

Differentiated Integration Beyond Brexit

Revisiting Cleavage Perspective in Times
of Multiple Crises

Alexander Radunz and Rafał Riedel

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5 From inner core to outer periphery

Supply and demand for European (differentiated) integration

Differentiated integration (DI) is an answer to the growing heterogeneity inside and outside of the European Union (EU). It allows overcoming integration gridlocks, it carries certain possibilities, but also it is associated with a number of risks, and as such it raises controversies among the informed observers. Still, we know surprisingly little about the public opinion on DI and its specific dimensions. Analysing the public opinion on each and every aspect of DI is hardly imaginable, and yet it does not mean that it would help us understand and explain the overall support and neglect towards DI. For example, the CODI (“Comparative Opinions on Differentiated Integration”) project brought about a data set which covers a number of aspects and a large portion (though not all) of the European population.

The methodological challenge related with studying the support or opposition towards DI is related with the conceptual puzzle of DI itself. While DI is understood in many various ways by the European integration (EI) scholars themselves, even more difficult is it to be captured in any public opinion attitudes towards it. The European publics may understand it differently depending on the policy area, as well as on a general level when being confronted with similar but yet different concepts, like for example *Europe à la carte*, or multi-speed Europe. Moreover, in the political discourse these various DI concepts take the form of slogans like *Europe of Fatherlands* or European federation, which does not bring more clarity. Scholars attribute them often with the support for deeper or shallower integration, whereas they may manifest quite distant understandings, depending on the context.

When investigating various types of support for various types of DI, scholars reveal numerous dimensions and factors related with this support (Schuessler et al. 2022). Since DI plays a crucial role in the EU’s development, it implies that the Member States’ citizens are interested in it, or at least in some selected aspects of it. Various analyses reveal substantive differences in support for different types of DI. For example, Julian Schuessler, Max Heermann, Lisanne de Blok and Catherine De Vries examine two dimensions that seem to structure citizens’ evaluations of DI. The first one relates to the effect of DI on the EI project, the second concerns the safeguarding of national autonomy. Their research shows that the pro-EU citizens more positively evaluate integrationist forms of DI but are more sceptical

when it comes to using DI to preserve national autonomy. Therefore, by necessity, some assessments of DI are related to more general questions about EI. Depending on its specific form, DI may be perceived either as a driver or as a stumbling block towards more EI (Schuessler et al. 2022). For this reason, scholars do not reach consensus about the set of questions to be used in surveying various aspects of attitudes towards DI. We also try to escape the trap of measuring the attitudes towards DI exclusively by referring to the questions that focus on one dimension of DI, for example the “two-speed” Europe (which is highly non-representative for DI). Instead, we prefer to focus on a more horizontal question that measures the Europeans’ preferences towards the idea of unification going further and deeper.

Some scholars equate support for integration with support for DI (Gabel 1998, Citrin & Sides 2004) which is far from being obvious. On the one hand, DI can be considered to pose a threat to the unity of the integration project, cementing differences between the Member States. When viewed in this manner, EU supporters should be opposed to DI. On the other hand, DI can be considered a necessary measure to overcome gridlock in a heterogeneous EU (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig 2012; Stubb 2002); in such a perspective, it allows at least a subgroup of Member States to act as forerunners, with the possibility of other states following over time. For pro-integration minded citizens, partial integration can be seen as a second-best option, to be preferred over a complete stagnation of the integration process (Leuffen et al. 2022, p. 221).

Keeping in mind all the above-mentioned concerns, in this study we operationalize the support for deeper and enhanced integration among the EU citizens, by referring to the question from European Social Survey (ESS) that is formulated in the following way: “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position.” We believe this question is adequate in diagnosing the European citizen’s attitudes towards DI by putting it into the context of EI in general. It allows the respondents to project their opinion about the need to enhance integration (“more Europe”) versus the need to halt it (“less Europe”), or even decrease it. At the same time, it does not suggest the informants any particular version of DI, be it *Europe à la carte*, or multi-speed Europe.

We argue that some more general attitudes towards EI may also inform EU citizens’ preferences about DI. Similar logic was applied in various studies including De Blok and de Vries (2022). Due to the long-lasting trend of the growing salience of the EI, we observe also the growing importance of DI in domestic politics. It is more visible in the domestic political discourses in grand instances like monetary integration, and less visible in more nuanced acts of differentiation, like the case of the European Public Prosecutor Office. However, domestically visible or not, they remain salient for the EU citizens, and the political contestation over differentiated EI is expected to play a more and more important role. Moreover, the moments of politicization over EI in general overlap with the moments of political contestation over some specific issues that define the system of DI. For instance, the Swedish referendum about the potential joining the Euro-zone

exemplifies a decision about entering a deeper level of integration, whereas voting for or against the ratification of the Treaty establishing the constitution for Europe manifested a more general attitude towards EI (De Blok & de Vries 2022). At the same time, these democratic acts were determined by various domestic factors, like the support for local political actors and their relation with the subject matter of the voting in question.

Moreover, we do not focus only on the question if and to what extent citizens support or neglect further integration in Europe, but we look beneath these attitudes trying to figure out what stands behind and builds them. In particular we try to identify and explain the underlying conflicting lines along which the citizens form their preferences regarding EI and DI. In other words – how various citizens differ in their assessment of different aspects of DI. Consequently, we employ updated cleavage theory as interpretative vehicle.

This way, we follow the logic of Dirk Leuffen et al. (2022) exploring the ways in which the preferences on DI align with the positions towards various societal differentiations. We agree that the attitudes towards DI are associated with more general conflicts over socio-economic issues that generate cleavage. Their research reveals that DI is favoured by citizens holding a liberal economic ideology, while more equality-oriented citizens tend to oppose DI, which they also attribute to the experiences with the economic crisis (Leuffen et al. 2022).

Citizens evaluate DI in correspondence with their more general attitudes on socio-economic differentiation (Leuffen et al. 2022). Dirk Leuffen and colleagues claim that:

(...) attitudes on DI are in line with their attitudes on individual autonomy, freedom of choice, equality, and solidarity. Economic liberals usually value freedom of choice and stress the efficiency-enhancing merits of differentiation. Accordingly, citizens with economic liberal worldviews should support differentiated integration. In contrast, other citizens hold stronger preferences for equality and solidarity – arguably, because they believe that inequality results from luck, rather than from individual control, work, or achievement (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005). Such citizens are more likely to oppose DI, possibly conceiving of it as an undermining of solidarity. They may also fear that differentiation could lead to dominance (cf. Eriksen, 2018) or cause negative external effects (cf. Kölliker, 2001). In contrast, respondents supporting freedom of choice, free trade, and a market economy should support DI. Since liberal economic attitudes should also translate into persons' self-placements on a left-right scale, we expect citizens on the political right to be stronger in favor of DI.

(Leuffen et al. 2022, pp. 221–222)

The EU citizens disagree on the scope and depth of specific policies as well as on the speed of their implementation. These individual-level preferences constitute the collective integration constraints (De Blok and de Vries 2022). From this point of view the EU citizens' polarized opinions and ideological stances are important

for their directly and indirectly formulated attitudes towards various aspects of EI. Going beyond the many explanations provided in the literature that were based on economic utilitarianism, national cues, territorial identifications or other determinants, in this study we focus on the ideological dispositions that undermine the EI and hence DI support. Such an analytical perspective allows to escape the trap of one-dimensional explanations, and it allows to explore the multifaceted nature of the system of individual level incentives building the attitudes towards the EU, and its various modes of integration.

To learn more about citizens' dispositions accompanying the support or opposition towards DI, this section analyses citizens' preferences on DI in conjunction with other variables related to their stances on particular socio-economic and socio-cultural issues. Unpacking the demand side contributes to our better explanations of the EU citizens' needs and preferences, and therefore it helps us to understand the input legitimacy for EI. Societal diversity in preferences to integrate deeper or faster needs to be answered by the political actors and their political offer. This is why we also look at the supply side of the political market.

EI as such, and DI in particular rise numerous controversies across and within the Member States. This is articulated directly – like in the case of treaty ratification referenda, or indirectly – through national elections. Sometimes the opinions are formed directly on specific EU policies and decisions (e.g. austerity measures or climate-energy package), and sometimes they are mediated and expressed indirectly (e.g., attitudes towards migration).

It has been argued by many scholars (McLaren 2002; Bakker & de Vreese 2016; Kentmen-Cin & Erisen 2017) that attitudes towards immigrants are a key explanatory factor in analyses of support or opposition for EI. Attitudes towards immigration have been at the forefront of political and economic agendas across the continent for years (de Vreese 2017), not only in times of refugee crisis (like in 2014/2015) but also in the Brexit debate, as a consequence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine or austerity measures implemented in the Southern peripheries of the EU.

The relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and attitudes towards the European Union is rightfully experiencing a (new) wave of social and scholarly attention. The proposition that citizens who hold anti-immigration attitudes are also more likely to be critical against the EU and European integration is not new.

(de Vreese 2017 p. 137, cf. Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005, cf. McLaren, 2002)

Our analysis provides new insights in the intricate relationship between immigration attitudes, DI attitudes and the ideological predispositions shaping these attitudes. We intend to assess how issues of EI are addressed in conjunction with other concerns like migration and trade by comparing various societies across Europe. Moreover, we are interested in the dynamics of the relations between

immigration attitudes and DI attitudes – how they evolved across time, with special attention given to the milestones, namely the occurring crises.

Additionally, Leuffen and others claim that “the data reveal striking differences amongst macro-regions: support for DI has become much lower in Southern European states. They attribute this opposition to negative repercussions of the Eurozone crisis.” (Leuffen et al. 2022, p. 218). These ideological predispositions are more readily retrievable in peoples’ minds and serve as benchmarks to determine how to reason about DI (Anderson 1998; De Vries 2018; Kritzinger 2003; Sánchez-Cuenca 2003).

The fact that we observe the growing salience of the EI in EU citizens’ lives is not often manifested in the European themes present in the domestic political discourses (De Blok & de Vries 2022). Even more is it clear in the case of DI, which is even less present in most of the Member States’ debates. It is much often an elite discourse (de Blok & de Vries 2022), and it happens in the times of the post-permissive consensus era. Due to this fact, we suggest that people use ideological benchmarks when forming their opinions about DI – mostly relating to their general predispositions towards the EU (de Blok & de Vries 2022). Therefore, we look at the relations between their support towards further integration on one side, and on the other at their ideological stances on various socio-economic and cultural issues. In the face of the lack of knowledge, and sometimes even interest about the EU politics, polity and policies, the citizens extrapolate their general ideological predispositions. This makes them critically salient for our understanding of the newly emerging cleavages and their relation to the preferences about the EU.

Since DI has become a systemic feature of the EU’s institutional and legal framework, many scholars have claimed that DI offers a viable solution to accommodate the heterogeneity among the EU members (Bellamy & Kröger 2017). The same as regards the heterogeneity within the Member States. The dividing lines go across national boundaries, but they also exist inside the EU Member States’ societies. Diversity of opinions is natural in any democratic polity, yet the grand question is whether these dividing lines form a cleavage. How much structurally rooted are these dividing lines within the democratic fabrics of the European societies?

5.1 Note on methods

How to explore supply and demand for European (differentiated) integration

In the first step, the supply side will be approached with a weighted multidimensional scaling (WMDS) of party positions and the relative attention that is paid to a specific issue. In a second step, the demand side will be accounted for with a series of multiple linear regression analyses (MLR) of representative survey data. The latter is collected across Europe by the ESS. Likewise, a factor analysis (FA) shall elucidate how the respondents’ attitudes are structured.

The method of WMDS has already been implemented in studies for political contestation about specific issues. Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and Bornschieer (2010)

apply it to demonstrate the restructuring of the Western European partisan space in the wake of globalization.

Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a statistical method for visualizing data. It is used to translate information about the pairwise distances among a set of objects or individuals via a distance matrix of dissimilarities into a graphical representation. The latter can be computed with one, two or more dimensions. These dimensions do not necessarily carry a clearly attributable label such as “cultural” or “economic” but are theoretically meaningful through interpretation (Bornschieer 2010, p. 39).

Objects which are more similar or have shorter distances to each other, are visualized closer on the calculated graph than objects that are less similar.¹ The model seeks to approximate a lower-dimensional representation of data by the minimization of a loss function, which is in its general form called *stress in distance*. Technically speaking, the targeted data are “dissimilarities between n row objects and m column objects, collected in an $n \times m$ matrix Δ .” Mair et al. (2021, p. 24) define the basic stress loss function for a metric MDS or unfolding and minimize it with the term

$$\sigma(X, Y) = n \sum_{i=1}^n m \sum_{j=1}^m w_{ij} (\delta_{ij} - d_{ij}(X, Y))^2$$

with w_{ij} as an optional $n \times m$ weight matrix.² Any statistical program for MDS that can handle weights and missing data could be used to minimize the loss function. In the subsequent analysis the statistical program *R* and the *unfold* function are used to compute and display the results.

In political terms, the approach can be used to uncover the structure of partisan space.

However, competing political parties turn different levels of attention within their programs and rhetoric contributions to public debates. For example, a traditional leftist party would put their focus more on redistribution rather than a progressive left party on cultural liberalism, even though both have similar stances on both issues.

WMDS can be applied when more weight is given to salient relationships between political parties and issue categories than less salient relationships. There are always statistical distortions between the “real” distances and their visual representation in low-dimensional spaces. However, “the weighting procedure ensures that the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues is more accurate than those corresponding to less salient ones” (Kriesi et al. 2012, p. 55). Errors constantly occur in reducing complexity to only few dimensions, but the weighting ensures that they are allowed where the topics are of little importance. This enables the model to simultaneously account for party positioning with respect to the issue categories *and* for their salience for these issue categories.

The data basis for the following analysis consists of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) which estimates party positioning on ideology, EI and specific policy issues for national political parties since 1999. In the subsequent waves

in 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2019 the number of countries increased from 14 Western European countries to 31, now covering all EU Member States. During this period, the number of parties increased from 143 to 277.

Between 235 experts in 2006 and 421 in 2019 were asked to analyse the parties' electoral programs and estimate their issue positions and saliencies.

Questions on parties' general position on European integration, several EU policies, general left/right, economic left/right, and social left/right are common to all surveys. More recent surveys also contain questions on non-EU policy issues, such as [...] immigration, redistribution, decentralization, and environmental policy.

(CHES 2023)

Accordingly, the items selected and renamed for the WMDS are the following:³

- anti_eu*; “overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration”; value scores from 1 = “Strongly opposed” to 7 = “Strongly in favor”;
- eu_intmark*; “position of the party leadership in YEAR on the internal market (i.e. free movement of goods, services, capital and labor)”; value scores from 1 = “Strongly opposes” to 7 = “Strongly favors”;
- eu_budgets*; “position of the party leadership in YEAR on EU authority over member states' economic and budgetary policies (asked in 2014 and 2019)”; value scores from 1 = “Strongly opposes” to 7 = “Strongly favors”;
- deregulation*; “position on deregulation of markets”; value scores from 0 = “Strongly opposes deregulation of markets” to 10 = “Strongly supports deregulation of markets”;
- redistribution*; “position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor”; value scores from 0 = “Strongly favors redistribution” to 10 = “Strongly opposes redistribution”;
- environment*; “position towards environmental sustainability”. (Asked in 2010, 2014 and 2019); value scores from 0 = “Strongly supports environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth” to 10 = “Strongly supports economic growth even at the cost of environmental protection”;
- multicult*; “position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation)”; value scores from 0 = “Strongly favors multiculturalism” to 10 = “Strongly favors assimilation”;
- urban_rural*; “position on urban vs. rural interests”; value scores from 0 = “Strongly supports urban interests” to 10 = “Strongly supports rural interests”;
- antimig*; “position on immigration policy”; value scores from 0 = “Strongly favors a liberal policy on immigration” to 10 = “Strongly favors a restrictive policy on immigration”;
- laworder*; “position on civil liberties vs. law and order”; value scores from 0 = “Strongly promotes civil liberties” to 10 = “Strongly supports tough measures to fight crime”;

galton; “position of the party [...] in terms of their views on social and cultural values.

“Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, abortion rights, divorce, and same-sex marriage. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition, and stability, believing that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues”; value scores from 0 = “Libertarian/Postmaterialist” to 10 = “Traditional/Authoritarian”;

The respective items for measuring the relative salience of the issues (for example *galton_salience*; “relative salience of libertarian/traditional issues in the party’s public Stance”; value scores from 0 = “No importance” to 10 = “Great importance.”

The output values of the CHES database are mean values generated by all experts’ estimates. The surveys cover several points in time for all countries included in the sample. For practical reasons, parties with an “insignificant” impact on the electoral (share of votes) or parliamentary level (share of seats) are excluded from the MDS. Therefore, the inclusion requirement is at least 2.5% of overall votes in national parliamentary elections or at least three awarded seats.

As mentioned before, the dimensions that result from WMDS analysis mainly deliver information about the representability of the data in an n -dimensional space. Thus, it is possible to lay theoretically meaningful axes between polarizing issue categories, like from *antimigration* to *multiculturalism* for a cultural axis and from *redistribution* to *deregulation* for an economic axis. These constructed dividing lines are meant to facilitate interpretation and do not equal dimensions that result from FA. In the graphical WMDS solution the positioning of parties is a function of their *joint* proximity towards all included issues and not only towards those that are identified as the poles of a dimension. Therefore, the axis constituted by the mentioned issue categories must make sense theoretically *and* they should lie at the extremes of the distribution as an indication of actual polarization over these issues. With respect to the relevance within this framework, it is of special interest whether the issue position of EI (*anti_eu*) proves polarizing and if so, which issues and parties surround it.

It is of importance to recall, that the respective distances in the solution need to be interpreted in relation to each other and not so in absolute terms (Bornschieer 2010, pp. 75–77). A right-wing populist party may for example not be exactly next to the issue category of *antimigration* in absolute terms because its proximity to further issues “pulls” it to other directions (2010, p. 39). If an issue is far away from all other issues, such as immigration, it may be either because the issue is not salient, because the topic does not fit into the general dimensional structure or because it unfolds some sort of polarization.

Recapitulating our derivations from postfunctionalism and cleavage theory, we expect a divergence of fringe parties at each end of the political left-right spectrum and that the right-end parties tend to position themselves more consistently

with the refusal of migration and EI. Additionally, it is considered a basic requirement for a two-dimensional WMDS configuration to be statistically appropriate regarding acceptable stress values (*Stress-I* below 0.2).

The further anticipation is, that the issue of EI realigns from an economic dimension and tends to realign with the cultural axis. In this case,

mainstream parties may converge on the economic dimension but increasingly differentiate themselves in cultural terms. Indeed, it is especially with respect to the cultural dimension that [...] the established parties [are expected] to reposition themselves under the pressure exerted by new structural conflicts.

