanent higher-level or special-skills positions. Only 9 out of fifty interviewees could concentrate on jobs that were closely related to their artistic interest. This confirms the first conjecture. The second conjecture is also supported by the data, as a subset of the workers can be identified as strategically risk-spreading. In most such cases, the information given by the worker shows a repeated return to one job after stints in another, which resembles the classical moonlighting strategy, even if the two or more jobs are not held at exactly the same time period. As mentioned at the outset, workers' projects can overlap, tag on from one project to the next, or be done at the same time—through freelancing, for example. The qualitative approach and our conceptual framework can accommodate such erratic patterns. By career directedness, the largest groups are Film careerists and Experimenters; thus, the following discussion will mainly address their risk-spreading behaviors.

Most Film careerists are mid-age workers whereas Experimenters are on average younger than Film Careerists and other Arts careerists. Additionally,

6 For students, non-cultural jobs taken while studying (e.g., hospitality-industry jobs) were not counted as diversification outside cultural work, if everything else they had done was arts/cultural.

TABLE 17 Festival worker's risk-spreading and self-realization tactics (based on author's data)

Career directedness	**Multiple-job holding**				
	A	**B**	**C**	**D**	
Film careerist	7	5	7	1	20
Other-arts careerist		5	2		7
Experimenter	2	4	6	5	17
Non-arts careerist				4	4
Drifter				2	2
Total	9	14	15	12	50

Note: A = film-focused sequence, B = focused cultural-work sequence, C = mixed-cultural work sequence (toward the arts), D = mixed non-cultural work sequence (away from the arts)

Experimenters can be observed to spread across all the age groups, except for the most senior one. The 20 Film careerists concentrate on the more lucrative jobs: except for one, they got the full-time jobs and over half (12) are paid workers; the rest volunteers. Among the 17 Experimenters, 12 have full-time festival jobs, but only 6 are actually paid staff. The two biggest subsets also differ by supervisory position-holding, with two thirds of the Film careerists holding such positions, while only a third of the Experimenters do so. Neither Non-arts careerists nor Drifters hold supervisory positions. In this sample, Film careerists, Arts careerists and Experimenters together cover most of the full-time jobs recorded for the sample, which suggests that the best jobs in this festival go to people matching by skills and aspirations. Talking to the personnel manager of the festival, I learned how this organization engages applicants in interviews regardless of position, showing the level of quality associated with job interviews in business and public organizations:

> Well, it evens, it sort of works itself out. Because, you see some people have got two whole weeks to give, some people are desperate to do something with us, would love to do two whole weeks, but can't afford to, have got to keep their paid job in Waterstone's, so you suggest to them, 'well, you could join this group, then you could do a shift every evening, of two or three hours'.—'Now this group might not have been your first choice,

> but you're a bit, your availability is limiting your options, take this and you'll still get the festival on your CV. You'll still get a chance to see films'. So, you just, you just go through it all, all the perks, all the value that there is, the different values in the different scenarios and you just find one that will work for their lifestyle and work for you.
>
> British festival recruiter

At least in this case, 'work mismatch', as cited as a problem by economists on nonprofit organizations (Steinberg, 1997) is hard to argue as a structural problem, but the study also reveals the openness of the roles and the matching around creative value rather than mainly formal criteria.

Turning to the third conjecture, the expected negative association between career directedness and non-arts job uptake can be discerned from the data analysis. The results show that Careerists (n=27) or are more likely to adopt a narrow spread of jobs, focusing on their chosen art or work closely related to it (multiple jobholding sequences *A* and *B*). Experimenters, to the contrary, seem to be under more pressure to adopt a wider spread of jobs, propelling them towards sequences *C* and *D*. Still, 12 of the 17 the Experimenters have stayed in arts or culturally-related lines of work. The difference between the Careerists and Experimenters still shows in avoidance of job diversification outside the arts (which is coded in trajectories *C* and *D*), as Careerists focus on specific arts while most Experimenters diversify within cultural occupations. Only one of the Careerists has diversified into the arts from a non-arts main job, whereas the Experimenters are approximately at balance between those based outside the arts world looking in and those inside it looking out.

However, career directedness is only weakly linked with narrowness of jobholding, even though career-directed workers are more likely to hold supervisory roles, which could be assumed to offer higher levels of pay, permanence and career prospects. Among the Film careerists, only one third holds jobs matching closely the respective area of occupational concentration while the rest engage mainly in other cultural work, or mixes cultural work with non-arts jobs. The other Arts careerists seem to be able to focus on cultural work, but not all will do so and some mix in non-arts jobs. Related to the fourth conjecture, this suggests that art-focused workers may tend to stick to jobs and projects which help them keep to the art as closely as they can while non-arts jobs cannot be excluded. The general result across the data is that even those who profess strong career interest in a specific area of the arts during their interview display a risk-spreading motive in their choice of other work. This corresponds with previous findings regarding limited openings and the precarious, project-based nature of most artistic work.

While the evidence for multiple jobholding motivated by risk-spreading is strong, there is much weaker evidence for career-directedness limiting arts workers' willingness to take second jobs outside the arts. Throsby and Zednik (2011) offer a possible explanation for this. Career-directed artists can remain firmly focused on their artistic practice, while taking jobs that appear to fall outside it, if they can perceive themselves as still practicing their art but in a non-conventional setting (e.g., a filmmaker employed by a company to make in-house video, or a painter becoming artist-in-residence at a factory). Other plausible explanations include the precarity of arts and arts-related work, which can induce even the most career-focused artists to pick up work in unrelated areas.

2.7 *The Value of Unpaid Festival Jobs*

While the sequences *A-D* show relationships between jobs of different creative and non-creative content, they in themselves do not confirm risk-spreading as a strategy. Whether there is a strategy in place or not, can be studied in the responses by the interviewees to the question "Why do you want to do this job if you don't make any money?" This question was also asked from the 24 paid staff in the sample, as the compensation is typically much lower than an industry or government-agency job with a comparable skill profile.[7]

For some Film careerists doing unpaid temporary work is part of the freelance strategy, while for others it means getting a film education, getting an introduction to the social worlds and the industry of cinema simultaneously, building up a skill portfolio, or just 'for being involved in film in some way'. 'Working in a festival is a good idea' for reasons such as getting to know the kind of event, the voluntary nature of the creative work, and the exposure to cinematic art. In the responses from workers in paid jobs, economic motives are also cited, such as tackling an overdraft and making money to pay higher-education tuition. Some clearly state their tactic of accepting only paid jobs as they cannot afford doing otherwise. Even unpaid volunteers sometimes follow a strategy that is partly economic, as they look at their current role as a 'stepping stone' to a better festival job the next year, to further their social ties, and increase their odds of a future income. The latter is not a matter of working oneself up the charity ladder by giving a gift of time, but rather an awareness

7 Skill comparability and matching roles are, of course, a reflection of the festival's relationships with other formal organizations in what Karpik calls the inter-firms regime of economic coordination, and should be high where film festivals have attained status as validated market-makers (Karpik, 2010, p. 185).

about a workplace in which paid jobs are not for newcomers and non-creative jobs (unless they involve high-tech components) and where workers must prove themselves as people with their own creative projects. This is illustrated by a typical response to another query in the questionnaire:

> [Q: Okay, last question. Do you think volunteering will help you to get a better job in the paid work world?] Yeah definitely, that's more or less why I'm here; it's why a lot of people do it. The easiest way to get a foot in the door is do something for nothing. Then hopefully get paid for it someday.
>
> Australian volunteer in British festival

Overall, the responses in this subset express that people find the work meaningful (including the overall purpose of contributing to an event production), have a structured work day, and receive a wage where work is paid. Even in the most career-directed subgroup mixed motivations, combining the artistic and the income question, dominate.

For the other Arts careerists, being part of the art world through festival work, thereby building networks, getting experience, adding skills to a portfolio and professed belief in one's work and love for cinema are also important. An intern's reasoning is illuminating with respect to precarious living conditions, as she holds on to two part-time jobs to permit her work during the event in a festival full-time job which does not pay but is, according to her interpretation, 'a stepping stone in my career'.

The Experimenters similarly cite reasons including career planning, volunteering as a way to get paid work later, building a competitive CV, and learning about the art and the industry. One of the Experimenters expresses the labor market value of her festival job clearly as that unique experience which 'separates him from the person with the same film degree next to him'. Volunteers, many of them being Experimenters, often approach the festival when they start out because they want to make an income. But most will learn that the way is through the unpaid work role. In this sample, some volunteers reveal they can afford to do the job only on the basis of savings or with help from friends and colleagues who will rent out to them during the event time.

Examining the mixed-cultural sequence, *C*, we find in the data that not a single worker who diversified into non-cultural jobs has a broader non-cultural work history, and 9 of them (*C*'s n=15) are intent on a career in the art worlds, while the others are still experimenting with the kind of arts and culture niche they ultimately seek. There are no non-arts careerists and Drifters' work histories conforming to the *C*-sequence. *C* highlights the 'experimental' life style

of those who are motivated to do creative work but find out that they cannot make a living from it. In some cases, non-arts jobs are taken out of expediency (e.g., the money they pay, the ease of entering and exiting them between arts jobs, or the amount of time and energy they leave available for art) and may also be the kind of jobs that offer fewest prospects for career-building. At the same time, the data underline the determination in some of these workers to stay creative. Even where 'the day job' could offer a comfortable career progression, most respondents in this multiple jobholding pattern have not been persuaded to settle for it, and instead continue to branch out from it into arts/culture-related pursuits. Around one in three interviewees have taken the riskier approach of taking a main job within arts/culture, because they have found it easier to find work within the arts instead of outside of it, or feel a need for immersion in arts activity without the distraction of a non-arts job, to carry out a fair 'experiment' of an artistic life. This pattern is also relevant for cases coded on a strong A—AR pattern, as the following quote by someone holding a coveted, secure job, which he holds out in, shows:

> And meanwhile I'm making a [...] film, the [arts government agency] job is a part-time job that pays me quite well, so I kind of want to concentrate on writing and trying to get more scripts ... I'm doing the short film programming ... a bit of money, so I've kind of managed to find myself in the short term quite a comfortable position where I don't have to go back and work in a box office.
>
> British festival staff

Turning to the two groups not focused on arts and culture, the data show that Non-arts careerists have no risk-spreading reasons. While one of the four interviewees in this subset is conscious of its value for her ideas to go into events planning (not specific to cinema, as verified), others are motivated by balancing a 'corporate job', working for 'social justice', or having 'a pleasant diversion' from the ordinary everyday life. These responses are consistent with a jobholding pattern in which the main job outside the arts is fairly secure, while the festival job generates additional experiences that are broadly creative and valuable while not tied to labor market understandings and career motivations concerning artistic/creative occupations. Still, this indicates that the motivation ascribed to taking a lower paid second job (which represents an hours-constraint on the first job, as in the labor-economics literature pertaining to multiple jobholding), need not apply to second jobs in the arts, which tend to be taken for non-financial reasons (and potentially, but not found in this sample, instead of doing more hours for more pay in the non-arts first job).

3 Conclusion

This chapter tried to demonstrate that festival work is more than a charitable endeavor by artistically inclined people. It is a manifest element in occupational plans of workers closer to a full-time job (although seasonal) and those who volunteer their time. Studying career determination, work history, and risk-spreading strategy as articulated by the volunteers and paid staff in one British organization shows that temporary project organizations with very short work periods possess high value for those seeking creative and cultural jobs. Notably, a majority of the workers was focused on talking about their educational and occupational values and pursuits; somewhat surprisingly, only the rare case of one worker mentioned the nonprofit value by which people in arts organizations are typically identified.

Bourdieu wrote on artists, the today's creatives:

> The propensity to move toward the economically most risky positions, and above all the capacity to persist in them (a condition for all avant-garde undertakings which precede the demands of the market), even when they secure no short-term economic profit, seem to depend to a large extent on possession of substantial economic and social capital.
>
> BOURDIEU, 1984, p. 67

This suggests that one has to strike it rich to comfortably be an artist. The observed patterns seem to confirm this assumption in broader terms, as the various compromises artists and cultural workers make in order to still pursue their core interests come to the light. At the same time, the economic basis of art and creative occupations has shifted. The data clearly reveal the privatization of occupational risk, the energy that goes into risk-spreading (rather than spending from the family wealth), and the 'thin ice' on which many people in jobs with relatively low prestige are underway. A major reason for why they can be doing so is the availability of art and arts-related jobs in charitable workplaces. Furthermore, the data show that social capital ought to be attained, and that this is one of the reasons why people accept unpaid work which even in sites such as the esteemed organization from which the sample is drawn is tough to get. The reason for this competition for economically risky positions is largely related to the fact that event productions permit the honing of skills which are of great value not only in the cinema field, but also in the broader arts, including arts management.

The festival offers opportunities for qualifications which have a direct relationship with the film festival as market participant. It thereby produces value

as an organization for the goods as well as the labor markets of the cinema field, while also being involved in the reproduction of precarious labor conditions the consequences of which for workers are not yet fully known. These conditions are both embellished and effectively masked by the imagery of event work as a 'fun experience'. While this and Loist's study of two German festivals are the first systematic analyses of these problems, field evidence from other interview sites suggest that the findings may be largely representative. There are very few film festivals that fully pay their workers, advocating experience as the reward. Overall, managers were both giving reasons for unpaid work as well as expressing the wish to be able to pay more or, in some cases, even all workers.

Regarding the science on multiple jobholding and risk-spreading investigations, the study reveals challenges for methodological approaches. Reckwitz's creativity dispositif theory (2017b) has argued that the artistic field shifts to the centre of society, and empirical studies overall provide evidence by showing shifts in associated labor-market patterns. More specifically, 'moonlighting' as classic artist strategy transgresses into the wider world of creative occupations but not without switching its temporality, including now the abundance of 'sunlighting'. These findings provide support for the claims by the creativity dispositif theory that creative aestheticization is a force that can flatten the boundaries of social entities. Seasonal labor of the kind that materializes in festival arts-nonprofit jobs also raises other research questions for future investigation. To give an example, labor sociologists have been trying to understand accrual of value in times of 'activation policies' (e.g., Greer, 2016; Jessop, 1999), which demand flexible behavior from job-seekers who no longer are allowed to wait for jobs suiting the 'full-employment contract' of past periods. A highly relevant question for social and labor policy is whether there are bad signals from failing to get permanent contracts right away or permanently intermittent work.

The study of event-production work opens up a host of questions. There is extraordinary readiness to participate in seasonal and low-prestige work in workplaces demanding high-commitment, a commitment which does not exhaust itself in a supposedly charitable appeal of the work. Furthermore, it is useful to understand more about the sort of devices which help to qualify this kind of work on the side of potential future employers. By the form giving shape to the work (festival volunteer, seasonal paid staff), the value communicated to the environment may be as undervalued as the festival's contribution of intermediation in the cinema field.

There also is a dilemma with temporary jobs as general labor market phenomenon, which Michael Gebel (2010) examined for Germany and the UK

(1991–2007). He shows that temporary labor contracts have a disproportionate impact on the labor-market entrants. Both countries have significantly high temporary-job shares in the overall labor market, somewhat higher for Germany. Among other findings, Gebel notes that the observed temporary-jobs decline is partly due to re-entry into education (which may also be the reason why temporary jobs are taken up in the first place). In Germany there is a higher wage penalty and more temporary jobholding thereafter; in the UK, the consequences are 'more of the same', namely unemployment and more training. Both countries' analysis reveals loss in welfare, high initial wage loss, and temporary work cycles. Extrapolating from that, the potentially ambiguous role of the arts-nonprofit organization in the spreading of risk to the engaged volunteer and lowly paid charismatic worker must be taken up in further research.

Finally, waged and unpaid labor provide significant labor inputs for cultural-economic policy goals, market organization and nonprofit missions in the cinema field. As work roles and structures strongly resemble the project formats of the industry, film festivals are highly attractive as 'stepping stone' for people seeing paid creative work because 'translatability' is high. Given the overt character of an organization that structures subjectivities into labor inputs and outputs quite openly, the question emerges as to why the compensation remains low or suppressed even in organizations that are highly reputed in the festival and industrial worlds. The popular theory, of course, is that they are arts nonprofits, with people volunteering for civic reasons, or festivals would not exist if asked to pay for labor inputs. With a look at the weak 'protest culture' in organizations such as festivals, one may also suggest that there is room for analyzing the collective action problems arising in festivals. Other factors come into play, including two institutional pillars in support of such work and labor patterns. These are higher education and the modern law, which are subject of Chapter 9.

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CHAPTER 9

Institutional Supports for Festival Volunteering

Festival work is an experience provided by experience-makers, framed by informal practical learning and ideas about gaining social capital. It is, however, also facilitated by institutions such as formal education and modern law. As this chapter hopes to demonstrate, their interrelations at the intersection with labor markets and work organizations contribute to the spread of nonprofit labor. I narrow my exploratory discussion to specific changes to higher education as well as employment and nonprofit law and the way they channel and regulate the value of volunteering. Higher-education institutions practically do so by re-organizing students' curricula to the extent that volunteering in nonprofit organizations and internships in both business and nonprofit organizations emerge as regular elements in educational and occupational trajectories. I also address the law, which has been pointed out as a neglected in Reckwitz's work, including not only law but more broadly, administration, state, and bureaucracy (Berthold Vogel in Soziopolis, 2017–2018).

My empirical analysis is limited to the scrutiny of English and German law to show how the boundary between a volunteer and a wage worker is drawn by legal-rational means.[1] Remuneration is regulated by the law in various ways, as this chapter will demonstrate. An important tool is the 'volunteer agreement', which underlines commitment where a 'contract' cannot be offered. The literature on nonprofit organizations typically tackles the non-distribution rule for nonprofit organizations (the barring from profiteering) and the associational character when it comes to law. I continue focusing on the commitment-compensation nexus, exploring rewards and limits to exchange and gift-economic forms.[2] I begin with the legal institutional environment, continue with policy-making on unpaid labor, and discuss higher education practices that shape the experience value of unpaid labor for future labor-market entrants. The last section of this chapter revisits the subjective meanings of volunteering in festival workforce (Chapter 8), exploring the correspondence

1 The English legal provisions discussed in the following also apply to the devolved countries of the United Kingdom at the time of writing. I thus draw on English and German law for British and German 'socio-legal realities'. The chapter presents the situation of German law before the country approved Minimum Wage in July 2014.

2 In Part 3, 'compensation' always means financial rewards for labor (mainly wages and salaries, but also bonuses, social security contributions).

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of such individually held meanings with the ideas and organizational logics enshrined in legal rules and communicated in policy maker strategies.

1 Legal Boundary-Making of the Volunteer and the Question of Compensation

At time of data collection for this chapter (2006–2008), Britain and Germany seemed particularly promising bases for the study of nonprofit law and remuneration because in both, public controversies on internships (in political bureaus and media-industry jobs in Britain, and more broadly across German industries) were held. The following discussion aims to show how a volunteer can work and thus become labor, without being recognized as an employee who by definition must receive compensation. This situation refers to formal volunteering and concerns a more general problem of nonprofit organizations that have been providing services in what is now commonly recognized as 'mixed economies' (Mitchell, 2006). Work legislation is, of course, much broader and more complex than compensation, including legal provision on things such as health insurance, old-age security, and anti-discrimination regulation. Regulation of remuneration is the most crucial question of labor in capitalism and the most basic form of tangible support which artists, creatives, and cultural workers pursue in economic life.

1.1 *The Intern and the Volunteer in English and German Law*

In Britain, a single piece of legislation, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (hereafter: NMWA), provides the legal frame by which interns and volunteers are approached as labor inputs for organizations (GOV.UK, 2022). Section 1 of the NMWA states that an individual who is a 'worker' must be remunerated for her work at a rate equal or above the national minimum wage (hereafter: NMW). Therefore, legally speaking, unpaid working individuals in formal organizations such as film festivals are not regarded as workers. The NMWA exempts 'voluntary work' in specifically listed charitable organizations from this rule. It also exempts interns who work to obtain work experience, as long as this activity is required as component of a higher-education degree course.

The German law provides legally for two social forms equivalent to this particular intern regulation— '*das Praktikum*' und '*das Voluntariat*'. A third form is '*das Ehrenamt*', which during the last years of the Merkel Government has made a renaissance appearance in the management of refugee immigration. In German law, the two first forms, are legally provided for. The *Praktikum* is a special case of the *Volontariat*. The *Volontariat*'s development in the law, its

alignment with the *Praktikum*, which proved to become the dominant form equating the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American notion of the volunteer, is an interesting case in its own right, as it was the social-capital resource of the upper middle classes but appears to have lost its elitist veneer with the hegemonialization of the creativity dispositif. In the course of the making of a 'global civil society', the English terms of volunteering and internship have been normalized to refer to unpaid forms of an experience that can be obtained by organizational participation where socially necessary work can be accomplished.

With respect to German law, voluntary aid or civic engagement (*Freiwillige*) is not a legal term, but commonly means the same as the *Ehrenamt* in terms of the practice (Eller, 2013). The legal profession's commentary has little concern for these social forms (Sullivan, 2000). The increasing role of education as supplementary and as complementary, as sometimes argued, in those social forms has not only supported the capacity of nonprofits to become powerful actors in organizational fields. It also has proven as a game changer for educational institutions, which could redefine their relationships with economic sectors and firms—an important condition for the entry of festivals into intermediation positions. To make the legal complexity more accessible, I discuss the English followed by the German legal setting, and I start with volunteering followed by internship in both sections.

1.2 *Volunteering and the English Law*

The NMWA defines the 'voluntary worker' as a special case. Section 54 (3) of the act, where the term 'worker' labels a person who holds an employment contract, the law implies that unpaid work is legal only when there is no contract of employment.[3] This situation enables two different contracts for work in the same organization and in similar (if not identical) work roles. One is the employment contract regulated by national law, the second the 'volunteering agreement', which is a common formalized relationship observed in many film festivals across the world. Remuneration serves as the boundary, which volunteers can quite easily and unknowingly cross, as legal and court-decision discussions on workplace disputes and their respective litigation for English charities have brought to light (European Volunteer Centre, 2005, p. 5). The

3 The legal term 'employment contract' is standardized neither within nor across the European Union's member-countries as well as in the United States where, as noted by Rubinstein, there is no single national definition of 'employee' (2006, p. 170). In the US, the Fair Labor Standard Act determines when volunteering requires compensation and when volunteers may claim against unfair labor practice in specific circumstances.

more stringent device of the tripartite test of English case law which is a key instrument in such rulings by the courts is of interest because it allows to spell out aspects of festival work as labor.

The tripartite test defines whether a contract which can be considered as legally valid exists, which in the positive case would grant certain rights and duties under the employment provisions. The test includes three conditions necessary and conjointly sufficient to declare such a contract to exist: firstly, an 'offer and acceptance' leading to an agreement; secondly, the 'contractual intention'; thirdly, the requirement of a 'consideration'. The consideration is the reason of a contractual relationship to exist, constituting quid pro quo; but even mutual promises by the involved parties lead to the assumption of a contractual relationship. If all three conditions are found to be present, compensation must occur. This underlines that a volunteer agreement is a non-contractual proposition which cannot be enforced legally.

At time of writing, British film festivals were not required to hold a written record of the relationship. Still, the relationship must be 'agreed' on to come into existence, which requires the avoidance of contractual language in the volunteer agreement. The first and the second condition of the tripartite test lend themselves to the perspective that festival managers must be extremely careful with their language of engagement to not incur legal disputation brought on by the worker. Managers may offer agreements to set out rules and policies as well as the specific tasks within the organization and the duration of engagement (as well as ask new hires to sign). Such agreements can be legally interpreted as a completed agreement (European Volunteer Centre, 2005, p. 6). To avoid mistakes, vague language, and the substitution of strong words like 'obligation' and 'commitment' with weaker expressions such as 'expectation' and 'hope' have been suggested by nonprofit consultants (European Volunteer Centre, 2005, p. 6; Moss, 2004, p. 242). When all the conditions are co-jointly present, English law dictates that there is a contract between the organization and the volunteer, and that the volunteer is a worker who must be paid at least minimum wage.[4] Outside of contract-based relations, 'sacking the volunteer' is legally impossible, but employment law ('hire and fire' rules) have diffused into the nonprofit world, as the following quotation illustrates:

> I've sacked about one person a year and I've only ever sacked them in the Audience Awards or Audience Reports [work—A.V.] areas because

4 In the cultural industries, initiatives instead of regulations such as the guidelines on British TV industry pay, aim to "help […] distinguish between workers and volunteers" (Government News Network, 2007).

> I can afford to lose them there and it would be, for example, someone who never came to either of the two training's […] and then turned up for the next meeting which included a film and a bit of a social and when we said to him 'You didn't come for the trainings, I'm sorry, you know, you're sacked'. He was really upset because he had never understood the, just […] coming to the trainings, and, that spoke volumes as well. But I mean also, perhaps I hadn't communicated it seriously enough, but, and he was, he was pleading with us that he would do everything right after that, and I said 'It's only eleven days and we can't …, the only evidence I have to go on is this' and he was really, he couldn't believe it, he couldn't believe you could sack a volunteer!
>
> British festival personnel manager

The tension around work rules shows that festivals and other resource-poor nonprofits are in a dilemma when it comes to keeping high both quality of event and commitment to event production. In Chapter 7, I introduced Biggart's notion of 'personalistic controls' which are evident in film festivals. On the legal side, however, nonprofits remain exposed to potential fraud or mistreatment of materials or clients caused by volunteers. The tendency in such an organization will therefore be to rationalize the work toward business-like forms (Maier et al., 2016). At the same time, mimetic behavior toward ideological and practical components of creativity and charity will remain important for commitment by workforce and for legitimacy at the field level. This situation fosters reciprocal relationships which festival workers easily acknowledge. The following quote puts it plain:

> I think we are a means to an end and they're gaining from us someone to work for free and we're gaining from them, what one has to do, if there's no real training from it.
>
> British festival intern

Reciprocity, as Kenneth Boulding writes, "tend[s] to slip over into exchange and very frequently is formalized as exchange, in which case it often loses its integrative aspect" (1972). This boundary between a labor-market exchange and a 'gift economy' must be maintained, and in the UK's nonprofit law, the 'consideration' as third condition of the tripartite test in English contract law responds to this problem as it concerns "any benefit received on one side or any cost suffered by the other side of a relationship" (European Volunteer Centre, 2005, p. 7). This element of the test covers more than pecuniary value and includes items which, by observation, many film festivals provide routinely for

volunteers such as free or discounted entry to events, retail discounts, and even training that is not strictly necessary for the volunteer to carry out the assigned tasks.[5]

Furthermore, in English law, there is also a 'voluntary worker' which as an exempted case comes under a separate section of the NMWA, i.e., Section 44. The first condition is that the individual must be employed by a charity, a voluntary organization, an associated fund-raising body, or a statutory body which is listed by the law-maker. Once again, we find a regulatory feature that prevents reciprocity to slip into exchange. This second condition refers to the voluntary worker having a highly restricted range of expense reimbursements, in-kind benefits and /or subsistence payments (NMWA, pp. sec. 44 (41–43)). With this exemption, the English law defines a hybrid subject, someone who is employed in a charity, compensated but not waged, and presumably charitably motivated or exposed to such values as part of organizational membership.

1.3 *Volunteering and the German Law*

About ten years ago the volunteer was not a legal phenomenon, which is peculiar in the context of Germany's lively associational tradition. According to this legal situation, as long as the parties in a volunteering relationship act without a contractual intention (or an exchange intention), the relationship is licit—yet, falling outside regulation. Should dispute between a charity and a volunteer arise, German legal experts can potentially draw on three specific situations that the national law considers, leading to potential arguments. The first is 'doing someone a favor' (*Gefälligkeitsverhältnis*); the second is that German law equates 'contractual intention' (one of the conditions of the English law's test) with the existence of a legally binding contract. And, also contrasting with English law, the German law does not see the 'consideration' a prerequisite for a contract. However, 'consideration' does influence the interpretation of the type of contract.

German law provides for contracts as single-sided obligations or incomplete reciprocal contracts (Palandt et al., 2006). An example of such a contract is the mandate, or '*Auftrag*', in which one party of the contract authorizes and obliges the other party to execute a task on its behalf (Beuthin, 2000). The mandate is the legal foundation of the *Ehrenamt*, literally an 'honorary office'. Like the typical altruistic volunteer, the authorized party of the mandate does not receive remuneration for time and effort spent. German Civil Code,

5 Where duties necessitate expenses in a technical sense, the law exempts them from being a 'consideration'.

specifically BGB §§ 662 and 666, provides that a legal obligation exists for the mandated person, including a duty to perform the assigned tasks carefully and in a fully accountable manner to the authorizing party (including duty to report) (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2022b, 2022c).

Like in English law, the German Civil Code, specifically § 611 Sec. 1, regards the employment contract as an exchange contract, with the contractual party obliging herself to remunerate in exchange for the services of the contractual party (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2022a). Like English law, German law does not consider the reimbursement of exact expenses as a 'remuneration' (see Eller, 2013, p. 896). In Germany remuneration also extends to any payment. Thus, volunteer rewards as a common practice in festivals is legally problematic in both countries. Minimum wage was introduced in Germany only in 2014. Prior to that, there was no similar entitlement for the German volunteer even where a contract of employment existed—which, however, was pointless as there was no general floor to remuneration in the German system. The judiciary merely takes corrective action in exceptional cases of wage agreements considered as unethical by the plaintiff, such as in cases when a wage offer appears to be extremely low when compared to the wage level that typically is an outcome of tariff negotiation.

This leaves those in unpaid charitable work with the positive formulation of a volunteer as altruist in Germany's legal code. German law has a more flexible contract law which provides indirectly for the social form to prosper, but it can be speculated that the absence of a clearly regulated volunteer work form may be a source of undervaluation of the volunteer in Germany. A British nonprofit organization that engages volunteers is restricted by a set of vague and complex rules when drafting an agreement, whereas a German organization is left with far more room to find appropriate case-by-case solutions to engage volunteers and stay within the law. In the British case, regulation of volunteering has increased, possibly in form of re-regulation to address complaints. But the effort to rule out that (regulated) charities bypass the Section 44 of the NMWA also narrows the opportunities for charities to reward their volunteers. This discussion underlines that the German volunteer as legal form is not in the scope of employment legislation. What is interesting about this situation is the immense spread of volunteered work in countries with starkly different institutional settings (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001).

1.4 *Internship in English and German Law*

Internships are common across public, nonprofit, and private business contexts. Compensation matters for interns are straightforward in the English law. According to the NMWA, regulation 12 (8), (National Minimum Wage

Regulations 1999), an intern need not be paid if the activity provides work experience in pursuit of an academic degree. To suppress compensation in all other cases (e.g., internships by postgraduates before entering the labor market) is justifiable only when the intern can be classed as a volunteer (thereby following the law as discussed above). Here the English and the German law differ remarkably. Skilling or training regulation goes back to 1915, when commercial law ('*Handelsgesetzbuch*') articulated internship in an attempt to regulate aspects of mercantile business (§ 82 a HGB).

The classical case is a business owner's son being sent to a friend's company to gain knowledge before entering the family business. This provision defines the '*Volontär*', who engages in voluntary activities in order to gain experience, which was not considered as requiring remuneration. In 1969, a federal-level vocational training law, the '*Berufsbildungsgesetz*' ('*BBiG*'), came into being normalizing the '*Volontariat*' as a matter of trade skilling into a few sectors, including some of the early cultural-creative industries like publishing and the media. This law, supporting the cultural elites in creating access to desirable work positions, is also the legal font of Germany's unique dual vocational training system. The current flurry of volunteering needs to be reconstructed from this legal source to provide a foundation for the discussion of creativity ideology, educational facilitation of practical experience, and the legal framework for the expansion of arts/cultural nonprofit work worlds.

In Germany, the aforementioned *BBiG* regulates the trainee ('*die Auszubildende*') and overwhelmingly industry-specific craft skills for legally recognized trade occupations ('*Fachausbildung*') which require a final exam. Unlike the *Voluntär,* the trainee acquires formal occupational education. German internships take the form of either *Voluntariat* or *Praktikum*. Because the *Voluntariat* is legally speaking not an employment relationship, the convention in legal practice is to apply the *BBiG* to the internship definition. In this sense, *BBiG* applies broadly to someone working to acquire occupational knowledge without undertaking formal education and without the agreement of an employment relationship (Section 26 BBG; Schaub et al., 2004, p. 126; Schmidt, 1971, p. 622). Stressing the educational aspect in the *Volontär*, who seeks for herself practical experience, the *BBiG* requires her to be reasonably compensated for her time contributed in form of an allowance. The *Praktikant* is a different case, as she is required to complete practical training as part of her occupational or academic degree qualification (Rischar, 2004, p. 281 and 288; Schmidt, 1971, p. 622). The *BBiG* applies generally to the *Praktikant* and the *Praktikum* (Section 26 BBG), but because the actvity is considered formal training, additional laws come into play. Because education is regulated at the state level in Germany, state law takes priority over federal-level vocational training

law (*BBiG*). This switch transforms a trainee entitled to an allowance at the federal level into a *Praktikant*, who is not entitled to reasonable remuneration (Bundesarbeitsgericht, 1981).

The unpaid *Praktikum* reflects broader societal changes to employment patterns and work organizations, and a broad uptake in such work roles in many industries. This situation has caused much public anger in the context of tight labor markets and the substitute of permanent jobs with such intermittent work-experience opportunities, especially penalizing fresh university graduates with fresh academic knowledge by not remunerating them, making them experience serial internships, as the critics of '*Generation Praktikum*' have claimed (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007; Stolz, 2005). Research on precarious career trajectories of university graduates has shown similar patterns for Britain, the US, Australia, and Japan (Gebel, 2010; Vallas, 2015).

