Gunvor **Jónsson**

Urban Displacement and Trade in a Senegalese Market

An anthropology of endings

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Gunvor Jónsson

UCLPRESS

In memory of my father,
Peter Olafur Jonsson

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Spelling conventions

This book uses English spelling conventions rather than the French conventions sometimes found in the literature on Francophone West Africa. Hence, for example, I have written the Ivory Coast (instead of la Côte d'Ivoire). Italics have been used only for non-English words, except for place names, which have not been italicised. For the spelling of words in Bamanankan (including the names of people and places), I have chosen to follow the spelling conventions in Bird, Hutchinson and Kanté (Bird and Kante 1976), which closely resemble the English pronunciation of Bamanan words. Vowels which do not occur in the English alphabet are è (phonetic ɛ, as for example in the English word 'bet'); and ò (phonetic ɔ, as for example in the English word 'bought'). Bamanankan has no diphthongs, hence the 'u' is pronounced as in the English word 'boot'. The plural in Bamanankan is produced by adding –w, regardless of whether the word ends on a vowel or a consonant. Hence the word *jatigi* (host) in plural becomes *jatigiw*; the word *dunnan* (stranger) in plural becomes *dunnanw*.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the people who participated in the research that forms the basis of this book. My gratitude goes to the traders at La Gare and the nearby cloth bazaar ('*sanfè*'), Sugunikura, and Centre Commercial El-Hadj Mawdo Sylla. I also want to thank those working at the Malian bus companies by the Grand Mosque, at the train station in Bel Air, at Pier 3 and 8 in the Dakar harbour, and at the Parking malien. Certain authorities and spokespersons were helpful in answering my questions, including representatives of the Conseil des Maliens au Sénégal, the Malian Embassy, the Malian customs office EMASE and the Malian migrant association AFA (Association Fraternité Action). In the absence of my own family, I was adopted as a relative by several caring and considerate people: BaSekou Doucourè, Karamògò Keita, Fanta Balo and Massaran Konatè – *aw ni cè, aw ni baraji*! I also want to acknowledge the *Dakarois* who helped me settle into the city: Youssou Traoré, Bamba Diop and especially Woury who helped me get to know the women at La Gare and whose friendship and conversation I greatly appreciated. I am grateful to Prof. Papa Demba Fall at Ifan (Cheikh Anta Diop University), who helped me navigate the Senegalese bureaucracy to obtain the necessary permits to conduct my research and started me off with some very useful insights as I embarked on my research in Dakar.

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1
The end of the line?

'Often, when people come here, they look around and say, "There is nothing here!"' Fatim complained, thrusting her arm out to indicate the space around her.[1] She and I were sitting in her tiny market stall under a tattered, weather-worn parasol which provided scarcely any respite from the scorching sun beating down on the dusty marketplace. Fatim watched over her goods balanced on top of old, repurposed metal drums. The rusty tracks of the former Dakar–Niger railway line lay stretched out on the ground behind us, forming the backdrop to this small outdoor market. A few dozen other rickety stalls were lined up along the old platform leading to the abandoned terminus building, known as *La Gare*. 'Some people think the *Marché de la Gare* doesn't exist any more, so they don't come', she added, disappointed.

    La Gare, where Fatim's small market was located, was the former terminus station of the Dakar–Niger railway line in the historical city centre of the Senegalese capital, Dakar (see Figure 1.1). For nearly a century, women had travelled regularly on the trains between the capitals of Mali and Senegal, transporting and trading goods all along the line (cf. Jones 2007; Lambert 1993a, 1993b, 1998; Lambert de Frondeville 1987; Laurent 2007). By the end of the colonial period, a wholesale market had emerged at the Dakar Terminus, after traders from Mali took over the old warehouses at the station to store their goods. Women, who had been transporting and trading goods on the railway line, expanded the Malian market at the Terminus and a retail market emerged in the 1980s. Trade was thriving, and even retailers would take home substantial sums of money. One woman, who traded retail at the market from the mid-1990s to 2007, recalled: 'From 8 to 10 o'clock in the morning, I had already sold goods for 100,000 CFA [150 euros approximately].[2] During Ramadan we sold so many dates. At the end of the day, you left with 300,000 to 500,000 CFA'. This was the

Figure 1.1 La Gare, the former terminus station of the Dakar–Niger railway in the Senegalese capital. Photo by Peter O. Jonsson, 2013.

bustling market some people were still expecting to find when turning up at the old Terminus – not the short stretch of modest retail stalls run by Fatim and her colleagues.

In April 2006, the traders at the Terminus had been handed an eviction notice and, over the next three years, the authorities persistently threatened to demolish the entire market but without taking any action. The traders were given no official warning before the market, along with the nearby barracks for railway workers, was bulldozed in April 2009. Billions of CFA worth of goods were destroyed by the police during the night of demolition, and the market traders were never compensated for their losses. This was supposedly done to make way for a prestigious construction project, envisioned by then-President Abdoulaye Wade: a 'Cultural Park' which would contain 'The Seven Wonders of Dakar'. At the face of it there was now 'nothing' left at the Terminus. The appearance of empty space, of cleared land, an unoccupied *terra nullius* at the old Terminus where 'Seven Wonders' would emerge from the ground to rebirth the city – was, however, deceptive. As I soon realised, the Terminus was still associated with Malian trade and the traders were still around. Their networks, their scattered new markets, and the imaginaries and history they associated with the Terminus were just not visible to the random passers-by rocking up at the abandoned old station.

My phone rang. It was Oumou asking if I was going to join her and her young daughter for lunch at her market. Oumou had worked at the former market at the railway terminus, where Fatim and I were now sitting in a semi-deserted space. I accepted Oumou's lunch invitation and thanked Fatim for the chat. I then began the 15 minute trek down to Oumou's market, along the dual carriage road which had been constructed only five years earlier. The shiny tarmac reflected the bright sunlight forcing me to squint as I wandered half-blinded and alone down the straight pavement that seemed to stretch endlessly out ahead of me into the horizon. When I reached the roundabout beneath the flyover for the Autoroute of the Future, I turned left. After a few more minutes of walking, I arrived at 'the village'. This was how one of the traders at Fatim's market jokingly referred to Sugunikura, and was in many ways an apt description of this new little market. The market was enclosed: its roof was covered with cloth and cardboard, and it was surrounded by a concrete wall. Being sheltered under this tent-like structure added to the sense of having entered a bounded village, where trade, domestic work and family life intertwined. At one end of the market, women stood over big cooking pots, preparing food for sale to the traders. The traders' young children ran and played in the aisles of the market, and infants were looked after by their mothers or older women in their stalls. The soundscape was a familiar Malian one, as most traders spoke in Bamanankan, while the rhythmic tapping sound of wooden clubs beating *bazin* cloth could be heard in the background. When Oumou was evicted from the former market at the Terminus, she had joined several of the other displaced traders at Sugunikura. As we began eating, I told Oumou that I had recently met several shuttle traders from Mali. One of them was Nanajan, 'tall Nana', who used to supply goods to the traders at the Terminus before the market was demolished. Did Oumou know her? 'I have known Nana for a long time, ever since she carried her baby on her back', Oumou replied. I commented that several of the Malian shuttle traders seemed to know Oumou. 'They know me from the Terminus', she explained, smiling at the flattery.

This book argues first of all that destruction and ensuing displacement does not produce a *tabula rasa*, a clean slate where identities, networks and histories must be produced from scratch. Traders and their markets do not simply vanish into thin air when eviction and demolition happen. Like Oumou, many of the displaced traders had relocated to new marketplaces that had been set up in the close vicinity of the Terminus, in the wake of the demolition. I spent many weeks during the early period of fieldwork trying to keep up with

Figure 1.2 Map of Malian trade and transport hubs in Dakar.

the fast pace of the shuttle traders from Mali as they walked around downtown Dakar, visiting the constellation of sites that continued to be associated with Malian trade in the old city centre. Sugunikura was just one of the scattered places to where Malian traders had dispersed, situated within a radius of a few kilometres which still had the Terminus at its epicentre (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3). This book thus examines not only what is lost but what emerges when a dense node, such as the Terminus, is dissolved, emptied, scattered and fragmented. It explores the different displaced traders' capacities for adjustment and highlights three salient aspects that mark the aftermath of such socio-spatial rupture: claims to and (re)production of place and belonging in a context of dislocation, dispersal and disorientation; negotiation of inclusion and exclusion within networks and markets in a context of socio-spatial fragmentation; and re-establishment of livelihoods and the organisational basis of trade in the context of reconfigured spaces of commerce. In other words, the focus is on the impact of urban displacement on three closely intertwined relations – namely relations to place, interpersonal relations and economic exchange relations. These are dimensions of displacement that not only affect traders and

Figure 1.3 Map showing the location of the main fieldwork sites in Dakar.

that are not only relevant in contexts of urban displacement, but which resonate with people's experiences of displacement in a great variety of contexts and at different scales beyond the city level.

The ethnographic exploration of the aftermath of rupture, and its generative aspects, informs a second, more abstract, argument of this book: eviction, displacement and exclusion in cities may lead to identity formations and forms of consciousness which are analytically comparable to those occurring on a larger transnational scale among globally dispersed migrants originating from the same place (or 'homeland'). Rapid urban development under neoliberal capitalism produces dislocations, uprooting and dispersal of urban residents. These urban phenomena in certain ways mirror the migration, displacement and diasporic formations witnessed on a much larger scale under global capitalism. As this book shows, people who have been uprooted and scattered *within the city* may maintain and re-create translocal networks among themselves and they may produce

ongoing attachments to the place of 'origin' from where they have dispersed. For example, they may reproduce a version of this place in a new location or relive it through collective memories and active engagement with that place of origin. Indeed, 'The Terminus' was still very much an everyday reference point and a real *place* in the imagination of the dispersed traders who had been associated with the former market at the train station in Dakar.

Oumou told me we could leave Sugunikura after she had prayed at 5pm. When she was done, she packed up her stall and, as we moved towards the boundary of the marketplace, called over a boy and told him to go and look for her daughter. The youngster was her son, she revealed. I wondered why I had never seen him at the market. 'He is doing mechanics here during the school vacation. He has done that from a very young age. He started by helping out at the Terminus. Now he knows how to fix a scooter engine', Oumou explained proudly. Her daughter joined us and we walked all the way back to Fatim's market, where Oumou began talking to a woman at one of the stalls. The woman handed her 25,000 CFA, the revenue from some dates that she had been selling on Oumou's behalf. Then we crossed the street. Oumou wanted to buy fish for dinner from the traders who were selling in the evening on the wide pavement opposite the Terminus. She started haggling with the fish sellers in Wolof, meanwhile greeting several Malian people around her in her native Bamanankan. I heard someone calling me from the top of one of the long, steep staircases that lead from the pavement up to the building that hosted a new Malian cloth bazaar. It was Safi, who was standing at the top of the stairs at the end of the aisle that led down to her cloth stall. She and several other Malian cloth traders had joined this new bazaar after being evicted from the Terminus. I greeted her back. Oumou interrupted, telling me she was disappointed that the fish was too expensive and that we needed to go. I shouted up the stairs to Safi that I would come back and talk to her tomorrow. Oumou and I then continued our walk towards the market at the bus terminal Garage Petersen, where the fish was apparently cheaper. I parted ways with Oumou at Petersen market and decided to head over to the commercial complex by the Grand Mosque to see if Nana was there. When I arrived, Nana's small hangout place by the Malian bus company Sira was full of women from Mali. Everyone was showing off their purchases and discussing the bargains they had found during their day among Dakar's markets. Nana was not there – she had gone to talk to her Lebanese supplier of children's bicycles – but Fatou Fall was. She greeted me loudly and then asked me to join the conversation: '*An ka baro kè*!' she excitedly commanded in Bamanakan – let's chat!

As the ethnography of this book engages with the lived and recounted experiences of displaced traders like Oumou, Fatim, Nana, Safi and Fatou Fall, it sheds light on a range of personal coping strategies, adaptations of livelihoods and diverse femininities. The book does not view the displaced people – the traders from the Terminus – as a monolithic, homogenous group but as composed of a variety of networks consisting of multiple and intersecting hierarchies and identities. This diversity informed their varied responses to displacement. Displacement, whether on a local or global scale, demands difficult adjustments, and people's capacities to adapt to new circumstances and environments vary. This book uncovers some of these different capacities and variations in traders' reactions to displacement.

Combining approaches from urban studies with migration and refugee studies in novel ways, this book sheds new light on dynamics and experiences of 'urban displacement' among market and shuttle traders. Its analytical approach to urban displacement addresses several blind spots in these two areas of scholarship. On the one hand, scholarship on displacement is dominated by migration and refugee studies. Such scholarship does not address displacements of relatively short distance, particularly those occurring within cities, dealt with in this book. On the other hand, urban scholars who study displacement in the context of urban renewal and gentrification focus overwhelmingly on residential eviction and, for various reasons, tend to overlook the systematic uprooting of traders and marketplaces in cities and its long-term consequences. Analyses of urban displacement also tend to address more immediate responses to such disruptive events but do not shed much ethnographic light on what happens in the aftermath of eviction and dislocation. This book therefore places itself at the intersection between migration and refugee studies and urban studies, enhancing understandings of the aftermath of urban displacements of traders. The ethnographic perspectives on urban displacement offered in this book are applicable beyond the narrow experiences of traders in Dakar and are salient to other networks of people who find themselves uprooted, fragmented and scattered across the city in the wake of disruptive and uneven urban development. These are processes which are occurring on a global scale in the present context of rapid urbanisation and neoliberal gentrification.

The similarities between urbanisation in Dakar and *global* urban displacement regimes allow for potential comparisons between what is happening in a relatively 'ordinary city' in West Africa, as described in this book, with dynamics occurring in cities in many other parts of the world, including global cities (Robinson 2002; Robinson 2006). In the

context of what James Freeman (2020) terms the 'neoliberal gentrification displacement regime', ordinary (read 'not wealthy') urban residents in many parts of the globe are increasingly excluded from access to public space and the right to produce and shape the cities they live and work in (cf. Harvey 2008). In this book, I draw attention to how the (global, capitalist) phenomenon of displacement occurring in the context of neoliberal urbanisation is experienced at the detailed, micro level of the everyday lives and struggles of West African traders in the Senegalese capital. This location may seem arbitrary, even irrelevant or marginal, when observing neoliberal urban development from a global vantage point. Yet, the city of Dakar, particularly during the past decades of liberal reform and urban renewal under former President Wade, in many ways epitomises life in the neoliberal city and its precarious, disorienting and uprooting condition, which urban residents all over the world are confronted with.

The ethnography brings attention to the migrants and mobile people who are trading in an African city. Diverging from the mainstream research focus on men, it places the spotlight on Muslim women's active participation in commercial activities and networks that span the borders of the West African region. Most of these women were the primary breadwinners of their families, and many were divorced and some widowed. Focusing on these groups generates new insights into the workings of urban economies and dynamics of inclusion and place-making in cities in this part of West Africa. Contemporary manifestations of regional and urban flows and circulation of money, goods and people *within* West Africa, and Muslim women's contributions to these, have until recently received relatively little scholarly attention (but see Chort, De Vreyer and Zuber 2020; Moya 2017). This oversight is surprising given the enthusiasm among Africanists for studying migration, long-distance trade and other manifestations of extraversion and interconnectedness across space. Anthropologists have long been keen to dispel the myth that Africa consists of isolated and unchanging localities and 'cultures', and this argument is often made by drawing attention to local–global relations, for example in the form of transnational and diasporic connections beyond the continent and local experiences of neoliberal capitalism and development imposed by external actors (Diouf 2000; Ferguson 2006; Piot 1999). Yet, globalisation is not the only way that the continent's inhabitants and places are connected to 'elsewheres'. As the following chapters emphasise, there are numerous flows and circuits at other, smaller scales that make up the regions and urban centres of Africa (Amselle 1977; Boesen and Marfaing 2007; Cohen 1969; Gregoire and Labazee 1993; Gugler 1971; Scheele 2012).

In the context examined in this book, women's economic activities in public space, their involvement in international shuttle trade, and their accumulation of wealth through trade were contentious issues which raised gendered concerns and moral dilemmas (as discussed in Chapter 5). Exploring how women overcome such gendered obstacles and persist in trade, especially in the aftermath of eviction and displacement, the ethnography brings to light the diversity of femininities and changeability of gender ideologies in the region. Studies of mobilities and trade in West Africa have largely neglected the active contributions of Muslim women to urban economies and their participation in mobile livelihoods and economic flows within the region. This oversight is particularly striking in the light of the expanding autonomies of women, which is a wider global trend, and there is a risk that this neglect of women may reproduce prevailing gender biases. This book challenges the dominant binary conception of gender in this region by highlighting women's active part in income generation, mobility and spatial flows.

An anthropology of endings

In a sense, this book begins at the end. The end station of the railway line in Dakar, where the former Malian market was located, is the location from where the story unfolds. The end of the Malian market is the central event around which the chapters revolve. What happens at the end? What does it mean to say that something is 'ending'? This book is an anthropological exploration of endings.

The terminus station at the end of the railway line in Dakar is considered, in this book, not as a bounded spatial entity but as a social setting where social worlds have emerged and developed. The Dakar Terminus was more than simply a train station; it was a marketplace and a hub for people of Malian background. Indeed, for my interlocutors, the name *La Gare* referred both to the train station and to the market at the Terminus. In the past, when the train was still running, the two were in close synergy (see Chapter 2). Most marketplaces in West Africa are in fact located near transport terminals or have entirely merged with these (Asante 2020: 133; Hill 1984; Stasik and Cissokho 2018; Thiel and Stasik 2016). On the one hand, as the word implies, a terminus is a place where movement 'terminates'. On the other hand, as a transport node a terminus station is also a place where things emerge and where journeys begin. As Michael Stasik and Sidy Cissokho put it, stations 'serve as feeders of movement, as they facilitate the traffic of people and goods; in turn, they

Table 1.1 Timeline of events.

1960s–1970s (immediate post-colonial period): Malian kola traders in Dakar take over the warehouses at the Dakar–Niger Railway Terminus to store their kola nuts.
1980s: Women trading *fruits secs* take over the warehouses and a Malian wholesale market emerges at the Terminus.
Late 1980s or 1990s: Smaller retail traders join the market at the Terminus and the market gradually expands in size.
2000: Abdoulaye Wade elected president on a neoliberal platform.
2003: Dakar–Niger railway is privatised.
2006: Eviction note served to the traders at the Terminus.
2007: Construction begins on a new tarmacked dual-carriageway, cutting through the western part of the market at the Terminus, where several market stalls have been demolished by the authorities in the previous year.
2009: The market at the Terminus is demolished without formal notice. After years of decline following privatisation, the Dakar–Niger railway passenger train stops running in Senegal.
2011: The model of the Cultural Park containing 'The Seven Wonders of Dakar' is presented to the public. It is to be built on the cleared land at the Terminus.
2012: President Abdoulaye Wade is democratically defeated at elections in Senegal.
2013: Fieldwork is carried out with the traders displaced from the Terminus.

are fed by movement, because the activities and relationships of travel and roadside communities keep them running' (Stasik and Cissokho 2018: vii).

The ethnography of this book focuses not merely on the role of the Dakar Terminus in the emergence of marketplaces and trade networks and its continued symbolic relevance for Malians in Dakar. It also examines the destructive event of market demolition and displacement. This was a moment of significant rupture – an 'ending' in a metaphorical and temporal sense when things are never going to be the same again. The narrative of the ethnography presented in the chapters of this book

follows a temporal structure, reconstructing the before, during and after of demolition and displacement (see Table 1.1 for a timeline of events). The book invites a deeper examination of such moments of rupture, drawing attention not only to 'endings' as conclusion, but also to what *emerges* at the end.

The anthropology of endings presented in the following chapters captures the *ambiguity* surrounding rupture and displacement: simultaneous endings and beginnings, and the co-existence of movement and stasis and of mobility and place. The ethnography examines the fates of people whose livelihoods were disrupted and who endured demolition of and eviction from their familiar surroundings. Where do such people go? What do they do in the aftermath? How do they reassemble their lives and re-establish their social worlds, their livelihoods, their sense of place? This book explores what happens at 'the end' of the disruptive event, when it is all over, so to speak – when the dust has settled and people find themselves scattered in sometimes unfamiliar surroundings, trying to pick up the pieces and creating something meaningful: a market, an income, a network, a sense of purpose and belonging, respectability and trust.

By making a particular destructive event its analytical point of departure, this book revives a tradition of 'situational analysis' in anthropology. This approach, pioneered by Max Gluckman and the Manchester School, focused on disruptive events and transformative moments as epistemological windows onto the ever-dynamic and conflictual constitution of society (Gluckman 1940; Evens and Handelman 2006). In recent years, anthropologists have started once again to turn their attention to such events (Holbraad, Kapferer and Sauma 2019; Meinert and Kapferer 2015). This book contributes to this recent scholarship on the aftermath of destruction and displacement, emphasising the productive and generative aspects of such ruptures – not in an optimistic sense that 'good things come out of destruction and displacement' but in the sense of what *emerges* from rupture and the socio-spatial dynamics it generates. In their comparative study of the aftermath of earthquakes, Edward Simpson and Michele Serafini correct the popular misconception that disasters lead to a *tabula rasa* and that destruction 'wipes things clean so that they can be remade anew' (Simpson and Serafini 2019: 211). Instead, they argue, old features reappear in the aftermath of destruction: 'An aftermath is a product of the longer history of the locality. The world does not implode into the moment of disaster to emerge afresh or ready to be remade in any old way. Older ideas will not disappear' (Simpson and Serafini 2019: 211–12).

A related insight comes from Amanda Hammar's (2014) 'displacement economies' approach, which is based on the premise that alongside closures and losses, displacement circumstances also lead to unexpected openings and gains. Hence, Hammar argues, it is necessary to focus 'not only on what and who generates displacement and why but on *what displacement itself produces*' (Hammar 2020: 70). Similar to these and other authors' work, the following chapters highlight what Martin Holbraad, Bruce Kapferer and Julia Sauma (2019) call 'the dual aspect' of rupture: the character of rupture as at once destructive and generative. As Holbraad et al. point out, rupture is 'a dynamic of sociocultural formation' (Holbraad, Kapferer and Sauma 2019: 22). While rupture implies destruction, 'such destruction has immanent within it a creative and regenerative potential that is never the reproduction of the same but always of difference' (Holbraad, Kapferer and Sauma 2019: 22).

The study of rupture and displacement raises a question of scale: how does one relate change at the 'local' scale to broader dynamics of social and economic transformation? In other words, how would I, as anthropologist, know which dynamics were caused merely by demolition and displacement from the Terminus, and which were caused by more general tides of ongoing neoliberalisation in Dakar and the wider region, which was reconfiguring space, economies and other social relations? At the ontological level different 'scales' do not exist: all aspects of life are intertwined, and while the analyst may try to artificially distinguish them, in some ways even analytically they are inseparable (Howitt 2000; Tsing 2000). Some of the conflicts and transformations I observed among the traders, including for example the dismantling of female networks and encroachment of male traders and intermediaries at the new markets (Chapter 5), were not simply caused by displacement, although this particular rupture probably exacerbated these dynamics. I acknowledge that various scales of transformation and disruption are closely intertwined, and in this book I therefore try to account for wider, relevant dynamics occurring beyond the confines of the specific places I was observing. At the very concrete and small-scale level, I focus on the demolition of the Malian market in Dakar and the kinds of adjustments and 'endings' it brought about. At the level of the city, I view this demolition in the context of destructions and clearances that were part of urbanisation and contemporary politics of space and land use in Dakar. At a regional level, I view the dynamics at play at the Terminus as reflecting the wider social shifts that have occurred over recent decades, where

neoliberal policies have closed down many opportunities for making a living while creating certain new ones. Paying attention to such simultaneously occurring shifts helps to create a more encompassing understanding of the people and places discussed in this book. In this sense, the Terminus provides a view onto wider dynamics; and this wider view helps us to better understand the issues at stake among the traders displaced from the Terminus.

Here it is worth pausing to clarify that the analyses in this book are not aimed at proving any cause–effect relationships between neoliberalisation and the various changes described in the ethnography. In other words, this book does not aim to explain the specific urban impacts of neoliberal policies and reform. Rather, neoliberalisation is part of the bigger political and economic picture that forms the contextual backdrop to the stories being told in this book. In this regard, it is important to avoid imposing a monolithic conception of 'global neoliberalism' upon the Senegalese context and portraying this as the essential cause of Dakar's socio-economic predicament. The neoliberal condition in Dakar should rather be thought of as but one of many different and hybrid variants of processes of neoliberalisation (Fredericks 2018: 5; cf. Larner 2003; Peck and Tickell 2002; Parnell and Robinson 2012; Robinson 2022). Regional experts have argued that, although he was a self-declared neoliberal, Abdoulaye Wade departed from a classic neoliberal reform agenda, as his neoliberal experiment was 'a nonlinear, messy process anchored in an autocratic approach to combat his waning legitimacy' (Fredericks 2018: 53). Wade for example privatised 'in fits and starts' (Fredericks 2018: 53) and many of his major projects ('*grand projets*') of infrastructure expansion and modernisation remained unfinished (de Jong and Valente-Quinn 2018). Furthermore, neoliberalisation is not the only salient process shaping urban development in Dakar but exists alongside other styles of political engagement and longer historical trajectories that predate the neoliberal framework and which also impact upon the city (Mizes 2021). There is a much longer history of displacement in Dakar dating back to colonial times, as Chapter 2 explains. Given long-standing contestations over the proper use of Dakar's streets, even without the neoliberal reforms and visions introduced during the Wade era, markets in Dakar might still have been demolished. Meanwhile, such speculations about the impacts of specific policies upon urban displacement and its aftermath are beyond the analytical scope of this book. The focus, rather, is on *what life was like* in these conditions.

Urban displacement in Dakar and beyond

Although the displacement of the traders from the Malian market at the Terminus had serious consequences, there was nothing particularly unusual or remarkable about it for most residents of Dakar: the evicted traders were the victims of a wider process of urban exclusion that has been ongoing since the establishment of the city in the mid-nineteenth century, and which was spurred under President Wade's liberal and kleptocratic regime (cf. Betts 1971; Bigon 2009; de Jong and Foucher 2010; Delcourt 1983; Melly 2010, 2013; Sow 1980; Tall 1994, 2009). This process has affected many of the city's residents, particularly native and poorer residents of Dakar who have historically been marginalised by colonising foreigners and those with economic and political power (cf. Bigon 2009). As the Senegalese scholar Fatou Sow succinctly stated, 'Basically the entire history of Dakar is intertwined with that of evictions and successive clearances that accompany it' (Sow 1980: 159).[3]

The Cultural Park and its Seven Wonders, which were to replace the Terminus market, were part of former president Wade's wider fantasy of creating a spectacular, modern metropolis which would find its place among the ranks of prominent 'global cities'. During his presidency Wade's administration prioritised massive investment in urban construction projects, including roads and monuments, with the aim of turning Dakar into 'West Africa's showcase capital' (Melly 2010: 40). As Caroline Melly points out, significant private sector investment in infrastructure was meant to globally connect Senegal, both physically and symbolically (Melly 2013: 395; see also de Jong and Foucher 2010). The Seven Wonders was only one of several grandiose projects announced during Wade's regime, the majority of which were never built. One of the most controversial projects he planned and realised was the Monument of African Renaissance, a 52-metre-high statue representing an African family that cost 21 million euros to build (de Jong and Foucher 2010).[4]

While Wade's presidency officially ended in 2012, its controversial legacy was still strongly felt in Dakar the year after, when I conducted fieldwork. His reign had marked a significant break with past politics, famously overturning 40 years of unbroken rule by the Socialist Party (PS) in Senegal. Wade's party, the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS), had a resolutely liberal platform. The PDS and other opposition parties formed the coalition Sopi, meaning 'change' in Wolof, which came to power in 2000 and which promised to defend democracy and a free-market economy (Ross 2008). For the Senegalese who had experienced

the tough structural adjustments in the 1980s and 1990s, the 2000s were more encouraging (Dahou and Foucher 2009: 14; de Jong and Foucher 2010: 192–3). Between 2000 and 2006, Senegal experienced a construction boom. This partly reflected a change in the international development paradigm in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century, which revived an emphasis on the importance of infrastructures (de Jong and Foucher 2010: 193; Melly 2013; cf. Nugent 2018). The previous decades of austerity and state withdrawal in many parts of Africa began to be replaced in the new millennium by liaisons forged between states and private investors and international donors, with a view to undertaking large-scale projects of infrastructure construction and renewal (Stasik and Cissokho 2018: xvii).

Wade's grand plans for the nation and its capital were highly exclusionary. Primarily aimed at luring international attention and foreign investment to Dakar, his vision focused only on a few spaces in the city and ignored the needs of the majority of the population (Melly 2013: 385-6). The promises of progress, prosperity and global connectivity, which the city's various new monuments and construction projects represented, never materialised for the majority of the city's inhabitants. Despite the mirage of infrastructural renewal and neo-modernist rhetoric of development, neoliberal reforms were accelerated during the Wade era, exacerbating social inequalities and enabling unprecedented wealth accumulation (Fredericks 2018: 137; de Jong and Valente-Quinn 2018). During his presidency, Wade's party faced increasing allegations of corruption and nepotism, and the population grew frustrated with his ostentatious spending and megalomaniac public projects in the face of growing unemployment and escalating food costs (Dahou and Foucher 2009; Gaye 2010; Melly 2010, 2017). In 2011 Wade tried to change the constitution to allow for his re-election to a third term in office, and attempted to appoint his son, Karim, as his vice president and immediate successor (Karim Wade was already nicknamed the 'Minister of the Earth and the Sky' due to his colossal ministerial portfolio under his father's government). Massive street protests erupted in Dakar, and various citizens' movements consolidated into the 'June 23 Movement' (M23), resulting in the withdrawal of the controversial bill (cf. Kelly 2012a Scheepers 2011; Diallo 2013; Kelly 2012b). Leaders of the various groups that made up the M23 and different opposition parties eventually rallied behind Macky Sall as presidential candidate, which led to the democratic defeat of Abdoulaye Wade in the March 2012 elections. In April 2013 Abdoulaye Wade's son, Karim, was detained on charges of 'illicit enrichment' at the Reubeuss prison in Dakar.

While the defeat of Wade in some ways marked the end of an era, the political regime change in Senegal was not as radical as some had hoped. The election of Macky Sall in 2012 promised to bolster democratisation in Senegal, particularly through the increasing political involvement of civil society. However, Sall's second term in office was characterised by democratic backsliding and a growing crisis of Senegalese democracy (Ghosh 2021). In March 2021 Senegal witnessed its worst unrest in many years. Widespread violent protests particularly in Dakar were triggered by the arrest of the opposition leader, Ousmane Sonko, over allegations of rape. The charges against Sonko were viewed by the opposition as politically charged and his arrest was seen by some as a move to eliminate the political opposition. At least 10 people died as live ammunition was allegedly used by security forces against protesters; the authorities also temporarily suspended two television channels, and social media and messaging apps were disrupted (Africanews 2021; Human Rights Watch 2021). The protests were partly motivated by wider political grievances, including growing frustrations over the lack of progress on democratic reforms. They erupted in the wake of President Macky Sall's suggestions that he would be running for an unconstitutional third term in 2024, after he earlier in the year signed a law to abolish the post of Prime Minister of Senegal (Freedom House 2021). Meanwhile, the protests, triggered also by growing poverty, reflected deep economic anxieties. Many people took to the streets to express grievances over the increasing lack of jobs, especially for youth, and a general deterioration of the economy because of the Covid-19 pandemic and related restrictions (Human Rights Watch 2021). The living conditions of many of Dakar's residents remain largely unchanged under the presidency of Macky Sall.

This book joins recent calls to redefine 'what, who, and where counts as displaced', and to consider different scales of analysis of displacement beyond merely those determined by national boundaries (Adey 2020: 4; cf. Horn and Parekh 2018). Scholarship on displacement has been largely orientated towards research on refugees and certain forms of international migration. Analysis has therefore usually focused on movements that cross international borders, particularly movement between the so-called Global South and North. This ignores displacements happening within cities in the twenty-first century, including forced movements resulting from eviction, gentrification and exclusion in the context of urban development, which is occurring rapidly on a global scale. Indeed, for migration scholars the term 'urban displacement' tends to refer to the phenomenon of people being displaced by war and disaster

seeking refuge in urban areas instead of refugee camps. In this book, however, I use the term to refer to the situation of people being displaced by uneven development processes occurring in the cities in which they are living and working.

The different forms and scales of displacement happening around the world, whether urban, regional or international, are not unrelated. Various scholars drawing on historical structuralism have argued that capitalism is a system that has always generated and depended on the displacement of human populations (Freeman 2020; Harvey 2004, 2008; Sassen 2014; Cohen 1987; Ferguson and McNally 2015). As capitalism evolved and expanded since the 'Age of Discovery', the world has gone through a series of global displacement regimes including trans-Atlantic slavery; the movement of forced labourers during the colonial era; rural populations displaced by industrial agriculture and enclosures, forced to seek work in cities; and the 'new helots' of unfree global labour migrants. Urban scholars argue that these processes of displacement are increasingly taking place within cities, which have become a key site for the extraction of surplus value required for the reproduction of the capitalist system. In the twenty-first century, urban displacement associated with gentrification has become a generalised global phenomenon (Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales 2018; Freeman 2020; Harvey 2008; Desmond 2016).

Urban displacement has historically gone hand in hand with urban development and the expansion of cities globally. The geographer James Freeman has identified three successive global urban displacement regimes, each of which has been historically accompanied by a new set of internationally circulating technologies and ideas (Freeman 2020). The theoretical framework he proposes pinpoints some of the key global capitalist dynamics that have contributed to urban displacement in cities around the world, from the beginning of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism, through urban renewal after the Second World War, to present-day neoliberal gentrification. This trajectory is in some ways mirrored in the history of urban displacement in Dakar, which I outline in Chapter 2. Meanwhile Freeman's conception of global urban displacement regimes, although it provides a useful heuristic framework, is too universalist and unidirectional to explain the historical complexities and contingencies of exclusion and eviction in Dakar. In this regard it is important to remember that contemporary urban renewal under the neoliberal paradigm does not take the same form everywhere, and scholars have even debated whether gentrification is truly a global phenomenon (cf. Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales 2015).

The urban studies literature on displacement has primarily focused on the issue of housing and residential evictions in the context of gentrification, frequently overlooking other types of urban displacement. Partly, traders have been overlooked in the mainstream literature on urban displacement because, as Myfanwy Taylor (2020) has pointed out, there has been a tendency in the gentrification literature to pit 'economy', represented by an aggressive capitalist system extracting surplus value from cities, against 'society', represented by residents inhabiting the city. In this context, commercial and workspace displacement of traders and small business owners has been neglected by the urban displacement literature. Displaced entrepreneurs do not fit the Marxist conception of class underpinning the original conception of gentrification, where those being displaced by the incoming middle class or 'gentry' are supposedly the 'working class' (cf. Glass 1964).

Arguably, though, the limited research on urban displacements of traders, and the long-term consequences of this, is first and foremost due to the geographical bias of urban studies. Urban studies has for a long time been skewed towards the interests and preoccupations of the wealthier regions of the world, focusing almost exclusively on North America and Europe and their 'global cities'. Like many other academic disciplines, conceptual frameworks in urban studies are still largely informed by research agendas set by the Global North (Pieterse 2010; Robinson 2002; Robinson 2006; cf. Bakewell and Jónsson 2013). In those Western contexts, informal markets and street trade do exist but dominate far less compared with cities in the Majority World, where they are both widespread and are common targets for eviction (González 2017; Asante 2020). The literature on urban displacement and gentrification has therefore focused overwhelmingly on the issue of housing and residential evictions. This overlooks the long-term consequences of the systematic uprooting of merchants and marketplaces – particularly in the cities of the Majority World, where these are widespread and are common targets for eviction.

While there is an emerging and groundbreaking body of scholarship on African urbanism, it still remains the case that urban studies do not take African experiences and analyses seriously enough (Malefakis 2021; Pieterse and Parnell 2014; Pieterse and Simone 2013; Stacey 2021; Thieme, Ference and van Stapele 2021; Todes et al. 2014). Mbembe and Nuttall lament that scholars continue to describe Africa as an object apart from the world; instead, they argue, scholarship on Africa should be de-provincialised (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004: 348). This echoes Jennifer Robinson's (2002) call for urban studies to embark on a *cosmopolitan*

project of understanding ordinary cities (cf. Bakewell and Jónsson 2011: 20). Indeed, as Jean and John Comaroff have argued, the socio-economic processes unfolding in contemporary Africa may in fact provide important 'universal' insights and lessons, because 'in the here-and-now, it is regions in the South that tend first to feel the concrete effects of world-historical processes as they play themselves out' (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012: 121). Indeed, rampant urban expansion is now happening much faster in Africa, Asia and Latin America than in Europe or North America, and this will continue to be the case in the next decades. The historical experience of urbanisation in Western cities, spurred by nineteenth-century industrialisation, is largely irrelevant to contemporary forms of global (or 'planetary') urbanism (Myers 2018; cf. Lees, Shin and López-Morales 2016).

Given the biases and research gaps of mainstream urban studies, I found much of this scholarship to be of relatively limited use for analysing the socio-spatial dimensions of my interlocutors' lives and livelihoods following eviction and displacement. I turned instead to refugee and migration studies, which in some ways proved more relevant. Hardly any of the literature on urban renewal and gentrification has ethnographically examined the aftermath of eviction and displacement in relation to traders and marketplaces, beyond the immediate impacts of and responses to such disruptive events. As I embarked on my analysis there was therefore not much in the way of conceptual frameworks or comparative cases to draw upon from urban studies for making anthropological sense of my interlocutors' experiences of displacement, including the longer-term re-establishment and re-organisation of markets; traders' adaptations to different spaces and infrastructures; and their changing networks, identifications and relationships, all of which are topics that are covered in the chapters of this book. The field of refugee and migration studies, by contrast, has developed analytical approaches and concepts to make sense of the forms of identity and consciousness that emerge among displaced populations, albeit in transnational and diasporic contexts. Such research examines, among other things, displaced people's ongoing attachments to an idealised place of origin or 'homeland', whether these be tangible or imaginary attachments; the group consciousness that develops among displaced people (and their descendants) on the basis of, for example, their collective history and shared experiences, their common ethnic and religious backgrounds, and their cultivation of shared values and norms; as well as the networks sustained among dispersed members of this group, who are scattered in different places

(Bakewell 2008a; Cohen 1997; Hage 2021). These were dimensions highly relevant to understanding the urban context of displacement on which I was focusing, and all are addressed in various ways in this book.

There is, however, a distinct body of research on evictions of urban street vendors in the Global South (Adaawen and Jørgensen 2012; Swanson 2007; de Pádua Carrieri and Murta 2011; Mackie, Bromley and Brown 2014; Lawal 2004; Steel, Ujoranyi and Owusu 2014; Musoni 2010; Bromley and Mackie 2009). Caroline Skinner's review of the research on street traders in Africa suggests that state responses to the presence and activities of such traders have often been oppressive and even violent, ranging from large-scale, sustained evictions or sporadic event-driven evictions, to lower-level ongoing harassment (Skinner 2008: 8–10). In recent years, smaller traders across urban West Africa have increasingly been driven out of downtown areas, as a result of policies of urban regeneration aiming to decongest and beautify cities (Spire and Choplin 2018; Marfaing 2015; Bouquet and Kassi-Djodjo 2014). Amandine Spire and Armelle Choplin (2018: 4) point out that mega events, megaprojects and new masterplans have recently provided opportunities to cleanse street traders from strategic parts of West African cities, including Accra, Abidjan, Bamako and Dakar. As in many other African cities, urban authorities in West Africa are striving to produce competitive world-class cities and have been implementing major urban transformations in attempts to make their cities conform to international standards (Watson 2014; Myers 2015; Spire and Choplin 2018; Gillespie 2016). Skinner's (2008) review identifies only a few examples in Africa where street traders have actually been integrated into urban plans, notably in Tanzania and South Africa. In Dakar, traders lack collective rights to public space and fixed property and, as Brown, Msoka and Dankoco note, 'official policy continues to try and ban street trade from the city centre, maintaining a traditional urban management view of the need for "tidy" streets' (Brown, Msoka and Dankoco 2014: 2241). Studies of evictions of street traders from city centres in West Africa have meanwhile highlighted the ineffectiveness of such oppressive measures, since traders are continually attracted to these spaces due to the high footfall and the associated profit to be made (Asante 2020: 4; Steel, Ujoranyi and Owusu 2014; Lawal 2004).

Several studies have focused on the process of eviction of street traders and its immediate social, economic and spatial impacts; yet, research rarely focuses on the longer-term impacts of street trader displacement and its anthropological dimensions (Mackie, Bromley and Brown 2014; Bromley and Mackie 2009; Omoegun 2015; Omoegun,

Mackie and Brown 2019). Ademola Omoegun, Peter Mackie and Alison Brown point out that, 'Little is known about the agency and actions of traders in the aftermath of evictions' (2019: 8). According to these authors, immediate impacts of evictions include 'the damaging of previously existing networks and reductions in sales due to reduced footfall, particularly due to the displacement of traders from central locations to peripheral sites' (Omoegun, Mackie and Brown 2019: 3). Alison Brown and Alastair Smith's (2016) research has highlighted the cumulative poverty impacts of evictions on informal traders, compounded through the loss of assets during eviction; fear and uncertainty, which entail, among other things, a reduced likelihood of investment; and the loss of business networks with suppliers and customers. Ademola Omoegun and his co-authors Alison Brown and Peter Mackie have recently contributed to filling the knowledge gap on the aftermath of West African traders' evictions and displacement, with studies focusing on displaced traders' rights claims and political activism to reclaim public space (Omoegun 2015; Omoegun, Mackie and Brown 2019). They do not account for the multiple ethnographic and socio-spatial dimensions of urban displacement, however.

A couple of recent ethnographic studies exist that consider the aftermath of evictions of traders and other urban dwellers in neighbouring cities, notably an article on Accra (Ghana) by Spire and Choplin (2018); and a chapter on Cotonou (Benin) in a doctoral thesis by Alice Hertzog (2020). Spire and Choplin's study follows street vendors who 'accepted' to be displaced and have their activity 'formalised' and analyses the manner in which socio-spatial order was reshaped within the relocated space (Spire and Choplin 2018: 3). The authors note that six years after the displacement, there was no lingering criticism or resistance to the public authorities who had orchestrated the forced eviction (Spire and Choplin 2018: 11). Instead, the group of women who had fought against the displacement had broken down and power dynamics had changed among the displaced vendors. Furthermore, new conflicts had broken out, focused on the space each vendor occupied in the new markets. Hertzog's (2020) thesis focuses on intersections of urbanisation and mobilities. In Chapter 6 she analyses an event of demolition and eviction, and its aftermath, focusing on the 'Liberation of Public Space' order carried out in Cotonou in 2017. Ordering the demolition of various stands, workshops and shacks built on public land, the operation that ensued left buildings along central avenues in ruins, destroying thousands of urban livelihoods. Hertzog argues that such destructive events reflect a 'collapsible urbanism' whereby the state acts

to collapse cities, 'undermining decentralisation and local governance whilst also weakening the urban economy' (Hertzog 2020: 16). Evictions caused by collapsible urbanism in turn trigger mobility, migration and forced displacement; mechanisms of collapsible urbanism are thus key to understanding urban mobility, argues Hertzog.

This book accounts for a variety of aspects of what actually happens to traders and markets in a context of (urban) displacement both in the immediate and, especially, the longer term. Rather than viewing displaced people as a homogenous mass or as passive victims deprived of agency – a stereotype which is particularly prevalent when it comes to refugees – the book considers the *differentiated* experiences, losses and gains, and capacities for adjustment among different people within the same context of displacement (cf. Hammar 2014). The chapters address the spatial, social and symbolic aspects of urban displacement. In this regard, my analysis fits the conceptualisation of 'displacement' proposed by Amanda Hammar in her edited volume on displacement economies: 'I define displacement as enforced changes in interweaving spatial, social and symbolic conditions and relations' (Hammar 2014: 9). Hammar's book offers an approach to displacement that 'focuses on the relational qualities and the paradoxes of displacement in general, and on both what produces displacement and what it in turn produces' (Hammar 2014: 4). While the chapters of Hammar's edited volume mainly focus on forced migrants, this framework captures well the approach to the displacement of markets and traders taken in the present book. Its chapters examine the multiple and generative dimensions of the process of displacement, including what happens to social relationships (such as trade networks, gender relations, trust and collaboration); to relations to space and the use and production thereof (such as changing or persistent relations to familiar places and place-making in new environments); and to symbolic and cultural aspects of life (such as moral economies or femininity).

The city through the eyes of women

Anthropologists have long been keen to dispel the myth that Africa consists of isolated and unchanging localities and 'cultures', and this argument is often made by drawing attention to local–global connections and migration beyond the continent (Diouf 2000; Ferguson 2006; Piot 1999). Similarly, urban scholars have increasingly drawn attention to the 'worlding' of African cities (Landau 2010; Simone 2001). Globalisation,

however, is not the only way that the continent's inhabitants and places are connected to 'elsewheres'. There are numerous other flows and circuits at other (smaller) scales that make up the urban centres and regions of Africa (Amselle 1977; Boesen and Marfaing 2007; Cohen 1969; Gregoire and Labazee 1993; Gugler 1971; Scheele 2012). Like the mythical 'African village' portrayed as remote and exotic, Muslim women in West Africa still appear relatively isolated and 'immobile'. By focusing on some of the other (smaller) scales and spaces besides 'the global', this ethnography paints a relatively dynamic picture of the lives of women residing in urban West Africa, which emphasises change, mobility and connections across space.

The traders represented in this book were generally mature women in their thirties, forties and fifties, who were financially in charge of their own households, even if they were married (see Table 1.2 for an overview of the main interlocutors referred to in the book). Almost all of them were Muslim and had Malian backgrounds, having either been born there or having parents from Mali.[5] I usually spoke with my interlocutors in a mix of French and Bamanankan, an official Malian language. In the context examined in this book, women's economic activities in public space, their accumulation of profit through commerce and their involvement in international shuttle trade were contentious issues which raised gendered concerns and moral dilemmas (as discussed especially in Chapter 5). Women in Islamic West Africa rarely preside over significant business and trade capital or engage independently in long-distance mobility and commerce. This differs from the 'market women' in matrilineal societies of West Africa, particularly Ghana, where women are known to dominate marketplaces and trade.[6] By comparison, in Senegal, women are less likely to be economically active, and as traders they are mainly involved in selling prepared foods, whereas other forms of trade are usually dominated by men (Lyons and Snoxell 2005). This book to some extent explores how women's practices of trade were 'embedded' in certain social relationships and identities, cultural norms and values and moral concerns, which shaped the women's aims and strategies (cf. Akerlof and Kranton 2010; Granovetter 1985; Meagher 2010). Meanwhile, the book does not just examine conformity and consensus but also discusses the conflicts and ongoing negotiations over women's economic activities. Studies of West African (male) traders have been notable for their emphasis on the embeddedness of economic behaviour, analysing the significance of social networks and ethnic and religious identity in particular in constituting successful trading networks and institutions (Amselle 1985; Cohen 1969; Diouf 2000; Ebin 1992;

Table 1.2 Overview of main interlocutors.

Main fieldwork sites:	Name (pseudonym)	Occupation	Marital status	Age (approximate)
Outdoor market at the Terminus	Aminata	retailer	divorced	early 30s
	Ami	*bazin* cloth retailer	monogamy (husband in Ivory Coast)	early 30s
	Ba Fanta	retailer	widow	50s
	Djenneba Sylla	retailer	monogamy	30s
	Fatim (daughter of Ba Fanta)	retailer	divorced	30s
	Rokia	*bazin* cloth retailer	monogamy (husband in Burkina Faso)	early 30s
Indoor cloth bazaar	Aissa	*bazin* cloth wholesaler	monogamy	early 40s
	Kadidia	*bazin*/wax cloth wholesaler	unmarried	late 20s
	Safi	*bazin*/wax cloth wholesaler	divorced	late 30s
Sugunikura	Aissatou	*bazin* cloth retailer	monogamy	early 20s
	Mah	wholesale trader	monogamy	late 40s
	Oumou	wholesale trader	polygamy (husband in Mali)	late 40s
Grand Mosque	Bintou	occasional shuttle trader	widow	late 40s
	Fatou Fall	wholesale shuttle trader	divorced	late 30s
	Nana	wholesale shuttle trader	recently married	late 40s
	Tènè	wholesale shuttle trader	divorced	late 30s
Other female interlocutors:				
Garage Petersen market	Hawa	retailer	monogamy	late 20s
Garage Petersen market	Fili	retailer	widow	late 40s
My Malian neighbour	Maimoona	housewife	monogamy	mid 20s
Itinerant shuttle trader	Ramatoullaye Diallo	small-scale shuttle trader	monogamy (husband in France)	early 40s

Gregoire and Labazee 1993; Meagher 2010). It is, however, important to note that the social rules and regulations that apply to male traders do not necessarily apply in the same way to women traders, who may be subjected to different social and moral constraints than men. Women traders do not necessarily organise themselves in a similar way to men. Their motives and strategies and the networks they rely on may differ significantly from men's, due to inequalities that limit women's power and access to resources and contacts (Clark 1994, 2003; cf. Meagher 2005: 231).

The distances involved in the commerce carried out by my female interlocutors, where trade journeys lasted several days and spanned more than 1,000 kilometres, were remarkable. The participation of Muslim women in transnational commerce, as observed in the Mali–Dakar corridor and at the Dakar Terminus, appears to be unique in Islamic West Africa where long-distance trade has traditionally been dominated by men (cf. Amselle 1985; Cohen 1969; Gregoire and Labazee 1993; Warms 1992, 1994). The mobilities and migration of women from Mali are usually depicted as exceptional, resulting from poverty and famine, and associated with destabilising social effects (Findley 1989, 1993; Grosz-Ngaté 2000; Guilmoto 1998; Hertrich and Lesclingand 2003; Lesclingand 2004; Vaa 1990; Vaa, Findley, and Diallo 1989). Meanwhile, beyond the 'rural exodus' from the countryside into towns, hardly any research has looked at Malian women's international mobilities and transnational commerce. In contrast, in the last decades scholars have documented *other* West African women's increasing involvement in international shuttle trade to destinations outside the African continent (cf. Bredeloup 2012; Buggenhagen 2012; Diallo 2014; Dianka 2012; Ebin 1993, 1995; Evers Rosander 2005, 2010; Haugen 2013; Marfaing 2007).