(Kriesi et al. 2012, p. 98)

Mainstream conservative parties are more likely to transform and diverge from the other established parties. If this is not the case, new populist-right parties are expected to emerge.

On the demand side the objective is to identify potential determinants and their underlying factors for EU scepticism among the respective populations in Europe. Retrieving cross-nationally comparative results allows us to take cleavage perspective on general attitudes towards EI. Therefore, the database from ESS is used throughout all further statistical analyses on the demand side.⁴ The ESS is an

academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are performed for cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations.

(ESS 2023)

The data will be analysed by MLR and FA which requires brief explanation. MLR is an extension of the Ordinary Least Squares Method and uses several explanatory independent variables to predict the outcome of a dependent response variable through a modelled linear relationship. This procedure finds the best fit for a distribution of data points by minimizing the sum of residuals from a modelled curve. The statistical implementation of the method is underpinned by two basic requirements of validity: the checks for multicollinearity and homoscedasticity. Multicollinearity occurs when some of the independent variables are correlated with each other too high. Therefore, a variance inflation factor (*vif*) will be calculated indicating the degree of variances due to multicollinearity. A *vif* value higher than 10 indicates problematic multicollinearity. Consequently, the first assumption is that multicollinearity is low. The second is the absence of heteroscedasticity, which refers to an unequal variance of the population used in the regression, for example, an unequal scatter of residuals. Otherwise, the regression coefficients and levels of significance are invalid. Therefore, a Breusch–Pagan test for heteroscedasticity is conducted for every regression. In case of failure, the regression will be conducted with an estimator that is robust to heteroscedasticity.⁵

Among the existing items that are asked throughout the ESS waves, the subsequent will be used to investigate the impact of individual attitudes and socio-structural dispositions on approval for the EU. Since this analysis is dedicated to the demand side, it should indicate a “call” for certain policies or rhetoric when considering EI. It will not be claimed whether political actors within parties or voters activate political contestation and demand for political positions *in general*. The aim is to look for mainstream but especially *green-alternative-liberal (GAL)* and *traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN)* parties’ potential to mobilize among the population that may divide along an integration–demarcation line of cleavage. Regarding the previously formulated hypotheses, the assumption is that the statistical results indicate a tendency in incentives to mobilize on the cultural dimension of the conflict. In other words: The effect of socio-economic or socio-structural variables is expected to diminish whereas cultural items might increasingly explain for variance within the regression model.

Therefore, the following variables are included in our research design.⁶

Dependent variable:

Attitudes towards EI (*EU attitude*); “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. [...] [What] number on the scale best describes your position?”⁷

Independent variables:

Attitudes towards immigration (economic; *migr eco*); “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”;

Attitudes towards immigration (cultural; *migr cult*); “And, using this card, would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”;

Attitudes towards homosexuals (*no hms*); “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish”;

Attitude towards a strong government that protect its citizens (*strong gov*); “It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens”;

Attitude towards reduction in income differences by government (*red inc dif*); “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”;

Attitude towards caring for the environment (*environ*); “He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him”;

Satisfaction with how democracy works nationally (*satsif. dem*); “And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?”;

Perception about income situation (*comf inc*); “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?”;

Sector of occupation (*sect*); “What does/did the firm/organisation you work/worked for mainly make or do?”⁸;

Urbanity of residence (*urban*): “Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?”;⁹

Highest level of education according to ISCED-standardization by UNESCO (*education*); “What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?”;

Abstention from last national election (*non vote*): “Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?”.

Further, a FA, more precisely a principal component analysis (PCA) is conducted for each year and country. This method is used in exploratory data analysis for dimensionality reduction through the projection of each data point on just a few principal components. Although lower-dimensional data is obtained, the data variation is preserved as much as possible. In this case, the PCA is conducted with an orthogonal varimax rotation which minimizes the complexity of the factor loadings and leaves the output simple to interpret. The sampling adequacy of the PCA is accounted for with a Keyser–Meyer–Olkin test (*KMO*), whose values should be below 0.5. In accordance with Kriesi et al. (2012) the six attitudinal variables that are part of the regression analysis will be included in the FA (*migr eco, migr cult, no hms, red inc dif, comf inc, environ*). This procedure unfolds whether individual attitudes underlie factors that might load clearly on an economic and cultural dimension of attitudes, or on mixed dimensions. When attitudinal coefficients turn out to be strong and significant in the regression model, additional verification for cultural or economic logics is achieved furthermore by PCA.¹⁰

As a by-product for the regression analysis, the progress of direction and polarization of the national electorates’ mean attitudes towards EI will be tracked over time, departing from the relatively “crisis-free” year 2004. This will be understood as baseline for the development of popular dissense about EI. Following Bramson et al. (2017), a dispersion measure, such as the standard deviation, functions as an accurate indication for societal polarization over a specific issue. Unlike the spread which considers only extreme positions of the population, dispersion measures consider the overall shape of a distribution.

Thus, for each country the demand side analysis begins with the overall development of population’s mean attitudes towards EI and their respective dispersion, for example, polarization in the ESS Rounds 02 (2002), 04 (2008), 06 (2012), 07 (2014), 09 (2018) and partly 10 (2020–2022). Then, the country-specific factor and regression analysis results follow.

The subsequent section deals with the case selection and points in time that are approached with the outlined methods.

The core idea of the transnational cleavage is to connect the social aspects of an integration–demarcation divide among populations with the political outcomes of the subsequent European crises. This is in line with the postfunctionalist paradigm of mass politicization as an outcome of crises. The last two decades have been marked as the “age of crisis” (Dinan et al. 2017), there are several critical points in

time that overlap each other with their impact. These events should be taken into consideration when suspecting the emergence and cultivation of a political divide over transnationalism. Several measurements over time are necessary for hypotheses testing, determining a reconfiguration of national partisan space in the wake of EI and European crisis. Thereby it will be investigated whether dispositions among societies are matching with the development of partisan program offerings. The Euro and the migration crisis have shown that there is a plausible delay between changing attitudes within electorates as reaction to critical events and political leaders' actions due to these electoral pressures. Either one or the other could occur first and trigger a response on the other side of political matchmaking – if there is a match anyhow. Once more, there is no general assumption about whether conflict activation and subsequent cultivation emanates from which side.

Additionally, the case selection requires some further notes. In the context of this work, it seems plausible and beneficial to select for countries that lie at the core of postfunctionalist explanations. Great Britain appears to be a must for every such sample. Following Hooghe and Mark's postfunctionalist assumptions, we try to take cleavage perspective on EI and DI *across* countries and hemispheres in Europe. Therefore, this sample selection is based on different historical and geographical waves of accession.

The main empirical focus concentrates on selected countries positioning themselves on various locations on the European map of DI (Winzen & Schimmelfennig 2015). These countries represent inner core (Germany), outer core (Poland), inner periphery (Switzerland) and outer periphery (United Kingdom (UK)). Following the logic of integrative hemispheres, Germany represents the inner-core of the EI process – as a founding member, participating in most supranational policies. The outer-core is represented by Poland – the largest new EU Member State that participates only in some EU policies and shows clear and increasing scepticism towards Brussels and any idea of further *communitarization*. Next, Switzerland – formally a non-member which is a special case of “integration without membership” represents the inner-periphery of EI. It is only bilaterally linked to the EU but entails similar political conflict structure over EI as other Member States. Further, the UK represents a special category of a former member that circulates on a more and more distant trajectory vis-à-vis EU and constitutes a critically important case of outer-periphery.

The sample takes into consideration the postfunctionalist claim that the developing transnational cleavage has broken to surface after the Euro crisis, causing a north–south rift between lender and debtor countries. *However*, with the migration crisis, this divide has captivated the member countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well – in a cultural logic. Additionally, in 2017 Hooghe and Marks recognize that the radical right and right-wing populist parties and movements might be developing towards the main profiteer and thus maintainer of the mainly culturally connoted cleavage *all over* Europe. We thereby aim at proving that this accounts not only for EU Member States, but generally for integrated countries. Our sample selection covers the cases and points in time as shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Operationalization for the demand and supply side analysis

<i>Critical Event</i>	<i>Demand Side: ESS Data</i>	<i>Supply Side: CHES Data</i>			
		<i>GER</i>	<i>POL</i>	<i>GB</i>	<i>SWI</i>
	2004	2006	2006	2006	/
Constitutional Treaty rejection	2008				
Eurozone	2012			2010	
Ukraine I	2014			2014	
Schengen, Brexit	2018				
(Covid-19)	(2020 to 2022)			2019	

The selection for ESS-waves on the demand side is uneven. In 2010, the first survey wave after the outbreak of the financial crisis, the ESS abolished asking respondents about their attitudes towards EU integration, which serves as dependent variable for the regression analyses. Nevertheless, to maintain several points in time that make sense to map popular tendencies, the 2012 wave is considered instead of the one in 2010. Since it took the global financial crisis two years to develop into a multi-faceted Euro crisis, this choice seems reasonable (Schimmelfennig 2018b).

Since neither the supply nor the demand side data allows for reliable time series analysis (low-*n*, uneven periods) this work does not aim for claiming *causal* inferences from the respective external stimuli (crises) to immediate change in party positions or voter attitudes, rather they serve as reference points and methodological fundament for hypothesis testing itself.¹¹ Furthermore, we travel across the map of DI from the inner-core to the outer-periphery, justifying the specific countries position on the orbital circles of integration and contextualizing the demand–supply analysis in background of the specificities that characterize each states’ European politics.

5.2 Inner core – Germany at the heart of European integration

Germany finds itself at the very heart of the EI project (Beck 2013; Muenkler 2015). It has been the case since the very foundation of the European Communities in the 1950s, when West Germany became one of the most important “founding members” and since that time has been labelled as the “engine” of EI (Dehio 1955). This role has been shared with France in the form of the so called “Franco-German engine” for a couple of decades. Nevertheless, due to the relative decrease in power of France (Giddens 2013), Germany – especially after the reunification (Kundnani

2015; Burley 1990), and the financial crises – remained alone on this position (Blome et al. 2015).

By DI standards, Germany is agreed to occupy the inner core (Schoellgen 1992, 2003; Muenkler 2015) of the system of European DI. It is the outcome of a number of interrelated factors, including the historical legacies, economic power, political gravity, geopolitical localization (Röpke 2008; Wolf 2004) as well as the general consensus in the German public discourse about the role of Germany in Europe and vice-versa the important functions that the EI process plays for Germany (Habermas 2015). With the exceptions that are described below in this chapter, the Eurosceptic narrative remains marginal in Germany, and the mainstream political parties, as well as the vast majority of the citizens do not question the core position that Germany inhabits in the EU.

Interestingly, this central place that Germany naturally takes in Europe does not translate automatically into the leadership role, at least not in an aware and acknowledged way (Schwarz 2005). For a number of reasons, and the shadow of history still seems to be the critical one (Bousquet 1990), Berlin tries to avoid the leadership role (Stephens 2013) and accompanying risks of being accused of the hegemonic position. As a result, we can identify a gap that is created in the space between the German size, potential and gravity on one side, and the “reluctant hegemon” (Schönberger 2012) self-perception on the other.

In order to understand Germany’s position in the inner-core of the EI project, several issues need to be taken into consideration. First and foremost, the historical legacy as a powerful state in the very centre of Europe.

The EI project was built on the ruins of the World War II, and the trauma stemming from it. Germany’s post-World War II self-limitation meant among others the “Europeanization of Germany” paradigm. Secondly, and more contemporarily, the monetary union is of crucial importance for the German relations with other EU partners. Despite the fact that it was not a German project by design, after two decades from the introduction of Euro, it is undoubtedly the German economy that gained the most out of it, in relative (*vis-à-vis* other Eurozone members) and non-relative terms. Anthony Giddens (2013) claims that Germany managed to achieve economically much more than they could ever (historically) dream of as regards the relative power.

Last but not least – the migration issue, which is so salient from the point of view of this analysis. It is not only one of the crises that is present in this study as an important contextual variable, but it is also the attitudes towards migration that are so closely interlinked with the support for the EI project. All these aspects are crucial for exploring the German position on the map of European DI, and they are discussed below in a more elaborated way.

As a result of, and as a reaction to the experience of World War II, Europe has witnessed a move from fierce military conflict to cooperation and regulation of politics. Prior to 1945 international relations experienced a relative legalization of power and force. “Nationalism and the ‘[f]ascist glorification of the nation-state’ was a stark lesson on the problems caused by a lack of coordination between European governments and many discussed the possibility of federalist

system and close cooperation” (Bradley 2012). This lesson is reflected the most in the post-World War II evolution of the German society that transformed into a democratized community, deeply rooted in the political culture of its education system, constitution and the rule of law that is nested in Germany’s daily politics – domestic and international. In the course of the second half of the 20th century, the prospects of the “all-powerful nation state” have been discredited by the mainland key players France and Germany (Bradley 2012; see Pinder 1998, p. 3).

During the second and third waves of EI, the major fear of Germany’s neighbours was about the effects of German unification and its economic potential that would bring the (perceived) balance of economic force to shake in Europe. Deeper integration, namely the association of unified Germany with EI was the answer at the time: A monetary and economic union sharing a common currency. However, it was “Germany that had to quit the currency that used to be the foundation of the German national and state identity” (Czarny & Menkes 2015, p. 23). In the third decade of the 21st century, and in the context of the benefits that the German economy gained from the participation in the monetary union, we tend to forget that the Germans were quite reluctant quitting the Deutsche Mark. This scarification was pursued at the request of the French, and for their acceptance of the German re-unification (Sauga et al. 2015).

And yet, there are various systematic perspectives about Germany and the Eurozone rationale. Apart from the reduction of transaction cost, it could be considered the “ultimate formula protecting Europe from pushing the lack of balance in favor of Germany. For Europe but also for a Germany founded on its attachment to the Deutsche Mark, Germany’s presence in the Eurozone signifies the Europeanisation of Germany” (Czarny & Menkes 2015, p. 23).

The development until the financial crises in 2008, “was also a derivative of the peace dividend. The transaction of German unification in exchange for intensification of EI, turned out to be a positive-sum game for all of its players” (Czarny & Menkes 2015, p. 25). However, on the other side, the Eurozone would be a Germano-centric instrument to steer economics in Europe. Further, “core-periphery relationships were aggravated through the increasing level of competition among European countries” (Gräbner et al. 2020, p. 12). Germany and most core countries were provided with their technological capabilities to master economic intra-EU competition (ibid.). Therefore,

accumulation of such capabilities is a path dependent process in which countries with already many capabilities usually are enabled to accumulate even more capabilities faster, leading to a situation in which “success breeds further success and failure begets more failure”.

(Kaldor, 1980, p. 88)

The financial crises turning into the sovereign-debt crises serves as a well-known example. The ECB, the German chancellor Angela Merkel and German finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble endorsed depriving Greece’s self-determination to

devalue its currency. Instead, an exchange rate of one Greek euro to one German euro was enforced to sustain credit transfers and the Greek economy itself. This led to the impression, that “German surplus is the expression of a ‘virtuous’ savings behaviour, to be extended to the periphery” (Simonazzi et al. 2013, p. 653). Whether German account surpluses translated into equal deficits of countries in the European periphery remains controversial until today. What stands out is that interdependency is cause and consequence of the Eurozone crises, whereas economic cost was highest for non-cooperation during that time. Germany was at the forefront of deeper integration during this period. In 2011 the German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble stated:

[T]here’s the fact that while we in Europe have a common currency and thus collective monetary policies, we still have national financial policies. We were counting on the fact that our national financial policies would converge as a result of the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the necessities that come of having a common currency. This was only partially successful, so we’re now going to make the Stability Pact significantly stricter. Still, it’s going to be a step-by-step process to make EU institutions as strong as we might wish them to be right away, here and now.

(SPIEGEL 2011)

Czarny and Menkes (2015, p. 24) conclude, that all mentioned views on Germany and the Eurozone are correct, “as there was not a uniquely decisive factor in the creation of the common currency.” Nevertheless, the popular outcomes of this crisis are decisive.

As mentioned in Chapter 2 about the financial and Eurozone crisis, Northern European governments expressed their reluctance to rebalance their export-led growth and politicization of exclusive national identity countered functional pressures for reform. However, the societal “high price tag” of monetary reform led to the rise of parties in the North and radical left parties in the South, draining support for established and mainstream parties (Hooghe & Marks 2019, p. 1120).

Similar to the Greek protesters, supporters of the “new” Euroscepticism in Germany felt like they were deprived of their wealth by the increasing governance of supranational bodies.

In Greece, the radical left *Syriza* won the 2012 national elections; protesters’ signs and newspapers’ title pages framed Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schäuble as reincarnations of Adolf Hitler, whereas the German public opinion got politicized especially on the right. For the federal elections in 2013 the *Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)* received 4.7% of voter share, failing the 5% hurdle for the German parliament, but stunning the public with this never-before-seen vote share off the cuff. The party was found just a few months earlier that year in protest against the *Eurorettungspolitik* (Decker 2022).

On the threshold of the Schengen crises, the Merkel government unilaterally accepted all migrants that were stranded in the Balkans leading to an estimated

half a million entering Germany within few weeks. There was broad public support among Germans to accommodate refugees and warmly welcoming them at major train stations. Thus, shortly after the government's decision, German bureaucracy was overwhelmed by the influx of people, causing the country to carry out border controls. A domino effect occurred when the Member States in the South-East, namely Slovakia, Austria, Hungary and Croatia closed and re-militarized their borders. Starting from Germany as epicentre, the refugee crisis turned into a fully fledged Schengen zone crisis, in which Member States "were unable or unwilling to develop common solutions to this migration challenge. Instead, they resorted to unilateral measures, such as the temporary closure of internal borders, which threatened the survival of the Schengen zone" (Brack & Gürkan 2020, p. 8). Public support for the *Willkommenskultur* dropped and got heavily polarized, as not only the momentum for the protest arena shifted from the left to the right, the *AfD* as an anti-EU protest party pushed into the state parliaments and finally the Bundestag in 2017 receiving 12.6% of vote shares. As outlined before, the German political system was seen as one of the last bulwarks against right-wing populism in Europe, especially for the mentioned historical reasons.

As German Euroscepticism was previously rising mainly in the liberal-conservative political spectrum and expressed itself in economic nationalist rhetoric, the migration crises finally "touched a nerve of national identity because it asked Europe's populations to harbor culturally dissimilar people" (Hooghe & Marks 2019, p. 1122). In 2015 immigration became the most important issue in almost every country within the EU and rising public support for nationalist parties made it more difficult for government leaders to work out deals on the European level. In early 2016, electoral pressure "to shut the door appeared irresistible" (ibid.). Angela Merkel's popularity dropped rapidly to a four-year low reflecting concerns over the influx of refugee and migrants to Germany. The government adopted a more restrictive law on asylum and led negotiations for a deal with the Turkish government to keep migrants from crossing the Aegean Sea. As a matter of fact, annual caps on migrants were decided by the then social democratic led government in Austria and Sweden reduced welfare support for refugees (Hooghe & Marks 2019, p. 1122). Facing the unilateral measures and their negative externalities in the EU, the *CDU-SPD*-led government sought for the enforcement of refugee redistribution quotas according to the Dublin agreement.

