



SPRINGER NATURE
Sustainable Development Goals Series

SDG: 16
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions



Simple Solutions to Complex Catastrophes

Dialectics of Peace, Climate, Finance,
and Health

John Braithwaite

OPEN ACCESS

palgrave
macmillan

Sustainable Development Goals Series

The **Sustainable Development Goals Series** is Springer Nature's inaugural cross-imprint book series that addresses and supports the United Nations' seventeen Sustainable Development Goals. The series fosters comprehensive research focused on these global targets and endeavours to address some of society's greatest grand challenges. The SDGs are inherently multidisciplinary, and they bring people working across different fields together and working towards a common goal. In this spirit, the Sustainable Development Goals series is the first at Springer Nature to publish books under both the Springer and Palgrave Macmillan imprints, bringing the strengths of our imprints together.

The Sustainable Development Goals Series is organized into eighteen subseries: one subseries based around each of the seventeen respective Sustainable Development Goals, and an eighteenth subseries, "Connecting the Goals", which serves as a home for volumes addressing multiple goals or studying the SDGs as a whole. Each subseries is guided by an expert Subseries Advisor with years or decades of experience studying and addressing core components of their respective Goal.

The SDG Series has a remit as broad as the SDGs themselves, and contributions are welcome from scientists, academics, policymakers, and researchers working in fields related to any of the seventeen goals. If you are interested in contributing a monograph or curated volume to the series, please contact the Publishers: Zachary Romano [Springer; zachary.romano@springer.com] and Rachael Ballard [Palgrave Macmillan; rachael.ballard@palgrave.com].

John Braithwaite

Simple Solutions to Complex Catastrophes

Dialectics of Peace, Climate, Finance,
and Health

palgrave
macmillan

John Braithwaite
The Australian National University
Acton, ACT, Australia



ISSN 2523-3084 ISSN 2523-3092 (electronic)
Sustainable Development Goals Series
ISBN 978-3-031-48746-0 ISBN 978-3-031-48747-7 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48747-7>

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2024. This book is an open access publication.

Color wheel and icons: From <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/>, Copyright © 2020 United Nations. Used with the permission of the United Nations.
The content of this publication has not been approved by the United Nations and does not reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States.

Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover credit: Sue McDonald EyeEm

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG

The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Paper in this product is recyclable.

Contents

1	Prologue	1
	References	6
2	Rapid Cascades, Coupled Crises	9
	Speed, Coupling, Complexity	10
	Hyper-Hubs and Hyper-Disruption	14
	Slow, Simple Solutions for a Fast, Complex World	19
	What Kind of Simplicity Helps Manage Complexity?	27
	Requisite Variety	32
	Summary of Policy Propositions by Chapter	39
	The Policy Hypotheses	39
	References	48
3	Containment of Crises	51
	Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue from Climate to Covid	52
	Nuclear Weapons and Covid Cannot Be Unmade	61
	Conclusion	70
	References	73

4	Containing Russia: Containing Nuclear Wars and Lesser Wars that Cascade	77
	George Kennan's Containment	78
	Radicalizing George Kennan and Hedley Bull Realism	80
	The Puzzle of Nuclear Weapon States that Rarely Invade Weak States	82
	Summarizing the Modern History of Invasions	91
	War Made Past Empires	94
	Why Indonesia Grows Toward Becoming a Future Great Power	97
	The Tunnel Vision of a Nuclear Peace	98
	The Nonviolence Alternative of Timor-Leste Plus 21 Abolitionist States	100
	Civil Resistance Often Works in Contemporary Conditions	103
	The Puzzle That the Wealthiest Societies are Militarily Weak	105
	Temporary Alliances to Contain Nuclear War Threats	114
	Three Historic Spikes of Short-Range Nuclear Missile Risk	126
	Covert Distrust of Free Russians by Western Neocons and Hawks	129
	References	135
5	Containing China: Containing Temporarily	141
	Permanently De-Containing China and Every Society	149
	Cyber-Guardrails	152
	Containing Iran and Other 'Rogue States'	155
	Containing Myanmar	159
	Implications of Containing 'Rogue States' for Containing a 'Rogue Russia'	161
	Contain Threats; Abandon Long-Term Containment of States	169
	References	178
6	Institutions to Manage Threats	181
	Containment of Threats	181
	Resurrecting Andrew Mack	184

	Drivers of Optimism About Peace	188
	The Big Picture of Catastrophe Prevention	204
	References	214
7	Containing Deadly Systems	219
	Averting Deforestation	220
	Odds of Armageddon	225
	Speed, Coupling, Endless Unbalancing of Equilibria:	
	AI, MADD, Hypersonics	229
	Lessons from the Past	235
	The ‘One-Eyed Man’	239
	Terror and the Harm Principle for Restorative Universities	243
	Persuading India and Pakistan	248
	Scaling Up Regional Dynamics of Disarmament	249
	Leadership by Universities for Doomsday Machine	
	Defection	254
	WMD Whistleblowers, Super-Intelligence,	
	Super-Deterrence	256
	References	264
8	Imagining Restorative Diplomacy	269
	What is Restorative Diplomacy?	275
	Super-Soft Diplomacy	277
	Diverse Deposits in the Adversary’s Bank	
	that Compensates for Competition	279
	Entrepreneurial Competition, Strong Cooperation	280
	Great Power Dialogue	287
	An Overly Realist Profession	288
	Good and Evil in the Heart of the Spymaster	294
	Renewing America’s Ethical Core Diplomatically	299
	References	301
9	Nuclear and Regime-Change Diplomacy:	
	the Restorative Critique	305
	Nuclear Diplomacy	305
	Nuclear Weapon Mishaps	307

Nuclear Surety Inspection as Restorative Regulatory Diplomacy	314
Beyond Neocon or Realist Verities	321
Relational Excellence in Diplomacy	323
Public Diplomacy for Uncertain Times	325
The Ethos of Winning	327
Interfering in the Domestic Politics of Others	329
Does Foreign Electoral Interference Work?	331
Violent Interventions in Foreign Domestic Politics	335
Catastrophic Success	336
John Mearsheimer Redeemed, Transcended	340
References	349
10 Contest Political Ritualism	355
Gaming Democracy	360
Slow-Food Global Politics	362
Regulatory Ritualism	365
Responsive Regulation to Contain Risk	371
Return to Street-Level Bureaucracy	378
Conclusion: Principles for Transcending Ritualism	382
References	385
11 Requisite Variety and Simple Institutional Virtues	389
Thinking Dialectically About Complexity	390
My Controversial Simplifications	397
The Ambulance Metaphor Revisited	402
Many Disparate Simple Institutions	405
Early Detection; Early Response	407
Overdetermined Prevention: Simple Versus Complex Dialectics	418
Thinking Systemically About Simple Institutions to Prioritize	421
Rally Behind Front-Line Workers of Crisis Prevention Institutions	424
References	426
Index	429

About the Author

John Braithwaite is an Emeritus Distinguished Professor of the Australian National University, and an interdisciplinary scholar of peacebuilding, war crime, business crime, criminological theory, and regulation and governance. He founded and was the first Director of the School of Regulation and Global Governance (RegNet) at ANU. Many of his previous works can be downloaded from johnbraithwaite.com.

Abbreviations

AI	Artificial Intelligence
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ATM	Automated Teller Machine
BCCI	Bank of Credit and Commerce International
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIA	United States Central Intelligence Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRIT	Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MADD	Mutual Assured Digital Destruction
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NSC	United States National Security Council

xii Abbreviations

PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
R&D	Research and Development
UN	United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction



1

Prologue

Abstract This book is optimistic in explaining why simple institutions and principles societies can strengthen to help humankind control complex catastrophes that endanger the planet. Security realities of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) do compel pessimism. Yet my argument is that it is possible to abolish WMDs. The journey of a revived peace movement can grow institutional capability to conquer climate catastrophe, pandemics, economic crises, and to secure peace from smaller wars. The book develops a dialectics of alternating between understanding complex ways of grappling with complexity and simple principles that are generative of nuanced response to complexity.

Keywords Complexity · Dialectics · Peace movement · Environment · Financial crises

This book is optimistic in explaining why simple institutions and principles societies can strengthen to help humankind control complex catastrophes that endanger the planet. Security realities of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) do compel pessimism. Yet my argument is that it is possible to abolish WMDs. The journey of a revived peace

movement toward achieving that will increase institutional capabilities to conquer climate catastrophe, pandemics, economic crises, and to secure peace from smaller wars. Nuclear calamity is an ugly topic. Denial and forgetting are natural human responses. My pitch to readers who care about environmental politics, policies to prevent the globalization of disease, and the dominations of the financialization of capitalism, platform capitalism, and surveillance capitalism is that pathways to transformation there can be unblocked by a peace movement that makes progress on WMD abolition.

A human species that has survived thousands of generations is likely to exist for no more than a century or two unless nuclear weapons are rapidly minimized, followed by progress toward abolishing them completely, alongside all WMDs. No strategy of abolition, no enduring survival. Yet with a strategy that falls short of full success, sustainable human development, human flourishing, and survival of humankind are probable. By destroying most (not all) nuclear weapons can we prevent weapons from destroying most (not all) of us. A world with fewer than 100 nuclear weapons is a threat to the planet but not an existential one; it would take at least 100 nuclear weapons striking urban areas to cause nuclear winter.

Payne (2020) documents huge numbers of generals, admirals, and defense secretaries enmeshed in the nuclear deterrence regime who came out in retirement to say that nuclear deterrence was irrational, ridden with logical flaws and contradictions, assumptions that were untested, untestable, implausible. These generals, admirals, and defense secretaries emerged from the closet as nuclear abolitionists. Even generals who are not WMD abolitionists often show how dubious they are about nuclear deterrence doctrines, for example saying: 'Firing off 1000 or 500 or 2000 nuclear warheads on a few minutes' consideration has always struck me as an absurd way to go to war' (General William Odom in Payne 2020, 104).

People say abolition is a pipe dream because the defense establishment of great powers always resists giving up their weapons. The historical record suggests quite the opposite (Payne 2020; Holloway 2011; Neuneck 2011; Rydell 2011). During the periods of US history when incumbent presidents said publicly that they would get behind a move

toward total abolition, as Presidents Truman, Kennedy, Reagan, and Obama did very explicitly in their time, dozens of former generals, defense secretaries, national security advisors and secretaries of state, including formidable hawks like Henry Kissinger, came out publicly in agreement, arguing that new realities, new evidence, made the old arguments for nuclear deterrence obsolete. Old generals have grandchildren too. The pipedream analysis grew even after these surges in strategic support for abolition because Stalin would not support Truman's abolitionism, Putin would not support Obama's even though Putin's predecessor did support Obama's step by step abolitionism before President Medvedev was replaced by Putin's return to the Presidency, Kennedy was assassinated, Reagan's term ended and a coup terminated his Moscow partner, Gorbachev, who advocated abolition before Reagan advocated it. One day, hope and history will rhyme, and abolitionist incumbents of the great powers will together ratify the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The alternative historical possibility, this book argues, is that the great powers will wipe each other out before that day arrives.

I argue that we owe our descendants no less a guarantee than step by step progress toward abolition of WMDs; social movements we join can deliver it; and although the challenges are complex; they are not impossibly complex. I conclude that prioritizing Sustainable Development Goal 17 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) by preventing wars and rebuilding justice with strong institutions after wars, opens a wide path to other Sustainable Development Goals, particularly Climate Action (13), Affordable and Clean Energy (7), No Poverty (1), Zero Hunger (2), Good Health and Wellbeing (3), Quality Education (4), Gender Equality (5), and Reduced Inequalities (10).

Movement has sadly been in the opposite direction since the politics of peace unraveled after the ill-fated Arab Spring in 2011. A problem is the propensity for wars to cascade to other catastrophes—economic, famine, pandemics, Ozone hole reopening, and climate change. Notwithstanding these realities, a politics of hope works better for humankind than nihilism. There are realistic strategies for containing war and tempering the other crises that cascade with it. By tempering these other crises, international society can reduce risks of them cascading to nuclear war.

At the time of writing, we see the problem with the war in Ukraine. Cooperation between Western and Russian university scientists on what great carbon powers like Russia and the United States need to do to tame the climate crisis has ceased. Instead of the United States, Europe, and Russia collaborating to assist each other to achieve the kind of reforestation of their large land masses that China has been achieving, Russia, the EU, and United States pour ever more weapons into Ukraine to blow ecosystems out of the soil. Tanks, aircraft, and other military materiel worldwide exhale carbon dioxide at scale onto the climate crisis, 2,750 million tons in 2022 according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Both sides are responsible for shelling at the largest nuclear plant in Europe, setting fire on one occasion to this dirty bomb waiting to happen. The oppression and anxiety of Ukrainians forced to work at the plant and live nearby under such threat by the Russian occupation was a war crime. Cooperation between NATO and Russian epidemiologists on future pandemic prevention ground to a halt since that war started in 2014.

This book argues that war and environmental destruction have been deep-rooted causes of pandemics in the era of the globalization of disease. Not only has collaboration between NATO and Russian regulators ceased toward financial crisis prevention, the talents of financial regulators have been conscripted to causing global financial crises that start in the enemy economy, but that have already spilled to global inflation, debt, and food insecurity for the planet's poorest people. Ukraine is no more than a tragic contemporary illustration of a general principle that peace is generative; it turns off taps that fuel the fires of crises; peace reconnects taps of crisis prevention knowhow.

My approach is first to understand the complex connections among crises. Then I argue that the best starting point for containing crises is to identify some simple principles and institutions that are generative of better control of the complexity of catastrophes. The first of these is peace itself. The book advocates not only soft diplomacy, but super-soft diplomacy, a diplomacy that abandons containment of Russia and China, replacing this with nourishing cooperative, collaborative problem-solving among competing great powers. At the same time, I advocate a kind of super-intelligence among intelligence agencies to detect cheating on

treaties that ban WMDs, treaties that require carbon emission reductions, combined with a distinctive kind of responsive deterrence. That deterrence goes to reform of the international law of extradition to protect whistleblowers. Those who treasonously disclose illicit WMD programs and other programs to game treaties that protect us against WMDs must be revered. We can protect them. It is proposed that intelligence agencies of all states share knowledge on covert WMD programs (super-intelligence) and that states commit to a duty to support chokepoint sanctions and to a last resort of conventional military attacks on the WMD programs of states that cheat on anti-WMD treaties. Collaborative commitment to this against a rogue WMD user should mean that this last resort is never needed.

The combination of extradition reform, a large enough temporary coalition to control a diverse array of contextual chokepoints, plus diverse conventional weapon capabilities might assemble a novel kind of super-deterrence executed by a temporary UN-sanctioned super-alliance. It only needs to hold together for long enough to secure WMD destruction in a rogue state. Put another way, the imperative for averting an irreparable cascade of many catastrophes might be for states to cooperate with their enemies on these solutions. This, after all, is what Churchill and FDR did in cooperating with Stalin to defeat the existential threat of fascism. That coalition lacked the chokepoint capabilities enabled by the coupled character of today's networked complexity. Chokepoints are chancy for aggressive single powers, however great they are. The complexly coupled flux of the world economy means that it is hard for any single great power to be sure that closing a chokepoint to another great power will not cause the other power and its allies to surprise it with their control of what turns out to be a more devastating array of chokepoints. The world economy can disengage from corporations that apply chokepoints against enemy states. Hence aggressive powers can stumble by cutting off the chokepoint branches on which they sit. Responsive regulation of WMD threats with chokepoints has therefore become potent but is most potent as a weapon of a large coalition of states, riskier as the weapon of a rogue great power.

My argument is that there are some simple solutions that go to the heart of how to tame complex catastrophes. We must also cultivate institutions that allow us to comprehend complexity. This is a book about the dialectics of movement between simple solutions and complex responsiveness to crises. The best path to pandemic prevention is to start with consensus on a simple preventive institution—a pandemic preparedness agency, as the European Union has recently institutionalized. The idea of such an institution, however, is that it will help societies to grapple with the complexity of pandemic response. The successful Taiwanese prototype of a preparedness plan swung into action in January 2021. It had no fewer than 124 discrete measures it was ready to mobilize against covid's complex evolution. The thesis of a simple imperative for a pandemic preparedness institution has the antithesis of a 124-point plan of some complexity. Wicked problems do require design thinking like this Taiwanese plan. The paradox here is that a simple institutional idea creates an institution that is generative of multifaceted responsiveness to complexity.

Please dear reader help by writing to me when you find any of the howlers that doubtless lurk in a book that ranges widely over terrain that I know quite well, but other terrain that I do not. My thanks to endless support from my beloved partner Valerie Braithwaite who engaged me on this book since 1972, for the support of all the family, including Brian, but especially Sari. Thanks to a hundred other co-authors, friends, former colleagues, and students across the world. My conversations with you helped in ways I hope you might see. Special thanks to my Palgrave editor Josie Taylor for being so helpful as she saw some vision in the book and to anonymous reviewers.

