RESEARCHING ESTONIAN TRANSFORMATION

MORPHOGENETIC REFLECTIONS

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Edited by
Veronika Kalmus, Marju Lauristin,
Signe Opermann and Triin Vihalemm

1632
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU
Press

Researching Estonian transformation: Morphogenetic reflections
Editors Veronika Kalmus, Marju Lauristin, Signe Opermann, Triin Vihalemm
Tartu, Estonia 2020

The publication of this volume has been supported by the Estonian Research Council project IUT20-38, the Archimedes Foundation (IUT20-38AP14) and the University of Tartu.
The preparation of individual chapters was supported as follows:
- Chapters 1 and 6: by the developmental program ASTRA of Tallinn University of Technology for years 2016–2022 (2014-2020.4.01.16-0032);
- Chapter 7: the Estonian Research Council project PUTJD570;
- Chapter 8: the Estonian Research Council project PUT1624.

Language editors: Richard D. Adang, Marcus Denton, Michael Haagensen
Design and layout: Roosmarii Kurvits
Cover design: Kalle Paalits

Copyright: University of Tartu, authors, 2020
ISBN 978-9949-03-334-8

University of Tartu Press,
www.tyk.ee

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PREFACE

This collective monograph can be seen as a retrospective and reflexive logbook of the long journey of our research group. We started in 2001, with the target-financed project 'Formation of the 21st Century Media Society in Estonia' (2001–2005, led by Marju Lauristin), which aimed to analyse the sociocultural processes in Estonia at the beginning of the new millennium. The main focuses of our research back then were the relationships between changes in media usage and public participation, the emerging patterns of stratification and socialisation, changes in spatial orientations and mobility, collective identities and value orientations, lifestyles and interests. By using a social constructivist approach to the life-world and the public sphere (inspired by Alfred Schütz, Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Jürgen Habermas), theories of structure and agency (Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck), and social practices and capitals in various fields (Pierre Bourdieu), we developed a core set of indicators for the representative survey 'Me. The World. The Media' (in Estonian 'Mina. Maailm. Meedia', abbreviated as MeeMa), conducted among 15–74-year-old Estonians in 2002 and followed up in four waves (in 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014). Since 2002 we have called ourselves the MeeMa research group.

Over these two decades we have witnessed substantial changes in our society and in the world; furthermore, sociological theories and methods have evolved, fine-tuning our conceptual and epistemological approach to social reality. Our second target-financed project, 'Estonia as an Emerging Information and Consumer Society: Social Sustainability and Quality of Life' (2007–2012, led by Peeter Vihalemm) focused on the theoretical and empirical analysis of the transformation trends in Estonia relating to the information and consumer society. While focusing our empirical research (including the 2008 and 2011 survey waves) on human capital, self-realisation and the coping abilities of different social groups in the new technological and social environment, we found additional conceptual foundation and inspiration in the theories of social transformation (Karl Polanyi, Ralf Dahrendorf, Michael D. Kennedy, Claus Offe, Piotr Sztompka and Henri Vogt) and (post-)modernisation (Zygmunt Bauman, Manuel Castells, Ronald Inglehart and Scott Lash).

The last project, the institutional research grant 'Acceleration of Social and Personal Time in the Information Society: Practices and Effects of Mediated Communication' (2014-2019, led by Veronika Kalmus and Triin Vihalemm) was motivated by the theoretical ambition to apply the paradigm of social time acceleration (Hartmut Rosa, Barbara Adam, Ulrich Mückenberger, William E. Scheuerman and Jan Spurk) and time-space compression (David Harvey, Henry Lefebvre and Doreen Massey) to explain the outcomes of complex changes in post-communist societies, using the Estonian transformation as an example. The 2014 survey wave and the linked qualitative studies, accordingly, focused on the roles of mediated communication as related to people's coping with accelerated social and technological changes.

In this book, we offer a reflexive review of our long-term experience of researching the transformation in Estonian society, particularly by using the lens of social morphogenetic analysis developed by Margaret Archer and her co-workers. Specifically, we aim to re-conceptualise the main results of our empirical studies by synthesising different theoretical perspectives on social change. We present the findings of the 2014 wave of the survey in greater detail, while providing relevant comparisons with data from earlier survey waves.

This monograph has been authored by 11 academics or doctoral students of the Institute of Social Studies and Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies. From 2001 to 2019, many more colleagues and students were part of the MeeMa research group and contributed to our academic work (listed alphabetically): Halliki Harro-Loit, Valeria Jakobson, Sten Hansson, Veronika Kalmus, Aare Kasemets, Margit Keller, Katrin Kello, Maie Kiisel, Ragne Kõuts-Klemm, Marju Lauristin, Marianne Leppik, Elo Lindi, Kadi Lubi, Maarja Lõhmus, Anu Masso, Tiiu Männiste, Annika Nigul, Signe Opermann, Mari-Liisa Parder, Aune Past, Rasmus Pedanik, Pille Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, Mart Raudsaar, Kristina Reinsalu, Age Rosenberg, Pille Runnel, Andu Rämmer, Johannes Saar, Regina Salmu, Rauno Salupere, Sander Salvet, Jarmo Seljamaa, Külliki Seppel, Andra Siibak, Maie Soll, Kairi Talves, Piia Tammpuu, Liina-Mai Tooding, Andre Uibos, Marko Uibu, Peeter Vihalemm and Triin Vihalemm.

As editors, we would like to thank all of the contributing authors of this book and the colleagues who participated in designing the MeeMa survey questionnaires. The research group is grateful to the employees of the market research companies Faktum and Saar Poll for efficient and smooth cooperation in data collection and analysis. We thank all of our survey and focus groups participants whose serious engagement and devotion of time were essential to achieve meaningful and reliable results.

Our research has been feasible thanks to generous grants from the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, the Estonian Research Council, the Estonian Science Foundation and the Archimedes Foundation.

We express our gratitude to the reviewers Matej Makarovič and Zenonas Norkus for their highly useful comments and recommendations, and to the reviewers of individual chapters: Sten Hansson, Külliki Seppel, Tarmo Strenze and Peeter Vihalemm.

We are thankful to the translator Tanel Pern, the language editors Richard D. Adang, Marcus Denton and Michael Haagensen, the language consultant Heidi Ann Erbsen, the cover designer Kalle Paalits, and the University of Tartu Press for smooth and pleasant cooperation in publishing this book.

Our very special thanks go to Roosmarii Kurvits who, besides her extensive work on layout and graphic design, contributed a lot to the harmonisation, clarity and consistency of the presentation style.

Editors
Tartu, May 2020

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Wave in Place Branding (edited by Cecilia Cassinger, Andrea Lucarelli and Szilvia Gyimóthy, Edward Elgar, 2019).

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CHAPTER 1.
APPLYING THE MORPHOGENETIC PERSPECTIVE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF ESTONIAN SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Anu Masso, Marju Lauristin, Signe Opermann and Veronika Kalmus

1.1. INTRODUCTION

This book covers a range of topics related to a society in transformation, using Estonia as an empirical example. In this work, we aim to theoretically synthesise the rich empirical data we have collected for over a decade through a range of representative population surveys. The data cover the main topics of people's life-worlds (socio-economic conditions, civic and political participation, culture, media, environment, consumption, memory and traditions, identities, etc.) and attitudes towards a rapidly changing society (perceived risks and benefits). Our aim is to re-conceptualise the transformation processes from the restoration of an independent and democratic society in 1991 until today.

The Estonian society as a part of European society, and particularly as a member of the European Union since 2004, is going through a painful re-consideration of its choices and opportunities. As the changes during the past nearly 30 years seemed to pave the way for more social integrity and diversity in Estonia, they also raised a lot of questions, from the construction of everyday realities and conceptualisations of life-worlds in a post-transformation society to the directions and outcomes of digital transformations, where Estonia has been considered one of the pathfinders.

In the current book, we reflect upon our experience of researching the social transformation of Estonian society, re-considering the findings of our long-term research project 'Me. The World. The Media' (in Estonian 'Mina. Maailm. Meedia', abbreviated as MeeMa, 2001–2019), which aimed to create a complete sociological picture of a society in change, shaped not only by objective conditions, but also by social representations of those developments. We started from a phenomenological understanding of *life-world*, in Alfred Schütz's conception of a subjective perception of the world (Schütz & Luckmann, 1974), expressed and described through values, attitudes, ideas and preferences. The phenomenology of Schütz also inspired us to study in detail how individuals perceive the social world in relation to personal time and space. Later in our research, we found Hartmut Rosa's (2003, 2005) work on time and the acceleration of social change well-suited to our research objectives. These and other theories (proposed by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Pierre Bourdieu, Jürgen Habermas, Anthony Giddens and others, already mentioned in the Preface to this book) are fundamental to our research on the socially constructed reality of changes, as indicated and reflected upon by our informants, and our insights into patterns of practices and agencies in the different fields of society.

Together with an interest in social reflexivity as individuals' perspectives upon their values and experiences in relation to wider social discourses, but especially regarding the perceptions of expectations and risks in the contemporary world (for a more detailed analysis, see Kiisel & Seppel, 2017), our research adopted Margaret Archer's (2003, 2007) typology of life strategies and modes of reflexivity. Based on this previous work, we have continued exploring possible frameworks for interpreting the findings of our research and found, in its latest phase, that the perspective of morphogenetic/morphostatic analysis, as developed by Archer and her co-workers (Archer, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017), helps to describe and explain processes in our rapidly changing society.

Our aim in this book and this chapter is to re-conceptualise the results of our empirical analysis of the transformation processes by discussing and synthesising different theoretical perspectives on social change and transformation[1], using the framework of *morphogenetic analysis* as an overarching set of concepts and principles. For instance, we make use of Archer's dual ontological framework for understanding the 'conditional and generative mechanisms operating *between* structure and agency' (Archer, 1995: 16; see also Archer, 1982), as well as Giddens's (1984) notion of 'structuration'.

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[1] A more comprehensive overview of the various theoretical approaches to social transformations in the post-communist societies is provided in *The Routledge International Handbook of European Social Transformations* (Vihalemm, Masso & Opermann, 2018).

Moreover, we have taken advantage of our in-depth knowledge as researchers and reflexive participants in this exceptional empirical case. The social transformations in Estonia during the past three decades provide an unprecedented opportunity to encounter and analyse the results of the unique historic experiment of institutionally planned simultaneous societal changes and the implementation of these changes through cultural interactions and individual reflections. We presume that in our small society of Estonia, with a population of around 1.3 million people, where the post-communist political and economic transition was effectively coupled with technological transformation and a cultural shift towards digitalisation, we have a model case for testing the relevance of the morphogenetic analysis. The advantage of our position as researchers lies in our exceptional opportunity to not only directly witness but also to observe and thoroughly analyse and reflect upon events made possible by the 'historical experiment' that took place in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when a number of (small) nation-states re-formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and went through rapid and drastic changes and stabilisation within a very limited time period. As a rule, in history, the occurrence of such a transformative turn that shakes a whole society – every social group and every societal domain – has taken far longer than a couple of decades. From a short time-distance, this quasi-experimental historical situation can be approached as a case study of the real 'transformative change' that in a relatively short time has resulted in the formation of new social and cultural agencies and relationships.

1.2. SETTING THE SCENE OF THE ESTONIAN CASE

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is one of the central events forming the common starting point for the following post-communist transitions in a range of Eastern and Central European countries, including Estonia. Specifically, the Estonian transformation from an occupied communist nation under Soviet rule to a free and democratic EU member state and one of the leaders of the digital revolution in Eastern Europe has attracted the attention of many researchers (see Chapter 2 for a detailed overview).

According to Marju Lauristin and her colleagues (2018: 11–12), 'the mechanisms of initial transition have often been understood as a rather uniform pattern of institutional reforms following some common design'. For instance, in the field of economic reforms, 'the international financial institutions in their prescriptions followed the neoliberal scheme, known as the "Washington consensus", and later a very similar approach was implemented by the European Commission during the EU pre-accession process via the "Maastricht criteria"' (ibid., p. 12). However, the actual historical changes in post-communist countries have demonstrated great diversity in the implementation of these prescriptions, from success stories to quite catastrophic failures (Norkus, 2018). Awareness of the varied trajectories of these changes calls for a theoretical model able to embrace and explain their divergence by providing a coherent and holistic view of the processes forming societal transformation (Lauristin et al., 2018).

From their early stages, the focus of post-communist studies has, indeed, been on the complexity of deep systemic changes when explaining social transformation processes. According to Claus Offe (1996), post-communist development can be seen as a multi-layered process of 'triple transition', where different aspects of change should be studied using universal social scientific categories, such as modernisation, post-modernisation and reflexive modernisation, agent-structure relationships, analysis of social systems, cultural and civilisation shifts, etc. Various social-philosophical and cultural approaches have informed our efforts to interpret the findings of our long-term research project, MeeMa. Among these, we highlight the theories contextualising the post-communist developments in broader civilisation history, modernisation and post-modernisation (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), the re-structuring of society (Beck, 1996; Giddens, 1991, 2013; Polanyi, 1944/1965), and Bourdieu's (1986, 1993) model of society as a system emerging from human practices in the various fields of capital formation, as well as Luhmann's (1995) and Castells's (1996, 2001, 2009) visions of society as a social system based on communication networks.

In our studies, we have used the term 'societal transformation' to refer to an intertwined self-regulatory societal development, launched by deep changes in some spheres of society, e.g. by political reforms or by revolutionary technological innovations, which simultaneously or at least very quickly lead to all-encompassing changes in the whole system of social, political, economic and cultural relations, as well as changes in social interactions and the course of individual lives. In this conceptual context, the social morphogenetic approach is highly suitable for our analysis of the post-communist social transformations due to its reference to the historical narrative as an indispensable element of sociological interpretation (Archer, 2013: 13). Although *time* has been a central category in many classical social theories (e.g. Elias, 1992; Giddens, 1984; Simmel, 1908/1950, 1917/1950), as well as in the most recent approaches (e.g. Rosa, 2005, 2013), the main contribution of Archer in this regard is to propose a conceptual tool for studying social change as a multidimensional morphogenetic/morphostatic process occurring in real historical time. The morphogenetic analysis proposed by Archer indicates how structural elements and actions are interrelated over various time periods. Similarly, she clearly indicates that structural conditions always proceed the actions that transform them, which in turn leads to *structural elaborations* (Archer, 1995). As Forbes-Pitt states in *Social Morphogenesis* (Archer, 2013), such a 'treatment of time concurs with the notions in complexity that time is irreversible. In other words, that one can never simply reduce the system and return to an earlier state as if time had not passed' (Forbes-Pitt, 2013: 117). In this context, we have to emphasise the importance of time when analysing relationships between institutional structures and individual actions or studying the emergence of new institutional structures and cultural forms in post-communist Europe.

Thus, we have found in Archer's meta-theory an intriguing and freeing approach that is closely related to actual social processes and evokes a critical view of reality, based on ontological analysis. Archer's model of morphogenetic analysis, based on the interactions between structure, agency and culture (SAC), enables us to take into account some randomness of certain (historical) events happening in particular time and space, creating new forces and developments in society, or even full transformative cycles of progress or stagnation.

For our empirical research, we have constructed a system of social indicators that makes it possible to grasp the most important sociological dimensions of the transformation processes we have witnessed in our society. Acting at the crossroads between cultural sociology (especially media and consumption studies) and transition studies, we defined the initial goal of our large empirical research project MeeMa as mapping the fundamental changes in the life-worlds of people involved in the process of the social re-structuring of Estonian society during the post-communist transition, coupled with the global technological transformation (the 'digital revolution'). In the latest stages of the MeeMa project (in particular, in the fifth wave of the survey, conducted in 2014), our focus shifted to the changes in the subjective perception of social time and space (Harvey, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991; Rosa, 2003, 2005, 2013). Detailed insights into the processes of social restructuring, changes in media consumption and cultural participation, as well as analyses of the effects of acceleration of social time in Estonian society during the transition and the role of different factors contributing to subjective social stratification and inequalities, are provided in several chapters of this volume.

The morphogenetic approach, which is used as a framing concept in this book, provides not only a beneficial theoretical framework, but also a valuable methodological toolkit for understanding the emerging cultural and social differences as outcomes of morphogenetic/morphostatic processes.

When applying morphogenetic analysis and the respective concepts developed by Archer and her co-authors to map the realities of post-communist Estonia, we seek, throughout this book, answers to the following questions:

- What have been the major *generative mechanisms* of changes occurring during the transition era in Estonia? To explain the generative mechanisms, we focus on the inter-relationships between initial *structural conditions* and *cultural conditions*, and *individual and collective agencies*, and ask whether and how the agencies which initiated morphogenetic changes or acted against them have produced morphostasis. Have these mechanisms changed throughout different periods of the transition?
- Which forms and what categories can describe *structural interactions* and *cultural interactions* in a transforming society? How are the micro-level social practices related to the structural and cultural interactions on the meso- and macro-levels? How do they interact with each other? How are they synchronised or desynchronised?
- What can be considered *positive or negative feedback* to changes? How is the *feedback loop* linked to social and cultural interactions? Is the character of feedback related to the types of reflexivity and/or to the acceleration of changes?
- What are the criteria for distinguishing different morphogenetic/morphostatic cycles in the process of societal transformation?

When seeking answers to these questions, we had to reflect on the methodological difficulties caused by the differences between our initial conceptual framework for empirical studies of Estonian social transformations, and the analytical model of the social morphogenetic approach. We hope that this work will better explain the social transformations in Estonian society and contribute to the theory of social transformations by adding to the theoretical model operational conceptualisation and empirical content.

1.3. METHODOLOGY OF OUR EMPIRICAL STUDIES

The empirical material in our study is based on unique data from population surveys, enabling the analysis of individual coping with macro-level structural changes in Estonian society during almost 15 years. The representative survey ‘Me. The World. The Media’ (MeeMa) was conducted in five waves – in 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011 and

2014 – by the Institute of Social Studies at the University of Tartu, in cooperation with opinion and market research companies (Faktum and Saar Poll)[2].

The questionnaires (containing about 900 variables) were divided into more than 20 thematic blocks, covering interests, values and attitudes, as well as respondents' social positions in various fields, affected by institutional changes in society: political and civic participation, cultural interests and activities, media usage (including computers and the Internet), professional activities and entrepreneurship, spatial contacts and mobility, consumption habits and environmental attitudes, religious, ethnic and generational identity, habits of time usage, subjective self-positioning in the social hierarchy, perception of future risks, wealth, health and education, and family status and housing conditions. All survey waves included questions on the evaluation of social changes, trust in institutions, political preferences, lifestyle, social and economic status, and other socio-demographic indicators.

The design of the questionnaires was influenced by the social constructivist approach (Alfred Schütz, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann), theories of structure and agency (Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck) and social practices in various fields (Pierre Bourdieu). The activities and positions in the various fields, media use and communication habits, values, worldviews, subjective experiences, and relations in time and space were the focus from the first survey wave on. In the 2014 survey wave, the acceleration of personal and social time (Rosa 2003, 2005, 2013) received our special attention.

The analyses involved comparisons across the main socio-demographic variables (the language of the questionnaire, age, gender, income, social status, etc.), as well as across various types (i.e. clusters of individuals) that we constructed in the analysis.

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[2] The questionnaire, prepared both in Estonian and Russian, consisted of two parts: the first in the form of a self-administered written questionnaire and the second in the form of an oral interview. The respondents were visited in their homes twice; during the first visit, a questionnaire was left to be completed by each respondent without assistance, and during the second visit a formalised interview was conducted. The survey sample included in each wave approximately 1500 individuals, in 2002–2008 covering the 15–74-year-old population, and in 2011 and 2014 the 15–79-year-old population. A probability random sampling method was applied, using population statistics as a basis. Based on the probability sampling model, 150 territorial sampling points were selected and ten respondents in each point were chosen. Both a language quota (to sample Estonian- and Russian-speaking respondents proportionally to their representation in the population) and the 'young man rule' were used, meaning that in each sampled household the youngest man of the sample age was preferred as the respondent.

Besides using single variables (886 in 2014), a range of aggregated index variables was calculated and used in the analyses (128 indices in 2014). Several uni- and multivariate analysis methods were used in analysing the data: correlation, factor, cluster and regression analysis, multidimensional scaling, etc. At the societal level, our study has revealed patterns of aggregated relational feedback to changes that have occurred in Estonian cultural and political space. Namely, we adapted cluster analysis to tackle collective responses, and the resulting types of 'corporate agencies', formed as compacted patterns of action, relationships, dependencies, and internal rules of interactions, represent some of the main mechanisms of social change.

In this book we try to widen our approach and reconsider our empirical findings through the lens of critical realism, initially developed by Roy Bhaskar (1979), as a central element of the meta-theory of social morphogenesis (Archer, 2013). One of the characteristic features of the critical realism principle used in the morphogenetic approach is its unique understanding of causality. Critical realism introduces a complex approach to causality to explain social change processes, instead of the linear understanding of causality used in the classical social theory (Durkheim, 1895/2013; Weber, 1949) and in quantitative social science research[3].

We have implemented the critical realist understanding of causality that opens a valuable field for mapping the multi-level generative mechanisms of social transformations, as well as for explaining the dynamics leading to positive or negative outcomes of social changes. We agree with Archer's critical realist statement that 'causation is not the establishment of correlations between the variables' (2015: 24). Instead, according to Archer's explanation, the mechanism provides the real basis of causal laws, above, beyond and regardless of the presence or absence of statistical associations with outcomes at the level of events (ibid.). Moreover, those mechanisms that help to explain social changes seldom appear as unique and linear determinants.

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[3] The emphasis of the critical realist approach has been amplified with the emergence of computational social science as a causal explanatory research framework (Cioffi-Revilla, 2014). Within this paradigm, such initial warning statements as 'end of theory' were prevalent, focussing attention on the increase in correlational types of inquiry in social science research, without explaining the causal relationships underlying these relationships (Anderson, 2008). However, later more nuanced epistemologies were proposed, for instance a suggestion to apply a more reflexive framework and accept the situatedness of social science research when using large-scale data (Kitchin, 2014). Recent discussions have suggested critical realism principles in the field of big data and digital research (Fuchs, 2017) through combining critical social theory, digital methods and related research ethics, and via contextualising social phenomena.

Instead, they appear as multiple 'generative complexes', which can thwart or nullify each other (ibid.). Such an understanding of causality as proposed within the critical realism approach is widely discussed in theoretical literature as a novel and useful methodological solution to study complex social transformation processes (Archer, 2010, 2013), as well as in the field of the current data turn within social sciences (Fox & Do, 2013).

In our study, we have implemented the relational understanding of causality inherent in critical realism (Archer, 2013). According to this approach, instead of focusing on the mechanical relationships between positive and negative feedback loops between social change processes, we have explained relational feedback by analysing interrelated networks of social phenomena. We have analysed relational feedback mostly by using cluster analysis (often combined with other variable grouping methods, such as factor analysis), which has enabled us to determine the interrelations within big sets of variables and, thereby, explain broad generative mechanisms of social changes. The cluster analysis method, combined with other methods and used in several chapters of this book, also enabled us to study interrelations between individuals (agencies engaged in social processes) and variables and aggregated indexes (indicating the generative mechanisms of social changes). Therefore, the method turned out to be valuable for explaining the inter-relational feedback loops of social change processes.

In transformation studies, it is inevitable that attempts are made to answer the questions 'why?' and 'how?' referring to presumed determinants of changes. The critical realist approach suggests paying attention to the changing historical context in order to specify causal mechanisms of social transformations. In our study, we have analysed social transformations by focusing mainly on the last 15 years, the period of our original data collection, but also by framing the changes in the longer period of post-communist transformation. The pluralist and complex approach to causality suggested by critical realism (e.g. Iosifides, 2011) has enabled us to analyse how particular transformation experiences in particular contexts are expressed in social processes, structures and systems, and to explain through conceptual schemes, theories and propositions why newly emerging transformation processes are expressed in particular ways. A relevant methodological tool for this kind of analysis has been created by Archer and her collaborators (Archer, 2013) by elaborating the morphogenetic model of social transformation.

1.4. THE MORPHOGENETIC MODEL OF ESTONIAN TRANSFORMATION

Archer's morphogenetic model of social transformation is based on interactions between structure, agency and culture (SAC, see Figure 1.1). This model shifts the focus of analysis from separate items or factors to the effects of interrelationships between three dimensions involved simultaneously in each and every moment of social changes: structural factors (S: social relations and institutional settings), agencies (A: activity and influence of individual or collective human agents pursuing their vested interests) and culture (C: perceptions, ideas, normative constraints, etc.). If we want to discover the real reasons for certain social events or tendencies, all of these factors should be considered together. These events may lead to an increase in diversity and greater variety of choices in society (morphogenesis) or, on the contrary, cause restrictions and constraints, reducing diversity and diminishing the variety of human choices, i.e. causing morphostasis.

As the morphogenetic model of social transformations is also time-sensitive, it has to take into account the irreversible character of social events and their sequence and synchronisation. From the time perspective, any process of transformation can be viewed as moving through three stages, or 'morphogenetic cycles': from the initial stage (T1) when certain events and conditions make certain agencies move into structural and cultural interactions (T2–T3), leading to the elaboration (T4) of some new structural and cultural conditions (Archer, 2013), and during this process also recreating the agencies themselves (through 'double morphogenesis', as Archer has termed this kind of changes in human agencies during transformation; Archer, 2015). As indicated on Figure 1.1, agency is central in initiating negative or positive feedback loops leading to structural or cultural societal changes. However, the social morphogenetic model is relational, indicating the tight interrelations of the three main structures through the relational feedback of networked agency. The agency operates relationally, through networked logic, and is at any stage of the social process interrelated with cultural and structural processes.

In the next sub-chapter, we explain the Estonian social transformation in detail through these constitutive aspects of the morphogenetic model of social transformations: generative mechanisms of social morphogenesis, social and cultural interactions, positive and negative feedback on morphogenetic cycles, agency and reflexivity.

Figure 1.1. Structure of the morphogenetic cycles in the Estonian social transformation


T1
Initial social conditions, socio-economic and political structures and national institutional settings
Agen-cies 1
Initial cultural conditions, national traditions, political ideologies, traditional content of education, media and communication, usage of languages
External structural environment
External cultural environment
T2–T3
Social interaction changing social relations, positions and institutional settings
Agencies 2–3
Cultural interaction changing ideas, values, meanings and rules, usage of languages
T4
Agen-cies 4
Social elaboration: emerging institutional settings, social, economic and political structures
Cultural elaboration: emerging knowledge, ideologies, cultural forms, media and communication, usage of languages

Source: the authors' elaboration of Archer's M/M model, based on Archer, 2013: 7

1.4.1. Generative mechanisms of social morphogenesis

Generative mechanisms are central to the morphogenetic approach (Archer, 2015). In the theoretical elaborations and empirical studies in the field of post-communist European transformations, one can find various factors and models which were developed to explain the causes of social transformation processes (e.g. Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; Golob & Makarovič, 2017; Norgaard, 2000; Norkus, 2018). In Chapter 2 we present the story of Estonian transformation through the morphogenetic lens, focusing on the most important external and internal factors, which we see in their interplay as generative mechanisms shaping the transformation of Estonian society during the last three decades, from the end of the Soviet Union to the current time (movements from T1 to T4 in Figure 1.1). Different well-documented events, circumstances and initiatives, such as economic, political and administrative reforms, socio-cultural and ideological movements and technological innovations, led to changes across the domains and levels of society, resulting in the emergence of a new social, economic and political order.

What is relevant in the morphogenetic approach is the understanding of how the process of social transformation 'happens' as an outcome of parallel activities and events, which are not linked by direct causality or statistical correlations but form, in each case, certain compounds, bundles of causes responsible for the outcomes of the transformation processes in question (see the circles of changes in Figure 1.1). Disclosure of these 'contingent complementarities', which can be seen as the generative mechanisms of morphogenic/morphostatic development (Archer, 2015), is the main objective of our research. As many different causes can be involved in shaping the outcomes of transformation, any exercise of morphogenetic analysis should clearly identify the issues in question and extract from the bundle of probable causes the most relevant ones. In particular, we were interested in the interplay between external and internal agencies and conditions (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2009) when explaining the social transformations in Estonia (see Figure 1.1). Therefore, instead of a mechanical view where causal interrelations of internal and external factors are explained, the inter-relational view is central in this model (cf. Archer, 2013), so that the systemic factors leading to positive or negative feedback loops are tightly integrated with the networked agencies interrelated with those systemic factors.

It is widely acknowledged that the most important external factor in Estonian development has always been the geopolitical position of the Baltic countries between the East (Russia) and the West/North (Scandinavia). The proximity to Russia has led to the 'securitisation' of politics (Lagerspetz & Vogt, 2004), and Russia has been a permanent background figure in the complicated relationships between ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking minority. On the other hand, the geographic and cultural closeness to Finland and other Nordic countries has played a crucial stimulating role in the Estonian transformation (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997). Easy access to Nordic jobs has been responsible for the high outward mobility of qualified workers, but the close proximity to prosperous Finland has also supported a strong competitive motivation to catch up with the Nordic living standard and has created very high ambitions (and critical attitudes) of the Estonian population concerning quality of life. An additional effect of geographical proximity was the access of the Soviet-era northern Estonian audience to Finnish TV, which created an aspirational model for life and has been interpreted by some researchers (e.g. Masso, 2008) as an important condition for Estonians' readiness, after 50 years of Soviet regime, for a smoother adaptation to capitalist society.

An important external cultural factor that has shaped structural interactions in all East European post-communist countries on their 'road to freedom' was the domination of the neoliberal ideology in the Western countries in general, and in the EU in particular, during the first cycles of transformation. This ideological framework played a very important role in shaping the rules that Estonian and the rest of East and Central European economic and social policies followed to achieve access to the EU (Iankova, 2018; Kollmorgen, 2018). The hegemony of neoliberalism and the prioritisation of financial effectiveness at the expense of moral values legitimised radical reform policies of 'shock therapy' and made it possible to ignore the adverse cultural and social effects of these radical reforms (Lauristin, 2003). The neoliberal hegemony amplified feelings of alienation among the 'losers' and contributed to the rise of anti-liberal agencies and their radicalisation as the wave of populist conservative nationalism swept through Estonia, as it did in many other countries (see Skąpska, 2018; Vogt, 2018).

Among the internal conditions, the demographic situation and smallness of the country have had constant impacts on all Estonian developments. The smallness of the population (only 1.3 million) is an ontological source of permanent worries, causing problems in the economy and making the culture vulnerable to outside influences. At the same time, the 'smallness' is a source of a strong national identity and communitarian spirit, which have helped Estonia to overcome crises, as well as providing a resource for the tight social networks necessary for mobilisation during social disruptions (such as an economic crisis) or in favouring the development and implementation of innovations. On the other hand, the effects of the demographic situation are related not only to the number of people, but also to the structure of the population in terms of ageing and, even more dramatically, in terms of ethnic composition. Due to the uncontrolled immigration from the East during the Soviet occupation, the share of the non-native population in Estonia is one of the highest in Europe. Therefore, a deficiency of ethnic (and social) cohesion in the society has been one of the major obstacles to morphogenic development. In Chapter 4, Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm analyse the morphostatic effects of the ethnic and social cleavages in the Estonian political development. In Chapter 6, Anu Masso and Sander Salvet partly confirm the social morphogenesis thesis that structural elaborations (such as accessibility to mobility) lead to new cross-border forms of individual spatial interactions; however, the morphostatic effects are more visible among Estonian Russians in the form of narrower social contacts and lower levels of social cohesion, expressed in emigration wishes. In Chapter 8, Triin Vihalemm, Külliki Seppel and Marianne Leppik shed light on the latest tendencies in this field, examining the differences among Russian minority members and analysing the morphogenic effects of translocalisation that have revealed the formation of a new cosmopolitan meta-reflexivity among the younger and well-educated members of the Russian minority.

The major cultural driver through all of the cycles of Estonian transformation has been a strong national motivation for self-assertion after the painful experiences of the Soviet occupation. At the same time, the whole Estonian development would have been different without the structural and cultural effects of the digital revolution. A high level of mediatisation and active cultural participation (see Chapter 3 by Ragne Kõuts-Klemm and Marju Lauristin, and Chapter 6 by Anu Masso and Sander Salvet) and an effective system of public education have created cultural resources enabling Estonia to seize the opportunities created by the global digital transformation and, eventually, to take a leading position in the EU in the building of an e-society and the European common digital market. Opportunities to harness the outcomes of digital development provide a strong competitive advantage, coupled with the strong national motivation for 'catching up' with the rich Nordic neighbours (this 'Westernisation' of spatial perceptions is examined in Chapter 6 by Anu Masso and Sander Salvet), forming a specific generative mechanism of Estonian transformation labelled by Henri Vogt (2011) 'Estonian national liberalism'. However, as suggested by the social morphogenetic model (see Figure 1.1) and indicated in several chapters in this book (including Chapter 4 by Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm, and Chapter 5 by Maie Kiisel), the social and cultural interactions within and between structural and individual agents (or forces) are the main drivers of social morphogenesis.

1.4.2. Social and cultural interactions

Social interactions during the first cycles of transformation in the beginning of the 1990s, when rapid institutional changes were taking place, changed the fundamental relations of ownership and citizenship and created new social positions in society. These interactions were related to the institutional reforms which replaced the Soviet economic and political institutions with Western capitalist and democratic ones, including the privatisation of state-owned companies and assets, the restitution of nationalised properties, and establishing institutions of democratic governance: free elections, multiple political parties, etc. The major institutional reforms were carried out under the supervision of powerful international agencies (e.g. the IMF, World Bank and EU). Interaction with these agencies formed an important part of the structural changes in the 1990s.

Since the end of the 1990s, technological transformation has also contributed to the formation of new hierarchies based on digital skills. Several chapters in this volume provide insights into these processes of structuration based on access to different capitals. In Chapter 10, Marju Lauristin presents an analysis of subjective stratification as an outcome of self-positioning on the vertical ladder of social stratification. This analysis demonstrates how social restructuring in the post-communist society was affected by two complementary processes: marketisation and computerisation. The result is easily comparable to '"double morphogenesis", which transforms agents (by regrouping them) in the same process through which they bring about social transformation', according to Archer (2015: 82). A similar double movement is covered in Chapter 6, which discusses how an unequal distribution of spatial capital among population groups has led to parallel acceleration tendencies, such as the simultaneous spatial widening of social networks and deceleration of social life, including the spatial immobility of younger age groups and the emigration desires of the Russian-speaking population. The turnover of generations as a factor in social structuration and an important generative mechanism of morphogenesis is discussed in Chapter 9 by Veronika Kalmus.

In the SAC model of morphogenetic analysis, social and cultural interactions form two interrelated sides of the morphogenetic cycle. Social interactions lead to changes in social position and the formation of new agencies in the process of 'double morphogenesis' (Archer, 2015). Cultural interactions include the formation of public opinion and more subtle changes in cultural meanings and individual practices. These changes often start as reactions to technological innovations, leading to different forms of self-expression and global flows of intercultural communication. They may result in fundamental changes in the normative order of society (Archer, 2017), or the radicalisation of certain protest movements, or in sudden shifts of voters from the left to the right side of the political scale. For post-communist countries, the first stage of reforms was inevitably connected with fundamental changes in cultural interactions caused by the end of state censorship and of ideological restrictions on the content of the media. Free media, freedom of movement and freedom of expression created access to unprecedented diversity of contacts, messages and forms of self-expression. The extraordinary mass performances of the 'Singing Revolution', such as the 'Baltic chain', in which people joined hands to link the capitals of the Baltic states, were the most spectacular examples of the link between the new situation of unprecedented media freedom and the formation of highly energised and powerful new agencies: the national independence movements.

In the 1990s and 2000s, access to new channels of communication, including social media, increased the variety of choices and interpretations, which increased people's ability to manage the growing complexity of the environment and helped people cope with rapid structural changes. In Chapter 3, Ragne Kõuts-Klemm and Marju Lauristin describe in detail these processes from the viewpoint of the emerging patterns of media usage in the age of social media. The emergence and patterns of social media usage could also be related to the new type of agencies (e.g. 'fractured expressive reflexivity'), this time with the effect of weakened civic involvement. The emerging agencies in the process of the mediatisation of society can be described as paradoxical or controversial, as they are both highly self-confident and socially active in their (virtual) networks, but quite disinterested in politics, having a negative attitude towards traditional institutional forms of policy making. In Chapter 4, Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm provide an overview of sociocultural interactions between people and political institutions, particularly the evaluation of social changes by people with different political affiliations. These interactions reflect the formation of the new pluralist political situation in Estonia after the dissolution of the mass movements, the emerging hegemony of the neoliberal ideology and the formation of 'normal political cleavages' based on different socio-economic interests (Saarts, 2017). Our analysis demonstrates (in several chapters in this book) that these social and cultural interactions may form both positive and negative feedback loops as constitutive drivers in social morphogenetic or morphostatic cycles.

1.4.3. Positive/negative feedback in morphogenetic/morphostatic cycles

In order to ensure a positive outcome from the growing richness of communicative contacts, morphogenetic development requires synchronisation between social and cultural interactions (Archer, 2013) created by mutual positive feedback loops (see Figure 1.1). If the social and cultural changes evoke positive feedback, this encourages further steps towards increasing diversity and complexity in a system, enhancing morphogenesis, whereas negative feedback results in stagnation and decline, reducing diversity and inhibiting further development. Our analysis of Estonian developments shows that the asynchronisation of social and cultural interactions happens when changing social relationships and institutional structures are not recognised and legitimised, or if new ideas and values emerging from communications on the global level are not accepted as meaningful for producing institutional changes. This failure in synchronisation can produce stagnation and alienation and lead to the inhibition of the morphogenetic process in a whole society or in some parts of it, creating 'enclaves' or 'vortices', explained by Maccarini (2015) as socially isolated spaces where some individual or organisational members of society face problems 'for which they perceive that no realistic solutions can be found, at least in the short run' (Maccarini, 2015: 167). Archer has also noted that 'oscillation between morphogenesis and morphostasis' due to the lack of synchrony between structure and culture is a fundamental problem of modernity (Archer, 2013: 12, 16).

Some of these negative effects of asynchronisation between structural and cultural interactions can be identified in Estonian developments when looking at the causes of regional, ethnic or generational inequalities (see Chapter 6 by Anu Masso and Sander Salvet; Chapter 8 by Triin Vihalemm, Külliki Seppel and Marianne Leppik, and Chapter 9 by Veronika Kalmus). Stacked morphogenesis, where the synchronisation of social and cultural interactions fails and social and cultural changes evoke negative feedback, turns into stagnation in social change, or morphostasis. Failed morphogenesis can even lead to morphonecrosis (Al-Amoudi, 2017; Archer, 2016; Archer, 2017), which presents individuals with contextual discontinuity or contexts where social and cultural interactions devolve into institutional power struggles. This uncontrolled morphogenesis may favour novel forms of social inequalities, as indicated in the theoretical model of social morphogenesis (Al-Amoudi, 2017), and confirmed in this book, for instance in Chapter 10 by Marju Lauristin, in Chapter 6 by Anu Masso and Sander Salvet, and in Chapter 7 by Triin Vihalemm, Signe Opermann and Veronika Kalmus.

The morphogenetic approach provides methodological tools for clear differentiation between the periods of transition and transformation, where these morphogenetic or morphostatic cycles are expressed. More specifically, transition is related to the stage of interactions, whereas transformation can be seen as a stage of elaboration (Archer, 2013: 19). In our earlier analysis, we divided Estonian transformation into seven periods (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2017), characterised by different economic, cultural, social or political outcomes. However, not all of these political changes have led to the emergence of new elements of social or cultural order, which could be interpreted as the starting conditions for a new morphogenetic cycle. Rather, Estonian transformation is best divided not into seven periods, but into four cycles: (1) the 'Liberation cycle', launched by Gorbachev's reforms, leading to the development of mass movements and finally the restoration of an independent Estonia (1988–1991); (2) the 'Reconstruction and nation state building cycle', building up basic institutional structures for independent statehood and starting European integration (1992–2003); (3) the 'Transnational adaptation cycle', starting with joining the EU in 2004 (2004–2017); and (4) the 'Alteration of perspective cycle', starting with the change in political climate due to the rise of national conservative forces in 2018. In Chapter 2, Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm present a nuanced overview of each cycle, its initial conditions, the character of the structural and cultural interactions and new conditions and agencies that evolved as the result of elaborations.

The sources of feedback can be internal or external, received as evaluations by outer institutions or extracted from actions and relationships with others. The feedback can be expressed by revealing positive or negative trends, publishing supportive or hostile comments, or by organising actions of support or protest. In Chapter 2, Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm discuss the controversial, or even paradoxical, nature of the reactions to external and internal feedback. They state that the public perception of overwhelmingly positive external feedback tended to be negative, even angry, whereas the negative internal feedback was welcomed. Analysing the effects of this controversy from the morphogenetic perspective, we can see a paradoxical situation in which positive and negative feedback exchanged roles: when international organisations and foreign observers continued to praise the Estonian 'success story', this helped to keep in power the neoliberal politicians who had been blamed for stagnation, which is evident in Estonia's morphostatic development after the economic crisis of 2008. At the same time the negative internal feedback had a morphogenic effect, supporting change and helping to increase the variety and diversity of political options.

Thus, in order to close the feedback loop and make the best use of positive or negative feedback as a resource for structural or cultural elaboration, actors should apply their reflexivity to synthesise their own visions and interpret often controversial responses or practical reactions of others.

1.4.4. Agency and reflexivity

One of the main principles of the morphogenetic model is that, in social order, feedback, whether positive or negative, cannot be 'automatic' but is necessarily mediated by human reflexivity, be it individual or collective (Archer, 2013: 22). Neglecting human reflexivity as an inevitable constituent of any social order may lead to a reduction of human behaviour to something similar to automated machine behaviour (Rahwan et al., 2019) and to vicious cycles of negative feedback loops being expressed in social disruptions, such as automating inequality (Eubanks, 2018) as a result of failed digital transformations.

Human reflexivity is not easy to conceptualise, or to measure; therefore, in this book we propose a framework for the operationalisation of reflexivity in the framework of the social morphogenesis thesis. Inspired by Archer's approach, which, at the most general level, defines reflexivity as an internal dialogue (e.g. Archer, 2003), we understand reflexivity as the ability of an individual agent to reflect upon him/herself, actions and practices from a self-reflexive, self-interpretative and self-aware perspective. Apart from that, a reflexive relationship also includes surrounding structures and the environment, perhaps outside one's personal and direct experience and control, but in one way or another resonating in his/her consciousness. Therefore, steps that lead to changes in temporal structures or any transformative change are not automatic, but closely related to cultural processes (Maccarini, 2014: 64), often agentially determined by collective reflexivity (Carrigan, 2016; Porpora, 2016).

However, reflexivity is not uniform or constant, but has a great variety of expressions in different social contexts. Archer (2007: 4), therefore, distinguishes at least four ideal-typical modes of reflexivity and argues that people with different socialisation experiences tend to practice different types of reflexivity, based on more abstract or more concrete thinking. These four main reflexivity types include (1) communicative reflexivity (the ability to initiate internal communication and take actions), (2) autonomous reflexivity (internal conversations leading to morphostatic outcomes in the form of collective actions), (3) meta-reflexivity (a higher capability of critical reflection on effective action in society), and (4) fractured (expressive) reflexivity (a lack of ability to use reflexive powers for purposeful action; Archer, 2003; 2007).

Morphogenetic analysis has focussed particular attention on the development of meta-reflexivity, as it is 'oriented to "values"' (Scambler, 2012: 149). Meta-reflexivity clearly differs from fractured reflexivity, which leads to passive agency manifested through 'non- or disoriented' living (Scambler, ibid.), including people to whom things happen and who become stuck at the level of metaphors in forms of generalisation of their thoughts[4]. Furthermore, fractured reflexives have not developed the necessary skills for responding to the dependencies created by the current digital transformations (e.g. smartphone addiction). The contemporary structure of society – increasingly diverse and complex, sometimes even controversial – supports the development of meta-reflexivity. A higher capability of abstraction and critical reflection on one's own internal conversations[5] and on effective action in society is needed. Today's contexts in which individuals need to function do not necessarily provide solid and stable solutions concerning various fields of life. Therefore, higher analytical-critical thinking is reflected in the variability with which individuals look at their future and personal 'life-projects' (Archer, 2003) or 'do-it-yourself projects' (Giddens, 1991). Through these and within a multitude of choices, people organise and reflexively update their life aspirations and plans to keep them cohesive and trustworthy.

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[4] See also Scambler's (2013: 314) discussion, in the context of health and inequalities, on 'vulnerable fractured reflexivity', which is 'becoming the prevailing mode of thought and action for those falling or left behind in financial capitalism'.

In Chapter 5, Maie Kiisel investigates the patterns of social action, based on social theoretical approaches to life-projects. She shows that closer socio-material involvement in social practices (social relationships and networks, consumption, civic and cultural participation, ecological practices, etc.) is accompanied by greater optimism and expectations regarding the development of society, but also more frequent involvement in changes, the perception of a faster pace of time and a higher rate of complexity. Those who practice meta-reflexivity increase the density of social action while making sense of their personal lives and societal challenges. Beside meta-reflexive individuals, autonomous ones also participate in these social actions, although they (especially the younger ones) tend to ignore old structures (social norms and established patterns of social action) and support new practices. Conversely, less involved groups tend to be pessimistic about the changes in society and less capable of taking action even if needed. Accordingly, many of them represent the fractured reflexivity type, to use Archer's (2014) theoretical formulation. Kiisel notes that one's ability to create and develop personal lifestyle choices is more related to interaction with innovative and change-resistant structural processes. Those who are more successful are not necessarily wealthier but are more capable of reflection and of taking advantage of various opportunities. At the same time, the more structural positions one has to act within, the more limited are his/her resources in terms of the availability of time.

The abilities of mobility and using time capital within the context of the deepening differentiation of social groups are discussed by Anu Masso and Sander Salvet (in Chapter 6) and Triin Vihalemm, Signe Opermann and Veronika Kalmus (in Chapter 7). Chapter 6 demonstrates that the acceleration of social life through digital technologies making possible and mediating mobility experiences has led to inequalities in mobility capital. Chapter 7 offers an alternative look at social stratification, demonstrating empirically how the capability of converting individual time capital differentiates social groups and creates new types of agency. We also emphasise in our book the developments in political culture based on collective choices and the formation of value structures among population groups, including people with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In Chapter 8, Triin Vihalemm and her colleagues analyse the development of minority integration and translocalism among the Russian minority in Estonia. The perspective of an open world framework, regulating the issues of migration, citizenship, rights and responsibilities in new ways so that they better correspond to already existing situations and meet the needs of multicultural families, an international workforce and students, has not been fully enacted and incorporated at the societal level. Nevertheless, relational feedback in the form of actual demands and expectations already exists, reflecting social interaction.

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[5] Cf. Juri Lotman's 'auto-communication model' (1990), according to which this internal dialogue as a meaning-generating mechanism makes sense of the internal Other.

In observing all of these developments and the dynamics of today's reality, we can see how the existing system faces difficulties, being too rigid to embrace new strategies expressed by the reflexive agencies. The above-described topics (i.e. patterns of social practices, mobility, time-use capability and integration) relate very closely to two important types of reflexive powers: social and political reflexivity, defined by Ismael Al-Amoudi (2017: 65) as the capacity to formulate, respond and act on the questions: How can one make one's way through the social world? How can individuals be engaged in collective action to steer society together? Unlike meta-reflexivity, characterising the mental processes and activities on the individual level, social and political reflexivity are fostered at the meso or macro levels, crucial to morphogenic society and dependent on endogenous rather than exogenous transformational mechanisms.

Individuals' ability to engage with society and the world at large can be enhanced by their capacity to resonate with the social processes of change that open the structural system so that new forms of agency can emerge. However, not all individuals are equipped with the resources to handle these emergent changes and/or they lack the agential ability to cope with and take advantage of new opportunities. Also, sometimes they may find themselves caught between simultaneously occurring processes of progress and stagnation in structural and social interactions, on the one hand, and cultural interactions, on the other hand. The results of a cluster analysis for the description of participation patterns in different fields (political participation, cultural activities, time management and social action) have led us to a generalised idea of the typology of social agencies emerging in the process of social acceleration that characterise current transformations (Lauristin et al., 2017). These types can be

Figure 1.2. Typology of social agencies in a rapidly changing society


Resourcefulness, active participation
B. Alternative activist
A. Innovator, driver of changes
C. Safeguard of traditions
D. Consumer of innovations
Resistance to acceleration of changes
E. Formal imitator
Support to acceleration of changes
F. Stressed laggard
G. Deprived loser
Lack of resources, passivity

characterised by their positions in a two-dimensional field, where the vertical axis represents the resourcefulness and strength of agencies, and the horizontal axis represents their relation to the acceleration of changes (Figure 1.2). Resourcefulness is characterised by the ownership of certain capitals (economic, cultural and social) and activeness in using the capitals. The relation to the acceleration of changes is shown by positive or negative attitudes (satisfaction or disturbance) toward changes and readiness to take part in the changes (Figure 1.2). We propose seven types of social agencies related to changes in society: *innovators, drivers of changes* (Type A), *alternative activists* (Type B), *safeguards of traditions* (Type C), *consumers of innovations* (Type D), *formal imitators* (Type E), *stressed laggards* (Type F), and *deprived losers* (Type G). So far we do not have sufficient evidence to demonstrate the relations between these types and certain kinds of reflexivity; however, it can be assumed that the energetic drivers of innovations may often have autonomous reflexivity; alternative activists may mainly be meta-reflexive; traditionalists and imitators, as well as passive losers, may be more inclined to communicative reflexivity; and the satisfied consumers of accelerated innovations and stressed laggards may demonstrate more fractured reflexivity (cf. Al-Amoudi, 2017; Archer, 2012). These assumptions can be proved only by a thorough qualitative study.

Theoretically and empirically, our research presented in this book adds some insights to the debate on the formation of these new social agencies, for example concerning the structuring role of generations in a transforming society. Besides the vertical positioning of Estonian generation groups in the social hierarchy, Veronika Kalmus (Chapter 9) demonstrates their horizontal positioning in terms of various mentalities, lifestyles and practices, or 'manifestations of generational habitus'. Generations as agents of social change reveal themselves in various ways, including through their political and civic agency, which, as Kalmus states, has strengthened during the period of study (2002–2014), indicating development towards democratic participation and expressing the increasing potential for positive feedback loops leading to social morphogenesis. However, older and younger generations, as indicated in Chapter 9, exercise their civic and political agency, as well as other practices (media consumption and time use) in different ways: older people support more traditional habits and preferences and younger people go along more easily with digitally mediated participation in various fields of cultural and societal life.

1.5. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS

The theoretical-methodological approach we have elaborated in this book, based on the morphogenetic approach proposed by Margaret Archer, has provided a valuable framework for re-considering social transformations. The model we proposed in this book for empirical research on social transformations is unique for three reasons: (1) it uses a holistic and historically embedded approach to social changes, focusing on simultaneous and interrelated processes of social structure, culture and agency, (2) it explains the relational character of social change processes, and (3) it explains simultaneous dynamics of social morphogenesis and morphostasis.

Furthermore, an original contribution of this book is the conceptual synthesis of several approaches to social transformations: by considering their multidirectional nature as explained by Polanyi, by integrating significant changes in temporal and spatial structures and their subjective perceptions (as elaborated, most prominently, by Rosa), and by attributing a central role to the changing modes of agencies (and their interactions) emerging in morphogenic social developments (Archer) and being related to social, cultural and political involvement. Through such conceptual exploration, supported by generalisations of empirical analysis, we have also contributed to expanding the semantic field of several concepts. For instance, we have discussed new aspects of *generations* and *generational units* (by suggesting their SAC composition), *agency* and the *acceleration of personal and social time*, and the compression of *social space* through speed and mobility.

The application of the morphogenetic model for the re-interpretation of the results of our study has proved the fruitfulness of the holistic approach in the empirical study of social transformation. In this approach we systematically included comprehensive sets of indicators representing interrelations between structure, culture and agency in different fields of society to explain any social change processes. The critical realist approach also suggests using the mixed-method approach and combining the observations of micro-, meso- and macro-level social processes. Another relevant feature of our holistic approach was using survey data covering more than a decade, which enabled us to shed light on the main generative mechanisms of societal changes in Estonia. We can conclude that the rapid societal changes in the post-communist Estonian society have been characterised by four main internal mechanisms – neoliberal reforms, digitalisation, ethnic divide and generational dynamics – coupled with external mechanisms of European integration, translocalisation and growing insecurity in international relations[6]. The main assumption of the liberal reforms has been that all individuals in the society are provided with diverse choices and equal opportunities. The experience of radical structural reforms, along with the rapid digitalisation of society, as well as the need to cope with the external challenges of Europeanisation and globalisation, have made the Estonian society a 'test case' of post-communist transformation. The generational dynamics in both large ethnic groups have enabled the convergence of active, diversity-oriented communities, being a resource for the social elaborations necessary for morphogenetic social change. Taken together, the specifics of the Estonian case have provided us a valuable real-life experimental situation for empirically studying and explaining the generative mechanisms of social changes within the social morphogenetic approach.

One of the most interesting results of our study is related to the simultaneous processes of morphostasis and morphogenesis in the transforming Estonian society. Assuming the increasing complexity and positive elaborations leading to social changes, our empirical study indicates that the processes of morphogenesis and morphostasis can occur alternately or even simultaneously. Such an oscillatory (or relational) nature of social morphogenesis has revealed itself in situations in which structural forces, for example in politics and economics, determine new (institutional) requirements or trends (e.g. for the innovation policy negotiated at the EU level), but these remain without satisfactory meaning at the levels of society and people, since cultural interaction does not take place (or takes place at a slower pace). Or, vice versa, the cultural changes initiated by growing translocalisation increase the diversity of values and practices, but institutional changes towards the securitisation of politics impose restrictions. Therefore, social morphogenesis needs to be seen and approached as a constantly synchronising process, where all three mechanisms of interaction (SAC) seldom work together 'hand in hand'. On the contrary, they usually represent asynchronous relations and, therefore, challenge both individual agents and the whole society to move towards 'eudaimonic well-being' (Archer, 2017).

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[6] The distinction between internal and external factors may become blurred in the era of globalisation.

In the first cycles of transformation, the neoliberal developments in Estonia, with emerging new forms of social diversity-oriented communities, favoured social morphogenesis. But during the last cycles, the neoliberal hegemony started to play the opposite role, enhancing morphostasis. The same can be said about the ambiguous role of Europeanisation from the morphogenetic viewpoint. Culturally and socially, EU membership strongly added to the diversification of Estonian society, but institutionally and structurally it supported standardisation and the restriction of choices. Movement to higher complexity by maintaining diversity only happens when relational feedback between structural and cultural interactions remains positive.

At the same time, our findings confirm the relational nature of agency formation and indicate the phenomenon of 'double morphogenesis' in social change processes. Based on the feedback between structural and cultural interactions, parallel horizontal and vertical movements occur in a particular socio-temporal situation (as indicated in Figure 1.1). The relational subject adapts to changes in ways that keep various opportunities open instead of choosing, accepting or refusing specific options. Therefore, culturally resource-rich individuals can direct their activities to support social elaboration and move towards novel social structures, but in another socio-historical context they may form protest identities and create alternative agencies that slow down or even resist change processes.

In some situations, 'exhaustion' from changes can hamper morphogenesis. This kind of scenario is inscribed in the social morphogenetic model of social change. Therefore, backward movements and stasis often happen in parallel with increasing diversity. As this book also reveals, positive relational feedback occurs in parallel with negative feedback, so that social change towards higher diversity not only leads to more complex social systems, but simpler diversity principles may exist side-by-side with more complex ones. Hence, this relational, dynamic nature of the morphogenetic social change model does not give primacy to any of its components, and therefore makes it possible to grasp both the predictable and the unpredictable mechanisms of social change towards higher diversity.

The attempt to use the morphogenetic model for the secondary analysis of empirical data, presented in this book, helped us to understand the complexity of interrelated cultural and structural changes and to see more clearly the processes leading to the emergence of new agencies. At the same time, we also admit the insufficiency of our empirical data for a comprehensive application of the morphogenetic model, especially for understanding the mechanisms of micro-meso-macro interactions. The application of a cluster analysis to discover different types of primary agencies provided us with some interesting insights into these relational phenomena. However, determining the conditions for the development of meta-reflexivity, and the role of different forms of reflexivity in generating morphogenesis or morphostasis and in the formation of secondary relational agencies requires more wide-scale qualitative research. We hope to pursue an in-depth analysis of agencies and reflexivity in our future studies.

Furthermore, cross-sectional data from the MeeMa survey and publicly available comparative data make it possible to compare the social transformations in Estonia with the developments in other countries going through similar changes. Studies of social transformations in East and Central European countries provide a rich collection of evidence-based stories showing relationships between the objective processes of change in the different layers and spheres of these societies, which make it possible to apply morphogenetic analysis to explain the relationships between the outcomes of these processes and certain historical events, particularly legal, economic and political reforms or international forces working as generating mechanisms (Norkus, 2018). This possibility of comparisons between parallel processes in different countries that started their new cycles of development at the same time and in similar historical circumstances makes it possible to determine regularities in the morphogenetic process. We believe that the theoretical-methodological framework proposed in this book provides a valuable and flexible toolkit for examining the social change processes in particular socio-cultural contexts, as well as shifts in practising and understanding the social diversity principles globally.

Another perspective for further research on social change processes lies in combining the multi-level and context-sensitive approaches applied in our empirical analysis with computational social science, which makes use of novel digital data sources and 'big data'. Since computational social science by itself has been criticised for its data-driven and linear approaches to causality (Fuchs, 2017), the understanding of causality as proposed by the critical realism approach and examined in this book offers a useful alternative. Besides several methodological alternatives to digital positivism, such as cultural analytics (Schäfer & van Es, 2017) and digital methods (Rogers, 2019), the relational view of causality advocated in this book invites further discussion and methodological developments in future empirical research on social transformation.

One of the main theoretical-methodological questions in the field of social transformations remains to be answered in further studies: How are new social elaborations, such as an increase in social diversity as an outcome of social changes and a source for social innovations, emerging in the context of old social structures? Generic structural interactions should always be supported by preceding cultural interactions, but the rearrangement of cultural meanings, such as values and social norms, is more inert and takes longer than structural reforms do. Therefore, asynchrony between different change processes is inherent in any social transformation, and time is always needed for the development of the value basis for the real implementation of proposed structural reforms, especially when the change encompasses several social spaces where structural interactions spread across state borders. In moving towards social flourishing or higher diversity in the course of social morphogenesis, double movements are natural, favouring higher diversity or, vice versa, cultural clashes, when meta-reflexivity is not developed. However, as the social change processes continue to emerge (in a perpetual cycle), the main question remains: What are the main mechanisms and sources for the emerging new values, ideologies and languages that will lead to structural shifts towards higher diversity, either in the form of evolving human diversity itself, or as expressed in the social understandings and governance principles regarding these diversities?

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CHAPTER 2.
THE ‘ESTONIAN WAY’ OF THE POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATION THROUGH THE LENS OF THE MORPHOGENETIC MODEL

Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union is one of the central events that make up what is considered to be the common starting point of post-communist transitions in the Eastern and Central European countries. The mechanisms of initial transition have often been understood as a rather uniform pattern of institutional reforms following some common design. In Western ‘transitology’, the reform policies in the post-communist East and Central Europe have even been reduced to the simple ‘mimicking’ of the ‘developed West’ without any original contribution (Krastev & Holmes, 2018). However, the real historical changes in post-communist countries showed a great deal of diversity, from amazing success stories to quite catastrophic results in some states (Havrylyshyn, 2007). The Estonian way ‘out of the red’ (Orenstein, 2001), from an occupied nation under Soviet rule to one of the leaders of the digital revolution in free and democratic Europe, has received special attention from various researchers (Buchen, 2007; Feldmann, 2006, 2013; Norkus, 2007, 2012). The Estonian story has been cited as a benchmark of successful neoliberal economic reforms (de Melo et al., 1996; Hansen & Sorsa, 1994; Panagiotou, 2001), and has been criticised as an example of unsolved social and ethnic issues behind the curtain of economic success (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; Lauristin, 2003; Saar, 2011).

In this chapter we present a sociological narrative of the Estonian transformation, informed by the morphogenetic/morphostatic perspective described in the previous chapter.

As recent developments in Estonian politics have demonstrated, in Estonia there have been periods of morphostatic stagnation, as in the other 'new democracies', such as Poland and Hungary (Cianetti et al., 2018; Skąpska, 2018). Post-Soviet transitions have so far not been approached from the perspective of the morphogenetic theory (Archer, 2013, 2015). This analysis is useful for disclosing the critical moments of alternation and the interplay between hidden morphogenetic and morphostatic forces through topical analysis focusing only on some subfields, such as economics and politics.

According to the morphogenetic approach, it is not sufficient to rely only on analysis from empirical data (collected and processed during the 17 years of our project) in order to understand properly the reasons for social changes (Archer, 2013). In the forthcoming analysis we use these empirical data as a starting point of analysis and important evidence of the existence of certain trends; in order to examine the mechanisms behind these trends, we combine empirical findings with theoretical explanations and insights into the historical context of Estonian development.

Among the generative mechanisms which played a decisive role in the transformation of the Estonian society, we look at the internal 'national' and external 'international' conditions and agents that affected political choices, as well as economic and social reforms in Estonian society during the first decade of the post-communist transition and afterwards during the process of transnational integration as a member of the EU (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2009). Among the external factors, we consider the effects of the neoliberal hegemony, supported by international organisations and networks, from the IMF and World Bank to the EU (Appel & Orenstein, 2018), as well as geopolitical factors (most importantly, the geographical and cultural closeness to the Nordic countries and the tense relations with neighbouring Russia). Among the internal factors, the most important roles have been played by historical legacies: the cultural roots of nation building, the trauma of Soviet occupation, including memories of massive repression, alienation and mistrust of any kind of party politics, and the enormous increase in the ethnic heterogeneity of society due to the military presence of the tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers and their families and the unrestricted influx of workers from Russia and other regions of the Soviet Union (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997; Smith, 2001). These legacies stimulated the birth of the massive liberation movements during the first cycle of transition, known as the 'Singing Revolution'. The impact of the historical trauma, which has not been fully recovered from even in contemporary Estonia, contributed to the post-colonial nature of the Estonian transformation, like many other East and Central European countries (Annus, 2014, 2019; Smith, 1998). However, the Estonian post-Soviet development has also been strongly influenced by the strong motivation of people to use their high level of education, Western contacts and highly advanced technologies in order to overcome the economic hardships of transition as quickly as possible. The rapid spread of new ICT technologies has made Estonia one of the forerunners of the digital revolution in Europe (Runnel & Pruulman-Vengerfeldt, 2009). This technological breakthrough developed out of the achievements of many Estonian scientists and technical professionals who were used during the Soviet time in the 'technical contest with the West', which turned Estonia into a test site of new technological ideas. For example, the Institute of Cybernetics was established at the Estonian Academy of Sciences as early as 1960. The readiness of Estonia for innovations created fruitful ground for the 'quick start' of the Estonian post-Soviet transition after the restoration of the independent Estonian state in 1991.

Cultural interactions during the first two cycles of the transition showed the strong will of the Estonian population to regain sovereignty and for a rapid 'return to the West' (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997). The proof of the successful realisation of these aspirations was found in joining the European Union and NATO in 2004. After that, in the third cycle, the development of Estonian society was re-oriented to adaptation to the EU legal, economic and political environment, together with the 'Europeanisation' of the national identity of Estonians. 'Europeanisation' became an important dimension of the social and cultural interactions inside the Estonian society (as in the other new member states), which stimulated morphogenetic, but in some cases also morphostatic, tendencies. This occurred mainly through the financial mechanisms and synchronisation between the Estonian decision-making process and the political time-table of the EU institutions, but also through the substantial content of the EU strategic initiatives in various fields, from the 'Lisbon strategy' to the digital single market and climate change, and through the growing interactions between people. The ambiguity of the 'European dimension' from the viewpoint of morphogenetic/morphostatic tendencies has revealed its critical importance in the current fourth cycle of development, when such events as Brexit and the refugee crisis have contributed to the wave of anti-European radical national conservatism in the Baltic countries, which are not directly involved in these events but do experience their impact mediated by the actions of EU institutions and changes in the European political environment (Lauristin & Hansson, 2019).

Looking at the four cycles of Estonian development, from the Singing Revolution of 1988–1991 to the present rise of the nationalist conservative counter movement, we will try to specify the generative mechanisms, the main agencies, the specific characteristics and the outcomes of each morphogenetic cycle. In doing this, we shall focus on the processes of social and cultural interactions that resulted in the emergence of new social agencies, and describe their ways of coping with economic, political, social, cultural and technological changes.

2.2. INITIAL CONDITIONS OF THE ESTONIAN TRANSITION AND THE FIRST MORPHOGENETIC CYCLE, 1988–1991

Among the initial conditions of Estonian (and Baltic) transformation, the most important was the historical situation of the Baltic countries as 'restored states' (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993; Ruutsoo, 1995). Invaded by the Soviet Union in June 1940, they lost their national independence and were turned into de facto Soviet republics, although they maintained international legal status as occupied states in the eyes of the international community. This status produced a range of social, political and cultural effects at the international and national levels (Smith, 2001). For the Baltic people, it created a powerful motivation to preserve their national identities and to be prepared to one day regain their lost independence, despite severe acts of repression and the presence of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops on their territories (Laar, 1996; Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997).

The first cycle of the Baltic transition began with the events of the Singing Revolution in 1988. However, the agencies that were capable of organising democratic movements with the aim of restoration of Estonian (as well as Latvian and Lithuanian) independent statehood had their origins in the earlier freedom movements in the 'Soviet camp': the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968. The forerunners of the Singing Revolution also included the activities of early groups of dissidents aiming to call international attention to the occupation of the Baltic countries as a result of the heinous Stalin-Hitler agreement in 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, or MRP) (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993). Predecessors of the Singing Revolution also included the student opposition in the 1960s and the cultural resistance of intellectuals and artists fighting for the opportunity to preserve freedom of the spirit throughout the Soviet rule (Lieven, 1994; Raun, 2001; Taagepera, 1993). In the Soviet Union, the Baltics were considered the 'West in the East', having a different lifestyle and a higher level of economic development than the other Soviet republics (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1993, 1997). The 'silent opposition' to the Soviet colonial regime was not only expressed in poetry and the arts, but was persistent in the everyday practices of the population, which retained micro-level habits and artefacts of pre-war Estonia alien to *Homo Soveticus* (Annus, 2019). While the Soviet regime had fiercely demolished the network of civic associations which had been quite strong in Estonia since the late 19th century, it did not manage to fully destroy informal networks. Even some 'politically innocent' associations, such as the 'Society for the Protection of Nature' and the 'Mother Tongue Society', continued their existence, not to mention the national networks of folk dancing and choir singing. These networks and associations helped to preserve the organisational skills and national ethos of the people, most spectacularly expressed during national song and dance festivities. Personal 'Western' contacts of Estonians and other Baltic people were re-established after the death of Stalin through communications with family members living since 1944 as political refugees in Sweden, Canada, the US and Australia. The special 'borderland' situation in the Baltic states supported aspirations for 'a return to the West', amplified by direct access to Finnish TV in Estonia beginning in 1958. Images of free, prosperous and democratic Finland were permanent sources of comparison, creating vivid images of Estonia's lost opportunities (Paasilinna, 1995). Attempts to modernise the Soviet economy in the late 1960s stimulated economic initiatives by local managers. Managerial and academic professionals in the Baltic countries gathered every available piece of information from Western (primarily Finnish) sources in order to use every possible loophole in the Soviet system and create better conditions for the creation of a specific Baltic version of the Soviet economy and promote Western ideas of management (Hion, Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1988; Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997).

These experiences were fully used to create strong national movements as agencies of liberation. Liberation movements in the Baltic countries (the Popular Front and the Estonian Citizens Committees in Estonia, Tautas Frontes in Latvia and Sajudis in Lithuania) united groups with various political ideologies (later giving births to various political parties, from Social Democrats and liberals to national conservatives), but at the end of the 1980s they all were united by the overwhelming desire for freedom. Internationally, the policy of non-recognition of Soviet occupation by the leading Western countries produced, at the end of the 1980s, an opportunity for Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian national movements to seek international support for their aspirations of independence. In order to achieve these goals, it was important to convince the international community not only of the common desire for freedom, but also of the democratic non-violent character of the Baltic revolution and of the economic feasibility of these small countries. The main social interactions of this period were related to the formation of massive national movements (the Popular Front and Citizens Committees), which united 70% of the Estonian population of all ages and professions (Lauristin, 2018). Mass movements became a powerful new force pushing for the end of occupation and for the restoration of an independent Estonia, as well as independence in the other two Baltic states, Latvia and Lithuania. They demonstrated not only strong national identity and a desire for independence, but also a remarkable capacity for self-organisation and collective action, recognised internationally after the success of the famous 'Baltic chain', the peaceful demonstration that united two million people in a demand for denunciation of the secret deal between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union that had led to the domination of the Baltic countries under Soviet rule. Participants in mass events shared a common anger against the repressive Soviet regime and common dreams of gaining back the pre-war free and green Estonian homeland. These nostalgic dreams were mixed with expectations of a bright future, mostly based on the images of the prosperous and modern Finnish neighbour. Nevertheless, these dreams were not shared by the three hundred thousand Russian migrants, who had been brought in by the Soviet regime in order to colonise rebellious republics, support Soviet military industry and secure Soviet power. The political antagonism between the ethnic groups was not allowed to be expressed openly during the occupation. At the end of the 1980s it became the most important public issue, dividing the population of Estonia into two militant camps (Smith, 2001).

For the Soviet soldiers and their families, paramilitary formations of industrial workers and representatives of the Soviet administration and guardians of communist ideological power, the efforts of national movements for the restoration of a capitalist Estonian state were presented by the Kremlin as a threat to their very existence. Deeply frightened by this perspective, many Russians joined the pro-Soviet Interfront, a counter-movement organised by the Kremlin to fight against Estonian 'nationalists'. The dividing line between national and pro-Soviet movements was clearly political: *pro* or *contra* free and independent Estonia. Occasionally this line coincided almost totally with the ethnic division between the indigenous and migrant populations, which became in the following decades the main source of inter-ethnic conflicts in Estonia and Latvia. A minority of the Russian population, mostly academics, artists and descendants of the pre-war 'white' Russian emigrants, joined the Estonian national liberation movements.