Until recently, Muslim women's active participation in migration, mobility and long-distance trade in West Africa has been largely neglected in academic scholarship, thus inadvertently (or deliberately) reproducing prevailing gender stereotypes. This oversight is particularly striking in the light of the expanding autonomies of women (Antoine and Dial 2003; Grange Omokaro 2009; Dial 2008; Rondeau 1996; Rondeau and Bouchard 2007). Indeed, while African women have always migrated (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997; Rodet 2009), most scholars agree that female autonomous migration in West Africa is on the increase due to increased education, the changing structure of economic activities, and lack of access to land for agricultural purposes, among other things (Adepoju 1995; Hertrich and Lesclingand 2003; van Dijk, Foeken and van Til 2001). According to Sylvie Bredeloup (2012: 26), the deterioration of living and

working conditions in Africa, coupled with the globalisation of labour markets – a process which has intensified and feminised – explains the increasing involvement of African women in long-distance migration and trade since the 1990s. Women have increasingly been entering shuttle trade, a business involving travelling back and forth across borders with trade commodities. This phenomenon emerged in the 1990s partly due to advances in transport and telecommunication technologies at the time, which made long-distance travel and interaction cheaper and easier (Freeman 2001). In Africa women's entry into shuttle trade was also commonly spurred on by the imposition of structural adjustment which entailed that conventional livelihoods were put at risk while new opportunities for transnational trading opened up (Haugen 2013: 22; cf. MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Meagher 2003; Peraldi 2005).

Despite these developments over the last several decades, Muslim women in West Africa are often portrayed as the relatively static nodes in the flows and networks produced by mobile men: women are the anchors of transnational families, the receivers of remittances, and the consumers of goods flowing in from elsewhere (cf. Buggenhagen 2001; Diagne, Mondain and Randall 2010; Guilmoto 1998). By ignoring or pathologising the economic contributions and mobilities of women, conventional analyses naturalise a binary conception of gender in this region. This contributes to a discourse that equates 'woman' with the domestic sphere, consumption, 'immobility', passivity, and dependency (Freeman 2001; Hann 2013; Massey 1994; Ortner 1974; Rosaldo 1974). This book challenges such dichotomous thinking by highlighting women's active part in income generation, mobility and spatial flows as well as the diversity of femininities and changeability of gender ideologies in the region.

For most of the married women traders I worked with, their husbands were unable to provide for them and their children, usually because their income was irregular and insufficient. This reflects wider trends in the region where men are increasingly unable to live up to the masculine ideal of establishing independent households and providing for their families due to the lack of economic opportunities. Generalised unemployment and lack of permanent jobs keep men dependent on their families and in a prolonged state of youth, and marital projects are difficult to realise, entailing a prolonging of celibacy (Grange Omokaro 2009: 200–1). In turn, West African women now participate more actively in the capitalist economy, contribute more to household budgets, and are increasingly educated. Hence, marriage is often postponed and conjugal unions are less stable than before (Antoine and Dial 2003; cf. Brand 2001: 103–4, 121 n.24). Indeed, about half of my main interlocutors were either

divorced or widowed and had not remarried. After menopause there is usually less social pressure on a woman in Mali to remarry, especially if she has already had children (Rondeau 1996: 162). Meanwhile, the institution of marriage remains strong in both Mali and Senegal, and social recognition of a woman usually requires that she be married (Dial 2008; Whitehouse 2016). Indeed, in lieu of having no husband some of my interlocutors preferred what Chantalle Rondeau (1996: 163–4) calls a 'social husband', who did not live with them or contribute financially, to having no husband. For example, the shuttle trader Nana, who had been a single mother for almost 15 years, had married late in life to a man who was financially dependent upon her. It appeared that she had married to relieve the pressure of social expectations, and less so for the affection or companionship of a spouse.

Even if a woman was able to financially support herself, she would suffer social stigma if she did not (re)marry. A number of my main interlocutors were married to what Rondeau (1996: 162) calls a '*mari de passage*' (a 'transit husband') – that is, largely absent husbands who were residing in another country, including the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, France and Spain. If these men came to visit their wives at all, then it was only temporarily. During the husband's absence, many of these women were expected to provide for themselves and their children, and only some husbands sent remittances to pay for bills and other major expenses (see Rondeau 1996: 156–7). Oumou was married to a Senegalese Soninke man working for the railway who had another wife in Mali. Similarly, Oumou's polygamous father, who ran a transport business, had maintained a household in the Ivory Coast with two wives, and travelled frequently back and forth across the border to Oumou's mother in Bamako. Meanwhile, I suspect that at least some of the traders I met, who claimed they had a husband who was living elsewhere, were covering up the fact that they were actually not married, thus evading social judgement or sexual harassment (cf. Rondeau 1996: 163–4). One of my interlocutors, the shuttle trader Tènè, deliberately used this strategy while travelling alone to Dakar, telling suspicious or nosey strangers that her husband was living in the US – although she confided in me that she was in fact divorced.

My female interlocutors in Dakar represented a wide spectrum of mobility and belonging. Some were newcomers to the city, while others had immigrated decades earlier; some came straight from Mali, while others had lived for long periods in other countries where they may have been born and raised by Malian parents; some had been born in Dakar to Malian parents or had arrived from Mali during childhood,

and some had mixed Malian/Senegalese parentage or were themselves in mixed marriages. Historically, Malian women have long used poly-residential strategies to facilitate their circulation in the region, moving between the different places of residence of the members of their extended families (cf. Rodet 2009). The female traders on the Dakar–Niger railway drew on connections to kin to facilitate their entry into the trade and the circulation of their goods (Lambert 1993a, 1993b). As this book illustrates, however, such reliance on extended families and dispersed lineages was no longer available to a growing group of women, including divorcees and widows who had been rejected by their kin. Poly-residential strategies appeared to be mainly a male preserve particularly for the 'transit husbands' of some of my married female interlocutors, who in turn often had to provide for themselves and their children while their husbands were away. In this sense, women's involvement in transnational and shuttle trade reflected both the need to generate cash and, increasingly, the atomisation of families.

Assembling an urban ethnography of displaced traders

My initial intention, as I embarked on a year of anthropological fieldwork in Dakar in early 2013, was to focus on the Malian presence in the city. I had previously conducted research on migration aspirations in the Kayes region of Mali and a long-standing Malian friend, Checkne, who now worked in the import business and therefore regularly came to Dakar to fetch his goods in the harbour, helped me launch my investigations (cf. Jónsson 2007, 2012). Checkne arranged accommodation for me with a Malian family in the city centre. He also took me around to the various Malian trade and transport hubs in the city. I visited a parking ground for Malian trucks and another one for Malian buses, the Malian zone of the Dakar harbour, the Malian customs office, and the new station for the goods train from Mali (see Figure 1.2 for a map of Malian trade and transport hubs across Dakar). I quickly realised that the Malian presence in Dakar was closely related to commerce (cf. Jónsson 2019).[7]

My explorations soon took me to the old Terminus – a place with highly symbolic significance for the generations of Malians settled in Dakar. For nearly a century it had been a central node in Malian trade, transport, and migration networks. It was only at the turn of the twenty-first century that the roads connecting Dakar and Bamako were fully asphalted. Before then, most Malians had to take the train to the Terminus to access Dakar and its harbour. The Terminus was located next to the

port of Dakar at the sea-side entrance to the city centre, on the southern tip of the Cap Vert Peninsula. Dakar's old city centre was characterised by government offices and embassies, luxurious skyscrapers, and broad tree-lined boulevards planned by French colonial administrators. Yet, walking from my flat to the Terminus, I had to weave in and out through chaotic traffic and the street-level traders, hawkers and beggars who crowded the pavements. I lived just outside the historical city centre, next to the bustling Garage Petersen, in a neighbourhood known as 'Difonsé' (the French *défoncé* means potholed, battered, broken, drugged up), on the border between the raucous neighbourhoods of Reubeuss and Medina. There were not only several Malians living in this area, but also numerous Guineans, Ivorians and other migrants from the sub-region as well as from North Africa and Asia. The families of successful former Malian kola traders lived in relatively spacious houses, which in the chaotic surroundings constituted tranquil oases, each containing a central courtyard with a tree and a functioning well, and one of them even with its own mosque. These scattered Malian households were situated in the midst of numerous new apartment buildings, which were often quickly and poorly constructed as part of the ongoing building frenzy in the city (cf. Melly 2010; Tall 2009).[8]

One of these Malian houses in the old city centre belonged to Papa Traore. I was introduced to Papa via his eldest son, who was the *jatigi* (host, tutor, broker in Bamanankan) of my Malian friend Checkne. Papa and his two wives ran a massive household where several dozen people, including their children, grandchildren, other relatives, visitors and occasionally myself, regularly turned up for their three daily meals. Papa was also a *jatigi*, providing food, accommodation and general hospitality to female shuttle traders from Mali during their regular business trips to Dakar. The first Malian shuttle trader I met at Papa's house was Fatouni. I chatted to her after dinner and the next morning she allowed me to accompany her on her errands in the city centre with her colleague Fanta who, like her, was an older woman from Kayes in western Mali. At one point we started walking down what seemed an incredibly long street. The midday sun was out and we had already been roaming about for hours, and I was becoming exhausted. The women were mostly silent and Fatouni only occasionally responded to my endless stream of curious questions with short dry answers. Intrigued as to where the women were leading me, I asked Fatouni. In her typical fashion, she answered sarcastically, 'If you want to do research, you have to search!' I silently trudged along, soon discovering that we were going to a small market located at the end of a long, inconspicuous alley. There I met Fatouni's

old friend: the loud, chatty and welcoming Oumou, by whose side I ended up spending countless days at 'the little Malian market', or Sugunikura as it was also known.[9] Sugunikura was one of the few markets that had emerged in the vicinity of the Terminus after the Malian market there had been demolished.

I also realised that there were several other Malian shuttle traders like Fatouni and Fanta who continued to travel back and forth with goods even after the passenger train had stopped running. Malian bus companies had begun servicing this transnational route during the last decade when the national highways had been tarmacked. While Fatouni largely confined herself to Papa's household during her short trips to Dakar, other shuttle traders tended to socialise at a small gathering place in front of a Malian bus company. I discovered this one day as I walked past and was seduced by the banter and intriguing personalities of Nana and Fatou Fall. These women were both successful Malian traders who travelled alone to Dakar where they spent weeks purchasing large quantities of goods and arranging their transport by truck back to Bamako.

By walking, observing and searching, I gradually retraced the displaced market traders and the shuttle traders who were continuously on the move. I thus assembled an empirical field of research, whose boundaries were traced by the constellation of scattered new Malian marketplaces and the networks of traders in Dakar who were formerly associated with the Malian market at the Terminus. This book is therefore not about 'Malians in Dakar' as such; instead, it focuses on a dynamic network of traders of Malian background. Migration scholars in particular have been criticised for construing immigrants as constituting discrete, homogenous communities ('ethnic enclaves') within cities (Gidley 2013; Glick Schiller and Wimmer 2003). This book does not assume a 'community' among Malians in Dakar (or in Mali for that matter). Rather, it examines some of the networks established among certain Malians in Dakar. The ethnography highlights the diversity of interests and identifications among the people who were part of these networks, while also exploring why some people of Malian background were not part of some of these networks.

As my mental map of the Malian presence in Dakar became increasingly detailed, I decided to focus primarily on four sites in the old city centre to where many of the traders from the former market at the Terminus had dispersed, all located within a radius of one kilometre (see Figure 1.3 for a map of the main field sites). All of these marketplaces were dominated by traders of Malian origins. One of these

sites was also the place where many of the Malian shuttle traders, who had previously travelled on the Dakar–Niger train, tended to congregate in the vicinity of the offices of the Malian bus companies. The four sites included a small outdoor retail market by the railway tracks, next to the old terminus building. This was the only remnant of the former Malian market at the Terminus. The second site was located a few hundred metres diagonally opposite this outdoor market, on the ground floor of a large apartment building. It resembled a bazaar with several aisles containing numerous stalls, where traders were mainly selling cloth. The third site was Sugunikura market which was located northwest of the Terminus within 15 minutes' walking distance. The fourth site was another 15 minutes' walk from Sugunikura, in a southwesterly direction, at a commercial centre located between the Grand Mosque of Dakar and the bus and taxi rank, Garage Petersen. This was where the female shuttle traders socialised in their *grin* ('clique' – see Chapter 4).

Thus, unlike multisited ethnography, which aims to study aspects of 'the world system', the constellation of sites that I was interested in capturing ethnographically was mainly within walking distance. I decided to map and investigate the displacement and scattering of the traders after the dismantling of the old Malian market at La Gare. Had I conducted my entire study in just one of the new Malian marketplaces, it is unlikely that I would have properly grasped the nature of that site, including how it was constituted through its relation to other past and current places in Dakar and the reasons for its particular location in the city.

As the evicted and displaced traders had scrambled for new trading spaces to sustain their livelihoods, this had entailed a sort of 'migration within the city', and my aim was to capture this spatially dispersed network within Dakar. My methodology in some ways resembled the multisited approach adopted by scholars studying diasporic and transnational networks, who spend time in various sites around the world where members of the geographically dispersed groups under study reside (Dia 2013; Olwig 2007; Paul 2011). I too was studying people who had dispersed from one original location, namely the traders who had been associated with the Dakar–Niger railway line and the market at its terminus in Dakar. Like a diaspora or transnational network, this was a group that had dispersed from one site, but who maintained certain imaginary and tangible connections to each other and to that original site, as will become evident in the forthcoming chapters. This spatially and network-orientated fieldwork took me all over Dakar, from the city centre to the near and distant

suburbs, which was both exciting and exhausting (my field notes include interviews and conversations with over 150 interlocutors in several dozen locations). It was clear, however, that I needed to have some grasp of the huge network of traders, migrants, transport hubs and markets before I could identify those places that were more marginal to my study, and those to 'zoom in' on. Once I had done that, my fieldwork became more squarely focused on the city centre, where I could walk from one site to the other.

The following chapters examine various anthropological dimensions of endings, both as metaphor and empirical object, to capture the ramifications of urban displacement and its aftermath for the traders from the Dakar Terminus. Chapter 2 begins by situating the eviction from the Terminus in its wider historical context of continuous urban displacement in Dakar since the inception of the city. The chapter then zooms in on the literal 'end' of the Dakar–Niger railway line, exploring how the Dakar Terminus over time evolved into a dense node as a place where travellers, traders, visitors and goods intersected and exchanged hands. It was a place filled with meaning, particularly for the women who had pioneered and expanded the marketplace at the end of the line and for the generations of Malians settled in Dakar. The traders fought to hold on to this space when presented with eviction notices, and they continued to identify strongly with the Terminus even after displacement. The subsequent Chapter 3 homes in on the process of eviction and market demolition, thus focusing on 'the end' in a temporal sense: a moment of rupture, a destructive event which concluded an era at the Terminus. A multi-vocal account of the end of the market documents differently situated knowledges about the city, ranging across city authorities, Malian elites and intellectuals in Dakar, vocal male traders, and largely silent women and other feminised traders. Their different reactions and responses to the eviction and clearance at the Terminus reflected divergent understandings of urban membership and how to claim the right to the city in a context of widespread urban informality and exclusionary governance.

Chapter 4 moves beyond the sense of 'conclusion' to explore what eventually *emerged* at the end, when the traders sought to reestablish their livelihoods and spaces of work. Stories of eviction, gentrification and urban displacement often leave out the aftermath. The chapter reveals not only what is lost but also, the opportunities and gains which paradoxically emerge when people displaced in the city restore and adapt their spatial environments. The symbolic significance of the Terminus was not simply erased when the market was demolished, and the space cleared of traders. The memories, networks, place attachments

and economic practices lived on. The market, as trade networks and as activities of exchange, emplaced itself in new ways after demolition and eviction. Market demolition does not actually create a 'blank slate'. The historical roots and spatial imprint of the former marketplace persisted in people's memory, facilitating its re-emergence: like rhizomes, it sprouted in new places nearby.

Continuing the inquiry into the aftermath of displacement, Chapter 5 illustrates how the examination of a rupturing event can reveal broader, ongoing tensions and transformations in society. The chapter documents the weakening of female networks and a growing marginalisation of women traders in favour of men at the newly established markets. These shifts were, however, not simply related to the closure of the Terminus but were also closely associated with wider transformations occurring during the decades of increasing political and economic liberalisation in Dakar and the wider region. The rupturing event at the Malian marketplace in Dakar had both generated and exacerbated certain gendered constraints and conflicts experienced by women traders; but it also brought to the surface wider, ongoing moral dilemmas regarding gender roles and ideologies faced by many residents of Dakar. The ethnography documents changing and competing conceptions of what it means to be a woman in this part of urban West Africa.

The final Chapter 6 considers endings in the metaphorical sense of 'means and ends', asking what ends the marketplaces served. Given that they no longer appeared to constitute actual 'markets', due to a significant decline in demand and profit, what were they ultimately for? Taken together, the different chapters show how the dense node and network that emerged at the Dakar Terminus were ruptured, and what became of the scattered fragments. The Conclusion in Chapter 7 draws on the concept of 'diaspora' to capture the group consciousness and spatial orientation evident among several of the traders in the aftermath of their urban displacement. While I acknowledge the problems of applying this terminology to this context, I ultimately invite readers, and in particular urban scholars, to consider the analytical possibilities that open up if we conceive of the urban condition as partly *constituted by* forced displacement. Instead of focusing merely on the immediate causes and consequences of evictions and clearances, what would it mean if we began to think about how the city is actually configured by urban displacement? Rather than focusing merely on destruction, this book turns attention to what is *generated* by urban displacement.

Notes

1   The interlocutors of this book have been anonymised with pseudonyms, since I feel it would be too controversial or insensitive to associate their names directly with the very intimate and personal stories they shared with me. I have however decided not to anonymise place names and historical figures in the Malian trade networks in Dakar, as these would be of interest to future research.

2   At the time of fieldwork, 1,000 CFA was equal to about 1.5 euros (rate on 1 March 2013 retrieved from www.xe.com). For comparison, the guaranteed minimum wage in Senegal in 2013 was 36,243 CFA/month, equivalent to 55.25 euros (http://www.travail.gouv.sn/node/203, accessed on 20 August 2018).

3   My translation from the French: *'Au fond toute l'histoire de Dakar se confond avec celle de refoulements et déguerpissements successifs qui la jalonnent'*.

4   According to de Jong and Foucher (2010), a North Korean construction company was responsible for executing the work. As part of the construction project, the Senegalese state transferred 27 hectares of publically owned land situated around the airport of Dakar to a businessman who was a member of the ruling party. He then resold the land under favourable conditions to the Senegalese Pension Fund *(l'Institution de prévoyance retraite du Sénégal)*, a public body. In addition, President Wade affirmed his rights to the monument and claimed 35 per cent of potential revenues made from it.

5   None of my female interlocutors were part of any of the Sufi orders that constitute the dominant form of Islam in Senegal, and which often form the basis of trading networks in the region and beyond (cf. Diallo 2014; Dianka 2012; Diouf 2000; Ebin 1992; Evers Rosander 2000). While nearly all my interlocutors were Muslim, their religious convictions, adherences and practices varied to such a great extent that I could not consider them a religious 'community'.

6   Much research among women traders in West Africa focuses on Ghana, a small country with good transport links, and involves more or less nominally Christian women, including Asante who are matrilineal (see for example Burrell 2014; Chalfin 2004; Clark 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2010; Robertson 1984). These distinctive features make such studies a problematic comparison for the present ethnography.

7   Mali is landlocked and depends greatly on maritime traffic for its international trade, primarily through the port city of Dakar. The Malian state has been granted a section of the port in Dakar (the Zone Malien at pier number 8 where containers arrive; goods in bulk destined for Mali arrive at pier 3), as well as a truck park on the outskirts of the Cap Vert Peninsula (the Parking Malien in Rufisque). Senegalese law does not apply in these zones, and foreign goods imported via Dakar and transited through Senegal to Mali are not subject to Senegalese customs duty.

8   Such properties, including the one I lived in, were often owned and managed by migrants from Lebanon and their diasporic descendants, who have had a significant presence in Dakar since the early twentieth century (Bigon 2009: 204; Delcourt 1983: 78–82 and 92).

9   Sugunikura literally means 'the new little market' in Bamanankan. Sugunikura is also the name of an important market in Bamako, known in French as *Marché de Médine*.

2

The roots and routes of Malian trade in Dakar

'You haven't seen anything yet. You haven't even been to the Terminus!' Papa Traore commented after I told him I wanted to meet the Malians in Dakar. Papa was a Malian patriarch and former kola nut trader, who was well connected to key people in the Malian migrant and trade networks in the city. He took me under his wing during my first days of fieldwork and reassured me that, by the end of my stay, I would have seen 'the entire Malian community in Dakar'. But first, he insisted, I needed to visit the Terminus. Indeed, the networks and infrastructures underpinning Malian trade in the Senegalese capital could in many ways all be traced back to this one central place. Since the end of colonialism, the station and the market of the Terminus served as a hub for a dynamic network of both settled and mobile Malians in the Senegalese capital, including traders, migrants and visitors. Up until recently, the only way for the majority of Malians to access Dakar and its harbour was by taking the train (the alternative of flying was the privilege of a small elite). As one middle-aged Malian man put it, 'The Terminus became a point of convergence for the Malians in Dakar. It was a symbolic place for Malians. Even if they didn't live there, they came there to see their relatives or buy a Malian product'.

There is a relatively limited understanding of how mobile people and migrants relate to the cities they arrive in in West Africa (Bakewell and Jónsson 2011; cf. Carrier 2016). This chapter begins to fill this gap by tracing the evolving commercial networks and mobile livelihoods of Malian traders, particularly women, which lay the ground for the emergence of the market at the Terminus and turned the station into a 'symbolic place for Malians' in Dakar. The experiences of international migrants in West Africa's cities and their contributions to

urban economies has been largely overlooked by contemporary urban scholarship. Very little research has focused on the substantial numbers of international migrants, including traders, who have been and still are moving to and settling in Dakar. Literature on Malian migrants living in Senegal and its capital city is virtually non-existent.[1] It is widely assumed that West African migrants are generally headed North, towards Europe; and that people with a mobile lifestyle, like the Malian shuttle traders, do not emplace themselves in their destinations. Contemporary analyses of West African migration and mobilities tend to focus on protracted journeys beyond the continent, involving great personal risk and with profound existential implications (see, for example, Andersson 2014; Bredeloup 2008; Streiff-Fénart and Segatti 2012; Vigh 2009; Tošić and Lems 2019). Emigration from Senegal, particularly to Europe, has thus been extensively documented and scrutinised by numerous scholars over the last couple of decades (Diop 2008; Riccio 2002; Fall and Bochaca 2012; Ebin 1992; Evers Rosander 2010; Cross 2013). By contrast, mundane and quotidian movements across contiguous borders and of relatively short distances, which historically were the main focus of research, usually fall under the radar of current research (cf. Amin 1974; Cohen 1969; Gugler 1971; Rouch 1956). Hence, there is little understanding of the role of urban and regional mobilities in producing the cities of West Africa, and of the ways in which generations of African migrants residing within the continent itself have shaped African cities (Bakewell and Jónsson 2011; Bakewell and Landau 2018; Choplin and Lombard 2014).

The growth of African cities was initially driven primarily by migration, hence the consequences of rural–urban migration for urban society in fact became an early theme for social scientific research on the continent (Bakewell and Jónsson 2011). Research examining the impact of migration on African urban life has historically centred on the relationships between 'hosts and strangers'. This has particularly been a focus of research in parts of urban West Africa, where Africans of foreign ethnicity tended to live in multi-ethnic neighbourhoods (or 'stranger communities') often referred to as Zongos (Shack and Skinner 1979; Skinner 1963; Schildkrout 1978; Agier 1983). In more recent work, this research focus on inclusion of migrants in West African cities has largely faded from consciousness, however. Despite the vast scholarship on 'integration' in other parts of the world, in particular Europe and North America, similar research on the African continent is sparse and focuses largely on Southern Africa (cf. Bakewell and Landau 2018; Cohen 2019; Gaibazzi 2018; Nyamnjoh 2006). Moreover, while there is a growing

body of research dealing with the phenomenon of diasporas around the world, including African migrants overseas, very little attention has been paid to African diasporas within the African continent (Bakewell 2008a).

This chapter retells the history of Dakar's urban development through the lens of the Terminus. This is a different kind of urban history, one that focuses on the role of mobilities and displacement in the development of the city. This perspective is informed by scholarship that argues that cities – and societies more generally – are produced through mobilities, including circulation and flows of all kinds, as well as immobilities, bottlenecks and displacement (Bakewell and Jónsson 2011; Hertzog 2020; Melly 2017; Vigneswaran and Quirk 2015). Such scholarship respatialises urban analysis by looking beyond the administrative boundaries of cities and understanding urbanism through unbounded and mobile perspectives. While some proponents of this approach to cities have advocated focusing on planetary flows of resources and global industrial supply chains (Brenner 2014), understanding urban dynamics in West Africa requires paying more attention to relatively localised flows – such as the circulation of agricultural produce or cloth within the region, to name a few examples from the Dakar Terminus (cf. Landau 2018; Hertzog 2020). Seen from the view of the Terminus, Dakar has been shaped by all kinds of urban and regional mobilities and exchanges. This includes regional migration and 'internal' African diasporas, transnational trade flows, regional and urban transport infrastructure, and urban displacement – which are all dynamics that have come into play at the Dakar Terminus for more than a century.

The chapter explores how and why the Dakar Terminus evolved into a dense node for various exchanges, mobilities and flows; and situates the eventual displacement of the traders within Dakar's longer history of successive evictions and clearances. It begins by describing the successive 'urban displacement regimes' (Freeman 2020) that have continuously shaped the urbanisation of Dakar, dating right back to early colonisation. This helps to explain the broader historical context in which the demolition of the market at the Terminus took place, and challenges reductionist analytical tendencies to simply pin the blame on 'neoliberal gentrification' (Mizes 2021). The subsequent sections then trace the history of the diverse mobilities and flows associated with the Dakar–Niger railway, which led to the emergence of the market at the Dakar Terminus. The railway infrastructure was appropriated by Malian traders, particularly by women who turned the train and its terminus station in Dakar into marketplaces, feminised spaces, and symbolic places for people of Malian background. The Terminus evolved into a dense

node where several networks, exchanges and flows of people and goods emerged and intersected. It thus represented much more than a train station for the generations of Malians settled in Dakar and those visiting the Senegalese capital. This helps explain why the traders fought to hold on to this space in the face of eviction notices and why the displaced traders continued to identify strongly with the Terminus, as described in the subsequent chapters.

Displacement regimes in the urbanisation of Dakar

The displacement of the traders from the Terminus was but a recent episode in a long history of displaced populations in Dakar and the surrounding region. At its origins Dakar's urbanisation was founded on displacement in the context of settler colonialism. This was initiated by French missionaries and traders who in the mid-nineteenth century began to expel Lebou villagers residing on the Cap Vert Peninsula (Bigon 2009: 189). French missionaries and traders began to settle in the southern part of the Cap Vert Peninsula in the mid-nineteenth century and in 1857 the French created a military establishment on the peninsula (Bigon 2009: 189).[2] A coastal lagoon was completed on the eastern point of Cap Vert, enabling the arrival of coastal trading vessels and with these ships came a yellow fever epidemic. Several Europeans and *Métis* were evacuated from Gorée Island (which faces Cap Vert) to Dakar, displacing the Lebou residents. Further bouts of epidemics followed over the next several decades and in the early twentieth century the Lebous were further displaced from their settlements at the coast towards the west of what became the city centre of Dakar (Delcourt 1983: 48 and 67–70; Bigon 2009: 188–190).

Dakar witnessed a steep rise in population at the beginning of the twentieth century. Liora Bigon (2009) has convincingly argued that careful town planning legislation by the French in the early twentieth century assisted in creating a de facto system of racial segregation (cf. Tall 2009). In 1902 the French government moved the capital of the Federation of French West African colonies (*AOF*) from St Louis to Dakar, after deciding to turn the port of Dakar into its chief Atlantic maritime post (Bigon 2009: 111; cf. Tall 2009: 60).[3] This initiated a phase of major urbanisation efforts, with the construction of roads and government buildings, hospitals, military barracks and housing for civil servants, among other things. The big trading houses of enterprises from Bordeaux and Marseilles were grouped around the *Kermel* market

located near the Dakar port. Consequently, the small train station of 1885 became insufficient and a new one, the Dakar Terminus, was built in 1914 on the spot where it still stands today (Delcourt 1983: 78–82; Kpakoun 1971: 9–19). In 1905, building restrictions were imposed that banned construction in perishable materials like mud and straw in Dakar city centre (*Dakar-ville*, or *Dakar-propre*); these were only allowed outside the city's unofficial borders (Bigon 2009: 190). When a bubonic plague epidemic that had spread via global maritime routes took hold in Dakar in April 1914, colonial authorities used it as a pretext to enforce residential segregation in Dakar and to justify the burning of Lebou huts for 'sanitary reasons' (Bigon 2009: 117). A permanent sanitary belt (*cordon sanitaire*) was established at the northern edge of Dakar, in which no building or free movement were permitted (Bigon 2009: 107). Thousands of Africans were transferred to the area north of it, which was initially referred to as '*village de segregation*' but later renamed the Medina by the French (Bigon 2009: 198).[4] During the colonial period, the Medina supplied labour to the European district in *Dakar-ville*. The Medina tended to be considerably flooded during the rainy season and was characterised by unpaved roads and impermanent housing in contrast to *Dakar-ville*, which was distinguished by 'grand boulevards, cafés, government buildings, tidy shops and multi-storey residences' (Melly 2013; see also Bigon 2009: 198–9). The French colonial authorities were, however, legally prevented from enforcing a wholesale residential segregation in Dakar because of the political status of the city as one of the Four Communes of Senegal. These Communes were considered exemplary cases of the French colonial doctrine of 'assimilation'. Residents enjoyed the right to vote and, after 1915–16, were granted French citizenship (Bigon 2009: 193; cf. Betts 1971: 150; Echenberg 1991: 44–5).[5]

After the Second World War, Dakar saw a great influx of both European and African civil servants and rural youth attracted to the big city. Rural migrants settled on the margins of Dakar alongside other disenfranchised residents, and additional informal neighbourhoods emerged in the empty space that separated the Medina from the city (Delcourt 1983: 99). Rapid urbanisation prompted colonial officials to implement relocation programmes, initially to the neighbourhood of Grand Dakar, which was planned as an outlet for the overflow of residents in the Medina (Tall 1994: 140; Melly 2010: 44–5). Two public housing initiatives, OHLM and SICAP, materialised in the 1950s and 1960s with the aim of providing affordable housing for civil servants. These initiatives gained momentum after independence when state

employees and other middle-income workers were provided with small and modest houses on state-owned land. At the same time, numerous people who had settled on land intended for development by the building societies were systematically evicted and relocated to distant areas on the periphery of the city (Melly 2010: 44–5; see also Tall 2009: 66–7). The remote suburb of Pikine was created in 1952 as a resettlement site for those evicted from the Medina and Grand Dakar, and it also hosted rural migrants (Vernière 1971; Simone 2004: 30). Caroline Melly points out that these precarious spaces – lacking in infrastructure, densely settled, and subject to frequent displacement – contrasted starkly with the character of the city centre, renamed Plateau (formerly *Dakar-ville*), which after independence was rapidly transformed by the construction of new government buildings, public squares, monuments and museums, and which hosted a global elite. Dakar thus paradoxically resembled the colonial metropolises which it sought to distance itself from, as President Senghor and his allies strove to establish the city as a hub of the global *négritude* movement, celebrating, nurturing and displaying African intellectual and artistic movements and aesthetics (Melly 2017: 33–4).

In the 1970s the global oil crisis and a series of droughts, coupled with the longer-term decline of agriculture, especially peanut exports, resulted in deepening socio-economic crisis in Senegal. Real-estate speculation in the capital city emerged in this period, further widening the gap between those 'dwelling on and owning land' (Melly 2010: 45). In the late 1970s Senegalese emigrants started investing in property in the near and distant suburbs of Dakar, both to house their own families and as a source of income. Still today, Dakar's population relies to a large extent upon its transnational migrants and their remittances rather than the state to fund the construction of houses and financing urban development and growth (Melly 2010: 50; Tall 1994, 2009). While this has benefited some residents, it also has contributed to land speculation and inflated rents in the city (Tall 1994; cf. Melly 2010: 54).

Another way to think of urban displacement in Dakar is to focus not simply on the people who have been evicted and relocated but also, on the rapid spatial transformations that 'displace' the sense of familiarity and belonging for people living and working in certain parts of the city (cf. Albrecht et al. 2007; Chu 2006). Over the last couple of decades, the centre of Dakar has in some ways moved away from the downtown area where the Terminus was located. The district (*arrondissement*) of Plateau, made up of nine smaller *communes* on the southern tip of the Cap Vert Peninsula, is still where most of the

federal government agencies, banking, international development, and corporate offices are located. Meanwhile, Dakar has sprawled out from these colonial confines. Being located on a peninsula, downtown Dakar is limited in its capacity to expand and accommodate newcomers, and the city's outskirts are rapidly growing (Fredericks 2018: 10). North of the district of Plateau, suburbs like Patte d'Oie and Parcelles Assainies link the peninsula to the urban periphery, and in these suburbs, banks have opened branches and the state has opened offices (Rowbottom 2009: 25). Economic activity, which used to be centred in Plateau, is spreading out into local markets and hubs dispersed throughout the city (Fredericks 2018: 10). The departments of Pikine and Guédiawaye, located on the periphery, are where much of Dakar's population now resides. Even further towards the mainland, in the district of Rufisque, the town of Diamniadio with its recently constructed international airport is the new frontier of urbanisation.

This shift of centrality of Dakar, coupled with the suppression of rail in favour of roads, had significant consequences for the Terminus and its traders (Jónsson 2019). The landscape in which the traders had to rebuild their livelihoods following eviction was entirely transformed, bearing little resemblance to the space in which the Terminus market had organically evolved during its heydays. New waves of Malian migrants and traders no longer arrived at the Terminus but settled in the suburbs, and some had successfully established themselves at the suburban market in Pikine. Given the congestion in downtown Dakar, supply trucks preferred to deliver and collect goods on the city's outskirts and a new Malian truck park had been built in Rufisque. The new Autoroute, which displaced many of the traders even before the market at the Terminus was demolished, did not appear to have improved access to the new Malian markets in downtown Dakar. Most people I spoke to said they could not afford the fee for the toll road and were therefore confined to a few highly congested roads if they wanted to access the old city centre from the suburbs and mainland (Oustafnews 2018; Gueye 2013). Later chapters explore the consequences of some of these large-scale transformations, and the shift of centrality of Dakar, for the Terminus and the women who had traded there.[6]

The remainder of this chapter looks beyond the history of urban displacement, turning instead to the history of migration, mobilities and trade flows in Dakar, captured from the perspective of the Terminus and the generations of Malians associated with it. Before attending to these issues, however, the problem of discerning between 'Malian' and 'Senegalese' people must be addressed.

Deconstructing 'the Malian community' in Dakar

Prevailing analyses of contemporary West African migration and mobilities appear largely unable to conceive of relatively poor countries, including Senegal, as constituting anything but places of emigration (cf. Bakewell and Jónsson 2013). This bias reflects dominant contemporary discourse on human mobility, which is largely informed by the geopolitical concerns of the Global North with keeping out the poor and the racialised Other (Landau 2019; Bakewell 2008b). The vast majority of Africans actually travel and migrate within the continent, yet the focus of political and media debates tends to give the faulty impression that such movements are largely directed beyond the African continent (Bakewell and de Haas 2007; Flahaux and de Haas 2014; Landau and Kihato 2018). Senegal, and particularly its capital city, has constituted an economically attractive and relatively stable destination for traders, migrants and visitors from the neighbouring countries, including Mali. Senegal and Mali are both ranked among the world's poorest countries, but Senegal is faring somewhat better on a range of multidimensional poverty indicators (UNDP and OPHI 2020). Moreover, while Senegal has held relatively peaceful elections, Mali has a history of military coups, the latest of which occurred in 2012 and contributed to plunging the country into deep political crisis and, subsequently, war (cf. Lecocq et al. 2013). On 11 January 2013, a state of war was officially declared in Mali as French and African troops launched a military intervention to halt rebels advancing on the Malian capital from the north and occupying territory along the way. Yet, I never actually met anyone in Dakar who was fleeing the war in Mali.[7] Most Malians were in Dakar looking for economic opportunities. Although Senegal is contiguous with Mali, it does not share borders with the troubled northern Malian regions from where people were fleeing. As my interlocutors liked to point out, the distance between Dakar and the Malian capital Bamako is shorter than the distance between Bamako and Kidal, the stronghold of the rebels in northern Mali. Dakar was an unlikely destination for those displaced by the conflict.[8] The factors motivating Malians, and women in particular, to travel to and trade in Dakar were so varied and complex that it is inadequate to reduce them to explanations of misery and conflict.

Meanwhile, any effort to identify and trace the origins of 'Malian immigrants' in Senegal is deeply complicated by the fact that the modern histories of these neighbouring countries are strongly intertwined – not least because of the Dakar–Niger railway – and ethnic and linguistic groups

span the borders of Mali and Senegal. During the first half of the twentieth century, the train facilitated the settlement of Senegalese in French Sudan (present day Mali), and vice versa, and the population of places where the train stopped along the route (Choplin and Lombard 2010; Lombard 2002). During colonialism, Mali and Senegal were both part of the Federation of French West Africa (*Afrique occidentale française*, AOF). The sovereign nation of Mali only dates back to independence in 1960, at which point the two neighbouring countries formed a short-lived federation.

The Malian traders I met in Dakar were mostly from southern and western Mali and spoke a Mande language (Maninka, Joola, Bamanankan or Soninke). Mande refers to a geographical area that covers the southern part of Mali and stretches into Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea, and Ivory Coast. Mande populations share related languages and cultural heritage; they trace their history back to Sundiata Keita, the legendary king and founder of the Mali Empire (Brand 2001: 13). Official citizenship appeared to be largely irrelevant to most Malian migrants in Dakar: they rarely registered with the diplomatic services and few participated in the Malian census (RAVEC)[9] conducted in Dakar, which enrolled them on the electoral register and entitled them to a national identity card.[10] Moreover, many of the older generations of Malian immigrants in Dakar had intermarried with Senegalese.

Most of my interlocutors had mixed national backgrounds and came from families whose kinship ties spanned the borders of numerous countries in West Africa and elsewhere. The biographies of the shuttle trader Fatou Fall and the market trader Safi are illustrative of this 'hybridity': Fatou Fall was fluent in both Wolof and Bamanankan, and while her home was in Bamako, she had many relatives in Thiès, just outside Dakar. Her father was Senegalese, her ex-husband was Togolese, and she was fostered and raised by a woman in Senegal until the age of 14, when she joined her parents in Mali. Her Malian mother had tried to make Fatou stay after her first visit to Bamako at the age of 10, but Fatou had escaped and travelled alone on the train back to her Senegalese foster mother, after telling sympathetic railway passengers that she had been kidnapped. Safi was raised in the Ivory Coast where she had looked after her mentally ill sister; when her sister moved to Mali, Safi followed her and got married. When their infant twin daughters tragically died, Safi's husband divorced her. This prompted Safi to move to Dakar, where she shared a small bedroom with two other unmarried women in the large house of her grandfather, who had been a highly successful Malian kola nut trader. Her household comprised a mix of Malians and Senegalese who spoke both Wolof and Bamanankan.

Despite this apparent 'hybridity', certain crude and even discriminatory distinctions were regularly drawn between 'natives' and 'migrants' in Dakar. This essentialism was partly the result of the colonial privileging of coastal West Africa over the interior. Under French colonialism, Dakar was one of the Four Communes of Senegal, a title which conveyed certain political privileges to its residents (the other communes were Gorée, Rufisque and St Louis). Since 1848 any person with five years' residence in these communes enjoyed the right to vote (Betts 1971: 150). With the passing of the Diagne Laws of 1915 and 1916, French citizenship was extended to all natives of the four communes (Delcourt 1983: 90; Echenberg 1991: 44–5). These residents were called *originaires* (or *habitants*) and could elect one deputy to the French parliament. They were regarded as citizens (*citoyens*), as opposed to other inhabitants of AOF, including those from French Sudan, who were mere subjects (*sujets*) (Bigon 2009: 193; cf. Diouf 1999).

These distinctions may have given birth to the notion that, in contrast to Mali, Senegal was characterised by a 'strong state'. Several times I recorded the following expression, uttered by both Malians and Senegalese: 'In Mali, the state is poor but the people are rich. In Senegal, it's the opposite: the people are poor but the state is rich'. The reference to 'rich people' implicitly referred to the long-standing tradition of trade in Mali. Trade was central to the prosperity of the medieval empires that flourished in the region of present-day Mali. It was associated with the free, non-casted members of society, the *hòrònw,* and hence, was considered a noble occupation (Vuarin 1997; Whitehouse 2012; cf. Tamari 1991). My Malian interlocutors liked to highlight trade as a worthy occupation and a distinguishing trait of Malian people. Meanwhile, the notion that trade distinguished the Malians from the Senegalese and somehow made them superior seemed slightly peculiar – particularly as the Senegalese are widely known for their extensive global trading networks (cf. Diallo 2014; Dianka 2012; Diouf 2000; Ebin 1992; Evers Rosander 2000). Moreover, it hardly needs pointing out that not all Malians were traders, even though my interlocutors claimed this occupation was intrinsic to Malian nationals. My interlocutors often emphasised their own distinctiveness and superiority vis-à-vis the Senegalese, which perhaps belied an inferiority complex of the 'under-privileged' (cf. Cohen 1969: 192): Wolof-speaking natives of Dakar would sometimes refer to Malian migrants and other Bamanan speakers in a derogatory manner with the word '*niak*',[11] implying that they were less 'refined' or 'civilised', or even criminal foreigners.

The tendencies toward essentialism can be seen as efforts by certain groups of traders to emphasise their distinctiveness and establish certain boundaries between themselves and the urban environment in which they operated. This echoes Abner Cohen's observations of diasporic Hausa traders in Ibadan: these traders sought to distinguish themselves ethnically both from the local Yoruba and from certain other groups of Hausa migrants in Ibadan; in turn they did not care much about internal distinctions among themselves, such as 'tribal identity', and both tolerated and included 'outsiders' (Cohen 1969: 50). Cohen explained this ethnic exclusiveness as serving the traders' political and economic aims. The interests underlying certain forms of identification, particularly among groups of traders, have been emphasised in later studies of 'ethnic enclaves', 'traders' dilemma' and 'social capital', which point out that boundaries and distinctiveness can produce solidarity, cohesion and trust within groups; and that exclusiveness can resolve problems of lack of access to information or burdensome redistributive demands (Meagher 2010; Portes 1998; van der Grijp 2003; Whitehouse 2012). Later chapters in this book further examine such issues of distinctiveness and identification, focusing particularly on the boundaries and networks established by traders at the Malian markets in Dakar.

With these caveats in mind let us now turn to the historical emergence of a Malian 'kola diaspora' in the Senegalese capital, which appropriated the warehouses at the Terminus and lay the foundations of what was to later become the Malian market.

Regional migration and the 'kola diaspora' in Dakar

'Towards the end of colonialism the first product they traded from the Terminus was kola. Kola is very important in West Africa: you can't have a marriage or a baptism without kola. The kola was the beginning of everything. You can begin the introduction there'. Youssou told me this one evening as we were driving home from the new terminus station for freight trains, in Bel Air. Like him, many of my interlocutors considered the pioneering kola nut traders, who appropriated the warehouses at the Dakar Terminus after the end of colonialism, as the founders of Malian trade in the Senegalese capital. I therefore decided to go and talk to Papa Traore, who had been closely involved in the transnational kola trade, to get a better sense of this history. One afternoon on the first day of Ramadan, I went to his warehouse in Rue Grasland. This was where he

used to store kola nuts when he had been a kola trader. He still had an office on the first floor, whereas the storage space below had been largely taken over by his sons. On arrival, I found several men lying on the floor, sleeping. Papa, however, was not too tired from fasting and he was in a chatty mood. After discussing the upcoming presidential elections in Mali, I told him I would like to know more about the history of the trade in kola nuts, since the Malians in Dakar often said that the kola trade was 'the beginning of everything' – of the Malians coming to the Terminus, and so on. Papa smiled, leaned back and said, 'Yes, the history of the kolas, and all that … Well, people quickly forget. In fact, everything began with the cultivation of peanuts'.

What Papa was referring to was the *navétanat*, the seasonal agricultural labour migrations of men, often originating from what is today Mali, to the peanut fields of Senegal and Gambia during the rainy season (Rodet 2009: 101; cf. David 1980). It occurred on a massive scale during the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century and has been described as one of the most important migrations in the modern history of West Africa (Manchuelle 1997: 53). From the 1830s, peanut production was commercialised in Senegal and Gambia by Europeans (David 1980: 12). So-called 'strange farmers' first appeared on Gambia's peanut plantations in 1848, particularly from Sudan (present-day Mali). A decade later, these seasonal labourers began to appear in Casamance and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, in the Sine-Saloum in Senegal, which became the peanut basin of that country. These migrants were initially referred to as *Serawollies* (Soninke) and *Tilibonkès* (lit. 'the people from the east'), but later became known as *navétanes*, which in Wolof refers to 'those who spend the rainy season' (David 1980: 12–13; Swindell 1980).[12] The autochthonous residents were little involved in this form of labour, and the big *navétanat* of the twentieth century was characterised by seasonal migrants lodging with an autochthonous host (David 1980: 15). The *navétanat* migrations were initially temporary and the migrants returned when the agricultural season finished (David 1980: 34–5; Rodet 2009: 103).

In the early 1910s, migrants, particularly from Western Sudan (Mali), began to settle permanently in the peanut basins of Senegal and Gambia, and this involved not only young men but entire families – hence also women (David 1980: 35; Rodet 2009: 101). Rodet (2009: 117) notes that once women settled in Senegal with their migrant husbands, they quickly began to cultivate their own plots of peanuts, selling the production and hence contributing to the 'peanut economy'. The first Malians who settled in the peanut basin in the 1910s acted as pioneer

migrants, facilitating the arrival of additional seasonal and permanent migrants from the pioneers' families and villages of origin. The local authorities encouraged the *navétanes* to settle permanently by providing them with the seeds for peanut farming (Rodet 2009: 119). Women from *Haut-Sénégal* (western Mali) also went to the rapidly expanding regions, including Kaolack and the peanut basin in Senegal, where migrants from French Sudan were increasingly settling, in order to remarry (Rodet 2009: 150).

From 1921, the French administration officially encouraged the settlement of the areas traversed by the Thiès–Kayes railway, in order to develop peanut farming there, for meeting the high demands for peanuts in the French *métropole* (Rodet 2009: 119–20). The administration stressed that the *navétanes* should as far as possible be allowed to circulate and left to work; other migrants were subjected to much stricter migration policies and controls (David 1980: 48–9). While the recruitment of male labourers and the directing of these towards the colonial projects became a high priority, the colonial administration was not in favour of women's mobilities.[13] The entry of France into the Second World War, however, significantly slowed the movements of *navétanes* between the two colonies. To avoid an economic disaster, the central administration in Dakar intervened in 1943, asking the governor of Sudan to recruit and send *navétanes* to Senegal, and during May and June of that year, 24,000 Sudanese were thus sent by railway to Tambacounda, Kaolack and Kolda. This operation was repeated every year between 1944 and 1946. Women participated only marginally in these *navétane* migrations (Rodet 2009: 254).

Papa told me that the constant journeys greatly exhausted the seasonal *navétane* migrants. His own grandfather had been a seasonal peanut cultivator in rural Senegal, but he decided to settle down to trade kola nuts from his new base in Dakar, instead of incessantly travelling back and forth between Mali and Senegal. Malian kola traders became visible in Dakar from the 1950s. To facilitate this trade, they drew on their transnational family networks in the region and used the Dakar–Niger railway to transport the precious nuts from the Ivory Coast to Senegal. While many Malians had migrated to Senegal during the twentieth century, many others had moved to the Ivory Coast in the colonial and immediate post-colonial period (Ballo 2009; cf. Gary-Tounkara 2008). Papa explained that since the populations in Sikasso, Mopti and other southern parts of Mali were closer to the Ivory Coast than Senegal, and the Ivory Coast was wealthier, they had gone to settle there. This facilitated the development of regional kola trading

networks, since almost every Malian had a relative in the Ivory Coast. Papa originated from southern Mali and had himself been a successful kola trader in Dakar.

With the construction of the Dakar–Niger railway line, Bamako became a major transhipment point for kola trade between the Ivory Coast, as the principal producing country, and the different consuming regions in Mali and Senegal (Amselle 1970: 169; cf. Jones 1995: 25). It was, however, only in 1935–40 that the first integrated commercial networks were put in place, covering the different stages of the kola distribution circuit from the Ivory Coast all the way to Senegal (Amselle 1970: 170). Nicholas S. Hopkins describes how this trade took off in the mid-1950s:

> Exports by land and sea from the Ivory Coast grew from two or three thousand tons a year at the beginning of the 20th century to 28–30,000 tons in 1954, by which time kola had become the colony's most valuable export after coffee and cocoa. About a third of this total was destined for consumption in Senegal, where the expansion of groundnut exports had raised domestic purchasing power. (Hopkins 1973: 246)

The conversion of Malian migrant labourers into urban kola traders reflected wider economic shifts in the region. In the 1970s a series of severe droughts led to a decline in peanut production and, when the world market price for peanut oil fell, Senegal's colonial era economic base was undermined (Ross 2008: 27–8). Adherents of Mouridism, the Islamic Sufi order founded in Senegal, were the main producers of peanuts during the colonial era; the order's involvement in peanut cultivation formed the basis of its economic and political influence, which continues to be highly significant in modern-day Senegal (Ebin 1992; Riccio 2005). The falling peanut prices and droughts made increasing numbers of Mouride adherents leave the peanut basin in the Baol region, where their Sufi order had been founded, and turn to trade in Dakar.[14] Malian peanut cultivators appear to have followed suit: according to Papa the decline of the peanut economy spurred the conversion of Senegal's Malian peanut farmers into kola nut traders.[15]

My interlocutors had somewhat contradictory recollections of when the Malian kola trade took off in Dakar. Some argued it happened towards the end of the colonial era; others, including Papa, argued that it only really flourished 10 years after the end of colonialism. Both arguments are most likely true to some extent: while Malian kola traders

probably settled in Dakar during the boom in the 1950s, the breakup of the Mali Federation and the restrictions on emigration and trade during Mali's post-colonial socialist regime are likely to have interrupted their enterprises (Gary-Tounkara 2003; Jones 2002b: 73–4; Keïta 2000: 37–8; Warms 1994: 99). As Papa explained: 'Ten years after independence the kola trade began here. Why ten years? During the socialist regime of Modibo Keita trade was not possible; it was the same case in [socialist] Guinea. You had to come and settle in the Ivory Coast or in Senegal in order to trade' (cf. Lambert 1993a: 43).