2 Volunteering as Policy Instrument and the Higher-Education Interest

Economic recessions have encouraged internships and volunteering practices particularly for new labor-market entrants in many countries around the world. As a New York film school professor with a long-term relationship with diverse festivals, including jury duty, put it in her interview with me, 'It is as hard to get an internship as it is to get jobs'. Yet, another social force has to be examined to elucidate the growth in volunteered work. Across the world, higher-education institutions (and increasingly schools in secondary education) emphasize the practical experience—to the extent that this experience has become mandatory in many curricula. This situation can be observed as to a systematic cooperation between film festivals and film schools, as the following quote reveals:

> Oh yeah, absolutely, I also post [the vacancies—A.V.] at some schools, the [public relations] School actually does posting for us, and then we ask for a resume or a statement of interest with relevant experience and then we actually interview people for these positions which, when I moved here, I was blown away by that, I was like, you interview for non-paying positions? But the festival has grown and has earned such a reputation that sometimes for certain positions there's like five people that are interested, and what do you do, you've gotta meet them if their resume looks good, then a lot of them stay on, you know, year after year. Some of them don't, we always contact them first to see if they're interested, the ones

> that stay on the most are house managers, that's a short time span. You know they work a lot during the festival, a couple of weeks before, they do trainings and stuff.
>
> American festival director

In an interview, a film school professor in Australia revealed about an agreement between his film school and the major festival in the same city that it was his dean's wish to create more credit points in cinema subjects, which was implemented as a course called 'industry practice'. For this, the film festival agreed to provide a fixed number of slots for student working hours in the production of the festival event. As he says:

> My line was always, if they need labor, talk to me and I will find students to do whatever they want, an excellent opportunity for students to get some experience in arts administration, but also simply to get themselves known around town and [finding out] how … culture works at the institutional level.
>
> Australian film school professor

Such a deal would involve university-side provision of insurance for the students but also the year-round production of a festival newsletter by the students to garner the attention of industry, government, and the public. My observations in a prestigious Chinese film festival revealed hundreds of students from English-language departments being deployed for subtitle production regarding films screened during the event, which is run annually with nearly one-thousand volunteers and just over twenty staff on annual contracts. The festival hires routinely entire student cohorts and has done so for well over fifteen years. The festival subsidizes these students' transportation and meals via basic allowances and gets them as rewards T-shirts and a certificate recognizing their 'hard work', as the manager conveyed. She also told me that 'we acknowledge them in a volunteer list published in the newspapers thanking for their help at the film festival' (interview transcript).

A European policy-research report emphasizes the labor-market and educational functions of film festivals which "visibly play a major role as employer and especially as educational and training centers" (Krainhöfer, 2019, p. 17). The author suggests that only few cultural organizations can offer the breadth of activity available in film festivals, including the transmission of specialist knowledge. This picture is borne out by my interviews. Asked about new British government initiatives, a festival manager responds by acknowledging a formal proposal by the government agency:

> Well, as with all government agencies, it takes some time to understand what they are on with their initiatives. It took me ages to understand. I think what we would like to be is an official training entity and these are the areas that we said we can do. [...] I was just trying to save money because they would pay people to work here. Probably only three or four people. But I also feel very strongly that we are an absolutely strong resource to the industry in terms of training.

And she continues by highlighting the value created for the film industry:

> Yes, no, what I mean is that being here is an enormous training process. People learn about the film industry, not just about seeing a movie, and saying I want to be a producer, a director, want to be a writer. The traditional wannabees. And they come, if they get a job, they learn about that other things exist. They learn about the relationship between these things, they learn about all the imperatives about the industry, it makes people freak out, they learn about what's very important, and that helps them learn about the business of film.
>
> British festival manager

The inspection of volunteering as a confluence of interests broadly defined by industry, employment, education, and the law demonstrates that practical work experience has left the semantic realm of traditional craft and trade skilling which would lead to firm membership in a group that is identifiable by its occupational trajectory and mechanisms of self-representation and social closure. Volunteering and internships have evolved as an experience format, which is normalized in the intertwined discourses of global civil society, active citizenship and a new labor market-oriented agenda of higher-education management that aggressively touts the notion that academic training is incomplete unless complemented by practical work experience. In the cinema field, the outcome of such confluences show in the evident structural links between for-profit and non-profit enterprises.

Furthermore, the role of government must be elucidated, as the nonprofit subsidization of for-profit organizations is part of a discursive structure which interlinks civil society politics with employment politics. To provide just a few pointers, under the UN's Global Compact (United Nations General Assembly, 2001) and—as far as Europe is concerned—under regional policy strategy volunteering has been encouraged. In Europe, volunteering has been recognized as remedy to youth unemployment and regarding academic unemployment, for slowing down the excess supply to creative labor markets. A European

Commission's paper gives all the ingredients found in film festival workforce as instantaneous and future creative workforce:

> Volunteers can accumulate important experience and knowledge which is in demand in the labor market and build up a network of contacts … volunteers can also acquire key competences and knowledge in areas like publicity, communications, self-expression, social skills, management and vocational training. They have the opportunity to try out various social roles, to learn to make the right decisions, to solve problems, to assimilate a work culture and to demonstrate their sense of justice and leadership qualities. Voluntary activity can form an important part of a person's CV and career. Voluntary activities are thus an important instrument of non-formal and informal learning that complement formal learning, education and training. They may also enhance employability, particularly of young people.
>
> European Commission, 2006, p. 11

'Experiential education' has speedily become a curriculum component across the global higher-education sector (Leonard et al., 2016; Mayer & Solga, 2008). In the UK, the coalition government of 2010–2015 created volunteering opportunities when promoting the 'Big Society' agenda in the wake of the privatization of public services (Dean, 2016). These policy goals have been met with criticism. British protest, for example, focused on internship conditions in the UK Parliament as well as in the media industries (Blair et al., 2003; Blair & Rainnie, 2000; Dex et al., 2000). Similarly, the 'intern economy' of the 'glamour industries of media and politics' in the US (Frank, 2003; Frederick, 2003) was revealed.

It was the legal literature on uncompensated student workers, however, which shed light on a dimension additional to 'mission creep' in higher education. As David Yamada discusses with available US figures from the 1980s, college-graduates' internship numbers jumped from 1 in 36 to 1 in 3 (2002, p. 217). The 'intern economy' was fueled by the steep rise in tuition and subsequent loan debt which resulted in demand for internships with low pay offered. This causal chain is also prominent for at least the United Kingdom. In Germany, where tuition does not exist, higher-education institutions have emulated the model of the intern economy in another way, as they have substantially replaced workforce with student workers who staff many important technical units of the universities (as do citizens who, similar to museum volunteers, help keep research libraries open on the weekends). While these initiatives can be read as laudable policies to foster the active citizen and

life-long learning, educational credentialing of the intern experience appears to relinquish the opportunity to demand proper compensation and perhaps to pressure labor markets in hardly discernible ways. If an internship is part of a degree, then it may not be paid at all. Only research taking national legal specificities into account can contribute to the socioeconomic impact of the expansion of volunteering as practical and civic experience.

More generally, however, there has been evidence from several countries that pay attention to the spreading of social inequalities in the wake of such fundamental structural interlinkages between labor markets, nonprofit organizations, and educational institutions and what can be broadly considered 'the democratization' of the volunteer experience. The latter is not a mean feat by elites in light of the historical alignment of charitable work with care work and can be interpreted within Reckwitz's theory as partial incorporation of charitable forms into the creativity dispositif as well as participation in the production of singularities. This 'alliance', which provides only for positive connotations of the work experience, masks what some have detected as matters of unequal access to opportunities and unequal socialization into a philanthropic habitus (Dean, 2016; Freeman, 1997; Johnson & Mortimer, 2011, p. 1243), revealing that the volunteer ethos is more likely fostered by parents with middle-class background, compared to lower-class parents. In a study of environmental nonprofit work, Pauline Leonard and co-authors (2016) observe that in times of lesser labor market opportunities nonprofit organizations disproportionally invite more elite students to the jobs and 'show off' with their volunteer intake to the funders of the organization.

Clare Holdsworth and Jocey Quinn (2010)'s study of English student community engagement provides the valuable insight into the close link between social policy, specifically the shift of welfare provision away from the state to non-statutory agencies and individuals, nonprofits and higher-education institutions in communal and regional development. They observe that it squeezes out political activism, because students emulate a language that deemphasizes social conflict and inequality. This type of service learning is prevalent in the entire UK, Australia, the United States, Kenya, South Africa and many other countries. Holdsworth and Quinn point out that students replace what could be communal jobs and jobs for those who live in the area, that higher-education institutions make service-learning mandatory in curricula and therefore challenge the notion of volunteered contributions as well as argue that this cause-related volunteering also has the potential to normalize young people to social inequalities. The fact that a national framework for youth action and engagement (2010, pp. 113–114) provides for incorporation of this kind of work and the work form into economic regeneration projects

underlines the level of agreement between public authorities and private entities.

3 The Experience Value of Unpaid Festival Work

The information presented in the following pages was collected in European and Australian film festivals, probing into the utility of the festival from the workers' perspective in the institutional contexts inspected above. Using the responses to an open-ended question about the benefit of the experience 'in the long run' and a question specific to the perceived relationship between the engagement and future gainful employment, the responses can be seen to fall into three dominant patterns of perceived value: networking, skills, and arts and pleasure. What could not be partitioned out fully in this exercise is the understanding of the art experience as a craft versus a public experience (owing to my failure of clarification during interview). Therefore, the analysis cannot separate arts from pleasure, or 'serious art' interest from art for leisure consumption. The data in the following table are summarized by using the 'career directness' measure introduced in Chapter 8.

The table output shows that across this sample work experience is perceived as powerful means for future use of skills and social capital. From a manager's point of view, this 'formula' is clear:

> [Q: Do you think that volunteering will help them get a better job in the paid-work world?] They do. Especially with art jobs, they get connections, they meet people, and they know people. Which is very important, because it's, uh, the structure of the art jobs is not like other jobs, were you have advertisements in newspapers, they are looking for someone. Many, many of the jobs are just connections.
>
> German festival manager

But the data also speak to the association people make with fun and leisure. Once again, it is striking how little reference is being made to meanings like charity, giving, and citizenship. Certainly, this could be due to the work context and the directing of the question toward future outcomes rather than past motives to join, but even the questionnaire's section on volunteering motives could not produce much elaboration on meanings of charity and civil work (people mainly reflect on their family tradition to give, or other biographical details). If the motives for doing nonprofit work would have been strong, they

TABLE 18 Australian and European festival workers' understandings of benefits derived from volunteering, n = 69 (author's research)

	Networking for job opportunities	Work experience and portfolio addition	Arts, pleasure, and social relations	Row totals
By age group:				
19–24	2	13	11	26
25–34	6	10	14	30
35 and older	2	3	8	13
Column totals	10	26	33	69
By career directedness:				
Film/arts careerist	5	13	9	27
Experimenter	2	10	9	21
Non-arts careerist	3		5	8
Drifter		3	10	13
Column totals	10	26	33	69

presumably would have been prioritized in these answers. This was not the case. Instead, workers focus on the assets. Interns, usually in the young-age bands, especially emphasize the causal chain, as shown in the two following passages:

> [Q: Do you think that volunteering will help you get a better job in the paid-work world?] On top of that, you don't get anywhere without experience and if you can't get a job due to lack of experience, how can you get experience if you don't volunteer. —Intern in a British festival
>
> Uh, I think it'll help me get, get me in my first job, and then, once I've got that, it'll be the jobs that I've had, but I think that definitely, well, fingers crossed anyway, for getting my first job it'll be good that I've had this experience.
>
> Intern in a British festival

A typical answer for the third category in the table is the 'love of film' and the social atmosphere of the art space, as illustrated by the two following quotes:

> [Q: Why do you think that this time spent volunteering at the Film Festival will help you in the long run?]
> I just love films and I love the fact that I'm able to actually, you know, that social connection, meeting with people, the fact that there is a variety of films of different countries and I like the sense of togetherness here, when people from different walks of life [come together] and share the same interests. For me, that's just great. —Australian festival volunteer
> Well, you see some famous faces and stuff… I don't know. I've really enjoyed it.
> British festival volunteer

It should be pointed out here that in the larger data set, Scandinavians are overall more hesitant to see the connection between volunteering as work experience and labor markets, because they do not see it as core element of their own culture:

> [Q: Do you think that volunteering will help you get a better job in the paid-work world?] I do, yes. I think in the US it definitely affects more, I'd say, like people respect volunteer jobs more. I think that's something that I've noticed that if you have … As I was saying I think a volunteer job in your resume weighs more in the US than here. [Q: Is that just Finland do you think, or Europe?] I have no idea. I've haven't worked anywhere else [in Europe] or I don't know the culture, but here I'd say it's more, well somehow, it's not regarded as important, but I do put my volunteer jobs in my resume as well, it kind of gives a sense of my orientation in a way, what I'm interested in. But it says more about my orientation than the fact that I'm a volunteering person or a person who likes to do volunteer work.
> Finnish volunteer

Finally, while charity is in the background, there is something like an undercurrent of 'moral socialization' provided through the work experience. In fact, festival work emerges as a trial of work ethic from interviews when asking about the prospect of a better job in the paid-work world:

> It shows it's something you really want to do if you're willing to.
> Intern in a British festival

The link between character formation, sacrifice, and labor is made in the following quote:

> [Q: … How do you think this will help you in the long run? Just because people keep asking you?] I mean, I think they keep asking, just to get to know, what kind of personality, what kind of person you are. What have you got inside—apart from all your studies, because you might have ten PhDs, or something, but you'd still be a bad person. So, I think it's more than that, to dig inside you, and get to know your character. I mean volunteer, that's the fashion … but I mean, if you say, I've been volunteering for this and this and that, it shows your character, what you are willing to sacrifice, to help. Or what you are willing to do in order to make people happy. You never, you don't get your pay, because some people, they are just like the donkey, following the carrot: if I get paid, I do it, otherwise, I won't. All right, that's fine, that's fair enough, but some people are no, I just want things happening.
>
> US American-British volunteer in a British festival

Apart from unpaid work experience as site of character formation there is also the notion of investment:

> Because it's an investment in myself. The stuff they're letting me do is more than I would be getting for a paid job […] And I didn't know, before I started, that that's what it would be, but it's better to be working somewhere you want to work, even if it's for free, than working somewhere you don't want to work, or moving kind of backwards.
>
> British festival intern

Finally, some experienced workers say how the festival experience gave them a grounding in industry work and public arts-administrative work, which has been contributed partly by an immersive environment mimetic to the typical work setting in creative/cultural industries while still apparently unique to the event production and associated work culture:

> [Q: Do you think that volunteering will help you get a better job in the paid-work world?] Well, my volunteer experience gave me access to offices, and computers, and phone systems, and equipment, and work structures, and situations … it's just nothing was … when I wanted to get into it, I felt familiar with it as an environment. It gave me a sense of knowledge and a real understanding of what a creative industry meant, what kinds of people actually get paid to make things in the arts happen, and what they were expected to do, and whether or not that's what I wanted to do.
>
> Formerly volunteering British festival staff

And:

> [Q: What would you recommend to somebody who wanted to get into arts administration, would you recommend they volunteer at the Film Festival, or not?] Yeah. I'd probably, yes I would because that's as fast-paced as you're probably gonna make it, as you're gonna get it, really, I think. I mean that's with no, not much sort of background experience really on that, but I think, yeah, it's, you get to meet people as well, which is another good thing, especially in the job that I did, that was another reason why I quite liked the job that I did, [as information coordinator across offices].
>
> Formerly volunteering British festival staff

Festival work comes with clearly structured subjective meanings for festival volunteers and interns, especially resonating with those who have been successful after their experience or who have not yet been disappointed. There is a general avowal of non-bureaucratic, non-formal work (as far as so perceived), which is providing trials to test oneself nonetheless. As one would expect from the discussion of national differences in legal contexts of volunteering, variation in evaluation of the promise of the experience for labor market success is discernible. But at the same time, the primary data and the literature on volunteering and internship show that both are global phenomena which do not need much local translation.

4 Conclusion

Policies on civil society, higher education, labor markets as well as employment and charitable law provide an institutional 'web' co-conditioning the expansion of flexible forms pertaining to work activities. At this historical juncture, internship and volunteering are forms circulating as desirable forms of socialization in a wide array of industries associated with both core and periphery of the aesthetic economy. The socio-legal analysis illustrates the adjustment of nonprofit organizational requirements to labor markets, examines the role of policy-making in the creation of volunteer and internship culture, and valuation in economic terms. The chapter contributes insights about the interlinkages between public policy and cultural-economic policy goals, thereby adding to previous research on film festival governance (e.g., Cheung, 2009), albeit from a work-sociological perspective. The chapter contributes tentative findings on the role of law in the creativity dispositif.

Volunteering as means to learn crucial skills not attainable in another way has evolved historically, from merchant business and craft skills to the modern apprenticeship system in the Keynesian Welfare National State. In the Post-Keynesian era, apprenticeships may still exist but this may continue to vary by country (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001, pp. 146–148). Paralleling that, a new model of work experience and worker socialization has been circulating as a post-national model. Volunteering makes work worlds eventive, project-based, and accelerates worker trajectories in ways that are little understood due to missing study focus. The more higher education continues to open up to ever more socioeconomic strata and constituencies, the more competitive and perhaps socially exclusive work forms like the internship as 'the third degree' become (see also Buckingham & Jones, 2001; Leonard et al., 2016). While these work experiences provide important inputs to student and young worker-careers and allow nonprofits to solve a resource problem in a 'creative' way that is legitimate, the consequences for labor, occupations, and professions will perhaps become more obvious in the coming decades as these careers mature over the life course—granted social science research can draw on proper data collection of such intermittent forms of work.

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CHAPTER 10

The Calling of Unpaid Labor

> The hard thing is actually getting people to pay you for your knowledge, because especially if you work in an environment like this in the festival in [Europe, in International film festivals—A.V.], where the festival is paying you to give your knowledge to people for free. Then, when you're outside of the festival, I know there are quite a few people who charge consultancy fees for doing what we do for free within the festival, but once you've developed relationships with filmmakers it's hard to say 'well, I'm on my own time now and I'll work with you to a certain extent but actually if I'm going to do more, you're going to have to pay me'.
>
> British festival staff

•••

> I've never thought about it that way. Ideally there should be enough money to pay everyone that's working with the festival.
>
> Swedish festival volunteer

∵

This last chapter in Part 3 addresses the question of where people 'draw the line' when it comes to working for free in a charismatic organization that aims to survive in organizational environments associated with uncertain future labor-market outcomes, and winner-take-all markets (Frank & Cook, 2010). The previous chapters have demonstrated how risk-spreading is even common at the periphery of sites where core artistic occupations work, how at least some workers have to accept precarious living conditions, and identified the film festival as a type of event-project organizations which offer experiences of value to labor market participation in exchange for volunteered labor. But where do people 'draw the line'? What is acceptable and where and why does disagreement start? Once more the set of European and Australian festival

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workers serves for examination of employment and labor market issues as well as meanings pertaining to work in nonprofit organizations.[1]

The chapter scrutinizes justice concerns regarding cultural work in industrial contexts, examining how social justice can be balanced with the charitable disposition, or 'doing good'. The inquiry into interviewees' responses to questions such as 'why do you want to work despite making no or little money?' and 'what kind of work should be compensated rather than volunteered?' is a matter of symbolic boundary-making (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). This phenomenon lends itself easily to the interpretation of individual responses by convention-sociological approaches, such as 'indignation', 'justification', 'order of worth', and 'critical capacity' of actors the guiding concepts by the sociology of conventions (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005a; Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999). The following qualitative analysis can also be reconnected to Chapter 1's discussion of the artistic and social critiques applied to the written scholarship on film festivals. To provide a strong heuristic, the data will be plotted against the plurality of 'regimes of justifications' (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007, p. 95) offered by convention sociology. Chapter 7 has already introduced the Project Polis as the most recent convention which, according to this perspective, structurally enables actors to grasp (and feel) injustices, formulate justifications, and debate about them. Conventions, orders of worth, or regimes of justification (poleis, as I call them, following a central-language translation) provide more analytic density to the study of the creativity dispositif, which does not specify variance for its empirical representations of creative subjectivity.

The Conventions School (Diaz-Bone, 2011) typically studies justification in action, as in contemporary protest movements. As the questions above provoke statements of justification, this provides a change in tactic which should be within the methodological space of this framework. Citing motivations in response to the question can potentially generate a pattern of boundary-drawing processes, especially between industry and the nonprofit realm which festival organizations connect as art entrepreneurs. Both Reckwitz's creative subject and Boltanski and Chiapello's project worker (see Chapter 7) are natural actors in these spheres. If festivals are boundary brokers, then studying the meanings reproduced in them and resonating with their workers (or not) may produce some insights into the stabilization of the creativity dispositif across these realms. The remainder of this chapter turns to the analysis, introducing

1 Few nonprofit research articles seem to tackle compensation issues (Eller, 2013; Hustinx, 2007; Theuvsen, 2004).

the full set of poleis (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b), discussing data and methodological matter, and presenting the findings.

1 Analytic Tools: Poleis, Critical Capacity, and Grand and Little Persons

Poleis, as presented in the following table, are conventions that help human actors to comprehend situations of uncertainty and provide justifications for their agency (as to past, present, and future). The Inspirational Polis, for example, is a major order of worth in which the typical persona is the artist. Reckwitz (2017b) says that the Inspirational Polis is not sufficient to explain the appeal of creative and cultural work, and that Boltanski and Chiapello fail to address aestheticization.

The framework represents the intellectual efforts of a "complex pragmatist situationalism" in all kinds of 'economics of conventions' (see Diaz-Bone, 2011), allowing Boltanski and Thévenot (2007) to argue that people quite generally possess what they call 'critical capacity' (see also Vaisey, 2008). The mobilization model structuring the polis as discursive bundle that addresses general welfare concerns is constructed with two supporting concepts, the Grand and the Little Person, which can be easily elucidated:

> A state of greatness, a 'great one' being a person who strongly embodies the [polis]'s values, and the state of smallness, defined as lack of greatness' … "The 'great one' in the Civic [Polis] […] is the representative of the group, the one who expresses its collective will. In the Market [Polis] […], the 'great' person is the one who makes a fortune for him or self by offering highly coveted goods in a competitive marketplace, and who knows when to seize the right opportunities. Finally, in the Industrial [Polis] […], greatness is based on efficiency and determines a scale of professional abilities."
>
> BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, 2005b, p. 168

This conception also provides for the interlinkages of poleis in that a person who is theoretically a Grand Person in one order of worth may actually be the Little Person in another one. In modernity (and late-modernity) the orders of worth thus overlap in ways that can be explored with this conventions framework.

To illustrate the above, the Grand Person of the Inspirational Polis eludes 'measure' and is therefore reflected as Little Person in the Industrial Polis,

TABLE 19 The orders of worth (poleis), based on (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b; Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007, p. 95) and (Denis et al., 2007)

Polis	Superior principle	Individual qualities (grandeur)	Important persons	Investments	Tests
Inspirational	Inspiration, originality	Creative, imaginative, passionate, devotion	Creative thinker	Risk	Introspection, solitude
Market	Competition	Defense of self-interest	Buyer, seller	Search for individual opportunities	Concluding a contract or transaction
Industrial	Effectiveness, performance	Dedication to work	Engineer, planner	Investment in progress	Rational tests
House	Tradition, loyalty	Dedicated, wise, benevolent	–	Sense of duty	Family ceremonies
Opinion	Judgement by others	Prestige, public recognition	Celebrities	Pursuit of publicity	Setting up public events
Civic	Collective good	Representative, official	Representative of collective	Renunciation of personal interests, dedication to solidarity	Demonstrations in favor of moral causes

which positively sanctions, indeed deems as highest welfare good, actions producing and representing efficiency and productivity measured on a scale. Another example is the House Polis, where the Grand Person is deemed as trustworthy within a social organization made from personal dependency. But in the reticular world, and in the Project Polis which would be the 'institutionalized' order emanating from it, the person 'striking it rich' in the House Polis would be a Little Person because the worth of the Project Polis is derived from the ability to connect and disconnect. This, however, suggests that loyalty, the highest good of the House, is of low value and potentially damaging to the value a person can accrue according to the logics of the connexionist world where social disengagement opens up new opportunities. As a phenomenon of common welfare, the network opportunist is the opposite of the Project Polis's Grand Person, the networker.

Their critique of capitalism addresses the selfish networker. In a connexionist world, exploitation and exclusion can be observed in the relationship between the networker/network opportunist (both are argued to exist) and what they call 'the double'—the Little Person who carries the signs of immobility as a function of the mobility of the Grand Person (not because of an autonomous choice) (2005b, pp. 355–365). Based on the construction of the poleis framework, we would expect to see references by interviewees to the Inspirational Polis, Industrial Polis, and connexionist world and, with respect to already mentioned perceptions of commodification, also the Market Polis as well as the Civic Polis, on which nonprofit and philanthropic actors draw to legitimize their views and their actions.

2 Data and Methodological Approach

While conventions are the major organizing concepts, the unit of observation is the situation, a shorthand for "complex arrangements or constellations of objects, cognitive formats, problems (coordination to be realized), institutional settings, persons, concepts" (Diaz-Bone, 2011, p. 48). Critical is a situation when a conflict between launched justifications arises. In peaceful societies this will lead to demands for coordination, where possible outcomes of conflict settlement are agreement, unresolved conflict, or compromise. Boltanski and Thévenot understand these agreements as coproduced achievements in the sense of twentieth-century sociology on 'negotiated orders' (Strauss, 1978). In conflicting situations people disagree because they 'for the right reasons have decided for one principle over another' (Jagd, 2007).

The questions utilized in the analysis were put to volunteers, paid staff with volunteering experience, and some of the managers. The information is

exploratory in light of missing representativeness. Given the actual response pattern, we mostly learn about meanings prevalent in the European film festival workforce.

> Why do you want to do this work, especially if you are not making money, or if you are earning very little?
>
> What kind of work, do you think, should be rewarded with money and not expected of someone who is volunteering? What about people with really special skills?

According to the methodology of 'critical capacity' situations invite or require subsequent action. Here, however, I present understandings that are internal or imagined conflict as provoked by the wording of each question which aim to tease out understandings of reward hierarchies. The formulation of 'should not be expected' was consciously chosen to pinpoint the issue, to stimulate arguments regarding the motivations and values in volunteering. All responses were examined for and should be viewed only as to content rather than frequency, although overall relative frequency cannot be disregarded in this first study of this kind. Some workers gave very elaborate answers, while others were either 'to the point' or rather less erudite in making clear the conflict, if noted at all. The unit of analysis is the instance of a justification. The text passages were grouped into categories that correspond with the theoretical framework, and inspected as to the substantive content and logic of the arguments. Responses by the interviewees do not strictly include just justifications; these had to be interpreted from the actual discussions, sometimes drawing on other parts of the interview for each case. The analysis also included a background check on association with national context, the job role and work agreement, the age, the career motive, one own's compensation, the job content, the responsibility held by the interviewee, and how much the utterances were reflecting one's own work role narrowly, or with some distance gained, and across the board of work roles. The responses reveal that some workers have given these questions full thought while the majority appears as trying to make sense in terms of their own roles rather than their larger life plan. As Chapter 9 exposed that the interviewees hardly question what they are doing as 'work' rather than as 'giving time', this chapter will further investigate these findings.

3 'Something Funny Happens When You Get Paid'

The following table summarizes the empirical results and associates them with the order of worth alluded to by the interviewee. The match is based on

the most typical response from the cases that cluster around the justification in question and indicates whether the typical person (included in the first column as a work role) concurs with remuneration for the activity they speak about (Yes/No). The table also states the evaluation, translated into the Grand/Little Person binary discussed further above, and the inferred polis. The most typical response is based on the interpretation of the most strongly expressed value in the responses that could be reasonably collated around the value propositions in each of them. The justifications for and against remuneration are presented by looking first at the rejections of remuneration, followed by the justifications given for remuneration. For response '#8', I included a proposed new order of worth called Green Polis, which will be explained further below.

The extraction of information from 69 festival workers and managers' interviews resulted in 21 *typical* justifications making up discernible clusters of worth. The following auxiliary table presents a better picture of the clustering, showing that the information is leaning toward reasonings associated with the Industrial Polis and the Project Polis more than other poleis.

To start with the gaps, there is no single reference to the Opinion Polis, which is surprising with respect to the festival's relationship to the star/celebrity system and the media more generally (the A—M relationship in Reckwitz's AEMR model). Theoretically speaking, we would expect justifications matching the Opinion Polis because festival work allows people to come in close contact with cultural elites and 'the economy of prestige' (English, 2005). To make sense of this non-occurrence, one could perhaps argue that once the workers are immersed in their daily activities, they may lose sight of the value that appealed to them when they were still applicants or audiences in awe of cinema's glamour and public sides before becoming 'insiders'.

More surprising is the lack of justifications especially by volunteers, whose justifications for 'giving time' should potentially conjure the worth associated with the Civic Polis. Where such allusions take place they are purely value-rational statements, and do not make up more than two responses among all the transcribed interviews. There are no responses suggesting work should be paid to avoid limiting opportunities to those who can afford to work unpaid. Such a justification would resonate with Civic Polis ideas, reflecting perhaps not only inclusivity and social justice motives, but also reasons given in light of the debates on unpaid internships inspected in Chapter 9. While the responses come from a self-selected group of people who can afford to work unpaid (the sample includes risk-spreaders who are cross-subsidizing their volunteer work through their paid work, see Chapter 8), it may well be that they implicitly see this as evidence that the accessibility problem can be overcome, therefore not recognizing at that moment an argument for all to get paid.

TABLE 20 Remuneration-worthy work and poleis according to Australian and European festival workers, n = 69 (author's compilation)

Typical response (by work role)	Response-set	Remuneration yes/no	Status in the polis	Basis for justification
Getting paid would create a hierarchy (volunteer)	1	No	Grand Person	House Polis
Work that is not taxing, having fun, and when spot tasks leave breaks for volunteers to watch movies (volunteer)	2	No	Little Person	Inspirational Polis
If it's just about passing around handouts, like in audience reports (staff)	3	No	Little Person	Industrial Polis
Ushers (volunteer)	4	No	Little Person	Industrial Polis
If the job helps to improve the CV (volunteer)	5	No	Grand Person	Project Polis
It is about the cause (volunteer)	6	No	Grand Person	Civic Polis
People who join for unpaid work (volunteers)	7	No	Grand Person	Civic Polis
Reimbursement for living expenses for everybody (several staff)	8	Yes	Grand Person	Green Polis
The more routine jobs like customer-services desks (volunteer)	9	Yes	Little Person	Industrial Polis
Managers (volunteer)	10	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial Polis
Long hour jobs by the 'people in charge' (volunteer)	11	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial Polis/Market Polis
Supervisors as work organizers (volunteer)	12	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial Polis
Volunteers with big responsibility, working a lot (volunteers, staff)	13	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial Polis
Those who are responsible for the risks, someone 'higher' (volunteer)	14	Yes	Grand Person	Project Polis

TABLE 20 Remuneration-worthy work and poleis (*cont.*)

Typical response (by work role)	Response-set	Remuneration yes/no	Status in the polis	Basis for justification
Dealing with customers (volunteer)	15	Yes	Grand Person	Project Polis
Finances (staff), public safety (staff)	16	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial Polis
People who need to make a living (not students) (staff)	17	Yes	Little Person	Market Polis
Decision-makers and those with client contacts (staff)	18	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial/ Project Polis
Specialist work that must produce professional quality (volunteer)	19	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial Polis
Drivers, technical crew, venue supervisors—technical departments (volunteer)	20	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial Polis
On longer contracts, the administrative departments (volunteer)	21	Yes	Grand Person	Industrial Polis

TABLE 21 Summary of data clusters presented in Table 20

Polis	Typification in Table 20	Typification in Table 20
	No-response	**Yes-response**
Inspirational	#2	
Opinion		
Civic	# 6, 7	
Market		# 11, 17
Industrial	# 3, 4	# 9–13, 16, 18–21
House	#1	
Project	# 5	# 14, 15, 18
Green		# 8

The previous chapters suggest that members of the workforce simply understand themselves within an 'industrial setting' where they produce an important public event—which may explain the lack of justifications. If this finding were borne out by representative samples, then one would have to assume that the festival workplace encourages the suppression of meanings related to charity and volunteering. Somewhat related to that is the single occurrence of a reference to the Inspirational Polis, providing a quintessential justification:

> I don't know something funny happens when you are getting paid; it becomes more about the money and less about the enjoyment of it. If the work is a reward, your focus is on the work, if the money is the reward the focus is on the money. … I do think it's less fun because there is more of someone else's, maybe not, maybe more of someone else's expectation.
>
> Australian volunteer

Furthermore, there are two types of responses each of which justify remuneration based on the Market Polis, citing students who need to make a living while working for the festival and emphasizing that the skilled workforce should be paid. Both allude to the transactional character of the relationship between employer and hired workers:

> I think anyone who makes a decision, like actually makes decision or a deal or a contract or an arrangement with an outside party, should be paid. Because that's a business relationship. And I think anyone who does more supporting, more general just-getting-to-know-the-festival kind of work … It's fine not to pay them, because they're getting paid in experience.
>
> British festival staff

This view appeals to common sense when supported by the performance of the Little Person perspective:

> Work that involves more organizing than just, like work at the information desk or work as a door person, who really doesn't need to know much, just know that you get tickets from people, let them in and that kind of stuff. If someone tells you to do something, you do it, but you don't have to be responsible for anything. As soon as you're responsible for organizing something I think that's worth [pay].
>
> Finnish volunteer

This valuation, quite in the grammar of the Industrial Polis, appears to make sense in terms of additional risks that a supervisory position involves. Furthermore, to not reimburse 'because that would create a hierarchy' is the only reference to worth articulated as the House Polis. Why is this not a reference to the Civic Polis? In Boltanski and Thévenot's work, the order of civic worth is based on French political culture, centering on the acceptance of a higher, general will. The House Polis, however, alludes to asymmetrical relationships built on a generational, and therefore forming a successive, pattern observable in kin lineages. This order of worth seems to not make much sense in a post-traditional festival community where work space is characterized by flattened hierarchies. At the same time, civil society discourse pertaining to a general will does not seem to match the empirical reality of festivals, as shown with Chapters 8 and 9. More support for the identification of the House Polis in the data discussed comes from the following quote which presents advice from a movie business handbook given to filmmakers, especially framing the event as one 'for filmmakers by filmmakers':

> Festivals are a frantic time; workers and guests never get enough sleep and party much too hard. Treat festival staffers and volunteers with the respect they deserve; don't become that arrogant filmmaker bossing around a festival volunteer who is working on an eighteen-hour day.
>
> MONTAL, 2004, p. 328

The quote shows that the hierarchy of artists vs. 'supply artists' (Becker, 1982) is not challenged although there are signs of recognition for what they are doing (see also Honneth, 2018). Finally, these responses identify the possible convention of a Green Polis according to which reimbursement for living expenses regardless of work roles was discussed. The Green Polis resonates with ecological issues pertaining to culture-nature relations in capitalism (Thévenot et al., 2000). I believe that it is appropriate to adopt it here because the Green Polis's grand value is sustainability. This could be expanded to people's ability to make a living and be well while working hard and creating value. The cited justification of paying 'living expenses for all' is not a wage demand, as it tackles basic conditions of 'market participation'. A corresponding quote shows concern for the issue of inclusion and is interesting for the reason that there is an understanding of a 'volunteer organization' preempting action aimed at fair compensation:

> I think everyone should be paid, even if it's a minor, nominal amount of money […] I just think, ten pound, even twenty pound, that will buy them

> a little bit of food, or just a little bit of something, well, because we're all working on one side as well, even though I have a larger responsibility from, say, the assistants, who will be coming in as volunteers, we're still working alongside each other [...], but I just think it's a nominal token, would be good, but again, it's funding, it's a charity, it's, you know, it's a difficult area. But everyone is aware that you are a volunteer, it's not the case that people go, 'Oh, and you're not getting anything?' [...] So, it's, both parties are aware.
>
> British festival staff

The interviews generate fresh insight into how people are able to work for free. Some workers generate income ahead of the festival so they can afford festival work; others (mainly those in their twenties) are supported by their parents and sometimes grandparents or partners. The reported means of support are money, food, traveling, expenses, free rent, social security, unemployment aid, student loans, and the credit card. These forms of credit are commonly used for financing the first movie of budding film artists. In Sweden, I was told that people are hired through brokering by the unemployment office which substitute the income that the employing festival would provide otherwise. I now turn to the two major empirical clusters, which are references to the Project Polis and the Industrial Polis.