The German "vehicle" or "engine" for EI seems to have stalled the process itself *via* overexpanding the very peripheries of EI, also in its own society.

It was a strong decision on a matter that continues to divide EU member states today. The decision by the German chancellor Angela Merkel also played a major role in setting the stage of the UK's popular referendum on the country's membership in the EU.

(Leruth et al. 2021, p. 9)

Following the referendum, Merkel gave away the long-standing opposition to a Europe of different speeds and noticed the necessity of DI and “the courage for some countries to go ahead if not everyone wants to participate. A Europe of different speeds is necessary, otherwise we will probably get stuck” (BBC 2017).

Looking back at Germany’s place and role within EI is not without contradictions in its claim to be the leader of a united and strengthened Europe. Back in 2014, in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass region, Angela Merkel’s government, together with France, promoted a tough stance on sanctions against Russia and for deeper integration in common foreign and security policy, enabling the EU to react uniformly to external shocks. Further, an energy union should decrease individual states’ vulnerability regarding energy dependency towards Russian oil and gas. On the contrary Germany rowed back, even actively cooperating with Russian pipeline politics in the case of Nord Stream II, which undermined EU cohesiveness in the energy sector. After the outbreak of the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, Olaf Scholz, the designated German chancellor of the new socialdemocrat–liberal–green *Ampelkoalition*, proclaimed the *Zeitenwende* in the German parliament in February 2022. The latter stands for a new understanding of German political leadership in Europe, releasing 100 billion euros and thereby adapting to the reborn realism of power politics in Europe. But rather, this amount of public spending is intended to restore the own military which has been strongly neglected in the decades before. Especially the first half of 2022 was characterized by (inter-)national disputes about Scholz’ coalition’s hesitation to contribute to the Western backed supply of weapons for the defence of Ukraine. Public support was broad for initiating a turn in Germany’s strategic role in a changing environment. The German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke to the people about defending their allies and nation. Therefore, a strong army would be necessary – “and the army needed the respect and support of German society. As the strong country at the heart of Europe’ Germany had a duty to meet. Germany needed to become capable of handling conflict” (Quinville 2022).

However, after Olaf Scholz’ initiation claiming the term *Zeitenwende* for Germany in Europe, it’s strategic implications already seems to have passed by in coalition disputes and bureaucracy – and an all-time low of Olaf Scholz and his coalition’s approval rate (Dunz 2022). Therefore, it remains open whether the first centre-left government after the Merkel era disposes enough internal and external capacities for shaping a path for further deepening of EI or whether its parties open the door to DI as another solution to the challenges for cooperation and solidarity among EU Member States and societies (Radunz & Riedel 2023). Nevertheless, Germany’s determination to remain in the EU’s inner-core is unquestionable. Equally clear are the German visions for the future of Europe which Berlin envisages as more and deeper integrated, more federalist and, most probably, more differentiated.

Looking back at the last three to four decades, Lipset and Rokkan’s German prime examples for the prototype *Volkspartei*, the oldest historical mainstream parties *CDU* and *SPD* have been continuously losing members and electorate alike. The rise of the *AfD* thereby signifies an advanced state of fragmentation that has

been growing over the years. How these “recent” changes in partisan structure matches with political demand by the electorate is demonstrated by the WMDS models as shown in Figures 5.1–5.4 for German party positions and by regression models for the German representative population’s attitudes towards EU integration in the 21st century.

The WMDS model for the year 2006 reveals a clear two-dimensional crosscut of a cultural and economic axis that goes along from *antimigration* to *multiculturalism* and from *deregulation* to *redistribution*.

The partisan space for sceptical positions towards EU integration (*anti_eu*) and the internal market (*eu_intmark*) is occupied by the German far left party *DIE LINKE* (*Linkspartei/PDS*). The latter is also closest to the *redistribution* issue. Anti-EU stances are arguably linked with ideas critical to national and global capitalism, such as free trade.

Observably, cultural issues such as *multiculturalism* and *urbanism* are occupied by the *Greens*, representing a typical *GAL* position, opposed to its “counterpart,” the conservative Christian-democrat sister parties *CDU* and *CSU*.¹² They occupy the *TAN*, *antimigration* and *law and order* pole, with the *CSU* being the closest to these issues. In the context of this model, the social democratic *SPD* takes a relative middle position towards the issues with slight exception to *deregulation*, positioning itself in the economic left and culturally right space of the distribution – in relative terms to the other parties.¹³

For 2010, *DIE LINKE* keeps its *redistribution* position but relatively abandons the EU sceptical issues, which both surprisingly experienced an observable decrease in value and salience. Furthermore, in relation to the other issues, opposition to the EU and the internal market are the farthestmost from all parties and




Figure 5.1 WMDS of German party positions in 2006 (6 subjects, 9 objects, Stress-I: 0.158982).




Figure 5.2 WMDS of German party positions in 2010 (6 subjects, 10 objects, Stress-I: 0.153698).




Figure 5.3 WMDS of German party positions in 2014 (8 subjects, 11 objects, Stress-I: 0.148502).

neither programmatically targeted nor polarizing at all. Additionally, the *CDU* and *CSU* moved slightly away from the previously occupied cultural pole (*TAN*, *antimigration*, *law and order*) to a centre position.

The 2013 national elections were the first to take place in the middle of the Euro crisis. Even though they have not overcome the 5% hurdle of the German




Figure 5.4 WMDS of German party positions in 2019 (7 subjects, 11 objects, Stress-I: 0.120897).

parliament, new parties surfaced on the electoral landscape, gaining a considerable increase in popularity: The right-wing populist *AfD* achieved out of the gate 4.7% and the *Pirate Party (PIRATEN)* 2.2%. In the 2014 WMDS model the *AfD* together with *DIE LINKE* occupy the formerly abandoned EU sceptical partisan space, with the former being closer to the general anti-EU issue and the latter being closer to internal market opposition. Both are equidistant to the newly included *EU budgets* issue, whereas the left-wing is clearly entailing the economic flank (*redistribution*) and the right-wing the cultural flank (*TAN*, *antimig*, *laworder*) of EU critical programmatic offers. Additionally, the *AfD* is now closer to *TAN* and *antimigration* than the formerly most conservative *CSU*. The German *Greens* are on the very opposite of the cultural *anti-EU* pole aligning with contrary issue, such as *environmentalism* and *multiculturalism*.

In 2019 the division within the anti-integration space is similarly ordered like in the previous period. Nevertheless, the *AfD* moved, in relation to *DIE LINKE*, further into the *anti-EU* partisan space, now completing the *TAN* proximity with opposition to *EU budgets*. As before, *AfD* is less disapproving of the EU internal market than *DIE LINKE*.

To sum the overall development up: In 2010 the cultural and economic issues were less cross-cutting than before and after. A programmatic supply space that is critical towards the EU was neither occupied by the conservative *CDU/CSU* nor by *DIE LINKE*. At the time, the party spectrum was structured less two-dimensionally before the *AfD* could enter the political arena, stretching the political space again to a clear two-dimensional crosscut. Additionally, the counterpart to this culturally

framed EU scepticism has been strongly linked to *urbanism*, *environmentalism* and especially *multiculturalism* from 2014 onwards. Looking at the right-wing's emergence, cultivation and consistent alignment with EU issues and the *Greens* as its partisan counter-pole, the German supply side analysis extracts clear indications for an *integration–demarcation* divide along the typical issues discussed previously. Additionally, a tendency from a formerly economic conflict over EI towards a cultural one is clearly observable.

For the demand side analysis, the mean attitudes of the elective German population towards EI have almost continuously increased from 2002 to 2018 by more than one point on the ten-point scale (5.10, 5.13, 5.40, 5.34, 6.21) and then dropped again to 6.02 in 2020. The respective standard deviation from the mean values has decreased from 0.0561 in 2002 to 0.0524 in 2014 but subsequently increased by 14.5 % to 0.0600 in 2018 and so did polarization over the issue. By 2020 the polarization measure dropped again to 0.0325 standard deviations.¹⁴

To begin with the German demand side analysis, the results of the factor analysis (PCA) for the individual period shall be briefly replicated (see Table 5.2). The six attitudinal items included in all models load almost exclusively on a cultural factor (*migr eco*, *migr cult*, *no hms*) with exception to 2012. The other attitude items load on a factor that cannot be clearly interpreted. Additionally, the 2018 FA reveals another mixed factor and a cultural factor that is interpreted as *welfare chauvinism*: Economic and cultural hesitation towards migration, as well as the preference for reducing income levels (*migr eco*, *migr cult*, *red inc diff*) load on one factor.

With reference to R^2 , the regression models explain for around 20% to 27% of variation in attitudes towards EI among the German eligible population (0.23, 0.21, 0.19, 0.27, 0.24). Among the following mentioned variables, all regression coefficients are significant and effective for the given period under the condition of inclusion and constancy of all other variables in the model.

Endorsing reduction in income differences (*red inc dif*) has a positive effect on attitudes towards EI only in 2018. Wishing for a strong government to protect its citizens (*strong gov*) has a moderate negative and significant effect (−.16) only once in 2014. Of the socio-economic and socio-structural items, living comfortably on one's income (*comf inc*) never turns out to be significant, same as *education*. The variable for sector of respondents' occupation (*sect*) with its ascending coding from primary to quaternary sector is significant, moderately strong, and positive only in 2004 (.16). The coefficient for urbanity of residence (*urban*) turns out to be strong in 2008 (.19) and moderately strong in 2012 (.10). In contrast, the coefficients for economic and cultural disapproval of migration (*migr eco*, *migr cult*) turn out to be strongly negative and significant across all models. The attitude of migrants being defective for the country's economy is relatively stronger negative (−.25) than the attitude of one's country's cultural life being undermined by migration (−.24) in 2004. However, this changes over time and the cultural rejection of migration constantly overrides the economic one, with the strongest negative effect on EU attitudes in 2014 (−.24) and remaining thereafter on a similar

Table 5.2 Multiple linear regression results for the elective German population, 2004–2018

EU attitude	GER 2004				GER 2008				GER 2012				GER 2014				GER 2018			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t		
migr eco	-.249306	.0334191	0.000	-.2549407	.0341388	0.000	-.1926085	.0277146	0.000	-.1975108	.0262256	0.000	-.1671713	.0361288	0.000	-.1671713	.0361288	0.000		
migr cult	-.2381518	.0331293	0.000	-.2054239	.033424	0.000	-.2256564	.0276465	0.000	-.2444958	.0257733	0.000	-.212305	.0338561	0.000	-.212305	.0338561	0.000		
no hms																				
satisf	.1472169	.0266363	0.000	.1882089	.0284047	0.000	.2393003	.0270717	0.000	.2636365	.0216383	0.000	.240475	.0291783	0.000	.240475	.0291783	0.000		
dem																				
strong gov																				
red inc dif																				
comf inc																				
environ	.1865285	.0568447	0.001							.1119277	.0554215	0.044	.1941207	.0512489	0.000	.2219554	.0670581	0.001		
non vote																				
urban																				
education																				
sect	.1645441	.0709874	0.021							.104945	.0516649	0.042								
R ²	0.2346			0.2119			0.1989			0.2744			0.2410							
N	2,152			2,103			2,357			2,553			1,885							

Source: ESS waves 2–9.

level in 2018 (−.21). In addition, the initial FA indicate that the economic refusal of migration is to be interpreted culturally since it loads consistently on a factor with cultural items (cf. Kriesi et al. 2012).

On the other hand, the item measuring satisfaction with democracy (*satisf dem*) has a strong positive and significant effect on the response variable peaking in 2014 (.26) and 2018 (.24). Inversely, this indicates that electives who are dissatisfied with how democracy works in Germany share disapproval of EI with a higher probability. Disapproval of homosexuals' liberties (*no hms*) turns out to be significant and negatively effecting EU attitudes only in 2014 (−.12). Finally, the coefficient for environmental attitudes is significant and strongly positive in 2004 (.19) and from 2012 to 2018 on (.11, .19, .22). What seems appalling is, that within the last ESS wave's regression model abstention from the last national election (*non vote*) has a very strong and negative effect on attitudes towards the EU (−.47).

Overall, the evidence is striking that disapproval of integration is driven by anti-migration sentiments within the electorate. The effect of fear for cultural undermining clearly dominates the fear for economic loss over time. In reverse, respondents embracing multiculturalism as consequence of migration are more likely to approve EU integration within the logics of this model. Interestingly, none of the socio-structural variables *education*, *sector* of occupation and residence (*urban*) play a consistent role in explaining for variation. The variable indicating attitudes towards reducing income differences (*red inc dif*) played also only once a significant role for the independent variable in 2018 (.17). Living comfortably on one's income (*comf inc*) does not extract any explanatory power within the regression model.

Therefore, the consistent dominance of cultural conflict over migration, and environmentalism as well as satisfaction with how national democracy works seems to be in line with the characteristics of the integration–demarcation divide. This was theorized and extracted on the supply side analysis earlier. It is thus surprising, that the item for non-voting acquires significance and a very strong negative effect in 2018, even after the EU-sceptical *AfD* gained its largest part of voters from the non-voters camp in the 2017 election (Hoerne & Hobolt 2017). According to the model, there is still a significant potential for elective people that are hostile to the EU but abstain from voting to be mobilized by the right-wing populist.

5.3 Outer core: Poland in the post-Brexit European Union

Poland, unlike Germany that is the founding Member State of the European Communities, experienced an EU accession referendum (2003) which means the Polish political system has already witnessed high political contestation related with EI. Despite the fact that the referendum ended with the result 77.45% “for” accession, the EU debate became the central one for the years before. In the years preceding the referendum, EI became the most important division line in the Polish politics, replacing the previous post-communist versus post-Solidarity movement divide. Beside the clear Euro-sceptics, like the *League of Polish Families (LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin)*, there were clear supporters of the Polish joining the EU.

There was also a group of parties and politicians labelling themselves as Euro-realists, including *AWS (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność)*. These politicians evolved into today's soft and hard Eurosceptics, and they are spread across the liberal *PO (Platforma Obywatelska / Civic Platform)*, and right-wing *PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość / Law and Justice)* camp.

Interestingly, parallel to the Brexit process, Poland evolved after 2015 elections from a poster child of successful transition, democratization and Europeanization, into the status of a troublemaker, who – together with Hungary – took an illiberal U-turn, which means also democratic backsliding and de-Europeanization. On the sphere of DI, Poland represents the puzzling case of an awkward partner who advocates unity and champions differentiation at the same time. Why is Poland such an interesting case to explore differentiation? As it is formulated by Agnieszka Cianciara:

Polish governments of all political colours have been consistently voicing opposition towards differentiated integration labelled as ‘two-speed Europe’. Yet Poland's de facto refusal to accede to the eurozone and marked unwillingness to join other enhanced cooperation formats, despite abilities and capacity to do so, make it one of the champions of internal differentiation in the post-Brexit EU. Thus, on the one hand, the post-accession story of differentiated integration of member states that joined the EU in the years 2004 and 2007 is a ‘story of normalization’ (...), where differentiation decreased and new members converged with old members and with established patterns of differentiation. On the other hand, Poland's opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and persistence outside of the eurozone, together with the growing government's Euroscepticism, make Poland an outlier compared to the majority of CEE members.

(Cianciara 2022, p. 538)

Directly after the fall of the *Berlin Wall*, Poland – together with a group of the formerly East-bloc countries – launched their journey towards the West under the “Return to Europe” slogan. This Europeanization project resulted in accepting them in the 2004, 2007 and 2013 waves of enlargement as full EU members. Since that moment their pro-EU commitment has been questioned many times, and the strongest trend observable in Poland and Hungary is an ostentatious U-turn which they took in the past years (Krygier & Czernota 2016). It is characterized not only by democratic backsliding and illiberal tendencies (Habets 2015), but also by accompanying de-Europeanization. It manifests itself in open anti-EU attitudes of the authorities as well as in various other spheres and dimensions from functional to normative ones.

Unsurprisingly for many Eurosceptic political actors (like for the *PiS* party in Poland), UK (ruled by the *Conservative Party*) was an important ally. They watched the British case as an illustration of a de-Europeanization process. The Brexit process may be perceived as testing the limits of differentiation in Europe. Indeed, it tests whether differentiation may turn into disintegration and de-Europeanization.

Before Brexit, the exemptions from the Eurozone and Schengen area had already been quite prominent examples of differentiation. But undermining one of the four freedoms (free movement of people) – that became one of the bones of contestation in the Brexit process – attacked one of the fundamentals of the integration project and questioned the very idea of EI. The British case showed that openly opposing the very core of the Single Market turned the direction of the integration trajectory. Economic theories of international integration tell us that it is not only the free movement of products and services which constitutes a Single Market. The creation and functioning of a Single Market are also conditional on liberalization and free movement of the factors of production: capital and labour. This is why the four freedoms have so far been treated as inseparable elements of one concept. At least, until 2020, when the UK succeeded in negotiating a status in which it has access to the Single Market, and the continental European do not have open access to the British labour market (Riedel 2023).

For Poland and other CEE EU Member States, the Brexit case is also instructive in terms of the dynamic process of EI differentiation and fragmentation. Two decades ago, in the pre-accession phase, the “return to Europe” paradigm anticipated full and deep membership in the Western structures. In contemporary CEE, the picture is much more mixed. Alongside the fully integrated states belonging to the core of the EU (e.g., the Baltic states or Slovakia), there are reluctant EU members who question the fundamentals of the EI project, for example, Poland and Hungary. In this context, it is worth reflecting on the lessons of Brexit for the better understanding of the system of Europeans differentiation, specifically from CEE perspective.

The core period of the Brexit process (2016–2020) coincided with the unprecedented de-Europeanization turn on the EU’s Eastern flank. More than ten years after the EU’s big-bang enlargement, many of the new Member States lost their initial pro-integration impetus and began flirting with Britain (and its EU-contesting attitude) both on the supranational level and in bilateral relations. Poland’s nationalist-conservative government (2015+) chose the UK as the number one strategic partner in their foreign and EU policies. In the European Parliament, the British Conservatives allied with the Czech *ODS (Občanská demokratická strana / Civic Democratic Party)* as well as the Polish *PiS* in the European Conservatives and Reformist group. Due to its economic and political weight, Poland is a critical case of general tendencies in the CEE region. However, the Polish case does more than exemplify some developments common to the CEE’s (semi)periphery. Additionally, Poland is also one of the most Brexit-impacted states, given the geographical structure of its trade migration flows and its other socio-economic characteristics.