After he had failed his high school exam twice, Papa was summoned to Dakar in 1972 by his grandfather to come and trade with him. He spent four years on the road between Dakar and Bouakè, which was considered the 'capital of kola' in the Ivory Coast. The kola trade was organised through family networks of Malians settled in Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Papa explained that, during the era of peanut cultivation, the Malians used to travel back and forth, but when they began trading they settled in Dakar and collaborated with their relatives in the Ivory Coast. Whenever their assistance or presence was required, the traders would travel from Dakar to their relatives in the Ivory Coast. That was how the Malians came to dominate this trade corridor in kola nuts, to the extent that my interlocutors in Dakar referred to it as the 'Malian monopoly' on kola nut trading.

In Dakar, the Malian kola trade was pioneered by a man named Gansère Traoré, a highly successful trader who lived to an old age, and who left behind a massive house with an interior mosque on the southern edge of the Medina. Stories about him were still well known by many Malians in the Senegalese capital, not least because his daughter was married to the famous politician, Soumaila Cisse, who was one of the two major contenders in the Malian presidential elections of 2013 (and again in the 2018 elections). Gansère Traoré was the first Malian trader to use the warehouses at the railway terminus in Dakar. With the relative cold and humid climate of Dakar, the shipments of kola nuts could not be stored in the port and instead Gansère stored them at the Terminus in some large old warehouses which were no longer used by the state. In the 1970s, the Malian kola traders in Dakar established an economic interest group (*groupement d'intérêt économique*, *GIE*) which collectively used one of the three warehouses at the Terminus. With time, the kola traders were able to move to other facilities; most of them rented warehouses and offices in Rue Grasland and adjacent streets in the Plateau neighbourhood of central Dakar (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Many later regretted that they had not invested in property

Figure 2.1 1942 map of Dakar. Published by the War Office of the United Kingdom.

URBAN DISPLACEMENT AND TRADE IN A SENEGALESE MARKET

Figure 2.2 Enlargement of section of 1942 map of Dakar (Figure 2.1), indicating the location of the 'Gare du Dakar–Niger', the nearby 'Goods station', and Rue Grasland in the vicinity.

in the city centre. While I sat with him in his office in Rue Grasland, Papa explained: 'This entire neighbourhood only had kola warehouses. We could have bought all the property here! But we did not think of that: all that the Malians had in mind was that one day, they would return'. Yet, immigrants who had arrived much more recently from Mali did not consider these former kola traders and their descendants as 'Malians', since they had been settled in Dakar for a very long time and often intermingled with Ivorians and Senegalese, among whom they had intermarried. Several of my female interlocutors working at the new Malian markets were related to one of the older kola nut traders in Dakar, and many of them also had family ties to the Ivory Coast. Some were even born and raised there.

A few kola traders did buy property in the city centre and one of them was Ibrahima Sidibe, another pioneer of the trade. As with Gansère, I use the term pioneer here to imply not merely 'those who migrated first', but someone who actually blazes the trail and sets in motion a whole network of subsequent migration and trade (cf. Bakewell, de Haas and Kubal 2011). Papa told me that, of all the *Wasulunkès* (people from Wasulu in southern Mali), it was Sidibe who started the kola trade in Senegal. The Malians from Wasulu who had settled in the Ivory Coast would send their kola nuts to Sidibe in Dakar. He built two large houses in Dakar, one in Rue Grasland and another one a few streets further north, in Rue Escarfait. Being a very pious

Muslim with a passion for great communal prayers, Sidibe eventually sold his house on Rue Escarfait, in order that a mosque could be built for the Bamanan-speakers of Dakar.[16]

The female shuttle traders who came to Dakar on the train from Mali would sometimes seek a host (*jatigi*) among the big Malian kola traders. Papa had been hosting shuttle traders for decades when I met him. His own sister had been a shuttle trader and instead of sleeping rough at the Terminus – which many of the women used as a dormitory while waiting to catch the next available train back to Mali – she went straight to Papa. She brought her colleagues with her, so eventually they all started coming to his house. These women kept returning to stay at Papa's house or, alternatively, they would go and sleep at Sidibe's house – which they still did while I conducted my fieldwork in Dakar. Sometimes, if the women noticed there was not much space at Papa or Sidibe's house, they might accompany another shuttle trader who was sleeping somewhere else. In that way they ended up in many different houses in Dakar.

Many kola traders lost money, partly due to the volatile nature of the business caused by infrequent availability of transport coupled with persistent problems stemming from improper storage of kola nuts during transit. With time, other groups – particularly Guineans – began competing with the Malian traders who hence lost their 'monopoly'. In recent decades, the kola nut has lost much of its symbolic value, since manufactured substitute products have entered the market, thus lowering demand. At rituals such as weddings and name-giving ceremonies in Dakar, biscuits, soft drinks and candy were handed out in addition to or instead of kola nuts, and usually it was only the older generation who actually chewed the nuts. In addition to decreased demand, supply decreased because the forests in the Ivory Coast, where the kola nuts grew wild, have been cut down to make way for expanding urban areas. Finally, with the outbreak of civil war in the Ivory Coast in 2002, most Malians did not want to risk their lives by going there to collect kola nuts for export.

The following section explains how women came to dominate trade on the Dakar–Niger train, which had turned into a 'moving marketplace'. It was some of these traders who eventually pioneered the Malian market at the Terminus, taking over from the kola traders who had appropriated the warehouses at the station for storage. The analysis reaches back to the origins of the Dakar–Niger railway line and examines both the original purposes and the actual uses of it, revealing how this infrastructure was appropriated for various ends beyond the ones it was intended to serve.

Moving marketplaces: women's regional railway commerce

In 1923, the Dakar–Niger railway was completed by the French colonial powers to extract export products, distribute European products to the interior of the French Sudan (current day Mali) and transport construction materials (Lambert 1993b; see Figure 2.3). It was also used for transporting African soldiers to serve in the French colonial army, and forced labourers were transported by railway as well (Jones 1995: 33). James A. Jones (1995: 4) argues that within a year of the French opening the first short section of the railway to the public in 1894, Africans appeared on it in the form of a new type of merchant, whom he refers to as the 'railway merchant'. Railway merchants took advantage of the price differentials that existed between towns along the railway (Jones 1995: 4–5; 2002a: 2). These merchants were a different group from the West African Joola traders who dominated the commercial trade routes and networks in the region (Jones 1995: 23–4).

The railway did not generate the kind of commerce that its builders had expected (Jones 2007; Lambert 1993a: 40–1; 1993b: 93–4). According to Agnès Lambert (1993b: 93), the railway was designed to confirm the supremacy of coastal areas and to divert the commercial exchanges from the interior to Senegal. Ignoring the main axes of African continental exchanges oriented from north to south, the east–west orientation of the railway cut perpendicularly across these (Lambert 1993b: 93; cf. Jones 2002a: 2). It thus failed initially to harness these continental exchanges, or to base itself on existing routes (Lambert 1993a: 41). While the railway initially did not present any great advantage for the established local trade, it made it possible for a new group of Africans to become merchants (Jones 1995: 21). These merchants were able to profit from the orientation of the railway line: 'By linking the economic space surrounding the railroad to traditional commercial networks, railroad merchants gained access to new forms of social capital while creating a bridge between the precolonial and colonial economies' (Jones 2007: 108). According to Jones, the railway offered an outstanding opportunity to people searching for alternatives to precolonial livelihoods: railway merchants were 'driven by a desire to escape the *villages de liberté* ['freedom villages' for former slaves], the idleness of the dry season, or to see something different. They were keenly observed by other Africans and their success encouraged imitators, including those who had nothing to trade but their labor' (Jones 1995: 36).

Figure 2.3 Map of the Dakar–Niger railway. In Mali, the railway line extends from the river port of Koulikoro on the River Niger in the south, passing through the capital of Bamako, and continuing up to the western border region of Kayes. From there it crosses into eastern Senegal, continuing westwards to the Atlantic Ocean, extending all the way to the southern tip of the Cap Vert Peninsula, where Dakar and its port are situated. Map © 2017 James A. Jones. Used with permission.

Until 1930 the poor quality of the Kayes–Niger line and its low rate of freight transport limited the impact of the railway on continental exchanges (Lambert 1993a: 41). The lack of railway equipment, particularly freight cars for the export of peanuts, was an issue of conflict between the trading houses and the railway company (Lambert 1993b: 93–4). In the 1930s, in order to deal with the hostility of the international trading houses, and to increase the circulation of goods, incentives were given to train passengers (Lambert 1993a: 41). With the complicity of the railway company, the train thus became a moving marketplace (*marché ambulant*) (Lakroum 1987: 337–40; Lambert 1993b: 94). More Africans started using the train, including Joola traders who, Lambert (1993b: 94) argues, 'inundated' the Malian markets with cheap imported goods and thus started competing with the big trade houses (cf. Jones 2002a: 2–3; 2007: 108–9; Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 91–2). By the Second World War, railway merchants had established a self-financing network in the western part of Sudan that enjoyed a degree of political support (Jones 2007: 109).

From the outset, small-scale railway trade represented a complementary income source for the African railway workers (*cheminots*) and their families (Jones 2002a: 5; Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 92). By the end of the nineteenth century, Africans operated trains and maintained the railway line, and over time the railway work force became dominated by people from French Sudan (present day Mali), as they had fewer alternatives for wage labour than their coastal neighbours in Senegal (Jones 2002a: 5; 2002b: 41). The control of access to transportation by operating employees could be converted into wealth by trading, and their relatives were among the first to benefit: 'With free tickets provided by the railroad administration (or free passage arranged by a friendly railroad worker), plus lodging and introductions provided by colleagues and relatives in major towns, all a family member needed was merchandise to begin a commercial venture' (Jones 2002b: 43).

Jones argues that women first became railway merchants as early as the 1890s, when African railway employees received railway passes and their spouses used them to go to town to buy better food than the railway supplied.[17] The big change was that which enabled African women to engage in long-distance trade, beginning in the 1920s–1930s (Jones 2002a: 5; Lambert 1993a: 42). According to Lambert (1993a: 42), the rail worker cooperative played an essential role in promoting women's small businesses on the train (cf. County 2010). It sold to its members, under extremely advantageous conditions, all kinds of consumer products which were immediately resold at prices that defied any competition from local traders. This system was the subject of numerous complaints lodged by the trading houses to the railway company, via the Chamber of Commerce. The wives of railway workers were particularly well placed to take advantage of this mode of supply. Through the cooperative, they received industrial thread and many other products; in return, they entrusted their husbands with woven and dyed cloths and fruits to sell on the market in Dakar (Lambert 1993a: 42). At the time, few women took the train by themselves, and the small trade was still dominated by male traders, including Joolas and railway employees who traded for themselves or for their wives (Lambert 1993a: 42–3).

In early 1959, Mali (then known as the Sudanese Republic) and Senegal united to become the Mali Federation, which gained independence from France in June 1960. The Federation only lasted one and a half years until August 1960, when Senegal withdrew. Diplomatic relations were broken and rail traffic between Dakar and Bamako

stopped. In an attempt to punish Senegal, Mali closed the border to all trade with its former partner until June 1963. On 11 October 1960, the Senegalese government decided to expel the Sudanese, and sent a train to transport them and their families (Jones 2002b: 73), On 29 November 1960, the Malian government completed the division of the Dakar–Niger railway by creating the *Régie du Chemin de Fer du Mali* (Jones 2002b: 73–4).

Mali's first president, Modibo Keita, and his followers chose a socialist course of development; they attempted to control as much of the nation's trade as possible and established numerous state enterprises to that end. Although Keita had been supported by merchants, once in power his government discouraged independent trade (Warms 1994: 99; cf. Jones 2000: 109). According to Warms (1994: 99), Keita considered merchants exploiters of the peasantry and impediments to development. In addition, he actively opposed migration and instead called for a 'return to the land'. The idea of this policy was to favour the return to rural areas of migrants searching for work in cities – the so-called *baaranyini* (lit. 'those who search work') – and to keep the youth in the rural areas, and limit the increase of unemployment in the cities. In order to regulate migration, the socialist regime reintroduced the *laisser-passer* (lit. 'let through') in 1962. Since the annulment of the *laisser-passer* by the French in 1949, migrants had circulated in the territories of the AOF and to Europe simply with an identity card. The new compulsory travel documents introduced in independent Mali were much more difficult to obtain (Gary-Tounkara 2003: 52–5). In 1962, the government organised the issuing of a national currency, the Malian franc. This worried many traders, who demonstrated on 20 July 1962 against the emergence of a currency that was not guaranteed (unlike the CFA franc). Modibo Keita responded by imprisoning Joola traders. In reaction to the creation of the Malian franc and the nationalisation of commerce, many Joola traders left the country (Gary-Tounkara 2003: 53–7).

The socialist state's stranglehold on the entire commercial sector in Mali led to the departure of European trade houses, of the Lebanese, and equally of numerous Malian traders, who took refuge in Senegal or the Ivory Coast (Lambert 1993a: 43). Lambert explains that the incapacity of the public companies that were supposed to provide for the country, and the absence of competition from Europeans and Lebanese, presented an opportunity for some Malian traders and transporters, who drew on ties they had developed with influential members of the state apparatus (Lambert 1993a: 43). The situation also favoured the feminisation of

railway trade: women benefited from the deference of railway agents; and several of them were promoted in business by their husbands or a civil servant relative with connections to power. Some educated women used the opportunity of being close to the ruling elite, in order to access business (Lambert 1993a: 44).

Small-scale trade by railway employees and their families intensified after the border re-opened in 1963; but it was especially after 1970–5 that it grew considerably (Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 92). Modibo Keita was overthrown in 1968 through a military coup led by Moussa Traoré and the new regime relaxed the government's control over commerce (Jones 2007: 107). The 1970s was a decade of droughts, and the deterioration of the economic situation forced families to diversify their income-generating strategies and women increasingly used the train to conduct trade. This provoked the influx of female small-scale traders but equally of retired railway employees searching for additional income in railway commerce (Lambert 1993a: 44).

The lucrative character of trade along the railway partly derived from the price differences between Mali and Senegal: until Mali joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and adopted the CFA franc in 1984, Malian prices were half of those in Senegal. The successful trade was also due to the complementarity of the zones of exchange, with raw products and traditional commodities coming from Mali; and manufactured products, especially fashion items for women, coming from Senegal, since colonial policies had limited industrialisation to the coast. Speculation on the price of certain foodstuffs, such as rice, also made the trade profitable (Jones 2002a: 5; Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 93).

Kinship was central to the strategies of the women traders on the railway (Poitou, Lambert de Frondeville and Toulabor 1992: 282). Many of the female traders were daughters or spouses of railway workers, which meant they had *permis de circulation*, the right to free transport on the national network (Lambert 1993a: 48). Having relatives among the customs officials or the railway police was also a starting point for trafficking goods. In turn, the often-unregulated circulation of female traders constituted a source of income for these officials (Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 93). Agnès Lambert argues that the success of women's commercial operations on the train required strong complicity by the state apparatus (Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 93; Lambert 1993a: 39). Support within the ruling class and the senior administration, which wholesalers all enjoyed through kinship, was a necessary factor in accumulation. The circulation of children was also a systematic part of

the trading strategies of the female traders on the train. The placement of young children with relatives and the recourse to the unpaid labour of a girl or a niece liberated the women from domestic tasks or provided them with help in conducting their business (Poitou, Lambert de Frondeville and Toulabor 1992: 282). The mobilisation of young girls as employees was part of a strategy of certain heads of trading families, constituting a stage preceding autonomous trading activities (Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 96).

The geographical dispersal of lineages, due to forced migrant labour and modern migrations resulting from colonisation, fundamentally served the mobility of the trading women: the married women's links with their families of origin served as a pretext for regular long-distance trading activity (Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 97; cf. Rodet 2009: 180–1). Liberated from domestic tasks by the presence of a co-wife, a female trader could make the necessary move for her trade to succeed (Poitou, Lambert de Frondeville, and Toulabor 1992: 284). The mobile traders would thus establish a poly-residential system whereby they could spend several months away from their husband's residence, living with their father or other kin in a different city where they needed to negotiate their business affairs. Trade partly and momentarily suspended women from social control within the family, allowing them to diversify their social networks beyond the family (Lambert de Frondeville 1987: 97).[18]

The political context for railway commerce began to change in the 1980s when the process of structural adjustment began in Mali (Rondeau and Bouchard 2007: 148). With the liberalisation of trade in grains in 1981 and peanuts in 1982, female traders engaged more openly in the commercialisation of these products, which they had exported illegally in the 1970s (Lambert 1993b: 96). Structural adjustment policies eliminated direct competition from the government but also increased the efficiency with which government officials collected customs duties and other fees (Jones 2007: 107). Ironically, during this period of 'liberalisation', the railway company displayed a desire for normalisation and profitability, which materialised through a range of measures aimed at limiting small railway trade (Lambert 1993a: 45). In 1984 Mali rejoined the West African Economic and Monetary Union and adopted the CFA franc, which brought about price increases of 100 per cent. This led to a further decline in female traders on the train: Lambert explains that since Senegal and Mali now had the same currency, raw products from Mali became less competitive in Dakar, and numerous female traders had to change to other, more favourable circuits than

the Dakar–Niger one (Lambert 1993a: 45; see also Jones 2007: 107). Lambert (1993a: 45) argues that the case of the female railway traders confirms the contradictory effects of liberalisation policies which, on the one hand, were designed to promote the private sector and on the other hand, to improve the health of public finances in a context of structural adjustment, by raising money for the coffers of the railway company and customs. The different measures implemented during the 1980s deterred the small railway traders, and monopolising male and female traders with large capital were the only ones to benefit from liberalisation (Jones 2007: 107; Lambert 1993a: 45–6).

The female merchants on the Dakar–Niger railway created an historical precedent: for many of my female interlocutors, who had found themselves destitute and in financial difficulty while living in Mali, jumping on the train to Dakar – and, later, catching the bus – was an obvious solution. The female railway merchants had actively encouraged future generations to follow in their footsteps, bringing along their daughters on the train to show them how to trade. At the Malian markets in Dakar, traces of such intergenerational cooperation and knowledge transmission were still evident: many market women had learnt trade from their mothers or grandmothers or aunts, who had also been traders. Some of the women had worked closely with their mothers and had travelled with them on the train; some were still in trade partnerships with their mothers living in Mali.

My research suggests, however, that the profile of the women trading in the Dakar–Niger corridor changed over the past decades, since Agnès Lambert conducted her research on the trains in the 1980s. The demise of Moussa Traoré's dictatorial regime in Mali in 1991 and further implementation of neoliberal policies made life more difficult for railway merchants. Subsequent economic reforms interrupted passenger rail service and ended the railway's monopoly on transportation in western Mali (Jones 2007: 108). The 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, a form of structural adjustment imposed by the French government, made food and transport more expensive and led to reduced profit margins for traders in Bamako (Rondeau and Bouchard 2007: 148–9). Increasing economic liberalisation, especially the failures of neoliberal structural adjustment, have impacted social and kin relations in both Mali and Senegal, where the structure of extended families – which provided some measure of social and financial support – has been gradually disintegrating and women are becoming increasingly self-reliant (cf. Antoine and Dial 2003; Grange Omokaro 2009; Rondeau 1996). In the past, according

to Lambert's research (1987; 1993b, 1993a, 1998; Poitou, Lambert de Frondeville and Toulabor 1992), kinship ties to railway employees, officials and to other railway traders facilitated entry into the railway trade. By contrast, many of my female interlocutors who had travelled on the train, and who continued to journey back and forth on buses, were divorcees and widows who had entered the trade at a mature age, since they could not rely on support from their extended families.

In 2003 the Dakar–Niger railway was privatised. Under pressure from the World Bank, the Malian and Senegalese governments agreed to privatise the network and after a tender, a 25-year concession was won by a Franco-Canadian consortium under the name Transrail (Jones 2007: 108). Once the opportunities for financial speculation were quickly exhausted, this consortium closed down most of the railway system, with devastating consequences for the traders and other people making their living off the railway line (Beaudet 2006; Munié 2007). The new owners invested minimally in the railway equipment (wagons and tracks) and dismissed more than 600 railway workers and closed two-thirds of all stations (Beaudet 2006; Jones 2007: 108; Munié 2007). This contributed to the impoverishment of rural areas adjacent to the line where, for over a century, life had been organised around the stations, as villagers traded their produce with travellers and railway workers' families (Beaudet 2006; Magassa 2018; cf. Laurent 2007). Although the concession was won in exchange for an operating agreement to ensure passenger services, Transrail did not consider the passenger service profitable and after privatisation the service began to decline (Munié 2007). Presumably, the last passenger train in Senegal ran in 2009 (cf. Coulibaly 2009; Martineau 2013).[19]

While the demise of the Dakar–Niger railway line in the twenty-first century significantly disrupted lives and livelihoods in the region, the construction of the railway line itself significantly altered regional economies and trade routes when it was originally introduced in the early twentieth century. The Dakar–Niger railway line was itself a product of wider regional shifts, as the colonial administration sought to redirect established north–south trade routes in an east-west direction and transferred the regional economic focus from the interior onto the Atlantic coast (Lambert 1993a). The regional centres associated with river trade, such as Kayes in western Mali, consequently declined while Dakar and Bamako grew as a direct result of the railway line and became capital cities (cf. Clark 1999).

Trade flows at the Terminus: the evolution of the Malian market

In the late 1980s a new wave of Malian traders entered the scene in Dakar, bringing *fruits secs* to the terminus train station, where a wholesale market emerged. *Fruits secs* refers to a broad range of natural produce, such as fruits, grains and condiments which have been dried for conservation, including ginger, chili, okra powder, coffee beans, tamarind, and herbal medicines and incense (see Figure 2.4). This trade at the Terminus was pioneered by a woman called Cicini. Some interlocutors told me that she started bringing watermelons and mangoes to the terminus station, and she asked Gansère Traoré (the Malian kola trade pioneer) to leave her some space in his warehouse to store her fruit. When Gansère became old, Cicini asked him to sub-let the warehouses to her, which he did, and from that point onwards the wholesale market in *fruits secs* developed. In a different version, however, I was told that Malian women arriving with their goods on the train started setting up store at the Terminus. As the managers from the railway company (*La Société du Chemin de Fer*) realised the old warehouses were empty, they decided to rent these out

Figure 2.4 A selection of *fruits secs* sampled at the train station in Bel Air, including dried ginger, chilli, coffee beans, incense and gum Arabic.

to the women for storage, so they would not have to leave their goods on the ground. Yet other interlocutors claimed that it was the Malians themselves who cleaned up the old warehouses and then approached the railway company to ask if they could use them for their goods. In any case, with time, these Malian traders took over all the warehouses at the Terminus and added newly constructed ones, so that in the end there were six massive warehouses, each with more than enough space inside for an entire truck to be parked and off-loaded.

The trade in Malian products evolved at the Terminus as small groups of women pooled money to order train wagons loaded with goods from Bamako, which they sold from the warehouses at the station. Initially, the traders mainly dealt in wholesale from inside the warehouses, although occasionally they would agree to sell retail as well. Eventually, sons and nephews of the female traders came to help unload the wagons while others came to help with accounting, and gradually these young men started investing in the market; with time entire families came to Dakar. The traders who had built their own warehouses rented out some of the space inside to other traders, to store the large quantities of goods they ordered from Mali. Some traders would pool resources, while others had enough capital of their own to order entire wagons of goods which were transported to the Terminus on the freight train.

Gradually, a retail market started appearing around the warehouses of the wholesalers and at the terminus building. One middle-aged Malian man told me that in the 1980s it was like a forest at the Terminus, and the warehouses were hidden from view amid several large hibiscus plants. Because of that, there were some young men who took the goods out of the warehouses to display them in a more open space, next to the road – there was a bus stop in front of the Terminus, so they displayed their goods there, and then the passengers on their way from the buses and the trains would come and buy fruit, and that was how they came to know the type of goods sold at the Terminus. There was a military camp close by, and a school with pupils, so all those people used to frequent the market, and the tourists from Plateau also came. Depending on whom one asks, the retail market at the Terminus emerged in the late 1980s or the 1990s. The products sold by the retailers varied, partly depending on seasonal availability and which type of goods the shuttle traders brought along on the train. In addition to foodstuffs, the retailers sold aphrodisiacs, textiles, soap, and arts and craft. The market at the Terminus eventually extended over an area of approximately 500m^2 and eventually included over 50 wholesalers and 400 retailers (cf. Traore 2009). The traders not only occupied the area adjacent to the station and railway tracks, but their

stalls also extended along a road that led up a small hill and further into the city centre. This road, called Rue Joris, constituted the 'frontier' of the former Malian market, which had thus expanded in a south-easterly direction, covering the area demarcated by the warehouses to the north, the railway tracks to the east, and the terminus building to the south.

The rooted market trade and the routes of shuttle trade intersected at the Terminus station and each depended on the other. There was a kind of symbiosis of movement and stasis at the Terminus. Shuttle traders from Mali acted as suppliers and middle-(wo)men for the traders at the Terminus; they would bring along goods on the 'Express' passenger train and sell them to the traders at the Terminus. One shuttle trader explained that they used to attach wagons with containers to the back of the Express train, and the front wagons of the train were also filled with goods. The settled wholesale traders and the mobile shuttle traders were interspersed in the space of the market: the shuttle traders who arrived by train from Mali often sat in the doors of the big wholesalers' warehouses selling hand-dyed damask cloth (*bazin*) and other goods that they had brought along; and at night they slept inside the warehouses. The Terminus thus epitomised what mobilities scholars have termed (im)mobility in recognition of the co-existence, complementarity and mutual dependency of mobility and immobility (Schapendonk 2011; Urry 2007; Adey 2006).

The Terminus emerged into a significant node for a variety of networks. Mondays and Fridays were the busiest days at the Malian market since that was when the shuttle traders arrived with goods. Fridays were especially great for trade, because the train also delivered people from outside Dakar who came to purchase goods to sell in their villages. As one female trader reminisced: 'On those days people bought anything they saw; they even came to buy things on their way home. People were willing to buy everything in those days'. The Malian shuttle traders also brought goods in the opposite direction, including beauty products, medicines, clothes, leather shoes and wallets, and everything made from plastic, such as buckets and sandals, which they purchased at the nearby markets of Sandaga, Tilèn and HLM. Meanwhile, the Dakar Terminus was not only the start and ending place of trade networks. It also served as a node for domestic workers and other temporary migrant labourers from Mali, who would come and go; visiting relatives from Mali who came to lend a hand to new mothers or to attend funerals or weddings; and children and youngsters from Mali who spent their holidays with relatives in Dakar.

The expansion and success of the Malian market was probably due to several interrelated factors, including its supply of cheap, seasonal and niche products that were unavailable in Senegal, such as *bazin* cloth and certain types of *fruits secs*. Shea butter and gum arabic were also imported on a large scale. The traders also sold seasonal fruits and vegetables. According to the market trader Oumou, the rainy seasons in Mali and Senegal are staggered, so the periods when certain agricultural products became available in Mali corresponded with demand in Senegal.[20] Increasing liberalisation of regional mobility and trade within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and economic differences between Mali and Senegal, which made trade in Dakar advantageous for Malian women, probably also contributed to the growth of the market. Many of the traders operating at the Terminus were highly mobile and travelled back and forth to Mali and sometimes other destinations, where they sourced goods. In 1979 ECOWAS member states – including Mali and Senegal – adopted a Protocol which stipulated the right of community citizens to enter, reside and establish economic activities in the territory of member states. Scholars have criticised the relatively weak implementation of the Protocol, as testified by recurrent expulsions and the corruption of border officials (cf. Adepoju, Boulton and Levin 2007; Bakewell and de Haas 2007; Devillard, Bacchi and Noack 2015; Lombard 2008). Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the free movement protocol contributed to the gradual development of the Malian market in Dakar, by removing some of the obstacles to the movement of people, goods and money within ECOWAS. The fact that the Malian market at the Terminus was pioneered by wholesalers who deployed the Dakar–Niger railway to facilitate their enterprises corresponds with Jones's and Lambert's observations of the impact of liberalisation on railway commerce, which meant that smaller traders gradually disappeared in the 1980s and the railway trade became dominated by wholesalers (Jones 2007: 107; Lambert 1993a: 45–6).

Malian trade in the old city centre of Dakar declined with the closure of the terminus station and the cessation of the passenger train. After the Malian market at the Terminus was demolished in 2009, Malian traders started appearing at the large market in the suburb of Pikine. These were not the same traders as those who were associated with the Terminus, but largely constituted a new wave of immigrants who had relatively little to do with the Malians in the city centre of Dakar. Malian migrants who had arrived in Dakar from the 1990s and onwards did not settle in Plateau alongside the previous wave of kola traders and their descendants. The city centre was full, and accommodation was much cheaper and more readily available in suburbs like Pikine, Guediewaye and Keur Massar.

A century of mobilities, trade and transformation

Urbanisation and forms of belonging in Dakar have in various ways been shaped by the past century of mobility and trade in the Mali–Dakar corridor and its surrounding region. From the mid-nineteenth century, the growing peanut economy dictated the directionality of migrant labour in the region, and families from the former Sudan (present-day Mali) hence began settling in Senegal. When the colonial administration imposed new infrastructures to extract resources from the continent, the direction of regional commerce also began to shift towards the coast, away from the interior. The emergence of Dakar as a pole of attraction for Malian traders and migrants around the middle of the twentieth century reflected a more general phenomenon of heightened mobility from the countryside to the capital city after the Second World War, when Dakar's position of economic primacy over the Senegalese hinterland was consolidated (Lambert 2002: 85–6). Viewing Dakar through the prism of the Terminus thus provides an unbounded historical perspective on the city, accounting for the flows that have contributed to producing it, both in its current and past form. Over the past century, the movements of goods and the comings and goings of people from beyond the administrative boundaries of the city have led to the establishment of markets and diasporas in Dakar, whose imprints on the urban landscape are evident across the peninsula.[21]

Far from being merely a place of emigration, Dakar has long constituted an attractive destination for people in the surrounding region. The history of the Terminus suggests that such newcomers to the city were not simply 'Other' or 'strangers' but represented a continuum of settlement and mobility. Considering the people of Malian background in Dakar, this has included both newcomers and pioneers with few prior links (or none) to Senegal; Malians who have continuously moved back and forth between the neighbouring countries; and families of Malian origin that have been settled in Senegal for generations. Moreover, as the history of the peanut cultivators and kola traders illustrates, many Malians in Senegal were part of transnational family networks that encompassed several localities, sometimes far beyond Mali and Senegal. While some contemporary migrants and traders in Dakar had ties with previous generations of Malians settled in the city, other groups of Malians in Dakar constituted entirely new migratory waves.

In contrast to the Zongos or 'stranger quarters' in other parts of urban West Africa, which since precolonial times have constituted the classic arrival neighbourhoods for migrants (Shack and Skinner 1979; Skinner

1963; Schildkrout 1978; Agier 1983), the Dakar Terminus represented a relatively open, unbounded space that was less clearly demarcated from its surroundings. Moreover, compared with residents of the Zongo, the people who were associated with the Terminus and its former market were not as clearly distinct from the local 'host' population in Dakar and their ethnic identities were not easily pinned down. The traders of Malian background who were working in Dakar regarded their own identities as multiple and fluid. Their translocal and poly-residential families spanned the borders of Mali and Senegal as well as other locations within and beyond the wider region. Yet, at the same time, they experienced the paradox of being categorised with a fixed identity label as 'foreigners'. Hierarchical relationships that historically set the coastal populations apart from those in the interior thus continued to be reproduced in present-day Dakar.

Employing a notion like 'the Malian community' to collectively denote this book's interlocutors in Dakar risks conveying a misleading image of a relatively static, settled and internally homogenous group. Such a notion leaves mobility out of the picture and hence disregards a segment who were not permanently settled in the capital but nonetheless were part of the Malian networks in Dakar. This included the shuttle traders who constantly travelled back and forth and maintained networks in both neighbouring countries through their socio-economic activities and relationships. To understand the Malian presence in Senegal, such mobile groups need to be accounted for. Importantly, the notion of a monolithic, homogenous migrant 'community' in Dakar also ignores the internal differentiations and conflicts among people of Malian background in the city, which will become apparent in the following chapters. The people associated with the Terminus participated in a variety of networks consisting of multiple and intersecting hierarchies and identities. This variety helps explain their different capacities to adapt and variations in their responses to displacement.

The Terminus also provides a lens onto the role of continuous displacement in the history of urbanisation of Dakar. During the Wade era, the urban displacement regime in Dakar was underpinned by promises of beautification and modernisation of the city and its infrastructures. This era was also characterised by the continued and growing separation of economic and political elites from the average residents of Dakar. Chapter 3 delves further into this growing gap and the routine uprooting and displacement of ordinary inhabitants in Dakar, epitomised by the demolition of the Malian market at the Terminus. The fact that the traders associated with the Terminus have been changing identity and adjusting to circumstances for over a century, as this chapter has shown, suggests meanwhile that we can expect a resourceful reaction to the demolition and dispossession.

Notes

1 There is some literature in English on rural and transit migrants in Dakar, as well as limited French research on Guinean migrants in the city (Lambert 2002; Zuluaga 2015; Diallo 2009; Lefebvre 2003; Ndiaye 2008; Parker 1991; Simone 2004). I have not come across any literature on Malians in Dakar.

2 Europeans already began arriving on Gorée Island, which faces Cap Vert, over the course of the fifteenth century, slowly populating the island.

3 The completion of the Dakar-St Louis railway in 1883 enabled a decisive increase in peanut exports through the port of Dakar, which set in train several developments that boosted the position of Dakar (Delcourt 1983: 64 and 70–2).

4 Bigon (2009: 196) points out that the sanitary belt served as a barrier between *Dakar-ville* and the Medina well after the 1914 plague – in fact, up until Independence this stretch of land remained relatively empty.

5 According to Bigon, Governor General Ponty eventually stopped the demolition of huts and delayed the transfer of people to the Medina, but the colonial authorities expressed regret that the segregation project in Dakar was abandoned (Bigon 2009: 200–1).

6 Chapter 4 considers the socio-spatial transformations that made Malian shuttle traders in particular shift their activities to the suburbs of Dakar. Chapter 6, in turn, asks why the new markets established after eviction continued to be located in downtown Dakar, when trade appeared to be thriving in the suburbs.

7 Some northern Malians who were already in Senegal postponed their return due to the outbreak of war, and many of them took the buses back to Mali in early March 2013, shortly after the rebel forces had been pushed back and the territories they had occupied in the North were retaken.

8 The countries receiving the bulk of Malian refugees were instead Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso (IOM 2013: 6–7).

9 RAVEC stands for *Recensement administratif à vocation électorale et d'état civil*.

10 The Malian embassy informed me that 5,000 Malians had registered with them, although they suspected about half a million Malians were living in Senegal. The General Secretary of the *Conseil des Maliens du Sénégal* also believed there were about half a million Malians living in Senegal, but only 13,000 Malians had been counted in the RAVEC census in Senegal, which the Council had helped carry out. When reporting on the visit to Dakar in 2013 by the interim president of Mali, Dioncounda Traoré, the official site of the Malian government stated there were almost 1 million Malians living in Senegal (http://www.primature.gov. ml/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9605:le-president-dioncounda-traore-a-dakar-dans-la-bonne-tradition-avec-la-diaspora&catid=5&Itemid=100037, accessed on 13 March 2013).

11 *Niak* is Wolof and referred to people from the forested regions of West Africa – as opposed to those from the coastal regions, like the Dakar natives. Denoting someone as *Bambara* was sometimes used with similar pejorative connotations as *niak*.

12 *Nawèt* in Wolof means rainy season (David 1980: 166). Swindell (1980: 93) points out that the word might also have derived from the French *navette*, meaning shuttle.

13 According to Rodet (2009: 172), AOF colonial law of 1928 limited women's movements and reinforced patriarchal control: married women had to ask permission from their husbands to migrate, and unmarried women had to ask permission from the head of their household (the same applied to minors under the age of 15).

14 In Dakar the Mouride traders managed to take over the markets from the Lebanese who had dominated the sale of imported goods (Ebin 1992).

15 According to Papa, initially between 1970 and 1973 the Malian traders in Dakar not only imported kola nuts, but also horses. They were imported by train and used by the Senegalese for cultivating peanuts and millet, and the Senegalese also began breeding them. At the same time, horses became much rarer in Mali. The Malian government stopped the trade, in order to prevent horses from becoming extinct during the great droughts. From then on, numerous Malian traders in Dakar turned to deal purely in kola nuts.

16 The '*Bamana missiri*' (Bamana mosque, also known as '*Mosqué des Bambaras*') was completed in 1988 with funding from the Muslim World League (based in Saudi Arabia); it adhered to a branch of Sunni Islam called Al-Fallah. During my fieldwork in 2013, the mosque was

providing sermons, Qur'anic teaching and Franco-Arabic schooling in Bamanankan, and included a room dedicated to women's prayer and Islamic studies.

17 Prof. Jones explained this in an email correspondence I had with him, dating from 29 May 2014.

18 The poly-residential system also partially liberated women from the constraints linked with cohabitation of extended families, where women were in charge of preparing the meals of up to a hundred people, usually under the scrutiny of their mother-in-law (Poitou, Lambert de Frondeville and Toulabor 1992: 285).

19 The concession with Transrail was terminated in December 2015, and the company was replaced by the newly established *Dakar Bamako Ferroviaire*. The two governments each entered into agreements with China Railway Construction Corp (International) Ltd to repair and reconstruct their respective sections of the line (Railway Gazette 2016; Reuters 2015). At the end of December 2017 the Malian passenger train between Bamako and Kayes started running again (Magassa 2018; ORTM TV1 2017).

20 Some of the products came from other West African countries and were transited through Mali on the train. Not everything at the market was imported by train; some goods arrived on trucks.

21 See Figure 1.2 for a map of Malian trade and transport hubs in Dakar.

3
Traders out of place: evictability and belonging at the Malian market

In August 2004, a statue commemorating the French soldiers and West African *tirailleurs* who fought for the French empire was placed in the roundabout in front of the Terminus. This was planned by President Abdoulaye Wade as part of the celebrations for 'The Day of the *Tirailleurs*' and on the same occasion the roundabout, formerly called *Place de la Gare Dakar–Niger*, was renamed *Place du Tirailleur* (RFI 2010; cf. de Jong and Foucher 2010: 196). Several of my interlocutors recalled this event as the beginning of the end for the Malian market. This act of renaming erased the significance of the terminus train station (*La Gare*). Subsequently, President Wade actively pursued his plans to transform the area that for nearly a century had been associated with the Dakar–Niger railway and, by extension, the Malian presence in the city.

During a single night in 2006, the city council of Dakar destroyed all the stalls that had been constructed uphill on Rue Joris as the market had sprawled out from its original location at the Terminus. A massive commercial billboard was placed on the pavement next to the old train station, facing the roundabout (see Figure 3.1).[1] In 2007 construction began on a new tarmacked dual carriageway which cut through the western part of the market at the Terminus.[2] Part of the 'Autoroute of the Future', it took three years to complete, along with a parking area next to where the platforms for the train used to be.[3] Around 2007–8, the state began to carry out construction work in the vicinity of the Terminus, as part of its plan to build a 'Cultural Park', extending over one kilometre and covering an area of 10 hectares (Gouvernement du Sénégal 2011; see Figure 3.2). This park would contain the 'Seven Wonders of Dakar' (*Les Sept Merveilles de Dakar*) which included the *Grand Théâtre*, a gift from China for which construction began in December 2008.[4] On 15 April 2011

Figure 3.1 Billboard facing the roundabout at the Dakar terminus train station. Behind it are the entrances to the new cloth bazaar where many Malian traders selling *bazin* and wax cloth had relocated after the former Malian market was demolished in 2009. The old terminus building is barely visible in the right side of the picture.

the *Grand Théâtre* was inaugurated, two years after the Malian market had been torn down.[5]

The market at the Dakar Terminus was demolished during the night between 8 and 9 April 2009. Oumou, who had run a successful wholesale business with her mother at the Terminus, recalled: 'We did have guards at the market, but they couldn't do anything against the police. They brought tanks and bulldozers, like it was a war'. When police arrived to shut down the market, there were Malians who attempted to beat them up and threw stones at them. 'That day, if you had gone to the Terminus, you would have wept. Everybody wept. I lost lots of money there', Oumou commented. The police threw the contents of the warehouses out on the ground, and many goods were also destroyed when the buildings fell upon them. The traders were never compensated for their losses. Moreover, the people, who had entered contracts of lease with the traders to allow them to occupy the land at the Terminus and who had received regular rent payments for the warehouses used by the traders, vanished.

Figure 3.2 Virtual map of the 'Cultural Park' planned by President Wade. In front is the roundabout with the Place du Tirailleur and facing it is the old terminus building for the Dakar–Niger train. The Malian market extended approximately up to the round building in the middle of the map. The road leading left from the roundabout is Rue Joris. Screenshot taken at 75 seconds from video 'Le futur Parc Culturel de Dakar'.

The traders told me they were given no formal notice announcing the exact date and time when the market would be demolished (Malijet 2009). Oumou said the only sign that something would happen was when the police came to spend the night at the station: 'If they sleep there, you know that something is going to happen'. Issa Dembele was the head of a prominent Malian migrant association which had been founded at the Terminus. The day before the market was demolished, the police contacted him to inform him that they were going to clear the area during the night: 'I phoned the traders to tell them they must save their goods before the police come. I personally went there at five in the morning with a vehicle in order to help them. We saved what we could, the rest of the goods were destroyed'. Some of the traders had realised the market was in jeopardy and had already moved their goods out before the market was bulldozed. But Oumou and her mother were unable to shift the tonnes of goods they were storing in an enormous warehouse, the construction of which had been entirely funded by Oumou's mother.

Most of the traders did not know the actual reason why the Malian market was bulldozed. Very few of my interlocutors had heard about 'The Seven Wonders of Dakar' or were aware of President Wade's broader vision for the area. According to Oumou they were told that the market was being closed because they were going to build the *Grand Théâtre*. The houses of the railway workers (*cheminots*) who lived in a settlement in the vicinity (*la cité des cheminots*) were also torn down, 'because they said they blocked the view of the theatre, and they were not nice to look at', as Oumou explained. The model of the Cultural Park was only presented to the public at the beginning of April 2011, two years after the Malian market had been demolished (Gouvernement du Sénégal 2011; cf. Maro 2011). The authorities appeared to assume that the traders did not need to know why they were being evicted – that it was obvious that they should not be there.

This chapter provides a multi-vocal account of the different reactions and responses to the eviction of the traders at the Terminus. These responses reflected differently situated knowledges about the city, including divergent understandings of urban governance and membership (cf. McFarlane 2011). The first part of the analysis reveals how an elite discourse informalised and feminised the traders at the Terminus, thereby denying them full membership of the city and legitimising their eviction. Intellectuals and other elites of Malian background tried to intervene in the authorities' eviction plans, on behalf of the traders – and particularly, on behalf of female traders who remained largely silent during the process. The efforts of this elite were based on a modernist discourse of membership and governance which emphasised the importance of the state, public land and the rule of law. This was a discourse which denigrated 'informality' and viewed the problems of the (feminised and informalised) traders as largely of their own making. Perhaps naively, this elite assumed that avoiding eviction and market demolition simply required obtaining correct knowledge about the law and making sure that the market operated in line with relevant regulations. This patronising approach reflected a poor understanding of the precarious, neoliberal context that the market traders were operating in.

The Senegalese authorities' apparent assumption that the traders at the Terminus were 'obviously' out of place reflected an exclusive notion of urban membership entrenched in Dakar during the Presidency of Abdoulaye Wade, when belonging to the city was based largely on an ability to attract and generate significant capital rather than on one's actual presence in the city (Dahou and Foucher 2009: 15; Diop 2013; Tall 2009; Melly 2010, 2013). In turn, access to urban life, space and other resources

and the right to actively shape and produce the city became increasingly restricted for more economically marginal and politically powerless people, including many of those associated with the Terminus (cf. Harvey 2008). In such an exclusionary context, how does one engage the authorities and get them to take one's claims to belonging and right to the city seriously? What were the bases on which the traders (and other residents in Dakar) could claim their right to the market, to public land and, ultimately, to the city – apart from the modernist, state-based model of the Malian expatriate elite, or the neoliberal capitalist model pursued by Wade's regime? The latter parts of the analysis explore two such alternative registers of claims-making and assesses their relative success or failure: firstly, certain traders' attempts at engaging in 'identity politics' to claim formality and thereby claim rights to the city, including rights to access and use the space at the Terminus. And secondly, what I call an 'esoteric register' where the traders contributed large sums of money for sacrifices to be carried out at the Terminus by ritual specialists from Mali and Senegal, to protect the market from demolition and the traders from eviction.

This chapter focuses on 'everyday politics' as opposed to the 'formal politics', like elections, studied by most political scientists. As Jeffrey Paller's (2019) ethnography of democracy in Ghana has eloquently shown, daily life is an arena of politics in its own right. An ethnographic approach to politics provides a window onto the motivations, behaviours and decision-making involved in politics, which are overlooked by political science scholarship (Paller 2019). The ethnography in this chapter suggests that an apparent vacuum of formal governance should not simply be viewed as a reflection of the absence of the state – which is a kind of bland, universal argument about urban neoliberalism – but as events filled with intentionality, politics and power. The present chapter urges analysts to better understand the significance of urban residents apparently taking the law into their own hands, as well as occasional inaction and non-enforcements of the law by state authorities. For example, as we shall see, women traders at the Terminus who supposedly 'created their own laws' to govern their economic activities were not deliberately circumventing the law, as some elite Malians claimed. Rather than acting in a 'lawless' manner, they were acting to *improve* regulation and enforcement of contractual obligations. Furthermore, urban residents who challenged the decisions of state authorities by deploying esoteric means against them were not desperately punching a neoliberal phantom state; instead, they were actively engaging with the authorities on a different register than the one provided by a democratic legal framework (cf. Rush Smith 2019). This also suggests that it is not

necessarily a lack of capacity or intentionality that makes authorities not enforce certain laws, such as when they ignore the eviction notices they have served to street traders (cf. Holland 2016).

Before launching into the multi-vocal account and analysis, the destruction and eviction at the Terminus first need to be situated in the broader context. These dramatic events did not occur in a vacuum. They formed part of a wider campaign of highly disruptive construction projects and forcible removals that street traders and other inhabitants of Dakar were made to endure in the name of urban renewal and modernisation.

Displacement of street traders in the Wade era

'It's Abdoulaye Wade. He destroyed the market!' one woman trader at the small outdoor market near the Terminus bluntly replied when I asked her why she thought the former Malian market was demolished in 2009. Indeed, a number of my interlocutors put the blame for the market closure squarely on former president Abdoulaye Wade himself and the political and economic elite of the day. Abdoulaye Ndiaye was the head of the team repairing the engines of the state-owned suburban train *PTB*.[6] He had his office in a building at the Terminus, close to the small group of traders who continued to work outdoors by the railway tracks. Abdoulaye and his colleagues were also very upset about what had happened to the market and the surrounding area at the Terminus. Abdoulaye explained that the *Grand Théâtre*, which was constructed in the aftermath of the market demolition, was located on the site where they used to have a depot for repairing the trains, which held equipment and wagons. The *cheminots* (railway workers) had also had a large warehouse there. 'The previous government took it from us because they wanted the land and because of the prestige of the national theatre. It is the same policy that closed down the train station. Those are all political errors!', Abdoulaye complained.[7]

These comments suggested that it was primarily the heightened quest, during Wade's reign, to appropriate public land that was behind the closure of the market at the Terminus. I had otherwise originally assumed that the authorities had destroyed the market in 2009 simply because they wanted to suppress informal street trading. One thing which had therefore puzzled me when I first went to La Gare was the fact that there was still a group of traders with stalls sitting outdoors near the old terminus building. I asked Oumou when exactly those people had returned to trade, after the market at La Gare had been destroyed. 'No – they never left', she replied. 'Those women are small retail traders. They didn't want to leave. When the police

broke the warehouses, those women returned afterwards to continue to sell'. I commented that I thought the authorities had permanently evicted all the traders, to stop them from trading there. But Oumou replied, 'They wanted the space. That is why they destroyed the warehouses. They did it to get the land'. Indeed, in 2011 one Senegalese news site claimed that the financial gain from the land at the former terminus station was estimated at over 200 billion CFA (Politicosn.com 2011). A Malian newspaper (Coulibaly 2009) reporting on the market demolition claimed that the authorities shut down the market because they had sold the construction materials from the old warehouses, including an expensive type of iron, to a Senegalese businessman in a deal worth millions of CFA.[8]

While hard to assess objectively, the traders at the Terminus were probably not targeted for eviction purely due to their relatively unregulated economic activity. This may have been part of the rationale on the part of the authorities, but circumstances also suggest that the traders became casualties of the political and economic desire for prestige projects and land for construction during Wade's reign. For a few years under Wade's presidency, tolerance of street traders in fact prevailed: Wade's 2000 election campaign had courted the votes of traders, and direct action by traders following his victory resulted in an agreement that traders should not be evicted. It has been argued that this agreement led to a rapid increase in street trading and conversion of temporary trading sites into fixed kiosks in the city centre of Dakar (Brown, Msoka and Dankoco 2014: 2240). The tolerance and recognition of street traders was, however, not constant during Wade's presidency.

In April 2006, the traders at the Terminus were handed an eviction notice demanding that they clear the area within four months. Several market stalls that had sprawled beyond the space near the railway tracks, where the market was originally founded, were destroyed by the city authorities. In 2007 construction began on a new tarmacked dual carriageway that cut through the western part of the market. These disruptions and clearances were part of a wider campaign of eviction and urban renewal at the time. In the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections, and as part of the preparations for the 11th session of the Islamic Summit Conference[9] held in Dakar in March 2008, several prestigious yet highly disruptive transport infrastructure projects were carried out in downtown Dakar. Notably, in this context, Wade decided to clear the streets of Dakar, allegedly in an effort to 'improve the circulation of traffic'. He instructed the regional Governor of Dakar to 'tidy the streets', which was interpreted as an instruction to evict (Brown, Msoka and Dankoco 2014; Hesseling 2008; Melly 2013). In November 2007, thousands of street

vendors were forcibly removed from the main streets of Dakar city centre (Brown, Msoka and Dankoco 2014: 2240). These clearances, coupled with growing dissatisfaction over deteriorating living conditions, led to violent riots by street vendors joined by teachers, civil servants and other discontented citizens. The president decided to negotiate with the traders, and various new initiatives gave traders a profile in governance structures, including weekly consultations between the mayor of Dakar and traders' representatives (following the riots, trader groups had formed two new umbrella groups) (Brown, Msoka and Dankoco 2014; Hesseling 2008).