Given the workers' great interest in networking (see Chapters 5 and 9), references to the Project Polis seem somewhat low in volume. The first type of response is indeed about the network value, and—perhaps in line with Boltanski and Chiapello—the work value is external to typical wage remuneration. Responses # 15 and #18 actually describe relationships that the networker would find lucrative (as would a networking opportunist described in the poleis framework). One may suggest here that the workers have perfectly understood the social value of the festival for customer and client relations while, surprisingly, not seeing it associated with their own occupational ambitions. Alternatively it might mean that the volunteer who looks at her own profile may perceive the internal organization as a reticular world, accepting work as yet another successful project she has accomplished. The other typical responses related to the Project Polis invoke notions of the risk-taker, decision-maker, and 'someone higher' as representative of the Grand Person. A risk-taker is articulated as a person who helps the organization to deal effectively with environmental uncertainty.

Finally, the Industrial Polis can be detected as order of worth in a number of utterances. As to activities that should be reimbursed, we find on the 'No'-side work roles and task areas associated with ushers and audience assistants who

pass materials like audience surveys on to theatrical audiences. These assistants reportedly don't deserve a wage because their tasks are seen as 'minor' or 'not so important' (hence: Little Person). But as the 'Yes'-side justifications show, technical abilities seem to legitimize pay:

> [Q: What is responsibility and skill?] Well, technical department obviously.
>
> British festival staff

Thus, while those dealing with audiences do not deserve a wage, other work roles that are co-present where cinema is performed in the classical format (see Chapter 3) can expect advocacy for pay. This is an interesting finding because organizations' survival very much depends on audience-related marketing and audience satisfaction, and ushers engage in 'crowd control'. Some interviews highlight this ambiguity clearly:

> I wouldn't have any of my ushers as volunteers, because they've got a huge responsibility for public safety, and they need to take that seriously and I need to take them seriously and that needs to be a contract of employment, so they absolutely should be paid, somebody handing out leaflets, or some of the audience reports stuff I can understand, maybe that's why they're not paid.
>
> British festival staff

Overall, however, the Industrial Polis is reflected in a diversity of expressions, from routine relationships and 'technical jobs' deserving compensation to the work by 'people in charge' and with 'responsibility', the basics of the entire enterprise (finance, administration, public safety):

> If you have more responsibilities, then you need to get paid. [Q: So, what would you say, where is the cut-off?] I think it's important that our drivers get paid, because that's the one really important job during the festival, and then if you are head of the cinema and the whole place.
>
> Finnish festival staff

This finding of 'compensation worth' in a non-representative sample reflects to some degree the 'rationalization of charity' (Hwang & Powell, 2009). It corresponds with the concern raised by Abbott regarding the devaluation of substantive professions raised in Chapters 4 and 7, whereby technical functions increase in value (and get higher compensation). Simultaneously, the finding resonates with the specific reward system in the division of labor in cinema,

where 'below the line'-work is conventionally paid first (and always paid in core functions). Even in the US American Hollywood industry, which according to its own myth is 'the most commercial' film industry (for dispute see Chapter 12), technical labor compensation is secured by collective bargaining while compensation of creative labor ('above the line') is based on individual project negotiations. This convention of the cinema industry is reflected in the hire of workers by film festival managers, who secure technical roles as functional necessities independent of creative content, as the following quote from a print-traffic specialist shows:

> Actually, I do the print shipping because from what I understand, most festivals have one person on staff maybe for one month or actually not even that. I mean they can be on voluntary basis, which I think is quite a strange solution, because it's actually one of the, it's a major part of the festival, actually getting the prints and securing them, and shipping them off carefully and safely.
>
> Swedish festival programmer

As the interviewee relates further, this role entails management of social relationships essential to smooth operations in the circulation of prints from one festival print-traffic department to the other. The next quote underlines the attribution to the Little Person in roles like ushers and audiences as discussed. Here, however, it appears as tasks by 'more important roles' because of its relationship to producers, not consumers, of cinema:

> [Q: What kind of work should be paid?] Umm, when you are dealing with specific groups of people, like the press, guests, … so that kind of people, and filmmakers, I mean, the job that I am doing, I need to do is to talk very calmly, and very openly and honestly to filmmakers, and I believe that that, those skills that they have, is something that you wanna get for being in that industry, and talk to people a lot, and for having a kind of clearer idea and a good head for schedules and things like that. So that needs to be paid.
>
> British festival staff

The same approach to what appears as 'necessary' is equivalent to 'below the line'-work in cinema but is here a problem pertaining to flexibilized work worlds, the conditions of which are reflected in the following discussion of venue operators whose work provides the infrastructure for the performance of singularities:

> And the supervisor of that venue is and should be paid, because there's only one supervisor for each venue, which I think is actually something to criticize, because for example in […] there's this one poor guy who for the five days is responsible for the venue. And works for twenty-four hours a day, sleeps whenever he has time. This year the person in … was somebody called […]. On Sunday, when we had this party, I asked him: 'Have you slept at all?' And he said something like he had slept for five hours the past five days.
>
> Finnish festival volunteer

Overall, the way festival workers think about the meanings of their work, the issue of remuneration resonates with 'normal' understandings of labor compensation whereas the anomaly of the organization that enables them to perform work equivalent to industrial labor is questioned by a minority. These results show that Industrial is prevailing over Market Polis, despite the point made earlier by a British interviewee that audiences are important. The designation of ushers and customer-facing staff as unskilled and unpaid reflects a 'productionist' view of cinema and film production—it's driven by the creators and producers, who present the Grand Person, the audiences just follow this lead despite their co-creative involvement in 'buzz production' (Burgess, 2020). Indirectly this may illuminate why no allusions to the values of the Opinion Polis occur in this sample.

Attributes of value such as efficiency and semi-autonomous work as well as expertise similar to that found in cinema and other media industries are associated with the Grand Person. There is a tendency in the information which posits technical and managerial work as more important to the operation than other work. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that respondents do not draw on charitable meanings—despite the obvious collective experience of event production being fully dependent on volunteers.

There is no doubt that managers and curators see the volunteer role as necessary role because of the lack of resources rather than the deeper need for civic duty, or even a gifting process as claimed for the digital economy (Elder-Vass, 2016). The rare allusion to the Civic Polis may be indicative of the boundary-blurring trend that occurs in organizational fields in the aesthetic economy, and is reflected in workers' career motivations such as this one:

> some of them want to get into the film side of it, and others want to get into the same side of it as I do—the events management stuff. So, we're really here for those same two reasons, it seems.
>
> British festival volunteer

Chapter 13 will look into boundary transgression more deeply, but the evidence from this sample makes already clear that festival organizations have been able to 'get in' on the production-side element of experience, making volunteering palatable, exciting, and rewarding by creating a transactional value through 'experience' that resonates with future workplaces and routes to creative employment rather than charitable motive or sense of duty. Volunteers' payoff is in seeing how film production and distribution is done and meeting people who do it, not just in getting access to free films as consumers.

The following quote from a person with long years of experience in the film festival shows that the labor-economic pattern here takes advantage of the reality of a reticular world as theorized by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005b):

> [Q: What's the role of volunteers in making a festival work?] Well, first of all the [organizations—A.V.] obviously don't have the budgets to pay the army of people you need to make everything happen, so volunteers are essential, every film festival uses volunteers and if volunteers come in in one year and are interested in working either in film festivals or the industry generally they stand a better chance of getting a paid job, using their previous years' experience, the next year and you can see the people who have come into the festival as volunteers […], who then go on and either work in the film industry, or work in the festival organization, or work for other festivals, so, they constantly feed through into the whole thing and, I think, they get a pretty good deal out of it because they get to see, they're not exploited in any way as far as I can see, they get enormous access to the films that are in the program, they get to meet a lot of people, possibly even get jobs eventually through meeting people here …
>
> Former staff, British festival

Similarly, the artistic director of a festival shows the negotiations of worth that go into the justifications for unpaid work in the festival and a conflict representative for many middle-class careers in the contemporary economy:

> [Q: In festivals where there's enough money to pay everyone, would you think that's better than having volunteers?] Look, it's better and it's worse. The unionist in me thinks it better to pay people, *but* when you pay people it becomes a job rather than a passion and their motives aren't quite as pure, so even though it's reprehensible not to pay people, it does sort the wheat from the chaff. The people who're doing it are doing it because they really love it, not because they couldn't get a job in … [Q: But you're paid and you have a lot of passion …?] I'm an aberration. And I did take a

> big pay cut from being a journalist to do this, because I wanted a change and I did think it was a noble thing to do. Like a civil service job, you do it because you have a belief in it. I've gone from being a unionist and an employee to being management in a non-unionized workplace—it's hard to reconcile and I feel guilty about it. If I was making squillions of dollars I would be really conflicted. I'm not Gandhi, but there are limits. I also realized I'm paid exactly half what my counterpart at [another festival] is paid—that was a humbling moment.
>
> British artistic director

4 Conclusion

The analysis of work and labor in event production allows us drawing together some of the arguments and discussions offered in Part 2 and Part 3. Economists have suggested that nonprofits take care of demands the market and the government cannot supply efficiently in other ways (Weisbrod, 1988). This statement needs to be requalified by the reality explored in Part 3 of this book. Nonprofits take care of more than niche markets, and especially of artistry which potentially is lucrative (see Chapter 5). Film festivals, I argue, not only have attained a strong standing as intermediaries because of their potential to ease market access and transactions broadly conceived, but also qualify themselves as devices that potentially provide creative inputs drawn from volunteered or low-pay labor. This phenomenon represents a 'hidden contract' that emerges from skillful policy-making across policy fields rather than within them.

Economists have been probing the nonprofit enterprise's quality, wondering about its trade-offs. Firstly, some have called the nonprofit organization 'entrepreneurial' because, as a supply-side phenomenon, it provides a significant advantage located in forms of irregular employment managed by nonprofits (Christopher Badelt in Anheier & Seibel, 2013, p. 170). Badelt alludes to the idea of Schumpeterian creative entrepreneurialism. The data interpreted in this chapter suggest that this is not just applicable to social services but may include nonprofit work in the cultural sector, where resource scarcity, grants dependency, and the problems arising from using charitable work as 'third-degree' qualification are voiced but not taken to a fuller conclusion. Secondly, Richard Steinberg questions altogether whether volunteering is an "alleged source of sectoral advantage" (1997, p. 191). While he agrees that it takes down labor costs, he sees the advantage diminished by "mismatches between volunteer skills and required tasks; the costs of recruiting, training, and supervising

volunteers; and conflicts between volunteers and paid staff". Still, he believes, there is a trade-off in his view, arguing that even paid staff in nonprofits can be a financial advantage because of lower wage expectations based on their intrinsic motivation to support the public good (listed by Rose-Ackerman, 1997).

However, the information given in interviews does not provide support for a mismatch rationale and does not speak to 'cheap sourcing', as the festival management in many of these observed non-profit organizations takes seriously its socializing role for media labor markets. That said, because of lack of instituted training opportunities (for Europe see Krainhöfer, 2019), the real cost of this relationship is probably distributed more widely—including over managerial positions, volunteers and their various supports that effectively fund the instituted role of the film festival in the cinema field.

Conclusion of Part 3

This part of the book set out to fill a major research gap on work in nonprofit festivals. It pays attention to still rarely empirically investigated "narratives, identities, and emotions of those who deploy and enliven those devices" (Smith Maguire, 2014, p. 11). The chapters show the organizations' dependency on and high trust in volunteers as majority workforce, and that this relationship is legitimized by various institutional pillars of support and highly routinized labor-related practices across nonprofits and education. Together they represent a world that works like a template for solving problems pertaining to cultural and social welfare, which can be emulated in other organizations across the world with relative ease. The research also demonstrates that film festivals provide assets for economic coordination not inspected by the aesthetic-goods literature, which are labor markets and skilling worksites that reproduce a particular ethos aligned with experience economies (Cockayne, 2016).

Certain provisions by nonprofit and labor laws enables film festivals to serve as training places for creatively inspired graduates as well as those who seek professional careers in the cinema field. They offer opportunities for intermittent and second jobs necessary for actors to either get into fields, or sustain a living while working or pursuing a sustained career in the field. Film festivals offer work experiences, which the higher-education side has phrased 'transferrable skills', to middle classes. But the process of experiencing labor can—depending on the position and the opportunities to rotate annually through the variety of roles and one's ambition—also involve deeper skilling, including artistic and technical work in cinema and the media, arts-administrative skills, fundraising and hospitality services skills, and many more. This means that film festivals (and certainly many other arts/cultural festivals) provide input into labor markets of various industries. In this sense, the chapters in Part 3 provide first systematic evidence from the cinema field, suggesting a successful incorporation of the artistic critique into capitalist economies (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b) through arts-nonprofit labor.

Everett Hughes wrote at the start of the 1950s that there "are still many ways of working besides those which fill the most space in the census tables. Some of these other kinds of work are refuges for those who do not want to work in the big system or are rejected by it" (Hughes, 1952, p. 425). Festivalization has enabled the proliferation of such refuges but also their rationalization as suggested by Weber's quote with which this book opens. In aesthetic capitalism, such refuges have been appropriated as legitimate sites of economic activity. The inquiry into nonprofit work raises the question of whether the nonprofit

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form has also been incorporated into the dispositif of creativity and to what extent it manifests a form reproducing the reticular world. Max Weber treated free labor as an essential dimension of rational capitalism. Free labor means that people "must be present who are not only legally in the position, but are also economically compelled, to sell their labor on the market without restriction" (2003, p. 277). This analysis shows that not only nonprofit organization, but nonprofit labor is potentially a linkage between creative and philanthropic forms, a hybridization that may have become the major requisite for some areas of types of economic activity in late-modern capitalism. By participating in the festival experience, workers learn about themselves as creative subjects with individually and collectively identified opportunities and within observable constraints. It has been a convention to describe volunteering in terms of time freely given for the benefit of individual or collective/social entities, as activity that is done outside one's own household, somehow in relation to a perceived or recognized public good (Musick & Wilson, 2012; Wilson, 2000).

The various analyses in Part 3 aimed to provide evidence that the meaning of volunteering has shifted, supporting work organizations using personalistic controls (Biggart, 1989) that tend to be flexibilized, subsequently placing demands on flexible careers. With respect to the nonprofit literature's domination by economists' arguments it remains to be further examined if such organizations more efficiently support the economic structures in the markets they serve (Baumann, 2002). Moreover, given that cultural worker generations tend to be relatively young and may not be pressing for more distant but perhaps already predictable social security and old-age related issues for the time being, it remains to be seen how intermittent and volunteered labor contributes to better fulfilling common welfare goals than full-time employment (the policy of the Keynesian welfare state) can. Empirical research on internships has already demonstrated that contemporary younger cohorts show more discontinuous careers and that younger cohorts experience joblessness at entry level despite their performance of 'perfect net citizen' behavior. As put by Frederick Powell, social capital "seeks to create a new fusion between civil society and the market that is the defining feature of postmodern welfare" (2007, p. 20). Research for policy makers and labor organizations is urgently needed to examine how unpaid volunteered work forms expedite rather than dissuade precarious conditions for future worker careers.

Much policy focus, however, consists of hype regarding 'creative opportunities' rather than tackling the privatization of risk imminent in cultural employment. As well-known from employment studies, wage and salary systems provide stability to workers, which seasonal payments, even where high, cannot match (Marsden, 2004, p. 666). Moreover, it perhaps even requires a global

debate as the volunteer/intern format alluding to creativity (see Chapter 9) is a globally appealing and affective-labor format. Most likely, it will prevail, given the ongoing expansion of education and the growing supply of creative labor created in the process, but also in terms of a broader culture of 'active citizenship', creative entrepreneurialism, and social innovation, all of which seems to offer non-standard work conditions that are based on politically supported ideas for work qualification, lifestyle and, potentially, political motivations.

PART 4

Adjustments

CHAPTER 11

Affect, Event, and Social Order

> One good thing about music is, when it hits you, you feel no pain.
>
> BOB MARLEY

In this last part of the book I turn to festivalization and immersive environments (Angerer et al., 2017) in their relation to affective governmentality and the power of persuasion (Chapter 11), culturalization and grants-economic foundations of the cinema field in philanthropy (Chapter 12), and the relationship between civil society discourse and the creativity dispositif (Chapter 13). Chapter 11 discusses affect and emotion in classical and contemporary actor and social-order models by sociologists, tackling power relations which give continuity to the reversal of 'affect deficiency' in aesthetic capitalism.[1] According to Reckwitz, rationalization (R in his AEMR model, see Chapters 2 and 4) is distinguishable by "more emotionally neutral, disciplinary and socially coordinated mechanisms" (2017b, pp. 203–204), while affective cultural niches were relegated to the margins of society. Yet, the reversal of affect deficiency produced a cross-nationally observable culture of affective positivity. As capitalism theories have focused on western rational capitalism, it is useful to clarify how the theory of aesthetic capitalism and the Affective-Turn literature on atmospheres, affordances, and immersion challenge some of the key concepts by sociological theory, and how it may be adjusting to the new knowledge of our times that has emerged in research on affect (Angerer et al., 2017; Bericat, 2016; Blackman & Venn, 2010; Clough & Halley, 2007; Gregg, 2010; Schützeichel, 2008; Slaby & Scheve, 2019; Wetherell, 2015).

This chapter attempts one such adjustment by bringing festivalization into dialogue with classical sociology (Weber, 1978).[2] A society in which

1 Psychology differentiates between basic affects as result of humans' evolved capacity for survival (fear, anger, sadness, disgust, and joy) and emotions which are primary and secondary. Secondary emotions are more complex and learned. Correlates of affect are bodily phenomena such as changes to breathing, speech pattern, etc. (Schützeichel, 2008).

2 I mostly use Günther Roth and Claus Wittich's translation of Weber's *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1978). The citation (Weber, 1980) is for a German-language edition.

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festivalization is a major social process was hard to imagine in Max Weber's time, posing the question of how theorizing about current culture of affective positivity (Angerer, 2007) and the teaching of classics—as Weber's work is part of the sociology canon, intended to inspire future sociologists—can be made relevant to especially the younger generations who are mundane and predominant actors in the aesthetic-digital economy (Elder-Vass, 2016; Peaslee et al., 2014). Therefore, I will examine whether contemporary ideas incorporating Affective and Spatial Turn-theorizing (Reckwitz, 2002) can be synthesized with Weber's typologies of action and order and his concepts of power and legitimate domination (Weber, 1978). For this, I discuss actor models already introduced in previous chapters, adding a fourth from recent organizational studies. As pointed out by Martin Saar (2013, 2014), in western philosophy one of freedom's basic meanings is that of freedom from affect. And yet it is the west as highly rationalized culture in Weber's widely adopted meaning from which new ideas of affective space-technologies have arisen, influencing economic, political, and social behaviors. The chapter tries to illuminate this trend with insights as to how festive events represent particular forms and mechanisms of power (Rojek, 2013), leading to a discussion of the power of persuasion (Baumann, 1993b) as a historically significant form of power undergirding these new relationships.

What I refer to as affective orders is a heightened phenomenon in the economy of singularities, but perhaps increasingly seen emerging in spheres pertaining to the 'logic of the general' (Reckwitz, 2020), reconfiguring 'rational time' as extraordinary. Positing the relationship between affect and power as a problem of governance is to ask how the relationship between affect and reason can be turned into a productive one so that compliance and even enthusiastic commitment (Saar, 2013) can be attained and become durable. This may lead to supplementary insight regarding the question of compliance during third-spirit capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b). As this is a problem of governmentality (Rose et al., 2006), I also prefer the concept of the 'affective order' to that of Reckwitz's 'affective space' (2012) to illuminate the emergence of the 'power of persuasion', showing that Peter Baumann's reconstruction of Weber's authority-power typology is a more potent basis for the study of affective governmentality and the cultural imaginary of the creativity dispositif theory—both of which suffer from weak operationalization potential for empirical research, while having strong validity regarding 'governmentality' (Foucault, 1991). Baumann's concept of persuasion serves as a robust foundation for understanding power and governance emerging in post-traditional events like film festivals, charity events, and many similar products of experience-makers.

The chapter is divided into roughly two parts, starting with Weber's typologies and contrasting them with contemporary understandings of affected and emotional actors. The second part examines Rojek's theoretical conclusions from the study of charitable cultural events and leads to the discussion of Baumann's reconstruction of Weber's work as mentioned.

1 Affect and Rational Capitalism

In the following overview on Weber's 'legitimate authority' I treat the notion of authority as synonymous with 'order', as Weber explored occidental capitalism through a comparative contrast with other historical and ideal-typical societal orders. His influential ideal-typology of authority consists of three types: legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic authority. Authority refers to power over others at a minimum of compliance. The ideal-typology of action includes four action types, which are instrumental-rational (or purposive-rational), value-rational, traditional (or habitual), and affective action (Weber, 1980, p. 12). These action types form the micro-sociological foundation for the aforementioned three orders of authority. In the 'translation' from micro to macro levels, we can see the loss of the fourth action type. Weber was convinced that affect could never form the basis of a stable and legitimate order, but late-modern reality may challenge this assumption and call for a political-sociological analysis of the legitimate power produced in affective spaces such as manufactured by experience-makers.[3]

In Weber's sociology of macro orders, affect is not completely absent, as it has a role to play in the emergence of charismatic authority while—he famously proposed—being diminished once charisma is routinized, leading to value-rational authority if it can be successfully transformed into a stable pattern of governance. Charisma in Weber's sense is affective authority grounded in the potential revelation of something virtuous. Routinization involves the process of transformation of an affective relationship by the 'followers' into a relationship based on value rationality, while not lacking passion, devotion and other 'higher emotions'. In this sense, Weber permits affect into social interactions but only by making a vanishing appearance. Arguably, festivalization as continuous production of affective spaces that constitutes and reproduces 'affective order' challenges some of Weber's essential understandings of

3 Somers (see Chapter 4) provides an account of broad societal and professional-group based legitimation for social capital, but understates the affected nature of places rich in social-capital production.

societal stability and longevity. That festivalization is a stable feature of a globalizing capitalism, mostly based on late modernity' models of organization (Drori et al., 2006), fuels the search for alternative ideas about the significance of the affect-order relationship.

Weber 's struggle to incorporate affect and emotion resulted in his formulation of value rationality, which serves including higher or secondary (and learned) emotions into his societal theory. They are also key to his grand thesis of 'the calling' as behavioral foundation of western capitalism, the object of *The Protestant Ethic* (1958). Affect, however, is to Weber nothing but idiosyncrasy ('*blosse persönliche Neigung*'). Still, as he concedes, in a process of a 'conscious release of emotional tension' affect can develop into something that attains meaning. As put by Wolfgang Schluchter, the eminent Weber scholar, only interpretable interests by actors as well as ideas that produce interest (presumably in oneself and in others) are sociologically relevant (1980, p. 12). Thus, for example moral beliefs may guide a value-rational actor, such as 'duty, honor, the beautiful, religious call, loyalty, [and] belief in a cause' (Weber, 1978, p. 25). Weber's reading of the transformation of affect, however, is interesting for our purposes as he articulates a mechanism by which affects 'going over the line' can be rationally pursued with means such as by experience-makers and other designers of atmospheres:

> Purely affectual behavior also stands on the borderline of what can be considered 'meaningfully' oriented, and often it, too, goes over the line. It may, for instance, consist in an uncontrolled reaction to some exceptional stimulus. It is a case of sublimation when affectually determined action occurs in the form of conscious release of emotional tension. When this happens, it is usually well on the road to rationalization in one or the other above senses.
>
> WEBER, 1978, p. 25

Atmospheric designs, producing affective thresholds through the making of charismatic social time (Böhme, 1993), may not entail, as Weber might have argued in an explanation of today's experience culture at the heart of capitalism, the transformation of affective responses into instrumental or value rationality. They can still provide for the emergence of collectively embodied feelings, contagious social settings and 'embodied processes of involved actors'—a time-space of a 'felt collective' and felt unity "where there might otherwise be difference, but can even render potential futures or repressed memories as abundantly present" (Riedel, Chapter 7 in Slaby & Scheve, 2019, p. 85). Affectivity, then, can be jointly produced; it constitutes a relevant object

of sociological inquiry (Barbalet, 1998). Weber's rationalization process—removing emotion and affect from work-related activities—might create demand for special times and places in which people can exercise or release their affect, so that the channeling of affective activities into these curated spaces is a complementary process (Schulze, 1992, 2000).

Schulze, as shown in Chapter 5, incorporates affective behavior of high value to rationally operating markets based on valorization processes, claiming a methodically searching experience-seeker. Weber's notion of 'consequent planning'—which he associates with instrumental and value-rational behaviors—also deserves consideration, as the more recent governmentality scholarship has highlighted a form of 'second-order planning'. According to Reckwitz, this is one of the major forms of governance (the 'invisible hand' of the market being another) stabilizing the order of the 'creative city': it apparently needs little of 'rule' and more of the provision of affordances—an overarching semantic horizon resonating with the creativity imperative—for already affected and creative subjects to pursue their life-style projects in form of aesthetic practices and episodes through which they find resonance with their inner selves (Röcke, 2021; Schulze, 1992).

Still, while affect has episodic and spontaneous quality, current realities require acknowledgment that affect can be incorporated into managed and designed environments, creating the basis for what Bourdieu called an 'economy of practice'. For Weber, affective behavior could never be the basis of a legitimate order, as that involves a rationalizing thought process, resulting in compliance in accordance with legitimation motives and legitimacy belief. Yet, the reality of 'conscious planning' of immersive environments (Alphen & Jirsa, 2019) invites us to further theoretical construction of relationships at the basis of affective orders.

In this context we must consider Weber's traditional action type, derived from behaviors "determined by ingrained habituation" (Weber, 1978, p. 25). This is the analytic space in his typology for semi-conscious routines, including both things like routine rituals of political and religious kind (e.g., the proclamation of the head of state's name in the *khutba* in Friday service at the mosque) as well as habits and routines as signifiers of our mundane social world. While Weber provides, once again, for this type of action to transform under certain conditions into value-rational action, his assumption that traditional action shares with affective action a lack of 'reflection' provides an opening to later twenty-century theorizing on the role of the body and embodied action (Cochrane, 2013; Turner, 2008). It is also plausible to argue that the traditional-action type reflects the more passive affects belonging to the sphere of the mundane. However, it does not suffice as a basis for routinely

produced behaviors of particularly heightened positivity as specific to today's aesthetic capitalism.

While Weber's works retains its relevance for the understanding of secondary emotions like passions, elation, and elevation (Schiller, 2009) as foundation for durable social orders, affect production cannot be conceived within this framework. In the following section, I therefore discuss efforts by four contemporary sociologists—Karpik, Reckwitz, Schulze, and Helena Flam—to theorize affected-actor models that may guide the study of social processes such as festivalization.

2 Four Actor Models for 'Affected' Late-Modern Capitalism

Starting with Reckwitz's 'creative subjectivity', the incommensurability between a poststructuralist dispositif analysis and Weber's methodological individualism needs to be addressed. I do so by using Reckwitz's distinction between aesthetic episodes and practices, which also highlights the difference between his and Schulze's model. Episodes appear to correspond with Weber's view of affective behavior as spontaneous and non-reflecting, whereas practices suggest both affective, reflective and some amount of planning ideas in actors, without generating instrumental or value-rational types of action in the strong sense of Weber's conceptions (see also Ferreira Almada et al., 2013). Reckwitz rejects the concept of a "pre-cultural affect", arguing that neither affects nor emotions are "inner possessions of individuals" or mere expressions (2012, p. 251), and he also disregards the difference between affect and emotion. While making affect 'always embedded in practices', therefore corresponding with cultural schemata—guiding "the production and reception of aesthetic events", he defines aesthetic episodes as momentary and unexpected. Still, aesthetic practices are opposite of Weber's instrumental rationality, distinguished by "acting upon the world" from "experiencing the world through sense perception" (2017b, pp. 12–13). In some sense, Reckwitz 'over-socializes' affect to provide for the material perspective on culture, as "via objects can one detect the omnipresence of senses and affects" (2012, p. 252). His notion of a 'cartography of affect' recognizes that affects may form discernible and potentially stable pattern which in Spinoza's sense can be subjected to political 'affect management' (Saar, 2013, pp. 289–290).

Unlike Reckwitz, Schulze develops his experience-rational actor on the basis of aesthetic episodes; his actor does not 'act upon the world' similarly to Reckwitz, but engages in novel-experience search guided by an internal disposition. Experience rationality circumscribes an individual who can systematize

her experience orientation towards aesthetic episodes. This could plausibly be argued to constitute an aesthetic practice for which immersive environments provide an affordance in form of abundant experience offers traded in experience markets. Related to the discussion of Weber, this may be seen as a habitual orientation guided by the wish to be affected—constituting even an 'affective disposition' (Mühlhoff, Chapter 10 in Slaby & Scheve, 2019, pp. 119–130). In the context of Weber's classical outline of modern-day actors, this leads to the possible interpretation that experience rationality constitutes a genuinely new disposition shaped and reproduced in aesthetic capitalism and experience society, and is habituated and oriented toward the value of the experience, which corresponds with the definition of meaningful action regardless of Weber's strong notion of reflection:

> Einen Sinngehalt einer sozialen Beziehung wollen wir a) nur dann eine 'Ordnung' nennen, wenn das Handeln an angebbaren 'Maximen' (durchschnittlich und annähernd) orientiert wird. Wir wollen b) nur dann von einem 'Gelten' dieser Ordnung sprechen, wenn diese tatsächliche Orientierung an jenen Maximen mindestens auch […] deshalb erfolgt, weil sie als irgendwie für das Handeln geltend: verbindlich oder vorbildlich, angesehen werden.
>
> WEBER, 1980, p. 16

Karpik's actor model named 'homo singularis' (see Chapter 5, Table 7) contrasts with Weber's instrumental-rational actor, rejecting general calculability. Like Schulze's actor, his subject makes qualitative judgements to guide her action in the light of unstable goals. But Karpik's actor differs by having reflexive capacity. For this trait, Karpik draws on Hannah Arendt's philosophy on judgement, defining actors as having "capacity for discernment", with each subjectivity owning her own tastes while they together make up a 'plurality of worlds'. Judgement draws on taste but "differs from taste by the distance it takes with regard to the object and by its reference to other judgements", which roots it in sociability. Judgement devices represent particular objects and therefore allow for a temporal interval between intermediate and deferred pleasure, according to this definition of judgement—which is choice (Karpik, 2010, pp. 38–39). While homo singularis is involved in aesthetic practices, she appears to be less of an experience-seeker on the lookout for aesthetic episodes and more of a knowledge-economic actor. Affecting behaviors and objects do not seem to possess theoretical value, they are secondary to judgement.

Finally, Flam's (2000) concept of the 'emotional man' carves out a presence between the rational and the normative actor. This emotional actor resonates

with Weber's affective-action type, as he is described as lacking calculability, predictability, and social accountability—possessing 'very powerful motives ranging in the spectrum and intensity'. Like Reckwitz, Flam makes no distinction between affective states and emotional expressions, arguing that because emotions are 'conflicted, strong, and inconsistent, they cannot be the basis of social order'. In Spinoza's perspective, this would be an undeniably social actor while presenting a threat to the political order that wishes to manage affects to its own benefit (Saar, 2013, p. 277).

Based on Arlie Hochschild (1983)'s influential work on 'feeling rules' in organizations Flam goes beyond Weber's 'vanishing form' with her idea of a 'constrained emotional man'. Flam presents the idea of a practice of 'representative emotions', i.e., behavioral models that others can adopt and therefore reducing uncertainty in organizational contexts (2002, p. 93). To me, this suggests that this action type can be the basis of a social order in Weber's sense. However, this proposition comes at the loss of the affective action, as she ultimately provides a normative model, even de-prioritizing affect and emotion in 'emotional man':

> This internalized, willed, intentional mechanism of control, which entails cognitive processes, such as self-reflection, self-criticism, and self-correction, but also feelings of trust, respect, shame, embarrassment, and guilt, is at the basis of any social order.
>
> FLAM, 2000, p. 21

Flam does observe 'loss of binding force' associated with rules, without, however, relating it to Affective Turn concepts. Rather than aiming to curtail affective spontaneity, disciplinary regimes of aesthetic capitalism call on actors' affective and emotional behaviors by circulating rather than suppressing things like 'imaginative value' and 'show value' (Beckert & Aspers, 2011; Böhme, 2017). This insight by writers of aesthetic capitalism makes for a comparative conclusion.

Compared to Schulze and Reckwitz's respective actors, Karpik's and Flam's actor models fail to reflect the abundance of affect production as contemporary human activity. Flam's actor model is interesting, however, as it highlights that 'emotional man' is oblivious to costs since emotional costs cannot be compared, and that an actor can be guided by self-interest while being subjected to the power of feelings, which both connects and separates individuals "against their will" (2000, p. 18). Reckwitz and Schulze's actor models appear as robust micro-foundational propositions for an affective order if characterized by some minimum of learning and more or less systematic adjustment through

communicated mutual expectations. The following table proposes a synthesis of action typologies:

The thesis of aesthetic capitalism (including that of 'experience society') suggests, of course, that the two last action types in the table have amplified as action types in mundane and extramundane environments. Immersive environments, in particular, have been proliferating designs that suspend—indeed maximize the suspension of—reflection and rationalization as well as tightly organized belief systems such as the ethos in Weber's meaning and as foundation for professionalization (see Chapter 7). Such affordances shield actors and subject-object relations from rationalized processes or increase the threshold for their emergence, including the calculability of emotional costs. Value-rational actors as principled actors appear even as an obstacle to the 'operation' of surprise production in the postmodern mode that Reckwitz described by the regime of Novelty (N3).