Table 2.1. 'What kind of future would you like to see for Estonia?' Public opinion surveys in 1989–1990

% of respondents

	Ethnic Estonians					Russian minority				
	1989		1990			1989		1990		
Should Estonia …	Apr	Sept	Jan	Mar	May	Apr	Sept	Jan	Mar	May
… remain a republic in the present Soviet Union	2	2	0	1	0	54	37	20	24	21
… gain more sovereignty as a republic inside a renewed Soviet Union	39	31	15	9	1	25	47	52	45	46
… become an independent state outside the Soviet Union	56	64	81	87	96	5	9	17	21	26
Don't know	3	3	2	2	3	14	7	9	8	7

Source: Kivirähk, 1991: 12–13

Cultural interactions during this first cycle of transition overwhelmingly occurred via direct broadcasts, massive rallies and crowded meetings held in public places throughout the country. Heated debates were focussed on different ways to restore the lost sovereign statehood. These meetings often ended with votes on manifestos and declarations, which were regularly published in the local and national press. Two competing wings of the liberation movements, the Popular Front and the Estonian Citizens Committees, were involved in a hot and sometimes quite wary discussion of the alternative paths to independence: the Citizens Committees insisted on calling on the West to apply international legal pressure on the Kremlin in order to achieve legal and actual restitution of the pre-war Estonian Republic. This path was exclusively based on the restoration of citizenship and ownership rights of the pre-war citizens and their descendants, leaving all Soviet-era immigrants out of the restoration process. Supporters of the Popular Front (among them, Russian-speaking democrats) proposed plans to achieve international agreement between the West and Soviet Union regarding the restoration of independence for the Baltic countries. The latter approach would have been more inclusive regarding Soviet-era immigrants, taking into account the active cooperation between the Estonian Popular Front and democratic forces in the other parties of the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the cycle, in 1988, both options had almost equal support among Estonians. At the same time, the Popular Front initiated the project of 'Economically Sustainable Estonia', stimulating public debates all over Estonia and in the media about the possibilities of surviving in the international market after breaking up with the Soviet Union. In May 1990, the aim of achieving full independence was supported by 96% of Estonians and 26% of the Russian-speakers (Table 2.1).

Despite the efforts of the national liberation forces, the leadership of the Soviet Union (including Gorbachev) were reluctant to accept the illegitimacy of Soviet rule in the Baltic countries and the restoration of their independence according to international law. By the spring of 1990 it had become clear that the internationally supported restitution of the independent Baltic states remained the only path acceptable to all of the independence movements. A positive outcome for this option heavily relied on the response of the international community to the unanimous democratic will of the Baltic people.

The newly independent Estonian state emerged at a moment of crisis as a result of contingent external and internal developments. Despite the opinions expressed by some political analysts that independence of the Baltic states would have been achieved even without any action by internal forces, merely as a 'gift of history' presented by external forces (Fisher-Galati, 2005), we are sure that without the pressure from the massive democratic movements the Western countries would have had no interest in the Baltic states' restitution. There are many examples of failed post-Soviet liberation movements, the most notable being in Ukraine, where political and economic reforms have been stopped by the interests of the 'rent-seekers' supported by the pro-Kremlin elite (Sakwa, 1999). In the Baltic states (unlike many other post-Soviet republics: Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, etc.) the actions of different mass movements at home, coordinated with those of exile organisations abroad and various circles of external supporters from governments, civil society organisations and the media, effectively influenced Western governments and international organisations, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. These efforts also prepared the Baltic people to take advantage of any opportunities leading to the restoration of independence. The opportunity for the decisive breakthrough was provided by the *coup d'état* in Moscow against Gorbachev on 19 August 1991. On 20 August, when Soviet tanks had arrived on the streets of the Estonian capital in order to crush the independence movement, the Supreme Council of the Estonian Republic, with the support of the Estonian Congress, announced the restoration of the Estonian republic and called on all countries to recognise this fact by providing Estonia its lawful membership in the United Nations. This was the *grande finale* of the first cycle of the Estonian post-communist transition.

The structural and cultural elaboration of the first morphogenetic cycle had formed the national consent about the nature of the steps to be taken in order to ensure effective restoration of independent Estonia as a modern nation state (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997; Smith, 2001). This consent included the agreement to prepare a new Constitution of the Republic. The outlines of constitutional reform, land reform, ownership, currency reforms, electoral reform, governance reform, and the establishment of major new political and economic institutions, from the multiparty system to the stock market, were elaborated during lengthy discussions in the two simultaneously acting parliamentary bodies: the Estonian Supreme Council and the Estonian Congress, the former representing the whole population of the republic, and the latter only citizens of the pre-war Estonian republic and their descendants. The debates in these two bodies were quite well synchronised due to the partial overlap in their membership, and achieved compatible results concerning the main points of the forthcoming reforms. Despite political differences and legalistic disputes[1], these bodies had a strong mandate from their electorate to work hand in hand for the common goal of independence, which enabled them to achieve consensus in those decisive moments of history. This democratic contest between the two elected bodies was an important generative mechanism of the first cycle of transition, which paved the way for the forthcoming radical political and economic reforms after the restoration of independence, and led to multiparty democracy. However, the political contest between the Popular Front and the Citizens Committees, and the confrontation of both Estonian movements with the Soviet-supporting Russophone counter-movement Interfront, whose representatives in the Supreme Council actively worked against the re-establishment of Estonian independence, were echoed in long-lasting political and ethnic tensions. These tensions have required a long and complicated process of reconciliation and integration and have been major factors of morphostasis during the following cycles.

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[1] The Estonian Congress was elected in February 1990. The elections had been prepared by the network of the Committees of Citizens, who had registered on voting lists only the citizens of the pre-war Estonian Republic and their descendants. The Supreme Council was a legislative body elected in March 1990 as the Supreme Soviet of Estonia by the entire population, including the Soviet-era migrants and even the members of the Soviet Army and their families. However, as the Estonian Communist Party had already lost its monopoly on power, the elections included lists of different organisations, including the Popular Front (which won the elections), the Estonian Communist Party (pro-Kremlin branch), newly established parties, such as the Social Democrats, Liberals and Christian Democrats, and different civic organisations, including a green movement, an association of farmers, an industrial association and even the pro-Kremlin Interfront. On 30 March 1990 the newly elected Supreme Soviet voted by an overwhelming majority to proclaim the restoration of the independent Republic of Estonia as its main goal and renamed itself the Supreme Council. On 20 August 1991 the Supreme Council voted for a resolution declaring the restoration of the independent Estonian state.

Concluding the description of the first cycle of the transition, we have to point out the role of the active civic movements as the main agencies of change capable of unifying the majority of the population for effective political action, fully using the short 'window of historical opportunity' provided by Gorbachev's reform policies in Russia and the support of the Western countries interested in ending the Cold War. The cultural interactions in this period were to a large extent informed by the post-colonial nature of the national liberation process. At the same time, the democratic character of the process was ensured by the social interactions between the different political forces looking for the best solutions for the restoration of independence. Elaborations of this cycle included the preparation for the establishment of a stable constitutional order and system of democratic governance, and preparing the Estonian people for the difficult economic and political reforms needed for the full reconstruction of the nation state.

2.3. THE SECOND CYCLE: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION STATE (1992–2003)

The new cycle had a quick start due to the quite detailed roadmap prepared by the previous elaborations: on the agenda of the Supreme Council in 1990–1991 there were outlines for a citizenship law, currency reform, banking, parliamentary elections, government formation and the establishment of an administrative system, ownership reform, market liberalisation and social welfare system. The time for mass rallies and celebrations was over, and the hard work of state building, economic recovery and coping with basic social needs was at hand. The most urgent issue during the first months of the 'hard exit' from the Soviet Union in August 1991 was to ensure economic survival in a situation of hyperinflation and the collapse of the many systems providing financial and material resources to Estonia from other parts of the Soviet Union. The government, burdened with these tasks, was considered to be a 'temporary administration', waiting for replacement after the first free elections, planned for autumn 1992, by the first constitutional government. These elections were also planned to end the other temporary institution, the Supreme Council, which would be replaced by a regular parliament. Structural and cultural interactions were concentrated around the liberalisation of prices, the start of market reforms and the establishment of a banking system and a national convertible currency (Hansson, 1993). Even more difficult were the issues of the restoration of historical justice by the return of lost ownership rights, providing compensation for acts of repression and disclosing the whole truth about the atrocities of the communist regime. These actions revealed the emerging divides inside Estonian society: on the social side, the different capacities of people to cope and make profits in the new market environment, and on the political side, different attitudes toward the Soviet past and the restoration reform policies. At the very beginning of the reform process, the full extent of the social and economic cleavages, ripping the united people of the Singing Revolution into the 'winners' and 'losers' of transition, was difficult to foresee. The deepest concerns at this stage were related to the future status of the Russian-speaking minority in the Estonian nation state (Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002; Pettai & Hallik, 2003; Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2008).

The new Constitution of the Republic was ratified by referendum on 26 June 1992. A week before that, Estonia had completed its currency reform, overnight cutting the country off from the Soviet rouble and establishing a fully convertible national currency pegged to the German mark. The first constitutional government was formed after the national elections in October 1992. The elections brought to power new political agencies: democratic parties which had emerged from the previous mass movements. A coalition was formed by three newly established parties: Pro Patria Union (associated with the Christian Democrats and National Independence Party, both representing the Citizens Committees movement), Social Democrats and Liberals (both coming from the Popular Front). All of these parties supported a clean break from the Soviet past and a radical model of economic reforms known as 'shock therapy' or 'the big bang' model (Balcerowicz, 1994). The plan of the radical economic reforms included the privatisation of the big enterprises on the international open market, full restitution of pre-war ownership rights (the return or compensation by vouchers of all assets, including land) and, as a social measure, the provision of vouchers linked to the years of employment by everybody who had worked in Estonia, for the privatisation of individual housing space (flats and houses) (Norkus, 2011; Terk, 2000). In two years, this first government managed to fully institute a system of governance, establish a modern financial and social insurance system and launch a massive privatisation process, including complicated land and housing reform (Laar, 1996). A major victory on the diplomatic front was achieved on 26 July 1994, when an agreement was signed between the Estonian and Russian presidents for the withdrawal of all Russian military forces from Estonian soil. The military withdrawal was completed on 31 August 1994, which marked the final end of the Soviet occupation of Estonia. Together with the military, their families left Estonia, reducing the number of Russian-speakers by about 80,000. Nevertheless, the agreement has been severely attacked by some of the most radical nationalist politicians for the clause which allowed retired Soviet officers and their families to remain in Estonia.

Estonia's radical reform policy, supported by such international organisations as the IMF and World Bank, received both praise and sharp criticism. Praise was related to the quick improvement in the initially disastrous economic situation and the achievement of an effective level of privatisation, which opened up the country to a quite generous flow of foreign investments (Havrylyshyn, 2007). Criticism related to the social and political consequences of these reforms (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). Looking back, this initial choice of a 'big bang' model (Havrylyshyn, 2007) was predicated on two complementary external and internal contingencies: internally there was a lack of resources needed for the softening of the hard reforms through an appropriate safety net, which made the high speed of privatisation with the participation of Western investors the only choice, in order to escape from full economic collapse after the break with the Soviet (Russian) economic system (including the cut-off from the traditional Russian market for Estonian industrial and agricultural production). Externally, there was the domination of neoliberalism as the only game in town, accepted not only by the World Bank and IMF, but even by the European Union, which set strict conditions on aid programmes for the 'newly independent states'. These conditions included the full package of structural reforms in the spirit of the 'Washington consensus' (Appel & Orenstein, 2018; Åslund, 2002: 72–78). It was an enormous challenge for Estonia's first post-independence government, and there are some authors who claim that only the complete absence of experience allowed the young leaders to start down this harsh road without fear or hesitation (Arias King, 2003). On the other hand, these leaders had the unique political experience of massive popular mobilisation and they counted on this to overcome the inevitable economic hardships. Claus Offe called this experience of political and cultural mobilisation the 'economy of patience' (Offe, 1991, 1996). Mitchell Orenstein described it as the road through the 'valley of tears' (2001). The secret of the success was not in the lack of financial know-how for 'rebuilding the ship at sea' (Elster, Offe & Ulrich, 1998), but in the strong common will and high motivation of people inspired by a sense of freedom (Laar, 2002).

Social interactions inspired by neoliberal reforms very sharply divided the Estonian society (like most of the other post-communist societies) into two parts: winners vs. losers of the transition (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997; Rychard, 1996; Titma et al., 1998). The harshness of reforms caused hardships for a lot of people, from the elderly, whose generous Soviet pensions had been severely reduced, to people living in rural areas, where the dissolution of collective and state farms had brought them into the unknown and severe situation of the free market without access to the cheap fuel, fertilizers and agricultural machinery they were used to (see Annist, 2014). All of these people had dreamed of freedom without having a clue about the high cost of freedom for average citizens. Not only workers from the closed factories and Soviet clerks from the disappeared state offices, but also a lot of other people were shocked by the free market prices for everyday commodities, including water and electricity. The fast liberalisation revealed and underlined the ethno-social and generational inequalities in society (see Kalmus et al., 2018), amplified by the fast-growing difference in the pace of development between the capital city and the other regions, particularly the north-east, inhabited mostly by Russian-speakers. The dominant discourses in cultural interactions had focussed on the issues of economic success, historical justice and national rebirth, and had paid little attention to social issues and difficulties of adaptation to the new political and economic environment. The fact that those issues were often related to the situation of the Russian-speaking minority contributed to their denial or de-legitimation (Lagerspetz, 2001). At the same time, in cultural interactions there was a conflict between the new and radical (future-oriented, Western-minded) innovators and the past-oriented (Soviet-minded and nostalgic) 'previous managers', who depicted the privatisation and other reforms as 'incompetent', 'hasty' and 'disastrous'. Everyday encounters between the 'new' and the 'old' went on not only in the elite circles but also among the 'ordinary people' (Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2008). Differences in evaluations of the Soviet past compared to the new realities of capitalism remained dividing lines in Estonian politics during the whole second cycle of the transition (see Chapter 4). The strongest criticisms of the radical reform policy were voiced by the oppositional Centre Party, speaking to and for all of those people who felt like the 'losers' of transition. It is no surprise that in Estonia, as in many other post-communist countries (e.g. Poland and Hungary), parties in the first radical reform government were voted out during the second elections after liberation.

The emerging picture of a socially divided society corresponded to Polanyi's theory of the 'double movement', which was expected to characterise all great transformations (Polanyi, 1944/1965). According to Polanyi, it is a task of governance to find the proper balance between the 'winners' and 'losers' by slowing the speed of changes and softening the 'disembedding' effects of reforms. In order to accomplish this, the interests of both parts of society should be politically represented. In a well-functioning democracy, this balance of interests is pursued by rotation in the government of left- and right-wing parties. In Estonia this rotation did not take place (see Vachudova, 2005). After the self-dismantling of the Estonian Communist Party in 1991, in Estonia there were no remaining clear political left-wing parties. A part of the first governing coalition, Social Democrats had re-labelled themselves as 'Moderates' or left-centre, and were fully supportive of the radical reforms. The leftist party 'United Estonia' represented Russian-speaking citizens, but it had very few supporters and did poorly in parliamentary elections. Opposition parties in the first parliament elected in 1992 represented the centrist forces: the core of the Popular Front developed into the Centre Party, led by the leader of the Popular Front, Edgar Savisaar, and the 'Rural League' and 'Union Party', whose leaders represented mainly the rural and industrial managerial circles. According to Åslund, these previous Soviet managerial circles were often 'rent seekers' who acted as the main reform inhibitors in most of the post-Soviet states (Åslund, 2002). Many of them had secured for themselves profitable positions in business due to their previous privileged access to foreign contacts.

However, the second free elections in 1995 did not change the course or the pace of reforms. Estonia had been named in 1995 by the World Bank as among the most advanced reformers (World Bank, 1996) and had been acknowledged for coherent reform policies, which remained unchanged even after the elections. These international financial institutions can be seen as the core of the generative mechanism framing post-communist transformation processes throughout Eastern and Central Europe in terms of the neoliberal economic model (Appel & Orenstein, 2018). After the elections of 1995, the winning parties, who had previously been in opposition, severely criticising the neoliberal reform policies of the first government, did not rush to undo them. All of the reforms continued, the economy started to grow and the social situation step-by-step improved. In 1997, due to the internationally confirmed outstanding progress in reform policies and rapidly achieved stable growth, Estonia was invited to pre-accession talks by the EU and NATO, among the first post-communist countries.

After several corruption scandals involving members of the government, parties representing the previous managerial elite suffered a total loss during the elections in 1999, and the first triple coalition of reformers returned to power (Lauristin & Hansson, 2019). As the main reforms had been successfully completed, this government started to prepare the next wave of reforms, targeting the modernisation of governance and reorganisation of regional and municipal structures. One of the most innovative features in this context was the implementation of the first e-government in Estonia in 2000 (see Kalvet, 2012). The foundations of the digital turn had already been laid in the middle of the 1990s. In 1997 the Estonian government had launched the 'Tiger Leap programme', a national computerisation plan, which had created the foundations for the birth of e-Estonia.

At the same time, preparations for joining the EU and NATO had gained momentum; one chapter after another of the EU *Aquis Communitaire* had been successfully negotiated and completed. In the framework of these negotiations, the issue of the integration of the Russian-speaking minority became one of the top priorities. The first integration programme, passed by parliament in 2001, interpreted minority integration not as a macro-level process targeting the minority as an ethno-social group, but fully in the spirit of neoliberal ideology as an individual free choice open to non-Estonians who wanted to participate in Estonian development by learning the Estonian language, becoming Estonian citizens and enjoying Estonia's free society (see Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002). As later studies revealed, this approach contributed to social differentiation among the Russian minority, divided them into more integrated, actively participating and socially successful groups of Estonian citizens and less integrated or even totally marginalised groups of non-citizens or, as an alternative choice, citizens of the Russian Federation (Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2009; Vihalemm et al., 2019).

Despite the visible progress in the domestic and international arenas, the government elected in 1999 did not last a full term. In the beginning of 2002, the neoliberal Reform Party, which was formed mainly with the support of the newly emerging business circles as a successor of the Liberal Party, decided to leave the coalition and form a new one with the Centre Party. They promised to address social issues more effectively and fight the growing regional disparities. However, the change in coalition partners did not lead to a lessening of the domination of neoliberal policies. These were extended due to the focus on the EU and NATO accessions, which were also at the top of the campaign agenda during the elections of 2003. Looking for the main factors of the victory of neoliberal ideas in the post-communist countries, Appel and Orenstein (2018) focussed on the mechanisms of international monitoring, based on the 'Washington consensus', and on the role of the EU pre-accession process, where the neoliberal criteria dominated in the assessment of the country's progress. They explained the persistent hegemony of the neoliberal reform ideology in the post-communist countries, offering the concept of 'competitive signalling'. This was the symbolic competition among the post-communist countries for Western investments, offering foreign investors the most exclusive liberal environments for their businesses. The need to attract foreign investors was indeed vital for the newly liberated countries, which suffered from a deficit in the financial resources necessary for the effective modernisation of their economies. The Estonian

Table 2.2. Emotional responses to the changes in society in 2002 and 2005

Q: 'How do you feel about the changes in Estonian society since the restoration of independence?' % of population group

The scale of subjective stratification	Has found the changes encouraging			Difficult to say			Has found the changes discouraging		
	2002	2005	Difference	2002	2005	Difference	2002	2005	Difference
Low	34	44	+10	19	23	+4	47	32	-15
Lower middle	46	52	+6	23	28	+5	31	20	-9
Middle	52	63	+11	27	26	-1	21	11	-10
Upper middle	65	74	+9	21	15	-6	14	11	-3
Upper	77	78	+1	13	18	+5	9	4	-5
Language									
Estonian	65	72	+7	16	16	0	19	12	-7
Russian	35	43	+8	35	39	+4	30	18	-12
Education									
Primary	50	51	+1	29	26	-3	21	23	+2
Secondary	52	61	+9	22	25	+3	26	14	-12
Higher	70	78	+8	15	14	-1	15	8	-7
Age									
15–19	62	67	+5	28	25	-3	11	8	-3
20–29	61	67	+5	21	23	+2	18	9	-9
30–44	54	66	+12	24	23	-1	23	10	-13
45–54	47	55	+8	21	25	+4	32	20	-12
55–64	53	62	+9	20	19	-1	26	19	-7
65–74	58	58	0	20	22	+2	22	20	-8
Total sample	55	63	+8	23	23	0	22	14	-8

Source: authors' calculations based on 'Me. The World. The Media'

experience as one of the most radical reformers supports this explanation, but it is not sufficient for understanding why, according to the results of all of our surveys conducted in 2002 and 2005, these harsh reforms constantly received support from the majority of the Estonian population (Table 2.2).

Our explanation adds to the macroeconomic and geopolitical mechanisms the domination of the 'transition culture' (Kennedy, 2002). The spirit of competition became overwhelming. People were invited in the course of cultural interactions by media, politicians, their family members and friends to take part in the race for success and become owners of their destinies. Cultural interactions during the second cycle of the post-communist transformation promoted interpretations of freedom not as political liberation, as it was understood during the mass rallies of the Singing Revolution in the first cycle, but as the individual freedom of the consumer and entrepreneur in a market-driven society (see Vihalemm & Keller, 2018). The newly established commercial media disseminated images of unlimited consumption as an appealing contrast to the Soviet ideas of collectivism and self-sacrifice. Attractive images of spending money on travel, cars and home renovation – all things that had been unthinkable for Soviet citizens – contributed to the rapid spread of consumerism among the Estonian population during the first decades of transition (see Kalmus et al., 2009). At the same time, the cultural interactions also constantly linked individual success to the fulfilment of national aspirations, for example through positive economic and political rankings of Estonia by different international agencies. The media constructed Estonian international competitiveness as a part of the national identity. The Finnish political scientist Henri Vogt (2011) has called this peculiar Estonian version of a transition culture 'nation-liberalism', which has been the major way to legitimise the hardships for the population created by the radical reform policies:

> Many commentators call these policies 'neoliberal', but I would rather use the attribute 'national neoliberal' (or perhaps 'nation-liberal'), with a strong emphasis on the attribute 'national'. [---] All societal acts include a national dimension; people's daily work efforts are not only meant to advance the well-being of the individual but also that of the entire nation – in spite of the individualistic tendencies that one can also easily observe in the country. [---] This may appear as a ruthless type of society, but it is certainly in many respects a dynamic one. (Vogt, 2011: 40)

Popular support for the 'Estonian way' was reflected in the growing level of satisfaction among all groups of society with changes in society after joining the EU (Table 2.2). However, these data also show that attitudes toward changes indicate quite clearly the divide between the 'winners' and the 'losers' of transition: among those who felt that their position was above average in society, satisfaction with the changes in society was much higher than for those who felt that their position was lower than average (see also Chapter 10). The same was true of the ethnic Estonian majority compared to the Russian-speaking minority: while positive attitudes clearly prevailed among ethnic Estonians, they were shared by less than half of the Russian minority. Among ethnic Estonians, those who expressed discontent were mostly of the older generation or people with less education.

More detailed evaluations of changes in different spheres could provide more information on social and cultural factors during the second cycle. The results of our survey in 2002 revealed that the majority of the Estonian population was more

Figure 2.1. Evaluation of changes in Estonian society after the restoration of independence, data from 2002

% of positive and negative assessments in the ethnic group



Source: authors' calculations based on 'Me. The World. The Media'

satisfied with the results of technological, economic and political changes than with social developments in society, their personal well-being and security, social justice and job opportunities (Figure 2.1). Comparison of the ethnic majority and minority revealed significant gaps in the perception of democracy, ethnic relations and education, whereas dissatisfaction with material well-being, jobs, social justice and security was shared by the whole population.

By the turn of the millennium the public discontent with the widening social divides in society had become clearly expressed. In 2001 social scientists launched a public debate about the cost of the transition. They claimed that the country was divided into 'two Estonias': the 'first Estonia' was enjoying the fruits of reforms, which provided them with a better living standard, and they felt the 'success story' of the country belonged to them personally. The 'second Estonia' felt deprived of opportunities to fulfil their basic needs and felt estranged from this 'success story' and ignored by the rulers of the country (Vetik, 2002). Data from a comparative study of living conditions in the Baltic and Nordic countries confirmed the objective basis of these claims (Grogaard, 1996; Kutsar, 1997, 2002). Social scientists also pointed out the weaknesses of social policies in Estonia: insufficient attention to the rising inequality between regions, ethnic groups and generations, and the alarming poverty level of families with children (Kutsar, 2009; Trumm & Kasearu, 2009). They called on politicians to participate in these debates and join in efforts to find solutions to the urgent problems of rising poverty and inequality.

However, due to the relative weakness of civic society, this viewpoint remained without an effective response from the political elites. After the dissolution of the mass liberation movements, civic concern in Estonia had lost its momentum and almost disappeared from the political arena, being replaced by the new institutions of representative democracy, particularly by comparatively weak and unpopular political parties (Steen, 1997). The government continued to lead the country further along the neoliberal track, with social issues low on the agenda. The elections in March 2003 marked further steps in the total marketisation of the public life. The newly established right-wing party Res Publica, representing the new economic elite, won its first parliamentary elections using professional and aggressive marketing strategies, such as huge expensive billboards and dramatic TV advertisements. They also exploited the growing dissatisfaction with reform policies, as exemplified in their slogan 'Vote for a new politics' (Lauristin & Hansson, 2019; Sikk, 2012). The right-wing government led by Res Publica announced that their main goal was to make joining the EU and NATO a 'new breakthrough' for Estonian success. They also promised a change from liberal to more conservative policies, announcing 'zero tolerance' and 'non-corruptible politics' as their leading principles.

Looking at the situation at the end of the second cycle of the Estonian transition, it is clear that at the time of the Estonian EU accession the process of reconstruction of the ex-Soviet Estonia into a modern nation state had achieved most of the political and economic goals set at the beginning of this process. Estonia had built up modern democratic political institutions, and under democratic governance the country had managed to end the Russian military presence and join many international organisations, from the UN to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. With the help of international funding, it had modernised its public infrastructure, developed a free and internationally competitive market economy, stabilised its economic situation and more than doubled its GDP. Estonia had been recognised by international monitoring agencies as one of the most successful reformers among the post-communist countries (see Bertelsmann, 2012; Havrylyshyn, 2007).

Among the social outcomes of the second cycle, the most important changes included the reconstruction of ownership relations and a re-orientation of the economy and employment structure from the Soviet model of forced industrialisation and unproductive collective farming to a more diverse and flexible structure of smaller enterprises, private farming and a service economy. Social interactions of this period were influenced by pervasive privatisation and marketisation, which had resulted in the formation of new patterns of social stratification, reflecting increasing economic, intergenerational and interethnic inequalities, as presented in more detail in Chapter 10 of this book. In terms of cultural interactions, a prominent role had been played by the liberalisation and commercialisation of the media (see Chapter 3). According to Freedom House's monitoring results, Estonian media freedom reached one of the top positions on the global scale, with Estonia ensuring complete free speech and political pluralism. Unfortunately, the capacity of the media to reflect the diversities and controversies of the transforming society, providing a voice for those in need and despair, was not sufficient. Partially this can be explained by the fact that the explosive growth of commercial media channels offered jobs for plenty of young journalists, who appeared to be beneficiaries of the success-oriented 'transition culture'. By disseminating the values of national and personal competitiveness and praising the consumerist lifestyle and individualist self-enhancement, Estonian journalists of this period also played their role in promoting neoliberal ideas.

In 2004 Estonia successfully completed the process of EU accession. By joining the EU, the stability and feasibility of the Estonian nation state was to a great extent ensured. These achievements received final recognition with EU membership. The Estonian referendum on EU accession was held on 14 September 2003. The vote was 67% in favour and 33% against.

The core generative mechanisms behind the progress made by the Estonian society in the second cycle of transition were created by the mutual reinforcement of competitive pressure promoted by international agencies, establishing the framework for structural reforms and thoroughly monitoring their implementation, as well as the high motivation of people stimulated by collective memories of Soviet misery and the creative energy of the Singing Revolution to achieve as soon as possible a standard of living comparable to 'normal life' in the West. The perspective of EU accession played an important role in preserving the motivation for reforms despite the initial setbacks and relative poverty of the country. Indeed, during the first post-liberation cycle Estonian society had experienced a remarkable increase in diversity and enjoyed new opportunities for personal self-realisation compared to the Soviet times. The perspective of a better life, based on the growth of the national economy and security provided by membership in the EU and NATO, seemed quite convincing. Membership in the EU and NATO signalled to the Estonian people that they had reached the finish line in the long race from the communist past to a free and democratic future.

2.4. THE THIRD CYCLE: EU INTEGRATION, AND STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL ADAPTATION TO THE TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM (2004–2017)

We consider the EU accession in May 2004 (together with membership in NATO the same year) to be the start of a new morphogenetic cycle in the Estonian post-communist transformation. Becoming an EU member had created a considerable identity shift, from the image of a victimised post-colonial post-Soviet nation to membership in the most democratic and powerful union of free nations in the world. By achieving this benchmark, Estonians, along with the people from the other new member states, hoped to be, at last, accepted by their Western counterparts as allies and equal partners. The gloomy warnings voiced by some sceptical opinion leaders that joining the EU was nothing more than moving from 'one union to another' and would mean losing the newly won sovereignty did not change the overall optimism dominating the pre-accession debates (Vetik, 2003). Eurobarometer surveys of Estonian public opinion after accession confirmed that there were overwhelmingly positive expectations about EU membership (European Commission, 2005). Compared to the average attitude of the member state populations toward the EU, Estonians always remained on the positive side. Even during the most severe migration crisis, Estonia stayed in the positive group of EU members (Debomy, 2016; Vogt, 2018).

The strong pro-European stance was supported by new social agencies which emerged due to participation in the European networks: young people gained access to European universities and took part in all-European youth activities, farmers and entrepreneurs benefited from EU funds, politicians could finance their expensive electoral promises using EU money, and environmentalists saw polluted rivers cleaned and poisonous substances removed from the air, fields and forests. Estonian

Figure 2.2. Life satisfaction in the Baltic states and Poland in 2001–2009

% of satisfied respondents



	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Estonia	50	54	53	70	71	79	78	74	73
Latvia	55	50	54	55	61	66	67	62	57
Lithuania	40	53	56	54	58	63	63	58	55
Poland	61	63	63	71	70	74	76	76	75

Source: Eurostat

scientists and artists enjoyed unprecedented cooperation and exchange with European colleagues, Estonian NGOs and municipalities found counterparts all over Europe, etc. Four years after accession, in 2008, our survey revealed that 15% of our respondents were participating in various EU projects. In 2014, the participation level in the various EU projects had increased to 18%, and among professionals with higher education to 39%. The 'Europeanisation' of Estonian society not only affected policies and financial opportunities, but also changed the forms and content of everyday practices in most organisations, as well as the everyday consumption patterns and life-worlds of people (see Vihalemm & Keller, 2018). In general, the first years after joining the European Union seemed to be a realisation of the 'European dream'. Due to the high rate of GDP growth (9.1% in 2005, 10.5% in 2006 and 7.4% in 2007), the gaps in the levels of well-being among socio-economic and ethnic groups decreased, and the opportunities to make money, increase consumption, travel and enjoy the good life increased. While in 1996 the GDP per capita in Estonia had been only 37% of the average of the EU15, only three years after EU accession, in 2007, it had reached 65%.

Despite the fact that the living standard in Estonia still remained considerably lower than the EU average and social inequality remained among the highest in EU, the satisfaction with life among the Estonian population after joining the EU jumped from 53% to 70% and continued growing until the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, when it dropped along with the decrease in GDP (Figure 2.2).

As a member of the EU, Estonia faced new challenges in institutional, social, economic, political and cultural development. With EU membership, the new generative mechanisms started to affect Estonian morphogenesis. These mechanisms worked through the implementation of EU legislation, through mobility of labour, through networks of cultural interactions, but primarily through the influx of EU funding, which guaranteed a rapid increase in well-being and ambitious modernisation of the country's infrastructure (Appel & Orenstein, 2018). The motivation for 'competitive signalling' for the new EU members remained very strong. Each of them tried to demonstrate to international investors their most attractive features as a place for successful investments. For Estonia, the most valuable signal of success was its well-developed digital environment. Digitalisation has been a government priority since 1997, and the trademark of 'e-Estonia' became the widely advertised symbol of the rapidly changing society (Kalmus et al., 2018; Runnel et al., 2009). Broad recognition has been received by Estonian digitalised public services, such as e-government, e-health, e-voting and e-residency, which brought Estonia into the group of leading countries in digital developments in the EU. Due to the achievements in digital development, the image of e-Estonia became the brand of a small and innovative country, appreciated by both international and Estonian experts. A panel of experts asked by the authors of the Estonian Human Development report to evaluate the changes that had taken place during the post-Soviet transition ranked as the best achievements e-government, the innovative mentality, the secure environment and economic competitiveness (Figure 2.3). International recognition of this image has contributed to high self-confidence and optimism among the Estonian economic elite and the majority of the population.

The Estonian economic development, which maintained a good pace after EU accession, was badly affected by the global financial crisis in 2008–2009. However, this crisis surprisingly turned into proof of the resilience of Estonian society: more rapidly than most of the EU member states, Estonia managed to overcome the crisis and return to the path of growth (The Economist, 2011; Vogt, 2011). The austerity policy that was instituted was even used by the government as a tool to finalise

Figure 2.3. Experts' evaluation of the Estonian achievements in 2000–2010, data from 2013

% of respondents. N = 177



Source: authors' calculations, based on the data in Lassur & Terk, 2013

needed structural reforms for joining the Eurozone. In the middle of the crisis, the government proudly announced that Estonia was ready for the euro, and this message was widely supported by the people as a celebration of 'Estonia's competitive spirit'. This feeling of success contributed to the confidence in the national ability to cope with any crisis, and added legitimacy to the neoliberal policies pursued by the Estonian government. Meanwhile, the negative impact of the crisis on the lives of ordinary people decreased. The fact that thousands of Estonians found a solution in emigration to Finland has been interpreted as a sign of the dynamism and resilience of the Estonian people, not as an unfortunate situation of thousands of broken families and emptied homes. People were advised to be inventive and find new ways of coping with their lives. 'Don't miss the new opportunities offered by the crisis!' was publicly proclaimed as an appropriate response to the crisis discourses. Even in social media, stories calling for compassion and reflecting the disastrous impact of the crisis on the lives of people did not receive a warm public response (Vihalemm et al., 2016).

Finally, the prevalent view of the Estonian 'success story' as an achievement solely of the neoliberal governance developed into quite the opposite: it created a social situation of political stagnation, or morphostasis, using Archer's concept (Archer, 2013). Despite the initial positive feedback, the post-accession achievements not only opened up new opportunities, but also created new concerns and fears, evoking negative feedback. For example, adaptation to the scale and rules of 'Eurofunding' negatively affected the economic culture in Estonia, stimulating in response to EU control mechanisms bureaucratic formalism in public management and developing attitudes of 'European clientelism', and imposing 'project orientation' on the economy and public policies (Appel & Orenstein, 2018). The need to precisely follow the rules set by the agencies administering EU funds strongly affected Estonian governmental structures and managerial practices (Randmaa-Liiv & Sarapuu, 2019; Sarapuu, 2012). For people who during the Singing Revolution had communicated (and argued) directly with their leaders and who had created a smooth, direct and instant digital environment enabling live participation in debates and in decision-making processes, these bureaucratic tendencies were unacceptable and odd. Justifying these tendencies by references to 'Brussels rules' or 'European standards' created animosity and mistrust among people toward 'Brussels' and toward their own government (Kiisel, 2013). The effects of bureaucratisation and increasing formality of communication between power holders and the public were often amplified by the financial rules of the EU, which had been developed for much larger organisations; projects, local communities and budgets in the leading member states pushed tiny Estonia to prioritise larger, even 'oversized', financing practices or overpopulated structures or projects and to neglect smaller, maybe more effective and more needed local projects. These adverse 'scale effects' sometimes had harmful impacts on local initiatives, on motivation and on opportunities of people outside the big cities. Instead of increasing diversity, EU regulations too often increased the centralisation of everything from social services to farming. The protests against the too large scale and ecologically threatening projects that had been decided on without taking into account the opinions of local populations became a common topic in the media.

The other source of morphostatic effects was the continuous 'securitisation' of Estonian politics (Lagerspetz & Vogt, 2004). Security issues related to the memories of the Soviet occupation and fears of Russian aggression in the future, had remained the focus of Estonian politics (as with the other Baltic states and Poland) since the restoration of independence (Smith, 2001). These issues had strongly motivated Estonians to join the EU and NATO, and had also cast a shadow on interethnic relationships in Estonia and Latvia (see Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002). Unfortunately, security concerns did not fade away with EU membership but became even stronger. Irritated by the success of the Baltic states in joining NATO (increasing its presence in the region), Russia activated a propaganda war in the region, focussing on the issues of the border and Soviet war memorials. This propaganda war reached its hottest point in April 2007 during the 'Bronze soldier' crisis, the riots of Russian-speaking youth against the removal of the monument to a Soviet soldier from the centre of Tallinn (see Brüggemann & Kasekamp, 2008; Ehala, 2009). Among the long-lasting effects of these riots, broadcast live on Estonian commercial TV, was an increase in mistrust on the part of both Estonians and Russians. One positive effect was that this crisis contributed to the more active implementation of a minority integration programme and more attention to the identity problems, cultural needs and participation of the Russian minority (see Kallas, 2012; Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2009).

At the beginning of the second decade of the new millennium, critical voices from academic circles, business leaders and journalists started to point out tendencies of stagnation and called for changes in politics, particularly addressed to the governing neoliberal Reform Party. Corruption in the prime minister's party was a signal for broader protests against immoral politicians. In 2011 several demonstrations demanded changes in the stagnant political system, criticised the neoliberal Reform Party for monopolising political power and called for the implementation of novel forms of political participation based on the use of public digital platforms ('digital commons'). An attempt to establish such a platform was undertaken in spring 2012 with the publication of 'Charter 12', which demanded that mainstream parties return to honest politics and open up the political system to new political forces. Signed at first by 12 intellectuals and published on the Internet, 'Charter 12' gathered more than 16,000 signatures in one week. The 'Charter 12 group', in cooperation with

ICT activists, launched a crowd-sourcing platform under the name 'public assembly'. This initiative to achieve a new level of participatory e-democracy was aimed at the collection and discussion of legislative proposals for changes envisaged in 'Charter 12'. However, the outcome of this action was major disappointment. The leading parliament members from the governing Reform Party claimed that the 'public assembly' was 'unconstitutional' and tried to block implementation of the proposals discussed and voted on by participants. The conflict between the institutionalised power system embodied in mainstream political parties, and the 'public assembly' activists as a digitally empowered agency of civic society revealed the emerging new generative mechanisms for social changes. These mechanisms were created by structural interaction between the new digital technologies and the rapidly expanding agency of civic activism.

The rising voice of civic activism was further amplified in the format of national 'opinion festivals', which beginning in 2013 were annually organised by an association of civic organisations. The growing capacity of civic activism to develop direct dialogue between citizens and officials, and the desire to develop real dialogue between governmental bodies and civic organisations did not match the formal communication style of the domestic 'Eurobureaucrats'. The failures in communication created tensions between 'ordinary people' and the political establishment. On the other hand, dissatisfaction grew among the new generation of young ICT developers, artists, journalists and other professionals. The new digital generation did not accept the old style 'transitional culture', with its narrow focus on material success and market competition in all spheres of life. They were not interested in joining old-style political parties, preferring new formats of public participation involving e-democracy and direct networking (see Kalmus et al., 2018). The practical effectiveness of Estonian civic initiatives received broad recognition in 2008, when the environmental initiative 'Let's do it!' called thousands of citizens to come out on the first Sunday of May to collect garbage left in the forests, near lakes and rivers and on beaches. In ten years, this Estonian initiative has expanded internationally, and since 2018 'World Clean-up Days', annual global social actions in which in 2019 20 million people from 180 countries participated, have been organised.

Criticism concerning the stagnant and arrogant style of neoliberal governance led to the fall of the Reform Party-led government in 2016. For the first time after the restoration of independence political power in Estonia moved from the right toward the left. The immediate effect of this shift was a change of priorities from 'hard' to 'soft' policy areas. The new centre-left government formed by the Centre Party, together with Social Democrats and moderate conservatives from the ProPatria

Union, announced social equality as a priority, and started efforts to improve the situation of families with children and to reduce income inequalities by implementing a progressive tax scheme. But these initiatives appeared to be too small and too late to reduce the anger of the one-third of the population who felt alienated and deprived. The inequalities created in the initial stages of the reform policies did not disappear, Estonian pensioners continued to be the poorest in the EU and regional disparities the biggest in the EU. The rise of the digital society created new aspects of inequality, from access to new smart technologies to unequal capacity to cope with the whole new digital environment, where the old services were disappearing and the labour market was moving into virtual space. Our studies revealed empirical evidence of the structural changes in Estonian society which had created new inequalities and increased social and cultural polarisation in different spheres (social and spatial mobility, time management, gender and ethnic gaps in job opportunities, etc.) (Vihalemm et al., 2017).

The refugee crisis, Trump's election and Brexit also affected the political atmosphere in Estonia, where the year 2017 witnessed the rise of Euro-sceptic and anti-migration sentiments as in many other countries in the EU. Ironically, in the same year Estonia had the best opportunity to test its capability to exercise international leadership: Estonia held the presidency of the EU Council. This was a sign that the morphogenetic cycle driven by the EU accession had reached a stage of elaboration.

Looking back at the economic development, Estonia can be considered to have achieved stability and consistent growth. After recovering from the crisis, the Estonian economy nearly reached the average level of the EU: in 2018 the Estonian GDP per capita had reached 82% of the EU 28 average (Table 2.3).

At the same time, Estonian public opinion was quite critical of the continuous praise of the Estonian success story and called on politicians to look in new directions. It was becoming obvious that with the ending of the third cycle the era of neoliberal domination was coming to an end. The radical liberalisation policies, which had in the first stages of transition played a positive role in the rise of economic competitiveness and the growth of national wealth, had revealed during the third morphogenetic cycle their deficiencies in social and cultural areas, starting to produce morphostatic effects. The new media environment had enhanced the polarisation of the life-worlds of the different groups and supported growing isolation between different institutional areas and segments of society. The digital revolution threatened the loss of jobs. The critical voices in society, including humanitarians and social scientists, called for change in the alienated social relationships and institutionalised practices undermining social and spiritual aspects of human life (Lauristin et al.,

Table 2.3. Changes in GDP per capita in the Eastern European countries in 2007–2018

% of the European Union member states, compared to the EU average

	2007	2008	2010	2011	2012	2014	2017	2018
Czechia	82	84	83	83	82	86	89	91
Slovenia	87	90	84	83	82	82	85	87
Estonia	**70**	**64**	**65**	**71**	**74**	**77**	**78**	**82**
Lithuania	60	63	60	66	70	75	78	80
Slovakia	67	71	75	75	76	77	72	73
Hungary	60	63	65	66	66	68	68	71
Poland	53	55	62	65	67	67	69	70
Latvia	57	59	53	57	60	63	66	69
Romania	43	51	51	52	54	55	63	65
EU 28	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: Eurostat

2017). The fairy tale of the 'positively transforming' Estonia was losing its attraction, and the new realities of the 21st century demanded alternative narratives.

Looking back at the third cycle of Estonian transformation, we can see remarkable changes in the nature and morphogenetic/morphostatic effects of the generative mechanisms. The new mechanism consisted of the two sides of the transnationalisation process, which had produced significant social and cultural changes for Estonian society. At first, European funding had broadened the Estonian capacity to reconstruct and reshape the institutional, technological and physical infrastructure of society. However, while making more generous public spending possible, the Europeanisation of the Estonian economy had restricted the freedom of local initiatives and changed the financial culture in society. Despite the enormous economic gains, Europeanisation also had morphostatic effects. Coupled with the continuous domination of the neoliberal ideology, it had increased formality and alienation in administrative practices and enhanced regional and social inequality. The second factor constituting a new generative mechanism in the third cycle of the Estonian transformation was created by the changes in the spatial and technological environment. Increasing European and global mobility restructured Estonians' spatial, economic and cultural relationships with the outside world and enhanced the translocalisation of workplaces, lifestyles and identities. The omnipresent global information networks multiplied the social and cultural effects of physical mobility. Digitalisation of public services, followed by the almost total penetration of the social media facilitated civic, professional and personal networking, created new forms of enterprises and labour relations, enhanced social acceleration and allowed new ways of social and cultural interaction to develop. Generational change mediated the structural and cultural impact of spatial and technological changes. These mechanisms contributed to the segmentation and asynchronisation of social life and challenged the political efforts to maintain the institutional and cultural frameworks of the nation state in this new environment. They weakened national identity and social solidarity, and loosened bonds with traditional institutions and values. At the same time, these mechanisms were conducive to emerging new forms of cultural and political life and created fertile ground for various civic initiatives and experiments. As an outcome of these elaborations, Estonian society gained access to more resources than ever before, but became more complicated and controversial. This rising complexity, along with the increase in inequality can be seen as reasons for the rise of conservative national populism in Estonian society as elsewhere.

2.5. THE FOURTH CYCLE: CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION OF THE TRANSITION AND RISE OF THE POPULIST COUNTERMOVEMENT (2018–)

The year 2018 was planned to be a year of national celebrations devoted to the 100th anniversary of the Estonian Republic. Various festivities, including the famous Estonian national Song and Dance Festival, had been planned as the final recognition of the positive developments that started with the restoration of the Estonian state in 1991. But rather unexpectedly 2018 also became a significant turning point in the paradigm of Estonian transformation. We consider it the start of the new morphogenetic cycle. The first signs pointing to the change in the developmental paradigm were revealed in the protest initiatives organised in 2017 demanding changes in the direction of Estonian development. These protests had very different sources, revealing the vast diversity of the emerging new agencies of civic society: such feminist initiatives as the Estonian version of #MeToo, environmentalists' protests against massive industrial projects[2], and rallies against LGBTQ rights and refugees organised by national populists. We can see in these protests echoes of international developments. More importantly, however, these protest initiatives indicated the negative reaction to mainstream politicians using the Estonian 'success story' to legitimise their political power. The rise of civic initiatives both on the national and local levels was evidence of the growing potential for critical reflexivity and public activism. The dissatisfaction with the state of affairs increased, heated up by the unpopular tax policies of the government, especially the increase in taxes on alcohol. There was broad popular support among young people, academics, community activists and various environmentalist networks for initiatives to save Estonian forests from industrial wood harvesting.

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[2] The transnational high-speed railway from Tallinn to Berlin, 'Rail Baltic', and the huge industrial complex for the production of cellulose on the river Emajõgi, near the university city of Tartu.

The paradigmatic change meant a shift in the focus of social processes from the classic social-economic axis dividing left and right-wing policies to one based on polarisation between an open and closed society, liberal democracy and conservative authoritarianism, and even between rationality and irrationality. With the fall of the Berlin wall and defeat of the communist ideology, many Western politicians and experts had proclaimed openness and liberal democracy to be an absolute and irrevocable guiding principle of the post-communist era. But the events of the second decade of the 21st century leading to the rise of national populism all over Europe proved the opposite: the vulnerability of openness and rationality as political and social principles in the face of the aggressive power of irrational fear and anger. In Estonia (as elsewhere) it was not only external factors (e.g. the refugee crisis, terrorism, Trump's election, Brexit and Putin), but their effects (contingent compatibilities) on certain domestic events, enhanced by specific national structural and cultural conditions that contributed to the conservative turn in society.

The first signals of the birth of the conservative counter-movement appeared during the parliamentary elections in 2015, when the populist Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) won 8% of the vote. They caught people's attention by campaigning heavily against the civil partnership law for same-sex couples that had been adopted by the parliament in 2014. This was a notable development, because previously this kind of right-wing populist rhetoric had had relatively little attraction in the Estonian public discourse (Auers & Kasekamp, 2013). However, the first signals were not taken very seriously. The ways in which right-wing populist parties managed to utilise social media in order to mobilise voters in post-communist societies had been increasingly attracting scholarly attention due to developments in Hungary (Norocel & Szabó, 2019). In Estonia, rhetoric of deep suspicion towards the 'ruling elites' and mainstream media, immigration, European integration and various liberal rights did not seem at first to be a serious danger capable of gaining broad public support and creating a real turn in the political atmosphere of the country. This has been perceived as merely an echo of external developments: Trump's election, Brexit, etc. The media and general public were used to seeing the expression of public dissatisfaction with politicians as 'business as usual'. The real anger and frustration of many people who had not recognised themselves in the portrait of the 'small, innovative and successful' nation depicted by the media had remained unnoticed by the mainstream politicians and the media. Like their counterparts in other countries, the Conservative People's Party has stood out from other parties by embracing an emotional and confrontational communicative style that contrasts with the more rational and pragmatic stances taken by most other parties (Lauristin & Hansson, 2019). However, the noisy anti-liberal rallies, combined with brain-washing manipulation by social media and growing discontent with the neoliberal policies of the previous governments among intellectuals and young people, framed in 2018 the agenda of the parliamentary election campaign and brought the national populists notable success. They have been effective in articulating fear and conspiracy narratives about the demise of 'traditional family values and gender roles', a massive influx of immigrants/refugees, and the European Union becoming a 'super-state' that destroys 'nation states' (Kasekamp et al., 2019). Estonian society was taken by surprise when the Conservative People's Party achieved the largest overall electoral gain in 2019, increasing its representation in parliament by a hundred percent, from 8 seats to 16 (out of 101). Before the elections, all mainstream parties had declared their reluctance to go into coalition with the conservative national populists. But after the elections the latter were invited by the Centre Party to join the new governing coalition in order to avoid the return to power of the actual winner of the elections, the Reform Party, which would then have had a chance to continue the neoliberal policies.

With national populists sharing power, the liberals and Social Democrats were left in opposition. Despite left-right disputes on many social and economic issues, the common task of the opposition was now to fight against attempts of national populists to dismantle the fundamental principles of liberal democracy: freedom of speech, human rights, independence of the media and judiciary and the autonomy of universities. The fight to preserve an open society in Estonia was associated with the future of the nation. As in other countries going through this type of 'backslide of democracy', basic democratic freedoms were at stake. For the youngest generation, who did not remember the hot debates about the Estonian choices during the Singing Revolution, this was the first opportunity to seize their own role in the history of the country, and to stand up for the defence of their vital values and interests. This young generation, who grew up after liberation from the totalitarian regime and enjoyed freedom of choice and unrestricted opportunities for self-realisation, have openly stood against the attempts of the conservative populists to close the country to strangers, preserve traditional family roles of women and restrictions on individual rights instead of free choice. But an even more serious confrontation between the young generation and the national conservatives has concerned the whole issue of climate change, which in Estonia is specifically related to the need to shut down the extremely polluting production of energy from oil shale.

The attacks against the 'leftist-liberal' forces launched by the national conservatives have provoked an active discussion about the future of the country. What kind of society can attract the young generation to devotion to the homeland has become the most important question. Virtual communities, such as 'Estonia for All' and 'Community of the Free Word' have emerged on the Internet in response to the conservative populists' attacks on LGBTQ people, foreigners, young activists, 'tolerasts' and 'liberasts', journalists and social scientists. Never before has Estonian society been in such political torment, in which families and friends have been divided by political conflicts. Following these hot debates, some politicians and journalists have even expressed the hope that the open conflict between national conservatives and democratic forces will help to clarify the value of democracy for people. At the same time, populists claim that the time of liberal democracy is over and that it should be replaced by the 'true democracy' of 'direct actions', ending representative democracy, which has been captured by the 'mainstream' political parties. The massive trolling and political manipulations on social media have attracted young people who are not interested in the complicated debates, but want action against those who are accused by populists of the destruction of families and betrayal of the interests of the Estonian nation. Attacks against liberal migration policies, multiculturalism and feminism appeal to people in small towns and villages who are frightened and irritated by the disappearance of traditional practices and the worsening access to many local services.

The public opinion polls at the end of 2019 revealed an astonishing shift in the public assessment of the country's progress. For the first time since the restoration of independence, the people who used to belong to the 'lower' part of the social ladder, and were always dissatisfied with changes in society, have now evaluated changes more positively than those at the top side. Liberal and social democratic political forces have found themselves challenged by the previously neglected 'second Estonia', people with lower incomes and lower levels of education, and notably Russian-speakers, who now seem to celebrate the anti-elite and anti-migrant slogans of conservative populists. Evidently, the eight months since the elections have not brought them more money or improvement in services, but obviously the feeling that now the power has switched from 'them' to 'us' has provided satisfaction despite the lack of material gains. At the same time, the popularity of the populist conservative party has not increased, but has even slightly declined, as has the popularity of the prime minister's Centre Party. In general, support for the opposition (the Reform Party and Social Democrats) has remained on the same level, or even a bit higher than that of the coalition parties. The aggressive attacks of national populists on the values of the open society have received strong critical responses from different groups and the media. They have activated new social agencies, including human rights activists and youth networks, which earlier did not participate in political debates, to fight against the attempt to destroy democratic reforms.

The outcome of these fights remains unclear, as the social and cultural interactions of this controversial new cycle of Estonian transformation are still in the initial stage. However, the rise of anti-democratic forces in Estonia is similar to other cases of 'democratic backlash' in Eastern and Central Europe (Cianetti et al., 2018; Hanley & Vachudova, 2018). The present critical situation raises similar questions in many post-communist countries, as well as in some old democracies. The question of why the conservative national populists have received remarkable support, which has helped them to enter governments and to grasp the leading positions in political life, calls for honest reflection on the common causes of these developments. Morphogenetic analysis may help to explain not only some obvious reasons for these developments in specific countries (e.g. the political ambitions of some leaders, and the disillusionment and marginalisation of some groups) but also to disclose hidden generative mechanisms on the European and global levels that have been influenced by the interplay between technological innovations, social and economic inequalities, geopolitical changes, and the underestimated strength of postcolonial cultural identities.

2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Meta-analysis of the Estonian post-communist transition through the lens of Archer's morphogenetic theory has opened up important new angles in our understanding of transformational processes, which have been neglected under classic theories of post-communist transformation. The main value of this approach lies in the connection between theorising about the processes of social changes and following their development through real historical time. We can create a more sensible periodisation of the whole process according to morphogenetic cycles. The sequence of the morphogenetic cycles, which is normally difficult to observe because of the long duration of the changes, is more clearly observable due to the compression of time in conditions of rapid reforms, so that the outcomes of certain decisions (political reforms, legislative changes, and economic and social projects) reveal their outcomes during the lifetime of one generation, which creates shorter feedback loops and offers opportunities for immediate corrections. This acceleration of changes has also made it possible to see how the seeds of the new social and cultural phenomena emerged in earlier cycles and how they developed into generative mechanisms in the next cycles.

Looking at four cycles of Estonian transformation, we understand better the interplay between external and internal feedback. External positive feedback regarding Estonia encouraged reforms and enhanced the acceleration of social time. During the first stages of the transition, external (positive) feedback supported morphogenesis, while internal feedback remained controversial and after the economic crisis turned more and more critical. As a result, we have a paradoxical situation from the viewpoint of morphogenetic theory: positive external feedback in the end facilitated stagnation, i.e. morphostasis, and negative feedback created space for diversity and the emergence of new voices, e.g. further morphogenesis.

We have to explore further the dynamics of morphogenesis and morphostasis in the process of transformation in order to understand additional mechanisms. Our observations of Estonian developments point to situations where factors of diversification and flourishing can turn their effects in the opposite direction, from morphogenetic to morphostatic development. This has been the case with neoliberal reform policies, as well as with the Europeanisation of Estonian governmental practices. These were both intended to support morphogenetic developments, opening up a great variety of new opportunities and enhancing diversity and complexity in the social systems of the country. However, finally they both evoked negative feedback in society and facilitated trends of stagnation. The same paradoxical morphogenetic/morphostatic (M/M) effects can be found as consequences of the digitalisation of all public services, and in the impact on democracy exercised by the development of the institutions of representational democracy.

The new morphogenetic cycle started in Estonia in a situation of political crisis and rising global uncertainty. The new generation of ‘digital natives’ that was born after the end of the Cold War has to take responsibility in Estonian society, and throughout our troubled world. Young people are not inclined to focus on the political conflicts of older generations. Their future is shadowed by climate change, new geopolitical tensions and disputes about the future of the synthesis between artificial and human intelligence. What kind of agencies the new generations will develop, what the main structural and cultural interactions will be that change the way institutions work in politics, economics, education, science and other areas, and what values and everyday practices will allow human life to flourish in these new conditions are questions requiring further analysis.

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CHAPTER 3.
CULTURAL INVOLVEMENT AND MEDIA USE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL MORPHOGENESIS

Ragne Kõuts-Klemm and Marju Lauristin

3.1. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTS OF INTERACTION AND REFLEXIVITY

Culture, as a constellation of millions of ideas and practices, receives constant input from the events taking place in the real world. The modern communication media offer a global platform for sharing information, interpretations of events and the formation of common meanings. Looking at the media through the lens of the morphogenetic model, we see it as an important part of cultural interactions. Both the system of media channels and the content of media are important in explaining the opportunities one has to exercise one's agency regarding structure and culture. Nevertheless, the mass media, social media or even digital media have not been the focus of Archer's theoretical considerations.

Archer has tackled digitalisation as one of the generative mechanisms that support rapid and extensive transformations in contemporary societies (Archer, 2015). Yet, how it causes changes in the ways people are connected with society and with each other through their media use practices or through cultural involvement have not been examined in detail by her. According to Archer, new technologies have the potential for innovation, since they enable new usage patterns and social practices, i.e. an increase in diversity: 'they catch on fast through positive feedback and do not become readily stabilized through negative feedback' (Archer, 2016: 154). The growing availability of media contents and new and diverse interactive digital environments enable audiences to more actively make selections and to choose how and for what reasons and purposes they embed themselves in the circulation of ideas. The current processes have been described in media studies as processes of audience fragmentation (Webster & Ksiazek, 2012) and the development of a number of distinct media repertoires (Hasebrink & Domeyer, 2012; Schrøder, 2019). Both indicate the growing diversity in people's everyday lives regarding media use and cultural involvement. Archer interprets the increase in diversity as the clearest indicator of the process of morphogenesis. According to Archer (2016), 'many novel social practices, promoted technologically, are distinctively morphogenetic' (Archer, 2016: 154).

Nevertheless, the languages of critical realism and empirical media studies differ in the central terms they use. There is a tendency in almost all social theories for media and communication to not find clear places or special attention in their theory building (Averbeck-Lietz, 2015; Mihelj & Stanyer, 2019), with one of the few exceptions being in the theory by Niklas Luhmann: his theory addresses both social systems and communication (Averbeck-Lietz, 2015). The low importance of media and communication in social theories explains the various pathways and differences in terminology, 'a lack of shared conceptual language' (Mihelj & Stanyer, 2019: 482). For example, Archer (2013, 2015) uses the term 'interaction' on the macro level of analysis: social change derives from complex socio-cultural interactions, which agents and structure are involved in. The mutual interplay of structure, culture and agency is explained in the concept 'interaction' (Archer, 2015). In media and communication theories, on the contrary, the term 'interaction' has been used in a more specific sense, mainly to refer to the micro level of communication; interaction combines the actions and re-actions of involved individuals, and it is a term used to describe communication processes taking place between at least two people (Burkart, 2002; McQuail, 2012). In his theory, Niklas Luhmann (1995) uses the concept 'interaction systems', which require at least two participating 'brains'; and the interaction system is one of the three types of social systems: interaction systems, organisations and society. According to Luhmann, interaction systems are temporally-spatially unstable: they begin and end again and again, but contribute to the emergence of society (Luhmann, 1995). Thus, in media studies the concept of interaction refers to action-re-action sequences where at least two agents participate; thus, the concept reveals the micro level. In media studies many concepts are used to describe the relations that people have with institutions, processes, organisations or bigger units, such as the concepts of involvement, engagement and participation (Kõuts-Klemm, 2013). Institutions or broader social constructs, e.g. culture, do not interact; they have influence, they impact, they are interconnected with each other, etc.

Thus, for conceptual clarity in the chapter we will use, instead of socio-cultural interaction, concepts that are common in media and communication studies – consumption, involvement, engagement and participation – to refer to the relations individuals can have to broader communicative units: groups, communities, institutions and societies. The focus of the current analysis is the individual, but the self-reported data that will be aggregated for the purposes of analysis will be used to refer to common patterns many individuals share.

Via this lens, we analyse the ways individuals as members of society collectively respond or relate to processes in culture (i.e. with the sphere of ideas as an interest in and consumption of particular content, manifested as media and culture consumption), and how they relate to processes taking place on the structural level (manifested as participation or engagement). The involvement in culture and contribution by individuals have consequences for socio-cultural interaction, using the terms of Archer's critical realism. Individuals have different opportunities to contribute. Some contributions require stronger engagement by individuals and some less, e.g. going to the theatre requires a stronger contribution than watching a recording of a play on television. The consumption of media content is one of the most direct ways to participate in society-wide communication, i.e. in culture; it enables people to be connected to socially relevant topics and events (Kõuts-Klemm, 2013). The background knowledge and social-cultural norms needed for interactions are mediated through media communication (and stored in personal memories and action packages). On the other hand, the contributions are clearly related to a different kind of reflexivity (in its various modalities; Archer, 2003). Reflexivity structures the interrelationship between different media (texts) and their audiences. We will briefly describe the main modes of reflexivity and their relations to cultural involvement; a deeper treatment of the concept can be found in Chapter 1 of this book.

Archer (2003) distinguishes between four modes of reflexivity: communicative reflexives, autonomous reflexives, meta-reflexives and fractured reflexives. People exercising different modes of reflexivity have different abilities to monitor their contexts and to intervene in the processes taking place in society. Or, in Archer's terms, people with different modes of reflexivity have different positions towards society, and towards the constraints and enabling aspects of structure: communicative reflexives take an evasive position, the autonomous take a strategic position, and meta-reflexives take a subversive position (Archer, 2003: 342). This classification does not include non-reflexives: people who do not develop their personal life-projects and are less able to exercise their powers (Archer, 2003). This last group have been conceptualised in political studies as 'passive' or 'standby' citizens (see the current debate about 'passivity' in Amnå & Ekman, 2014). Reflexives participate in society and in politics differently, some contributing more and some less. Studies have shown that media consumption helps even for those who do not participate actively to be 'monitorial citizens', who are informed and if circumstances change can start to exercise their personal powers and participate (Hooghe & Dejaeghere, 2007). Media consumption offers an opportunity to be involved in the sphere of ideas circulating in society.

The question is: has digitalisation as a mechanism for diversity growth caused changes in the modes of reflexivity? The Israeli media scholars Fisher and Mehozay (2019) have analysed the epistemes of digital communication, 'how the algorithms see the audiences', and point out the significant differences in the current concept of individuals. According to them, in digital media what prevails is 'the post-social conception of the individual', which is based on decisions made by algorithms and where individuals have been seen as 'amalgams of ever-changing, dynamic, lively data points' (Fisher & Mehozay, 2019: 1188). Thus, the digital media environment as a structuring power forces fractured, ever-changing and de-humanised identities/agencies. The same has been pointed out by Archer (2016) in her concept of reflexivity. Archer has found that due to digitalisation the appearance of the 'fractured expressive reflexivity' is clearer. This mode of reflexivity is characteristic to 'people to whom things happen, not those who make things happen' (Archer, 2016: 156). As the availability of ideas and contexts disseminated by media broadens, one of the consequences is that involvement in different areas of society becomes easier, but can cause more confusion as well. Probably, 'information overload' is not synthesised by people as a coherent world-view, and probably digital media, fractured in their content and character, does not help in this process (Li, 2017). On the other hand, this could be rather favourable to the development of reflexivity. As Archer claims, reflexivity appears in non-routine situations when habitual action is blocked by problematic circumstances (Archer, 2010: 273). Digital media can offer users a lot of new situations.

We will not cover changing reflexivities in depth in this chapter. The aim of the analysis is to indicate the contribution media use and cultural involvement can have on the processes of morphogenesis or morphostasis in Estonian society. Nevertheless, we have a strong basis to assume that different involvements in society are related to different modes of reflexivity. We can only hypothesise from the aggregated behavioural and attitudinal patterns references to different modes of reflexivity. Thus, taking a closer look at the processes in the real world and using as an example the developments of the last two decades in Estonia, we will ask: What kind of patterns have been revealed in cultural involvement and media use in Estonia during the last two decades? To what extent can we observe growing diversity in cultural involvement and media use?

3.2. CHANGES IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF ESTONIA

During the Soviet period in Estonia, in the 1980s, the media landscape was neither diverse nor pluralistic; it did not represent different world-views. In the Soviet system, the media were treated as an 'ideological weapon' and were kept under strict control to spread the canonised world-view (Vihalemm & Lauristin, 1997). The Soviet authorities exercised preliminary and post-publishing censorship in all media channels (Lauk, 1999). Additionally, due to technological limits the media systems had less diversity; in the 1980s the Estonian-language media system consisted of one state-controlled TV-channel, with programming 12 hours per day (Šein, 2004: 141), two state radio programmes that together had 34 hours of programming per day (Lõhmus & Vihalemm, 2004: 99), and 28 newspapers (only four of them available country-wide) (Vihalemm & Kõuts, 2004: 64). In the Soviet censorship system, broadcasting was subordinated to the highest control, while local media outlets and literature were less canonised (Vihalemm & Lauristin, 1997).

However, there is evidence that even in the very limited and restricted media system the audience exercised their agency. This may have involved 'silent resistance' by Estonian journalists in writing 'between the lines' in their reporting (Lauk & Kreegipuu, 2010); thus journalistic texts made 'open reading' possible. The agency of audiences also manifested itself in preferences for less-canonised content, i.e. in the form of local newspapers[1]. The local newspapers in Soviet Estonia were the channels with the closest proximity to audiences in the 1980s. A sophisticated study by Lauristin et al. (1987) distinguished the types of contact with local media and other cultural and social activities among readers. Contact with local papers differentiated the social practice of media use through seven patterns: (1) critical and selective regular readers of local newspapers (7%), (2) polyfunctional readers, who read regularly without selecting topics ('lovers of local papers') (12%), (3) regular and contented readers (15%), (4) moderately active and critical readers with culture interests (12%), (5) moderately active readers with instrumental needs/utilitarian interests (21%), (6) sporadic readers with negative attitudes and with the need to be entertained by media (20%), and (7) not-interested/ apathetic/unpretentious readers (13%) (Lauristin et al., 1987: 144–163). The patterns were not only revealed in answers given to the questionnaire in 1987, but were additionally validated via exhaustive personal interviews. Therefore, even under very restricted circumstances agency can appear and reflexivity as personal power can be exercised.

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[1] Local newspapers were the newspapers with the smallest issuing area; each of the 15 counties (rayons) had its own newspaper. For current international classifications, they would be classified as community newspapers, with the difference that the newspapers were created and published by a state organ, on the authority of the Communist Party.

The patterns make it possible to conclude that the conditions for the *first morphogenetic cycle* in Estonia, in 1988-1991, were created in the times of Soviet rule, and this made it possible in the first cycle for mass media to function as a culture facilitator and support for social movements (see Chapter 2 in this book).

In the *second cycle of transformations*, in 1992–2003 (see Chapter 2 in this book), there was an explosion of media channels and new opportunities for leisure-time activities (Vihalemm et al., 1997). There was an especially high growth in the number of published newspapers and magazines, many new commercial TV channels entered the market (Šein, 2004) and due to the growth in satellite communication many more (international) TV channels were available to audiences (Jõesaar, 2009; Vihalemm, 2004). The digitalisation of media started rapidly in the middle of the 1990s (Paju, 2004). During the second cycle of transformation, media pluralism and diversity grew. Media companies launched their online news platforms in Estonia in 1995 and strong competition between the biggest providers started by offering a lot of free news every day: the strong competition for the ‘attention’ of audiences began (Himma-Kadakas, 2018). On the other hand, legislation supported high commercialisation of media, as Jõesaar (2009) has claimed. He has shown in his analysis that the political climate favoured commercial media and created disadvantages for public service broadcasting, even when private TV channels did not follow the regulations regarding Estonian language and culture (Jõesaar, 2009: 59). The investments in technological innovation were highly important to media companies during this period; managers reported being active in ‘making news and money’ (Himma-Kadakas, 2018: 16-17), but the economic recession in 2008 hit the private media unexpectedly and severely: the media market data show that advertising revenues decreased by one-third in Estonia (Krutaine et al., 2018).

Among the population we can see during the period the positive attitude towards new technology, which was supported by the general expectations for quick and positive changes: that life would be better than in the Soviet Union. However, the risks and problems related to the new technologies were not discussed in the public sphere, there was no information about the negative consequences of technology and the mass media covered only success stories; public awareness of technological risks was low (Korts, 2004). It was perceived by the end user that new technologies would make everyday life easier, that it was worth the investments in devices and skills development, and that the new technologies would meet a number of user needs (Runnel & Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, 2004).

In analysing Estonia as an exemplary case, we should note that digitalisation had some specific variation in the country. As a part of the former Soviet empire, digitalisation took place at the same time as socio-political changes: during the destruction of the old and stagnant Soviet structures, a technological advance took place (the new-reborn state supported it strongly, e.g. the 'Tiger Leap programme' for quick computerisation) (Runnel & Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, 2004). The changes not only covered the changes in technologies, but also included the organisational and occupational levels: '"replacements" took place in the technology sphere and among media professionals' (Lauk, 1996; Saks, 2002). The social context favoured the changes; in comparative statistics about developments in the information society and technological innovation, Estonia ranked high during the 1990s and 2000s (International Telecommunication Union, 2007). The widespread and quick launch of e-banking, e-voting and state e-services was only possible due to the high trust of the population (Runnel & Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, 2004).

Digitalisation in the media sphere reached its highest level during the *third cycle of transformation*, in 2004–2017 (see Chapter 2 in this book). In media, the situation was rather complicated, since media companies in Estonia had during the economic recession of 2008 faced significant decreases in revenues (Krutaine et al., 2018). The investments in technological innovation were limited due to changes in ownership, e.g. the Nordic media owners Schibsted and Bonnier sold their shares to domestic owners. According to Himma-Kadakas (2018), the lack of resources was accompanied by quality issues: the online content offered by the Estonian news media produced a 'flow' of fast and cheap news (Himma-Kadakas, 2018: 19). A distinction between quality journalists and cheap online journalists appeared (Himma-Kadakas, 2018: 19). At the same time, the usage of traditional media channels decreased and the usage of digital channels increased (see Table 3.1).

In the usage of digital and social media channels, studies show that informational use competes with other 'gratifications', such as entertainment and sociability (Schrøder, 2015). A fragmentation of audiences characterised the developments in Estonia as well (Kõuts-Klemm, 2017). Online content of low quality was reflected in a slight decrease in trust in media, although it was still pretty high among the

Table 3.1. Media reach among the Estonian population in 2005, 2007, 2008, 2017 and 2018

% of respondents

	2005	2007	2008	2017	2018
Internet users, age 15–74	53	66	67	90	n.a
Users of social media, age 15–74	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	58
Readers of printed newspapers, age 15–74 (reach)	93	92	90	51	29
Readers of online/digital newspapers, age 15–74 (reach)	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	47
Listening to the radio, age 12–74 (hours and minutes)	4:04	4:06	4:03	3:14	Reach: 59%
Watching TV, age 4+ (hours and minutes)	3:52	4:07	4:09	4:08	Reach: 82%

Sources: different studies for radio, TV and print media by Kantar Emor in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2017; Kantar Emor *Meediapäeva uuring* 2018 [Media day 2018]

Estonian population compared to other European countries (see European Commission, 2014).

Taking into account this picture of great transformations in the Estonian media landscape during the cycles of transformation, we will concentrate on observations of changes in social diversity in Estonia via indicators of media use and cultural involvement. We will focus on the agents and on their relationships to media and culture.