John Braithwaite

References

- Holloway, David 2011. The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. In *Getting to zero: The path to nuclear disarmament*, ed. Catherine M. Kelleher and Judith Reppy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Neuneck, Gotz. 2011. *Getting to zero: The path to nuclear disarmament*, ed. Catherine M. Kelleher and Judith Reppy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Payne, Rodger A. 2020. Stigmatization by ridicule. In *Non-nuclear peace: Beyond the nuclear ban treaty*, ed. T. Sauer, J. Kustermans, and B. Segaert. London: Palgrave.
- Rydell, Randy 2011. Advocacy for nuclear disarmament: A global revival?. *Getting to zero: The path to nuclear disarmament*, ed. Catherine M. Kelleher and Judith Reppy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





2

Rapid Cascades, Coupled Crises

Abstract Improved peacemaking, and step by step progress toward abolition of Weapons of Mass Destruction helps prevent environmental, pandemic, and financial catastrophes. Across four kinds of crises first prioritize simple principles and simple institutions that prevent coupled catastrophes from cascading one to the other. The next step is to pursue requisite variety in responses by diagnosing dialectically when additional interventions will and will not add value for crisis control. Societies can refine slow-food cooking of crisis response plans. A slow-food approach to growing simple institutions can be iteratively responsive to complexity. This is so when institutions are designed for capability to scale up during crises, to be generative, and to be evidence-based learning institutions that gradually accumulate wisdom to confront complexity.

Keywords Complexity · Environment · Pandemics · Nuclear war · Financial crises

Speed, Coupling, Complexity

Complexity of risk is something modernity accelerates. So is coupling of risk from one kind of crisis to another kind, and speed in the globalization of crises. Crises today cascade faster into one another. This is true of economic and ecological crises, the globalization of disease, and security crises. Crises develop increasingly rapidly because of accelerating innovation in global capitalism. Social media platform innovation accelerated the rapid spread of lies to the point of outpacing older, simpler institutions for the proliferation of truths. This includes lies that motivate new forms of dangerous behavior like advocating a coup to put right an allegedly stolen election, or the lie that war can be waged to sustain a new Caliphate to conquer the Middle East and Africa.

Improved professionalization in the proliferation of falsehoods led to election of climate change deniers during the very period of history when it became too late for fully effective catastrophe prevention. New technologies of cyberwarfare, cybercrime and cyberterrorism, new space warfare by electromagnetic and cyberspace technologies, and new ways of disabling them in space, may cascade to horrific hails of space wars. Coupled cascades put us at risk from cyber-threats that tip security systems toward cascades of nuclear weapons use by accident, miscalculation, or linkages to faulty technologies.

Russia, China, and the United States may not be far from capability for multiple forms of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), not only MAD by nuclear weapons, but also Mutual Assured Digital Destruction (MADD) through digital time bombs planted, ready to explode on demand, in electricity grids and other systems that serve nuclear weapons targeting, hospitals, telecommunications, and more. They would explode with malware designed to activate during a crisis. No one knows how advanced great powers are in achieving MADD capability. Only technological pessimists could think that while kinetic MAD is within their grasp, cyber MADD never will be.

The June 27, 2017 cyber-attack on Ukraine by Russia turned Ukrainian screens black everywhere. Money could not be withdrawn from ATMs. Ukrainians could not be paid, send or receive mail, pay at gas stations, or buy a train ticket or groceries. Worse, Ukraine could

not monitor radiation levels at Chernobyl and Zaporigia. This combined with effects on hospitals rendered the cyber-attack a war crime against humanity. NATO-based companies with major operations in Ukraine were also devastated. Merck and Fedex alone were hobbled at a cost of \$1 billion as the Russian malware infected their worldwide communications (Perlroth 2021, 18). A couple of years later, before and after covid and when Ukraine staggered from an unprecedented measles outbreak, Russian trolls surged anti-vaccination dogmas across Facebook accounts of young Ukrainian mothers (Perlroth 2021, 19). War cascaded to escalated epidemic severity.

Russia also attacks NATO states with anti-vaccination messages intended to cause health harm, but more fundamentally to sew division in ways that intersect with other cleavages based on politics, race, neo-Nazi belief systems, class, and religion. Other states target Russia and China in the same ways; others target this kind of sewing of internal divisions against Israel; Israel in turn sews divisions among Palestinians and Iranians. From unimagined sources seeds are sown for future fascism and war. The argument of this book is that restorative diplomacy, genuine healing among old enemies, is the fundamental solution to this problem that has worked again and again throughout history in persuading old enemies against future meddling in one another's domestic politics. It is just that restorative prevention and healing are more imperative than in the past, during an era when cyber operations are almost totally undeterrable and do such great crime and war harm that is extremely difficult to prevent technologically. Cybercrime is already the most common and damaging form of property crime for these reasons (Braithwaite 2022); soon cyberwar could become the most harmful form of warfare when the first case of Mutual Assured Digital Destruction turns all the screens black on both sides of alliances fighting a large war.

Russia would be better off had it restored diplomatic relationships with NATO states so they stopped meddling in Russia's internal affairs, ended financial sanctions against Russia, ceased costly proxy warfare against Russia to defend Ukraine. The United States would be better off had it not provoked Putin to meddle in US politics without which Donald Trump would have been defeated by Hilary Clinton in 2016

(Levin 2020). That meddling has been so effective in dividing Americans against one another that even a coup against an elected government could be attempted. It has been effective in stoking fires of neo-fascism in America, in costing US companies losses as high as a billion dollars from Russian hacks, in causing US taxpayers to suffer an inflation shock and the loss of trillions of dollars preparing Ukraine for war only to see its ally lose big chunks of its territory. A continuation of great power politics as usual is a lose-lose game compared to restorative diplomacy that heals the hurts that motivate all these crimes and weakens both great powers vis a vis China (Chapter 8).

Mutual Assured Destruction capabilities with the satellite communications that allow aircraft to land, and other critical forms of communication may not be far off. Russia and China can already destroy the coupling of financial systems and the internet between Europe and the United States. Subsea cables are responsible for 97% of the data and information flows of transcontinental communication and finance (Acharya 2023). Enemies can cut cables somewhere along a vast ocean floor without being detected. Early in 2022 when Russian President Putin was rattling his nuclear saber, Britain and NATO messaged that cutting submarine cables would be ‘an act of war’ (Bone 2022).

This is an example of chokepoint deterrence because there is little prospect this century that humankind could build the number of satellites that would be required with the bandwidth of what cables can do. Russia cut trans-Atlantic cables on a number of occasions during milder crises of the Cold War. Repairing them can take weeks; then they can be cut again. Or Russia could then follow up by cutting another between the United States and Japan/Korea. The United States could reciprocate. Russia is coupled by cable to a lot less wealth than could be destroyed via the coupling of the United States with Europe or Japan. The coupling most vital to Russia since the war in Ukraine commenced is to China and its allies, not vulnerable cable connections across vast oceans. Google is doing it alone to build its own undersea cable to link its North and South American operations and data centers. This may be an attractive Russian escalation target along some future Russian trajectory to threatening MADD—with few Russian companies traveling that line. MADD by this means requires cutting many cables at once because single cuts

can be re-routed along an alternative line, though with significant cost. Something that may have protected the West from the concerted attacks on undersea cables may be that China is a big player in the telecommunications and subsea cable industry. On the one hand, that is not much of an assurance perhaps for a future war with China, backed by Russia. On the other hand, this is another instance of how economic interdependence retains the potential to motivate peacemaking.

Coupling makes us wealthier and more capable of solving problems. Yet the more coupled, the more vulnerable we are. This book argues that because we can no longer 'contain' our enemies from cutting our coupling, nor they contain us from cutting theirs, there is no choice but to get better at turning enemies into friends. We can beat cyberbombs into cybershares that plough furrows of digital and quantum cooperation. We must beat nuclear bombs into nuclear fusion that we share to solve our mutual climate and energy crises. Fear of MADD can motivate the peace movement to educate us on where to seek shelter inside buildings when a nuclear mushroom cloud appears on the horizon. It is a mistake to think that messages on what to do will appear on our screens and airwaves; they may all turn blank at the moment the mushroom appears.

Hence, a second fundamental of this book is that rapidity of change is compounded by the tightly coupled character of crises. As Warren Buffet said of the international economic crisis in 2008, risks today are more coupled than in the past, so the collapse of a US bank more readily cascades to collapse of European banks. This is a fact of life. It is also a fact that we become wealthier as banks sell to one another. Bank dominoes fell at first because they were infected with securitized US subprime loans that were bad loans; in no time banks were collapsing because other banks were. Banks did not know how infected with bad loans other banks might be. So they stopped trusting them. This bleeding rapidly congealed the lifeblood of interbank lending.

A tipping point toward systemic collapse was passed when interest rates on risky interbank lending became so high that banks were stuck with bundles of mortgages in good loans. They were unable to sell them to prop up their liquidity. They could not pay their debts. The only line of credit they could access was taxpayer bailout. Risk therefore became

both more complex and more systemic. Systemic risks are risks that result in crises of whole systems, as opposed to breakdowns of bits of systems. Systemic risk means that collapse of one bit of a system cascades to many bits infecting other bits with catastrophe. In contemporary risk societies (Beck 1992) characterized by compressed space–time (Harvey 1989) and just-in-time logistics for ensuring that all capital is at work rather than tied into inventory, risk complexity can cascade quickly to systemic global crises.

Hyper-Hubs and Hyper-Disruption

Rapid cascades of tightly coupled crises is a terrible consequence of the complexity of a more interconnected world; yet there are many positives. Our generation has been able to visit diverse societies in a way our forebears could not. We are more able to connect to people of other lands, electronically and face-to-face, to taste their food and wine, and to enjoy collaboration with them. Electronically enabled collaboration allowed us to learn faster by catalyzing collective genius. The internet can connect fragments of knowledge to build better, or fragment and destroy knowledge because internet platforms are more profitable when sensational lies cascade than when they connect the dots of banal truths. Money is made rekindling movements based on internet-facilitated falsehoods as different as Islamic State, neo-fascism, pedophilia promotion, and movements for coups.

Network effects have a complexity that can reduce risks of crises until critical thresholds are crossed that are tipping points to systemic risk. A more globalized trading system can mean that if a key supplier collapses in a domestic market, a new one can be found in a foreign market. On the other hand, if banks across the world fear they are at risk from being seen as infected with a collapsing asset class, most might freeze lending, as we saw with that 2008 tipping point. A small number of commanding-heights hubs with a large number of interconnections makes for more fragility to cascading global crises than a system with many peripheral nodes of moderate connectivity (Goldin and Vogel 2010, 6–7). This was a lesson learnt from World War I; an alliance structure that tied one set

of countries to a Berlin hub that felt threatened and encircled, another to a London hub, locked many allies into a world war that previously would have been more regional. Moscow's fear of encirclement today is not so dissimilar to Berlin's complex of fears in 1914.

With the globalization of disease, we saw how fast death moves if a major Chinese city (Wuhan) becomes a virus node, then in quick succession big European (Milan) and American cities (New York). One helpful thing about previous initial nodes of epidemics is that they spread from rather rural nodes in peripheral parts of the world system (Africa and Iraq with ebola, HIV, and MERS). There were no major international airports, streams of tourists, or businesspeople wanting to invest along Congo's Ebola River, nor across the border regions between Iraq, Iran, and Syria where MERS jumped from camels to nomadic herders.

Unfortunately, the world system before 2008 had evolved toward one where two financial hubs—New York and London—dominated more than in previous moments of financial history. Mercifully the third hub taking off in China was by 2008 substantial enough to re-prime global pumps. After the crisis, the biggest financial firms in these cities absorbed many competitors that struggled to survive the crisis. US investment firms BlackRock and Vanguard picked up many cheap assets after 2008. Nodal power became even more concentrated. The global power of the very largest banks in the world that were in China after the crisis, also grew their domination after they were all substantially untouched by the crisis that humbled North Atlantic finance.

For many centuries up to 1945, there was also a degree of multipolarity of military power. This collapsed into a bipolar world with hubs in Washington and Moscow, a world where Berlin, Tokyo, London, Paris, Istanbul, and Vienna mattered less than they did early in the century. A brief unipolar moment ensued after collapse of the Soviet Union. This has now evolved toward the two major industrial powers (the United States and China) becoming the major powers in space (and cyberspace technology), and the dominant military powers.

During the Cold War, Russia had weak economic, information economy, and banking institutions. These past weaknesses of the Soviet Union are strengths of China today. The hyper-connectivity of the new global hubs of Chinese and Western power makes them more vulnerable

to targeted attack, but difficult to attack without harming the attacker. Vladimir Putin has some similarities to Hitler in being a man obsessed with the humiliation of historically recent setbacks that diminished the power of his empire. This alleges no surety that Putin is like Hitler as an empire-builder; he may be more motivated to show the strength to resist further decline. Probably Putin is a mix of offensive ambitions and defensive fears of encirclement (Beebe 2019). Humiliated leaders are dangerous when they see an existential threat in something as normal as Ukraine resisting domination. It may not be likely, but it should not be beyond our imagination to ponder the possibility of Putin planting false intelligence to spark confrontation between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan, that could weaken both greater powers in comparative terms. We know even North Korea with its weaker capability than the great powers could hack a top Russian missile manufacturer (Pearson and Bing 2023).

Putin has already demonstrated the imagination for a targeted attack on the most hegemonic hub of power on the planet. Russia succeeded in reshaping US politics by intervening in favor of Donald Trump, including in ways as creative as funding an unsuspecting Trump supporter to appear at rallies with a 'Lock Her Up' truck equipped with a Hilary Clinton model inside a cell with prison bars to create content for Lock Her Up video clips on social media. It is likewise having some impact with covert financial and other sustenance for far-right political parties that have attracted increasing support in Hungary, Poland, Austria, Italy, France, Germany, even Sweden, among others (Belton 2020). But for Russian interventions like the hack and leak of the Democratic Party server, Hilary Clinton would have won the 2016 Presidential election (Levin 2020), an election controversy that greatly destabilized America. The hack into the server of President Macron's party and leaks of troves of political damage two days before the 2017 French election helped to divide France. In this case, it did not lose Macron the Presidency. It was combined with a Russian fake news Facebook campaign against Macron's liberalism (Jasper 2020, 122). The largest democracy, India, is corroding from upper-caste supremacist trolling and terror of far-right Hindu fundamentalists. Many major Western democracies are endangered by white supremacist terrorism and far-right electoral politics. One can overstate how important Russian campaign

funding and trolling is in the rise of neofascist politics across democracies. The structural character of hate speech on unregulated platform capitalism is the more profound explanation. If restorative diplomacy and a respectful future relationship with post-war Russia can help avert foreign cyber-meddling, however, this is another good argument for restorative diplomacy (Chapter 8). The hope is for restorative diplomacy with a post-war Russia that has abandoned old imperial ambitions and by a NATO that abandons its new but contested imperial ideas of expanding even to East Asia.

A theme of this book is that cyber-attack risks have grown as a result of hyper-concentrated hubs of hegemony that have become ever more concentrated as a result of one form of hegemony cascading to other hegemonies. These are hegemonies of Weapons of Mass Destruction, weapons of market destruction, weapons of chokepoint domination of platforms and of panoptic surveillance through platform capitalism, weapons of domination of space and cyberspace, and domination of global regulatory institutions in which both Washington and Beijing now strive to dismantle the rules-based international order in ways that favor them. Just as Western states granted impunity to Japanese and German war criminals who were testing biological weapons in their concentration camps, likewise today it is clear that Russia (and likely other major powers) grant impunity to cybercrime corporations. They gather criminals to steal secrets and attack targets that might harness networks of millions of computers (botnets) to cripple whole systems of commerce, freeze foreign financial systems, harden arteries of hospitals, water supply, electricity, e-commerce, e-governance, and democratic governance itself. Homeowners occasionally suffer homes invaded by a burglar. All who own computers on phones, on desks, have had them invaded countless times by bots. This makes it odd when criminologists say that property crime rates have been in long decline in Western societies. Sure, terrorist organizations like the IRA no longer organize armed holdups of banks; why would any rational terrorist fund terror today by high-risk crimes of that kind? The modus operandi of terrorists, common criminals, and espionage alike are increasingly tied to the internet.