Can we argue that imperatives such as 'Experience your life!' or 'Be creative!' can constitute the basis for what Weber calls an efficacious ('*geltende*') order? According to Michael Hechter, for a social order to emerge there must be 'reasonable predictability so that individuals can coordinate their activity', productive interaction fostering mutual cooperation—both necessitating the explanation of prosocial behavior stabilizing a given order (2009, pp. 29–30). How can this be achieved in highly uncertain environments where mimetic behaviors rather than coercive and normative behaviors appear to reproduce cultural schemata and structure? A response must deal with concepts of power and legitimate authority for affective orders arising from 'festivalized' spaces

TABLE 22 Synthesis of recent actor concepts with Weber's action typology (Reckwitz, 2017b; Schulze, 1992; Weber, 1978)

Action type	**Key theoretical difference**
Instrumental rationality	Means, ends, and consequences, imagined success
Value rationality	Imagined obligation, call to duty, higher purpose
Affective-habitual behavior	Aesthetic episodes, mundane affective behaviors
Experience rationality, creative subjectivity	Aesthetic practices, methodical experience search, affective disposition

which work with affect production, competing with, if not replacing the role of religion and political ritual in postmodern society:

> While religion ties the affects to invocations of transcendence and the political ties them to the project of perfecting society, the aesthetic ties them to sensuous perception enacted for its own sakes.
>
> RECKWITZ, 2017b, p. 205

Reckwitz maintains that the postmodern art field is the source of aesthetic-affective practices, supporting a hegemonic dispositif of creativity and its ideology of creativity embedded in 'networks of artefacts, subjectification, forms of perceptions, sensations, cultural schemes, and so forth' (Reckwitz, 2012, pp. 251–253). But where does the legitimacy of such networks, presumably producing prosocial behaviors seen in the "ensemble of social practices in which the embedded affects form a recognizable pattern" (Reckwitz, 2012, pp. 251–253), reside? If every dispositif affects its subjectivities and subject-object relations then we still need to identify the source of power that produces the excess of affective positivity as governance mechanism to the 'affective economics' (Jenkins, 2006) characterizing aesthetic capitalism. This returns us to Weber's theoretization of legitimate authority—in our context, as foundation of an affective order.

In the final two chapters of the book I will provide an argument as to what lends stability to this historically particular creativity dispositif, which I will call the 'logic of benevolence' and its associated institutional arrangements. Rojek's work on contemporary events, inspected in the next section, prepares this argument through a sociological interpretation of event-elite relationships in postmodern fest culture, demonstrating a particular social force which the subsequent chapter explores as 'power of persuasion' in Baumann's work.

3 Affective Order and the Impermanence Aestheticized Life Worlds

In this section, I approach festivals as event productions for cultural purposes and positive emotions producing prosocial behavior and excitement. As a more general class of social encounters, events do not exclude negative emotions, as evident from the breadth of events reaching from peaceful solemn protests or vigils to hate-speech rallies. These types are designed as powerful emotional events in their own right, appealing to other registers of affect and emotion. Post-traditional festival culture is characterized by joyous participation in cosmopolitan diversity. Even events that feature negative or disturbing content,

such as horror films, mafia dramas, climate-catastrophe documentaries, etc., stay in the festivity frame, and can be presented curatorially as a 'celebration' of the genre (Vivar, 2003).

To say it with Meyer and Rowan (1977), festive events 'litter today's societal landscape', eroding further the boundary between work and leisure consumption. They attract our attention as extraordinary mega-events of high political and economic value (Roche, 2011), as temporary release from the humdrum work in the mundane world (Lampel & Meyer, 2008), as immersive environments (Böhme, 2017; Böhme & Engels-Schwarzpaul, 2017; Chytry, 2012), or as minimalist organizations performing art temporarily, such as for example small music bands emerging in taverns for a night (DiMaggio, 2006). This leads us to consider their impermanency which ostensibly suggests them as extramundane categories that cannot produce stable societal order.

Reckwitz pointed out this problem by comparing musealization and eventization as social processes in the 'creative city'. Festive events contrast with the more permanent art forms by a constant highlighting of the extramundane, and relating them to novelty production. He seems to fear that eventization prevents the 'proper sedimentation of art works into cultural memory', as in events—performance art, installations, art events, curatorial arts and festivals (Reckwitz, 2014b)—, 'it will be easier to be surprised by something presented as novel when one has never known the old' (p. 332). To put it in terms of the 'economy of enrichment' (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020), events are associated with the 'trend form', whereas museums and repertoire performances are associated with the 'collection form'. Festivals, which valorize collections (such as cultural practices and objects, or such as auteur modes and styles of filmmaking in the cinema field) in a 'trendy' way, presenting 'trending' art and cultural phenomena seem to fall outside this binary proposition. Reckwitz (2020) further emphasizes the 'tragedy for collective cultural memory' with respect to a discernible process by which high and popular culture are valued simultaneously in many post-traditional fests. As put by Hartmut Rosa with respect to a quasi-intellectualization of popular culture, 'the means and ways of accessing cultural objects are heightened with affect, while the cultural content becomes exchangeable and indiscriminate' (Rosa in Soziopolis, 2017–2018). Reckwitz also stresses the irreproducibility of the event space and the experiences arising from its practices.

Film festivals seem to not quite correspond with this analysis, as the classical format of cinema (see Chapter 3) produces similarly instantaneous experiences whereas the festival combines trend and collection forms of art, observable in master classes, awards for highly acclaimed actors, and the making of 'classics' from a curatorial point of view (cf. Gonzalez Zarandona, 2016;

Zielinski, 2016). This hybrid can be observed for a larger population of the 'more permanent' arts organizations which have incorporated event elements to entice a broader public, as required by their grants-economic resource rules.

In my view, the dated debate on higher versus lower art conceals a very important role events hold in the 'macroeconomics' of cultural production, where eventization provides an interesting dilemma in a rapidly integrating world society for which the aesthetic-digital economy seems to be an infinite resource (not last because it incorporates creative aestheticization, even demanding it as key resource). Regarding globalization, festivals provide a particular global advantage for those seeking to expand aesthetic economies and break down institutional field boundaries in the process, using public spaces and notions of a civil-society fest culture promoted by variably democratic regimes to incorporate countries and their populations in aesthetic-economic and knowledge-economic stages of global value chains.

Events provide faster and more instantaneous access to global and regional knowledge repertoires (including 'world models')—rather than 'permanent art institutional forms' which acquire their reputation and resources on a traditional basis and are less cost-effective, especially where there is no 'power of collections', as museums with the richest collections tend to cluster on the Global North where artistic talent is valorized by western institutions.[4] Similar to the early world-exhibition format, but belonging to another regime of capitalist accumulation, festive events can project orientation to 'permanent aesthetic innovation' to national and world audiences, as events are highly mediatized (A—M relationship according to Reckwitz's AEMR model).

The assumption of a loss of collective cultural memory as raised by Reckwitz suggests that eventization lacks integration potential. Contrastingly, I would argue that their culturally and socially integrative potential for world society is considerably high. Post-traditional festivals particularly resonate with the younger generations and, more generally, those who see themselves as deprived of a cultural education narrowly circulating among only the local or national elites who are well versed in the more permanent art forms as part of elite socialization. Festival events provide for a fast track of cultural induction to aesthetic capitalism, aesthetic and experience-rational self-styling—across many social strata. They also help speed up the formation of cultural repertoire oriented toward global capitalism and a more secular world culture, including for emerging 'functional elites' (Keller, 1968). As such, cultural events are also

4 Barriers don't end with the competitive advantage by concentration of highly valued art works in the Global North. The problem expands to the costs for insurance if such reputation should be 'borrowed' by other regions and emerging economies.

vulnerable to commercial and political exploitation, while providing for the structuring of publics in a way classical (cinema) theatre cannot (Delanty, 2011; Wong, 2016).

This highlights the festivals' role as formatted encounters, which facilitate convergence based on the celebration of difference. And they may do so more efficiently than more ordinary leisure consumption based on global consumer markets can, as such consumption is more tightly integrated with the institution of the family (a traditional environment), and more scattered even when device worlds, as shown in Chapter 5, try to structure the interest in singularities and unique experiences. A fuller exploration of 'culturalization policy' (provided in Chapter 12) would show that especially in emerging economies or countries that are 'industrially upgrading' and need to transition to a knowledge society (Chua, 2008), post-traditional festivals come under political patronage. That this occurs within a political economy of cultural production can be illuminated with the disproportionately higher attention given to film-exhibition culture than the film production by the national artists, as many festival scholars have critically observed (e.g., Barrow, 2016). This may have also provided for the one-sided study of festivals as consumption sites (even when conceived of as co-creative) ignoring festivals as part of larger production networks related to global and regional patterns of media productions and the active intermediary role in them.

Returning to Reckwitz's concern, the acceleration in art—through the adoption of the 'trend form' which temporalizes the festival content as 'collection form' (the curating of 'new waves' of cinema being the prime example here), both being mechanisms of valuation (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020) may not necessarily, and probably not by itself, lead to loss of collective memory, while it directly confronts the old classifications pertaining to the bourgeois art field, which probably will not yet retreat to niches and late-modernity's periphery as long as ever new elites—national and global ones—can be charged with maintaining and promoting them (Gold & Gold, 2005). This warrants a closer look at the relationship between affect and public culture.

4 Event Power: On Charity and Justice

Chris Rojek sees global events as a wholly new phenomenon, as a mechanism for the moral regulation of populations. Rather than being rituals confirming traditions, they appear to be problem-solving mechanism (2013, p. 184). Film festivals as global network (and especially the group of FIAPF-accredited events are important empirical referents in this perspective). Rojek's

observations provide a lead for the understanding of the power of persuasion as key to stabilizing affective order. Studying global events that are confluences for pressure groups, corporations and the state to address humanitarian and environmental concerns, he describes the making of a temporary community of common interests and an imagined space in which citizens gather around the belief of 'doing good', aiding 'public transcendence' of people's personal troubles (p. 145). What he means by 'event power' results from application of event management tools (Getz, 1997; Allen & McDonnell, 2002) which insinuate that 'the people on the street have the power to solve global problems' (Rojek, 2013, p. 184). Rojek argues that these events "seize upon this intense, widespread need to be recognized as a morally competent, *relevant* person" (p. 183). It is "the image of the true and noble response of the people to get stuck in, sort things out and affirm a fellowship that is admirable and appealing" (2013, p. 184). This civil-society imagery rests partly on the suspension of belief in public authority structures, as the global event attains the appearance of an assembly of the will of the people. In his view, these events constitute a 'temporal economy of gestures and an illusory community produced by event managers and the media', subscribing to a postmodern heroism and a creative 'can do' attitude, where citizens are co-creative audiences (Ferris & Harris; Giridharadas, 2019; McGoey & Thiel, 2018).

Rojek stresses the irreproducibility of event action but unlike Reckwitz relates it to the problem-solving features, arguing effectively that they produce sympathy and indignation (over social justice concerns) in the context of a 'general feeling of powerlessness' vis-à-vis things like global poverty and humanitarian crises, while providing for little transition into problem-solving at large:

> Event consciousness has a preference for episode over structure, representation over analysis, indignation over reflection and a rapid action response over coordinated long-term transformation which would minimize the risk of incidents and emergencies facing the world and militate against widespread feelings of helplessness and powerlessness.
>
> ROJEK, 2013, p. 185

This suggests that affective spaces such as charity events potentially create aesthetic episodes as well as kindle the imagination (Berezin, 2002#313), but produce indignation that can wear off rather quickly while leaving citizens affected and feeling represented in an imagined world community. His analysis resonates with critical civil-society writings, where charitable cultural "communities of participation" are seen as assembled from 'active citizens'

(Powell, 2007, p. 214), and further activated through events as arranged public spheres. Rojek's analysis provides a further empirical world where Boltanski and Chiapello's 'project worker' in a 'multitude of mini-spaces of calculation':

> Projects make production and accumulation possible in a world which, were it to be purely connexionist, would simply contain flows, where nothing could be stabilized, accumulated or crystallized. [...] In the seamless fabric of the network, projects delineate a multitude of mini-spaces of calculation, wherein orders can be generated and justified.
>
> BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, 2005b, pp. 104–105 and 106

The global network of post-traditional events provides an empirical reference for this multitude of spaces, where orders are generated and justified. Rojek's critique pertains more to the substantive use of the event format by policy makers and 'arrangers' than the event itself which is utilized to "proclaim popular, stateless solutions to problems that neither elected government nor the corporation can handle" (2013, p. 46). This conjecture is supported by Rojek's own study of the *Burning Man* fest in Nevada (Rojek, 2014), which espouses a different idea of civil society and, with respect to the film festival world, events that are anti-capitalist and rallies for justice—often giving 'alternative cinema' a special role in it (MacKenzie, 2014). Rojek's analysis echoes Elsaesser's formulation of International European film festivals serving as "repositories and virtual archives of the revolutions that have failed to take place in Europe over the past 50–60 years" (2005, pp. 100 and 103–104).

Events tend to provide a 'sentiment of justice' without necessarily addressing 'sense of justice' (Rojek). Hence, sentiments "play a central role in processes of ordering, regulating and structuring human interactions through rules" (Bens & Zenker, Chapter 8 in Slaby & Scheve, 2019, p. 103). Put in Boltanski and Chiapello's notions, sites defined by 'event power' produce more indignation than sites for justification and debate. The atmospheres curated by event arrangers are highly political, as they are 'smoothing forces, evoking coherence and insinuating that there is a homogeny even across conflicting voices' (Riedel, Chapter 7 in Slaby & Scheve, 2019, p. 90).

The discussion so far suggests that 'power events' are embedded in creativity ideology but also in civil-society ideology and that both may be intersecting, engendering the event as project for an active and creative, benevolent and affected citizen. Rojek's critique serves to highlight that there is a connection between civic, cultural events and the rise of anti-intellectualism which may not be fully explained by the rise of the 'regime of the old' and the 'offensive play with negative affectivity', as put by Reckwitz (2020). Following

on from Reckwitz and Rojek, the dispositif of creativity fosters a liberal, but simultaneously anti-contemplative culture, a positive affectivity culture, actor orientation toward the logics of surprise and the unique, and a production of benign 'non-normative scandal'. Rojek offers a clear power-sociological analysis:

Charitable cultural events produce a kind of 'sub-politics' in which non-elected elites and citizens who want to compensate their mundane powerlessness, come together in affective spaces. This analysis offers an example of boundary transgression, in this case the transformation of a charity hero into a celebrity which creatively solves or performs the solving of problems, and the charismatic fabrication of the citizen as a postmodern hero (on celebrities see Rojek, 2010; Rojek, 2012). This discussion leads to a conjecture regarding the self-styling of the elites and the coordination with a media/star system in which social groups can shine as visionaries, heroes and leaders (see more on heroic stewardship in Chapter 13).

This pattern reveals philanthropy as politics of singularity, benevolence, and empowerment, which establishes a particular version of a 'territory of feeling' and a mode of mobilization of citizens around 'causes'. Power events provide a temporary 'city' of benevolence based on creative, active citizen ideals, which—as I show in Chapter 13—can be theorized as a regime of justification (Silber, 2011). This line of argument will be taken up in Chapters 12 and 13. In the remaining section of Chapter 11, I will elaborate the specific form of power that dynamizes 'event power' affective positivity culture as 'culture structures' (Sewell, 1999) unique to postmodern capitalism.

5 The Power of Persuasion, a Neglected Concept

In the following, I will show that Peter Baumann's argument provides a power-sociological foundation to Reckwitz's formulations of a permanent affect stimulus and a permanent mode of review legitimized (Reckwitz, 2017a, p. 168) by the social regime of N3 (see Table 6 in Chapter 2). This provides an alternative to Reckwitz's understanding that aesthetic forms supporting the creativity dispositif are 'always already' affective, while having to account for the spread of a 'positivity culture of the attractive' (Reckwitz, 2017a, p. 270). It gets us closer to a formulation of institutional legitimacy for these patterns and can even account for what Reckwitz calls 'digital affect culture of the extremes' (A—M relationship).

Baumann posits that the power of persuasion ('*Motivationsmacht*'), defined as the social power of 'A making B wanting something or not wanting

something' has been a neglected form of power (Baumann, 1993b). He distinguishes between four types of this kind of power, and provides for the possibility that persuasive power coupled with positive sanctioning can become a strong social force. In Weber's thought, power means coercion, force, and threat—hence, the power to sanction. According to the classic, it is a 'chance' or potential distributed unequally, and those possessing such power can expect a relatively lower risk of resistance and less social conflict in response to their claims, demands, and wishes. Especially but not exclusively, leadership theories acknowledge and advocate for the shift from authoritarian styles of leadership to leading by persuasive means. Rojek's object is one such example, but there is a broader literature demonstrating the wide-spread notion of persuasion in things such as 'soft power' in the international-relations regime, (Nye, 2004); strategies by the media (Mayhew, 1997), and family pedagogy (Kaufman, 1987). Similarly, Karpik's differentiating between 'capturing' and 'captivating' consumers and audiences (see Chapter 5) can be added, as it locates the power of persuasion in the channeling (or, captivating) judgement devices. In Schulze's theory, the power of persuasion is largely diffused across experience-producers' strategies, embedded in the appeal of experience goods and experience spaces. What exactly then is this persuasive power?

The 'grammar of persuasion' is that actor A wants to win over actor B rather than topple her. In his deduction and revision of Weber's scheme of power and authority, Baumann first partitions out 'raw' power (e.g., legal and economic monopolistic power) from the power to sanction. The power to sanction refers to interactions with mutual adjustments between actors. While retaining the idea of a 'chance to succeed' he widens the perspective on power by stating a type of power grounded in motivation ('*Motivationslage*'), rather than being coercive, sanctioning power.[5] Sanctioning power defines a situation where A influences B's wishes with the effect that B suspends her goals, replacing them with the goals more suited to A's plan. But goals can also be altered while preferences and wishes remain stable, so that the adoption of A's goals by B may subsequently result in altered conditions according to which B still can follow her own wishes and preferences. This more complex understanding of the relationship between goals, preferences, and wishes and the power to intervene in those on either side of a power relationship leads him to propose four types of persuasive power shown in the following table. I have supplemented

5 Weber's concept of power lacks notions of agreement and disagreement' and therefore of mutual adjustment. It is non-communicative raw power ('*Durchsetzungschance*'). Baumann concludes that the 'reconstruction of the relationship between power and authority has to remain incomplete'.

TABLE 23 Power of persuasion, based on Baumann's typology (Baumann, 1993b), incorporating (Karpik, 2010, pp. 45–46)

Power type	Description
Situated	Situational shaping of wishes and preferences—adaptiveness of preferences (confluences, appellations)
Epistemic	Opinions (beliefs of matters being the case) –Shaping specific information within the situation ('information politics)' (opinion-regime, expert-regime, cicerones, appellations)
Interpretative	Interpretations—Interpretative understandings of wishes and preferences (cicerones, expert-regime)
Normative	Expectations (rankings)

them with already familiar corresponding device forms to immediately show the relevance for the discussion of the event as an intermediary.

In this perspective, Karpik's originality and personalization models (the two logics informing substantive judgement devices, see Chapter 5) reflect two currently existing logics of persuasion. The devices combine strategies of persuasion creating opportunities for B to follow A and to influence wants and preferences. 'Situated power' refers to opportunities that create wishes, which often are triggered by situations alluding to the realization of those wishes perceived (Baumann, 1993b, p. 57). Because wishes are affective and emotional phenomena they are spontaneous and vulnerable to experimental and experience devices.[6] Baumann cites a German proverb—"*Gelegenheiten machen Wünsche*" (p. 65) —which parsimoniously describes the concept of a confluence (Karpik) and an affordance (affect studies). Epistemic power, the second shape of persuasion, comprises withholding or enabling communication (information and knowledge), which seems to resemble Karpik's notions of strategic uncertainty and the work of the expert-opinion regime. The third type, interpretative persuasion, refers to a situation in which A aims to change B's self-understanding—a perfect example being the exposure of people to

6 According to Baumann, preferences can be intransitive. A preference of X over Y does not mean that there is X over Z. This, rather than intrinsic incommensurability, retains uncertainty in the economy of singularities. In other words, one could argue that singularities are an affordance for wishes and preferences to remain vague, escaping full rationalization—an insight which, I believe, resonates with Schulze's critique of the experience society.

ideas like 'social innovation' and the unquestioned need to be creative (see also psychological self-identity theory). As wishes and preference sets are unstable phenomena, the economy of singularities cannot do without expert groups that keep raising the issue of 'true wishes' for experience-seeking actors. Where such devices are successful they potentially lead to preference re-orderings (p. 65). This mode entails a strong shift from normative communication to questions that prefer a certain open-endedness—for the creative individual to 'work out the rest', aided by devices or consultants and curators of the suitable environments for this kind of experience (see also Bröckling, 2019, pp. 160–169).

The fourth and last type, normative persuasion, circumscribes situations in which not only goals but wishes and preferences too are shaped by norms. Baumann illustrates that with a vexing social interaction, which is a frequent situation, such as A wanting to go with B to the cinema, but 'in reality' wishing that B wants to join (only) because she would enjoy the shared experience with A. Commonly expressed as matter of convincing someone, it is plea for being affected and acting on that basis. Here, Baumann's type of normative persuasion echoes August Comte's ideas on emotions, formulating that

> … human action of any sort possesses a relationship to emotional impulses, but these impulses could be channeled or shaped in different ways in different epochs, and could be used to motivate that moral action (action prompted by feelings and ideas of empathy, altruism and self-sacrifice) essential to social order (Comte, 1853, Vol. I: 150).
>
> SHILLING, 2002, p. 17

A contemporary illustration is the observable strategy by contemporary human-resource managers to look for the 'right' person who has all the formal credentials and motivated to put her knowledge to work while making it also necessary that the applicant performs enthusiasm (according to conventional 'feeling rules', see Flam further above, and as borne out in empirical film festival research in Part 3). To sum up, locations, expectations, interpretations, and opinions are 'influencers' in their own right, providing for persuasion to change actors' behaviors.

To complete Baumann's argument, the interdependence between persuasive power and positive sanctioning (a reconstructed concept based on Weber)—both forms of social power—needs to be inspected (1993b, pp. 71–75). Baumann maintains that the longer the power to sanction (regardless of positive or negative sanction) lasts the more those impacted by the consequences of sanctions will start to give in to its reality—in the sense of being

socialized into this reality. This does not mean subjects are necessarily agreeing or subjecting to it—still, they get habituated (or, may be giving in while building up resentment). This is an observable common mechanism that ensures the relatively conflict-free functioning in pacified societies. Positive sanctioning works in a way that makes options for action comparatively more attractive, and therefore may also alter motives, preferences, and wishes. In this way, the power at work only creates the conditions for its force. While it may not increase the acceptance of, or dependence on, positive sanctions, feelings of gratitude may be triggered, providing a motivating force in their own right. This sets up a psychological pathway for transformation of not just goals but preferences and wishes—all being motivational bases for action. (Similarly, negative sanctions or the threatening of applying them may incur motivational changes in the long run.)

Baumann's analytic framework prepares a synthesis between poststructuralist theory (Moebius & Reckwitz, 2018) and classical and contemporary sociological theory. Reckwitz, in a critique of Foucault, maintains that the forms the dispositif produces must be attractive in order to be appealing to subjects which then generates compliance (in Weberian vocabulary).

> Damit es sozial angenommen wird und sich durchsetzt, ist neben reinen Herrschaftseffekten entscheidend, dass es ein kulturelles Imaginäres aufspannt und die Teilnahmen an ihm Faszination und Befriedigung, das heißt einen dauerhaften affektiven Reiz, verspricht.
>
> RECKWITZ, 2014b, p. 51

This shows that the creativity-dispositif theory provides for both persuasive power and the power to sanction. The extension of Weberian thought on governance (compatible with the thesis self-conduct in governmentality theory (Rose et al., 2006)), however, provides an analytic framework for empirical investigations in this regard, allowing, for example, the study of 'event power' in terms of motivational devices such as offered by Karpik's framework of 'regimes of economic coordination' and the finer elaboration of action types beyond Weberian ideal-types.

Baumann's re-reading of Weber in light of observable influences on preferences, wishes, and wants provides further elaboration of 'affective governance', highlighting the power of persuasion as central force in social, political, and economic coordination. This argument can be found in Spinoza's political philosophy, which claims that the efficacy of state action is conditioned on the ability to influence the emotions of the governed subjects—thus providing an early theory of 'affect management' (Saar, 2013, pp. 289–290) which

resonates with current theories discussed. Persuasion is efficacious, according to Spinoza, when institutional arrangements reckon with the affective nature of humans (2013, p. 286). For Baumann, the power of persuasion constitutes a chance to induce change in wishes and preferences rather than goals only.

6 Conclusion

Persuasion may be the majority case of social power (Baumann, 1993b, pp. 159–160) and, as I argue, circumscribes power unfolding in the social process of festivalization. In Baumann and Spinoza's respective works we find arguments for 'affect management', which in today's world seems to be heightened by a great measure of tools pertaining to positive sanctioning across society, observable in forms of persuasion, channeling devices, and 'second-order planning' in creative-organizational contexts, creating affective economic spaces. Accordingly, the immersive environment stabilized by the power of persuasion, if coupled with positive sanctioning, can be a force for both inertia and change. Baumann's reconstruction or adjustments of Weber's typology offers a formal hypothesis for the emergence of the particular affective positivity culture, which is a central dimension of festivalization. This significance includes a new morality of a certain 'permissiveness' of exuberant positive emotions—identified as release from affect deficiency by Reckwitz and others, but also lending social legitimacy to affective communication across society, including communication with affect and emotion contrasting scientific, 'rational' modes of communications and modifying these (see end of Chapter 4). Situated persuasion corresponds with the affective space (Reckwitz); epistemic persuasion with the judgement device (Karpik); interpretative persuasion with the experience-seeker (Schulze); and normative persuasion with the expectations on feelings (Flam).

Persuasive strategies are widely applied throughout advanced industrial society and are contagious forms of communication to countries with emerging knowledge economies and democratization tendencies, generating a global culture of affective positivity reproduced in the global media spaces of the aesthetic-digital economy as well as in its connected locations. Baumann suggests that persuasion is used to diffuse fundamental conflicts in advanced society which are legitimized by active citizen participation in decision-making processes pertaining to societal problems at many levels, while political institutions have several advantages and form interests that make them asymmetrically powerful players (cf. Chapter 6 Poggi, 1978). This situation can and is contended by oppositions including, for example, social movements which

try to build up resources on their side to decrease the institutions' monopoly power. Baumann also states that complex societies keep conflicts in check through particular forms of social integration. Rojek's analysis offers insight into global events as a mechanism for problem-solving, formulating a critique of a depoliticized, yet eventfully engaged public on its basis, with events channeling their motivations and goals into diffused forms of citizen participation. Eventization provides for faster and more instantaneous access to global and regional knowledge repertoires than 'permanent art institutional forms' and is therefore attractive to a wide range of actors who embed in the process.

Rojek's empirical analysis of these affecting public forums suggests moreover a boundary transgression between two institutional logics, arts and charity, as both rationalized spheres of activity co-jointly produce an affective positivity culture. Both of these were, to use Reckwitz's terms, 'affective niches' which in the course of the twentieth century have developed into larger organized spheres, with models of action and meanings diffused across the world, as the accounts of aesthetic economy and global civil society have documented. As dispositif analysis also assumes a number of dispositifs to co-exist, the inferable production of affective order may suggest an additional force supporting the appeal of the creativity dispositif. In the remaining two chapters I aim to construct this regime or dispositif of benevolence. Historically, philanthropy has been associated with patronage and analyzed as a particular type of power of influence. Rojek's analysis of charity events suggests a sociological approach to contemporary philanthropy in the postmodern age and its relationship with post-traditional events which mask the process of rationalizing charity by sheer excess of affective positivity culture.

CHAPTER 12

A Postmodern Grants Economics: Elites, Excess, and Cultural Diversity

> The merging of politics and aesthetics thus affects what can be counted as art at all, the reputations of whole genres and media as well as those of individual artists.
>
> BECKER, 1982, p. 166

> The science called 'economics' is based on an initial act of abstraction that consists in dissociating a particular category of practices, or a particular dimension of all practice, from the social order in which all human practice is immersed.
>
> BOURDIEU, 2005, p. 1

In cinema, celebrities on screen, in leading award shows, and reported on while posing on the red carpets of film festivals seem to exhaust our meanings of the elite. Festivals perform these celebrities, thereby connection to the star/media system (A—M according to Reckwitz's AEMR model, see Chapter 2), which stratifies the renaissance city and its creative outlets, among them cultural events and tourist destinations (Bae, 2012; Chang & Yeoh, 1999; Reckwitz, 2017b, pp. 185–200; Wynn & Yetis-Bayraktar, 2016). While in the history of cinema manifestos the influential role of big capital vis-à-vis the arts is common (cf. MacKenzie, 2014) only a recent manifesto by Mark Cousins has criticized film festivals as to their prioritization of these cultural elites, to elevate themselves above other cultural events at the detriment of an authentic film-loving community. More neutrally, film festival scholars have described this difference-making as part of the arranger's work (e.g., Stevens, 2011, p. 142). This chapter aims to broaden this perspective on elites in the cinema field, approaching its variety of elites as entrepreneurs, politicians, grant-makers, cultural and wealth elites. This approach offers a state/culture-nexus analysis

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and a tentative idea of the grant-economic infrastructure which furthers the social process of festivalization.

Grants economics (Boulding et al., 1972) concerns here the public and private subsidization in the cinema field, for which Chapter 5 already provided a glimpse into one aspect of it, i.e. the film festival-based grants operations (Cheung, 2010; Falicov, 2016). This remains overwhelmingly a minority subject in cinema and festival studies, elaborated through case study (Cheung, 2010). Film festival scholarship has focused on industry-side influences and sheer market force, media power, government policy, urban elites, patrons as economic constraints as well as festival resources (Cheung, 2009, 2016; Gamson, 1996; Mazza & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2008; Papadimitriou, 2016). Facing a dearth of reliable systematic and representative data, I nonetheless aim to generalize patterns of grants-economic dynamics in exploratory fashion, expanding on economic issues and power relations attended to in Chapters 5 and 11.

My approach is from a different angle, by tackling structures and meanings in which grants-economic processes emerge as major resource basis, and positing the cinema field in its relationship to audio-visual policy as one major regulatory. Moving from inspection of organizational fields to macrosocial environments, the festival as valuable instrument for cultural and economic policies, and element in a larger architecture of media capitalism, where trade wars over profitable market territory are assuaged by strategies pertaining to 'culturalization' policies, a postmodern form of governmentality (Reckwitz, 2017b) can be revealed.

The empirical discussion will focus on two major traditional players in the cinema field, illuminating that Hollywood cinema's strength is based on oligopolistic market power, which the European Union's audio-visual policy makers aims to curb with cultural-policy tools, furthering in this way the process of festivalization in the cinema field. While any study of the Hollywood industry offers the most systematic data for cinema studies, the European Union as an alliance of national states is a good choice for representing the many other struggling national states facing 'global Hollywood' (Elsaesser, 2005), and their need to maintain national production for the sake of distribution, exhibition, and development of homegrown talent. The European Union is also a valuable case in its own right as its cultural and audio-visual policies more specifically help to delineate a struggle between political elites and business elites (as well as their American political backers), which also supports the position of the European Union vis-à-vis other countries as a patron for film heritage and local, independent arts as well as world cinema. As already established in earlier chapters, including Chapter 1, this provides not only for alliances but also valorizes the European film festival in a way that does not necessarily

strengthen local production and local reputation-making regimes (Elsaesser, 2005; Falicov, 2016; Halle, 2002). In this way, the chapter offers a view of the more complex geographies of regulation and governance mechanisms at national and global levels.

Altogether this chapter serves to portray the cinema field as what it is—a busy space of encounters between art elites, governments, political and business elites. It is a heavily subsidized area of industrial activities, and an economic arena not just occupied by heavy financial capital but also—and in more dynamic interdependence with capital than commonly believed—by private and public aid. Film festivals have become conduits for these, channeling the means for assessing them and therefore participating in grants distribution in a way that has never been studied systematically. This effort can be understood as complementing political-economy analysis on how Hollywood battles the uncertainty of profits (Wasko, 2007) with insights into the role of a sizeable grants economy. This economy, I maintain, is propelled by a philanthropic logic of funds allocation for arts and culture, which sets up the argument of a 'benevolence state' arising from interdependencies between elected and unelected elites.

1 Culturalization and '*L'Exception Culturelle*'

The next section drafts the relationship between film festivals and political and business interests as stakeholders, described by many film festival researchers (e.g., Stevens, 2016, pp. 33–40). Elites are groups vying for access and influence over the state. 'Culturalization' describes a tendency to solve problems by using the power of persuasion and cultural 'soft power' by elected elites (see Chapter 11). This makes 'culture'—and the event—a key political asset but also a liability in contemporary politics, where elites must adjust to citizens demanding democratic participation. Activating citizens by culturalization is not a one-sided process of influence, as—related to its phenomenological essence as 'difference'—culture begs culture, or more of its production and thus more resource demands as well as wider participation.

Culturalization denotes a surface-structural process (see Chapter 4 in Sewell, 2005) plain to see in the dynamics of the 'creative city'.[1] Reckwitz identifies three historical phases, 'popular culturalization' in the 1970s, 'new

1 In his work on singularization, Reckwitz formulates culturalization in terms of the logic of the unique versus the logic of the general and, in accordance with that, as strong and weak culture. 'Strong culture' is another word for singularities. A similar binary is offered by Hardt

urbanism' in the 1980s, and 'political culturalization' in the 1990s. This last phase, articulated by Reckwitz, is what I explore in this chapter as culturalization, a process of 'total aestheticization' of the city attached to a specific mode of governance (2014b, p. 195), where festivalization can be seen to add its special aesthetic-economic layer. Cinema festivals and many other arts/cultural festivities are policy tools called upon for the regeneration of local and regional areas that are threatened by the loss of old industrial organizations. A major strategy, outlined by Boltanski and Esquerre (2020), is their incorporation into 'enrichment economies', e.g., in economic revival through turning them into tourist areas and aesthetic-economic sites of production and consumption. Introducing festivals lends such areas an extramundane aura. Similarly the attraction of 'mega-events' (Joo et al., 2017; Roche, 2006) serves as tools by political and business elites to diffuse social conflict (especially that by labor having lost its workplaces) and compete with other elite projects for resources, investors, and election votes. They are a broader pattern of a response to emergencies, which Rojek's work highlighted with examples of charitable and justice causes (Rojek, 2013). Reckwitz notes that cultural governance denotes planning of a kind of 'second-order steering', with policy tools mainly intending to aid self-organizing processes in creative-urban culture in form of impulses and designs in which creativity can be materialized.[2] Reckwitz's proposal of a 'culture-oriented governmentality' (2014b, p. 309) acknowledges these political forces, without, however, explaining why these constitute legitimate forces—which seems salient in light of the various conservative forces that do not ascribe to the relentless pursuit of post-traditional culture-focused policies. The following should highlight the extensive role of the state vis-à-vis the arts.

