

An Opaque Mirror for Trajan

A Literary Analysis and Interpretation of
Plutarch's *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*



Laurens van der Wiel

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AN OPAQUE MIRROR FOR TRAJAN

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By

LAURENS VAN DER WIEL

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For my parents, Hadewych and Paul

And my brothers, Alexander and Matthias

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Some parts of this book overlap with articles published elsewhere:

[1] An earlier version of most sections of Part II, chapter 2 appears in van der Wiel, L. (2023), “A Proposal for Restructuring Plutarch’s *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*”, *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 63, 1–26. Appendix I in its entirety and some parts of the literary analysis appear in this article as well, as will be indicated throughout.

[2] The entirety of Part III, chapter 1.3 (except for 1.3.2) presents a slightly adapted version of van der Wiel, L. (2023), “Human Perfection in Plutarch. Finding the Right Balance between Philosophy and Politics in the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*”, in Leemans, J. – Roskam, G. – Van Deun, P. (eds.), *Longing for Perfection in Late Antiquity. Studies on Journeys between Ideal and Reality in Pagan and Christian Literature*, Leiden, 231–253.

Text Editions, Translations, and Abbreviations

[1] Greek and Latin texts are cited from the *Teubner* editions, except for Plato's works, where the Oxford editions were consulted. All text editions used are listed in the bibliography. The subdivision of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as provided by modern editions is incorrect in various cases. These are listed in Appendix I: sometimes apophthegms should be split up or joined together; in other instances apophthegms are wrongly represented as separate sections. However, for the sake of clarity I always use the 1971 *Teubner* text of Nachstädt (reprint of the 1935 edition) in references to apophthegms or sections. Such references take the following form:

(a) *Philippus XIX* (178CD) refers to the nineteenth apophthegm in the section on Philip, the father of Alexander (177C–179C) in the edition of Nachstädt (even though this is Philip's eighteenth apophthegm according to Appendix I);

(b) *Fabius Maximus* (195C–196A) refers to the entire section on Fabius Maximus, which consists of seven apophthegms. *Semiramis* (173AB) refers to the one apophthegm in the section on Semiramis in Nachstädt (even though this is the final apophthegm of the section on Darius according to Appendix I).

[2] Translations are taken from the *Loeb Classical Library* (LCL) series, unless indicated otherwise. All editions used are listed in the bibliography.

[3] When referring to the *Moralia*, I use the traditional Latin titles; for short references to Plutarch's works (esp. in the footnotes and appendices), I use the abbreviations that are frequently applied in the field of Plutarchan studies, as listed in the table below. Other abbreviations follow *L'Année Philologique*.

Moralia

1A–14C	<i>De liberis educandis</i>	<i>De lib. educ.</i>
14D–37B	<i>De audiendis poetis</i>	<i>De aud. poet.</i>
37B–48D	<i>De audiendo</i>	<i>De aud.</i>
48E–74E	<i>De adulatore et amico</i>	<i>De ad. et am.</i>
75A–86A	<i>De profectibus in virtute</i>	<i>De prof. in virt.</i>
86B–92F	<i>De capienda ex inimicis utilitate</i>	<i>De cap. ex inim.</i>
93A–97B	<i>De amicorum multitudine</i>	<i>De am. mult.</i>
97C–100A	<i>De fortuna</i>	<i>De fortuna</i>
100B–101E	<i>De virtute et vitio</i>	<i>De virt. et vit.</i>
101F–122A	<i>Consolatio ad Apollonium</i>	<i>Cons. ad Apoll.</i>
122B–137E	<i>De tuenda sanitate praecepta</i>	<i>De tuenda</i>
138A–146A	<i>Coniugalia praecepta</i>	<i>Con. praec.</i>
146B–164D	<i>Septem sapientium convivium</i>	<i>Sept. sap. conv.</i>
164E–171F	<i>De superstitione</i>	<i>De sup.</i>
172B–208A	<i>Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata</i>	<i>Reg. et imp. apophth.</i>
208B–242D	<i>Apophthegmata Laconica</i>	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i>
242E–263C	<i>Mulierum virtutes</i>	<i>Mul. virt.</i>
263D–291C	<i>Quaestiones Romanae</i>	<i>Quaest. Rom.</i>
291D–304F	<i>Quaestiones Graecae</i>	<i>Quaest. Graec.</i>
305A–316B	<i>Parallela Graeca et Romana</i>	<i>Parall. Graec. et Rom.</i>
316C–326C	<i>De fortuna Romanorum</i>	<i>De fort. Rom.</i>
326D–345B	<i>De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute</i>	<i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i>
345C–351B	<i>Bellone an pace clariores fuerint Athenienses</i>	<i>Bellone an pace</i>
351C–384C	<i>De Iside et Osiride</i>	<i>De Is. et Os.</i>
384D–394C	<i>De E apud Delphos</i>	<i>De E</i>
394D–409D	<i>De Pythiae oraculis</i>	<i>De Pyth. or.</i>
409E–438E	<i>De defectu oraculorum</i>	<i>De def. or.</i>
439A–440C	<i>An virtus doceri possit</i>	<i>An virt. doc.</i>

440D–452D	<i>De virtute morali</i>	<i>De virt. mor.</i>
452F–464D	<i>De cohibenda ira</i>	<i>De coh. ira</i>
464E–477F	<i>De tranquillitate animi</i>	<i>De tranq. an.</i>
478A–492D	<i>De fraterno amore</i>	<i>De frat. am.</i>
493A–497E	<i>De amore prolis</i>	<i>De am. prol.</i>
498A–500A	<i>An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat</i>	<i>An vitiositas</i>
500B–502A	<i>Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores</i>	<i>Animine an corp.</i>
502B–515A	<i>De garrulitate</i>	<i>De gar.</i>
515B–523B	<i>De curiositate</i>	<i>De cur.</i>
523C–528B	<i>De cupiditate divitiarum</i>	<i>De cup. div.</i>
528C–536D	<i>De vitioso pudore</i>	<i>De vit. pud.</i>
536E–538E	<i>De invidia et odio</i>	<i>De inv. et od.</i>
539A–547F	<i>De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando</i>	<i>De se ipsum laud.</i>
548A–568A	<i>De sera numinis vindicta</i>	<i>De sera num.</i>
568B–574F	<i>De fato</i>	<i>De fato</i>
575A–598F	<i>De genio Socratis</i>	<i>De genio Socr.</i>
599A–607F	<i>De exilio</i>	<i>De exilio</i>
608A–612B	<i>Consolatio ad uxorem</i>	<i>Cons. ad ux.</i>
612C–748D	<i>Quaestiones convivales</i>	<i>Quaest. conv.</i>
748E–771E	<i>Amatorius</i>	<i>Amatorius</i>
771E–775E	<i>Amatoriae narrationes</i>	<i>Am. narr.</i>
776A–779C	<i>Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum</i>	<i>Maxime cum principibus</i>
779D–782F	<i>Ad principem ineruditum</i>	<i>Ad princ. iner.</i>
783B–797F	<i>An seni respublica gerenda sit</i>	<i>An seni</i>
798A–825F	<i>Praecepta gerendae reipublicae</i>	<i>Praec. ger. reip.</i>
826A–827C	<i>De unius in republica dominatione, populari statu, et paucorum imperio</i>	<i>De unius</i>
827D–832A	<i>De vitando aere alieno</i>	<i>De vit. aer.</i>
832B–852E	<i>Decem oratorum vitae</i>	<i>Dec. or. vit.</i>

853A–854D	<i>Comparationis Aristophanis et Menandri epitome</i>	<i>Comp. Ar. et Men.</i>
854E–874C	<i>De Herodoti malignitate</i>	<i>De Her. mal.</i>
874D–911B	<i>Placita philosophorum</i>	<i>Plac. philos.</i>
911C–919E	<i>Quaestiones naturales</i>	<i>Quaest. nat.</i>
920B–945E	<i>De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet</i>	<i>De facie</i>
945F–955C	<i>De primo frigido</i>	<i>De prim. frig.</i>
955D–958E	<i>Aqua an ignis utilior sit</i>	<i>Aqua an ignis</i>
959A–985C	<i>De sollertia animalium</i>	<i>De soll. an.</i>
985D–992E	<i>Gryllus</i>	<i>Gryllus</i>
993A–999B	<i>De esu carniū</i>	<i>De esu</i>
999C–1011E	<i>Quaestiones Platonicae</i>	<i>Quaest. Plat.</i>
1012B–1032F	<i>De animae procreatione in Timaeo</i>	<i>De an. procr.</i>
1033A–1057B	<i>De Stoicorum repugnantiiis</i>	<i>De Stoic. rep.</i>
1057C–1058E	<i>Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere</i>	<i>Stoic. absurd. poet.</i>
1058E–1086B	<i>De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos</i>	<i>De comm. not.</i>
1086C–1107C	<i>Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum</i>	<i>Non posse</i>
1107D–1127E	<i>Adversus Colotem</i>	<i>Adv. Col.</i>
1128A–1130E	<i>De latenter vivendo</i>	<i>De lat. viv.</i>
1131B–1147A	<i>De musica</i>	<i>De mus.</i>
	<i>Fragmenta</i>	<i>fr.</i>

Parallel Lives

<i>Theseus</i>	<i>Thes.</i>
<i>Romulus</i>	<i>Rom.</i>
<i>Comparatio Thesei et Romuli</i>	<i>Comp. Thes. et Rom.</i>
<i>Lycurgus</i>	<i>Lyc.</i>
<i>Numa</i>	<i>Num.</i>
<i>Comparatio Lycurgi et Numae</i>	<i>Comp. Lyc. et Num.</i>

<i>Solon</i>	<i>Sol.</i>
<i>Publicola</i>	<i>Publ.</i>
<i>Comparatio Solonis et Publicolae</i>	<i>Comp. Sol. et Publ.</i>
<i>Themistocles</i>	<i>Them.</i>
<i>Camillus</i>	<i>Cam.</i>
<i>Aristides</i>	<i>Arist.</i>
<i>Cato Maior</i>	<i>Ca. Ma.</i>
<i>Comparatio Aristidis et Catonis</i>	<i>Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.</i>
<i>Cimon</i>	<i>Cim.</i>
<i>Lucullus</i>	<i>Luc.</i>
<i>Comparatio Cimonis et Luculli</i>	<i>Comp. Cim. et Luc.</i>
<i>Pericles</i>	<i>Per.</i>
<i>Fabius Maximus</i>	<i>Fab.</i>
<i>Comparatio Periclis et Fabii Maximi</i>	<i>Comp. Per. et Fab.</i>
<i>Nicias</i>	<i>Nic.</i>
<i>Crassus</i>	<i>Crass.</i>
<i>Comparatio Niciae et Crassi</i>	<i>Comp. Nic. et Crass.</i>
<i>Alcibiades</i>	<i>Alc.</i>
<i>Marcus Coriolanus</i>	<i>Cor.</i>
<i>Comparatio Alcibiadis et Marcii Coriolani</i>	<i>Comp. Alc. et Cor.</i>
<i>Lysander</i>	<i>Lys.</i>
<i>Sulla</i>	<i>Sull.</i>
<i>Comparatio Lysandri et Sullae</i>	<i>Comp. Lys. et Sull.</i>
<i>Agesilaus</i>	<i>Ages.</i>
<i>Pompeius</i>	<i>Pomp.</i>
<i>Comparatio Agesilai et Pompeii</i>	<i>Comp. Ages. et Pomp.</i>
<i>Pelopidas</i>	<i>Pel.</i>
<i>Marcellus</i>	<i>Marc.</i>
<i>Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli</i>	<i>Comp. Pel. et Marc.</i>
<i>Dion</i>	<i>Dion</i>
<i>Brutus</i>	<i>Brut.</i>
<i>Comparatio Dionis et Bruti</i>	<i>Comp. Dion et Brut.</i>
<i>Timoleon</i>	<i>Tim.</i>

<i>Aemilius Paulus</i>	<i>Aem.</i>
<i>Comparatio Timoleontis et Aemilii Pauli</i>	<i>Comp. Tim. et Aem.</i>
<i>Demosthenes</i>	<i>Dem.</i>
<i>Cicero</i>	<i>Cic.</i>
<i>Comparatio Demosthenis et Ciceronis</i>	<i>Comp. Dem. et Cic.</i>
<i>Alexander</i>	<i>Alex.</i>
<i>Caesar</i>	<i>Caes.</i>
<i>Sertorius</i>	<i>Sert.</i>
<i>Eumenes</i>	<i>Eum.</i>
<i>Comparatio Sertorii et Eumenis</i>	<i>Comp. Sert. et Eum.</i>
<i>Phocion</i>	<i>Phoc.</i>
<i>Cato Minor</i>	<i>Ca. Mi.</i>
<i>Demetrius</i>	<i>Demetr.</i>
<i>Antonius</i>	<i>Ant.</i>
<i>Comparatio Demetrii et Antonii</i>	<i>Comp. Demetr. et Ant.</i>
<i>Pyrrhus</i>	<i>Pyrrh.</i>
<i>Caius Marius</i>	<i>Mar.</i>
<i>Agis</i>	<i>Agis</i>
<i>Cleomenes</i>	<i>Cleom.</i>
<i>Tiberius Gracchus</i>	<i>TG</i>
<i>Caius Gracchus</i>	<i>GG</i>
<i>Comparatio Agidis et Cleomenis cum Tiberio et Caio Graccho</i>	<i>Comp. Ag., Cleom. et Gracch.</i>
<i>Philopoemen</i>	<i>Phil.</i>
<i>Titus Flamininus</i>	<i>Flam.</i>
<i>Comparatio Philopoemenis et Titi Flaminini</i>	<i>Comp. Phil. et Flam.</i>

Isolated Lives

<i>Aratus</i>	<i>Arat.</i>
<i>Artaxerxes</i>	<i>Art.</i>
<i>Galba</i>	<i>Galba</i>
<i>Otho</i>	<i>Oth.</i>

Introduction

Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ παρήνει τὰ περὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας βιβλία κτᾶσθαι καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν· ἅ γὰρ οἱ φίλοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐ θαρροῦσι παραινεῖν, ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται.¹

Demetrius of Phalerum recommended to Ptolemy the king to buy and read the books dealing with the office of king and ruler. “For,” as he said, “those things which the kings’ friends are not bold enough to recommend to them are written in the books.”

It was perhaps for this same reason that Plutarch dedicated *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* to Trajan, well aware as he was of the dangers of flattery at the imperial court.² The collection contains 494 apophthegms of the most famous monarchs, lawgivers, and commanders of antiquity (cf. 172C: τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παρὰ τε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ παρ’ Ἑλλήσιν ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων), people with whom the Roman emperor could readily identify. The sayings (and, in fact, also some actions) are grouped together according to historical figures, who are, in turn, arranged by people in line with Plutarch’s threefold division of mankind:³ a first and shorter section presents some barbarians (172E–174F: Persians, Egyptians, Thracians, and Scythians), after which a series of Greeks follows (175A–194E: Sicilians, Macedonians, Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans), and a final part describes the Romans (194E–208A). As a consequence, the work covers a major part of ancient history, including apophthegms from, generally speaking, the Persian Wars until the creation of the Roman Principate and the *Pax Romana* established by Caesar Augustus (206F–208A).⁴

One might say that *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* occupy a somewhat peculiar position in the Plutarchan oeuvre.⁵ On the one hand, the work is traditionally presented as belonging to the *Moralia*. This rich part of Plutarch’s oeuvre consists of treatises and dialogues on moral, ethical, metaphysical, or natural philosophical issues; other works reflect

¹ *Demetrius Phalereus* (189D).

² Plutarch discusses the theme of flattery in detail in *De ad. et am.*

³ See esp. Mossman (2010) 145–146 on this aspect in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*

⁴ Only *Cyrus* (172EF), *Peisistratus* (189B–D), and the first Spartans (189D–190A) deal with earlier times.

⁵ On the distinction between *Moralia* and *Lives*, see Geiger (2008).

an interest in literary theories, antiquarian problems (collections such as *Quaestiones Romanae* and *Quaestiones Graecae*), etc. In terms of its format, the apophthegm collection seems to be the closest to works such as *Coniugalia praecepta* and *Mulierum virtutes*:⁶ the former similarly offers a brief compilation, in this case of pieces of advice for the newlyweds Pollianus and Eurydice, former students of Plutarch addressed by a dedicatory letter (138B–D); in the latter Plutarch tells Clea (a friend of his, as appears from the proem, 242E–243E) a series of more lengthy stories on virtuous women.

In other respects, however, the collection's content and goals are also quite close to the *Parallel Lives*, the other half of Plutarch's oeuvre.⁷ The dedicatory letter addressed to Trajan with which the work begins (172B–E), introduces the series of apophthegms (172E–208A) as an abbreviation of the biographical project, written specifically for the busy Roman emperor who has no time to peruse the extensive paired *Lives* of Greeks and Romans. Thanks to the collection, so Plutarch states, he will now have the opportunity to familiarize himself with these characters "as clearly as in a mirror" (172D: ὡσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις καθαρῶς, cf. *Aem.* 1.1) and "quickly" (172E: ἐν βραχέσι), for words are the most convenient instrument for the understanding of character (172C–E, cf. *Alex.* 1.2). The letter, then, in several respects reminds one of the prologues to some biographical pairs, and this is partially confirmed by the close connection between the material included in both the *Parallel Lives* and in the apophthegm collection. Yet this is definitely not a one-to-one ratio: some heroes of the former are absent from the latter, whereas many other famous statesmen or generals are the subject of a section in the collection but do not figure in a *Life*. The same goes for the apophthegms, for not every saying in a section on a protagonist is included in his *Life* and *vice versa*. The dedicatory letter, then, should be read as a programmatic introduction in the first place:⁸ *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* are meant to enable the reader, especially the Roman emperor, to gain insight into and to reach a moral assessment of character, in line with the *Parallel Lives*.⁹

⁶ *Apophth. Lac.* are a different case: they present Plutarch's notes, not meant to be published; see Stadter (2014b).

⁷ Other works of the *Moralia* that are close to the biographical genre are *Dec. or. vit.* (see *infra*, note 987 on the questioned authenticity of the work) and *Parall. Graec. et Rom.* (probably inauthentic; see Pace (2018) 44n1 for secondary literature).

⁸ See Duff (1999) 13–51 on the programmatic proems of the *Parallel Lives*.

⁹ Roskam (2021) 109: "The goal of the collections of sayings, then, is exactly the same as that of the *Parallel Lives*: they are a project of zetetic moralism. But the collections are also presented as a kind of shortcut."

Yet there is more in this regard. The evident implication of the letter is that a brief acquaintance with the prominent heroes of Greek and Roman history will also *instruct* the emperor and guide him in becoming a better ruler. As such, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* fit within the genre of *specula principum* and could be the only undeniable proof of Plutarch's attempt as a philosopher to enter into dialogue with a monarch as a Greek advisor¹⁰ in order to improve his reign or perhaps even to transform him into a true philosopher king, an ideal which the author shares with his philosophical *exemplum* Plato.¹¹ The work, then, is an important source for our understanding of the Chaeronean's philosophical-political thinking, for his views on the functions of moral *exempla* and exemplary literature (including the *Parallel Lives*), and perhaps even for his self-understanding regarding his place as a Greek public-spirited philosopher in the Roman Empire.

Scholarship, however, paid little attention to the dedicatory letter to Trajan and the apophthegm collection. From the sixteenth century on, editors and commentators expressed doubt about the authenticity of the two parts of the work.¹² In the nineteenth century Richard Volkmann's harsh assessment, influenced by contemporary views on what good literature should look like, dealt the final blow.¹³ The text was largely ignored until Robert Flacelière cautiously turned the tide in 1976.¹⁴ Today, after the introduction of Fuhrmann's *Budé* edition favouring the genuineness of the work,¹⁵ and especially after Mark Beck's convincing defence of the dedicatory letter 22 years ago,¹⁶ Plutarch's authorship is generally accepted, although some scholars still remain sceptical.¹⁷

Since then some progress has been made. A couple of more recent contributions briefly address the general structure of the collection¹⁸ and the process of composition;¹⁹ others discuss some of its apophthegms or sections – although usually in connection with other accounts of the same or similar stories in Plutarch's oeuvre and other authors²⁰ – and in a PhD thesis defended ten years ago Serena Citro provides a new Italian

¹⁰ Cf. Stadter (2012b) 95 (= (2015) 208).

¹¹ Boulet (2005) and (2014) discusses the philosopher king in Plutarch.

¹² Xylander (1570) 732; later Wyttenbach (1795) CLIX and (1810) 1039–1042.

¹³ Volkmann (1869) 210–234.

¹⁴ Flacelière (1976).

¹⁵ Fuhrmann (1988).

¹⁶ Beck, M. (2002).

¹⁷ E.g. Almagor (2018) 269–280.

¹⁸ Briefly Mossman (2010) 146–147; esp. Stadter (2014b) 674–676.

¹⁹ Pelling (2002) 65–90; Beck, M. (2003); Stadter (2008); Stadter (2014b).

²⁰ Esp. Citro (2019a); (2019b); (2020); (2021).

translation and a commentary of the dedicatory letter and (parts of) some sections of the work.²¹

Though strides have been made lately, previous scholarship has left important questions unanswered. For example, although *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* should serve as a mirror for the emperor (for this is how the dedicatory letter introduces the work, 172D), it is not immediately clear how a series of apparently unconnected apophthegms without much context or authorial comments should instruct a ruler or which lessons are to be drawn from them; nor is it, in line with this first question, obvious how the collection as an exemplary work fits within Plutarch's oeuvre. This book responds to these gaps, providing a first literary analysis of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a whole, that does full justice to the collection as an independent literary work of art, in order to shed light on the internal cohesion and ideas expressed *in the text itself*, on the way in which Plutarch wanted Trajan – or any other reader – to approach the work, and, connected with this, on how its protagonists are to be assessed and how they can serve as *exempla*.

This book consists of three main parts:

[I] **Part I** contains three **preliminary chapters**. (a) The first one not only presents a critical overview of the arguments in support of and against the authenticity of the dedicatory letter to Trajan and the apophthegm collection, but also provides new insights into this *quaestio vexata*. Because none of the claims against authenticity are convincing, and since various stylistic and content-related elements in fact rather prove to support Plutarch's authorship, it will be concluded that *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* (in their entirety) are a genuine work of the Chaeronean. This chapter, then, builds on previous scholarship, but will also present various new, compelling arguments in order to convince the final sceptics. (b) The second chapter attempts to date the work. An absolute dating is difficult to reach, but a few elements from the letter and the collection seem to point towards the end of Trajan's reign. In a next step, it is examined whether this conclusion is supported by the relative chronology of the *Parallel Lives* (a topic that needs reconsideration, cf. Appendix III) and the apophthegm collection. (c) The third chapter briefly discusses Plutarch's views on the functions of the 'genre' of compilations of sayings and anecdotes in general and on the place of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* in the context of contemporary, early imperial, literature specifically. A comparison with Valerius Maximus

²¹ Citro (2014) discusses the dedicatory letter (172B–E) and *Agathocles* (176EF), *Antipater* (183EF), *Aristeides* (186A–C), *Alcibiades* (186D–F), *Iphicrates* (186F–187B), *Timotheus* (187BC), *Phocion* (187F, 188B, 188CD), *Teleclus* (190A), *Lysander* (190D–F), and *Pelopidas* (194C–E).

will point out that the Chaeronean truly wrote the collection as a kind of shortcut to the *Parallel Lives* with (an) emperor(s) as its target audience in mind: the work, then, belongs to the ‘genre’ of ‘mirrors of princes’ in the first place, and is closely related to biography.

[2] **Part II**, the core of this book, presents a **literary analysis** of the entire work. It opens with a close reading of the dedicatory letter (172B–E), which has repercussions for the remaining chapters on the collection. (a) It will be argued, indeed, that the letter provides clues about the general structure of the work. This will be followed by a systematic analysis of the collection itself, dividing it into three main parts: a section on monarchs (172E–184F: barbarians, Sicilians, and Macedonians), on the Greeks of the mainland (184F–194E: Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans), and on the Romans (194E–208A). (b) The letter requires a critical and participatory attitude from its readers, who are expected to look for striking tensions inviting them to re-evaluate the characters described at the outset, and this is in line with how the following compilation of apophthegms is to be read. As a consequence, the analysis focuses on the structure and internal cohesion of (the different sections of) the collection in every detail, in order to define how Plutarch depicts the protagonists and to point out that he carefully structured the work to this end.

The literary analysis, then, examines *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a text which has a meaning on its own. Other works by Plutarch (or by other authors) are therefore only briefly addressed when they shed light on the plausibility of the interpretation proposed by the analysis, but never on the assumption that the apophthegm collection primarily takes its meaning from other texts.

[3] **Part III** builds on the analysis of Part II and addresses how *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* function as exemplary literature – as ‘**a guide for the emperor**’, so to speak – and how this fits within Plutarch’s overall thinking about *exempla*. It consists of three main chapters that each concern a specific level of interpretation, all of which are again announced by the dedicatory letter (172B–E). Each of these levels reflects a different application of role models. (a) The first chapter discusses the functions of famous individuals (cf. 172C: τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων) as role models and strongly depends on insights about character depiction in the collection (cf. II). (b) The second deals with groups of people or peoples as *exempla* (cf. 172C: παρά τε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ παρ’ Ἑλλήσιν), in line with the more general and less nuanced image of ethnicities (cf. II): this different application of models also serves different goals. (c) The third examines mankind and human history in its entirety (cf. 172C: the notion of σύνταγμα) as a mirror for moral behaviour.

In contrast to Part II, a comparison with other works of Plutarch is of central importance in Part III. I will discuss especially the *Parallel Lives*: Plutarch’s techniques of characterization, the importance of (different

types of) *synkrisis*, the relevance of his tripartite division of mankind and his views on the ethnic background of historical figures for assessing their moral and political virtue, and his ideas about world history and the dynamics behind historical evolutions are all important aspects that remind one of the biographical project and play a central role in the apophthegm collection as well. Yet, when relevant, I will also address texts of the *Moralia*, such as *De profectibus in virtute* and *Ad principem ineruditum*: the Chaeronean's exemplary thinking as reconstructed from his oeuvre as a whole, on the one hand, clarifies aspects of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a manual for good rulership; the collection, on the other, deepens our insights into his exemplary thinking and tells us a lot about how he wanted his other works to be read.

In this way I hope to show that *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* are not a poorly composed and incoherent patchwork of sayings and anecdotes, as scholars have long assumed: instead, the text reveals a well-thought-out organization that steers the interpretation of the readers towards conclusions that are often reminiscent of other parts of Plutarch's oeuvre. It also shows that the author practised what he preached as a Platonist writer, trying to be a supportive teacher for a ruler in his pursuit of becoming the best possible monarch. In short, Plutarch's *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* are a well-considered and thought-provoking work that should not only activate its readers – in the first place sole rulers – to reflect on moral behaviour of the past, but is also meant to guide them in their personal progress towards virtue.

PART I

PRELIMINARIES

I

Authenticity

The authenticity of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and the question of whether the work was meant for publication have been heavily debated. Three options have been proposed:²²

[1] The dedicatory letter to Trajan and the collection are both inauthentic. This was the main position in the nineteenth and twentieth century.²³

[2] A rather idiosyncratic position is advanced by Saß, who argues that the letter is a forgery, but that the collection was compiled – not published – by Plutarch.²⁴

[3] The entire work was written *and published* by Plutarch. Today, this is the dominant view,²⁵ although there remain sceptics.²⁶

If the dedicatory letter is authentic (1.1), there is little reason to reject Plutarch's authorship of (at least parts of) the apophthegm collection, and this would imply that the entire text was meant to be published (1.2).

1.1 The Dedicatory Letter

Scholars rejected the letter's authenticity because of its style and content and on the assumption that Plutarch did not know Trajan personally. None of these arguments are convincing, and a close stylometric analysis in fact supports Plutarch's authorship.

²² See Citro (2014) 28–48 for a chronological overview of the scholarly debate on the authenticity.

²³ Xylander (1570) 732; Wytttenbach (1795) CLIX and (1810) 1039–1042; Volkmann (1869) 210–234; Schmidt, C. (1879); Weissenberger (1895); Hartman (1916) 116–117; Ziegler (1951) 864; Nachstädt (1971) 1.

²⁴ Saß (1881) 20–21. Babbitt (1931) 5–6 proposes a similar suggestion.

²⁵ Benseler (1841) 436–440; Flacelière (1976); Fuhrmann (1988) 3–15; Beck, M. (2002); Roskam (2014) 190–191. See also Pelling (2002) 70 and 85; Mossman (2010) 146 cautiously follows Beck; Stadter (2008) 53 and 55, and (2014b) 675. In the conclusion of her dissertation, Citro (2014) 330 cautiously accepts the authenticity.

²⁶ Almagor (2018) 269–280 sticks to the arguments of Volkmann (1869) 210–234.

1.1.1 Writing Style and Content

So sehen wir, dass man in diesem Briefe auf Schritt und Tritt an einer Verkehrtheit im Gedanken oder im Ausdruck hängen bleibt. Dergleichen konnte ein Plutarch nicht schreiben: Er ist das klägliche Machwerk eines unverschämten Falsarius und man begreift nicht, wie Wyttenbach sagen konnte, er habe den Ausdruck und den Stil des Plutarch ziemlich gut nachgeahmt.²⁷

Volkmann's harsh judgement has been the most influential attack against the letter's authenticity, as he provides the only detailed discussion on its writing style and content. His arguments influenced scholars for more than a century, until Flacelière, Fuhrmann, and Beck demonstrated that none of them are valid.²⁸ The next pages briefly run through these arguments *contra* and *pro* authenticity and will shed further light on this issue. The letter reads as follows (172B–E; words in bold support authenticity; words underlined were adduced as arguments against authenticity):

Ἀρτοξέρξης ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεύς, ὃ **μέγιστε αὐτόκρατορ Τραϊανὲ Καίσαρ, οὐχ ἦττον οἰόμενος** βασιλικὸν καὶ φιλόφρονον εἶναι τοῦ μεγάλα δίδοναι τὸ μικρὰ λαμβάνειν **εὐμενῶς καὶ προθύμως**, ἐπεὶ παρελαύνοντος αὐτοῦ καθ' ὁδὸν αὐτουργὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἰδιώτης οὐδὲν ἔχων ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ταῖς χερσὶν ἀμφοτέραις ὕδωρ ὑπολαβὼν προσήνεγκεν, ἠδέως ἐδέξατο καὶ ἐμειδίασε, τῇ προθυμίᾳ τοῦ δίδοντος οὐ τῇ χρεῖᾳ τοῦ διδόμενου τὴν χάριν μετρήσας. ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος εὐτελεστάτως ἐποίησεν ἐν Σπάρτῃ τὰς θυσίας, ἵνα αἰετὸς θεοῦ τιμᾶν ἐτοιμῶς δύνωνται καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων. τοιαύτη δὴ τινὶ γνώμη κάμου λιτά σοι δῶρα καὶ ξενία καὶ **κοινὰς ἀπαρχὰς προσφέροντος ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας** ἅμα τῇ προθυμίᾳ καὶ τὴν χρεῖαν ἀπόδεξαι τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων, **εἰ πρόσφορον ἔχει τι πρὸς κατανόησιν ἠθῶν** καὶ προαιρέσεων ἡγεμονικῶν, ἐμφαινομένων τοῖς λόγοις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτῶν. καίτοι καὶ βίους ἔχει<ς> τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παρὰ τε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ παρ' Ἑλλησιν ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων: ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πράξεων αἱ πολλαὶ τύχην ἀναμειγμένην ἔχουσιν, αἱ δὲ γινόμεναι παρὰ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς τύχας ἀποφάσεις καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις **ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις καθαρῶς** παρέχουσι τὴν ἐκάστου διάνοιαν **ἀποθεωρεῖν**. ἢ καὶ Σειράμνης ὁ Πέρσης πρὸς τοὺς θαυμάζοντας, ὅτι τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ νοῦν ἔχόντων αἱ πράξεις οὐ κατορθοῦνται, τῶν μὲν λόγων ἔφη κύριος αὐτὸς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ πράξεων τὴν τύχην μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἅμα αἱ ἀποφάσεις τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς πράξεις παρακειμένας

²⁷ Volkmann (1869) 217–218.

²⁸ Flacelière (1976); Fuhrmann (1988) 3–15; Beck, M. (2002).

ἔχουσαι σχολάζουσαν φιληκοῖαν περιμένουσιν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ [καὶ] τοὺς λόγους αὐτοὺς καθ' αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ δείγματα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα συνειλεγμένους οὐδὲν οἶομαί σοι τὸν καιρὸν ἐνοχλήσειν, ἐν βραχέσι πολλῶν **ἀναθεώρησιν** ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων μνήμης γενομένων λαμβάνοντι.

Artaxerxes, the king of the Persians, O Trajan, Emperor Most High and Monarch Supreme, used to think that, as compared with giving large gifts, it was no less the mark of a king and a lover of his fellow-men to accept small gifts graciously and with a ready goodwill; and so, on a time when he was riding by, and a simple labourer, possessed of nothing else, took up water from the river in his two hands and offered it to the king, he accepted it pleasantly and with a cheerful smile, measuring the favour by the ready goodwill of the giver and not by the service rendered by the gift. Lyncurgus made the sacrifices in Sparta very inexpensive, so that people might be able always to honour the gods readily and easily from what they had at hand. And so, with some such thought in mind, I likewise offer to you trifling gifts and tokens of friendship, the common offerings of the first-fruits that come from philosophy, and I beg that you will be good enough to accept, in conjunction with the author's ready goodwill, the utility which may be found in these brief notes, if so be that they contain something meet for the true understanding of the characters and predilections of men in high places, which are better reflected in their words than in their actions. True it is that a work of mine comprises the lives also of the most noted rulers, lawgivers, and monarchs among the Romans and the Greeks; but their actions, for the most part, have an admixture of chance, whereas their pronouncements and unpremeditated utterance in connexion with what they did or experienced or chanced upon afford an opportunity to observe, as in so many mirrors, the workings of the mind of each man. In keeping herewith is the remark of Seiramnes the Persian who, in answer to those who expressed surprise because, while his words showed sense, his actions were never crowned with success, said that he himself was master of his words, but chance, together with the King, was master of his actions. In the Lives the pronouncements of the men have the story of the men's actions adjoined in the same pages, and so must wait for the time when one has the desire to read in a leisurely way; but here the remarks, made into a separate collection quite by themselves, serving, so to speak, as samples and primal elements of the men's lives, will not, I think, be any serious tax on your time, and you will get in brief compass an opportunity to pass in review many men who have proved themselves worthy of being remembered.

Volkman regards the following elements as problematic (underlined):

[1] **σύνταγμα**: “Offenbar will doch der Autor, welcher hier unter Plutarchs Maske spricht, von den Biographien reden. Wie konnte er aber da den Ausdruck *σύνταγμα* brauchen, was doch nur eine Schrift, ein Buch, niemals aber ein Corpus von Büchern bezeichnet”.²⁹ Beck defends the singular: Plutarch regarded the *Parallel Lives* as one whole,³⁰ which is in line with recent research that sees connections amongst pairs.³¹ In addition, the author mainly uses βιβλίον but never σύνταγμα when referring to a specific pair.³²

[2] **αὐτοκράτωρ**: “Hat es auch bei den Griechen *αὐτοκράτορες* schlechthin gegeben?”³³ Volkman thus interprets αὐτοκράτωρ in the meaning of “emperors”. Beck, on the contrary, argues that the word can just as much refer to Greeks, translating it as “rulers”,³⁴ which is in line with the core meaning of the word.³⁵ An examination of the 80 occurrences of αὐτοκράτωρ in the *Parallel Lives* shows that he is correct, but the military context in which it usually appears, suggests that “generals” would be a better translation:³⁶ (a) in the Greek *Lives*, the word is often used as an adjective combined with στρατηγός,³⁷ in three passages it appears on its own in the meaning of “general”,³⁸ and it sometimes refers to men who are appointed as peace negotiators (with full power);³⁹ (b) in the Roman *Lives* too the military context prevails, but only four passages contain the combination αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός,⁴⁰ while in all other 53 cases αὐτοκράτωρ occurs as a noun.⁴¹ This difference with the Greek

²⁹ Volkman (1869) 216.

³⁰ Beck, M. (2002) 167.

³¹ E.g. Mossman (1992); Pelling (2002) 188; Beneker (2005b); Buszard (2008); Pelling (2010); Stadter (2010a) 197; Duff (2011b) 262; Beck, M. (2014).

³² Duff (2011b) 213–214.

³³ Volkman (1869) 217.

³⁴ Beck, M. (2002) 164, based on a series of passages in Greek *Lives*.

³⁵ LSJ, s.v. “αὐτοκράτωρ”: “one’s own master”.

³⁶ αὐτοκράτωρ occurs 46 times in the isolated *Lives*: in *Arat.* the military context prevails; in *Galba* and *Oth.* it almost always refers to a Roman emperor. In *De tuenda* 123D the word refers to Titus; in *De fort. Rom.* 319F it concerns Antony; in *De se ipsum laud.* 546E it means “generals”; in *Praec. ger. reip.* 805A it refers to an emperor; *De facie* 945C uses αὐτοκράτωρ as an adjective; and it occurs five times in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*

³⁷ *Alc.* 18.3, 19.5, 33.3; *Arist.* 11.1; *Eum.* 5.2; *Dion* 29.4, 48.4. Similar cases are *Arist.* 8.1; *Nic.* 12.6; and *Dion* 3.3.

³⁸ *Nic.* 16.7; *Dion* 33.2; and *Comp. Tim. et Aem.* 2.7.

³⁹ *Phoc.* 26.3; three cases in *Nic.* 10.4–5; three in *Alc.* 14.6–11.

⁴⁰ *Cor.* 27.1; *Sert.* 11.1; *Pomp.* 61.1 and 67.7. See Mason (1974) 118 on this usage.

⁴¹ Only in *Cic.* 12.2 does αὐτοκράτωρ occur without a military connection; see Mason (1974) 119 on the passage.

Lives, where it is used mainly as an adjective, can readily be explained: the word often serves as the equivalent of the Latin *imperator*.⁴²

Almagor, however, is not convinced by Beck and thinks that αὐτοκράτορων (172C) must have the very same meaning as αὐτοκράτορ in the opening line (172B; “emperor”), where Plutarch addresses Trajan.⁴³ Yet the Chaeronean sometimes deliberately gives different meanings to the same word in one text.⁴⁴ Moreover, the double use of αὐτοκράτορ intentionally and subtly connects Trajan with the men about whom he will read (despite these ‘different’ meanings). In that sense, Plutarch’s use of the term αὐτοκράτορων may well reveal a well-considered authorial strategy.

[3] **Σειράμνης ὁ Πέρσης**: Volkmann points out that this Persian is unknown: “Einen Perser *Σειράμνης* kennt Niemand in Alterthum. Was aber diesem hier in den Mund gelegt wird, das ist bei Diodor. XV, 41 ein Ausspruch des Pharnabazus an Iphicrates.”⁴⁵ Yet as Beck notes, this is not a convincing argument against authenticity – if not an argument in favour of authenticity – for it might just be an example of *Anekdotenwanderung* (i.e. when the same anecdote is told about different figures).⁴⁶ I add to this that examples of such confusion can also be found in other Plutarchan works whose authenticity has never been questioned: a story about Gorgias in *Coniugalia praecepta* (144B), for instance, closely resembles an apophthegm about Philip of Macedon told in *De adulatore*

⁴² See Mason (1974) 118 for this and other usages of the word, and for examples in Plutarch and other authors.

⁴³ Almagor (2018) 272.

⁴⁴ In *Con. praec.* 138B Plutarch plays with two meanings of νόμος: (1) “usage, custom” and (2) “melody”, see LSJ, s.v. “νόμος”.

⁴⁵ Volkmann (1869) 217. A TLG search for this name or for possible variations (e.g. Σιράμνης and Σεράμνης) returns no results. Consulting Fraser – Matthews (1987) does not lead to any results either, but Justi (1895) s.v. “Σειράμνης” suggests that Seiramnes is in any case a possible name for a Persian. Various attempts have been made to identify Seiramnes: (1) Wytttenbach (1810) 1042: “Persicum nomen alterius, ut videtur, hominis Σισάμνης apud Herodotum V. 25. VII. 65. Voss. dat Σείσαμνος; Harl. et Jun. plenius ἢ καὶ Σεισάμνης ὁ Π.” (Froben (1542) 126 reads Σειράμνης; Wytttenbach must refer to a note of Hadrianus Junius, cf. Wytttenbach (1795) CXLIX; see Wesseling (2011) 254 on this book). The general of VII.65 is a more likely candidate than the corrupt judge of V.25. Broadhead (1960) 318–319 suggests that Σησάμας in Aeschylus’ *Persae* 322 could be the same name (not necessarily the same person) as Σισάμνης. (2) Müller, K. (1851) s.v. “Semeronius Babylonius” argues that the Persian author Semeronius (mentioned in *Chronicum Paschale*) should perhaps be identified as Seiramnes; Justi (1895) s.v. “Σεμηρόνιος” disagrees.

⁴⁶ Beck, M. (2002) 172n21.

et amico (70C) and the *Life of Alexander* (9.12–14), which occurs in the collection as *Philippus XXXI* (179BC).⁴⁷

[4] **σκολάζουσαν φιληκοῖαν**: Volkmann here ignores the rhetorical and programmatic function of the letter, writing: “als ob das nicht auch vor der vorliegenden Apophthegmensammlung, ja von jedwedem Buche gelte, das man nicht zur Arbeit, sondern zur Erholung in die Hand nimmt.”⁴⁸ Yet Plutarch defends the *raison d’être* of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*: he already wrote some *Parallel Lives*, so the reader might wonder why a collection of sayings would still be of any use. The explanation is that the busy Roman emperor does not have the amount of σκολάζουσαν φιληκοῖαν which the *Parallel Lives* require. A short compilation will solve his problem. We may note that this is not the only instance where Plutarch defends the usefulness of a collection. His words indeed recall the prefatory letter to *Coniugalia praecepta*. Recently Pollianus and Eurydice married. They were students of Plutarch, so they might wonder why they would be in need of advice which they had already heard. The author thus argues that his collection of pieces of advice can more easily be remembered (138C).⁴⁹

Volkman’s remaining arguments concern expressions and ideas that are, in fact, typical of Plutarch and will therefore be addressed below. The following elements (highlighted in bold above) support Plutarch’s authorship (in order of importance; some of the most compelling arguments have not been made before):

[1] **The Artaxerxes and Lycurgus apophthegms**: two apophthegms occur at the outset of the letter (172BC). These are also told in other works of Plutarch, in very similar wording.⁵⁰ A forger could have been familiar with these passages, but there are two minor changes to the Artaxerxes apophthegm that must stem from Plutarch’s pen: (a) according to TLG, the combination εὐμενῶς καὶ προθύμως instead of mere προθύμως in the *Life of Artaxerxes* (4.4–5.1) can be found in only one other ancient Greek

⁴⁷ Several apophthegms in *Apophth. Lac.* are also told about different Spartans, see Appendix II.3.

⁴⁸ Volkmann (1869) 217. Flacelière (1976) and Beck, M. (2002) do not comment on this point of criticism.

⁴⁹ See chapter 1.2.1 for more similarities with *Con. praec.*; for the variety of commonplaces in this collection, see Hawley (1999); Harvey (1999) 200–206 provides a bibliography on the work.

⁵⁰ Part II, chapter 1.3 provides a detailed comparison of the passages.

work, viz. Plutarch's *De fraterno amore* (479F);⁵¹ (b) of the ten instances of οὐχ ἦττον οἴομαι in TLG, six are from Plutarch.⁵²

[2] **εἰ πρόσφορον ἔχει τι πρὸς**: a search for this phrase gives only three relevant results, all of them in Plutarch.⁵³ The first one is the occurrence in the letter (172C); the other works are *De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet* (928C) and *De latenter vivendo* (1128E).

[3] **ἀποθεωρεῖν and ἀναθεώρησιν**: in studying the use of ἀποθεωρεῖν in Greek literature, Roskam concludes that it occurs primarily in Plutarch. The combination with ἀναθεώρησις at the end of the letter also appears typical of the author.⁵⁴ This is indeed “a strong indication” of the letter's authenticity.⁵⁵

[4] **κατανόησιν ἠθῶν**: this or similar combinations can be found in eight Greek works. Five of them (*Reg. et imp. apophth.* included) are attributed to Plutarch.⁵⁶

[5] **τοὺς λόγους ... ὥσπερ δείγματα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα**: Volkman criticizes this sentence as being incomprehensible,⁵⁷ but Beck points out that *De curiositate* (516C) contains the same expression in a similar context.⁵⁸

[6] **κοινὰς ἀπαρχὰς ... ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας**: “Aprophthegmen gehen weder von Philosophie aus, noch sind es gemeinsame Erstlinge”, Volkman argues.⁵⁹ Yet (a) this is a reference to Plato's *Protagoras*;⁶⁰ (b) moreover, Plutarch also compares his dialogue *De E apud Delphos* with ἀπαρχαί

⁵¹ A TLG proximity search for lemmata εὐμενῶς and προθύμως (after first word) [within 5 words]. I am grateful to Bram Demulder for sharing this observation with me.

⁵² A TLG advanced proximity search for WI: οὐχ; WI: ἦττον (after first word); and lemma: οἴομαι (after first word) [within two words] lists for Plutarch: *Ca. Mi.* 37.10; *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 172B; *Apophth. Lac.* 208D; *Mul. virt.* 262D; *De E* 386C; *Quaest. conv.* 731B. Almagor (2018) 179, however, argues that the change οἰόμενος (172B) – φαινόμενος (*Art.* 4.4) would be atypical of Plutarch.

⁵³ A TLG proximity search for lemmata εἰ; πρόσφορον, -ου, τό (after first word); ἔχω (after first word) [within 15 words] gives 13 results; only two of them have a construction similar to *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 172C.

⁵⁴ Roskam (2014) 182–183. The implications of this will be discussed in the literary analysis of the letter.

⁵⁵ Roskam (2014) 191.

⁵⁶ A TLG proximity search for lemmata κατανόησις, -εως, ἦ; and ἠθος, -ους, τό (near first word) [within five words] lists for Plutarch: *Nic.* 1.5; *Pomp.* 37.1; *Ca. Mi.* 37.10; *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 172C; *Praec. ger. reip.* 799B.

⁵⁷ Volkman (1869) 217.

⁵⁸ Beck, M. (2002) 167 and 168. See also Beck, M. (2005) 53.

⁵⁹ Volkman (1869) 217.

⁶⁰ Beck, M. (2002) 165. The implications of this reference are discussed in the literary analysis.

(384E),⁶¹ and a similar usage is met in *Adversus Colotem* (1117DE);⁶² (c) and the metaphor matches the context of the letter, where it connects the relationship between Plutarch and Trajan with the apophthegm on Lycurgus and the offerings in Sparta.⁶³

[7] **Juxtapositions of content-related words:** a high frequency of such pairs – at least six per Stephanus page but preferably more – can be an argument in favour of Plutarch’s authorship.⁶⁴ The letter does not even take up an entire Stephanus page (172B–E), yet it contains more than six of these pairs.⁶⁵

[8] **A typical prologue:** the letter not only presents *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a shortened version of the *Parallel Lives*, but also closely resembles the prologues to some pairs in terms of its general structure and content.⁶⁶ (a) the mirror comparison (ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις καθαρῶς) recalls the prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon*;⁶⁷ (b) and the notion that words reflect character more than deeds reminds one of the first chapter of the *Life of Alexander*.⁶⁸ One should evidently keep the specific context of this prologue in mind,⁶⁹ but the argument that words may be a better instrument for the understanding of a character than big actions indeed occurs elsewhere in Plutarch.

[9] **ὁ μέγιστε αὐτοκράτορ Τραϊανὲ Καῖσαρ:** on the basis of a Delphic inscription in Latin and Greek, Beck argues that μέγιστος αὐτοκράτωρ was in Plutarch’s times a correct Greek equivalent for *optimus princeps*, one of Trajan’s titles.⁷⁰

⁶¹ Flacelière (1976) 102. See van der Wiel (2021) 81–82 on this metaphor in *De E*.

⁶² Beck, M. (2002) 165.

⁶³ Cf. Part II, chapter 1.

⁶⁴ Teodorsson (2000), who speaks of pairs of synonyms.

⁶⁵ In the letter, the most relevant pairs are: (1) εὐμενῶς καὶ προθύμως, (2) αὐτουργὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ιδιώτης, (3) ἐτοιμῶς [...] καὶ ῥαδίως, (4) ἠθῶν καὶ προαιρέσεων, (5) ἀποφάσεις καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις, (6) δείγματα [...] καὶ σπέρματα. One can perhaps add (7) βασιλικὸν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον, (8) ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων, and (9) τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς τύχας, in line with Teodorsson (2000) 513, who argues that “even such pairs as πολύφιλος καὶ πολυτίμητος (497 C) and ἄφιλος καὶ ἀδύνατος (497 C) also seem to be acceptable as partly synonymous, seeing that the meaning of the second word of each pair is implied by the first. It specifies and clarifies that word”. Citro (2014) 64 also notes “alcune coppie sinonimiche” in the letter.

⁶⁶ This will be discussed in detail in Part II, chapter 1, based on Duff (2011b) 218–223 and Duff (2014) 334.

⁶⁷ Beck, M. (2002) 167. On the mirror metaphor in this and other Plutarchan passages, see Duff (1999) 32–34; Stadter (2004); Zadorojnyi (2010); Frazier (2011).

⁶⁸ Flacelière (1976) 102; Fuhrmann (1988) 7; Beck, M. (2002) 167.

⁶⁹ Wardman (1971) 260; Duff (1999) 14–22.

⁷⁰ Beck, M. (2002) 164–165. See also Mason (1974) 119 on Trajan’s titles in this inscription (*SIG*³ 827).

1.1.2 Plutarch and Trajan

According to Schmidt, the main argument against authenticity is that Plutarch did not know Trajan personally.⁷¹ There are two problems with his position. On the one hand, Plutarch's personal acquaintance with the emperor is irrelevant for the question of authenticity. If Plutarch did not know Trajan, it is not inconceivable that he attempted to get in touch with him. As Stadter writes, there had been Greeks before Plutarch who became important counsellors of Roman emperors, so his letter could "be a tangible sign of the Chaeronean's effort to establish a similar intimacy with a reigning emperor".⁷² Or he might just have wanted to dedicate a work to Trajan which could help him become a better ruler, without really aspiring to a function at the imperial court: this entirely fits his philosophy.⁷³ Additionally, there are no indications that Valerius Maximus was an associate of Tiberius either (and this even seems rather unlikely since he was probably of low birth), but he still dedicated *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, a collection similar to *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, to him.⁷⁴

On the other hand, it is not impossible that Plutarch was indeed in contact with Trajan, at least to a certain extent. Jones, even though he does not accept the letter's authenticity, assumes that Plutarch would definitely have pleased Trajan with his literary works and considers the note in the *Suda* that Plutarch received the *ornamenta consularia* from the emperor to be reliable.⁷⁵ The Chaeronean was also a good friend of Sosius Senecio (*consul ordinarius* in 99 and 107 to whom he dedicated the *Parallel Lives*, *Quaestiones convivales*, and *De profectibus in virtute*) and knew many other acquaintances of the emperor.⁷⁶ Finally, Plutarch

⁷¹ Schmidt, C. (1879) 10–14. Rawson (1989) 250–251 points out that it was at least assumed in later times that there were contacts between Plutarch and Trajan. *Reg. et imp. apophth.* might be responsible for this, see Schmidt, C. (1879) 73. Jones, C. P. (1966) 63–66, Swain (1991), and Bowie (1997) discuss possible connections between Hadrian and Plutarch.

⁷² Stadter (2012b) 95 (= (2015) 208); cf. how Duff (2008c) 10–11 reads the dedication of the *Parallel Lives* to Sosius Senecio.

⁷³ Cf. Roskam (2009) 84–85. Roskam (2002) discusses Plutarch's ideal of a philosopher's influence on rulers.

⁷⁴ See chapter 3 for a comparison of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and *Facta et dicta memorabilia*; and *infra*, note 210 on Valerius' origins.

⁷⁵ Jones, C. P. (1971) 29–34. *Ibid.* (1971) 30, however, rejects Plutarch's high position in Illyria described by the *Suda*. On these and similar traditions, see Swain (1991) 318 and (1996) 171; Zecchini (2002) 197; Liebert (2016) 23n36.

⁷⁶ Stadter (2002a) 11: "If Beck's argument is correct, the letter not only provides us evidence for a relationship of some sort between the two men (perhaps distant, or through an intermediary, a common friend such as Senecio), but a valuable indication of how Plutarch hoped that his work would be read by the elite of the empire." On Plutarch's influential

was a priest of Delphi: it seems therefore probable that Trajan at least knew of his existence.⁷⁷

1.1.3 Conclusion

There are no internal or external reasons to question the authenticity of the dedicatory letter to Trajan. On the contrary: various expressions and ideas occur elsewhere in the Chaeronean's oeuvre and almost exclusively there, sometimes even in only one or a few other works. No forger, as skilled as he or she might have been, could have imitated Plutarch's writing style in such detail. It is also far from unlikely that Plutarch, as a Platonist writer, tried to instruct a ruler, even in the (rather improbable) case that the emperor had never heard of him.

1.2 The Collection

Various strong arguments favour the authenticity of the collection and prove that it was meant to be published: (1) the authenticity of the letter (cf. 1.1); (2) the well-thought-out structure of the collection (cf. Part II),⁷⁸ reflecting insights in line with Plutarch's views on the functions of *exempla* and exemplary literature (cf. Part III); and (3) the relative chronology of the work and the *Parallel Lives* (cf. 2.2; this is a more speculative argument, but a certain pattern can be noted). All of this has been or will be addressed in the remainder of this book. This chapter therefore only discusses the main arguments *against* the authenticity of the collection: scholars have denied Plutarch's authorship on the basis of the number of cases of *hiatus* (1.2.1) and the origins of the apophthegms (1.2.2). Less important arguments will be briefly addressed throughout the analysis.

1.2.1 Hiatus

The apophthegms of the collection are said to contain more *hiatus* than is usually met in Plutarch⁷⁹ – although it is not clear how much is ‘too

friends, see Ziegler (1951) 665–695; Jones, C. P. (1971), esp. 1–64; Puech (1992); Sirinelli (2000) 167–198; Roskam (2009) 17–18; Stadter (2014a) 16–17; Stadter (2015) 21–44.

⁷⁷ Fuhrmann (1988) 9: “On ne sait s’il a jamais rencontré cet empereur, mais il est sûr que celui-ci connaissait au moins de réputation le philosophe de Chéronée et qu’il honorait en lui le prêtre d’Apollon”. See furthermore Stadter (2014a) 20–21 about Trajan's interest in Delphi. Two letters to Delphi suggest that the emperor was committed to the oracle, but Flacelière (1976) 97 considers them a mere formality.

⁷⁸ Cf. Fuhrmann (1988) 4 on the geographical and chronological ordering principles in the work.

⁷⁹ The dedicatory letter does not contain true *hiatus*: in the case of μέγιστε αὐτόκρατορ (172B) and ἄμα αἰ (172D) an apostrophe is to be added; see Benseler (1841) 437. The same

much', as a result of which the amount of *hiatus* in a work is never an absolutely valid argument against authenticity.⁸⁰ (a) Benseler suggests emending problematic passages in the apophthegm collection when possible, as he does with other Plutarchan works he deems authentic.⁸¹ This practice, also defended by Ziegler, is adopted by others with regard to the entire oeuvre.⁸² Yet the method is not without risk. Although many conjectures make sense, various *hiatus* probably do stem from Plutarch and can be either the consequence of negligence – because he did not deem it that important⁸³ – or are stylistically motivated.⁸⁴ (b) Volkmann, however, regards the 54 *hiatus* he counts in the apophthegm collection as a strong argument against its authenticity.⁸⁵ The sheer number may look impressive. However, his list contains several disputable cases:

[I] As Benseler points out, a certain amount of *hiatus* is allowed in direct quotations.⁸⁶ Volkmann lists 28 such cases.⁸⁷

goes for ἴνα ἀεί (172C). Benseler (1841) 437 correctly suggests to read εἰ πρόσφορον (172E; this is the reading of Nachstädt (1971) and Fuhrmann (1988), in line with the manuscripts) instead of εἰ ὅρον ... τινά in Bernardakis (1889). See Babbitt (1931) 10: “Apparently the first part of πρόσφορον was omitted early, and τι was changed to correspond.”

⁸⁰ On *hiatus* in Plutarch, see Benseler (1841) 314–548; Weissenberger (1895) 18–20 (on *Sept. sap. conv.*, also listing cases where *hiatus* is allowed); Schellens (1864) (esp. for the *Moralia*); Ziegler (1951) 932–935; Swain (1996) 137.

⁸¹ Benseler (1841) 314–394 deals with *hiatus* in the *Lives*; 394–548 concerns the *Moralia*; 436–440 discusses *Reg. et imp. apophth.*: some conjectures are convincing, others might be correct but are far from certain.

⁸² Sintenis (1846) 323–358 emends many *hiatus* in the *Lives*; Ziegler (1951) 934–935 agrees with this methodology.

⁸³ As appears from *Bellone an pace* 350E; see Weissenberger (1895) 18.

⁸⁴ E.g. Hutchinson (2018) 229 argues that the *hiatus* in *Pomp.* 74.3 (“ὄρῳ σ” εἶπεν “ἄνερ [...]”) should not be elided because of the rhythmic ending.

⁸⁵ Volkmann (1869) 231–234, followed by Weissenberger (1895) 60.

⁸⁶ Benseler (1841) 436–437 (on 173F): “videor mihi consilium Dionysii ab ipso his verbis expressi reperisse. Quod si est, hiatus non offendit”.

⁸⁷ 176D: φιλοσοφία ὠφέλησε; 176F: μοι ὁ; 177B: ἔμε εἶναι; 178F: βασιλεῦ, αὐτόν; 179B: ἐκαθεύδεθ' ὑμεῖς (because an apostrophe can be added, there is in fact no *hiatus*); 181B: κεκτημένοι οὐ; 181D: δοκεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος; 186E: εὐηθες εἶναι (the edition used by Volkmann has εὐήθη εἶναι); 187F: σκεπτομένῳ, ὃ Φωκίων; 189C: μου ἀρέσκης; 189E: κόμη εὐπρεπεστέρους; 189F: τυ, αἰ (Volkmann reads τεῦ εἰ); 190C: πόσοι εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ εἰσίν; 190D: ὁ τιν ἄνομοιότατος (Volkmann reads τὴν ἄνομοιότατος); 190E: ἐφικνεῖται ἦ; 193E: πολέμου ὀρχήστραν; 194D: δεδεμένη ὑπομένει Ἀλέξανδρον; 195A: σοῦ ἐθελήσουσιν; 196A: ἐγὼ ἀνέβαλον; 197D: Σύροι ὄπλαριοι; 198F: τί ἀνδριάς; 200D: ἐκάστου ἀρετῆς; 204A: ἔμαυτῷ αὐτοκράτορι; 204D: πεινατικοῦ ἐμετικός; 205C: σοί ἐστιν; 206B: ἐνταῦθα εἶναι. One can add 173F (χρυσίου οὐκ), in line with Benseler (1841)

[2] In five of Volkmann's cases (two of which are part of a saying), *hiatus* should be disregarded because there is a pause between two vowels.⁸⁸

[3] At least two of Benseler's emendations of *hiatus* listed by Volkmann are to be accepted.⁸⁹

I count 20 remaining cases in the *Teubner* edition of Nachstädt,⁹⁰ or 0.56 per Stephanus page.⁹¹ A comparison with Plutarch's *Coniugalia praecepta* shows that this number is not excessively high. This work is quite similar in content and format to *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*.⁹² It is a collection of pieces of advice in the form of anecdotes, customs of peoples, and poetic and philosophical quotes, introduced by a letter (138B–D) as a gift for two former students of Plutarch who, like Trajan, might have wondered why they should need this kind of instruction.⁹³

436: “in promissis Cyri continebantur, qua de causa non poterant mutari”; and 175F (παύσωνται οἱ Συρακόσιοι), again cf. Benseler.

⁸⁸ Benseler (1841) 436–437 lists 173D: Ξέρξου, ὁ; 187F: οὔτε γελῶν ὄφθη οὔτε δακρῶν (not listed by Volkmann); 195A: γενομένου, ἐπιστραφεῖς (not listed by Volkmann); 198C: ἔτη, ἀπέθανεν. One can add 178F: βασιλεῦ, αὐτόν (also part of a saying); 187F: σκεπτομένῳ, ὃ Φωκίων (also part of a saying); 193F: ἔφη ἔνταῦθα.

⁸⁹ (1) On *Gaius Fabricius* I (194F: Λαβίηνῳ εἶπεν, but Λαιβίνον' εἶπε in Nachstädt (1971), which makes more sense), see Benseler (1841) 438. (2) Volkmann reads τὴν ἑβδόμην· διὸ ὀργισθεῖς in *Augustus* XIV (207F), but Nachstädt (1971) 109 omits διὸ, in line with some manuscripts. The suggestion of Benseler (1841) 439 might be better: “offendit διὸ in apodosis conjicicioque διοργισθεῖς (v. Agesil. c. VI.) fuisse scriptum”.

⁹⁰ 174D: ξένῳ ἔδωκε; 175A: ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν; 177C: μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ; 180F: αὐλητοῦ ἐρώμενον; 181A: ἐπεὶ οὖν; 181B: κεκτημένοι οὐ; 185A: οὐκέτι ἦν; 187B: παλαιοῦ Ἀρμοδίου ἀπόγονον (2 *hiatus*); 189E: ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἐκώλυσεν; 190C: μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ; 190D: αὐτὸ ἐτέρου; 195B: Πυρροῦ ἰατρός; 196C: αὐτῷ ἐνόπλους; 197B: γενόμενοι ἐν; 200D: ἐπειδὴ ἐτύγχανον; 202C: χωρὶς ὀλίγον; 205B: τι εἰπόντα; 207B: Σικελία Ἄρειον; 207F: δήμου ἐξημαρτηκέναι. Volkmann counts three more *hiatus*: two in 191D (ἴσοι ἀγωνισάμενοι ἐνίκησαν; Nachstädt (1971) has ἴσοις ἀγωνισάμενος ἐνίκησεν, cf. the manuscripts) and one in 200C (ἐκείνῳ, ἔξεπατήθησαν; Nachstädt (1971): ἐκείνον ἐξεπατήθησαν). Volkmann also mentions a *hiatus* in 192EF, but I could not find this one. Benseler (1841) 439 counts 17 remaining *hiatus* (besides four cases for which he could not find a satisfactory emendation).

⁹¹ The apophthegm part of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* (172E–208A[first half]) spans 35.5 Stephanus pages.

⁹² *Apophth. Lac.* were probably not meant to be published (cf. Stadter (2014b) 666–674); in *Mul. virt.*, Plutarch claims to tell *unknown* stories (227D): these are much more elaborate than brief apophthegms.

⁹³ See Pomeroy (1999) 42–43 on these students (McNamara (1999) 160 points out that the majority of the advice concerns women); on *Con. praec.* as a gift for the addressees, see Patterson (1992) 4714 and (1999) 131.

Leaving the letter aside, I found 22 instances of *hiatus* in the text. Twelve of them occur in a saying;⁹⁴ one has a pause between the vowels;⁹⁵ two are not true *hiatus* as an apostrophe is to be added.⁹⁶ There remain five cases,⁹⁷ or 0.67 per Stephanus page.⁹⁸ Thus, the apophthegm collection and *Coniugalia praecepta* have about one *hiatus* per two pages.⁹⁹

1.2.2 The Origins of the Apophthegms

Scholars have put forward four relevant possibilities concerning the origins of the collection:

[I] According to Volkmann, there is no connection between *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and the rest of Plutarch's work.¹⁰⁰ Yet about 62% of the collection's apophthegms occurs in other works of the Chaeronean,¹⁰¹ often in strikingly similar wording.¹⁰² This is a large number, even more so since about half of the oeuvre is lost.¹⁰³ Additional-

⁹⁴ 139C: γυνή ἄμα and χιτῶνι ἐκδύεται; 140C: εἰ ἦδη ἀνδρί and ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖνος; 141C: φάρμακα ἔχεις; 142A: ὀργιζομένη ὄτι; 143F: τί οὖν; 144EF contains two *hiatus* in λύχνου ἀρθέντος ἢ αὐτῆ ἔστι. τί οὖν, twice in 141D and once in 144A, should be added too: they are part of a quote, although invented by Plutarch himself.

⁹⁵ 142B: κόλακι', οὐτῶ.

⁹⁶ 139C: μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι; 143D: νομίζετε οὖν.

⁹⁷ 140F: καίτοι ὕδατος; 144C: μέλλοντι ἀρμόζεσθαι; 144F: παρήνει αἰσχύνεσθαι; 145A: γεγραμμένα ἀναγνοῦσα; 145F: ὅσαι ἐγένοντο. See also Benseler (1841) 434 (not listing 145A).

⁹⁸ The pieces of advice of *Con. praec.* take up 7.5 Stephanus pages (138D[second half]–146A).

⁹⁹ Goessler (1999) 98–99 considers advice 48 from 145A on as a “peroration”. One might argue not to take this (probably more rhetorical) part into account. Yet ignoring advice 48, the amount of *hiatus* – surprisingly – decreases: three in 6.5 Stephanus pages (0.46 per page; still about one per two pages).

¹⁰⁰ Volkmann (1869) 234. Schmidt, C. (1879) 20–21 believes that there is a relationship between *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and Plutarch, but not in the case of *all* apophthegms. Almagor (2018) 274 makes a similar point, but he only studies the Persians: they only represent 4.6% of the work (ca. 35% of their apophthegms occurs elsewhere in Plutarch).

¹⁰¹ Cf. Appendix II.1.

¹⁰² See Pelling (2002) 69 on this “extreme closeness in wording between the *Apophthegmata* and the Lives”. This also goes for *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and the *Moralia*; see Appendix II.3.

¹⁰³ It is difficult to estimate how much is lost. The Lamprias catalogue (a third- or fourth-century library-catalogue; see Flacelière – Irigoien (1987) CCXXVIII–CCXXIX) contains a list of Plutarch's works and might shed light on this issue (cf. Harrison (1992) 4648), but does not provide certainty: as Russell (1972) 18–19 points out, it “comprises 227 titles, including a number of Lives now lost, and some 130 other lost works. [...] It

ly, when only taking into account sections on protagonists about whom Plutarch wrote an extant *Life*, the percentage rises to about 85%.¹⁰⁴

[2] Wyttenbach suggests that a forger took the apophthegms from Plutarch's published works.¹⁰⁵ This cannot be the case, as appears from stories of the collection that occur in at least two other texts of the Chaeronean. Beck has shown this in the case of apophthegms that are also told in one of Plutarch's declamations and in the *Parallel Lives*,¹⁰⁶ but a clearer example is *Philippus XX* (178D).¹⁰⁷

A	B	C
<p>Ἐπει δὲ ὑπό τινος ξένου κληθείς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐν ὁδῷ πολλοὺς ἐπήγετο (sc. Philip) καὶ τὸν ξένον ἐώρα θορυβούμενον (ἦν γὰρ οὐχ ἰκανὰ τὰ <i>παρεσκευασμένα</i>), προσπέμπων τῶν φίλων ἐκάστῳ, <i>πλακοῦντι χώραν ἐκέλευεν ἀπολείπειν· οἱ δὲ πειθόμενοι καὶ προσδοκῶντες οὐκ ἦσθιον πολλά, καὶ πᾶσιν οὕτως ἤρκεσεν.</i> <i>Reg. et imp. apophth.</i> 178D</p>	<p>ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸν (sc. Philip) <u>ἐπὶ χώρας</u> ὡς σὺν ὀλίγοις ὄντα δειπῆσαι παρεκάλεσεν, εἶτα ὄρων πολλοὺς ἄγοντα <i>παρεσκευασμένων</i> οὐ πολλῶν ἐταράττετο. συναισθόμενος οὖν ὁ Φίλιππος ὑπέπεμπε τῶν φίλων ἐκάστῳ <i>κελεύων</i> <u>πλακοῦντι καταλιπεῖν χώραν, οἱ δὲ πειθόμενοι καὶ προσδοκῶντες ἐφείδοντο τῶν παρακειμένων.</u> <i>ἤρκεσεν</i> οὖν ἅπασι <u>τὸ δεῖπνον.</u> <i>De tuenda</i> 123F–124A</p>	<p>τὸν βασιλέα Φίλιππον <u>ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας</u>· ἦκε γὰρ ἄγων πολλοὺς, τὸ δὲ δεῖπνον οὐ πολλοῖς ἦν <i>παρεσκευασμένον·</i> ιδῶν οὖν θορυβούμενον τὸν ξένον <i>περιέπεμπε</i> πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἀτρέμα, <i>χώραν</i> <u>πλακοῦντι καταλιπεῖν</u> <i>κελεύων·</i> οἱ δὲ <u>προσδοκῶντες ὑπεφείδοντο τῶν παρακειμένων</u> καὶ πᾶσιν οὕτως ἐξήρκεσε τὸ δεῖπνον. <i>Quaest. conv.</i> 707B</p>

omits some genuine books that survive; on the other hand it includes some extant *spuria*, so that we must conclude that some of the unknowns may be spurious also"; see also Barrow (1967) 193: "also we know indirectly of 15 works which we have not got and which are not included in the Lamprias Catalogue". It is also possible that the Lamprias catalogue contains doublets in some cases (cf. *infra*, note 118).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Appendix II.I.

¹⁰⁵ Wyttenbach (1795) CLIX (also on *Apophth. Lac.*); also Hartman (1916) 116–117, based on two arguments: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον in 196E (this argument is rejected in the literary analysis on the passage) and a difference between *Cato Maior XXV* (199D: ὡς φησι) – *Ca. Ma.* 10.3 (αὐτός δὲ φησιν ὁ Κάτων), although ὡς φησι can still mean that Cato himself spoke the words (cf. the LCL translation).

¹⁰⁶ Beck, M. (2003).

¹⁰⁷ Schmidt, C. (1879) 59–65 argues that in cases such as *Philippus XX* the *Reg. et imp. apophth.* version and the other versions were based on older collections.

The wording in A, B, and C is similar (italics). Since A contains one set of elements that also occur in B, and another set corresponding to C (bold), it is unlikely that A is based on either B or C.¹⁰⁸ Appendix II.3 provides an overview of many similar cases: due to the size of Plutarch's oeuvre, it would be absurd to explain all of them as contaminations (let alone as a mere coincidence): this would mean that a forger would have had to compare all accounts of all apophthegms in all of Plutarch's works in order to write the collection.¹⁰⁹

[3] Another possibility would be that *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* represent Plutarch's notes, similar to *Apophthegmata Laconica*, not meant to be published.¹¹⁰ Yet as *Philippus XX* shows (and similar cases in Appendix II.3), it seems rather unlikely that A was the source of B and C, for B and C share elements absent from A (underlined). Theoretically, there are many options, but the most probable one is that A, B, and C go back to the same source¹¹¹ – one compiled by Plutarch, as Pelling thinks.¹¹²

[4] Recent scholarship therefore argues that the apophthegms in the collection are based on Plutarch's notes, which were also used for his other texts, and that the work was meant to be published.¹¹³ Stadter and Pelling have a different view on the nature of such notes, but this issue

¹⁰⁸ In light of this, see also Stadter (2014b) 676: "It is improbable that the anecdotes are simply excerpts from the *Lives*, since the collection contains anecdotes for men not found in the *Lives*, and skips anecdotes in the *Lives*." Pelling (2002) 70–83 bases his arguments on the content of the stories in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and the *Lives*.

¹⁰⁹ Also Schmidt, C. (1879) 61–62 on *Philippus XX*: "Itaque si ex ipso Plutarcho eum hausisse statuas, facere non poteris, quin ἀπ. ex duobus locis conflatum esse contendas. Quod certe abhorret a verisimilitudine".

¹¹⁰ See *supra*, note 24 on Saß (1881) 20–21 and Babbitt (1931) 5–6. See Stadter (2014b) 666–674 on *Apophth. Lac.*

¹¹¹ Cf. Beck, M. (2003) 187, based on a comparison of the declamations, the *Lives*, and *Reg. et imp. apophth.*: "In three cases, when three points of comparison were possible, one version did diverge significantly from the other two. In each of these three cases, however, a different work was found to be divergent from the other two."

¹¹² Pelling (2002) 71 rejects that the collection and the *Lives* coincidentally share sources, so they must be "based on something else. [...] Plutarch would hardly follow anyone else's words so closely and so regularly as we would have to assume. It is better to think of this 'something else' as some large-scale gathering of material by Plutarch himself, and that presumably points to some sort of preparation or note-taking." See also Stadter (2014b) 670.

¹¹³ Beck, M. (2003).

will be addressed in chapter 2, as it has no immediate relevance to the authenticity.¹¹⁴

Thus, the relationship between *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and any other part of Plutarch's oeuvre is not fundamentally different from that between, for instance, *De cohibenda ira* and the *Life of Alexander*. This is the case for the collection in its entirety (as appears from Appendix II), so there are no indications that the work went through different phases of composition and review. In short, there is no reason to doubt the collection's authenticity.¹¹⁵

1.3 Conclusion

The dedicatory letter to Trajan is entirely in line with Plutarch's writing style and philosophy, to an extent that seems inimitable. Arguments against the collection are mostly related to the nature of the work and seem to be influenced by modern convictions about what good literature looks like: it was thought that Plutarch, a literary genius, could not have written such a simple text containing various instances of *hiatus*, let alone that he dedicated it to a Roman emperor (whom he might have never met). Yet as *Coniugalia praecepta* shows, the Chaeronean indeed "regarded such a collection as a sensible artistic thing to do";¹¹⁶ and the parallel of Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia* (cf. chapter 3) illustrates that an emperor would not have been offended by such a 'simple' gift. This is *a fortiori* the case with *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*: it would rather have been an honour for Trajan to receive a work from the famous priest of Delphi, who, in imitation of his *exemplum* Plato, attempted to educate his ruler.

¹¹⁴ Pelling (2002) 65–90; Stadter (2014b). Such notes are, as Stadter (2015) 128 puts it, different from "the philosophical hypomnemata well documented by the *Repetita placent* project headed by Luc van der Stockt". On these *hypomnemata*, see Van der Stockt (1999a), (1999b), (2002), (2004a), (2004b), and (2014); Van Meirvenne (2002); Xenophonos (2012b) and (2013); Demulder (2022), *passim* in chapter 5.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Pelling (2002) 85: the "collector was much more likely to be Plutarch: the person who knows his way best about his notes and drafts is always the author himself."

¹¹⁶ As Pelling (2002) 85 puts it with regard to *Reg. et imp. apophth.*

2

Dating

Even the fiercest sceptics about the authenticity of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* cannot but agree that the work dates from the second or third century at the latest: Aelian might have made use of the collection in his *Varia historia*, which would suggest a dating not later than the second century;¹¹⁷ the third- or fourth-century Lamprias catalogue mentions the work;¹¹⁸ a third- or fourth-century papyrus (*P. Oxy.* 78 5155) contains a part of the text, which, as Schmidt puts it, suggests “early circulation”;¹¹⁹ the collection was consulted by Stobaeus;¹²⁰ and it was known as a Plutarchan work by Sopater of Apamea.¹²¹ This chapter attempts to reach a more precise dating in the author’s lifetime, in light of the dedicatory letter to Trajan and the connection with the *Parallel Lives*.

2.1 Absolute Dating

A few elements from the dedicatory letter to Trajan are relevant for fixing an absolute dating of the work. The reference to the *Parallel Lives* (172C) provides a first *terminus post quem*, if Jones is correct that the biographies were composed after 96.¹²² In addition, Plutarch refers to his *Parallel Lives* as a coherent *project* (172C: σύνταγμα). This suggests that he had already written a significant number of biographical pairs, as

¹¹⁷ Schmidt, C. (1879) 68–74; Ziegler (1951) 864, however, is not convinced.

¹¹⁸ Definitely no. 108 (Αποφθέγματα ἡγεμονικά, στρατηγικά, τυραννικά) and perhaps no. 125 (Απομνημονεύματα; in my view, this is probably a lost work); see Nachstädt (1971) 1; Fuhrmann (1988) 3; Citro (2014) 1–2.

¹¹⁹ Schmidt, T. S. (2019) 82.

¹²⁰ Saß (1881) 19–20; Babbitt (1931) 5; Ziegler (1951) 864; Nachstädt (1971) 1.

¹²¹ Nachstädt (1971) 1.

¹²² Jones, C. P. (1966) 70; see also Roskam (2021) 91. Delvaux (1995) 97, however, argues that the project was composed around 110–115: (1) *Sull.* 21.8 (*Lys.–Sull.* is the fourth pair in his scheme [105]) mentions that the battle of Orchomenus (86BC) took place about (σχεδόν) two hundred years ago; and (2) Sosius Senecio died around 116. Yet σχεδόν is vague, and the project might have continued after Sosius’ death. In addition, a second person singular does not necessarily refer to Sosius (*pace* Jones, C. P. (1966) 69; Delvaux (1995) 97), but might address any reader: only the pairs calling the Roman by name (*Dem.* 1.1, *Thes.* 1.1, *Dion* 1.1) certainly predate 116; the same goes for *Per.–Fab.*, predating *Dion–Brut.* (see Appendix III).

will be confirmed by the relative chronology of the biographies and the collection (chapter 2.2). Thus, since Plutarch never finished this project, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* were probably compiled closer to his death around 120 than to ca. 96.¹²³ The dedication to the emperor Trajan narrows this period down: in light of the reference to the *Lives*, one expects a dating close to 117, as argued by Citro.¹²⁴

An additional, but less decisive, element is in line with this. Plutarch often avoids explicit references to current affairs,¹²⁵ but he does not always refrain from using allusions.¹²⁶ The same goes for the apophthegm collection, as the work might refer to Trajan's conquests. Beck regards the two Persian apophthegms in the dedicatory letter as possible allusions to the emperor's campaign against the Parthians.¹²⁷ Interestingly, the collection's first three major sections present not only the Persians (172E–174B), but also the Thracians and Scythians (174C–F, belonging together):¹²⁸ if the first indeed call the Parthian expedition to mind, the second group might allude to the Dacian wars.¹²⁹ As a consequence, the opening sections include peoples that were part of the Roman Empire after Trajan's conquests. Additionally, the overall focus on the concept of *imitatio Alexandri* (discussed in Part III, chapter 3) seems to refer to the emperor's Parthian campaign again.

If the work indeed alludes to Trajan's expedition in the East, this would once more point towards the end of his reign. The emperor left Rome on 11 May 113,¹³⁰ but Plutarch is more likely to have made such an allusion when the war was won. *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* would then have been published after 20 February 116¹³¹ and before Trajan's death in 117.

¹²³ Again Jones, C. P. (1966) 70 on the *Lives*: "The end of the series probably came only with Plutarch's death in c.120"; and Roskam (2021) 91. On Plutarch's death, see Jones, C. P. (1966) 63–66.

¹²⁴ Citro (2014) 47. See also Fuhrmann (1988) 10.

¹²⁵ As Pelling (2002) 253–265 and (2011) 2–13 points out, Plutarch had many opportunities to refer to contemporary events in *Caes.*, but he seems to have avoided this.

¹²⁶ Pelling (2002) 261: "Plutarch likes his focus to be soft; he prefers to leave the points as contemporary *resonances*, no more"; followed by Stadter (2002b) 238, although he still sees "overt references to the previous emperor" (Domitian) in *Num.*, *Sol.*, and *Publ.* See also Stadter (2015) 178.

¹²⁷ Beck, M. (2002) 165.

¹²⁸ Besides the short *Reges Aegypti* (174C) placed in between the Persians and the Thracians. The analysis will address the Thracian and Scythian sections as a whole.

¹²⁹ See Oltean (2007) 53–58 on these wars: the first expedition started in 101; the second in 105.

¹³⁰ Lepper (1948) 28.

¹³¹ See Lepper (1948) 209 on this date of Trajan's official victory.

2.2 Relative Dating: The Collection and the *Parallel Lives*

This chapter first explores the connection between *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and the *Parallel Lives*, in order to examine whether the presence of sections on specific historical figures in the collection implies that the *Lives* of these men were written already (2.2.1). The second part, on the contrary, tries to explain why certain heroes – Romans, as will become clear – are left out from the apophthegm collection: in some cases, their absence might mean that their biographies had yet to be written (2.2.2). In light of this, the third part provides an overview of the possible relative chronology of the collection and the *Parallel Lives*, building on the chronology of the biographies as proposed in Appendix III (2.2.3). One should keep in mind that this chronology remains a difficult issue and a matter of speculation, but the table suggested here is still largely in line with the most influential one proposed by Jones in 1966, which seems to be at least generally correct.¹³²

2.2.1 The Connection Between the Works

In light of chapter 1, there are three relevant theories concerning the relationship between the *Parallel Lives* and *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*:

[1] Stadter claims that notes such as *Apophthegmata Laconica* were used for the composition of the *Parallel Lives* and *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*:¹³³

Ap.reg. almost certainly represents a selected, edited, and modestly embellished subset of a larger collection. *Ap.Lac.* would have been one section of that larger collection.¹³⁴

If he is correct, sections in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* do not necessarily postdate their corresponding *Lives*,¹³⁵ because, as Beck has shown, Plutarch gathered such notes from his early years on, and these were used for the *Moralia* as well.¹³⁶

¹³² Jones, C. P. (1966) 66–70.

¹³³ Stadter (2014b).

¹³⁴ Stadter (2014b) 677.

¹³⁵ Stadter (2014b) 666–669 stresses that the order of the apophthegms in *Apophth. Lac.* resembles the order in the *Lives*. This only partially goes for the sections in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, see *ibid.* 676.

¹³⁶ Beck, M. (2003) 188 and Beck, M. (2010) 361 (“Stadter concludes that this collection dedicated to Trajan was derived from a larger collection, one that may have been started early on by Plutarch in his youth”). See Stadter (2008) on connections between *Praec. ger. reip.* and *Reg. et imp. apophth.* Stadter (2014b) 677 also stresses that col-

[2] Pelling argues that a kind of historical draft, compiled when Plutarch prepared his biographies (or perhaps a series of biographies), formed the basis for both works.¹³⁷

I suggest that they [*Reg. et imp. apophth.*] are subsequent to the Lives, not part of their preparation: a collection based on Plutarch's work for the Lives, but garnered *from* those Lives or the work for them, not *for* them.¹³⁸

If this is the case, sections in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* required the preparation of specific (groups of) biographies, which implies that the corresponding *Lives* of these sections would have been written or at least prepared before the collection.

[3] Verdegem suggests that the relationship between the *Parallel Lives* and *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* might not be the same throughout the entire collection:¹³⁹

In fact, nearly all the Roman apophthegms in *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* may have figured in a draft for a Plutarchan *Life*. When it comes to the Greeks, on the other hand, the same goes for only about two thirds of the items in *Sayings of Kings and Commanders*. Since Plutarch must have known many of the Greek apophthegms since his youth, he may have well started a personal collection long before he even planned to write a series of *Parallel Lives*. If so, he may have re-arranged and reworked the material he had on a particular figure when he started working on his *Life*. To a certain extent, then, Pelling and Stadter may both be right about the relationship between the *Parallel Lives* and *Sayings of Kings and Commanders*.

A systematic comparison of the apophthegm collection and the other works of Plutarch's oeuvre (Appendix II.1 and 2) shows that this third option is the correct one, for – *generally speaking* – there is indeed a

lections such as *Apophth. Lac.* were compiled from Plutarch's early career on, and that the apophthegms were rearranged when the author planned to compose a *Life* about the protagonist in question. Whether such reordered collection was also used for *Reg. et imp. apophth.* is, in my view, less clear, but this might for example have been the case for some sections such as *Pyrrhus* (184CD), see Appendix II.2.

¹³⁷ Pelling (2002) 65–90.

¹³⁸ Pelling (2002) 70.

¹³⁹ Verdegem (2010) 404.

striking difference between the barbarian and Greek (172E–194E) and the Roman parts (194E–208A) of the apophthegm collection.¹⁴⁰

(a) In the first group, there are many sections on historical figures who are *not* the subject of a *Life*; if there is a corresponding *Life*, this often does not contain all apophthegms of the section, which are usually not told in the same order there; and many apophthegms also occur in the *Moralia*. In these cases, then, Stadter seems to be correct, although *Pyrrhus* (184CD) seems to be an exception.

(b) In the part on the Romans, however, only a few sections do not have a *Life*; almost all apophthegms occur in the corresponding *Life*, usually in the same order, but only a few in the *Moralia*; and often, apophthegms read as summaries of (parts of) chapters of the *Life*. Pelling therefore seems to be correct in the case of the Romans, although there are two exceptions: for *Cato Maior* (198D–199E) and *Cicero* (204E–205E), Plutarch seems to have consulted collections of their sayings (such as, probably, one compiled by Tiro for the orator) instead of a draft for the *Lives*.¹⁴¹

The presence of some Greek sections, then, does not necessarily mean that the corresponding *Lives* were published or prepared already, but this is different with most of the Romans.

2.2.2 Romans Absent From the Collection

Every Roman *Life* contains apophthegms. Thus, when a Roman hero is *not* included in the collection, this might mean that Plutarch still had to prepare or write his biography.¹⁴² Yet in the case of some heroes, other explanations are possible: as the dedicatory letter addresses the emperor, Brutus, Marcus Antonius, and probably also Cato Minor are not surprising absentees; and Plutarch omitted the Romans of the remote and mythical past.¹⁴³ Another explanation is less likely: Stadter claims that negative ex-

¹⁴⁰ See in this context Pelling (2002) 1–2 (= (1979) 74–75); and also Stadter (2014b) 683: “For the Roman *Lives*, Plutarch’s reading neither began so early nor extended so broadly”.

¹⁴¹ Appendix II.1 and 2 provides a detailed overview and description of all these observations.

¹⁴² As to the non-legendary Romans (see the note below) absent from *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, Plutarch possessed material on Brutus (*Brut.* 2.6–8); *Ant.* contains sayings in 4.9, 16.3, and 45.12; *Ca. Mi.* in 6.1, 9.1–2, and 13.5; *Crass.* in 7.1, 18.2, and 30.5; *Marc.* in 10.6–8, 17.1–2, and 24.4 (a letter); *Sert.* in 5.4, 16.8, and 23.6–7; *TG&GG* does not contain clear sayings of Tiberius Gracchus (but longer speeches of the man are included in 9.4–6 and 15.2–9), but provides various examples of Gaius Gracchus in 24(3).6–7 and esp. in 25(4).

¹⁴³ Stadter (2008) 55: “Early legendary figures are excluded from the Roman section: there are no anecdotes for Romulus, Numa, Publicola, Coriolanus, or Camillus” (as to the Greeks, the same goes for Theseus); and *ibid.* 55: “Some subjects of biographies – the

empla are deliberately left out,¹⁴⁴ but this is contradicted by the presence of some (rather) base barbarians and sections such as *Pyrrhus* (184CD; Pyrrhus' presentation in the collection is much more negative than in his *Life*, as will be shown in the analysis) and *Alcibiades* (186D–F).¹⁴⁵

2.2.3 The Relative Chronology

The first column lists the Roman *Lives* in order of the possible relative chronology as suggested by Appendix III. The paired Greek *Lives* are only included when they are also relevant for some Roman sections. The second column refers to the corresponding (parts of) section(s) in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* – cases of lost *Lives* are indicated by a question mark – and gives their total number of apophthegms. When such a section is absent from the collection, this column either includes a possible explanation or a question mark, when the reason for the absence is unclear. The third column indicates which sections might not be (entirely) based on the (preparation of the) *Life* in question.

[1] The <i>Parallel Lives</i>	[2] <i>Reg. et imp. apophth.</i>	[3] Other sources?
1 <i>Life of Scipio</i>	<i>Scipio Maior?</i> 196B–197A 9	Unknown
1 <i>Life of Scipio</i>	<i>Scipio Minor?</i> 199F–201F 22	Unknown
	<i>Caecilius Metellus?</i> 201F–202A 3	Unknown
2 <i>Marc.</i>	?	
3 <i>Sull.</i>	<i>Sulla</i> 202E 1	
4 <i>Luc.</i>	<i>Lucullus</i> 203AB 3	
5 <i>Cic.</i>	<i>Cicero</i> 204E–205E 20	Probably partially based on a collection of sayings
6 <i>Publ.</i>	Remote or legendary past	

Gracchi, Sertorius, Crassus, Cato Minor, Brutus, Antony – are omitted, perhaps as unsuitable or unedifying”.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. note 143; and Pelling (2002) 83: “This taste for the morally improving is indeed a *tendency*, no more”.

¹⁴⁵ Examples of negative *exempla* amongst the barbarians are *Cyrus Minor* (173EF; he instigates internal strife) and *Anteas* (174EF; depicted as a true barbarian). Sicilian tyranny, presented in a negative way in esp. *Dionysius Maior* (175C–176C), can hardly be regarded as a system desired by Plutarch.

7	<i>Num.</i>	Remote or legendary past			
8	<i>Rom.</i>	Remote or legendary past			
9	<i>Cam.</i>	Remote or legendary past			
10	<i>Fab.</i>	<i>Fabius Maximus</i>	195C–196A	7	
11	<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Flaminius V</i>	197CD	1	
	<i>Flam.</i>	<i>Flaminius</i> Ia–IV	197A–C	5	
12	<i>Brut.</i>	Inappropriate hero			
13	<i>Aem.</i>	<i>Paulus Aemilius</i>	197F–198D	9	
14	<i>Caes.</i>	<i>Caesar</i>	205E–206F	14	
15	<i>Pomp.</i>	<i>Pompeius</i>	203B–204E	16	
16	<i>Ca. Ma.</i>	<i>Cato Maior</i>	198D–199E	26	Partially based on a collection of sayings
17	<i>Ca. Mi.</i>	Inappropriate hero			
18	<i>Ant.</i>	Inappropriate hero			
19	<i>Pyrrh.</i>	<i>Gaius Fabricius</i>	194F–195B	4	
	<i>Mar.</i>	<i>Marius</i>	202A–D	6	
		<i>Catullus Lutatius</i>	202DE	1	
20	<i>Sert.</i>	?			
21+	<i>Crass.</i>	?			
21+	<i>Cor.</i>	Remote or legendary past			
21+	<i>TG</i>	?			
	<i>GG</i>	?			

If one accepts the relative chronology of the *Parallel Lives* as proposed by this table and Appendix III, the apophthegm collection would post-date the publication or at least preparation of the first nineteen pairs: in all of these *Lives* only the absence of Marcellus in the collection is surprising, although the small amount of apophthegms in *Sulla* (202E) might seem strange as well;¹⁴⁶ in the case of the final five Romans, one can only see why Coriolanus was left out, and Crassus and the Gracchi, especially Gaius, are striking absentees.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ Various apophthegms of *Sull.* are left out from *Sulla* (202E), see *Sull.* 21.3, 24.2, and 29.11–12.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. *supra*, note 142.

2.3 Conclusion

A discussion of the absolute dating of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* in connection with the relative chronology of the *Parallel Lives* (hypothetical as it might be) and the collection leads to two conclusions:

[1] Various elements in the dedicatory letter and the apophthegm collection suggest that the work was published at the end of Trajan's reign, after his campaigns in the East, when Plutarch would have written most pairs of the *Parallel Lives*. The proposed relative chronology of the biographies (if correct) points in the same direction: a comparison with the Romans included in and left out from the collection implies that the text was probably composed after (the preparation of) *Pyrrhus–Marius*, one of the later pairs, but before several later Roman *Lives*. The apophthegm collection, then, seems to be one of Plutarch's latest works.

[2] The consistent image arising from all this might also have repercussions for the *Parallel Lives*: it suggests that the proposed chronology of Appendix III is at least in general correct; and it provides a(n unfortunately not significant) *terminus ante quem* for (the preparation or perhaps publication of) *Pyrrhus–Marius* and the *Lives* preceding this pair, viz. Trajan's death in 117.

3

Early Imperial Anecdote Collections

Early imperial works such as Plutarch's *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, and perhaps most military *compendia* of the first two centuries, such as Sextus Julius Frontinus' *Strategemata*, Aelianus Tacticus' *Tactica*, and Polyaeus' *Strategemata*, are all examples of the same text type: 'collections of sayings and anecdotes'. Additionally, all these collections – with the (possible) exception of Frontinus' work written under Domitian's reign¹⁴⁸ – are dedicated to a Roman emperor: Valerius addresses Tiberius, Aelianus Tacticus dedicates his compilation to Trajan, and Polyaeus writes to Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus.¹⁴⁹ All these authors present their works as manuals for good generalship in the first place, except for Valerius and Plutarch: their prefaces announce a wider range of topics and material.¹⁵⁰

The goal of this chapter is not to provide a systematic discussion and overview of the (history of the) text type,¹⁵¹ but rather to point out how Plutarch thought about the 'genre' and the place and function of his apophthegm collection in the context of previous and especially of contemporary, early imperial, literature of this kind (the parallel of Valerius Maximus). An initial part therefore briefly discusses the Chaeronean's ideas about 'apophthegmatic' literature and the importance of apophthegms or *chreiai* in literary works, and concisely addresses the function of such 'anecdotes' in (rhetorical) education during the author's lifetime (3.1). This will appear relevant for the main part of this chapter, comparing *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* with Valerius Maximus' collection, since both works seem to be most closely related to each other in terms of content and structure (3.2). A conclusion will take insights from

¹⁴⁸ Perhaps a dedication to Domitian was removed from the text after the emperor's death, see Turner (2007) 442–443.

¹⁴⁹ Turner (2007) 434–435 briefly compares these texts (but does not include Plutarch and Aelianus Tacticus). According to the manuscripts, Aelianus dedicated his text to Hadrian, but this should be Trajan, see Fiaschi (2014) 128. On the connection between Aelianus and Frontinus, see König (2020) 135–139 and 143–146.

¹⁵⁰ Plutarch's letter announces ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων (172C): only the final category concerns generals (see *supra*, p. 30–31); only parts of Valerius' work include military *exempla* (7.4), see Turner (2007) 435 on this section.

¹⁵¹ On miscellanies in the early Empire, see Morgan (2007).

both parts together, in order to describe Plutarch's views on the goals and target audience of his apophthegm collection (3.3).¹⁵²

3.1 Plutarch's View on Collections of Sayings and Anecdotes

3.1.1 *Gnome, apophthegma, apomnemoneuma, and chreia*

The words *gnome*, *apophthegma*, *apomnemoneuma*, and *chreia* are often discussed together, as they all refer to a (more or less) anecdotal element containing a saying, which can easily be incorporated in the context of an oration, treatise, or any other literary work. The meaning of *gnome* seems clear: it concerns an anonymous aphorism, describing a universal truth accepted by society.¹⁵³ It is less easy to reach a well-circumscribed definition of the other terms, all referring to a brief story that is more anecdotal in nature. First, *apophthegma* and *apomnemoneuma* seem to be more or less synonymous (I systematically use the English 'apophthegm'). Beck writes with regard to Plutarch's collection and Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia*:¹⁵⁴

In essence these works are simply collections of *chreiai* or brief anecdotes. There is considerable semantic overlap between the terms *chreia*, *apophthegma*, *apomnemoneuma*. If there is a detectable difference it resides in the degree of elaboration on which the *chreia* is subjected, with an elaborated *chreia* being termed an *apophthegma* or *apomnemoneuma*.

As also appears from this quotation, the difference between a *chreia* and an apophthegm is much more complex. Stenger provides more insight into this matter, which is not entirely in line with Beck's view:

[I] An apophthegm is a saying or reaction (not necessarily in direct speech) attributed to a(n authoritative) historical figure and can (but need not) describe the background or event provoking the saying, which therefore does not need to describe a general truth, although sometimes this is the case (in such instances, one might say that the apophthegm in fact contains a *gnome*).

¹⁵² I am very grateful to Professor Christopher Pelling and Professor Alexei Zadornyj for their suggestion to include this chapter in this book. Subchapters 3.2 and 3.3 are based on my paper "*Exempla* for the Emperors. A Comparison of the Prefaces to Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia* and Plutarch's *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*", presented at the 12th International Congress of the International Plutarch Society "Plutarch and his Contemporaries: Sharing the Roman Empire", Warszawa (online via Zoom), 2–5 September 2021.

¹⁵³ Searby (1998) 13–14; Stenger (2006).

¹⁵⁴ Beck, M. (2003) 171.

[2] In the case of a *chreia*, the description of the background of the saying is a necessary element: the situation or specific context in which a historical figure finds himself or herself and his or her response to this situation is the focus of the anecdote. Thus, the reader or audience can learn from the reaction and apply this practical lesson in similar situations in everyday life – and this is why a *chreia* is ‘useful’, of course.¹⁵⁵

Despite these definitions, it sometimes remains difficult to draw a clear line between an apophthegm and a *chreia*: in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, for example, there are many items that could be both. Yet without doubt, the two categories were not always clearly distinguished in antiquity either,¹⁵⁶ and Plutarch seems to have regarded his work as a collection of *both* apophthegms or *apomnemoneumata* and *chreiai*, as appears from the wordplay by which he introduces the work (172C):¹⁵⁷

καὶ τὴν **χρείαν** ἀπόδεξαι τῶν **ἀπομνημονευμάτων**

accept also the usefulness of my apophthegms

As a consequence, it might make sense that, in line with Searby, this chapter sometimes refers to ‘*chreia*’ “as equivalent to apophthegm, in the sense of a brief situational saying.”¹⁵⁸ In the remainder of this book, however, I will always use ‘apophthegm’, while acknowledging that not every element in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* might be a true apophthegm *stricto sensu*.

This brings me to another observation. Forty elements in Plutarch’s collection do not contain a saying (or contain a saying of another person than the subject of the section which the apophthegm belongs to) and might therefore not be ‘real’ apophthegms of the protagonists in question.¹⁵⁹ This number, which does not include less clear sayings where

¹⁵⁵ Paraphrased from Stenger (2006), who provides a detailed discussion of the difference between a *gnome*, apophthegm, and *chreia*, with a convenient overview on p. 219. See also Searby (1998) 13–16.

¹⁵⁶ As also appears from Stenger (2006) *passim*.

¹⁵⁷ Own translation.

¹⁵⁸ Searby (1998) 16.

¹⁵⁹ *Cyrus I* (172E); *Cotys I* (174D); *Gelon II* (175A); *Dionysius Maior VII* (175F), VIII (175F–176A), and X (176AB; although ὡς might introduce an implicit saying); *Philipus I* (177C) and XXX (179B); *Alexander XIV* (180D) and XXXIV (181F); *Antigonus Monophthalmus II* (182A); *Antiochus Tertius II* (183F); *Antiochus Hierax* (184A); *Antiochus Septimus II* (184EF); *Aristeides I* (186A; ὡς might seem to introduce a saying, but see *Arist.* 2.6), IV (186B), and V (186BC); *Alcibiades III* (186D); *Iphicrates I* (186F–187A); *Phocion I* (187E) and XV (188F); *Brasidas III* (190BC); *Epameinondas I* (192C); *Paulus*

the act of speaking is still implied,¹⁶⁰ is a little bit more than 8% of the entire collection.¹⁶¹ Yet seventeen of these cases occur at the outset and at the end of a section, where they – as appears from the analysis – fit well because of structural reasons: these elements thus introduce or conclude and even (re)assess the series of the actual apophthegms on a protagonist and reflect on his life as a whole.¹⁶² The other 23 cases, however, usually describing memorable *deeds* of the protagonists, seem to contradict the letter which announces a collection of *sayings*.¹⁶³ Yet this does not mean that Plutarch neglects the actual *function* of the text as described in his dedicatory letter (discussed in the analysis), viz. illustrating the characters of the subjects: the anecdotal value of most of these deeds serves the same goal as most sayings, so they deserve a place in the collection as well.¹⁶⁴ In this respect, an observation of Stenger is relevant:¹⁶⁵

Denkbar wäre, daß der Terminus zu Plutarchs Zeiten das bezeichnet hätte, was der deutsche Ausdruck ‘Denkwürdigkeiten’ meint, also sowohl Aussprüche als auch bezeichnende Handlungen berühmter Persönlichkeiten.

Aemilius VIII (198BC); *Cato Maior XXVII* (199D); *Scipio Minor I–IV* (199F–200A) and *XIV* (201A); *Marius I* (202AB); *Catulus Lutatius* (202DE); *Pompeius Ia* (203B) and *VII* (204A); *Cicero II* (204E) and *XXI* (205E); *Augustus VI* (207C) and *IX* (207D). One can add *Semiramis* (173AB), the closing apophthegm of *Darius* (172F–173A), and *Parysatis* (174A), concluding *Artaxerxes Mnemon* (173F–174A); *Scipio Maior VII* (196E) and *Scipio Minor XXI* (201E) are to be taken together with their preceding apophthegms, which contain a saying (cf. Appendix I).

¹⁶⁰ *Sulla* (202E); *Gelon I* (175A); *Fabius Maximus III* (195DE); *Themistocles III* (185A). More problematic are apophthegms that contain verbs of punishing or ordering a punishment: *Artaxerxes Longimanus III* (173D: τιμωρίαν ἔταξεν); *Hiero V* (175C: ἐζημίωσε); *Alexander XXVIII* (181D: ἐζημίωσε); and *Pompeius II* (203C: ἐκόλασε). *Artaxerxes Longimanus III* is perhaps still a rather clear saying, since the kind of punishment is described. In the other three cases, such a description cannot be found.

¹⁶¹ ‘Clear’ sayings (1) are introduced by a form of λέγω or φημί; (2) contain a command or a prohibition (often κελεῖω or προστάττω); (3) contain sayings in direct speech, cf. the present tenses in *Alexander XIII* (180CD) and *Cato Maior XXI* (199B). (4) In *Alexander IV* (179E) and *Themistocles VI* (185BC), the ‘saying’ is a piece of writing.

¹⁶² See Part II, chapter 2.2.

¹⁶³ Volkmann (1869) 222–223 adduces this as an argument against authenticity. Saß (1881) 4 disagrees.

¹⁶⁴ Clear examples are *Cotys I* (174D) and *Gelon II* (175A).

¹⁶⁵ Stenger (2006) 204.

In Plutarch's view, then, an apophthegm does not always need to contain a saying, but can describe a remarkable action as well: in other words, the characters sometimes let their actions speak for themselves.¹⁶⁶

3.1.2 Anecdote Collections

Compilations of sayings existed from the early days of Greek literature on. Plutarch was well aware of these traditions and even subtly refers to this literary background in the dedicatory letter to Trajan: as discussed, he alludes to Plato's *Protagoras* 343a–b, describing the aphorisms of the Seven Wise Men dedicated to Apollo in the oracle of Delphi (172C).¹⁶⁷ It is well known that collections of sayings of these ancient sages circulated in antiquity and that it became a 'genre' which was very popular.¹⁶⁸ Plutarch knew, read, and used these texts: much material in *Septem sapientium convivium* was probably taken from such compilations.¹⁶⁹ The Chaeronean, just like Plato, considered these sayings the earliest expressions of philosophy.¹⁷⁰ Thus, he must have regarded these collections as a **philosophical** type of text, and this is in line with the function of such compilations in Hellenistic times.¹⁷¹

Collections of *chreiai* – since they are often attributed to a historical figure and reveal something about his or her character – are also closely connected with **biography** and might even have had a strong impact on the origins of this genre.¹⁷² Skidmore argues that *compendia* of *chreiai* on the Cynics (since this philosophical movement rather focused on the way of living and behaviour of its philosophers) and later on philosophers of other schools evolved into a kind of text type situated between philosophy and biography, and that the distinction between these collections and biographical works was not always clear.¹⁷³ Whether or not

¹⁶⁶ Cf. *De gar.* 511BC, introducing an action of Heraclitus and Scilurus (told in the collection as *Scilurus* [174F]).

¹⁶⁷ See *supra*, p. 33; and *infra*, p. 78–79. See also Wehrli (1973) *passim* on collections of sayings of the Seven.

¹⁶⁸ See Leão (2008) 481–484 on the origins and popularity of the genre.

¹⁶⁹ E.g. the barbarian Anacharsis was well known for his sayings; see Kindstrand (1981) 6–16; and Armstrong (1948) on his different appearances throughout Greek literature. On Anacharsis in *Sept. sap. conv.*, see Mossman (1997) 123–124; Kindstrand (1981) 44–48; Ungefehr-Kortus (1996) 146–186; Leão (2009) 511; and esp. Leão (2019) 62–67.

¹⁷⁰ See *infra*, p. 78–79.

¹⁷¹ Searby (1998) 35.

¹⁷² Wehrli (1973).

¹⁷³ Skidmore (1996) 35–37 (also *ibid.* 37–38 on *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and Valerius Maximus specifically). Such collections on the Cynics and the Seven Wise Men influenced Diogenes Laertius, see Dorandi (2014) 71.

this means that the biographical genre is to be traced back in its entirety to such collections, apophthegms and *chreiai* were indeed obviously an important part of ancient Greek biography.¹⁷⁴ This is no less true for Plutarch's biographical works, as can be seen from many passages of the *Parallel Lives* that are exclusively built up from apophthegms in order to highlight a specific characteristic of the protagonist.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, as argued by Beck, apophthegms more than once laid the basis of a *Life*, to which Plutarch added other information during the writing process.¹⁷⁶ In the Chaeronean's view, then, apophthegm and *chreia* collections are inextricably linked to the content and composition of the biographical genre (as also appears from the dedicatory letter to Trajan, of course).

Yet collections of *chreiai* also had an important function in **rhetoric and rhetorical education**, at least in the early imperial period and probably earlier:¹⁷⁷ such collections were of course especially interesting for orators, who could consult them as a source for material for their compositions. They were no less relevant for students of rhetoric, who could use them as models, since the elaboration of *chreiai* or *apophthegmata* was one of the exercises taught in the *progymnasmata*. These can be defined as¹⁷⁸

a series of preliminary exercises in composition which were a prelude to the study of rhetoric, that is, to the dominant form of education available to the elites from the Hellenistic period to the end of antiquity and beyond.

These exercises consisted of various small or relatively small compositions: besides *χρεῖαι* and *ἀποφθέγματα*, they included the writing or re-writing of, for example, *γνώμαι* or maxims, *μῦθοι* or fables, *ἐγκώμια* or eulogies, and *ἐκφράσεις* or detailed descriptions, between which there was a certain hierarchy in terms of difficulty, as documented by various handbooks.¹⁷⁹ The Greek textbook written by Theon (perhaps first century) could be the earliest to survive, although the dating of this manual has been questioned.¹⁸⁰ Obviously, it was an important skill for an orator, historian, or any author to be able to adapt and elaborate material according

¹⁷⁴ Cf. the examples of Skidmore (1996) 36–37.

¹⁷⁵ Examples of such chapters are *Them.* 18, *Phoc.* 8–10, *Lyc.* 19, *Ca. Ma.* 8–9, and *Cic.* 26–27.

¹⁷⁶ Beck, M. (2002) 167–168.

¹⁷⁷ Searby (1998) 36.

¹⁷⁸ Webb (2001) 289.

¹⁷⁹ Paraphrased from Webb (2001) 293–298. On the teaching of history and the *progymnasmata*, see Gibson (2004) (also providing an overview of the exercises on 109–116).

¹⁸⁰ Heath (2003).

to specific contexts and goals, and the *progymnasmata* had a strong impact on nearly every page of nearly every work from the early imperial period and beyond.¹⁸¹ Plutarch's literary output is a clear example of this, as can be seen from, for instance, the large amount of apophthegms and *χρεῖαι* in the *Moralia*, and the interest in ἠθοποιῖα and σύγκρισις (other examples of such preliminary exercises) in the *Parallel Lives* (and other works).¹⁸²

Plutarch, one concludes, connected the 'genre' of collections of sayings – either aphorisms or more anecdotal elements (apophthegms or *chreiai*) – with philosophy (as early as the wisdom to be derived from the sayings of the Seven Sages) and with (the writing of) biographies (character description by means of anecdotal material). The link between both domains is an obvious one: if biographies, in Plutarch's view, had a moralizing function, this also goes for collections of sayings and anecdotes: philosophy and character description are thus combined.¹⁸³ Yet Plutarch also had experience with their central function in rhetorical contexts, and his own education in the *progymnasmata* no doubt helps to explain the prominent place of apophthegms in his literary output.

3.2 Plutarch and Valerius Maximus

Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia* were written during Tiberius' reign, some decades before *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*.¹⁸⁴ One might therefore wonder whether Plutarch had the Roman's collection in mind when composing his own. This is not *a priori* unlikely. Not only is there no doubt that the Chaeronean at least knew of the existence of the Latin work,¹⁸⁵ he also read and used it, certainly in the case of the Roman *Lives* and perhaps in some other works.¹⁸⁶ If Valerius Maximus, then, to some extent provides a background to the Greek collection, this raises two questions about the relationship between the texts: do the goals of the authors differ or not, and if they do, what does this tell us about the 'genre' of text and the intended audience of readers; and does the Greek writer attempt to imitate or emulate his Latin predecessor, or, alternatively, does he in fact criticize him? As will become clear, this partially depends on the answer to the first question.

¹⁸¹ Penella (2011) 88–89.

¹⁸² Cf. Penella (2011) 89. See also Beck, M. (2003) on Plutarch and the *progymnasmata*.

¹⁸³ Cf. Part III, chapter I.1.

¹⁸⁴ See Briscoe (2019) 2–4 for a detailed discussion of the dating of Valerius' work.

¹⁸⁵ As he explicitly refers to *Facta et dicta memorabilia* in *Marc.* 30.5 and *Brut.* 53.5.

¹⁸⁶ This has been convincingly argued by Freyburger – Jacquemin (1998). See Hilton – Matthews (2008) 336–342 for *Facta et dicta memorabilia* as a possible source for *Quaest. Rom.* 268BC. On the broader reception of Valerius Maximus in (later) antiquity, see Burgesdijk (2022).

A comparison of the introductions to the works and its implications for the structure of the compilations provide insights into both matters.¹⁸⁷ Of course, the prefaces are rhetorically highly elaborate, but their internal cohesion and agreement with the collections they announce show that they provide reliable information on the authors' goals, practices, and target audience. Inevitably, the following discussion slightly overlaps with Part II of this book, in particular with the literary analysis of Plutarch's dedicatory letter and the following overview of the general structure of the collection.

3.2.1 The Prefaces¹⁸⁸

As will be shown in greater detail in Part II, Plutarch's letter consists of a first part focusing on the dedication to the emperor, and a second, apologetic, part defending the *raison d'être* of the work. The same goes for the preface to *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, yet there are also differences:

(a) The discussion of the usefulness of the collection opens Valerius' introduction (*urbis Romae ... labor absit*), but concludes Plutarch's dedicatory letter (εἰ πρόσφορον ἔχει ... λαμβάνοντι, 172C–E).

(b) The relationship between author and emperor concludes Valerius' text (*nec mihi ... summam disseram*), but opens Plutarch's work (Ἀρτοξέβριξ ὁ Περσῶν ... ἀπόδεξαι τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων, 172BC).

a) The Apologetic Part

This analysis follows the order of Valerius Maximus. His preface is much shorter than the Greek and is far less complicated:¹⁸⁹ in Plutarch's introduction, one should always keep the broader framework of his argument in mind, as he dwells upon the differences between the *Parallel Lives* and *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* in order to defend the usefulness of the latter. This sometimes obscures, but never contradicts his actual practice in the collection ([b] and [c] in the table below, then, actually concern the *Parallel Lives*, but also shed light on Plutarch's collection). At first sight, both prefaces make almost exactly the same points. Yet there are also some striking differences (underlined):¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Skidmore (1996) *passim* discusses *Reg. et imp. apophth.* in his book on *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, but does not provide a systematical comparison of the prefaces.

¹⁸⁸ Translations of Valerius Maximus are my own.

¹⁸⁹ For a commentary of the preface to *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, see Wardle (1998) 66–74.

¹⁹⁰ The table only cites the most relevant elements, not necessarily in the order of the texts. In Plutarch, I do not follow the LCL translation in the case of ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων, see *supra*, p. 30–31. I also do not accept Wilamowitz's conjecture ἔχεις, see *infra*, note 248.

Valerius Maximus

Plutarch

[a] The authors compiled collections of anecdotes of men worthy of memory ...

<i>facta simul ac dicta memoratu digna</i> ("both the actions and sayings worthy of memory")	(1) τοὺς λόγους <u>αὐτοὺς καθ' αὐτούς</u> ... συνειλεγμένους ("the remarks, made into a separate collection quite by themselves") (2) ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων μνήμης γενομένων ("men who have proved themselves worthy of being remembered")
--	---

[b] ... of various peoples (Romans and non-Romans) ...

<i>urbis Romae exterarumque gentium</i> ("of the city of Rome and foreign peoples")	τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παρὰ τε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ παρ' Ἑλληνῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ <u>αὐτοκρατόρων</u> ("of the most noted rulers, lawgivers, and generals among the Romans and the Greeks")
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[c] ... which therefore contain material that can be found elsewhere too.

(1) <i>quae apud alios latius diffusa sunt</i> ("which are among others too widely spread") (2) <i>ab inlustribus electa auctoribus</i> ("after selecting them from distinguished writers")	καίτοι καὶ βίους ἔχει τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων κτλ. (see also [b]: about the <i>Parallel Lives</i>) ("True it is that a work of mine comprises the lives also of the most noted" etc.)
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[d] Yet both compilations will still be convenient because of their accessibility ...

<i>latius diffusa sunt quam ut breuiter cognosci possint</i> ("which are too widely spread to get acquainted with them shortly")	ὥσπερ δείγματα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα ("as samples and primal elements of the men's lives")
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[e] ... and time-saving character.

(1) <i>ut documenta sumere uolentibus longae inquisitionis labor absit</i> ("in order that those who want to use <i>exempla</i> are free from the toil of a long search") (2) See also [d]	οὐδὲν οἶμαί σοι τὸν καιρὸν εὐνολήσειν, ἐν βραχέσι πολλῶν ἀναθεώρησιν ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων μνήμης γενομένων λαμβάνοντι ([the sayings] "will not, I think, be any serious tax on your time, and you will get in brief compass an opportunity to pass in review many men who have proved themselves worthy of being remembered")
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These differences concern the authors' [1] material, [2] goals, and [3] target audience, naturally all closely related to each other:

[1] Valerius Maximus speaks of anecdotes he took from other authors. Although this "statement of modesty" is definitely indeed a *topos*,¹⁹¹ he somehow seems to tell the truth: scholars have identified various of his sources,¹⁹² and the similarities between these and Valerius' accounts often appeared so close that his practice has been described in terms of "plagiarism".¹⁹³ In the case of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* the author describes a different situation: the material of the collection occurs in other works *of his own*, as is suggested by the comparison with the *Parallel Lives*. Again, there is some truth in this, as has been discussed in chapters 1 and 2: in most cases Plutarch used the same notes for the anecdote collection as for the biographies (and, in fact, often also for the *Moralia*). Thus, he did not return to his sources, but based *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* upon material which he had previously collected.

[2] At first, [1] only seems a trivial difference in *modus operandi*. Yet it is also entirely in line with the specific goals as described by the prefaces: *Facta et dicta memorabilia* should become a convenient instrument for consulting anecdotes, recorded in various works of different authors. Plutarch, on the other hand, describes *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a kind of *abbreviation* of the *Parallel Lives* (of course, this should not be taken too literally, since this claim is related to the function of these two works and not to a one-to-one ratio of the material they include). He thus also considers their goals to be similar: getting insight into characters of great men of the past, in the case of the collection as quickly as possible.¹⁹⁴ This is why he only selected sayings, so he claims, regarding the utterances of historical subjects as an ideal tool to this end.¹⁹⁵ Thus, although in both works "accessibility" and "brevity" are important,¹⁹⁶ their goals (as presented by the prefaces) seem fundamentally different.

¹⁹¹ Burgesdijk (2022) 290 on *ut documenta [...] labor absit*.

¹⁹² On Valerius' sources, see Helm (1955) 104–114; Bloomer (1992) 59–146; and Wardle (1998) 15–18.

¹⁹³ Welch (2013) 68 explains this "plagiarism": "By quoting but not citing, Valerius obscures the presence of his forebears in a way that hints at plagiarism and even resonates with Seneca's contemporary discussion of literary and declamatory theft. This plagiarism, however, is part of Valerius' larger project of gathering and redacting material into a record of tradition. He wrests words from Cicero and Livy, to be sure, but they don't land in his own mouth. Rather, they land in a stream of utterances handed down from text to text to text, his text included, in a way that foregrounds text over author and story over text".

¹⁹⁴ Cf. the prologues to *Per.–Fab.* and *Aem.–Tim.*, discussed in Part III, chapter 1.

¹⁹⁵ See *supra*, p. 34 on a connection with the prologue to *Alex.–Caes.* in this regard.

¹⁹⁶ Skidmore (1996) 48: "All compilations by definition must aim at brevity and accessibility, but some forms are more successful in achieving these qualities". See also

[3] The *primary* target reader of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* is, according to the letter, none other than the Roman emperor: Plutarch not only addresses Trajan in order to dedicate the work to him, but also asks him to make use of it. The busy man is now able to get acquainted with Roman and Greek – and, in fact, also barbarian – “rulers, lawgivers, and generals” (172C: ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων).¹⁹⁷ people with whom he can identify. Valerius Maximus, on the other hand, collected “deeds and sayings of the city of Rome and foreign people” (*urbis Romae exterarumque gentium facta simul ac dicta*). This broader category is a direct consequence of his wider reading audience, consisting of anyone who faces difficulties finding relevant anecdotes in the large amount of available literature (cf. [2]). One readily thinks of students and rhetoricians.¹⁹⁸ *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, then, are not meant for the emperor himself.

These three differences are of course relevant for the interpretation of the dedications to Tiberius and Trajan.

b) The Dedication

Valerius Maximus invokes the emperor because “by his heavenly providence virtues [...] are most friendly encouraged, but vices most severely avenged” (*caelesti prouidentia uirtutes [...] benignissime fouentur, uitia seuerissime uindicantur*). He continues that, just as orators and poets usually call upon some deities at the outset of their works, he himself now addresses the divine Tiberius in order to ask for his favour.¹⁹⁹ The praising of the emperor and the description of his divinity occupy half of the preface. This contrasts sharply with Valerius’ depiction of his own personality, described by Wardle as “self-denigration”.²⁰⁰ he refers to himself as “my insignificance” (*mea paruitas*); and the invocation of

Wardle (1998) 67; Beck, M. (2002) 168 (on *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and *Facta et dicta memorabilia*).

¹⁹⁷ Own translation.

¹⁹⁸ See Bloomer (1992) 1. Skidmore (1996) holds another view and focuses on a moralizing function. More recent scholarship reconciles these positions, see *infra*, notes 215 and 216.

¹⁹⁹ *nam si prisca oratores ab Ioue Optimo Maximo bene orsi sunt, si excellentissimi uates a numine aliquo principia traxerunt, mea paruitas eo iustius ad fauorem tuum decucurrerit* (“for if ancient orators started well from Iuppiter Optimus Maximus, if the most excellent poets commenced from one or another divinity, my insignificant self all the more justly resorts to your favour”).

²⁰⁰ Wardle (1998) 70.

the ‘new god’²⁰¹ is preceded by a short digression stressing the writer’s humility and lack of talent (he does not hope to offer a complete overview, nor does he attempt to compete with his literary predecessors in any way).²⁰² The themes of the emperor cult and the author’s modesty, then, typical elements in a preface of the early Empire,²⁰³ are taken to extremes: the suggestion is that the text only exists thanks to Tiberius, and that all its deficiencies are the result of Valerius’ poor skills.²⁰⁴

As for Plutarch’s letter, the evident implications of the two opening apophthegms on Artaxerxes Mnemon and Lycurgus (172BC) remind one of the Latin preface: as will be discussed below, Plutarch twice compares himself to humble citizens, presents *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a simple gift, and the Lycurgus apophthegm alludes to Trajan’s divine status:²⁰⁵

	Recipient	A humble present	Giver
Situation	Σοι (μέγιστε αὐτόκρατορ Τραιανὲ Καῖσαρ)	Λιτὰ δῶρα καὶ ξένια καὶ κοινὰς ἀπαρχάς (i.e. <i>Reg. et imp. apophth.</i>)	Κάμοῦ (Plutarch)

²⁰¹ Wardle (1999) 524 points out that *cetera diuinitas opinione colligitur, tua praesenti fide paterno auitoque sideri par videtur, quorum eximio fulgore multum caerimoniis nostris inclutae claritatis accessit: reliquos enim deos accepimus, Caesares dedimus* (“though other deity is obtained by supposition, yours seems through belief in sight equal to your father’s and grandfather’s star, by whose excellent brightness much of celebrated splendor was added to our sacred rites, since we accepted the other gods, but we delivered the Caesars”) should be interpreted as follows: “the Romans took over all other gods (from whatever source), but added the Caesars to the heavenly council and to the religious calendar”; against Fowler (1988) 263–264, who suggests to read *videmus* instead of *dedimus*. See also Mueller (2002) 13 on the emperors as new gods.

²⁰² Wardle (1998) 67 notices an additional *topos* in this regard: “It was common in prefaces to complain of the difficulty of the task undertaken”.

²⁰³ See Janson (1964) 100–106 on these “attitudes in front of the emperor” as a typical element in prose prefaces of Latin literature in the early imperial period (104–106 briefly discuss Valerius Maximus).

²⁰⁴ This might even give the modern reader the impression of a parody, but there is no reason to doubt that Valerius Maximus was a genuine supporter of Tiberius, see Wardle (1997) 345: “It is best to see him as representative of a wide class of loyalists to the imperial house, which could easily be seen as a dynasty beginning with Caesar.” See also Mueller (2002) 11–20 for Valerius Maximus’ attitude towards Tiberius’ divinity.

²⁰⁵ Citro (2017b) 17: “In definitiva, nei *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* osserviamo un parallelismo tra il contadino/gli Spartani/l’autore stesso, tutti rappresentati nell’atto del donare un bene, di cui dispongono al momento, ad una figura di rango su-

First apoph.	Ἀρτοξέρξης ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεύς	Ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ὕδωρ	Ἀὐτουργὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ιδιώτης
Second apoph.	Τοὺς θεοὺς	Εὐτελεστάτας θυσίας	[the common Spartans]

Yet it will also become clear that these elements are deconstructed: (1) as Citro points out, Plutarch still highlights that his gift is in fact useful, unlike the water given to Artaxerxes (cf. 172C: καὶ τὴν χρεῖαν ἀπόδεξι τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων);²⁰⁶ (2) the reference to Plato's *Protagoras* 343ab alludes to the Chaeronean's Platonist background and connects him with the Seven Wise Men (esp. Lycurgus), again underscoring the philosophical value of the author and his work;²⁰⁷ and (3) ἀπαρχάς only implicitly refers to Trajan's 'divine status'.²⁰⁸ This shows that Plutarch's apparent modesty is, in fact, not devoid of an awareness of his position as a celebrated intellectual, and that the vague reference to the ruler cult is only to be regarded as a traditional element with which the author likes to play.²⁰⁹

Valerius' preface, then, is an extreme example of flattery addressed to the emperor; in Plutarch's text, however, both the author's inferiority and Trajan's divine status are intentionally kept to a minimum and even undermined. There are several possible explanations for this contrast:

[1] A *possible* difference in social status: Plutarch belonged to the local nobility, but Valerius might have been a man of low birth and little standing. It should, however, be noted that scholars disagree about the Roman's modest origins, as this hypothesis is in the first place based on his humility in the preface²¹⁰ (where its aim is to enhance Tiberius' greatness and to create a transition to the collection's first section on the worship of the gods).²¹¹

periore (Artaserse/ le divinità/ Traiano)" and 19: "Infatti Plutarco scrive che il dono che sta porgendo a Traiano è assimilabile all'omaggio dell'uomo povero ad Artaserse e alle offerte sacrificali dei Lacedemoni alle divinità".

²⁰⁶ Citro (2014) 72; (2017a) 57; (2017b) 19–22.

²⁰⁷ Beck, M. (2002) 165–166.

²⁰⁸ Beck, M. (2002) 165 and 167.

²⁰⁹ See also Part II, chapter 1.1 on these elements in the dedicatory letter.

²¹⁰ Skidmore (1996) 113–117 argues that Valerius Maximus was of patrician descent. Briscoe (2019) 1 disagrees: "no patrician, even if he had become one by adoption, would have talked of *mea paruitas* (1 praef. line 18), portrayed himself as a *cliens* of Sex. Pompeius (4.7. ext. 2), or talked of the *gens Valeria* as he does at 8.15.5."

²¹¹ At the end of the preface the transition to the first part of the collection is made explicit: *Et quoniam initium a cultu deorum petere in animo est, de condicione eius summatim disseram* ("and because I have in mind to start from the veneration of the gods, I

[2] Plutarch's scepticism towards ruler cults: an only implicit and passing reference to this *topos* of addressing an emperor does not need to compromise his philosophical ideas.²¹²

[3] The goals of the works: if *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* should enable Trajan to gain insight into the characters of heroes (cf. the apologetic part), this is not only for the sake of this insight alone. He should also do something with it and adjust his own behaviour (the letter, as will become clear in the literary analysis, also subtly and cautiously alludes to this). In other words: Trajan needs moral improvement. He is not perfect and definitely not a god. An undue focus on the emperor's divine status, then, would also have compromised the very goal of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. The same goes for the *topos* of modesty: if Plutarch (over)stressed the deficiencies of his text and minimized his value as an author, the reader(s) would question the collection's usefulness to his (esp. the emperor as envisaged reader) or their moral progress.

3.2.2 The Structure of the Collections

The *main* goals of the Latin and Greek works are precisely what their authors say they are: the former first of all has a rhetorical function, providing a convenient collection for other writers; the latter primarily serves ethical goals. This can also be seen from the structure of the collections. Paradoxically, precisely the arrangement of the Roman text according to moral themes (within which Romans and non-Romans are separated into two subsections)²¹³ coincides with its rhetorical aims. Bloomer writes:²¹⁴

This work was clearly meant for specific audiences and uses; a collection of anecdotes organized under general rubrics was of most service for students and practitioners of declamation, a form of oral performance that constituted both the final stage in Roman education and, for the professional performer and the Romans who thronged the recital halls, the preeminent public art form of the early Principate.

will treat the situation of this briefly"). According to Wardle (1998) 74, "it is clear that V. means the following paragraph only, the introduction to the examples, which sets out the formal divisions and procedures of Roman worship".

²¹² For Plutarch's attitude towards the imperial cult, see esp. Scott (1929). Bowersock (1973) criticizes and nuances some of Scott's observations. For more secondary literature on this topic, see Roskam (2009) 67.

²¹³ Lawrence (2022) provides an interesting discussion of virtues in sections on Romans as well as on *externi*.

²¹⁴ Bloomer (1992) I.

For example, when students of rhetoric or professional orators need an anecdote on pious behaviour, they should simply consult the relevant section. The structure of *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, then, clearly serves the goals as set out in the preface. Of course, this does not mean that Valerius was not well aware of the ethical value of his work, but I would – siding with Wardle – not say that ethical goals were the author’s *primary* concern, as argued by Skidmore:²¹⁵ the work is, without doubt, written for easy consultation in the first place, although one would definitely go too far by claiming that this is Valerius’ only goal, as the author ensures that his work is also interesting for “the through-reader”.²¹⁶

Plutarch’s work, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part II, has an entirely different structure, thus serving different goals. The various sections on kings and commanders are not ordered thematically, not even alphabetically, but according to their cultural origins. Additionally, different ethnicities do not always follow each other according to a clear rationale: the reader has no reason to expect the Macedonians (177A–184F) in between the Sicilians (175A–177A) and Athenians (184F–189D), nor does it make sense that the ancient Egyptian Pharaohs (174C) would follow the Persians (172E–174B), let alone that the Greek general Memnon (174B) closes this Persian section, if Plutarch regarded *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a kind of reference work for apophthegms on famous individuals. Within these larger sections, individuals admittedly follow each other more or less chronologically, but there are many exceptions to this ‘rule’.²¹⁷ Skidmore argues:²¹⁸

²¹⁵ Wardle (1998) 14, referring to Skidmore (1996): “I would argue that the serious moral purpose envisaged by Skidmore should be combined with a primary audience of those involved in declamation, the advanced stage of the élite Roman’s education, indeed perhaps the most practical aspect of his education. In urging upon this group the importance of morality, in providing material useful for declamation and in demonstrating through his prefaces and conclusions the way such *exempla* could be deployed V. is fulfilling a complex role”. Haegemans – Stoppie (2004) 167 agree with Wardle (p. 147 provides a convenient overview of relevant secondary literature).

²¹⁶ Morgan (2007) 264. Langlands (2008) 161 argues: “Recent scholarship on Roman rhetoric and declamation has shown that such exercises should not be thought of as encouraging sophistry and empty rhetoric, but rather as a means both of acculturation and of moral education: rhetoric and ethics were closely entwined in Roman culture”; see also Langlands (2011) 100–122, focusing on ethics.

²¹⁷ Also Stadter (2014) 675–676; and see Part II, chapter 2.2. I therefore disagree with Morgan (2007) 270, who argues that *Reg. et imp. apophth.* “could equally well be skimmed or read through.”

²¹⁸ Skidmore (1996) 37–38.

Plutarch's means of achieving accessibility [...] are perhaps less successful as a result of the origins of his material and of the genre in which he was writing, for not only is the genre in general related to the writing of *Lives*, but also in this specific case the composition of the *Apophthegmata* was a direct result of the writing of Plutarch's *Lives* (*Apophthegmata*, preface, 172E).

To some extent, Skidmore is correct (although the preparation of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* is not related to that of the *Parallel Lives* alone):²¹⁹ the genre of Plutarch's collection is connected with that of the biographies, given that both works, presenting similar material, should provide insight into character. Yet precisely in this respect, the Greek text might achieve accessibility in its own way: sections concern individuals, not themes, and surprising deviations from chronology or from a more logical sequence from an ethnic point of view serve the characterization of the individuals as well, as shall become clear throughout the literary analysis of Part II.

Thus, the structure of the Greek collection is inspired by more literary or at least more biographical (characterization) and philosophical (the assessment of characters) principles, and is, unlike the Latin work, not composed for the purposes of easy *consultation*. This does not necessarily mean that Plutarch ignored the rhetorical eloquence of his characters or the possibility of including the apophthegms in orations or in other texts, nor that an audience reading the collection for this reason alone is not welcomed by the work (for most sayings are witty responses that might inspire and can be used by rhetoricians in their orations),²²⁰ but this was simply not the main reason why the author compiled the work.

3.3 Conclusion

In the case of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, one can only *formally* speak of similar text types, since in terms of their main goals and target audience the texts are different. Valerius Maximus, on the one hand, claims to collect material for anyone who wants to find interesting material on specific topics, which is in line with the sometimes almost verbatim quotations of earlier authors and with the structure of the collection, designed for easy consultation. The dedication to the emperor stands alone and should, together with the excessive humility of the author, be regarded as a *topos* (although this

²¹⁹ See chapter 2.2; and Appendix II.

²²⁰ Cf. Beck, M. (2002) 169: "An emperor like Trajan, who had not received the benefits of rhetorical training, would nevertheless appreciate the utility of forceful speech combined with authoritative examples."

does not mean that Valerius is not serious about his humble position in comparison with the emperor). *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, then, are in the first place to be regarded as a manifestation of the rhetorical education and practice in the author's days, although this aspect is, of course, not detached from moral education and the ethical value of *exempla*.

Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata, on the other hand, are presented as an abbreviation of the *Parallel Lives*, and this is largely in line with the overlap in material in both *corpora*. Similar to the biographies, so Plutarch writes, the collection should provide insight into characters, as is supported by the structure of the work focusing on individuals and their characterization. As such, the work is closer to the early Hellenistic compilations of *chreiai* that were meant to shed light on the characters of, in the first place, philosophers, which clearly influenced Plutarch's views on the function of the text type. This goal is somewhat detached from the role of works such as *Facta et dicta memorabilia* in the context of the rhetoric(al education) of the early Empire²²¹ – even though during his own education in the *progymnasmata* Plutarch of course collected much of his (Greek) material.²²² The envisaged reader of his collection is Trajan: as a Platonic philosopher Plutarch genuinely believes that his work might be useful to the emperor, who – as is implied – could improve his rule by reading about earlier rulers, lawgivers, and generals. Of course, other Romans and Greeks are invited to read the text as well. In light of the dedicatory letter, they might have wondered how Trajan or any other sole ruler would (or should) have responded to the text, and what this says about the image of the perfect monarch as conceived by Plutarch; perhaps they would have read the work for advice in their own everyday life, or just for their amusement; only rarely, I believe, would they have read the work for rhetorical purposes. Yet the dedicatory letter consistently presents *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a true 'mirror of princes', and this is why it merits such a reading in the first place.²²³

²²¹ Cf. Skidmore (1996) 38 on the structure of *Reg. et imp. apophth.*: "Plutarch probably reflects Hellenistic practice in arranging his examples by person rather than by theme as Valerius does".

²²² See *supra*, p. 45 on Beck, M. (2003).

²²³ Beck, M. (2002) 170: "It [the dedicatory letter to Trajan] documents a Greek philosopher displaying some interest in a Roman emperor's edification"; Roskam (2009) 84–85: "It has proven fairly difficult to find clear and explicit traces of Plutarch's eagerness to get in touch with the emperor or even to influence him through his writings. Especially important in this respect is the dedicatory letter to *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*". On Plutarch's ideal of philosophers educating rulers, see Roskam (2002) 175–189.

Finally, the similarities between the Latin and Greek prefaces might seem only a consequence of convention. Yet both the fact that they are so numerous and that Plutarch knew, read, and used Valerius' text suggests that his Roman predecessor may have instigated or at least inspired him to write his own collection. If this is true, the striking differences in focus on the emperor's divine status and the author's modesty are all the more relevant: the Chaeronean would definitely have frowned upon the excessive flattery directed at Tiberius, as it would have reminded him of the lack of free speech that characterized Domitian's reign. Thus, by alluding to these two *topoi* and by at the same time subtly undermining them, Plutarch also seems to adjust Valerius' claims and shows what should be the correct attitude towards the ruler: an emperor is no god, needs improvement, and can learn from listening to his subjects, for especially a philosopher like Plutarch can serve as his teacher. As such, then, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* at the same time show that something had changed from Trajan's rule on, for fear no longer dominated the Empire. This enabled Plutarch to do what he, as a Platonist writer, must have always desired: to be a monarch's educator for the sake of the commonwealth, in the footsteps of his own great teacher and role model Plato.

PART II

A LITERARY ANALYSIS

Introduction

The approach of this full literary analysis of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* will be different from that of previous research. Often scholars have addressed only a selection of apophthegms, mainly focusing on parallel passages in Plutarch or other authors, in order to point out differences between various accounts.²²⁴ Thus, although such research can lead to important insights, little attention has been paid to the meaning of the apophthegms in the collection as an independent work. Perhaps the reason for this is that one might get the impression that an interpretation of the stories as they appear in the text can reveal nothing more than what a straightforward reading suggests – for the apophthegms are told in their most basic form, without authorial comments, and apparently detached from every context.

Precisely this final point is somewhat problematic. Every apophthegm is surrounded by other stories and in this way receives a specific meaning *in the context of the collection*, and this meaning can diverge greatly from what a separate reading of the apophthegm suggests. When story A relates how a general risks his life and dies in battle after claiming to protect his city, a reader might admire his bravery; when story B describes how a city is conquered because its general is dead (without specifying how he died), a reader might believe that this commander was the only talented man of his people; when taking A and B together, however, the general – if the stories indeed concern the same man – might appear to be a reckless person who caused a disaster to his country by putting his life on the line, because of which both his bravery and his military talent should be questioned. This (only partially hypothetical)²²⁵ example describes how Plutarch wants his audience to approach the collection: by structuring the work in specific ways, or by drawing verbatim and thematic connections between (series of) apophthegms and (series of) sections, he steers the readers towards certain conclusions about characters, groups of people, or events, encouraging them to actively engage with the information presented.

Of course, this does not mean that Plutarch was independent of his sources and notes: he could almost exclusively use what they offered him. As a consequence, when he had more material on a specific ruler or general, he often included more about this man (compare for example

²²⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 21–22.

²²⁵ Inspired by the analysis of the Theban sections (192C–194E).

the length of *Lycurgus*, 189D–F, with *Agesilaus*, 190F–191D);²²⁶ when his notes contain various apophthegms illustrating Philip's mildness, it is not surprising that this is one of the main characteristics described by *Philippus* (177C–179C). Yet Plutarch still made a specific selection from his sources (for he never includes everything – quite the contrary), he ordered the stories in a particular way, often deviating from his notes (as appears from a comparison of the Spartan section with *Apophthegmata Laconica*), and he adapted this material in order to establish specific connections. Thus, even though he could not make an unlimited set of points concerning any individual, he clearly crafted his apophthegms and the entire collection in order to create a certain image of the historical figures, often in connection with each other, hereby highlighting important aspects of good rulership, generalship, and lawgiving.

The following literary analysis will therefore not focus on the material itself in the first place, but on the way in which it is presented. The emphasis will be on the internal cohesion and structure (at any level) of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a whole, by means of close reading: this is, I believe, the best method to interpret the text in a way that does justice to the work as a piece of literature on its own. The main question is how a critical reading that takes Plutarch's (sometimes rather subtle) guidance into account leads to a specific picture of a protagonist or groups of protagonists. Other passages in Plutarch, then, are of minor importance (and are often only briefly addressed in the footnotes), unless deviations from or agreements with these accounts shed *additional* light on the apophthegm collection.

The literary analysis consists of three parts:

[1] A discussion of the dedicatory letter to Trajan (172B–E) as a programmatic proem that in several respects calls the prologues to some *Parallel Lives* to mind. This is in line with the fact that Plutarch presents the collection as being closely connected to the biographies (chapter 1).

[2] An overview of the compositional units and general structure of the collection in light of information from the dedicatory letter (chapter 2). This will be a prerequisite for [3], but at the same time distinguishes the different levels of interpretation that will form the basis of Part III.

[3] An analysis of the apophthegm collection in three parts of almost equal length: (a) the monarchical sections (172E–184F; chapter 3), (b) the Greeks of the core mainland (184F–194E; chapter 4), and (c) the Romans (194E–208A; chapter 5).

²²⁶ See *infra*, p. 190.

Inevitably, some apophthegms and sections will receive more attention than others: not every saying or anecdote is of equal significance for the representation of a character, and Plutarch seems to have included some stories just because of their wittiness and proverbial nature, or because of other motivations. Yet I aimed for completeness, and the following analysis intends to give due place to every element of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*.

I

The Dedicatory Letter (I72B–E)

In the dedicatory letter to Trajan, Plutarch presents *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a shorter alternative to the *Parallel Lives*. The text also resembles the prologues to some of the biographical pairs in terms of its wording, functions, and structure. The similar wording will be discussed in detail in the analysis. As to the functions of the prologues, Duff writes:²²⁷

First and foremost they introduce and name the subjects of both Lives of a pair [...]. Most also give some brief rationale for why the Lives of the two subjects have been brought together in a single book [...]. Second, prologues set the reader's generic expectations. Some comment explicitly on the genre or purpose of the Lives [...]. Prologues may also contain discussion of the nature of virtue and how to attain it; this is related to genre, in that the purpose of the Lives is sometimes said to be the revelation of the character of their subjects or the moral improvement of the reader. Third, prologues establish Plutarch's own persona and construct his readers as people who share his values. Finally, prologues draw the reader's attention, and arouse interest.

In the dedicatory letter, Plutarch regards the subjects of the collection as similar to those of the *Lives*. He also explains why he compiles apophthegms, reflecting on their purpose described both in terms of the revelation of character and of moral improvement, although this second element is only alluded to (see 1.2), and he connects his own practice with what he expects from the reader (see 1.1).

Duff also provides an overview of the structure of the prologues. They usually consist of two parts. The first part “contains generalized reflections” which gradually “become more specific”. Plutarch often cites some apophthegms, and the dedicatee, Sosius Senecio, is sometimes mentioned at the outset.²²⁸ In the second part,²²⁹

²²⁷ Duff (2014) 334. See also Stadter (1988) on elements and themes in the prologues (esp. 283–293).

²²⁸ Quoted and paraphrased from Duff (2014) 334.

²²⁹ Duff (2014) 334. See also Duff (2011b) 218–222 on the structure and different elements of the prologues.

Plutarch frequently refers subjectively to the writing process and occasionally here (and only here) uses the term “book” [...] The presence of the narrator is generally felt more strongly in the second section, though there is a tendency to move towards more impersonal expressions as we approach the end.

Along the same lines, this chapter divides the dedicatory letter into two parts (cf. also Part I, chapter 3).²³⁰ The first reads as a traditional dedication to the emperor. By means of two apophthegms, it reflects on the theme of giving and taking when there is a social distance between giver and recipient. Trajan is addressed in the opening words, but these general reflections are only specified at the end of the section, where Plutarch again refers to his dedicatee (I.1). The second part can be defined as the apologetic section, a conventional topic in introductions to an ancient work and recurrent in the prologues too.²³¹ It dwells upon the usefulness of the apophthegm collection, comparing the work with the *Parallel Lives* and defending its *raison d'être*. Thus, Plutarch's presence is more pronounced than in the first part, but more general statements follow again towards the end. The author concludes the letter with a final reference to Trajan: this return to the author–reader relationship at the end is not unusual in the prologues either (I.2).²³²

A close reading, however, shows that there is more. Plutarch subtly plays with these traditional elements in order to illustrate the eventual purpose of the apophthegm collection, which appears to be somewhat different from how he actually presents it. In line with this, a thought-provoking clash between the two parts of the text comes to light (I.3).²³³

I.1 The Dedication (172BC)

Ἀρτοξέρξης ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεύς, ὃ μέγιστε αὐτόκρατορ Τραϊανὲ Καῖσαρ, οὐχ ἦττον οἰόμενος βασιλικὸν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον εἶναι τοῦ μεγάλα διδόναι τὸ μικρὰ λαμβάνειν εὐμενῶς καὶ **προθύμως,** ἐπεὶ παρελαύνοντος αὐτοῦ καθ' ὁδὸν αὐτουργὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ιδιώτης οὐδὲν ἔχων ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ταῖς χερσὶν ἀμφοτέραις ὕδωρ

²³⁰ Verbal similarities that keep the first part together are highlighted at the outset of chapter I.1 below. The second part is dominated by a distinction between actions, influenced by τύχη, and words.

²³¹ See Part III, chapter 1.2–4 *passim*.

²³² Again noticed by Duff (2011b) 223.

²³³ The following pages are in various respects indebted to Beck, M. (2002) on the letter's authenticity; and to Citro (2017b), providing up to the present day the only systematic commentary on the text. Citro (2017a) also deals with the dedicatory letter, but focuses on the values commended to a ruler and military leader.

ὕπολαβὼν προσήνεγκεν, ἠδέως **ἐδέξατο** καὶ ἐμειδίασε, τῇ **προθυμίᾳ** τοῦ διδόντος οὐ τῇ **χρεῖα** τοῦ διδομένου τὴν χάριν μετρήσας. ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος **εὐτελεστάτας** ἐποίησεν ἐν Σπάρτῃ τὰς **θυσίας**, ἵνα ἀεὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν ἐτοίμως δύνωνται καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων. **τοιαύτη δὴ τινὶ γνώμῃ** κάμοῦ **λιτὰ** σοὶ δῶρα καὶ ξένια καὶ κοινὰς **ἀπαρχὰς** προσφέροντος ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἅμα τῇ **προθυμίᾳ** καὶ τὴν **χρεῖαν ἀπόδεξαι** τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων ...

Artaxerxes, the king of the Persians, O Trajan, Emperor Most High and Monarch Supreme, used to think that, as compared with giving large gifts, it was no less the mark of a king and a lover of his fellow-men to accept small gifts graciously and with a ready goodwill; and so, on a time when he was riding by, and a simple labourer, possessed of nothing else, took up water from the river in his two hands and offered it to the king, he accepted it pleasantly and with a cheerful smile, measuring the favour by the ready goodwill of the giver and not by the service rendered by the gift. Lycurgus made the sacrifices in Sparta very inexpensive, so that people might be able always to honour the gods readily and easily from what they had at hand. And so, with some such thought in mind, I likewise offer to you trifling gifts and tokens of friendship, the common offerings of the first-fruits that come from philosophy, and I beg that you will be good enough to accept, in conjunction with the author's ready goodwill, the utility which may be found in these brief notes ...

Plutarch opens his letter with two apophthegms on famous rulers of the past. As Beck writes, this is not only a typical feature of his style, but it evidently also provides a fitting introduction to the collection.²³⁴ At first sight, the stories refer to the situation of Plutarch, that is, giving a present to someone in a higher position, as described in the table on p. 62–63. This straightforward application of the apophthegms is in line with the ancient reader's expectations in a proem and more specifically in a dedication to the emperor: it reflects the author's modesty, for Plutarch compares himself with common men, and it refers to the imperial cult (τοὺς θεοὺς – σοὶ and θυσίας – ἀπαρχάς). As discussed, it is not surprising that this second element is only alluded to, since Plutarch does not approve of religious belief in a ruler's divine status.²³⁵

Yet once the author specifies the relevance of the stories (from *τοιαύτη* on), a series of verbatim repetitions (indicated in bold and underlined) highlights that there is more than this evident application. Artaxerxes seems to be connected with Trajan's situation, as can already be seen

²³⁴ Beck, M. (2002) 165. Cf. also Stadter (1988) 290; Duff (2014) 334.

²³⁵ See *supra*, note 212.

from the juxtaposition of their names, while Lycurgus in the first place seems to be related to Plutarch's:

[1] The author asks the emperor to accept (ἀπόδεξαι) the usefulness (χρείαν) of the present together with his willingness (προθυμία). This is, at first sight, similar to the Persian king, who accepted (ἐδέξατο) water while taking the giver's willingness (προθυμία) into account, instead of the usefulness (χρεία) of the gift. Yet the similar wording also emphasizes a crucial difference:²³⁶ as Citro writes, Plutarch's gift has χρείαν, for the collection will be useful for the emperor, while in the case of Artaxerxes only the προθυμία of the giver matters (οὐ τῇ χρεῖα vs. καὶ τὴν χρείαν).²³⁷ This hints at a higher philosophical purpose of the text.

[2] In the same way as Lycurgus with regard to the gods (cf. τοιαύτη δὴ τι γνῶμη), Plutarch thinks that one should always be able to endow the ruler with a gift. His specific present consists of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* (ἀπομνημονευμάτων),²³⁸ described as inexpensive and thereby recalling the cheap offerings in Sparta. An additional similarity is provided by the comparison with the sacrifice of firstlings (ἀπαρχάς – cf. θυσίας). At first sight, the metaphor functions on the level of the evident application of the Lycurgus story: as such it is part of the allusion to the imperial cult,²³⁹ and the idea of offering a part of a larger whole is a well-chosen illustration of Plutarch sending a part of his stock of notes to the emperor.²⁴⁰ Yet at closer inspection, there is more to it. As scholars noticed, it recalls Plato's *Protagoras* 343a–b.²⁴¹ The passage concerns the Seven Wise Men:²⁴²

οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας, καὶ καταμάθοι ἂν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιολογηθέντα ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ συνελθόντες ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ

²³⁶ Note also προθύμως earlier in Artaxerxes' apophthegm (172B). See also Beck, M. (2002) 165 and Citro (2017a) on the verbal repetitions.

²³⁷ Citro (2014) 72; (2017a) 57; (2017b) 19–22. See also *supra*, p. 63.

²³⁸ See LSJ, s.v. "ἀπομνημόνευμα": "memorial", "record", or "memoirs" (only in plural). This is similar to the meaning of ἀπόφθεγμα, see Beck, M. (2003) 171; and *supra*, p. 52.

²³⁹ Cf. Beck, M. (2002) 165 and 167.

²⁴⁰ See Jim (2011) 46–48 on this meaning of ἀπαρχή; and Citro (2017b) 17 on the use of ἀπαρχή in the letter specifically. Beck, M. (2010) 359 argues that the Lycurgus apophthegm implies "that Plutarch has a collection of *apophthegmata* at hand from which he has made the one he offers to Trajan."

²⁴¹ Beck, M. (2002) 166; (2005) 54; and (2010) 359–360.

²⁴² As Beck, M. (2002) 166 points out, *De gar.* 510E–511A refers to the same passage. On *De E* 384EF, see *supra*, p. 33–34. See also Citro (2017a) 55–57 and (2017b) 19–21 on these passages.

Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα ἃ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, Γνωθὶ σαυτὸν καὶ Μηδὲν ἄγαν. τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ Χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

All these were enthusiasts, lovers and disciples of the Spartan culture; and you can recognize that character in their wisdom by the short, memorable sayings that fell from each of them: they assembled together and dedicated these as the first-fruits of their lore to Apollo in his Delphic temple, inscribing there those maxims which are on every tongue – “Know thyself” and “Nothing overmuch.” To what intent do I say this? To show how the ancient philosophy had this style of laconic brevity; and so it was that the saying of Pittacus was privately handed about with high approbation among the sages – that it is hard to be good.

The similarities with the dedicatory letter are remarkable: Plato compares sayings with ἀπαρχαί; he claims that they come from philosophy (cf. ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας, 172C); and κοινῇ recalls κοινάς (172C), which refers in the specific context of the collection to the many kings and commanders of whom sayings are brought together.²⁴³ The comparison with first-fruits in the letter, then, is rooted in the Chaeronean’s background as a Platonist. In addition, as Beck writes, his function as priest of Delphi is called to mind, and it even invites comparing him with the Seven Wise Men, further emphasizing his connection with Lycurgus.²⁴⁴ All this contributes to Plutarch’s self-presentation as a philosopher, which once more alludes to a possibly higher moral goal of the work.

One expects the latter to consist in the moral progress of Trajan or any other reader. This is obviously the implication of the Artaxerxes apophthegm: as the verbatim agreements suggest, the emperor should model his behaviour after the Persian king. In this way, it shows what the entire apophthegm collection should do, viz. provide moral lessons for a ruler that can lead to imitation. Yet in light of this, the application of the Lycurgus apophthegm is surprising. One would expect this man to serve as a role model for Trajan as well, for he is concerned with his subjects

²⁴³ See also Beck, M. (2002) 166: “Certainly the adjective, κοινάς, in the letter refers to this joint offering made by the seven wise men.”

²⁴⁴ Beck, M. (2002) 166: “The allusion to Delphi here also serves to call to mind Plutarch’s role as priest there”; and 165: “The author of the letter, meanwhile, parallels himself with Lycurgus, one of the seven wise men, a prudent and pious Spartan sage, who oversaw the resurrection of Sparta’s fortunes”.

and ensures that they can fulfil their duty.²⁴⁵ If the emperor wants to be a good monarch, he should share this mindset. In addition, Lycurgus will also appear on the stage in the collection: his section (189D–F) contains similar apophthegms from which the same lessons can be drawn.²⁴⁶

In the letter, however, Plutarch only shows how *he himself* is instructed by this Lycurgus: he seems to copy the Spartan by explicitly adopting his attitude. The imitation Plutarch-Lycurgus thus encircles another imitation which is only implicitly (through the similar wording) desired to take place:

Implicitly desired imitation	Explicit imitation		Implicitly desired imitation
Artaxerxes accepted small gifts	Lycurgus' mindset	Plutarch shares Lycurgus' mindset	Plutarch asks Trajan to accept his small gift

Plutarch shows how he is imitating a ruler of the past. Trajan is expected to do the same. This recalls some prologues to the *Parallel Lives*, where the author presents himself as the paradigmatic reader of his own work.²⁴⁷ Yet there is also a difference in this regard. In the prologues, Plutarch does not refrain from stating that one should read the biographies for moral improvement. The implicitness in the letter to Trajan, however, is striking: the author will never claim that the emperor needs ethical improvement and that the apophthegm collection can contribute to this, although a more careful reading suggests that this is the case. To some extent, this implication undercuts the dedicatory aspect of the letter suggested by the straightforward application of the opening apophthegms. The text is not sent to the emperor just because he is the emperor (and a deity), as is the case with Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia* (cf. Part I, chapter 3). On the contrary: Plutarch offers Trajan this present because he should actually *do* something with it.

Finally, the dedication *topos* also explains *why* the goal of moral progress is not made explicit. Plutarch is adopting the cautious attitude expected from a subject addressing the most powerful man of the world. This caution also dominates the next part of the letter.

²⁴⁵ Lycurgus' apophthegm, then, has a triple function: (1) the 'straightforward application' (described in the table *supra*, p. 62–63): Plutarch compares himself with the common Spartans, emphasizing his modesty, and Trajan is compared with the gods (see also Beck, M. (2002) 165 and Citro (2017b) 17); (2) it illustrates that Plutarch and Lycurgus share the same mindset; and (3) Lycurgus might serve as a role model for the emperor.

²⁴⁶ This will be further explored in the analysis of *Lycurgus* (189D–F).

²⁴⁷ See Part III, chapter 1.4.1–2 on *Per.* 1–2 and *Aem.* 1.

1.2 The Apologetic Part (I72C–E)

At the outset of the second part, Plutarch announces two issues that will be addressed in the remainder of the letter (I72C):²⁴⁸

... εἰ πρόσφορον ἔχει τι πρὸς κατανόησιν ἠθῶν καὶ προαιρέσεων ἡγεμονικῶν, ἐμφαινομένων τοῖς λόγοις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτῶν. καίτοι καὶ βίους ἔχει τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παρὰ τε Ῥωμαίους καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήσιν ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων ...