But despite these signs of recognition, informal traders continued to lack legal status. Rather than legitimise trading rights in the street, the new mayor of Dakar, elected in 2009, preferred to relocate such traders elsewhere (Brown, Msoka and Dankoco 2014: 2240–1). In 2009 support for Wade and his PDS party began to decline and, in March that year, Socialist candidate Khalifa Sall was elected mayor of Dakar, ending the PDS party's control over the mayor's office (Fredericks 2018: 41). As mayor, Khalifa Sall made urban development one of his priorities (Marfaing 2015). In 2009, a National Agency for Spatial Planning (*Agence Nationale de l'Amenagement du Territoire*) was set up with the aim to improve the quality of life of citizens and clear streets in Dakar; and in 2010 a broad brush city development strategy was published under the aegis of Cities Alliance (2010), a group initiated by the World Bank and UN-Habitat (Brown, Msoka and Dankoco 2014: 2240). The strategy, stretching until 2025, aimed to make the Senegalese capital a 'modern metropolis' in terms of environment, services and infrastructure, and urban governance. In this context, street trade was perceived as contrary to the sought-after image of modernity, and the mayor therefore planned to rehouse 50,000 listed street vendors (Marfaing 2015). At the end of 2013, several evictions of traders took place at various markets in the city centre.

The fire at the famous Sandaga market during my fieldwork in 2013 provides ample illustration of the predicament of informal traders and workers in downtown Dakar, who were continuously being displaced (cf. Mizes 2021). In late October 2013, the mayor of Dakar announced that the ambulant vendors from the Sandaga market would be relocated to the area contiguous with Sugunikura, which was one of the small Malian markets that had been established in the wake of the demolition of the market at the Terminus. This happened after the famous Sandaga market building was burnt down. Most people I spoke to, as well as Senegalese news reporters, alleged that the fire was started by the city authorities, supposedly to empty the building of traders and, after restoration work, replace them with more up-market businesses (cf. Diaw and Balde 2013). After the fire at

Sandaga all the empty land next to Sugunikura was swiftly appropriated by the city council and, during the course of November and December, this area was cleared and prepared for the arrival of the Sandaga traders. This meant there was no longer any space available for Sugunikura's delivery trucks to enter or park in the area and hence, goods could not be delivered directly to the market. Moreover, to make way for the Sandaga traders, numerous mechanics who used to have their workshops in this previously empty area, including one of Oumou's brothers, were evicted. Oumou and I later spotted some of them on our walk back home from Sugunikura, where Oumou worked. Over the previous weeks, several makeshift stalls along our path home had been destroyed by the authorities. The evicted mechanics from Sugunikura had now set up their workshops in the midst of the remaining heaps of rubble, a vivid illustration of the eternal cat and mouse game that was constantly played out, as the authorities attempted to clear the main streets and pavements of downtown Dakar of any signs of 'informal' economic activity.

At the same time, some of the traders evicted from the Terminus appeared to have internalised a modernist discourse about progress, reflected in surprisingly positive reactions to the 'beautification' of the area around the Terminus, where they had formerly worked. They commented that the area around the Terminus looked much nicer than before; and that the recently constructed *Grand Théâtre*, which was the only one of the 'Seven Wonders of Dakar' that had been built at the time of my fieldwork, was 'beautiful'. These unsentimental remarks and apparent lack of nostalgia for their former marketplace must be viewed in the light of the authorities' modernising vision for the city and the ongoing process of rapid urban development taking place in Dakar. The physical landscape of Dakar was continuously being transformed, as buildings, roads, markets and neighbourhoods were not only constantly being constructed, but also closed down, demolished, cleared, refurbished or set on fire. As the market trader Oumou put it,

> This city changes all the time. If you go back to your country and you come here again in two years, you will see lots of change! It's because we haven't finished constructing the city. We are a bit late here in Africa. But in the US, there they have finished the work! Their cities are done now.

The violence of eviction and demolition was in some ways considered as merely momentary suffering and a part of the necessary sacrifices on an imagined path to greater prosperity and improved living standards. This discourse about development and progress was championed by

Abdoulaye Wade during his presidency, epitomised by the promised construction of new urban infrastructure and grand monuments in Dakar. These projects and promises contributed to fuelling collective fantasies of progress on the horizon and convincing displaced residents that their immediate suffering was necessary and justified to make way for the longer-term advancement of the city and the nation (Boeck 2011; Larkin 2013; Melly 2017). Ferdinand de Jong and Vincent Foucher indeed argue that the persistent popularity of Wade and his surprising re-election in 2007 were related to his 'capacity to embody the renewal of the dream of modernisation and to stage an infrastructural spectacle' (de Jong and Foucher 2010: 193).[10] The divided reactions of my interlocutors to the demolition of the Malian market and its replacement by one of Wade's unfinished prestige projects encapsulates the ambiguity many of Dakar's residents felt towards Wade's legacy: partly enchanted by his optimistic and grandiose visions for the nation and its capital, yet also disappointed and deceived by it.

Despite the regime change in 2012, the situation of so-called informal traders in Dakar does not appear to have improved or changed in any significant way. Under the presidency of Macky Sall, little progress has been made in terms of recognition of the rights of informal traders in Dakar and acknowledgment of their vital economic roles and contributions to the urban economy. Punitive legal frameworks that limit and criminalise the activities of informal workers are still in place and are being used by city authorities to permit police harassment. Although informal workers do in fact pay a variety of taxes and duties in Dakar, they do not receive services or social protection, nor do those contributions give them any security in their work, particularly for those who work in public spaces. There is thus a continued need to develop adequate and enabling legal frameworks for informal workers in order to provide legal protections, end the criminalisation of their activities, and stop police harassment and forced evictions (Abizaid 2019). In this sense, the predicament of the traders described in this book continues to reflect the experiences and circumstances of traders making a living in the markets, streets and public spaces of Dakar.

Feminising and informalising the traders

Regardless of how dramatic and unjust the events surrounding the closure of the market at the Terminus may appear, such experiences are by no means uncommon. For example, slum evictions in the Global

South have been occurring with greater frequency and aggressiveness since the early 2000s. This has been largely attributed to cities' growing efforts to become 'world class' by seeking to attract investment, promote development and improve their global competitive position (Weinstein 2021). The scholarship on evictions, expulsions and dispossessions generally situates these practices in the context of capital accumulation under conditions of neoliberal globalisation (Weinstein 2021; see also Hart 2006; Sassen 2014). In Dakar and in other cities all around the world, including those in the Global North, eviction, dispossession, demolition and displacement go hand in hand with capitalist processes of urban development, regeneration and gentrification (Devlin 2006; Gertel 2009; Lessinger 1988; Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Smart 1988; Harvey 2008; Soederberg 2018; Desmond 2016).

The accounts I heard of the demolition of the Malian market conveyed the impression that the authorities had felt little need to justify clearing and 'beautifying' an area of the city; and that the traders themselves had largely accepted that such experiences were part of life as inhabitants of Dakar. But how did it come to be common knowledge that the traders at the Terminus were out of place? What kinds of subjecthoods were attributed to the traders that so 'obviously' legitimised their eviction? Demolition and eviction do not happen at random, but target certain groups and areas, while bypassing others. How do some people get to be included in the category of 'evictable' while others are left alone? More specifically, considering that they had occupied the area for decades, how did the traders at the Terminus suddenly come to be identified as evictable?

A few months into my fieldwork I interviewed the director of the Malian customs office in Senegal (EMASE). Madame Diawara was a remarkable woman who had fought hard to reach the higher ranks of Malian bureaucracy. When I told her I was interested in Malian women traders, she replied dryly that she only knew of one Malian woman in Dakar who was doing 'formal' trade. 'All the rest are informal traders – and I do not know what they are doing', she commented contemptuously. Her dismissive reply suggested that what she deemed 'informal' was at the same time illegitimate and possibly even unlawful, and she did not want anything to do with it. This reveals a normative discourse which reproduces a problematic formal/informal binary (cf. Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom 2006; Sindzingre 2006). This binary homogenises and stigmatises those deemed 'informal traders' by associating them with various negative attributes. Madame Diawara's response reflected an attitude I encountered among other highly educated and employed,

wage-earning Malians, who saw the traders at the Terminus as operating on 'the outside' of the framework of governance and society – and, therefore, on a par with criminals.

Over the last half-century, markets and traders in urban Africa have primarily been approached through the analytical lens of the 'informality paradigm'. An unfortunate result of this has been an analytical dichotomy that juxtaposes formal and informal economies (Lipton 1984; North 1990). This classification of economic activities into two categories has been critiqued as a gross oversimplification: it essentialises these categories, ignoring their interlinkages and stigmatising the informal by associating it with chaos and illegality (cf. Fafchamps 2004; Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom 2006; Meagher 2013; Sindzingre 2006; Totolo 2013; Trager 1987; Vaa 1991). Most scholars now reject the dual economy perspectives. As Totolo points out, 'it has become clear that informal forms of governance and organisation are central to local economies, as supplements or even as substitutes for formal institutions and regulations' (Totolo 2013: 168). Indeed, in urban West African economies, informality[11] is ubiquitous (Meagher 2005; cf. AlSayyad 2004). What tends to be termed 'the informal' (*l'informel*) in Dakar, including marketplace activities, pavement and ambulant vending, and shuttle trade, is not merely an illegitimate, parallel sector that is grafted onto 'the rest of the economy'. It is the real economy: it feeds the city's inhabitants and constitutes the livelihoods of most of them. Traders at the Malian market were thus partaking in the normal experience of conducting economic transactions and making a living in West Africa, where most economic activities occur with little or no intervention by the state (cf. Fafchamps 2004; Meagher 2010; Totolo 2013). Indeed, informality constitutes the 'way of life' for residents in urban settings around the world (cf. AlSayyad 2004). Nevertheless the label of informality is often used to justify occasional intervention by authorities and law enforcement agencies against certain groups and areas in cities. 'Informality' can thus be considered as a normative and political construct which may be applied strategically to legitimise certain forms of power and oppression (eviction, for example) and reinforce dominant social hierarchies (patriarchal ones, for example).

Malian elites tended to associate the traders from the Terminus with various interchangeable negative labels, including 'informality', which rendered the traders marginal to society, the law and all that was deemed 'formal'. Hence, they were deemed 'obvious' and legitimate targets for eviction. For example, some of the Malian 'intellectuals', as people with a high level of education who were often engaged in political issues were referred to, claimed that the traders from the Terminus were not

properly 'integrated' into their host society. Issa Dembele was originally from Mali but had obtained his degree as a medical doctor in Dakar where he was running his own general practitioner's practice. He was also the head of the first Malian migrant association that had been established at the Terminus. Issa told me the new Malian markets in Dakar were not adhering to the law and that the traders had 'put themselves apart like a community within a community'. He also argued that Malian trade had no future in Dakar:

> The traders are in the informal [sector] and they are not educated. There are certain intercultural problems. The Malians are a burden for Senegal. I would even say that in all the countries where Malians are they are a burden for the host countries. They are all in the informal and they don't leave their community to integrate themselves in the host country.

A bit later he looked at me mischievously and said, 'When Sarkozy talked about *immigration choisie* [chosen immigration] [12] I agreed with him. You have to help the unemployed before giving the work to foreigners'.

Much like Issa, Papa's old Malian friend Djiby Tounkara depicted the Malian traders at the Terminus as undesirable immigrants with an integration problem. Djiby was also considered an intellectual by his Malian peers, as he had a university degree from Dakar and was well-read and politically active, representing a Malian left-wing political party in Dakar. When I discussed the closure of the Terminus with him he told me:

> The Senegalese state didn't want a concentration of West African foreigners on its territory. All these people were sleeping at the Terminus and committing crimes. The Senegalese authorities were fed up; but politically it was too controversial to throw out a minority of less than 5,000 foreigners. Wade and the state wanted to seize the space to carry out works of development. … So they had to chase away the people. There were constant annoyances. The police, the embassy, the city council, they were fed up. There was smuggling and aggression at the Terminus. Many people were sent to prison. In terms of security, it had become a problem for Dakar, so they had to clear the place.

The traders' imposed subjecthood of informality, marginality, criminality and 'evictability' was further reinforced by the notion that their occupation of the area at the Terminus was unlawful – although it was never clear

what exactly constituted the law and whether or not the traders were adhering to it. In fact, the market traders used to pay an annual duty and monthly fees to the authorities for operating at the former Malian market. Even if some traders did not contribute to paying all taxes and fees, this may not necessarily have reflected their deliberate avoidance of formal regulations. The traders' non-compliance with certain formal regulations most likely reflected what AbdouMaliq Simone has pointed out, which is that some economic actors are 'simply not aware of the frequently complex web of regulations applicable to even the most minimal of economic activities. … An informal sector is partly elaborated because of the excess and inappropriateness of regulations that persist in the absence of systematic and realistic ways of assessing domestic economies' (Simone 2004: 25–6; cf. Devlin 2006; Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom 2006: 12). Interpersonal agreements about stall ownership, subletting and market entry regulations were necessary for establishing order at the market and to compensate for the absence or obscurity of any state mechanisms to enforce rules and regulations at the market (this point is illustrated in subsequent chapters detailing the organisation of trade at the new Malian markets in Dakar). It is hard to argue that the traders had collectively committed any crime by running the market at the Terminus the way they did.

Dubious rent-seeking practices, which state officials engaged in at the market, and the state's deliberate ignorance of the traders' contracts and regular payments of rent appear to suggest that in many ways, it was in fact the state that was 'informal'. When the traders received the first eviction notice in 2006, they complained that they had signed leases and were paying rents to the state. Many of the traders understandably believed that they had contractual rights to occupy the land, having signed and paid for it. But the Senegalese authorities responded that they were not aware that people were paying rent at the Terminus. The question of property ownership, and the validity of the contracts the traders had signed to lease the land and the warehouses, were therefore at the heart of the dispute over the closure of the market at the Terminus. Originally, Malian wholesalers dealing in *fruits secs* had sublet the warehouses at the Terminus from the woman called Cicini, who had pioneered the Malian market in *fruits secs*. They paid rent to her, and she in turn paid the Railway Company (*La Société du Chemin de Fer*) which leased the warehouses to her. The traders who later built their own warehouses paid the construction costs themselves but leased the land from the Railway Company. Meanwhile, the Railway Company mismanaged the money, and the traders were therefore later told to pay their rent to a different

company, which was also state-owned. Many traders signed long-term leases and were paying regular monthly or quarterly rent, but the market was demolished just a few years into their contracts. Oumou's mother had agreed on a 20-year lease, but her warehouse was bulldozed just 10 years into her lease. Another trader showed me a receipt for the rent he had paid every three months for one of the warehouses at the Terminus. The payment was made in August 2006 for the sum of 400,000 CFA (600 euros) to a state official.

It is striking that the people I interviewed who appeared to 'know' something about the government's intentions and its motives for closing down the Malian market were nearly all men. Comments made by these men about the mostly female traders tended to be patronising. For example, Issa Dembele – the head of a Malian migrant association – told me that one of the problems in terms of closing down the market was that 'The women thought the place belonged to them; they said, "We have been here for 50 years"'. Papa Traore told me that when the Senegalese authorities wanted to remove the women from the market, the Malian ambassador, 'had to explain to the traders that they were not above the law and had to accept what the authorities had decided'. Issa also commented that:

> It must be said that the Senegalese administration is very tolerant. The Malian traders were in the informal. There were no formal contracts for the utilisation of the warehouses. The traders paid a rental fee. They needed to create a company to enter into legality. But the women had created their own laws, in order to establish who the owners of the warehouses were and how much one had to pay for the right of usage. The traders often fought over the right to use the warehouses; that's why they constructed some new warehouses.

Such remarks implied that the traders refused to understand and accept the circumstances that led to the demolition of the market. This suggests a form of ignorance that, according to Roy Dilley, implies an element of human agency, of wilful neglect, as in 'going astray' (Dilley 2010: 181). By engaging in contracts of lease or proclaiming their rights in the face of eviction notices, the traders had attempted to behave like informed actors in a dialogue with the law, the formal economy, and the public authorities. The 'better informed' men nonetheless dismissed these acts and the knowledge upon which they were based as misguided. By claiming the women had 'misunderstood' what was going on, a handful of men (such as intellectuals, powerful patriarchs and traders, and the

ambassador) affirmed their own superior knowledge (cf. De Jorio 2009: 106–7). In turn, the (feminised) traders' claims to knowledge of their rights actually became examples that reflected their ignorance (cf. Dilley 2010: 181). It is worth noting that my interlocutors from the political, intellectual and economic elite consistently referred to the traders from the Terminus as 'women' even though some of them were actually men. In this way, the discourse propagated by authorities and intellectuals also feminised male traders at the market and located them within a gender hierarchy that included competing masculinities. Indeed, patriarchy does not simply entail that 'men dominate women' but implies a system of competing masculinities and femininities ranked within a hierarchical system of power (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Morrell 1998).[13] Those men who do not fully conform to the dominant masculine ideal may be socially marginalised within such a system, to varying degrees.

The suggestions that the traders 'should have known better' did not account for how they would have acquired this 'correct' knowledge that some of the Malian men appeared to possess. In fact, several of the market traders thought that they were indeed operating within a legal framework – whereas the Senegalese state considered them to be operating on 'the outside' of the framework of governance and society and thus not qualifying for any legal protection from or compensation for eviction. It was only when the government claimed the land from the traders that this 'correct knowledge' was revealed, as the traders were informed that their contracts were invalid and that the state was the rightful owner of the land (and, presumably, also of the buildings, which the authorities destroyed).

Meanwhile, certain intellectuals with close ties to the Malian traders in Dakar tried to take on responsibility for this 'knowledge transmission' by acting as intermediaries between the traders and the authorities, and informing the traders of the law. It was these intermediaries in particular who argued that the traders' 'wilful ignorance' was largely the reason for their own downfall. For Djiby Tounkara, for example, the traders were largely evicted because they did not understand the law which regulated ownership and occupation of public land. When Djiby explained to me why the Malian market had been demolished, he began by arguing that the railway land in the city centre belonged to the Senegalese state: 'A state does not sell its estates [*patrimoine*], it only rents them out. It had rented it to the Railway Company; but the land never belonged to anyone else than the state'. He told me the Railway Company had originally built the warehouses on land that it rented from the state and since the contract was signed during the colonial period it was no longer valid: 'The original

contract between the Railway and the Senegalese state expired 25 years before the Senegalese state started reclaiming the land from the traders at the station'. For Djiby, knowledge of the distinction between government land and private land appeared to be very important. And yet, that distinction was largely irrelevant under Wade's liberal administration when public land in Dakar was used as currency for personal and political gain – and hardly for the public good.

Malian intellectuals, like Djiby Tounkara, appeared to be stuck in an outmoded discourse about the state in Senegal. The common saying about Senegal being characterised by a 'strong state', as opposed to Mali's weak state, which I alluded to in the previous chapter, appeared to still hold significant sway over the elite of middle class and educated Malian expats. Colonial distinctions, which favoured the West Africa coast over the interior, were thus reproduced by Malian elites, who related to Senegal as a superior system where the state was strong and the law was in force (unlike in Mali where the state was 'weak'). This idealised vision, however, bore little resemblance to the neoliberal reality informal traders in Dakar were operating within, where the state had largely withdrawn from public life – except in its patrimonial and kleptocratic form, where it would prey on public land for elitist and exclusionary prestige projects.

The Malian elite's (patronising) discourse on 'informality' assumed that knowing the law – and acting in accordance with it – would have safeguarded the traders and their market. Yet, it is by no means obvious that possessing knowledge about land rights or rules for eviction would have saved the market or secured compensation for the traders after the market had been destroyed. I have already alluded to the obscurity and deception that shrouded the whole affair of the demolition of the market at the Terminus. In this light, it is not surprising that the traders perhaps developed 'their own laws' as Issa Dembele claimed. The traders knew what to expect from the type of contractual relations they developed among themselves, whereas navigating the rules and regulations of the supposedly 'formal economy' appeared to be the exclusive preserve of the wealthy and politically powerful, and not necessarily a function of any objective knowledge of the law. This may partly explain why some women blankly admitted not knowing why the authorities had closed down the market – just as they did not understand the 'rationales' of the authorities in so many other regards.

When I asked women traders why the former market had been destroyed, they sometimes simply responded that they did not know, or referred the question to other people around them without answering themselves. This apparent 'ignorance' is worth scrutinising. For example,

to use Roy Dilley's (2010: 180) conceptualisation of ignorance, did it reflect an absence of knowledge of the subject (not-knowing as absence) or an active refusal to know about it (not-knowing as 'a refusal to take notice of')? Did they actually not want to respond and therefore *feigned* ignorance? Examining these questions will further explain why the Malian women trading at the Terminus were sidelined from negotiations over their eviction and about any compensation after the market demolition – and why the women thus appeared to succumb to an imposed subjecthood as 'informal', hence 'evictable'.

In some respects, women's apparent ignorance about the closure of the market might be viewed as the result of withheld knowledge and purposeful deception, which the first section of this chapter alluded to. Later in this chapter I address some of the secrecy that surrounded the protracted negotiations over the traders' eviction from the Terminus. Ignorance may be purposely generated in the interest of power and capital, denying knowledge to certain classes of people in order to facilitate their manipulation or exploitation (High, Kelly and Mair 2012: 14).

While this critical view of non-knowledge certainly has its merit, it grants relatively little agency to those who appear to be ignorant. It is possible to consider another reason for the women traders' silence and apparent non-knowledge. Roy Dilley (2010: 183) argues that, in hierarchical social systems that are based on the exclusive hereditary transmission of learning within bounded social groups – as among the Mande – it is not only the fact that people are excluded from certain forms of knowledge that produces ignorance. Secrecy also fosters a cultural politics of ignorance: 'This contrived or pretended ignorance is linked to the social standing of the respective parties, and it constitutes a political act of "refusing to know" for reasons of cultural politics, prestige, and moral integrity' (Dilley 2010: 183). This brings me to consider another form of ignorance that might explain why some of my female interlocutors did not respond to my question as to why the market had been destroyed: there are certain things about which certain people are not supposed to know – which entails that, even if they do know about them, they may feign ignorance. In fact, High et al. (2012: 18) point to several studies which show that 'ignoring or forgetting is important because it enables potentially troublesome relationships to be avoided or dissolved'.

Djenneba Sylla, who traded outdoors near the old train station, was a pious hijab-clad Muslim, devoted to her Malian husband who was selling spare car parts at Garage Petersen and was looking well after Djenneba and their children. She embodied the prevailing ideal of female modesty and propriety. When I asked her why she thought the

market had been destroyed, she simply replied, 'I don't know'. On the one hand, this response could be said to reflect the fact that many of the women traders were excluded from the type of knowledge that only a few Malian men possessed about the authorities' plans and motivations. On the other hand, by avoiding the attribution of blame or engaging in gossip and politics, Djenneba was refraining from a conduct that would potentially bring shame (*maloya*) and compromise her social standing (cf. Brand 2001; Grosz-Ngaté 1989). As a respectable woman, she was not supposed to possess or transmit such forms of knowledge (cf. Dilley 2010: 183). This also relates to Dilley's point about the moral implications of ignorance: in certain contexts, 'ignorance bears a virtuous moral load' and – like Adam and Eve before the Fall – not knowing implies a state of grace and innocence (Dilley 2010: 178).

The women traders' apparent ignorance may appear to have constituted a quiet acquiescence of their eviction and the market demolition. Silence, however, does not necessarily imply acceptance; rather, it may constitute a tactical response to an unresolvable dilemma. The women's statuses and livelihoods would be compromised regardless of how they reacted. Those women who had acted to somehow regulate the former market and who had protested against eviction were deemed ignorant of the law, as we saw earlier. Those who remained quiet to maintain their respectability and social status reinforced a gendered hierarchy, which entailed that only men were involved in political debates and negotiations with the authorities. Regardless of how they reacted, the women were sidelined in discussions over the fate of the market that they had pioneered and dominated. While certain men could legitimately seek to contest their own evictability, as we shall see in the following, there appeared to be little questioning that most of the traders at the Terminus were 'obviously' out of place. As politically powerless women and feminised men, these traders' gender itself rendered them 'evictable'.

Contesting 'informality' through identity politics

Youssou Camara was a middle-aged Malian man who had been a wholesale trader at the former Malian market. He was now in charge of the new warehouses at the terminus for the freight trains travelling to and from Mali, in the industrial zone of Bel Air just north of the harbour. He and another trader, Madu Cisse, had set up an association for the traders at the Terminus, on whose behalf the two of them had engaged in several years of correspondences with the authorities to stop the closure

of the market, or at least find a suitable alternative in the event that the market were to be closed. They had kept an archive of the many letters they had received from the authorities over the years. Madu Cisse, who had been the head of the association, explained that they received the first letter from the Senegalese authorities way back in 2000: 'We had the impression that it was just words and nothing concrete'.

Unlike Malian intellectuals, who blamed the traders for ignoring the law and causing their own eviction, for Youssou Camara the long-drawn-out process of eviction and the ambiguities surrounding it illustrated the illegibility and flexible application of the law, which meant that traders were always uncertain as to whether they were on the right or the wrong side of the law (cf. Devlin 2006). In his own words:

> The problem here in Africa is that people don't know their rights. The law says that if you want to evict someone from their accommodation you have to give them six months' notice and you have to allow them to find another place to where they can move. But a state doesn't give a damn about that! If it wants a location, it will make people leave and afterwards destroy their belongings.

Youssou explained that since the delivery of the eviction notice in 2006, the authorities kept 'crying wolf', threatening to evict the traders without exercising the threat. He told me the authorities did grant the Malian traders a new plot near the entrance to the station at Bel Air:

> I can show you the original map; it is written 'Malians' on the areas that were dedicated to us, including that market space. But another man took it, a Senegalese. Afterwards, he constructed a building there. He occupied it by force. The authorities didn't do anything. It's their fault. They are the authorities so it is their responsibility to tell him to leave. They should have taken charge but they did nothing.

The eviction notice, which was handed to the traders at the Terminus in April 2006, had asked them to clear the area within four months (see Figure 3.3). The notice, of which Youssou later gave me a copy, began: 'The government has decided on the modernisation and restructuration of the neighbourhood of the train station of Dakar, and consequently, to transfer all its activities to Colobane, Bel Air and Rufisque'. The notice explained that this move formed part of a programme to improve urban mobility (*Programme d'Amélioration de la Mobilité Urbaine*). It went on to outline the authorities' plans for improving the public transport system

NOTE D'INFORMATION

Objet : **TRANSFERT DE LA GARE FERROVIAIRE DE DAKAR**

Le Gouvernement du Sénégal a décidé la modernisation et la restructuration du quartier de la gare de Dakar et, par conséquent, du transfert de toutes les activités de celle-ci vers COLOBANE, Bel- Air et Rufisque.

Cet important programme a été défini et financé par l'Etat et les Bailleurs de fonds dans le cadre du Programme d'Amélioration de la Mobilité Urbaine (PAMU).

Ainsi, les magasins de la gare seront transférés à Bel- Air, les ateliers et les dortoirs à Rufisque. Tous ces travaux ont déjà commencé. De même, le terminus des trains voyageurs du PTB et de l'Express Dakar- Bamako sera déplacé momentanément à CYRNOS à partir de la fin du mois de Juillet 2006 en attendant la construction de la gare multimodale de COLOBANE.

En effet, le souci majeur du Gouvernement étant d'assurer la continuité du service public, il était indispensable de construire une **Nouvelle Grande Gare Ferroviaire** nationale et internationale, à la dimension de Dakar, intégrant la mise en place d'un système de transport combiné par bus entre COLOBANE, la Place de la Gare et le Centre Ville.

Ce système de transport combiné permettra aux voyageurs de prolonger leur trajet, avec un seul ticket, jusqu'à leur destination finale.

La construction de cette nouvelle gare ferroviaire commencera immédiatement après celle du **Nouveau Pont de COLOBANE**.

Toujours dans le souci de faciliter le déplacement des voyageurs, l'ensemble des infrastructures et du matériel roulant du PTB seront renouvelés et, mieux, **quatre trains réversibles climatisés** seront mis en circulation entre Thiès, Rufisque et Dakar dès la fin des travaux de renouvellement de la voie.

La libération des emprises ferroviaires de la gare de Dakar permettra ainsi, outre la modernisation du quartier, une meilleure réorganisation du transport de Banlieue en offrant plus d'efficacité et de souplesse.

C'est la raison pour laquelle il est instamment demander aux occupants des emprises ferroviaires de la gare de Dakar de prendre les dispositions utiles pour libérer leur logement ou magasin avant la fin du mois de Juillet 2006.

LA DIRECTION GENERALE

PTB SA: Capital 1 835 590 000 f CFA – RC : SN DKR 2003 B 7720 – NINEA : 22708752 G3
Comptes Bancaires : CLS 30 610163 9 061 0 00 ; BICIS 09520 004991 00068 ; SGBS 0 500 331 458 7
Adresse : Gare de Dakar – BP : 265 DAKAR Tel :889 19 00 / Fax : 842 62 60 ; E- mail: ptb@sentoo.sn

Figure 3.3 Note from April 2006 announcing the closure of the Malian market at the terminus train station in Dakar.

and infrastructure, concluding that 'The liberation of the premises of the railway line at the train station of Dakar thus permits, apart from the modernisation of the neighbourhood, a better reorganisation of the transport from the suburbs, offering more efficiency and flexibility'. This, the notice concluded, was the reason why the occupants at the Terminus were being asked to vacate their accommodation or warehouse.

When I was given the copy of the eviction notice by Youssou, he went through it with me, reading it out line by line. In the third paragraph of the notice it said the warehouses at the Terminus would be relocated and that this work had already started. Youssou burst out:

> None of that is true! They hadn't built anything at that moment. They are lying. When we came to Bel Air, there was nothing. We spent quite some time outside, in the open air. The warehouses we are using now date from 2008, and they were given to us in 2010.

Youssou then read the fourth paragraph aloud, where it said the government was going to build a large new national and international train station (*une nouvelle grand gare ferroviaire nationale et internationale*). He repeated the sentence to himself and exclaimed 'That's all a lie! They've never built that'. The official explanation put forward in the 2006 eviction notice appeared deceitful to Youssou, since it talked of a new train station and the re-location of the traders to new warehouses, none of which ever materialised.

In contrast to the accounts by Malian intellectuals in Dakar, Youssou and his former colleague Madu contested the notion that the traders at the Malian market – like many other inhabitants of urban Africa – were 'informals' operating beyond the framework governing the city and hence, essentially not part of the city. As we shall see in the following, Youssou and Madu's arguments made on behalf of the traders against their eviction were drawn from an eclectic mix of cosmopolitanism and indigeneity discourse, in order to claim belonging and appeal for solidarity – for example, by evoking their shared identity with their Senegalese 'brothers' and their collective heritage from colonial French West Africa; by referring to the importance of 'integration' of the populations in the sub-region; and by implying that they were the historical 'first-comers' at the Terminus (cf. Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Landau and Freemantle 2009; Ludl 2014). This raises the question as to why they felt that they had to evoke these complex and sensitive identity politics in their correspondences in order to defend the market. What I want to suggest is that these arguments were attempts to redefine the traders' status vis-à-vis the authorities, and to claim a status of 'formality' that took the traders out of the category of 'evictables'. To be able to claim their rights, they had to reformulate their collective identity in ways that were recognised as 'formal' and which were associated with 'rights' by the state.

A month into my fieldwork I interviewed Madu Cisse who, together with Youssou, had engaged in the high-level correspondences about the

market's fate on the traders' behalf. Madu was in charge of one of the new Malian markets that had been set up for the traders evicted from the Terminus. He provided very diplomatic responses to my questions regarding the eviction of the traders from the Terminus. He explained that when the state had wanted to close the market he had contacted the Malian and Senegalese authorities, in order to 'follow the correct path' for resolving this problem. He also claimed that the new market where I was interviewing him was called 'the market of integration' (*Le marché d'intégration*) and that it was open to all nationalities – Malians, Burkinabes, Senegalese and Nigeriens. When I mentioned this name of the market to Oumou, who worked there, she asked, 'What is integration?' To Oumou and my other interlocutors, the market was simply called '*le petit marché malien*' (the little Malian market) or Sugunikura. This made me wonder why Madu had emphasised that it was a market of 'integration' and whether there might have been some underlying political reason for this. When I discussed the closure of the Terminus with Youssou, he showed me a letter they had sent to President Wade in 2006, asking for certain clarifications about the authorities' plans for the market. The letter concluded that the traders wanted to ensure that their activities were in conformity with the law, and that they were mindful that President Wade and President ATT (of Mali) were both concerned about the 'integration' of the Malian and Senegalese 'brothers'.

The contemporary European discourse on 'integration' problematises the relationship between migrants and their 'host country' (cf. Spencer and Cooper 2006: 14), but this is not generally how the concept of integration is used in francophone West Africa. Rather, for my Malian interlocutors the French word *intégration* referred to the regional integration of the member states in the West African economic community, ECOWAS. The members of ECOWAS have long expressed their commitment to regional integration by signing various protocols relating to the freedom of movement, circulation and settlement across the borders of the member states, and Senegal and Mali are both signatories to these protocols (cf. Adepoju, Boulton and Levin 2007). The word 'integration', which Madu insisted was part of the name of the new market he was managing, implicitly referred to the ideal of regional solidarity and emphasised the shared identity of all West Africans as members of ECOWAS. The name of the market was thus a symbolic reminder to the Senegalese authorities of their political commitment to an 'integrated' ECOWAS. By extension, the name emphasised the 'formal' status of the market traders, as members of a neighbouring state and of a regional economic community, rather than as mere 'informal traders'.

In their correspondences with the authorities regarding the market closure, Madu and Youssou had also argued that the Terminus was a heritage site that did not belong to any one state. This was because it was built during the times of colonial French West Africa (AOF) when it served both Senegal and Mali, and because the Malians had been present at the Terminus even before independence. When I spoke to Youssou about alleged crimes that had occurred at the Terminus, including the sale of drugs and a couple of murders, he was adamant that these social problems did not justify the authorities' demolition of the market:

> Foreigners cannot decide on the development of a country; it's up to the government of Senegal to decide that. If they want to develop a place, we have to accept that. But the Terminus dates from the colonial era. It is a piece of heritage from colonial times. It belongs to neither the Malians nor the Senegalese.

By emphasising the shared heritage and 'kinship' between Mali and Senegal in their correspondences to the authorities, the market traders were proclaiming their status as both Malian nationals and as members of a regional economic community, both of which the Senegalese state formally recognised. In this way the traders sought to become recognisable to the authorities by having a 'formal' status and constituting a tangible political entity that the authorities could deal with, instead of being marginal outsiders who had no place within the framework governing the city.

By emphasising their citizenship and belonging in Africa, the traders were also implicitly appealing to Wade's African agenda. During his presidency, Wade was keen to assert his African identity: he was an engaged competitor for leadership on the African continent, playing a central role in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) and attempting to mediate in various African conflicts (de Jong and Foucher 2010). Meanwhile, Wade's assertion of African identity had an ambiguous function because he knew how to translate his international prestige into concrete resources (de Jong and Foucher 2010: 194–5; cf. Dahou and Foucher 2009: 18–19). Indeed, while the construction of the *Grand Théâtre* may have appeared to form part of Wade's grand project of 'African renaissance', in reality it testified to his instrumental approach to international relations: the theatre clearly signalled Wade's recognition of China – which had donated the theatre – and cemented diplomatic relations between China and Senegal that were restored after a gap of nearly 10 years in October 2005, after the Senegalese government broke

its relations with Taiwan (Matthew 2011; cf. de Jong and Foucher 2010: 195–6). By entering this relationship, Dakar obtained gifts and loans from China totalling 337 billion CFA (Dahou and Foucher 2009: 19).

Historically, the path of the Senegalese state has often been determined by external forces (Dahou and Foucher 2009: 16). Under Wade (2000–12) liberalisation reached new heights as the Senegalese economy was rebuilt around migration, remittances and increased donor funding (Dahou and Foucher 2009: 15; cf. Diop 2013; Tall 2009). Indeed, the work of Serigne Mansour Tall (1994; 2009) has shown how the increasing disengagement of the state in housing programmes in Dakar has coincided with increasing investments in housing by Senegalese emigrants. The eviction of the traders from the Terminus reflected a more general pattern of displacement, gentrification and land speculation that has historically characterised urban development in Dakar (Betts 1971; Bigon 2009; de Jong and Foucher 2010; Melly 2010, 2013; Tall 1994, 2009). This was increasingly the case under Wade, as Senegalese emigrants and foreign investors based abroad were buying up land and properties in the city. As Caroline Melly pertinently writes, 'Who exactly belongs to the city and who is able to benefit from its resources is an increasingly contentious issue in Dakar' (Melly 2010: 53).

Oumou remarked on this one evening as we were walking home from her market. As we passed by the rubble of several stalls and shacks destroyed by the council, she exclaimed,

> The government always builds, it never leaves its land – even if it's not today, one day they will do it. One day, the government can come and say that it needs this land, so the people are obliged to leave. Even if you think they are not using it, one day they will come and build there.

I commented that it was the same thing that happened at the Terminus. Oumou nodded vigorously. We walked on and then she commented,

> Here, it's not always clear who the owner of a piece of land is. If you are rich, you can do everything here. You speak to a minister and afterwards: hep! it's you who is the owner of some land – even if it belonged to the government. They do things like that here! If only you are rich, you can do anything here.

Ultimately, neither attachment to a place nor the rights of the occupants mattered much when it came to administering valuable public land in

Dakar, as Oumou's comments implied. The attempts by Malian traders to appeal against their eviction and the demolition of their market by emphasising their territorial belonging, shared heritage with the Senegalese, and regional integration, were futile. More potent means had to be brought onboard if the traders were to contest the power imbalances that threatened to destroy their market.

The esoteric register

Considering the protracted negotiations and correspondences over the closure of the market at the Terminus that Madu and Youssou had engaged in, I was puzzled that Oumou said that she did not know in advance that the market would be shut down. I asked her again towards the end of my fieldwork if they were not told anything about when the police would come to demolish the Malian market. 'Nothing! They said nothing!' she insisted. I commented that I thought Youssou and Madu had been talking with the authorities, but Oumou interrupted and exclaimed, 'Youssou lies! That association, it didn't exist when they came to smash La Gare [the market at the Terminus]. Youssou is lying'. Oumou had no idea of the correspondences and negotiations that had been taking place between Youssou and Madu's association and the Senegalese authorities. Indeed, it appeared that a handful of Malians, including those who were closely involved in negotiating the fate of the market at the Terminus, perhaps knew more about the authorities' plans and decisions than they relayed to the traders at the market, and benefited from this 'secret knowledge'. Djiby Tounkara found it highly suspicious that, unlike most other traders, Youssou and Madu had not lost any money when the market closed down; instead, they had gone and started up new businesses. 'Before, they were just manual labourers', Djiby commented. According to Issa Dembele a couple of wealthy Malians had also profited from the closure of the market at the Terminus, by renting out new market spaces to the dispersed traders. After telling me this, he added, 'But you have to be careful, Fatoumata![14] There are certain things that are very sensitive. There are certain aspects where the people don't like that you ask too many questions'.

It is, however, conceivable that Youssou (and others) not only withheld knowledge for his own personal gain but that he also believed he was protecting the women from the burden of possessing this powerful knowledge. This would partly reflect the way that

certain forms of knowledge tend to be conceptualised as powerful 'secrets' in Mande society (cf. Roth and Jansen 2000). For example, the *nyamakalaw*[15] monopolise knowledge in the form of hereditary secrets kept within their social group, about how to perform a specific trade like forging or praise singing. Patrick McNaughton (2000: 178–9) argues that this secrecy is preserved both as a strategy for maintaining the association's social power, but also to protect the innocent (women and children in particular) from being exposed to greater levels of power than they can handle. The notion that knowledge about the closure of the Malian market constituted a similarly 'powerful secret' is illustrated in the way Youssou transmitted – and withheld – this knowledge when I interviewed him. I sometimes felt that Youssou was intimidating me slightly, to test how far I was willing to go to learn about what had happened at the Terminus, and decide whether it was worth his while to take the risk of sharing this knowledge with me. During our first meeting, for example, our otherwise balanced exchange suddenly shifted, and Youssou stopped answering my questions and said something rather obscure:

> As you know, in research there are secrets; you need secrets to do a PhD. There are many people who have come here and asked me questions – journalists and so on. You need to consider what you'll do with this information. It's no good to write a book, people won't read that. . . . There were some other researchers here, Canadians, who were looking at shea butter. The shea tree is grown in which other countries? That's what I am talking about. You see, like them you need secrets. You can think about that, reflect on what I've just told you.

Confused over the message he was trying to convey, I started to worry that I might have gone too far with my questions. But there had not been any indication during the interview that Youssou did not want to collaborate. In fact, he had been talking very freely and shared many sensitive insights with me. But there was clearly something powerfully important attached to those 'secrets' that I was asking him to share with me. On another occasion, as Youssou and I drove back to the city centre in his car after an interview, we discussed the profession of a researcher. I asked him whether he thought there was any equivalent occupation in traditional Malian society – did *griots* do work that was similar to what I was doing? 'No, the *griots* don't do research',[16] Youssou answered, 'it is the *féticheurs* [sorcerers] who do that'. I asked

him whether the sorcerers (*soma* in Bamanankan) needed to carry out research in order to be able to perform their esoteric work, and Youssou confirmed this.

I later asked Oumou about the notion of the researcher and sorcerer being alike, without mentioning that it was Youssou who had suggested it. Oumou said she did not think my work had anything to do with that of a sorcerer. About an hour later, we started chatting about Youssou and the new train station and Oumou then spontaneously exclaimed, 'It's Youssou Camara who is a *soma* [sorcerer]!' I was not too surprised about this comment. Indeed, Youssou had trained to learn about herbal medicine, and whenever I met with him at his workplace he was usually busy with male customers to whom he was selling expensive natural aphrodisiacs. He was also well-versed in cowrie shell divination, and I got further confirmation of his animist beliefs when he told me a story about a Dogon mask that he and his brothers had tried selling but given up because the mask had started speaking to Youssou. Yet, more significantly, between 2006 and 2009 Youssou had been in charge of wielding the 'occult' forces to the benefit of the traders at the Malian market, in what he believed had been a largely successful attempt at making sure the authorities did not touch their market. As he told me during one interview:

> We did a lot of sacrifices during that period, so that they wouldn't come and destroy La Gare [the market at the Terminus]. It's not a small number of *féticheurs* who came to the Terminus. There was one man who came from Mali. He entered one of the warehouses and undressed completely. He did his work [sorcery] and the next day he came out. There were many things like that happening, lots of things. And it worked! Every time, if I said I needed 100,000 CFA to perform a sacrifice, immediately I had one million on my table. The traders wanted that.

In contesting Youssou's claims about the power of their sacrifices, I suggested that perhaps the reason President Wade had hesitated to destroy the market was rather that it was a Malian market – maybe he was afraid of jeopardising the fraternal relations with his neighbouring country? Youssou nodded, but firmly said:

> No – Wade doesn't give a damn about that! Once he had decided to destroy a market, he did it.[17] It is because of our sacrifices that they left La Gare for three years before breaking it [the market]. Those weren't small sacrifices! They were very big sacrifices. People spent

a lot of money. There are a lot of *féticheurs* in Mali who are aware of what happened at the Terminus. And even here – a lot of *féticheurs* in Senegal are also aware of what happened at the Terminus.

I later asked him why the *féticheurs* had come all the way from Mali to the Terminus – did they come to carry out some 'research' there? Youssou explained that they came to bury things – presumably fetishes – in the ground at the Terminus.

Youssou thus possessed two kinds of 'secret knowledge' – that is, a privileged insight into exclusive forms of knowledge – which enabled him to influence the authorities' decisions: the knowledge he obtained through corresponding and negotiating with the authorities; and the knowledge of the sacrifices he performed and of the work of the *féticheurs* he employed. When I interviewed Youssou, he was letting me in on some of these powerful secrets, which meant I had acquired a form of knowledge that I could potentially use against him. Perhaps this is why he saw my work as a researcher as equivalent to that of a *féticheur*.

When I asked him why the sacrifices in 2009 did not work, Youssou looked puzzled and replied, 'But they worked! How do you know they didn't work?' 'Because they destroyed the market', I replied. He objected: 'No, but since 2006 they didn't touch anything! In July 2006, the bulldozers arrived. But they never destroyed anything. They just turned around. They didn't touch anything at the Terminus. But they were there, right in front of the entrance to the market. It's God who accepted our sacrifices'. I kept rephrasing my question to understand how come the market had ultimately been destroyed if their sacrifices had indeed worked. Finally, Youssou admitted, 'Well, we were betrayed'. In 2009, there was a group that came to see Youssou and told him they had found a big *marabout* (Muslim diviner)[18] who had snakes and bees that could kill any person who came to destroy the market at the Terminus. Youssou never told me the details of what ensued. I asked him to clarify whether the *marabout* had deceived them, and Youssou confirmed: 'It was the *marabout*, he was fake'.

This story ironically suggests that *marabouts* and *féticheurs* played a role in reinforcing respect for leases at the former market. If we are to take seriously Youssou's claims about the potency of the sacrifices – and considering the significant financial backing he received from the traders, we should – then what does this tell us about urban governance and membership in Dakar at the height of Wade's liberal regime? In the end, magic it would seem was more effective in influencing authorities' decisions than any legal or democratic avenues; magic could regulate a

market far more effectively than actual laws and formal rules. It would however be too simplistic to assume that magic simply filled up the void left by the lack of governance and accountability, thus reflecting the absence of the state under neoliberalism (cf. the analysis of vigilantism in the South African context by Rush Smith 2019).[19] Among the population in Senegal, particularly the non-elite and working class, there tends to be a strong suspicion that elites derive their political power and wealth from the illicit use of magic (Bonhomme and Gabail 2018: 949). In this sense, it was presumably magic that empowered the authorities to threaten the traders with eviction from the Terminus. By countering the source of this power imbalance with the same means – that is, with sorcery – the market traders were treating 'like with like'. In other words, the esoteric forces that the traders were using against the authorities constituted a kind of 'sympathetic' or 'imitative' magic, curing like with like.

At face value, the fact that the traders at the Terminus were not evicted before 2009 appears to suggest a kind of forbearance on the part of the authorities. Alisha C. Holland (2016) conceived of the term 'forbearance' as a way to describe intentional and revocable government leniency toward violations of the law. Noting that, in much of the Global South, legal rules are ignored, Holland points out that prevailing approaches to understand such 'inaction' assume that politicians do attempt to enforce the law and fail due to state weakness (Holland 2016: 232). Instead, Holland argues that politicians in certain cases *choose* not to do so, even when they do have the capacity to enforce the law. Holland focuses empirically on two common legal violations by the poor, street vending and squatting, and argues that politicians respond to these with forbearance – that is, deliberately withholding sanctions – to maximise votes as well as rents among the urban poor. Holland's analysis implies that disenfranchised and poorer urban residents do hold some power and are in some ways able to influence the decisions of authorities. Non-enforcement is thus not void of meaning and politics. For Youssou, the fact that the bulldozers arriving to demolish the Terminus 'turned around' was by no means trivial but reflected deliberate and intentional actions by powerful agents or forces. Insisting that 'it was because of our sacrifices', Youssou implied that the forbearance of the authorities, which ran counter to the intentions of the eviction notice, proved that they were being influenced by the market traders's sacrifices. Their 'forbearance' in other words did not reflect an apolitical choice to simply leave the traders in peace. Rather, it revealed a kind of politics that operated on a different register to the law and democracy and which was not simply motivated by obvious political allegiances. This was urban politics operating on an esoteric register.

Fostering or annihilating 'informality'?

Under Wade's liberal and kleptocratic regime, certain illegitimate economic practices, which in other circumstances might be deemed 'informal', were tolerated and even supported by the regime as long as they were carried out by the wealthy and politically connected. In this context, application of the 'informality' label appeared to be selective. Despite the claims of Malian elites, the dividing line separating the 'formal' and 'informal' in Dakar had less to do with compliance with formal regulations and legislation, and more to do with whether or not one could attract and grow significant capital. In the era of liberalisation, Roy and AlSayyad have argued that 'the organizing divide is not so much that between formality and informality as the differentiation that exists within informality – that which marks off different types of informal accumulation and informal politics. The neoliberal state, of course, deepens such forms of differentiations, fostering some forms of informality and annihilating others' (Roy and AlSayyad 2004: 5).

Several intersecting factors discriminated against the traders at the Malian market and made them an 'obvious' and legitimate target for eviction in the eyes of the authorities and Malian elites. As small- (and medium-) scale traders, they did not benefit from the infrastructural developments in Dakar under Wade, which served wealthier residents and economic actors based abroad. To the contrary, like other relatively powerless inhabitants of Dakar they were subjected to a common story of exclusion and clearances in a context where land was increasingly commoditised and privatised. Despite the neoliberal mantra of the importance of attracting foreign investment, the money generated by traders from Mali was deemed less attractive than that of other foreigners, such as the Chinese who donated the money for the *Grand Théâtre*. And finally, as relatively powerless women and 'feminised' men, the traders were positioned in a patriarchal system which deemed their knowledge as less valid, incorrect or inappropriate compared with the elite of the gender hierarchy whose position granted them access to knowledge/power.

Meanwhile, virtually everyone in Dakar had a relative involved in 'informal trade' and everyone relied on it for their daily consumption. The ubiquity of so-called 'informality' was reflected in authorities' backstage acceptance of traders and their ad-hoc approach to law enforcement. On the one hand, law enforcing authorities appeared to display an aggressive intolerance of hawkers and small-scale

businesses operating on the streets of downtown Dakar, targeting them in occasional raids to clear them off the pavements of Reubeuss, Medina and Plateau in the city centre. On the other hand, evicted traders usually reappeared or were replaced by other traders almost immediately, and police and *gendarmes* would then turn a blind eye until launching the next campaign. When the clock struck 5pm and the nearby *gendarmes* were off duty, the Malian traders at the new cloth bazaar at the Terminus would immediately put tables with goods out onto the pavement in front of their market to attract customers, since the law apparently was not enforced after hours. I observed *gendarmes* leaving work who would stroll past and greet these pavement traders.

The fact that the traders at the Terminus were not evicted before 2009 suggests that the 'informality' of the traders at the Terminus and the formal/informal dichotomy was only invoked when it suited the strategic purposes of the authorities, in this case clearing the area to make way for 'The Seven Wonders of Dakar'. This resembles Ryan Devlin's (2006) observations of the regulation of street vending in New York, where the law was enforced only occasionally, usually in response to complaints over the vendors. Rather than constituting a viable framework for governing the city, such approaches resemble the ad-hoc and exceptional rules imposed when attempting to manage a crisis (Devlin 2006: 3; cf. AlSayyad 2004). In the examples from both New York and Dakar, city authorities were not acting on the basis of discrete and well-defined categories of legality and illegality but rather, the definition of what was or was not allowed by law became fluid and contingent (cf. Devlin 2006: 3). Hence, pavement and market traders in Dakar or street vendors in New York might at any point find themselves on the wrong side of the law, depending on the needs and interests of the authorities. This is a type of 'informality' which slips in and out of legality in a contingent and unpredictable manner. As Devlin (Devlin 2006: 6) explains, this allows the authorities great flexibility and is a condition that can be tactically mobilised by anti-vending interests; but it also creates an environment of uncertainty and illegibility of the law for the traders.