One fact about hyper hubs of global domination, particularly in the United States and China, is that they are hubs of innovation into useful

new technologies never seen before. For the same reason, they are hubs of cybercrime and cyberwarfare excellence in innovative technologies for crippling technological systems on earth and in space. They keep their most novel destructive capabilities secret because the future cyber-crises inflicted by national security states will be more damaging to the degree that they surprise as never seen before. No virus worth its disruptive salt does much damage without being novel. It is when there is some novelty about financial crises that regulators fail to understand, prevent, or even spot them coming. No banks had thought in the twentieth century that it was a good idea to lend to the poor at scale for housing. It was radical financialization of capitalism that made demand sustained by bank debts of the poor an attractive idea to finance capitalism. Then at hegemonic nodal finance hubs, innovation in derivatives financially engineered novel securities that made a new kind of collapse of bank dominoes possible in 2008.

Ambitious young people are dazzled by prospects of participating in productively innovative hubs. Many of these great young minds migrate from the promise of innovation in production to innovation in destruction, from 'do no evil' to 'do novel evil'.

Accelerated speed of crises of diverse kinds explains not only the quantitative coupling of micro crises (e.g., at a bank) to macro disasters (of a global financial system). Acceleration also explains why one kind of crisis moves so fast that it cascades into qualitatively different kinds of crises, as hypersonic nuclear missiles might when they travel so fast that there are only minutes for correcting false alarms of impending nuclear attack. An accelerating crisis can cascade so fast to a different character of crisis that it might be too late to shut it down before the character of the new risk cascade is understood. The war in Ukraine helped stoke global inflation, trimmed every country's economic growth projections for 2022–2024, with particularly steep collapse for Ukraine and Russia, even more so for the world's hungriest people dependent on their grain and fertilizer exports, and on affordable food and energy generally. An artificially strong US dollar then led the poorest societies into perilous debt traps from which they could not extricate their starving citizens. When different kinds of crises cascade into one another, crises become more complex, nonlinear, and unpredictable.

Societies with a pathological will to power in future may roll the dice on catastrophic cascades of American crises if they tip the balance in favor of a Donald Trump, or roll the dice on a new form of cyberespionage against capital markets that might cascade an inventive form of financial crisis, or spread a pandemic for which only they are prepared with vaccines and countermeasures. That would be a stupid thing for Russia to do. Then we already know that those with the most extreme will to power in Moscow are capable of playing with foolish forms of fire.

Slow, Simple Solutions for a Fast, Complex World

How can there be simple solutions to the speed of coupled crises that are complex? The beauty of simple solutions is that a slow-food approach to institutional preparedness is generative of nourishing institutional flavors that can sustainably penetrate societies buffeted by fast-moving cascades of tightly coupled crises. Slow food is an antithesis not only to fast food but also to fast fashion that mimics global metropolises of fashion capital with mountains of rapidly obsolescent clothing. Nicole Perlroth (2021) visited Facebook headquarters to see graffiti that crossed out ‘Move fast and break things’, replacing it with ‘Move slowly and fix your shit’. Societies can have it both ways. They can have entrepreneurship that drives creative destruction, and institutions that preserve security for the planet.

A quality university system that is not captured by the very military-industrial complex that is throwing babies over the waterfall is a simple enough institutional imperative. Universities are vital to building strong markets, designing effective regulatory institutions, and energizing civil society. Universities are institutions that we know how to build again and again across every society. They can deliver capability for responding to the most complex of phenomena. This foreshadows one conclusion about simple solutions for containing catastrophe. The simple solutions are often stable institutions that are designed to eschew simple-minded responses to complexity by being nimble and independent in their thought about how to scale up containment of complex emergencies.

This renders them generative of problem-solving. A paradox is that a good university is a slow-food accomplishment that enables rapid detection and rapid response to catastrophic risks.

The independent university is a simple institutional idea that is increasingly compromised in markets for university influence captured by a military-industrial complex and corporate funders with agendas about channeling citadels of knowledge to corporate interests. Universities do better when they ‘just say no’ to nuclear weapons manufacturers, cyberwarriors, space war entrepreneurs, gambling firms, alcohol and tobacco conglomerates, and any organization with an interest in growing sales of dangerous products. If societies get the tried and true institution of independent universities settled, they can do endless productive unsettling of a whole range of other institutions to help them become more adaptive to complexity. That is not without ethical complexity: societies should not want universities working with defense contractors to develop DNA sequencing to spread novel epidemics that create greater havoc because they use ingenious AI. Yet no one wants to stop DNA sequencing designed to conquer disease. Former World Bank leader Ian Goldin (2021) made the point that Silicon Valley managed step changes in the character of capitalism, not just incremental change, not only slow-food approaches to business institutional change. Goldin asks could Silicon Valley have been possible without Stanford and other great universities in its vicinity. Stanford was a slow-food institution long replete with scientists plugging away at big ideas for information transformation in a slow-food way.

While the idea is simple, universities in important ways are captured by national interests that are partly shaped by a military-industrial complex that beckons universities to articulate ideas about the ‘national interest’ to mass media obsessed with an interest that is national, sometimes imperial. International interests in diffusion of peace globally are less likely to deliver ‘impact’ for university professors or for national media organizations. There is complexity in how academics should manage those pressures. For an American academic, is it more important to narrowcast important ideas to engaged activist audiences or to broadcast to apathetic mass audiences? Is it more important to reform the New York Times so it is interested in genocide risks in countries where

suffering fails to capture the national imagination in media markets? Is it important to subscribe to the New York Times because it is more internationally engaged than dailies of lower quality? Or is it better to give to Reporters Without Borders because they support more courageous front-line non-white reporters, who only occasionally place their writing with the New York Times co-authored with a white American journalist? Is it less important to support progressive neo-colonial media that remain obsessed with the national interests of white-majority societies, and more important to support new media from Africa engaged with big questions of war, peace, debt, and environmental collapse that seek negation of neo-colonial realities. It is a neo-colonialism of journalism where Nigerian media source news on fighting in Libya from Reuters or the BBC. I found that one method for academics from white-majority countries to support a deeper form of independence of the Western university is sometimes to set up a base in the Reporters Without Borders office of a front-line society, learning from them, nurturing and valorizing their work through our Western writing.

It is simple thinking to have a substantial ambulance service that is nimble and well designed to scale up speedily. That takes decades of slow-food institutional development of a service cooked through experience with crises like COVID-19. Then when bigger crises like a nuclear war require more rapid scaling up, the ambulance service has become a simple, resilient institution in better repair for the complex crisis. In the meantime, a well-funded, efficient ambulance service responds to lesser but important crises like homicide that between 2015 and 2021 took 3.1 million lives worldwide (United Nations 2023, 5), or an opioid epidemic. Especially in poorer countries, this is one of the cheapest, simplest ways to simultaneously reduce the homicide rate, the incidence of deaths from drug overdose, and tragic health consequences of suicide attempts. A good ambulance service gets people with stab or gunshot wounds, or overwhelmed by drugs, to the hospital quickly. That is, an institution that can contribute so much to reducing death rates from future nuclear wars and global pandemics can pay for itself by stemming the flow from stab wounds, the collapse of bodies burdened by opiates, this year. That is what thinking slow and simple means about the

institutions required for rapid response to complex crises. Sadly, corporatized universities neglect research that would help ambulance services to become more evidence-based as they grow to be responsive institutions. Ambulance services do not have the scale or resources to be big funders of universities. Universities become ambulance chasers of the wrong kind; they are hooked on chasing the corporate ambulances with research funding cash.

Covid illustrated how developmental states like Taiwan and Singapore had the required simple institutions of pandemic response crisis-ready, while states that had misplaced faith in market preparedness to respond to all ills—Trump’s United States, Johnstone’s United Kingdom, Bolsonaro’s Brazil, did not. Some formerly neoliberal states like Jacinda Ardern’s New Zealand adapted well to behave more like a developmental state that valorized simple institutions of adaptive preparedness. The European Union learnt from these mistakes, from the millions of covid deaths that might have been prevented, learnt from East Asia to be crisis-ready next time with a new pandemic preparedness agency. Other societies like Australia, and perhaps Canada, that did not manage covid badly overall, nevertheless performed disastrously in learning lessons from the pandemic about strengthening their aged-care workforces and regulatory systems (Royal Commission into Aged Care 2020). The wealthiest societies that should have been best prepared with simple preventive plans, because they had the resources to fund strategic prevention, performed worse than Africa with all its poverty. As with the politics of climate change, the problem in societies like the United States was that voices of university experts on the complexity of pandemics were trumped by a platform capitalism that proliferated covid lies. There was simply more money to be made when these platforms were put at the disposal of political lobbies in rich societies.

The demands of rapid waves of coupled crises require societal commitments to simple institutions of surrender to the realities of not getting the world we might want. Who wins the next election is not as important as having a stable system for transferring power from the last winner to the next. Who wins the next great power contest is not as important as having a stable system for moving on from the current to the next number 1, both constrained by a rules-based international order. Who

is number 1 is less important than numbers 1–5 accepting that who is number 1 will change from time to time. The important thing is working together for stable progress of all major powers to extinguish crises and commit to that rules-based international order. It is in the interests of the United States to constrain its maritime power by joining the Law of the Sea Convention, because one day it will be number 2, and right now China is reshaping and gaming the Law of the Sea as a member of the Convention preparing for the time when it will rule the seas.

Because war risks are so catastrophic, we all have an interest in stability and balances of power that change at a pace societies have time to adjust to. Suites of institutional stabilizers are needed that are learning institutions, but that are tried and true, simple enough for the poorest societies. WHO did not do a totally bad job of assisting the poorest societies of Africa to speedily grow those simple institutions for stabilizing COVID-19 and ebola; it performed more disastrously in WHO persuasiveness with great powers. Great powers were smart enough to co-opt brilliant Turkish immigrants in Germany and the US National Institute of Health to their vaccine money-making. These states lacked the wisdom to stem the flow cascading from new covid variants by rapidly rolling out vaccines at low cost to the world's poor. The world was lucky when Omicron took over as a less deadly variant. Next time policy stupidity might be ravaged by worse luck. This book argues that former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (2009), is right that good luck is also why the world has not stumbled into a nuclear war it wished to avoid. Luck runs out for societies that fail to rise to the challenge of institutional preparedness for catastrophe prevention.

Cascades of crime waves feed into waves of war. They cluster at war-torn regions like the Middle East, the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes region of Africa (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). These are examples of complex cascades. Having a good ambulance institution designed to scale up quickly is good for containing harm from radically varied complexes of cascade phenomena. While cascades are complex, nonlinear, frequently passing tipping points to reverse direction, a well-designed ambulance service is an example of a simple institution for containing that complexity, however complexity unfolds. A good university system that does the research and training to diagnose

the changing directions of complex crises as they pass tipping points is another example of a simple institutional imperative to maintain good order. That institutional imperative is simple, even as what universities do through their research is complex. There is a degree of complexity in running university administrations to maximize excellence in mastery of complexity. Nevertheless, it is a deadly simple policy for a state to fund a strong system of universities to compete with one another in pursuit of inventive excellence and in recruiting the best students. This insight is of a piece with saying that picking winners in markets is complex and difficult; but a policy that protects the competitiveness of markets through resilient commercial law enforcement has proved less complex to preserve, as more and more societies have reaped benefits from such policy settings.

This book is particularly concerned about four kinds of crises—climate change, crime-war cascades, epidemics, and financial crises. These catastrophes are conceived as complex and prone to cascade effects. It is well documented that climate crisis proceeds as a cascade phenomenon that takes ecosystems beyond tipping points that resist reversal. One reason climate crises have complex effects is the large impacts that climate cascades are likely to have on these other three kinds of crises. As rivers dry up, powerful states are then tempted to divert melting snows away from flows into weaker countries' river systems. When they divert this water, the stronger state might suffer cyber-attacks, terrorism, or arming of a domestic insurgency (Smith et al. 2022). African and Middle Eastern states do this kind of diversion of surrounding states' rivers with damaging effects for regional stability. There are fears that China might divert Himalayan snow melts from flowing South into the huge river systems of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh and great South-East Asian river systems like the Mekong to instead replenish drying systems critical to Chinese famine-prevention, like the Yellow and Yangtze River systems. Such temptations cascade in complex ways toward future wars.

War in turn cascades to economic crises and to epidemics. A well-documented example is the way that the deadliest cascade of war of the past half century centered on the Democratic Republic of Congo. That fighting massively spread HIV-AIDs across Africa. More than twenty

foreign armies were fighting inside Congo. Mass rape occurred at a monumental scale. Foreign soldiers raped to spread the virus back home and across the continent. There were times when instability in Congo did not help with containing ebola, which first appeared on Congo's Ebola River and had ten further Congo epidemic waves. To this day ebola is still a virus that adapts and is not fully contained within Africa. Afghanistan and its bordering Northwest region of Pakistan is the region of the planet where polio regained a foothold thanks to endless cascades of warfare. The alleged role of polio health workers in the discovery and assassination of Osama Bin Laden did not help with the ongoing popularity of killing polio vaccine teams as Western collaborators wanting to do harm rather than good. Jihadists passed polio workers' cars on a motorbike to fire into the vehicle. The result is a planet that still lives with one of history's most horrific diseases.

Climate crisis directly engenders epidemics because as forests are destroyed, wildlife that clings to green strips near towns is thrust in close contact with humans. Australia sees this with mass bat infestations of city parks. Viruses leap from bats to humans in ways that did not happen in the past when bats stayed in natural habitats without venturing into city centers. Viruses leapt from apes to humans in new ways in Congo with HIV-AIDS and along the Ebola as destruction of Congo's tropical forest habitats moved apes to trees on the fringes of human settlements.

When climate crises cascade to wars and the globalization of disease, these cascades can in turn cascade to economic crises. Covid illustrated this dynamic of thrusting the world into recession, and then later into an inflation crisis. This book diagnoses the various ways each of these four crises have tendencies to cascade into one another. In sum, we see two general features of importance in these trends. One is that in conditions of connected-up modernity, crises cascade faster. The second is that crises have become more tightly coupled. An implication for this book is that some of the most generic simple solutions to catastrophes are simultaneously relevant to all four types of catastrophes, as this chapter has illustrated with a slow-food approach to resilient, scalable ambulance services and universities.

I take a page from the playbook of institutional anomie theory and apply it to interconnected crises of modernity (Braithwaite [2022](#)).

This arises from an interpretation of the way Messner and Rosenfeld (2012) forged institutional anomie theory from the insights of Robert K. Merton's (1968) *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Anomie is the collapse of the normative order of a society. It unfolds as a kind of cascading collapse of moral order. Anomie effects are complex and prone to reversal. Emile Durkheim explained the rising nineteenth-century suicide with the social disruption of industrialization. William Julius Wilson (2012) and Braithwaite (2022) explain the steep crime rise of 1960–1992 in Europe, North America, and other developed economies through anomie associated with *deindustrialization*. The institutional anomie point is that however complex are cascades of anomie, it is important to have strong basic institutions like a good education system, a resilient health system, loving families for raising children, plentiful employment, and rights of access to housing for the poor. Such institutions are well understood. Many societies have done well in building them at different stages of modern history. Other societies at other times have not. While the rapidly moving and coupled crises to which they respond are complex to understand, these simple institutions take long histories to consolidate. Institutions of quality housing for the poor, for example, are not complex to build. They take decades to consolidate, construct, and maintain; just as they can be rapidly destroyed by neoliberal reformers of housing markets. Care is required to prevent the corrosion of housing markets at the hands of neoliberal ideologues. Welfare states and communist societies of the 1950s and 1960s were not as wealthy or sophisticated as today's market societies, yet they did a much better job at the simple task of building up adequate housing stocks for the poor to conquer the homelessness that makes it so much harder to conquer other cascading problems such as new forms of substance abuse (like fentanyl), suicide, and crime. We know a great deal about what we need to do to build and preserve the simple institutions that contain complex catastrophes.

Some of the cascades that have surged homelessness have been more complex institutions that great financial minds like Warren Buffett and Allan Greenspan confessed to misunderstanding. The worm in this apple was complex Wall Street markets in slicing and dicing securitized

subprime mortgage loans.¹ This book argues that simple regulatory institutions were capable of controlling this catastrophic cascade across banks and societies. The problem was clustered at some Wall Street and City of London institutions that were trusted by regulators to be too clever for their own good. Countless more simple-minded regulators than those responsible for the New York and London markets did a better job of protecting global markets when they said, in effect:

I'm sorry, but I'm not smart enough to understand the risks of this financial engineering with housing loans. All I can understand is that loan defaults are rising. Although I might not be as clever as you, or as clever as regulators of Wall Street, at grappling with complex derivatives, unless you can explain their risks to me in simple terms that I can master, I am going to stop your bank from trading in them.