The UK’s decision to leave the EU rose important questions about consequences and implications for various EU Member States, as well as the Union as a whole. With the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, Poland has gained the status of one of the Union’s most problematic members. This is both because of the openly Eurosceptic attitude of the ruling (after 2015) party – *PiS* – and because of some structural features that characterize the Polish economy. Therefore, the Polish case is

interesting in the post-Brexit context, especially in post-pandemic times, when the system of European DI is dynamically changing. The Russian aggression against Ukraine (2022) is also vitally important for the Polish relations with Brussels, or the Western structures in general. Russian threat has always functioned as a push-factor for the pro-European attitudes of the Polish citizenry. The unprecedented unity of the West against the Russian aggressor serves the consensus building in the Polish European politics.

The key question in this context is whether the British experience of leaving the EU can act as a (“good” or “bad”) example for other Member States, in this particular case – Poland. This section asks if and how Brexit influenced Poland’s European policies and politics, whether it served as a warning or as a stimulus to a more *sovereignist* approach by the Polish government. Brexit may lead the nationalist-populist government in Warsaw towards even more sovereignist attitudes against Brussels. Any perception of British success outside of the EU could support the Eurosceptic voices in Poland, feeding an illusion of Poland becoming the “second Britain.” Just as the UK was one of the main advocates of EU’s Eastern enlargement, its leaving the EU may serve as one of the main arguments for the Eurosceptics that “there is life outside of the EU.”

Despite the generally (exceeding 80% in the public opinion polls) broad acceptance for Polish membership in the EU, many symptoms need to be seriously taken into account. More and more Polish youngsters (aged 18–29) claim that Poland would cope better with the challenges of the world if left to do so on its own. The flagship EU policies, like the green transition, or monetary integration, meet strong opposition in Poland. The public discourse is saturated with Euroscepticism, negative attitudes towards the main EU institutions as well as the largest and leading EU members (predominantly Germany). Poland is on a conflicting trajectory with the EU on most fundamental issues, like the rule of law (Matysek-Jędrych & Mroczek-Dąbrowska 2021).

The UK (still as the EU-member) had been perceived in Poland – especially by the nationalist-populist ruling *PiS* party – as a natural ally in the EU. In times of growing marginalization of Poland losing such an important partner inside the Union is significantly disadvantageous. In the European Parliament *PiS* lost their main ally – that is *the Conservative* Euro-deputies. In the Council, UK had a reputation of a troublemaker, especially in times when Euroscepticism was British policy. That role of troublemaker is now seen as occupied by the illiberal democracies of CEE, predominantly by Poland (after Jarosław Kaczyński’s party took power) and Hungary (after Victor Orban gained the constitutional majority in the Hungarian parliament).

The departure of one of the largest EU Member States – the UK – has affected the voting power of the others in the EU institutional system. Comparative analysis of the allocation of votes, coalition building potential and voting power in general before and after the Brexit show that the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) will gain in voting power, with Poland experiencing the biggest increase statistically. How far it benefits from this power shift will, however, depend on how well the Polish authorities coordinate of their voting behaviour (Goellner 2018). Seen from the economic point of view, one needs not

to forget that Poland is not Britain as regards economic strength and potential. Additionally, Poland is far more dependent on trading with other EU countries (more than 70% of all exports, and 80% of all imports is traded with EU economies). Trade flows are substantially different in the case of the two countries. Not only has the UK traditionally been a key player in the global economy, but the geographical allocation of trade flows differs considerably. The share of UK's trade with its EU partners was remarkably lower than in the Polish case. For the UK, the first four trading partners are USA, Germany, Switzerland and China – three out of four UK's leading trade partners are non-EU states. In contrast, 75% of Polish trade is with EU economies. That said, despite the fact that Germany is Poland's most important partner, the UK remains an important market for Polish exports (Riedel 2023).

Bilaterally, we may observe a kind of asymmetry in terms of the importance of the mutual foreign trade between Poland and the UK. Great Britain is an important market for the Polish export (second largest, after Germany), whereas the Polish market does not seem to be significant for the UK (11th place). The relatively large trade surplus makes Poland more dependent on exports to the UK than on imports from the UK, which results in Poland being more vulnerable to all sorts of post-Brexit restrictions on access to the British market. It is the access to the UK market, much more than the resources coming from it, which make Poland dependent in economic relations with Great Britain (Matysek-Jędrych & Mroczek-Dąbrowska 2021).

Another dimension which is of crucial importance is the large Polish diaspora living in Great Britain. Directly after the *Big Bang* enlargement, the UK (together with Sweden and Ireland) decided to open the labour market without taking advantage of the seven years transition period (which was the case of the other continental EU Member States). This was mutually beneficial due to Poland's large unemployment rates at that time, as well as UK's economy needing labour in times of economic growth. As a consequence, the UK – as the large and dynamic economy – has remained the first recipient of Polish economic migrants for more than a decade after 2004. At the time of Brexit, it was still the second (after Germany) destination of Polish migrants, however on a seriously smaller scale compared to the levels immediately after enlargement. Nevertheless, for hundreds of thousands of Polish migrants, Great Britain leaving the EU, translates into limiting labour mobility opportunities. This applies both to new waves of migration and to migrants who have already settled in the UK and did not meet the criteria of residency established by London as a consequence of the Brexit process. In times when the number of out-going Polish migrants has decreased significantly, as well as in the context of other thirty labour markets remaining open for the potential migrants (beyond EU, also the European Economic Area and Switzerland), closing the British labour markets does not play that important a role, economically speaking. However, in terms of social aspects – it does. The established migration networks in Britain had been functioning effectively. Brexit closes off their further development. Linguistically, the British labour market was also more accessible for Polish migrants due to the relatively widely spread English language competences.

Last, but not least, the liberal British economic model was also preferential for the easy flow of migrants, compared to other European labour markets. It needs also to be remembered that the Brexit campaign was to a large extent fuelled by the anti-migration rhetoric. This is quite surprising in the face of the colonial British history and UK's traditional openness for migrants from across the globe. Nevertheless, the uncontrolled inflow of migrants from CEE (and among them, proportionally the most from Poland) met strong criticism and opposition in Great Britain. It was reflected in the pre-Brexit referendum campaign, and it found its consequences in the post-Brexit settlement with the EU.

The Polish represent the majority of the EU citizens living in the UK. After the UK's withdrawal, Poland is now the largest EU economy outside the Eurozone. Trade relations of the two countries are also going to be strongly affected by the Brexit process. Both the Polish and the British ruling parties were members of the same group in the European Parliament (*European Conservatives and Reformist*), sharing similar views on many aspects of EI (Brusenbauch 2019). Last but not least, Poland used to be (and still is) the largest recipient of the EU funds, whereas UK – despite the (in)famous British rebate was a net contributor to the EU budget. For many, the simplistic view of the balance of EU budgetary transfers remains the key parameter of cost–benefit analysis of EU membership. This is why it was one of the main arguments in the Brexit campaign to leave. In the Polish case, it remains – and will remain for many years – a reason to be part of the EU project.

One of the most important criteria as regards positioning a Member State on the map of DI is its attitude towards the supranational monetary union. In this case, what makes the Polish and British society similar is the lack of appeal of monetary integration on the supranational level. Now, after Brexit, it is important to ask: Why do Poles have an undisputed Euro-positive attitude whilst belonging firmly to the Eurosceptic camp when it comes to joining the Eurozone club? There is an important gap in Polish society between support for EI as such and opposition to supranational monetary integration in particular (Riedel 2018). And this cannot be understood just as an illustration of diversified public opinion typical of all democratic societies. In this case, the same people demonstrate a great deal of sympathy and support for the EU whilst at the same time being strongly Euro-sceptic. In developing these attitudes they refer to totally different, very often conflicting, sets of ideas, norms and values. Hence there is a fundamental misunderstanding inside the Polish public opinion rather than a logical Euro-optimism combined with an equally rational Euroscepticism.

In Poland, directly after the transformation, there was very strong support for EI and Polish participation in it (Bajczuk 2011). The EU impressed the Poles as an area of economic prosperity, political stability and a promised land in general. Such high expectations could only be disappointed. Once EU accession negotiations started and the EU became much more a set of figures, transition periods, opt-outs and so forth, the fairy-tale picture disappeared. The first disappointments can be observed in the period 1998–2002. At that time however the government launched its information/promotional campaign before the accession referendum (2003). This stimulated an upward trend in support which also continued after the

momentous year of enlargement (2004). The enlargement enabled access to the Single Market and a “rain” of cohesion money. Support for the EU thus reached its peak in 2008. Then the economic crises came to Europe (to Poland however to a lesser extent). As in many other EU Member States, society started to become more Eurosceptic (Riedel 2017). This downwards trend was broken again in 2014, following developments in Eastern and South-Eastern Ukraine. Poles saw with their own eyes the alternative to their pro-Western orientation. Directly after the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, Polish and Ukrainian GDP were very similar. Two and a half decades later, Polish GDP is three times higher than Ukrainian, as a result of Leszek Balcerowicz’s shock therapy and the strategic choices undertaken by the post-1989 governments. Poland is also the only EU Member State which has a border both with Russia and Ukraine, which makes it more exposed to any effects of the Ukrainian–Russian conflict. This critical situation spoke to the imagination of the Polish people to such an extent that their support for the EU skyrocketed and surpassed previous levels. In 2015 both the presidential and parliamentary elections were won by the *Law and Justice* party, which appeared as a self-proclaimed Euro-realist, but in practice a strongly Eurosceptic (by rhetoric and action) political actor. Jarosław Kaczyński, *PiS*’ leader, reads the Polish society’s sentiments accurately and there are no surprises in the behaviour of his party (and government) towards Brussels. Perhaps it is even more representative than the public opinion polls which very often express a politically correct, rather than real, attitude of the Polish society (Riedel 2023).

One of the possible explanations for this phenomenon is the economic utility theory which suggests that the more a society gains from the EI project, the more positive it is about it. In economic terms there are two strong arguments which persuade the Poles to be satisfied with their EU membership. One is participation in the Single Market which stimulated export growth (as an emerging market, the Polish economy is very much export-dependent) and the second is the access to EU funds (cohesion and structural funds) which boosts public investments on an unprecedented scale. Here it is important to note that these two factors may disappear when Poland loses its competitive advantage (based on low labour costs) and when the voivodships (regions) stop qualifying for EU funds. All that suggests Poland’s euro-enthusiastic attitude will decrease, too. Additionally, other problems are seemingly cumulating inside and outside the EU project. These are, among others, the implications of the refugee/migration crisis, related collective decision problems in the allocation of the refugees, not to mention the recently overcome economic crisis, the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, pandemic-related restrictions and so forth. All in all, the EU is no longer seen as a promised land, a panacea for the inefficiencies of Polish politics and economy, or as a prize for transformation fatigue. Instead of being a solution, the EU has turned into a problem in the eyes of many Poles. The Euroscepticism of Poland’s closest neighbours (like the Czech Republic) and partners (like Hungary or the UK) is also an important contextual factor.

The Brexit context is of highest importance for Eurosceptic actors. They can point to an example of a country that has left the EU and remained successful

in many spheres of socio-economic life. Especially in the case of Poland, whose relations with the UK (trade flows, large diaspora, etc.) are quite special, Brexit is an exceptionally convincing example. Both in Poland and UK, Eurosceptic parties remain in power. Britain ended outside of the EU. Yet, even in the case of Poland, we are witnessing a process of worsening Brussels–Warsaw relations. This may have serious implications in the long term, since the ruling *PiS* party has all sorts of communication tools at its disposal and conducts an openly anti-EU narrative in Polish public discourse. The expression “Pol-Exit” became *de-taboo-ized* and has entered the very centre of the political debate.

After Donald Tusk’s return to the Polish politics (2021), the pro/anti EU cleavage was promoted as one of the most crucial importance in the Polish public debate. This has not been the case since the accession referendum campaign in 2003. The old personal “Tusk–Kaczyński” conflict got reactivated in new post-Brexit circumstances and it manifested in new ways and forms. Bearing in mind the pro-European attitude of the vast majority of the Polish society, Tusk and his party (*Platforma Obywatelska / Civic Platform*) have attempted to set the agenda of problematic (for *PiS*) topics, like the arguments between Warsaw and Brussels on the issues of green transition, judiciary reforms, rule of law standards, art. 7 procedure or Recovery Fund. The *PiS* narrative, in return, became even more sovereigntist, and – as a consequence – openly anti-EU. Such a strong polarization in the debate among the political elites may bring about the similar effect among the Polish citizens. Pro-EU and pro-Western orientation have been an element of broad political consensus in the post-1989 Poland. Contesting and challenging it would mean a *Copernicus* turn in the Polish politics’ paradigms.

Migration is a salient issue in Poland, especially in the EI context. First and foremost, it is important to note that the Polish society emerged from communism as a highly homogenous one as regards to its ethnical and national composition. This unprecedented phenomenon was the result of the three generations’ closure of the borders and the lack of freedom of movement within the East-bloc satellite states. For centuries, Poland has been a “migration exporting” society, making the Polish diaspora one of the largest ones in Americas, or Western Europe. This trend even accelerated after the 2004 EU enlargement, when the UK, Ireland and Sweden opened their labour markets, stimulating the large-scale migrants’ outflow from Poland. With the process of time, and more importantly – with the economic progress, this has changed. At the present the Polish society is in transition with regards to the migration flow phenomenon – Poland is being converted from a migrant-exporting country into a migrant-importing one, and it has been the case already before the massive inflow of Ukrainian refugees as a result of the 2022 Russian aggression against Ukraine. For some groups of migrants and refugees Poland is a transfer country, for some others, it became a destination country, and the growing number of migrants within the Polish society is a relatively new phenomenon. The growing economy needs the labour force inflow, especially in the face of the Polish population aging problem. At the same time, becoming a migration society has not yet been digested in political terms in Poland. Anti-migration (including anti-refugee) sentiments are easily exploited as political vehicle, especially by

the right-wing parties. The anti-migration rhetoric brings about easy electoral gains – especially in the rural, underdeveloped regions – due to the established self-perception of the Polish society as a homogenous one. Ethnic and national diversity is alien for a large fraction of the Polish society, despite of the experience of living in the borderless EU space for almost two decades. This is especially interesting in the context of the statistical analysis as shown in Figures 5.5–5.8, since the cultural foundations (dominant Catholicism and related traditionalist values) prove to be decisive in explaining the attitudes towards migrants (Radunz & Riedel 2023).

How the migration issue and other conflicting issues that are embedded in culture interact with the issue of EU integration and therefore potentially reshape political conflict structure in Poland is presented with the subsequent statistical outputs.

In 2006 the Polish partisan space is not as clear-cut as for example in Germany. The *traditionalist-authoritarian-nationalist* value item and the advocacy of *law and order* are relatively close to *redistribution*, opposition towards the *internal market* and *anti-EU*. Unlike the previous two cases where culturally right parties were more linked with economic liberalism, the Polish right-wing populist *Law and Justice (PiS)* and conservative to far-right *League of Polish Families (LPR)* are positioned in a political space that is uniquely structured within the country sample. *LPR* is clearly closest to the *anti-EU* issue categories, however the nationalist-agrarian and left-wing *Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona RP, S)* almost seamlessly occupies *antimigration*.

Differing from the previous findings on the German party system, *multiculturalism*, *urbanism* and *deregulation* are modelled the most distanced to *redistribution* with only *multiculturalism* being surrounded by left and liberal parties. From




Figure 5.5 WMDS of Polish party positions for 2006 (7 subjects, 9 objects, Stress-10.157261).




Figure 5.6 WMDS of Polish party positions for 2010 (5 subjects, 10 objects, Stress-I: 0.122409).




Figure 5.7 WMDS of Polish party positions for 2014 (5 subjects, 11 objects, Stress-I: 0.1373).




Figure 5.8 WMDS of Polish party positions for 2019 (6 subjects, 11 objects, Stress-I: 0.175048).

all the parties that were taken into account for the 2010 period, *PiS* is closely aligned with a whole cluster of *anti-EU* and culturally right-wing issue categories. The EU issues are now part of a strongly centripetal nationalist pole. Whereas there is no counter-conglomerate to these issues, the rest of the party spectrum is close to only one specific issue category. Within this space, the *PiS* has only slightly moved away from *redistribution*, still being equally distanced to it like leftist parties.

In the WMDS model mapping the Polish party system in 2014, the *Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL)* and especially the *PiS* moved gradually away from *antimigration*, *EU integration* and *internal market* opposition but remain closely distanced to *law and order* and *TAN* values. *Redistribution* is now relatively equidistant to the *Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)* and the *Civic Platform Palikot's Movement (Ruch Palikota, RP)*. The partisan structure is of specific nature in this period. The economic and cultural main conflicts are separated rather than aligning their poles or crosscutting each other. Some issue categories such as *environment* and the *anti-EU* seem to defy the explanatory power of the economic axis.

The 2019 WMDS analysis unveils that the *anti-EU* partisan space has been occupied (again) by *PiS* and *Kukiz* as a right-wing competitor, strongly realigning with the *TAN* pole of the party configuration. Again, the main axes of conflict are not intersecting, wherefore *internal market* defies the model logic of these conflicts. The *PiS*, now in government, re-positioned itself to mainly culturally connoted EU sentiments, such as *antimigration* but did not let loose of *redistribution* completely. It seems to care about sovereignty when it comes to *EU budgets*, about *TAN*

values and *law and order* but less about protecting the national economy from EU trade. Additionally, in 2019, a preliminary EU friendly, multicultural *and* environmentalist counter-pole has been occupied by *Wiosna*, which was previously only loosely structured.

Summarizing the Polish WMDS analyses from 2005 to 2019, the initially roughly structured partisan conflict space is marked by de- and realignment with EU issue categories, especially for the right party spectrum which takes on culturally connoted anti-EU sentiments but still keeps its spatial proximity towards *redistribution*. Although a pro-EU, *multicultural* and *GAL* counter-pole has been slowly evolving since 2007; the Polish party system is strongly structured by a focal point consisting of *antimigration*, *law and order*, *TAN* values, opposition to *EU integration* and not the other way around. This might be explained with the remaining proximity of the redistribution issue category and hence the popularity of welfare chauvinism as “authoritarian reactions [...] coupled with legislative measures aimed at providing a veneer of social justice narrowly reserved to the native majorities” (Norocel et al. 2020, p. 3).