3.3. MEDIA USE AND CULTURAL INVOLVEMENT SUPPORTING SOCIO-CULTURAL INTERACTION

Historically, on the system level the main function of modern mass media has been seen in integration (Parsons and his followers). Mass media create a common basis for interactions, support culture transmission and the socialisation of future generations, and provide a forum for different ideas necessary for decision-making. Vlasic clearly summarised the five integrative functions of mass media on the micro and macro levels: 'the offering of common topics and a basis for common knowledge to the individual; admitting of representation of individuals and their interests; constitution of the (political) public sphere; mediating of common norms and values; and construction of social reality' (Vlasic, 2004: 67). The functions were clearly seen during the era of mass media in Estonia during the mass movements in the first cycle of transformation. Media have made information available for public use; in the modern literate world, the information in mass media has been treated as commonly known (Luhmann, 2000). There has been a strong assumption that mass media help to create and disperse taken-for-granted knowledge about the social world (Couldry & Hepp, 2017; Luhmann, 2000): mass media facilitate the socio-cultural structure. The need for this function has grown in conjunction with the growing complexity of society (Luhmann, 1995). Among communication scholars, when we ask what holds societies together, the frequent answer is mass media: on the system level, media communication facilitates the evolution of recursivity (recursion) by creating the memory of society, and on the level of individuals it offers opportunities 'to be connected' to the social world (Kõuts-Klemm, 2013). Both levels contribute to the 'world of ideas', i.e. culture.

Without doubt, opportunities to be involved in media communication on the societal and individual levels have changed significantly in recent decades. The diversity of media channels and culture institutions has grown, and the growing wealth of individuals has created a fruitful basis for wider culture consumption (Williams, 2003). In Western countries, media and leisure time activities have been more and more available for people from different socio-economic milieus. The dispersal of the Internet and Internet-using devices (Internet of Things – IoT) to connect with the digital world reached high levels decades ago (Newman, 2012).

The growing diversity in media communication has been accompanied by the growing complexity of contemporary societies. The interconnectedness of different levels and agents has changed the organisational form of societies. The Internet has networked users and messages in unprecedented ways: 'the Internet is the technological basis for the organizational form of the Information Age: the network' (Castells, 2001: 1). Especially the success of global social media platforms in entrenching the institutional logic of modern societies shows the consequences for societies. 'In the connective world, the platforms have penetrated the heart of societies: disrupting markets and labour relations, circumventing institutions, transforming social and civic practices and affecting democratic processes' (van Dijck et al., 2018).

The Internet as a networking platform has brought about significant changes in the relationships between media and audiences: (1) one-directional mediated mass media communication has been challenged by mediated interpersonal communication (in forms social media make possible), (2) the ongoing blurring of the boundaries between different types of communication arenas and contents, and a remixing of culture is occurring. The processes have been supported by 'time-space compression': 'the speeding up of global processes, so that the world feels smaller and distances shorter, so that events in one place impact immediately on people and places very long distances away' (Hall, 2000: 619). Internet technology has far-reaching consequences for society; according to Luhmann: ‘for the first time the medial substrate will be distinct from the social’ (Luhmann, 1998: 309). This impacts the structuring of knowledge and, beyond that, the complexities of society. According to Archer, this has consequences for normativity and social structure as well. The media structure will change: ‘digital diffusion dismantles the whole mainstream media structure – its Orwellian hegemony, the contribution that distraction makes to quietism and to fostering consumerism’ (Archer, 2016: 163). Smart devices in our pockets bring with them new practices and opportunities to participate and to be involved: ‘our social world is fundamentally interwoven with media’ (Couldry & Hepp, 2017: 16).

The time spent on media consumption has grown in recent decades, and in the modern world the individual is connected to the media up to ten hours per day (Newman et al., 2019). In Estonia, too, the latest studies show that an average person dedicates eight hours 24 minutes per day to media consumption (Kantar Emor, 2018). Smart devices in our pockets make steady interactivity and the omnipresence of media communication possible; old one-directional media communication is challenged by interactional media communication, and this fascinates audiences. Internet-connected devices allow for ‘cross-media use’ (Bjur et al., 2013) by audiences, and media are involved in personal life-worlds in very different ways. Hand in hand with technological diversity, the involvement in culture is more diverse. Besides interpersonal and mass communications, ‘the emergence of powerful and digital communication tools have made the old distinctions more permeable than ever; we can talk about mass-personal communication’ (O’Sullivan & Carr, 2018: 1161).

However, not only technological availability has diversified our world; diversity in meaning constellations is growing as well. Today, the offer of media content in a global world is, from the viewpoint of individuals, more diverse than several decades ago. Traditional, i.e. legacy, media have found new platforms to disperse their content to audiences, new online-born outlets have emerged, and citizen initiatives have added diversity to the public sphere through their outlets and communication channels. Criticism of the mainstream media has led to discussion of what mainstream is, and whose viewpoints the mainstream media offer (Freedman, 2018; Noor, 2017). The emergence of alternative content – opinionated media or populist channels – is the other side of the coin, offering diversification and growing availability.

As a result of different ways to connect to the ‘broader world’, the fragmentation of audiences and cultures has developed: ‘if the social structure becomes more fragmented into segregated subgroups, without a larger unified core (mainstream), it becomes harder for media to address all the interests and communication needs' (Quandt, 2012: 13). The united public sphere is disappearing and personal 'media menus' are evolving (Hasebrink & Domeyer, 2012). Subgroup communication spaces and localised identities can be developed, but encapsulated communication circles are possible as well (Flaxman et al., 2016). Wiewiura and Hendricks (2018) go even further in their pessimistic conclusions about the deliberative character of Internet communication when they claim that 'the chaotic and muddled nature of mass signals in the public spheres of the Internet may create information pathologies [---] because the agendas are set under epistemic and doxastic conditions there' (Wiewiura & Hendricks, 2018: 1135). While the web has many characteristics similar to the characteristics Archer attributes to the social structure, it is a context for and product of human interaction that offers us positions and practices analogous to our roles in real-world functioning (Pratt, 2014): it has a transformative power over the social structure.

3.4. AGENCY AS INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION VIA COMMUNICATION MEDIA

The long tradition of audience studies in the framework of the uses and gratifications approach (UGA) sees media consumption as a meaningful and well-reasoned activity. The large proportion of their time that people choose to devote to media consumption is evidence that media must be doing something right, according to McGuire (1974: 169). Generally, the two dimensions work together in individual media choices: functionalities of media (informing, entertaining and social function; Lee, 2013) and worthwhileness of particular media (Schrøder, 2015). Media selections depend on personal preferences: how well particular channels fit into the daily routines of people and what channels best satisfy their personal needs. Additionally, media selections depend on social norms: in every culture, there is an unwritten list of channels that need to be followed to provide common ground for interactions, and this depends on past developments, e.g. the development of literacy level, technological structure, etc. The fourth important component explaining media use is situativity: how well media fit into particular temporal-spatial settings (Schrøder, 2015). Regarding legacy media, scholars have not reached agreement on how strong the agency of audiences is: are they mere receivers of messages or do they intervene in the functional logic media create. Critical voices state that the UGA scholars have overestimated the agency of audiences (Burkart, 2002), and that situational and outside factors have stronger impacts than decisions by people in using media.

In media studies the concept of agency is not used frequently; instead, there have been different approaches to the 'powers' audiences can exercise in their media selections: powerful media vs. conscious and purposeful selections made by audiences (McQuail, 2012).

Digital media have changed audience categorisations: while in pre-digital times audiences were conceptualised as belonging to particular socio-demographic categories, in digital media what prevails is 'the post-social conception of the individual', where individuals are seen as 'amalgams of ever-changing, dynamic, lively data points' (Fisher & Mehozay, 2019: 1188). The omnipresence of Internet communication has changed the opportunities for agency in several ways. From one-sided mediated communication, we have moved to mass-personal mediated communication (O'Sullivan & Carr, 2018). The Internet allows users to not only experience media in newer ways, but to also actively contribute to their own content (Sundar & Limperos, 2013: 505). The affordances of digital technologies have transformed our media experience by inviting us to engage with content in such a personal way that we not only act, but actively construct meaning (Sundar, 2008). The wider availability of different media content, perceived frequently as 'information overload', gives more importance to personal selections. Individuals combine their own media repertoires (Hasebrink & Domeyer, 2012). Psychological studies conclude that 'individual choices tend to distribute themselves over equally available mass communication alternatives in a pattern' (McGuire, 1974: 169).

Digital media do not label or evaluate audiences: the analysis of audiences is mere tracking of the surface and calculating their behavioural patterns based on data points, without individual categories or simple classifications (Fisher & Mehozay, 2019). Personalisation and mass-customisation make it possible to detect behavioural patterns of agents. In personal media selections, different media outlets and content with different functionalities are combined into meaningful sets for an agent. We can assume that behind the repertoires there are different reflexivities. Agency appears through the selections a person makes to be connected with the world outside him/herself: to be connected with others and with social entities. It is decisive and definitely related to reflexivity as to whether an individual can make use of the new situation, or whether too many opportunities cause feelings of insecurity, 'information overload' (Schmitt et al., 2018), mistrust towards media (Brosius et al., 2019), or news-avoidance (Ksiazek et al., 2010). Content diversity and availability lead to a diversity of strategies that audiences use to handle growing complexity and often growing insecurities as well. There has been increasing fragmentation. Some studies indicate the first signs of growing polarisation and segregation based on media selections. In contemporary egalitarian societies, the new stratifications will become visible if we take into account news media following: 'those rich in cultural capital are more likely to orient themselves towards what is socially recognized as "quality" news and that they in some instances show a distaste for "popular" news [---] news consumption may not necessarily be the result of a series of deliberate strategies, but rather the product of socially shaped taste palettes that are formed in the process of socialization' (Ohlsson et al., 2017: 127). Archer stresses this, too: 'Home viewing of scheduled programs is the resort of the elderly and the poor. It is rapidly being replaced by an elective combination that is self-mixed from an increasing array' (Archer, 2016: 163–164). The picture is diverse; longitudinal studies of culture consumption have found that in Western societies 'the shift from highbrow snob to inclusive omnivore' is taking place (Peterson, 2005: 261), where the evaluation of tastes by researchers is complicated and it makes sense to 'measure' the frequency and breadth of participation: 'to operationalize the omnivorousness by counting the number of activities chosen by a respondent and identify as omnivorous everyone who scores above a given level' (Peterson, 2005: 264).

Thus, the consequences of digital transformations are not homologous on the systemic or individual level. They depend on the interplay of structure and agency in particular spatial-temporal settings. The involvement in socio-cultural interactions receives central importance in analysing changes. In doing that, the cross-media perspective can offer valuable information. The cross-media perspective starts from the premise that audiences are not just semiotic sense-makers but, rather, active participants in making sense of interdependent media technologies, multimodal content and situational circumstances (Bjur et al., 2013: 27).

3.5. METHODOLOGY: PATTERNS OF MEDIA USE AND CULTURAL INVOLVEMENT

We suggest using empirical data about media use and cultural involvement as an opportunity to analyse the contributions by individuals to socio-cultural interaction, i.e. individuals, through their selections of media content and culture products, contribute to the structuring and re-structuring of the social system. Every spatial-temporal setting of individuals is characterised by particular ideational constellations that support or enable specific types of agency. This agency can appear in specific forms of culture involvement and media selections. We believe that an agent in a specific spatial-temporal setting acts in coherence with his/her reflexivity. The selections one makes in different situations and under different circumstances are meaningful for him/her and probably he/she is able to explain the meanings of his/her behaviour/agency. Studies from psychology stress the coherence of individual normal behaviour and if we transfer the principles to media studies we can conclude that 'individual choices tend to distribute themselves over equally available mass communication alternatives in a pattern' (McGuire, 1974: 169).

As researchers, we can observe individuals' activities, but in doing so we need additional instruments to take into account the meanings of attributes to a person's activities. In this sense, statistical data on cultural participation are rather limited. We suggest getting more information by asking people and in this way detecting the patterns of socio-cultural interaction in which the individual participates. Peterson (2005), who, among others, has long experience in analysing people's relations to culture, claims that as a valid measure we can use what people report doing: this reflects 'the way the people use art in shaping identity and symbolically announcing their place in the world' (Peterson, 2005: 265). Self-reported data illuminate patterns of socio-cultural interaction that are meaningful for agents and coherent with their mode of reflexivity.

Self-reported data have been criticised for several reasons (de Vreese & Neijens, 2016; Prior, 2009), but the most important criticism deals with two aspects: 'imperfect recall of the media consumed is one part of the problem; the other is that survey instruments impose a limit on the number of media outlets that can be analyzed' (Mukerjee et al., 2018: 27). Without doubt, self-reported data are not well suited to evaluating news exposure: how particular content reaches target groups. Nevertheless, the analysis of media usage from the perspective of socio-cultural interaction has different purposes: to explain and illuminate different interrelations with the 'world outside', which has strong connections to one's reflexivity. For analysis, it is not necessary to reach the precision and detailed accuracy of remembering individual actions, or particular selections one has made. The answers to a sophisticated survey questionnaire, in their combinations, provide opportunities to analyse the self-placement of an individual in the world and their relations to other agents. The responses to a survey questionnaire are analysed only in connection with each other, in patterns of socio-cultural interaction. We claim that the answers to the questions in a survey questionnaire are not arbitrary, sporadic or incidental; the answers in combinations (since there are hundreds of questions and answers given by respondents) have meaning for respondents.

We have based our empirical work on that premise and have sought patterns in cultural involvement among Estonians through the decades (see the methodology of the study 'Me. The World. The Media' in Chapter 1). We have defined the cultural

Table 3.2. Operationalisation of the dimensions of cultural involvement in 2014

Based on self-reported data. In each case different activities, genres, topics, technologies or products were asked about separately

Dimensions of cultural involvement	Scale
Importance of culture and different culture activities/products for a person	1 – has no importance at all … 5 – very important
Visits to different cultural events and institutions: theatre, concerts, cinema, art performances, museums, libraries and other cultural events	1 – do not visit at all … 5 – visit frequently
Frequency of the use of different media: reading books, watching TV, listening to the radio, Internet use	1 – do not use at all … 5 – use frequently
Following different genres and topics in media: news, culture, discussions and opinions in socio-political topics, films and entertainment	1 – do not follow at all … 5 – follow frequently
Subjective perception of time spent on different activities: reading, work, home and hobbies	1 – do not do it at all … 5 – do it very frequently
Access to media technologies and availability of culture products at home: books, devices for Internet connection	1 – very low … 5 – very high

involvement rather broadly: from self-reported cultural activities (visiting museums, reading books, attending concerts and the theatre, watching television, etc.) to attitudes towards culture (importance of culture, conversations about culture, interest in cultural discussions, etc.). We have seen media consumption as one dimension of cultural involvement that can, in the situation of different content for different target groups, distinguish respondents with different 'tastes' and relationships, as some other recent studies have done (e.g. in Sweden, Ohlsson et al., 2017). Thus, cultural involvement has different dimensions, which all will be methodologically analysed based on self-reported data. Dimensions in combinations indicate the patterns of cultural involvement. If respondents mention particular genres, formats and media content, it is possible to aggregate the answers into meaningful units that describe patterns of being connected with cultural contexts for every respondent and search for similarities for groups of respondents (see the operationalisation of the dimensions of cultural involvement in Table 3.2).

The changes in socio-cultural interaction can only be seen based on longitudinal analysis. The meaningfulness of an approach to seeking patterns in cultural involvement and media use based on the survey questionnaire can be seen in a comparison of the data from different study waves (our representative surveys were carried out in 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014, and they allow for comparisons over years). In Table 3.3 we present as an illustration the patterns revealed by the cluster analysis from selected survey waves: all of the analyses have been published elsewhere as separate studies (see Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2017; Lõhmus et al., 2006). As the

Table 3.3. Types of cultural involvement representing two different phases of transformations in 2005 and 2014

	2005	**2014**
Type I	New multi-active	Traditional multi-active
Type II	Traditional active	Internet-centred new-active
Type III	New Internet-centred	Moderate, traditional
Type IV	Passive reader	Internet-centred, disinterested in culture
Type V	Passive non-interested	Passive

Sources: Lõhmus et al., 2006; Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2017: 233

collection of data and the logic of analysis have remained the same over the years, we see in comparing the distinguished clusters (Table 3.3) that the patterns of cultural consumption seem to have cores that change slowly.

Table 3.3 shows that the first types are more omnivorous than others, and the last types represent passive, not interested, univorous relations to the environment around the individual. Some earlier studies in Western countries have related univorousness to rather low tastes and low occupational status hierarchy (Peterson & Simkus, 1992). The labels in our analysis reveal nothing about the 'quality' of cultural contact: earlier class society distinctions between 'highbrow' and 'lowbrow' tastes are not suitable for the cross-media contexts of contemporary societies. As Hartley (2018) puts it: the 'distinction mechanism not only works on the level of news providers and news genres but also on the level of engagement practices – the ways in which people enact and describe their own news engagement practices' (Hartley, 2018: 46).

The social and cultural context has changed a lot during the different study waves. The data points in Table 3.3 represent the situation in different morphogenetic cycles: the 2005 survey represents the situation at the end of the second cycle of morphogenesis (in 1992–2003) and the survey from 2014 represents the situation at the end of the third cycle of transformation (in 2004–2017), which was morphogenetic, but at the end revealed some tendencies towards stagnation (see Chapter 2). Developments in digital technologies took place during that period, and this is reflected in our terminology as well (compare the columns in Table 3.3). New ways of being involved in cultural communication have developed and we are interested in distinguishing those who have integrated new communication technologies into their cultural involvement from those who have not.

The argument that the types presented can be treated as patterns of cultural involvement needs further clarification; to do so, we will examine the contents of

Table 3.4. Types of cultural involvement in 2014

Cluster analysis (k-means method); % of the Estonian-speaking respondents



Type I: Traditional multi-active
This type is characterised by above average frequency of cultural participation (goes to the theatre, concerts, museums, the library and song festivals, owns a remarkably large library and often buys and reads books). Dominant interest in traditional book-centred culture, but also the use of the Internet is more active and versatile than average. Interests combine historical and socio-political interests. The type is also characterised by higher than average political activity. The lifestyle of this individual is active and diverse. Probably meta-reflexives, according to Archer's typology (2003).

Type II: Internet-centred new-active
This type also takes part in cultural activities in traditional ways (e.g. going to the cinema, the theatre and concerts), but most activity is centred around the Internet. Internet-centred socio-cultural interaction was dominant among the respondents. Respondents in this group report abandoning traditional cultural participation in favour of taking part in cultural activities and communication online. Representatives of this type are characterised by multitasking and highly diverse and active lifestyles, and they report a strong sense of lack of time. Probably communicative or meta-reflexives, according to Archer's typology (2003).

Type III: Moderate, traditional
In this type, traditional, pre-digital cultural contacts are quite common (e.g. reading books, newspapers and magazines, sometimes going to the theatre, and not going to the cinema). Their lifestyle is less mobile and more focused on their homes. Their cultural participation is largely mediated through traditional media (spending a lot of time with mass media). As it includes older people and is a lower income group, it is likely that they lack the money and other resources to participate in other ways. They are consumers of mediated culture, but they do not necessarily have low taste or follow popular culture. They follow political discussions, science and documentary productions and TV news. Probably communicative or autonomous reflexives, according to Archer's typology (2003).

Type IV: Internet-centred, disinterested in culture
The pattern of cultural involvement consists of mainly mediated contacts with culture. The respondents do not participate in live events, and do not go to the theatre or cinema, libraries or museums. They participate in socio-cultural interactions primarily through the Internet. They do not read books and do not follow traditional media, but due to their interest in technology and modern culture, they keep up with the latest socio-technological developments in society. They do not follow cultural discussions and are not interested in talking about culture. Probably expressive/fractured reflexives, according to Archer's typology (2003; 2016).

Type V: Passive
This pattern involves relatively low participation in socio-cultural interaction. The respondents have rather limited mobility in their life-worlds, and have little interest in the world beyond their own familiar surroundings. Above all, in media consumption, they have a need for entertaining and easy-to-follow content that does not require much mental effort (they are more active than average in watching TV). Probably autonomous reflexives, according to Archer's typology (2003).

Based on Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2017: 232–238

the patterns more closely in Table 3.4 and describe the patterns of cultural activities and media usage among respondents in detail.

Cultural involvement seems to be a meaningful basis for distinguishing contributions to socio-cultural interaction (in the sense of Archer), since we see that the types distinguished in our study clearly differ based on their self-reported interests (see Figure 3.1). Stronger involvement, such as the patterns of Types I and II show, is more strongly connected to the interests in 'serious' social topics (e.g. politics, economics and socio-political discussions), with lower interest in human or softer 'popular' topics (e.g. lifestyles, personalities, crime and fiction). If we compare the interests of respondents representing traditional cultural involvement patterns (Types I and III) to the respondents representing Internet-centred involvement patterns (Types II and IV), we see that cultural involvement via digital communication is more related to interest in the topics of technology and business and in popular lifestyle topics, such as fashion, food and travel. Passive and non-diverse cultural involvement indicates lower interest in every sphere of life than among the population in general; for the less involved groups, only topics usually handled by the tabloid press are interesting, e.g. crime, celebrities and DIY topics.

The analysis does not make it possible to draw conclusions about the scope of the interest in time and space, since the empirical analysis did not go into the details of the preferred/consumed content. Nevertheless, subsequent qualitative studies have shown that diversity in media repertoires on the content level is much higher and can be explained by the use of different dimensions. The scope of content interests ranges from international and global topics to very narrow and personal levels, such as the local community or peer group; in each news repertoire, the channels for getting information are different from the channels for being involved (Kõuts-Klemm, 2017: 376). There are groups who are not interested in journalism-produced news at all and their interests are limited to the private sphere. Nevertheless, community-oriented, nationally-oriented or internationally-oriented groups have been distinguished as well. The localisation of identities in different spaces is probably one of the consequences of the fragmentation of cultural involvement (see Chapter 8 about translocalism).

Based on the data presented and additional information that characterises the types distinguished (see Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2017), we can claim that, in their contributions to socio-cultural interaction, the types differ significantly. The opposite groups in the use of social media are Types II and IV: for Type II social media form an enriching instrument, supporting their participation; for Type IV it is the opposite: social media allow for social closure, maybe even falling into filter bubbles or echo chambers (Flaxman et al., 2016). Both types are rather well adapted to quick changes in society: they are 'consumers of accelerations', but their cultural

Figure 3.1. Interest factors by cultural involvement type in 2014

Mean factor scores compared to the sample average



Source: Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2017: 238

involvement is quite different. Type IV does not participate in traditional activities that preserve the core of culture, and they are not interested in the heritage of the ideational world. We believe that this restricts the possibilities of meta-reflexivity and autonomy. Probably they have a new mode of reflexivity that Archer (2016) has labelled 'fractured expressive reflexivity'. According to Archer, this is characterised by a 'preoccupation with today's ephemera, inability to design purposeful courses of action; undeveloped personal "concerns", displaced by fleeting absorption in fashion, fads and fabricated celebrities; and consequent un-readiness to make commitments to social or political action' (Archer, 2016: 156). But we believe that the distinction between the two groups, who are both active users of the Internet and social media, is not determined by the media they use but by the fact that their cultural involvement differs because of their reflexivity type, supported by their socio-cultural context, and vice versa if we come back to the idea of the 'double morphogenesis' offered

Figure 3.2. Social and political participation by media user type in 2014

Differences between the groups are significant at the level of p≤0.001



Source: Vihalemm & Kõuts-Klemm, 2017: 272

by Archer (2016). Thus, the contributions to socio-cultural interaction differ between the groups significantly.

If we take into account only media use patterns, we see clearer relations between media use and participatory practices. It is clear that there is a strong correlation between the two: the broader or more diverse the media repertoires, the higher the levels of social and political participation (see Figure 3.2; the cluster analysis is based on the indices of media use).

The general conclusion from the patterns (Table 3.4) is that cultural involvement has two dimensions that are important to take into account if we talk about the different patterns socio-cultural interaction can display. The two dimensions are: (1) the intensity and diversity of cultural involvement (frequent contacts vs. less frequent contacts with many channels vs. fewer channels), and (2) preferences of traditional,

Figure 3.3. Involvement in socio-cultural interaction based on cross-media use and cultural involvement in 2014


Active, diverse
I: Traditional multi-active
II: Internet-centred new-active
III: Moderate, traditional
Traditional
Innovative
IV: Internet-centred, disinterested in culture
V: Passive
Passive, non-diverse

habituated contacts vs. openness to innovation and changes, and orientation towards new technologies (Figure 3.3).

Different levels of involvement in culture are related to the media use patterns of an individual. Different media channels offer different content and demand that individuals synthesise the information they get from particular media channels differently. The comparison and synthesis of a number of information flows by the individual are without doubt more demanding and require the development of a communicative or autonomous mode of reflexivity.

Communicative or autonomous reflexives can satisfy their personal interests or needs in digital contexts, since the Internet provides more freedom in selections one can make in cultural and media consumption. Probably information overload or information disorder are normal situations for them and they are not stressed by the constant flow of non-routine situations. They have developed the ability to select.

Schrøder (2019) has found that many digital media users attribute their selections to the principle of relevance.

Those who experience the information load as being too demanding can choose the strategy of news avoidance or strictly limit their involvement. Those who do not express the need to be connected to different levels and spheres of society restrict their consumption to media of personal communication spheres (Brites & Kõuts-Klemm, 2018); among those people, the possibility of growing encapsulation exists. Qualitative research on mobile news-following in spatial-temporal settings in Sweden suggests that 'transmedia textures may also (in other geo-social spaces) sustain the close bonds and local moorings of sedentary lifestyles, which in turn correspond to more centripetal dynamics of news media practices' (Jansson & Lindell, 2015: 92). The motivation to be connected to cultural and political life is lower among those people.

If there is a question about the direction of the changes in different digital societies – does the current phase of transformation lead digital societies to morphogenesis or morphostasis? – then 'it is decisive for whether or not the conditional influence is exerted further down the time line on the next generation of agents' (Archer, 2010: 277). To determine generational changes, we analysed the socio-demographic composition of patterns of cultural involvement as well. We found that some of the youngest respondents were present in every type of cultural involvement in Estonia in 2014, but that they were more concentrated in the two Internet-centred types: almost half of the youngest respondents (15–29 years old) belonged to Type II (Internet-centred new-active) and almost half of them to Type IV (Internet-centred disinterested in culture). Thus, we believe that behind their cultural involvement lay the expressive fractured mode of reflexivity, which is characterised by the 'unreadiness to make commitments' (Archer, 2016: 156). The other sociological studies carried out in Estonia have supported the assumption that most youngsters are bystanders and do not contribute significantly to social and political life (Beilmann et al., 2018).

3.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

As the functions of media and communication in society have not been a focus of interest of critical realism, we saw the need to examine in more depth the ties between media use and cultural involvement, and between socio-cultural interaction and critical realism.

The historical role of mass media has been to offer background knowledge to members of particular socio-cultural groups and to monitor society.

The underlying assumption of our analysis derives from modern media sociology, where the mass media contribute to the emergence and transformations of contemporary societies (Luhmann, 2000), since this works as a powerful means for the dispersal of information, ideas and shared norms, and a basis for identity building. Media serve as a means for connecting individuals with the social system: to social structure and culture (Kõuts-Klemm, 2013). Especially during the *first morphogenetic cycle* in Estonia – during the Singing Revolution and the restoration of the independent state – mass media played a crucial role (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2002) in helping to negotiate common concerns and in finding agreement in the goals of changes. Mass media channels and content diversified, and more and more different world-views appeared in the content of mass media compared to the Soviet period. Media consumption has been for agents one of the most direct ways to be involved in society and to be informed about events and actions. Still, we can claim that cultural diversity was lower than during the second cycle of transformation (in 1992–2003), since the media were followed by the masses and the fragmentation of media audiences had not occurred yet.

During the *second cycle of transformation*, diversity in Estonian society grew, the structural reforms helped to create media pluralism and commercialisation started: the Estonian state created via liberal media policy the necessary conditions for the successful development of private media (Jõesaar, 2011). During the second cycle of transformation, it depended on individual agency and the mode of reflexivity as to how they used the opportunities media communication offered for being connected with society and with other agents. Individuals could be differently involved in culture and their transformative potential was supported by the media. Those who built up diverse and intense media-use patterns with a clear orientation to the goal of being informed had frequent participatory relations with social, political and cultural life. At the same time, our analysis shows that media also play an important role in double morphogenesis, supporting the formation of different modes of reflexivity and the creation of new media-centred agencies related to the types of media consumption.

Agents in every society contribute to patterned involvement structures: some of them in multiple ways, and some of them in more limited ways. Different sociocultural constellations condition different combinations of routinised and innovative practices. The combinations differ for every single agent as well. Digitalisation has potentially broadened the possibilities of new combinations.

The *third cycle of transformation* (2004–2017) in Estonia was characterised by digitalisation not only in the media sphere, but in other relationships between the state and individual as well: different programmes for building up e-Estonia were launched. Many services started to be more readily available for digitally advanced users, and global networking and cultural opening took place. New divisions were created and old ones were amplified in digital and social networks. The information disorder challenged agents to develop their modes of reflexivity to orient themselves in highly complex communication networks. Similarly to the studies in some Scandinavian countries (Lindell, 2018; Ohlsson et al., 2017), the emergence of new distinctions can be seen.

Thus, digitalisation has been one of the reasons for growing social complexity, and this has been accompanied by growing diversity in media communication as well. Internet or mobile media do not determine social-cultural interaction. While reflexivity leads to the diverse and intense media use that supports participation in social and political life, it also contributes to morphogenetic processes. Our empirical data support the idea that reflexivity is a catalyst for resources of participation and connectedness. Lindell (2018) labels the same idea based on the Swedish example slightly differently, claiming that 'capital possession is related to an overall "connectedness" (Lindell, 2018: 3042). Thus, we conclude that reflexivity is a resource for handling quick and deep changes in society.

Nevertheless, the concerns expressed by Archer (2016) regarding digitalisation find empirical evidence in our study. Archer (2016) believes that with some agents the mode of reflexivity develops towards the 'fractured expressive reflexivity' characteristic to 'people to whom things happen, not those who make things happen' (Archer, 2016: 156). We found among some population groups univorous digital media use practices accompanied by narrow interests in different life spheres and low social, cultural and political participation. Restricted and narrow involvement via the Internet and mobile media can cause low/restricted contributions to socio-cultural interaction. Tension between multifunctional cross-media involvement and the segmented and mono-dimensional e-technocracy pattern creates future paths. We believe that the modes of reflexivity different groups exercise differ significantly. The question arises as to whether the groups of low participation interests under particular circumstances become activated through well-designed manipulative messages. The latest political developments in Estonia indicate that agents supposedly within the mode of fractured reflexivity can become more open to ideological manipulations. This is not only a concern in Estonia, but in many other countries as well.

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CHAPTER 4.
THE PATTERNS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to provide insight into the transformation of Estonian society from the perspective of political participation. Our analysis of political agencies is inspired by Karl Polanyi's conception (1944/1967) of the 'double movement' experienced by societies in times of transformations. According to Polanyi, the transformation process is affected by two streams of activities which have opposite directions. The first stream supports the fundamental changes taking place in society and pushes for their more persistent and faster realisation. The opposite one is formed by activities of people whose lives have been disrupted ('disembedded', in Polanyi's wording) by the changes. They make efforts to inhibit the changes in order to retain the former conditions and social order for as long as possible. As we have shown in Chapter 2, this situation also emerged in Estonian society, where we have observed a shift from initial public support for the radical reforms of the 1990s to stagnation in the second decade of the new millennium. According to Polanyi (ibid.), the task of good governance lies in finding a proper balance between these double movements, enabling transformation to go on without unnecessary cataclysms. Looking through the lens of the morphogenetic/morphostatic model (Archer, 2015; see Chapter 1) at the political aspects of transformation, we seek an answer to the question of how certain patterns of political agency are related to social and cultural interactions, supporting or inhibiting morphogenetic transformation in Estonian society.

We will focus on the diversities in the political behaviour and positioning of people in the political field (see Bourdieu, 1998) as manifestations of their political agency (Giddens, 1984; Hirschman, 1970). Based on Hirschman's (1970) model of political participation, we will distinguish between a positively engaged, consenting position (loyalty), an opposing, non-consenting and critically vocal position (voice), and a silent, evasive position (exit) towards the activities of institutions of power. The focus of the chapter is on the different patterns of political engagement prevalent in Estonian society between 2002 and 2014 and the relationship between these patterns and the structural changes in society. Following the model of morphogenetic analysis described in Chapter 1, we interpret the development and manifestation of political engagement as a part of cultural interaction, as an expression of individual choices made by people concerning opportunities for participation in political life. On the other hand, we relate emerging patterns of political participation to social interactions leading to the re-structuration of society in the process of post-communist transformation. The relation between social structure and political participation has strong democratic consequences, as it implies that some groups within societies are more successful at getting their voices heard in the political decision-making process than other groups (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2013). In the research on transformation, the question about the voices that have been heard and the voices that have not been listened to when the decisions about future developments have been made is highly relevant in order to understand why some opportunities have been realised and others missed.

The empirical data used in the subsequent analysis come from the first and the last waves of the national surveys in the framework of the research programme 'Me. The World. The Media' (MeeMa), conducted in 2002 and 2014. The surveys included a range of questions concerning participation in the institutionalised forms of political life (national and local elections, and affiliation with political parties), in informal political actions and civic activities, such as demonstrations and campaigns, and in the usage of media for political purposes (Kalmus et al., 2018). Our surveys also covered questions about political attitudes and orientations, including trust in political institutions and assessments of the roles of the state and the market. This provided us an opportunity for a multidimensional analysis of political participation from four angles: activities, interests, relations with institutional structures, and political ideologies (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2013). Based on these data, we have made an attempt to develop a typology of political participation that could be helpful for the exploration of the morphogenetic/morphostatic processes in the Estonian political field that occurred during the two morphogenetic cycles described in Chapter 2: the restoration of the nation state (1992–2003) and transnationalisation (2004–2017). While in international comparative studies of political participation in Europe Estonia is grouped with other 'new democracies', countries with low levels of democratic participation (Keil & Gabriel, 2013), we try in our study to look beyond this generalisation at those agencies which could drive Estonian society toward more active participation.

4.2. THE FORMATION OF THE ESTONIAN POLITICAL SCENERY AFTER THE RESTORATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The radical market-economic reforms in Estonia created a wholly different social order, which gave rise to new situations in everyday life that had to be handled and resolved by all people in the spheres of welfare and economic activity, from housing and utilities to professional careers and consumption opportunities. Understanding participation as 'a practice or everyday activity that is exercised by citizens in specific situations' (Wimmer et al., 2018: 2), we can apply the notion of political participation to all situations where citizens encounter political institutions and make political choices. Reforms changed the individual's position in relation to the state, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of free citizens, which are lacking in a totalitarian society. Free people were expected to participate in public life through free elections, as well as through the informal channels of civic participation. The communist rhetoric of political unity was replaced by the pluralism of political views. The spirit of the radical post-communist reforms was understood as a clean break with the Soviet planned economic system and communist ideology and a shift to a Western model of society and politics based on democracy and a free market economy (see Laar 1996; Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997; Smith, 2001). The newborn political parties tried to articulate ideological platforms based on the schemes of the Western 'normal' pattern of political contestation in a capitalist society, organised around left- versus right-wing choices. However, after the Estonian Communist Party dissolved itself in 1991, following the restoration of the Estonian Republic, classic socialist ideology had no representation in Estonia (see Lauristin & Hansson 2019; Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997; Mölder & Pettai, 2013; Saarts, 2017; Smith, 2001). Social Democrats positioned themselves between the left and right forces, preferring a 'third way' option. The Centre Party, which dominated the left side of Estonian politics offered a quite populist mixture of centre and left ideas. Among the right-wing parties, Pro Patria represented the traditional Christian-democratic ideology, but the Liberals (since 2000 known as the Reform Party) and Res Publica revealed in their

Figure 4.1. Self-assessment on the left-right scale by the supporters of the parties in 2014

% of respondents with Estonian citizenship



party programmes quite extreme right-wing (neoliberal and neoconservative) views. In our study, we wanted to clarify to what extent the people who supported those parties shared left-wing or right-wing ideological positions concerning liberalisation of the economy and the role of the state and market in providing social well-being. Looking at our survey data from 2005 and 2014, we can see that the liberal and conservative parties (Pro Patria, Reform Party and Res Publica) quite clearly dominated the right-wingers among the electorate, but the followers of the Centre Party, Social Democrats, Greens and even National Conservatives revealed a mixture of left- and right-wing attitudes, some including a higher and some a lower share of leftist supporters (Figure 4.1).

In election after election, the Estonian political field fell into the dividing lines and social cleavages formed during the first cycle of the transition, described in Chapter 2. Until the end of our survey series, in 2014, there was a quite clear linkage between the emerging social-economic divisions and the placement of people on the left-right scale (Figure 4.2). According to the morphogenetic interpretation, we understand this relationship between social position and ideological self-assessment of people to be one of the significant elaborations of the post-communist social transformation.

Figure 4.2. Self-assessment on the left-right scale by subjective social stratum in 2014

% of respondents with Estonian citizenship



Our data also showed that in opposition to the attitudes of the political elite and despite the long-term domination of the neoliberal ideology on the level of governmental policy, there was no broad neoliberal consensus among the whole Estonian population. To the contrary, the clear majority of the population preferred that the state shoulder greater responsibility for social cohesion in the transition to a market economy.

The Lithuanian sociologist Jolanta Aidukaite has explained the widespread support across all strata for a bigger role for the state in the provision of individual welfare as a 'socialist bias' characterising the post-Soviet mentality (Aidukaite, 2009).

However, in Estonia, as in the other Baltic countries, 'normalisation' of the political life around the left-wing ideological dimension, reproducing socio-economic cleavages, was inhibited by the post-colonial dimension, related to the historical trauma experienced by the majority of the Estonian people under Soviet occupation. This post-colonial dimension included security concerns related to the 'Russian threat' and nostalgic attitudes connected with the Soviet past (Annus, 2019; Lagerspetz & Vogt, 2004; Smith, 2001), legitimising the hardships of reforms as a sacrifice needed for accomplishing a clean break from the Soviet system. Thus, the generative mechanism which was responsible for the broad popular support for the radical reforms cannot be explained only by the effects of the neoliberal ideology, but must include the complementary effects of this post-colonial context of economic and social reforms. Nevertheless, there were quite big differences between people of

Figure 4.3. Agreement with statements concerning state support for vulnerable groups, by social stratum in 2002 and 2014

% of group



Source: Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2017: 155

Figure 4.4. Agreement with statements concerning privatisation and the open market, by social stratum in 2002 and 2014

% of group



Source: Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2017: 155–156

different social positions (and ethnic backgrounds) in the assessment of relationships between the state and the market (Figure 4.3).

Even though the increase in economic inequality has been very rapid in Estonia compared to other post-communist states, the contribution of the state to the reduction of social inequality has been relatively insignificant.

At the same time, when we compare the evaluation of liberal economic reforms, there is a clear left-right cleavage: representatives of the low and lower middle strata are critical, while the middle and upper strata are favourable toward the reforms which have introduced rapid privatisation and marketisation of Estonian society (Figure 4.4).

As explained in Chapter 2, since the first free election in 1991 Estonia has been mostly governed by coalitions led by right-wing parties, representing mostly the higher strata in society. As we see in Chapter 2, the tensions between the neoliberal hegemony in the political realm, supported by the 'winners' of transition, and the more socially oriented views widespread among the lower strata of society concerning the issues of social policy, education and other 'soft areas' have remained unchanged through all of the cycles of transformation. This situation evoked negative feedback, cumulating in morphostatic effects during the third cycle of transformation. The situation started to change after the left-centre forces took over the government in 2016, and in 2019 there was a shift in Estonia from support for liberal political forces to the rise of conservative national populists.

Following Bourdieu (1998: 33–34), we can talk here about the restructuration of the Estonian political field as a result of these interactions. By 'political field', we mean the area of public life where political power-relationships in society are formed, maintained or changed by distinct political agencies. In order to look more closely at the reasons behind these morphogenetic/morphostatic tendencies in Estonian political development, we have conducted a cluster analysis in order to determine the political agencies that could facilitate those tendencies. Those agencies can be described as certain patterns of practical and cognitive engagements in political life, characterised by activeness and resourcefulness, relations with political institutions and value orientations (Kalmus et al., 2018; Keil, 2013). In order to create a typology of political participation, we will relate the indicators of political participation to social stratification and interethnic relations. And, finally, the question of the role of the generational shift on the political field requires our attention.

In the following sections, we will present the main trends in the structuration of the political field, based on the cluster analysis of the patterns of political engagement for the first (2002) and last (2014) years of the survey.

4.3. MODEL OF ANALYSIS

In order to determine the patterns present in the political participation of the population, and to outline the different types of political agency, we employed k-means clustering. As input variables for the clustering, we used negative or positive assessments of changes in society and aggregate indices based on summarising the values of individual variables characterising political engagement, civic activities, trust in political institutions and left-right ideological choices[1]. The same variables were used in the five waves of the MeeMa survey in 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014.

The selection of the categories for the formation of the clusters was made from the aggregated indicators representing three important aspects of political engagement: (1) participation in formal and informal political activities (the level of active engagement), (2) trust in political institutions and agreement with governmental policies (loyal or critical attitude) and (3) social or liberal political ideology (support for social or pro-market orientations concerning the role of the state and market). This three-dimensional model allowed us to interpret the clusters as types of political participation, differentiated as active, moderate or passive (disaffected) agencies, and as more supportive or more critical of the transformational changes in society, also revealing the ideological left-right background of these assessments. Employing cluster membership as a new variable attributed to the respondents, we looked in a further analysis of the political field at the social context of such clusters, as well as at other variables related to various aspects of social and cultural interactions.

The cluster analysis based on these aggregated variables allowed us to formulate the typology of political agency using a three-dimensional model consisting of indicators of the level of political engagement, attitudes towards the institutions of power, and position on the left-right scale (social vs. market orientation). For comparison between the different years, we chose five-cluster solutions. Depending on the strength and content of the variables describing each cluster, we distinguished two active, two moderate and one passive, disaffected type of political participation, characterised as critical or loyal in their attitudes to reform policies and sharing more social or liberal pro-market views (Figure 4.5). Not all possible positions in the political field are represented. Indeed, the strength of a cluster analysis lies in highlighting the empirically existing diversity of political engagement present at the time of the survey by clustering the respondents by similarities in their social attitudes and practices of participation. In the framework of the morphogenetic model

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[1] These indices included: engagement and interest in politics (participation in elections, identification with parties and interest in politics); public engagement (participation in civic organisations and public actions, and frequency of newspaper reading); positive or negative attitudes (trust in political institutions and the changes taking place in the Estonian society); and social or market orientation (agreement with statements describing the role of the state regulations or market competition in providing well-being).

Figure 4.5. Model used for the formation of the political participation clusters


Active, resourceful, highly engaged in political and civic activities
Market orientation
Type A
Type B
Social orientation
High trust, loyalty, positive assessment of reforms
Moderate bystanders
Low trust, opposition, critical assessment of reforms
Type C
Type D
Social orientation
Type E
Market orientation
Passive, alienated, excluded from political and civic activities

Based on Lauristin, 2017: 162

(as presented in Chapter 1, Figures 1.1 and 1.2), we tackle these clusters as sets of primary agents, and their relational characteristics as a typology of political agency.

4.4. RESULTS OF THE CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, 2002 AND 2014

4.4.1. The political field at the end of the second morphogenetic cycle (2002 MeeMa survey)

The first MeeMa survey took place between 1 December 2002 and 6 January 2003. After the resignation of Mart Laar's centre-right government and the appointment of Siim Kallas as the Prime Minister in January 2002, the government was formed by a pragmatically oriented coalition of the Reform and Centre parties. The period of the survey can be characterised as the honeymoon of the post-crisis of confidence Centre Party and Reform Party government, a period of relative calm and of rapid economic development. By 2002, at the end of the second morphogenetic cycle described above (see Chapter 2), the Estonian political field had stabilised, the major political parties, with clearly defined and established ranks of supporters, had been established, and their alliances had been formed (see Toomla, 2011). The morphogenetic cycle of nation building had reached the stage of elaboration. The transition, in the strict sense of the word focused on the implementation of a market economy and the organisation of democratic institutions and forms of political participation, was virtually finalised and new priorities had to be established for national development. However, despite the remarkable improvement in the overall economic situation, social inequality was growing and social tensions between the 'winners' and 'losers' of the transition revealed themselves even more dramatically. The disappointment of the older generation and the desire of the younger generation for a bigger say in politics began to mutually amplify each other, leading to the anticipation of a change in political leadership after the upcoming parliament elections in March 2003.

This was the historical background for the interpretation of the survey results presented in the following analysis of political interactions in 2002 and 2014. Based on the results of the cluster analysis of the data from 2002, five types of political participation (two active, two moderate and one passive) were constructed, based on their active or passive engagement, supportive or critical relations with state institutions, evaluation of reform policies, and dominant pro-social or pro-liberal attitudes (see Figure 4.6).

The most active and resourceful Cluster A was characterised by highly active participation in elections and civic organisations, increased interest in politics, higher than average trust in state institutions, and a positive attitude towards the changes

Figure 4.6. Distribution of respondents into the political participation clusters in 2002

% of the total sample



Based on Lauristin, 2017: 164

Table 4.1. General characteristics of the political participation clusters in 2002

Mean values of the indices (scale 1–5)

	A. Positive activist	B. Critical activist	C. Positive bystander	D. Critical bystander	E. Passive alienated	Total sample
Evaluation of changes	4.00	2.19	4.01	3.47	2.07	3.11
Interest and engagement in politics	4.40	3.71	2.03	2.33	2.01	2.96
Trust in state institutions	3.48	2.98	3.50	3.02	2.29	3.03
Social orientation	3.09	2.68	3.04	1.59	3.75	2.94
Market orientation	2.21	2.02	1.76	4.18	1.64	2.26
Civic participation	4.01	3.50	1.97	2.15	2.01	2.78

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 165

taking place in transition-period Estonia. At the same time, this cluster lacked a clearly defined ideological orientation: the respondents were relatively indifferent towards statements representing the social and market orientations. Even though the positive activist Cluster A only made up a quarter of the sample (see Figure 4.6), the members of this cluster had a significant impact on the processes taking place in the Estonian society in the early 2000s thanks to their active support of reform policies (see Table 4.1).

The active and loyal Cluster A found a counterpart in Cluster B, which also displayed a quite active level of political and civic engagement but revealed a highly critical attitude towards the changes taking place in society. However, similarly to the positive Cluster A, Cluster B also did not have a distinctive ideological profile.

The moderate Cluster C also revealed supportive attitudes toward social priorities, but lower trust in the market. The other moderate cluster, D, had a clearly liberal orientation, while having less trust in political institutions and a slightly more critical assessment of the changes in society. We have thus termed Cluster C 'Positive bystanders' and Cluster D 'Critical bystanders'. In 2002, the fifth cluster, E, was the only cluster with a very strong anti-market social orientation; they also stood out for their passive attitude, marked distrust in state institutions, and an overly negative attitude towards the changes going on in the Estonian society. It is important to note that in 2002 the main distinction we found between the two active types of political agency did not lie in their predominantly left or right world-views but in their levels of trust in state institutions and in their different evaluations of the changes going on in the society after the radical economic and political reforms of the 1990s. It seems that in 2002 the most active part of the Estonian population still had not divided clearly according to their views on socio-economic issues, but were mostly distinguished by their experiences of practical outcomes of political and economic reforms (Table 4.1).

As Figure 4.6 shows, Clusters A, C and D, which are characterised by positive or neutral attitudes towards the functioning of the Estonian state and ongoing reforms (in Hirschman's terms, those in the loyal position), in 2002 made up 57% of the respondents. Clusters B and E, with negative attitudes, made up 43% of the sample. A more detailed picture of the ideological preferences in the different clusters is available in Table 4.2. We can see that in 2002 only the critical bystanders in Cluster D supported the neoliberal idea that individual well-being was fully the responsibility of individuals. In all other clusters, the social responsibility of the state had more support. The distinction between the social and liberal orientations of the clusters becomes clear when one looks at the evaluation of the rapid privatisation and marketisation of Estonia, where in Clusters A, C and D the liberal pro-market attitude supporting radical reforms prevailed, but the critical Clusters B and E were against the reforms. An interesting nuance was added to the profiles of the clusters by statements about the priority of personal freedom or state security. Here the more leftist critical clusters, B and E, appeared to also be more conservative, giving preference to state security over personal freedom. To some extent, this conservative bias can be explained by the social background of the clusters, showing that in the critical Clusters B and especially E there was a larger number of older and less educated respondents than in Clusters A, C and D (Table 4.3).

We can conclude that elaborations during the second morphogenetic cycle of the Estonian post-communist transformation led to a situation corresponding well to

Table 4.2. Support for social vs. liberal pro-market statements by political participation cluster in 2002

% of cluster

	A. Positive activist	B. Critical activist	C. Positive bystander	D. Critical bystander	E. Passive alienated
L: 'Individual wellbeing should depend solely on the efforts of citizens themselves.'	24	24	15	82	10
S: 'The state should help the more vulnerable to cope.'	64	54	61	13	77
L: 'Rapid privatisation and open market have been beneficial to Estonia.'	50	19	45	40	20
S: 'Rapid privatisation and open market have been bad for Estonia.'	25	38	18	26	32
C: 'State security is more important than the protection of personal freedom.'	35	35	23	29	35
L: 'The protection of personal freedom is more important than state security.'	37	25	36	41	26

L – liberal pro-market statement, S – social statement, C – conservative statement.

Source: authors' calculations, 'Me. The World. The Media' 2002

Polanyi's (1944/1967) theory: the 'loyal' Clusters A, C and D can be categorised as agencies pushing changes forward, while the 'critical' Clusters B and E represent the opposite direction of the 'double movement', demonstrating either active or passive interests in the inhibition of the changes. The explanation of these different attitudes can be found in the social and cultural backgrounds of the loyal and critical clusters (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 shows that in 2002 the social composition of the active and loyal Cluster A, which comprised a quarter of our sample, was characterised by a larger share of educated, middle-aged Estonians with high social self-assessment and median or higher incomes. The data also indicate a slight predominance of male respondents in this cluster and a significant number of entrepreneurs, managers and top-level specialists, i.e. people professionally involved in decision-making. In terms of party identification (see Table 4.4), members of this cluster showed the greatest support for the right-wing populist Res Publica, followed by the neoliberal Reform Party and moderate conservative Pro Patria Union. This most active and resourceful agency strongly contributed to the power of right-wing parties, which maintained leadership in the radical neoliberal reform policies.

The respondents forming the critical Cluster B clearly contrasted with the positive attitudes of Cluster A, and were politically very active. They represented an active and highly critical oppositional agency. Similarly to Cluster A, Cluster B actively

Table 4.3. Socio-demographic profile of the political participation clusters in 2002
% of cluster

Language	**A. Positive activist**	**B. Critical activist**	**C. Positive bystander**	**D. Critical bystander**	**E. Passive alienated**	**Total sample**
Estonian	92	64	69	71	44	68
Russian	8	36	31	29	56	32
Gender						
Male	54	43	47	55	40	48
Female	46	57	53	45	60	52
Education						
Primary	14	20	31	23	25	22
Secondary	51	59	54	55	63	57
Higher	35	21	15	22	12	21
Age						
15–29	14	11	54	43	28	28
30–44	24	26	26	27	32	27
45–54	21	24	11	15	17	18
55–64	22	18	6	9	13	15
65–74	18	20	2	5	9	12
Income						
Lower than median	18	40	27	31	47	33
Median	29	33	26	25	29	29
Higher than median	52	27	46	45	25	38
Social stratum						
Low	7	17	6	9	12	10
Lower middle	19	25	12	19	25	20
Middle	30	30	36	30	35	32
Upper middle	26	21	26	25	19	23
Upper	19	7	20	16	9	14

Based on Lauristin, 2017: 166

participated in both elections and the civil society. In political party terms, members of this cluster predominantly voted for the centre-left Centre Party (who were also the first choice in Clusters C and E and the second choice in Clusters A and D). The second party preference in this cluster was Res Publica, a new right-wing populist party that in 2002 attracted a large number of critical citizens. In Hirschman's (1970) terms, Cluster B represents vocal protesters (voices). In social background, in 2002 this critical cluster formed a contrast to the successful and well-off Cluster A.

Table 4.4. Support for political parties in the political participation clusters in 2002

% of cluster. The sum totals are larger than 100% as each respondent could choose up to two parties

Supported party	A. Positive activist	B. Critical activist	C. Positive bystander	D. Critical bystander	E. Passive alienated	Total sample
Pro Patria Union (centre-right)	23	4	7	10	4	10
Reform Party (neoliberal)	23	11	18	19	5	15
Res Publica (right-populist)	37	20	30	17	11	23
Moderates (social democratic)	15	8	10	9	3	9
Centre Party (centre-left populist)	29	37	25	22	22	7
People's Union (left-populist)	17	7	3	5	3	7
No party is close to my views	8	17	11	14	22	15
No interest, not familiar with the views of these parties	6	23	27	30	41	25

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 168

While A was a cluster of active 'winners', B was mostly a cluster of active 'losers'. A notable 42% of the members of Cluster B ranked themselves below average on the social ladder, while 28% ranked themselves higher than average. In Cluster A the exact opposite was true: 45% ranked themselves higher than average and only 26% below average. In terms of profession, Cluster B was mainly made up of white- and blue-collar workers, while the proportion of managers and intellectuals was nearly two times lower than in cluster A. An additional explanation for the low social positioning by members of this active cluster is certainly related to ethnic background. Namely, 36% of the cluster completed the 2002 survey in Russian. Cluster B thus clearly represented the voice of the ethnic minority in the political field. This was, in turn, amplified by gender, the slight female bias of the respondents in this cluster. However, the majority of Cluster B was still comprised of Estonian-speaking respondents characterised by higher social self-assessment, combined with strong critical agency, which was also reflected in their active participation in civic initiatives and other informal political practices.

The moderately active bystanders' clusters, C and D, were comprised of a large proportion of young respondents, with students making up 33% of Cluster C and 21% of Cluster D; the extremely liberal and more critical Cluster D also included a higher than average proportion of entrepreneurs. At the same time, the level of participation in elections and civic organisations in the bystanders' clusters was low. Their less-developed political agency meant that rather than playing an independent role in the political field in 2002, their positive or critical attitudes provided supportive background for the more active clusters, A and B. At the same time, due to their relative youth, their more definite world-views could play a significant role in shaping future developments in society. It is also important to note that the ethnic composition and citizenship status of these 'background' clusters was close to the Estonian average.

Members of the disaffected passive Cluster E were characterised by very low levels of political agency. In Hirschman's classification, they represented the position of the socially excluded 'outsiders', lacking a voice in social matters (exit). Similarly to Cluster B, the politically disaffected and excluded Cluster E showed higher support for leftist ideas, but their attitudes toward state institutions and evaluation of the ongoing changes in society were much more negative, even hostile. It is important to note that, in opposition to the stereotyped expectations, elderly people (aged 55–74) did not make up a large proportion of this disaffected cluster: the majority (60%) of this cluster was aged 15–44. The majority in this cluster were also female (60%) and more than half (56%) of its members were Russian-speaking respondents (see Table 4.3).

We can conclude that the political field of 2002 was polarised by the influence of two types of strong political agency, Clusters A and B; this opposition largely resulted from the differences in their attitudes towards changes in the society but was not based on clear left-right ideological positions. The different social compositions in terms of social status (income, education and profession) explain why Cluster A had much higher perceived opportunities to influence developments than the active critical Cluster B. The positive attitudes of the active and well adapted Cluster A were, to a large extent, accompanied by the support of the moderate 'bystanders' of Cluster C, while the critical market-minded Cluster D desired even more radical and fast changes in society. A relatively large proportion of low income, low social position, ethnic minority and female respondents were in Clusters B and E, possessing a critical attitude towards changes, whereas the 'loyal clusters' were dominated by socially more successful and advanced respondents. This picture reveals that the political field of Estonia in 2002 was clearly dominated by pro-reform agencies. This situation is also reflected in the level of support in the clusters for different parties (see Table 4.4).

The overwhelming support for the right-wing parties among the most active cluster, A, can be seen as a clear indication of the forces producing the domination of the neoliberal agenda in the Estonian political field from the restoration of independence until the end of the whole cycle of nation state rebuilding. This situation was reflected in the results of the national elections in 2003, which brought a massive victory to the newly created right-populist Res Publica. After the failure of this party to maintain political stability, the leading role was taken over by the neoliberal Reform Party, which stayed in power through the next four elections (see Chapter 2).

4.4.2. The political field at the end of the third morphogenetic cycle (2014 MeeMa survey)

In the decade after the first survey, the Estonian society experienced stabilisation, even stagnation, in the political field. After emerging from the recession caused by the global financial crisis, Estonia became mired in economic and political stagnation, which continued into 2014 and 2015. At the same time, there was an increase in the political agency of different social groups. Public critical sentiment escalated in early 2012 and remained strong for the entire year (see Chapter 2). Media and opinion leaders demanded from the government and party politicians more open and honest dialogue with citizens which would lead to a breakthrough towards deliberative democracy, but this never happened. On the President's initiative, a broad-based public assembly was summoned in order to go through a list of pressing concerns spotlighted by members of the civil society and to discuss possible solutions. The public assembly convened in April 2013 and voted on 18 proposals for the amendment of the Political Parties Act and electoral acts, sifted out after initial review, which were then evaluated by experts and submitted to the Parliament (Riigikogu). Unfortunately, very few of these proposals were acted on, as the process became stuck in the gears of the bureaucratic machinery.

The liberal Reform Party, the leading party of the coalition government, won the 2013 local elections; the centre-right coalition they led chose to avoid abrupt changes. The macroeconomic indicators were relatively positive, but people who expected more responsibility from the government were disappointed. In the early spring of 2014, the right-wing government led by the Reform Party was dissolved due to the resignation of the Prime Minister, who became a member of the European Commission. A new coalition, under the leadership of a young Prime Minister from the same party, was formed and the Social Democratic Party was invited by the liberals and conservatives to join the government as a junior member of a centre-right coalition. This provided hope for a shift in the political course toward more social responsibility. The public mood improved significantly. The fifth wave of MeeMa survey was conducted in August and September 2014, a period characterised by relatively positive expectations for the new government. Below, we provide a look at whether and how the processes outlined above are represented in the typology of political

Figure 4.7. Distribution of respondents into the political participation clusters in 2014

% of the total sample



Source: Lauristin, 2017: 187

agency constructed from the results of the cluster analysis of the 2014 survey data using the same methodology as in the previous surveys.

Figure 4.7 shows that by 2014 the total share of the active clusters had diminished from 43% to 39%. The critical political agency had become prevalent in the society, represented by the active critical Cluster B, the moderate critical Cluster D and the passive Cluster E (a total of 64% of all respondents). At the same time, the ratio of people disaffected with politics had increased from 25% to 29% (cluster E).

From the perspective of political cleavages, the situation in 2014 had become ideologically more consistent. In 2002, when the elaborations bringing to an end the second cycle of the post-Soviet transformation were still going on, the link between socio-economic status and the left-right dimension of political preferences was unclear, as in the post-Soviet conditions economically less well-off groups also hoped for the success of market-oriented reforms. The data from 2014 revealed that the structure of the political field had become more coherent. Distinctions in attitudes between the socially oriented and liberal market-oriented groups had become clearer, better reflecting socio-economic cleavages behind different political orientations (Tables 4.5 and 4.6).

A closer look at the ideological profiles of different clusters in terms of which statements they were more or less likely to agree with shows that the differences in the respondents' social or market-oriented views and left-right attitudes were related to their general assessments of the changes in society (Table 4.5). The positively engaged Clusters A, C and D were more liberal, and the critically engaged active B and passive E clusters expressed a stronger social orientation on the issues

Table 4.5. General characteristics of the political participation clusters in 2014

Mean values of the indices (scale 1–5)

	A. Positive activist	B. Critical activist	C. Positive bystander	D. Critical bystander	E. Passive alienated	Total sample
Evaluation of changes	4.05	2.39	3.91	3.54	2.47	3.27
Interest and engagement in politics	3.20	3.26	2.34	2.20	2.19	2.63
Trust in state institutions	3.59	3.14	3.45	2.38	2.62	3.02
Social orientation	1.95	4.31	2.09	1.97	4.47	3.24
Market orientation	2.90	1.18	2.69	2.70	1.15	1.94
Civic participation	4.12	4.02	1.95	2.19	1.80	2.77

Based on Lauristin, 2017: 187

Table 4.6. Support for social vs. liberal pro-market statements by political participation cluster in 2014

% of cluster

	A. Positive activist	B. Critical activist	C. Positive bystander	D. Critical bystander	E. Passive alienated	Total sample
L. ‘Individual well-being should depend solely on the efforts of citizens themselves. ‘	74	10	68	64	5	37
S. ‘The state should help the more vulnerable to cope.’	17	87	22	18	91	55
L. ‘The market can properly regulate itself without state intervention.’	42	5	38	34	5	21
S. ‘The market should be regulated by the state to serve public interests.’	29	79	30	28	80	55
L. ‘Rapid privatisation and open market have been beneficial to Estonia.’	60	30	50	23	16	34
S. ‘Rapid privatisation and open market have been bad for Estonia.’	11	34	14	27	39	27

L – liberal pro-market statement, S – social statement.

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 189

of social justice and market regulation. In general, we can state that the level of pro-social views regarding the Estonian political field had increased by 2014 due to the evolving left-right opposition between the two active Clusters A and B. Even the previously disaffected and politically passive Cluster E had become slightly more active, while retaining their pronounced preference for leftist ideas and critical opinion of the Estonian state (see Table 4.6).

Besides dealing with the left-right distinction, the survey in 2014 also included questions about the evaluation of the Soviet past. Answers to these questions

Table 4.7. Agreement with statements regarding the Soviet era by political participation cluster in 2014

% of cluster

	A. Positive activist	B. Critical activist	C. Positive bystander	D. Critical bystander	E. Passive alienated	Total sample
'There was nothing good in the Soviet era to be nostalgic about.' – **Disagree**	39	64	38	63	84	57
'In the Soviet era, people were more caring and more honest with each other.' – **Agree**	36	55	40	59	72	55
'In the Soviet era, life was more secure.' – **Agree**	25	51	38	64	71	52
'In the Soviet era, an average income allowed for a higher level of material well-being.' – **Agree**	26	43	34	63	54	48

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 189

revealed certain parallels between the assessments of the past and attitudes concerning the current conditions in society. Clusters B and E, which were characterised by more critical attitudes toward ongoing changes in the modern Estonian state, viewed life in the Soviet era in much more positive terms than did Clusters A and C, which expressed more positive attitudes concerning the present and future of Estonia (see Table 4.7).

The results of the 2014 survey indicated certain changes in the social background of the clusters (Table 4.8). Compared to the results in 2002, the composition of the active and critical Cluster B was even more dominated by women (63%). At the same time, there was no longer in this cluster a higher than average share of Russian-speaking respondents, as in 2002. The overall number of members of Cluster B had dropped; as a result, there was a visible increase in this cluster in the share of critical and more social-oriented Estonians. Among the Russian-speaking respondents, especially the younger ones, the negative opinions concerning the effects of the radical neoliberal reforms had softened. The social status and political sympathies of the critical Cluster B had become more similar both in composition and in party preferences to the positive active Cluster A, which in 2002 represented only those members of society who held leading positions in the political and economic fields. The leading Cluster A, meanwhile, had by 2014 undergone a slight shift toward a more social orientation. The overall shift toward 'soft' values may have been caused by an increase in the proportion of women in the active Clusters A and B. At the same time, it seems that among the more advanced part of the

Table 4.8. Socio-demographic profile of the political participation clusters in 2014
% of cluster

Language	A. Positive activist	B. Critical activist	C. Positive bystander	D. Critical bystander	E. Passive alienated	Total sample
Estonian	91	78	73	62	48	68
Russian	9	22	27	38	52	32
Gender						
Male	45	37	56	54	48	47
Female	55	63	44	46	52	53
Age						
15–29	29	20	40	22	15	24
30–44	22	16	19	21	13	17
45–54	18	18	14	17	16	17
55–64	14	19	11	18	21	17
65–79	16	26	14	22	35	25
Education						
Primary	10	10	21	21	24	18
Secondary	47	48	52	58	59	53
Higher	43	42	27	21	16	29
Income						
Below average	13	12	15	25	20	17
Average	26	32	33	43	49	37
Above average	58	54	49	32	28	43
Social stratum						
Low	6	9	8	25	33	17
Lower middle	12	17	16	21	24	18
Middle	26	32	24	29	21	26
Upper middle	30	22	26	12	14	21
Upper	25	19	26	12	8	17

Based on Lauristin, 2017: 190

integrated Russian-speakers the influence of the liberal world-view had grown in parallel with their more active mobility in Western countries (see Chapter 8). Some of them preferred the moderate liberal Cluster D to the critical active Cluster B, demonstrating a slight shift in the ideological orientation of the Russian minority from the left to the right. However, Russian-speakers formed again, as in 2002, the majority in the most passive and disaffected Cluster E, which had maintained its highly socialist and negative views.

Table 4.9. Support for political parties in the political participation clusters in 2014

% of cluster, the first choice

	A. Positive activist	B. Critical activist	C. Positive bystander	D. Critical bystander	E Passive alienated	Total sample
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (conservative)	21	10	9	4	4	9
Centre Party (centre-left populist)	7	22	15	31	41	25
Conservative People's Party (conservative national populist)	3	3	2	2	2	2
Reform Party (neoliberal)	26	11	18	7	5	12
Social Democratic Party (centre left)	17	22	12	7	7	13
No party is close to my views	10	13	13	18	15	14
No interest, not familiar with the views of these parties	12	15	25	28	23	21

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 191

Table 4.10. Political participation by language group in 2002 and 2014

% of group

	A. Positive activist		B. Critical activist		C. Positive bystander		D. Critical bystander		E. Passive alienated	
Language	**2002**	**2014**	**2002**	**2014**	**2002**	**2014**	**2002**	**2014**	**2002**	**2014**
Estonian	33	23	17	26	17	20	16	11	16	20
Russian	6	5	20	15	17	16	14	17	43	48
Total sample	25	17	18	22	17	19	15	13	25	29

The party identifications of the clusters had shifted slightly to the left, shown by increased support for the Social Democratic Party among the active Clusters A and B and the dominance of the Centre Party in Clusters D and E (Table 4.9).

Clusters A and B, which included the most active respondents in the 2014 data, were much more ideologically polarised than in 2002, demonstrating disagreement on the left-right axis between the two elite groups in Estonian society as a part of the cultural interactions in the third cycle of the morphogenetic transformation (Table 4.9).

In 2014 polarisation based on the level of participation in Estonian public life also became more clearly visible among the Russian-speaking respondents: the share of the most passive cluster had risen from 43% in 2002 to 48% in 2014 (Table 4.10). At the same time, the presence of the Russian-speakers had increased among the critical bystanders (Cluster D). In 2002, they were mostly in the passive Cluster E.

Figure 4.8. Political participation by citizenship and ethnic background in 2014

% of group



Internal differentiation by the type of political engagement in the Russian-speaking minority was strongly linked to citizenship. When we compared in 2014 the share of politically active clusters among ethnic Estonians not with the whole Russian-speaking population, but with the Russian-speakers having non-Estonian citizenship (Figure 4.8), even though the share of politically disaffected people remained almost two times higher among the Russian-speaking citizens of Estonia (36%) compared to the ethnic Estonians (20%), it was three times higher among the non-citizens of Estonia (61%). At the same time, the citizens of Russian background fell more often than non-citizens into the active and moderate clusters, especially critical activists (Cluster B: 20%) and positive bystanders (Cluster C: 24%).

A new situation in the political field, as well as in the entire society, was emerging with the rise of the young generation, born and educated in a free and democratic society. Their forms of political participation will form the future Estonian political life (see Chapter 9). A significant number of the younger generation (represented by respondents 15–29 years of age in our surveys) were actively engaged in social media, but were relatively indifferent towards the political actions of the power-holders and ideological disputes. They were also not involved in traditional forms of politics, having very low trust in the state and the existing parties (Kalmus et al., 2018). The share of the younger generation in the 2002 survey was the highest in Cluster C of positive bystanders (52%) and in Cluster D of critical bystanders (43%), which both had low levels of interest in politics, being active in non-political virtual reality. In 2014 there was an increase in political engagement among the younger respondents, who now comprised 29% of the positively active Cluster A. But the biggest share (40%) of the young people were still in Cluster C of loyal bystanders.

Figure 4.9. Political participation by age group in 2002 and 2014

% of group



However, compared to the situation in 2002, when the youngest groups were mainly among the bystanders, whereas the older groups were among the loyal and critical active clusters, the situation in 2014 looked rather more balanced: both active clusters were populated by all age groups more equally (Figure 4.9).

When a centre-right coalition representing Cluster A once again rose to power after the 2015 parliamentary elections, this did not change the negative sentiments of the young people concerning participation in 'mainstream politics'. Their motivation for participation started to change in the latest cycle of development of the Estonian society, with the rise of conservative populism in 2018 (see Chapter 2).

4.4.3. Changes in the political field launching the fourth morphogenetic cycle

Quite unexpectedly for the liberal political forces, the 2019 elections produced a significant shift towards national conservatism, resulting in the formation of a populist coalition under the leadership of the Centre Party, sharing power with national conservatives and right-wing populists (as described in Chapter 2).

Table 4.11. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Estonian state by ethnicity, education and party preference in 2019

% of group

Ethnicity	**'Very good' + 'good'**
Ethnic Estonians	37
Russian-speaking minority	52
Education	
Primary	47
Secondary	36
Higher	31
Supporters of parties	
Centre Party (centre-left)	68
Conservative People's Party (conservative national)	82
Pro Patria (centre-right)	48
Social Democratic Party (centre-left)	34
Reform Party (neoliberal)	24

Source: Kantar Emor, national poll, December 2019

The propaganda of the right-wing populists managed to attract some angry groups, who felt deprived and neglected materially or psychologically by the neoliberal politics. It is obvious that the conservative nationalist discourses found sympathisers among the critical active Cluster B, and also in the other critical Clusters D and E. Among them were underpaid farmers and workers, depressed unemployed people, forgotten-by-the-state inhabitants in remote regions, some disappointed intellectuals and some protest-minded youngsters, seeking 'fun' in actions against the establishment. During the elections of 2019 many of these young activists started to participate in social media campaigns, creating and spreading videos and memes depicting liberal politicians as 'Eurocrats' who threatened family values and national culture.

One might expect that this conservative turn would contribute to even more pronounced morphostasis or even morphonecrosis, leading to the rejection of cultural diversity and tolerance. However, the presence of conservative populists in the governmental coalition demonstrated a paradoxical morphogenetic effect. The survey data collected in December 2019 (Kund, 2019) surprisingly showed that the assessment of the state's performance had improved among ethnic minority members and less educated people (Table 4.11).

It is remarkable that the previously most critical groups, the 'losers', gave higher marks to the government. Looking at these data, it is clear that these structural changes in public opinion took place due to the changed subjective positions of the previously neglected groups in the Estonian political field. The national populists were successful in mobilising popular support by giving more 'voice' to the passive Cluster E and they obviously also managed to engage some of the younger 'critical bystanders' from Cluster D. At the same time, the majority of the younger generation, who did not support right-wing populism, were activated and became organisers of protest initiatives and social media networks against the national conservatives, who they felt threatened the freedoms and rights of young people.