According to Howard Becker, national states as sovereigns must allow the arts to achieve sophistication while also having to protect others from perceived pathologies of arts or arts as source of public conflict (including conflict with other national states). The state will protect itself from art (which Becker deems political by nature) and can support collective action on its own behalf. Protecting and regulating the arts requires the negotiation of tastes and morals. Governments are among the "few such parties with overt political goals and the only one with such massive resources …" (Becker, 1982, p. 185). The concept

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on immaterial labor, whereby affective labor is strong culture (Hardt, 1999). On culture concepts see also (Bauman, 1999; Reckwitz, 2002; Sewell, 2005).

2 This idea is the core of Florida (2002), who later had to retract at sight of protracted urban poverty, inequality, and violence (Florida, 2018). Earlier critical social science, prominently by David Harvey (2008), has been ignored by elites of any influence.

of the 'developmental state' is a suitable means to elaborate the interventionist state in emerging economies around the world (Woo-Cumings, 1999) beyond second-order planning, while stating more clearly the historical significance of the late-modern state (Jepperson & Meyer, 1991; Meyer et al., 1997) as active broker of culture. Culturalization policies developed in western democracies can be illuminated with the notion of the developmental state, clarifying that development is not a linear path of progress, but a political-economic regime that can potentially be called upon in the old centers of industrialization, with the motor of modernization changing sites—as related by the account of a 'multiple modernity' by Shmuel Eisenstadt (2002).

Of special interest is here the mimetic adoption of cultural policies and their strategies, as well as the objects and subjects they aim to involve, across the world (Ho & Hutton, 2012). Chapter 11 discussed already one aspect of such developmental policies that encourage events and eventization, to provide impulses in emerging economies guided by policy elites to upgrade into what are now the creative and cultural industries, e.g. by tapping into the resources of the global 'festival network' and joining it with newly created events (Teo, 2009; Vogel, 2012). Rather than being a merely regulatory force in economic coordination, the western as well as other developed national states can be shown as a developmental state emerging in particular areas of political and economic interest. It refers to intervention qua culturalization policies, as means to 'develop' the national population as both competitive workforce and committed consumers. Similarly, in emerging economies that still need to prove themselves vis-à-vis global governance institutions and foreign investors as well as the 'donor industry', eventization helps to portray societies as political, culturally diverse and tolerant, although they may not have the formal credentials of democracies. Several festival studies have highlighted this situation (Attanasi et al., 2013; Boum, 2012; Leca et al., 2015).

At the concrete level of policy-making, the interests and goals of a particular political class will affect what during their times of rule is encouraged and what faces disapproval (Becker, 1982). States are also market-makers, albeit in neoliberal policy assumed to be regulatory (Beckert, 2006b, pp. 430–431). This position, I believe, has to be rejected for the culturalizing state, which is more adequately conceptualized as a developmental state. Observations on contemporary audio-visual policy reveal governments allocating large financial resources to cultural projects of interest to artists, business, social, and policy elites; using means of a taxation state, in which arts nonprofits have a specific function. Reckwitz's outline of culture-oriented governance suggests that arts patronage by the state (Becker, 1982) resonates with the configuration of the Post-Keynesian Welfare State (Jessop, 1999).

Governance by culture involves the development of actors in support of making, valuing and circulating of singularities—representing a way to proliferate singularities as well as stimulating boundary-making around them, which involves the definition of industrial spaces and their expansion within the framework of an aesthetic-digital economy. Through such policy and patronage relations vis-à-vis cultural producers the state facilitates the emergence and expansion of organizational fields such as studied for festivals and business event culture (Bae, 2012; Ho & Hutton, 2012; Joo et al., 2017; Mazza & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2008; Peirano, 2016; Vogel, 2012; Wang et al., 2018). It suggests more than a role for the state external to event action as well as the creative city as an intersecting space for elite projects to unfold. Aestheticized environments, especially those of cities and global cities, are the 'waterholes' of economic, political, and social elites and directly related to gentrification and the rise of creative industries or their connection to global production networks (Christopherson, 2006; Sassen, 2002). Gentrification of urban and semi-rural neighborhoods is enveloped in larger culturalization policies, putting creative class and elites in direct conflict with the middle classes and the poor shut out by lacking the resources. Put differently, culturalization policies and the economization of culture as productive force directly relates to the increase in social inequalities, which in this sense are also an effect of a reconfigured welfare state, which can be indirectly explored by an analysis of culturalization, involving a shift in elite focus away from equality to diversity.[3]

Such policies certainly need to balance allocation and attention given to the local, regional, national, and supranational levels of governments, as the cultural capital-city format by the European Union exemplarily shows—the circulation of a competitive format that allows for direct intervention by policy makers into cities and neighborhoods with the allure of economic support and the promises of 'enriching' strategies, as such places are also marketed for tourism and new industrial interests. The cultural-capital format can be seen as a symbol of a broader resource set of such persuasive devices, involving external public funds for communal politics, private-public partnerships, and entrepreneurial city politicians for many local economies (Dawson, 1998, p. 115; Hitzler & Niederbacher, 2010, p. 349).

In the industrial-policy arena of cinema, culturalization is highlighted by the semantic shift from culture treated as exceptional good to culture as phenomenon of diversity. Diversity here alludes to the democratization of an

3 A welfare state implies a "provision for economic security for the overwhelming majority of the population through a large public sector and a considerable sense of solidarity" (Logue, 1979, p. 69).

economy that circulates singularities. In 1993, France introduced the concept of '*l'exception culturelle*' into international trade negotiations (GATT), drawing a boundary between commodities and cultural goods or expressions to enable governments to protect national culture. This situation reinstates a jurisdiction for national sovereignty in a vastly expanding global trade regime. It thereby also restores allocative state power, for example in the form of automatic subsidies for creative businesses, and permits an otherwise negatively sanctioned host of taxation and tariff instruments to international trade negotiations. The low willingness of countries around the world to deregulate their audio-visual sectors is to great deal conditioned by the reality of the US's oligopolistic power in cinematic goods, which receives backing by the country's political elites, rejecting cultural exception-measures as protectionism detrimental to the national film industry.

'Cultural diversity' as boundary-making phenomenon (Lamont & Molnár, 2002) insinuates a diplomatic compromise to trade conflict and is institutionally supported by the UNESCO Convention on Protection and Portion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 2005, together with a subsequent Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity providing legal acts under which UN member-states have the legal right to exclude (some) cultural goods and services from international trade agreements and develop protective measures to maintain these. This brief discussion of the larger political economy of cultural diversity underlines that culturalization, including strategies of festivalization, are phenomena of globalization, deriving legitimacy from inter-governmental agreements and global-governance mechanisms ensuring the meaning of cultural diversity and its preservation (see also Boltanski & Esquerre, 2020). In the cinema field, activities pertaining to so-called transnational cinema production and co-production agreements between countries are lower-level governance mechanisms fostering such goals while preserving an international trade regime.

The struggle of national governments to define what is national about their film culture is not historically novel, and neither is the use of culture as soft power in international relations (Clarke, 2016, p. 158). The dominance of Hollywood's trade good is a consequence of a successful business-state alliance and of early internationalization strategies to counter re-emerging competition by Europe's leading film industries.

As the United States as victor of WWII swept away protective measures in its aftermath, this setting created opportunities for political entrepreneurs, to mobilize various actors for the re-building of national cinemas and seek legitimacy for protectively assembling particular aid to the industry and cultural producers (de Grazia, 1989, p. 59). Despite a long history of combinations of

financial and other policy measures to promote creative entrepreneurial and business investments, nothing, according to de Grazia, has stopped the "seemingly irresistible movement of American cultural models through the international markets", and aiding cultural elites to gain status and power, with her arguing that it has facilitated mass audiences' temporary suspense from 'traditional authorities and life-style exploration'.

De Grazia questions protective industry policies, pointing out the leadership role of the US in the 'communication revolution'. In Europe and elsewhere, such state support, however, includes, amongst other things, resources for bilateral relations and for independent, small filmmakers (1989, pp. 85–86) which are supposed to counter tendencies of 'Americanization of the European civil society' praised by de Grazia.[4] Cultural policy makers and associated interests do not seem convinced by notions such as, advocated by de Grazia, that one ought to accept the superiority of American movies just like the superiority of French wine. What we see instead is culturalization as protective and competitive strategy, which can be potentially studied as to the political support given to the establishing of regimes of economic coordination and the sanctioning of judgment devices such as film festivals that, I suggested in Chapter 5, operate as device worlds as the following quote underlines:

> Like the specialized service economies of global cities that facilitate the organization of transnational industries, their non-profit cultural sectors should also be understood as ancillary industries that rely upon and indeed support a global economy.
>
> IORDANOVA & RHYNE, 2009, p. 12

The notion of cultural diversity, which works at all governance levels to secure both majority and minority protections and elaborations, points to a pattern of resources and allocation mechanisms which shall be outlined with a few examples.

Both the European Union and Canada champion and implement 'cultural diversity measures'. In Europe, the value of cultural diversity is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 167 of the European Unification Treaty signed in 2017). More recently, legal regulations of this kind serve to justify particular production and distribution agreements, such as seen in cooperation of the EU with

4 A typical pattern of movie consumption across the world and regardless of strength of national production is that of Germany in 2012: Of all theatrical admission, German movies make up 17 percent, US movies 81 percent, and productions from the European Union 21 percent (Posener, 2014).

South American and Arab countries' film sectors, setting up a legitimate zone of national heritage protection. The effect is also discernible from inspecting the sudden growth of festival populations in such areas, despite the possible clashes between a post-traditional festival culture and authoritarian governments fostering conservative traditions. It needs to be underlined that such festival events are not local versions but fully isomorphic on western festival culture in the cinema field—the negotiations over what culture is exhibited being left to the emerging cultural elites or being ruled over, as seen especially in China, by government authorities.

Overall, protection measures have been shown to build and maintain a national industry and film culture, without making any dent to the hegemony of American cinema (Crane, 2014). Film festivals, in my view, reflect this reality in their combination of mainstream and independent cinemas, commercial and subsidized cinemas, and the support of cultural production through various measures coupled with competitive settings. Festivalization aids representation and maximization of cultural diversity, including the making of cultural heritage, production of canons, and the identification of gaps in the representation of marginalized values identifiable in cultural actors and objects, commonly formulated as the needs of 'marginalized voices' and social identities in policy communication. This institutionalizing relationship between a culturalizing state and marginalized identities, while not conflict-free (on sponsors in LGBTQ festivals see Rhyne, 2007), is achieved through alliances of civil-society forces with various elites, performing their many interactions in post-traditional fests as sites of the public sphere (see Giorgi et al., 2011; Regev, 2011; Wong, 2016).

Culturalizing state patronage generates citizen empowerment through cultural participation directly organized and regulated in ways contrasting with earlier policy instruments furthering cultural participation (Powell, 2007, p. 11), revealing the extent of economies of singularities as to their role in democratic politics. Florida (2002) observes this for the creative city as a relentless search for activities that 'happens at the margins'. Where culture is associated with the expression of pluralisms and human rights, culture enables wider participation which in turn increases opportunities for enlarged government regulation of social space by cultural governance instruments. Naturally, this invites a growth in formal-rational organization to facilitate the management of culture.

The semantic shift from cultural exception to cultural diversity "goes beyond traditional logics of conservation" (Moreno Domínguez & Montero, 2009, p. 80), marking the transgression of arts and culture beyond its boundaries. Culture becomes a symbolic destination—an imagination that is produced in

transnational production techniques (e.g., Elsaesser, 2005).[5] Menger grasps the potency of governance by culture for political elites, writing that "the wider the definition of culture, the more culture can claim to play an economic role, and the stronger the economic rationale of public support may appear to be, at least at first sight" (1999, p. 543).

This also suggests another way to understand postmodern art transgressing its own field boundaries, i.e., as making the public sphere, a politically connoted space of citizen deliberation, a normalized space ruled by the principles of the aesthetic economy. As such, it provides nonprofits with legitimate membership in fields they can serve through the reproduction of social and cultural capital. This involves a shift from normative ideals of a public sphere, including space for the deliberation of transformational politics, including perhaps civil disobedience, to routinely organized cultural participation in nonprofit organizations celebrating diversity and setting a path for the relentless production of culture in excess (for theorizing excess see Abbott, 2016). This, then, naturalizes the role for cultural events to work as mechanisms to 'manage' the excess, like the continuous output of an 'infinite variety' of cinema ('welter' in Abbott's terms) that naturally seems to be in need of classifying, valorizing, and being communicated. An outcome of the management of excess in cultural expression is the increase in bureaucratic structure both as government and nonprofit forms, including hybrid forms of legal private-public partnerships as well as a variety of ancillary organizations such as educational institutions, libraries, museums, filmmaker cooperatives, archives, and others that become part of a cultural production stream.

The above is a necessarily brief outline of a political economy set in motion by culturalization as governance mechanism. It serves to explain why festivalization is a deep resource for political and business elites while also facilitating democratic participation, resonance with citizens' goals and the elaboration of postmodern ideas of culture—all of which are entered into the dynamics of world trade regimes in which culture promotion and cultural-diversity protection play out as a 'soft power' in the global economy. I have also argued that the state, rather than being merely regulatory in the current era, has come to carve out a legitimate role in the preservation of cultural value regardless of any concern for narrow nationalist interest. In this process of orienting itself and its subjects to a governance by culture—including through the provisions for post-traditional celebrations of diversity and identity—the state

5 On Ireland's cinema: "Contemporary Irish cinema exists primarily as a point of reference within larger transnational aesthetic and financial networks across Europe and North America" (Brodie, 2016, p. 80).

has enlarged its sphere of influence over citizens. This inspection of a broader support structure aiding festivalization is not complete. The grants-economic processes, highlighting the roles of state and philanthropic logic in the post-traditional fest culture, must be inspected to derive some firmer, albeit still tentative, conclusions and hypotheses from the discussion above.

2 The 'Economy of Love': Culturalization and the 'Benevolence State'

In this section I use concepts established by a small field in economics, called grants economics (1973; 1972) by its founder Kenneth E. Boulding. The formulation of an economy specific to grants is based on a tripartite concept of the contemporary economy, including the 'economy of love', the 'economy of fear'—and the market economy as sphere of exchange deemed the only real economy in mainstream economics. Subsidization of cinema, as outlined here, may provide a different idea of what's economic.

> The grants-economic approach "insists that *both* grants and exchange are necessary to the organization of a modern economic system, and that intelligent reform must be based on an integrated view of the system which includes both grants and exchange as interacting mechanisms." (1972, p. 19).

This holistic approach to the welfare of a given society also asserts that the far larger part of transactions is not the market exchange, as a plethora of transactions exist in modern economies without a well-defined quid pro quo. As Arjo Klamer points out in an appreciation of Boulding's much neglected work across the social sciences, the framework reveals the existence of grants that would be difficult to observe otherwise, such as so-called implicit grants, which can be illustrated by generous industrial policy to particular sectors (see also Boulding et al., 1972, p. 23; Klamer, 2015). Grants are transfers that involve a redistribution of net worth but include the bestowal of social value. In the following discussion, we will concern ourselves with forced grants (also called tribute) and voluntary grants. It is not necessary at this point to associate these general patterns with real-existing institutions; the major interest is the realm commonly known as gifts and grants, but the interweaving of economic processes across all three domains is also relevant to my broader argument about a 'benevolence state'.

Using this tripartite scheme facilitates an understanding of the cinema field as to its economic totality, rather than in the common frames of business

and artistic cinema. This accounting framework also gets us around the evergreen debate within the social sciences as to whether gifts are truly meant to be gifts. The way in which Boulding and fellow researchers use the term 'grants' differs from today's incorporation into the institution of philanthropy, in which the 'economy of love' emerges through practices called grant-making. Grant-making and grant-makers are terms typically used for private foundations and their public counterparts. At Boulding's level of a more general economic framework, however, they also refer to state roles and activities as well as the actions of individual and collective actors. The term of grant-making then can also be used (against prevailing professional and popular usage) to refer to forced grants, although the meaning is more of a tribute (as well as the threat of one). This would include negative sanctions such as embargos and boycotts in international trade as a case of the 'economy of fear'. Boulding and co-authors argue that the grants economy acts like a regulator on the market economy because of its performance of integrative functions (income distribution, system maintenance, economic growth, technological advancement, etc.) (1972, p. 21). This proposition will be inspected in Chapter 13 as to the theoretical case of a 'benevolence state'.

Boulding makes the remarkable claim that "the grants economy represents the heart of the political economy, because it is precisely the level of one-way transfers that the political system intervenes in the economic system" (Boulding et al., 1972, p. 21). This may lead to an alignment of public, state interests with those of private wealth elites, even when the state may have the option of transfers that favor the non-elite but will in practice align with the elite. Purely by pecuniary value, philanthropy is not a major force in life when compared to exchange-based transfer. But economic value cannot be equated with other types of values outside the strictly price-based mechanism of a standard market for philanthropy is engaged in the production of singularities in the cultural and social sphere (see more in Chapter 13). A historical analysis would reveal a precise structural function in organizational fields and in the cultural meaning systems of society, as a mobilizing force in the economy of singularities and corresponding notions of creative entrepreneurship and 'permanent aesthetic innovation' (Reckwitz, 2017b). It would also reveal private wealth allocation to elite projects involving the furthering of entire organizations, industries, and fields.[6] The state, too, has been an active agent in subsidization of the cultural economy, suggesting a role typically not considered

6 Grant-recipient study shows what kind of formal organizations can receive grants: NGOs, INGOs, public charities, independent foundations, community foundations, global advocacy networks, religious charities, so-called 'friends-of' organizations, cultural associations (both

philanthropic but one which can be made visible as an 'economy of love' in the grants-economic framework.

Returning to arts-state relations, there are three main structural relations between the arts and the state: property (for example, copyright law), nuisance (exemption rule), and intervention (Becker, 1982, p. 167).[7] Intervention in Becker's terms takes the shape of support, censorship, and suppression, but all of these can be conceived of in grants-economic categories and relations pertaining to either the 'economy of fear' or the 'economy of love'. A recent example of intervention in the cinema field and in cultural production more generally is China PRC's efforts to suppress and censor films critical of some aspects of the country and playing in film festivals. Supports, or positive sanctions, which Chapter 11 has revealed as a mutually supporting relationships with forms of power as persuasion (Baumann, 1993b), can adopt a variety of forms and objects for the purpose of stimulating creativity, cooperation, and competition.

The research literature on cinema-field subsidization is remarkably thin, given the many forms that I will illustrate in the remainder of this section. Policy communication on grants is a more visible research resource, often biased toward serving companies' ends, but still providing the majority of publicly available information from which grants-economic structures in the cinema field can be inferred. To simplify I conceive of grants as public and private monies, governments' direct and indirect funding, and legal mechanisms. These patterns show less of the typical arguments about the neoliberal age of marketization, suggesting that there is another complexity at work which works itself out through interdependence between market and state in grants-economics relations. Market-intervening instruments are applied around the world and are launched to secure national audio-visual interests in production and national and international exhibition in an area of trade believed to be under control of deregulation. This fact was concealed perhaps by debates on the necessity and legitimacy of public subsidies, ushered in by neo-conservative policy and the corresponding rise of populism, observable, for example, in the United States (Lewis & Brooks, 2005; Scitovsky, 1972). The

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local and bilateral), universities, research think tanks, research policy centers, community federations, welfare associations, and governments.

7 Artists are one occupational group whose behaviors must be exempted for the sake of allowing autonomous art, art that challenges mainstream values or values of particular social groups (Becker, 1982, p. 178). A structural equivalent is the necessary exemption of the medical doctor, whose skills will harm the body unless the intervention is exempted as nonharmful—accomplished mainly by medical doctors taking the Hippocratic Oath.

following section provides empirical illustrations of the grants-economic phenomena in the cinema field.

2.1 *'There Is No Business Like Show Business'*

Tax on theatre admissions is one of the oldest ways of financing future productions. There are also favorable trade laws, quota for particular movie product (e.g., restricting foreign product; (e.g., Yecies, 2007)), and tax shelter and subsidies. Furthermore, there are 'incentive schemes' for investors in exchange for tax abatement. Industrial producers can receive public support to alleviate their losses from piracy in form of intellectual-property theft (policing that crime, however, is still a taxpayer's outlay), a consequence of possibilities of value circulation in the digital economy that may undercut the movie business's attempt to generate valuable profits, including the 'buzz' in classical and festival performances, from theatrical opening before releasing the product to other platforms (Smits, 2019). Support for the industry can also be extended indirectly and in form of a threat such as refusal of licenses to video theatres to encourage cinema consumption in the 'classical format' (see Chapter 3). As seen in the UK, national lottery funds can provide co-financing of movies according to the rule that they will be distributed successfully in the market place, to keep national film alive despite of Hollywood dominance as already discussed. Such funds may end up providing an indirect incentive to Hollywood distribution companies to take up the 'fight' for British film. As means of 'epistemic persuasion' (see Chapter 11), Hollywood can be raised as specter to support actors claims to national and local film, and under certain circumstances there may be elaborate rent-seeking, as argued for subsidy arrangements (Govil, 2017).

The 'soft power' of Europe is located in and represented by a mix of organizations, centrally among them EURIMAGES, a program by the Council of Europe since 1989, the MEDIA program, governments, and film boards. The MEDIA subprogram of Creative Europe is the main policy instrument in support of the audio-visual industry, legitimized politically by goal formulations pertaining to stabilizing democracy, respect for freedom, and media pluralism—all according to the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Parliament, 2021). European audio-visual policy is served by an immense institutional infrastructure in pursuit of a single European market for audio-visual services. A network in which Europe collaborates with Latin American and the Caribbean, for example, has over sixty member states (one of them being the EU itself). Audio-visual policy intersects with many other policies and grants-economic areas, including citizen protection, education, technological innovation, intellectual property, public access to cultural goods (and safeguarding cultural heritage), and more.

During the decade in which Europe's policy makers began their direct public subsidization of cinema and television industries, the United States introduced measures to stimulate cinema production according to its national-institutional traditions of industrial policy. At the state level, and to prevent 'runaway production' to the Canadian cities of Toronto and Vancouver, authorities provided a range of mainly taxation-policy instruments to stop the flight while attracting foreigners to set up film production as well as business from other states of the Union. In 1997, Canada answered with a movie production incentive program. 'Shooting movies' is a highly bureaucratic and costly activity comparable to getting building-construction permits, even when films are smaller productions, setting perfect terms for an 'economy of love' which can be supported with aesthetic-creative imagery valorizing 'shooting locations' (a competition furthered by film commissions and film bureaus) such as beautiful mountain areas or the creative city and its downtown area, creating favorable opinion and stimulating—if all goes according to plan—creative 'local talent' markets and related economic activities (Petrov, 2008). In the US, the Jobs Creation Act of 2004 represented a tax incentive for film producers in the low- and medium budget range, i.e., less than 20 million US dollars, under IRC Section 181—creating favorable financial conditions for producers, who were allowed to deduct the costs of qualifying film in full in the year of cost incurrence. Thus, while it is often claimed that the US film industry is purely business, information on subsidies reveals a support role by the state for independent movie production, with the mandate to make this industry segment more competitive.

To explore the grants economy in cinema, we need not stay with examples of the Global North. Innovation policy on film production is observable in other countries and can be tied to public financial support that essentially serves a range of industries. In 2010, for example, the President of Nigeria pledged to create a 200 million US dollar loan fund for a movie project that would adopt new computer-based technologies in the production or post-production phases. The government's role can even be larger, as it may choose to support and interlink infrastructure, such as selecting companies (in supposedly competitive bidding processes) to have them build cinemas, studios, and processing facilities, and invite them to invest in film production. Such policies may introduce private-public partnerships with powerful industry elites in the background. For example, an initial investment of 147 million US dollars for the above case (to the Egyptian Cinema Company) was backed by the Egyptian Chamber of Cinema, National Bank of Egypt and MISR National Bank. The banks invested 20 percent, the individual 'strategic investors' 30 percent, and the remaining 30 percent floated on the Cairo Stock Exchange.

A further example is that many countries offer Indian producers subsidies to encourage tourism through location-embedding into the content, which in turn will appeal to the extraordinarily large audience India has for distributors. India releases well over 1,000 movies a year, but has only 12 screens per million. This must be compared to the 117 screens per millions in the US and the Hollywood presence on screens around the world. But public subsidy can also be huge were small countries attempt to stave off the decline of their industries. Around the year 2000, the most heavily publicly funded cinema industries were Austria and Azerbaijan (90 percent) and closely following Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal (above 80 percent). This general picture taken from the trade press can be corroborated with research that, although rare, is available from a diversity of countries.

In a study of US state-level incentive programs over the period of 1998–2013, Michael Thom (2018) finds nothing close to a result resembling success in the creation of permanent employment in a magnitude corresponding with a good job-growth rate. Even if sustainable over several years, it would not be a break-through-the ceiling effect to be expected from a subsidy program in form of a real job growth stimulus. If anything, the inspected programs tended to create higher wages for workers in demand due to short supply, with wage increases shouldered by favorable taxes. Thom concludes that most state programs would 'certainly qualify as a bubble' resulting from policy makers' competition with peers or goal to gain voter compliance. McKenzie and Walls (2013)'s study of subsidy effects on box office (based on a sample of 1997–2000 movie productions) finds no impact on financial movie success even where the movies were released on a higher number of screens and were made with higher budgets, including advertising and marketing investments. This effect could not even be established for the crucial 'opening week' results for box-office income.

Yet another study on incentives, this time on favorable conditions for movie production, demonstrated for the case of the *Hobbit* in New Zealand the many concessions by the national government to the film industry as well as the vulnerability of government employment policy to threats of business withdrawal (a feature of the 'economy of fear'). It shows that the government gave in, as it removed from the New Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000 crucial employment based-rights and protections for film production workers in the negotiations of business deals (Conor, 2015, p. 33).[8]

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8 Despite these concessions, New Zealand then lost the Lord of the Rings franchise because of its Covid-19 restrictions, with Amazon shifting production of its series to Northern Ireland. See https://www.belfastlive.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/lord-rings-made-uk-second-21300006.

In Germany, studied during 1993–2005, the constraints and opportunities in a federal system of cultural-economic promotion shows that the federal government is permitted to only further economic aspects, whereas the regional government can support both cultural and economic goals, with all 16 states of the German federation being able to coordinate film policy to improve the effectiveness of subsidies and formulate a common standpoint on media policy. Germany's cinema has been kept alive by state subsidies and co-production support involving the television sector (cf. Chalaby, 2009), which has different aesthetic demands on film. To maintain a diverse infrastructure in the cinema exhibition field, the government hands out prize money for cinemas willing to play a high proportion of European film, assists rural cinemas with print acquisition, and other measures to support efforts that will strengthen rural and regional identity (European Coordination of Film Festivals & OPTEM, 1999, p. 89). A study using panel data from the Italian film industry finds that 45 percent of the movies produced between 2002 and 2011 received public support, averaging over 600,000 EUR per movie. The maximum support was in value of 4 million EUR. Ninety percent of well over 450 movies shown in film festivals and/or received prizes from award ceremonies were subsidized by the Italian government (Meloni et al., 2015, p. 5).

Turning to Asia, Taiwan took to subsidization of the national film industry after lifting import quota, which resulted in more Hollywood 'blockbusters' (Cucco, 2009) being on screen in the country's theatres. As Taiwan's New Wave of Independent Cinema proved successful abroad while failing in the domestic market, the government developed a range of measures, such as subsidization via the tax system, direct support in form of small grants to co-fund film marketing and exhibition, production support (present since the early 1990s), income tax breaks for film companies (since 2004), and bonus payments for future projects trying to reach artists already financially successful or topping the box-office charts (since 2008). For 'marginal movies', exhibiting firms can apply for grants helping screening them even when they are predicted to 'flop', an outright gift to exhibitors. In addition, there is private-to-private philanthropic support for low-budget movie productions, coming from "rich families for the purpose of supporting the filmmaking projects of their offspring" but also private philanthropy for movies the grant-makers deem relevant (Shiau & Aveyard 2011, p. 134).

To sum up this small set of studies, which illustrates their heterogeneous methodological and other study features, the state (1), often in private-public partnership, engages in cinema projects that economists characterize as incurring 'radical uncertainty'. The subsidization, either through tax incentives or direct subsidies, (2) often connects, through projects, actors across the

entertainment industries (e.g., real estate, food brands, tourist boards etc.). Given the movie as a case of an immersive environment, where elements potentially constitute product (branded food items seen in movies etc., which must be cleared by intellectual property rights), the chains of actors involved in film finance, while being difficult to discern, can be substantial. The returns to government input (3) are not always clear. The few reports on white-collar crime in cinema investment show that governments can lose money or misplace incentives, and never see substantial return to revenue through such economic-growth stimuli (Geballe, 2009). Having illustrated the general pattern of state-economy relationships in the global cinema field, I now turn to particular subsidies in relation to film festivals: co-production, festival funds, and training initiatives.

2.2 *Film Festivals and Relation to Subsidization*

From the perspective of the European Commission the function of film festivals is to help European films to achieve visibility domestically and abroad, and the priorities include the increase in volume of international sales. EC support under the Creative Europe/MEDIA program for film festivals defines them (in 2017) as 'audio-visual events programming eligible films (fiction, documentary, or animation), which are screened to wide audiences composed of general public, accredited, an international audio-visual industry professions as well as the media' operating in accordance with 'clear procedures on selection and other regulatory items'. The legal form can be private, nonprofit, association, charity, foundation, municipal government agency to allow for subsidization. The policy is restricted to membership countries participating in the funding of the program, and funded festivals must be established and owned by nationals from those countries. The eligibility criteria further exclude 'commercial works', 'amateur films', non-narrative art as well as 'thematic festivals' that narrowly focus on selected topics (Krainhöfer, 2019, pp. 5–6).

The Commission also wants film festivals to collaborate and network for the purpose of "greater synergies that could maximize the impact of European support" (2019, p. 2). As the director of the audio-visual policy, culture and sports program of the European Commission formulates at the beginning of this era of culturalization policy:

> Our policy is to help festivals whose activity has the same ends in view as our own. It is up to the Member States, the regions and the municipalities to play the leading role in supporting festivals. It is their responsibility. Our own concern is with the European dimension of the festivals. And as

> soon as this European dimension comes into being, we shall be there to help you. I think it is important to make this point clear.
>
> JEAN-MICHAEL BAER in European Coordination of Film Festivals & OPTEM, 1999, p. 84

The former director of Europa Cinema, Claudie-Eric Poiroux (also festival director of Premiers Plans d'Angers, France) reported about 30,000 EUR-priced grants for exhibitors programming, promoting, and educating on European films in 1999. This came with the condition of providing film education for young audiences to mitigate the impact of American movie culture—a goal around which forty cities and cinema exhibitors started to partner up with local film festivals (European Coordination of Film Festivals & OPTEM, 1999, p. 93).

Falicov (2016)'s already mentioned study of film festival funds (see Chapter 5) highlights the several items that grants distributed through fund competition reward: training for talented directors, funding, providing space for work and networking, and post-production initiatives. The grant criteria introduce a number of structural elements that reflect funders' goals to create a transnational product, such as the obligatory inclusion of co-production partners from the funding countries, and expectations of successive successes that attract interest by private financiers. Film festivals ought to 'build cultural bridges' and educate about cultural diversity, while also shaping a pan-European identity and retaining the many languages spoken in the European Union.[9] As an example of demand specifics for grants to festivals in Peru, Barrow (2016) writes that younger filmmaking generations, who are typically less used to state support, will search for funding sources, finding them not in national organizations but in international film festivals with funding schemes. This reflects the scope of European film festival policymaking. The small range of such funding schemes (e.g., Stevens, 2011, p. 147) highlights their competitiveness.

Detailed studies, as cited here, underscore the existence of a grants-economic pattern pertaining to subsidies linked to economic development—thus, charting the contours of a developmental state that provides the conditions for cultural supply in excess, while not funding across the breadth of artistic talent, but promoting economic entrepreneurship under notions of 'creative commons' (see Potts, 2019). They are also an outward sign of strong alliances between business and policy elites in areas pertaining to the aesthetic-digital

9 Over ninety percent of the EU-movie productions, according to one source, are never screened beyond their country of production (Öner, 2009, p. 187).

economy in many countries around the world (on industry lobbying by FIAPF in Australia see Dawson, 1998; Stevens, 2016).

Press and academic research contributions on public subsidies provide first evidence for the role of tax incentives and direct subsidization for cinema. The data provide a clear picture of various means of coordination and collusion involving industry and festival worlds, underscoring the value of festival intermediaries. They also strengthen the insight that the European Union has created an 'economy of love', legitimized by democratic aspects of the bloc and the national countries that are its core members, and by a common union against Americanization. Protective measures include heavy regulation of arts nonprofits such as film festivals which depend on grants. This regulation suggests itself as a challenge to the self-identification of the collective of film festival practitioners as a free community of artists and audiences and an alternative to Hollywood, which must be seen more nuanced in the context of trade of cultural goods and services.

As shown, several countries use tax-exemption measures to stimulate business activity and employment growth by supporting movie productions, and although research has tentatively shown that tax-exemption measures for businesses may not result in the goals they promise (or goals policy makers want them to have to legitimize funding from the state), such measures have grown by magnitude, complexity and quantity. They can also be seen in countries not so well known for public spending on democratic culture. The preservation and international showcasing of national artistic and linguistic culture and landscape is a further motivation for state subsidy and trade protection, which may also enable the state to promote its preferred presentation of that culture as having unique show value (Böhme, 2017). The subsidization of industry business must also be considered in the context of the strategies designed to keep independent filmmakers at bay with economically unsustainable grants and weakly profitable merit competitions. It suggests the funding of a high-risk cultural industry with public monies (Wasko, 2004), legitimated by the necessity of protecting or creating more cultural goods. Subsidization in Europe, as briefly discussed here, is reflected in American movie business handbooks as 'overseas tax incentives and government subsidies'.[10]

Additionally, the study of philanthropic grant-making for actors in the cinema field (Falicov, 2016) points to entrants into this culturalization-policy field by private and public philanthropy, stimulating merit-based competitions to

10 With rarely published openness, a Walt Disney Pictures executive tells how those measures deemed for locals can be captured by US American firms through co-production deals and other business-friendly measures (see Steven Gerse in Squire, 2004, pp. 486–496).

detect talent, and adding themselves to social and cultural elites that reside over arts nonprofits as trustees on organizational boards—a phenomenon that awaits research. I argue that the study of such public support adds further support for the hegemony of the creativity dispositif, being one of its pillars indeed. The imperative to have a creative (or aesthetic economy) has enabled the state to step in, including having a role in the development of regional and local economies (for a case study see Palmi et al., 2016) and strengthening its role in higher-education sectors.