Moving to the demand side of Polish politics between the ESS rounds 2 (2002) and 7 (2014), the means in attitude towards EI continuously dropped by more than 17% until 2014 (6.64, 6.48, 5.66, 5.49), increased again to 6.07 in round 9 (2018) and finished by 5.99 in 2020.¹⁵ Over the whole studied period, the standard deviation for mean attitudes, and therefore polarization, significantly increased by almost 12% until 2018 (0.0656, 0.0649, 0.0659, 0.0729, 0.0734) and sank to 0.0696 standard deviations in 2020.

Factor analysis of the attitudinal items retains a cultural factor (*migr cult, migr eco, no hms*) and a mixed factor for all periods with exception to the 2014 wave (see Table 5.3). For this year, a clear-cut cultural and an economic factor (*environ, red inc dif, comf inc*) are extracted.

The outputs of the regression models reveal an own pattern of explanations for variation in EU attitudes. Unlike Germany, a negative effect is most striking for *all* the items that load on a cultural factor. The negative coefficient for the factorized fear for national economic harm due to migration (*migr eco*) is significant and strongly negative in 2008 (-.18) and 2014 (-.12). As just mentioned above, this variable loads on a common factor with only cultural attitudinal items in the FA. The fear for cultural undermining by migrants (*migr cult*) is significant and strong in 2004 (-.14) and after insignificant and low values in 2008 and 2012 (-.11) it's effect significantly increases in 2014 (-.15) reaching a peak in 2018 (-.18). Even more consistent is the negative and strong coefficient for the anti-homosexuality attitude item (*no hms*) which employs the strongest explanatory power within the regression model in all, but one period and further extended from 2014 on (-.23, -.19, -.26, -.24). The item measuring satisfaction with how (national) democracy works (*satisf dem*) exerts a positive and strong effect in 2012 (.33) and moderate effect (.13, .15, .12) in the other waves, except for the last. None of the socio-structural disposition variables seem to matter over time (*urban, education, sect*). Thus, after 2014 the items measuring perceived income situation (.30, .38) and attitudes towards reducing income differences (*red inc dif*) are significant

Table 5.3 Multiple linear regression results for the elective Polish population, 2004–2018

EU attitude	POL 2004			POL 2008			POL 2012			POL 2014			POL 2018		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
migr eco	-0788472	.040951	0.054	-1783353	.0455663	0.000	-1121207	.0406129	0.006	-1194425	.0381406	0.002	-1800521	.0440484	0.000
migr cult	-1376885	.0429204	0.001				-1051433	.0434771	0.016	-1485424	.0400729	0.000	-2491087	.0728381	0.001
no hms	-2315695	.0619621	0.000	-1939422	.0702634	0.006				-2647974	.0652148	0.000	-0851401	.0343824	0.013
satisf	1332579	.0348282	0.000	1504407	.0361226	0.000	3345493	.0337243	0.000	1156829	.0335034	0.001			
dem															
strong															
gov															
red inc															
dif															
comf inc															
environ															
non vote															
urban															
education															
sect															
R ²	0.0841			0.0897			0.1383			0.1366			0.1092		
N	1,086			1,084			1,275			1,029			938		

Source: ESS waves 2–9.

Note: The model explains on average for 10% of variation in attitudes towards European integration ($R^2 = 0.08, 0.09, 0.13, 0.13, 0.11$).

(-0.25, -0.18). Both indicate, within the limits of the model, that respondents who are in favour of EU integration tend to be satisfied by their income and do not favour redistribution.¹⁶ This is very much diverging from the other countries' results, nevertheless, in line with the outcome of the Polish supply side analysis. Both models reveal that between 2012 and 2019 the division over EI took a strong cultural path. Opponents of the latter tend to be heavily opposed to multiculturalism and *GAL* values, measured by attitudes towards migration and homosexuality. However, they are prone to favouring redistribution policies.

The observations on the Polish demand and supply side suggest that an integration–demarcation divide is at play in the configuration of the Polish partisan space and the variation in attitudes towards integration among the Polish people and that it is strong culturally connoted, in combination with welfare chauvinist tendencies on the right.

5.4 Inner periphery – Switzerland's integration without membership

Switzerland, representing the inner periphery of European DI, is known for its political neutrality and its regular practice of direct democracy in a primary part of the national legislation process (Lavenex 2009). As will be outlined, the direct say of the Swiss people and hence domestic politicization in international relations and agreements has been an element of restriction for parties and government leaders. Only 20% of the Swiss population support a Swiss–EU accession. Whenever the topic for further EI is being spilled into the sphere of domestic politics, fierce debates are sparked about the Swiss cultural heritage and its independence in the international structure. However, the case of Switzerland represents the prototype for dealing with popular demand for Euroscepticism on the one hand and functional pressures in a largely integrated neighbourhood on the other hand – both being a constraint to each other. Switzerland is a non-Member State that is almost entirely surrounded by Member States to the EU and the Eurozone, with the exception of Liechtenstein (which is much closer integrated with the EU as a member of the EEA – European Economic Area). Historically speaking, Switzerland managed to uphold political neutrality officially since its founding in 1848.

Before the era of EI in the 20th century it prevailed without any serious material damage through World War II. In the post-war era, Switzerland joined and contributed to several integrative treaties and institutions. Joining as a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 until today. The association that also includes Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein served as an alternative to the establishing European Economic Community (EEC). Switzerland was also participating in the negotiations for the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992 and succeeded with a formal submission of accession to the EU. In 1992 the EU and EFTA agreed on a common internal market with the EEA providing for the inclusion of EU legislation regarding the four freedoms in all 30 EEA Member States. However, in a contentious Swiss referendum by the end of the same year, EEA membership was rejected by the Swiss people with a close result (50.3% to 49.7%). The referendum process and its counter-positions strongly reflected a

strong cultural divide among the Swiss population. The formal application was subsequently suspended by the Swiss government. Another federal popular initiative to launch accession to EU membership negotiations with the EU failed by almost 75% to vote on “No.” A similar initiative failed in 2001 and only in 2016 the Swiss application status was finally withdrawn. After the first failed referendum about EEA membership, both parties re-initiated negotiations for further bilateral agreements on a sector-by sector basis (Groth 2014), also for the Swiss to safeguard some of the economic benefits that the EU has had to offer and to “ensure that Swiss companies would not be at a disadvantage in key economic sectors” (Swiss Confederation 2022).

These negotiations resulted in two waves of overall ten bilateral agreements and several additional referenda that made EU law applicable to Swiss law (Vahl & Grolimund 2006). They were mostly about technical trade barriers, consumer rights and free movement of people. In 2000 the first wave of bilateral agreements was accepted by referendum. Those were conventional agreements on market access such as the free movement of people, a Mutual Recognition Agreement, a common public procurement market, agricultural policies, overland transport, research and civil aviation. This was followed by the second wave of bilateral agreements that aimed at harmonizing economic, security and asylum policies and led to signing the Dublin agreement and a Swiss membership of the Schengen zone from 2009 on.

In combination with the existing free trade agreement, the Swiss private sector was given extensive access to the Single European Market with its 445 million consumers at the time. By 2022, the EU is Switzerland’s main trade partner whereas the Swiss account for the fourth largest of the EU.

The bilateral agreements were adopted in a single package, introducing the “guillotine clause.” They are legally linked to each other which means that they can only take effect and endure together. Conversely, breaching one agreement signifies the invalidation of all other.

In 2014 the popular initiative “mass migration initiative” (MII) to constitutionally limit migration to Switzerland succeeded. It was initiated by the governing right-wing populist *Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)* and aimed at restricting immigration by annual caps and the preferential treatment of Swiss citizens on the national labour market by constitutional rule. With 57% the turn-out rate for this popular vote has been significantly higher than most previous referenda. The result put the EU–Swiss relations under immense stress – its lawmaking is considered to be a serious breach with one of the “indispensable pillars” of bilateralism in the wake of EI: the free movement of people, or in other words: the non-discrimination of EU citizens in Switzerland. “The MII confirmed that Switzerland, despite its status as a non-member, is firmly embedded in the politics of European integration – and is under the same populist pressure as member states” (Schimmelfennig 2019, p. 117). Thus, the conflict between Switzerland’s autonomy and its international obligations has been interpreted differently among supporters and opponents of the initiative. Armingeon and Lutz (2022) highlight that the supporters did not consider a major problem but rather expressed expectations about the EU’s willingness

to re-negotiate bilateral treaties with their country. Further, their largest share favoured the policy demand of immigration restrictions over stable reactions with the EU (ibid.).

The Member States and the European Commission made clear that there would be no such re-negotiations, upholding these positions after the result. Therefore, the EU put bilateral agreements in several sectors on hold and considered to even terminate Swiss market access. For statesmen and women this serves as a prime example for the dilemma between popular initiatives, migration control and functional pressures through international interdependence.

“The implementation of this constitutional amendment asks nothing less than squaring the circle between the norm of adhering to international agreements and employing a popular policy demand that necessitates its violation” (Armingeon & Lutz 2022, p. 2). The majority of the Swiss people, however, preferred good relations with the EU over the implementation of the new constitutional article, hence demand for continuing the bilateral path remained high (ibid.; Lauener et al. 2022). Under these constraints the Swiss government tried to negotiate some sort of middle way, “muddling through” (Armingeon & Lutz 2022, p. 2). Finally, domestic employment rates were approached by legislative measures, but the free movement of persons remained intact. By the end of the legislative process, the Swiss *Bundesversammlung* voted for a policy measure that approaches national workers employment rates and endorsing state agencies for employment to hire more national employees than recruits from abroad. However, the free movement of people, for example, EU citizens and Schengen visa holders, was not restricted, causing the measure to be called an “implementation light” that remained within legal room for manoeuvre of the bilateral treaties (Armingeon & Lutz 2022). The realization differed fundamentally from the initiative’s text. Thus, the following attempts by anti-EU hardliners within the *SVP* and the Action for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland (*AUNS*) to enforce a stricter implementation by popular vote didn’t materialize.

Switzerland has experienced the EU’s determination and the high economic price of restricting free movement and has gone through a learning process that has only just begun in the UK. The fact that the Swiss government had sufficient room for maneuver facilitated the implementation of a pragmatic solution.

(Schimmelfennig 2019, p. 117)

There is yet another development to consider when outlining the aspect of external differentiation and compliance among the EU and Switzerland, which is the negotiations and the Swiss withdrawal from the Institutional Framework Agreement (IFA). “Bilateralism follows the principles of static international agreements and diplomatic dispute settlement. The substantive political rules in bilateral agreements largely reflect EU rules at the time of negotiation” (Schimmelfennig 2019, p. 117).

Changes in the EU rule work requires renegotiation and adoption by the Joint Committees of Switzerland and the EU or by adoption through the Swiss legislation.

However, both ways contain legal uncertainty and there are no judicial mechanisms “for monitoring compliance, interpreting rules, and resolving disputes.” Thus, the EU proposed “to move to ‘dynamic adaptation,’ a general principle derived from the European (ibid.)”

In 2018, the text for an IFA was drafted, addressing these institutional issues. However, a contentious end to the negotiations was just on the way. Both sides’ negotiation mandate collided especially in the struggle for judicial monitoring through the EU Court of Justice on both territories. After a successful mobilization against Swiss EEA membership in 1992, Christoph Blocher, former member of the *Bundesrat* for the right-wing populist *SVP* and well-known EU critique, re-entered the arena of political campaigning against the IFA. He founded the Action for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland (*AUNS*) as a committee against Swiss accession to the United Nations Organization in 1986. In 2018, he reformulated his position:

The EU will become the sole legislator for everything that affects the European internal market. The EU also determines what that will be. Switzerland would no longer have anything to decide. [...] The battle against the abolition of Swiss democracy must not only be waged but won.

(Blick.ch 2018, own translation)

The Swiss government declared in May 2021, “that the conditions for signing the IFA are not met and that it is better to terminate the negotiations” (Swiss Federal Council 2021). The then designated Swiss foreign minister Ignazio Cassis (*SVP*) proclaimed to have hit the “reset” button. The process had reached an impasse.

Generally, the Swiss position is driven by the preservation of formal Swiss sovereignty and the desire to retain the ultimate control over binding rules, their monitoring and adjudication. Especially “foreign judges”, i.e., the EU Court, is a toxic concept in Swiss public discourse.

(Schimmelfennig 2019, p. 119)

Thereby, the EU Commission stated:

Without this agreement, this modernisation of our relationship will not be possible, and our bilateral agreements will inevitably age: 50 years have passed since the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement, 20 years since the bilateral I and II agreements. Already today, they are not up to speed for what the EU and Swiss relationship should and could be. We will now analyse carefully the impact of this announcement.

(EU Commission 2021)

It is therefore in doubt whether the current bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland could remain in such a static condition when social and economic realities become increasingly interdependent in Europe.

Concluding the Swiss European politics, one should highlight the unique features of the Swiss political system, and in particular the special role of direct democracy. Hooghe and Marks identified the first “break to surface” in the failed referenda in 2005 as the start of the constitutional crisis and a re-emergence of popular sovereignty and identity as political limitation to EI. Hobolt (2006, p. 2) concludes in *Direct democracy and integration*, that rather than establishing a constitutional Europe,

public consultation has resulted in a year-long “period of reflection” to interpret the referendum outcomes and find a way to move forward. Paradoxically, the constitutional process that has set out to “bring the Union closer to its citizens” may thus ultimately have fallen at the hands of the people.

Switzerland, even though an inner-periphery non-member, has already entered that path long before. In fact, the postfunctionalist paradigm of politicization and “democratization” of EI politics in the early 2000s as popular push-back to vast political integration in the 1990s was long at play in the non-member Switzerland. It had its very first contentious referendum that fed into a cultural divide over EI in 1992 with the popular rejection of EEA membership. Executing many referenda, in comparison to other European States, the Swiss were used to repeating politicization in popular votes on institutional and bilateral or even multilateral matters. It stands to reason that, whenever a legislation and thereby referenda touched upon other political dimensions than economics, popular vote acted as a restraint to deeper integration.

Switzerland is often described as a case of integration without membership or limited integration (Tovias 2006; Cottier 2013). The Swiss position on the map of DI is therefore an outcome of a long-lasting path dependent historical process (Kux & Sverdrup 2000; Gstöhl 2002). The concept of neutrality plays a key role in the EI context, since any Bern’s attempt to get closer to Brussels is perceived as a violation of the sovereignty or democracy in Switzerland (Church 2007; Tomczyk 2013). It is also determined by a group of structural factors, like the uniqueness of the Swiss political system and the role of direct democracy in it. This spills over into a number of soft determinants, like the specific political culture (Caramani & Wagemann 2005; Matyja 2009). The public discourse in Switzerland is highly politicized, especially as regards the EI issues (Neidhart 2002; Fischer & Sciarini 2014). Apart from the questions that directly address the EU or EEA relations, there is plenty of issues in the Swiss political discourse that are indirectly intertwined with the attitude of the Swiss to EI, like, for example, the migration issue. How these issues shape demand and supply side of Swiss political conflict structure is presented by the outputs of WMDS and MLR outputs as shown in Figures 5.9–5.11.¹⁷

The Swiss WMDS models from 2010 on indicate that the categories issuing EU policies are occupied by the former mainstream and now right-wing populist Schweizer Volkspartei (*SVP*). The party gravitates with other nationalist or demarcationist issue categories such as *galtan*, *antimigration* and *law&order* and hence approaches the partisan space from a cultural direction. The Green Party




Figure 5.9 WMDS of Swiss party positions for 2010 (7 subjects, 10 objects, Stress-I: 0.119656).




Figure 5.10 WMDS of Swiss party positions for 2014 (7 subjects, 11 objects, Stress-I: 0.127057).

(GPS) and the Socialdemocrats (SPS) occupy the counter-pole with least distance to *redistribution*, *environment* and *multiculturalism*. This holds partly true for the Green-Liberal Party (GPL) which naturally moves further away from the redistribution issue category. However, the cutting surface of these three parties mostly occupies a culturally connoted pro-European partisan space – contrary to the SVP.




Figure 5.11 WMDS of Swiss party positions for 2019 (8 subjects, 9 objects, Stress-I: 0.10598).

The Liberal Party (*FDP*) seems to play only an issue-related role in the model output with a relative proximity only to *deregulation*.

Thereby, the *anti-EU* issue category itself is relatively close to the *SVP* and the right-wing ends of the cultural dimension but compared to the other countries it is not as close. In most other cases within this work's sample the anti-EU issue category is accompanied by the very (right-wing) end of the cultural dimension. The issue category measuring dissent to the functioning of the EU internal market is positioned almost equidistant to all parties and other issues than the EU itself. Therefore, it seems to not work as a polarizing vehicle at the time. The *urban-rural* divide among party supply accompanies the all EU as a well as all cultural issue categories over all periods.

Thus, in the 2014 period, the *EU internal market* issue category has moved stronger towards the economic and cultural right end of the partisan supply space. This seems to coincide with the latest Swiss-EU framework accord negotiations that started in 2014 and lasted until 2018. Therefore, the economic relations between the two trade areas raised salience and polarization for economic issues among the Swiss population. Overall, polarization over EU issues has increased. The newly integrated issue category measuring approval to *EU budgets* distributions replaces the EU internal market. Naturally, Swiss parties do not divide themselves over this issue since Switzerland is neither a payer nor beneficiary of EU internal budgets.

The partisan conflict structure remain mostly stable for the rest of the observed periods. Same as for the British WMDS analyses, *deregulation* remains all the time closer to the anti-EU pole and its right-wing cultural issue satellites, however, the

economic and cultural conflict dimensions do not increase in their cross-cutting with the specificity such that for the leftist and the liberal parties the dominant dimension remains the economic one whereas only for the *SVP* the cultural one remains the dominant dimension for mobilization.

EI does not fully account for a restructuring party politics in Switzerland, but it is in line with a higher-level divide, that embodies the rejection of denationalization and internationalization of Swiss economics and especially culture.

The elective Swiss population's mean attitudes towards EI have continuously decreased from 2004 to 2018 by 13.25% and regenerated by 2020 (5.39, 5.01, 4.57, 4.56, 4.67, 4.88). Whereas the respective standard deviation from the mean attitudes has increased by 16.81% (0.06, 0.06, .065, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07) over time.

As shown Table 5.4, the linear regression model explains for 35% in 2004 and 20–27% between 2008 and 2018 of variation in attitudes towards EI ($R^2 = 0.35, 0.25, 0.21, 0.26, 0.19, 0.27$).

The FA of the attitude items retains a clear-cut cultural factor (*migr eco, migr cult, no hms*) and an economic factor (*environ, red inc dif, comf inc*) for all periods. Comparing this structurization of attitudes on the demand side with the other countries included in this sample, the Swiss population is the prime example for societal division that runs along an economic and at the same time a cultural dimension when it comes to EI.

The output of the Swiss regression models reveals that respondents' cultural fear for migration (*migr cult*) strongly outruns economic fear for migration (*migr eco*) with the biggest difference in 2012 (–.18) and (–.29) with the only exception in 2018. Additionally, the rejection of homosexual's liberties (*no hms*) exerts a strong and negative effect on attitudes towards EI over the whole observed time span.