... if so be that they contain something meet for the true understanding of the characters and predilections of men in high places, which are better reflected in their words than in their actions. True it is that a work of mine comprises the lives also of the most noted rulers, law-givers, and generals among the Romans and the Greeks; ...

Both issues concern the usefulness and *raison d'être* of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. In this way, there is also a connection with the preceding part that dwelt upon the utility (χρεία) of a present:

[1] A first issue is introduced by the conditional clause. The question is whether sayings truly provide a better insight into the characters of historical figures than their actions. Plutarch will have to prove the truth of this: only when this is the case can the collection be a most convenient tool for the emperor (and others).

[2] A second question is announced by καίτοι, highlighting an objection:²⁴⁹ clearly, readers need to wonder why they would be in need of the collection, if they can, after all, also read the *Parallel Lives*. This suggests that the goal of the biographies consists of what is described in [1] as well, viz. enabling the reader to gain insight into the characters of different heroes. In this way, Plutarch establishes a connection between *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and the biographical project. The evident implication is that the former will be a compilation of Roman and Greek “rulers, lawgivers, and generals” too. Only from this point on is it clear what type of material the collection will contain.

²⁴⁸ I do not follow the LCL translation of αὐτοκρατόρων, see *supra*, p. 30–31. Nachstädt (1971) 2 has ἔχει<ς>, a conjecture of Wilamowitz, but this emendation is not necessary. Babbitt (1931) and Bernardakis (1889), and consequently Ingenkamp – Bernardakis (2008) 1, all follow the manuscripts. See also Citro (2014) 52–53 and (2017b) 6.

²⁴⁹ LSJ, s.v. “καίτοι”.

The two issues are addressed by the following three phrases, which share a similar contrast between words (in bold) and deeds (underlined) (172C–E):

... ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πράξεων αἱ πολλαὶ τύχην ἀναμειγμένην ἔχουσιν, αἱ δὲ γινόμεναι παρὰ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς τύχας ἀποφάσεις καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις ὡσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις καθαρῶς παρέχουσι τὴν ἐκάστου διάνοιαν ἀποθεωρεῖν. ἦ καὶ Σεϊράμνης ὁ Πέρσης πρὸς τοὺς θαυμάζοντας, ὅτι τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ νοῦν ἐχόντων αἱ πράξεις οὐ κατορθοῦνται, τῶν μὲν λόγων ἔφη κύριος αὐτὸς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ πράξεων τὴν τύχην μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἅμα αἱ ἀποφάσεις τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς πράξεις παρακειμένας ἔχουσαι σχολάζουσιν φιληκοῖαν περιμένουσιν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ [καὶ] τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ καθ' αὐτοῦ ὡσπερ δείγματα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα συνειλεγμένους οὐδὲν οἴομαί σοι τὸν καιρὸν ἐνοχλήσειν, ἐν βραχέσι πολλῶν ἀναθεώρησιν ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων μνήμης γενομένων λαμβάνοντι.

... but their actions, for the most part, have an admixture of chance, whereas their pronouncements and unpremeditated utterance in connexion with what they did or experienced or chanced upon afford an opportunity to observe, as in so many mirrors, the workings of the mind of each man. In keeping herewith is the remark of Seiramnes the Persian who, in answer to those who expressed surprise because, while his words showed sense, his actions were never crowned with success, said that he himself was master of his words, but chance, together with the King, was master of his actions. In the Lives the pronouncements of the men have the story of the men's actions adjoined in the same pages, and so must wait for the time when one has the desire to read in a leisurely way; but here the remarks, made into a separate collection quite by themselves, serving, so to speak, as samples and primal elements of the men's lives, will not, I think, be any serious tax on your time, and you will get in brief compass an opportunity to pass in review many men who have proved themselves worthy of being remembered.

The first phrase (ἀλλὰ ... ἀποθεωρεῖν, 172CD) deals with issue [1], and the connection with [2] is not immediately clear. Plutarch only claims in general terms that actions also involve an element of chance, and that this is different with sayings. This explains why words are a more effective tool to reflect upon character and intentions. This conviction is supported by the second phrase (ἦ ... βασιλέως, 172D), which contains a third and final apophthegm of the letter. It not only shows why words display character so clearly, but also provides an example of such a saying illustrating the speaker's personality.²⁵⁰

²⁵⁰ See also Citro (2017b) 26–29 on this apophthegm.

This apophthegm, however, has raised some questions, as discussed above. Nothing is known about Seiramnes, although he probably was a general, as the story seems to suggest.²⁵¹ Scholars have noticed that Diodorus Siculus tells a similar story about the Persian satrap Pharnabazus²⁵² in his treatment of the second Persian campaign against Egypt, which started in 373 BC.²⁵³ During the expedition, Artaxerxes Mnemon hired the Greek Iphicrates to come to the aid of the Persian army (*Bibliotheca historica* XV.41):

ἔτη δὲ πλείω τοῦ Φαρναβάζου κατανηλωκότος περὶ τὰς παρασκευάς, ὁ μὲν Ἰφικράτης ὀρῶν αὐτὸν ἐν μὲν τῷ λέγειν ὄντα δεινόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς **πραττομένοις** νοχελῆ, παρρησίᾳ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐχρήσατο, φήσας **θαυμάζειν** πῶς ἐν μὲν **τοῖς λόγοις** ἐστὶν ὀξύς, ἐν δὲ τοῖς **ἔργοις** βραδύς. ὁ δὲ Φαρναβάζος ἀπεκρίθη, διότι **τῶν μὲν λόγων αὐτὸς κύριός** ἐστι, τῶν δ' **ἔργων ὁ βασιλεύς**.

After Pharnabazus had wasted several years making his preparations, Iphicrates, perceiving that though in talk he was clever, he was sluggish in action, frankly told him that he marvelled that anyone so quick in speech could be so dilatory in action. Pharnabazus replied that it was because he was master of his words but the King was master of his actions.

Comparing this with the Seiramnes story, one notices the same emphasis on the opposition between words and deeds,²⁵⁴ and some additional agreements in wording.²⁵⁵ Diodorus' and Plutarch's account, then, probably share a common source.²⁵⁶ The implication is that the king whom the

²⁵¹ In the prefatory letter to his collection of apophthegms (most of which were derived from *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and *Apophth. Lac.*, besides the *Vitae philosophorum* of Diogenes Laertius, see Juhász-Ormsby (2017) 46), Erasmus (1539) 4 also assumes that Seiramnes was a general: “Siramnes Persa, Dux ut upinor”.

²⁵² Wyttenbach (1810) 1042; Volkman (1869) 217; Beck, M. (2002) 172; Citro (2017b) 27. Cf. *supra*, p. 31.

²⁵³ See Ruzicka (2012) 99–121 for a detailed historical account of this campaign.

²⁵⁴ The wording, however, is not entirely the same: Plutarch uses *πράξεις*; Diodorus speaks of *ἔργα* (both use *λόγοι* to refer to words). Instead of *λέγω* and *πράττω*, the letter contains the two nouns again.

²⁵⁵ Both texts contain a form of *θαυμάζω*, share *κύριος* in combination with *αὐτός*, and end with a reference to the *βασιλεύς*, a Persian king. See Citro (2017b) 27–29 for a more elaborate comparison.

²⁵⁶ As appears from *Art.* 24.1, Plutarch knew about the Persian campaign described by Diodorus and the disagreements between Pharnabazus and Iphicrates. According to Binder (2008) 77, the source of *Art.* 24 could have been Deinon.

dedicatory letter refers to could be Artaxerxes Mnemon, the same as the one in the opening story. This will appear important below (1.3).

The third phrase (ἐκεῖ ... λαμβάνοντι, 172DE) finally provides an answer to [2] and makes all previous claims relevant for *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and Trajan.²⁵⁷ It should be read in connection with the answer to [1], as the parallel structure and similar wording suggest:

- I 1) ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πράξεων αἱ πολλὰί τύχην ἀναμεμιγμένην ἔχουσιν,
2) αἱ δὲ γινόμεναι παρὰ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς τύχας ἀποφάσεις καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις,
ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις καθαρῶς
παρέχουσι τὴν ἐκάστου διάνοιαν ἀποθεωρεῖν.
- III 1) ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἅμα αἱ ἀποφάσεις τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς πράξεις παρακειμένας ἔχουσαι σχολάζουσιν φιληκοῖαν περιμένουσιν
2) ἐνταῦθα δὲ [καὶ] τοὺς λόγους αὐτοὺς καθ' αὐτοὺς
ὥσπερ δείγματα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα συνειλεγμένους
οὐδὲν οἴομαί σοι τὸν καιρὸν ἐνοχλήσειν,
ἐν βραχέσι πολλῶν ἀναθεώρησιν ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων μνήμης γενομένων
λαμβάνοντι.

The first part of I contains a general claim: actions are blended with chance. In the corresponding part of III, Plutarch states that the *Parallel Lives* (ἐκεῖ μὲν) specifically blend words with actions. As a consequence, τύχη plays an important role in the biographies. Insight into their characters will therefore be more difficult to obtain. This is why a full understanding of men of the past requires an “unoccupied fondness for listening” (σχολάζουσιν φιληκοῖαν).²⁵⁸ In other words, the reader needs time to read the *Lives*.

In the second part of I, Plutarch writes that sayings (ἀποφάσεις) and utterances (ἀναφωνήσεις) allow the audience to examine (ἀποθεωρεῖν) a person's intentions clearly. The equivalent in III again contains a specific application of this, which now concerns *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* (ἐνταῦθα δέ): in contrast with the *Lives*, the sayings (λόγους) brought together in the collection will not take much time for those who want to study (ἀναθεώρησιν) characters. In line with this, the counterpart of the mirror simile in I consists of another comparison in III: words are compared with samples and seeds of lives (δείγματα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα). The metaphors at first sight express the same basic idea: because of the absence of τύχη, sayings ensure that one can easily and

²⁵⁷ Citro (2017b) 29: “Nella parte conclusiva dell’epistola l’autore indica la sostanziale differenza tra le *Vite* e la raccolta apoftegmatica”.

²⁵⁸ See Citro (2017b) 31–32 on φιληκοῖα; she notices a similar usage in *De aud.* 40B and *Apophth. Lac.* 208B.

quickly perceive the hero's *διάνοια*. The collection will therefore be a most convenient means for a busy man like the Roman emperor. The utility of the work has now successfully been defended.

Yet a contrast between the general claims in I and their specifications in III suggests that there is more than this apologetic aspect. As Roskam writes, the use of *ἀποθεωρεῖν* and *ἀναθεώρησις* is pregnant with meaning:²⁵⁹

In this passage, the verbs *ἀποθεωρέω* and *ἀναθεωρέω* are indeed combined with one another: the suggestion is that the convenient collection will enable Trajan (the alleged dedicatee of the work) to make himself quickly familiar with the material (the phase of *ἀναθεωρεῖν*) and then further reflect on it from a distance (the phase of *ἀποθεωρεῖν*).

In light of this, it should be noted that Plutarch refers in III only to Trajan's act of reading the collection, which can be defined as nothing more than getting insight into characters (*ἀναθεώρησις*). Phrase I, on the contrary, concerns the possible next phase of *ἀποθεώρησις*: drawing lessons from characters *after* reading. It alludes, then, to the moment of moral reflection and improvement. That this expression is combined with a mirror comparison is not coincidental. Although the notion of accurate and reliable reflection is often an important element in Plutarch's use of the metaphor, it is almost always applied in combination with human *exempla* for the readers, connected with the concept of imitation.²⁶⁰ The simile in the letter, therefore, might refer to lessons to be drawn from role models for the sake of improvement as well.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Roskam (2014) 191. Another relevant passage in this regard is the prologue to *Aem.–Tim.* (discussed in Part III, chapter 1.4.2), containing *ἀναθεωρέω*. Roskam (2014) 191 claims that one indeed expects this verb in a prologue, while *ἀποθεωρέω* fits well within the purpose of the *synkriseis*: “In this early stage, the verb *ἀναθεωρεῖν* is indeed fully appropriate: Plutarch first has to make himself familiar with his material, and it is only at the end of his account that he will be able to evaluate his heroes' achievements from a distance. Exactly this same dynamics between *ἀποθεωρέω* and *ἀναθεωρέω* can be found in the proem to the *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*”. See also Roskam (2017) 172–173.

²⁶⁰ As Zadorojnyi (2010) 173–174 states, the mirror in antiquity can indeed be “a source of veritable likenesses that enable better understanding”, but reflections can also be regarded as “deceptive, ‘bewitching’ and only apparently stable”. This ambiguous aspect of the mirror comparison might also be implied in the letter; see *infra*, p. 91.

²⁶¹ Beck, M. (2002) 165: “The behavior of both Artaxerxes and Lycurgus is being modeled in the apophthegms. Trajan is encouraged to understand and learn from their behavior (cf. the mirror simile)”. One should however keep in mind that this is still rather implicit in the text.

Thus, only when dealing with general claims does the author suggest that the eventual goal of apophthegms consists of the reader's moral progress, or learning something *from* the characters; when Trajan's specific situation is addressed, the text only refers to learning *about* them. This is in line with Plutarch's cautious attitude: he refrains from straightforwardly stating that the emperor needs to improve his character. Yet the parallel structure of phrases I and III implies that this is still what should happen: ἀναθεώρησις will presumably take place when Trajan carefully reads the work, but Plutarch hopes that ἀποθεώρησις will follow too. And perhaps, this could also be the subtle implication of the seeds metaphor: sayings might at this later phase also plant a desire in the readers to become like their heroes and shape their own characters. At this second, implicit stage, the notion of growth is important (and in line with δεῖγμα in the meaning of "a pattern to be followed").²⁶² Hence, the use of βίος in the letter might refer not only to the actual lives of the men of the past, but also to those of the readers, an ambiguity which recalls the *Parallel Lives* once more.²⁶³

1.3 A Clash between the Two Parts

Although the second part discusses in detail the importance of sayings for understanding character, the first part opens with two stories that only contain actions. This remarkable clash is highlighted by the Seiramnes apophthegm, which, on the contrary, contains a saying and refers to a Persian king, perhaps even the same as the one in the opening story. The suggestion is that this contrast is intentional, and that Plutarch wants to redirect the reader to the earlier stories. This, in fact, can also be seen from versions of the Artaxerxes and Lycurgus apophthegms in other works of the Chaeronean. As usual, he adapts his material to fit the specific content and goals,²⁶⁴ as appears from a comparison of different accounts of the stories.²⁶⁵

²⁶² A suggestion made to me by Professor Christopher Pelling.

²⁶³ Cf. Duff (1999) 33 on the ambiguous meaning of βίος.

²⁶⁴ See Stadter (1996) and Beck, M. (1999) for some examples of Plutarch's ways of adapting apophthegms.

²⁶⁵ In the following scheme, words in bold occur in the letter and in the other account(s). Words in italics in the right column(s) highlight differences from the letter. An apophthegm similar to the Lycurgus story occurs in fragment 47 Sandbach (*Comm. in Hes.*), where the final clause is also part of a saying. This apophthegm is not included in this table, since the wording is quite different, and because it is not attributed to Lycurgus. Citro (2017b) 16–17 provides a comparison of all accounts.

Artaxerxes

Ἀρτοξέρξης ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὃ μέγιστε ἀντόκτατορ Τραϊανὲ Καῖσαρ, οὐχ ἦττον οἰόμενος βασιλικὸν καὶ φιλόνηρον εἶναι τοῦ μεγάλα διδόναι τὸ μικρὰ λαμβάνειν εὐμενῶς καὶ προθύμως, ἐπεὶ παρελαύνοντος αὐτοῦ καθ' ὄδον ἀνουργὸς ἄνηρ οὐδὲν ἔχων ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ταῖς χερσὶν ἀμφοτέραις ὕδωρ ὑπολαβὼν προσήνεγκεν, ἠδέως ἐδέξατο καὶ ἐμειδίασε, τῇ προθυμίᾳ τοῦ διδόντος οὐ τῇ χρεΐᾳ τοῦ διδομένου τὴν χάριν μετρήσας.

Reg. et imp. apophth. 172B

ἐν <δὲ> τῷ δέχεσθαι χάριτας οὐχ ἦττον τοῖς διδοῦσιν ἢ τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν ἐν [δὲ] τῷ διδόναι φαινόμενος εὐχαρὶς καὶ φιλόνηρος, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦν οὐτὼ σμικρὸν τι τῶν διδομένων, ὃ μὴ προσεδέξατο προθύμως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥόαν μίαν ὑπερφυῆ μεγέθει προσενέγκαντος Ὀμίσου τινὸς αὐτῷ, “νῆ τὸν Μίθραν” εἶπεν “οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ πόλιν ἂν ἐκ μικρᾶς ταχὺ ποιήσῃε μεγάλην πιστευθεὶς.” Ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλλων ἄλλα προσφερόντων καθ' ὄδον ἀνουργὸς ἄνηρ οὐδὲν ἐπὶ καιροῦ φθάσας εὐρεῖν τῷ ποταμῷ προσέδραμε, καὶ ταῖν χεροῖν ὑπολαβὼν τοῦ ὕδατος προσήνεγκεν, ἠσθεὶς ὁ Ἀρτοξέρξης φιάλην ἔπεμψεν αὐτῷ χρυσοῦν καὶ χιλίους δαρεικοῦς.

Art. 4.4–5.1

“Artaxerxes, the king of the Persians, O Trajan, Emperor Most High and Monarch Supreme, used to think that, as compared with giving large gifts, it was no less the mark of a king and a lover of his fellow-men to accept small gifts graciously and with a ready goodwill; and so, on a time when he was riding by, and a simple labourer, possessed of nothing else, took up water from the river in his two hands and offered it to the king, he accepted it pleasantly and with a cheerful smile, measuring the favour by the ready goodwill of the giver and not by the service rendered by the gift.”

“and in his acceptance and bestowal of favours appeared no less gracious and kindly to the givers than to the recipients. For there was no gift so small that he did not accept it with alacrity; indeed, when a certain Omisus brought him a single pomegranate of surpassing size, he said: ‘By Mithra, this man would speedily make a city great instead of small were he entrusted with it.’ Once when he was on a journey and various people were presenting him with various things, a labouring man, who could find nothing else at the moment, ran to the river, and, taking some of the water in his hands, offered it to him; at which Artaxerxes was so pleased that he sent him a goblet of gold and a thousand darics.”

Lycurgus		
<p>ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος εὐτελεστάτας ἐποίησεν ἐν Σπάρτῃ τὰς θυσίας, ἵνα αἰεὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶν ἐτοιμῶς δύνωνται καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων. <i>Reg. et imp. apophth.</i> 172BC</p>	<p>Πυνθανομένου δέ τινος διὰ τί μικρὰς οὔτω καὶ εὐτελεῖς ἔταξε τῶν θεῶν τὰς θυσίας, ἔφη ἄποισι μὴδέποτε τιμῶντες τὸ θεῖον διαλείπωμεν’ <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 228D</p>	<p>καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν θυσιῶν πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον διὰ τί μικρὰς οὔτω καὶ εὐτελεῖς ἔταξεν. “Ἴνα μὴ ποτε” ἔφη “τιμῶντες τὸ θεῖον διαλείπωμεν”. <i>Lyc.</i> 19.8</p>
<p>“Lycurgus made the sacrifices in Sparta very inexpensive, so that people might be able always to honour the gods readily and easily from what they had at hand.”</p>	<p>“When someone in- quired why he ordained such small and inex- pensive sacrifices to the gods, he said, ‘So that we may honour the Divine powers without ceasing.’”</p>	<p>“That, again, to one who inquired why he ordained such small and inexpensive sacrifices: ‘That we may never omit,’ said he, ‘to hon- our the gods.’”</p>

The following elements stand out:

[1] As to Artaxerxes, the story as told in the letter is split up in the *Life*. Between the two parts, another apophthegm occurs, which is very similar to the water story: a simple man (Ὠμίσιου τινός) gives Artaxerxes a present of limited value (a pomegranate, albeit a big one), after which the king expresses his gratitude. This story, however, contains a saying. Plutarch knew the apophthegm when he wrote *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, for it is included in the collection as *Artaxerxes Mnemon* II (174A). It is, therefore, striking that he opted for a story without a saying in the first part of the dedicatory letter. In addition, every detail focuses on the king’s actions: he accepts water with pleasure and smiles (ἠδέως ἐδέξατο καὶ ἐμεδίασε), elements that are absent from the *Life*.²⁶⁶

[2] As to Lycurgus, *Apophthegmata Laconica* and the *Life of Lycurgus* contain a saying in direct speech. In the letter, however, this is transformed into a single final clause without indicating that Lycurgus spoke the words.²⁶⁷ As a result, the reader might get the impression that it does not present a saying, but Plutarch’s interpretation of the Spartan’s action.

²⁶⁶ Citro (2017b) 12–13: “Il ritratto positivo del sovrano persiano è accentuato ulteriormente dall’uso dell’avverbio ἠδέως e del verbo μεδιάω, che indicano chiaramente l’apprezzamento di Artaserse per il gesto dell’uomo, apprezzamento che si traduce in un sorriso di benevolenza.” This chapter advocates a different interpretation.

²⁶⁷ The version which contains a saying probably precedes the version without a saying, as *Apophth. Lac.* might represent the notes used for *Lyc.* and *Reg. et imp. apophth.*; cf. Stadter (2014b) 666–674 and Appendix II.

Thus, Plutarch twice avoids using a saying in the first part of the letter, thereby deliberately creating a contrast with the second part. The question is why. I can think of two possible explanations, which are not mutually exclusive. The first is of a rhetorical nature, and related to the level of the letter; the other functions at the level of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* in their entirety:

[I] The first is in line with Plutarch's overall caution. If the opening apophthegms suggest that Trajan should imitate two rulers of the past, the implication is that he has to derive lessons from them, as argued above. Yet we have already seen that the author does not want to state *explicitly* that Trajan needs such moral progress. The emperor does not, however, need to be offended: he is only implicitly asked to imitate one *act* of Artaxerxes (and perhaps of Lycurgus), and Plutarch immediately elaborates the idea that words reflect characters better than deeds. Trajan, then, is not asked to model his personality after these *exempla*, for this might go too far. In other words, the contrast between the two parts of the letter provides an additional mitigating factor which fits well within the general cautious atmosphere of the text.

This also solves an issue noticed by Almagor. He wonders why the author opens his letter with a reference to the Persian king, arguing that Plutarch would never establish such a close connection between the Roman emperor and a barbarian.²⁶⁸ This is indeed a surprising move in light of the recent Parthian campaigns (if Plutarch indeed had this in mind),²⁶⁹ since Trajan would then be asked to learn something from his enemies. In addition, Artaxerxes Mnemon is not what one would call a clear example of good moral behaviour in the *Life of Artaxerxes*, at least not in the closing chapters of the biography.²⁷⁰ The discrepancy between the first and second part of the letter, however, suggests that Artaxerxes might not be a true moral example for the emperor after all, or at least that this cannot be decided from his story.

²⁶⁸ Almagor (2018) 272. Citro (2017b) 8 also states that Artaxerxes' appearance in the letter is surprising, but does not relate it to the question of Plutarch's authorship.

²⁶⁹ On this possible reference, see also Beck, M. (2002) 165. He furthermore believes that Plutarch opted for a story concerning Lycurgus to establish a connection with Trajan too, as he "may call to mind the extremely martial and, for many years, successful city of Sparta. Undoubtedly Trajan himself was one of the most vigorously active Emperors from a military point of view". Citro (2014) 65–67 and (2017b) 15–16 points out that there could also be another explanation, for the Spartan king could have been an example for Trajan in other respects too: as Desideri (2002) argues, Plutarch might refer to the educational reforms of the Flavians and later of Trajan by establishing a connection with Lycurgus' educational system in *Comp. Lyc. et Num.*

²⁷⁰ Almagor (2017) 138.

[2] By redirecting the readers, Plutarch invites them to actively think about the stories at the outset of the text. Keeping in mind that sayings are a better means to study character, they should ask what the actions and smile might tell about Artaxerxes' true disposition.²⁷¹ They wonder whether the motivation described in the participle clause can be regarded as the king's actual motivation, or whether it only reflects a possible interpretation of his behaviour, suggested by the author.²⁷² Similarly, it is not clear how the final clause in the Lycinus story is to be read. At first, this again seems to have a rhetorical function at the level of the letter: it ensures that the readers will, by personal experience, be convinced of the importance of sayings, for they can more readily draw obvious conclusions from Seiramnes' apophthegm than from the opening stories. As a result, they are also persuaded of the usefulness of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and of this type of text in general.

Yet this is only the case so long as one only reads the letter. The first apophthegm of the collection, which not incidentally concerns a Persian king again, does not contain a saying either (172E). In addition, the analysis of the collection will point out that sayings do not always paint a clear picture at all. Even more: Plutarch often deliberately problematizes the image of the heroes, sometimes even through contradictory sayings of the same person. Claims in the letter are therefore not entirely consistent with the work, and seem to put the reader on the wrong track. The clash between the two parts of the letter, then, prepares the readers for this and shows them that a critical attitude is necessary when reading the collection: only profound reflection will provide a correct understanding of the true dispositions of characters, even when reading a compilation of apophthegms. In this way, the apparent inconsistency in the letter makes the readers reflect on the type of literature they are dealing with,²⁷³ and

²⁷¹ In Plutarch, smiles and laughter occur in a variety of contexts, see esp. Frazier (2000). See also Babut (1992) 195, specifically about the smile which shows the "supériorité du vrai philosophe". See also Klaerr – Philippon – Sirinelli (1989) 299–300 about this aspect.

²⁷² In the letter, the detail φαίνόμενος that occurs in the *Life* is left out. Almagor (2018) 179 considers this another indication of inauthenticity: "This slight change could not have been made by Plutarch himself, aware as he was of all the nuances and subtleties of Artaxerxes' character, but by a reader of the biography". Yet a critical attitude of the reader with regard to Artaxerxes' appearance is also expected in the letter, so this nuance is in fact also implied here (*pace* Citro (2017a) 54–55).

²⁷³ This is similar to Plutarch's practice in some of his dialogues. As to the Delphic dialogues, Müller, A. (2012) shows that the author wants his readers to weigh up the argumentations of the characters against each other, which makes them conclude that the method of dialogue is the best option to reach the most reliable answer. In a later article on these texts, Müller, A. (2013) argues that Plutarch wants to teach his readers how a

teaches the correct reading strategy of weighing all elements of a text against each other, especially when these seem to be contradictory or problematizing.

Finally, even this might be in line with the mirror simile. Zadorojnyi writes with regard to the prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon*:²⁷⁴

Reflections in mirrors can be faithful and educative, but equally they can distort, lie or harm. By the same token the subjects of Plutarch's biographies are not out-and-out admirable or wicked; too often their motives and actions are difficult to pigeonhole. So the mirror-metaphor in *Aemilius* 1.1 carries a veiled injunction that the reader of the *Lives* must not be an idle voyeuristic onlooker but rather an intelligent and pro-active scryer who has the responsibility to investigate the text and its protagonist.

The metaphor in the dedicatory letter may well have the same implication: if sayings are comparable to mirrors, they might deceive as well. Thus, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* after all require active and critical readers too, similar to those welcomed by the *Lives*.

1.4 Conclusion

Plutarch's caution in addressing the Roman emperor dominates the entire letter. In line with this, the first part reads as a traditional dedication, and the second as a typical defence of the utility of the work, described only in terms of getting insight into character. Yet a close analysis of both sections suggests that the eventual goal of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* consists of Trajan's moral progress (and probably also that of other readers). An intentional clash within the letter highlights that this can only be reached when adopting a critical attitude, for in the same way as the letter seems to deconstruct itself, it will not always be easy to derive clear conclusions from the sections in the collection. Thus, although reading *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* requires far less time than reading the *Parallel Lives*, reflection still remains a *condicio sine qua non* for a correct assessment of characters and, therefore, for moral progress when reading the former work as well.

good interlocutor should behave during a conversation and how they can apply the dialogical method themselves. See in this context also Brenk (2016). For the active reader of the *Parallel Lives*, see Duff (2008c) and Duff (2011a). For the relationship between narrator and narratee in the *Lives*, see Pelling (2002) 267–282 and Pelling (2004).

²⁷⁴ Zadorojnyi (2010) 182.

2

The Letter and the Structure of the Collection

The apophthegm collection consists of various levels that entail different interpretations. All of these are announced by the dedicatory letter (172B–E), in connection with the *Parallel Lives*: (1) the work contains apophthegms (2) of famous men of the past (τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων), (3) there are different types of rulers of various peoples (παρά τε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ παρ’ Ἑλλήσιν ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων), and (4) the text constitutes a whole (cf. the *Parallel Lives* as a σύνταγμα).²⁷⁵

2.1 Apophthegms

Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata consist of 494 apophthegms. These are the smallest units of the collection. All apophthegms are related to a specific moment in time or are instigated by specific circumstances.²⁷⁶ As Stenger notices, their elaboration varies widely:²⁷⁷ some consist of only one syntactic unit (but never less than one syntactic unit),²⁷⁸ for example ἔλεγεν introducing a saying without any contextual information; others give an extensive description of the historical background, and Plutarch sometimes even adds the aftermath of a story.²⁷⁹ A new apophthegm begins when there is a shift in time, circumstances, or cause.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁵ As stated, most parts of this chapter are an adapted version of parts of van der Wiel (2023a), esp. 1–7. In this article I point out that the traditional division of the collection should sometimes be reconsidered. These cases are also briefly discussed in the notes below and in the literary analysis presented in the next chapters. A general overview is provided in Appendix I, also taken from van der Wiel (2023a) 23–26.

²⁷⁶ The cause or historical background can contain a saying of the subject too (so an apophthegm can contain two sayings): van der Wiel (2023a) 12–13 thus joins *Gaius Fabricius* IV and V (195AB).

²⁷⁷ Stenger (2006) 203–204.

²⁷⁸ van der Wiel (2023a) 9–10 thus joins *Cato Maior* I and II (198D), VI and VII (198E), and XVI and XVII (199A).

²⁷⁹ In light of this, van der Wiel (2023a) 15 takes *Scipio Minor* XX and XXI (201DE) together.

²⁸⁰ In line with this, van der Wiel (2023a) 8–9 splits *Flaminius* I (197A) after πεμφθεις δέ; *Pompeius* I (203BC) after νέος δ’ ὄν; *Lucullus* II (203AB) after προσβὰς δέ (*ibid* 18).

This is almost always indicated by a δέ at the outset of this new element *within* a section.²⁸¹

2.2 Sections on Historical Figures

A series of apophthegms on the same historical figure together form a section. The collection comprises 89 such units,²⁸² which vary substantially in length: the shortest sections contain only one apophthegm, while the longest, *Alexander* (179D–181F), has 34. The first apophthegm of a section usually does not contain δέ as its second word,²⁸³ marking a break, and always opens with the name of its subject, except for *Cyrus* I (172E).²⁸⁴ This is often combined with additional information such as family ties, important functions, nicknames, origins, or other distinctive elements. This is necessary to clarify who is the subject of the following apophthegms, for the text, as published in antiquity, probably did not provide the lemmata of the modern editions.²⁸⁵ This can be seen from *P. Oxy.* 78 5155, a third- or fourth-century copy of some Spartan sections of the collection (191EF): while apophthegms are separated from each other by a divider mark or a blank space, the transition from one individual to another is only indicated by the name at the outset of the new section.²⁸⁶ This also explains why the first section, *Cyrus* (172EF), is the only exception to this rule: a divider mark or blank space sufficed to highlight the transition from the letter to the collection.

In line with the dedicatory letter, various sections truly read as an abbreviated *Life*, or at least as the core of a *Life*.²⁸⁷ In these cases, the first

Philippus XVI and XVII (178BC), and *Themistocles* XV and XVI (185EF) are to be taken together, see van der Wiel (2023a) 12–13.

²⁸¹ Four exceptions can only be explained as a scribal error or inconsistency of the author: *Philippus* II (177C); *Antigonus Monophthalmus* IX (182C); *Eudamidas* II (192B); and *Parysatis* (174A), belonging to the previous section. Other cases in Nachstädt are not true exceptions, as the division in modern editions should be reconsidered: *Agis Secundus* VI (190D); *Cicero* XV (205C); *Caesar* VII (206C); and *Caesar* X (206D).

²⁸² See van der Wiel (2023a) 18–21 on *Semiramis* (173AB) and *Parysatis* (174A) as part of the preceding sections.

²⁸³ Many exceptions can be explained by connections with the preceding apophthegm(s), see van der Wiel (2023a) 3n11.

²⁸⁴ Cf. Stadter (2014b) 676. *Demetrius Poliorcetes* I (183A) is not a real exception to this rule: the first words refer to his nickname.

²⁸⁵ Cf. Babbitt (1931) 12 on their absence in the manuscripts.

²⁸⁶ See Parsons – Henry (2012) 95–96 on the papyrus and on the use of the divider mark or blank spaces here. On Plutarchan papyri, see Lundon (2004); and Schmidt, T. S. (2019) for a complete overview.

²⁸⁷ Cf. Beck, M. (2002) 167.

apophthegm(s) often give(s) general information about the new subject (and, as discussed, do(es) not necessarily contain a saying),²⁸⁸ which reminds one of Plutarch's biographies. Contrary to what one might expect, the *Lives* seldom commence with a description of the early years of the hero, but rather convey something about the character in general. Duff speaks of "proemial openings" in these cases:²⁸⁹

Proemial openings [...] contain material drawn from any point in the subject's life; this material, furthermore, is often not told in chronological order, or even in a way which might suggest that it is chronological. The organization is thematic, and while proemial openings may contain material from childhood, they look at the Life as a whole and contain material from adult life too. An important concomitant of this is that childhood in the *Lives* is rarely narrated.

Information often included in the proemial openings are "the subject's family, character, education, physical appearance, etc."²⁹⁰ Such elements are precisely what one finds in the opening 'apophthegms' of some sections in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*:²⁹¹ they thus have a function similar to Duff's proemial openings, as they concern the entire life of the character and do not belong to a specific historical event, because of which the imperfect tense often dominates here.²⁹²

The apophthegms following these opening 'stories' are usually ordered chronologically, or at least give this impression. They are also structured thematically, according to the principle of what I call 'gradual shifting'. This means that most apophthegms share an element with the preceding one(s), in a way that recalls how Plutarch connects the pieces of advice in *Coniugalia praecepta*, as discussed in detail by Goessler.²⁹³ These common elements can be anything: a historical event (cf. the chronological structure), a theme such as justice or mildness, or even

²⁸⁸ See also Part I, chapter 3.1.1 on Plutarch's views on apophthegms.

²⁸⁹ Duff (2011b) 227. These "proemial openings" are different from the cases where a *Life* immediately opens with the narrative itself, called the "bare openings" (*ibid.* 237–240). Stadter (1988) made a distinction between formal and informal proems, rejected by Duff (2011b) 218: "Stadter's 'informal' proems are best seen, then, as simply the opening sections of first *Lives* which do not follow a prologue"; see also Duff (2008a) and (2014) 343.

²⁹⁰ Duff (2011b) 224, referring to Leo (1901), see esp. 180–182.

²⁹¹ *Cyrus* I (172E); *Philippus* I (177C); *Aristeides* I (186A); *Iphicrates* I (186F–187A); *Phocion* I (187E); *Epameinondas* I (192C); *Scipio Minor* I–IV (199F–200A); *Marius* I (202AB); and *Pompeius* Ia (203B).

²⁹² E.g. in *Artaxerxes Longimanus* I (173D); *Teres* (174CD); *Pericles* I (186C); *Scipio Maior* I (196B).

²⁹³ Goessler (1999).

just a word or name. In this way, Plutarch creates entire chains. In other cases, however, there is no connection between two apophthegms that follow after one another. Such breaks often separate blocks of stories.

The closing apophthegms of five sections contain a saying *about its* protagonist and are therefore rather atypical. Yet this is also reminiscent of Plutarch's practice in the *Parallel Lives*: these five stories shed further light on the character in general and often even reassess the entire section,²⁹⁴ thus recalling the biographies that do not close with the hero's death but assess his life as a whole.²⁹⁵

2.3 Sections on Peoples and Types of Government

Historical figures are ordered according to the nation or city state they belong to. With a few exceptions, they follow each other chronologically within these larger sections, as noticed by Stadter.²⁹⁶ Groups of peoples, in turn, are put together according to two principles:

[I] Most important is Plutarch's threefold categorization of humanity.²⁹⁷ First, there are fifteen barbarians (172E–174F; 33 apophthegms): eight Persians (172E–174B; 23), one section on Egyptian kings in general (174C; 1), three Thracians (174CD; 4), and three Scythians (174EF; 5). Second, there are 54 Greeks (175A–194E; 294): six Sicilians (175A–177A; 31) and fourteen Macedonians (177A–184F; 111) are followed by 34 Greeks of the core mainland, viz. fourteen Athenians (184F–189D; 73), eighteen Spartans (189D–192C; 49), and two Thebans (192C–194E; 30).²⁹⁸ A series

²⁹⁴ *Alexander* XXXIV (181F); *Aristeides* V (186BC); *Brasidas* III (190BC). One should also add *Semiramis* (173AB) about Darius and *Parysatis* (174A) about Artaxerxes Mnemon.

²⁹⁵ See Pelling (2002) 365–386 (= (1997a)) on closure in the *Parallel Lives*.

²⁹⁶ Stadter (2008) 55 lists the following deviations: *Semiramis* (173AB; although he recognizes that this belongs to *Darius*); *Peisistratus* (189B–D), following *Phocion* (187E–189B); and *Gaius Popillius* (202E–203A), following *Sulla* (202E); cf. Stadter (2014b) 676 in a similar overview of the collection's general structure. Less significant are a few Spartan men who "are grouped achronologically at the end of the Spartan section", see Stadter (2008) 55. One can add the *Diadochi*, see the analysis of 181F–184F.

²⁹⁷ On this tripartite division of mankind, see Jones, C. P. (1971) 124–125; Swain (1996) 350–352; Preston (2001) 118–119 (on *Quaest. Graec.* and *Quaest. Rom.*); and Mossman (2010) 145–146 (also on *Reg. et imp. apophth.*). Almagor (2018) 273 also recognizes the "threefold division of humanity observed in Plutarch's work" in the apophthegm collection, as well as a geographical order, "as it progresses from the Persian east to the Roman west".

²⁹⁸ Plutarch "often denies that Macedonians are true Greeks", see Swain (1989b) 516. This might have been an additional reason to separate them from the Greeks of the core mainland.

of 20 Romans closes the collection (194E–208A; 167). As the ancient ‘editions’ of the text probably did not contain lemmata to separate the different ethnicities from each other either,²⁹⁹ Plutarch sometimes clarifies a transition to a new people at the outset of these sections, especially in cases where a name alone might not suffice.³⁰⁰

[2] Peoples are also ordered according to the type of rulers their sections include: barbarian sole rulers are followed by Sicilian tyrants and Macedonian monarchs. Greek generals and popular leaders are followed by those of the Roman Republic. The collection closes again with a monarch, *Augustus* (206F–208A; after *Caesar*, 205E–206F), which establishes a ring composition. Especially this final point is closely connected with the following level of the text that concerns *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a kind of abbreviated world history.

2.4 A World History

In general, the collection contains two chronologies. The first consists of what can be defined as the ‘monarchical’ sections (172E–184F): the Persians, Egyptians, Thracians, and Scythians will all be defeated by the Macedonian Empire. This chronology is interrupted: after the last diadoch of the collection, *Antiochus Septimus* (184D–F), Plutarch takes the reader back to the times of the Persian Wars by introducing *Themistocles* (184F–185F). The logical sequence Athens – Sparta – Thebes, representing the order in which these city states once dominated the Greek world, opens a second chronology. The Romans introduce an entirely different setting, but references to the *Diadochi* emphasize that this second chronology continues.³⁰¹ One reads how the Romans gradually conquer their regions and the collection closes with their world dominion.

²⁹⁹ See esp. Nachstädt (1971) 70 on his title ΡΩΜΑΙΚΑ: “Titulus (ut plerumque etiam lemmata) deest ubique, sed in mge ῥωμαικά JSAX Voss. 2; ἀποφθέγματα ῥωμαικά G part. II Laud. 55. De Romanis O m. post.” Titles in Valerius Maximus are not original either, see Wardle (1998) 6 and 15.

³⁰⁰ *Polys* (174C): Πόλυς ὁ Θρακῶν βασιλεύς; *Idanthysus* (174E): Ἰδάνθυρσος ὁ Σκυθῶν βασιλεύς; Πέρσαι at the outset of *Cyrus* I (172E) immediately indicates which people will be treated first; as *Lycurgus* (189D–F) follows the Athenians, he had to be explicitly introduced as a Spartan (189D: Λυκοῦργος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος) to distinguish him from his Athenian namesake.

³⁰¹ Pyrrhus plays an important role in *Gaius Fabricius* (194F–195B); in *Flamininus* (197A–D), the Romans have to face various Macedonian enemies in order to free the Greeks; etc.

2.5 Overview

The table below provides an overview of the general structure of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, which coincides with the levels of interpretation announced by the dedicatory letter to Trajan. In line with this, the following analysis will divide the collection into three main parts of approximately equal length: (1) the monarchical sections (172E–184F; 175 apophthegms; chapter 3), (2) the sections on the Greeks of the core mainland (184F–194E; 152; chapter 4), and (3) the Roman sections (194E–208A; 167; chapter 5).

The general structure of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*

I The dedicatory letter to Trajan
172B–E

The letter announces in connection with the *Parallel Lives*: (1) apophthegms of (2) famous men/individuals (τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων), (3) who are different types of rulers of various peoples (παρά τε Πρωταίους καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ ἀποκατατόνων)
(4) The reference to the *Parallel Lives* as a σύνεργμα alludes to the collection as an abbreviated world history

II The collection
172E–208A

- (1) *Interpretation at the level of the apophthegms*
(2) *Interpretation at the level of individuals*
(3) *Interpretation at the level of cultural identity:*

Barbarians 172E–174F		Greeks 175A–194E		Romans 194E–208A		
Despotism 172E– 174B	Egypt 174C	'Less typical' Greeks 175A–184F	Core mainland 184F–194E	Roman Republic 194E–205E	Principate 205E–208A	
Persians 172E– 174B	Thracians 174CD Scythians 174EF	Sicilian tyrants 175A– 177A 177A 184F	Sparta 189D– 192C 192C	'Earlier' republic 194E– 203A	Civil wars 203A– 206F 206F 208A	
<i>In line with (3), interpretation at the level of type of government:</i>						
Monarchy 172E–184F		Generals and popular leaders 184F–205E				Monarchy 205E–208A
<i>(4) Interpretation of the collection as an abbreviated world history: two general chronologies:</i>						
A first general chronology 172E–184F		A second general chronology 184F–208A				
From the Persian Empire to Macedonian 'world dominion'		From the Persian Wars to Roman 'world dominion'				

3

The Monarchical Sections (172E–184F)

3.1 Persian Despotism (172E–174B)

This part consists of five units: (1) *Cyrus* (172EF); (2) *Darius* (172F–173B); (3) *Xerxes* (173BC); (4) a series of sections, from *Artaxerxes Longimanus* until *Orontes* (173D–174B), that all shed light on the pivotal figure of Artaxerxes Mnemon;³⁰² and (5) a final apophthegm presenting *Memnon* (174B).³⁰³ As Almagor points out, the Persian section is closely connected with the dedicatory letter in three ways: the presence of Persians and more precisely of Artaxerxes Mnemon, of course; some verbatim similarities; and the dominating theme of giving and taking.³⁰⁴ As a consequence, it is to be interpreted in light of the letter in terms of its content and should be read in a similar way: the reassessment of Artaxerxes Mnemon in the letter prepares the reader for the sections on three Persian kings, viz. *Darius*, *Xerxes*, and, unsurprisingly, *Artaxerxes Mnemon* again. But first Cyrus the Great appears on the stage: the section dedicated to him – separated from the next one by a small chronological gap³⁰⁵ and by its different content – will serve not only as an introduction to the Persian section, but also to the monarchical sections as a whole.

³⁰² Almagor (2018) 274 notes that Artaxerxes I is placed more or less at the center of the Persian section, but the following analysis focuses on Artaxerxes II Mnemon: (1) *Artaxerxes Longimanus* provides the background of *Artaxerxes Mnemon* (173F–174A), (2) *Cyrus Minor* (173EF) and *Orontes* (174B) reflect upon the character of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and (3) a story on Artaxerxes Mnemon opens the dedicatory letter.

³⁰³ Mossman (2010) 146 observes: “Nepos selects the following barbarian kings and generals for mention: Cyrus, Darius I, Xerxes, Artaxerxes I and II, Datames [...], and Hamilcar and Hannibal. This list very largely overlaps with the sections on barbarians in Plutarch’s *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* [...] though the Carthaginians do not figure; their sayings are included in the *Sayings of Romans* instead.” She refers to the conclusion of Geiger (1981) 95–99 that Nepos’ selection of historical figures had an impact on Plutarch. Geiger (1988) argues that Plutarch also borrowed the idea of comparing Greeks and Romans in his *Parallel Lives* from Nepos.

³⁰⁴ Almagor (2018) 273, on βασιλικόν (172B) – βασιλικότερον (173D); and βίον combined with σπέρματα (172D) – σπέρματα combined with βίοι (172F).

³⁰⁵ E.g. no apophthegms on Cambyses II are included.

3.1.1 Cyrus (172EF)

Cyrus I opens with Πέρσαι instead of with Cyrus' name. This already suggests that the Persian section will not only focus on the characters of the kings themselves, but also on the Persian people and their relationship with their rulers: a general claim about Cyrus' subjects is explained by their assessment of his reign.³⁰⁶ The opening apophthegm, then, does not contain a saying nor even an action. As stated, Plutarch often opens a section in this way, but it still is remarkable that, immediately after the discussion of the importance of sayings, the first apophthegm does not contain one: it only relates that the Persians love people with hooked noses because of Cyrus' physical appearance (172E).³⁰⁷

The next two apophthegms continue this positive image. *Cyrus* II discusses the character of a good ruler in connection with his relationship with his subjects. The saying consists of two parts (172E). The first one is more general: Cyrus says that people who do not want to provide good things (τὰγαθά) for themselves are forced to do so for others. The second is more specific, related to the task of the king: only those who are better than their subjects are fit to rule. As both parts of the saying are presented as belonging together, the reader has to interpret them as a whole: a good ruler, who is concerned with the well-being of his subjects and who knows what is good, provides these good things for his people, not for himself. This continues the theme of giving and taking in the letter.³⁰⁸

Cyrus III (172EF) builds on this, and makes it more specific by presenting Cyrus as an example of a good ruler.³⁰⁹ As was the case with I and II, this apophthegm also connects the people with their king: he knows what is bad for his subjects and when he has to refuse their requests. When the Persians ask him to dwell in another country, he does not give in,

εἰπὼν ὅτι καὶ τῶν φυτῶν τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ βίοι ταῖς χώραις συνεξομοιοῦνται.

saying that both the seeds of plants and the lives of men are bound to be like the land of their origin.

³⁰⁶ The apophthegm occurs in *Praec. ger. reip.* 821E as the final story of a series of apophthegms illustrating the advantages of the people's goodwill towards the ruler.

³⁰⁷ As Babbitt (1931) follows Bernardakis (1889), he does not include καὶ καλλίστους ὑπολαμβάνουσι, admitting in a note that it occurs in some manuscripts. *Praec. ger. reip.* 821E contains these same words.

³⁰⁸ Paragraph cf. van der Wiel (2023a) 9.

³⁰⁹ A lengthy account of the story occurs in Herodotus IX.122.

The combination of σπέρματα and βίοι recalls the phrase δειγµατα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα in the dedicatory letter (172D).³¹⁰ In that passage, Plutarch called sayings the “germs” of one’s life, the basis on which the characters of men of the past can be judged. A similar link between σπέρματα and βίοι is established in the quote above: Cyrus refuses the request of the Persian people out of regard for their character. This is why III is in fact an illustration of the truth of II and its applicability to Cyrus’ own life: the king was a good man and aimed to improve his subjects.

This educating role is a core task of the (good) monarch, entirely in line with Plutarch’s Platonic views. This especially comes to the fore when Plutarch is dealing with a monarch’s duty as a lawgiver throughout his oeuvre (one readily thinks of *Lycurgus–Numa*), and this will also appear as a recurrent theme in the collection: by means of laws, a ruler can improve the characters of his subordinates.³¹¹ That this major responsibility of the sole ruler is stressed at the outset of the work, and of the monarchical sections in particular, is not coincidental.

Cyrus thus provides a positive opening for *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. While *Cyrus* I illustrates the goodwill of the Persian people towards their king, II and III gradually explain why he was beloved.³¹² This rather straightforward interpretation contrasts with the more complicated way in which the following sections are to be read. Finally, it should be noted that this is not the only case of such a difference between the opening sections and what follows, as will become clear throughout the analysis.

3.1.2 Darius (172F–173B)

Darius I, a general remark by Darius about his own character (172F; cf. the imperfect tense), seems to be rather isolated.³¹³ II is more specific and tells of his mildness in collecting taxes (172F–173A). In III, the king opens a pomegranate, and when someone asks him what he would like to have as much as the seeds in the fruit, he answers (LCL): “Men like Zopyrus” (173A: Ζωπύρους), a good friend of his who returns in IV. In this apophthegm, similar to III, the king says that he would not even want to have one hundred Babylons in exchange for the mutilation of this man

³¹⁰ Almagor (2018) 273.

³¹¹ See Part III, chapter 2.4.

³¹² *Lyc.* 5.1 also connects the goodwill of the Spartans towards Lycurgus with his moral superiority.

³¹³ The apophthegm also occurs in *An seni* 792C, combined with two other stories told in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, see *infra*, note 352.

(173A).³¹⁴ Once more a friend is described as something valuable which one possesses. II–IV are thus connected thematically and focus on the admirable way in which Darius values the right priorities and wealth. This contrasts strikingly with *Semiramis* (173AB):³¹⁵

Σεμίραμις δὲ ἑαυτῇ κατασκευάσασα τάφον ἐπέγραψεν ὅστις ἂν χρημάτων δεηθῆ βασιλεύς, διελόντα τὸ μνημεῖον ὅσα βούλεται λαβεῖν. Δαρεῖος οὖν διελὼν χρήματα μὲν οὐχ εὔρε, γράμμασι δὲ ἑτέροις ἐνέτυχε τάδε φράζουσιν· ‘εἰ μὴ κακὸς ἦσθ’ ἀνὴρ καὶ χρημάτων ἄπληστος, οὐκ ἂν νεκρῶν θήκας ἐκίνεις.’

Semiramis caused a great tomb to be prepared for herself, and on it this inscription: “Whatsoever king finds himself in need of money may break into this monument and take as much as he wishes.” Darius accordingly broke into it, but found no money; he did, however, come upon another inscription reading as follows: “If you were not a wicked man with an insatiate greed for money, you would not be disturbing the places where the dead are laid.”

In the modern editions, this is traditionally considered the only apophthegm of a separate section on Semiramis (173AB), since it contains sayings (inscriptions) of this queen and not of Darius.³¹⁶ Yet, as I discuss elsewhere, other sections also conclude with an apophthegm *about* the protagonist,³¹⁷ and there are several reasons for considering the ‘section’ part of *Darius*: it concerns a Babylonian queen (which does not fit within the Persian section); it breaks the general chronological structure of the collection; and it opens with δέ. As the closing story of *Darius*, it should be interpreted as conveying something about the king in the first place, as is also suggested by Mossman.³¹⁸

³¹⁴ These apophthegms about Zopyrus and Darius are well known from Herodotus (*Darius* III cf. Herodotus IV.143; *Darius* IV cf. Herodotus III.154 etc.), but his account of *Darius* III is not about Zopyrus.

³¹⁵ On Plutarch’s assessment of Semiramis in other works, see Brenk (2005) 96 (= (2007) 184): “Semiramis, for example, could compete with men on their own playing field, that of successfully governing a large empire.” See also Brenk (2000) 55–59 (= (2007) 94–98) and Brenk (2007) 210 (= (2008) 249) about this positive image of Semiramis in Plutarch. Chapman (2011) 73–74 rejects Brenk’s position.

³¹⁶ On Plutarch’s use of inscriptions, see Buckler (1992) 4788–4799 and 4838; and Liddel (2008).

³¹⁷ See *supra*, note 294.

³¹⁸ Paragraph from van der Wiel (2023a) 19–20 (with minor changes). Mossman (2010) 147 lists Semiramis as a separate section, but adds that “this relates in fact only to Darius and seems to be taken from the inscription on Nitocris’ tomb in Herodotus 1.187”.

A different man appears on stage in this concluding story. Darius was obviously deceived, but still he violated a grave in order to take riches. Perhaps, then, there is some truth in the inscription reproaching his avarice, and to say the very least, this complicates the image as constructed on the basis of the preceding three apophthegms. The contrast with *Darius IV* especially stands out, since it is linked to *Semiramis* by the same location, the city of Babylon, and by similarities in wording. This is a clear example of gradual shifting:

<i>Darius II</i> (172F–173A)	<i>Darius III</i> (173A)	<i>Darius IV</i> (173A)	<i>Semiramis</i> (173AB)
Wealth (taxes)	Wealth (ἔχειν ἐβούλετο) Good friend (Zopyrus)	Wealth (ἐθελῆσαι λαβεῖν) Good friend (Zopyrus) Βαβυλωνίους; Βαβυλῶνας	Wealth (βούλεται λαβεῖν) Semiramis (Bab- ylon)

Darius II–IV offer a consistent and rather positive image of the king and his relationship with possessions, but this image is immediately deconstructed by *Semiramis*, evoking precisely the opposite view. The final and explicit judgement of Darius' character (κακὸς ἀνὴρ χρημάτων ἄπληστος, 173B) thus gives the entire section a darker outlook, and it is left to the readers to make their personal assessment.

3.1.3 Xerxes (173BC)

This section not only describes Xerxes' character, but also has a transitional function. On the one hand, the opening words (173B: Ξέρξη τῷ Δαρείῳ) highlight a connection with the previous section (cf. *Darius I*, 172F: Δαρεῖος ὁ Ξέρξου πατήρ), and the second apophthegm takes the reader back to Babylon (173C: Βαβυλωνίους); on the other hand, some themes announced by *Xerxes* prepare for the following sections.

Xerxes I describes the strife between the king and his brother for the Persian kingdom (173BC).³¹⁹ This connection between brotherly love and

³¹⁹ *De frat. am.* 488D–F tells this story in similar or the same wording: **Ἀριαμένης κατέβαινε ἐκ τῆς Βακτριανῆς** (173B) – **Ἀριαμένης μὲν οὖν κατέβαινε ἐκ Μήδων** (488D); **ἔπεμψε οὖν αὐτῷ δῶρα** (173B) – **δῶρα πέμπων** (488D); **φράσαι κελεύσας τοὺς διδόντας** (173B) – **ἐκέλευσεν εἰπεῖν τοὺς κομίζοντας** (488E); **‘τούτοις σε τιμᾶ νῦν Ξέρξης ὁ ἀδελφός· ἐὰν δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀναγορευθῆ, πάντων ἔση παρ’ αὐτῷ μέγιστος.**’ (173B) – **‘τούτοις σε νῦν τιμᾶ Ξέρξης ὁ ἀδελφός· ἂν δὲ βασιλεὺς κρίσει καὶ ψήφῳ Περσῶν ἀναγορευθῆ, δίδωσί σοι δευτέρῳ μεθ’ ἑαυτὸν εἶναι.**’ (488E); **ὁ μὲν Ἀριαμένης εὐθὺς προσεκύνησε καὶ τὸ διάδημα περιέθηκεν** (173C) – **Ἀριαμένης δ’**

strife for power will be further thematized in the remainder of the Persian section and beyond.³²⁰ II relates how the king treats the Babylonians harshly after their failed revolt. The opening word (ὀργισθείς) is quite telling: Xerxes is angry and loses his temper. What follows is an excessive and humiliating penalty (173C). The association anger–excess will also be further explored in the remainder of the monarchical section. *Xerxes* III and IV are closely connected with each other, dealing with the king’s expedition against the Greeks: he refuses to eat Attic figs as long as he has not conquered Attica (173C), and allows spies to inspect his camp after catching them (173C).³²¹ Thus, III resumes the theme of possession, which will be continued in the following sections; in IV, Xerxes shows himself to be a gentle ruler: even though one might argue that this story instead shows his confidence in his troops and perhaps even his arrogance, the emphasis falls on the fact that he did the spies no harm (note the phrase οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν, 173C). Xerxes’ leniency thus dominates, which contrasts with *Xerxes* II. Again, mildness is a main theme in what follows, but IV also ensures that the readers have to deal with contradictory stories: they should wonder whether the king truly was lenient.

3.1.4 Four Sections on Artaxerxes Mnemon (173D–174B)

Artaxerxes Mnemon (173F–174A) is to be interpreted in connection with the surrounding sections, all of which describe not only their own protagonists, but this king as well. First, the subsection on his grandfather, *Artaxerxes Longimanus* (173DE), invites the reader to compare his character with that of his namesake. The section has two main themes, closely connected with each other and with the preceding sections: the theme of giving and taking, recalling *Cyrus* III (172EF), *Darius* III–IV (173A), and *Xerxes* III (173C); and the theme of punishing, announced by *Xerxes*

εὐθὺς ἀναπηδήσας προσεκύνησε τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ λαβόμενος τῆς δεξιᾶς εἰς τὸν θρόνον ἐκάθισε τὸν βασιλείον (488F), in *Xerxes* I, Ariamenes puts the crown on Xerxes’ head; in *De frat. am.*, he places his brother on the throne: a note might have contained both elements; ὁ δὲ Ξέρξης ἐκέλευε τὴν δευτέραν μεθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἔδωκε τάξιν (173C) – ἐκ τούτου μέγιστος ἦν παρ’ αὐτῷ καὶ παρείχεν εὐνοῦν ἑαυτόν (488F) do not agree verbally: the combination παρ’ αὐτῷ and μέγιστος of 488F occurs earlier in *Xerxes* I, while the combination of δίδωμι, δεύτερος and μεθ’ ἑαυτὸν of 173C occurs in the corresponding place of *De frat. am.* (488E).

³²⁰ Brotherly love was close to Plutarch’s heart, as *De frat. am.* testifies. On the importance he attached to family, see Albin (1997), esp. 67–68 on brotherly harmony; see Bannon (1995) for the *Lives*.

³²¹ *Xerxes* III (173C): Ἀττικὰς δ’ ἰσχάδας – negation of the predicate (with added part. aor.) – ἀλλ’; IV (173C): Ἑλληνας δὲ κατασκόπους – negation of the predicate (with added part. aor.) – ἀλλά.

II (173C). *Artaxerxes Longimanus* I is a standard opening apophthegm (173D):

Ἀρτοξέρξης ὁ Ξέρξου, ὁ μακρόχειρ προσαγορευθεὶς διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν χεῖρα μακροτέραν ἔχειν, ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ προσθεῖναι τοῦ ἀφελεῖν βασιλικώτερόν ἐστι.

Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, called “Longhand,” because of his having one hand longer than the other, used to say that it is more kingly to give to one who has than to take away.

The section is introduced by typical components, such as the king’s name, family ties, his nickname (ὁ μακρόχειρ) and its explanation. Plutarch also had a clear reason to include this specific saying: it suggests a link between the nickname and the importance which the king attaches to the act of giving, although the author clearly recognizes that it originates from his physical appearance.³²² This ‘false connection’ thus creates the impression that Artaxerxes I got his nickname from how others, or perhaps he himself, assessed his moral virtues, and not just from how he looked.³²³ In this way, the apophthegm is similar to *Cyrus* I, which also connects physical appearance with the evaluation of character (172E). This suggests that both men were rulers of the same kind, or at least that Artaxerxes desired to equal the elder king in terms of his greatness.

In *Artaxerxes Longimanus* II, the king allows his fellow hunters to shoot before him (173D). III narrates how he only mildly punishes bad leaders (173D).³²⁴ Both illustrate his kindness and justice, which distinguish him – as well as his successors, as is the suggestion at this point – from predecessors such as Darius and Xerxes. This is emphasized by the double occurrence of *πρῶτος δέ* (173D) at the outset of these apophthegms and by the wordplay in II (173D: *Πρῶτος δὲ πρωτοβολεῖν*). More specifically, the theme of mild punishments contrasts with *Xerxes* II (173BC). The same goes for *Artaxerxes Longimanus* IV: Satibarzanes, who attempts to make the king do something unjust for money, is not punished, but even receives the sum he was promised (173DE). Once

³²² As he also does in *Art.* 1.1, quoted *infra*, p. 108. See also Binder (2008) 83: “Das Epitheton wird einerseits rational aufgrund einer körperlichen Anomalie, wie hier bei Plutarch (u. a. auch *mor.* 173D; Strabon 15, 3, 21 kennt den Beinamen ebenfalls und erklärt ihn auch rational, allerdings nicht in Bezug auf Artaxerxes, sondern fälschlicherweise auf Dareios)”.

³²³ On physiognomy in Plutarch, see Georgiadou (1992b); Tatum (1995) and (1996), focusing on kings.

³²⁴ The story is alluded to in *De aud. poet.* 35F and in *De sera num.* 565A (not mentioning Artaxerxes I, see Almagor (2018) 274).

more, justice and mildness are combined. *Artaxerxes Longimanus* II, III, and IV thus confirm the positive image established by I.

But there is more to this opening apophthegm. Several similarities in terms of wording refer back to the image of the character of Artaxerxes Mnemon at the outset of the dedicatory letter, which calls for comparison.³²⁵ At a second reading there, a more nuanced image of Artaxerxes Mnemon arose and questions had to be asked about his actual disposition. This is different from *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, of which a straightforward interpretation suffices. The *Life of Artaxerxes* is in line with this. At the outset of the *Life*, Plutarch also describes the nickname of the protagonist's grandfather, whose positive image remains intact (*Art.* 1.1):

Ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Ἀρτοξέρξης, τῶν ἐν Πέρσαις βασιλέων πραότητι καὶ μεγαλοψυχία πρωτεύσας, Μακρόχειρ ἐπεκαλεῖτο, τὴν δεξιὰν μείζονα τῆς ἐτέρας ἔχων, Ξέρξου δ' ἦν υἱός [...].

The first Artaxerxes, preëminent among the kings of Persia for gentleness and magnanimity, was surnamed Longimanus, because his right hand was longer than his left, and was the son of Xerxes [...].

In a later passage, Artaxerxes Mnemon is explicitly compared with his grandfather (*Art.* 4.4):³²⁶

Ἦν δέ τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ βασιλέως, ἐπιείκεια φαινόμενη τοῖς πολλοῖς. ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ καὶ πάνυ ζηλοῦν ἔδοξε τὴν Ἀρτοξέρξου τοῦ ὁμωνύμου πραότητα, ἠδίω θ' ἑαυτὸν παρέχων ἐντυγχάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ τὸ τιμᾶν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ὑπερβάλλον, κολάσεως δὲ πάσης ἀφαιρῶν τὸ ἐφυβρίζον καὶ ἠδόμενον, ἐν <δὲ> τῷ δέχεσθαι χάριτας οὐχ ἦττον τοῖς διδοῦσιν ἢ τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν ἐν [δὲ] τῷ διδόναι φαινόμενος εὐχαρις καὶ φιλόανθρωπος.

There was, too, a certain **dilatoriness** in the nature of the king, which most people **took for** clemency. Moreover, in the beginning **he appeared** to be altogether emulous of the gentleness of the Artaxerxes

³²⁵ Compare the saying of *Artaxerxes Longimanus* I with that of Artaxerxes II in the letter: both combine a form of βασιλικός with a saying about giving and taking; see also *supra*, note 304.

³²⁶ Note the focus on presents and punishments, also the main themes in *Artaxerxes Longimanus* I (173D), as observed by Almagor (2018) 274–275, who concludes that it is possible (275) “that both anecdotes belong to a certain *hypomnema* and that while composing the *Artaxerxes* Plutarch transferred these stories from Artaxerxes I to the protagonist of the biography, using the comment on the ‘imitation’ of Artaxerxes I (*Art.* 4.4: ζηλοῦν ἔδοξε τὴν Ἀρτοξέρξου τοῦ ὁμωνύμου πραότητα) to justify this transference”.

whose name he bore, **showing himself** very agreeable in intercourse, and bestowing greater honours and favours than were really deserved, while from all his punishments he took away the element of insult or vindictive pleasure, and in his acceptance and bestowal of favours **appeared** no less gracious and kindly to the givers than to the recipients.

It is significant that Artaxerxes I is called gentle and magnanimous without qualification in the first words of this biography, while in the case of the second passage, all emphasis is placed on how the younger Artaxerxes appeared to be (as highlighted by the underlined words), rather than on his actual disposition.³²⁷ This leaves open the question of whether he was a real or only a fake imitator of his grandfather. One notices a similar difference between the characters of grandfather and grandson when comparing the dedicatory letter and *Artaxerxes Longimanus*.

There is also a tension between the unambiguous *Artaxerxes Longimanus* and the following Persian apophthegms. As Almagor points out, all of these (173E–174B), except for the last one (*Memnon*, 174B), are related to Artaxerxes Mnemon through family relations and explicit references to him.³²⁸ The picture is problematic. First, there is a section on his brother, Cyrus the Younger (173EF). This man tries to convince the Spartans to assist him on his expedition, by first comparing himself with Artaxerxes Mnemon, claiming (173E)

τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καρδίαν ἔχειν βαρυτέραν καὶ πλείονα πίνειν ἄκρατον αὐτοῦ καὶ φέρειν βέλτιον· ἐκεῖνον δὲ μόλις ἐν ταῖς θήραις ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων μένειν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δεινοῖς μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου.

that he had a stouter heart than his brother, and that he could drink more strong wine than his brother could and carry it better; moreover, that at hunts his brother could hardly stay on his horse, and at a time of terror not even on his throne.

This saying has a double function: (1) it indirectly informs the reader of what Cyrus' expedition is about, viz. taking the throne from his brother, thereby resuming a topic from *Xerxes* I (civic harmony and brotherly

³²⁷ According to Mossman (2010) 150, “this passage is beginning to prepare the reader for the dramatic change in Artaxerxes' practice later in the life”. See also Almagor (2018) 279 on φαινόμενος.

³²⁸ Almagor (2018) 276: “the figure of Artaxerxes Mnemon dominates the second part of the Persian section, as four of the last five persons are introduced interacting with him: Cyrus talks of his brother, Parysatis is presented as his mother and Orontes as his son-in-law”.

strife, 173BC),³²⁹ (2) and, of more direct concern, it contrasts a harsh Cyrus with a soft Artaxerxes Mnemon. This second point is important, as it is also related to the question of whether Artaxerxes is a true Persian or not: at the outset of the collection, Cyrus the Great describes the Persians precisely in terms of their roughness (he claims that his subjects should be like their land). A character's conformity with his cultural heritage is a recurrent theme throughout the collection and is often connected with the right to rule.

In the next section (173F–174A), the reader can explore whether Artaxerxes' softness is weakness, as Cyrus implies, or gentleness.³³⁰ In the first apophthegms (173F–174A), the second option seems to prevail. *Artaxerxes Mnemon* I calls his friendly grandfather to mind: he allows everyone to speak with him or with his wife (173F).³³¹ Similar kindness appears from II and III (174A):

2. Πένητος δ' ἀνθρώπου μῆλον ὑπερφυῆς μεγέθει προσενέγκαντος αὐτῷ δεξάμενος ἠδέως 'νή τὸν Μίθραν' εἶπεν 'οὗτός μοι δοκεῖ καὶ πόλιν ἂν ἐκ μικρᾶς μεγάλην πιστευθεῖς ἀπεργάσασθαι.

3. Ἐν δὲ φυγῇ τινι τῆς ἀποσκευῆς αὐτοῦ διαρπαγείσης ξηρὰ σῦκα φαγῶν καὶ κρίθινον ἄρτον 'οῖαζ' εἶπεν 'ἠδονῆς ἀπειρος ἤμην.'

2. A poor man brought to him an apple of extraordinary size which he accepted with pleasure, and at the same time he remarked, "By Mithras I swear it seems to me that this man would make a big city out of a small one if it were entrusted to his charge."³³²

³²⁹ The apophthegm occurs, besides a short reference in *Quaest. conv.* 620C, in *Art.* 6.2–4 too, introducing the beginning of Cyrus' war against his brother.

³³⁰ In the *Life*, the story has a similar function. According to Mossman (2010) 150, the "reader may well end up believing what Cyrus says of his brother in 6".

³³¹ In *Art.* 5.6, the apophthegm concludes a series of stories illustrating 4.4 quoted above. In the *Life*, then, the story receives all the emphasis, also illustrated by the comment that this action of the king "gratified the Persians most of all" (μάλιστα κεχαρισμένην ὄψιν παρέιχε τοῖς Πέρσαις). That Artaxerxes Mnemon allowed everyone to speak with himself as well is not told in the *Life*, but coincides with two stories earlier in the chapter (5.2–3). Plutarch also refers to the Persian (and 'barbaric') custom of secluding women in *Them.* 26.4–5. Volkman (1869) 228 sees a problem in the deviation οἱ δεόμενοι (173F) – ταῖς δημότισιν (*Art.* 5.6). The version of 173F, where anyone is allowed to speak to the king's wife, is definitely more powerful, but the variation might also be the consequence of a scribal error; cf. Nachstädt (1971) 7: "αἱ δεόμεναι? Na. cf. ταῖς δημότισιν v. *Art.*"

³³² In the account of *Art.* 4.5 Artaxerxes Mnemon accepts a pomegranate instead of an apple (174A: μῆλον). Almagor (2018) 276–277 argues that this could be the consequence of Plutarch's literary choice, but he prefers another explanation: *Art.* 4.5 reads ῥόαν μίαν

3. Once in a precipitate retreat his baggage was plundered, and as he ate dry figs and barley-bread he exclaimed, “What a pleasure is this which has never been mine before!”³³³

Various elements again recall the dedicatory letter. First, II resembles Artaxerxes’ apophthegm in 172B in terms of content and wording.³³⁴ The account of the corresponding *Life* has different wording in some of these cases,³³⁵ which suggests that *Artaxerxes Mnemon* II contains secondary changes in order to establish a closer relationship with the letter. Second, since III (174A) is in line with II (in both stories, the king appears to be happy with small things), it similarly refers back to the dedicatory letter. Finally, Artaxerxes reacts after a misfortune, which recalls Seiramnes’ saying (172D).

The precise relevance of all these connections with the letter will become clear below, after a discussion of *Orontes* (174B), but first there is *Parysatis* (174A):

Παρύσατις ἢ Κύρου καὶ Ἀρτοξέρξου μήτηρ ἐκέλευε τὸν βασιλεῖ
μέλλοντα μετὰ παρρησίας διαλέγεσθαι βυσσίνους χρῆσθαι ῥήμασιν.

Parysatis, the mother of Cyrus and Artaxerxes, advised that he who was intending to talk frankly with the king should use words of softest texture.

ὑπερφυῆ μεγέθει (for a full quotation, see *supra*, p. 87), so a forger could have read μῆλον instead of μίαν when inserting the passage into the collection. Yet a more likely explanation would be a misreading by Plutarch of his own notes, or a mistake during the transmission of the text.

³³³ *Artaxerxes Mnemon* III resembles *Art.* 12.5–6. There are also connections with similar apophthegms on the king: the story opening the dedicatory letter (172B), also told in *Art.* 5.1; and *Artaxerxes Mnemon* II (174A) and *Art.* 4.5 (two variants of the same story); see Almagor (2018) 114–118, arguing that these apophthegms are related to a story told by Ctesias and occurred in Plutarch’s notes.

³³⁴ Πένητος δ’ ἀνθρώπου (174A), cf. αὐτουργὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ιδιώτης (172B); προσενέγκαντος (174A), cf. προσήνεγκεν (172B); δεξάμενος ἠδέως (174A), cf. ἠδέως ἐδέξατο (172B); and μικρᾶς μεγάλην (174A), recalling τοῦ μεγάλα διδόναι τὸ μικρὰ λαμβάνειν (172B).

³³⁵ Πένητος δ’ ἀνθρώπου (174A) does not occur in *Art.* 4.5, which has ὤμισου τινὸς instead, but προσενέγκαντος (174A) can be found in the *Life* too. The combination δεξάμενος ἠδέως (174A) is not exactly the same in *Art.* 4.5 (προσεδέξατο προθύμως, but not part of the apophthegm). μικρᾶς μεγάλην (174A) occurs in both accounts: *Art.* 4.5 contains πλὴν ἂν ἐκ μικρᾶς ταχὺ ποιήσειε μεγάλην.

There are two reasons to regard this as a separate section, as do the modern editions: it seems to open with the name of a new main character and additional personal information, and it does not contain δέ. Yet there are better arguments for considering the saying part of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*: as a separate section, it would deviate from the chronological sequence; although Parysatis was a powerful woman at the Persian court,³³⁶ she does not really belong to the category of ἡγεμόνες, νομοθέται, and αὐτοκράτορες announced by the dedicatory letter; *Brasidas* (190BC) is another example of a section closing with a saying of the subject's mother; and, perhaps most importantly, the saying might shed light not only on Parysatis' character, but on that of Artaxerxes as well: the queen does not mention him by name, but one may reasonably conclude that she is advising others on how best to approach her son – the more so because Plutarch introduces her as his mother. In addition, δέ could have been left out because the king does not play an *active* role in the story. If this saying is to be interpreted as a guideline to speak to Artaxerxes Mnemon, the image of the king darkens: whoever wants to speak with him μετὰ παρρησίας, should use words “made of linen” (βυσσίνους χρῆσθαι ῥήμασιν). This phrase is often interpreted as “soft words”,³³⁷ but Almagor suggests another meaning: the expression refers to the concealing nature of cloth.³³⁸ Parysatis' saying, then, implies that talking frankly to her son might be dangerous. By speaking in general terms she demonstrates her own caution and contributes to the truth of this image. It is now clear that the king might be not that gentle.³³⁹ This reassessment of Artaxerxes' character again recalls Plutarch's practice in the dedicatory letter: one wonders whether this Persian king is as good as he seems, or, in line with the fourth chapter of the *Life of Artaxerxes*, whether his appearance is only an attempt to imitate the great character of his grandfather.³⁴⁰

Finally, there is *Orontes* (174B). Its one apophthegm is in line with the argument in the dedicatory letter about the way in which words uttered

³³⁶ On Parysatis, see Fiehn (1949) 2051.

³³⁷ See also the LCL translation: “words of softest texture”.

³³⁸ Almagor (2018) 277–278, in line with Gera (2007) 453, who still sticks to the interpretation of the softness of linen, but connects it with deception.

³³⁹ Paragraph from van der Wiel (2023a) 20–21 (with adaptations and additions).

³⁴⁰ *Art.* 4 still invited asking questions about Artaxerxes Mnemon, but *Art.* 30.9 (at the end of the *Life*) leaves no doubts: βιώσας μὲν ἐνενήκοντα καὶ τέσσαρ' ἔτη, βασιλεύσας δὲ δύο καὶ ἐξήκοντα, δόξας δὲ πρῶος εἶναι καὶ φιλυπήκοος οὐχ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸν υἱὸν Ὀχον, ὠμότητι καὶ μαιφονία πάντας ὑπερβαλόμενον (“He had lived ninety-four years, and had been king sixty-two, and had the reputation of being gentle and fond of his subjects; though this was chiefly due to his son Ochus, who surpassed all men in cruelty and blood-guiltiness”; see Binder (2008) 360 about the passage). δόξας δὲ πρῶος recalls ἔδοξε τὴν Ἀρτοξέρξου τοῦ ὁμωνύμου πραότητα (*Art.* 4.4).

in misfortune, and subsequent actions, illustrate character (172DE). Yet even though, in light of this, *Orontes* at first sight seems to say something about the section's subject, it again concerns Artaxerxes Mnemon as well: Orontes, his son-in-law, fell from his grace, and the only reason that is given is the vague δι' ὀργήν. This reference to anger as a motivation of the king's decision raises new questions about his character. Plutarch was familiar with all the negative consequences of anger and discussed them in detail in *De cohibenda ira*. It is therefore remarkable that parallels from other authors suggest that Artaxerxes' anger may have been not entirely unjustified. That Plutarch remains silent about the full facts of the case creates the impression that, even though Orontes might not have been guilty, the king still decided against him.³⁴¹ Actions of kings with regard to their friends are therefore compared with the fingers of mathematicians, based on their arbitrariness. This reminds one of the randomness of τύχη, although this motif is not *explicitly* thematized here. Thus, Seiramnes' apophthegm from the letter (172D) is recalled in various ways: by the way in which Orontes reacts to events beyond his power; because the character of Artaxerxes Mnemon is reassessed again; and because of the king's power over Orontes.

This connection between the dedicatory letter and the Persian section is relevant for the interpretation of the characters of the previous kings as well. The deceptive and dangerous nature and the contrasts between the true disposition and outward behaviour of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes Mnemon ensure that the readers realize that they are not dealing with essentially good monarchs, but with dangerous despots whose actions are unpredictable: in all three cases, an inconsistent image of the kings arises, which does not allow for a straightforward assessment of these whimsical characters. Thus, the connection between a king and arbitrariness established by Seiramnes (172D, note the juxtaposition τὴν τύχην μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως) suddenly has relevance beyond the interpretation of the letter.

3.1.5 Memnon (174B)

With this section, Plutarch seems to deviate from the general geographical structure of the collection: Memnon was not Persian, but Greek. Yet he fought on the Persian side, and closing the Persian section with a Greek evokes Alexander's conquest and transformation of the Persian

³⁴¹ Babbitt (1931) 20 reads διὰ κατηγορίαν instead of δι' ὀργήν, based on Diodorus Siculus XV.10–11: when Tiribazus was accused by Orontes, he listed all his deeds which favoured the king, after which he was acquitted. This led to the punishment of Orontes. One understands why Babbitt changed the text, but the vagueness of δι' ὀργήν is probably intended by Plutarch.

Empire with which the Chaeronean inevitably had to conclude this part.³⁴² In this context, the absence of Darius III is quite telling: the Persian section ends with Ἀλεξάνδρῳ as its final word, providing a striking pendant of Πέρσαι at the outset (172E).³⁴³ Furthermore, the presence of a Greek goes hand in hand with the theme of cultural identity that dominates the collection, often related to παιδεία and moral superiority: Memnon respects his opponent and asks his soldiers to do the same. Thus, after a series of apophthegms that highlight the negative sides of Persian despotism, this story closes the section on a positive note. This is in line with how Plutarch concludes other sections on peoples, as will become clear.

3.2 The Egyptian Kings (174C)

Οἱ Αἰγυπτίων βασιλεῖς κατὰ νόμον ἑαυτῶν τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐξώρκιζον ὅτι, κἂν βασιλεύς τι προστάξῃ κρῖναι τῶν μὴ δικαίων, οὐ κρινούσι.

The kings of the Egyptians, in accordance with a rule of their own, used to require their judges to swear that, even if the king should direct them to decide any case unfairly, they would not do so.

This one element of the Egyptian section can hardly be regarded as a real apophthegm, as it does not concern one person but rather describes a custom of all pharaohs. By including it after the Persians, Plutarch also deviates from the general chronology. In this way, it marks a break and separates units at a larger level of the text: the Persian section is emphatically distinguished from the Thracians and Scythians, two barbarian peoples that inhabit different parts of the world and have a completely different way of living. This is in line with the strange inclusion of Memnon, which contributes to this same effect: the ring composition it creates (Πέρσαι ... Ἀλεξάνδρῳ) marks the Persian part as a separate unit. Yet this distinction between Persians and Thracians/Scythians does not mean that certain themes are not continued: the break rather illustrates Plutarch's conception of barbarism, as will be discussed in Part III, chapter 2.1.

³⁴² Pace Almagor (2018) 273: "Now, the inclusion of the Rhodian Memnon, Darius Codomannus' commander of Greek mercenaries, in the Persian section (174b) would not appear to have been made by Plutarch. It would seem to correspond to a Roman division of mankind into Romans and *externi*."

³⁴³ Almagor (2018) 273–274.

3.3 Barbarian Disarray (174C–F)

Three explicit references to historical events show that there is a chronology in the Thracian and Scythian sections as a whole:³⁴⁴ the first Thracian king belongs to the earliest period of the Trojan War (174C: ἐν τῷ Τρωϊκῷ πολέμῳ); the first Scythian king lived during the Persian Wars (174E: ἐφ' ὃν διέβη Δαρεῖος); the Scythian Anteus was a contemporary of Philip of Macedonia (174E: Ἀντέας ἔγραφε πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον and τοὺς δὲ πρέσβεις τοῦ Φιλίππου).³⁴⁵ This is an indication that both sections should be read together, as can also be seen from the fact that they contain apophthegms of three historical figures which are structured in a parallel way and are mutually connected by thematic similarities and by their wording: Poltys, the first character of the Thracian section, is thematically linked with Idanthysus, the first of the Scythian section; Teres, the second Thracian, with Anteus, the second Scythian; and Cotys, the third Thracian, with Scilurus, the third Scythian:

[I] The names at the outset of *Poltys* (174C) and *Idanthysus* (174E) are introduced in a similar way.³⁴⁶ Both stories concern a king's ties with a Greek and an oriental people.³⁴⁷ A war has started and the king attempts to put an end to it: Poltys, one of the few legendary figures in the collec-

³⁴⁴ The same almost holds true for the actual chronology: in the sequence Poltys (174C, on the Trojan War) – Teres (174CD, see Babbitt (1931) 23: “King of the Odryssae in Thrace in the earlier part of the fifth century B.C.”) – Cotys (174D, see Babbitt (1931) 24: “King of Thrace, 382–358 B.C.”) – Idanthysus (174E, a contemporary of Darius) – Anteus (174EF, a contemporary of Philip) – Scilurus (174F, see Babbitt (1931) 27: “King of the Scythians, second or first century B.C.”), only Idanthysus seems out of place.

³⁴⁵ *Anteus* III on the captured flute player *Ismenias* (174EF) might originate from diplomatic contacts between the Scythian and the Macedonian king too, see Gardiner-Garden (1989) 33: “Though *Ismenias*' skill, wit and life-style were the subject of many anecdotes, though a meeting between *Ismenias* and the barbarian King *Ateas* may have been fabricated for its comic value, and though *Ismenias* is unlikely to have been captured by *Ateas* when it was *Ateas* who was defeated by Philip, it is possible that *Ismenias* made an appearance at *Ateas*' court as a member of one of Philip's ambassadorial parties.” Stadter (1989) 56–57 gives an overview of this *Ismenias*' and his namesakes' appearances throughout Plutarch's oeuvre.

³⁴⁶ *Poltys*: Πόλτυς ὁ Θρακῶν βασιλεύς (174C) – *Idanthysus*: Ἰδάνθυρσος ὁ Σκυθῶν βασιλεύς (174E).

³⁴⁷ Note *Poltys*: Αἰχαιῶν (174C) – *Idanthysus*: Ἰώνων (174E) and *Poltys*: Τρώων (174C) – *Idanthysus*: Persians led by Δαρεῖος (174E). Plutarch establishes a link between *Agessilaus*' campaign against the Persians and *Agamemnon*'s expedition in *Ages.*; see Nevin (2014) 50–59. On the connection between Greeks (including Alexander the Great) and the Greeks of the *Iliad*, on the one hand, and that between both Romans and Barbarians and the Trojans, on the other, see Bréchet (2008).

tion, tries to prevent the Trojan War; Idanthysus asks for help from the Ionians against Darius. Both kings fail.

[2] The relationship between *Teres* (174CD) and *Anteas* (174EF) is more complex. In the one apophthegm of this first section, connected with *Polys* by the theme of war, the king says that he does not differ from his grooms (τῶν ἵπποκόμων) in times of peace. *Anteas* contains three apophthegms, which are a clear example of gradual shifting:³⁴⁸

<i>Anteas I</i>	<i>Anteas II</i>	<i>Anteas III</i>
Against <i>Philip</i> : Macedonians fight men, Scythians fight hunger and thirst (174E); πολεμεῖν	Against <i>Philip</i> : Anteas is currying his <i>horse</i> himself and asks whether <i>Philip</i> would do this as well; the negative answer surprises him (174E); πόλεμον	When he hears flute music, Anteas says he would rather hear his <i>horse</i> neighing (174EF)

Both *Teres* and *Anteas* thus refer to fighting,³⁴⁹ but the clearest similarity is the equation of the kings with ἵπποκόμοι.³⁵⁰ This can be read as a representation of these protagonists as humble men, especially in *Anteas II* (to a lesser extent also in *Teres*, dealing with peaceful times alone). Yet since such barbarian “absence of political organization is usually seen as a lack of civilization” in Plutarch’s works,³⁵¹ a similar judgement might make more sense here too. More importantly, however, both sections illustrate that war is the only thing that matters for these rulers. This is the most straightforward interpretation of *Teres*,³⁵² but a similar position was apparently taken by *Anteas*, as can be seen from *Anteas III*.

Interestingly, *Teres* is told about *Anteas* in *An seni* 792C.³⁵³ This could simply be a case of *Anekdotenwanderung*,³⁵⁴ but there are various other possible explanations: Plutarch could have made a mistake in one of his two accounts, perhaps by copying and recopying his notes, for example when inserting the apophthegm from his notes (such as *Apophth. Lac.*)

³⁴⁸ In *De Al. Magn. fort.* 334B and in *Non posse* 1095EF, *Anteas III* is adduced as a negative example. The wording is almost entirely the same. See also Beck, M. (2003) 184 on *Anteas III* and the second Alexander oration. A wall of room 19 of a school in Trimithis also seems to refer to the story, see Criboire – Davoli (2013) 9.

³⁴⁹ *Teres*: στρατεύοιτο (174D) – *Anteas I*: πολεμεῖν (174E) and μάχεσθαι (174E).

³⁵⁰ *Teres*: ἵπποκόμων (174D) – *Anteas II*: ψήγων τὸν ἵππον (174E).

³⁵¹ Thus Schmidt, T. S. (2004) 229.

³⁵² The apophthegm also occurs in *An seni* 792A–D, there combined with many other stories (e.g. with accounts of *Darius I* [172F] and *Dionysius Maior IX* [176A]).

³⁵³ Volkmann (1869) 228 considers this an argument against authenticity.

³⁵⁴ See *supra*, p. 31 on Seiramnes, in line with Beck, M. (2002) 172.

into the ὑπόμνημα used for *An seni*.³⁵⁵ In this case, the attribution to Teres in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* would probably be the correct one. Yet in light of the parallel structure of the Thracian and Scythian sections, it is perhaps not unlikely that the attribution to Anteus is the original one, and that Plutarch deliberately changed the main figure in the apophthegm collection in order to complete the parallelism.

[3] In *Cotys* I, the king accepts a leopard and gives a lion in return (174D). In II, presents are received and given as well: because of his irascible nature, the king destroys vessels in order that, when someone were to break these, he would not punish this person too severely out of anger (δι' ὀργήν, 174D). This strange way of expressing gratitude evokes a lack of self-control. At the same time, the connection between anger and excessive punishment also recalls some Persian apophthegms: *Xerxes* II (173C) and especially *Orontes* (174B, also containing δι' ὀργήν) come to mind. In *Scilurus*, the king teaches his 80 sons that they will be strong as long as they work together, but that discord would destroy them, by showing that a bundle of spears cannot be destroyed, while each spear separately can easily be broken (174F).³⁵⁶ Another theme from the Persian section is continued, that is, the connection between civic harmony and brotherly love, the focus of *Xerxes* I (173BC) and *Cyrus Minor* (173EF).

Thematic connections between *Cotys* and *Scilurus*, then, are less clear. One can define their common theme as 'the importance of personal relations', in the first case concerning good friends, in the second with regard to family. This might not seem an obvious link, but the references to broken objects, expressed by similar words,³⁵⁷ are still a striking resemblance between the two sections and complete the parallelism:

[1] <i>Poltyx</i> and <i>Idanthysrus</i>	[2] <i>Teres</i> and <i>Anteus</i>	[3] <i>Cotys</i> and <i>Scilurus</i>
Political relations: diplomatic missions fail	Lack of political hierarchy; only war matters	Personal relations and their dangers; lack of self-control

³⁵⁵ See *supra*, note 114 on *hypomnemata*; on the use of such notes in *An seni*, see Xenophon (2012b).

³⁵⁶ In *De gar.* 511C the story is cited as a second example illustrating the truth of the following question (511B): οἱ δὲ συμβολικῶς ἄνευ φωνῆς ἃ δεῖ φράζοντες οὐκ ἐπαινοῦνται καὶ θαυμάζονται διαφερόντως; ("And are not those who indicate by signs, without a word, what must be done, praised and admired exceedingly?").

³⁵⁷ *Cotys* II (174D): εὐθραυστα, συνέτριπεν, συντρίβοντας – *Scilurus* (174F): καταθραῦσαι, συνέκλασε.

This parallel structure depicts the Thracians and Scythians as similar people and true barbarians: they are disorganized, often dangerously lack self-control, and do not know how to deal with others and other peoples. They provide food for moral reflection, but are clearly not *exempla* for the audience of readers. Yet Plutarch's image is not entirely negative, for the section again concludes on a wise note, as was the case with the Persian section: Scilurus recognized the importance of brotherly harmony.³⁵⁸

3.4 Sicilian Tyranny (175A–177A)

3.4.1 Gelon and Hiero (175A–C)

Gelon (175AB) contains four apophthegms. The first emphasizes the transition from the barbarian to the Greek part of the collection and seems to mark a break: Gelon defeats the Carthaginians, forbids them to sacrifice children to Cronus and thereby puts an end to an extremely barbaric custom (175A).³⁵⁹ These promising opening lines, however, are overshadowed by the section's final apophthegm, which relates how the tyrant asks to bring his horse to a party when music is played (175AB). This story recalls *Anteas* III (174EF; both apophthegms even contain a very similar structure)³⁶⁰ and compels the reader to reassess the character of the collection's first Greek, who turns out to be less civilized. This can also be seen from the two apophthegms framed by *Gelon* I and IV: in II, the tyrant orders his soldiers to work the land, not only in order to improve the fields, but also to prevent them from deteriorating (175A); in III, he promises to repay citizens after a war, which he eventually does (175A). One thus notices a gradual shift from a peaceful towards a more warlike ruler: while Gelon is establishing peace in his first apophthegm, he is training his soldiers in the second, and fights a war in the third. In the fourth and last apophthegm, vigour appears to be his absolute priority:

³⁵⁸ On positive barbarians in Plutarch, see *infra*, note 1167.

³⁵⁹ In *De sera num.* 552A the story illustrates that Gelon was one of the tyrants who changed for the better. González González (2019) discusses human sacrifice in Plutarch. The theme occurs in *Pel.* 21 (see Georgiadou (1997) 166–167), cf. *Am. narr.* 773B–774D; *Them.* 13; *Ages.* 5: in all these passages, the main figure is opposed to human sacrifices. Plutarch shares their opinion, cf. *De sup.* 171B–E, also referring to the Carthaginian habit. Gelon's victory is also referred to in *Tim.* 23.8.

³⁶⁰ *Anteas* III (174F) and *Gelon* IV (175AB) first describe the background of the event (music is played), after which a *genitivus absolutus* illustrates the reaction of the participants (174F: θαυμαζόντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων – 175AB: ἁρμοζομένων τῶν ἄλλων ἐφρῆξῆς καὶ ἄδόντων), subsequently contrasted with the reaction of the main character (174F: αὐτὸς ὤμοσεν – 175B: αὐτὸς ... ἀνεπήδησεν).

<i>Gelon I</i>	<i>Gelon II</i>	<i>Gelon III</i>	<i>Gelon IV</i>
175A: κατεπολέμησεν, εἰρήνην ποιούμενος	175A: ὡς ἐπὶ στρατεῖαν	175A: μετὰ τὸν πόλεμον	175B: αὐτὸς τὸν ἵππον εἰσαγαγεῖν

As a consequence, the break between the barbarian and Greek sections suddenly appears less clear, in that the theme of barbarian savagery is continued in the first Greek sayings.³⁶¹ Something similar appears from the next section on *Hiero* (175BC): *παρρησία* prevails, which is again not only relevant for the assessment of this tyrant. First, I and II display Hiero's general (twice an imperfect tense) opinions about what can and cannot be said. In I, he claims that everyone can always speak frankly to him, but II limits what can be said: ἀπόρρητα should not be shared (175B). In III, Hiero indeed appreciates frank speech (175B, cf. I).³⁶² In IV, Xenophanes of Colophon complains (is he asking for more money?), but Hiero does not give in (175C). In V, a comic poet is punished because of something inappropriate he said (175C: τὶ τῶν ἀπορρήτων, cf. II). The image of Hiero, then, is not (entirely) negative, but the exclusive focus on the theme of *παρρησία* recalls Persian despotism and the usual flattery at a court, especially in *Artaxerxes Mnemon* (173F–174B).³⁶³ Although the first sections of the Sicilian part are not to be assessed in an entirely negative way, since both Gelon and Hiero are definitely the 'better' tyrants,³⁶⁴ they are included in order to extend two important barbarian themes to this new part of the collection, albeit in a modified and more positive form. They thereby provide the framework within which the other Sicilian protagonists will be assessed.

3.4.2 The Dionysii (175C–176E)

Dionysius the Elder is the main figure of the Sicilian part: with thirteen apophthegms, *Dionysius Maior* (175C–176C) is the collection's first section of considerable length, as none of the preceding sections comprise more than five units. Two elements indicate that it is to be read in connection with the next one on his son (176C–E). First, *Dionysius Minor* opens in an unusual way, with δέ (176C). As the absence of the particle often marks a break, its presence indicates a continuation.³⁶⁵ Second, Dionysius the Younger twice plays a role in *Dionysius Maior* (III and IV,

³⁶¹ Bréchet (2004) discusses barbarism and savagery in Plutarch.

³⁶² In *De cap. ex inim.* 90B the story illustrates that obvious truths are more likely to be heard from one's enemies.

³⁶³ See in this context Mossman (2010) 148 on *Art.*: "Artaxerxes the man remains something of a vacuum. The real star of this life is the Persian court and its luxury and cruelty."

³⁶⁴ Cf. *De sera num.* 551F–552A (see *infra*, note 1151).

³⁶⁵ See van der Wiel (2023a) 3n11.

175DE); Dionysius the Elder appears twice in *Dionysius Minor* (IV and V, 176DE). In these apophthegms, they explicitly reflect upon each other's character. As a consequence, a central theme is the contrast between father and son, emphasized by the acquisition and preservation of absolute power by Dionysius the Elder at the outset of his section, and by the loss of power by his son at the end of *Dionysius Minor*.

a) *Dionysius Maior* (175C–176C)

Dionysius Maior I narrates how the man is chosen στρατηγός by the people of Syracuse (175C). In line with this, II deals with the early years of his despotic rule: he refuses to abstain from power because of a conspiracy, since, so he says, fear of death, so brief a moment, does not outweigh the loss of great power (175D). III and IV (175DE) seem to shift towards another topic: the relationship between the tyrant and his son, where the former seems to be the better of the two. After describing that the young man spoiled a free person's wife in III, Plutarch includes a short dialogue (175DE):

ἠρώτησε μετ' ὀργῆς, τί τοιοῦτον αὐτῷ συνοῖδεν. εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ νεανίσκου 'σὺ γὰρ οὐκ εἶχες πατέρα **τύραννον**' 'οὐδὲ σὺ' εἶπεν 'υἱὸν ἕξεις, ἔάν μὴ παύσῃ ταῦτα ποιῶν.'

he asked the young man, with some heat, what act of his father's he knew of like that! And when the youth answered, "None, for you did not have a despot for a father." "Nor will you have a son," was the reply, "unless you stop doing this sort of thing."

The difference between the characters of the two Dionysii is further emphasized by IV: when the tyrant finds out that his son kept all the cups he once gave him and never made any friends with them, he cries out that there is no tyrant in him (175E: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν σοὶ **τύραννος**). These two apophthegms are not independent from the preceding in terms of the way in which Dionysius the Elder obtained and maintained power: his character is a despotic one, in contrast to that of his son, who will lose tyrannical power (in *Dionysius Minor* III–V, 176DE). This provides a (first) possible answer to the question of why Dionysius the Elder preserved his power, while the Younger lost it – a question which will explicitly be asked twice in *Dionysius Minor* IV and V (176DE), redirecting the reader to this comparison of father and son.³⁶⁶

This despotic nature of the elder Dionysius' reign becomes apparent from the remaining apophthegms (V–XIII, 175E–176C). Not all of these are necessarily (entirely) negative: some seem to describe the tyrant's attempts to improve his subjects. In *Dionysius Maior* VII (175F), for ex-

³⁶⁶ Discussed more in detail in the analysis of 176DE below.

ample, he aims to keep the citizens away from getting drunk and dining. Other apophthegms might at first sight seem to point out clever insights or actions, for instance V (175EF: a clever way of collecting taxes), X (176AB: the tyrant finds out who is genuinely hostile to him), and XI (176B: he avoids being the most hated man). Yet Dionysius' true motives behind these (apparently) positive or clever stories might not always be that admirable: the tyrant's eventual goal in VII (175F) was probably rather to avoid his subjects being able to gather, as one would expect from a suspicious despot (cf. the final words μετ' ἀλλήλων, receiving all the emphasis); and in the seemingly positive story of XIII (176BC), where he teaches a man to make use of his riches, a more negative interpretation is possible too, as the story seems to depict the lawlessness of the Sicilian political system.

Taking a general look at all these stories together, then, one cannot help but conclude that different themes arise which characterize a tyrannical rule,³⁶⁷ and some of which also recall barbarian despotism: arbitrariness (which can lead to fear and hate by the people of the tyrant), hate and fear by the people of their tyrant (which can lead to conspiracies, if the fear is not too great), and the fear by the tyrant of (conspiracies of) his subjects (which can lead to arbitrary actions). Arbitrariness appears from V, VI,³⁶⁸ VII, XI, and XIII; fear and/or hate by the people from V, VII, VIII, X, and XII; fear by the tyrant from VII, VIII, X and XI, and perhaps also from IX (Dionysius hopes he will never have leisure time: one might conclude from this saying that the suspicious tyrant can never let down his guard, because he is always examining his opponents).³⁶⁹ At the very least, one can say that the relationship between Dionysius the Elder and his subjects, based as it is on mutual hate and fear, is not a particularly healthy one. This is entirely in line with how his rule is described in the *Life of Dion* (9.3):

Οὕτω γὰρ ἦν ἄπιστος καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους ὑποπτος καὶ προβεβλημένος διὰ φόβον ὁ πρεσβύτερος Διονύσιος, ὥστε...

³⁶⁷ Tyranny is an important theme in *Sept. sap. conv.*: see Aalders (1977); Leão (2009). See also Mossman (1997) 123: “Periander is undoubtedly excluded from the Seven, as Aalders suggests, because he is a tyrant”.

³⁶⁸ The story also occurs in *Sol.* 20.7.

³⁶⁹ *An seni* 792C combines the story with two other apophthegms that occur in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, see also *supra*, note 352. The reader of the collection will probably notice the same similarities, esp. between *Dionysius Maior* IX (176A) and *Teres* (174CD; cf. σχολάζοι in both apophthegms). This second apophthegm, however, concerns the flourishing of rulers in wars, but the surrounding apophthegms of *Dionysius Maior* IX lead to another interpretation.

For the elder Dionysius was so distrustful and suspicious towards every body, and his fear led him to be so much on his guard, that...

A series of anecdotes then illustrates the truth of this.

Finally, it should be noted that the image of Dionysius the Elder in the collection is again a problematic one. His first four apophthegms seem to give a positive image (even though the conspiracy referred to in II is already quite telling), as they highlight the tyrant's strength and concern with his son's morality, whereas the despotic actions and sayings in the second part seem to deconstruct this.

b) *Dionysius Minor* (176C–E)

The section on the elder Dionysius' son typically opens with a general saying of the historical figure: he claims that he does not surround himself with σοφισταί out of admiration for them, but because he wants to be admired through them (176C). *Dionysius Minor* II shows that he is not lying on this point, for when the διαλεκτικός Polyxenus says that he had confuted him, he reacts (176CD):

‘ἀμέλει τοῖς λόγοις’ εἶπεν ‘ἐγὼ δέ σε τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλέγχω· τὰ γὰρ σεαυτοῦ καταλιπὼν ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ θεραπεύεις.’

“Yes, very likely by your words, but by your deeds I confute you; for you forsake your own affairs, and pay court to me and mine.”

This Polyxenus was sent to the tyrant by none other than Plato,³⁷⁰ who is referred to in III. After his loss of power, Dionysius the Younger is asked how Plato was of use to him. He replies that he could more easily bear

³⁷⁰ Cf. Plato's spurious *Second Letter* 314cd, addressed to Dionysius the Younger: *περὶ δὲ Πολυξένου* ἐθαύμασας ὅτι πέμψαιμί σοι· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ περὶ Λυκόφρονος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρὰ σοὶ ὄντων λέγω καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ *διαλεχθῆναι* καὶ φύσει καὶ τῇ μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων πάμπολυ διαφέρεις αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἐκὼν *ἐξελέγγεταί*, ὡς τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντες (“You were surprised at my sending Polyxenus to you; but now as of old I repeat the same statement about Lycophrone also and the others you have with you, that, as respects dialectic, you are far superior to them all both in natural intelligence and in argumentative ability; and I maintain that if any of them is beaten in argument, this defeat is not voluntary, as some imagine, but involuntary”) – *Dionysius Minor* II (176CD): *Πολυξένου* δὲ τοῦ *διαλεκτικοῦ* φήσαντος αὐτὸν *ἐξελέγγειν* ‘ἀμέλει τοῖς λόγοις’ εἶπεν ‘ἐγὼ δέ σε τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλέγχω κτλ. Plutarch knew Plato's *Letters* and considered them authentic: on Plato's letters and Plutarch's *Life of Dion*, see Porter (1979a) XXII–XXVII, defending the authenticity of the letters referred to by Plutarch; on Plutarch's use of Plato's *Seventh Letter* for the *Life of Dion*, see Beneker (2012) 87–102 (also briefly De Blois (1992) 4605; Teodorsson (2005b) 225–226);

the whims of fortune (176D: τύχης μεταβολήν) thanks to the philosopher. In this way, the apophthegm provides a connection between the previous and the next two sayings, in which Dionysius twice answers the question of why he lost his power (176DE):

4. Ἐρωτηθεὶς δὲ πῶς ὁ μὲν πατὴρ αὐτοῦ πένης ὦν καὶ ιδιώτης ἐκτήσατο τὴν Συρακοσίων ἀρχήν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἔχων καὶ τυράννου παῖς ὦν [πῶς] ἀπέβαλεν, ὁ μὲν πατήρ' ἔφη 'μισουμένης δημοκρατίας ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐγὼ δὲ φθονουμένης τυραννίδος.'

5. Ὑπ' ἄλλου δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐρωτηθεὶς ὁ πατήρ' ἔφη 'μοι τὴν τυραννίδα τὴν ἐαυτοῦ κατέλιπεν, οὐ τὴν τύχην.'

4. On being asked how his father, who was a poor man and a private citizen, had gained control over the Syracusans, and how he, who held control, and was the son of a despot, had come to lose it, he said, “My father embarked upon his venture at a time when democracy was hated, but I at a time when despotism was odious.”

5. Being asked this same question by another man,³⁷¹ he said, “My father bequeathed to me his kingdom, but not his luck.”

IV and V both illustrate the truth of III: as often, the way in which a historical figure deals with the τύχης μεταβολή is precisely demonstrated by a reference to the change of events and τύχη (similar to Seiramnes' saying in the dedicatory letter, 172D). Thus, *Dionysius Minor* is in its entirety a clear example of gradual shifting:

<i>Dion. Min. I</i>	<i>Dion. Min. II</i>	<i>Dion. Min. III</i>	<i>Dion. Min. IV</i>	<i>Dion. Min. V</i>
176C: <i>Σοφιστάς</i>	176C: Πολυξένου τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ (sent by <i>Plato</i>)	176D: <i>Πλάτων</i> Ἐκπεσῶν δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς	176D: ἀρχήν ... ἀπέβαλεν ὁ μὲν πατήρ	176D: τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐρωτηθεὶς ὁ πατήρ

Occhipinti (2016) 151; for an overview of parallels between Plutarch's oeuvre and Plato's *Letters*, see Jones, R. M. (1980) 119 (not mentioning *Dionysius Minor* II).

³⁷¹ As Babbitt (1931) 36 points out, this man is Philip of Macedonia in the account of Aelian's *Varia historia* XII.60. It is difficult to tell whether Plutarch's note contained Philip's name, but he definitely knew about his meeting with Dionysius (*Tim.* 15.7). Perhaps he deliberately omitted Philip: all the focus should be on Dionysius.

The first two apophthegms rather shed a negative light on the tyrant, who only seems to care about his reputation, but the final two illustrate a certain greatness in his character. The placement of III at the core of the section, referring to Plato's influence and marking a change, is significant: Plutarch paints not only a generally positive image of the Syracusan's final years,³⁷² but also depicts him as a kind of philosopher.

The references to Dionysius the Elder in III and IV redirect the reader to the first four apophthegms of the preceding section (175C–E). Again, there is a reassessment of character, but this time the other way around: although *Dionysius Maior* III emphasizes the debauchery of Dionysius the Younger (175DE), and *Dionysius Maior* IV at first sight his greed, but at a closer look also his indolence because he did nothing with the cups he received (175E: φίλον οὐδένα σεαυτῷ πεποίηκας), a rather noble personality comes to light through his own sayings. The same dynamics can be found in the *Life of Timoleon* (14–15), where Plutarch discusses the younger Dionysius' behaviour after his arrival in Corinth, following his loss of power. First, the passage describes how people tried to explain his conduct, of which the first is in line with the image in *Dionysius Maior* III and IV (on his debauchery, cf. φιλακόλαστον in *Tim.* 14.4; and his laziness, cf. ῥάθυμον *ibid.*).³⁷³ Yet Plutarch disagrees with these explanations (*Tim.* 15.1):

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγοι τινὲς αὐτοῦ μνημονεύονται, δι' ὧν ἐδόκει συμφέρεσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν οὐκ ἀγεννῶς.

However, certain sayings of his are preserved, from which it would appear that he accommodated himself to his present circumstances not ignobly.

A series of apophthegms follows, the second of which is the same as *Dionysius Minor* III. This passage from the *Lives* thus confirms that *Dionysius Minor* III–V should be understood in a positive light. As in other cases, then, the process of moral reflection that is characteristic of the biographies is also desired to take place in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, despite the absence of contextual information.

³⁷² In the *Life*, Plutarch assesses the nature of the younger Dionysius in a positive way, but points out that lack of education was the greatest flaw in his character: as such, this was his father's fault (esp. *Dion* 9.2).

³⁷³ Although *Tim.* 14.4 is related to a later phase of the tyrant's life, it recalls the younger Dionysius' image in *Dionysius Maior* III and IV, where the young man appears to be a licentious (the rape story in III [175DE]) and indolent man (he keeps his cups, instead of using them to make friends in IV [175E]).

c) Comparison

The eventual question of this whole section is why Dionysius the Elder preserved power and why his son lost it. A first answer has to do with the characters of both men, as the implicit connection of *Dionysius Maior* I–II and III–IV suggests: the father is a true despot, and his reign can be defined as an oppressive regime (V–XIII, 175E–176C). If the fear which he intentionally invokes does not suffice to deter his subjects from conspiracies, his permanent watchfulness helps him to get rid of his opponents. The debauchery and worthless behaviour of his son, on the contrary, will prevent him from retaining power, one should conclude. Yet a second answer, provided by *Dionysius Minor* IV (176D) and V (176DE), is definitely ‘more true’: the elder Dionysius became powerful when the people hated democracy, but his son acquired power when tyranny was hated.³⁷⁴ And perhaps this hate was precisely the result of his father’s despotic rule, which the reader got to know about in *Dionysius Maior* V–XIII (175E–176C): suddenly, these apophthegms might in fact provide a guide to *losing* power. Opposite solutions for the same issue are therefore possible, and Plutarch’s morally problematizing position again requires an active readership.

3.4.3 Dion and Agathocles (176E–177A)

Agathocles (176EF) is placed before *Dion* (176F–177A), although one would expect the section about Dion to follow *Dionysius Minor*:³⁷⁵ Dion indeed put an end to Dionysius’ rule, as Plutarch mentions at the outset of his apophthegm. Thematic motivations seem to take precedence over the general chronological structure: *Agathocles* I and II, the second of which shares similar wording to the dedicatory letter to Trajan,³⁷⁶ refer to the protagonist’s humble origins as the son of a potter (υἱὸς ἦν κεραμέως, 176E) and recall *Dionysius Minor* IV, in which Dionysius the Elder is described as πένης and an ιδιώτης (176D).³⁷⁷ History, so it seems, is re-

³⁷⁴ In *Tim.*, Dionysius’ downfall is also explained by his bad luck and contrasted with Timoleon’s good fortune, a main theme in this *Life* (esp. *Tim.* 16.1). On τύχη in *Tim.*, see Ingenkamp (1997); De Blois (1997) 219–224; De Blois (2000); Teodorsson (2005b).

³⁷⁵ Agathocles ruled Syracuse from 317–289 BC, see Babbitt (1931) 37. After his return from banishment in 357 BC, Dion soon expelled Dionysius and acquired power in Syracuse; see Occhipinti (2016) 139–140.

³⁷⁶ An observation made by Citro (2017b) 13: “Un’espressione simile sia per la struttura sia il significato (avverbio + verbo: πρώως e μειδίω) si ritrova in un apoftegma della raccolta relativo ad Agatocle (Plu., Reg. et imp. apophth. 176F [...])”. See also Citro (2017a) 53.

³⁷⁷ *Agathocles* I (176E) occurs in *De se ipsum laud.* 544BC, for a comparison, see Citro (2014) 89–91; II (176EF) in *De coh. ira* 458EF, see again Citro (2014) 94–98; III (176F)

peating itself, and the Sicilian pendulum, which swings between freedom and tyranny, shifted again in the direction of this second political constitution.³⁷⁸ *Agathocles* therefore once more stresses the fruitlessness of tyrannical rule of which Dionysius the Younger spoke: every tyrant or despotic dynasty is doomed to be replaced by a new one.

Yet it is possible to escape from this cycle, as the one apophthegm in *Dion*, closing the Sicilian section, points out.³⁷⁹ After Dion put an end to Dionysius' tyranny, he hears that one of his best friends might be plotting against him (176E). This recalls the 'fear of the tyrant' in *Dionysius Maior*, but unlike what tyrants would do, Dion ignores these suspicions, since (176F–177A):³⁸⁰

βέλτιον εἶναι φήσας ἀποθανεῖν ἢ ζῆν μὴ μόνον τοὺς πολεμίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους φυλαττόμενον.

“It is better to die than to live in a state of continual watchfulness not only against one's enemies but also against one's friends.”

Plutarch left out some important elements. Callippus really plotted against Dion, who eventually died at his hands. It is therefore not surprising that Plutarch refers to this story in *De vitioso pudore* 530C as a negative example, claiming that Dion was killed because (LCL) “he was ashamed to take precautions against one who was his friend and guest” (αἰσχυνθεὶς φυλάττεσθαι φίλον ὄντα καὶ ξένον). The version of the *Life of Dion*, however, does not contain any reference to Dion's shame, which was probably an adaptation of Plutarch in order to fit in the apophthegm with the context of *De vitioso pudore*, but gives another explanation.

in *De sera num.* 557C, combined with a similar story on Agathocles and the Corcyreans (557BC), see Citro (2014) 103–106 and (2020) 110–113. The first part of *Agathocles* II (176EF) is followed by a similar story on Antigonus in *De coh. ira* 458EF, because of which the second part of *Agathocles* II is told about Antigonus too. Volkmann (1869) 228–229 discusses this as an argument against authenticity, but Citro (2014) 96–97 argues that Plutarch could have made one apophthegm out of a story on Agathocles and Antigonus in the collection. This could also be yet another case of *Anekdotenwanderung*.

³⁷⁸ *Agathocles* I (176E: ποτήρια ... χρυσᾶ) recalls *Dionysius Maior* IV (175E: ἐκπομάτων χρυσῶν); *Agathocles* II (176EF) reminds one of *Gelon* III (175A).

³⁷⁹ Roskam (2002) 175 discusses Plutarch's view on Plato's influence on Dion in the *Life of Dion*: “he more than once emphasizes that Plato, through his pupil Dion, laid the foundation for the liberation of Sicily”; see also Roskam (2009) 43 and 47. De Blois (1997) 209–216 and (1999) focuses on the contrast between the tyrant and sage in the *Life*.

³⁸⁰ Volkmann (1869) 229 sees a problem in the use of τοὺς πολεμίους: “Unpassend werden im Ausspruch des Dion die πολέμοι statt der ἐχθροὶ den φίλοις gegenübergestellt, vgl. v. Dion. c. 56.”

Chapter 55 in the biography relates that Dion's son had died before Callippus' conspiracy. When he heard about the plot in the next chapter, he answered out of grief and depression (*Dion* 56.3)

ὅτι πολλάκις ἤδη θνήσκειν ἔτοιμός ἐστι καὶ παρέχειν τῷ βουλομένῳ σφάττειν αὐτόν, εἰ ζῆν δεήσει μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους φυλαττόμενον.

that he was ready now to die many deaths and to suffer any one who wished to slay him, if it was going to be necessary for him to live on his guard, not only against his enemies, but also against his friends.

In this passage, Dion is even willing to die because he is in great distress. The fact that both the outcome (the actual murder by this friend) and the depression caused by the death of his son are left out of the account of the apophthegm indicates that Plutarch quotes this saying because of the general truth it contains and because it contrasts sharply with the many suspicions that characterize life at a tyrant's court. Thus, detached from its original context, Dion's saying seems to illustrate how he put an end to a cruel rule and established a stable reign instead, an image supported by the false chronology of placing Agathocles before Dion – for no new change in political constitution seems to follow.

This positive assessment of Dion as the person who freed the island from tyranny is basically in line with the *Life*,³⁸¹ although the image of Dion is definitely more complicated in the latter. The version of the collection, then, seems to be a simplification, but this enables Plutarch to end on a positive note again: Dion provides a well-chosen conclusion for the Sicilian section, in which the dark sides of tyranny are the core theme. The message is that, in order to establish a lasting and fruitful reign, one should strive for a good relationship between the monarch and the people, which can only be based on justice and mutual trust and respect.

3.5 Macedonian Monarchy (177A–184F)

The Macedonian part comprises 111 apophthegms, of which more than half belong to *Philippus* (177C–179C) and *Alexander* (179D–181F). These are the two longest sections of the whole collection, and not without good reason: Plutarch was especially intrigued by Alexander the Great, as the *Life of Alexander* and *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* testify,³⁸² and the king is also a pivotal figure in the *Parallel Lives*, at least

³⁸¹ See also Roskam (2009) 47 on the *Life*.

³⁸² *Alex.* depicts a rather complicated image, while the laudatory essays are far more positive, see Whitmarsh (2002) 179–180; and Monaco Caterine (2017) 408 on Alexander's

in the post-classical *Lives*.³⁸³ Alexander and his father, then, are central figures in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* too, as can be seen from their overall presence.³⁸⁴ Themes prominent in their sections are already announced by *Archelaus* (177AB).

3.5.1 Archelaus (177AB)

Perhaps this section could have been structured in a more logical way. *Archelaus* III (177AB), for example, might have fitted better after I (177A), since both refer to Euripides, but it occurs after II on Archelaus' witty request to a barber to cut his hair "in silence" (177A: σιωπῶν).³⁸⁵ IV (177B) would also have fitted better close to I, since both refer to an artist (the tragedian in I, a harp player in IV) and share a similar content, as will become clear. Yet various lexical and thematic elements in I, IV, and V (177B) still create a connection with the Sicilian section. Precisely through this connection, some differences stand out that are important for the remainder of the monarchical sections and beyond:

[I] In the first apophthegm, a bad person asks the king to give him a golden drinking cup (ποτήριον χρυσοῦν). The ruler responds by giving it to Euripides: the tragedian had the right to receive this present, in the same way as the wicked man had the right to ask for it, so he says (177A). This recalls two Sicilian apophthegms: *Agathocles* I told just before this

appearance as a "philosopher-king" in this work, in contrast to the *Life*. For a comparison of the speeches and the biography, see also Wardman (1955); Hamilton, J. R. (1969) XXI–II–XXXIII, concluding (XXXIII): "We need not, and cannot, take these speeches seriously as representing Plutarch's view of Alexander". According to him, this difference between both works is the consequence of (*ibid.*) "the difference between rhetoric and biography".

³⁸³ See Harrison (1995) 92–93. See e.g. also Monaco Caterine (2017) about Demetrius and Pyrrhus as failed imitators of Alexander in their *Lives*.

³⁸⁴ A reference to Alexander closes the Persian section (174B); Philip appears twice in the Scythian section (174E); a first mention of Philip in the Athenian section occurs in *Hegesippus* (187DE), after which the relationship between Athens and Macedonia dominates until *Peisistratus* (189B–D); Philip also appears in *Antiochus Spartiates* (192B), almost at the end of the Spartan section; some Roman sections, finally, refer back to Alexander: *Caesar* IV (206B); *Augustus* III (207AB), VIII (207CD), and X (207DE) contain explicit references to the Macedonian king; and when the Roman Republic conquers the world (194E–202E), and when Pompey is called "the Great" (203B–204E), the reader will inevitably have Alexander in mind.

³⁸⁵ *Archelaus* III (177AB) also occurs in *Alc.* I and *Amatorius* 770C (a mutilated fragment, see Minar – Sandbach – Hembold (1961) 435): for a comparison, see Verdegem (2010) 112–114. In these accounts, the saying is attributed to Euripides instead of the king. Perhaps, (1) Plutarch possessed two similar apophthegms about this event; (2) deliberately changed the story; or (3) made a mistake. II is told in *De gar.* 509A as well.

section (176E) and especially *Dionysius Maior* IV (175E).³⁸⁶ Verbal similarities create a smooth transition between the Sicilians and the Macedonians, but the reference to drinking cups also reintroduces the theme of establishing friendships by giving presents, a task neglected by the Sicilian tyrants but performed excellently by Archelaus: this king indeed used precious drinking cups as an instrument of making friends, and also carefully reflected on his choice.³⁸⁷

[2] In *Archelaus* IV, a κισσαροφῶδός complains that Archelaus has not given enough. The king's answer resembles his response in *Archelaus* I (177B).³⁸⁸ Both apophthegms thus illustrate that everyone is free to ask the king for whatever he or she wishes to receive, but eventually the king *himself* chooses what he gives and on whom he wants to bestow his gifts.³⁸⁹ That Plutarch includes two apophthegms that seem to make the same point announces that this will be an important theme in later sections.

[3] In *Archelaus* V, the king reacts mildly when somebody throws water over his head, ignoring the incitements of his friends (177B). It is highly doubtful that Dionysius the Elder, who even put people to death just for maligning him, would ever have reacted like that. In particular, a contrast with *Dionysius Maior* X (176AB) stands out: when people think badly of Archelaus, they are allowed to do so.

Various elements of his behaviour therefore contrast with the Sicilian tyrants, and also with the barbarian despots: the right use of riches; the mildness and forgiveness of the king (which one would not expect from barbarian despots or tyrants); the permission to speak freely (a theme recalling *Parysatis*, 174A, amongst others); and, in fact, even the presence of a poet and musician at the Macedonian court, recalling *Anteas* III (174EF) and *Gelon* IV (175AB) by contrast.³⁹⁰ The cultural implications of this final point should not be underestimated: approaching the 'Greeks of the core mainland' (184F–194E), one meets more educated

³⁸⁶ Cf. *Agathocles* I (176E): κεραμεῖα ποτήρια ... παρὰ τὰ χρυσᾶ; and *Dionysius Maior* IV (175E): ἐκπωμάτων χρυσῶν καὶ ἀργυρῶν.

³⁸⁷ Also an important theme in *De am. mult.*

³⁸⁸ *Archelaus* I (177A): 'σὺ μὲν γάρ' εἶπεν 'αἰτεῖν, οὗτος δὲ λαμβάνειν ἄξιός ἐστι καὶ μὴ αἰτῶν.' – *Archelaus* IV (177B): 'σὺ δέ γε αἰτεῖς.'

³⁸⁹ Cf. the assessment of *Archelaus* I in *De vit. pud.* 531E.

³⁹⁰ *De Al. Magn. fort.* 334B combines *Anteas* III with *Archelaus* IV (177B) too (cf. also Beck, M. (2003) 183–184), both preceded by a series of other negative *exempla* (333F–334B). The negative assessment of Archelaus' treatment of Timotheus in the laudatory essay is the consequence of the goals of the text, aiming to praise only Alexander (as becomes explicit from 334D on); see Van der Stockt (1995) 464–465 on the passage. *Archelaus* IV (177B) does not require a negative assessment, as the story is told only a few lines after the positive story on Euripides receiving a golden cup in I (177A).

(and, therefore, more Greek) rulers. All this illustrates that a different, more positive, and more Hellenic type of monarchy is possible.³⁹¹ The characteristics of such a rule will be further explored in the next sections.

3.5.2 Philippus (177C–179C)

Philippus consists of two main blocks. These are separated from each other by three apophthegms (XIII–XV, 178AB) that are not connected either with what precedes or with what follows. There also seems to be no link between them, except for a single word.³⁹²

First block	<i>Philippus</i> I: Theophrastus about Philip's character
	<i>Philippus</i> II–XII: illustration of Theophrastus' saying
Break	<i>Philippus</i> XIII–XV
Second block	First part <i>Philippus</i> XVI and XVII: Alexander should make friends
	<i>Philippus</i> XVIII–XXI: Philip and his friends
	Second part <i>Philippus</i> XXII: Alexander should avoid Philip's mistakes
	<i>Philippus</i> XXIII–XXXI: Philip and his mistakes

The first block, depicting a univocally positive image of the king that recalls Archelaus, somewhat contrasts with the second block.

Theophrastus' saying confirmed

Philippus opens in a typical way.³⁹³ Its first apophthegm, introducing the first block of the section, contains a general comment applicable to Philip's entire life. It is not expressed by the king but by the philosopher Theophrastus. One can only regret that the text is corrupt (177C).³⁹⁴

³⁹¹ Discussed in detail in Part III, chapter 2.

³⁹² *Philippus* XIII and XIV are connected by the appearance of an ὄνος (178AB). XV contains the famous saying that the Macedonians call a spade a spade (178B; see Rutten (2019) 71–84 on the proverb). XIII occurs in *An seni* 790B (in very similar wording); XIV reminds one of *Aem.* 12.10; *De fortuna* 97D refers to the background of XV.

³⁹³ Plutarch does not seem to think positively of Philip in *Pel.* 26.6–8, but since Philip's character is compared with Epameinondas here, one of Plutarch's greatest heroes (see *infra*, p. 207), one should not expect to reach a similar judgement in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, where the king is compared with other monarchs. See also Buszard (2008) 187 about similar differences in Plutarch's assessment of historical figures in the *Parallel Lives*.

³⁹⁴ As appears from the translation, Babbitt (1931) 40 reads μέγαν between μόνον and μεταξύ (an adaptation of the editor), probably based on μείζονα that follows.

Φίλιππον τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου πατέρα Θεόφραστος ἰστόρηκεν οὐ μόνον † μεταξὺ τῶν βασιλέων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τύχῃ καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ μείζονα γενέσθαι καὶ μετριώτερον.

Theophrastus has recorded that Philip, the father of Alexander, was not only great among kings, but, owing to his fortune and his conduct, proved himself still greater and more moderate.

Various emendations have been proposed, but none of them provides any certainty.³⁹⁵ There is, therefore, no point in basing big conclusions on the details of this apophthegm: it suffices to say that, in all likelihood, a positive image of a μέγας and μέτριος Philip arises. As is often the case, the question is whether the following apophthegms confirm this picture.

The next three sayings are related to Philip's military successes. *Philippus* II mentions Parmenio for the first time: he was the only general of the Macedonians, unlike the fortunate Athenians, who were able to appoint ten generals each year, so the king says (177C). In III, Philip hears about many of his successes (κατορθώματα) (177C). The latter are not specified, but the content of the surrounding stories implies that at least some of these might concern military achievements. In other versions, one of these events is indeed a victory of Parmenio.³⁹⁶ II and III therefore show Philip's response to the good luck of others and to his own success (cf. τύχη in I). IV takes place after another military accomplishment, the defeat of the Greeks (177CD). This connects the apophthegm with II and III, but this triumph is not thematized, for IV and the next two apophthegms share a new theme: in all three, someone asks Philip to act harshly against his opponents, but he opts for the opposite. His words in IV, when he is advised to oppress the Greeks with guards, are worth quoting (177D):

ἔφη μᾶλλον πολὺν χρόνον ἐθέλειν χρηστὸς ἢ δεσπότης ὀλίγον καλεῖσθαι.

he said that he preferred to be called a good man for a long time rather than a master for a short time.

³⁹⁵ The *apparatus criticus* of Nachstädt (1971) 17–18 lists some possible emendations.

³⁹⁶ The apophthegm occurs in *Alex.* 3.8 and in the spurious (cf. *infra*, note 985) *Cons. ad Apoll.* 105AB. In both accounts, the three successes are (1) a victory of Parmenio, (2) a victory at the Olympic games, and (3) the birth of a child (Alexander in the *Life*). Volkmann (1869) 230 writes: “Dem König Philipp werden bei Plutarch nicht viele glückliche Ereignisse an einem Tag gemeldet, wie im dritten Ausspruch, sondern drei.”

The connection between δεσπότης and short-term rule recalls the Sicilian section, where no dynasty managed to rule for generations precisely because of their tyrannical disposition. There is, then, some truth in the saying. This difference between Philip, who aims to be a good king, and a despot is further elaborated in what follows: he refuses to banish a slanderer (177D), and when Nicanor is speaking ill of him, he realizes that he had neglected the poor man (177DE).³⁹⁷ This theme of slander, in both cases again connected with ill advice ignored by the king (cf. *Archelaus* V, 177B),³⁹⁸ provides a link with VII: when the δημαγωγοί in Athens malign Philip, he is even grateful to them, because he now attempts to show that they are wrong (177E). This attitude is again entirely different from how Dionysius the Elder dealt with those who spoke ill of him (*Dionysius Maior* X, 176AB), and Philip seems to resemble Archelaus.

One can conclude, then, that Theophrastus' positive judgement of Philip's character in I (177C) is confirmed by II–VII (177C–E). Gradual shifting dominates once more:

***Philippus* I (177C)**

Φίλιππον τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου πατέρα Θεόφραστος ἰστορήκεν [...] τῇ τύχῃ [cf. *Philippus* II–IV] καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ [cf. *Philippus* IV–VII] μείζονα [cf. *Philippus* II–IV] γενέσθαι καὶ μετριώτερον [cf. *Philippus* IV–VII]

<i>Philippus</i> II (177C)	<i>Philippus</i> III (177C)	<i>Philip- pus</i> IV (177CD)	<i>Philippus</i> V (177D)	<i>Philip- pus</i> VI (177DE)	<i>Philip- pus</i> VII (177E)
Parmenio Μακαρίζειν	(Military) success: too much ὄ τύχῃ	Military success Advice not followed	Advice not followed – Philip maligned	Advice not followed – Philip maligned	Philip maligned

³⁹⁷ *De coh. ira* 457EF includes a similar, but not the same, story: the name of the slanderer is different (nor is his poverty mentioned), and Philip's saying is not the same at all. The wording is only similar in the first part of the apophthegms: both contain αἰ κακῶς λέγοντα (177D and 457E, there λέγοντος) and a combination of a form of οἶομαι, δεῖν, and an infinitive of κολάζω (*ibid.*). In 457F, the story is immediately followed by a similar apophthegm (*Philippus* XXVI in the collection, combined with another series of apophthegms on Philip's way of dealing with slander, see *infra*, note 455). Apparently, Plutarch had a large amount of similar stories about this aspect of the king's character.

³⁹⁸ Archelaus was also encouraged by his friends (ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων παροξυνόμενος) to punish a man, as happens in *Philippus* IV (177CD: συνεβούλευον ἐνιοί), and esp. in V (177D: τῶν φίλων κελεύοντων) and VI (177D: Σμικύθου ... διαβάλλοντος and τῶν ἐταίρων οιομένων).

The mention of the Athenians at the outset of VII connects the story with VIII (177EF), which opens similarly.³⁹⁹ In this apophthegm, the king makes a joke about the Athenians who are making various requests after he set them free without asking for a ransom: they seem to believe that they were vanquished ἐν ἀστραγάλοις (177F, LCL: “a game of knucklebones”).⁴⁰⁰ This is in line with his moderate character in the previous apophthegms: despite the fact that the Athenians maligned him, he still did them a favour by releasing some prisoners; despite their apparent ingratitude, he still jests. From this apophthegm on, the chain is further extended through the theme of humour: first, there is another bone-joke in IX: Philip’s collarbone (κλείς) was broken in battle and the physician is allowed to take what he wants for the cure (LCL): “for you have the key in your charge” (177F: τὴν γὰρ κλεῖν ἔχεις), so the king says.⁴⁰¹ Another wordplay can be found in X (177F). Thus, the joke of VIII prompted Plutarch to include the other two apophthegms (IX and X) about a humorous Philip. This inclusion perhaps even deviates from the chronological and geographical structure: according to Riginos, Philip would have received the wound mentioned in IX (177F) during a battle against the Illyrians, in 345 or 344 BC.⁴⁰² If this is the case, thematic motivations would again seem to take precedence over the general chronology. XI (178A) restores this deviation: it not only takes the reader back to conquered Athens,⁴⁰³ but also returns to the theme of V–VII (177DE): Philip once more ignores ill advice and opts for a lenient course. The topic of his mildness is continued by XII (178A), again combined with his humour: during a lawsuit, the king gets rid of two bad persons in a funny way, but does not punish them severely. This is the final apophthegm of the first block (I–XII, 177A–178A) that serves to illustrate the king’s greatness and moderation.

Philip and Alexander

This block in turn consists of two parts. Both start with an instruction of Philip for his son, followed by a series of illustrations of how he sticks to

³⁹⁹ *Philippus* VII: Τοῖς δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δημαγωγοῖς (177E) – VIII: Τῶν δ’ Ἀθηναίων (177E).

⁴⁰⁰ The reference to the defeat of the Greeks at Chaeronea in this apophthegm (177E: Τῶν δ’ Ἀθηναίων, ὅσοι περὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἐάλωσαν) seems to continue the chronology: *Philippus* IV seems to have taken place immediately after the battle (177C: νικήσαντι τοῖς Ἕλληνας).

⁴⁰¹ Concerning Philip’s wound, see Riginos (1994) 103–106 and more specifically 115–116, where this apophthegm is discussed as one of the testimonia.

⁴⁰² Riginos (1994) 115.

⁴⁰³ *Philippus* VIII took place in Athens after the battle at Chaeronea (177EF). The same goes for XI (178A).

his own advice. Reading Philip's first instruction in *Philippus* XVI and XVII, one is halfway through the section (178BC):

16. Τῷ δὲ υἱῷ παρήνει πρὸς χάριν ὀμιλεῖν τοῖς Μακεδόσι, κτώμενον ἑαυτῷ τὴν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμιν, ἕως ἕξεστι βασιλεύοντος ἄλλου φιλόανθρωπον εἶναι.

17. Συνεβούλευε δὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δυνατῶν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς φίλους κτᾶσθαι καὶ τοὺς πονηροὺς, εἶτα οἷς μὲν χρῆσθαι οἷς δ' ἀποχρῆσθαι.

16. He recommended to his son that he associate with the Macedonians so as to win their favour, and thus acquire for himself influence with the masses while another was reigning and while it was possible for him to be humane.

17. He also advised him that, among the men of influence in the cities, he should make friends of both the good and the bad, and that later he should use the former and abuse the latter.

Two elements indicate that both apophthegms, traditionally considered separate units, in fact are a whole: the historical context of the event is the same, and XVII does not repeat the object (τῷ υἱῷ), not even in the form of a demonstrative pronoun.⁴⁰⁴ Both parts discuss the importance of making friends. This is precisely what Dionysius the Elder wants his son to do (175E), and, as argued above, this theme also connects the Sicilian and Macedonian sections by contrast in *Archelaus* (177AB). In particular, the occurrence of the topic in *Philippus* is meaningful, since a link is established between Dionysius the Elder and his son, on the one hand, and the Macedonian king and his son, on the other. This will prove relevant in Philip's second advice (178EF) as well.

The next five apophthegms (178C–E) deal with Philip's own friendships, highlighted by lexical connections, and often indeed connect them with gift-giving. One reads, therefore, how the king gives heed to his own instruction.⁴⁰⁵ XXI (178E), closing this series, is at the same time

⁴⁰⁴ Taken from van der Wiel (2023a) 12 and n35.

⁴⁰⁵ In *Philippus* XVIII, the king's benefactor and guest friend (εὐεργέτην ... καὶ ξένον) refuses all gifts (178C); in XIX, he realizes during the sale of some prisoners that one of these men, who called himself a friend of his father (πατρικὸς ... φίλος), is truly benevolent and a true friend (ἀληθῶς γὰρ εὖνους ὢν καὶ φίλος, 178C); in XX, Philip asks all of his friends (τῶν φίλων ἐκάστῳ) to "leave room for cake" when realizing that the preparations of their host's (ξένου and ξένον) dinner are insufficient (178D; also told in *De tuenda* 123F–124A and in *Quaest. conv.* 707B; see Part I, chapter 1.2.2 for a compar-

connected with a new and final theme of the section, that is, Philip's regret: in XXII and XXIII, Plutarch returns to the relationship between Philip and Alexander (178EF):

22. Πυθόμενος δ' ἐγκαλεῖν αὐτῷ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὅτι παῖδας ἐκ πλειόνων ποιεῖται γυναικῶν, 'οὐκοῦν' ἔφη 'πολλοὺς ἔχων περὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἀνταγωνιστὰς γενοῦ καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἵνα μὴ δι' ἐμὲ τῆς βασιλείας τύχης ἀλλὰ διὰ σεαυτόν.'

23. Ἐκέλευε δ' αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλει προσέχειν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, 'ὅπως' ἔφη 'μὴ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα πράξεις, ἐφ' οἷς ἐγὼ πεπραγμένοις μεταμέλομαι.'

Learning that Alexander complained against him because he was having children by other women besides his wife, he said, "Well then, if you have many competitors for the kingdom, prove yourself honourable and good, so that you may obtain the kingdom not because of me, but because of yourself." He bade Alexander give heed to Aristotle, and study philosophy, "so that," as he said, "you may not do a great many things of the sort that I am sorry to have done."

As was the case with *Philippus* XVI and XVII (178BC), XXII and XXIII are in fact one apophthegm.⁴⁰⁶ The first part, where Philip states that his son has to deserve the throne (178E),⁴⁰⁷ recalls the Sicilian section once more: that Dionysius the Younger was the son of a tyrant did not suffice,⁴⁰⁸ and the right to rule is something which one has to create oneself, not something which one can receive for free. This is a core theme of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, already thematized in *Cyrus* II (172E): moral qualities give a person the right to rule. This is why Philip asks Alexander to listen to Aristotle in the second part (178EF).⁴⁰⁹ The acquaintance of the future king with a philosopher again recalls Dionysius the Younger (176C–E) and his relationship with Plato (176D). There is also another connection with previous sections: the link between brotherly love and strife for kingship. While the Persian and barbarian sections contain different references to (the possibility of) armed conflicts between brothers for the rule (*Xerxes* I, 173BC; *Cyrus Minor*, 173EF; and

ison); in XXI, the king is deeply touched by the death of Hipparchus of Euboea, for he had not favoured this man enough (τῆς **φιλίας**, 178E).

⁴⁰⁶ See van der Wiel (2023a) 12. Babbitt (1931) 48–49 also takes both parts together.

⁴⁰⁷ Cf. *Comp. Lys. et Sull.* 2.3–4.

⁴⁰⁸ See again the lack of education of Dionysius the Younger, mentioned in *Dion* 9.3.

⁴⁰⁹ On Plutarch's view on Aristotle's connection with Alexander, see Roskam (2009)

Scilurus, 174F), Philip points out that moral virtues should prevail (cf. 178E: καλὸς κἀγαθός). These will lead to a healthy relationship between monarch and subjects, which results in a steady rule.

The final saying of *Philippus* XXIII introduces the remaining apophthegms of the section, in most of which the king makes some mistakes.⁴¹⁰ Philip fixes his mistake, often after hearing a subject who frankly speaks the truth to his face. In line with this, it stands out that most of these apophthegms do not contain a (memorable) saying of Philip, but of his subjects instead:⁴¹¹ this is quite remarkable in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and enhances the image of the king as a moderate man, illustrating the importance which he attached to justice and frank speech. In the context of all these stories, *Philippus* XXVI–XXVII (179AB) seem to be somewhat out of place. Yet XXVI (179A) is still related to the preceding apophthegm, since both shed light on his desire to make the right decisions as a judge.⁴¹² There is also a connection with the next saying. In XXVI, the king argues that he, in order to avoid having a bad reputation, would not acquit a guilty man. XXVII (179A) continues this theme of reputation and reminds one of the first block of apophthegms (177C–178A): Philip does not punish the Greeks that malign him at the Olympic games. In this way, this story is in turn connected with XXVIII and XXIX (179B): in this second apophthegm, Parmenio has to defend Philip in front of the complaining Greeks. Thus, even though XXVI and XXVII do not show the king making a mistake, they are not irrelevant in the context of the second block. They illustrate how Philip deals with

⁴¹⁰ There are some connections at a lower level too: *Philippus* XXIV (178F) and XXV (178F–179A) are connected by the theme of jurisdiction; XXVIII and XXIX (179B) by the theme of sleeping too long.

⁴¹¹ *Philippus* XXV (178F–179A: Machaetas denounces Philip for not listening attentively); XXX (179B: a musician against the king who pretends to know much about music); XXXI (179BC: Demaratus about Philip's domestic quarrel); XXXII (179C: an old woman wants her case to be heard in court): (1) XXX (which contrasts with *Per.* 1.6) occurs in *De ad. et am.* 68A (the musician's remark is recommended as frank speech), in *De Al. Magn. fort.* 334CD (contrasting Philip with Alexander, who knew when he had to be part of the audience; see also Beck, M. (2003) 184–185), and in *Quaest. conv.* 634D (making the same point); (2) XXXI occurs in *De ad. et am.* 70C (commending the remark of Demaratus) and in *Alex.* 9.13–14 (after the description of the dispute between Philip and his son and wife in 9.6–12; on the importance of domestic harmony for the statesman in Plutarch, see Swain (1999) 88–90); (3) XXXII is told in *Demetr.* 42.7–8 (Demetrius only rarely allowed his subjects to speak with him, in contrast to Philip [the passage is misinterpreted by the LCL translation, reading it as referring to Demetrius]; see Stadter (2000) 506 on a parallel in Dio about Hadrian).

⁴¹² The story is also attributed to Philip in *Con. praec.* 143F and *De coh. ira* 457F, but to Pausanias in *Apophth. Lac.* 230D.

slander and complaining subjects, recalling his moderate character (cf. I–XI, 177C–178A). In this way, they are in line with the apophthegms about his mistakes (XXII–XXXII, 178E–179C) in which *παρρησία* has a prominent place.

Conclusion

The picture of Philip becomes more nuanced towards the end: the first part of the section illustrates the truth of Theophrastus' unreservedly positive judgement of the man, but the mistakes of the final apophthegms show that he was not perfect. Yet Philip recognized his imperfections, and there was always room for free speech, which in turn strengthens the positive picture again. This is in line with a second conclusion: *Philippus* not only sheds light on Philip's character, but also shows the reader how to distinguish a true king from a despot or tyrant. As stated, this appears from the first apophthegms which connect Philip with Archelaus and contrast with the preceding barbarian and Sicilian sections, but it comes even more to the fore in the second block on friendship (in connection with the use of possessions) and frank speech. As both topics are linked to Philip's advice for Alexander, the reader is invited to examine to what extent his son gave heed to this, and whether he proved himself to be a true king.

3.5.3 Alexander (179D–181F)

Alexander I and II refer back to Philip and describe the future king's hunger for conquering. This theme will dominate the entire section. In his first apophthegm, Alexander, when still a child, complains that his father left him nothing to accomplish (179D).⁴¹³ This explicitly recalls *Philippus* III, where this king's military successes are described in similar wording.⁴¹⁴ In the second story, Philip appears on the stage once more, encouraging his son to take part in the Olympic games. The latter, however, refuses on the ground that only kings can be his opponents (179D).⁴¹⁵ Interestingly, it is not Philip but rather Alexander's friends who are the interlocutors in the version of the *Life of Alexander* (4.10) and *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* (331AB):⁴¹⁶ this is clearly an adaptation

⁴¹³ *Alex.* 5.4 tells the same story, followed by a comment that Alexander did not long for wealth, but for fame acquired in war (5.5–6).

⁴¹⁴ *Alexander* I (179D): πολλὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου κατορθούοντος – *Philippus* III (177C): πολλῶν δὲ κατορθωμάτων αὐτῷ καὶ καλῶν.

⁴¹⁵ The use of *ποδῶκης* (179D) in the description of the young Alexander reminds one of Achilles. See in this context Mossman (1992) 92: "Alexander [...] encouraged comparisons between himself and Achilles."

⁴¹⁶ Beck, M. (2003) 180.

in order to further expand the contrast between father and son. The relevance of *Alexander* III, however, is less clear: a married girl is brought to the king at night, who is angry with his servants because they almost made him an adulterer (179DE). As it no longer seems to be related to Alexander's young years, it separates I and II from IV, highlighting that a new and first major block of apophthegms starts.⁴¹⁷

The first main block

The fourth apophthegm connects Alexander's early years with the period of his conquests. The young man offers large amounts of frankincense. His παιδαγωγός, Leonides, says that he will only be allowed to do so once he has become master of the land of this product. In line with his desire for glory in I and II, Alexander sends a lot of frankincense to his tutor after conquering this region (179DE).⁴¹⁸ In this way, the apophthegm also announces the two main themes of the block it introduces (IV–XVIII, 179E–180E), which, by the way, are important topics in the *Life* too: Alexander's military successes,⁴¹⁹ and his lavish use of riches, often to the benefit of his friends.⁴²⁰

These two themes are also paired in *Alexander* V: the king encourages his soldiers to eat all they want, for the next day they will eat from their enemies' supplies (179EF). The next two apophthegms present Alexander's generosity: in VI, he gives a dowry of 50 talents instead of the ten which his friend asked for (179F); in VII, a similar story, Anaxarchus the philosopher even gets one hundred talents after merely asking for it (179F–180A).⁴²¹ They remind one of Philip's advice on establishing and

⁴¹⁷ Stadter (2014b) 676 divides the section as follows: "The forty-four [sic] Alexander anecdotes in *Ap.reg.* are arranged as childhood anecdotes (nos. 1–4), campaign stories (5–13), virtues (14–28), friends (29–30), kingship (31–32), and death (33–34)." Based on the principle of gradual shifting, this chapter proposes a different structure.

⁴¹⁸ In *Alex.* 25.6–7 the story follows the capture of Gaza (25.4–5). This placement, different from its occurrence at the outset of *Alexander*, is significant; see Whitmarsh (2002) 189 on the *Life*: "Alexander's sweet fragrance is thus linked into a complex of themes suggesting the corrupting influence of Eastern culture." This implication is absent from the collection, rather emphasizing that the riches of the East did *not* corrupt the king.

⁴¹⁹ Alexander's military success, the consequence of his φιλιππία, is a main theme in *Alex.–Caes.* too, see Buszard (2008), esp. 188n13: "Ambition is mentioned more often in this pair than in any other." He points out that this ambition is not always a positive value (esp. in *Caes.*), but argues that (*ibid.*) "[t]he portrayal of Alexander in his own *Life* is a positive one, taken as a whole."

⁴²⁰ Hamilton, J. R. (1969) XL points out that "the longest digression (39–42.4)" of *Alex.* concerns "the king's generosity and his loyalty to and care for his friends."

⁴²¹ *Alex.* 8.5 and *De Al. Magn. fort.* 331E contain a short reference to *Alexander* VII: in the *Life*, the mention of Anaxarchus precedes a reference to two other gifts for other

maintaining friendships (*Philippus XVI–XVII*, 178BC): for his friends, nothing is too much in the eyes of Alexander, and by using riches, he manages to enhance his popularity, as his father asked him to do. But Plutarch wants his readers to realize that this generosity does not imply that the king himself longed for luxury, as appears from *Alexander IX*, which is inserted after a short apophthegm that picks up again on the theme of war (VIII, 180A): when Alexander receives expensive foods from the Carian queen Ada, he says that (IX, 180A)

κρείττονας ἔχειν αὐτὸς ὀσοποιούς, πρὸς μὲν ἄριστον τὴν νυκτοπορίαν
πρὸς δὲ δεῖπνον τὴν ὀλιγαριστίαν.

he had better fancy cooks – his night marches for his breakfast, and for his dinner his frugal breakfast.

This witty saying illustrates Alexander's frugality and self-restraint, and one concludes that wealth is nothing more than a convenient means for the king.⁴²² It also emphasizes his martial character, thereby introducing four apophthegms (X–XIII) on his wars and successes on the battlefield, and on his military insights and strategic skills, of which two also concern the theme of wealth (XI and XII; X and XI are furthermore connected by a reference to Parmenio).⁴²³

At first sight, *Alexander XIV–XVII* (180DE) switch to another topic. XIV and XVII contain criticism of Antipater and frame a pair of sayings on Alexander's divine status. In this way, as will become clear, they lead the reader towards a specific interpretation of that pair. In XIV, the king receives a letter from his mother, containing unspecified charges (*διαβολάς*) against Antipater (180D).⁴²⁴ In XVII, the criticism is more pre-

philosophers; in the laudatory essay, Plutarch similarly refers to Anaxarchus before a list of wise men who were bestowed with great gifts by Alexander. In both passages, this is presented as proof of Alexander's everlasting love of philosophy.

⁴²² The story occurs in a list of illustrations of how Alexander could master himself in different respects in *Alex.* 22.7–9; in *De tuenda* 127B, a passage which promotes a frugal lifestyle; and in *Non posse* 1099C, as part of a discussion concerning pleasure (and combined with another story on Alexander's self-restraint, also told in *Alex.* 22.1–2). The saying is longer in the *Life*: Plutarch probably combined two sayings there; or perhaps he shortened the lengthy speech in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* in order to create a 'real' apophthegm.

⁴²³ *Thest.* 5.4 refers to Alexander's insight described in *Alexander X*; XI also occurs in *Alex.* 29.7–9 (cf. also Arrian, *Anabasis*, II.25), but Alexander's answer to Darius is here different from the collection (similar to Diodorus XVII.54). Both (parts of) the answer(s) were probably included in Plutarch's notes.

⁴²⁴ *Alex.* 39.8, *De Al. Magn. fort.* 332F–333A, and *De Al. Magn. fort.* 340A contain the same story; for a comparison, see Beck, M. (2003) 182–183. On the negative image

cise: the king replies to someone who praises Antipater's frugal lifestyle that in his outward appearance Antipater seems to be λευκοπάρυφος,⁴²⁵ but inside the man is ὀλοπόρφυρος (180E).⁴²⁶ This clashes with Alexander: his generosity and lavishness for his friends contrasts with his own rather austere way of life. Yet more importantly, this difference between façade and real disposition and true beliefs is not only relevant for Alexander's lavish spending, but also for his attitude towards his divine status in XV and XVI (180DE). This reminds one of the *Life* (*Alex.* 28.6):

ὁ δ' οὖν Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων δηλὸς ἐστὶν αὐτὸς οὐδὲν πεπονθῶς οὐδὲ τετυφωμένος, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἄλλους καταδουλούμενος τῆ δόξῃ τῆς θειότητος.

From what has been said, then, it is clear that Alexander himself was not foolishly affected or puffed up by the belief in his divinity, but used it for the subjugation of others.

This is Plutarch's final conclusion after a series of stories about Alexander's divinity, which follow his visit to the oracle of Ammon (*Alex.* 27.5–7). In the first part of this passage the king seems to be pleased and to accept his divine status (*Alex.* 27.8–11), but from the second part it becomes apparent that he did not genuinely believe in it. This explains why his attitude to his divinity was different when he dealt with barbarians or with Greeks (*Alex.* 28). *Alexander* XV and XVI occur in this first and second part, respectively: in the first, Alexander seems to approve of his divine status, through a more or less philosophical,⁴²⁷ though not humble saying (180D), but he rejects it in the second: when he is hit by an arrow, he quotes Homer in order to point out to his friends that blood, not divine ichor, leaves his wound (180E).⁴²⁸ His god-like status is, therefore, of similar use to his wealth: it is a means to consolidate his power

of Olympias, who was loved by Alexander but nevertheless failed to influence him, see Blomqvist (1997) 79–81.

⁴²⁵ See LSJ, s.v. “λευκοπάρυφος”: “with white-edged robe, Alexander Magnusap. Plu.2.180e.”

⁴²⁶ Plutarch seems to share this view on Antipater's character: *Phoc.* 29.3 also emphasizes the difference between Antipater's behaviour and his disposition, referring to his apparently simple lifestyle, while he was, in fact, a tyrant.

⁴²⁷ See Plutarch's assessment preceding this saying in the *Life* (*Alex.* 27.11): ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς περὶ τούτων <καὶ> φιλοσοφώτερον δοξάζειν [καὶ] λέγων ὡς [...] (“Still more philosophical, however, was his own opinion and utterance on this head, namely that [...]”).

⁴²⁸ This apophthegm occurs in *Alex.* 28.3. In *De Al. Magn. fort.* 341B, Plutarch refers to the same event as part of a list of stories in which the king got wounded in battles:

but it does not affect his character. XIV and XVII therefore are relevant precisely because of their contrast with Alexander's character in terms of his frugal lifestyle and the way in which he dealt with his divinity: while Alexander sometimes might seem ὀλοπόρφυρος in his outward behaviour, his true character remains λευκοπάρυφος. In this way, XVII is well placed at the centre of the whole section on Alexander.

The final apophthegm of the section's first large block is in line with this, again illustrating the king's know-how when it comes to keeping his friends, subjects, and soldiers happy, without compromising the integrity of his own character. *Alexander* XVIII reads as follows (180E):

Ἐν δὲ χειμῶνι καὶ ψύχει τῶν φίλων τινὸς ἐστιῶντος αὐτὸν ἐσχάραν δὲ μικρὰν καὶ πῦρ ὀλίγον εἰσενέγκαντος, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λιβανωτὸν εἰσενεγκεῖν ἐκέλευσεν.

When one of his friends was entertaining him in the cold of winter, and brought in a small brazier with a little fire in it, Alexander bade him bring in either firewood or incense.

The reference to frankincense in this story not only picks up the theme of Alexander's lavish use of riches, but also reminds one of IV, which opens the block. By creating a ring composition, XVIII thus provides a perfect closure, also being well placed after the apophthegm concerning Antipater's façade (180E) and in this way again contrasting Alexander the Great with him.

The second main block

This part consists of *Alexander* XXIII–XXXI (181B–E). It is separated from the first by four apophthegms, the relevance of which within the general interpretation of the section is not immediately clear: XIX–XXII (180E–181B), of which the first three are linked to each other by the theme of inappropriate love, as appears from a series of lexical connections.⁴²⁹

the allusion to Alexander's divine status is therefore not the first reason why the story is quoted there.

⁴²⁹ *Alexander* XIX: ἐρῶν (180F), XX: ἐρώμενον (180F) and ἐρασθῆναι (180F), XXI: δι' ἔρωτα (181A); XIX: ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἠρώτησε (180F) which results in ὁμολογήσαντος (180F), XXI: ὠμολόγησε (181A), which results in ἠρώτησεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος (181A); XX: ἐβιάζετο (180F), XXI: βιάζεσθαι (181A). Additionally, the object of a highly positioned person's love is a musician in the first two apophthegms (note πάλιν δέ [180F], which connects XIX and XX): XIX: ψάλτριαν (180E), XX: αὐλητοῦ (180F). XIX occurs in *Amatorius* 760CD, after another story on Alexander in love; XXI in *De Al. Magn. fort.* 339D and *Alex.* 41.9–10, in a list of stories concerning Alexander's goodwill towards his friends. See Beck, M. (2003) 186–187 for a comparison of these three passages. Note

These four stories thus have a function similar to III (179DE), as they seem to mark a break. With the second block, the readers travel to India and Alexander's final campaign: they sense that the king's death is near. This explains the surprising inclusion of XIX–XXII: these apophthegms suggest that some time has passed and avoid the final phase of the king's life (in India) starting immediately after his visit to the oracle of Ammon.

In XXIII, the king is impressed by an Indian archer (181B); in XXIV, he meets the Indian king Taxiles, who wants to outdo him in bestowing gifts (181C). The next three stories all deal with the capture of rocks (181CD). In these apophthegms, something strange is going on. XXV (181C) contains a saying about the seemingly impregnable Aornos rock. It is, however, kept by a coward and therefore not that difficult to take, so the king says. XXVI (181CD) deals with a different rock (cf. ἄλλος ἔχων πέτραν), believed to be almost impossible to take as well. Yet no battle had to be fought: its ruler entrusted (ἐνεχείρισεν) Alexander with his life and with his stronghold.⁴³⁰ Because of this, the king allowed him to keep his land, and even added a region to it. The first words of XXVII (181D) suggest that this story concerns the same rock as the one described in XXVI. Yet this is, in my view, rather unlikely. The apophthegm reads as follows (XXVII):

Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς πέτρας ἄλωσιν τῶν φίλων λεγόντων ὑπερβεβληκέναι τὸν Ἡρακλέα ταῖς πράξεσιν, ‘ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ’ εἶπε ‘τὰς ἐμὰς πράξεις μετὰ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἐνὸς οὐ νομίζω ῥήματος ἀνταξίας εἶναι τοῦ Ἡρακλέους.’