Many humble mature-minded CEOs of banks said something like this to their brash and brilliant young derivatives traders. They saved their banks from disaster. Eastern hemisphere leaders of prudential regulatory agencies who learnt humility after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis saved their economies from recession in this way in 2008. So did the chair of the Polish prudential regulator. This book will discuss why Poland was the European economy that performed best during the crisis years and the years immediately after. These leaders served their economies and societies with slow food thinking about defending institutional integrity.

What Kind of Simplicity Helps Manage Complexity?

H.L. Mencken famously said: 'For every complex problem, there is an answer that is clear, simple and wrong'.² Actually there are always many, as there are always many wrong answers that are complex. This book argues that there are also some complex answers that are right, but that are unknowably hard for science to credibly validate as right because of methodological complexity associated with omitted variable bias.

Complexity hides the effects of variables that are unobserved, unmeasured, but that may be the real drivers of crises that have escaped the explanatory imagination of science. In addition, there are some simple answers that are methodologically more feasible to validate as right, even though they fail to account for the full complexity of problems that never fully yield even to joint explanation by a suite of parsimonious explanations.

IT innovation aims to make life simpler. When lost, our smart phone tells us where we are. It can tell us how much exercise we do, forgotten historical facts, and more. The worm in the IT apple is that in aiming at making our lives simpler in endless new ways, thickets of Apps on phones became more complex to navigate. They opened up even more backdoors to hackers. We end up spending less time on simpler things in life like coffee with a friend, more time tapping devices, when it is not screens we are born to respond to, but faces and relationships. Proliferation of many good, simplifying IT innovations burdened us with a more complex totality to our lives. Endless micro simplifications sum to macro complexity. When simplicity morphs into complexity, it takes longer to get stuff done. It is harder to do so, especially for older people overwhelmed by accelerating pace of change that requires downloading new Apps to get simple things done. We find that IT makes life less human, more confusing, and stressful to navigate, leading many to give up on this new mainstream of complex modernity. A world of more gadgets has proved less friendly, especially after cyberspace opened up new frontiers for criminals to con us, cyberwarriors to threaten our privacy, security, our anxieties, and new entry points to our children's lives for exploitative adults.

Tax law illustrates this. I have been writing on simplified tax and business regulatory solutions to complexity for decades. States write simple new tax laws to guide business and individual taxpayers in how to pay the right tax as new forms of business, then new kinds of business entities (like trusts) are created that individuals can reinvent themselves to be, or be part of. As the sheer number of simple rules grows, clever tax lawyers use one simple rule against another. They argue in court that the doctrine behind one simple rule applies to this case in a way that means another simple rule should not apply. This is why, even though many bright-line

tax rules are needed, new rules should be justified in terms of the law of a smaller number of tax principles that are debated and understood in a democracy. This means that in a contest within a complex thicket of tax rules, the small number of simple overarching principles should be able to trump the complex of rules. Simplification of the institution of tax law to make it more responsive to a limited number of overarching principles is an answer to complexity driven by the accumulation of simple rules. The accumulated mess of rules is comprehensible only to well-heeled tax lawyers and those who can afford their advice. Tax law became a tangle that privileges the rich to get away with paying no tax, while the rest of us shoulder the tax burden. In tax law, as in modern life in general, it is easier for professionals to add to what is already there than it is to take away. A sound law of simple tax principles would take down many rules that add more harm than good to tax system integrity (Braithwaite 2005). As with IT vendors, so with tax professionals, the market incentives are to sell new add-ons, band-aids, and workarounds to each extra trap opened by aggregated rules. This is when what is needed is transformative re-institutionalization of strategic simplicity.

A solution to the danger of simplicity degrading to renewed complexity is certainly simple, stable institutions. An example is principle-based tax law that oversees the complex dynamism of endless new rules, a tax law guided by a manageable number of principles that can deal with novel developments in an economy.³

The human brain can deal at one time with fewer variables than the fingers our hands can count. The way humans adapted to a world more complicated than the worlds our brains had evolved to manage are *institutions* that we can rely on to grapple with complex understanding of thousands of variables at a time. The way good institutions for tax system integrity grapple with thousands of tax laws at once, millions of tax laws of other countries, is just an example. If we want a just and economically efficient economy, we do well to support the simple virtue of a responsive tax authority and tax law. In such a system, the government argues to appellate courts empowered to rule that a simple law is being used to compromise the tax system's integrity of commitment to its overarching principles. Judges respond by striking down the application of this simple law to the complex circumstance of cash flows through multiple tax

havens, for example. The fundamental principles of tax system integrity trump the rule; the simple integrity of the tax system is restored. The regulatory literature shows that other kinds of regulatory inspectors paradoxically have the cognitive capability to more consistently enforce the law and to more effectively improve compliance when an inspection team assesses 30 broad and vague, but generative principles, than when they enforce a thousand precise, specific rules (Braithwaite et al. 2007). It is a paradoxical feature of regulatory science that broad, vague principles can prove more valid than many precise rules for delivering valued outcomes, and more reliability (consistency at the hands of different inspectors, or across different contexts).

Limits of human cognitive capability force us to respond only to some aspects of our complex and dangerous world. If we choose to focus on the wrong variables, ignoring more germinal ones, we make terrible mistakes of unresponsiveness to the complexity of the world. This chapter has argued for committing politically to three institutions that are generative of complexity management: an ambulance service that can scale up, a university system with independence and regulatory institutions (such as a tax authority) with principled responsiveness. The rest of the book will discuss more institutions with these generative capabilities for managing complexity. There is an evidence base that each of these institutions and policies has proven effective for crisis prevention or amelioration. They are, nevertheless, only tentative suggestions to start a better conversation. The important systematic work on which are the most important simple solutions remains to be done.

National and sub-national pandemic preparedness plans are also simple basic solutions. For the maintenance of financial stability, not only is a credible tax enforcement system imperative, but so is a credible regulatory system that defends the integrity of markets by enforcing laws against fraud, corruption, and monopolization. Money power misguides all societies to under-invest in these. A simple imperative that is important for pandemic prevention and prevention of international financial crises is international cooperation on crisis prevention. This has been even more critically absent in setting simple targets to prevent climate change, regulation to enforce those targets, and scientific cooperation on R & D to invent new technologies for renewable energy and green

growth. Tragically, as the crisis gets worse, obstacles to prevent Western scientists from collaborating with Chinese scientists, or outstanding scientists in 'rogue' states like Iran, deepen.

Another simple solution to environmental crises is planting more trees appropriate to local ecosystems and felling fewer. The book argues that while China has been managing substantial, environmentally consequential, reforestation, other countries with large land masses have not, notably Australia, Russia, Canada, and the United States. We must rush to insist that such simple solutions as planting enough trees have become entangled in complexities of offsets markets. This is because regulatory institutions fail to prevent fraud in carbon markets and fail to quash greenwashing. Yet this is just a simple point about the interconnectedness between simple solutions to securing the integrity of markets and simple reforestation policies. It always was predictable and predicted that as the price of carbon went up, carbon fraud would increase and fester as an organized global complexity corrupting carbon markets.

While responsive business regulation is a remedy to environmental and financial crises, this book's most important simple solution to catastrophes of war is strengthening nuclear weapons treaties, and regimes against other Weapons of Mass Destruction. Arms reduction agreements can be satisfactorily simple so long as mutual inspection is robust, so long as all nuclear plants are subject to compliance inspections without notice by international inspection teams. Trust and verify works, as Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed. Simple reforms to international extradition laws can have a bigger peace dividend than meets the eye. So can a simple transformation of the profession of diplomacy to restorative diplomacy, and for simple rules of states constraining themselves against regime change, meddling in the elections of other countries, assassinations, and proxy wars to fragment the sovereignty of other states. The book argues that the evidence is strong that the world irrationally underinvests in UN peacekeeping. On many of these fronts, I argue that there are simple requirements for institutions of freedom from domination that mean by reducing crime (including crime in financial markets, crime in carbon markets, fraud and corruption in health systems) societies better equip themselves to cope with all four types of catastrophes.

If our focus becomes more oriented to getting simple institutions guided by some simple principles right, we run less risk from the inevitability of focusing our limited cognitive and political capabilities on a small number of variables where we believe the attention should be, only to find that the variables of our focus cause us to oversimplify. We often back the wrong horses, averting attention from picking winners that run stronger because they are generative of complex problem-solving on a wider front. When humans tire of fast food, a poor solution is to pile up more mountains of fast-food alternatives that make quick profits until people tire of their tepid food values. The transience of their taste surges could have been better satisfied by simple, slow food that has enduring, generative virtues. Likewise, when a child says, 'I'm bored', one remedy is to thrust a device at them on which they might flip to another screen, another film clip. We educate children less than we should in the slow-food art of tarrying contemplatively on the pages of a good book. In the end, another fast audiovisual fails to extinguish boredom in the way reflective engagement with great literature can conquer boredom deeply, slowly, nurturing young souls. Scanning another screen is insufficiently generative of those deep habits of contemplation that do conquer boredom, not merely momentarily, but for a lifetime. Hence, simple principles of good living like breathing the beauty of trees, and the institutions that nurture those principles, are prioritized because they are so generative of human flourishing. In this case, the flourishing of trees nurtures birds that nest in them, which in turn nurture us.

Requisite Variety

A principle of cybernetics (the science of learning to steer networked phenomena) is requisite variety. It means that when we fail to consider enough variables, if we can make a difference by asking questions about more variables, then we have oversimplified. By oversimplifying, we lose the ability to steer. On the other hand, if we add too many variables, we give ourselves too much to do; then we also lose the ability to steer the flow of events. In conditions of escalating complexity, a way to optimize

the principle of requisite variety is to prioritize institutions that are generative of problem-solving. This means that in the journey toward requisite variety for crisis management, start with simple institutions and principles of broad and generative preventive power. Then cultivate the craft of moving dialectically between the simple and the complex. Starting institutions may make a lot of mistakes, but because the institutions with preventive capability are generative of learning, are learning institutions that cultivate reflection and regulatory conversations, they also have an institutional memory that corrects for mistakes.

By getting this limited number of institutions right, we give ourselves more room for making mistakes in grappling with complexity, be they mistakes of oversimplification or of losing our way because leaders do not understand the complexity of the models supposedly guiding their steering of risk. The financial crisis that unraveled the world economy in 2008 was an example of the latter kind of error. It will become more recurrent in worlds of AI that are beyond the comprehension of executives. International society failed to cushion the 2008 crisis because simple institutions such as ratings agencies failed to do their job of simple truthfulness in ratings of risk. Then financial regulators failed to prosecute or revoke the licenses of ratings agencies to prevent persistence of this fraud. More fundamentally, they failed at conversational regulation (Black 2002). Financial regulators were not conversationally generative of reflection by quick-money ratings agency executives on where they were leading their clients. The entire financial system lost its way.

Accomplishing requisite variety is difficult. After each pandemic, humankind does learn, but we are repeatedly struck by limits to our understanding of the complex ways they unfold. Why did this town lose so many more lives than others? Why did new waves occur at certain times, not others? Most epidemiologists expected that covid would be particularly deadly in Africa, as HIV had been. Most international relations experts thought that Russia would not invade Ukraine in 2022 because this would be irrational. Most finance experts early this century thought that big banks were sufficiently rational that they would not fail to prevent the kinds of bankruptcies that befell them in 2008. We learnt enough to understand that there will be more global financial crises, without learning to grapple with where, when, and why the next one

will occur. We learnt that trust in the self-interest of banks in saving themselves must be hedged by vigilant, resilient, responsive regulatory institutions that insist on simple things like adequate reserves, monitoring that ratings agencies are not captured or corrupted, and insistence that banks explain clearly to regulators how their risk models work. That means providing credible results from testing them.

In this, my contribution is modest. The book concludes that a good way to pursue requisite variety in response to complex crises is to secure well-tested fundamentals of prevention more than we do. Most low-hanging fruit of preventive simplicity are institutions, like an independent university system well-resourced to grapple with wicked problems. Some are simple principles, such as reluctance of governments to meddle in the domestic politics of other countries. Meddling tends to be against the interests of meddling states because it tends to entangle interveners in complex entanglements. The evidence will be reviewed that shows that meddling repeatedly backfires. Even the best funded intelligence service dimly understands the shifting domestic politics of 190 other countries (Jervis 2010). Expressed another way, meddling in the domestic politics of others recurrently conduces to more variety in engagements with the politics of other countries than foreign states have the cognitive capability to manage. States struggle enough with managing the complexity of their own society. They do better to concentrate on getting the fundamentals of their own domestic institutions right, then cooperate with other societies on institution-building projects on which they enjoy shared agreement.

Across all four kinds of catastrophes, this book argues that ritualism in honoring international agreements is endemic. Hence, social movement activism that calls to account ritualism, duplicitous non-compliance with signed agreements, is simple and imperative. Across all kinds of catastrophes, the book argues that major powers place too much emphasis on containing states that are their competitors and insufficient emphasis on containing risks through early detection and early response.

None of this denies that nuance and sophistication in grappling with complexity is the essence of good scholarship and good policymaking. Simple-minded, oversimplified analysis is a hallmark of weak research and policy. Running a business or a society well is not a matter of getting

a handful of fundamentals right. There are usually more than a hundred variables to get right, or a thousand. In my future book, *How to Prevent War*, I argue that there are indeed hundreds of peacemaking variables to get right, but also generative priorities that are largely institutional. Most states can succeed most of the time in averting wars by taking seriously a hundred variables relevant to war prevention, making only limited progress on many of them. This is accomplished by prioritizing a shorter list of institutions and principles of war prevention that are sufficiently generative of improved circumstances for the society, and also for the society's potential enemies, to prevent entanglement in all kinds of wars.

Omitted variable bias is therefore a monumental constraint on social science that seeks to grapple with the complexity of a hundred causes of war or of ecosystem degradation. Statistical research in the social sciences cannot cope with causal models with a hundred explanatory variables. Omitted variable bias is controlled in randomized controlled trials, but they tend to explain weakly the complexity of a real world buffeted by a hundred relevant variables. This is even a problem in the hard science of pharmaceutical trials, where a randomized control trial of taking one little pill for an ill fails to tell us what happens in contexts where patients are forgetful about the regularity of pill popping or take it during a period when they consume alcohol, or when they have anxiety attacks. In addition to reliance on science, patients need support from a clinician who is diagnostic of the relevant kinds of complexity to cope with health challenges. For all the superiority of medical research as science compared to international relations as science, it cannot counsel us in detail on how to live a long life—as in exactly how much of which foods or drugs to consume as individuals. It can provide us with fundamental principles which are profound. University of Pennsylvania professor, Ezekiel Emanuel, articulates six ‘commandments of wellness’: eat a good diet, exercise, no smoking, wear a seatbelt, sleep, and socialize (Grose 2023).⁴ Most people can work wonders on their wellness by strengthening their commitment to those simple principles.

For the challenge of preventing war, *How to Prevent War* will argue that the practical research challenge is how to combine historical causal process tracing with quantitative research on many weak and

complex associations of a hundred variables, guided by fertile theories of warmaking. Which of these 100+ variables are most generative of multiple causal dynamics relevant to peace? These might help us constitute a finite suite of slow-food principles of peace comparable to Emanuel's commandments of wellness, some more specific, some of broad and generative import.

Diplomacy is an example of an institution vital to peace that Chapters 8 and 9 show does succeed in preventing many wars, has had many profound successes of disarmament such as the nuclear non-proliferation regime that persuaded the overwhelming majority of countries to spurn nuclear weapons, triumphs of ecological catastrophe prevention such as the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances that became an even bigger triumph when we learnt that ozone-depleting substances are also greenhouse gases, victories over pandemics, and economic crisis prevention. Yet I argue that these triumphs are balanced by many more failures than should occur because contemporary diplomacy is so duplicitous. It repeatedly spurns the principle of deep listening to adversaries. It is insufficiently relational, weakly committed to respectful relationships that apologize, forgive, and heal, that admit past lies.

A needed transformation to render restorative diplomacy more generative of problem-solving is a relational approach that understands why the data show the 'narrative of the broken promise' to be a recurrent poison in international affairs that festers war and tyranny. The Peacebuilding Compared data shows that of 73 armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War preliminarily coded so far, the narrative of the broken promise is a proximate factor motivating protagonists and an impediment to peace in 61 cases, in a major way for 41. For example, Western diplomacy is incapable of conceding fully and openly that Vladimir Putin and his predecessors were right when they complained that the United States and West Germany promised that NATO would not expand further Eastward after Moscow promised to facilitate the transfer of East Germany from being a member of the Warsaw Pact to reunification as part of Germany. This promise happened in the context of Gorbachev's move toward dismantling the Warsaw Pact and dismantling nuclear weapons stationed West of the Russian border. I document the detailed evidence for this in the book. The West could instead confess to broken promises,

not only there but also in implementing in good faith the 2014 Minsk agreement to make a ceasefire work for the first Ukraine war. That does not prevent NATO from arguing that Eastern European countries have the right to make their own decisions on what alliances they choose to join, a right to be free from foreign invasion, and from Russian domination as vassals of any Russian 'sphere of influence'. Instead, the duplicitousness of both Western and Russian diplomacy prefers to stigmatize scholars who point to a sordid history of broken promises and broken treaties. Scholars who remind the West of its lies are denigrated as apologists for war criminals. Or they are apologists for enemies of the forward march of Western civilization if they scold the West for systemic breaches of treaties with First Nations peoples.