From 2008 to 2020 the variable measuring demand for reducing income differences (*comf inc*) by the government turned out to be strong and positive over time, exerting the strongest effect across all periods and dependent variables in 2014 (.34). However, perceiving to live comfortably on one's income (*comf inc*) has a strong and positive effect as well on EU attitudes in the periods 2012 (.28), 2014 (.20) and 2020 (.29). These two variables, in combination, project an interesting pattern. Pro-European people seem to approve redistribution, whereas they are satisfied with their very own material situation. This leads to the interpretation that the pro-European attitudes are mostly held among a "saturated" left-liberal political spectrum of the Swiss population that potentially perceives EU integration rather as a gain than a threat to them.

Summarizing the results for the Swiss demand side, attitudes towards EI have not been an exclusively cultural question since the economic attitudes towards redistribution seem to play an equal role as well. However, these attitudes mostly coincide with an economic and cultural leftist, but materially satisfied population group that feeds into the logic of *GAL* vs. *TAN* values – when it comes to issues such as EI. It is also noteworthy, that the factors underlying the Swiss attitudinal

Table 5.4 Multiple linear regression results for the elective Swiss population, 2004–2020

<i>EU attitude</i>	<i>CH 2004</i>			<i>CH 2008</i>			<i>CH 2012</i>		
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>
migr eco	-.2920343	.0320007	0.000	-.2655559	.03883	0.000	-.1828271	.0364415	0.000
migr cult	-.3261581	.0298223	0.000	-.2927106	.0343609	0.000	-.2872967	.0331578	0.000
no hms	-.2403841	.0550914	0.000	-.2017659	.069522	0.004	-.1882552	.0654027	0.004
satis dem									
strong gov	-.1041881	.0455087	0.022						
red inc dif				.208442	.0618255	0.001	.2108732	.063452	0.001
comf inc							.275846	.0947175	0.004
environ									
non vote	-.2630115	.1198004	0.028						
urban									
education	.0989825	.0416432	0.018						
sect									
R2	0.3477			0.2542			0.2059		
N	1,477			1,248			1,063		
<i>EU attitude</i>	<i>CH 2014</i>			<i>CH 2018</i>			<i>CH 2020</i>		
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>
migr eco	-.2201636	.0387909	0.000	-.2374306	.0478728	0.000	-.2567412	.0482675	0.000
migr cult	-.2857584	.0359535	0.000	-.1732663	.0421413	0.000	-.2220817	.0450712	0.000
no hms	-.1783769	.0717797	0.013	-.2473414	.0926991	0.008	-.2224691	.0909935	0.015
satis dem									
strong gov				-.1409061	.0700897	0.045			
red inc dif	.3444828	.0627347	0.000	.2121437	.0736349	0.004	.2290967	.0756663	0.003
comf inc	.2018165	.1002812	0.044				.2898175	.1054137	0.006
environ				.1872888	.0931104	0.045			
non vote									
urban				.2149089	.0747602	0.004			
education	.097151	.0457502	0.034				.126342	.0449823	0.005
sect							.1990285	.1002412	0.047
R2	0.2595			0.1903			0.2694		
N	1,005			955			1,002		

Source: ESS waves 2–10.

variables on the demand side structure fit perfectly into a two-dimensional conflict structure over all periods.

Combining the Swiss demand and supply side in the given time leads back to the successful popular *Mass Migration Initiative* and the start of the Swiss–EU negotiations for the IFA in the same year of 2014. This coincided with an all-time low for EU integration approval among the Swiss population (4.57 points on the ten-point scale). During this time, polarization increased by almost 17% compared

to 2008. After the “MII light” was implemented and the IFA negotiations were finished, ratification stood out. Attaching the Swiss market to the EU internal market and, at the same time, keeping the country open to migrants triggered a further politicization of a society that is already heavily polarized over migration and sovereignty. Apart from all rational, or even functional arguments, the partisan proponents of the MII and the “reset button” for the IFA were well aware of the emerging demand for such actions – acting as postfunctional “agents.” According to the statistical output, demand and supply side seem to work in both ways of that direction. Nevertheless, a general decrease in Swiss support for and polarization over (further) integration into the EU corresponded with both of the above-mentioned processes.

5.5 Outer periphery – Great Britain testing the limits of differentiation

The UK is treated as a special case in this research since the process of Brexit (Oliver 2015) sets new standards in the DI arrangements. The referendum itself as well as the negotiations launched in line with the art. 50 Treaty on European Union (TEU) acted as a “game-changer” in the European differentiation. Additionally, UK used to be a special case (and a kind of laboratory of differentiation) since it was always a society strongly diversified internally as regards the attitudes and preferences towards the DI in Europe. London, Scotland and Northern Ireland remained notoriously pro-EU, whereas the rest of England as well as Wales represented much more Eurosceptic views.

The British case – both historically and contemporarily – has been especially informative for the study of DI both due to the London’s exceptionalism legacy present in its European politics and when taken into the consideration the Brexit referendum, on-going negotiations as well as their outcomes and results (Glencross 2015). The interplay between the two dimensions of integration seemed to have effectively answered the British allergy to “Union” (Lemke 2014). However, after advance in integration in the 1990s, followed by the 2004 *big-bang* enlargement, as well as subsequent waves in 2007 and 2013 and accompanied with the economic crisis (Schweiger & Magone 2014) which hit the British economy severely, the critical mass was achieved, and the dissatisfaction with the membership in the EU became dominant in the public discourse. The party system reacted to it on the supply side, giving the Brexit scenario its own dynamics. From the British perspective, the EI project was not only a game of deepening and widening but also of differentiation of a new generation. The Brexit referendum – in its supranational dimension – was not only about Britain’s position on the map of the EU (and its peripheries). It was also about the future of the integration project as such. UK switched from an integration-tolerant country to integration-hostile country, which – by its behaviour and attitude – challenged the very fundamentals of the integration process. It produces externalities to be consumed by other Member States and non-members no matter if they are pro- or anti-integrationist (Riedel 2018).

Both in academic deliberations and in the real-life politics, the DI concepts offered, so far, a way out from the dichotomous thinking between full membership and full non-membership. The British way of thinking about UK's participation in the EU closes this way out. This utter kind of opposition to Europe takes an extreme form that cannot be comprehended in existing categorizations (Leruth 2015). The British citizens' decision to leave the EU opened up a new chapter in the discussions about the future forms of DI in Europe and, interestingly, inside the UK as well. Britain ended up diversely integrated with the EU – most parts of it found themselves out of the EU, whereas some others (Northern Ireland) remained inside in the Common Market, whereas even some others may be positioned in a “grey zone” which is to be defined in the up-coming years.

We know there is “life” outside of the EU, the British will need to seek answer to the question what life they will build outside of united Europe. The other important question is what united Europe. Differentiation in Europe has reached such a phase, scale and depth in which it is legitimate to agree to the argument that it is a systematic characteristic of the EI project as seen in 21st century. Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen and Berthold Rittberger (2015) even wrote about the system of DI, in which differentiation is an essential and enduring characteristic of the EU. Directly after the Brexit referendum, the initial six founding states (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands) met in Berlin in order to discuss the new circumstances generated by the Brexit earthquake as well as to identify the options ahead. Symptomatically, the rest of the EU was called to a meeting in Warsaw a day later for the same purpose. The new divisions in Europe became even more clear in the sharp picture after the British decided to leave. Brexit gave the DI new impetus and dynamics. The near future will reveal whether it was a turning point, reversing the trend towards disintegration.

When researching the dynamics of DI, and its determinants, the UK is a very illustrative example – especially when the analytical perspective is focused on the cleavages that play an important role in explaining attitudes towards EI among the British citizens. UK has always been a special case in the EI project. The British *exceptionalism* manifested in various forms and ways over the history. 23 June 2016 delivered another culmination point in the story of the *stubborn European's* relations with its continental partners. The *Brexit* referendum, which brought about victory for the supporters of UK leaving the EU, marked an important milestone in these relations (Riedel 2018).

With its imperial past and a long-lasting tradition of the “splendid isolation” logic in its international relations, London has never been an easy partner for the other continental Europeans (this statement is even more true for the Irish). It is true that the UK, historically speaking, had a specific attitude to the EI project, however the Brexit referendum brought about some new quality in the debate on the DI in Europe. It used to be one of the most important old Member States (though not the founding member), with one of the most powerful economies and high recognition in international relations. The above-mentioned created a relative bargaining power for the UK and as a result an exemptive type of differentiation

in the EU (Schimmelfennig 2014). London's divorcing Brussels provided a strong disintegrative impulse for the whole project. And as such, it has a deconstructive potential for the post-World War II economic and political order in Europe. The *tsunami effect* of Britain going out of the EU may be felt not only by the entrepreneurs operating across the Channel, but on the whole Single Market, including the barriers in migration traffic, capital flows, deficits in EU funds and policies. Brexit process and its externalities coincided with the pandemic and the Ukrainian war which blurred the picture of the cost-benefit analysis of leaving the EU.

In the case of the UK, it is not the capacities but the preferences that kept London outside of the European core. It simply belongs to the category of the less willing countries, together with outsiders like the quasi-members: Switzerland or Norway (all of them having different legal status however). Some Member States opt out (internal differentiation), whereas some non-Member States opt in (external differentiation) which results in the need for reconciling heterogeneity inside and outside of the union. Britain is loosely integrated with the EU both horizontally and vertically. Even before Brexit, UK did not participate in all EU policies (horizontal differentiation) and in some others it participated at its own speed and extend (vertical differentiation). Taking into account the above stated, logically speaking, it made little sense for the UK to exit the EU in the hope of gaining some greater autonomy – re-entering the Single Market with similar obligations but fewer decision rights (Leruth & Lord 2015). However, renegotiating UK membership answered some other need – the need for the reconfiguration of the relationship between the UK and the EU. In his January 2013 speech, the British Prime Minister David Cameron, set out a plan to ask for a mandate from the British people to negotiate a new settlement with Europe (at that time this operation was seen as a method of strengthening his position in the Conservative Party, but apparently it ended with his resignation after the referendum). At the same time an audit was launched to calculate the costs and benefits of UK's membership in the EU. The key issues that David Cameron focused on were the following: allowing UK to opt out from the EU's declared ambition to forge an "ever closer union," restricting access to in-work and out-of-work social benefits to EU migrants (until they have been resident for four years), giving greater powers to national parliaments (in their competences to block EU legislation) and securing explicit recognition that the euro is not the only currency of the EU.

The first British referendum addressing the question of UK's participation in EI project was held in 1975 and concerned whether to stay in the EEC. The integration project was still in its early and immature phase and the UK was a freshman in the community. Over the period of 40 years the EU has acquired a directly elected and influential parliament, substantially reduced the veto power of individual Member States, engaged in civilian and military operations abroad, launched a border-free traffic area and – last but not least – established its own currency interconnecting the national economic policies even stronger. The Britons have not chosen to participate in all the above mentioned in 1975 (Glencross 2015, p. 306). But they

participated in the process of creation of every single element of the EI project. None of the EU competences appeared in Brussels without the legitimization of the UK.

The 23 June 2016 referendum was supposed to deal with the renegotiated position of the UK in the EU. The growing public frustrations about the UK–EU relations were the effect of the long-lasting failure to consult the British citizens about Britain’s place in Europe and the changing EU that was undermining the relationship between London and Brussels (Cameron 2016). Despite countless vetoes, opt-outs and constraints, many British governments (both labour and conservative) moved the Britain’s involvement in the EI project ahead of the British public understanding.

The Brexit referendum however did not manage to bring stability to the European debate in UK. On the opposite: The misunderstandings grew on both – the opponents and supporters – sides. The 23rd June referendum was another example of the misuse of direct democracy mechanisms with quite auto-destructive outcomes. The balance of pros and cons related to referendums have been investigated extensively in the literature, it will suffice here to provide a short overview. On one side the referendums make it possible to confront the problematic issue, spark the public discourse, debate the arguments and build the democratic legitimacy of the decision. However, on the negative side, the referendums very often lead to oversimplification of the issue in question. They offer binary solutions only, very often to complicated, nuanced problems. The referendum questions can be manipulated, and they get politicized very easily or even used for purely political (or party) strategic reasons. In the end the technical problem – the results of the referendum will need to be implemented by the representative democracy institutions (like the parliament). The decision-makers will need to take action against their own will or the will of their constituencies (Riedel 2018).

In the case of the UK, the 23rd June referendum was supposed to refresh the British people’s understanding of EI. As a result (and in opposite), it brought about even more polarization, more myths (both positive and negative about Brussels) and less objective knowledge in general. As it happened before in many other EU Member States, like the Netherlands, France, Ireland or Denmark, the referendum did not help to bring the EU citizens closer to the EU, but rather sparked Euroscepticism and EU-confusions. Instead of offering a solution, the Brexit referendum generated even more problems. Initially, the commitments to hold this referendum have been used to manage tensions within the Conservative Party. Intra-party problem spilled over to the nationwide, or even Europe-wide, scale. Short-term tactics emerged into strategic continental concerns.

Britain’s relations with the EU returned to the forefront and by doing this they addressed not only the uncertainties about the direction of the EU evolution but also put the question of the *EU’s finalite* at the centre of the debate. Just *market friendship* or fully fledged political union? The very perspective of a potential Britain exiting the EU sparked the public debate about the future of the EI project as well as about its future form, including various forms of

differentiation. The pro-European campaign focused on the positive agenda stressing practical, pragmatic and utilitarian involvement in the EU that benefits Britain's economy security and power. It was stressed that leaving the EU would not stop British business facing regulations agreed in Brussels. Even immigration would remain a contentious issue due to the demands of the British labour market (Oliver 2015).

A proper contextualization of the Brexit referendum is vital for clear understanding of how the general public preferences are formed and expressed on the topic of options for differentiation available to the citizens. In diplomacy, the "splendid isolation" has been known as a British tradition of being an outsider, which dates back to the imperial past. UK's sitting on the sidelines of integration was not only geographical but also emotional and political. It has had many manifestations from *Atlantism*, through *pro-Commonwealthism*, up to *Anglospherism* but has never been truly isolationism or desinterment (Daddow 2015). British imperialist discourses that date back to the 19th century were rather focused on the question how Great Britain could influence the world, instead of how to defend itself from external pressures. This reverse of logics suggests that it is also a mental problem nested in the change of UK's position globally. Subordination to Europeanization impulses represented the final end of splendid imperial past. The historical context needs to be supplemented by the most recent history, that is, Margaret Thatcher's attitude to Europe which was so much forming Britain's anti-Europeanism. One of the reasons why UK used to be such an awkward partner in Europe was the distinctive personal influence of the "Iron Lady," whose individual action and legacy generated and magnified the core dynamics that soured UK's ties to Europe so bitterly (Fontana & Parsons 2015, p. 89).

To flee the chains of Brussels was the expression used by those who argue that the regulatory burden imposed on businesses by Brussels has sapped competitiveness and costs jobs. The economic crisis, followed by the long-lasting stagnation has given a gloss to claims that the UK would do better outside the EU – by expanding its trade with the Commonwealth. Additionally, the fast-growing Asian economies have the appearance of mirror images of neoliberal Anglo-Saxon ones. In this vision, the Great *Britannia*, reunited with the Anglosphere and trading with Asia, would be simultaneously unchained from Europe and prosperous in its Anglo-Saxon way (Kenny & Pearse 2016). Most of the analytical reports on the effects of Britain leaving the EU were rather pessimistic (and, in some cases, apocalyptic), suggesting negative outcomes for the household incomes, economic growth, gross domestic product or trade (Hodgson 2016). But it is usually not the rational choice that is decisive for the referendum results, but rather political emotions. As it was framed by Antony Hilton:

Brexit is not about economics, it is about the kind of country people think they want to live in and the kind of people they think they are. It is not a factual matter, it is like faith: you believe or you don't – and that's why the outcome is uncertain.

(Hilton 2016)

The political force that was the strongest supporter of Brexit is the UK Independence Party (*UKIP*) led by Nigel Farage. Once a moderate actor on the British political scene, it evolved into a xenophobic, right-wing party, attacking migrants, as well as the religious, sex, ethnic and racial minorities. Its leaders were fully aware of the huge potential of the emotions and fears that were likely to be the deciding factor influencing the British referendum decision. Still in April 2016, the Economist Intelligence Unit forecasted that the UK electorate would reject Brexit on the 23rd June referendum on the UK's membership in the EU. It was expected that the voters' fears about leaving the EU would rise as the referendum approaches and the economic arguments in favour of staying would prevail (Haralambous 2016). On the other side we have observed in Britain some growing public frustrations at the UK–EU relations which resulted from the longstanding failure to consult the UK citizens about their country's place in Europe. Two weeks before the referendum the opinion polls gave the supporters of Brexit a 10% lead which suggested quite a safe victory of the isolationists camp to be predicted. After the murder of Jo Cox, a British politician campaigning for the UK's remaining in the EU, there was an observable shift towards the supporters of membership camp. However, the final results of the referendum showed a moderate 51.9% for leaving and 48.1% for remaining.

The binary nature of referendums overshadowed the modest victory of the leave camp. It was an earthquake not only in British politics and economy but also in the European ones. The initiator of the referendum, Prime Minister David Cameron, in his speech on the post-electoral day morning declared his resignation in the perspective of three months. However, he tried to calm down the panicking markets that the trade of goods and services would continue, in the post-Brexit scenario, on contractual basis similar to the terms that exist as part of the EU. Britain would no longer have a say in the development of the EU laws and regulations but the whole British economy would still be bound by it. It would not solve the problem of the supremacy of the EU legal order or the free movement of workers together with accompanied rights to welfare. All these issues were to be settled in the upcoming negotiations between London and Brussels.

Among the intra-UK, domestic politics issues that need to be observed are the relations between the four parts constituting Great Britain – England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. The referendum map showed that the Scots and the Northern Irish as well as the metropolitan England voted to stay in the EU, whereas peripheral England and Wales voted for leaving. Predominantly it was the Scottish independence issue which became an important factor in the Brexit debate. The two processes were interrelated: London's potential leaving the EU and Edinburgh's leaving the UK as a consequence. The political casualty was evident – Brexit might have given the Scottish nationalists an argument to hold another independence referendum (which was proclaimed in Nicola Sturgeon's speech directly after the referendum day). The Scots are predominantly pro-European and therefore very much interested to stay in united Europe, maybe even more than in the UK. Scotland's first minister claimed that Brexit requires the Scottish Parliament agreement and, since it is against the Scots' will and interest, it would never happen. This threat

of the potential legal blockage shows the complexity of the situation in which UK found itself.