After the capture of the rock his friends were saying that he had surpassed Heracles in his deeds, but he remarked, “No, I do not feel that my deeds, with my position as commander, are to be weighed against one word of Heracles.”

First, ἄλωσις can hardly refer to the peaceful transfer of the rock in XXVI, even more so since the place was in the end even given back to its former ruler – so there is no real ἄλωσις at all in the previous apophthegm.⁴³¹ Second, the comparison with Heracles implies that a battle was

also the use of ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ at the outset of Alexander's reply in XX, see Roskam (2007) 185 (about *De lat. viv.* 1128A): “the combination of ἀλλ’ οὐδέ at the beginning of a reply is fairly common in Plutarch; see, e.g., *Sept. sap. conv.* 154C and 155F; *Apophth. Lac.* 211A; *De sera num.* 548B; *De genio Socr.* 578A; *Quaest. conv.* 726B; cf. also *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 180F.”

⁴³⁰ ἐγχειρίζω is translated as “surrender” by LCL, but see LSJ, s.v. “ἐγχειρίζω”: “put into one's hands, entrust”: the verb is used in a meaning similar to πιστεύσας later in the apophthegm.

⁴³¹ LSJ, s.v. “ἄλωσις”: “capture” and “conquest”.

fought, and there is no clear reason why Alexander's friends would make such a comparison after the non-heroic surrender of XXVI. The πέτρα of XXVII, then, rather seems to refer back to the Aornos rock of XXV. This is confirmed by Arrian. In *Anabasis* V.30, a comparison with Heracles is also made after Alexander has taken the Aornos rock; in V.26, Alexander refers back to the taking of the Aornos by alluding to Heracles too (his saying, however, is different from *Alexander* XXVII, and he appears to be less modest).⁴³² Both *Alexander* XXV (181C) and XXVII (181D) thus seem to deal with the capture of the Aornos in the context of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. XXVI (181CD) could have been inserted after XXV because of the close thematic similarities between these stories. As a result, the reference to the rock at the opening of XXVII was no longer clear – and Plutarch himself was probably confused about all these stories concerning different rocks.⁴³³

The first five apophthegms of the second main block are thus related to each other as follows (note the gradual shifting):⁴³⁴

<i>Alexander</i> XXIII (181B)	<i>Alexander</i> XXIV (181C)	<i>Alexander</i> XXV (181C)	<i>Alexander</i> XXVI (181CD)	<i>Alexander</i> XXVII (181D)
Τῶν δ' Ἰνδῶν	εἷς τῶν Ἰνδῶν βασιλευς	Ἀόρνου πέτρας ἐν Ἰνδοῖς	ἄλλος ἔχων πέτραν ἄληπτον δοκοῦσαν εἶναι	Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς πέτρας ἄλωσιν [in India]

In addition, XXVII contains a reference to Alexander's friends (181D), which instigates the inclusion of three apophthegms (XXVIII–XXX, 181DE) that again deal with the king's friendships.⁴³⁵ XXXI (181E), how-

⁴³² See also Babbitt (1931) 65.

⁴³³ Note for example that a saying similar to the one of *Alexander* XXV occurs in *Alex.* 58.3–4, where the king takes Sisimithres' rock instead of the Aornos. If this is the same place as Choriene's rock in Arrian, *Anabasis* IV.21 (and the stories in both works are similar indeed: see esp. the role of Oxyartes in both accounts), one gets a highly complicated image, since the anonymous rock in *Alexander* XXVI seems to be the same stronghold as Choriene's rock of Arrian's account as well.

⁴³⁴ The episode of Alexander and Taxiles (*Alexander* XXIV) is told in *Alex.* 59.1–5, after a series of stories dealing with the taking of strongholds (*Alex.* 58), one of which concerns the capture of Sisimithres' rock (58.3–4) discussed above. The precise location of *Alexander* XXVI is unclear, but India is the most obvious option in light of the surrounding stories.

⁴³⁵ *Alexander* XXVII (181D): τῶν φίλων λεγόντων – XXVIII (181D): τῶν δὲ φίλων τινά – XXIX (181D): τῶν δὲ πρώτων φίλων καὶ κρατίστων – XXX (181CE): φίλων and

ever, takes the reader back to Alexander's Indian campaign with a reference to his final great victory in the region: the well-known battle of the Hydaspes.⁴³⁶ This order seems strange, as the connection with India is interrupted for a while. From a thematic point of view, however, XXXI is in fact well placed: the previous apophthegm recalls earlier stories that deal with Alexander's gifts for his close acquaintances (181DE).⁴³⁷ With this apophthegm, then, Plutarch takes his reader back not only to the first part of *Alexander* (esp. VI and VII, 179F–180A), but all the way to Philip's advice for his son. Thus, Plutarch wants to close Alexander's section with apophthegms discussing Alexander's final expeditions in India, but at the same time wants Philip's advice for Alexander to resonate for a while. XXXI, closely connected with XXXII (181E), in fact has a similar function:

31. Ἐπεὶ δὲ Πῶρος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ μετὰ τὴν μάχην 'πῶς σοι χρήσωμαι;' **βασιλικῶς** εἶπε, καὶ προσερωτηθεὶς 'μὴ τι ἄλλο;' 'πάντα' εἶπεν 'ἐν τῷ **βασιλικῶς** ἔνεστι,' θαυμάσας καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀνδραγαθίαν πλείονα χώραν ἢς πρῶην εἶχε προσέθηκε.

32. Πυθόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τίνος λοιδορεῖσθαι **βασιλικόν** ἔφη 'ἔστιν εὖ ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν.'

τοὺς φίλους. XXIX (also referred to in *Alex.* 47.9–10) concerns Alexander's two best friends, Craterus and Hephaestion: the first loved the king, the second loved Alexander. There are three references to XXX in Plutarch's oeuvre, which all stress Alexander's love of philosophy: in *De Al. Magn. fort.* 331E and *Alex.* 8.5, Plutarch mentions Alexander's 50 talents for Xenocrates in a list of gifts for other sages (one of whom was Anaxarchus, cf. also *Alexander* VII [179F–180A]); *De Al. Magn. fort.* 333B also mentions Xenocrates' refusal of the gift, but does not cite Alexander's saying.

⁴³⁶ The reference to Porus in XXXI shows that the μάχη mentioned is the Hydaspes battle, described in *Alex.* 60.

⁴³⁷ Xenocrates refuses 50 talents, after which Alexander asks whether the philosopher does not have any friends, since in his own case, the riches taken from Darius hardly sufficed for maintaining his friendships (on Xenocrates in Plutarch, see Roskam (2009) 45–46; on his influence on Plutarch, see Dillon (1999)). The story might seem to fit better in between *Alexander* VI and VII (179F–180A, even combined with XXX in other works of Plutarch, see *supra*, note 435): VII and XXX share similar wording (Ἀναξάρχῳ δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ [179F] – Ξενοκράτει δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ [181D], ἑκατὸν αἰτεῖ τάλαντα [179F] – πεντήκοντα τάλαντα [181D], φίλον [180A] – φίλον [181E] and τοὺς φίλους [181E]); VI and XXX also share verbal similarities (πεντήκοντα τάλαντα [179E] – πεντήκοντα τάλαντα [181D], τίνος τῶν φίλων [179E] – φίλον [181E] and τοὺς φίλους [181E], similarities also shared by VI and VII), and a similar saying too ('σοὶ γε' ἔφη 'λαβεῖν, ἐμοὶ δ' οὐχ ἰκανὰ δοῦναι' [179F] – 'ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ' ἔφη 'μόλις ὁ Δαρεῖου πλοῦτος εἰς τοὺς φίλους ἤρκεσεν' [181E]). Because of the reference to Darius' defeat, however, XXX occurs later in the section (cf. the chronological structure).

31. Porus, after the battle, was asked by Alexander, “How shall I treat you?” “Like a king,” said he. Asked again if there were nothing else, he said, “Everything is included in those words.” Marvelling at his sagacity and manliness, Alexander added to his kingdom more land than he had possessed before.

32. Learning that he was being maligned by a certain man, he said, “It is kingly to be ill spoken of for doing good.”

Both apophthegms are connected through the presence of a form of the word βασιλικός.⁴³⁸ In XXXI its precise meaning and connotations might not immediately be clear, but the next apophthegm clarifies it: Alexander is maligned, but this does not anger him. His response illustrates the king’s mildness. Through the connection between both apophthegms, established by this verbal repetition and by their similarities with apophthegms of *Philippus* (esp. between *Alexander* XXXI and *Philippus* XXXII, 179C),⁴³⁹ a clear distinction is again made between true kingly behaviour, characterized by generosity and mildness, and despotism. The reader, therefore, interprets βασιλικός as “befitting a true king”, which implies, first of all, acting generously and mildly. The context in which the story of *Alexander* XXXI is quoted in *De cohibenda ira* is quite revealing for this precise meaning of βασιλικός as Plutarch conceives it (458BC):⁴⁴⁰

Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ πικρότερος αὐτοῦ γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Καλλιस्थένης καὶ Κλεῖτον. ἧ καὶ Πῶρος ἀλοῦς παρεκάλει χρῆσασθαι βασιλικῶς αὐτῶ.

⁴³⁸ The word occurs various times in *Alex.* too, often illustrating that Alexander was a good king and contrasting him with the barbarism of Darius; see Schmidt, T. S. (2004) 231–232 on this matter.

⁴³⁹ Both *Alexander* XXXI (181E) and *Philippus* XXXII (179C) do not contain a saying of the king, but of another person who refers to the essence of being king (the old woman in Philip’s apophthegm exclaims “καὶ μὴ βασιλευε” – Porus asks to be treated “βασιλικῶς”), after which Philip and Alexander are surprised (θαυμάσας in both apophthegms) and do more than expected (Philip not only listens to the old woman, but to all cases; Alexander not only gives back Porus his own kingdom, but even more). *Alexander* XXXII (181E) recalls the first block of Philip’s apophthegms, in which the king was often maligned but punished no one (*Philippus* V–VI, 177DE), and also later, similar apophthegms in the section (esp. *Philippus* XXV–XXVIII, 178F–179B).

⁴⁴⁰ Zadorojnyi (2014) 304–305: “Porus’ comment must have struck a chord with Plutarch, who celebrates the notion of ideal (that is, philosophically aligned) monarchy as the best and noblest political regime”. The apophthegm also occurs in *Alex.* 60.14–16 and in *De Al. Magn. fort.* 332E, after which Plutarch argues that Alexander always acted φιλοσόφως. See Beck, M. (2003) 182 on the verbal similarities between the sayings of the three accounts.

καὶ πυθομένου ‘μή τι πλέον;’ ‘ἐν τῷ βασιλικῶς’ ἔφη ‘πάντ’ ἔνεστι.’ διὸ καὶ τῶν θεῶν τὸν βασιλέα ‘Μειλίχιον’ Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ‘Μαιμάκτην’ οἶμαι καλοῦσι· τὸ δὲ κολαστικὸν ἐρινυῶδες καὶ δαιμονικόν, οὐ θεῖον οὐδ’ ὀλύμπιον.

But Alexander had behaved more harshly than was his custom toward Callisthenes and Cleitus. And so Porus, when he was taken captive, requested Alexander to treat him “like a king.” When Alexander asked, “Is there nothing more?” “In the words ‘like a king,’ replied Porus, “there is everything.” For this reason also they call the king of the gods Meilichios, or the Gentle One, while the Athenians, I believe, call him Maimactes, or the Boisterous; but punishment is the work of the Furies and spirits, not of the high gods and Olympian deities.

For Plutarch, a king should be mild and forgiving. He should be μειλίχιος and not μαιμάκτης:⁴⁴¹ aggressive and ruthless behaviour does not suit a true king, but is a feature of despotic and tyrannical governments. This is in line with *Alexander* XXXI and XXXII.⁴⁴² These two apophthegms thus provide a fitting closure for the section, being well placed immediately before XXXIII, in which the king is dying (181E), and XXXIV (181F), in which his death is finally mentioned: at the end of Alexander’s section, the reader acquires a full understanding of what true kingship means, and how it characterized Alexander’s and his father’s rule.

Yet even Alexander had his flaws. Plutarch was all too aware of this, for he does not ignore excesses such as the murder of Cleitus in the *Life of Alexander*.⁴⁴³ But there is no trace of this negative aspect in the *Alexander* section, contrary to most other sections which call for reassessment. In a later section, however, Antipater refers to the murder of Parmenio, who appeared to be a good friend of the Macedonian kings in *Philippus*

⁴⁴¹ See LSJ, s.v. “μειλίχιος”: “gentle, soothing”, and esp. its second meaning: “II. later of persons, mild, gracious” (about Zeus); and s.v. “μαιμάκτης”: “boisterous, stormy” (again about Zeus).

⁴⁴² Cf. the account of *Alexander* XXXII in *Alex.* 41: Alexander’s friends turned idle because of their wealth and slandered him because of his military expeditions (*Alex.* 41.1). After this Plutarch focuses on Alexander’s πραότης (41.2). Volkmann (1869) 229 writes: “Was in Alexander 32. Ausspruch steht: *πυθόμενος δὲ ὑπό τινος λοιδορεῖσθαι*, stimmt nicht mit v. *Alex.* c. 41, wo diese Anschuldigung allen Freunden des Königs zur Last fällt.” Yet the imperfect tense in the *Life* highlights that the saying is not related to this specific event alone.

⁴⁴³ Wardman (1955) 100–107 is not inclined to focus much on these negative elements. Hamilton, J. R. (1969) LXIII–LXVI, however, points out that the king’s character deteriorates later in the *Life*; see in this context also Whitmarsh (2002) 186; and Buszard (2008) 188–192 on Alexander’s anger and drinking behaviour in the *Life*.

II (177C) and *Alexander* X and XI (180B), and questions whether the victim truly conspired against Alexander (183E).⁴⁴⁴ In this way, Plutarch still manages to problematize the positive image of the king, although the element is far removed from *Alexander*, thus mitigating its effect. There is, however, one other point of criticism that can be found in the section itself. It is alluded to by the last apophthegm. This one is similar in nature to *Philippus* I (177C), for in *Alexander* XXXIV one does not hear the king speaking, but only reads a quote of Demades (181F):

Τελευτήσαντος δ' αὐτοῦ Δημάδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ὅμοιον ἔφη ἑξ ἄλλων ἀναρχίαν ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐκτετυφλωμένῳ τῷ Κύκλωπι.⁷

When he had come to his end, Demades the orator said that the army of the Macedonians, because of its lack of leadership, looked like the Cyclops after his eye had been put out.

This again emphasizes Alexander's qualities as a general, but it also connects the previous apophthegm, in which he is dying, with the remainder of the Macedonian section: the reference to Polyphemus evokes the many movements of his arms in different directions because of the pain and confusion which Odysseus and his men had caused him.⁴⁴⁵ The Macedonian army is no longer an organized machine with a common purpose, but disintegrates and will from this point on be controlled by different generals and kings. The empire suffers the same fate. If Alexander's rule had one flaw (as presented in *Alexander*), it was that his accomplishments did not last and that he had not consolidated the power he had built up.

Conclusion

Alexander's generosity, mildness, and martial talent are unprecedented – at least this is how the section presents him. As for the first two aspects of his character, it stands out that he gave heed to his father's advice: both are the consequence of his *παιδεία* and his familiarity with Aristotle. They also partially explain his military and political ingenuity, for they ensure that his soldiers, friends, and acquaintances are willing to follow him anywhere. Yet his love of conquering that dominates the section

⁴⁴⁴ Discussed in the analysis of *Antipater* (183EF). Citro (2014) 110–112, discussing this apophthegm, points out that Plutarch seems to believe in Parmenio's innocence, as appears from the *Life* and *De ad. et am.* 65CD.

⁴⁴⁵ Plutarch also refers to the saying in *De Al. Magn. fort.* 336D–F (there attributed to Leosthenes); the apophthegm occurs in *Galba* 1.5 too (also about Demades). In both passages, the comparison with Polyphemus is based on the random movements of the Macedonian army.

from the first apophthegm on might also be the main flaw in his character. It distracted him from what a ruler should do, viz. providing internal stability and prosperity in the realm. Alexander only succeeded in this as long as he lived, but afterwards the country fell apart. If the Sicilian sections illustrated by means of negative *exempla* that a healthy relationship between a sole ruler and his subjects ensures a dynasty's long-term rule, *Alexander* now suggests that this alone might not be sufficient: one should also appoint good successors. This will become apparent from the following sections on the *Diadochi*, where internal struggles and divisions of power are gradually more emphasized.⁴⁴⁶ Alexander should have prevented this.

3.5.4 The *Diadochi* (181F–184F)

The sequence of these sections is confusing from a chronological and geographical point of view (chronological deviations are indicated in bold):⁴⁴⁷

Historical figure	Region	Period	Section
Ptolemy I Soter	Egypt	367 BC – 282 BC	181F
Antigonus I Monophthalmus	Asia Minor, Greece	382 BC – 301 BC	182A–183A
Demetrius Poliorcetes	Macedonia	336 BC – 283 BC	183A–C
Antigonus II Gonatas	Macedonia	320 BC – 239 BC	183CD
Lysimachus	Thracia, Asia Minor	355 BC – 281 BC	183DE
Antipater	(General; regency)	?397 BC – 319 BC	183EF
Antiochus III the Great	Seleucid Empire	242 BC – 187 BC	183F
Antiochus Hierax	Seleucid Anatolia	263 BC – 226 BC	184A
Eumenes II	Pergamum	197 BC – 158 BC	184AB
Pyrrhus	Epirus	319 BC – 272 BC	184CD
Antiochus VII	Seleucid Empire	159 BC – 129 BC	184DE

⁴⁴⁶ Martínez Lacy (1995) 224 observes that Plutarch regarded the reign of Philip and Alexander as rather positive, while the period of the *Diadochi* is often assessed negatively.

⁴⁴⁷ Information taken from OCD, see respectively Thompson (2012); Bosworth (2012b) and (2012d); Errington (2012a); Bosworth (2012e) and (2012c); Griffith – Sherwin-White – van der Spek (2012a) and (2012c); Errington (2012b); Derow (2012); Griffith – Sherwin-White – van der Spek (2012b).

The chaos becomes real with *Lysimachus* (183DE), marking a first clear chronological break, and even more from *Antipater* on (183EF). The placement of this second section is most surprising: one would rather expect it to directly follow *Alexander* (179D–181F), even more because its first apophthegm (183E) explicitly refers back to Alexander's death, while the second (183EF) contains a saying of Demades, who also figured in *Alexander* XXXIV (181F).⁴⁴⁸ This inversion of order has two functions. First, it illustrates the truth of Demades' saying in *Alexander* XXXIV. Related to this, there is a structuring function. Based on the table above, the *Diadochi* can roughly be divided into two groups: the rulers presented before *Lysimachus* and *Antipater*, and those after these sections, continuing the inversions in chronology. The reason for this becomes clear after reading *Ptolemaeus* (181F) and the sections concerning the Antigonid Dynasty (182A–183D).

a) Ptolemaeus (181F)

The section on Ptolemy, son of Lagus, takes the reader to Egypt and reinstates the question of how a good king should deal with wealth:

Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου τὰ πολλὰ παρὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐδείπνει καὶ ἐκάθειυεν· εἰ δέ ποτε δειπνίζοι, τοῖς ἐκείνων ἐχρητο μεταπεμπόμενος **ἐκπώματα** καὶ στρώματα καὶ τραπέζας· αὐτὸς δ' οὐκ ἐκέκτητο πλείω τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλουτεῖν ἔλεγε τὸ πλουτίζειν εἶναι **βασιλικώτερον**.

Ptolemy, son of Lagus, used, as a rule, to dine and sleep at his friends' houses; and if ever he gave a dinner, he would send for their dishes and linen and tables, and use them for the occasion. He himself owned no more than were required for everyday use; and he used to say that it was more kingly to enrich than to be rich.

The focus of *Ptolemaeus* thus causes the reader to lose sight of the theme of Demades' saying in *Alexander* XXXIV (181F, on internal strife) for a while, until it will be recalled in *Antipater* (183EF). The apophthegm shares several elements with the preceding Macedonians (177A–181F) and with the barbarian and Sicilian sections. At first sight, the story emphasizes royal frugality, which reminds one of *Philipus* XXXI (179BC) and *Alexander* IX (180A), XXXI and XXXII (181E), and connects it with *Artaxerxes Longimanus* I (173D).⁴⁴⁹ On closer reading, however, an interesting contrast within this apophthegm emerges: Ptolemy only partially

⁴⁴⁸ Discussed in more detail in the analysis of *Antipater* (183D–F).

⁴⁴⁹ 173D: τὸ προσθεῖναι τοῦ ἀφελεῖν βασιλικώτερόν ἐστι; in turn connected with the similar saying of his grandson in the dedicatory letter (172B).

sticks to his own words. It is clear that he himself is indeed not rich, but nor does he succeed in enriching his subjects. On the contrary: he is profiting from the wealth of his friends. In particular, the presence of drinking cups is a contrasting element: while these objects were the means by which the Macedonian kings used to make friends (cf. *Archelaus* I, 177A), less generous tyrants kept them for themselves (*Dionysius Maior* IV, 175E; and *Agathocles* I, 176E). Ptolemy's place is in between both groups: he is not generous at all, since he has nothing, yet he still tries to maintain friendships by using other peoples' possessions. The image, then, is rather positive, but also problematic.

b) The Antigonid Dynasty (182A–183D)

This series of apophthegms starts with *Antigonus Monophthalmus* (182A–183A). This first section takes the readers to Asia Minor; those on Antigonus' son (*Demetrius Poliorcetes*, 183A–C) and grandson (*Antigonus Secundus*, 183CD) will again introduce some rulers of Macedonian regions (182A–183D).⁴⁵⁰

A series of good monarchs?

The contrast between Alexander and his successors is continued in *Antigonus Monophthalmus* I (182A):⁴⁵¹ the king's efforts to collect money arouse complaints that Alexander was different. II (182A) highlights another difference, this one between the king's eagerness to punish and Philip's and Alexander's mildness. III marks a break, announcing a character change (182A):

Θαυμαζόντων δὲ πάντων ὅτι γέρον γενόμενος ἠπίως ἐχρήτο καὶ πρῶως τοῖς πράγμασι, πρότερον μὲν γάρ' εἶπε 'δυνάμεως ἐδεόμην, νῦν δὲ δόξης καὶ εὐνοίας.'

When all were astonished because, after he had grown old, he handled matters **with mildness and gentleness**, he said, "Time was when I craved power, but now I crave repute and goodwill among men."

⁴⁵⁰ The continuation Antigonus I Monophthalmus – Demetrius Poliorcetes – Antigonus II Gonatas is made explicit: *Demetrius Poliorcetes* I (183B): τοῦ πατρὸς – *Antigonus Secundus* (183C): Δημητρίου τοῦ πατρὸς – *Antigonus Monophthalmus* XVI (182EF) and XVIII (183A) similarly highlight the relationship between father and son.

⁴⁵¹ If *Antigonus Monophthalmus* followed *Alexander XXXIV* (181F, Demades on the Cyclops), the contrast would have been less clear: *Ptolemaeus* causes a greater geographical deviation; Antigonus Monophthalmus could have been connected with Polyphemus (Plutarch never refers to Antigonus' nickname, but *Sert.* 1.8 shows that he was well aware of it).

From now on, Antigonos will strive for a good relationship with his people. In line with what has been concluded from previous sections, the king realizes that this can only be obtained through leniency. At first sight, he succeeds: most of the apophthegms that follow are in line with this and show a character similar to Archelaus, Philip, and Alexander. First, *Antigonos Monophthalmus* IV and V deal with the interaction of the king with his son Philip (182B).⁴⁵² To some extent, this recalls Philip's instructions for Alexander in *Philippus* XVI–XVII (178BC) and XXII–XXIII (178EF), but the link becomes clearer in what follows: in *Antigonos Monophthalmus* VI and VII (182BC), Antigonos is rejecting his divine status (cf. *Alexander* XV and XVI, 180DE);⁴⁵³ next, he wants to be as righteous as possible, for he is not a barbarian king (cf. *Philippus* IV, 177D),⁴⁵⁴ as is illustrated by his conduct at the trial of his brother Marsyas in IX (182C, cf. *Philippus* XXVI, 179A); he does not care about the soldiers slandering him and even orders them to continue in X (182CD, cf. esp. *Philippus* VII, 177DE; XXVII, 179A; and XXIX, 179B);⁴⁵⁵ he does not listen to the advice of Aristodemus,⁴⁵⁶ who wants him to re-

⁴⁵² *Antigonos Monophthalmus* IV occurs in *De gar.* 506D, where the name of Antigonos' son is not given; Antigonos' saying showing his willingness to educate his son is recommended in the passage. It is also told in *Demetr.* 28.10, where the son in question is not Philip, but Demetrius; the apophthegm illustrates that Antigonos made his decisions on his own. V also occurs in *Demetr.* 23.6, where Antigonos' action is clearly approved of, and the son in this account is again Philip, as in the collection. Τοῦ νεανίσκου (182B) in V clarifies that the son in question can only be the same person as τὸν υἱὸν Φίλιππον (182B) in IV. There are various possibilities to explain the difference with *Demetr.* 28.10: (1) by putting IV and V together in the collection, Plutarch might have incidentally or consciously changed Demetrius into Philip, or (2) he made a mistake in the case of *Demetr.* 28.10, or (3) intentionally attributed the story to the protagonist there.

⁴⁵³ *Antigonos Monophthalmus* VII occurs in *De Is. et Os.* 360D, where it is even combined with another apophthegm on the divine status of Alexander the Great (absent from *Reg. et imp. apophth.*): when Apelles painted Alexander holding a thunderbolt, Lysippus, who made statues of the king with just a spear in his hand, disapproved of it.

⁴⁵⁴ *Reg. et imp. apophth.* often connect cultural identity with true and right kingship, see Part III, chapter 2. Nikolaidis (1986) 230–231 discusses this apophthegm together with *De Al. Magn. fort.* 329D, since this fragment also illustrates “that virtue is peculiar to the Greeks whereas vice pertains to barbarians”.

⁴⁵⁵ Cf. also *Archelaus* V (177B) and *Alexander* XXXII (181E). In *De coh. ira* 457E, *Antigonos Monophthalmus* X is combined with stories about Philip (*Alexander* XXXI is told in this broader passage as well, see *supra*, p. 145–146).

⁴⁵⁶ Aristodemus, called a friend of Antigonos in this apophthegm (182D: τῶν φίλων τινός), appears twice in *Demetr.*: in 9.2, he is referred to as “one of his father's friends” too (τῶν πατρῶων φίλων), while in 17.2, he is labelled as the “arch-flatterer among all his courtiers” (πρωτεύοντα κολακεία τῶν ἀυλικῶν ἀπάντων).

duce the number of presents he gave in XI (182D, cf. *Alexander* IV–VII, 179E–180A; and XXX, 181DE); he is jesting in XII and XIII (182DE, cf. *Philippus* VIII–X, 177EF); and he decides not to give anything to the Cynic Thrasyllus in XIV (182E).⁴⁵⁷

Θρασύλλου δὲ τοῦ κυνικοῦ δραχμὴν αἰτήσαντος αὐτόν, ‘ἀλλ’ οὐ βασιλικόν’ ἔφη ‘τὸ δόμα.’ τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος ‘οὐκοῦν τάλαντον δός μοι’, ‘ἀλλ’ οὐ κυνικόν’ ἔφη ‘τὸ λῆμμα.’

When Thrasyllus the Cynic asked him for a shilling, he said “That is not a fit gift for a king to give.” And when Thrasyllus said, “Then give me two hundred pounds,” he retorted, “But that is not a fit gift for a Cynic to receive.”

This witty apophthegm is yet another in which the topic of giving presents is combined with a form of βασιλικός,⁴⁵⁸ and the connection with some apophthegms of *Alexander* in particular again stands out (*Alexander* XXX, 181DE, and also VII, 179F–180A). In addition, it calls *Arche-laous* I (177A) to mind: as shown above, this king decides on his own to whom he bestows presents and what these gifts consist of. The character change introduced by III, then, seems to be genuine.

This will, however, be somewhat contradicted by the remaining three apophthegms (*Antigonus Monophthalmus* XVI–XVIII). XVI and XVIII focus on the interaction between Antigonus I and his son Demetrius. In XVI, Demetrius has to free the Greeks at his father’s command, who wants to spread his reputation (182EF).⁴⁵⁹ That Antigonus attaches high importance to his fame is illustrated by XVII about a poet who writes of his great deeds (182F).⁴⁶⁰ In XVIII, Demetrius plays a major role for a

⁴⁵⁷ According to Babbitt (1931) 73, a lengthy account of *Antigonus Monophthalmus* XV occurs in 551E, but this must be *De vit. pud.* 531EF. By claiming that Antigonus addresses Bias or Bion, Volkmann (1869) 229 misreads the passage: Plutarch first tells an apophthegm in which Antigonus indeed addresses Bias, but this is followed by an account of *Antigonus Monophthalmus* XV in which an unnamed Cynic (κυνικοῦ γάρ ποτε) appears on the stage. The wording is almost exactly the same.

⁴⁵⁸ See the opening apophthegm of Artaxerxes Mnemon in the dedicatory letter to Trajan (172B), *Artaxerxes Longimanus* I (173D), *Alexander* XXXI (181E), *Ptolemaeus* (181F). *Antigonus Monophthalmus* XV (182E) is the collection’s final apophthegm to establish this connection.

⁴⁵⁹ In *Demetr.* 8.2, Plutarch approves of this war, after which he quotes Antigonus’ saying (8.3).

⁴⁶⁰ When this poet is cooking a conger-eel. Because of this, the story is also told in *Quaest. conv.* 668CD, dealing with the question of whether fish or meat is to be preferred (see 667E).

second time. In this apophthegm, strategically placed since it provides a transition to the section on Demetrius (183A–C), Antigonus decides to kill Mithridates because of a dream and tells his son about it, but Demetrius saves the man (183A).⁴⁶¹ A lengthy version of the same event is told in the *Life of Demetrius* in order to illustrate the (LCL) “strong natural bent of Demetrius towards kindness and justice” (4.5: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εὐφυΐας δείγματα τοῦ Δημητρίου πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην) and that he was (LCL) “naturally humane and fond of his companions” (4.1: καὶ φιλόανθρωπον φύσει καὶ φιλέταιρον), despite the fact that *Demetrius–Antonius* primarily constitute rather negative examples.⁴⁶² These essential good qualities of Demetrius, then, can clearly be found in *Antigonus Monophthalmus* as well.

Thus, although *Antigonus Monophthalmus* IV and V, through a comparison with Antigonus’ son Philip, open a series of apophthegms that depict a favourable image of the king, the section ends on a less positive note for this man, when he is compared with his other son Demetrius in XVIII.⁴⁶³ This again has a problematizing function: apparently, the character change announced by III was not complete and was perhaps only an outward change for the sake of his own reputation (cf. δόξης, 182A). This is in line with the placement of XVIII, showing a rather cruel king, after two apophthegms that emphasize his love of reputation and share

⁴⁶¹ *Antigonus Monophthalmus* XVIII (183A), as transmitted by the manuscripts, is grammatically incorrect. Various emendations have been proposed. (1) At first, deleting ὁ δέ seems to be the most obvious one, see Nachstädt (1971) 34; Babbitt (1931) 74n2 (“παραλαβὼν F.C.B.: ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν. Some slight change is required to make the sentence grammatical. Bernardakis accomplishes the same result by omitting Ἐπεὶ δ’ and ὁ Δημήτριος”); and Fuhrmann (1988) 55. (2) As Babbitt’s note indicates, Bernardakis (1889) 30 drops ἐπεὶ δ’, and does not delete ὁ δέ but ὁ Δημήτριος instead. A later scribe could definitely have added this name (perhaps taken from a marginal note) to the text in order to clarify to whom ὁ δέ refers, while the addition of ὁ δέ is far more difficult to explain if ὁ Δημήτριος was already the subject. (3) Ingenkamp – Bernardakis (2008) 30 also delete ὁ Δημήτριος, but preserve ἐπεὶ δ’. Since deleting ἐπεὶ δ’ seems unnecessary, this is perhaps the most likely reading.

⁴⁶² Cf. *Demetr.* I, discussed in Part III, chapter I.2.1. On Demetrius as “the opposite of the *basileus dikaios*”, see Schettino (2002) 204. Yet Demetrius and Antony have some good features too, see Duff (1999), 53–65; Pelling (2002) 133; Duff (2004) 282; Alexiou (2010) 331.

⁴⁶³ Note however that *Demetr.* 19 contains some sayings of Antigonus related to his son’s extravagance, depicting a rather negative image of the young man. The king did not condemn this behaviour, because his son carried out his expeditions so successfully (19.9). Other sayings of Antigonus told in *Demetr.* are not included in the collection either (e.g. 6.1 and Antigonus’ final saying in 29.7). Perhaps Plutarch left them out because he did not yet possess all the material on Demetrius (cf. Part I, chapter 2.2).

similar wording to III, thereby referring back to that apophthegm and calling for reassessment.

If the first Antigonus did everything because of fame and reputation, the question is whether one can derive conclusions about the true disposition of his descendants, for the mildness and justice they exhibit might not be genuine either:

[1] In *Demetrius Poliorcetes* (183A–C),⁴⁶⁴ the king twice takes a city and shows clemency to the conquered:⁴⁶⁵ after besieging the Rhodians, Demetrius leaves his citytaker because of the courage of the inhabitants (183B); after defeating the Athenians, he gives the people grain, and when someone corrects his broken Greek, he gives even more (183BC).⁴⁶⁶ Yet III might somewhat contrast with *Antigonus Monophthalmus* XVI (182EF): if he was sent to liberate the Greeks, one might wonder why the Athenians decided to revolt in his own section. Despite his leniency, which is definitely a positive characteristic, the image of the king as a liberator might therefore still be questioned.

[2] *Antigonus Secundus* (183CD) contains similar complexities.⁴⁶⁷ II–V (I is discussed below) are structured according to gradual shifting. II and III concern the realm of war, still connected with IV about a soldier asking for compensation. There is a certain tension between these first two: at first, both illustrate that the king knows how to motivate his soldiers, but his boasting in II does not appear justified when his army has to withdraw in III. The connection between IV and V in turn consists of the theme of reputation. In IV, Antigonus says that he only cares about a man's virtues, not about those of his father, when giving presents. This recalls the advice of Philip for Alexander: he knows when to give and to whom, as was the theme of *Philippus* XVI and XVII (178BC) on friendships and possessions; and it reminds one of Philip's saying that Alexander had to deserve the kingdom because of his virtues, and not because of his father (XXII–XXIII, 178EF). Yet V suggests that Antigonus II might not have the right priorities (183D):

⁴⁶⁴ Nachstädt (1971) 35 counts three apophthegms, splitting the first between διαφθερεῖν and σπεισάμενος (183B). Babbitt (1931) 74–77 correctly takes both parts together; see van der Wiel (2023a) 12.

⁴⁶⁵ See τὴν ἐλέπολιν (183B) in the second part of *Demetrius Poliorcetes* I–II and ἐλῶν τὴν πόλιν (183B) at the outset of *Demetrius Poliorcetes* III, connecting both stories.

⁴⁶⁶ The version of *Demetrius Poliorcetes* III in the *Life* (*Demetr.* 34) focuses on Demetrius' kindness, but does not refer to the saying nor to the fact that he did not speak correctly.

⁴⁶⁷ This Antigonus plays an important role in *Arat.* On Antigonus and Aratus of Sicyon, see Porter (1930). Porter (1979b) XIII argues that *Arat.* “seems to have been composed while the material collected for the *Lives of Agis and Cleomenes* was still fresh in Plutarch's mind”: this suggests that it is a late *Life* (cf. the relative chronology).

Ζήνωνος δὲ τοῦ Κιτιέως ἀποθανόντος, ὃν μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐθαύμασεν, ἔλεγε τὸ θέατρον αὐτοῦ τῶν πράξεων ἀνηρῆσθαι.

When Zeno of Citium died, whom he admired most among the philosophers, he said that the audience to hear of his exploits had been taken away.

This recalls *Dionysius Minor I* (176C), where the tyrant wanted to be admired because of his acquaintance with wise men.⁴⁶⁸ *Antigonus Secundus V* seems to have a somewhat similar meaning. The readers should therefore wonder whether the king only cares about his own reputation or fame. The true disposition of all members of the Antigonid house, then, is quite vague.

Familial harmony

Perhaps more important is the theme of familial harmony in the Antigonid house. *Demetrius Poliorcetes I* refers to the king's love for his father.⁴⁶⁹ After defeating the Rhodians, he is begged not to destroy the painting of Ialysus, an artwork by Protogenes.⁴⁷⁰ He answers that (183A)

μᾶλλον τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς εἰκόνας ἢ τὴν γραφὴν ἐκείνην διαφθερεῖν.

he would sooner destroy the statues and portraits of his father than that painting.

Love between father and son,⁴⁷¹ expressed in a surprising way by means of this argument in *Demetrius Poliorcetes I*, is the main topic of the opening apophthegm of the following section too, where Antigonus II offers to surrender his entire realm to Seleucus, who had captured his father

⁴⁶⁸ Note two forms of θαυμάζω in *Dionysius Minor I* (176C): θαυμάζων – θαυμάζεσθαι.

⁴⁶⁹ See Rose, T. C. (2015) 209–210 for accounts of the story in other authors. *Demetrius Poliorcetes I* opens with δέ (183A) because Demetrius plays an important role at the end of *Antigonus Monophthalmus*: as in most other cases, the particle indicates that the following apophthegm concerns the same person as the protagonist of the previous one (Demetrius is, in fact, the protagonist of *Antigonus Monophthalmus XVI*); see van der Wiel (2023a) 3n8.

⁴⁷⁰ Babbitt (1931) 76: “The painting was seen by Cicero (*Orator*, 2 (5)) at Rhodes; later it was carried to Rome and placed in the temple of Peace (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* xxxv. 36 (102)).” The episode of Demetrius' triumph over the Rhodians is told in *Demetr.* 22–23, where the story concerning the painting occurs as well (22.5). The mention of Protogenes of Caunus in the passage is discussed by Linder (2015) 70–71, arguing that the story highlights Demetrius' mildness.

⁴⁷¹ See in this context *Demetr.* 3.1.

Demetrius (183CD).⁴⁷² In this context, a passage of the *Life of Demetrius* is of paramount importance. This fragment is included after a story of Antigonus I, who was happy with the fact that his son could sit beside him with a spear in his hand (*Demetr.* 3.3–5):

οὕτως ἄρα πάντη δυσκοινωνήτον ἢ ἀρχὴ καὶ μεστὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ δυσνοίας, ὥστ' ἀγάλλεσθαι τὸν μέγιστον τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων καὶ πρεσβύτατον, ὅτι μὴ φοβεῖται τὸν υἱόν, ἀλλὰ προσίεται τὴν λόγχην ἔχοντα τοῦ σώματος πλησίον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ **μόνος** ὡς εἶπεῖν **ὁ οἶκος** οὕτως ἐπὶ πλείστας διαδοχὰς τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν ἐκαθάρευσε, μᾶλλον δ' εἰς **μόνος** τῶν ἀπ' Ἀντιγόνου Φίλιππος ἀνεῖλεν υἱόν. αἱ δ' **ἄλλαι** σχεδὸν ἅπανσαι **διαδοχαὶ** πολλῶν μὲν ἔχουσι παίδων, πολλῶν δὲ μητέρων φόνους καὶ γυναικῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ **ἀδελφοὺς ἀναιρεῖν**, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὰ αἰτήματα λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτω συνεχωρεῖτο, κοινόν τι νομιζόμενον αἴτημα καὶ βασιλικὸν ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας.

So utterly unsociable a thing, it seems, is empire, and so full of ill-will and distrust, that the oldest and greatest of the successors of Alexander could make it a thing to glory in that he was not afraid of his son, but allowed him near his person lance in hand. However, this house was almost the only one which kept itself pure from crimes of this nature for very many generations, or, to speak more definitely, Philip was the only one of the descendants of Antigonus who put a son to death. But almost all the other lines afford many examples of men who killed their sons, and of many who killed their mothers and wives; and as for men killing their brothers, just as geometers assume their postulates, so this crime came to be a common and recognized postulate in the plans of princes to secure their own safety.

The passage does not show an entirely positive image of Antigonus I and his descendants (as in *Antigonus Monophthalmus* IV and V, 182B, esp. the image of the young Philip is negative), but still illustrates that this house was a far better example compared to the other *Diadochi*. This puts the fragment in line with how the sections on the Antigonid Dynasty are to be read. Furthermore, the theme of internal harmony and the contrast between the Antigonid house and other rulers are particularly relevant for a general interpretation of the *Diadochi* sections, for it explains the strange place of *Lysimachus* (183DE) and especially of *Antipater* (183EF).

⁴⁷² This apophthegm occurs in *Demetr.* 51.1–2.

c) Lysimachus and Antipater (183D–F)

Lysimachus (183DE), the section on Alexander's former general and later king of Thracia, contains two apophthegms. In *Lysimachus* I (183DE), the ruler loses his Thracian territory due to lack of water.⁴⁷³ His words after this surrender resemble a similar saying in *Dionysius Maior* II, in which the tyrant decides not to give up his rule.⁴⁷⁴ Through this contrast, Lysimachus appears to be weak. *Lysimachus* II (183E), in turn, is similar to *Hiero* II: a friend tells him that he can share everything with him, but not his secrets.⁴⁷⁵ The Sicilian tyrants are thus recalled twice, steering the readers towards an interpretation not only of this story, but also of what follows, as will become clear.

A similar function can be attributed to *Antipater* (183EF). The picture of the section is not negative: *Antipater* I illustrates the importance he attached to friendship and trust (similar to *Dion*, 176F–177A, there presented as a positive example)⁴⁷⁶ and *Antipater* II shows his disapproval of gluttony and greed. This is remarkably different from his other appearances in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*: his image in *Philippus* XXIV (178F) and especially *Alexander* XIV (180D) and XVII (180E; on Antipater's own greed, note the contrast with *Antipater* II) is not positive at all, and the same goes for the context in which he will be referred to in *Phocion* XV (188F; about Antipater's wrong expectations of his friends, note the contrast with *Antipater* I).⁴⁷⁷ Again, one has to deal with different points of view, and the picture of *Antipater* is highly questionable.

As stated, *Antipater* also has a structuring function, since both apophthegms recall *Alexander* XXXIV (181F): *Antipater* II refers to Demades and, more implicitly, the mention in *Antipater* I of a possible plot of Parmenio, the most trusted general of Philip and Alexander, referred to in *Philippus* II (177C) and in *Alexander* X and XI (180B), resumes the theme of internal strife too.⁴⁷⁸ These two apophthegms therefore also colour the way in which the reader approaches the following sections, which will recall the disintegration of the Macedonian Empire after Alexander's death. This helps to clarify why the sections on the *Diadochi* (181F–184F) are split up by *Lysimachus* and *Antipater*:

⁴⁷³ The apophthegm is also told in *De tuenda* 126EF and in *De sera num.* 555DE.

⁴⁷⁴ *Lysimachus* I and *Dionysius Maior* II even share some verbal similarities and similar constructions: 175D: κρατηθείς – 183D: κρατηθείς; 175D: οὐτῶ βραχύν – 183E: ὡς μικρᾶς ἡδονῆς; 175D: ἀρχὴν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν τηλικαύτην – 183E: ἐκ βασιλείως πεποίηκα.

⁴⁷⁵ *De cur.* 517B and *De gar.* 508C tell the story because of Philippides' saying, instead of because of Lysimachus.

⁴⁷⁶ Citro (2014) 109–112 discusses this apophthegm, focusing on Parmenio's innocence.

⁴⁷⁷ As will be discussed in the analysis of *Phocion* XV–XVI (188F).

⁴⁷⁸ See Citro (2019a) 213–215 for a comparison of *Antipater* II, *De cup. div.* 525C, and *Phoc.* 1.1–3.

[1] In the first part (182A–183D), *Ptolemaeus* distracts the reader after *Alexander XXXIV*: the theme of internal strife is therefore not immediately continued, but the topic of the essence of good monarchy is resumed, although the picture is definitely somewhat problematic. The same goes for the sections on the Antigonid Dynasty, where another theme dominates as well: this house is characterized by familial love, which distinguishes it from the other *Diadochi*.

[2] *Lysimachus* and *Antipater* (183D–F) not only shed light on their own subjects, but also recall (1) themes from the Sicilian sections and (2) Demades' saying, reintroducing the theme of civic strife. They hereby provide the interpretative background for [3].

[3] The following sections (183D–184F) also contain some problematic and even some rather bad examples of rulers, and return to the topic of internal strife, announced by *Alexander XXXIV* (181F) and recalled by *Antipater*.

d) Strife for Power (183E–184D)

Antiochus Hierax (184A), *Eumenes* (184AB), and *Pyrrhus* (184CD) all combine the theme of brotherly love and strife for power. *Antiochus Tertius* (183F), however, does not fit within this context. It is unclear why Plutarch included it after *Antipater*. Possibly he wished to create an additional chronological break, enhancing the confusion elicited by Demades' saying: it ensures that *Antiochus Hierax* takes the reader back to earlier times. The section recalls apophthegms from the barbarian section: *Antiochus Tertius* I (183F), in which Antiochus orders that cities should ignore his unlawful commands, reminds one of the Egyptian custom (174C) and leaves a positive image; II (183F) by contrast seems to show barbarian lack of self-restraint: the king quickly leaves Ephesus after seeing the beautiful priestess of Artemis, fearing that he would not be able to master himself.⁴⁷⁹ Again, the picture is problematic.

The first example of a struggle for power between brothers concerns the fight between Antiochus Hierax and Seleucus. When the first hears that his brother has died, he mourns; when he appears to be still alive, he celebrates (184A). *Eumenes* tells the same story. Perseus, king of Macedonia, planned to kill Eumenes, king of Pergamum. As a consequence, he was thought to be dead (184AB). The haste with which Attalus takes his brother's rule, and the absence of his grief, is telling. But, similar to *Antiochus Hierax*, the report of Eumenes' death is false. When he meets his brother, accompanied by bodyguards and with a spear in his hand, there is a certain tension and Eumenes' words show that he did not really appreciate Attalus' quick response to the report of his death (184B). Yet he does his brother no harm and even bequeaths to him his rule and his

⁴⁷⁹ Cf. the analysis of the barbarian sections in chapter 3.3.

wife after his death; Attalus apparently repents, for he afterwards bestows the kingship upon Eumenes' son, as is described in the remainder of the story.⁴⁸⁰ This chain of apophthegms does not end here. *Pyrrhus* opens as follows (184C):⁴⁸¹

Πύρρον οἱ υἱοὶ παῖδες ὄντες ἡρώτων, τίνι καταλείπει τὴν βασιλείαν· καὶ ὁ Πύρρος εἶπεν ‘ὅς ἂν ὑμῶν ὀξυτέραν ἔχη τὴν μάχαιραν.’

The sons of Pyrrhus, when they were children asked their father to whom he intended to leave the kingdom; and he said, “To that one of you who keeps his sword sharper.”

In light of the preceding sections, the suggestion is not just that the most warlike son should become king, but also that a possible future quarrel about the throne is to be settled by means of the sword.⁴⁸² This contrasts sharply with *Eumenes*. Although his brother clearly desires the kingdom, Eumenes avoids escalation at all cost and tries to maintain a good relationship with him. Pyrrhus, on the contrary, seems to encourage the opposite. The background of the barbarian sections, with similar references to brotherly rivalry for the kingship (esp. *Xerxes* I, 173BC; *Cyrus Minor*, 173EF; and *Scilurus*, 174F), is relevant in this respect, and there is a further contrast with *Philippos* XXII and XXIII (178EF), where this king argues that moral, true kingly virtues should decide who should rule.

Pyrrhus II (184C)⁴⁸³ is related to *Pyrrhus* I by the motif of excessive fondness for war⁴⁸⁴ and similarly recalls the barbarian and Sicilian

⁴⁸⁰ Plutarch tells both apophthegms in *De frat. am.: Antiochus Hierax* in 489AB (introduced as follows: Ἀντιόχου δὲ τὴν μὲν φιλαρχίαν ψέξειεν ἂν τις, ὅτι δ’ οὐ παντάπασιν αὐτῇ τὸ φιλάδελφον ἐνηφανίσθη, θαυμάσειεν; “But Antiochus might be condemned because of his lust for dominion, yet admired because his love for his brother was not altogether extinguished thereby”), *Eumenes* in 489EF (assessed in an entirely positive way).

⁴⁸¹ Braund (1997) 120–121 discusses the account of this apophthegm in *Pyrrh.* 9 as an example of Pyrrhus’ excessive *πλεονεξία*, which contrasts harshly with the image of Antigonus who attaches great importance to the education of his sons in the closing chapters.

⁴⁸² As Volkmann (1869) 229 notices, Pyrrhus addresses only one of his sons in the account of *Pyrrh.* 9. That he speaks to all of his sons in the collection is much more powerful in the context of the theme of brotherly harmony.

⁴⁸³ Plutarch tells this same story in *Pyrrh.* 8.7, after a remark about Pyrrhus’ interest in military matters alone (8.6); see Buszard (2008) 202 on the passage and its contrast with Alexander. On Pyrrhus’ *πλεονεξία* in the *Life*, related to the poor education of his children and, therefore, his succession, see Braund (1997), esp. 126–127 (also on its contemporary relevance).

⁴⁸⁴ Cf. the context in which *Pyrrhus* I is cited in *Pyrrh.* 9 (see Nederlof (1940) 47 on this passage): the king only cared about the military education of his children. In the

section: Pyrrhus is not interested in music, only in things military (cf. *Anteas* III, 174EF, and *Gelon* IV, 175AB).⁴⁸⁵ *Pyrrhus* III and IV (184C) deal with the king's failed military campaigns: the first one contains the well-known saying on the Pyrrhic victory,⁴⁸⁶ the other has the king leave Sicily for the Romans and Carthaginians to start fighting there.⁴⁸⁷ In V, he is addressed as "Eagle" by his soldiers (184CD):⁴⁸⁸ this nickname again illustrates his warlike character, and it is unlikely that Plutarch approved of such predilection for violence.⁴⁸⁹

Pyrrhus VI, closing its section, is somewhat remarkable in the context of all these sayings and stories concerning war, but at close reading, one notices a similar pattern as in the preceding apophthegms. The story goes as follows (184D):

Ἀκούσας δὲ ὅτι νεανίσκοι πολλὰ βλάσφημα περὶ αὐτοῦ πίνοντες εἰρήκασιν, ἐκέλευσεν ἀχθῆναι μεθ' ἡμέραν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἅπαντας· ἀχθέντων δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἠρώτησεν, εἰ ταῦτ' εἰρήκασιν περὶ αὐτοῦ· καὶ ὁ νεανίσκος 'ταῦτα' εἶπεν 'ὦ βασιλεῦ· πλείονα δ' ἂν τούτων εἰρήκειμεν, εἰ πλείονα οἶνον εἴχομεν.'

Hearing that some young men had made many defamatory remarks about him while in their cups, he ordered that they should all be brought before him the next day. When they were brought, he asked the first whether they had said these things about him. And the young man replied, "Yes, Your Majesty; and we should have said more than that if we had had more wine."

The apophthegm also occurs in the *Life of Pyrrhus*.⁴⁹⁰ A comparison with this account yields two observations. The saying of the young man is followed by Pyrrhus' reaction, which is not included in the account of the collection (*Pyrrh.* 8.12): γέλασας ἀφῆκε (LCL: "Pyrrhus laughed and

Life, therefore, Pyrrhus' love of war is an important topic too, see also Buszard (2008) 199–205; Xenophonotos (2017).

⁴⁸⁵ In *Anteas* III and *Pyrrhus* II, the subjects are famous flute players. Flute players were of little standing (at least in Athens, see Van der Stockt (1995) 463 on *Alc.* 2.5), so Nederlof (1940) 42–43 does not consider the inclusion of the story in *Pyrrh.* 8.2 successful.

⁴⁸⁶ *Pyrrhus* III occurs in *Pyrrh.* 21.14 (on its historicity, see Nederlof (1940) 152–153). After this chapter, Pyrrhus decides to go to Sicily (*Pyrrh.* 22 etc.), as also appears from *Pyrrhus* IV.

⁴⁸⁷ Plutarch includes this same saying in *Pyrrh.* 23.8. See again Nederlof (1940) 171 on its historicity.

⁴⁸⁸ See *Pyrrh.* 10.1 for the account of the *Life*, discussed by Nederlof (1940) 48.

⁴⁸⁹ As appears from *Arist.* 6.

⁴⁹⁰ See Nederlof (1940) 44–45 on a similar account of Valerius Maximus *V.I.ext.3*.

dismissed them”); and the apophthegm is preceded by a list of stories about his mildness and friendliness.⁴⁹¹ two of these are even similar to some apophthegms concerning Philip’s mildness.⁴⁹² The clearest case is the story that immediately precedes the *Life’s* version of *Pyrrhus VI*: when the king is slandered, some advise that the criticizer should be banished. Pyrrhus refuses, since he does not want the man to speak ill of him elsewhere (*Pyrrh.* 8.11): Philip, asked to banish a slanderer as well, makes exactly the same point in *Philippus V* (177D).⁴⁹³ Plutarch most likely already possessed all these apophthegms when he composed the collection,⁴⁹⁴ so it is remarkable that he chose to include only *Pyrrhus VI* and left out the king’s mild reaction: this apophthegm, instead of the story recalling Philip, reminds one of *Dionysius Maior X* (176AB),⁴⁹⁵ and the absence of the king’s reaction leaves the reader in the dark. One simply does not know what follows, nor whether Pyrrhus will react mildly or not. In fact, the preceding apophthegms that highlight his harsh and violent behaviour, his warlike character, and the similarities with barbarian kings⁴⁹⁶ and Sicilian tyrants,⁴⁹⁷ rather suggest that his response will not be lenient at all.

To conclude: especially in the second part of the *Diadochi*, Plutarch highlights the struggles between the different kingdoms and the internal

⁴⁹¹ See *Pyrrh.* 8.8: ἦν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις ἐπιεικῆς καὶ πρᾶος ὀργήν, σφοδρὸς δὲ καὶ πρόθυμος ἐν ταῖς χάρισιν (“He was also kind towards his familiar friends, and mild in temper, but eager and impetuous in returning favours”). Nederlof (1940) 43 writes: “Dat Pyrrhus in de omgang vriendelijk is geweest, staat buiten alle twijfel”. He further argues that Plutarch has a contrast with Demetrius’ unkind character in mind (43–44).

⁴⁹² In the first apophthegm of this list, Pyrrhus blames himself that he never favoured his friend Aeropus, after this man died (*Pyrrh.* 8.9–10): this calls *Philippus XXI* (178E) to mind, who utters a similar regret.

⁴⁹³ The sayings of *Philippus V* (177D) and the apophthegm in *Pyrrh.* 8.11 even share verbal similarities: “αὐτοῦ μένων” ἔφη “μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἐν ὀλίγοις ἢ **περιμῶν** πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους **κακῶς λεγέτω**” – *Philippus V* (177D): ἵνα μὴ **περιμῶν** ἐν πλείοσι **κακῶς λέγοι**. This is a clear example of *Anekdotenwanderung*.

⁴⁹⁴ Cf. Part I, chapter 2.2 on the relative chronology of the collection and the *Lives*.

⁴⁹⁵ Note 175A: Δύο δ’ ἀκούσας νεανίσκους πολλὰ βλάσφημα περὶ αὐτοῦ – 184D: Ἀκούσας δὲ ὅτι νεανίσκοι πολλὰ βλάσφημα περὶ αὐτοῦ; 175A: εἰρηκέναι παρὰ πότον – 184D: πίνοντες εἰρήκασιν. This wording is absent from the *Life*, so these two apophthegms are modelled after each other (or at least *Pyrrhus VI* after *Dionysius Maior X*).

⁴⁹⁶ Mossman (2005) 501–502 and Xenophon (2017) 326 discuss Pyrrhus’ problematic Greekness.

⁴⁹⁷ In *Pyrrh.* 23.3 Pyrrhus in fact even becomes a tyrant during the Sicilian expedition; see also Aalders (1982) 30; Mossman (1992) 101; and Mossman (2005) 514 on this passage. On tyrannical aspects in Pyrrhus’ character, see further Duff (1999) 113–114; and Mossman (2005) 508.

strife for power. These topics often remind the reader of the barbarian and Sicilian sections. Because Antigonus I Monophthalmus, his son, and grandson are assessed more positively, Plutarch decided to include their apophthegms before *Lysimachus* and *Antipater*. This does not, however, mean that an entirely positive image arises, nor that the apophthegms after *Lysimachus* and *Antipater* do not contain positive examples: the break is rather meant to highlight the excessive longing for power and, consequently, for violence, a great flaw in the characters of this second group of *Diadochi* in particular. This supports the criticism of Alexander in Demades' saying: his neglect of ensuring good succession. Thus, it seems as if all efforts to unite all mankind have been in vain, not just from a political (a large empire) but also from an ethical perspective: the reader seems to be sent back to the outset of the collection on barbarians and tyrants.

e) Antiochus Septimus (184D–F)

A large chronological gap separates *Pyrrhus* from *Antiochus Septimus*, which closes the Macedonian section and indeed the whole monarchical part. This marks a break, as can also be seen from its content. Although there is some continuation – *Antiochus Septimus* I illustrates how the king deals with frank speech (which is also the theme of *Pyrrhus* VI) – there is above all a clear contrast with Pyrrhus' harshness, for his saying sheds light on Antiochus' mildness, through which he clearly shines out as a good *exemplum*: the king is dining with some of his poor subjects, who do not recognize him and discuss his mistakes. Antiochus realizes that they are telling the truth (184DE). Similar leniency appears from the second apophthegm: the king treats the Jews whom he is besieging with such kindness that they surrender (184EF). Apparently, Plutarch wants to conclude his treatment of monarchs on a positive note, as he does at the end of other major sections too. In addition, *Antiochus Septimus* enlarges the chronological break between the monarchs and *Themistocles* (184F–185F). This is especially relevant for an interpretation of higher levels of the text, as will be addressed by Part III, chapters 2 and 3.

4

The Greeks of the Core Mainland (184F–194E)

The Greek section consists of three parts: the Athenians (184F–189D), the Spartans (189D–192C), and the Thebans (192C–194E). This reflects a certain chronology: the Athenian hegemony was followed by the supremacy of the Spartans after the Peloponnesian War, who were in turn defeated by Thebes after the battle of Leuctra. These historical events will appear to be two key points in the collection.

4.1 The Athenians (184F–189D)

4.1.1 Love of Honour and Justice (184F–186F)

So far, one has only met monarchs. The first Athenian sections therefore not only take the reader back to earlier times, but also to an entirely different society, in which ‘democracy’ prevailed.⁴⁹⁸ Nonetheless, this different context can provide lessons for a monarch, for it is the background *par excellence* in which strife to be the first, envy and jealousy, and, above all, attempts to appeal to the people predominate. In line with this, the main theme of *Themistocles* and the next sections is φιλοτιμία, a topic which will be explored in connection with justice.⁴⁹⁹

a) Themistocles (184F–185F)

The focus on φιλοτιμία already appears from the first apophthegms: Themistocles did everything in order to become the most honoured man of his city.⁵⁰⁰ Although he, in his young years, liked drinking and women,

⁴⁹⁸ For Plutarch’s view on democracy, see Aalders (1982); Teixeira (1995); Plácido (1995); Erskine (2018) 239–245.

⁴⁹⁹ For a brief overview of the concept of φιλοτιμία throughout ancient Greek literature, see De Pourcq – Roskam (2012). For Plutarch specifically, see Frazier (1988); Duff (1999) 83–89; Roskam (2011); Schmitz (2012) 69; Xenophontos (2016) 130–132.

⁵⁰⁰ φιλοτιμία is also a main theme in the *Life*, discussed in detail by Martin (1961a), together with σύνεσις (sagacity) as a second main feature of Themistocles’ character (influenced by the picture of Herodotus and Thucydides); see also Zadorojnyi (2006) 262; Nikolaidis (2012) 40–43; Roskam (2021) 113–120 on φιλοτιμία in *Them*. On the sources of the *Life*, see Flacelière (1972) 22–25.

his behaviour changed radically after Marathon, as related by *Themistocles* I (184F–185A). He explains why (185A):⁵⁰¹

‘οὐκ ἔῤ̃ με καθεύδειν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν τὸ Μιλτιάδου τρόπαιον.’

“the trophy of Miltiades does not allow me to sleep or to be indolent.”

II builds on this (185A). When someone asks Themistocles if he would rather be Achilles or Homer, he answers with a similar question: would you rather be the victor of the Olympic games, or his proclaimer?⁵⁰² Thus, I and II not only emphasize Themistocles’ desire to perform great actions, but especially his longing for fame and praise.

In Plutarch, such love of honour is not necessarily bad, since it can be an inspiring force, but too much is not good either.⁵⁰³ *Themistocles*, in the end, will rather prove this second point: his φιλοτιμία dominates his character, for he uses everything in order to become the first. One of his means to reach this goal is the Persian War, which he expects and even longs for.⁵⁰⁴ This appears from the next four apophthegms: when Xerxes is approaching Greece, Themistocles bribes Epicydes in order to prevent this cowardly man from becoming general (185A),⁵⁰⁵ when Eurybiades

⁵⁰¹ *Them.* 3.4 and *Thes.* 6.9 tell the same apophthegm, focusing on love of honour. In *De cap. ex inim.* 92C, the story shows how an enemy can bring one to self-criticism; *Praec. ger. reip.* 800B describes how one should adapt one’s life to the public stage; in *De prof. in virt.* 84BC, Plutarch writes that Themistocles not only admired Miltiades, but also wanted to emulate him. See also Stadter (2008) 59–60 for all of these accounts.

⁵⁰² Achilles is also implicitly connected with the concept of being the first at the Olympic games in *Alexander* II (179D; cf. ποδώκης). *Themistocles* II does not occur in the *Life*, but *Them.* 17.4 describes how Themistocles was praised at the Olympic games after Xerxes had left Greece (*Them.* 16).

⁵⁰³ The proem to *Agis&Cleom.*–*TG&GG* and *Maxime cum principibus* 777EF address the theme of fame in politics; see Roskam (2009) 174. Nikolaidis (2012) 51–52 describes Plutarch’s position well: “*philotimia* cannot be ranked as a virtue [...] because *philotimia* is a means or a motive, if you prefer, and not an end in itself, as a proper virtue ought to be. On the other hand, *philotimia*, especially if it is excessive, can be a very destructive passion [...]. However, *philotimia* is, at the same time, the only passion that may urge one to accomplish various noble achievements motivated by the honour and reputation involved in them”. See also Duff (1999) 83–89 on its positive and negative aspects; and Roskam (2005d).

⁵⁰⁴ Cf. *Them.* 3.5.

⁵⁰⁵ In *Them.* 6.1, *Themistocles* III is part of a series of stories concerning Themistocles’ rivals, introduced by 5.3: Τῆ δὲ φιλοτιμίας πάντας ὑπερέβαλεν (“In his ambition he surpassed all men”). In *Comp. Nic. et Crass.* 3.4, Themistocles’ action (risking his life for

does not want to give heed to his advice (IV and V, 185AB),⁵⁰⁶ he secretly sends letters to Xerxes in order to get things done in the way he wants (VI, 185BC).⁵⁰⁷ In line with I and II, these actions and sayings show that the Athenian does not care just about winning the war, but rather about victory obtained *by him*.⁵⁰⁸ The next two apophthegms (creating the impression of a chronological order, as they seem to concern the period after the war) show that he was successful, for he finally gets what he desires: fame (185C).⁵⁰⁹

All this provides the background against which *Themistocles IX* is to be read. This apophthegm is placed at the core of its section, and provides an additional connection with what follows through the theme of justice. Simonides, apparently a friend of Themistocles,⁵¹⁰ asks for an unjust decision from the politician, but he refuses. His answer contains a parallel structure which compares and contrasts his tasks with Simonides' job as a poet (185CD):⁵¹¹

his country, not allowing a bad general to be elected) is contrasted with a bad decision of Nicias, who saved himself when he was a general.

⁵⁰⁶ *Themistocles* IV and V are told after each other in *Them.* 11.2–4 too, both against Eurybiades. In IV (185AB), however, Themistocles' interlocutor is Adeimantus in some editions, cf. also Volkmann (1869) 229. Yates (2015) 10 writes: "Plutarch draws heavily on Herodotus' Adeimantus for his portrayal of Eurybiades, even to the point of attributing one of Adeimantus' quips to him". Babbitt (1931) 88–89 (and Bernardakis (1889) 36) reads as follows: Ἀδεϊμάντου δὲ ναυμαχεῖν μὴ τολμῶντος, εἰπόντος πρὸς τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα. Nachstädt (1971) 41, however, adds Eurybiades: Εὐρυβιάδου δὲ ναυμαχεῖν μὴ τολμῶντος, εἰπόντος δ' <Ἀδεϊμάντου> πρὸς τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, which is in line with Herodotus 8.59. Nachstädt's reading might be the right one, but the reading Εὐρυβιάδου δὲ ναυμαχεῖν μὴ τολμῶντος, εἰπόντος πρὸς τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα (cf. *Them.* 11.3) could be correct too. Babbitt's suggestion is less likely: *Themistocles* V and VI would be unclear without a reference to Eurybiades in IV.

⁵⁰⁷ For the lengthy account in the *Life*, see *Them.* 13–16. See also *Arist.* 8–10.

⁵⁰⁸ These military actions in *Themistocles* III–VI are connected with each other by verbal similarities too (note the gradual shifting): III (185A): αἰσχροκερδῆ καὶ δειλὸν – IV (185AB): Εὐρυβιάδου and μὴ τολμῶντος – V (185B): Εὐρυβιάδου – ἄκουσον δέ – VI: (185BC): μὴ πείθων δὲ τὸν Εὐρυβιάδην.

⁵⁰⁹ Note *Themistocles* VII (185C): ἐνδοξός (twice) – VIII (185C): δόξαν. Both apophthegms occur in *Them.* 18–22 (VII in 18.5, VIII in 18.3), which only consists of apophthegms, introduced as illustrations of φιλοτιμία (Nikolaïdis (2012) 41–42 does not regard them as the best illustrations of φιλοτιμία).

⁵¹⁰ On Simonides and Themistocles, see Frost (1980) 3; Molyneux (1992) 154–155; Zadorojnyi (2006) 265–266.

⁵¹¹ Van der Stockt (2002) 124 and esp. 126–134 discusses the Themistocles–Simonides story as part of a cluster.

μήτ' ἄν	ἐκεῖνον γενέσθαι	ποιητὴν ἀγαθόν	ἄδοντα	παρὰ μέλος,
μήτ'	αὐτὸν	ἄρχοντα χρηστὸν	δικάζοντα	παρὰ τὸν νόμον.

Simonides would not be a good poet if he sang out of tune, nor should he himself be a useful official if he gave a decision out of tune with the law.

At first, this resembles other apophthegms in which an unseemly request from a friend or acquaintance is refused by a ruler, who attaches high importance to his task of safeguarding justice.⁵¹² Usually an obviously positive assessment arises from such stories.⁵¹³ Yet since *Themistocles IX* is inserted after a series emphasizing excessive longing for honour, one interprets it based on the pattern of expectations created by these previous stories. As a consequence, a less favourable image arises: Themistocles' response to the poet might not reflect his righteous character, for he might only answer in this way in order to protect his good reputation.⁵¹⁴

What follows can also be read in this light, and a comparison with the *Life* supports this interpretation. In *Themistocles X* (185D), the politician calls his son the most powerful Greek, because he rules his mother, who rules her husband; XI (185D) continues the theme of family ties: his daughter is going to marry and he says he likes the suitable man more than the rich one for her husband; in XII (185D), finally, connected with XI through wealth as its topic, he announces that the land he is selling has a good neighbour (note the gradual shifting).⁵¹⁵ These three apoph-

⁵¹² Cf. *Antigonus Monophthalmus IX* (182C); *Pericles III* (186C). Also similar is *Fabius Maximus VII* (196A).

⁵¹³ See *infra*, note 644 on Plutarch's assessment of opposite examples.

⁵¹⁴ (1) In *Them.* 5.6, the story is also told after a series of apophthegms concerning φιλοτιμία (see also *supra*, note 505; the passage reads τι τῶν οὐ μετρίων [5.6] instead of τινα κρίσιν οὐ δίκαιαν [185C], probably the original wording as other accounts discussed below suggest; see also Zadorojnyi (2006) 268 on this wordplay in the *Life*). Since *Themistocles IX* (185C) is surrounded by apophthegms that occur in *Them.* 18 (see *supra*, note 509), all of which illustrate Themistocles' φιλοτιμία, the reader is invited to reach an assessment similar to its meaning in the *Life*. (2) In *Praec. ger. reip.* 807AB, *Themistocles IX* is contrasted with a saying that shows an entirely different Themistocles; see also Zadorojnyi (2006) 267; and *infra*, p. 170–171. (3) In *De vit. pud.* 534DE, *Themistocles IX* is combined with a similar story about Agesilaus, which does not occur in *Agesilaus* (190F–191D), and clashes with *Agesilaus VIII* (191B).

⁵¹⁵ The theme of riches connects *Themistocles XI* (185D: χρημάτων and χρήματα) with XII (185D: πωλῶν); the same goes for the reference to a man's qualities in XI (185D: ἐπιεικῆ ... ἄνδρα) and XII (185D: γείτονα χρηστόν).

thegms occur in the same chapter of the *Life*. The final two appear in reverse order and are introduced as follows (*Them.* 18.8–9):⁵¹⁶

Ἴδιος δέ τις ἐν πᾶσι βουλόμενος εἶναι, χωρίον μὲν πιπράσκων ἐκέλευε κηρύττειν ὅτι καὶ γείτονα χρηστὸν ἔχει· τῶν δὲ μνωμένων αὐτοῦ τὴν θυγατέρα τὸν ἐπιεικῆ τοῦ πλουσίου προκρίνας, ἔφη ζητεῖν ἄνδρα χρημάτων δεόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα ἀνδρός.

Again, with the desire to be somewhat peculiar in all that he did, when he offered a certain estate for sale, he bade proclamation to be made that it had an excellent neighbour into the bargain. Of two suitors for his daughter's hand, he chose the likely man in preference to the rich man, saying that he wanted a man without money rather than money without a man.

When reading X–XII out of context, Themistocles would seem to possess a certain kind of wisdom. Yet they might once more highlight his love of honour in the first place, in connection with the preceding apophthegms. In this way, they call for an interpretation similar to the assessment above (in bold): Themistocles is only concerned with self-presentation.

In short, the section describes how Themistocles desires the coming war and the fame that it will entail, asserts himself when the war has finally begun, becomes famous, and enjoys his fame. The consequence of this is illustrated by the remainder of the section: in XIII, the Athenians no longer like him (185DE),⁵¹⁷ and in XV and XVI, in fact one apophthegm,⁵¹⁸ he is banished (185EF),⁵¹⁹ after insulting the Eretrians in XIV

⁵¹⁶ *Themistocles* X occurs in *Them.* 18.7, XI in 18.9, and XII in 18.8. X also occurs in *Ca. Ma.* 8.4, discussed *infra*, note 748. *De lib. educ.* 1CD presents the saying as pronounced by Themistocles' son; see *infra*, note 983 on the authenticity of this work.

⁵¹⁷ The apophthegm contains two sayings. In *De se ipsum laud.* 541DE, both are told after each other too. In *Praec. ger. reip.* 812B, only the first occurs. In *Them.*, the first occurs in 18.4, still illustrating φιλοτιμία; the second in 22.1, introduced as follows: Ἦδη δὲ καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν διὰ τὸ φθονεῖν ἠδέως τὰς διαβολὰς προσιεμένων ("And at last, when even his fellow-citizens were led by their jealousy of his greatness to welcome such slanders against him"). The story is therefore placed well in *Themistocles*, further highlighting love of honour and at the same time marking a turning point. See also Stadter (2008) 56 on these different accounts of both sayings.

⁵¹⁸ It describes one event (also included as one story in *Them.* 29.4–5): Themistocles responds to a question of the Persian king, see van der Wiel (2023a) 12; Babbitt (1931) 94–95 puts no. 16 between brackets. See Gera (2007) on Themistocles and the Persian king in Plutarch and others; and Zadorojnyi (2014) 307 on the story in Plutarch.

⁵¹⁹ On ostracism in Athens and Themistocles' banishment, see Barbato (2021), focusing on honour in Athenian society. See also Martin (1961a) 333 on Themistocles' banishment as the consequence of his φιλοτιμία in the *Life*.

(185E: the suggestion is probably that his arrogance annoyed the Athenians).⁵²⁰ Because of this, he has to turn to the Persian king,⁵²¹ who enriches him in XVII (185F).⁵²² In this closing apophthegm, Themistocles enjoys his wealth: being banished in fact brought him success, so he seems to claim in the presence of his sons.⁵²³ This final judgement confirms and darkens the image of the man: Themistocles only cared about himself, and not about his country.

Themistocles' downfall, one concludes, is a direct consequence of a flaw in his character, his excessive φιλοτιμία. Yet this also leads to positive results: thanks to him, Athens wins the war against Persia and he does not give in to Simonides' unjust request.⁵²⁴ This, however, does not make him a righteous person (although he was most beneficial to his country): a good statesman should put the people first, and act accordingly; Themistocles, on the contrary, put himself first.

b) Myronides (185F–186A)

The placement and content of *Myronides* is surprising. From a chronological point of view, one would expect it between *Aristeides* (186A–C) and *Pericles* (186C), but it instead precedes both.⁵²⁵ There is also no

⁵²⁰ *Themistocles* XIV (185E) reads as follows: Τοὺς δ' Ἐρετριεῖς ἐπισκόπτων ἔλεγεν ὥσπερ τευθίδας μάχαιραν μὲν ἔχειν καρδίαν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν ("The Eretrians, he said humorously, were like cuttle-fish in having a sword but no heart"); on μάχαιραν, see Babbitt (1931) 185: "The 'bone' of the cuttle-fish; cf. Aristotle, *Historia Animalium*, iv. 1. 12"; the Eretrians depicted a cuttle-fish on their coins in the fifth century BC, see Howorth (1893) 155: Themistocles refers to this connection. The story also occurs in *Them.* 11.6, after an account of *Themistocles* IV–V (11.2–4; Themistocles against Eurybiades): in line with these apophthegms, Themistocles only addresses one unnamed Eretrian (τοῦ δ' Ἐρετριέως: the definite article is strange) who tries to say something about the war. The meaning is clear: the Eretrian(s) know(s) nothing about warfare.

⁵²¹ Xerxes or his son Artaxerxes: in *Them.* 27.1–2, Plutarch admits that he is not sure about this matter.

⁵²² εἰ μὴ ἀπωλώλειμεν refers to Themistocles' banishment. The story is told in *Them.* 29.10, *De Al. Magn. fort.* 328EF (see also Beck, M. (2003) on *Themistocles* XVII and the oration), and *De exilio* 601F–602A. The presents given to Themistocles are three cities (*Them.* 29.11); on the historicity of this, see Marr (1994).

⁵²³ Themistocles' sons were banished together with him, but were allowed to return to Athens after his death; see Frost (1980) 5; and Marr (1995) 161–163.

⁵²⁴ Martin (1961a) 336 on the *Life*: "Plutarch thus considers his personal integrity merely an expression of his *philotimia*. Themistocles is honest because he thereby gains recognition". See Zadorojnyi (2006) on references to Simonides and Timocreon that reveal the Athenian's wrong attitude towards money in the *Life*.

⁵²⁵ According to Babbitt (1931) 94–95, the battle referred to in the apophthegm could be that of Oenophyta in 457 BC, also referred to in *Bellone an pace* 345D. This is also

strong thematic link with the surrounding stories: it concerns a battle against the Boeotians, won by the Athenians because of Myronides' great generalship. As often, such a break indicates that the author seeks to steer his readers towards a specific interpretation. This will become clear after reading the following section.

c) Aristeides (186A–C)

This section opens with a typical general description of Aristeides 'the Just', explaining why he acquired this nickname (186A):⁵²⁶

Ἀριστείδης δὲ ὁ δίκαιος ἀεὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐπολιτεύετο καὶ τὰς ἐταιρείας ἔφρευγεν, ὡς τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων δυνάμεως ἀδικεῖν ἐπαυρούσης.

Aristeides the Just was always an independent in politics, and avoided political parties, on the ground that influence derived from friends encourages wrongdoing.

This motivation for his abstinence from ἐταιρεῖαι will appear to be relevant later, but *Aristeides* II (186AB) first focuses on the nickname: as often in Athenian democracy, it triggers the jealousy of the people. This leads to the protagonist's ostracization.⁵²⁷ At the same time, the story also illustrates his greatness: someone asks him to write down the name of Aristeides on his potsherd, while acknowledging that he does not know this politician. The just Athenian still does what he is asked.⁵²⁸ The theme of banishment recalls Themistocles' downfall, who returns in *Aristeides* III (186B) as Aristeides' rival: when both are sent out together on an embassy, Aristeides proposes to forget their enmity for a while.⁵²⁹ Again, his justice stands out.

Yet Plutarch does not mention that Themistocles was the one who instigated Aristeides' banishment in order to become the first in Athens

another example of *Anekdotenwanderung*: *Apophth. Lac.* 225D attributes the same saying to Leonidas, son of Anaxandridas (compare 186A: 'πάρεισιν' εἶπεν 'οἱ μέλλοντες μάχεσθαι' – 225D: 'οὐ γάρ' ἔφη 'πάρεισιν οἱ μέλλοντες μάχεσθαι; [...]').

⁵²⁶ The corresponding passage of *Arist.* 2.6 is discussed *infra*, p. 325–326; see also Citro (2019b) 151–153 on *Aristeides* I and the *Life*. Aristeides' nickname is mentioned in *Arist.* 6.1–2; see Zadorojnyi (2018) 217 on the passage.

⁵²⁷ Cf. *Arist.* 7.2, describing ostracism as φθόνου παραμυθία φιλόανθρωπος ('a merciful exorcism of the spirit of jealous hate'; cf. *Them.* 22.4–5). See *infra*, p. 328 on this passage.

⁵²⁸ *Aristeides* II occurs in *Arist.* 7.8.

⁵²⁹ *Praec. ger. reip.* 809B recommends Aristeides' saying; see Citro (2019b) 147–151 on the passage and *Aristeides* III. The saying is absent from *Arist.*, but a similar saying occurs in 8.3–4; see Citro (2019b) 150 on the fragment.

himself.⁵³⁰ Perhaps, he assumed that this was well known, or perhaps he deemed it sufficient to mention the enmity of both politicians in *Aristeides* III, assuming that Themistocles' role in the previous story or at least his approval of it would become clear by itself. Another explanation, in line with the surprising inclusion of *Myronides*, separating Aristeides' section from that of his rival, would be that Plutarch possibly did not want his readers to contrast the former, known as 'the Just', immediately with Themistocles, who might then be labelled as 'the Unjust'. A comparison with *Arist.* 2.5–6 points in this direction. It consists of two apophthegms, one of which corresponds to *Aristeides* I:

ὁ μὲν οὖν **Θεμιστοκλῆς** εἰς **ἐταιρείαν** ἐμβαλὼν ἑαυτὸν εἶχε πρόβλημα καὶ δύναμιν οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητον, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα καλῶς ἄρξεν αὐτὸν Ἀθηναίων, ἄνπερ **ἴσος** ἦ καὶ **κοινὸς ἅπασιν**, 'μηδέποτε' εἶπεν 'εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐγὼ καθίσαιμι τὸν θρόνον ἐν ᾧ πλέον οὐδὲν ἕξουσιν οἱ φίλοι παρ' ἐμοὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.' **Ἀριστείδης** δὲ καθ' αὐτὸν ὥσπερ **ὀδὸν ἰδίαν** ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῆς πολιτείας, *πρῶτον μὲν οὐ βουλόμενος συναδικεῖν τοῖς ἐταίροις ἢ λυπηρὸς εἶναι μὴ χαριζόμενος*, ἔπειτα τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων δύναμιν οὐκ ὀλίγους ὀρῶν ἐπαίρουσαν **ἀδικεῖν**, ἐφυλάττετο, μόνῳ τῷ χρηστὰ καὶ δίκαια πράσσειν καὶ λέγειν ἀξιῶν θαρρεῖν τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην.

Themistocles joined a society of political friends, and so secured no inconsiderable support and power. Hence when some one told him that he would be a good ruler over the Athenians if he would only be fair and impartial to all, he replied: "Never may I sit on a tribunal where my friends are to get no more advantage from me than strangers." But Aristides walked the way of statesmanship by himself, on a private path of his own, as it were, because, in the first place, he was unwilling to join with any comrades in wrong-doing, or to vex them by withholding favours; and, in the second place, he saw that power derived from friends incited many to do wrong, and so was on his guard against it, deeming it right that the good citizen should base his confidence only on serviceable and just conduct.

When compared with *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, some differences stand out: the apophthegm on Themistocles, which contrasts sharply with *Themistocles* IX (185CD), is left out from his section;⁵³¹ and Aristeides' motivation consists of two parts, the first of which (in italics)

⁵³⁰ *Them.* 6.7 and *Arist.* 7.1 describe Themistocles' role in Aristeides' ostracism.

⁵³¹ Plutarch was aware of the contrast between these apophthegms, as *Praec. ger. reip.* 807AB (discussed *supra*, note 514) points out; see also Shipley (1997) 35 on the difference between Themistocles in *Arist.* and in his own *Life*.

contrasts with Themistocles' attitude (the second tells the account of the collection). The absence of both elements in *Aristeides* illustrates that Plutarch did not indeed want to contrast a just Aristeides with an unjust Themistocles. Both men are therefore only to be compared with each other from *Aristeides* III on. Since Themistocles' φιλοτιμία is the main theme of his section, while in *Aristeides* its protagonist's selflessness is stressed, these main characteristics provide the yardstick against which both men are to be assessed.

As a consequence, when one reads that Aristeides does not enrich himself when establishing the contributions of the Delian League (IV, 186B),⁵³² and how the Athenians look at him, hearing Aeschylus' verses about someone who does not only want to *seem*, but also genuinely to *be* ἄριστος (V, 186BC),⁵³³ it stands out that both stories contrast with Themistocles' use of money to feed his hunger for honour (esp. in *Themistocles* III, 185A; and XVII, 185F), and his rejection of Simonides' proposal (*Themistocles* IX, 185CD) – a just act, but carried out for the sake of his own repute.

To conclude: Plutarch avoids a juxtaposition of *Themistocles* and *Aristeides* because he does not want to contrast unjust and just deeds, as *Themistocles* IX also presents a just act, and thus avoids an entirely negative image of Themistocles.⁵³⁴ He rather wants to show the wrong and right motivations which can incite one to justice, viz. love of honour and love of the common good, respectively (for this shows whether someone is also *truly* just). He wants to make this point very clear and attempts to explore this theme in greater depth in what follows. This is why Pericles arrives on the stage.

⁵³² Also told in *Arist.* 24.1–2. Aristeides' poverty is a main theme in *Arist.*, esp. in chapter I and at the end of the *Life* (27, also concerning Aristeides' descendants). Cf. also Part III, chapter 1.3.1 on *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.*

⁵³³ In the *Life*, the apophthegm follows a most positive assessment of the selfless Aristeides (*Arist.* 3.4); see also Citro (2020) 115–118 on *Aristeides* V and the *Life* (and on Aeschylus' verses, with references to secondary literature, and for a discussion of other passages where Plutarch cites them). Plutarch opts for δίκαιος in *Arist.* 3.5 instead of the original ἄριστος (the quote in *De aud. poet.* 32DE contains ἄριστος); see Babbitt (1931) 97: "On account of the reading δίκαιος in the *Life of Aristeides* it has been thought that the actor who spoke the words may have substituted 'the Just' for 'the best' when he saw Aristeides in the audience." Plutarch probably retained ἄριστος in *Aristeides* V in order to establish a connection with *Phocion* IX (188C: καλὸν κάγαθόν).

⁵³⁴ Besides *Arist.* 2.4–6, other apophthegms are left out to this end: elements of 3.1, a story of 4, and Aristeides' prayer after his ostracism, wishing that the Athenians would do well in the future, contrasted with a prayer of Achilles in 7.8: unlike Aristeides, Themistocles turned to the Persian side after his banishment, and the reference to Achilles would have provided an additional contrast with *Themistocles* II (185A).

d) Pericles (186C)

Anyone familiar with Pericles' *Life* will not be surprised at the small number of apophthegms dealing with one of Athens' most famous statesmen: as Plutarch writes in *Per.* 8.7, not many of his "memorable sayings" have been preserved.⁵³⁵ Of the three apophthegms that follow this statement, the first appears in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as *Pericles* II: Pericles orders the removal of the eye-sore of the Piraeus, Aegina (186C).⁵³⁶ This well-known saying hardly seems relevant in the context of the other stories, but definitely deserves a place because of its wit. More important is *Pericles* III. This apophthegm deserves particular attention, as it both resembles *Themistocles* IX (185CD) and recalls *Aristeides* I (186A). It reads as follows (186C):⁵³⁷

Πρὸς δὲ φίλον τινὰ μαρτυρίας ψευδοῦς δεόμενον, ἧ προσῆν καὶ ὄρκος, ἔφησε μέχρι τοῦ βωμοῦ φίλος εἶναι.

To a friend who wanted him to bear false witness, which included also an oath, he answered that he was a friend as far as the altar.

Pericles II and III are surrounded by two stories which are related to each other, creating a ring composition. These will also steer the reader towards a specific interpretation of III. In I (186C), one reads that Pericles always said to himself that he commanded free men when he put on his general's cloak (χλαμύς).⁵³⁸ In IV, also told in the *Life*, a dying Pericles counts himself fortunate because no Athenian ever had to put on black attire (μέλαν ἱμάτιον, providing a connection with *Pericles* I) through him (186C: δι' αὐτόν).⁵³⁹ Pericles, then, does not care so much about himself, but puts the people he governs first: his opening apophthegm illustrates how he considers his power to be at the service of the free Greeks and Athenians; his final apophthegm should be read in light of this too, as the

⁵³⁵ See Stadter (1989) 107–108 on this fragment.

⁵³⁶ Cited in *Praec. ger. reip.* 803A as an example of good use of metaphors in political rhetoric. *Dem.* 1 includes the saying too, but without an assessment (and Pericles' name is not mentioned). See also Stadter (1989) 108.

⁵³⁷ On other accounts of this story, see *infra*, note 542.

⁵³⁸ In *Quaest. conv.* 620D, Plutarch describes how the saying should be adapted in order to make it relevant for a symposiarch; in *Praec. ger. reip.* 813E, Plutarch does the same for a politician of his own times.

⁵³⁹ In *Per.* 38.4, it is followed by a most positive assessment (39.1). Plutarch tells the same story in *De se ipsum laud.* 543BC, as an example of how one can adjust the reasons for which one is praised, if necessary. See also Podlecki (1987) 79; and Stadter (1989) 345–346.

words δι' αὐτόν receive all the attention.⁵⁴⁰ The theme of selflessness and the contrast between Themistocles' and Aristeides' sections is therefore continued (I and IV) and again connected with justice (III).

One concludes that Pericles acted justly, and that his motivations were right.⁵⁴¹ In this way, he resembles Aristeides. Yet, as can be seen from *Pericles* III, he is in some way closer to Themistocles: both men ended up in the same situation. If one now recalls *Aristeides* I, a contrast between this politician, on the one hand, and Themistocles and Pericles, on the other hand, stands out: Aristeides avoided bad influences from friends and would, as a consequence, never have been involved in such a predicament. This seems preferable to the situation of Pericles: one might claim that uncomfortable situations that arise from ἐταυρεῖται should always be prevented, when truly serving one's subjects.⁵⁴² Yet one might also wonder whether Aristeides' avoidance of political parties did not make him vulnerable for ostracism, and whether Pericles' rule was – for this reason – not more effective. As such, then, the comparison of these men does not necessarily lead towards a clear conclusion and the moral dilemma Themistocles, Aristeides, and Pericles found themselves in provides food for thought.

e) Alcibiades (186D–F)⁵⁴³

Alcibiades is of an entirely different nature than the three politicians presented so far. The first three apophthegms (186D) on his younger years already illustrate his bad character (he bites his opponent while wrestling, mutilates a dog, and hits his teacher),⁵⁴⁴ and he disregards the laws

⁵⁴⁰ *Per.* presents Pericles' rule as a monarchy (in line with Thucydides, see *Per.* 9.1). Stadter (1989) XXX argues that Plutarch paralleled Pericles and Fabius Maximus because both were accused of being tyrants.

⁵⁴¹ Stadter (1989) XXX lists three goals of *Per.*: “to demonstrate through a presentation of his actions that Pericles in fact possessed and exercised the virtues of *praotēs* and *dikaiosynē*, to refute those who hold the contrary opinion, and to lead the reader to make a decision to put these virtues into practice in his own life.”

⁵⁴² Cf. Plutarch's assessment of the story in *De vit. pud.* 531C: Pericles should have prevented this situation by avoiding insincere behaviour. In *Praec. ger. reip.* 808A, the saying illustrates and specifies that a politician should not be one's friend as far as the altar, but not farther as is just and good for the state.

⁵⁴³ On the anecdotal structure of *Alc.*, see Russell (1966b); Duff (2003) on *Alc.* 2–3; Schmitt-Pantel (2008) 237.

⁵⁴⁴ These three apophthegms occur in *Alc.*: (1) I in 2.2 (see Duff (2003) 95–100 on the passage, focusing on the lion image; and Duff (2009) 38–39 on the biting metaphor in the *Life*); (2) II in 9.1–2 (also belonging to his earlier life; see Verdegem (2010) 161–162 on both accounts); (3) III in 7.1 (see Verdegem (2010) 151–152), where Plutarch adds that the story did not take place in his youth (Τὴν δὲ παιδικὴν ἡλικίαν παραλλάσσω; “as he

and the people in the remainder of the section. *Alcibiades* IV even explicitly contrasts him with Pericles (186E):⁵⁴⁵

Ἐλθὼν δ' ἐπὶ θύρας τοῦ Περικλέους καὶ πυθόμενος αὐτὸν μὴ σχολάζειν ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἀποδώσει λόγους Ἀθηναίοις, 'οὐ βέλτιον' ἔφη 'σκοπεῖν ἢν, ὅπως οὐκ ἀποδώσει;'

He came to Pericles' door, and upon learning that Pericles was not at liberty, but was considering how to render his accounting to the Athenians, he said, "Were it not better that he should consider how not to render it?"

The next two apophthegms illustrate that he practices what he preaches: he flees his own lawsuit, uttering a similar saying (V, 186E),⁵⁴⁶ and, related to this, argues that he would not even trust his own mother if she had to decide about his fate (VI, 186E). When he is sentenced to death in his final apophthegm (186EF), he betrays his fatherland by turning to Sparta.⁵⁴⁷ In this way, the end of *Themistocles* is called to mind (XV–XVII, 185EF): both men put themselves first, although Alcibiades goes much further in this regard.⁵⁴⁸

was getting on past boyhood"), but in the collection the changed order of II (not related to a specific moment in Alcibiades' life, see Verdegem (2010) 162) and III ensures that the reader interprets all three apophthegms as childhood stories; see Russell (1966b) 38–42 and Duff (2003) on Alcibiades' earlier life in *Alc.* *Alcibiades* I also occurs in *Apophth. Lac.* 234E, told about an unknown Spartan. It is remarkable that Alcibiades' words in the collection are closer to this apophthegm than to the account of the *Life* (the sayings of 186D and 234E open with οὐ μὲν οὖν; *Alc.* 2.3 has οὐκ ἔγωγε). Verdegem (2010) 122–125 discusses all these accounts: the relationship between *Alcibiades* I and the *Life* is difficult to define, he writes, arguing that the story might originally belong to the unknown Spartan and was deliberately attributed to the Athenian in *Alc.* and the collection. See also Verdegem (2010) 409.

⁵⁴⁵ See also Citro (2019a) 208–209, concluding: "È chiaro che Alcibiade e Pericle hanno una visione opposta dei doveri concernenti la gestione del potere." The apophthegm occurs in *Alc.* 7.3 and immediately follows the account of *Alcibiades* III; see also Verdegem (2010) 152–155 on both accounts.

⁵⁴⁶ On the absence of *Alcibiades* V from the *Life*, see Citro (2019a) 211, building on Verdegem (2010) 259.

⁵⁴⁷ *Alcibiades* VI and VII are told after each other in *Alc.* 22.2–3 too; discussed by Verdegem (2010) 258–259.

⁵⁴⁸ Alcibiades also fled to Persia, see Verdegem (2010) 32–35 for a short biographical overview of his life.

f) Comparison

One concludes that, except for Myronides, the first protagonists of the Athenian section are to be compared with each other. Aristeides and Pericles are just out of regard for the people, Themistocles *acts* justly out of φιλοτιμία (but his motivation does not make him a just man). Alcibiades, however, does not act justly at all and even despises the people. Plutarch constructs a gradation of just and unjust statesmen, related to their relationship with their subjects:

	Avoids <i>ἐταιρείαι</i>	Putts the people first	Respects the laws
<i>Aristeides</i>	I	II, III, and IV	I, II, and IV
<i>Pericles</i>	No	I and IV	II
<i>Themistocles</i>	No	No	IX
<i>Alcibiades</i>	No	No	No

Although Alcibiades' witty cleverness might appeal to the reader, he is – in light of this comparison – the only man about whom almost nothing positive is told.⁵⁴⁹ This makes him one of the few historical figures in the collection whose image is overly negative.⁵⁵⁰

4.1.2 Four Generals, Two Orators (186F–187E)

Generalship becomes the main theme in the next four sections: *Lamachus* (186F), *Iphicrates* (186F–187B), *Timotheus* (187BC), and *Chabrias* (187CD). The closing phrase of *Alcibiades* VII (186EF) prepares the reader for the shift: in the hyperbaton τὸν Δεκελεικὸν ... πόλεμον, the final word receives all the emphasis.⁵⁵¹ The theme of war will be continued in the section on the orator Hegesippus (187DE), who talks about war but is not present on the battlefield. This section and the next one on the orator Pytheas (187E) contain the first references to Philip and Alexander in the section on the Greeks of the core mainland. They thereby prepare

⁵⁴⁹ Stadter (2008) 56 claims that “the *Apophthegmata regum* omits many anecdotes, unattractive or unsuitable to imitate, that are reported in both *Precepts* and *Lives*, such as Alcibiades and the quail (799D, Alc. 10)”, but this does not mean that Alcibiades' image in the collection is a positive one. Citro (2019a) 213, in my view, correctly summarizes his appearance in the collection: “Alcibiade appare assolutamente noncurante delle conseguenze deleterie che un comportamento scorretto ed illegale può arrecare alla prosperità della città.”

⁵⁵⁰ Duff (1999) 229–240 and (2003) speaks of an ambiguous character in *Alc.*; see also Verdegem (2010) 417–422.

⁵⁵¹ πολέμῳ in *Lamachus* (186F) establishes a verbal connection with *Alcibiades* VII (186EF).

and will shed light on a new and larger section on Phocion (187E–189B), who lived during the Macedonian rule.

a) The Four Generals (186F–187D)

Lamachus died in the Sicilian expedition.⁵⁵² It is likely that ancient readers read his one apophthegm in light of this disaster, especially since *Alcibiades* precedes it and because of a reference to a military catastrophe:⁵⁵³ Lamachus says that one cannot make two mistakes in war (186F). This saying illustrates why prudence is a most important feature for a general: any misstep can lead to unforeseen disasters. The Sicilian calamity obviously illustrates this (Nicias' absence might perhaps be explained by the relative chronology discussed in Part I, chapter 2.2, if Plutarch was not well acquainted with his sayings before composing the *Life*).

As often, *Iphicrates* (186F–187B) opens with a saying *about* this general, not with a saying by the man: as the son of a shoemaker, he was despised, but he gained a reputation by capturing an enemy soldier alive (186F–187A). Yet, as his final two apophthegms (V and VI, 187B) illustrate, he was still looked down upon by some people for his entire life: in both stories, he is mocked and reacts by praising himself. Other versions of *Iphicrates* VI (187B), however, do not concern the general's reputation, but his sagacity.⁵⁵⁴ Deviations from these other accounts in the section highlight that the theme of competence is to some extent also present in the collection: after being asked why he is so arrogant during an assembly (ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ 'τίς ὧν μέγα φρονεῖς...', 186F), although he is not a horseman, hoplite, archer, or targeteer, Iphicrates answers that he is the competent (cf. ἐπιστάμενος) commander of all these. The words quoted do not occur in the other accounts and steer the interpretation: Iphicrates just gave his opinion on a certain military matter, and responds to the critique by claiming that he, as a commander, knows more about strategy than common soldiers. His self-praise, then, is justified by his experience, and he deserves to be respected. This also appears from the two central apophthegms that deal with the general's fears (hereby also depicting his sagacity) and vindicate his boasting (187A):

⁵⁵² The three generals of the Sicilian expedition are listed in *Alc.* 18.1–2, focusing on the prudence of Nicias, on the one hand, and the boldness of Alcibiades and Lamachus, on the other hand. *Alc.* 21.9 describes Lamachus as a warlike man without authority.

⁵⁵³ In *Alc.*, Alcibiades' oratorical skills persuade the Athenians to start the expedition; see Pelling (2002) 343–344 (= (2000) 336–337).

⁵⁵⁴ *Iphicrates* VI occurs in *De fortuna* 99E (on the importance of intelligence, for τύχη alone is not enough) and in *An virt. doc.* 440B (making a similar point). See also Citro (2019b) 146–148 on these passages.

2. Ἐν δὲ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμμάχῳ χώρᾳ στρατοπεδεύων καὶ χάρακα βαλλόμενος καὶ τάφρον ὀρύττων ἐπιμελῶς πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα ‘τί γὰρ φοβούμεθα;’ χειρίστην ἔφησε στρατηγοῦ φωνὴν εἶναι τὴν ‘οὐκ ἂν προσεδόκησα’.

3. Παραταπτόμενος δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔφη δεδιέναι, μὴ τὸν Ἴφικράτην οὐκ ἴσασιν, ᾧ καταπλήττεται τοὺς ἄλλους πολεμίους.

2. Encamping in a friendly and allied country, he threw up a palisade and dug a ditch with all care, and to the man who said, “What have we to fear?” he replied that the worst words a general could utter were the familiar “I never should have thought it.”

3. As he was disposing his army for battle against the barbarians he said he feared that they did not know the name of Iphicrates with which he was wont to strike terror to the hearts of his other foes.

Both are related to the surrounding apophthegms and to each other (φοβούμεθα – δεδιέναι). *Iphicrates* II is connected with *Lamachus*, as it concerns a general’s caution. While *Iphicrates* III deals with Iphicrates’ reputation (the theme of the surrounding apophthegms), it at the same time notes his insight into the importance of psychological warfare. His military talent in II and III, then, again justifies his self-praise and regard for his reputation of I, V, and VI: Iphicrates’ φιλοτιμία is not directed towards himself, but to his qualities as a commander, for a good general is not only respected by his soldiers, but also feared by his enemies.⁵⁵⁵ Additionally, Iphicrates even refers to his reputation in order to encourage his soldiers in a subtle and original way, by giving the impression to discourage them (if the barbarians do not know Iphicrates, this might be a problem).⁵⁵⁶ Yet, as appears from IV (187AB), in which he is being persecuted and risks being sentenced to death, not all Athenians recognized his value as a commander.

Timotheus (187BC) continues this theme of a general’s reputation, again combining it with the importance of being cautious.⁵⁵⁷ In the first apophthegm (187BC), the Athenian is envied because of his εὐτυχία. When some men mock him by painting cities that were captured while

⁵⁵⁵ Self-praise is closely related to φιλοτιμία. Ingenkamp (2012) 22 therefore correctly speaks of *De se ipsum laud.* as “a treatise on one of the consequences of φιλοτιμία”.

⁵⁵⁶ In *De se ipsum laud.* 545B–D, a series of apophthegms, one of which is an account of *Antigonus Secundus* II (183CD), illustrates that self-praise in a time of peril is a good thing.

⁵⁵⁷ *Timotheus* II: μου στρατηγοῦντος; III: τῶν τολμηρῶν στρατηγῶν; IV: τὸν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγόν.

Timotheus was asleep, he reacts by implicitly praising himself.⁵⁵⁸ In the remainder of the section, Plutarch connects this topic of an inactive Timotheus with the question of what distinguishes the general from a common soldier. *Timotheus* II contrasts him to another general: when one of the bold generals boasts about his wound to the Athenians, Timotheus points out that he would have been ashamed instead (187C).⁵⁵⁹ The connection with III (187C) is not just the fact that the general is twice criticizing a man, but goes much further. In this apophthegm, some rhetoricians praise Chares as a role model for Athenian generals.⁵⁶⁰ According to Timotheus, however, such a person would not be a good general, but should be the one who brings the *σπρώματα* to a general. This can only be interpreted as a reference to his strength.⁵⁶¹ The implication of II and III, then, as also pointed out by Citro, is that a general does not necessarily have to face danger (II), nor does he need to be a physically strong person (III): these characteristics rather befit common soldiers.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁸ 187C: εἰ τηλικαύτας πόλεις λαμβάνω καθεύδων, τί με οἴεσθε ποιήσῃν ἐγρηγορότα; (“If I capture such cities as those while I am asleep, what do you think I shall do when I am awake?”). Plutarch would have approved of such response: *De se ipsum laud.* describes that self-praise is allowed in defence of one’s reputation (540C–541A), although it is best not to deny the role of fortune (542CD). In *De Her. mal.* 856B, *Timotheus* I illustrates that historians are malicious when diminishing one’s exploits by ascribing too much to fortune. The reaction of Timotheus, then, is not included. In *Sull.* 6.5, Timotheus’ response is different and he is therefore criticized: ἀλλὰ ταύτης γε τῆς στρατείας οὐδὲν ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι τῇ Τύχῃ μέτεστι; (“In this campaign, at least, men of Athens, Fortune has no share”). This enhances the praise of Sulla, who accepts that he is considered fortunate. For a detailed comparison of all versions, see Citro (2021). Volkmann (1869) 229 considers the contrast between the collection and *Sull.* problematic, but both sayings might have circulated and fit well in their own context.

⁵⁵⁹ The apophthegm occurs in *Pel.* 2.6; see Citro (2019b) 140–143 for a comparison of *Timotheus* II and the *Life*. One reads there that the denounced general is Chares, the same person who appears in *Timotheus* III (187C). The reason why his name is left out of *Timotheus* II (187C) is obvious: if Plutarch mentioned that Chares was a general in II, this would contradict the next apophthegm, in which Chares is still to be chosen στρατηγός.

⁵⁶⁰ Chares will also be opposed in *Phocion* VIII (188B).

⁵⁶¹ Cf. *An seni* 788DE, describing Chares as ἀκμάζοντα τῷ σώματι καὶ ῥωμαλέον (“a powerful man at the height of his physical strength”). Timotheus’ saying is much longer in this passage: as often, Plutarch inserts only a part of a saying in the version of the collection in order to give the impression of brevity and of a witticism. See also Citro (2019b) 144–145 on the apophthegm in *An seni*.

⁵⁶² Citro (2019b) 140–146 discusses *Timotheus* I and II together. See also Citro (2021) 204 on the entire section.

Chabrias (187CD) tells a similar story.⁵⁶³ The first apophthegm (187C) deals with a general's knowledge: he needs to be aware of anything related to the enemy. In its second apophthegm, Iphicrates reappears on the stage. Together with him, Chabrias is prosecuted for treason. To some extent, then, there is a connection with *Chabrias* III, as it reminds one of *Iphicrates* III (187A), again concerning the distinction between generals and soldiers (187D):

Εἰώθει δὲ λέγειν ὅτι φοβερώτερόν ἐστιν ἐλάφων στρατόπεδον ἡγουμένου λέοντος ἢ λεόντων ἐλάφου.

He was wont to say that an army of deer commanded by a lion is more to be feared than an army of lions commanded by a deer.

This difference between commander and troops, related to the theme of cautiousness, cleverness, and reputation of the good general, dominates this part of the Athenian section: the safety of all depends on the commander's prudence, but the crowd is not always willing to follow the wisest and most talented person, preferring men such as Chares. Not incidentally, all these insights are instigated by a reference to the Sicilian calamity, because of which Athens lost her important position in the Greek military and political landscape. In these sections, then, Plutarch explores the essence of the good general: sagacity and insight clash with vigour. This raises questions different from the previous sections, where effectiveness and usefulness clash with virtue.

b) The Two Orators (187DE)

The next two apophthegms feature two rhetoricians, but the connection with war is not completely broken: in *Hegesippus* (187DE), the Athenian tries to start a war (πόλεμον) against Philip, for the sake of their freedom.⁵⁶⁴ As *Pytheas* (187E) points out, they failed: the Macedonians have conquered the city, and Alexander is Athens' new ruler. In this second section, the young orator (ἔτι μειράκιον ὄν) opposes some votes con-

⁵⁶³ On Chabrias in *Phoc.*, see Tritle (1992) 4270–4272.

⁵⁶⁴ There is a connection with *Pericles* IV (186C), who is glad that no Athenian ever had to wear a μέλαν ἱμάτιον because of his policy. Hegesippus wants the opposite, answering to one who says that he wants a war (187DE): ‘ναὶ μὰ Δία’ εἶπε ‘καὶ μέλανα ἱμάτια καὶ δημοσίας ἐκφορὰς καὶ λόγους ἐπιταφίους, εἰ μέλλομεν ἐλεύθεροι βιώσεσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιήσῃν τὸ προσταττόμενον Μακεδόσι’ (““Yes, by Heaven, I am,” said he, “and black clothes and public funerals and orations over the graves of the dead, if we intend to live as free men, and not to do what is enjoined upon us by the Macedonians”). This also announces Phocion, who will call for peace.

cerning the king's divinity.⁵⁶⁵ war is now entirely absent, and Athens no longer matters. Pytheas' saying thus illustrates Hegesippus' lack of military insight: in particular, his apophthegm recalls *Iphicrates* VI (187B), the core apophthegm of the sections on the four generals.⁵⁶⁶ This general was disrespected by the Athenian assembly (ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ), despite his military genius (cf. also the trial in *Chabrias* II, 187D). Hegesippus, when speaking in this same assembly (τις ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας), pleaded for war, something he is not well versed in. His lack of caution and military talent led to a new Athenian disaster.

c) Comparison

A comparison of the men figuring in 186F–187E shows that a good statesman should be both a good general and a good orator, for the brilliant general will be unable to keep his people safe and to bring victory if he lacks oratory skills and cannot convince others; the good rhetorician, by contrast, will bring calamity if he lacks military insights. The next section on Phocion will bring onto the stage a man who possessed both talents, entirely in line with how he is presented in his *Life* (*Phoc.* 7.5):⁵⁶⁷

ὁρῶν δὲ τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ πράσσοντας τότε διηρημένους ὥσπερ ἀπὸ κλήρου τὸ στρατήγιον καὶ τὸ βῆμα [...] ἐβούλετο τὴν Περικλέους καὶ Ἀριστείδου καὶ Σόλωνος πολιτείαν ὥσπερ ὀλόκληρον καὶ διηρμοσμένην ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι.

He saw that the public men of his day had distributed among themselves as if by lot the work of the general and the orator. [...] He therefore wished to resume and restore the public service rendered by Pericles, Aristides, and Solon, which was equally apportioned in both fields of action.

Thus, in contrast to *Lamachus–Pytheas*, *Phocion* will describe a versatile politician, similar to the men that preceded this series (*Themistocles–Alcibiades*).

4.1.3 Phocion (187E–189B)

This is the longest Athenian section, containing nineteen apophthegms. This is not surprising, as the corresponding *Life* is one of Plutarch's most

⁵⁶⁵ The apophthegm is cited as an example of good speech in front of the people in *Praec. ger. reip.* 804B.

⁵⁶⁶ Preceded by six apophthegms: *Lamachus* (186F) and *Iphicrates* I–V (186F–187B); and followed by six: *Timotheus* I–III (187BC) and *Chabrias* I–III (187CD).

⁵⁶⁷ See Tritle (1992) 4272 on Phocion's "archaiotropia".

‘apophthegmatic’ biographies.⁵⁶⁸ This can especially be seen from some chapters that are almost entirely built up from apophthegms (e.g. *Phoc.* 8–10). Many of these do not occur in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*.⁵⁶⁹

Phocion and the people

Phocion’s opening apophthegm – again without a saying – deals with his apparent lack of emotion: he was never seen laughing or crying (187E).⁵⁷⁰ *Phocion* II (187EF) is in line with this, illustrating his love of laconic speech:⁵⁷¹ when he is going to address the Athenians (187E: Ἐκκλησίας δὲ γενομένης), he tries to shorten his speech.⁵⁷² I and II (187EF) thereby

⁵⁶⁸ Tritle (1992) 4296. *Ibid.* 4287–4290 discusses the apophthegms in *Phocion* and compares them with *Phoc.*, concluding (4289–4290): “The impression produced by this comparison is that the compiler of the ‘Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata’ extracted his anecdotes from the ‘Phocion’ and at the same time summarized much of the preceding narrative, probably to make the anecdote comprehensible. In one case he adds an anecdote found in another source (Valerius Maximus), and in another states that Phocion killed Micion in a battle during the Lamian War when Plutarch states only that Micion was among the Macedonian dead. Such disagreement in the versions of these anecdotes confirms the view that the ‘Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata’ is a later non-Plutarchan work.” Yet almost all these elements can be explained if one assumes that the same Plutarchan notes (such as *Apophth. Lac.* or perhaps a kind of historical draft) were used for both *Phoc.* and *Reg. et imp. apophth.* As to the “disagreement”, it is unclear what Tritle means: *Phocion* XIII (188E) reads οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ συμβαλὼν ἐκράτησε καὶ διέφθειρε Νικίωνα [Nachstädt (1971) 52: “Μικ. vit.”] τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν Μακεδόνων; *Phoc.* 25.4 has: ἐμβαλὼν δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ κατὰ κράτος τρεψάμενος, αὐτόν τε τὸν Μικίωνα καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἀπέκτεινε.

⁵⁶⁹ Only five apophthegms of the collection occur in these chapters: III in *Phoc.* 8.4, IV in 8.5, V in 9.1, VI in 9.8, and VII in 10.9. V also occurs in (1) *De vit. pud.* 532F–533A, preceded by an account of *Phocion* XVI (both stories show how one can refuse difficult requests); and (2) *Praec. ger. reip.* 822E: Plutarch claims that one should not be ashamed to confess poverty. This is similar to the quote of Thucydides following the apophthegm in (3) *De vit. pud.* 533A. In addition, Plutarch writes in these final two passages that one should learn these sayings of Phocion and others by heart. The interpretation of *Phocion* V is closer to the *Life*. VI, finally, is also told in *Praec. ger. reip.* 811A, see *infra*, note 575.

⁵⁷⁰ Cf. *Phoc.* 4.3. Plutarch did not have much information about Phocion’s youth, see Tritle (1992) 4268–4270.

⁵⁷¹ This is the only apophthegm of *Phoc.* 5 that occurs in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* (5.8). Dubreuil (2018) 262 points out that *Phocion* II takes place in an unnamed setting, while in the *Life* it takes place in the theatre (according to Dubreuil (2018) an important motif in the biography, emphasizing the decline of Athenian democracy).

⁵⁷² In line with Phocion’s admiration for Sparta (*Phoc.* 20.4–6; cf. *Phoc.* 5 on his own short sayings). On Phocion’s brevity, see Tritle (1992) 4270.

open a first block of apophthegms (I–VII, 187E–188B) that together provide the background for the remainder of the section, and especially for its final part (XVII–XIX, 189AB) in which Phocion is sentenced to death:

[1] In *Phocion* III, he claims to be the one who opposes the Athenian people (187F). *Phocion* IV builds on this image:⁵⁷³ when the citizens approve of his opinion, he asks whether he said something wrong (188A). This highlights that it was exceptional indeed when Phocion and the common Athenians agreed.⁵⁷⁴

[2] *Phocion* V is no longer related to his speech in front of the crowd, but still contrasts him with the people: he is the only man who refuses to contribute financially for a feast, since he first has to pay his debts (188A). This difference between Phocion and the multitude even outside of the realm of politics leads to the following saying of Demosthenes, the orator's only appearance in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* (188A):⁵⁷⁵

Δημοσθένους δὲ τοῦ ῥήτορος εἰπόντος ‘ἀποκτενοῦσί σε Ἀθηναῖοι’
‘ἔάν μανῶσιν [νῆ Δία]’, εἶπε, ‘σὲ δ’ ἔάν σωφρονῶσιν.’

Demosthenes, the orator, said to him, “The Athenians will put you to death if they go mad.” “Yes,” he replied, “me if they go mad, but you if they keep their senses.”

Phocion VII, connected to this apophthegm by the theme of the death penalty, closes this first block: Phocion visits a bad person who is sentenced to death (188AB).

The first block thus distinguishes Phocion from the crowd in all respects.⁵⁷⁶ It emphasizes his philosophical nature and greatness and shows that he is precisely the opposite of a flatterer of the people. This image becomes more relevant later. It also explains *why* Phocion died at the hands of the people, a topic thematized in his final apophthegms and foreshadowed by Demosthenes' words.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷³ Note also a verbal connection: *Phocion* III (187F): γνώμας – IV (188A): γνώμην.

⁵⁷⁴ Erskine (2018) 250: “Agreement with the people is seen as so untypical for Phocion that it merits an anecdote itself”.

⁵⁷⁵ In the account of *Phoc.* 9.8, Phocion also reacts to Demosthenes, but in *Praec. ger. reip.* 811A, Demades is the interlocutor. Again, the version of the collection is closer to the *Life*.

⁵⁷⁶ See Erskine (2018) 250 on the motif of Phocion against the people in the *Life*.

⁵⁷⁷ As stated in note 569, *Phocion* III–VII occur in *Phoc.* 8–10. The apophthegms in these chapters are introduced by *Phoc.* 8.3, which is in line with the interpretation in the collection: πλείστα τοῦ Φοκίωνος ἀντικρούοντος αὐτῷ καὶ μηδὲν εἰπόντος πόποτε μηδὲ πράξαντος πρὸς χάριν, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοῖς κόλαξι χρῆσθαι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδωρ, ἐχρήθ’ οὗτος [*sc.* δῆμος] τοῖς μὲν κομψοτέροις καὶ ἰλαροῖς ἐν παιδιᾷς

Phocion as a versatile statesman

The next block deals with the wars against the Macedonians. Not only do Phocion's skills as an orator come to the fore, but also his military talent and insights. *Phocion* VIII even combines these two themes: because the citizens of Byzantium do not trust Chares, he is sent to the city and makes Philip withdraw himself, as appears from the aftermath stressing Phocion's military success (188B: ἐποίησε τὸν Φίλιππον ἀπελθεῖν ἄπρακτον).⁵⁷⁸ In X, XI, and XII (IX will be discussed below),⁵⁷⁹ he again gives military advice in his capacity as an orator, in which prudence is the common thread (188C–E): knowing when not to fight is also important for a strategic mind. In XIII, he has to lead the army: by ignoring the advice of others, he is victorious (188E).⁵⁸⁰ Both VIII (188B) and XIII (188E) thus show Phocion's talent as a general, recalling *Lamachus–Chabrias* (186F–187D). The apophthegms placed in between (188C–E) remind one of *Hegesippus–Pytheas* (187DE). In this way, this block is in line with the *Life of Phocion* 7.5 cited above: as the man was truly a great rhetorician and possessed military insights, he often managed to bring either victory or safety to his city.

Phocion IX, however, concerns a different theme. Yet from a chronological point of view, it is well placed,⁵⁸¹ and it is still connected with

μέρει δημαγωγοῖς, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰεὶ νήφων καὶ σπουδάζων τὸν αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐκάλει τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μόνον ἢ μάλιστα ταῖς βουλῆσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁρμαῖς ἀντιτασσόμενον (“For Phocion opposed them more than anybody else, and never said or did anything to win their favour; and yet, just as kings are supposed to listen to their flatterers after dinner has begun, so the Athenians made use of their most elegant and sprightly leaders by way of diversion, but when they wanted a commander they were always sober and serious, and called upon the severest and most sensible citizen, one who alone, or more than the rest, arrayed himself against their desires and impulses”). The words in bold resemble *Phocion* XVI (188F).

⁵⁷⁸ *Phoc.* 14 contains a lengthy account of the event.

⁵⁷⁹ *Phocion* X occurs in *Phoc.* 21.1 (part of a series of apophthegms), XI in 22.5–6, XII in 23 (the first part of XII occurs in 23.2, the second in 23.5–6; the chapter, containing various similar apophthegms, is followed by Leosthenes' death in 24.1, highlighting that Phocion's caution was justified). XI also occurs in *De coh. ira* 459EF: in the same way as Phocion advises not acting in a hurry, the angry man should not take vengeance immediately.

⁵⁸⁰ The first part of the apophthegm (188E: Τῆ δ' Ἀττικῆ ... στρατιώτας δ' ὀλίγους) is told in *Phoc.* 25.1–2, the second (188E: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ συμβαλῶν ... τῶν Μακεδόνων) in 25.4. These two parts in the *Life* surround another apophthegm, related to the same historical event.

⁵⁸¹ Note the chronological evolution in *Phocion* VIII–XIV (186B–F): in VIII (188B), Philip is the enemy; in IX and X (188C), Alexander is the king; in XI (188CD), Alexander

the next apophthegm by a reference to the friendly relationship between Alexander and Phocion (188C):⁵⁸²

Ἀλεξάνδρου δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως ἑκατὸν τάλαντα δωρεὰν πέμπαντος ἠρώτησε τοὺς κομίζοντας τί δῆποτε πολλῶν ὄντων Ἀθηναίων αὐτῷ μόνῳ ταῦτα δίδωσιν Ἀλέξανδρος· εἰπόντων δ' ἐκείνων ὡς μόνον αὐτὸν ἡγεῖται καλὸν κάγαθὸν εἶναι, 'οὐκοῦν' ἔφη 'ἑασάτω με καὶ δοκεῖν καὶ εἶναι τοιοῦτον.'

When Alexander the king sent him twenty thousand pounds as a present, he asked those who brought the money why it was that, when there were so many Athenians, Alexander offered this to him only. They replied that their king considered him only to be upright and honourable. "Then," said he, "let him suffer me both to seem and to be such."

Phocion is characterized both through Alexander's action and words and through his own reaction. The king's action recalls his generosity emphasized by *Alexander* (179D–181F). In particular, a similarity with *Alexander* XXX (181DE) stands out, for a gift was refused there too. This connects Phocion with Xenocrates: in this way, his philosophical nature is highlighted once more (cf. *Phocion* I–VII). In addition, Alexander's words contain an explicit characterization: only Phocion is καλὸς κάγαθός. The Athenian's reaction illustrates the truth of this, as it also reminds one of Aeschylus' first verse in *Aristeides* V (186BC):⁵⁸³ the agreement between one's outward appearance and genuine disposition, in combination with moral excellence, are clear verbal reminiscences.⁵⁸⁴ This emphasizes Phocion's moral superiority (cf. I–VII). It also announces the first part of the next block of apophthegms (XIV–XVI). *Phocion* IX thus functions as the link between all three blocks in the section, and is therefore well placed at its centre.

has died; in XII and XIII (188DE), the Athenians revolt; and in XIV (188EF), Antipater rules the city.

⁵⁸² After the account of *Phoc.* 18.1–2, Alexander's messengers continue to insist that Phocion accept the gift, but he refuses again with another saying (18.3–4).

⁵⁸³ See *supra*, note 533.

⁵⁸⁴ Citro (2020) 116: "Nell'aneddoto si legge che Alessandro Magno considerava solamente Focione, tra tutti gli Ateniesi, καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός. Focione orgogliosamente afferma che non solo agli occhi delle persone sembra una persona onesta, ma lo è anche intimamente. Come nell'aneddoto di Aristide, ritornano i due verbi δοκέω ed εἶμι, che rappresentano il nucleo del ragionamento plutarco: il valore di una persona si misura in base alla sua reale disposizione d'animo e non agli artifici che adopera per fingersi onesta in pubblico."

Phocion and the Macedonians

In *Phocion* XIV, Athens is defeated and Antipater appears on the stage for the first time in the Greek section. When the leader of Athens' garrison (Menyllus), placed there by Antipater, wants to enrich Phocion, the Athenian answers (188EF)⁵⁸⁵

μήτ' ἐκεῖνον Ἀλεξάνδρου βελτίονα εἶναι καὶ χεῖρονα τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐφ' ἣ λήψεται νῦν τότε μὴ δεξάμενος.

that Menyllus was no whit better than Alexander, and the ground for his receiving money was not so good as before, since he had not accepted it then.

The apophthegm thus explicitly refers back to IX (188C) and continues its theme of Phocion's relationship with rulers. At the same time, it introduces XV and XVI, once more through the principle of gradual shifting (188F):⁵⁸⁶

15. Ἀντίπατρος δ' ἔφη ὡς δυεῖν αὐτῷ φίλων Ἀθήνησιν ὄντων οὔτε Φωκίωνα λαβεῖν ἐπέπεικεν οὔτε Δημάδην διδοῦς ἐμπέπληκεν.

16. Ἀξιούντος δ' Ἀντιπάτρου ποιῆσαι τι τῶν μὴ δικαίων αὐτόν 'οὐ δύνασαι,' εἶπεν, 'Ἀντίπατρε, καὶ φίλῳ Φωκίῳνι χρῆσθαι καὶ κόλακι.'

15. Antipater said that he had two good friends at Athens; and of the two he had never persuaded Phocion to accept a gift, nor ever sated Demades by giving.

⁵⁸⁵ The first part of the apophthegm (188E: Μετ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον ... ὑπ' Ἀντιπάτρου; i.e. the reference to the garrison) occurs in *Phoc.* 28.1, the second (188EF: Μενύλλου ... δεξάμενος, i.e. the actual apophthegm) in 30.1. As was the case with *Phocion* IX (188C) in *Phoc.* 18.1–2, Menyllus also continues to insist that Phocion accept his money, and Phocion again refuses with another saying (*Phoc.* 30.2).

⁵⁸⁶ *Phocion* XVI immediately follows XIV in the *Life* (*Phoc.* 30.3), while XV occurs later in the chapter (30.4). This changed order in the collection contributes to the gradual shifting: XIV (188EF): Ἀντιπάτρου and διδόντος – XV (188F): Ἀντίπατρος, διδοῦς, and φίλων – XVI (188F): Ἀντιπάτρου and φίλῳ. The reference to the war connects XIV with XIII (188E); Antipater again appears on the stage in XVII (189A). XVI also occurs in (1) *Agis* 2.4 (where Plutarch adds: τοῦτο λεκτέον ἢ ὁμοίον τι τούτῳ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς: “οὐ δύνασθε τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀκόλουθον”); “this, or something akin to this, must be said to the multitude: ‘Ye cannot have the same man as your ruler and your slave’”, recalling earlier apophthegms in which Phocion refused to please the people), (2) *De ad. et am.* 64C (fitting well in the context of the treatise), and (3) *Con. praec.* 142BC (the husband is asked to keep Phocion's saying in mind). (4) On its occurrence in *De vit. pud.* 532F–533A, see *supra*, note 569.

16. When Antipater required as his right that Phocion do a certain act of unrighteousness, he said, “Antipater, you cannot use Phocion as a friend and flatterer both.”

Phocion’s frugality and the presence of Antipater connect XIV and XV; Antipater’s friends connect XV and XVI. In addition, XVI reminds one of *Themistocles IX* (185CD). But most striking is that both Demades’ gluttony and the theme of friendship are combined: the same topics constituted the only components in the two apophthegms of *Antipater* (183EF). These stories tell as much about Phocion’s character as about Antipater’s: as stated, his image is not positive, especially in the second apophthegm where he appears to be unjust. He therefore needs moral guidance from Phocion the philosopher.

The chain does not end with XVI: the reference to Antipater’s death in XVII (189A) connects this and the next two apophthegms to the previous ones. This story also recalls VI (188A): the Athenian and his friends are sentenced to death. There is also a link with I (187E): in XVII (189A), dealing with the moment immediately after the trial, and XVIII (189A), there is a contrast between Phocion and his associates. While the latter cry and complain, the former remains quiet.⁵⁸⁷ XIX, which closes the section, is also telling in this regard (189AB):⁵⁸⁸

Ἦδη δὲ τῆς κύλικος αὐτῷ προσφερομένης ἐρωτηθεὶς εἴ τι λέγει πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ‘ἔγωγε’ εἶπεν ‘ἐντέλλομαι καὶ παρακαλῶ μηδὲν Ἀθηναίους μνησικακεῖν.’

When the cup of hemlock was already being handed to him, he was asked if he had any message for his son. “I charge and exhort him,” said he, “not to cherish any ill feeling against the Athenians.”

The story of an Athenian philosopher who annoyed the people and was therefore executed by means of poison calls Socrates to mind (he is also

⁵⁸⁷ Cf. *Phocion XVII* (189A): οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι κλαίοντες – τῷ δὲ Φωκίῳ σιωπῇ βαδίζοντι, followed by a calm saying of Phocion when someone spits in his face; and *XVIII* (189A): ἐνὸς ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντος – followed by a calm saying of Phocion, recalling I (187E).

⁵⁸⁸ *Phocion XVII–XIX* (189AB) occur after each other in *Phoc.* 36.1–4 in the same order, and followed by an additional apophthegm absent from the collection. The first phrase of XIX (189AB): Ἦδη δὲ τῆς κύλικος αὐτῷ προσφερομένης) is not part of its account in the *Life*, and presents the following saying as his final words in the collection. *XVIII* (189A) is also told in *De se ipsum laud.* 541C, illustrating how unfortunate people, treated ill, can praise themselves.

recalled in the closing chapters of the *Life*.⁵⁸⁹ The section thus closes by stressing the philosophical image of the Athenian. Yet there is also a connection with the first part of the Athenian section (*Themistocles–Alcibiades*). As stated, this link was already emphasized by Phocion's versatility in the second block of his section, and by apophthegms that recall *Themistocles* IX (185CD) and *Aristeides* V (186BC). Phocion's closing apophthegm now completes this picture: it recalls the final three apophthegms of *Themistocles* (185EF) and especially *Alcibiades* VII (186EF) by contrast: even when Phocion is put to death, he does not lose his love for his country.

Conclusion

Phocion is a versatile statesman. In line with the previous sections, the reader can draw lessons from the combination of the Athenian's oratory skills and military talent, characterized by his caution. Yet he is also a philosopher and, connected with this, he did not flatter the Athenians, especially in the first (*Phocion* I–VII, 187E–188A) and final part (XIV–XIX, 188E–189B). As to his relationship with the people (the focus of II–VII, 187E–188A), however, one might wonder whether Phocion was not exaggerating and made himself too unpopular. After all, his death sentence (XVII–XIX, 189AB), foreshadowed by VII (188AB), helped no one: not Phocion, nor his friends, nor the people (an important aspect in *Phoc.–Ca. Mi.*).⁵⁹⁰ This once more stimulates moral reflection: perhaps precisely Phocion's excessive adherence to his principles deprived the Athenians of profiting much from his talent as a versatile politician. Trajan, then, should probably learn from the philosophical aspect of Phocion's character in another way, viz. the way in which he acted as an adviser of sole rulers in true Platonic fashion (described in IX, 188C; and XIV–XV, 188EF). The fact that Alexander, Menyllus, and Antipater held Phocion in high esteem and the description of a friendship or at least a relationship based on mutual respect between the Athenian and two of these rulers encourages the Roman emperor to give heed to philosophical guidance and to regard advising philosophers as true friends who have his best interests at heart. Interestingly, Phocion thus no longer appears

⁵⁸⁹ On Socrates and Phocion (and their similar death) in Plutarch, see Tritle (1992) *passim*; Alcalde Martín (1999); Trapp (1999); Dubreuil (2018) 272–273; Erskine (2018) 238 and 252–256.

⁵⁹⁰ Cf. Dubreuil (2018) 275 with regard to the *Life*: “Should he honestly be celebrated for his unflinching opposition to the *demos*' desires and even for his silence when this ensures not only his own death but also that of his friends? Or can a man really be blamed for refusing to act when the general sway of history marches against him? I believe Plutarch left us to decide.”

to be the actual role model in this respect. This will appear important for an interpretation of the remainder of the Athenian section.

4.1.4 Peisistratus and Demetrius of Phalerum (189B–D)

Peisistratus (189B–D) provides the most striking chronological break of the collection, as one would expect the section to precede *Themistocles* (184F–185F). It is probably not placed there because Plutarch would not have wanted to commence the Athenian section with a tyrant. If *Peisistratus* preceded *Themistocles*, the break between *Antiochus Septimus* and the Athenians would have been less clear, for this would have continued the theme of sole rulership. Elements such as fear for the tyrant⁵⁹¹ and strife for power⁵⁹² predominate indeed, although the image of Peisistratus is definitely not that negative: he appears to be a mild person, for in all situations where a Dionysius the Elder would have acted cruelly and oppressively, the Athenian harms no one.⁵⁹³

Yet Plutarch could also have left out the tyrant, in the same way he excluded other prominent Athenians such as Solon and Demosthenes. There are two reasons why *Peisistratus* in fact fits well after *Phocion*: a thematic one, for the tyrant provides some continuation, since various historical figures and themes from the monarchical sections appear in *Phocion*;⁵⁹⁴ and a structural one: the chronological break of *Peisistratus* separates the logical sequence of *Themistocles–Phocion*, which constitutes a ring composition, from *Demetrius Phalereus*, the final Athenian apophthegm. Preceded by 247, and followed by 246 apophthegms, this saying is placed almost exactly at the core of the entire collection.

⁵⁹¹ In *Peisistratus* II (189BC), a young man who has a secret relationship with the tyrant's mother (note a similarity with *Dionysius Maior* VI, 175F) is in fear; in *Peisistratus* IV (189C), some men also seem to fear the reaction of the tyrant when they think they have misbehaved near his wife (note a similarity with *Hiero* V, 175C). Plutarch refers to *Peisistratus* II (but does not quote it) in *De coh. ira* 457F as part of a list of sayings of kings who restrain their anger – a recurrent theme in the monarchical sections.

⁵⁹² Esp. in *Peisistratus* I (189B, the tyrant is betrayed by some of his friends), and perhaps also in V (189D, his children complain when he is going to marry a second time), in connection with stories concerning strife for power between brothers. V (189D) is also told in *De frat. am.* 480DE and in *Ca. Ma.* 24.7–8 (Plutarch quotes a similar saying of Cato and writes that this was in fact uttered by Peisistratus before, see *infra*, note 1038).

⁵⁹³ Esp. *Peisistratus* III (189C), cf. Macedonian apophthegms in which a king is asked to act harshly, but refuses wisely (esp. in *Philippus* [177C–179C]).

⁵⁹⁴ Philip in *Phocion* VIII (188B); Alexander in IX (188C), X (188C), and XI (188CD); Antipater in XIV (188EF), XV (188F), XVI (188F), and XVII (189A); and Demades in XV (188F).

The section, containing one apophthegm, deserves particular attention (189D):

Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ παρήνει τὰ περὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας βιβλία κτᾶσθαι καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν· ἅ γὰρ οἱ φίλοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐ θαρροῦσι παραινεῖν, ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται.⁵⁹⁵

Demetrius of Phalerum recommended to Ptolemy the king to buy and read the books dealing with the office of king and ruler. “For,” as he said, “those things which the kings’ friends are not bold enough to recommend to them are written in the books.”

At first sight, the reference to a king’s friends and *παρρησία* once more provides some continuation, since it seems to be connected with *Phocion* by contrast: Phocion, as a true friend, made no attempt to flatter rulers and always spoke frankly, but Demetrius claims that a king’s friend might not have the courage to say everything. Yet precisely by referring to his lack of boldness, he still suggests that Ptolemy needs improvement and should read some books. In this way, he is actually speaking frankly.⁵⁹⁵

Demetrius wrote apophthegm collections, just as Plutarch is doing.⁵⁹⁶ This recalls the dedicatory letter to Trajan, describing Plutarch’s own attempt to advise the emperor with a similar literary work, in a very cautious way. In line with this, it is perhaps not coincidental that *Demetrius Phalereus* is followed by a section on Lycurgus, one of the *exempla* of the letter. Thus, the break established by *Peisistratus* ensures that *Demetrius Phalereus* almost reads as a kind of introduction to *Lycurgus*. This may draw the reader’s attention and highlights that some sections will follow that present the core task of the good monarch.

4.2 The Spartans (189D–192C)

Various Spartan sections respond to themes of the Athenian sections, which will also be built on by the Thebans in what follows. The monarchical sections will often be recalled as well. As such, the Spartan section, as will become clear, reflects on the nature of the good political system. Almost all Spartan apophthegms occur in *Apophthegmata La-*

⁵⁹⁵ On Demetrius and Ptolemy I and II, see Collins (2000) 58–81; on Demetrius as librarian in the Alexandrian Library, see 82–114; Plutarch speaks of a friendship between the Athenian and Ptolemy I (*De exilio* 601F), see 94.

⁵⁹⁶ See Tritle (1992) 4290 on Demetrius of Phalerum: “Among his many works were collections of both *apophthegmata* and *chreiai* that were later excerpted by scholars and antiquarians such as Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus.” See also Stenger (2006) 210.

conica: the only full exception is *Nicostratus* (192A). *Agis Secundus* VI (190D), which is in fact the second part of *Agis Secundus* V (190D), is also absent from this collection of Spartan sayings and anecdotes.⁵⁹⁷

4.2.1 Early Sparta (189D–190A)

Lycurgus (189D–F) only contains five apophthegms. This might disappoint the reader: the Spartan takes a central position in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and was well known for his laconic speech. Yet this should be put in perspective. The only Spartan section that exceeds *Lycurgus* is *Agesilaus* (190F–191D), containing twelve apophthegms.⁵⁹⁸ This is not surprising, since its corresponding section in *Apophthegmata Laconica* (208B–215A, 79 apophthegms) is more than twice as long than *Lycurgus*' section there (225E–229A, 31 apophthegms): Plutarch simply had much more material about Agesilaus. In addition, precisely the conciseness of *Lycurgus* – and of other Spartan sections – illustrates and emphasizes laconic brevity:⁵⁹⁹ that *Lycurgus* was sententious in speech, then, is not only shown by his sayings, but also visually represented by the length of the section.⁶⁰⁰ In line with this, the first apophthegm to follow *Lycurgus*, *Charillus* I, refers to the fact that *Lycurgus* enacted only a small amount of laws (189F). If this was preceded by an extensive section describing Spartan legislation in every detail, the reader would have to question the truth of this.

Lycurgus indeed focuses on this Spartan's capacity as a lawgiver, in line with his appearance in the dedicatory letter.⁶⁰¹ *Lycurgus* I, however,

⁵⁹⁷ Cf. Appendix II; see also Fuhrmann (1988) 8. On *Agis Secundus* VI as a continuation of V, see van der Wiel (2023a) II.

⁵⁹⁸ *Agis Secundus* (190CD) and *Lysander* (190D–F) in fact contain five apophthegms; see Appendix I.

⁵⁹⁹ On Plutarch's love of βραχυλογία (cf. *De gar.*), see Zadorojnyi (2014) 306–307. *Lyc.* 19–20 describes brevity of speech as part of the young Spartan's education, since it made their speech more meaningful. Many other chapters of *Lyc.* are (almost) entirely built up from apophthegms of *Lycurgus* or of other Spartans.

⁶⁰⁰ On *Lycurgus*' own laconic speech, see *Lyc.* 19.6: Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ Λυκοῦργος βραχυλόγος τις ἔοικε γενέσθαι καὶ ἀποφθεγματικός, εἰ δεῖ τεκμαίρεσθαι τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασιν (“And indeed *Lycurgus* himself seems to have been short and sententious in his speech, if we may judge from his recorded sayings”), after which *Lycurgus* II is told (19.7); IV resembles 19.9; between the two apophthegms, *Lycurgus*' measure of the dedicatory letter is included. An account of *Lycurgus* II also occurs in *Sept. sap. conv.* 155DE, where Chilon cites the saying.

⁶⁰¹ Similar to the apophthegm in the letter, some elements in *Lycurgus* do not contain a real saying of the king, but describe one of his measures, followed by a purpose clause: compare the letter (172B): ἐποίησεν... (172C) ἵνα ἀεί – *Lycurgus* IV (189E): ἐκόλυσεν,

is somewhat separated from this: it refers to the Spartan custom of wearing long hair (189DE).⁶⁰² Although this apophthegm only reflects Lycurgus' concern regarding his subjects' physical appearance and is more general and superficial, III and IV (189E) are related to the characters of the Spartans and reveal more profound insights. Both are introduced by II (189E):

Πρὸς δὲ τὸν κελεύοντα ποιεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει δημοκρατίαν ‘σὺ πρῶτος’ εἶπεν ‘ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ σου ποίησον δημοκρατίαν.’

To the man who urged him to create a democracy in the State his answer was, “Do you first create a democracy in your own house.”

This saying should make the readers reflect upon the preceding Athenian section and shows the superiority of the Spartan system, through the connection between domestic issues and the condition of the state (which, in fact, also recalls *Philippus* XXXI, 179BC): if democracy is not to be preferred in a household, then this is *a fortiori* the case with the organization of state structures. This announces *Lycurgus* III, which also refers to houses and explains *why* Spartan oligarchy is desirable: Lycurgus forces the Spartans to build simple homes, ensuring that they will live frugally (189E).⁶⁰³ This is in line with *Cyrus* III, where a king's measure related to the dwelling place of his subjects also intended to improve them (172EF). As stated above, this educating role is a core task of the (good) monarch.⁶⁰⁴ Lycurgus, as a lawgiver, clearly fulfils this function. This also appears from IV, where he forbids boxing and wrestling contests for the sake of the characters of the Spartans, ensuring that they do not create the habit of surrendering (cf. 189E: ἐθίζονται). *Lycurgus* V, finally, concerns a prohibition of the king as well. In this story, which will be discussed in more detail below,⁶⁰⁵ he does not aim to educate his own people, but avoids educating others: the Spartans are not allowed

ἴνα μηδέ – *Lycurgus* V (189E) ἐκόλωσεν, ὅπως μή. Thus, not only Lycurgus' appearance after *Demetrius Phalereus*, but also the content of his apophthegms connect the letter with the centre of the collection.

⁶⁰² Also quoted in *Lyc.* 22.2 (Plutarch does not say that Lycurgus introduced the custom, but only that later Spartans remembered his saying) and in *Lys.* 1.3 (Lysander wore his hair long in accordance with Lycurgus' custom).

⁶⁰³ *Lyc.* 13 is a chapter on the Spartan laws, which were not written down: part of these 'rhetras' are *Lycurgus* III and V. The value of these laws is illustrated by other apophthegms: III by one of Epameinondas; V by one of Antalcidas, also added to the apophthegm in the collection, see *infra*, p. 202–203.

⁶⁰⁴ See chapter 3.1.1 on *Cyrus* (172EF).

⁶⁰⁵ See *infra*, p. 202–203.

to fight their enemies often, since this will strengthen the latter (189EF). The overall structure of and shift in the section is thus as follows:

<i>Lycurgus I</i>	<i>Lycurgus II</i>	<i>Lycurgus III</i>	<i>Lycurgus IV</i>	<i>Lycurgus V</i>
εἶθισε	πρὸς τὸν κελεύοντα ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ	ἐκέλευε δὲ τὰς οἰκίας εἰς οἰκίας	ἐκώλυσεν ἐθίζονται	ἐκώλυσεν
Custom: physical ap- pearance of the Spartans	The Spartan political system	The superiority of the Spartan system: law- giving	Lycurgus educating the Spar- tans	Avoiding educating the enemy

If the contrast between the Athenian and Spartan systems exists in the educating role of the ruler through lawgiving – as this is the perfect tool to make people accustomed to a certain behavioural pattern (cf. the use of ἐθίζω) – one concludes that leaders elected in a democracy are often unable to fulfil this pedagogical duty. In this respect, it might be interesting to take a second look at especially *Phocion* (but of course also at its preceding sections), where this idea is connected with the distinction between the image of a politician as a flatterer or as a true friend. As described in this section, the Athenians prefer those who flatter them above those who speak frankly and show the right path. The first clause of *Phocion XVII* is telling in this regard (189A):

Μετὰ δὲ τὴν Ἀντιπάτρου τελευταίην δημοκρατίας Ἀθηναίοις γενομένης κατεγνώσθη θάνατος τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ τῶν φίλων [...].

The death of Antipater was followed by a democratic government at Athens, and sentence of death was passed in Assembly on Phocion and his friends.

Since the crowds are often inclined to be self-destructive, there is a causal relationship between the establishment of democracy and the death of those who have their best interests at heart, as this apophthegm suggests. In line with this, a reading of *Lycurgus* might clarify why Phocion failed despite his talented leadership: power should not be with the common crowd, but with the wise ruler who attempts to educate them.⁶⁰⁶ Yet in light of this, one might also wonder whether Phocion – precisely because

⁶⁰⁶ On the philosopher king in Plutarch, see Boulet (2005) and (2014); and Demulder (2022), in chapter 4, focusing on the connection with this Platonic ideal and the demiurge.

of the different context he lived in – should not have tried to establish a healthier relationship with the people first instead of behaving as a haughty philosopher, for this might have provided a more solid basis that could have enabled him to perform his task as teacher of the people, unlike Lycurgus, who had less difficulties with the reality he lived in. Yet to what extent Phocion should have given in remains an open question.

Charillus, or the contemporary of Lycurgus,⁶⁰⁷ is to be read in close connection with the previous section. As stated, its first apophthegm refers to Lycurgus' small amount of laws, also evoking Charillus' own love of apophthegms (189F).⁶⁰⁸ *Charillus* III (189F) connects two other themes of *Lycurgus*: Spartans wear their hair long (cf. *Lycurgus* I, 189DE), and the absence of expensive and luxurious possessions in early Sparta (cf. *Lycurgus* III, 189E) – Charillus claims that hair is the cheapest adornment. These two apophthegms thus depict an image of the king that is similar to that of Lycurgus. In this context, *Charillus* II, as the most important element again placed at the core of its section, is relevant for the image of Charillus as well as of his predecessor (189F):

Τῶν δὲ εἰλώτων τινὸς θρασύτερον αὐτῷ προσφερομένου, ‘ναὶ τὸ σιῶ’ εἶπε ‘κατέκτανον κά τυ, αἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμεν.’

When one of the helots conducted himself rather boldly towards him, he said, “By Heaven, I would kill you if I were not angry.”

The horrible way in which the Spartans treated the Helots was well known in ancient times, so it is striking that the apophthegm presents a moderate king.⁶⁰⁹ This is important to maintain the positive image of early Sparta as a kingdom characterized by an almost philosophical rule:⁶¹⁰ a reference to bold Helots in connection with a king's mild reaction seems to suggest that such cruelties did not belong to this earlier period. This reminds one of the *Life of Lycurgus*. After describing the inhuman treatments which the Helots suffered, Plutarch concludes (*Lyc.* 28.12):

⁶⁰⁷ Charillus was Lycurgus' nephew. His birth is described in *Lyc.* 3.

⁶⁰⁸ After a list of Lycurgus' own apophthegms in *Lyc.* 19 (see *supra*, note 600 on this chapter), Plutarch includes sayings of other Spartans in *Lyc.* 20. *Charillus* II is included as the second.

⁶⁰⁹ Beck, M. (2005) 58–60 argues that Plutarch depicts Lycurgus as the example of a mild ruler in *Lyc.*

⁶¹⁰ Cf. de Blois – Bons (1995) 99 on *Lyc.*: “This *Vita* gave Plutarch the opportunity to present his version of an ideal state which – in his view – really came into being and did not exist in theoretical [sic] scholarly works only.”

τὰς μὲν οὖν τοιαύτας χαλεπότητας ὕστερον ἐγγενέσθαι τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις νομίζω, μάλιστα <δὲ> μετὰ τὸν μέγαν σεισμόν, ᾧ συνεπιθέσθαι τοὺς εἰλωτας μετὰ Μεσσηνίων ἱστοροῦσι, καὶ πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν χώραν ἐργάσασθαι, καὶ μέγιστον τῇ πόλει περιστῆσαι κίνδυνον [...].

However, in my opinion, such cruelties were first practised by the Spartans in later times, particularly after the great earthquake, when the Helots and Messenians together rose up against them, wrought the widest devastation in their territory, and brought their city into the greatest peril.

In a similar way, Plutarch manages to retain the favourable image built up by *Lycurgus* (189D–F): *Charillus* II (189F) provides an answer to questions about the position of the Helots in Sparta of yore which the ancient reader might have had in mind. This exclusively positive image differs greatly from other sections, where participatory readership usually leads to a more nuanced assessment of the characters in question. Yet it should be clear that this is in fact again in line with the *Life of Lycurgus*, which can hardly be considered a ‘real’ biography, but rather presents a description of the Spartan – and perhaps ideal – state,⁶¹¹ and with Plutarch’s practice elsewhere in the collection, where the first sections of a larger whole often lead to an entirely positive assessment.

Yet chapter 28 of the *Life* also indicates that Plutarch’s view on Sparta’s later times is different.⁶¹² A similar tension between early Sparta and the condition of the later city state exists in the collection too, as appears from 190A–192C. But before Plutarch moves to this part, he includes two apophthegms: one in *Teleclus* (190A) and one in *Theopompus* (190A).⁶¹³ The combination of justice and love of honour in the first apophthegm, on the one hand, and the scornful remark about a city wall – this does not befit true men⁶¹⁴ – in the second, on the other hand, remind one of

⁶¹¹ Cf. Beck, M. (1999) 174; and de Blois (2005) 146.

⁶¹² Plutarch also praises Lycurgus for the durability of his laws in *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 4.

⁶¹³ For a detailed discussion of *Teleclus*, see Citro (2014) 257–263.

⁶¹⁴ Lycurgus also was of the opinion that one should not make use of city walls in order to defend oneself, see *Lyc.* 19.11–12: “πῶς ἂν πολέμιων ἔφοδον ἀλεξοίμεθα;” “ἂν πτωχοὶ μένητε καὶ μὴ μέσδων ἄτερος θατέρω ἐρᾶτε ἦμεν.” καὶ πάλιν περὶ τῶν τειχῶν: “οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀτειχιστος πόλις ἄτις ἀνδρείοις καὶ οὐ πλινθίνοις ἐστεφάνωται” (“When they [*sc.* πολῖται] asked how they could ward off an invasion of enemies, he answered: ‘By remaining poor, and by not desiring to be greater the one than the other.’ And when they asked about fortifying their city, he answered: ‘A city will be well fortified which is surrounded by brave men and not by bricks’”). A similar connection between riches and war will also be made later in the Spartan section.

the Athenian section and provide the background against which the following Spartans will be assessed. In this part, pressing questions arise: to what extent are those later Spartans faithful to their illustrious past and, perhaps more difficult, to what extent do they need to be?

4.2.2 A Period of Wars (190A–D)

First, there is one apophthegm on *Archidamus Secundus*.⁶¹⁵ A chronological gap of almost three centuries thus follows *Theopompus*.⁶¹⁶ This cannot be the consequence of lack of material, as *Apophthegmata Laconica* testify: Plutarch could have included plenty of apophthegms related to this period.⁶¹⁷ Furthermore, this gap is highlighted by a reference to the Peloponnesian War at the outset of the first section: from this point on, the period of Spartan hegemony starts. The link between war and riches provides a contrast with Lyncurgus' Sparta, in which the absence of riches was accompanied by the absence of many wars.⁶¹⁸ One now learns that the opposite applies as well: wars require limitless wealth (190A). It is clear that something has changed. This difference with early Sparta also appears from the next sections, in which many battles are fought.

Brasidas (190BC) primarily deals with the most typical aspect of Spartan warfare and generalship: boldness, a desire to fight open battles, and the importance of physical strength which enables one to fight and defend oneself. Yet a shift in the section exposes a problem. In his first apophthegm, Brasidas captures a mouse, which bites him and flees. The Spartan reacts (190B):⁶¹⁹

‘οὐδὲν οὕτως’ ἔφη ‘μικρόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ σώζεται τολμῶν ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας.’

“There is nothing so small that it cannot save its life, if it has the courage to defend itself against those who would lay hand on it.”

⁶¹⁵ Also told in *Cleom.* 48(27).3. On its occurrence in *Crass.* 2.9, see *infra*, note 689. In both passages, the saying is attributed to Archidamus, but in *Dem.* 17.4 (following Theophrastus), Plutarch writes that “Croblylus” spoke these words – yet another example of *Anekdotenwanderung*. As Babbitt (1931) 123 points out, this “Croblylus” is the same person as Hegesippus, see also *Hegesippus* (187DE) on the orator’s nickname.

⁶¹⁶ Theopompus lived in the eighth century BC, Archidamus II in the fifth century BC; see Babbitt (1931) 123.

⁶¹⁷ E.g. a section on Leonidas, son of Anaxandridas (224F–225E).

⁶¹⁸ Note the similar connection between two apophthegms in *Lyc.* 19.11–12, quoted *supra*, note 614.

⁶¹⁹ In *De prof. in virt.* 79E, this is one of the stories showing that lessons can be drawn from everything one perceives.

The truth of this is illustrated by *Brasidas* II, where the Spartan kills his enemy with the spear that just wounded him (190B),⁶²⁰ but in the following apophthegm, he is less lucky: he is killed in battle (190BC).⁶²¹ Apparently, the general saying of *Brasidas* I needs some qualification. This already announces a question that will become more important in later sections: is it sometimes better to leave aside one's (Spartan) principles, when the outcome will in that specific case be more convenient? Thus, although one cannot deny that *Brasidas*' appearance is that of a true Spartan,⁶²² the section still does not call for a straightforward interpretation.

Similar boldness appears from *Agis Secundus* (190CD): in the first (190C), second (190C), and fifth and sixth apophthegms, in fact one unit, (190D), the Spartan claims that it does not matter whether the enemy outnumbers the Spartan troops.⁶²³ There is little point in discussing all these apophthegms in detail, but one thing is clear: the motif of a general's caution and cleverness, so prominent in the Athenian section, is now far away. While this typical characteristic of Spartan generalship recalls Theopompus' disregard for city walls in his one apophthegm (190A), *Agis Secundus* I, II, and V surround two apophthegms that, in turn, recall *Teleclus* (190A): in *Agis Secundus* III, the king is not impressed by the fact that the Eleans act justly for only a brief period (190CD), and *Agis Secundus* IV also shows that he attached high importance to moral qualities (190D).⁶²⁴ Again, the reader meets a true Spartan, but the same difference with ancient Sparta stands out: there are many wars to be fought. The city will not be able to continue this forever, as will be thematized in what follows.

⁶²⁰ Also told in *De sera num.* 548BC; see Amendola (2014).

⁶²¹ *Brasidas* III (190BC) therefore does not contain a saying of *Brasidas*, but of his mother (cf. *Parysatis* [174A], closing *Artaxerxes Mnemon* [173F–174A]). The story is also told in *Lyc.* 25.8–9 as part of a series of apophthegms.

⁶²² *Lys.* I describes a statue of *Lysander*, which many people thought to represent “*Brasidas*, an exemplar of Spartan character” instead of this “more complex figure *Lysander*”, as Candau Morón (2000) 455 puts it.

⁶²³ *Agis Secundus* thus contains a ring composition: it opens and closes with apophthegms concerning the numbers of the enemy, highlighted by verbal similarities: *Agis Secundus* I (190C): πόσοι – V–VI (190D): πόσοι. On V and VI as one unit, see van der Wiel (2023a) II.

⁶²⁴ *Agis Secundus* III, IV, and V occur in *Lyc.* 20.6, 20.5 (told about *Demaratus*), and *Lyc.* 20.9 (about *Archidamidas*); see *supra*, note 608 on this chapter. *Volkman* (1869) 230 sees some problems: “Die Zeitangabe im dritten Ausspruch des *Agis* δι' ἐτῶν τεσσάρων lautet v. *Lyc.* c. 20. δι' ἐτῶν πέντε. Der vierte Ausspruch wird in demselben Capitel der *Plutarchischen Biographie* dem *Demaratus*, der fünfte dem *Archidamidas* beigelegt.” In *Apophth. Lac.*, however, IV is told about *Agis Minor* (216C), and V about *Agis*, *Archidamus*' son (215D).

4.2.3 Lysander (190D–F)

The next section is much more problematic.⁶²⁵ In its second apophthegm, to be read together with the first, the theme of boldness as a typical Spartan characteristic is continued, but this time by showing a negative example – at least from the Spartan point of view (190DE):⁶²⁶

1. Λύσανδρος Διονυσίου τοῦ τυράννου πέμψαντος ἰμάτια ταῖς θυγατράσιν αὐτοῦ τῶν πολυτελεῶν οὐκ ἔλαβεν εἰπὼν δεδιέναι, μὴ διὰ ταῦτα μᾶλλον αἰσχροὶ φανῶσιν.

2. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ψέγοντας αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ δι' ἀπάτης τὰ πολλὰ πράσσειν ὡς ἀνάξιον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἔλεγεν, ὅπου μὴ ἐφικνεῖται ἢ λεοντῆ, προσραπτέον εἶναι τὴν ἄλωπεκῆν.

1. When Dionysius, the despot, sent garments of a very costly kind for Lysander's daughters, Lysander would not accept them, saying that he was afraid that the girls would appear more ugly because of them.