Some of the essence of excellence in peacebuilding and in the prevention of diverse kinds of catastrophes is being able to identify fundamental principles and institutions. These constitute simple ways of imposing a better ordering of complexity. Deep listening is such a simple principle routinely neglected by brilliant scholars absorbed in working on the complexity of their thinking, their mathematical models, or the complex thicket of regulatory rules they write that entangle, trip up, the people they fail to hear. Deep listening is fundamental to that work by the clinician who helps patients respond to the complex circumstances of pills that do not work for them, or that interact adversely with something else in the life of one patient, even when the statistical evidence shows that in most cases the pills do help. Deep listening to stakeholders is a fundamental even more tragically underdone in international diplomacy than in medicine. Hence, however badly we do the science of comprehending complexity, deep listening to stakeholders has good prospects of improving on it. In medicine, randomized controlled trials support that conclusion (Young et al. 2011; Lundahl et al. 2013; Foy et al. 2010). In diplomacy, it is not possible to randomly assign different forms of diplomacy to crises, restorative diplomacy compared to punitive diplomacy, to discover when war results. It could never be ethical to decline to listen to an adversary when a crisis might lead to war. This book is about revealing different kinds of evidence that restorative diplomacy is principled and generative of a better way of living together to save this planet. Hence the quest of the book becomes to open up a journey of discovery of more

generative institutions like the profession of diplomacy, and more generative principles, like restorative diplomacy, that are principles that renew institutions to become more generative of a politics of survival.

The United States and China fail to cooperate with each other on principles as simple as delivering a 1.5 degree target on warming above pre-industrial levels (Zhang 2023). The persistent preference inside citadels of power is to pat fellow insiders on the back for their latest gaming of climate politics in pursuit of realist advantage that is only short-term. Such simple imperatives are neglected because political careers reap the short-term rewards from seeming to prevail in here and now politics of domination. Duplicitous denials of history's broken promises exemplify realist practices that can deliver short-term career triumphs to political practitioners of duplicity by burdening future generations with resentments in the hearts of enemies who hark back to their 'narrative of the broken promise'. It is naïve of today's practitioners of duplicitous climate diplomacy to deny that the Global South will exact formidable recompense against Northern descendants of the leaders who lie today. If the North does not pay up, its ability to keep dominating the Global South will be shot. A renewed non-aligned movement may then become more assertive and hopefully more transformative than the NATO alliance of Western privilege masquerading as Western democratic virtue.

AI's takeoff makes all of this more difficult. How can we possibly understand the complexity of thought in a universe of diverse AIs, each of which might soon enough become a thousand or a million times smarter than us at certain aspects of thinking? I have no idea how to answer this question. Things that seem simple today, like hiding from AI, tomorrow may be complex. The principle of requisite variety may help to manage the dialectics of complexity in some ways that are usefully simple. An immediate moratorium on AI development in weapon systems seems prudent, starting in more ethical universities and moving to the UN and treaties, until diplomatic and scientific conversations have diagnosed and proposed action on the character of AI risk. This could address the risk that AI weapons races will destabilize all equilibria concerning capability for mass killing in ways we cannot understand. This book does not discuss the specifics of how to regulate killer robots. It does propose a simple principle. This is that there is an

imperative for a restorative diplomacy toward consensus on international AI regulation. Second, the book implies that there will be a need for institutions to regulate AI. Third, meta regulation (regulation of regulation) of AI at different levels of governance is needed to temper power imbalances that AI could cascade. These simple solutions are implied by the policy proposals traversed.

Summary of Policy Propositions by Chapter

This book details how it is possible to marshal the evidence to begin the journey of taming the complexity of our most wicked catastrophes. Conclusions are summarized below so what I conclude to be the crucial policy propositions can be skimmed. Along that path, many empirical conclusions are also advanced. I aim to be practical about what might be done, and what might be refuted. Before the list of 48 policy conclusions by chapter, I organize them under four general principles:

1. First prioritize simple principles and simple institutions that prevent coupled catastrophes from cascading one to the other. The next step is to pursue requisite variety of responses by diagnosing dialectically when additional interventions will and will not add value for catastrophe control.
2. Prioritize peace, long-term commitment to total abolition of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and step by step progress toward abolition.
3. Cultivate restorative diplomacy for institutions to save the earth.
4. Temper abuse of power by institutionalizing responsive regulation and meta governance of catastrophic risk factors.

The Policy Hypotheses

1. When catastrophes move faster, wider, and cascade to coupled complexity, analysis paralysis and denial are understandable, but bad mistakes (This chapter).

2. After first prioritizing simple solutions that are low-hanging fruit, then pursue requisite variety in networked response to complexity (This chapter and Chapter 11).
3. Societies can refine slow-food cooking of crisis response plans, agencies, and training. A slow-food approach to growing simple institutions can be iteratively responsive to complexity. This is so when institutions are designed for capability to scale up during crises, to be generative, and to be evidence-based learning institutions that gradually accumulate wisdom to confront complexity (This chapter and Chapter 10).
4. Virtuous path dependency of regulatory preparedness, welfare preparedness, and market preparedness are needed for crisis responsiveness. Acting alone, strong markets that put a price on carbon fail to tame climate change without prosecution of carbon fraud and without state closures of power plants and carbon-intensive production lines (Chapters 3 and 10).
5. Because the big four catastrophes are increasingly coupled in cascades one to the other, good starting candidates for simple principles may be those that help with all four. An example is building a strong, independent university system (This chapter).
6. Prioritize institutions that are generative of problem-solving. Universities are generative of complex understanding of complex catastrophes. Generative institutions help discover requisite variety of policy response to complexity (This chapter).
7. Responsive regulation of powerful interests is imperative because organizational power games catastrophes. The military-industrial complex games war to sell weapons. High finance games tax and market rules to make the fabric of law more complex, widening gaps between rich and poor. Industrial capital games environmental enforcement and carbon pricing by carbon fraud, offsets fraud, and greenwashing. Big pharma games patents, monopolizing profiteering from pandemics, widening rich-poor health gaps (Chapters 3 and 10).

8. Build institutions of crime control that enforce the law against crimes that ignite catastrophe, such as carbon fraud, greenwashing, financial fraud, crimes against humanity, and extrajudicial political assassinations (Chapters 3 and 10).
9. Complex response to complex catastrophes is sometimes driven by inherent complexity. At other times, complexity can be regulated because it is contrived into markets. This happens when there is more profit in selling add-ons, band-aids, and workarounds than in simplifying (This chapter).
10. Peace is top priority for requisite variety of policy response to tightly coupled catastrophes because war so strongly conduces to economic crisis, environmental crisis, and epidemics. Societies at war disable collaboration on solutions to crises (This chapter to Chapter 4).
11. Humankind will not live long enough to make major progress on containing catastrophes without a strategy for banning Weapons of Mass Destruction, for responsive regulation of those who breach the ban, and tangible, measurable progress toward WMD elimination and international WMD inspection excellence (Chapter 4).
12. There have been three major spikes in risks of nuclear war: the Kennedy–Khrushchev spike (early 1960s); the mid-1980s (Reagan–Gorbachev); and the Biden–Putin–Xi spike. Tangible steps were taken with the first two toward nuclear weapons elimination. Prospects of that with the current spike are mired in failures of peacemaking in Ukraine, failed trade war prevention, and a statecraft of stigmatizing enemies (Chapter 4).
13. Extradition law reform is a strategy for super-intelligence and super-deterrence of WMD ban violators. State legislatures could enact laws that declare extradition treaties nullified for blowing the whistle on a WMD program that is in breach of international laws on covert WMD development. Whistleblowing WMD scientists could get asylum and distinguished positions in the world's universities. When nuclear powers frustrate disarmament, regional disarmament treaties can be grown. When a majority of states support a disarmament treaty, an option is collective disobedience to nuclear weapons

- states by respecting international law and protecting WMD whistleblowers from extradition into the talons of great power justice systems (Chapters 4 and 7).
14. Progressively dismantled mutual assured nuclear destruction (MAD) can be steppingstones to prevent Mutual Assured Digital Destruction (MADD) (Chapter 4).
 15. Restorative diplomacy, UN peacebuilding, and continuing to grow progress in transformation of punitive cultures are principles for peace (Chapters 4–9).
 16. Markets in virtue can help contain markets in vice that cascade to catastrophe. Markets in renewables illustrate the idea of a market in virtue. Active national and international civil society is pivotal to markets in virtue and to the governance of governance, nationally and internationally (Chapter 3).
 17. Governance of governance (meta governance) matters at many levels: the WHO governing pandemic responses of states and Big Pharma; states, professions, and trade unions governing corporate workplace safety policies; citizens standing up for their relatives in aged care when government inspectors fail to do their jobs (Chapter 3).
 18. Invading other countries is rare today. It does not pay. It has been an irrational practice at least since China's failed attempts to conquer Taiwan in the 1950s. The new empirics of warmaking effectiveness are conditions of modernity that give realist international relations theory less explanatory and normative power than it enjoyed from ancient times until the end of the Cold War (Chapter 4).
 19. Complete disarmament of 21 states during the 73 years since Costa Rica disarmed has paid dividends. It enticed not a single invasion. Apart from the United States, all the very wealthiest societies in GDP per capita are small, militarily weak societies. Small and unarmed can be beautiful so long as UN peacekeepers can be invited in. International society must rally around the right to remain disarmed (Chapter 4).

20. Permanent containment of crisis risks is good, permanent containment of states dangerous. Only temporary containment of states works; and it only works when combined with ongoing dialogue on what states must do to get containment lifted (Chapters 4–6).
21. Temporary re-containment of Russia makes sense at the time of writing because it wages a war of aggression in Ukraine. Likewise with Myanmar’s military junta until it restores democracy, releases elected members of parliament, ends the Rohingya genocide, and ceases waging war on its own people (Chapter 5).
22. A sequenced architecture of commitment can be a good way to strengthen peace agreements and confidence-building: You do A; then and only then we do B; when we do B, you do C; when you do C, we do D. Containment of threats can thus continuously improve. It can be a mistake to allow the perfect to be an enemy of the good with containment. Small arms containment successes build confidence for bigger challenges through sequenced architectures of commitment (Chapters 6 and 7).
23. Late twentieth-century drivers of declining armed conflict can be reenergized for future declines. These drivers include: reduced use of vetoes against peace diplomacy on the Security Council; expanded UN peacekeeping; care about excessively militarizing peacebuilding; more preventive diplomacy; more inclusive security architectures (that cease excluding China and Russia); embedding peace agreements more seriously; learning to better craft escape routes for refugees; investment in humanitarian intervention and civilian protection—human rights, gender rights; housing for refugees; poverty reduction; good governance; transitional justice; security sector reform, all rolled into multidimensional peace operation packages (Chapter 6).
24. Single thin reeds of war prevention snap, yet they work when local and international society invests to bind them together in a fabric of multidimensional peacebuilding (Chapter 6).
25. Regions and regional organizations like ASEAN and the African Union have avoided the historic pitfalls of European alliance structures that dragged the planet into world wars. Support other regions

- to continue rejecting military alliances, expanding nuclear-weapons-free zones, and restorative regional peace diplomacies (Chapters 6 and 7).
26. Just as market manipulators have progressively learnt new ways to game markets, over time democracy manipulators learnt how to game democracy. The best way to win elections was to misgovern. Earlier in democracy's evolution, the best way to win elections was to govern well. Democracy's virtues can be retrieved by investing in checks and balances that temper domination. Better democracies and better peacebuilding can help to build more robust separations of powers post-conflict (Chapter 6).
 27. Simple forest preservation and tree planting in evidence-based ways are vital to climate restoration, crime and war reduction, epidemic prevention, and therefore to financial crisis prevention (Chapter 7).
 28. Immediate diplomacy is needed toward guardrails among great powers on the use of AI in warfare and cyber-attacks that cross red lines. These can be steps toward treaties to regulate AI weapons and cyberwarfare (Chapter 7).
 29. Track II diplomacy options exist for great powers to persuade nuclear weapon states like Pakistan on why it is in their interests to show the way forward to adversaries by dismantling Pakistan's nuclear weapons (Chapter 7).
 30. An important kind of containment is of rogue states that threaten other states with nuclear weapons. Maximally large, temporary coalitions of states can reveal an escalating responsive regulatory pyramid that can invoke chokepoint trade sanctions and conventional military action by many states as a last resort at the peak of a pyramid that never needs to be used. The last resort is super-deterrence supported by many UN member states against the rogue WMD state and super-intelligence sharing on rogue WMDs (Chapter 7).
 31. Restorative diplomacy outperforms realist diplomacy today at preventing war, climate change, financial crises, and pandemics. Restorative diplomacy outperforms realist diplomacy in accomplishing long-run realist national interest objectives. Relentless determination of states to be more realist backfires as surely as

- individual determination to be more spontaneous. In most circumstances, the best way to win friends and influence states is communicating relationally a commitment to international human rights conventions with a reputation for shared support for a rules-based international order (Chapter 8).
32. Peacebuilding compared causal process tracing suggests narratives of the broken promise have been impediments to peace in 41 out of 73 armed conflicts. Restorative diplomacy must have an ethic of keeping its promises even when realist interests urge breaking them (This chapter and Chapter 8).
 33. Restorative diplomacy requires following the mentality of American Indigenous societies by ritualizing, deepening UN-ratified peace agreements, with regular commemorations at which statecraft speaks from the heart, apologizes and forgives past slaughter, builds new commitments atop a growing architecture of peace, and ritualizes collective memory. Restorative diplomacy sets itself against transactional peace agreements conceived as contracts that rich countries can later buy their way out of (Chapter 8).
 34. Learn restorative diplomacy lessons from the Marshall Plan. Put deposits, financial and emotional, in the banks of old adversaries (Chapter 8).
 35. Learn restorative diplomacy lessons from spymasters like South Africa's Niël Barnard. Spies are not diplomats; they cannot be fully restorative. As South African history teaches, however, they can be more restorative and therefore more competent than spies currently are. Projects like South African nuclear weapons destruction, Africa as a nuclear-weapons-free continent, release of Mandela, Apartheid abolition, and peace spreading across southern Africa illustrate (Chapter 8).
 36. At the micro level, restorative justice can help reduce and heal drug addiction; at the macro level restorative diplomacy can achieve more for preventing epidemics of drug abuse, particularly through restorative and responsive regulation of the interface between war and drug commercialization (Chapter 8).

37. AI weapons and space war must be more transparently and responsively regulated by nuclear surety regulatory regimes that embrace audit by foreign technical teams (Chapter 9).
38. Head-of-state and head-of-military hotlines between adversary states are keys to last resort diplomatic paths from war. North Korea needs them (Chapter 9).
39. Meddling in the politics of other countries induces blowback, terrorism, and war. Many states do not meddle in the politics of other states; all states should commit to never doing so, especially not by violent means like assassinations, plotting coups, arming insurgents. Respecting democracy development by never interfering in another country's elections is in the long-run national interests of states that spurn meddling (Chapter 9).
40. Relentless civil society activism is a remedy to the ritualism of states promising big and delivering poorly on crisis amelioration (Chapter 10).
41. Regulation must be a human, relational craft. Centralized bureaucracies that over-prioritize desk audits and risk measurement that dates quickly as it feeds into algorithmic regulation are a risk. Detective skills and relational skills of street-level inspectors must be re-prioritized (Chapter 10).
42. Regulators around the world can achieve more if they learn to collaborate with one another at being cosmopolitan. Regulators can use national enforcement threats to demand global compliance improvements under the shadow of the axe of deferred prosecutions (Chapter 11).
43. Early detection and early response are imperative with fast-moving risks (Chapter 11).
44. Principles for a dialectics of requisite variety are: (a) Prune and strengthen rules; (b) Transform jurisprudence so fundamental principles justify rules, yet trump rules; (c) Shift away from automaticity of enforcement of rules, algorithmic or human, to a restorative diplomacy of rule enforcement of peace agreements, environmental stewardship, virus containment, and stewardship of financial systems (Chapter 11).