A normative discourse which disparages informality can be used strategically to serve certain political interests and more generally, to underpin established social hierarchies of, for example, gender and class. While critical scholars have thoroughly deconstructed the simplistic and misleading formal/informal dichotomy, this normative binary had been adopted by certain influential actors in Dakar. The dichotomy that Malian intellectuals, officials and powerful male traders established between

what they considered 'the formal' and 'the informal' was also implicitly gendered. The informal was to the formal what female was to male, so to speak: inferior, financially unsustainable, dependent, irrational, and in need of control and discipline (cf. Freeman 2001; Ortner 1974). By feminising and 'informalising' the market traders, they were deprived of social status and thus, their political claims and livelihoods deemed little worthy of consideration. While a few male traders contested their evictability and claimed an insight into and partial control of the plans and motivations of the authorities, the majority of the traders at the Terminus were largely excluded from such areas of power. Meanwhile, as the rest of this book illustrates, the traders evicted from the Terminus were not mere victims but also resilient. The following chapters draw attention not only to endings but also to what *emerges* at the end, when a dense node such as the Terminus is dissolved, emptied, scattered and fragmented.

Notes

1   According to Melly, large-scale road projects initiated in Dakar in 2006 created worsening traffic jams and detours that sparked public outrage. To appease the public, officials called on urban residents to be patient and to focus on the brilliant futures that awaited the city and the nation, and as part of this effort, 'Towering billboards celebrating Senegal's dazzling future were strategically placed where traffic tended to thicken' (Melly 2013: 390–1).

2   The Autoroute of the Future (*Autoroute de l'Avenir*) was completed in several phases. It would link the northern and southern extremities of Dakar and include a high-speed toll segment (*autoroute à péage*) linking the peninsula to the new airport in Diamniadio (Melly 2017: 40–1).

3   I have deduced these dates of construction of the road and the parking lot from satellite images of the area available from Google Earth.

4   A document from the Senegalese government (Gouvernement du Sénégal 2011) describes the 'Seven Architectural Wonders' of Dakar as follows: '*Situé entre l'ancienne gare de Dakar, le carrefour Cyrnos, le Boulevard de l'Arsenal et l'Avenue Lamine Guèye, ces « Sept merveilles » architecturales qui vont former le Parc culturel de Dakar sont notamment le Grand Théâtre national, l'Ecole des Arts, l'Ecole d'Architecture, les Archives nationales, la Maison de la Musique, la Bibliothèque nationale et le Musée des Civilisations noires*'. A virtual tour of the Cultural Park is available online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1O1wNsfmaM.

5   As part of the plan for the Cultural Park, President Wade also wanted to demolish most of the old train station and transform the terminus building into a Museum of Contemporary Art *(Musée des arts contemporains)*. This plan was abolished by President Macky Sall in March 2013 (Ndiaye 2013). Meanwhile, a Museum of Black Civilisations was built in the close vicinity of the old Terminus building and inaugurated in 2018.

6   PTB stands for *Petit Train de Banlieue* (little suburban train), formerly known as the *Petit Train Bleu*. It runs between Thiès, Rufisque and Dakar.

7   The railway workers (*cheminots*) employed by the *PTB* protested when their workshop for the trains was torn down, and they also campaigned for several years to get the authorities to allow the trains from the suburbs to continue all the way to the old train station in the city centre, as they had in the past. They succeeded in this in 2013, while I was carrying out fieldwork (see Malou 2013).

8   The Malian interlocutors of the article suggested the deal had already been signed between certain authorities and the businessman in 2006, and this businessman was growing impatient. During the demolition of the market, several workers were spotted in the no-access zone established by the police where the warehouses had been bulldozed; they were recuperating the iron and other materials which were immediately transported away from the site (Malijet 2009). Two of my interlocutors corroborated this and claimed that the construction materials from the old colonial warehouses, which the Malian traders were leasing, were valuable assets, which were stolen as soon as the warehouses were broken down.

9   The Islamic Summit Conference is a summit of member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), attended by global leaders from the Islamic world (www.oic-oci.org).

10   My translation from the original French text.

11   According to Kate Meagher, the prevailing definition accepted across disciplinary and ideological boundaries is that 'the informal economy refers to income generating activities that operate outside the regulatory framework of the state (Meagher 2013: 2).

12   In 2006, then interior minister of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, announced a new immigration policy whereby immigration would be 'chosen and not imposed' (*choisie et non subie*) (Raizon 2006). The policy was largely intended to reduce the number of low-skilled non-European immigrants (cf. Neveu Kringelbach 2013). Sarkozy popularised the term *immigration choisie* (chosen immigration), which became a slogan during his successful 2007 presidential election campaign.

13   Chapter 5 develops this point further, focusing on competing femininities among the traders.

14   All my interlocutors knew me as Fatoumata Doucoure. I was given this name the first time I carried out fieldwork in Mali in 2006, and this was the name I was introduced with to other people by my Malian friend and former host, who helped me settle in Dakar.

15   *Nyamakala* is sometimes translated as caste, but I find this term misleading because it tends to imply a status hierarchy whereas in fact the different *nyamakala* groups each have their own, exclusive domains of power/knowledge (Conrad and Frank 1995).

16   *Griots* would probably not agree with this claim. Lucy Durán's film on *griots* documents that they in fact call themselves researchers of history and cultures (Durán 2013).

17   Youssou told me several other markets were destroyed by Wade in the same period, including *Marché Elisabeth* in the harbour, *Marché Petersen* close to where I lived, and *Le Marché de Colobane*.

18   The *marabout* (*mori* in Bamanankan) is a syncretic figure who draws on pre-Islamic traditions as well as the Qur'an to perform healing and divination. Meanwhile, it can also refer to an Islamic scholar and teacher (*karamògò* in Bamanankan), a spiritual leader, or a saint.

19   According to Nicholas Rush Smith, most accounts of vigilantism focus on state failure or civic failure, arguing that vigilantes step in for states that cannot provide order or emerge from societies where social bonds are fractured. In contrast, he argues that vigilantism might best be viewed as an uncomfortable form of citizenship (Rush Smith 2019: 4–5).

4
Displacement and place relations of mobile and sedentary traders

On a grey afternoon in early August, I accompanied Nana and her teenage daughter Coumba to the Stade de l'Amitié, from where they would be catching their bus to return to Mali. Other passengers were patiently waiting in the rain, trying to cover themselves under jackets and scarves, or seeking temporary shelter in one of the food tents. By contrast, Nana, Coumba and I installed ourselves comfortably under the canopy of the Sira bus company that Nana always travelled with. I started chatting to one of the employees and did not notice when Nana and Coumba left. A few minutes later, they called me from the stall of a rival bus company that was run by a Malian woman whom Nana was now sitting next to, chatting. I joined them, but shortly after Nana and her daughter left for the toilet and did not return. The rain intensified. Several men started entering the stall to sit down next to me, but I did not know any of them and did not fancy engaging with their banter. I decided to grab Nana's veil that she had left behind and went out to look for her and Coumba. I felt slightly lost and left out, as I wandered around alone in the rain. But then suddenly I heard Coumba calling me. I looked around for the location of her voice which seemed to come out of nowhere. I then realised that she and Nana were sitting in the luggage compartment beneath an empty bus, sheltering from the rain. It looked cosy and I felt a bit disappointed that they had not immediately invited me along. Nana probably realised this, because she told me she had asked Coumba to call me, but then she saw that I was sitting comfortably where I was, under the canopy of the bus company. She moved over to make room for me, and I climbed in. It was only then that I realised that there was a woman lying in the darkness, deep inside the compartment. I had mistaken her for a bundle of luggage, as she was covered from head to toe in a long cotton *saree*.[1] She slowly sat up and greeted me in a deep rusty voice, while

tucking the *saree* behind her ears to reveal her striking face, which was decorated with traditional scarring and tattoos. She asked for my name and enquired critically why I called myself Fatoumata if I was not a Muslim. I explained that it was a name that other Malians had given to me, to which she responded 'I've kept my own name. My name is Amelie Longsong'. Amelie was a Christian from Togo but she told us she lived in Bamako. Her poetic name and mystical appearance intrigued me; but I was clearly not the only person who was fascinated by her. She began chatting to Nana and soon started bragging that she knew 'all the customs officials' and, noticing the impressed look on Nana's face, she added, 'The big boss of the customs officials, who is in Bamako – he is my friend!' Amelie mentioned his name and, recognising who he was, Nana nodded eagerly and exclaimed, 'What is your secret, Amelie?! You have to tell me your secret!' Amelie laughed confidently. Nana continued trying to charm her, inviting her to come along to her hangout place (*grin*) by the Grand Mosque of Dakar, next to the Sira bus company, adding, '*on va bien causer la-bas!*' (we'll do some nice chatting over there). She then asked for Amelie's mobile phone number.

The above episode exemplifies the sometimes unexpected ways in which place and social relations were created by the Malian women on the move after the cessation of the passenger train to Dakar. Through close and sustained observation at the parking lot, I came to the surprising realisation of how place was made through the social interactions between Nana, Coumba and Amelie, in the luggage compartment underneath a bus. The episode illustrates Nana's privileged relationship with the Sira bus company and her both affectionate and strategic relationships with other mobile women she encountered in Dakar. It thus points to some of the ways in which Nana experienced a sense of place, even in locations she was merely passing through on her way elsewhere. The dense and meaningful experiences people have in contemporary transport and travel hubs are easily overlooked and yet, as this episode reveals, even in what might appear as 'non-places' mobile people in transit are continuously finding ways of making themselves at home (cf. Casey 1996). As Dalakoglou and Harvey point out, 'airports, shopping malls and motorway service stations might be non-places to the passing traveller – but they are replete with social relations, with material histories, with regulatory forces and when given the chance reveal complex social and cultural dynamics that bear close attention' (Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012: 463).

In this chapter I examine the spatialised experiences of and responses to displacement among different groups of traders associated with the Terminus. The ruptures caused by the demolition of the market at the Terminus and the privatisation of the railway line entailed significant

shifts in the traders' spatial relationships. Destruction, dispossession and dislocation meant that both shuttle and market traders had to restore their working spaces and livelihoods in new spatial environments. The traders had to make sense of new surroundings, produce new places, and adjust and reassess their relationships with old places like the Terminus. Displacement frequently entails loss and suffering and a subsequent need to emplace oneself in order re-establish one's proper place in the world (Lems 2018). Meanwhile, as Amanda Hammar has pointed out, there are also those who *gain* from the opportunities that displacement paradoxically generates (Hammar 2014: 15). By comparing the relatively sedentary market traders with the highly mobile shuttle traders, like Nana, the variety of changes in these traders' spatial worlds and the losses and the gains this entailed will become apparent.

In the aftermath of displacement, the scattered market traders appeared to 'cling on' to the space of the old Terminus, whereas the shuttle traders seemed more adaptable and engaged in new forms of place-making and in making sense of new places. To explain this discrepancy, I begin this chapter by examining the changing conditions of place-making for the highly mobile shuttle traders who had previously deployed the passenger train and conducted their commerce at the Dakar Terminus. Their experiences in the aftermath of rupture and displacement were characterised by a sense of disorientation and a need to make sense of the completely new environments in which they found themselves while on the move and in transit in Dakar. The analysis meanwhile also points to the agency and creativity that were evident in these contexts of having to make sense of and create new places. I highlight some of the commercial opportunities that emerged in this context of displacement and the new forms of place-making this led to among the Malian shuttle traders. The second half of the chapter turns to the evicted market traders and considers some of the reasons for their resistance to relocate their stalls and marketplaces away from the space near the old Terminus. On the surface, their conservative efforts to cling on to the lost space appeared to reflect a sedentarist outlook among these traders, who viewed their commercial identities as 'rooted' in the location of the old Terminus. On closer examination, however, the market traders' dependency on the specific location of the Terminus cannot be dismissed as simply irrational and nostalgic. The analysis reveals that there were practical and economic reasons behind their place attachments at the Terminus. Altogether, the chapter underscores the diversity of meanings which mobile and relatively sedentary traders attached to the space of the Terminus; and their different capacities for readjustment to new surroundings and working environments in the aftermath of displacement.

Making sense of place on the move – from rail to road

When the market at the Terminus was closed and the passenger train stopped running, many of the Malian shuttle traders gave up coming to Dakar. Some stopped their transnational trade altogether and 'retired' in Mali. Others instead re-oriented their networks and routes away from Dakar, pursuing alternative destinations like Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast or Guinea Conakry. A few settled down permanently in Dakar and, if they had sufficient capital to rent a shop or market stall, transitioned from mobile into 'sedentary' trade.[2]

Meanwhile, the decline of the Dakar–Niger railway and improvement of the roads linking Mali and Senegal also incited one entrepreneurial Malian woman – herself a shuttle trader – to create a bus route in 2003 for passengers travelling between Bamako and Dakar. The roads that lead from Dakar and Bamako to the border between the two countries were fully asphalted by 1999 on the Senegalese side and by 2006 on the Malian side (Choplin and Lombard 2010: 5). The Malian woman founded the first bus company servicing this transnational route in 2006, and other companies emerged during the next three years. Many of the Malian shuttle traders, who had previously journeyed on the train, hence continued to travel together by bus. These traders were colloquially known in Dakar as 'les bana-banas du Mali' – bana-bana referring to various kinds of itinerant and informal traders – and some of the Malian bus companies covering the Dakar–Bamako route became unofficially known as the 'bana-bana buses' (see Figure 4.1). Rather than competing with mainstream Malian (and Senegalese)[3] buses over passenger comfort in terms of, for example, air-conditioning or legroom, the bana-bana buses obtained loyal and regular customers among 'the Malian bana-banas' by catering specifically to their transport needs. One-way bus tickets between Dakar and Bamako normally cost 30,000 CFA (45 euros) but on the bana-bana buses they could easily be negotiated down to 25,000 CFA (37.5 euros), which was the same price as that charged on the Express train that these shuttle traders had travelled with in the past, before privatisation.[4] In fact, the bana-bana buses usually charged their regular clients merely 20,000–22,500 CFA, and some of these companies had a discount system where they offered the tenth journey for free.

Ba Fanta, an older woman who traded outdoors next to the railway tracks, explained, however, that the main reason the number of female shuttle traders had declined after the passenger train had stopped running was that the bus journeys were too exhausting: the aisle inside the buses

Figure 4.1 Advertisement of destinations covered by one of the Malian bus companies popular with the shuttle traders, 'the Malian *bana-banas*'.

used by the shuttle traders was normally so packed with luggage that passengers could not move but were crammed into their seats during the nearly two days of travel. A female shuttle trader describing her bus journey explained: 'Your feet are so swollen you'd think you had elephantiasis. Even your entire body hurts, because you don't move'. The few stops on the route were mostly at checkpoints and border posts, where the travellers would be harassed by corrupt officials.

The following analysis examines how these Malian shuttle traders experienced and related to the environments they moved through and inhabited on their journeys to and from Dakar – in other words, how they experienced a sense of place 'on the move'. I consider the shuttle traders' experiences of place within the realm of transport, comparing the 'train place' to the 'bus place' and the implications of changing from the former to the latter means of transport as these women journeyed to and from Dakar. Focusing analytically on such 'place-making on the move' constitutes an implicit critique of the recent mobilities turn in the social sciences, particularly nomadology-inspired analyses which glorify flow and movement at the expense of other salient analytical perspectives (Noyes 2004: 164; cf. Franquesa 2011). In contrast to these approaches,

by examining the spatial experiences of the shuttle traders the wider point I want to make here is to bring place-making to the fore in analyses of mobilities. Scholarship on place-making has emphasised that even in less stable situations of transit, mobility and transport, people actively create and engage with place (Casey 1996: 46; Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012). Through their bodies, people inadvertently experience and make place, even if they may not always be able or willing to establish a sense of familiarity or belonging in the places where they find themselves (cf. Bjarnesen 2013; Chu 2006; Marchand 2015). At the same time, places and people's relations with them are subject to constant change; place-making is a dynamic process. As phenomenological observers have pointed out, places do not just exist in and of themselves, emerging out of pre-existing empty space. Rather, places are produced and re-created through our interactions with the environments that we inhabit (cf. Casey 1996; Ingold 2009: 33). This will become evident in the following when I explore how the mobile traders, who were accustomed to travelling on trains, gradually adapted to the space of the buses, making place for themselves and their goods.

The passenger train had constituted a kind of moving marketplace, but this place could not be re-created on the buses. Oumou fondly remembered her interactive railway journeys:

> In Kati, the *bana-banas* would get lots of vegetables. During the journey, everyone would trade out of the windows at the stations. The train only stopped for 5–10 minutes so you had to be quick, so that's why everyone traded out of the windows. You could fill a big crate with three buckets. You'd just pour the contents of your bucket out of the window into their crate like this [she empties an imaginary bucket]. Then after the three buckets, they'd place 1,500 francs in the bottom of your bucket and hand it back. People also bought their meals through the windows. If I didn't want to eat what they were selling, I would send a young boy to get me some meat or fish – I knew lots of young boys who I could just send out to buy me things.

For most of the journey, the bus was experienced as an entirely bounded place and as separate from the road it travelled on (cf. Boyer 2003). In contrast, the train was largely integrated with the landscapes it travelled through, as passengers entered and exited at the various stations, and exchanges of goods occurred through the windows, thus eliminating the external boundaries of the train (cf. Roy and Hannam 2012). Possibilities

of interacting with other passengers were also relatively limited on the buses compared with the more spacious train, where passengers had been able to move around inside while the vehicle travelled. As my Malian neighbour in Dakar recalled:

> People used to get on and off the train at the stations, and there were also traders entering the train to sell to the passengers on board. If you got tired, you could get up from your seat and walk up and down the train. There was also a bar and a restaurant, and some cabins even had beds. Now you have to sit up all the way and if the bus is full, it only stops once, in Tambacounda.

A unique kind of temporality appears to have characterised the Dakar–Niger railway journeys, which were characterised by slowness and stopping (cf. Roy and Hannam 2012). Bus journeys in contrast were largely characterised by speed. One apparent advantage of the buses over the train was that they were generally faster, departures were more frequent, and – apart from the occasional check points – the buses made fewer stops *en route*. For the Malian bus companies, speed implied a faster turnover of passengers and hence more profit. To some extent, this prioritisation also applied to the mobile traders themselves who preferred to minimise their less productive waiting and travel time. Yet, the priority of speed also conflicted with certain financial, social and existential needs of passengers and drivers, as well as roadside communities.

The speedy bus journeys (and the limited space for luggage on the bus) meant that the shuttle traders were largely impeded from any engagement with the local economies along the route that they travelled. Hence, the people living along the transnational route were prevented from accessing long-distance flows of commodities, people and transport, effectively cutting them off from participation in wider circuits of exchange (cf. Porter 2012). Thus, paradoxically, the road and the speed it enabled implied a *disconnection* from flows for the people and places in-between the nodes where the buses stopped (cf. Ferguson 2006). Moreover, for the shuttle traders who now found themselves stuck in their seats for the duration of their journeys, unable to move or interact with the surrounding environments, the speed associated with bus journeys paradoxically entailed a heightened sense of *immobility* (cf. Jónsson 2014). Inevitably, the shuttle traders did sometimes end up spending several days on the road if the bus broke down along the way or if the driver had no substitute driver and insisted on stopping to sleep. The bus companies meanwhile clearly prioritised the 'need for speed' even if that

Figure 4.2 Malian truck, identifiable by its distinct red number plates, parked on a street in downtown Dakar, used by small-scale shuttle traders to transport their goods back to Mali.

need occasionally jeopardised people's safety and well-being (cf. Carrier 2005). The non-unionised bus drivers were often tired and overworked as they had little opportunity to rest during or in-between shifts, because the companies wanted to optimise the use of their buses by quickly filling them with passengers and setting off on the road. This was presumably the cause of one major road accident that happened during my fieldwork in which half of the passengers on a bus travelling to Mali were killed after the bus swerved and collided with a stationary truck. While accidents also occurred on the train, I was told that they were generally less severe since the train was not moving fast. Overall, the transition from the train to buses entailed significant sacrifices and loses on the part of the shuttle traders, as well as for the drivers and roadside communities.

Experienced shuttle traders had to adjust their expectations and routines when taking the bus and could not simply transfer the habits they had acquired from years of travelling by train. Compared with the more spacious passenger train, the buses had relatively little room for luggage, and the goods that did not fit into the Malian buses had to be transported separately. Some bus companies offered separate transport for the shuttle traders' goods, usually by means of one of the Malian trucks stationed at

Figure 4.3 Bus departure from the Malian bus terminal at the Stade de l'Amitié.

the 'Parking malien' on the outskirts of the Cap Vert Peninsula. There were also Malian trucks parked on inconspicuous street corners in Dakar city centre, which were used by shuttle traders to send back smaller quantities of goods (see Figure 4.2). Yet, paying for the separate transport of their goods in addition to paying for their bus tickets represented a significant cost for the shuttle traders. Therefore, the women tried to carry as much luggage as possible on the buses, often to the frustration of bus company employees who tried to distribute space equally among all passengers. The forced separation of passengers and luggage on the buses could be slightly traumatic before departure from the Stade de l'Amitié (see Figure 4.3). One middle-aged female shuttle trader started crying because she was not allowed to transport a big fridge on the bus back home to Mali (cf. Watts and Urry 2008). Travelling with their property on the train and negotiating with officials on route had been an integral part of the shuttle trader profession. In the past while travelling on the train, the shuttle traders would pool their money to collectively pay the duty on the goods they were bringing with them, and they were able to negotiate directly with the customs officers who came around for inspection (cf. Lambert de Frondeville 1987). Meanwhile, the separate transport of their goods

by truck meant that the shuttle traders had less control over these aspects of their trade. They now had to rely on truck drivers and *convoyeurs*[5] to negotiate taxation and bribery on their behalf at the border posts and numerous checkpoints.[6]

Meanwhile, the shuttle traders were gradually adjusting to the physical space of the buses, finding ways to make room for themselves and their belongings and thus, familiarising themselves and making themselves more at home on the buses. Through certain practices, including specific seating arrangements and agreements between drivers and passengers, social relations and hierarchies were established among the passengers. Nana and Fatou Fall were Malian shuttle traders with relatively large trade capitals. They regularly came to Dakar to purchase wholesale goods, including bicycles, cement, rice and gas, for their clients in Bamako. Because they were loyal customers and friends with the employees of the *bana-bana* bus company, Sira, they had certain privileges aboard the return bus to Mali. They could always get a seat at the front of the bus; and while waiting for the departure at the Stade de l'Amitié they could sit together with the employees in the shade of the bus company's canopy instead of waiting under the scorching sun (or sometimes, in the rain). Fatou described her journey back to Mali:

> The driver puts on music. And they make tea for us. It's not for all the passengers, but I always sit next to the driver, so they make tea for me as well. Because I know the people at Sira, when they call the passengers to enter the bus, I always get to enter first, and I always sit right next to the driver. We chat all the way and drink tea.

The bus drivers sometimes colluded with Fatou Fall and other shuttle traders to smuggle goods on the buses: 'The drivers know the bus; they know where there is a space to hide things, so that the customs officials won't notice it. Sometimes, they don't pay customs. Other times they pay. It depends. If they're lucky, they don't pay'. Fatou explained that she herself had recently brought back 20 outfits (*complets*) on the bus for another trader and she did not pay the customs fee. She knew the bus better than the customs officials and was therefore able to hide the goods well, distributing them in different bags which she placed in different areas of the bus.

Gradually, the shuttle traders were finding ways to make room for themselves and their belongings on the buses and to relate to other people encountered during their journeys. Through the various strategies they devised, the shuttle traders were making the bus a familiar place where

they could feel 'at home' while on the move, as they had on the train. Initially, the shuttle traders had difficulties making sense of place after the cessation of the passenger train and the disappearance of the market at the Terminus. Losing access to certain forms of interaction and exchange, and the necessary adjustments in habits, routines and expectations this entailed, challenged the shuttle traders' efforts to establish meaningful relations with the environments they travelled through and to make sense of place. Their attempts at finding a place for themselves and their things on the buses reflected some of the ways in which they were carving out places for themselves, thus making themselves at home while on the move.

It is important to note that the sense of disorientation and discomfort experienced by the shuttle traders was not due to their mobile livelihoods and incessant travelling per se. Developing an existential sense of belonging and home does not necessarily require one's experiences and identity to be permanently rooted in a territorial 'homeland' (Chu 2006: 395–6; Malkki 1992). Home and emplacement, moreover, do not merely involve fixed, bounded locations like a house or a city: making sense of place and feeling at home is a mental and social process, requiring effort, and is not an automatic result of being in a certain physical location (cf. Heidegger 1977; Marchand 2015). As Nowicka has pointed out, 'Home is a space in-becoming and not a fixed, pre-established place' (Nowicka 2007: 73). Emplacement and, by extension, home is a process and not merely a static condition or a kind of physical 'rootedness'. Arguably, emplacement and home are thus always constructed 'on the move': home is a continuing, ongoing project that we all, like the Malian shuttle traders, are continuously in a state of creating and moving towards (cf. Heidegger 1977; Ingold 2011).

Transient emplacement in Dakar

One of the first Malian female shuttle traders I spoke with in Dakar was a middle-aged woman from Kayes called Fatouni. She was hosted by Papa in his compound, which was conveniently located near the Sandaga market where the Malian shuttle traders spent most of their days frantically purchasing goods. At night, Fatouni and her colleagues would roll out their thin mattresses on the floor in the 'female' bedroom, where Papa's nieces normally slept. In the morning, these shuttle traders shared *seri* (porridge) with the other women living in the compound. In the evenings, when they returned from their itinerant shopping, they

were invited to share in the communal meal, which alternated between two typical Malian dishes, *tô* and *basi*.[7] I met the same female shuttle traders at Papa's house, whenever they returned for another shopping spree. Some of these women had been hosted at his home for decades.

Papa thus continued a long standing Malian tradition of hosting 'strangers' which in Bamanankan is referred to as *jatigiya*. The concept of *jatigiya* exists in the various Mande languages, but the concept also has equivalents in other regional languages of West Africa (cf. Donaldson 2014).[8] Polly Hill has argued that what she called the 'landlord system' in West Africa, which would include *jatigiya*, 'is standard throughout most of the savannah zone and it is presumably common if not universal in the forest zone' (Hill 1966: 351–2). Such landlord systems, whereby networks of settled 'strangers' (immigrants) accommodate long-distance 'stranger-traders' (cf. Hill 1966: 350), have appeared across West Africa since precolonial times, and possibly evolved during the times of the great trading cities of the Sudan (cf. Manchuelle 1997: 25).[9] In the past, and to some extent still today, the mobility of West African traders in the region and further afield has largely been possible thanks to the presence of *jatigiw* in the places of circulation (cf. Agier 1983: 159).[10]

It would however be naive to assume that solidarity among strangers of similar origins necessarily extends to all co-nationals or co-ethnics. Some migrants and long-distance traders may be more marginal to transnational communities and associated systems of hospitality (cf. Hill 1966: 359; Whitehouse 2012: 176–7). In Dakar, the Malian system of *jatigiya* was not inclusive of all Malian shuttle traders passing through the city. Some of these women simply did not know any Malians in Dakar who would host them. Other shuttle traders did have an offer of free accommodation from a *jatigi*, who might be a relative, but they sometimes declined these offers if the accommodation was located far from the shops and markets in the city centre, where these women usually purchased their goods. Finally, there were shuttle traders who deliberately avoided staying with a *jatigi*. Nana for example told me, 'If you lodge with a *jatigi*, you take your shower in the morning, you use the electricity – one day you'll feel ashamed because you haven't paid. It's better to go and lodge elsewhere'. Not being able to properly reciprocate the hospitality and generosity meant that some shuttle traders declined being hosted by a *jatigi*. There were shuttle traders who felt that being part of the *jatigiya* system constituted a social and economic burden. They told me of *jatigiw* who took advantage of their status as 'generous hosts' to demand certain 'gifts' from the shuttle traders, effectively turning the relation into a means of profit-making, under the guise of religiosity and

supposed ethnic solidarity. Some shuttle traders felt disrespected by their host. Fatou, for example, left her former *jatigi* after the *jatigi*'s daughter falsely accused Fatou of stealing.

These were prominent reasons why some shuttle traders preferred renting space in a flat in Dakar, thus establishing a more impersonal and contractual type of relation with a landlord instead of relying on the hospitality of the Malian diaspora. In the past, shuttle traders without a local host could use the Terminus as a dormitory during their stays; but this was no longer possible because, since the Malian market was demolished in 2009, the old terminus building had been fenced off and was under daily surveillance by *gendarmes*. In response, small Malian enterprises servicing the shuttle traders began appearing in 2009, combining provision of accommodation, transport of goods, and brokering services. Shuttle traders who were new to Dakar would easily find accommodation via this system, and there was normally a truck parked outside these flats to transport the shuttle traders' goods back to Mali. Moreover, attached to the flats were usually a couple of *coxeurs* (guides, brokers), who could help newcomers to find their way around the city and locate the different markets.

To understand how and why commercial opportunities emerged for small Malian enterprises in the context of displacement, it is relevant to consider not only the specific circumstances of rupture associated with the closure of the Terminus. Entrepreneurialism, commoditisation and individualism are values and subjectivities widely associated with the neoliberal era of state withdrawal in most parts of the world. This has contributed to bringing about new, alternative femininities based on values of individualism, self-reliance and financial independence, as discussed in the following chapter (Chapter 5). These wider socio-economic transformations arguably helped set the stage for introducing commercialised forms of services for the shuttle traders displaced from the Terminus and led to the production of new kinds of places for and by these women. The new enterprises servicing the shuttle traders rendered the *jatigiya* system largely superfluous, substituting a market-based solution for the traditional patron–client relation between itinerant traders and their *jatigiw* in Dakar. The decline of the *jatigiya* system and the proliferation of private enterprises catering to the needs of shuttle traders implied a shift towards a purer commercialisation of Malian networks, which was gradually replacing ethnic solidarity, patronage and gift-giving relations. In some respects, this commercialisation of the infrastructure underpinning the shuttle trade rendered the women's experiences and interactions in Dakar more impersonal and anonymous.

The different spheres of the shuttle traders' daily lives unfolded in distinct and physically separate places in Dakar: they slept in one place, bought and sold their goods in a second, socialised in a third, and travelled from a fourth place, while their goods sometimes departed from a fifth place. This fragmentation differed radically from their past experiences at the Terminus. At the time when the train was still running and the Malian market existed, the Terminus had been a place of socio-spatial density, where several different kinds of activities, people and objects intersected and intermingled (cf. Stasik 2013). Different sorts of traders, various travellers, Malian visitors and migrants, and other passers-by and customers from the surrounding area had come together at the station, which was synonymous with the Malian marketplace. The Terminus was highly significant for Malian shuttle traders, whose commercial and social lives had largely unfolded in this one unifying and multifaceted space, where they could remain for the duration of their stay without necessarily having to go anywhere else. Shuttle traders without a local host would use the Terminus as a dormitory during their stays: in the evening, they lit a fire and prepared food; then they put a piece of carton on the ground to sleep on, and the next morning used the bathroom facilities at the Terminus. By contrast, the shuttle traders I met in Dakar preferred to minimise the time they spent in their rented accommodation. The flats were frequently shared by men and women, sleeping in separate rooms. If the bedrooms were full, mattresses were laid out in the kitchens for people to sleep on. This close co-habitation with strangers sometimes created tensions among the women. Another problem was that, since people were frequently coming and going, the front doors of the flats tended to be unlocked and the keys were sometimes circulating among many different hands, which could result in theft. For these reasons, the shuttle traders rarely spent much time in the rented flats; instead, their social and commercial activities mostly occurred elsewhere. This indicates a shift in these traders' forms of emplacement in Dakar which became more 'compartmentalised' after the closure of the Terminus.

Meanwhile, and possibly in response to this overall socio-spatial fragmentation and anonymity, the Malian shuttle traders I met in Dakar had created an alternative place that partially reproduced the sense of place experienced at the Terminus, which had constituted a point of convergence for Malians passing through, trading and residing in Dakar. These shuttle traders appeared to have 'transposed' their emplacement at the Terminus, to an area next to the Malian bus company called Sira, where they had established their own *grin*, a term which refers to a sort of 'hangout place' as I explain below. This raises questions: to what extent did

this *grin* replace the Terminus as a multifaceted and socially significant place for the Malian shuttle traders in transit? Did the *grin* provide a sense of belonging or something more ephemeral for the mobile traders?

Forms of place-making and emplacement by people in transit and on the move might occur in unexpected ways, which are easily overlooked by passing observers (cf. Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012: 463). The geographer Michel Bruneau has argued that for cross-border entrepreneurs (like the Malian shuttle traders) their 'host places' are 'only points of passage or way stations, not places of settlement and integration. The only essential place for them is the one of their origin, whence they leave with their goods; they return regularly, and invest their earnings there. They never actually leave: it is their only base' (Bruneau 2010: 46; cf. Rosenfeld 2012; Tarrius 2001). Bruneau thus implies that place-making in transit is of little significance to mobile traders. The material presented in the following pages takes issue with such relatively thin analyses of experiences of place-making in transit. Particularly in research on mobile and transitory populations, the analytical privileging of motion and flow risks ignoring the fact that people always exist 'in place' and thus overlooking their experiences of, connections to and relationships with the places they inhabit – even as they are moving through places (cf. Berriane 2015; Schapendonk 2011). The following observations of the Sira *grin* in Dakar provide a more complex picture of the forms of place-making the mobile traders engaged in during periods when they were not in their places of origin. Even if these shuttle traders only emplaced themselves in ephemeral and transient ways, this does not mean that place was an insignificant or irrelevant dimension of their experiences in transit.

In Mali, *grin* refers to a group of (usually male) friends who assemble in a regular place where they socialise, often on a daily basis, for example engaging in chatting, tea-making, listening to music and playing cards. The literature has tended to emphasise the masculine character of these groupings, where women are either not allowed or largely appear as 'accessories' to the male members, as actual or potential girlfriends – although a few cases have been observed of *grins* where the gender membership was mixed (Bondaz 2013: 75–6; Brenner 1994: 2). *Grins* and similar groupings are commonly associated with unemployed young men, particularly college graduates ('*jeunes diplomés en chômage*') (Brenner 1994: 3; cf. Masquelier 2013). While the *grins* tend to be criticised by elders as an unproductive waste of time, these groupings are also portrayed in the literature as constituting a 'refuge', a 'space for tactical retreat', and a 'space of freedom' from formal social constraints

for these youths (Bondaz 2013: 70; Brenner 1994: 3–4, 7; Jónsson 2007: 76; Masquelier 2013: 472). *Grins* are often places where the concerns of the youth are voiced and debated, including opposition to official politics and critiques of the hegemonic patriarchal ideal (Bondaz 2013; Brenner 1994). *Grins* are also places where social networks are maintained and extended; hierarchically structured *grins* may even nurture clientilist relations among the members (Bondaz 2013: 69).

The women shuttle traders from Mali had formed their own *grin* next to the offices of the Sira bus company, near the Grand Mosque of Dakar. When they were not out in town doing business, they would sit in the Sira *grin*, along the exterior wall of the company's office, on thin mattresses, broken chairs, or a wobbly wooden bench. Some shuttle traders used the *grin* as a meeting point in the morning before heading out together to the shops. Most of the women were out on errands during the day, but some shuttle traders would stay in the *grin* to pass the waiting time involved in transacting a business agreement and organising the transport of goods back to Mali. This was particularly the case for big shuttle traders like Fatou Fall and Nana, who spent relatively long periods in Dakar while waiting for deals to be settled. Shuttle traders who were selling goods through an intermediary in Dakar might also spend their day in the *grin*, while waiting to recover the profit from the sales. Those who had come to Dakar to buy smaller quantities of goods generally spent the entire day shopping, aiming to complete their purchases within a few days. At the end of the working day the shuttle traders usually congregated at the *grin*, bringing their purchases to show to each other and exchanging tips on good bargains. There were usually between 5 and 15 people sitting in the *grin* whenever I went there, depending on the time of day and year – during big annual celebrations and school holidays most of the shuttle traders remained at home in Mali. While the *grin* was primarily frequented by female shuttle traders from Mali, the – mostly male – friends and colleagues of the employees at Sira also visited regularly. This included a couple of young male apprentices; a few middle-aged and older traders and *coxeurs* looking to make business or exchange advice with the women; and a couple of middle-aged Malian 'intellectuals' involved in politics or academia. Many of these men would turn up after the prayer at sunset to engage in conversation in Bamanankan or watch sports events on a small TV, while drinking strong tea.

For some of the shuttle traders the Sira *grin* was a place of commercial opportunity, networking and economic activity. The Sira bus company, to which the *grin* was attached, was located in a commercial complex next to the Grand Mosque of Dakar. All but one of the Malian bus companies in the

city had their offices in this complex, which had become a tiny Malian hub where traders and migrants could meet fellow Bamanan speakers, transfer money home, buy a bus ticket to Mali, and purchase small quantities of Malian goods.[11] This benefited the shuttle traders at the Sira *grin* as they had been deprived of their social and working space at the Terminus. Nana and Fatou were not just idly socialising in the *grin* but were in fact conducting much of their business from this spot. While sitting in the *grin*, they spent much time making phone calls to clients and suppliers, and used the informal money transfer agency next to the *grin* to receive and send the cash required for their businesses. There were a couple of young men associated with Sira, whom Nana and Fatou regularly paid to collect goods for them or to drive them around town on the back of their motorcycles. These women also met with *transporteurs* and *convoyeurs* in the *grin* to organise the transport of their goods back to Mali. One of the employees at Sira was in charge of organising Fatou's business transactions whenever she was absent from Dakar. At least two of the men who frequented the Sira *grin* were *coxeurs* whom the shuttle traders would employ to help them locate specific types of goods that they had come to buy.

The Sira *grin* and its surroundings thus in some ways reproduced, on a much smaller scale, the sort of rich and multifaceted space that had allegedly characterised the Terminus in the days of the former Malian market, where a diversity of travellers, entrepreneurs, consumers, ethnicities and social classes had intersected and interacted. The old Terminus was a space filled with history and which had generated its own particular socio-cultural dynamics and identities. Although strictly speaking it was a train station, it would be wrong to consider it on a par with other spaces of travellers' famously described by Marc Augé as 'non-places' – that is, spaces like airports or supermarkets that 'cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity' (Augé 1995: 77–8).[12] To the contrary, the Dakar Terminus had been a dense node filled with meaning and history, a distinct place of familiarity and belonging.

Both the Terminus and the Sira *grin* were important sites for the shuttle traders constituting, in the language of mobilities scholars, 'moorings' that anchored the traders' mobilities. Mobilities scholars have argued that mobility is dependent upon relative immobility represented by 'underlying physical and material infrastructures' (Urry 2007: 19; cf. Adey 2006). While such moorings are often considered to be immobile, the material presented here suggests that in fact, they might not be permanent structures fixed in space. To the contrary, they are easily dissolved and moved to other locations. In the Sira *grin* the shuttle traders had in a sense relocated and recreated the place of the former market at the Terminus.

Figure 4.4 Friday afternoon prayer. The Sira *grin* has been packed away (the mattresses from the *grin* are lined up against the wall on the right) and the members have either dispersed or assembled in collective prayer. The minaret of the Grand Mosque of Dakar is visible in the background.

The *grin* was placed in a similarly multifaceted locality constituting a new Malian hub with access to transport and other services that facilitated the businesses of the mobile women. This suggests that the shuttle traders' attachment to the Terminus was not so much an attachment to the location as an attachment to social infrastructures and atmospheres. This was a very different kind of place attachment than the one expressed by the market traders, whose commerce was directly tied up with the concrete location of the Terminus, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter. These insights illustrate that places are not merely physical locations. As Magdalena Nowicka has pointed out, places exist through the imagination and people can transport and recreate them elsewhere as 'mobile locations' (Nowicka 2007: 70–1). A demolished market or a home that has been left behind may persist as places as their memories live on and as people attempt to recreate these places elsewhere.

Compared with the Terminus, the new 'Malian hub' where the *grin* was located appeared to be a much less diverse place. Although the commercial complex also included Chinese and Senegalese traders, these people's shops were located in a different section, and the Malians

were nearly all clustered together in one separate corner of the complex. Moreover, in terms of its physical and material features, the Sira *grin* was an ephemeral place – unlike the old Terminus. The *grin* had no walls or doors, and physically it was merely demarcated by the mats and chairs that members were sitting on; by the handbags, suitcases and plastic bags with goods belonging to the shuttle traders; and by the *grin* members themselves. Occasionally in the late afternoon when the scorching sun reached the *grin*'s regular spot next to the Sira office, the members would cross the small street leading up to the mosque to sit on the pavement opposite the commercial complex, thus transporting the place of the *grin* with them. The *grin* could literally be 'packed away': during Friday prayer or specific periods when the shuttle traders preferred to stay in Mali, the *grin* members dispersed, taking their goods with them, and the chairs, stools and mattresses were tucked away in the Sira office or put to other uses (see Figure 4.4). Consequently, the place of the *grin* momentarily vanished.

Finally, unlike the former station and the market at the Terminus, the Sira *grin* was not part of public space. Unlike most *grins* in Mali, which tend to be located at the entrance to a compound, thus functioning as a buffer zone between public and domestic space, the Sira *grin* was located on private property (cf. Bondaz 2013: 70). Yoro was the manager (*chef d'escale*) of the Sira office, and the shuttle traders in the *grin* treated him respectfully, as a patron. It was largely because of Yoro's goodwill and since they were clients of his bus company that the shuttle traders were allowed to occupy the space next to the Sira office. One afternoon Fatou and I were sitting in the *grin* with Sekouba, an older Malian man who had lived for decades in Dakar and the three of us started discussing whom the commercial complex and the space around the Sira office actually belonged to. We were all aware of the frequency with which local authorities would chase away petty pavement traders; hence, it was not obvious why the Sira *grin* was left in peace. But Fatou confidently argued,

> This space here belongs to Sira! The guardian of the complex, he knows that we are with Sira. He knows that we are Yoro's *bana-banas*. So he cannot chase us away. If Yoro moves all the way to HLM [cloth market in the suburbs] we too are going to move there. We will leave this place and we'll follow him all the way there, because we are only here because of Sira. The guardian knows that.

Grins in Mali are closely associated with the space of the street. Julien Bondaz has argued that they reflect the semi-private fashion in which streets are used in West Africa, where streets constitute a kind of 'border

space' (*espace limitrophe*) at the interface between the public and the private (Bondaz 2013: 70). Once, as the shuttle traders and I crossed the street to sit on the pavement opposite of the Sira office, we were, however, asked to leave by one of the residents of the building behind us, who complained that we did not have the right to sit on his private property. This example, coupled with the local authorities' frequent demolition of pavement stalls and habit of chasing away ambulant street vendors, testified to the intensive policing of both public and private space in Dakar city centre. Any attempts at the kind of appropriation of the street that Bondaz (2013) refers to was experienced as a constant battle in downtown Dakar. To evade such conflict, the shuttle traders had tactically affiliated themselves with the Sira bus company. The patronage of Sira provided them with a 'sanctuary' and ensured that they could not be evicted from their *grin*.

The Sira *grin* created by the shuttle traders was thus far more ephemeral than the space of the Terminus. In fact, it was largely human activity and social interaction that constituted the *grin* as a place. Without this human presence, the place ceased to exist and became just an empty corner in a commercial complex. This helps explain why conversation was deemed so important in the Sira *grin*. When I was quietly sitting in the *grin*, I was frequently asked why I was not saying anything, and I was usually encouraged to engage in chatting (*baro*), initiated with the imperative, *'An ka baro kè!'* (Let's chat!). *Baro* has a more profound meaning in Bamanankan than conveyed in its English translation into chat or conversation, as Dorothea Schulz explains:

> It [*baro*] designates talk-as-action and points to its socially constitutive quality. That is, it refers to the capacity of 'talk' to create sociality, rather than merely resulting from or reflecting on it. It is often contrasted to a feeling of isolation and longing (*nyanafin*) that emerges in the absence of social company. Metalinguistic commentaries, such as the frequently evoked adage *duniya ye baro ye*, 'the world is (made by) talk', similarly illustrate that 'just talking' is far from being without aim. Talk adds a social dimension to the texture of everyday life that is crucial to a person's being-in-the-world. (Schulz 2002: 812)

Baro and other forms of socialising in the Sira *grin* created a sense of groundedness and belonging, a sense of being-in-the-world for these shuttle traders who were constantly on the move. The shuttle traders I met were assertive and independent women – their livelihoods

required such an attitude. They had to be able to negotiate hard and to manage if a deal fell through, if their goods were stolen, or if they were cheated; they had to be able to endure being away from their children and to travel, work and live on their own. *Baro* in the Sira *grin* added a social dimension to the shuttle traders' stay in Dakar and helped them cope with the occasional loneliness and hardships of their highly autonomous and mobile lifestyle. Meanwhile the place of the *grin* and the social relations developed there through *baro* were not necessarily long-lasting or deeply felt; they largely lost relevance once these women were back at home in Mali. When they were not together in the Sira *grin*, the shuttle traders did not meet up or socialise to any significant extent. In fact, Fatou Fall told me she never met up with Nana when they were back in Bamako. The ephemeral character of the *grin* was thus due not only to its lack of an enduring physical presence but also to the nature of the inconstant (and at times disloyal) relations among most of the traders.

Nostalgia for slower, old-fashioned transport and grand colonial railway architecture might easily lead analysts to ignore the dense and meaningful experiences people like the Malian shuttle traders have in more contemporary transport and travel hubs. My observations of the Sira *grin* illustrate that even in what might appear as 'non-places' – the outer walls of an office of a bus company, for example – people in transit are continuously finding ways of making themselves at home (cf. Casey 1996). Place-making was by no means irrelevant to the shuttle traders' experiences, as some commentators have suggested. The traders' ambiguous commitment to place constituted a kind of 'transient emplacement': an ambivalent relation to place marked by simultaneous place attachment and detachment, groundedness and aloofness. The kinds of transient emplacement that many of the traders in transit were engaged in, which entailed frequently circumventing established systems of patronage, ethnic identifications and patriarchal norms, were not merely responses to the specific changes associated with the end of the railway line. Ultimately, mobile women traders like Nana and Fatou were also attempting to make space for alternative femininities, to make themselves more at home, and to suit their mobile and autonomous lifestyles. The ways in which these shuttle traders inhabited and made sense of their environments while in transit therefore also need to be considered in the light of more generalised social change in the context of neoliberalism, marked by increasing self-reliance and commercialisation permeating social relations (cf. Ferguson 2010; Piot 2010).

Sedentary trade and the importance of location

In sharp contrast to the mobile shuttle traders, the evicted market traders appeared to be clinging much more stubbornly onto the space of the Terminus, refusing to relocate and reluctant to adapt their businesses to the changing commercial landscape. Oumou and I were once sitting in her market stall at Sugunikura, discussing how the closure of the market at the Terminus had affected her and the other traders. She explained:

> After the market was destroyed, people are saying that, 'Now there is nothing at the Terminus, so we're not going there any more!' Now, they only go to Syndicat Pikine [a large suburban market]. They say it's easier to get there. If you come from Mali, you can go straight to Syndicat, but to get here is too complicated.

This assessment only added to my confusion as to why the displaced traders had remained in the city centre. When I asked Oumou whether things were selling better at the suburban market in Pikine she replied, 'They sell lots and lots over there!' I then asked if she did not want to move her business to Pikine, to which she replied: 'I don't want to move to Pikine, I don't know it over there. It is here that I know'.

I initially struggled to find any convincing explanation why the evicted traders had continued to stay put in the city centre of Dakar and established new markets there, instead of relocating to the suburbs. Oumou's responses to my questions suggested that it was perhaps more a sense of familiarity and social attachments to the place that kept the traders rooted in this location. There did not immediately appear to be any convincing commercial reasons for refusing to relocate out of the city centre. The further businesses were removed from Dakar's city centre, the cheaper the rents were and the easier the access was for Malian supply trucks. The Malian businesses I had visited at the suburban markets of Pikine and HLM appeared to be thriving – whereas the traders at the new Malian markets in the city centre were often struggling financially and at risk of further displacement. Why did the traders not simply relocate?

Resistance to the relocation of marketplaces is in fact a common reaction by traders, as studies from, for example, Egypt, Hong Kong and India have shown (Gertel 2009; Lessinger 1988; Smart 1988). The reasons for traders' contentious responses to relocation are constituted by a complex mix of financial, social and emotional aspects: traders

may have their customer base in that specific location; the organisation and operation of their businesses may depend on their social networks in the area; and the traders may have a certain sense of attachment to the place (cf. Smart 1988: 134). Some of the factors that make traders reluctant to relocate may be specific to a particular market context (such as home–work integration), while others may be more universally applicable to all kinds of markets (dependence on local customers, for example). The newly established Malian markets in downtown Dakar operated according to particular socio-spatial logics which help explain why the traders had not relocated but continued to cluster around the old train station in the city centre. In the following I will examine two of these logics which kept the market traders tied to the location of the old Terminus: 'branding' of their markets and goods; and relations with regular customers. Unlike the shuttle traders, the market traders' businesses depended much more on the specific location of their markets and stalls. Their sedentary trade meant that they relied on customers coming to them, whereas the mobile shuttle traders would bring their goods directly to their clients, making their trade less location-dependent. The following sections focus on the relatively practical reasons for the displaced market traders' reluctance to relocate to the suburbs and their continued commercial 'anchoring' at the Terminus, which facilitated their access to customers and the generation of profit. The more affective and social dimensions of the market traders' place attachments at the Terminus, which in some cases undermined their abilities to succeed and prosper in commerce, will be addressed in Chapter 6 where I focus on the networks, interactions and informal regulations at the markets which continuously tied the displaced traders into a shared moral economy. My aim here is to present a contrast to the mobile traders' 'place-making on the move' by introducing examples that deal with sedentary trade and the associated importance of location and commercial identities 'rooted' in place. By introducing this contrast, it is possible to consider why different groups of traders might differ in their responses to displacement and rupture, in terms of their relative flexibility and capacity for adaptation in the aftermath.

Marketing Malian authenticity

Analysing the demand for and marketing of *bazin* at the new Malian markets begins to illuminate why the evicted *bazin* traders in particular

had established their new businesses in the close vicinity of the old Terminus, rather than relocating to a different part of the city, despite the precarious and hostile environment they were operating in in downtown Dakar. *Bazin*, a damask cloth used in tailoring, has become increasingly fashionable over the last decades in Senegal and many other urban settings in West Africa (Kirby 2013: 63; cf. Schulz 2007). In her study of female dress in Mali, Schulz refers to *bazin* as 'The fabric *par excellence* through which to assert social distinction' (Schulz 2007: 257). Today in Dakar, as elsewhere in West Africa, *bazin* is used both as a gift and as a means to dress up in a fashionable way (Buggenhagen 2012; Kirby 2013; Schulz 2007: 258). Kelly Kirby writes that fashion thrives in Senegal, despite decades of economic decline, and in Dakar both younger and older generations invest substantial time, energy and resources into looking stylish, sometimes beyond their financial means (Kirby 2013: 63–4; cf. Heath 1992). *Bazin* was certainly very expensive by local standards. Yaya, who worked at the cloth bazaar, told me that the *bazin moyen riche* (a lower quality than *bazin riche*) he imported from Bamako normally sold for 9,000 CFA (13.5 euros), earning him a profit of 2,000 CFA – although sometimes if a customer did not know the price, he could sell it for more, earning him a profit of 5,000–8,000 CFA.