4.5. FINAL REMARKS

This chapter has presented an outline of the social sub-currents of the Estonian political landscape based on an analysis of the results of two waves of the MeeMa survey. Our goal was to demonstrate the influence of the deep structures of political agency on the development of the political field. Broadly speaking, the results of our cluster analysis rather convincingly showed that the processes taking place in Estonian politics are not an accidental by-product of political campaigns or the influence of the media; instead, they represent much deeper processes of structuration in the society itself, and the development of political agency in various social groups. The analysis showed that in spite of fluctuations in public opinion and the volatility of election results, the Estonian political field has been characterised by a rather clear pattern of political agency that we chose to describe using the three-dimensional model based on the axes of activity-passivity, loyalty-criticism and liberal-social orientation outlined at the beginning of this chapter. After we completed the model with descriptions of the preferences of potential voters regarding the actions of various political agents and parties, this model proved highly suitable for the description of changes in the political field, when we compared the results of the surveys in 2002 and 2014 (Figure 4.10).

Comparing the profiles of political participation in the second and third morphogenetic cycles of Estonian post-Soviet transformation (Figure 4.10), we can see that in 2002 the people who expected more social responsibility from the restored Estonian state were hopeful and joined the positive types of active or moderate participation (Clusters A and C), whereas the strongly pro-market groups were less satisfied with the results and pace of market liberalisation, joining the moderate critical Cluster D. The most socially oriented Cluster E was in a marginalised position, not having support from active groups. In 2014 the situation changed: the two most active types of political participation, A and B, formed antagonistic agencies divided by left-right positions; the pro-social orientation had become very critical

Figure 4.10. General characteristics of the political participation clusters in 2002 and 2014

Mean values of the indices (scale 1–5)



Source: authors' calculations, based on the 'Me. The World. The Media' surveys and formed a strong oppositional agency, including members of the disaffected Cluster E. One of the main reasons for the increased political disaffection at the end of the third cycle was the long domination of the neoliberal trends in Estonian politics, enshrined by the support of Cluster A, which represented the more successful members of the society. By 2014, a notable change had occurred in the professional and ethnic backgrounds of the active and critical Cluster B, representing the critical social tendency. The composition of Cluster B became more similar to the positive active Cluster A, which previously was the only cluster that represented those of higher social status, who held leading positions in the political and economic fields. The ideologically opposing active clusters of political agency, A and B, both gained leading positions in the redistribution of political and material capital. They were relatively evenly matched in terms of influence in the political field. The lasting relatively equal influence of the two active Clusters A and B, representing the liberal pro-market agency and the critical pro-social agency, created democratic competition between the classic left- and right-wing political agendas, which in turn could have facilitated a normal rotation of right- and left-wing politics (Grzymala-Busse, 2007). Instead, for a long time the Centre Party, representing 'the losers', was kept out of government coalitions for 'security reasons'. The Social Democratic Party participated in centre-left coalitions with the Reform Party and Pro Patria Union in the role of a junior partner and managed to implement some reforms in social insurance and child protection, but these were insufficient to produce a shift in the general neoliberal course. A balance between economic (monetary) and social priorities in Estonian development was not maintained, and the dominance of the narrow track of neoliberal options was perceived as the only possible path of Estonian political development. The long-term domination of extremely optimistic market liberalism was supported by the positive international feedback to the Estonian 'success story', which was used by the right-wing parties to legitimate their political monopoly and avoidance of pro-social reforms (see Lagerspetz & Vogt, 2013; Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2009).

The long-lasting political stalemate has contributed to alienation among a large part of the electorate, those belonging to the 'bystanders' or 'alienated' clusters. This situation was one of the main reasons for the national conservative rise in the Estonian political field described in Chapter 2. This corresponds well with the notion of the 'hollow democracy', used to explain the 'democratic backslide' in the Central and Eastern European countries (Cianetti et al., 2018). However, the conservative turn in Estonia has not produced the predicted morphostatic effect. To the contrary, the aggressive attacks of national populists against minorities, migrants, intellectuals and 'liberal tolerasts', which continued even after their representatives had entered the governing coalition, have evoked protests among democratic activists and have started to mobilise previously politically indifferent young people from Clusters C and D, the 'political bystanders'. As a result, there was a re-activation of democratic values and the emergence of more diversity in the Estonian political field. This unexpected 'compound of contingencies' has launched a new cycle of cultural and social interactions in the new political and technological environment, which hopefully will instigate further morphogenetic changes in Estonian society.

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CHAPTER 5.
LIFESTYLE AS A SHAPER OF SOCIETY

Maie Kiisel

Many authors have discussed the possible role of social structure and individual will in social change. This chapter presents an overview of the theoretical approaches to how the distinctive way of life of the individual affects social structure and, vice versa, how the prescriptions and non-prescriptions of structure affect the actions of the individual. Theoretical conclusions will be considered using 'Me. The World. The Media' survey data, making it possible to determine the role of individual lifestyle in social change and acceleration.

5.1. THE ROLE OF LIFESTYLE IN INTEGRATING AND RESTRUCTURING SOCIETY

5.1.1. Lifestyle theories

According to Giddens, the individuals are not free agents who only follow personal will, but agents shaped by the conditions of social structure. At the same time, social structure does not transcend individual choice. The fabric of society, which, according to Giddens, is structured by the tangible action of social agents themselves, thus both limits and enables the existence of individual free will. His theory is thus termed 'dualistic': individual actions and social structure mutually affect each other.

Even the most inadvertent human actions (such as oversleeping) are meaningful, if for no other reason than that they rule out some other activity (such as participation in a morning meeting on the allocation of tasks for the coming week) due to related time and resource use. If, however, individuals either manage to eliminate some social action (e.g. sending birthday cards) along with its rules and resources or create another (e.g. e-shopping), this will have an impact on not only the life choices of a single individual but on the social structure in general (e.g. the disappearance of postmen and the appearance of delivery services).

The participation of a member of a society in social relations through social actions is inevitable. Working, furnishing a home, raising children, and obtaining food and clothing are universal necessities. These tasks can, however, be performed in a variety of ways. People can also participate in activities whose necessity is not strictly regulated by social relations. A person's characteristic pattern of action is called a lifestyle. Weber, who introduced this concept (*Lebensführung*) to social theory, primarily understood it as a way of controlling one's life through the possibilities and conditions of one's social position (Abel & Cockerham, 1993). One of the most influential lifestyle theoreticians is Bourdieu, whose *Distinction* (1984) has inspired many researchers of stratification. Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* as embodied mental structures reproducing the social order is, however, relatively static, as it provides no explanation as to why a person would want to convert different forms of capital or why power relations should be so crucial in everyday actions. The lifestyle theories of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) and Giddens (1991) are much more dynamic as, from their perspective, individuals' lifestyle explorations lead to constant minuscule changes in the social structure that eventually give rise to bigger changes. From the perspective of these authors, lifestyle is not so much related to class properties and social position as to the inevitable side effects of human action, putting more emphasis on horizontal differentiation and the equalising effect of lifestyle building.

Even though the concept of lifestyle has an important place in social studies, a closer look at research databases shows that the term itself is generally left undefined. 'Lifestyle' as a term is commonly used in studies of stratification (as a categorising concept, a measure of inequality, etc.), as well as in analyses seeking to model '(un)healthy' lifestyles. The focus is clearly on the individual: lifestyle as a personal attribute and personal choice.[1] Lifestyle-based stratification as a force transforming social structure is rarely studied in empirical analyses. Sobel (1981: 16)[2] and Spaargaren and Van Vliet (2000: 55)[3] caution against the reduction of lifestyle to a behavioural phenomenon, as the resulting tautology – lifestyle for its own sake – eradicates the rich meaning of the concept in social sciences.

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[1] The Estonian tradition of lifestyle studies tends to be characterised by a more holistic and inclusive view that does not polarise the people under analysis on the basis of a single narrow socially desirable set of habits. Lifestyle theories tend to be more deterministic in nature, allocating the social structure more power over the individual, not vice versa. For instance,

For the stratification analyst Sobel (1981), the key question is the necessity of lifestyle for the individual and society. According to Sobel, individuals shape their lifestyle based on the reference sets currently available to them as a consequence of their social positions. Shopping practices are a clear expression of reference sets: the skills and possibilities of acting as a consumer are relatively accessible to everyone, as a result of which it is rather natural that solutions for many problems (the resolution of ecological problems, promoting economic growth, etc.) are sought in consumption. According to Sobel (1981: 51), individuals occupy specific positions in the social structure, which are associated with specific roles and expectations. Fulfilling these expectations enables individuals to enact their expected roles. Unfortunately, the more complex the society, the more positions the individual must be aware of. Growing differentiation in available positions also means an increase in the number of choices available in the market of roles and positions; the social structure is also made more complex by individual deviations in human action. Sobel finds that individual deviations or lifestyles help reduce social chaos that would otherwise arise if the complex expectations of society were not materialised in concrete role models.

Archer's concept of life-project (2003), Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's concept of individualisation (2002) and Giddens's concept of lifestyle (1991) also express the optional nature of the motivation and implementation of an individual way of life. Giddens's concept of lifestyle involves both reflexivity and practices of living that the individual uses to organise endeavours into cohesive, although continuously updated, life plans in a situation of the multiplicity of choices. Lifestyle organises the individual's practices of living, filtering information from increasingly mediated

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in *Our changing way of life* (Hion, Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1988), 'way of life' is understood as a system of persistent forms of everyday behaviour of individuals (including mentality) shaped by economic and social developments, as well as cultural traditions, foreign contacts, etc. The focus is on more general changes in society universal to the majority of individuals, not just the result of their individual choices.

[2] Sobel's conception of 'lifestyle' is based on Weber, Merton and Mead.

[3] The work of Spaargaren and Van Vliet is somewhat exceptional, due to its reliance on Giddens.

experiences: the media, expert systems, etc. This allows the person to create an individual trust landscape that enables them to confirm the correctness and safety of their choices. At the same time, lifestyle does not eliminate standardising social factors (e.g. commodification and the educational system). The lifestyle theory of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim is similar to Giddens's approach, but somewhat more deterministic. From their perspective, the individualisation of lifestyle is not simply a result of the natural development of the individual's reflexive living practices, but also a compulsion enforced by late-modern institutions, placing the responsibility for choices accompanying the disruption of traditional bonds (including body, genes, nationality, kinship, work and family relationships) on the individual, ignoring the fact that different individuals are in unequal positions in terms of making such choices. Individualisation has become institutionalised: the individual is standardised to meet the needs of rational social organisation. Archer's theory gives the individual more autonomy in choices than Giddens's or Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's does. Archer associates personal ability to make individual choices with childhood experience: the individual tends to apply the model of social action (a form of reflexivity) acquired in childhood later in life. This model of communication and social action based on the characteristics of internal conversation determines the level of persistence, independence and enterprise the individual is able to maintain in the development of life-projects.

5.1.2. Lifestyle and social structure

Studies defining a person's lifestyle as a consequence of personal traits and desired/undesired habits make possible the normative categorisation of people (e.g. a category of people with socially undesirable habits), associating the causes of their lifestyle with their personal characteristics (e.g. income, education and nationality), rather than the way the person is 'embedded' or integrated into the social structure. Indeed, Weber and Bourdieu associate the possibilities of the stylisation of life with socio-economic status. Keller and Robert (2011), Sobel (1981), as well as Beck and Giddens, find that, in the development of a lifestyle, institutional components, such as family life, work and economic opportunities, can no longer be separated from those that are individually chosen. Giddens and Beck also see lifestyle as a component that directly restructures society. For Giddens (1984/1989), such choices are not necessarily conscious. Through reflexive observation and bodily practices, the agent reproduces the structure, while the small adaptations they constantly make in the rules and resources shaping society also initiate changes for other agents. Thus, when making a purchase at a store, shoppers surrender some of their income. The purchases they make confirm that they are satisfied with the rules used for pricing the products. On the basis of repeated purchase operations, the seller of the products can conclude that selling such goods is worthwhile and extend the contract with the manufacturer (i.e. the rule) for ordering a certain amount of the products for sale (i.e. the resource). Through the repetition of this action, the agents will reinforce both their mutual expectations (i.e. why action is always social, integrating the parties) as well as the social structure intertwined with consumption. If the seller notices that the purchases of certain goods have gone down, they will reduce the amount they order from the manufacturer, thus also reducing the supply chain. According to Giddens, micro-changes arising from the repetition of a certain pattern of action or from the disruption of it are thus central factors restructuring society.

Archer (2012: 3), however, finds the reflexive modernisation theory of Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) unsatisfactory and she contests the claim that the mainstreaming of private lifestyle choices as a social phenomenon also leads to fluidity of social structure, up to the point where 'a lack of social structures [---] establishes itself as the basic feature of the social structure' (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 51). Archer's theory of social morphogenesis argues that the structure does not disappear; it just starts changing at an accelerated pace. Meanwhile, according to Archer (2013), the main factor in structural change is neither the structure nor the agent, but the processes that enable different structures at both the micro and macro levels to be impacted by each other in increasingly more unexpected ways. At the same time, such impacts (e.g. the scope and mechanisms of a banking crisis) are practically undetectable in empirical terms due to temporal shifts and their evolutionary nature. The individual's choices as a consumer may thus result not so much from gradual 'stylistic' experiments in retailing but a process combining increasingly aggressive interactions from financial markets (e.g. investments in the retail network), politics (e.g. higher agricultural subsidies paid in Central than in Eastern Europe), ecological processes (e.g. the spread of plant diseases caused by mono-agriculture), and mediatisation (e.g. spotlighting the risks of consumption). No single individual is capable of shaping these developments; they find them already present. Hence, while structure and agent are interconnected in Archer's conception, she still proposes relatively autonomous roles for both.

However, Archer, too, finds that exposure to structural incongruities arising from the acceleration of social change forces individuals into internal self-criticism, as a result of which they either create or adapt their personal life-projects to fit the given circumstances. But are all people equally capable of 'founding' and maintaining a lifestyle? Coming from the psychological tradition, Waters (2006) shows that all living creatures possess an inherent inclination to engage in processes of self-change. This facilitates the transformation of an idea of lifestyle into behaviour. The inclination to self-change encourages self-confidence and taking responsibility, participating in meaning-making, and socialising with lifestyle communities. Similarly to Waters, Giddens (1991) disagrees with the idea that people who find themselves in less equal positions in terms of capital or some other measure cannot afford self-actualisation. Since modernisation tends to produce exclusion through differentiation, we could also talk about lifestyle formation in a situation of suppression. Unfortunately, it can also lead to bitterness and even to the renunciation of socially approved principles of action.

Unlike Giddens and Beck, Archer (2012) finds that although the accelerating transformation of social structure leads certain individuals to critical self-analysis, supporting them in the discovery of new appropriate courses of action (calling such individuals 'meta-reflexives'), this type of reflexivity is still just the dominant manner of conceptualising social life; there are several others that either disregard 'structural incongruity' or are unable to relate to this incongruity in the choice of a course of action. According to Archer (2003), the agency of the individual is directly based on internal conversations, resulting in not recognising the factors in her theory that do not receive attention in internal conversation. Even an individual who is not very reflexive in internal conversations can still appear very successful in making unprescribed choices. Sobel, for example, states that a lifestyle exists regardless of whether there has been striving for one, even in the case of a lack of stylistic cohesion. In other words, the impact of actions on social structure can be notable, even if the actions are not intentional or the impact is not the person's motive for acting.

The reliance of people on existing, even if unacknowledged social positions fulfilling the prescriptions of which can facilitate lifestyle formation, can be considered one factor affecting individual choices. Calhoun (2003) and Sobel (1981: 53) emphasise that people in similar social positions tend to communicate with each other more often, as they are better equipped to understand each other. People in similar positions are thus more likely to form a reference group. What does this entail? In addition to meeting the necessary preconditions of a social life, spatial and temporal opportunities must be found for activities affirming the affiliation of the individual with the immediate circle of the reference group. This makes their lives more complex. According to Waters (2006), this requires performing actions supporting the assumed roles within the lifestyle group, following specific rules, performing rituals and maintaining contact with the group. Such activities thus require sufficient time and space, and since individuals are not equal in potential, lifestyles are never uniform or all-inclusive for the entire population. While contacts between different lifestyle groups support learning from each other and the transfer of skills and meanings, these also intensify the time use of the individuals involved. A person who aims to lead several different lifestyles will quickly run into the limits of human abilities and structural limitations: nobody can simultaneously do several things or be in many different places at the same time. I can thus presume that while the social groups outlined in the analysis below may come into contact with each other, they may not always understand each other's intentions. An individual not leading a certain lifestyle cannot be presumed to be capable of fulfilling the prescriptions of this lifestyle, in spite of the fact that they may have more free time.

5.1.3. Lifestyle as personal and social change

Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) stress that individualisation is what forces people into action, as action is what enables the individual to confirm that the incongruencies they have experienced can be overcome and their goals can be achieved (e.g. purchasing ecological products as a confirmation of personal eco-identity). The ability to keep oneself occupied is also vital for coping with social change. Giddens (1984/1989: 61–62) and Sztompka (2000), the latter in his study of the Eastern European post-transformational trauma, stress that when established practices of action suddenly become inappropriate, e.g. due to their structural disruption, this can lead to dramatic change in an individual's psychological ability to control their life. Involvement in action enables the individual to perceive changes as opportunities, rather than dangers. It can thus be presumed that the individual also allows new lifestyle practices to enthral them unconsciously due to the fact that this increases their self-confidence and provides control over the 'structural incongruity' perceived in the increasingly complex society.

Research carried out by Kask (2015) showed that after achieving a certain level of mastery a person's conscious attention to their chosen lifestyle may decrease. The attention is then often transferred to another related lifestyle due to mental hunger or emptiness (Giddens calls it a compulsion). Someone with an established life-project is thus also more disposed to respond to all those well-meaning recommendations that have been deprived of specific recipients in the confusion of lifestyles. Thus, if lifestyle groups have developed specific rules defining their lifestyles (how to make financial choices, how to keep pets, etc.), these rules will gradually also be transferred to other, mainly similar lifestyle groups, as well as policies shaping the standards of action of groups outside this lifestyle. Even people not subscribing to the particular lifestyle will thus be required to either allocate more time at the expense of something else or, vice versa, free up time. If no concessions are made in social expectations to the pace of change, this will result in an increase in the density of both social time and social structure. Lifestyle developments establishing new rules in society in general thus underpin the same factors that Rosa (2003) interprets as the processes promoting the acceleration of modernity: individualisation, differentiation, rationalisation, and the 'domestication' of identified indeterminacies. Archer (2012) and Rosa (2003: 21) both acknowledge, however, that accelerating processes of creation or transformation of structures can still be supplemented by processes that slow down change or maintain morphostasis. Morphogenetic processes, i.e. those accelerating structural change, may not necessarily be characterised by increased complexity. People occupying different social positions and participating in different changes may also not perceive the acceleration of time and increase in structural complexity in similar manners or be able to keep up with the changes at the same pace.

5.1.4. Application of lifestyle theories

Various contradictions concerning the ability of social relations arising from individuals' practices of living to change social structure have been discussed above. These include the question of whether changes in social structure occur due to organic changes in the lives of individuals or if structure develops relatively autonomously of individual choices; whether lifestyle is a conscious individual action or it 'happens' regardless of how it turns out (e.g. as a result of the person's social position); whether a lifestyle is expressed only in specific individualised actions or also in general institutionalised activities (such as family and working life); whether the adoption and development of a lifestyle is a universal or an elitist ability; and whether unprescribed choices increase or decrease social equality. The discussion above also raised the question of whether lifestyle practices increasing the intensity of social life increase the complexity and/or pace of society and how people of different structural positions experience and reflect the related changes.

Answering these questions requires constructing a model making it possible to understand the individual's dilemmas in experiencing change. Individual choices between change-resistant and transformative actions are required both in situations where change arises from the individual's personal micro-experiments where one action will organically lead to another, as well as in cases where the individual is

Figure 5.1. Temporal and spatial pressure to reconcile change-resistant and transformative actions


Availability of change-resistant ideologies and institutions
Adaptation
Saturation point – the need to abandon action that has become socially reduntant
Autonomy
Availability of choices for transformational action

Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 373

forced into having to make choices by forces of attraction and repulsion arising from incidental contacts between global structures (e.g. the use of ICT). This is illustrated in Figure 5.1. When perceiving the necessity or possibility of change, individuals are required to make a long-term choice between actions (as structural elements) that form a coherent whole from their perspective. More specifically, each action requires resources, skills, a supporting structure and, above all, time, which will eventually run out even in the case of successful reconciliation. The individual may find it easier to choose either the path of adapting to the structurally predetermined situation or the path of autonomous choices, rather than attempting to simultaneously endeavour to fulfil both ambitions. That would increase time pressure. Operating between morphostatic (structurally resistant to change) and morphogenetic (structurally transformative) processes, the individual thus always experiences the need to make choices regarding action. Meanwhile, institutionalised structures can also force irreconcilable demands upon some individuals, such as requiring them to take responsibility for their careers while simultaneously taking care of their loved ones.

Figure 5.2. Role of temporal-spatial excessive pressure on individual actions in the development of transformative and change-resistant processes


The number of new activities corresponding time use
Saturation point
Abandonment of activities (change-resistant or transformational)
Density of action in time and space
3rd wave of lifestyle institutionalisation
2nd wave of lifestyle institutionalisation
1st wave of lifestyle institutionalisation
Availability of choices for transformational action

Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 375

The burden of choice can thus also be experienced by individuals unable to make individual choices due to the lack of personal need, (time) resources or skills.

At some point, the tensions between the incompatible institutional prescriptions result in an excess of pressure that forces the individual to abandon deference to an institutionalised or optional action (see Figure 5.2). However, even a voluntary practice cannot become sustainable if it is not enforced in the social structure (if there are no followers, consumers, etc.). The development of institutions (i.e. a new morphostatic stratum) is thus also programmed into the process of structural transformation. On the one hand, this makes it easier to follow a specific lifestyle, as the burden of individual trial and error is decreased (i.e. the density of the time-space of actions is reduced); on the other hand, institutionalisation reduces the individual's subsequent possibilities of abandoning the chosen 'style' (see Figure 5.2 for an illustration of the development of the institutionalisation of lifestyle), as it is easier to continue treading the beaten path. Institutionalisation reduces the need to develop incidental social relations that would otherwise be used if structural changes knocked one off one's feet. Accordingly, while going off the path of institutionalised development increases the pressure on the individual's temporal and spatial resources, non-essential actions can facilitate the preservation of available options in times of major changes.

A new process of structural transformation is initiated when there is insufficient space left for any optional practices available besides institutionalised practices of action due to their increased temporal and spatial density.

The new cycle of structural transformation can be reflected in individual behaviour both as conforming to the established structural conditions and as abandoning the observation of established conditions. It depends on the individual's resources and social position as to which of these two processes the individual finds easier to be guided by at a given time. In the late-modern society, where social structures are tightly integrated within each other, the temporal-spatial pressure of morphostatic structures can also be presumed to increase gradually due to the constant increase in the number of social institutions shaping social demands.

Lifestyle theorists have not focussed sufficient attention on the fact that the human life course can limit individual choices (both when young and old). Unless a young person is affiliated with an institutionalised system, such as a school, if they lack access to appropriate resources and unless they are able to utilise their skills or interests, their lifestyle cannot develop. Youth lifestyle experiments may thus simply be a product of the individual's social position and structural confusion. The style developed as a result of these experiments can only be identified *ex post facto* when past lessons have started to guide new behaviour and the connections between them become visible to the observer. The incompleteness of a young person's lifestyle can also become an advantage: they can make creative use of institutionally established structures and currently emerging institutions (e.g. by making money through a hobby or using their wits to make do at a low standard of living).

In the course of social changes, an individual's social position can shift as a result of individual, structural or temporal-spatial factors, as well as factors related to structural processes. The kinds of reflexive and bonding social action the individual participates in and the way these combine in a lifestyle can also predict the characteristics of the social relations linking the individual to the social structure. How the person feels as a part of these relations and how acting within these relations supports or hinders their freedom of choice or self-realisation is a different matter. It is thus necessary to measure the density of the relations or networks resulting from these more or less individual actions and connect the results to data in order to understand how fast or slow, simple or complex, or closed or open the social structure is for a given individual.

5.2. METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSING INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL ACTION

The lengthy tradition of lifestyle research has been analysed in depth by Sobel based on the American context. Sobel (1981: IX) notes that lifestyle can be defined as a distinctive and thus identifiable way of living. Lifestyle can be measured through observable and distinctive activities. Sobel's (1981) analysis showed that the analysis of the individual's consumption habits produces clearer results than other means of lifestyle analysis, as consumption demonstrates the ability to identify and follow individualised social position guidelines. Thus, whereas work as a status component is regulated by numerous restrictions and rules, consumption is much less determined, although it is limited by the individual's personal needs and opportunities and structurally regulated by market supply. Modern theories of consumption based on Giddens regard it as a recurrent thread found in everyday practices (Warde, 2014), participation in which becomes an indicator of social competence. At the same time, indicators of consumption have their limitations, as social structure is also shaped by actions unrelated to consumption. In the present analysis, I will extend the focus from acquiring goods and securing services to everyday actions, such as those that create and establish social structures (as a rule, in combination with consumption, technology, social relations, space, etc.).

To analyse the changes taking place in the diversity and intensity of involvement in social action, I have defined a number of types of actions that create social relations. For each of these actions, I have created an index variable consisting of several survey questions in order to ensure comparability over different surveys. The indices represent classical subjects of analysis for social theory, such as the market (consumer society), state (political participation), and citizen (civil society and cultural participation). These are supplemented by an index variable representing individuals' social actions in the private sphere that connect them to other people outside kinship relations (i.e. social life). The sixth variable covers human actions in nature. This variable is based on the theoretical assumption that modernisation should be accompanied by growing differentiation between nature and society. The general characteristics of the index variables are described in Table 5.1.

The period between 2002 and 2014 saw an increase in the social activity of people (e.g. social relations, cultural participation and consumerism) connected with consumption: more commoditised components were integrated into social relations. Participation in non-governmental organisations also saw a significant increase (in 2002, the related index had no value in 71% of respondents; by 2014, this number had decreased to 42%). In recent years, the diversity and activity of participation

Table 5.1. Index variables used for the analysis of involvement in social action in 2002–2014

Index variables	**Number of initial variables**	**Maximum possible and maximum actual score**	**Lack of variable, non-participation** (% of respondents in 2014)
Social life (how active is the person's participation in activities that create and maintain relationships with friends and acquaintances)	3	6/6	10
Consumerism (how active is the person in shaping their home, body and appearance)	8	8/8	27
Participation in civic organisations (participation in NGOs from different fields)	20	20/14	42
Nature practices (how actively the person spends time in nature and works in a garden)	2	4/4	18
Participation in elections (how often the person has voted in recent years)	3	6/6	26
Cultural participation (how actively the person visits cultural institutions, reads books and participates in cultural activities)	7	12/12	12

Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 377

in non-governmental organisations has remained steady or even tapered off a bit: this is probably caused by the transformations in civic society itself. Participation in elections, not in itself an optional action (being an entitled duty), did not change over time over the entire sample. Participation in nature-related practices decreased (Kiisel, 2013): the percentage of people stating that they frequently or sometimes spent time in nature decreased by about 1% per year beginning in 1983.

The six action-focused index variables were included in a cluster analysis (k-means method) to provide an overview of respondent groups with similar involvement in social action. Cluster analysis is characterised by a focus on extremes, highlighting those among whom the representation of all variables is low and those among whom the same properties are very high. The same took place in this analysis. The analysis showed that involvement in reflexive and individualised practices was inherent in a single, relatively well-off segment of the population. Activity in several reflexive actions was a relatively good indicator of activity in all others. The index of participation in elections had a significant effect on the dynamics of the clusters. Without adding this component and relying solely on individualised components, the analysis tended to produce an extremely large cluster (roughly half of the respondents), where the mean values of different action indices of the respondents all remained very low. The index variable of participation in elections allowed me

Figure 5.3. General characteristics of the clusters of involvement in social action in 2002–2014

Mean values of the cluster components on a relative scale, where the highest value for each variable = 1. See Appendix 5.1 for values



DIVERSE AND STRONG INVOLVEMENT

DIVERSE AND MODERATE INVOLVEMENT



Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 378–379 to demonstrate how a passive, relatively weakly individualised lifestyle contained a significant subtype of people who were sufficiently well-informed of the state of the society to fulfil their civic duty regardless of their minimal interest in politics and/or lack of lifestyle ambition.

For the analysis, I decided to use a classification into five clusters, identifiable over all five surveys. The five clusters were as follows (for the dynamics of the clusters between 2002 and 2014, see Figure 5.3 and Appendix 5.1):

1. Diverse and strong involvement: the values of the indices of all social actions were high, although the consumerism index was slightly lower than in the third cluster, 'involved through consumption'. This cluster was mainly characterised by extremely diverse and active participation in non-government organisations. Since this variable tended to be very low in other clusters, civic society participation was the indicator variable of the cluster of the strongly involved.

2. Diverse and moderate involvement: basically identical to the previous cluster, with the exception that the index of civic society participation was significantly lower. The values of some other indices as measured in 2014 were actually even slightly higher in the moderately-involved cluster compared to the strongly involved cluster.

3. Involved as a consumer: this cluster showed the highest values in the index of consumerism, accompanied by high social life and cultural participation values, although these still remained below those of the diversely involved groups.

4. Involved as a voter: generally, indicators of involvement were very weak, except for participation in elections, which was equal to the respondents characterised by strong and diverse involvement; the value of the index of nature-related practices was also relatively high.

5. Weak involvement: the representation of all social actions was lower than in other groups.

The first two groups were extremely similar; a comparison of socio-demographic differences over different surveys showed that these groups were also likely to be easily interchangeable between different cohorts (including as a result of life course changes). In the interpretation of results, it was therefore often reasonable to either mentally merge the two groups or consider them to be equivalent (in such cases, reference will be made simply to the groups characterised by diverse involvement in social action).

The cluster analysis carried out in similar terms in all five studies is presented in five figures, each of which illustrates the transformation of one cluster in time (Figure 5.3). The most significant tendency revealed in the figures is the fact that the diversity and activity of social actions only increased in the diversely involved clusters.

5.3. ANALYSIS OF INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL ACTION

5.3.1. Opportunities of socio-demographic groups for lifestyle-based involvement

Involvement in optional activities characterising different socio-demographic groups changed over the 12 years of the study (an overview of the data for 2014 is presented in Table 5.2). Participation in social action was most strongly differentiated by age (the relationship to age became weaker), first language/nationality, and education (both of these relationships became stronger). The correlation with gender (increased over time), income (stable), and social self-positioning (increased over time) were all remarkably weaker. Looking at the socio-demographic structure of different types of involvement in social action, only one group clearly stood out from the others in terms of age: the group of individuals involved as consumers, which was distinguished by an average age 15 years lower than that of other groups. But while age differences between different groups generally tended to become less noticeable over time, other socio-demographic variables displayed a tendency towards increasing polarisation. The share of people belonging to the main ethnic group and possessing higher education was significantly higher in the groups diversely involved in social action. The general level of education, while high in previous surveys, further increased in these groups. The share of women was higher among the diversely involved and increased over the years, meaning that the structure of social actions surrounding women was denser than it was around men. Given that optional activities were fused with consumption, it is natural that average income per household member, the factor enabling this process, was higher among the more strongly involved groups than among the less involved. The income of the more strongly involved groups also began recovering sooner after the economic crisis. Indicators of entrepreneurship and financial wealth were also higher among the more diversely involved. At the same time, the weakly involved groups were characterised by higher levels of such indicators as lack of money and consumption indifference. These groups also did not see any increase in the level of education, while the proportion of people from minority ethnic groups (especially in the older age groups) and men increased.

Table 5.2. Socio-demographic profile of the involvement clusters in 2014
% of cluster

	Diverse and strong involvement	Diverse and moderate involvement	Involved as a consumer	Involved as a voter	Weak involvement
Age					
15–24	10	9	38	4	17
25–34	13	17	20	16	14
35–44	15	10	10	16	10
45–54	24	15	17	18	15
55–64	21	19	8	22	18
65–75	17	29	7	24	26
Survey language					
Estonian	88	76	54	80	50
Russian	12	24	46	20	50
Gender					
Male	33	37	46	50	57
Female	67	63	54	50	43
Education					
Basic, primary	4	5	22	13	30
Secondary	36	47	56	59	58
Higher	60	48	22	27	11
Income					
Very low	3	2	6	6	9
Low	6	7	10	12	15
Average	27	25	30	39	45
High	34	32	28	24	17
Very high	26	29	23	17	10
Social self-positioning					
Lower stratum	9	6	10	18	30
Lower middle stratum	14	15	17	20	22
Middle stratum	27	28	22	26	26
Upper middle stratum	30	24	25	21	12
Upper stratum	19	28	27	14	11

Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 382

A comparison of the overall sample with the younger age group (Table 5.3) showed that the frequent concerns about social coping of the younger generations might in some sense be justified. Only 19% of all young people (and only 10% of Russian-speaking youths) belonged to the group of those diversely involved in social action, while the figure for the overall sample was 27%. The shares of youngsters

Table 5.3. Involvement patterns of same age groups in 2002 and 2014

% of age group

		Diverse and strong involvement	Diverse and moderate involvement	Involved as a consumer	Involved as a voter	Weak involvement
Total sample	2002	6	16	17	29	32
	2014	13	14	16	30	27
Aged 15–29	2002	4	7	40	9	40
	2014	9	10	35	16	30
15–29	2002	4	7	40	9	40
27–41	2014	13	15	17	34	21
30–44	2002	5	19	14	31	32
42–56	2014	17	12	14	32	25
45–59	2002	8	21	7	36	28
57–71	2014	11	17	6	37	29
60–74	2002	6	18	4	48	24
72–75	2014	15	18	7	26	34

Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 388, 389

in the weakly involved group and people involved as consumers were slightly higher than average.

Fortunately, the survey data allow me to analyse what happened to the youngest age group in 12 years. Table 5.3 shows the changes that took place in the social action of the same age groups 12 years later. There were clear indications of changes in involvement related to life course, as well as to structural changes in the society in the transitional period. By 2014, the involvement pattern found in the youngest age group in 2002 had become practically identical to the pattern of the overall sample. Involvement also slightly increased in the 30–44 age group from 2002. Meanwhile, the action patterns of the 45–59 age group had remained practically unchanged 12 years later. Life course changes were thus accompanied by the possibility of different and more varied relations to society, which developed by middle-age and subsequently remained unchanged for a relatively long period of time, after which they began to decline. In addition to life course, the social structure of society began to be affected by the ageing of the population: the number of young people who are inherently less involved in social action got smaller. Involvement in social action also underwent changes in relation to the transformation of social infrastructure. Thus, whereas in 2002 consumerism was primarily characteristic to the younger age groups, who were the first to adopt the consumption of new products and services, the proportion of activities integrated with consumption subsequently also increased in the older age groups as a result of the early consumers getting older, as well as the establishment of a new structure of products and services. Even though the slight shift towards higher involvement over the twelve years of the study[4] (see Table 5.3) might be explained simply by the ageing of the population and transformations in the socio-material structure, it could also be said that the younger generations were born into a society where prescriptions for social action were more diverse and more stringent. The key question is what this will result in.

In youth, involvement in lifestyle activities is limited, as the choices and time-use of the young person are strongly framed by the family, compulsory schooling, material dependence and limitations on their rights. At the same time, in spite of all this or perhaps because of all this, young people are relatively autonomous in their actions, as they are not required to contribute to the development of actions, finding these already in place. Being relatively free of many obligations and financial worries, they are freer to choose activities that they have become conscious of, often as a result of the contributions of the older generations (e.g. studying or volunteering abroad or trying new forms of work). Young people are thus more easily able to embrace changes, initially with less demanding actions, such as consumption. An increase in the number of social relations in the social structure can thus also lead to a decrease in the diversity of action and an increase in autonomy.

5.3.2. Involvement in social action and the agent's ability to relate to changes

PARTICIPATION IN CHANGES. People themselves also participate in social changes as agents of structuration, although not to the same degree. It is more likely that changes in one person's actions can result in another person perceiving changes in their environment of social action. From the chosen theoretical perspective, the perception of external changes encourages people to take action, as this allows them to overcome and manage the anxiety related to changes; and vice versa, action instigates new changes, as it creates new social relations or accelerates time (e.g. by the addition of new tasks). In this way the acceleration of changes in social structure becomes normalised: social life and the use of time and space become denser. Social structure thus not only becomes more fluid or flexible as a result of individualisation, it also becomes more complex and networked. For example, the increasing specificity of work tasks increases the time required to enter the job market, even though professional opportunities are more diverse. This leads to the question of whether changes in one dimension of social relationships can begin to hinder changes in another.

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[4] Cluster analysis divides respondents into groups based on similarities. Producing groups with identical indicators is not possible due to differences between databases.

The empirical analysis showed that lifestyle development was not affected by circumstances involving the person's immediate circle of close acquaintances, such as someone dying or getting married or divorced. Lifestyle changes were instigated by changes in the general context of social action that were perceived to be personal opportunities. The emergence of new jobs, entrepreneurship incentives, addition of new real estate and other structural changes never have a direct effect on anyone, but they can inspire individuals by creating new opportunities for their 'life-projects' (Archer). Life-projects, such as changing positions or fields of work, moving to another area, building a home or even a company, were statistically more common in the more diversely active groups who could better afford distinctive activities while, conversely, becoming more deeply involved through working towards their aims. Respondents diversely involved in social action were better capable of perceiving and utilising external factors and support systems, which may be related to the fact that their social circles were significantly larger. These groups included more people who listened to the recommendations of relevant experts, accounted for information on potential risks, and changed their patterns of living in response to the reorganisation of transport, education and social life, and changes in laws, as well as community initiatives, as a rule while still sticking to their personal principles. The diversely active respondents thus included the largest number of those who Archer terms 'meta-reflexive'. The opportunities or deficiencies perceived in changes inspired respondents to take up the relevant social action (involve the community, spread information, reorganise personal life, etc.). The more passive groups were less likely to notice external factors or perceive them as opportunities, which is why it would be wrong to assume that any form of policy making could result in the spread of the desired practice in different groups.

Table 5.4 shows that the ability to promote a distinctive lifestyle in different fields (e.g. healthy living, political activism, active citizenship, consumption of organic food as a food-focused lifestyle, and workplace leadership: the ability to control one's working life) was concentrated in the group of diversely involved people.

The development of the abilities of the people involved more deeply in social action could also be facilitated by the fact that they were much more likely to work in white-collar than blue-collar jobs. 'White collar' tasks led to the transfer of practical skills to a broad variety of fields, including participation in civic organisations.

Table 5.4. Lifestyle ability by involvement cluster in 2014

Mean values of the indices on a relative scale, where the highest value for each variable = 1

Optional lifestyle indices	Diverse and strong involvement	Diverse and moderate involvement	Involved as a consumer	Involved as a voter	Weak involvement	Total sample	Cramer's V p≤0.001
Political activity	1.00	0.71	0.46	0.42	0.18	0.47	0.189
Participation in civic actions	1.00	0.78	0.63	0.49	0.33	0.58	0.226
Diversity in reading newspapers	1.00	0.99	0.62	0.74	0.52	0.73	0.193
Healthy lifestyle	1.00	0.87	0.72	0.67	0.61	0.73	0.156
Consumption of organic food	0.92	1.00	0.84	0.71	0.58	0.76	0.159
Workplace leadership	1.00	0.67	0.48	0.35	0.22	0.46	0.158
Ecological lifestyle	1.00	0.97	0.75	0.74	0.54	0.75	0.211

Source: Keller & Kiisel, 2017: 328, Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 394

Whereas respondents involved in action as voters more commonly worked in jobs involving nature, animals and plants, and the weakly involved ones commonly did simple physical labour, as well as repetitive work involving machinery, diversely involved respondents were more likely to be required to fulfil tasks involving management, organising others' activities, conflict resolution, information processing, communication and paperwork. The skills required for these tasks are relatively easy to acquire through the observation of other people and the examination of the results of their activities, or simply as skills related to other activities (e.g. participation in meetings, linguistic competence and computer use). One-off training courses offered to the less involved group under the support programmes of the public institutions did not facilitate the kind of spontaneous, unobtrusive and smooth acquiring of such skills as a white-collar worker had access to in their daily work. Job-seeking opportunities were more limited for the less involved groups. Among the respondents, they had more experience of themselves or a member of their family becoming unemployed. Even though all groups had been affected by financial problems (46% on average) and increases in the prices of goods and services (50%), their impact had been the strongest on the weakly involved group (60% and 58%, respectively), who were also statistically the least well-off.

Figure 5.4. Evaluation of the changes in Estonian life over the past ten years by involvement cluster in 2002–2014

Averages of evaluations on a 5-point scale:
1 – I have found the changes discouraging; 5 – I have found the changes encouraging



Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 386

PERCEPTION OF CHANGES. Social actions became more diverse and stronger only in those groups that were already diversely active in 2002. The diversification of action was accompanied by the tendency to self-evaluate social position slightly higher each year of the survey. The rest of the groups remained relatively similar in terms of involvement in various activities. In the weakly involved group, however, evaluations of social position went down year to year.

Assessments of changes taking place in Estonia paralleled the self-evaluations of social position: more diversely involved respondents always expressed greater satisfaction with changes (see Figure 5.4). Among the diversely involved, expectations regarding the future were also higher than among the less involved. The evaluations of the pace of social changes changed. Whereas in 2002 diversely involved groups actively participating in changes were the most likely to perceive the pace of change as too high, in 2014 the pace of changes taking place in Estonia was perceived to be the fastest by the weakly-involved, even though their personal practices of action or judgements did not change significantly over time.[5] It may thus be presumed that more diversely involved individuals, who acted within denser structural relations and created new bonds themselves, did not perceive the increasing complexity of the life-world as a problem, but they exhausted the potential for further diversification of their activities and growing pace. Thus, if a diversely involved person was looking for companions for a fishing trip or social event, they would be able find a large number of people in their extensive social network who would 'like' their invitation on social media but not as many of those with sufficient free time for such an investment in their friendship. The enticing invitation to optional action clashed with the increased density of time; no more new distinctive activities could be fit into practices of living.

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[5] In both surveys, the pace of social changes was judged to be the slowest by respondents involved in social action as consumers. This may be a result of the younger generation's

The less involved in social action the respondents were, the less they saw changes as opportunities and the more as risks. They also did not believe in political solutions. For example, the voting preferences of the diversely involved groups were divided between mainstream consensus parties that represented urban social interests. The less active groups were often either not interested in politics, were disappointed in parties, or voted for protest or populist parties.

5.3.3. Mobility and tempo of life in the structures of social action

How were different types of involvement related to the use and perception of time and space (pace, timing, distance, increasing density and change of practices of living)?

PHYSICAL AND VIRTUAL MOBILITY. Diversely involved people were characterised by the most diverse and active experience in mobility within Estonia and travelling to foreign countries. This was structurally supported by the opening of the borders and the development of travel infrastructure, and individually supported by higher fluency in foreign languages and higher awareness of foreign affairs. The same values were the lowest in the weakly involved groups. Both mobility and travel require time and money, as well as curiosity. The weakly involved were often indifferent to travel.

In addition to their greater ability to travel physical distances, diversely involved respondents were also the most connected to virtual communication networks. Their homes were the best equipped with communication devices, they were the most diverse readers of online media, and they displayed the most interest in news, social

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different expectations regarding the pace of changes.

discussions and everyday life stories in media. However, while the television viewing habits of the diversely involved respondents were the most diverse, the weakly involved people spent the most time on this activity. Whereas the diversely involved cluster achieved diversity in their choices of TV channels by selectively watching news clips on the Internet (i.e. self-centred timing), the weakly involved were more likely to watch TV shows at air time (i.e. synchronous timing). According to the 2014 survey, 20% of individuals involved as consumers no longer watched TV shows on TV sets but on the Internet. Large portions of the less involved groups, meanwhile, had not become Internet users at all (30% of individuals involved as voters, 35% of the weakly involved). In spite of the general decrease in reading, the diversely involved tended to spend increasingly more time on this (16%), while 31% of the weakly involved no longer read books at all and 16% also had not read them before.

Travel and media experiences also supported a cosmopolitan mindset. Cosmopolitanism does not necessarily mean identifying oneself as a citizen of the world or having a global outlook; according to Beck, it can also be expressed simply by ignoring the traditional boundaries between the inside and the outside, national and international, leading to new and stimulating combinations of interpretations (Wimmer & Quandt, 2006: 343). The identity of the diversely active respondents encompassed the largest number of different links, leading to the perception of greater cohesion compared to other types of involvement with practically all groups of people (humanity as a whole, people with similar tastes, former schoolmates, successful people, people with similar hobbies, Estonians, Estonian Russians, etc.),[6] with the exception of poor people or those with economic problems: the two groups with whom the least involved groups perceived greater cohesion. The cosmopolitan identity of the diversely involved did not, however, necessarily signal the kinds of concessions in cohesion with family, friends and acquaintances implied by the theory of individualisation. On the contrary, these ties were the most important among the extremely heterogeneous identity resources of the diversely involved group. Historical roots were also more important to the diversely involved than other groups: their knowledge of their ancestors tended to include significantly earlier periods of time than in the less involved clusters.

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[6] The survey probed the sense of cohesion (self-identification) with 29 different social groups; the greatest cohesion with three of these was perceived by individuals involved as consumers, and the perception of cohesion with one – poor people – was characteristic to the two less involved clusters, with the other 25 divided between the two diversely integrated clusters.

Table 5.5. Subjective perception of time by involvement cluster in 2014

Mean values of the indices on a relative scale, where the highest value for each variable = 1.

Indices of time use and perception	Diverse and strong involvement	Diverse and moderate involvement	Involved as a consumer	Involved as a voter	Weak involvement	Total sample	Cramer's V
General lack of time	1.00	0.27	0.73	0.84	0.72	0.73	0.129**
Difficulties in finding common time for family activities	1.00	0.88	0.95	0.92	0.85	0.91	0.097**
Perceived lack of time ('chronic lack of time')	1.00	0.75	0.93	0.85	0.71	0.83	0.111**
Surplus time	0.58	0.75	0.77	0.73	1.00	0.80	0.086**
Overwork	1.00	0.74	0.86	0.77	0.75	0.80	0.104**
Multitasking	0.97	0.92	1.00	0.78	0.74	0.85	0.129**
Efforts to manage time differently	1.00	0.75	0.86	0.69	0.66	0.76	0.098**
Rest, relaxation	0.90	0.94	1.00	0.94	1.00	0.96	0.079*

*$p \leq 0.005$; **$p \leq 0.001$.

Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 392

PERCEPTION OF TIME. While diversely and strongly involved people made the fewest concessions to the tendency to spend more time on work and the Internet and less on friends and family, they were the most likely to suffer from lack of time (see Table 5.5), admitting to the greatest difficulties among all respondents in finding opportunities for spending time with their family, acknowledging a chronic lack of time and a tendency to overwork, being most likely to attempt to reorganise their time-use to make room for desired activities, and finding the least time for rest. Among the weakly involved, meanwhile, the same values were at the opposite end of the scale. The less involved groups were characterised by a noticeable necessity to work more than in the past, but also an inability to find ways to utilise their free time. This may reflect the smaller social networks of the less involved respondents, as well as less distinctive role models. They were also physically more secluded: the weakly involved group and individuals involved as voters were more likely to live in rural areas and small towns where services, means of transportation and the Internet were less accessible and their use was restricted by lower incomes.

Surprisingly, diversely and moderately involved respondents suffered the least from a general lack of time, their opportunities for spending time with their family ranked near the top and they were nearly the least likely to suffer from chronic lack of time and overwork. The strongly involved were active participants in non-governmental organisations (not in just one but, on average, in organisations operating in three different fields), and this amounted to nearly one job's worth of extra workload. Meanwhile, 22% of the moderately involved did not have jobs at all. They dedicated more time to themselves and their family: their ambitions were related to the actions they innately spent their time on. The perception of a lack of time among the diversely and strongly involved was mainly caused by the fact that besides their homes and families, they had many more opportunities for action than they could make use of.

There was another important exception to the apparent direct correlation between time-use and involvement in social action. The group of individuals involved as consumers were characterised by the cyclical use of time typical to youths: multitasking due to external obligations (such as school, work and hobby groups) alternated with time spent on hobbies and resting. Their use of time was characterised by time spent on studying, appearance, sports, friends, Internet, shopping and transportation.

5.4. CONCLUSIONS

The most important conclusion from the analysis is that involvement in social action was promoted by the social action itself. The mechanism driving this could be the inspiring and impelling influence of social action supported by the (time) resources freed up in society, as well as the increasing ability of a network of similar individuals to see new opportunities for change. It could be a counter-reaction to an accelerating Archerian process of change in social structures (the irreconcilability of social truths and social actions), an attempt to reconcile transformative and change-resistant structural processes. Involvement in social action was also supported by the infrastructure serving the needs of the fast-paced lifestyle, which, in the presence of sufficient resources, could ease access to social action for the agent (e.g. the individual could employ social networks to find a job or a partner, and use an increasing number of different airlines). It may also have resulted from the familiarity of one of the components of a new action, making it easier to adopt new actions relative to others or masking the associated time pressure (e.g. consumption or project management practices). The mechanism driving involvement in lifestyle activities could also have been the desynchronisability of practice, facilitating the performance of several tasks at the same time in the combination and sequence deemed the most suitable by the agent. A diversely involved person was thus more likely to also be more involved in other fields of life; thus, more involved respondents were more active in practices related to the household and health, political undertakings and citizens' initiatives, as well as both voluntary and paid work. For example, typical mutually combinable 'white collar' tasks enabled the agent to choose the timing, intensity and tempo of their actions (i.e. the morphogenetic mode of trial and error). A person with a more monotonous job shaped in synchronous time was able to observe and imitate fewer work tasks, also remaining dependent on someone else's decisions even if the person could resolve the situations in question in another manner (i.e. morphostatic relations). This kind of an environment of forced helplessness promotes a type of agency which, according to Archer, will nurture either normative obedience or low initiative in the individual. This will result in a reduction in the ability of a person acting in a sparser social structure to react to or consciously bring about changes.

The results of the 'Me. The World. The Media' survey show that patterns of social action are a much better predictor of the ability to follow individualised practices of living than income or evaluation of social position. This conclusion might also be consistent with Giddens' and Beck's theoretical conjecture that the ability to express oneself through lifestyle (unlike income) has an equalising effect on individuals in society. Unfortunately, it is also clear that lifestyle bonds mainly conferred advantages on those whose social coping ability was already high, enabling these people to also benefit more from the development of social infrastructure. Time- and space-use data reveal the polarisation between the two extremes of involvement clusters. The range of mobility and density of time-use of the diversely involved tended to increase. At the same time, their perceived lack of time was a sign that desynchronised reorganisation of time was not always encouraging to the strongly and diversely involved respondents. Even though the diversely involved tended to find more encouragement than distress in changes, they were characterised by the strongest sense of the reduction in the pace of changes. It is likely that, whereas in 2002 the diversely involved had the ability to shape the changes themselves and had a sense of control over the tempo of changes through their practical actions, in 2014 this group had exhausted the 'unused resources' of their dense and complex network of social relations as a result of the increased diversity and tempo of their activities. This was also demonstrated in time-use, the reorganisation of which the diversely and strongly involved had to constantly deal with. Their lives were characterised by less rest, more multitasking and a higher sense of a lack of time than others.

Archer's approach allows to understand that lifestyle ability is not a matter of horizontal or vertical equality but a question of the relationship between a person's social position and transformative and change-resistant structural processes. The greater the number of social positions the person must be mindful of in their actions, the

Figure 5.5. The central role of the social action and lifestyle choices of different groups in the development of change-resistant and transformative structural processes


Enforcement
of transformational processes
Abandonment of change-resistant
ideologies and institutions
Involved as
a consumer
Saturation point
Diversely and
strongly involved
in social action
Involved as
a voter
Abandonment of activities
driving transformational processes
The optimal density of action
in time and space
Diversely and
moderately involved
in social action
Weakly involved
in social action
Enforcement
of change-resistant processes

Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 402

greater the pressure on their temporal and spatial resources. What is at stake here is where greater concessions will have to be made once the resources are completely exhausted: whether they will be made at the expense of morphostatic (e.g. generational relations and established non-governmental organisations) or morphogenetic relationships (e.g. giving up a business plan or undertaking) (see Figure 5.5). Accordingly, the agent's actions' links to transformative and non-transformative structural processes play a major role along with the diversity or strength of social relations. This presupposition enables to better understand why the youthful respondents involved in social action as consumers did not fit in with the logic of the other four involvement groups, where denser temporal and spatial action structures predicted ostensibly more success in every sense than a sparser structure of action. While consumers also engage in multitasking, they do so within a relatively homogeneous set of practices which are also located in a landscape of structurally transformative processes. This mainly applies to Internet use, individualised hobbies, and communication with friends and acquaintances living abroad. The opposing evaluations of time characteristic to the two diversely involved clusters are expressed in the same figure in their placement in relation to optimal temporal and spatial density. While the social action of both clusters involves both transformative (e.g. Internet use) and resistant practices (such as an attempt to maintain historical bonds), the more active respondents were characterised by a more evident compulsion to opt for either change-resistant or transformative actions. Meanwhile, the position of the less involved groups in the figure mostly fell on the axis of implementation of change-resistant processes, as they were increasingly less connected to the groups accepting of the changes and they lacked sufficient resources to turn the changes to their favour. Individuals involved in social action as voters, characterised by more tense time-use, were 'at the limit of their abilities' from the perspective of the temporal and spatial density of actions. Since they had access to more practices involving them in social action (political participation, organised cultural practices, etc.) than the weakly involved group, they can be presumed to have been capable of creating 'structures of resistance' that could be employed to resist transformative processes.

In addition to fluid and transient late modern relationships and practices, the diversely active groups also possessed the traditional relationships of the modern society. Thus, in spite of the existence of global relationships of the diversely involved, family members, friends and relatives, and the historical identity of the family still retained their priorities (and ranked far above the others); channels requiring the synchronous use of time were not excluded from media consumption, etc. It may thus be said that diversely involved agents required the presence of an external world maintained by the more static way of life of the less involved groups. The 'old world', where traditions are kept alive, was indispensable for the identity creation of the diversely involved, to be used, if necessary, at suitable times (e.g. through evoking childhood memories, studying family trees and reproducing the stories found therein, and celebrating church holidays). Having analysed the changes that had taken place in time-use, however, it may be presumed that the increased density of time had created increasingly more preconditions for a reduction in contacts between the diversely involved and the less involved in social action. The range of activities enabling contact between them, including common or similar activities, had decreased. Remaining activities included shopping practices, participation in memory events, etc.

At the same time, it is also necessary to inquire as to what the increasing density of time and necessity of doing more could mean to the social structure. Thanks to the acceleration in social relations, the diversely involved individuals met an increasing number of people serving as models for reflexively adjusting their life-projects. Even though a certain general shift towards an increase in social actions was observed, it is not possible to say whether this would gradually also begin to extend to individuals from the less involved groups or if the diversely active groups would simply keep ‘increasing in density’. Looking at the decrease in participation reflected in the indices of the most active cluster (Figure 5.3), evident in the 2014 data, it may also be questionable whether there is any room left for this. It cannot be ruled out that having become ensnared in strong action bonds has begun to hinder reacting to changes: in spite of being engaged in energetic and diverse action, the pace of changes seemed much slower than before to the diversely involved group. Diverse and strong relations have a dual nature: they are difficult to break, as participation in them is a guarantee of coping with changes and maintenance of an identity founded on personal change. Should a need for all-encompassing changes arise in society, these relations will become a hindrance, as even transformative activities build non-transformative structures that keep the social structure stable. The diversely involved thus also have more difficulties with shaping their pace of living, as their identity is dependent on involvement in distinctive activities. Slowing down would presume non-action, which, however, is difficult to imitate (with imitation being the main mechanism of the development of a practice). Changes also require the ability and possibility of abandoning existing relationships.

Moving along with changes also calls for the ability to adapt methods of interpretation. Even though the communication network of the diversely involved is heterogeneous from the perspective of lifestyles, this does not necessarily mean great diversity in their capabilities of the interpretation of social life. The necessity of condensing time increases the necessity of quickly finding, analysing and synthesising different kinds of information. This results in a preference for more easily accessible and more easily processable information more closely corresponding to the requirements of one’s lifestyle, as well as a preference for maintaining contact with people with more similar attitudes despite their external differences (e.g. cosmopolitan outlook). When this is added to the reduction in time available for direct social contacts, it may be presumed that the ability of the diversely involved to interpret changes will diminish, as increased tempo will mainly increase relationships between individuals with similar practices of thought and action. An increase in relationships between similar individuals may create ‘islands’ of social relations in a society lacking good connections and ability of mutual translation.

Calhoun (2003) notes that cosmopolitans tend to ignore social reality and different mechanisms of the manifestation of communal solidarity of individuals. His descriptions of the cosmopolitan class coincide with the data of the 'Me. The World. The Media' survey. The dimensions of both extreme and moderate cosmopolitans are identifiable in our data. The former consider making social prescriptions to other people a moral obligation. Diversely involved respondents are more likely to approve of the necessity of the adoption of mechanisms reshaping personal lifestyles: the development of a healthier range of products, the increase in excise duties and fines, following expert advice, etc. The necessity of various forms of intervention was most strongly approved of by the groups of the diversely involved. At the same time, the diversely involved also possessed the greatest abilities, opportunities and resources for embracing these interventions or tolerating their spill-over effects. The dimension of moderate cosmopolitanism, from the perspective of which a cosmopolitan outlook emerges from the opportunity to participate in the diverse 'citizenships' of a globalising society, to be tolerant towards and enjoy differences, is also evident in this chapter. This is reflected in the ability of the diversely involved groups to feel a sense of community with practically all social groups.

Whereas the diversely involved were more likely to communicate with each other, the social circles of the less involved were probably significantly smaller and the range of groups to identify with was significantly narrower (which can, of course, simplify finding people of a similar group). At the same time, they may still have had relationships with diversely involved people through dwindling generational, family or professional (subordination) relationships. Since their homogeneous and weak social relations did not enable them to come into contact with a rich diversity of social practices, the less involved could also not keep up with them in imitative learning or become caught in a chain of changes where one thing led to another. Their ability to understand and enjoy changes was significantly lower. Presumably, whereas the diversely active saw their identity in the mutual integration of the old and new world (the nation-state and the borderless world) and the possibility of their coexistence, the weakly involved groups tended to perceive their identities in the restoration of familiar social structures.

The time saving of the diversely involved individuals also resulted from the fact that their social action involved more consumption (including consumption of information), meaning that their social practices promoted networks of social relations consisting of longer value chains of consumed products and services. Through their participation in the consumption of products and services, the production of which involved more know-how, different resources, great distances, etc. (in addition to basic needs), the diversely involved individuals thus initiated more connections between different spheres of action, industries, manufacturing cycles and geographic areas through their practices. The 'spacious souls' and empathy of the diversely involved did not mean, however, that their actual actions integrated a greater number of less involved individuals into the social structure. The weakly involved had fewer opportunities to become involved in the chains of production of elite products and services. Their personal life-projects, which may have been related to being good grandmothers, looking out for their families or taking care of domestic life, may not have been realisable, as they lacked the resources required for meeting institutionalised lifestyle expectations (i.e. morphostatic reproduction collides with the process of morphogenesis). For example, they may have lacked the means, time or language skills to visit close relatives living abroad.

Whereas public debates increasingly revolve around the necessity of major changes, bringing these about is relatively difficult in a dense social structure where power over social actions is egalitarian (e.g. shrouded in the everyday action of numerous similar agents), yet polarising (from the perspective of nationality, gender, education, income, and opportunities and risks related to changes). This increased the likelihood of talking across each other, led to the fragmentation of public arenas, and supported continuing polarisation. The tendencies of polarisation might not, however, follow a linear pattern, as from the Archerian perspective, even social structures inaccessible to the individual would still influence each other. Thus, changes may be initiated by youths who are capable of moving along with changes promising to reward them for skilful lifestyles thanks to their relative lack of social relations, accompanied by high autonomy and the capacity for reflection. Thanks to their ability to impose a new normality through their consumption practices, the younger generation of people involved in social action as consumers can thus reshape the socio-material environment, which will serve as the core for and shape social reality. Given that individuals involved as consumers have the greatest experience with working abroad, the largest number of acquaintances abroad and the greatest desire to move there, the younger generation may also become a mediator of global changes, thus stimulating both structural transformations and the resulting resistance.

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Appendix 5.1. General characteristics of the clusters of involvement in social action in 2002–2014

Mean values of the cluster components on a relative scale, where the highest value for each variable = 1

Diverse and strong involvement	**2002**	**2005**	**2008**	**2011**	**2014**
Social life	0.55	0.57	1.00	0.79	0.43
Consumerism	0.36	0.72	0.97	0.73	0.76
Participation in civic organisations	0.77	0.90	0.91	1.00	0.55
Nature practices	0.87	0.77	0.62	0.68	0.66
Participation in elections	0.86	0.73	0.36	0.89	0.98
Cultural participation	0.44	0.43	1.00	0.96	0.73
Diverse and moderate involvement					
Social life	0.51	0.56	0.70	0.72	0.92
Consumerism	0.39	0.61	0.45	0.65	1.00
Participation in civic organisations	0.12	0.27	0.35	0.27	0.23
Nature practices	0.83	0.75	0.67	0.71	1.00
Participation in elections	0.98	0.95	0.98	1.00	1.00
Cultural participation	0.58	0.59	0.82	0.80	0.74
Involved as a consumer					
Social life	0.86	0.80	0.70	0.75	0.65
Consumerism	0.54	0.78	0.68	0.77	0.96
Participation in civic organisations	0.08	0.26	0.19	0.27	0.24
Nature practices	0.64	0.50	0.51	0.59	0.58
Participation in elections	0.14	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.15
Cultural participation	0.51	0.53	0.75	0.76	0.60
Involved as a voter					
Social life	0.33	0.35	0.43	0.44	0.45
Consumerism	0.18	0.32	0.34	0.31	0.43
Participation in civic organisations	0.08	0.16	0.22	0.17	0.17
Nature practices	0.66	0.58	0.58	0.53	0.68
Participation in elections	0.94	0.95	0.94	0.97	0.98
Cultural participation	0.18	0.18	0.24	0.31	0.26
Weak involvement					
Social life	0.39	0.38	0.43	0.44	0.50
Consumerism	0.24	0.39	0.40	0.39	0.33
Participation in civic organisations	0.05	0.14	0.17	0.13	0.10
Nature practices	0.46	0.46	0.39	0.40	0.58
Participation in elections	0.12	0.17	0.12	0.16	0.15
Cultural participation	0.16	0.14	0.19	0.25	0.16

Source: Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017: 378–379

CHAPTER 6.
SPATIAL MOBILITIES IN A 'HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY'

Anu Masso and Sander Salvet

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The starting point for this study is the rapid growth in spatial mobility that characterises the global era. Everyday movements between activity spaces like home, work and leisure places, as well as permanent migration across state borders, are set to increase.

Increases in spatial mobilities form one of the key processes in contemporary societies, involving growth in the mobility of individuals, goods, knowledge and information, which the literature refers to as the 'mobility turn' (see e.g. Cresswell, 2011; Faist, 2013; Urry, 2000). Research has indicated that this increase in spatial mobility is expressed in the increasing number of visited places as well as spatial contacts (Kaufmann et al., 2004). Rosa (2013) argues the increasing spatial mobility is due to the acceleration of the pace of life in general, and refers to this as social acceleration, by which Rosa means individuals are visiting more spatial locations than ever before, so that mobility itself has become a social norm. However, not all individuals are able to keep up with these changes, which therefore results in problems such as a growing fragmentation of activities and pressure for 'time-appropriate behaviour' (Rosa, 2013). Therefore, the growing speed of spatial mobilities, in the form of increases in visited places and contacts, as well as the underlying mechanisms of the shifts in mobilities is highly disputable in theoretical and empirical studies.

Studies have agreed that digital transformations in general and shifts in information and communication technologies (ICT) in particular are one of the main factors explaining the changes in spatial mobilities (Green, 2002; May & Thrift, 2003). However, these studies do not fully agree on what the consequences are of the digital transformations on spatial mobilities. Research assumes that increased use of ICT leads to growing 'speed' of spatial mobilities, through enabling an increasing number of visited places and contacts (e.g. Al-Rawi, 2017). Other research propose, by contrast, that physical mobility will be increasingly replaced by digitally mediated mobility (e.g. Daniel et al., 2017). Research is needed in order to explain the mechanisms of shifts in spatial mobilities, in general, and for answering the question, if and how the digital transformations may lead in particular to the acceleration in spatial mobilities.

In this chapter, we rely on secondary empirical data collected in the rapidly transforming Estonian society, in which a variety of spatial transformations, including the freedom of movement and increased access to ICT and other mobility technologies, took place within a relatively short time period during the 1990s. Estonia is therefore an excellent example for revealing the ongoing shifts in spatial mobility and contributing to the discussions in this field. As suggested in previous studies (Castles, 2010; Iosifides, 2012) we used a mixed method approach necessary for grasping the complexity, multilevel nature and variations of spatial mobilities. The representative survey data 'Me. The World. The Media' collected in Estonia in 2002–2014 is the main source of empirical data for the chapters in this book. This chapter also relies on secondary analysis of mobile positioning data (Masso et al., 2018), as well as in-depth interviews with mobile groups and experts being responsible for governing mobile groups and the register data (Tammpuu & Masso, 2018).

We strive, on the basis of these data to contribute to the discussions about changes in spatial mobilities, through mapping the main tendencies of the phenomenon during last 15 years in Estonia in the context of rapid social transformations. The aim is to explain the driving mechanisms of these transformations. We formulated three research questions:

1. Has the spatial opening up of Estonian society led to social acceleration or deceleration, as explained and experienced through the example of spatial mobility?
2. What are the main factors, which have led to the shifts in mobility experiences, and its acceleration or deceleration?
3. If and how, have the new structural conditions (e.g. spatial opening up, digitally mediated mobilities) led to the shifts in mobility experiences so that new structural elaborations (e.g. novel mobility practices, migration policy) emerge?

6.2. THEORIES OF SPATIAL MOBILITIES

Since the mobility turn in migration studies (Faist, 2013), spatial mobility has been conceptualised from numerous angles, as in relation to ethnic and class identity, segregation and integration, economic changes, etc. Although spatial mobility is understood broadly as the movements of people, goods, machines, information, and many other material and immaterial entities from one geographical location to another (Kaufmann et al., 2004), this chapter primarily focuses on the movements of individuals in space. We also differentiate the terms 'spatial mobility' and 'migration'. The first can be considered more neutral than the second, which captures power-relations of a particular society, is analysed from conflicting perspectives, and often has a policy-driven focus (Castles, 2010). However, spatial mobility does not merely encompass a geographical displacement, but it also has a social dimension – the terms 'spatial mobility' and 'social mobility' are closely related to each other (Kaufmann et al., 2004). For example, moving from one country to another may change an individual's social position.

The traditional approaches both to mobility and migration studies have often been criticised (Cadwallader, 1992) for being unable to analyse the complex character of mobility including both micro-, meso- and macro-level indicators. There have been some attempts at conceptual improvement of the migration theory (Castles, 2010), offering general social theory as a framework and concentrating on migration, as a social transition process in particular. The social transformation approach has been central, both theoretically and empirically, in discussions and empirical studies about changes in spatial mobilities (Castles, 2010). There are theoretical discussions about the transformations of spatial mobilities in general (Castles, 2010), or the growth of permanent forms of spatial mobilities like immigration as one of the main drivers of the current social transformation in Europe (Faist et al., 2018). There are several examples of transformations in spatial mobilities and the acceleration of mobilities – in the form of increases in both the speed and the frequencies of spatial activities – the growth in everyday activities, the permanent form of migration, practices and attitudes.

The recent discussions about social transformations in Europe, seen through the prism of spatial mobilities, have mainly emphasised the essential role of digital transformations as being one of the central drivers of the social transformations (Archer, 2013) or explaining the changing speed and character of spatial mobilities (Jansson, 2017; Jensen et al., 2018; Thompson, 1999). For example, spatial mobility is tightly intertwined with technologies, like transport and ICT infrastructure, that may provide some better ground for a higher level of mobility (Sheller & Urry, 2006). Also new media is often perceived as a facilitator of migration (e.g. Al-Rawi, 2017; Marino, 2015), and may therefore indirectly participate in the reinforcing or restructuring of the aforementioned power-relations. Several authors concur that digital transformations in general and ICT in particular may guide and supplement mobility (Adams, 2017; Archer, 2014; Jansson, 2017) and therefore is the main driver or mechanism explaining the change in character of mobility experiences and the growing speed of spatial mobilities. However, from the sociological perspective, the mobility and the intensification of the individuals' interactions (Giddens, 1990) are phenomena especially natural to the late modern societies. Concepts like spaces of flows (Castells, 1989) and mobile lives (Bauman, 1995) are often used for characterising the effect of digital transformations on individual lives.

In this chapter we are particularly interested in how social transformations related to mobility are interlaced with the development of ICT. Research agrees that digitalisation is the main explanatory factor of the shifts in spatial mobilities. There is, however, no consensus on whether or not the digital transformation is leading to the acceleration of spatial mobilities – growth in speed and frequencies of activities – or vice versa, to the decline of spatial mobilities through replacing the face-to-face contacts and physical mobility by digitally mediated contacts. For instance, some authors point out that ICT mediates support from migrant communities and relatives in the country of origin, consequently facilitating individual's spatial mobility (Collin, 2014; Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Kang, 2011). Others argue the use of technology may reduce the need to physically move from one location to another – especially, for younger generations, and people working in specific professional fields, such as knowledge workers (Daniel et al., 2017; Masso et al., 2018). There is also research that proposes that the use of ICT substitutes only short-distance spatial mobility, but increases long-distance mobility (Konrad & Wittowsky, 2018). As research has not fully explained the main mechanisms, through which digitalisation may change the mobility experiences, this study strives to contribute to these discussions. Although the 'theoretical' literature has paid a great deal of attention on the ability of individuals to 'keep up' or 'fall behind' in the context of the pressure on spatial mobility (Castles, 2010; Rosa, 2013), there have been only a few empirical studies on this issue (see e.g. Fontanari, 2018; Masso et al., 2018).

6.3. DYNAMICS OF SPATIAL MOBILITIES

This section explains the dynamics of spatial mobilities in Estonian society through three key mechanisms, through which the ICT has transformed the mobility experiences in Estonia: (1) increase of inequalities in mobilities in the context of spatial opening up of Estonian society; (2) mediatisation of mobility experiences by (digital) media technologies, and (3) datafication of mobilities both transforming individuals' mobility experiences and offering opportunities for controlling spatial mobilities.

These mechanisms have been expressed in Estonian society as temporally sequential transformations. Large spatial inequalities were initially inherent at the beginning of the 1990s, whereas datafication has been a most recent transformation. However, media technologies have had an essential role in mediating the mobility experiences since the 1990s. These three mechanisms are tightly intertwined with each other, so that although differing in their specific impact, they all have contributed to the changes in mobility experiences. Next, the dynamics will be framed theoretically and explained using empirical studies, which have been conducted during the last decade in Estonia.

6.3.1. Growing inequalities of mobilities

The spatial mobility of individuals has slightly increased in recent decades, but simultaneously, mobility and immobility patterns within the world population have remained sharply unequal (Castles, 2018; Mau et al., 2015). About one third of the global migrants originate from only ten countries, and more than a half of migrants settle in ten destination countries (United Nations, 2017). These mainly involve movements from poorer southern countries to wealthier northern ones (Castles, 2014; Czaika & Hobolth, 2014).