45. Rally behind front-line workers of crisis prevention institutions before burnout spreads. Every citizen gets opportunities to show admiration for front-line risk containment workers. There are inspiring contributions little children and the frail aged can make to honoring first responders to catastrophes (Chapter 11).
46. Restorative and responsive diplomacy is a more promising theoretical foundation for international relations than realism (Chapters 3, 9, and 10).
47. Minimally sufficient deterrence is a more promising theory of deterrence of states, more powerfully consistent with contemporary facts, than any theory of nuclear deterrence (Chapters 6, 9, and 10).
48. The most important thing about choosing between simple and complex networked solutions is not to choose. Think dialectically about the dynamics of sequencing those choices (Chapter 11).

Notes

1. Greenspan was Federal Reserve Chairman for two decades to 2006. He was a revered until the crisis. Greenspan said in 2008 that he erred in not insisting on more regulatory distrust in banks: 'I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organisations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms' Greenspan (2008).
2. The source is mostly cited as Henry Louis Mencken's 1920 book, *Prejudices*. However, different versions of the quote are attributed to differing talks and newspaper writings of Mencken, Mark Twain, and twentieth-century business gurus, particularly Peter Drucker.
3. The John Rawls (1999) methodological principle of reflective equilibrium is useful here. When our considered reflections on the virtue of a new rule opens up an inconsistency with a settled principle, we should open ourselves to a debate on tweaking that principle to restore reflective equilibrium between the principle

and the rules. In tax law, that means the appellate courts or the legislature adjusting the principle.

4. Quoted in Grose (2023).

References

- Acharya, Aishwarya. 2023. The Quad needs to talk security for subsea cables. *Technology*, May 24.
- Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk society*. New York: Sage.
- Beebe, George S. 2019. *The Russia trap: How our shadow war with Russia could spark into nuclear catastrophe*. New York: Thomas Dunne.
- Belton, Catherine. 2020. *Putin's people: How the KGB took back Russia and then took on the West*. London: William Collins.
- Black, Julia. 2002. Regulatory conversations. *Journal of Law and Society* 29: 163–196.
- Bone, Hollie. 2022. Russian submarines cutting underwater cables is an act of war, UK defense chief warns. *Mirror*, January 8.
- Braithwaite, John. 2005. *Markets in vice, markets in virtue*. New York: Oxford.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrocriminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, and Bina D'Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, Toni Makkai, and Valerie Braithwaite. 2007. *Regulating aged care*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Evans, Gareth. 2009. *The challenge of getting to zero*. Melbourne: Nautilus Institute.
- Foy, Robbie, Susanne Hempel, Lisa Rubenstein, Marika Suttorp, Michelle Seelig, Roberta Shanman, and Paul G. Shekelle. 2010. Meta-analysis: Effect of interactive communication between collaborating primary care physicians and specialists. *Annals of Internal Medicine* 152: 247–258.
- Goldin, Ian. 2021. *Rescue: From global crisis to a better world*. London: Hachette.
- Goldin, Ian, and Tiffany Vogel. 2010. Global governance and systemic risk in the 21st century: Lessons from the financial crisis. *Global Policy* 1: 6–7.
- Greenspan, Allan. 2008. I was wrong about the economy, sort of. *The Guardian*, October 24.

- Grose, Jessica 2023. We need pleasure to survive. *New York Times*, January 25.
- Harvey, David. 1989. *The condition of postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Jasper, Scott. 2020. *Russian cyber operations*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 2010. *Why intelligence fails*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Levin, Dov H. 2020. *Meddling in the ballot box: The causes and effects of partisan electoral interventions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lundahl, Brad, Teena Moleni, Brian L. Burke, Robert Butters, Derrick Tollefson, Christopher Butler, and Stephen Rollnick. 2013. Motivational interviewing in medical care settings: A systematic review and meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials. *Patient Education and Counseling* 93: 157–168.
- Merton, Robert K. 1968. *Social theory and social structure*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Messner, Steven, and Richard Rosenfeld. 2012. *Crime and the American dream*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Pearson, James and Christopher Bing. 2023. North Korean hackers breached top Russian missile maker. *Reuters*, August 8.
- Perfroth, Nicole. 2021. *This is how they tell me the world ends: The cyber weapons race*. New York: Bloomsbury.
- Rawls, John. 1999. *A theory of justice*. New York: Belknap.
- Royal Commission into Aged Care. 2020. *Aged care royal commission final report*. Canberra: Australian Government.
- Smith, D., N. Bell, J. Faller, V. Galaz, A. Norström, C. Pattison, and C. Queiroz. 2022. *Elements of a planetary emergency: Environment of peace*. Stockholm: SIPRI.
- Wilson, William J. 2012. *The truly disadvantaged*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Young, Lance Brendan, Paul S. Chan, Lu. Xin, Brahmajee K. Nallamothu, Comilla Sasson, and Peter M. Cram. 2011. Impact of telemedicine intensive care unit coverage on patient outcomes: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *Archives of Internal Medicine* 171: 498–506.
- Zhang, Yuhan. 2023. The death of US-China climate cooperation. *Global Policy*, January 17.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





3

Containment of Crises

Abstract Virtuous path dependency of regulatory preparedness, welfare preparedness, and market preparedness are needed for crisis responsiveness. Acting alone, strong markets that put a price on carbon fail to tame climate change without prosecution of carbon fraud and without state closures of power plants and carbon-intensive production lines. Responsive regulation of powerful interests is imperative because of gaming catastrophe through organizational power. The military-industrial complex games war to sell weapons. High finance games tax and market rules to make the fabric of law more complex, widening gaps between rich and poor. Industrial capital games environmental enforcement and carbon pricing by carbon fraud, offsets fraud, and greenwashing. Big pharma games patents, monopolizing profiteering from pandemics, widening rich–poor health gaps.

Keywords Path dependency · Regulation · Welfare · Markets

Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue from Climate to Covid

We have seen that crises cascade outside boundaries within which they were more contained in the past. Uncontained vigor and reach of capitalist markets drive many of the dangerous cascades of modernity. The climate crisis careers toward catastrophe because even in 2024 many investors make so much money from oil, coal, and natural gas. State power has been corrupted by that wealth. Politicians were captured by it when fossil fuel lobbyists made campaign contributions or obtained political support by putting money straight into politicians' pockets. Carbon giants funded social media campaigns to cascade lies about climate science.

One simple institutional response to these markets in vice has been markets in virtue. Markets are increasingly responsive to truths about what is protecting or destroying the environment. Investment in renewables is proving cheaper as well as cleaner. Those who shunned the propaganda to shift their pension fund investments to environmental opportunities in renewables enjoyed unusually high returns for more than a decade after the Global Financial Crisis, something that became less true after the Ukraine War pushed up prices and profits from carbon. Those who invested tangibly and directly in the energy market in a local way through solar panels on land they controlled and to community batteries also benefit by that contribution to a market in virtue.

Although markets in virtue are among simple solutions to markets in vice, Peter Drahos points out that too many decades of investment in brown markets before they tipped to favor green markets mean that ecosystems are already on the precipice of tipping points. Markets in green virtue, even with the aid of regulation that puts an extra market price on carbon, have moved too slowly and too late to save the planet. Hence Drahos (2021b) argues that decisive, urgent, leverage from state action by major economies, especially China, is also imperative. State regulatory action should close all coal-fired power plants immediately, ban development assistance for coal-fired power, ban sale, then use of all internal combustion vehicles in this decade, then in aircraft in the next. States must also invest with the private sector in R&D for air

travel fueled by hydrogen or other alternatives. State R&D investment in green circular city designs of various kinds becomes more common. Many kinds of green innovation need more support.

Covid had similar imperatives. The Trump Administration's Operation Warp Speed assisted many corporate R&D efforts on covid. It was good policy; some investments were big winners. Markets would not have moved fast enough without the state and philanthropic investment (as in the seed funding at Tennessee universities by Dolly Pardon without which the Moderna vaccine would not have got off the ground when it did). Many governments made investments not only in vaccines but on covid tests, treatments for patients already with covid, and more. The early Chinese government investment in Wuhan, with collaboration from Western universities, identified the genomic sequence of COVID-19 with amazing speed, an accomplishment that laid a foundation for subsequent Western accomplishments. As we have learnt from space programs and defense infrastructure like the internet that transformed economies, the big, fast changes require simultaneous effort from markets, governments, and universities. It is a simple lesson that gets lost when the propaganda of tech giants and neoliberal ideologues claim that the private sector accomplished everything. Likewise, authoritarian states claim they did (with the Sputnik Vaccine, for example).

Collaboration among states quickly corroded to finger pointing as the covid crisis deepened. The poison was political efforts to harness racism (the 'China' Virus); and blame foreigners to bluster at cover-up of our failings. Vital collaboration with the World Health Organization corroded alongside international collaboration. Innovation became less oriented to cosmopolitan containment. From 2020, Western universities started pruning a huge proportion of their collaborations with Chinese and Russian universities. Vaccine nationalism, indeed vaccine apartheid, prevailed. Major economic powers, particularly the United States and Germany, jostled to secure monopoly rights and financial advantage for their Big Pharma champions. This was a tragically different story from that finest moment of the American century, the time of the Marshall Plan, when the United States was doing so much to help countries more devastated by World War II than itself. At the beginning of the 1950s, America did not patent the Salk polio vaccine that America developed.

It gave away the intellectual property for polio prevention as a gift to the children of the world who were dying or surviving with twisted limbs. Polio was a more devastating disease for humankind than covid, but its ravages were more totally conquered, thanks to American generosity and sidelining of commercial preferences and political lobbying of Big Pharma.

With covid, the African petri dish for diverse virus variants was left dangerously unvaccinated for more than a year longer than other continents. The sums were simple. At the time vaccines were proven acceptably safe and effective, IMF research concluded that states chipping in \$50 billion to a comprehensive vaccination campaign and other virus control efforts could deliver a dividend to the world economy of \$9 trillion in extra global output by 2025 (Tooze 2021). Vaccine nationalism drove denial of the simple arithmetic of economically rational collaboration to fix the crisis quickly. The harvest reaped included at least two variants that swept the planet after taking off in Africa during that lost African year. One did make the crisis worse, but another was Omicron, which while more contagious, fortuitously was less deadly. In the future, the world might not be so lucky, especially if that future world is one where enemies, be they states or terrorist groups, design pathogens to be more voraciously adaptive through biological weapons programs.

Efforts of the World Health Organization to push for open-source biotechnology and other means of breaking down monopolization of knowledge, so that all scientists share breakthroughs widely, failed during covid, as they failed with the SARS, HIV-AIDS, all dangerous epidemics this century (Drahos 2010, 2021a). Corporate champions were backed by their states to defend patent walls around their innovations, making therapies unaffordable to poor people in many rich countries and almost all people in the poorest countries. Even tests for the presence of covid were unaffordable in poor countries during the early years of the crisis.

It is still early for a well-rounded evaluation of which states and cities steered more and less effective responses to covid. There will be decades of analysis of a stupendous data base. Which cities introduced which regulatory and welfare responses at which times, with what effects on covid containment, deaths, and on long covid? One plausible set of hypotheses will go to the regulatory capitalism literature (Levi-Faur and

Jordana 2005). They will assess the paradox that states which mobilized early against covid with large regulatory infrastructures almost certainly did better at keeping their markets strong. Probably they fared better at averting long lockdowns that devastated markets, as well as long shut-downs of education and of face-to-face civil society. New York, London, Milan, and Madrid may come to be seen as experiencing less decisive early regulatory escalation than East Asia, but also more total deprivation of freedom of movement and other liberties such as access to education than the overwhelming majority of East Asian cities and towns. An exception was the Chinese continuation of certain city lockdowns for China's late surge into 2022. In spite of that, the Chinese economy clearly grew much faster than all Western economies between 2020 and 2023, though that is not the impression communicated by Western media. Where simple infrastructures of regulation and welfare were strong and rapidly deployed, perhaps the data will come to show that markets and freedom remained stronger in the medium term. It remains to be seen what the depoliticized assessment of the less responsive performance of China in dealing with the Omicron variant in 2022 will be compared to communist Vietnam for example, and compared to superior rollout of superior vaccines in many Western societies.

East Asian societies like Vietnam, even though they were much more densely connected to the original site of the outbreak (Wuhan) than the West, likely will be shown to have suppressed covid more successfully at the national level. This, even though Wuhan authorities covered up disgracefully for three weeks as they started quarantine and contact tracing. We do not yet know whether it could have been possible to contain covid to this region of China during those three weeks? Taiwan was an example of successful early containment, even though it hosted many direct flights to Wuhan, strong business interconnections, 850,000 citizens living, and 400,000 working in China and more mainland China visitors per capita than other countries (Wang et al. 2020). Other nearby East Asian societies that kept the death rate and economic disruption comparatively low included Singapore and South Korea, which had a severe early infection shock, as did Japan with its large elderly population, later compounded by cruise ship disasters and hosting an Olympic Games mid-pandemic.

East Asian authoritarianism or paternalistic Confucian deference to the state were popular 2020 tropes around Western dinner tables and media chatter to explain patterns of Eastern virus containment. A month into their covid crisis, Australian policymakers asked if they were mistaken in their normal pattern of following North Atlantic leads of policy diffusion. Australia, with its huge population of Chinese citizens and visitors, decided that North Atlantic societies were squandering their advantage in lead time to prepare for the pandemic. For example, Australia moved to the idea that shorter, sharper, early East Asian regulation was the way to defend both welfare and markets in the long term. The evidence that mask mandates were prudent existed prior to covid. Inaction on masks was rare in East Asia but widespread in the West for many months into 2020. Health bureaucrats covered up their poor preparedness in scaling up manufacturing for mask availability with dangerous arguments that laypeople who used masks improperly might do as much harm as good. Capability to manufacture masks and other items of PPE is a good example of a simple institutional capability that is one essence of responsiveness to complex crises. Masks were so simple that people coped initially by sewing them at home. For future epidemics, developing countries must acquire a foundation for surging their capacity to manufacture their own vaccines in light of what we learnt about how rich countries and corporations profit from pandemics at the expense of the poor (Drahos 2010, 2021a).

Singaporean and Taiwanese schools were open during the early months of the pandemic when US schools were closed. The freedom deficit was the opposite of the way it was frequently portrayed in the Western press. Every child arriving at those East Asian schools during those peak early months of the pandemic was having their temperature checked and hands sanitized on arrival. School days were punctuated with 20-second disciplined handwashing and education about why this was important. In Australian schools, when mandated handwashing finally commenced somewhat later in 2020, social distancing was risible as children jostled and splashed one another during perfunctory hand washing. Soap ran out in unprepared schools. Providing kids with school soap during a pandemic is a simple institutional challenge for education

departments. It was a challenge schools did not adequately rise to for many weeks.

Expert commentators now increasingly opine that East Asian preparation and planfulness about how schools and other institutions like aged-care facilities should respond to the crisis were more important than Confucian authoritarianism. Why might this be so? East Asia had learnt from the SARS epidemic that next time their education system, their welfare state, and their state and civil society regulatory institutions would be ready for rapid escalation. Market responsiveness was readied to scale up medical material and personnel. This preparedness was crystallized in East Asian regulatory institutions whose task was rapid coordination of all institutions of the society for epidemic response from January 1, 2020. This was not totally state institutions, but hybrid governance; professional institutions from civil society and volunteerism were prominent. Vietnamese responses were locally highly variegated in response to urban geography interpreted by Communist Party members who led highly localized residents' committees. Taiwan was prepared with an action plan of 124 discrete measures overseen by its National Health Command Centre (established as a SARS lesson learned) and by local preparedness teams (Wang et al. 2020). We might conceive these through Foucauldian biopolitics as 124 capillaries of power (Lorenzini 2021). Regulatory scholars are more likely to see them as a long list of micro regulatory measures that previous experience with epidemics had proven might be helpful. For the regulatory theorist, the lesson of greater interest might be that no grand theory of how to regulate worked (like British PM, Boris Johnson's premature 2020 infatuation with herd immunity as the complete *laissez-faire* fix). Rather, outcomes flowed from as large a number of simple capillaries of regulation as Taiwan's 124.