Being curtailed by austerity politics, it has nevertheless developed a large zone of influence that mainly serves elites and is characterized by winner-take-all markets (Frank & Cook, 2010) rather than independent cinema as an autonomous craft. Indeed, as the eligibility criteria by the European Commission show, amateur movies (so-called) are not even legitimate grant-seekers. It shows that the state funds indirectly through organizations, both business and nonprofit forms, rather than supporting citizen-artists directly. The results of such measures are international networks build on film finance and subsidies, but also a substantial increase of bureaucratic organizations typically concealed in creative-entrepreneurial narratives as to their increased significance (Maier et al., 2016).[11] This chapter further confirms film festivals' role in market-making and the major features of FCE (see Chapter 4). It complements the view by business scholars that innovations may not be market-entrepreneurial products by risk-takers scrambling for social and reputational capital in festivals and fairs, but an outcome influenced by offers of public subsidy as one important factor that needs to be added to the sources and channels of innovations.

3 Concluding Discussion

As proposed by Rhyne, the commercialization is only one aspect of film festival population growth. What then are these "kinds of quasi-capitalist economic activities" and what does it mean to say that "the administrative and economic practices of community organizations and nonprofits are inseparable from political and cultural agendas", aligning interests of social movements with those of markets and nations (Rhyne, 2007, p. 298)? The study of culturalization policy in the cinema field and the grants-economic perspective

11 For example, the British Film Institute is the United Kingdom's primary organization for cinema and television asks visitors to its website immediately for support as a charity. Here 'philanthropic love' masks the protective measures of an assumed austerity state.

have facilitated the inquiry into these claims, demonstrating how the film festival organizations are 'network citizens' in the production of creative outputs while being governed by a political concept of cultural diversity that puts them into an economy of excess production in goods characterized by high uncertainty. Festivals' intermediary role seems possible in the context of a sanctioning developmental state in the area of cinema and television, taking the role of a patron over national and democratic values. As a soft power, festivals enter the larger context of trade and provide a diplomatic tool for persuasion and positive sanctions exerted by the EU and other countries in defense of art they purport to nurture.

The second-order planning in the 'creative city' (Reckwitz) is reflected in an undergirding grants-economic regime which facilitates charitable business rather than the artist. This grants economy follows a philanthropic logic even where public subsidies are concerned, as they foster merit competition as major aspect of the institution of philanthropy—indeed, even its credo. Film festival managers have been stressing for long the underfunding of their operations, a pattern that sharply contrasts with their intermediation activities and the subsidization of the more profitable commercial actors and the rise of bureaucratic infrastructure facilitating the cultural-development state.

Some festival researchers have doubted the efficacy of this grants system. Shiau and Aveyard illustrate the fate of many determined political movies with the film *Let it Be*, which narrates the direct effect on the livelihood of an ageing rice farmer from the lifting of the rice-import ban in preparation for Taiwan's joining WTO in 2002. As a movie financed by public television, domestically celebrated by a small, private support community, internationally circulated in film festivals, the authors conclude that it made no difference to poverty or trade policy (Shiau & Aveyard, 2011). As in Rojek's global events, participants are affected by such stories. Yet, it remains to be seen whether cultural-diversity policy resonating with the imperative of the creativity dispositif can offer sustainable solutions to injustice and inequality. The Brazilian filmmaker Glauber Rocha—notably, in 1965—referred to this situation as the 'cultivation of a taste for misery' by European observers of Latin American underdevelopment (see in MacKenzie, 2014, p. 218).

I hope to have demonstrated that the cinema field may be a clear example of the proposition that the grants economy is the means by which the political system intervenes in the economy (Boulding, 1973). To study such instances as patterns of social and economic life I believe that we need to adopt a new model of the economy. Here, Elder-Vass's proposal of a 'provisioning economy' provides a perspective, as this framing of the economy includes "activities that create or deliver benefits to people whether or not they operate through

commodity exchange" (2016, p. 216). He advocates that we need to switch out of market-economic thinking to understand the current economic forms and their complexes of practices, to which market models cannot be easily applied. Grant economics supports this proposal, while allowing for parsimonious modeling of the breadth of the phenomena the concept describes. Regarding Reckwitz's work, I argue that there is not only an aesthetic economy but also a grants economy which cements the dispositif of creativity into late-modern society. Singularization entails the intertwining of these economies of practice as well as the melding of two powerful logics of contemporary society—creativity imperative, prescribing experience-seeking and making, the logic of benevolence, putting gratitude over equality, identity and diversity over equality. Both of these logics enable 'project work' (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b), legitimizing support in form of grant cycles pertaining to novelty production, project-term money, and start-up culture. In the last chapter of this book, I move to an interpretation of these patterns in dialogue with current capitalism theory, identifying gaps and points of resonance to articulate festivalization as process leaving its mark on current capitalism and the failure of national states to address redistributive justice concerns.

CHAPTER 13

Activation, or the Eclipse of the Civic Polis

> In order to establish this 'acceptable equilibrium' and produce this new form of 'poverty', neoliberals use institutions of the Welfare State, which they always opposed because it produces 'social property', overturning the functions and ends they were meant to fulfil. They have learned to tame its institutions and make them serve the ends of neoliberal capitalism, in much the same way as they have tamed democratic institutions to ensure they remain dominated by an 'oligarchy of wealth'.
>
> LAZZARATO, 2009, p. 128

In this last chapter, I explore 'the knot that ties' festivalization to capitalism, as interlinkage between a quasi-linguistic structure of formally planned yet practically spontaneous encounters in the organized immersive environments and maintained by an 'informal lexical stability' (Elsaesser, 2005) with capitalism as "a spectacular case of a power-laden yet long-enduring structure" marked by a "surface instability" emerging from the core procedure of capitalism—the interconvertibility of values into exchange value, with the commodity form "making almost all resources readable as exchangeable commodities" (Sewell, 2005, pp. 145–151). Taking Sewell's perspective (adopted from Charles Sabel), I will reconstruct this relationship, keeping in mind that capitalism is dynamic, showing high compatibility with a "wide variety of institutional arrangements and property relations" (2005, p. 149). Following Sewell's assessment of political structures, the state is characterized by large power concentrations. Political structures can vary as to their depth (institutedness) and thus durability. The bureaucratic form is extremely durable, adjusting to the social process of aestheticization as Chapters 4 and 7 have discussed. Languages as structures, to which I equate what I have studied as the festivalization of the cinema field, are deep and durable but, according to Sewell, characteristically weak in power. Festivals represent the combination of low power and durability which they attain from a larger formation of discourse pertaining to communication and postmodern culture (see Chapter 12).

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In this chapter I will argue that private and public philanthropy are major institutional supports for the creativity dispositif's global spread, inviting an explanation regarding the legitimization of the overt 'affective positivity culture' emerging in 'affective orders' (Chapter 11) specific to post-traditional, cosmopolitan events. Part 4 proposes the ways in which philanthropy 'affects' the state, pointing towards a transformation ongoing about eighty years, and barely taken into account in theories of capitalism. I address a significant institutional re-configuration which I tentatively call a 'benevolence state'. This institutional arrangement contains, of course, variance similarly to the way we observe to the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), but I will focus on an ideal-typological discussion common to Weberian sociology, while drawing on observations pertaining to US American philanthropy as national and global phenomenon. The overall goal of this outline is to advocate the incorporation of the complex relationships between welfare state, civil society, and the state as a dynamic historical configuration into contemporary critiques of capitalism. In my view, this necessitates a more holistic framework for the study of the economy, as provided, for example, by grants economics (see Chapter 12), and relatedly the abandoning of the isolating study of nonprofit sectors which have been equated with civil society. While this chapter incorporates the empirical research on cinema and its cultural politics into a theoretical discussion of 'deep structure', it addresses the film festival scholars' concern over the 'economization' of festival events directly. Still, this necessitates a few excursions into discourses, at this time, mostly external to critical media scholarship.

Returning to cultural globalization and 'global civil society', and aligning such discussions with the welfare-state discourse in the field of capitalism theory, will benefit the global view on philanthropy and the development of a 'benevolence state' regardless of the variance in, or an absence of, the comprehensive social policy-related structures and instituted meanings underlying a governed 'social state'. From this vantage point, the regimes of governance by benevolence, the logic most developed today through the institutional growth of philanthropy, permit us to see that the renaissance of civil society so-called, the growth of elite culture, and the dismantling of institutions once responsible for redistributive justice founded on values like equality and solidarity, rights and entitlements (Holmwood, 2000; Somers, 2010; Turner, 2001), rather than gratitude and merit are interconnected structures. This permits us to assess the significance of festivalization beyond the narrower concern of aesthetic-economic activities and cultural work. This entails the examination of key factors in 'the epochal shift from a semantic of allocational struggles to valorization struggles' (Berthold Vogel in Soziopolis, 2017–2018). Welfare-state

scholars have already begun this work by scrutinizing 'activation' as a policy principle of the fading Keynesian welfare state as an 'austerity state', but have yet to examine the rise of other regimes that enlarge the grants-economic sphere through what I call a 'taxation state' promoting indirect taxation over allocation 'from the center' (Bugra & Agartan, 2007; Polanyi, 1957).

Picking up from Chapter 12, this chapter elucidates the 'economy of love' (Boulding, 1973) as governed by a historically specific version of ideas of the commons. Rather than being a 'third sector' ideological distant to the state, as is the common sense in nonprofit scholarship (e.g., Keane, 1998, 2003), this 'economy of love' reproduced by a globally instituting logic of philanthropic benevolence gives shape to a 'benevolence state'. Being captured by unelected elites, this state keeps growing, transforming civil society into a strongly legitimated but weakly socially coordinated social force (Hardt & Negri, 2001), as we also detected in cinema festivalization. The institutionalist approach of this chapter supplements the theory of a hegemonically operating creativity dispositif (Reckwitz, 2017b) and returns us to the problem of social critique (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b) (Chapters 1 and 12).

The chapter begins with a brief introduction to philanthropy. In this chapter I am concerned primarily with 'Big philanthropy', private foundation philanthropy, as associated rationalized practices which emulate middle-class activities through nonprofit organization to the logic of philanthropy (Van Til & Ross, 2001). I consider philanthropists as strategic elites (Keller, 1968) in their historic specificity, and charity/philanthropy as successfully rationalized and diffused complexes of social organization and related cultural practices (Hwang & Powell, 2009). In a second section I turn to 'activation', using Stephan Lessenich's work to clarify the parallel formation of the restructured welfare state and 'rationalization of charity'. I argue that Big philanthropy has a crucial role to play in welfare ideology pertaining to the Post-Keynesian Welfare State. The third section inspects civil society discourse, both as a sociological framework (the Civic Polis by convention-economic sociologists, (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b)) and as the interdisciplinary discourse of academic and public origin which celebrates the renaissance of civil society nudging the shaping of an uneven playing field of 'global civil society'. Drawing on the conception of a 'regime of benevolence' by Silber (2011), and Boltanski and Chiapello's important insight on changing semantics from equality to inclusion/exclusion, moves us closer to a formulation of the philanthropy-state relationship. In the concluding section, I draw together the various arguments about the benevolence state, affective positivity culture, and festivalization, which will render a sense of the mutual empowerment between philanthropic and creativity ideologies.

1 The National and International Arena of Philanthropy

Philanthropy and its constellation of nonprofits can broadly be accounted for, but not explained, by the arguments of an 'organizational revolution' denoting an explosion-like emergence of formal-rational organizations around the middle of the twentieth century (cf. Bromley & Meyer, 2017, p. 942). Commonly communicated as a 'sector' despite its complex interdependencies with for-profit economic and government-side ideas for economic and social development, reproducing the cultural imagery of a 'third' or 'independent' sector occupying a space between market and state (e.g., Keane, 1998, 2003), nonprofit practices appear as seemingly unrelated to political and unelected elites represented by their philanthropic foundations, and at times being 'hired by the state' (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). The tendency to shift public service functions to another realm of accountability, including a 'workfare regime' for the middle classes, is borne out by some statistics on French and German nonprofit employment (Archambault et al., 2014).[1] Estes and Alford (1990) asked already thirty years ago whether "the ideologies of self-help, self-determination, and individual responsibility [will] continue to shield the nonprofit sector (and for how long), especially since they may also undermine the nonprofit sector". The dimension of an international-relations regime calling on governments and nonprofit organizations to cooperate, however, takes us closer to the role of philanthropy in civil society (Vogel, 2006, 2010), showing a global arena in addition to regional and national settings in which grant-makers (both public or private) next to political elites frame in significant ways the capabilities and value orientations of a civil society (Akman, 2012; Hearn, 2001). Putting social groups back into analysis of organizational and institutional arrangements, reveals the pervasive presence of new and old elites which can occupy such value-leadership positions (Cousin & Chauvin, 2017; McGoey, 2016; McGoey & Thiel, 2018; Monier, 2018; Moran, 2014).

The empowerment of philanthropists in this capacity has been conditioned by generational continuity in the wealth elites. First-generation Big

1 Archambault and co-authors (2014) show that the big winners of German government policy on nonprofit sector growth are the Welfare Associations (mostly founded in the nineteenth century) with their 'nonprofit market size' increasing since the 1960s. Around the first decade of the 2000s, the nonprofit labor markets for both countries have a mix of flexible labor such as 'mini jobs', an extremely disproportionate gender ratio (around 70 percent are women), and a part-time employment more common than in government agencies (49 percent vs. 29 percent). This cooperation between German government and welfare organizations may help to 'strengthen civil society' but not without privatizing risk to nonprofit workers.

Philanthropy originated from the extractive and heavy industries, but has largely been replaced in terms of highly visible leadership positions in 'global civil society' by those attaining their wealth from the aesthetic-digital economy and the financial services sector (see also Callahan, 2017). Company leaders like those who steered the rise of Apple, Facebook, Google, Amazon and Microsoft (the so-called 'tech-giants') have come to dominate the economy of singularities—and its economics. They have also channeled their wealth-determined influence through adopting philanthropy projects close to their businesses (and sometimes their personal) interests, investing in art, culture, healthcare and education projects, sticking to the tradition of social elites (Ostrower, 1997). The adoption of gift-economic conceptions by the associational realm (for festival nonprofits cf. Gamson, 1996; Rhyne, 2007) can be observed as waxing precisely at a time the Keynesian welfare state has been waning.

Both rationally organized philanthropy (Acs, 2017) and the aesthetic-digital economy significantly display their capacities to operate on a logic of abundance and excess, with boundaries between the two at times not discernible (Elder-Vass, 2016; see also Till, 2013).[2] While one may claim this a facet of American entrepreneurship (Acs & Phillips, 2002), the globalization of this pattern today cannot be undebated, and must be placed in a real connection to the growth of wealth elites regardless of the national states' respective development status. 'Mega philanthropy' is far from being a priority pastime of wealth elites, often rhetorically dwarfed by the sheer figures of business wealth or presented, as done by some, as small portion of what the state spends (for example, Moran, 2014). To get a clearer idea of the inter-elite connections and the related interests in a benevolence state, the narrow economic view that even 'Big philanthropists' give away only a small part of their wealth and a fraction of what the state spends, must be rejected for ignoring the political leverage that these donations can exert—by setting an agenda for 'good cause' spending which governments then follow, and by directly lobbying the inner circles of government (another meaning of fundraising is related to that), or getting appointed to advise on government-policy programs.

Big philanthropy is facilitated in that regard by the structures of 'global civil society' where it also shapes its culture of visionaries and self-images of stewards of the commons. This global organizational network, tied to global

2 Even in the festival world, some of these links are direct, such as for example, Jeff Bezos's maintenance of a film submission mechanism (the product name is Withoutabox.com) that would facilitate low-cost submission for filmmakers, yet giving Amazon market influence over the online market for DVD during 2000-2018.

governance structure and policy institutions, can hardly be ignored for its architecture observable through a list of legal regulation, political legislation, legal, taxation, and wealth advisors, corporate philanthropy, 'giving circles', philanthropic fundraisers, philanthropy rankings, grant-seeking nonprofits and grant-making foundations, and so on. This only begins to describe the contours of an emerging institutional environment in which the logic of benevolence plays itself out.

Notwithstanding global civil society's ubiquity, philanthropy research has never grown into a large area of knowledge production despite foundations fostering an interest in its own legitimating logic since the early years (e.g., Barman, 2017; Lagemann, 1999; Parmar, 2015). Relegated to the periphery of management perspectives on nonprofit organizations, it is little prepared to address the status quo of elite power.[3] Nonprofit research's silence on philanthropic power and associated relations of great inequality (masked by a culture of conviviality and generosity) must be considered in the context of philanthropy's ascent which parallels the welfare state and the adoption of variations of Keynesian macroeconomic policy after and around WWII, especially in industrially advanced societies and reconstructed economies after the defeat of fascism (Blaug, 1990). Around the start of the 1980s, philanthropy could be seen to expand its support for higher-education institutions across private and public domains. A paralleling social world of fundraising activities, emerging in the early twentieth century from a perceived need to communicate with the colleges and universities' environments, would accompany the rise as well as spread of Big philanthropy's models across the US and the world, arriving in the 1990s in Europe and later elsewhere (Vogel, 2002).

A consequence of this massive expansion of influence was the 'rationalization of charity' as discussed already in this book. Around the 1990s, philanthropy started to become creative—quite in the sense of the spreading creativity dispositif (Reckwitz, 2014a)—, as new generations of philanthropic foundation leaders joined boards of trustees of mighty foundations, if not helming them completely (McGoey, 2016). Philanthropy research is stuck in a bind, as it thrives in a wealth-funded culture of think tanks, research institutes, academic 'chairs', libraries, and donated schools of nonprofit management and social entrepreneurship, strategy study groups, media schools and so on (e.g., Denham & Stone, 2004)—therefore, in a culture of finding ever new and 'novel'

3 E.g., the index in Michael Edwards' *Civil Society* contains no entry for foundation or philanthropy, but lists names of persons and organizations. The only related commentary says that 'donor agencies' are rarely held accountable for the impact they make, especially in foreign aid (2004, p. 105).

approaches for solving the problems of world society at home and abroad. While this meant staying on the traditional model of elite philanthropy, the notion of 'stewardship' as already postulated by the old guard, underwent—based on this portrayed knowledge economy with access being easy for civil-society members as well as celebrated donors—a significant semantic shift, inviting philanthropists of any size of wealth to actively intervene in the organizations that sought them out for grants. This development toward the end of the twentieth century marks the rise of the creative philanthropy entrepreneur, steeped in a language that takes its wisdom from positive psychology (one of the wellsprings of creativity ideology, as shown by Reckwitz).

Observing more closely philanthropy, fundraising, and nonprofit discourse as such epistemological supports allows me to suggest that if Boltanski and Chiapello had included into their analysis nonprofit management writings (including occupational literature on the fundraising profession where these ideas are treated with expert attention), they would have revealed the paralleling rise of the welfare state and an arena of wealth redistribution and self-appointed management of the commons—including in their theory of late twentieth-century capitalism this world of activities and meanings as a basis for their third spirit's emergence. Indeed, many of the ideas that would congeal into an almost uniform notion of social capital (Bourdieu & Steinrücke, 2005) in an astonishingly short time can be traced back to philanthropically backed visions pertaining to the emerging network capitalism. While the renaissance of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur (cf. Bröckling, 2007) plays a significant role in the making of 'creative' and 'inspired' philanthropy and its influence over the nonprofit realm as a mimetically adoptable model (see Chapters 4 and 7), it is plausible to argue that the patterns of philanthropy may be related to a particular 'regime of justification', the matter of the third section.

As to the global scope of philanthropy ('international foundation philanthropy'), both mimetic and normative adoption foster the spread of models—of philanthropic stewardship in relation to ideas and resources regarding management of public goods—to the world, starting with Eastern and Central Europe, moving to other regions of the world, as well as returning to the old centers of industrial wealth like western Europe (Vogel, 2006, 2010). It could do so thanks to the formation of new 'elite connections' (Etzioni-Halevy, 2005) and bolstered by the discourse of a 'need' for liberal elites, who, of course, are nothing but the heirs of a grants-economically embedded higher-education system.

In the US, the Clinton Administration proved to be a turning point for a particular idea of redistribution via philanthropy. The liberal elites would join or support the Democratic Party and trade their (political) fundraising support

for the demotion of class issues as well as lobby the party on 'tax fairness' (Phillips, 2003, pp. 342–343). From today's vantage point it is clearer now that Clinton presided over a unique moment when the US federal budget moved into surplus because of heavy borrowing and financial investment by the private sector, sparked by financial deregulation. With full employment and rising incomes, it seemed the state had less to do and could 'give away' its budget surplus as tax cuts favoring those on highest incomes. The federal budget quickly slipped back into deficit, which massively widened when the financial boom proved unsustainable and collapsed. Yet, the 'ecology of philanthropy' had irreversibly changed in the course of the Clinton Administration years, with later incoming presidents staying on course regardless of political party values and ideology of public spending (see also Shipman et al., 2018). In the global arena and the unevenness of the world system, especially American philanthropy has immense global power of 'societal design' (for a case study see Wilson, 2018). It is Europe, however, where political and academic elites provided the necessary imagery of a 'Third Way' as seedbed for an ideological transformation of the welfare-state discourse, 'bending' it toward the more powerful US American discourse of the 'active citizen'.

2 Activation

In this section I make the case that philanthropy has been partaking in the 'activation' of citizens, precisely by joining and arguably co-creating the 'competition state' (see Jessop further below) and mobilizing citizens around the notion of a civil sphere (Alexander, 2008) in which they ought to be 'active'. This requires a working concept for the welfare state, which Bob Jessop's essay on the Post-Keynesian Welfare State (1999) offers as exemplary for a range of capitalism analyses with similar focus. (Barr, 2001; Le Grand & Robinson, 1984; Vic & Wilding, 1985; Wood & Gough, 2006). According to Jessop, the Keynesian Welfare National State ('the welfare state', hereafter) incorporated the 'strategic reorientation of its key economic and social functions', resulting in a new configuration he calls the Post-Keynesian Welfare State. The traits of this socio-economic policy regime include, firstly, the aspect that international competitiveness gains priority over national full employment; secondly, that social policy is exposed to a "productivist reordering", which then is prioritized over redistributive welfare rights; thirdly, the conception of 'governance' as a new imagery that de-privileges the national state vis-à-vis other governance levels (regional and global), which compete with each other (regardless of national sovereignty); and fourthly, a process of internationalization coordinating

across scales of economic and political action' (Jessop, 1999, p. 392). In another way this summary of transformations also describes processes of globalization. Philanthropy emerges as empowered in all these scenarios as I want to briefly illuminate.

Both curtailed redistributive welfare rights and policy-regime internationalization are trajectories in which philanthropy appears as problem-solver and new care-taker vis-à-vis the state and the national populations, entering as co-participant in fields formerly strongly regulated and promoted by social and cultural policy. This way, philanthropy could actively enlarge its historical grant-maker role, serving formats of 'policies, programs, and professions' (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) for its own expansion of influence over common welfare goals (Poggi, 1978, p. 123). It parallels the strategic reorientation of the welfare state toward a Schumpeterian workfare regime associated with the logic of austerity and 'post-welfarism' (McGimpsey, 2017).

The 'productivist reordering' of social policy entails a strategy of activation which also emerges through means of 'governance by culture' (see Chapter 12), representing a diversion from the principle of a 'caring state' (De Swaan, 1990). Some economic/social historians present the rise of 'civil society' as a return to the pre-Keynesian situation in which philanthropists, churches, labor unions and voluntary associations provide health, welfare, education and insurance services the state will not—a situation that never went away in countries where the state remained small (e.g., Green, 1993).

Certainly many of 'ordinary citizen' projects fostering common welfare would have not been possible without the financial backing by public and private philanthropy and the legal legitimacy given to nonprofits by the state (Lazzarato et al., 2017). This empowerment of philanthropy and legitimation of charitable firms within the boundary of the national state was furthered by the internationalization of policy regimes, giving philanthropy a permanent seat in the global-governance structure, advisory roles with respect to instructing governments, a role in aid regimes, and a hand in the making of 'global civil society' at global and national levels (Powell, 2007; Vogel, 2006). Regarding the formation of global governance, the priority placed on firms and capital over labor issues, makes a case of de-statization. The state has become "less hierarchical, less centralized, and less dirigiste in nature", making room for other powerful actors to step in, including ordinary citizens and elites along the spectrum of democracy. De-statization is also related to the promotion of what is nowadays a widely held and fully instituted belief that collaboration in all "varied forms and levels of partnerships between official, parastatal, and nongovernmental organizations in managing economic and social relations" (Jessop, 1999, p. 390). This, we can add, is served by the powerful imagery of

a 'global civil society' solving problems national states are not trusted with (Alexander, 2006; Archambault et al., 2014, p. 528; Goonewardena & Rankin, 2004; Wiarda, 2003). The 'Grand Person', to use a term by Boltanski and Thevenot (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007), emerges as the 'active citizen' as a micro-sociological model.

Stephan Lessenich's essay *Mobility and Control: on the Dialectic of an 'Active* Society' (Chapter 3 in Dörre et al., 2015) allows for a straightforward perspective on activation as a double process. The analysis of activation must be extend to the embrace of assumed civil-society capabilities by the state. Whereas the Post-Keynesian Welfare State exerts pressure on people to mobilize themselves in an entrepreneurial format as labor, the active citizen attains elaboration by the discourse of Tocquevillean civil society, based on the original insight by Tocqueville himself in America that a society can come to its own rescue when in need (see also Hearn, 2001). In the Post-Keynesian Welfare State, I argue, a second regime which I tentatively name the 'benevolence state' has risen alongside the 'workfare state'.[4] Both, I argue, constitute the institutional arrangement we observe in a retrenched and reformed welfare state. The 'workfare state' has largely been interpreted by analysts as an outcome of politicians' response to market fundamentalism. It also served, in my view, as a gift to philanthropy and nonprofit entrepreneurs to develop an arena of action. The 'benevolence state', the invisible companion-structure of the 'workfare state', is an outcome of politicians' embrace of the communitarian values and practices associated with the civil society renaissance and the ideological formation of social capital as an epistemological public good (Somers, 2005)—the 'Third Way' politics by Britain's Labor party, and specifically Tony Blair, being a national variant. In both 'benevolence' and 'workfare state', activation is the paradigm of governance.

McGimpsey (2017) in particular recognizes an important feature of this 'austerity state' which promotes the 'market state', namely the capacity by states to spend legitimately where spending can be decorated as 'social investment'. Common to both is the notion of merit which replaces the welfare-state society's achievement of entitlements, shifting to a semantic of mobilization. In the 'workfare state', the active citizen is diligent; in the 'benevolence state', the active citizen is a problem-solver and taker of initiatives—modelled in theory by Boltanski and Chiapello as 'project worker' (Chapter 7) and the creative subject (Reckwitz). Deduced from that, the 'workfare-state subject' fosters

4 The dismantling of the welfare state starting in the 1980s represents a return to Benthamite notions in form of a workfarism (Powell, 2007, p. 40); see also (Greer, 2016).

profane creativity or, alternatively, is excluded by lack of creative imagination altogether. These propositions can be elucidated with Lessenich's arguments.

While similarly emphasizing the shift towards a merit-based assignment of welfare, Lessenich traces it to different causes, internal to the national political system. In his view, a sociology of the 'active society' as a historically informed critique must de-mystify the welfare state as the 'state we do not want to return to', because the welfare state represents a technique of governmentality that prepares citizens for a market economy based on a peaceful maintenance of conflict between market-economic and constitutional democracy (Lessenich in Dörre et al., 2015, pp. 101–102). The welfare state appears here as a 'neutralizing force', a 'political regulatory force of capitalist and democratic movement' (2015, p. 118) which engages in activation of the citizen for a 'flexibilized' economy (Piore & Sabel, 1984). This tendency contrasts with the notion of citizens who would combine in collective action to claim ever more rights while being more sensitive toward the paternalism of the welfare state (Lessenich in Dörre et al., 2015, p; 124). Viewing domestic social changes rather than external economic pressure as the force for change, he sees paralleling processes of economization and the subjectification of the social—neither the 'public hand of state, nor invisible hand of market but the active hands of each and every one of us'. Here, Lessenich invokes not just governmentality theory (Rose et al., 2006) but also argues on the base of a communitarian-ideological inflection of the 'social contract' (Rousseau, see further below), which he then aligns with the 'mobile subject' in Boltanski and Chiapello's theory (2005b, p. 127).

Lessenich wants societies to abandon neoliberal governmentality, for the primary goal of making the subjects "*think* of and develop knowledge of themselves as potentially active". In this sense, he adopts the Grand Person of the connexionist world, a highly valued role because it mobilizes network power for the greater common good. However, unlike Boltanski and Chiapello who seek change through a polis in-formation emerging from the trials of a connexionist society, Lessenich seems to wish a new 'edition' of activation policy. Interestingly, there is no space for civil society to take action in his vision—therefore no constraint by the power of double activation by mechanism pertaining to both 'benevolence' and 'workfare state'.

I propose a different scenario by which an emerging 'benevolence state' replaces welfare-state paternalism, simultaneously legitimizing the 'workfare state' as an economizing project serving economic elites and their powerful version of economics. This remains consistent with the new principles summarized with Jessop's insights further above, including the imperative of a 'competition state'. This conjecture will be more obvious when we accept that

national sovereignty might have weakened vis-à-vis global capital, national capital are capable of 'flight' from high taxation or regulation, and global governance institutions prescribe models for national states, dominant foreign powers, and Big Philanthropy. At the same time, bureaucratization and regulation have increased through further rationalization of the private realm, including the associational sphere (see Bromley & Meyer, 2017; see also Smith & Lipsky, 1993).[5] According to Lessenich, the strong belief in a potential (future) re-capture of the welfare-state institution is an obstacle to citizen empowerment (through, for example, Basic Income policies that would put in place a 'social state' where none exists). I will argue that, in contrast, the space of the 'benevolence state' is emerging. The trajectory of rationalization together with a potent civil society ideology, which activates citizens to contribute where the state is claimed as incapacitated or not legitimate, enables the philanthropic elites and associated ideas and models for action to emerge as a powerful fortification of the Post-Keynesian Welfare State. This empowerment is supported by the taxation-state structure, characterized by a 'politics of exemption' for worthy elites and citizens, including their organizations.

The 'benevolence state' marks a privilege for both wealth and democracy in a way that foreseeably creates a conflict across the elites, some of whom will come to want to rescue the state or preempt further conflict. Thus, I suggest that taxation is the realm where we can observe the shift from a directly redistributive welfare state (in Polanyi's sense as re-allocation from the center) to an exemption state to call on 'private investors' in the realization of the welfare goals (cf. Raddon, 2008). Indeed, this calls for a grants-economic framework as proposed in the 1960s when philanthropy's empowerment was on the horizon in the United States (Boulding, 1972).

I propose to adopt Jessop's meaning of the 'competition state' to allow for both the role of philanthropic wealth elites, the state's co-creative role in the rationalization of charity, and its embrace for solutions at global and national levels of policy-making. Big philanthropy, unlike philanthropic benevolence as a human gesture, is specific in that it introduces meritocratic competition into society, not sparing political systems. This is attuned to the notion that elites can be made (and are self-made according to their own perception of attaining wealth), and that innovation (the social regime of N2, not revolution

5 The role of the state beyond a purely regulatory role has been resurrected through the post-Washington Consensus, following upon the Washington Consensus (Jessop, 1999; Somers, 2005).

(N1), see (Reckwitz, 2017b)), is the legitimate model for individual, social, and societal change. Here, Big philanthropy shows some historical continuity with the early ideas held by foundation philanthropists, while perpetuating through its institutions the ideology of (aesthetic) permanent innovation. The grant-making logic of merit-based competition and the mode of governance to achieve socioeconomic development has already been emulated by the state bureaucracy as public competitions for funds and projects show.[6] The dismantling of the welfare state and the rise of the Post-Keynesian Welfare State are therefore a project shared by elites. Philanthropy works through coordination via inter-elite and inter-professional links groomed in business and foundation activities (Galaskiewicz, 1991).

Many writers on civil society have argued that via the demands of democracy, the political class, whose survival depends on electoral democracy, not only has come to consider civil society activation as low-cost approach to welfare delivery but also to realize democracy-related goals by activating the possibilities of citizen participation supposedly absent from the earlier welfare state period. This chapter of history clearly needs to be rewritten as civil society is not free from counter-democratic forces (Akman, 2012). What I want to focus on here, however, is that political elites of the hour adopted the active society from communitarian discourse, thereby bending toward neoliberal and neoconservative forces' power and combating the threat from democratic mobilization during welfare-state reign. Such a conjecture fully agrees with Boltanski and Chiapello's formulation of the third spirit of capitalism and highlights the shift from state to self-provision, from public to private responsibility for safety and security, from collective to individual risk management, as discussed by many commentators on current transformations. In the next section, I inspect the discourse of civil society and the lack of theorizing about the institution of philanthropy.

6 The United States and Germany's respective higher-education systems provide evidence for two different trajectories arriving at the same competitive logic of institution-building characteristic of elite philanthropy. In the US, philanthropy stimulated the upward spiral of tuition fees for individual consumers through making universities unique in all its functions; in Germany, where there is no tuition but public civil service within the (public) universities, the 'Initiative for Excellence' has—in the remarkably short time of two decades—materialized the stratification of a sector and the crystallization of a set of universities with a flagship status similar to US public research universities as well as a quasi-Ivy League status. The state and within-science system reformers have tried to quieten critique from inside the system with a strategy of competition on (cultural) diversity, which has led to a flourishing of non-disciplinarity teaching subjects appealing to grant-makers as 'creative'.

3 Civic Polis, Positive Emotions, and the Disappearance of Equality

Looking at the Civic Polis and the 'regime of benevolence', we may be able to formulate how charity and philanthropy are anchored in our contemporary ideas of worthiness and welfare, how this particular construction of welfare can inform, transform, and 'affect' the state, and how the notion of philanthropy influences changes to the welfare-state principle in an attack by intertwined grants-economics and creative-ideologically based models of practices. How can the logic of philanthropy and its entire complex as cultural, economic, and social structure be integrated into current theories of late-modern capitalism? This section suggests that a clear path leads through Boltanski and Thévenot poleis framework.