2. To those who found fault with him for accomplishing most things through deception (a procedure which they asserted was unworthy of Heracles) he used to say in reply that where the lion's skin does not reach it must be pieced out with the skin of the fox.

Lysander I (190D) is indirectly connected with *Lycurgus* I (189DE) and III (189E), and *Charillus* III (189F) by the link between the typical Spartan contempt for riches and wealth and physical beauty.⁶²⁷ This close connection ensures that *Lysander* I paints an image of this man as a genuine Spartan like those of *Lycurgus*' time.⁶²⁸ Yet one is invited to

⁶²⁵ In *Lyc.* 30.1, Plutarch argues that the *Lycurgus*-like Sparta ended with Agis II (who introduced money), and that especially Lysander was to be blamed for the moral decline. This also appears from *Lysander* (190D–F).

⁶²⁶ See also Citro (2020) 113–115 on this aspect in *Lysander* II.

⁶²⁷ The same link is established by *Charillus* III (189F), and both themes occur separately in *Lycurgus* I (189DE) and III (189E). Note *Lycurgus* I (189E): αἰσχροῦς – *Lysander* I (190D): αἰσχροί.

⁶²⁸ Cf. also in *Lys.* 2, where the apophthegm is followed by a second apophthegm – in the same way as in *Apophth. Lac.* (229A). This story of the *Life* was usually interpreted as a second apophthegm about Lysander. Yet Sansone (1981) has proved that this apophthegm is, in fact, about another Spartan, as is the case with *Apophth. Lac.*, if one follows the manuscripts containing Ἀρίσταξ instead of πρεσβευτής, taken from the *Life* by Bernardakis. That *Lysander* I only contains the actual apophthegm about Lysander supports this view. Changing the text of the *Life* (Sansone (1981) 206 suggests changing

question this when reading II (190DE): the general seems to accomplish much “through deception” (LCL) and is therefore considered “unworthy of Heracles” (LCL).⁶²⁹ Lysander’s witty response, referring to Heracles’ lion skin, does not do away with the impression that he might be a less typical Spartan than the first apophthegm suggests.⁶³⁰ Thus, there is some tension between the two opening apophthegms.

Lysander III, IV, and V (190EF) perform a similar function.⁶³¹ If justice and regard for laws was an important feature of early Sparta, Lysander acts in an inappropriate way in III: he draws his sword when the Argives make a just claim about a specific region (190E). Yet the image is different in IV again: the story is similar to *Theopompus* (190A) and seems to imply that he highly values open warfare (190E). *Lysander* V (190EF) in turn resembles *Lysander* III (190E), since in both apophthegms Lysander ignores an opponent, with a reference to territory. Precisely the dynamics between all these contradictory stories is in line with the ambiguity in Lysander’s Spartan or ‘unspartan’ character in the *Life*: it is difficult to reach a clear-cut assessment of this inconsistent personality in the collection too.⁶³² Similar problems will arise in the next section on Lysander’s contemporary.

περσβευτής in the *Life* into Ἀρίστας), however, is not necessary, see the reaction of Renehan (1981). *Lysander* I also occurs in *Con. praec.* 141E.

⁶²⁹ Candau Morón (2000) 467 on *Lys.*: “Three times he [Plutarch] mentions that Lysander belonged to the family of the Heraclidae, without once mentioning alternative hypotheses”.

⁶³⁰ *Lysander* II also occurs in *Lys.* 7.6 (see Candau Morón (2000) 469 on this passage), after he is compared with the just Callicratides in negative terms. See Davies (2018) 536–540 and Citro (2020) 113–115 for a comparison of the two passages. See also Verdegem (2010) 123–124 on the lion and fox metaphor with regard to *Alcibiades* I (186D), in a note also referring to *Lysander* II and other passages.

⁶³¹ These apophthegms are also told in *Lys.* 22.2, 22.5, and 22.3 (after *Lysander* III), respectively, illustrating his harshness in speech (cf. 22.1). The chapter contains more apophthegms than these three. *Lysander* V is also told in *De ad. et am.* 71E. As Fernández Delgado (2008) 28 points out, the same story is told about Agesilaus in *Apophth. Lac.* 212E.

⁶³² On Lysander as a less typical Spartan and his ambiguity, see Stadter (1992); Shipley (1997) 28–32 (also on Agesilaus); Candau Morón (2000). On the origins of negative representations of Lysander, see Prentice (1934).

4.2.4 Agesilaus (190F–191D)

The section opens with a typical saying, not related to a specific event in time (190F):

Ἀγησίλαος ἔλεγε τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας ἔλευθέρους μὲν κακοὺς εἶναι, δούλους δ' ἀγαθοὺς.

Agesilaus used to say that the inhabitants of Asia Minor were poor freemen, but good slaves.

Such opening apophthegms often announce the main theme of the remainder of a section. Thus, the contrast between freedom, related to Greeks and Greekness, and slavery, usually connected with Persian despotism (also implicitly in the saying),⁶³³ makes one expect that a conflict between Greeks and Persians will be fought in what follows – the well-known campaign of Agesilaus in Asia Minor against the Persian king in order to free the Greek cities (the focus of the first half of the corresponding *Life*). *Agesilaus* II seems to meet this expectation: the Spartan king does not understand why the Persian king should be called ‘Great’, since the latter should not be considered greater than he himself if he is not more just (δικαιότερος) and reasonable (σωφρονέστερος) (190F).⁶³⁴ This not only depicts Agesilaus as a true Spartan, but also evokes the theme of true kingship, connected with virtue, from the monarchical sections.

However, one wonders whether Agesilaus is more δίκαιος and σῶφρων indeed. The following two apophthegms imply a positive answer: in III, the king claims that if all people were just (δίκαιοι), no one would need to be brave (190F);⁶³⁵ in IV, he says that it is difficult to have compassion and to be reasonable (191A: φρονεῖν).⁶³⁶ V closes the block II–V (190F–191A) with a ring composition. A certain surgeon calls himself “Zeus” when addressing the king in a letter. Agesilaus answers (191A):⁶³⁷

⁶³³ See esp. Part III, chapter 2 for this theme in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*

⁶³⁴ The apophthegm occurs in *Ages.* 23.9, where Plutarch adds that he is, in his words, ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς οἰόμενος δεῖν τῷ δικαίῳ καθάπερ μέτρῳ βασιλικῷ μετρεῖσθαι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ μείζονος (“rightly and nobly thinking that justice must be the royal measure wherewith relative greatness is measured”); in his deeds, however, he was less just, as pointed out in this chapter too. It is also told in *De se ipsum laud.* 545A, see *infra*, note 672.

⁶³⁵ The story immediately precedes *Agesilaus* II in *Ages.* 23.8.

⁶³⁶ Also told in *Ages.* 13.6–7, see *infra*, note 644 on this passage.

⁶³⁷ Told in *Ages.* 21.10, as part of a series of apophthegms; see Shipley (1997) 263–264.

‘βασιλεὺς Ἀγησίλαος Μενεκράτει ὑγιαίνειν.’

“King Agesilaus to Menecrates, health and sanity!”

Agesilaus’ contempt for titles, the fact that he calls himself simply “King Agesilaus”,⁶³⁸ and the wording recall *Agesilaus* II (190F).⁶³⁹ The implication of this first block is clear: Agesilaus is righteous and wise indeed. These moral qualities of this genuine Spartan endow him with the right to rule, various aspects reminding one of *Alexander* (179D–181F; also recalling *Philippus* XXII–XXIII, 178EF). The contrast Greeks–Persians is relevant in this context too: a joint reading of these first five apophthegms recalls the Macedonian conquest of the East. This might seem far-fetched at first sight, but *Agesilaus* VI, marking a break, shows that this is indeed intended. The apophthegm opens a new block that darkens Agesilaus’ image: Greeks are fighting Greeks. When the king hears about the number of opponents that had fallen, he exclaims (191AB):⁶⁴⁰

‘φεῦ τὰς Ἑλλάδος’ εἶπεν ‘ἂ τοσούτους ὑφ’ αὐτᾶς ἀπολώλεκεν, ὅσοις ἄρκεϊ τοὺς βαρβάρους νικῆν ἅπαντας.’

“Alas for Greece which by her ain hands has destroyed so many men, in number enuch to conquer all the barbarians!”

The Spartans are still victorious, but this did not last: Spartan hegemony came to an end under Agesilaus’ reign, after the battle of Leuctra.⁶⁴¹ Plutarch refers to this event in *Agesilaus* X (191BC), but VI is first followed by three apophthegms, with no clear connection (191B). As in other cases in the collection, these stories suggest that some time has passed, although they also shed light on Agesilaus’ character. In particular, VIII is relevant in this context,⁶⁴² since it further problematizes the image as

⁶³⁸ Note the contrast with the words of the physician, addressing Agesilaus (191A): ‘Μενεκράτης Ζεὺς βασιλεῖ Ἀγησίλαῳ χαίρειν’ (“Menecrates Zeus to King Agesilaus, health and happiness”). Bos (1947) 130 points out that there were various other stories about Menecrates’ arrogance.

⁶³⁹ *Agesilaus* II (190F): προσαγορεύειν – V (191A): προσαγορευομένου, and II (190F): βασιλέα – V (191A): βασιλεῖ and βασιλεύς.

⁶⁴⁰ Told in *Ages.* 16.6. This lack of unity among a people is a strong uniting factor in *Ages.–Pomp.* as a whole: as Shipley (1997) 16 puts it, Plutarch “regrets that both Romans and Greeks engaged in conflicts among themselves instead of uniting in crusades among barbarians”. See also *ibid.* 41–46 on Panhellenism in *Ages.*

⁶⁴¹ Sparta’s decline is also an important theme in *Ages.*, see Shipley (1997) 24–26.

⁶⁴² The relevance of *Agesilaus* VII (191B) and IX (191B) is less clear. IX occurs in *Ages.* 21.9 (see *supra*, note 637 on this passage) and in *Lyc.* 20.12, not (explicitly) attributed to Agesilaus (see *supra*, note 608 on this passage).

established in II–V (190F–191A): the king tries to free one of his friends (191B: *τινα τῶν φίλων*), writing to Hidrieus of Caria (191B).⁶⁴³

‘Νικίας εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, ἄφες· εἰ δ’ ἀδικεῖ, ἐμοὶ ἄφες· πάντως δ’ ἄφες.’

“If Nicias has done no wrong, let him go free; if he has done wrong, let him go as a favour to me; but let him go anyway.”

This contradicts both Agesilaus’ *δικαιοσύνη* and his *φρόνησις*: a king should always opt for the just decision, regardless of his personal commitment to the specific case.⁶⁴⁴ The contrast with some Athenian apophthegms, in which this issue was explored in greater depth, stands out (esp. *Themistocles* IX, 185CD; and *Pericles* III, 186C). *Agesilaus* X, following the disaster of Leuctra, on the contrary, again shows Agesilaus’ respect for the laws. Many soldiers fled from the battlefield. As a consequence, their citizenship should be taken from them. The ephors want to avoid this and therefore appoint Agesilaus as lawgiver (191C: *νομοθέτην*). Yet he does not want to change the laws, and says that from the next day on, the laws will apply again (191BC): in this way – and this is how Plutarch assesses the story in *Ages.* 30 – the king saves both the Spartan state and its constitution.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴³ In *Ages.*, neutrality when dealing with friends is a theme as well, see Shipley (1997) 32–35. See *ibid.* 194 on this unknown Nicias and Hidrieus of Caria.

⁶⁴⁴ *Agesilaus* VIII (191B) is introduced as follows in *Ages.* 13.5: *τᾶλλα μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀκριβῆς καὶ νόμιμος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φιλικοῖς πρόφασιν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ λίαν δίκαιον* (“Indeed, although in other matters he was exact and law-abiding, in matters of friendship he thought that rigid justice was a mere pretext”). The story is contrasted with *Agesilaus* IV in the passage: after the account of VIII, Plutarch writes (13.6): *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πλείστοις τοιοῦτος ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος· ἔστι δ’ ὅπου πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἐχρήτο τῷ καιρῷ μᾶλλον* (“Such, then, was Agesilaüs in most cases where the interests of his friends were concerned; but sometimes he used a critical situation rather for his own advantage”), followed by the account of IV. The interpretation of IV in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, where it seems to reflect Agesilaus’ *φρόνησις*, then, is different without this comment. VIII also occurs in *Praec. ger. reip.* 807F–808A, see *supra*, note 542. According to Stadter (2008) 58, Plutarch’s disapproval in the treatise differs from the story’s positive assessment in the collection. A reading of VIII in the context of its entire section, however, does not bring one to such a positive assessment.

⁶⁴⁵ Plutarch also praises this action in *Comp. Ages. et Pomp.* 2.3. In *Praec. ger. reip.* 817EF, Plutarch claims that a statesman should sometimes ignore the law for the sake of the public good.

Thus, in the end, the image of Agesilaus is ambiguous, as was the case with *Lysander*.⁶⁴⁶ Although the first apophthegms show that he possesses the right moral qualities to rule, this is nuanced by a later story; although he seems to be a military genius and promising opponent for the Persians, he fights Greeks instead of barbarians. Even worse: in *Agesilaus* XI, he fights on the barbarian side, assisting the Egyptian army (191CD).⁶⁴⁷ Yet the section ends on a positive note. In XII, the king is dying and asks his friends to make no image of him (191D),⁶⁴⁸

‘εἰ γάρ τι καλὸν ἔργον πεποίηκα, τοῦτό μου μνημεῖον ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μηδέν, οὐδ’ οἱ πάντες ἀνδριάντες.’

“For,” said he, “if I have done any noble deed, that is my memorial; but if none, then not all the statues in the world avail.”

Some of his *καλὰ ἔργα* can definitely be found in the section: although Agesilaus, as other kings, has his flaws, there is still much to be commended about his character. Yet he will always be remembered as the king under whose rule Sparta was deprived of its hegemonic position. This downfall can partially be explained by the moral decline after Agis II: these later Spartans lost sight of Lycurgus’ laws. This was, in fact, already announced by *Lycurgus* V (189EF):

Στρατεύειν δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐκώλυσεν, ὅπως μὴ ποιῶσι μαχιμωτέρους. ὕστερον γοῦν τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου τραθέντος ὁ Ἀνταλκίδας εἶπε καλὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐθίσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα πολεμεῖν ἄκοντας.

He [sc. Lycurgus] prohibited making war upon the same people many times, so that they should not make their opponents too belligerent. And it is a fact that years later, when Agesilaus was wounded, Antalcidas said of him that he was getting a beautiful return from the Thebans for the lessons he had taught them in habituating and teaching them to make war against their will.

⁶⁴⁶ Hamilton, C. D. (1992) 4205–4207 notes (4205) “a pattern of alternation between praise and blame of Agesilaus’ actions” in *Ages.*; Van der Stockt (2005) 441–445 speaks of a suspicious character with problematic features.

⁶⁴⁷ For a lengthy account of this event, see *Ages.* 39. Plutarch strongly disapproves of this campaign in *Comp. Ages. et Pomp.*, see also Shipley (1997) 21–23.

⁶⁴⁸ Plutarch refers to the apophthegm in *Ages.* 2.3–4, explaining why there are no images of the king. The story also reminds one of *Agesilaus* IX: note the description of images in XII (191D: μηδεμίαν πλαστὴν μηδὲ μμηλάν; “plaster or paint”) and his lack of appreciation of an imitation of a bird in IX (191B).

This is a remarkable apophthegm, because it actually consists of two sayings.⁶⁴⁹ The first (Στρατεύειν ... μαχιμωτέρους) fits within the apophthegms of *Lycurgus* (189D–F), most of which shed light on his lawgiving reforms. The saying of Antalcidas in the second (ὄσπερον ... ἄκοντας) has two functions. On the one hand, it is naturally important at the level of the ‘apophthegm’ as a whole: it is similar to the aftermath which Plutarch sometimes adds to an apophthegm, illustrating the truth of *Lycurgus*’ view.⁶⁵⁰ On the other, the saying also performs a function at the level of the Spartan section as a whole, depicting its later deviation from the early, great system of *Lycurgus*: some early laws were apparently forgotten in *Lysander*’s and *Agessilaus*’ time, and in fact already earlier, as the many wars in *Archidamus Secundus*–*Agis Secundus* highlighted (190A–D). Yet the question remains as to what this changed context truly tells us about the ambiguous kings and generals of later times. It is probably unreasonable to expect that they would have acted like the Spartans of old in their specific situations where ethical decision-making was far less straightforward. And it is precisely this that might also make one understand the moral ambiguity in their actions in some respects, as long as their outcome was fruitful (a theme announced by *Brasidas*, 190BC).

4.2.5 Nine Short Sections (191D–192C)

The Spartan section concludes with a series of nine shorter sections. Six of them contain only one apophthegm:⁶⁵¹

Section	Name	Position	Period
191D	Archidamus III	King	Son of Agessilaus II, ruled in 360/359–338 BC
191E	Agis III	King	Ruled in 338–?330 BC
191E	Cleomenes II	King	Ruled in 370–309 BC
191F	Pedaritus	General	Belongs to the period of the Peloponnesian War

⁶⁴⁹ *Lyc.* 13 also puts both apophthegms together, and refers to the first one as the “third rhetra” (see *supra*, note 603; see also Shipley (1997) 27). Plutarch includes both in *Ages.* 26.2–5 too (again as one of the three rhetras). The second apophthegm is included separately in *Pel.* 15.2–3, without a reference to *Lycurgus*’ law.

⁶⁵⁰ See chapter 2.1 on this procedure.

⁶⁵¹ Information in the scheme below is taken from Cartledge (2012) for Archidamus III; Bosworth (2012a) for Agis II; Babbitt (1931) 134 for Cleomenes II, 135 for Pedaritus, and 136 for Antiochus; and Hodkinson (2012) for Antalcidas. Nothing is known about Damonidas. Information about Nicostratus and Antiochus is taken from their sections themselves.

Section	Name	Position	Period
191F	Damonidas	Unknown	Unknown
192A	Nicostratus	General	Contemporary of Archidamus
192AB	Eudamidas	King	Succeeded Agis III in 331/330 BC
192B	Antiochus	Ephor	Time of Philip
192BC	Antalcidas	General and ephor	Time of Agesilaus II

The first six historical figures are contemporaries, with the exception of one man, or possibly two: Pedaritus and Damonidas. *Pedaritus* (191F), however, is placed before *Damonidas* (191F) due to its thematic closeness and similar wording, as will become clear. Since nothing is known about Damonidas, it is impossible to determine whether his section deviates from the general chronological sequence: he might fit in with this series of contemporaries. *Nicostratus* (192A), the final Spartan of these six, is followed by two sections that refer to men who appeared in the Macedonian sections, thereby indicating that they belong to later times.⁶⁵² *Antalcidas* (192BC) concludes the list, taking the reader back to the reign of Agesilaus. Despite this chronological deviation, it fits there well, as it is followed by two Thebans who belong to the same period.

In these nine sections, the two Spartan main themes are continued, viz. open warfare and moral virtue, especially justice:

[I] *Archidamus Tertius* is introduced as Agesilaus' son. When he sees catapults discharging projectiles, he complains that this is the end of manly ἀρετή, after invoking Heracles (191D). This reference to Sparta's greatest hero⁶⁵³ connects this saying with *Lysander* II (190DE), again underscoring the high importance which the Spartans attached to open warfare and how this shaped their identity. This theme is continued by *Agis Tertius* (191E; two apophthegms on war) and *Cleomenes* (191E; the reader again meets true Spartan boldness).⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵² Xenocrates, who played a role in *Alexander* XXX (181DE), reappears on the stage in *Eudamidas* I (192A); Philip returns in *Antiochus Spartiates* (192B).

⁶⁵³ Plutarch wrote an unparalleled *Life* of Heracles, but this was probably motivated by the hero's ties to Thebes, as the Chaeronean wrote *Lives* on other famous Boeotians too, see also Hägg (2012) 240.

⁶⁵⁴ *Agis Tertius* I (191E) opens with δέ, probably because it shares the very same message as *Archidamus Tertius* (191D), viz. direct contact between soldiers on the battlefield (taken from van der Wiel (2023a) 3n11). It is told in *Lyc.* 19.4 as part of a description of laconic speech (see also *supra*, note 600 on this chapter): as Volkmann (1869) 230 notices, the unknown Athenian in the *Life* is Demades in *Agis Tertius*, but in *Apophth. Lac.*

[2] Both *Pedaritus* (191F) and *Damonidas* (191F) contain only one apophthegm, concerning a different theme:⁶⁵⁵ in their apophthegms, the protagonists do not achieve the highest position, but do not seem to be angry or displeased with that, for they put their country first. This similarity between both stories is highlighted by their parallel structure.⁶⁵⁶

[3] The next sections combine these themes of generalship (cf. [1]) and moral superiority (cf. [2]). *Nicostratus* (192A), the first of these, invites the reader to reassess a historical figure who appeared a few lines earlier. Nicostratus, a general, is asked by Archidamus to betray a specific place in exchange for a great compensation, and answers (192A)⁶⁵⁷

μη εἶναι τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἀφ’ Ἡρακλέους· τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ἡρακλέα περιόντα τοὺς κακοὺς κολάζειν, Ἀρχίδαμον δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς κακοὺς ποιεῖν.

that Archidamus was not descended from Heracles, for Heracles, as he went about, punished the bad men, but Archidamus made the good men bad.

This says as much about Nicostratus’ uprightness as about Archidamus’ baseness: while this king appeared to be a genuine Spartan in his own section (191D), his moral qualities are questioned in 192A, again in terms of his Spartan nature. Thus, the reference to Heracles in both sections is not coincidental (cf. also *Lysander* II, 190DE). In addition, there is also a structural function: with this ring composition, *Nicostratus* closes the series of apophthegms of Archidamus’ contemporaries. In this way, the general disposition of all subjects placed in between *Archidamus Tertius–Nicostratus* might be questioned: if the straightforward interpretation of the first section already seems to be problematic, the same might be true for the evident conclusions drawn from the other sections on some ‘true’ Spartans.

216C the Athenian is also identified as Demades. *Cleomenes* (191E) occurs in *Lyc.* 20.14 (see *supra*, note 608 on this chapter), there introduced as a saying of a νεανίσκος.

⁶⁵⁵ *Pedaritus* is also told in *Lyc.* 25.6, a few lines before an account of *Brasidas* III (see *supra*, note 621 on this passage); *Damonidas* occurs in *Sept. sap. conv.* 149A (part of Thales’ discourse about being happy with one’s position; *Damonidas* is probably not named for chronological reasons). On *Damonidas* and the apophthegm of the collection, see Sansone (2012).

⁶⁵⁶ Πεδάριτος – Δαμωνίδας / οὐκ ἐγκριθεῖς – ταχθεῖς / εἰς τοὺς τριακοσίους – εἰς τὴν τελευταίαν τοῦ χοροῦ τάξιν. *Damonidas* again contains δέ because of the close similarities with the preceding story (see again van der Wiel (2023a) 3–4n11).

⁶⁵⁷ Also told in *De vit. pud.* 535AB.

With *Eudamidas* and *Antiochus Spartiates*, the reader reaches the time after the Macedonian conquest. *Eudamidas* (192AB) contains two apophthegms. Both are provoked by a similar cause and share a similar punchline: Eudamidas twice hears a philosopher speaking, in *Eudamidas* I about virtue (192A) and in II about good generalship, and the Spartan comments on the discrepancy between the philosopher's words and deeds (192B).⁶⁵⁸ Once more, the Spartan main themes are thus combined. *Antiochus Spartiates* (192B) continues this: Philip returned a region to the Messenians, because of which Antiochus asks whether he also bestowed upon this people the strength to fight for their land. One might question his just nature (cf. the similar *Lysander* III, 190E). The first two apophthegms of *Antalcidas* (192BC), the last Spartan of the collection, connect the theme of moral superiority and generalship for a final time. Both stories resemble each other: an Athenian insults the Spartans, and Antalcidas reacts with a witty remark.⁶⁵⁹ In particular, *Antalcidas* II deserves attention, as it seems to serve as a kind of introduction to the Theban section (192BC):

Ἐτέρου δ' Ἀθηναίου πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπόντος ‘ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ πολλάκις ὑμᾶς ἐδιώξαμεν’, ‘ἡμεῖς δ’ οὐδέποτε’ εἶπεν ‘ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐρώτα.’

When another Athenian said to him, “You cannot deny that we have many a time put you to rout from the Cephisus,” he said, “But we have never put you to rout from the Eurotas!”

Similar retorts will be made by Epameinondas (*Epameinondas* XV and XVI, 193CD), the first man to invade Laconia.⁶⁶⁰ This will be described

⁶⁵⁸ Its second apophthegm, however, does not contain δέ, but opens with πάλιν. In other cases throughout the collection, the adverb is followed by δέ, indicating that the situation in the apophthegm which follows is similar to the situation in the previous one, but not the same; see *Dionysius Maior* IV (175E); *Philippus* XXIX (179B); *Alexander* XX (180F); *Epameinondas* IX (192F–193A). Except for the absence of the particle, this is not different in the case of *Eudamidas* I (192A) and II (192B), so they should not be considered one large apophthegm (in addition, a δέ separates the stories in *Apophth. Lac.* 220DE, there the first and second apophthegm of Eudamidas too). See also van der Wiel (2023a) 3n8.

⁶⁵⁹ As Volkmann (1869) 230 points out, *Antalcidas* I (192B) is told as a saying of Pleistonax in *Lyc.* 20.8 (see *supra*, note 608 on this chapter). *Lyc.* 20.8 is the same story as *Apophth. Lac.* 231D, also told about Pleistonax. In *Apophth. Lac.* 217D, however, which more closely resembles *Antalcidas* I, the story is included in a section on Antalcidas. This is, then, a clear example of *Anekdotenwanderung*.

⁶⁶⁰ Not incidentally, *Antalcidas* II (192B) is told in *Agēs.* 31.7, after a description of the Theban invasion in Spartan territory (combined with a similar saying of another Spartan

in the next part, but Plutarch first concludes *Antalcidas* and the Spartan section with a final reference to the impeccable Heracles (192C).

4.3 The Thebans (192C–194E)

Up to this point, two types of generals have appeared on the stage: in the Athenian section, caution and cleverness were regarded as indispensable characteristics of a general, but physical strength as such was not an important feature; in the Spartan section, on the contrary, most apophthegms focus on open warfare and boldness, and Plutarch did not always make a distinction between a general and a common soldier: in fact, when using military tactics the commander in question was even denounced by his fellow citizens. It is not always clear which conclusions are to be drawn from these opposing pictures. The Theban section will provide further insights on this matter. This part of the collection has only two subsections: *Epameinondas* (192C–194C) and *Pelopidas* (194C–E). Both generals lived in the same period, fought the same battles, and were friends, as is emphasized at the outset of *Pelopidas*.⁶⁶¹ Their sections should thus be read in close connection with each other.

4.3.1 Epameinondas (192C–194C)

With 24 apophthegms, *Epameinondas* is the fourth-largest section of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. There are two reasons for this. The character of Epameinondas, a great general with a keen interest in philosophy, deeply impressed Plutarch.⁶⁶² There is also a structural reason: a short Theban section after much longer Athenian and Spartan sections would throw the general composition of the collection out of balance. Since it is likely that Plutarch of all Thebans possessed a large amount of material on Epameinondas in the first place (and to a lesser extent on Pelopidas), he was forced to include more apophthegms in the section on this man.⁶⁶³

in 31.6). In addition, the apophthegm occurs in *Praec. ger. reip.* 810F, combined with a saying of Epameinondas.

⁶⁶¹ In the discussion of the trial of Epameinondas and Pelopidas in *De se ipsum laud.* 540DE, there is – in contrast with *Pel.* – a difference between the presentation of the great Epameinondas and the cowardly Pelopidas, see Buckler (1978) 38; Georgiadou (1992a) 4233–4234. See also the story of *Epameinondas* XXIII (194A–C).

⁶⁶² Georgiadou (1992a) 4224. On Epameinondas' central function in *De genio Socr.*, see Zanetto (2000) 538–540. *Epameinondas* probably shows much about the lost *Life* (more than parallels with Pausanias; see Tuplin (1984) on this matter). See also *infra*, p. 243–244.

⁶⁶³ A TLG search for lemma Ἐπαμινώνδας, -α, ὁ gives 149 results for Plutarch: he probably possessed a lot of apophthegms on this Theban in his notes.

A first block

Epameinondas I (192C) is again a typical first apophthegm, praising the protagonist as a commander: his soldiers never panicked when he guided them. As is the case with similar openings, this one is somewhat separated from the remainder of the section, but at the same time announces its main theme: good generalship. II continues this: Epameinondas claims that death is most beautiful in war (192C), suggesting a position similar to that of the Spartans.⁶⁶⁴ Yet the importance and precise meaning of this saying are not immediately clear, nor is it explained in what follows, because the next three apophthegms primarily deal with another theme: poverty and frugality. In III (192CD), the Theban criticizes a fat soldier (the military context somehow still connects this with II). The next two apophthegms (192D) illustrate that he himself is (192D) εὐτελής περὶ τὴν διαίταν (LCL: “frugal in his manner of living”).⁶⁶⁵ The topic of frugality will appear to be related to the theme of death and war at the end of the section, as is also suggested by the gradual shifting that connects all these topics.

Epameinondas VI (192E) still speaks of a frugal lifestyle, but also shifts towards another theme. When everyone is celebrating, Epameinondas does not join the party, probably because at least someone should take care of the πόλις, even during festivities. The apophthegm is not very clear, but there is no doubt that it sets the general apart from the crowd, which – contrary to II – to some extent seems to highlight a difference with the Spartan ideals. This, in turn, provides a connection with VII (192E) and VIII (192EF).⁶⁶⁶ Both contrast commanders and the common folk or troops too, although this is not immediately clear in this second apophthegm, describing how Epameinondas encourages his soldiers after two contradictory oracles (192F):

⁶⁶⁴ If one follows the reading of the manuscripts, which all contain κάλλιστον. Nachstädt (1971) 64, however, reads ἱερόθυτον: “κάλλιστον Ω hoc mge adscriptum ad genuinam lectionem ἱερόθυτον declarandam (349c gn. V. 280) in textum irrepsisse recte putat Stb.” A similar saying of Epameinondas is quoted in *Bellone an pace* 349C, but the wording is entirely different from the short saying in *Epameinondas* II: if this saying derives from the (note for the) apophthegm of the oration, Plutarch changed it into a bold and general claim.

⁶⁶⁵ In *Non posse* 1099C, an account of *Epameinondas* IV (192D) is combined with *Alexander* IX (180A) and another apophthegm of this king, see *supra*, note 422 on this passage. *Epameinondas* V (192D) is connected with the two preceding apophthegms: μαγείρου – IV (192D): τὴν διαίταν, δεῖπνον, πεμμάτων καὶ ὄψων καὶ μύρων παρασκευήν; and III (192C): τὸ σῶμα – V (192D): τοῦ σώματος.

⁶⁶⁶ *Epameinondas* VII also occurs in *Praec. ger. reip.* 808DE.

ἀναστὰς εἶπεν ἔαν μὲν ἐθελήσητε τοῖς ἄρχουσι πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ὁμόσε χωρεῖν, οὗτοι ὑμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ χρησιμοί' δείξας τοὺς βελτίονας· ἔαν δ' ἀποδειλιάσητε πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐκεῖνοι' πρὸς τοὺς χείρονας ἰδῶν.

he arose and said, “If you are willing to obey your officers, and come to close quarters with the enemy, these are the oracles for you,” and he pointed to those of good omen; “but if you are going to play the cowards in the face of danger, then those,” and he glanced at those of ill omen.

Obedying one’s officers is defined as facing the enemy. This is the main function of the soldier. Yet the way in which this differs from a general’s task, and what should be understood by this, will again only become clear at the end of the section.

Epameinondas IX (192F–193A), similar to the situation in VIII (the general again has to encourage his soldiers after a sign from heaven),⁶⁶⁷ closes a series of sayings uttered before battles. In what follows, the reader sees the general after a battle: X–XII (193AB) are all related to his greatest success, his victory at Leuctra.⁶⁶⁸ This once more highlights Epameinondas’ military talent and shows that his insights should be taken seriously.

A second block

There is no clear connection between *Epameinondas* XII (193B) and XIII (193BC). The latter apophthegm, breaking the gradual shifting, thus opens a new block (XIII–XXIV, 193B–F) in which previous themes are taken up again and clarified. First, XIII describes how Epameinondas refuses the gold of Jason of Thessaly and thereby again presents his frugality and disregard for wealth (193BC).⁶⁶⁹ XIV, resembling XIII also in

⁶⁶⁷ Cf. πάλιν δέ, 192F; see also *supra*, note 658. This is a theme in *Pel.–Marc.* too; see esp. *Marc.* 3–6 on omens.

⁶⁶⁸ In *Epameinondas* X (193A), the commander rejoices about his victory; he again takes up his attitude from VI (192E) in XI (193AB); in XII (193B), the general prevents the Spartans from hiding their great defeat. These three apophthegms thus all refer or refer back to the victory of Leuctra: X (193A): ἐν Λεύκτροις νικήσῃ Λακεδαιμονίους; XI (193A): μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐκείνην; XII (193B): τὰ τοιαῦτα συμπτώματα. X contains a general saying, and does not necessarily precede XI from a chronological point of view, but his attitude in X resembles his happiness in the moments immediately after the battle, referred to in XI (193AB: ἐχθὲς κτλ.). X occurs in *Cor.* 4.6 (compared with Marcianus’ love for his mother), *An seni* 786D, and *Non posse* 1098AB (the happiness of Epameinondas’ mother after Leuctra is contrasted with Epicurus’ mother).

⁶⁶⁹ Epameinondas refers back to this in *De genio Socr.* 583F–584A.

terms of its structure, contains a similar response with regard to a large amount of money sent by the Persian king (193C).⁶⁷⁰ Second, the theme of war is retaken: XV focuses on military alliances (193CD) and is therefore in line with XIII and XIV;⁶⁷¹ XVI (193D) in turn resembles XV, since in both stories, Thebes is accused, first by Athens, then by Sparta, and Epameinondas responds by referring to the mythology of Athens and to Sparta's typical laconic speech respectively;⁶⁷² in XVII, by contrast, the Theban enemies are forging alliances (193DE). As a consequence, war is imminent again, so in XVIII (193E) the general always keeps the Boeotian people under arms.⁶⁷³ The saying again contrasts common soldiers with their leader, a third main theme of the section as a whole. Battles are fought once more in the following apophthegms: Epameinondas minimizes the successes of Chabrias in XIX (193EF) and ridicules the new weapons acquired by the Athenians in XX (193F).

Yet especially relevant are the final four apophthegms, since these connect all these main topics also with each other. In XXI (194A), the general claims that a man who becomes rich is reluctant to face perils. The following apophthegm (194A) reads as follows: when Epameinondas is asked whether he is a better commander than Iphicrates or Chabrias,⁶⁷⁴ he argues that he cannot pass judgement on this matter, since they are all still alive. This can be interpreted in two ways, both of which are probably correct: [1] Epameinondas could mean that all successes and misfortunes of the entire lives of the generals should be taken into account in order to come to the right assessment; or [2] that the way in which a general dies is relevant too. Possibilities for judging Epameinondas' career in both ways are provided by his two closing apophthegms:

⁶⁷⁰ Cf. *Epameinondas* XIV (193C): Ἀῦθις δέ. Note the *genitivus absolutus* in XIII (193B): Ἰάσονος δὲ τοῦ Θεσσαλῶν μονάρχου [...] δισχιλίους δὲ χρυσοὺς τῷ Ἐπαμεινώνδῃ πέμψαντος – XIV (193C): τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως τρισμυρίουσ δαρεϊκοὺς ἀποστείλαντος αὐτῷ.

⁶⁷¹ *Epameinondas* XIII (193B): συμμάχου μὲν εἰς Θήβας – XV (193C): σύμμαχοι Θεβαίων (and note XIV [193C]: τὰ συμφέροντα Θεβαίοις φρονῶν and φίλον Ἐπαμεινώνδαν). As stated, XV is similar to *Antalcidas* II (192BC): *Praec. ger. reip.* 810EF therefore combines these stories (and *Phocion* VI [188A]).

⁶⁷² *Epameinondas* XV (193C): κατηγοροῦν – XVI (193D): κατηγοροῦντας. An account of *Epameinondas* XVI occurs in *De se ipsum laud.* 545A, combined with *Agesilaus* II (190F): both stories illustrate that one can praise oneself in order to impress the foolhardy.

⁶⁷³ *Epameinondas*' saying, calling Boeotia the (193E) πολέμου ὀρχήστραν, is also quoted in *Marc.* 21.3, there applied to Rome of Marcellus' time.

⁶⁷⁴ Two men whom the reader met in the Athenian section, see *Iphicrates* (186F–187B) and *Chabrias* (187CD). *Iphicrates* is also mentioned in *Chabrias* II (187D).

[1] In *Epameinondas* XXIII (194A–C), the general has to defend himself at his trial and enumerates his successes (because of which he is acquitted).⁶⁷⁵ This apophthegm is of exceptional length,⁶⁷⁶ emphasizing Epameinondas' great military talent: based on this long saying alone, one concludes that the Theban is truly the greatest general.

[2] *Epameinondas* XXIV (194C) seems to contrast with his accomplishments for the sake of his city described in the previous apophthegm, and somehow darkens the seemingly univocally positive image that has been built up by alluding to a bad future (cf. *Alexander* XXXIV, 181F):

Ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευταίᾳ μάχῃ τρωθεὶς καὶ κομισθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἐκάλει Δαΐφαντον, εἶτα μετ' ἐκείνων Ἰολαΐδαν· τεθνάναι δὲ τοὺς ἄνδρας πυθόμενος ἐκέλευε διαλύεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος αὐτοῖς στρατηγοῦ. καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον ἐμαρτύρησεν, ὡς εἰδότες ἄριστα τοὺς πολίτας.

When in his last battle he had been wounded and carried into a tent, he called for Daiphantus, and next after him for Iolaïdas, and, learning that the men were dead, he bade the Thebans to make terms with the enemy, since no general was left to them. And the facts bore out his words, for he best knew his fellow-citizens.

To interpret this story correctly, one should take a second look at *Epameinondas* II (192C): dying in battle is the most beautiful death, as the general said. This is how Daiphantus and Iolaïdas, two generals as can be concluded from XXIV, seem to have died. ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευταίᾳ μάχῃ suggests that Epameinondas is dying as well. As a consequence, Thebes is lost, since the city no longer has a military commander. Is death on the battlefield the most beautiful death? For soldiers, perhaps, since a soldier who does not dare to risk his life, because of riches that make him too fond of his easy life, is not of any use (VIII, 192EF; and XXI, 194A). A general who risks his life, however, is at the same time putting the cause of his nation at stake. It is precisely this that constitutes a main difference between commanders and soldiers.

⁶⁷⁵ The apophthegm occurs in *De se ipsum laud.* 540DE: the collection's version is much longer, which fits better after *Epameinondas* XXII. A short reference to the event is also made in *Praec. ger. reip.* 799EF. Epameinondas' invasion in Laconia is described in *Ages.* 31. For a detailed comparison of all the accounts, see Buckler (1978) 37–38.

⁶⁷⁶ Stadter (2014b) 682 argues that this apophthegm “seems to derive from a speech in a historical work”, but adds in a note that this requires “further study”.

4.3.2 Pelopidas (194C–E)

A close reading shows this section to be in line with the interpretation of *Epameinondas*. Its first apophthegm (194C) immediately invites the reader to compare the section with the previous one, not only because Pelopidas is introduced as the συστράτηγος Ἐπαμεινώνδα, but also because of its content:⁶⁷⁷ Pelopidas' penchant for poverty.⁶⁷⁸ *Pelopidas* II, recalling *Epameinondas* II (192C), reads as follows (194D):⁶⁷⁹

Τῆς δὲ γυναικός, ἐπὶ μάχην ἐξιόντος αὐτοῦ, δεομένης σφίζειν ἑαυτὸν, ἄλλοις ἔφη δεῖν τοῦτο παραινεῖν, ἄρχοντι δὲ καὶ στρατηγῷ σφίζειν τοὺς πολίτας.

As he was leaving home for the field of battle, his wife begged him to have a care for his life. “This advice,” said he, “should be kept for others, but for a commander and general the advice should be to have a care for the lives of the citizens.”

After reading *Epameinondas*, the readers should realize that a general, by caring for his own life, at the same time cares for his citizens' lives. To some extent, then, the problematic saying of *Pelopidas* II alludes to the Theban's dangerous recklessness – an important theme in the *Lives of Pelopidas–Marcellus* as a pair, as is announced by its prologue, which argues against commanders who endanger themselves in battle. Not incidentally, III, still dealing with Pelopidas' function as a general (194D),⁶⁸⁰ is followed by three apophthegms that not only highlight his reckless

⁶⁷⁷ Georgiadou (1997) 12 points out that “Plutarch has very little to say about Pelopidas' early life” in *Pel.*, see also 32 and Georgiadou (1992a) 4226–4228: the first two chapters (*Pel.* 3–4, after the prologue) focus on Pelopidas and Epameinondas in particular. The same goes for *Pelopidas*.

⁶⁷⁸ Told in *Pel.* 3.8 after a comparison of his and Epameinondas' poverty (*Pel.* 3.6–7). See also Citro (2019a) 203 on this apophthegm and the *Life* (she speaks of an “imitazione dell'amico Epaminonda”); and see Georgiadou (1997) 72 (unlike the blind Nicodemus, Pelopidas is able to do more important things than acquiring money).

⁶⁷⁹ In *Pel.* 20.2, the story precedes the battle of Leuctra. Plutarch might have left this detail out of the collection, as the successful outcome could change the interpretation. The saying is different (20.2: τοῖς δ' ἄρχουσιν – 194D: ἄρχοντι δὲ καὶ στρατηγῷ; see Citro (2019a) 206–207 for a detailed comparison). According to Georgiadou (1997) 162, the scene might be modelled after Andromache's “passionate plea to Hektor to stay away from the battle” in the *Iliad*.

⁶⁸⁰ *Pelopidas* III (194D) is told in *Pel.* 17.2 in almost exactly the same wording. Georgiadou (1997) 149 points out that a “similarly playful stichomythy is attributed to Leonidas, *Apoph. Lac.* 225B; also *ib.* 234B.”

behaviour, but also show its consequence. All three concern his captivity by Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae:⁶⁸¹ in IV (194D), he is caught and provokes the despot; the apophthegm thus not only describes the result but also an additional example of his recklessness. When Alexander's wife comes to see him in the next apophthegm, he says that the fact that she can stand her husband amazes him (194DE). In line with IV, this saying thus contains an insult to the tyrant.⁶⁸² When Epameinondas sets him free in VI, finally, he states that he is indebted to his captor (194E),⁶⁸³

πεπειρᾶσθαι γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ νῦν μάλιστα οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον <μόνον>, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς θάνατον εὐθαρσῶς ἔχοντος.

for by actual test he had now found himself more than ever to be of good courage not only in facing war but also in facing death.

Pelopidas' actual death, alluded to by these words and in line with *Pelopidas* II, is not narrated, but Plutarch tells it in the corresponding *Life*: during a battle against Alexander of Pherae, he had the tyrant in his sights, and, inflamed by irrational anger,⁶⁸⁴ he tried to kill him, but was slain himself (*Pel.* 32). There is no clearer example of a useless death.⁶⁸⁵ This recalls *Epameinondas* XXIV (194C) and, in line with this, the suggestion of Pelopidas' earlier apophthegms is that he only harmed his city by his excessive boldness. One can therefore question whether he truly cared for his citizens' lives in this way, as he claimed in *Pelopidas* II.⁶⁸⁶

The Theban section, one concludes after reading *Pelopidas*, promotes the type of generalship described by the Athenian sections, rather than that of the 'true Spartans'. This, however, does not mean that all Spartan apophthegms on war and generalship must be condemned. It should in

⁶⁸¹ Depicted as a most cruel tyrant in *Pel.*, see Georgiadou (1992a) 4235.

⁶⁸² Both apophthegms are told with various details in *Pel.* 28.2–10; see Georgiadou (1997) 199–201 on this passage.

⁶⁸³ Surprisingly, *Pelopidas* VI does not occur in the *Life*. The reference to Epameinondas in *Pelopidas* I and VI creates a ring composition; the name of Alexander connects IV, V, and VI.

⁶⁸⁴ *Pel.* 32.9: οὐ κατέσχε τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ὀργήν ("he could not subject his anger to his judgement").

⁶⁸⁵ Cf. the prologue to *Pel.–Marc.* See also Georgiadou (1997) 30.

⁶⁸⁶ Citro (2019a) 207 recognizes that Plutarch does not always seem to agree with claims about boldness in war similar to *Pelopidas* II, referring to the prologue to *Pel.–Marc.* Building on Ingenkamp (2008), however, she argues that Plutarch's criticism there is mitigated in the *synkrisis*. See also Georgiadou (1992a): Plutarch prefers Pelopidas, who can be excused because of what the bad tyrant did to him, in contrast with Marcellus (*Comp. Pel. et Marc.* is discussed on 4251–4252).

the first place be read as a reassessment. Together *Epameinondas* and *Pelopidas* elucidate the value of boldness in fighting, but make clear that this first of all befits soldiers, not commanders. This does not mean, of course, that Plutarch disapproves of apophthegms in which a general applies boldness in speech in order to encourage his soldiers, nor would he necessarily have condemned Brasidas' death (the Spartan cause was not lost after this), or Agis' faith in his troops despite their low numbers. The Theban section rather avoids the wrong conclusions being drawn from reading about the Spartans alone. In particular, *Epameinondas* XXIV (194C) is of the utmost importance in this regard, as it provides the background against which *Pelopidas* VI (194E) will be assessed: after a joint reading of the Athenian, Spartan, and Theban apophthegms, Pelopidas' courage when looking death in the eyes depicts the image of a thoughtless general, at least in his later years. Because of this, he fails to serve the commonwealth, and thereby also fails to fulfil his core task as a general.⁶⁸⁷ One might conclude, then, that a general's value is often to be assessed in light of his successes and the safety and glory he brings to his people. This recalls the interpretation of the ambiguous Spartans: perhaps their characters should not always be judged in terms of their 'Spartanness', but also on the basis of their achievements and efficiency. Similar themes will be prominent in the first parts of the Roman sections.

⁶⁸⁷ I do not, therefore, entirely agree with Citro (2019a) 208 who, based on *Pelopidas* I and II, speaks of the "immagine edificante di Pelopida, esente dal vizio della φιλοπλουτία e fautore della preminenza dell'interesse comunitario rispetto alla cura dei vantaggi personali".

5

The Roman Sections (194E–208A)

The Roman sections consist of two major parts: (1) apophthegms that focus on Romans conquering other people (194E–202E; 5.1),⁶⁸⁸ and (2) those that primarily concern Romans fighting their fellow countrymen, resulting in the establishment of the Principate (203A–208A; 5.3 and 5.4). These parts are separated from each other by a chronological break (*Gaius Popillius*, 202E–203A; 5.2).

5.1 The Conquerors of the Roman Republic (194E–202E)

5.1.1 Manius Curius and Gaius Fabricius (194E–195C)

Manius Curius (194EF) contains two apophthegms which can together be read as an introduction to the sections on the Roman Republic. The first contrasts the protagonist with his fellow citizens (194E):⁶⁸⁹

Μάνιος Κούριος, ἐγκαλούντων αὐτῷ τινῶν ὅτι τῆς αἰχμαλώτου χώρας ὀλίγον ἐκάστω μέρος διένειμε τὴν δὲ πολλὴν ἐποίησε δημοσίαν, ἐπὶ ῥύξατο μηδένα γενέσθαι Ῥωμαίων, ὃς ὀλίγην ἠγήσεται γῆν τὴν τρέφουσαν.

When some complained against Manius Curius because he apportioned to each man but a small part of the land taken from the enemy, and made the most of it public land, he prayed that there might never

⁶⁸⁸ Manius Curius fights the Samnites; Gaius Fabricius the Epirotes (led by Pyrrhus); Fabius Maximus the Carthaginians; Scipio Maior the Carthaginians and Antiochus; Flamininus the Macedonians (led by Philip) and Antiochus; Gaius Domitius Antiochus; Publius Licinius the Macedonians (led by Perseus); Paulus Aemilius the Macedonians (led by Perseus); Cato Maior (a rather exceptional section) some Spanish people; Scipio Minor the Carthaginians, Celtiberians, and Numantians; in the section on Caecilius Metellus, Plutarch mentions a war but does not name the enemies; Marius fights the Teutons, Cimbrians, and some Italian peoples; Catulus Lutatius the Cimbrians; and Sulla fights the Greeks (Athens).

⁶⁸⁹ The story also occurs in *Crass.* 2.10 (some editions – also LCL – attribute the story to Marius, but this is probably a scribal error): Plutarch argues that Crassus was wrong in claiming that only those who can sustain an army are rich, after referring to *Archidamus Secundus* (2.9): ὁ γὰρ πόλεμος οὐ τεταγμένα σιτεῖται (“for ‘war has no fixed rations’”). This is followed by *Manius Curius* I: he had an entirely different opinion, Plutarch writes.

be a Roman who would regard as small the land that gave him enough to live on.

This depicts the traditional image of the early Republic by combining frugality with the theme of working the land.⁶⁹⁰ It evidently also provides an ideal opening for the Roman section: in what follows, Rome will conquer the world! At a higher level, the apophthegm recalls *Lycurgus* (189D–F) and *Cyrus* (172EF): as one reads there, the place where people live forges their lives. This is precisely what Manius Curius means by allotting only a small piece of the conquered land to the Romans: he aims to mould and improve their characters.

Manius Curius II is closely connected with I by focusing on the theme of riches, but now illustrates Manius' own frugality: the Samnites attempt to offer gold to the Roman when he is preparing turnips for dinner.⁶⁹¹ As expected, he refuses the money (194EF). This is connected with the next section on Gaius Fabricius (194F–195B).⁶⁹² A verbal connection with *Gaius Fabricius* I (194F) already suggests continuity.⁶⁹³ This apophthegm discusses the importance of good generalship: the Roman claims that his people are not defeated by their enemies, but their general by the Epirot king.⁶⁹⁴ This situates the remainder of the section in the period of the conflict between the Epirotes and the Romans. The following stories illustrate Fabricius' relationship with wealth and his incorruptibility. Three times he refuses gifts or proposals from Pyrrhus (cf. *Manius Curius*):

[I] In *Gaius Fabricius* II (194F–195A), Pyrrhus' motivation is unclear and his two presents rather seem pathetic attempts to impress the Roman.⁶⁹⁵ First, the Epirot only tries to give money (194F–195A), but his second gift is of different nature, for all the details of his exaggerated preparation focus on his desire to impress the frugal man (195A): he chooses the biggest elephant (μέγιστον ἐλέφαντα), ensures that Fabricius does not notice the animal approaching him (ἐξόπισθεν ἀγνοοῦντι τῷ Φαβρικίῳ), and makes it trumpet (ρήξαντα φωνήν). The sharp contrast with Fabricius' modest reply makes one almost pity the king.⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹⁰ As will be further explored in *Cato Maior* (198D–199E).

⁶⁹¹ Also told in *Ca. Ma.* 2.2, see *infra*, p. 326. Pasco-Pranger (2015) discusses this passage.

⁶⁹² On the virtuous image of Fabricius in *Pyrrh.*, see Mossman (2005).

⁶⁹³ *Manius Curius* II (194E): ἦταν – *Gaius Fabricius* I (194F): ἦταν.

⁶⁹⁴ The apophthegm occurs in *Pyrrh.* 18.1, where Plutarch clarifies Fabricius' saying: the defeat belongs to the general's qualities (cf. various other apophthegms in the collection, esp. *Chabrias* III [187D]).

⁶⁹⁵ Cf. Plutarch's interpretation of the action in *Pyrrh.* 20.2–5.

⁶⁹⁶ Note μειδιάσας, showing his moral superiority (cf. *supra*, note 271). *Pyrrh.* 20.5 contains διαμειδιάσας.

[2] In III, Pyrrhus asks the Roman to become his commander. Its placement after II suggests that he does so because he was impressed by Fabricius' moral superiority, which is in line with the account in the *Life of Pyrrhus*.⁶⁹⁷ As expected, the Roman refuses (195A).

[3] The third case is dealt with in IV and V, in fact one apophthegm, where the theme of betrayal provides an additional connection with III.⁶⁹⁸ After Pyrrhus' doctor proposed to kill the king, Fabricius discloses the plan (195AB). In what follows, the grateful Epirot wants to release some Roman captives, but Fabricius in turn releases some prisoners too (195B),

μη δόξει λαμβάνειν μισθόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ χάριτι Πύρρου μεμνησκέναι τὴν ἐπιβουλήν, ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ δοκῶσι Ῥωμαῖοι δόλω κτείνειν, ὡς φανερώς νικᾶν οὐ δυνάμενοι.

lest he should give the impression that he was getting a reward. “For,” as he said, “it was not to win favour with Pyrrhus that he had disclosed the plot, but that the Romans might not have the repute of killing through treachery, as if they could not win an open victory.”

The story is told at length in the *Life of Pyrrhus*, with remarkable differences. First, there is the description of Pyrrhus' reaction: Plutarch only mentions that the physician is punished in the *Life* (21.5: ἐκόλασε), but *Gaius Fabricius V* is more precise: Pyrrhus has the betrayer hanged (195C: ἐκρέμασε). Even though one expects a severe punishment for a traitor, this (unnecessary) detail still contributes to Pyrrhus' depiction as a harsh despot, which recalls his own section and contrasts with the mildness exhibited by some of his fellow *Diadochi* and especially by the earlier Macedonian monarchs (177A–184F). In addition, Plutarch cites the entire letter which Fabricius sent to Pyrrhus in the *Life* (21.3–4). *Gaius Fabricius IV*, on the contrary, only contains the question of why Pyrrhus is such a bad evaluator of his friends. This turns it into a true apophthegm. Furthermore, Fabricius' role is less significant in the biography: *Gaius Fabricius V* presents Pyrrhus as being grateful to him and releasing the prisoners because of him (195C: τῷ δὲ Φαβρικήῳ), but the *Life* mentions that he did this also for the Romans (21.5: Φαβρικήῳ δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις). In addition, the decision to free captives in return is made by

⁶⁹⁷ *Pyrrh.* 20.8 introduces the story as follows, after an account of *Gaius Fabricius* II and another apophthegm: οὕτω δὴ θαυμάσας τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὸ ἦθος ὁ Πύρρος ἔτι μᾶλλον ὠρέγετο φιλίαν ἀντὶ πολέμου πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι (“Thus Pyrrhus was led to admire the high spirit and character of the man, and was all the more eager to have friendship with his city instead of waging war against it”).

⁶⁹⁸ See van der Wiel (2023a) 13 on these elements as one unit.

the Roman people and not by Fabricius.⁶⁹⁹ That Fabricius *himself* does not want to receive a reward from Pyrrhus can only be read in the collection. His saying, finally, occurs in the *Life* too, but there it is part of the lengthy quotation of Fabricius' letter and precedes the release of the prisoners.⁷⁰⁰

These adaptations – for in the Roman part of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* Plutarch often seems to have created apophthegms out of larger passages (such as letters) rather than the other way around – are in line with the idealized picture of the individual heroes of the early Roman Republic. Fabricius *himself* refuses to accept the freed Romans for free, so he appears as a man of principle (cf. *Manius Curius*); the presentation of Pyrrhus as a tyrant enhances his picture as a liberator. Yet there is more: since the monarchical sections (172E–184F) often describe an understanding of and concession to practical reality, especially when dealing with gift-giving, there is an additional contrast between Pyrrhus' gifts and Fabricius' rigid adherence to his early republican ideals. Probably Fabricius is only an *exemplum* in the sense that he provides a perfect representation of a set of virtues, in line with other opening sections that depict a univocally positive image (*Cyrus*, *Archelaus*, *Lycurgus* and his earlier successors, *Manius Curius*): he observes honesty, related to open warfare, and frugality to a degree that might be inimitable in reality. Perhaps, then, imitating him is not always desirable: although his internal disposition is admirable, one might question whether a general truly puts the people's interests first when refusing to end a war by benefitting from betrayal or to gain an advantage by receiving captives in exchange for nothing. The following sections are in line with this insight.

5.1.2 Fabius Maximus and Scipio Maior (195C–197A)

The next two sections, on Fabius Maximus and Scipio the Elder, take the reader a few decades later, to the period of the Second Punic War.⁷⁰¹ Since these two generals applied entirely different tactics to fight the same ene-

⁶⁹⁹ Described in *Pyrrh.* 21.6. The motivation of the Romans is different: they do not want their enemy to favour them, nor do they want to be rewarded for doing the right thing.

⁷⁰⁰ *Pyrrh.* 21.4: οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα σὴ χάριτι μὴνύομεν, ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ τὸ σὸν πάθος ἡμῖν διαβολὴν ἐνέγκῃ καὶ δόλῳ δόξωμεν, ὡς ἀρετῇ μὴ δυνάμενοι, κατεργάσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον (“And indeed we do not give thee this information out of regard for thee, but in order that thy ruin may not bring infamy upon us, and that men may not say of us that we brought the war to an end by treachery because we were unable to do so by valour”). Note the verbal similarities with *Gaius Fabricius* V (195B), in bold.

⁷⁰¹ *Manius Curius* was consul in 290 BC, *Gaius Fabricius* in 282 and 278 BC. *Fabius Maximus* became *dictator* in 217 BC; see Babbitt (1931) 154–158.

my, the reader is invited to compare their sections in order to decide who was the better of the two – if such a conclusion can be drawn.⁷⁰²

a) Fabius Maximus (195C–196A)

A ridiculed Cunctator

Fabius Maximus I (195C) contrasts with *Gaius Fabricius* IV–V (195AB) on open warfare. It indirectly introduces Fabius’ nickname (“*Cunctator*”), which he acquired by avoiding a clash with Hannibal. Because of his tactics, he was ridiculed (195C: καταγελώντων δὲ τῶν πολλῶν), but this did not affect him (195C):

τὸν σκώμματα **φοβοῦμενον** καὶ λοιδορίας **δειλότερον** ἡγεῖται τοῦ
φεύγοντος τοὺς πολεμίους.

he thought the man who feared gibes and jeers was more of a coward than the one who ran away from the enemy.⁷⁰³

The next apophthegm contrasts Fabius’ strategy with that of another Roman: Minucius.⁷⁰⁴ He commands together with him and defeats some enemies (195C). Many Romans praise him for this, but Fabius reacts with a phrase structured similarly to the previous saying (195D):⁷⁰⁵

μᾶλλον ἔφη τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἢ τὴν ἀτυχίαν τοῦ Μινουκίου **φοβεῖσθαι**.

⁷⁰² This is in line with how Xenophon (2012c) reads *Fab.*, where the Roman is often to be compared with his fellow generals. See also Russell (1966a) 150 on this series of comparisons.

⁷⁰³ *Fabius Maximus* I (195C) is an abbreviation of *Fab.* 5. The contrast with Minucius (5.5) and the fact that Hannibal understood Fabius’ tactics (5.3–4) are left out of the apophthegm, but both elements occur in *Fabius Maximus* II (195CD), the contrast with Minucius even verbally. The saying of I occurs at the end of the chapter, where it is much more elaborate (5.7; only the first part is similar to I: “οὕτω μέντ’ ἔφη “**δειλότερος** ἢ νῦν εἶναι δοκῶ γενοίμην, εἰ **σκώμματα καὶ λοιδορίας φοβηθεῖς** ἐκπέσοιμι τῶν ἐμαντοῦ λογισμῶν κτλ.”).

⁷⁰⁴ On the contrast Fabius–Minucius in the *Life*, see Xenophon (2012c) 166–171.

⁷⁰⁵ Again, the apophthegm is an abbreviation of parts of *Fab.* The first part (195CD: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ συνάρχοντος Μινουκίου ... φοβεῖσθαι) occurs in 8.2, with the exception of the praise of Minucius (ὡς ἀνδρὸς ἀξίου τῆς Ῥώμης), which occurs in 5.5 (τὸν δὲ Μινούκιον μέγαν ἄνδρα καὶ τῆς Ῥώμης ἄξιον ἡγοῦντο στρατηγόν); the second part (195D: καὶ μετὰ μικρὸν ... ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς) in 11–12 (12.2–3 contains two more sayings of Fabius, left out of the collection. In this way, there remains a connection with the next apophthegm).

Fabius said that he felt more afraid over Minucius's good luck than over any bad luck he might have.

Again, there is a contrast with a paradoxical punchline related to Fabius' own military tactics. The truth of the saying is illustrated by the aftermath added to the apophthegm: when the overconfident Minucius is ambushed, Fabius comes to his rescue. The story concludes with a comment of Hannibal, illustrating that he understood the dangers of Fabius' apparent caution (195D). *Fabius Maximus* III, taking place after the disaster (ἀτυχία, cf. II) of Cannae, similarly contains a saying of the Carthaginian general: once more, a Roman eager to fight Hannibal stands alongside Fabius, who, on the contrary, still wants to avoid an open conflict (195DE). This time, however, it is Hannibal's saying that is structured similarly to the sayings in I and II (195E):

μᾶλλον φοβεῖται Μαρκέλλου μαχομένου Φάβιον μὴ μαχόμενον.

he had more to fear from Fabius who would not fight than from Marcellus who would.

As before, there is a clash between two elements, one of which is to be feared more than the other. Again, a general's preference is paradoxical.⁷⁰⁶ In short: I–III (195C–E) illustrate Fabius' military skills and the successes of his tactics in light of the failure of other commanders and

⁷⁰⁶ The wording of *Fab.* 19 is similar to *Fabius Maximus* III: (I) 195D: **Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν Κάνναις ἀτυχίαν** – 19.1: **μετὰ τὴν μάχην**; 195D: **τόλμαν** ἔχοντος **ἀνδρὸς** καὶ φιλομαχοῦντος – 19.2 καὶ πρὸς **ἄνδρα τολμηρὸν** τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀντιτολμῶντι (part of an elaborate description of Marcellus' recklessness in war); 195D: αὐτὸς **ἤλιπεν**, εἰ **μηδεὶς μάχοιτο**, ταχὺ τὴν **δύναμιν** τοῦ Ἀννίβα **παρατεινομένην** ἀπαγορεύσειν – 19.3: **ἤλιπε μηδενὸς μαχομένου** μηδ' ἐρεθίζοντος τὸν Ἀννίβαν αὐτὸν ἐπηρέασειν αὐτῶ καὶ κατατριβήσεσθαι περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, ὥσπερ ἀθλητικοῦ σώματος τῆς **δυνάμεως ὑπερτόνου** γινομένης. Interestingly, Hannibal's reaction is different from his saying in *Fabius Maximus* III, see 19.5 (compare with the quote above): καὶ τελευτῶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέστη τοσαύτην, ὥστε **Μαρκέλλῳ** μὲν ἀποκαμεῖν μαχόμενον, **Φάβιον** δὲ **φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μαχόμενον** (“And finally he was brought to such a pass that he was worn out with fighting Marcellus, and afraid of Fabius when not fighting”): if this is the original wording, Plutarch not only modelled the quote after the similar sayings in *Fabius Maximus* I and II, but also changed the content: Hannibal fears Fabius more than Marcellus in the collection (this is not the point of the *Life*). Note also another, but similar, saying of Hannibal in *Marc.* 9.7: αὐτὸς δ' ὁ Ἀννίβας ἔλεγε, τὸν μὲν Φάβιον ὡς παιδαγωγὸν φοβεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ Μάρκελλον ὡς ἀνταγωνιστὴν· ὑφ' οὗ μὲν γὰρ κωλύεσθαι κακὸν τι ποιεῖν, ὑφ' οὗ δὲ καὶ **πάσχειν** (“And Hannibal himself used to say that he feared Fabius as a tutor, but Marcellus as an adversary; for by the one he was prevented from doing any harm, while

even by the assessment of his opponent. Although the Roman is ridiculed by his people and opposed by other commanders, he never gives up his cautiousness.⁷⁰⁷ Thus, he seems to care more about the well-being of his country than about his own reputation (cf. *Epameinondas* and *Pelopidas*; 192C–194E). *Fabius Maximus* IV closes a series of apophthegms that depict this univocally positive image. It sheds light on another virtue of Fabius, his gentleness: when a Lucanian soldier leaves camp at night to visit his love, Fabius does not punish him, for he was a good soldier, but presents him with the girl (195EF).⁷⁰⁸

The image darkens

The next two apophthegms are related to Fabius' capture of Tarentum, taken by deceiving Hannibal (195F–196A).⁷⁰⁹ They continue the insight that open warfare is not always the right strategy – or at least not the most convenient one. Yet they also contrast with the preceding apophthegms:

[1] One may wonder whether the people of Tarentum deserved the sacking of their city, although one can still approve of the fact that at least the images of the gods were not taken away (the saying itself, however, is quite unkind). Plutarch condemns Fabius' treatment in the corresponding *Life*.⁷¹⁰ In *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* this obviously is less clear, but the placement of *Fabius Maximus* V (195F) after a story that highlights his kindness and mildness is telling.

[2] Another contrast is provided by *Fabius Maximus* VI (195F–196A). The apophthegm is to be read together with the previous one: Marcus Livius, who kept the acropolis of Tarentum when Hannibal had taken the city,⁷¹¹ says that the city was retaken thanks to him (δι' ἐαυτόν), ap-

by the other he was actually harmed"). See Georgiadou (1992a) 4231–4233 and (1997) 31; and Xenophonotos (2012c) 174–177 on the contrast Fabius–Marcellus.

⁷⁰⁷ As Stadter (1975) 81 points out, *πρότης* or the fact that Pericles and Fabius could “endure the stupidities of the mass of common citizens and their own colleagues” connects *Per.–Fab.* as a pair.

⁷⁰⁸ The story occurs in *Fab.* 20.5–9, preceded by a similar story (20.2–3). The chapter opens as follows (20.1): Τὰς δ' ἀποστάσεις τῶν πόλεων καὶ τὰ κινήματα τῶν συμμάχων ὁ Φάβιος μᾶλλον ᾤετο δεῖν ἡπίως ὁμιλοῦντα καὶ πρώως ἀνείργειν καὶ δυσωπεῖν (“Fabius thought that the revolts of the cities and the agitations of the allies ought to be restrained and discountenanced rather by mild and gentle measures”). The reference to mildness for revolting cities is striking in the context of *Fabius Maximus* V (195EF).

⁷⁰⁹ Fabius' plan is described in *Fab.* 21–22.4; the sacking of Tarentum in 22.5–6; the saying in 22.7.

⁷¹⁰ *Fab.* 22.6 describes the cruelties of the Romans. Xenophonotos (2012c) 174–177 discusses Fabius' decline in these later chapters.

⁷¹¹ As already described by *Fabius Maximus* V (195F: Ταραντίνους δὲ κατέχοντα φρουρᾷ τὸν Αννίβαν πλὴν τῆς ἀκροπόλεως) and repeated here (195F: Μάρκου δὲ Λιβίου

parently jealous of Fabius' success. When others laugh at this (οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατεγέλων), it is not clear whether Marcus or Fabius is their target.⁷¹² Yet apparently Fabius feels compelled to defend himself, and answers (196A):

‘ἀληθῆ λέγεις· εἰ μὴ γὰρ σὺ τὴν πόλιν ἀπέβαλες, οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀνέλαβον.’

“You are quite right; for, if you had not lost the city, I should not have recaptured it.”

This is a clever response to a man who attempts to belittle his actions. Yet οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατεγέλων recalls καταγελόντων δὲ τῶν πολλῶν in I (195C), and his response there contrasts with his reaction to Marcus Livius: Fabius suddenly seems to care more about his reputation than ever before. One may question whether the Roman maintained his lack of φιλοτιμία until the end of his life.⁷¹³ Some questions might therefore be asked about his true disposition. In light of this, the reader might also doubt his motivations in *Fabius Maximus* VII (196A), related to the previous story by similarities in terms of wording.⁷¹⁴ Fabius praises his son, when he was consul, for putting his country before his family, even though he might seem to dishonour his father. Perhaps this story only *seems* to close the section on a positive note: it is no less possible that the Roman only acted like this because of his reputation.⁷¹⁵

To a certain extent, then, the structure of *Fabius Maximus* resembles the *Life*, although the latter is definitely more negative: there, the capture of Tarentum is a turning point too, again contrasted with a description of Fabius' mild character. When the Romans start plundering, Plutarch

τοῦ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν φρουροῦντος).

⁷¹² Interestingly, Fabius himself is laughing in *Fab.* 23.4: γελάσας οὖν ὁ Φάβιος· “ἀληθῆ λέγεις” εἶπεν (“At this Fabius laughed, and said: ‘You are right’”). By changing this in the collection, Plutarch not only connects *Fabius Maximus* VI with I, but also creates a certain ambiguity: some are laughing after Marcus' words, which can also be interpreted in the sense that they are making fun of Fabius.

⁷¹³ The story follows Fabius' second triumph in *Fab.*, described as more lustrous than the first (23.2). This irritated Marcus, described as (23.4) ὑπὸ φθόνου καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἐξενεχθεῖς (“carried away by his jealousy and ambition”).

⁷¹⁴ *Fabius Maximus* VI (195F–196A): οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατεγέλων, ὁ δὲ Φάβιος – VII (196A) οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι διετράπησαν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Φάβιος.

⁷¹⁵ The account of the story in *Fab.* 24.1–4 should perhaps be read in light of this too. That his son is chosen as consul is described as part of a list of examples of how the Romans honored Fabius. Xenophon (2012c) 176–177, however, reads the episode of *Fab.* 24 in an entirely positive way.

writes that Fabius could not master his φιλοτιμία anymore and committed horrible actions because of this (*Fab.* 22.5). How the author concludes the chapter is especially interesting. After describing that Fabius established a statue of himself in the city, he writes (22.8):

πολὸν Μαρκέλλου φανεῖς ἀτοπώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλως ἐκεῖνον ἄνδρα **πρῶτητι** καὶ **φιλανθρωπία** θαυμαστὸν ἀποδείξας [...].

He thus appeared far more eccentric in these matters than Marcellus, nay rather, the mild and humane conduct of Marcellus was thus made to seem altogether admirable by contrast.

Again, love of honour and mildness are combined (cf. *Fabius Maximus* V–VII). The contrast with all that precedes stands out: in the previous chapters, Fabius does not care about the scorn and mockery of his fellow Romans, who prefer bold men in war (cf. *Fabius Maximus* I–III), but in *Fab.* 22 he tries to become like his opponent: he wants the Roman people to believe that Tarentum was taken in open battle. Blinded by his excessive φιλοτιμία, he even commits atrocities, which clashes with the description of his character in *Fab.* 20.⁷¹⁶ Because of this, he could indeed not be more different from Marcellus, the man whom he tried to emulate.

b) Scipio Maior (196B–197A)

An entirely different general was Scipio Maior, who defeated Carthage and Hannibal. The section opens in a typical way (196B):

Σκιπίων δὲ ὁ πρεσβύτερος τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν **στρατειῶν** καὶ τῆς **πολιτείας** σχολὴν ἐν γράμμασι διατριβὴν ποιούμενος ἔλεγεν, ὅποτε σχολάζοι, πλείονα πράττειν.

Scipio the Elder used to spend on literature all the leisure he could win from his military and political duties, and he used to say that he was busiest whenever he had nothing to do.

This not only depicts the Roman as a philosopher, but also announces the remainder of the section.⁷¹⁷ In the first seven apophthegms (in fact six, as will become clear) that follow (196B–E), Scipio is leading the Roman army in foreign countries (cf. *στρατεία*); in the final two (196E–197A), one reads about his public appearance in Rome (cf. *πολιτεία*).

⁷¹⁶ See also Stadter (1975) 84 and Nikolaidis (2012) 37–39 on this horrible act of φιλοτιμία in *Fab.* 22.

⁷¹⁷ Note also a contrast with *Dionysius Maior* IX (176A: *σχολάζοι*), definitely not a philosophical character.

Scipio's successful στρατεῖαι

This first block is ordered chronologically, with two exceptions. First, *Scipio Maior* II already refers to the defeat of Carthage (196B), although this event is yet to be dealt with in VI (196D), and will there be described in similar words. Its general applicability explains why the story is placed almost at the outset of the section: when soldiers bring a beautiful girl to Scipio, he answers that he cannot accept her, for he is a commander (196B). This claim can be seen as a kind of second opening story: it provides the background against which the first series of apophthegms is to be read, viz. Scipio's commandship and a difference between a general and his soldiers (στρατεῖαι) – an important theme in the Greek sections as well. There is also a structural reason that explains why II is in fact well placed: II and VI, creating a ring composition, surround three apophthegms that all deal with the Second Punic War (196B–D).

These apophthegms illustrate that Scipio has a great deal of confidence in his own stratagems and troops. And rightfully so: all sayings are followed by a description of his success. In this context, the opening words of V are of particular interest. They illustrate the quickness and ease with which the talented general defeats the Carthaginians (196C):

Ἐπεὶ δὲ διάρως τῆς τε γῆς ἐκράτει καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα τῶν πολεμίων κατέκαυσεν, οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι πέμψαντες ἐποιούντο συνθήκας [...].

When he had crossed over, and was master of the land, and had burned the enemy's camps, the Carthaginians sent to him and made a treaty of peace [...].

Carthage is no real match for the Roman general. This is why the enemies want to negotiate, but they soon regret this after Hannibal's arrival. Scipio says that he does not intend to adhere to the treaty because the enemies sent for their general, and the first words of VI again show that he made the right decision: Carthage is suddenly totally defeated (196D). Scipio now knows that he can make his demands, saying that he will not listen to the negotiators (cf. V) before Lucius Terentius is freed. The enemy complies. VII, a second chronological deviation, describes Terentius' gratitude (196E):

Ὁ δὲ Τερέντιος ἐπηκολούθησεν αὐτῷ θριαμβεύοντι πιλίον ἔχων ὥσπερ ἀπελεύθερος· ἀποθανόντος δὲ τοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκφορὰν παραγενομένοις ἐνέχει πίνειν οἰνόμελι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα περὶ τὴν ταφήν ἐφιλοτιμήθη. **ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον.**

Terentius marched behind him in the triumphal procession, wearing a felt cap just like an emancipated slave. And when Scipio died, Ter-

entius provided wine with honey for all who attended the funeral to drink their fill, and did everything else connected with his burial on a grand scale. But this, of course, was later.

The final four words often recur in the *Parallel Lives* to conclude a digression that breaks the chronology.⁷¹⁸ In *Scipio Maior* VII, however, they aroused suspicion: scholars sceptical of the collection’s authenticity have argued that an inattentive forger, using Plutarch’s extant works when composing *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, borrowed them from the *Life of Scipio Maior*, now lost.⁷¹⁹ Yet the phrase fits equally well in the context of the section: VI and VII are in fact one apophthegm, as VII obviously only describes a consequence of VI (a very similar case can even be found in *Flaminius* II, 197B). The death of Scipio mentioned in *Scipio Maior* VII naturally called for the addition of ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον, as one would expect a reference to his death at the end of the section. In other words, the use of the phrase is unsurprising: it is readily motivated by the author’s practice of adding an account of the aftermath to an apophthegm, which in this specific case entails a strong deviation from the general chronological structure.⁷²⁰

Thus, *Scipio Maior* II–VII (196B–E) are all related to each other by a chain of thematic similarities. Verbal closeness between these stories further enhances this (note the gradual shifting and the ring composition):⁷²¹

<i>Scipio Maior</i> II (196B)	Ἐπεὶ δὲ Καρχηδόνα <u>κατὰ κράτος</u> εἴλε
<i>Scipio Maior</i> III (196B)	ἧς (sc. πόλιν) <u>ὑπερφαίνετο</u> ναὸς Ἀφροδίτης
<i>Scipio Maior</i> IV (196C)	πύργον ὑψηλὸν <u>ὑπὲρ</u> θαλάττης
τὸν στόλον	

⁷¹⁸ Exactly the same or similar phrases occur in, for example, *Rom.* 9.3, *Lyc.* 7.5, *Alc.* 7.6, *Phil.* 13.9, *Pyrrh.* 3.9, *Pomp.* 2.12, *Alex.* 56.1, *Caes.* 4.9, *Dem.* 20.5, *Ant.* 5.1 and 50.7, *Flam.* 12.13 and 14.3, *Marc.* 5.5, *Sull.* 6.23, *Luc.* 36.7, and *Crass.* 3.8. See also Duff (2011b) 229 on this phrase, often applied as a “transition from proemial opening to lives proper”.

⁷¹⁹ Hartman (1916) 116 adduces ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον as one of his main arguments against authenticity, see *supra*, note 105. Babbitt (1931) 4 writes: “anyone enthusiastic in supporting the genuineness of the *Sayings* might equally well suggest that this was an observation of some copyist, put down as a marginal note, which has crept into the text”; see also Saß (1881) 6.

⁷²⁰ Paragraph taken from van der Wiel (2023a) 14–15 (with some adaptations).

⁷²¹ In the case of the connection στόλον in *Scipio Maior* IV – διάρας in V, see LSJ, s.v. “διαίρω”: “III. intr. (sc. ἐαυτὸν, etc.), *lift oneself over, cross, τὸ πέλαιος*”. Some manuscripts read διαβάς, see Nachstädt (1971) 75.

<i>Scipio Maior</i> V (196C)	Ἐπεὶ δὲ διάρας τῆς τε γῆς ἐκράτει – τὰς σπονδὰς
<i>Scipio Maior</i> VI–VII (196DE)	περὶ <u>σπονδῶν</u> καὶ εἰρήνης <i>Ἐπεὶ δὲ νικηθέντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι κατὰ κράτος</i>

Although VIII takes place in an entirely different setting – suddenly, the Romans have crossed another sea in order to fight Antiochus the Great – it still belongs to this first series of apophthegms. The enemy again asks to negotiate, but Scipio refuses (196E). Only this time, the saying is not followed by the outcome of the events, but this is not necessary: from *Scipio Maior* III on, the readers have read that every utterance of the general was followed by his successes. This image of Scipio as a good judge of his own abilities and of the value of his soldiers ensures that they can now fill in the following events themselves.

Scipio's questionable πολιτεία

Plutarch is now able to shift towards another theme: Scipio's time back in Rome, after his victories. When he is opposed by the treasurers in his penultimate apophthegm (196EF), and is accused by Petillius and Quintus in *Scipio Maior* X (196F–197A), he twice praises himself for his military exploits in order to defeat his opponents.⁷²² Yet especially in the first, his haughty behaviour is somewhat questionable: the Senate decides that Scipio will receive money from the treasury, but the *quaestores* refuse to open it that day. Apparently, Scipio does not want to wait, and threatens to open it himself. One might argue that if a general is to be respected in military affairs (cf. II on the difference between generals and soldiers), the same goes for *quaestores* in terms of monetary matters. Despite its wit, then, this apophthegm does not seem to contribute to the positive image of the Roman, who no longer knows his place after his great actions as a commander.⁷²³

c) Comparison

Fabius Maximus (195C–196A) and *Scipio Maior* (196B–197A) present two entirely different tactics in the same war. Although the virtues of the idealized Republic still shimmer in the background, as the Romans assess their commanders in terms of their boldness, the successes of Fabius Maximus' tactics and the disasters brought by the opposite strategy

⁷²² Of this section only *Scipio Maior* X occurs elsewhere in Plutarch: in *De se ipsum laud.* 540F, Scipio's appropriate self-praise is contrasted with Cicero's boasting; in *Ca. Ma.* 15.1–2, Plutarch writes that Cato instigated the prosecution. A similar story occurs at the end of *Epameinondas* (192C–194C); see *infra*, p. 243.

⁷²³ *Caes.* 35 and *Caesar* VIII (206C) tell a similar story about Caesar.

show that adhering to such ideals might not always be the right course. Yet Scipio Maior, representing an offensive approach, in turn highlights that Fabius' way is not always the correct one either. A comparison of the two sections, then, leaves doubt as to which strategy is to be preferred. This lack of clarity seems intentional: a good general knows which tactics are to be applied at which moment. If this is the message Plutarch indeed wanted to convey, this might explain why Marcellus is left out from *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a separate section: Scipio shows the proficiency of his tactics, while Marcellus' course only fits within this framework as a negative example (in the collection).⁷²⁴ This is why he was destined to play only a minor role in *Fabius Maximus III* (195DE),⁷²⁵ as is in line with the absence of Poseidonius' saying in the *Life of Marcellus* (9.4), describing Fabius as Rome's shield and Marcellus as her sword.⁷²⁶

5.1.3 Titus Quintius Flamininus (197A–D)

The apophthegms of this section are arranged differently from the *Life*, in order to create (at least the impression of) a chronological organization.⁷²⁷ *Flamininus* I should be split up.⁷²⁸ Its first part (Τίτος Κοῖντιος ... αἰρεθῆναι) again contains an observation about the subject's entire life, summarizing his *cursus honorum* (197A). The next two apophthegms concern the war against Philip and the liberation of Greece. *Flamininus* Ib (πεμφοθεῖς δὲ ... συγγενεῖς) depicts the enemy king as a true tyrant, who killed his friends and family (197A); II deals with the period after Phil-

⁷²⁴ From *Fab.* 25 until the end of the *Life*, Plutarch focuses on Scipio's successes over Hannibal. Fabius opposes him (cf. *supra*, p. 221–223 on his φιλοτιμία; see also Xenophon's (2012c) 177–179).

⁷²⁵ Cf. Georgiadou (1992a) 4232 on *Fab.*, although Marcellus is only a negative *exemplum* in the collection, while Scipio Maior here embodies the *exemplum* to be followed: “Fabius' sagacity and excessive care in planning to avoid losses, which was often censured as cowardly inactivity, sufficed only for the defensive; Marcellus' boldness and activity was adequate for the offensive. The mixture of both virtues could only be effective in the military policy towards the Carthaginian army in Italy.”

⁷²⁶ I am grateful to Professor Christopher Pelling for this suggestion.

⁷²⁷ Schrott (2014a) and (2014b) provides a detailed commentary of *Phil.–Flam.* in two volumes. Parallels with *Reg. et imp. apophth.* are indicated briefly *passim*.

⁷²⁸ As van der Wiel (2023a) 8–9 points out, a second apophthegm starts from πεμφοθεῖς δὲ στρατηγός on (note the particle). The first part occurs in *Flam.* 2.1–2 (focusing on Flamininus' φιλοτιμία); the second in 17.5, as part of a series of apophthegms. *Flamininus* Ib contains a detail absent from the *Life*: (197A): τοῦ δὲ Φιλίππου λαβεῖν ὀμήρουσ ἀξιούντος (“Philip insisted that he ought to receive some Romans as a guarantee of his safety”).

ip's defeat and builds on this image: Titus proclaims the freedom of the Greeks,⁷²⁹ an obvious contrast with the theme of despotism in Ib. Some Romans who were captured during the Second Punic War and were set free by the Greeks out of gratitude follow Titus in his triumph, dressed as emancipated slaves (197B).⁷³⁰ In the next amusing apophthegms, Titus not only appears as a liberator of the Greeks, but also points out how they can retain their freedom.⁷³¹ He seems to behave as their general.⁷³²

Compared to the previous sections, *Flamininus* instead shows an empty shell of a character. Although he appears to be a talented commander, there is not much more to say about his personality: he is a liberator and makes some witty remarks.⁷³³ Because the moral relevance of the section is not immediately clear, its main goal might exist at a higher level of the text: there is still its importance for an interpretation of the collection as an abbreviated world history, as the section reflects Rome's military influence in Greece. But there is more in this regard. After opening the collection with despots and tyrants who conquered or ruled the world,

⁷²⁹ This part of the apophthegm is told at length in *Flam.* 10.

⁷³⁰ As is told in *Flam.* 13.5–9. The apophthegm recalls *Scipio Maior* VI and its aftermath described in *Scipio Maior* VII (196DE), encouraging these stories to be taken together, see van der Wiel (2023a) 15.

⁷³¹ On liberation in *Phil.–Flam.*, see Pelling (1989) 208–216. Of course, Greek freedom did not last. As Pelling (2012) 61 writes, “in 196 BCE Corinth witnessed that proclamation of freedom, yet exactly fifty years later Corinth met her end, destroyed ruthlessly by a Roman proconsul of a different stamp.”

⁷³² In *Flamininus* III, the Roman asks the Achaeans not to fight outside of their region (197B). The apophthegm is told before the account of *Flamininus* Ib in *Flam.*, as part of the same list of apophthegms (17.4). In *Flamininus* IV, Antiochus is on his way to the Achaeans in order to attack them, and the Roman encourages them (197C). This is the final apophthegm in *Flam.* 17. *Flamininus*' dinner described in *Flamininus* IV contains an additional detail (the precise place where it took place: Chalcis; cf. Livius, *Ab urbe condita*, XXXV.49). In *Flamininus* V, the Roman jokes about Philopoemen, the Achaean general who has enough troops (this connects VI with V), but lacks riches (197CD): ‘χειρας ἔχει Φιλοποίμην καὶ σκέλη, γαστέρα δ’ οὐκ ἔχει’ (“Philopoemen had arms and legs but no belly”). The saying is therefore told after another witty apophthegm about Philopoemen's looks in *Phil.* 2.6.

⁷³³ The *Life* explores more aspects of *Flamininus*' character, e.g. his φιλοτιμία in particular; see Pelling (1986) 84–85 and (1989) 208–210; Roskam (2011) 208; Nikolaidis (2012) 34–39; and Pelling (2012) 60–62. There is not much of this in the section, perhaps except for the closing apophthegm in which *Flamininus* jokes about Philopoemen's lack of means, hereby emphasizing his own power as set out in the preceding apophthegms (see Nikolaidis (2012) 36–37 on this jealousy as a feature of *Flamininus*' love of honour). On *Flamininus* as a true Greek in *Flam.* 5.6–7, see Martin (1961b) 167–168 (focusing on his φιλανθρωπία).

closing it with Romans who subjugate the same regions, explicitly announced by *Manius Curius* I (194E), might be a dangerous undertaking: it could connect the barbarian despots, Sicilian tyrants, and some base Macedonian monarchs with the Romans. Plutarch wanted to avoid this not only because it could insult Trajan, but also because he did not think about Roman dominion in this way: even though Greece eventually lost its freedom, the Roman authorities are not comparable to the Hellenistic monarchs, nor did Plutarch consider the Romans to be barbarians.⁷³⁴ This is why he shows how the Roman Republic fights for its own freedom, and even for the freedom of others. In short, Rome is presented as a liberating rather than as a subjugating force in the Republican sections, and this comes especially to the fore in *Flamininus*.

5.1.4 A General's Experience: Three Sections (197D–198D)

Gaius Domitius (197DE, one apophthegm),⁷³⁵ *Publius Licinius* (197EF, one ap.), and *Paulus Aemilius* (197F–198D, nine ap.) also focus on generalship, more specifically on a general's experience. *Gaius Domitius* fights Antiochus again (cf. *Flamininus* IV, 197C). When many advise him to attack immediately, he refuses and waits until the following day, on which a great victory takes place. In *Publius Licinius*, by contrast, the protagonist is less successful: Perseus triumphs and many Romans are killed.⁷³⁶ These sections provide the background against which *Paulus Aemilius* will be read.

Paulus Aemilius I (197F) is directly connected with *Publius Licinius*: Aemilius is appointed consul in order to defeat the same Perseus (LCL) “because of the inexperience and effeminacy of the generals” (ἀπειρία καὶ μαλακία τῶν στρατηγῶν).⁷³⁷ This sheds a negative light on the previous section and explains why its subject was vanquished, even though

⁷³⁴ See chapter 2.3 on Plutarch's division of mankind.

⁷³⁵ The manuscripts read Γάιος (see Nachstädt (1971) 78), but the story probably concerns Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was consul in 192 BC, see Babbitt (1931) 170–171.

⁷³⁶ The contrast is enhanced by the fact that Plutarch gives the total number of fallen enemies in *Gaius Domitius* (197E: πεντακισμυρίουσ τῶν πολεμίων) and of fallen Romans in *Publius Licinius* (197E: δισχιλίους ὀκτακοσίους). *Publius Licinius*' failure is mentioned in *Aem.* 9.3 (this parallel is not listed by Nachstädt (1971) 78 and Babbitt (1931) 172–173).

⁷³⁷ The first part of the apophthegm (on Aemilius' failed election) is told in *Aem.* 6.8; the second part (on the ἀπειρία of the generals) in *Aem.* 9 (where *Publius Licinius* is mentioned, see the note above); Aemilius' successful election is mentioned in *Aem.* 10.1–5, and his saying occurs in *Aem.* 11.1–2 as part of a more lengthy speech (see Liedmeier (1935) 136–140 for a comparison of this speech in Plutarch, Polybius, and Livy).

he is not explicitly named. The next apophthegms, by contrast, deal with Aemilius' successes in this war. They are structured chronologically. II is a witty story: when his daughter's dog dies, Aemilius speaks of good fortune (198A: ἀγαθῆ **τύχη**), as the pet was called Perseus (197F–198A).⁷³⁸ The entire section, however, will from now on focus on the general's experience (ἐμπειρία, in line with *Paulus Aemilius* I and contrasting with *Publius Licinius* again). The influence of **τύχη**, picked up only at the end of the section, will therefore be questioned.

Paulus Aemilius III reminds one of various other stories in the collection. When soldiers speak boldly about strategies, Aemilius orders them to remain silent, for he is the commander (198A).⁷³⁹ His insights as a general and a reference to arms connect this with the following apophthegm, where guards at night are not allowed to carry weapons, in order that they will not fall asleep (198A).⁷⁴⁰ V (198AB), finally, recalls *Gaius Domitius*, just as much in terms of its content as by verbal similarities.⁷⁴¹ Both subjects are therefore depicted as generals with a similar profile: when Nasica asks to attack immediately, Aemilius refuses by referring to his experience (198B: πολλάι με **πεῖραι** κωλύουσι).⁷⁴² This is connected with VI: after Perseus is vanquished, the general is preparing a party, saying (198B)⁷⁴³

τῆς αὐτῆς **ἐμπειρίας** εἶναι στράτευμα φοβερώτατον πολεμίοις καὶ
 συμπόσιον ἥδιστον φίλοις παρασχεῖν.

that it was a part of the same proficiency to provide an army most terrifying to an enemy and a party most agreeable to friends.

⁷³⁸ As appears from *Aem.* 10.5–8, this event immediately followed his election described in *Paulus Aemilius* I (197F). Perhaps this is how Ἐλθὼν δ' εἰς οἶκον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς at the outset of *Paulus Aemilius* II (197F–198A) is to be read too.

⁷³⁹ The account of *Aem.* 13.6 focuses on the impatience in the army; *Paulus Aemilius* III focuses on boldness (198A: θρασύτητα, absent from the *Life*).

⁷⁴⁰ The story is told after *Paulus Aemilius* III in the *Life* too (*Aem.* 13.7, in similar wording).

⁷⁴¹ *Gaius Domitius* (197D): τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἡγεμονικῶν εὐθὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν κελευόντων – *Paulus Aemilius* V (198AB): τοῦ Νασικᾶ παρακαλοῦντος αὐτὸν εὐθὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν.

⁷⁴² The saying of the account in *Aem.* 17.1–5 does not contain “πεῖραι”, but “αἰ δὲ πολλάι με νῖκαι διδάσκουσαι” (17.4). This (probable) adaptation establishes verbal connections in the collection.

⁷⁴³ Also told in *Aem.* 28.9 and *Quaest. conv.* 615E. The saying concerns his precision, as these accounts point out. Again (cf. the note above), ἐμπειρία only occurs in the collection, establishing connections with other stories.

In line with this, VII and VIII deal with Aemilius' triumph.⁷⁴⁴ The closing apophthegm IX is related to VII and VIII by referring to this same triumph, and to VIII through the theme of family. This, and the reference to τύχη, also takes the reader back to II, creating a ring composition. When two of his sons die in the days of the triumph, he says (198CD)⁷⁴⁵

περὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀδεῆς γεγονέναι καὶ ἀκίνδυνος, ὅποτε τῶν εὐτυχημάτων τὴν νέμεσιν εἰς τὸν οἶκον ἀπερειαμένης τῆς τύχης ὑπὲρ πάντων αὐτὸς ἀναδέδεκται.

he had no fears or misgivings about his country, since Fortune had thrust upon his house the retribution due for all their good fortune, and he had received this in behalf of all.

The theme of Aemilius' τύχη in the section (II and VII), then, is somewhat contradicted by the apophthegms it frames, which all highlight his military insights and experiences. The main reason why he was successful, then, is not (just) his fortune, but especially his talent. This also appears from a joint reading with the two preceding sections: as stated, *Paulus Aemilius* V, placed at the core of its section (preceded and followed by four apophthegms) and thereby again receiving full emphasis, is closely connected with *Gaius Domitius*. Both highlight that the experienced general should adhere to his plans, for he has a better understanding of war tactics. *Publius Licinius*, placed in between the two sections, offers a strong contrast: he is referred to as an inexperienced commander by *Paulus Aemilius* I, and the calamity he brought Rome can therefore not be defined as a matter of “bad luck” alone. Thus, in line with other sections that dealt with good generalship, a comparison of these three Romans highlights that the military successes of a country often depends on one

⁷⁴⁴ In VII, the defeated king complains that he will be part of this triumph (198B). The Roman answers that Perseus can prevent this by committing suicide. In the account of *Aem.* 34.3, part of the description of the triumph, the king is presented as a coward. VIII illustrates Aemilius' frugality (198BC): he took nothing of Perseus' endless riches (198B: Χρημάτων δ' ἀπείρων). In other sections, similar behaviour of some generals proved their virtue too. The use of ἄπειρος might not be coincidental: in this context, it means (LSJ, s.v. “ἄπειρος”) “boundless, infinite”, but it can also mean “without trial or experience of a thing, unused to, unacquainted with”. The word does not occur in the account of *Aem.* 28.10–13: again, it connects various apophthegms.

⁷⁴⁵ On fortune as an important theme in *Aem.–Tim.*, see Pelling (1986) 94; Swain (1989a) *passim*. On the adoption of Aemilius' two other sons, see *Aem.* 5.5 (one of these sons was no less than Scipio Minor; the other became part of Fabius Maximus' house). The event of *Paulus Aemilius* IX is told in *Aem.* 35–36.

person, and that it is important to have the right man in the right place (cf. for example the Theban sections, 192C–194E).

5.1.5 Cato Maior (198D–199E)

With its 26 apophthegms, this is one of the longest sections of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. This is not surprising, since many sayings attributed to Cato Maior circulated.⁷⁴⁶ Due to the amount of material, *Cato Maior* seems somewhat chaotic at first reading, but at a closer look it displays, in fact, a well-thought-out structure that should lead the readers to insights into this character.

Deteriorated Romans

The first apophthegms situate *Cato Maior* in the context of Roman history by recalling the first Roman in the collection. *Manius Curius* (194EF) described the core virtues of the early Republic: frugality and, connected with this, eagerness to work the land. *Cato Maior* I and II, in fact one apophthegm, now contrast later Rome with this image: Cato disapproves of the prodigality and great expenses in the city of his days and is amazed that an ox (cf. agriculture) is less expensive than fish (198D).⁷⁴⁷ *Cato Maior* III also contains criticism of his contemporaries, reminding one of *Manius Curius* II (194EF), which alluded to the Roman conquests. It reflects an additional change, for Rome has now become a major power (198D).⁷⁴⁸

Λοιδροῶν δὲ ποτε τὴν ἐπιπολάζουσαν γυναικοκρατίαν ‘πάντες’ εἶπεν
 ‘ἄνθρωποι τῶν γυναικῶν ἄρχουσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων,
 ἡμῶν δὲ αἱ γυναῖκες.’

⁷⁴⁶ On apophthegmata collections as sources for *Ca. Ma.*, see Pasco-Pranger (2015) 302n18; and Appendix II.2.

⁷⁴⁷ In both *Cato Maior* I and II, Cato’s criticism of the profligacy of the Romans concerns food (198D): ‘χαλεπὸν ἐστι λέγειν πρὸς γαστέρα ὄτα μὴ ἔχουσαν’ (“it was hard to talk to a belly which has no ears”). This is different from other accounts: (1) *Ca. Ma.* 8.1–2 presents both sayings as two different apophthegms; (2) *De tuenda* 131E and *De esu* 996E only contain the first part; (3) *Quaest. conv.* 668B only the second. *Cato Maior* I and II, however, are presented as one whole in the collection: they are introduced by the same verb, and the context of the second saying in the *Life* and in *Quaest. conv.* 668B (Cato criticizes the extravagance of the Roman people) becomes the context of both sayings in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* (cf. πολυτέλεια, which appears in *Quaest. conv.* and in the *Life* only in the account of *Cato Maior* II, but is part of the introduction of both apophthegms in the collection). See also Vicente Sánchez (2008). Note from van der Wiel (2023a) 9–10n29 (adapted).

⁷⁴⁸ This is close to *Themistocles* X (185D), as Plutarch recognizes in *Ca. Ma.* 8.4; see also *supra*, note 516.

In bitter criticism of the prevalent domination of women, he said, “All mankind rules its women, and we rule all mankind, but our women rule us.”

Cato Maior thus opens in a way similar to the *Life. Ca. Ma.* 2 describes that Cato lived in the vicinity of the former residence of Manius Curius, where, as Plutarch writes, the story of *Manius Curius II* (194EF) took place. This influenced Cato: Manius Curius became his role model and, until the end of his life, Cato defended Rome, no longer the small and frugal city of old, from excesses and effeminacy. This will also be illustrated by his final apophthegms (XX–XXIX, 199A–E), but first Plutarch includes a series of sayings (IV–XIX, 198D–199A) that are not related to a specific moment. As expected, the general nature of these apophthegms is highlighted by the overall use of the imperfect tense, while the aorist dominates in the surrounding stories (I–III and XX–XXIX).⁷⁴⁹ This invites a comparison of the two parts: the image of Cato based on his principles described in his general wise sayings provides the framework within which one will evaluate his specific measures aiming to improve the Roman people.

Cato's sententiae

In this part of the section, various themes are addressed in different small blocks. IV introduces a first group of general sayings that deal with making mistakes (198D):⁷⁵⁰

Ἐφη δὲ βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον εὐεργετήσας μὴ κομίσασθαι χάριν ἢ μὴ ὑποσχεῖν κόλασιν ἀδικήσας, καὶ πᾶσιν αἰεὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι χωρὶς ἑαυτοῦ διδόναι **συγγνώμην**.

He said that he preferred to receive no thanks when he had done a favour rather than to suffer no punishment when he had done a wrong, and that he always granted pardon to all who erred, with the single exception of himself.

⁷⁴⁹ As appears from a list of the main verbs, see in the case of the first (I–III) and second block (XX–XXVIII): *Cato Maior* I–II (198D): εἶπεν, III (198D): εἶπεν, XX (199B): εἶπεν, XXII (199B): ἠρέθη, XXIV (199C): ἔφησεν, XXV (199D): ἔλαβεν, XXVIII (199E): εἶπεν. The *aoristus* thus dominates (although some contain the imperfect tense), in contrast with IV–XIX, where the overall use of the imperfect tense stands out: IV (198D): ἔφη, V (198E): ἔλεγε, VI–VII (198E): ἔφη, VIII (198E): ἔλεγεν, IX (198E): ἐνόμιζε, X (198F): ἔφη, XI (198F): παρεκάλει, XII (198F): ἔλεγε, XIII (198F): ἔλεγε, XIV (199A): ἔλεγε, XV (199A): ἠξίου, XVI–XVII (199A): ἐνόμιζε, XVIII (199A): ἔλεγεν, XIX (199A): ἔλεγε.

⁷⁵⁰ Told in *Ca. Ma.* 8.16–17, closing a list of apophthegms.

His forgiveness will appear most important later in the section, but in what immediately follows, this saying is first adjusted:

[1] As appears from V, Cato does not mean that leaders should not censure those who do wrong (198E: **τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι**, cf. IV). VI and VII, again one unit, provide further information on this matter. The Roman mentions what he likes and dislikes about young men and soldiers (198E).⁷⁵¹ As it concerns good and bad behaviour of others, it should be interpreted in line with the previous apophthegm and the second part of IV: Cato suggests what is to be recommended or rebuked.

[2] The next apophthegm deals with good behaviour of rulers, recalling Cato's unmerciful attitude towards himself in the first part of IV: leaders should always be able to master themselves (VIII, 198E).

In line with this, IX–XI (198EF) discuss self-respect and honour.⁷⁵² XII (198F) deals with honour and virtue. In this way, it is well placed in between IX–XI and XIII–XV (198F–199A), on justice and wrongdoing.⁷⁵³ Connections between Cato's final general sayings are less obvious. XVI and XVII belong together and deal with moderation (199A).⁷⁵⁴ XVIII and XIX might be connected by the theme of reputation (199A). All of these sayings, reflecting deep insights, depict the image of Cato as a wise man: he knows how rulers should behave, what their subjects should do, and what the relationship between the two groups should look like. One concludes that he is the right person to guide the Romans. This picture will be confirmed, but also partially deconstructed, by the next part of the section.

⁷⁵¹ See van der Wiel (2023a) 9–10 on *Cato Maior* VI and VII as one apophthegm, where I point out in note 30 that VI is told on its own in the *Moralia* (*De aud. poet.* 29E and *De vit. pud.* 528F), while *Ca. Ma.* 9.5 has VI and VII as one unit (*χαίρειν – μισεῖν* in the collection connects both sayings even more closely than the *Life*).

⁷⁵² *Cato Maior* IX contains a more general saying (one should always honour oneself, 198E), but X is more specific, for Cato does not complain that there are no statues of him (198EF), whereas XI is again more general (suggesting how one can avoid losing one's ἐξουσία, 198F, which has to do with honour too). X (198EF) also occurs in *Ca. Ma.* 19.6 and in *Praec. ger. reip.* 820B, where Plutarch adds that statues can make people envious. Both passages focus on the impact of praise on the public interest. The context of all the accounts varies: in the *Life*, the Romans set up a statue of Cato, after which Plutarch inserts this apophthegm, which took place earlier; in the treatise, Cato forbids the Romans to make statues of him; in the collection, Cato sees many statues being erected.

⁷⁵³ *Cato Maior* XV (199A) occurs in *Ca. Ma.* 9.10 (in a list of apophthegms), *An seni* 784A, and *De vit. aer.* 829F.

⁷⁵⁴ See van der Wiel (2023a) 10.

Cato the educator

Cato Maior XX is a transitional apophthegm: it deals with Cato's general attitude and contains a saying related to a specific event (199AB):

Ἐπετίμα δὲ τοῖς πολίταις ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰρουμένοις ἄρχοντας·
‘δόξετε γάρ’ εἶπεν ‘ἢ μὴ πολλοῦ τὸ ἄρχειν ἄξιον ἢ μὴ πολλοὺς τοῦ
ἄρχειν ἀξίους ἠγεῖσθαι.’

He used to rebuke the citizens for electing always the same men to office. “For,” **said he**, “you will give the impression that you hold office to be of no great worth, or else that you hold not many men to be worthy of office.”

The relevance of *Cato Maior* XXI (199B) is less clear and seems a bit out of place, since XXII (199B) takes up the theme of elections.⁷⁵⁵ In the second apophthegm, Cato wants to be appointed censor. He presents himself as a doctor, which reminds one of I–III (198D) showing the people in need of a cure. This image of a leader as an educator also repeats themes from *Manius Curius* (194EF), where the Roman of old attempted to improve his subjects. Yet most strikingly, Cato calls himself ἀπαραίτητος in *Cato Maior* XXII.⁷⁵⁶ Lack of mercy contrasts with the theme of forgiveness of IV (198DE), but this is not immediately thematized: first, XXIII (199BC) illustrates that Cato sticks to the principles described in VII (198E), as both apophthegms refer to fighting and the importance of one's voice in battle.⁷⁵⁷ Thus, as XXIII concerns good soldiers, it is

⁷⁵⁵ *Cato Maior* XX and XXI occur in *Ca. Ma.* 8.8–9 and 8.11 respectively (8 also includes *Cato Maior* I–III, see *supra*, note 747 and 748).

⁷⁵⁶ For a lengthy account of the story, see *Ca. Ma.* 16.4–8. There are some differences: (1) (16.6) ἡξίου τοὺς πολλοὺς εἰ σωφρονοῦσι μὴ τὸν ἡδιστον, ἀλλὰ τὸν **σφοδρότατον** αἰρεῖσθαι τῶν ἰατρῶν (“He adjured the people, if they were wise, not to choose the most agreeable physician, but the one who was most in earnest”), adding that he and Valerius Flaccus were such men; (2) Cato does not call himself harsh, but this is how his opponents refer to him, in connection with his adherence to the ancestral customs (16.4): οἱ δὲ μοχθηρὰ συνειδότες ἑαυτοῖς ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τῶν πατρίων ἐκδιαίτησιν ἐθῶν ἐφοβοῦντο τὴν αὐστηρίαν τοῦ ἀνδρός, **ἀπαραίτητον** ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καὶ γαλεπὴν ἐσομένην (“those who were conscious of base practices and of a departure from ancestral customs, feared the severity of the man, which was sure to be harsh and inexorable in the exercise of power”). Plutarch probably changed the saying in the collection in order to focus more on the image of Cato as an ἀπαραίτητος.

⁷⁵⁷ *Cato Maior* XXIII is told in *Ca. Ma.* 1.8 as part of his earliest campaigns. In the collection, however, Plutarch presents the story as belonging to Cato's later years as a commander, teaching young people (199B: Διδάσκων δὲ τοὺς νέους). The apophthegm is also referred to in *Cor.* 8.3: Coriolanus had a strong voice and physical strength.

also connected with XXIV–XXVII (199CD), which deal with riches acquired in the same war:⁷⁵⁸ in the first apophthegm, the Celtiberians are mobilized in exchange for spoils they will receive after defeating the opponents (199C); the next apophthegm follows this victory: Cato is not attracted to the enemy’s riches (199CD).⁷⁵⁹ In XXVI, the Roman enriches his soldiers with a modest sum and argues that governors are not allowed to become wealthier through their position (199D).⁷⁶⁰ Thus, he tries to make both rulers and subjects frugal, and adheres to this himself.

This emphasizes that Cato practised what he preached with regard to the correct behaviour of statesmen, generals, and soldiers in IV–XIX. This suggests that he truly wanted to restore the values of the early Republic: he appears as a genuine physician and educator of the people. Yet this is followed by *Cato Maior* XXVII (199D):

Πέντε δ’ οἰκέτας εἶχεν ἐπὶ τῆς στρατείας, ὧν εἷς αἰχμάλωτα τρία σώματα πριάμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἔλαθε τὸν Κάτωνα, πρὶν εἰς ὄψιν ἔλθειν, ἀπήγξατο.

He had five persons to wait upon him in the campaign, one of whom bought three of the captives. But when he discovered that Cato knew of it, he did not wait to come before his master, but hanged himself.

This refers back to the image of an ἀπαραίτητος Cato, as described in XXII (199B): although Cato claimed to be forgiving in IV (198DE), XXVII describes that his servant did not even dare to face him after making a mistake. That the aftermath of the story, Cato’s own reaction (which one would of course expect in an apophthegm on the man), is left out, highlights that the fear of his οἰκέτης is the true focus of the anecdote as told in the collection.⁷⁶¹ XXII and XXVII thus surround stories that are entirely in line with the image of Cato’s general sayings (XXIII–XXVI),

⁷⁵⁸ All these apophthegms concern the war in *Hispania Citerior* and occur in *Ca. Ma.* 10: *Cato Maior* XXIV (199C) in *Ca. Ma.* 10.1–2, XXV and XXVI (199CD) in 10.3–5, XXVII (199D) in 10.6.

⁷⁵⁹ In *Ca. Ma.* 10.5, this is followed by an additional saying left out of the collection, probably because it shows a less inexorable Cato.

⁷⁶⁰ *Cato Maior* XXV (199CD) and XXVI (199D) are organized differently in the *Life*: the first part of *Cato Maior* XXV (199CD: Πλείονας δὲ πόλεις ... ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις) is told in *Ca. Ma.* 10.3, the second part (199D: οὐδὲν αὐτὸς ... ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας) in *Ca. Ma.* 10.4, while the first part of *Cato Maior* XXVI is placed in between the two parts (the first phrase of *Ca. Ma.* 10.4; something similar to its second part occurs in *Ca. Ma.* 10.6).

⁷⁶¹ *Ca. Ma.* 10.6, on the contrary, describes Cato’s reaction: τοὺς δὲ παῖδας ὁ Κάτων ἀποδόμενος, εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν τιμὴν (“Cato sold the boys, and restored the money to the public treasury”).

but they contradict Cato's mildness described in this *sententiae* part. In this way, the image of IV–XIX (198D–199A), which justify his right to rule and to educate his subjects, is problematized by his final apophthegms. As a consequence, the reader is invited to wonder whether the apparently unforgiving Roman is not too principled. This is in line with the final two witty apophthegms, which similarly show a harsh Cato. In both stories, Greeks appear on the stage: in XXVIII, the Roman does not want to help some Greeks (199DE);⁷⁶² in his final apophthegm, he mocks Postumius Albinus, who asked for lenience from his audience after writing a text in Greek (199E; note the verbal connection with IV, 198DE):⁷⁶³

δοτέον εἶναι **συγγνώμην**, εἰ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ψηφισαμένων ἀναγκασθεῖς ἔγραψε.

he ought to be granted indulgence if he had written the book under compulsion by a decree of the Ampictyonic Council!

The humour mitigates the image after the switch in *Cato Maior* XXVII (199D). Cato's willingness to defend his country from foreign influences is still in line with his defence of the Republican values. Yet his rejection of anything Greek in these final apophthegms again illustrates that Cato actually is too conservative.⁷⁶⁴ A ruler should have his principles, but an insight into practical reality is equally essential. This is something Cato lacks: he wants to restore the early Republic, but since society has changed and Rome has conquered much (cf. *Cato Maior* III, 198D), it is impossible and perhaps even undesirable to imitate the Romans of old in all respects. In conclusion: a certain degree of leniency and indulgence is a necessary characteristic of the good statesman. Cato knew this well, as *Cato Maior* IV suggests, yet in this regard alone, he did not turn his words into deeds.

5.1.6 Scipio Minor (199F–201F)

This section is even longer than *Cato Maior*, not because of the total amount of its apophthegms (it comprises 22), but because of their un-

⁷⁶² Told in *Ca. Ma.* 9.2.

⁷⁶³ The story occurs in *Ca. Ma.* 12.6, introduced as follows (12.5): δι' ἑρμηνέως ἐνέτυχε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, δυνθεῖς ἂν αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν, ἐμμένων δὲ τοῖς πατρίοις καὶ καταγελῶν τῶν τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ τεθραυμακῶτων (“[H]e dealt with the Athenians through an interpreter. He could have spoken to them directly, but he always clung to his native ways, and mocked at those who were lost in admiration of anything that was Greek”).

⁷⁶⁴ An important theme in the *Life*, see e.g. Beck, M. (2000) 20. On Romans and their way of dealing with Greek culture in the *Parallel Lives*, see Pelling (1989); Swain (1990).

usual length.⁷⁶⁵ The opening stories are also remarkable: unlike many other sections, which start with only one general remark, *Scipio Minor* commences with four apophthegms that do not contain a saying of the Roman. This suggests a close relationship between the section and the lost *Life of Scipio Minor*.

Scipio against the Carthaginians; Scipio as a politician

The main topic of the first block consists of Scipio's military exploits in the Punic War, but some apophthegms deal with Roman politics. Both themes are announced at the outset:

[1] *Scipio Minor* I both recalls and contrasts with *Cato Maior*: after a description of his frugality and self-control (similar to Cato), Plutarch adds that of all generals Scipio enriched his soldiers most (unlike Cato) after defeating Carthage (199F). Such a general claim, describing the entire life of the Roman (199F: ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα καὶ τέτταρσιν, οἷς ἐβίωσε), is a typical opening.

[2] This is followed by another general saying about Scipio Minor. There seems to be no connection with *Scipio Minor* I (199F):⁷⁶⁶

Τὸ δὲ Πολυβίου παράγγελμα διαφυλάττων ἐπειρᾶτο μὴ πρότερον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ποιήσασθαι τινα συνήθη καὶ φίλον ἀμωσγέπως τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων.

He observed the precept of Polybius, and tried never to leave the Forum before he had in some way made an acquaintance and friend of somebody among those who spoke with him.

A comparison with *Quaestiones convivales*, where this quote opens the fourth book (659EF), shows that Plutarch changed Polybius' saying in *Scipio Minor* II: ἀπελθεῖν is followed there only by ἢ φίλον τινα ποιήσασθαι τῶν πολιτῶν. Plutarch's comment explains why he adapted it in the collection: φίλον is not to be interpreted as referring to a true friend, but in more general terms, as anyone who wishes you the best.⁷⁶⁷ As Plutarch avoids adding authorial comments in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, he was forced to add τινα συνήθη and ἀμωσγέπως τῶν

⁷⁶⁵ Esp. *Scipio Minor* VIII (200BC), XIII (200E–201A), XV (201AB), and XVI (201BC).

⁷⁶⁶ See Dana (1995) 92 on this apophthegm.

⁷⁶⁷ *Quaest. conv.* 659F: φίλον δὲ δεῖ μὴ πικρῶς μηδὲ σοφιστικῶς ἀκούειν ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀμετάπτωτον καὶ βέβαιον, ἀλλὰ κοινῶς τὸν εὖνον (“we must not interpret ‘friend’ with pedantic strictness as referring to the celebrated ideal type, immutable and steadfast, but take it in a broader sense as meaning any well-wisher”; see Roskam (2009) 72n5 on this fragment and further relevant passages).

ἐντυγχανόντων, in order to illustrate that Polybius used φίλος in a more casual meaning.

First, Scipio's deeds in Carthage are dealt with (cf. *Scipio Minor* I); next, his time in Rome is described (cf. II):

[I] *Scipio Minor* III concerns his earlier years and again refers to Carthage (200A). Cato the Elder, now explicitly mentioned, claims that the young Scipio is the only wise man in the army. Scipio's military talent and the reference to the enemy city connect this story with the next series of apophthegms on the defeat of Carthage, introduced by IV (200A):

Εἰς δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην ἐλθόντος ἀπὸ στρατείας <εἰς ὑπατείαν> ἐκάλουν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐκείνῳ χαριζόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὡς Καρχηδόνα δι' ἐκείνου ταχὺ καὶ ῥαδίως ληψόμενοι.

When he came to Rome from a campaign, the people called him to office, not by way of showing favour to him, but hoping through him to capture Carthage speedily and easily.

Its location after Cato's quote suggests that the Roman people are influenced by his saying in III. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Plutarch connects *Scipio Minor* III with Scipio's first consulship in *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* (804F–805A).⁷⁶⁸ Additionally, the focus on Scipio's swiftness recalls the contrast between *Fabius Maximus* and *Scipio Maior* earlier (195C–197A).⁷⁶⁹ Even though an explicit comparison between the younger and elder Scipio is lacking, it naturally comes to mind: this provides the background against which the military values of Scipio the Younger will be assessed.

That the Romans are right to put all their faith in Scipio is illustrated by the next apophthegm: suddenly, the Roman army has already taken possession of Carthage, with the exception of the fortress. This is why Scipio ignores Polybius, who advises him to use missiles: it would be absurd not to fight the enemy now that they are almost defeated (200AB).⁷⁷⁰ The contrast with the strategy of Fabius Maximus is obvious. The next two apophthegms describe the sacking of the city and illustrate the truth

⁷⁶⁸ Cato's quote also occurs in *Ca. Ma.* 27.6, almost at the end of the *Life*, where Plutarch argues that he instigated the Third Punic War. After this saying, Plutarch connects it with Scipio's swiftness, again reminding one of the connection between *Scipio Minor* III and IV (*Ca. Ma.* 27.7): ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπόφασιν ταχὺ δι' ἔργων ἐβεβαίωσεν ὁ Σκιπίων ("This utterance of Cato's, Scipio speedily confirmed by his deeds").

⁷⁶⁹ Note the focus on the elder Scipio's swiftness in *Scipio Maior* V (196CD).

⁷⁷⁰ On Polybius in Plutarch, see Gabba (2004); Zadorojnyi (2005) 505; Zecchini (2005).

of *Scipio Minor* I (199F): the Sicilian objects, stolen by the Carthaginians, are sent back to their hometown (VI, 200B) and Scipio does not allow his slaves or *liberti* to take part in the plundering (VII, 200B).⁷⁷¹ He manages to enrich his soldiers, while his own frugality comes to the fore once more.

[2] From *Scipio Minor* VIII on, politics are the new main theme: Scipio helps a friend who presents himself for the consulship (200BC). This recalls II (199F), but the connection with this apophthegm especially emerges in IX (200CD), closely connected with VIII through the theme of enmity in elections. In this story, the Roman is a candidate for the censorship and his saying strongly reminds one of Polybius' advice on making friends on the Forum in II. When his opponent, Appius Claudius, boasts that he knows all Romans, in contrast to Scipio, the latter answers that he is right (200D),⁷⁷²

‘ἔμοι γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναί πολλοὺς ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀγνοεῖσθαι μεμέληκεν.’

“for I have not taken such pains to know many as to be unknown to none.”

Scipio Minor X builds on this. Scipio asks to send himself as well as his opponent as *legati* or *tribuni militum*⁷⁷³ in the Celtiberian War, in order to let the soldiers assess the virtues of both (200D). The result of this is described in XI: once more, the Romans put their faith in Scipio, for he is appointed censor (200DE). A witty remark in this apophthegm, in which Scipio seems to abuse his position, contains a final reference to Carthage.⁷⁷⁴ There is, then, a certain contrast with XII, describing Scipio's sense of justice – or at least his adherence to laws (200E). Two apophthegms on his travels follow (200E–201A):⁷⁷⁵ these seem to separate the two blocks from each other.

⁷⁷¹ *Scipio Minor* VI (200B): ἀνδριάντων and ἀναθημάτων; VII (200B): χρημάτων. Plutarch refers to VII in *De fortuna* 97D (yet without a reference to his slaves and *liberti*).

⁷⁷² Plutarch refers to this election in *Aem.* 38, which does not contain these sayings.

⁷⁷³ In line with how Babbitt (1931) 191 translates ἡ πρεσβευτᾶς ἢ χιλιάρχους.

⁷⁷⁴ In this story, Scipio takes away a young man's horse. Censors had the power to do this when this person was ἀκόλαστος, as Plutarch describes in *Aem.* 38.8. The young man of *Scipio Minor* XI, however, can hardly be called ἀκόλαστος: Scipio takes his horse because he ordered a cake called “Carthage” which his guests could “spoil” (διαρπάσαι, 200DE), for in this way, he spoiled Carthage before the general did.

⁷⁷⁵ At the outset of *Scipio Minor* XIII, a Homeric verse is quoted by Cleitomachus. As Volkmann (1869) 230 writes, the verse is cited by Poseidonius in *Maxime cum principibus* 777A. This might be the correct name (see Babbitt (1931) 191, referring to Athenaeus

Scipio against the Numantians

Gradual shifting dominates once more in *Scipio Minor* XV–XXI (201A–E). These apophthegms concern a second war fought by Scipio. The beginning of the first apophthegm reminds one of the opening words of V (200AB): again, Scipio is appointed consul in order to defeat the enemy, this time the Numantians. He gives two possible explanations for why the Romans have not yet won the war: either the ἀνδρεία of the enemy, or the ἀνανδρία of the Roman soldiers (201AB). The next apophthegm shows that the second option is the correct one, for when Scipio reached the army, he (201B)

πολλήν ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δεισιδαιμονίαν καὶ τρυφήν
κατέλαβε

found there much disorder, licentiousness, superstition, and luxury

to which he put an end by a series of measures (201BC). Yet apparently not all of them listen well: when he finds an expensive item in the luggage of one of the *tribuni militum*, as Plutarch describes in *Scipio Minor* XVII, he says (201CD):

‘ἐμοὶ μὲν’ εἶπεν ‘ἡμέρας τριάκοντα καὶ τῇ πατρίδι, σαυτῷ δὲ τὸν βίον
ἅπαντα τοιοῦτος ὢν ἄχρηστον πεποίηκας σεαυτόν.’

“By such conduct you have made yourself useless to me and your country for thirty days, but useless to yourself for your whole lifetime.”

Although Scipio enriched his soldiers in the first block, he now seems to prefer the opposite course. This is continued by XVIII, which addresses a somewhat similar situation: to a soldier who is in the possession of a beautiful shield, Scipio says that one should have faith in one’s right hand (201D).⁷⁷⁶ The next apophthegm contains a parallel quote, but is no longer related to the theme of riches: a Roman complains that the wood for the palisade weighs a lot, so Scipio remarks that this man trusts the wood more than his weapon (201D).⁷⁷⁷ This theme of safety and de-

549D). Yet a different story follows in the treatise, and it is possible that the *Life* attributed the saying to Cleitomachus too.

⁷⁷⁶ *Scipio Minor* XVII (201C): ψυκτῆρας διαλίθους – XVIII (201D): θυρεὸν [...] εὖ κεκοσμημένον.

⁷⁷⁷ *Scipio Minor* XVIII (201D): πρέπει δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἄνδρα μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἢ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ – XIX (201D): τῷ γὰρ ξύλῳ τούτῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ μαχαίρᾳ πιστεύεις.

fence is in turn connected with XX (201DE),⁷⁷⁸ which contrasts with V (200AB): surprisingly enough the general now avoids open warfare. This strategy appears successful: the enemy loses the battle. A certain Numantian reacts to the fact that the Romans are suddenly victorious in XXI, which is in fact part of the preceding apophthegm (201E):⁷⁷⁹

τὰ πρόβατα ταῦτά καὶ νῦν ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ ποιμὴν ἄλλος.

the sheep were still the same sheep, but another man was their shepherd.

This saying, referring back to *Scipio Minor* XV (201AB) and highlighting its truth and Scipio's qualities as a general, closes the block about the Numantian War, once more by creating a ring composition. There remain two apophthegms that follow the victory in the Numantian War (see *Scipio Minor* XXII, 201E: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν Νομαντίαν ἐλών, further extending the chain): Scipio is back in Rome, and is opposed by Gaius Gracchus in both stories. In the closing apophthegm, Scipio's reaction to a threat of one of Gracchus' men, who called for the execution of the 'tyrant' Scipio (201E), reads as follows (201F):

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε τὴν Ῥώμην πεσεῖν Σκιπίωνος ἐστῶτος οὐδὲ ζῆν Σκιπίωνα τῆς Ῥώμης πεσοῦσης.

for it is not possible for Rome to fall while Scipio stands, nor for Scipio to live when Rome has fallen.

This closing apophthegm is related to the next section.

One concludes that Scipio's strategies in the Carthaginian War strongly differ from his methods in the Numantian War. In the first, Scipio allowed his soldiers to enrich themselves and preferred open warfare; in the second, he prefers the opposite course. This illustrates that he knows the right strategy for any situation. His versatility is to be admired: while Fabius Maximus applied one tactic, and Scipio Maior the other, Scipio Minor is able to apply the right one at the right moment. His qualities as a general are therefore assessed against the background of a joint reading of *Fabius Maximus* and *Scipio Maior* (195C–197A), where he appears superior.

⁷⁷⁸ Note *Scipio Minor* XX (201D): τὴν ἀσφάλειαν. See also XX (201D): τοῦ σιδήρου – XIX (201D): τῆ μαχαίρα.

⁷⁷⁹ See van der Wiel (2023a) 15. The saying recalls *Chabrias* III (187D) on the importance of a commander; and the series *Gaius Domitius–Paulus Aemilius* (197D–198D) on a general's experience.

Epameinondas and Scipio in the collection

Conclusions about Scipio's character as depicted in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* are not only relevant for their own sake, but can also shed light on the question of which Scipio was paired with Epameinondas in the *Parallel Lives*.⁷⁸⁰ There are various surviving pairs of which both subjects are included in the collection.⁷⁸¹ Only the *Lives of Agesilaus–Pompeius* and *Alexander–Caesar* concern men who have a section of considerable length. Since a comparison of their sections also points out why they are compared with each other in the biographical project,⁷⁸² one might expect something similar in the case of the *Lives of Epameinondas and Scipio* and their sections in the collection:⁷⁸³

[1] There is only one connection, albeit a remarkable one, between *Epameinondas* (192C–194C) and *Scipio Maior* (196B–197A). *Epameinondas* XXIII (194A–C) and *Scipio Maior* X (196F–197A) describe how their protagonists are accused of something and defend themselves by referring to their military exploits. This convinces the audience in both cases, for the people do not even vote. Appian's comparison of these actions of both men might indeed be based on a similar comparison in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*.⁷⁸⁴

[2] As noticed by Citro, the collection provides various arguments in favour of Scipio Minor.⁷⁸⁵ I would therefore say that the younger Scipio is a more likely candidate indeed, although this is by no means entirely certain. (a) First, this Scipio appears to be one of the most frugal Romans at the outset and at the end of his section (199F–201F). This is, as argued above, in line with the elder Cato's defence of the early Republican values in the previous section (198D–199E), but it also reminds one of *Epameinondas*

⁷⁸⁰ As Dana (1995) 91 points out, *Scipio Minor* must contain much material from the lost *Life*.

⁷⁸¹ *Per.–Fab.*, *Arist.–Ca. Ma.*, *Pyrrh.–Mar.*, *Lys.–Sull.*, *Ages.–Pomp.*, and *Alex.–Caes.*

⁷⁸² See esp. *infra*, p. 267–268 on *Agesilaus* (190F–191D) and *Pompeius* (203B–204E) and on *Alexander* (179D–181F) and *Caesar* (205E–206F).

⁷⁸³ Ziegler (1951) 896; Sandbach (1969) 74; Scardigli (1986) 20; Swain (1996) 138; Georgiadou (1997) 7–8; Nikolaidis (2005) 299–300 favour Scipio Maior as the paired Roman of Epameinondas; Scipio Minor is favoured by Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1926) 260; Herbert (1957); Stadter (1989) XXVIII; Geiger (2014) 293. Shrimpton (1971) 55; Duff (1999) 2; and Jacobs (2018) 1 leave the question open.

⁷⁸⁴ See Babbitt (1931) 150–151: “Appian, *Roman History, Syrian Wars*, 40–41, compares the action of Epameinondas with the similar action of Scipio Africanus Major (*Moralia*, 196F); and this suggests the probability that Appian had before him Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* of Epameinondas and Scipio, now lost.”

⁷⁸⁵ In a paper presented at the XX Plutarch Network Meeting (10–11 October 2019, Madeira), Serena Citro recognizes various similarities (which she defines as ἐγκράτεια with regard to pleasures) between *Epameinondas* and *Scipio Minor*.

(192C–194C). Although a similarity with Cato Maior seems to be the focus of Scipio’s earlier apophthegms, where he does not take part in the looting and asks his servants to do the same (*Scipio Minor* I, 199F), the theme of frugality as it appears in his final apophthegms (*Scipio Minor* XVI–XVIII, 201A–D) instead reminds one of Epameinondas as emerges from the analysis of his section: as good generals, both Scipio and the Theban realize that wealthy soldiers are of no use, since these do not dare to risk their lives. (b) A joint reading of *Epameinondas* (192C–194C) and *Pelopidas* (194C–E) points out that a general, on the contrary, should not lose his life for the well-being of his country. A similar connection between Scipio’s life and the fortune of Rome is established in *Scipio Minor* XXIV (201EF). (c) In addition, Epameinondas was probably accused of tyranny at the end of his *Life*, as can be concluded from *Epameinondas* XXIII (194A–C). Something similar must have occurred at the end of the *Life of Scipio Minor*, as the final apophthegm of the section (201EF) quoted above suggests too.⁷⁸⁶

5.1.7 Caecilius Metellus (201F–202A)

This section contains only three apophthegms.⁷⁸⁷ In the first one, Metellus rejects the suggestion of a centurion to attack a stronghold, in order to save the lives of his soldiers (201F–202A). In the second, another commander tries to obtain information about Metellus’ plans, who again wisely refuses (202A).⁷⁸⁸ In line with earlier sections, the image of a most prudent general arises. Yet especially the third apophthegm deserves attention (202A):

Σκιπίωνι δὲ ζῶντι πολέμων ἀποθανόντος ἠχθῆσθη καὶ τοὺς μὲν υἱοὺς ἐκέλευσεν ὑποδύντας ἄρασθαι τὸ λέχος, τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς ἔφη χάριν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥώμης, ὅτι παρ’ ἄλλοις οὐκ ἐγένετο Σκιπίων.

He was bitterly opposed to Scipio while Scipio lived, but felt very sad when he died, and commanded his sons to take part in carrying the

⁷⁸⁶ In addition, the way in which Scipio died is discussed in *Rom.* 27: Plutarch concludes that the Roman died a natural death, a difference with Epameinondas that might have been addressed in a *synkrisis* (if he wrote one).

⁷⁸⁷ Only *Caecilius Metellus* II (202A) occurs in another work of Plutarch. It is likely that the material in the section was gathered for the *Life of Scipio Minor*, see also Appendix III.

⁷⁸⁸ The story is told in *De gar.* 506D, as part of a series of apophthegms (one of which is the same story as *Antigonos Monophthalmus* IV, discussed *supra*, note 452). Plutarch concludes (506E): κἂν μέμφηται δὲ τις, ἐγκαλεῖσθαι βέλτιόν ἐστι σωθέντας δι’ ἀπιστίαν ἢ κατηγορεῖν ἀπολλυμένους διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι (“it is better that men should criticize you when they are already saved through mistrust than that they should accuse you when they are being destroyed because you did trust them”).

bier. He said that he felt grateful to the gods, for Rome’s sake, that Scipio had not been born among another people.

One would expect to find this apophthegm at the outset of the section: it sheds light not only on Metellus’ character, but also on that of Scipio, the subject of the previous section (note the connection with the closing apophthegm, 201EF); and it seems to describe a more general condition. Yet Plutarch intentionally inserted it before *Marius* and *Sulla* (202A–E). It is clear that Metellus puts his country first, regardless of his personal enmity: the use of *πολεμῶν* not only continues the theme of war and generalship,⁷⁸⁹ but also stresses that the hostility between Metellus and Scipio was truly profound, because of which the former’s reaction is even more remarkable. A similar love for his country appeared from *Scipio Minor* XXIII (201EF), closing that section, and this is precisely the reason why Metellus respects him so much. As *Marius* and *Sulla* follow, one expects a strong contrast, for the conflict between the subjects of these sections brought their country much harm.

5.1.8 *Marius, Sulla, and the Civil War (202A–E)*

Yet such a contrast between *Caecilius Metellus* (201F–202A) and the sections on *Marius* and *Sulla* does not follow. Surprisingly, the latter sections and the one apophthegm on *Catulus Lutatius* placed in between do not belong to the second part of the Roman section presenting Romans fighting their fellow citizens.⁷⁹⁰ They do not even contain a single reference to the civil war they fought against each other,⁷⁹¹ but only to their wars with non-Romans: *Marius* almost appears to be a true and traditional Republican general similar to his predecessors, as he is fighting the Teutons, Cimbrians, and Italians,⁷⁹² *Catulus Lutatius* wages a war against the Cimbrians,⁷⁹³ *Sulla* spares the Athenians after their defeat.

⁷⁸⁹ A suggestion made to me by Professor Christopher Pelling.

⁷⁹⁰ Although Plutarch considered this period a decline of the Roman Republic, as Buszard (2005) illustrates through a joint reading of *Pyrrh.–Mar.*

⁷⁹¹ *Marius* VI (202D) refers to the Social War: Ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐμφυλίῳ πολέμῳ. Babbitt (1931) 201 remarks that in Plutarch these words usually refer to a “Civil War” – for Social War, *συμμαχικός* is the usual adjective. Perhaps, this was a deliberate choice of the author, drawing attention to the absence of the civil war in their sections. Plutarch refers to the Social War as a pause for the enmity between *Marius* and *Sulla* in *Sull.* 6.2.

⁷⁹² In *Marius* IV (202C; also told in *Mar.* 18.4–8, see Vicente Sánchez (2008) 213 for a comparison), V (202CD; told in *Mar.* 28.4 in a political context, the version of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* is related to a military context), and VI (202D; also told in *Mar.* 33.4), respectively.

⁷⁹³ This apophthegm (202DE) occurs in *Mar.* 23.

Marius I is a telling case in this regard. It opens the section in a typical way, containing general information about Marius' descent and how he became involved in public life: when he wants to become *aedilis curulis*, he realizes that he will lose the elections, so he changes his mind and decides to run for *aedilis plebis*. He is not successful (202AB):

κάκεινης ἀποτυχῶν ὁμως οὐκ ἀπέγνων τοῦ πρωτεύσειν Ῥωμαίων.

Failing also to obtain that, he nevertheless did not give up the idea that he should some day be the first among the Romans.

Marius I reads as an abbreviation of chapters 3–5 in the *Life of Marius*,⁷⁹⁴ but no such quotation can be found there.⁷⁹⁵ Plutarch, therefore, consciously added it to the collection in order to steer his readers in a specific direction: they can only interpret it as foreshadowing the civil war. In line with other sections that open with similar general sayings, one expects Plutarch to further elaborate this theme in the remainder of *Marius*. The next apophthegm, however, deals with the painful surgery on Marius' legs, which he endured without showing how he suffered (202B), illustrating, as in the *Life*, his fortitude;⁷⁹⁶ *Marius* III depicts the Roman as a just man, in a military context (202BC).⁷⁹⁷ Both apophthegms illustrate Marius' qualities as a general (his fortitude and integrity; cf. men such as Manius Curius and Gaius Fabricius) and are in this way connected with the following stories concerning his generalship (202CD), in the wars

⁷⁹⁴ Marius' descent is described in similar words in *Mar.* 3.1, after which his first military deeds are described. He was admired by his commander Scipio, as is illustrated by a saying (of Scipio about Marius) in 3.4–5. This saying results in Marius' first political steps (4.1). The first part of *Marius* I reads as an abbreviation of all this (202A). The second part is a short version of 5.1–3 (note 5.1: Μετὰ δὲ τὴν δημαρχίαν ἀγορανομίαν τὴν μείζονα παρήγγειλε – 202B: ἀγορανομίαν τὴν μείζονα παρήγγειλεν).

⁷⁹⁵ In what follows the passage in *Mar.*, Marius becomes quickly *praetor*, despite his two defeats on a single day (5.4). This event is left out of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and replaced by the words quoted above.

⁷⁹⁶ The story is introduced as follows by *Mar.* 6.5: τῷ δὲ Μαρίῳ καὶ σωφροσύνην μαρτυροῦσι καὶ καρτερίαν, ἧς δείγμα καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν χειρουργίαν ἐστίν (“There is testimony both to the temperance of Marius, and also to his fortitude, of which his behaviour under a surgical operation is a proof”).

⁷⁹⁷ See the assessment of this story in *Mar.* 14.3: μάλιστα δ' ἡ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις ὀρθότης αὐτοῦ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἠρεσκεν (“But it was above all things the uprightness of his judicial decisions that pleased the soldiers”). This follows the description of Marius' ferociousness and vehemence, to which his soldiers became accustomed. This contrast between Marius' harshness and integrity is similar to the juxtaposition of *Marius* II and III (202BC).

against the barbarians listed above. In line with *Caecilius Metellus*, *Marius* I thus intentionally puts the readers on the wrong track: the section appears to fit entirely within those on the conquering Roman Republic, as Marius seems to exhibit true Republican virtues. As a consequence, the assessment of the Roman is entirely different from the rather negative picture that appears from his *Life*.⁷⁹⁸ His enmity with Sulla, a common thread throughout this biography, is mentioned not even once, and the same goes for his cruel murders of many fellow Romans, to which some sayings are related (*Mar.* 43–45).

The same dynamics exist between *Sulla* and the *Life*, which is an even more striking case:⁷⁹⁹ the horrible, yet famous, episode of the proscriptions – to which again some sayings relate⁸⁰⁰ – is entirely left out of the section, which actually consists of only one item (202E):⁸⁰¹

Σύλλας ὁ εὐτυχῆς ἀναγορευθεὶς τῶν μεγίστων εὐτυχιῶν ἐποίητο δύο, τὴν Πίου Μετέλλου φιλίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ κατασκάψαι τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀλλὰ φείσασθαι τῆς πόλεως.

Sulla, who was called the Fortunate, counted two things among his greatest pieces of fortune: the friendship of Pius Metellus, and the fact that he had not razed Athens, but had spared the city.

⁷⁹⁸ Cf. the highly negative description already in *Mar.* 2.4. See also Buszard (2008) 205–210 on Marius as a negative example, connected with his lack of *paideia* (often illustrated by his aversion to Greekness in the *Life*). On the poor education of Marius (and Pyrrhus, see *supra*, notes 483 and 484), see also Duff (2008b) 17–18; Xenophontos (2017), esp. 324–325.

⁷⁹⁹ Stadter (1992) argues that a joint reading of *Lys.–Sull.* (although the image is, as always, not entirely negative) stresses Sulla’s horrible personality (much worse than Lysander’s, see 47: “The features which only disturb in the portrait of Lysander horrify in the *Life* of Sulla”). Duff (1997) however stresses the ambiguity arising from such a joint reading, see 182: “Lysander, the apparently better of the two men, is unsuccessful; Sulla, through the greater use of violence, succeeds where Lysander had failed.” See also Duff (1999) 193–200.

⁸⁰⁰ *Sull.* 31, opening as follows (31.1): Τοῦ δὲ Σύλλα πρὸς τὸ σφάττειν τραπομένου, καὶ φόνων οὐτ’ ἀριθμὸν οὐθ’ ὄρον ἐχόντων ἐμπιπλάντος τὴν πόλιν (“Sulla now busied himself with slaughter, and murders without number or limit filled the city”; there are even various verbatim agreements with *Mar.* 43.2). Note also that *Cic.* 3.3 describes Sulla’s reign as a monarchy, after which the Roscius episode is told, focusing on Sulla’s cruelty.

⁸⁰¹ *Sull.* 6.8 (about Sulla’s memoirs, cf. ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι γέγραφε) only refers to the friendship with Metellus, since this illustrates well that he seemed to “make himself entirely the creature of this deity [i.e. Fortune]” (6.9: ὅλως ἐαυτὸν τοῦ δαίμονος ποιεῖν). A reference to his treatment of Athens, a great historical event, did not fit here, but is necessary in the context of the first part of the Roman section (on Rome conquering the world). Additionally, Lucullus seems to refer to the saying in *Luc.* 19.5.

This would again be a most typical opening: it explains Sulla's nickname and reflects upon his entire life (cf. the imperfect *ἐποιεῖτο*). Yet this is all the reader hears about the *dictator*: what follows is, quite surprisingly, an apophthegm about Gaius Popillius.

5.2 Gaius Popillius (202E–203A)

With this section, Plutarch deviates from the chronological order for the last time, leaving the Rome of Marius and Sulla and going back to the first half of the second century BC, switching the West for the East (202EF):⁸⁰²

Γάιος Ποπίλλιος ἐπέμφθη πρὸς Ἀντίοχον ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ τῆς συγκλήτου κομίζων, κελεύουσας ἀπάγειν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου τὸ στράτευμα καὶ μὴ σφετερίζεσθαι τῶν Πτολεμαίου τέκνων ὄρφανῶν ὄντων τὴν βασιλείαν [...].

Gaius Popillius was sent to Antiochus bearing a letter from the Senate commanding him to withdraw his army from Egypt, and not to usurp the kingdom of Ptolemy's children who were bereft of their parents.

The remainder of the apophthegm describes the remarkable way in which the Roman carried out his mission and made Antiochus obey the senate.⁸⁰³ This reflects his *φρόνημα* (202F), but this is not the only function of the story: it separates the preceding part of the Roman section from the following sections (*Lucullus*, 203AB; *Pompeius*, 203B–204E; *Cicero*, 204E–205E; *Caesar*, 205E–206F; and *Augustus*, 206F–208A). These are, therefore, meant to be read together: they deal with the death throes of the Roman Republic, share different themes, and explicitly reflect upon each other. In line with this, the reference to the strife between the *Diadochi* in the fragment quoted takes the reader back to the monarchical part of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. As a result, the reader will approach the final part of the collection (esp. *Lucullus–Caesar*, 203A–206F) in light of this, bearing in mind themes of these earlier sections: in contrast with *Marius* and *Sulla* (202A–E), the emphasis will henceforth be on the theme of internal strife, which Plutarch deliberately postponed until the end of his work.

⁸⁰² Stadter (2008) 59 speaks of an “erroneous placement”.

⁸⁰³ A similar story is told about Sulla and Mithridates in *Comp. Lys. et Sull.* 5.2: Plutarch could also have included this apophthegm in *Sulla* (202E), had he decided not to break the chronology.

5.3 The End of the Roman Republic (203A–206F)

5.3.1 Lucullus and Pompeius (203A–204E)

a) Lucullus (203AB)

The three apophthegms of this section – *Lucullus* II (203AB) should be split up⁸⁰⁴ – keep the reader in the East and illustrate how the general encourages his soldiers before a battle against Tigranes in Armenia.⁸⁰⁵ One wonders why Plutarch only includes these stories, which are all related to the same event, even though he possessed more material on the Roman.⁸⁰⁶ Apparently, he specifically wanted to stress Lucullus’ successes. The reason for this is that the section should be read together with the next one, in which the image of this Roman as a successful general alone will be problematized.⁸⁰⁷

b) Pompeius (203B–204E)

Pompey’s section reads as a shortened version of his biography. Its opening apophthegm contains a typical general assessment of the hero, applicable to his entire life (Ia, 203B):⁸⁰⁸

Γναῖος Πομπήιος ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἠγαπήθη τοσοῦτον ὅσον ὁ πατήρ ἐμισήθη.

Gnaeus Pompey was loved by the Romans as much as his father was hated.

This opening phrase is nothing more than a summary of the first chapter of the *Life of Pompeius*, where father and son are compared. It stands apart from the remainder of the section, which consists of two main blocks that clash with one another: one on Pompey’s younger years, and one on the later years of his career.

⁸⁰⁴ Between σκυλεῦσαι and προσβάς δὲ τῷ λόφῳ, see van der Wiel (2023a) 18. *Luc.* only includes I and IIb in 27.9 and 28.4, see *ibid.* 18n47.

⁸⁰⁵ *Lucullus* I is a story about an “unlucky day”. See *Cam.* 19 for an excursus on lucky and unlucky days: Plutarch addressed the theme in a treatise before (19.3: ἐτέρωθι (fr. p. 141 Bernard.) δηπόρηται).

⁸⁰⁶ Other sayings occur in *Luc.* 19.5, 24.7, and 39.5, to give a few examples. According to the relative chronology (Part I, chapter 2), *Luc.* predates *Reg. et imp. apophth.*

⁸⁰⁷ This procedure reminds one of Plutarch’s practice in the *Parallel Lives*, see *infra*, p. 298–303.

⁸⁰⁸ This is a typical opening ‘apophthegm’ and should be separated from *Pompeius* Ib, see van der Wiel (2023a) 8–9.

The young Pompey's successes

The first apophthegms (*Pompeius* Ib–V, corresponding to *Pomp.* 6–14) of this block concern the time when Pompey served Sulla's party, as its first phrase indicates (203B):

νέος δ' ὢν παντάπασι τῇ Σύλλα μερίδι προσέθηκεν αὐτόν [...].

In his youth he was heart and soul for Sulla's Party.

He is successful in this period of his life: when Sulla orders him to present his troops, he refuses until he has won many victories;⁸⁰⁹ in *Pompeius* II, also showing his righteousness, he is sent to Sicily as a general, to stop his violent and plundering soldiers (203C); in III, closely related to the previous apophthegm and still situated in Sicily, he spares the Mamertines and Sthennius, because of the latter's plea (203CD).⁸¹⁰

Σθενίου δὲ τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ φήσαντος οὐ δίκαια ποιεῖν αὐτόν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς αἰτίου πολλοὺς ἀναιτίους κολάζοντα, τοῦτον δὲ αὐτόν εἶναι τὸν τοὺς μὲν φίλους πείσαντα τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βιασάμενον ἐλέσθαι τὰ Μαρίου.

But Sthennius, their popular leader, said that Pompey was not doing right in punishing many innocent men instead of one man who was responsible, and that this man was himself, who had persuaded his friends, and compelled his enemies, to choose the side of Marius.

The enmity between Sulla and Marius (not mentioned so far) is casually referred to a first time. Apparently, it is only from *Pompeius* on that the theme of civic strife deserves a place. This is in line with the general structure of the Roman section discussed above, but the apophthegm also sheds light on Pompey's character. More precisely, the mildness he shows after Sthennius' appeal is necessary for a positive image of the man: that he was a partisan of Sulla does not mean that he shared in his cruelty.⁸¹¹ A similar and equally implicit defence of Pompey is found in

⁸⁰⁹ The apophthegm reads as an abbreviation of *Pomp.* 6–8.

⁸¹⁰ The story occurs in *Pomp.* 10.11–13, preceding *Pompeius* II. See Stadter (2008) 56 on this reversed order, and on the fact that the Mamertines become Himeraeans in the *Life* (which is historically correct).

⁸¹¹ *Praec. ger. reip.* 815EF combines *Pompeius* III with a story on Sulla's cruelty: he ordered the killing of all the inhabitants of Praeneste, with the exception of one of his guest-friends. This man, however, decided to be murdered together with his people. Both stories recommend the act of virtue of Sthennius and Sulla's guest-friend, but also contrast Pompey's mildness with Sulla's cruelty. See in this context Martin (1960) 69: "Prāotēs is,

the *Life*. After Plutarch recounts that the young commander attached himself to Sulla by marriage (*Pomp.* 9), the reader might question his good disposition, since he supports the cruel tyrant and is bound to him so closely.⁸¹² The episode of the Sicilian campaign that follows (*Pomp.* 10) involves not only stories about mildness, but also some atrocities: in this chapter, Plutarch first refers to Pompey's less friendly treatment of the Mamertines of Messana (10.2–3); then he relates the outrageous execution of Carbo (10.4–6), and finally includes a story taken from Gaius Oppius, who tells that Pompey put Quintus Valerius to death (10.7–8). Yet Plutarch emphasizes that Pompey's behaviour in Messana was rather exceptional (10.2), and argues that Oppius, who knew Caesar well, is not a trustworthy source (10.9). The murder of Carbo, for which no excuse exists, is cleverly hidden away between both stories, and the attack on Oppius' reliability is immediately followed by *Pompeius* II and III, which illustrate Pompey's mildness.⁸¹³ Thus, both in the *Life* and in the collection Plutarch knew that mentioning Pompey's attachment to Sulla might depict a negative image of the man. Leaving out horrible apophthegms earlier in *Sulla* (202E) did not solve this problem, for the ancient readers knew what kind of person he was. Plutarch therefore ignored the apophthegms that might shed a dark light on Pompey's character and only included *Pompeius* II and III (203CD). In this way, he makes one reach an assessment of Pompey's mild character that is similar to his image in the *Life*, without entirely leaving out the complexities that arise from his connection with the Roman *dictator*.

Pompeius IV, recalling Ib (203BC), continues Pompey's successes during Sulla's reign: he is hailed as *imperator* (αὐτοκράτωρ), but refuses the title so long as the enemies' camp stands. After this, the camp is taken (203DE).⁸¹⁴ This culminates in V, describing an important moment in Pompey's life: back in Rome, Sulla addresses the young man as “the

furthermore, associated with legality and contrasted with cruelty, violence, and tyranny in several passages.”

⁸¹² *Pomp.* 9.3: ἦν οὖν τυραννικὰ τὰ τοῦ γάμου καὶ τοῖς Σύλλα καιροῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς Πομπηίου τρόποις πρέποντα (“This marriage was therefore characteristic of a tyranny, and befitted the needs of Sulla rather than the nature and habits of Pompey”).

⁸¹³ But in a different order: *Pompeius* II (203C) occurs in *Pomp.* 10.14 (a striking difference is the emphasis on the violence of the soldiers in II [note ἐν ταῖς ὁδοιπορίας ἐκτρεπομένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ ἀρπάζειν, 203C], absent from the *Life* [only containing ἐν ταῖς ὁδοιπορίας ἀτακτεῖν]); III (203CD) in 10.11–13 (note the unnecessary addition of Marius' name in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, not included in the *Life* and *Praec. ger. reip.* 815EF).

⁸¹⁴ In *Pomp.* 11–12, the story is told at length. Its final words highlight that the episode still belongs to Pompey's younger years: this is how the apophthegm is to be interpreted in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* too.

Great” (*Magnus*). This title is even more prestigious than *imperator*, as it suggests a connection between Pompey and Alexander the Great. In the remainder of the story, Pompey asks for a triumph, but Sulla refuses: the young man is not even a member of the senate. Pompey complains (203E)

ἀγνοεῖν τὸν Σύλλαν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατέλλοντα πλείονες ἢ δύνοντα προσκυνοῦσιν [...].

that Sulla did not realize that more people worship the rising than the setting sun [...].

This saying, again emphasizing Pompey’s young age, makes Sulla give in.⁸¹⁵ In the second part of the long apophthegm,⁸¹⁶ the aristocrat Servilius is upset because of this decision, but finally realizes that Pompey is “great indeed” (203F: μέγαν ἀληθῶς).⁸¹⁷ This suggests that the Roman truly deserves this title, as can also be seen from VI (203F–204A): Pompey enumerates in front of the censors the campaigns in which he took part (according to the custom for Roman knights: this provides an additional connection with the preceding apophthegm, which focuses on another Roman custom), and adds that he did all this when he himself was the commander (204A: ὑπ’ ἐμαυτῷ αὐτοκράτορι).⁸¹⁸ *Pompeius* VII closes the first block, continuing the focus on his qualities as a general despite his age and illustrating his mildness: when Pompey is in possession of some letters of men asking Sertorius to come to Rome in order to take power, he forgives them by burning these letters (204A).⁸¹⁹

⁸¹⁵ It also emphasizes his φιλοτιμία; see Pelling (2012) 65–67 on this theme in *Pomp.*

⁸¹⁶ In the *Life*, another story related to the triumph is inserted between the two parts (*Pomp.* 14.6).

⁸¹⁷ Besides a reference to the event in *Sert.* 18.3 (again focusing on Pompey’s young age: οὐπω γενειῶν), Plutarch tells the same story in *Crass.* 7.1 (concluding with Crassus’ joke about Pompey’s ‘greatness’), and in *Pomp.* 13–14 (the first words in 13.3 and οὐπω πάνυ γενειῶν in 14.2 focus on the general’s age). See also Stadter (2008) 61–62 on these accounts: he argues that the collection’s version is to be read in an entirely positive way.

⁸¹⁸ See *Pomp.* 22.5–9 for a more elaborate account of the story. The wording of the passage is similar to the version in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*; see Stadter (2014b) 678 for a comparison.

⁸¹⁹ The story occurs in *Pomp.* 20.7–8 and in *Sert.* 27.1–5, almost at the end of the *Life* and again focusing on his young age: 27.4: ἔργον οὖν ὁ Πομπήϊος οὐ νέας φρενός, ἀλλ’ εὖ μάλα βεβηκυίας καὶ κατηρτυμένης ἐργασάμενος (“Pompey, then, did not act in this emergency like a young man, but like one whose understanding was right well matured and disciplined”).

A turning point

So far, then, all the focus lies on Pompey's military successes, which brought him great titles, and his young age. As stated, the nickname *Magnus* alludes to a comparison with Alexander the Great. Yet this connection is never made explicit.⁸²⁰ It shimmers in the background even in VIII on Pompey's actions in the East (204A):⁸²¹

Ἐπεὶ δὲ Φραάτης ὁ Πάρθων βασιλεὺς ἔπεμψε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ὄρω
χρῆσθαι τῷ Εὐφράτῃ, μᾶλλον ἔφη χρῆσεσθαι Ῥωμαίους ὄρω πρὸς
Πάρθους τῷ δικαίῳ.

When Phraates, king of the Parthians, sent to him, claiming the right to set his boundary at the river Euphrates, he said that the Romans set justice as their boundary towards the Parthians.

This recalls *Lucullus* (203AB): this Roman fought in this same war and all the apophthegms in his section are related to this. He will return in the next two apophthegms: as announced above, the positive image of this successful general will now be problematized. Yet at the same time, he will also cast a shadow on the later years of Pompey's career.⁸²²

Pompey's downfall

In *Pompeius* IX, Plutarch describes how Lucullus, in the period after his military expeditions (204B: μετὰ τὰς στρατείας, referring back to the campaigns in the East of *Pompeius* VIII and *Lucullus*), enjoys a life of extravagance and luxury, while criticising Pompey's way of life, which is not in line with his age.⁸²³ Pompey, however, argues that the opposite is true and that it is rather Lucullus' behaviour that is not fitting for his

⁸²⁰ Green (1978) 4 writes about the historical truth of Pompey's *imitatio Alexandri* (in contrast with Caesar, see *infra*, note 854): "Pompey, from adolescence onwards, had consciously modelled himself on the Macedonian conqueror, both physically and, in particular, as regards his military career." He lists the following similarities between both men: (1) Pompey's title *Magnus*, (2) his triumph, and (3) his victories in Spain (and the inscription he established there) and against Mithridates. All these elements occur in this first half of *Pompeius*.

⁸²¹ In the account of *Pomp.* 33.8, Phraates also asked for the liberation of Tigranes, refused by Pompey.

⁸²² Heftner (1995) 22–26 divides *Pomp.* into two parts: his "Aufstieg und Größe" (1–45) and his "Niedergang und Fall" (46–80). This coincides with the dynamics in *Pompeius*. Papadi (2008) describes how tragical images and references occur mainly in the second part of the *Life*.