Regulatory theorists are interested in the infrastructure of responsive mobilization that could deliver this number of capillaries. East Asia faced the bigger, more immediate, surprise than the West, but was better prepared with plans to minimize disruption to markets, to maximize welfare mobilization (especially in the health and education sectors), and for bigger, faster escalations of regulation that were therefore of shorter duration. China also coordinated its vast society for surge capacity to hot spots that hit the peak of the infection curve earlier, a capability late in

arriving to the West. Regulatory studies might therefore stand ready to learn from East Asia about rapid capabilities for scaling up regulatory infrastructure, strategic redundancy of multiple capillaries of regulation, selection strategies for adding new capillaries as new learning comes in, and learning about coordination to shift regulatory and treatment capabilities from one part of the state and of the planet to another (with coordination from WHO, civil society mobilization by organizations like Médecins Sans Frontières, to sequentially surge medical capabilities into the countries that hit early pandemic peaks). This might mean a global gift economy where gifts are given to pandemic peak economies by pre-peak and post-peak economies, gifts of knowledge from open-source research architectures, gifts of medical equipment and personnel, as happened in the 1950s with polio. Meta regulation of states through the WHO, of national macroeconomic policies through the G-20, of education systems and private firms by states, strategic dedication to finding ways to regulate the problem without shutting down markets, might be guided by centralized and decentralized learning from other places about options for selecting and sequencing regulation. Meta regulation by the WHO means, among other things, the WHO regulating state regulation. All these forms of meta regulation are germinal topics for regulation and governance research (Parker 2002; Morgan 2003; Sørensen 2006; Grabosky 2017).

Probably when all the data are in, my simple suggestions will prove too simple. These incipient patterns might be exaggerated; cultural Confucianism might prove a more potent explanation than meta regulation and path dependencies of capillaries of preparedness after all. All I have shown is that simple institutional thinking supplies evocative, plausible hypotheses to guide future evaluations of responses to crises. A key one is that the paths East Asia learned to take in response to the SARS epidemic created a virtuous path dependency of regulatory preparedness, welfare preparedness, and market preparedness for epidemic responsiveness. More than that, the path dependency was institutionalized through nodes of governance like Taiwan's National Health Command Centre. The covid crisis shows that all societies were forced to think in new ways about strengthening regulation, expanding welfare, and strengthening measures to preserve jobs and markets. In the moment of crisis,

those who thought they were neoliberals found themselves to be practitioners of regulatory welfare capitalism, as did many communists (Benish and Levi-Faur 2020).

Covid is an illustration of how a crisis can demand a larger welfare state and a more formidably regulatory form of capitalism. It highlights imperatives to get better at putting markets, regulation, and welfare more strategically in harness for crisis management. Such system solutions are not simple, but nor are they impossibly complex, and they yield to evidence-based policy science. Consider the profound new risks of accidental nuclear war posed by cyberwarfare and cybercrime capabilities that can, for example, disconcert satellites in outer space that control doomsday machines (Ellsberg 2017; Beebe 2019). These risks demand stronger investments in nuclear non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction regimes, and international collaboration on regulation of cybercrime. They require special inspection teams to check offensive cyber-ops proposals to ensure that they are unlikely to accidentally trigger a nuclear war. These risk assessments should never be done by those who design cyberoffense proposals. Mostly they are in those less safe hands, sad to say (Levint 2021). Descriptively, the most massive growth in regulation during the past decade has been regulation of cyber-threats. This is mostly private sector regulation by IT personnel, though state regulation is also burgeoning, as is university research investment in regulating cybercrime and cyberwarfare. We might think of regulatory welfare capitalism as not only a descriptively accurate tendency in the trajectory of capitalism, but normatively as one that societies must accelerate in directions that are helpful to surviving existential threats.

Sadly, path dependencies that sustain markets in carbon and markets in destabilizing new weapons systems that threaten mass destruction have their own resilient path dependencies that keep the planet on extinction paths. Hence, the steering of path dependencies toward more regulation to contain them and more welfare to soften their impacts might be worthy topics. Neoliberal ideologies have certainly shifted the shape of welfare states. Yet there is quite a lot of evidence that crises and path dependencies mean that, at the macro level, societies have resisted ideological pressures and have expanded welfare states and regulatory states, notwithstanding much neoliberal contraction (Braithwaite 2008).

Many of these crises, such as care crises associated with population aging are beyond the scope of this book. There are connections, however. Australia did comparatively well in suppressing excess deaths during the covid epidemic. It had an unusually high percentage of deaths, however, from its first three waves in aged-care homes (over 80% of deaths). Britain had an unusually high proportion of deaths among welfare beneficiaries with a disability. These societies learned that they had suffered simple and remediable regulatory failures during the pandemic. In Australia a Royal Commission Into Aged Care (2020) found that, unlike police who stayed on the beat, aged-care inspectors stopped inspecting aged-care homes. As a result, a minority of homes failed to implement infection control plans, with thousands of preventable deaths as a result. At the same time, the 90% of aged-care homes that had zero deaths during 2020 were prepared to meet their regulatory obligations to implement infection control. It was not rocket science to understand that if you took all cops off the aged-care beat, older citizens would die.

Our responsibility is to understand the dynamics of regulatory welfare states and how to diagnose their meta governance, governance of governance that secures simple guarantees of effectiveness. Societies might then learn to steer interdependent threats that include the globalization of disease, economic crises, ecosystem collapse, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other existentially dangerous path dependencies. It may be that these path dependencies are cascading so relentlessly toward complex catastrophes that confronting them with containment by simple institutions will not cut it. I simply say that an analysis of data patterns such as those becoming evident from Australian aged-care homes suggest that simple institutional thinking can make a massive difference even as it fails to provide many of the answers.

Crises may ultimately move most species from path dependencies of survival to paths of rapid extinction. In the covid era, the new equilibrium we head for is an unfolding mystery. It can make sense to grapple with meta governance strategies that might 'flatten the curve' for somewhat improved conditions of catastrophe until cures are discovered. War and financial crises are well studied examples where interventions often work in flattening crisis curves; yet they are hard to predict, hard to end, and tend to cascade into each other. United Nations peacekeeping

repeatedly fails to end wars. Yet we will see that the evidence is strong that when peacekeeping is multidimensional in helping to nurse many different kinds of institutions back to health, it can flatten the curve of cascades of killing. This in turn helps economies resume growth path dependencies and helps democracies that lapsed into despotism to reboot democratic institutions (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018, 494–497). The World Health Organization and the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs are nodes of meta governance that matter when they partner with local nodes of governance to steer path dependencies of epidemics of disease or violence. This meta governance is a messy business. Path dependencies recurrently slip out of any policymaker’s control. That does not make having a strong, internationally supported World Health Organization and other simple forms of meta governance to contain cascading path dependencies less worthy of policy learning.

Nuclear Weapons and Covid Cannot Be Unmade

Two crises that began to cascade out of control during World War II were nuclear armaments and polio. During World War I, worrying cascades were chemical and biological weapons and a completely novel influenza virus that took at least 50 million lives. It was particularly devastating, and most undercounted, in South Asia and Africa. The next chapter explains that these were coupled crises: the critical site of global spread of the Great Influenza of 1918 was a troop reception area with a huge hospital at Etaples, France that treated gas victims, receiving 100,000 troops a day. These four catastrophes for humankind shaped institutional history, mercifully in many good ways, in the decades after both these wars. Each of these catastrophes destroyed millions of lives, but the simple institutional responses to them after the two wars prevented cascades to hundreds of millions more lives that would have been lost without them.

What the world learnt was that once these challenges were out of the bottle, it was difficult to put them back in. A cascading risk normally

cannot be completely unmade, regardless of whether it is a form of financial engineering on Wall Street, the engineering of drones, space warfare, cyberwarfare, or AI. Worse than that, once a new virus jumps from some other animal to humans, if humankind fails to contain it, the virus will adapt into ever more variants that tend to become even harder to contain. Sadly, viruses adapt more quickly to exponentially grow their power than human bodies or human social systems adapt.

Once nuclear weapons or poisonous gas have been created as weapons of war, if we do not contain their proliferation, great powers will compete to develop ever more deadly weapons of these kinds until finally one is discovered by some brilliant scientist that delivers mass extinctions. That is why universities need a simple rule that neither our brightest and best, nor our greediest and worst, should be permitted to deploy the knowledge-creation infrastructure of universities to invent weapons of war. Period. A simple rule against any future Manhattan Projects that engage descendants of Einstein under any circumstances, ever. University by university, academics would do well to go on strike until such a policy is implemented.

Passive containment of viruses or weapons of mass destruction cannot work; active containment is required. Consider the tragedy of university scientists developing nuclear weapons systems. Once invented, the implications of it being impossible to uninvent them became profound. It meant that it can never be a complete solution for all states to sign a treaty to never produce nuclear weapons, though that is one incomplete but valuable UN solution that was put in place in 2017 and must acquire more flesh and force. 'So long as any state has nuclear weapons others will want them; so long as any state retains nuclear weapons they are bound one day to be used'.¹ In a world where these weapons have been invented, and long since mutated from atomic bombs to more dangerous weapon variants, but in which everyone swears not to produce them, an opportunity is created for a criminal state or a sophisticated terrorist organization. A criminal state might then produce nuclear weapons and dominate a world in which all others have dismantled nuclear weapons programs. 'In the valley of the blind, the one-eyed man will be king' is the somewhat ablest poetic evocation of this argument. It is of uncertain provenance, but oft quoted. I argue that in the valley of the blind, blind

citizens can swarm resistance to contain collectively a one-eyed pretender to despotism.

In response to the limitations of abolition of Weapons of Mass Destruction, one imperative is reinforcement and return to active forms of containment by rights to inspect the military bases of other countries. These are inspections to ensure that nuclear weapons are not being hidden, and rights to inspect nuclear plants to ensure that weapons grade material is not being produced or secreted there. Even more active inspection is needed than the older inspection regimes abolished in recent decades. Containment requires regulatory institutions like the International Atomic Energy Agency to have robust powers for surprise inspections that are connected up with the combined intelligence capabilities of many cooperating members of the United Nations. Then the UN must be institutionally capable of imposing severe consequences on states or terrorist organizations that have violated the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This must have the effect that non-compliers become economically and militarily weak states or fatally weakened terror organizations.

During the first 80 years of the history of nuclear weapons, more than twenty states and terror organizations have set out to build a nuclear weapon. Less than half of them succeeded. Many who tried did not get far. None of them got far before their deep, tightly held secret, was discovered. Even Israel, which might have the most impressive intelligence infrastructure for securing state secrets, could not keep its nuclear weapons program secret. Nor could Apartheid-era South Africa, which also had formidable security services. Fifteen of the efforts to develop a secret nuclear weapons capability were very well funded and subject to rigorous secrecy enforcement. None of them were kept secret; none escaped the simple regulatory pressures that the nuclear non-proliferation regime managed to mobilize. In the regulation literature, it is impossible to find any other detection regime that has a 100% record of successful detection of a compliance breakout. This is a result of so many capable intelligence agencies putting huge resources into proving that they are more capable of detecting this existential risk than competitor intelligence agencies. We can learn from this 80 years of intelligence agency

capability to design a future enforcement system that makes a decision by all states to ban nuclear weapons stick.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was a time of heightened concern because former Soviet states inherited nuclear weapons – with Russia and Ukraine containing the overwhelming majority. They also inherited ideologically communist militaries from the Soviet military that had both commercial and ideological reasons to betray these newly capitalist states by black market sales of nuclear technologies. Mercifully, the world's intelligence organizations worked well enough together with the UN's nuclear non-proliferation institutions, and private sector self-regulatory institutions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to suppress the unusually elevated level of risk of this decade. I will argue that restorative diplomacy between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev laid the political foundation for that accomplishment.

Most of us believed President George W. Bush and Tony Blair when they said in 2003 that their intelligence indicated that Saddam Hussein could not be trusted to eliminate his programs for weapons of mass destruction. Their intelligence indicated no such thing; their assertions were political lies, willful misinformation. International society should have been listening to the nuclear surety inspectors from organizations that included the International Atomic Energy Organization. Prominent in the leadership of these inspectorates were inspectors from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, the very states that led the illegal charge into Iraq. The inspectors effectively told us that they doubted the pontifications of the Bush and Blair administrations. Vladimir Putin also assured us that Russian intelligence strongly supported the rigorous findings of the inspectors. The inspectors could not see the evidence of any proliferation risk that might justify an invasion, and they said so. The invasion proved that Bush and Blair were wrong; the inspectors were right; the Russians were right. There was no longer a nuclear weapons program in Iraq; nor was there any longer a chemical or biological weapons program. A simple regulatory inspection program mandated by international consensus on the dangers of Saddam's regime had worked. Inspection often works² because it is extremely costly to build a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, the probability of detection is high from a combination of intensive inspection and intelligence agencies turning

insiders and suppliers to spill the beans. The costs of defending against what can ensue from detection are also high, including cyber-attacks, bombing from the air by drones or conventional aircraft, foreign intelligence agencies recruiting employees inside nuclear manufacturing sites for sabotage, trade sanctions, and risk of the kind of preemptive war that occurred in Iraq. Most states and terror organizations believe in the nuclear weapon taboo, but they also understand that every other secret program has been discovered by international society.

Most states comply simply because they believe it is right, a prudent thing for peace that they comply, and therefore rational as well. Great powers with nuclear weapons in addition can and do offer complying states rewards, including security guarantees, if they comply. Guarantees are particularly important with technologically capable near neighbors of Russia and China like Japan and South Korea. Initially, this was important to Australia in the 1950s, a country that then had great nuclear physicists who had been involved in the Manhattan Project and strong political movements to become a nuclear weapons state.

Simple regulatory institutions normally fail for political reasons more than technocratic ones. They get corrupted by political power, as we saw with the way almost all NATO states corrupted the intelligence and inspection evidence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Regulators like nuclear inspectors are also frequently intimidated by lobbyists, which included foreign lobbyists from Israel in this case, who implicitly threaten to appeal inspectors' findings and prove them wrong, setting back their careers and their professional reputations, and tying them up in grueling hearings or court cases (a problem that afflicts all kinds of inspectors: [Acs and Coglianese 2022](#)).

The Australian Prime Minister during covid created the impression that aged-care facilities were being inspected to ensure they were pandemic ready. This political messaging was misleading; almost no aged-care homes were being inspected up to the second covid wave according to the evidence uncovered by the Royal Commission into Aged Care ([2020](#)). I posit this as a law of regulatory corrosion:

Simple regulatory institutions tend to fail politically more than technocratically. The most complex challenges are not about design of inspections, but

about capture or corruption, intimidation of inspectors, or political decisions to cut corners on regulatory excellence.

Technocratically, regulatory inspection of nuclear weapons programs is assisted by the fact that nuclear weapons grade material emits not only signals that are highly detectable by inspectors, but signals with a signature. The signature denotes that it was not manufactured here, but there. A challenge of chemical and biological weapons inspection is that stockpiles cannot be detected so readily. Two other factors have saved us to render chemical and biological weapons the lesser danger. One is that the weapons that proved so deadly and debilitating were effectively subject to a total taboo after World War I. This rapid international response greatly reduced investment in grandiose chemical and biological weapons programs. R&D on chemical and biological weapons became morally unacceptable across the world's great universities from 1918. There were secret programs between the two wars that were quite advanced in Japan. But the brightest and best of the world's great universities have been minimally engaged with innovation to create next-generation chemical and biological weapons. This is a contrast to the way that great university nuclear physicists at Los Alamos and after World War II did work at scale and with massive state and corporate funding to develop next-generation nuclear weapons. During World War II there were formidable debates about whether chemical weapons would be used, but surprisingly, none of the major powers used them. Churchill was open to doing so if Hitler used them first in his Russian campaign. Intel agencies everywhere were monitoring their enemies on the ban. That was win-win monitoring that constituted risks to reputations that brilliant university scientists did not wish to take by joining biological and chemical weapons research programs. These weapons did not grow in effectiveness as weapons of war in the way that nuclear and conventional weapons did.

With the first invasion of Iraq in 1990, the NATO coalition of the willing was worried about the advantages for Saddam Hussein of his chemical and biological weapons (which he did have in 1990). These weapons delivered zero advantage on the battlefield. Saddam had used them extensively in his 1980s existential war against Iran that cost a million lives. In that war as well, there was no battle in which Iraq's

use of chemical weapons turned the tide of battle in its favor. It was mostly civilians wiped out by chemical weapons. When Syria used chemical weapons in its civil war that started in 2011, chemical weapons turned no battles in their favor. They did cause disfavor from their valued ally, Russia. President Putin prevailed on Syria to dismantle their chemical weapons warfare, creating an opportunity for soft diplomacy with Syria on chemical weapons that worked when President Obama failed with his threats of ‘consequences’ if his red line on chemical weapons use was crossed. Russian firepower, Hezbollah, and especially Kurdish troops made the decisive difference when they fought Islamic State (and other enemies of the Syrian state). Not chemical weapons. Since 2018, after more than a century of many wars subsequent to the chemical and biological weapons genie escaping the bottle, these weapons have won no wars, not even a battle. The lesson is that imperfect inspection, imperfect but formidable moral consensus in universities and foreign ministries, and great power dialogue on the issue to engender consensus on the UN Security Council, can do enough to render seemingly terrifying WMDs useless in practice. Will they remain useless, however, when AI executes millions of ways of adapting and diffusing them?