One explanation for these large inequalities in mobility has been the unevenly distributed motility (Jansson, 2017; Molz, 2014) – mobility potential – which has become an essential type of capital in present day high-speed societies (Kaufmann, 2014). Compared to earlier discussions about mobility (Harvey, 1990; Warf, 2008) where the focus has been on access (e.g. to transport, interaction), and distance as a potential barrier, the concept of motility puts a stronger emphasis on an individual's own abilities and agency. Motility not only includes access (e.g. to communication and transport infrastructure), but it also encompasses skills (e.g. map reading, language proficiency), and plans (e.g. emigration wishes and the capacity to fulfil these wishes by combining access options with necessary skills) (Dubois et al., 2015). Although a high level of motility does not always lead to actual movements, the differences in access, skills and plans allow researchers to distinguish between various mobility and immobility patterns (Dubois et al., 2015). Motility can also be converted into other forms of capital, e.g. economic, social and cultural capital, and vice versa (Flamm & Kaufmann, 2006). However, recent studies have shown motility is not only related to the agency of the individuals, but also expresses two-ways relationship with the social structure (Carling & Collins, 2018) – the social structure is not only enabling the mobility, but also the (im)mobility has an effect on the social structure. This present study hypothesises that despite desired and imagined migrations never being achieved, as in the case of young adults in the West Africa, they shape both the lives of individuals as well as the development of societies (Carling & Collins, 2018).

Other studies have reached similar conclusions – especially in emphasising the importance of access, as well as economic and social capital as resources for spatial mobility. However, in a different way than in the motility approach, variations in mobility have been explained by discerning external, socio-economic, and human internal factors. External factors include, for example, the existence of a personal vehicle (Kamruzzaman & Hine, 2012; Schönfelder & Axhausen, 2010), the number of working hours and the place of residence (Miranda-Moreno et al., 2012), and social networks (Axhausen, 2007; Carrasco & Miller, 2006; Lee & Kwan, 2011). Several studies have found that variations in spatial mobility can be explained by socio-economic factors, e.g. generational differences, gender, income, level of education and occupation (Kamruzzaman & Hine, 2012; Miranda-Moreno et al., 2012), while others have shown that the effect of socio-economic factors is rather small (Schönfelder & Axhausen, 2010). In the case of human internal factors, spatial mobility may depend on factors related to individual characteristics: habits, values, preferences, attitudes, prejudices, etc. (Van Acker et al., 2010; Van Wee, 2009).

One of the most substantial factors explaining changes in spatial mobilities in transition societies are geo-political changes, especially the shift from a closed totalitarian society to an open independent one. During the Soviet period, spatial mobility was restricted in the Soviet Union, especially in areas close to the Western border. The Soviet era, as a period of cultural globalisation, is described by a 'failed spatial transition' (Masso, 2008). During this period, ideological superstructures were changed (e.g. 'proletarian internationalism' was introduced), but without consistent manifestations in space (e.g. mobility was restricted, and personal contact with Western countries limited). The spatial transformation that started with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Estonian independence in 1991 led to the opening of state borders as well as cross-border and intra-country mobility opportunities for individuals. During the ensuing post-transition spatial period, the social space 'calmed down' (Masso, 2008), as individuals appropriated the changed conditions of spatial activity.

Another factor that explains changes in spatial mobility in post-communist transition societies is dissemination of, and access to ICTs, which in Estonia occurred at the same times as the geographical space opened up. The continuous development of ICT is seen as one of the most essential technological revolutions of all time. Previous research has demonstrated that the development of ICT has influenced human activities in multiple ways: by reducing perceived distance, intensifying interpersonal communication, increasing spatial mobility and expanding social networks (Larsen et al., 2008). During the Soviet era, Estonians used different strategies to overcome spatial immobility – for example, they followed Western media channels. Nowadays, as people have a greater freedom of movement, media use mainly plays the role of a facilitator that mediates practical advice and emotional support to future and current travellers and migrants, and thus supports spatial mobility. At the same time, media use has offered alternatives to mobility, as distance, temporal constraints and state borders carry less importance in online environments. Estonia's e-residency program is an example of new emerging forms of residency and internationalisation (Tammpuu & Masso, 2018). The compression of time-space, induced by the ICT transformations, has increased the number of activities per day. According to research literature, societal groups in transition countries operate at various speeds: faster groups actively choose and follow various media channels, while slower groups are more infrequent and one-sided media users (Lauristin et al., 2017). Additionally, many everyday activities take place spontaneously, in response to daily information exchange. All this affects spatial mobility and environment use, as well as the extent to which societal groups are integrated or separated from each other.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, the general accessibility to countries around the world has considerably improved for the Estonian population (see Appendix 6.1) – this includes predominantly European destinations (e.g. Germany, Denmark, Norway), while geographically distant locations have remained inaccessible (Masso & Opermann, 2017). At the same time, face-to-face contacts with the inhabitants of neighbouring countries (e.g. Russia) have been substituted by mediated communication, whereas contacts with people living in Western countries have become more direct and frequent (Masso & Opermann, 2017). This marks an overall shift in spatial perception from East to West in Estonian society.

Figure 6.1. Emigration wishes by language group in 2011 and 2014

% of group



Source: Masso & Tammpuu, 2017: 548

Figure 6.2. Spatial mobility by age group in 2014

Based on mobile phone data.
Mean values of the indices (scale 1–4)



Source: Masso et al., 2018: 8

Various ethnic and socioeconomic groups have not experienced this shift and spatial opening up in the same way. Although the motives have diversified for accelerated internal and cross-border mobility of ethnic groups, the movement trajectories and purposes of Estonian-speaking individuals are broader (e.g. related to work, education, recreational activities and entertainment) than those of Russian-speaking individuals, whose internal mobility is mainly linked to the place of living, and cross-border mobility to personal ethnic networks (e.g. visiting relatives and friends abroad) (Masso & Tammpuu, 2017; see also Appendix 6.2).

Some inequalities between ethnic groups in spatial mobility are evident in emigration desires (see Figure 6.1). More Russian-speaking individuals wish to move abroad permanently, while more Estonian-speaking individuals prefer temporary forms of migration. At the same time, more Estonian-speakers would like to permanently stay in Estonia, while more Russian-speakers do not rule out emigration and consider it possible in the future. Such tendencies reflect the different attitudes of the Russian- and Estonian-speaking populations to the Estonian society: Russian-speaking individuals express a weaker and more uncertain, and Estonian-speaking individuals a stronger and more certain attachment to Estonia. However, ethnic differences in emigration desires have slightly decreased over time and the two groups have become more similar (Masso & Tammpuu, 2017; Salvet & Masso, 2019). There also are generational discrepancies (see Figure 6.2). The most active members of the younger generation travel or commute mostly within Estonia, while the most active members of the older generation are described by cross-border mobility (Masso et al., 2018). This indicates 'delayed mobility'[1] patterns among the older generation, and a new 'immobility culture' among the younger generation (Masso et al., 2018). Research has pointed out that a bigger proportion of the younger generations express emigration wishes, but younger people are also more hesitant about these aspirations, compared to older generations (Salvet & Masso, 2019).

Both ethnic and age-specific differences in mobility patterns suggest that motility, as a capital, is unevenly distributed between the Estonian-speaking and the Russian-speaking population, as well as younger and older generations (see Table 6.1). Masso et al. (2018) suggest that generational differences can be explained through the use of ICT, and the changing nature of work and family related responsibilities over the life course. On the one hand, younger people have more responsibilities that restrict movement, and they compensate immobility with mediated communication. On the other hand, older people have less responsibilities, and they use ICT to facilitate their mobility, e.g. by searching online travel information. Consequently, ICT can be either a substitute for, or a facilitator of, spatial mobility depending on the availability of other resources.

In other words, the motility of the Estonian population has increased in a similar way to other post-Soviet societies as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain in early

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[1] 'Delayed' compared to the mobility patterns of older generations in Western countries.

Table 6.1. Spatial contacts, perceived spatial distances and emigration wishes by socio-demographic and other variables in 2002–2011

Cramer's V

	Index: Variety of contacts with different countries			Index: Perceived cultural proximity		
	2002	2008	2011	2002	2008	2011
Language (1 = Estonian, 2 = Russian)	.277***	.144***	.242***	.239***	.246***	.226***
Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	.094	.095	.078	.098	.083	.039
Age (1 = 15–24, 2 = 25–34, 3 = 35–44, 4 = 45–54, 5 = 55–64, 6 = 65–75)	.103**	.141***	.125***	.095	.092	.093
Education (0–2 = less than basic education, 3 = basic education, 4–6 = vocational education, based on basic education, 7 = secondary education, 8–9 = vocational education, based on secondary education, 10–14 = higher education)	.207***	.290***	.239***	.198***	.111**	.114**
Income per family member (1 = up to €60, 2 = €61–€100, 3 = €101–€150, 4 = €151–€200, 5 = €201–€250, 6 = €251–€300, 7 = €301–€400, 8 = €401–€500, 9 = €501–€600, 10 = €601–€800, 11 = €801–€1000, 12 = over €1000)	.158***	.152***	.175***	.158***	.107**	.098*
Social self-positioning (perceived by the respondent on a scale from 1 to 10)	.135***	.143***	.132***	.121***	.102***	.086
Foreign language skills (1 = very limited, 2 = limited, 3 = moderate, 4 = good, 5 = very good)	.172***	.189***	.211***	.197***	.148***	.112***
Use of foreign languages (1 = very limited, 2 = limited, 3 = moderate, 4 = extensive, 5 = very extensive)	.147***	.171***	.172***	.191***	.136***	.111***
Interest in Western channels (4 = very often, 3 = often, 2 = average, 1 = seldom)	.147***	.236***	.169***	.242***	.179***	.141***

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Sources: Masso & Opermann, 2017: 513; Salvet & Masso, 2019: 28

1990s, and the enlargement of the European Union in the mid-2000, both of which lifted restrictions to cross-border movement (King, 2002; Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2008). At the same time, motility has been distributed unevenly by ethnicity and age, and supports various mobility patterns. The Estonian-speaking population has a higher motility; higher motility in the context of cross-border travel characterises older generations, whereas international migration is the context for younger generations (Masso et al., 2018; Masso & Tammpuu, 2017; Salvet & Masso, 2019). Analogous mobility differences have also been noticed in other European countries (Kaufmann et al., 2018). One explanation to age-specific differences can be the digital divide in that ICT use supports tech-savvy younger generations' emigration wishes but acts as a substitute for their cross-border travel (Masso et al., 2018; Salvet & Masso, 2019).

6.3.2. Mediatisation and experiences of (im)mobilities

The second mechanism by which ICT has transformed the mobility experiences in Estonia, explained here theoretically and proved through empirical data, is mediatisation. As spatial mobility has increased and ICT developed, the intertwinement of mobility and media has deepened (Couldry & Hepp, 2017; Jansson, 2017). Nowadays, migrants use ICT-mediated communication to collect necessary background information and make preparations before departure (Al-Rawi, 2017; Hiller & Franz, 2004), as well as to establish new contacts in the destination country and maintain existing relationships in the country of origin after emigration (Collin, 2014; Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Lášticová, 2014). Social media and instant messaging applications have, in particular, facilitated spatial mobility by making both practical advice and emotional support more accessible to migrants (Marino, 2015; Oh, 2016), and make migration socially more acceptable to some groups, such as mothers who can keep in touch with their children living in the country of origin (Madianou, 2014). To further discuss how ICT use contributes to the uneven distribution of motility, the second dynamic analysed within this chapter is mediatisation – the deepening interplay between ICT developments, and transformations in culture, society and everyday life (Couldry & Hepp, 2017; Hjarvard, 2013; Jansson, 2017; Krotz, 2017; Lundby, 2014). Mediatisation can, by its extensivity and longevity, be considered as a meta-process, similar to globalisation, individualisation, commercialisation, rationalisation, democratisation and urbanisation (Lunt & Livingstone, 2015). As a manifestation of mediatisation, the social world is now constructed from many geographically distant locations and time zones (Couldry & Hepp, 2017), and both media access and use have become prerequisites for individuals to have control over their spatial mobility (Jansson, 2017). The concept of mediatisation allows the study of social transformations in relation to changing media technology and use. But it does not necessarily mean that social transformations are caused by media innovations – media rather is one of many factors that participate in such transformations (Hepp et al., 2015).

In Estonia, mediatisation of mobilities has been reflected in different aspects of media use, and mobility experiences with interest in news content about certain countries and new media use, on one hand. On the other, there is practiced spatial mobility and emigration wishes. Empirical studies have proved that during the last three decades, people living in Estonia have mainly been interested in news on neighbouring countries – Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Sweden – and less on more distant parts of the world (Masso & Opermann, 2017). Media use has extensively replaced the spatial mobility of the Estonian population between Estonia and Russia (Masso & Opermann, 2017). More specifically, Estonian-speaking individuals mainly prefer the Western countries as travel and emigration destinations, while interest in news on Russia is related rather to political and economic events and problems (Masso & Opermann, 2017). At the same time, the media use patterns of Estonia's Russian-speaking population have supported maintaining ties with Russia, instead of returning to Russia (Leppik & Vihalemm, 2017; Vihalemm & Leppik, 2017). Interest in Finnish and Swedish news has considerably increased since 1991, which has facilitated increasing labour migration from Estonia to Nordic countries (Masso & Opermann, 2017). Nevertheless, the attractiveness of these countries cannot be explained only by media use. A number of variables such as a higher standard of living, bigger incomes, geographical proximity and good access as well as cultural similarities play crucial roles (Anniste et al., 2017; Tiit, 2015). By contrast, the use of Latvian news has been quite stable, but the interest in Lithuanian news has declined in recent years, which indicates that the relations between Estonia and Latvia have remained unvaried, but have weakened between Estonia and Lithuania (Masso & Opermann, 2017; Vihalemm, 2015).

Besides the shift to the West in news consumption, the medium itself has played a role in mobility experiences (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3). Active and diverse use of traditional media, namely newspapers and television, little use of Estonian language news, and infrequent use of online media usually describe individuals who are spatially immobile and wish to stay in Estonia (Salvet & Masso, 2019). Active and diverse digital media users, people who have bigger interest in Estonian-language news and use less traditional media are more likely to be mobile, and express a wish to emigrate from Estonia either temporarily or permanently (Salvet & Masso, 2019). At the same time, people who moderately use both traditional and new media are more hesitant about their emigration aspirations (Salvet & Masso, 2019). These findings accord with the assumption that digital media use can facilitate spatial mobility (e.g. Al-Rawi, 2017; Marino, 2015). The findings also indicate an age-specific difference in the Estonian society in that younger generations, who are more active users of new media, are more willing to be mobile in the form of temporary or permanent migration than older generations, who are more active users of traditional media (Salvet & Masso, 2019).

Mediatisation has been less evident in the relationship between news about immigration and attitudes towards those immigrants who have chosen Estonia as a destination country. Anti-immigrant sentiments have been more prevalent in Estonia than in most other European countries. Still, these negative sentiments

Table 6.2. Media use by emigration wishes in 2014

Mean values of the indices (scale 1–5) and F-test

	Wish to stay	Do not know	Wish to leave	F	Sig.
Activity and diversity of reading newspapers	3.04	2.91	2.84	3.8	.023
Following online media and news portals	2.27	2.83	2.96	53.18	.000
Activity and diversity of listening to the radio	3.15	3.02	3.27	3.32	.036
Activity and diversity of watching TV	2.98	2.85	2.86	2.46	.086
Watching TV news	3.21	2.68	2.84	22.75	.000
Activity and versatility of computer usage	2.38	3.16	3.40	104.79	.000
Diversity of devices for using the Internet	2.17	2.97	3.16	122.61	.000
Using the Internet with tablets and smartphones: activity and versatility	1.44	2.27	2.45	104.56	.000
Use of various social media platforms	1.74	2.77	3.09	148.15	.000
Diversity of friends on Facebook	1.74	2.75	2.95	118.41	.000
Functional diversity of social media use	1.77	2.71	3.09	132.53	.000

Source: Salvet & Masso, 2019: 29–30

Table 6.3. Emigration wishes explained by age and new media use habits in 2014

Based on linear regression models. ß-coefficients

	Total sample	Estonian	Russian
Age	-.129***	-.133***	-.132***
Following online media and news portals	-.009	-.012	.023
Activity and versatility of computer usage	.022	.007	.049
Diversity of devices for using the Internet	.046*	.075**	-.021
Using the Internet with tablets and smartphones: activity and versatility	.033*	.027	.048
Use of various social media channels	.030	.024	-.009
Diversity of friends on Facebook	-.008	.024	-.016
Functional diversity of social media use	.054**	.027	.102**

* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001.

Source: Salvet & Masso, 2019: 31

can be explained by the relatively small immigrant communities and the infrequent contacts between different ethnic communities, weaker immigrant integration policies and state support of religion, not by the modality of news about immigration (Schlüter et al., 2019). The finding that media coverage cannot be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes is not unique to Estonia, but is characteristic to European countries in general (Schlüter et al., 2019).

The mediatisation of mobility experiences of potential immigrants wishing to move to Estonia has also taken place in the form digital migration, visible in the

Estonian e-residency program, which was introduced in Estonia in December 2014, as an 'ethno-culturally safe' alternative to immigration (Tammpuu & Masso, 2018). Access to the Estonian e-state services was granted to entrepreneurs living abroad, which enabled them to virtually establish and administer companies in Estonia (Sullivan & Burger, 2017). The adoption of e-residency has transformed the image of e-Estonia into a globally open transnational society, where openness is achieved through mediated communication, and without the need for spatial mobility (Tammpuu & Masso, 2018). From the perspective of e-residency, mediatisation of mobility has resulted in a new type of virtual mobility, which has helped Estonia to overcome constraints related to its small size and geopolitical location (Tammpuu & Masso, 2018). E-residency is an example, in which digital transformations have led to novel forms of 'digital nomadism', enabling the de-territorial forms of residency. Therefore, digital ICT means are not only functioning as a resource and an enabler of mobility and mobile forms of residency, but also transforming the everyday forms of life and work.

Overall, from the perspective of emigration, the mediatisation of mobility experiences of the Estonian population has taken place via the use of online news and social media (Salvet & Masso, 2019). Through new media use, migrants orient themselves toward certain destination countries, especially Finland and Sweden (Masso & Opermann, 2017). In parallel, migrants from Estonia, like migrants from other post-Soviet countries, often maintain transnational ties with their nation of origin through media use routines, e.g. by watching television programmes in their native languages via the Internet (Metykova, 2010). Similar forms of intertwinement of new media use and mobility experiences can often be seen among other migrants worldwide (Collin, 2014; Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Lášticová, 2014). In contrast, from the perspective of immigration, e-residency has been a unique alternative to immigration, diminishing the need for any physical presence in Estonia (Tammpuu & Masso, 2018). The Estonian case has clearly indicated the broad variety of mediation – use of media for accessing geographical places and networks, as well as of mediatisation – the novel digital technologies have turned out to be essential part of the everyday lives, and transformed the previously dominated territorially-bounded forms of mobility and residency.

6.3.3. Social datafication and mobilities

The third and most recent digital transformation that has led to the shifts in mobility experiences is social datafication, which we understand as the tendency to turn everyday practices into data (see e.g. Schäfer & van Es, 2017). Activities in social media, digital transactions, use of smartphone apps – these are only some of the examples of the situations, in which individuals are (un)consciously creating data about themselves. These datafied practices constitute an essential part of the ways everyday reality is constructed, perceived and practiced. Research indicates that datafication has proved to be a significant part of the construction of everyday lives (Just & Latzer, 2017). Couldry and Meijas (2018) argue the process of construction assumes the appropriation of social relations within the newly emerging social order, in which the global quantification sectors like Facebook are accessing, using and controlling the individuals' data. The datafication of everyday lives is generally visible as part of the life-world (Just & Latzer, 2017), or in particular fields and domains of life and during various life periods (see e.g. Lupton & Williamson, 2017). Due to the growth of the mobility, experiences are increasingly datafied and the exponential increase of ICT enables tracking the mobility of both self and of others. Therefore, the datafication of mobilities proved to be essential in structuring the everyday life experiences. However, the datafication of mobility includes, similarly to development of other media technologies, both liberating forces, like access to the instrumentally useful spatial data of maps and navigation tools, as well as dependencies, such as dangers to privacy and possible discrimination and inequalities, to which access, use and control of individual mobility data may lead.

One of the main sources for datafication of mobility experiences are smartphones, constituting currently the most essential media experience. Research has shown (Kalmus et al., 2018) that smartphones play an essential role in transforming both the feeling of space and time, and mobility experiences, through mediating the mobility experiences, widening the spatial spread of contacts, as well as offering the datafied experiences of mobility. The previous theoretical approach of Ben Agger claims that 'smartphoning creates a kind of "iTime" that challenges the pre-Internet boundaries between public and private, communal and individual, day and night, work and leisure, space and time' (Agger, 2011: 120). This notion is closely related to the process of 'time-space convergence' or 'time-space compression' (see Harvey, 1990; Janelle, 1969), by which distant places across the world become much more effectively accessible, due to the development of transportation (Warf, 2008). Indisputably, the most recent technological media have revolutionised the entire understanding of connectivity, boundaries and mobility (Dholakia et al., 2015). Mobile and smart devices have not merely created new possibilities for greater mobility and flexibility in space and time, they have become 'ingrained into social life' (Westlund, 2014: 135) in a way no previous medium has been able to do.

In their empirical study, Kalmus et al. (2018) used survey data to test this hypothesis. Their results indicated (see Table 6.4) that the core outcomes of smartphone usage are expanding both flexibility and the diversity of opportunities. As a consequence, access to the Internet everywhere has grown and spatial boundaries are disappearing. Internet access is tightly related to smartphones and the sense these devices are enabling more flexible use of time and offering multitasking options and better opportunities for organising one's life and for being informed and connected with intimates and friends. This spatial shift was age related and characteristic primarily of the youngest are group (15–21 year-olds), followed closely by the group of 22–28 year-olds, and then decreasing gradually with growing age (Kalmus et al., 2018). Interestingly, the level of the spatial shift of the 15–21 year-olds was matched by a small group of 71–79 year-olds smartphone users. Age is the only socio-demographic variable explaining the variation in the perception of spatial shifts related to smartphone use. However, the aforementioned core outcome of smartphone usage is predicted by the index of multitasking, which indicates the enthusiastic perception of smartphone usage is related to a higher level of habitual ability of practising different activities simultaneously.

Other studies have shown that smartphones are not just changing the perception of space and time, but also offering novel datafied experiences for mobilities. Research has shown that smartphones offer opportunities for physical mobilities among refugees as disadvantaged mobile groups, such as networking with home and host community, ensuring a sense of security, but also storing their memories of everyday living (Alencar et al., 2018). The data, created during the everyday practices of mobile groups, are used by governmental institutions with the aim of controlling data-driven mobility. The aims of data-based governance of mobility have mostly been to ensure greater predictive accuracy (Peters, 2001) and are founded on the widespread faith in the insights generated through large data sets and statistical calculations. There are several positive examples about datafication of mobile lives and border control through the application of large-scale data algorithmic techniques. One application implemented in both Switzerland and the USA aims to assure higher employment rates among refugees by settling them in particular regions that match their personal characteristics and profiles (Bansak et al., 2018). However, Leurs and Shepherd (2017) are not alone in claiming that mobile groups may be especially vulnerable regarding manipulation of data since they (e.g. refugees) have less informational capital or need the existing informational resources to manage the difficulties related to resettlement (e.g. highly skilled migrants).

Table 6.4. Change in spatio-temporal boundaries related to smartphone use in 2014

GLM regression analysis

	Model 1: Expanding flexibility and diverse opportunities		Model 2: Vanishing boundaries and foci		Model 3: Changing social identity and communication conventions	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	-.205***	.060	-.190**	.061	.086	.059
Socio-demographic variables						
Age	-.154**	.060	-.202***	.060	-.087	.058
Gender	-.044	.043	.015	.044	-.003	.042
Language	.024	.046	.024	.046	.078	.044
Education	.020	.045	.005	.045	.023	.044
Income	.079	.045	-.019	.045	-.031	.043
Occupational status	.011	.054	-.020	.054	-.209***	.052
Social self-positioning	.064	.052	.032	.052	-.171***	.050
Number of children under 18	-.005	.039	-.014	.039	-.102**	.038
Variables measuring time perception and time use						
Multitasking	.147**	.049	.075	.050	-.036	.048
Perceived lack of time	-.012	.047	.058	.048	.103*	.046
Efforts to manage time differently	.032	.038	.070	.038	-.078*	.037
Time spent on work and education	-.036	.043	-.005	.044	.087*	.042
Time spent on media use	-.011	.041	.019	.041	.102**	.040
AIC	1656.687		1660.023		1626.389	
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	33.487**		33.036**		66.863***	

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Source: Kalmus et al., 2018: 56

Therefore, according to research, the possible datafied discrimination, which may ensue is a particular problem in Europe due to contemporary practices of social sorting (Leurs & Shepherd, 2017). Social sorting uses various discursive, symbolic, materialistic and datafied processes to decide who belongs and who does not belong to Europe. This issue of how mobile groups practice and perceive datafications is studied comparatively among refugees residing in Estonia and Turkey (Masso & Kasapoglu, 2020). Both of these countries are considering the datafication of mobility in general and use of algorithmic mobility control methods in particular. This study supported Just and Latzer (2017) who claim that the perception of particular algorithms, such as refugee relocation algorithms, social media algorithms controlling access to contacts or themes, etc., do not only vary across life domains or algorithms, but potentially also across the particular group in hierarchical data relations. Masso and Kasapoglu's research (2020) indicates that while algorithms are tightly intertwined with the everyday lives of refugees, they express varying levels of awareness regarding the algorithmic control of their lives. In addition to domains of life, such as social and political orientation, commercial transactions, socialisation and recreation (Latzer & Festic, 2019), the algorithmic construction of refugee lives includes securitisation as an essential life domain. Mobility control algorithms are implemented in the case of refugees who express both acceptance, denial and resistance to the control of their lives through algorithms.

Besides individual lives being intertwined with datafied practices, the emergence of new digital data sources is also offering novel opportunities for controlling mobilities, such as the digital identification cards used in Estonia's e-residency program. The universal principle of this program is to offer access to digital services to foreign nationals independent of their location. Research conducted in Estonia indicates the program is reproducing spatial and economic inequalities. People with higher digital literacy skills and foreigners coming from countries with higher digital development level can more easily access the e-residency programme (Tammpuu & Masso, 2019). A closer look at the political principles of this program shows that the program's selectivity principles adopting the state's restrictive immigration policy lead to the unequal access to the e-residency program (Tammpuu & Masso, 2019). A similar clash occurs, in a study about algorithmic control of mobility of refugees, between the expectations of the data subjects and the decision-makers from governmental institutions (Männiste & Masso, 2020; Masso & Kasapoglu, 2020). In the study, the refugees referred to cultural and security-related motivations, in contrast to the experts developing algorithmic mobility control solutions who emphasised economic reasons, effectivity and social progress.

6.4. DISCUSSION

The aim of this chapter was to map the social transformations in Estonian society during the last three decades through the prism of spatial mobility, based on secondary empirical analysis and framed by theoretical approaches. Estonia's rapidly transforming society is excellent for studying changes in spatial mobilities and enabled us to explain the driving mechanisms behind the growing speed of spatial mobilities, and find the answers to the questions of whether the digital transformations have led to the acceleration or the deceleration of spatial mobilities. We also strove to explain whether and how digital transformations have led to the structural elaborations of mobility experiences, resulting in novel forms of experiencing as well as controlling the spatial mobilities.

The chapter relied on secondary data on the dynamics of spatial mobilities in Estonia's society during the last three decades. This secondary analysis proved the theoretical social acceleration thesis (Rosa, 2013). There has been significant growth in spatial mobilities during the last three decades in Estonian society in the context of spatial contacts, the widening of networks and visits across state borders, openness for cross-cultural contacts, as well as desires for migration as a permanent form of mobility (Masso et al., 2018; Masso & Opermann, 2017). However, these studies also indicate that the growth in spatial mobility has led to growing inequalities (Masso & Opermann, 2017), so that increased access to spatial mobilities has been unequally spread both across national groups (Masso & Tammpuu, 2017) as well as across generations (Kalmus et al., 2017; Masso et al., 2018). Previous research confirms the wider spatial spread of contacts and activities of Estonian-speakers compared to Russian-speakers (e.g. Silm & Ahas, 2014). The generational differences in the spatial mobilities have indicated that whereas the younger generations are characterised by higher spatial mobilities, there is significant variation within group. Namely, a new 'immobility culture' exists among the younger generation in terms of cross-border activities in a transition society whereas the most active groups of older generation are characterised by 'delayed mobility' (Masso et al., 2018).

This study has shown that digital transformations offer a valuable framework for explaining the acceleration and deceleration of spatial mobilities. We have focused on the three main mechanisms within the digital transformations, which are tightly intertwined with the shifts in spatial mobilities that explain the acceleration/deceleration of social life: (1) capitalisation and inequalities; (2) mediatisation; (3) datafication of mobilities. First, spatial capitalisation has been the main driving mechanism explaining the growth of inequalities in mobilities, since an unequal spread of resources (like foreign languages and media) is unequally providing access to spatial locations and supporting the appropriation of spatial perceptions in the context of opening up society to the West. Second, mediatisation of mobilities as a novel form of spatial experiences has emerged, in which current mobility experiences are tightly intertwined with media technologies. These are expressed in the form of social media communities enabling networking with both home and host communities of spatially mobile groups, as well as new forms of 'digital nomadism' offered by digital identities like Estonia's e-residency program. Third, datafication is the most recent form of digital transformation. Datafication has led to the datafied form of mobilities, so that the digital traces produced in everyday activities are necessary both for assuring the mobility (e.g. navigating with a smartphone) as well as for controlling the mobility through datafied solutions, that in turn may also lead to exclusiveness and reproduction of social inequalities.

Therefore, we can conclude that due to the spatial opening up of Estonian society and the accessibility of both economic as well as cultural resources, which support individuals' spatial mobilities, has led to the acceleration of social life through the growth of activity spaces. Besides mapping the parallel acceleration and deceleration tendencies, the analysis has also indicated that certain transformations in the mobility experiences have happened, which partly confirms Archer's (2013) social morphogenesis thesis that argues structural elaborations may lead to the new forms of individual spatial interactions. There are several examples of the elaboration paving the way for the new forms of social order, like readiness for the forms of 'digital nomadism' and mobile residency offered by Estonia's e-residency program, and the transnational networks offered by smartphone applications. However, the study also indicated that although there are several individual-level novel interactions showing the relational readiness for the elaborations in mobility, the macro-level structural systems have sometimes failed in keeping up with the changes. Examples include the selectivity principles of Estonia's digital migration policy adopting the state's traditional migration policies (Tammpuu & Masso, 2019), and some of the dangers of the ethnically discriminatory practices implemented in the novel algorithmic mobility governance (Männiste & Masso, 2020).

In summary, this study assumed digital transformations to be one of the central explanatory characteristics for shifts in spatial mobilities and social acceleration. However, since the macro-level structural forms of digital transformations have significantly changed over time, we were only partially able to map empirically these shifts as being reflected in individual-level mobility experiences. Therefore, further empirical studies are needed to map the extent, direction and character of the ways digital transformations and spatial mobilities are intertwined.

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Appendix 6.1. Spatial contacts and networks in 1991–2014

Order of countries* 1–21, percentages in brackets. Each empty cell indicates that particular variable was not included in the questionnaire for that particular year

	Interest in news about different countries				Visited at least once					
	1991**	**1994****	**2002**	**2005**	**1994****	**2002**	**2005**	**2008**	**2011**	**2014**
Russia	**1.**(82)	**1.**(80)	**1.**(88)	**1.**(88)	**1.**(70)	**2.**(56)	**2.**(61)	**2.**(75)	**5.**(33)	**5.**(33)
Finland	**6.**(50)	**4.**(58)	**2.**(82)	**2.**(84)	**5.**(20)	**4.**(39)	**4.**(46)	**4.**(59)	**4.**(35)	**4.**(37)
Latvia	**7.**(75)	**7.**(68)	**5.**(77)	**5.**(78)	**2.**(63)	**1.**(65)	**1.**(67)	**1.**(79)	**1.**(52)	**1.**(49)
Lithuania	**2.**(76)	**3.**(67)	**7.**(75)	**7.**(75)	**3.**(53)	**3.**(52)	**3.**(52)	**3.**(64)	**3.**(48)	**2.**(42)
Sweden	**8.**(41)	**6.**(52)	**4.**(77)	**3.**(79)	**8.**(11)	**6.**(28)	**5.**(35)	**5.**(42)	**2.**(50)	**3.**(37)
Germany	**7.**(45)	**7.**(51)	**5.**(77)	**5.**(78)	**7.**(12)	**7.**(24)	**7.**(26)	**7.**(27)	**7.**(21)	**8.**(22)
Belarus, Ukraine	**4.**(57)	**8.**(42)	**13.**(55)	**12.**(59)	**4.**(39)	**5.**(31)	**6.**(33)	**6.**(38)	**9.**(17)	**10.**(15)
Mediterranean countries			**11.**(58)	**11.**(62)		**11.**(9)	**9.**(17)	**9.**(21)	**8.**(18)	**6.**(23)
Denmark, Norway	**10.**(26)	**10.**(32)	**8.**(68)	**9.**(70)	**9.**(5)	**9.**(14)	**10.**(16)	**10.**(19)	**10.**(15)	**9.**(16)
France			**10.**(62)	**10.**(68)		**10.**(9)	**11.**(12)	**11.**(13)	**11.**(12)	**12.**(14)
Netherlands, Belgium			**14.**(55)	**14.**(58)		**12.**(8)	**12.**(10)	**13.**(11)	**13.**(11)	**14.**(11)
UK, Ireland	**9.**(33)	**9.**(35)	**9.**(66)	**8.**(71)	**10.**(2)	**13.**(7)	**13.**(9)	**12.**(12)	**12.**(11)	**15.**(11)
Poland, Hungary, Czechia	**11.**(26)	**11.**(22)	**17.**(51)	**17.**(52)	**6.**(16)	**8.**(22)	**8.**(23)	**8.**(25)	**6.**(22)	**7.**(22)
USA, Canada	**5.**(55)	**5.**(57)	**6.**(76)	**6.**(75)	**11.**(1)	**14.**(5)	**14.**(5)	**14.**(5)	**15.**(3)	**17.**(5)
Middle East			**15.**(55)	**15.**(56)		**16.**(2)	**16.**(2)	**16.**(3)	**16.**(3)	**18.**(4)
Africa			**20.**(42)	**20.**(42)		**15.**(3)	**15.**(4)	**15.**(5)	**14.**(5)	**16.**(6)
Latin-America			**18.**(48)	**18.**(46)		**18.**(1)	**18.**(1)	**18.**(<1)	**18.**(<1)	**21.**(<1)
Asia			**12.**(57)	**13.**(58)		**17.**(2)	**17.**(2)	**17.**(3)	**17.**(3)	**19.**(3)
Australia, New Zealand			**16.**(53)	**16.**(52)		**19.**(1)	**19.**(1)	**19.**(<1)	**19.**(1)	**20.**(<1)
Former Soviet Union										**11.**(15)
Balkan countries			**19.**(46)	**19.** (43)						**13.**(12)

* Countries are listed as they were presented to the respondents in the survey. For assuring comparability with previous empirical studies (Vihalemm, 1997, 2004) some countries visited less frequently are merged into regional categories (e.g. Japan and China were surveyed one year, whereas in another year only the regional category Asia was included).

** Data collected in 1991 and 1994 derive from the Balticom research project.

Vihalemm, P. (2004). Maailm väljaspool Eestit: kogemus ja kontaktid, huvid ja hoiakud [The world outside Estonia: Experiences and contacts, interests and attitudes]. In V. Kalmus, M. Lauristin, & P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt (Eds.), *Eesti elavik 21. sajandi algul: ülevaade uurimuse* Mina. Maailm. Meedia *tulemustest* [Estonian life-world in the beginning of the 21st century: Overview of the findings of the survey *Me. The World. The Media*] (pp. 75–80). Tartu: Tartu University Press.

Vihalemm, P. (2015). Eesti päevalehtede tähelepanu teistele maadele [The attention turned to other countries in Estonian daily newspapers]. In I. Ude, & P. Vihalemm (Eds.), *Eesti*

Visited several times, stayed for longer			Relatives or friends					Work and business contacts			
2002	2011	2014	2002	2005	2008	2011	2014	2002	2011	2014	
1.(28)	**1.**(17)	**2.**(16)	**1.**(31)	**1.**(33)	**1.**(35)	**1.**(24)	**1.**(23)	**2.**(4)	**4.**(2)	**5.**(2)	Russia
3.(12)	**2.**(16)	**1.**(19)	**2.**(15)	**2.**(29)	**2.**(33)	**2.**(17)	**2.**(20)	**1.**(5)	**1.**(4)	**1.**(5)	Finland
2.(17)	**3.**(14)	**3.**(16)	**7.**(8)	**7.**(13)	**9.**(12)	**10.**(4)	**10.**(4)	**3.**(3)	**3.**(2)	**2.**(2)	Latvia
4.(11)	**5.**(7)	**5.**(8)	**11.**(4)	**10.**(7)	**12.**(7)	**12.**(2)	**12.**(3)	**6.**(2)	**6.**(2)	**4.**(2)	Lithuania
6.(6)	**4.**(7)	**4.**(9)	**6.**(9)	**5.**(16)	**4.**(18)	**6.**(9)	**6.**(7)	**4.**(3)	**2.**(2)	**6.**(2)	Sweden
7.(5)	**6.**(5)	**7.**(4)	**5.**(11)	**3.**(17)	**3.**(22)	**7.**(8)	**7.**(7)	**5.**(3)	**5.**(2)	**3.**(2)	Germany
5.(8)	**7.**(4)	**6.**(5)	**4.**(13)	**6.**(15)	**5.**(17)	**4.**(11)	**3.**(11)	**14.**(1)	**11.**(1,1)	**13.**(1)	Belarus, Ukraine
12.(1)	**8.**(4)	**8.**(4)	**16.**(1)	**14.**(4)	**6.**(16)	**11.**(4)	**11.**(3)	**12.**(1)	**12.**(1)	**9.**(1)	Mediterranean countries
8.(3)	**10.**(3)	**9.**(4)	**9.**(4)	**9.**(8)	**11.**(8)	**8.**(7)	**9.**(5)	**7.**(1)	**7.**(1,3)	**7.**(2)	Denmark, Norway
10.(2)	**11.**(2)	**13.**(2)	**12.**(2)	**15.**(4)	**16.**(4)	**13.**(2)	**13.**(2)	**13.**(1)	**13.**(1)	**10.**(1)	France
13.(1)	**12.**(1)	**14.**(2)	**14.**(2)	**16.**(4)	**14.**(5)	**14.**(2)	**21.**(2)	**9.**(2)	**9.**(1)	**11.**(1)	Netherlands, Belgium
14.(,9)	**13.**(3)	**10.**(3)	**8.**(5)	**8.**(12)	**7.**(15)	**3.**(11)	**4.**(9)	**8.**(1)	**8.**(1)	**8.**(2)	UK, Ireland
9.(2)	**14.**(2)	**11.**(3)	**13.**(2)	**13.**(4)	**15.**(4)	**16.**(1)	**18.**(1)	**11.**(1)	**10.**(1)	**14.**(<1)	Poland, Hungary, Czechia
15.(<1)	**15.**(2)	**16.**(1)	**3.**(13)	**4.**(17)	**8.**(14)	**5.**(10)	**5.**(7)	**10.**(1)	**16.**(<1)	**12.**(1)	USA, Canada
		17.(<1)	**15.**(1)	**17.**(2)	**17.**(3)	**18.**(<1)	**14.**(2)	**17.**(<1)	**18.**(<1)	**16.**(<1)	Middle East
		18.(<1)	**20.**(<1)	**21.**(<1)	**20.**(1)	**20.**(<1)	**16.**(<1)	**21.**(<1)	**19.**(<1)	**20.**(<1)	Africa
			19.(<1)	**20.**(1)	**21.**(1)	**21.**(<1)	**17.**(1)	**18.**(<1)	**21.**(<1)	**21.**(<1)	Latin-America
		20.(<1)	**17.**(1)	**18.**(2)	**19.**(1)	**19.**(<1)	**20.**(<1)	**15.**(<1)	**17.**(<1)	**18.**(<1)	Asia
		19.(<1)	**10.**(4)	**11.**(6)	**13.**(5)	**9.**(6)	**8.**(6)	**20.**(<1)	**20.**(<1)	**19.**(<1)	Australia, New Zealand
		12.(2)	**18.**(1)	**12.**(5)	**10.**(9)	**15.**(2)	**15.**(2)	**19.**(<1)	**14.**(<1)	**15.**(<1)	Former Soviet Union
		15.(1)	**21.**(0<1)	**19.**(2)	**18.**(2)	**17.**(<1)	**19.**(<1)	**16.**(<1)	**15.**(<1)	**17.**(<1)	Balkan countries

Sources: Vihalemm, 1997; Masso & Opermann, 2017: 504–505

Akadeemilise Ajakirjanduse Seltsi Aastaraamat 2014 [The yearbook of the Estonian Academic Society for Journalism 2014] (pp. 75–77). Tartu: University of Tartu Press.

Vihalemm, T., & Leppik, M. (2017). Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna lõimumise viisid ja muutustega kohanemise praktikad [The integration patterns and practices of adaptation to social changes among the Estonian Russian-speaking population]. In P. Vihalemm, M. Lauristin, V. Kalmus, & T. Vihalemm (Eds.), *Eesti ühiskond kiirenevas ajas. Uuringu "Mina. Maailm. Meedia" 2002–2014 tulemused* [Estonian society in an accelerating time: Findings of the survey 'Me. The World. The Media' 2002–2014] (pp. 557–590). Tartu: University of Tartu Press.

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Appendix 6.2. Cross-border contacts and networks by language group in 2014

Order of countries* 1–21, percentages in brackets. Each empty cell indicates that particular variable was not included in the questionnaire for that particular year

	Visited several times, stayed for longer		Visited once or twice		Relatives or friends		Work and business contacts	
Countries	Estonian	Russian	Estonian	Russian	Estonian	Russian	Estonian	Russian
Finland	1.(24)	3.(7)	4.(38)	2.(33)	1.(24)	3.(13)	1.(5)	2.(3)
Latvia	2.(21)	4.(6)	1.(53)	1.(41)	10.(3)	7.(6)	2.(3)	6.(2)
Russia	3.(14)	1.(21)	5.(37)	5.(23)	7.(6)	1.(61)	12.(1)	1.(4)
Sweden	4.(13)	8.(2)	3.(42)	4.(27)	4.(9)	11.(3)	4.(2)	8.(1)
Lithuania	5.(11)	6.(3)	2.(46)	3.(33)	15.(1)	9.(5)	3.(2)	5.(2)
Germany	6.–7.(5)	7.(2)	8.(24)	9.(17)	6.(6)	4.(7)	5.–6.(2)	3.(3)
Mediterranean countries	6.–7.(5)	9.–10.(2)	7.(25)	6.(20)	9.(3)	13.–14.(2)	10.–11.(1)	8.–9.(1)
Denmark, Norway	8.(5)	12.(2)	9.(21)	13.(7)	8.(6)	12.(3)	8.(1)	4.(2)
UK, Ireland	9.(4)	9.–10.(2)	12.(13)	14.(6)	2.(10)	5.(7)	5.–6.(2)	10.–12.(1)
Belorus, Ukraine	10.(3)	2.(10)	13.(13)	7.(20)	11.(2)	2.(31)	13.–14.(1)	7.(2)
Poland, Hungary, Czechia	11.(2)	11.(2)	6.(25)	10.(14)	16.(1)	15.–16.(1)	13.–14.(1)	13.–14.(1)
Netherlands, Belgium	12.(2)	19.(2)	11.(14)	17.(3)	13.(2)	17.–18.(1)	10.–11.(1)	10.–12.(1)
Former Soviet Union	13(2)	5.(3)	14.(13)	8.(18)	19.(1)	10.(5)	15.–16.(1)	10.–12.(1)
France	14.(2)	13.(1)	10.(16)	12.(8)	12.(2)	13.–14.(2)	9.(1)	13.–14.(1)
Balkan countries	14.(2)	14.(1)	15.(13)	11.(11)	17.–18.(1)	17.–18.(1)	17.–20.(<1)	15.(1)
USA, Canada	16.(2)	16.(<1)	17.(6)	18.(2)	5.(8)	6.(7)	7.(2)	19.–21.(<1)
Middle East	17.(1)	15.(1)	18.(4)	15.(4)	20.(<1)	8.(5)	15.–16.(1)	16.(1)
Africa	18.(1)	17.(<1)	16.(7)	16.(4)	21.(<1)		21.(<1)	19.–21.(<1)
Australia, New Zealand	19.(<1)		20.(1)	20.(1)	3.(9)	15.–16.(1)	17.–20.(<1)	17.–18.(<1)
Asia	20.(<1)		19.(4)	19.(1)	17.–18.(1)	20.(<1)	17.–20.(<1)	17.–18.(<1)
Latin-America			21.(1)	21.(<1)	14.(2)	19.(1)	17.–20.(<1)	19.(<1)

* Countries are listed as they were presented to the respondents in the survey. For assuring comparison with previous studies (Kalmus et al., 2004) the countries less frequently visited are grouped into regional categories (e.g. Mediterranean countries) or names of the continent are used.

Source: Masso & Tammpuu, 2017: 534

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CHAPTER 7.
PERSONAL TIME-USE CAPABILITY IN SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND OPERATIONALISATION FOR EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT

Triin Vihalemm, Signe Opermann and Veronika Kalmus

7.1. INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 1 (on the morphological conceptualisation of social transformation) and Chapter 2 (on narrating the transformation of Estonian society), a crucial question arises: how to 'diagnose' and evaluate the diversity of society by looking at morphogenetic/morphostatic mechanisms that influence developments. This chapter complements such a 'diagnosis' through the prism of 'social acceleration', which is perceived and signified by social agents mainly through the concept of (personal) time.

The way members of (Western) society experience and perceive time is crucial in the characterisation of the process of social change (Leccardi, 2014). As all social processes are temporal, and the time dimension is inherent in any dynamics, it is crucial to conceptualise time for the theoretical and empirical analysis of social transformation to be able to see how exactly all human actions are 'orchestrated' by time. Researchers have developed theoretical constructs and empirical metrics to examine this question. Some of the better known are the concepts of synchronisation/desynchronisation (e.g. Assmann, 2013; Rosa, 2003), rhythms of society (Lefebvre, 2004), routines of everyday life (Shove et al., 2015; Southerton, 2015), and time regimes (Hassan, 2009). Alongside these concepts, theories and analyses addressing speed as a separate social phenomenon, such as Tomlinson's (2007) cultural analysis of speed, or sociological analyses of the changing temporal structure of capitalist society by Rosa (2003), and by Agger (2004), Castells (2010) and Hassan (2009), are most inspiring due to their devotion to social dynamics both on the systemic and subjective levels. Empirically, social actors perceive a general speeding-up of action, sufficient time versus a shortage of time, develop personal strategies of time use, and have time-related conceptions about social development, justice and power. In theoretical terms, the concepts of speeding up and slowing down make it possible to look dynamically at social transformation processes, or 'cycles', referring to Archer's (1995) morphogenetic/morphostatic processes, and discover somewhat hidden layers of social 'structuration', to use Giddens' (1979) term.

The analysis in this chapter is, to a large extent, inspired by Rosa's (2003, 2013, 2019) critical conceptualisation of social acceleration, clarified as '*growth in quantity per unit of time*', and 'an irrevocable *tendency toward escalation*' (Rosa, 2019: 1; original emphasis). In his terms, the speeding up of systemic processes by rapid technological development is a separate phenomenon, but it is closely connected with the contradictory dynamics of various complementary aspects of modernisation, such as individualisation and rationalisation (Rosa, 2003: 3). Theoretically, Rosa and his co-authors (2017) associate speed with capitalist modernity and economic logic, and show how other structures in society, such as science, politics and culture, contribute to the creation and regulation of the pace of social processes. This logic reproduces itself by preserving the socioeconomic and political status quo, i.e. feeding systemic necessity and keeping the economy working mainly through the fundamental imperative of growth, speeding up, high rates of innovation and continuous movement towards 'progress' (Rosa et al., 2017: 55). In his account of social acceleration, Rosa also shows how individuals perceive social relations through the prism of time and how their coping with accelerating time contributes to general societal processes (Rosa, 2005, 2013; Rosa et al., 2017).

This chapter, while being inspired by Rosa's conceptualisation of social speeding-up, focuses on individuals' coping with accelerating time. Some empirical studies have contested the theoretical argument of speeding up by claiming that there is no clear evidence of a common feeling of being rushed associated with the increased use of ICTs. For instance, Sullivan and Gershuny's (2018) study, based on 15 years of observation and a diary research project in the UK, showed that instead of a generalised sense of speeding-up, social differentiation in subjective time intensity occurs among gender and occupational groups: professional/

managerial occupational groups are under time pressure and have less leisure time than people from lower status groups. Also, women experience higher levels of time fragmentation and multitasking, reporting more often feeling 'always rushed'. Sullivan and Gershuny (2018) propose that occupational and gender inequalities are stable and describe the stasis rather than the genesis of social transformation. The research on leisure time reveals, however, quite a dynamic picture: while in earlier centuries higher social positions were related to plenty of leisure time, nowadays higher social position is associated with less leisure time (Jarosz, 2016; Linder, 1970). Also, norms and perceptions concerning time for unpaid work have changed (Gershuny & Harms, 2016).

Thus, time-related practices and perceptions seem to be rather sensitive to social transformation, and the concept of social acceleration may still be useful for investigating social differentiation and, through this, the whole process of social change. In this analysis, we aim to validate – at least partially – Rosa's thesis of acceleration as the essential and inevitable logic of organising social relations and interactions, diversification or homogenisation processes in society. As Sullivan and Gershuny (2018) suggest, analysing the context of activities and specific groups of people defined by several socio-demographic and lifestyle parameters (such as career, family life and ICT usage practices) is relevant in this research area. Based on the literature (to be introduced in the next sub-chapters), we assume that the acceleration logic manifests itself in people's everyday lives in numerous ways and, therefore, we set the task of operationalising the general concept of social acceleration through the prism of everyday activities and reflections. This aim led us to a mixed-method approach consisting of focus groups and a population survey ('Me. The World. The Media').

In this chapter, we pose three research questions:

- What are the subjective reflections of accelerated life among different social groups?
- How do people manage the processes connected with the speeding-up of modern society, i.e. what are their capabilities of coping with social acceleration?
- How do these capabilities in relation to acceleration differentiate social groups in the Estonian society?

7.2. ACCELERATION AS A STABILISATION MECHANISM OF MODERN SOCIETY

Rosa introduces the concept of acceleration as an 'instrument' for analysing and understanding the current conditions we live under in modern capitalist societies. The notion of 'social acceleration' within the paradigm of critical sociological theory stresses the increasing pace of various interactions and processes related to material growth, technological augmentation and fast rates of cultural innovation (Rosa et al., 2017: 54). We have adopted the logic of 'dynamic stabilisation' by Rosa, Dörre and Lessenich, stating that people and institutions literally face the higher costs and bigger investments the accelerative processes demand: more fuel energy and other types of resources, including human resources needed for keeping dynamic processes going (Rosa et al., 2017: 55). Also, the authors claim that it takes more and more political 'energy' to activate, educate and engage citizens in the 'game'.

Rosa (2013) suggests analysing the economic logic of acceleration through three main dimensions, or 'inner motors', that concern all levels of a society. The first 'motor' is *technical acceleration:* the increasing speed of production and consumption of all kinds of goods and services. The significant change in the pace of life started with technological innovations, especially in the transportation sector (high speed trains, aeroplanes, etc.). The new digital technologies have made possible transformations in a variety of industries – production and delivery of information, ideas, images, data, goods, capital and services – in a fundamentally different way than in the pre-digital era. A mere smartphone may be used as a powerful tool for reaching out to the whole world or bringing people (i.e. real-time interactions) in distant locations together, producing numerous advantages for users while creating new risks (surveillance, datafication, etc.). Empirical research by Sullivan and Gershuny (2018) has shown that, at the subjective level, increased ICT use has no direct link to the feeling of constant time pressure. Rather, the impact of ICT use on social acceleration depends more on, and is mediated by, other structural mechanisms, such as the labour market (e.g. occupational status), education, cultural norms and age.

Secondly, Rosa (2013) states that the increase in the speed of changes is driven by a *cultural motor*, i.e. the dominant cultural ideals of modernity. According to him, this process involves changing patterns of associations and interactions, and changing forms of practice and knowledge, resulting in a 'shrinking present', ever-growing complexity and functional differentiation. Indeed, classic types of organisations offering stable membership for democratic participation have been challenged and partly replaced by new and more temporary mobilisations that impact policy makers (e.g. protest movements and initiatives engaging various stakeholders and addressing certain problems, issues or undesirable developments). The slow transfer of knowledge and practices has partly been replaced by quick visually coded instructions that are available virtually; through these, the mode of deep reading is challenged, and it forces more shallow reading.

However, Rosa's view on culture ignores the paradox that the culture of acceleration, on the one hand, urges people to take maximum advantage of the opportunities offered by contemporary life, and use all of their time in this pursuit; on the other hand, it also creates contrary meanings. Both speed and slowness as cultural symbols permeate the production of meanings in consumer culture (fast food, fast fashion, etc.), in artistic expression (e.g. slow films) and in social communities and movements. Several anti-movements, such as the slow food and fashion movement, slow travel, slow parenting and slow education contribute to various cultural scenes in the world. Most likely, highly educated specialists in economically advanced Western societies are involved in such slow living practices and communities (see Botta, 2016; Broadway, 2015). Also, examples in other socio-cultural areas exist, such as Turkey (Cicek et al., 2019) and Poland, one of the post-socialist countries (Kramarczyk, 2016). Although the idea of slowing down is gaining popularity, it is common only among small groups of highly educated and high-status professionals. For others, constant rush has become a status indicator: a certain 'badge of honour' (Sullivan & Gershuny, 2018: 24). Slowing down, therefore, has not yet developed as an aspirational norm in Veblen's sense for other social groups.

The third 'motor' of the speeding-up of individual lives is, according to Rosa (2013), *structural*. Although technological development should favour a quicker completion of tasks, and therefore give users more free time, this has become increasingly questionable. People are driven and often pressured by the goal of living life to the fullest each day. This, in turn, may lead to a serious time shortage and 'asynchronicity' between rhythms and routines people and institutions follow. People perceive their personal time as passing faster than in earlier periods because of the fast-moving world. Moreover, in order to 'keep their place', they need to tighten up their time by trying to do and achieve more than before and use time more efficiently by multitasking, using technology and other time-maximisation strategies. Like other symptoms of speeding-up, fragmented time-use and multitasking vary across socio-economic levels, but also across gender and family status (Sullivan & Gershuny, 2018). Also, significant social differentiation and the emergence of a new type of social inequality has been found in spending leisure time (Jarosz, 2016). Thus, the structural dimension of acceleration (in the interplay with the cultural dimension) seems to influence people's daily lives in different ways by 'speeding up' some groups' activities and 'slowing down' those of others.

As Rosa (2013: 43) has pointed out, quite often aspirations to meet 'the speed demands of globalized society' tend to fail, because of burnout and psychological complications, such as depression, attention disorders, etc. Also, not all promising strategies, such as fast food, speed dating, power naps, shallow reading, etc., are successful: eventually they cause health problems, poor relationships and additional stress, leading to general life dissatisfaction. Even worse, they may sometimes turn into waste activities that do not generate any value. Therefore, one can try to act at a faster pace, getting rid of pauses and intervals between different activities, but still be no more efficient or productive; in fact, one may become even less so.

To sum up, according to Rosa and colleagues' (2017) concept of social acceleration, the logic of capitalist society reproduces itself by preserving the socioeconomic and political status quo, i.e. by feeding systemic necessity and keeping the economy working mainly through the fundamental imperative of growth, speeding up, high rates of innovation and perpetual movement towards 'progress'. The maintenance and stability of modern society depends on how much its economic, political and natural cycles, scientific and cultural creation and people's everyday lifestyles can be speeded up and made more dynamic. However, at the everyday level, the structural speeding-up dynamism may paradoxically support the stasis of unequal social relationships. Sullivan and Gershuny (2018), thus, oppose Rosa's idea of speeding up as a force that can be made dynamic, stating that the modern capitalist society supports stasis in the underlying social inequalities of time use.

Therefore, from the cultural and social perspective, acceleration, from which different social groups may benefit to different extents (Wajcman, 2008, 2015), may lead to contradictory effects and even polarisation in society. Furthermore, 'individual variation in technological skills, networking capabilities and adaptation to the increasing complexity and pace of life may create new forms of social stratification' (Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 4). From the subjective point of view, individuals acting within the frameworks of social acceleration and escalatory stabilisation should not be seen only as victims of greed, but also as actors driven by competition-caused anxiety. On the one hand, one might be afraid of being left behind, i.e. not being able to sufficiently increase one's economic and social capital. On the other hand, there is something enjoyable or attractive in such dynamisation that relates to freedom, happiness, and an increase in reach and power, and improves the quality of life, as the main aim of sustainable development. Nevertheless, this tension takes a lot of energy out of individuals and may lead to psychological desynchronisation, which manifests itself in burnout or stress-related diseases. How can one find a way out of the acceleration cycle?

Rosa (2019) suggests that deceleration (slowing down) is not the proper answer or the cure for ever-accelerating life. Instead, a thorough critique and analysis of the psycho-social conditions of our lives in this current age may shed light on solutions or ways of reforming capitalism and changing the relationship with the surrounding society. In particular, the perception of the good life and moments of *resonance* – things that touch people's emotions and hearts and create positive or vivid impacts – which bring people into social interaction with the world, have the potential to provide solutions to the social alienation that acceleration creates. Rosa (2019: 5; original emphasis) has defined the quality of life through 'one's *relationship to the world*, i.e. the ways in which one experiences and positions oneself with respect to the world, the quality of one's *appropriation of the world*'. Furthermore, when social acceleration occurs, questions of 'time justice' (Mückenberger, 2011) become more and more critical: social groups mobilise for the sake of gaining higher stakes in the distribution of time capital, the right to regulate the pace of their own lives, and time-related privacy. As a resonance to the logic of social speeding-up, subjects' logic of personal time considerations guides their social acceptance of, or resistance to, technological and social innovations and policies, resulting in the intensification of the speeding-up processes.

In our view, Rosa's conceptualisation still mainly addresses the structural changes in society. Based on the emerging empirical evidence described above, we claim that these structural changes can generate diverse personal experiences. Testing this hypothesis will be the main aim of our analysis. Thus, we approach Rosa's account of the overwhelming power of social acceleration with some tentative curiosity. The subjective perception of social acceleration and personal life practices in this context are worth closer examination. Before introducing our methodological framework, we will give an overview of earlier empirical findings that guided the selection of questions and categories for our original investigation.

7.3. SUBJECTIVE TIME-RELATED EXPERIENCES IN MODERN SOCIETIES: SEEKING INDICATORS

7.3.1. Social differentiation in paid and unpaid work time

Empirical research has confirmed that satisfaction with one's time use relates to the amount of time free from obligations per day (Eriksson et al., 2007). However, time free from obligations is not directly tied to satisfaction with life, depending instead on the level of income, which in turn depends on employment and the fact that the working time of different individuals comes with different price tags. This, in turn, places certain limitations on the relationship between free time and time spent making a living. The pay for one's time spent working, depending on education, job market and physical location, strongly affects the evaluation of surplus time and therefore life satisfaction. Economically successful periods increase employment and life satisfaction despite decreased leisure time. Vice versa, economic recession does not bring about more leisure time and more life satisfaction but rather increases time stress because of extended working hours for some groups, time spent on searching for jobs or performing unpaid work, production for consumption etc., all of which increase *time stress* (Aguiar et al., 2011; Koos et al., 2017; Mattingly & Sayer, 2006).

Thus, time deficit and surplus time have to be investigated in relation to labour market position and material wealth. In our study we have therefore paid attention not only to the time spent on paid work but also on people's lifelong learning and education as characteristics of their capacity to improve their labour market value and get sufficient monetary rewards for their working time.

The availability of time free of obligations and satisfaction with life also depend on the amount of unpaid labour, such as household work, raising children, and caring for sick and/or elderly relatives. According to several empirical studies, women (Sayer, 2005; Sevilla-Sanz et al., 2010) and people of lower socio-economic position (Heisig, 2011) spend more time doing unpaid work. With technological developments, time spent on unpaid housework has changed qualitatively but not much quantitatively: time and energy spent on cooking, cleaning, etc. has diminished due to better materials, technologies and services; however, childcare time has increased due to changing social norms (parents are expected to devote more time to enhancing their children's human capital; Gershuny & Harms, 2016). Activities related to paid work, shopping, eating etc. were spatially and temporally more fixed fifty years ago than they are today, when institutions have less power to dictate collective rhythms (Southerton, 2015). The relationships between time flexibility and time-use satisfaction are paradoxical. For instance, happiness relates to time flexibility in performing one's duties (Eriksson et al., 2007). However, the increased place-and-time flexibility of paid work has increased the fragmentation of work and leisure time and the overlapping of work and private life (Flaherty & Seipp-Williams, 2005; Mattingly & Sayer, 2006; Zherebin et al., 2015). Since technology ensures that people are permanently 'available', it also causes interruptions in working rhythms and the necessity for readjustment (Schöneck, 2015), which in turn can lead to stress. Globally, the increased employment of women has created a greater fragmentation of daytime activity between caring for children/doing housework and paid work

(Burton & Phipps, 2009). Therefore, questions related to time spent on paid and unpaid work, and stress related to time fragmentation between professional and family obligations tend to be gendered issues, as several scholars have pointed out (Bianchi et al., 2012; Bryson, 2007; Coltrane, 2000; Geist & Cohen, 2011; Gershuny & Harms, 2016; Robinson & Godbey, 1999; Sayer et al., 2009; Sevilla-Sanz et al., 2010; Southerton, 2006; Southerton & Tomlinson, 2005). Another issue connected with women's massive entering into the labour market and the blending of time spent on paid and unpaid work and leisure is the 'right to one's own time' (Mückenberger, 2011). Some scholars have found that the feeling of being rushed is related to the time spent on unpaid and paid work as 'constrained' activities and not so much on the subjective feeling of activity fragmentation and multitasking (Sullivan & Gershuny, 2018).

With this in mind, we have developed categories and indicators for our qualitative and quantitative analysis, such as time spent on paid work (including extra jobs) and unpaid household and care work, as well as indicators to monitor changes of the pace and complexity of work, and to analyse work time flexibility and distance work.

7.3.2. Social differentiation in leisure time

Rosa claims that advances in, and widespread access to, technology help to free people from certain time-consuming activities both at work and at home, leading to certain population groups having more time without obligations (Rosa, 2013: 132). The changes in the work and leisure time balance inspired scholars to optimistically envision the coming of an age of leisure in developed countries (Dumazedier, 1967; Rifkin, 1995). This optimistic vision has, however, not been realised. Leisure has become (partially) fragmented, because of the interruptions by professional work or household-related duties (Bittman & Wajcman, 2000). In general, the duration of leisure time has increased (Aguiar & Hurst, 2008; Bittman, 2004), but the social differentiation of leisure time has also increased (Gershuny, 2003; Glorieux et al., 2010; Robinson & Godbey, 1999). Specific problems prevent social groups from full enjoyment of their leisure time. The quality of leisure time is higher in better educated groups and among lower-educated adults the enjoyment of leisure activities has declined despite the increase in the duration of leisure time (Krueger, 2007; Sevilla et al., 2012). However, people in higher socio-economic and occupational positions, having more diverse leisure time, are more rushed and fragmented in their relaxation activities (Gershuny, 2005; Katz-Gerro & Sullivan, 2010). Furthermore, the lifestyle of hurried leisure increases rather than decreases the general feeling of time pressure (Gunthorpe, 2003; Robinson & Godbey, 1999), which, in turn, increases the probability of poor health outcomes (Brown et al., 2001; Lehto, 1998). Thus, higher status groups who are more time-pressured in the long term face health risks that reduce their human capital.

The cultural meaning of leisure has changed from the idea of personal time, free from any commitments (Parker, 1975) to leisure as a body of activities, related products and services that form a special type of commitment (Jarosz, 2016). During their leisure time, people feel more pressured to meet certain consumption and lifestyle standards (Southerton, 2003). Katz-Gerro and Sullivan (2010) call this type of leisure, which is diverse and intertwined with consumption, 'voracious'. Also, people's expectations for co-present leisure (Jarosz, 2016), i.e. leisure time spent with family members, friends and other people, have also increased (Bianchi et al., 2007; Southerton, 2003).

Sullivan (1996) shows that leisure time spent with one's family or friends is more enjoyable; thus, synchronisation leads to greater satisfaction. Also, synchronisation (less fragmentation) of leisure and work is reported to be economically more beneficial (Weiss, 1996). As public holidays help to synchronise work, leisure and co-present leisure time (Mers & Osberg, 2006; Vihalemm & Harro-Loit, 2019), we assume that the celebration of holidays also provides evidence of the reduction of time stress and distractions.

Based on these research findings, we have identified categories for integrated qualitative and quantitative research, such as spending time on different leisure activities, 'activity-free' time, spending time with family and friends, synchronisation problems, the celebration of holidays and buying leisure-related products, such as holiday trips.

7.3.3. Multitasking and the fragmentation of time-generating social differences

As discussed above, despite the opportunities created by technological advances for gaining more free time, these advances have also caused numerous subjective problems related to time use. Since new technologies make it possible to carry out multiple parallel activities, the pace of living is still high and life is filled with different activities (Rosa & Scheuerman, 2009). Fast and activity-filled living, however, leads to increased stress, characteristic mainly of more affluent societies (Bonke & Gerstoft, 2007; Hamermesh & Lee, 2007; Southerton, 2003), where the opportunities provided by new technologies are made more use of. The same factors can also cause differentiation between different social groups within the same society: time deficits and feeling rushed are more characteristic to higher social status in Western, developed societies; time surplus is more characteristic to lower status groups, such as unemployed and retired people (Hamermesh & Lee, 2007). The relationships between ICT development, multitasking and feelings of time deficit/being rushed are also related to education; however, this relationship can differ across countries. For example, in the UK educational differences have tended to decrease (Sullivan & Gershuny, 2018), but this is not the case in Estonia (Tooding, 2017).

As pointed out above, research has provided a lot of evidence of gender differences in the feeling of time stress or time pressure related to the fragmentation or desynchronisation of daily activities. Employment structures and an increase in single-parent households have been mentioned as the main reasons (Robinson & Godbey, 1999; Sullivan & Gershuny, 2018). The most vulnerable group is single working mothers with young children (Sullivan & Gershuny, 2018).

To measure potential differentiation in the Estonian society, we have employed the categories of sufficiency and excess of time, pace of living, and multitasking, especially in relation to family, having children, education and profession.

7.3.4. Time use, social relations and attitudes towards the pace of societal development

Empirical research also draws attention to the inequalities in society that are related not only to labour market position but also to social obligations at certain stages of life, and social capital. For example, time spent on unpaid but time-consuming home- and care-taking work is poorly convertible to other capitals, and performing these duties does not leave enough time to improve one's opportunities for more beneficial capital conversions (e.g. learning, development of social support networks, recreation, etc.). These can be called 'time poverty traps', especially in countries with underdeveloped social care systems (Hirway, 2018). A few decades ago, local cultural norms and traditions somewhat buffered the structural disadvantages of certain groups but, in today's global cultural village, cultural norms spread quickly from place to place and can cause additional time pressures. For example, in Estonia social norms previously permitted children autonomy in walking from home to school alone. Nowadays, new norms imported from the U.S. and Western Europe, according to which parents are more obliged to safe-guard children and escort them to school until the late teen years have been adopted in Estonia, although escorting is an additional time burden for many parents, especially single ones.

The distribution of time is also related to social relationships and the various capitals to manage these relationships. For example, Sullivan and Gershuny (2016) have found an increase in the time men have spent on doing housework since the occupational status of their wives changed; the authors explain this as being related to the increase in women's human capital, which is critical in bargaining over such an undesirable activity as housework. Thus, the idea of time transactions and human and social capital needed to make these transactions is also crucial when analysing the social differentiation in personal time use.

Personal time use and time deficits are also related to the perception of the speed of social processes, the pace of development and changes in immediate working and living environments. As technological developments facilitate the use of long-distance channels for communication and mandated tasks, employers and politicians have intensified and sped up processes, reducing the time provided to citizens for reacting to changes in regulations or deadlines (Rosa, 2013). It is, thus, important to investigate the perceived speed or slowness of changes in society and the workplace, as well as the relationships between satisfaction with these changes, personal pace of living, and satisfaction with life. In general, personal life satisfaction is correlated with evaluations of the speed of changes in society: people who are dissatisfied with their lives tend to find the pace of social changes to be too fast (Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017). General life satisfaction and the feeling of keeping abreast of the times are related to rather intensive personal time use and moderate deficits of time, whereas people who have plenty of surplus time tend to feel that they are behind the times (Tooding, 2017). This kind of positive view of social changes and novel phenomena is generally linked to higher social position (Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017). All of these findings show that a faster pace of social life and openness to social changes are generally more welcomed by those social groups who have more resources to adapt to new opportunities and to make new (possibly beneficial) capital conversions.

7.3.5. Social differentiation in time conversions

According to Rosa (2013: 24), social acceleration is structurally inevitable and recruits individual actors regardless of how they feel about it. We argue that actors' different capacities to take advantage of opportunities and alleviate the negative consequences brought about by technological, cultural and structural speeding-up 'engines' are crucial in shaping the developments in society: patterns of social differentiation/homogenisation, relationships between social groups, and causes and symbols of mobilisation. For an individual, the opportunity to gain more leisure time is the main benefit of acceleration, but only if he or she is well-embedded in social structures. Better education, fewer family-related obligations, good multitasking skills and other factors may increase one's opportunities to have more time of one's own through 'successful capital conversions'. Continuous time deficits, lack of leisure time, problems in synchronising activities and the feeling of being behind the times are the negative consequences of social acceleration. One's position in the labour market as well as the organisation of housework and care activities are critical in shaping the ability to make beneficial time capital conversions. Flexible working time, remote working, instantly received information, digital work devices, fast consumption, and leisure goods and services have ambiguous impacts: on the one hand, they allow for the effective use of time; on the other hand, they generate other time-consuming obligations and information overload (Agger, 2011; Kalmus & Opermann, 2020). Most of the indicators of the subjective perception of time are conditional and need more precise contextualisation. Thus, the operational model and instruments for measuring the subjective capability of coping with social acceleration has to be multi-component, allowing for various relationship patterns between the components. In the following methodological framework, we explain the logic of our empirical investigation in more detail.

7.4. STUDY DESIGN, METHOD AND OPERATIONALISATION

Based on theoretical concepts and previous empirical research, we developed indicators of the acceleration of personal and social time for the fifth wave of the survey 'Me. The World. The Media' (2014). We aimed to explore how people think about and evaluate their life pace, the speed of societal changes and their position in societal developments, when and how people feel time stress and relief from time stress, the pressure for quicker performance/shorter experience and slowing down, how they respond to the speed of changes in their everyday work and private environment, and how technological devices help or pressure their life arrangements. We also mapped time use (for various activities), multitasking, difficulties in finding common time for family activities, efforts to manage time differently and other characteristics of people's time use (see also Kalmus & Opermann, 2020; Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017).