⁸²³ Plutarch had a series of apophthegms on Lucullus' love of luxury, see Stadter (2012a) 784–785.

years (204AB).⁸²⁴ This indicates that the remainder of the section concerns Pompey's later years, suggesting that he is no longer that vigorous young man. This also appears from X: a physician advises a diet of thrushes, but these are out of season at that moment. Only Lucullus possesses these, so the sick Pompey decides to stick to a diet of feasible things (204B).⁸²⁵

The theme of food prompted Plutarch to include an apophthegm about the shortage of grain in the city, after which Pompey set sail and returned quickly, despite a storm (204BC),⁸²⁶ more importantly, he in the following apophthegm again refers to the topic of food and eating in a saying about Marcellinus, who switched sides to the advantage of Caesar and opposes Pompey in the Senate (204C).⁸²⁷ This reference to the conflict with Caesar at the outset of the anecdote (204C: Τῆς δὲ πρὸς τὸν Καίσαρα διαφορᾶς) is of particular relevance for the comparison Pompey–Lucullus. At first sight, Plutarch only contrasted Lucullus' profligacy with Pompey's frugality in order to shed a negative light on the former, while praising the latter. Yet if these stories are read in connection with *Lucullus* (203AB), this also appears to be related to the successes of both men. As stated, one only reads about Lucullus' great deeds in the East in his own section. This is similar to the description of Pompey's youthful years, characterized by his great military exploits, some of which also took place in the East. The later years of the lives of both men, on the contrary, are different: Lucullus chooses a quiet life after his expeditions; Pompey opts for the opposite course and remains active in public life. Even though one can hardly doubt that Plutarch would have approved of Pompey's course rather than of Lucullus' Epicurean-like seclusion,⁸²⁸ the apophthegms which follow from *Pompeius* XII on illustrate his downfall

⁸²⁴ This apophthegm occurs in *An seni* 785E–786A, *Luc.* 38.5 (where both Crassus and Pompey make the remark), and *Pomp.* 48.6–7. In this final passage, however, Plutarch adds that Pompey devoted his final years to his wife, neglecting politics as well (48.5); see Beneker (2005a) 75–81 on this passage and on Pompey's affection for women as an explanation for his downfall in the *Life* (this theme is absent from *Reg. et imp. apophth.*).

⁸²⁵ *Pompeius* X occurs in the same works as IX: *An seni* 786A (after the account of IX, since both apophthegms illustrate the undignified behaviour of Lucullus in his final years: Plutarch chooses Pompey's side), *Luc.* 40.2 (illustrating how Pompey makes himself popular with the saying, while Lucullus is hated; the apophthegm is again told close to *Pompeius* IX in *Luc.* 38.5; *Luc.* 39.4–5 furthermore describes Lucullus' excessive wealth, there also contrasted with Pompey by sayings of both men concerning Lucullus' estate in Tusculum), and *Pomp.* 2.11–12 (as part of a general description of Pompey's character, illustrating his frugality).

⁸²⁶ Also told in *Pomp.* 50.

⁸²⁷ The saying also occurs in *Pomp.* 51.6–8.

⁸²⁸ Cf. *Comp. Cim. et Luc.* 1.3; see Roskam (2005c) 366–367 on this passage.

in his later years during the civil war: in XIII, Cato blames Pompey for not having supported him when he opposed Caesar (204D);⁸²⁹ in XIV, Pompey says (204D)

ὥς πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἔλαβε θᾶσσον ἢ προσεδόκησε καὶ κατέθετο θᾶσσον ἢ προσεδοκήθη.

that he had attained every office sooner than he had expected, and laid it down sooner than had been expected.

The saying occurs in almost the same words in the *Life of Pompeius* in the context of the prelude to the civil war: it was true, for Pompey often dismissed his soldiers, but when Caesar appeared to be a threat, he strived for more power (*Pomp.* 54.1). In light of the following apophthegm about Pompey's death in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, this contrast might stand out too, but the saying is definitely to be interpreted in a darker way: perhaps he should have laid down his office, in particular in his final years, for death now brings an end to his office. The placement of *Pompeius* XIV, then, is not coincidental: it does not belong there because of the general chronological structure, nor is it in line with the order of the *Life*, but it provides the interpretatory background of XV, in which Pompey is killed on Egyptian shores.⁸³⁰ Thus, his successes suddenly ended and his way of life does not seem preferable to Lucullus in all respects.

Conclusion

Plutarch created a clash between the two main blocks of *Pompeius*, clarified by the scheme below (note the gradual shifting):

Pompeius Ia: general assessment

Block 1: the young (cf. emphasis in other works) Pompey's successes (7 apophthegms)	<i>Pompeius</i> Ib: <i>Sulla</i> <i>Pompeius</i> II and III: sent by <i>Sulla</i> to Sicily – Pompey's mildness <i>Pompeius</i> IV: Pompey hailed <u>imperator</u> , Domitius defeated [<i>Sulla</i>] <i>Pompeius</i> V: Pompey the <u>Great</u> – <i>Sulla</i> <i>Pompeius</i> VI: Pompey as <u>imperator</u> <i>Pompeius</i> VII: Pompey's mildness after the Sertorian war [The dominating theme of civil war announces block 2]
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⁸²⁹ The story is also told in *Pomp.* 60.8 and *Ca. Mi.* 52.3, in both cases after Caesar took Ariminum; see Stadter (2014b) 680 on all three accounts.

⁸³⁰ The story of Pompey's death covers *Pomp.* 78–79.

Pompeius VIII: Pompey in the East [implicit connection with Alexander the Great – announces Lucullus]

Block 2: the **old**
Pompey's **downfall**
(7 apophthegms)

Pompeius IX and X: contrast with Lucullus
[*Pompeius* XI: connected with X and XII by the
theme of food]
Pompeius XII–XV: war with Caesar

Since the first block contains a promising picture of the Roman as a new Alexander, it is quite meaningful that it is precisely the stories after his actions in the East that introduce his downfall, when he fights his fellow Romans. The problematizing structure of the section recalls *Agesilaus* (190F–191D), where a similar promising first block suggested that a Greek triumph over barbarians would follow, in contrast with the second part in which Sparta loses her great position by fighting Greeks. This is entirely in line with the evolution throughout *Agesilaus–Pompeius* and with Nevin's reading of the pair: Agesilaus is a failed Agamemnon, Pompey is a failed Alexander.⁸³¹ The question one might ask, then, is whether in the end Lucullus' or Pompey's course is more desirable.

c) Comparison

Although Lucullus' luxury at the end of his life should definitely be rejected, one can hardly count Pompey more fortunate or successful: the former at least knew when to withdraw (though not *how* to withdraw), whereas the latter did not know when to quit. In the *Lives* of both men, Plutarch connects this with their luck, as can be seen from the following passage (*Comp. Cim. et Luc.* 1.1):⁸³²

Μάλιστα δ' ἂν τις εὐδαιμονίσειε τοῦ τέλους Λεύκολλον, ὅτι πρὸ τῆς μεταβολῆς, ἦν ἤδη κατὰ τῆς πολιτείας ἐτεκταίνετο τοῖς ἐμφυλίοις πολέμοις τὸ πεπρωμένον [...].

⁸³¹ Nevin (2014) points out that Pompey does not succeed in his *imitatio Alexandri*, in the same way as Agesilaus' imitation of Agamemnon fails. See esp. Nevin (2014) 61: "While Pompey seemed (mistakenly) to have an air of Alexander in his early days, the likeness will prove disastrously false." See also Shipley (1997) 9–17 on these and many more parallels, and on some major differences between *Ages.* and *Pomp.*; and Pelling (2011) 27 on the pairing of Caesar, instead of Pompey, with Alexander.

⁸³² This is in line with an earlier comment in the *Life*, see *Luc.* 33.1: Μέχρι τοῦδε φαίη τις ἂν Λευκόλλω τὴν τύχην ἐπομένην συστρατηγεῖν. ἐντεῦθεν δ' ὥσπερ πνεύματος ἐπιλιπόντος προσβιαζόμενος πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἀντικρούων ("Up to this point, one might say that fortune had followed Lucullus and fought on his side; but from now on, as though a favouring breeze had failed him, he had to force every issue, and met with obstacles everywhere"). Lucullus stopped in time.

One might deem Lucullus especially happy in his end, from the fact that he died before that constitutional change had come, which fate was already contriving by means of the civil wars.

Pompey's fate, described in his *Life*, illustrates exactly the opposite (*Pomp.* 46.1–2):⁸³³

Ἡλικία δὲ τότε ἦν, ὡς μὲν οἱ κατὰ πάντα τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ παραβάλλοντες αὐτὸν καὶ προσεικάζοντες ἀξιοῦσι, νεώτερος τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ τεττάρων ἐτῶν, ἀληθεία δὲ τοῖς τετταράκοντα προσῆγεν. ὡς ὄνητό γ' ἂν ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου παυσάμενος, ἄχρι οὗ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχην ἔσχευεν [...].

His age at this time, as those insist who compare him in all points to Alexander and force the parallel, was less than thirty-four years, though in fact he was nearly forty. How happy would it have been for him if he had ended his life at this point, up to which he enjoyed the good fortune of Alexander!

The reference to Alexander is in line with *Pompeius*, where a comparison with Lucullus combined with allusions to this king brings the reader to the same final assessment of Pompey's unlucky end. Yet this does not mean that it is clear which Roman is to be preferred: Lucullus' way of living in his final years after realizing that all his military luck was spent is most shameful and does not call for imitation, in the same way as Pompey's poor judgement of his abilities is not an example either. A joint reading of *Lucullus* and *Pompeius* thus keeps the reader in the dark. Perhaps the truth lies, as it often does, somewhere in the middle: the insight of Pompey's saying in *Pompeius* V (203EF), when the Roman contrasted his young age and vigour with Sulla, should have helped him to prevent his own downfall by taking a step back as the *dictator* did, without entirely retiring from public life and surrendering to luxury, in contrast with Lucullus. This is in line with Plutarch's general argument in *An seni respublica gerenda sit* (where Lucullus figures multiple times as a negative *exemplum*),⁸³⁴ although the collection once more raises more questions than answers, for it is unclear to what extent Pompey should have given in.

⁸³³ See Harrison (1995) 102 about this chapter as a turning point: "The *Life of Pompey*' separates at this point into two halves; Alexander is never adduced in the second half, Caesar rarely in the first." See also Beneker (2005a) 74–75 and Nevin (2014) 64–65 on this matter.

⁸³⁴ *An seni* 785E–786A and 792B.

5.3.2 Cicero (204E–205E)

The section on Cicero is well placed in between *Pompeius* (203B–204E) and *Caesar* (205E–206F), as the orator often doubts whose side he has to take during their conflict. Except for this aspect, however, its broader relevance in the context of the sections on the end of the Roman Republic is perhaps not always clear (this esp. goes for the apophthegms on Cicero's oratory skills). Yet it illustrates the character of a protagonist of this period well, it is carefully structured, and the ancient reader would have expected much material on Cicero in the collection, as he was well known for his witty sayings. Important in this respect was a collection compiled by Tiro, which might have formed the basis of at least parts of this section.⁸³⁵

Overview

The section opens in a typical way. *Cicero* I and II (204E) concern the subject's name. Not incidentally, then, both apophthegms also occur in the first chapter of the *Life of Cicero* after an explanation of the meaning of 'Cicero' (1.4–6). III (204EF) fits well after I and II: its general saying (cf. the imperfect ἔλεγε, 204E) is to be expected rather at the outset of the section. In addition, Cicero's jest announces the remainder of *Cicero*, consisting of three parts: [1] Cicero's jests in his function of orator; [2] his rude and malicious jokes; and [3] his witticisms related to the civil war, illustrating his permanent doubt as to whose side was preferable:⁸³⁶

[1] The first part consists of *Cicero* IV–XI (204F–205B). A comparison with the *Life* is revealing: both IV (204F) and XI (205B) occur in *Cic.* 7 and are related to the Verres episode.⁸³⁷ They surround a series of apophthegms (*Cicero* V–X, 204F–205B) that are all told in *Cic.* 26.⁸³⁸

⁸³⁵ See Appendix II.2.

⁸³⁶ In *Cic.* 5.6, *Cicero* III is combined with the following comment: ἡ δὲ περὶ τὰ σκώμματα καὶ τὴν παιδιὰν ταύτην εὐτραπελία δικανικὸν μὲν ἐδόκει καὶ γλαφυρὸν εἶναι, χρώμενος δ' αὐτῇ κατακόρως, πολλοὺς ἐλύπει καὶ κακοθηεῖας ἐλάμβανε δόξαν ("And his readiness to indulge in such jests and pleasantry was thought indeed to be a pleasant characteristic of a pleader; but he carried it to excess and so annoyed many and got the reputation of being malicious"). See Kelsey (1907) 4: "there is no good reason to doubt that he was reproducing statements of a well-informed earlier author when he wrote [...]", after which he cites *Cic.* 5.6 and parts of 27. Kelsey does not refer to the section of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* On the sources of *Cic.*, see Lendle (1967); Gudeman (1971); Moles (1988) 26–31; the first two chapters of Pelling (2002); and a short chapter in Lintott (2013) 15–17.

⁸³⁷ Cf. *Cic.* 7.6. *Cicero* IV and XI, told in *Cic.* 7.7 and 7.8, respectively, are not the only sayings in this chapter. On Cicero's witticism during this trial, see also Kelsey (1907) 3.

⁸³⁸ *Cicero* V (204F–205A) occurs in *Cic.* 26.6 (and in *De se ipsum laud.* 541F–542A), VI (205A) in 26.9–10, VII (205A) in 26.11, VIII (205AB) in 26.3, IX (205B) in 26.5 (and in *Quaest. conv.* 631D), and X (205B) in 26.9 (before the account of *Cicero* VI. In the

This chapter, entirely built up from sayings, is followed by *Cic.* 27.1–2:⁸³⁹

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἐχθροὺς ἢ πρὸς ἀντιδίκους σκώμμασι χρῆσθαι πικροτέροις δοκεῖ ῥητορικὸν εἶναι· τὸ δ' οἷς ἔτυχε προσκρούειν ἕνεκα τοῦ γελοίου πολὺ συνῆγε μῖσος αὐτῶ. γράψω δὲ καὶ τούτων ὀλίγα.

Now, this use of very biting jests against enemies or legal opponents seems to be part of the orator's business; but his indiscriminate attacks for the sake of raising a laugh made many people hate Cicero. And I will give a few instances of this also.

By creating a ring composition, *Cicero* IV and XI create a block of apophthegms that instigate a similar interpretation: all these stories concern Cicero's jests related to trials and lawsuits, and contrast with the following two apophthegms.

[2] *Cicero* XII and XIII are told in *Cic.* 27.4 and 27.6 respectively, after the passage quoted, and indeed illustrate his inappropriate jests: in XII, the orator mocks the ugly daughters of Voconius (205C); in XIII, Faustus is his victim (205C).⁸⁴⁰ Thus, as in the *Life*, one reads a series of more suitable sayings related to his oratory function, contrasted with improper and offensive remarks.

[3] What follows is to be read against the background of all this. As stated, this block presents Cicero's doubts in the civil war. It is introduced by *Cicero* XIV and XV (205C), which should in fact be considered one apophthegm, since XV opens with καί:⁸⁴¹

14. Πομπηίου δὲ καὶ Καίσαρος διαστάντων ἔφη ‘γινώσκω ὄν φύγω, μὴ γινώσκων πρὸς ὄν φύγω.’ (15.) καὶ Πομπήιον ἐμέμψατο τὴν πόλιν

Life, the story is not told about Castus Popillius, but about Publius Consta, an unknown Roman, see Lintott (2013) 169). The order in which they appear in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* is therefore not entirely the same, but the apophthegms in which Metellus Nepos is mentioned (V, VI, and VII) are put together in the collection. Volkmann (1869) 230 notices: “Diodotus der Lehrer der Beredsamkeit in Cicero's A. 7 heisst im Leben des Cicero c. 26 Philagrus. Die silberne Sphinx Cic. A. II, ist in der vita c. 7 von Elfenbein.”

⁸³⁹ See Xenophon (2012a) 606 on the passage. Wittiness is a theme throughout *Dem.–Cic.* as a pair; see Moles (1988) 174. On the pairing of these *Lives* in general, see also Lintott (2013) 3–15.

⁸⁴⁰ Cicero is joking about Faustus' debts and the fact that he is selling his possessions, by referring to the proscriptions of his father Sulla (205C); see also Moles (1988) 174 and Lintott (2013) 171.

⁸⁴¹ See van der Wiel (2023a) 10–11. Nachstädt (1971) 101–102 puts no. 15 between brackets.

ἐκλιπόντα καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα μᾶλλον ἢ Περικλέα μιμησάμενον, οὐκ ἐκείνοις τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλλὰ τούτοις ὁμοίων ὄντων.

14. When Pompey and Caesar took opposite sides, he said, “I know from whom I flee without knowing to whom to flee.” 15. He blamed Pompey for abandoning the city, and imitating Themistocles rather than Pericles, when his situation was not like that of Themistocles, but rather that of Pericles.

Cicero XIV (205C) is related in the *Life of Cicero* in the context of Pompey’s departure from the city (37.3): this also suggests taking the two parts together.⁸⁴² Cicero’s doubt in this story is closely connected with XVI, since καὶ πάλιν μετανοῶν (205CD: “after again changing his opinion”) illustrates that he was still in doubt, and contains the first jest of this block (205CD). The jokes of XVII–XIX (205DE) similarly show that he was not a convinced supporter of Pompey, recalling Plutarch’s assessment in the *Life* (38.2).⁸⁴³ There remain two apophthegms. XX (205E) is connected with XIX (205DE) by its reference to Pharsalus.⁸⁴⁴ Cicero comments on Caesar’s restoration of some of Pompey’s statues, saying that in this way he in fact established his own images.⁸⁴⁵ The theme of Caesar’s clemency is also relevant for Cicero’s own life: one knows that after Pharsalus, he switched sides again and was forgiven by Caesar. In line with this, *Cicero* closes with an apophthegm returning to Cicero’s function as an orator and getting back to normal.⁸⁴⁶

⁸⁴² Taken from van der Wiel (2023a) 11n31, where I also point out that *Cicero* XV (205C) is not told in this *Life*, but in *Pomp.* 63.2, where Caesar expresses his surprise at Pompey’s action too (63.1). The event is also strongly criticized in *Comp. Ages. et Pomp.*; see also Shipley (1997) 20. Moles (1988) 186 describes Cicero’s dilemma in *Cic.* as one “between morality (joining Pompey) and expediency (joining Caesar)”; followed by Lintott (2013) 190.

⁸⁴³ *Cicero* XVI and XVII (205CD) occur in no other work of Plutarch. XVIII and XIX (205DE) can be found in *Cic.* 38.5 and 38.7, respectively, as part of a larger list of similar sayings (XIX seems to be out of place: the defeat at Pharsalus mentioned there is only referred to in *Cic.* 39.1: the apophthegm is therefore included in *Cic.* 38 because of its thematic similarities, despite the resulting chronological deviation).

⁸⁴⁴ *Cicero* XIX (205DE): Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν Φαρσάλῳ μάχην – XX (205E): Ἐπεὶ δὲ Καῖσαρ κρατήσας.

⁸⁴⁵ In the account of *Cic.* 40.4–5, Plutarch comments that Cicero did not appear in public anymore, unless in order to speak about Caesar: Moles (1988) 190 speaks of “flattery”, which “will also be a key element in his relations with Octavian Caesar.” In *Caes.* 57.6, the story illustrates Caesar’s clemency; its occurrence in *De cap. ex inim.* 91A is therefore not surprising.

⁸⁴⁶ The story cannot be found in any other work of Plutarch’s oeuvre.

Conclusion

The main focus of the section consists of Cicero's jests, sometimes inappropriate, and most importantly describing his unconvinced behaviour in the civil war:⁸⁴⁷ the orator always chooses the safest course.⁸⁴⁸ His good judgement (which is to be admired) often saves his life. Yet the general picture is not very flattering, for Cicero might appear to be a coward. Perhaps, then, the section is to be read as an adjustment to *Pompeius* (203B–204E): the contrast between this section and *Lucullus* (203AB) might yield the interpretation that one should only walk the path of success, but the (rather unattractive) picture of Cicero now suggests that Plutarch does not want to say that one should be an inconsistent personality or someone who puts one's own interests first.

A second conclusion concerns Cicero's sayings that are also relevant for an evaluation of Pompey and Caesar: the incapacities of the former are contrasted with the military genius of the latter. The theme of Caesar's mildness is interesting in this respect too. All these elements are of importance for a reading of what follows.

5.3.3 Caesar (205E–206F)

In various respects, Caesar's section resembles *Pompeius* (203B–204E): (1) it begins with his early years (205EF: ἔτι μειράκιον ὄν) during Sulla's tyranny (205E: ὅτε Σύλλαν ἐφευγεν); (2) most of his first apophthegms (206AB) focus on his love of honour; (3) there is a comparison with Alexander the Great, although now an explicit one (206B); (4) after which most apophthegms deal with the civil war (206C–E); and (5) one of these apophthegms takes place in the East (206E). From the reference to Alexander on, the difference between both men will become apparent: Caesar deserves to be compared with the Macedonian king; Pompey does not.⁸⁴⁹

Caesar's love of honour

Caesar I, one of the longest apophthegms of the collection, describes how the young man was held in captivity by some pirates after he fled Rome during Sulla's rule (205E–206A). This opening story also occurs near the beginning of the *Life of Caesar*, and stands somewhat apart from the remainder of the section.⁸⁵⁰ The next apophthegms illustrate Caesar's

⁸⁴⁷ See Lintott (2013) 10–11 on the negative aspects of Cicero's speech.

⁸⁴⁸ This theme connects *Dem.–Cic.*, see Lintott (2013) 11.

⁸⁴⁹ Cf. Nevin (2014) 66.

⁸⁵⁰ On the lost beginning of the *Life*, see Pelling (1973) and (2011) 129–132; and Schmidt, T. S. (2019) 87–88. *Caesar* I is told in *Caes.* 1–2, where Plutarch first describes the enmity between Caesar and Sulla, who wanted to kill the young man (1.1–4). This made him flee Rome, after which he was captured by pirates (1.5–8): this corresponds

φιλοτιμία:⁸⁵¹ he wants to become either *pontifex maximus* or an exile (206A),⁸⁵² and divorces his wife only because of a rumour in order to protect his reputation (206AB).⁸⁵³ The next two stories deserve particular attention (206B):

4. Τὰς δ' Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις ἀναγινώσκων ἐδάκρυσε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἶπεν ὅτι ‘ταύτην τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχων ἐνίκησε Δαρεῖον, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέχρι νῦν οὐδὲν πέπρακται.’

5. Πολίχνιον δ' αὐτοῦ λυπρὸν ἐν ταῖς Ἄλπεσι παρερχομένου καὶ τῶν φίλων διαπορούντων εἰ καὶ ἐνταῦθά τινες στάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἄμιλλαι περὶ πρωτείων, ἐπιστὰς καὶ σύννους γενόμενος ‘μᾶλλον ἂν’ ἔφη ‘ἐβουλόμην πρῶτος ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ἢ δεύτερος ἐν Ῥώμῃ.’

4. While he was reading of the exploits of Alexander, he burst into tears, and said to his friends, “When he was of my age he had conquered Darius, but, up to now, nothing has been accomplished by me.”

5. As he was passing by a miserable little town in the Alps, his friends raised the question whether even here there were rival parties and contests for the first place. He stopped and becoming thoughtful said, “I had rather be the first here than the second in Rome.”

Caesar IV and V are told after each other in the *Life of Caesar* (II.3–6), but in a different order: they do not belong to the same historical event, but are put together there because both in a similar way (cf. II.5: ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν) illustrate Caesar’s desire to be the first: they are telling illustrations of his φιλοτιμία.⁸⁵⁴ In this chapter, Caesar is on his way to Spain, the province recently appointed to him after his praetorship (II.1–2). The

to the first sentence of the apophthegm. The second part agrees with *Caes.* 2. Nikolaidis (1986) 243 discusses *Caesar* I because of its depiction of the pirates as uncivilized barbarians (ἀναισθήτους καὶ βαρβάρους [205F]), contrasting with Caesar. Stadter (2014b) 678–680 compares the pirate story in *Caesar* I and the *Life*.

⁸⁵¹ For Caesar’s ambition in the *Life*, assessed in a rather negative way by Plutarch (in contrast with his assessment of Alexander’s φιλοτιμία), see Buszard (2008). On ζῆλος in the *Parallel Lives*, see Pérez Jiménez (2002). See also Pelling (2012) 59 on Caesar’s ζῆλος and φιλοτιμία.

⁸⁵² Plutarch tells the story in *Caes.* 7.1–3.

⁸⁵³ *Caes.* 10.7–9 and *Cic.* 29.9 tell the same story. The wording of *Caes.* is closer to *Caesar* III.

⁸⁵⁴ Green (1978) 3, denying the historical truth of Caesar’s *imitatio Alexandri*, refers to the account of *Caesar* IV in the *Life* as a variation of a similar anecdote that occurs in

story of *Caesar V* belongs to this journey, when he crosses the Alps. *Caesar IV* takes place in Spain, as Plutarch writes in its account of the *Life*.⁸⁵⁵ This gives the impression that it belongs to the period after Caesar's journey through the Alps, when he had reached Spain. According to Perrin, however, the event of *Caesar V* took place in 61 BC, while *Caesar IV* probably belongs to Caesar's earlier time in Spain, in 67 BC.⁸⁵⁶ If Perrin is right, the order of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* is the correct one from a chronological point of view and might reflect the order of Plutarch's notes.

Yet there is a thematic explanation too: when reading the collection, one will also draw the wrong conclusions about the chronology of both stories, since *Caesar IV* does not mention that Caesar was in Spain, nor does *V* mention that he was on his way to this province. Especially in the case of this second story, this changes its interpretation, even more so when reading *VI* and *VII* (in fact one apophthegm) in which Caesar crosses the Rubicon (206BC).⁸⁵⁷

6. Τῶν δὲ τολμημάτων τὰ παράβολα καὶ μεγάλα πράττειν ἔφη δεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ βουλευέσθαι. (7.) Καὶ διέβη τὸν Ῥουβίκωνα ποταμὸν ἐκ τῆς Γαλατικῆς ἐπαρχίας ἐπὶ Πομπήιον εἰπὼν ‘πᾶς ἀνερρίφθω κύβος.’

6. He said that the venturesome and great deeds of daring call for action and not for thought. 7. And he crossed the river Rubicon from his province in Gaul against Pompey, saying before all, “Let the die be cast.”

In light of this, *Caesar V* reads as if the wars in Gaul are fought already, and as if Caesar is crossing the Alps in the direction of Rome, not the other way around as in the original context. As a consequence, *Caesar IV* reads as a turning point: by comparing himself with Alexander the

the same chapter. He points out that these stories (and their account in other authors) are the only testimonies. On Alexander and Caesar as a pair, see Pelling (2011) 25–35.

⁸⁵⁵ *Caes.* II.5: ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ σχολῆς οὔσης (“In like manner we are told again that, in Spain, when he was at leisure [...]”).

⁸⁵⁶ Perrin (1919a) 468 and esp. 469: “Suetonius (*Div. Jul.* 7) and Dio Cassius (xxxvii. 52, 2) connect this anecdote more properly with Caesar's quaestorship in Spain (67 B.C.), when he was thirty-three years of age, the age at which Alexander died.” See also Pelling (2011) 183–184. Yet Plutarch does not explicitly connect *Caesar V* to a later period, but only included it there because of its thematic similarities with *Caesar IV* (a similar case in *Cic.* 38 is described *supra*, note 843).

⁸⁵⁷ See van der Wiel (2023a) II on these elements as one apophthegm, in line with the absence of δέ and the presence of καί at the outset of VII. Nachstädt (1971) 104 puts no. 7 between brackets. The saying occurs in *Caes.* 32.8 and *Pomp.* 60.3–4.

Great, the Roman realizes that he has not yet achieved anything at all. Immediately afterwards, he marches on the capital. This interpretation is not only supported by the topographic information which is included and excluded, but also by the content of the saying of V: Caesar claims that the only thing that matters to him is to be the first, no matter where. In what follows, he will risk everything in order to reach that goal.

The civil war

From now on, things are moving fast: after crossing the Alps (*Caesar* V) and the Rubicon (VI–VII), Caesar has suddenly already reached Rome in VIII. In this apophthegm, he tries to take riches from the Roman treasure, after threatening to kill Metellus, since the latter refuses to help him. Meanwhile, Pompey has left the city and crossed the sea (206C).⁸⁵⁸ IX and X, of which the subdivision should be reconsidered, continue Caesar's movement (206CD).⁸⁵⁹

9. Τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν αὐτῷ βραδέως εἰς Δυρράχιον ἐκ Βρεντεσίου κομιζομένων λαθὼν ἅπαντας εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβὰς μικρὸν ἐπεχείρησε διαπλεῖν τὸ πέλαγος· συγκλυζομένου δὲ τοῦ πλοίου ποιήσας τῷ κυβερνήτῃ φανερόν ἑαυτὸν ἀνεβόησε ‘πίστευε τῇ τύχῃ γνοὺς ὅτι Καίσαρα κομίζεις.’ 10. Τότε μὲν οὖν ἐκωλύθη τοῦ χειμῶνος ἰσχυροῦ γενομένου καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν συνδραμόντων καὶ περιπαθούτων, εἰ περιμένει δύναμιν ἄλλην ὡς ἀπιστῶν αὐτοῖς[.]

ἐπεὶ δὲ μάχης γενομένης νικῶν ὁ Πομπήιος οὐκ ἐπεξήλθεν, ἀλλ’ ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, ‘τήμερον’ εἶπεν ‘ἦν ἡ νίκη παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀλλὰ τὸν εἰδὸτα νικᾶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν.’

9. As the transportation of his soldiers from Brundisium to Dyrrachium proceeded slowly, he, without being seen by anybody, embarked in a small boat, and attempted the passage through the open sea. But as the boat was being swamped by the waves, he disclosed his identity to the pilot, crying out, “Trust to Fortune, knowing it is Caesar you carry.” 10. At that time he was prevented from crossing, as the storm became violent, and his soldiers quickly gathered about him in a state of high emotion if it could be that he were waiting for other forces because he felt he could not rely on them.

⁸⁵⁸ *Caes.* 35.6–11 and *Pomp.* 62.1 contain the same story. The version of *Caes.* is much more elaborate and contains an additional saying of Caesar in 35.6.

⁸⁵⁹ See van der Wiel (2023a) 15–17 on the redivision of these apophthegms, based mainly on ἐπεὶ δέ at the outset of Xb, used as an opening for 44 apophthegms (μὲν οὖν continues the story, see Denniston (1954) 470–481), on a comparison with *Caes.* 38.3–7 and 39.8, and on the contrast πίστευε – ἀπιστῶν in IX–Xa.

A battle was fought and Pompey was victorious; he did not, however, follow up his success, but withdrew to his camp. Caesar said, “To-day the victory was with the enemy, but they have not the man who knows how to be victorious.”

The direction in which Caesar is going in IX–Xa is not immediately clear. As Pompey’s departure from Rome is described in the previous apophthegm (206C: Ἐπεὶ δὲ Πομπηίου φυγόντος ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης), Caesar at first sight seems to be crossing the sea from Brundisium to Dyrrachium in order to pursue his enemy. Only at the end does one realize that Caesar in fact is already on the other side of the sea and is trying to go back, out of fear of an attack when most of his soldiers have still to be transported. The reference to his faith in τύχη during the storm and the complaints of his soldiers provide the background against which Xb will be read:⁸⁶⁰ after IX and Xa, the reader might conclude that τύχη has abandoned Caesar, for he fails to cross the sea due to a storm, and that his lack of confidence in his troops says something about his military capacities, for his soldiers seem to think that their presence alone suffices. Xb, however, shows that both conclusions are wrong. Caesar’s fear and lack of confidence was not unfounded, for Pompey indeed wins the battle. This obviously illustrates Caesar’s military insight.⁸⁶¹ Furthermore, τύχη has not forsaken him, for he is not utterly destroyed by his enemies. In addition, Caesar’s saying concerning the incompetence of his enemies contrasts with his own strategic genius (206D).⁸⁶² This is in line with what follows: XI deals with the moments before Pharsalus, when Caesar points out that Pompey made an error of judgement. The reader knows what the outcome will be (206DE).⁸⁶³

There remain four apophthegms. *Caesar* XII and XIII deal with the final battles of the civil war: Caesar utters his famous words *veni vidi*

⁸⁶⁰ The story fills *Caes.* 38, where the account is much clearer. See also *De fort. Rom.* 319B–D (where the outcome of the event is left out: Caesar could not cross the sea), describing the role of fortune in Caesar’s life. Beck, M. (2003) 176–177 provides a detailed comparison of all accounts.

⁸⁶¹ The following element of the *Life* is left out (39.1): Ἐκ τούτου κατέπλευσε μὲν Ἀντώνιος, ἀπὸ Βρεντεσίου τὰς δυνάμεις ἄγων, θαρρήσας δὲ Καῖσαρ προὐκαλεῖτο Πομπήϊον (“After this, Antony put in from Brundisium with his forces, and Caesar was emboldened to challenge Pompey to battle”): Caesar’s forces were present, but this did not suffice.

⁸⁶² Fortune is one of the explanations for Pompey’s mistake in the account of *Caes.* 39.8; *Pomp.* 65.8 provides two other explanations for his restraint from routing the enemies: μὴ δυνηθέντος ἢ φοβηθέντος (“either because he could not, or because he feared to do so”).

⁸⁶³ The story is also told in *Caes.* 44.7–8 and *Pomp.* 69.7–8.

vici after the defeat of Pharnaces (206E),⁸⁶⁴ and complains after Cato's suicide, since he was not able to spare the man (205E; the apophthegm recalls his clemency from *Cicero*, 204E–205E).⁸⁶⁵ *Caesar* XIV and XV are a typical closure, prefiguring Caesar's death (206EF).⁸⁶⁶ The general structure of *Caesar*, then, is as follows (note the gradual shifting):

<i>Caesar</i> I: typical opening (time of Sulla)	
Love of honour at all cost	<i>Caesar</i> II: Caesar runs for <i>pontifex maximus</i>
	<i>Caesar</i> III: Caesar divorces only because of rumours
	<i>Caesar</i> IV: turning point – comparison with Alexander the Great
The civil war	<i>Caesar</i> V: Caesar wants to be the first Crossing the Alps
	<i>Caesar</i> VI and VII: <i>alea iacta est</i> Crossing the Rubicon
	<i>Caesar</i> VIII: Caesar takes money from the treasure Entering Rome
	<i>Caesar</i> IX: Caesar's <i>fortune</i> Brundisium – Dyrrhachium
	<i>Caesar</i> X: Caesar's <i>fortune</i> , <u>Pompey's incapacity</u> Dyrrhachium
	<i>Caesar</i> XI: <u>Pompey's incapacity</u> Pharsalus
	<i>Caesar</i> XII: <i>veni vidi vici</i> , <u>Caesar as a great general</u> The East
	<i>Caesar</i> XIII: Cato's <i>suicide</i> Africa
<i>Caesar</i> XIV and XV: Caesar's <i>death</i>	

⁸⁶⁴ The saying occurs in *Caes.* 50.3, where Plutarch adds that it sounds much better in Latin (*Caes.* 50.4); see also Pelling (2011) 393. On Plutarch and (his knowledge of) Latin, see Rose, H. J. (1924) 11–19; Jones, C. P. (1971) 81–87; Moya del Baño – Carrasco Reija (1991); De Rosalia (1991); Titchener (1992) 4130; Strobach (1997) 33–39; Zadorojnyi (2005) 496–497; Setaioli (2007); Stadter (2010b) and (2012a); Pelling (2011) 43–44; Setaioli (2019).

⁸⁶⁵ *Caes.* 54.1–2 and *Ca. Mi.* 72.2 also contain the saying. Caesar's mildness reminds one of *Cicero* XX (in line with *Ca. Mi.* 72.3: had Caesar spared Cato's life, this would have enhanced his good repute).

⁸⁶⁶ In XIV, Caesar says that Antony and Dolabella do not scare him, but that he does not trust Brutus and Cassius (206E). Three *Lives* contain the story: *Ant.* 11.6, *Brut.* 8.2, and *Caes.* 62.10 (the chapter contains other sayings about Caesar's murderers too). See Pelling (2011) 464–465 on all accounts. In XV, Caesar claims that he prefers an unexpected death (206F). The saying occurs in *Caes.* 63.7: this chapter contains different anecdotes on various signs prefiguring Caesar's death. On Caesar's downfall and the final chapters of the *Life*, see Pelling (1997b).

Conclusion

The reader is invited not only by the similarities in structure between *Pompeius* (203B–204E) and *Caesar* (205E–206F), but also by their comparison in *Cicero* (204E–205E) to contrast the image of the two Romans. The question is why Caesar won while Pompey lost. A first answer, already suggested by the earlier comparison of Pompey and Lucullus, concerns the fortune of both men. Τύχη stood with Caesar, and no longer with Pompey in his final years. The latter should therefore perhaps have taken a step back. Second, the qualities of both generals are compared, already in *Cicero*. Caesar prevails in this regard too, and Pompey makes the greatest mistakes that lead to his own destruction and that of others. In light of this, when both protagonists are compared with Alexander the Great as a key figure (the *tertium comparationis* is twice their love of honour, resulting in their wars), the connection Caesar–Alexander appears more justified than Pompey–Alexander. Precisely this was the reason for the pairing of Alexander–Caesar and of Agesilaus–Pompey in the *Parallel Lives*. At first, one therefore concludes that the image of Caesar seems much more positive.

Yet the theme of internal strife darkens the image. Plutarch ensures that this receives all the attention in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, not only by the content of these sections, but also by postponing the mention of a civil war between Sulla and Marius until *Pompeius*, and by introducing the later Roman sections (*Lucullus–Caesar*) with a reference to the *Diadochi*, recalling the themes of internal harmony and durability of an empire from the monarchical sections (172E–184F). Once more, a comparison with the *Parallel Lives* is interesting in this regard. First, the downfall of Agesilaus and Pompey is accompanied by a change of opponents: after fighting other people, both suddenly turn against their fellow Greeks or Romans, which leads to their downfall.⁸⁶⁷ This similarity between both men is an important theme in their *Lives* too, and one of the reasons why they are paired with each other. The nature of the wars fought by Alexander and Caesar, however, was different: the former defeated barbarians; the latter also fought Roman citizens. Although this contrast is not stressed in *Alexander–Caesar*, it is emphasized by the collection. The readers can therefore wonder whether Caesar is not to be blamed for this: the Macedonian Empire stayed together as long as Alex-

⁸⁶⁷ Nevin (2014) 66–67 writes about *Ages.–Pomp.*: “Both subjects were great military figures who might have defeated foreign foes, but both missed this goal because their desire for preeminence led them into conflict with their own peoples. The allusions to Agamemnon and Alexander show the failed potential of their careers. Negative comparison thus clarifies the theme that permeates the pair, namely the personal and civic damage that is caused by excessive desire for victory.” On these *Lives* as a pair, see also Heftner (1995) 19–22.

ander lived, but Caesar did his own country much harm. One concludes, then, that despite the fact that this Roman is the greatest general, and despite his unparalleled clemency, his image is definitely not univocally positive, for his excessive φιλοτιμία brought the Romans no good. This is of paramount importance for a reading of *Augustus*.

5.4 The Roman Principate: Augustus (206F–208A)

Plutarch closes his collection with the first Roman emperor.⁸⁶⁸ The section opens with a comprehensive apophthegm (206F–207A):⁸⁶⁹

Καῖσαρ ὁ πρῶτος ἐπικληθεὶς Σεβαστὸς ἔτι **μειράκιον ὧν Ἀντώνιον ἀπήτει <τάς> δισχιλίας πεντακοσίας μυριάδας, ἃς τοῦ πρώτου Καίσαρος ἀναιρεθέντος** ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Ἀντώνιος μετήνεγκεν, ἀποδοῦναι Ῥωμαίοις βουλόμενος τὸ καταλειφθὲν ὑπὸ Καίσαρος, ἐκάστῳ δραχμὰς ἑβδομήκοντα πέντε· τοῦ δ' Ἀντωνίου τὰ μὲν χρήματα κατέχοντος, ἐκείνον δὲ τῆς ἀπαιτήσεως ἀμελεῖν, εἰ σωφρονεῖ, κελεύοντος, ἐκήρυττε τὰ πατρῶα καὶ ἐπίπρασκε· καὶ τὴν δωρεὰν ἀποδοῦς **εὐνοίαν μὲν αὐτῷ, μῖσος δ' ἐκείνῳ παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν** περιεποίησεν.

Caesar, who was the first to bear the title of Augustus, was only a youth when he made formal demand upon Antony for the million pounds which had belonged to the first Caesar, who had been assassinated, and which Antony had transferred from Caesar's house to his own keeping; for Augustus wished to pay to the citizens of Rome the sum which had been left to them by Caesar, three pounds to each man. But when Antony held fast to the money, and also suggested to Augustus that, if he had any sense, he had better forget about his demand, Augustus announced an auction of his ancestral property and sold it; and by paying the bequest he fostered popularity for himself and hatred for Antony on the part of the citizens.

⁸⁶⁸ On Augustus' first appearances in Greek literature, see Hose (2018). Geiger (2005) 233 argues: "at the time of writing of the Lives of the Emperors, in my view under Nerva, Plutarch saw Augustus as the first Princeps", but under Trajan's reign, Caesar would have been considered the first due to changing attitudes towards this man. According to Geiger (1975) 444–451, this would be relevant for the dating of the *Parallel Lives*; see also Geiger (2002); Pelling (2002) 253; and Geiger (2014) 292. See however Barnes (2009) 287n4; and Pelling (2009) 253–254, questioning Geiger's view.

⁸⁶⁹ The story occurs in *Ant.* 16.1–6; *Brut.* 22.1–3; *Cic.* 43.8 (cf. Moles (1988) 194; and Lintott (2013) 201–202).

This opening story is well chosen (cf. the words in bold): it relates to Augustus' younger years;⁸⁷⁰ it refers back to Caesar's death, to which the two final apophthegms of *Caesar* (206EF) allude too (the first of these mentions Antony as well); the enmity between Augustus and Antony connects it with the next two apophthegms (207AB); and, finally, Augustus' generosity, which aims at gaining popularity among the people, recalls Alexander's largesse (esp. *Alexander* IV–VII, 179E–180A; and *Alexander* XXX, 181DE) and Philip's advice for his son that he should win the love of the masses especially in his younger years (*Philippus* XVI–XVII, 178BC): this is precisely what Augustus does, and this will form a solid basis for his later successes described in the remainder of the section.

In contrast to the preceding sections focusing on civil wars, Plutarch does not want to focus too much on the war between Augustus and Antony: only *Augustus* II and III deal with this topic. In II, the Thracian king Rhoemetalces supports Augustus after betraying Antony (207A);⁸⁷¹ in III, Antony has already been defeated when Augustus takes Alexandria (207A). While the people of this city fear harsh treatment, the emperor acts mildly (207B),⁸⁷²

πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸν κτίστην
 Ἀλέξανδρον, τρίτον δὲ δι' Ἄρειον τὸν φίλον.

first because of its [Alexandria's] greatness and beauty, secondly because of its founder, Alexander, and thirdly because of Areius his own friend.

Alexander the Great is mentioned here for the first time in the section on Augustus. He will return in VIII, where the emperor is explicitly compared with him (207CD), but Plutarch first inserts other stories instigated by the apophthegm quoted. First, the mention of Alexandria leads to the inclusion of IV, about the procurator of Egypt (Ἐρῶς ὁ τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ διοικῶν) who is punished in a horrible way by Augustus because he ate a victorious quail (207B).⁸⁷³ This contrasts sharply with Augustus' mildness in III and problematizes the image a first time.

⁸⁷⁰ Note ἔτι μειράκιον ὄν at the outset of *Caesar* (205EF) as well.

⁸⁷¹ Also told in *Rom.* 17.3 (on the betrayal of Tarpeia), combined with a similar saying of Antigonus.

⁸⁷² Plutarch tells this apophthegm in *Ant.* 80.2 (in a different order: Alexander is mentioned first) and in *Praec. ger. reip.* 814D (the elements occur in the same order as in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*). See Stadter (2008) 62–63 for a more detailed discussion of these accounts.

⁸⁷³ According to Brenk (2002) 79 (= (2007) 167), “Egyptian material in the *Lives* is mostly limited to *Agessilaos*, *Alexander-Caesar*, and *Antony*.” If the *Life of Augustus* had survived, it might have been part of this list.

In addition, the mention of Areius in III, a friend of Augustus, provides a link with V, in which this man plays a role too: he becomes procurator of Sicily (207B).⁸⁷⁴ This apophthegm, in turn, is connected with VI by the theme of friendship: on every birthday, Augustus receives a φιάλη from Maecenas, his confidant (207C: συμβιωτής).⁸⁷⁵ This brings the reader to VII. In this story, Athenodorus, a philosopher and advisor of Augustus, is of great age and therefore wants to leave. The emperor allows him to do so. When the old man is about to go home, he says (207C):

‘ὅταν ὀργισθῆς, Καῖσαρ, μηδὲν εἴπῃς μηδὲ ποιήσῃς πρότερον ἢ τὰ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα γράμματα διελθεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτόν[.]’

“Whenever you get angry, Caesar, do not say or do anything before repeating to yourself the twenty-four letters of the alphabet[.]”

Because of this saying, Augustus realizes that he is still in need of the philosopher’s help and therefore asks him to stay. When one recalls Augustus’ punishment of Eros in IV (207B), this seems to be a wise decision. At the same time, a relationship between ruler and philosopher once more calls Alexander to mind, who was asked by Philip to listen to Aristotle’s advice in order to avoid mistakes (*Philippus* XXII and XXIII, 178EF). This reminiscence leads to the core apophthegm, *Augustus* VIII (207CD, preceded and followed by seven apophthegms):

Ἀκούσας δὲ ὅτι Ἀλέξανδρος δύο καὶ τριάκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη κατεστραμμένος τὰ πλείστα διηπόρει τί ποιήσει τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, ἐθαύμαζεν, εἰ μὴ μείζον ποιήσει τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, ἐθαύμαζεν, εἰ μὴ μείζον Ἀλέξανδρος ἔργον ἠγείτο τοῦ κτήσασθαι μεγάλην ἡγεμονίαν τὸ διατάξαι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν.

He learned that Alexander, having completed nearly all his conquests by the time he was thirty-two years old, was at an utter loss to know what he should do during the rest of his life, whereat Augustus expressed his surprise that Alexander did not regard it as a greater task to set in order the empire which he had won than to win it.

In line with VII (207C), VIII thus recalls the Macedonian sections too. The story refers to the great flaw of Alexander, which provided the main point of criticism in his section: he was mainly concerned with conquering and waging wars against barbarians. Because of his singular focus,

⁸⁷⁴ Note *Augustus* IV: διοικῶν – V: διοικητήν.

⁸⁷⁵ See LSJ, s.v. “συμβιωτής”, as second meaning: “esp. of the *confidants* of the Roman Emperors, etc., Plu.2.207c, Jul. *Caes.*326b; ‘σ. τοῦ βασιλέως Βαβυλωνός’ LXX *Bel* 2.”

the Macedonian Empire disintegrated after his death (cf. esp. *Alexander* XXXIV, 181F; and the following sections on the *Diadochi*, 181F–184F).

These two themes of, on the one hand, mildness and restraint of anger, and, on the other hand, the longevity of a great empire are continued in Augustus' final apophthegms (207D–208A): three stories follow, in which the emperor becomes furious and either restrains himself or repents after an outburst of anger; and two related to the durability of the Roman Empire. In *Augustus* IX, the emperor attacks a man who would have been involved in the adultery committed by his daughter, Iulia (207D: Ἰουλίᾳ τῇ θυγατρὶ). Augustus immediately repents because he lost his self-restraint out of anger (207D: ὑπ' ὀργῆς). In this way, the apophthegm fits within the theme of VII (207C); furthermore, it is connected with X by the reference to Iulia (207DE). In this story, Augustus sends his daughter's son (τὸν θυγατρίδου), Gaius, to Armenia, while asking (207E)

παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὖνοιαν αὐτῷ τὴν Πομπηίου, τόλμαν δὲ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου, τύχην δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παρακολουθῆσαι.

the gods that the popularity of Pompey, the daring of Alexander, and his own good luck might attend the young man.

Some historical facts, not mentioned, were undoubtedly known by the ancient reader: Gaius was severely injured during this campaign and died soon after. Augustus then had to find another heir to the throne. There is, therefore, an implicit connection with *Augustus* XI (207E):

Ῥωμαίοις δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔλεγεν ἀπολείπειν διάδοχον, ὃς οὐδέποτε περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος δις ἐβουλεύσατο, Τιβέριον λέγων.

He said that he would leave to the Romans as his successor on the throne a man who never had deliberated twice about the same thing, meaning Tiberius.

The theme of the sustainability of the Roman Empire is not only present through the historical background of *Augustus* X (207DE) and its link with this apophthegm (207E), for the reference back to Alexander in the context of Gaius' campaign to the East also connects X with VIII (207CD, on the durability of the Macedonian Empire).⁸⁷⁶ The reader con-

⁸⁷⁶ The account of *Augustus* X in *De fort. Rom.* 319DE (see Zadorojnyi (2018) 226 on this and similar passages) contains some differences: (1) Plutarch does not mention where Gaius' campaign took place and (2) the saying does not mention Alexander, but refers to Scipio, who is in turn absent from *Augustus* X. Scipio is not mentioned in *Reg. et imp. ap-*

cludes that Augustus, after the eastern campaign of Gaius, was concerned with his succession and, therefore, with the longevity of his dynasty. This contrasts with Alexander in a positive way, although Augustus' concern probably came too late: it was well known that the emperor was at first in doubt whether he had to appoint Tiberius as his successor or not,⁸⁷⁷ and "never deliberating twice about the same thing" can hardly be seen as a good characteristic – definitely not in comparison with Augustus, who repented after giving in to his excessive anger in IX.⁸⁷⁸

Augustus XII relates to Augustus' later years. This announces that the remainder of the section belongs to this period of his life (207E):

Θορυβοῦντας δὲ τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι νέους καταστεῖλαι βουλόμενος, ὡς οὐ προσεῖχον ἀλλ' ἔθορύβουν, ἄκούσατε' εἶπε 'νέοι γέροντος, οὐ νέου γέροντες ἤκουον.'

When he was trying to quiet the young men in high station who were in an uproar, and they paid no heed, but continued with their uproar, he said, "Do you young men listen to an old man, to whom old men listened when he was young."

Augustus tries to calm down agitated young men. He himself was volatile once too. In this way, XII marks a break between XI (207E) and XIII and XIV (207EF), repeating Augustus' restraint of anger (also recalling Philip).⁸⁷⁹ in XIII, the emperor does not treat the Athenians harshly despite his anger (207EF); in XIV, he gets angry because of the frank speech of the only remaining descendant of Brasidas, but treats him mildly (207F).⁸⁸⁰ A somewhat more moderate, elder Augustus therefore

ophth. because of the connection Augustus–Alexander (Pompey the Great fits here too), while the broader passage of *De fort. Rom.* 318D–320A only contains Roman examples. For the same reason, the reference to Armenia is necessary in the collection, while its absence is not a problem in *De fort. Rom.* (where the connection Augustus–Alexander is irrelevant). Beck, M. (2003) 177–178 also compares the two accounts, concluding (178): "It would not be too far fetched to conclude that Plutarch inserted Alexander in place of Scipio on the eve of Trajan's Parthian expedition since the *aemulatio Alexandri* motif would loom large for any leader venturing on a campaign of conquest in that part of the globe."

⁸⁷⁷ See in this context also *De gar.* 508AB. Suetonius, *Tiberius* 21 describes Augustus' doubts, but concludes that in the end the emperor was convinced that he made the right decision.

⁸⁷⁸ I am grateful to Professor Christopher Pelling for this suggestion.

⁸⁷⁹ XIII: ὀργιζόμενος – XIV: ὀργισθεῖς.

⁸⁸⁰ Thucydides' book referred to in the apophthegm is book VII of the ancient division (in thirteen books), describing a campaign of Brasidas (now the fourth book); see Babbitt (1931) 235; Parke (1955) 69.

appears from XII on. In this respect, the account of this story in *An seni respublica gerenda sit* is worth quoting (784D):⁸⁸¹

Καίσαρος δὲ τοῦ καταλύσαντος Ἀντώνιον οὔτι μικρῶ **βασιλικώτερα καὶ δημοφελέστερα** γενέσθαι **πολιτεύματα** πρὸς τῇ τελευτῇ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς νέους ἔθεσι καὶ νόμοις αὐστηρῶς σωφρονίζων, ὡς ἐθορύβησαν, ‘ἀκούσατ’ εἶπε ‘νέοι γέροντος οὗ νέου γέροντες ἤκουον.’

In the case of the Caesar who defeated Antony, all agree that his political acts towards the end of his life became much more kingly and more useful to the people. And he himself, when the young men made a disturbance as he was rebuking them severely for their manners and customs, said, “Listen, young men, to an old man to whom old men listened when he was young.”

The use of *βασιλικώτερα* is striking. The precise meaning of the word does not become clear from this passage, not even through its combination with *δημοφελέστερα*, used in Plutarchan fashion as a further specification:⁸⁸² one does not hear what “a more kingly government” or “a policy which is more useful to the subjects” consists of. This is why the inclusion of *Augustus XII* in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* is telling: it relates to the ruler’s mildness (an important theme in *Augustus* in general, esp. in *Augustus XIII*, which immediately follows). It is, therefore, not unlikely that the passage of *An seni respublica gerenda sit* should be read in light of this: Augustus’ rule became milder as the emperor grew older. Such interpretation is in line with the development throughout *Augustus*, where his restraint of anger is a main theme and the same apophthegm as the one of the treatise marks a turning point.⁸⁸³

Augustus XV closes not only the section, but also the entire collection. It one last time comes back to the longevity of the Roman Empire (208A):

⁸⁸¹ Jones, C. P. (1971) 79 comments on this passage: “The notion that Augustus’ rule changed with time, growing ‘more kingly and public spirited’, was a commonplace. It had grown naturally out of an implied claim of Augustan propaganda, that the emperor, after the necessary measures to defeat the hordes of the East, had transferred power from himself to the senate and turned a new leaf in his own history and the state’s.”

⁸⁸² Cf. Teodorsson (2000). See also *supra*, p. 34.

⁸⁸³ As Jones, C. P. (1971) 79 and Ash (1997) 191 point out, *Augustus* could shed light on the lost *Life of Augustus*. Restraint of anger, then, might have been a core topic in the work. Geiger (2005) 234–235 suggests that Augustus’ building projects might have been discussed in the *Life* (cf. *Per.*). Yet, as Boatwright (2002) 269 observes, Plutarch also omits the theme of building policy from *Alex.*

Πείσωνος δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐκ θεμελίων ἄχρι τῆς στέγης ἐπιμελῶς οἰκοδομοῦντος, ‘εὐθυμον’ ἔφη ‘με ποιεῖς οὕτως οἰκοδομῶν, ὡς αἰδίου τῆς Ῥώμης ἔσομένης.’

When Piso built his house with great care from the foundation to the roof-tree, Augustus said, “You make heart glad by building thus, as if Rome is to be eternal.”

This reference to Rome’s hopefully eternal durability is the perfect closure of the work, as it is the culmination of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as an abbreviated world history. It is probably not by chance that the reader meets all the people to whom Plutarch devoted a section in his collection throughout *Augustus*: there is a Thracian king in II (207A); one travels to Egypt in III and IV (207AB); one goes to Sicily in V (207B); the Macedonian Alexander the Great is mentioned in III (207AB), VIII (207CD), and X (207DE), in which Gaius is dispatched to Armenia; the Athenians and the Spartan Brasidas are referred to in respectively XIII and XIV (207EF). These references not only recall, at the level of the text as a whole, all of its main sections, but also, at the level of contemporary reality, almost all the people that were in Trajan’s day part of the Roman Empire (cf. Part I, chapter 2).

An overview of the section’s structure is now convenient (note the gradual shifting). *Augustus* III (207AB) introduces IV–VIII (207B–D); VII and VIII (207CD) introduce IX–XV (207D–208A):

Augustus I: Augustus is beloved by the people, Antony is hated

Augustus II: Augustus and the Thracian king against Antony

Augustus III: (Antony is defeated)

Alexandria (Egypt) – friendship with Areius – Alexander the Great

Augustus IV: <u>Egyptian Procurator</u> (διοικῶν)	Augustus V: <u>Friendship</u> with <u>Areius</u> , who becomes the Sicilian <u>procurator</u> (διοικητήν)	Augustus VI: <u>Friendship</u> with <u>Maccenas</u>	Augustus VII: <u>Friendship</u> with Athenodorus, which reminds one of <u>Alexander</u> and Aristotle <u>Restraint of anger</u> (ὀργισθῆς)	Augustus VIII: <u>Alexander the Great</u> <u>Durability of an empire</u>
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Augustus IX: Augustus attacks a young man out of anger (ὄπ’ ὀργῆς) and repents – adultery committed by his daughter (τῆ θυγατρὶ) Iulia

Augustus X: Gaius Caesar, son of Augustus’ daughter (τὸν θυγατρῖδοῦν) and (although not explicitly stated) his successor, is sent to Armenia – reference to Alexander

Augustus XI: Tiberius as successor (cf. the durability of the empire)

Augustus XII: From now on, Augustus' later years

Augustus XIII: Augustus is angry with the Athenians, but does not punish them

Augustus XIV: Augustus is angry, but remains mild. Similar to Philip

Augustus XV: durability of the empire

One concludes that *Augustus* establishes a ring composition by recalling the monarchical sections. The image of the first emperor is similar to that of many Macedonian kings, and especially to Philip and Alexander the Great, as he needs philosophical guidance to help him to restrain his anger – the idea that rulers should practice philosophy is a key point of Plutarch's thinking and is not incidentally stressed once more at the end of the work. Augustus, then, is not perfect, but tries his best and aims to suppress his sometimes rather explosive character in order to be a lenient ruler. In this way, he clearly has his subjects' best interests at heart. Yet precisely this, in fact, also appears from a difference with Alexander the Great: he wants to establish stability and prosperity in the Roman Empire, and conquering is no longer a main goal. This reference to the *Pax Romana* alludes to the possible perpetuity of the Roman Empire.

Concluding Remarks

The dedicatory letter to Trajan in various respects reminds one of proems to pairs of the *Parallel Lives*, which coincides with the fact that *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* are introduced as an abridged version of the latter and should familiarize Trajan with the greatest heroes of the past. A critical attitude expected from the reader reveals a clash within the programmatic letter, highlighting that participatory readership is essential for getting acquainted with characters in literature. As such, the letter has a metatextual function: it makes readers reflect upon the way they should deal with apophthegms, and this should have repercussions for how the following collection will be approached. In short, the letter trains its readership.

In line with these expectations of the readers, the analysis of the apophthegm collection has shown that the work is, generally speaking, carefully structured at all levels – which are also announced by the dedicatory letter – in a way that should guide the readers towards a specific interpretation and judgement:

[1] Within sections on famous individuals (cf. 172C: τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων), apophthegms (172C: ἀπομνημονευμάτων) usually give at least the impression of being a chronological summary of the hero's life (or *Life*). In most cases they are connected with each other through the principle of gradual shifting, but sometimes Plutarch deviates from this practice in order to achieve a certain literary effect. Similarly, not all apophthegms are equally relevant for characterization: some in the first place seem to perform a structuring function (for example separating blocks of apophthegms), but in this way they are still an important device to guide the reader.

Sections follow each other chronologically. Often, the reader is invited to compare sections on contemporaries with each other, and this comparison should have strong repercussions for the assessment of the historical figures. When Plutarch inserts chronological deviations, he again seems to have a certain (structuring) effect in mind that should influence the interpretation (e.g. in order to create units at higher levels of the text, such as *Gaius Popillius*, 202E–203A; or to avoid a direct clash between certain protagonists, such as *Myronides* between *Themistocles* and *Aristeides*, 184F–186C).

[2] Groups of people (cf. 172C: παρά τε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ παρ' Ἑλλησιν) and types of rulership (cf. 172C: ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων) divide the text into three parts of almost equal length: a first part on monarchs (barbarians, Sicilians, and Macedoni-

ans, 172E–184F), a second one on the Greeks of the mainland (Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans, 184F–194E), and a third one on the Romans (194E–208A). Plutarch often seems inclined to open (and sometimes to conclude, cf. *Dion*, 176F–177A) sections concerning a people on a positive note. The implications of this are discussed in Part III.

Frequently the image of a people influences the portrait of the individuals: the general evolution throughout the Sicilian sections tells much about the paranoid behaviour described in *Dionysius Maior* (175C–176C); the overall picture of ‘the Spartan’ has an impact on the way *Lysander* (190D–F) and other sections should be read.

[3] In general, there are two main chronologies in the work: one consisting of the monarchical sections (172E–184F), and a second one including the Greeks of the mainland and the Romans (184F–208A). The break is located between *Antiochus Septimus* (184D–F) and *Themistocles* (184F–185F): before the former, the focus lies on the rulers’ mildness or harshness towards their subjects; from the latter on, the collection explores topics such as strife in society amongst equals, and closely connected with this the difficulties statesmen (orators or generals) might face in their attempt to persuade the masses, flattered by their opponents. Yet a certain degree of consistency can be noted across both parts, as the relationship between rulers and peoples is always central at this level of the text.

When the readers follow Plutarch’s guidance, often expressed through verbatim and thematic connections, they reach an assessment of the hero’s character. However, with the possible exception of some opening sections such as *Cyrus* (172EF), *Archelaus* (177AB), *Lycurgus–Theopompus* (189D–190A), and *Manius Curius–Gaius Fabricius* (194E–195B), this assessment is only rarely straightforward. Barbarian kings do not seem to act consistently, Macedonian rulers seem far better persons than the despots and tyrants until Plutarch stresses their flaws, Greek democracy is dominated by the difficult question of when it is appropriate to compromise one’s principles, and it is not always clear to the Athenian, Spartan, Theban, or Roman generals and orators (and, as a consequence, to the audience of readers) which tactics are to be applied in a war. In almost every character, then, there are many features to admire; at the same time, there is almost always at least something to disapprove of.

The idea that only positive *exempla* figure in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* should therefore be rejected⁸⁸⁴ (although there does indeed seem to be a tendency to leave out the most horrible episodes of ancient history).⁸⁸⁵ Virtues such as justice, mildness, bravery, sagacity, and

⁸⁸⁴ Stadter (2008) 55 and (2014a) 19 regards *Reg. et imp. apophth.* as a collection of positive *exempla* in particular.

⁸⁸⁵ Cf. also *supra*, note 144 on Pelling (2002) 83.

temperance are not the only protagonists in the collection, for the work also shows respect for human nature with all its shortcomings: vices such as jealousy, arrogance, suspicion, anger, and lack of self-restraint often receive ample attention as well. The collection, then, is much closer to the complexities of the *Parallel Lives* than is generally assumed.

The dedicatory letter raises some questions in this respect. The analysis has shown that in this ‘programmatically proem’ Plutarch not only states that the reader can quickly gain insight into characters of the past thanks to the apophthegm collection, but he also suggests that a further step of the reader’s moral improvement should eventually take place. This means that in essence *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* are a piece of exemplary literature. A case such as Lysander (190D–F), however, makes one wonder whether he truly is a role model, and if he is an *exemplum*, in what sense he *can* be one; when the unprincipled Themistocles saves his homeland (184F–185F), it is unclear to what extent he is to be imitated; and even a most philosophical character such as Phocion (187E–189B) does not simply call for μίμησις, for despite (or perhaps precisely because of) his virtues he brought death not only to himself but also to his friends. Part III will address such issues and examines how *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* function as exemplary literature.

PART III

A GUIDE FOR THE EMPEROR

Introduction

Part III, building on the literary analysis of Part II, discusses *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as exemplary literature, examining how the work serves as a guide for the Roman emperor (since he is presented as the target reader), in the context of Plutarch's oeuvre. When referring to 'Trajan', however, I do not only mean the emperor as a historical figure, but also – and in the first place – Trajan as the reader implied in and constructed by the text: the person whom the audience will inevitably have in mind when reading the collection, imagining how Plutarch expected a ruler to respond to the text, and what this says about his ideas about the perfect monarch and good rulership. Of course, a reader might have approached the work in other ways as well, but the text presents itself as a 'mirror of princes', and this is why it should be read as such in the first place.⁸⁸⁶

As announced by the dedicatory letter (172B–E), the collection applies role models at three levels: that of the individual sections; of groups of sections on a people and groups of peoples (cultural identity and types of rulership); and of the work as a whole (as a world history). A chapter will be dedicated to each level:

[1] Chapter 1 deals with the 89 sections on the individual characters. The first part addresses the functions of moralism in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and its connection with characterization in the sections on historical figures, in light of Plutarch's practice in the *Parallel Lives* (1.1).⁸⁸⁷ Closely connected with this, the next subchapters discuss Plutarch's views on the function of different types of individual role models (negative, virtuous, and basically positive *exempla*) as described in the *Parallel Lives* (mainly in the prologues) and in *De profectibus in virtute* (84B–85C), and examines the implications for the apophthegm collection (1.2–4). This will clarify how this level of the text should function as a guide for the emperor (1.5).

[2] Chapter 2 focuses on the level of the peoples and their rulers, which implies a much more generic and because of this perhaps more straightforward application of role models: the question is how groups of protagonists can teach specific lessons, and how these lessons differ from instructions that result from reading about individuals. The chapter consists of four parts: 2.1 deals with the three types of barbarians in

⁸⁸⁶ Cf. Part I, chapter 3.

⁸⁸⁷ As a consequence, this subchapter is indebted to Duff (1999) and Pelling (2002) 237–251.

the collection, the Persians, the Egyptians, and the Thracians–Scythians (172E–174F); 2.2 examines the Sicilian tyrants (175A–177A); 2.3 addresses the Macedonian monarchy (177A–184F); and 2.4 takes a look at other types of government, in the first place ‘democracy’ (184F–206F). Because these groups of sections explore the essence of good rulership, parallels with *Ad principem ineruditum* are of central importance in this chapter.

[3] Chapter 3 discusses *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a world history. Perhaps it is not immediately clear how this level of the text can be regarded as an actual ‘model’. Yet human history provides the context within which Trajan (or ‘Trajan’) will act: he will continue the story of mankind, inspired by his predecessors and instigated by the desire to become a role model himself in the future. The apophthegm collection as a whole, then, raises awareness about one’s position in the chain of *exempla* it presents, encouraging the reader to approach the work in a way that ensures a positive effect on the further development of history. Thus, the past (in its entirety) can truly serve as a mirror for moral behaviour.

The chapter first discusses Dillon’s article on Plutarch’s idea of the ‘end of history’ (3.1).⁸⁸⁸ A next part addresses the implications of world history as represented in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* (3.2). I will point out that the Chaeronean advises the emperor to deal with *exempla* correctly – i.e. in a way that neglects his love of personal honour acquired in war – in order to serve his subjects to the best of his abilities, establishing a peaceful and prosperous future. In the context of Trajan’s military campaigns, then, the highest level of the text might serve as a warning for the emperor (3.3).

In the concluding remarks, I will briefly point out how these three levels interact with and influence each other.

⁸⁸⁸ Dillon (1997).

I

The Individual Characters

1.1 Moralism and Characterization

Duff argues that ethics and morals are inseparable from characterization in ancient Greek literature in general and in Plutarch's biographies in particular.⁸⁸⁹ That this not only holds true for the *Parallel Lives*, but also for how the author thought about the function of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and the 'genre' of collections of sayings and anecdotes in general, has been discussed in Part I, chapter 3: in the Chaeronean's point of view, character description is combined with philosophy (or at least with a moral assessment and guidance) in such texts.⁸⁹⁰ In light of these insights, the following pages further explore this connection between moralism and characterization in the apophthegm collection, which will raise interesting questions concerning the way in which the individual characters of the work should function as role models, thus providing the basis of the next subchapters on Plutarch's exemplary thinking and its connections with this specific work.

1.1.1 Moralism

a) Descriptive or protreptic?

Pelling distinguishes two types of moralism in the *Parallel Lives*, which are not mutually exclusive:⁸⁹¹ a protreptic type, which means that one tries to affect the audience's behaviour; and a descriptive one, defined as "being more concerned to point truths about human behaviour and shared human experience".⁸⁹² Pelling's view inspired various other scholars studying Plutarch and his distinction has proven very valuable in their

⁸⁸⁹ Duff (1999) 13 (in a chapter on the prologues to the *Lives*): "In Greek thought, character had an ethical element, conceived in terms of right and wrong, virtue and vice, in terms of conformity to or divergence from moral norms, and this was revealed by deeds. Ancient conceptions of character were therefore less centred on the private, inner world of the individual; more with actions, and their evaluation."

⁸⁹⁰ See esp. Part I, chapter 3.1.2.

⁸⁹¹ Pelling (2002) 248 = (1995a) 360–361 [in Italian] and (1995b) 220.

⁸⁹² Defined in Pelling (2002) 239 = (1995a) 346 [in Italian] and (1995b) 208; this distinction is followed by Duff (1999) 68–69.

research,⁸⁹³ for it takes into account that there are different *Lives* from which it is most difficult to derive clear-cut moral lessons applicable in everyday life.⁸⁹⁴ In line with this, this subchapter applies these categories to *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, since they might shed light on the collection as well, as one expects because of its close connection with (the Plutarchan) biographies.

A first question concerns the kind of moralism dominating the apophthegm collection as a whole:

[1] The dedicatory letter (172B–E) provides a first insight into the matter. As discussed, Plutarch only claims that the collection will enable Trajan to *get acquainted with* the characters of figures of the past. This suggests that moralism in the work will be entirely descriptive. Yet the distinction between ἀναθεώρησις and ἀποθεώρησις,⁸⁹⁵ the mirror metaphor, and the dynamics between the apophthegms dominating the letter imply that, after observing human behaviour of previous times (the descriptive aspect), Trajan can and should also take a further step and attempt to improve his character. Thus, the letter points out that a proreptic effect is, in the end, still desired to follow moral reflection.

[2] At first sight, this can also be seen from the specific historical figures included in the collection. Most of them are men with whom Trajan can identify. This suggests that the proreptic function of the work is – in general – perhaps even more straightforward than that of the *Parallel Lives*. In the case of the collection one can readily see how figures such as Alexander the Great or Agesilaus, the most prominent rulers of their society, might serve as role models for the Roman emperor, and this is even more obvious in the case of Caesar and Augustus, Trajan’s Roman predecessors;⁸⁹⁶ in the biographical project, by contrast, this seems less evident, as it is often unclear to what extent the readers should draw moral lessons for their own ethical conduct from heroes who lived not only in a distant past, but also in an entirely different context.⁸⁹⁷

⁸⁹³ Cf. esp. Verdegem (2010) 25–27. See e.g. also Xenophontos (2012a) 628; Chrysanthou (2018) 1; Roskam (2021) 93.

⁸⁹⁴ See also Roskam (2021) 92–95 on the “purpose of the *Parallel Lives*”.

⁸⁹⁵ Cf. Roskam (2014).

⁸⁹⁶ Note also the overall focus on generalship in sections that deal not with monarchs, but with other state structures: a joint reading of the Athenian, Spartan, and Theban sections (184F–194E) pointed out that there should be limits to a general’s boldness; the earlier Roman sections (194E–202E) together highlighted, in line with this, the importance of military insight and experience. From many of these apophthegms, Trajan, himself the highest military power, can often derive specific lessons (cf. the way in which Jacobs (2018) reads the *Parallel Lives*).

⁸⁹⁷ Duff (1999) 66–67; Pelling (2002) 239–243 (= (1995a) 346–352 [in Italian]) and (1995b) 208–213; Zadorojnyi (2012) 181; and Jacobs (2018) 30–31 and esp. 420–422.

Yet every biography as a rule contains something useful for the reader's own life and situation. Often this will concern moral insights and instructions of a more general kind – and this is precisely what Plutarch would have thought.⁸⁹⁸ To put it differently: a social, geographical, or chronological distance between readers and their *exempla* does not prevent them from assessing these characters, and this assessment, one expects, should enable them to distinguish right from wrong, which should have repercussions for their own everyday behaviour.

This is important for a second question, dealing with a *lower level* of the collection. Some sections could be more relevant for Trajan than others and might, therefore, to some extent be more protreptic. This once more reminds one of Pelling, who concludes that moralism does not have the same purpose in all the *Lives*:⁸⁹⁹

some *Lives*, like *Caesar*, veer to the descriptive end of the spectrum, while others, like *Aristides* or *Brutus* or *Aemilius Paullus*, tend to the protreptic. But it is also now clearer that there is indeed a spectrum, that the distinction between protreptic and descriptive moralism is a blurred one, and the two forms go closely together.

In *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, the apophthegms of the early Spartans (189D–190A), for example, do not contain evident moral lessons. One cannot imagine that *Lycurgus* (189D–F) advises Trajan to promulgate similar laws, viz. to make the Roman people wear their hair long (cf. I, 189DE) or to use only simple tools to build their homes (cf. III, 189E). These sections, therefore, rather seem to describe a peculiarity in human behaviour of the past. *Augustus* (206F–208A) is entirely different. Just to give an example, when the first emperor attempts to ensure succession to the throne – even though he might have been forced to make the wrong decision – and tries to establish stability in the Empire in XI (207E), it is not difficult to see what Trajan should learn from this, especially after a difficult period in Roman history.⁹⁰⁰ Yet it would also be wrong to say that *Lycurgus* only serves a descriptive goal. Despite the witty oddities it includes, the section stresses the ruler's educating role, as pointed out by the analysis. This obviously entails an important

⁸⁹⁸ In *De prof. in virt.* 79C–80A, Plutarch expresses the idea that one can always derive something beneficial and useful from everything that has been said and done; in *De aud. poet.*, he claims that one can always deduce something useful from every text, as long as one knows how to engage with literary works properly.

⁸⁹⁹ Pelling (2002) 248 (= (1995a) 360 [in Italian] and (1995b) 220). See also Duff (2008c) 7 on this spectrum.

⁹⁰⁰ See also chapter 3.

lesson for any emperor. In line with what has been concluded about the relevance of some *Parallel Lives*, then, one should keep in mind that Trajan is able to draw moral lessons from every section, albeit sometimes of a more general nature, if he is willing to participate in the reading process the text attempts to elicit, which should bring him to a specific assessment.

One concludes that, in the same way as there is a spectrum between descriptive and protreptic moralism in the *Parallel Lives*, some sections in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* seem to be more descriptive than others, but only in the sense that one can less readily draw specific instructions from them. Yet the possibility of affecting Trajan's or any other reader's character and behaviour is never excluded and even always desired throughout the entire work, as this is expected to follow the first stage of moral reflection.

b) Explicit or implicit?

Duff provides another way of defining types of moralism in the *Parallel Lives*, which will further deepen our understanding of the collection as well and thus deserves a place in this chapter too. He speaks of explicit as opposed to implicit moralism when the narrator comments on specific events.⁹⁰¹ As the narrator's voice is usually absent from the narratives of the *Parallel Lives*, Duff argues that its moralism mostly is of the second type. As a consequence, it is not always clear how certain actions are to be assessed.⁹⁰² This resembles Plutarch's practice in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, but the collection is definitely a more extreme example of such implicit moralism: there is not a single trace of the narrator's opinions or judgements in what seems to be nothing more than a list of sayings and a few actions. Of course, this does not mean that the narrator does not guide his readers: as the analysis of the entire work points out, the selection of material and the way in which it is presented leads them to a specific interpretation and, therefore, judgement of the subject's morality. Yet this does not do away with the fact that the readers eventually have to do the job themselves: much depends on their willingness and capacity to follow the crumbs attempting to lead them through the text. Plutarch obviously expects his readers to be able to do that, as can also be seen from his practice in other works: these contain various

⁹⁰¹ Duff (1999) 53–54. Duff (2008c) 5–6 also briefly discusses implicit moralism in the *Lives*.

⁹⁰² Duff (1999) 54: “In the body of the *Lives* themselves – as opposed to the formal *synkriseis* – moralism is almost invariably of the second sort” (adding that there are many cases where the narrative does not seem to deal with character as such, but rather with historical facts) and 55: “most *Lives* provide very little explicit guidance as how to understand the moral position of their subjects or of the actions narrated.”

indications that he wants his audience to draw certain conclusions which he – or at least the narrator – does not formulate explicitly.⁹⁰³

One might think that this extreme implicitness in the apophthegm collection is only the consequence of the type of text and the tradition which the work belongs to. However, this is only partially true. Valerius Maximus sometimes introduces groups of stories with short comments and even reflections.⁹⁰⁴ Thus, the narrator is not entirely absent from his work. Plutarch could have done something similar: he could have written an introduction for a series of apophthegms at any level of the text, perhaps for each people, each dynasty, or even every single section, if he wanted to do so. *Coniugalia praecepta* illustrate this well: most pieces of advice are accompanied by comments of the narrator, who does not refrain from explaining how the stories, quotes, or other types of advice can help the newlyweds.⁹⁰⁵ In this way, this work provides an example of a similar text type by the same author in which a more *explicit* protreptic moralism prevails. One must conclude, then, that the implicitness in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* was a conscious choice of Plutarch. Two reasons come to mind:

[I] Implicit moralism is the consequence of the collection's target reader. This can be seen from the author's caution in the dedicatory letter: if he avoids commending moral progress to the emperor there, as is expected from a subject addressing a monarch, he can hardly do the opposite in the collection. In other words, the absence of explicit moralism goes hand in hand with the fact that he avoids giving the *impression* of protreptic moralism. Even explicit moralizing claims of a merely descriptive kind would break with that practice, for – as discussed above – protreptic conclusions can and should often be drawn from such information. This reminds one of *Demetrius Phalereus* (189D), placed almost exactly at the centre of the text and recalling the dedicatory letter: the Athenian realizes that it is not evident for a ruler's friends to give moral lessons or to rebuke him for certain actions or behaviour. This is why he recommends some books to Ptolemy.⁹⁰⁶ Plutarch does exactly the same: he does not give instructions as such, but lets the apophthegms speak for themselves. Yet precisely by focusing on his caution in the letter and by the remarkable

⁹⁰³ Konstan (2004) argues that in Plutarch's view the readers give the eventual meaning to the text, not the author, which calls Barthes' 'The Death of the Author' to mind. See also Duff (2011a) on the critical reader in Plutarch.

⁹⁰⁴ Often to indicate why he includes a specific theme. A chapter on omens for example opens with a motivation for why it belongs to the theme of religion (I.5.praef.). At the outset of his second book, Valerius Maximus also dwells upon his moral purpose: one can learn from examining institutions of old, so he writes (II.praef.).

⁹⁰⁵ See also Part I, chapter 1.2.1 on *Con. praec.* and *Reg. et imp. apophth.*

⁹⁰⁶ Probably Ptolemy I, see also *supra*, note 595.

location of the Demetrius apophthegm, the author also emphasizes that he knows what he is doing and that he consciously assumes the attitude expected from a citizen addressing the emperor. This highlights that his caution is not the result of his fear, but rather reflects a common practice: it is a traditional attitude with which Plutarch likes to play.

[2] This conventional caution, however, definitely is not Plutarch's most important motivation. The author simply does not like to provide clear-cut moral instructions: he often enjoys letting his readers search for an ethical or even metaphysical truth themselves,⁹⁰⁷ and, in line with a recent book by Roskam, one might even say that philosophical ζήτησις dominates the Chaeronean's oeuvre.⁹⁰⁸ In light of this, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* are a typically Plutarchan work, for its audience has to enter a complex and participatory readership in order to decide how the moral behaviour of the subjects is to be assessed.⁹⁰⁹ This recalls the *Parallel Lives* once more, and is also in line with Chrysanthou's reading of the biographical project.⁹¹⁰

This aspect will be further explored in the following overview of strategies of characterization in the collection.

1.1.2 Characterization

In the collection implicit moralism goes hand in hand with almost entirely implicit characterization. In the few cases where a personality is explicitly described, this – with a few exceptions⁹¹¹ – happens through

⁹⁰⁷ For example *De E*, reflecting on the nature of Apollo, is dominated by ζήτησις, see Bonazzi (2008); Thum (2013) *passim*. Obsieger (2013), however, claims that *De E* is not to be taken seriously, but see Roskam (2015) 319: “In my view, Obsieger is right in arguing that nobody, not even Ammonius, is meant to speak the last word about this topic, but he overstates his case by overemphasising the role of humour. In fact, Obsieger underestimates, in my view, the multifaceted dynamics of Plutarch's philosophical ζήτησις”; cf. van der Wiel (2021) 72n2 on this matter.

⁹⁰⁸ Roskam (2021) *passim*.

⁹⁰⁹ Roskam (2021) 110 argues that “the collections of sayings aim at zetetic moralism in its light version.”

⁹¹⁰ Chrysanthou (2018).

⁹¹¹ In *Cotys I* (174D), the Thracian king is described as follows: Φύσει δ' ὦν ὀξύς εἰς ὀργὴν καὶ πικρὸς τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων ἐν ταῖς διακονίαις κολαστής (“He was by nature very irascible and prone to punish severely any lapses in service”). This is a straightforward interpretation of the apophthegm which follows. Something similar occurs in *Epameinondas IV* (192D): Οὕτω δ' ἦν εὐτελής περὶ τὴν δίαίταν, ὥστε [...] (“He was so frugal in his manner of living that once [...]”), again followed by a story which can only be interpreted in this way. Such explicit authorial interpretations are rare in the collection.

another character talking about the subject in question (cf. the absence of the narrator's voice).⁹¹² Because the reliability of these speakers is often to be questioned, the reader is in such instances always invited to measure the truth of their remarks by sayings of the character discussed. In other cases (albeit rarely), a protagonist describes his own personality.⁹¹³ Again, the reader is expected to measure the validity of such comments by other apophthegms on the same historical figure.⁹¹⁴

This already illustrates that characterization is a process that primarily takes place in the reader's mind. Every single piece of information that can be related to a character will influence the way in which the audience perceives his or her personality: it can confirm the image that has been built up, it can add something new to this picture, but it can also contradict and deconstruct it. This happens at several levels of the text, which once more recalls Plutarch's practice in the *Parallel Lives*:

- [1] Characterization of a subject within his own section;
- [2] Characterization of a subject in sections other than his own;
- [3] Characterization through direct or indirect *synkrisis*. This partially falls within the two preceding levels.

All those levels, constituting the process of assessment and reassessment, can in turn be influenced by a text-external factor:

- [4] The reader's acquaintance with the subject. As the audience will have read about the *exempla* often before, they will already have a certain image of these men when reading the text. In other words, the characters in the apophthegm collection are (almost) never built entirely from the ground up.⁹¹⁵

a) Characterization within the section of the subject

In studying characterization in the *Parallel Lives*, Pelling speaks of "integrated characters". These are:⁹¹⁶

⁹¹² Examples of explicit characterization are listed *infra*, note 919.

⁹¹³ Clear examples are *Darius I* (172F) and *Cyrus Minor* (173EF), where these kings praise themselves.

⁹¹⁴ Not necessarily in the character's own section: *Cyrus Minor* (173EF) only contains one apophthegm, so Cyrus' self-characterization cannot be compared with other apophthegms in his own section, but his image can be contrasted with his brother (see 1.1.2.c on *synkrisis*).

⁹¹⁵ Exceptions might be some less well-known people, such as some barbarians, Hellenistic rulers, or obscure Spartans, although this often depends on the reader's education and knowledge too.

⁹¹⁶ Pelling (2002) 287 (cf. (1988a) 262).

not stereotypes nor monolithic characters, but those in which traits cluster readily together: a person's qualities are brought into some sort of relation with one another, and every trait goes closely with the next.

Again, this observation influenced other scholars, such as Candau Morón, who examines Lysander and Sulla as integrated characters.⁹¹⁷ Pelling's view is also relevant for *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. A central concept in this respect is gradual shifting, which is the overall structuring and ordering principle of a series of apophthegms within a section. If every single apophthegm represents a certain characteristic or perhaps a set of characteristics, a connection between apophthegms suggests a similar relationship between the various features they illustrate. This creates a 'blended' image similar to the "integrated characters" of Pelling's analysis.

A clear and not too extensive example of this is *Anteas* (174EF). The analysis has shown that *Anteas* I and II (174E) are connected by the presence of Philip, and II and III (174EF) by a reference to a horse. This goes hand in hand with the characterization of the Scythian king: the first apophthegm contains a general representation of the Scythians as true barbarians, dealing with the limited supplies they need. *Anteas* is one of them. This becomes clearer in *Anteas* II, where the king does not make a distinction between himself and the common people. He does not enjoy pomp and circumstance; he is a no-nonsense man. The closing apophthegm is in line with this, showing the king's disregard for music, and also his warlike personality. He still appears to be a simple man and a true barbarian. There is, therefore, a connection between all of these characteristics, and this is highlighted by verbal and thematic similarities.

Yet more is going on in this section, since the first apophthegm also represents the most general claim, further developed and deepened by the next ones. *Anteas* is no exception in this regard: in many other cases, gradual shifting also entails a transition from rather general to more specific aspects. This is often (but not necessarily) accompanied by a shift from a clear to a more problematic picture. This once more reminds one of Pelling:⁹¹⁸

One typical feature of Plutarch's technique is his progressive redefinition of character. He tends to begin by presenting traits or themes rather crudely and bluntly, only later complementing and refining and adding the subtleties, and a character tends to become more singular as his Life progresses.

⁹¹⁷ Candau Morón (2000). See also note 918 below on Verdegem (2010).

⁹¹⁸ Pelling (2002) 293 (cf. (1988a) 269). See Verdegem (2010) 163–164 on *Alc.* 2–9 as an example of such "progressive redefinition of character".

It does not, therefore, come as a surprise that in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* most cases of explicit characterization occur at the outset of a section.⁹¹⁹ The same goes for the description of physical features connected with a general assessment of the personage,⁹²⁰ and the frequent use of the imperfect tense in such opening apophthegms, which often concern the hero's entire life.⁹²¹ The few stories on childhood function in a similar way, as they often reflect a feature that will dominate the section or will be further explored, such as Alexander's and Themistocles' φιλοτιμία (*Alexander* I and II, 179D; and *Themistocles* I, 184F–185A) and Alcibiades' lack of morality (I, 186D).⁹²² Pelling writes concerning character development in Plutarch:⁹²³

With idiosyncratic characters, development is typically *problematic*. For Plutarch it is much simpler. A few childhood traits, broadly

⁹¹⁹ The clearest examples are *Darius* I (172F) and *Philippus* I (177C). In *Scipio Maior* III (200A), one of the section's opening stories, Cato gives an explicit description of the young Roman's character. Of a similar nature, although less explicit character descriptions, are *Cyrus* I (172E) and *Pompeius* Ia (203B): both men are described as beloved from the perspective of their people. *Phocion* IX (188C, Phocion is praised by Alexander) and *Pompeius* V (203EF, Sulla about Pompey) illustrate that such explicit descriptions can also occur later in a section; and in other cases, a character is even described in the section of another subject, such as *Cyrus Minor* (173EF), both describing its own subject and that of the following section, *Artaxerxes Mnemon* (173F–174A). The inscription of *Semiramis* (173AB), finally, is an interesting case: it addresses anyone who would break into the tomb, which turns it into an explicit description of Darius once he enters the place.

⁹²⁰ The examples are *Cyrus* I (172E) and *Artaxerxes Longimanus* I (173D).

⁹²¹ Cf. Part I, chapter 2.2 on the general structure of sections of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* Such opening apophthegms often announce the theme of the entire section (e.g. the general remark in *Epameinondas* I [192C], announcing that generalship will be the main theme). This sometimes also goes for a first apophthegm that does not contain an imperfect tense. Examples are *Gelon* I (175A), where the specific event of the Carthaginian defeat announces the theme of barbarism; *Dionysius Maior* I (175C), in which the tyrant announces that he will be a monarch (the entire section that follows explores what his rule looks like); *Pyrrhus* I (184C), illustrating his warlike character that will dominate the section; *Iphicrates* I (186F–187A), concerning the importance of a general's reputation.

⁹²² Other stories on a hero's younger years are *Iphicrates* I (186F–187A), about his first great deed; *Pytheas* (187E; the section, however, only contains one apophthegm); *Scipio Minor* III (200A), describing his early military exploits; *Caesar* I (205E–206A), about Caesar and the pirates; and *Augustus* I (206F–207A), concerning Caesar's inheritance. Plutarch always stresses that these stories indeed deal with the hero's earlier years, usually with ἔτι μαιράκιον ὄν, or other phrases: ἔτι παῖς ὄν (*Alexander* I and *Alcibiades* I), ἔτι δὲ νέος ὄν (*Scipio Maior* III), or πρῶτον (*Iphicrates* I).

⁹²³ Pelling (2002) 288 (= (1988a) 263).

sketched, can suffice, not because the adult personality is going to show only those traits, but because any new adult traits will naturally complement the ones we know from childhood.

Thus, this also applies to childhood stories and other opening apophthegms in the collection: all such instances give a clear and rather unproblematic image, and sayings that immediately follow often seem to confirm that picture, further clarifying and defining aspects of it. The most straightforward example of this is *Philippus*: the truth of the first apophthegm (177C), containing Theophrastus' explicit character description, is supported by the next eleven stories, which at the same time illustrate various elements.⁹²⁴ Yet, as also appears from this section,⁹²⁵ such clarity does not always remain intact until the end, especially in longer sections, not in spite of, but often precisely by means of Plutarch's application of gradual shifting.⁹²⁶

[I] The further exploration of certain characteristics by connecting various stories often leads to more complexity. The block *Dionysius Maior* VII–X (175F–176B) contains two apophthegms dealing with the tyrant's punishments. VII (175F) seems to highlight his cleverness, as its place before VIII (175F–176A) implies, but the position of X (176AB) after IX (176A) suggests that he lives in a perpetual state of suspicion and

⁹²⁴ Similar cases are: *Alexander* (179D–181F), where almost all apophthegms in the section illustrate his love of honour announced by I (179D); *Antigonus Monophthalmus* III (182A), confirmed from IV (182B) on; Pyrrhus' warlike character described by *Pyrrhus* I (184C), further deepened by II–V (184D); *Themistocles* II–VIII (185AB), in line with I (184F–185A), and all that follows is to be read in light of this; *Aristeides* I (186A), describing the man as "just", as is proved by what follows (186A–C); the amorality in *Alcibiades* I (186D), illustrated by the remainder of the section (186D–F); *Agesilaus* I (190F), confirmed by the four following apophthegms (190F–191A); the tactics of Fabius Maximus described in his first apophthegm (195C), dominating the entire section (195C–196A); and *Scipio Minor* I (199F), reading as a summary of the section as a whole.

⁹²⁵ See *infra*, note 930 on the contrast between the two main blocks in this section and in similar cases.

⁹²⁶ There are various sections in which the picture is not problematized by gradual shifting. These are, not taking sections of one or two apophthegms into account: *Cyrus* (172EF); *Artaxerxes Longimanus* (173DE), although the section should also be seen as part of a series of sections problematizing *Artaxerxes Mnemon*; *Archelaus* (177AB); *Pyrrhus* (184CD; a one-sidedly negative section); *Aristeides* (186A–C); *Pericles* (186C); *Alcibiades* (186D–F; a one-sidedly negative section); *Iphicrates* (186F–187B); *Timotheus* (187BC); *Chabrias* (187CD); *Peisistratus* (189B–D); *Lycurgus* (189D–F); *Charillus* (189F); *Agis Secundus* (190CD); *Gaius Fabricius* (194F–195B); *Scipio Maior* (196B–197A); *Flaminius* (197A–D); and *Paulus Aemilius* (197F–198D). In almost all of these cases, however, the image of these men is problematized by other strategies.

distrust. Dionysius' ability to judge wrongdoers, then, can be assessed in two ways. Thus, even when focusing on the same aspect of a character (Dionysius' eagerness to punish) through similar apophthegms (*Dionysius Maior* VII and X), a reader will not necessarily draw the same conclusions from them. It is precisely gradual shifting that contributes to this effect, as it steers the readers to focus on specific connections between certain stories.⁹²⁷

[2] In addition, Plutarch often includes contradictory stories. He prefers to do so at the end of a section. This can happen in various ways. In the case of *Darius* (172F–173A), the final apophthegm (*Semiramis*, 173AB) is still connected with the preceding story and continues the gradual shifting, focusing on wealth and on the idea of having the right priorities, but at the same time shows a radically different image of the king.⁹²⁸ In *Gelon* (175AB), on the contrary, gradual shifting mitigates the contrast: the first (175A) and final apophthegm (175AB) clash harshly, but the stories in between (175A) ensure a smooth transition.⁹²⁹ Yet this does not do away with the fact that the picture is less clear than it seemed to be at first sight.

[3] In other cases, Plutarch separates various blocks of apophthegms. Sometimes, their content can clash. In this way, the obvious break in grad-

⁹²⁷ Similar examples are *Alexander* XV (180D) and XVI (180E), which discuss Alexander's attitude towards his divine status, but show a different image; and *Themistocles* IX (185CD), which seems to highlight his justice, and the apophthegms that follow (185DE), all to be read in light of Themistocles' φιλοτιμία described in I–VIII (184F–185C). Note also how bravery in *Pelopidas* (194C–E) turns out to be recklessness through gradual shifting, and how *Phocion* (187E–189B) combines the image of the great politician with that of the philosopher, which together raises questions.

⁹²⁸ A similar break occurs in *Dionysius Minor* (176C–E), from the appearance of Plato in III (176D) on, still continuing the gradual shifting. *Antigonus Monophthalmus* (182A–183A) is another example, containing a break from III (182A) on, which is, however, still connected with II (182A). The final apophthegm of *Epameinondas* (194C) also entails a far less positive image (Thebes is lost; the apophthegm is still closely linked with XXII and XXIII, 194A–C). Another example is *Fabius Maximus* (195C–196A): open warfare is still avoided at the end of the section, but a different image of the Roman arises from V (195F) on.

⁹²⁹ The same procedure can be found in *Xerxes* (173BC): in II (173C), the king is cruel, but in IV (173C), he is mild. III (173C) is placed in between as a transition. Something similar occurs in *Hiero* (175BC): all apophthegms deal with frank speech, but there gradually appear to be some limitations. Another example is *Alexander* XXXIV (181F), which fits well after an apophthegm announcing his death, but is partly to be interpreted as criticism. A clear instance is *Brasidas* (190BC): in I (189B), he claims that everyone can defend himself, but he dies in III (189BC). The contrast is mitigated by II (189B), in which he gets wounded.

ual shifting marks a contrast between two pictures of the subject. A clear instance is *Agesilaus*, which shows a conflict between I–V (190F–191A) and VI–XII (191A–D) – a symptom of a complex personality.⁹³⁰

To conclude: gradual shifting constitutes the main driver of characterization *within* a section. It blends the apophthegms into an image of the subject's character. This does not, however, necessarily result in a clear assessment. In many cases, Plutarch even ensures that it contributes to the opposite effect. As strange as this might seem, this problematizing aspect is actually entirely in line with the author's practice in his *Parallel Lives*: it encourages moral reflection and raises challenging questions that do justice to the complexities of life and history.

b) Characterization of the subject in other sections

Various apophthegms (re)introduce the subject of one of the preceding or following sections. The pictures these evoke tends to be less favourable to the hero than his own apophthegms: a clear example is the positive image in *Lucullus* (203AB), contrasting with the subject's appearance in *Pompeius* (203B–204E). Reassessment in this way is often more negative than the re-evaluation instigated by gradual shifting, although there are some exceptions.⁹³¹ To a certain extent, this is again in line with the biographies: as noticed by various scholars, the image of a hero is often represented more positively in his own *Life* than in another biography.⁹³²

⁹³⁰ Other sections containing this strategy are *Philippus* (177C–179C), where XIII–XV (178AB) marks a break (the second block [178B–179C] deals with Philip's mistakes, although his rule seemed impeccable in the first block [177C–178A]); *Cato Maior* (198D–199E), where a clashing series of apophthegms follows from XXII (199B) on; note also Pompey's downfall after *Pompeius* VIII (204A), contrasting with his youthful success in the first block (Ia–VII [203B–204A]; a case similar to *Agesilaus* [190F–191D]). Yet blocks of apophthegms do not always show contrasting images (cf. *Alexander* [179D–181F]): sometimes, a break in gradual shifting just marks different phases in the hero's life.

⁹³¹ *Alcibiades* IV (186E) paints a positive picture of Pericles, in line with the preceding section (186C); the image of Demetrius is positive in *Antigonus Monophthalmus* XVIII (183A); the reference back to Lycurgus in *Charillus* I (189F) is entirely in line with his own section (189D–F) that immediately precedes this; and there is the entirely positive image of Scipio Minor in *Caecilius Metellus* III (202A), also told quickly after this man's own section (199F–201F). One might be inclined to count the picture of Pyrrhus in *Gaius Fabricius* (194F–195B) as a positive reassessment, but his behaviour is to be assessed against the background of the morally superior Gaius Fabricius.

⁹³² See Jones, C. P. (1971) 80 on the absence of the Vettius episode in *Pomp.*, although it is told in *Luc.* Another example is the trial of Pelopidas discussed by Buckler (1978) 41; see also *supra*, note 661.

In *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, this procedure of reassessment takes place in two ways: explicitly, when the subject is named, and implicitly:

[1] Instances of the first kind do not necessarily occur closely to the subject's section.⁹³³ The clearest example is Antipater. Before reaching his own section (183EF), the reader has already met him a few times.⁹³⁴ After his own apophthegms, he will appear on the stage a few more times (*Phocion* XV–XVI, 188F). Almost every appearance of the man is negative,⁹³⁵ except for his own apophthegms. When comparing these contradictory stories, a most problematic picture arises.

[2] Allusions to a subject of another section create the same effect. To ensure that the reader interprets them as related to the historical figure in question, such cases are placed directly after his section and are thematically connected with it. Two examples are *Orontes* (174B), referring back to *Artaxerxes Mnemon* (173F–174A), and *Paulus Aemilius* I (197F), related to *Publius Licinius* (197EF).

⁹³³ Although this is often the case, due to the chronological structure and the arrangement according to family ties. Examples are: *Idanthyrsus* (174E), presenting Darius as a true despot, stronger than in *Darius* (172F–173B); *Dionysius Maior* III and IV (175DE), containing a bad image of his son, contrasting with his own section (176C–E), in turn referring back to the elder Dionysius in order to problematize his image; *Antipater* I (183E), containing a reassessment of *Alexander* (179D–181F); *Demetrius Phalereus* (189D), where Ptolemy is advised to improve himself (although a careful reader will realize that the king needs this from *Ptolemaeus* [181F] too); *Lycurgus* V (189EF), highlighting what is wrong with Agesilaus' generalship (described in 190F–191D); perhaps *Lysander* I (190D), where Dionysius sends a present to this Spartan's daughters (the theme of gift-giving reminds one of the Sicilian sections, but this generosity is assessed negatively); *Nicostratus* (192A), where Archidamus' character is described in a negative way, different from what one will conclude from *Archidamus Tertius* (191D) itself; *Epameinondas* VII (192E), in which Pelopidas' behaviour is presented as unworthy of a general; in *Scipio Maior* VIII (196E), Antiochus the Great is outdone by Scipio: this same king also appears in *Flamininus* IV (197C) and *Gaius Domitius* (197DE) as a kind of tyrant, which contrasts with *Antiochus Tertius* (183F). In *Pompeius* IX and X (204B), Lucullus appears to be a luxurious man. See also the rather negative image of Pompey in *Cicero* XIV–XV (205C) and *Caesar* Xb (206D), although both instances explain Pompey's downfall described in his own section (203B–204E) and are as such perhaps a clarification rather than a real reassessment.

⁹³⁴ As discussed in the analysis of *Antipater* (183EF).

⁹³⁵ *Philippus* XXVIII (179B), where the king has much faith in Antipater as his general, might be an exception, although the reader still might wonder whether his faith is entirely justified.

Finally, one should keep in mind that these apophthegms at the same time shed light on the subject of their own section. When Alcibiades questions Pericles' behaviour (*Alcibiades* IV, 186E), this says as much, if not more, about him than about his tutor: this apophthegm, therefore, still functions at the level of the procedures described in (a).

c) Synkrisis

Synkrisis is an important feature of the *Parallel Lives*.⁹³⁶ First, there are the so-called 'formal *synkriseis*': with a few exceptions, all paired biographies conclude with an explicit comparison of the heroes.⁹³⁷ Second, there is 'internal *synkrisis*', as set out by Hans Beck in a seminal article, showing that one should not only look for comparisons *within* a pair:⁹³⁸

Vielmehr bestehen oft auch zwischen Nachbar-Viten desselben Kulturkreises und derselben Epoche (z. Bsp. *Alkibiades-Nikias*; *Romulus-Numa*; *Caesar-Cato minor*) intertextuelle Bezüge und Vergleichsebenen, die dazu führen können, daß diese Einzelbiographien eng aufeinander abgestimmt sind. Dabei lassen sich mehrere prinzipiell getrennte, im narrativen *plot* freilich oft konvergierende literarische Strategien zur Vernetzung von Einzelbiographien benennen.

The strategies he mentions are: (1) cross-references between *Lives*, and (2) the function of what he calls "*Folienfiguren*", who are of greater importance when they are also the subject of a separate biography (and as a consequence in fact almost function as cross-references).⁹³⁹

Despite some significant differences, various aspects of *synkrisis* in the *Lives* also occur in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*:

[I] As a consequence of the implicit moralism predominant in the collection, 'formal *synkrisis*' is entirely absent from the work. This does not mean, however, that characters are never explicitly compared: Plutarch sometimes includes apophthegms in which two or more subjects (whether they have a section in the collection or not) are contrasted by a certain character.

⁹³⁶ *Synkrisis* is not just an aspect of characterization, but also a feature of Plutarch's moralism, see Verdegem (2010) 27–32 in a chapter on "comparative moralism".

⁹³⁷ The only pairs that lack a formal *synkrisis* are *Alex.–Caes.*, *Phoc.–Ca. Mi.*, *Pyrrh.–Mar.*, and *Them.–Cam.* On these formal *synkriseis*, see Erbse (1956); Russell (1966a) 150; Stadter (1975) for *Comp. Per. et Fab.*; Pelling (1986); Nikolaidis (1988) for *Comp. Nic. et Crass.*; Larmour (1992); Duff (1999) 252–257 (part of a chapter on *synkrisis* in general) and a shorter version in Duff (2000); Larmour (2014); Roskam (2021) 98–99.

⁹³⁸ Beck, H. (2002) 468. See also Russell (1966a) 150–151 on comparisons of the protagonist with minor figures within one *Life*.

⁹³⁹ Beck, H. (2002) 468–489.

[2] In other cases, *synkrisis* is only implicit, and it is left to the readers to draw conclusions. This mostly concerns contemporaries (such as Epameinondas and Pelopidas, 192C–194E).

[3] When *synkrisis*, either explicit or implicit, involves the protagonist of a section, it is much more powerful than when it concerns minor figures. There are many examples of such minor figures: Zopyrus in *Darius* III and IV (173A); Semiramis in *Semiramis* (173AB); Euripides in *Archelaus* I (177A) and III (177AB); Leonidas in *Alexander* IV (179E); Leosthenes in *Phocion* XII (188DE), to name a few. Some of these minor figures are more important than others. The single reference to Postumius Albinus in *Cato Maior* XXIX (199E) is less relevant than Parmenio or Demades, who appear more than once throughout the collection.⁹⁴⁰ In other words: the more the audience hears about a person, the more elaborate the *synkrisis* can and will be.

Explicit synkrisis

As stated, *synkrisis* is often part of the types of characterization discussed on the previous pages, since it can contribute to the picture of a subject within his own section (a), and in the section of another hero (b).⁹⁴¹ There are four possibilities:

[1] In *Cyrus Minor* (173EF), the subject attempts to prove that he is superior to his brother through an explicit comparison. His saying characterizes his own personality (cf. a), but also provides the negative background against which *Artaxerxes Mnemon* (173F–174A) will be read (cf. b). Other examples of this procedure also tend to shed a negative light on the subject of the other section.⁹⁴²

[2] In *Phocion* XV (188F), Antipater compares Phocion with the base orator Demades. As stated, this sheds a rather negative light on the Macedonian ruler (cf. b), but this stands apart from the comparison, as it does

⁹⁴⁰ Parmenio appears in *Philippus* II (177C), XXIX (179B), *Alexander* X (180B), XI (180B), and *Antipater* I (183E); Demades in *Alexander* XXXIV (181F), *Antipater* II (183EF), *Phocion* XV (188F), and *Agis Tertius* I (191E).

⁹⁴¹ This evidently also holds true for implicit *synkrisis*, but here it depends on the willingness of the reader to enter into the process of comparison.

⁹⁴² Other apophthegms comparing the subject of their own section with one or more subjects of other sections are: *Anteas* II (174E): Anteas and Philip; *Dionysius Maior* III (175DE): Dionysius the Younger and his father; *Antigonus Monophthalmus* I (182A): Antigonus and Alexander; *Antigonus Monophthalmus* VIII (182C): Antigonus and barbarian kings; *Chabrias* II (187D): Chabrias and Iphicrates; *Pytheas* (187E): Pytheas and Alexander; *Agésilau*s II (190F): Agésilau and Artaxerxes Mnemon; *Epameinondas* XXII (194A): Epameinondas, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; *Gaius Fabricius* III (195A): Gaius Fabricius and Pyrrhus; *Pompeius* V (203EF): Pompey and Sulla; *Caesar* IV (206B): Caesar and Alexander.

not involve his own character. The *synkrisis* itself contributes to the positive image of Phocion (cf. a). The image of the minor figure Demades is negative. In most cases of this procedure, the subject compares himself with another person, but some cases are similar to *Phocion XV* (188F), where another person makes the comparison. The subject of the section in question is in most instances favoured, at least at first sight.⁹⁴³

[3] A contrasting example is *Cicero XV* (205C), where the orator compares Pompey with Themistocles and Pericles (this example falls under the category of explicit characterization of a man in the section of another hero). As discussed, the story fits well within the process of gradual shifting. In this way, it says something about Cicero's character (cf. a), but this stands apart from the process of *synkrisis*, which only involves Pompey and the two Greeks, providing a rather negative picture of the Roman (cf. b). Similar cases also tend to shed a negative light on the subjects of another section.⁹⁴⁴

[4] A personage can compare two minor figures. In these cases, *synkrisis* is not related to the strategies described in (a) or (b), for it does not involve protagonists of the collection. These instances are therefore less important.⁹⁴⁵

Thus, the general observations described in (a) and (b) apply to these cases: when a subject is compared with someone else in his own section (cf. a), this usually fits within the gradual shifting. When he is compared with one or more historical figures in the section of another subject (cf.

⁹⁴³ Other examples where *synkrisis* only involves the subject of the section in question are: *Alexander XI* (180B): a comparison with Parmenio; *Alexander XXVII* (181D): Heracles; *Themistocles VII* (185C): a Seriphean; *Iphicrates V* (187B): Harmonius; *Timotheus II* (187C): a bold general; *Phocion VI* (188A): Demosthenes; *Teleclus* (190A): Teleclus' brother; *Pelopidas I* (194C): Nicodemus, a crippled person; *Fabius Maximus III* (195DE): Marcellus; *Cato Maior XXII* (199B): candidates for the censorship; *Scipio Minor III* (200A): Scipio's fellow soldiers; *Scipio Minor IX* (200CD): Appius Claudius; *Scipio Minor XXI* (201E): the generals who preceded Scipio.

⁹⁴⁴ Similar cases are *Phocion XIV* (188EF): comparing Alexander with Menyllus; *Nicostratus* (192A): Archidamus and Heracles; *Epameinondas VII* (192E): Pelopidas and a certain mistress.

⁹⁴⁵ Examples are *Archelaus I* (177A): comparing one of the king's base friends with Euripides; *Philippus X* (177F): a witty comparison of the brothers Ἀμφοτέρως and Ἐκατέρως; *Alexander XXIX* (181D): Craterus and Hephaestion; *Pyrrhus II* (184C): two flute players, but a general is preferred; *Themistocles II* (185A): Achilles and Homer; *Themistocles XI* (185D): comparing men who want to marry his daughter; *Epameinondas XX* (193F): Antigenidas and Tellen; *Caesar XIV* (206E): Antony and Dolabella, on the one hand, and Brutus and Cassius, on the other hand. These cases are meant to convey something about the person who makes the comparison.

b), this often problematizes the image that arises from a reading of his own apophthegms.⁹⁴⁶ This discrepancy between the picture of a subject's own section and the one resulting from comparison is, in fact, also in line with the *Parallel Lives*, where the formal *synkrisis* at the end of a pair often complicates the narratives of the biographies themselves.⁹⁴⁷

Implicit synkrisis

The observations about explicit *synkrisis* also apply to this type of *synkrisis*, where it relies sometimes exclusively on the reader's willingness to contrast two historical figures. Take *Cicero XV* (205C) again: although the orator is not part of the explicit comparison, nothing prevents the readers from comparing him with Pompey, or even with Themistocles and Pericles, if they see a reason to do so. Using various strategies, Plutarch invites his reader to make such comparisons, but not all of them are equally strong. There is, therefore, a gradation from cases where *synkrisis* is instigated clearly, to those where it is entirely up to the reader to see a certain *tertium comparationis* (the examples given below concern subjects who have a section in the collection, but one might of course also compare 'minor figures' with each other):

[I] Mentioning a historical figure by name offers an obvious call for comparison. The clearest examples are those where the relationships between successive sections are explicitly described (in most cases, these concern family ties).⁹⁴⁸ At the beginning and end of *Pelopidas* (194C–E), Plutarch mentions his association with Epameinondas. As the sections of both men also share many themes, the reader should naturally compare them.

⁹⁴⁶ See also *supra*, note 933 for examples of negative reassessments of a hero in another section.

⁹⁴⁷ Cf. chapter 1.3.1 on the case of *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma*.

⁹⁴⁸ Cases such as *Hiero I* (175B), which mentions that he followed Gelon; *Dion* (176F–177A), mentioning the end of Dionysius' reign; *Philippus VII* (177E), referring to the leaders of Athens; *Philippus XVI* (178B), XVII (178BC), XXII (178E), and XXIII (178EF), which invite the reader to compare the rule of Philip and his son; *Philippus XXIV* (178F) and XXVIII (179B), which mention Antipater; in *Alexander I* (179D), the young boy complains that his father is conquering everything (this can perhaps also be seen as an explicit comparison); *Demetrius Poliorcetes* (183A–C) is announced by *Antigonus Monophthalmus XVI* (182EF) and XVIII (183A), and mentioned again in *Antigonus Secundus I* (183C); *Demetrius Poliorcetes I* (183A), in turn, again refers back to *Antigonus Monophthalmus* (182A–183A); *Aristeides III* (186B) invites a comparison of the man with *Themistocles* (184F–185F); *Gaius Domitius* (197DE) refers to Scipio the Elder, the subject of another section (196B–197A); *Pompeius* (203B–204E) mentions Caesar in XII and XIII (204CD); *Caesar* (205E–206F), in turn, refers back to Pompey in VIII (206C), Xb (206D), and XI (206DE); Caesar is mentioned in *Augustus I* (206F–207A); Alexander in *Augustus III* (207AB) and VIII (207CD).

[2] In other cases, two heroes (usually following each other) are connected by a shared topic, often expressed in similar wording. *Fabius Maximus* (195C–196A) and *Scipio Maior* (196B–197A), included immediately after the first section, deal with the same war. As a consequence, the reader is expected to compare the tactics of the two generals. Many more examples of this procedure can be found, which shows that anything can lead to a comparison at any level of the text.⁹⁴⁹

[3] In many other cases a reader might feel compelled to compare two or more heroes. Since there is no indication in the text that Plutarch desired his readers to make these comparisons, these instances (such as the hypothetical and perhaps unlikely example of *Cicero* XV, 205C, described on the previous page) will not be addressed here.

Implicit *synkrisis* often has a problematizing function too. Take the example of *Pelopidas* (194C–E) again: after a comparison with *Epameinondas* (192C–194C), the reader will conclude that his courageous nature should perhaps rather be defined as overboldness. The contrast between the tactics applied in *Fabius Maximus* (195C–196A) and *Scipio Maior* (196B–197A) also calls for *synkrisis*, which does not result in a clear conclusion: it raises questions about the nature of good generalship, as it is not made explicit which strategy is to be applied at which moment.

To conclude

Similar to other strategies of characterization, *synkrisis* – whether explicit or implicit – entirely fits within Plutarch's zetetic moralism.⁹⁵⁰ It requires an active and participatory role of the readers, and provides them

⁹⁴⁹ For instance the theme of punishing and giving and taking that dominates the Persian sections (172E–174B) and invites a comparison of all the kings; the parallel structured sections of the Thracians and Scythians (174C–F), highlighting the similarities between these men; *Gelon* IV (175AB), which recalls some barbarian apophthegms, in this way calling for comparison; the reference to cups in *Archelaus* I (177A), which recalls the Sicilian sections (175A–177A) and invites a comparison of the Macedonian with the tyrants; *Philippus* (177C–179C), often stressing that the king does not want to be a despot, thus recalling the theme of tyranny in earlier sections; there are also many similarities between *Antigonus Monophthalmus* (182A–183A), *Philippus* (177C–179C), and *Alexander* (179D–181F); note also the close connection between *Antiochus Hierax* (184A), *Eumenes* (184AB), and *Pyrrhus* (184CD), also reminding one of the themes of tyranny, and contrasting with the Antigonid dynasty (182A–183D); also striking are the themes shared by *Themistocles* (184F–185F), *Aristeides* (186A–C), *Pericles* (186C), and *Alcibiades* (186C–F); *Peisistratus* (189B–D) again recalls themes of the monarchical sections (172E–184F); the sections about the fall of the Roman Republic (203A–206F) and *Augustus* (206F–208A) remind one of the monarchical sections too.

⁹⁵⁰ Roskam (2021).

with more questions than answers: in the comparison of two or more heroes it is often possible to argue *pro* and *contra* the same person, because of which it is difficult to find out who is to be preferred. Once more, this is not different from the function of *synkrisis* in the *Parallel Lives*.

d) The reader's background knowledge

In some cases, text-external factors have serious repercussions. The ancient reader would probably never have accepted the apparently positive image arising from *Marius* (202A–D) and *Sulla* (202E). The opposite goes for *Pyrrhus* (184CD): Plutarch deliberately depicts a highly negative image of the man, which is to some extent different from the traditional Pyrrhus, often presented as a mild and kind ruler.⁹⁵¹ Sometimes, then, the audience's background knowledge performs a problematizing function. This can work in various directions: Plutarch wants his readers either to question the image of these men in the collection, or to challenge the conventional picture, or both. What he tries to achieve can be seen from how he presents his material and how this contributes to the reliability of the image he depicts. As to the examples mentioned, these take the following form:

[1] The total absence of any reference to the civil war in the Roman sections – to which Plutarch even draws attention⁹⁵² – shows that the author does not want the unconventional picture to be welcomed by his audience. Yet he is still challenging the traditional image, by pointing out that the two 'villains' might have had some virtues. Their behaviour and sayings, then, provide interesting food for moral reflection.

[2] The case of *Pyrrhus* is somewhat different. Its first apophthegms are in line with the Epirot's well-known warlike nature. After these, Plutarch concludes the section with an incomplete apophthegm, where the king is slandered. It is left to the reader to fill in the outcome, and to question whether he would have reacted leniently or not. In this way, Plutarch does not directly deny the traditional image, but he plays with gradual shifting and its implications for characterization (cf. Pelling's "integrated characters" discussed in (a)): after reading about Pyrrhus' excessive love of war, the readers should doubt whether mildness fits within his character (cf. the 'blended' image). The author, then, is challenging the traditional image precisely by exploiting it.

⁹⁵¹ See *supra*, note 491.

⁹⁵² See for example *supra*, note 791 on the use of ἐμφύλιος in *Marius* VI (202D).

1.1.3 Conclusion: A Collection of Problematic Heroes?

In *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* moralism is not only descriptive but also has a protreptic function, and is entirely implicit. This is closely connected with characters and characterization in the work: most sections concern subjects with whom Trajan can identify (although this is not always necessary for his moral progress), and they are usually characterized in an implicit way. One would, therefore, expect a participatory reading to bring the target reader to certain conclusions about ethical conduct that invite him to adapt his own behaviour. Yet a closer look at the various strategies of characterization shows that Plutarch applies every tool in order to complicate the image of the historical figures: gradual shifting, characterization in other sections, *synkrisis*, and even the reader's prior knowledge all often contribute to this effect. If it is difficult to reach a clear assessment of these characters, this means that moralism in the collection is essentially problematic as well – at least at the level of the individual sections. As a consequence, it is not entirely clear how the work should instruct the emperor as its implied reader.

One might therefore wonder what the precise function of this problematizing aspect is and whether this can be reconciled with the protreptic goals of the work. In addition, there are some sections from which, at first sight, a clear image arises. These are rather exceptional, so the question is why Plutarch sometimes deviates from his general practice. In the following chapters, it will be argued that an explanation for these issues can be found by examining Plutarch's views on the function of role models, and by comparing them with his strategies in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. There are three types of role models in the collection:

[1] Negative: *Pyrrhus* (184CD) and *Alcibiades* (186D–F).

[2] Univocally positive: *Cyrus* (172EF), *Archelaus* (177AB), the early Spartans (189D–190A), and the early Romans (194E–195C).⁹⁵³

[3] Basically positive. This is the largest group. Even *Aristeides* (186A–C) and *Phocion* (187E–189B) should be counted among them: they are most virtuous men, but the former was banished and the latter was put to death together with his friends.

The following pages first address Plutarch's views on the function of negative examples, as this has significant repercussions for interpreting [1] (1.2). The next part studies Plutarch's opinion about perfection, which is important for how the collection's most virtuous men are to be assessed [2] (1.3). The third part analyses how Plutarch thinks about basically positive role models (1.4). This will offer insights for an adequate understanding not only of [3], but also of [2] again.

⁹⁵³ Cases such as *Memnon* (174B), the remarkable 'apophthegm' of *Reges Aegypti* (174C), or *Dion* (176F–177A), all containing only one unit, are not taken into account.

1.2 Negative *Exempla*

1.2.1 The Prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius*

In the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius*, Plutarch dwells upon the function of negative role models. The passage is highly rhetorical and should be read in connection with the two narratives that follow. Yet the text also informs us of the author's true worries about the issue: these are in line with his view on the relevance of negative examples in his treatises of *Seelenheilung*.⁹⁵⁴

a) Literary analysis

The following literary analysis is inevitably highly indebted to the analysis of Duff.⁹⁵⁵ The structure of the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius* consists of three parts:

A	General claim: every τέχνη also studies the opposite of what it tries to accomplish (1.1–1.4)
B	The motivation including negative examples in the <i>Parallel Lives</i> (1.5–1.6)
C	Specifically on the pair Demetrius and Antony, focusing on their similarities (1.7–1.8)

As appears from the table, there is a shift from general to specific claims, as often in Plutarch.⁹⁵⁶

A General claim (*Demetr. 1.1–4*)

Plutarch first points out a similarity between the arts (τέχναι; in the sense of technical knowledge) and the senses (αἰσθήσεις): they are capable of making distinctions (1.1). But there is also a difference in this respect. The senses receive every single impression that reaches them by chance. These impressions are passed on to the understanding (τὸ φρονεῖν). The function of the senses, then, consists of nothing more than the *accidental* perception of distinctions, and it is up to reason to do something with

⁹⁵⁴ Ingenkamp (1971) discusses *De coh. ira, De gar., De cur., De vit. pud., and De se ipsum laud.* as treatises of *Seelenheilung*; see also Ingenkamp (2000). Nikolaidis (2011) speaks of “‘Minor’ Ethics” in the case of *De gar., De cur., and De vit. pud.* The distinction κρίσις – ἄσκησις can be found in other Plutarchan works as well: Van Hoof (2010) 41–65 discusses Plutarch’s “Practical Ethics” in light of this (see also Van Hoof (2014) on this group of texts); Demulder (2022) 175–176 discusses κρίσις and ἄσκησις in *De tranq. an.* In the *Lives* such patterns can be found too, see for example chapter 1.4.1 on *Per.* 1–2.

⁹⁵⁵ Duff (2004).

⁹⁵⁶ Duff (2014) 334.

it (I.2). The arts are different, for they are supported by one's intellect (μετὰ λόγου συνεστῶσαι) and have a *specific* focus. Yet occasionally, art also has to study the opposite of this focus. Medicine studies health, but a physician also needs to have knowledge about diseases. This unpleasant examination of the opposite, therefore, is a logical and necessary consequence of the goal of the art in question (I.3).⁹⁵⁷

As Duff points out, various elements in this passage (I.1–3) recall the prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*,⁹⁵⁸

which had also begun with a contrast between the senses and reason: our physical senses, Plutarch had argued, must receive every stimulus that strikes them, whereas with our mind we can choose to concentrate only on objects which are beneficial to us – such as the virtuous deeds of others.

The *Parallel Lives*, this prologue suggests, focus on virtues, and the implication seems to be that Plutarch only selects the best men of the past. Notably, this is different from the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius*, written at a later stage of the biographical project:⁹⁵⁹ although the author has not yet referred to his biographies in the general claims of [A], the first section suggests that he now has realized that the focus should not exclusively lie on the virtues. Thus, the various similarities between the prologues to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus* and *Demetrius–Antonius*, both in terms of content and wording, are not coincidental: the latter can truly be read as an addition to statements presented in the former.⁹⁶⁰

⁹⁵⁷ κατὰ συμβεβηκός is to be translated as “by accident” (LCL has “incidentally”), but this does not mean that studying the opposite is not an inevitable consequence. It should therefore rather be read in the meaning of “rarely”, “not as its main goal”, and perhaps even to a certain extent as “unwillingly”. Duff (2004) 274 writes: “The point is perhaps that negative examples should not be considered interesting in themselves [...]. Bad examples can be valuable, but are not to be sought out as of themselves absorbing or titillating. This is a point to which Plutarch will return in I.5.”

⁹⁵⁸ Duff (2004) 273.

⁹⁵⁹ Duff (2004) 273. See Appendix III on the relative chronology of the *Parallel Lives*.

⁹⁶⁰ Note the wording shared by both prologues: *Demetr.* 1.1: αἰσθήσεσιν – *Per.* 1.2: αἰσθήσει; *Demetr.* 1.1: ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι – *Per.* 1.2: ἀντιλαμβανομένη; *Demetr.* 1.2: ἐντυγχάνουσαν – *Per.* 1.2: τῶν προστυγχανόντων; *Demetr.* 1.6: Ἰσμηνίας – *Per.* 1.5: Ἰσμηνίας; *Demetr.* 1.6: αὐλοῦντας, twice αὐλεῖν, αὐλητῶν – *Per.* 1.5: twice αὐλητής; *Demetr.* 1.6: ἀκροᾶσθαι – *Per.* 1.6: ἀκροᾶσθαι; *Demetr.* 1.6: προθυμότεροι – *Per.* 1.4: προθυμίαν, 2.2: προθυμίαν; *Demetr.* 1.6: θεαταί – *Per.* 1.6: θεατής, 2.1: θεασάμενος, 2.4: θεατήν; *Demetr.* 1.6: μιμηταί – *Per.* 1.2: μιμητικός, 2.4: μιμήσει; *Demetr.* 1.6: ἀνιστορήτως – *Per.* 1.4: ιστορήσασιν, 2.4: ιστορίᾳ (the similarities listed are only relevant similarities

The moral implications of all of this become more explicit in the final part of [A], still of a rather general nature (I.4):

αἱ τε πασῶν τελεώταται τεχνῶν, σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις, οὐ καλῶν μόνον καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὠφελίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ **βλαβερῶν** καὶ **αἰσχρῶν** καὶ ἀδίκων κρίσεις οὔσαι, τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κακῶν καλλωπιζομένην ἀκακίαν **οὐκ ἐπαινοῦσιν**, ἀλλ' ἀβελτερίαν ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἄγνοϊαν ὧν μάλιστα γινώσκειν **προσῆκει** τοὺς ὀρθῶς βιωσομένους.

and the most consummate arts of all, namely, temperance, justice, and wisdom, since their function is to distinguish, not only what is good and just and expedient, but also what is bad and unjust and disgraceful, have no praises for a guilelessness which plumes itself on its inexperience of evil, nay, they consider it to be foolishness, and ignorance of what ought especially to be known by men who would live aright.

This is connected with [B]. As Duff again writes, it enables Plutarch to make his previous claims specifically relevant for the *Parallel Lives*.⁹⁶¹ A second connection, I would add, is more subtle: the words in bold remind one of Plutarch's practice in his treatises of *Seelenheilung*, which aim to heal specific vices. As Ingenkamp has shown, these texts consist of two main parts: κρίσις, in which the theoretical part of the cure is set out, and ἄσκησις, containing exercises of theoretical (ἐπιλογισμοί) and practical (ἐθισμοί) nature in order to remove the κακόν. Negative *exempla* play a role in the first part, precisely because they offer a frightening picture of how a bad characteristic can bring shame (αἰσχῦναι) and harm (βλάβαι).⁹⁶² By responding to the readers' sense of honour, they convince them of the truth of a certain theoretical point of view, because of which they will attempt to remove the evil from which they (might) suffer.⁹⁶³ The focus on what is harmful, on what is fitting, and on praise and blame in the prologue (*Demetr.* 1.4) indicates that Plutarch has something similar in mind. This will become more explicit in [B].

between *Demetr.* 1.1–6 and *Per.* 1–2.4; *Demetr.* 1.7 and *Per.* 2.5 that announce the two next *Lives* were not taken into account).

⁹⁶¹ Duff (2004) 275: "The relevance of the argument to a reading of the *Lives*, with their especially moral, character-forming purpose, is now becoming clearer."

⁹⁶² Ingenkamp (1971).

⁹⁶³ This social aspect is in line with Van Hoof (2010) on Plutarch's "Practical Ethics".

B Negative exempla in the Parallel Lives (Demetr. 1.5–6)

This section deserves to be quoted in full:⁹⁶⁴

1.5 οἱ μὲν οὖν παλαιοὶ Σπαρτιᾶται τοὺς εἴλωτας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς πολλὴν ἀναγκάζοντες πίνειν ἄκρατον εἰσηῖγον εἰς τὰ συμπόσια, τοῖς νέοις οἷόν ἐστι τὸ μεθύειν ἐπιδεικνύντες· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐκ διαστροφῆς ἐτέρων ἐπανόρθωσιν οὐ πάνυ φιλάνθρωπον οὐδὲ πολιτικὴν ἠγούμεθα, τῶν δὲ κεχημένων ἀσκεπτότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ γεγονότων ἐν ἐξουσίαις καὶ πράγμασι μεγάλοις ἐπιφανῶν εἰς κακίαν οὐ χεῖρον ἴσως ἐστὶ συζυγίαν μίαν ἢ δύο παρεμβалеῖν εἰς τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν βίων, οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡδονῆς μὰ Δία καὶ διαγωγῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ποικίλλοντας τὴν γραφήν, 1.6 ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ Ἴσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος ἐπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς μαθηταῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐ καὶ τοὺς κακῶς αὐλοῦντας εἰώθει λέγειν “οὕτως αὐλεῖν δεῖ” καὶ πάλιν “οὕτως αὐλεῖν οὐ δεῖ”, ὁ δ’ Ἀντιγενεΐδας καὶ ἥδιον ὤφειτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀκροᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους αὐλητῶν, ἐὰν καὶ τῶν φαύλων πείραν λαμβάνωσιν, οὕτως μοι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς προθυμότεροι τῶν βελτιόνων ἔσεσθαι καὶ θεαταὶ καὶ μιμηταὶ βίων, εἰ μὴδὲ τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεγομένων ἀνιστορήτως ἔχοιμεν.

Accordingly, the ancient Spartans would put compulsion upon their helots at the festivals to drink much unmixed wine, and would then bring them into the public messes, in order to show their young men what it was to be drunk. And though I do not think that the perverting of some to secure the setting right of others is very humane, or a good civil policy, still, when men have led reckless lives, and have become conspicuous, in the exercise of power or in great undertakings, for badness, perhaps it will not be much amiss for me to introduce a pair or two of them into my biographies, though not that I may merely divert and amuse my readers by giving variety to my writing. Ismenias the Theban used to exhibit both good and bad players to his pupils on the flute and say, “you must play like this one,” or again, “you must not play like this one”; and Antigenidas used to think that young men would listen with more pleasure to good flute-players if they were given an experience of bad ones also. So, I think, we also shall be more eager to observe and imitate the better lives if we are not left without narratives of the blameworthy and the bad.

The humiliation of the helots builds on the convincing aspect of negative examples alluded to in [A]: the Spartans realized that these bad para-

⁹⁶⁴ I deviate from Ziegler (1996) 2, who reads <ἦν τ>ἴνα (a conjecture of Reiske) instead of ἐὰν in the final sentence quoted. The codices, which read ἴνα, indeed need emendation, but Sintenis’ suggestion ἐὰν, also followed by the Greek text and translation of Perrin (1920) 4–5 [LCL], is a more convenient solution.

digms show what one does not want to become, because of the shame and blame they suffer (cf. the notion of exhibition in ἐπιδεικνύντες). As Plutarch evidently does not approve of Sparta's cruel custom, he will only make use in his *Parallel Lives* of people who already became bad by themselves.⁹⁶⁵ His insistence on the fact that he will only include *a few* of these pairs (LCL: "a pair or two"), stressed by the position of μίαν ἢ δύο after συζυγίαν, is telling in two respects:

[1] This claim is again in line with [A]: a certain τέχνη only *occasionally* studies the opposite of what it tries to accomplish. This is not different with the τελεώταται τέχνηαι. In the *Parallel Lives*, then, only a few negative examples may suffice. Plutarch's readers should not be exposed to vice longer than necessary. This also alludes to the possible dangers of evil models, a theme that will implicitly be developed later in the passage.⁹⁶⁶

[2] It also suggests that Plutarch will on occasion include more than one negative pair. The chronology of the *Parallel Lives* suggests that *Pyrrhus–Marius*, containing many vices, followed quickly or perhaps even immediately. *Coriolanus–Alcibiades*, of which the second subject is definitely a bad person, also seems to belong to this final period of the series. As argued by various scholars, this implies that after a while Plutarch grew more eager to include negative examples in his biographical work.⁹⁶⁷ In light of this, he seems to motivate this change from *Demetrius–Antonius* on at the outset of the pair, which, in line with [A], again supports the view that it is to be read as an adjustment to the prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*.

Even though his motivation as described up to this point in [B] (οἱ μὲν οὖν – εἰς τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν βίων) is sufficiently clear, Plutarch apparently still feels compelled to stress what his motivation is *not* like: in the next part he notes that these negative examples are not included for the sake of his readers' amusement.⁹⁶⁸ When only reading the first part (οὐκ ἔφ' ἡδονῆν μὰ Δία καὶ διαγωγῆν τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων), the suggestion is that biographies of bad men *in themselves* could be entertaining literature (cf. [A]). But the words that follow quickly (ποικίλλοντας τῆν

⁹⁶⁵ Duff (2004) 276 describes the Spartan story as "a negative example to illustrate how not to use negative examples." As discussed by the analysis, *Charillus* II (189F) refers to the treatment of the helots in Sparta.

⁹⁶⁶ See Duff (2008c) 14 on a connection with Plato in this respect.

⁹⁶⁷ Cf. Appendix III on the relative chronology of the *Parallel Lives*.

⁹⁶⁸ Duff (2004) 278 writes that Plutarch is "at pains to emphasise that the purpose of narrating the Lives of such less-than-perfect-men is not at all the pleasure of the casual reader, who might take pleasure in spicy, exciting tales (1.5). [...] [T]he pleasure that arises from such narrative is not to be seen as the goal for the serious reader".

γραφῆν) clarify that this is not what Plutarch wants to say – at least not explicitly. He only writes that *varietas delectat*: in a collection of men of great virtues, biographies about some ‘villains’ (as is the suggestion) might keep the entire project interesting. Yet this is *not* what the author wants to accomplish.

This is once more in line with the apologetic function of the text. In his prologues, Plutarch often has to defend the choices he made and attempts to clarify the position of the *Lives* in question in the entire project.⁹⁶⁹ By referring to the diverting aspect of his work at the outset of *Demetrius–Antonius*, he defends himself against the possible accusation that he might give the impression of enjoying studying vices, or that he is writing sensational history.⁹⁷⁰ He therefore claims that if there were to be any diverting aspect to these negative *Lives* – which is evidently not his goal – it would consist in the fact that one will like the other biographies more. Thus, precisely the fact that *Demetrius–Antonius* is not an amusing pair (which will, however, be contradicted later in the prologue and does not coincide with the pair itself) might give it diverting power, as is the implication at this point (1.5).

The apology continues in 1.6. The author tells two anecdotes that are (only at first sight) similar to each other. Both refer to a well-known flute player:

[I] The story on Ismenias repeats Plutarch’s motivation for including negative *exempla*. This is highlighted by a verbal connection with the Spartan story, but the Ismenias anecdote illustrates Plutarch’s practice better.⁹⁷¹ The famous musician asked his students to listen to good and

⁹⁶⁹ Claims in *Alex. 1* (Plutarch writes lives instead of history) can also be read in light of this apologetic function of the prologues; in *Dem. 1–3*, Plutarch defends himself for his limited access to books, his knowledge of Latin, and the fact that he does not discuss the speeches of Demosthenes and Cicero; in *Nic. 1*, he claims that he is not writing the work in order to compete with other authors; in *Thes. 1*, he explains why he included mythological characters in his series. See Chrysanthou (2018) 27–34 on this aspect of these prologues.

⁹⁷⁰ See Duff (2004) 279 on the *topos* “that rival historians indulged in sensationalist narrative either lacking in moral content or transgressing the basic rules of historical accuracy”. See also *infra*, note 988 on *Cim. 2.5*: historians should be favourably disposed towards the subjects of their inquiry, Plutarch claims. This is also an important theme in *De Her. mal.*, and Pearson – Sandbach (1965) 5–6 in my view seem correct in reading this pamphlet in light of Plutarch’s idea that historical literature should focus on virtues in order to educate its readers. Thus, when the Chaeronean reached *Demetr.–Ant.*, he must have felt compelled to defend himself for something that might be interpreted as an inconsistency on his part.

⁹⁷¹ Cf. ἐπιδεικνόντες (*Demetr. 1.5*) and ἐπιδεικνόμενος (1.6): the perception of others is in line with the notion of αἰσχῶναι and βλάβαι.

bad performances, in order to show what should be imitated and avoided. Thus, the teacher applies bad role models in order to teach explicit lessons in a direct way.

[2] The anecdote about Antigenidas has a different focus and seems to illustrate a more indirect function of such models. It also alludes to what should *not* be regarded as Plutarch's motivation, viz. the diverting aspect resulting from the inclusion of negative *exempla*. Although he has stressed that variety is not what he aims at, his mere mention of this possibility highlights his awareness that this might be a side-effect. The Antigenidas story now clarifies that this side-effect is, in fact, not unwelcome. The implication seems to be that Plutarch is aware of the entertaining function of the *Parallel Lives*, and that an alternation of such pairs as *Demetrius–Antonius* and biographies of good men keeps the reader interested. Although *varietas* is not his *eventual* goal, it still can and will have a positive effect on his audience. Thus, one should not read οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονῆ too strictly, as only becomes clear at this stage of the text.

The closing words of [B] (οὕτως μοι ... ἔχοιμεν), explaining the relevance of the anecdotes for the *Parallel Lives*, somehow problematize all this by clarifying that this effect of ἡδονή is embedded in the process of *Seelenheilung*. This conclusion highlights that the entertaining aspect, illustrated by the Antigenidas story,⁹⁷² actually *precedes* the act of imitating positive role models referred to by Ismenias, although it is told later.⁹⁷³ Being acquainted with bad people, again described in terms of blame (ψεγομένων) and thus envisioning what one does not want to be (cf. Antigenidas), creates a desire to hear about the positive *exempla* again. This will, in the end, result in an imitation of this second group (cf. Ismenias). Thus, ἡδονή suddenly appears not as a welcome side-effect anymore, but even almost as a prerequisite for moral improvement.

At a closer look, the image becomes even more problematic. Plutarch does not mention that the bad *Lives* themselves will entertain the readers, but he still suggests that it is a possibility:

[1] The structure of the phrase οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονῆ ... τὴν γραφὴν is striking. As stated, Plutarch first refers to the ἡδονή of his readers, which suggests for a while that this pleasure should be seen as related to a reading of the negative *Lives* themselves. Only at the end does Plutarch clarify that the entertaining effect should be read in terms of variety.

[2] θεαταὶ καὶ μιμηταὶ in the closing words of [B] is pregnant with meaning. The metaphor of the readers as spectators *and* actors of a play

⁹⁷² Cf. the double use of φαύλων (in the Antigenidas story and in the concluding phrase).

⁹⁷³ Note καὶ θεαταὶ καὶ μιμηταὶ βίωv: imitation (also the goal of Ismenias' practice, but not explicitly named as Antigenidas' goal) follows perception.

is used in connection with the better *Lives*. At first sight, then, it refers to both the descriptive and protreptic moralism in these works.⁹⁷⁴ But there is more. The biographies (*Demetr.–Ant.*) that follow – and which were up to this point depicted as univocally bad *exempla* – will precisely be presented as theatre pieces: this will even be the strongest component that forges the two narratives into a whole.⁹⁷⁵ Plutarch, therefore, not only suggests that his negative biographies can, in the end, be amusing too in the eyes of some readers, but he also ensures that they *will* be amusing. As a consequence, there *will* be ἡδονή that does not result from variety but from the author’s artistic skills.

The question at stake is why Plutarch is doing this. He might point out that caution should be exercised when reading the following narratives: readers should not let themselves get carried away by the appealing style of the literary work, for it does not describe how they should try to become. Thus, in the case of this pair, one should only be a θεατής, not a μιμητής. The theatre metaphor, then, as far as it concerns *Demetrius–Antonius* and other pairs of base men, should rather be read in light of the function of negative role models as known from Plutarch’s *Seelenheilung* treatises: a tragedy often shows the suffering of people (cf. βλάβη); a comedy makes one laugh (cf. αἰσχύνη). This is in line with the dangers of literature, especially relevant for theatrical genres and poetry that might lead the audience to the wrong conclusions when not read in the correct way.⁹⁷⁶ Thus, by referring to these issues in his prologue and by continuously stressing the dramatic structure of his *Lives*, Plutarch warns and continues warning his readers of the risks of reading such ‘negative’ pairs. These risks also explain why Plutarch only includes a few biographies on bad men.

⁹⁷⁴ See also the first section of chapter 1.1.1, building on Pelling (2002) 237–251 (= (1995b)).

⁹⁷⁵ On this prologue and its connection with the theme of tragedy that dominates the pair, see Pelling (1988b) 21–22; Duff (2004); Pelling (2016b) 126–129. See also Tatum (1995) 426–428 and (1996) 141–143; Zadorojnyi (1997) 170 and (1999) 529–530 on this aspect in *Demetr.*; Xenophontos (2012a) 607–616; Beck, M. (2016), focusing on comic aspects in *Ant.*

⁹⁷⁶ Plutarch addresses such issues in *De aud. poet.*, see Hunter – Russell (2011) 2–17. They argue that Plato’s *Republic* provides the background: unlike Plato, Plutarch does not want to banish poetry, for if young men know how to read poetry, they will benefit much from it. Yet Roskam (2021) 56n46 points out that (with references to secondary literature) “more recent discussions have shown the essential similarities between the views of both thinkers”; see esp. Zadorojnyi (2002). For the Platonic background in *Demetr.* 1, see Duff (2004).

C The similarities between Demetrius and Antony (Demetr. 1.7–8)

Plutarch is now able to take his final step, viz. introducing the specific *Lives*. He does so in his typical way, by listing some striking similarities between the Greek and the Roman.⁹⁷⁷ The opening phrase might pose some difficulties (1.7):

Περιέξει δὴ τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον τὸν Δημητρίου τοῦ Πολιορκητοῦ βίον καὶ τὸν Ἀντωνίου τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος, ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα δὴ τῷ Πλάτῳ μαρτυρησάντων, ὅτι καὶ κακίας μεγάλας ὥσπερ ἀρετὰς αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις ἐκφέρουσι.

This book will therefore contain the Lives of Demetrius the City-besieger and Antony the Emperor, men who bore most ample testimony to the truth of Plato's saying that great natures exhibit great vices also, as well as great virtues.

Although the pair is at first introduced as entirely negative, Plutarch now turns to the idea of 'great natures'.⁹⁷⁸ It is unclear whether he means at this point that one example of such μεγάλαι φύσεις (such as Demetrius and Antony) only possesses κακίας μεγάλας while another only has ἀρετὰς, or whether one 'great nature' has both vices and virtues, but I prefer the second reading, since it is undeniable that the narratives of *Demetrius–Antonius* themselves show that these men had their good characteristics too.⁹⁷⁹ One therefore wonders whether this compromises Plutarch's arguments earlier in the prologue. This does not need to be the case. Despite some virtuous acts, Demetrius and Antony indeed remain rather bad examples, in the same way as quite good men have their vices too. Thus, as Duff states, "the programme has not changed",⁹⁸⁰ but the focus is somewhat different: because of this shift Plutarch considered it appropriate to write the prologue in question (once more in line with its apologetic function).

b) Conclusion

In the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius*, Plutarch feels compelled to defend himself against two possible accusations. He writes about vices, which might give the impression that he enjoys doing so, and he thereby seems to deviate from his practice in other pairs, especially from how it is described in the prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*: he will no

⁹⁷⁷ Duff (2004) 281; Duff (2014) 333.

⁹⁷⁸ See Duff (1999) *passim* on Plutarch's 'great natures'. See also Buchler-Isler (1972) 80–81; Verdegem (2010) 24.

⁹⁷⁹ Duff (1999) 47–48.

⁹⁸⁰ Duff (1999) 64.

longer avoid rather negative heroes. Yet despite the strong rhetorical and apologetic aspect of the text, the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius* recalls Plutarch's treatises of *Seelenheilung* in various respects. As a consequence, it seems to reflect his actual opinion about the function of negative role models: although an overload of vices could be dangerous, it is sometimes necessary to depict a frightening image of harm and blame, for this can persuade the (high-class) audience to avoid certain thoughts and actions. When finally convinced, one will study the opposite behaviour more, which can result in imitation.

1.2.2 Negative *Exempla* in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*

Three elements illustrate that the presence of negative *exempla* in the collection is in line with Plutarch's views on such role models as described in the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius*:

[1] There are only two clear negative examples, *Pyrrhus* (184CD) and *Alcibiades* (186D–F).⁹⁸¹ As in the *Parallel Lives*, the number of bad models is kept to a strict minimum.

[2] The location of *Pyrrhus* and *Alcibiades* illustrates that negative examples are meant to convince one that the opposite is preferable: both sections are framed by characters who exhibit virtuous behaviour. *Pyrrhus* I (184C) follows two sections that deal with the same topic: the unity among brothers (*Antiochus Hierax* and *Eumenes*, 184AB). The image of the Epirote as a true tyrant suggests that he will not accept frankness in his final apophthegm (184D), which clashes with the first story of the next section (184DE), in which Antiochus VII is glad to hear the truth about himself. *Alcibiades* similarly concludes a series of sections that dwell upon the same themes: justice and respect for the people (*Themistocles*, and esp. *Aristeides* and *Pericles*; 184F–186C). It hereby strengthens the positive image of those who preceded (in particular *Pericles*, 186C; cf. esp. the reference to *Pericles* in *Alcibiades* IV, 186E). Thus, *Pyrrhus* and *Alcibiades* indeed perform a convincing function, and the placement of the sections ensures that the audience is able to distinguish what is wrong (cf. Ingenkamp's κρίσις).

[3] The issue concerning the possibly entertaining aspect of negative *exempla* is also relevant in the context of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. First, there is the concept of *varietas delectat*. If Plutarch truly thought in this way about his worst models in the *Parallel Lives*,

⁹⁸¹ One might be inclined to count *Cyrus Minor* (173EF) as a negative *exemplum*, but the section only contains one apophthegm, which sheds light on the section of his brother (173F–174A) in the first place. It presents Artaxerxes Mnemon as weak. If this accusation is valid, *Cyrus* might be preferable in some respects, which means he falls under the category of dubious men.

he might have had something similar in mind when including *Pyrrhus* and *Alcibiades* in the collection: an alternation between better and worse protagonists will keep the readers interested. But more important is the humour in both sections. Pyrrhus is a tragicomic figure. Despite his ‘victories’ and eventual defeat (III and IV, 184C), he behaves like a *miles gloriosus* (I and II, 184C; and V, 184CD). He becomes even more pathetic in VI, when some young men deride him (184D). This image is also in line with his appearance in *Gaius Fabricius*: all his pomp and circumstance fails to impress the Roman, who makes fun of the Epirote (194F–195B). This embarrassing scene (cf. αἰσχῶναι) demonstrates what one does not want to become like. Most apophthegms on Alcibiades are witty too, at least to some extent, although he appears to be more vicious than Pyrrhus. He tries to escape justice (186E). Yet it does him no good: in the end, he is still sentenced to death and feels forced to turn against his country (186EF). The damage (cf. βλάβαι) he causes to himself and his homeland again depicts a nightmare view of what one could become. It calls to mind the theatre metaphor so prevalent in *Demetrius–Antonius*, and shows that the entertaining aspect is not meant to make the audience sympathize with such characters. On the contrary: it is entirely in line with their dissuading function as described in [2].

1.3 ‘Perfect’ *Exempla*⁹⁸²

τελείους δ’ ἀνθρώπους ἡγοῦμαι τοὺς δυναμένους τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν μεῖξαι καὶ κεράσαι τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ δυεῖν ὄντων μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἐπιβόλους ὑπάρχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, τοῦ τε κοινωφελοῦς βίου πολιτευομένων, τοῦ τ’ ἀκύμονος καὶ γαληνοῦ διατρίβοντας περὶ φιλοσοφίαν. (*De lib. educ.* 7F–8A)

And I consider those who can mix and blend political power with philosophy to be perfect persons, and I assume that they are in possession of two good things that are the greatest, both of the life of common utility, being active in politics, and of the waveless and calm life, busying oneself with philosophy.

The passage quoted is one of the few definitions of the perfect life in the Plutarchan oeuvre, but unfortunately the authenticity of the work is disputed.⁹⁸³ Yet it still basically reflects Plutarch’s views. The next pages

⁹⁸² As stated in the acknowledgements, this chapter, except for 1.3.2, presents a slightly adapted version of van der Wiel (2023b). I use my own translations, as I did in this earlier version.

⁹⁸³ Ziegler (1951) 810–811. For a discussion and biographical overview of this debate, see Abbot (1980) ix–xxx1; Albini (1997) 69n2; Xenophontos (2016) 27n21.

argue that he was indeed of the opinion that perfection, from a moral point of view, consists of finding the right balance between political life and philosophy.

There are six occurrences of τελειότης in Plutarch.⁹⁸⁴ One of these is found in a disputed work.⁹⁸⁵ Τέλειος occurs 105 times,⁹⁸⁶ nine of which in disputed works.⁹⁸⁷ Limiting myself to the undisputed texts and to the relevant passages, a consistent image arises:

[I] Plutarch does not believe that human beings can attain perfection,⁹⁸⁸ but one should still try to come as closely as possible to the ideal. This explains why Plutarch often refutes the Stoics in this regard: if it were impossible to become a true sage, and if progress towards virtue did not matter, moral behaviour would no longer make sense.⁹⁸⁹

⁹⁸⁴ The result of a TLG search for lemma τελειότης, -ητος, ἡ in Plutarch. The only passage that concerns human perfection is *De aud. poet.* 25A. In other passages, τελειότης refers to: (1) the completeness of a life (*Cam.* 43.2), (2) adulthood or being full-grown (*Cons. ad Apoll.* 113C, *Quaest. conv.* 638A), and (3), in line with this, strength (*Quaest. conv.* 638A, *Gryllus* 992A, *De comm. not.* 1060C).

⁹⁸⁵ For the problem of the authenticity of *Cons. ad Apoll.*, see Ziegler (1951) 797–800. Hani (1972) 27–50 and Defradas – Hani – Klaerr (1985) 1–12, however, defend Plutarch's authorship. Hani (1972) is in turn criticized by Babut (1975) 218–219.

⁹⁸⁶ A TLG search for lemma τέλειος, -α, -ον in Plutarch gives 103 results, but the final two concern the same fragment: Sandbach 157 and Jacoby FGtH 3B 388 F1. Looking for τελείως gives three results.

⁹⁸⁷ *De lib. educ.* 7C and 7F–8A; *Cons. ad Apoll.* 109E, 112B, 113E, 119F; *De fato* 572E; *Dec. or. vit.* 843E; *Aqua an ignis* 957A. On the disputed authenticity of *De lib. educ.*, see *supra*, note 983; for *Cons. ad Apoll.*, see *supra*, note 985; for *De fato*, *Aqua an ignis*, and *Dec. or. vit.*, see Ziegler (1951) 725–727 and 878–879.

⁹⁸⁸ As is the implication of *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* 4.3, discussed below. A similar point is made in *Cim.* 2.5 (which, however, does not contain τέλειος): historians should not focus on the bad characteristics of their subject, ὥσπερ αἰδουμένους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, εἰ καλὸν οὐδὲν εἰλικρινὲς οὐδ' ἀναμφισβήτητον εἰς ἀρετὴν ἦθος γεγονὸς ἀποδίδωσιν (“as if showing mercy to human nature, if it does not render a good character which is pure and indisputable as regards virtue”). See also Stadter (2000) 506; and Verdegem (2010) 24–25 on this passage, and on the fact that there are no perfect heroes in the *Parallel Lives*.

⁹⁸⁹ Roskam (2005b) 221–222 distinguishes three groups of works in which Plutarch criticizes the Stoic view: (1) “formal polemics against Stoicism” (221), (2) treatises containing “occasional anti-Stoic criticism” (221), and (3) a group “that stands midway between the other two” (222). Passages of (1) where τέλειος is used in the context of refutations of the Stoic doctrine concerning human perfection are: *De Stoic. rep.* 1046F (two occurrences); *Stoic. absurd. poet.* 1058B; *De comm. not.* 1061F, 1068C, 1069F, 1070B, and 1070D. For treatments of human perfection in (3), containing τέλειος, see: *De prof. in virt.* 75C, 76A, 82E, and 84D (this passage will appear relevant, see chapter 1.4.3). For a full

[2] A higher degree of perfection comes from philosophy, reason, and education.⁹⁹⁰ It is connected with a certain set of virtues, such as φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, and δικαιοσύνη,⁹⁹¹ and the ability to control one's emotions.⁹⁹² There is a close link with αὐτάρκεια.⁹⁹³

[3] Politics are an indispensable part of the perfect life. Anyone familiar with Plutarch will not be surprised by this. He wrote several works on the importance of a philosopher's participation in public life,⁹⁹⁴ and he practised what he preached.⁹⁹⁵ The passage that most explicitly connects political life and τελειότης is the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*, which is the focus of this chapter.⁹⁹⁶ A literary analysis will show that, in Plutarch's opinion, the demands of politics and philosophy can

discussion of this work, see Roskam (2005b) 222–363. See also Babut (1969) 319–322 for Plutarch's ideas about the Stoic sage and moral progress.

⁹⁹⁰ See *De aud.* 37F, but also *De aud. poet.* 25A: only philosophers know what happiness is – i.e. the perfect life, in this passage equated with the full possession of what is good. In *De soll. an.* 962C, Plutarch writes that perfect λόγος is the result of careful attention and training (ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ διδασκαλίας). In *De fortuna* 99C, he points out that reason and sagacity lead to the τελειοτάτη τέχνη. For a similar argument, see *An virt. doc.* 440A.

⁹⁹¹ *Demetr.* 1.4 calls these virtues πασῶν τελεώταται τεχνῶν. *An seni* 789F refers to the φρόνησις of old men as a perfect consequence of their age.

⁹⁹² In *Tim.* 6.7, Plutarch contrasts Timoleon's distress after he rightfully killed his brother with a story of Aristeides the Locrian who stuck to what he said, despite the horrible consequences. He concludes by calling this an example of a τελειότερα ἀρετή. For a similar reason, Aemilius is called τελειότερος in *Comp. Tim. et Aem.* 2.10. In *De aud. poet.* 26A, Plutarch refers to men in poetry as not perfect, but surrendered to πάθη and wrong opinions.

⁹⁹³ *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* 4.3 and 5.3, discussed below. This also appears from many other passages that contain τέλειος – even those that do not concern human perfection. *Agis&Cleom.* 2.1 is interesting in this regard too.

⁹⁹⁴ In *An seni* and *Praec. ger. reip.*, Plutarch gives advice on public life. *De unius* is (perhaps spurious: see Roskam (2009) 25n52 for an overview of secondary literature on this complex debate) fragment of a treatise concerning forms of government, see Ziegler (1951) 823–824. In particular *Maxime cum principibus* and *Ad princ. iner.* focus on the importance of a philosopher's influence on politicians; see Roskam (2009) 63–69 and Pelling (2014) on Plutarch's (Platonic) political theory. That Plutarch wrote *De lat. viv.* to reject Epicurus' λάθε βιώσας is then not surprising; see Roskam (2007) 87.

⁹⁹⁵ On Plutarch's own political career, see Ziegler (1951) 657–659; Roskam (2009) 17–19.