The most valuable and prestigious quality was *bazin riche* (in Dakar often referred to as *Mali thioup*) which was produced in Austria and Germany, and dyed locally after being imported into West Africa (Kirby 2013: 65; Schulz 2007: 257). Kirby explains that hand-dyed *bazin riche* (as opposed to commercially dyed) is generally considered the most beautiful, 'because of the dyers' artistic abilities to create multiple layers of rich resist-dyed[13] colours and motifs in intricate compositions' (Kirby 2013: 66; cf. Schulz 2007: 258). She also notes that, 'most vendors, tailors and designers I talked with in Dakar agreed that the highest quality of dyed *bazin riche* comes from both informal and commercial dyeing enterprises in Mali' (Kirby 2013: 66; cf. Buggenhagen 2012: 26 and 94; Rabine 2002: 46 and 64). Like the people Kirby spoke to, my interlocutors claimed that the water in Dakar was too salty for the dye to connect properly with the fabric and hence, already after one wash, the colour of Senegalese-dyed *bazin* would vanish.[14]

The above contextualisation helps explain why *bazin riche* was particularly sought after in Dakar, and why customers were concerned about acquiring the very best quality from Mali and not for example the inferior locally dyed version. One woman, who had traded at the former Malian market at the Terminus, explained, 'There is *bazin* dyed here [in

Dakar] that traders claim are from Mali, but it is not. That stuff that they walk around with displaying in the street, it's not from Mali. But with the *bazin* at the Terminus, you can be certain it is from Mali'. By purchasing their *bazin* from Malians at the Terminus, customers felt reassured that they were getting 'the real thing': Malian quality straight from the hands of female dyers in Bamako. I suspect that the Senegalese preference for Malian *bazin* not only reflected a concern with buying a quality product that would last several washes, but also a desire for an 'authentic' product (cf. Rabine 2002). Dakar was overflowing with mass-produced clothes from Asia and second-hand clothes from Europe, and in this context 'authentic' Malian hand-dyed *bazin* stood out as both a unique and luxurious item. In this regard, the following quote by Dorothea Schulz is relevant:

> today Mali is considered, by Malians as well as by many inhabitants of its neighboring countries, as the center of greater cultural authenticity, especially when compared to countries such as Senegal and Ivory Coast that were more vigorously transformed through the colonial encounter (Schulz 2007: 276 n.13).

This suggests that for the Senegalese, Mali (and Malians) was associated with authenticity – not merely in the context of dyeing *bazin*, but on a more fundamental level. The traders at the Terminus were representatives of a more authentic (Malian) culture. By creating a 'Malian' space within Dakar, these traders had also created a myth of authenticity within that space. Hence, the Terminus came to be considered as the place to look for 'authentic' Malian *bazin*. As there was little to go by in order to judge the origins of hand-dyed *bazin*, inexperienced customers put their faith in the Malian traders at the Terminus, who they assumed to be guarantors of genuine Malian quality.

This helps explain why the Malian *bazin* traders insisted they had to remain in the close vicinity of the Terminus and could not relocate their markets to the suburbs: to do so would have dissociated them from the mythical, 'authentic' Malian space they had created in the city centre. In this sense, 'authenticity' was their marketing strategy. Indeed, the value and desirability of an object may relate more to local myths about the time and place of an object's provenance than to the actual conditions of its production or more 'functional' criteria. Elizabeth Vann points out in a study of counterfeit goods in Vietnam that 'authenticity' may be created through interactions between buyers and sellers and does not necessarily reside in objects themselves, as a characteristic of their manufacture (such

as the quality and cost of the labour and materials associated with the production of the object) (Vann 2006: 292). Authenticity of a commodity may be established at the point of consumption, based on how it relates to the socio-cultural and historical context of the buyer.[15]

Malian *bazin* traders admitted that it was difficult to tell the difference between Malian and Senegalese dyed *bazin* just by looking at it. Unlike famous commercial luxury brands like *Gagny Lah*, most of the hand-dyed Malian *bazin* had no label or quality control stamp to indicate that it was indeed 'the real thing'. Rokia who worked at the outdoor market by the Terminus told me that a few of her colleagues who sold *bazin* might be able to distinguish between Malian and Senegalese *bazin* but for most people it was only once you washed the cloth that you would be able to tell the difference: the colours of the Malian *bazin* would last several washes, so the first time you washed your new *bazin* you would instantly know which quality you were dealing with. Safi said she could not distinguish between Senegalese and Malian *bazin* even if you put them right next to each other. 'But there are many differences, you just don't see it', she added.

Safi's notion that the value of Malian *bazin* was based on aspects that one 'cannot see' relates to what Roy Dilley (2004) has described as the 'invisibility of production'. Like so many other commodities in the contemporary global market, the process of production of the Malian *bazin* was invisible to consumers in Dakar and the commodity alienated from its point of production, to use Dilley's terms (Dilley 2004: 806–7). Dilley argues that the separation of production and consumption is fundamental to the creation of a new regime of value in which 'objects can be represented as "authentic", "antique", "traditional", and so on' (Dilley 2004: 807). This is because the value of an object within this regime 'is allowed to "float free" from the reference of production' (Dilley 2004: 807). As Dilley puts it,

> Where the processes of production become or are made invisible, objects are disembedded from the social relations and processes of production, and thus a hyper-real context of consumption and desire can be elaborated by both seller and buyer alike. Sellers are able to perpetrate the fiction of authenticity, and buyers can indulge in their desires for grasping hold of something that is authentic in the form of such purchases (Dilley 2004: 808).

Customers had no guarantee but had to trust the traders that what they were buying was indeed real Malian *bazin*. Aissatou who was trading

bazin at Sugunikura lived in the suburb of Yarrack, and I asked her if she could not trade her *bazin* from home. She replied that she did not have any customers out there, explaining that: 'They don't have any confidence. If they only see your things, they won't buy from you; they all prefer to go to the market [in the city centre]'. People's scepticism about the genuineness of Malian *bazin* sold in the suburbs was not unfounded. As mentioned earlier, itinerant traders would sometimes try to trick customers into buying Senegalese *bazin*, claiming that it was Malian. One article from the Malian news site *Maliweb* (Toure 2007) raises a similar concern about crooks in Bamako who would drive around on scooters and try to trick male customers into buying the inferior quality, *bazin moyen riche*, claiming that it was *bazin riche* (apparently they specifically targeted men, because women were usually better at distinguishing between the two different qualities of *bazin*).

Unfortunately, customers looking for authentic Malian *bazin* were not safeguarded against fraud at the Terminus. Fatim, who had been born in Dakar to Malian parents, was mainly selling aphrodisiacs at the outdoor market. She and I were chatting about how the sale of *bazin* was increasing as Tabaski (*Eid al-Adha*) was approaching, and we then started to discuss the different types of *bazin*. Fatim complained that it was sometimes difficult for the *bazin* traders to make a decent profit on the Malian *bazin*, because customers refused to pay more for it than they did for the Senegalese *bazin*. I commented that I supposed customers often could not tell the difference between the two; so the traders in turn could also trick the customers into thinking they were buying Malian *bazin*. 'That's right!' Fatim replied and added:

> Often, the customers come here to the market and ask, 'Where are the Bambaras who sell Malian *thioup [bazin]*?' I just point them in the direction of the *bazin* stalls. They think the Bambaras are going to show them the true quality [*la vraie qualité*] – although the Bambaras are the biggest crooks of them all!

Fatim's remarks about the 'Bambara crooks' suggest an underlying deep suspicion and potential for conflict among traders at the new marketplaces. It is important to avoid romanticising relations among market traders, as Chapter 6 further clarifies. Just because their business was relatively sedentary and their physical presence at the markets more permanent that did not mean that relations among these traders were necessarily more loyal and heartfelt than among the mobile traders encountered in the Sira *grin*.

Finding 'the Malians': clientilisation and credit

To an outsider such as myself, or the occasional visiting tourists, the goods sold at Sugunikura and the outdoor market initially appeared entirely foreign and their purposes indeterminable. Displays included big baskets with dried twigs, leaves and bark; pieces of white chalk and black rock; dried powders; re-used glass jars with wooden bits inside or pieces of sugar; ceramic vases with lids; and small bottles with obscene images of breasts, buttocks and penises. Foreign visitors who wanted to make a symbolic contribution to the traders by purchasing something would usually stick to the safe choice of a colourful woven basket or beaded jewellery – sometimes oblivious to the fact that what they thought were necklaces were actually meant to be worn underneath the clothes as seductive waist-beads (*baia-juru*). Over the course of my fieldwork, I gradually realised the purpose and function of each of these seemingly obscure items. Apart from *bazin* cloth, the goods sold at the Malian markets were mainly beauty and health products, including aphrodisiacs; some fresh or processed foodstuffs, including *fruits secs*; and other mainly decorative items (see Table 4.1).

Certain goods sold at the Malian markets were exclusive or niche products, produced by Malian artisans and supposedly not available elsewhere in Dakar – at least not of the same quality. This included the *bazin* dyed in Mali, the Malian herbal aphrodisiacs, and a certain handmade black soap which my interlocutor Djenneba Sylla claimed only Malians knew how to make. The traders also claimed that it was the Malians who had introduced the Senegalese to aphrodisiacs; and that Sugunikura and the outdoor market were the only places in Dakar where these 'secrets' were available wholesale. These Malian products were not widely available in Dakar but, as Safi explained, 'Everyone knows that the Malians are at the Terminus. People say that this is where you find the Malians'. This was an important reason why the evicted traders did not want to relocate very far from the Terminus, since customers would otherwise not be able to find them. Many of the traders at the Malian markets relied on the loyalty of regular local customers, who knew where to find them, what their prices were, and the quality and range of goods they offered. Many of these customers expected to find the traders near the Terminus, and this clientele could not easily be transferred to a completely different place. They were local retailers, who did not have the time or the money to travel out of the city centre to source goods.

Table 4.1 List of goods, services and facilities available at Sugunikura market.

Consumables	Beauty and health	Other goods	Services
• Chewable clay mineral (*bôgôni*; kaolinite in English) • Dates and other dried fruits and nuts • Dried chili • Dried okra-powder • Herbal tea leaves (*kènkèliba*) • Malian couscous (finely ground dried millet or maize) • Plantain bananas (occasional) • Seasoning paste (*sunbala*) • Tamarind	• Aphrodisiacs (natural and industrially manufactured) • Handmade earrings and waist-beads • Herbal medicines • Natural fibre bath sponges (*fu*) • Shea butter • Soap • Volcanic rocks (for pedicure)	• *Bazin* cloth • Calabashes (made into spoons and containers) • Incense and incense burners • Woven baskets • Woven fans (*fifalan* - seasonal)	• *Bazin* beaters • Food stalls • Hair-braiding (occasional) • Market bank (*GIE* and money transfers) • Mechanics • Mosque • Toilets • Small retail shop (selling, e.g., bread, soft drinks, matches, phone credit, pens, potatoes) • Storage space

The relations between traders and customers at the Malian markets in Dakar can be characterised as a form of 'clientilisation', a term coined by Clifford Geertz to denote the tendency 'for repetitive purchasers of particular goods and services to establish continuing relationships with particular purveyors of them, rather than search widely through the market at each occasion of need' (Geertz 1978: 30). For buyers and sellers, whose main concerns are prices and the quality of goods, clientilisation lowers the cost of searching for cooperative clients (Geertz 1978: 30). The established traders at the Malian markets mainly relied on a long-standing loyal customer base that they had developed over several years; they were less preoccupied with attracting new customers to their stalls. This explains why Oumou for example always covered up her fruit cakes with thick plastic which meant they were not visible to passers-by browsing the market. She told me everyone knew that she was the one selling those fruit cakes, and her regular customers did not want to buy

them if they had been exposed to the dust from the market, so she covered them up. She relied on her reputation to acquire customers rather than on a visible display of her goods. When Rokia returned to the outdoor market after giving birth, she had too little capital to invest in *bazin*, so I asked her if she could not sell something else instead; but she replied, 'Fatoumata, I have so many clients for *bazin*. They are phoning me and saying, "Once you start selling again, I'll come and buy from you!"' Her loyal customers were patiently waiting for her to get back into business.

The traders' insistence on 'staying in place' as far as possible, rather than relocating, was related not only to clientilisation but also to obtaining credit. After Rokia had given birth, she returned to the market, appearing regularly every day, even though she did not have any *bazin* to sell or any capital to invest in new stock. When I asked her why she did not just stay at home, she explained that she was looking to see if anybody would give her goods or credit. Trust was not 'blind' at the Malian markets: the traders would only give credit if they felt certain they could get it back, which meant one had to be available to them so that they could frequently come and check up to enforce the agreement. To obtain credit, traders thus had to be familiar faces with a regular presence, giving the impression of being relatively immobile and sedentary rather than mobile strangers who could not be pinned down. Traders therefore cultivated their physical presence and permanence at the market with a view to obtaining credit.

Fatim worked as a retailer at the outdoor market by the railway tracks. Her mother, who worked at the same market, had been born in Dakar to Malian parents and had married a Malian man in Dakar where Fatim had been born and raised. Fatim had never been to Mali and she told me she did not like to travel. When I first met her, she was divorced from her first husband, but had remarried and had two children; but during my fieldwork, she separated from her children's father. She had very limited financial means, and therefore could only afford to purchase relatively few goods. Since her regular, long standing presence at the market gave her access to credit and supply networks, she was able to acquire goods for sale. Some of her goods belonged to traders at Sugunikura, who had asked her to sell them on their behalf. Fatim's constant presence at the outdoor market gave her creditors the reassurance that they could easily reinforce their contracts with her. Her creditors were nearby (at Sugunikura) and could easily come and check that Fatim was complying with their agreements and had not appropriated the goods or the profits. Fatim was frequently contacted on the phone or in person by the owners of the goods she was selling, to check whether she was abiding by their

credit agreements. One man for whom she was selling dates came past on his motorbike to ask whether she had sold any yet. Fatim replied no, but the man wanted to be sure that she was not withholding money from him, so he asked her to weigh the dates, to visually check that the quantity was the same as what he had originally given her to sell. The creditor clearly did not trust Fatim. Indeed, it would be mistaken to assume that the traders trusted each other merely because they were part of the same 'bounded market'. Rather, having a permanent stall at the market (and being related to the other market traders through kinship ties) gave creditors the reassurance that they could easily find traders like Fatim when payment was due (cf. Carrier 2016). Hence, a degree of 'rootedness' at the market, both in terms of remaining physically stable in place and being socially tied to the other people at the market, facilitated the flow of goods and credit among the Malian markets.

Place attachment and place-making among displaced traders

The examination of the aftermath of displacement from the Terminus illustrates the ambiguity of rupture as simultaneously destructive and generative (cf. Holbraad, Kapferer and Sauma 2019). The terminus train station and the train itself had served the Malian shuttle traders as places of transport, as temporary homes, as places for social encounters and interaction, and as marketplaces where goods were imported, exported and exchanged. These various social practices were in some ways carried over into new, distinct places, illustrating how old features may reappear in the aftermath of destruction (cf. Simpson and Serafini 2019).

This chapter has highlighted how different groups of displaced traders experienced and related to the environments they inhabited and moved through, following the closure of the market at the Terminus and the cessation of the passenger train from Mali. A shortcoming of mobilities scholarship has been the tendency to overlook or downplay the ways in which place and social relations are created by people on the move, including traders. Place-making was by no means irrelevant to the shuttle traders' experiences, contrary to what some commentators have suggested. The mobile traders' social interactions with the environments they travelled through *emplaced* them, albeit in different ways before and after the cessation of the Dakar–Niger passenger train and the demolition of the market at the Terminus. The shuttle traders had to adjust their routines and expectations to the new constraints of the

buses. Yet, they also developed new ways to actively emplace themselves during their bus journeys, making themselves at home by engaging with the social and physical environment on the bus. After the cessation of the train and the demolition of the Malian market, the shuttle traders' activities had become increasingly compartmentalised, carried out in distinct and physically separate places. The Sira *grin* and the surrounding Malian hub did to some extent unite different spheres of these traders' activities, providing a place for them to socialise and do businesses. The Sira *grin* was, however, a relatively ephemeral place which added a social dimension to the shuttle traders' temporary stays in Dakar. What these women experienced on the move and in transit thus appeared to be a form of 'transient emplacement', an ambivalent relation to place constituted by simultaneous place attachment and detachment, groundedness and aloofness. Meanwhile, the shuttle traders' experiences of place, and their forms of place-making on the move, were dynamic processes which were continuously evolving as the women were adapting to new circumstances and environments.

The new places created and used by the shuttle traders shaped these mobile women's activities and experiences, presenting both new limitations as well as new possibilities. In Dakar, the shuttle traders were increasingly distancing themselves from the other Malians associated with the Terminus, including the market traders and local Malian hosts (*jatigiw*). Instead, the mobile women were gradually shifting their allegiances to connect with other groups of Malians based in Dakar. Their new connections included the employees of Malian bus companies, Malians letting out flats to the shuttle traders, and Malians organising the transport of their goods by truck. These people were in charge of new and emerging infrastructures underpinning the shuttle traders' mobile livelihoods, both during their stays in Dakar and on the move. These developments illustrate some of the material gains and opportunities that displacement paradoxically generated (cf. Hammar 2014).

The analysis of the aftermath of rupture and displacement revealed that different groups of traders had different capacities for readjustment. The mobile shuttle traders appeared relatively flexible and adaptable compared with the sedentary market traders. The shuttle traders modified their businesses to capitalise on spatial and infrastructural transformations in the Senegalese capital. The market traders by contrast appeared to continue with 'business as usual' at the Terminus, despite the radical spatial transformations which in many ways had undermined the viability of commerce in this location. Based on these contrasting observations, it is tempting to draw certain normative

conclusions regarding the relative value of mobility and sedentarism. Meanwhile, mobilities scholarship has been criticised for espousing a 'nomadologist' bias that celebrates the power and agency of those engaged in unconstrained movement (Franquesa 2011; Hage 2005). Ideological and generalising statements regarding the 'world views' of respectively mobile and relatively sedentary traders potentially reinforce problematic, essentialising binaries like those which the previous and the next chapter attempt to dismantle (including formal/informal and male/female binaries). In this chapter I have tried to steer clear of such normative assessment of the outlooks and livelihoods of the different groups of traders displaced from the Terminus.

Whereas the shuttle traders were forced to abandon the location of the Terminus and adapt to and invent new places, the market traders were trying to hold on to the old location. The landscape surrounding them had, however, transformed significantly. The spatial circumstances that had led to the emergence and success of the marketplace at the Terminus, including easy access to public space and transport infrastructure coupled with a high footfall around the station, were no longer present. Nonetheless, certain dimensions of the former marketplace had survived. This included the myth of authenticity which underpinned the trade in Malian *bazin*; loyal relations with certain long-standing clients in the area; and credit relations among traders with a regular and reliable presence at the markets. These aspects provided clear commercial rationales for remaining in place at the Terminus and resisting relocating the markets out to the suburbs. Apparent 'sedentarism' and continued place attachment were therefore not reactionary and irrational responses by immobile, inflexible traders. Rather, being rooted in location had certain commercial advantages. In fact, immobility was in some ways a performance which gave market traders a certain reputation that facilitated their access to credit, clients and profit. Even though the marketplace itself was in various ways moving, as it was shrinking, mutating and relocating, the traders had to create a semblance of immobility and commercial identities rooted in place.

By focusing on the traders' active place-making in the wake of rupture and displacement, the analysis presented here has mainly emphasised the traders' agency. This, in turn, raises questions about the *limitations* imposed on the traders and how the traders sought to conform with – or circumvent – the perceptions and ideals they were subjected to by their surrounding social environments. This is especially relevant when considering the plight of women traders, as the next chapter shows. Women had turned the train and its terminus into largely feminised

spaces, and this had in some ways legitimised their presence and commercial activities in public space. After displacement, however, they no longer operated in female-dominated environments, thus potentially breaching gender norms with regards to trading in public space. Persisting in trade after eviction therefore increased the need for women to justify their commerce morally and ideologically.

Notes

1   A *saree* is a garment for women, originally from South Asia, which many of my female interlocutors wore. It consists of a several-metres-long, wide drape that is wrapped around the body.
2   Over the past decades, many of the Malian women who had been travelling back and forth on the train had got married and settled permanently in Dakar.
3   I have bracketed the Senegalese buses as they were not highly competitive: their standards were lower than the average Malian buses and most people I spoke with preferred using the Malian buses.
4   Relatives of railway employees used to travel for free on the train, though (Lambert 1993a: 48). Moreover, some *bana-banas* avoided paying for the train ticket by hiding when the conductor came around. Some people had managed to travel without a ticket by sitting on the roof of the train. Those tactics were not possible on the bus.
5   *Convoyeurs* escort the truck driver to administer the paperwork and payments required for the transit, export or import of goods.
6   When entering Mali, apart from the border post in Diboli, there were six checkpoints on the road between the Senegalese border and Bamako. The number of checkpoints in Senegal had been reduced to only three after a successful strike in November 2012 carried out by truck drivers who blocked the border passage between Diboli and Kidira with their vehicles, protesting against the endless number of checkpoints.
7   *Tô* is a heavy, starchy mash made from maize or millet. *Basi* is Malian couscous made from maize or millet.
8   For example, in Kumasi (Ghana), Lomé (Togo), and Ibadan (Nigeria), landlords lodging long-distance traders are referred to in Hausa as '*mai gida*' (Hill 1966: 350; cf. Agier 1983: 107; Cohen 1965). The Wolof word *teranga* is sometimes considered equivalent to *jatigiya*, although from my experience in Dakar, *teranga* was used more broadly to simply mean hospitality.
9   Manchuelle notes that Claude Meillassoux has suggested that the origins of the *jatigiya* system may have derived from the symbiotic relations between Soninke farmers and desert nomads who brought salt and livestock from the desert in exchange for cereals, while their herds grazed on the Soninke farmers' freshly harvested fields (Manchuelle 1997: 236 n. 69).
10   The *jatigiya* system is not limited to long-distance trade networks. With the rise of modern labour migration in West Africa, *jatigiya* has played a central role in the establishment and perpetuation of transnational migration systems (David 1980: 172–8; Pian 2008: 97). As Jean Schmitz explains, two types of relations hinge on the *jatigi* (the host): between autochthonous hosts and strangers, and between itinerant and settled traders (Schmitz 2007: 102).
11   One of the managers of this commercial centre told me that out of the 150 *cantines* (storage spaces which some traders were using as shops) contained in the centre, 18 were owned by 'Bambaras' (Malians).
12   In fact, as Dalakoglou and Harvey (2012) point out, even hypermodern spaces such as airports, shopping malls, and motor service stations 'might be non-places to the passing traveller – but they are replete with social relations, with material histories, with regulatory forces and when given the chance reveal complex social and cultural dynamics that bear close attention' (Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012: 463).

13 Resist-dyeing refers to methods of dyeing that prevent ('resist') the dye from reaching all the cloth. Before dyeing, selected areas of the cloth are blocked out to resist the dye, for example by applying wax or mud paste, or by tying or stitching the cloth. Another possibility is to use a chemical agent in a specific type of dye that will repel another type of dye printed on top (Wikipedia n.d.).

14 Kirby explains that laws in Senegal prohibit people from using river water for dyeing, whereas, 'In Mali, dyeing in or close to the Niger River is not yet forbidden by Malian law; however there is increasing awareness that dyeing as currently practised is extremely polluting' (Kirby 2013: 66).

15 It is interesting to note that for people in Mali it tends to be Guinean cloth that is considered most desirable, representing an 'authentic' product of superior quality. I would like to thank Prof. Mary-Jo Arnoldi for pointing this out in a conversation.

5
Persisting against the patriarchal odds

Aissa was a middle-aged Malian woman who had traded *bazin* cloth at the former Malian market and frequently travelled back and forth with goods on the train until it was privatised. With a shop in the new indoor cloth bazaar located next to the Terminus, she was still well-known by most of her colleagues there as an experienced and successful trader. In fact, a young woman I knew who worked at the bazaar once called me over when I was sitting with Aissa and her colleagues, and when I explained to her that I was busy chatting to Aissa she replied, very impressed, 'Do you know Aissa?!' as if Aissa was a celebrity. Yet, Aissa had lost certain privileges after moving into the new cloth bazaar and now had to endure the fierce competition from other traders, including men who were increasingly joining the ranks of female *bazin* traders. Aissa lamented the lack of solidarity among her fellow women traders. She wanted to set up an association for the women trading at the bazaar, but this was not possible, she explained, because the women were competing and were not interested in supporting each other's businesses. Aissa particularly wanted the women to unite against a growing group of young men, referred to as *coxeurs*, who were posing as intermediaries in the cloth trade.

Women traders like Aissa, who had been displaced from the Terminus, found themselves increasingly in the minority and competing with men. Historically, the Dakar–Niger passenger train and the market at the Terminus were feminised spaces: the train was used primarily by women transporting and trading goods; and the expansion of the market at the Terminus had largely been driven by enterprising women. In the past, women had dominated the trade in certain commodities at the Terminus, particularly *bazin* cloth and aphrodisiacs.[1] By contrast, at the new Malian markets there did not appear to be any gender restrictions on trading activities, neither in terms of the scale of trade nor the kinds of items

marketed by traders. As one young female *bazin* trader commented, 'It used to be women who traded *bazin* but the men are now entering the trade too. Women are also joining the military now; it's like that'. These comments implicitly reflected contemporary neoliberal discourse according to which opportunities for men and women are the same since anyone can supposedly succeed by virtue of hard work and free market principles (cf. Rottenberg and Rottenberg 2018; Banet-Weiser, Gill, and Rottenberg 2019; Rottenberg 2019). Such a discourse downplays the growing marginalisation of women traders, which appeared to have gone hand in hand with the past decades' increasing political and economic liberalisation in Senegal and the wider region. When containers and paved national highways started facilitating transport of larger volumes of goods over longer distances at the end of the twentieth century, men began encroaching significantly on the transnational trade between Mali and Senegal that women had dominated. This was confirmed by the man in charge of the 'Parking malien' where the Malian trucks that transported goods to Mali from the Dakar harbour were stationed: 'Before with the train, the women were more numerous in commerce than the men. Now it's the reverse: the men are more numerous in bringing the trucks, and they trade wholesale'.

The increasing presence of men at the new Malian markets appeared to be closely associated with the weakening of the female networks that had underpinned both railway commerce and market trade at the Terminus. Historically, railway commerce used to be facilitated by women's kinship networks, and trade skills were passed down from one generation of women to the next. Women were prepared from an early age for a career in the transnational commerce associated with the Dakar–Niger railway (Lambert de Frondeville 1987; Lambert 1993a, 1993b; Poitou, Lambert de Frondeville, and Toulabor 1992). Similarly, at the Terminus women's domination of market trade was partly underpinned by intergenerational knowledge and skills transmission between mothers and daughters; and by female networks linking traders at the Dakar Terminus with those moving back and forth from Mali. Conditions had changed significantly over the years, though. As the previous chapter showed, networks between mobile and settled traders were disrupted or destroyed with the demolition of the Malian market and cessation of the passenger train. And, unlike the well-connected women trading on the Dakar–Niger line in the 1980s described by Agnès Lambert, many shuttle traders were single mothers who had entered the trade at a mature age and who were largely alienated from family support networks (Jónsson 2019). The women I observed at the markets in Dakar were no longer teaching their daughters how to trade,

and the generation of women who had founded the Malian market at the Terminus had largely retired and been replaced by men.

The circumstances that had given rise to women's ascendancy in these areas of trade had thus gradually withered. Women continued to contribute significantly to household incomes and even sought to amass personal wealth through this kind of commerce. Meanwhile, after eviction women to some extent had to renegotiate their rights to participate in the market. Displacement from the Terminus had entailed a rupture of the implicit moral contract that had allowed women to trade in a public space that was historically constituted as 'feminine'. In a context where it was relatively anomalous for women to be seen outside in public space engaging in more than just petty commerce and travelling long distances for trade, the active economic participation of women was often downplayed and considered morally problematic. In this context, the women traders frequently sought to justify their commerce in ways whereby it appeared not to undermine the prevailing patriarchal order. This chapter examines the discursive strategies and performances the displaced women traders drew upon to justify and legitimise their continued involvement in trade in the face of gendered constraints. These constraints included growing competition from men in the marketplace, the undermining of networks and solidarity among women traders, resistance from spouses, and wider ideological and moral obstacles. The material illustrates the *competing femininities* among these traders, who viewed their relationships with men in radically different and sometimes contradictory ways: as competitors, as superiors, as fellow sufferers, as irrelevant, and so on. Women traders did not merely espouse and perform gendered behaviour and identities that conformed with hegemonic femininity. A focus on competing femininities highlights the diversity and changeability of gender roles, relations and ideologies (cf. Tyszler 2019; Packer 2019).

I begin this chapter by highlighting some of the gendered tensions at the new markets, where male *coxeurs* (middlemen) were increasingly making inroads on the formerly feminised space. The subsequent sections examine the competing femininities and gender ideologies which women negotiated, responded to, drew on and performed to justify and motivate their continued involvement in trade. In these varied ways the women dispersed from the Terminus were staking a claim to the markets and legitimising their persistent involvement in commerce, despite the growing gendered obstacles. The analysis crudely divides the tradeswomen's justifications and motives for their commercial activities, and the kinds of gender ideologies which underpinned them, into three distinct parts: subsistence, gender complementarity and individualism. This is merely

done for heuristic purposes and not to present these as mutually exclusive. The women's reasons for persisting in trade were complex and evolving, ultimately reflecting tensions between the individual and the collective in a changing society. The women often sought to justify their social and financial autonomy morally and ideologically, but also contested prevailing gender ideologies by publicly engaging in trade. Traders who rationalised their activities in terms of subsistence revealed some of the moral compromises that women made to be able to trade, including compromises in terms of their ideal gender roles and compromises with regards to wealth accumulation. Justifications of trade also reflected struggles over the meanings of 'gender complementarity' as women sought to defend their rights to engage in trade and freely dispose of their own income in the face of certain needs and demands of men. Finally, individualism motivated trade, particularly for women who operated in a socially and financially autonomous fashion, with varying consequences for their social relationships.

'Those young men are causing us problems'

Both shuttle and market traders in Dakar made use of *coxeurs*. Essentially, the *coxeur* was someone who 'brings you to the goods you are looking for' as the shuttle trader Fatou Fall put it, adding that 'The *coxeur* is not a trader. He doesn't have any goods'. *Coxeurs* would for example guide Malian shuttle traders around to the shops, factories or markets that they were looking for in Dakar. Some traders at the new Malian markets, particularly those at the cloth bazaar, relied on *coxeurs* to attract customers. These *coxeurs* would go out and look for potential customers and guide them back to the stalls of the traders (cf. Ebin 1992: 91; Seck 2006). Shuttle traders paid the *coxeurs* directly for their services while some market traders paid *coxeurs* a monthly salary to search for customers for them. But *coxeurs* had additional ways of earning money: if a *coxeur* brought a customer to a trader and that trader made a sale, the *coxeur* would expect a bonus – although that usually depended on how much the customer had bought and whether the *coxeur* was already receiving a salary from the trader. On top of that, c*oxeurs* would not only connect customers with goods but would also commonly broker deals on their behalf. The *coxeur* could artificially increase the price when informing the customer how much she had to pay for an item, and then pocket the difference between that and the actual price negotiated with the trader. This practice, which involved lying to the customer, was deemed immoral by many of the traders I spoke to, and in breach of Islamic principles.

The *coxeurs* attached to the new cloth bazaar next to the old Terminus would circulate through the nearby streets and ask people if they were looking for '*Mali thioup*' (Malian *bazin*) and then attempt to drag potential customers along to the bazaar. Many of the *coxeurs* roaming around outside the bazaar were self-employed men who were hoping to score a bonus if they managed to broker a sale. This practice must, however, have frequently yielded the opposite result: pedestrians passing on the stretch of pavement in front of the bazaar experienced intense harassment from the *coxeurs* approaching and stalking them, while aggressively asking them what they were looking for. I regularly came across upset tourists who tried to shake them off. Some of the female *bazin* traders were strongly opposed to the practice of *coxeurs*, who had seemingly inundated the cloth bazaar. Aissa told me,

> Those young men are causing us problems! They'll go to the city centre and bring someone all the way from there to here. Then you'll have to sell your *bazin* to the customer for 25,000 CFA [37.5 euros], and the *coxeur* takes 15,000 and that leaves you with 10,000 – even though that is forbidden in Islam. From the 10,000 CFA, you – the trader – have to pay the rent for your shop and the electricity every two months. You work hard, while he doesn't do anything! He just takes the money, and then he leaves. They don't have any risks. In life, you have to work hard to have something. You have to do like that [she draws her index finger across her forehead, mimicking the wiping off of sweat].

Aissa asked me rhetorically: 'To write your book and complete your study, you work hard, don't you?' I said yes. 'Well, it's like that! But he, the *coxeur*, he does nothing. He only takes the profit. We, the Malian women, we wanted to set up an association. We wanted to change that, but we can't do anything. It's the people in high positions who can do something about it'.

In a sense, Aissa and her colleagues' predicament reflected the 'trader's dilemma' described by Richard Grabowski (1997), who argued that buyers and sellers meeting in the marketplace are faced with the problem of choosing between cooperative and uncooperative behaviour. Uncooperative behaviour will likely result in short-lived trade and the trader being designated as untrustworthy while cooperative behaviour will likely lead to extensive trade. In other words, the dilemma can be characterised as a problem of trust, and a trader who chooses to be uncooperative in a market exchange must weigh the short-run gain against a possibly large long-run loss (Grabowski 1997: 388). Traders like Aissa depended on cooperative

behaviour in relations with clients and customers. Developing a loyal customer base and relations with cooperative suppliers helped to ensure the kind of regular income that was necessary to cover the expenses for running their businesses, including payment to their suppliers, overheads like electricity and stall maintenance, and rent to the landlord who owned the building where the bazaar was located. By contrast, the *coxeurs* did not depend to the same extent on cooperation and development of long-term relationships. The *bazin* trade was a lucrative business: there was a high demand, and the cloth originating from Mali was considered to be of superior quality (as explained in the previous chapter). *Coxeurs* therefore had little to lose by inflating the price and scoring a significant profit from a one-off sale, even if that meant cheating both the seller and buyer. The only thing at risk appeared to be the *coxeur*'s reputation: if too many regular buyers and sellers became familiar with his shrewd and untrustworthy behaviour, he might end up not being able to make any future deals. But there appeared to be enough customers and enough markets in Dakar for these *coxeurs* to get away with their self-interested behaviour.

For women in particular it was not so easy to circumvent the *coxeurs*. First of all, traders like Aissa depended on her own good reputation and high status to produce trust (Grabowski 1997: 389; cf. Gambetta 1988). Women did not become *coxeurs*, I was told, because it was deemed inappropriate behaviour for a woman to roam the streets and chat up strangers and also because women were not considered capable of embodying the *coxeur*'s aggressive demeanour, which involved grabbing customers and shouting at other competing *coxeurs*. Respectable women were expected to display a more dignified behaviour. Hence, in order not to compromise her reputation and maintain her status, Aissa had to stay put in her stall. This posed a problem because many of the former customers from the Terminus were unaware of the existence of this new commercial complex; since the staircases leading from the pavement up to the bazaar were hidden from view behind a large commercial billboard, it was not easily visible to people passing by on the street. As Fatou Fall argued, when I discussed Aissa's predicament with her,

> You have to have *coxeurs* if you want any customers. You give them 1,000 CFA and they can bring 15-20 clients. That's good! If you want to stay upstairs all the time [like Aissa], and you refuse to go outside to walk around and look for clients, then what are you going to do? The *coxeur* can do that for you, he brings you clients.

The growing presence of male *coxeurs* had not simply emerged in response to new market forces of competition, supply and demand, however, but also appeared to be the product of economic crisis and unemployment. When I asked Ba Fanta, who worked outdoors by the railway tracks, whether there were any *coxeurs* at her market, she said, 'There are ... People just try to make a bit of money'. This highlights a different, more pitiful aspect of the *coxeur* profession. Adding middlemen into the equation of trading was a form of job creation intended to help poor and unemployed men, even if that extra link in the supply chain further inflated prices for local consumers. Employing *coxeurs* thus reflected a moral decision on the part of some traders, rather than any rational economic calculation of profit. When I interviewed a wealthy Malian wholesale trader at the suburban market in Pikine, he explained:

> When the trucks come to the market, they each carry 500–600 sacks. We give each *coxeur* 20–30 sacks to sell. The *coxeurs* are both Senegalese and Malians. They're all men. They are heads of families, so we give them the goods to sell for us. Otherwise, we could easily sell them ourselves; but we know that everyone is here to look for money, so we give the goods to them.

These diverse perceptions of male *coxeurs* at the new marketplaces illustrate some of the strikingly different understandings of gender relations that I recorded among my female interlocutors reflecting on their relations with men: men overstepping gender boundaries and encroaching on women's economic territory (Aissa's view); men as mere tools to be used for women's own economic advancement (Fatou Fall's view); or as fellow sufferers in the same precarious boat (Ba Fanta's view).

West Africanist scholarship has generated important insight into how male dominance and gender inequality is perceived and experienced in this region, often challenging Eurocentric prejudice and misconceptions. Research in the West African context has tended to emphasise the complementarity of the genders and a communitarian ethic where women are often associated with cooperation and social harmony (Brand 2001; De Jorio 2009; Fall-Sokhna and Thiéblemont-Dollet 2009; Grosz-Ngaté 1989; Hoffman 2002; Sieveking 2007). For example, scholars have pointed out that while women in Mali have sought to improve their rights, they reject the Euro-American ideology of individualism and pursuit of autonomy, and instead stress the need to relate (Brand 2001: 4; De Jorio 2009). Mande women

consider themselves complementary, not subordinate, to men, and some scholars have even argued that male authority among the Mande is more ideological than material. What is at work in Mande society is, according to Barbara Hoffman, 'mythical male dominance': men demonstrate dominating behaviours against women, and women act as if males were the dominant sex, but women nevertheless hold certain kinds of social and economic power and political authority (Brand 2001: 102; Hoffman 2002: 3, 11).

These insights are significant for understanding the kinds of gendered constraints women traders were confronted with at the new Malian markets and for making sense of why and how women persisted as traders despite ideological and moral obstacles – all of which will be addressed in the following sections. An analytical focus on 'West African women' or 'Mande gender ideology' meanwhile risks downplaying the *competing* gender discourses which do exist even in supposedly 'communitarian' societies that emphasise gender complementarity and the social embeddedness of identities and experiences (as opposed to more 'individualistic' societies) (Kabeer 2012). My female interlocutors' narratives about why they traded were frequently incoherent and at odds with their own behaviour, which suggests that different and sometimes contradictory ideological models were at play simultaneously (cf. Clark 1999b: 68). Most strikingly, the question of whether a married woman should stay at home and be provided for by her husband or whether all women had a moral duty to financially support their families, particularly under conditions of poverty, appeared to be an unresolved moral and ideological conundrum (cf. Le Cour Grandmaison 1969).

Fatigue and patriarchal bargaining

Supporting themselves through trade was not necessarily how my women interlocutors had envisaged their adult lives, but it was often a necessary livelihood strategy. Kadia was married to a Malian former kola trader who had suffered great financial losses so Kadia's daughter had started sending her textiles from Mali to sell in Dakar to support the family.[2] A female shuttle trader I met at the Terminus had started travelling in old age to sell the *bazin* she dyed at home in Bamako, after her husband had suffered a stroke and was completely paralysed; she had travelled by foot all the way from Bamako to Dakar. Another trader, Aminata, had moved to Dakar after getting married to a Senegalese man but he left her and their four children, so Aminata had started trading

at the Malian market in order to pay for the family's subsistence. Her ex-husband, a local schoolteacher, did not contribute any money and had not seen their children since the divorce.

Several scholars have emphasised that structural adjustment and associated austerity measures introduced in the aftermath of independence in Senegal has undermined the provider status of men and contributed to the feminisation of poverty. Meanwhile, as Agnes Hann points out, there has tended to be disagreement about whether it is men or women who have suffered the most (Hann 2013). In the context of liberalisation, the proliferation of non-state development actors led to certain initiatives to assist women in their entrepreneurial activities, particularly through provision of micro finance. This, some observers have argued, increased women's economic and social autonomy, whereas the status and identity of men has been undermined as they have increasingly been unable to live up to the idealised role of breadwinner (Perry 2005; Buggenhagen 2012; Melly 2011). Other observers, meanwhile, point out that women's financial autonomy has frequently rendered them more, not less, vulnerable, especially in a neoliberal context of austerity where they can no longer rely on social services provided by the Senegalese state (Hann 2013; Kane 2011; Bop 1996).

To be sure, many of the women I met in Dakar were trading out of financial necessity to support themselves and their families. Yet, I often sensed that there was much more to the women's trade than a mere pursuit of the means to pay for their families' subsistence needs. Although poverty was sometimes the main reason or at least part of the explanation why women had entered the trading profession, it was not necessarily the only motivating factor. Yet the notion that these women had had any free choice in their decision to trade, or derived any pleasure from it, was often downplayed. Aspects like personal enjoyment, learning, and independence derived from trading were largely suppressed in a prevailing 'victimhood discourse' on women engaged in trade. Interlocutors would frequently tell me things like, 'The women who trade don't do it because they love commerce, but because of the social situation' or, 'You become a shuttle trader to support your children, not because you love to travel'. In the following I argue that the victimhood discourse in some ways appeared to be a patriarchal means to discourage married women from leaving the home and pursuing their own income generation. It was meanwhile used strategically by women traders themselves to legitimise their commercial activities in the face of conservative gender norms and in a context where men were increasingly staking a claim to the markets.

The lack of a capable male breadwinner clearly created a financial necessity for women to engage in trade to earn money for their families. But, for some of my interlocutors, women's involvement in trade was also a potential moral problem because, according to them, a woman should marry and stay at home and be provided for by her husband. N'deye, a young unmarried female trader, used to trade with her aunts; but one after the other they had stopped when they got married, and eventually N'deye was the only woman from the family who was left at the market. If a married woman traded at the market it suggested (to some people) that she was neglecting her role as a wife and mother, which reflected negatively on her husband. I met several Malian men in Dakar who preferred that their wives stay at home instead of going out to work. This could be based on religious grounds: being a good Muslim for some men meant taking full charge of their families, including their wives. But prestige also appeared to play a role since being able to 'afford' to have one's wife stay at home implied that you were self-sufficiently wealthy, even if in practice many men struggled to make ends meet on their own. The distressing discrepancy between these masculine ideals and the reality of poverty is illustrated by a conversation I had with the young Malian man Yaya who assisted Safi in her textile shop and who also ran his own stall in the same commercial complex. Yaya told me he wanted to become a *Wahhabiyya*. *Wahhabiyya* originally referred to an Islamic sect founded by the Saudi-born revivalist Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, and in contemporary Western discourse the term usually conjures up associations with extreme fundamentalist Muslims and 'Salafism'. For many of the Malians in Dakar, however, *Wahhabiyya* referred to a non-violent reformist type of Islam emphasising 'correct Muslim practice' (Whitehouse 2012: 102; cf. Amselle 1985). Yaya explained to me that he found it difficult to be a true *Wahhabiyya*:

> Once I have a lot of money I'll become a good Muslim, I will be one hundred percent *Wahhabiyya*. But if you don't have money it's hard to be a good Muslim … Well, it's not that you need lots of money; you just need enough to take care of your wife and your children, to build a nice home and pay your bills. If you can't do all that, you can't be *Wahhabiyya*. To be *Wahhabiyya*, you need lots of money to afford to keep your woman in the house [he turns an imaginary key] … But we in Senegal are poor. If you don't have any money, how can you do all those things you're supposed to in order to be a good Muslim? How can you pay your bills and feed your family if you don't have any money? You're forced to commit crime [*faire le*

banditisme]. And that's not good. Then you can't be a good Muslim. It doesn't mean you need a lot of money, but if you have nothing, how can you be *Wahhabiyya*? That's why I can't say I am really *Wahhabiyya*.

These gender ideals of male breadwinners and domesticated wives help explain why a dominant discourse on women engaged in trade emphasised these women's lack of choice in the decision to trade, insisting that they traded out of pure necessity and not out of their free will. Certain interlocutors, including some of the women themselves and some of the older Malian men who were familiar with the traders, emphasised that women did not trade because they liked it, but because they had no husband who could provide for them. When I discussed this with a divorced trader – while sitting next to her widowed colleague – she told me, 'The Malian women are *fatiguées* [tired]. They are tired in their marriages and tired in trade'.

The French word *fatigue* – literally meaning tiredness, exhaustion – cropped up numerous times in my conversations with women traders.[3] Frequently, one of the first things shuttle traders asked me when we were introduced was, 'Do you have any medications against *la fatigue*?' Usually I would reply that I thought they should get some rest, which puzzled the women and made some people laugh – these women did not have time to rest. Occasionally, when I accompanied shuttle traders on purchasing trips around Dakar, they would turn to me and ask, 'It's hard the work of a *bana-bana*, isn't it?' Indeed, it was very taxing work physically and mentally. While I would not deny these traders' real experiences of exhaustion, I did wonder why the women so frequently felt they needed to point this out.

Emphasising their *fatigue* might have been an indirect expression of pride by the traders in the hard work they carried out, thus resembling the middle-class American take on 'stress' which 'mingles a certain pride in the fast pace of life with worry about its effects' (Becker 2013: 2). This pride would suggest a work ethic that celebrates the hardships of labour, not just for men but also for women. Indeed, François Manchuelle has pointed out that Soninke proverbs, 'praise hard work in a fashion reminiscent of Max Weber's "Protestant Ethic"' (Manchuelle 1997: 28). I made similar observations among my Soninke interlocutors in rural Mali (Jónsson 2007: 42). This work ethic was apparently an ideal that was shared more broadly among the Mande (of whom the Soninke are part). During my fieldwork in Dakar, Safi and I were once listening to a song by the famous Malian musician, Toumani Koné, which also conveyed this kind of work ethic.

Safi translated bits for me: 'He says, if you want something, you have to be *fatigué*. Otherwise, if you don't want to work, you can't have anything. You have to make an effort. The one who does not want to work, you have to kill that person'. Among my interlocutors 'hard work' was valued by both genders and was thus not definitive of either masculinity or femininity.

At times my interlocutors' usage of the term '*fatigue*' resembled the way Westerners may use the term 'stress' to stand in for uncertainty and fear (cf. Becker 2013: 3). For example, just before the presidential elections in Mali, Oumou told me, 'We want peace. Everyone in Mali is *fatigué* because of the war'. In these cases, the *fatigue* interlocutors experienced would manifest as headaches, and there were high levels of consumption of paracetamol and other similar painkillers among my interlocutors in order to cure '*la fatigue*'. When a female trader once told me that the women in her family suffered from migraines, her colleague who was sitting next to her turned to me and commented, 'It is very dangerous if women have headaches; they can even die from it. It is men who have headaches because they are often stressed. With women, it is their stomach that aches. But if a woman has a headache, it's really not good!' Mental stress – and in this context my interlocutor actually used the word '*stress*' rather than '*fatigue*' – and its accompanying headaches were thus construed as something only men should endure. Stomach aches, being indicators of women's reproductive functions, were associated with 'women's work' and hence something women endured. Complaining about '*la fatigue*' might have been a way for a trade woman to indirectly criticise her own involvement in this 'masculine' type of work and bemoan the wider socio-economic situation that forced her to perform this work, which meant she had to step outside of her ideal gender role.

The prevailing 'victimhood discourse' associated with women traders maintained an ideology of female domesticity and male dominance by implying that the women who traded were not deliberately pursuing this occupation and that ideally, they would prefer to be provided for by a husband. Framed in this way, women's trade did not necessarily undermine the status or perceived dominance of men. This suggests that tradeswomen accepted the victimhood discourse in order to uphold the 'myth' of male dominance (cf. Hoffman 2002). Their espousal of the victimhood discourse can thus be considered as a way of 'bargaining with patriarchy'. This term coined by Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) refers to the advantages, including status and recognition, which women derive from adhering to the implicit norms of a patriarchal system. Portraying themselves as tired (*fatigué*) and suffering, the women downplayed their own agency in the decision not only to become but also to remain traders. This victimhood discourse socially

legitimised these traders' activities because the women were not seen to challenge or subvert dominant gender ideology. Hence, the victimhood discourse allowed the women to go about their trade without jeopardising their own status or social relationships.

Women's 'small needs'

On a few occasions I naively asked married women traders whether they gave any of their earnings to their husbands. This usually provoked loud outbursts of laughter, and when they realised I was not joking my interlocutors immediately dismissed this idea. The notion that women's earnings belonged only to themselves and were theirs to dispose of was considered unnegotiable (cf. Abu 1983; Le Cour Grandmaison 1969). This of course appeared perfectly justified, considering the patriarchal ideal of male providers, as well as the reality that husbands could not always be relied upon for full financial support. Husbands would occasionally attempt to bend this rule and try to persuade the women to share some of their income with them, but usually to no avail.

Parallel with the notion that married women should stay at home was another kind of ideology that stressed both the distinctness and the complementarity of gender roles, which women drew on to justify their involvement in commerce (cf. Brand 2001; Hoffman 2002; Koné 2002). My interlocutors would sometimes claim that married women traded to cover their own 'small needs' (*petits besoins*), which included giving presents to their children, sending remittances to their parents in Mali, or buying small luxuries for themselves. The Malian traders sometimes criticised Senegalese women who they claimed did not want to work; they just wanted to stay at home and get money from their husbands (cf. Adjamagbo and Antoine 2004; Toma 2012).[4] According to Oumou,

> In Mali, women are looking for money. They work*, dé*! We, the women of Mali, we don't like to ask our husbands to give us money, we prefer to look for money ourselves. To do like that [she opens her palm, like a beggar] with your husband is not good.

In this sense, women were supposedly trading not in pursuit of individual autonomy and wealth, but to contribute to the well-being and social status of their families and to partly relieve the financial burden on their husbands (cf. Clark 1999a). Earning money for themselves was thus construed as an altruistic act by women traders to the benefit of their

families, including their husbands. Trading to cover their 'small needs' supposedly complemented rather than contravened women's domestic, reproductive and care work (cf. Clark 1999a). Yet, the so-called 'small needs' that the female traders were providing for were not necessarily as insignificant as the term suggests. Paying for their children's fees and equipment for school, as well as clothes for themselves and their children, were hardly 'small' needs. Moreover, nurturing social relations through gifts and remittances and maintaining a respectable image through a well-turned-out appearance were important ways for women to signify wealth and strengthen social networks (cf. Buggenhagen 2012: 26). For female traders, such social capital could potentially generate more customers, market insights, and new business opportunities. Meanwhile, by referring to their needs as 'small' the women discursively construed their income and economic activities as insignificant and non-threatening to the overall power balance within the household (and society at large).