Variables constructed
by the expert method
Survey
'Me. The World. The Media' 2014
Qualitative validation
of the results
of the descriptive analysis
Focus groups 2015
Typology created
in the secondary analysis
Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017
Qualitative validation
of the types
created in the cluster analysis
Focus groups 2017, 2018
Personal interpretation of and coping
with the speeding up of society
Diversification of society based on
individuals' time-use capability

Figure 7.1. Design of the time-use capability study in 2014–2018

7.4.1. The first focus group study

After a descriptive analysis of the survey data (some results are presented in the next sub-chapter) we conducted six focus groups in 2015 (three in Estonian and three in Russian; in this study we used only data from the focus groups with the Estonian-speaking participants including in total 9 males and 15 females). Participants with various educational and professional backgrounds were recruited through research panels by the Saar Poll market research company.

The interviews provided in-depth guidance for the interpretation of the survey results about the perception of the changing pace of personal life and societal development, the feeling of keeping abreast of the times and/or being behind the times, openness and resistance to changes, and thinking of time as a means for beneficial/bad capital conversions (see Figure 7.1).

The focus groups consisted of people born mostly between the following years: 1949–1954, 1969–1974 and 1989–1994. The oldest group came of age after the Second World War and the establishment of Soviet power. The middle age group was socialised during the Soviet period, although they reached adulthood within the turbulent flow of the Singing Revolution (1987–1991), the restoration of Estonian independence and radical reforms in all of the main societal areas. The formative years of the youngest group coincided with the transition period of Estonia, including ongoing democratisation, marketisation and digitalisation (Kalmus & Opermann, 2020). The interviews were recorded and transcribed. MAXQDA software (2016, 2018) was used for the inductive content analysis (Elo et al., 2014).

On the basis of the knowledge gained in the first phase of the research, we created a conceptual and operational model of personal time-use capability in a collective brainstorming session of the research group, and Marju Lauristin conducted a cluster analysis to create a typology of the Estonian population (Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017).

7.4.2. Secondary analysis of the survey data for the conceptualisation of 'time capital' and developing the model of 'time-use capability'

The secondary analysis of the survey data aimed to explain how individual actors differed on the basis of their capability to cope with social acceleration. We operationalised individual agents' relations to social acceleration through the concept of *personal time-use capability*. The development of this concept was inspired by Marian Preda's (2013) approach to 'time capital'. Preda divides the physical time capital that every individual is born with into *chronological time capital* (personal life expectancy) and *psycho-sociological time capital*. The latter relates to the quality of time spent on performing various activities, predominantly those that influence mood and health and, thereby, have a potential to increase or decrease chronological time capital (Preda, 2013: 31–32).

Preda's conceptualisation is based on the economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals defined earlier by Bourdieu (1986), Portes (1998) and Putnam (2000). In addition to these, Preda includes Becker's (1964) perspective on human capital, which focuses on creativity, personal qualities and social skills. At the core of his concept, Preda sees the conversion of capitals: individual time capital can be converted to economic capital (e.g. salaries), cultural capital (e.g. education) and social capital (e.g. networking time). The 'transaction' also works the other way round: people who are more 'capitalised' in terms of money or social relations can buy various services that help to save time and provide comfort; more 'capitalised' people can also ask for others' help to win extra time.

The idea of conversions of personal time capital to other forms of capital seems suitable for exploring individuals' coping with acceleration as an essential and inevitable logic of organising social relations and interactions. A person who is successful in converting chronological time to paid work or buying smart technologies that make it possible to save time is a champion in the management of social speeding-up. To the contrary, a person whose time capital conversions are less productive and who thereby struggles with a deficit of time is a loser in social acceleration. However, based on the analysis of earlier empirical research, we assume that the relationships between personal capitals and social benefits are more complicated. Following Preda, it would be logical to conclude that well-off and socially better positioned, or in other words better 'capitalised' social groups, would also be better off in terms of time capital, i.e. they would be able to spend more time in a manner providing them satisfaction. But as noted above, in Western welfare societies, more affluent and socially better positioned people tend to lack time, be more rushed and live tense lives.

From the individual's perspective, a perfect time relationship is multilayered and presumes that people possess the capacity and opportunities to schedule and alternate their activities, to choose not to perform certain activities themselves by opting to use a relevant service, and to regulate the pace and intensity of their own activities. Such a capacity is connected not only to material well-being and social status, but also to social relations, life-cycle phase and other factors. Whereas Preda defines time-use quality in terms of the satisfaction people can produce for themselves within chronological boundaries through activities they enjoy, it follows from the logic of social acceleration that enjoyment can also be found in activities that *are perceived as* necessary, such as the attainment or maintenance of social status and recognition, as well as the maintenance of freedom of time use in general. The alternation, scheduling and substitution of specific activities requires specific knowledge, skills, funds, relations and other resources. The exchange relationship between time and activities is, thus, multilayered and requires accounting for a far more diverse set of factors than the mere evaluation of personal time use.

Thus, we elaborated further on Preda's concept and proposed an original 'model of personal time-use capability', developed by Vihalemm and Lauristin (2017). 'Capability' refers not only to the possession of the forms of capital described above, but also the willingness and capacity to use them in such a manner (including converting different forms of capital) that the effect of such capital use on one's health, state of mind and maintenance of existing capital resources is positive. Simply put, personal time-use capability expresses the abundance of material and non-material benefits people gain for the time spent on certain activities (including freely usable time). In other words, it stands for their efficiency in converting time capital to economic, social, cultural, symbolic and human capital, and vice versa.

As these aspects can be manifested in everyday lives in manifold ways, we did not strive to construct one meta-variable but rather a set of aggregated variables that in different combinations create patterns that represent various ways of coping with personal time constraints in the context of social acceleration. Our operational model includes four groups of aggregated index variables[1].

The first group of variables express people's **time-use structure, i.e. self-reported time spent on various activities**: *on work and education*, *on housework*, *on media use*, *on reading books* and *on hobbies*.

The second group of index variables is comprised of variables in which our preliminary statistical analysis showed strong correlations with time-use variables: aggregated indicators of **practices and social relationships making it possible to convert time capital to other forms of capital, such as social or economic capital, and vice versa**: *participation in civic organisations*, *participation in civic actions*, *functional diversity of social media use*, *diversity of friends on Facebook*, *work and business contacts in other countries*, *mobility in Estonia* and *consumerism* (buying products and services to increase quality time).

The third group is formed of indicators of people's **relations to changes in society and the workplace** that require adaptation and increase time pressure and/or entail new opportunities: *openness to changes*, *resistance to changes*, *being bothered by changes* and the *perception of work-related changes*.

The fourth group consists of indicators of **time perception and time-use strategies**, such as *surplus time*, *perceived lack of time*, *overwork*, *difficulties in finding common time for family activities*, *multitasking*, *efforts to manage time differently*, *changing the family's rhythm of life on holidays and important days* and *participation in public holiday events*.

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[1] Aggregated variables (indices) help to increase the reliability of data and reveal more general tendencies. The indices were formed by summarising the codes of answers given to several questions measuring the same phenomenon. For instance, the index *Perceived lack of time* (i.e. chronically perceived time scarcity) summarises five variables. The maximum score in this index was 13. The variables were: *Freely used time during the daytime* (in hours, the answer '*Usually I don't have such time*' added 2 points, and the answer '*Less than an hour*' added 1 point), *Suffer from time deficiency* (the answer *'Yes, very often'* added 3 points, *'Quite often'* added 2 points and *'Sometimes'* added 1 point), *To what extent 'workload and work-related duties' and 'the load of housework' impede dealing with other more pleasant activities* (the answer *'Surely, to a large extent'* added 2 points and *'To some extent'* added 1 point), *'To what extent do you agree with the claim that you are always in a hurry and you make serious efforts to manage everything'* (the answer *'I strongly agree'* added 3 points and *'I rather agree'* added 1 point), *Having time during the week when you do not need to look at the clock or be accessible to everyone* (the answer *'I do not have such time'* added 1 point).

These index variables (24 in total) were standardised (to five-point scales based on symmetric distribution) and used as input variables for a k-means cluster analysis run on the total sample. A six-cluster solution turned out to be the clearest and the best for interpretation. The clusters show different forms of capabilities of coping with social acceleration, and the socio-demographic profiles of the clusters demonstrate how time-use capability differentiates the Estonian population.

7.4.3. The second focus group study

In 2017 three focus groups were conducted separately among three above-described generation groups, and one was conducted in 2018 in mixed age setting. The snowball and convenience sampling procedures were used to recruit participants. These four group interviews consisted of 7 males and 17 females with higher educational background, working in academia and education. All interviews were held in Estonian.

In the second focus group study, besides the discussion on time use and perception of societal changes, we tested how participants resonated with the sociological portraits that were created based on the survey data. We were interested in whether people recognised themselves and their acquaintances in these ideal (or pure) types, how they related to them and how they perceived their social positions and worldviews. First, participants read brief descriptions of the sociological portraits (without socio-demographic characteristics). Then they were asked to discuss which type best described their own and their acquaintances' lifestyles and opportunities.

7.5. INDIVIDUALS' SUBJECTIVE REFLECTION UPON SOCIAL SPEEDING-UP AND PERSONAL TIME-USE CAPABILITY

Earlier empirical research has shown that the pace of personal time is hectic, and time deficits are quite significant among people with higher social status. The MeeMa survey confirmed this in the case of Estonian society. As Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show, the time deficit is bigger and the pace of everyday life is faster among people with higher education, white-collar workers and those aged 30 to 54. The speeding-up cycles directly impact people with higher professional status who claim more often to have busy schedules that usually lead to acceleration processes (i.e. a growing number of both work-related and general activities within certain time windows; Tooding, 2017). At the same time, the advantage of such a busy life filled with many tasks and obligations lies in greater material and social capital accumulated over the years.

Figure 7.2. Share of people with tight time budgets in socio-demographic groups in 2014

% of group



Source: Tooding, 2017: 426

In general, 60% of the Estonian adult population felt that the pace of their own and their family's lives had become faster (Figure 7.3). The differences between occupational and educational groups were not very large, so we may argue that the perception of the pace of life is shaped by several factors, not only by labour market structures. Focus group participants, too, had perceived an increase in the tempo and intensity of their lives during the last ten years. Their time use had become somewhat tighter. This feeling was strongly related to work because most of the retired people did not sense an increase in the pace of life (Figure 7.3). 'Empty' time seemed to be related to other lifestyle aspects, because retired people experienced 'empty' time less frequently than workers and students (Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.3. Life and work pace by education and occupational status in 2014

% of group



* Respondents did not answer the questions about work.

In the focus groups, we observed that time was often spoken of as a disappearing resource that had to be used carefully. One participant gave a good description of this belief, which was shared by many others: fitting many activities into a single unit of time seemingly created more time resources, even though in biological terms the time remained the same. Thus, more personal time could be accommodated in biological time, but this only added to the sense of a lack of time:

> It may, perhaps, be difficult to judge this at the moment, but it seems to me that time is starting to slip away more and more. Years go by. There is also so much to do all the time. [---] But even though you may live and act fast, biological time is actually passing at the same pace. (Senior researcher, born 1969–1974, male, 2017)

People are reluctant to make time investments in activities in which they cannot see direct or indirect benefits:

> … I'm actually very, very conscious of what I spend my time on and what is … something there's really not much point spending it on. (Associate professor 1, born 1949–1954, female, 2017)

Researchers engaged in project-based work (for a more detailed discussion of 'projectification' and the acceleration of work life, see Allmer, 2018; Cicmil et al., 2016) find that 'slow' research requiring concentration and an investment of time has often had to give way to the principles of market economics (see also Kalmus & Opermann, 2020). Researchers are, thus, forced into a ceaseless struggle for project funds, described as follows by the same senior researcher cited above:

> You are often invited to give a talk somewhere [on the weekend] and, well, if I also have to pay for [the transport] out of my own pocket, I will think, 'That'll be 200 euros, then! I will not bother to make the trip for anything less. Take it or leave it!' At least my wife and kids will get something out of this [money]. It would be completely pointless if it wasn't for that. (Senior researcher, born 1969–1974, male, 2017)

Participants described changes in their perceived ability and practices regarding changing work arrangements in their workplaces, especially in the context of digitalisation. Together with the changing working environment, the increase in the complexity of work requirements and workload was perceived to be higher than before. Therefore, some participants considered coping with the continuous integration of technological and organisational changes, often presented as 'innovations', to be a potential source of work overload and job stress.

> Document management systems, anti-virus software, etc. The Internet is also developing at such a rapid pace, but you have to keep up with the times, both in your work life and in general. (Librarian, born 1969–1974, female, 2015)

Whereas the young and middle-aged generations perceive technological and organisational innovations to be parts of the natural order of things – as necessary and unavoidable – the older generation, with their extensive experience and more critical attitude towards the careless use of time, largely act out of pragmatic considerations: they have less time available than younger people, making them reluctant to use it imprudently.

Feeling rushed (*I am always busy and trying to cope with everything*) is more characteristic of higher status, managerial jobs and specialists, and higher education groups (Figure 7.3). People who feel rushed also more frequently exercise habitual multitasking (Figure 7.3). The pressure to be involved in more activities during certain time periods seems to derive from the flexibility of the timing of job tasks in the case of managers and entrepreneurs (Figure 7.3). Specialists and especially service personnel feel rushed by the multitude of their work tasks and obligations, but their work is still quite synchronised institutionally: there is not much flexibility in determining work hours (Figure 7.3).

In the focus groups, the issue of the digitalisation of work and communication practices raised contradictory views in discussions. One significant phenomenon associated with technology usage and digital communication in combination with the increasing pace of life, discussed in all focus groups, was **multitasking** (see also Figure 7.3). The ability to engage in multiple tasks simultaneously has been seen for many years as a prime skill and strategy for the productive and efficient performance of work. Naturally, opinions on strategies of more efficient time use, especially multitasking as a new standard practice for alleviating time pressure, tended to vary. Multitasking is not an entirely new phenomenon, as critically pointed out and exemplified by Archer (2014: 4), but modern technology has made it much more intense. Similarly to the adaptation to technological advances, younger generations tend to find it much more natural than older respondents. As our analysis of the survey data shows, they are also much more skilled at it (Kalmus et al., 2018).

Some focus group participants accurately evaluated the multitasking and technological aids that make this even more efficient:

> As to how to plan your time when you have so little of it, multitasking really helps. [---] I can schedule meetings on my computer and combine different things. I think technology is really the best thing for organising and combining things. (Customer service representative, born 1989–1994, female, 2015)

Several participants working in academia (who often have to perform unique and complex tasks), however, were far from seeing being rushed and multitasking as good solutions; on the contrary, they saw them as interfering with personal performance and, at best, suitable as temporary solutions, not parts of an everyday, habitual style of work:

> [Multitasking], after all, requires more cognitive effort to switch from one task to another. Although, if you have become completely stuck on something, it might, perhaps, be more sensible to switch to a different activity. (PhD student, born 1989–1994, male, 2017)

Focus group discussions also inspired protest and mobilisation against the compression of work time through a variety of administrative and technological means. One male participant referred to time as a literal resource and condemned the overburdening of time with excessive requirements that he felt had become the normal expectation for organisers of work and managers, applied by default and without much thought. He called for more conscious planning of processes through the realistic assessment of time resources:

> We're stupidly feeding a sort of default assumption as if we should do more and more with the existing resource we have. In my opinion, this is a very bad starting point. Why should we compress more and more into less and less time?! (Lecturer, born 1969–1974, male, 2017)
>
> Source: Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 17.

A senior participant with long academic experience **doubted the innovative value** of administrative and technological changes in university teaching:

> We [the older generation] don't really accept these innovations right away. And I really don't know why we should take up every new idea. Especially given that these 'completely new' ideas are well-forgotten old ones. [---] I think that looking for something new, always something new, is a sort of cult inherent in our current consumer society. (Associate professor 1, born 1949–1954, female, 2017)

Some focus group participants admitted that they had tried not to adopt new information systems or attend all scheduled meetings because they knew that these tools were incremental and did not bring qualitative change to a system. People seem to have developed certain ideas and sometimes also skills to avoid certain incremental arrangements. For example, one participant spoke of how she had learned to use four information systems in different organisations she had worked at. While facing the task of learning about another information system, she played with the idea of skipping it but hesitated because she was afraid that not taking this seemingly silly step would worsen her general skills of learning:

> And then [after another new system was implemented at the workplace] I started thinking about all these changes … how about I just skip a few? Do I really need to go through all these steps? But maybe I won't ever learn to use it if I haven't gone through all the steps. [---] It's actually quite embarrassing from time to time, like when some of the changes are sort of silly. And then you just sort of hope that they will be reversed, even though I'm not entirely sure I'll ever live to see that happen. (Associate professor 2, born 1949–1954, female, 2017)

In addition to opposition to manager-led planning practices, **workplace tensions** are also alleviated through social solidarity. One participant working at a research institution expressed her serious concern about the increasing risk of workplace stress and burnout in academia, and therefore said she was often in a situation where support and help among her colleagues was needed, especially in their busiest times. 'I cannot just let them collapse next to me under the intense pressure of work,' she said (junior researcher, born 1969–1974, 2017).

And last, but not least, work that is sensed as pleasant and interesting, offering satisfaction and even joy, is compensation for the increase in tensions and pace of life. Figure 7.3 shows that Estonian employees rather enjoyed their work. Thus, increased working time and pace do not exclude work satisfaction:

> I have no time-related stress because I like my work and I have sort of managed to merge my job and my hobbies. So even if I'm doing work-related things outside office hours, I don't ever perceive this as a burden or a grind or a struggle. (Senior researcher, born 1969–1974, female, 2017)

The focus groups also revealed the mechanisms of alleviation of the tension of the **increased pace of work and living**. These seemed to correspond to Southerton's belief (2003) that leisure time is furnished with purchased products and services, and people's perceptions of leisure time are shaped by certain consumption standards that are united under the hybrid term of quality time (Bianchi et al., 2007; Southerton, 2012). Discussions of the pace of living as a factor affecting lifestyle and quality of life also covered such concepts as 'quality time' and 'garbage time', and how the proportion of one or the other could be increased or decreased by technological means. Quality time was primarily connected to valuing oneself and the creation of better conditions and enjoyable situations for oneself. Examples of related strategies mentioned by the participants included the purchase of a lounge pass for a plane trip or a gym membership providing more benefits and better services to give their bodies and minds some well-earned relaxation, thus making them more efficient in their work and activities.

> I have come to value my time more than before … through small things. For example, I used to go to a less expensive gym that was further away, with the result that I actually didn't really go there often, as it was so far away and required such a huge effort. So, I ended up opting for a slightly more expensive place that was conveniently located on my way home from work. I pay more, but at the same time I also save some time and it is sort of more likely for me to actually make it to the gym. (PhD student, born 1989–1994, female, 2017)

'Empty time' spent without a purpose was mainly defined as accompanying a passive or routine activity, such as time spent on public transport or in a queue that can easily be filled by consuming media content or communicating on a smart device. Listening to audio books or podcasts, e.g. while exercising, has also become increasingly more popular. One member of the youngest age group (born 1989–1994) gave a vivid description in our 2017 focus group discussion of how she spent more than half an hour listening to books each day and had trained herself to listen at 1.7 times the normal speed. One could say, then, that some people are (perhaps unwittingly) trying to further speed up personal time in the context of structural and technological processes.

The calls for slowing down the pace of life as a planned intervention into the course of societal development, which has been conceptualised as 'social resonance' (Rosa, 2019), was also discussed in focus groups. In figurative terms, social resonance means restoring sensitivity to the surrounding world and oneself: awareness of experiences and responding to social 'resonation'. In a group discussion in 2018, however, the consensus seemed to be that a 'slowed down' lifestyle, especially one followed as a conscious choice, not one that had naturally evolved through historical continuity, was overly romanticised in the modern world and was elitist in many ways, as it presumed the availability of certain initial resources.

> It seems to me that people leading slow lifestyles tend to over-romanticise that way of life in some sense. [---] What I mean to say is, it can exhaust itself rather quickly … In the sense that you still want to afford yourself modern dental care, no matter how simple your life is. You can raise free-range chickens and grow goutweed and so on, but some things still cost actual money. (Chronicler, born 1969–1974, female, 2018)

To sum up, in the integrated qualitative and quantitative study, we discovered several ideas and practices to resist or alleviate time pressure and the intensification of the work pace. The higher positioned social groups, being the prime targets of direct (a multitude of complicated tasks during the same amount of time) or indirect (desynchronisation, blurring the borders between different task-timings) technological and structural speeding up, were very much aware and

Figure 7.4. Evaluation of the speed of changes in Estonia by personal life pace in 2014

% of group



critical of time as a resource and careful about its investment in new tasks related to administrative and technological synchronisation (i.e. meetings, new information and communication systems). Multitasking, even if supported by technological means, is perceived as dangerous, because it degrades job performance and the 'market value' of the workforce. Thus, technological and structural speeding-up has motivated the subjective re-evaluation of workforce sales transactions, at least in the higher positions of the labour market. It is still unknown which forms such resistance takes, but it is likely that the top workforce, who rationally calculate their capitals and have powerful enough voices to negotiate, will have impacts on further speeding-up cycles and demand the implementation of certain alleviation/slowing-down mechanisms.

The personal sense of the change of life pace also has certain impacts on the general evaluation of the pace of the development of the whole society (Figure 7.4). People who feel their life pace is stable (15% of the total population) also tend to see societal development as proceeding at a satisfactory – not too fast or too slow – pace. Two thirds of the group who felt there was an increase in their life pace were more likely to consider society's speed to be too fast, but still the majority of them found that the speed of the society was 'normal' and that also normalised the intensification of their own lives. The group who felt that their life pace was slowing down had the most divergent opinions about the speed of societal development, and they were least often satisfied with it. The feeling of too fast a speed of societal development was connected with the fear of being left behind, but the opinion that societal development was too slow was motivated by the expectation of making use of some benefits brought about by the further development of society before the end of one's life (this group was older than average).

The knowledge obtained from the quantitative and qualitative studies led us to elaborate on the concept of personal time-use capability and conduct a typological analysis of the Estonian population.

7.6. SOCIOLOGICAL PORTRAITS OF PERSONAL TIME-USE CAPABILITY GROUPS

To explore the social differentiation of Estonian society based on personal time-use capability, we carried out a cluster analysis. Time-use capability is not an autonomous empirical category but an instrument of interpretation, an umbrella term for the differentiation of social groups in Estonian society, based on four broad categories (see Section 7.4.2).

The characterisation of the six time-use capability clusters according to their constituent variables is provided in Figure 7.5 and Appendix 7.1; the socio-demographic profile is provided in Appendix 7.2, and the characterisation of the types based on other attitudes and practices related to the concept of social acceleration is provided in Appendix 7.3. The description of each type is illustrated with excerpts from the second focus group study (conducted in 2017 and 2018), where participants discussed these sociological portraits.

7.6.1. Successful multitaskers

The first group that formed in the cluster analysis scored high in most constituent variables of the time-use capability model. This group can be considered the most capable of social acceleration, being equipped with suitable educational, social, biological and material capitals for successful conversions of their time to get the most out of it. The members of this group were highly active in many fields of work and leisure, spending a lot of time on work and education, hobbies and reading books, thus raising their human and cultural capital (Figure 7.5; Appendix 7.1). They were very eager social media users, and they participated actively in civic organisations and activities. In particular, the index of multitasking peaked in this group; thus, we have labelled the group *successful multitaskers* because the means of multitasking was the highest in this group (Appendix 7.1). *Successful multitaskers* are open to changes both in society and the workplace, seeing changes as opportunities, not as threats. They perceive the increased pace of life as normal, and they have

Figure 7.5. General characteristics of the time-use capability types in 2014

K-means cluster analysis of the composite indices (scale 1–5); see Appendix 7.1 for values



developed various strategies for coping with the speeding-up (e.g. multitasking and taking breaks); they have the skills for intensive activities. The desire to optimise time performance is an important motivator for them: they often try to rearrange their time-use, facilitated by flexible working hours (Appendix 7.3). Despite these attempts, they often have trouble in synchronising activities, especially in their personal lives: opportunities for spending time with friends and family can be hard to find (Appendix 7.1). The tension caused by intensive time-use is alleviated by taking breaks: most members of the group admit that they can occasionally take time for themselves, when they do not have to be constantly available and keeping an eye on the clock. Like people with intense lifestyles, they use national holidays and other days of celebration for breaks (Vihalemm & Harro-Loit, 2019). Most of them think they have enough time to attain the life goals they have established for themselves; thus, they tend to be oriented towards investing their time and other types of capital for future benefit (Appendix 7.3).

The socio-demographic profile of this cluster clearly indicates their elevated social status: most of the group is made up of entrepreneurs, managers and professionals. The proportion of students is also notable. Most of the members of the group are aged 20–55, i.e. at various stages of relatively active development. A large proportion of them have higher education and higher than average incomes. The members of the cluster are, thus, characterised by high levels of economic, cultural (educational) and social capital. The members of the cluster also invest significant resources in the maintenance of and increase in human capital: half of them have taken steps towards leading healthier lives (even though the majority of them are in good health) and they also actively engage in various training courses (Appendix 7.3). They are skilled at using technology, illustrated by the fact that they protect their digital identities; many members of the group also make extremely diverse use of digital channels and tools (Appendix 7.3). The members of this group could be said to be the bearers of social acceleration. Even though half of them tend to worry about the natural environment, they remain optimistic about the future. *Successful multitasker* was recognised as an ideal type that 'every well-adjusted and self-respecting person' should try to conform to (Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 15). Even though this type is the ideal of modern society, it was also perceived as 'constructed' and (excessively) rational. Many thus have begun doubting their ability to lead the described lifestyles and to meet all of the characteristics of this type, as that would be too exhausting. The description of this type and the discussion also inspired reflexive feedback from the perspective of personality. What suited one individual did not necessarily suit another: they acknowledged that they were not part of the target group for the 'multitasking master class'.

> Well, a successful multitasker seems to be the type that would be an ideal role model in the current society. [---] At a certain period of time, I was also influenced by such things and thought that was what I should go after, until I realised that I *was not* that type of person *at all*. [---] I've had to make such a shift in order to avoid all of this struggle, because I'm personally not capable of multitasking. [---] The type called 'time-stress-free hobbyist' is a natural condition and somewhere near what I'd like to achieve. (PhD student, born 1989–1994, male, 2017) Source: Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 15.

Several participants confessed to having abandoned activities of the type characteristic to the 'successful multitasker' due to a lack of time and energy: examples of these included withdrawing from positions of authority, from participation in civic organisations and from civic actions, and giving up reading books. The ideal type thus tended to remind the interviewees of the things they had given up:

> I spend a tremendous amount of time on work and self-development. … My free time for hobbies and reading books has decreased significantly. I've made a conscious decision. … I'm an active social media user but don't often participate in civic activities and associations. … And there's also the fact that I was elected to a representative body and it's something I've once again sort of given up. My time schedule is extremely tight, and I multitask a lot on my personal and work projects … (PhD student, born 1989–1994, female, 2017) Source: Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 16.

To sum up, the members of this group are characterised by their extremely high personal time-use ability: their chronological time is filled with activities that are pleasant and/or serve to increase or maintain other forms of capital. They possess higher than average levels of economic, social, symbolic and cultural capital, which they can convert to increased personal time capital or, vice versa, they can create more 'quality time'. They find the acceleration of social time to be a normal state of affairs; they have developed a variety of skills for managing the increased pace of life while still retaining their quality of life: even when in a rush, they still can take breaks, or work on multiple tasks at the same time. In most cases, acceleration tends to increase (or at least maintain) their economic, social and symbolic capital. The only form of capital at risk is human capital: low levels of sleep and long working hours eventually take a toll on their health. Even though this cluster only makes up 18% of the Estonian population, their social position and well-developed social network make them more 'vocal' and influential in society. They are likely to view intense and high-paced living as a norm that they also tend to expect (by default) from other people in their fields of influence, thus acting as the mediators of acceleration in society. At the same time, the focus group discussions indicated that even though the model of a successful multitasker might be considered an ideal, it seems unattainable for many members of society.

7.6.2. Discontent multitaskers

Certain aspects of the lifestyle of the first cluster are shared by the second cluster, which we have termed *discontent multitaskers*. Like the first cluster, the members of this one (comprising 12% of the Estonian population) are characterised by intensive time-use, perceive a constant lack of time and often tend to multitask. Unlike the first group, however, they are not content with the fast pace of life and do not consider it normal. They are bothered by the changes taking place in society in general, as well as in the workplace and in their social circles (Appendix 7.1). They tend to work 'nine to five' jobs, although more than eight hours a day on average. At the same time, half of the group still enjoy their jobs (Appendix 7.3). Thus, the hours they dedicate to their work can at least in part be considered time spent in a pleasant and practical manner (Preda, 2013). The members of this cluster also find it very difficult to find time for joint family activities. The frequent attempts of the members of the cluster to plan and rearrange their time use are in many cases unsuccessful, as they constantly feel strapped for time and discontent (Appendix 7.3). The time of the members of this cluster is largely filled with unpaid housework and care-taking duties (Appendix 7.1), limiting their opportunities to convert personal time capital to economic capital. Their chances of increasing their time capital through the investment of social and symbolic capital are slightly better: the members of the group are active in civic associations and social media, while a third of them participate in representative bodies (Appendix 7.3). They also spend more time than average on hobbies and recreational activities (Appendix 7.1). The members of this cluster are, thus, still able to increase their time capital through the creation of quality time and can escape their daily routines and take breaks, e.g. on days of celebration (Appendix 7.1). Remarkably, despite the relative 'youth' of this cluster, only half of its members claim to have no health problems (Appendix 7.3). The members of the cluster are also more passive in their attempts to increase human capital by getting enough sleep and living healthier lifestyles (Appendix 7.3). They are relatively proficient at using digital technology: many use a large variety of digital gadgets and know how to protect their digital identities (Appendix 7.3). Most of the members of this cluster are younger or middle-aged (Appendix 7.2). In terms of profession, they comprise a higher than average proportion of professionals, junior professionals and service workers, as well as ordinary workers (Appendix 7.2). The educational profile of the cluster corresponds to the average Estonian level of education; in terms of gender, the cluster is dominated by women (Appendix 7.2).

In general, *discontent multitaskers* tend to appear as the 'victims' of social acceleration despite the average or higher than average levels of capital they possess. Nevertheless, they remain optimistic, thinking that they still have time to achieve their life goals (Appendix 7.3).

In the focus groups, this type was also perceived as the ‘losers’ of the acceleration society and the participants referred to this fact in the discussions of their personal problems. Several young and middle-aged participants with under-age children felt under a double pressure: in addition to job responsibilities, they had to fulfil their many duties at home, primarily unpaid care work for the family. For a young mother of a toddler, one of the greatest challenges was balancing the increasing workload and family life and finding time for herself (Kalmus & Opermann, 2020).

> I think I do represent the type called ‘discontent multitasker’, since all of my time, from early morning till late evening, is usually tightly planned, both at work and at home. And thus, I can only carve out about one hour a day for myself, to do what I want to do … *at home* … I cannot go out easily. (Administrative staff member, born 1989–1994, female, 2018)
>
> Source: Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 15.

At the same time, the role model evoked no sense of danger in the participants and mobilised no protest against a way of life that exhausted people’s time and energy. Instead, it tended to be perceived as a necessary part of the life cycle in a period when children are still small, yet one needs to work. The fact that discontent multitaskers include many socially active people, highly trusted by their fellow citizens (indicated by their election to various representative bodies) did not receive much attention in the focus groups. We may say that even though the members of this type can cope with the demands of the acceleration society, they do not present an inspiring role model due to their discontentment.

7.6.3. Virtual multitaskers

The third cluster is characterised by social media-centred lifestyles. Many of their activities take place in virtual environments. Time spent on housekeeping, work and personal development is lower than average in this cluster (Appendix 7.1). Members of the cluster are also not especially active as participants in civic associations and activities (Appendix 7.1). The multitasking index of this cluster is significantly higher than average, even though there is no specific need for this: there is no excess of tasks waiting to be done or any related time pressure. The members of this group are more likely to have time to spare (Appendices 7.1 and 7.3). Doing several things at once is more likely a technologically mediated habit, not an ‘objective necessity’ per se. We have, thus, termed this group of people *virtual multitaskers*. The cluster includes 14% of the Estonian population. In terms of social status, it is dominated by students and workers, meaning that the cultural capital of this cluster is significantly lower than that of the previous two groups (Appendix 7.2). The group is dominated by men and over half of the members of the cluster are younger than 30 (Appendix 7.2). The lives of virtual multitaskers are lived at a moderate pace: work and school days, sleeping hours and time free from obligations cause no tensions in terms of the synchronisation of activities; they also do not experience a scarcity of time. The members of the cluster are more likely to spend, rather than increase, their personal time capital: in most cases, strict work or school hours do not give them much joy (Appendix 7.3). The time spent on hobbies is close to the average, moderate attention is paid to holidays, and holiday trips are rare, most likely due to the lack of funds (Appendix 7.3). As a result, the most common way of spending quality time is on virtual reality, social media and digital technology (Appendix 7.3). Due to their youth, the members of this cluster share an optimistic view of the chronological time capital they possess, perceiving the fulfilment of major life goals to be still ahead. They are also less concerned than average about environmental problems (Appendix 7.3). Difficulties related to social acceleration are relatively unfamiliar to this group; they are, instead, more likely to enjoy the opportunities provided by technology for the flexible use of time and space, which they tend to utilise 'for fun', not out of necessity. The relatively high level of unused time is maintained by the life cycle and biological advantages of the group: the members of the cluster are young, healthy and mostly unburdened by financial or family obligations.

In the focus groups held in 2017 and 2018, young participants often identified themselves with 'virtual multitaskers' due to their constant and active use of virtual environments; other features were not considered applicable.

> I do spend a significant amount of time in virtual environments, but not much on social media. For me, there's no need to tweet every half hour or post every single thing on Instagram. I just don't feel like I need to. (Librarian, born 1989–1994, female, 2018)
>
> Source: Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 16.

In general, the participants tended to stress that they did not spend a significant amount of time in virtual environments. This may have been influenced by the fact that, in the group discussions, excessive time spent on social media and in the digital realm was associated with wasting time.

7.6.4. Time-stress-free hobbyists

The fourth group, termed *time-stress-free hobbyists*, includes 21% of the Estonian population. The name of the cluster is primarily based on the fact that the members of this group do not suffer from a lack of time or difficulties in finding time to spend with their families; they also have no need for constant multitasking and they get sufficient sleep, as well as having time free from obligations (Appendix 7.1). The members of this cluster are moderately burdened with housework and caring for family members, most likely because they are predominantly over 55 years of age and have already fulfilled their obligations related to the raising of children (Appendix 7.2). More than half of the members of the cluster no longer work, and those who do perceive no time pressure related to the organisation of work and tasks (Appendices 7.1 and 7.2). The members of this cluster, thus, feel no time stress. The second factor reflected in the name of this cluster is the importance of civic and community activities, as well as cultural and hobby activities, in the lives of the members of the group (Appendices 7.1 and 7.3). Many have been elected to representative positions (Appendix 7.3). Following Preda (2013), we may say that the members of the group possess a high level of time capital. They have a large amount of freely usable time that they spend on pleasant activities. They try to develop their human capital through education: despite their age, a relatively large proportion of them participate in lifelong learning, having taken classes or retraining courses in the past year (Appendix 7.3). The cluster is dominated by women (Appendix 7.2). Due to their age, the members of the group may have health problems, but are making significant attempts to change their lifestyles for the sake of health and, thus, to gain more time capital (Appendix 7.2). The members of this cluster are also very concerned about the environment (Appendix 7.3). In conclusion, they tend to play an inhibiting role in the processes of social acceleration. They do not expect much from the future anymore; most of them find that their best days were in the past (Appendix 7.3). They consider the preservation of existing values (including the environment) more important than an ever-accelerating society with increased material well-being. Even though the members of the group do not lose anything in the acceleration of social time, as they are very little affected by institutional and lifestyle pressure on the practices of personal time use, they still oppose changes, multitasking and the acceleration of the pace of life for both personal and social reasons, valuing opportunities for concentration and immersion, continuity and the slow pace of processes.

Several focus group participants in 2017 and 2018 considered the time-stress-free hobbyist an ideal role model they hoped to reach in the future (in the second half of their lives). This model was mainly valued for the peaceful rhythm and devotion to hobbies and working for fun and passion. At the same time, civic and communal activity and continuous personal development, also associated with the model, received very little attention and there was not much desire to be involved in them. Several of the participants identified their lifestyles with the model of the time-stress-free hobbyist, while highlighting certain conflicts with social demands, vividly expressed as follows:

> It's kind of embarrassing, but I think I'm one of those 'stress-free-hobbyists', which is totally opposite to the Protestant work ethic. [---] I'm not much of a hard worker. No, really! I suffer no time-related stress, as I like my job and my work has sort of merged with my hobbies [---] My time is regulated by the fact that I'm a commuter: I take a train to work in the morning and return in the evening. My work has to fit between the two times and, since the Wi-Fi on the train is so bad, I can't really do any work there. When I get home, I have to focus on other things. (Chronicler, born 1969–1974, female, 2018)
>
> Source: Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 17.

Some of the participants felt an affinity to this ideal type because they had managed to maintain their hobbies despite a rapid pace of life. Some admitted that one could follow the lifestyle of a time-stress-free hobbyist sporadically:

> Well, in my case, there's an interplay of the 'time-stressed hard-worker' and the 'time-stress-free' type. [---] *I haven't given up* my hobbies and favourite things. Really! I go to a sports club, although often something intervenes so that I can't go. [---] I love reading, and I do read books – crime fiction especially – and *nothing keeps me* from finding out who the murderer is! [---] So, I'd love to identify myself with the stress-free actor. Yet, it's difficult to get away from the stressful periods that come, you know. (Associate professor 2, born 1949–1954, female, 2017) Source: Kalmus & Opermann, 2020: 17.

This role model attracted participants in the focus groups with its low level of conformance to the perceived demands of society; people tended to find it attractive mainly due to the stress-free attitude and devotion to hobbies. At the same time, as mentioned above, concerns for the environment or community/civic activity received little attention in the focus groups.

7.6.5. Time-stressed hard-worker

The fifth cluster, termed the *time-stressed hard-workers*, is in many ways the opposite of the fourth. The members of this cluster spend almost all of their time working just to make a living. From Preda's (2013) perspective, this kind of time use can be termed wasted time capital: the work generally brings no joy, the working hours are long, and the strict schedule does not facilitate combining different activities

(Appendices 7.1 and 7.3). There is hardly any time for other activities, such as personal development, hobbies, reading and spending time with family. This causes major discontent and tension. This cluster makes up 13% of the Estonian population. Since the members of the cluster suffer from a chronic lack of time and overwork, they tend to try to rearrange their activities to save time and they practice multitasking (Appendix 7.1). At the same time, multitasking and a fast pace of life are not considered a normal condition by the members of the cluster; instead, they yearn for a more peaceful routine and fear burnout caused by excessive pace. Around one-fifth of the cluster experience health problems and, in many cases, they make attempts to change their lifestyles and habits for the sake of health, but work-related pressure still tends to reduce the amount of time they have for sleep and relaxation and, thus, also decreases their chronological time capital (Appendix 7.3). The social status of the members of this group is extremely varied: they include entrepreneurs and managers, service employees and ordinary workers (Appendix 7.2). In terms of age, the cluster is mostly made up of people of active working age, 30–64; the cluster includes a higher than average proportion of Estonian Russians and men (Appendix 7.2). The financial requirements of the members of this cluster seem to be higher than their income-earning opportunities at their main jobs, so many of them also take on work on the side for extra income. They are moderately technologically competent and have a moderate level of digital skills and practices (Appendix 7.3). Even though they feel burdened by work and earning a living, a significant number of them have been elected to representative bodies or positions of authority. The members of this cluster are divided (partly based on age) into those with more ambitious expectations for the future ('We still have time to fulfil our goals') and those with more resigned attitudes ('Our best days are behind us'; Appendix 7.3). They are more concerned about the state of the environment than the members of the group of successful multitaskers. In the context of social acceleration, the members of the cluster appear to be victims in a certain sense. They are under a double institutional and life-cycle-related pressure (active working age, strictly regulated working hours and working several jobs) and they tend to oppose changes in society and in their personal lives. Opportunities for shaping their own lives are scarce, as they possess limited economic agency: they are burdened by loans, their level of education (close to the national average) and relatively limited participation in continuing education and training can prevent them from finding better-paid positions, and they are employed in the private sector, either in the industrial or service sectors, where jobs provide little flexibility in terms of working hours. The members of this cluster are, thus, forced to adapt to the bursts of increase in pace created by economic acceleration.

The *time-stressed hard-worker* was also a type that the focus group participants could identify with partially. Several middle-aged and older professionals described their lives as highly stressful, while conceding that intense periods varied in length and alternated with more relaxing phases. Although middle-aged and older people had predominantly internalised the norm of intense and hard work, some focus group participants loudly voiced their disapproval of the practice of accelerated time use, stating that sometimes one *must* make a conscious choice to take breaks from responsibilities. In a similar vein, another participant opposed the idea of extreme workloads, ironically describing her 'deviation' from the prevalent social norm. This ideal type thus mobilised people to fight back, having a significantly stronger effect as an alarming precedent than the model of the discontent multitasker.

7.6.6. Withdrawn

The sixth cluster is termed the *withdrawn* group and it includes people who are generally retired, do not participate in civic associations, and are more passive than average as hobbyists and media consumers (Appendix 7.1). They have largely exhausted their chronological time capital and are reaching the final stages of their lives. They tend to have difficulties in finding something to do with their time and have a 'surplus' of time (Appendix 7.1), which can cause feelings of 'not keeping up with the times' and stress related to being left behind: many members of this cluster agreed with the statement 'Everyone is always rushing somewhere, while I often have nothing to do'. In Preda's (2013) terms, such a state can be considered a waste of time capital. Many of these people find that 'Our best days are behind us' (Appendix 7.3). Their time capital is further reduced by problems with health; many make no attempts to change their habits for the sake of health (Appendix 7.3). The cluster is mainly made up of older people and has a high proportion of men (Appendix 7.2). Members of this group make up 22% of the Estonian population. They are greatly affected by acceleration, mainly due to the perception of being left behind. They thus experience the stress related to the acceleration of social time not as a personal lack of time but as a lack in comparison with other members of the society. They find it difficult to bear the deceleration of personal time in the context of the acceleration and intensification of social time.

The withdrawn type was only mentioned once in the focus group discussion in 2017 consisting of the oldest participants, and in a somewhat more philosophical or meditative sense. What the participant referred to was a conscious and premeditated withdrawal from daily life, the distance required for 'looking inside yourself'. No discussions of this sort occurred in the focus groups made up of younger people.

> I would also say that I'd like to be a 'hobbyist' or … or a 'time-stressed hard-worker', but I'm not sure if I am one or not. But I'm also fine to be 'withdrawn', not in the negative sense but in the sense that you finally have time to focus on your soul. On being yourself … And that's exactly it: you live your entire life always having to do this and having to do that. And you have certain obligations, don't you? Children, family, whatever. So, this could be the time when I could start thinking about what I have actually lived for. (Associate professor 3, born 1949–1954, female, 2017)

The participants did not mention the health problems, 'empty time' or pessimistic resignation characteristic to the withdrawn type.

7.7. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This chapter was inspired by the thesis of acceleration as the essential and inevitable logic of organising social relations and interactions articulated by Hartmut Rosa. Although this concept is contested both in empirical research of people's time use (Sullivan & Gershuny, 2018) and in a theoretical conceptualisation of the transformation of current society (Archer, 2014: 5), we found the notion of social acceleration to be fruitful in finding out how the logic of speeding-up can shape the diversification or homogenisation processes in Estonian society. We discovered that acceleration creates an alternative logic of the diversification of society that only partially coincides with the economic, political or cultural logic of differentiation. Speeding-up as a transformative force can be perceived by subjects and reflected upon in relation to their everyday lives.

By using the mixed-method approach, we defined six groups representing the ideal types of time-use capability and explained their ways of adapting to technological and structural speeding-up. Considering subjective satisfaction with one's time use, outcomes of one's time management practices, pace of life, sufficiency of time for various activities, and keeping up with the times, we found that the sociological portraits of 'winners' in society, governed by the logic of speed, were quite different.

The first ideal type, *successful multitaskers*, is represented by people who are capable of intensive lives and who are interested in investing their time in various spheres. Such time investigation returns value for time spent in the form of money, knowledge, social acknowledgement, and/or emotional pleasure. Representatives of this type most likely belong to higher occupational and education groups. Another 'winner' group – *virtual multitaskers* – consists of people with much lower socio-economic and educational status (e.g. students and workers), who do not experience a deficit of time but enjoy using technological means for multitasking. They view the rapid changes in society rather positively, even if their own lifestyle is not much influenced by distant work, flexible working time, lifelong learning and other characteristics of the economic speeding-up. Virtual networking offers them pleasure and emotional stimulation, and symbolic or real transactions can make the world more accessible to them. Thus, their lives have been positively shaped by the technological and cultural speeding-up, and they are not (negatively) influenced by structural acceleration.

The third group of 'winners' – *time-stress-free hobbyists* – benefit from opportunities to slow down in their personal lives (due to having grown-up children, retirement or maturation of their professional careers) that free them from or ease obligations but allow them to engage in other activities related to hobbies and community life that prevent loneliness and provide satisfaction from doing things with other people. Members of this group have very high levels of time capital that they can convert into social and human capital by contributing to community life, educating themselves and changing their habits to follow healthy lifestyles. They take breaks and resist multitasking and rapid changes; thus, *time-stress-free hobbyists* function as reflexive 'brakes' on social acceleration. They are not well-off economically but the diversity of their leisure time, found to be related to life satisfaction (Jarosz, 2016), makes them an aspirational group for economically better-off and technologically more skilled groups.

The 'losers' of the speeding-up of economic, technological and cultural processes are also represented by three sociological ideal types. The *discontent multitasker* type has a quite similar occupational and educational profile as the *successful multitasker* type. They both belong to higher socio-economic status groups who experience time deficits and feeling rushed, according to empirical studies (Sullivan & Gershuny, 2018). Multitasking can be sensed and coped with positively (in the case of *successful multitaskers*), as well as negatively; therefore, multitasking is not a useful marker of the feeling of being rushed as a negative consequence of speeding-up. It is performing unpaid domestic and care-taking work – a deeply gendered issue – that limits time capital conversions in the case of *discontent multitaskers*. They perceive the fast pace of life and time-use fragmentation as unwanted.

The other type of 'losers' are *time-stressed hard-workers*, i.e. people of lower occupational strata whose time deficits and time stress derive not so much from the intensification of their work as from their low salaries, which prevent them from making more beneficial time transactions. The need to seek additional paid work to earn a living for themselves and their families sinks them deeper into the trap of time-scarcity. Their lifestyle is characteristic to industrial urban modernity: fixed work hours for low pay and working extra jobs to make ends meet. They lack time for hobbies, reading or family activities, and this causes stress and dissatisfaction. *Time-stressed hard-workers* face the greatest difficulties in synchronising family activities; they are disturbed by major changes, fear burnout, and long for a more restful pace of life instead of being forced to cope with economy-driven changes. As males predominate in this group, we may conclude that males' time-use capability is equally affected by structural factors, although in different ways. Thus, we do not agree with Sullivan and Gershuny (2018) that women's higher sense of being rushed deserves more attention in theoretical conceptualisations of social transformations and practical policy recommendations. The focus of policy interventions, however, should be located in different structural domains of society: the social system to support caretaking in the case of women, and the labour market and educational subsystems in the case of men.

The third type of 'losers' are the group called the *withdrawn*, who have a great deal of surplus time because they are mostly retired. They are very passive regarding civic participation, hobbies and media use. Although they experience the stress of being left behind, their lifestyle is shaped not only by the structural process of social acceleration, but also by other structural factors, such as the low level of pensions.

The ideal types can also be interpreted as certain models of response and reflection to the idea of speeding-up. The model of *time-stress-free hobbyist* has the 'highest potential' to be an aspirational group for an accelerating society, 'surpassing' the much more capital-demanding ideal type of *successful multitasker*.

A sufficiency of time is certainly a life-quality label in Estonian society. However, the idea of a time-stress-free life does not motivate people to seek collective solutions (e.g. slow-life communities), which could serve as a cultural elaboration, in Archer's terms, but is instead a personal aspiration, exercised temporarily via lifestyles fluctuating between hard-working and time-stress-free periods. *Successful multitaskers* can cope with the speeding-up processes and are not motivated by 'adaptive systemic stabilisation' (Rosa, 2013). Unpaid work and low-paid blue-collar work can be potential forces – sources for negative feedback in Archer's terms – that may destabilise speeding-up when subjects are capable and willing to mobilise.

Groups receiving less material compensation, social recognition or personal enjoyment from their time investments are more critical of different manifestations of social acceleration (at both the individual and societal levels), but they are also less capable of opposing the dominant system or developing alternative lifestyles. When people are struggling with personal time management, they may not have time for political participation.

Even though this might be a sociological simplification, the analysis of our typology still shows that individual movement from one type to another is limited, due to education, age, family obligations or personality traits (such as stress tolerance or cognitive capacity for multitasking). One of the most significant structuring forces besides labour market position is life cycle, which regulates both unpaid obligations (such as raising children) and dealing with ageing. While from the perspective of economic productivity, the elderly should participate in the labour market as long as possible, for society in general a much more desirable ideal is to live a satisfying life by engaging in hobbies and contributing to the local community, which in turn provides opportunities for the creation of new values.

Alongside the problems related to women's right to paid employment, the accelerating society is increasingly experiencing problems with the intensification of the pace of life due to unpaid work and reduced opportunities for beneficial conversions of time capital. This often results in resentment and burnout. Accelerating modernisation has revived many problems that used to be solved in the previous cycles of societal development (e.g. with the help of extended families) and are now in need of new solutions mandated by a different type of 'popular demand'. At the subjective level, this demand tends to be experienced in the form of anxiety and exhaustion. These problems, however, require new forms of political and cultural expression as agencies' feedback on changes.

Our qualitative study can be used as a basis for hypotheses of future research. In the context of social acceleration, people may not be motivated to act because of the fear of being pressed for time, but by striving for the ideal of wholesome days with non-fragmented activities. The feeling of being in control of one's own activities seems to be more important than the pace or number of activities. Thus, structural fragmentation and desynchronisation (and the personal agency to cope with it) seem to be critical for individual reflection on the economic and other processes of our society. The structural cycles of change can be fast, but they have to be manageable in the form of wholesome cycles of personal time that combine substitutions (e.g. buying services), time-space reductions (e.g. virtual activities instead of physical) and prioritisation of activities. As personal time cycles are related not only to occupational structures but also to (gendered) life cycles, the notion of life cycle deserves more attention in further investigations of social transformations.

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Appendix 7.1. General characteristics of the time-use capability types in 2014

Mean values of the indices (scale 1 to 5)

	Successful multitaskers	Virtual multitaskers	Time-stress-free hobbyists	Discontent multitaskers	Time-stressed hard-workers	Withdrawn
Time use structure: time spent on various activities						
Time spent on work and education	3.53	2.30	2.01	2.41	3.49	1.27
Time spent on housework	3.09	2.54	3.18	3.36	2.98	2.90
Time spent on media use	2.95	2.91	3.14	2.87	2.48	2.79
Time spent on hobbies	3.82	2.80	3.30	2.92	2.46	2.07
Practices and social relationships making it possible to convert time capital into other forms of capital						
Participation in civic organisations	3.35	1.44	2.45	2.45	1.82	1.38
Participation in civic actions	3.97	1.85	3.35	3.69	2.31	1.62
Consumerism	4.74	3.30	2.58	2.20	3.04	1.55
Functional diversity of social media use	3.44	3.47	1.18	3.81	1.35	1.14
Time perception and time-use strategies						
Multitasking	3.74	3.42	2.68	3.73	3.10	2.06
Perceived lack of time ('chronic lack of time')	3.42	2.62	2.41	3.48	3.80	1.92
Surplus time	1.71	2.19	2.05	1.98	1.62	2.27
Overwork	2.93	2.18	1.84	2.82	3.93	1.48
Efforts to manage time differently	3.25	2.62	2.72	3.59	3.04	2.26
Difficulties in finding common time for family activities	3.22	2.82	2.83	3.38	3.42	2.50
Changing the family's rhythm of life on holidays and important days	3.58	2.74	3.40	3.49	2.73	2.31
Relations to changes						
Openness to changes	3.15	2.67	2.05	2.40	2.48	1.71
Resistance to changes	2.56	2.77	3.14	2.87	2.98	3.47
Being bothered by changes	2.90	2.38	2.99	3.46	3.58	2.92

Source: Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017: 441

Appendix 7.2. Socio-demographic profile of the time-use capability types in 2014

% of type

Age	Successful multitaskers	Virtual multitaskers	Time-stress-free hobbyists	Discontent multitaskers	Time-stressed hard-workers	Withdrawn
15–19	14	16	2	4	2	1
20–29	27	42	4	37	12	3
30–44	22	23	7	35	24	7
45–54	20	11	18	16	27	15
55–64	9	7	29	7	30	23
65–74	7	1	40	2	5	50
Gender						
Female	37	62	42	33	57	52
Male	63	38	58	67	43	48
Education						
Primary/basic	14	27	9	16	9	28
Secondary	39	52	58	53	61	57
Higher	48	21	34	30	30	15
Occupational status						
Entrepreneur, manager	19	5	6	10	19	2
Intellectual, specialist	35	13	17	26	19	2
Office or service worker	11	12	8	16	20	4
Manual worker	6	28	17	29	36	18
Student	20	28	1	7	1	1
Unemployed, retired	9	15	51	12	5	73
Language						
Estonian	72	66	79	93	51	52
Russian	28	34	21	7	49	48
Type of residence						
Capital city	34	26	33	21	31	33
Other city/town	52	57	52	57	55	54
Rural area	14	17	15	22	14	13

Based on Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017: 448–449

Appendix 7.3. Acceleration-related practices and attitudes by time-use capability type in 2014

% of type

	Successful multitaskers	Virtual multitaskers	Time-stress-free hobbyists	Discontent multitaskers	Time-stressed hard-workers	Withdrawn
Flexible/varied working hours	22	9	15	6	14	6*
Fixed working hours	54	62	66	65	54	60*
Work gives pleasure	62	36	50	53	33	33*
Has participated recently in re-training or advanced training	64	28	40	48	30	16*
Considers him/herself healthy	72	75	31	57	46	21
Health is bad, limiting activities	8	6	25	9	16	46
Has changed lifestyle, habits for the sake of health	51	32	54	44	40	38
No/less than one hour of discretionary time per day	16	11	8	23	38	6
Work/school day longer than eight hours	25	18	7	22	40	5
Sleeps less than eight hours	54	47	47	60	61	55
Frequent holiday trips abroad	37	17	16	18	11	2
Considers a global catastrophe caused by climate change likely	29	21	32	28	35	38
Is concerned about the state of the environment	59	33	71	55	57	39
High intensity and versatility of Internet use (aggregated index variable, % of those who had high scores)	58	44	11	40	16	5
Protects his/her digital identity	59	44	25	54	37	10
Has been elected to a representative body or community office	22	10	46	34	27	13
Thinks that the best years of life are over	8	12	53	9	30	68
Thinks that there is still enough time to achieve the primary goals of life	77	78	27	74	49	15

* The cluster includes very few people who had a job.

Based on Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017: 447

CHAPTER 8.
RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA: INTEGRATION AND TRANSLOCALISM

Triin Vihalemm, Külliki Seppel and Marianne Leppik

8.1. INTRODUCTION

The majority of the Estonian Russian-speaking population[1] moved to Estonia between 1945 and 1991, in the context of the occupation by the Soviet Union in that period. The re-independence of the Estonian state in 1991 brought a profound change for the Russian-speaking people: from a privileged position as representatives of the dominant ethnos in a multinational Soviet society with special housing arrangements, mother-tongue infrastructure and job opportunities to become an ethnic minority in Estonia as a reinstated independent nation. As the Estonian government applied rapid and radical economic reforms, the Russian-speaking population were faced with having to adapt to the changes. Most of them had to start learning the Estonian language, which had not previously been necessary, and go through the naturalisation process to obtain citizenship or find ways to get by without it. In addition to the requirements stemming from citizenship and language politics, the population had to adapt to new labour market rules, changes in the education system and other sectors. This in turn put pressure on personal relationship networks and required other socio-material investments. Although the pressure to change in daily life was difficult both for ethnic Estonians and other nationalities in the early 1990s, the repertoire available for making sense of one's experiences differed significantly between ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking population and was reflected in different values and identities (see e.g. Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2017; Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2009).

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[1] The authors define as Russian-speaking population the persons who migrated to Estonia during the Soviet period from the territory of the former Soviet Union and their descendants whose main language of communication is Russian (including Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Tatars, etc). From the Estonian Russian-speaking population 31% has been born in Estonia, thus being second-generation immigrants, and 17% belong to the third generation (their parents have been born in Estonia). According to international conventions they are no more defined as immigrants but called 'population with immigrant background'.

Despite efforts to implement various measures within the framework of the national integration strategy, the differentiation between the economic and political position of ethnic Estonians and people with Russian as their mother tongue or main language of communication deepened further in the early 1990s and has not disappeared to this day. For Russian speakers, the structural affordances of integration in different domains of social life, such as citizenship, education, the media and the linguistic regulation of the job market, have proceeded at different paces and intensity (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun, 2013), thereby making the individual patterns of integration multifarious. As is evident from empirical research (e.g. Kruusvall, 2015; Lauristin, 2011; Vihalemm & Leppik, 2017), the Russian-speaking population cannot be described as a uniform group: its members are characterised by different identity orientations as well as by different structural opportunities, capabilities and motivations for integrating into various domains of social life and communicating with ethnic Estonians.

The neighbouring state of Russia has an explicit and implicit impact on the life prospects and everyday habits of the Russian-speaking population. The close (mediated) relationships with the neighbouring Russian Federation and other countries of origin were partly maintained after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and partly established anew via the various virtual media platforms that emerged in the last decade.[2]

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[2] Though the origins of the Soviet-era migrant population in Estonia are very diverse both ethnically and geographically, due to the socialisation through the Russian-language education system and often also work environment, their everyday language is often Russian. Ethnic minorities from other countries of origin (e.g. Ukrainians) also follow actively the media of their historic homeland, but the survey data are too robust to analyse this in detail.

Although the majority of the Russian speakers living in Estonia migrated to Estonia many decades ago, their children and grandchildren are also connected to their family's country of origin through professional, educational, political, cultural, religious, entertainment and other virtual networks operating mainly in the Russian language. Therefore, in order to explain the more common patterns and mechanisms of structural and socio-psychological reintegration it is important not to limit analysis to the relations between the Estonian Russian-speaking population and the state and ethnic Estonians, but to also consider the translocality of this portion of the Estonian population. The translocal approach to analysing the social integration of a migrant population takes into consideration the different (mediated) connections people have with other people, institutions and media discourses across the borders of the host society.

From this perspective, integration should not be seen as a gradual movement from one system to another but rather as oscillating between several systems, perhaps in competition, coexistence or a combination of parallel relations and norms. The different spheres of life mean that individuals can form uneven (integration) patterns: for example, in economic sense, a person can be fully integrated into the host society, creating work-based relationships with locals and learning local written and unwritten business rules, but at the same time base one's political practices (e.g. voting, following political news, participation in social media campaigns) on the norms and principles of another country. In the case of Estonian Russian speakers, such socio-cultural multi-sitedness appears not only to be a spatial phenomenon, but also has cultural and temporal dimensions.

8.2. TRANSLOCALISM IN EXPLAINING SOCIAL STRUCTURATION MECHANISMS

In general, how the Estonian Russian-speaking population has adapted to post-transformation Estonian society is consistent with what has been described as translocal, whereby aspirations, norms, and action repertoires are shaped by multiple cultural, socio-political and economic systems. In the following sub-chapters, the authors will explain the main patterns of how the political, economic and cultural reintegration of Russian-speaking Estonians into the social structures of Estonia is occurring in the context of mediated translocality, starting with the theoretical underpinnings of the translocal approach.

The term translocalism is derived from the concept of transnationalism, coined by anthropologists Glick-Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc (1995: 48) as the 'process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relationships that link together their societies of origin and settlement.' As a result, migrants do not simply assimilate or integrate into receiving societies, but maintain cross-border relationships, and even if they are loyal and conscientious citizens of the host country, their cross-border engagements can provide psychological, financial, and social resources that enable them to challenge the subordinating models of both sending[3] and receiving nation states (Basch et al., 1994; Glick-Schiller et al., 1995; Glick-Schiller & Salazar, 2013). The term transnationalism refers to nations, states and citizenship, and focuses on issues related to the 'portability of national identity' (Sassen, 1998) and claiming identity negotiated within social worlds that span more than one place (Vertovec, 2001: 573). The authors of this chapter prefer to use the term translocality (coined by Appadurai, 1995) in the meaning of mixed media and communicative practices, use of parallel frameworks and accents of interpretation across different national and international (media)spaces. It has been argued that one of the main drivers of translocality is the wish to compensate for changes in life environment, while still interpreting the media production of the former home-country in the context of present-day experiences and social needs (Robins & Aksoy, 2005). Migrant audiences tend to use a 'dual frame of reference' through which they continuously compare the situation in their historical homeland with that of their host society (Guarnizo, 1997: 311), thus creating their own transnational 'habitats of meaning' (Hannerz, 1996), or lived spaces through which people manage meaning in their everyday lives, which in the case of migrant populations, transcend national borders.

In the analysis, we follow Lacroix's (2014) assumption that the simultaneous social embeddedness of a migrant population in translocal structures, as well as its plural inscription and socialisation, gives rise to a specific form of agency. Lacroix stresses the more complex social roles and positions of transnational populations compared to uni-national populations. On the individual level we may call these roles and positions *actor repertoires*, or the assemblages of potential ways of acting and thinking in a particular situation. The range of actor repertoires possessed by any individual depends on how stringent the existing, institutionalised norms of the particular sphere of everyday life are, and on other actors in the network.

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[3] In the sending country, subordination usually occurs through accusations of socialisation in the destination country as a sign of moral and cultural corruption vis-à-vis the country of origin and its community.

Transnational ties make the repertoire of socially meaningful acts more complex by providing the cultural grounds, for example, for resistance, or refusing the duty to follow the implicit prescriptions of acceptable conduct inscribed in the norms and values of either the sending or receiving society. Levitt (2011) argues that translocal structures are actually liberating for the individual, increasing agency. Others maintain that it only works in synergy with local agency (Andersson, 2013; Diminescu, 2008; Krotz, 2008; Smith, 2006). Empirical research on translocal migrant populations has revealed that only a small proportion of migrants engage in regular transnational practices (Portes et al., 2002; Waldinger, 2008), probably because translocal practices are rather demanding in terms of social and cognitive resources and may not be accessible to the whole migrant population. Migrants who are considered relatively well integrated and to be pro-assimilative, vis-à-vis the receiving society, are inclined to exercise transnational practices more often than those who are less successfully integrated (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Mazzucato, 2008; Schans, 2009; Snel et al., 2006), and transnationalist practices tend not to be weakened by integration (Cela et al., 2013; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Itzigsohn & Saucedo, 2002; Portes et al., 2002; Schans, 2009; Snel et al., 2006).

However, the more specific mechanisms of interaction between these two sources of agency – integration into the host society and translocalism – have been studied less. The aim of this chapter is to explain these mechanisms on the basis of empirical analysis of the interplay between social integration and translocalism in the Estonian Russian-speaking population. We will analyse the connections between translocal practices, political and economic agency, civic and public participation and activities related to ethnic community and belonging.

8.3. THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ESTONIAN NATION BUILDING AND POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION

The 1990s constituted a period of rapid change that involved both post-Soviet transformation and Estonian nation building. Important normative barriers and access criteria were set during this period in regard to the social mobility and positioning of the Russian-speaking population, mainly via the Language Law, Citizenship Law and Aliens Act. Language requirements were set up that controlled and regulated access and career opportunities in the labour market, citizenship and state-financed tertiary education (for further details see Hogan-Brun et al., 2009). Until then, the Russian-speaking migrants were neither ideologically (Pilkington, 1998) nor structurally (Kolstø, 1999) motivated to learn the local language, they expected the local population to respond in Russian (Vihalemm, 1992, 1993). Consequently, by the end of Soviet rule only every seventh Russian speaker in Estonia reported having some command of the local language (Druviete, 1997).

People's initial intentions and real actions did not coincide: for example, in 1993, 60% of the Russian-speaking population considered leaving Estonia, at the same time 67% wanted to apply for Estonian citizenship (Vihalemm, 1993). Actual opportunities for Russian speakers were much narrower for various reasons. Altogether, 12-13% of Russian speakers emigrated from Estonia (Heleniak, 2004), the proportion of people with immigrant background dropped from 38% in 1989 to 32% in 2000 (Tammur et al., 2015). Between 1992 and 1996, around a fifth of the Russian speakers became naturalised Estonian citizens, after that the naturalisation process slowed considerably, especially after 2006 when the holders of the 'alien passport' were granted the right to free movement and residence within the EU – a unique status of de facto EU citizens who have no other citizenship.[4] According to the latest Census in 2011, from the people defining themselves as ethnically Russian, 54% have Estonian citizenship, 24% Russian citizenship and 21% no determined citizenship ('alien passport') (Kallas & Kivistik, 2015).

In the 1990s, the language policy consisted mostly of implementing rules and controls. The establishment of comprehensive state-supported programmes teaching the Estonian language to both young people and adults only began in the second decade of re-independence (Tomusk, 2010), until then the main agents in the field were private and third sector organisations. In that context, it is estimated that only a quarter of the people whose job required a certificate of language proficiency in the 1990s, were able to acquire it (for the calculation based on a study by EMOR, see MISA, 2002).

In parallel, the industrial sector created and maintained by the USSR and which had provided jobs for migrants was collapsing, and was being replaced by a service and trade-centred employment structure, characteristic of a post-industrial economic system. This profoundly impacted the employment opportunities and socio-economic position of the Russian-speaking population. People used different adaptation strategies: some chose the path of assimilation, acquired the required language skills and applied for positions in service and public sectors, others tried to find new opportunities in the mainly Russian-language enclave economy, which was based on private entrepreneurship targeting the Russian market or the reorganised heavy industry sector (oil shale industry in north-eastern Estonia, different industrial enterprises in Tallinn, rail transport, etc). Getting a white-collar job now required very good proficiency in Estonian (later also English).

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[4] The specificities of the citizenship policy have been detailed e.g. in Kallas & Kivistik (2015), Lauristin (2011) and Pettai & Hallik (2002).

The ethnic wage gap and occupation-based differentiation in the labour market increased (Leping & Toomet, 2007),[5] and many Russian speakers could no longer find positions that corresponded to their level of education (Helemäe, 2008). Retrospective analysis has shown that Russian-speaking people whose jobs disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet labour market and who re-entered the profoundly changed labour market in the Estonian-speaking white-collar sector, had to accept, in their perception, lower positions than they had previously held. At the same time, those who stayed voluntarily or due to lack of alternatives in the Russian-language sectors of the labour market did not perceive such subjective lowering of status as their daily routines remained mostly the same, even if the entire context of the labour market changed (Leppik & Vihalemm, 2015). In 1995, 60% of Estonian Russian speakers admitted that the Estonian language was necessary for professional development and career progress, but at the same time, 43% believed that a Russian-speaking person can find employment through good personal connections or professional skills, rather than mastery of Estonian itself (Vihalemm, 1999). Subsequent studies have concluded that although language proficiency provides certain returns, the success rate at entering the labour market is still lower for Russian speakers than for ethnic Estonians (Lindemann, 2009).

These processes are also reflected in the imagined revenues for action repertoires – local language skills (more than ethnic affiliation) are linked to the perception of current socio-economic status and future perspectives of individuals and entire families and the stratification within the minority group (Vihalemm & Leppik, 2019). At the same time, the mainstream educational institutions (with the exception of some minor attempts in the private sector) maintained the ethno-linguistic segmentation established in the Soviet period, with ethnic Estonian and Russian-speaking children studying in parallel education systems. The education reform to make Russian secondary education bilingual (with 60% of subjects taught in Estonian) was postponed several times, and has been finally implemented between 2007 and 2012. As the Russian language disappeared from public tertiary education in the early 1990s, this has increased educational inequalities between the ethnic groups (Lindemann & Saar, 2012); for example, in terms of continuing in tertiary education. Different surveys have indicated discontent among the Russian-speaking population in relation to the unequal educational opportunities (Kirss, 2017; Masso et al., 2011; Saar, 2008), which have resulted in Russian families adopting different coping strategies, ranging from assimilative (sending their children to Estonian-language kindergartens and schools) to separatist (Masso & Kello, 2012).

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[5] The ethnic wage gap had grown to around 10-15% in favour of Estonians by the 2000s (Leping & Toomet, 2008).

In the political sphere, there has long existed a gap between ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking population in terms of their trust of Estonian state institutions as well as their assessment of their political efficacy. The gradual decrease of this gap was undone by the 'Bronze night'[6] in 2007, and has not yet achieved pre-2007 levels (Ehin, 2009). At the same time, the rise of a Russian-based ethno-class solidarity predicted by some researchers (Smith & Wilson, 1997) has not materialised for several reasons. One reason could be that non-citizens can participate in local elections, which has served as a career incentive in towns with significant Russian population and also granted success to the Centre Party, whose supporters are predominately Russian-speaking (Kallas & Kaldur, 2017). The political agency of the Russian-speaking population has been growing steadily since the 2000s (Lauristin, 2017),[7] partly in relation to the increasing share of Estonian citizens among Russian speakers, partly due to the gradual formation and strengthening of civic organisations. Although in general, the political activity of Russian speakers lags behind that of ethnic Estonians, the participation rates in elections among citizens of ethnically Estonian and other origins are rather similar (Kallas & Kaldur, 2017).

Civic society has been developing slowly in Estonia, but is also linguistically segmented (Lauristin et al., 2011). Although participation in civil society organisations is low also among ethnic Estonians (17%), it is even lower among Russian speakers (11%), and especially low among those with undefined citizenship (8%) (Kallas &

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[6] This name refers to street protests in Tallinn in April 2007, when mainly young Russian-speaking people tried to stop the government-ordered removal of the Soviet war monument (called the Bronze Soldier) from the city centre to the Military Cemetery. They assaulted the police and committed acts of vandalism. This event created mutual distrust between ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking population.

[7] A shift has also occurred in the media representation of the Russian-speaking population compared to the 1990s: besides the discourse of the isolated, passive and deprived, a new active discourse has formed that emphasises the politicians acting in the interests of the Russian-speaking electorate (Jakobson, 2004).

Kaldur, 2017). The indicators of social capital among Russian speakers in Estonia reveal a level of engagement that is two times lower than that among minorities in other EU countries (Masso, 2008). Similarly, the combination of values and identities that supports the reproduction of socio-network capital is less widespread than among ethnic Estonians (Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2008; Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2009).