⁹⁹⁶ *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* 3.1. *An seni* 790A calls kingship the most perfect political function, but does not refer to πολιτεία as a necessary part of the perfect life. In *Non posse* 1088E, there is also a connection between perfection and the active life: Theon argues against the Epicureans, claiming that perfection (τι κρείττον ... καὶ τελειότερον) cannot

clash,⁹⁹⁷ and that it is a sign of a higher perfection when one is able to walk the path of the golden mean.⁹⁹⁸

1.3.1 The *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*

a) Literary analysis

Plutarch as a rule starts a *synkrisis* by privileging one hero, and then systematically prefers the other.⁹⁹⁹ This is no different in his comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior, although in this case, the heroes are recommended and denounced for the same characteristics. The general structure – which is not to be taken too strictly¹⁰⁰⁰ – is as follows:

A	Introduction (1.1–3)
B	In terms of military exploits and speech, Cato is superior (1.4–2.5)
C	In terms of wealth, Cato is superior (3)
C'	In terms of wealth, Aristeides is superior (4)
B'	In terms of military exploits and speech, Aristeides is superior (5)
A'	'Concluding' assessment (6)

The theme of perfection is addressed multiple times from C on, but the entire text should be taken into account for a full understanding.

A Introduction (1.1–3)

Most *synkrisis* intend to highlight the differences between a Greek and a Roman,¹⁰⁰¹ in order to enable the reader to decide who was the better

be found in bodily pleasures, but in the soul, in the way contemplative and politically active men do (ὥσπερ οἱ θεωρητικοὶ καὶ πολιτικοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν).

⁹⁹⁷ On the contrast between politics and philosophy in the *Lives*, see van Raalte (2005) 88–92.

⁹⁹⁸ *Agis* 2.1, quoted *infra*, p. 333, suggests something similar and connects it with perfection too, but does not problematize this issue.

⁹⁹⁹ Duff (1999) 257–262 discusses this in detail. He speaks of (261) “Equality of treatment”, of which *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* is a striking example (261–262). Attempts to deny the authenticity of the *synkrisis* have been rejected, and today, Plutarch’s authorship is generally accepted. See Duff (1999) 256 on this matter, with references to relevant secondary literature.

¹⁰⁰⁰ The first phrase of B (1.4) is closely connected with A; the opening words of C (3.1) continue the theme of politics which concludes B (2.4); B’ builds on the image of the ἀυτάρκης Aristeides in C’ (from 4.2 on); the opening of A’ (6.1), finally, still concerns Cato’s praise described in B’ (5.3).

¹⁰⁰¹ Erbse (1956) 401; Pelling (1986) 90; see also Duff (1999) 256, with nuance: “In general, where they exist, formal prologues bring out the similarities between the two

of the two. In the opening phrase of the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*, Plutarch argues that this is a difficult case, since the two share too many similarities (I.1).¹⁰⁰² Yet in the first example, he already notes a difference: both acquired political power and fame (πολιτείαν και δόξαν) because of their innate virtue and power (ἀρετῇ και δυνάμει), but the context was entirely different (I.2). This becomes apparent from the parallel structure of I.2–3.¹⁰⁰³

	1.2	1.3
M.C.	φαίνεται δ' ὁ μὲν Ἀριστείδης	ὁ δὲ Κάτων
I	1 οὐπω τότε μεγάλων οὐσῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων	ἐκ πολίχνης τε μικρᾶς
	2 και ταῖς οὐσίαις ἔτι συμμέτροις και ὀμαλοῖς ἐπιβαλῶν δημαγωγοῖς και στρατηγοῖς	και διαίτης ἀγροίκου δοκούσης
Main clause	ἐπιφανῆς γενέσθαι	φέρων ἀφήκεν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ εἰς πέλαγος ἀχανῆς τὴν ἐν Ῥώμῃ πολιτείαν
II	τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἦν τίμημα τότε πεντακοσίων μεδίμων, τὸ δὲ δευτερον [ἰππεῖς] τριακοσίων, ἔσχατον δὲ και τρίτον [οἱ ζευγῖται] διακοσίων	οὐκέτι Κουρίων και Φαβρικίων και Ἀτιλίων ἔργον οὐσαν ἡγεμόνων [...] ἀλλὰ πρὸς γένη μεγάλα και πλούτους και νομάς και σπουδαρχίας ἀποβλέπειν εἰθισμένην

[II] shows the similarity between both men: [I] their modest living place and [2] their frugal lifestyle. At the same time, it also points to a differ-

subjects; *synkriseis* bring out the differences, though there is considerable variation from this pattern.”

¹⁰⁰² See Swain (1992) 108–109 on this matter.

¹⁰⁰³ I.2: “And Aristeides, on the one hand, seems to have become a prominent man when Athens then was not yet great and after associating with popular leaders and generals who were similar and equal in terms of riches. For the greatest estimation of wealth at the time counted five hundred *medimnoi*, the second three hundred, and the final and third two hundred”; I.3: “Cato, on the other hand, leaving a small village and a lifestyle that seemed rustic, threw himself, as if into an immense sea, into the politics in Rome, which was no longer the work of men such as Curius and Fabricius and Atilius as rulers [...], but which used to pay attention to the great *gentes* and their riches and donations and eagerness to rule”. As to ἀχανῆς in I.5, Sansone (1989) 236 (translating with “the yawning billows”) points out that this is a “favorite expression of Plutarch’s”, and lists the following passages: *Aem.* 25.6, *Cic.* 6.4, *Mar.* 26.2, *De prof. in virt.* 76C, and *Non posse* 1107A. One can add: *Alex.* 31.10 and *De lat. viv.* 1130E.

ence: in the case of Aristeides, the general condition of an entire city state is described; in the case of Cato, it concerns his specific dwelling place. This refers back to the *Life of Cato Maior*, where Plutarch describes Cato's home before he participated in Roman politics: he lived close to the former residence of the poor Manius Curius, whom he took as his model (*Ca. Ma.* 2.1–3). This is important for the interpretation of [III]: simple, early Athens, still following Solon's legislation,¹⁰⁰⁴ is contrasted with Rome, described in highly negative terms. Yet Rome once looked like Athens in the ancient times of Manius Curius. The comparison between Cato and these Romans of old thus depicts him as an anachronism.

This first paragraph, therefore, does not yet contain an explicit assessment of the heroes. It only describes the context in which they lived. This different background provides the argument in B.

B Cato's superiority: military exploits and speech (1.4–2.5)

The introductory phrase of B is closely connected with A. Plutarch again contrasts Aristeides' Athens with Cato's Rome, in connection with wealth and descent (1.4).¹⁰⁰⁵

οὐκ ἦν δ' ὁμοιον ἀντιπάλῳ χρῆσθαι Θεμιστοκλεῖ, μήτ' ἀπὸ γένους λαμπρῷ καὶ κεκτημένῳ μέτρια – πέντε γὰρ ἢ τριῶν ταλάντων οὐσίαν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι λέγουσιν ὅτε πρῶτον ἤπτετο τῆς πολιτείας – καὶ πρὸς Σκιπίωνα, Ἀφρικανοὺς καὶ Σερουίους Γάλβας καὶ Κουϊντίους Φλαμινίους ἀμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ πρωτείων, μηδὲν ὀρμητήριον ἔχοντα πλὴν φωνὴν παρρησιαζομένην ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων.

And it was not the same to deal with Themistocles as antagonist, who did not come from an eminent house and had acquired moderate possessions – for they say that he possessed five or three talents when he for the first time engaged in public life – and to contend with men such as Scipio Africanus and Servius Galba and Quintus Flaminius about the first place, without any incentive except for his [Cato's] voice that spoke frankly about justice.

The different situation brings Plutarch to a first criticism of Aristeides: in military campaigns, he never prevailed (which is, as Sansone writes,

¹⁰⁰⁴In *Sol.* 18.1, Plutarch describes Solon's division of the Athenian people in similar wording.

¹⁰⁰⁵The precise information about Themistocles' property reminds one of the description of Solon's τίμημα in A (recalling the exact numbers of his measure in 1.3); the list of Roman names recalls a similar construction in A too (compare with the list of three Roman names in 1.3, also in plural: Κουρίων καὶ Φαβρικίων καὶ Ατλίων; see Zadorojnyi (2018) 215 on this and similar passages).

not in line with the *Life*),¹⁰⁰⁶ contrary to his Roman counterpart (2.1–3).¹⁰⁰⁷ Plutarch's argument is surprising: as Duff states, the author prefers Cato's victories in small Spanish towns and a war against Antiochus to the greatest Greek victories in the period of the Persian Wars;¹⁰⁰⁸ moreover, he ignores Themistocles' military talent and thus minimizes his value as a rival. This is not fair to Aristeides, and in particular this second point also contradicts the *Life*.¹⁰⁰⁹

The second part of B discusses the political career of the two men. The image of Aristeides deteriorates further: Themistocles caused him to be ostracized, but Cato survived every lawsuit (2.4–5).¹⁰¹⁰ Cato's rhetorical talents, as his only weapon (1.4), become *the explanation* for his superiority at the end of B.¹⁰¹¹ This even leads Plutarch to compare him with Aristotle (2.5).¹⁰¹²

For Plutarch, persuasiveness is an important feature of the statesman and this motif is reflected here as well.¹⁰¹³ Yet in the episode of Aris-

¹⁰⁰⁶Sansone (1989) 236: "In the *Life* of Aristeides, however, Plutarch portrayed him as commander in chief at Plataea (11.1)."

¹⁰⁰⁷Note πρώτους ἀμιλλωμένους ὑπερβαλόμενος in 2.1, resembling ἀμιλλᾶσθαι περιπρωτείων in 1.4.

¹⁰⁰⁸Duff (1999) 261. Concerning the description of Antiochus' defeat in 2.3, Sansone (1989) 237 points out that the "wording encourages us to recall that Aristeides too (9.5–6) had been responsible for expelling Asiatic invaders from Greece"; see *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* 2.3: ἡ νίκη, περιφανῶς ἔργον οὐσα Κάτωνος, ἐξήλασε τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὴν Ἀσίαν – *Arist.* 9.6: Ἀριστείδης [...] ἐκέλευε [...] ὅπως τὴν ταχίστην ἐκβάλωσι τὸν Μῆδον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

¹⁰⁰⁹The enmity between Aristeides and Themistocles is described in *Arist.* 2–3.4, which shows that it was not easy at all to have Themistocles as an opponent.

¹⁰¹⁰See ἀντιπάλους χρώμενος, similar to ἀντιπάλῳ χρῆσθαι in 1.4. On the wrestling metaphor in this *synkrisis*, see Sansone (1989) 237.

¹⁰¹¹Compare πρόβλημα τοῦ βίου καὶ δραστήριον ὄργανον ἔχων τὸν λόγον ("having his speech as a barrier of his life and efficacious instrument") in 2.5, and μηδὲν ὀρητήριον ἔχοντα πλὴν φωνὴν παρρησιαζομένην ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων (translation: see *supra*, p. 320) in 1.4 again.

¹⁰¹²Plutarch cites Antipater's "praise of Aristotle" elsewhere in the *Lives* too, see van Raalte (2005) 103–104.

¹⁰¹³*Agis* 2.1, cited *infra*, p. 333. See also *Praec. ger. reip.* 801C–804C on the importance of a statesman's persuasiveness and the right ways to address the people. 801E reminds one of *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.*: ἢ που δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπων ἰδιότην ἐξ ἱματίου καὶ σχήματος δημοτικῷ πόλιν ἄγειν βουλόμενον ἐξισχῦσαι καὶ κρατῆσαι τῶν πολλῶν, εἰ μὴ λόγον ἔχει συμπείθοντα καὶ προσαγόμενον; ("Or is an ordinary man with common clothes and appearance, who wants to lead a city, in some way able to prevail and rule over many, if he would not have speech which persuades and wins over?"). Precisely his persuasiveness provides Cato's power in the *synkrisis* too.

teides' banishment in the *Life*, Plutarch tells an anecdote about how he did not even try to defend himself and wrote down his own name on the ostrakon of an illiterate man, who admitted he did not even know Aristeides (*Arist.* 7.7–8).¹⁰¹⁴ Aristeides, therefore, was not forced to leave Athens because he lacked persuasiveness, but because he did not want to use his voice.

C Cato's superiority: wealth (3)

The reference to Aristotle at the end of B brings Plutarch to a more philosophical reflection on human perfection (3.1):¹⁰¹⁵

Ἵτι μὲν δὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἄνθρωπος ἀρετῆς οὐ κτᾶται τελειοτέραν, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι· ταύτης δέ που μῶριον οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν οἰκονομικὴν οὐ σμικρὸν τίθενται [...].

It is generally believed that a human being can acquire absolutely no more perfect virtue than that of civic affairs; and most people regard the virtue of managing one's household to be no little part of it.

Perfection means taking part in politics, and Plutarch explains how one can become a good politician. A similar connection of private and public life can be found in *Septem sapientium convivium*, where Chilon combines household management with the task of the statesman, adding a story on Lycurgus (155DE).¹⁰¹⁶

This Spartan king also appears on the stage in the next phrase of the *synkrisis* in comparison with Cato. Not only did the Roman give heed to Lycurgus' insight, but he also taught the people to do so (3.1–2).¹⁰¹⁷ This

¹⁰¹⁴The story is also recalled by B' and will therefore be discussed in more detail below.

¹⁰¹⁵See Sansone (1989) 237: "Plutarch is here influenced by Aristotle, according to whom (*Eth. Nic.* 1094b8–9, *Pol.* 1252a5) the good of the state is greater and more comprehensive than the good of individual citizens. [...] The virtue that is exercised in civic life, which Plutarch carefully refrains from naming, is justice (*Pol.* 1253a37), the virtue that comprehends the rest (see *Eth. Nic.* 1129b25, *Plato Rep.* 434c) and of which Aristeides is the conspicuous exemplar. Thus the criticism of Aristeides in this chapter is subtly undercut." Yet in what follows, Plutarch will precisely claim that Aristeides was *not* just by being poor.

¹⁰¹⁶*Praec. ger. reip.* also closes with a call to avoid private quarrels, since these often affect the entire state (825A–F); see Swain (1999) 88–90. On this statement in the *synkrisis*, see Sansone (1989) 237 again: "Further Aristotelian influence; cf. *Pol.* 1252b16 and 28, 1253b3."

¹⁰¹⁷In *De se ipsum laud.* 544C, Cato depicts the opposite image of his own character: οἷς [*sc.* φάρμακα for self-praise] καὶ Κάτων ἐχρητο φθονεῖσθαι λέγων, ὅτι τῶν ἰδίων ἀμελεῖ καὶ τὰς νύκτας ἀγρυπνεῖ διὰ τὴν πατρίδα ("Cato too used these things while say-

comparison and the motif of Cato as the teacher of the people recall Plutarch's image of the philosopher king:¹⁰¹⁸ it is a core task of the good ruler to educate the masses, and Cato apparently fulfilled this mission.¹⁰¹⁹

Aristeides, on the contrary, did not follow Hesiod's and Homer's advice on household management (3.2–3). The reference to these poets continues the series of paradigms:¹⁰²⁰ while Cato is compared to two Greek role models (Aristotle and Lycurgus), and prominent ones, Aristeides ignores the advice of Homer and Hesiod, essential to Greek παιδεία.¹⁰²¹ The Roman, then, is more Greek than the Athenian, which contrasts sharply with the *Lives* that depict Cato as rejecting anything Greek.¹⁰²²

The term δικαιοσύνη in the reference to the epic poets is also striking: through his entire life, Aristeides was praised for his justice (“ὁ Δίκαιος” was his nickname). Again, the picture of the biographies is subverted.¹⁰²³ Using a body metaphor,¹⁰²⁴ Plutarch points out that, by remaining poor, Aristeides in fact did injustice to his household and descendants (3.4). However, it is less clear how his poverty defiled his political career. An explicit contrast with Cato provides a first explanation: his offspring performed important political duties for many generations; Aristeides' family could not even dream of this (3.5). This further highlights the damage the Athenian caused to his children, but also that he hurt his city, for his family was a costly burden to the community, and was not able properly

ing that he was begrudged because he did not have care for his private affairs and passed sleepless nights for the sake of his country”).

¹⁰¹⁸Roskam (2002) 181: “Once the ruler has been fully educated, he can assume the arduous task of educating in turn his own people.” See also de Blois – Bons (1995) 106; Roskam (2009) 66–67. See also Hershbell (1995) about the educational role of the law-givers Lycurgus and Numa. Although Cato is definitely not a philosopher king, Plutarch would have appreciated his attempts to improve the Romans. See also *supra*, note 606.

¹⁰¹⁹Plutarch has Cato's *De agricultura* in mind; see Sansone (1989) 238.

¹⁰²⁰In his article on “Plutarch's Use of the Poets”, de Wet (1988) 19 briefly refers to the passage.

¹⁰²¹As Bréchet (2003) 527–528 points out, Homer and Hesiod are examples of παλαιοί. These are connected with wisdom and virtues, see also section 1.3.1.b of this chapter. In *De aud. poet.*, Plutarch presents reading poetry as a suitable way of preparing young people for philosophy: even though he is a Platonist, he still incites his readers to study the poets (but see *supra*, note 976).

¹⁰²²Plutarch discusses this in *Ca. Ma.* 25: Cato not only enjoyed mocking Greeks, but also hated philosophy. On the Romans and their acceptance of or aversion to Greekness in Plutarch, see Swain (1990), discussing *Ca. Ma.* on pp. 126–128.

¹⁰²³Aristeides' nickname is dealt with in *Arist.* 6–7. Plutarch presents it as one of the reasons for his banishment (cf. the analysis of his section, 186A–C, in Part II).

¹⁰²⁴Sansone (1989) 238 points out that Plutarch has Plato, *Prot.* 334b–c in mind.

to serve the country.¹⁰²⁵ In line with Lycurgus' saying earlier in the paragraph, one concludes that the poor truly harm the commonwealth more than the rich.

There is also another, implicit explanation, to be derived from a further contrast with Cato. The Roman shows his subjects the right path, as a good politician should do. Aristeides, however, did quite the contrary. By being poor, he, in a certain sense, provided a bad model for the people: if they all were to follow his example, it would damage the state. Thus, Aristeides is to be blamed for neglecting his educating role too, as seems to be the implication at this point in the *synkrisis*: Cato is the better politician.

C' Aristeides' superiority: wealth (4)

Ἡ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀμφιλογίαν ἔχει;

Or is this the first point which could tell either way? [Pelling]¹⁰²⁶

This brief quotation marks a break.¹⁰²⁷ From now on, Aristeides is univocally praised. Poverty, Plutarch continues, can also be a sign of a great character, if it does not originate from indolence and negligence (4.1). This contrasts with the quotation of Homer and the reference to Hesiod: although their claims might be right, they do not apply to Aristeides. The difference between C and C' is continued in what follows, recalling 4.2 (note the verbal references):¹⁰²⁸

οὐ γὰρ ἔστι πράττειν μεγάλα φροντίζοντα μικρῶν, οὐδὲ πολλοῖς δεομένοις βοηθεῖν πολλῶν αὐτὸν δεόμενον. μέγα δ' εἰς **πολιτείαν** ἐφόδιον οὐχὶ πλοῦτος, ἀλλ' αὐτάρκεια, τῷ μηδενὸς ἰδίᾳ τῶν περιττῶν δεῖσθαι πρὸς οὐδεμίαν ἀσχολίαν ἀπάγουσα τῶν δημοσίων. ἀπροσδεῆς

¹⁰²⁵ Plutarch writes that Aristeides' descendants themselves asked for public money (3.5). Sansone (1989) 238 notes a contradiction with *Arist.* "27.2 and 27.5, where we are told that the citizens of Athens gave grants to some of Aristeides' female descendants (but not that the latter *begged* for them)."

¹⁰²⁶ The precise meaning of πρῶτον is difficult to define. Although the LCL text has πρῶτον, Perrin (1914) 393 translates: "Possibly this point invites discussion", ignoring the word. Sansone (1989) 169 reads: "Or does this matter allow of debate beforehand?" Adverbial use might be correct, but I decided to follow the translation of Pelling (2002) 275 (= (2004) 415).

¹⁰²⁷ Also Duff (1999) 261–262.

¹⁰²⁸ Sansone (1989) 239 sees a reference back to *Ca. Ma.* 21.8 in this passage, where Plutarch "criticized Cato for calling 'god-like' the man who increases the value of the estate that he inherits."

μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ θεὸς, ἀνθρωπίνης δ' ἀρετῆς, ᾧ συνάγεται πρὸς τοῦλάχιστον ἢ χρεία, τοῦτο **τελειότατον** καὶ θειότατον.

For it is not possible to perform great actions while giving heed to small things, nor to help the many who are in need while you are in need of many things yourself. And not wealth, but self-sufficiency is a great support for politics, which does not lead one to any negligence of public affairs, by having need of nothing that is superfluous in one's private life. For, on the one hand, god is absolutely without want; as regards human virtue, on the other hand, that part of it which reduces need to its smallest extent, is most perfect and most divine.

This is in line with other Plutarchan passages on perfection: *τελειότης* is connected with *αὐτάρκεια* and is beyond reach for human beings.¹⁰²⁹ At first sight, the definition provides a second contradiction with C: it is not doing politics but rather *αὐτάρκεια* that is the most perfect virtue. Yet perhaps it should rather be read as an adjustment: *αὐτάρκεια* is recommended precisely because it enables one to better perform public duties. The term *ἐφόδιον* is well chosen in this respect, as it often refers to the means that enable one to fulfil a certain task.¹⁰³⁰ Plutarch's claim, therefore, is somewhat paradoxical: independence from wealth is presented as the right *ἐφόδιον* for political life.

Yet the question is *how* *αὐτάρκεια* can be of help to the politician. The reason Plutarch gives (wealth distracts from politics) contrasts with C. It also differs from the description of Aristeides as an *αὐτάρκης* in the *Life* and his value in this respect for public affairs (*Arist.* 2.6; Aristeides is contrasted with his rival Themistocles, who opted for the opposite course):

Ἀριστείδης δὲ **καθ' αὐτὸν** ὥσπερ **ὁδὸν ἰδίαν** ἐβάδιζε **διὰ τῆς πολιτείας**, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ βουλόμενος συναδικεῖν τοῖς ἐταίροις ἢ λυπηρὸς εἶναι μὴ χαριζόμενος, ἔπειτα τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων δύναμιν οὐκ ὀλίγους ὀρῶν ἐπαίρουσαν ἀδικεῖν, ἐφυλάττετο, μόνῳ τῷ χρηστῷ καὶ δίκαια πράσσειν καὶ λέγειν ἀξιῶν θαρρεῖν τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην.

Aristeides, on the other hand, walked through politics on his own, as if on a private road, first because he did not want to act unjustly together with his friends or to cause sorrow by not favouring them; second because he observed that the power from friends brought not a few to injustice, he was on his guard, since he thought that the good citizen is only of good courage by doing and saying useful and just things.

¹⁰²⁹ As discussed at the outset of this chapter (1.3).

¹⁰³⁰ See LSJ, s.v. “ἐφόδιον”: “supplies for travelling, money and provisions, esp. of an army”.

Compared with this, Plutarch's argument in the *synkrisis* appears rather weak. Despite the fact that C' contains some truth, it does not do away with the arguments of C: Aristeides still damaged his house, and consequently his country. It is therefore striking that the remainder of C' does not expand on the importance of poverty for politics at all, although this is what Plutarch, in fact, should do, if he wants to defend Aristeides against the negative image he just painted.¹⁰³¹ In what follows, the author only dwells upon αὐτάρκεια as a perfect virtue and indeed how it sets free one's mind.

This argument again opens with a body comparison (4.3), which further connects and contrasts C' with C, where Plutarch draws on the same metaphorical field in order to defend a different position. A similar procedure can be noticed in 4.4–5, which again sets Aristeides in opposition to Cato. The Athenian is listed together not only with Epameinondas, but also with Manius Curius and Gaius Fabricius (4.4). In the next phrase, on the contrary, Cato is presented as a hypocrite: he cooked turnips (γογγυλίδας) but talked and wrote about becoming rich (4.5). This root vegetable is not randomly chosen as Cato's favourite meal. It once more refers back to an apophthegm told in the *Life*, where Manius Curius is preparing the same dish (*Ca. Ma.* 2.2).¹⁰³² Stories as these instigated Cato to take this man as his *exemplum* (2.3). Thus, the image of Cato as an anachronism, evoked by A, is rejected by this reference in C': he is just a superficial imitator of the Romans of yore, while Aristeides deserves to be compared with them. In other words: at first Cato seemed to live according to the prescriptions of the greatest Greeks (Aristotle and Lycurgus) in B and C, but in C', Aristeides is the one who finally resembles the early men of Rome's cultural heritage.

Plutarch subsequently illustrates the truth of his view by citing an apophthegm of Aristeides (4.6) to argue that the Athenian was definitely not indolent (4.7).¹⁰³³ The chapter concludes with a reference back to the opening words of C'.¹⁰³⁴ Plutarch will now return to the theme of 1.4–2.5, but the connection between perfection and self-sufficiency continues.

¹⁰³¹ And which Plutarch could have done: in *Praec. ger. reip.* 822D–823E, he argues that the good politician does not need to be wealthy.

¹⁰³² Note *Ca. Ma.* 2.2: ἔψοντα γογγυλίδας – *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* 4.5: γογγυλίδας ... ἔψοντι. Sansone (1989) 239 sees a problematic contradiction between these passages: "Plutarch is either very careless or is trying to engage in deception. It was not Cato but Curius [...] who was discovered boiling turnips himself, nor was anything said about him regarding them as the finest delicacy."

¹⁰³³ The apophthegm concerns the trial of Callius, presented as the wealthiest man in Athens in *Arist.* 25. This passage contains a similar apophthegm of Aristeides (25.7–8).

¹⁰³⁴ 4.1: ῥαθυμίας – 4.7: ῥαθυμίας.

B' Aristeides' superiority: military exploits and speech (5)

The first word of this paragraph introduces this new topic: στρατηγία (see B). Both passages are closely connected by means of references to the same [1] wars and battles, [2] names of opponents, and [3] other similarities:

B	B'
[1] Μαραθῶνι (2.1), Πλαταιαῖς (2.1), Μαραθῶνος, Σαλαμῖνος (2.2), Πλαταιαῖς (2.2), Ἴβηρικὸν πόλεμον (2.3), ἐπ' Ἀντίοχον (2.3)	[1] Μαραθῶν (5.1), Σαλαμίς (5.1), Πλαταιαί (5.1), Ἀντίοχον (5.2), Ἴβηρικῶν πόλεων (5.2)
[2] Θεμιστοκλεῖ (1.4), Σκιπίωνα Ἄφρικανούς (1.4), Θεμιστοκλεῖς (2.2), Σκιπίωνι (2.3)	[2] Θεμιστοκλεῖ (5.4), Σκιπίωνι (5.4)
[3] ἀντιπάφῳ χρῆσθαι (1.4), δόξαν (2.3), ἀντιπάλοις χρώμενος (2.4), ἀήττητοι (2.4)	[3] δόξης (5.2), ἀντιπράττων (5.4), ἀήττητον (5.4)

It goes without saying that Plutarch attempts to redirect his readers to B. Surprisingly, he claims that it is not worthwhile to compare the battles fought by the two men (5.2: οὐκ ἄξιον δήπου παραβαλεῖν), even though this is precisely what he did in B. In addition, this point resembles what he said in 1.4: opposing Themistocles is not the same as competing with the illustrious Romans of Cato's days. Thus, as was the case with C–C', Plutarch constructs arguments of similar nature to defend different positions in B–B' as well.

In what follows, the conflict between the two parts of the *synkrisis* continues. While praising Cato's persuasiveness in B, Plutarch sheds a negative light on this characteristic in B': the Roman was fond of self-praise. This also casts shadow over his military exploits, since it seems to imply that he only was the first because one could always hear him boasting. Furthermore, this argument defends Aristeides from the fact that he never prevailed: he simply did not care about fame and did not talk himself to the top. Plutarch is therefore able to continue a theme of C': the Athenian's αὐτάρκεια – making him more perfect – was not only directed at πλοῦτος, but also at δόξα (5.2–3). This once more leads to a reflection on perfection (5.3–4):

τελειότερος δέ μοι δοκεῖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τοῦ πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐγκωμιάζοντος ὁ μὴδ' ἑτέρων τοῦτο ποιοῦντων δεόμενος. τὸ γὰρ ἀφιλότιμον οὐ μικρὸν εἰς πραότητα πολιτικὴν ἐφόδιον, καὶ τοῦναντίον ἢ φιλοτιμία χαλεπὸν καὶ φθόνου γονιμώτατον [...].

In my view, more perfect in virtue than the man who often praises himself, is the man who has no need of others to do so either. For the absence of love of honour is no small help for statesmanlike mildness, and the opposite, love of honour, is hard to deal with and the greatest source of jealousy.

This quote is followed by two phrases, containing a parallel structure and contrasting Aristeides with Cato: the first worked together with his opponent, and saved his city; the latter did the opposite, and almost damaged his country (5.4). This shows that φιλοτιμία can truly be a destructive force. Yet here too, there is a contrast with B, which mentions Aristeides' ostracism. As Plutarch states there, this was instigated by Themistocles (2.4). This naturally comes to mind when the author describes Aristeides' assistance of his enemy in B' (5.4), as indeed happened after his banishment (*Arist.* 8). In addition, Plutarch focuses on the jealousy (φθόνος) of the people in the story of the ostracism, where he adds a short digression on this Athenian practice (*Arist.* 7.2):¹⁰³⁵

μοχθηρίας γὰρ οὐκ ἦν κόλασις ὁ ἐξοστρακισμός, ἀλλ' ἐκαλεῖτο μὲν δι' εὐπρέπειαν ὄγκου καὶ δυνάμεως βαρυτέρας ταπεινώσις καὶ κόλουσις, ἣν δὲ φθόνου παραμυθία φιλάνθρωπος [...].

For ostracism was not a punishment for depravity, but one called it, as a pretext, an abasement and berth of esteem and too strong power, although it was a lenient abatement of envy.

This summons some questions about B': apparently, Aristeides was still a victim of envy, so for him, absence of φιλοτιμία did not suffice to get rid of it. This time, references to an earlier chapter therefore function in the opposite way: statements in the latter chapter are to be questioned.

A' 'Concluding' assessment (6)

This final paragraph does not entirely stand apart from B', as the theme of praise and fame is continued.¹⁰³⁶ Yet there is also a break, since it concerns the one event in Cato's life for which he deserves the most blame. An initial reading of this section therefore gives the impression of some kind of conclusion: after all, Cato is to be rejected and the more perfect

¹⁰³⁵The combination ὄγκου καὶ δυνάμεως also occurs in *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* 1.3: δι' ὄγκον ἤδη καὶ δύναμιν (of the people or of the great families), which blinds the Romans, because of which they treat haughtily those who want to rule.

¹⁰³⁶Note also παρ' ἄξιαν (6.1) – παρ' ἄξιαν (2.5).

Aristeides is the true role model.¹⁰³⁷ Such an interpretation, however, would be a sudden change of practice. It will therefore not come as a surprise that at a closer reading a more problematic picture arises.

A' refers back to the *Life*: when it was discovered that he secretly slept with a slave girl in his later years, Cato married a young girl of low birth (*Ca. Ma.* 24). In this passage, Plutarch does not assess the episode, unlike in the *synkrisis*. Yet he does not conclude the work by rebuking Cato for these actions as such (6.1–2), although this would suffice to end on a negative note with regard to the Roman. On the contrary: he closes his text with the importance of honour and power that comes with marriage, and which Cato should have exploited. The following passage follows a reference to the reason Cato gave for his second marriage (*Ca. Ma.* 24.4). After a complaint by his son, he claimed that he just wanted more children like him (6.3).¹⁰³⁸

εἰ γὰρ ἐβούλετο παῖδας ἀγαθοὺς ὁμοίως τεκνῶσαι, γάμον ἔδει λαβεῖν **γενναῖον** ἐξ ἀρχῆς σκεψάμενον, οὐχ ἕως μὲν ἐλάνθανεν ἀνεγγύω γυναικὶ καὶ κοινῇ συγκοιμώμενος ἀγαπᾶν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐφωράθη, ποιήσασθαι πενθερὸν ὃν ῥᾶστα πείσειν, οὐχ ὧ κάλλιστα κηδεύσειν ἔμελλεν.

For if he wanted to procreate equally good children, he should have considered from the beginning to choose a marriage with a high-born. He should not have been satisfied as long as he secretly slept with an unbetrothed and common woman, nor should he, when discovered, have made as his father-in-law the one whom he would persuade most easily, instead of with whom he would be most beautifully allied in marriage.

The focus on the girl's low birth recalls the contemporary status of Rome described in A: the city is ruled by the great *gentes* alone, with whom Cato's family cannot be identified. In other words: while the first half of the *synkrisis* depicts the Roman as an anachronism and praises him for this, and while this image is rejected by the second half, the last paragraph denounces him precisely because he does not comply with the historical

¹⁰³⁷ See also Sansone (1989) 240: "Plutarch's tendentiousness is apparent from his decision to emphasize this incident at the very end of the comparison."

¹⁰³⁸ In *Ca. Ma.* 24.5, however, Plutarch adds that this saying was uttered earlier by Peisistratus, an apophthegm which also occurs in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* as *Peisistratus V* (189D) and in *De frat. am.* 480DE (cf. *supra*, note 592). It is not clear whether he means that the saying is wrongly attributed to Cato, but at least in the *synkrisis*, he presents it as authentic.

reality of his times. Apparently, honour *does* matter. It is not immediately clear what one should think of this.

b) Consistent inconsistency

A superficial reading of the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior* makes one conclude that Plutarch, in the end, unambiguously prefers Aristeides.¹⁰³⁹ The Greek seems to be more perfect, but at a closer look, a more problematic image arises. There appear to be some contradictions between the *synkrisis* and the *Lives*. As Duff points out, such instances are no exception in the *Parallel Lives*.¹⁰⁴⁰ He concludes:¹⁰⁴¹

the *synkrisis* do not give the reader a summary of the content or the moral issues raised in the preceding narratives. Rather they give a new and often different view of the protagonists from the one given in the narrative. This is partly a result of the rhetorical structure of the *synkrisis*: the two different ways of constructing the past inevitably give different pictures. But the dissonance between narrative and *synkrisis* seems deliberate. Sometimes, furthermore, the text actually draws attention to the dissonance by means of unresolved contradictions between Life and *synkrisis*.

I have shown that this also applies to the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*, although in this case even more striking ‘contradictions’ occur *within* the text. These are definitely not coincidental, since they are highlighted by various attempts to redirect the reader by means of a network of verbal and thematic similarities. One can only conclude that Plutarch deliberately makes his own text deconstruct itself.¹⁰⁴²

Yet despite these apparent contradictions, there is still a certain degree of consistency. This will be illustrated by a chronotopic analysis. Such an approach has proved useful in research on Plutarch: Banta analysed

¹⁰³⁹ See also Sansone (1989) 240: “By concluding his comparison with an assertion of Aristeides’ possession, and Cato’s lack, of this cardinal virtue [*sc.* self-control], Plutarch leaves us no doubt as to which of the two men he regards as morally superior.” In addition, arguments that favour Cato appear weaker than those praising his Greek counterpart. As Duff (1999) 261 puts it: “Plutarch plainly struggled to find arguments in Cato’s favour”.

¹⁰⁴⁰ See Duff (1999) 263–283, who speaks of “closural dissonance”; also Duff (2011a) 74–75. Verdegem (2010) 29–32, however, is not inclined to read too much into discrepancies between *Lives* and *synkrisis*.

¹⁰⁴¹ Duff (1999) 286.

¹⁰⁴² Konstan (2004) 14 argues that “Plutarch’s approach is not so very far removed from that of modern deconstructionist critics”, in the context of his approach to poetry. The confusion elicited by *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* suggests that this is in line with how he wanted his own works to be read.

passages of the *Life of Romulus* in light of Ladin's local chronotopes and pointed out how these refer to and contrast with each other (he speaks of "chronotopic conflicts").¹⁰⁴³ This works for the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior* as well. In 1.2–4, four chronotopes can be distinguished:

[1] Athens of simple means, in the period of the Persian Wars (the time of Themistocles and Aristeides);

[2] Later, great Athens, in terms of its virtues similar to later Rome (this is not explicitly described, but evoked by the description of earlier Athens in terms of its contrast with the later condition of the city),¹⁰⁴⁴

[3] Rural republican Rome, of simple means, before its greatest conquests (the times of men such as Manius Curius);

[4] Later republican Rome, characterized by the rule of rich families who flatter the degenerated people (the time of Cato the Elder and men such as Scipio Africanus).

[1] and [3] belong together: they describe the time before the greatness of a city, which is in the case of Rome described in [4], and for Athens [2] alluded to by [1]. This distinction reminds one of Bréchet's extensive study of the image of the *παλαιοί* in Plutarch. Bréchet points out that, although the Ancients have their flaws, they are often connected with a certain set of virtues and contrasted with later times (of a degenerated people). Thus, although more recent periods are associated with civilization, in contrast with the more primitive status of earlier societies, these elder times remain more perfect in terms of morality.¹⁰⁴⁵ The same can be seen from the "conflicting chronotopes" in the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*: Aristeides belongs to the *παλαιοί* chronotope [1], Cato to the other [4].

This provides an important key for a correct understanding of the *synkrisis*. When Cato is rightfully praised (B and C), it is because he conforms to the historical reality of [4]. When he is denounced, it is because he does not (5.3). All the arguments in B and C that present Cato as more virtuous – i.e. as virtually belonging to [3] – are deconstructed in B' and C'. Yet this does not contradict the overall picture that he was a good or at least a successful politician.

¹⁰⁴³Banta (2007); based on Ladin (1999), dealing with local chronotopes esp. on pp. 218–219.

¹⁰⁴⁴Note the focus on the difference between past and future Athens: (1.2) οὐπω τότε – (1.2) ἔτι – (1.3) τότε.

¹⁰⁴⁵Bréchet (2003). See also Russell (1982) on Plutarch and legendary figures.

When Aristeides, on the contrary, is praised in C' and B', it is because of his virtues: he appears as a true *παλαιός* [I]. Claims that he was not virtuous in B and C are also dismissed there. Arguments (C' and B') that praise his political career, however, are weak and should be questioned, and those that blamed him as a politician (in B and C) are not rejected in the following paragraphs, or at least not successfully. In particular, the story of his ostracism raises questions.

To conclude: a chronotopic analysis points out that the *synkrisis* contrasts the image of the virtuous *παλαιός* (cf. I.I: ἀρετῇ καὶ δυνάμει) with that of the successful statesman (cf. I.I: πολιτείαν καὶ δόξαν) in times of degeneration. After all, the first phrase appears not to be applicable to both heroes, but they can be praised for their own reasons, related to the specific chronotope they belong to. If the *Parallel Lives*, dedicated to the influential Roman politician Sosius Senecio,¹⁰⁴⁶ provide a set of role models from which men of public affairs can derive moral lessons, the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior* illustrates that Plutarch is not merely advising his audience to copy the more virtuous man in all respects.¹⁰⁴⁷ philosophy comes first, as his preference for Aristeides seems to indicate, but he is, for example, not advising his readers to become as poor as the Athenian. Adaptability is a necessary characteristic and a sign of perfection too: sometimes, it might be a good thing to set aside one's principles,¹⁰⁴⁸ since the public good does not always benefit from an overly rigid attitude.¹⁰⁴⁹

c) Conclusion

The two definitions of perfection in the *synkrisis*, viz. performing political duties (3.1) and *αὐτάρκεια* (4.2 and 5.3–4), should not be read as mutually exclusive. On the contrary: the politician is to be denounced when he lacks philosophical virtues; the philosopher when he does not adapt to practical reality in order to serve the commonwealth. This is similar to Plutarch's claims in other works.¹⁰⁵⁰ In particular, a passage from the prologue to *Agis and Cleomenes–Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* comes to

¹⁰⁴⁶On Sosius and Plutarch, see Stadter (2015) 36–42.

¹⁰⁴⁷See also Stadter (2015) 228 in a short discussion of this *synkrisis*: “In the end, as in the beginning, the investigation remains paradoxical for Plutarch's contemporary reader: neither protagonist can be imitated directly. Yet the exercise has not been useless. The two lives have set the philosophical discussion of simplicity and detachment from possessions firmly in a historical and personal context.”

¹⁰⁴⁸See Nikolaidis (1995) on this theme in Plutarch.

¹⁰⁴⁹A theme which one would, however, rather connect with Cato Maior in the narrative of the *Lives* themselves.

¹⁰⁵⁰Cf. *Ad princ. iner.* and *Maxime cum principibus*; see also *supra*, note 994 on these works.

mind. The quote below follows a chapter that warns about the dangers of excessive φιλοτιμία (2.1):¹⁰⁵¹

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπηκριβωμένος καὶ τελείως ἀγαθὸς οὐδ' ἂν ὄλως δόξης δέοιτο, πλὴν ὅση πάροδον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις [καὶ] διὰ τοῦ πιστεῦεσθαι δίδωσι [...].

For he who is perfect and absolutely good will altogether not be in need of fame, except for fame of that kind which gives a way to successes by being trusted.

The similarities with the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior* are striking: the passage connects perfection and the idea of αὐτάρκεια, and also adds that one should never lose sight of reality. But while this passage at the beginning of the *Life* seems to teach a straightforward lesson,¹⁰⁵² the *synkrisis* keeps the reader in the dark and highlights that it is never easy to decide between contemplative and active life.¹⁰⁵³ As stated, this problematizing aspect is in line with Plutarch's practice in other comparisons, but it does not merely serve a rhetorical goal: by inviting its readers to argue *pro* and *contra*, it teaches them the deliberative skills needed on their path to perfection.

Finally, the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior* also shows in this way that it is almost impossible to combine both aspects of the perfect life. This might explain why Plutarch was of the opinion that a human being cannot reach perfection, as the right practice in morally challenging situations is often unclear, an inevitable consequence of active and public life. This difficulty is emphasized by *De liberis educandis* 7F–8A as well – the one who *can* mix politics and philosophy is perfect – a passage which, therefore, truly seems to reflect Plutarch's position, even if he did not write it.

1.3.2 Perfect *Exempla in Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*

If perfection is, in Plutarch's eyes, unattainable, this raises questions about the univocally positive examples in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*: certain heroes seem to have reached some degree of perfection. Yet when one takes a look at which specific sections concern these one-sidedly virtuous men, the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*

¹⁰⁵¹ See Nikolaidis (2012) 48–49 on a young man's φιλοτιμία in the proem. On this theme in the proem and other works, see Roskam (2011); Pelling (2012) 62–65; Schmitz (2012) 77–81; Lintott (2013) 4–5.

¹⁰⁵² Roskam (2011) 210 and 223.

¹⁰⁵³ On theory and praxis in Plutarch, see Bonazzi (2012).

provides an answer to this difficulty. The only sections of a certain length that might qualify as ‘perfect’ are *Cyrus* (172EF), *Archelaus* (177AB), the early Spartans (189D–190A), and the early Romans (194E–195B). All of these occur at the outset of a larger section: they are the eldest of their people (or are at least presented as such) and can therefore be defined as true *παλαιοί*. This can also be seen from the sections that follow them: since such *παλαιοί* are often considered of central importance for the cultural heritage and, as a consequence, education of the society of which they laid the foundations, it is no coincidence that themes explored in their sections are often further developed in those of later men, who consider these ancient values as the core of their cultural identity – although they do not always act in accordance with this.¹⁰⁵⁴

This is illustrated most clearly by the Spartan and Roman sections. In the case of *Lycurgus–Theopompus* (189D–190A), the focus lies on what is presented as typical Lacedaemonian values, viz. frugality, open warfare, and justice. Against this background, the remaining Spartans will be judged by the reader, as this is also how these men judge themselves and their fellow citizens: they often refer back to their predecessors, assessing their virtues and those of others in terms of their similarities with the Spartans of yore.¹⁰⁵⁵ The same happens in the case of the Romans: *Manius Curius* (194EF) and *Gaius Fabricius* (194F–195B) depict the virtues that characterize the early Roman Republic, once more justice, frugality, and open warfare. In what remains, these themes are continued: in one of the first apophthegms that follow, Fabius Maximus is criticized when he avoids a direct clash with Hannibal, while Minucius is called a man worthy of Rome because of his boldness (195CD). This background is still important much later in the Roman section: Cato Maior attempts to restore the virtues of old, as already becomes apparent from his first apophthegm (198D), and this theme dominates his entire section (198D–199E).

Less clear in this regard are perhaps the Persian and Macedonian sections, but the same procedures can be found here. In *Cyrus III* (172EF), the king describes the Persians of his time as a rough people. When Artaxerxes Mnemon is ridiculed in the section of his brother, this is precisely because he is a soft ruler and, one concludes, not a true Persian (173EF). *Archelaus*, finally, represents the main virtues of a Macedonian monarch: he is just, and knows by *himself* when to give and when not

¹⁰⁵⁴ See also *supra*, note 269 on education in *Lyc.–Num*.

¹⁰⁵⁵ An important person is Heracles, the greatest Spartan of old, often referred to in the Spartan sections: *Lysander II* (190DE), *Archidamus Tertius* (191D), *Nicostratus* (192A), and *Antalcidas III* (192C). These references are always connected with the ancient virtues mentioned.

to (177AB). Philip, Alexander, Ptolemy, and the Antigonids try to stick to these principles, although they do not always succeed (177C–183D).¹⁰⁵⁶

The positive opening sections, then, indeed remind one of the *synkrisis*' image of the *παλαιός*. Yet they also raise some questions, similar to the clash between the virtuous men of old and the successful statesmen in this same text. As has been discussed in I.I.I, moralism in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* also has a protreptic aspect, but this does not do away with the fact that some sections entail less clear moral lessons or instructions (and seem to be more 'descriptive'). The example given there was *Lycurgus* (189D–F). This is not incidentally one of the *παλαιοί* in the work. Take *Gaius Fabricius* (194F–195B): this Roman is able to end a war with the help of Pyrrhus' physician in IV–V, but refuses for the sake of Rome's virtuous reputation alone (195AB). This seems to be moralism of a rather descriptive kind too, as these apophthegms raise challenging questions: does Plutarch truly want Trajan to put the lives of many Roman soldiers and citizens at risk because deceit in war might not be considered honourable? Or take *Archelaus V*: even though one can only admire this king's reaction when someone throws water over his head (177B), the question remains of whether Plutarch is advising the emperor to let himself be insulted – and even almost attacked physically – by someone who thinks badly about him because of the wrong reasons. After all, a monarch should be respected by his subjects in order to make his rule sufficiently effective.

Thus, these models, virtuous as they might be, cannot be considered straightforward guides for the right conduct in practical reality. Rather they represent the mindset of the 'perfect', self-sufficient human being. Yet one should know when to give in, as also pointed out in the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*. As a consequence, more can be learned from men such as Fabius Maximus, Philip, and even Lysander.¹⁰⁵⁷ These men have their imperfections, but the fact that they lived in a situation more or less similar to that of the people of Plutarch's and Trajan's days – in reality, so to speak – makes them much more interesting,

¹⁰⁵⁶ Themes such as mildness, justice, and gift-giving dominate *Philippus* (177C–179C) and *Alexander* (179D–181F). *Ptolemaeus* (181F) and *Antigonus Monophthalmus* (182A–183A), and also the other *Diadochi* (183A–184F) are judged and judge themselves and others based on these virtues as well.

¹⁰⁵⁷ See also Citro (2020) 113–115 on *Lysander II* (190DE) and its occurrence in *Lys.* 7.6 specifically: "Certamente da una prospettiva etica lo spartano dimostra negligenza di alcuni valori quali l'onestà e la correttezza. Ma, in considerazione dei risultati militari conseguiti, pur mediante raggiri, il personaggio è totalmente condannabile? Il giudizio di Plutarco, come si è detto poc' anzi, appare ambiguo e per nulla dirimente. È sempre, in ogni circostanza, possibile condurre un'azione che sia utile militarmente e politicamente ed al contempo anche eticamente giusta?"

relevant, real, and human. A case that represents this most clearly is *Alexander*, especially the apophthegms concerning his generosity and his divinity (180DE). The king led a frugal life and did not truly believe that he descended from Zeus (cf. the mindset of the *παλαιός*). Yet he realized how he could make his rule more successful by exploiting riches and the belief of others (cf. social and political reality).¹⁰⁵⁸ When such concessions serve the commonwealth, they might sometimes be justifiable, as long as they do not affect one's personality.

To conclude: the same dynamics between the virtuous *παλαιός* and the statesman dealt with in the *synkrisis* also dominate *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*. These contrasting images serve a similar goal, as they call for deliberation. This is in line with the problematizing function of comparison in the collection (I.1.2.c): the virtues of the elder are compared with the issues with which the later statesmen are confronted. When this second group deviates from the core values of their ancestors, for the sake of the public good, this raises questions similar to those elicited by the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*. Answers remain difficult: a critical reading of the collection does not point out to what extent one should give in, in the same way as the *synkrisis* keeps its readers in the dark.

I.4 Positive *Exempla*

Two prologues discuss the function of good role models: those of *Pericles–Fabius Maximus* and *Aemilius–Timoleon*. Claims made in these texts call to mind *De profectibus in virtute* (84B–85C). The first parts of this chapter will analyse these three passages in order to reconstruct Plutarch's views on this matter (I.4.1–I.4.3).¹⁰⁵⁹ In the subsequent section, the implications for *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* will be addressed (I.4.4).

¹⁰⁵⁸ Esp. *Alexander* XIV–XVII (180DE).

¹⁰⁵⁹ A connection between *De prof. in virt.* 84B–85C and the purpose of the *Parallel Lives* has often been noted; see esp. Roskam (2005b) 332–335. Duff (1999) 31–32 and Verdegem (2010) 19–22 discuss *Aem. 1* in connection with *De prof. in virt.*; Cooper (2008) 68–72 examines these works and connects them with the goals of *Praec. ger. reip.*; Zadorojnyi (2012) 177–183 discusses a series of passages on mimesis in Plutarch. On the unity between *Moralia* and the *Lives*, see Barthelmess (1986) 61–64 and 80–81; and the volume of Nikolaidis (2008).

I.4.I The Prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*

This passage is almost certainly the earliest surviving explicit discussion of the purpose of the *Parallel Lives* and of the way in which any moralising programme might work.¹⁰⁶⁰

This quotation, taken from Duff's extensive discussion of the prologue, not only explains why this chapter should address this text first,¹⁰⁶¹ but also highlights its value for a study of Plutarch's views on the function of role models in general. As was the case with the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius*, a literary analysis will reveal insights that appear relevant beyond the purpose of these specific biographies and even the entire project of the *Parallel Lives*, despite the rhetorical character of the text.

a) Literary analysis

As is often the case in Plutarch, a network of verbatim repetitions steers the interpretation. This divides the prologue into five parts (which, of course, also build on each other):

A	One should focus on what is useful (1.1–1.3: ξένους ... ἐκκαλεῖ)
B	This means focusing on virtue, for this leads to μίμησις (1.4: ταῦτα ... πράττειν)
A'	One should focus on what is useful (1.4–2.2: πολλαίκις ... θεωμένους)
B'	This means focusing on virtue, for this leads to μίμησις (2.2–2.4: ὅθεν ... παρεχόμενον)
C	Implications for the <i>Parallel Lives</i> (2.5: ἔδοξεν ... γραφομένων)

A' further clarifies A, B' clarifies B, and C reads as a kind of conclusion. A close reading of these parts in connection with each other will show that, perhaps surprisingly, not μίμησις, but critical readership, which can be defined as ἰστορία, is the *first* goal of the *Parallel Lives*.

¹⁰⁶⁰Duff (2001) 353.

¹⁰⁶¹On the chronology of the *Parallel Lives*, see Appendix III. *Per.–Fab.* is the tenth pair, but, as Duff (2001) 353 points out, there is no clear discussion of the function of the biographical project in the first nine pairs (but the lost *Epameinondas–Scipio*, probably the first pair, might have contained such a discussion).

A *On usefulness*

Ξένους τινὰς ἐν Ῥώμῃ πλουσίους κυνῶν ἔκγονα¹⁰⁶² καὶ πιθήκων ἐν τοῖς κόλποις περιφέροντας καὶ ἀγαπῶντας ἰδὼν ὁ Καῖσαρ ὡς ἔοικεν ἠρώτησεν, εἰ παιδία παρ' αὐτοῖς οὐ τίκτουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ἡγεμονικῶς σφόδρα νουθετήσας τοὺς τὸ φύσει φιλητικὸν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ φιλόστοργον εἰς θηρία καταναλίσκοντας, ἀνθρώποις ὀφειλόμενον.

On seeing certain wealthy foreigners in Rome carrying puppies and young monkeys about in their bosoms and fondling them, Caesar asked, we are told, if the women in their country did not bear children, thus in right princely fashion rebuking those who squander on animals that proneness to love and loving affection which is ours by nature, and which is due only to our fellow-men.

This apophthegm (I.1) opens the prologue in a way typical of Plutarch.¹⁰⁶³ The Caesar mentioned is probably Augustus,¹⁰⁶⁴ who was well known for his attempts to restore moral order in Rome.¹⁰⁶⁵ This story seems to support this view. As a consequence, it responds to the aristocratic values of Plutarch's audience, in the first place of his Roman readers. In this context, it is significant that the victims of the emperor's disapproval are strangers, not Romans: morally correct behaviour, which should above all be exercised by the aristocracy, is closely connected with identity issues.¹⁰⁶⁶ It goes without saying that a well-educated Roman citizen of the upper class will look down upon a group of foreigners who are behaving badly, or at least in an un-Roman way. Thus, at the outset of this prologue, Plutarch clearly wants to achieve a certain effect on his audience and attempts to address the way in which they perceive their own position: they are above the others, not only in terms of their influence, but also because of their superior morality and the 'Romanness' this entails.

¹⁰⁶²Holden (1894) 73 argues that Sintenis' conjecture ἔκγονα (instead of τέκνα) "is superfluous as well as a less suitable word for pointing the contrast". Stadter (1989) 53 argues that the use of the same word some lines further on suggests that ἔκγονα might be correct, although recognizing that Plutarch also uses τέκνα for animals.

¹⁰⁶³Duff (2001) 353n4; Bowie (2008) 154. Cf. also the dedicatory letter of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 172B.

¹⁰⁶⁴See Holden (1894) 74; Stadter (1989) 53: both refer to Suetonius *Aug.* 34, 42, who records similar sayings. According to Beck, M. (2005) 62–65, Plutarch attempts to establish a connection between Pericles and Augustus by beginning the prologue with this anecdote.

¹⁰⁶⁵And also for "laws encouraging fertility", see Stadter (1989) 53.

¹⁰⁶⁶This is an important aspect of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* as well, and will be discussed in chapter 2.

The comment following the apophthegm (ἡγεμονικῶς ... ὀφειλόμενον), which makes the story fit well within the specific context of the prologue, is in line with this. By first claiming that Augustus' reaction is that of a true ruler, Plutarch once more appeals to the status of his audience, as they perform public functions too – albeit at a lower level. They should, therefore, immediately learn from the emperor's behaviour: not only do they have to act in a certain moral way, but they also need to be a paradigm for others, showing the people what is right and wrong. As a consequence, their moral superiority entails their duty to rule.

The focus on ἀνθρώποις ὀφειλόμενον at the end of the phrase builds on this. By opting for this verb, Plutarch establishes a connection between the apophthegm and its clarification in what follows (1.2): Augustus' criticism was right, for it is wrong to waste one's time on what is unworthy of one's attention (μηδεμιᾶς ἄξια σπουδῆς), while ignoring what is good and useful (τῶν δὲ καλῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων). The apparent *figura etymologica* (a form of ὀφείλω, "owe" – a form of ὠφέλιμος, "useful") stresses that one is really obliged to do what is useful, and to avoid what is not. This goes especially for aristocrats.

Later in the prologue, Plutarch will expand on this, but first he includes a theoretical discussion of how one should try to pursue these useful things. Perception (αἴσθησις) is forced to accept every single impression without making any distinctions, for it is up to the mind (νοῦς) to focus on what is best.¹⁰⁶⁷ That the best is also the most useful, is illustrated, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, from the realm of αἴσθησις: some colours are more advantageous for one's sight than others.¹⁰⁶⁸

B On virtue

Plutarch now points out what these things deserving attention are (1.4):

ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἔργοις, ἃ καὶ ζῆλόν τινα καὶ προθυμίαν ἀγωγὸν εἰς μίμησιν ἐμποιεῖ τοῖς ἱστορήσασιν· ἐπεὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ θαυμάσαι τὸ παραχθὲν ὀρμὴ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξαι, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τοῦναντίον χαίροντες τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καταφρονοῦμεν [...].

Such objects are to be found in virtuous deeds; these implant in those who search them out a great and zealous eagerness which leads to imitation. In other cases, admiration of the deed is not immediately accompanied by an impulse to do it. Nay, many times, on the contrary, while we delight in the work, we despise the workman [...].

¹⁰⁶⁷ As stated, *Demetr.* 1 recalls this passage, and a series of striking similarities (listed *supra*, note 960) ensures that it can be read as an adjustment to these earlier claims of *Per.* 1–2.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Plutarch builds on Plato's theory of sight; see Stadter (1989) 55–56.

The observation of virtue instigates a desire to imitate, which implies that it is useful (cf. A). The second part of the quotation (from ἐπεὶ on) shows that Plutarch, in this context, has role models in mind: only when one also admires the man who performed the deed is one dealing with an act of virtue. This obviously shows that studying role models is an important and fruitful occupation, since virtuous people will lead one to both admire and imitate them. The suggestion is that the two *Lives* introduced are about such morally superior men, even though the passage quoted does not yet explicitly refer to them. Plutarch, the reader must conclude, will offer such great *exempla* that will enable them to do their duty, viz. focusing on what is useful (cf. A). This will make it possible to become like Pericles and Fabius Maximus. The author, then, seems to have done the job of his audience's νοῦς: he has selected what will be fruitful for his aristocratic readership.

This straightforward interpretation, however, will be somewhat disturbed by the use of ἱστορήσασιν – if one accepts this reading.¹⁰⁶⁹ The word commonly means “observe something because of which one will be informed”,¹⁰⁷⁰ and this, indeed, is to some extent in line with the repeated use of θεωρέω and related terms in A.¹⁰⁷¹ The implication at this point seems to be that the reader just has to read the *Lives*, containing all these virtues, and will be incited to imitate its protagonists. Later on in the text, however, it will become apparent that more is going on. But first, there is A', where Plutarch repeats an earlier theme.

A' On usefulness

Similar to A, A' appeals to the aristocratic feelings of the target audience. Plutarch first refers to the low social status of people such as perfumers and dyers, after which he tells two apophthegms dealing with musical performances (1.5–1.6).¹⁰⁷² The first concerns the famous flute player Is-

¹⁰⁶⁹Duff (2001) 357n18 also adopts “Amyot’s emendation of τοῖς ἱστορήμασιν (‘the narratives’).”

¹⁰⁷⁰See LSJ, s.v. “ἱστορέω”, which offers as possible meaning: “*examine, observe*”; “*to be informed about, know*”, and also “*read in history*”.

¹⁰⁷¹See 1.2: φιλοθέαμον, θεάματα, θεωρεῖν; 1.3: θεωρῆ, θεωρεῖν, θεάμασιν. Note also the focus on perceptive experience in 1.1–1.3. See LSJ, s.v. “θεωρέω”: it can just refer to observations, but is often related to an investigative attitude too. See also Duff (2001) 357n18: “ἱστορία in the sense of ‘research’ is on several occasions elsewhere in Plutarch linked with the idea of sight (*Thes.* 30.3; *Cato Mi.* 12.2; *Pomp.* 40.2; *Def. orac.* 419e; cf. *Aud. poet.* 44b)”.

¹⁰⁷²See again chapter 1.2.1 on *Demetr.* 1, adducing *exempla* from the same metaphorical field.

menias, also a man of lower class.¹⁰⁷³ He is rebuked by the philosopher Antisthenes, who claims that one who can play so well can only be a bad person. The point is that he wasted his time on a useless skill (cf. A), instead of studying virtue (cf. B). The second apophthegm (I.6) suggests something similar, but it also recalls Augustus' saying (I.1): the story is about Alexander the Great. As a young man he is denounced by Philip for beautifully playing a stringed instrument.¹⁰⁷⁴ Plutarch adds that the father is right, for a ruler should listen to music but not play it (I.6).¹⁰⁷⁵ This comment recalls the addition of ἡγεμονικῶς to Augustus' story in A. Again, Plutarch has his readers' political functions in mind.

All this, however, does not mean that the apophthegms of A and A' serve the same goal. Augustus rather describes Plutarch's theory as set out in what follows, whereas the two stories of A' have a convincing function. If the reader is not yet persuaded by the claims in A and B, the harm (cf. βλάβαι) illustrated by Ismenias, and the shame (cf. αἰσχῦναι) of the Alexander story will be helpful, depicting an image of what one does *not* want to be or become like. In this way, these negative role models fulfil the same function as those in the κρίσις part of a treatise of *Seelenheilung*.¹⁰⁷⁶ The same can be said about the series of artists listed in 2.1: no boy of good birth (οὐδεις εὐφυῆς νέος) wants to be like these men, despite the great art they created.¹⁰⁷⁷ Plutarch again ensures that his readers' aristocratic feelings dominate: such examples responding to their sense of honour should have a positive effect.

Thus, A' does not simply confirm the preceding sections. By showing a frightening and dishonourable picture, it also reads as an addition to A: actions that are truly of no use for those who perceive them are not just useless as such, for when imitating them, one can be harmed as well. As a consequence, they are even to be avoided to a certain extent. By A' the reader will therefore be convinced of Plutarch's claims in A. As stated, this connection between the two parts is supported by a series of verbatim agreements.¹⁰⁷⁸

¹⁰⁷³ Scholars often refer to *Alc.* 2.6–7, emphasizing the low esteem for flute players in classical Athens: see Mooren (1948) 72n4; Podlecki (1987) 28. See also *supra*, note 485.

¹⁰⁷⁴ See Zadorojnyi (2006) 268 for a list of similar anecdotes that depict the statesman's superiority over artists.

¹⁰⁷⁵ It is not surprising that an apophthegm about Ismenias is followed by one on Philip; see *supra*, note 345 on the connection between the men in various apophthegms.

¹⁰⁷⁶ See *supra*, p. 307 and 312 on the function of βλάβαι and αἰσχῦναι in these works, based on Ingenkamp (1971).

¹⁰⁷⁷ See Chrysanthou (2018) 40 on "Plutarch's use of strong indicatives and evaluative terms" in the prologue.

¹⁰⁷⁸ A': Φίλιππος and βασιλεύς (I.6) – A: Καῖσαρ and ἡγεμονικῶς (I.1); A': θεατῆς (I.6), θεασάμενος (2.1), θεωμένους (2.2) – A: φιλοθέαμον (I.1), θεάματα (I.2), θεωρῆ

B' On virtues

Something similar goes for the many verbal similarities between B and B'.¹⁰⁷⁹ The sections seem to make the same point: Plutarch claims that only deeds that lead to imitation are useful, and again adds that virtue brings one to it. Yet B' closes with a phrase that seems to deny certain arguments in B. This apparent contradiction has raised questions (*Per.* 2.4):

τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐφ' αὐτὸ πρακτικῶς κινεῖ καὶ πρακτικὴν εὐθὺς ὀρμὴν ἐντίθησιν, ἠθοποιῶν οὐ τῇ μιμήσει τὸν θεατὴν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τοῦ ἔργου τὴν προαίρεσιν παρεχόμενον.

For the good moves actively towards itself and inserts straightway an active impulse (cf. LCL), by moulding the spectator's character not through imitation, but by providing a moral choice through the investigation of the work. [own translation]

“Shaping character” and “providing with προαίρεσις” is, at first sight, to be interpreted in more or less the same way: as Duff points out, προαίρεσις, in the meaning of moral choice, is strongly connected with character.¹⁰⁸⁰ In other words, a change in προαίρεσις entails a change in character. In this way, the phrase seems to reject earlier claims in the prologue that stress the importance of imitation: apparently, only ἱστορία can change a personality. This also differs from how one might expect Plutarch to think about μίμησις:¹⁰⁸¹

Plutarch, in accordance with much ancient thought, related character (ἦθος) with habituation (ἔθος), so imitation would naturally have an important role in any theory of character formation or improvement.

(1.2), θεωρεῖν (1.2), θεάμασιν (1.3); A': ῥαθυμίας (2.1) – A: ῥᾶστα (1.2); A': τέρπει (2.1) – A: τερπνόν (1.3); A': ἄξιον σπουδῆς (2.1) – A: ἄξια σπουδῆς (1.2); A': ὠφελεῖ (2.1) – A: ὠφελίμων (1.2), note also ὠφελόμενον (1.1).

¹⁰⁷⁹B': μιμητικός (2.2), μιμήσει (2.4) – B: μίμησιν (1.4); B': ζῆλος (2.2), ζηλοῦσθαι (2.2) – B: ζῆλόν (1.4); B': προθυμίαν (2.2) – B: προθυμίαν (1.4); B': ὀρμὴν (2.2) – B: ὀρμὴ (1.4); B': ἀρετὴ (2.2), ἀπ' ἀρετῆς (2.3) – B: ἀπ' ἀρετῆς (1.4); B': πράξεις (2.2), πράξεις (2.3) – B: πραγθέν (1.4), πράξει (1.4); B': θαυμάζεσθαι (2.2) – B: θαυμάσαι (1.4); B': ἔργα (2.2), εἰργασμένους (2.2), ἔργου (2.4) – B: ἔργοις (1.4); B': ἱστορία (2.4) – B: ἱστορήσασιν (1.4).

¹⁰⁸⁰Duff (1999) 39 (= (2001) 357), after which he concludes: “The reader's character, then, is moulded, as he observes and investigates the character of the great men of the past. By doing this, he gains προαίρεσις, gains the ability to make correct moral choice. This naturally leads to or involves imitation.”

¹⁰⁸¹Duff (2001) 354.

One therefore understands why Duff argues (1) that *Per.* 2.4 should perhaps be emended by adding μόνον after οὐ,¹⁰⁸² or (2) that, if the text is not changed, one should still interpret the phrase in this meaning of “not so much ... but more ...”.¹⁰⁸³ Yet this fragment, in fact, also makes sense in the most straightforward interpretation.

First, ἱστορία recalls ἱστορήσασιν in B. As Duff writes, Plutarch in this prologue “links and merges the activity of the heroes of the past, of the writer, and of the reader”, using the double sense of various words, of which ἱστορέω – ἱστορία is an example:¹⁰⁸⁴ even though Plutarch has not yet referred to his biographies up to this point in the text, both the noun and the verb obviously allude to his act of writing the *Parallel Lives* after his research on his subjects, and also to the act of reading the work.¹⁰⁸⁵ This equates Plutarch’s writing process with the activity of his audience: the author carried out his inquiry and wrote down his *Lives*; the readers are now able to imitate his practice. This suggests that reading the biographies will not just be an act of accepting Plutarch’s account for what it is. It will first of all be an act of critical examination.¹⁰⁸⁶

If the straightforward interpretation of *Per.* 2.4 is correct, ἱστορήσασιν in B is to be read in an exclusive way and meaning “examination”: *only* those who have *scrutinized* virtuous actions (cf. τὸ καλὸν in 2.4) will be instigated to imitate them, since only they are endowed with the right προαίρεσις, for one will only realize what is truly good after close examination. The implication is that inquiry or ἱστορία *precedes* imitation. This, in fact, is in line with the first part of B’ quoted: what is good will indeed make one do what is good (μίμησις).¹⁰⁸⁷ But first, one needs to know what these good things are (ἱστορία).

¹⁰⁸²In line with Jones, C. P. (1971) 103n2: “Since Plutarch clearly does not mean to deny that imitation affects character (cf. *Per.* 1. 4), μόνον has perhaps disappeared before τὸν θεατήν” (Podlecki (1987) 29 also sees a problem in the text), and in line with the use of μὴ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ καί, Duff (1999) 38 (= (2001) 356) writes: “Perhaps the best response to this apparent contradiction is to emend the text by the addition of μόνον before τῇ μίμησει”, adding in a note that a καί after ἀλλὰ is not necessary. See also Zadorojnyi (2012) 181–182.

¹⁰⁸³Duff (1999) 38 and Duff (2001) 356, based on similar occurrences in some biblical passages.

¹⁰⁸⁴Duff (2001) 353, concerning the double meanings of “ἔργον, μίμησις, ἱστορία, and ἠθοποιία”; see also the analysis in Duff (1999) 34–45; and Duff (2011a) 76–77.

¹⁰⁸⁵Cf. the various meanings of the verb listed *supra*, note 1070.

¹⁰⁸⁶Also the analysis of Duff (1999) 34–45 and Duff (2001). The second chapter of Chrysanthou (2018) (26–65) contains similar insights about the reader’s active participation.

¹⁰⁸⁷μίμησις in the meaning of “imitation of general virtues or qualities rather than specific acts”, as Duff (2001) 354 puts it.

C *On the Parallel Lives*

The closing part of the prologue (2.5) makes all the foregoing explicit for the *Parallel Lives*. Verbal connections with A–A' and B–B' ensure that it reads as some kind of conclusion.¹⁰⁸⁸ Based on the arguments he gave in A, Plutarch claims that he decided to write *Lives* and *Pericles–Fabius Maximus* specifically. As he usually tends to do in the prologues, he lists the similarities between both men.¹⁰⁸⁹ These are their virtues (ἀρετάς) and usefulness (ὠφελιμωτάτων) for their country. This is in line with claims made earlier in the text: Plutarch chose these men because he wants to focus on what is advantageous (cf. A) – i.e. focusing on ἀρετή (cf. B). Yet in the final phrase, he suggests that the reader might conclude he has the wrong focus (2.5):

εἰ δ' ὀρθῶς στοχαζόμεθα τοῦ δέοντος, ἔξεστι κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν γραφομένων.

But whether I aim correctly at the proper mark must be decided from what I have written.

On the one hand, such a claim is to be expected at the end of a prologue: Plutarch likes to conclude his introductions with such an appeal to his readers as a transition to the narratives themselves, thereby also expressing his own modesty. Yet, on the other hand, this call for an assessment of the author's moral focus is also in line with claims in B and B', where ἱστορία on the readers' part appeared to be of central importance: even if Plutarch is focusing on the right things, this does not mean that his audience should just read and imitate.¹⁰⁹⁰ It is the process of examination that moulds character. Thus, Plutarch's *inquiry* is to be repeated by his readers if they want to improve. Only this can firmly establish a deep understanding of a hero's ἀρετή, because of which they will make the right choices when facing moral issues (μίμησις).

b) Conclusion

The prologue has its relevance for the pair that follows. Similarities with treatises of *Seelenheilung* are important in this regard. The focus on the

¹⁰⁸⁸ C: ἀρετάς (2.5) – B: ἀρετῆς (1.4), B': ἀρετή (2.2), and ἀρετῆς (2.3); C: ὠφελιμωτάτων (2.5) – A: ὠφελίμων (1.2), note also ὠφειλόμενον (1.1), and A': ὠφελει (2.1); note also the use of στοχαζόμεθα τοῦ δέοντος (2.5) in C, recalling the discussion in A (one should focus on what is useful), and κρίνειν (2.5), recalling the use of ἱστορήσασιν (1.4) in B and ἱστορία (2.4) in B'.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Cf. *Demetr.* 1.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Another example is *Aem.* 1, discussed in the next subchapter; see Duff (2011a) 77 on such closing phrases as a call for ἱστορία.

status and honour of the readers in combination with a series of negative *exempla* is the main convincing strategy that often dominates the first part of such treatises. In line with this, the prologue reads as a kind of κρίσις. The *Lives* themselves, then, can be considered the ἄσκησις part, as the call for ἱστορία at the close announces: the biographies will be an exercise in turning the theory of the prologue into practice (the dangers of having the wrong focus). This explains the stress on αἴσθησις: in the first *Life* of the pair, Plutarch will include an extensive discussion of Athens' marvellous Acropolis.¹⁰⁹¹ The prologue, therefore, already warns its readers that they should not let themselves be excessively impressed by these magnificent buildings. Yet this does not imply that nothing can be learned about Pericles' goals as a statesman from these buildings, as they brought great glory to his city: a careful examination of his true motivations will lead one to an insight into Pericles' ἀρετή, which should be the main focus when reading the *Parallel Lives*.¹⁰⁹²

Yet perhaps there is also an apologetic element. Plutarch is not only training his readers, but also defending himself for this comprehensive description of monuments that clearly amazed him, and protecting himself against possible criticism.¹⁰⁹³ This is why, at the outset of the work, he already anticipates that this interest in the Acropolis, as far as it concerns the art, is nothing more than admiration. He does not want to become a Pheidias.¹⁰⁹⁴

All these rhetorical motivations, however, do not interfere with the sincerity of Plutarch's claims. They indeed reflect how he actually thought about his biographies and about role models in general. In this regard, Duff's words are again worth quoting:¹⁰⁹⁵

The correct response to the *Lives* is not simply to “look”, nor only to imitate, but to investigate, consider, and test; to apply, as Plutarch might have put it, philosophy and reason.

¹⁰⁹¹ Filling almost two chapters: *Per.* 12–13.14. See also Beck, M. (2005) 63–65 on this connection between prologue and *Life*.

¹⁰⁹² See Chrysanthou (2018) 54–56, concluding (55–56): “It is true that Pericles' building programme is not presented as producing any eagerness for imitation of the works or the craftsmen, which is Plutarch's actual emphasis in the prologue; but it constitutes itself part of Pericles' virtuous deeds (cf. *Per.* 2.2: τὰ ἔργα), which, as made clear in the prologue, can elicit admiration as well as imitation of a correct moral choice and action (*Per.* 2.2–4).”

¹⁰⁹³ Which recalls once more the implicit apology in *Demetr.* 1, see chapter 1.2.1.

¹⁰⁹⁴ As Chrysanthou (2018) 55 points out, the reference to Pheidias both in the prologue (2.1) and in the *Life* (13.14) links the two parts of the work. This is emphasized by the mention of this artist at the end of the description of the Acropolis, there presented as the most important man of the project.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Duff (2001) 356.

The only thing I would add to this is that imitation is not to be placed at the same level as investigation. It is the very consequence of this investigation: only when *ιστορία* has firmly established knowledge of and insight into a hero's virtues in one's soul will one also – and automatically – do what is good (*μίμησις*). Precisely how this works can be seen from a discussion of the following two works.

1.4.2 The Prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon*

That claims in the prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus* truly reflect Plutarch's position – at least on the function of the *Parallel Lives* in general – can be seen from similar statements at the outset of *Aemilius–Timoleon*. This pair was written shortly after *Pericles–Fabius Maximus* and provides additional information about the issue at stake.¹⁰⁹⁶ This suggests that Plutarch's thinking evolved when the project continued.

a) Literary analysis

The prologue is much shorter than that to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*, but still contains similar complexities. This already appears from 1.1–2:

Ἔμοι [μὲν] τῆς τῶν βίων ἄψασθαι μὲν γραφῆς συνέβη δι' ἑτέρους, ἐπιμένειν δὲ καὶ φιλοχωρεῖν ἤδη καὶ δι' ἑμαυτόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἀμῶς γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλ' ἢ συνδιαιτῆσει καὶ συμβιώσει τὸ γινόμενον ἔοικεν, ὅταν ὥσπερ ἐπιξενούμενον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑποδεχόμενοι καὶ παραλαμβάνοντες ἀναθεωρῶμεν

‘ὄσσοις ἔην οἴός τε’ (Hom. Il. 24, 630),

τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ κάλλιστα πρὸς γνῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων λαμβάνοντες.

I began the writing of my “Lives” for the sake of others, but I find that I am continuing the work and delighting in it now for my own sake also, using history as a mirror and endeavouring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues therein depicted. For the result is like nothing else than daily living and associating together, when I receive and welcome each subject of my history in turn as my guest, so to speak, and observe carefully

“how large he was and of what mien,”

¹⁰⁹⁶ See Appendix III on the relative chronology of the *Parallel Lives*.

and select from his career what is most important and most beautiful to know.

Two observations are relevant for Plutarch's views on the function of role models:

[I] The passage seems entirely in line with the prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*. Once more, Plutarch's activity is connected with that of the reader:¹⁰⁹⁷ what he started to do for the sake of his audience appears useful for himself as well, for writing *Lives* changes the author's character too.¹⁰⁹⁸ How this change works, is first described in terms of μίμησις again: although the word is not mentioned, the mirror imagery, in combination with ἀφομοιώω, suggests that a far-reaching imitation is the primary goal of the *Parallel Lives*.¹⁰⁹⁹ The first occurrence of ἱστορία is to be read as referring to Plutarch's written accounts, which contain these virtues to be imitated: the *Lives* themselves are compared with a mirror.¹¹⁰⁰

This somewhat contrasts with the second phrase. Although συνδιαίτησις and συμβίωσις are to some extent still related to the concept of close imitation,¹¹⁰¹ this notion disappears in what follows. From now on, the importance of inquiry *preceding* imitation will dominate. This can be seen from τὸ γινόμενον. The precise meaning of this participle is, at first sight, rather vague, but the ὅταν clause provides clarification. It starts with a second simile concerning guest-friendship. Every single man (ἕκαστον) about whom Plutarch wrote a *Life* is compared with a ξένος invited at home. This person does not stay too long, but leaves after a while, making room for the next (cf. ἐν μέρει). During this temporary visit, Plutarch examines the hero in question: ἱστορία no longer refers to a written text, but must in the first place be interpreted in the mean-

¹⁰⁹⁷ Also Duff (1999) 30–31; Stadter (2000) 493; Chrysanthou (2018) 38–39.

¹⁰⁹⁸ See Verdegem (2010) 20 on the use of the first person in this prologue.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Duff (1999) 33 on the prologue: “Plutarch presents himself as meeting these virtuous men personally, but he does this ‘through history’ (or possibly, ‘through research’). For the reader, the two meanings dovetail; one reads of the virtuous lives of the great men of the past through Plutarch's own *Lives*. But the purposeful confusion between, on the one hand, the actual lives and virtues of his subjects, and, on the other, Plutarch's own literary representation of them, allows him to make a subtle claim for the worth of his writings: his *Lives* invite the reader to model himself *as it were directly* on the lives of virtuous men”.

¹¹⁰⁰ From the perspective of the readers; see Duff (1999) 32–34 on the ambiguity of the metaphor.

¹¹⁰¹ LSJ, s.v. “συνδιαίτησις”: “*living together, intercourse*”; and s.v. “συμβίωσις”: “*living with, companionship [...]; of wedded life*”.

ing of “inquiry”, in line with ἀναθεωρῶμεν.¹¹⁰² What this examination looks like, can be seen from the final part of 1.2, following the Homeric quotation: Plutarch’s investigation entails that he selects the best actions his heroes performed. Again, the first chapters of the *Life of Pericles* come to mind, stressing that one should focus on what is good, which will automatically lead to an imitation of these ἀρεταί. A close reading of the prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon* suggests similar implications: τὸ γινόμενον in the main clause is what comes into being every time when Plutarch investigates the characters of his subjects and selects their virtues. This consists in “living closely together” with these men of the past. As this expression is connected with μίμησις in 1.1, the implication is that ἱστορία indeed precedes imitation. Both prologues are, therefore, notably similar up to this point. The same can also be said about 1.3–1.4, reading as a kind of conclusion of 1.1–1.2: building on a quotation of Sophocles (1.3), Plutarch claims that this selection of τὰ κυριότατα καὶ κάλλιστα – which can be defined as his ἱστορία – provides great pleasure and is a most effective improvement of character (1.4). In short, a first stage of character change or ἠθοποιΐα is connected with the process of ἱστορία by the prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon* too.

[2] But there is more to 1.1–2. It contains a paradox stressing insights absent from *Per.* 1–2. Although the process of inquiry is compared with a visit of guest-friends, none of whom stay for a long time, its result is described as a much more abiding relationship: one will live closely together with the *exempla* in question, for a long time. Plutarch will return to this paradox later in the text, but first, he needs to dwell on the idea of selecting what is best from his heroes’ lives, building on 1.3–1.4.

Plutarch first refers to Democritus’ theory of advantageous and evil spirits: one should wish to be visited by the first rather than by the second group. This is rejected by the Platonist writer, as it leads to superstition (1.4).¹¹⁰³ Yet it shows – albeit only to a certain extent (viz. the focus on what is good) – his own experience in writing his *Lives* (1.5):

ἡμεῖς δὲ τῇ περὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν διατριβῇ καὶ τῆς γραφῆς τῇ συνηθείᾳ παρασκευάζομεν ἑαυτοῦς, τὰς τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ δοκιμωτάτων μνήμας ὑποδεχομένους ἀεὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, εἴ τι φαῦλον ἢ κακόηθες ἢ ἀγεννὲς αἰ τῶν συνόντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁμιλίας προσβάλλουσιν, ἐκκρούειν καὶ διωθεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἴλεω καὶ πραεῖαν ἀποστρέφοντες τὴν διάνοιαν.

¹¹⁰² See Roskam (2014); see also Part II, chapter 1 on the verb in the dedicatory letter (172B–E).

¹¹⁰³ Plutarch’s aversion to superstition appears from *De sup.*, a lengthy discussion of the topic.

But in my own case, the study of history and the familiarity with it which my writing produces, enables me, since I always cherish in my soul the records of the noblest and most estimable characters, to repel and put far from me whatever base, malicious, or ignoble suggestion my enforced associations may intrude upon me, calmly and dispassionately turning my thoughts away from them to the fairest of my examples.

The observations on 1.1–2 are relevant here as well:

[1] In the first part (ἡμεῖς ... ἐαυτούς), Plutarch once more refers to two meanings of ἱστορία: the act of investigation (τῆ περὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν διατριβῆ) and its product, the written *Lives* (τῆς γραφῆς). Both elements recall 1.1 and 1.2 and should be read in connection with the author's arguments there. This can also be seen from the use of συνήθεια, recalling συνδιαίτησις and συμβίωσις in 1.2: all these words refer to a close and intimate relationship with someone or something.¹¹⁰⁴ This leads to an interpretation in line with the first part of the prologue: one needs both the act of occupying oneself with history and its result, this deep familiarity with the writing that represents the historical figures. This has a strong implication for the reader, again in line with the prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*: reading a text as such does not suffice. Plutarch expects a critical, investigative attitude from his reader, similar to his own inquiry: only this can, in the end, bring one to μίμησις.

[2] In the remainder of the passage, Plutarch returns to the paradoxical tension between a short-term investigation of historical figures and the result of an everlasting intimacy with them. First, ὑποδεχόμενος refers back to 1.2, where the same verb occurs in the ὅταν phrase, describing how ἱστορία functions. In addition, ἀεί provides a contrast with this earlier part, as it concerns this long-term effect: Plutarch already explained there how one should briefly examine the past. He will now explain how the resulting long-term relationship (cf. τῆς γραφῆς τῆ συνηθεία) works.

This goes as follows. Examining a series of heroes and selecting what is best enables one to recall these best persons (cf. τὰς τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ δοκιμωτάτων μνήμας); when this knowledge is rooted deeply in the mind, one is able to cope with morally challenging situations at any time (cf. ὑποδεχομένους ἀεί): if, in everyday life, Plutarch finds himself in a difficult position, he just reminds himself of his most beautiful *exempla*.¹¹⁰⁵

¹¹⁰⁴LSJ, s.v. “συνήθεια”: “habitual intercourse, acquaintance, intimacy, [...] sexual intercourse”.

¹¹⁰⁵Pelling (2011) 17 on *Aem.* 1: “the point seems to be that we explore the experiences and dilemmas of those figures from the past, and ask what we would have done ourselves in their circumstances, or what they would have done in ours.” It will become clear below that these are, in Plutarch's view, two different phases: the first one concerns the ἱστορία,

A contrast with Democritus stands out: the philosopher only wished that he would encounter what is right and advantageous in his life, but Plutarch knows that he will not always be able to avoid bad influences (cf. ἐξ ἀνάγκης).¹¹⁰⁶ This is why he equips himself with the right tools (cf. παρασκευάζομεν): he has closely examined the characters of his heroes and carefully measured what was good or bad in their actions, so every single time when he finds himself in a complex situation, he does not need to panic (cf. ἴλεω καὶ πράειαν), unlike a superstitious man. He only has to recall the virtues he investigated and will act accordingly.

The last sentence (*Aem.* 1.6), finally, concludes the text in the same way as the prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*: Plutarch names his subjects, Timoleon and Aemilius Paulus, and describes their similarities, viz. the choices they made and their good fortune.¹¹⁰⁷ But he also calls for examination in this regard: it will be difficult to decide whether their greatest deeds were the consequence of this good fortune or of their φρόνησις.¹¹⁰⁸ In this way, the text again closes with emphasis on ἱστορία, the requisite for moral improvement: only after acquiring a certain insight through inquiry can the recollection of the *exempla* be useful; only then is it possible to become or act like one's heroes.

b) Conclusion

An analysis of the prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon* points out not only that Plutarch's views closely resemble his position described at the outset of *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*, but also that he adds something new, viz. the focus on one's familiarity with the subjects. This further explains why ἱστορία precedes μίμησις. Thus, based on both prologues, one concludes that the study of role models for the sake of moral improvement functions as follows:

[1] The stage of **ἱστορία**: one examines great people of the past and tries to find out what their virtues are. This can either happen through the investigation of these men themselves (Plutarch's ἱστορία based on his sources), or through a critical reading of a Plutarchan biography (ἱστορία of Plutarch's readers) or of other literary works, one presumes.

[2] The stage of **συνήθεια**: this examination leads to a close familiarity with these heroes (one knows what they were like). As a consequence,

and the resulting συνήθεια (one can imagine what a hero would have done) can lead to μίμησις.

¹¹⁰⁶Note also the verbal repetition of φαῦλα (in the reference to Democritus' philosophy; 1.4) – φαῦλον (in the description of Plutarch's practice; 1.5).

¹¹⁰⁷On fortune as an important theme in *Aem.–Tim.*, see Pelling (1986) 94; Swain (1989a), esp. 283–284.

¹¹⁰⁸This reminds one of *De fort. Rom.*, see Teodorsson (2005b) 221.

when finding oneself in a morally challenging situation, one can easily recall instructions from [1].

[3] The stage of **μίμησις**: insights resulting from [2] enable one to make the right choice in such a challenging situation. One can act accordingly.

1.4.3 *De profectionibus in virtute* 84B–85C

That insights from the two prologues analysed so far are not only relevant for the *Parallel Lives* but reflect Plutarch's general position about role models can be seen from two chapters of *De profectionibus in virtute*, where similar points are made. A comparison of this passage with claims in both prologues will also adjust the scheme above and further clarify how the process of **μίμησις** precisely functions.

a) Interpretation

De profectionibus in virtute is one of Plutarch's later works, but still predates *Sosius'* death and, if the dating suggested in Part I, chapter 2 is correct, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as well.¹¹⁰⁹ In this treatise, Plutarch aims to reject the Stoic doctrine of moral progress (and its implication, the concept of the σοφὸς διαλεληθῶς):¹¹¹⁰ when making moral progress, this can be perceived through various signs, as the Chaeronean attempts to prove. Chapters 14–15 (84B–85C) describe one of these signs: putting one's judgements (**κρίσεις**) into actions (**πράξεις**) (84B).¹¹¹¹ This might seem to contradict *Per.* 1–2, where the author claims that if one knows what is good, virtuous acts will *automatically* follow. In other words, **κρίσις**, the acquisition of knowledge of virtues, should *always* lead to good actions, this prologue suggests. Yet one could react to this by saying that when someone's deeds are in accordance with his or her ideas, this shows that he or she is also *truly convinced* of them and that he or she has reached certain insights that are more complete than those that do not instigate virtue. Thus, *De profectionibus in virtute* does not need to contradict the prologue at all.

¹¹⁰⁹ See Roskam (2005b) 222–223, providing an overview of the scholarly debate on this matter. The treatise is dedicated to *Sosius Senecio*, who probably died in 116; see also Jones, C. P. (1966) 73.

¹¹¹⁰ As Roskam (2005b) 222 points out, “the explicit attack on the Stoic doctrine is mainly concentrated in the first two chapters of the essay, where the problem is set in a clear and economic way.”

¹¹¹¹ This is in line with the focus on the importance of consistency throughout the treatise; see Roskam (2005b) 321 on the importance of the “harmony between **λόγοι** and **πράξεις**” and 276 on an earlier part of the treatise.

This difference between the superficial acceptance of a theoretical point of view and a thorough understanding and appropriation of its validity is, in fact, alluded to in the next part of the treatise, where Plutarch first continues to discuss how it can be perceived that one is willing to act in line with one's κρίσεις. A first indication that this is happening, he writes, is ζῆλος: at this point in the text, role models appear on the stage, and, as Roskam points out, the wording is again close to the prologue to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*.¹¹¹² An apophthegm of Themistocles (84BC), told in the collection as *Themistocles I* (184F–185A), illustrates this ζῆλος well.¹¹¹³ The Athenian felt a great desire to imitate Miltiades, after this man's victory at Marathon. He has, therefore, made more progress than the common citizens, who only praise the general. This highlights that there is indeed a difference between real awareness of the moral superiority of an *exemplum*, and an only limited admiration for the person in question: the Athenians expressing their admiration for Miltiades know that he is a brave man, but Themistocles' hunger for similar actions suggests that he has a more profound insight instigating a desire to act.

In what follows, Plutarch discusses at length what the desired imitation looks like (84C–F). Two elements now remind one of the prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon*: the concept of a far-reaching μίμησις, and, in line with this, the words describing this in terms of a sexual relationship with one's role models.¹¹¹⁴ In *De profectibus in virtute*, both aspects gradually become more extreme. In a first stage, erotic love is only compared with the desire of the προκόπτων: when in love, one feels φθόνος, jealousy, similar to the ζῆλος felt by those making progress. This ζῆλος, Plutarch adds, longs for satisfaction (ἀναπληρώσεως ὀρεγόμενον). An additional similarity between sexual desire and a willingness to imitate arises: in both situations, one wants to be closely together with another person, and even merge one's identity with him or her. This becomes most explicit in 84EF, leaving little to the imagination. One can hardly read it in another way than becoming an exact copy of the role model:¹¹¹⁵

Ὅταν οὖν οὕτως ἀρχόμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐρᾶν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον κατὰ Πλάτωνα (legg. 711e) μακάριον μὲν αὐτὸν ἠγεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, ‘μακάριον δὲ τὸν ξυνηκόον τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σωφρονουῦντος στόματος ἰόντων λόγων’, ἀλλὰ καὶ σχῆμα καὶ βάδισμα καὶ βλέμμα καὶ

¹¹¹² Roskam (2005b) 333.

¹¹¹³ Langlands (2020) 90–92 argues that Plutarch's interaction with “Roman exemplary ethics” also appears from how he uses this apophthegm in *De prof. in virt.*

¹¹¹⁴ Langlands (2020) *passim* sees a connection in this metaphor between Plutarch and “Roman exemplary ethics”.

¹¹¹⁵ See also Roskam (2005b) 329: “It is clearly a very close imitation, down to the smallest detail, which Plutarch has in mind here.”

μειδιάμα θαυμάζοντες αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀγαπῶντες οἳ σὺναρμόττειν καὶ συγκολλᾶν ὄμμεν ἑαυτοὺς, τότε χρὴ νομίζειν ἀληθῶς προκόπτειν.

Whenever, therefore, we begin so to love good men, that not only, as Plato puts it, do we regard as blessed the man himself who has self-control, “and blessed, too, anyone of the company which hears the words that come from the lips of such a man,” but also, through our admiration and affection for his habit, gait, look, and smile, we are eager to join, as it were, and cement ourselves to him, then we must believe that we are truly making progress.

In what follows, the comparison between erotic love and longing for μίμησις is extended even further: in the same way as someone in love accepts the physical deficiencies of the beloved, one who is making progress will still love his or her role model in times of misfortune (84F–85A).

The concept of becoming an *exemplum*'s facsimile raises questions about the feasibility of the entire process of imitation. Yet one should not forget that, up to this point, Plutarch has only described what the προκόπτοντες desire (ζῆλος), and not what they will actually do (the ‘real’ μίμησις). This can also be seen from the reference to a “good and perfect man” (84C: ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τελείου) whom the προκόπτοντες take as their role model. As according to Plutarch human perfection is as good as unattainable, this expression should be understood as part of a rather theoretical discourse.¹¹¹⁶ It is, therefore, not surprising that both the notion of perfection and of exact imitation disappear later in the text, when Plutarch clarifies how μίμησις works in reality (85AB):¹¹¹⁷

ἤδη δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις παρέπεται βαδίζουσιν ἐπὶ πράξεις τινὰς ἢ λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν ἢ χρησαμένοις τύχῃ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τοῦς ὄντως ἀγαθοῦς γεγενημένους, καὶ διανοεῖσθαι ‘τί δ’ ἂν ἐπραξεν ἐν τούτῳ Πλάτων, τί δ’ ἂν εἶπεν Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ποῖος δ’ ἂν ὄφθη Λυκούργος ἢ Ἀγησίλαος’, οἷον πρὸς ἔσοπτρα κοσμοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μεταρρυθμίζοντας, ἢ φωνῆς ἀγεννεστέρας αὐτῶν ἐπιλαμβανομένους ἢ πρὸς τι πάθος ἀντιβαίνοντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκμεμαθηκότες τὰ τῶν Ἰδαίων ὀνόματα Δακτύλων χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φόβους αὐτοῖς ὡς ἀλεξικάκοις, ἀτρέμα καταλέγοντες ἕκαστον·

¹¹¹⁶ Cf. chapter 1.3 on perfection in Plutarch.

¹¹¹⁷ After a short discussion of this fragment, Verdegem (2010) 22 concludes: “In order to make true moral progress, one should rather try to ‘act in the spirit’ of good men. This requires active involvement: one has to reflect upon the actions of one’s role models (cf. *Aem.* 1.2: ἀναθεωρῶμεν) and compare oneself to them”.

ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπίνοια καὶ μνήμη ταχὺ παρισταμένη καὶ ἀναλαμβάνουσα τοὺς προκόπτοντας ἐν πᾶσι πάθεσι καὶ πάσαις ἀπορίαις ὀρθοὺς διαφυλάσσει καὶ ἀπτῶτας.

With men of this sort it has already become a constant practice, on proceeding to any business, or on taking office, or on encountering any dispensation of Fortune, to set before their eyes good men of the present or of the past, and to reflect: “What would Plato have done in this case? What would Epameinondas have said? How would Lycurgus have conducted him self, or Agesilaus?” And before such mirrors as these, figuratively speaking, they array themselves or readjust their habit, and either repress some of their more ignoble utterances, or resist the onset of some emotion. True it is that those who have got by heart the names of the Idaean Dactyls use them as charms against terrors, repeating each name with calm assurance; but it is also true that the thought and recollection of good men almost instantly comes to mind and gives support to those who are making progress towards virtue, and in every onset of the emotions and in all difficulties keeps them upright and saves them from falling.

Those who constantly reflect on how their role models would have acted are closer to the ideal. These *exempla* are not only people who live in the present, but also – and perhaps in the first place – those of the past: the men Plutarch lists all died a long time ago. Except for the first one (although Plato plays an important role in Dion’s biography), these are also the protagonist of a *Life*. This can hardly be coincidental: if *De profectibus in virtute* is one of Plutarch’s later works, he probably had his biographies in mind when he wrote the treatise. As a consequence, the passage quoted is, as Roskam writes, “certainly of paramount importance for a correct evaluation and interpretation of the Plutarchan *Lives*”.¹¹¹⁸ In this context, various elements recall the prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon*:

[1] The most striking resemblance between the texts is definitely the mirror metaphor:¹¹¹⁹ one embellishes one’s life (note a form of κοσμέω in *Aem.* 1.1 too) by looking at the βίοι of others. These lives can also be seen as literary texts, not only in the prologue:¹¹²⁰ information about all the men to whom Plutarch refers in the passage of *De profectibus in virtute* can of course primarily be derived through literature too.

¹¹¹⁸ Roskam (2005b) 332.

¹¹¹⁹ Also Roskam (2005b) 334–335.

¹¹²⁰ See Duff (1999) 33 on *Aem.* 1: “‘life’ (βίος) can refer both to the character and career of a man, and to the written record of such”.

[2] In line with this, the prologue suggested that literature can replace association with real people.¹¹²¹ This appeared to be connected with Plutarch's writing process, which he described as if he truly spent time with the subjects of his biographies, resulting in an everlasting familiarity with them (*Aem.* 1.1–2).¹¹²² In *De profectibus in virtute*, he similarly claims that those who are making progress are constantly accompanied by their role models, as the text stresses the durability of the relationship between the προκόπτοντες and their *exempla* multiple times.¹¹²³ In this context, the comparison with the Idaean Dactyls is well chosen.¹¹²⁴ By enumerating their names, those facing fear can keep off evil. This illustrates the final function of role models: when finding oneself in a difficult situation, one easily recalls them to keep oneself on the right path. The prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon* made exactly the same point, with a similar focus on quiet fearlessness (*Aem.* 1.5).

[3] Finally, the use of the plural, which also dominated in the prologue to *Aemilius–Timoleon*, suggests that people need more than one role model.¹¹²⁵ In *De profectibus in virtute*, however, this seems to contradict earlier claims in the text: as stated, Plutarch first speaks of one *exemplum* – the “perfect person” – but this suddenly becomes “good men” when he describes how this imitation of good *exempla* functions in reality.¹¹²⁶ This goes hand in hand with the fact that the notion of perfection has disappeared too. This is not surprising: since full perfection seems unreachable, one will never be able to bear a clear-cut, one-sidedly positive role model in mind. This is why it is essential to have more examples: in an ethically difficult situation, one should recall various great people, all of whom must have had their flaws too. The question to be asked about every single one of them will be if and why their actions were good in their specific cases, and which response might be preferable in one's own situation. The men Plutarch lists should, therefore, not be interpreted as each related to a different moral dilemma. On the contrary: all should be compared with each other when facing one particular difficulty. This is also the implication of the use of ἕκαστον in the reference to the Idean Dactyls.

¹¹²¹ As appears from συνδιαίτησις, συμβίωσις, συνήθεια, and the comparison with ξενία.

¹¹²² Note μνήμη in 85B – μνήμας in *Aem.* 1.5.

¹¹²³ Cf. παρέπεται, ἐπίνοια καὶ μνήμη ταχὺ παρισταμένη, and the use of the present tense in *De prof. in virt.* 85AB.

¹¹²⁴ On these mythical Idaean Dactyls, see Rose – Dietrich (2012).

¹¹²⁵ Note the plural of γεγεννημένους; the list of role models; ἔσοπτρα; αὐτῶν; τὰ τῶν Ἰδαίων ὀνόματα Δακτύλων; ἀνδρῶν in *Aem.* 1.

¹¹²⁶ In 84EF, the singular dominates: τὸν σώφρονα; τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος; αὐτοῦ.

b) Conclusion

In line with the two prologues, *De profectibus in virtute* 84B–85C at first seems to suggest that role models should be imitated almost exactly. Once more, this focus disappears when dealing with practical reality: because of the fallibility of human nature, it is extremely unlikely to find an *exemplum* that should be copied in all respects; because of the differences between present and past, the right response in one situation might be wrong in another one. It is now clear why there is a need for more than a single role model: a comparison enables one to decide what the best possible action is – or could be – in a specific, difficult case. This functions as follows: when someone has carefully studied characters of a series of historical figures (ιστορία), he or she can imagine and recall how all of them would have reacted in this specific case (cf. συνήθεια). In every single (hypothetical) reaction, something virtuous might be found. Only when comparing these is it possible to decide what the best option might be: σύγκρισις, then, precedes the right response to ethical difficulties.

To summarize, the picture of the function of good role models can now be completed. For Plutarch there are four stages when dealing with *exempla*:

[1] **ιστορία**: a close examination of great people of the past to find out about their specific ἀρεταί (*Per.* 1–2 and *Aem.* 1).

[2] **συνήθεια**: a familiarity with the heroes (as a result of the examination), which will be a help when being confronted with a morally challenging situation (*Aem.* 1 and *De prof. in virt.* 84B–85C).

[3] **σύγκρισις**: comparing the actions of various role models to reach the right decision (*Aem.* 1 and *De prof. in virt.* 84B–85C).

[4] **μίμησις**: acting accordingly (*Per.* 1–2, *Aem.* 1, and *De prof. in virt.* 84B–85C). Imitation, then, does not just consist of copying heroes, but means that one is inspired by them.

This explains various aspects of the *Parallel Lives*. First, there is the importance of active and participatory readership:¹¹²⁷ without ιστορία on the part of the audience, reading the biographies can hardly be effective, for this will not lead to συνήθεια. Second, if comparison is a central concept in dealing with role models, one can readily see why Plutarch wrote *Lives* in parallel and why he often concludes a pair with a formal *synkrisis*. It is *not only* a means of actively engaging with stories from the past (cf. ιστορία), *nor* should it *only* be regarded as an important aspect of characterization, but it is *also* a deliberative tool, a prerequisite for making correct decisions. In line with this, it is also clear why Plutarch wrote an entire series of biographies, which should all truly be considered part

¹¹²⁷ Also Zadorojnyi (2012) 183: “As narratees we must stay awake and participate in the contextualization of mimetic situations.”

of the same major project, and why he so often applies internal *synkrisis*: the *Parallel Lives* provide a set of role models who should all be recalled and compared with each other in difficult cases. Finally, one should not be surprised by the fact that the biographies deal with people of the past who lived in a context entirely different from that of Plutarch's readers: μίμησις is based on insight into character, and should not be regarded as an exact imitation of a person who found himself in precisely the same situation (although perhaps rarely it might be).

1.4.4 Positive *Exempla in Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*

All this is in line with the apophthegm collection:

[1] First, we may again recall the problematizing nature of the work. Ἱστορία or critical readership is of central importance here as well. As often in the *Parallel Lives*, readers have to find out for themselves what the true motivations of the historical figures are, for Plutarch will never give a clear-cut image of the men he describes (cf. implicit moralism and characterization), since this would not lead to an understanding of these characters (and their situations) that includes all their complexities.

[2] A thorough encounter with the protagonists will lead to συνήθεια. But there is also an additional element in this regard. Apophthegms can be remembered easily. As a consequence, they can be recalled quickly in challenging situations (cf. the reference to the Idaean Dactyls in *De prof. in virt.* 85B). As such, apophthegm collections should be a most convenient tool in this regard. This reminds one of how Fundanus aims to arm himself against anger, as he describes in *De cohibenda ira* (457DE):

διὸ καὶ συνάγειν αἰεὶ πειρῶμαι καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν οὐ ταῦτα δὴ νοῦν
μόνα τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οὕς φασι χολῆν οὐκ ἔχειν οἱ <οὐκ> ἔχοντες,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὰ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τυράννων [...].

For this reason I always strive to collect and to peruse, not only these sayings and deeds of the philosophers, who are said by fools to have no bile, but even more those of kings and despots.

After this passage, Fundanus quotes a series of such examples: apophthegms about Antigonus I, Philip, Magas, Ptolemy, and Alexander are cited (457E–458B), three of which also occur in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*.¹¹²⁸ Whenever Fundanus feels his anger arise, he can just recall these stories in order to keep calm: the same obviously goes for the reader of the apophthegm collection, as also appears from the overlap

¹¹²⁸ *Philippus* XXVII (179A); *Alexander* XXXI (181E); *Antigonus Monophthalmus* X (182CD).

in material. The shortness and wittiness of apophthegms, then, strongly contributes to the stage of συνήθεια (cf. μνήμη).

[3] Similar to the biographies, σύγκρισις does not belong only to the stage of characterization or ιστορία either. As stated, Plutarch knew only too well that the right response to a difficult question is not always clear and that it is often impossible to give straightforward advice. In the collection, this also appears from the comparison of virtuous παλαιοί with the practical reality in which their descendants live: they acted differently in specific situations because the apparently most virtuous option might sometimes be damaging for the commonwealth. Thus, as the prologues and *De profectibus in virtute* suggest, the different ways in which role models could have acted should be recalled calmly and should be contrasted with each other, in order to make the best possible decision. Interestingly, the case of *Cicero* XIV–XV describes this practice well: the orator compares Pericles and Themistocles in his assessment of Pompey’s action of leaving Rome when Caesar was approaching (205C).

[4] These comparisons, finally, should provide the basis on which Trajan, or any other possible reader, will be able to make the right, or the most right, decision and to act accordingly (μίμησις).

Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata, one concludes, should not – or at least not in the first place – be regarded as a collection of ready-made answers, often witty, to any possible situation a ruler might encounter. On the contrary, the work is truly about gaining insight into characters, in line with the way it is introduced by the dedicatory letter: Trajan should get acquainted with all the individuals in the text that have something good in them. These men should accompany him throughout his reign, and help him cope with his most difficult moments.

Working with Exempla: The Roman Perspective

Rebecca Langlands sees a close connection between Plutarch and “Roman exemplary ethics”, which she does not believe to be based on intertextuality but rather on a shared cultural background: the typical Roman practice of telling stories about *exempla* and reflecting on them at various events of social life.¹¹²⁹ She lists many similarities that call to mind the conclusions described above:

[1] She points out that, in Plutarch, “*exempla* do not just inspire to virtue but also stimulate moral debate and hone moral discernment”,¹¹³⁰ which is in line with Roman ethics.

[2] In her view, Plutarchan *synkrisis* should be seen in light of this:¹¹³¹

¹¹²⁹ Langlands (2020), esp. 75–77.

¹¹³⁰ Langlands (2020) 82.

¹¹³¹ Langlands (2020) 83.

In Roman exemplary ethics multiplicity is closely related to situational sensitivity, the principle that virtues needs to be enacted differently in different circumstances, and that it is important to be able to judge what the specific requirements of one's own situation are when one is making a moral decision, and to tailor the requirements of one's behaviour accordingly.

[3] There is also a connection with “Roman exemplary ethics” in both “the importance of the critical reader” and the “living presence of the *exemplum*”.¹¹³²

[4] In light of these similarities, Langlands concludes with regard to *De profectibus in virtute* and the *Parallel Lives*:¹¹³³

Indeed in these works Plutarch explicitly theorises a Roman cultural practice which we barely find described at all either in earlier or contemporary Latin sources although it is absolutely implicit there as an underlying framework. Perhaps he does so because, whereas his Latin-writing contemporaries can take for granted their readers' familiarity with these models and ideas, Plutarch is introducing them to a new Greek-speaking audience, who may be unfamiliar not only with the historical figures and events that he writes about in his Roman lives, but also with the whole conceptual, ethical framework within which he makes sense of them.

This chapter has shown that there might be some truth to all this, although I would not say that the whole framework of Plutarch's ideas about exemplarity is not also, at least in general, essential to Greek culture, education, historiography, and other types of literature. Yet the stage of *ιστορία* indeed reminds one of points [1], [2], and [3] as described by Langlands; *συνήθεια* of [3]; and *σύγκρισις* of [2]. As to [4], it also appears that Plutarch does not just theorize the ethics behind Roman exemplarity – if he was indeed influenced by it – but also systematizes it: each stage of Plutarch's system is a prerequisite for the next one, for without *ιστορία*, there will be no *συνήθεια*, without which *σύγκρισις* in challenging situations cannot take place. The Chaeronean, if Langlands is right, thus might have done more than just adopting – whether consciously or not – principles he became acquainted with during his interaction with Rome and Roman elite, if not earlier during his Greek education in the *progymnasmata*, in which character depiction and concepts such as *σύγκρισις* play a prominent role as well.¹¹³⁴ Plutarch, then,

¹¹³²Langlands (2020) 83 and 84; also referring to Duff (2011a).

¹¹³³Langlands (2020) 93.

¹¹³⁴Discussed in Part I, chapter 3.1.

actively engaged with these ideas: throughout his literary career (as the cumulative information arising from a chronological reading of *Per.* 1–2, *Aem.* 1, and *De prof. in virt.* 84B–85C suggests) he gradually developed a theoretical and systematic framework within which he expected ethical progress based on dealing with role models to take place. And he advocated this framework not only to his Greek readers, but also to his Roman audience and even to the emperor, for the same principles of *ἱστορία*, *συνήθεια*, and *σύγκρισις* seem to be the foundation of a reading of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* that will, or should, in the end lead to the desired *μίμησις*.

1.5 Conclusion

Plutarch's views on the function of role models explain various aspects of the moralism and – closely intertwined with this – characterization in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*:

[1] The implicit and problematic nature of characterization and, therefore, moralism is in line with the importance of *ἱστορία*, *συνήθεια*, and *σύγκρισις*. This is connected with the fact that *μίμησις* means that role models in this way guide one in ethical decision-making: the collection should rather influence one's behaviour in the sense that it provides the deliberative tools needed in everyday life, where good and bad are not always clearly distinguished.

[2] Apparently 'perfect' *exempla* do not depict reality and thus clash with category [1]. Precisely in this way, they in fact contribute to the overall problematizing moralism in the collection, for they provide the background against which the actions of 'real' humans are assessed: sometimes, one acts in accordance with the *παλαιοί*; sometimes, one does the opposite due to certain circumstances; and it is often difficult to determine which option is the better one. These seemingly 'perfect' *παλαιοί* themselves, however, do not have much to contribute to decision-making in morally challenging situations, precisely because they do not live in practical reality. This is why their sections rather exhibit moralism of a more descriptive kind, in the sense that they provide little support in specific situations, although this does not mean that such sections do not teach lessons of a more general nature that can and should influence the readers' behaviour, or at least their convictions and beliefs.

[3] The few clearly negative *exempla*, finally, stand apart from the procedures described above. By depicting shame and blame, they appeal to the readers' sense of honour and thereby persuade them that certain opinions and actions are to be avoided. Their protreptic aspect thus obviously consists in the fact that they depict what is undesirable.

2

Peoples and Their Rulers

The collection makes the readers reflect on the correct response to challenging situations. This, however, does not mean that there is no general and univocal ethical paradigm within which such difficult decisions are to be made. This task is fulfilled by higher levels of the text, viz. those concerning cultural identity and types of rulership. These two structuring principles are closely intertwined (because of which ethnic distinctions are in fact deconstructed): the chronological gap between *Antiochus Septimus* (184D–F) and *Themistocles* (184F–185F) not only separates monarchy from other state structures, but also draws a line between more and less typical Greeks.¹¹³⁵ Only when taking both aspects into consideration will general instructions for the good monarch appear, and the scale that exists between barbarism and Greekness will seem to go hand in hand with the scale between despotism and a philosophically inspired (and therefore more Hellenic) type of monarchy.¹¹³⁶

2.1 Three Types of Barbarians

The location of *Reges Aegypti* (174C) between the Persian (172E–174B) and the Thracian–Scythian sections (174C–F) creates a chronological and geographical deviation. As a consequence, two groups of barbarians are separated by a third one. The nature of this one Egyptian ‘apophthegm’ emphasizes this break even more, for it is the only unit that deals with a group of people presented as if they all acted the same for centuries.

Schmidt’s research on the representation of barbarians in Plutarch’s oeuvre provides an explanation for this practice. He points out that the Chaeronean makes a distinction between two types of ‘barbarian’ political organizations:¹¹³⁷

¹¹³⁵ See also Part II, chapters 2.3 and 2.4.

¹¹³⁶ Studies of Plutarch’s work on the use of words concerning Greekness and barbarism reveal that concepts such as φιλανθρωπία and πρᾶσις are related to the first and their opposites to the second category, see Schmidt, T. S. (2000). See also Whitmarsh (2002) 177–178; and Schmidt, T. S. (2002) 57–58. Bréchet (2004) studies ἀγριότης in Plutarch, linked with barbarism too. Nikolaidis (1986) 244 provides an overview of Greek and barbarian features.

¹¹³⁷ Schmidt, T. S. (2004).

[1] Barbarians often function as “paradigms of monarchy”, specifically a negative form of sole rulership that is close to despotism. Schmidt notes that this is “not peculiar to Plutarch: ever since the Persian Wars, the barbarians have been associated with the idea of absolute monarchy”.¹¹³⁸

[2] Sometimes, Plutarch refers to barbarians as “lawless peoples”. With this category, also characterized by lack of organization and by savagery, Schmidt rather associates “peoples located on the fringe of the world, like the Scythians and the Indians (cf. *Pomp.* 70.4), but it also applies to various other peoples.”¹¹³⁹

Egypt does not belong to either of these two categories. Plutarch often shows a deep respect for Egyptian culture and society (see *De Iside et Osiride*), as did many Greeks before him, and a Greek might even learn much from their ancient wisdom.¹¹⁴⁰ Perhaps, then, one should instead make a distinction between three types of barbarians: the despots, the disorganized savages, and the sages of old.

This is entirely in line with the analysis of the barbarian sections in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*:

[1] The figure of Artaxerxes Mnemon, who dominates the Persian section, is darkened precisely by the focus on his arbitrariness and the fear it generates in everyday life at his court (173D–174B). Something similar goes for the unpredictable and perhaps even deceptive nature of Darius and Xerxes (172F–173C). The Persians *as a group*, then, truly reflect the ‘despotic side of barbarism’ and thus rather represent a negative form of monarchy.

[2] The parallelism that strongly connects the Thracian and Scythian section (174C–F) depicts them as almost exactly the same kind of peoples. That precisely a lack of political hierarchy (cf. ‘barbarian’ lawlessness and disorganization) and a dangerous lack of self-control (cf. ‘barbarian’ savagery) are two of the main characteristics they share shows that they are depicted as the ‘true barbarians’ of Schmidt’s second group.

¹¹³⁸Schmidt, T. S. (2004) 229–230, also referring (230) to “the abuse of power at the Persian court” in *Art.*

¹¹³⁹Schmidt, T. S. (2004) 228–229. In this context, Schmidt also refers to Spanish tribes, the Cimbri, the Teutones, and finally to the Thracians.

¹¹⁴⁰Pelling (2016a). See also Richter (2001) on *De Is. et Os.*; and Meeusen (2017) on Egyptian influence in *Quaest. conv.*, concluding that (226) “Egypt served as some kind of a ‘barbaric’ paradigm or mirror culture for Plutarch (a proto-Hellenic society perhaps?), in which he could see the reflection, not only of his own Greek identity but also – and more importantly – that of a divine, transcultural entity.”

The way in which *Reges Aegypti* divides the barbarian section (172E–174F) into two parts is therefore closely connected with Plutarch's view on barbarism as recognized by Schmidt. Yet the Egyptian kings do more than this alone. They also serve as a kind of mirror image, as they possess precisely the opposite characteristics of the barbarians surrounding them (174C):

Οἱ Αἰγυπτίων βασιλεῖς κατὰ νόμον ἑαυτῶν τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐξώρκιζον ὅτι, κὰν βασιλεύς τι προστάξῃ κρῖναι τῶν μὴ δικαίων, οὐ κρινούσι.

The kings of the Egyptians, in accordance with a rule of their own, used to require their judges to swear that, even if the king should direct them to decide any case unfairly, they would not do so.

Unlike the Persians, the Egyptians oppose any form of arbitrariness that characterizes a despotic rule; unlike the Thracians and Scythians, they have a well-organized legal system where kings hold the highest positions. In this way, they show what the safe middle ground of monarchy looks like. A sole ruler has the greatest power and should act accordingly, but he should also be aware that there are higher powers: justice still rules the ruler, as Plutarch puts it in *Ad principem ineruditum* 780C.¹¹⁴¹ This also calls a later passage of this treatise to mind (781BC):

ὁ μὲν Ζεὺς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν Δίκην πάρεδρον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς Δίκη καὶ Θέμις ἐστὶ καὶ νόμων ὁ πρεσβύτατος καὶ τελειότατος· οἱ δὲ παλαιοὶ οὕτω λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσι καὶ διδάσκουσιν, ὡς ἄνευ Δίκης ἄρχειν μηδὲ τοῦ Διὸς καλῶς δυναμένου· [...] φοβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα τοῦ παθεῖν κακῶς μᾶλλον τὸ ποιῆσαι· τοῦτο γὰρ αἰτιὸν ἐστὶν ἐκείνου καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ὁ φόβος τοῦ ἄρχοντος φιλάνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἀγεννής, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρχομένων δεδιέναι μὴ λάθωσι βλαβέντες,

‘ὡς δὲ κύνες περὶ μῆλα δυσωρήσονται ἐν αὐλῇ
θηρὸς ἀκούσαντες κρατερόφρονος’ (K 183 sq.),

οὐχ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλαττομένων.

¹¹⁴¹ Τίς οὖν ἄρξει τοῦ ἄρχοντος; ὁ ‘νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνητῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων’ ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος (fr. 169), οὐκ ἐν βιβλίοις ἔξω γεγραμμένος οὐδέ τισι ξύλοις, ἀλλ' ἔμφυτος ὢν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγος, αἰεὶ συνοικῶν καὶ παραφυλάττων καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐῶν ἔρημον ἡγεμονίας (“Who, then, shall rule the ruler? The law, the king of all, both mortals and immortals, as Pindar says – not law written outside him in books or on wooden tablets or the like, but reason endowed with life within him, always abiding with him and watching over him and never leaving his soul without its leadership”).

But if a guess about this matter is proper, I should say that Zeus does not have Justice to sit beside him, but is himself Justice and Right and the oldest and most perfect of laws; but the ancients state it in that way in their writings and teachings, to imply that without Justice not even Zeus can rule well. “She is a virgin,” according to Hesiod, uncorrupted, dwelling with reverence, self-restraint, and helpfulness; and therefore kings are called “reverend,” for it is fitting that those be most revered who have least to fear. But the ruler should have more fear of doing than of suffering evil; for the former is the cause of the latter; and that kind of fear on the part of the ruler is humane and not ignoble to be afraid on behalf of his subjects lest they may without his knowledge suffer harm,

Just as the dogs keep their watch, toiling hard for the flocks in the sheepfold,
When they have heard a ferocious wild beast,

not for their own sake but for the sake of those whom they are guarding.

A joint reading of the barbarian sections *in general* gives rise to a similar insight regarding the limits of monarchy. Justice should always prevail, and precisely this component is lacking in a despotic society; the good monarch should act as a protector of the people, a task neglected by the Thracian and Scythian type of barbarians: the δῆμος truly needs a guide. This shows that the monarch needs to know his precise place, as did the Egyptians of old.

2.2 Sicilian Tyranny

The Sicilian section (175A–177A) also introduces the entire Greek section. One who is well acquainted with Plutarch expects this shift to be accompanied by an ethical transition: scholarly research has pointed out that the Chaeronean connects ‘barbarism’ with a certain set of vices, in the same way as ‘Greekness’ entails a series of the corresponding virtues.¹¹⁴² Yet precisely this, in fact, also shows that being a Greek from an ethnic point of view does not always need to mean the same as being a good and well-educated person, for ‘being Greek’ should in some respects rather be considered an ethical quality instead of related to ethnicity.¹¹⁴³ Thus, in the same way as a certain ‘barbarian’ might be more

¹¹⁴²Cf. Martin (1961b) 167: “These three concepts – *philanthrōpia*, civilization, Hellenism – seem almost inseparable for Plutarch.”

¹¹⁴³Cf. also Schmitz (2012) 83, with references to secondary literature.

Greek than an ‘actual Greek’, an ‘actual Greek’ might also be more of a ‘barbarian’.¹¹⁴⁴ This, in fact, also emerges from the Sicilian section, where tyranny is the main theme:¹¹⁴⁵ its positive and promising opening apophthegm is gradually overshadowed by the negative aspects of tyrannical rule, because of which the line between ‘Greeks’ and ‘barbarians’ has to be questioned.¹¹⁴⁶

In this context, Schmidt’s position is again of relevance. He has pointed out “that there is a cluster of ideas between tyranny, despotism and barbarians in Plutarch’s works”.¹¹⁴⁷ Thus, from a thematic point of view, the placement of the Sicilian tyrants after the barbarians is not surprising, as they are more ‘barbaric Greeks’. This also explains why the Sicilians do not belong to the ‘core Greeks’, although their ‘Greekness’ is – from an *ethnic* point of view – definitely far less questionable than that of the Macedonians (who are, on the contrary, placed immediately before the Greeks of the core mainland because of their *ethical* qualities). As a consequence, the following three “negative components of barbarian monarchy”, as again defined by Schmidt and often occurring in Plutarch’s oeuvre, characterize the Sicilian section too (esp. in *Dionysius Maior*, 175C–176C, the core of the Sicilian section): (1) “absence of law (i.e. despotism, arbitrary rule)”, (2) “absence of freedom”, and (3) “absence of free speech”.¹¹⁴⁸ In particular, this third theme is prominently present.¹¹⁴⁹ One concludes that – even though there is a slight improvement when the

¹¹⁴⁴This is even expressed explicitly in *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 1.10–12: a Roman ruler might be more Greek than a Greek ruler, if his reign is milder.

¹¹⁴⁵This explains why Timoleon is left out of the Sicilian section. Of course, he was a Corinthian (but note that the Greek general Memnon got a place in the Persian section too [174BC]) and, as Teodorsson (2005b) 224 points out, there was not much apophthegmatic material available about the man (although there was, as always, at least *some* material), but the most important motivation is definitely of a thematic nature: Plutarch decided to conclude his Sicilian section with only one effective apophthegm on Dion, who, as a liberator of Syracuse, can be considered Timoleon’s predecessor: *Dion* (176F–177A) illustrates what was essentially wrong with the Sicilian tyrants, and provides, in this way, a perfect closure. From a literary and structural point of view, then, the inclusion of Timoleon would have broken the effectiveness of *Dion* (176F–177A): the Sicilian section is about tyrants, not about liberators. For similarities between *The Life of Dion* and *Tim.*, see Schneider (2019).

¹¹⁴⁶See the analysis of *Gelon* (175AB).

¹¹⁴⁷Schmidt, T. S. (2004) 229. Cf. also the representation of the Syracusans as a kind of barbarians in *The Life of Dion*, see Occhipinti (2016).

¹¹⁴⁸Schmidt, T. S. (2004) 229.

¹¹⁴⁹The theme dominates *Hiero* (175BC), is subtly present in *Dionysius Maior* VII (175F), is the main theme in *Dionysius Maior* X (176AB), and occurs in *Dionysius Minor* I (176C).

tyrants are compared with their ‘barbarian’ colleagues¹¹⁵⁰ – the Sicilian section in fact continues ‘barbarian’ themes.

As such, then, the Sicilians do not provide many new insights into what the negative pole of sole rulership looks like: the lessons to be drawn from, again, a *general* interpretation of their apophthegms is basically the same:¹¹⁵¹ “there is an important limit to monarchical power, namely law and justice”, as one might put it. This does not, however, mean that the section does not contribute something new to this in another way. By building on the ‘theory’ of the barbarian sections, the Sicilian section performs a persuasive function. This happens by means of the focus on the painful position of all tyrants, who do not have real friends and always have to be on their guard for traitors and conspiracies, as appears from the series of changes of power.¹¹⁵² This horrible, generalized image of the life of ‘the tyrant’¹¹⁵³ reminds one of the function of the negative *exempla* at a lower level of the text, in line with Plutarch’s *Seelenheilung*: it aims to convince the reader that the frightening situation described is not desirable at all (cf. βλάβαι and αίσχύναι: the tyrants are harmed by their wrong opinions, and dishonoured when losing their power).

In light of this, the description of the tyrant’s life also clarifies a point made in *Ad principem ineruditum* 781BC, cited above: for a ruler, doing something bad leads to suffering something bad. A tyrant has to fear for his life precisely because he harms his people, who therefore want to get rid of him. Something similar also appears from a later passage in the same work (781E):

¹¹⁵⁰This is the suggestion of *Gelon* I (175A) and of the rather positive image of *Hiero* (175BC). Note also the ambiguity in *Dionysius Maior* (175C–176C), where many of his lawless actions might also be regarded as reflecting some insight. The image of *Dionysius Minor* (176C–E) is not that negative either. Thus, there is – in general – some improvement when barbarians and Sicilians are compared.

¹¹⁵¹Only from a *general* interpretation: even though Plutarch was indeed a great opponent of tyranny (see Nikolaidis (1995) 301 and 307–308; Teixeira (1988) 56), the section is not entirely negative: as also discussed in the note above, *Gelon* I (175A), the first apophthegm of the Sicilian section, can only be assessed in a positive way, and the same can be said of Hiero’s appreciation of free speech (175BC), just to give a few examples. This is in line with Plutarch’s assessment of both tyrants in *De sera num.* 551F–552A. See also *Dion* 5.8–10 for a positive assessment of Gelon, in contrast with the rule of Dionysius the Elder, who made fun of this tyrant in this passage (a story also told in *De se ipsum laud.* 542D). Teixeira (1988) 51 also points out that not all tyrants are inherently bad in Plutarch’s eyes.

¹¹⁵²See also Teixeira (1988) 49–50.

¹¹⁵³As appears most clearly from a joint reading of *Dionysius Maior* and *Dionysius Minor* (176C–E), but it is also the suggestion of the reversed order of *Agathocles* (176EF) and *Dion* (176F–177A).

τῷ γὰρ ὄντι δεδίασιν οἱ βασιλεῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οἱ δὲ τύραννοι τοὺς ἀρχομένους· διὸ τῇ δυνάμει τὸ δέος συναύξουσι, πλειόνων γὰρ ἄρχοντες πλείονας φοβοῦνται.

For in reality kings fear for their subjects, but tyrants fear their subjects; and therefore they increase their fear as they increase their power, for when they have more subjects they have more men to fear.

Good rulers are only occupied with the well-being of their subjects, not with their own, but in precisely this way they also have a care for their own lives. This is a fortunate byproduct of their love for the people, contributing to the sustainability of their reign and dynasty. Yet with regard to the Sicilian sections, the opposite seems to be the case: the apophthegms appeal to fear for one's life and should convince the target audience (monarchs such as Trajan) to rule mildly and in accordance with justice (cf. the *Seelenheilung* process). In other words: careful attention for the people's well-being seems to be an expected and desired byproduct of the rulers' fear for their own lives, who now know that, if they want to be safe, they should strive for a rule opposite to tyranny and despotism (and perhaps this is also indirectly the case with *Ad prin. iner.*). What this 'opposite' looks like is the main subject of the Macedonian sections.

2.3 True Monarchy

The general image arising from a joint reading of especially *Archelaus*, *Philippus*, and *Alexander* (177A–181F) is to be contrasted with that of the barbarians and the Sicilian tyrants. This happens by means of various themes through which the essential differences between their political systems are highlighted. This is accompanied by a geographical evolution: the readers leave the realm of barbarians and despots, and the closer they get to the Greeks of the core mainland, the more they are approaching a better – one might say a more Greek – type of monarchy. Such connections between topographical information and ethical values can be found elsewhere in Plutarch too. When Alexander, in his *Life*, marches to the East, this is accompanied by a deterioration of his character;¹¹⁵⁴ when Pyrrhus reaches Sicily, he actually becomes a tyrant.¹¹⁵⁵ Something similar, then, happens in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, although it there concerns the general image of a group of people.

In the Macedonian section, justice is recommended as the principal virtue once again. Yet it also explores various aspects of this virtue.

¹¹⁵⁴ Whitmarsh (2002) 186.

¹¹⁵⁵ See *supra*, note 497.

Knowing when to give and when to take,¹¹⁵⁶ knowing that mildness and self-restraint are required even when being slandered,¹¹⁵⁷ knowing when not to punish even when a subject has done wrong:¹¹⁵⁸ all these insights, strongly contrasting with barbarian despotism and Sicilian tyranny, might be regarded as belonging to this core value. Only when rulers truly possess this will they be able to establish a healthy relationship with their subjects and at the same time a long-lasting reign. This can be seen from the fact that the first Macedonian dynasty survives for more generations – a strong contrast between the pair *Dionysius Maior–Dionysius Minor* (175C–176E) and *Philippus–Alexander* (177C–181F), as highlighted by the analysis. This recalls *Ad principem ineruditum* again (779D–F):

διὸ τοῖς ἄρχουσι χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ σύμβουλον περὶ ἀρχῆς γενέσθαι· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ὥσπερ ἄρχοντα παραδέξασθαι φοβοῦνται, μὴ τῆς ἐξουσίας αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν κολούση τῷ καθήκοντι δουλωσάμενος. οὐ γὰρ ἴσασι τὰ Θεοπόμπου τοῦ Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλέως, ὃς πρῶτος ἐν Σπάρτῃ τοῖς βασιλεύουσι καταμίξας τοὺς ἐφόρους, εἴτ' ὄνειδιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς γυναικός, εἰ τοῖς παισὶν ἐλάττονα παραδώσει τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣς παρέλαβε, 'μείζονα μὲν οὖν' εἶπεν 'ὄσφ καὶ βεβαιοτέραν'. τὸ γὰρ σφοδρὸν ἀνεῖς καὶ ἄκρατον αὐτῆς ἅμα τῷ φθόνῳ διέφυγε τὸν κίνδυνον.

And that is why it is difficult to give advice to rulers in matters of government, for they are afraid to accept reason as a ruler over them, lest it curtail the advantage of their power by making them slaves to duty. For they are not familiar with the saying of Theopompus, the King of Sparta who first made the Ephors associates of the Kings; then, when his wife reproached him because he would hand down to his children a less powerful office than that which he had received he said: "Nay, more powerful rather, inasmuch as it is more secure." For by giving up that which was excessive and absolute in it he avoided both the envy and the danger.

Theopompus, it seems, might not just have taken this measure because the opposite would mean the end of his power, but also because this was the just thing to do (cf. τῷ καθήκοντι). This improved his relationship with the people. This relationship, one concludes from the passage, is one of mutual trust: the citizens are prepared to follow their ruler, since

¹¹⁵⁶ *Archelaus* I (177A), IV (177B); *Philippus* XVIII (178C), XXI (178E); *Alexander* V (179EF), VI (179F), VII (179F–180A), XVIII (180E), XXIV (181C), XXX (181DE).

¹¹⁵⁷ *Philippus* V (177D), VI (177DE), VII (177E), XXVI (178B); *Alexander* XXXII (181E).

¹¹⁵⁸ *Archelaus* V (177B); *Philippus* IV (177CD), XI (178A), XIX (178CD); *Alexander* XII (180C), XXI (180F–181A), XXII (181AB), XXIII (181B), XXXI (181E).

they know that this person has their best interests at heart because of the leniency he displays (cf. τὸ γὰρ σφοδρὸν ἀνείς καὶ ἄκρατον αὐτῆς); the rulers put their subjects first, and precisely because of this, they need to have no fear (cf. διέφυγε τὸν κίνδυνον).

Yet self-preservation – although it also contributes to the commonwealth by bringing stability¹¹⁵⁹ – is not the most important reason why a ruler should establish such a good relationship. Leniency on the ruler's part should also ensure indulgence on the people's part in cases where it is impossible to give in: when certain unpopular measures are taken, a bond of trust between the monarch and his subjects ensures that they know that these are to be taken for their own sake and well-being. This topic, related to the ruler's educational function, is alluded to by *Ad principem ineruditum* 780B:

δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ὁ κανὼν αὐτὸς ἀστραβῆς γενόμενος καὶ ἀδιάστροφος οὕτως ἀπευθύνει τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐφαρμογῇ καὶ παραθέσει συνηξομοιῶν, παραπλησίως τὸν ἄρχοντα πρῶτον ἀρχὴν κτησάμενον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ κατευθύναντα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ καταστησάμενον τὸ ἦθος οὕτω συναρμόττειν τὸ ὑπήκοον [...].

But just as a rule, if it is made rigid and inflexible, makes other things straight when they are fitted to it and laid alongside it, in like manner the sovereign must first gain command of himself, must regulate his own soul and establish his own character, then make his subjects fit his pattern.

This passage suggests that a good relationship based on a lenient and just rule – for this is the consequence when a ruler first takes care of his own character, as appears from other parts of the treatise cited¹¹⁶⁰ – enables the ruler to improve his subjects.

This theme, however, which is of central importance in Plutarch's Platonic conception of the philosopher king, does not seem to be prominently present in *Archelaus–Alexander* (177A–181F), and not even in the monarchical sections as a whole. The only clear exception is the first section on Cyrus (172EF): he was the most beloved king of the Persian people, but not because he gave his subjects everything they wanted. All the measures he took were inspired by his love for the people and aimed to improve them. As such, then, the opening section not only announces a main theme of the monarchical sections – that one should establish a healthy

¹¹⁵⁹This rather belongs to the interpretation of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* as a world history, addressed in the following chapter.

¹¹⁶⁰Cf. esp. the story of Theopompus in *Ad princ. iner.* 779D–F cited above.

relationship with one's subjects – but also alludes to its eventual goal, viz. improving one's subjects, which should happen through lawgiving.

Although this theme is not further explored in the monarchical sections themselves, it occurs – perhaps surprisingly – in the sections presenting other state structures. *Demetrius Phalereus* (189D), an apophthegm that recalls the dedicatory letter preceding *Cyrus*, reads as a kind of introduction to *Lycurgus* (189D–F). It thereby puts this Persian and Spartan section at the same thematic level, and the placement of sections on Lacedaemonian oligarchy, surrounded by 'democratic' sections, also leads one to a comparison of these different ruling systems and to a general lesson that recalls *Cyrus* and *Ad principem ineruditum* 780B.

2.4 Other Types of Government

In political systems where rulers are to be chosen by the people, future leaders often need to please the people; once they are chosen, they usually are still forced to do the same if they want to protect themselves. As a consequence, most democratic rulers are unable to take the people's best interests to heart: they either have to succumb to the whims of the masses, or they might be removed from power in a violent or non-violent way.¹¹⁶¹ In Plutarch's view, then, democracy – at least the type that gives too much power to the people – does not seem to be an ideal context for the good politician.¹¹⁶²

In the collection, this theme is closely intertwined with that of generalship, a topic which dominates the non-monarchical sections: it is often stressed that generals who only attempt to please the people – usually by their bold behaviour, either by risking their own lives or by overconfidently sending their soldiers into the battlefield – are detrimental to the common good.¹¹⁶³ Yet in a democratic system, it is precisely these popular men who are often chosen to lead the army. Good generals, then, either in ancient Athens or in the early Roman Republic, need to maintain their position and try to convince the people that this position is the correct one.¹¹⁶⁴ Yet too often this might seem almost impossible to achieve.

¹¹⁶¹ Plutarch even speaks of a kind of enslavement in this respect, see Roskam (2011) 210 on *Agis* 1.1–4.

¹¹⁶² As Erskine (2018) 239–245 points out, Plutarch did not think entirely negatively of democracy, but the type that gives too much power to the people (cf. Athens after Ephialtes' reforms) is definitely a bad state structure.

¹¹⁶³ See e.g. *Timotheus* II and III (187C); *Phocion* XII (188DE); the theme is prominently present in the Theban section (192C–194E); *Fabius Maximus* II and III (195C–E); *Publius Licinius* (197EF); *Paulus Aemilius* V (198AB); *Caecilius Metellus* I and II (201F–202A).

¹¹⁶⁴ A prominent theme in *Themistocles* (184F–185F; he even bribes his opponents to save his city); *Iphicrates–Chabrias* (186F–187D), and also *Hegesippus* (187DE; he is an

This also applies to other levels of decision-making. Sections such as *Aristeides* (186A–C), *Phocion* (187E–189B), and *Cato Maior* (198D–199E) illustrate that the masses rarely trust and elect those who truly serve the commonwealth, and, as stressed in the Athenian section, they often even banish their great leaders or sentence them to death.¹¹⁶⁵ This deficit in (semi-)democratic systems is thematized in *Lycurgus* (189D–F) and closely connected with lawgiving: the Spartan system is superior to those of the surrounding sections, for in such a system, rulers who truly care about their subjects do not need to flatter them, but try to improve them by means of laws and can also act as strict teachers when necessary. A certain distance between ruler and subjects, then, is desirable, for when rulers try to please and flatter their subjects, they are not real rulers: they are dominated by and are forced to yield to the will of the people.¹¹⁶⁶ They have, therefore, no real power. This deprives them of the ability to fulfil their most important function: the education of their subjects.

If the monarchical sections, then, show that rulers should not make themselves hated among the people, the sections that deal with other state structures highlight that the opposite – an excessive pursuit of love from and approval by the people – is not what they should strive for either. Good, philosophically inspired monarchs know by themselves what is good for their subjects and attempt to achieve this, usually by lawgiving, always steadily keeping their own course. Plutarch, one concludes, attempts to stress that the correct relationship between ruler and subjects is situated right in between an oppressive rule and excessive complacency.

2.5 Conclusion

An interpretation at a higher level of the text entails a different application of role models: speaking about groups of people *in general*, one makes bolder claims that do not always seem valid at a lower level focusing on individuals and all their complexities. This appears most clearly from the barbarian sections. Although ‘barbarian’ despotism and lawlessness is presented as a negative form of monarchy, some Persian sections show a positive picture of the king in question, such as *Cyrus* (172EF) and *Artaxerxes Longimanus* (173DE). The same can be said about the Scythians and Thracians, where *Scilurus* (174F) illustrates that good kings existed

orator, but tries to convince the Athenians of the war); *Phocion* (187E–189B); and the sections on the conquering Roman Republic (194E–202E).

¹¹⁶⁵ *Themistocles* XV–XVII (185EF); *Aristeides* II (186AB); *Alcibiades* VII (186EF); *Chabrias* II (187D); *Phocion* XVII–XIX (189AB).

¹¹⁶⁶ Alcibiades is a clear example of a flatterer of the people, an aspect which is connected with his φιλοτιμία; see Nikolaidis (2012) 44. See also Russell (1972) 117–129 on Alcibiades as a flatterer.

amongst those peoples as well.¹¹⁶⁷ Yet precisely by attributing certain characteristics to a *group* of people, Plutarch is able to introduce more clear-cut lessons into his collection, something he is unable to do when dealing with the essentially problematic nature of individual ethical decision-making in everyday life alone.

It is difficult to tell whether these possibilities of a more generic application of *exempla* are essential to Plutarch's views on exemplarity: in his oeuvre, there seems to be no passage that theorizes this idea. Yet it is now clear that the Chaeronean was at least aware of these possibilities. This appears especially from *Reges Aegypti* (174C): the only 'apophthegm' about a *group* of people is to be contrasted with the general image that arises from a joint reading of the apophthegms on two other *groups* of people, which leaves no doubt as to which type of rulership is to be followed. Plutarch, then, knew very well what he was doing.

The general lessons arising from this interpretational level often call *Ad principem ineruditum* to mind. This is no coincidence: the treatise attempts to set out some guidelines for the good monarch. They can be summarized as follows:

[1] Sole rulers should first take care of their own characters. Once philosophy has removed all excess, this will result in a lenient and balanced and therefore just rule. This rule is also characterized by stability, because of the resulting good relationship between monarch and subjects.

[2] As a consequence of this relationship, sole rulers can also act strictly when necessary: they can fulfil their educational function, improving their subjects.

As to the collection, [1] especially appears from the monarchical sections (172E–184F; and, in fact, also from *Augustus*, 206F–208A; and perhaps from *Caesar*, 205E–206F, and *Pompeius*, 203B–204E, recalling the monarchical sections in various respects) recommending mildness to the emperor; [2] is the theme of the second half of the work (184F–208A), highlighting – in connection with this educational function – that excessive indulgence is not desirable. The contrast between the two parts of the collection, then, corresponds to the logical order as described by *Ad principem ineruditum*: concern for one's character comes first, for only this can provide the solid basis that enables rulers to perform their core function as guides of their subjects.

¹¹⁶⁷ Even though barbarians lacked Greek *paideia*, good barbarians and even barbarian sages occur in Plutarch as well; see e.g. Georgiadou (1992a) 4242–4245 on the rather positive representation of Hannibal in *Pel*. The most important example in this regard is Anacharsis; see Schmidt, T. S. (2004) 230. His absence in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* is not surprising: he does not fit in the categories of rulers, lawgivers, and generals.

Thus, that moralism at the level of the individuals is essentially problematic does not mean that the work promotes a nihilistic view, for a higher interpretational level still provides a certain paradigm within which challenging situations are to be solved. It is up to the rulers to always try to act in accordance with this, although it will not always be clear whether they are succeeding in the specific situations they are confronted with.

3

A World History

As *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* comprise sections on barbarian, Greek, and Roman heroes, almost from the earliest history known to Plutarch up to only a few decades before his own birth, the entire work can be read as an abbreviated world history – and this probably even to a larger extent than the *Parallel Lives*,¹¹⁶⁸ not only because of the inclusion of some barbarians, but also because a general chronological arrangement is prominently present in the collection. This chapter discusses an interpretation at this highest level of the text, focusing on how it reveals a message for the Roman emperor specifically. The first part concerns Dillon’s thought-provoking article inspired by Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* (3.1),¹¹⁶⁹ as this will appear to be an ideal starting point for a discussion of this theme in the collection (3.2).

3.1 Plutarch’s ‘End of History’

Plutarch, Dillon argues, believed that history had reached some kind of endpoint after the establishment of the Roman Principate, which had created peace and freedom for all human beings (at least to a certain extent).¹¹⁷⁰ The key passage on which his argument is based is *De fortuna Romanorum* 316E–317A,¹¹⁷¹ where the Chaeronean indeed seems to express this idea:¹¹⁷²

¹¹⁶⁸See Pelling (2005) 339 on the *Parallel Lives* as “a compendious history of Greece and Rome”, and esp. Pelling (2010) on the idea (217) “that the entire series of *Parallel Lives* is constructed to go together, with the *Lives* combining to build global histories of classical Greece and of the Roman Republic” (although Pelling also nuances this later in the article).

¹¹⁶⁹Dillon (1997), inspired by Fukuyama (1992).

¹¹⁷⁰There is much secondary literature on Plutarch’s belief that the Roman Empire was desired by god/providence: Candau Morón (2000) 462–463 provides a convenient overview.

¹¹⁷¹Dillon (1997) 236–238. In this passage, Plutarch compares evolutions throughout history with Epicurean cosmology and with the Platonist cosmology of the *Timaeus*. The conclusion to be made from this metaphor is described well by Dillon (1997) 236: “the Roman Empire becomes analogous to the orderly cosmos, which, now that it has been established, will continue, by the will of God, to subsist forever.” See in this context also Teodorsson (2005a) 435 on the oration.

¹¹⁷²I deleted the colon after ἀγκυρηβόλιον in the *Teubner* edition, in line with the LCL translation.

Ἐγὼ δέ, ὅτι μὲν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ πρὸς ἀλλήλας αἰεὶ πολεμοῦσι καὶ διαφέρονται Τύχη καὶ Ἀρετῇ, πρὸς γε τηλικαύτην σύμπηξιν ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως εἰκὸς ἔστιν αὐτὰς σπεισαμένας συνελθεῖν καὶ συνελθούσας ἐπιτελειῶσαι καὶ συναπεργάσασθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων τὸ κάλλιστον, ὀρθῶς ὑπονοεῖν οἶομαι. καὶ νομίζω, καθάπερ Πλάτων (Tim. p. 28b 32b) φησὶν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ὡς ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ πρώτων γεγενῆσθαι τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, ἵν' ὁρατός τε γένηται καὶ ἀπτός, γῆς μὲν τὸ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ στάσιμον αὐτῷ συμβαλλομένης, πυρὸς δὲ χρῶμα καὶ μορφὴν καὶ κίνησιν, αἱ δ' ἐν μέσῳ φύσεις, ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ, μαλάξασαι καὶ σβέσασαι τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀνομοιότητα συνήγαγον καὶ ἀνεμίξαντο τὴν ὕλην δι' αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ ὁ τὴν Ῥώμην ὑποβαλλόμενος χρόνος μετὰ θεοῦ τύχην καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐκέρασε καὶ συνέζευξεν, ἵν' ἑκατέρας λαβὼν τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπεργάσθαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἔστιαν ἱερὰν ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀνησιδώραν καὶ 'πέισμα' μόνιμον καὶ στοιχεῖον αἰδίων, ὑποφερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν 'ἀγκυρηβόλιον σάλου καὶ πλάνης' ὡς φησι Δημόκριτος (B 148).

I believe myself to be right in suspecting that, even if Fortune and Virtue are engaged in a direct and continual strife and discord with each other, yet, at least for such a welding together of dominion and power, it is likely that they suspended hostilities and joined forces; and by joining forces they co-operated in completing this most beautiful of human works. Even as Plato asserts that the entire universe arose from fire and earth as the first and necessary elements, that it might become visible and tangible, earth contributing to it weight and stability, and fire contributing colour, form, and movement; but the medial elements, water and air, by softening and quenching the dissimilarity of both extremes, united them and brought about the composite nature of Matter through them; in this way, then, in my opinion, did Time lay the foundation for the Roman State and, with the help of God, so combine and join together Fortune and Virtue that, by taking the peculiar qualities of each, he might construct for all mankind a Hearth, in truth both holy and beneficent, a steadfast cable, a principle abiding for ever, "an anchorage from the swell and drift," as Democritus says, amid the shifting conditions of human affairs.

One should, however, have two important reservations with regard to this text:

[I] *De fortuna Romanorum* is a laudatory essay.¹¹⁷³ It is, therefore, not unlikely that some claims in the work do not reflect Plutarch's views,

¹¹⁷³ Ziegler (1951) 720 did not even regard the work as to be taken seriously. Swain (1989b) attempts to point out which parts of the oration represent Plutarch's ideas, and which are the consequence of the text's rhetorical nature.

and that others show a distorted picture of what he actually believed. There are also major differences between the presentation of Alexander the Great in *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, another epideictic oration, and that of his *Life*.¹¹⁷⁴ This is an obvious and inevitable consequence of the type of text, and it would be hard to claim that the biography's more complex and human picture of the Macedonian king does not coincide with Plutarch's actual view, in contrast with the oration's univocally positive image.¹¹⁷⁵ Something similar, then, must be the case for *De fortuna Romanorum* and the author's personal opinions about at least some of the issues at stake.¹¹⁷⁶

[2] Most scholars agree that *De fortuna Romanorum* is one of Plutarch's earliest works.¹¹⁷⁷ If the passage did reflect the youthful author's genuine beliefs, it is by no means certain that he maintained this view until the time of his more mature literary career (esp. in the case of the *Parallel Lives* and *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, as these are probably among Plutarch's later writings).

Dillon also quotes two other fragments in order to corroborate his argument. The first one is *De Pythiae oraculis* 408BC, where Theon approves of the contemporary peace and quiet in Greece, and argues that the lack of complex political situations explains why the Delphic oracles are no longer formulated in verse.¹¹⁷⁸ Yet he only describes the *current* situation (τὰ δὲ νῦν πράγματα καθεστῶτα; LCL: "the settled conditions prevailing at present"), and there is no indication that he believes that this will last forever. Something similar can be said about the second passage (*Praec. ger. reip.* 824CD):

¹¹⁷⁴ See also *supra*, note 382.

¹¹⁷⁵ Wardman (1955); Hamilton, J. R. (1969) XXIII–XXXIII; Whitmarsh (2002) 179–180; Monaco Caterine (2017) 408.

¹¹⁷⁶ Swain (1989b) 516 concludes that "while there are many points of detail where *de fort. Rom.* diverges from comparable material in the *Lives* and the *Moralia*, the way in which fortune works, indeed the whole idea that events of history, especially Roman history, have been to some extent predetermined, squares firmly with Plutarch's serious beliefs." The concept of "the end of history" is a different matter, of course.

¹¹⁷⁷ Dillon (1997) 236 acknowledges this, but argues in 239n5 that it bears witness to a profound knowledge of Latin sources: "It cannot, therefore, be *too* early a work"; against Hartman (1916) 143.

¹¹⁷⁸ Hartman (1916) 174 believes that this praise closing the text aimed to please the Roman audience. Theon's position is, as Dillon (1997) 235 writes, "presumably that of Plutarch." On Theon representing Plutarch's point of view in *De Pyth. or.*, see Schröder (1990) 16.

ὄρα γάρ, ὅτι τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰρήνης ἐλευθερίας εὐετηρίας εὐανδρίας ὁμοιότηας, πρὸς μὲν εἰρήνην οὐδὲν οἱ δῆμοι τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ δέονται, πέφευγε γὰρ ἐξ ἡμῶν καὶ ἠφάνισται πᾶς μὲν Ἕλλην πᾶς δὲ βάρβαρος πόλεμος· ἐλευθερίας δ' ὅσον οἱ κρατοῦντες νέμουσι τοῖς δῆμοις μέτεστι καὶ τὸ πλεον ἴσως οὐκ ἄμεινον· εὐφορίαν δὲ γῆς ἀφθονον εὐμενῆ τε κρᾶσιν ὥρων, καὶ τίκτειν γυναῖκας 'ἐοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσι' (Hes. OD 235) σωτηρίαν <τε> τοῖς γεννωμένοις εὐχόμενος ὃ γε σῶφρων αἰτήσεται παρὰ θεῶν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πολίταις.

For observe that of the greatest blessings which States can enjoy, – peace, liberty, plenty, abundance of men, and concord, – so far as peace is concerned the peoples have no need of statesmanship at present; for all war, both Greek and foreign, has been banished from among us and has disappeared; and of liberty the peoples have as great a share as our rulers grant them, and perhaps more would not be better for them; but bounteous productiveness of the soil, kindly tempering of the seasons, that wives may bear “children like to their sires,” and that the offspring may live in safety – these things the wise man will ask the gods in his prayers to grant his fellow-citizens.

In my view, Dillon might read too deeply into this passage as well. Once again, there is a focus on the *present* condition (ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ) alone. In addition, the context of the fragment should be considered: in what follows, Plutarch argues that the only thing a statesman (a πολιτικός) should try to establish is ὁμόνοια. He has private quarrels in mind, but he concludes by claiming that precisely these can become a detriment for the entire state (824F–825A):

ὥσπερ ἐμπρησμός οὐ πολλάκις ἐκ τόπων ἱερῶν ἄρχεται καὶ δημοσίων, ἀλλὰ λύχνος τις ἐν οἰκίᾳ παραμεληθεὶς ἢ συρφετὸς διακαεὶς ἀνήκε φλόγα πολλὴν καὶ δημοσίαν φθορὰν ἀπεργασαμένην, οὕτως οὐκ αἰεὶ στάσιν πόλεως αἰεὶ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ φιλονεικίαι διακαίουσιν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐκ πραγμάτων καὶ προσκρουμάτων ἰδίων εἰς δημόσιον αἰεὶ διαφοραὶ προελθοῦσαι συνετάραξαν ἅπασαν τὴν πόλιν [...].

But just as a conflagration does not often begin in sacred or public places, but some lamp left neglected in a house or some burnt rubbish causes a great flame and works public destruction, so disorder in a State is not always kindled by contentions about public matters, but frequently differences arising from private affairs and offences pass thence into public life and throw the whole State into confusion.

The image of a possible public disaster and overall chaos as a consequence of lack of concord in a state contrasts sharply with the peaceful, free, and prosperous society set out at the beginning of 824CD. One can only conclude that ὁμόνοια is the basis of all other ἀγαθά mentioned there.¹¹⁷⁹ Thus, this passage highlights important aspects of Plutarch's views on history and the circumstances in his own days: first, there is a strong focus on how individuals influence historical developments; second (but in fact a result of this rather individualistic approach), there is no guarantee that individuals will, in the future, no longer have a negative impact on, or confuse, or perhaps even overthrow the Roman Empire. *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, then, not only seems to praise the situation in Plutarch's own days, but also warns of a possible decline in later times. History, one concludes, does not necessarily seem to have come to an end in the Chaeronean's eyes.

This is in line with *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a world history (3.2). At first, the fact that *Augustus* (206F–208A) – the establishment of the Roman Principate ruling all people and bringing them peace¹¹⁸⁰ – concludes the work seems to support the way Dillon reads the Plutarchan passages discussed (3.2.1).¹¹⁸¹ Yet when taking a closer look at how the author presents the driving forces behind historical developments throughout the collection, the reader is invited to ask the same questions as those elicited by *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 824C–825A (3.2.2).

3.2 World History in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*

The collection does not always provide a clear chronological overview of historical events. There are several minor deviations within sections on certain peoples. Because these usually intend to steer the reader towards a specific interpretation of individual characters, these cases are of less importance for this chapter.¹¹⁸² Additionally, the order in which

¹¹⁷⁹ See Cook (2004) on ὁμόνοια in *Praec. ger. reip.* 814B; Roskam (2005a); and de Blois (2005) 148 on this aspect in *Praec. ger. reip.* in general and in *Lyc.*

¹¹⁸⁰ The war between Augustus and Antony is only dealt with in *Augustus* I–II (206F–207A). The remainder of the section only focuses on how the first emperor attempts to be a mild ruler, in line with Alexander, and how he aims to establish peace and stability in his empire, unlike Alexander.

¹¹⁸¹ Dillon (1997) 239n7 writes on the comparison of Platonist cosmology and the establishment of the Roman Principate (*De fort. Rom.* 316E–317F): “This analogy, incidentally, would give Augustus a position very similar to the Platonic Demiurge, though I am not aware that Plutarch explicitly made the comparison.”

¹¹⁸² Such deviations often create structural entities at various levels of the text, in order to create groups of sections that will be read together and should be compared with each other. The clearest examples of this are *Dion* (176F–177A), contrasting with the previous

different people follow each other is not always straightforward. In particular, the placement of the Macedonians raises questions. This has been addressed in 2.3, but the explanation provided there does not yet clarify why Plutarch concludes the section with *Antiochus Septimus* (184D–F), thereby further stressing a gap of a few centuries between this section and the next one on Themistocles (184F–185F). This large break, as will now become clear, is especially relevant for an interpretation at the highest level of the text, for it also separates two *general* chronologies:

[1] A first chronology starts with Cyrus' beloved rule and ends with the chaotic situation during the period of the *Diadochi*.

[2] A second one begins with Themistocles' successes against the Persian Empire and concludes with the establishment of the Roman Principate.