Another geographical location for which Brexit generated potential problems as a side effect is the Irish island – both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The agreement between the Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is a fragile one and London's decision to go out of the union could move back the process that positively developed in the last two to three decades. What is worse, the new settlement was negotiated not between London and Dublin but between London and Brussels, which brought about quite a hard bargaining, since the EU negotiators wanted to give a clear signal and to discourage any other Member State from considering such a move. Worth noticing, a couple of hours after the official announcement of the referendum results (which showed the Northern Irish support for remaining in the EU), the leaders of Sinn Fein declared that the British government lost its legitimacy and mandate to represent the people of Northern Ireland.

One may observe an interesting pattern across Great Britain, where the Scottish and the Irish are more often decided to stay in the EU, and where it is the English and the Welsh that are more likely to leave. Taking into account how UK is governed after the Devolution Act, the Brexit would mean a substantial change leading to reassessment of the previous framework. If a narrow majority consisting of the English predominantly would decide about the future of Scots, Irish or even Welsh who voted differently, such a situation could even result in renegotiation of the constitutional setting inside the UK.

And finally, one has to remember some general principles, patterns and tendencies about referenda as such. The voters are inherently sceptical and tend to vote negatively whenever given the opportunity (“if in doubt vote no” principle). The voters are also seemingly willing to trust the recommendations of the political parties of their preference. The wording of the question becomes critical, especially in the context of growing Euroscepticism (Qvartrup 2016). And it is not direct but indirect democracy that underlies at the heart of British politics. The British monarchy is a parliamentary democracy, not one driven by referenda. It is not a mistake or coincidence that in many political systems (for example in Germany at the federal level – see the Section 5.2 dedicated to Germany in this chapter) referendum is not an option as a method of decision-making.

It was not the demand for differentiation that drove the Brexit referendum dynamics. It was the desire to leave the EU among the large parts of British publics and political elites. Historically speaking, London was one of the major driving forces behind the increased differentiation. It was treated as a kind of a compromise between the strong independence needs of the British and the consistency of the European project. However, it soon appeared that this is a short-term tactic that do not offer a solid fundament on which UK presence in the EU could be grounded (Riedel 2018).

Even though UK has always been on the positive side as regards the balance of discriminatory and exemptive differentiations, it appeared not enough for quite a portion of the British citizens and political elites. UK, before the referendum, enjoyed a status of a preferential membership – the opposition of discriminatory

membership (Schimmelfennig 2014) – a case in which a Member State is exempted from many rights and benefits of integration. UK was released from many undesired obligations that most of the other Member States took. The rest of the EU was not determined enough to demand the full adoption of the EU law. The UK was strong by its Euroscepticism, economic as well as political power and, as a result, enjoyed a positive discrimination in the community.

The Brexit referendum – in its supranational dimension – was not only about Britain’s position on the map of the EU. It was also about the future of the integration project as such. Brexit produces externalities to be consumed by other Member States and non-members no matter if they are pro- or anti-integrationist. Following the logic of the integration evolution from one crisis to another one, it is possible to interpret the Brexit decision as an opportunity for EU’s reform. The reformist impulse of Brexit may enhance EI in two various possible ways. First, it may help to reform the EU into a more differentiated system which will allow to accommodate countries willing to integrate at various speeds and extends. Secondly, once “getting rid” of the major troublemaker and marauder, that is Britain, the EU may accelerate now towards the “ever closer union” (Riedel 2018).

UK’s European question was more than a question of whether to be or not to be in Europe. It was a question about party politics, identity, political economy, globalization and, last but not least, a changing Europe. The problem is that it can never be entirely answered (Oliver 2015). It will come back in a reframed form with every new generation, every new treaty, every new enlargement. It is discussable though whether the referendum was the most optimal method of dealing with it. At the same time, the Brexit is not a one-day-event which simply meant the walking out of Europe. Instead, it rather meant the beginning of a lengthy and complex process of negotiations (Bernstein 2016) leading to the new settlement between Brussels and London.

In 2006 the Conservatives and UKIP, as a significant conservative competitor for national elections, occupy the anti-EU space with the former being closer to *deregulation* and the latter closest to anti-EU, *antimigration* and *TAN* values (see Figure 5.12). For this period, no ideological counterweight is observable in the computed partisan conflict space. This indicates that there is no strong pro-European programmatic within this structure, or it is not being articulated in a salient way. The *anti-EU* issue category is clearly aligned with a cultural demarcationist partisan space. The Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party are equidistant to crucial issue categories such as *redistribution* and *cultural liberalism* and there is no significant party occupying the left-liberal political spectrum.

In 2010 *UKIP* has not made it into the closer selection of parties for their low performance within the previous elections. Therefore, in this WMDS model, the conservatives move closer to the *anti-EU* issue and keep similar distance to *deregulation*, *antimigration*, *galtan* and *law&order* – compared to their relative position in 2006 (see Figure 5.13). Surprisingly the issue for the *EU internal market* is far away from all parties, as if they do not have any clear economic stances on the contemporary function of the internal market as such. However, another possibility




Figure 5.12 WMDS of British party positions for 2006 (5 subjects, 9 objects, Stress-I: 0.127711).




Figure 5.13 WMDS of British party positions for 2010 (3 subjects, 10 objects, Stress-I: 0.157829).

suggests that the issue *EU internal market* does not fit overall into the two-dimensional structure of British partisan conflict. *Anti-EU* positions are again, as in the 2006 model, clearly aligned with a cultural division of British party politics.

In 2014 the Conservatives diverge again from the culturally connoted *anti-EU* pole that is exerting *further* gravitational force to the nationalist end of issue




Figure 5.14 WMDS of British party positions for 2014 (5 subjects, 11 objects, Stress-I: 0.092869).

categories such as *TAN values*, *law&order* and *antimigration* (see Figure 5.14). *UKIP* “encompasses” all these issues. Conservatives and *UKIP* are both closest and equidistant to *deregulation*. Still, there is no left-liberal counterweight party occupying an economic *and* cultural left political spectrum. The only exception for an opposition to the anti-EU issue category are the Liberal Democrats. Still, *EU budgets* and *anti-EU* in general play an important role within the right ideological spectrum. However, the *EU internal market*, again, doesn’t seem to be a major topic for mobilization.

In 2019 the model output has significantly changed (see Figure 5.15). In 2016 the Brexit referendum was held. Meanwhile, the Conservatives have moved closer to the culturally connoted *anti-EU* pole being slightly closer to it than the *Brexit Party* which is an ideological ally to the formerly strong *UKIP* party. The *Greens* enter the “significant” political arena and finally occupy the culturally connoted pro-European counter-pole to the *Conservatives*. Additionally, the rejection of the *EU internal market* has moved closer to the Conservatives, same as the issue for *EU budgets*. Surprisingly, *Labour* is, in relation to the other parties, closer to the *anti-EU* and the (anti) *EU internal market* issue than before.

Overall, for the British partisan supply side, *anti-EU* positioning is mostly dominated by the Conservatives’ each divergence and convergence towards *deregulation* and *antimigration*. The latter is over all periods aligned with the *anti-EU* issue category. The Conservative’s movements go hand in hand with the (re-)emergence of a right-wing nationalist competitor which *UKIP* and subsequently the *Brexit party* embody. The latter has only gained 2.1% in the 2019 general election, however in the same year’s European Parliaments election it earned most of the seats. Still, through the upcoming enforcement of the Brexit this gained




Figure 5.15 WMDs of British party positions for 2019 (6 subjects, 11 objects, Stress-I: 0.093906).

more of a symbolic character rather than real power relations. However, the Brexit party turned very prominent in media and party politics during this period.

Regarding the interplay of the economic and cultural axes, they are cross-cutting only to a certain degree, creating a focal point to *deregulation* and nationalist or rejectionist values. This focal point is always accompanied by the *anti-EU* issue category. Yet, there has not been a partisan counter-pole to this focal point until the 2019 period. The results indicate that pro-European partisan organized support has always been scarce in the UK and that cultural issue categories have been the *main driver over time* for EU rejectionism

From ESS rounds 2 (2002) to 7 (2014), the British means in attitude towards EI dropped by 17.44% and increased again by 16.61% up to round 9 in 2018 (4.44, 4.02, 3.90, 3.67, 4.27).¹⁸ Over the whole studied period, the standard deviation for mean attitudes, and therefore polarization, slightly decreased and then increased again. Therefore “polarization” over the weak mean attitudes is relatively stable over time (.058, .052, .056, .055, .057).

The model explains for 15% to 17% between 2004 and 2010 and for 21% in 2014 and 2018 of variation in attitudes towards EI ($R^2 = 0.15, 0.17, 0.15, 0.20, 0.21$) (see Table 5.5).

The FA of the attitudinal items extracts factors that can neither be interpreted as cultural nor economic. Both the economic and cultural fear for migration (*migr eco*, *migr cult*) load on a common factor that is distinct from all others.

The two items measuring attitudes towards migrants exert a strong and negative effect on people’s attitudes towards EI in all regression models. However, after 2012 the cultural migration item strongly overrides the economic one (−.22, −.26).

Table 5.5 Multiple linear regression results for the elective British population, 2004–2018

<i>EU attitude</i>	<i>GB 2004</i>			<i>GB 2008</i>			<i>GB 2012</i>
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>
migr eco	-.1922137	.035245	0.000	-.0894792	.0289621	0.002	-.1843909
migr cult	-.1346234	.0342598	0.000	-.1903269	.0265427	0.000	-.1646642
no hms	-.1484691	.0658615	0.024	-.1609623	.0577039	0.000	
satisf dem	.07904	.027276	0.004				
strong gov							
red inc dif	.2653664	.0592187	0.000	.1886839	.0482799	0.000	.3488405
comf inc							
environ							
non vote	.2622311	.1340742	0.051	.3978819	.1161412	0.001	.5446665
urban							
education							
sect							
<i>R</i> ²	0.1460			0.1659			0.1488
<i>N</i>	1,401			1,889			1,685

Source: ESS waves 2–9.

Like in the Swiss case, attitudes towards reducing income differences (*red inc dif*) exert a consistent and strong positive effect on attitudes towards EI over all periods. Consistent with the rhetoric of the Brexit campaign, people who are against further EI are, by chance, against regulatory measures within their country.¹⁹

Indeed, the British partisan supply side structure responds well to this logic. Up to the very last period of the supply side analysis, the conservative party spectrum narrowly occupied the *deregulation* and, in combination with other cultural issues, the *anti-EU* issue category. Whereas leftist and liberal parties turned out to be mostly equidistant to the economic or cultural pro-European space for mobilization (if there was any). The British party system with its anti-EU peculiarities is responsive to a certain degree to the demand side of the respective political issue(s). Regarding the ESS and CHES data analysis there was no strong pro-EU mobilization neither on the societal nor on the partisan side of British politics up to the period of 2018.

Most strikingly over all periods and mostly diverging from the other country samples is the effect exerted by the binary item representing whether people have voted or abstained in the last respective British parliamentary elections (*non vote*). These patterns are unique among the country sample. The item surveying election participation exerts the strongest positive effect on respondents' EU attitudes in all British regression models and *vice versa*. In the first place this seems surprising since more educated and pro-EU respondents are expected to be more engaged in protest and electoral politics, embodying a bias towards EU friendly attitudes in comparison with the overall population (see Kriesi et al. 2012, p. 85). Whereas,

		GB 2014			GB 2018		
<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>
.0312894	0.000	-.1996185	.0292471	0.000	-.1456328	.0334759	0.000
.0299884	0.000	-.2247221	.0274644	0.000	-.2610367	.0309199	0.000
					.0613741	.0237392	.010
.0547233	0.000	.2311943	.0507371	0.000	.2826276	.0570337	0.000
.1346264	0.000	.291214	.124216	0.019	.4742414	.1467314	0.001
					.1658548	.0580467	0.004
		0.2003			0.2051		
		1,787			1,766		

in Great Britain, EU sceptic attitudes seem to be strongly overrepresented in the electoral arena – if taking for granted the self-reported behaviour of the respondents. This leads to the assumption that there has not been a legacy of outspoken consensus in favour of EI, neither in the British society nor in party politics. Indeed, the British demand side reveals a stagnating polarization of generally low mean attitudes towards EI and a potential to mobilize on anti-EU sentiments both in a conservative cultural and a liberal economic logic.

Further proof of this responsiveness brings about the development between the 2014 and 2018 periods. The British mean in attitudes towards EU integration rose for the first time in the 20th century and a strong and positive effect of care for the environment (*environ*) on the demand side is observed. Simultaneously, the *Green Party* solemnly entered the House of Commons, occupying a culturally and economically leftist pro-EU space as an ideological counterweight to the liberal-conservative party spectrum on the EU-sceptic right. After the referendum and during the Brexit negotiations this speaks for an emergence or “awakening” of EU attitudes that are fed by both sides of the political conflict line about EI, but especially by *GAL* and *TAN* values. It is thus highly remarkable that the above-mentioned mirrors the Polish and German sample in a *reversed* manner. For these Member States, with their differing party systems and no referenda as part of the legislative process, EI has been perceived through the lens of permissive consensus prior to politicization and mobilization on the political right. Following the British supply and demand side analysis, this consensus has never really been visible among parties and electorate. Rather, *constraining consensus* among demand

and supply for EI could be identified up until the Brexit referendum, when British politics were sensitized again to the EI issue in general. The late increase in EI approval and the parliamentary emergence with the Greens promoting pro-EU values and *GAL* issues speak for this.

5.6 When supply (mis)matches demand – determinants and dynamics of differentiated European integration

Understanding the determinants and dynamics of differentiated EI requires in-depth analysis of the participating countries' domestic political structures. The interplay between the nation state and supranational dimension of a multi-level governance system is a complex one. It needs the integration of various ways of theorizing, predominantly the grand theories of EI – to explain supranational developments, and the classical political science theorizing – to interpret the developments in the national politics. For this reason, we provided the analysis of a country's domestic demand (voter attitudes) and supply (party positioning) for EI. This is explicitly necessary for phenomena that cannot be explained by the mentioned grand theories of EI, such as Brexit, in the case of UK, and the illiberal challenge, in the case of CEE. Therefore, a quantitative approach adds to the interdisciplinary value of our work. Within the overall framework, statistical analysis of representative survey data, in combination with analysis of partisan programmatic data, helps to identify drivers for different outcomes of integration on the domestic political level. The research design projects that the determinants for demand and supply for integrationist policies among national populations and political parties, as well as their match or mismatch work as significant drivers for EI. Hence, this proves to be equally important for DI outcomes, such as the supranational actor–power relations.

This approach is pioneering in that no previous concept empirically investigated the restructuring of European party systems through an ideological mapping of parties' stances including their saliences for European issues, such as migration and EU budgets *and* the systematic analysis of cross-nationally comparative, representative survey data. The method allows to measure the long-term stability of alignments between voters and parties and to draw conclusions about possible breaks (dealignments) or new mobilization potentials (realignments)

First, the supply side was approached with a WMDS of party positions and the relative attention (salience) that is programmatically paid to specific issues. The CHES provides the database by comparatively encoding party programs and their political leaders' behaviour for each country at the same point in time. This statistical model allows for a multidimensional ideological mapping of party positions and their relative distance towards each other and political issues categories – for several points in time. This approach is critical to uncover the changing structure of partisan space in the course of EI in the 21st century.

In a second step, the national populations' attitudes on the demand side were accounted for with a polarization measure and regression analyses of representative survey data from the ESS. The objective is to identify the changing determinants and their underlying factors for attitudes towards the EU among

the sample's populations, track demand for such politics over time and compare the results cross-nationally. The polarization over the scale and depth of EI was tracked over time through the dispersion (standard deviation) of people's mean attitudes towards EI and serves as basic indication for growing dissensus over this issue. Further, numerous MLR analyses were conducted to explain for respondents' attitudes towards the enhancement of EI as dependent variable – over time. Several independent socio-cultural and socio-economic items, as well as socio-structural control variables were included. The average attitudes towards (further) EI have developed differently across the country sample. Surprisingly, throughout all points in time until 2014 Poland maintained the highest average score on attitudes ranging around 6.5 on the eight-point scale. Nevertheless, it experienced a rapid drop from 2014 onwards. The German electorate expressed the second highest score ranging around 5.2 and finishing the highest in 2018. Switzerland is determined to be in third place with a range around 4.9 points. As a matter of fact, the British electorate continuously expressed the lowest average in attitudes towards further EI with the lowest measurement of 3.67 out of eight points in 2014.

Thus, with exception to Germany the mean attitudes have generally dropped over time in all countries. Poland witnessed a 17% drop in mean approval, similar to Great Britain (–17,5%) and Switzerland (–13%). Interestingly, in the latter three countries this decrease has reached its lowest peak in the 2014 period. Subsequently, a vast rise in attitudes towards EU integration is observed.

Further, the dispersion measure, the standard deviation of mean attitudes, and therefore our selected measure for polarization over EI, has increased sharply over time for Germany (15%), Poland (12%) and Switzerland (17%). Only Great Britain sustained a relatively stable polarization over its weak mean attitudes. These initial “basic” measurements serve as the first indicators that support the claim for the general rise of constraining dissensus among the national populations in our sample. However, the rise in general attitudes towards EU between 2014 and 2018 in Poland, Switzerland and Great Britain leaves room for interpretation whether not country-specific critical occurrences have led to a rediscovery of EUs or EIs functionality. For Poland, this rise comes across with the first Russian invasion in Donbass and annexation of Crimea. In the Polish public discourse, the Ukrainian case is oftentimes portrayed as the alternative fate to the pro-Western orientation that Poland had taken in 1989. In this context Russia acts here as a push-factor in the pro-EU attitudes among the Polish (Riedel 2019). Therefore, the EU could be projected as a safe haven against further Russian aggression during these times. In Switzerland, due to its geo-political and geo-economic localization, the rationale is different. The Swiss people may have acknowledged the necessity and functioning of the EUs internal market (before the IFA re-politicized this issue) and ultimately Brexit may have led to a rise in information gathering about the cons but especially the pros of Great Britain itself in the EU. This seems plausible since in the years up to the Brexit *votum* and the vote itself were characterized by strong “culturization” of EI, right before new economic and social realities were created through the outcome of the referendum. In each and every of the above-mentioned cases, apart from the country-specific features, the common denominator is the

migration issue. It is however seen from a slightly different perspective in each of the respective societies – as the cultural threat, as the economic challenge, as the refugee pressure.