In the case of Russian speakers in Estonia, the regional aspect also plays an important role. The speed and extent of the changes that have occurred in different regions differ greatly. In the cities and rural areas outside Tallinn and the industrial region in the north-east, employment, public services, education and other spheres of daily life have shifted almost fully to the Estonian language, and this obviously fosters assimilative strategies. At the same time, in the towns of north-east Estonia, structural conditions that could more forcibly encourage the use of the Estonian language in everyday life have remained weak. Tallinn, where the Russian-speaking population forms about half of the total population and where political and economic competition is the highest, offers opportunities for both assimilation and separation (Korts, 2009).

In this context, and considering the combination of different domains of social life, the (structurally provided) options for individual action during the transformation period have been multifarious. Estonian state-led policies that have stressed the importance of acquiring the Estonian language[8] have somewhat 'fixated' this idea in the public perception: the basis for advancing one's social position in Estonian society is proficiency in the state language, not ethnic belonging (as is the case in Latvia and Lithuania) (Vihalemm & Leppik, 2019). When comparing the social profile of those with active Estonian language skills and those with passive language competence, the higher social position (managers, specialists and other white-collar job positions) of the linguistically more 'equipped' speakers is evident (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun, 2013). At the same time, the competitive adaptation, predicted for example by Laitin (1998), where members of the minority try to outdo each other in order to acquire the necessary linguistic skills to access societal benefits, has not occurred. This has been partially hindered by geographical separation, the linguistically separated school system and the widely held belief that good Estonian language skills are not sufficient, and real success in society assumes deeper levels of assimilation (Siiner & Vihalemm, 2011).

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[8] The policy goals of the state have been defined in state integration programmes. The first state programme 'Integration in Estonian Society 2000–2007' promoted Estonian language learning as the main indicator of integration and key to success in society; in its successor programmes, 'State integration programme 2008–2013', and 'Integrating Estonia 2020', tolerance, civic integration and participation opportunities were stressed in addition. Ideologically, the programmes have conformed to the liberal-democratic interpretation of nationalism and multiculturalism in treating integration as a matter of individual choice, and emphasising an individual's freedom of choice in determining their group affiliation and cultural identity. The long-term goal of the integration process is the formation of a state identity that is inclusive and manages to balance the exclusionary identities of the different linguistic groups, but this should take place in the Estonian-language public sphere.

The relations embedded in the language are more complex than the stipulations in the state integration programme, the language law and other documents regulating the language policy. For historical reasons, language had been the central issue in the process of Estonian nation building and it is difficult to transform the Estonian language from a medium of ethnic identity into a neutral communication medium in the public sphere, as is envisioned in the state integration policy. A stronger common denominator for the two groups could be based on the development of common civic networks supporting the formation of a common civic culture, rather than the cultivation of a state identity that is inevitably culturally hegemonic.

Furthermore, the potential alternative identity narratives provided by the Russian Federation, using the influence of Russian state TV channels, must also be considered. While these attempts were rather unsystematic during the Yeltsin era, they have become more focused and powerful since Putin came to power, turning into a constant ideological (media)-war since 2013, in the context of the crisis in Ukraine. In different forms, the counter-project yielded by the Russian Federation constructs a diasporic identity, by offering a political identity (Rossijane) and varying anti-Western positionings from warrior to victim as a unifying ideology. This ideology constructs rights and protection at a collective level. The diasporic identity – in both its manifest and latent forms – is supported by Russian state-financed and controlled television programmes and virtual platforms. Therefore, the everyday media consumption of the Russian-speaking audience has become a matter of security because of the impact the propagandist messages aimed at Russian-speaking audiences in the Baltic States have on their identity (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015; Jõesaar, 2015a).

The Estonian media policy has been greatly shaped by the process of gradually replacing a media system strictly regulated by the state with the free market model that opened it up to international and transnational audio-visual and later digital media markets (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun, 2013). The media market has splintered into multiple public and private substructures of content creation, that in turn have helped the formation of heterogeneous personalised patterns of media consumption.

The Estonian media system can be characterised by 'institutional and functional incompleteness' (Moring & Godenhjelm, 2011: 182); in other words, the media services for the (Russian) minority (language) group are provided to some degree but not consumed.[9] Russian-language media production has been to a large degree in private hands, with the exception of few publications by local administrations. For a long period, the Estonian public broadcaster offered one Russian-language radio programme. A Russian-language public television programme was created in 2015 in reaction to the heightened ideological war between Russia and the Western states, but due to its moderate funds for content production compared to Russian competitors, it has struggled to attract its target audience.

On average, the majority of Russian speakers spend about 4 hours per day watching Russian television channels (mainly Russian state-controlled channels, the most popular being RTR Planeta, NTV Mir and PBK) (Kantar Emor)[10], which has remained stable over the last ten years. The majority follow these channels in conjunction with local – mainly Russian-language – media channels and, to a lesser extent, also Western media outlets (Juzefovičs, 2017; Seppel, 2017). For example, 92% of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia claim to follow at least one Russian media channel every day, 89% at least one local media channel, and 49% at least one non-Russian foreign channel. In comparison to ethnic Estonians, their media consumption is more varied, 44% of whom follow foreign (international) media and 19% Russian media (Vihalemm, 2017). At the same time, the news consumption of the Russian-speaking population is more sporadic and less routine: 61% of ethnic Estonians and only 45% of Russian speakers followed the news daily (Leppik & Vihalemm, 2017).

The popularity of the programmes broadcast by the Estonian public service (both Estonian and Russian-language) is rather low among the Russians-peaking population – these programmes are watched for at least 15 minutes per week by around a fifth of the Russian-language audience (Jõesaar, 2018). Since 2005, the share of people regularly following Estonian-language media channels has decreased, at the same time the audience for local Russian-language media channels has increased a little, while there are no significant changes in the following of Russian and international news channels. Newspaper reading (both on paper and online) has decreased from 65% to 46% (Leppik & Vihalemm, 2017).

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[9] The media consumption practices of the Russian speakers in Estonia have been thoroughly analysed elsewhere, see e.g. Jakobson (2002), Jõesaar (2015b), Jõesaar & Rannu (2014), Jõesaar et al. (2013), Seppel (2015, 2017), Vihalemm, P. (2011) and Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun (2013).

[10] Kantar telemetrics survey data obtained from public press releases and personal communications.

As the share of Internet users has increased over the last 18 years (2000–2018) from 18 to 80%, in addition to heavy consumption of television content from the Russian Federation, the Russian-speaking population also exercises active translocal communication practices: personal interactions with people from Russia via Skype or social media, sending and receiving news links and reading suggestions, posting on social media, visiting friends and relatives, running businesses, buying from Internet shops, joining online campaigns, subscribing to regular online content production in YouTube or news aggregators and so on (to be further explained below). A systematic overview of the cross-border activities of Russian speakers in Estonia is still missing, but in the coming subchapters some aspects will be explained.

8.4. INTEGRATION CLUSTERS

The Estonian Integration Monitoring 2011 research team came up with the idea of complementing the traditional broad categories of the measurement of integration[11] with more sensitive ways to diagnose problems and define the target groups of integration policies. The methodology was created by Lauristin (2011) and is further developed in the current analysis. The methodology is based on the assumption that the mechanisms for the reintegration of the immigrant population after the political-economic transformation of the host society can be described as the combination of different dimensions of integration, by highlighting the most important correlations. Lauristin (2011) used cluster analysis based on k-means clustering to describe five patterns of integration among the Russian-speaking population. The clusters were formed from five index variables that described linguistic, political and social integration. Simplified versions of the original systematisation, with a focus on language skills and political participation, the main targets of the state integration policy, have been subsequently used in integration monitoring (Kruusvall, 2013, 2015).

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[11] Many different ways have been used in academic and applied research to measure integration (e.g. Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Niessen & Schibel, 2004). Typically, the studies distinguish between structural (citizenship, education, occupation) and subjective/individual level indicators (attitudes, feeling of security, identification) as well as between the major domains of social life: legal-political, economic and cultural integration.

The current analysis, based on data from the survey 'Me. The World. The Media' (carried out in 2014), covers domains of social life (legal-political, cultural and economic) in more detail. The domains of integration have been formed on the basis of the aggregation of single variables into indices. The analysis is based on Giddens' structuration theory (1984), which assumes that through the (daily) actions of individuals the (unintentional) recreation of the social structure occurs. The dimensions of integration describe the major mechanisms through which individuals or groups can interact in society either by following rules/norms and using available social resources (symbolic, material, political and other forms of power) or by altering the rules/norms and re-distributing resources.

Such a multi-dimensional approach fits well with the conceptualisation of translocalism discussed above as a specific form of agency arising from the simultaneous social embeddedness in multiple social spaces that provides a foundation for *actor repertoires* in a particular situation. The current empirical material allows us to make only a partial analysis, as the survey was mainly focused on Estonian society (e.g. the question of trust in institutions was asked about Estonian state institutions, as well as citizenship and participation in elections), but several questions were more general (e.g. membership in voluntary organisations, signing petitions, doing voluntary or charity work, celebrating holidays) that may also include cross-border (virtual) actions. The connections between and patterns of the domains provide clues about the possible 'structural efficiency' of these actions. By describing social attitudes across the social integration patterns and comparing them within the group and with the majority group (ethnic Estonians), the authors can show the degree of divergence from the local, structurally supported mainstream developments.

As stated above, these several domains of social integration do not necessarily measure the extent of integration into Estonian society exclusively but can principally be understood in a broader sense to also include activities and engagements outside Estonia. By analysing the connections between the integration clusters and domains with the specially created index variable of translocality, the authors want to shed light on the (hidden) possibility of the convergence of certain action repertoires with the structures that cross the boundaries of Estonian society. This, in turn, can affect social restructuration locally and challenge the subordinating model of incorporation proposed by the host states. Based on the theoretical underpinnings presented above, the authors assume that the more complex combination of domains of integration gives a person or group greater bargaining power between different social positions that, in turn, produces a stronger sense of autonomy (and agency).

Eight indices of social integration were created for the analysis: political participation as an Estonian citizen; communication in the Estonian language; trust in Estonian institutions; alternative democratic participation; participation in the public sphere; participation in NGOs and other civic activities; economic activity; ethno-cultural identity.

Political involvement is comprised of the single variables of having Estonian citizenship, participation in the latest parliamentary, local and European parliament elections, and a subjective feeling of togetherness with co-citizens. *Participation in civic organisations* includes variables that measure trust in and activity in the third sector (is a representative/has a public function, participation in NGOs, trust in NGOs, participation in campaigns and movements, charity and voluntary work). *Trust in Estonian institutions* combines variables measuring trust in such Estonian institutions as the Parliament, the President, the Government, the media, the courts, the police, education system, health care system, church and banks. *Alternative democratic participation* combines different ways of being politically active outside voting at elections, including participation in public meetings, demonstrations, political debates, wearing a badge or ribbon with political content, and support for or joining a protest campaign, as well as participation in an Internet petition. *Participation in the public sphere* consists of several single variables measuring participation in different public cultural, sports and commemorative events that create a certain common symbolic space and temporal feeling of belonging. This index also includes variables about daily following of the news, self-assessments about how well informed one feels about current affairs, and how important it is to be informed about current affairs. *Economic involvement* includes the most heterogeneous variables that describe a person's repertoire of action strategies for ensuring economic welfare: entrepreneurship (being owner, board member or shareholder of a company), participation in business projects or EU-funded projects, recent participation in work-related (re)training courses, owning real estate and the sub-index 'financial wealth' formed by the single question 'Do you have sufficient money for… (food, clothes, hobbies, media subscriptions etc.).' *Estonianisation* involves knowledge of the Estonian language and frequent use in different spheres of life (on the street, in the service sphere and in public institutions, at school or work, while engaged in hobby activities, among friends), having ethnic Estonians as friends, following Estonian-language media. Finally, *ethno-cultural identity* includes variables expressing the feeling of ethnic belonging as a Russian (Ukrainian, or other ethnic group), participating in and supporting the activities of an ethnic cultural society, celebrating holidays in the Russian folk calendar and national holidays of the Russian Federation and religiosity (identifying as a religious person, following ecclesiastical practices and attending church).[12]

In combining these eight indices, four clusters of social integration into local Estonian society were formed using k-means clustering. Russian speakers are compared among themselves, and not against variables from the full sample of survey respondents. The cluster analysis allows us to distinguish groups of people who behave similarly based on predefined variables so that the differences between the groups are the greatest. The four-cluster solution distinguishes respondents the most and is also similar to the cluster solutions found in previous analyses (e.g. Kruusvall, 2015; Lauristin, 2011).

The clusters formed are labelled as follows: *multi-active cosmopolitan cluster* (strong involvement through multiple domains of social life); *dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster* (strong political involvement as Estonian citizen, high trust in Estonian institutions and relatively strong economic involvement and ethno-cultural identity); *active ethno-culturally engaged cluster* (strong ethno-cultural identity, participation in civic organisations and public sphere participation) and *passive, weakly engaged cluster* (weak involvement in all dimensions).

In the following, the four clusters of social integration into Estonian society are described in greater detail (see Figure 8.1). The clusters can be interpreted as the different ways through which the Russian-speaking population in Estonia has integrated into Estonian society through different political, civic, cultural and economic structures that shape people's daily practices, and which in turn reinforce or change the existing structures.

The *multi-active cosmopolitan cluster* includes about 19% of the adult Russian-speaking population. This cluster represents strong involvement in Estonian society via multiple structures. The members of this cluster have high political and economic involvement in Estonian society, they are active voters, as most of them are Estonian citizens. They also participate in civic organisations, follow the news and take part in public events (Figure 8.1). At the same time, they are critical of state institutions and they have more experience with political demonstrations, signature campaigns and other forms of political expression (Table 8.1). This group includes a relatively high number of people fluent in Estonian and those who follow Estonian-language media channels.

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[12] Russian speakers in Estonia predominantly belong to the Russian Orthodox Church, while ethnic Estonians (who on average are more secular) are traditionally Lutheran.

Figure 8.1. General characteristics of the integration clusters in 2014



Source: Vihalemm & Leppik, 2017: 566

The demographic breakdown of the clusters in Appendix 8.1 shows that this cluster is dominated by women (almost 70%), but age-wise is rather heterogeneous. Members have mostly been born in Estonia and one-third lives in regions where the majority of people are ethnically Estonian. This cluster has the highest share of highly educated, which is probably one of the factors supporting their social involvement. Despite their stronger than average ethno-cultural identity (Figure 8.1), in comparison to other clusters, they identify themselves with different groups in society more often through various regional and global categories like solidarity with Europeans and all humankind as well with the non-territorialised, mentally defined communities like people with the same lifestyle or taste preferences, and so on (see Appendix 8.2). Their strong cosmopolitan orientation (the strongest of all clusters) is also reflected in the name of the cluster.

Table 8.1. Alternative democratic and civic participation by integration cluster in 2014

% of cluster

	Multi-active cosmopolitan	Dutiful, institutionally engaged	Active, ethno-culturally engaged	Passive, weakly engaged
Has participated in garbage collection or home decoration bees (i.e. Let's Do It World)	55	24	42	12
Has done some other voluntary work	24	10	2	1
Has participated in concerts, family events, etc. organised by church	17	7	23	4
Has donated money, things, clothes	52	12	48	5
Has participated in memorial events	36	18	38	14
Has participated in public meetings	34	9	18	2
Has worn a badge or ribbon with political message	37	15	32	12
Has signed a petition on the Internet or social media	27	5	12	6
Is a representative, has a public function	17	12	4	0
Is a member of one or several civic organisations	82	29	82	18

>60%	41–60%	21–40%	<20%

Source: Vihalemm & Leppik, 2017: 572

The *dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster* includes about 35% of the Estonian Russian-speaking population. Political involvement as a citizen among members of this cluster is strong: almost 80% are Estonian citizens and they are active voters. Compared to members of the first cluster, they have high trust in the main state institutions, follow the news and participate in public events at least with average frequency (Figure 8.1). Their political activity is dominated by institutionalised forms, they are less engaged with alternative political activities and less frequently participants in civic organisations (also compared to the third, 'diaspora' cluster) (Table 8.1). The notion 'dutiful' that has been used in the name of the cluster is derived from Dalton's (2008) concept of *duty citizens*, with which the author signified the type of traditional democratic participation that is based on voting. Their economic involvement and ethno-cultural identity is at an average level in comparison to other clusters. The socio-demographic profile of the cluster is characterised by an equal share of both genders and a rather young age profile – a little over half are aged 15 to 45 (see Appendix 8.1). A little over 40% have knowledge of the Estonian language and follow (to a certain extent) Estonian-language media. The knowledge of the Estonian language is probably helped by the fact that two-thirds of the group were born in Estonia, they are relatively young and tend to live in areas where the majority of the people are ethnically Estonian (Appendix 8.1). A little less than one-third have a higher education. In their identity-formation, a major role is played by space and time: a rather high feeling of solidarity with all Estonian inhabitants and Europeans, but also with their own generation (see Appendix 8.2).

The *active ethno-culturally engaged cluster* includes about 26% of the Russian-speaking population. The members of this cluster are characterised by weak political involvement as a citizen – a large majority of the group does not have Estonian citizenship and they can participate only in local elections. Despite the fact that the vast majority have limited engagement in traditional political participation, they are active at the community level and in civic society, take active part in public events, as well as engage in non-conventional democratic participation (see Table 8.1). In the civic sense, the members of this cluster are quite active in comparison to the Russian-speaking population as whole. The name of the cluster also includes the notion 'active'. The other half of the name of the cluster, 'ethno-culturally engaged', comes from the fact that its members are characterised by a strong ethno-cultural identity and religiosity – 49% claim to be believers and attend church (twice the average in the Russian-speaking population) and follow other religious traditions; in other words, they have a relationship with the church (congregation) as an institution. It has emerged from earlier analyses (Vihalemm, T., 2011; Vihalemm & Kaplan, 2017) that belonging to the Russian orthodox church is strongly related to Russian ethno-cultural identity, and the name of the cluster (ethno-cultural engagement) already tacitly implies the religious dimension. The members of this cluster have a strong Russian-orientation in their media consumption patterns and citizenship status, although trust in Estonian state institutions is quite high. They are weakly engaged in the economic sphere – the share of entrepreneurs and people pursuing different economic projects is low, they are on average less well-off; however, they are more strongly involved as consumers; that is, they tend to make sense of society and their own position through their opportunities as a consumer (Kiisel & Seljamaa, 2017). As 90% of the members of this cluster have no command of Estonian, they do not follow Estonian-language media or use it for communication; 60% of the cluster is constituted by women, almost half are in the age-group 45–64 and a quarter are older than 65 years (Appendix 8.1). Even if almost half were born in Estonia, 40% have citizenship of the Russian Federation and a third has the so-called 'alien passport'.

This cluster exhibits strong characteristics associated with the spatial-temporal translocality of the diaspora: Russian citizenship, media consumption dominated by a Russian media focus and a strong nostalgia for the USSR. Their political participation and trust in institutions represent the use of resources that are institutionally supported – 'ready made' for individual use and require less collective mobilisation capacities. Their level of trust in state institutions is an indication of a belief in the functionality of institutions like the courts and police, and subsystems like education and health care. The relatively high score in this variable in the 'diaspora' cluster indicates that the argument by researchers in the 1990s (i.e. Melvin, 1995) that 'social citizenship' guaranteeing the basic rights and needs of the Russian-speaking population is a significant buffer for the lack of political rights, continues to be vital in the present day. The dominant categories for the self-identification of members in this cluster are ethnic minority (Estonian Russians), and to a lesser extent also common territory (inhabitants of Estonia) and generation (see Appendix 8.2).

The *passive, weakly engaged cluster* includes about 21% of the Russian-speaking population. Members of this cluster are weakly involved in societal structures (e.g. low participation in politics and civil society, weak social networks) and have low financial and educational resources. The adjective 'passive' in the name of the cluster refers simultaneously to intentional non-participation as well as unintentional passivity due to institutional hindrances or lack of personal resources, as the intentional and unintentional components in the non-participation in societal structures are always related and mutually reinforcing. The cluster has a similar share of men and women (see Appendix 8.1). Almost half are from the age group 45–64, they have no citizenship or are citizens of the Russian Federation, the average level of knowledge of Estonian is poor and the cluster has a high share of people born outside Estonia. The collective identity and feeling of solidarity with different social groups tends to be lower in this cluster than in the other clusters (Appendix 8.2).

The distribution of the different clusters among the Russian-speaking population suggests that around three-quarters of the population is embedded in different structures of Estonian society; that is, the government and other state institutions have certain institutional channels for communicating with them, be it via civic organisations or at public events, via elections and accompanying political activities, or through the labour market and other economic mechanisms. But almost a third might not be reachable through public communication and state policies. Their passivity simultaneously hinders integration as well as works as a buffer that prevents straightforward protesting and assembling in defence of personal interests, although this does not prevent expressions of more irrational anguish in fragmented micro-conflicts.

About one-fifth of the Russian-speaking population have high social agency and emancipation, they are characterised by the ability to use as well as influence social resources and rules, which makes them simultaneously also more self-aware, critical and less trusting of political institutions. Such patterns of integration require quite vast resources, which are partially dependent on the individuals themselves, but on the other hand are influenced by contextual factors that are not available to everyone. The differentiation of the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster and *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster in the analysis (instead of forming one cluster) indicates that the focus on the principle of individual rights on the one hand, and duties and loyalty towards the Estonian state and institutions on the other, delineated in the integration programmes and other political documents, do not always coincide at the level of everyday practices. The larger share of people belonging to the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster compared to the *active ethno-culturally engaged* cluster indicates that the integration strategy based on institutional loyalty and local political self-determination (while retaining ethno-cultural identity) is somewhat more widespread than the diasporic adaptation strategy based on communitarian practices. At the same time, the distribution of members in clusters of integration across age cohorts (see Appendix 8.1) indicates that in the future, the share of the cluster of ethno-cultural engagement will probably increase and that of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster will likely decline. This can be explained by the 'third generation' effect in the integration of migrant populations, which is often characterised by a decrease in assimilative strategies like loyalty towards institutions, and a rise in the mobilisation of distinctive collective cultural resources and the exercise of alternative democratic participation strategies.

8.5. ACTION REPERTOIRES ACROSS CLUSTERS OF INTEGRATION

Besides structural factors, the members of different clusters can also be distinguished on the basis of different action repertoires. In terms of participation in civil society and public events (Table 8.1),[13] the members of the *active ethno-culturally*

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[13] There are statistically significant mutual correlations between the index variables of involvement in public sphere and alternative democratic participation (r=.283**), index variables of involvement in the public sphere and participation in civic organisations

engaged cluster are almost as active as those of the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster. The participation of members of the former depends on the existence and strength of informal communication networks and is more spontaneous in nature, as well as more communitarian in manner: they participate in different voluntary work bees, charity and church events, go to public celebrations and are ready to express their solidarity for a cause (by wearing a badge or ribbon). At the same time, their participation in public meetings, signing petitions and in other alternative political actions (characteristic of members of the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster) is much more modest.

Different levels of agency characteristic of the representatives of different clusters is also visible in their job activities. Most of the members of the *active ethno-culturally engaged* cluster and *passive, weakly engaged* cluster who are (still) active on the labour market (84% and 77% respectively) perform routine work: service or operating machines and equipment, also bookkeeping and technical calculations. About 40% of the members of the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster have jobs requiring more complicated and socially significant communication with other people: listening to, teaching, counselling or reconciling other people, to a lesser extent also analysis and creative work. In comparison, 85% of the members of the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster have jobs that require the management of other people, the coordination of work, representation, or analysis and creative work. There is a moderate correlation between political and economic involvement (Pearson's r=.236**) and indeed, the members of clusters who have stronger political agency tend also to have greater freedom of action and more responsibilities also in the work sphere, and vice versa.

Influencing the structuration mechanisms of society through civic organisations and civic actions is also open to those who mostly follow orders in their work life and who lack the economic resources to influence society through market mechanisms. There is no statistically significant correlation between the index variables for economic involvement and alternative democratic participation and participation in civic organisations, which means that in a certain sense, the economic and civic domains function as alternative structuration mechanisms that are attainable for different parts of the Russian-speaking population.

(r=.361**), as well as index variables of alternative democratic participation and participation in civic organisations (r=.379**). Thus, the different possibilities for participation in civic organisations that shape the structuration processes are mutually reinforcing.

Table 8.2. Changes in everyday lifestyle by integration cluster in 2014

% of cluster

Q: Which factors have prompted changes in everyday lifestyle in recent years?	Multi-active cosmopolitan	Dutiful, institutionally engaged	Active ethno-culturally engaged	Passive, weakly engaged
Local arrangement of transport, education and social life	14	9	14	13
Rising prices and financial problems	43	44	53	61
Becoming unemployed / a family member becoming unemployed	28	22	35	44
Change in profession, job, position (one's own or a family member's)	44	22	29	24
Re-evaluation of one's values and beliefs	30	11	18	20
Has not changed one's daily living arrangements nor lifestyle in the last two-three years	32	44	30	24

>50%	41–50%	31–40%	21–30%

Based on Vihalemm & Leppik, 2017: 573

While involvement of immigrant populations in political and economic structures are studied in most of the research on integration, everyday lifestyle is rarely part of the focus. In the following, we explore how changes in the local market, state and civic institutional context have affected the everyday life of the minority population (see Table 8.2).

The major motives for changing one's life arrangements are change of job status and accompanying financial problems. The perceived changes due to infrastructure – transport, education, social services – are rarer and if these do not cause tangible problems, people do not perceive them and report them in surveys. The lives of the members of different clusters have been affected by such changes more or less equally, which means that the sphere of everyday services is relatively 'flat' as a potential pressure forcing life changes.

On the everyday level, lives are most stable for members of the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster: in their own evaluation, they have had to change their lives the least due to (external) intervening factors (e.g. job loss), and they have re-evaluated their values and beliefs even less frequently. The *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster seems to have rather unstable job relations, but rather due to their own initiative rather than through job loss. This cluster also has the biggest share of members who have changed their living arrangements due to re-evaluating their values and beliefs. Both of these aspects can be explained by the relatively younger average age of this cluster (see Appendix 8.1).

Members of the *passive, weakly engaged* cluster are the most influenced by outside intervention. Job losses and accompanying financial problems make them change their usual life arrangements most often, but lead less often to starting a new job. Probably finding a new job has less effect on solving their material difficulties, as a considerable share of members in this cluster are older, their knowledge of Estonian is lower than the average and they have a lower level of education. Therefore, the simplification and limitation of one's lifestyle can be the only tangible solution.

Members of the *active ethno-culturally engaged* cluster have also often changed their way of life, remaining at the same time mentally quite inert – they are less likely to re-evaluate their values and beliefs.

Changes in everyday living arrangements are an important aspect through which people's general reactions to change can be evaluated, as these are directly perceptible and they can be answered more freely from any ideological burden, compared to for example social attitudes. The data in Table 8.2 indicates that the labour market as a social structure has the greatest influence on people's living arrangements, but the reactions differ from cluster to cluster. Members of the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster tend to go through a mental change, as the practical solving of work-related and financial problems tends to be accompanied by the re-evaluation of one's values and beliefs. Among the members of the other clusters, solving practical problems does not coincide with such searches for new values. Conditionally, it can be said that, even if the practical living arrangements change, the change is explained and justified through 'old' mental structures.

The broader, ideological self-positionings towards the developments of Estonian society are rather similar in regard to abstract themes. For example, there is no difference between the clusters in their evaluation of the future trajectory of the political and economic developments of Estonian society; in all clusters, there is a similar share of people who hope for change or people who have no clear opinion on the matter. At the same time, there are considerable differences between the members of different clusters in the case of more personal evaluations. For example, in their attitudes towards the Soviet Union, in the *active, ethno-culturally engaged* cluster and *passive, weakly engaged* cluster, the clearly dominant viewpoint is that the wages in the Soviet Union allowed a better quality of life than those in a market economy (see Figure 8.4 for data). In the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster and *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster, the viewpoints are more diverse; in both clusters a large part is sceptical about such historical nostalgia. While one would expect positive attitudes towards Soviet times to be more common among the older generation (because of a nostalgia for their youth, personal memories of daily life in the Soviet Union), this is not the case – a large share of the members of the sceptical *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster are from older age groups.

In general, the evaluation of changes during the transformation of Estonian society are more positive in the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster and *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster, while the *active, ethno-culturally engaged* cluster and *passive, weakly engaged* cluster are more nostalgic towards the social order of the past. The latter two clusters are also more oriented towards Russia in their media consumption and political affiliations. In the next subchapter the media consumption habits of the clusters of social integration are explored in more detail.

8.6. MEDIA CONSUMPTION HABITS ACROSS CLUSTERS OF INTEGRATION

The media consumption habits of the members of different clusters diverge quite significantly (see Figure 8.2).

Members of the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster are characterised by the most active and diverse media use, with the highest share of followers in the case of all measured media outlets, except for the TV channels of the Russian Federation – 52% follow the news, daily TV and radio news, web portals of newspapers, news portals (also in the Estonian language), as well as news links sent via social media. Only 11% admit to following the news infrequently or randomly. Most follow Russian TV channels and local Russian-language radio regularly, more than half also follow international news channels, almost a third watch Estonian-language TV channels, and a fifth listen to Estonian-language radio channels. In this cluster, the Estonian Russian-language news portals are followed more actively than Russian news portals (66% compared to 32%). The members of the cluster are themselves also active sharers of news: 74% of people with social media accounts report posting news links in social media, 18% regularly.

Members of the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster are less active media consumers, but are more active than those of the *active ethno-culturally engaged* and *passive, weakly engaged* clusters – 44% follow the news daily and 15% from time to time, thus consumption of the news is quite regular and they are knowledgeable about current affairs. In their media repertoire, Russian TV channels and local Russian-language media dominate, both radio and news portals, to a lesser degree local Russian-language newspapers. The international channels are followed more often than Estonian-language media: around a fifth follows Estonian-language TV regularly and 15% Estonian-language radio and news portals. About half of the members who use social media also share news links with their contacts.

Figure 8.2. Media consumption habits by integration cluster in 2014

% of people who report often following a respective channel



* Following daily or several times a week.

Among the members of the *active ethno-culturally engaged* cluster, 52% are daily news followers, 20% have no regular habit for following the news and get their information randomly or via others. As in all other clusters, their media repertoire is dominated by Russian TV channels and local Russian-language radio, but members of this cluster also read local Russian-language newspapers and Russian newspapers more regularly than members of the *institutionally engaged* cluster, while their online news consumption is lower. In this case, the media repertoire is very strongly Russian and Russian-language oriented – following international channels and Estonian-language channels is very low. Also in this cluster, one-half of the social media users are active sharers of news.

Members of the *passive, weakly engaged* cluster have the most irregular patterns of news consumption – 35% follow news daily and another 35% infrequently. As in other clusters, media consumption is dominated by Russian TV channels and local Russian-language radio stations. In general, their media consumption is the lowest, especially in the case of web portals. At the same time, compared to the otherwise also less active *ethno-culturally engaged* cluster, the members of this cluster listen more often to the radio, including Estonian language media. From among users of social media, around half also share news on social media sites. Compared to other groups, the share of people who trust social media is very low (7% compared to 20–25% in other clusters). This can be related to a relatively low trust in all media, as well as other social and state institutions characteristic to this cluster in general.

The media consumption habits of the different clusters of integration follow similar trends as other indicators of social agency: the members of the two more active clusters, the *multi-active cosmopolitan* and *institutionally engaged* clusters, are more active and varied in their media repertoire, while the *passive, weakly engaged* cluster is the most passive also in this case, and the *ethno-culturally engaged* cluster has the strongest Russian-orientation.

8.7. TRANSLOCALITY

In order to explore (mediated) relations specifically outside Estonia, we constructed an aggregated index variable for translocality. This index was composed on the basis of the following single variables: visiting friends and relatives living in Russia and other countries, having friends and relatives who have recently emigrated from Estonia, having many social media contacts outside Estonia, doing business or having work or study relations abroad, following Russia's media, following other international media. For the following analysis, the respondents were divided into two groups according to their personal score on the index: those with *stronger* (or above-average) and those with *weaker* (or below-average) *translocality*. Those with stronger translocality have close contacts with different countries, have friends and relatives abroad, visit them more frequently, and are regular followers of international and Russian TV channels. Those with weaker translocality are also avid followers of Russian TV, but tend to have rarer contacts abroad and do not follow international channels.

Figure 8.3. Means of the translocality index in the integration clusters and socio-demographic groups in 2014

Scale 0–5 (0 – missing, 5 – strong)



In the following, we will first give an overview of the translocal relationships and communication practices among the Estonian Russian-speaking population in general and then discuss the connections between translocality and the patterns and domains of social integration and the potential convergence between these two agencies. To analyse translocality, an aggregated index variable was created that was explained in detail in the methodology chapter.

The level of translocality is strongly related to age, those aged 25–44 tend to score high on the translocality index, which is the lowest among people aged 65 and over (see Figure 8.3). People with high translocality tend to live in areas where the majority of people are ethnically Estonian (outside Tallinn and the industrial towns of Ida-Viru county). In terms of citizenship, Estonian citizens are more likely to score higher than those with Russian or undetermined citizenship. Host state citizenship seems to function as state-specific capital that also facilitates integration into the host society, especially for the first generation. Education also plays a role: people

Table 8.3. Translocal practices by integration cluster in 2014

% of people in a particular cluster performing a particular activity type

	Multi-active cosmopolitan	Dutiful, institutionally engaged	Active ethno-culturally engaged	Passive, weakly engaged
Social media communication predominantly outside Estonia (more than half of social media contacts abroad)	63	34	31	38
Friends and relatives in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus	84	65	78	68
Friends and relatives in other countries	86	70	80	70
Friends and relatives recently migrated abroad	71	41	50	22
Work and business relations in other countries, cross-border business projects	14	10	5	11
Frequent follower of Russian media channels	93	95	90	92
Frequent follower of other international media channels (except Russian)	69	54	38	37

>80%	61–80%	41–60%	21–40%

with higher levels of education have a higher score on the translocality index; they tend to be more translocal than their compatriots with only secondary or primary education. Among the members of the different integration clusters, the score is highest among members of the *multi-active* cluster and lowest among members of the *passive, weakly engaged* cluster, whereas the *institutionally* and *ethno-culturally engaged* clusters have similarly moderate average rates.

A more detailed description of the nature of translocal practices that were constituent variables in making the index can be seen across the clusters in Table 8.3.

The majority of the members of the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster, which scores the highest on the translocal index, frequently follow Russian and international media; they also have many social media contacts abroad, as most of them also have friends and relatives in Russia, Ukraine and other countries, as well as family members and friends who have recently migrated abroad. Consequently, their cross-border relationships, both personal and virtual, are tight and mutually reinforcing (Table 8.3).

Members of the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster have fewer personal contacts abroad, and compared to members of the *multi-active* cluster, they are less

Table 8.4. Correlations between the translocality index and the indices of different domains of integration by integration cluster in 2014

Pearson's r

	Multi-active cosmopolitan	Dutiful, institutionally engaged	Active ethno-culturally engaged	Passive, weakly engaged
Linguistic involvement	-.25*			.21*
Economic involvement	.27**		.21*	
Participation in local public sphere		.18*		
Alternative democratic participation		.23**		
Civic involvement		.19**	.19*	
Local political involvement		.22**	.23*	
Ethno-cultural identity		.22**		

*p≤.1; **p≤.05.

frequent followers of international media channels, albeit still more frequent than members of the *ethno-culturally engaged* cluster. The latter have more acquaintances and relatives living abroad and have a more recent emigration experience in the family compared to the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster. The members of the *passive, weakly engaged* cluster have much less emigration experience in the family but their mediated relationships are almost as frequent as those of the members of the *institutionally* and *ethno-culturally engaged* clusters.

These results support the findings of studies conducted in other countries: stronger translocality occurs in more strongly and multi-dimensionally integrated parts of the migrant population, as well as in cases of higher levels of political and social activity in general. In order to explain the possible mechanisms for how translocality may support different patterns of integration, we calculated the correlations between the translocality index variable and different constituent variables of the integration clusters (Table 8.4).

In the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster, translocality is negatively connected with linguistic integration: despite the fact that most cluster members have good skills in the Estonian language, those who reported stronger translocal communication practices also reported following the local Estonian language media less frequently. The opposite effect appears in the *passive, weakly engaged* cluster: people with stronger and wider translocal ties speak better Estonian and follow Estonian-language media channels more frequently. The same general trend (albeit statistically insignificant) also characterises the *ethno-culturally* and *institutionally engaged* clusters. Therefore, in general, translocal connections do not work in opposition to the local linguistic integration but seem to be in a mutually supportive relationship. With growing mobility in the host society, following the local media can be (partly) replaced by an international, cross-border communication repertoire.

Translocality is also positively connected with economic activity in the *ethno-culturally engaged* cluster and *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster. In the *multi-active cosmopolitan* cluster, stronger translocal practices coincide with more frequent (cross-border) business projects, other entrepreneurial practices and re-training for new jobs that enables employment flexibility. Translocal practices also correlate with relative wealth (having money to satisfy different needs). In the *ethno-culturally engaged* cluster, these correlations appear less clearly (except for wealth) because a significant share of the cluster is already retired.

In general, members of the *institutionally engaged* cluster are less active in the public sphere and in alternative democratic participation compared with the *multi-active* and *ethno-culturally engaged* clusters, although the few members who practice these activities are also distinguished by their wider and stronger translocal networks. Their more intense cross-border communication could be the reason they are more active in the public sphere and political processes beyond elections.

Participation in civic organisations (NGO membership, having a public function, having done voluntary work) is positively correlated with translocality in the *ethno-culturally* and *institutionally engaged* clusters. For example, their participation in collective voluntary work campaigns (e.g. garbage removal in forests, parks and other public green areas) can be connected with different international and local environmental campaigns. In the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster, people with more intense translocal communication practices participate in (cross-border) charity projects and campaigns. In the *ethno-culturally engaged* cluster, people with stronger translocal ties are more frequently elected to trustee positions in various organisations (including translocal ones).

In the *ethno-culturally* and *institutionally engaged* clusters, translocality is also positively correlated with traditional political engagement: voting at European and local elections. In the *dutiful, institutionally engaged* cluster, which has the largest share of Estonian citizens, people with translocal ties are also more active in national elections. At the same time, members of this cluster seem to use translocal media and personal networks to celebrate Russian folk, religious and national holidays. Interestingly enough, the trend is the opposite in the *ethno-culturally engaged* cluster, there is no correlation between translocality and ethno-cultural practices: people participate in the local ethno-cultural associations and church events without the need to use translocal connections in order to support their ethno-cultural identity.

In general, it seems that in the case of the *institutionally engaged* cluster, translocality reinforces participation in the civic and public sphere and ethno-cultural identity reproduction practices. Cross-border relationships seem to provide communication partners, references and occasions for civic and public self-expression and also for maintaining a virtual bond with one's historical-cultural identity (by celebrating religious and national holidays, etc.). It is noteworthy that there are more people who agree with the statement 'It is easier for me to communicate with other people on the Internet than face-to-face' (42% in this cluster compared to under 30% in other clusters) and 'On the Internet, I show aspects of my life that are not discussed in face-to-face interactions' (35% in this cluster, under 20% in other clusters). The virtual ties may provide necessary anonymity for self-expression that might be more hidden and self-controlled in the case of offline relationships, which are characterised by fear to look 'disloyal' towards the ethnic majority. The members of this cluster also report more frequently (39%, compared to less than 20% in other clusters) that they have social media 'friends' they do not know in real life but have accepted their invitations out of politeness. These occasional contacts may also generate encounters with civic and ethno-cultural activities and organisations that the daily action repertoire does not include.

In the pattern of local integration via ethno-cultural (community) engagement, translocal relationships reinforce participation in civic organisations and related activities. The members of this cluster belong mainly to church-related associations, choirs and other cultural associations, health-related interest groups and sports associations, which may have cross-border contacts (Lauristin et al., 2011). The mechanisms for how translocal ties may reinforce (or hinder) ethno-cultural (diasporic) integration patterns would require deeper, perhaps qualitative investigation. The reverse relations between translocality and national language use are remarkable: in the case of weak integration, more intense translocal relationships seem to reinforce the use of the national language, but in the case of stronger, multidimensional integration and higher social status within the host society, translocal relationships and media consumption seem to dominate over connections with members of the majority and local language media outlets.

In order to explore the possible interactions between translocality and ideological beliefs, we compared the means of the translocality index across the sub-groups holding different opinions within the integration clusters (see Figure 8.4).

As a general trend in all clusters, the more optimistic view a sub-group holds about changes in the host society and the life prospects of oneself and one's family, the higher the average means of the translocality index. Similarly, translocality is

Figure 8.4. Means of the translocality index in groups of different opinions by integration cluster in 2014

Scale 0–5 (0 – missing, 5 – strong)



negatively correlated with nostalgia for the Soviet period (measured via the belief in the greater 'purchasing power' of salaries in the Soviet era): the less nostalgic the person is the higher her translocality index. In general, stronger translocal experience seems to also contribute indirectly to ideological beliefs and self-positioning in the context of social changes.

8.8. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This chapter provides an overview of the process of integrating the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and describes four patterns of the social integration of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia: multi-active cosmopolitan engagement, dutiful institutional engagement, ethno-cultural engagement and weak engagement. The analysis connects these patterns of integration with another source of agency – translocality. Translocality is defined here as the life-world constituted by relationships, identities, understandings and practices emerging from different social spaces. In line with previous research (Andersson, 2013; Diminescu, 2008; Krotz, 2008; Smith, 2006), the current study confirms that translocal agency reinforces social agency stemming from how embedded a person is in the local society. The current analysis, however, went further by studying how translocality supports (or does not support) the following different dimensions of integration into the local/host society: economic, civic, political and ethno-cultural, as well as media consumption and participation in the public sphere.

The analysis showed that the strongest translocal practices are characteristic of that part of the Russian-speaking population that is most integrated, both vis-à-vis the structures of the society as well as in terms of relationships with ethnic Estonians. However, deeper analysis of this group does not confirm the findings of some previous studies about the pro-assimilative orientation of the translocal and successfully integrated migrant population (Guarnizo et al., 2003, Mazzucato, 2008; Schans, 2009; Snel et al., 2006). The study revealed that the most multi-dimensionally integrated part of the minority population with the strongest translocal ties has a cosmopolitan-emancipatory rather than assimilative identity orientation, and this group is not very trusting of local institutions. The emergence of the translocal well-integrated group marks the arrival of the new vanguard, who has a high level of agency and who subscribes neither to the narrative of nationalising assimilation nor the diaspora narrative from the Russian Federation. Translocality supports their search for emancipatory agency and new meanings and relations in order to alter locally restricted and subordinating repertoires.

Translocality works differently for the group who has accepted the nationalising policy and who is the most supportive and trusting of state institutions and socio-economic developments. The dutiful, institutionally prescribed engagement pattern involves neutrality in ideological debates and preserving relations, respecting change and being moderately critical. Translocality in this pattern primarily supports the perseverance of the ethno-cultural identity within the frame of a new political and civic identity. For this group, translocal relationships generate encounters with civic and ethno-cultural activities and organisations and foster civic and political activity. This gives the group a stronger voice and balances the otherwise very institutionalised integration patterns with ethno-cultural and alternative civic practices.

The group of people whose pattern of integration can be defined as diasporic, are characterised by strong ethno-cultural identity and alternative civic and communitarian activity, as well as active participation in the public sphere. As this group does not have high socio-economic status in the host society, they are likely to compensate for this through (rather moderate) translocal relations, as in relative terms their socio-economic wellbeing and stability might be relatively satisfactory in comparison with people living across the border in the relative periphery of the Russian Federation. Although this group is highly critical of the transformation in Estonian society and sceptical about their personal future, their more intense translocal practices are connected with more positive evaluations of economic and political changes and expectations for the future. It is likely that the translocal relations and information about everyday life from their relatives and friends living in the Russian Federation and elsewhere, can provide references that enable them to implement a richer repertoire of ‘habitats of meaning’ and through this to construct positive self-esteem.

The part of the Russian-speaking population with the weakest level of integration into Estonian society is characterised by withdrawal from the public sphere and minimal institutional participation in society and also has the lowest translocal engagement. But within this group more intense translocal practices are also related with higher local agency (relative to this group); for example, better national language skills, more contacts with the ethnic majority and a more positive evaluation of social changes and personal life prospects.

The study of translocality in relation to different patterns of integration reveals that translocal practices and local integration are mutually supportive, especially through social agency, which is crucial in both. Translocal relations help construct diverging ‘habitats of meaning’ that are not locally restricted and implement an innovative repertoire of actions and understandings that empowers agents, in case the differentiation through translocality (compared to the more monotonous repertoire of locally-oriented agents) manages to align with the (spontaneous) cultural and (institutional) politico-economic ‘mainstreams’. This is facilitated by education – higher levels of education correspond to higher levels of translocality and more multi-dimensional social integration.

At the same time, the convergence effects can occur in different spheres and via different mechanisms: from increasing self-esteem, balancing tensions between civic and ethnic identity or challenge the model of integration imposed by the host state. The challenge for the government is to adopt a more comprehensive approach to integration that considers the different ways through which people establish their relationship with the state and society.

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Appendix 8.1. Socio-demographic profile of the integration clusters in 2014

% of cluster

Gender	**Multi-active cosmopolitan**	**Dutiful, institutionally engaged**	**Active ethno-culturally engaged**	**Passive, weakly engaged**
Male	33	51	41	52
Female	67	49	59	48
Age				
15–25	11	11	12	11
25–45	33	32	17	23
45–65	43	35	46	46
65+	14	22	26	20
Citizenship				
Estonian	83	78	27	15
Russian Federation	10	12	43	41
Undetermined	8	10	29	43
Place of birth				
Estonia	72	69	53	60
Outside Estonia	28	31	48	40
Knowledge of Estonian language				
Does not know Estonian	40	57	87	83
Does know Estonian	60	43	13	17
Education				
Elementary	7	8	20	15
Secondary	45	59	63	72
Higher	48	34	18	13
Place of residence				
Tallinn	41	54	38	48
North-Eastern Estonia	27	20	35	33
Rest of Estonia	32	26	27	19
Occupational status				
Entrepreneur, manager	18	7	2	2
Intellectual, specialist	26	20	8	5
Office or service worker	15	9	12	17
Manual worker	17	24	28	27
Student	6	7	8	5
Retired	14	25	33	32
Unemployed, inactive	4	8	9	12

Source: Vihalemm & Leppik, 2017: 570

Appendix 8.2. Collective self-identification with various groups in society by integration cluster in 2014

Question: 'With whom do you feel togetherness so you can say "we"?'

% of people in a particular cluster who marked the respective social group	Multi-active cosmopolitan	Dutiful, institutionally engaged	Active ethno-culturally engaged	Passive, weakly engaged
People with similar lifestyle to me	16	18	12	7
People with common hobbies	37	20	28	9
People with the same religion	15	5	13	5
Neighbours	28	23	30	18
People with whom I share memories	31	22	23	13
People with similar tastes and preferences	24	12	19	3
Common working people	11	13	17	12
Inhabitants of my town, borough, village	23	17	18	14
People of the same generation	44	50	38	41
People with the same citizenship	13	17	20	8
Residents of the Baltic states	27	26	28	16
Humankind	12	15	13	12
Europeans	30	37	18	21
Residents of Estonia	32	50	38	39
Ukrainians and other nationalities living here	16	17	18	21
Estonian Russians	61	55	50	39
Estonians	22	17	16	5

CHAPTER 9.
THE STRUCTURING ROLE OF GENERATIONS IN A TRANSFORMING SOCIETY
REFLECTIONS UPON THE ESTONIAN CASE WITHIN THE PARADIGMS OF SOCIAL MORPHOGENESIS AND SOCIAL ACCELERATION

Veronika Kalmus

9.1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of 'generation' has several different meanings in the social sciences. According to a meta-level classification proposed by, among others, Semi Purhonen (2016), three basic ways to use the term 'generation' exist. The first, genealogical usage of the concept refers to familial generations and is dominant in anthropology, sociology of the family, studies on socialisation and education, social mobility, migration and so on. The second meaning of 'generation' is synonymous with 'birth cohort' or 'age group' and designates a group of people born at the same time or during a certain period. The third use of the term is in the sense of social or cultural or historical generations, where the very notion of a 'generation' depends on the existence of shared generational identity and self-awareness (Mannheim, 1927/1952). Although the three meanings are connected, they should be kept analytically distinct for the sake of conceptual clarity (Kertzer, 1983) and methodological facilitation.

This chapter employs the concept of 'generation' in two senses. In conceptualising the role of generations in social transformations, I focus on *social generations* in the sense of socially constructed collectives produced by shared experiences and closely linked to societal changes and to the concept of social time and chronological consciousness (Lovell, 2007). In our quantitative empirical analyses (Kalmus, 2016; Kalmus et al., 2013a, 2017; Kalmus et al., 2018b), the results of which are generalised in this chapter, generations were operationalised as 'age groups' or 'cohorts', the latter term signifying a group of people born in a certain time period without necessarily forming a generation in the historical or social sense.

Generation as a sociological category designates, according to the classical theory of Karl Mannheim (1927/1952), location in the social structure in two ways: by positioning individuals or groups on the historical axis of the social process and in the social hierarchy. The Mannheimian generation approach, thus, has served as a viable alternative to Marxian class perspective for the understanding of societal dynamics and social stratification: generations are constituted according to their relation to historical and cultural time, and to the respective lifestyles underlying status-based stratification (cf. Bourdieu, 1979/1984; Weber, 1922/1978). This chapter revisits this classical sociological argument in terms of some relevant contemporary theoretical approaches: firstly, by synthesising Mannheim's conceptualisation of generations with the SAC components (structure, agency and culture) of modern sociological theorising (e.g. Archer, 2013) and, secondly, by embedding the resulting conceptual synthesis within the paradigm of social acceleration (Rosa, 2013) to examine and explain the dynamics of the positions and roles of generations in social transformation.

This chapter employs the assumption that social acceleration, by intensifying transformation, has affected different social groups to varying degrees, bringing about emergent patterns of social stratification. As generations differ, due to dissimilar locations on the life span, in their speed of adapting to rapid social and technological changes, age has become one of the most significant markers of social inequality, bringing about an asynchronous entrainment of different generation groups by transformational developments. In the context of the accelerating speed of social time and life (Wajcman, 2015), certain characteristics of generation groups are, presumably, especially meaningful in determining the ability to cope with changes and social positioning.

After introducing the theoretical framework and methodological considerations of the analysis, this chapter establishes conceptually enriched research questions, and presents trends and generalisations on three selected sets of empirical characteristics of generation groups: (1) appropriation and use of various media technologies; (2) time as a resource and capital, and agentive control over time use; and (3) attitudes towards social changes, mental structures, civic and political participation, and subjective self-positioning.

9.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

9.2.1. Mannheim's theory of generations and the SAC model

The concept of a generation is one of the key components in Karl Mannheim's broader sociological theory of knowledge, which focuses on the social or existential conditioning of knowledge by location in a socio-historical structure. The most well-known and widely used concepts developed by Mannheim include 'generational location', 'generation as an actuality', 'generational units', 'formative years (and experiences)' and 'fresh contacts'; the first three terms provide the foundation of his theory of generations. In the following, I will demonstrate that Mannheim's approach elegantly embraces and interweaves three main components of sociological theorising (structure, agency and culture, or the SAC model); furthermore, it helps us to conceptualise the roles of generations in structuring social life (i.e. in constituting social hierarchy) and in social changes (transformative processes).

'Generational location' (*Lagerung*) designates the structural and social conditions shared by members of an age group and provides them with a 'specific range of *potential experience*' (Mannheim, 1927/1952: 291), i.e. a set of life chances or mental opportunities predisposing the cohort to a certain characteristic mode of thought. 'Generational location' positions age groups in a social structure in terms of generations' relation to social, cultural and historical time (Corsten, 2011), and respective lifestyles underlying status-based social stratification (cf. Weber, 1922/1978). It is quite obvious that the concept of 'generational location' includes the aspects of both structure (S), which the individual members of an age group have little or no control over (e.g. the overall level of the economic and technological development of the societal era), and the culture (C) they potentially share and carry (e.g. a religious or an ideological pattern of thought).

'Generation as an actuality' (*Generationszusammenhang*) emerges when members of the cohort actually participate 'in the characteristic social and intellectual currents of their society and period' (Mannheim, 1927/1952: 304), sharing a set of historical responses to their location in social time. 'Generation as an actuality', thus, is comprised of the aspects of collective agency (A), e.g. mobilising for a political or social cause, as well as of culture (C), e.g. creating generation-specific 'discursive practices' or 'generational semantics' (cf. Corsten, 1999), such as a particular literary style or a set of conventions of online communication (or 'netiquette').

Generations are internally divided by individuals' geographical and cultural location and by their differing responses to particular social situations, forming the third pillar of Mannheim's theory, 'generational units' (*Generationseinheiten*). This concept is, notably, multi-dimensional as it embraces all components of the SAC model: (1) generational units are formed through intersections with other structural variables (S), such as gender, race/ethnicity, socio-economic status and place of residence (cf. Alanen, 2009), and (2) generational units are created (or rather, create themselves) by sub-cultures within generations or 'peer cultures' (cf. Corsaro, 1997), which include the aspects of both culture (C) and agency (A).

Conceptually generations can be seen as structural components of the social system (S), as well as collective agents (A), both structural and cultural ones. Furthermore, generations and generational units carry and create their characteristic cultures (C), constituted, among other elements, of shared identities, values and other mental structures.

Mannheim's discussions of generational consciousness and awareness, related to the second and third conceptual pillars of generation, forestall contemporary notions of *reflexivity*. Namely, for these two aspects of generation ('generation as an actuality' and 'generational units') to be realised, individual members of a generation must actively reflect on their shared experiences and make use of their common spatial and cultural location to implement change (Narvanen & Nasman, 2004). By showing that the transmission of a common cultural heritage is always reflexive and interactive, Mannheim highlighted the problems of inter-generational misunderstanding, even opposition, in the process of socialisation. The young are always the first age cohort to experience new social conditions during their formative years: according to Mannheim, they have 'fresh contacts' with emerging phenomena. Social generations come into being when new birth cohorts have to negotiate their way to adulthood in changing social conditions or, in other words, 'when a formative historical experience coincides with a formative period of people's lives' (Marada, 2004: 153; see also Mannheim, 1927/1952). New generations, in Mannheim's sense, form during sudden and significant societal changes, which compel young people (particularly late adolescents) to adjust to a new social context. Once members of a new generation have developed a distinctive historical consciousness and social and political outlooks, they carry this mentality throughout their lives.

Mannheim implied that during profound social changes, rather than being objects of socialisation, young people *could* become agents of social transformation. His treatment of collective generational organisation, challenging existing societal norms and values, helps us further in conceptualising the role of generations in 'social morphogenesis' (Archer, 2013) and in 'social acceleration' (Rosa, 2013).

9.2.2. The role of generations in social morphogenesis

Margaret Archer has not theorised in great detail on the role of generations in social transformation; she, however, mentions the *loss of inter-generational contextual continuity* (along with the loss of habitual and routine action, of traditional social classes, of lasting norms, of a stable role array, etc.) as one of 'the profound qualitative changes potentially involved' in social morphogenesis (Archer, 2013: 14). According to a widespread conviction and line of thought in the theory of generations (Corsten, 1999; Eisenstadt, 1988; Mannheim, 1927/1952), during the socialisation period young people's dispositions and values crystallise. Archer's notion of the 'loss of inter-generational contextual continuity' means, among other things, that the crystallised values and cultural beliefs of the older generations are not compatible with changed social reality, and the young have to develop new dispositions to be able to cope in the new society. The new dispositions, once crystallised, remain quite intact throughout these people's lives. Consequently, the new collectively shared understandings help to transform the society further (Nugin & Kalmus, 2018).

Consistent with this argument are Ronald Inglehart's theses of inter-generational value changes. According to Inglehart (1997), one would expect to find substantial differences, even disruptions and discontinuities, between the older and the younger generations in societies that have undergone crucial changes in economic and political conditions (see Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2008, for the specificity of young generations in three transitional societies). Individuals are more likely to adopt those values that are consistent with their own experiences during their formative years and reject values that are inconsistent with first-hand experience. If younger generations are socialised under significantly different conditions from those that shaped older generations, the values of the society will gradually change through inter-generational replacement.

In all these conceptualisations, the new social generations (though initiated by change and potentially changing societies) are a source of future stability. Their values and shared understanding of social reality provide resources for self-reflexive identity building (Corsten, 1999; Misztal, 2003; Nugin, 2015) and solidarity, which may have a synchronising and harmonising influence for several decades (Nugin & Kalmus, 2018).

In returning to Archer's (2013) conceptualisation of the cycles of social transformation, we may postulate that generations and generational units, by virtue of their SAC composition, play a considerable and varying role in the dialectics of *societal morphostasis* and *societal morphogenesis*. Firstly, generations are structural components, participating in *structural maintenance* in the course of inter-generational social interaction in societal morphostasis. Generations are also custodians of culture, performing the central role in the interactive transmission of cultural heritage from one generation to the next in the process of socialisation (*cultural maintenance* in societal morphostasis). The reflexive and transformative power of generations as collective agents gathers momentum in a *morphogenetic cycle* when the shared culture (values, understandings, identities and other mental structures) of a new generation, formed in the course of their 'fresh contacts' with new phenomena and a new context, provides a basis for *positive feedback* on *cultural and structural elaboration*. The further course of societal morphogenesis depends, to a considerable extent, on the outcomes of the interaction between generations and generational units and on the dynamics of generational cultures, which influence the nature of feedback (positive or negative) on cultural and structural elaboration.

9.2.3. Generations and social acceleration

Mannheim's theory is, among its other qualities, remarkably far-sighted: he conceptualised the relationship between the interaction of generations and what he called the 'strengthening of the social dynamic' (Mannheim, 1927/1952: 302). According to Mannheim (1927/1952: 302), 'Static conditions make for attitudes of piety', and the younger generations tend to follow and imitate the older; thus, we may say that they contribute to the maintenance of *societal morphostasis*. When the tempo of social change increases, 'the older generation becomes increasingly receptive to the influences from the younger' (Mannheim, 1927/1952: 302), giving rise to what we now call *reverse socialisation* (see Kalmus, 2007) and, potentially, to *societal morphogenesis*.

Hartmut Rosa, too, has analysed the dynamics of relationships between the speed of social change and generational replacement in different socio-historical epochs. According to him, the pace of social change, measured in terms of the turnover of generations, has accelerated from *inter-generational* in pre-modernity to *generational* in 'classical' modernity to *intra-generational* in late modernity (Rosa, 2005: 447). As Andreas Hepp has observed, this aspect of acceleration 'is particularly evident for the processes of deep mediatization: driven by digitisation, the media environment of an entire generation is changing before their eyes' (2019: 23), and during their very lifetime. The acceleration of social change in general can be seen in the dynamic relationship between generations (cf. ibid.).

In synthesising Mannheim's and Rosa's ideas, we may summarise by saying that the 'speeding up' of social and technological changes (Spurk, 2004) due to economic, structural and cultural motors (Rosa, 2005), or 'social acceleration' (Rosa, 2013), evokes fundamental changes in the inter-generational transmission of knowledge and culture, i.e. in the very nature of the process of socialisation.

This postulate, together with the above-presented conceptualisation of the role of generations in the dialectics of societal morphostasis and societal morphogenesis, inspires new questions for analysing the relationships between generations and social transformation. We may ask:

How have different generation groups responded to various aspects of social transformation? Which generation groups have given positive or negative feedback to particular social and technological changes? How have they participated in the transformative processes as collective agents, both structural and cultural?

What are the emergent generational patterns of social structuration and (de)synchronisation? How can we explain those patterns?

We can assume that these questions are particularly acute and intriguing in societies that have recently experienced radical political and social changes and are still undergoing intense and partly conflicting transformational processes. These societies are sometimes characterised by the concept 'double movement', proposed by Karl Polanyi (1944) in his theory of economic transformation, and referring, basically, to liberal reforms and ideologies and more or less spontaneous reactions to them. As shown in Chapters 1 and 2 of this volume, the Estonian society serves as an exemplary arena for observing such developments.

9.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

To analyse and conceptualise the relationships between generations and social transformation in Estonia, this chapter presents an empirical narrative based on selected findings, trends and generalisations from three waves (2002, 2011 and 2014) of the 'Me. The World. The Media' survey. As the formation of generations and the cycles of social transformation are detectable in a longer time perspective, the data from 2002 are compared to the data from the most recent observations (2011 or 2014).

Researching the role of social generations in societal changes quantitatively involves several methodological challenges and problems. Firstly, one has to deal with the epistemological controversy between the self-constructed, reflexive and qualitative nature of the Mannheimian concept of social generations and the strict quantitative features (age, time and size limits) that inevitably arise in the operationalisation of the concept in population surveys. Most importantly, researchers must solve the boundary problem of delineating generations in the continuum of births of the whole population. The 2014 wave of the survey 'Me. The World. The Media' included questions about the length of one's perceived generation (in years). The largest group of respondents saw ten years as the most appropriate length of time for their generation, while the length of perceived generation grew as age increased, ranging from six years (predominant among 15- to 20-year-olds) to 20 years (among 71- to 79-year-olds; Kalmus & Opermann, 2019). Furthermore, researchers have to take into account various statistical considerations (e.g. the age groups should be of comparable size, and appropriate for multidimensional statistical analysis). Finally, according to Spitzer (1973), if age specific differences are historically significant, they will reveal themselves wherever the cut-offs are made in the continuum of birth years.

Based on all these considerations, we have constructed the age groups mostly as covering ten years. Nevertheless, depending on the sample of the wave of the survey (15- to 74-year-olds in 2002 and 2011 versus 15- to 79-year-olds in 2014), the statistical method and the level of generalisation, we have used somewhat different age groups in our previous analyses of the same data (Kalmus, 2016; Kalmus et al., 2013a, 2017, 2018b; Kalmus et al., 2018a) as well as in this chapter. Furthermore, we concede that rather than delineating social generations in Mannheim's sense, our statistical groups represent age cohorts, which may carry certain generational characteristics.

Secondly, our empirical indicators do not cover all components and processes introduced in the theoretical framework (e.g. the interaction of generations); rather, they provide a non-complete mosaic of structural, cultural and agentive characteristics of different age groups, thus forming a partial and proxy estimation of the SAC aspects of social generations.

The following empirical narrative covers selected aspects of social transformation in Estonia and the changing positions, roles, perceptions and activities of Estonian generation groups: (1) changes in media technologies, (2) acceleration of personal and social time, and (3) overall societal changes and transition culture.

9.4. CHANGES IN MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES

The post-socialist transition in Estonia is often viewed as a special case among Central and East European countries. Specifically, economic reform in Estonia was radical, particularly in its highly liberal transformation policies, which is sometimes highlighted as the key component in Estonia's success. Closely related to the economic aspects of the socio-cultural field, technological change was a crucial component in the Estonian transition. 'Internetisation' became one of the central symbols of the rapidly changing society, leading to a widely held perception of Estonia as a leading e-state (Runnel et al., 2009).

In contemporary societies, where ICTs are becoming increasingly important in almost all spheres of life, differences in capital, lifestyle and habitus are manifested more and more in distinctive consumption patterns, self-expression and cultural practices based upon unequal access to and socially variable uses of ICT products and digital services. Such digital stratification, in turn, creates and reproduces social stratification, particularly in the context of rapidly developing information societies in which both public and private services are increasingly available exclusively online (Kalmus et al., 2013b). As digital skills tend to be most rapidly acquired by younger generations, more technologically challenged elderly people may experience a decline in social status. Distinctive patterns of new media use, thus, acquire growing significance both in understanding social structuration and in the sociology of generations. Media technology – and its dominant uses, which an individual gets socialised into during his or her childhood and youth – becomes that which 'one keeps a special relation with for the balance of one's life' (Bolin & Westlund, 2009: 109). Based on this assumption, the concept of 'media generations' appears, differentiating, for instance, between the radio generation, the black and white television generation, and the Internet generation (Volkmer, 2006). Moreover, contemporary children and young people are often defined by their relationship to the media technology they embrace in their childhood, with a variety of labels, such as the 'digital generation' (Papert, 1996), the 'Net generation' (Tapscott, 1998) and 'digital natives' (Prensky, 2001), used to signify supposedly common characteristics of this age cohort.

This sub-chapter examines generations in Estonia from the perspective of media use and media generations. Section 9.4.1 explores the aspects of new media use that are more or less directly related to structural positioning in the economic and political field, i.e. digital stratification that originates mainly from socially diverse access to technological resources. 'Access', however, includes several dimensions. In addition to economic capital, education, social resources and cognitive resources help individuals know which hardware and digital services to purchase and update, and how to 'domesticate' them, that is, how to fit them meaningfully into their lives (Livingstone, 2009). In expanding this idea, we may say that the totality of all these resources and the awareness of the emerging techno-culture are relevant factors that shape digital stratification (cf. Selwyn, 2004), as well as the varying feedback to digital transformations.

9.4.1. Generational dynamics of the structural characteristics of new media use

Representative population data gathered in 2002 and 2011 allow us to compare the pace of different generations' domestication and appropriation of new media technologies and the opportunities they provide for participation in the economic and political spheres. To fit this purpose, the respondents were divided into six age groups, each covering ten years. The age groups were of comparable size and, as the distance between two measurements was almost nine years, it was possible to observe how nearly the same birth cohorts' positioning vis-à-vis each other changed in this period (see Table 9.1).

Media use characteristics were measured by a number of original single indicators, on the basis of which several cumulative media use indices were calculated. To compare age groups, this sub-chapter mainly employs analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine statistically significant differences in the mean values of these indicators and indices.

In terms of the most basic indicator of a digital divide – Internet use versus non-use – gaps between generation groups appeared in a linear fashion, with 15- to 24-year-olds being in first position in both years. By 2011, however, differences between the three youngest age groups had significantly reduced. The growth of Internet users in the 1938–1947 birth cohort was the slowest in absolute terms; proportionally, however, the increase was the largest among the two oldest groups.

Quite similar patterns were manifested in home access to the Internet, with younger cohorts tending to be better equipped than older ones. The exception is that in 2002 both the youngest generation and that of their parents, 35- to 44-year-olds, were better equipped than young adults aged 25–34; similarly, the latter had fewer media technologies at home than those two other generations. Most probably this is a life cycle effect: while teenagers tend to take the lead in appropriating the newest media technologies in their daily lives, urging their parents to provide resources to purchase media equipment for home use, young adults may have somewhat different consumption priorities associated with starting and maintaining households and families.

With regard to home access to media technologies, the gaps between 15- to 24-year-olds and all other age groups had noticeably widened by 2011; moreover, the index score of the cohorts born in the 1958–1967 period and earlier had significantly dropped in the nine year gap. Such quickly developing generational differentiation was probably due to the very fast changes in the media technological environment

Table 9.1. Structural characteristics of new media use by age group in 2002 and 2011

Differences between the age groups were statistically significant at p < .001.
To observe the dynamics, the data cells of the same birth cohort are coloured with the same shades.
In each row, the two highest figures are in bold

	Year of survey	All	15–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65–74
Years of birth	2002	1928–87	1978–87	1968–77	1958–67	1948–57	1938–47	1928–37
	2011	1937–96	1987–96	1977–86	1967–76	1957–66	1947–56	1937–46
N	2002	1470	268	304	264	232	213	189
	2011	1510	261	259	273	285	251	181
Users of the Internet (%)	2002	43	**78**	**56**	46	37	18	4
	2011	85	**100**	**98**	96	86	72	40
Home access to the Internet (%)	2002	24	**37**	26	**33**	25	14	3
	2011	82	**95**	**94**	94	82	71	41
Access to media technologies at home (index; maximum 5)	2002	3.18	**3.55**	3.33	**3.51**	3.17	2.81	2.36
	2011	3.07	**3.57**	3.27	**3.36**	3.02	2.71	2.12
Self-evaluated computer skills (1=no skills; 5=very good)	2002	3.20	**3.51**	3.13	**3.15**	2.88	2.95	2.32
	2011	3.12	**3.99**	**3.80**	3.35	2.87	2.39	1.78
Using the Internet for study- and work-related information*	2002	0	**0.65**	**0.23**	0.05	-0.22	-0.40	-0.62
	2011	0	**0.55**	**0.36**	0.26	-0.06	-0.53	-0.97
Using the Internet for political and economic information*	2002	0	**0.25**	**0.33**	0.19	-0.14	-0.34	-0.56
	2011	0	0.04	**0.33**	**0.44**	0.04	-0.33	-0.85
Using the Internet for political and economic participation*	2002	0	**0.32**	**0.34**	0.18	-0.13	-0.39	-0.62
	2011	0	**0.34**	**0.44**	**0.34**	-0.02	-0.45	-1.07

* Values of the index Z-scores (means).

Source: Kalmus, 2016: 328

and the corresponding adjustments in measurement: in 2011, the list of questionnaire items in the index included more new media devices, such as the DVD player, MP3 player/iPod, smartphone, laptop, tablet, e-book reader and scanner.

When it comes to self-reported computer skills, the youngest age group led in both years, with older cohorts following in a nearly linear way (with minor fluctuations in 2002). It is notable that the 1978–1987 and 1968–1977 birth cohorts believed that their cognitive resources in this field had improved in nine years, while all older generation groups rated their computer skills as considerably lower than they did in 2002.

The generation pattern of using the Internet to search for information related to one's studies and work followed a linear trend in both years. Remarkably, the differences between the youngest respondents and the three previous generation groups had diminished by 2011. The relative disadvantage of the two oldest groups, however, had increased.

When it came to searching for online information more directly related to the fields of politics and economics (such as looking for jobs and places to live, and legal or political information), the lead, both in 2002 and 2011, was taken by the 1968–1977 birth cohort, followed by that of 1978–1987. The youngest respondents, born between 1987 and 1996, showed an index score only slightly above the sample average in 2011, which is partly due to a lesser need for that type of information at that age. The relative handicap of the 1958–1967 and earlier birth cohorts had increased in nine years.

Somewhat similar patterns were revealed with regard to using the Internet for political and economic participation (for forums, purchases, bank transactions and e-services). Here, too, the 1978–1987 and 1968–1977 cohorts showed the highest activity levels in both years. The young people born between 1987 and 1996, however, shared second position with their parents' generation.

In short, the youngest generation group, born in the 1987–1996 period, was best equipped with technological devices and skills in 2011, and made the most active use of this capital to meet information needs related to their studies and/or work. This age group, however, ranked only second or third in terms of using the Internet for more direct participation in the political and economic fields, which is partly an age effect. The birth cohort of 1978–1987 displayed a very similar pattern in 2002. In nine years, this group of young people improved their levels in most of the observed resources and online activities and maintained a high position in the political and economic fields, being most active in using the Internet for political and economic participation. Nearly the same was true with regard to the cohort of 1968–1977, whose resources and activity levels were far above the sample average in 2011, and who remained among the top players in the field. Although the share of Internet users and those with home access increased considerably among the cohorts born in 1958–1967 and earlier, their relative handicap in terms of perceived cognitive resources and observed online activities increased over nine years.