Being a married woman trader pursuing 'small needs' required maintaining a delicate balance of power and complementarity of work with one's spouse. On the one hand, women could not always rely on the income of their husbands, and trading was a form of insurance against that risk. Oumou for example told me that the women at her market traded to cover their 'small needs' but added that,

> I am not like the others. I cover all my own expenses. I am the one who takes care of me; my husband doesn't have to pay for me. With the salary of the husband, you never know. One day, he can earn lots and another day, nothing; sometimes he will fall ill. It's not certain. So it's good if you yourself can contribute something, not to have any difficulties.

On the other hand, if women appeared to be relatively self-sufficient financially it might create an incentive for their husbands to shirk their obligations as providers to the family and decrease their financial support. Fatim was trading at the outdoor market near the old Terminus station. When I asked her when she had started to trade at the market, she told me in an upset tone that it was when she got married:

> My husband doesn't do anything! I am the one who pays everything at home: the bed where I sleep, all the furniture that's at the house, there's also a wooden chest that I've paid for; even the TV. Everything! He thinks I cannot leave him, that's why he is like that. But luckily, all the furniture in the house belongs to me; I'm the one

who has paid for it. He's done nothing. He sees that I have a lot of goods [for sale] so he thinks that I earn a lot – although it doesn't belong to me. I only sell goods for the other traders and me, I earn nothing. If I ask my husband for money he will say, 'You have your own money!'

A few months later, Fatim told me she and her husband had separated. Conflicting expectations regarding gender roles and complementarity appeared to have destabilised their marriage. Despite the prevailing masculine ideal, it was not uncommon for men to withdraw from their financial responsibilities towards their families, relying on women to become the main breadwinners. Indeed, most of my female interlocutors were financially in charge of their own households regardless of whether they were married.

In some cases, though, the strictly separate economic spheres of men and women and the obligation on men to provide financially meant that within a marriage it was possible for female traders to be relatively well-off while their husbands were poor. Fatou Fall explained, 'In Mali the husband pays everything. The woman is not supposed to pay. She can if she wants to, if she has money. But if she refuses, the man pays everything: water, rent, clothes, and food'. I commented that in Denmark, where I was born, husband and wife usually shared their income and expenses and it was less important who earned the most. Fatou replied,

No, we don't do that here, *dé*! The money you earn, that's for yourself. I have a friend in Bamako, she has two cars and three houses. But her husband doesn't have anything! He has no money. But that girlfriend of mine! She also owns land. She trades in China and Dubai.

This story of Fatou's friend illustrates how women might take advantage of a patriarchal arrangement while men became the victims of a hegemonic masculine ideal that limited gender equality in marriage (cf. Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Morrell 1998). In other words, men might paradoxically lose out in the patriarchal bargain which minimised women's economic responsibilities and placed most of the burden of providing for the household on the shoulders of men. These findings resemble observations made by Colette Le Cour Grandmaison (1969) in her seminal study of the economic activities of women in Dakar. Le Cour Grandmaison found that the Islamic obligation on men to provide for their family had reinforced the independence of wives in the utilisation

of their assets and earnings acquired through work. The Qur'an obliges a Muslim man to take full charge of his wife and children, regardless of his own poverty or the wealth of his wife; it also allows the wife full disposal over her own assets (Le Cour Grandmaison 1969: 148).[5] Le Cour Grandmaison showed that women in Dakar took advantage of this right to keep their gains separate from the family budget.[6] Nonetheless, while women in theory were perfectly entitled to keep their own money, in practice women who amassed personal wealth without redistributing any of it were often frowned upon by my Malian interlocutors. Such practices by women appeared to undermine a communal ethic and signal subversive forms of individualism, as the next section explains.

'We are all arrogant!'

Several of the female traders appeared to be partly motivated by a desire to increase their levels of personal consumption and to accumulate personal capital. Even if they had initially started trading due to financial difficulties and for subsistence reasons, their motives could change over time. They might start out with a small amount of capital that only allowed them to cover their 'small needs', but if they were successful then their ambitions might also increase. I discussed this with Fatou Fall. She was divorced and her ex-husband had passed away. I asked her, 'If you married again with someone in Mali and your husband had money, would you then stop travelling to Dakar?' Fatou had just told me that the reason she was a shuttle trader was that she was a single household head with no husband to provide for her. 'No!' she replied firmly. 'But you just said that you only travel because you don't have a husband to pay your expenses...', I commented. 'Yes... but even if he earns money, I also want to earn money!' she replied firmly. 'But what are you going to do with that money?' I asked her. 'Well, I will buy a beautiful car for myself. I will buy gold – I will wear golden bracelets up to my elbows!' she replied and laughed out loud at this thrilling fantasy. Such self-indulgent behaviour and conspicuous consumption were admired but usually only if they were accompanied by charity and generosity.

Many of the women I encountered clearly enjoyed certain aspects of their occupation. Trade was valued as a means to learn new things and experience the world outside the confines of the domestic space and, in the case of shuttle traders, beyond the borders of one's own country. Women often derived a sense of independence, personal growth and satisfaction from trading. In a few cases, trade even appeared to be a

passion bordering on obsession. Engaging in trade purely for the sake of amassing capital was, however, considered anti-social, even signalling a form of madness, as the rumours about Hawa illustrate. Maimoona, the Malian housewife who lived next to me, told me about her Malian friend Hawa who appeared to have become 'addicted' to trading to the detriment of her marriage. I frequently met Hawa because she had a small stall at the market that I had to pass through almost every morning on my way to meet other interlocutors. She traded opposite her Malian friend and neighbour, Fili, and they both sold aphrodisiacs. According to Maimoona, Fili was trading because she was poor and needed to earn money for the family; but Hawa went to the market even though she did not need to trade and she kept all the money to herself:

> My friend, Hawa, she doesn't give a single franc to her husband! They live in that house where my husband and I used to live. There, you have to fetch water and then you pay for it – there is no water in the house. Every time, you pay 25 CFA. But even that small amount, she doesn't pay; she always waits for her husband to give her the money before she fetches any water. 25 CFA! They say she is stingy. She keeps all her money to herself; she doesn't give anything to her husband. She doesn't have any children so she has no expenses; but she won't give any money to her husband. She also doesn't send anything to her parents… . 'Her husband told her to leave the market but she said she can't. She earns a lot of money! Her husband said to her, 'if you are trading you have to show what you earn!' But she doesn't. Now her husband has said he won't buy anything for her. He won't give her any credit for her phone; she has to buy that herself. Even the clothes – if it's not for the celebrations [*les fêtes*] he won't give it. Except the things they eat, he gives money so she can cook for the two of them.

I asked Maimoona what Hawa did with her money. 'I don't know! She keeps them all'. Maimoona explained that Hawa's husband initially gave her the start capital to buy goods to sell but when Hawa had sold them she did not return any money to him. At one point Hawa's husband sent her to Mali for fertility treatment, Maimoona explained:

> He told her: 'While you are there, you don't leave the house. Don't go to the market [to trade]!' But she said she didn't care, that she would go to the market – even if he divorced her! Everyone says to

her, '*Tu es folie!*' [you are crazy]. But she is not crazy, *dé*. I know she is not crazy. But I don't know why she's become like that. Before she was my friend. Now, everyone says she is crazy…

Hawa's husband and her friend Maimoona were concerned and even frightened by Hawa's anti-social and greedy behaviour, which deviated radically from the communitarian ethic that most of my interlocutors espoused (at least in principle). Scholarship has emphasised the relational ontology that characterises West African conceptions of personhood, meaning that the genders are considered as complementary and interdependent, and identities and experiences as socially embedded arena (cf. Brand 2001; Grosz-Ngaté 1989; Koné 2002). Hawa's behaviour as a trader appeared to contradict this outlook. And yet, scholars have also emphasised that Mande women often hold significant domains of power and that male dominance is in certain ways more mythical than real (Hoffman 2002).

'They are always arguing', Maimoona added. 'He wanted to divorce her but he can't. He wanted to take a second wife, but he can't. She is a real Bambara, *dé*!' I asked her what she meant and she explained, 'You know the Bambaras use a lot of *gris-gris* [powerful amulets and concoctions]. With that, the man cannot leave them, even if he wants to'. These comments suggested that Hawa was in fact what in Bamanankan would be called *muso waraba*, a 'lion woman'. *Muso waraba* referred to an extremely powerful woman who had supreme authority within a household where everyone, including her husband, obeyed her commands. She used *gris-gris* to secure this power: there were certain waist-beads that, when women tied them around their waists, they could do anything to men. As Oumou explained, 'If she attaches that, then afterwards she attaches everyone to her wrapper. *A b'a bèe siri a ka tafè kun na* [lit. she attaches everyone to the top/end of her wrapper]. If you attach everyone to your wrapper it means everyone is under your command'. Also, the *muso waraba* would dig a hole under the conjugal bed in her house where she would place her *gris-gris* and afterwards, cover up the hole with cement. 'That's how she traps the men', Oumou told me. The *muso waraba* could be a good or a bad person, rich or poor; the essential thing was that she was in charge and ordered everyone else around (*elle commande tous*). Hence, the authority of the *muso waraba* was confined to the domestic sphere, and although she might reverse power relations within the house, her aim was not to destroy the family or pit people against each other. These notions appeared to partly characterise Hawa's motives:

They say that all the Malian women here are good, except Hawa. All the Malian women here know how to look well after their husbands; except her. Her husband is suffering a lot. People say she doesn't love her husband. But she does! Last year, he sent her to Mali, he gave her all her belongings [*bagages*] and told her to go back to Mali. Everyone said they had divorced. But after three months, she returned.

The behaviour of the 'lion woman' was an expression of individualism which in some ways was acceptable behaviour for women because it did not entirely subvert the communal ethic and relational ontology. More troublesome than the *muso waraba* was the *muso nangaraba* – women who were unreliable troublemakers, seducing married men and causing social division. This term was often used to designate the women engaged in shuttle trade. These women were often targets of suspicions since many of them were divorced and their financial autonomy and high mobility contravened prevailing patriarchal ideals regarding respectable feminine behaviour.

There was no direct translation of *nangaraba*, a Bamanankan word which meant slightly different things to different interlocutors. In fact, my interlocutors' different interpretations of the term appeared to reflect their competing understandings of the meaning and value of individualism and how it pertained to women. In Fatou and Nana's *grin*, *nangaraba* referred to a cocky and confident woman who could get away with this attitude because she was powerful, wealthy, or very beautiful and charming. Fatou Fall once proclaimed: 'People say that I'm *nangaraba*, but I don't care. I show my shrewdness and cunningness [*mon malin*] to everyone! But I have many friends'. Fatou Fall and Nana were both openly referred to as *nangaraba* by the people who frequented their *grin*. When I asked the shuttle traders whether their *grin* at Sira had a 'president' – as was common in Mali – they responded, 'We are all arrogant! None of us wants to be at the bottom, so we can't decide who's going to be president. If for example Fatou says she's going to be president, Nana is not going to accept that'. After hanging out with these two women for a while, even I was called a *nangaraba*.

While Fatou and Nana considered the designation *nangaraba* appealing and fascinating, albeit acknowledging its subversive potential, for Oumou the *nangaraba* was a very manipulative and self-serving woman:

The *nangaraba* turns people against each other, she lies, she steals. She is fearless. She doesn't work, but she earns money. She is in

all the houses of the neighbourhood, busy gossiping and lying. She doesn't do any good, she doesn't care. Everyone is afraid of the *nangaraba*, she is very very bad.

Oumou also stressed that the *muso waraba* (the lion woman) was afraid of the *muso nangaraba*, because she caused trouble and was very dangerous. It appeared that for Oumou the *nangaraba* threatened to destabilise social harmony and disrupt families – something even the *muso waraba* feared. *Nangaraba* represented individualism in women, and, considering my interlocutors' competing definitions of *nangaraba*, this character provoked ambivalence, admiration and fear.

Individuality is to some extent recognised as a dynamic force in Mande cosmology, as expressed in the concept *fadenya* (father-childness). According to Bird and Kendall (1980), *fadenya* is associated with 'centrifugal' forces of social disequilibrium: envy, jealousy, competition and self-promotion. Not bound by social commitments or obligations, nor impeded by social convention, the person who displays *fadenya* behaviour is capable of performing extraordinary and heroic acts. *Fadenya* is complemented by the forces of *badenya* (mother-childness), which is associated with 'centripetal' forces of society: submission to authority, stability, cooperation and altruism. These are qualities which pull the individual back into the social mass. These contrasting orientations within society result in a dialectic tension between the individual and the group. Alain Marie (2007: 175–6) has argued that all societies, even communitarian ones, value personal individuality to some extent (see also Kabeer 2012). Any society needs a diversity of competences and individual talents, particularly to exercise leadership or mediation. Marie argues, however, that the problem in communitarian societies is 'individualisation' (or, individualism); that is, when individuals free themselves from their obligations of solidarity and instead devote their specific skills and talents to the satisfaction of their personal desires and ambitions at the expense of others and the public interest (Marie 2007: 175). Meanwhile, as Marianne Gullestad has pointed out, even in supposedly 'individualistic' societies (like Norway) contrasting notions of individualism may be recognised, with independence and autonomy considered a positive and egotism a negative form (Gullestad 1992: 184).

The problem with the *nangaraba* was perhaps not so much her strong character and individuality – the lion woman also possessed these traits. Rather, it was the fact that she represented individualism, which my interlocutors clearly perceived in contrasting ways. Oumou did not distinguish between positive and negative notions of individualism but

merely viewed it in opposition to the collective ethic. The notion that the pursuit of purely personal gains might be a good thing did not register with Oumou. Fatou and Nana, however, appeared to see in the *nangaraba* a kind of *fadenya* and individuality – a woman who, because she stood out from the crowd, attracted admiration and recognition. They considered individualism – the independence and autonomy embodied by the *nangaraba* – as a good thing and not merely an expression of egotism at the expense of others. Hence, these shuttle traders appeared to espouse a more individualistic outlook compared with Oumou's 'communitarianism'.

While the stories above reflect certain women's pursuit of autonomy and potential subversion of social norms, it would be mistaken to conclude that these women were necessarily engaged in self-serving 'ego-trips'. Trade was a means for these women to adapt to changing economic conditions where the support from spouses, family and wider social networks was shrinking. Ideally in old age a Malian woman could rely on her daughters-in-law to support her and take over her domestic duties. But nowadays, I was told, older women had to rely on their own daughters instead, as they could no longer expect their sons' wives to take care of them (cf. Kandiyoti 1988). Nana was planning to bring her ageing mother to Bamako to house her with her own nuclear family there. Her mother was living with Nana's siblings in Kayes, but the sons were not working and the daughters-in-law were disrespectful and neglectful of Nana's mother. Female traders frequently complained that 'daughters-in-law are no good these days'.[7] For many of the Malian women I met in Dakar, the failures of their marriages and the wider break-down of generalised reciprocity within families meant they could anticipate less security in old age. Nana told me she would keep working as a shuttle trader for her entire life, because she had no other choice. It was not obvious that anyone would be taking care of the women traders at the last stages of their lives, especially if they were divorced, childless, or widowed, as many of them were.

Competing femininities in the marketplace

The loss of feminised networks and spaces of commerce, coupled with growing competition from men in the new marketplaces, made starkly visible the moral dilemmas and gendered constraints facing women traders displaced from the Terminus. Women who were involved in income generation and even wealth accumulation faced ideological barriers which complicated their abilities to thrive and succeed as traders – and

more generally, as full members of society. The ideological obstacles to women's commercial activities were not only expressed in the judgements and concerns voiced by other people, including husbands, housewives, male traders and fellow women traders; but were also reflected in the moral and gendered concerns voiced by the women themselves regarding their own involvement in trade. Women who were trading were sometimes portrayed as impoverished victims, who involuntarily had to step outside of their ideal gender role to generate necessary subsistence income. In other conceptions, women traders were deemed proactive in the face of a precarious economic environment, stepping up to support their households and take charge of their own expenses and complementing the economic roles of men by lightening their financial burdens. A different standpoint yet espoused new, alternative femininities among women traders, emphasising their autonomy, self-reliance and self-sufficiency. These were values which some people considered as threatening forms of individualism, potentially fostering greedy and egotistic behaviour. Yet, in a different light – especially from the perspective of single mothers and unmarried divorcees – these appeared as both necessary and self-empowering models of femininity in a context where neither the state nor the family could be relied upon for support.

This chapter exemplifies some of the analytical difficulties of separating out the specific ruptures generated by eviction and displacement from the Terminus from the wider transformations and challenges brought about by more general currents of political and societal change. For example, the ideal of men and women having complementary economic roles, rather than being in competition with each other, was difficult to uphold at the new Malian markets. Meanwhile, such moral dilemmas regarding ideal gender roles and relations were not merely a result of market demolition and displacement but were more generally felt among residents in Dakar (Antoine and Dial 2003; 2008; Lambert, van de Walle, and Villar 2018; Neveu Kringelbach 2016). Moreover, the *competing* femininities espoused and performed by the traders did not simply reflect the recent upheavals and fragmentation caused by dispossession and displacement from the Terminus. The traders associated with the Terminus have been changing identity and adjusting to circumstances for over a century, as Chapter 2 emphasised. In addition to competing femininities there were many other internal differentiations among the people of Malian background associated with railway commerce in Dakar. Given their hybrid, transnational and mobile backgrounds and livelihoods, many of the traders regarded their own identities as multiple and fluid. The competing understandings among

my interlocutors of what motivated and justified women's involvement in commerce reflected the diversity of femininities available to these traders as mobile and migrant women of Malian backgrounds immersed in the Senegalese metropolis. These women's hybrid identities and mobile livelihoods had exposed them to a range of femininities that have emerged in this region in the context of economic and political crises and liberalisation unfolding in the post-colonial era (Cornwall 2002; Davidson 2020; Dial 2008; Fouquet 2011; Grange Omokaro 2009; Neveu Kringelbach 2016; Perry 2005; Packer 2019). Examining women's active participation in economic life, as this chapter has done, does not therefore merely shed light on the specific gender obstacles and competing femininities generated by displacement from the Terminus. Ultimately, it reveals the changing and diverse conceptions of what it meant to be a woman in this part of urban West Africa. The rupturing events at the Terminus thus brought into sharp relief some of the more generalised dilemmas and underlying tensions experienced on an ongoing basis by most residents in Dakar. In this sense, the ethnography of an event and its aftermath can provide a lens onto aspects of everyday life which might be glossed over or supressed in everyday conversation (Gluckman 1940).

Women's right to accumulate wealth regardless of the poverty of men was a contentious issue among the dispersed traders in Dakar. Women traders used various strategies to legitimise their economic activities socially and morally. Some women took advantage of the patriarchal ideal to legitimise their increasing financial autonomy from their spouses. At the same time, the patriarchal norm concerning the respective financial rights and obligations of spouses was frequently transgressed. Indeed, a situation where wives were the main providers of the household was not merely a temporary arrangement but was relatively common among my interlocutors (cf. Le Cour Grandmaison 1969: 148). Women often sought to balance their autonomy as traders with the social requirements to not ruthlessly compete with men and other fellow traders and adhere to the norms of 'gender complementarity' and a communal ethic. Women often discursively upheld the ideological distinctions and complementarities between men and women. In practice, however, these ideals were challenged when it came to accepting the growing presence of men in the new marketplaces, particularly that of male *coxeurs*. These men wanted a 'piece of the cake' too, and they did not always play by the rules: the *coxeurs* were not faced with the traders' dilemma as they did not depend on a regular and loyal customer base to provide a steady income to cover the expenses associated with marketplace trade. Hence, they appeared to be undermining some of the women's businesses. The

gendered boundaries of inclusion at the market had to some extent been *redrawn* in the aftermath of displacement from the Terminus, as men were increasingly encroaching upon the commercial terrains of the displaced women. The next chapter, meanwhile, reveals that the former boundaries of inclusion and exclusion at the Terminus were in some ways being reproduced in the new marketplaces, as certain mechanisms producing social cohesion and trust among the traders were *carried over* from the Terminus.

Notes

1   This gendered 'monopoly' on the sale of certain items resembles observations made by Turritin in 1988 of Bambara traders in rural Mali: Traditional Bambara beliefs prescribe a strict differentiation by gender with respect to marketing activity. Women's activities are related to selling products of the land, men's activities to buying for resale and negotiating commercial transactions with strangers. The result is that women deal mainly in labour-intensive locally produced raw or processed foodstuffs ('fresh' produce) as well as a narrow range of craft products; men deal in items available through long-distance trade (salt, kola nuts, cattle and, in the past, slaves) (Turritin 1988: 586).

2   Kadia was a griot and interestingly also considered this occupation as a kind of trade. When I chatted to her and the other women who were part of her credit association (*tontine*), they explained that most of the members of their *tontine* were traders, while a small minority were salaried employees. Kadia then looked at me and added, 'I sell what comes out of my mouth; the others sell cloth'.

3   The equivalent word in Bamanankan is approximately *sègèn* ('tired'), which was sometimes used by interlocutors interchangeably with the French adjective *fatigué*. Meanwhile, as a noun the Bamanan word, *sègèn,* can also mean poverty.

4   Sorana Toma (2012: 82–4) argues that gender gaps with respect to labour force participation appear to be higher in Senegal than in many other sub-Saharan African countries; and that Senegalese women are financially dependent on their husbands and not expected to work outside the household, whereas in Mali women and men participate equally in the labour force.

5   See particularly the second chapter of the Qur'an, 'Surah al-Baqara', verse 233. The hadith literature further elaborates on the obligations of a husband towards the mother of his children.

6   Le Cour Grandmaison noted that this norm, where women kept their income to themselves, could occasionally be transgressed. For example, a woman would provide financial assistance if the husband momentarily had difficulty finding work, but such assistance would be suspended as soon as he had again secured a regular income (Le Cour Grandmaison 1969: 148).

7   The Malian women I met who had relocated to Dakar upon marrying preferred to live there together with their husbands, rather than staying behind in Mali with their mothers-in-law, some of whom lived in deprived rural areas and were engaged in subsistence farming. Sometimes, Malian mothers-in-law would put pressure on their sons in Dakar to send their wives to Mali, to come and work for them. They claimed their sons were wasting money on their wives rather than sending remittances home to their families. This underscores the tensions and rifts between mothers and daughters-in-law which my interlocutors frequently mentioned.

6
'We are all part of the Terminus'

Few people outside the Malian trading networks were aware of what exactly had happened to the traders from the Terminus or knew about the scattered new markets in downtown Dakar, where the displaced traders continued selling their wares. The displaced traders had lost many customers after their eviction from the Terminus. Safi, who worked at the new indoor cloth bazaar next to the old terminus building, explained:

> Many people thought we left after the market at the Terminus was closed. They just heard they were going to close the Malian market, so they're not aware that we're here. That includes even our old customers, who don't come here. And the new people don't know we are here, so they go to HLM [suburban cloth market] instead.

Most of the traders were working under precarious conditions and at risk of eviction from the new marketplaces where they had re-established themselves. The new indoor cloth bazaar located opposite the Terminus was in a privately owned building. Although the traders there paid substantial amounts in rent – a stall cost 40,000 CFA (60 euros) per month[1] – the building was not officially registered as a commercial space and the traders could easily be evicted by their landlord or the authorities (see Figure 6.1). This was partly why Safi, who traded at the bazaar, was frequently visiting the nearby police station and the base of the *gendarmes*, where her friendships, *copinage* and heavy flirting enabled her to informally negotiate with officials who might otherwise interfere in her and her colleagues' businesses.

The traders at Sugunikura, which was within 15 minutes' walking distance from the Terminus, also found themselves in a rapidly changing environment where the risk of another eviction and further displacement constantly lurked around the corner (see Figure 6.2). At the mid-point

Figure 6.1 One of the entrances to the cloth bazaar next to the Terminus. A sign at the top of the staircase advertises the sale of different qualities of Malian *bazin* and wax cloth.

of my fieldwork, the traders at Sugunikura pooled resources and had an imam perform a ritual sacrifice of a cow at the market. Oumou claimed they had done it to improve sales at the market, because the traders there were not selling anything. There was, however, a rumour that the traders had performed the sacrifice because they worried that they would soon be evicted since the lease of the land they were occupying had expired the previous year. They had initially been given six months' notice by the authorities and when the time was up they had negotiated another six months; but this extension had ended. It is possible that Oumou was not aware of this. She appeared to think that as long as they paid their rent (10,000 CFA a month per stall, equivalent to 15 euros) they would be able to stay at the market. As the history of the closure of the market at the Terminus suggests, the more well-informed and well-connected of the traders tended to keep such sensitive information to themselves (see Chapter 3).

Figure 6.2 Malian trader with her daughter at the entrance to the Sugunikura market.

At the outdoor market by the railway tracks next to the Terminus, the traders paid a daily fee of merely 150 CFA to the municipality; but working in the open air had its drawbacks. There were just a few trees sheltering traders and customers from the scorching sun. During the months when the *Harmattan* wind was blowing, the old umbrellas that the women sat under fell over and sometimes broke. The sand carried by the *Harmattan*, and the dust whirled up by this wind, caused eye infections which the traders and I suffered from frequently. During the rainy season the traders frequently had to rush to cover up all their goods to protect them from the sudden, heavy showers, which in turn meant that they themselves got completely soaked. The space available to the outdoor traders was limited to the narrow strip of land where the platforms for the Dakar–Niger train used to be. The suburban train, *Petit Train de Banlieue* (PTB), started reusing the terminus station in mid-2013. Since the terminus building remained closed, passengers waiting for the PTB train had to sit on benches by the railway tracks, rubbing shoulders with the traders and their wobbly displays piled high on wonky tables (see Figure 6.3). The managers of the station wanted to build a protective wall along the railway tracks, which meant the traders

Figure 6.3 *Bazin* cloth trader in her stall, outdoors near the railway tracks by the Terminus.

would eventually have to move away. Towards the end of my fieldwork another construction project began right next to this outdoor market to build a Museum of Black Civilisations*, Musée des civilisations noires* (Agence de Presse Sénégalaise 2014). Former President Wade's plan of constructing the 'Seven Wonders of Dakar' was partly materialising after all.

Former customers were often unaware that the traders from the Terminus had relocated to new markets. The general public was not familiar with Sugunikura and the cloth bazaar, which were not visible to random passers-by, who might otherwise have paid the markets a visit. Indeed, it appeared that in the popular imagination of Dakar's residents, only the few remaining traders sitting outside by the railway tracks near the Terminus continued to represent 'the Malian community in Dakar'. For example, journalists looking for a 'Malian opinion' on anything ranging from the economic impact of the war to the presidential elections in Mali tended to interview the traders at this small outdoor market. This was

ironic because in fact, the majority of the traders there were not Malian but Senegalese; and many of those among them who did hold Malian citizenship had spent most of their lives in Dakar. Apart from journalists, the myth of this small market's 'exotic' Malian profile also still attracted some tourists. These were usually either adventurous young travellers with a local guide, or visitors who had time to kill before catching the ferry to Gorée Island, which departed not far from the market. Unfortunately for the traders, though, tourists rarely came to buy anything but just came to see the market and experience its 'Malian vibe', as part of their sightseeing in Dakar.

My interlocutors frequently blamed their lack of customers on the fact that there was 'no money in Dakar'. Indeed, the worsening of the displaced market traders' businesses partly reflected the general worsening of the macro-economic environment. At the time of my fieldwork, financial crisis was deepening both in Senegal and in Mali. Wade's neoliberal agenda had failed to result in economic advancement for most of Senegal's population and his kleptocratic reign had left the national economy in shambles. In Mali, the military coup in March 2012 and the state of war that was declared in January 2013 had depressed the economy there. My various interlocutors told me that foreign investment and access to loans had declined in Mali; production had decreased; fewer goods were being imported; people had less money; and prices had gone up. Meanwhile, the lack of customers at the new markets was also partly related to competition from Malian traders who had recently established themselves in the suburbs of Dakar. Since 2009, the wholesale trade in *fruits secs* from Mali, which had driven the expansion of the former Malian market at the Terminus, had largely been taken over by traders at the large suburban market, Marché Syndicat Pikine. Furthermore, numerous Malian shuttle traders had started supplying *bazin* cloth to the large suburban cloth market, HLM, rather than selling it to the traders at the Terminus. Senegalese traders had also started sending convoys of trucks to Mali to purchase *bazin* cloth which they sold in Dakar, thus bypassing the transnational Malian trade networks altogether.

The drastic decline of customers and sales, and the continued risk of eviction, raise fundamental questions about the nature and *raison d'être* of the newly established Malian marketplaces in downtown Dakar. Why did these markets persist and what other purposes might they have served apart from the pursuit of profit? In raising these questions regarding the intentions of the traders and the aims of their new markets, this chapter explores yet another dimension of the metaphorical 'ends' of the Terminus

– that is, what were these markets *for*, ultimately? Why did the traders from the Terminus not simply dismantle their market network and begin new ventures elsewhere? What kinds of pursuits were they engaged in at these markets, if not the singular pursuit of an income? The market traders continued to 'stick together' both figuratively, as a relatively cohesive network collaborating to varying degrees; and also in a more literal sense, since the traders remained spatially clustered. A close ethnographic look at the social and commercial dynamics in the marketplaces sheds light on why and how the traders from the Terminus remained attached to their markets and each other. Through various forms of collaboration, credit relations, and informal regulations of behaviour at the markets, the traders produced symbolic boundaries that demarcated who could be considered part of 'the people of the Terminus'. This enabled the market traders to restore the interpersonal bases of trust, which was vital in the context of interruption and dislocation around the Terminus. Beyond the pursuit of profit and advancement of their businesses, traders also derived non-commercial benefits from inclusion in these markets. As a result of these boundary-making practices, and by literally referring to themselves as 'the people of the Terminus', the scattered and displaced traders reproduced a form of group consciousness among themselves and a continued mental orientation towards the Terminus. A sort of diasporic consciousness was thus emerging in the aftermath of displacement from the Terminus (cf. Cohen 1997; Sigona et al. 2015; Brubaker 2005).

To explore the production and maintenance of this 'Teminus diaspora', the first sections of the chapter describe relations of collaboration and credit among the dispersed market traders. These relations, while not necessarily harmonious or functional, acted as cohesive forces tying together the dispersed market traders into a trans-local network comprised of 'the people of the Terminus', whose members depended on each other for various resources. The latter sections of the chapter delve further into the kinds of informal organisation and regulation of economic exchange practices at the markets, that is, unwritten rules which governed conduct and social relations at the interconnected markets. The analysis reveals that regulation of trade in these marketplaces was not simply based on capitalist logics supporting individual choice and profit maximisation. As economic anthropologists have observed across the world, economic activities are always to some extent 'embedded' in social relations and non-economic institutions that constrain economic behaviour – be it kinship, religion or politics (cf. Applbaum 2012; Granovetter 1985; Hart 2007; Isaac 2012; Murphy 2014; Mauss 1954). Individual motives and intentions in the marketplace

must therefore be viewed in relation to the wider social context in which choice and action occur. Among the dispersed traders, imposing and adhering to implicit norms and rules regarding economic behaviour helped to re-establish a sense of cohesion and a measure of trust in a context of upheaval and uncertainty. By adhering to collective norms and values, traders became part of the community of 'the people from the Terminus' who were socially and morally tied together. Meanwhile, it is important to bear in mind that customs, habits and norms are not just followed mechanically and automatically. Not all traders are socially embedded to the same extent, and traders may seek to deliberately remove themselves from the pressure and scrutiny of collectivities and competitors (Granovetter 1985; Hart 1975; Meagher 2005). The following analysis addresses the dilemmas associated with trust and collaboration faced by the traders who were part of the market network. This included delayed or non-payment of credit, difficulties of competing and accumulating profit, and threats of jealousy and sorcery.

'Here is what we know'

The newly established marketplaces in downtown Dakar, together with the new terminus station for Malian freight trains, constituted scattered fragments of the dismantled market at the Terminus. The people working in these dispersed locations were all considered '*les gens de La Gare*', the people of the Terminus. The new marketplaces comprising the evicted traders were often collectively referred to as '*La Gare*', the Terminus. The networks and commercial activities associated with the Terminus were thus far more expansive than what met the eye at the empty, old terminus building. Beyond the few traders sitting outdoors by the old terminus there was a much bigger, partly invisible network of evicted and scattered traders in Dakar, who continued to consider themselves part of the Terminus. Malians working at the new freight train terminus in Bel Air considered themselves part of this network. They had formerly worked at the old terminus, and the freight trains from Mali that terminated in Bel Air continued to supply the displaced traders at their new markets in downtown Dakar. As the Malian manager of the station in Bel Air stated, 'Here and the market at the Terminus is the same thing. We are in continuity with the market over there'.

The wider context of informality in Dakar, where income-generating activities operated largely outside the regulatory framework of the state, meant that relations of familiarity and trust were important to maintain

if the newly established markets were to function (Meagher 2005, 2006, 2010). The literature on informal economies has highlighted that social networks and implicit norms and rules that underlie economic activity play a key role in 'non-state' regulation and enforcement of contracts. Informal networks may also provide financial services in contexts of partial or complete exclusion from the formal banking system (Sindzingre 2006: 67–8; Totolo 2013: 172). While the traders from the Terminus relied on such informal forms of organisation and regulation, their recent eviction and displacement had meanwhile undermined certain forms of collaboration and led to a fragmentation of networks (see Chapters Three and Four). In the aftermath of displacement, it was therefore important to maintain and re-establish the networks, collaboration and trust underpinning organisation and regulation of the newly established markets.

Meanwhile, traders who operated their businesses from the city centre had little knowledge of *other* Malian trading activities in Dakar, beyond the space of the Terminus. Several of my interlocutors at the newly established markets in downtown Dakar were unaware of the growing presence or activities of Malian traders in the suburbs. I went to the famous cloth market at HLM with Fatou Fall, and as we walked around I asked her whether there were any Malians selling *bazin* there. She replied that there were not, explaining that,

> Everyone knows that the Malian goods are being sold at the Terminus, so they don't come to HLM to buy Malian *bazin*. That's why none of the Malian *bazin* traders come here to sell – the customers expect to find them at the Terminus. People come to HLM to buy Senegalese cloth and clothes, not Malian ones.

I later accompanied another shuttle trader, Tènè, to HLM. She introduced me to a couple of Malian traders who to my surprise worked there permanently and who explained that there were several other Malians selling *bazin* at HLM. While Malian *bazin* cloth may have fetched a better price at the Terminus (as explained in Chapter 4), this clearly did not mean that it was the only place it was traded in Dakar. However, there appeared to be little collaboration or communication links between Malian traders working at the markets in the suburbs of Dakar, and those displaced from the Terminus. None of the Malian market traders with stalls at the large suburban food market, Marché Syndicat Pikine, had previously worked at the Terminus. They had come to Pikine directly from Mali, constituting a new wave of migrants who were taking advantage

of the new commercial landscape in Dakar. Only a few of the Malian traders in Pikine were supplying 'the people from the Terminus' at their new markets in the city centre. Oumou once asked a wholesale trader at the market in Pikine to sell some boxes of fruit cakes on her behalf. She did but she never paid Oumou the money back that she earned from the sale. After a tiresome and fruitless pursuit of the debt, Oumou exclaimed, 'All the traders at Syndicat are liars!'

I once asked Oumou why she and the other market traders did not go and trade in the suburbs, as I had the impression commerce was better out there. She answered,

> Here is what we know. Me, I don't know Syndicat market … I'll give you an example: if you go to school at Lycée Lamine Gueye, then that is the place you know. You're not one day going to go and attend the Lycée au Malick Sy, are you? Because you don't know it there. It's Lamine Gueye that you know. It's the same thing. All the traders here, they are part of La Gare [the Terminus]. Here and La Gare is the same thing. Us, here, we don't know what's in Pikine.

Oumou's remarks suggested that she and her fellow traders had cultivated a particular sense of belonging and community at the Terminus, which could not easily be transposed or replicated elsewhere. They preferred to stay in their familiar environment, the place they 'knew' as Oumou put it. The traders' attachments to the location and the people of Terminus were thus not merely based on practical and commercial reasons, as established in Chapter 4. Their place attachments at the Terminus were related to personal, social and affective aspects too. Meanwhile, by distancing themselves from the traders in Pikine and calling them 'liars', traders like Oumou were reinforcing the symbolic boundaries that demarcated who belonged to the in-group of 'the people of the Terminus'. Such exclusionary boundaries helped reinforce solidarity and potentially foster collaboration and trust among the traders as part of this in-group (Lamont and Molnár 2002; Wimmer 2013; Barth 1969).

The traders at the scattered new markets in the city centre collaborated in various ways, both by working together as trade partners and by helping each other out. Rokia's colleagues at the outdoor market pooled money every day for Rokia to purchase and cook lunch for them all. In turn, she relied on her colleagues to look after her baby girl when she had to deal with customers. Traders would sometimes sell goods on each other's behalf, for example if one of them was praying or at the toilet when a customer appeared. Some traders would even deliver

goods to each other's customers and sell goods on each other's behalf if one of them was absent from work. Illiterate traders could turn to their colleagues if they needed to write down or read something, including phone numbers and names of clients and credit arrangements; or if they had to do complex calculations. They would also help each other to pack up stalls and provide storage for each other.

The traders also collaborated to transfer money and to order and transport goods from abroad. Various informal agencies run by Malian businessmen in Dakar transferred money on behalf of the market traders, taking a very modest commission of 0.5 per cent. At the two agencies I visited, the agents both insisted that they were mainly involved in transferring money in order to help out their fellow Malians and not to make a profit. The various Malian money transfer agencies appeared to be organised on the basis of a value-transfer system, which is different from other transfer systems where the distributing agent usually needs to receive the money prior to payout (Pieke, Hear, and Lindley 2005: 19). Value-transfer systems require 'a high level of trust between agents who later will settle the debt between them in a variety of often trade-based methods' (Pieke, Hear, and Lindley 2005: 19). The Malian trust-based money transfers illustrate how the traders associated with the Terminus facilitated and supported each other's businesses, and thus continued to constitute a closely knit trading network. This raises the question of why the traders chose to collaborate and even trust each other.

Kinship relations among the dispersed traders provide part of the explanation for the enduring networks among the displaced traders, although my observations caution against romanticising such relations. Several of the 'people of the Terminus' had relatives who worked at the same market as them or at one of the other newly established markets, and whose help or collaboration they might draw upon. Aissatou was selling her husband's *bazin* from her stall at Sugunikura, while her husband was trading from a shop which he shared with another trader at the indoor cloth bazaar. Aissatou's husband would give her a bonus from the sales she made. Every evening, when Aissatou closed shop, a youngster came to her stall and packed her *bazin* into sacks and transported them on a pushcart to Aissatou's husband's shop, where they would be stored safely overnight. Many relatives worked together in the same stall, and sometimes evenly shared their profits. Not all relatives got along, though. There were for example mothers and daughters who tended to argue or married couples who had split up, and these people deliberately traded at opposite ends of their market or had chosen to trade at different Malian marketplaces.

The traders I met at the markets often drew on transnational kinship ties in Mali to source the goods they marketed in Dakar, thus keeping these business relationships within the family (cf. Haugen 2013: 29–30). Aissa, for example, received *bazin* and shea butter from her mother in Bamako and in turn Aissa sent her shoes and mass-produced shirts for sale in Mali. There were traders at the Malian markets who were employed by their Mali-based kin to retail these relatives' goods in Dakar. They did not own the goods that their relatives sent them but merely received a bonus from the sales. Some Mali-based traders appeared to deliberately employ young unmarried female kin to sell their goods in Dakar based on the normative assumption that such employees would be relatively easy to control. While such arrangements provided an income source for Malians based in Dakar, it subjected the employed relatives based in Dakar to intra-lineage power relations, which impeded their possibilities of establishing and growing their own independent businesses (cf. Haugen 2013: 30; Rosenfeld 2012; Vuarin 1997; Whitehouse 2012).

These observations of the ambiguous nature of kinship relations among the traders appear to bear out the point made in the Marxist literature, particularly of the Manchester School, that there is always an underlying potential for conflict. In fact, being a migrant in a big city and faced with socio-economic insecurity might heighten the potential for conflict. As Max Gluckman (1961) pointed out, people migrating from rural areas to work on the mines and in cities in southern Africa did not necessarily get along with 'tribal elders' and other old alliances from home, and had to form new alliances along very different lines. This provides an important reminder of avoiding any assumption of solidarity among traders (and migrants) who are co-nationals and kin. Shared identity in itself is not necessarily a sufficient basis for the development of cooperation and trust (Molony 2009; Overå 2006).

Indeed, neither kinship nor ethnicity were necessarily the most important social relations the traders drew upon, nor were they automatically bases for collaboration and trust. Such dynamics might instead evolve on the basis of more personalised relations with friends and colleagues (Overå 2006; Zucker 1985; Yükseker 2004). Close friendships among market traders sometimes entailed that they agreed to collaborate rather than compete. When Rokia returned to trading after giving birth, she kept all her *bazin* in the same stall as her friend, Ami. Since their *bazin* was identical and came from the same supplier, in order to distinguish which *bazin* belonged to whom they had stuck small pieces of white tape with their initials on them. If a customer came to their stall, they would show both Rokia and Ami's *bazin*, and then the customer would choose

which one to buy. I asked Rokia if there was not any competition between her and Ami. She firmly replied no. She explained that when she had recently applied for a bank loan, Ami had lent her 60,000 CFA (90 euros) to pay for the deposit. Rokia leaned in and looked at me sincerely saying, '*Ami ye mɔ̀gɔ nyuman ye, dé!*' (Ami is really a good person). Such relations of lending and borrowing money, as well as goods, constituted elements in the 'glue' that bound together the displaced traders.

'They don't rob you, they exploit you!'

Many of the traders based at Sugunikura market were small wholesalers who supplied the retailers at the outdoor market by the railway tracks. By cooperating with the smaller retailers, the wholesalers could distribute their goods across several stalls at the outdoor market, resulting in a faster turnover than if they had to sell it all themselves from their own stalls at Sugunikura. Traders at these two markets were thus interlinked through certain credit arrangements. Wholesalers often gave their goods on credit to the smaller retailers, who did not have enough capital to invest in goods of their own. These retailers did not have to pay for the goods supplied by the wholesaler, and if they were unable to sell they simply returned the goods to the wholesaler. If they did sell the goods, they returned the revenue to the wholesaler who then paid them a bonus. This reduced the financial expenses and risks for the small retailers while the wealthier wholesaler supplying the goods carried a greater proportion of the financial risk. This arrangement was implicitly in line with Islamic principles of commerce that seek to enhance socio-economic justice by advocating that (wealthy) merchants do not capitalise on (poor) people's needs but instead, take the risk upon themselves (Balala 2014). Credit relations were thus partly based on certain moral principles and a sense of solidarity among fellow traders. Indeed, for some traders, their Islamic convictions underpinned an ethic of solidarity and redistribution (cf. Whitehouse 2012: 80). As the *bazin* trader Safi once exclaimed,

> You have to be good! There are too many people who aren't good; they lie as often as they eat. They think because they've paid their credit and because they have money, that they are good. But money doesn't make you good! One day you can have money, but the next day the money is with me. In the end, God will judge you if you are mean.

There was however a risk that a creditor's 'leap of faith' – giving away their goods without any reassurance of repayment – would be exploited. Even if their goods had been sold, repayment might be endlessly postponed and the debt never returned to the creditor. It was not always clear at which point the traders could expect their credit to be repaid. This was especially the case if the trader stood in a close social relation to their debtor; and indeed, the trade partners and customers who were most likely to obtain credit were usually also a trader's long-standing acquaintances. Credit relations were largely managed according to subjective and shifting criteria, depending on the social relations between a creditor and her debtor. This ambiguity meant that the distinction between delayed repayment of debt and actual theft was sometimes relative and constituted a grey area that was difficult to regulate. As Oumou once exclaimed, while moaning about her debtors: 'They don't rob you. They exploit you!'

Negative stereotypes about women traders in particular being too 'slow' at repaying credit were widespread among both male and female traders, who were reluctant to engage in credit relations with the women. This negative stereotype reflected wider ideological notions of the relative 'speed' and 'slowness' of men and women: women were in many ways assumed or expected to be 'slower' than men (Jónsson 2016). When traders had given goods to a retailer to sell on their behalf, their main concern was usually that the revenue from the sales should be repaid to them quickly and in a lump sum, instead of small instalments repaid over a long period. Fatou Fall claimed that women were too slow at repaying credit because, unlike men, they wanted to 'eat' the money. 'Eating money' referred to spending money on immediate consumption rather than long-term investment. I asked two shuttle traders why most of the market traders, with whom they had entered into credit agreements to sell their goods, were men. They replied that they preferred male clients to women: 'Men are faster in commerce. They pay you back faster, but the women, even if they have your money, they don't want to pay you. They want to put some money aside [*elles veulent économiser*], whereas the men pay you immediately'.

The notion that women were too 'slow' in commerce may also have derived from the dominant ideals that shaped the gendered division of labour within households, where women were associated with reproduction and consumption and men were construed as providers (see Chapter 5). It is conceivable that some women traders carried over this economic role from the household into the marketplace, which meant they were perhaps less concerned with accumulating profit for the sake of

reinvestment and instead prioritised private consumption. To assume that all women were 'hard-wired' to behave according to a different economic logic than men would, however, be both sexist and factually wrong. Indeed, most of the traders who complained about the 'slowness' of women traders were themselves women, who distanced themselves from such economic practices. Many of the women traders were shouldering heavy financial burdens as the main breadwinners of their families. This helps explain why some women might have appropriated the revenues from their sales for private consumption instead of immediately returning them to their creditors.

Women who appropriated financial capital for personal and household consumption outside the markets could only afford to repay their debt to other traders in small instalments. This in turn meant that the traders, who had provided the credit, would not recover enough capital to reinvest in their own business but only enough to cover their own consumption needs. As Fatou Fall explained, 'If you have given a female trader 500,000 CFA [750 euros] credit, she will give you 150,000 or 200,000 CFA [225 or 300 euros] back. She will not return the 500,000 CFA to you. So you are forced to eat that money she's given you'. In the end, as Fatou argued, everyone ended up just 'eating' the profits instead of reinvesting and growing their capital. This credit system was in fact the reason she had given up selling *bazin* cloth at the Terminus back in the days when the train was still running:

> At La Gare, when I was selling there, I kept losing money because of credit. That's why I stopped trading there. Especially with the *bazin*, people always asked for credit. Afterwards, they would sell it and they would eat all the money before reimbursing you. That is why many women stopped trading *bazin* at La Gare, and returned to Mali. At La Gare - eh! The market was good! But I left it because of that.

Such problems with credit relations among 'the people from the Terminus' reflect a common dilemma for traders, particularly in places where the state does not provide public welfare. Traders face, 'the quandary between the moral obligation to share wealth with kinfolk and neighbours and the necessity to make a profit and accumulate capital' (van der Grijp 2003: 277, cf. Hart 1975; Jónsson 2012; Meagher 2006; Portes 1998; Whitehouse 2011).[2] In certain contexts people can find it difficult to refuse the requests for material support by others who may be poor and vulnerable, even if providing such support may

jeopardise their own finances. This is partly because they themselves may occasionally have to fall back on this social 'safety net'; and partly since refusing such requests might jeopardise their reputation and they might become targets of malicious and jealous acts, such as sorcery (Rosenfeld 2012: 224; Whitehouse 2012: 78–81). This situation has been referred to with various terms including 'the entrepreneur's social dilemma', 'negative social capital', and 'burdensome social relations'. These terms convey the notion that being embedded in certain social networks may have negative consequences such as 'exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward levelling norms' (Portes 1998: 15, cf. Hart 1975; Whitehouse 2011).

To overcome these dilemmas, certain scholars have argued that traders may distance themselves from other 'needy' people, for example through keeping their income and economic success secret, through religious conversion, or emigration (Hart 1975; Whitehouse 2012: 81–4; cf. Jónsson 2012). Such strategies, however, do not necessarily work for those who actually depend on these networks for social support and as insurance mechanisms (cf. Meagher 2005: 228–9). Many of my interlocutors, including those who were doing relatively well financially, were acutely aware of the insecurity of their occupations: they frequently stressed that trade was a matter of luck, and that fortunes were easily lost. Credit networks were not simply a means to access trade capital but also constituted forms of redistribution. These were strong incentives for remaining within the 'moral economy' at the Terminus and maintaining reciprocal relations with other traders at the scattered Malian markets, even if it meant sustaining certain losses resulting from credit relations.

Learning the secrets of the market

Many traders evicted from the Terminus preferred not only to remain close to the location of their former, demolished marketplace and their fellow, displaced colleagues, but to sit right next to other traders selling the same commodities as themselves. For example, *bazin* and *wax* traders were concentrated together at the indoor cloth bazaar where they sat side by side. The *bazin* and date traders at Sugunikura were so keen to sit next to other *bazin* or date traders that they had swapped places after the different stalls had been allocated and some even paid a premium to be able to sit near traders dealing in the same goods as themselves.

This pattern was not merely observable among the traders of Malian background but more generally, applying to most businesses in Dakar. Whether they were selling fish, shoes or second-hand clothes, competing traders all traded in the same spot.

Economists have pointed out that the clustering of competing businesses dealing in the same commodities generally increases the number of potential customers available to traders.[3] The phenomenon of clustering is in fact observable across the world. Johanna Lessinger laments that 'Planners the world over seem unable to grasp the fact, obvious to any marketer, that all the sellers of a market must be located in close proximity to each other if the market is to function vis-à-vis either suppliers or buyers' (Lessinger 1988: 162 n.4). In India, Lessinger observed that clustering of competing wholesalers was necessary for them to judge the flow of supply and demand and to make contact with new suppliers (Lessinger 1988: 147). The principle of clustering furthermore underlies agglomeration economies, which refers to the benefits that come when firms and people locate near one another in cities and industrial clusters (Glaeser 2010: 1). Besides attracting more customers, a cluster attracts more suppliers than an individual trader would be able to; and agglomeration enhances productivity, since working in proximity to others enables copying, collaborating and competing (Davis 2014; cf. Warf 2006).

These various economic rationales partly explain the clustering I observed at the Malian markets: new traders trying to establish themselves needed to attract new customers, and the surest way of doing so was to go and sit where potential customers generally tended to appear – that is, where competing traders selling the same product were already sitting. Meanwhile, the following section illustrates that there were additional explanations as to why these traders preferred sitting close to their competitors.[4] It should be kept in mind that clustering is not always an economic advantage, especially in an environment of poverty, liberalisation and state neglect where clustering may generate collective inefficiencies (Meagher 2010: 133–4). Little scholarly attention has been paid to the less productive aspects of clustering in such contexts.