A comparison of both chronologies is in line with 3.1.

3.2.1 Two *Paralleled* Chronologies

The two chronologies do not exist entirely independently from each other, for an underlying parallel structure connects them. Generally speaking, both consist of two parts: a first one on great 'nations' that lose their freedom and power (sections on 'the conquered') and a second one on those that subdue most of these 'nations' (sections on 'the conquerors').

a) The sections on the conquered

The first parts consist of the series *Cyrus–Dion* (172E–177A) for the first chronology and *Themistocles–Pelopidas* (184F–194E) for the second. In these sections, the focus lies on the internal instability of a 'nation' or dynasty. They show how a people often loses its independence and how a powerful reign can come to its end because of this:

[1] As to the first chronology, this stands out most clearly in the Persian section. *Cyrus Minor* (173EF) deals with the war this man started against his brother, which contrasts sharply with Xerxes' action in his first apophthegm (173BC). In *Artaxerxes Mnemon* (173F–174A) and *Orontes* (174B), the situation is hardly better: the king distrusts his own entourage. This lack of harmony does the Persian Empire no good: the next and final section on Memnon (174B), concluding with Ἀλεξάνδρω,

tyrants; *Myronides* (185F–186A), separating *Themistocles* (184F–185F) from *Aristeides* (186A–C) and strongly affecting the way in which the two men are compared; *Peisistratus* (189B–D), which turns *Demetrius Phalereus* (189D) into a kind of introduction to *Lycurgus* (189D–F); *Gaius Popillius* (202E–203A), because of which the sections on the death struggle of the Roman Republic will be read as one whole. These cases have been addressed in detail in the analysis.

illustrates how the Macedonian king brought an end to its existence. As to the other barbarian sections (174C–F), something similar can be said. It is no coincidence that *Anteas* (174EF), whose section is dominated by references to Philip, is followed by an apophthegm on brotherly harmony in *Scilurus* (174F): the implication is that barbarian lack of self-restraint and absence of organization makes them no match for the Macedonian conqueror.¹¹⁸³ In the case of the Sicilians (175A–177A), finally, the core theme consists of the mutual distrust between a tyrant and his people, and how this eventually often leads to the downfall of a dynasty.

[2] The same happens to the Greeks in the first part of the second chronology. At first, things seem to go well in Athens. *Themistocles* (184F–185F) takes the reader back to the times of Darius and Xerxes, described at the outset of the Persian section (172F–173C) and hereby further highlighting the parallel between both chronologies. Its subject's φιλοτιμία explains why the Greeks could survive the Persian Wars. Yet precisely φιλοτιμία will also mean the end of Athens. The city's democratic system is dominated by individuals who often care too much about their own powerful position in society and too little about the well-being of their fellow citizens.¹¹⁸⁴ As a result of this instability, Athens is unable to cope with foreign threats: when Alcibiades, in disregard for both the law and the people, turns against his homeland (186D–F), this says enough about the internal condition of the πόλις, and it is not surprising that Athenian hegemony came to an end.¹¹⁸⁵ The same goes for all Greeks together: Agesilaus' campaigns against the Persians only failed because of the lack of unity among the Greek cities.¹¹⁸⁶ Internal strife in Hellas where every entity longs for dominion (the Athens–Sparta and Sparta–Thebes conflicts), then, explains why Philip was able to conquer the Greeks rather quickly in the end, an idea which Plutarch expresses elsewhere in his oeuvre as well.¹¹⁸⁷

¹¹⁸³ On the conflicts between Philip and Anteas, see Rolle (1980) 143–145 and Gardiner-Garden (1989).

¹¹⁸⁴ This theme is stressed most explicitly in the sequence *Themistocles–Alcibiades* (184F–186F).

¹¹⁸⁵ Note also how the Sicilian calamity is followed by a series of sections on generalship (186F–187D), also focusing on φιλοτιμία.

¹¹⁸⁶ As Agesilaus explicitly says in his sixth apophthegm (191AB).

¹¹⁸⁷ Pelling (2012) 62 makes a similar point with regard to *Phil.–Flam.*: “In this pair he connects the collapse of Greece to that self-destructive Greek φιλονικία: Rome might be the agent of Greece’s fall [...] but it was really Greece that destroyed herself.” See also Pelling (1986) 86–87.

b) The sections on the conquerors

The second parts concern the Macedonians (177A–184F) and the Romans (194E–208A):

[1] *Philippus* (177C–179C) and *Alexander* (179D–181F) relate how both kings subdue almost the entire world known to them. Of course, their empire falls apart afterwards, but the sections on the *Diadochi* (181F–184F) do not yet describe how these smaller kingdoms eventually lose their freedom to the Romans.¹¹⁸⁸ This will only be related in [2]. As such, then, one is still reading about subjugators.

[2] Similar to the Macedonians, republican Rome gradually becomes master of its part of the globe (esp. in 194E–202E, but also in the remainder of the Roman section).¹¹⁸⁹ The result of this is illustrated by *Augustus* (206F–208A), in which all the people who figured in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* appear on the stage for one final time. Roman world dominion, bringing peace to all ethnicities, seems a fact.

Plutarch is paralleling both peoples, which suggests that history repeats itself. In light of this, it is most important that almost all parts of the empire built up in [1] become part of the one established in [2]. Various aspects in this regard remind one of Dillon's position:

[1] When, after Alexander's death, his empire disintegrates into a patchwork of smaller kingdoms fighting each other, these 'nations' suffer the same fate as the people they once conquered because of their own lack of internal stability and unity. In other words, Alexander's attempt to join all people under one reign in the end failed. Thus, if the Roman conquests – of which the *Diadochi* are victims too – mirror his achievements, the suggestion is that they restore order and fulfil his mission of creating a stable and eternal world empire, by replacing the Macedonian rulers. The theme of an empire's durability in *Augustus*, at least at a first and superficial reading, suggests that the Roman Principate truly reached this point.

¹¹⁸⁸ The sections on the *Diadochi* do not show how these kingdoms fall, with the only exception being *Antigonus Secundus* I (183C), where the surrendering of Antigonus' kingdom is only discussed in order to describe his love for his father Demetrius: the theme of loss of power is entirely absent from the remainder of this section.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Lucullus* (203AB) deals with an expedition in Armenia; in *Pompeius* VIII (204A), there is a conflict with the Parthian Phraates; in *Caesar* XII (206E), Pharnaces of Pontus is defeated; in *Augustus* III (207AB), Egypt finally becomes part of the Roman Empire, and X (207DE) describes another expedition to Armenia. Although the later Roman sections focus on Romans fighting civil wars, there is still some continuity with the earlier sections where republican heroes conquer the world.

[2] As stated in the analysis of *Flamininus* (197A–D), this parallel between Romans and Macedonians is not to be taken too strictly: the Romans are not to be regarded as subjugating forces in the way the Macedonian monarchs – or sometimes rather ‘tyrants’ (cf. esp. Pyrrhus) – are presented, for precisely the Roman Republic defeats a series of these base kings. The apophthegm collection, then, describes Rome as a liberating force. This is not only the consequence of the fact that the opposite might be insulting to the emperor and the broader Roman readership. It is also particularly relevant for the interpretation as an abbreviated world history: the world order with which the text concludes is a harmonious, peaceful, and free one, in line with how a stable and apparently eternal world empire should look like.

Rome possesses what Macedonia lacked, and is therefore able to complete its task. Because of this, history seems to have come to its end. Yet in line with the reservations expressed in 3.1, one might wonder whether *Augustus* describes more than just the *contemporary* status of the Roman Empire. The answer to this question again seems negative: in line with *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 824C–825A, the overall focus on individual φιλοτιμία, often undermining ὁμόνοια, shows that *every* powerful empire is *always* in danger.

3.2.2 The Driving Force Behind History: φιλοτιμία

Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata describe a history of ruling *individuals*: the work hardly takes the ‘bigger picture’ into account, for it does not represent historical developments as being influenced by, for example, factors of a social and economic nature. When empires are being built up or preserved, this is due to the great qualities of one or a few men; when empires fall down, this is the consequence of their flawed characters. The main characteristic – both the quality and the flaw – that is presented as the driving force behind all this is love of honour:¹¹⁹⁰ φιλοτιμία incites men to great deeds, but especially when it means the end of ὁμόνοια, it becomes destructive to the commonwealth.¹¹⁹¹ The analysis in 3.2.1 has shown that this message is stressed multiple times throughout the collection (in the sections on the conquered, but in the end also in those on the *Diadochi*).

¹¹⁹⁰This is not different from the *Parallel Lives*, see Roskam (2011) 208: “history often appears as a battlefield of empty ambitions that bring about wickedness rather than tranquility of mind.”

¹¹⁹¹Frazier (1988) 119.

Plutarch, then, could hardly have been blind to the dangers of excessive φιλοτιμία as a destructive power for Roman society as well.¹¹⁹² The focus on the civil war preceding the establishment of the Principate (203A–208A) illustrates this well: this moment of discord could have meant the end of Roman world dominion, but it only resulted in the end of the Republic. That Alexander the Great serves as a model in both *Pompeius* (203B–204E) and *Caesar* (205E–206F) is telling in this regard: in the description of Pompey’s and Caesar’s excessive φιλοτιμία (where the Macedonian is always a background figure)¹¹⁹³ that leads to a major clash, the possibility of a great empire’s downfall always looms in the background, as the dynamics of world history emphasize.¹¹⁹⁴ Thus, the existence of Rome was once threatened too.¹¹⁹⁵

Augustus knew this all too well. His section (206F–208A) not only illustrates his great respect for the Macedonian king, but also the insight that his accomplishments were not fruitful. Alexander both conquered all ethnicities and failed to keep them united because of his φιλοτιμία: on the one hand, this characteristic was the very reason why he established such a powerful empire; on the other hand, his excessive focus on conquering also made him neglect internal harmony in the realm, a requisite for the durability of his military exploits. Augustus, therefore, realized that there should be limits to one’s *imitatio Alexandri*, as also appears from his actions: being aware of the flaws in his character, the first emperor gave heed to philosophical advice in a way that resembles Alexander’s acquaintance with Aristotle; contrary to this king, however, he cared less about conquests than about the stability of his empire.¹¹⁹⁶ Precisely this balance in his rule made Rome, in the end, more successful than Macedonia.

¹¹⁹² See also Pelling (2012) 64–67 on the theme of φιλοτιμία in the *Lives* that concern the late Republic. See Heftner (1995) 37–38 on this aspect in *Pomp.*, as the cause of the civil war.

¹¹⁹³ Alexander comes to mind when Pompey is addressed as Magnus and asks for a triumph in *Pompeius* V (203EF); the Macedonian is explicitly referred to in *Caesar* IV (206B), before Caesar decides to take power in Rome.

¹¹⁹⁴ As Shipley (1997) 46 puts it, “[t]he anti-Persian project was still in mind in the unhappy report of the Roman civil wars (*Pomp.* 70.2–5), where Plutarch seems to recall the earlier folly of the Greeks (ch. [*Ages.*] 15. 3).”

¹¹⁹⁵ Pelling (2012) 66–67 argues that the fact that Rome had already conquered many barbarians, unlike the Greeks, explains why it survived internal clashes (67): “Was there something about Rome that delayed its final collapse, whereas Greek states were so dysfunctional that they could not even get to the starting gate? Something that allowed Rome to handle and survive its excesses of φιλοτιμία in ways that Greece had not? I think there was, and I think Plutarch knew it”.

¹¹⁹⁶ Augustus explicitly expresses this position in *Augustus* VIII (207CD).

Yet there is more. Augustus also knew that this durability would not necessarily be an established fact from his reign on, as difficult issues such as throne succession could occur in the future as well.¹¹⁹⁷ If, after his reign, an uneducated ruler were to seize power, flaws in this man's character might lead to public disasters. The final words of *Augustus* illustrate this concern (208A):

Πείσωνος δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐκ θεμελίων ἄχρι τῆς στέγης ἐπιμελῶς οἰκοδομοῦντος, ‘εὐθυμον’ ἔφη ‘με ποιεῖς οὕτως οἰκοδομῶν, ὡς αἰδίου τῆς Ῥώμης ἔσομένης.’

When Piso built his house with great care from the foundation to the roof-tree, Augustus said, “You make my heart glad by building thus, as if Rome is to be eternal.”

The subjective ὡς in this apophthegm is not just a detail, definitely not when it comes from the first Roman emperor: Augustus appreciates Piso's faith in the future (or what he interprets as such), but he does not necessarily share it.¹¹⁹⁸ The dynamics throughout *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a world history – which can be defined as the dangerous balance between individual φιλοτιμία and common ὁμόνοια – highlight that this cautiousness is entirely justified: history might repeat itself, and the fact that Rome survived a series of civil wars does not mean that it can deal with a new one. This was something which Plutarch almost experienced in his own lifetime¹¹⁹⁹ (as Candau Morón observes, this should make one doubt that Dillon's interpretation is entirely correct),¹²⁰⁰ which might also explain the prominent place of the late republican biographies in the *Parallel Lives*.¹²⁰¹ The collection, then, does not describe a firm belief that ‘history has come to an end’. It only expresses the hope that this will be the case.

¹¹⁹⁷ *Augustus* XI (207E).

¹¹⁹⁸ The *genitivus absolutus* expresses Piso's goals, but the addition of ὡς highlights the subjectivity of his motivation, which is not necessarily shared by Augustus; cf. Kühner – Gerth (1966) 93–95.

¹¹⁹⁹ See Jones, C. P. (1971) 125: “Just as Marius nearly destroyed Rome by his quarrel with Sulla, so the folly of Nero nearly overturned the empire by setting in train the civil wars of Plutarch's youth. Nothing was more to be cherished than the peace that Roman power guaranteed”.

¹²⁰⁰ See Candau Morón (2000) 465 on “intervals of unrest and social turbulence” during Plutarch's lifetime, because of which “the statements formulated by Dillon (1997) 465 are hardly credible”.

¹²⁰¹ Stadter (2000) 509–510.

3.3 Conclusion: A Warning for the Emperor

Once more, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* correspond with other parts of the Plutarchan oeuvre. In line with what Dillon observes with regard to the Chaeronean's other works – and about early imperial literature in general – the collection also seems to express the “idea that Roman rule is a kind of culmination of all previous political arrangements.”¹²⁰² This does not, however, necessarily imply that history is at an end. On the contrary: similarly to *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, the collection alludes to a possible downfall instigated by lack of concord, often the result of individual issues neglected by rulers.

As to the focus on the individual, there is both a striking similarity and a great difference between the apophthegm collection and the *Parallel Lives*. Pelling writes with regard to the latter as a world history and the place of individual characters within this broader story:¹²⁰³

So the *Lives* do come together to depict ‘global history’, or at least those parts of it that are most relevant. But that history is valuable not for its own sake, but for the light it sheds on the individuals; and that is why the global history does not need to be comprehensive, for it need illustrate only the worlds and the periods where Plutarch’s great individuals belonged.

In *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as well, Plutarch uses historical background to explain why a hero acted in one way or the other: as discussed, the context in which a series of *παλαιοί* lived has strong repercussions for the way in which their behaviour is to be judged, and the same goes for their descendants and their specific situations. Yet in the collection, the individuals in turn also shed light on world history, as they are depicted as those who *created* the past, and this highest level of the text is also important for its own sake as it describes its own message. This is also why ‘global history’ is more comprehensive in the collection than in the *Parallel Lives*.

This is a consequence of a difference in target audience, and perhaps even of the precise historical context in which the collection was written. The focus on the dangers of *φιλοτιμία* and lack of concord, often connected with the main figure of Alexander the Great, entails a strong warning message for the Roman emperor. If the dating of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as proposed is correct, this means that Trajan’s campaigns in the East, which can obviously be seen as an act of *imitatio Alexandri*, came just before the composition of the work. In light

¹²⁰²Dillon (1997) 239n14.

¹²⁰³Pelling (2010) 230.

of the observation about φιλοτιμία as the driving force of world history, it might not be too far-fetched to believe that Plutarch regarded these military exploits as something that might bring the emperor to neglect internal harmony and peace, things that should really matter for the good and well-educated ruler. And if the author wanted to warn his ruler of this possible danger, he could probably not have found a better way to do so than through Augustus' mouth as his cautioning device.

Finally, it is no coincidence that this most concrete lesson appears from an interpretation where world history or humanity in its entirety serves as a role model, so to speak, for it becomes very clear that Trajan's reign and that of any possible future ruler will become part of history, and that their concern for their own characters will be assessed in either a positive or a negative way in light of the impact they had on the lives of their subjects and the future course of their empire. In other words, they will continue the story, and might themselves one day become new *exempla* instructing new rulers. This awareness of their own position in the continuous narrative of mankind should truly persuade them to welcome the two tools the collection offers them: a general ethical framework that teaches what a good rulership looks like (chapter 2), and the deliberative skills they need in order to act in accordance with this framework when facing difficult times (chapter 1). As such, then, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* can truly serve as a guide for the emperor.

Concluding Remarks

Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata serve as a guide for Trajan at three levels of the text in a way that is reminiscent of other works of Plutarch's oeuvre. These levels influence each other:

[1] The sections on historical figures share several features with the individual biographies of the *Parallel Lives*: characterization is usually implicit and almost never clear-cut and the same holds for the moralism resulting from this; the driving forces behind characterization such as gradual shifting and *synkrisis* – reminding one of Pelling's "integrated characters"¹²⁰⁴ and the different levels of comparison in the biographical project – all contribute to the essentially problematic nature of moralism in the collection. Every single section, then, to some extent functions as an abbreviated *Life*, and this is also how the author introduces the apophthegm collection in the dedicatory letter (172B–E).

This problematizing aspect is in line with Plutarch's views on the functions of role models. With the exception of two clearly negative *exempla* (*Pyrrhus*, 184CD; and *Alcibiades*, 186D–F) that, in line with the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius*, highlight which opinions and deeds are to be avoided at all cost for the sake of honour and reputation and one's well-being (cf. the notion of *αἰσχῦνα* and *βλάβαι*),¹²⁰⁵ all the protagonists raise more questions than answers with regard to the correct responses in challenging situations. This to a certain extent also applies to the most virtuous figures, often the eldest men of the collection (such as *Cyrus*, 172EF; *Lycurgus*, 189D–F; *Charillus*, 189F; *Manius Curius*, 194EF; and *Gaius Fabricius*, 194F–195B): they act in a simple society where decision-making is not influenced by the need to compromise, for the good deed always seems to be the act of virtue. In this way, the *παλαιοί* provide little direct guidance for combining the contemplative life with the public life in everyday reality (cf. *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.*). In this respect, they are, in fact, rather problematic *exempla*.

As a consequence, readers benefit much more from role models who live in a similarly complex context. This is why the largest group of *exempla* in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* consists of figures who have great qualities but whose behaviour and decisions still raise questions about the correct response in difficult times: (a) they activate the readers to empathize with their experiences and to examine their virtues (*ιστορία*); (b) this active participation ensures that the readers will be thoroughly acquainted with these *exempla* (*συνήθεια*); (c) thus, when facing a moral dilemma they can

¹²⁰⁴Pelling (2002) 283–300 (= (1988a)).

¹²⁰⁵Ingenkamp (1971).

recall their models and envisage how the latter would have acted in this situation: comparing their (hypothetical) responses with each other and trying to find out what would be the best possible reaction (σύγκρισις), (d) the readers are finally able to act accordingly (μίμησις). This is precisely how Plutarch describes the function of role models in the prologues to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*, *Aemilius–Timoleon*, and in *De profectibus in virtute* (84B–85C).

[2] Groups of sections on a people, however, provide the general framework within which difficult decisions are to be made. As such, then, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* can sometimes still teach clear-cut moral instructions, albeit only at a higher level of the text. This is a natural consequence of the fact that speaking about groups of people leads to more general (and often less nuanced) conclusions: even though there is no proof that Plutarch theorized the possibilities of applying role models in a generic way, it is clear that he exploited them in the collection at the level of ethnicities and types of rulership.

An interpretation at this level in various respects calls *Ad principem ineruditum* to mind: as in the treatise, the author recommends mildness to the ruler, for this ensures a good relationship with his subjects, a prerequisite for a stable reign; excess in this respect, however, is discouraged, since too much complacency can result in the ruler being ruled by the people, bereft of his educating function. Thus, Trajan should always respect these general guidelines when being led by his role models in everyday life [1].

[3] As a world history, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* encourage Trajan to give heed to the general guidelines of [2]: the highest level of the text ensures that he is aware of his position as the man who will now continue the narrative of the collection. In the future, then, a section on apophthegms of Trajan might describe the dos and don'ts for new rulers. He should therefore be careful about the way he deals with models *himself*, if he wants to become a positive *exemplum*. His Parthian *imitatio Alexandri* is of paramount importance in this regard, as this will have a strong impact on how his successors will assess his reign: will they wonder, like Augustus did with regard to Alexander the Great, why Trajan only cared about conquering and in the meanwhile neglected the internal harmony of the Roman Empire; or will he, in the footsteps of the first emperor, attempt to establish a new *Pax Romana* and ensure prosperity for his subjects?

The three levels of interpretation thus all interact with each other: without the essential desire triggered by [3], Trajan will not feel compelled to establish a stable reign in line with the general guidelines of [2]; without the general guidelines of [2], Plutarch would have left the emperor in the dark about the right direction for his rule, whenever in morally challenging times he recalls the *exempla* provided by the apophthegm collection [1].

General Conclusion

This book inevitably began with a discussion of the **authenticity** of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, now proven to be a genuine work of Plutarch, meant to be published. The dedicatory letter to Trajan (172B–E) at the outset of the text provided the most compelling evidence in this regard: several phrases, expressions, and metaphors are typical of the author or sometimes even occur (almost) exclusively in Plutarch; the letter also contains more than six juxtapositions of words with a related meaning, another feature of his writing style; and as a programmatic proem it is in various respects reminiscent of the prologues to some pairs of the *Parallel Lives*, especially in terms of its structure.

The letter cannot be separated from the apophthegm collection (172E–208A). At first sight, this appears most clearly from a series of verbatim connections. Focusing on the theme of giving and taking, the Artaxerxes story at the outset (172B) closely links the letter not only with the Persian section (172E–174B), but also with several apophthegms included later in the work, similar in terms of their content and wording (*Artaxerxes Longimanus* I, 173D; *Alexander* XXXI, 181E; *Ptolemaeus*, 181F; *Antigonus Monophthalmus* XV, 182E). In addition, a construction similar to the combination τῶν βίων ... σπέρματα (172D) at the end occurs in *Cyrus* III (172EF: τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ... οἱ βίοι). Yet more important is that the letter introduces – in connection with a reference to the *Parallel Lives* – all aspects of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*: the collection contains apophthegms (172C: ἀπομνημονευμάτων) of famous men (172C: ἐπιφανεστάτων) of different types of rulers of various peoples (172C: παρά τε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήσιν ἡγεμόνων καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων), and, as a whole, the work reads as an abbreviated world history (in line with the idea of σύνταγμα, 172C). All these elements constitute the different levels of interpretation of the text, where 494 apophthegms are grouped into 89 sections on individuals, who are put together according to ethnicity, including all the peoples that were part of the Roman Empire in Trajan's days.

Since the letter is genuine and inextricably tied to the collection, the collection itself must be authentic as well, and was meant to be published.

Arguments against Plutarch's authorship of the collection mainly concerned the number of cases of *hiatus* and the origins of the apoph-

thegms.¹²⁰⁶ The former is always a risky argument: not only has the maximum amount of *hiatus* Plutarch would have allowed never been fixed (if that is even possible at all), but the genre of text might also have had an impact on this feature of his writing style. In this context, a comparison with *Coniugalia praecepta*, a work of Plutarch's oeuvre that is amongst all other undisputed texts the most closely related to *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, suffices to show that about one *hiatus* per two Stephanus pages is not too much in this type of text. As to the origins of the apophthegms, the relationship between the accounts of the collection and other works of Plutarch is not different from that between those of two or more undoubtedly authentic texts: they often seem to go back to earlier notes of Plutarch. Finally, there is no proof whatsoever that the collection went through different stages in the editorial process.

In short, there are no convincing arguments against the authenticity of the apophthegm collection and the former *communis opinio* appears to have been influenced by anachronistic conceptions of good literature, according to which it seems inconceivable that a man of literary talent like Plutarch would have written and published such an incoherent patchwork of raw apophthegms and dedicated it to the most powerful man in the world, whom he might never have met. Yet even in this regard, appearances are deceptive: the literary analysis has shown that the collection in fact reflects a well-thought-out and balanced structure at all levels of the text, aiming to direct the readers towards a specific assessment of the characters and groups of peoples included in the work in a way that calls to mind the *Parallel Lives* and *Moralia*; often subtle adaptations to apophthegms (usually in terms of wording) contribute to the same effect. Writing such a collection, even though it does not reflect the narrative complexities of the biographies or the argumentative sophistication of the moral treatises, thus still requires much literary talent and experience.

The fact that there are no (clear) indications that Plutarch knew Trajan personally does not need to pose a problem either. It still is likely that the emperor would at least have heard about the prolific writer and priest of Delphi from his entourage at the court (men such as Sosius Senecio, with whom Plutarch was well acquainted), and even if this were not the case, there is nothing surprising about a Platonist writer trying to influence a ruler's political course as a philosophical advisor. In fact, in light of works such as *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* and especially *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum* and *Ad principem ineruditum*, one even expects Plutarch to write a work that, taking into

¹²⁰⁶Other more detailed arguments are of minor importance, such as Hartman (1916) 116–117 on ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅσπερον in 196E and deviations between the accounts of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and other works of Plutarch (mainly addressed in the footnotes: these can usually be explained as stylistically motivated or as examples of *Anekdotenwanderung*).

account Trajan's busy life, could provide convenient advice for the ruler. A parallel, such as Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia* dedicated to Tiberius, finally shows that an emperor would not be insulted by receiving such a 'simple' gift – quite the contrary.

As to the **dating** of *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, the dedication to Trajan (and, in line with this, the reference to the *Parallel Lives* in the dedicatory letter) indicates that the work was published between 98 and 117. More hypothetically, the Persian apophthegms in the letter, the Persian (172E–174B) and Thracian–Scythian (174C–F) sections, and the overall focus on the concept of *imitatio Alexandri* in the collection might allude to Trajan's greatest conquests, suggesting a dating in 116–117. The relative chronology of the *Parallel Lives* and the Roman part of the apophthegm collection, speculative as it might be, seems to confirm this view, if one accepts Verdegem's suggestion that Plutarch used notes such as *Apophthegmata Laconica* for the Greek part of the work (the position of Stadter), but a penultimate historical draft related to the process of composition of the *Parallel Lives* for the Roman part (the position of Pelling)¹²⁰⁷ – a suggestion indeed generally supported by a systematic comparison of the collection and the remainder of the Plutarchan oeuvre.

If this relatively late moment of composition and publication is correct, this has strong repercussions for an interpretation of the work as a world history.

In Plutarch's view on the type of text of **collections of sayings and anecdotes**, works such as *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* are rooted in a philosophical tradition and are closely related to biography. Of course, collections of apophthegms and *chreiai* were of great use to students of rhetoric, in line with the education in the *progymnasmata*, and to professional orators, and Plutarch was well acquainted with this tradition. Yet this did not influence how he thought about the main function of his work: as appears from a comparison of his collection with Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, the first goal of the Greek author is truly to provide insight into characters of the past and to instruct the emperor in this way. His work, then, indeed belongs to the 'genre' of 'mirrors of princes'.

The **literary analysis** of the dedicatory letter reveals much about how the apophthegm collection should be read. Plutarch claims that only sayings can provide a quick and clear-cut insight into characters of men of the past in the second part of the letter (172C–E), because of which his representation of Artaxerxes at the outset of the first part (172BC: Plutarch only describes actions) should be questioned. He thereby encourages his

¹²⁰⁷ Verdegem (2010) 404, based on Pelling (2002) 65–90 and Stadter (2014b).

readers to assume a critical attitude towards the text: not every piece of information he provides should necessarily be taken at face value in its entirety, so the audience should carefully read the text with an eye on elements that might further modify the portrait of a character, or on possible contradictory apophthegms problematizing the image in the way Artaxerxes' picture was deconstructed in the letter.

As a consequence, the readers often grope in the dark in their attempts to assess the kings and commanders of the work. Plutarch applies every tool of characterization to this end. Gradual shifting, which means that most apophthegms are connected with the previous story or stories through verbatim, thematic, or chronological links by means of which the author creates chains throughout a section on a protagonist, usually also entails a shift from a clear and almost stereotypical image to a more ambiguous and idiosyncratic one (cf. "integrated characters").¹²⁰⁸ When this is not the case, Plutarch sometimes breaks the gradual shifting in order to create blocks of apophthegms illuminating different and clashing sides of a character (cf. *Agesilaus*, 190F–191D); in other instances, the portrait of a man in his own section can be adjusted or even contradicted by his appearance in the section on another subject, because of which the readers have to deal with several contrasting pictures of the same person (e.g. the image of Antipater throughout the work). *Synkrisis* similarly raises many pressing questions. When comparing two men – usually contemporaries – it is almost never clear who is to be admired most: in politics, the virtuous approach can be less fruitful than the course of φιλοτιμία and self-preservation; in war, the talented general who lacks persuasive skills might be disregarded, unlike the successful orator who is inexperienced in military tactics and, because of this, sometimes detrimental to his city state or nation.

This does not mean that every individual character is essentially problematic. Plutarch frequently opens sections on peoples with protagonist(s) from ancient times who are presented as highly virtuous without qualification. The image of these παλαιοί provides the background against which the other men will be assessed and assess themselves and their fellow countrymen, as the Spartan section illustrates well. In some cases, Plutarch closes a section on a people on a positive note. These apophthegms usually play a role at the level of ethnicity too: Memnon highlights Greek superiority over barbarians in terms of morality (174B); Dion uncovers the issues of the Sicilian political system of tyranny (176F–177A). *Pyrrhus* (184CD) and *Alcibiades* (186D–F), finally, are two examples of obviously negative sections and, as such, do not raise questions as to whether they or their predecessors or contemporaries are to be preferred. Yet such clear-cut pictures are the exception rather than the rule.

¹²⁰⁸Pelling (2002) 283–300.

The literary analysis thus has demonstrated that *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* require a participatory readership that closely takes all aspects of the text into account. Indeed, it is an independent literary work and deserves to be read as such. Other accounts of the apophthegms in Plutarch's oeuvre, then, should by no means be the main focus when interpreting their meaning in the collection. Yet, often, the interpretation of the collection still leads to conclusions that are in line with the other Plutarchan accounts, especially when these concern the *Parallel Lives*: excessive φιλοτιμία is no less one of the main themes in *Themistocles* (184F–185F) than in the *Life*; allusions to Pompey's failed *imitatio Alexandri* dominate both his section (203B–204E) and his biography. Furthermore, (slight) deviations from parallel passages can be illuminating, for frequently they support the initial interpretation as proposed in the analysis: this can range from minor changes in terms of wording (e.g. *Scipio Minor* II, 199F) to the omission of the full facts of a story (e.g. *Dion*, 176F–177A). These adaptations serve specific goals and steer the audience towards certain judgements of the characters and their value, and these are usually but not necessarily the same as in the *Life* or in other works.

Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata not only aim to allow the reader to gain insight into the characters of the protagonists. The collection should also be a device helping the reader to become a better person. Although anyone might benefit from the work in this regard, the target reader is Trajan, of course: either Trajan as a historical figure or 'Trajan' as the reader implied in and constructed by the text, kept in mind by the audience envisaging how an emperor would (have to) respond to the work. In that respect, the protagonists included in the text have an additional relevance: all these kings, generals, and lawgivers are, one might say, the Roman emperor's predecessors, which suggests that Trajan (or 'Trajan') is desired to learn from their behaviour, as he should be able to identify readily with them. Thus, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* should also be **a guide for the emperor**.

Yet in the dedicatory letter Plutarch avoids stating that Trajan can improve his character by means of the work. Only very subtly does he highlight that this is an additional goal: the opening apophthegms suggest that Trajan should model his behaviour after Artaxerxes (and, perhaps, after Lycurgus as well), albeit only at a superficial level, for he is only implicitly asked to imitate actions; and a close reading of the second part of the letter shows that, when speaking about Trajan's specific situation, Plutarch describes the function of the collection only in terms of character depiction, although he alludes to the notion of moral progress when speaking in general terms (the mirror metaphor and the distinction

between the stages of ἀναθεώρησις and ἀποθεώρησις).¹²⁰⁹ This caution in advising a ruler of course reflects the way in which any citizen would have approached the Roman emperor, but there is more to this than just convention: again, the author expects a critical attitude from the readers that is in line with how they should approach the collection; more interestingly, Plutarch in fact exploits the conventional attitude in order to draw attention to the role of an advising philosopher he would like to perform, at the same time stressing that he hopes that Trajan will indeed be interested in, and will even actively pursue, moral progress. That the apophthegm of Demetrius of Phalerum is placed at the very centre of the collection is telling in this regard: he asks Ptolemy to read some books on kingship because a monarch's friends only rarely have the courage to give proper advice (189D).

Plutarch applies role models at three levels of the text. As to the sections on historical figures, three groups can be distinguished. The smallest group consists of the two negative sections, *Pyrrhus* (184CD) and *Alcibiades* (186D–F): they describe what the emperor should *not* imitate, persuading him to avoid certain deeds and ideas that might harm not only society but also himself by causing shame and pain. In this way, they also strengthen the positive image of the men surrounding them and encourage the audience to give heed to these *exempla* in the first place. This procedure is embedded in Plutarch's process of *Seelenheilung*,¹²¹⁰ and in various respects recalls the prologue to *Demetrius–Antonius*.

Entirely virtuous men constitute a second group. These are, as stated, the *παλαιοί* of the collection (and, as a consequence, occur at the outset of sections on a people). Although their picture is usually clear-cut, their function as role models is highly problematic: they live in a remote past and a simple society that does not pose many ethical problems, because of which virtuous behaviour is, in a way, self-evident to them. A reader like Trajan, who faces moral dilemmas on a daily basis in the complex political reality of the Roman Empire where the most virtuous response might not always be the best for the people, does not get far with these *exempla* as his only guides. All this reminds one of the difficult balance between the contemplative and public life as described by the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato Maior*.

Basically positive but problematic *exempla* are the largest group. In line with Plutarch's thinking about the function of role models as described in the prologues to *Pericles–Fabius Maximus*, *Aemilius–Timoleon*, and in *De profectibus in virtute* (84B–85C), they are expected to guide Trajan as follows: a critical and participatory reading of their sections – a complex scrutinization of their προαιρέσεις, as one might put it (ιστορία)

¹²⁰⁹ Cf. Roskam (2014).

¹²¹⁰ Ingenkamp (1971).

– ensures that the emperor will be well acquainted with these subjects (συνήθεια). The wittiness and memorable aspect of apophthegms and the brevity of the sections further enhance this effect. When finding himself in a morally challenging situation, Trajan will thus be able to recall these role models quickly and calmly, envisioning how they would have reacted. As one can always argue *pro* and *contra* a specific response, the (hypothetical) reactions of the *exempla* are compared with each other in order to find out what the best possibility might be. Σύγκρισις, then, performs an important function with regard to Plutarch's attitude towards exemplary models in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as well. The final step consists of μίμησις: Trajan acts in accordance with what he learned from the comparison, inspired by his role models without literally copying them.

Thus, at the level of the individual sections, the apophthegm collection does not give straightforward instructions but provides the reader with the deliberative tools needed in the difficult process of ethical decision-making in everyday life. This is different from how groups of peoples and types of rulership function as role models in *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*: when speaking in general terms Plutarch is able to teach more direct lessons. This explains why the only apophthegm dealing with a group of people is *Reges Aegypti* (174C): the readers are expected to compare *all* Egyptian kings with *all* Persians (172E–174B) and *all* Thracians–Scythians (174C–F), and they have to conclude that a monarch should always strive for a just rule (in contrast to Persian despotism) and should at the same time be a guide for the people (unlike the disorganized barbarian ‘savages’). The Sicilian section (175A–177A) builds on this, stressing that a tyrannical rule despising laws and justice hurts not only society, but also the rulers themselves: a troubled relationship between the tyrant and the people leads to revolts and changes of power. This frightening image encourages the ruler to become a good monarch, modelled on the lessons to be drawn from the Macedonian section (177A–184F), recommending mildness: only this can establish a bond of mutual trust between ruler and his subjects and only this will result in a long-lasting, stable, effective, and fruitful reign.

Yet Plutarch also advises against excessive complacency, as appears from a general reading of the sections on other types of government (184F–205E on generals and popular leaders): when giving in too much to the desires of the masses, rulers will no longer be able to perform their function as educators of the people. Trajan's reign, then, should be a just and mild one, situated in between despotic arbitrariness and unbridled leniency, if he wants to be a guide for his subjects. This instruction, recalling *Ad principem ineruditum* in various respects, provides the general framework that the emperor should always keep in mind when making decisions in challenging dilemmas.

Even more specific is the instruction taught at the highest level of the text: *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* as a world history, a theme that is more prominent in this work than in the *Parallel Lives*. Although the assumption that Plutarch thought that history had come to an end after the establishment of the Roman Principate might go too far,¹²¹¹ one still concludes from works such as *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* (esp. 824C–825A) that he hoped that this would be the case. This is why the collection as a whole seems to read as a warning for Trajan, in light of the recent Parthian campaigns – if the dating of the work suggested is correct – that bear witness to the emperor's *imitatio Alexandri*. In *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* the overall focus on φιλοτιμία as the driving force behind historical developments, building up empires and tearing them down, suggests that the contemporary state of the Roman Empire, joining together all peoples and bringing them peace and prosperity, might not last forever. Bearing this in mind, it is up to Trajan to decide how he wants to be remembered: will he, in his desire to conquer, neglect internal harmony and jeopardize the future of the empire; or will he give heed to the advice described at lower levels of the text in order to establish a peaceful future for his subjects? As such, world history as presented in the collection raises awareness of the target reader's own position in the chain of role models provided by the work: Trajan will write a new chapter in the story of mankind and will become a new *exemplum* himself, either one to be followed and admired or one to be avoided and despised.

As a piece of exemplary literature, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* perfectly fit within Plutarch's oeuvre. One can only admire how the author, working exclusively with anecdotal material from the past that seems to have left little room for authorial comments and personal adjustments or additions, still managed to include all these complex lessons, instructions, and portraits of individuals and groups of people at the different levels of the collection, in his desire to become a philosophical advisor for the emperor on his journey towards the ideal of the Platonic philosopher king. The work, then, truly serves as a guide and mirror for Trajan. Yet this mirror is indeed an opaque one, for Plutarch knew only too well that the road to human perfection can never be mapped out clearly but is an endless search characterized by failure and success, the challenging scrutinization of all sides of stories and moral issues within a certain ethical framework, and, above all, by an unrelenting but insatiable willingness to become a flawless person.

¹²¹¹ *Contra* Dillon (1997).

Appendices

Appendix I: A Restructuring of the Collection

The first columns give an overview of the composition of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and of the total number of apophthegms in every (sub)section according to the subdivision proposed by van der Wiel (2023a), from which this appendix is taken (pp. 23-26; only slightly adapted). The final column indicates where (some) modern editions deviate from this division. I have taken the following editions into account:

Be.: the *Teubner* of Bernardakis (1889)

Ba.: the *Loeb* of Babbitt (1931)

Na.: the *Teubner* of Nachstädt (1971)

Fu.: the *Budé* of Fuhrmann (1988)

In.: the *editio maior* of Ingenkamp – Bernardakis (2008)

For example: in the case of *Cotys* (174D), Bernardakis, Babbitt, and Ingenkamp print I and II as a unit, as indicated by the final column. The division proposed by this appendix considers them to be two separate apophthegms, as do Nachstädt and Fuhrmann. For ease of reference the numbering of the apophthegms follows Nachstädt.

N°	SECTION	PAGES	COUNT	DEVIATIONS
	<i>Entire collection</i>	<i>172E–208A</i>	<i>494</i>	
<i>I</i>	<i>15 Barbarians</i>	<i>172E–174F</i>	<i>33</i>	
<i>Ia</i>	<i>8 Persians</i>	<i>172E–174B</i>	<i>23</i>	
1	<i>Cyrus</i>	172EF	3	All editions list <i>Semiramis</i> as a separate section
2	<i>Darius</i>	172F–173B	5	
3	<i>Xerxes</i>	173BC	4	
4	<i>Artaxerxes Longimanus</i>	173DE	4	
5	<i>Cyrus Minor</i>	173EF	1	All editions list <i>Parysatis</i> as a separate section; Be. and In. join <i>Artaxerxes Mnemon</i> II and III
6	<i>Artaxerxes Mnemon</i>	173F–174A	4	
7	<i>Orontes</i>	174B	1	
8	<i>Memnon</i>	174B	1	

N°	SECTION	PAGES	COUNT	DEVIATIONS
Ib	1 Egyptian custom	174C	1	
9	<i>Reges Aegypti</i>	174C	1	
Ic	3 Thracians	174CD	4	
10	<i>Poltyis</i>	174C	1	
11	<i>Teres</i>	174CD	1	
12	<i>Cotyis</i>	174D	2	Be., Ba., and In. join I and II
Id	3 Scythians	174EF	5	
13	<i>Idanthyrsus</i>	174E	1	
14	<i>Anteas</i>	174EF	3	Be. and In. join I and II
15	<i>Scilurus</i>	174F	1	
II	54 Greeks	175A–194E	294	
Ila	6 Sicilians	175A–177A	31	
16	<i>Gelon</i>	175AB	4	
17	<i>Hiero</i>	175BC	5	
18	<i>Dionysius Maior</i>	175C–176C	13	
19	<i>Dionysius Minor</i>	176C–E	5	
20	<i>Agathocles</i>	176EF	3	
21	<i>Dion</i>	176F–177A	1	
Ilb	14 Macedonians	177A–184F	111	
22	<i>Archelaus</i>	177AB	5	
23	<i>Philippus</i>	177C–179C	30	All editions present XVI and XVII as two different apophthegms; Na. and Fu. present XXII and XXIII as two different apophthegms
24	<i>Alexander</i>	179D–181F	34	
25	<i>Ptolemaeus</i>	181F	1	
26	<i>Antigonus Monophthalmus</i>	182A–183A	18	
27	<i>Demetrius Poliorcetes</i>	183A–C	2	Na. and Fu. present I and II as two different apophthegms
28	<i>Antigonus Secundus</i>	183CD	5	
29	<i>Lysimachus</i>	183DE	2	
30	<i>Antipater</i>	183EF	2	

N°	SECTION	PAGES	COUNT	DEVIATIONS
31	<i>Antiochus Tertius</i>	183F	2	
32	<i>Antiochus Hierax</i>	184A	1	
33	<i>Eumenes</i>	184AB	1	
34	<i>Pyrrhus</i>	184CD	6	
35	<i>Antiochus Septimus</i>	184D–F	2	
IIC	14 Athenians	184F–189D	73	
36	<i>Themistocles</i>	184F–185F	16	All editions present XV and XVI as two different apophthegms, but Ba. seems inclined to join them
37	<i>Myronides</i>	185F–186A	1	
38	<i>Aristeides</i>	186A–C	5	
39	<i>Pericles</i>	186C	4	
40	<i>Alcibiades</i>	186D–F	7	
41	<i>Lamachus</i>	186F	1	
42	<i>Iphicrates</i>	186F–187B	6	
43	<i>Timotheus</i>	187BC	3	
44	<i>Chabrias</i>	187CD	3	
45	<i>Hegesippus</i>	187DE	1	
46	<i>Pytheas</i>	187E	1	
47	<i>Phocion</i>	187E–189B	19	
48	<i>Peisistratus</i>	189B–D	5	
49	<i>Demetrius Phalereus</i>	189D	1	
IId	18 Spartans	189D–192C	49	
50	<i>Lycurgus</i>	189D–F	5	All editions present V and VI as two different apophthegms
51	<i>Charillus</i>	189F	3	
52	<i>Teleclus</i>	189F	1	
53	<i>Theopompus</i>	189F	1	
54	<i>Archidamus Secundus</i>	190A	1	
55	<i>Brasidas</i>	190BC	3	
56	<i>Agis Secundus</i>	190CD	5	
57	<i>Lysander</i>	190D–F	5	
58	<i>Agesilaus</i>	190F–191D	12	

N°	SECTION	PAGES	COUNT	DEVIATIONS
59	<i>Archidamus Tertius</i>	191D	1	
60	<i>Agis Tertius</i>	191E	2	
61	<i>Cleomenes</i>	191E	1	
62	<i>Pedaritus</i>	191F	1	
63	<i>Damonidas</i>	191F	1	
64	<i>Nicostratus</i>	192A	1	
65	<i>Eudamidas</i>	192AB	2	
66	<i>Antiochus Spartiates</i>	192B	1	
67	<i>Antalcidas</i>	192BC	3	
IIe	2 Thebans	192C–194E	30	
68	<i>Epameinondas</i>	192C–194C	24	
69	<i>Pelopidas</i>	194C–E	6	
III	20 Romans	194E–208A	167	
70	<i>Manius Curius</i>	194EF	2	
71	<i>Gaius Fabricius</i>	194F–195B	4	All editions present IV and V as two different apophthegms
72	<i>Fabius Maximus</i>	195C–196A	7	
73	<i>Scipio Maior</i>	196B–197A	9	All editions present VI and VII as two different apophthegms
74	<i>Flaminius</i>	197A–D	6	No editions split I
75	<i>Gaius Domitius</i>	197DE	1	
76	<i>Publius Licinius</i>	197EF	1	
77	<i>Paulus Aemilius</i>	197F–198D	9	
78	<i>Cato Maior</i>	198D–199E	26	All editions present I and II, VI and VII, and XVI and XVII as different apophthegms
79	<i>Scipio Minor</i>	199F–201F	22	All editions present XX and XXI as two different apophthegms
80	<i>Caecilius Metellus</i>	201F–202A	3	
81	<i>Marius</i>	202A–D	6	
82	<i>Catulus Lutatius</i>	202DE	1	
83	<i>Sulla</i>	202E	1	
84	<i>Gaius Popillius</i>	202E–203A	1	

N°	SECTION	PAGES	COUNT	DEVIATIONS
85	<i>Lucullus</i>	203AB	3	No editions split II
86	<i>Pompeius</i>	203B–204E	16	No editions split I
87	<i>Cicero</i>	204E–205E	20	All editions present XIV and XV as two different apophthegms, but Na. seems inclined to join them
88	<i>Caesar</i>	205E–206F	14	All editions present VI and VII as two different apophthegms, but Na. seems inclined to join them. IX and X require a redivision (cf. p. 264–265)
89	<i>Augustus</i>	206F–208A	15	

Appendix II: The Collection and the Plutarchan Oeuvre

I List of Parallel Passages

The following table lists which Plutarchan works contain an account of the apophthegm of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* in the left column. For the references to these other works, I mainly took the LCL text of Babbitt (1931) and the *Teubner* text of Nachstädt (1971) into account (except for stories in other Plutarchan works that are only remotely similar; stories that are partially told elsewhere, however, are included in this table).

Cyrus (172EF)		[Parysatis (174A)]	
I	<i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 821E	[I] IV	
II		Orontes (174B)	
III		I	
Darius (172F–173B)		Memnon (174B)	
I	<i>An seni</i> 792C	I	
II		Reges Aegypti (174C)	
III		I	
IV		Poltys (174C)	
[Semiramis (173AB)]		I	
[I] V		Teres (174CD)	
Xerxes (173BC)		I	<i>An seni</i> 792C
I	<i>De frat. am.</i> 488D–F	Cotys (174D)	
II		I	
III		II	
IV		Idanthysus (174E)	
Artaxerxes Longimanus (173DE)		I	
I	<i>Art.</i> 1.1	Anteas (174EF)	
II		I	
III	<i>De aud. poet.</i> 35F <i>De sera num.</i> 565A	II	
IV		III	<i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 334B <i>Non posse</i> 1095EF
Cyrus Minor (173EF)		Scilurus (174F)	
I	<i>Art.</i> 6.2–4 <i>Quaest. conv.</i> 620C	I	<i>De gar.</i> 511C
Artaxerxes Mnemon (173F–174A)		Gelon (175AB)	
I	<i>Art.</i> 5.6	I	<i>De sera num.</i> 552A
II	<i>Art.</i> 4.5	II	
III		III	
		IV	

Hiero (175BC)		IV	<i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 334B
I		V	
II		Philippus (177C–179C)	
III	<i>De cap. ex. inim.</i> 90B	I	
IV		II	
V		III	<i>Alex.</i> 3.8 <i>Cons. ad Apoll.</i> 105AB
Dionysius Maior (175C–176C)		IV	
I		V	
II		VI	<i>De coh. ira</i> 457EF
III		VII	
IV		VIII	
V		IX	
VI	<i>Sol.</i> 20.7	X	
VII		XI	
VIII		XII	
IX	<i>An seni</i> 792C	XIII	<i>An seni</i> 790B
X		XIV	
XI		XV	<i>De fortuna</i> 97D
XII		XVI–XVII	<i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 806B
Dionysius Minor (176CD)		XVIII	
I		XIX	
II		XX	<i>De tuenda</i> 123F–124A <i>Quaest. conv.</i> 707B
III	<i>Tim.</i> 15.4	XXI	
IV		XXII–XXIII	
V		XXIV	
Agathocles (176EF)		XXV	
I	<i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 544BC	XXVI	
II	<i>De coh. ira</i> 458EF	XXVII	<i>Con. praec.</i> 143F <i>De coh. ira</i> 457F
III	<i>De sera num.</i> 557C	XXVIII	
Dion (176F–177A)		XXIX	
I	<i>Dion</i> 56.3 <i>De vit. pud.</i> 530C	XXX	<i>De ad. et am.</i> 68A <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 334CD <i>Quaest. conv.</i> 634D
Archelaus (177AB)			
I	<i>De vit. pud.</i> 531E		
II	<i>De gar.</i> 509A		
III	<i>Alc.</i> 1.5 <i>Amatorius</i> 770C		

XXXI	<i>Alex.</i> 9.12–14 <i>De ad. et am.</i> 70C
XXXII	<i>Demetr.</i> 42.7–8
Alexander (179D–181F)	
I	<i>Alex.</i> 5.4
II	<i>Alex.</i> 4.10 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 331AB
III	
IV	<i>Alex.</i> 25.6–7
V	
VI	
VII	<i>Alex.</i> 8.5 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 331E
VIII	
IX	<i>Alex.</i> 22.7–9 <i>De tuenda</i> 127B <i>Non posse</i> 1099C
X	<i>Thes.</i> 5.4
XI	<i>Alex.</i> 29.7–9
XII	
XIII	
XIV	<i>Alex.</i> 39.8 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 332F–333A <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 340A
XV	<i>Alex.</i> 27.11
XVI	<i>Alex.</i> 28.3 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 341B
XVII	
XVIII	
XIX	<i>Amatorius</i> 760D
XX	
XXI	<i>Alex.</i> 41.9–10 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 339D
XXII	
XXIII	
XXIV	<i>Alex.</i> 59.1–5
XXV	<i>Alex.</i> 58.3–4
XXVI	
XXVII	

XXVIII	
XXIX	<i>Alex.</i> 47.9–10
XXX	<i>Alex.</i> 8.5 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 331E <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 333B
XXXI	<i>Alex.</i> 60.14–16 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 332E <i>De coh. ira</i> 458B
XXXII	<i>Alex.</i> 41.1–2
XXXIII	
XXXIV	<i>Galba</i> 1.5 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 336D–F
Ptolemaeus (181F)	
I	
Antigonus Monophthalmus (182A–183A)	
I	
II	
III	
IV	<i>Demetr.</i> 28.10 <i>De gar.</i> 506D
V	<i>Demetr.</i> 23.10
VI	
VII	<i>De Is. et Os.</i> 360D
VIII	
IX	
X	<i>De coh. ira</i> 457E
XI	
XII	
XIII	
XIV	
XV	<i>De vit. pud.</i> 531EF
XVI	<i>Demetr.</i> 8.2
XVII	<i>Quaest. conv.</i> 668CD
XVIII	<i>Demetr.</i> 4
Demetrius Poliorcetes (183A–C)	
I–II	<i>Demetr.</i> 21–22
III	<i>Demetr.</i> 34

<i>Antigonus Secundus (183CD)</i>		II	
I	<i>Demetr.</i> 51.1–2	III	<i>Them.</i> 6.1 <i>Comp. Nic. et Crass.</i> 3.4
II	<i>Pel.</i> 2.4 <i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 545B	IV	<i>Them.</i> 11.2–3
III		V	<i>Them.</i> 11.4
IV	<i>De vit. pud.</i> 534C	VI	<i>Them.</i> 13–16 <i>Arist.</i> 8–10
V		VII	<i>Them.</i> 18.5
<i>Lysimachus (183DE)</i>		VIII	<i>Them.</i> 18.3
I	<i>De tuenda</i> 126EF <i>De sera</i> 555DE	IX	<i>Them.</i> 5.6 <i>De vit. pud.</i> 534E <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 807B
II	<i>Demetr.</i> 12.9 <i>De gar.</i> 508C <i>De cur.</i> 517B	X	<i>Them.</i> 18.7 <i>Ca. Ma.</i> 8.4–5 <i>De lib. educ.</i> 1C
<i>Antipater (183EF)</i>		XI	<i>Them.</i> 18.9
I		XII	<i>Them.</i> 18.8
II	<i>Phoc.</i> 1.3 <i>De cup. div.</i> 525C	XIII	<i>Them.</i> 18.4 <i>Them.</i> 22.1 <i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 541E <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 812B
<i>Antiochus Tertius (183F)</i>		XIV	<i>Them.</i> 11.6
I		XV–XVI	<i>Them.</i> 29.4–5
II		XVII	<i>Them.</i> 29.10 <i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i> 328EF <i>De exilio</i> 602A
<i>Antiochus Hierax (184A)</i>		<i>Myronides (185F–186A)</i>	
I	<i>De frat. am.</i> 489AB	I	
<i>Eumenes (184AB)</i>		<i>Aristeides (186A–C)</i>	
I	<i>De frat. am.</i> 489EF	I	<i>Arist.</i> 2.6
<i>Pyrrhus (184CD)</i>		II	<i>Arist.</i> 7.8
I	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 9.5	III	<i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 809B
II	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 8.7	IV	<i>Arist.</i> 24.1–2
III	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 21.14	V	<i>Arist.</i> 3.5
IV	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 23.8	<i>Pericles (186C)</i>	
V	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 10.1	I	<i>Quaest. conv.</i> 620D <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 813E
VI	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 8.12	II	<i>Per.</i> 8.7 <i>Dem.</i> 1.2 <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 803A
<i>Antiochus Septimus (184D–F)</i>		III	<i>De vit. pud.</i> 531CD <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 808AB
I			
II			
<i>Themistocles (184F–185F)</i>			
I	<i>Them.</i> 3.4 <i>Thes.</i> 6.9 <i>De prof. in virt.</i> 84BC <i>De cap. ex inim.</i> 92C <i>De sera num.</i> 552B <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 800C		

IV	<i>Per.</i> 38.4 <i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 543BC
Alcibiades (186D–F)	
I	<i>Alc.</i> 2.2–3
II	<i>Alc.</i> 9.1–2
III	<i>Alc.</i> 7.1
IV	<i>Alc.</i> 7.3
V	
VI	<i>Alc.</i> 22.1
VII	<i>Alc.</i> 22.3
Lamachus (186F)	
I	
Iphicrates (186F–187B)	
I	
II	
III	
IV	
V	
VI	<i>De fortuna</i> 99E <i>An virt. doc.</i> 440B
Timotheus (187BC)	
I	<i>Sull.</i> 6.5 <i>De Her. mal.</i> 856B
II	<i>Pel.</i> 2.6
III	<i>An seni</i> 788DE
Chabrias (187CD)	
I	
II	
III	
Hegesippus (187DE)	
I	
Pytheas (187E)	
I	<i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 804B
Phocion (187E–189B)	
I	<i>Phoc.</i> 4.3
II	<i>Phoc.</i> 5.8
III	<i>Phoc.</i> 8.4

IV	<i>Phoc.</i> 8.5
V	<i>Phoc.</i> 9.1 <i>De vit. pud.</i> 533A <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 822E
VI	<i>Phoc.</i> 9.8 <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 811A
VII	<i>Phoc.</i> 10.9
VIII	<i>Phoc.</i> 14
IX	<i>Phoc.</i> 18.1–2
X	<i>Phoc.</i> 21.1
XI	<i>Phoc.</i> 22.6 <i>De coh. ira</i> 459F
XII	<i>Phoc.</i> 23.2–6
XIII	<i>Phoc.</i> 25.1–4
XIV	<i>Phoc.</i> 28.1 <i>Phoc.</i> 30.1
XV	<i>Phoc.</i> 30.4
XVI	<i>Phoc.</i> 30.3 <i>Agis</i> 2.4 <i>De ad. et am.</i> 64C <i>Con. praec.</i> 142BC <i>De vit. pud.</i> 532F–533A
XVII	<i>Phoc.</i> 36.1–2
XVIII	<i>Phoc.</i> 36.3 <i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 541C
XIX	<i>Phoc.</i> 36.4
Peisistratus (189B–D)	
I	
II	
III	<i>De coh. ira</i> 457F
IV	
V	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 24.7–8 <i>De frat. am.</i> 480DE
Demetrius Phalereus (189D)	
I	
Lycurgus (189D–F)	
I	<i>Lyc.</i> 22.2 <i>Lys.</i> 1.2–3 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 228E

II	<i>Lyc.</i> 19.7 <i>Sept. sap. con.</i> 155DE <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 228D	V–VI	<i>Lyc.</i> 20.9 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 215D
III	<i>Lyc.</i> 13.5 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 227BC	Lysander (190D–F)	
IV	<i>Lyc.</i> 19.9 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 228D	I	<i>Lys.</i> 2.7–8 <i>Con. praec.</i> 141D <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 229A
V	<i>Lyc.</i> 13.8–11 <i>Ages.</i> 26.2–5 <i>Pel.</i> 15.3 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 213F <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 217DE <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 227CD	II	<i>Lys.</i> 7.6 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 229B
Charillus (189F)		III	<i>Lys.</i> 22.2 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 229C
I	<i>Lyc.</i> 20.2 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 232B	IV	<i>Lys.</i> 22.5 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 229D
II	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 232C	V	<i>Lys.</i> 22.3 <i>De ad. et am.</i> 71E <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 229C
III	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 230B	Agesilaus (190F–191D)	
Teleclus (189F)		I	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 213C
I	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 232B	II	<i>Ages.</i> 23.9 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 213C <i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 545A
Theopompus (189F)		III	<i>Ages.</i> 23.8 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 213BC
I	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 221E	IV	<i>Ages.</i> 13.6–7 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 209EF
Archidamus Secundus (190A)		V	<i>Ages.</i> 21.10 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 213A
I	<i>Cleom.</i> 48(27).3 <i>Crass.</i> 2.9 <i>Dem.</i> 17.4 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 219A	VI	<i>Ages.</i> 16.6 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 211EF
Brasidas (190BC)		VII	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 208F–209A
I	<i>De prof. in virt.</i> 79E <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 219C	VIII	<i>Ages.</i> 13.5 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 209E <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 807F–808A
II	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 219C <i>De sera num.</i> 548C	IX	<i>Ages.</i> 21.9 <i>Lyc.</i> 20.12 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 212F
III	<i>Lyc.</i> 25.8–9 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 219D <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 240C	X	<i>Ages.</i> 30.5–6 <i>Comp. Ages. et Pomp.</i> 2.3 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 214B
Agis Secundus (190CD)		XI	<i>Ages.</i> 39.1–10 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 214F–215A
I	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 215D	XII	<i>Ages.</i> 2.3–4 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 215A
II	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 215D		
III	<i>Lyc.</i> 20.6 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 215F		
IV	<i>Lyc.</i> 20.5 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 216C		

Archidamus Tertius (191D)		X	<i>Cor.</i> 4.6 <i>An seni</i> 786D <i>Non posse</i> 1098AB
I	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 219A	XI	
Agis Tertius (191E)		XII	
I	<i>Lyc.</i> 19.4 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 216C	XIII	<i>De genio Socr.</i> 583F–584A
II	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 215CD	XIV	
Cleomenes (191E)		XV	<i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 810F
I	<i>Lyc.</i> 20.14 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 224BC	XVI	<i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 545B
Pedaritus (191F)		XVII	
I	<i>Lyc.</i> 25.6 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 231B	XVIII	<i>Marc.</i> 21.3
Damonidas (191F)		XIX	
I	<i>Sept. sap. conv.</i> 149A <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 219E	XX	
Nicostratus (192A)		XXI	
I	<i>De vit. pud.</i> 535AB	XXII	
Eudamidas (192AB)		XXIII	<i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 540DE <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 799EF <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 817EF
I	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 220D	XXIV	
II	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 220E	Pelopidas (194C–E)	
Antiochus Spartiates (192B)		I	<i>Pel.</i> 3.8
I	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 217F	II	<i>Pel.</i> 20.2
Antalcidas (192BC)		III	<i>Pel.</i> 17.2
I	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 217D	IV	<i>Pel.</i> 28.1–4
II	<i>Ages.</i> 31.7 <i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 217D <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 810F	V	<i>Pel.</i> 28.5–10
III	<i>Apophth. Lac.</i> 217DE	VI	
Epameinondas (192C–194C)		Manius Curius (194EF)	
I		I	<i>Crass.</i> 2.10
II	<i>Bellone an pace</i> 349C	II	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 2.2
III		Gaius Fabricius (194F–195B)	
IV	<i>Non posse</i> 1099C	I	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 18.1
V		II	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 20.2–6
VI		III	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 20.8–9
VII	<i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 808DE	IV–V	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 21
VIII		Fabius Maximus (195C–196A)	
IX		I	<i>Fab.</i> 5
		II	<i>Fab.</i> 8–12
		III	<i>Fab.</i> 19

IV	<i>Fab.</i> 20.5–9	VI	<i>Aem.</i> 28.9 <i>Quaest. conv.</i> 615EF
V	<i>Fab.</i> 22	VII	<i>Aem.</i> 34.3
VI	<i>Fab.</i> 23.4	VIII	<i>Aem.</i> 28.10–13
VII	<i>Fab.</i> 24.1–4	IX	<i>Aem.</i> 35–36
<i>Scipio Maior</i> (196B–197A)		<i>Cato Maior</i> (198D–199E)	
I		I–II	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 8.1–2 <i>De tuenda</i> 131D <i>Quaest. conv.</i> 668BC <i>De esu</i> 996E
II		III	
III		IV	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 8.16–17
IV		V	
V		VI–VII	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 9.5 <i>De vit. pud.</i> 528F
VI–VII		VIII	
VIII		IX	
IX		X	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 19.16 <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 820B
X	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 15.1–2 <i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 540F–541A	XI	
<i>Flaminius</i> (197A–D)		XII	
Ia	<i>Flam.</i> 2.1–2	XIII	
Ib	<i>Flam.</i> 17.5	XIV	
II	<i>Flam.</i> 10 <i>Flam.</i> 13.5–9	XV	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 9.10 <i>An seni</i> 784A <i>De vit. aer.</i> 829F
III	<i>Flam.</i> 17.4	XVI– XVII	
IV	<i>Flam.</i> 17.7–8	XVIII	
V	<i>Phil.</i> 2.6	XIX	
<i>Gaius Domitius</i> (197DE)		XX	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 8.8–9
I		XXI	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 8.11
<i>Publius Licinius</i> (197EF)		XXII	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 16.4–8
I		XXIII	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 1.8 <i>Cor.</i> 8.3
<i>Paulus Aemilius</i> (197F–198D)		XXIV	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 10.1–2
I	<i>Aem.</i> 6.8 <i>Aem.</i> 9 <i>Aem.</i> 10.1–4 <i>Aem.</i> 11.1–2	XXV	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 10.3–4
II	<i>Aem.</i> 10.5–8	XXVI	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 10.4–6
III	<i>Aem.</i> 13.6	XXVII	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 10.6
IV	<i>Aem.</i> 13.7		
V	<i>Aem.</i> 17.1–5		

XXVIII	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 9.2
XXIX	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 12.6
Scipio Minor (199F–201F)	
I	
II	<i>Quaest. conv.</i> 659EF
III	<i>Ca. Ma.</i> 27.5–7 <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 804F–805A
IV	
V	
VI	
VII	<i>De fortuna</i> 97D
VIII	
IX	<i>Aem.</i> 38
X	
XI	
XII	
XIII	
XIV	
XV	
XVI	
XVII	
XVIII	
XIX	
XX– XXI	
XXII	
Caecilius Metellus (201F–202A)	
I	
II	<i>De gar.</i> 506D
III	
Marius (202A–D)	
I	<i>Mar.</i> 3–5
II	<i>Mar.</i> 6.5–7
III	<i>Mar.</i> 14.1–3
IV	<i>Mar.</i> 18.4–8
V	<i>Mar.</i> 28.4
VI	<i>Mar.</i> 33.4

Catulus Lutatius (202DE)	
I	<i>Mar.</i> 23
Sulla (202E)	
I	<i>Sull.</i> 6.8
Gaius Popillius (202E–203A)	
I	
Lucullus (203AB)	
I	<i>Luc.</i> 27.9
IIa	
IIb	<i>Luc.</i> 28.4
Pompeius (203B–204E)	
Ia	<i>Pomp.</i> 1
Ib	<i>Pomp.</i> 6–7
II	<i>Pomp.</i> 10
III	<i>Pomp.</i> 10.11–13 <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 815EF
IV	<i>Pomp.</i> 11–12
V	<i>Pomp.</i> 14.2–4 <i>Crass.</i> 7.1 <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 804EF
VI	<i>Pomp.</i> 22.5–9
VII	<i>Pomp.</i> 20.7–8 <i>Sert.</i> 27.1–5
VIII	<i>Pomp.</i> 33.8
IX	<i>Pomp.</i> 48.6–7 <i>Luc.</i> 38.5 <i>An seni</i> 785E–786A
X	<i>Pomp.</i> 2.11–12 <i>Luc.</i> 40.2 <i>An seni</i> 786A
XI	<i>Pomp.</i> 50
XII	<i>Pomp.</i> 51.6–8
XIII	<i>Pomp.</i> 60.8 <i>Ca. Mi.</i> 52.2–3
XIV	<i>Pomp.</i> 54.1
XV	<i>Pomp.</i> 78–79
Cicero (204E–205E)	
I	<i>Cic.</i> 1.5
II	<i>Cic.</i> 1.6

III	<i>Cic.</i> 5.6
IV	<i>Cic.</i> 7.7
V	<i>Cic.</i> 26.6 <i>De se ipsum laud.</i> 541F–542A
VI	<i>Cic.</i> 26.9–10
VII	<i>Cic.</i> 26.11
VIII	<i>Cic.</i> 26.3
IX	<i>Cic.</i> 26.5 <i>Quaest. conv.</i> 631D
X	<i>Cic.</i> 26.9
XI	<i>Cic.</i> 7.8
XII	<i>Cic.</i> 27.4
XIII	<i>Cic.</i> 27.6
XIV– XV	<i>Cic.</i> 37.3 (XIV) <i>Pomp.</i> 63.1 (XV)
XVI	
XVII	
XVIII	<i>Cic.</i> 38.5
XIX	<i>Cic.</i> 38.7
XX	<i>Cic.</i> 40.4–5 <i>Caes.</i> 57.6–7 <i>De cap. ex inim.</i> 91A
XXI	
Caesar (205E–206F)	
I	<i>Caes.</i> 1–2
II	<i>Caes.</i> 7.1–3
III	<i>Caes.</i> 10.8–9 <i>Cic.</i> 29.9
IV	<i>Caes.</i> 11.3
V	<i>Caes.</i> 11.2
VI–VII	<i>Caes.</i> 32.8 <i>Pomp.</i> 60.2
VIII	<i>Caes.</i> 35.9–10 <i>Pomp.</i> 62.1

IX–Xa	<i>Caes.</i> 38 <i>De fort. Rom.</i> 319B–D
Xb	<i>Caes.</i> 39.8 <i>Pomp.</i> 65.7–8
XI	<i>Caes.</i> 44.7–8 <i>Pomp.</i> 69.5
XII	<i>Caes.</i> 50.3
XIII	<i>Caes.</i> 54.2 <i>Ca. Mi.</i> 72.2
XIV	<i>Caes.</i> 62.10 <i>Ant.</i> 11.6 <i>Brut.</i> 8.2
XV	<i>Caes.</i> 63.7
Augustus (206F–208A)	
I	<i>Ant.</i> 16.1–5 <i>Brut.</i> 22.2–3 <i>Cic.</i> 43.8
II	<i>Rom.</i> 17.3
III	<i>Ant.</i> 80.1–2 <i>Praec. ger. reip.</i> 814D
IV	
V	
VI	
VII	
VIII	
IX	
X	<i>De fort. Rom.</i> 319DE
XI	
XII	<i>An seni</i> 784D
XIII	
XIV	
XV	

2 *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* and the *Parallel Lives*

Based on the table presented above, some important conclusions can be drawn with respect to the connection between *Reg. et imp. apophth.* and the *Parallel Lives*. These – in general – support the position of Verdegem that the Greek sections (and, I add, the barbarian apophthegms) were taken from a larger collection of apophthegms, of which *Apophth. Lac.* would have been part, compiled from Plutarch's early literary career on (and also used for the *Moralia*), while the Roman sections were mainly based on a draft for the *Parallel Lives*.¹²¹²

2.1 The Barbarian and Greek Sections and the *Parallel Lives*

All fifteen barbarians (172E–174F), except for *Artaxerxes Mnemon* (173F–174A), are not the subject of a *Life*. This also goes for all six Sicilians (175A–177A), except for *Dion* (176F–177A; only one apophthegm), and all fourteen Macedonians (177A–184F), with the exception of *Alexander* (179D–181F), *Demetrius Poliorcetes* (183A–C; only two apophthegms), and *Pyrrhus* (184CD). In the Athenian section (184F–189D), *Myronides* (185F–186A), *Lamachus* (186F), *Iphicrates* (186F–187B), *Timotheus* (187BC), *Chabrias* (187CD), *Hegesippus* (187DE), and *Pytheas* (187E) do not have a *Life*; the Spartan section (189D–192C) contains even many more examples.

Of all sections on a subject of a *Life*, the connection between the biography and the collection is least clear in *Alexander* (179D–181F): of its 34 apophthegms, only sixteen occur in the *Life* in a very different order, and eleven are found in the *Moralia* or other *Lives*. Of the sixteen items in *Themistocles* (184F–185F), only one is lacking in the *Life*, where the order of the other apophthegms is slightly different, and seven occur in the *Moralia* or other *Lives*. *Aristeides* (186A–C) contains five apophthegms, four of which are told in the *Life* in a slightly different order, whereas the other one occurs in the *Moralia*. Only two of the five apophthegms in *Pericles* (186C) are also told in the *Life*, but all occur in the *Moralia*. In the seven items of *Alcibiades* (186D–F), one is absent from the *Life*, where the order of the remaining six is slightly different.¹²¹³ Five of the nineteen apophthegms in *Phocion* (187E–189B) are told in the *Moralia*, but all of them occur in the *Life* in more or less the same order. As to the three Spartan sections who have a *Life*, *Lycurgus* (189D–F), *Lysander* (190D–F), and *Agesilaus* (190F–191D) all seem to be based on *Apophth. Lac.* (this is also supported by section 3 of this Appendix), and various apophthegms are told in the *Moralia*. In the case of *Pelopidas* (194C–E),

¹²¹² Verdegem (2010) 404, reconciling Stadter (2014b) and Pelling (2002) 65–90.

¹²¹³ See Verdegem (2010) *passim* for a comparison of the section and *Alc.*

the first five of six apophthegms occur in *Pel.* in a slightly different order. None are found in the *Moralia*.

All of this suggests that Stadter is correct about the type of notes used for the *barbarian and Greek part* of the collection: a large compilation of apophthegms, of which *Apophth. Lac.* would have been part, seems to have formed the basis of this portion of *Reg. et imp. apophth.*¹²¹⁴ Yet the connection between the *Lives* and the apophthegm collection seems closer in the case of *Pyrrhus* (184CD). For the composition of this section, then, Plutarch *might* have used a draft compiled for the *Lives*. An observation by Pelling is relevant here:¹²¹⁵

some of the later Greek Lives – *Philopoemen*, perhaps, or *Timoleon*, or *Pyrrhus* – might be more similar to the Roman biographies: periods where his [Plutarch's] general knowledge might carry him less far, where more systematic research would be necessary.

The connection between *Pyrrhus* (184CD) and *Pyrrh.*, which suggests that (at least the preparation of) *Pyrrh.–Mar.* predates *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, is in line with the observations on *Marius* (202A–D) and *Gaius Fabricius* (194F–195B) presented in Part I, chapter 2 (and Appendix III).

2.2 The Roman Sections and the *Parallel Lives*

Of the 20 Romans, only the short sections on *Manius Curius* (194EF; two apophthegms), *Publius Licinius* (197EF; one apophthegm), and *Gaius Popillius* (202E–203A; one apophthegm) do not have a *Life*. Other sections without a biography are related to a *Life* on another subject: *Gaius Fabricius* (194F–195B) contains four apophthegms from *Pyrrh.* (in the same order); the one item of *Catulus Lutatius* (202DE) occurs in *Mar.* 23; Schmidt thinks that the apophthegm of *Gaius Domitius* (197DE) was part of the *Life of Scipio Maior*, and that the three apophthegms of *Caecilius Metellus* (201F–202A) occurred in the *Life of Scipio Minor*.¹²¹⁶

The connection between the Roman sections and their corresponding *Lives* is very close. All apophthegms occur in the *Life*, with the exception of *Lucullus* IIa (203AB), and *Flaminius* V (197CD), which describes Phi-

¹²¹⁴ Stadter (2014b).

¹²¹⁵ Pelling (2002) 25 (= (1979) 96).

¹²¹⁶ Schmidt, C. (1879) 30–48 (also arguing that the apophthegms of *Epameinondas* [192C–194C], *Scipio Maior* [196B–197A], and *Scipio Minor* [199F–201F] would have occurred in their corresponding *Lives*, now lost). See Babbitt (1931) 197 on *Caecilius Metellus* (201F–202A): “Distinguished Roman general, consul 143 B.C.; sometimes confused with Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, whose life Plutarch either wrote or intended to write (*Life of Marius*, chap. xxix.)” Perhaps, then, these sayings are related to the lost *Life of Metellus* (if it existed) instead of to the *Life of Scipio Minor*.

lopoemen's physical appearance and is therefore told in *Phil.* 2.6 (the *Life* of the contemporary Greek paired with *Flam.*). There are only a few clear deviations from the order of the apophthegms in the *Life: Flamininus* Ib (197A), which maintains the chronological order,¹²¹⁷ *Paulus Aemilius* VIII (198BC) because all apophthegms on the campaign against Perseus are put together (I–VII, 197F–198A), and *Pompeius* VII (204A), X (204B), and XIV (204D). Some apophthegms even read as summaries of chapters of the *Life*. Clear examples of this occur in *Fabius Maximus* (195C–196A): I summarises *Fab.* 5; II contains elements from 8–12; III is much more developed in 19; IV in 20; etc.¹²¹⁸ In addition, only fourteen of the 121 Roman apophthegms (without *Cato Maior* and *Cicero*, cf. *infra*) occur in the *Moralia*. As expected, some apophthegms occur in more *Lives* that concern the same period and milieu: in the case of the Romans of the end of the Republic, various apophthegms are shared by *Ant.*, *Brut.*, *Caes.*, *Ca. Mi.*, *Cic.*, and *Pomp.*, since *Caesar* III (206AB) occurs in *Caes.* 10.8–9 and *Cic.* 29.9; VII (206BC) in *Caes.* 32.8 and *Pomp.* 60.3–4; VIII (206C) in *Caes.* 35.9–10 and *Pomp.* 62.1; X (206D) in *Caes.* 39.8 and *Pomp.* 65.7–8; XI (206DE) in *Caes.* 44.7–8 and *Pomp.* 69.7–8; XIII (206E) in *Caes.* 54.2 and *Ca. Mi.* 72.2; and XIV (206E) in *Caes.* 62.10, *Ant.* 11.6, and *Brut.* 8.2.

Plutarch therefore indeed seems to have used the drafts for his Roman *Lives* for the Roman sections in the collection, as argued by Pelling,¹²¹⁹ but there are two exceptions: *Cato Maior* (198D–199E) and *Cicero* (204E–205E). Twelve of the 29 apophthegms in *Cato Maior* do not occur in *Ca. Ma.*, four are also told in the *Moralia*, and the order of the apophthegms differs significantly from that of the *Life*. In the (less striking) case of *Cicero*, three of its 21 apophthegms do not occur in *Cic.*, nor in any other Plutarchan work, and three are also found in the *Moralia* (the order of apophthegms in *Cicero*, however, is almost exactly the same as in *Cic.*). The connection between these sections and the *Parallel Lives*, then, is far less significant than in the case of the other Romans, especially in *Cato Maior*. This is not surprising. In antiquity, collections of sayings by Cato Maior and Cicero (probably compiled by Tiro) circulated.¹²²⁰ Plutarch must have made use of them, as the many apophthegms in *Ca. Ma.* (e.g. chapters 8–9) and *Cic.* (e.g. chapters 26–27) and the corresponding sections in *Reg. et imp. apophth.* testify.¹²²¹ Based on these

¹²¹⁷In Ib, Flamininus has a meeting with Philip, who is defeated in II.

¹²¹⁸Cf. Schmidt, C. (1879) 26 on the difference in length between Greek and Roman apophthegms in the collection.

¹²¹⁹Pelling (2002) 65–90.

¹²²⁰Kelsey (1907) 7: “After Cicero’s death a collection of his witticisms was circulated, arranged in three books; by some it was thought to be the work of his freedman Tiro”.

¹²²¹Cf. Smith (1940a) 154 on the sources of Cicero’s *De senectute* and Plutarch’s *Ca. Ma.*: “Both were dependent on biographical sources whose origins may be dated to that

collections, the Chaeronean could have made his own collection, similar to *Apophth. Lac.*, from which he could select and reorder different material when composing the biographies, the sections in *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, or any other text of the *Moralia*. The process of composition of *Cato Maior* and *Cicero* thus might have resembled that of the barbarian and Greek sections, although this is less clear in the case of the orator. A suggestion of Pelling concerning his section could be correct as well.¹²²²

The obvious explanation is that the ὑπόμνημα gathered a large number of such stories, and that later two separate, independent selections were made, one by Plutarch for the various clusters in the Life and one for the *Apophthegmata*. (Nor is it difficult to guess where most of this material originally came from: Tiro collected three books of Cicero's witticisms in his *de iocis*, and also wrote a biography which presumably included much of the same material.)

3 Apophthegms Occurring in Two Other Plutarchan Works

The following table cites the apophthegms of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* (left column) that occur in at least two other works of Plutarch (right column). The account of *Reg. et imp. apophth.* is referred to as version A; the second, third, etc. other accounts as versions B, C, etc. When B and C share elements absent from A, it is unlikely that A was the source of B and C. When A and B share one set of elements, and A and C another one, A can hardly have been based on B or C. The most plausible option in such cases, then, is that A, B, and C are based on the same source, version X (probably a note of Plutarch's archive). Connections between apophthegms are highlighted as follows:

[1] *In italics*: word(s) or phrase(s) shared by all accounts.

[2] **In bold**: word(s) or phrase(s) shared by A and at least one but not all of the other accounts.

time. There were, moreover, collections of Cato's sayings gleaned from his speeches and elsewhere, a collection of letters to his son"; see also Smith (1940b) 110 and Pelling (2002) 17 (= 1979) 89 on the "unusual number of *apophthegmata*" in *Cic.* Schmidt, C. (1879) 4–6 also argues that Plutarch used older collections of sayings of Cato Maior and Cicero, and (64–65) claims that *Cato Maior* (198D–199E) was based on such a collection; Scuderi (2004) 322 makes a similar point with regard to the apophthegms in *Cicero* (204E–205E).

¹²²²Pelling (2002) 81.

[3] Underlined: word(s) or phrase(s) absent from A but present in two or more of the other accounts.

[4] The remaining words or phrases are only present in that specific version of the apophthegm.

Below the *Reg. et imp. apophth.* version a short note describes the relationship between all accounts on the basis of their significant similarities and differences.¹²²³ These notes take the following form: “X>ABC”, which means that X (a preliminary note of Plutarch) was probably the source of A, B, and C. Sometimes, it seems possible that one of the accounts was the source of all other versions (cf. the first case of *Artaxerxes Longimanus* III, 173D). I have always tried to include all possibilities in the note for the sake of completeness, e.g.: “X>ABC or A>BC” (this does not mean that A was the source of B and C, but rather that A was a more or less exact copy of X). I applied a different practice in the Spartan part: the account of *Apophth. Lac.* often seems to have been the source of the other accounts.¹²²⁴

<i>Reg. et imp. apophth.</i> version	Other Plutarchan versions
<p>A Πρῶτος δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι τῶν ἡγεμονικῶν τιμωρίαν ἔταξεν, ἀντὶ τοῦ τὸ σῶμα <u>μαστιγοῦσθαι</u> καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν <u>ἀποτίλλεσθαι</u> <u>μαστιγοῦσθαι</u> μὲν ἀποδουσαμένων τὰ <u>ἰμάτια</u>, <u>τίλλεσθαι</u> δὲ τὴν τιάραν ἀποθεμένων. <i>Artaxerxes Longimanus</i> III (173D) X>ABC or A>BC</p>	<p>B καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ <u>ἰμάτια</u> <u>μαστιγοῦντες</u> οὐχ ἄπτονται τοῦ σώματος <i>De aud. poet.</i> 35F C ὡς γὰρ ἐν Πέρσiais τῶν κολαζομένων τὰ <u>ἰμάτια</u> καὶ τὰς τιάρας <u>ἀποτίλλουσι</u> καὶ <u>μαστιγοῦσιν</u> <i>De sera num.</i> 565A</p>
<p>A <i>Kῦρος</i> ὁ νεώτερος τοὺς <i>Λακεδαιμονίους</i> συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ παρακαλῶν <u>ἔλεγε</u> τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καρδίαν ἔχειν βαρύτεραν καὶ πλείονα πίνειν ἄκρατον αὐτοῦ καὶ φέρειν βέλτιον· ἐκείνον δὲ μόλις ἐν ταῖς θήραις ἐπὶ τῶν</p>	<p>B οὐχ ἦττον οὖν τοῖς ἄνω πιστεύων ὁ <i>Kῦρος</i> ἢ τοῖς περὶ αὐτόν, ἐπεχείρει τῷ πολέμῳ· καὶ <i>Λακεδαιμονίους</i> ἔγραφε, παρακαλῶν βοηθεῖν καὶ συνεκπέμπειν ἄνδρας, οἷς ἔφη δώσειν, ἂν μὲν πεζοὶ παρῶσιν, ἵππους, ἂν δ' ἵππεῖς, συνωρίδας· ἂν δ' ἀγροὺς ἔχωσι, κόμας· ἂν δὲ κόμας, πόλεις· μισθοῦ δὲ τοῖς στρατευομένοις οὐκ</p>

¹²²³ The presence of articles and the difference between forms of λέγω and φημί and other verbs with similar meanings that are perfectly interchangeable are not proof of a closer relationship between two or more accounts. The same goes, I believe, for cases such as βελτίων, κρείττων, or ἀμείνων (e.g. *Alexander* IX, 180A).

¹²²⁴ In line with Stadter (2014b) 666–674.

ἵππων μένειν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δεινοῖς **μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου. παρεκάλει** δ' ἀποστέλλειν **ἄνδρας** πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος τοῖς μὲν **πεζοῖς ἵππους δώσειν**, τοῖς δὲ **ἵππους** ἔχουσιν ἄρματα, τοῖς δὲ **χωρία** κεκτημένοις **κόμας**, τοὺς δὲ **κόμας** ἔχοντας **πόλεων** κυρίουσ ποιήσειν· ἀργυρίου δὲ καὶ χρυσίου **οὐκ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ** σταθμὸν **ἔσσεσθαι.**

Cyrus Minor (173EF)

C only contains a part of the story.

X>ABC or A>BC

ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλὰ μέτρον **ἔσσεσθαι.** μεγαληγορῶν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ πολλά, καὶ **καρδίαν** ἔφη *τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ* φορεῖν **βαρυτέραν**, καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν μᾶλλον, καὶ μαγεύειν βέλτιον, οἶνον δὲ **πλείονα πίνειν** καὶ φέρειν· ἐκείνον δ' ὑπὸ δειλίας καὶ μαλακίας ἐν μὲν τοῖς κυνηγεσίοις **μηδ' ἐφ' ἵππου**, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κινδύνοις **μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου** καθήσθαι.

Art. 6.2–4

C ἄλλ' ὡς ὁ *Kῦρος* **ἔλεγεν** πρὸς *Λακεδαιμονίους* γράφων, ὅτι τὰ τ' ἄλλα *τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ* βασιλικώτερος εἶη καὶ φέροι καλῶς πολὺν **ἄκρατον·**

Quaest. Conv. 620C

A *Ἰσμηνίαν* δὲ τὸν ἄριστον *αὐλητὴν λαβὼν αἰχμάλωτον* **ἐκέλευσεν αὐλῆσαι·** **θαυμαζόντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων** αὐτὸς ὤμοσεν ἥδιον **ἀκούειν τοῦ ἵππου** χρεμετίζοντος.

Anteas III (174EF)

X>ABC or B>AC

B ὁ δὲ τῶν Σκυθῶν βασιλεὺς Ἀντέας *Ἰσμηνίαν τὸν αὐλητὴν λαβὼν αἰχμάλωτον* **ἐκέλευσεν αὐλῆσαι** **παρὰ πότον.** **θαυμαζόντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων** καὶ κροτούντων, αὐτὸς ὤμοσεν **ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἵππου** χρεμετίζοντος ἥδιον.

De Al. Magn. fort. 334B

C Ἀτέαν, ὃς *Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ αὐλητοῦ* ληφθέντος *αἰχμάλωτου* καὶ **παρὰ πότον** αὐλήσαντος ὤμοσεν ἥδιον **ἀκούειν τοῦ ἵππου** χρεμετίζοντος;

Non posse 1095F

A *Δίων* ὁ Διονύσιον ἐκβαλὼν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος, ἀκούσας *ἐπιβουλευεῖν* αὐτῷ *Κάλλιππον*, ᾧ μάλιστα τῶν φίλων καὶ ξένων ἐπίστευεν, οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ἐλέγξει, βέλτιον εἶναι φήσας ἀποθανεῖν ἢ **ζῆν** μὴ μόνον τοὺς πολεμίους **ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους** **φυλαττόμενον.**

Dion (176F–177A)

X>ABC

B Ἐν τοιούτοις δὲ τοῦ *Δίωνος* ὄντος, ὁ *Κάλλιππος* ἐτι μᾶλλον εἵχετο τῆς *ἐπιβουλῆς* [...] ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν *Δίων* [...] εἶπεν ὅτι πολλάκις ἤδη θνήσκειν ἔτοιμός ἐστι καὶ παρέχειν τῷ βουλομένῳ σφάττειν αὐτόν, εἰ **ζῆν** δεήσει μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐχθρούς, **ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους** **φυλαττόμενον.**

Dion 56.1–3

C οὕτω παραπώλετο *Δίων*, οὐκ ἀγνοήσας *ἐπιβουλεύοντα Κάλλιππον* ἀλλ' αἰσχυνθεὶς *φυλάττεσθαι φίλον* ὄντα καὶ ξένον·

De vit. pud. 530C

A Τοῦ δ' *Εὐριπίδου* τὸν καλὸν **Ἀγάθωνα** περιλαμβάνοντος ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ καὶ καταφιλοῦντος **ἤδη γενειῶντα**, πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἶπε 'μὴ θαυμάσητε· *τῶν γὰρ καλῶν* καὶ *τὸ μετόπωρον* **καλὸν ἐστίν.**'

Archelaus III (177AB)

B is only a short reference to the story.

B οὐ γάρ, *ὡς Εὐριπίδης ἔλεγε*, πάντων *τῶν καλῶν* καὶ *τὸ μετόπωρον* **καλὸν ἐστίν**, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' Ἀλκιβιάδῃ μετ' ὀλίγων ἄλλων δι' εὐφυΐαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπῆρξε.

Ale. 1.5

C τὰ δ' ὑπ' *Εὐριπίδου* ῥηθέντ' ἐστὶ κομψά· ἔφη γὰρ **Ἀγάθωνα** τὸν καλὸν **ἤδη γενειῶντα** περιβάλλον καὶ κατασπαζόμενος, ὅτι *τῶν καλῶν* καὶ *τὸ μετόπωρον* <καλόν>.

Amatorius 770C

<p>A Πολλῶν δὲ κατορθωμάτων αὐτῷ καὶ καλῶν ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ προσαγγελθέντων, ὃ τύχη εἶπε, ‘μικρόν τι μοι κακὸν ἀντί τῶν τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ἀγαθῶν ποιήσον.’ Philippus III (177C) X>ABC or C>AB</p>	<p>B Φιλίπῳ δ’ ἄρτι Ποτεΐδαιαν ἡρηκότι τρεις ἦκον ἀγγελία κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, ἡ μὲν Ἰλλυριοῦς ἠττήσθαι μάχη μεγάλη διὰ Παρμενίωνος, ἡ δ’ Ὀλυμπίασιν ἵπῳ κέλητι νενικηκέναι, τρίτη δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου γενέσεως. Alex. 3.8 C Φίλιππος δ’ ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς τριῶν αὐτῷ προσαγγελθέντων εὐτυχημάτων ὑφ’ ἑνα καιρόν, πρώτου μὲν ὅτι θεθρίπῳ νενίκηκεν Ὀλύμπια, δευτέρου δ’ ὅτι Παρμενίων ὁ στρατηγὸς μάχῃ Δαρδανεῖς ἐνίκησε, τρίτου δ’ ὅτι ἄρρεν αὐτῷ παιδίον τέτοκεν ἡ Ὀλυμπίας, ἀνατείνας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν τὰς χεῖρας ‘ὃ δαίμων’ εἶπε, ‘μέτριόν τι τούτοις ἀντίθες ἐλάττωμα’, εἰδὼς ὅτι τοῖς μεγάλοις εὐτυχήμασι φθονεῖν πέφυκεν ἡ τύχη. Cons. ad Apoll. 105AB</p>
<p>A Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπὸ τίνος ξένου κληθεὶς ἐπὶ δειπνον ἐν ὁδῷ πολλοὺς ἐπήγετο καὶ τὸν ξένον ἑώρα θορυβούμενον (ἦν γὰρ οὐχ ἱκανὰ τὰ παρεσκευασμένα), προσπέμπων τῶν φίλων ἐκάστῳ, πλακοῦντι χώραν ἐκέλευεν ἀπολιπεῖν· οἱ δὲ πειθόμενοι καὶ προσδοκῶντες οὐκ ἦσθιον πολλά, καὶ πᾶσιν οὕτως ἤρκεσεν. Philippus XX (178D) X>ABC</p>	<p>B ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸν (<i>sc.</i> Philip) ἐπὶ χώρας ὡς σὺν ὀλίγοις ὄντα δειπνήσαι παρεκάλεσεν, εἶτα ὄρων πολλοὺς ἄγοντα παρεσκευασμένον οὐ πολλῶν ἐταράττετο. συναισθόμενος οὖν ὁ Φίλιππος ὑπέπεμπε τῶν φίλων ἐκάστῳ κελεύων πλακοῦντι καταλιπεῖν χώραν, οἱ δὲ πειθόμενοι καὶ προσδοκῶντες ἐφείδοντο τῶν παρακειμένων. ἤρκεσεν οὖν ἅπασιν τὸ δεῖπνον. De tuenda 123F–124A C ὅπως μὴ πάθωσιν ὁ παθεῖν συνέπεσε τῷ δεχομένῳ τὸν βασιλεῖα Φίλιππον ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας: ἦκε γὰρ ἄγων πολλοὺς, τὸ δὲ δειπνον οὐ πολλοῖς ἦν παρεσκευασμένον· ἰδὼν οὖν θορυβούμενον τὸν ξένον περιέπεμπε πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἀτρέμα, χώραν πλακοῦντι καταλιπεῖν κελεύων· οἱ δὲ προσδοκῶντες ὑπεφείδοντο τῶν παρακειμένων καὶ πᾶσιν οὕτως ἐξήρκεσε τὸ δεῖπνον. Quaest. conv. 707B</p>
<p>A Ἀγανακτούντων δὲ τῶν φίλων, ὅτι συρίττουσιν αὐτὸν ἐν Ὀλυμπίαις εὖ πεπονθότες οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ‘τί οὖν’ εἶπεν, ‘ἐὰν κακῶς πάθωσι;’ Philippus XXVII (179A) C is not told about Philippus, but something similar to C could have been the source of A, B, and D: X>ABD</p>	<p>B καὶ πρόχειρον ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου. λέγεται γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων παροξυνόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὡς εὖ πάσχοντας καὶ κακῶς αὐτὸν λέγοντας εἶπεν ‘τί οὖν, ἂν [καὶ] κακῶς ποιῶμεν αὐτούς;’ Con. praec. 143F C Τῶν δὲ φυγάδων αὐτὸν προτρεπομένων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἄγειν τὴν στρατιάν λεγοντῶν τε ὅτι τοῖς Ὀλυμπίαις ἀνακηρυττομένου αὐτοῦ ἐσύριττον αὐτὸν μόνοι, ‘τί οὖν οἴεσθε’ ἔφη ‘τοὺς ὅτε εὖ ἐπάσχον συρίττοντας κακῶς παθόντας ποιήσαιν;’ Aporphth. Lac. 230D</p>

	<p>D ἐν Ὀλυμπίοις δὲ βλασφημίας περὶ αὐτοῦ γενομένης καὶ τινῶν λεγόντων, ὡς οἰμῶξαι προσήκει τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὅτι εἰ πάσχοντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου κακῶς αὐτὸν λέγουσι· ‘τί οὖν’ ἔφη ‘ποιήσουσιν, ἂν κακῶς πάσχωσι;’ De coh. ira 457F</p>
<p>A Ψάλτην δὲ τινα βουλομένου παρὰ δεῖπνον ἐπανορθοῦν αὐτοῦ καὶ λαλεῖν περὶ κρουμάτων ὁ ψάλτης ‘μὴ γένοιτό σοι’ εἶπεν, ‘ὦ βασιλεῦ, κακῶς οὕτως, ἵνα ταῦτ’ ἐμοῦ βέλτιον εἰδῆς.’ Philippus XXX (179B) X>ABCD</p>	<p>B ὅθεν ὁ μὲν ψάλτης οὐκ ἀπιθάνως οὐδ’ ἀμούσως ἐπεστόμισε τὸν Φίλιππον ἐπιχειροῦντα περὶ κρουμάτων διαφέρεσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν, εἰπὼν ‘μὴ γένοιτό σοι οὕτως ὦ βασιλεῦ κακῶς, ἵν’ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα βέλτιον εἰδῆς.’ De ad. et am. 67F–68A C ὅθεν καὶ φασὶ πρὸς τινα ψάλτην περὶ κρουμάτων αὐτοῦ διαφερομένου καὶ δοκοῦντος ἐξελέγγειν, ἀτρέμα μειδίσαντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν ‘μὴ γένοιτό σοι, βασιλεῦ, ἀθλίως οὕτως, ἵνα ταῦτ’ ἐμοῦ βέλτιον εἰδῆς.’ De Al. Magn. fort. 334CD D κομψῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦ Φιλίππου τὴν ὀψιμαθίαν ἅμα καὶ περιεργίαν ὁ ψάλτης ἐπέσχευ· οἰομένου γάρ αὐτὸν ἐξελέγγειν τοῦ Φιλίππου περὶ κρουμάτων καὶ ἁρμονιῶν ‘μὴ γένοιτό σοι’ εἶπεν, ‘ὦ βασιλεῦ, κακῶς οὕτως, ἵν’ ἐμοῦ σὺ ταῦτ’ εἰδῆς βέλτιον.’ Quaest. conv. 634CD</p>
<p>A Ἐπεὶ δὲ διενεχθέντος αὐτοῦ πρὸς Ὀλυμπιάδα τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἦκε Δημάρατος ὁ Κορίνθιος, ἐπυνθάνετο, πῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχουσιν <ὁμονοίας> οἱ Ἕλληνες· καὶ ὁ Δημάρατος ‘πάνυ γοῦν’ ἔφη ‘σοὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμονοίας ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, οὕτω πρὸς σέ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων ἐχόντων.’ ὁ δὲ συμφρονήσας ἐπαύσατο τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ διηλλάγη πρὸς αὐτούς. Philippus XXXI (179BC) A similar story is told in <i>Con. praec.</i> 144B about Gorgias. X>ABC</p>	<p>B ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Δημάρατος ὁ Κορίνθιος, ξένος ὢν τῆς οἰκίας καὶ παρρησίας μετέχων, ἀφίκετο πρὸς Φίλιππον. μετὰ δὲ τὰς πρώτας δεξιώσεις καὶ φιλοφροσύνας ἐπερωτῶντος τοῦ Φιλίππου, πῶς ἔχουσιν ὁμονοίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ Ἕλληνες, “πάνυ γοῦν” ἔφη “σοὶ προσήκει Φίλιππε κηδεσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅς τὸν οἶκον τὸν σεαυτοῦ <u>στάσεως</u> <u>τοσαύτης</u> καὶ κακῶν ἐμπέπληκας.” οὕτω δὲ συμφρονήσας ὁ Φίλιππος ἐπεμψε καὶ κατήγαγε πείσας διὰ τοῦ Δημαράτου τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον. Alex. 9.12–14 C οἷον ἐλθεῖν Δημάρατον εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἐκ Κορίνθου λέγουσι καθ’ ὃν χρόνον ἐν διαφορᾷ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ὁ Φίλιππος ἦν· ἀσπασαμένου δ’ αὐτὸν τοῦ Φιλίππου καὶ πυθομένου πῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχουσιν ὁμονοίας οἱ Ἕλληνες, εἰπεῖν τὸν Δημάρατον εὖνον ὄντα καὶ συνήθη ‘πάνυ γοῦν ὦ Φίλιππε καλὸν ἐστὶ σοὶ πυνθάνεσθαι περὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὁμοφροσύνης, <u>τὴν δ’ οἰκίαν</u> <u>περιορᾶν</u> <u>τὴν σεαυτοῦ τοσαύτης στάσεως</u> καὶ διχονοίας γέμουσαν’. De ad. et am. 70BC</p>

<p>A Ἐλαφρὸς δ' ὢν καὶ <i>ποδώκης</i> [καὶ] παρακαλούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς <i>Ὀλυμπία</i><σιν> δραμεῖν <i>στάδιον</i>, <i>εἶγε</i>· ἔφη <i>ἑβασίλεις ἔξαιν ἔμελλον ἀνταγωνιστάς</i>. <i>Alexander II (179D)</i> X>ABC or A>BC or B>AC</p>	<p>B οὔτε γὰρ ἀπὸ παντὸς οὔτε πᾶσαν ἡγάπα δόξαν, ὡς Φίλιππος λόγου τε δεινότητι σοφιστικῶς καλλωπιζόμενος, καὶ τὰς ἐν <i>Ὀλυμπία</i> νίκας τῶν ἀρμάτων ἐγχαράττων τοῖς νομίμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀποπειρωμένων, εἰ βούλοιτ' ἂν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἀγωνίσασθαι <i>στάδιον</i>, ἦν γὰρ <i>ποδώκης</i>, <i>εἶ γε</i>· ἔφη <i>ἑβασίλεις ἔμελλον ἔξαιν ἀνταγωνιστάς</i>. <i>Alex. 4.9–10</i> C <i>ποδώκε</i>στάτος γὰρ τῶν ἐφ' ἡλικίας νέων γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐταίρων αὐτὸν ἐπ' <i>Ὀλύμπια</i> παρορμώντων, ἠρώτησεν εἰ <i>βασίλεις ἀγωνίζονται</i>· τῶν δ' 'οὐ' φαμένων ἄδικον εἶπεν εἶναι τὴν ἄμιλλαν, ἐν ἣ νικήσει μὲν ἰδιώτας νικηθήσεται δὲ βασιλεύς. <i>De Al. Magn. fort. 331AB</i></p>
<p>A <i>Ἀναξάρχῳ</i> δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ δοῦναι τὸν διοικητὴν ἐκέλευσεν ὅσον ἂν αἰτήσῃ· τοῦ δὲ διοικητοῦ φήσαντος ὡς ἑκατὸν αἰτεῖ <i>τάλαντα</i>, <i>καλῶς</i>· ἔφη <i>ποιεῖ γινώσκων ὅτι φίλον ἔχει καὶ δυνάμενον τηλικαῦτα δωρεῖσθαι καὶ βουλόμενον</i>. <i>Alexander VII (179F–180A)</i> See <i>Alexander XXX</i> (181ED). These are only short references to the apophthegm.</p>	<p>B ὁ μὲντοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἐμπεφυκὼς καὶ συντεθραμμένος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ ζήλος καὶ πόθος οὐκ ἐξερρῦη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἡ περὶ <i>Ἀναξάρχον</i> τε τιμῆ καὶ τὰ <i>πεμφθέντα Ξενοκράτει πεντήκοντα τάλαντα</i> καὶ Δάνδαμιν καὶ Καλανὸς οὕτω σπουδασθέντες μαρτυροῦσι. <i>Alex. 8.5</i> C καὶ πῶς μὲν εἶχε πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλῃν εἰρηται καὶ ὅτι τὸν μὲν ἀρμονικὸν <i>Ἀναξάρχον</i> ἐντιμότατον τῶν φίλων ἐνόμιζε· Πύρρωνι δὲ τῷ Ἠλείῳ πρῶτον ἐντυχόντι μυρίου χρυσοῦς ἔδωκε, <i>Ξενοκράτει</i> δὲ τῷ Πλάτωνος συνήθει <i>πεντήκοντα τάλαντα</i> δωρεάν <i>ἐπεμψεν</i>· Ὀνησίκριτον δὲ τὸν Διογένοιο τοῦ Κυνὸς μαθητὴν ὅτι ἄρχοντα τῶν κυβερνητῶν κατέστησεν, ὑπὸ πλειόνων ἰστόρηται. <i>De Al. Magn. fort. 331E</i></p>
<p>A Τῆς δὲ τῶν <i>Καρῶν βασιλίσσης Ἄδας ὄψα καὶ πέμματα</i> παρεσκευασμένα περιττῶς διὰ δημιουργῶν καὶ <i>μαγεῖρον</i> φιλοτιμουμένης αἰεὶ πέμπειν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔφη κρείττονας <i>ἔχειν</i> αὐτὸς <i>ὀμοποιούς</i>, πρὸς μὲν <i>ἄριστον τὴν νυκτοπορίαν</i> πρὸς δὲ <i>δεῖπνον τὴν ὀλιγαριστίαν</i>. <i>Alexander IX (180A)</i> X>ABCD or A>BCD</p>	<p>B ἦν δὲ καὶ γαστρὸς ἐγκρατέστατος, καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἐδήλωσε καὶ τοῖς πρὸς <i>Ἄδαν</i> λεχθεῖσιν, ἦν ἐποίησατο μητέρα καὶ <i>Καρίας βασιλίσσαν</i> ἀπέδειξεν. ὡς γὰρ ἐκείνη φιλοφρονουμένη πολλὰ μὲν <i>ὄψα</i> καθ' ἡμέραν ἀπέστελλεν αὐτῷ <i>καὶ πέμματα</i>, τέλος δὲ τοὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι <i>δεινοτάτους ὀμοποιούς</i> καὶ ἀρτοποιούς, ἔφη τούτων μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι· <i>βελτίονας</i> γὰρ <i>ὀμοποιούς ἔχειν</i> ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ Λεωνίδου δεδομένους αὐτῷ, πρὸς μὲν τὸ <i>ἄριστον νυκτοπορίαν</i>, πρὸς δὲ τὸ <i>δεῖπνον ὀλιγαριστίαν</i>. <i>Alex. 22.7–9</i></p>

	<p>C λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον εἰπεῖν τοὺς τῆς Ἰθάκης ὄψοποιούς ἀποπεμψάμενον ὡς ἔχει <u>βελτίονας</u> [ἄγειν] αἰεὶ σὺν αὐτῷ, πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἄριστον τὴν νυκτοπορίαν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δεῖπνον τὴν ὀλιγαριστίαν. De tuenda 127B D ὅπου καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπεώσατο τῆς Ἰθάκης τοὺς <u>μαγείρους</u> αὐτὸς εἰπὼν ἔχειν ἀμείνονας ὄψοποιούς, πρὸς μὲν ἄριστον τὴν νυκτοπορίαν πρὸς δὲ δεῖπνον τὴν ὀλιγαριστίαν. Non posse 1099C</p>
<p>A Ἐπιστολὴν δὲ παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς ἀναγινώσκων αἰτίας ἀπορρήτους κατ' Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ διαβολὰς ἔχουσαν, ἅμα τοῦ Ἡφαιστίωνος ὥσπερ εἰώθει συναγινώσκοντος, οὐκ ἐκόλυσεν· ὡς δ' ἀνέγνω, τὸν δακτύλιον ἀφελόμενος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τῷ στόματι τῷ ἐκείνου τὴν σφραγίδα ἐπέθηκεν. Alexander XIV (180D) X>ABCD</p>	<p>B πολλάκις δὲ τοιαῦτα τῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος γραφούσης, ἐφύλαττεν ἀπόρρητα τὰ γράμματα, πλὴν ἅπαξ Ἡφαιστίωνος ὥσπερ εἰώθει <u>λυθεῖσαν</u> ἐπιστολὴν αὐτῷ συναγινώσκοντος, οὐκ ἐκόλυσεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν δακτύλιον ἀφελόμενος τὸν αὐτοῦ, προσέθηκε τῷ ἐκείνου στόματι τὴν σφραγίδα. Alex. 39.8 C ἐπιστολὴν δὲ ποτε τῆς μητρὸς ἀπόρρητον διερχόμενος, Ἡφαιστίωνος ὡς ἔτυχε παρακαθημένου καὶ ἀπλῶς συναγινώσκοντος, οὐκ ἐκόλυσεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν δακτύλιον ἑαυτοῦ τῷ στόματι προσέθηκεν αὐτοῦ, κατασφραγισάμενος φιλικῆ πίστει τὴν σιωπὴν· φιλοσόφως· εἰ γὰρ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔστι φιλοσόφως, τίν' ἔστιν ἄλλα; De Al. Magn. fort. 332F–333A D λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῆς μητρὸς ἀπόρρητον ἐπιστολὴν λύσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ σιωπῆ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀναγινώσκοντος, Ἡφαιστίων ἀτρέμα παραβάλλον τὴν κεφαλὴν συναγίνωσκεν· ὁ δὲ κωλύσαι μὲν οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἐξελὼν δὲ τὸν δακτύλιον προσέθηκε τὴν σφραγίδα τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἡφαιστίωνος. De Al. Magn. fort. 340A</p>
<p>A Τοξεύματι δὲ πληγεὶς εἰς τὸ σκέλος, ὡς πολλοὶ συνέδραμον τῶν πολλάκις αὐτὸν εἰωθότων θεὸν προσαγορεύειν, διαχυθεὶς τῷ προσώπῳ 'τουτὶ μὲν αἷμα' εἶπεν 'ὡς ὁράτε καὶ οὐκ' (E 340) ἰχώρ, οἷός περ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν.' Alexander XVI (180E) X>ABC or A>BC</p>	<p>B ὕστερον δὲ πληγῆ περιτεσὼν ὑπὸ τοξεύματος καὶ περιαλγῆς γενόμενος· “τοῦτο μὲν” εἶπεν “ὦ φίλοι τὸ ῥέον αἷμα καὶ οὐκ (Hom. II. 5, 340) “ἰχώρ, οἷός περ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν.” Alex. 28.3 C πρὸς Ἀσσακάνους Ἰνδικῶ βέλει τὸ σφυρόν, ὅτε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κόλακας εἶπεν ἐπιμειδιάσας 'τουτὶ μὲν αἷμα, οὐκ (Hom. E 340) 'ἰχώρ, οἷός περ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν'.' De Al. Magn. fort. 341B</p>

A **Ἀποστέλλοντος** δ' αὐτοῦ τῶν Μακεδόνων τοὺς νοσώδεις **καὶ ἀναπήρους** ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ἐνεδείχθη τις **εἰς τοὺς νοσοῦντας ἀπογεγραμμένος** αὐτὸν οὐ νοσῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰς ὄψιν ἄχθεις καὶ ἀνακρινόμενος **ὠμολόγησε** προφασίζεσθαι δι' ἔρωτα **Τελεσίπας ἀπιούσης ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, ἠρώτησεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος 'πρὸς τίνα δεῖ** περὶ τῆς Τελεσίπας **διαλέγεσθαι;**' πυθόμενος δ' ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν **'οὐκοῦν'** ἔφη ὃ **Ἄντιγένη, πείθωμεν τὴν Τελεσίπαν,** ἵνα μείνη μεθ' ἡμῶν· βιάζεσθαι γὰρ **ἐλευθέραν** οὖσαν οὐχ ἡμέτερον.
Alexander XXI (180F–181A)
X>ABC

B ἐπεὶ δέ, τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας αὐτοῦ καὶ γέροντας εἰς οἶκον **ἀποστέλλοντος**, Εὐρύλοχος Αἰγαῖος **ἐνέγραψεν** αὐτὸν **εἰς τοὺς νοσοῦντας**, εἴτα φωραθεὶς ἔχων οὐδὲν κακόν, **ὠμολόγησε Τελεσίπας ἐρᾶν καὶ συναπακολουθεῖν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ἀπιούσης** ἐκείνης, **ἠρώτησε τίνων** ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ τὸ γύναιον. ἀκούσας δ' ὅτι τῶν **ἐλευθέρων** ἑταιρῶν "ἡμᾶς μὲν" εἶπεν ὃ Εὐρύλοχε **συνεράντας** ἔχεις· ὄρα δ' ὅπως **πείθωμεν** ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροισι **τὴν Τελεσίπαν**, ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ **ἐλευθέρων** ἐστὶ."
Alex. 41.9–10

C **Ἀντιγένης** δὲ τοῖς ἀποπεμφθεῖσιν εἰς Μακεδονίαν διὰ νόσον **καὶ πῆρωσιν** ἀναμίξας αὐτὸν καὶ **ἀπογραψάμενος**, ὡς ἐλήφθη μηδὲν κακόν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ προσποιούμενος ἄρρωστιαν τινά, ἀνὴρ πολεμικός καὶ τραυματῶν τὸ σῶμα μεστός ὄφθεις ἠνίασε τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον· **πυθθανομένου** δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν **ὠμολόγησε Τελεσίπας ἐρᾶν καὶ συνακολουθεῖν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ἀπιούση** μὴ δυνάμενος ἀπολειφθῆναι. **'καὶ τίνος'** ἔφη **'τὸ γυναιόν ἐστιν'** ὁ **Ἀλέξανδρος** **'καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ διαλέγεσθαι;'** τοῦ δ' **Ἀντιγένους** εἰπόντος ὡς **ἐλευθέρα** ἐστίν, **'οὐκοῦν'** εἶπε **'πείθωμεν** αὐτὴν καταμένειν, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι καὶ διδόντες.'

De Al. Magn. fort. 339CD

A **Ξενοκράτει** δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ **πεντήκοντα τάλαντα πέμψας**, ὡς οὐκ ἐδέξατο **μὴ δεῖσθαι** φήσας, ἠρώτησεν, εἰ μηδὲ φίλον ἔχει **Ξενοκράτης**: **'ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ'** ἔφη **'μόλις ὁ Δαρείου πλοῦτος** εἰς τοὺς φίλους ἤρκεσεν.'
Alexander XXX (181DE)
See **Alexander VII** (179F–180A). B and C are only short references to the apophthegm.

B ὁ μέντοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἐμπεφυκὸς καὶ συντετραμμένος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ ζῆλος καὶ πόθος οὐκ ἐξερρῦν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἡ περὶ **Ἀνάξαρχον** τε τιμὴ καὶ τὰ **πεμφθέντα Ξενοκράτει** **πεντήκοντα τάλαντα** καὶ Δάνδαμιο καὶ Καλανὸς οὕτω σπουδασθέντες μαρτυροῦσι.

Alex. 8.5

C καὶ πῶς μὲν εἶχε πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλῃν εἰρηται καὶ ὅτι τὸν μὲν ἀρμονικὸν **Ἀνάξαρχον** ἐντιμώτατον τῶν φίλων ἐνόμιζε· Πύρρωνι δὲ τῷ Ἠλείῳ πρῶτον ἐντυχόντι μυρίου χρυσοῦς ἔδωκε, **Ξενοκράτει** δὲ τῷ Πλάτωνος συνήθει **πεντήκοντα τάλαντα δωρεᾶν ἐπέμψεν**. Ὀνησίκριτον δὲ τὸν Διογένους τοῦ Κυνὸς μαθητὴν ὅτι ἄρχοντα τῶν κυβερνητῶν κατέστησεν, ὑπὸ πλειόνων ἰστόρηται.

De Al. Magn. fort. 331E

	<p>D <i>Ξενοκράτην, πενήκοντα τάλαντα δωρεὰν</i> Ἀλεξάνδρου <i>πέμψαντος</i>, ὅτι οὐκ ἔλαβε θαυμάζομεν· τὸ δὲ δοῦναι, οὐ; ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως καταφρονεῖν χρημάτων δοκοῦμεν τὸν μὴ προσιέμενον καὶ τὸν χαριζόμενον; οὐκ ἔδειτο πλούτου Ξενοκράτης διὰ φιλοσοφίαν, Ἀλέξανδρος δ' ἔδειτο διὰ φιλοσοφίαν, ἵνα τοιούτοις χαρίζεται. <i>De Al. Magn. fort. 333B</i></p>
<p>A Ἐπει δὲ <i>Πῶρος ἐρωτηθεὶς</i> ὑπ' αὐτοῦ μετὰ τὴν μάχην <i>‘πῶς σοι χρήσμαι;’</i> <i>‘βασιλικῶς’</i> εἶπε, καὶ <i>προσερωτηθεὶς</i> <i>‘μὴ τι ἄλλο;’</i> <i>‘πάντα’</i> εἶπεν <i>‘ἐν τῷ βασιλικῶς ἔνεστι,’</i> θαυμάσας καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀνδραγαθίαν πλείονα <i>χώραν</i> ἢς πρόφην εἶχε <i>προσέθηκε.</i> <i>Alexander XXXI (181E)</i> The second part of the apophthegm only returns in B as well. As to the first part, the most plausible option is X>ABCD</p>	<p>B Ἐπει δὲ ληφθέντα τὸν <i>Πῶρον</i> ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἠρώτα, <i>πῶς αὐτῷ χρήσεται</i>, <i>“βασιλικῶς”</i> εἶπε· προσπυθόμενου δὲ <i>μὴ τι <καὶ> ἄλλο</i> λέγει, <i>“πάντ”</i> εἶπεν <i>“<ἐν>εστιν ἐν τῷ βασιλικῶς.”</i> οὐ μόνον οὖν ἀφήκεν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν ὡν ἐβασίλευε σατράπην καλούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσέθηκε χώραν [καὶ] τῆς αὐτονόμου καταστρεψάμενος, ἐν ἣ πεντεκαίδεκα μὲν ἔθνη, πόλεις δὲ πεντακισχιλίας ἀξιολόγους, κόμας δὲ παμπόλλας εἶναι φασιν· ἄλλης δὲ τρις τοσαύτης Φίλιππὸν τινα τῶν ἐταίρων σατράπην ἀπέδειξε. <i>Alex. 60.14–16</i> C ἔπεισέ μοι τὸ τοῦ <i>Πῶρου</i> δεῦρο μετενεγκεῖν. ἐκείνος γὰρ ὡς ἦχθη πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον αἰχμάλωτος, πυθόμενου <i>πῶς αὐτῷ χρήσεται</i>, <i>‘βασιλικῶς’</i> εἶπεν <i>‘ὦ Ἀλέξανδρε,’</i> <i>‘πάντι δ’ ἐπερομένου</i> <i>‘μὴ τι ἄλλο;’</i> <i>‘οὐδέν’</i> εἶπε <i>‘πάντα γὰρ ἔ<νε>στιν ἐν τῷ βασιλικῶς.’</i> <i>De Al. Magn. fort. 332E</i> D ἢ καὶ <i>Πῶρος</i> ἄλους παρεκάλει <i>χρήσασθαι βασιλικῶς αὐτῷ</i>· καὶ <i>πυθόμενου</i> <i>‘μὴ τι πλέον;’</i> <i>‘ἐν τῷ βασιλικῶς’</i> ἔφη <i>‘πάντι’</i> ἔνεστι. <i>De coh. ira 458B</i></p>
<p>A Τελευτήσαντος δ' αὐτοῦ Δημάδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ὅμοιον ἔφη <i>‘διὰ τὴν ἀναρχίαν</i> ὀρᾶσθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐκτετοφλωμένῳ <i>τῷ Κύκλωπι.’</i> <i>Alexander XXXIV (181F)</i> X>ABC or A>BC</p>	<p>B Δημάδης (fr. 15 de Falco) μὲν γὰρ Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτήσαντος εἰκάσε τὴν Μακεδόνων στρατιάν ἐκτετοφλωμένῳ <i>τῷ Κύκλωπι</i>, πολλὰς κινουμένην ὀρων κινήσεις ἀτάκτους καὶ παραφόρους· <i>Galba 1.5</i> C εἶτ' ἐκλιπόντος εὐθὺς ὁ Λεωσθένης ἔλεγε τὴν δύναμιν ἐμπλανωμένην ἐαυτῇ καὶ περιπίπτουσαν εοικέναι <i>τῷ Κύκλωπι</i> μετὰ τὴν <i>τύφλωσιν</i> ἐκτείνοντι πανταχοῖ τὰς χεῖρας ἐπ' οὐδένα σκοπὸν φερομένας· οὕτως ἐρρέμβετο κενεμβατοῦν καὶ σφαλλόμενον ὑπ' ἀναρχίας τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῆς. <i>De Al. Magn. fort. 336EF</i></p>

<p>A Πρὸς δὲ τὸν υἱὸν Φίλιππον πυθόμενον πλειόνων παρόντων ‘πότε μέλλομεν ἀναξενγνύναι;’ ‘τί δέδοκας;’ εἶπε ‘μὴ μόνος τῆς σάλπιγγος οὐκ ἀκούσης;’ Antigonus Monophthalmus IV (182B) X>ABC</p>	<p>B λέγεται γοῦν μεираκίον ἔτι ὄντα τὸν Δημήτριον αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, πότε μέλλουσιν ἀναξενγνύειν· τὸν δ’ εἶπεν πρὸς ὀργήν· “ἀγωνίᾳς μὴ μόνος σὺ τῆς σάλπιγγος οὐκ ἀκούσης;” Demetr. 28.10 C Ἀντίγονος γοῦν ὁ βασιλεὺς [ἐκεῖνος] ἐρωτήσαντος αὐτὸν τοῦ υἱοῦ πηνικά μέλλουσιν ἀναξενγνύειν ‘τί δέδοκας;’ εἶπε ‘μὴ μόνος οὐκ ἀκούσης τῆς σάλπιγγος;’ De gar. 506CD</p>
<p>A Μέλλων δὲ ναυμαχεῖν πρὸς τοὺς Πτολεμαίου στρατηγούς, εἰπόντος τοῦ κυβερνήτου πολὴ πλείονας εἶναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῶς, ‘ἐμὲ δέ’ ἔφη ‘αὐτὸν παρόντα πρὸς πόσας ἀντιτάτεις;’ Antigonus Secundus II (183CD) X>ABC or B>AC</p>	<p>B βέλτιον δ’ Ἀντίγονος ὁ γέρων, ὅτε ναυμαχεῖν περὶ Ἄνδρον ἐμελλεν, εἰπόντος τινὸς ὡς πολὴ πλείους αἱ τῶν πολεμίων νῆες εἶεν, “ἐμὲ δ’ αὐτὸν” ἔφη “πρὸς πόσας ἀντιστήσεις;” Pel. 2.4 C καὶ Ἀντίγονος ὁ δεῦτερος τᾶλλα μὲν ἦν ἄτυφος καὶ μέτριος, ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ Κῶ ναυμαχίᾳ τῶν φίλων τινὸς εἰπόντος ‘οὐχ ὄρας, ὅσῳ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πολέμια νῆες;’ De se ipsum laud. 545B</p>
<p>A Λυσιμαχος ἐν Θράκῃ κρατηθεὶς ὑπὸ Δρομηαίτου καὶ διὰ δίψαν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὸ στράτευμα παραδούς ὡς ἔπιεν αἰχμάλωτος γενόμενος, ὃ θεοῖ’ εἶπεν ‘ὡς μικρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα δοῦλον ἑμαυτὸν ἐκ βασιλέως πεποίηκα.’ Lysimachus I (183DE) X>ABC</p>	<p>B ἀλλ’ ὅσπερ ὁ Λυσιμαχος ἐν Γέταις συσχεθεὶς δίψῃ καὶ παραδόντα τοῖς Γέταις μετὰ τοῦ στρατεύματος αἰχμάλωτον εἶτα πῶν ὕδαρ ψυχρόν ‘ὃ θεοί’ εἶπεν, ‘ὡς βραχείας ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα μεγάλην εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπεβαλόμην’ De tuenda 126E C οἷον ἱστοροῦσι δῆπου Λυσιμαχὸν ὑπὸ δίψης ἐκβιασθέντα καὶ παραδόντα τοῖς Γέταις τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ὡς ἔπιεν ὑποχείριος γενόμενος, εἶπεν ‘φεῦ τῆς ἐμῆς κακίας, ὅς δι’ ἡδονὴν οὕτω βραχεῖαν ἐστέρημαι βασιλείας τηλικαύτης.’ De sera num. 555DE</p>
<p>A Πρὸς δὲ Φιλιππίδην τὸν κομφοδοπιὸν φίλον ὄντα καὶ συνήθη ‘τίνος σοι’ εἶπε ‘τῶν ἐμῶν μεταδῶ;’ κάκεῖνος ‘οὐ βούλει πλὴν τῶν ἀπορρήτων.’ Lysimachus II (183E) The absence of φιλοφρονουμένου in A and D seems coincidental. The variation οὐ βούλει (A and C) – ὃ βασιλεῦ (D and B) could be coincidental as well. X>ABCD would then still be possible, unless one assumes that there are two groups.</p>	<p>B φιλοφρονουμένου δὲ ποτε τοῦ Λυσιμάχου πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ εἰπόντος “ὃ Φιλιππίδη, τίνος σοι τῶν ἐμῶν μεταδῶ;” “μόνον” ἔφη “βασιλεῦ μὴ τῶν ἀπορρήτων”. Demetr. 12.9 C Ὁρθῶς οὖν Φιλιππίδης ὁ κομφοδιοπιὸς φιλοφρονουμένου τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτὸν Λυσιμάχου καὶ λέγοντος ‘τίνος σοι μεταδῶ τῶν ἐμῶν;’ ‘οὐ βούλει’ φησί, ‘βασιλεῦ, πλὴν τῶν ἀπορρήτων.’ De gar. 508C D διὸ καλῶς Φιλιππίδης ὁ κομφοδιοπιὸς εἰπόντος αὐτῷ ποτε Λυσιμάχου τοῦ βασιλέως ‘τίνος σοι τῶν ἐμῶν μεταδῶ;’ ‘μόνον’ εἶπεν, ‘ὃ βασιλεῦ, μὴ τῶν ἀπορρήτων.’ De cur. 517B</p>

<p>A Δημάδου δὲ τοῦ ῥήτορος ἤδη πρεσβύτου γεγονότος ἔφη <i>καθάπερ ἱερείου διαπεπραγμένου καταλείπεσθαι μόνην</i> τὴν γαστέρα καὶ τὴν γλῶτταν. Antipater II (183EF) X>ABC or B>AC</p>	<p>B Δημάδης μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν ναυάγιον τῆς πόλεως, οὕτως ἀσελγῶς βιώσας καὶ πολιτευσάμενος, ὥστ' Ἀντίπατρον εἶπεν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γέροντος ἤδη γεγονότος, ὅτι <i>καθάπερ ἱερείου διαπεπραγμένου γλῶσσα καὶ <u>κοιλία</u> μόνον ἀπολείπεται.</i> Phoc. 1.3 C καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' Ἀντίπατρος εἶπε θεασάμενος αὐτὸν γέροντα <i>‘καθάπερ ἱερείου διαπεπραγμένου μηδὲν ἔτι λοιπὸν ἢ τὴν γλῶσσαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν <u>κοιλίαν</u>’</i> De sup. div. 525C</p>
<p>A <i>Θεμιστοκλῆς</i> ἔτι μειράκιον ὦν ἐν πότοις ἐκυλινδεῖτο καὶ γυναιξίν· ἐπεὶ δὲ Μιλτιάδης στρατηγῶν ἐνίκησεν ἐν Μαραθῶνι τοὺς βαρβάρους, οὐκέτι ἦν ἐντυχεῖν ἀτακτοῦντι Θεμιστοκλεῖ· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς θαυμάζοντας τὴν μεταβολὴν ἔλεγεν ὡς <i>‘οὐκ ἔῃ με καθεύδειν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν τὸ Μιλτιάδου τρόποιον.’</i> Themistocles I (184F–185A) I did not include <i>De sera num.</i> 552B, since this is only a reference to the first part of <i>Themistocles I</i>. The part on Themistocles' μεταβολή was probably part of X, for it occurs in A, B, and F (the reference to πτότων) and might have been left out of the other accounts. X>ABCDEF</p>	<p>B ὥστε νέος ὦν ἔτι, τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχης πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους γενομένης καὶ τῆς Μιλτιάδου στρατηγίας διαβοηθείσης, σύννουσ ὀρᾶσθαι τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὰς νύκτας ἀγρυπνεῖν καὶ τοὺς πότους παραιτεῖσθαι τοὺς συνήθεις, καὶ <i>λέγειν</i> πρὸς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας καὶ θαυμάζοντας τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον μεταβολὴν, ὡς <i>καθεύδειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔφη τὸ Μιλτιάδου τρόποιον.</i> Them. 3.4 C πεπονθῶς ὅπερ ὕστερον χρόνοις πολλοῖς <i>Θεμιστοκλῆς</i> ἔπαθε καὶ <i>εἶπεν</i>, ὡς <i>καθεύδειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔφη τὸ Μιλτιάδου τρόποιον.</i> Thes. 6.9 D ἐπεὶ πάντας γ' Ἀθηναίους εἰκόσ ἦν ἐπαινεῖν τὴν Μιλτιάδου τόλμαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν, <i>Θεμιστοκλῆς</i> δ' <i>εἰπὼν</i> ὡς <i>οὐκ ἔῃ καθεύδειν αὐτὸν</i> ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἀνίστησι τὸ Μιλτιάδου τρόποιον, οὐκ ἐπαινῶν μόνον καὶ θαυμάζων ἀλλὰ καὶ ζηλῶν καὶ μιμούμενος εὐθὺς ἦν καταφανής. De prof. in virt. 84BC E ὡς <i>Θεμιστοκλῆς</i> ἔλεγεν <i>οὐκ ἔῃν αὐτὸν καθεύδειν τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι Μιλτιάδου νίκην.</i> De cap. ex inim. 92C F ὅτι καὶ <i>Θεμιστοκλῆς</i> ἄπτεσθαι τῆς πολιτείας διανοοῦμενος ἀπέστησε τῶν πότων καὶ τῶν κώμων ἑαυτόν, ἀγρυπνῶν δὲ καὶ νήφων καὶ πεφροντικῶς ἔλεγε πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις, ὡς <i>οὐκ ἔῃ καθεύδειν αὐτὸν τὸ Μιλτιάδου τρόποιον.</i> Praec. ger. reip. 800C</p>

<p>A Ξέρξου δὲ καταβαίνοντος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τῷ μεγάλῳ στόλῳ, φοβηθεὶς Ἐπικύδην τὸν δημαγωγὸν αἰσχροκερδῆ καὶ δειλὸν ὄντα, μὴ στρατηγὸς γενόμενος ἀπολέσῃ τὴν πόλιν, ἔπεισεν ἀργυρίῳ τῆς στρατηγίας ἀποστήναι. Themistocles III (185A) X>ABC</p>	<p>B Ἦδη δὲ τοῦ Μήδου καταβαίνοντος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βουλευομένων περὶ στρατηγοῦ, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐκόντας ἐκστῆναι τῆς στρατηγίας λέγουσιν ἐκπεπληγμένους τὸν κίνδυνον, Ἐπικύδην δὲ τὸν Εὐφημίδου, δημαγωγὸν ὄντα δεινὸν μὲν εἰπεῖν, μαλακὸν δὲ τῆ ψυχῇ καὶ χρημάτων ἥττονα, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐφίεσθαι καὶ κρατήσιν ἐπίδοξον εἶναι τῆ χειροτονία. Them. 6.1 C καίτοι ὁ γε Θεμιστοκλῆς, ἵνα μὴ φαῦλος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τοῖς Περσικοῖς καὶ ἄφρων στρατηγῆσας ἀπολέσῃ τὴν πόλιν, ἀργυρίῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπέστησεν αὐτόν. Comp. Nic. et Crass. 3.4</p>
<p>A Πρὸς δὲ Σιμωνίδην ἐξαιτούμενόν τινα κρίσιν οὐ δικαίαν ἔφη μὴτ' ἂν ἐκείνον γενέσθαι ποιητὴν ἀγαθὸν ἄδοντα παρὰ μέλος, μὴτ' αὐτὸν ἄρχοντα χρηστὸν δικάζοντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Themistocles IX (185CD) X>ABCD</p>	<p>B ὡς που καὶ πρὸς Σιμωνίδην τὸν Κεῖον εἰπεῖν, αἰτούμενόν τι τῶν οὐ μετριῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ στρατηγούντος, ὡς οὐτ' ἐκείνος ἂν γένετο ποιητῆς ἀγαθοῦ ἄδων παρὰ μέλος, οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἀστεῖος ἄρχων παρὰ νόμον χαριζόμενος. Them. 5.6 C ὁ δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς πρὸς τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἀξιούντᾳ τι τῶν μὴ δικαίων 'οὐτ' ἂν σὺ ποιητῆς ἀγαθοῦ εἴης' ἔφη 'παρὰ μέλος ἄδων, οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ χρηστὸς ἄρχων παρὰ νόμον κρίνων.' De vit. pud. 534E D καίτοι πρὸς γε Σιμωνίδην ἀξιούντᾳ τι τῶν μὴ δικαίων 'οὔτε ποιητῆς' ἔφη 'σπουδαῖός ἐστιν ἄδων παρὰ μέλος οὐτ' ἄρχων ἐπιεικῆς παρὰ τὸν νόμον χαριζόμενος'. Praec. ger. reip. 807B</p>
<p>A Τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἐντροφῶντα τῇ μητρὶ πλείστον Ἑλλήνων ἔλεγε δύνασθαι τῶν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων ἄρχειν Ἀθηναίους, Ἀθηναίων δ' ἑαυτόν, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μητέρα, τῆς δὲ μητρὸς ἐκείνου. Themistocles X (185D) X>ABC</p>	<p>B Τὸν δ' υἱὸν ἐντροφῶντα τῇ μητρὶ καὶ δι' ἐκείνην ἑαυτῷ σκόπτων ἔλεγε πλείστον τῶν Ἑλλήνων δύνασθαι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλησιν ἐπιτάσσειν Ἀθηναίους, Ἀθηναίους δ' ἑαυτόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μητέρα, τῇ μητρὶ δ' ἐκείνου. Them. 18.7 C τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν Θεμιστοκλέους μετενηγεμένον ἀποφθεγμάτων. ἐκείνος γὰρ ἐπιτάττοντος αὐτῷ πολλὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ διὰ τῆς μητρὸς, 'ὄ γύναι' εἶπεν, 'Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ἄρχουσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐγὼ δ' Ἀθηναίων, ἐμοῦ δὲ σὺ, σοῦ δ' ὁ υἱός, ὥστε φειδέσθω τῆς ἐξουσίας, δι' ἣν ἀνόητος ὢν πλείστον Ἑλλήνων δύναται.' Ca. Ma. 8.4-5 [D De lib. educ. 1C: Pseudo-Plutarch?]</p>

<p>A Τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων αὐτὸν προφητικακίζόντων ‘τί κοπιᾶτε’ εἶπεν ‘ὕπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλὰκις εὐχρηστούμενοι;’ καὶ ταῖς πλατάνοις ἀπεικάζεν αὐτόν, αἷς ὑποτρέγουσι χειμαζόμενοι, γενομένης δ’ εὐδίας τίλλουσι παρερχόμενοι καὶ κολούουσιν. Themistocles XIII (185DE) X>ABCD</p>	<p>B1 Ἐλεγε δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐ τιμᾶν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ πλατάνῳ χειμαζομένους μὲν ὑποτρέχειν [κινδυνεύοντας], εὐδίας δὲ περὶ αὐτοὺς γενομένης τίλλειν καὶ κολούειν. Them. 18.4 B2 καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας ‘τί κοπιᾶτε’ εἶπεν ‘ὕπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλὰκις εὐ πάσχοντες;’ Them. 22.1 C ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων εἰπὼν οὐδὲ ποιήσας ἐπαχθές, ὀπηνίκα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εὔρα μεστοὺς ὄντας αὐτοῦ καὶ περιορῶντας, οὐκ ἐφείδeto λέγειν ‘τί, ὦ μακάριοι, κοπιᾶτε πολλὰκις ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εὐ πάσχοντες;’ καὶ ὅτι ‘χειμαζόμενοι μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δένδρον ὑποφεύγετε, γενομένης δ’ εὐδίας τίλλετε παρεξιόντες.’ De se ipsum laud. 541DE D ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς τοιοῦτου τινὸς ἀπαντῶντος αὐτῷ παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰπεῖν ‘τί, ὦ μακάριοι, κοπιᾶτε πολλὰκις εὐ πάσχοντες;’ Praec. ger. reip. 812B</p>
<p>A Πολλῶν δὲ δωρεῶν ἀξιωθείς καὶ ταχῶς πλούσιος γενόμενος πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας εἶπεν ‘ὦ παῖδες, ἀπολώμεθ’ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἀπολώμεθα.’ Themistocles XVII (185F) X>ABCD</p>	<p>B αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα φασὶν ἦδη μέγαν ὄντα καὶ θεραπευόμενον ὑπὸ πολλῶν, λαμπρᾶς ποτε τραπέζης αὐτῷ παρατεθείσης, πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας εἰπεῖν: ‘ὦ παῖδες, ἀπολώμεθα ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἀπολώμεθα.’ Them. 29.10 C ὡσθ’ ὅπερ εἶπε Θεμιστοκλῆς, ὀπηνίκα φυγῶν ἔτυχε δωρεῶν μεγάλων παρὰ βασιλέως καὶ τρεῖς πόλεις ὑποφόρους ἔλαβε, τὴν μὲν εἰς σίτον τὴν δ’ εἰς οἶνον τὴν δ’ εἰς ὄνον, ‘ὦ παῖδες, ἀπολώμεθ’ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἀπολώμεθα.’ De Al. Magn. fort. 328EF D Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ χορηγία βασιλικῆ πρυτανευόμενος εἶπεν λέγεται πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ‘ἀπολώμεθ’ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἀπολώμεθα.’ De exilio 602A</p>
<p>A Περικλῆς, ὁπότε μέλλοι στρατηγεῖν, ἀναλαμβάνων τὴν χλαμύδα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγε ‘πρόσεχε, Περικλείς, ἐλευθέρων μέλλεις ἄρχειν καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Ἀθηναίων.’ Pericles I (186C) X>ABC</p>	<p>B ὁ μὲν οὖν Περικλῆς, ὁσάκις ἡρημένος στρατηγὸς ἀναλαμβάνοι τὴν χλαμύδα, πρῶτον εἰώθει διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ὑπομνήσκων ‘ὄρα, Περικλείς· ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις, Ἑλλήνων ἄρχεις, Ἀθηναίων ἄρχεις’. Quaest. conv. 620CD C εἰσιόντα δ’ εἰς ἄπασαν ἀρχὴν οὐ μόνον ἐκείνους δεῖ προχειρίζεσθαι τοὺς λογισμοὺς, οἷς ὁ Περικλῆς αὐτὸν ὑπεμνήσκεν ἀναλαμβάνων τὴν χλαμύδα ‘πρόσεχε, Περικλείς· ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις, Ἑλλήνων ἄρχεις, πολιτῶν Ἀθηναίων.’ Praec. ger. reip. 813D</p>

<p>A <i>Ἐκέλευσε δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν Αἴγινα ὥσπερ λήμην ἀφαιρεῖν τοῦ Πειραιῶς.</i> Pericles II (186C) D is only a short reference to the anecdote. X>ABC or B>AC or C>AB</p>	<p>B ἀπομνημονεύεται δ' ὀλίγα παντάπασιν, οἶον τὸ <i>τὴν Αἴγινα ὡς λήμην τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀφελεῖν</i> κελεύσαι Per. 8.7 C καὶ <i>τὴν Αἴγινα</i>, ἦν τῶν Ἀττικῶν τις ἐκέλευεν <i>ὡς λήμην τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀφελεῖν</i>, Dem. 1.2 D καὶ Περικλῆς <i>τὴν λήμην τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀφελεῖν</i> κελεύων Praec. ger. reip. 803A</p>
<p>A Πρὸς δὲ φίλον τιῶν <i>μαρτυρίας ψευδοῦς δεόμενον, ἧ προσῆν καὶ ὄρκος</i>, ἔφησε <i>μέχρι τοῦ βομοῦ φίλος εἶναι.</i> Pericles III (186C) C is only a short reference to the anecdote.</p>	<p>B ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦ Περικλέους ἀποδέχομαι πρὸς τὸν ἀξιούοντα <i>μαρτυρίαν ψευδῆ</i> μαρτυρῆσαι φίλον, <i>ἧ προσῆν καὶ ὄρκος</i>, εἰπόντος <i>‘μέχρι τοῦ βομοῦ φίλος εἰμί’</i>. λίαν γὰρ ἐγγὺς ἦλθεν. De vit. pud. 531CD C δεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἄχρι <i>τοῦ βομοῦ φίλον εἶναι</i> τῷ μὴ συνεπιορκεῖν, ὡς ποτε Περικλῆς εἶπεν Praec. ger. reip. 808AB</p>
<p>A Μέλλων δ' ἀποθνήσκειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐμακάριζεν ὅτι <i>μηδεὶς Ἀθηναίων μέλαν ἰμάτιον δι' αὐτὸν ἐνεδύσατο.</i> Pericles IV (186C) X>ABC or B>AC or C>AB</p>	<p>C ταῦθ' ὡς οὐκέτι συνιέντος, ἀλλὰ καθηρημένον τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ, διελέγοντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους· ὁ δὲ πᾶσιν ἐτύγχανε τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκῶς, καὶ φθεγγόμενος εἰς μέσον ἔφη θαυμάζειν ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ μνημονεύουσιν, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τύχης ἐστὶ <i>κοινὰ</i> καὶ γέγονεν ἤδη πολλοῖς στρατηγοῖς, τὸ δὲ κάλλιστον καὶ μέγιστον οὐ λέγουσιν. “<i>οὐδεὶς γάρ</i>” ἔφη “<i>δι' ἐμέ τῶν πολιτῶν [Ἀθηναίων] μέλαν ἰμάτιον περιεβάλετο.</i>” Per. 38.4</p>
<p>A Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔτι παῖς ὦν ἐλήφθη λαβὴν ἐν παλαιστρα· καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος διαφυγεῖν <i>ἔδακε τὴν χεῖρα</i> τοῦ καταπαλαίοντος· <i>εἰπόντος δ' ἐκείνου ‘δάκνεις ὡς αἰ γυναῖκες’, ‘οὐ μὲν οὖν’ εἶπεν ‘ἀλλ’ ὡς οἱ λέοντες.’</i> Alcibiades I (186D)</p>	<p>B ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ παλαίῳ πιεζόμενος, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ πεσεῖν ἀναγαγὼν πρὸς τὸ στόμα τὰ ἄμματα τοῦ πιεζούντος οἷος ἦν διαφυγεῖν τὰς <i>χεῖρας</i>. ἀφέντος οὖν τὴν λαβὴν <i>ἐκείνου καὶ εἰπόντος</i>: “<i>δάκνεις ὧς Ἀλκιβιάδης καθάπερ αἰ γυναῖκες</i>”, “οὐκ ἔγωγε” εἶπεν, “<i>ἀλλ’ ὡς οἱ λέοντες.</i>” Alc. 2.2–3</p>

<p>C tells the same anecdote about an unknown Spartan. X>AB</p>	<p>C Ἐν χειραγία περικρούοντος τοῦ προστραχηλίζοντος κενοσπούδως καὶ κατασπῶντος ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ἐπειδὴ τῷ σώματι ἐλείπετο ὁ προσπεσών, ἔδακε τὸν βραχίονα· καὶ ὁ ἕτερος εἶπε ‘<i>δάκνεις, ὦ Λάκων, ὥσπερ αἱ γυναῖκες</i>·’ ‘οὐ μὲν οὖν’ εἶπεν ἄτερος, ‘<i>ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ λέοντες</i>.’ Aporrhth. Lac. 234E</p>
<p>A Ῥήτορος δὲ τινος ἐπερωτῶντος αὐτὸν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ‘<i>τίς ὢν μέγα φρονεῖς; πότερον ἰππεύς ἢ ὀπλίτης ἢ τοξότης ἢ πελταστής;</i>’ ‘οὐδείς’ ἔφη ‘τούτων, ἀλλ’ ὁ πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπιστάμενος ἐπιτάττειν.’ Iphicrates VI (187B) X>ABC is the most plausible option</p>	<p>B Ἡρώτα τις Ἴφικράτην τὸν στρατηγόν, ὥσπερ ἐξελέγchon, <i>τίς ἐστίν;</i> ‘οὔτε γὰρ ὀπλίτης οὔτε τοξότης οὔτε πελταστής’. κάκεινος ‘<i>ὁ τούτοις</i>’ ἔφη ‘<i>πᾶσιν ἐπιτάττων</i> καὶ χρώμενος’. De fortuna 99E C καίτοι γ’ ὁ στρατηγὸς Ἴφικράτης πρὸς τὸν Χαβρίου Καλλίαν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ λέγοντα ‘<i>τίς εἶ; τοξότης; πελταστής; ἰππεύς; ὀπλίτης;</i>’ ‘οὐδείς’ ἔφη ‘τούτων ἀλλὰ τούτοις πᾶσιν ὁ ἐπιτάττων.’ An virt. doc. 440B</p>
<p>A <i>Τιμόθεος</i> εὐτυχῆς ἐνομιζέτο στρατηγὸς εἶναι, καὶ φθονοῦντες αὐτῷ τινες <i>ἔξωγράφουν τὰς πόλεις εἰς κύρτον</i> αὐτομάτως <i>ἐκείνου καθεύδοντος ἐνδουμένας</i>; ἔλεγεν οὖν ὁ Τιμόθεος ‘<i>εἰ τηλικαύτας πόλεις λαμβάνω καθεύδων, τί με οἴεσθε ποιήσιν ἐγρηγορότα;</i>’ Timotheus I (187BC) X>ABC or C>AB</p>	<p>B ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔπαθε ταῦτο <i>Τιμοθέω</i> τῷ τοῦ Κόνωνος, ὅς, εἰς τὴν Τύχην αὐτοῦ τὰ κατορθώματα <i>τῶν ἐχθρῶν</i> τιθεμένων, καὶ <i>γραφόντων ἐν πίναξι</i> κοιμώμενον <i>ἐκείνου</i>, τὴν δὲ Τύχην δικτύῳ <i>τὰς πόλεις</i> περιβάλλουσαν Sull. 6.5 C ὡς <i>Τιμόθεον οἱ ἐχθροί, γραφόντες <ἐν> πίναξιν εἰς κύρτον</i> τινὰ <i>τὰς πόλεις</i> αὐτάς, <i>ἐκείνου καθεύδοντος, ὑποδουμένας</i>. De Her. mal. 856B</p>
<p>A Πρὸς δὲ <i>θυσίαν τινὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἰτούντων ἐπιδόσεις</i> καὶ <i>τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιδιδόντων, κληθεὶς πολλάκις</i> ‘<i>αἰσχρνοίμη ἄν</i>’ εἶπεν ‘<i>ὑμῖν μὲν ἐπιδιδούς, τούτω δὲ μὴ ἀποδιδούς</i>’, ἅμα <i>δεικνύων τὸν δανειστήν</i>. Phocion V (188A) X>ABCD, but A seems closer to B</p>	<p>B Πρὸς δὲ <i>θυσίαν τινὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἰτούντων ἐπιδόσεις, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιδιδόντων, κληθεὶς πολλάκις</i> ἔφη· “τούτους αἰτεῖτε τοὺς πλουσίους· ἐγὼ δ’ <i>αἰσχρνοίμη ἄν, εἰ τούτω μὴ ἀποδιδούς ὑμῖν ἐπι<δι>δοῖν</i>”, <i>δείξας Καλλικλέα</i> τὸν δανειστήν. Phoc. 9.1 C καὶ <i>πρὸς</i> τοὺς Ἀθηναίους <i>ἐπιδουῖναι</i> κελεύοντας <i>αὐτὸν ἐν</i> ἐορτῇ καὶ <i>κροτούντας</i> ‘<i>αἰσχρνοίμη</i>’ εἶπεν ‘<i>ὑμῖν μὲν ἐπιδιδούς τούτω δὲ μὴ ἀποδιδούς</i>’ <i>Καλλικλέα</i> <i>δείξας</i> τὸν δανειστήν. De vit. pud. 533A D οὗτος μὲν γάρ, ἀξιούντων <i>αὐτὸν ἐν θυσίᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιδουῖναι</i> καὶ <i>κροτούντων</i> <i>πολλάκις</i> ‘<i>αἰσχρνοίμη ἄν</i>’ εἶπεν ‘<i>ὑμῖν μὲν ἐπιδιδούς Καλλικλεῖ</i> <i>δὲ τούτω μὴ ἀποδιδούς</i>’, <i>δείξας</i> τὸν δανειστήν Praec. ger. reip. 822DE</p>

<p>A Δημοσθένους δὲ τοῦ ρήτορος εἰπόντος ‘ἀποκτενοῦσί σε Ἀθηναῖοι’ ‘ἐὰν μανῶσιν [, νῆ Δία]’, εἶπε, ‘σὲ δ’ ἐὰν σωφρονῶσιν.’ Phocion VI (188A) X>ABC or A>BC or B>AC</p>	<p>B τῶν δ’ ἀντιπολιτευομένων αὐτῶ ρήτορον, Δημοσθένους μὲν εἰπόντος “ἀποκτενοῦσί σ’ Ἀθηναῖοι,” Φωκίων· “ἂν μανῶσιν”, εἶπε: “σὲ δ’ ἂν σωφρον<ήσ>ωσι.” Phoc. 9.8 C χαριέντως δὲ καὶ ὁ Φωκίων, τοῦ Δημάδου κεκραγῶτος ‘Ἀθηναῖοι σε ἀποκτενοῦσιν.’ ‘ἂν γε μανῶσιν’ ἔφη, ‘σὲ δέ, ἂν σωφρονῶσι’. Praec. ger. reip. 811A</p>
<p>A Λόγου δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτῆς ἐμπεσόντος ἀδεσπότηου καὶ τῶν ρήτορων ἀναπηδώντων εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ μὴ μέλλειν ἀλλὰ πολεμεῖν ἤδη κελευδόντων ὁ Φωκίων ἠξίου περιμεῖναι καὶ γῶναι βεβαίως. ‘εἰ γὰρ τήμερον’ ἔφη ‘τέθνηκε, καὶ αὔριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην τεθνηκώς.’ Phocion XI (188CD) X>ABC</p>	<p>B ἀναπηδώντων δὲ πολλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ βοώντων ἀληθῆ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ τεθνάναι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, “οὐκοῦν” εἶπεν “εἰ σήμερον τέθνηκε, καὶ αὔριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην τεθνηκώς, ὥσθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡσυχία βουλευσασθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ μετ’ ἀσφαλείας.” Phoc. 22.6 C ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ Φωκίων μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτήν οὐκ ἐὼν προεξανίστασθαι τοῦς Ἀθηναίους οὐδὲ ταχὺ πιστεύειν, ‘εἰ σήμερον’ εἶπεν, ‘ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τέθνηκε, καὶ αὔριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην τεθνηκώς.’ De coh. ira 459EF</p>
<p>A Ἄξιοντος δ’ Ἀντιπάτρου ποιησαί τι τῶν μὴ δικαίων αὐτόν ‘οὐ δύνασαι,’ εἶπεν, ‘Ἀντίπατρε, καὶ φίλω Φωκίῳν χρῆσθαι καὶ κόλακι.’ Phocion XVI (188F) C and E are only short references to the story (which only contain the saying) X>ACDE</p>	<p>A Ἀντιπάρτῳ δὲ τραχύτερον ἀπεκρίνατο, βουλομένῳ τι γενέσθαι δι’ αὐτοῦ τῶν μὴ πρεπόντων. “οὐ δύναται” γὰρ εἶπεν “Ἀντίπατρος ἅμα μοι καὶ φίλω καὶ κόλακι χρῆσθαι.” Phoc. 30.3 B ὅπερ οὖν Φωκίων πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ἄξιούντᾱ τι παρ’ αὐτοῦ τῶν μὴ καλῶν “οὐ δύνασαι” εἶπεν “ἅμα καὶ φίλω Φωκίῳν χρῆσθαι καὶ κόλακι” Agis 2.4 C καλὸν τὸ Φωκίῳνος πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ‘οὐ δύνασαι μοι καὶ φίλω χρῆσθαι καὶ κόλακι’ De ad. et am. 64C D καὶ καθάπερ ὁ Φωκίων, τοῦ Ἀντιπάρτου πρᾶξιν αὐτῷ προστάττοντος οὐ καλὴν οὐδὲ πρέπουσαν, εἶπεν ‘οὐ δύνασαι μοι καὶ φίλω χρῆσθαι καὶ κόλακι’ Con. praec. 142BC E οἷον τὸ Φωκίῳνος πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ‘οὐ δύνασαι μοι καὶ φίλω χρῆσθαι καὶ κόλακι.’ De vit. pud. 532F–533A</p>
<p>A Τῶν δὲ μελλόντων συναποθνήσκειν ἐνὸς ὄδυρομένου καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντος ‘οὐκ ἀγαπᾶς,’ εἶπεν, ‘ὦ Θοῦδιππε, μετὰ Φωκίῳνος ἀποθανούμενος;’ Phocion XVIII (189A) X>ABC or A>BC</p>	<p>B ἐπεὶ δὲ Θοῦδιππος ἐν τῷ δεσποτηρίῳ γενόμενος, καὶ τὸ κόνειον ὀρῶν τριβόμενος, ἠγανάκτει καὶ κατέκλειε τὴν συμφορὰν, ὡς οὐ προσηκόντως τῷ Φωκίῳνι συναπολλύμενος, “εἶτ’ οὐκ ἀγαπᾶς” εἶπεν “ὅτι μετὰ Φωκίῳνος ἀποθνήσκεις;” Phoc. 36.3</p>

	<p>C καὶ Φωκίων τάλλα πρᾶος ἦν, μετὰ δὲ τὴν καταδίκεν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς διεδείκνυε τὴν μεγαλοφροσύνην, καὶ πρὸς ἓνα τῶν συναποθνησκόντων ὀδυρόμενον καὶ δυσανασχετοῦντα ‘τί λέγεις’ εἶπεν ‘οὗτος; οὐκ ἀγαπᾷς ἀποθνήσκων μετὰ Φωκίανος;’ De se ipsum laud. 541C</p>
<p>A Λυκούργος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος εἶθισε τοὺς πολίτας κομᾶν λέγων ὄτι τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς ἢ κόμη εὐπρεπεστέρους ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ αἰσχρὸς φοβερωτέρους. Lycurgus I (189DE) D>ABC</p>	<p>B διὸ κομῶντες εὐθὺς ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐφήβων ἡλικίας, μάλιστα παρὰ τοὺς κινδύνους ἐθεράπευον τὴν κόμην, λιπαράν τε φαίνεσθαι καὶ διακεκριμένην, <u>ἀπομνημονεύοντές τινα καὶ Λυκούργου λόγον περὶ τῆς κόμης, ὄτι</u> τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς εὐπρεπεστέρους ποιεῖ, τοὺς δ’ αἰσχρὸς φοβερωτέρους. Lyc. 22.2 C ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο Λυκούργειόν ἐστι· καὶ φασιν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἡ κόμη τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς εὐπρεπεστέρους ὀραῖσθαι ποιεῖ, τοὺς δ’ αἰσχρὸς φοβερωτέρους. Lys. 1.2–3 D Ἐπεμέλοντο δὲ οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται καὶ τῆς κόμης, <u>ἀπομνημονεύοντές τινα Λυκούργου λόγον περὶ τούτου, ὄτι</u> τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς ἢ κόμη εὐπρεπεστέρους ποιεῖ, τοὺς δ’ αἰσχρὸς φοβερωτέρους. Aporphth. Lac. 228E</p>
<p>A Πρὸς δὲ τὸν κελεύοντα ποιεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει δημοκρατίαν ‘σὺ πρῶτος’ εἶπεν ‘ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ σου ποίησον δημοκρατίαν.’ Lycurgus II (189E) The variation κελεύοντα – ἀξιούντα is insignificant. D>ABC, but A might seem closer to B (ποιεῖν)</p>	<p>B οἷόν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας πρὸς τὸν <u>ἀξιούντα ποιεῖν</u> δημοκρατίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει· “σὺ γάρ” ἔφη “πρῶτος ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ σου ποίησον δημοκρατίαν.” Lyc. 19.7 C εἶτα προσεπεῖπεν ὅτι καὶ Λυκούργος πρὸς τὸν κελεύοντα δημοκρατίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει <u>καταστήσαι</u> ‘πρῶτος’ ἔφη ‘ποίησον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ σου δημοκρατίαν’ Sept. sap. conv. 155DE D Πρὸς δὲ τὸν <u>ἀξιούντα</u> δημοκρατίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει <u>καταστήσασθαι</u> ὁ Λυκούργος ‘σὺ πρῶτος’ ἔφη ‘ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ σου ποίησον δημοκρατίαν.’ Aporphth. Lac. 228C</p>
<p>A Ἐκέλευε δὲ τὰς οἰκίας ποιεῖν ἀπὸ πρίονος καὶ πελέκεως μόνον· αἰσχυνεῖσθαι γὰρ εἰς οἰκίας λιτὰς ἐκπώματα καὶ στρώματα καὶ τραπέζας πολυτελεῖς εἰσφέροντας. Lycurgus III (189E) C>AB seems the most plausible option.</p>	<p>B ἑτέρα δὲ πάλιν κατὰ τῆς πολυτελείας, ὅπως οἰκία πᾶσα τὴν μὲν ὄροφὴν ἀπὸ πελέκεως εἰργασμένην ἔχη, τὰς δὲ θύρας ἀπὸ πρίονος μόνου καὶ μηδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἐργαλείων. Lyc. 13.5</p>

	<p>C Πάλιν δ' ἐπιζητούντων τινῶν, διὰ τί ὀροφὴν ἀπὸ πελέκεως ταῖς οἰκίαις ἐπιτιθέναι προσέταξε, θύραν δ' ἀπὸ πρίονος μόνου καὶ μηδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἐργαλείων, ὅπως ἂν' ἔφη 'μετριάζωσιν οἱ πολῖται περὶ πάντα, ὅσα εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν εἰσάγουσι, καὶ μηδὲν τῶν παρ' ἄλλοις ζηλουμένων ἔχωσιν.' <i>Aporphth. Lac. 227BC</i></p>
<p>A Πυγμαῖον δὲ καὶ παγκράτιον ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἐκόλυσεν, ἵνα μηδὲ παίζοντες ἀπαυδᾶν ἐθίζονται. <i>Lycurgus IV (189E)</i> C>AB (forms of κολύω are not a significant similarity)</p>	<p>B καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀθλημάτων, ταῦτα μόνῃ κολύσαντος ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοὺς πολῖτας ἐν οἷς χεῖρ οὐκ ἀνατείνεται. <i>Lyc. 19.9</i> C Μόνῃ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ἀθλημάτων ἐφέντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς πολῖτας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὅπου ἡ χεῖρ οὐκ ἀνατείνεται, ἐπύθετό τις τὴν αἰτίαν· ὁ δὲ ὅπως' εἶπε 'μηδεὶς αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πονεῖν ἀπαυδᾶν ἐθίζεται.' <i>Aporphth. Lac. 228D</i></p>
<p>A Στρατεύειν δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐκόλυσεν, ὅπως μὴ ποιῶσι μαχιμότερους, ὕστερον γοῦν τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου τρωθέντος ὁ Ἀνταλκίδα παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐθίσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα πολεμεῖν ἄκοντας. <i>Lycurgus V (189EF)</i> This apophthegm contains a first saying of Lycurgus and a second story on Agesilaus. A combination of E (from the Agesilaus section of <i>Aporphth. Lac.</i>) and G (from the Lycurgus section of <i>Aporphth. Lac.</i>) seems to have been the basis of A and B.</p>	<p>B Τρίτην δὲ ῥήτραν διαμνημονεύουσι τοῦ Λυκούργου, τὴν κολύουσαν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους <πολλάκις> στρατεύειν, ἵνα μὴ [πολλάκις] ἀμύνεσθαι συνεθιζόμενοι πολεμικοὶ γένωνται. καὶ τοῦτο γε μάλιστα κατηγοροῦν Ἀγησιλάου τοῦ βασιλέως ὕστερον, ὡς ταῖς συνεχέσι καὶ πυκναῖς εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐμβολαῖς καὶ στρατείαις τοὺς Θηβαίους ἀντιπάλους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατασκευάσαντος, διὸ καὶ τρωθόμενον αὐτὸν ἰδὼν Ἀνταλκίδα, "Καλὰ" ἔφη "τὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοὺς μὴδ' εἰδόμενος μάχεσθαι διδάξας." <i>Lyc. 13.8–10</i> C ὅστε καὶ τρωθέντος αὐτοῦ τότε τὸν Ἀνταλκίδα εἶπεν· "ἡ καλὰ τὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοὺς μὴδ' ἐπισταμένους μάχεσθαι διδάξας." τῷ γὰρ ὄντι Θηβαίους αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν πολεμικωτάτους τότε γενέσθαι φασί, ταῖς πολλαῖς στρατείαις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ὡσπερ ἐγγυμνασαμένους. διὸ καὶ Λυκούργος ὁ παλαιὸς ἐν ταῖς καλουμέναις τρισὶ ῥήτραις ἀεῖπε μὴ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν, ὅπως μὴ πολεμεῖν μανθάνωσιν. <i>Agēs. 26.3–5</i> D διὸ καὶ φασιν Ἀνταλκίδα τὸν Σπαρτιάτην, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος ἐπανήλθεν ἐκ Βοιωτίας τρωθόμενος, εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτόν· "ἡ καλὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοὺς πολεμεῖν καὶ μάχεσθαι διδάξας." <i>Pel. 15.3</i></p>

Ε Συνεχῶς δ' αὐτοῦ τοῖς Θηβαίοις πολεμοῦντος καὶ **τρωθέντος** ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, φασὶ τὸν **Ἀνταλκίδα** εἶπεν **‘καλὰ τὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοὺς μὴδ’ ἐπισταμένους μάχεσθαι διδάξας.**’ τῷ γὰρ ὄντι Θηβαίους αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν πολεμικωτάτους τότε φασὶ γενέσθαι ταῖς πολλαῖς στρατείαις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπ’ αὐτούς, διὸ καὶ Λυκοῦργος ὁ παλαιὸς ἐν ταῖς καλουμέναις Ῥήτραις ἀπέειπε πολλάκις ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν, ὅπως πολεμῆν μὴ μανθάνωσιν.