9.4.2. Generational habitus and life-worlds as reflected in media usage

This section examines the aspects of media use that are related to the *horizontal dimension of social differentiation,* in the sense of differentiating practices and manifestations of what we might call 'generational habitus' (Edmunds & Turner, 2002), mentalities and life-worlds: specifically, the usage of media technologies and channels, TV format viewing preferences, attitudes towards the advantages and risks of the Internet, and the spatial reach of media use [measured by the index of news awareness, i.e. the self-evaluated level of how well the respondents were informed about events in their local (i.e. city or regional) environment, in Estonia, and abroad in different countries or areas]. In addition, findings on more nuanced ‘media repertoires’ (Hasebrink & Popp, 2006) in terms of topic preferences and spatial orientations in media use, presented in detail elsewhere (Kalmus et al., 2013a), were re-interpreted as representing generational habitus and life-worlds. This section, due to the lack of comparable indicators in different waves of the survey, draws only on the data from 2011. In taking into account life course phase and socio-historical context during the respondents’ formative years, the sample was split into four age groups, each covering 14 years (see Kalmus, 2016 for details and justification).

An analysis of patterns in media technology adoption, media channel and programme preferences, and the perceptions of the advantages and risks of the Internet revealed significant differences between age groups with regard to most features of their media-related generational habitus: use of traditional media channels and more serious TV formats increased linearly in older age groups, while using new media for various purposes showed the opposite tendency (Figure 9.1). Television entertainment appeared to be the only format that bridged the gaps between generation groups, probably due to its versatility and appeal to a wide range of audience groups.

Furthermore, the analysis presented in detail elsewhere (Kalmus et al., 2013a) revealed very clearly the divergence of topic preferences between people born before or after the mid-1960s, i.e. the younger generations’ lower interest in political, historical and environmental issues, as well as the cross-generational trends in changing spatial orientations of media use, following the age-bound trajectory from Russian media across local media to global media. Quite remarkably, generational distinctions in channel and topic preferences and spatial orientations did not result in significant differences in the spatial reach of media use, measured by the self-evaluated level of being informed about events in various parts of the world, or news awareness (Figure 9.1).

The trends presented in Figure 9.1 allow for composite sketches to be made to compare the generation groups in Estonia. In line with the findings about digital stratification presented in the previous section, *the youngest age group* (15- to 29-year-olds, born between 1982 and 1996) was highly successful in their swift domestication of new media technologies: they were the most active and multifaceted in using computers and the Internet, and they demonstrated the strongest recognition of the advantages of this medium. The intensity and functional diversity of using the newest platform – social media – together with creative and communicative uses

Figure 9.1. Media use and media perception by age group in 2011

Mean values of the indices (scale 0–4, if not stated otherwise)



Source: Kalmus, 2016: 331

of the Internet, were the aspects of new media use where the youngest cohort's lead, compared to 30- to 44-year-olds and older groups, was greatest. Conversely, this generation was most passive in consuming traditional media, particularly in news, talk shows, and documentary formats.

The group of 30- to 44-year-olds (born between 1967 and 1981) stood out in terms of very active and versatile consumption of both traditional and new media. They were the keenest readers of online newspapers and news portals, which probably explains the lower frequency of watching TV news in this cohort, compared to the two older groups. At the same time, 30- to 44-year-olds demonstrated high reflexivity with respect to new media, as shown by high assessments of the advantages and risks of the Internet. The explanation probably lies in the large proportion of parents in this age cohort who were facing the challenge of mediating, i.e. guiding and/or regulating, their children's online activities (Kalmus, 2012), and had to acquire relevant life-course related experiences and reflexivity.

The *two oldest age groups in Estonia* (born in 1937–1951 and 1952–1966) mostly remained faithful to the traditional media they had consumed during their childhood or youth and demonstrated a reluctance to adopt new media forms.

The characteristics of media use and perception of related cognitive aspects allow us to interpret the crucial distinctions between age groups as indicating different 'media generations'. The youngest age groups, indeed, welcomed their 'fresh contacts' (Mannheim, 1927/1952) with digital media much more enthusiastically. In particular, the cohort born in 1982–1996 displayed a number of media use features attributed to the 'digital generation' (Papert, 1996; Siibak, 2009), such as using the Internet extensively for social networking, self-expression and communication. Furthermore, their media use patterns corresponded to their self-characterisation as the 'Facebook generation', which came to light in a focus group interview with young Estonian people born between 1990 and 1995 (see Opermann, 2013).

The cohorts born in the 1937–1951 and 1952–1966 periods possessed several traits characteristic to the 'radio/print generation' and the 'TV generation' (Bolin & Westlund, 2009), respectively, seen together as the 'mass-media generation' (Hepp, 2019). As people born between 1967 and 1981 displayed – compared to the youngest age group – a greater inclination towards traditional news media and less intensity and diversity of social media use, they seemed to form an 'intermediary or buffer generation' (cf. Pilcher, 1994) between the 'TV generation' and the 'digital generation', and have been labelled the 'secondary digital media generation' by Hepp (2019: 30).

To conclude, we can postulate that in terms of vertical digital stratification and active online participation in the political and economic fields, a dividing line seemed to run between the cohorts born in the 1968–1996 period and the older age groups. The younger generations, well equipped with technological and cognitive resources, had made active use of this capital to meet the information needs related to their studies and/or work and to become and remain top players in online political and economic participation. Although the cohorts born in the 1958–1967 period and earlier had increased their technological capital considerably during the decade under observation, their relative handicap in terms of cognitive resources and online activities had increased. In terms of feedback on technological changes, mainly the younger cohorts had actively and positively responded to the opportunities provided by their 'generational location' on the unfolding transformational track of ICT developments, thus acquiring features of 'generation as an actuality' (Mannheim, 1927/1952). Our previous analyses (Kalmus et al., 2011, 2013b), nevertheless, warn against overlooking individual variation in younger generations. Other socio-demographic characteristics (such as gender, ethnicity, education, income and social status) also contribute to the intensity of and/or motives for Internet use, indicating the existence of 'generational units' (Mannheim, 1927/1952).

When it came to horizontal differentiation in terms of lifestyle-related aspects of media use, membership in a generation, again, played a significant role. The trends presented in this sub-chapter seem to justify the discursive labelling of the young as the 'digital generation'. Nevertheless, the boundary of the 'digital generation' remains vague, extending, in some aspects, to those born in the late 1960s or members of the 'secondary digital media generation' in Hepp's (2019) terms.

However, some inter-generational similarities (e.g. watching TV entertainment programmes and being informed about events in various parts of the world) existed, functioning as slight markers of inter-generational contextual continuity and synchronism.

9.5. ACCELERATION OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL TIME

This sub-chapter employs the assumption that social acceleration, by intensifying transformation, has affected different social groups to varying degrees, bringing about emergent patterns of social stratification. Generations differ, due to being at different ages, in their speed of adapting to rapid social changes. Furthermore, time as a capital and commodity, and agentive control over time use, have become paramount resources in the context of social acceleration, influencing individuals' social positioning and well-being. As generational and life-course related features presumably played a significant role in determining how social actors dealt with new temporal pressures and challenges, age may have become one of the most significant markers of time-bound social inequality. To test this assumption, the sub-chapter will focus on the indicators of time use, time perception, 'time wealth' (Mückenberger, 2011), perceptions of smartphones in structuring time use, and the capability of converting 'individual time capital' into other types of capital, as conceptualised by Marian Preda (2013; see Chapter 7).

9.5.1. Generational perceptions of time and smartphoning

Figure 9.2 reveals significant differences between age groups regarding time use and time perception. The index of *surplus time* (when one has nothing to do with one's time) had the highest mean value among the youngest group, followed by 71- to 79-year-olds. At the same time, 15- to 20-year-olds had the best scores on *spending time on hobbies* as well as *work and education*. *Overwork* was most characteristic to 31- to 40-year-olds, closely followed by the groups aged 21–30 and 41–50. These three age groups, furthermore, suffered most from *perceived lack of time*. Strategies for using one's time more efficiently appeared to be correlated with age in a fully linear fashion: the younger the respondents, the more they reported both *multitasking* and *efforts to manage time differently*. The youngest generations, thus, responded to the 'speeding up' process most swiftly and positively, taking an active role through agentive time management and multitasking.

The picture, however, is a bit more complex. In being inspired by theoretical explorations of the importance of digital media and mobile technologies in shaping people's perceptions of personal and social time, and in moulding the patterns and rhythms of their everyday lives and individual practices (e.g. Agger, 2011), we analysed shared perceptions of smartphones in structuring personal and social life, time use and interaction (Kalmus et al., 2018b). Our analysis indicated that opinions about the roles and functions of smartphones in moulding everyday life formed coherent and meaningful social imaginaries. The perception of smartphones, according to our analysis, involved three dimensions: *Expanding flexibility and diverse opportunities*, *Vanishing boundaries and foci*, and *Changing social identity and communication conventions* (see Figure 9.3). The first two dimensions expressed the two poles of the same phenomenon: positive *versus* critical attitudes towards smartphone use. All dimensions were internalised to different degrees by generation groups.

Interestingly, the youngest age groups saw the function of smartphones most positively (*Expanding flexibility and diverse opportunities*), while also being most cognisant of the negative aspects (*Vanishing boundaries and foci*). Furthermore, in the regression models, age was the strongest predictor of positive as well as negative perceptions of smartphoning. Although the third dimension – *Changing social identity and communication conventions* – was significantly and negatively related to age, it was most strongly predicted by lower values of both objective and subjective social status. Moreover, the temporal dimension of the life-world – how one used and perceived personal time – formed a set of significant predictors on the identity and communication factor of smartphoning: the more 'time capital' (Preda,

Figure 9.2. Time use and time perception by age group in 2014

Mean values of the indices (scale 1–5)



Source: Kalmus et al., 2017: 659

2013) and 'time-use capability' (Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017) the respondent had, the less he/she perceived the effect of smartphoning on identity and communication conventions, being more immune to influence on the integrity of selfhood.

As a general conclusion, we may state that attitudinal responses to a set of new social and cultural conditions and needs that had emerged along with widespread smartphoning and the concurrent mobile time regime (or 'iTime', according to Agger, 2011) were related to generational belonging, as well as personal time and time-use capability. Most importantly, the age-related trend-line of the dimension of critical reflexivity towards smartphone use showed quite a novel nuance of the hitherto predominantly celebratory discourse of the 'digital natives' (cf. Papert, 1996;

Figure 9.3. Imaginaries of smartphone use by age group in 2014

Among smartphone users. Mean factor scores with 95% confidence intervals



Source: Kalmus et al., 2018b: 55

Prensky, 2001): younger smartphone users (aged 15–34) were the ones who tended to recognise the problems arising from smartphoning, such as de-focussing, the fragmentation of activities, and communication pressure.

9.5.2. Time-use capability

We assume that coping with technological and social acceleration can also be estimated in terms of time-use capability, i.e. the capability of converting 'individual time capital' into other types of capital, as conceptualised by Preda (2013) and elaborated in detail in Chapter 7. The pattern of age group distribution in time-use capability types (Table 9.2; see also Chapter 7) revealed that the capability of converting individual time capital was related to generational belonging: the three younger groups tended to be overrepresented among *successful multitaskers*, characterised

Table 9.2. Age groups by time-use capability type in 2014

% of type. Figures in bold signify higher values compared to the total sample

	Successful multitasker	Virtual multitasker	Time-stress-free hobbyist	Discontent multitasker	Time-stressed hard-worker	Withdrawn	Total
Total	18	14	21	12	13	22	100
15–19	**14**	**16**	2	4	2	1	6
20–29	**27**	**42**	4	**37**	12	3	19
30–44	**22**	**23**	7	**35**	**24**	7	18
45–54	**20**	11	18	16	**27**	15	18
55–64	9	7	**29**	7	**30**	**23**	18
65–74	7	1	**40**	2	5	**50**	21

Source: Vihalemm & Lauristin, 2017: 448

by the highest time-use capability, while the two oldest groups were overrepresented among the clusters with lower time-use capability. Thus, younger generations were generally more flexible in developing up-to-the-minute time-use strategies (e.g. multitasking) to cope with social acceleration.

A more nuanced analysis (Kalmus & Opermann, 2020) has revealed that, besides generational features, other factors (such as biological and professional lifecycle and the interaction between the two) played a role in shaping time-based social stratification. For instance, Table 9.2 shows that people aged 20–44 were over-represented among *discontent multitaskers:* the type faced with the challenge of constantly perceived lack of time and synchronisation difficulties in conditions of social acceleration. This phase of life tended to be characterised by the double burden of parenting young children and working hard to establish professional position and economic security. Educated professionals with under-age children were, indeed, strongly over-represented among *discontent multitaskers* (Kalmus & Opermann, 2020). Our focus groups (see Chapter 7 for the methodological details) also revealed insurmountable difficulties faced by several young and middle-aged participants with small children (particularly mothers) in balancing increasing workloads, family duties and the ‘right to one’s own time’ (Mückenberger, 2011).

Thus, while generational belonging was one of the most significant variables in determining membership in time-use capability types, there was a more varied and multidimensional pattern of socio-demographic and life-course factors that influenced coping with technological and social acceleration.

9.6. OVERALL SOCIETAL CHANGES AND TRANSITION CULTURE

To evaluate the nature of generational responses to overall societal changes, we used the maximum distance between the measurements in our survey, i.e. the data gathered in 2002 versus 2014. We divided the sample into five age groups, each covering 12 years. The age groups were of comparable size and, as the distance between two measurements was almost 12 years, it was possible to observe how nearly the same birth cohorts' positioning vis-à-vis each other had changed in this period (see Table 9.3).

9.6.1. Attitudes towards societal changes and mental structures

Two direct indicators (perception of the speed of changes and subjective evaluation of changes as encouraging or discouraging) and two more indirect measures (the indices of an optimistic attitude towards life and trust in state institutions; see Table 9.3) shed light on the generational patterns of feedback to societal changes. First, we observed that the perception of the tempo of changes was a generational phenomenon: whilst, as a tendency, younger age groups perceived the speed of changes as more appropriate, the attitude of each generation group remained almost the same in the 12-year-period. Thus, ageing had no noticeable impact on the perception of social acceleration the respondent had got used to.

The subjective evaluation of societal changes followed a different pattern. In 2002 we observed a U-curve, with the youngest and the oldest groups seeing the changes significantly more positively. In 2014 a linear decline in the favourable attitude towards the changes was manifested, with a sharp drop among the middle-aged group (41- to 53-year-olds). Furthermore, there was an intra-generational decrease in the positive attitude in all age groups in 2002–2014, especially clear in the birth cohort of 1936–1948 when this group reached retirement age. Ageing, with its social implications (decreasing material security among retired people) thus became a more important factor in determining the evaluation of societal changes.

Quite a similar pattern was manifested in the case of an optimistic attitude towards life, which tended to decline over the course of life (the trend-line was fully linear only in 2014). The sharpest intra-generational drop appeared, again, in the birth cohort of 1936–1948 when they reached retirement age.

Trust in state institutions followed U-curved patterns across the life course in both years. Probably several factors, such as age-related scepticism (in middle-aged

Table 9.3. Dynamics in attitudes towards social changes, political and civic participation, and social status by age group in 2002 and 2014

To observe dynamics, the data cells of the same birth cohort are coloured with the same shades

	Year of survey	All	15–27	28–40	41–53	54–66	67–74
Years of birth	2002	1928–87	1975–87	1962–74	1949–61	1936–48	1928–35
	2014	1940–99	1987–99	1974–86	1961–73	1948–60	1940–47
N	2002	1470	352	367	326	291	134
	2014	1431	308	240	304	348	231
Perception of the speed of changes as appropriate (%)	2002**	43	54	42	37	39	36
	2014*	43	50	50	43	35	38
Positive evaluation of social changes during the last 10 years (%)	2002**	55	61	53	49	52	59
	2014**	52	63	59	48	45	40
Optimistic attitude towards life (index mean; 1–4)	2002**	2.45	2.72	2.48	2.28	2.35	2.26
	2014**	2.55	3.21	2.92	2.45	2.17	2.02
Trust in state institutions (index mean; 1–5)	2002	3.00	3.09	2.86	2.99	3.06	3.07
	2014*	3.01	3.17	3.05	2.92	2.92	3.00
Identify themselves with any existing political party in Estonia (%)	2002	59	57	56	58	65	67
	2014**	65	49	64	66	69	81
Are not interested in politics; are not familiar with political parties (%)	2002	26	29	30	26	18	22
	2014**	20	33	22	17	17	12
Do not remember whether they voted in last local elections (%)	2002**	30	35	36	34	19	19
	2014**	6	9	5	6	3	6
Do not remember whether they voted in last parliament elections (%)	2002**	24	27	31	25	15	10
	2014**	9	15	11	8	5	6
Do not participate in any civic organisation (%)	2002**	69	74	71	66	68	63
	2014	41	41	40	39	44	41
Social self-positioning (mean; 1–10)	2002**	5.06	5.54	5.15	4.97	4.82	4.35
	2014**	5.06	5.56	5.69	4.96	4.75	4.36
Financial wealth (index mean; 1–5)	2002**	3.00	3.38	3.29	2.98	2.62	2.05
	2014**	3.21	3.60	3.64	3.24	2.92	2.63

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.001$ (based on Cramer's V or ANOVA).

groups) and different socialisation experiences, interacted in shaping the generational responses to state-initiated societal changes, or structural elaborations.

All in all, younger age groups welcomed societal changes with a higher level of approval or greater optimism. The nature of the generational feedback depended on life-course related factors (such as entering retirement), socialisation experiences and generational cultures, manifesting, *inter alia*, in shared thought patterns or *mental structures*. Our earlier studies (Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2008; Vihalemm &

Kalmus, 2008) demonstrated that 'new cultural templates' (cf. Sztompka, 2004), operationalised as mental structures consisting of value orientations and categories of self-identification, had been adopted predominantly by younger (aged 15–25) and middle (aged 26–45) generations in Estonia. The new templates of *Adaptability and Re-creation of Social Capital*, *Global Orientation and Emancipation*, and *Reinforcement of Success* were, in turn, positively correlated with the positive evaluation of social changes, usage of ICT, cognitive bonds with the West, sufficiency of money, and consumerist orientation (Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2008). Thus, mental structures internalised mainly by younger and middle generations supported a smoother adaptation and positive feedback to societal changes that had taken place during the Estonian transformation.

The old, nostalgic cultural templates of *Deprivation and Disillusionment*, and *Re-Traditionalisation and Nostalgia* had been internalised mainly by the oldest generation (aged 46–74). These mental structures were negatively correlated with the positive evaluation of social changes, usage of ICT, financial wealth, consumerist orientation, and tolerance toward different lifestyles (Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2008), which referred to difficulty in coping with and negative feedback to societal and cultural changes.

It is important to note, however, that intra-generational ethnic differences (*generational units* in Mannheim's terms) existed in the acceptance of cultural templates. Whilst the cultures of the middle and the oldest generations were more divided along ethnic lines, several new mental structures were commonly shared by young ethnic Estonians and Estonian Russians (Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2017; Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2008). Still, our analysis of the 2014 data (Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2017) revealed a peculiar cultural template of *Ethnic Differentiation and Spiritual Solidarity* that was strongly accepted by all age groups of Estonian Russians and rejected by all generations of the ethnic majority. As this mental structure was negatively correlated with the positive evaluation of social changes during the last 10 years, liberal orientation and trust in state institutions, we may interpret this as a manifestation of negative feedback to the latest social and cultural changes, particularly inter-ethnic policies. Furthermore, *Ethnic Differentiation and Spiritual Solidarity* represented a feature of inter-generational continuity and cultural reproduction among the Russian-speaking community and functioned as a desynchronising factor between the young generations of ethnic Estonians and Estonian Russians.

9.6.2. Political and civic participation

In the middle of the 1990s, after exhausting reforms, interest in politics was low in all Baltic states (Titma & Rämmer, 2006). During the first two decades of the new millennium, the proportion of people who shared the views of some political party grew slightly (Table 9.3). Furthermore, in 2014 somewhat fewer people said that they were not interested in party politics.

Our analysis of the generational dynamics in participation (see also Kalmus et al., 2018a) revealed an increase in political identification among all age groups, except for the youngest respondents, 15- to 27-year-olds, who demonstrated a lower level of interest in party politics in 2014 than their counterparts in 2002 did (Table 9.3). This trend was in line with the declining conventional political engagement among young people in Western societies (Banaji & Cammaerts, 2014; Sloam, 2014). The intra-cohort dynamics, however, showed that all four comparable generation groups had become more prone to identification with political parties in 12 years of maturation.

Political agency was manifested, *inter alia*, in attitudes towards voting. Therefore, we focussed our trend analysis on the issue of remembering participation in the last local and parliamentary elections (Table 9.3). A sharp decline in the share of people who did not remember whether they voted or not in the last elections was noteworthy, being similar in the case of both election types and across all four comparable generation groups. Although 15- to 27-year-olds displayed a more apathetic attitude than older age groups in 2014, the overall trend suggests that political participation played an increasingly crucial role in all generations' lives by the end of the observed period.

In the middle of the 1990s, participation in voluntary organisations was low in all post-communist societies (Howard, 2002). Our data reveal that participation in civic organisations grew substantially during the first decades of the new millennium (Table 9.3). In 2002, more than two-thirds of Estonians did not report membership in any union or organisation. Twelve years later, less than half had remained outsiders in this respect.

It is also noteworthy that membership in civic organisations increased substantially – more than 30% – among the two youngest age groups (Kalmus et al., 2018a). The youngest respondents (aged 15–27) mainly participated in sports clubs or other sport-related organisations, and in choirs, dance clubs, or other art and culture organisations. It is also important to note that the participation rates among the youngest generation were boosted by very high participation among 15- to

19-year-olds, i.e. secondary school students, while young people aged 20–27 were somewhat less active in civic society.

Our 2014 data, including the results of a cluster analysis (see Kalmus et al., 2018a for details), demonstrated that generation groups did not differ in the quantitative extent of civic participation; inter-generational division lines, however, did exist in the kind of organisations, actions and activities, i.e. qualitative features of *civic-ness*. The oldest generations were more active in participating in memorial events and events organised by churches which did not demand too much personal input. Middle-aged citizens were most involved in garbage collection bees, while younger people were more active in participating in sports events and volunteer work. All observed forms of digitally mediated political engagement decreased linearly in older groups, reflecting the overall pattern of age-based digital stratification described above in this chapter (see Section 9.4.1). Thus, inter-generational differences were shaped by the unequal shares of personal resources needed for participation in certain activities. However, our analysis revealed some tendencies of younger generations to be more oriented towards civic participation through individual contribution (e.g. volunteer work) and with the aim of actively reshaping the future living environment (Kalmus et al., 2018a), i.e. exercising their generational agency in societal morphogenesis.

Our analysis, furthermore, demonstrated that new opportunities of digitally mediated participation had not created completely new forms or patterns of political or civic engagement. Rather, active citizens used these opportunities as additional means to support and upgrade their existing forms of participation (Kalmus et al., 2018a). While all forms of digitally mediated participation were much more common among younger age groups, older age groups had also begun to take advantage of the new opportunities. Furthermore, substantially different *generational units* existed among the new generation of Estonian citizens. For instance, our analysis of the data collected in 2016 as part of the Horizon 2020 project dealing with the development of active citizenship among European young people (CATCH-EyoU) revealed among 15- to 30-year-old Estonians four clearly distinguishable participation types, differentiated by age, gender, ethnicity and place of residence (Beilmann et al., 2018). Only two small clusters (*General activists* and *Positively engaged activists*, forming together about one-fourth of young people) were prominently involved in online political participation compared to the two larger types (*Benefactors* and *Passive young citizens*). The latest data from the EU Kids Online survey, conducted in Estonia in 2010 and 2018, also suggested that the increased frequency of the young generation's internet use had not led to any growth in their digital participation (Kalmus and Siibak, 2020).

To conclude, the political and civic agency of all generation groups strengthened during the observed 12-year period, signalling a general development towards democratic participation patterns and an increasing morphogenetic potential. Similarly to the trends found in Western democracies (Banaji & Cammaerts, 2014; Sloam, 2014), our analyses revealed a declining appeal of conventional political engagement among the youngest generations, referring to an increasing need for new forms of feedback on structural and cultural elaborations.

9.6.3. Social self-positioning

As we demonstrated in Section 9.6.1, younger age groups welcomed societal changes with a higher level of approval and greater optimism. This was reflected in their higher self-positioning on the imagined social ladder (measured on a 10-point scale; see Chapter 10). Table 9.3 shows that the dividing point was located in the middle age group (41- to 53-year-olds): both in 2002 and 2014, the mean score of self-positioning dropped beneath the overall sample average in this generation. Furthermore, self-evaluated social status decreased linearly with increasing age across all age groups and within each observed generation group over 12 years. The only exception to this trend was the birth cohort of 1975–87: their subjective self-positioning rose in 12 years of maturation, exceeding the mean score of 15- to 24-year-olds in 2014.

The inter- and intra-generational trend-lines in social self-positioning were echoed in the index of financial wealth that followed the same linear tendencies in both years, with a similar exception of the intra-generational advance in the 1975–87 birth cohort. Thus, it seems that material security and related consumption opportunities were among the main predictors of social self-positioning in the Estonian society.

Our regression analyses revealed, indeed, that financial wealth was the strongest predictor of self-evaluated social status in the overall population, as well as in all generation groups (see Chapter 10; Kalmus et al., 2017). Thus, the active civic and cultural participation of older generations (see Chapters 3 and 4) did not alleviate the social deprivation caused by constricting consumption opportunities in the pre-retirement and retirement ages.

Besides financial security, time as capital played a significant role in social self-positioning. The regression analysis of the 2014 data (Kalmus et al., 2017) revealed a clear tendency: the more engaged (in work, education and hobbies) people were, the more they suffered from a lack of time, and the more they multitasked to cope with this, the higher they positioned themselves on the imagined social ladder. And vice versa: the more surplus time people had, the lower they estimated their subjective social status. The time use indices were insignificant predictors of social self-positioning only among the oldest age group (60- to 79-year-olds).

Thus, the lack of time was not perceived as a factor of deprivation in the socially accelerating Estonian society. Furthermore, all generation groups agreed that money was more important than time as a scarce resource. When asked *Would you prefer to work more and get higher pay, or work less and have more free time?* (in the 2014 survey), all age groups unanimously preferred higher pay. Such a noteworthy inter-generational consensus (as one of the very few commonly shared orientations among all age groups) was probably caused by the lingering scarcity of financial resources in the post-socialist society and by the Protestant work ethic, re-vitalised by the neoliberal ideology.

9.7. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Generational location plays a highly significant differentiating role in the Estonian society: generation groups, indeed, structure the transforming society on the vertical dimension – in terms of positioning individuals in social hierarchy – as well as on the horizontal dimension: in the sense of differentiating mentalities, lifestyles, practices and manifestations of generational habitus.

With regard to most aspects of social transformation analysed in this chapter, younger generation groups demonstrated greater speed, extent and flexibility in adapting to rapid changes and overall social acceleration, while older generations mostly remained faithful to habits and preferences acquired during their childhood and/or young adulthood. In some aspects (e.g. conventional political participation and news awareness), older age groups contributed more to maintaining their level of capitals, while in many other areas (e.g. digital skills, online participation in the political and economic fields, and consumption opportunities) younger generations were notably ahead in moving along on the crest of the wave of social transformation. This, all in all, contributes to explaining the higher self-positioning of younger age groups in the social hierarchy, and suggests that generations tend to desynchronise the progression of age groups in social time-space. Some minor manifestations of inter-generational continuity and, thus, generations as partially synchronising agents, however, existed: in watching TV entertainment programmes, news awareness, the greater importance of money as a scarce resource (compared to time), the lack of time as a predictor of higher social status, and the mental structure of *Ethnic Differentiation and Spiritual Solidarity* among the Russian-speaking community.

Generational effects (in terms of determining individuals' structural location and shaping their practices and dispositions) were, however, multidimensional and intertwined with other structural factors (i.e. socio-demographic characteristics and biological factors), as well as individual agency. For instance, our analyses of digital stratification and the emergence of the 'digital generation' vis-à-vis other media generations (Kalmus, 2016; Kalmus et al., 2011, 2013a) suggest that besides age, other socio-demographic characteristics (such as gender, ethnicity, education, income and social status) also contributed to predicting the intensity of and/or motives for Internet use. Furthermore, the findings about the vagueness of the boundary of the 'digital generation', extending in some aspects to those born in the late 1960s, suggest that besides lifespan position (being young enough to 'learn new tricks'), generational groups' varying adaptability to social changes and technological innovations probably played a role in forming generational effects. As a matter of fact, the cohorts born in the late 1960s and in the 1970s experienced very rapid changes and different social conditions during their formative years. Several respondents in a qualitative study of Estonian people born in the 1970s stated that the chaotic 1990s defined their generation as 'creative, adaptable to changes and adjustable to new social contexts' (Nugin, 2010: 353). Experiencing extensive structural and cultural elaborations and thus harsh contextual discontinuity during the formative years may have fostered the adaptability of today's middle-aged generation to all kinds of innovation.

In general, Mannheim-inspired theoretical assumptions about the importance of 'fresh contacts' with new phenomena and the new social context for the nature of generational feedback to structural and cultural elaboration held true: in most instances of social transformation analysed in this chapter, younger generation groups welcomed novelties and changes with greater enthusiasm or higher levels of approval. The feedback, nevertheless, also depended on life-course related experiences and reflexivity, and particular aspects of relevant generational units.

Our analyses demonstrated that the political and civic agency of all generation groups strengthened during the observed period, signalling a general development towards democratic participation patterns and an increasing morphogenetic potential. Nevertheless, the appeal of conventional political activism for the youngest generations was declining, and new opportunities for digitally mediated participation had not created new forms or patterns of political or civic engagement (Kalmus et al., 2018a). This somewhat paradoxical standstill of the new 'digital generation' reveals an emergent need for new forms of feedback regarding structural and cultural elaborations.

Some signs of the dawn of the transformative force of today's young generation are, however, visible. For instance, according to our analysis (Kalmus et al., 2018b), the young displayed the highest level of critical reflexivity towards the ever-present smartphoning in the deeply mediatised society and the concurrent mobile time regime or 'iTime' (Agger, 2011), with its social and cultural implications. More importantly, the global youth climate movement, initiated by representatives of Generations Y and Z (made up of people born from the early 1980s onward, according to many researchers and popular media), already labelled as the 'Climate Change Generation' or the 'Climate Generation' in public discourses, has also spurred environment-conscious youth activism in Estonia. Time will show whether this generational movement will persist to develop into a truly 'active' or even 'strategic' generation (Edmunds & Turner, 2002), agentive and powerful enough to begin a completely new chapter in the book of societal morphogenesis.

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CHAPTER 10.
SUBJECTIVE STRATIFICATION OF THE ESTONIAN POPULATION IN 2002–2014

Marju Lauristin

10.1. CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE 'ME. THE WORLD. THE MEDIA' SURVEY

Following Bourdieu, the dynamics of the social space are described as a continuous change in the positions occupied by social subjects in the economic, cultural and political fields (Bourdieu, 1998). Emerging outcomes of the stratification process can be explained by looking at the access to the forms of capital characteristic to each of these fields and the manner in which they are used by different agents. An empirical analysis of potential links between a subjective definition of social position and the character of behavioural practices and lifestyles, carried out in the MeeMa survey, makes it possible to interpret people's assessment of their positions on the social ladder as a general disposition to act in a certain manner, depending on the resources available to the person (different forms of capital) and the rules and norms of the specific sphere or field. Self-reflection of the subject's social position thus expresses the relationship between their situation and opportunities regarding their characteristic practices, and is thus close in essence to Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1998: 7–8). According to Bourdieu and other scholars who have developed his ideas, habitus is a behavioural model of social origin, the development of which is considered to be significantly shaped by early socialisation and especially education. Bourdieu himself saw the development of habitus distinguishing some social groups from others as a significant mechanism in the re-creation of social structures, field-specific rules and positions of cultural reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 203–205).

In a transitional society, where previously held rules undergo abrupt changes and the members of the society become readapted and re-socialised over a short period of time, transition-specific habitus can be presumed to develop in the course of social re-education, which mainly consists of the generation of strategies for coping with changes. From this perspective, placing oneself higher than average is reflective of a disposition expressing ambition and expectation of success, placing oneself at the average reflects safe adaptation to the environment, and placing oneself lower than average is a sign of the fear of failure, and surrendering to or ignoring intimidating norms and rules. Meanwhile, the Bourdieuan distinction manifests itself precisely as assessing one's position to be lower or higher than average ('normal'). Only departure from this distinction can infuse the unremarkable 'average' position with meaning, and can help us understand what is 'normal'.

In the framework of morphogenetic analysis, we have to reconsider emerging social positions as a result of social interactions, particularly as relational feedback to the changing opportunities of people conditioned by structural changes going on in society (Archer, 2015). In contrast to the conventional understanding of subjective stratification primarily as the individual reflection of the prevalent objective social-economic hierarchies existing in society, self-positioning on the social ladder can be interpreted from the perspective of a morphogenetic model as a micro-level phenomenon of social interaction, in which the person mentally compares his or her ambitions, opportunities and achievements with those of other agents acting in the same structural context and reflects on relational feedback generated by public opinion regarding the assessment of different social positions (Donati, 2015).

10.2. STRATIFICATION AS A PROCESS OF SOCIAL (RE-)STRUCTURING IN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY

Stratification in a post-Soviet transitional society is made unique by the fact that it has taken place in an extremely compressed and accelerated period of time, where both the rules of the economic and political fields and the value judgements used to legitimise these rules have undergone simultaneous changes. As a result of the rapid shift from a nationally determined socialist organisation of life to a capitalist market economy, the principles of the distribution of capitals and positions developed under the previous system of social organisation lost their value and people were required to quickly adapt to new rules defining social relations. In some cases, this led to competition for new positions in the job market, on the ladder of social standing, and in politics. In the literature on transition, this process of social repositioning has also been termed the emergence of a distinction between 'winners' and 'losers' (see Rychard, 1996).

The ownership reform of the 1990s, the second cycle of transitional developments in Estonia described above (see Chapter 2), had an enormous effect on the social and political restructuring of Estonian society. The reformers had some success in compensating for the loss of material and social affluence experienced by those repressed by the Soviet state, as well as those who fled from Estonia as refugees. The reforms also gave rise to new, still unresolved conflicts and resentment. From the perspective of stratification, the devaluation of the social and cultural capital accumulated in the Soviet era, the sharp decline in the social position of the 'ordinary working person', intellectuals, farmers and old-age pensioners, also had a big impact, added to the sharply increased economic inequality.

In the post-communist transitional culture, material success emerged as the predominant measure of social status (see Kennedy, 2002). The tendencies of social stratification in the newly independent Estonia have thus been mainly analysed from the perspective of economic status, poverty and wealth (see Einasto, 2002; Kutsar & Trumm, 1999; Narusk & Hansson, 1999; Saar, 2002; Titma, 1999; Tiit, 2002). Others have focussed on analysing the phenomenon from the perspective of social justice, equality and inequality (Plotnik, 2008). A few sociologists have analysed the impact of stratification on people's self-assessment as members of society. Even in studies of 'subjective stratification', people's self-evaluations of their positions in the social strata, the emphasis has been on material inequality (see Lindemann, 2011; Pettai, 2002).

10.3. MEASUREMENT OF SUBJECTIVE STRATIFICATION

Unlike objective stratification, which can be precisely quantified in terms of wealth, subjective stratum membership is based on respondents' assessment of their positions when comparing their opportunities and positions with others. Such comparisons are usually not made against the background of an abstract or statistical 'society as a whole' but in terms of a reference group known to the person, their conception of 'normal circumstances', in relation to which they deem themselves 'average', 'better' or 'worse off'. As a result, an 'objectively' poor person may see themselves as better off than average and, vice versa, a rich person may suffer from the sense that not everything they desire is accessible to them. It can thus be interesting to compare the pictures of subjective and objective stratification in different societies (see e.g. Lindemann, 2011) to see how broad the gap between objective and subjective well-being is.

Figure 10.1. Subjective social stratification in 2002–2014



Source: Lauristin, 2017: 671

In our survey, we have tried to identify the factors shaping people's subjective notions of their places in society, their 'gains' or 'losses' compared to other people in the transitional process. In order to measure subjective stratification, we have asked the participants in each survey to place themselves on a notional ten-step social ladder depicting the different positions of people in the society based on their wealth and influence. Level 10 is the top level of society, occupied by the richest and most influential, while level 1 is the lowest level, occupied by those who feel completely excluded from society (Lauristin, 2004). For our analysis, we created a 5-point scale, merging the first three sparsely populated levels (1, 2 and 3), which we termed the 'low stratum', as well as the last four (7, 8, 9 and 10), terming the resulting group the 'high stratum'. The three intermediate strata were treated separately: level 4 as the 'lower middle stratum', level 5 as the 'middle stratum', and level 6 as the 'upper middle stratum'. A similar scale had also been used in previous studies of stratification (Lindemann, 2011; Pettai, 2002). In the collection of articles *Kaks Eestit* (*Two Estonias*), published in 2002, Iiris Pettai presented her analysis of the subjective stratification of Estonian residents based on a survey carried out in 2001, where the respondents were asked to place themselves on a ten-step ladder, similar to our survey. The results of the survey were similarly reduced to a five-point scale using the same principles. The results, however, significantly departed from ours: 31% placed themselves on the lowest level, 22% slightly below average, on the fourth level (in our case, respectively, 11% and 20%, see Figure 10.1), 23% placed themselves in the middle (32% in our case), and only 24% ranked themselves higher than average (in our case, 36%). The wording of the question was different in Pettai's survey, listing specific (objectively gauged) criteria for social position – wealth, income, education and occupation – and asking the respondents to define where they would position themselves (based on these criteria). In our case, the wording of the question was looser, asking the respondents to imagine the society as a relational ladder, with the wealthiest and most influential located at the top of the ladder and the poorest and most socially excluded located at the bottom. Our intention was to give the respondents the ability to choose the most relevant criteria, and to balance material and non-material aspects in the subjective evaluation of their relative positions.

We also analysed the relationship between subjective stratum membership and other variables of the social structure, as well as the value judgements and variables of cultural and social participation, media consumption and time management covered by the survey. Our goals were to plot the pattern of stratification as it evolved over the different cycles of transition, to examine the dynamics of this pattern, and to explicate the relationship between the process of stratification and other aspects of the transformation.

10.4. GENERAL DYNAMICS OF THE SUBJECTIVE STRATIFICATION OF ESTONIAN SOCIETY, 2002–2014

When we analysed the distribution of respondents between the steps of the social ladder in all five surveys, we saw that the picture was relatively close to a normal distribution (see Figure 10.1). This may seem surprising, given the objective level of the inequality prevalent in the Estonian population provided by the analysis of socio-economic stratification (Saar, 2011). The large differences between objective and subjective stratification were probably caused by the above-mentioned tendency that people used to evaluate their positions not based on objective knowledge of the society as a whole but based on their more familiar surroundings or reference groups they identified with (see also Lindemann, 2011: 483). However, the capacity for differentiating obviously grew over the 12 years of the survey, as the middle portion of the stratification distribution underwent a steady decrease, indicating a clear polarisation between the lower and higher strata taking place in society. The proportion of those placing themselves lower than average was extremely variable, with the proportion of those placing themselves at the very bottom, in the low stratum, fluctuating between 11% and 21%. At the same time, the proportion of those ranking themselves higher than average in society underwent a slight increase, reaching 42% in 2008, at the end of the economic boom. A comparison of the proportion of those ranked higher and lower than average (Figure 10.1), seemed to reflect a shock in the Estonian society after accession to the European Union caused by the depressing comparison between the Estonian level of well-being and the EU average. The number of those ranking themselves lower than average in society underwent a considerable increase in the 2005 survey compared to 2002 (40% and 31%, respectively). The rapid economic growth of the following years gave such a boost to the self-assessment of people that in 2008 a total of 42% considered themselves to have achieved a higher than average position. The economic recession brought the overly optimistic back down to earth, with the proportion of those ranking themselves higher than average decreasing to one-third in 2011 and increasing only slightly in 2014. At the same time, there was a sharp increase in the share of the subjective lower stratum and a reduction in the size of the middle stratum as a result of the crisis.

When we compare the dynamics of the subjective stratification among the Estonian- and Russian-speaking respondents, we see a slightly different picture (Figure 10.2). Before the economic crisis, the self-assessments of Estonian- and Russian-speaking populations were relatively similar: equally low in 2005, after accession to the European Union, and significantly higher in 2008, at the beginning of the crisis. The economic downturn saw the social self-assessment of the Russian-speaking population suffer a more significant decline than the Estonian-speaking population's, and it had not yet recovered to the pre-crisis levels at the time of the last survey. While the end of the crisis significantly boosted the Estonians' self-image, the curve of the subjective stratification of the Russian-speaking population visibly sank below the average in the 2011 and 2014 surveys. If we compare the distribution of Estonian- and Russian-speaking respondents in the first (2002) and last (2014) waves of our survey, we can see that among the Estonian-speaking population, the number of respondents ranking themselves as below average was relatively similar in 2002 and 2014, while the number of those ranking themselves as average decreased and the share of respondents with a higher than average self-assessment increased. Among the Russian-speaking population, the share of those placing themselves in the lower social strata underwent a sharp increase (34% in 2002, 49% in 2014) and the share of those placing themselves on the middle levels of the social ladder or slightly higher decreased by a similar margin (55% in 2002 and 36% in 2014).

It is important to mention that the share of those (mostly young) Russian-speaking respondents placing themselves on the top levels of the social ladder slightly increased, similar to their Estonian peers. We can thus observe a continued decline in the subjective social position among half of the members of the Russian-speaking community, accompanied by increasingly sharp social polarisation between a small

Figure 10.2. Subjective social stratification of Estonian- and Russian-speaking respondents in 2002–2014

% of language group



Source: Lauristin, 2017: 672

elite and the rest of the community. This ethnically differentiated subjective stratification indicates the development of an ethnic lower class, which can be considered an extremely dangerous trend from the perspective of social integration.

Meanwhile, the much-discussed gender wage gap has not given rise to an equally sharp contrast in the social self-assessments of women and men (Table 10.1). Inequality in economic capital is probably balanced by women's educational advantage: Estonian women's level of education is significantly higher than men's due to their more active participation in higher education. However, a comparison of data from 2002 and 2014 shows that increased polarisation is visible among both women and men: the middle stratum is losing ground while both ends of the stratification scale are gaining in importance. Even here, however, a slight deterioration in women's positions is still visible: whereas the share of those placing themselves at the very top of the social ladder increased among men, the proportion of those placing themselves at the very bottom grew among women (11% in 2002, 19% in 2014).

Table 10.1. Subjective social stratification of socio-demographic groups in 2002 and 2014

% of population group. Significant differences between groups are highlighted. The red background marks the values lower than average, blue – higher than average

	Low		Lower middle		Middle		Upper middle		Upper	
	2002	**2014**	**2002**	**2014**	**2002**	**2014**	**2002**	**2014**	**2002**	**2014**
Share of stratum in the total sample	11	17	20	18	32	26	22	21	14	17
Gender										
Male	11	15	19	18	31	25	24	21	15	19
Female	11	19	21	18	34	26	21	20	13	16
Language										
Estonian	10	13	20	16	31	28	23	23	15	19
Russian	12	26	21	23	6	21	20	16	11	14
Age										
15–19	**3**	14	10	11	27	21	**32**	21	**28**	**32**
20–29	**6**	7	19	13	32	25	26	26	18	**29**
30–44	8	10	21	14	35	25	22	27	13	24
45–54	12	19	23	19	31	28	21	21	12	13
55–64	17	20	22	22	33	26	17	19	11	13
65–74	23	26	22	27	34	27	17	12	**4**	7
Education										
Less than secondary	16	27	19	20	34	24	20	15	11	14
Secondary	11	19	23	19	33	29	22	19	11	14
Higher	6	9	13	16	32	22	27	27	22	25
Income per household member (2002 – kroons > 2014 – euros)										
Up to 1500 > up to 150	17	32	27	24	33	25	16	14	7	5
1501–2500 > 151–250	13	32	21	23	34	23	22	14	10	8
2501–4000 > 251–400	6	23	16	22	38	28	26	16	14	10
4001–6000 > 401–600	**3**	10	11	20	27	27	30	23	**29**	20
Over 6000 > over 600	**3**	**4**	**5**	**5**	19	21	**31**	**34**	**42**	**35**

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 697

The most dramatic change took place in the age-related decrease in social self-assessment (see Chapter 9 for details). Two sharp drops can be observed here: after age 45 and after age 65 (Table 10.1). An increase in social polarisation between the younger and the older respondents also took place over the years. In 2014, the proportion of those ranking themselves at the top of the social ladder (upper stratum) was the highest (32%) among the 15–19 age group and nearly the same in the next age group, 20–29 (29%). Meanwhile, in the 45–54 age group, only 13% placed themselves in the top stratum and among the 65–74 age group, just 7%. A comparison between the figures from 2002 and 2014 shows a strong tendency towards a decrease in social self-esteem among the middle-aged and older generations. In the 65 and older age group, more than half considered themselves to rank below average on the social ladder.

A person's conception of his or her position in Estonian society can be said to be, in some ways, predetermined by their socio-demographic background, such as membership in an ethnic minority or an older age group. These are structural limiting factors that may also begin to limit the person's agency under other unfavourable conditions.

10.5. FACTORS INFLUENCING PEOPLE'S ASSESSMENT OF THEIR SOCIAL POSITIONS

The analysis of stratification factors presented below is based on the relationships of correlation between the stratum membership index and the indices and variables expressing the respondents' social status, activities and attitudes. In order to analyse these relationships, we first identified the distributions of variables significantly ($p \leq 0.01$) linked to stratum membership index values in each survey database and then used these variables in a regression analysis in order to single out the most significant factors in stratum membership, independent of other variables (see Table 10.2).

These results of the regression analysis indicated that the most important criteria which had affected people's assessment of their position in Estonian society were their capacity as consumers. This capacity is expressed by the wealth index, summarising answers to the question about the sufficiency of money for various needs, from acquiring food and clothing to travelling, hobbies, and cultural and sports events. Even though people's incomes are directly connected to material wealth, our regression analysis shows that income contributed to social self-assessment through the consumption opportunities it provided, rather than directly.

The influence of consumption on social self-assessment was also indicated by the relationship to the consumerism index, measuring the respondents' selectiveness and competence as consumers. Meanwhile, the quality of consumption played a more pronounced distinguishing role in the first half of the transitional period, when the impact of the former deficit economy was still felt. In comparing different cycles of transition, the impact of variables reflecting agency (higher education, entrepreneurial spirit and diversity of computer use) on stratification assessments

Table 10.2. Stratification factors: results of the regression analysis in 2002–2014

Linear regression, stepwise inclusion/exclusion of the variables.

Variables marked with +++ had one of the three highest ß-coefficients in the regression model; those marked with ++ were among the next three significant variables; those marked with + were among the weakest significant variables; empty cells – not included in the regression model as significant variables

Stratification factors	2002	2005	2008	2011	2014
Wealth	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++
Consumerism	+++	+++	++		++
Optimistic attitude towards life		+++	+++		
Evaluation of the changes	++	++	++	+	
Income	++	++	+		
Contacts with the Western world	++		+		
Age	++				+++
Access to media technologies at home	+	+++			+
Gender	+		+		
Place of residence		++	+		++
Ethnicity, language		++	+		
Education			++	+++	++
Entreprisingness			++	++	+++
Activity and versatility of computer usage			+++	++	
Liberal orientation			+	+	
General trust				++	++
Civic participation				++	+

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 675

Figure 10.3. Subjective social stratification by occupational status in 2014

% of group



Source:
Lauristin, 2017: 675

Figure 10.4. Subjective social stratification by attitude towards changes in society in 2002

% of group



Source: Lauristin, 2017: 679

Table 10.3. Respondents with different attitudes towards changes in society by subjective social stratum in 2014

% of stratum group. Figures in bold signify higher values compared to the total sample

Evaluation of the changes	Low	Lower middle	Middle	Upper middle	Upper	Total sample
Has found the changes encouraging	39	51	59	**74**	**73**	61
Has found the changes discouraging	**38**	24	18	12	9	19
Difficult to say	23	24	23	14	18	20

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 679

underwent marked increases in the later survey waves (2008, 2011 and 2014), especially among the Russian-speaking respondents.

Even though occupational status was often considered the most important indicator of objective stratification, this variable did not come out as an independent factor of subjective stratification. Our data demonstrate that occupational status may not always coincide with a person's subjective conception of their position in society (Figure 10.3). In our survey, every fifth professional and every seventh manager or entrepreneur ranked their positions in society as below average; the same was true for every third worker and service provider. Meanwhile, the self-assessment of students was relatively high, expressing the highly optimistic expectations of youth regarding future careers. The relatively low self-assessments of workers and service providers presents a stark contrast.

Also noteworthy is the link between subjective social position and satisfaction with life and with changes in society. Attitude towards the rapid changes taking place in society was a significant stratification factor in the three first waves of the survey, expressing the ability to adapt to constant change in the social environment.

Figure 10.5. Subjective social stratification by computer usage group in 2014

% of group



Source:
Lauristin, 2017: 679

Satisfaction with social changes basically divided Estonians into two groups on the transition-period social ladder: those satisfied with changes generally ranked themselves higher than average, while those opposing changes ranked themselves below average (see Figure 10.4).

In the final phase of the transitional period, this variable decreased in significance, completely disappearing from the regression analysis models in the last year of the survey. However, it still retained its importance when we compare the different strata (Table 10.3). The change accompanying increased social prosperity is best characterised by the ratio of respondents satisfied and dissatisfied with changes gradually shifting towards increased satisfaction (the ratio was 31:28 in 2002 and 59:18 in 2014).

In the context of the success of the Tiger Leap programme and the popularity of Estonia's e-state image, the social self-assessment of the Estonian population was also improved by computer use becoming a part of everyday life, reflected by the *activity and versatility of computer usage* index. Non-computer-users were mainly found in the lower classes, while active computer users considered themselves to rank higher than average in society (see Figure 10.5).

In conclusion, we may say that the regression analysis clearly indicated the importance of agency rather than structural membership in a specific social group as the principal factor in subjective stratification. However, agency could also be interpreted as access to resources related to income, place of residence, contacts with the Western world, age, ethnicity or gender. The latter played a relatively more significant role in the respondents' social self-assessment in the first waves of the survey. In the later waves, these indicators were progressively supplemented by variables emphasising personal participation and the possession of cultural and social capital, such as education, entrepreneurial attitude and activity of computer usage.

10.6. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF SUBJECTIVE STRATIFICATION

The previous sections of this chapter repeatedly referred to the role of different structural and cultural factors in the development of subjective stratification. A more systematic picture of the socio-demographic background, upon which the characteristic traits of individual strata are projected, is presented below (see Table 10.4).

Also from these data it is evident that despite all efforts at minority integration policies (see Chapter 8), the *ethnic* division of Estonian society remained the strongest distinctive factor in the emerging pattern of subjective social stratification, with the general tendency being favourable to the higher self-positioning of the ethnic majority. Both the April crisis of 2007 and the economic crisis of 2008 increased this negative tendency and added to the protest mentality and the sense of collective exclusion and alienation among the Russian-speaking population, which were the factors impeding positive self-assessment and resulting in lower social self-positioning. It is important to note here that *gender-based distinction* tended to have similar effects as ethnic distinction, even though it was not quite as marked. Women's weaker position is evident only on both ends of the scale, with the lower stratum including a higher than average share of women and the upper stratum including a relatively larger proportion of men.

A higher *level of education* clearly marked a higher, and lower level of education a lower, perceived social position. The regression analysis indicated an increase in this tendency over the transitional period. Our data also support the view that the transitional society favoured *youth*. In 2014, 42% of the top stratum of the Estonian society was made up of under 30-year olds, while 55% of the lowest stratum was over 55. The poor financial situation of old-age pensioners and the sharp decrease in the symbolic capital possessed by the elderly – in strong contrast to the Western welfare states – was a major source of social discontent in the transitional period and also had a significant impact on the Estonian political landscape.

Occupational status and *income* have traditionally been seen as objective sources of social stratification. In the transitional society, however, the impact of both of these structural distinctive factors was internally contradictory due to the possibility of a comparison with the many times higher wages received by our northern neighbours in the same occupations. While it would be expected that people with the national average household income would place themselves in the middle class, half

Table 10.4. Socio-demographic profile of the subjective social strata in 2014

% of stratum group. Figures in bold signify higher values compared to the total sample

Language	**Low**	**Lower middle**	**Middle**	**Upper middle**	**Upper**	**Total sample**
Estonian	52	61	74	76	73	68
Russian	**48**	**39**	26	24	27	32
Gender						
Male	41	47	46	49	52	47
Female	**59**	53	54	51	48	53
Education						
Primary/basic	**27**	20	16	12	14	17
Secondary	58	55	59	49	43	53
Higher	16	26	25	**39**	**43**	29
Age						
15–19	5	4	5	7	**11**	6
20–29	8	13	18	24	**31**	19
30–44	11	14	17	**23**	**24**	18
45–54	20	18	19	18	13	18
55–64	**22**	**21**	18	17	13	18
65–74	**33**	**30**	22	12	8	21
Occupational status						
Entrepreneur, manager	1	6	9	14	15	9
Intellectual, specialist	5	13	17	**26**	**27**	18
Office or service worker	10	10	11	8	14	11
Manual worker	18	19	28	20	17	21
Student	5	5	7	11	16	9
Retired, unemployed	**61**	**46**	27	21	12	33
Income per household member						
Up to 150 euros	10	8	6	4	2	6
151–250 euros	**20**	13	10	7	5	11
251–400 euros	**50**	45	40	29	22	37
401–600 euros	14	27	26	27	29	25
Over 600 euros	4	5	15	**31**	**38**	18
Place of residence						
Tallinn	**41**	34	28	27	25	31
Tartu or Pärnu	7	7	11	13	**22**	12
Surrounding areas of Tallinn, Tartu and Pärnu	3	8	10	11	9	9
Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Jõhvi or Sillamäe	13	11	6	10	12	10
Small towns	25	22	28	20	21	23
Rural areas	11	17	16	20	11	15

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 691

of the representatives of Estonian households receiving a national average income had ranked themselves as members of the lower stratum even after ten years of Estonian EU membership, in 2014 (at the time of the survey, the average household income was 250–400 euros per household member.) Meanwhile, social self-positioning was obviously connected to occupational status: despite the differences in the levels of income, intellectuals, professionals, managers and business owners most frequently ranked themselves as members of the upper stratum, whereas workers made up the core of the middle stratum. Finally, the lower strata was typified by those outside the job market: old-age pensioners, the unemployed and housewives. At the same time, the low status of the non-employed population formed a sharp contrast with the extremely high social self-assessment of students, who were even more prevalent in the upper stratum than managers were. The fact that studies were much more prestigious than employment, especially as in many spheres the wages received by professionals were below the Estonian average, caused severe problems for the entry of young people into the job market and prompted many university graduates to seek greater opportunities for personal fulfilment abroad.

In terms of *place of residence*, lower self-assessment was often related to the experience of living in industrial centres, such as Tallinn, Narva or Kohtla-Järve, while higher self-assessment tended to be connected to the background of living and working in Tartu and other smaller towns, as well as rural areas. This tendency was perhaps due to both the ethnic composition of the populations of these cities and the more general tendency of social contrasts having a greater impact on people's self-image in big cities, while in smaller places the individual characteristics and endeavours of each person tended to have a more pronounced effect.

10.7. STRATIFICATION AND AGENCY

Among the factors affecting self-assessed stratum membership analysed above, variables reflecting social agency or commitment to self-fulfilment appeared to play a role as important as wealth and objective structural variables (such as age, ethnicity, gender, education and employment status). Let us now take a closer look at the relationship between subjective stratum membership and the results of the cluster analyses of political agency, cultural activity and time use (see Table 10.5 and the descriptions of the corresponding clusters in Chapters 3, 4, and 7). Below, we will look at social strata in terms of these clusters.

Table 10.5. Various clusters of activity by subjective social stratum in 2014

% of stratum group. Figures in bold signify higher values compared to the total sample

Cultural involvement clusters	Low	Lower middle	Middle	Upper middle	Upper	Total sample
A. Traditional multi-active	6	15	19	**23**	**22**	17
B. Internet-centred new-active	5	9	14	21	**29**	16
C. Moderate, traditional	**28**	25	22	17	10	21
D. Internet-centred, disinterested in culture	18	23	26	27	**30**	25
E. Passive	**43**	29	18	11	9	21
Political participation clusters						
A. Positive activist	6	11	17	25	**25**	17
B. Critical activist	12	20	**28**	24	25	22
C. Positive bystander	8	16	17	24	**28**	19
D. Critical bystander	**19**	15	14	8	9	13
E. Passive alienated	**55**	**38**	23	20	13	29
Time-use capability clusters						
A. Successful multitasker	5	11	14	24	**36**	18
B. Discontent multitasker	6	12	14	**16**	11	12
C. Time-stressed hard-worker	13	11	13	**16**	14	13
D. Virtual multitasker	11	10	14	15	**17**	14
E. Time-stress-free hobbyist	19	22	**26**	20	13	21
F. Withdrawn	**46**	**33**	18	9	10	23

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 687

10.7.1. Stratification and political agency

Assuming that subjective position on an imaginary social vertical axis was related to the respondents' conceptions of politics, power relationships and their personal impact as members of society, it may be presumed that a higher subjective ranking was characteristic to those who were more socially influential and politically active (see Table 10.5). The composition of the lower stratum seemed to follow the clearest pattern: three-quarters of those perceiving themselves to rank the lowest (i.e. on the first three levels of a ten-step ladder) were essentially alienated or excluded from social life, took no interest in information related to politics and did not participate in formal political life (did not vote and did not communicate with officials) or unofficial actions. Predictably, they were also characterised by pessimistic views on both their ability to participate and the developments taking place in society in general. In the next group, the lower middle stratum, the share of alienated and excluded people was essentially the same as those having a positive outlook. Next, comparing those in the middle of the social ladder with the people who had placed themselves on the below average rank, we observed more engagement with social matters and a more positive outlook regarding the developments in society compared to the people who ranked themselves in the lower position in society. In the middle stratum were the greatest share of people classified as 'critical activists'. Among those placing themselves even a single level above the average on the social ladder, alienated, nostalgic and pessimistic attitudes were far less prevalent, while the share of positive bystanders and activists underwent a sharp increase.

10.7.2. Stratification and cultural agency

The cluster analysis of cultural activity highlighted a preference for traditional over digital forms of participation as one significant distinguishing variable for different types of cultural activity (see Chapter 3). Meanwhile, the regression analysis of the factors of subjective stratification revealed the importance of computer use in the development of a person's social self-assessment. A similar relationship occurred between the pattern of stratification and cultural activity (see Table 10.5). Firstly, similar to the comparison between the clusters of political agency and the pattern of stratification, the lowest social strata were mainly characterised by passiveness and alienation, not only from politics, but also from culture. Secondly, the preference for digital forms over traditional cultural media was also fostered by social prestige: the higher the perceived social position of respondents, the more they preferred digital forms of cultural participation over traditional ones, regardless of their content. At the same time, as a positive development, respondents combining digital skills with deep cultural interests prevailed in the groups with the highest social self-assessments. In total, 51% of the upper stratum and 44% of the upper middle stratum belonged to clusters with a high level of cultural activity (see Table 10.5).

Characteristically for the cultural situation of a transitional society, however, people relatively actively involved in traditional cultural activities – from reading books and watching television to handicrafts and choir singing – often placed themselves at the bottom of the social ladder. One-third of the lower stratum were highly or moderately actively involved in traditional forms of culture, with their share being even higher among the Russian-speaking respondents, for whom active cultural consumption appeared to compensate for their lower social position.

10.7.3. Clusters of time-use capability and stratification

The 2014 survey showed a somewhat unexpectedly (i.e. not predicted at the time of preparing the questionnaire) clear and strong relationship between the perceived social position of the respondents and the type of time management (see Table 10.5). The analysis indicated that higher self-assessed stratum membership was linearly related to the multitasking index. In other words, those who perceived themselves to be on the top levels of the social ladder were also engaged in a number of different activities, tirelessly and successfully juggling their time and attention to keep up with them, never feeling bored and constantly suffering from stress resulting from a lack of time, yet at the same time openly enjoying this situation and their ability to manage a number of simultaneous obligations and attractions. Meanwhile, the lower stratum (most of whom were not employed) was characterised by an excess of free time and resulting boredom. One significant factor causing people to perceive themselves as below the social average was the feeling of time moving so fast that it was impossible to keep up with the changes. This, in turn, created the desire to slow down time, abandon their constant haste and find a suitable tempo for their activities. About one-fifth of the respondents were able to cope with this, with the greatest share of conscious 'decelerators' being found in the middle stratum. The clear relationship between stratification and clusters of time-use capability demonstrates that time management competency and the closely related digital competency became significant tools for coping with changes and were capital for successful self-fulfilment.

10.8. SOCIAL PORTRAITS OF THE STRATA

Finally, we will briefly present the main features of the subjective social strata (see Tables 10.4 and 10.5).

A. SELF-ASSESSED UPPER STRATUM. Members of this stratum placed themselves on level 8, 9 or 10 of the social ladder. The upper stratum was characterised by an optimistic outlook on life, higher than average intensity of both interests and commitments, and, most importantly, an elevated assessment of their level of conscious consumption, enterprisingness, wealth, computer use and employment. At the same time, the orientation towards social values and nostalgia for Soviet life was significantly lower than average. A member of the upper stratum both possessed and used more material and technological opportunities than average; they were also actively oriented towards professional fulfilment and development. They were well-adapted to the fast pace of life, and they enjoyed operating in a more densely compressed time and a globally open space. Characterised by a positive, often uncritical relationship to everything new, they were instigators or enthusiastic followers of changes. They trusted the government and had a positive opinion of the developments taking place in Estonia, they were proficient in the use of new information and communication technologies, and they preferred to use smart devices for both information and experiences, although they also made active use of traditional opportunities for participation in cultural hobbies and events. They were socially capable, had large circles of friends, and participated in social and voluntary undertakings. They took an interest in technology, business and sports, while literary and social interests tended to be neglected in comparison. They were either building successful careers or preparing for them, i.e. studying in upper secondary schools or universities. They valued higher education and had or wanted to have higher than average incomes. They spoke foreign languages, and travelled a lot both in Estonia and abroad. The typical representative of this stratum was a young entrepreneur, professional or student, generally with a higher education and a higher than average income, living in Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu or a county town. Russian-speakers ranking themselves as members of the top stratum tended to be characterised by low interest in politics, coupled with notable consumerist attitudes.

B. SELF-ASSESSED UPPER MIDDLE STRATUM. Members of this group placed themselves only slightly higher than average, on level 6 of the ladder. In demographic terms, this group was slightly older than the first group, with the share of middle-aged respondents exceeding that of youngsters, and they were slightly more likely to be Estonians and rural inhabitants; in terms of gender, the distribution of respondents here was similar to the population average, while in terms of social status the share of university graduates and economically well-off company owners, managers and professionals was significantly higher than average, and similar to the upper stratum. The upper middle stratum was also characterised by an optimistic outlook on life and higher than average involvement in various activities; the level of political participation and participation in hobby activities was higher than in the upper stratum, while enterprisingness, consumerism, and Internet activity tended to be lower. Most significantly and in contrast to the enthusiasm of the upper stratum, this group was characterised by a certain guardedness, and an effort to live stress-free, participate in more traditional hobbies and avoid excessive multitasking in the digital world. The group was characterised by a more balanced, active and optimistic outlook, and a more cautious and critical attitude towards both technological and social changes.

C. SELF-ASSESSED MIDDLE STRATUM. This group was the largest, similar to the population average in age and education, slightly more likely to be ethnic Estonians and residents of small towns, and contained a higher than average number of ordinary working people with attitudes and interests also resembling the average of all respondents. They tended to be communal and balanced, had a generally positive outlook on life, but were critical at times. They were not very ambitious and tended to be conservative and cautious about innovations. In terms of way of life and hobbies, they were home- and family-focused, practical and moderately active cultural consumers. In contrast to the strata with less positive self-assessment, they tended to be more involved in third-sector networks; at the same time, they were socially and politically more critical, yet more stress-free in terms of time management than those placing themselves on the higher levels of the social ladder. People placing themselves in the middle of the social ladder, i.e. those who ranked themselves as average citizens, tended to resemble the average respondent in many other aspects, although they were slightly more optimistic, trusting, enterprising and physically active than average. The only variables where they ranked lower than average were consumerism and frequency of computer use. The way of life and attitudes of the middle stratum were, in a sense, a weak echo of the upper strata; having a generally positive, but more cautious attitude and being more critical in their political assessments, they were more conservative in terms of dealing with changes. Their positive attitudes stood in sharp contrast with the attitudes of those who ranked themselves lower than average on the social ladder.

D. SELF-ASSESSED LOWER MIDDLE STRATUM. Even though this cluster was less active and slightly more negative than average in terms of all indices, the members of this group were closer in their profiles to the middle stratum than to those placing themselves on the lowest levels of society. More than half of the members of this cluster were 55 and older; the number of Russian-speaking and retired respondents was also higher than average. At the same time, the educational distribution of the members was relatively close to the average; more than a quarter of the respondents had higher education and one-fifth were employed as professionals or managers. The share of alienated and excluded people was essentially equal to the share of actively and critically-minded respondents participating in community life both as voters and civic activists and taking an interest in what was taking place around them. The way of life common to this stratum tended to be unpretentious, home-focused and slow to adapt to new situations. In terms of their attitudes, this stratum tended to be more pessimistic and critical than average; participation in social and cultural life tended to be confined to traditional media and close community.

In broad terms, this group can be characterised as disturbed or disappointed by changes but seeking to maintain respectable incomes. The typical member of the group was a recently retired skilled worker, service provider or white-collar worker trying to get by on a small income. The differences between the group of people ranking themselves only one level lower than average and those believing themselves to be on the lowest levels of Estonian society were rather marked. This was mainly expressed in the greater similarity of the lower middle stratum to the population average in terms of confidence and level of political and cultural participation. Even though the group tended to be less confident in the consumerist environment, with an orientation towards material wealth, they had not, in contrast to the lower stratum, lost contact with the surrounding world or lost hope of improving their situations.

E. SELF-ASSESSED LOW STRATUM. The members of this group placed themselves on the lowest levels of the social ladder. They could not cope with the rapidly changing environment and had thus been pushed to the social periphery. They were generally urban dwellers, poor, alienated, excluded, and often in poor health. The group was significantly older than average, half were Russian-speakers, and there was a higher than average share of women. They were distrustful of the Estonian government and pessimistic about their future; they took little interest in the surrounding world and society. Most of them barely made ends meet; 61% were retired or unemployed. In summary, the most typical representative of the lower stratum was a female, Russian-speaking pensioner with a lower than average level of education, living in Tallinn. It is important to note that half of this group of people, who had the most pessimistic outlooks and felt excluded from Estonian society, were ethnic Estonians and 24% of the stratum was made up of people under 45 of both language groups.

10.9. CONCLUSIONS

In the transitional period, the Estonian society has developed a pattern of subjective stratification, promoting consumer society values, technological opportunities, and individualistic self-affirmation.

By placing themselves in the middle or in the top or bottom part of the imaginary social ladder, the respondents mainly presented a generalised and intuitive assessment of their abilities and their success in coping with a transitional society and responding to the challenges of new technological developments. From the perspective of the morphogenetic model (see Chapter 1), the emergent pattern of subjective stratification which has led to the gradual polarisation of the Estonian population can be interpreted as a generative mechanism supporting morphostasis. For many years now, there has been a sharp divide in the social self-evaluation and attitudes towards the Estonian government held by the Estonian- and Russian-speaking populations. Meanwhile, a similar divide in prosperity, time management and mobility has also been developing between the successful and mobile Estonian-speakers and those who are less successful and slower to adapt to changes. This has resulted in a low level of solidarity, structural social underdevelopment, and a reduced rate of innovation. Respondents (and the corresponding part of the population) who subjectively placed themselves at the lower end of the scale of social stratification were characterised as a relatively pessimistic, distrustful, low-resource, passive, discouraged by innovations, socially alienated and nostalgic niche of Estonian society. National conservative populism tends to be oriented towards the exploitation of this very niche.

The model of stratification described here has remained relatively unchanged for the past few decades, ensuring the hegemony of a neoliberal world-view. The administration of the Estonian state has also been oriented to this model, mainly relying on the support of those interested in changes who have little difficulty keeping up with the rate of social development, and ignoring members of the middle and lower strata, who perceive themselves as losers in the whirlwind of these changes and hold more critical views. Whereas at the beginning of the transitional period stratification facilitated the promotion of reforms and could be considered a factor promoting morphogenesis, stratification has increasingly become a factor promoting morphostasis and hampering the increase of social diversity and prosperity.

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Appendix 10.1. Correlations between social self-positioning and indicators used for the regression analysis of the data from 2014

Pearson correlation coefficients; p≤0.001. Significant differences between groups are highlighted

	Total sample	Language		Gender	
		Estonian	Russian	Male	Female
Wealth	0.513	**0.512**	0.471	0.473	**0.543**
Satisfaction with life	0.452	0.438	0.422	0.439	**0.464**
Optimistic attitude towards life	0.446	0.416	**0.440**	0.421	**0.470**
Enterprisingness	0.350	0.325	**0.347**	**0.393**	0.298
Access to media technologies at home	0.345	0.289	**0.397**	0.330	**0.358**
Activity and versatility of computer usage	0.330	0.315	**0.379**	**0.348**	0.318
Sphere of occupation	-0.329	-0.304	**-0.340**	**-0.363**	-0.314
Consumerism	0.318	0.322	0.342	**0.346**	0.301
Language skills	0.304	0.249	**0.300**	0.315	0.294
Personal experience with Western countries	0.302	0.278	0.269	**0.330**	0.275
Has found the changes encouraging	0.298	0.258	**0.296**	0.311	0.289
Mobility in Estonia	0.291	0.222	**0.317**	0.298	0.283
Orientation to work and personal development	0.280	0.239	**0.309**	**0.296**	0.269
Age	-0.278	-0.248	**-0.310**	**-0.290**	-0.227
Self-expression and communication-centred Internet use	0.265	0.237	**0.269**	0.246	**0.282**
Feeling of not keeping up with the times	-0.260	-0.241	**-0.364**	-0.257	**-0.291**
Diversity of cultural consumption	0.247	0.213	**0.257**	0.252	0.270
Indifference to consumption (low number of needs)	-0.244	-0.206	**-0.268**	-0.256	-0.237
Positive attitude towards the Soviet era	-0.240	-0.186	**-0.214**	-0.177	**-0.291**
General trust	0.233	0.202	0.197	**0.262**	0.209
Desire to participate in training, continuing education	0.225	0.184	**0.269**	0.220	0.237
Real estate ownership	0.223	**0.238**	0.192	**0.248**	0.195
Multitasking	0.219	0.175	**0.248**	0.220	0.229
Time spent on work and education	0.206	0.171	**0.249**	0.194	0.214
Positive attitude towards the Estonian government	0.205	0.162	0.158	0.144	**0.258**
Social orientation	-0.200	-0.184	-0.175	-0.173	**-0.217**
Education	0.192	**0.238**	0.115	0.199	0.203
Liberal orientation	0.180	0.155	0.169	0.166	0.182
Overwork	0.174	0.128	**0.258**	0.187	0.153
Participation in civic actions	0.171	0.150	0.112	0.169	0.190
Marital status	-0.147	-0.151	-0.139	-0.112	-0.158
Being bothered by changes	-0.133	-0.120	**-0.206**	-0.136	-0.120
Place of residence	0.110	-0.143	**0.251**	-0.051	0.067

Source: Lauristin, 2017: 698

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