The poleis framework—a collection of discourses about common welfare comprising conceived 'orders of worth'—assumes a plurality of such conventions (see Chapters 7 and 10). According to Boltanski and Thévenot, actors will draw on these orders of worth, which provide a resource for their justifications that may arise from reflecting on their felt indignation. Indignation must also be understood as affected by these conventions, as the orders of worth are always present to some degree. Subsequent to this work on representations of welfare (a term I prefer for its political-economy connotation), Boltanski and Chiapello showed that the artistic critique was successfully incorporated into the regime of capitalist accumulation ('project worker' and 'network citizen committing to it'). Here, I want to show that the social critique has been muffled by a process other than neoliberal and network capitalism. To examine the logic of philanthropy inflecting the powerful complex of civil-sphere meanings that give rise to network phenomena such as 'global civil society' is the goal of this section.[7] In the following I outline a rarely examined order of worth, the Civic Polis, and show methodological and theoretical problems arising from Boltanski and Thévenot conception. I then discuss Ilana Silber's argument for a new order of worth based on her empirical case of contemporary Israeli philanthropy.

3.1 *Civic Polis and the Justification Regime of Benevolence*

The Civic Polis (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007, pp. 153–167) designates an unusual order in the framework because, unlike for the other orders of worth, the

7 The poleis framework has been conceived within the frame of French society, drawing on influential texts in the history which have shaped these various orders of worth, according to Boltanski and Thévenot (2007). It also includes non-French texts, such as the influential works by Adam Smith (1981), which they use for the description of the Market Polis.

highest value cannot be assigned to an individual. It is the order that describes the common good as an entity, serving as basis for evaluation and justification of activities and ideas pertaining to collective actors formed by association among individuals. Issues find expression in a union due to their shared commonality. To quickly show its contemporary relevance and maybe its seeming dissonance with current neoliberal capitalism, as it sits oddly with ideas of 'individuals without society', I discuss its theoretical potential for the currently revived debate over 'the commons' as well as theorizing further Weber's 'legitimacy belief' (Baumann, 1993a). Against the other poleis, individual actors can be judged immediately as Little Person or Grand Person, such as the actor in the Inspirational Polis who professes or demonstrates devotion, and, if sufficiently 'large', makes this actor a Grand Person.

The Civic Polis is conceived from one major and highly influential idea, namely Jean-Jacques Rousseau's social contract theory (see also Horowitz, 1999, pp. 41–80). In this order of worth, the authority of a non-partisan sovereign is similar to that belonging to the House Polis. The difference in the construction is that the sovereign of the Civic Polis presumably has no body, as the sovereign materializes in the convergence of the human will (see also Poggi, 1978). Put plainly, individuals subjugate their private interests to the larger sovereign they are willed to embrace, the commonwealth—giving it expression in social entities such as mass, organization, and the collective. This deduction embraces Rousseau's assumption of antagonism among particular interests or identities. He famously saw antagonisms being transcended by the adoption of the 'general will'. In reflection of France's voting system, he saw individuals freed from their dependencies incurring from particular interests, thus leading to a more perfect democratic system. Rousseau also formulates the institution of the state, which Boltanski and Thévenot reflect in their construct of the office incumbent—a body of governance that tends to deviate from the means of arriving at the 'general will', that is, according to Rousseau, through a 'feeling of common identification'. According to Rousseau, there is an imminent danger in this second form of a collective body (government) as a threat to common welfare (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007, pp. 160–162). Liberation from dependencies is at the heart of the tension between the government and the general will expressed by the people or their various forms of association. In Rousseau's social contract theory, which the authors resource for the analytic components describing this order of worth, liberation entails freedom from a charismatic leader (sanctified as Grand Person in the Inspirational Polis) as well as from personal dependencies (House Polis), self-love (Market Polis), and reputation as bestowed by others (Opinion Polis). Vanity (self-love and fame) never helps the commonwealth, Rousseau argues. Being the foundation

of Boltanski and Thévenot's construction of this order, the Civic Polis can be summarized derived from the ideals of participation giving meaning and justifying motives to this common cause—the 'common being' felt as freedom from singular issues through incorporation and representation of the individual in a union.

This sets the basis for analysis of whether anti-statist discourse (Dean & Villadsen, 2020) such as found in neo-conservatism and communitarianism, facilitated by political and academic elites as well as civil-society representatives, has any resonance with this perhaps very specific national discourse from France.[8] As Somers's analysis of social capital and the problem of 'collusion' raised in New Institutionalist writings (examined in Chapter 4) have shown, there are contending ideas of civil society in current society which can be stated quite clearly with the poleis framework. A comparison with some of the other poleis suggests that the reference to Rousseau's work is only one way of claiming civil society for contemporary society. In the Civic Polis, grandeur equates with common will and equality as just mentioned. But the way greatness is achieved and claimed contrasts with other poleis' constructions of high value. Firstly, it contrasts sharply with the House Polis in this regard with which it superficially has an overlap on a presumably non-partisan sovereign in the patron who organizes the social relations according to his/her 'household'. Yet, the Civic Polis defies patronage, political parties, client relations, collusion and alike, which are more correctly justifiable in recourse to the House Polis, as the latter is constructed on the organization of family kinship, loyalty, and sequenced orders derived from that (rather than independence). Groups and their social and symbolic boundaries are 'policed', following from the House Polis conception. The Inspirational Polis's high values are originality, creativity, devotion, autonomy, and passion (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007, pp. 120–130), which, as shown in Chapter 7, are high values for the 'creative ethos' (Koppetsch, 2006) and which is the basis of cinema's auteur discourse (Burgin et al., 2014; Ho, 2007).

Boltanski and Thévenot consider a possible real-world compromise between inspirational and civil worlds because of their respective immanent tendency for change ('they question some status quo'); and because social movements are charismatic, mobilizing around inspirational worth, while certain sectors of today's civil society find their source of inspirational

8 Notably, the Market Polis is also derived from a single source: Adam Smith's foundational and highly influential conception (e.g., 1981) for rational-market economics, which narrowly depicts the economy as one of exchange—an issue of concern raised with Boulding's work in Chapter 12.

creative entrepreneurship and postmodern heroism (Alexander, 2010; Evans & Hesmondhalgh, 2005; Nayar, 2009). These poleis also have in common the rejection of the high value bestowed on actors in the Opinion Polis, where prestige depends on others (rather unlike a common will, materializing itself in worth or the autonomy of the charismatic person). But one may also argue that the worth of the Inspirational Polis seems different from that of the Civic Polis, because collectivity and identification qua 'commonality' are emphasized whereas the Grand Person of the Civic Polis is constructed as someone resisting the lure of pursuit of private interests.

While the construction of the Civil Polis is somewhat sparse in Boltanski and Thévenot work (similarly Silber, 2011), it serves sufficient depth for proposing here that the emerging Project Polis in the connexionist world of network capitalism should be stated as a historical compromise. This compromise between Inspiration and Civic worth diverts the latter into failure to durably realize common welfare goals, if not plunging it into a deep crisis, as perhaps climate catastrophe and lack of common will by rich governments to help poor people in need of an anti-COVID-19 vaccine have recently demonstrated. From this perspective it is possible to examine activation—the subject of the preceding section—in terms of an active citizen being mobile, self-responsible and creative, which matches a key idea of the civil society discourse in the path of de Tocqueville's influential work (Horowitz, 1999, pp. 115–141).

The Grand Person of the Project Polis is active and mobile, also having a tendency toward nomadism crucial to network mobility (see the definition by Boltanski and Chiapello at the end of Chapter 7). Yet, this also shows that the Project Polis is 'off the track' of the Civic Polis as inspired by Rousseau's philosophy—a work that lends itself to the construction of an order based on core values such as solidarity, equality, and the esteem of the public good. Once again, Somers may be repeated here as to her historical analysis of how social capital-ideology focuses actors on their particular interests, sidelining the common interest in the public good conceived of as a 'general will' and ready to be defended by social conflict rather than being evaded as a question of societal integration and justice. Networking and active citizenship place the highest value on activity, creativity and a pragmatic de-coupling in search of more social capital that can be realized in new projects.

The connexionist world shares with the Inspirational Polis an orientation toward 'singularization' (Reckwitz, 2020), which is principally rejected by the Civic Polis, as formation is always around a shared form and purpose. The order of civic worth constructed from adopting Rousseau thus shows the great distance of this social utopia from the currently theorized worth in contemporary capitalism. To emphasize this conclusion, Karpik's framework (Karpik,

2010) can be used to highlight that the logic of singularization sets up the Civic Polis against the reticular world, which favors a regime of economic coordination Karpik titled the 'network market' (and its logic of personalization, see Chapter 5). Reckwitz's theory of the singularization of society further underlines that singularization is at core individuation rather than the living for a common or general will.

The poleis framework and associated ideas of compromise and conflict between orders can also help articulating the festival scholarship's critique in light of cinema's festivalization (respective end of Chapters 1 and 3). This trend, as argued, jeopardizes artist autonomy and the loss of a community of like-minded cinema lovers who allegedly need another economy to support them as well as other forms of association. Festival research has shown that these events foster conflicting values, pertaining to, in the concepts of Boltanski and Thévenot, the poleis of Market, Opinion and Inspiration. Despite ample ethnographic descriptions produced, however, they avoid a critique of the reticular world and the nascent Project Polis, which discursively shape the conditions of cultural labor—their own certainly included. Similarly, their low depth of analysis of the grants-economic sources and the soft power exerted through public and private-money funded merit competitions is in the way of a more wholesome critique of festivalization. The order of worth signified by the House Polis, which would focus on philanthropic patronage and subsidies-based resource dependency, aside from commercialization tendencies in arts nonprofits, would be a productive avenue for more theoretical research. In another way, it would allow them to offer a critique of social capital based on Bourdieu, whose conception of this form of capital has high resemblance with the structure of the House Polis, while the connexionist world by Boltanski and Chiapello pertains to a different historical time and focus (see Bourdieu & Steinrücke, 2005, pp. 63–70).[9]

To assimilate the study of philanthropy to the poleis framework, we can look at Silber (2011)'s study of Israeli wealth elites. Asking if a new regime of justification whereby elites justify their actions has emerged, she also criticizes the intellectual owners of the framework for their lack of theorizing affect and emotion.[10] Her critique derives partly from observing domestic philanthropists

9 Bourdieu's notion of social capital is based on a field-group semantic for social organization, not adjusted for the historical conditions of network society with its circulation of information (Castells, 1999). In my view, it still has, with some adjustments, high theoretical potential for the study of elites (Bourdieu, 1985).

10 The 'sociology of critical capacity' has addressed emotions in three ways: indignation and emotional basis for critique to proceed to articulated arguments, the Inspirational Polis where passion and affect are highly valued while anger and negative emotions are not

who funnel their anger about contemporary government politics into 'mega donations' for societal transformation similar to their American counterparts.

According to Silber, the Civic Polis cannot serve to theorize this phenomenon:

> Indeed, their presentation of the civic regime of justification does not specify who, or what institution in particular, if at all, is to be taken accountable, responsible for the enhancement of the collective good. In fact, there are no references to the state either in their description of the civic world, nor of critiques from within the civic world towards other worlds [...], nor of critiques from within the industrial world towards the civic world.
>
> SILBER, 2011, p. 308

Silber suggests a "quasi-regime of justification, wherein benevolent emotions might operate as potent devices of moral evaluation on their own, capable of both encoding 'grandeur' and providing criteria for evaluation and inspiration of criticism of those that fail the standards of worth set out by this regime" (2011, p. 312). Silber clearly has in mind the host of wealth elites and civil-society serving elites (like professional groups), private gift monies, grant-making foundations, boards of trustees of private nonprofit organizations, all making up the institutional realm of the logic of philanthropy (see above). Justification on the donor side also arises from having to consider the "moral implications and civic responsibilities of great concentrations of wealth" (p. 302). Dealing with the quality of emotions at the basis of this regime, she does not consider civic anger as a basic emotion, but treats it as 'a confluence of discursive formations', which entail a compromise with the 'industrial worth' on which donors also draw for justification (p. 308).

Civic anger gets transformed into benevolence (expressed on behalf of the less fortunate strata of the highly unequal Israeli society), as these older Israeli generations have come to feel a sense of responsibility, which they contextualize by their government's failure to deliver comparable welfare goals for younger generations and a more diverse Israeli society.

In my mind, Silber's proposal of a new regime works as an alternative hypothesis about civil society-philanthropy-state relations when compared to the Civic Polis, setting itself apart through the notion of benevolence and not subscribing to the utopia of a 'general will' that prevails along the lines of

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included as valuable, and as a liminal state, emerging where emotions accompany the shift in actors' claims from one regime to another (Silber, 2011, p. 310).

Rousseau's philosophy. The regime of benevolence must conceptually entail an asymmetry between the qualifying actors (or objects and other entities), as philanthropy is a unilateral transfer (cf. Boulding et al., 1972). If deduced from the logic of American philanthropy and derived practices (Acs, 2017), the regime of benevolence appears as the precise opposite of the Civic Polis, as the Grand Person does not embody patrimony or self-anointing stewardship as principle of 'rational philanthropy' that informs the major, and indeed globalizing, major model and its operational form, the foundation. Even if the paternalistic dimension has been rescinding in recent years, making way for a more convivial approach (Rojek, 2016)—arguably, an outcome of the impact the connexionist world has made on the cultural and social fabric—, this type of benevolence requires a search for an order of worth the Civic Polis does not capture.

From the perspective of the framework, however, Silber's proposal can be questioned or at least re-formulated as the House Polis's grandeur is embodied by the benevolent patriarch of community over which he presides. This suggests a compromise on the House Polis, requiring further elaboration, especially as there are some relevant aspects to modern-day philanthropy such as meritocratic belief and quasi-philosophy of advancement (observable in the 'great texts' of Big philanthropy such as by Andrew Carnegie, see (Acs, 2017)) apparently subscribing to the higher values of the Industrial Polis as well as to the Inspirational Polis.[11] With respect to the lacking conception of the state in Boltanski and Thévenot framework, Silber's analysis offers some resonance with the Civic Polis. Showing the struggle of older elites to rein in the political elites and the government, which they see as corrupt and inefficient in addressing welfare goals, these donors seem ready to defend the state they helped to build in their previous careers in industry and political offices. Drawing on justifications provided by the Civic Polis matches Rousseau's philosophy, as alarm over government efficiency can be raised with the intention to preempt the escalation of social conflict. Indignation developing into reflected civic anger—affected justifications in my view—can draw on the repertoire of the Little Person in that Polis, the 'office incumbent' who self-servingly fails to serve the 'general will'. While it is difficult to say whether a 'quasi-regime of justification' of the kind Silber proposes is necessary—the failure of making 'affect' relevant could be remedied alternatively, perhaps on the basis of feminist and masculinities critique and affect studies. There is much worth in her

11 The argument regarding the House Polis is supported by the interpretation of postmodern philanthropic heroism as re-feudalization (McGoey & Thiel, 2018).

work that can help searching for the legitimate basis of an affective positivity culture, especially if prepared against the context of current civic anger of the populist, anti-statist, conservatist and fascist kind (Reckwitz, 2017a, pp. 374–422), and which precisely are marginalized by the wider structure of a liberally connoted 'global civil society', while claiming their own grants-economic support, postmodern heroes, and social-movement networks— in full view by observers of the Trump Administration as the perhaps most prominent example (see also Engels, 2015).[12]

To sum up, rational philanthropy, having developed a distinct entrepreneurial culture and having never shed its 'calculative mind', is far from being an ideal representation of benevolence as an altruistic philosophy of compassion. Silber's study raises questions such as to whether philanthropists can actually represent 'grandeur' in the Civic Polis, if this was the polis the currently hegemonic renaissance discourse on civil society might claim, and whether such actors further values such as solidarity and love of humankind? And as to the state, which in classical civil-society philosophy has also been suggested as the 'enlightened' state, there is the question of whether a Civic Polis can provide for a proper conception of elites that may deflect state goals away from the 'general will'. The here implied controversy, which currently, in the wake of US citizen George Floyd's death, plays itself out in the media over Big Philanthropy's giving goals and their relation to funding especially 'Black causes', however, shows that theorizing the justification of benevolence may be necessary to keep sociological theory of capitalism relevant, and sociology and neighboring social research from continuing in the same path I have critically commented on in this chapter. To get a handle at the suffocation of social critique in the frame of the 'benevolence state' we need to inspect the tenets of the renaissance discourse, a small excursion that will make plain the diversion from redistribution of wealth-discourse, an important pillar of the 'good old' welfare state.

3.2 *Renaissance for Inclusion—and Cultural Diversity at the Loss of Equality Ideals?*

For an anti-statist discourse there is an overwhelming concern for the protective shield of a 'healthy' civil society against the rational (bureaucratic) state, residing, as it seems, in an illusion that nonprofit and grants-economic

12 Jussi Laine provokes that civil society is not a magic formula that "will inevitably lead to democratic and socially just outcomes and save the world" and that there can be "less civil actors, operations, and objectives that are, for instance, disintegrative, clientilistic, unrepresentative or otherwise biased …" (2014, p. 71).

structures cannot be rationalized.[13] The renaissance discourse partly achieves this narrative by collecting 'resources' across various periods and locations of writings on civil society, de-historicizing the state to arrive at the 'pastiche' (Jameson, 1991) of a state-society relationship that cannot be borne out by reality of complex interdependencies (see Goonewardena & Rankin, 2004). Two eminent writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson (Ferguson, 1996; Smith, 2002), for example, wrote against an absolutist state, while Hegel saw the state even as the solution to civil society's internal contradictions—shaping the state as the rational version of civil society (Goonewardena & Rankin, 2004, p. 122; Horowitz, 1999). These core works of modern philosophy are at great distance to the renaissance discourse.

Similarly, a growing awareness of the economic dimension of nonprofit organizational work by researchers (see start of Chapter 7) has furthered interest in grants-making, yet without much of a theoretical foundation in and resonance with organizational studies addressing the structuration of fields. The literature often describes philanthropic foundations as powerful financiers and charismatic leaders setting impulses, essentially lacking an elite theory that could reflect its positivist attitude toward postmodern heroism. Furthermore, incorporating the theory of the creativity dispositif suggests itself in today's eventive forms of social-movement mobilization, deploying ideas for protest insinuating creative expression, diversity, and vibrancy (Johnson, 2011). This turn toward understanding real-world citizenship participation as essentially aestheticized practices suggests itself as part of a larger analysis of the double meanings of a 'workfare state' and a 'benevolence state' (for a statistical study of the relations see Pennerstorfer & Neumayr, 2016).

With respect to corruption and collusion across the array of elites—including governments and business elites perpetually failing development agendas (Seitz, 2021), and the excess of wealth elites passing as celebrities in the media—a critique of this renaissance is necessary, to comprehend silence on and silencing of a moral discourse on wealth redistribution, which has only began to insert itself on the global conscious (Piketty, 2015). Prominent civil-society conceptions such as those by Karl Marx and Scottish philosophers tackle the relation between life worlds and the economy, but are not informative on grants-coordinated economies. They can say little about elites, specifically unelected elites and their tremendous influence over social and economic trends in today's society (Rojek, 2012). Civil society writers often

13 With measurement, qualitative and quantitative research trajectories have developed which produce valuable insights into the nonprofit worlds while also furthering the idea of a sector (e.g., Bailer et al., 2013; for a critical essay see Dekker, 2010).

ignore that the space they aim to describe is not a self-sustainable social economy, but a highly dependent and flexibilized resource structure for both civil-society organizations to grow and to serve goals aligned or at least not in clear opposition to those by the state and the wealthy. A revision of the renaissance thesis would have to entail the acknowledgment of the diversity of elites, their different interrelations with the state and the economy—beyond a 'ruling class' (Keller, 1968). The civil society model proliferating across national boundaries is a derivative of Anglo-American conceptions of political culture (Somers, 2005) and a widely diffused cultural belief (Potte-Bonneville, 2007, pp. 304–305). Its adoption may arguably entail 'Americanization', thus providing a convenient tool for tribute paid by leaders around the world who occasionally want to resist foreign influence by shutting down non-profits working with foreign funds.

It is, once more, Boltanski and Chiapello's theory of third-spirit capitalism which provides a source for interpretation of the consequences of erosion of civil society by a hegemonial renaissance ideology. Noting on the role of the charitable realm (in France) in the previous rejuvenation of a social critique—observable in the emergence of aid and welfare organizations forming around issues of rising inequality and poverty in the 1980s in light of a lack of critique (2005b, pp. 349–355),—they show that their interpretation of that culture suggests that this realm came to influence within the larger process of retreat from 'affect deficiency' . It also set off a path for a semantic shift from 'exploitation' to 'exclusion'. Their fine sense for such cultural-structural reconfigurations and their consequences is reflected in their analysis of how the emergence of the category of exclusion in the 1970s—which would largely supersede that of exploitation in the coming decades—was based on a '*topos* of emotions' (rather than one of critique, as they claim), shaping the ascent of a humanitarian-action regime roughly two decades later. Humanitarian action and social integration would be directed at all forms of social poverty (2005b, p. 347; see also Johnson, 2011; Rojek et al., 1989).

The authors see this phenomenon typical of the reticular world, where being without connection means to hold no value as a network node, therefore being excluded from attention. Furthermore, the social worker, the volunteer, and the human-rights activist emerged as roles of citizen-hero—variants of the 'project worker'. Boltanski and Chiapello highlight the de-valuation of 'social class' as partial result of the subsequently developing 'inclusion/exclusion' dynamics, which I have shown benefits a culture-oriented governmentality that strengthens the cultural developmental state (see Chapter 12). The renewal of social critique in the 1990s shows the signs of civil-society work I discussed with Rojek (2013)'s notion of 'event power': cause-based and

volunteered actions rather than membership-based political engagement; 'vague citizen rights' and the mix of mediatized direct aid and human rights, focusing on provoking and revealing the abuse by power-holders—not direct allocation to remedial policies (Fyfe & Milligan, 2003). The philanthropic doctrine of funding has always been to raise someone above average and out of the ordinary—'to make a difference'. In the inflection of Tocquevillean civil-society discourse and in the regime of 'governance by culture', this difference translates into 'cultural diversity' and 'inclusion'. Unfortunately, Boltanski and Chiapello do not draw the link to the grants-economic foundation of this space, which makes nonprofit organizations—devoid of associational membership or at least subject to erosion of a group identity—vulnerable to external influences by external governance models. Their observation leads to the claim that a 'politics of inclusion preempts politics of responsibility for social inequality'. In this way, Boltanski and Chiapello demonstrate an important linkage between the formation of late-modern charity and philanthropy on one hand and redistributive justice on the other hand. They wonder how a politics of exclusion based on a 'politics of feeling' can be turned into a 'politics of exploitation' which would relieve victims of the burden of individual-responsibility attribution and create a basis for addressing the privileged and their generosity. In an exclusion paradigm, injustices can be addressed only by detection of 'risk-groups' the state has not yet legitimately constructed with law and redress instruments (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b, pp. 353–355). In this paradigm elite and social-class conflicts remain peripheral and even muted as concerns. Still, these authors must be praised for identifying the unhinging of the relationship between the 'luck of the rich and the bad luck of the poor'. As equality is constitutional in western society, there has to be a justification for inequality. To remind the reader, the core welfare in the Project Polis consists of generating information (a highly priced good in aesthetic-digital capitalism, (Zuboff, 2019)) as well as of passing on information to ensure that the network reproduces itself, remaining just like its Grand Person always mobile.

Regarding older theories of philanthropic gifts as arguable reciprocal transfers, one could respond with Boltanski and Chiapello that the value of sharing enables philanthropy to encroach upon this polis. But at the same time the connexionist metaphor seems too vague to position philanthropy in the value scheme of the Project Polis, as it does not address the question of a 'mandate' and the formation of a collective in relation to a common welfare good the way the Civic Polis does.[14] Philanthropy in its ideal-typical form has no

14 Some counterevidence can be found in public-economics research, e.g., "What does seem to be shifting is the level of publicity for mega-gifts, the commercial ethos of giving,

social justice goals; it operates on mechanism of inclusion/exclusion and yet, it has a conception of the sharing of a common good which remains difficult to align with the philosophy of the welfare good symbolized by the Civic Polis. The lesson from failed 'Third Way' politics and the many failed philanthropy-inspired development projects should be, according to some critics, a reform of the welfare state enriched by citizen participation, as the welfare state is the instrument by which to realize "social justice rather than charity" (Powell, 2007, p. 222).[15]

4 The Rise of the 'Benevolence State'

My chapter tentatively suggests that civil society is philanthropy's 'Trojan horse' (Somers, 2005) left at the gates of the state by wealth elites who want to have a larger say in the state and the economy, especially a global one (Poggi, 1978) (Chapter 8 in Shipman et al., 2018). This situation represents a fight for 'meta-capital' according to Bourdieu's field theory (cf. Müller, 2014), which has also been interpreted as re-feudalization (McGoey & Thiel, 2018).

I am willing to argue that Big philanthropy, the top of the wealth elites engaging in societal change-making, have been decisive in instituting an area of activity in close exchange with political elites which they sincerely cultivate (for examples of 'alliance' projects see Giridharadas, 2019). But this 'benevolence state' should not be taken as another form of neoliberal civil-society critique, as such an approach would merely scratch at the surface of the 'complexity of patronage relationships and social group mobilization, and civil society's internal inter-hierarchical effects' (Hearn, 2001, p. 347).

One dimension of the 'benevolence state', the formalization of mixed economic forms, has been presented by Patricia Bromley and John Meyer who argue that "public governance, the historical purview of government, is increasingly shaped by nonprofits, perhaps particularly by professional associations and other lobbyists" and that nonprofits not only take over government tasks but that government agencies also "mimic nonprofit service provision strategies" (2017, p. 945). They explain it by the combination of scientific

and the extent of control that donors are exercising over their gifts, all of which indicate enhanced capacity of the super-wealthy overtly to exercise and foster class privilege." (Raddon, 2008, pp. 38–39).

15 Some authors suggest abandoning the concept of civil society altogether in order to achieve radical economic-democratization of the state (Goonewardena & Rankin, 2004, p. 120).

principle and the expansion of rights and responsibilities by individuals in the organization (p. 964). They also root the spread of the formal organization across sectors in the 'shift toward a plural state', stating that "cultural shifts provide an explanation for why it has become a priority for many government agencies in many countries to take on this pluralistic and partnership based approach to governance" (p. 947). Another dimension that needs to be added is what we can call with Irène Eulriet the 'model of public culture' (2014). Elite philanthropy denotes a historically specific cultural configuration shaping democracies' respective polity. Big philanthropy is a case of 'strategic elites', i.e., powerful minorities that take an interest in the affairs of state and society to the extent that this can have consequences (for better or worse) for state and population which may never see redress, and privatizing social resources via a 'taxation' state (similarly see Mazzucato, 2019; Shipman et al., 2018). Using the notion of 'culture structure' (Sewell, 2005), as I do implicitly throughout this book, we can see this phenomenon "inform individual or group relations within the policy and give[s] them their particular texture and shade" (Eulriet, 2014, p. 415). Along these lines, I next will formulate a cultural-structural profile of philanthropy in summarizing fashion, citing some studies that shall serve the focus on elites and the state in the remainder of this chapter.

Philanthropy is based on a deeply held merit belief which it shares with many non-philanthropic wealth elites. That means that philanthropy is principled in its commitment to those who deserve and, even more so, committed to 'discovering' the deserving ones. Its extraordinary relations with higher-education institutions has helped the institutionalization of its 'economy of love' (Boulding, 1973), a grants-economic pattern of positive sanctioned, namely meritocratic competitions. Philanthropy as grant-maker and steward of society (Acs, 2017) has emerged prior to and with the rising welfare state, which dwarfed the role of philanthropy for only a few decades, relegating it to the margins of welfare provision but also to a role in the global arena where it has built governance mechanisms. Big philanthropy has engaged its power, rooted in organizations, to challenge directly the state as well as alternative visions held by other elites and non-state representatives of the larger citizenry.

Philanthropy's 'power of persuasion' (Baumann, 1993b), resting on a deep source of wealth, is perceived from within these elites as a wholly positive one, proven, as it seems, as an advancement of causes, organizations, and individuals, and a belief of being creative. While the relations to, initially, higher learning have not been obsolete, in the more recent decades, Big philanthropy has turned to other causes, including wider dispersion of educational philanthropy projects that will broaden the consumer and producer basis of the aesthetic-digital economy. This influential structure has been enlarged, as one

may argue, by incorporation of creativity ideology as well as by the embrace of opportunities resulting from culture-oriented governmentality, matching philanthropy's instruments for exclusion/inclusion. The formal procedures of grant-making are carried on by every stipend or grant made for an individual or an organization: from the small grant to the big grant, from the individual grant offered to an entrepreneurial individual to the institutional grant which successfully rationalizes the innovation. Significantly, it is a practice that government bureaucracies have emulated, and which, in essence, is a routine of trials of creativity—a meaning that can take many forms as argued by Reckwitz (2020), and centered on the logic of the Unique.

Philanthropy's self-identity is associated with singularity, seeking 'unique approaches', building 'unique institutions', and engaging in 'exceptional giving'. This charismatic dimension of philanthropy has been relatively backgrounded in the epoch of industry-based philanthropy, but has undergone re-mobilization for a new era of modern culture, where philanthropic deeds have been shown to embellish the society of affluence, leading to a new renaissance bourgeoisie which celebrates itself culturally, artistically, and scientifically. As some sociologists have argued, if philanthropy were to distribute wealth in market fashion its charisma would vanish (McGoey & Thiel, 2018, p. 111). This highlights the need for philanthropy to express itself in valorizing competitions.

Here, the singularizing society (Reckwitz, 2020) proves to be a vast resource, while festivalization ensures the widening performance space for postmodern heroes. At the same time, this kind of philanthropy and its participation in cultural events appeals to middle classes seeking meaning in a connexionist world, encourages their own philanthropic engagement, and suggests a commonality of a bourgeois renaissance in which everybody is affected by the equality of opportunity. Philanthropy has had a long relationship with the arts in the United States (Lewis & Brooks, 2005) and globally, sharing 'originality' as core value. But it is more plausible to argue that philanthropy became more exposed to creative aestheticization as knowledge-economic patterns would be opening up to creative-economic production and consumption (see Chapter 4 which revisits this historical moment). Going back to my conception of the link between festivalization as quasi-linguistic structure and capitalism as a deep structure at the start of the chapter, festivalization of capitalism and its furthering by powerful elected and non-elected elites explains an important foundation of 'the epochal shift from a semantic of allocational struggles to valorization struggles' (Berthold Vogel in Soziopolis, 2017–2018). The relationship between allocation and valorization can be demonstrated with what Rojek calls a 'gesturing economy' (see Chapter 11) and 'philanthropic hero'

productions (see also Wilson et al., 2015). The matter's depth and the inclusion of middle classes into this phenomenon can be illustrated perhaps more succinctly with one of the many occurrences in the world of philanthropic giving—a story picked from the Internet news on professional sports, an entertainment industry in today's experience economy:

> Recently, professional athletes were asked to contribute to the emergency relief fund for COVID-19 victims by a global sports association. Among these contributors is Stephen Curry a US American, NBA basketball player tossing in some of his valuables for the auction that the fund was supposed to emerge from. Curry's net worth in 2020 is well over 100 million US dollars. Taking into account that Curry has family potentially living of his income, the wealth can still be put in relation to the typical citizens' median household income of almost 75,000 US dollars (2018).

This example has all the benevolence-related signs of sympathy, empathy and immediacy (the latter being more carried by the media format of the activity than the actual timeline). Yet, what has to be emphasized is that direct aid, including transfer to public accounts, is a secondary option for all such elites, and perhaps does not appeal as a choice, as that aid can better be valorized through mediatized performances and competitions (or auctions) involving celebrities (cf. Rojek, 2012, 2013). This illustration serves to underline the point made for re-feudalization of society (McGoey & Thiel, 2018), creating a post-traditional aristocracy without lineages but not without community. Celebrities, as formulated by Jeffrey Alexander, are "among the most powerful icons of our times": they "are transitional objects for adults, mediating between internal and external reality, between the deepest emotional needs and contingent possibilities for their satisfaction" (2010, p. 325). The 'routine' is rarely questioned, even outside the United States, where philanthropy has proven as isomorphic on national models of benevolence.

In this context it is surprising how little attention is paid to theorizing the elites (Shipman et al., 2018). The most fitting conception for the phenomenon of philanthropy may still be the notion of 'strategic elites' by Suzanne Keller (1968) in ways I have presented philanthropic wealth elites: as responsibility-seeking elite-minority groups that aim to shape societal goals, have an interest in the maintenance of the status-quo (of capitalism as a system), and efficaciously pursue goals in a long-term horizon by endowing their foundations. These elites can be studied by their internal moral diversity, their growth in size, their internal division of labor, and their relationship to formal organizations. Philanthropic elites seem to be an anomaly in this perspective, as their

power partly derives from movements across policy fields and social spheres, favoring a global philanthropic action model and a cosmopolitan outlook (cf. Giridharadas, 2019). Early wealth philanthropists like Andrew Carnegie popularized the neo-feudal notion of 'noblesse oblige', by which elites construct an asymmetric power position in the civil sphere so they take stewardship vis-a-vis the common good (McGoey & Thiel, 2018). This does not make them less generous but rather contagious because renaissance civil society provides many forms of participation for the middle classes under the same logic and in similar formats—that is what 'rationalization of charity' effectively means. In cooperation with the state, which has created particular tax and legal instruments, the diffusion of philanthropy seems to be entrenched for now. Ultimately, however, this faintly democratic spread of the notion of the philanthropic elite—individual and collective actors having the powers to persuade and positively sanction by their resource means and political influence their wealth constitutes—is countered by symbolic differentiation in the top of wealth elites ('mega-donor', etc.) and the power to pursue projects that others cannot (Gates, 2021).

Philanthropy's critics like Linsey McGoey and Slavoj Žižek have pointed out the make-belief or justification of a high wealth concentration as necessary condition for the support of the public goods (cited in McGoey, 2012, p. 191 and 197). Others, among them economists (e.g., Acs & Phillips, 2002), have underlined the role elite philanthropy plays for entrepreneurial capitalism and that 'wealth taxed away will cease wealth creation'. These two opposite positions alone suggest that philanthropic foundations are far from solving a dilemma of unearned wealth and inheritance in meritocracies (cf. Beckert, 2004), reminding us instead of a fault line with respect to redistributive justice and the question of struggles between unelected and elected elites, or alternatively, their collusion in the legitimacy of wealth-based inequality (Etzioni-Halevy, 2005).