The clustered market traders I observed were in fact interfering with each other's trade practices and correcting their competitors. These observations counter the capitalist market logic that underlies global agglomeration economies. At the Malian markets, the aim of clustering was partly to ensure that the market was regulated and to control and discipline fellow traders. Clustering facilitated the circulation of

information within the market. This had the advantage of helping novices learn the skills required to trade in the market. More senior traders in turn were able to impose certain norms and hierarchies that were to their advantage. The control, cohesion and regulations imposed made it difficult for newcomers to advance their businesses while maintaining their dignity and positive relations with fellow traders, who included kin and compatriots. Clustering and the close monitoring it enabled also impeded traders' attempts at maintaining secrecy, and this risked eroding their businesses.

After the demolition of the market at the Terminus, Djenneba had initially rented stalls both in the indoor cloth bazaar and at Sugunikura, but eventually she had decided to give them up and concentrate her efforts at the outdoor market, where she did not have to pay any rent. She thought it was better to start out small and little by little build up her skills and her network of clients, before branching out. As she explained:

> If you sit here, you will learn how to talk to the customers, so that they will come and look and buy from you. You will learn how to invest the money you have earned. Even if you don't earn anything and there are no customers, you sit down and you look, to learn the secrets of the market.

Observation was an important skill in trade. In fact, the ability to observe and analyse one's surroundings was considered one of the most basic skills of social life. According to Djiby Tounkara – the older Malian 'intellectual' who taught me Bamanankan for a period – the most basic and important knowledge of all was the knowledge of observation, which he referred to as '*ka kòlòsi*' in Bamanankan. This verb both referred to being attentive or careful, as well as to watch over or to look after something. Hence, *ka kòlòsi* did not simply imply a detached way of observing but also of engaging, responding and learning, not merely by watching but also by listening, feeling and touching. In terms of trade, *ka kòlòsi* implied a full sensual immersion in the marketplace where traders learned to think with the body, for example, by handling goods; by using eyes, hand gestures and body movements in their interactions with customers; and by sensing and adjusting to the rhythms of the market including the speed or slowness of supply and sales.

When Djenneba Sylla had started trading (at a mature age) at the former Malian market in 2007, she sat next to the mother of one of the aphrodisiac traders I knew from Sugunikura. This woman gave

Djenneba some of her shea butter to sell and explained to her how to prepare the small packages of herbal aphrodisiacs she sold. In the more distant past, young girls at the Terminus learned to trade from their mothers or aunts whom they worked with. This intergenerational transmission of trade knowledge had diminished; but some traders still permitted other newcomers to sit next to them and observe them at work. Sitting together with more experienced traders allowed novices to learn about the prices of goods, how to package and display goods, and how to interact with customers.

Youngsters and apprentices were frequently corrected and 'lectured' to by the older female traders on how to treat customers and understand their needs. Indeed, the traders sometimes reprimanded one another for not paying attention to what was going on around them. Unlike the businesses that operate according to capitalist market principles within economies of agglomeration, the clustered traders at the Malian markets not only observed each other, but actively commented upon and reprimanded one another. The informal apprenticeships among the clustered traders thus also entailed that junior and novice traders would learn the social norms that regulated trade practices at the markets.

The 'disciplining gaze' of more established, senior traders explains why even such experienced traders preferred clustering with their younger competitors. Older traders tried to dominate their more junior colleagues, reprimanding them if they disregarded the trade hierarchy or became too competitive. When my neighbour Maimoona came to see me and Aissatou at the Sugunikura market, two female customers appeared and Aissatou quickly got up and called them to come and see her *bazin* stall. One of the older women *bazin* traders immediately reprimanded Aissatou, telling her off in Bamanankan: 'Leave the customers! Everyone needs to stay in their place – it's the customer who will choose! Everyone has their luck!' On this occasion, Aissatou just ignored her. But as a newcomer Aissatou was dominated by the older, more experienced women who surrounded her.

Observation (*ka kòlòsi*) among clustered traders facilitated learning, cohesion and control. Too much 'observation' could be a problem, however, especially as it could lead to the creation of rumours and circulation of gossip. 'Observation' at the markets usually involved eavesdropping, and I had to be particularly careful about who was within listening distance when I asked my interlocutors more personal and sensitive questions. After Maimoona had visited me and her friend

Aissatou at Sugunikura, she told me that she would not be coming back as she disliked the older women trading next to Aissatou:

> People there are too jealous. If they see you chatting with someone they'll let you speak, and they'll stay all quiet on the side – but they are listening! They hear every word, and if they hear you mention someone's name afterwards they'll immediately go and tell other people that you said this or that about so and so.

Being part of a close-knit group of traders meant that many of the women knew a great deal about each other's businesses and private lives. Djenneba who traded outdoors by the railway tracks told me one of her biggest problems was that she did not know how to calculate, so she was obliged to ask the other traders for help. But because of that they always knew how much she earned each time she made a sale: 'They will know my secret! If I knew how to calculate, I would just put the money here [she pats her money belt] and the others wouldn't know – it would be my secret'. Many of the traders at this market knew of each other's business practices since they frequently helped each other out and as they could easily observe each other due to the open structure of the market. The traders at the outdoor market also knew of each other's often difficult personal circumstances such as whose husband was in prison, who was being beaten by her husband, or who had recently got divorced. There were few secrets between these traders who not only knew of each other's strengths and successes but were also well aware of each other's weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Of all the Malian markets, the traders at this outdoor market were the least inclined to compete. Many of them had agreed not to sell the same commodities as their neighbouring colleagues to avoid fighting over customers or potentially out-competing each other. For example, Djenneba had stopped selling certain aphrodisiacs because her neighbour was also selling them; and another trader sitting near Djenneba had stopped selling the handmade black soap that Djenneba's relative produced after realising that this was Djenneba's job. Djenneba justified these micro-monopolies by saying, 'We have children at home that we need to feed, so we all need to earn money – everyone here knows that'. Traders at this market struggled to maintain a level of secrecy and everyone knew each other's business, both private and professional. This further explains the strong emphasis on regulation at this particular market: these arrangements not only reflected solidarity among traders who knew each other's personal stories intimately but

also, the impossibility of competing with colleagues who were aware of your every move.

Intimate familiarity with each other's businesses, including the number of clients and approximate daily turnover of one's fellow traders, could easily lead to jealousy and, I was told, even attempts by competitors to exploit other traders' weaknesses and destroy their businesses through the use of sorcery. One way my interlocutors tried to avoid the destructive jealousy that frequently accompanies a redistributive ethic was by keeping their business activities secret (cf. Whitehouse 2012: 82; Hart 1975). Many of the traders I spoke with emphasised the importance of discretion, secrecy and a healthy dose of scepticism towards other traders. As one wholesale trader at Sugunikura commented, '*Il faut se méfier*' [you have to be cautious/wary]. If you tell everyone about your successes, some people will get jealous. You should keep it to yourself'. These were not minor precautions: many traders believed that being too gullible and trusting exposed you to serious risks, and there was a real fear of the destruction that other people could inflict upon one's life and business. Oumou usually insisted that I should stay by her side in her stall and was never very happy about me exploring Sugunikura on my own. Once, when I told her I wanted to draw a map of the market, she said she did not think that was necessary and that I already knew the market. I replied that I had not been to the back of the market and I had not seen all the stalls yet; but Oumou remained sceptical about my plan, explaining: 'Fatoumata, there are good people here and there are bad people. Not everyone here at the market is nice. Some people here are very bad'.

On another occasion, I was strongly reprimanded by Oumou and her colleague Boubou because I had not been cautious enough when I had decided to venture out into the market on my own. I had been sitting for hours next to Oumou while she was chatting in Bamanankan to two older shuttle traders, and I could not follow their fast conversation. I became bored and impatient when suddenly a woman greeted me from behind Oumou's stall. She told me to come over and chat so I grabbed my bag and got up. Oumou looked at me appalled and asked, 'Why do you want to talk to her?!' Feeling slightly annoyed with Oumou wanting to control my movements and interactions, I replied that I wanted to greet her, and then I defiantly left and ventured over to speak to the woman. When I returned to Oumou's stall about 15 minutes later, she was very upset and asked me where I had been. I explained that I had only briefly chatted to the woman and had spent most of the time

talking to Mah, a friend of Oumou. Oumou replied that I could not go around the market and talk to just anybody:

> There are many bad people at the market. I have already told you so before! There are good ones, and there are bad ones. There are even sorcerers … That woman who called you over she is no good, she talks too much: '*pili-pili-pili*' [imitating the sound of gossip]. That's not good! She wants to know everyone's business. She thinks she can know the entire market. She comes straight from the bush. She doesn't know anything. She doesn't know the big city. She thinks she can know everything. Can you know all the people in the market? That's impossible!

Oumou then prepared to pray and Boubou took over and told me,

> It's like that, *dé*, Fatoumata. Have you ever seen me here talking to the other people? Never! I am always alone here. I don't want to talk to everyone. If they start to know my problems they might talk. If they know too much, it's not good. You shouldn't trust people. I am giving you a piece of advice: you have to be careful.

I suspect that Oumou's being upset reflected not merely a worry for my own well-being but also for herself. It is likely that Oumou was even angrier with me and more worried about where I had been because she had told me things she would not tell the other traders. By venturing out alone in the market, I jeopardised this trust and became a potential conduit of confidential information between Oumou and this other woman.

Marketing, magic and morality

When I asked traders how they managed to attract new customers, especially in the face of competition from neighbouring traders selling the same goods, some replied in a fatalistic manner: 'God decides if the client buys from you or another trader' or, 'The client can come to you or to your competitor; God will chose. You can't do anything about it'. I asked Fatim, who sold aphrodisiacs, how she attracted customers and whether she did any sort of publicity. 'No, we don't advertise. But if the customers are there, they will come … but there are no customers'.

A glimpse into the forms of 'marketing' carried out by the displaced traders illustrates that these markets did not operate according to pure capitalist market logics where the creation of demand and maximisation of profit dictated sales tactics and exchange relations with customers. In many ways, magic rather than calculated marketing strategies determined the reciprocal relationship between traders and customers at these markets. Rather than being shaped mainly by forces of supply and demand, relations between traders and their (potential) customers were shaped largely by notions of fate, as well as hierarchy, loyalty and trust. When I asked Rokia if competing traders at the same market did not fight over customers, she replied,

> No. If the client comes to you, you get to sell. If a client is walking towards us, and we both sell *bazin*, and the client goes straight to you, then that's it. The trader that the client goes to is the trader who sells. If you tell the client the price and they don't accept your final price, then they can move on to the next stall.

Commercial advertising and branding through mass media were not available to most of the traders at the Malian markets, who lacked the capital, literacy and contacts to deploy such channels of communication to procure customers. In any case, many traders considered such marketing strategies futile. Since 'fate' decided which trader a customer chose to buy from, there was little the trader could do in terms of marketing to influence that choice. The traders needed to enter into a social relationship with customers and try to nurture a sense of clientship and loyalty to ensure the customer would keep returning. They could not control whether an individual customer would want to enter such a relation, nor with whom; apart from the price and quality of goods, this decision depended on subjective criteria such as which of the traders a customer felt personally attracted to. Hence, the traders needed to enchant the customers somehow; they needed to spellbind and magically lure customers to their stall or shop. The traders commonly believed they could improve their own luck through spiritual and esoteric means. Esoteric practices including prayer, sacrifices and use of *gris-gris* (amulets) were widespread among the market traders, reflecting attempts to influence their fate in business and ensure a customer chose them over their competitor. Although hardly any of my interlocutors talked about their own engagement in these practices, they all acknowledged that their colleagues were involved in them. Traders carried amulets in bags or encased in jewellery; amulets were attached to the roofs of market stalls;

and I observed one trader, who was also a *marabout*, pray for another trader's businesses. I mentioned to Rokia that I had noticed some traders were wearing rings with *gris-gris* inside and asked her if they did that to attract customers. She nodded eagerly and said, 'That, there is plenty of that! Especially the Bamana, they use lots of that! *Gris-gris*!' I nodded, and she continued in Bamanankan:

> There are many types of *gris-gris*! That tree there, someone can talk to it every day, and in the end, the tree will answer them back – one day, it will! Then they go to Guinea, and there are people there who tell them to sacrifice a chicken and pour the blood on the foot of the tree. Or you can kill a sheep at the tree. People do many things! They wear rings or bands around their neck or waist. Some spray water on their goods in the morning. There are many *gris-gris*! From the top of this market to the bottom, everybody uses *gris-gris*! Even *sanfè* [upstairs in the cloth bazaar].

When I asked her if that was the only way to attract clients, she firmly replied, 'Yes'. I mentioned that in Europe, traders would do publicity and make a pretty window display of their goods, to attract the customers. She commented, '*O tè kè yan. Baara*[5] *dòròn bè kè!*' [That is not done here. Only 'magic!'].

Once a trader had procured a customer, it was as if they 'owned' this customer. Even if the trader did not have the exact product their customer was asking for, she would still try to satisfy the customer's demand by attempting to source the product elsewhere, usually from competitors and other colleagues in the vicinity. For example, a *bazin* trader who did not have the exact colour her customer desired could borrow *bazin* from her adjacent colleagues. In turn, regular customers indirectly contributed to regulating competition at the Malian markets, by remaining loyal to specific traders rather than shopping around for a bargain or allowing themselves to be manipulated by advertising. Such customers benefited from their loyal relations with specific traders at the interconnected markets: they could expect to get a fair price and the best quality, since traders had little interest in cheating them to score a higher profit as that would destroy the loyal relationship.

The emphasis on fate and magic arguably reflected the fact that the informal structures facilitating the marketing of goods and regulating competition at the Terminus had been largely disrupted or destroyed following eviction. The hierarchies and reputations that had supported some traders' businesses had been undermined, and many older women

who had been successful at the former market had lost their powerful positions along with their assets. Meanwhile, seniority of a trader was still relevant to some extent when it came to acquiring customers. I once observed how the young *bazin* trader Aissatou managed to attract a woman customer to her stall. As the customer approached, she was suddenly 'snapped up' by Aissatou's neighbour, an older woman – and Aissatou did not object. On another occasion Aissatou was displaying various *bazin* to a customer in her stall when this same trader appeared to actively attempt to 'steal' the customer from Aissatou, unfolding and displaying her own *bazin* to the customer at the same time. As Aissatou and I walked home that day, I commented on this, but Aissatou laughed and said, 'No, she doesn't steal my customers; she's very correct. But she thought the woman was going to buy a lot, that's why she showed her *bazin*. Sometimes the client can buy one *bazin* from one trader and another from a different trader'. Aissatou added that if a customer 'wants to be kind' they could buy a piece of *bazin* from each of the three most senior women trading *bazin* in the same aisle as Aissatou. It appeared that Aissatou largely accepted this hierarchy which entitled her more senior neighbouring traders to more customers than a newcomer like herself. Her deference may have been partly due to the rigid age hierarchy into which most people in Mali are socialised (cf. Freeman 2007). Meanwhile, I later learned that tension was growing between Aissatou and one of these women who constantly demanded that each of Aissatou's customers had to buy some of her *bazin* too. Aissatou had to comply with this woman because Aissatou's husband had been an apprentice to her and he and Aissatou had named their first child after her, which meant they considered the woman family. These more experienced, senior women were usually referred to as '*grandes dames*' or '*grobiné*',[6] denoting women who were well-dressed and who appeared wealthy and powerful. I often felt intimidated in the presence of these women: they would occasionally make rude and humiliating comments about me or simply ignore me when I greeted them, presumably as part of their embodied strategies to assert their powerful positions. Projecting the air of a *grande dame* appeared to be part of a conscious strategy to attract customers and suppress competition.

The older women traders' high status in the market hierarchy was in jeopardy following displacement and dispersal. New traders had joined the markets, especially young men who were unaware of and disregarded the hierarchies and norms that had been established at the Terminus. I once witnessed a young male colleague of Aissatou persistently trying to physically intercept the customers headed towards her, herding them

from her stall to his own. Many of the traders frowned upon such ruthless forms of competition which entailed profiting at other people's expense. *Bazin* traders in particular complained that it was unfair that certain colleagues were snatching customers from them. I regularly noted that traders emphasised the importance of solidarity among 'competitors' at the various Malian markets, and of traders not being overly egotistic in their economic pursuits – for example, by avoiding lowering one's prices beneath those of other competitors in the same market. This ethic was not merely espoused by poor traders. Various market traders I spoke to expressed concerns about free market competition and the absence of regulations. Older women would occasionally draw on a religious discourse to justify why more junior traders should be more restrained in their competitive urges. As mentioned in Chapter 5, some of the older women traders were particularly upset about the *coxeurs* (intermediaries) who would swear in the name of God that the price they were quoting to customers was genuine, when in fact they were inflating the cost to pocket a huge profit. Not only were these men not 'playing by the rules'; they were committing a sin because lying when conducting commerce was *haram*, a sinful deed forbidden in Islam, the women argued.

It is important to avoid romanticising these religious and moral principles of trade or merely seeing them as reflecting particular cultural values. Rather, insisting on such principles of 'fairness' largely reflected traders' attempts to regulate the market – which is arguably a universal (cf. Meagher 2005: 218). Such regulation was even more necessary in the context of displacement and fragmentation of networks, where old hierarchies and trust-based relations established at the Terminus had splintered.

Stagnant marketplaces?

Solidarity, loyalty, collaboration and trust do not emerge automatically but require effort. It is important to avoid any assumption of solidarity among traders who are co-nationals and kin. Shared identity in itself was not necessarily a sufficient basis for the development of cooperation and trust at the new Malian markets. Rather, by engaging in informal forms of organisation and regulation of the markets, the traders produced symbolic boundaries that demarcated who could be considered part of 'the people of the Terminus'. In other words, shared socio-cultural norms, rules, reciprocity and collaboration at the interconnected markets contributed to maintaining a group consciousness among the dispersed

traders. Within this 'in-group', traders would support and, to some extent, trust each other. Maintaining and reproducing such symbolic boundaries delineating who constituted 'the people of the Terminus' was especially important given the recent disruptions to this network in the form of displacement and dispersal. Uprooting and scattering of the traders from the Terminus meant that the bases of trust had been compromised.

The traders and their associates continued to constitute a dense network, whose nodes were scattered around the old railway terminus. On the one hand, there were certain benefits to accepting the conditions of trade and clustering with competitors at these interconnected markets. Traders could access networks of supply and credit, take advantage of certain services (money transfers in particular), learn the skills of trade and access a pool of clients with whom they could develop long-term, loyal relations. On the other hand, participating in these markets, and adhering to the shared norms and values, potentially impeded the accumulation of wealth. The relatively parochial outlook of several of the displaced traders, their problematic credit relations with each other, the hierarchical relationships among junior and senior traders, and the strict moral ground rules regarding marketing and competition at the markets to some extent obstructed the pursuit of profit, especially for youngsters and novices at the markets. Some traders benefited from these forms of regulation but in many ways participation in these networks appeared to constitute a burden, a form of negative social capital (Portes and Landolt 1996). Indeed, most of the market traders I followed in Dakar during 2013 were not generating any significant profit and their markets were characterised more by an absence than a presence of customers. However, this was not merely due to the destruction of the former market and invisibility of new markets, nor was it caused merely by the norms and values that regulated economic behaviour at these markets. As Kate Meagher (2005) has emphasised, although social networks do not always promote economic development, negative outcomes cannot simply be attributed to the influence of 'dysfunctional cultural values'. It is necessary to also pay attention to social, political and historical processes. The decline of profits was also linked to urban development and introduction of new infrastructure, whereby transport had gradually shifted from trains to trucks, and which had entailed a spatial reconfiguration of Malian trade in Dakar away from the Terminus and out into the suburbs. Moreover, the wider political and economic crises and transitions unfolding during my fieldwork appeared to be taking their toll on the Malian markets.

My observations suggested that there were other aspects motivating the traders apart from the sheer pursuit of profit. Participating in the

markets was partly motivated by a sense of belonging and familiarity or 'knowing the market' as Oumou put it; as well as by a quest for status, respectability and self-worth, especially for traders high up the market hierarchy including the '*grandes dames*'; and by the acquisition of skills and knowledge, particularly in the case of novices and apprentices at the markets. Meanwhile, the forms of regulation and social hierarchy imposed at the markets were also contested by increasingly ruthless competitors and junior traders, who were usually men – including *coxeurs*, as seen in the previous chapter. In fact, among the traders associated with the Terminus there was an underlying deep suspicion and potential for conflict. Social dynamics at the markets included antagonisms among kin who refused to cooperate; imposition of social hierarchies which undermined the efforts of junior traders; closely monitoring, eavesdropping and gossiping about each other; and heightened competition, secrecy and suspicion among fellow market traders. The fact that these traders managed to establish trust and collaboration should be seen as an accomplishment and not a given, as observers of 'ethnic entrepreneurship' tend to assume (cf. Portes and Zhou 1992; Zhou 2004).

The material presented in this chapter raises concerns over the future of this trade. The previous chapter questioned women's ability to dominate these markets and derive a measure of financial autonomy from their trade in Dakar. The present chapter highlighted the lack of customers and decline of profit at the new markets. Although the traders held on to the belief that the customers would eventually return, it is hard to argue that these were actually 'markets' when there were hardly any customers. After all, a 'market' normally implies demand. While the sale of *bazin* at the cloth bazaar did appear to be a relatively lucrative trade, other products like aphrodisiacs, soap or Oumou's fruit cakes did not appear to create sufficient turnover to make these businesses sustainable in the longer term. Even the future of *bazin* trade was uncertain as the Senegalese were increasingly competing with the traders at the Terminus, using their own networks and retailers to source and market this Malian cloth. The traders' vulnerable situation was also linked to their precarious occupation of the new market spaces they operated from after eviction. The continued risk of eviction and further displacement jeopardised the sustainability of the displaced traders' businesses. These fears were unfortunately confirmed after I left the field. Interlocutors told me over the phone that the traders from the cloth bazaar had been asked to clear the building. So far, they have only found short-term alternatives to enable them to carry on trading elsewhere.

Notes

1   By comparison, a one-bedroom flat in the suburbs cost 30,000 CFA a month. I paid 60,000 CFA a month for a one-bedroom-plus-bathroom flat near the Medina.
2   This differs somewhat from the dilemma which all traders face, of choosing between cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour in relations with their clients and customers (cf. Grabowski 1997).
3   This principle is known in economics as Hotelling's law (Hotelling 1929).
4   It should also be kept in mind that clustering is not always an economic advantage – especially in an environment of poverty, liberalisation and state neglect, as Kate Meagher points out: 'Instead of providing a framework for the pooling of skilled labour, the attraction of suppliers and traders, incremental technical advance and mutual learning, clustering in a dysfunctional institutional environment can generate "collective inefficiencies"' (Meagher 2010: 133–4). Little scholarly attention has been paid to the less productive aspects of clustering in such contexts (Meagher 2010: 137).
5   Although *baara* literally means 'work', in this context the word *baara* referred to the esoteric work of a *marabout* (*mori baara*) or of a *feticheur* (*soma baara*). My translation of *baara* into the word 'magic' does not convey this detailed meaning.
6   *Grobiné* is a term used in Bamanankan, derived from the French *gros bonnet*, meaning 'big wig' or 'big shot'.

7
Conclusion

Urban displacement and diaspora

This is a book about the urban displacement of traders and markets, and what emerges from such rupture. Its central argument is that endings – including eviction, demolition and displacement – should be considered as *generative* and not simply as concluding.

Analyses of the socio-spatial dynamics occurring in the aftermath of displacement are usually confined to the field of migration and refugee studies. However, such dynamics are equally important to examine in the context of widespread urban displacement and eviction, such as that experienced by the traders at the Terminus. Comparable to the kinds of identity formation that develops at other (larger) scales of displacement, '*les gens de La Gare*' in many ways resembled a diasporic network. The traders were bound together by the shared myths, identities, memories and histories that were associated with the place from which they had originally dispersed: the Terminus.

In a most basic sense, the concept of diaspora implies historical dispersal from a shared place and a continued sense of connection and orientation to that lost place among a group of people (cf. Cohen 1997; Sigona et al. 2015; Brubaker 2005). For some people that place may be a country of (perceived) origin; but for the traders, whom I encountered in Dakar, the Terminus was in many ways that kind of diasporic place. The terminus station of the Dakar–Niger railway line was associated with an historical 'coming together' of people of Malian background – traders, migrants, beggars, divorcees, widows, intellectuals, sorcerers – who contributed to creating the place known as La Gare. The Terminus was more than a mere train station or marketplace. It was a socially significant locality, created through a variety of criss-crossing networks, shared histories and cultural and material practices (cf. Appadurai

1995; Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012). Even after the privatisation of the railway line, the dismantling of the Malian market and the ensuing dispersal of the traders, the sense of place established at the Terminus was continuously being reproduced. The scattered traders still considered themselves connected to the Terminus and to the social relations and economic practices established there.

One of the underlying analytical principles of this book has been the insistence on viewing the displaced not as a homogenous mass or 'community', but as a diverse group of people with multiple identities who were part of various and intersecting networks. Chapter 2 highlighted the diverse regional backgrounds and hybrid identities of the traders associated with the Terminus. Chapter 3 examined the multiple and competing voices implicated in the long-drawn process of eviction. Chapter 4 considered the varied implications of the spatial transformation at the Terminus for the two different types of traders associated with the place: sedentary market traders and mobile shuttle traders. Chapter 5 examined multiple femininities and diverse gender ideologies among the women associated with the Terminus. Finally, the analysis in Chapter 6 sidestepped the easy assumption that traders with similar backgrounds, including shared ethnic and religious identifications, will naturally work together and support each other. Instead, it examined how the traders produced the symbolic boundaries that demarcated who could be considered part of 'the people of the Terminus'. Regardless of their shared experiences and backgrounds the (re)establishment of trust and collaboration among the displaced and dispersed traders should be seen as an accomplishment and not a given. The chapter highlighted the social forces that kept these scattered, displaced traders tied into a translocal market network and a shared moral economy, which contributed to maintaining a group consciousness among the dispersed traders.

At the same time, arguably, a dense network and node must have previously existed for an urban 'diasporic' formation to occur. In other words, urban displacement can potentially result in a form of diasporic consciousness if the displaced have a shared history, identities and memories and a collective sense of belonging to the place they have been displaced from – as in the case of the people of the Terminus. Slum clearances, 'ghetto' evictions, and gentrification of close-knit neighbourhoods may also in the aftermath result in comparable forms of consciousness and identity formation among the groups of people who have been displaced. The collective dimensions of the urban displacement experience can translate into support structures, enabling people to

be resilient in the aftermath, as in the case of the Terminus. They may also provide the foundations for collective political action, although this potential would have to be explored further by urban scholars.

Shrinking (and stretching) the concept of diaspora by applying it at this relatively small scale helps to shed light on how the displaced and dispersed traders experienced a sense of place and how their trade was organised. The *grin* that had been created by the shuttle traders, who were hanging out by a Malian bus company in the new commercial complex, reflected an attempt to re-create the sense of place these traders had previously experienced at the Terminus and its market. In other words, these women had transposed their emplacement at the Terminus to their *grin*. Similarly, the dispersed market traders expressed a form of psychological connection to a place that no longer existed, as reflected in their reference to themselves as 'the people of the Terminus'. Thus, despite the demolition of the market and cessation of the train, the Terminus persisted as a place, as its memory lived on and as people attempted to recreate it elsewhere. The traders continued to engage in economic practices informed by their previous experiences at the Terminus: relations of credit, supply, collaboration and competition were maintained and reproduced among the dispersed traders. Market traders also continued to reproduce the 'myth of authenticity' that had been associated with the former Malian market at the Terminus. In these ways the scattered new marketplaces and hubs like the Sira *grin* and the Bel Air train station were all interconnected sites which had a shared, central point of reference at the Terminus.

Applying the term 'diaspora' in this unconventional way is not intended as a polemic. I have little interest in redefining the concept of diaspora and opening up the Pandora's box of long-standing and ongoing debate about this term's conceptual limits and political uses (see, for example, Anthias 1998; Clifford 1994; Edwards 2001; Kelley 2000; Raman 2003; Tölölyan 2007). The term is simply the best word I could find to capture the socio-spatial dynamics emerging in the aftermath of urban displacement, in the wake of the rupture of the dense node and network that was the Terminus. My usage here of the term 'diaspora' is heuristic, as it helps to point to a new way of understanding and analysing the impacts of urban displacement. Prevailing analyses that focus only on the immediate consequences of eviction cannot grasp how the ensuing displacement reconfigures interpersonal relations, identities, networks, livelihoods, urban economies and even cities themselves, in the longer term. Given how ubiquitous urban displacement is in our current era of the 'neoliberal gentrification displacement regime' (Freeman 2020),

one can only imagine how many scattered networks and possibly even 'diasporas' of evicted residents and dispersed traders, just like the people from the Terminus, exist in cities all over the world. What the story of the Terminus highlights is that urban displacement does not merely lead to the scattering of people, fragmentation of networks, uprootedness from place, and loss of assets and income. New things emerge from the dust, and the old is not erased but is drawn upon to recreate meaning and purpose and to rebuild livelihoods. These observations are not naively hopeful tales intended to mitigate the painful process of urban displacement. I am not suggesting that 'if only the urban displaced can form a "diaspora" then they will cope much better'. My point is rather to highlight that things do happen in the aftermath of the kinds of urban renewal processes that involve clearances and displacement. Displaced people's networks, memories and place attachments forged in certain parts of the city do not simply vanish with eviction. But have urban planners, let alone scholars, actually thought of where the urban displaced go, and what happens to their social networks, their relationships with their familiar environment, and their livelihoods – other than to assume it is all destroyed and that urban displacees somehow 'get on with it', with or without protest?

Examining the aftermath of eviction and dislocation, the ethnography of the Terminus ultimately raises questions about the purposes of the scattered traders and their marketplaces. If the traders and the spaces associated with the Terminus did not constitute actual 'markets', because of the absence of customers and the constant dispersal of the traders and their marketplaces, what then were they? For the traders, it seemed, the markets constituted places of hope, places where they carried out purposeful, goal-oriented activities aimed at improving their futures. Even if these activities turned out to be futile in the longer term, they nevertheless provided a sense of meaning and purpose in life; and there was always the hope that the market would take a turn for the better and the customers would return. For the women in particular, the markets provided alternatives to domesticity, offering a different path towards female autonomy and power (Jónsson 2023). Their trade was not simply aimed at making an economic livelihood. In the end, trade was as much a struggle for an acceptable position in society.

These reflections connect to my more recent ethnographic research at a marketplace in East London, in the United Kingdom (Jónsson et al. 2023; see also Dahinden et al. 2023). This marketplace was experiencing a range of potentially undermining transformations, including gentrification of the local neighbourhood, repeated closures due to the Covid-19 pandemic, competition from online retailers and

discount brands on the high street, and rising wholesale prices due to the UK's departure from European Union membership ('Brexit'). In the face of these multidimensional challenges, it is perhaps surprising that this market still existed at all. Yet, not unlike the women I observed in Dakar, for the traders based in East London participating in the market was about more than just making money. There was a whole range of social dynamics that kept traders attached and attracted to the market, including the social relations forged there through exchanges, banter and friendships with regular customers and other traders; their personal biographies and family history associated with market trade and the marketplace; their sense of familiarity with the place, including the particular environment and the people; the sense of 'community' the market contributed to in the local area; and more generally, the ambience of the marketplace and the enjoyment of participating in the dynamics of public space (Jónsson and Watson 2021; Jónsson et al. 2022). There is a host of non-economic benefits to marketplace trading that make it a meaningful endeavour and which is part of the reason why traders stick with the market, even when it is declining. Existing studies in different towns and cities of the United Kingdom have also extensively documented the many benefits and pleasures that *customers* derive from local marketplaces, which usually play an important social role as they often serve marginalised populations, offering low-cost and good-quality products, as well as providing a space for social interaction which helps combat loneliness and isolation, particularly for elderly people and single parents (Jónsson and Watson 2021).[1] Urban African studies have placed less emphasis on the consumer aspects of urban marketplaces and the experiences of shoppers. This could be a fruitful avenue for further investigation, not least as it would help to document the vital importance of more or less informal markets in African cities and the Majority World more generally, in a context where traders are being systematically evicted and displaced by city authorities.

Gender and everyday politics in urban West Africa

Urban studies have over the past decades been strongly shaped by an analytical focus on neoliberalism. Taking such a universalist concept as the starting point for analysis risks resulting in generic statements about the experiences and conditions confronting urban dwellers in different parts of the world (Parnell and Robinson 2012; Baptista 2013). Attention to the ways in which the world system is implicated in urbanism in cities

across the globe is important. Meanwhile, in addition to more theoretically driven, structuralist accounts that take African urban settings as their analytical starting point, there is a need for more ethnographically informed, fine-grained understandings of cities across Africa. Analyses which pay attention to historical contingencies, everyday politics, and lived experiences can reveal urban dynamics that are not captured by abstract analytical frameworks informed by concepts like neoliberalism and world systems. In this regard, the Terminus ethnography contributes to the Global urbanism agenda, through its empirical and inductive analysis, which led to the discovery of certain urban dynamics requiring new concepts – including 'urban diaspora', the 'esoteric register', and 'transient emplacement'.

Chapter 3 explored everyday politics in Dakar, providing a multivocal account of the different reactions and responses to the eviction of the traders at the Terminus. It considered the different models or 'registers' available to people in Dakar for claiming their rights to access and use the city, and which reflected differently situated knowledges about the city, including divergent understandings of urban governance and membership. To engage the authorities and get them to take the traders' claims to belonging and their rights to the city seriously, Malian intellectuals and elites in Dakar advocated a conventional approach of appealing to the law, rationality and formal regulations. The chapter meanwhile identified alternative registers of claims-making that differed from the prevailing modernist and neoliberal models, which had proved largely ineffective and even detrimental to the traders. The traders' relatively successful recourse to an esoteric register suggested that disenfranchised and poorer urban residents in Dakar did hold some power and were in some ways able to influence the decisions of authorities – even if such decisions were ultimately revocable. Paying attention to such everyday forms of politics helps to unsettle Eurocentric ontologies and scholarly preconceptions of what constitutes 'politics', thereby broadening the analytical scope for understanding inclusion, resistance and activism in urban settings in the South.

The analysis of the aftermath of urban displacement implicitly raises questions about how women persist as traders in an environment where they are deemed evictable and have to silence themselves (see Chapter 3). The traders evicted from the Terminus were not simply marginalised because they were 'foreigners' in the city. Inclusion and exclusion in Dakar were not primarily premised on citizenship, as it tends to be in contemporary European and North American states, nor on permanent presence in the city (Melly 2011; cf. Brown 2019). Rather,

the intersection of economic status and gendered identity appeared more significant in this regard, constituting, for example, bases for 'informalisation', 'evictability' and generally, disenfranchisement. This was reflected in the binary reproduced by my interlocutors in Dakar, which associated so-called 'informality' with femininity, conceiving of both as inferior, financially unsustainable, dependent, irrational, and in need of control and discipline (cf. Freeman 2001, Ortner 1974). In this context, having knowledge of rights – to the market and to the city – is important to some extent. But, as Chapter 3 implicitly demonstrated, having the capability of enacting and claiming rights is necessary too (Sen 1979, 2001). This appeared lacking for the women traders during the process of eviction.

Since they lacked capability to claim their rights, the women I encountered instead drew upon certain moral discourses to justify their work and allow them to carry on trading in public space (Chapter 5). Not talking politics, being modest and pious, supporting one's husband's income generation, and working for subsistence but not for accumulation could be considered performances that allowed these women to sit on the market and generate an income. Meanwhile, a radically different way in which some women were laying claims on the city and their rights as traders was by emphasising their personal ambitions as traders and representing themselves as women who were making money on their own and for themselves. In these ways, these women were implying that they were actively participating in and contributing to the urban economy and, hence, were already part of the city.

In the context of the long-drawn negotiations over and challenges to the eviction notice served on the traders at the Terminus, the conspicuous silence of most of the women traders during this process was striking (Chapter 3). Their silence appeared to make them easy targets for eviction. Why did they not protest or organise? Were these women simply apolitical? What, more generally, are the implications of the story about the Terminus for the possibilities of emancipation and political mobilisation of women traders in the South? Resistance comes in many forms and is not always overt, organised, or based on any coherent political ideology or strategy (De Certeau 1984; Scott 1985). The women from the Terminus, who sought to object to their own eviction, were in a Catch-22 situation: voicing their concerns led to them being labelled 'ignorant', while gaining recognition and respectability required that they remain silent. In the bigger picture, however, these women had long been expressing resistance and agency by having founded a successful market, earning their own living and even accruing wealth, and travelling

independently with goods across long distances, thus defying patriarchal gender norms. Their very livelihoods were implicitly political acts of defiance and were potentially transformative for gender norms and relations (Jónsson 2023).

To understand the potential for female emancipation and empowerment in a specific urban context, it is important to look out for signs of resistance and defiance already present on the ground among women (Kabeer 2012). This book has generally cautioned against applying a homogenising lens on groups of women, traders and migrants in the city, to avoid glossing over internal differentiations, changing identities, conflicts and continuous adjustments to evolving circumstances. The material in Chapter 5 illustrated the competing femininities among the women traders, who viewed their relationships with men in strikingly different ways. Women's right to individually accumulate wealth regardless of the poverty of men was a contentious issue among these traders, and there were competing understandings of the meaning and value of individualism and how it pertained to women. The discussion of emic concepts such as *fadenya*, *muso waraba* and *nangaraba* highlighted that Mande speakers do consider individualism as relevant to personhood, even if they reject ontological individualism – which is the Western variant, whereby society is seen as made up of atomised individuals and is no more than the sum of these individuals (Kabeer 2012: 231; cf. Gullestad 1992). Naila Kabeer has eloquently critiqued a sort of cultural relativism which undermines the feminist project by arguing that communitarian societies do not need rights for women because they do not adhere to ontological individualism (which such arguments suppose is the basis for any feminist claims). Kabeer argues that it is possible to criticise without negating the social relationships within such communitarian societies. The starting point for such a critique, she argues, is to listen to the voices of protest grounded in local experience and articulated in local idioms, instead of the Westerners who insist on 'saving women' – especially if they are Muslim (Abu-Lughod 2002).

Analyses focusing merely on 'traditional' and dominant gender roles risk homogenising West African populations and taking insufficient notice of the diversity and changeability of femininities and gender ideologies. Societies change and 'traditional' arrangements and ideological models, derived from (for example) mythology or religion, do not necessarily reflect the lived experiences of women in contemporary urban West Africa – including those women who are economically active outside the domestic sphere and who do not adhere to prevalent heteronormative expectations of primarily identifying as mothers or wives. Exploring the lives of West African women who travel and trade in cities outside the home offers

insights into a range of far-reaching changes in gender roles and relations during the recent decades of economic and political liberalisation. As women have been drawn into trade and travel, they have needed to contend with dominant gender ideologies and relations, which they might seek to defy or attempt to accommodate. Only by looking at the range of practices beyond the domestic sphere, as it has conventionally been studied, can we hope to understand reconfigurations of female autonomy and power. Travel and trade have called into question conventional gender ideals and produced an increasing diversity of femininities, and they have done so most strikingly for female breadwinners and childless, divorced and widowed women, the subjects of this book.

Mobilities, migration and the African city

While the ethnography of the Terminus has highlighted the problems of uneven urban development and displacement, it also cautions against viewing mobility and change as necessarily disruptive. Indeed cities, and marketplaces in particular, are largely constituted by mobility and are constantly adapting and transforming. Since its inception, the market at La Gare was a dynamic space 'on the move', mutating and expanding in different directions. The former marketplace at the Terminus was created by migrants and visitors to Dakar and had been constituted by the incessant coming and goings of people and the constant movement of traders, suppliers and buyers as well as goods. In many ways, the decline witnessed at the new Malian marketplaces was the result of a *lack* of movement – including the cessation of the passenger train and the wider reconfiguration of transport infrastructure in Dakar, which discouraged trucks from travelling to the city centre where the markets were located. Without shuttle traders and train passengers, and with the diminishing presence of supply trucks and customers, the markets were becoming static; and this absence of movement was spelling their death. This suggests that scholars analysing the production of the African city should look to the urban dynamics of movement, migration and displacement, including mobilities and networks that extend beyond the physical and administrative boundaries of the city (Bocquier 2004; Mbembe and Nuttall 2004; Robinson 2002).

African cities are not static and isolated spaces, whose connectivity is limited to provincial rural–urban webs. Cities in Africa are nodes in translocal, transnational and also global webs and flows – not merely as departure points for migrants but also, significantly, as attractive spaces

for migrants and mobile traders (Bakewell and Jónsson 2011: 20). Hence, certain processes similar to those characterising 'global cities' seem to be occurring in African cities, albeit on a very different scale. As Robinson has argued, the global economy is only one of many forms of global and transnational economic connection (Robinson 2002: 539). To capture this, she suggests looking at the diversity of city economies in relatively poor cities, where local and translocal informal economic activities co-exist with national and transnational formal economic connections (Robinson 2002: 542). The ethnography of the Terminus has shed light on some of the numerous mobilities, circuits and connections that make up Dakar and other urban spaces in West Africa, and which have tended to be overlooked by anthropologists and urban scholars concerned more with dynamics at the 'global' level.

Since the postmodern spatial turn in the 1990s, growing scholarly attention to the world system has entailed that 'the global' has become the privileged scale at which to study the seamless reality of our interconnected world (cf. Hage 2005; Biao 2013). This perspective has undoubtedly been important in challenging racist, colonial and parochial models of identity as territorially rooted and of localities as static, isolated and essentially different. Ethnographic research on long-distance mobilities, transnational economic flows and trade in West Africa has been inspired by this tradition and has tended to emphasise global connections extending beyond the African continent. Contemporary scholars have meanwhile tended to disregard spatial and mobile dynamics largely *contained within* West Africa. Seen from the view of the Terminus, Dakar has been shaped by all kinds of urban and regional flows and exchanges. Chapter 2, for example, recounted a different kind of urban history, one that focused on the role of mobilities and displacement in the development of Dakar. The chapter touched on the history of regional migration and 'internal' diasporas, transnational trade flows, transport infrastructure, as well as urban displacement in Dakar as captured through the prism of the Terminus. It examined the historical migrations and circulations that resulted in the development of the Malian market at the Dakar Terminus.

How do migrants and mobile people relate to their cities of arrival in West Africa? How do they insert themselves into the urban economy and claim belonging – as foreigners, traders, women? The assumption tends to be that people would rather leave than settle in the cities of West Africa and that an ordinary city like Dakar is not an attractive destination for migrants. In cities of the Global North, research on migration has dealt extensively with questions of 'integration', citizenship and diversity.

Similar questions regarding mobility and inclusion have, meanwhile, been largely disregarded in Southern cities and particularly in West Africa. Some scholars have started examining the contemporary experiences of migrants in cities of mainly East, Central and South Africa (Bakewell and Landau 2018; Kihato 2013; Landau 2010; Gaibazzi 2018; Whitehouse 2012; Carrier 2016; Carrier and Scharrer 2019). Such studies have tended to focus on contexts marked by xenophobia and expulsions of foreigners; but less so on more mundane aspects of making a living and getting by in the city, as examined in this book.

Understanding how people relate to their cities of arrival and settlement in West Africa requires moving beyond the common-sense dichotomy between mobility and place (see Chapter 4). Such a juxtaposition portrays transience, circulation and hybridity as incompatible with emplacement and local attachment. Yet, many scholars have documented that the West African region is characterised by a wide range of mobile livelihoods and that residents are often enmeshed in vast translocal and transnational networks and relationships (de Bruijn, van Dijk and Foeken 2001; Abdalla, Barros and Berthet 2014). These important insights regarding the normality of mobility could be used more extensively to inform urban scholarship in the region. The people of the Terminus had migrant backgrounds and were foreign shuttle traders, but this did not mean they did not form any attachments to the urban space. To the contrary, they were continuously producing the place, even after the market was demolished. Negating the significant ties that people on the move, including mobile and migrant traders, form with their surrounding environments can be used as political pretexts for evictions and clearances of the spaces such people occupy in the city. The pervasive binary of mobility and place (and related concepts like immobility and sedentarism) is therefore not politically innocent and requires constant deconstruction to support the creation of socially just and inclusive cities.

The urban Africanist scholarship that addresses mobility has tended to look at cities in West Africa largely as places of emigration or immobility, where residents feel 'stuck' and unable to pursue the geographical, social and existential mobilities they desire. This may have to do with the fact that much of this research focuses on (young) men. The ethnography of the Terminus has brought to light the little-known dynamics of female entrepreneurship and mobility in Dakar. The stories of these women are counter to prevalent stereotypes of Muslim women residing in urban West Africa, who are still often perceived as relatively isolated from the outside world, immobile and economically stagnant. African women, particularly if they are Muslim, are often assumed to be 'stuck at home', confined to

the domestic worlds of childcare, cooking and consumption. Relatively little research has been concerned with the increasing number of single women in Islamic West Africa, who travel and trade in cities outside the home. These female household heads and mature unmarried women need to be mobile and generate income.

The ethnography of the Terminus speaks to the wider contemporary urban studies literature on the worlding of cities in the South (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004; Roy and Ong 2011). Women like the traders at the Dakar Terminus have played an active part in moving goods from the West African interior to international markets (and vice versa) and have connected remote settlements to the international flows of goods. The traders actively developed and strengthened socio-economic ties and exchanges across space, thus in their own way contributing to regional economic integration and inclusion of otherwise marginalised people and places. From a global and macro-economic vantage point, these kinds of traders and their markets may appear marginal and 'shadowy' (Ferguson 2006). But on the ground, in the everyday lives of West Africa's ordinary urban residents, they represented the dominant economy from which most people derived their subsistence. Endeavouring to view the city through the eyes of (Muslim) women, as this book has done, thus helps us to see the 'real' urban economy. Instead of fixating on the presence or absence of abstract global flows and the 'formal economy', examining the commercial activities of entrepreneurial women reveals the multitude of ways in which urban West Africa is implicated in trans-local and transregional flows, and connected to multiple elsewheres.

I phoned Oumou the other day to tell her that I had finished writing my book. She expressed her excitement, and then passed the phone to her daughter. After exchanging greetings, I asked her how her studies were going. She explained that she had started trading alongside her mother. Ten years on from my fieldwork in Dakar, she and Oumou are still side by side at Sugunikura – the little Malian market in Dakar. The demolition of the market at the Terminus was a significant rupture in Oumou's life; but it was an ambiguous moment of simultaneous endings and beginnings. Working with her daughter at one of the new markets that had emerged in the aftermath of eviction from the Terminus, Oumou's experience testifies to the generative aspects of displacement and to the agency of urban residents in the face of the continuous evictions and successive clearances that characterise Dakar (Sow 1980). The traders' experiences at the Terminus over the past decades exemplify how Dakar is in many ways constituted by displacement, as well as migration, mobility and other flows. Through these movements

and ruptures, the city is constantly remade. As Oumou told me once: '…we haven't finished constructing the city'. While constant uprooting, displacement, mobility, (re)construction and renewal can make life in the city precarious and disorienting, dynamics of movement and change are also what produces the city. This is a paradox that holds true not only for Dakar, but for many cities across the globe.

Note

1   See also the Markets4People project at Leeds University: https://trmcommunity value.leeds.ac.uk/.

Glossary

AOF
: The Federation of French West Africa (*Afrique occidentale française*). A former federation of eight French colonial territories, which included present-day Mali and Senegal.

Bana-bana
: Senegalese term referring to various kinds of itinerant and informal traders. The word is derived from the Wolof *baana-baana*, which supposedly means 'for me, for me' (*pour moi*) (cf. Mino 2009; N'Diaye Corréard 2006: 56–7).

CFA franc
: Currency of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (*Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine*), which currently comprises eight countries in ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), including Senegal and Mali. Note that interlocutors usually referred to the currency simply as 'franc' or 'CFA'. At the time of fieldwork 1,000 CFA franc was equal to about 1.5 euros.

Cheminot
: Railway worker.

Coxeur
: Guides and intermediaries, assisting customers and traders in locating and purchasing the goods or services they desire.

…dé!
: Emphatic particle, stressing the preceding word or sentence (similar to adding 'really' or 'at all' in English).

ECOWAS
: Economic Community of West African States (including Mali and Senegal).

GIE
: Economic interest group (*groupement d'intérêt économique*).

Grin
: Clique assembling in a regular place where they socialise, often on a daily basis.

Jatigi
: Host, landlord, broker, tutor.

La Gare
: The terminus station of the Dakar–Niger railway in Dakar.

Muso waraba
: Literally 'lion woman', referring to a woman with great authority in the household who keeps everyone 'under her thumb', including her husband.

Navètanat	Large-scale seasonal migration of labourers from the West African interior (including Mali) to peanut plantations in Senegambia (Senegal and Gambia) from the mid-nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century.
Shuttle trader	Shop-less trader travelling ('shuttling') back and forth between Mali and Senegal to purchase or sell goods. In Dakar, these traders were sometimes referred to as *'les bana-banas du Mali'*.
Sugunikura	One of the new Malian markets in Dakar. Literally means 'the new little market'.

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'Jónsson's book is a masterful study of the aftermath of displacement in a major African city. It shows how displacement is about more than leaving a place; it is also about how people rebuild livelihoods, and how the space left behind continues to haunt their imagination of a meaningful life.'

Hélène Neveu Kringelbach, UCL

'This book is an inspiring tribute to the Malian women traders of Senegal. "Emptied out" by a development scheme, they regrouped to recover their livelihoods and protect their families. Jónsson creatively marries studies of migration and urbanisation, providing fresh insights to both fields.'

Robin Cohen, University of Oxford

The Malian market at the railway terminus in Dakar was bulldozed in 2009 and, following privatisation of the railway, passenger services in Senegal soon ceased altogether. The consequences were felt especially by women traders who had travelled the line since its inauguration, making the terminus in Dakar the centre of a thriving network of traders and migrants. To examine the fates of those whose livelihoods were destroyed or disrupted, Gunvor Jónsson spent a year with the women evicted from the terminus.

Urban Displacement and Trade in a Senegalese Market explores what happens at 'the end' of urban displacement, when it is all over, so to speak – when the dust has settled and people find themselves scattered in sometimes unfamiliar surroundings, trying to pick up the pieces and create something meaningful.

This book argues that rupture and ensuing displacement do not produce a clean slate where identities, networks and histories must be produced from scratch. Traders and their markets do not simply vanish into thin air when they are evicted. The book examines not only what is lost but what emerges when a dense node, such as the terminus, is dissolved and fragmented. The ethnography of the traders reveals that the aftermath of eviction in cities may lead to diasporic forms of consciousness and identity formations. Displacement, whether on a local or global scale, demands difficult adjustments and people's capacities to adapt to new circumstances and environments vary. This book uncovers some of these different capacities and variations in traders' reactions to displacement.

Gunvor Jónsson is Senior Research Officer at the Department for Business and Trade and Honorary Research Associate in Sociology at The Open University.

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