Thus, within the limits of the regression models, the overall pattern reveals, that across samples and points in time the cultural hesitation towards migrants exerts the strongest, most consistent and clearly negative effect on attitudes towards EI. Other cultural attitudinal variables, such as the item measuring the neglect of homosexuals' liberties, work as strong predictor for dependent variable. However, similar to the comparative outcome of the partisan structure on the supply side, the respondents are more diversified across countries with regards to their economic preferences' impact on EI attitudes. Further, socio-structural variables' effect diminishes almost completely over time in the whole sample. We therefore conclude, again within the interpretative limits of the statistical model, that socio-cultural attitude items dominate the formation of attitudes towards EI in the 21st century.²⁰

Since this analysis is dedicated to the demand side (citizens' dispositions), it indicates a certain call for policies or rhetoric when considering European (differentiated) integration in the respective national political arena. This constitutes mainstream but especially *GAL* and *TAN* parties' potential – over time – to mobilize on a supposed *integration* vs. *demarcation* divide within the British, Polish, German and Swiss electorates.

The demand side unravels that in all selected countries, with their very own national characteristics and logics, there is manifest potential for right-wing populist and nationalist parties to mobilize dominantly on a cultural dimension against further deepening and widening or even the status quo of EI. And so is for differentiation or disintegration from the latter. This potential is mainly driven by the electorates' cultural opposition towards migration rather than their attitudes towards economic issues such as redistribution. Thus, the supply side analysis presents evidence that EU sceptic parties' consistent strategy is *indeed* to mobilize voters almost exclusively on the cultural dimension against political integration. This is valid *vice versa* for *GAL* parties and voters with strong pro-European (cultural) attitudes. Finally, the sample indicates that domestic divide over the status quo and future of EI is a crucial determinant for explaining for different levels of integration. However, it is rather of cultural than economic nature which claim is an important contribution to the existing literature on DI in Europe. It is in line with other findings that the scholars of EI unveiled in the previous years. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks propose that the themes of immigration, integration and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less consequential for political parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan detect in their classic work. They present evidence suggesting that (1) party systems are determined in episodic breaks from the past; (2) political parties are programmatically inflexible; and (3) as a consequence, party system change comes in the form of rising parties (Hooghe & Marks 2018, p. 109). In this sense it is important to underline that both the Polish

PiS and the German *AfD*, as well as the British *UKIP* are relatively new parties (in relation to their respective party systems). They originated in 2001 (*PiS*), 1993 (*UKIP*) and 2013 (*AfD*) in opposition to the existing party system and traditional cleavage structures. They are built on the foundation of emerging socio-political divides that serves them as political vehicles. However, we do not claim that the old cleavages lost their validity. Prior cleavages' structuration power for the landscape of political parties diminishes over time, but few traditional cleavages die completely. The territorial cleavage, the religious cleavage and the class cleavage have each lost bite, none has been entirely extinguished but rather transformed and incorporated into new contexts. Cleavage theory conceives layers of partisan attachment rather than the replacement of one dimension of contestation by another. The party system of a specific country reflects its history of prior struggles as well as its current divides (Hooghe & Marks 2017, p. 127). This is why in this study we have dived into four distinguished party systems in their particular political systemic background.

Indeed, cleavage theory may be understood as a theory of discontinuity in the response of party systems to serious exogenous shocks (see the chapter on crisis and critical junctures). Change comes chiefly in the form of new political parties that challenge existing parties on a new cleavage (Rovny 2012; de Vries & Hobolt 2012). The positional manoeuvrability of political parties established on prior cleavages is constrained by self-selected activists, self-replicating leaders and embedded reputations (Hooghe & Marks 2018, pp. 118–119). This is why it is so difficult for the old and established parties to flexibly react to the critical impulses and the newly emerging cleavages. At the same time it is relatively easier for the new political parties to build on the emerging socio-political divides that emerge as a reaction to the crises and external shocks.

The building blocks of our argument are fabricated from the cleavage theory substance – we focus on how, in the European context, voters and political parties respond to these issues. Following the line of argumentation of the literature dedicated to the transnational cleavage, we try to reveal what stands behind the citizens' attitudes towards differentiated EI. In a seminal work by Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, we can read:

The competition on European integration and immigration is structured on the new cleavage. The TAN pole of this cleavage is staked out by the radical right. Radical right parties take more extreme positions on these issues, place more salience on them, and exhibit greater internal unity than mainstream parties. By virtue of their commitment to GAL values, green parties are located at the alter-pole. Just as the religious cleavage and the class cleavage were raised by Catholic and socialist parties on one side of the divide, so the transnational cleavage is mobilized by radical right parties at one extreme. As the transnational divide has become salient, mainstream parties have been compelled to compete on issues that lie far from their programmatic core.

(Hooghe & Marks 2018, p. 111)

Following the same line of argumentation, we acknowledge that the core of the transnational cleavage is the political reaction towards EI and immigration. In our analysis we had a closer look at the relation between attitudes towards EI and migration. They are an element of a wider processes of globalization manifested in intensifying international exchange, including trade flows. In Europe, the countries forming the EU decided to go beyond the free movement of goods and services but decided to form a common market and liberalized the free flow of the factors of production, that is, the capital and the labour. In this sense Europe is the best testing ground for the cleavages that are related with migration and supranational integration in general. DI, additionally, brings about the issues of the scope and level of integration, which makes it even more interesting for the study of the Europeans' preferences towards "more" or "less" Europe. However, we detect the Swiss case as an outstanding piece of evidence for the expansion of these conflict patterns over the landscape of *whole* integrated Europe. The outlined empirics in Swiss legislation fit well with the development of the Swiss partisan structure and the electorate's attitudes, such as the vote for, and difficult implementation of the Mass Migration Initiative and the unilateral abandonment of the IFA.

The EU – in the perspective of the transnational cleavage – represents rule by foreigners, it erodes the nation state and its authority over its own population, or the control over the borders – which are the traditional attributes of the state. Further, the EI process generates social insecurity, just like globalization in general, and migration is perceived as a threat in this constellation. However, the economic dimension, in which the migrants produce higher competition for jobs, housing or social policies, is just one of many. The other important one is the cultural threat – in this viewpoint migrants signify the erosion of nativist values, or simply one's own status in society. Therefore, they are perceived as the carriers of alien norms and ideas.

Hence, EI, as complex as it is, poses multidimensional challenges, and the issue of migration is the key one. However, migration itself is a multidimensional phenomenon, and the economic and cultural dimensions are critical for the better understanding of the transnational cleavage. Hooghe and Marks name it the transnational cleavage because its focal point is the defence of national, political, social and economic ways of life against external actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods or exerting rule. It is a reaction to the changes that weakened the subjectively perceived national sovereignty, promoted international exchange, increased immigration and – in consequence – exacerbated cultural and economic insecurity (Hooghe & Marks 2018, p. 110).

The transnationally emerging cleavage challenges the established order, this is why it is fertile ground for new political initiatives. At the same time, it is a natural soil for the populist political offer, since its essence is anti-establishment, challenging the status quo and building on the antagonism between "us" (national community) and "them" ("corrupted elites"). The "common we" is oftentimes defined in ethnical or nationalist terms as opposed to "them" who are portrayed as foreigners, migrants or refugees. "Corrupted elites" are oftentimes seen as the cosmopolitan

(e.g., Brussels level) establishment, which is opposed to the nativist and tame homeliness. This is why both Europe and migration are so closely intertwined concepts and require to be analysed in conjuncture. Moreover, attitudes towards migration align with perceptions of EI having gone too far, and the specific determinants of this pro-, anti-migration stances correlate thereby with attitudes towards DI.

Consequently, our multi-dimensional approach explores the complex relations between the attitudes towards the phenomenon of migration and differentiated EI. Regarding the growing complexity of the European politics, including its systematic feature – that is DI, a one-dimensional approach to attitudes is inherently insufficient. Different predictors of the public opinion formation matter to different extents when explaining the attitudes towards enhanced EI. For example, Boomgaarden and colleagues (2011) indicate the presence of five dimensions of EU attitudes: performance, identity, affection, utilitarianism and strengthening. Earlier studies on the citizens' attitudes towards the EU or the EI process were trapped in the dichotomous thinking between support and neglect, whereas they should be treated as the two sides of the same coin. Bearing in mind the multifaceted nature of EI, we believe that the in-depth investigations into the subject need to go beyond using umbrella buzzwords like Euroscepticism, when exploring attitudes towards the EU. Political support or neglect can be directed towards different objects of support, it can be diffuse or specific and can be of a utilitarian or affective nature (Boomgaarden et al. 2011, p. 243). In order to explain for attitudes towards the EI process, or its DI characteristics, it is necessary to combine it with the undermining populations' ideological preferences. This is why we combined the support for DI with several attitudinal components that may clarify the bigger picture of the EU citizens' attitudes. Most studies draw on very similar models in order to explain attitudes towards the EU, even though these are often conceptualized quite differently (Boomgaarden et al. 2011, p. 244). However, the overall approach towards EI and DI deserves some further notes on generalizability in the upcoming section.

5.7 Limitations to measuring supply and demand for European (differentiated) integration

The results and interpretations of the previous section shall be accompanied with some remarks about the logics and limits of interpretation. Thus, it should be recalled, that the demand side analysis itself does not generally determine which factors and cognitive processes are at play when, for example, antimigration or anti-homosexuality attitudes exert a strong and negative effect on consent with further EU integration. It does not causally determine that, for instance, in the Polish sample EU sceptical individuals are in any case economically deprived *and* hesitant to homosexuality. However, it unveils that there is a share within the population that is to be mobilized on the supply side with rhetoric that aims for either one of the two (separately) or both dispositions (combined).

Moreover, socio-economic *and* socio-cultural attitudes might be rooted in one or more moderating variables, such as occupation and education, that is to say,

social class. Therefore, a moderation and mediation analysis would be required. This work does not make any statements of such kind. Instead, it is argued that political actors, in favour of EI or differentiation, have no more incentives or strategic basis to bind voters in class-specific patterns in the long run. Therefore, to mobilize for electoral gains, they need to appeal to people's attitudes about cultural controversies in general, and partly to their individual perceived economic position – depending on the national specifications. Over time and for selected countries and (cultural) anti-migration explanatory variables increasingly dominate the demand side analyses, whereas the socio-structural variables' effects subside.

For the demand side analysis, the socio-cultural attitude variables included are consistently significant and strong over time. They function as a simplistic but effective explanation for contemporary conflict patterns when it comes to transnationalism and EI, each in their own national context. Concluding from the demand *and* supply side, these conflict patterns have become more pronounced after 2010, as well as the polarization measurements for popular discontent over EU integration in all four cases.

Ultimately, this is in accordance with postfunctionalist theory of European crises as “critical juncture(s)” or facilitator for national political restructuring. However, this interpretation requires some further clarification about the intersection of country-specific results and postfunctionalist projection of European crises. As mentioned earlier, the demand and supply side analyses are not designed to determine causal relations between crisis and change in domestic political contestation. Thus, one must make a logical intermediate step to accept for those exogenous events shaping domestic reality within the selected cases. The specification of the Eurozone crisis and Schengen crisis is that they are truly transnational in that no national political leader or population can withdraw from the consequences in the long term. It is observed that the supply side of these countries is increasingly shaped by issues and values (*GAL* vs. *TAN*) which are central to the crises. Further, the demand side increases to polarize over European (differentiated) integration *and* the mentioned issues, and the values exert a significant effect on EU attitudes. Therefore, it is logically concluded that European crises account for at least some of the change patterns observed during the analyses.

A central feature of this work's set-up is to encompass different empirical realities while observing changes between the EU and the state level, and as a postfunctionalist consequence, changes between the EU and the societal level. The results obtained for all four countries speak for the emergence of a transnational cleavage at different stages with country-specific formations on both, the demand and supply side. This is very much in line with the foresight of the classic cleavage theorists proposing further additions and refinements of their model.

Regarding the supply side determinants of the integration–demarcation divide, the results are also in line with the work of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and Bornschieer (2010) which claim that in the wake of EI, emerging and transforming parties dominantly mobilize on the cultural dimension. This has been foremost observed for conservative mainstream parties included in this work's analysis. In conformity to Kriesi et al. (2012), those mainstream parties may converge relatively on the

economic dimension but increasingly differentiate themselves culturally (Poland), or, if they fail to do so, new populist right competitors emerge (Germany). This partially runs counter to Hooghe and Marks's claim that political parties are "sticky," meaning restrained in their ability to revisit and adapt their positions towards major political issues in the long run. In turn, it confirms the assertion of Bornschieer and Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) that established parties are generally flexible, as long as there is competition. The fact that in this context the latter authors rather than Hooghe and Marks are agreed with may be due to the method of analysing party positions. The postfunctionalists "simply" look at the direction, salience and dissent of party positions. Whereas in this methodology and in those of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and Bornschieer (2010), the relation to others – pairwise comparison in WMDS – is used to create a multidimensional and more dynamic picture of reality.

Finally, the relatively low impact of education across the regression models is not in accordance with contemporary scholars. Higher education was projected earlier in this work as a prime asset for competing in a mobile world and thus as a powerful (re-)structuring factor. Thereafter, opponents of EI were expected to be mainly determined as "insecure" by their education and their disapproval was projected as "populist reaction against élites who have little sympathy for national borders" (Hooghe & Marks 2017, p. 11). However, the low impact of this socio-structural disposition may be explained with the fact that the uneducated do not deliberately identify themselves or their peers as "losers" of EI or any other process. And neither do political actors mobilize them on the idea that *they* are in fact the unskilled, cognitively behind and should therefore oppose the EU. Similar to class, anti-EU attitudes are probably rooted in education to some extent. In this context, however, the higher and the lower educated themselves provide no source for momentary mobilization and cultivation within the periods such as the belief systems of an obviously heterogeneous group of migration rejectionists do.²¹ In other words: education produces no *additional explanatory value next* to the effective migration items.²²

Further, there are some considerations about the generalizability of the findings, which concentrate on the database, the statistical model and the temporal perspective on cleavages *per se*.

First, the characteristics of the CHES for estimating European party positioning reveal some vulnerability, since this kind of survey is prone to several biases. To be considered is the order bias, according to which the order of electoral programs presented to the experts may have confounding effects on their rankings, or the familiarity bias, after which respondents assign higher or lower values to parties they are familiar with. If controlled for these and other tendencies, there remains the dilemma of experts' general subjectivity. This may be influenced for example by the experts' personal research interests or the societal framework conditions around their research activities.

The ESS generates quantitative data from representative survey waves, which allows for certain inferences from samples to the basic population, as well as cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons. For methodological reasons, the

populations were filtered for people that are eligible to vote before being approached with regression analysis as well as mean and dispersion measurements. Strictly speaking, this pre-filtering violates the conditions of representativeness, and the validity of Chapter 4's inferences is limited to the defined group of elective citizens. The filter accounts for momentary, realistic mobilization potentials among political parties. Nonetheless, such dynamics are excluded that go along with potential acquisition of citizenship and, consequently, the right to vote in national democratic elections for people with a migration background.²³ Governing parties and other political actors for example, that share *TAN* values might be incentivized to shape bureaucracy in such a way that delays naturalization processes and therefore keep migrants from potentially voting for *GAL* parties.

Turning to the specifics of the statistical method used for this work's supply side analysis, WMDS generally reduces data of high dimensionality and thus complexity into a lower-dimensional through pairwise comparison. Because MDS is a numerical optimization technique, it might sometimes fail to compute the best solution since it focuses on local minima. Those are not necessarily the best solutions but still better than all other solutions nearby (Holland 2008, p. 1). Also, the MDS analyses were conducted under the premise that the data of party positioning fits well into a two-dimensional structure. The calculated *stress-I* values confirm this assumption; however, it is not determined whether a two-dimensional structure of partisan space is generally the best solution for each model.

Still, the question arises whether the conceptualized transnational cleavage actually reflects a *permanent* upheaval in the structure of political contestation, as Lipset and Rokkan's work once did. Indeed, this is a central point of critique for most post-Lipset–Rokkanian cleavage concepts presented earlier: the temporal aspect of their basis of observation. In classical cleavage theory, the historical analysis of the party structure in the 1960s is based on an evaluation of a time span of more than 100 years. In contrast, Ronald Inglehart observes a period of about 40 years and Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012), as well as Bornschier (2010), examine a span of about 30 years. The treated period for this work is even limited to 15 years. “Concerning the long-term persistence or decline of cleavages [...] [the] findings of such analyses may alert one to certain problems” (Bartolini & Mair 1990, p. 220). It is not enough to merely adopt the language of classical theory and criticize Lipset and Rokkan's rigidity on the macro-sociological approach. Much has changed for the nation state as container for social strata and the usefulness of still considering class should be questioned. However, claiming a new *cleavage*, or “critical juncture” based on these relatively short time spans runs the risk of postulating the emergence of new political parties and popular attitudes already as epochal turns of time (cf. Mielke 2001, p. 89).

Notes

- 1 MDS can also serve as a dimension reduction technique for high-dimensional data.
- 2 Metric MDS is also called principal coordinate analysis (PCA) and is a subtype of MDS dealing with numerical distances, in which there is no measurement error. Exactly one distance measure is received for each item pair (see Mair et al. 2021).

- 3 See Appendices.
- 4 Therefore, the statistical program STATA is used.
- 5 Mainly levels of significance might decrease slightly as a consequence.
- 6 For value scores and re-coding, see Appendix A.
- 7 Although the term unification differs from the term integration, the ESS states in its questionnaires and codebooks that unification “refers to further integration rather than further enlargement” (ESS 2018).
- 8 This variable is self-created and categorizes the respondents’ occupations into a primary, secondary, tertiary and *quaternary* sector (information and data processing). See Appendices.
- 9 Bigger cities are expected to have a higher share of immigrants and highly educated people that have more positive attitudes towards migration and self-select into urban areas (Ford & Jennings 2020, p. 307).
- 10 Further interpretation of the factorization results will follow in Chapter 6.
- 11 A logical conclusion between the crisis-like events of the periods and the exemplary developments is attempted in the conclusion.
- 12 *Christlich Demokratische Union* and *Christlich-Soziale Union*.
- 13 *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*.
- 14 Due to changes in the survey itself ESS round 10 allows only for deriving mean attitudes and standard deviation of the German eligible population.
- 15 Due to changes in the survey itself ESS round 10 allows only for deriving mean attitudes and standard deviation of the Polish eligible population (ESS 2022).
- 16 Or in other words: Economic well-being has a significant (positive) effect on attitudes towards integration and *vice versa*.
- 17 Note that for Switzerland there are no data available for the 2006 period.
- 18 Due to the Covid-19 pandemic ESS round 10 data could not yet be delivered for Great Britain.
- 19 Refer to a “Free...” Brexit Campaign image or slogan.
- 20 Further notes on the interpretative limits of our statistical models follow in Chapter 6 (limitations).
- 21 Again, to investigate higher education’s intermediating effect on EI, a mediation and moderation analysis would be required, which would go beyond the scope of this thesis.
- 22 Nevertheless, it shall be recalled, that the variance inflation factor (*vif*) was suitable for all regression models.
- 23 Given that, participating in national elections is tied to national citizenship.