Although causality is impossible to argue here, there is perhaps a hypothesis at the horizon, namely that philanthropy of the more recent wealth-elites has been mobilized by the creativity dispositif, to which philanthropic elites are also exposed according to a societal-dispositif logic. This would suggest the appeal of creative subjectivity to philanthropic elites. This proposition would make intelligible the aforementioned "more direct involvement of donors with beneficiary organizations, increased restrictions on the use of large gifts, and heightened demand for recognition of donations" (Raddon, 2008, p. 38). Applying Reckwitz's inter-fields transgression thesis,[16] it would suffice here to

16 Reckwitz asks how fields relate to one another: "Since they are not governed by a central planning agent, they are not coordinated with one another from the outset. In retrospect,

outline how philanthropy and nonprofit phenomena take on the contours of creative subjectivities and how civil society becomes a realm of creativity, registering particular positive emotions in a regime of benevolence that targets emotions (Silber, 2011) (see also Villadsen & Dean, 2012, p. 401). The 'culture structure' transformation hints at the alignment of creativity and philanthropy, evident in 'swaps' like scandal instead of revolution, partnership instead of cooptation, challenge instead of a problem, diversity instead of antagonism, and more. This cultural pattern denotes a historically contingent 'affective positivity culture' and management by affect (Saar, 2014).

But what about the state? Philanthropy not only changed the language of civil society, it also 'affected' the vocabulary of public authorities. Introducing the logic of philanthropy to public goods provision, acts of kindness, and demands for originality replace the public's vocabulary of 'entitlement'. Persuasion concerns the decoupling of rights from entitlements toward an activated citizen and civil society that may fight for their rights. Philanthropy influences nonprofits regardless of their supervision by the state (cf. Bromley & Meyer, 2017) (see also Chapter 9). It carries into the public domains meritocratic and originality competitions, renewing itself in the hegemonic phase of the dispositif of creativity, where the rhetoric switches from 'giving' to 'doing'—a consolidation of elite stewardship and the dispersion of an according action model.

Philanthropy is an enabling force, homologous to education and thus not benign to the state which holds, to reference Bourdieu, the monopoly of 'symbolic violence' (Müller, 2014). As key challenger to the state, Big philanthropy presses for realization of its own vision of society and an economy of permanent innovation, wielding power through inter-elite connections. To stay abreast with the appeal of philanthropy, political elites, I suggest, have adopted mimetically the grant-making logic, thereby promoting further the logic of the Unique and advancing singularization in the state. In the Post-Keynesian Welfare State's era, privatization of state assets appears to strengthen rather than weaken political elites because they can show their competences in state-led projects—the 'visible manifestations of state power' (Hibou, 2011).[17] More generally, one would expect this to be part of a struggle to 'remain relevant' to voters and corporations, as with the privatization of the welfare state the influence of political elites would be expected to decline.

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however, a complementarity emerges between them, a system of specialized division of labor capable of establishing the dispositif institutionally" (2017b, p. 205).

17 On use of fests as patronage events by political elites with tax-payers' money see economists (Frey, 1994, pp. 32–33) and (Waterman, 1998, p. 61).

In their approach to the current transformations, including the unprecedented increase of massive wealth in the hands of a few, most critiques have directed their focus on neoliberalism as marketization of all spheres of society (e.g., Madra & Adaman, 2010). In this chapter I have argued that the contemporary 'competition state' may also be shaped by inter-elite struggles including philanthropic-wealth elites and that the erosion of the institution of the state as a Keynesian welfare state may be more diffused, more comprehensive, and of longer term than a possible reversal of neoliberalist policy in light of global crises may suggest. It remains doubtful whether cultural globalization, including festivalization and the agenda-setting by cultural organizations (Kapur & Wagner, 2011), may be the ultimate force of change. It is reasonable to be skeptical because the rational state has incorporated a logic of benevolence which befits its double activation role as cultural state and austerity state, which mobilizes workers and society for global capitalism that holds rich rewards for a tiny elite.

But even if deflecting from contemporary awakenings about the rise of social inequality (Burawoy, 2015; Piketty, 2018, 2020), it is important to consider the rise of elite philanthropy and its related ideological and organizational instruments as constraints on the welfare state and convenient tool to distribute responsibility for a Post-Keynesian Welfare State away from the political class. As I have argued, the shift provides across the larger space of public and private realms for a transformation of the logic of solidarity into a logic of benevolence when it comes to providing for societal welfare. It involves a modification of the state's apparatus, having become elite-driven and entailing that ideas on citizenship are being "incorporated into the neoliberal project" (Raddon, 2008, p. 28). I have tried to show that this involves a capture and grooming of the state by wealth elites.

Conclusion of Part 4

For the most part of the book, I applied theoretical frames from cultural sociology and economic sociology to establish the dynamics and components of the social process I call festivalization. In Part 4, I changed tactics in order to provide a more general-sociological perspective on the eventization of the economy and society to show how this phenomenon can be incorporated in contemporary theories of capitalism.

Chapter 11 asked how the affected self could be incorporated into Weber's work on authority and if authority by affective order was possible. This is important because the aesthetic-digital economy provides special incentives to create immersive environments that are forms of postmodern governmentality. Using Baumann's reconstruction of Weber's authority and power conceptions, I argued that persuasive power and sanctioning power must be understood as pervasive today and that they can explain the rise of philanthropy as an 'older affect culture' which was once relatively marginal to modern society as an exclusive domain of elites. In the support of public events common to the Post-Keynesian National State, philanthropy couples with the creativity imperative, achieving a form of persuasive patronage which finds its expression in a historically elaborate form of imagined civil society that is supported by institutional arrangements across geopolitical levels and regions. The festival event is a case of an 'affective space', which in the aggregate establishes an 'affective order' through creation of 'affected communities' in accelerated patterns). Rather than patronage, many philanthropic practices and actors engage in the semantics of conviviality, which furthers participation by mainly but not exclusively the middle classes, thereby the diffusion of a culture of benevolence.

Chapter 12 used the grants-economics conception by Boulding to show that 'economies of love' are the key pillars of the process of culturalization and culture-oriented governmentality. Propositions of economization, as found in festival scholarship, therefore require adjustment, taking into account the dynamics of intertwined grant-economic and market-economic processes, the study of which may lead to better understanding of the power relations in the cinema field. The analysis of cinema subsidies shows festival nonprofits as elements in valorizing networks supporting business and political elites' alliances—raising the issue of elites in cultural fields and civil society organizations.

Chapter 13 examined philanthropy-state relationships with respect to the discourse of civil society. I argued that the welfare-state model has been

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replaced in the cultural sphere by nonprofits substituting for the public direct allocation and that this has been provided for by instituted forms of public and private grant-making. Philanthropy has, on principle, no social justice goals, operating instead with mechanisms of meritocracy-based inclusion/exclusion, the grammar which cultural governmentality 'dictates' and which, as argued by Boltanski and Chiapello, preempts the redress of inequality. The lesson from failed Third Way politics and its other national variants is essentially the need for a reform of the welfare state enriched by citizen participation, as the welfare state is the instrument by which to realize "social justice rather than charity" (Powell, 2007, p. 222). For reasons different from those cited by Lessenich, I have argued that the return to the welfare-state institution is difficult to achieve without a recognition of the way philanthropy has reconfigured the state and its culture, which includes a taken-for-granted attitude toward non-elected elites setting the agenda of a 'global civil society' and influencing welfare visions for generations to come.

At minimum, the rationalization of philanthropy and charity in late-modern capitalism, as guided by non-elected, wealth elites, can explain two observable phenomena: firstly, the scope of the appeal of creativity beyond the edges of societies that have made creativity a source of accumulation as well as a matter of active citizenship. This notion of active citizenship has been proliferating through international grants-making and foreign aid. Secondly, the absence of effective collective mobilization and critical dispute imbued with the necessary powers which would lead to the curbing of excess wealth and the re-regulation of an 'exemption state', legitimizing and enriching non-elected elites. Film festival scholars have offered an artistic critique, demanding true autonomy for the arts to keep their pursuits authentic. This book aims to show that the grants-economic foundation is an important object of critique, which must be launched in form of a social critique (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b). Such a critique has to tackle philanthropy as the 'great rationalizer of society' next to professions and the state (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), an inquiry which may lead to the question of why there has been so much 'innovation'—and so little of a 'revolution', as not only cinema scholars have wondered.

Toward Social Activism, a Conclusion

> A spirit of capitalism will only be consolidated if its justifications are concretized, that is, if it makes the persons it is addressing more aware of the issues that are really at stake, and offers them action models that they will actually be able to use.
>
> BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, 2005b, pp. 163–164

Searching for the meaning of the observable spread of cultural nonprofit-organized events produced by volunteer labor and supported by grants and gifts globally, I set out to study the festivalization of capitalism as it manifests itself in the late-modern eventization in the cinema field, showing off in a mix of positivity, creativity, and meritocracy principles. I specifically aimed at demonstrating that previous explanations for the growth spurt in such celebrations of culture remains incomplete as long as eventization is solely attributed to neoliberal forces in economy and polity. Instead, I argued that this social process attains some of its force from the rationalization of charity and philanthropy and the associated rise of wealth elites who wield their influence in the aesthetic-digital economy and the political sphere. Following the demand for a "viable and sustained theory" of the economic model underlying the film festival (Rhyne, 2009, p. 9), I have gone beyond the convention of studying the 'festival sector' and the 'economy of public and private subsidy' by exploring how festival culture, once deemed alien to capitalism as inutile leisure, is now fully incorporated in its economy. As an experience-maker, the festival can make a center-stage appearance in economic coordination and be of great benefit to an array of actor groups while simultaneously reproducing precarious cultural labor. I have demonstrated how the relationship between eventization and capitalism has, firstly, been shaped and driven by an intertwining of creativity and philanthropy ideals and ideologies, and, secondly, plays into the interests of policy makers and social elites seeking social legitimacy in times of great uncertainty, rampant global poverty, and inequality (Piketty, 2015). Festivals, I reason, have been conditioned by a public culture that itself is the result of a relatively fast happening institutionalization of a broad discursive and organizational formation: Tocquevillean civil society. This cultural and material web of actors, forms, and processes,

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which undoubtedly has its critics worldwide, cultivates the understandings of civil society as social capital as well as philanthropic grant-making as the major way to spur social innovations or provide, as shown in arts and educational philanthropy in particular, the basis for technological and knowledge-economic innovations. This formation is marked by an expanding realm of public goods provision where, alongside the Post-Keynesian National State, civil society and philanthropy serve as supports to the continuing activation of citizens. As a 'invading' soft power, 'global civil society' promotes a culture of creative social entrepreneurship and the arts reflecting cultural diversity which in turn is meant to facilitate the road to democracy and participation in creative economies—in absence of substantial welfare policy and the related interlinked institutions which the west was able to build and may well be looking into its de-institutionalizing at present.

My research started with the identification of a now maturing small field of research on film festivals, a literature recognizing festivals' valuation agency for artists as potentially valuable for media markets while also viewing them as potential threat to artistic endeavor. For art, valuation outside the market sphere is a dominant instituted pattern in modern society which appears as challenged now by nonprofit organizations such as festivals and other eventive formats with the potential of a market-intermediary role. This deserves further attention in industry analysis (Carroll Harris, 2017; Kehoe & Mateer, 2015; Smits, 2019).

Festivals, I have argued, are a quintessential postmodern art form and an 'aesthetic sociality', which according to Reckwitz's theory of the creativity dispositif is currently at the center of society from where it serves as non-depletable resource of creativity for other social fields and the postmodern regime of the surprise. In this sense, I have argued, creativity has also transgressed boundaries to the nonprofit sector, 'doing well' particularly where it can take the form of accelerated 'project work', the key social form according to Boltanski and Chiapello. Festivalization of capitalism manifests itself in phenomena such as arrangers for postmodern art—the experience-makers.

Ever since I began to listen to film festival workers' reasoning as to why they work in these and similar seasonal events, I have been puzzled by the festival research literature's nearly complete silence on festivals' involvement with higher education and labor markets. To reveal the structural dependencies of these seemingly decoupled worlds of nonprofit work and valorization of festival art I launched the study of the three-fold function of the film festival as experience-maker with respect to cinema goods, amateur and professional audiences, and labor. Coupled with the inspection of the intermediary role, my investigations contribute novel insight into an important area of

cultural-economic and social life which, as I believe, manifests some reality of what Berthold Vogel articulated as an 'epochal shift from a semantic of allocational struggles to valorization struggles' (Soziopolis, 2017–2018). To study these functions in their interlinked way, I took the film festival scholars' and practitioners' worries about the diversion from the mission of independent cinema as a starting point for developing an economic sociology of experience-making, expanding on existing works on valuation as well as Schulze's seminal sociology of the 'experience society' (1992). Integrating cultural-sociological, cultural-economic and economic-sociology theory, I built a framework with which the complexity of festivalization at field and organizational level respectively can be studied and tell us about capitalism as a 'deep structure' (Sewell, 2005).

Combining empirical with theoretical approaches, I systematically examined the claims of valuation agency all the way to festivals' potential incorporation in the value chain of cinema, which has been suggested by festival researchers as well as festival curators yet seems implausible according to mainstream economic theory. I confirmed earlier Weberian theorizing on how organizations build up 'charismatic time' to mediate the transfer of cultural into economic value, finding specific effects and asserted non-effects of film festival participation by movies and artists. I have utilized Karpik's framework of economic-coordination regimes (2010) to explore whether film festivals only operate in the 'authenticity regime', a construct with features similar to those of Reckwitz's postmodern art field. Having found festivals, however, in originality and personalized service-model based regimes suggests that they may also develop systematic relationships in the global value chains of cinema, which are interwoven with other value chains for which theatrical exhibition and festivals provide attention-bestowing signals. This in turn provides a hunch for future research to establish events' broader role in the aesthetic-digital economy. Furthermore, this finding (Part 2) suggests a strong need for further systematic research on nonprofits' participation and 'governors' of culture in economic coordination. It points to a rethinking of economic-sociological frames of analysis which maintain a gap between market-exchange based valuation and valuation through cultural institutions. Furthermore, I aimed to extend on the current management theory of the 'negotiation of value' and field-configuring events (Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Moeran & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2011), which cannot explain why particularly event-producing nonprofits attract and groom device worlds so well. Both events and non-profits are understudied and undertheorized forms of economic coordination, with only few organizational sociologists paying attention to these (e.g., Gross & Zilber, 2020).

Re-building from the basic foundation in New Institutionalism and examining senior scholars' claims that nonprofit and philanthropic organizations have increased their presence in institutional environments where they provide for smooth 'collusion', I proposed—based on Somers's critique of social capital ideology—that the nonprofit organization entered industrial fields and market-organizing positions as a 'renaissance discourse' on civil society started to take hold. Such changes to market structure are plausible, as shown for an earlier time for the shift from dyadic to triadic role structure (cf. Jones & Maoret, 2018, p. 3; White, 1993). That market structure could change and thereby represent a new phase of rationalization (Heubel, 2002), I argued can be explained by the theory of the creativity dispositif. To briefly revisit, there was a 're-styling' of civil society as institution of social capital, which I suggested was accompanied by the growing importance of philanthropic foundations and major donors. In Part 2, the results of my analysis of the 'festival effect', limiting the study to a representative US movie sample, showed that festivals can differently bestow competitive value on independent movie culture and areas of cultural diversity, and that festivals, supported by a slim and instable resource base, carry significant value for career trajectories of artists. Film festivals do have valorization effects as a network, but much more systematic study is needed to replicate the festival effect and theorize the linkages between for-profit and nonprofit economic actors.

I have provide insights into cultural-intermediary work in post-traditional event production. I have found the labor to be of immense value, as not even big-budget organizations go without large volunteer contingents. I have shown that film festivals are not mere leisure and charitable pursuits but hold a particular value, among them prominently social-capital value in the work of both professionals and volunteers for creatives' labor markets. Film festivals, I could confirm, are cherished experiential workplaces in the creative economy for a wide array of people and professional aspirations. Experience-making by festivals for their workforce is not just stabilized by film festivals' relations to 'stakeholders' of business and industries, but has major support and inter-institutional linkages with nonprofit and employment law, higher education, and—at least observable for the European Union and large parts of East and Southeast Asia regions—policy-making on cultural economy, employment, and civil society. This result provides for a conjecture of an economic and social structure supporting arts/cultural fields' eventization beyond merely field-specific effects. It may show transformational shifts in capitalist accumulation of which I then aimed to make sense of with the theories of the creativity dispositif theory and of third-spirit capitalism.

With an application of Boltanski and Thévenot's poleis framework (2007), I turned to the research question with which my initial study began: the motivation for people to work in film festivals although they do not make any money. Being put on the spot, festival workers will largely not present labor value as charitable, being proud believers in their work contribution. This underlines what has been found in the other qualitative analyses as well as the discussions of European policy and higher-education policy on practical training, namely that there is multiple valuation in film festival dynamics: of arts and artists to get attention value negotiable in for-profit and non-profit markets for cinema (mostly, but not exclusively independent cinema); of middle class youth with creative-track goals who obtain an education that socializes them into creatives' labor markets; and, of politicians and social institutions that will be valued for the creative experience they make available for others and the economy. The way film festivals accomplish that is through governance by charismatic organization. They are implicated in the normalization of de-professionalization.

Part 2 and Part 3 considered together, I hoped to convince my reader that cinema-field eventization is not only part of the 'international division of cultural labor' or a segment of a nonprofit sector. Regarding the arts-nonprofit as an actor in field structuration processes theorized by institutional sociologists, I have ascertained its particular role. More specifically, I have argued that event-producing nonprofits can be legitimate field actors because of the normalization of a particular idea of social capital, a legitimized value as a market-lubricating component. This ideological diffusion has given civil-society organizations a major role in the global economy, being called upon by policy makers on all governance levels to help create, in variable ways, favorable market or 'development' conditions.

In Part 4, I have provided some ideas pertaining to social entities: the affective order, the grants economy, and the benevolence state. Deploying these has enabled me to explore a puzzle: I have been not convinced that aestheticization alone is a force of positivity. While I find mimetic adoption of forms and transgression of boundaries by format plausible, I have found absent from the creativity dispositif theory, and partially also in the theory of the third spirit of capitalism, the nonprofit and grants-economic phenomena, which in our reality provide 'building blocks', logics, formats for an affective positivity culture associated with the meaning of civil society. I tried to show that the intertwining of philanthropy and creativity imperatives in aesthetic economy and civil society raises the question of whether the hegemonialization of the creativity dispositif may be benefitting from and supporting the diffusion of the logic of

philanthropy into what I call the 'benevolence state'. As philanthropy entertains the logic of the Unique, being a notable yet understudied phenomenon of singularization (Reckwitz, 2020), its contribution to the commonwealth as described by the ideal Civic Polis (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2007) should be examined further, investigating how its affective-cultural power participates in the erosion of welfare state discourse and institutions and provides a buffer against the 'social critique' and related citizen demands. As I suggested, the 'benevolence state' represents the intensification of interdependencies among elites and the concentration of massive wealth that keeps being exempted from redistribution and which therefore may be held accountable for inequality and precarity.

Do the findings provide new knowledge that could entice film festival researchers to move away from an artistic critique to the redressing of concerns over festivals as 'archives of revolutions' (Elsaesser, 2005) rather movement organizations for social change? I will outline some ideas regarding a social critique in the remainder of this conclusion. Three criticisms by film festivals scholars to be addressed are: the devaluation of associational forms of cinema appreciation, the inability to secure independent art circulation for a growing population of artists, and the precarious work contracts held by film festival workers.

As most important to me appears the recognition that film festival work is potentially exploitative in the context of a regime that systematically creates uncertainty in markets and for individuals, for the sake of profit-making and maintaining cultural influence in competitive global capitalism. Rather than thinking of film festivals as a space 'kept outside the market', it seems useful to understand how nonprofit practices came to be entangled in the aesthetic economy and may become more prominent in the current digital economy (Voss, 2020). As I conclude from my analysis, artistic critique must return to combine again with a social critique to mobilize for a stable economic basis, evident in better wages and social insurances, and recognition of work as labor when it ultimately contributes to value in global commodity chains. Even radical alternatives such as basic income or other redistribution policy schemes that disconnect work from activation imperatives should be considered. A basic income is appropriate to the network society, in which a person can bond while, if so wished, minimizing opportunistic social capital-behavior. Not only might it help solve precarity and insecurity problems, it probably would decelerate artistic production which is currently produced as part of a creative economy with small pockets of autonomous art—by those who can afford it. Securing an economic base might thus curb aesthetic overproduction and take pressure off the demands for constant attention toward

the aesthetically novel—taking attention back to aesthetic concentration on art and allowing for the widest possible definition of creativity rather than its rationalized forms (Becker, 2017; Merrifield, 2017). It would allow artists to focus on their work rather than have them 'moonlighting' to make ends meet or to accrue more social capital.

Turning back to cinema history's first film festival manifesto (Cousins, 2012), we may have to more deeply consider the ambiguity of this format's versatility for its many stakeholders. And I am quoting freely here my colleague Alan Shipman who has pointed out to me in talking about the festival that the commercial success of Ken Loach's socially critical films in an England that for long has continued to vote for austerity under Conservative governments shows that by moving social problems into the domain of artistic representation, such 'protest films' actually remove them from the political domain, muffling conversion of audience reaction into political protest (see also Roussel, 2010). This to me suggests the time for a new festival manifesto has come—a manifesto that can rely on advocacy from parties committed to intellectual art who strive for new alliances between arts and its forms of dissemination on more equal terms.

Finally, 'third-spirit capitalism' (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b) can only be legitimate as an economic base for democracies when people are allowed to opt out. Capitalism must convince its people to work for it, produce a commitment that does not damage the committed and enrich those who violate its rules. Plenty of protest across the world shows time for reforms are up (Engels, 2015). Perhaps it is more useful to look at it as a normative proposition. Capitalism can only be the true relentlessly innovating force, as Schumpeter seminally formulated, if people are allowed to opt out, forcing elites to re-think how they serve the populations and for what higher end, rather than the other way around.

Appendix: Methodological Supplement for Chapter 6

This note contains details on methodological strategy and decisions that led to the presented models for the 'festival effect'.

1 Data and Sampling

The unit of analysis is the movie. The Internet Movie Database (hereafter IMDb) as resource has been an essential source for film performance researchers (Holbrook & Addis, 2008), and it is the largest and most comprehensive movie database, including mainstream and independent productions as well as reporting on movies' film festival participation. Unlike other databases which focus on providing commercial performance it holds information useful for studying commercial and artistic outcomes. Being a user-friendly, inexpensive tool for artists adding their work to the Internet domain, it likely attracts disproportionally more entries of documentaries and short films, of which there are disproportionally more than feature films.

Comparing yearly distributions for several IMDb-provided variables like box office, first weekend, etc. from four years' listings (2004–2007), I chose the cohort of 2006 with 13,226 movies, which appeared to be not significantly different from the other yearly distributions. Choosing 2006 allows for time to elapse for hypothesized future events to mature. IMDb uses four basic categories for movie product: feature (27 percent of all IMDb films in 2006), short (38 percent), documentary (12 percent), and video (23 percent). The sample of this study excludes video films, which relatively rarely perform in film festivals.[1] Feature, short, and documentary films are treated as genres. Data were collected in May 2009 and updated to finalize all variables. Information goes up to January 2011, after which analysis began. Through manual selection and in line with IMDb criteria on film festival reporting, 7,129 movies which participated in film festivals were identified. The sampling frame was then adjusted to the study of movies released in the United States in 2006, resulting in 3,039 movies—by far the largest national subset. Settling on one country permitted to hold constant national-institutional production context.[2]

1 There were 181 cases of videos in 2006 (0.8 percent of all movies participating in festivals) in this database. There are hybrids, but like videos they are small population shares. Therefore IMDb-categories documentary and documentary short was collapsed into the studied category of documentary.

2 In 2006, France, the second largest national movie population with festival participation in the database produced 13.5 percent of US-released documentaries, Canada 15 percent of

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IMDb defines what a film festival is and requires verification for movie's circuit participation from filmmakers. Throughout the data collection, checks on other festival and movie databases to complete and verify information were performed (Showbiz.com, Variety.com, the magazine *Film Comment*, etc.).[3] Among the 7,129 movies across all national contexts, 55 percent made it into merely one festival, compared to 59 percent in the US American subset. Comparing the global sample with the US subset by genre, the US subset holds fewer features (24 vs. 30 percent), more shorts (62 vs. 54 percent), and nearly the same number of documentaries (15 vs. 16 percent). From this population of American movies participating in film festivals, a random sample (10 percent) was drawn in each of the genre categories, proportionate to the relative representation of the genres in this US population. To arrive at the initial sample, n = 300, proportionate sampling technique was applied: genre (3 subgroups) and length of festival run (1, 2, and 3 or more festival participations). Stratifying by length of festival run (a measure of 'festival circuit' exposure) was necessary to minimize sampling error stemming from a highly skewed distribution. Consulted industry and festival experts deemed the information about the festival run reliable, pointing out that due to the circuit participation's signaling quality, this would unlikely be underreported information.

Exploratory data analysis led to the deletion of an extreme outlier in both movie and director characteristics with the rare 'superstar' profile for Clint Eastwood's *Flags of our Fathers* in 2006 (Eastwood et al., 2007). This resulted in a final sample for analysis n = 299. This sample contains 70 features (23 percent), 185 shorts (62 percent), and 44 documentaries (15 percent).

2 Dependent Variables

The study includes six dependent variables: two commercial and four artistic outcome variables. Box-office revenue (Model 1) is presented as a binary variable (any revenue vs. none). In this sample only 6 percent recorded any gross income. Because no short film generated box office, this genre was excluded from Model 1. The second dependent variable, distribution status (Model 2), indicates whether the movie had a listed distributor following upon festival participation. Gauging distributor interest in any form has high validity as an empirical measure of the dynamics of commercial

US-released shorts, and France 21 percent of the total of US-released features. Only 5 percent of all festival participations in 2006 occurred in France.

3 One-off events in universities were excluded whereas established film school student festivals were included (see also survey report in Film Festivals, Introducing a Global Population).

classification in the independent movie sector, where even distributor interest signals partial success and raises hopes for financial success. As 39 films had prior distributor arrangements, they were logically excluded from Model 2.

The four dependent variables for artistic outcomes are: future feature films by the lead film artist, the movie director (Model 3a); her future shorts and documentaries (Model 3b); future prizes won by the artist (Model 4); and future prizes won by the movie (Model 5). Each of these measures is shaped as a count variable. Only nine percent of the sample had more than one director; for practical reasons, artistic information was collected only on the first of the film artists (directors). Future creative works by the film artist (Models 3a and 3b) are gauged by the number of Wide Screen projects after the year 2006 that were directed by the same artist. Future prizes listed for the artist (Model 4) as well as future prizes listed for the sample movie (Model 5) combine countable awards and nominations. This summation was necessary due to the low volume of prizes overall (e.g., there are only 63 prizes for movie as product in the sample, Model 5). By late 2010, 92 percent of the movies' directors had not received any prize, and the highest number of prizes achieved by a single director was nine. Similarly, 79 percent of the movies had not received any prizes and over half of those with prizes received only one. As there were very rare cases of prizes won in industry events (e.g., Academy Awards, BAFTA, Independent Spirit Awards, and Golden Globe), such prizes were combined with festival prizes in the final outcome variable.[4]

3 Predictor Variables

Exploratory data analysis resulted in a number of festival-population attributes which could be technically incorporated into this quantitative analysis of the 'infinite variety' of film fests. In total, the movie sample represents over 700 appearances in festivals; the movies were exhibited across nearly 500 uniquely different festivals. Thus, about a sixth of the estimated population of contemporary film festivals was 'reported' on in this sample (see Film Festivals, Introducing a Global Population pp. 18–31). The total of movies screened in festivals across thirty countries. The major variable, participation frequency, captures the event exposure of a movie, measured as the number of festival events in which the movie participated. The variable is categorized to manage the skewed distribution. Of all movies, 61 percent participate in only one festival, 20 percent appear in two or three festivals, and the remaining 19 percent have a festival run of four events or more. The longest run in the sample was 29 festivals.

4 The three Independent Spirit prizes (the top award in the independent filmmaker community since 1984) were received by a single sample movie.

Five variables indicate key attributes of the circuit phenomenon. The first three capture the essence of the tournament dynamics, gauging outcomes of inclusion/exclusion mechanisms for artistic and commercial recognition: participation in Sundance indicates A-list participation with high visibility and signaling potential; participation in FIAPF-accredited events indicates industry-sanctioned events; and participation in Queer-community festivals—a category emerging as relevant in this sample—indicates community and niche visibility and opportunities. Sundance was chosen for the A-list quality measure because the sample showed overall rare appearances in A-list festivals, with screenings at Sundance, the US's major independent festival, being the most frequent ones, but still only 4 percent of sampled movies only. Participation in FIAPF-accredited festivals occurred in 6 percent of the sample, and 3 percent of movies appeared in community-niche festivals, the LGBTQ fests.[5] The fourth and fifth circuit indicators are intended to capture potential effects from the festival's economic-geographic location attributes: festival participation in the Greater Los Angeles area (12 percent), indicating close proximity to Hollywood, the domestic and global power center of the film industry; and participation in the domestic film industry territory (95 percent of sampled movies appeared in US festivals). The measure of domestic festival participation is a ratio of the number of US festival appearances to total appearances in a movie's festival run.

4 Control Variables

This set of variables incorporates measures established in film performance research— so-called film and artist factors—and includes plausible and empirically-driven, model-specific controls. Organizational factors were impossible to obtain for the entire sample and were excluded from the model. The set of film and artist factors includes movie budget in million US Dollars (mean = 920,000), the number of the film artist's prior Small and Wide Screen works, and the number of prizes won both during the festival run and before the first festival appearance. Budget, a film factor, is one of the most difficult variables to obtain information on. For the four originally inspected IMDb cohorts mentioned at the start of the sampling discussion, there was an average 76 percent of missing budget data, a finding similar to the first published study of the 'festival effect' (Mezias et al., 2008). Similarly, the problem was addressed by imputing values based on the assumption that some budget must have existed. The assigned values are based on consultation with filmmakers and film school professors; they are

5 Festival premiere, first release as festival release, participation in Black-Community film festivals, and many other attributes discussed as important across cinema studies were also measured, but had to be removed for methodological reasons after the exploratory analysis.

imputed median values for each genre; except for the case of shorts where the imputed value was adjusted to half of the median budget for shorts shorter than nine minutes.

Five variables capture artist factors. These include two measures for past success in completed Wide Screen projects (i.e., movies made to enter theatrical exhibition), indicated by counts of the artist's directed features and the artist's directed shorts and documentaries. Included is a 'flag' for past television works (Small Screen) to account for activity in a different industry segment. Nearly a third of artists had prior experience in television.[6] A last set of artist factors includes the prizes won by the film artist prior to 2006, and for Model 4, the artist's prizes during the festival run of her movie. Prizes measurement rules are identical to those used for the outcome variables of Models 4 and 5.

Model-specific controls include four variables: ancillary market participation, indicated by a listed DVD premiere (Model 2); commercial participation, indicated by participation in a film market (Models 1 and 2); gender of the movie director (1 = female; Models 4 and 5); and finally, distributor status, the outcome variable in Model 2, entered in Model 5. Nearly two percent of all movies had DVD premieres; two percent had market participation (specifically in the Cannes Market, the European Film Market at the Berlinale, and at Clermont-Ferrand, a major market for short film). Twenty percent of the movies were directed by women. Finally, nearly a fifth of the movies had a listed distributor by January 2011.

5 Statistical Techniques

The analysis was performed with regression tools provided by Stata 11.0. In preparation, Chi-square and Fisher's exact tests (one-way ANOVA) for unadjusted differences in covariates by genre were performed. The two models with commercial outcomes—Models 1 and 2—were performed with logistic regression. Accordingly, results are reported in odds ratios (OR).[7] In Models 1 and 2, the outcomes were conceptualized as discrete information, as having received box office vs. not and having attained distributor attention vs. not, to address the phenomenon of highly skewed distributions with asymmetrical tails. Modeling the same data as continuous variables would risk washing out the primary effects of interest.

6 The exploratory analysis includes a measure for future Small Screen success (see the interpretation Section 4)

7 An odds is the likelihood that an event will occur compared to the likelihood that it will not occur. The OR indicates the relative likelihood of an event under one condition compared to its likelihood under another. The OR ranges from 0 to infinity; an OR equal to 1 indicates no difference in the likelihood of an event between two conditions (e,g., between two groups).

As the outcomes for models 3a, 3b, 4, and 5 are counts, i.e., lists of non-negative integers, their distributions can be theoretically represented by the Poisson distribution. Models 3, 4 and 5 are analyzed with negative binomial regression tools. Accordingly, results are reported in incidence rate ratios (IRR). The Poisson distribution is theoretically suitable for capturing the tournament dynamic of an event circuit and 'qualification device' signals quality through awards, because the lowest value an outcome can have, is zero, and there is no upper bound on observed counts, i.e., the number of awards. Where there is 'glut', prizes are extremely relevant to future choices about product and reputational status. The notion of an interval, important to the conception of the Poisson distribution, is appropriate for prize variables for the film industry, where movie product is known to have a short shelf life (indicated through the interval of four years) and where being 'aesthetically novel' can define artistic breakthrough. In the Poisson distribution, μ is the expected rate at which an event will occur. In this analysis, this is reflected by the idea that in the long run festival participation will pay off in terms of reputation for movie and director and more creative work for the latter. As μ increases, the probability of a zero count decreases and the distribution approximates the normal distribution. In the models, this corresponds with the idea that if the festival is an instituted third-party information provider and a legitimate reputation-maker and the festival circuit is a larger organized, routinized system, prizes should be incidences which conceivably occur on an average rate in a given interval. However, Poisson regression, upon inspection of the four count outcome variables, is not methodologically adequate for this part of the study, as the variables show overdispersion (i.e., the variance is greater than the mean).[8] Hence this modeling effort follows the advice of Long and Freese (2006) to apply negative binomial regression analysis, correcting the incapacity of Poisson regression to account for overdispersion through adding one additional parameter, which adjusts the variance independently of the mean and allows the model to reflect unobserved heterogeneity among observations. The models and outcomes are presented in Chapter 6.

8 The over-dispersion was established by calculating conditional means and variances from cross tabulations of each outcome variable with the key predictor variable (festival circuit participation). It turned out that the means and variances not similar enough to proceed with Poisson regression technique.

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