Aporphth. Lac. 213F

Φ Πρὸς δ’ **Ἀγησίλαον** πληγέντα ἐν μάχῃ ὑπὸ **Θηβαίων** **‘ἀπέχεις’** εἶπε **‘τὰ διδασκάλια, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοὺς μὴδ’ ἐπισταμένους μάχεσθαι διδάξας.**’ ἐδόκουν γὰρ ταῖς συνεχέσιν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς τοῦ Ἀγησίλαου στρατείας μάχιμοι γεγονέναι.

Aporphth. Lac. 217DE

Γ Ἐρωτηθεὶς δὲ διὰ τί **ἐκόλυσεν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους** **πολλάκις στρατεύεσθαι**, ἔφη **‘ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις ἀμύνεσθαι** συνεπιζόμενοι ἐμπειροὶ πολέμου **γένωνται.**’ διὸ καὶ **Ἀγησίλαου** ἐγκλημα οὐ βραχὺ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, ταῖς εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν συνεχέσιν εἰσβολαῖς καὶ στρατείαις τοὺς Θηβαίους ἀντιπάλους <τοῖς> Λακεδαιμονίοις κατασκευάσαντος. **τετρωμένον** γοῦν ἰδὼν αὐτὸν **Ἀνταλκίδα**ς **‘καλὰ’** εἶπε **‘τροφεῖα ἀπέχεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοὺς μὴτ’** εἰδόμενος **μάχεσθαι διδάξας.**’

Aporphth. Lac. 227CD

A *Χαρίλλος* ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς, **διὰ τί νόμους ὀλίγους οὕτω** *Λυκοῦργος* ἔθηκεν, ἀπεκρίνατο τοὺς **χρωμένους ὀλίγοις λόγοις μὴ δεῖσθαι νόμων πολλῶν.**

Charillus I (189F)

C>AB is possible, but A seems close to B.

B *Χαρίλαος* δ’ ὁ ἀδελφιδοῦς τοῦ *Λυκοῦργου* περὶ τῆς ὀλιγότητος αὐτοῦ τῶν νόμων ἐρωτηθεὶς, εἶπεν ὡς οἱ λόγοις μὴ χρώμενοι πολλοῖς οὐδὲ νόμων δέονται πολλῶν.

Lyc. 20.2

C *Χαρίλλος* ἐρωτηθεὶς **διὰ τί τοὺς νόμους ὁ** *Λυκοῦργος* **οὕτως ὀλίγους ἔθηκεν,** ‘ὅτι’ ἔφη ‘τοῖς **ὀλίγα** λέγουσιν ὀλίγων καὶ **νόμων** ἐστὶ χρεία.’

Aporphth. Lac. 232B

A Πρὸς δὲ τὸν *πυθόμενον* διὰ τί *κομῶσιν* εἶπεν ὅτι **τῶν κόσμων ἀδαπανώτατος οὗτός ἐστι.**

Charillus III (189F)

C>A

B is told about Nicander. The one similarity between A and B seems coincidental.

B *Πυθόμενον* δὲ τινος διὰ τί *κομῶσι* καὶ *πωγωνοτροφοῦσιν*, ‘ὅτι’ ἔφη ‘πάντων κάλλιστος καὶ **ἀδαπανώτατος** ἀνδρὶ ὁ ἴδιος κόσμος.’

Aporphth. Lac. 230B

C Πρὸς δὲ τὸν *πυθόμενον* διὰ τί *κομῶσιν* εἶπεν ὅτι **‘τῶν κόσμων ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ ἀδάπανος οὗτός ἐστι.’**

Aporphth. Lac. 232C

<p>A Θεόπομπος ἐν τινι πόλει πρὸς τὸν ἐπιδεικνύμενον τὸ τεῖχος αὐτῷ καὶ πυνθανόμενον, εἰ δοκεῖ καλὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν εἶναι, † ‘οὐδ’ εἰ γυναικῶν’ εἶπεν <ἦν>. <i>Theopompus I (190A)</i> D>A The presence of “καλόν” in A seems coincidental.</p>	<p>B Ἐπεδείκνυέ τις αὐτῷ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τεῖχος ὄχυρὸν καὶ καρτερῶς ἄγαν ἐξωκοδομημένον καὶ ἡρώτα εἰ καλὸν αὐτῷ φαίνεται· ‘νῆ Δί’ ἔφη ‘καλόν, οὐχ ὡς ἀνδράσι δὲ ἄλλ’ ὡς γυναιξίν ἐνοικεῖν.’ <i>Aporhth. Lac. 212E</i> C Διερχόμενος δὲ τὰ τῶν Κορινθίων τεῖχη καὶ θεασάμενος ὑψηλά τε καὶ ὄχυρά ἐπὶ πολὺ τε παρατείνοντα, ‘τίνες’ εἶπεν ‘αἱ τὸν τόπον κατοικοῦσαι γυναῖκες;’ <i>Aporhth. Lac. 215D</i> D Ἐπιδεικνυμένου δὲ τινος αὐτῷ τεῖχος καὶ πυνθανομένου εἰ καρτερόν καὶ ὑψηλόν, ‘οὐδ’ εἰ γυναικῶν’ εἶπεν ‘ἦν.’ <i>Aporhth. Lac. 221E</i> E Πανθοίδας πρεσβεύων εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἐπιδεικνύτων αὐτῷ τινων τεῖχος μέγα καὶ ὑψηλόν, εἶπε ‘νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὧ ξένοι, καλὴ γυναικωνίτις.’ <i>Aporhth. Lac. 230C</i></p>
<p>A Ἀρχίδαμος ἐν τῷ Πελοποννησιακῷ πολέμῳ τῶν συμμάχων ἀξιούτων ὀρίσαι τοὺς φόρους αὐτοῖς, εἶπεν ‘ὁ πόλεμος οὐ τεταγμένα σιτεῖται.’ <i>Archidamus Secundus I (190A)</i> E>A, for ζητεῖ probably replaced the original σιτεῖται.</p>	<p>B λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ παλαιὸς ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ Πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου, κελευόντων <τάς> εἰσφορὰς τάσαι τῶν συμμάχων αὐτόν, εἶπεῖν ὡς ὁ πόλεμος οὐ τεταγμένα σιτεῖται. <i>Cleom. 48(27).3</i> C ὁ γὰρ πόλεμος οὐ τεταγμένα σιτεῖται κατὰ τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον, ὥσθ’ ὁ πρὸς πόλεμον πλοῦτος ἀόριστος <i>Crass. 2.9</i> D ὅτε καὶ φησι Θεόφραστος, (fr. 145 W.), ἀξιούτων τῶν συμμάχων ὀρισθῆναι τὰς εἰσφορὰς, εἶπεῖν Κρωβύλον τὸν δημαγωγόν, ὡς οὐ τεταγμένα σιτεῖται πόλεμος. <i>Dem. 17.4</i> E Τῶν δὲ συμμάχων ἐν τῷ Πελοποννησιακῷ πολέμῳ ἐπιζητούντων, πόσα χρήματα ἀρκέσει, καὶ ἀξιούτων ὀρίσαι τοὺς φόρους, ‘ὁ πόλεμος’ ἔφη ‘οὐ τεταγμένα ζητεῖ.’ <i>Aporhth. Lac. 219A</i></p>
<p>A Βρασίδας ἐν ἰσχάσι συλλαβῶν μὴν καὶ δηχθεῖς ἀφήκεν· εἶτα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ‘οὐδὲν οὕτως’ ἔφη ‘μικρόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ σώζεται τολμῶν ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας.’ <i>Brasidas I (190B)</i> C is not attributed to Brasidas, but to Agesilaus. D>AB</p>	<p>B Βρασίδας δὲ μὴν τινα συλλαβῶν ἐν ἰσχάσι καὶ δηχθεῖς ἀφήκεν· εἶτα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ‘ὦ Ἡράκλεις’ ἔφη, ‘ὡς οὐδὲν ἐστί μικρόν <οὕτως> οὐδ’ ἀσθενές, ὃ μὴ ζήσεται τολμῶν ἀμύνεσθαι.’ <i>De prof. in virt. 79E</i> C Ἄλλοτ’ ἰδὼν μὴν ἐλκόμενον ἐκ θυρίδος ὑπὸ παιδαρίου, ἐπεὶ ὁ μῦς ἐπιστραφεὶς ἔδακε τὴν χεῖρα τοῦ κρατοῦντος καὶ ἔφυγεν, ἐπιδείξας τοῖς παροῦσιν εἶπεν ‘ὅταν τὸ ἐλάχιστον ζῆλον οὕτως ἀμύνηται τοὺς ἀδικούντας, τί τοὺς ἀνδράς προσήκει ποιεῖν λογίσεσθε;’ <i>Aporhth. Lac. 208F</i></p>

	<p>D Βρασίδας ἐν ἰσχύσι συλλαβὸν μῶν καὶ δηχθεὶς ἀφήκεν· εἶτα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ‘οὐδὲν οὕτως’ ἔφη ‘μικρὸν ἐστίν, ὃ οὐ σφάζεται τολμῶν ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας.’ <i>Aporrhth. Lac. 219C</i></p>
<p>A Ἐν δὲ μάχῃ διὰ τῆς ἀσπίδος ἀκοντισθεὶς καὶ τὸ δόρυ τοῦ τραύματος ἐξεκκύσας αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὸν πολέμιον ἀπέκτεινεν· ἐπερωτηθεὶς δὲ πῶς ἐτρώθη, ‘προδοῦσης με τῆς ἀσπίδος’ εἶπεν. <i>Brasidas II (190B)</i> B>AC</p>	<p>B Ἐν δὲ τινι μάχῃ διὰ τῆς ἀσπίδος ἀκοντισθεὶς καὶ τὸ δόρυ τοῦ τραύματος ἐξεκκύσας αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὸν πολέμιον ἀπέκτεινε καὶ πῶς ἐτρώθη ἐρωτηθεὶς ‘προδοῦσης με’ ἔφη ‘τῆς ἀσπίδος.’ <i>Aporrhth. Lac. 219C</i> C ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βρασίδας ὡς ἔοικεν ἐξεκκύσας τὸ δόρυ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὸν βαλόντα πατάξας ἀνεῖλεν. <i>De sera num. 548BC</i></p>
<p>A Ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβη πεσεῖν αὐτὸν ἐλευθεροῦντα τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης Ἕλληνας, οἱ δὲ πεμφθέντες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις τῇ μητρὶ προσῆλθον αὐτοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν ἠρώτησεν εἰ καλῶς ὁ Βρασίδας ἀπέθανεν· ἐγκωμιαζόντων δὲ τῶν Θρακῶν αὐτὸν καὶ λεγόντων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἔσται τοιοῦτος, ‘ἀγνοεῖτε’ εἶπεν ‘ὦ ξένοι· Βρασίδας μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, ἃ δὲ Λακεδαίμων πολλῶς ἔχει τήνου κάρρονας.’ <i>Brasidas III (190BC)</i> There seem to be two groups: C>A and D>B</p>	<p>B ἢ δὲ Βρασίδου μήτηρ Ἀργιλεωνίς, ὡς ἀφικόμενοί τινες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα τῶν ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως εἰσῆλθον πρὸς αὐτήν, ἠρώτησεν εἰ καλῶς ὁ Βρασίδας ἀπέθανε καὶ τὰς Σπάρτας ἀξίως· μεγαλυνόντων δ’ ἐκείνων τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ λεγόντων ὡς οὐκ ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἄλλον ἢ Σπάρτη, “μὴ λέγετε” εἶπεν “ὦ ξένοι· καλὸς μὲν γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ Βρασίδας, πολλοὺς δ’ ἄνδρας Λακεδαίμων ἔχει τήνου κάρρονας.” <i>Lyc. 25.8–9</i> C Ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβη πεσεῖν αὐτὸν ἐλευθεροῦντα τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης Ἕλληνας, οἱ δὲ πεμφθέντες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις τῇ μητρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀργιλεωνίδι προσῆλθον, πρῶτον μὲν ἠρώτησεν εἰ καλῶς ὁ Βρασίδας ἐτελεύτησεν, ἐγκωμιαζόντων δὲ τῶν Θρακῶν καὶ λεγόντων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος, ‘ἀγνοεῖτε’ εἶπεν ‘ὦ ξένοι· Βρασίδας γὰρ ἦν μὲν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, πολλοὺς δ’ ἐκείνου κρείσσονας ἔχει ἢ Σπάρτη.’ <i>Aporrhth. Lac. 219D</i></p>
	<p>D Ἀργιλεωνίς ἢ Βρασίδου μήτηρ, τελευτήσαντος αὐτῆ τοῦ υἱοῦ, ὡς παραγενόμενοι τινες τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν εἰς Σπάρτην ἦκον πρὸς αὐτήν, ἠρώτησεν εἰ καλῶς καὶ ἀξίως τῆς Σπάρτης ὁ υἱὸς ἐτελεύτα· μεγαλυνόντων δ’ ἐκείνων καὶ λεγόντων ἄριστον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀπάντων Λακεδαίμωνίων εἶναι, εἶπεν· ‘ὦ ξένοι, καλὸς μὲν ἦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ παῖς μου, πολλοὺς δ’ ἄνδρας Λακεδαίμων ἔχει τήνου κάρρονας.’ <i>Aporrhth. Lac. 240C</i></p>

<p>A <i>Ἐπαινουμένων δὲ τῶν Ἡλείων ἐπὶ τῷ τὰ Ὀλύμπια καλῶς ἄγειν 'τί δέ' εἶπε 'ποιοῦσι θαυμαστόν, εἰ δι' ἐτῶν τεσσάρων μᾶ ἡμέρα χρῶνται τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ;</i>' ἐπιμενόντων δὲ τοῖς ἐπαίνοις, ἔφη 'τί θαυμαστόν, εἰ πράγματι καλῶ καλῶς χρῶνται, τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ;' <i>Agis Secundus III (190CD)</i> C>AB, but A is somewhat closer to B</p>	<p>B Ἴαγίς δ', ἐπαινούτων τινῶν τοὺς Ἡλείους ὡς καλῶς τὰ Ὀλύμπια καὶ δικαίως ἄγοντας, "καὶ τί μέγα" ἔφη "Ἡλείοι ποιοῦντι δι' ἐτῶν πέντε ἡμέρα μᾶ χρώμενοι τᾷ δικαιοσύνῃ;" <i>Lyc. 20.6</i> C Ἐπαινούτων δὲ τινῶν Ἡλείους, ὅτι δικαιοτάτοι εἰσι περὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Ὀλυμπίων, "καὶ τί μέγα" εἶπεν ἡ θαυμαστόν ποιοῦσιν, εἰ ἐν ἔτεσι πέντε μᾶ μόνον ἡμέρα δικαιοσύνη χρῶνται;' <i>Aporphth. Lac. 215F</i></p>
<p>A Πρὸς δ' ἄνθρωπον πονηρὸν ἐρωτῶντα πολλάκις τίς ἄριστος εἶη Σπαρτιατῶν, εἶπεν ὁ τὴν ἀνομοιότατος.' <i>Agis Secundus IV (190D)</i> C>AB</p>	<p>B Δημάρατος, ἀνθρώπου πονηροῦ κόπτοντος αὐτὸν ἀκαίριος ἐρωτήμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο πολλάκις ἐρωτῶντος, τίς ἄριστος Σπαρτιατῶν, ἔφη· "ὁ τὴν ἀνομοιότατος." <i>Lyc. 20.5</i> C Πρὸς δ' ἄνθρωπον πονηρὸν ἐρωτῶντα πολλάκις τίς ἄριστος εἶη Σπαρτιάτης ὁ σοὶ ἀνομοιότατος.' <i>Aporphth. Lac. 216C</i></p>
<p>A Ἐτέρου δὲ πυνθανομένου πόσοι εἰσὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅσοι' εἶπεν ἱκανοὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἀπείργειν.' <i>Agis Secundus V (190D)</i> D is told about Ariston. C>AB</p>	<p>B Ἀρχιδαμίδας δὲ πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον πόσοι εἰσὶ Σπαρτιάται, "ἱκανοὶ" εἶπεν "ὃ ξένη τοὺς κακοὺς ἀπερύκειν." <i>Lyc. 20.9</i> C Πυνθανομένου δὲ τίνος πόσοι εἰσὶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὅσοι ἱκανοὶ' εἶπε 'τοὺς κακοὺς ἀπερύκειν.' <i>Aporphth. Lac. 215D</i> D Πυνθανομένου δὲ τίνος πόσοι Σπαρτιάται τὸ πλῆθος, ὅσοι ἱκανοὶ' εἶπε 'τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀπερύκειν.' <i>Aporphth. Lac. 218A</i></p>
<p>A Λύσανδρος Διονυσίου τοῦ τυράννου πέμψαντος ἰμάτια ταῖς θυγατράσιν αὐτοῦ τῶν πολυτελῶν οὐκ ἔλαβεν εἰπὼν δεδιέναι, μὴ διὰ ταῦτα μᾶλλον αἰσχυραὶ φανῶσιν. <i>Lysander I (190D)</i> D is told about Archidamus. E>ABC</p>	<p>B Διονυσίου δὲ τοῦ τυράννου πέμψαντος αὐτοῦ ταῖς θυγατράσι πολυτελῆ χιτῶνια τῶν Σικελικῶν, οὐκ ἔλαβεν, εἰπὼν φοβεῖσθαι μὴ διὰ ταῦτα μᾶλλον αἰσχυραὶ φανῶσιν. ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τύραννον ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως ἀποσταλεῖς πρεσβευτῆς, προσπέμψαντος αὐτῷ δύο στολὰς ἐκείνου, καὶ κελεύσαντος ἦν βούλεται τοῦτων ἐλόμενον τῇ θυγατρὶ κομίζειν, αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ἔφη βέλτιον αἰρήσεσθαι, καὶ λαβὼν ἀμφοτέρας ἀπῆλθεν. <i>Lys. 2.7-8</i> C Ταῖς Λυσάνδρου θυγατράσιν ὁ τύραννος ὁ Σικελικὸς ἰμάτια καὶ πλόκια τῶν πολυτελῶν ἐπέμψεν· ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος οὐκ ἔλαβεν εἰπὼν 'ταῦτα τὰ κόσμια καταισχυρεῖ μου μᾶλλον ἢ κοσμήσει τὰς θυγατέρας'. <i>Con. praec. 141D</i></p>

	<p>D <i>Ταῖς δὲ θυγατράσιν αὐτοῦ ἰματισμὸν πολυτελεῖ</i> Διονυσίου τοῦ Σικελίας τυράννου <i>πέμψαντος, οὐκ ἐδέξατο εἰπὼν ‘φοβοῦμαι μὴ περιθέμεναι αἱ κόραι φανῶσί μοι αἰσχραί.’</i> <i>Apophth. Lac. 218E</i></p> <p>E <i>Λύσανδρος, Διονυσίου τοῦ τῆς Σικελίας τυράννου πέμψαντος αὐτοῦ ταῖς θυγατράσιν ἰμάτια πολυτελεῖ, οὐκ ἔλαβεν εἰπὼν δεδιέναι, μὴ διὰ ταῦτα μᾶλλον αἰσχραί φανῶσιν.</i> 1 a. <i>ἀλλ’ ὀλίγον ὕστερον πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τύραννον ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως ἀποσταλεῖς πρεσβευτῆς, προσπέμψαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ Διονυσίου δύο στολάς καὶ κελεύσαντος ἦν βούλεται ταύτην ἐλόμενον τῇ θυγατρὶ κομίζεσθαι, αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ἔφη βέλτιον αἰρήσεσθαι· καὶ λαβὼν ἀμφοτέρως ἀπῆλθεν</i> <i>Apophth. Lac. 229A</i></p>
<p>A <i>Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ψέγοντας αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ δι’ ἀπάτης τὰ πολλὰ πρᾶσσειν ὡς ἀνάξιον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἔλεγεν, ὅπου μὴ ἐφικνεῖται ἡ λεοντῆ, προσραπτέον εἶναι τὴν ἄλωπεκῆν.</i> <i>Lysander II (190DE)</i> C>AB</p>	<p>B τῶν δ’ ἀξιούντων μὴ πολεμεῖν μετὰ δόλου τοὺς ἀφ’ Ἡρακλέους γεγονότας <i>καταγελαῶν</i> ἐκέλευεν· “ὅπου γὰρ ἡ λεοντῆ μὴ ἐφικνεῖται, προσραπτέον ἐκεῖ τὴν ἄλωπεκῆν.” <i>Lys. 7.6</i></p> <p>C <i>Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ψέγοντας αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ δι’ ἀπάτης τὰ πλεῖστα πρᾶττειν ὡς ἀνάξιον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους καὶ δόλω, οὐκ ἄντικρυς κατορθοῦντα, γελαῶν ἔλεγεν, ὅπου μὴ ἐφικνεῖται ἡ λεοντῆ, προσραπτέον εἶναι τὴν ἄλωπεκῆν.</i> <i>Apophth. Lac. 229B</i></p>
<p>A <i>Πρὸς δ’ Ἀργεῖους δικαιότερα τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων λέγειν περὶ τῆς ἀμφισβητουμένης χώρας δοκοῦντας σπασάμενος τὴν μάχαιραν ‘ὁ ταύτης’ ἔφη ‘κρατῶν βέλτιστα περὶ γῆς ὄρων διαλέγεται.’</i> <i>Lysander III (190E)</i> C>AB αὐτῶν became τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων in A and B because Plutarch left out πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους twice.</p>	<p>B <i>Ἀργεῖοις μὲν γὰρ ἀμφιλογουμένοις περὶ γῆς ὄρων, καὶ δικαιότερα τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἰομένοις λέγειν, δεῖξας τὴν μάχαιραν “ὁ ταύτης” ἔφη “κρατῶν βέλτιστα περὶ γῆς ὄρων διαλέγεται”.</i> <i>Lys. 22.2</i></p> <p>C <i>Πρὸς Ἀργεῖους δὲ περὶ γῆς ὄρων ἀμφισβητοῦντας πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ δικαιότερα λέγειν αὐτῶν φάσκοντας σπασάμενος τὴν μάχαιραν ‘ὁ ταύτης’ ἔφη ‘κρατῶν βέλτιστα περὶ γῆς ὄρων διαλέγεται.’</i> <i>Apophth. Lac. 229C</i></p>
<p>A <i>Τοὺς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ὀρῶν ὀκνοῦντας προσμάχεσθαι τοῖς τείχεσι τῶν Κορινθίων, ὡς εἶδε λαγῶν ἐξαλλόμενον ἐκ τῆς τάφρου, ‘τοιούτους’ ἔφη ‘φοβεῖσθε πολεμίους, ὧν οἱ λαγοὶ δι’ ἀργίαν ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐγκαθεύδουσιν;’</i> <i>Lysander IV (190E)</i></p>	<p>B <i>ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων ἀφροσῶτων παρερχόμενος πρὸς τὰ τείχη τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἑώρα προσβάλλειν ὀκνοῦντας, καὶ λαγῶς τις ὄφθη διαπηδῶν τὴν τάφρον, “οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε” ἔφη “τοιούτους φοβούμενοι πολεμίους, ὧν οἱ λαγοὶ δι’ ἀργίαν τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐγκαθεύδουσιν;”</i> <i>Lys. 22.5</i></p>

<p>C>AB A similar story is told about Archidamus in <i>Aporhth. Lac.</i> 218D.</p>	<p>C Ἐπεὶ δὲ <i>Κορινθίων ἀφροστώτων διερχόμενος</i> παρὰ τὰ <i>τείχη</i> τοὺς <i>Λακεδαιμονίους ἐώρα</i> προσβάλλειν ὀκνοῦντας, <i>καὶ λαγώς τις ὄφθη</i> διαπηδῶν τὴν <i>τάφρον</i>, 'οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε' εἶπεν, 'ὧ Σπαρτιάται, τοιοῦτους φοβούμενοι πολέμιους, ὧν δι' ἀργίαν οἱ <i>λαγαοὶ</i> τοῖς <i>τείχεσιν ἐγκαθεύδουσιν</i>;' <i>Aporhth. Lac. 229D</i></p>
<p>A <i>Μεγαρέως</i> δ' ἀνδρὸς ἐν κοινῷ συλλόγῳ παρρησία χρησαμένου πρὸς αὐτόν, 'οἱ λόγοι σου' εἶπε 'πόλεως δέονται.' <i>Lysander V (190EF)</i> D is told about Agesilaus. E>ABC</p>	<p>B <i>Μεγαρέως</i> δ' ἀνδρὸς ἔν τινι συλλόγῳ παρρησία χρησαμένου πρὸς αὐτόν, "οἱ λόγοι σου" εἶπεν "ὧ <u>ξένε</u> πόλεως δέονται". <i>Lys. 22.3</i> C Λύσανδρος μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔοικε πρὸς τὸν ἐκ <i>Μεγάρων</i> ἐν τοῖς συμμαχοῖς παρρησιαζόμενον ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔφη τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ πόλεως δεῖσθαι. <i>De ad. et am. 71E</i> D <i>Μεγαρέως</i> δὲ τινος περὶ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς αὐτόν μεγαλαυχουμένου, 'μειράκιον' ἔφη, 'οἱ λόγοι σου πολλῆς δυνάμεως δέονται.' <i>Aporhth. Lac. 212E</i> E <i>Μεγαρέως</i> δ' ἀνδρὸς ἔν τῳ κοινῷ συλλόγῳ παρρησία χρησαμένου πρὸς αὐτόν, 'οἱ λόγοι σου' εἶπεν 'ὧ <u>ξένε</u>, πόλεως δέονται.' <i>Aporhth. Lac. 229C</i></p>
<p>A Ἀγησίλαος ἔλεγε τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας ἐλευθέρους μὲν κακοὺς εἶναι, δούλους δ' ἀγαθοὺς. <i>Agesilaus I (190F)</i> C is told about Callicratides. B>A</p>	<p>B Ἐλεγε δὲ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας ἐλευθέρους μὲν κακοὺς, δούλους δ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. <i>Aporhth. Lac. 213C</i> C Ἐρωτηθεὶς δὲ ὅποιοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶν οἱ Ἴωνες, 'δούλοι μὲν ἀγαθοί' εἶπεν 'ἐλευθεροὶ δὲ κακοί.' <i>Aporhth. Lac. 222E</i></p>
<p>A Εἰθισμένον δ' αὐτῶν τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα μέγαν προσαγορεύειν, 'τί δαὶ ἐκεῖνος' εἶπεν 'ἐμοῦ μείζων, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερος καὶ σωφρονέστερος.' <i>Agesilaus II (190F)</i> C>ABD</p>	<p>B πρὸς δὲ τοὺς λέγοντας, ὅτι ταῦτα δοκεῖ τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ, "τί δ' ἐκεῖνος ἐμοῦ μείζων" εἶπεν, "εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερος;" <i>Ages. 23.9</i> C Εἰθισμένον δὲ τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντων τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα μέγαν προσαγορεύειν, 'τί δαὶ ἐκεῖνος ἐμοῦ μείζων' ἔφη, 'εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερος καὶ σωφρονέστερος.' <i>Aporhth. Lac. 213C</i> D καὶ περὶ τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως μεγάλου δὲ καλουμένου ὁ Ἀγησίλαος 'τί δ' ἐμοῦ γε μείζων ἐκεῖνος, εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερος,' <i>De se ipsum laud. 545A</i></p>
<p>A Περὶ δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐρωτηθεὶς ποτέρα βελτίον 'οὐδὲν ἀνδρείας' ἔφη 'χρηζόμεν, ἐὰν πάντες ὦμεν δίκαιοι.' <i>Agesilaus III (190F)</i> C>AB</p>	<p>B καίτοι τῷ λόγῳ πανταχοῦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀπέφαινε πρωτεύειν τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἀνδρείας μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι μὴ παρουσίας δικαιοσύνης, εἰ δὲ δίκαιοι πάντες γένοιοντο, μηδὲν ἀνδρείας δεήσεσθαι. <i>Ages. 23.8</i></p>

<p>A Νυκτὸς δὲ μέλλων κατὰ τάχος ἀναζευγνύειν ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον ὀρῶν ἀπολειπόμενον δι' ἀσθένειαν καὶ δακρύνοντα, 'χαλεπὸν' εἶπεν ἅμα ἔλεειν καὶ φρονεῖν.' Agésilau IV (191A) C>AB</p>	<p>C Ἐρωτηθεὶς δέ ποτε ὀπότερα βελτίων τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἀνδρεία ἢ δικαιοσύνη, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἀνδρείας ἔφασκεν εἶναι μὴ παρούσης δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δὲ δίκαιοι πάντες γένοιτο, μηδὲν ἀνδρείας δεηθήσεσθαι. Aporphth. Lac. 213BC</p>
<p>A Μενεκράτους δὲ τοῦ ἱατροῦ <τοῦ> Διὸς προσαγορευομένου γράψαντος ἐπιστολὴν πρὸς αὐτόν 'Μενεκράτης Ζεὺς βασιλεῖ Ἀγησιλάῳ χαίρειν' ἀντέγραψεν 'βασιλεὺς Ἀγησίλαος Μενεκράτει ὑγιαίνειν.' Agésilau V (191A) C>AB</p>	<p>B τοῦ δ' ἱατροῦ Μενεκράτους, ἐπεὶ κατατυχῶν ἐν τισιν ἀπεγνωσμέναις θεραπείαις Ζεὺς ἐπεκλήθη, φορτικῶς ταύτη χρωμένου τῇ προσωνυμίᾳ, καὶ διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐπιστεῖλαι τολμήσαντος οὕτως: "Μενεκράτης Ζεὺς βασιλεῖ Ἀγησιλάῳ χαίρειν", ἀντέγραψε: "βασιλεὺς Ἀγησίλαος Μενεκράτει ὑγιαίνειν." Ages. 21.10 C Μενεκράτους δὲ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, ἐπεὶ κατατυχῶν ἐν τισιν ἀπεγνωσμέναις θεραπείαις Ζεὺς ἐπεκλήθη, φορτικῶς ταύτη χρωμένου τῇ προσωνυμίᾳ, καὶ διὸ πρὸς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐπιστεῖλαι τολμήσαντος οὕτως 'Μενεκράτης Ζεὺς Ἀγησιλάῳ βασιλεῖ χαίρειν', οὐκ ἀναγνοὺς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀντέγραψε 'βασιλεὺς Ἀγησίλαος Μενεκράτει ὑγιαίνειν.' Aporphth. Lac. 213A</p>
<p>A Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ νικησάντων Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ἐν Κορίνθῳ πυθόμενος τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολεμίων νεκρῶν 'φεῡ τὰς Ἑλλάδος' εἶπεν ἅ τοσοῦτους ὅφ' αὐτὰς ἀπολώλεκεν, ὅσοις ἀρκεῖ τοὺς βαρβάρους νικῆν ἅπαντας. Agésilau VI (191AB) C>AB</p>	<p>B καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάῳ θαυμαστὸν οὐκ ἦν, ὃς πυθόμενος μάχην μεγάλην γεγονέαι περὶ Κόρινθον [καὶ ἄνδρας τῶν πάντων ἐνδόξων ὡς ἐνὶ μάλιστα αἰφνίδιον ἀπολωλέναι] καὶ Σπαρτιατῶν μὲν ὀλίγους παντάπασι τεθηκέναι, παμπόλλους δὲ τῶν πολεμίων, οὐκ ὄφθη περιχαρῆς οὐδ' ἐπιρμημένος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων βαρῶν στενάξας "φεῡ τῆς Ἑλλάδος" ἔφη "τοσοῦτους ἄνδρας ἀπολωλεκυίας ὅφ' αὐτῆς, ὅσοι ζῶντες ἐδόναντο νικᾶν ὁμοῦ σύμπαντας τοὺς βαρβάρους μαχόμενοι." Ages. 16.6</p>

	<p>C <i>Πυθόμενος</i> δὲ <u>μάχην γεγονέαι</u> <u>περὶ Κόρινθον</u> <u>καὶ Σπαρτιατῶν μὲν παντάπασι</u> <u>ὀλίγους</u> <u>τεθνάναι</u>, Κορινθίον δὲ καὶ <u>Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν</u> <u>ἄλλων</u> <u>συμμάχων</u> αὐτοῖς <u>παμπόλλους</u>, οὐκ ὤφθη <u>περιχαρῆς οὐδ'</u> <u>ἐπιρμήνος</u> τῇ νίκῃ, <u>ἀλλὰ καὶ</u> <u>πάνυ βαρῦ στενάξας</u> 'φεῦ τὰς Ἑλλάδος' ἔφη 'ἢ <u>τοσοῦτους ἔφ' αὐτᾶς ἀπολώλεκεν</u>, <u>ὅσοις ἄρκει</u> <u>τοὺς βαρβάρους νικᾶν ἅπαντας.'</u> <i>Apophth. Lac. 211EF</i></p>
<p>A Παραιτούμενος δὲ τινα τῶν φίλων παρὰ τοῦ Καρῶς Ἰδριέως ἔγραψε πρὸς αὐτόν 'Νικίας εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, ἄφες· εἰ δ' ἀδικεῖ, ἔμοι ἄφες· πάντως δ' ἄφες.' Agesilaus VIII (191B) C>ABD</p>	<p>B [ἄνα]φέρεται γοῦν ἐπιστόλιον αὐτοῦ πρὸς Ἰδριέα τὸν Κᾶρα τοιοῦτο· 'Νικίας εἰ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖ, ἄφες· εἰ δὲ ἀδικεῖ, ἄμιν ἄφες· πάντως δ' ἄφες.' Ages. 13.5 C Τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἀκριβῆς ὄν καὶ νόμιμος, ἐν τοῖς φιλικοῖς πράγμασι ἐνόμιζε πρόφασιν εἶναι τὸ λίαν δίκαιον [πρὸς αὐτούς]. <u>φέρεται γοῦν ἐπιστόλιον αὐτοῦ παραιτουμένου τινὰ τῶν φίλων πρὸς Ἰδριέα τὸν Κᾶρα</u>, οὕτω· 'Νικίας εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, ἄφες· εἰ δ' ἀδικεῖ, ἔμοι ἄφες· πάντως δ' ἄφες.' Apophth. Lac. 209E D καὶ πρὸς τινα δυνάστην <u>ἐπιστόλιον αὐτοῦ</u> τοιοῦτον <u>φέρεται</u> 'Νικίαν, εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, ἄφες· εἰ δ' ἀδικεῖ, ἔμοι ἄφες· πάντως δ' ἄφες'. Praec. ger. reip. 807F–808A</p>
<p>A Τοῦ δὲ μιμουμένου τὴν τῆς ἀηδόνος φωνὴν ἀκοῦσαι παρακαλούμενος 'αὐτᾶς' εἶπεν 'ἄκουκα πολλάκις.' Agesilaus IX (191B) D>ABC</p>	<p>B <u>παρακαλούμενος</u> δὲ <u>πάνυ ἀκοῦσαι</u> <u>τοῦ τῆς ἀηδόνος μιμουμένου</u>, <u>παρητήσατο φήσας</u>· "αὐτᾶς ἄκουκα." Ages. 21.9 C ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι <u>τοῦ μιμουμένου τὴν ἀηδόνος</u> <u>παρακαλούμενος</u>, "αὐτᾶς" ἔφη "ἄκουκα τήνας." Lyc. 20.12 D Τοῦ δὲ μιμουμένου τὴν τῆς ἀηδόνος φωνὴν ἀκοῦσαι παρακαλούμενος 'παρητήσατο φήσας ἄκουκα πολλάκις.' Apophth. Lac. 212F</p>
<p>A Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν Λευκτροῖς μάχην, πάντας τοὺς τρέσαντας ἀτίμους εἶναι τοῦ νόμου κελεύοντος, ὀρώντες οἱ ἔφοροι τὴν πόλιν ἀνδρῶν ἔρημον οὖσαν ἐβούλοντο τὴν ἀτιμίαν λῦσαι καὶ νομοθέτην ἀπέδειξαν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον· ὁ δὲ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἐκέλευσε τοὺς νόμους ἀπὸ τῆς αὔριον κυρίου εἶναι. Agesilaus X (191BC)</p>	<p>B1 δεινὸν οὖν ἦν τοιοῦτους ἐν τῇ πόλει περιορᾶν πολλούς, οὐκ ὀλίγων <u>δεομένη στρατιωτῶν</u>. καὶ <u>νομοθέτην αἰροῦνται</u> τὸν <u>Ἀγησίλαον</u>. ὁ δὲ μῆτε προσθεῖς τι μῆτ' ἀφελὼν μῆτε μεταγράψας, <u>εἰσήλθεν εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων</u> καὶ φήσας ὅτι <u>τοὺς νόμους δεῖ σήμερον εἶναι καθεῦδειν</u>, ἐκ δὲ <u>τῆς αὔριον</u> ἡμέρας <u>κυρίου εἶναι</u> πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν, ἅμα τοὺς τε νόμους τῆ πόλει καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιτίμους ἐφύλαξε. Ages. 30.5–6</p>

τρέσαντας in A and τρεσάντων in B2 does not mean that A and B are more closely related: the words are used in a different construction. Τρέω in A and B2 has a meaning similar to φεύγω and probably derives from φυγόντων in C. Verbs such as κελεύω could always have been inserted when it was not part of the original note and do not indicate a closer relationship. In line with other apophthegms which occur in *Ages.*, the following relationship seems to be the most plausible one:

C>AB

A Ἐπει δὲ πεμφθεις τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων σύμμαχος ἐπολιορκεῖτο μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλαπλασιῶν ὄντων τῶν πολεμίων καὶ περιταφρευόντων τὸ στρατόπεδον, κελεύσαντος ἐπεξιέναι καὶ διαμάχεσθαι τοῦ βασιλέως, οὐκ ἔφη διακωλύσειν τοὺς πολεμίους ἴσους αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι βουλομένους. ἔτι δὲ μικρὸν ἀπολειπούσης τῆς τάφρου συνάψαι, κατὰ τοῦτο παρατάξας τὸ διαλείπον καὶ πρὸς ἴσους ἴσους ἀγωνισάμενος ἐνίκησεν.

Agesilaus XI (191CD)

B is a highly elaborate version of the story.

C>AB

A Ἀποθήσκων δὲ τοὺς φίλους ἐκέλευσε μηδεμίαν πλαστὴν μηδὲ μιμηλὴν ποιήσασθαι, τὰς εἰκόνας οὕτω προσαγορεύων· ‘εἰ γὰρ τι καλὸν ἔργον πεποιήκα, τοῦτό μου μνημεῖον ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν, οὐδ' οἱ πάντες ἀνδριάντες.’

Agesilaus XII (191D)

All apophthegms concern Agesilaus.

D>AB

B2 οἶον μὲν<τοι> τῇ περὶ τῶν τρεσάντων ἀπορία προσήγαγεν Ἀγησίλαος ἴαμα μετὰ τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις ἀτυχίαν, κελεύσας τοὺς νόμους ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν καθεῦδει

Comp. Ages. et Pomp. 2.3

C Ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ Λεῦκτρα μάχῃ πολλῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φυγόντων καὶ τούτων ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἀτιμίας ὑπευθύνων ὄντων, οἱ ἔφοροι ἔρημον ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν ὀρώντες δεομένην στρατιωτῶν ἐβούλοντο τὴν ἀτιμίαν λύσαι καὶ τοὺς νόμους τηρεῖν. αἰρούνται οὖν νομοθέτην τὸν Ἀγησίλαον· ὁ δὲ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ‘νομοθέτης μὲν οὐκ ἂν γενοίμην ἐτέρων νόμων’ εἶπε, ‘τοῖς γὰρ οὕσιν οὐτ' ἂν προσθεῖην τι οὐτ' ἂν ἀφέλοιμι οὔτε μεταποιήσαιμι· τοὺς δ' ὄντας ἡμῖν νόμους κυρίου εἶναι καλῶς ἔχον ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρίας.’

Apophth. Lac. 214B

B Ἐπελθόντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ περιταφρευόντων τὴν πόλιν [...] τὸ δὲ διαλείπον ἡμῖν δίδωσιν ἴσφ καὶ δικαίφ μέτρφ διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς [...] καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν ἀνηρέθησαν, οἱ δὲ φεύγοντες ἐσκεδάσθησαν καὶ διερρύθησαν.

Ages. 39.1–10

C Περιταφρευόντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ πλήθος, καὶ Νεκτανάβιος, ᾧ συνεμάχει, ἀξιοῦντος ἐπεξιέναι καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, οὐκ ἔφη διακωλύ<σ>ειν τοὺς πολεμίους ἴσους αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι βουλομένους. ἔτι δὲ μικρὸν ἀπολειπούσης τῆς τάφρου συνάψαι, κατὰ τοῦτο παρατάξας τὸ διαλείπον καὶ πρὸς ἴσους ἴσους ἀγωνισάμενος τροπὴν ἐποίησατο καὶ πολλὸν φόνον τῶν πολεμίων ὀλίγοις τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν στρατιώταις καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ τῇ πόλει διεπέμψατο.

Apophth. Lac. 214F–215A

B τῆς δὲ μορφῆς εἰκόνα μὲν οὐκ ἔχομεν (αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θνήσκων ἀπέπειε μήτε πλαστὴν μήτε μιμηλὴν τινα ποιήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος εἰκόνα), λέγεται δὲ μικρὸς τε γενέσθαι καὶ τὴν ὄψιν εὐκαταφρόνητος·

Ages. 2.3–4

C Τῶν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἑλληνικῶν ἐθνῶν ψηφισαμένων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πόλεσιν εἰκόνας ἀνιστᾶν αὐτοῦ, προσέγραψεν ‘ἐμοῦ μηδεμία εἰκὼν ἔστω μήτε γραπτὴ μήτε πλαστὴ μήτε κατασκευαστή.’

Apophth. Lac. 210D

	<p>D Κατὰ δὲ τὸν <ἀπ> Αἰγύπτου ἀπόπλουν ἀποθνήσκων ἐνετείλατο τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν μήτε πλαστὰν μήτε γραπτὰν [μήτε] μιμηλᾶν τοῦ σώματος [εἰκόνα] ποιήσασθαι, ‘εἰ γὰρ τι καλὸν ἔργον πεποιήκα, τοῦτό μου μνημεῖον ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδ’ οἱ πάντες ἀνδριάντες, βαναύσων καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἔργα ὄντες.’ <i>Aporphth. Lac. 215A</i></p>
<p>A Ὁ δὲ νεώτερος Ἄγις, Δημάδου λέγοντος ὅτι τὰ Λακωνικὰ ξίφη διὰ μικρότητα καταπίνουσιν οἱ θαυματοποιοί, ‘καὶ μὴν’ ἔφη ‘μάλιστα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν πολεμίων τοῖς ξίφεσιν ἐφικνοῦνται.’ <i>Agis Tertius I (191E)</i> C>AB</p>	<p>B Ἄγις μὲν οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς, σκόπτοντος Ἀττικοῦ τινος τὰς Λακωνικὰς μαχαίρας εἰς τὴν μικρότητα, καὶ λέγοντος ὅτι ῥαδίως αὐτὰς οἱ θαυματοποιοὶ καταπίνουσιν ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, “καὶ μὴν μάλιστα” εἶπεν “ἡμεῖς ἐφικνούμεθα τοῖς ἐγχειριδίοις τῶν πολεμίων.” <i>Lyc. 19.4</i> C Ἄγις ὁ νεώτερος, Δημάδου λέγοντος ὅτι τὰ Λακωνικὰ ξίφη διὰ μικρότητα καταπίνουσιν οἱ θαυματοποιοί, ‘καὶ μὴν’ ἔφη ‘οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν πολεμίων τοῖς ξίφεσιν ἐφικνοῦνται.’ <i>Aporphth. Lac. 216C</i></p>
<p>A Κλεομένης πρὸς τὸν ὑπισχνούμενον αὐτῷ δώσειν ἀλεκτρυόνας ἀποθνήσκοντας ἐν τῷ μάχεσθαι ‘μὴ σύ γε’ εἶπεν ‘ἀλλὰ δός μοι τοὺς κατακτείνοντας ἐν τῷ μάχεσθαι.’ <i>Cleomenes I (191E)</i> X>ABC?</p>	<p>B νεανίσκος δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐπαγγελλούμενον αὐτῷ δώσειν ἀλεκτρυόνας ἀποθνήσκοντας ἐν τῷ μάχεσθαι, “μὴ σύ γε” εἶπεν, “ἀλλὰ δός μοι τῶν ἀποκτεινόντων ἐν τῷ μάχεσθαι.” <i>Lyc. 20.14</i> C Κλεομένης ὁ Κλεομβρότου, διδόντος αὐτῷ τινος μαχίμου ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ λέγοντος ὅτι μαχόμενοι ἀποθνήσκουσι περὶ νίκης, ‘τῶν κατακτείνόντων τοῖνον αὐτοῦς’ ἔφη ‘τινὰς δός μοι, ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τούτων ἀμείνους.’ <i>Aporphth. Lac. 224BC</i></p>
<p>A Πεδάριτος οὐκ ἐγκριθεὶς εἰς τοὺς τριακοσίους, ἦτις ἦν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρωτεύουσα τιμὴ τῇ τάξει, ἰλαρὸς καὶ μειδιῶν ἀπήει, χαίρειν λέγων εἰ τριακοσίους ἢ πόλις ἔχει πολίτας ἑαυτοῦ βελτίονας. <i>Pedaritus I (191F)</i> C>AB</p>	<p>B ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πεδάριτος οὐκ ἐγκριθεὶς εἰς τοὺς τριακοσίους, ἀπήει μάλᾳ φαιδρός, ὥσπερ χαίρων ὅτι βελτίονας αὐτοῦ τριακοσίους ἢ πόλις ἔχει. <i>Lyc. 25.6</i> C Οὐκ ἐγκριθεὶς δ’ εἰς τοὺς τριακοσίους, ἦτις ἐν τῇ πόλει πρωτεύουσα τιμὴ τῇ τάξει ἦν, ἰλαρὸς καὶ μειδιῶν ἀπήει· ἀνακαλεσαμένων δ’ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐφόρων καὶ πυνθανομένων διότι γελᾷ, εἶπε ‘διότι συγχαίρω τῇ πόλει τριακοσίους κρείττονάς μου πολίτας ἐχούσῃ.’ <i>Aporphth. Lac. 231B</i></p>
<p>A Δαμωνίδας δὲ ταχθεὶς εἰς τὴν τελευταίαν τοῦ χοροῦ τάξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸν χορὸν ἰσάντος ‘εὐγε’ εἶπεν ‘ἐξεῦρες, πῶς καὶ αὕτη ἐντιμος γένηται.’ <i>Damonidas I (191F)</i> C is told about Agesilaus and should not be taken into account. D>AB</p>	<p>B καὶ τοῦ Λάκωνος ἔση φαυλότερος, ὃς ἐν χορῷ τινι κατασταθεὶς εἰς τὴν ἐσχάτην χώραν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ‘εὐ γ’” εἶπεν ‘ἐξεῦρες, ὡς καὶ αὐτα ἐντιμος γένηται’; <i>Sept. sap. conv. 149A</i></p>

	<p>C Ἔτι δὲ παῖδα αὐτὸν ὄντα, γυμνοπαιδίας ἀγομένης, ὁ χοροποιὸς ἔστησεν εἰς ἄσημον τόπον· ὁ δ' ἐπέισθη καίπερ ἤδη βασιλεὺς ἀποδεδειγμένος καὶ εἶπεν ἔγχε· δείξω γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ οἱ τόποι τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐντίμους, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄνδρες τοὺς τόπους ἐπιδεικνύουσι.'</p> <p>Aporhth. Lac. 208DE</p> <p>D Λαμωνίδας ταχθεὶς ἔσχατος τοῦ χοροῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸν χορὸν ἰστάντος ἔγχε· εἶπεν, ὦ χοραγέ, ἐξεῦρες πῶς καὶ αὕτη ἡ χώρα ἄτιμος οὕσα ἐντίμος γένηται.'</p> <p>Aporhth. Lac. 219E</p>
<p>A Ἀνταλκίδας πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἀμαθεὶς ἀποκαλοῦντα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄμονοι γοῦν εἶπεν ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν μεμαθήκαμεν κακὸν παρ' ὑμῶν.'</p> <p>Antalcidas I (192A)</p> <p>A and C are told about Antalcidas; B and D about Pleistonax. Therefore: C>A D>B</p>	<p>B Πλειστοῦναξ δ' ὁ Παιωνίου, ῥήτορος Ἀθηναίου τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀμαθεὶς ἀποκαλοῦντος, ὄρθῳς ἔφη λέγεις· μόνοι γὰρ Ἑλλάνων ἄμμες οὐδὲν κακὸν μεμαθήκαμεν παρ' ὑμῶν."</p> <p>Lyc. 20.8</p> <p>C Πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀμαθεὶς καλοῦντα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους Ἀθηναῖον ἄμονοι γοῦν εἶπεν ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν μεμαθήκαμεν παρ' ὑμῶν κακόν.'</p> <p>Aporhth. Lac. 217D</p> <p>D Πλειστοῦναξ ὁ Παιωνίου, Ἀττικοῦ τινος ῥήτορος τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀμαθεὶς ἀποκαλοῦντος, ὄρθῳς ἔφη λέγεις· μόνοι γὰρ Ἑλλήνων ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν κακὸν μεμαθήκαμεν παρ' ὑμῶν.'</p> <p>Aporhth. Lac. 231D</p>
<p>A Ἐτέρου δ' Ἀθηναίου πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπόντος ἄλλα μὴν ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ πολλὰκις ὑμᾶς ἐδιώξαμεν', ἡμεῖς δ' οὐδέποτε εἶπεν ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐρώτα.'</p> <p>Antalcidas II (191BD)</p> <p>C>ABD</p>	<p>B λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀνταλκίδας, Ἀθηναίου τινὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὑπὲρ ἀνδρίας πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ εἰπόντος ἡμεῖς μέντοι πολλὰκις ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ ἐδιώξαμεν", ὑποτυχεῖν· ἄλλ' ἡμεῖς γ' οὐδέποθ' ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐρώτα."</p> <p>Ages. 31.7</p> <p>C Ἐτέρου δ' Ἀθηναίου πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπόντος ἄλλα μὴν ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ πολλὰκις ὑμᾶς ἐδιώξαμεν', ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔφη οὐδέποτε ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐρώτα.'</p> <p>Aporhth. Lac. 217D</p> <p>D καὶ τὸ Ἀνταλκίδου τοῦ Σπαρτιάτου πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναῖον τὸν φήσαντα ἄλλα μὴν ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ ἐδιώξαμεν', ἄλλ' ἡμεῖς γ' ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐρώτα οὐδέποτε.'</p> <p>Praec. ger. reip. 810F</p>

<p>A Ἡδιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν αὐτῷ γεγονότων καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἶναι ἔλεγε τὸ [τῶν γειναμένων αὐτῶν] τοῦ πατρὸς ἔτι ζῶντος καὶ τῆς μητρὸς ἐν Λεύκτροις νικῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίους. <i>Eraeinondas X (193A)</i> X>ABCD</p>	<p>B τοῦτο δ' ἀμέλει καὶ τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδα <u>φασὶν</u> ἐξομολογήσασθαι τὸ πάθος, εὐτυχίαν ποιούμενον ἑαυτοῦ μεγίστην, ὅτι τὴν <i>ἐν Λεύκτροις στρατηγίαν</i> αὐτοῦ καὶ νίκην ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἔτι ζῶντες ἐπεῖδον. <i>Cor. 4.6</i> C ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἡδιστον αὐτῷ γέγονεν, ἀπεκρίνατο τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔτι ζῶντος καὶ τῆς μητρὸς νικῆσαι τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχην. <i>An seni 786D</i> D μαρτυρεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας εἰπόν, ὡς <u>φασιν</u>, ἡδιστον αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ τοὺς τεκόντας <u>ζῶντας ἐπιδεῖν τὸ ἐν Λεύκτροις</u> τρόποιον <u>αὐτοῦ</u> στρατηγούντος. <i>Non posse 1098AB</i></p>
<p>A Ἐπει δ' ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς ὑποστρέψας ἔφευγε θανάτου δίκην μετὰ τῶν συστρατῆγων ὡς ἐπιβαλὼν τῇ βοιωταρχίᾳ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τέσσαρας μῆνας, τοὺς μὲν συνάρχοντας ἐκέλευεν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναφέρειν τὴν αἰτίαν ὡς ἐκβιασθέντας, αὐτὸς δ' οὐκ ἔφη βελτίονας ἔχειν τῶν ἔργων λόγους· εἰ δὲ δεῖ τι πάντως εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς, ἀξιούν, ἂν ἀποκτείνωσιν αὐτόν, ἐπιγράψαι τῇ στήλῃ τὴν καταδίκην, ὅπως οἱ Ἕλληνες εἰδῶσιν ὅτι μὴ βουλομένους Θηβαίους Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἠνάγκασε τὴν Λακωνικὴν πυρπολῆσαι, πεντακοσίους ἐνιαυτοὺς ἀδήωτον οὖσαν· οἰκίσαι δὲ Μεσσήνην δι' ἑτῶν τριάκοντα καὶ διακοσίων· συντάξαι δὲ καὶ συναγαγεῖν εἰς ταῦτον Ἀρκάδας· ἀποδοῦναι δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὴν αὐτονομίαν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπράχθη κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν στρατείαν. ἐξῆλθον οὖν οἱ δικασταὶ σὺν πολλῷ γέλῳτι μηδὲ τὰς ψήφους ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀναλαβόντες. <i>Eraeinondas XXIII (194A–C)</i> C1 is only a short reference to the story, C2 is only a reference to the first part of the story. X>ABC2</p>	<p>B Θηβαῖοι γοῦν, ἐγκαλουμένων τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅτι τοῦ χρόνου τῆς βοιωταρχίας ἐξήκοντος αὐτοῖς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπανήλθον ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐνέβαλον καὶ τὰ <u>περὶ Μεσσήνην</u> <u>διόκησαν</u>, Πελοπίδαν μὲν ὑποπίπτοντα καὶ δεόμενον μόλις ἀπέλυσαν, Ἐπαμεινώνδου δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων μεγαλγορήσαντος, τέλος δὲ φήσαντος ὡς ἑτοιμὸς ἐστὶν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἂν ὁμολογήσωσιν, ὅτι τὴν Λακωνικὴν διεπόρθησε καὶ Μεσσήνην ὄκισε καὶ συνέστησεν Ἀρκαδίαν ἀκόντων ἐκείνων, οὐδὲ τὰς ψήφους ἀναλαβεῖν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοντες τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ χαίροντες ἅμα καὶ γελῶντες ἀπηλλάγησαν. <i>De se ipsum laud. 540DE</i> C1 οὐδέ γ' αὐτὸν πάλιν Ἀθηναίους, Ἐπαμεινώνδου πρὸς τὴν κατηγορίαν ἀπολογεῖσθαι μὴ θέλοντος ἀλλ' ἀναστάντος ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον ἀπιόντος, εὐκόλως ἐνεγκεῖν τὴν ὑπεροψίαν καὶ τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ ἀνδρός· <i>Praec. ger. reip. 799EF</i> C2 ὡς Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ἐπιβαλὼν τέτταρας μῆνας τῇ βοιωταρχίᾳ παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν οἷς εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐνέβαλε καὶ τὰ <u>περὶ Μεσσήνην</u> ἔπραξεν· <i>Praec. ger. reip. 817EF</i></p>

<p>A † Πετιλλίου δὲ καὶ Κοῖντου πολλὰ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον αὐτοῦ κατηγορησάντων, εἰπὼν ὅτι τῆ σήμερον ἡμέρα Καρχηδονίου καὶ Ἀννιβαν ἐνίκησεν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἔφη στεφανωσάμενος ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὸ Καπετώλιον θύσων, τὸν δὲ βουλόμενον τὴν ψῆφον ἐκέλευσε φέρειν περὶ αὐτοῦ· καὶ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνέβαινεν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἐπηκολούθησε τοὺς κατηγοροὺς ἀπολυτῶν λέγοντας. Scipio Maior X (196F–197A) B is only a reference to the story.</p>	<p>B ὡς ἐπὶ Σκιπίωνα τοὺς περὶ Πετίλιον. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ἀπ' οἴκου τε μεγάλου καὶ φρονήματος ἀληθινοῦ ποιησάμενον ὑπὸ πόδας τὰς διαβολὰς μὴ † ἀποκτεῖναι δυνηθεὶς ἀφῆκε Ca. Ma. 15.1–2 C ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι Κικέρωνι μὲν ἐδυσχέραινον ἐγκωμιάζοντι πολλακίς ἑαυτοῦ τὰς περὶ Κατιλίαν πράξεις, Σκιπίωνι δ' εἰπόντι μὴ πρέπειν αὐτοῖς κρίνειν περὶ Σκιπίωνος, δι' ὃν ἔχουσι τὸ κρίνειν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, στεφανωσάμενοι συνανέβησαν εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον καὶ συνέθισαν. De se ipsum laud. 540F–541A</p>
<p>A Νικήσας δὲ τὸν Περσέα καὶ τὰς ἐπινικίους ποιούμενος ἐσιτιάσεις ἔλεγε τῆς αὐτῆς ἐμπειρίας εἶναι στρατεύμα φοβερωτάτον πολεμίους καὶ συμπόσιον ἥδιστον φίλοις παρασχεῖν. Paulus Aemilius VI (198B) X>ABC or A>BC</p>	<p>B ὁ δὲ καὶ τούτοις ἔχαίρει, <καὶ> ὅτι πολλῶν παρεσκευασμένων καὶ λαμπρῶν τὸ ἥδιστον αὐτὸς ἦν ἀπόλαυσμα καὶ θέαμα τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θαυμάζοντας τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔλεγε, τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι ψυχῆς παρατάξεώς τε προστήναι καλῶς καὶ συμπόσιον, τῆς μὲν ὅπως φοβερωτάτη τοῖς πολεμίους, τοῦ δ' ὡς εὐχαριστότατον ἦ τοῖς συνοῦσιν. Aem. 28.9 C καὶ γὰρ δὴ Παῦλον Αἰμίλιον στρατηγὸν λέγουσιν, ὅτε Περσέα καταπολεμήσας ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πότους συνεκρότει, κόσμῳ τε θαυμαστῷ περὶ πάντα καὶ περιττῆ τάξει χρώμενον εἰπεῖν ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστί καὶ φάλαγγα συστήσαι φοβερωτάτην καὶ συμπόσιον ἥδιστον, ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ εὐταξίας εἶναι. καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ βασιλικωτάτους ὁ ποιητῆς (<i>A 16 et al.</i>) εἶωθε 'κοσμῆτορας λαῶν' προσαγορεύειν. καὶ τὸν μέγαν θεὸν ὑμεῖς πού φατε τὴν ἀκοσμίαν εὐταξία μεταβαλεῖν εἰς κόσμον. Quaest. Conv. 615EF</p>
<p>A Κάτων ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ τῆς ἀσωτίας καὶ πολυτελείας καθαρπτόμενος εἶπεν 'ὡς χαλεπὸν ἐστί λέγειν πρὸς γαστέρα ὅτα μὴ ἔχουσαν.' Cato Maior I (198D) <i>Cato Maior I and II (198D)</i> should be considered one unit. X>ABCD or A>BCD or B>ACD</p>	<p>B Μέλλων ποτὲ τὸν Ῥωμαίων δῆμον ὠρμημένον ἀκαίρως ἐπὶ σιτομετρίας καὶ διανομᾶς ἀποτρέπειν, ἤρξατο τῶν λόγων οὕτως· 'χαλεπὸν μὲν ἐστί ὃ πολῖται πρὸς γαστέρα λέγειν ὅτα οὐκ ἔχουσαν.'</p> <p>Κατηγορῶν ... Ca. Ma. 8.1 C ἂν δ' ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν λευλιμένη χαλεπὸν ἦ χρῆσθαι καὶ φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς γαστέρα ὅτα μὴ ἔχουσαν, ὡς ἔλεγε Κάτων, διαμηχανητέον τῇ ποιότητι τῆς τροφῆς ἐλαφρότερον ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος. De tuenda 131D D χαλεπὸν μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ Κάτων ἔφησε, λέγειν πρὸς γαστέρας ὅτα μὴ ἔχουσας. De esu 2 996D</p>

<p>A Θαυμάζειν δὲ πῶς σφύζεται πόλις, ἐν ᾗ πωλεῖται πλείονος ἰχθὺς ἢ βοῦς. Cato Maior II (198D) X>ABC or A>BC or B>AC</p>	<p>B ... ἔχουσαν.' Κατηγορῶν δὲ τῆς πολυτελείας ἔφη χαλεπὸν εἶναι σωθῆναι πόλιν ἐν ᾗ πωλεῖται πλείονος ἰχθὺς ἢ βοῦς. Ca. Ma. 8.2 C ὁ γοῦν Κάτων οὐχ ὑπερβολικῶς ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς πρὸς τὴν τρυφήν καὶ πολυτέλειαν τῆς πόλεως δημηγορῶν εἶπεν, ὅτι πλείονος πιπράσκειται ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἰχθὺς ἢ βοῦς κεράμιόν τε ταρίχους πωλοῦσι τιμῆς, ὅσῃν οὐκ ἂν ἑκατόμβη βούπρωρος ἄλλοι κατακοπέισα. Quaest. conv. 668BC</p>
<p>A Τῶν δὲ νέων ἔφη χαίρειν τοῖς ἐρυθριῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ὠχριῶσι. Cato Maior VI (198E) There seem to be two groups: AB and CD.</p>	<p>B Τῶν δὲ νέων ἔφη χαίρειν τοῖς ἐρυθριῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ὠχριῶσι Ca. Ma. 9.5 C ὁ δὲ Κάτων ἔλεγε φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρυθριῶντας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ὠχριῶντας. De aud. poet. 29E D ὁ μὲν οὖν Κάτων ἔλεγε τῶν νέων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶν τοὺς ἐρυθριῶντας ἢ τοὺς ὠχριῶντας De vit. pud. 528F</p>
<p>A Πολλῶν δ' ὄρων ἀνισταμένους ἀνδριάντας 'περὶ ἐμοῦ δ' ἔφη 'βούλομαι ἐρωτᾶν μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, διὰ τί ἀνδριάς οὐ κεῖται [Κάτωνος] ἢ διὰ τί κεῖται.' Cato Maior X (198EF) X>ABC or B>AC</p>	<p>B πρὸς δὲ τοὺς θαυμάζοντας, ὅτι πολλῶν ἀδόξων ἀνδριάντας ἐχόντων ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἔχει, 'μᾶλλον γάρ' ἔφη 'βούλομαι ζητεῖσθαι, διὰ τί μου ἀνδριάς οὐ κεῖται ἢ διὰ τί κεῖται'. Ca. Ma. 19.6 C ὁ δὲ Κάτων, ἤδη τότε τῆς Ῥώμης καταπιμπλαμένης ἀνδριάντων, οὐκ ἐδῶν αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι 'μᾶλλον' ἔφη 'βούλομαι πυνθάνεσθαι τινας, διὰ τί μου ἀνδριάς οὐ κεῖται ἢ διὰ τί κεῖται'. Praec. ger. reip. 820B</p>
<p>A Τῷ δὲ γῆρα πολλῶν αἰσχρῶν παρόντων ἠξίου μὴ προστιθέναι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας αἰσχύνην. Cato Maior XV (199A) X>ABCD or B>ACD</p>	<p>B Πρὸς δὲ πρεσβύτην πονηρευόμενον 'ἄνθρωπε' εἶπε, 'πολλὰ ἔχοντι τῷ γῆρα τὰ αἰσχροῦ μὴ προστίθει τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας αἰσχύνην.' Ca. Ma. 9.10 C ὁ γὰρ Κάτων ἔλεγεν, ὅτι πολλὰς ἰδίας ἔχοντι τῷ γῆρα κήρας οὐ δεῖ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας ἐκόντας ἐπάγειν αἰσχύνην. An seni 784A D ὁ Κάτων πρὸς τινὰ πρεσβύτην πονηρευόμενον 'ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τί τῷ γῆρα' ἔφη 'πολλὰ κακὰ ἔχοντι τὴν ἐκ τῆς πονηρίας αἰσχύνην προστίθης.' De vit. aer. 829F</p>
<p>A Διδάσκων δὲ τοὺς νέους εὐθαρσῶς μάχεσθαι πολλάκις ἔλεγε τοῦ ξίφους τὸν λόγον μᾶλλον καὶ τὴν φωνὴν τῆς χειρὸς τρέπειν καὶ καταπλήττειν τοὺς πολεμίους. Cato Maior XXIII (199CD) X>ABC</p>	<p>B λόγου δ' ἀπειλῆ καὶ τραχύτητι φωνῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἐχρήτο, ὀρθῶς καὶ διανοούμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῦ ξίφους μᾶλλον καταπλήττεται τὸν ἐναντίον. Ca. Ma. 1.8</p>

	<p>C και γὰρ ἦν, ὥσπερ ἠξίου τὸν στρατιώτην ὁ Κάτων, οὐ χειρὶ καὶ πληγῇ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τόνῳ <i>φωνῆς</i> καὶ ὄψει προσώπου φοβερὸς ἐντυχεῖν πολέμῳ καὶ δυσυπόστατος, ἀθροισομένων δὲ πολλῶν καὶ συνισταμένων περὶ αὐτόν, ἀπεχώρουσιν οἱ πολέμιοι δέισαντες.</p> <p>Cor. 8.3</p>
<p>A Ἐτι δὲ νέος ὢν τοσαύτην εἶχε δόξαν ἀνδρείας καὶ συνέσεως, ὥστε <i>Κάτων</i> μὲν τὸν πρεσβύτερον εἰπεῖν ἐρωτηθέντα περὶ τῶν ἐν <i>Καρρηδόνι</i> στρατευομένων, ἐν οἷς καὶ Σκιπίων ἦν, (κ 495) ‘<i>οἷος πέπνυται, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ αἰσσοσιν.</i>’ Scipio Minor III (200A) X>ABC</p>	<p>B οὕτω μὲν ἐξεργάσασθαι λέγεται τὸν τρίτον καὶ τελευταῖον ὁ <i>Κάτων</i> ἐπὶ <i>Καρρηδονίου</i> πόλεμον, ἀρξαμένου δὲ πολεμεῖν ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀποθεσπίσας περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐπιθήσειν τῷ πολέμῳ τέλος ἀνδρός, ὃς ἦν μὲν τότε νεανίας, χιλιαρχος δὲ στρατευόμενος ἐπεδείκνυτο καὶ γνώμης ἔργα καὶ τόλμης πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἀπαγγελλομένων δὲ τούτων εἰς Ῥώμην, πυνθανόμενον τὸν Κάτωνά φασιν εἰπεῖν (Od. 10, 495)· <i>οἷος πέπνυται, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ αἰσσοσιν.</i> ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπόφασιν ταχὺ δι’ ἔργων ἐβεβαίωσεν ὁ Σκιπίων.</p> <p>Ca. Ma. 27.5–7</p> <p>C θαυμάσας αὐτοῦ μειρακίου μὲν ὄντος τὴν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ μονομαχίαν καὶ νίκην, μικρὸν δ’ ὕστερον τὰ πρὸς <i>Καρρηδόνι</i> χιλιαρχούντος ἔργα, περὶ ὧν καὶ <i>Κάτων</i> ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἀνεφώνησεν (κ 495) ‘<i>οἷος πέπνυται, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ αἰσσοσιν.</i>’</p> <p>Praec. ger. reip. 805A</p>
<p>A Μαμερτίνος δὲ τῆς ἐναντίας γενομένουσιν μερίδος οἷος [τε] ἦν ἀποσφάττειν ἅπαντας· Σθενίου δὲ τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ φήσαντος οὐ δίκαια ποιεῖν αὐτόν ἀνθ’ ἐνὸς αἰτίου πολλοὺς ἀναιτίους κολάζοντα, τοῦτον δὲ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν <i>τοὺς μὲν φίλους πείσαντα</i> τοὺς δ’ <i>ἐχθροὺς βιασάμενον</i> ἐλέσθαι τὰ Μαρίου, θαυμάσας ὁ Πομπήιος ἔφη συγγνώμην ἔχειν Μαμερτίνοιο ὑπὸ τοιοῦτο πεισθεῖσιν ἀνδρός, ὃς τὴν πατρίδα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς προτιμᾷ. καὶ τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ τὸν Σθένιον ἀπέλυσεν.</p> <p>Pompeius III (203CD) X>ABC</p>	<p>B τὴν δ’ Ἡμεραίων πόλιν ἐγνωκότος αὐτοῦ κολάζειν, γενομένην μετὰ τῶν πολεμίων, Σθένιος ὁ δημαγωγός αἰτησάμενος λόγον οὐκ <i>ἔφη δίκαια ποιήσειν</i> τὸν Πομπήιον, ἀν τὸν <i>αἴτιον</i> ἀφείξαι <i>ἀπολέσει</i> τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικούντας, ἐρομένου δ’ ἐκείνου τίνα λέγει τὸν αἴτιον, ἑαυτὸν ὁ Σθένιος ἔφη, <i>τοὺς μὲν φίλους πείσαντα</i> τῶν πολιτῶν, <i>τοὺς δ’ ἐχθροὺς βιασάμενον</i>. ἀγασθεῖς οὖν τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ ἀνδρός ὁ Πομπήιος ἀφήκε τῆς αἰτίας πρῶτον ἐκείνον</p> <p>Pomp. 10.11–13</p> <p>C καὶ πρὸς Σθένωνα Πομπήιος ἔπαθεν, ὅτε, Μαμερτίνος μέλλοντος αὐτοῦ κολάζειν διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν, οὐκ <i>ἔφη δίκαια πράξειν αὐτόν</i> ὁ Σθένων, εἰ πολλοὺς ἀναιτίους ἀπολεῖ δι’ ἕνα τὸν <i>αἴτιον</i>· ὁ γὰρ ἀποστήσας τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς εἶναι τοὺς μὲν <i>φίλους</i> πείσας τοὺς δ’ <i>ἐχθροὺς βιασάμενος</i>. οὕτω ταῦτα διέθηκε τὸν Πομπήιον, ὥστε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀφείναι καὶ τῷ Σθένωνι χρήσασθαι φιλανθρώπως.</p> <p>Praec. ger. reip. 815EF</p>

<p>A Ἐπανεθλόνα δ' αὐτὸν ὁ Σύλλας ταῖς μὲν ἄλλαις τιμαῖς ἐδέξατο φιλοφρόνας καὶ Μᾶγνον προσηγόρευσε πρῶτος αὐτόν, <i>θριαμβεῦσαι</i> δὲ βουλόμενον οὐκ εἶα μηδέπω μετέχοντα βουλῆς, εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Πομπηίου πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἀγνοεῖν τὸν Σύλλαν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατέλλοντα πλείονες ἢ δύνοντα προσκυνοῦσιν, ὁ μὲν Σύλλας ἀνεβόησε ‘θριαμβευέτω.’ Pompeius V (203EF) On Pompey’s title “Magnus”, see <i>Pomp.</i> 13. X>ABCD or A>BCD</p>	<p>B εἰ δὲ Πομπήιος οὐπω πάνυ γενειῶν εἰσελᾷ θριαμβεῦων εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ᾗ βουλῆς διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν οὐ μέτεστι, παντάπασιν ἐπίφθονον ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἑαυτῶ καὶ τὴν τιμὴν ἐκείνῳ. ταῦτα πρὸς Πομπήιον ὁ Σύλλας ἔλεγεν, ὡς οὐκ ἔάσων, ἀλλὰ ἐνστησόμενος αὐτῷ καὶ κολούσων τὸ φιλόνομον ἀπειθοῦντος, ὁ δὲ Πομπήιος οὐχ ὑπέπτηξεν, ἀλλ’ ἐννοεῖν ἐκέλευσε τὸν Σύλλαν ὅτι τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατέλλοντα πλείονες ἢ δυόμενον προσκυνοῦσιν Pomp. 14.2–4 C Ἦνία δὲ Πομπήιος αὐτόν, εὐημερῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίαις, καὶ πρὶν ἢ βουλῆς μεταλαβεῖν θριαμβεῦων, καὶ Μᾶγνος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μέγας, ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναγορευθεῖς, καί ποτε καὶ φήσαντός τινος, ὡς Πομπήιος Μᾶγνος πρόσεισι, γελάσας ἠρώτησεν ὡς “τηλίκος.” Crass. 7.1 D Πομπήιος δὲ καὶ <i>θριαμβεῦειν</i> ἡξίου μῆπω παριῶν εἰς σύγκλητον· οὐκ ἐῶντος δὲ Σύλλα, ‘πλείονες’ ἔφη ‘τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατέλλοντα προσκυνοῦσιν ἢ δυόμενον.’ καὶ Σύλλας ὑπεῖξε τοῦτ’ ἀκούσας. Praec. ger. reip. 804EF</p>
<p>A <i>Τῶν δὲ Σερτωρίου γραμμάτων</i> κρατήσας ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ, ἐν οἷς ἦσαν ἐπιστολαὶ πολλῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῷ καὶ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας τὸν <i>Σερτώριον</i> εἰς Ῥώμην <i>καλούντων</i>, <i>κατέκαυσε</i> πάσας διδοῦς μετανοῆσαι καὶ βελτίονα γενέσθαι τοὺς πονηροῦς. Pompeius VII (204A) X>ABC or C>AB</p>	<p>B ὁ γὰρ <i>Περπένας</i> τῶν <i>Σερτωρίου γραμμάτων</i> <i>γεγονώς κύριος</i>, ἐδείκνυεν ἐπιστολάς τῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, οἳ τὰ παρόντα κινήσαι βουλόμενοι πράγματα καὶ <i>μεταστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐκάλουν τὸν Σερτώριον</i> εἰς τὴν <i>Ἰταλίαν</i>. φοβηθεῖς οὖν ὁ Πομπήιος ταῦτα, <i>μὴ μείζονας ἀναστήσει</i> τῶν πεπαυμένων πολέμων, τὸν τε <i>Περπέναν</i> ἀνεῖλε, καὶ τὰς ἐπιστολάς <i>οὐδ’ ἀναγνοὺς κατέκαυσε</i>. Pomp. 20.7–8 C Οἱ μὲν οὖν πλείστοι τῶν Ἰβήρων εὐθὺς ᾤχοντο καὶ παρέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιπρεσβευσάμενοι τοῖς περὶ Πομπήιον καὶ Μέτελλον· τοὺς δὲ συμμείναντας ὁ <i>Περπένας</i> ἀναλαβὼν ἐπεχειρεῖ τι πράττειν. <i>χρησάμενος</i> δὲ ταῖς <i>Σερτωρίου</i> <i>παρασκευαῖς</i> ὅσον ἐνασχημονῆσαι καὶ φανερός γενέσθαι μῆτ’ ἄρχειν μῆτ’ ἄρχεσθαι πεφυκώς, Πομπηῖον συνέβαλε, καὶ ταχὺ συντριβεῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ γενόμενος αἰχμάλωτος, οὐδὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην ὑπέμεινε συμφορὰν ἡγεμονικῶς, ἀλλὰ <i>τῶν Σερτωρίου γραμμάτων κύριος γεγονώς</i>, ὑπισχνεῖτο Πομπηῖον δεῖξιν ὑπατικῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μέγιστον ἐν Ῥώμῃ δυναμένων αὐτογράφους ἐπιστολάς, <i>καλούντων Σερτώριον</i> εἰς <i>Ἰταλίαν</i>, ὡς πολλῶν ποθοῦντων τὰ παρόντα κινήσαι καὶ <i>μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν</i>. ἔργον οὖν ὁ Πομπηῖος οὐ νέας φρενός, ἀλλ’ εὖ μάλα βεβηκυίας καὶ κατηρτυμένης ἐργασάμενος, μεγάλων ἀπήλλαξε</p>

	<p>τὴν Ῥώμην φόβον καὶ νεωτερισμῶν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστολάς ἐκείνας καὶ τὰ γράμματα τοῦ Σερτωρίου συναγαγὼν ἅπαντα <i>κατέκαυσεν</i>, οὐτ' ἀναγνοὺς οὐτ' ἑάσας ἕτερον, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν <u>Περπένηναν</u> κατὰ τάχος ἀνεῖλε, φοβηθεὶς μὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξενεχθέντων πρὸς τινὰς <u>ἀποστάσεις</u> καὶ ταραχαὶ γένωνται <i>Sert. 27.1–5</i></p>
<p>Α Λευκίου δὲ Λευκούλλου μετὰ τὰς στρατείας ἀφεικότος αὐτὸν εἰς ἡδονὰς καὶ πολυτελῶς ζῶντος, τὸν δὲ Πομπήιον ὡς παρ' ἡλικίαν τοῦ πολλὰ πράσσειν ὀρεγόμενον νέγοντος, μᾶλλον ἔφη γέροντι τὸ τρυφᾶν ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν εἶναι παρ' ἡλικίαν. <i>Pompeius IX (204B)</i> X>ABCD</p>	<p>Β Κάτων δ' ὡσπερ ἐπίπλους καὶ φοιβόληπτος ἐν τῇ βουλῇ τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ πόλει καὶ τῷ Πομπηίῳ προηγόρευε, Λεύκολλος δ' ἀπειπὼν ἡσυχίαν ἤγεν, ὡς οὐκέτι πρὸς <u>πολιτείαν</u> ὠραῖος· ὅτε δὴ καὶ Πομπήιος ἔφη γέροντι τὸ τρυφᾶν ἀφρότερον εἶναι τοῦ <u>πολιτεύεσθαι</u>. <i>Pomp. 48.6–7</i> C οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράσσον καὶ Πομπήιον ἐγλεύαζον τὸν Λεύκολλον εἰς ἡδονὴν ἀφεικότα καὶ πολυτέλειαν αὐτόν, ὡσπερ οὐ <u>τοῦ τρυφᾶν</u> μᾶλλον τοῖς τηλικούτοις παρ' ἡλικίαν ὄντος ἢ <u>τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι</u> καὶ στρατηγεῖν. <i>Luc. 38.5</i> D οὐδὲ τῇ τοῦ Πομπηίου Μάγνου φωνῇ διατραπέντες, [τῇ] πρὸς Λεύκολλον ἦν εἶπεν, αὐτὸν μὲν εἰς λουτρά καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ συνουσίας μεθημερινὰς καὶ πολὺν ἄλυν καὶ κατασκευὰς οἰκοδομημάτων νεοπρεπεῖς μετὰ τὰς στρατείας καὶ πολιτείας ἀφεικότα, τῷ δὲ Πομπηίῳ φιλαρχίαν ἐγκαλοῦντα καὶ φιλοτιμίαν παρ' ἡλικίαν· ἔφη γὰρ ὁ Πομπήιος <u>ἀφρότερον</u> εἶναι γέροντι τὸ τρυφᾶν ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ νοσοῦντι συνέταξε [see the case below] <i>An seni 785E–786A</i></p>
<p>Α <i>Νοσοῦντι</i> δ' αὐτῷ <i>κίχλην</i> ὁ <i>ιατρός λαβεῖν προσέταξεν</i>· οἱ δὲ <i>ζητοῦντες οὐχ εὖρον</i> (ἦν γὰρ παρ' ὄραν), ἔφη δὲ <i>τις εὐρεθήσεσθαι παρὰ Λευκούλλῳ δι' ἔτους τρεφομένης</i>· <i>ἔϊτα</i> ἔφη <i>εἰ μὴ Λεύκολλος ἐτρέφα, Πομπήιος οὐκ ἂν ἔζησε;</i> καὶ χαίρειν ἑάσας τὸν ἱατρὸν ἔλαβε τι τῶν εὐπορίστων. <i>Pompeius X (204B)</i> X>ABCD</p>	<p>Β <i>ιατρός αὐτῷ νοσοῦντι</i> καὶ κακῶς ἔχοντι πρὸς τὰ σιτία <i>κίχλην προσέταξε λαβεῖν</i>. ὡς δὲ <i>ζητοῦντες οὐχ εὖρον ὄνιον</i> (ἦν γὰρ παρ' ὄραν), ἔφη δὲ <i>τις εὐρεθήσεσθαι παρὰ Λευκούλλῳ δι' ἔτους τρεφομένης</i>, <i>ἔϊτ'</i> εἶπεν, <i>εἰ μὴ Λεύκολλος ἐτρέφα, Πομπήιος οὐκ ἂν ἔζησε;</i> καὶ χαίρειν ἑάσας τὸν ἱατρὸν ἔλαβε τι τῶν εὐπορίστων. <i>Pomp. 2.11–12</i> C ὁ γοῦν Πομπήιος εὐδοκίμησεν <ὅτι> νοσῶν, τοῦ μὲν ἱατροῦ κίχλην αὐτὸν λαβεῖν κελεύσαντος, τῶν δ' οἰκετῶν οὐκ ἂν εὐρεῖν ἀλλαγῶτι φαιμένων θέρους ὦρα κίχλην ἢ <i>παρὰ Λευκούλλῳ</i> σιτευομένην, <i>οὐκ</i> εἶπασε λαβεῖν ἐκεῖθεν, ἀλλ' εἶπὼν πρὸς τὸν ἱατρὸν <i>οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ Λεύκολλος ἐτρέφα, Πομπήιος οὐκ ἂν ἔζησεν;</i> ἄλλο τι παρασκευάσαι τῶν εὐπορίστων ἐκέλευσε. <i>Luc. 40.2</i></p>

	<p>D [see the case above] είναι γέροντι τὸ τρυφᾶν ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ <i>νοσοῦντι</i> συνέταξε <i>κίχλην</i> ὁ <i>ιατρός</i>, ἦν δὲ δυσπόριστον καὶ <i>παρ' ὄραν</i>, ἔφη δέ τις εἶναι <i>παρὰ Λευκόλλῳ</i> πολλὰς <i>τρεφομένας</i>, οὐκ ἔπεμψεν <i>οὐδ' ἔλαβεν</i> εἰπὼν <i>‘οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὴ Λεύκολλος ἐτύφθα, Πομπήιος οὐκ ἂν ἐξήσσε;’</i> <i>An seni 786A</i></p>
<p>A Πρὸς δὲ <i>Κάτων</i> πικρῶς καθαγιάμενον, ὅτι πολλάκις αὐτοῦ προαγορευόντος τὴν Καίσαρος δύναμιν καὶ αὐξήσιν οὐκ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τῆς δημοκρατίας γινομένην ἀντέπραπτεν αὐτός, ἀπεκρίνατο <i>‘τὰ μὲν σὰ μαντικώτερα, τὰ δ' ἐμὰ φιλικώτερα.’</i> <i>Pompeius XIII (204C)</i> X>ABC or B>AC</p>	<p>B τοῦ δὲ <i>Κάτωνος</i> ὑπομιμνήσκοντος ὧν ἐν ἀρχῇ περὶ Καίσαρος αὐτῷ προεἶπεν, ἀπεκρίνατο <i>μαντικώτερα</i> μὲν εἶναι τὰ <i>Κάτωνι λεχθέντα</i>, <i>φιλικώτερα</i> δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ <i>πεπρᾶχθαι</i>. <i>Pomp. 60.8</i> C εἶπεν οὖν ὁ <i>Κάτων</i>· “ἀλλ' εἰ γ' οἷς ἐγὼ προὔλεγον ἀεὶ καὶ συνεβούλευον ἐπέισθη τις ὑμῶν ἄνδρες, οὐτ' ἂν ἐν' ἐφοβείσθε νῦν, οὐτ' ἐν ἐνὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας εἶχετε.” Πομπηίου δ' εἰπόντος, <i>μαντικώτερα</i> μὲν <i>εἰρησθαι Κάτωνι</i>, <i>φιλικώτερα</i> δ' <i>αὐτῷ πεπρᾶχθαι</i>, συνεβούλευεν ὁ <i>Κάτων</i> ἐνὶ Πομπηίῳ τὰ πράγματα τὴν σύγκλητον ἐχειρίσαι· <i>Ca. Mi. 52.2–3</i></p>
<p>A Μετέλλου δὲ <i>Νέπωτος</i> εἰπόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι <i>‘πλείονας μαρτυρῶν ἀπέκτονας ἢ συνηγορῶν σέσωκας’</i>, καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν· ἔφη <i>‘πλεῖον ἐμοὶ πίστεως ἢ λογιότητος.’</i> <i>Cicero V (204F–205A)</i> X>ABC</p>	<p>B Μετέλλου δὲ <i>Νέπωτος</i> εἰπόντος, ὅτι <i>πλείονας καταμαρτυρῶν ἀνήρηκεν ἢ συνηγορῶν σέσωκεν</i>, “ὁμολογῶ γάρ” ἔφη “<i>πίστεως ἐν ἐμοὶ πλέον ἢ δεινότητος</i> εἶναι”· <i>Cic. 26.6</i> C καὶ ὁ <i>Κικέρων</i>, τοῦ <i>Μετέλλου</i> πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπόντος ὅτι <i>πλείονας ἀνήρηκε καταμαρτυρήσας ἢ συνηγορήσας σέσωκε</i>, ‘τίς δ’” εἶπεν ‘οὐ φησιν ἐν ἐμοὶ πλέον εἶναι <i>πίστεως ἢ δεινότητος;</i>’ <i>De se ipsum laud. 541F–542A</i></p>
<p>A Πρὸς δὲ τὸν δοκοῦντα <i>Λίβυν</i> ἀπὸ γένους εἶναι, φήσαντα δ' αὐτοῦ μὴ ἀκοῦειν λέγοντος, ‘καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἀτρύπητον ἔχεις τὸ οὐς’ εἶπε. <i>Cicero IX (205B)</i> X>ABC</p>	<p>B ἦν δὲ τις <i>Ἰκταούιος</i> αἰτίαν ἔχων ἐκ <i>Λιβύης</i> γεγενῆσθαι <i>πρὸς</i> τοῦτον ἐν τινὶ δίκῃ λέγοντα τοῦ <i>Κικέρωνος</i> μὴ ἐξακοῦειν “καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἔχεις” εἶπε “τὸ οὐς ἀτρύπητον”· <i>Cic. 26.5</i> C καὶ <i>Κικέρων</i> <i>πρὸς Ἰκταούιον</i>, ἐκ <i>Λιβύης</i> εἶναι δοκοῦντα λέγοντος δ' αὐτοῦ φάσκοντα <i>μὴ ἀκοῦειν</i>, ‘καὶ μὴν τετρυπημένον’ ἔφη ‘<i>ἔχεις τὸ οὐς.</i>’ <i>Quaest. conv. 631D</i></p>
<p>A Ἐπεὶ δὲ <i>Καῖσαρ</i> κρατήσας τὰς <i>Πομπηίου</i> <i>καταβεβλημένας εἰκόνας</i> ἀνέστησε μετὰ τιμῆς, ἔφη <i>περὶ</i> αὐτοῦ [<i>λέγων</i> ὁ <i>Κικέρων</i>] ὅτι <i>‘τοὺς Πομπηίου Καῖσαρ ἰστάς ἀνδριάντας τοὺς αὐτοῦ πύγγυσιν.’</i> <i>Cicero XX (205E)</i> X>ABCD seems to be the most plausible option.</p>	<p>B οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ <i>περὶ</i> τῶν <i>Πομπηίου</i> <i>λεχθῶν εἰκόνων</i>, ἃς ἀνηρημένας καὶ <i>καταβεβλημένας</i> ὁ <i>Καῖσαρ</i> <i>ἐκέλευσεν ἀνασταθῆναι</i>, καὶ ἀνεστάθησαν. ἔφη γὰρ ὁ <i>Κικέρων</i>, ὅτι ταύτη τῇ <i>φιλανθρωπίᾳ</i> <i>Καῖσαρ</i> <i>τοὺς μὲν Πομπηίου ἴσησι</i>, <i>τοὺς δ' αὐτοῦ πύγγυσιν ἀνδριάντας.</i> <i>Cic. 40.4–5</i> C καὶ τὰς <i>Πομπηίου</i> <i>καταβεβλημένας εἰκόνας</i> οὐ περιεῖδεν, ἀλλ' ἀνέστησεν, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ <i>Κικέρων</i> εἶπεν, ὅτι <i>Καῖσαρ</i> <i>τοὺς Πομπηίου</i> <i>στήσας</i></p>

	<p><i>ἀνδριάντας τοὺς ἰδίους ἐπιξε. τῶν δὲ φίλων ἀξιοῦντων αὐτὸν δορυφορεῖσθαι καὶ πολλῶν ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρεχόντων ἑαυτοῦς, οὐχ ὑπέμεινε, εἰπὼν ὡς βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἅπαξ ἀποθανεῖν ἢ αἰεὶ προσδοκᾶν.</i> Caes. 57.6–7 D τῷ Καίσαρι <i>κελεύσαντι</i> τὰς Πομπηίου τιμὰς ἀνασταθῆναι <i>καταβεβλημένας</i> ὁ Κικέρων ‘<i>τοὺς Πομπηίου</i>’ φησὶν ‘<i>ἀνδριάντας</i> ἐστήσας, <i>τοὺς δὲ σοὺς ἐπιξας</i>’. De cap. ex inim. 91A</p>
<p>A Πομπηίαν δὲ τὴν γυναῖκα κακῶς ἀκούσασαν <i>ἐπὶ Κλωδίῳ</i> παραιτησάμενος, εἶτα τοῦ Κλωδίου φεύγοντος ἐπὶ τούτῳ δίκην μάρτυς εἰσαχθεὶς <i>οὐδὲν</i> εἶπε φαῦλον περὶ τῆς γυναικός· ἐρομένου δὲ τοῦ κατήγορου ‘<i>διὰ τί τοῖνον ἐξέβαλες αὐτήν</i>’, ‘<i>ὅτι τὴν Καίσαρος</i>’ ἔφη ‘<i>γυναῖκα καὶ διαβολῆς ἔδει καθαρὰν εἶναι.</i>’ Caesar III (206AB) X>ABC</p>	<p>B ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ ἀπεπέμψατο μὲν εὐθὺς τὴν Πομπηίαν, μάρτυς δὲ πρὸς τὴν δίκην κληθεὶς, <i>οὐδὲν</i> ἔφη τῶν λεγομένων <i>κατὰ τοῦ Κλωδίου</i> γινώσκειν. ὡς δὲ τοῦ λόγου παραδόξου φανέντος ὁ κατήγορος ἠρώτησε “<i>πῶς οὖν ἀπεπέμψω τὴν γυναῖκα;</i>” “<i>ὅτι</i>” ἔφη “<i>τὴν ἐμὴν ἠξίουσαν μὴδ’ ὑπονοηθῆναι.</i>” Caes. 10.8–9 C ὁ μὲντοι Καῖσαρ οὐ <i>κατεμαρτύρησε κληθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸν Κλώδιον, οὐδ’</i> ἔφη <i>μοιχεῖαν κατεγνωκέναι</i> τῆς γυναικός, ἀφεικέναι δ’ αὐτήν <i>ὅτι τὸν Καίσαρος</i> ἔδει γάμον οὐ πρᾶξεως αἰσχροῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φήμης καθαρὸν εἶναι. Cic. 29.9</p>
<p>A Καὶ διέβη τὸν Ρουβίκωνα ποταμὸν ἐκ τῆς Γαλατικῆς ἐπαρχίας ἐπὶ Πομπήιον εἰπὼν ‘<i>πᾶς ἀνερρίφθω κύβος.</i>’ Caesar VII (206C) X>ABC or A>BC or C>AB</p>	<p>B τέλος δὲ μετὰ θυμοῦ τινος ὥσπερ ἀφεις ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, καὶ τοῦτο διὴ τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς εἰς τύχας ἐμβαίνουσιν ἀπόρους καὶ τόλμας προοίμιον ὑπεῖπὼν “<i>ἀνερρίφθω κύβος,</i>” ὥρμησε πρὸς τὴν διάβασιν Caes. 32.8 C καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν Ρουβίκωνα ποταμὸν ἐλθὼν, ὃς ἀφώριζεν αὐτῷ τὴν δεδομένην ἐπαρχίαν, [...] καὶ τοσοῦτον μόνον Ἑλληνιστὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἐκβοήσας, “<i>ἀνερρίφθω κύβος</i>”, διεβίβαζε τὸν στρατόν. Pomp. 60.3–4</p>
<p>A Ἐπεὶ δὲ Πομπηίου φυγόντος ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ἐκ τῆς Ρώμης Μέτελλος ἑπαρχος ὢν τοῦ ταμείου βουλόμενον αὐτὸν κρήματα λαβεῖν ἐκόλυε καὶ τὸ ταμεῖον ἀπέκλεισεν, ἠπέλιψεν ἀποκτενεῖν αὐτόν· καταπλεγέντος δὲ τοῦ Μετέλλου ‘<i>τοῦτ’</i> εἶπεν ‘<i>ὦ νεανίσκε, φῆσαι μοι χαλεπώτερον ἢν ἡ ποιῆσαι.</i>’ Caesar VIII (206C) X>ABC</p>	<p>B ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Μέτελλον εἰπὼν, ἐβάδιζε πρὸς τὰς θύρας τοῦ ταμείου. μὴ φαινόμενον δὲ τῶν κλειδῶν, χαλκεῖς μεταπεμψάμενος ἐκκόπτειν ἐκέλευεν. αὐθις δ’ ἐνισταμένου τοῦ Μετέλλου καὶ τινῶν ἐπαινούντων, διατεινόμενος ἠπέλιψεν ἀποκτενεῖν αὐτόν, εἰ μὴ παύσαιτο παρενοχλῶν· “<i>καὶ τοῦτ’</i>” ἔφη “<i>μειράκιον οὐκ ἄγνοεῖς ὅτι μοι δυσκολώτερον ἢν εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι.</i>” Caes. 35.9–10</p>

	<p>C Ὀλίγαις δ' ὕστερον ἡμέραις Καῖσαρ εἰσελάσας καὶ κατασχὼν τὴν Ῥώμην, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐπιεικῶς ἐνέτυχε καὶ κατεπράυνε, τῶν δὲ δημάρχων ἐνὶ <i>Μετέλλω</i>, κωλύοντι χρήματα λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ ταμείου, θάνατον ἠπέλιψε, καὶ προσέθηκε τῇ ἀπειλῇ τραχύτερον λόγον· ἔφη γάρ ὡς τοῦτο φῆσαι χαλεπὸν ἦν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον ἢ <i>πρᾶξιαι</i>.</p> <p>Pomp. 62.1</p>
<p>A Τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν αὐτῷ βραδέως εἰς Δυρράχιον ἐκ Βρεντεσίου κομιζομένων λαθῶν ἅπαντας εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβὰς μικρὸν ἐπεχείρησε διαπλεῖν τὸ πέλαγος· συγκλυζομένων δὲ τοῦ πλοίου ποιήσας τῷ <i>κυβερνήτῃ</i> φανερὸν <i>ἑαυτὸν</i> ἀνεβόησε πίστευε τῇ τύχῃ γνοὺς ὅτι Καίσαρα κομίσεις·</p> <p>Caesar IX (206CD) X>ABC or C>AB</p>	<p>B πρὸς δὲ τὴν πλημμύραν τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τὴν ἀντίβασιν τοῦ <i>κλύδωνος ἀγριαίνων ὁ ποταμός</i>, καὶ τραχὺς ἅμα καὶ κτύφω μεγάλῳ καὶ <i>σκληραῖς</i> ἀνακοπτόμενος δύναις, ἄπορος ἦν βιασθῆναι τῷ κυβερνήτῃ, καὶ μεταβαλεῖν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ναύτας, ὡς ἀποστρέψων τὸν πλοῦν. αἰσθόμενος δ' ὁ Καῖσαρ <i>ἀναδείκνυσιν ἑαυτὸν</i>, καὶ τοῦ <i>κυβερνήτου</i> λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς, ἐκπεπληγμένου πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, “ἴθι” ἔφη “<i>γενναῖε, τόλμα καὶ δέδιθι μηδέν· Καίσαρα φέρεις καὶ τὴν Καίσαρος Τύχην</i> συμπλέουσιν.”</p> <p>Caes. 38.4–5 C <i>σκληρᾶς</i> δὲ πρὸς τὸ ρέυμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ γενομένης ἀντιβάσεως καὶ <i>κλύδωνος</i> ἰσχυροῦ, μεταβαλλόμενον ὄρων τὸν <i>κυβερνήτην</i> ἀφεῖλεν ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς τὸ ἱμάτιον καὶ <i>ἀναδείξας ἑαυτὸν</i> “ἴθι” ἔφη “<i>γενναῖε, τόλμα καὶ δέδιθι μηδέν, ἀλλ’ ἐπιδίδου τῇ Τύχῃ τὰ ἰστία καὶ δέχου τὸ πνεῦμα, πιστεύων ὅτι Καίσαρα φέρεις καὶ τὴν Καίσαρος Τύχην</i>.”</p> <p>De fort. Rom. 319CD</p>
<p>A Τότε μὲν οὖν ἐκωλύθη τοῦ χειμῶνος ἰσχυροῦ γενομένου καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν συνδραμόντων καὶ περιπαθούτων, εἰ περιμένει δύναμιν ἄλλην ὡς ἀπιστῶν αὐτοῖς· ἐπεὶ δὲ μάχης γενομένης νικῶν ὁ Πομπήιος οὐκ ἐπεξῆλθεν, ἀλλ’ ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, <i>τῆμερον</i> εἶπεν “<i>ἦν ἡ νίκη παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀλλὰ τὸν εἰδότα νικᾶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν</i>.”</p> <p>Caesar X (206D) X>ABC or B>AC</p>	<p>B οὕτω δ’ ἀπέγνω <τότε> τὰ καθ’ αὐτόν, ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ Πομπήιος ὑπ’ εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἡ τύχης ἔργῳ μεγάλῳ τέλος οὐκ ἐπέθηκεν, ἀλλὰ καθειρῆξας εἰς τὸν χάρακα τοὺς φεύγοντας ἀνεχώρησεν, εἶπεν ἄρα <i>πρὸς τοὺς φίλους</i> ἀπίων ὁ Καῖσαρ· “<i>σήμερον ἂν ἡ νίκη παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦν, εἰ τὸν νικῶντα εἶχον</i>.”</p> <p>Caes. 39.8 C καὶ προσβάλλοντα τοῖς ἐρύμασι καὶ προκαλούμενον ἐκάστοτε, τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα νικᾶν καὶ κρατεῖν τοῖς ἀκροβολισμοῖς, ἅπαξ δὲ μικροῦ συντριβῆναι καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν ἀποβαλεῖν, τοῦ Πομπηίου λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισαμένου μέχρι τροπῆς ἀπάντων καὶ φόνου δισχιλίων, βιάσασθαι δὲ καὶ συνεισπεσεῖν μὴ δυνηθέντος ἢ φοβηθέντος, ὥστ’ εἶπεν Καῖσαρ <i>πρὸς τοὺς φίλους</i> ὅτι “<i>σήμερον ἂν ἡ νίκη παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦν, εἰ τὸν νικῶντ’ εἶχον</i>.”</p> <p>Pomp. 65.7–8</p>

<p>A Ἐν δὲ Φαρσάλῳ Πομπηίου παρατεταγμένην τὴν φάλαγγα κατὰ χώραν ἐστάναι καὶ προσδέχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους παρεγγυήσαντος ἀμαρτεῖν αὐτὸν ἔλεγε τὸν ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ τόνον καὶ ροίζον ἐκλύσαντα τῶν στρατιωτῶν. Caesar XI (206DE) X>ABC Pelling (2002) 80: "Should we then prefer to think of a single shared υπόμνημα for both Lives [<i>Caes.</i> and <i>Pomp.</i>], which for his own reasons he [Plutarch] chose to follow closely in <i>Pompey</i> and more distantly in <i>Caesar</i>? That is tempting – but the argument is inconclusive. If there were different υπόμνηματα for each Life, we could equally presume that the two drafts for <i>Caesar</i> and for <i>Pompey</i> might each include the story in a similar form, and that he kept to that form more closely in the one case than in the other."</p>	<p>B Ἐπεὶ δὲ σημαίνειν ἔμελλον ἀμφοτέροι τὴν ἔφοδον, Πομπηῖος μὲν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ὀπλίτας ἐστῶτας ἐν προβολῇ καὶ μένοντας ἀραρότως δέχεσθαι τὴν ἐπιδρομὴν τῶν πολέμιων, μέχρι ἂν ὑσοῦ βολῆς ἐντὸς γένωνται. Καίσαρ δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦτο διαμαρτεῖν φησιν αὐτόν (b. c. 3, 92, 4. 5), ἀγνοήσαντα τὴν μετὰ δρόμου καὶ φορᾶς ἐν ἀρχῇ γινομένην σύρραξιν, ὡς ἔν τε ταῖς πληγαῖς βίαν προστίθῃσι, καὶ συνεκκαίει τὸν θυμὸν ἐκ <τοῦ ἀ>παντᾶν ἀναρριπυζόμενον. Caes. 44.7–8 C ὁ δὲ Καίσαρ (b. c. 3, 92, 4. 5) αἰτιάται τὸ στρατήγημα τοῦτο: τῶν τε γὰρ πληγῶν τὸν ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς τόνον ἀμαυρῶσαι, καὶ τὴν μάλιστα τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τῷ συμφέρεσθαι τοῖς πολέμοις πληροῦσαν ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ φορᾶς ἀντεξόρμησιν, ἅμα κραυγῇ καὶ δρόμῳ τὸν θυμὸν αὐξοῦσαν, ἀφελόντα, πηξῆσαι καὶ καταπύξει τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἦσαν δ' οἱ μὲν μετὰ Καίσαρος δισχιλιοὶ πρὸς δισμυριοὶς, οἱ δὲ μετὰ Πομπηίου βραχεῖ πλείονες ἢ διπλάσιοι τούτων. Pomp. 69.7–8</p>
<p>A Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν Λιβύῃ τῶν περὶ τὸν Σκιπίωνα φυγῆν καὶ ἦταν Κάτωνος ἑαυτὸν ἀνελόντος 'φθονῶ σοι, Κάτων,' εἶπε 'τοῦ θανάτου· καὶ γὰρ σὺ ἐμοὶ τῆς σῆς σωτηρίας ἐφθόνησας.' Caesar XIII (206E) X>ABC or A>BC or B>AC or C>AB</p>	<p>B πυθόμενος δ' ὡς ἑαυτὸν ὁ ἀνὴρ διεργάσατο, δῆλος μὲν ἦν δηχθεὶς, ἐφ' ᾧ δ' ἄδηλον· εἶπε δ' οὖν· "ὦ Κάτων, φθονῶ σοι τοῦ θανάτου· καὶ γὰρ σὺ ἐμοὶ τῆς <σῆς> σωτηρίας ἐφθόνησας." Caes. 54.2 C ὡς δ' ἤκουσε τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ, λέγεται τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν· "ὦ Κάτων, φθονῶ σοι τοῦ θανάτου· καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ σὺ τῆς σαυτοῦ σωτηρίας ἐφθόνησας." Ca. Mi. 72.2</p>
<p>A Ἀντώνιον δὲ καὶ Δολοβέλλαν ὑφορωμένων ἐνίων καὶ φυλάττεσθαι κελευόντων, οὐ τούτους ἐφῆ δεδιέναι τοὺς βαναύσους καὶ λιπῶντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἰσχυροὺς καὶ ὄχρους ἐκείνους, δεῖξας Βροῦτον καὶ Κάσιον. Caesar XIV (206E) X>ABCD</p>	<p>B πάλιν δὲ λέγεται περὶ Ἀντωνίου καὶ Δολοβέλλα διαβολῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς νεωτερίζοιεν ἐλθούσης, "οὐ πάνυ" φάναι "τούτους δέδοικα τοὺς παχεῖς καὶ κομήτας, μᾶλλον δὲ τοὺς ὄχρους καὶ λεπτοὺς ἐκείνους", Κάσιον λέγων καὶ Βροῦτον. Caes. 62.10 C λέγεται γὰρ ὡς, ἀμφοτέρους τινὸς ὁμοῦ διαβάλλοντος πρὸς αὐτόν, εἶποι μὴ δεδιέναι τοὺς παχεῖς τούτους καὶ κομήτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὄχρους καὶ λεπτοὺς ἐκείνους, Βροῦτον <λέγων> καὶ Κάσιον, ὑφ' ὧν ἔμελλεν ἐπιβουλεύθει ἀναρεῖσθαι. Ant. 11.6</p>

<p>A Καίσαρ ὁ πρῶτος ἐπικληθεὶς Σεβαστὸς ἔτι μειράκιον ὢν Ἀντώνιον ἀπῆται <τάς> δισχιλίας πεντακοσίας μυριάδας, ἅς τοῦ πρώτου Καίσαρος ἀναιρεθέντος ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Ἀντώνιος μετήνεγκεν, ἀποδοῦναι Ῥωμαίοις βουλόμενος τὸ καταλειφθὲν ὑπὸ Καίσαρος, ἐκάστω δραχμῆς ἑβδομήκοντα πέντε: τοῦ δ' Ἀντονίου τὰ μὲν χρήματα κατέχοντος, ἐκείνον δὲ τῆς ἀπαιτήσεως ἀμελεῖν, εἰ σωφρονεῖ, κελεύοντος, ἐκήρυτε τὰ πατρῶα καὶ ἐπίπρασκε· καὶ τὴν δωρεὰν ἀποδοῦς εὐνοίαν μὲν αὐτῷ, μῖσος δ' ἐκείνῳ παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν περιποίησεν. Augustus I (206F–207A) X>ABCD</p>	<p>D καὶ πρῶτον μὲν Ἀντωνίου καὶ Δολοβέλλα λεγομένων νεωτερίζειν, οὐκ ἔφη τοὺς παγεῖς καὶ κομήτας ἐνοχλεῖν <αὐτόν>, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὄχρους καὶ ἰσχνούς ἐκείνους, Βροῦτον λέγων καὶ Κάσιον. Brut. 8.2</p> <p>B Ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων, ὁ νέος ἀφικνεῖται Καίσαρ εἰς Ῥώμην, ἀδελφῆς μὲν ὢν τοῦ τεθηκότος υἱὸς ὡς εἴρηται (p. 71, 12), κληρονόμος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπολειμμένος, ἐν Ἀπολλωνία δὲ διατρίβων ὑφ' ὃν χρόνον ἀνηρέτω Καίσαρ. οὗτος εὐθὺς Ἀντώνιον ὡς δὴ πατρῶον φίλον ἀσπασάμενος, τῶν παρακαταθηκῶν δὴ πατρῶον φίλον ἀσπασάμενος, τῶν παρακαταθηκῶν ἐμέμνητο· καὶ γὰρ ὤφειλε Ῥωμαίων ἐκάστω δραχμῆς ἑβδομήκοντα πέντε δοῦναι, Καίσαρος ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις γράψαντος. Ἀντώνιος δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὡς μεираκίου καταφρονῶν, ἔλεγεν οὐχ ὑγιαίνει αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρενῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ φίλων ἔρημον ὄντα φορτίον ἀβάστακτον αἰρεσθαι τὴν Καίσαρος διαδοχὴν· μὴ πειθομένου δὲ τούτοις, ἀπαιτοῦντος τὰ χρήματα, πολλὰ καὶ λέγων πρὸς ὕβριν αὐτοῦ καὶ πράττων διετέλει. δημαρχίαν τε γὰρ ἐνέστη μετιόντι, καὶ δίφρον χρυσοῦν τοῦ πατρὸς ὡσπερ ἐψήφιστο τιθέντος, ἠπέλιπεν εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπάξιεν εἰ μὴ παύσαιτο δημαγωγῶν. Ant. 16.1–5 C ἐν δ' Ἀπολλωνία διέτριβεν ὅτε Καίσαρ ἀνηρέθη, σχολάζων περὶ λόγους κάκεινον ἐπὶ Πάρθους ἐλαύνειν εὐθὺς ἐγνωκότα προσμένων. ἅμα δὲ τῷ τυθέσθαι τὸ πάθος ἦλθεν εἰς Ῥώμην, καὶ δημαγωγίας ἀρχὴν τοῦνομα Καίσαρος θέμενος ἐαυτῷ, καὶ διανέμων τὸ καταλειφθὲν ἀργύριον τοῖς πολιταῖς, Ἀντωνίον τε κατεστασίαζε, καὶ χρήματα διαδιδούς συνίστη καὶ συνῆγε πολλοὺς τῶν ὑπὸ Καίσαρι στρατευσαμένων. Brut. 22.2–3 D ἄχρι οὗ Καίσαρ ὁ νέος ἐξ Ἀπολλωνίας παραγενόμενος τόν τε κληρὸν ἀνεδέξατο τοῦ Καίσαρος ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν δισχιλίων πεντακοσίων μυριάδων, ἅς ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας κατεῖχεν, εἰς διαφορὰν κατέστη πρὸς αὐτόν. Cic. 43.8</p>
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A Τῶν δ' Ἀλεξανδρέων μετὰ τὴν ἄλωσιν τὰ δεινότατα πείσεσθαι **προσδοκόντων ἀναβῆς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα** καὶ παραστησάμενος Ἄρειον τὸν Ἀλεξανδρέα φεῖδεσθαι τῆς πόλεως ἔφη **πρῶτον** μὲν **διὰ τὸ μέγεθος** καὶ **τὸ κάλλος**, ἔπειτα **διὰ τὸν κτίστην Ἀλέξανδρον**, **τρίτον** δὲ δι' Ἄρειον **τὸν φίλον**.
Augustus III (207AB)
X>ABC

B Αὐτὸς δὲ Καῖσαρ εἰσήλauen εἰς τὴν πόλιν, Ἄρειῳ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ προσδιαλεγόμενος καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν ἐνδεδικώς, ἵνα εὐθὺς ἐν τοῖς πολίταις περιβλεπτός εἴη καὶ θαυμάζοιτο τιμώμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διαπρεπῶς. εἰς δὲ τὸ γυμνάσιον εἰσελθὼν καὶ **ἀναβῆς ἐπὶ βῆμά** τι πεπονημένον, ἐκπεπληγμένων ὑπὸ δέους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ προσπιπτόντων, ἀναστῆναι κελεύσας ἔφη πάσης αἰτίας τὸν δῆμον ἀφιέναι, **πρῶτον** μὲν **διὰ τὸν κτίστην Ἀλέξανδρον**, δεῦτερον δὲ τῆς πόλεως θαυμάζων **τὸ κάλλος** καὶ **τὸ μέγεθος**, **τρίτον** δ' Ἄρειῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ **χαριζόμενος**.

Ant. 80.1–2

C Ἄρειόν τε Καῖσαρ, ὅτε τὴν Ἀλεξανδρείαν εἶλε, διὰ χειρὸς ἔχων καὶ μόνῳ προσομιλῶν τῶν συνήθων συνεισήλασεν, εἶτα τοῖς **Ἀλεξανδρεῦσι** τὰ ἔσχατα **προδοκῶσι** καὶ δεομένοις ἔφη διαλλάττεσθαι διὰ τε **τὸ μέγεθος** τῆς πόλεως καὶ **διὰ τὸν οἰκιστὴν Ἀλέξανδρον**, 'καὶ **τρίτον**' ἔφη **τῷ φίλῳ** μου τούτῳ **χαριζόμενος**.
Praec. ger. reip. 814D

Appendix III: The Relative Chronology of the *Parallel Lives*

Various scholars have attempted to establish the order of publication of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*.¹²²⁵ All resulting chronologies contribute much to our understanding on this matter, but none of them are, in my opinion, entirely correct. Although full certainty can probably never be reached, it still is valuable to make yet another attempt, for previous research never took the relationship between the *Lives* and *Reg. et imp. apophth.* into account in discussing this topic.

I Methodology

As appears from previous research, the relative chronology of publication of the *Parallel Lives* can be based on three pillars (in order of importance):

[1] The position of three pairs: Plutarch introduces *Dem.–Cic.* as the fifth pair (*Dem.* 3.1), *Per.–Fab.* as the tenth (*Per.* 2.5), and *Dion–Brut.* as the twelfth (*Dion* 2.7).

[2] The cross-references further complete the picture: they are, in my view, related to the process of publication rather than to the order of composition, because they should direct the reader to (often a fuller account in) another narrative.¹²²⁶ When Plutarch refers back to an earlier published pair in *Dem.–Cic.* (no. 5), this means that the former must be one of the first four. There are, however, a few contradictory cross-references that complicate the picture: (a) *Them.–Cam.* refers back to *Thes.–Rom.* (*Cam.* 33.10), which itself refers back to *Lyc.–Num.* (*Rom.* 21.1), which, in turn, presents *Them.–Cam.* as finished (*Num.* 9.15 and 12.13); (b) *Aem.–Tim.*¹²²⁷ would follow and precede *Dion–Brut.* (*Dion* 58.10; *Tim.* 13.10 and 33.4),¹²²⁸ and (c) *Dion–Brut.* would have been completed after *Alex.–Caes.* (*Brut.* 9.9), which itself refers back to *Dion–Brut.* (*Caes.* 62.8 and 68.7). Stoltz cautiously questioned the authenticity of the contradictory cross-references of *Brut.*, *Cam.* and *Dion*, but Geiger correctly points

¹²²⁵Lion (1837); Michailis (1875), followed by Holden (1894) XXV–XXVII; Mewaldt (1907); Stoltz (1929); Ziegler (1951) 899–903; Theander (1958); Jones, C. P. (1966); Delvaux (1995); Nikolaidis (2005).

¹²²⁶*Pace* Nikolaidis (2005) 285.

¹²²⁷In *Aem.–Tim.*, *Cor.–Alc.*, and *Sert.–Eum.*, the Roman *Life* precedes the Greek. Some editions change the order (e.g. LCL places *Tim.* before *Aem.* and *Alc.* before *Cor.*) but the order should be preserved, see Geiger (1981) 104 (focusing on *Aem.–Tim.*); Pelling (1986) 94; Duff (1999) 206; Pelling (2002) 357. See also an extensive note of Stiefenhofer (1914) 470–471, who sees no reason to change the order of *Aem.–Tim.* and *Sert.–Eum.*, but changes *Cor.–Alc.* (since Alcibiades is always mentioned first in the *synkrisis*).

¹²²⁸It is, however, unclear to which passage *Tim.* 13.10 refers, see Mewaldt (1907) 573; Nikolaidis (2005) 294–296.

out that this is statistically highly improbable.¹²²⁹ Thus, the authenticity of all cross-references is to be accepted.¹²³⁰ Additionally, in my view the contradictory ones do not necessarily undermine the (general) reliability of all other cross-references,¹²³¹ for it seems unlikely that Plutarch erred about which *Lives* he had already published, and one can hardly see why he would put his readers on the wrong track.¹²³² In line with an influential article by Mewaldt,¹²³³ Jones provides an explanation:¹²³⁴

To meet this difficulty, it was suggested by J. Mewaldt that the *Parallel Lives* were not all issued one pair at a time, as had been generally assumed, but that certain pairs were published in groups. Plutarch might have issued one group consisting of *Themistocles-Camillus*, *Lycurgus-Numa*, and *Theseus-Romulus*, and another consisting of *Dio-Brutus*, *Aemilius-Timoleon*, and *Caesar-Alexander*; and thus there would have been no difficulty for the reader in consulting, for example, the *Dio* while reading the *Timoleon* and *vice versa*.¹²³⁵

Jones does not entirely agree with Mewaldt: in what follows, he argues that *Lyc.–Num.* must have been published separately, because “Plutarch clearly speaks of the *Lycurgus–Numa* as already published”.¹²³⁶ The cross-reference in question reads as follows (*Thes.* I.4):¹²³⁷

¹²²⁹ Geiger (1979) 61n47; against Stoltz (1929) 57 and 95.

¹²³⁰ Already Mewaldt (1907) 566 and today the *communis opinio*.

¹²³¹ See however Pelling (2002) 9 (= (1979) 81), building on Geiger (1979) 61n47.

¹²³² Nikolaidis (2005) 284–285.

¹²³³ Mewaldt (1907).

¹²³⁴ Jones, C. P. (1966) 66–67. Pelling (2002) 8–9 (= (1979) 80–81), however, is not convinced by Mewaldt: Plutarch could have inserted the contradictory references in a published *Life* at a later stage, or (according to Pelling more likely) he could just have inserted the cross-reference to a *Life* which was not finished yet, because he knew what he was going to write in the planned *Life*.

¹²³⁵ Such simultaneous publications might sometimes be indicated by a present tense (*Caes.* 45.9, referring to *Pomp.*; *Nic.* 11.2, to *Alc.*; *Num.* 12.13, to *Cam.*; Nikolaidis (2005) 285 and 287–289 regards this as an indication of simultaneous *preparation*) or a future tense (*Caes.* 35.2, referring to *Pomp.*; Nikolaidis (2005) 285 and 287–289 argues that the *Life*, prepared together with *Caes.*, still had to be written; I believe *Pomp.* was published simultaneously with and included after *Caes.*).

¹²³⁶ Jones, C. P. (1966) 67, building on Stoltz (1929) 72–74; Bühler (1962) 273.

¹²³⁷ Delvaux (1995) 100 cites *Thes.* I.4 to point out that the hypothesis of simultaneous publication is incorrect: “Cette hypothèse, à son tour, est inacceptable car la *Vie de Romulus* est à ranger parmi les dernières de toutes, ainsi car Plutarque le declare lui-même dans la *Vie de Thésée* I, 4”. I do not see how this can be deduced from *Thes.* I.4. See also Bühler

ἐπει δὲ τὸν περὶ Λυκούργου τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ Νομᾶ τοῦ βασιλέως λόγον ἐκδόντες, ἔδοκοῦμεν οὐκ ἂν ἀλόγως τῷ Ῥωμύλῳ προσαναβῆναι, πλησίον τῶν χρόνων αὐτοῦ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ γεγονότες [...].

But after publishing my account of Lycurgus the lawgiver and Numa the king, I thought I might not unreasonably go back still farther to Romulus, now that my history had brought me near his times.

In my opinion, however, this can equally well mean that *Thes.–Rom.* was attached to *Lyc.–Num.* in a group of simultaneously published pairs.¹²³⁸ Whatever the case, it is clear that *Thes.–Rom.* immediately follows *Lyc.–Num.*, and that at least *Them.–Cam.* was published together with *Thes.–Rom.* and attached after this pair in the series.¹²³⁹ Thus, these three pairs form one block. As such, then, contradictory references do not need to be problematic, but can even be convenient for the relative chronology: if *Them.–Cam.* is referred back to in another pair, this means that *Lyc.–Num.* and *Thes.–Rom.* precede the latter as well (and in this order).

[3] Finally, the content of the biographies can provide some insights. (a) Nikolaidis perceives different categories in the *Parallel Lives*: a first group (A) “In answer to friendly suggestions”; and a second group (B) consisting of *Lives* which were selected by Plutarch, not by his friends, with three subgroups: “B.1. Written for Plutarch’s own sake”, “B.2. A negative parenthesis” and “B.3. A mixed category”.¹²⁴⁰ (b) Hans Beck’s influential contribution on ‘internal *synkrisis*’ has shown that Plutarch wants his reader to see connections between non-paired *Lives* (esp. between

(1962) 281 (based on *Thes.* 1.4, *Thes.–Rom.* cannot be the final pair as it immediately follows *Lyc.–Num.*); and Nikolaidis (2005) 302–303 against a late position of the pair.

¹²³⁸Jones, C. P. (1966) 67 explains the contradictory cross-references in *Num.* as follows: “It is true that those who read the *Numa* at publication would not have been able to make use of Plutarch’s references to the *Camillus*, but Plutarch elsewhere alludes to a *Life* that was still in process of composition (*Caes.* 35, 2; 45, 9), and the interval before the appearance of the *Camillus* could have been very short.”

¹²³⁹Jones, C. P. (1966) 67 explains the opening words of *Them.* (Θεμιστοκλεῖ δέ) in light of this: “Since the *Lycurgus-Numa* had already appeared, the *Themistocles-Camillus* must have been published simultaneously with the *Theseus-Romulus*. The *Themistocles* will therefore have followed directly on the *Romulus*, and it is appropriate that the reference to the begetting of Theseus that closes the *Romulus* (35, 7) should have been followed by the discussion of Themistocles’ humble origins that opens the *Themistocles* (i, i)”. Nikolaidis (2005) 304–305 is not convinced and argues that *Sol.–Publ.* preceded *Them.–Cam.*, and that Θεμιστοκλεῖ δέ contrasts with Solon. Duff (2008a) 201; (2008d) 176–179; and (2011) 218, however, argues that the beginning of the *Life* is lost. See also Verdegem (2008) on the simultaneous preparation of *Lyc.*, *Num.*, and *Cam.*

¹²⁴⁰Cited from the scheme in Nikolaidis (2005) 318; see Holden (1894) XX–XXVIII, in line with Michailis (1875), on similar categories of the *Parallel Lives*.

those dealing with contemporaries).¹²⁴¹ One therefore expects thematic links between biographies that were published simultaneously or close after each other. (c) Also important in this regard is Pelling's observation about "increasing knowledge":¹²⁴² because *Luc.* and *Cic.* were written at an earlier stage than the other Late Republican *Lives*, it is "not surprising that in *Lucullus* and *Cicero* he seems less knowledgeable than in the later *Lives*".¹²⁴³ This final point is related to the process of composition in the first place, but it might shed light on the order of publication as well.¹²⁴⁴

Once a relative chronology has been established on the basis of [1] and [2] (2), it will be examined whether [3] confirms this image and whether it can further clarify it (3).

2 The Cross-References: Jones (1966) Revisited

Jones establishes the relative chronology of publication solely on the basis of the cross-references. He does so in six steps. Most of these make sense, but some should be reconsidered:

[1] Jones assumes that the lost *Epameinondas–Scipio* – either *Maior* or *Minor*¹²⁴⁵ – opened the *Parallel Lives*, as is the *communis opinio* today.¹²⁴⁶ The absence of a general proem to the entire series may indeed corroborate this view:¹²⁴⁷ such a proem (if it existed) most likely introduced *Epameinondas–Scipio*,¹²⁴⁸ as this is – at least to our knowledge – the only lost pair.¹²⁴⁹

¹²⁴¹ Beck, H. (2002).

¹²⁴² Pelling (2002) 2–7 (= (1979) 75–80).

¹²⁴³ Pelling (2002) 2 (= (1979) 75).

¹²⁴⁴ Nikolaidis (2005) 284 observes a major gap between the time of composition and publication, but *Lives* which seem to have been prepared together were often published closely to each other or even simultaneously (cf. chapter 3.1 of this appendix).

¹²⁴⁵ Plutarch wrote a biography of both *Scipiones*, one of which was probably an unpaired *Life*. *Ages*. 28.6 refers back to the *Life of Epameinondas*; *Pyrrh.* 8.5 to a *Life of Scipio Maior* or possibly *Minor*; *TG* 21.9 and *GG* 31(10).5 to a *Life of Scipio Minor*. Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ Σκιπίων is the seventh item in the Lamprias catalogue, which does not refer to other unknown pairs (items 26–40, however, are all isolated *Lives*, of which only *Galba* and *Oth.* (32) and *Arat.* (40) are preserved): there is therefore no reason to assume more losses.

¹²⁴⁶ Of course, this is not entirely certain; see the scepticism of Duff (2011b) 259.

¹²⁴⁷ Jones, C. P. (1966) 67; and already von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1926) 260, followed by Ziegler (1951) 897.

¹²⁴⁸ Cf. Duff (2001) 353. See however Alexiou (2010) 350–351: "Das Proömium jeder Syzygie, falls ein solches vorhanden ist, bezieht sich vor allem auf die folgenden zwei Biographien und hat keine allgemeine Gültigkeit."

¹²⁴⁹ *Mar.* 29.12 refers to a *Life of Metellus* in the future tense; *De Her. mal.* 866B to a *Life of Leonidas*. These *Lives* are absent from the Lamprias catalogue. It is therefore unclear whether they were completed and, if they were, whether they were part of the *Par-*

[2] Jones' second step concerns the *Lives* between the fifth (*Dem.–Cic.*) and tenth pair (*Per.–Fab.*). He argues that the four places can be filled by *Lyc.–Num.*, *Thes.–Rom.*,¹²⁵⁰ *Them.–Cam.*, and *Lys.–Sull.*, because (a) *Thes.–Rom.* refers back to *Dem.–Cic.* (*Thes.* 27.8); (b) *Lyc.–Num.*, *Thes.–Rom.*, and *Them.–Cam.* are one block (henceforth called the 'Lyc. series'); (c) *Per.–Fab.* refers back to *Lys.–Sull.* (*Per.* 22.4); (d) *Lys.–Sull.* in turn seems to refer back to *Lyc.–Num.*¹²⁵¹ Yet (d) is by no means certain, for *Lys.* 17.11 might equally refer to another work.¹²⁵² One can, however, still deduce that the *Lyc.* series precedes *Per.–Fab.* in another way: (a) *Alex.–Caes.* refers back to *Lyc.–Num.* (*Caes.* 59.4); (b) *Dion–Brut.* is the twelfth pair; (c) *Dion–Brut.*, *Aem.–Tim.*, and *Alex.–Caes.* are one group¹²⁵³ (henceforth the 'Dion series'), because of which the *Lyc.* series must precede *Dion–Brut.* too; and (d) there is only one place in between *Per.–Fab.* (no. 10) and *Dion–Brut.* (no. 12), because of which the *Lyc.* series must precede the tenth pair as well. That *Lys.–Sull.* belongs in between nos 5 and 10, however, is no longer confirmed by the cross-references.

[3] Jones subsequently argues that *Aem.–Tim.* and *Alex.–Caes.* (not necessarily in this order) take positions 13–14, following *Dion–Brut.*, as they are part of the *Dion* series, and that *Ages.–Pomp.* must have followed immediately.¹²⁵⁴ I agree that the cross-references in *Caes.* suggest that *Ages.–Pomp.* is situated directly after *Alex.–Caes.* and, in line with Mewaldt,¹²⁵⁵ I am even inclined to consider *Ages.–Pomp.* part of the *Dion* series (cf. the present tense in *Caes.* 45.9);¹²⁵⁶ *Alex.–Caes.* and *Ages.–Pomp.*, then, must have followed *Dion–Brut.* in the series, for there is

allel Lives. (a) Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1926) 258 believes that the *Life of Metellus* and *Leonidas* were never finished; Nikolaidis (2005) 287 claims that the *Life of Metellus* was never finished, considering *Pyrrh.–Mar.* the last pair of the collection (286 and 318). (b) Ziegler (1951) 896–897 believes that both *Lives* were completed; Holden (1894) xxiv thinks that the *Life of Metellus* was part of the *Parallel Lives*.

¹²⁵⁰A late position of *Thes.–Rom.* is correctly rejected by Nikolaidis (2005) 302–303, see *supra*, note 1237.

¹²⁵¹Jones, C. P. (1966) 66–67.

¹²⁵²See Delvaux (1995) 101. Mewaldt (1907) 576 is convinced that *Lys.* 17.11 must refer to *Lyc.* 30; according to Perrin (1916) 281 it is *Apophth. Lac.* 239F; Nikolaidis (2005) 321 names various candidates: "Ag./Kl. 3.1,5? Lyk. 30.1? [*Inst. lac.*] 239 E-F? other?".

¹²⁵³Jones, C. P. (1966) 67.

¹²⁵⁴Jones, C. P. (1966) 67.

¹²⁵⁵Mewaldt (1907) 568.

¹²⁵⁶*Caes.* 35.2 refers to *Pomp.* in the future tense; *Caes.* 45.9 in the present tense. *Ages.–Pomp.* also refers back to *Epameinondas–Scipio* (*Ages.* 28.6); *Lyc.–Num.* (*Ages.* 4.3 and 20.9); and *Dion–Brut.* (*Pomp.* 16.8).

only one place between *Per.–Fab.* and *Dion–Brut.*¹²⁵⁷ It is, however, less clear why Jones assumes that *Aem.–Tim.* cannot have been the eleventh pair, so I will not follow this argument.

[4] In the next step, Jones fills in two places in between the first (*Epameinondas–Scipio*) and fifth (*Dem.–Cic.*) pair with *Cim.–Luc.* and *Pel.–Marc.*, because (a) the tenth pair (*Per.–Fab.*) refers back to these *Lives* (*Per.* 9.5 to *Cim.–Luc.*; *Fab.* 19.1–2 and 22.8 to *Pel.–Marc.*); and (b) in his table *Lys.–Sull.* belongs to the pairs between 5 and 10, because of which there are only three places left between 1 and 5 before *Per.–Fab.*¹²⁵⁸ Yet since *Lys.* 17.11, as we have seen, does not necessarily refer back to *Lyc.*, this argument no longer stands (cf. [2]). As a consequence, *Pel.–Marc.* can also take position 6 or 9; *Cim.–Luc.* can also be 6 (but not 9, since *Thes.* 36.2 refers back to this pair).

Based on the cross-references, then, one can at this point only conclude the following concerning the relative chronology of the first fourteen or fifteen pairs:

Provisional relative chronology of pairs 1–14 or 1–15	
1	<i>Epameinondas–Scipio</i>
2–4	<i>Pel.–Marc.</i> ? [if not 6 or 9] – <i>Cim.–Luc.</i> ? [if not 6] – <i>Lys.–Sull.</i> ? [if not 6 or 9] [At least two of these three pairs belong to 2–4]
5	<i>Dem.–Cic.</i>
6–9	<i>Cim.–Luc.</i> ? [as 6 if not 2–4] – <i>Pel.–Marc.</i> ? [as 6 or 9 if not 2–4] – <i>Lys.–Sull.</i> ? [as 6 or 9 if not 2–4] <i>Lyc.–Num.</i> , <i>Thes.–Rom.</i> , <i>Them.–Cam.</i> [in this order as 6–7–8 or 7–8–9]
10	<i>Per.–Fab.</i>
11	<i>Aem.–Tim.</i> ? [if not 13 or 15]
12	<i>Dion–Brut.</i>
13–15	<i>Aem.–Tim.</i> ? [if not 11] <i>Alex.–Caes.</i> and <i>Ages.–Pomp.</i> [in this order]

This scheme is in various cases more cautious than Jones' first table, but does not contradict it.¹²⁵⁹ It stands out that there is only one vacant place in the first ten pairs (2, 3, 4, 6, or 9), and possibly a second one in 11.

¹²⁵⁷The reference to *Brut.* in *Pomp.* 16.8 is not evidence if *Ages.–Pomp.* is part of the *Dion* series.

¹²⁵⁸Jones, C. P. (1966) 67–68.

¹²⁵⁹Jones, C. P. (1966) 67. I already added *Cim.–Luc.* and *Pel.–Marc.* to this scheme, but Jones includes them only in his second scheme on p. 68.

[5] In what follows, Jones attempts to point out which pairs postdate *Ages.–Pomp.*¹²⁶⁰ I follow his arguments. The pairs in question are: (a) *Nic.–Crass.* and *Alc.–Cor.*, most likely in this order:¹²⁶¹

The *Nicias–Crassus* and the *Alcibiades–Coriolanus* appear to have been published within a short time of each other, since the *Alcibiades* (13, 9) refers to the *Nicias*, and the *Nicias* (11, 2) in the present tense to the *Alcibiades*. Since there is no place in I–XV for two pairs published closely together, these two must belong in XVI–XXIII; and with this agrees the fact that the *Coriolanus* (39, 11) refers to the *Numa* (VI), and the *Nicias* (28, 4) to the *Lysander* (VII–IX).

In line with Mewaldt, I would in this case even speak of simultaneous publication;¹²⁶² (b) *Demetr.–Ant.*, referring back to *Dion–Brut.* (*Ant.* 69.1–2); (c) *Phoc.–Ca. Mi.*, citing *Ages.–Pomp.* (*Ca. Mi.* 54.10), and *Dion–Brut.* (in *Ca. Mi.* 73.6; *Ca. Mi.* 22.4 and probably *Phoc.* 29.1 also refer to *Dem.–Cic.*);¹²⁶³ (d) *Pyrr.–Mar.*, referring to *Alex.–Caes.* (*Mar.* 6.4; *Mar.* 10.2 also refers to *Lys.–Sull.*, and *Pyrrh.* 8.5 perhaps to *Epameinondas–Scipio*, depending on which Scipio’s *Life* is cited). Based on these cross-references, Jones seems to be correct.¹²⁶⁴

[6] Jones’ final step deals with the five remaining pairs: *Sol.–Publ.*, predating the *Nic.–Crass.* and *Alc.–Cor.* group (*Cor.* 33.4); *Agis&Cleom.–TG&GG*, which cannot be earlier than the eleventh pair;¹²⁶⁵ *Phil.–Flam.*, published before *Arist.–Ca. Ma.* (*Ca. Ma.* 12.4); *Arist.–Ca. Ma.*, predating *Phoc.–Ca. Mi.* (*Ca. Mi.* 1.1); and *Sert.–Eum.*, about which no additional information is provided by the cross-references.¹²⁶⁶ The main

¹²⁶⁰ Jones, C. P. (1966) 68.

¹²⁶¹ Jones, C. P. (1966) 68. In addition, *Crass.* 11.11 refers back to *Pel.–Marc.* Nikolaidis (2005) 312–314, however, argues that *Alc.–Cor.* precedes *Nic.–Crass.*; I read *Nic.* 11.2 as a reference to a published *Life* that must have followed immediately.

¹²⁶² Mewaldt (1907) 573. Note the present tense in *Nic.* 11.2, cf. *supra*, note 1256 on *Alex.–Caes.* and *Ages.–Pomp.*

¹²⁶³ Perrin (1919b) 286 omits the cross-reference of *Ca. Mi.* 22.4: “καὶ Κικέρωνος so Sintonis for the corrupt MSS. ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ Κικέρωνος γέγραπται; Coraës and Bekker adopt the early anonymous correction καὶ Κικέρωνος, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκείνου γέγραπται”. The *Teubner* text indicates a lacuna after γέγραπται. This reference is of minor importance, because *Ca. Mi.* refers back to *Brut.*

¹²⁶⁴ Jones, C. P. (1966) 68.

¹²⁶⁵ *Cleom.* 33(12).5 refers back to *Lyc.*; *Cleom.* 45(24).9 refers back to *Phil.*: since there is only one place left in between 2–9, this would belong to *Phil.–Flam.* if *Agis&Cleom.–TG&GG* were to predate *Dion–Brut.*, see Jones, C. P. (1966) 68. In addition, *TG* 21.9 and *GG* 31(10).5 refer back to the lost *Scipio Minor*.

¹²⁶⁶ Jones, C. P. (1966).

questions are which of these pairs should fill out the one (position 2, 3, 4, 6, or 9) or possibly two (11) vacant places in 1–12, and whether a certain chronology can be established amongst the later pairs as well. Cross-references are not helpful in this regard, so it is time to take a look at some content-related criteria.

3 Content-Related Criteria

Based on the secondary literature, one can distinguish between three types of criteria, all of which are of course highly hypothetical: [1] *Lives* that present the same milieu and time; [2] thematic connections between *Lives* that are not related to the historical context; and [3] categories of pairs:

[1] **Historical context.** Plutarch prepared *Lives* belonging to the same period together. Pelling demonstrates this with regard to the six latest Republican *Lives* (*Pomp.*, *Ca. Mi.*, *Caes.*, *Brut.*, *Crass.*, and *Ant.*),¹²⁶⁷ although scholars today suggest that *Crass.* might stand apart.¹²⁶⁸ Yet, as appears from the provisional relative chronology of the first fourteen or fifteen pairs (presented in section 2), Plutarch also often seems to have published these *Lives* in group or closely together: *Tim.* and *Dion* (11 and 12 or 13 and 12) concern more or less the same time and place, as both men oppose Dionysius II,¹²⁶⁹ and the same goes for *Brut.*, *Caes.*, and *Pomp.* (12 and 13–15). It is no coincidence that *Nic.* and *Alc.* form one block, nor is it surprising that *Thes.–Rom.* immediately follows *Lyc.–Num.*, as the pairs describe mythical (*Thes.–Rom.*) or almost legendary (*Lyc.–Num.*) times, as is thematized by *Thes.* 1.4. In line with this, one expects that:

(a) *Pel.–Marc.* immediately follows *Epameinondas–Scipio* as the second pair,¹²⁷⁰ since *Pel.* and *Epameinondas* – and perhaps also the *Lives* on their Roman counterparts¹²⁷¹ – deal with the same period in the same polis, and because *Pel.* 3–4 (containing an extensive comparison of the

¹²⁶⁷ Pelling (2002) 1–44 (= (1979)).

¹²⁶⁸ See the Postscript of Pelling (2002) 26–29: he defends his original view, (29) based on the fact that “the *Lives*’ relative chronology suggests that *Crassus* was written at much the same time as the other relevant *Lives*”. Nikolaidis (2005) 289–290 argues in favour of the separate preparation of *Crass.* (that *Ant.* stands apart as well is less certain). Chlup (2013) 118 regards *Crass.* as “a late addition to the later *Roman Lives*, or at the very least the final *Life* of the group”.

¹²⁶⁹ A joint reading of the *Lives* also reveals interesting insights; see de Blois (1997).

¹²⁷⁰ Cf. Nikolaidis (2005) 299, also referring to Plutarch’s Boeotian patriotism.

¹²⁷¹ If the paired Roman was Scipio Maior, *Marc.* and the lost *Life* would have dealt with the Second Punic War; see also Nikolaidis (2005) 298–299 in favour of Scipio Maior.

two Thebans and describing the origins of their friendship) seems to assume some acquaintance with Epameinondas' character.¹²⁷²

(b) *Ca. Mi.* and *Ant.*, dealing with the death struggle of the Roman Republic, are published quickly after *Brut.*, *Pomp.*, and *Caes.*,¹²⁷³ which is in line with the contemporary subjects of *Phoc.* and *Alex.*

(c) *Demetr.* and *Pyrrh.* also belong together (Plutarch refers 28 times to Δημήτριος in *Pyrrh.*; Πύρρος occurs eighteen times in *Demetr.*),¹²⁷⁴ and perhaps the Hellenistic *Eum.* was published afterwards, which seems to be supported by the connection between *Mar.* and *Sert.*¹²⁷⁵

(d) *Sol.–Publ.* are published closely together with the *Lyc.* series, as it also deals with the remote past: more likely is the sixth position, before *Lyc.–Num.*, rather than the ninth after *Thes.–Rom.* and *Them.–Cam.*¹²⁷⁶

(e) *Luc.* precedes or follows *Cic.* in position 4 or 6, although 4 seems more probable in light of (d).¹²⁷⁷

(f) If these assumptions are correct, all the places of 1–10 are taken (in line with the cross-references, *Lys.–Sull.* can only be the third pair), and some connections amongst the later pairs arise. This not only confirms but also adds further precision to the table presented in section 2.

[2] **Thematic motivations.** These partially overlap with [1], but there are also some obvious connections between *Lives* that do not concern contemporaries. An example is that the subject of *Cam.*, who follows *Rom.*, (LCL) “was styled a Second Founder of Rome” (*Cam.* 1.1: κτίστης δὲ τῆς Ρώμης ἀναγραφεῖς δεύτερος).

¹²⁷²Cf. *Pel.* 3.1: ὡσπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδα (“as was Epaminondas”), without further explanation.

¹²⁷³See the first chapter of Pelling (2002) *passim* (= (1979)) on the simultaneous preparation of *Ca. Mi.* and *Ant.*

¹²⁷⁴Nikolaidis (2005) places *Pyrrh.–Mar.* at the end of the series, with some distance from *Demetr.–Ant.*

¹²⁷⁵See Nikolaidis (2005) 315 on Eumenes, “whose *Life* Plutarch had decided to write and probably drafted, when he was at work on *Demetrios.*”

¹²⁷⁶Nikolaidis (2005) 304–305, however, puts *Sol.–Publ.* in between *Thes.–Rom.* and *Them.–Cam.* as the eighth pair.

¹²⁷⁷See in this regard Pelling (2002) 2–7 (= (1979) 75–80) on “increasing knowledge” (Plutarch is better informed in the Republican *Lives* other than *Luc.* and *Cic.*). On connections between *Luc.* and *Cic.*, see Theander (1958) 15–17 (who also sees a link with *Sert.*). Delvaux (1995) 103 attributes the third position to *Cim.–Luc.*, because “le général romain se comporta en bienfaiteur de Chéronée et celle-ci, reconnaissante, lui éleva une statue.”

(a) First, *Arist.–Ca. Ma.* and *Phoc.–Ca. Mi.* seem to be so closely related to each other that one expects the first to precede the second.¹²⁷⁸

(b) Theoretically, *Phil.–Flam.* could have been published immediately before *Arist.–Ca. Ma.* and after *Alex.–Caes.* and *Ages.–Pomp.*, but it seems more likely that the pair takes the eleventh position (cf. [1] (f) and *Ca. Ma.* 12.4), followed by *Dion–Brut.* and *Aem.–Tim.* (which, as a consequence, must take position 13):¹²⁷⁹ this is supported by the theme of liberation and opposition to tyranny, Macedonian suppression, and Caesar’s attempts to establish a monarchy shared by these three pairs. To a certain extent, it also makes sense from a chronological point of view (*Flam.* and *Aem.* belong to more or less the same period).

[3] **Categories of *Lives*.** I do not follow Nikolaidis’ distinction between pairs written “in answer to friendly suggestions” and those “written for Plutarch’s own sake”,¹²⁸⁰ but there is definitely a difference between a first group of rather positive examples and a second one that shows more negative or doubtful *exempla*. This change is announced by *Demetr.–Ant.*, which must therefore be the first of this group.¹²⁸¹ Other pairs that seem to belong here are: *Pyrrh.–Mar.*, *Sert.–Eum.* (which probably appeared soon after *Pyrrh.–Mar.*, see [1]),¹²⁸² *Nic.–Crass.*, *Cor.–Alc.* (prepared and

¹²⁷⁸Not just because the Greeks were Athenians and because of the family connection between the Romans (which is stressed in the first words of *Ca. Mi.*; this suggests that *Ca. Ma.* immediately preceded it): Aristeides the Just (cf. *Arist.* 6.1–2) and Phocion the Good (cf. *Phoc.* 10.4) have to deal with the whims of the masses when sticking to their philosophical convictions, connected with the theme of rigidity explored in *Ca. Ma.* and esp. in *Ca. Mi.* (cf. Duff (2008c) 12 on *Ca. Mi.*; see also Demulder (2022) 127–140 on *Phoc.–Ca. Mi.*). Delvaux (1995) 110 also puts the pairs together.

¹²⁷⁹The reference to *Tim.* at the end of *Dion* (58.10) seems to introduce the Greek *Life* of the pair that immediately follows; the first words of *Tim.* seem to refer back to the closing chapters of *Dion*: this is a strong indication that these *Lives* followed each other immediately in the order *Dion – Tim.*

¹²⁸⁰Nikolaidis (2005) 297 etc. and 318. In my view, he reads too much in the prologue to *Aem.–Tim.*: Plutarch’s claim (he starts to realize that his *Lives* are also valuable for his own sake and not only for his readers) is in line with the author–reader connection established in other prologues, see esp. Part III, chapter 1.4.1–2. In addition, *Aem.* 1 contains no indication that in the first group (Nikolaidis (2005) 297) “others, most probably his Roman friends, asked Plutarch to compose the biographies of certain illustrious men”, while the heroes “of this second category (a bigger one, as it eventually turned out), were mainly selected by Plutarch himself.”

¹²⁸¹*Demetr.* 1, discussed in detail in Part III, chapter 1.2.1.

¹²⁸²Nikolaidis (2005) 316 lists various arguments in favour of a late position of *Sert.–Eum.* See Geiger (1981) 85–104 and (1995) 179 on the Hellenistic *Lives* (*Pyrrh.*, *Demetr.*, and *Eum.*) as later biographies of the series.

published closely together), and perhaps *Agis&Cleom.–TG&GG*, though definitely not all of these four *Lives* are that negative.¹²⁸³ One might perhaps also expect *Lys.–Sull.* (no. 3) in this list if one reads the pair in a negative light,¹²⁸⁴ but this is contradicted by the cross-references.¹²⁸⁵ In this context, Delvaux points out that *Lys.–Sull.* fits well within the series of *Epameinondas–Scipio*, *Pel.–Marc.*, and *Cim.–Luc.*, which are all connected by Plutarch's local pride.¹²⁸⁶ This might indeed have repercussions for the prologue to *Dem.–Cic.*, where the author dwells upon writing history in his small village.¹²⁸⁷

4 Conclusion

Although the relative chronology will never be established with full certainty (including not by the table below), the cross-references (2) and historical and thematic connections throughout various pairs (3) lead to a consistent image:

Proposed chronology of the <i>Parallel Lives</i>			
1	<i>Epameinondas–Scipio</i>	12	<i>Dion–Brut.</i>
2	<i>Pel.–Marc.</i>	13	<i>Aem.–Tim.</i>
3	<i>Lys.–Sull.</i>	14	<i>Alex.–Caes.</i>
4	<i>Cim.–Luc.</i>	15	<i>Ages.–Pomp.</i>
5	<i>Dem.–Cic.</i>	16	<i>Arist.–Ca. Ma.</i>
6	<i>Sol.–Publ.</i>	17	<i>Phoc.–Ca. Mi.</i>
7	<i>Lyc.–Num.</i>	18	<i>Demetr.–Ant.</i>
8	<i>Thes.–Rom.</i>	19	<i>Pyrrh.–Mar.</i>
9	<i>Them.–Cam.</i>	20	<i>Sert.–Eum.</i>
10	<i>Per.–Fab.</i>	21–23	<i>Nic.–Crass., Cor.–Alc.</i> [belong together] and <i>Agis&Cleom.–TG&GG</i>
11	<i>Phil.–Flam.</i>		

¹²⁸³ Cf. Zadorojnyi (1997) 172.

¹²⁸⁴ Candau Morón (2000) 455–456 notes some virtues in the pair too; see also Alexiou (2010) 351–352.

¹²⁸⁵ Nikolaidis (2005) 306–308 argues against a position of the (rather) negative *Lys.–Sull.* close to *Per.–Fab.* with its proem calling for imitation and favours a late position, in line with *Mar.* and *Sert.* (308 and 314–315), but an earlier one also makes sense, if it is true that (306) “Plutarch wants to be more informative in those earlier books”; see also Delvaux (1995) 104–105 on the historical interest in *Sull.* and the first five pairs.

¹²⁸⁶ Delvaux (1995) 103.

¹²⁸⁷ Delvaux (1995) 103–104.

This table is still largely in line with Jones' conclusion.¹²⁸⁸ As appears from Part I, chapter 2, a comparison with *Reg. et imp. apophth.* supports this picture, at least to a certain extent.

¹²⁸⁸Jones, C. P. (1966) 68.

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