On September 11, 2001, as I glanced out the window of my New York University office that looked on to Washington Square I glimpsed an aircraft flown by Al Qaeda terrorists whizz by my peripheral vision. Then a muffled crash from the other side of the building, loud screaming from people in Washington Square. Rushing to the street, a woman said what an amazing accident that the plane flew right into the middle of the only building of such height. It did not look like an accident. When a second plane flew into the second tower from the opposite side minutes later, many had the same thought as me: ‘Get off the street behind closed doors because if they are capable of pulling off such destruction, they are clever enough to have biological weapons on board’. It soon became clear that Al Qaeda had not spread chemical or biological weapons across New York and Washington. Nor has their widely believed capability to bring a ship with a dirty nuclear bomb into the harbor of an American metropolis been realized in the 23 years since, even though their network grew hugely after 2001, especially in Africa after 2011. Yes, a significant number of letters and parcels containing anthrax were posted

by someone to the mailrooms of politicians in September 2001. This harm was minimal. The postal traces suggest they were probably posted by fringe US supporters or associates of the US national security state to target members of Congress who were tepid in support of an invasion of Afghanistan.

My argument is that international non-proliferation regimes and taboos have been effective international institutions that have protected us more fully from mass murder by chemical or biological weapons because R&D on them never engaged the world's brightest and best university scientists and was never sufficiently in the open to allow peer review and other institutions of science to build excellence in that R&D. This does not mean that if we neglect the maintenance of these simple, effective institutions of violence control, this WMD horror will never rise from the ashes of the Somme. For the moment, even though secret chemical and biological weapons programs are harder for inspectors to detect compared to secret nuclear programs, nuclear weapons are a far larger threat to humankind.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime has also been a success in terms of containing our worst fears. President John F. Kennedy in 1961 predicted a cascade of 15–25 nuclear weapons powers within a decade. Today there are still only the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. This is thanks to civilizing forces in international civil society that finally won a 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. Dogged regulatory inspectors in places like Iraq under the nuclear non-proliferation regime were the other decisive actors when they lent technocratic strength to the arms of the abolitionists (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, 318).

We have seen that the great influenza of 1918 was spread by the mass movement of troops from foreign countries back to their homelands. It strengthened R&D on epidemiology and pandemic prevention. While the globalization of travel grows as one of the factors that accelerates the globalization of disease, university epidemiology has been an effective science in discovering the many capillaries of prevention discussed earlier through the example of the covid pandemic. Each epidemic—influenza,

polio, HIV, ebola, SARS, MERS, and more—motivated better science to counter accelerating and more tightly coupled risks.

Polio existed in ancient Egypt, but in the 1940s in the United States it cascaded out of control, peaking in 1953. It seemed completely eradicated by 1964 (Williams 2013, 273). There has been near global eradication throughout this century, though the virus survives in areas controlled by the Taliban and other Islamist groups in Afghanistan, North-West Pakistan, and Northern Nigeria. By affecting so widely the country with the best universities in the world, and debilitating a beloved wartime president, polio motivated a level of philanthropic support that was epic as an example to future generations. Two-thirds of America's great philanthropic society are estimated to have donated to polio research. Seven million participated as volunteers in local fundraising fetes, concerts, and countless other participatory events. Generosity of ordinary Americans funded what one commentator described as 'the biggest public health experiment ever...The modern era of vaccine evaluation began with the landmark [polio] field trial' (Oshinsky 2005, 188). No one who lived through the 1940s or 1950s fails to remember the effects of polio on so many we knew. We never forget the fear the disease engendered. On April 12, 1955, when the results of the successful vaccine trial were announced:

Schoolchildren and factory workers got the word over public address systems. Office workers heard it while huddling around radios. In department stores, courtrooms, and coffee shops people wept openly with relief. To many, April 12 resembled another V-J Day – the end of a war. 'We were safe again', recalled author Frank Deford, then a fourth grader in Baltimore. 'At our desks we cheered as if the Orioles or the Colts had won a big game. Outside we could hear car horns honking and church bells chiming in celebration. We had conquered polio'. (Oshinsky 2005, 203)

Viva the grass roots of American civil society and its scientists. In a 1955 Rose Garden reception for Jonas Salk and his vaccine team, President Eisenhower trembled with emotion as he promised to give the Salk polio vaccine to 'every country that welcomed the knowledge, including the Soviet Union' because families everywhere must be spared 'seeing

their loved ones suffering in bed' (Oshinsky 2005, 216). Salk was earlier asked by an interviewer 'Who owns the patent on this vaccine?' His reply 'Well, the people, I would say. There is no patent. Could you patent the sun?' (Oshinsky 2005, 211). The simple idea was that a surge of public support, a particular variant of *The Crowd in History* (Rudé 1964) could deliver prevention if the investment were strong and sustained, if the people of the nation that led it had greatness of character. It was another chapter in the story of the finest moments of the American century and a lesson for all humankind.

Negative lessons from this period also loomed. The US government left distribution of the vaccine to a largely unregulated private sector. McCarthyism reinforced the idea that a strong welfare state was communism. The result was worse than an inefficient shambles. Eleven children lost their lives and 250 suffered paralytic illness when the Cutter pharmaceutical corporation distributed dangerous batches of vaccine. This resulted in vaccine testing becoming a major function of the National Institutes of Health and the establishment of what later came to be called the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The further lesson learned was that while people power, philanthropic foundations, and private corporations could do great things, they could do better with support from, and accountability to, simple state public health institutions.

Conclusion

Complex challenges are difficult because they are complex. A slow-food approach to growing simple institutions is possible, however. It can repeatedly, often decisively, be helpful in responding to complexity. This is especially so when institutions are designed for capability to scale up during crises, to be generative, and to be evidence-based learning institutions in the face of complexity. For we fearful individuals, this is a message of comfort at some personal levels in a stressful world. As university researchers we can disappoint ourselves that we have made no great contribution to solving any human problem of import. Perhaps we pursued what we thought was a useful theory, a drug that would

save lives, but our data showed our hopes to be false, overblown. Some respond to those disappointments from the failure of their research to impact complexity by becoming a wonderful university administrator. In that role no less than in showing that something did not work, they contribute to sustaining a simple institution that is full of individuals who do luck onto ideas that do make a big difference. When we contribute to institutions of learning at any level—as a supervisor of young scientists, as a teacher in schools or universities, as an early childhood educator, as parents educating our children, aunts our nieces, we do our bit to sustain institutions of learning that are the most important elements of a slow-food approach to responding to complex crises.

As ambulance paramedics, or any kind of health care worker, we might save a great slow-food societal crisis preventer, a great reconciler or peacemaker, or people who know how to infuse others with thinking globally by acting locally. The paramedics who delivered Ronald Reagan to the hospital after he was shot in 1981, the next chapter argues, may actually have saved the lives of most readers. As delightful musicians, exquisite cooks, evocative artists, we might lift the spirits of those who build institutions that tackle complex crises through our tasty soulfood slowly cooked to revive worthy souls.

Simple institutions must be capable of moving quickly to contain crises and the risks that are root causes of crises because global capitalism and global competition drives crises that cascade faster, and more tightly coupled to other kinds of crises. We have seen that institutions for containing the complexity of contagions of viruses in aged care can be simple inspection institutions that enforce simple infection control standards. Future chapters will show how simple nuclear surety inspection systems with simple failings similar to those we saw in aged care are of neglected relevance to containing nuclear catastrophes.

The decisive obstacles to containing crises are most frequently about political and corporate power. Politicians may conclude that there are more votes in giving young people what they want now than old people what they need a bit later because elders are people who die or stop voting soon. The aged are unlikely to understand that the reason they are dying is that an inspector has failed to visit their aged-care facility for more than a year. Likewise, there are no votes in funding competent

nuclear surety inspections. Even when at some future date many will lose their lives as a result of such regulatory failure, ordinary citizens also will probably not grasp that this is the reason. Chapter 10 will show that a further problem is that leaders who do not see it as in their political interests to sustain the simple institutions that contain complex crises rarely defend that position publicly. They find that the best way of serving their political interests is to create the impression of sustaining a simple institution people revere. The survey evidence shows that ordinary citizens do tend to respect the institutions we have been discussing: universities, ambulance services, many responsive regulatory institutions. Chapter 10 argues that government inspection and most kinds of business regulatory institutions are like this; the best political strategy is regulatory ritualism—creating the symbolic appearance of regulating crises through respected institutions, but not the substance.

Democracy in the overly narrowed sense of voting in elections is a simple institution that can be structurally helpful in crisis prevention. For example, it gives people a simple pathway to changing the government compared to mounting a revolution, a war, or a coup, to do so. In conditions of modernity where most people value a right to vote for such good and simple reasons, sadly it is not generally in the interests of politicians to sustain democracy in good order. The better political strategy is normally to sustain the appearance but not the substance of democracy. Chapter 10 argues that there are many ways to temper ritualism in democracies with checks and balances. A significant minority of societies have secured sufficient power of the crowd in history to sustain such countervailing institutions.

Before we journey downward to the decisive roles of the crowd in history, the next chapter looks up to the commanding heights of the world system. It is hard not to think of containing crises without considering the success of containing the Soviet Union. It was a success in that Soviet tyranny did ultimately crumble because of the patient slow-food approach of the containment doctrine during the Cold War. However, Chapters 4 and 5 argue that containment of states sets limits on a slow-food approach because containment is normally impossible to sustain for any long period. One reason is that if containment can deliver the

geopolitical power to totally contain a state because of one issue, containment can be an unsustainable obstacle to collaborating with them on a host of other crises. Containment of risks and of crises, as opposed to containment of states, is easier to sustain in the *longue durée*. On that foundation, Chapters 6 and 7 consider containment of our most deadly risks. Chapters 8 and 9 then develop a view on what kind of diplomacy is needed for that kind of containment of cascading crises.

Notes

1. This quote comes from former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans quoting the international blue-ribbon panel of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. (Gareth Evans 2022, 66).
2. In the regulatory inspection literature more generally, inspection often works, even when it fails to result in significant penalties because detection deterrence is found by the evidence to do more work than sanctions deterrence (Braithwaite 2008, 2022).

References

- Acs, Alex, and Cary Coglianese. 2022. Influence by intimidation: Business lobbying in the regulatory process. *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*.
- Beebe, George S. 2019. *The Russia trap: How our shadow war with Russia could spark into nuclear catastrophe*. New York: Thomas Dunne.
- Benish, Avishai, and David Levi-Faur. 2020. The reassertion of the regulatory welfare state: A preface. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 691: 7–16.
- Braithwaite, John. 2008. *Regulatory capitalism*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrocriminology and Freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, and Bina D’Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence*. Canberra: ANU Press.

- Braithwaite, John, and Peter Drahos. 2000. *Global business regulation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drahos, Peter. 2010. *The global governance of knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drahos, Peter. 2021a. *Public lies and public goods: Ten lessons from when patents and pandemics meet*. Florence: European Universities Institute.
- Drahos, Peter. 2021b. *Survival governance: Energy and climate in the Chinese century*. New York: Oxford.
- Ellsberg, Daniel. 2017. *The doomsday machine: Confessions of a nuclear war planner*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Evans, Gareth. 2022. *Good international citizenship: The case for decency*. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.
- Grabosky, Peter N. 2017. Meta-regulation. In *Regulatory theory*, ed. Peter Drahos, 149–161. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Levi-Faur, David, and Jacint Jordana. 2005. The rise of regulatory capitalism: The global diffusion of a new order. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 598: 200–217.
- Levinte, Ariel. 2021. How cyber ops increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. *Defense One*, April 21.
- Lorenzini, Daniele. 2021. Biopolitics in the time of Coronavirus. *Critical Inquiry* 47: 40–45.
- Morgan, Bronwen. 2003. The economization of politics: Meta-regulation as a form of nonjudicial legality. *Social & Legal Studies* 12: 489–523.
- Oshinsky, David M. 2005. *Polio: An American story*. New York: Oxford.
- Parker, Christine. 2002. *The open corporation: Effective self-regulation and democracy*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Royal Commission into Aged Care. 2020. *Aged care royal commission final report*. Canberra: Australian Government.
- Rudé, George F. 1964. *The crowd in history: A study of popular disturbances in France and England, 1730–1848*. New York: Wiley.
- Sørensen, Eva. 2006. Meta governance: The changing role of politicians in processes of democratic governance. *American Review of Public Administration* 36: 98–114.
- Tooze, Adam. 2021. What if the COVID crisis is just a trial run? *New York Times*, September 3.
- Wang, Jason, Chun Y. Ng, and Robert H. Brook. 2020. Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big data analytics, new technology, and proactive testing. *Journal of the American Medical Association* 14: 323.
- Williams, Gareth. 2013. *Paralysed with fear: The story of polio*. New York: Palgrave.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





4

Containing Russia: Containing Nuclear Wars and Lesser Wars that Cascade

Abstract War cascades to economic crises, environmental crises, and epidemics. There have been three major spikes in risks of nuclear war: the Kennedy-Krushchev spike (early 1960s); the mid-1980s (Reagan-Gorbachev); and the Biden-Putin-Xi spike today. Tangible steps were taken with the first two toward nuclear weapons elimination. Prospects of that with the current spike are mired in failures of Ukraine peacemaking. Extradition law reform is a strategy for deterrence of WMD ban violators. When nuclear powers frustrate disarmament, regional disarmament treaties can be grown. Progressively dismantled mutual assured nuclear destruction (MAD) can be steppingstones to prevent Mutual Assured Digital Destruction (MADD). Invading other countries is rare today. It does not pay. Recent empirics of warmaking effectiveness have reduced the explanatory power of realist international relations theory.

Keywords Extradition · Reagan · Gorbachev · Kennedy · Ukraine

George Kennan's Containment

An ethos of this book is that the normal way for states to interact should be to keep it simple through dialogue and support for each other to flourish with better institutions. This generally produces better outcomes than seeking to pull off the complex task of containing them. Containment tends to conduce to covert operations and duplicity. Containment of Japan in the 1930s illustrated that complexity. Beggar-thy-neighbor policies were applied to Japan's industrial rise with particular intensity. Japanese access to oil and steel imports was cut after its invasion of Manchuria. Western colonial domination in Asia pushed back against the emergence of a competing Japanese imperialism. All this was understandable, even defensible in certain respects. But its effects were complex in the way they led to 'Asia for the Asians' anti-colonialism and expansion through Japanese militarism. Japanese colonialism proved more tyrannical than its Western predecessors. The problem with how this containment was done was that it led the Emperor to believe that the only way Japan could break out of it was militarism and the folly of attacking Pearl Harbor.

Rejection of beggar thy neighbor policies after World War II, US generosity with rebuilding Japan, and embrace of Japanese companies into open competition with Western industry, was a simpler approach that renewed a democratic and peaceful Japan. This book will consider the history of the bungling of containment strategies and the empirical evidence of blowback and counterproductivity thereby generated. Keeping it simple through dialogue and support for other states to flourish with better institutions tends to be preferable even when we do not like their politics, even if we fear they will surpass our own state as a great power. Benefits flow when alternative views about how to organize economies, political and legal institutions, are put in robust, mutually respectful competition internationally. That creates a foundation for learning from societies that innovate into special institutional excellence. It can diffuse and be built upon when societies help one another.

George Kennan published the policy of containment of the Soviet Union in succinct form in 1947. This followed up on his long State

Department telegram on containment of 1946. Its first principle was to contain the Soviet Union from expanding its sway beyond its extant hegemony. An oppressive regional carve-up was settled with Stalin by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Yalta in 1945. The Soviet sphere of hegemony was basically the areas where the Soviets had conquered Hitler's army. A second principle was to contain Soviet influence across the world. Moscow was contained from penetrating world markets, from access to Western education, knowledge, and technologies. The Soviet Union mostly contained itself from reaping the benefits of global markets and global universities by denying its youth the right to travel.

After Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao Zedong's leadership of China, China ceased making these mistakes. When China no longer contained its intellectuals from reaping benefits on offer from Western universities and ceased containing its businesses from competing in global markets, China grew to become uncontainable. Kennan's hopes for Soviet containment came to fruition 40 years after his conception of the Cold War doctrine. Soviet power ultimately eroded and collapsed internally after being cut off from global circuits of power and circuits for learning institutional excellence. This became acutely true in the transition from the industrial economy (in which communism had performed quite well) to the information economy (from which it was too cut off to succeed, insufficiently nimble, and innovative) (Castells 2011). This book is about the idea that not only was Kennan right about his Cold War containment doctrine, he was also right about dialogue with the Soviet leadership during containment. Kennan was right about the imperative to respond to Soviet Premier Gorbachev and his successor, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, by dismantling NATO containment. During the Cold War, containment was interpreted by different administrations in variable ways. Some thought containment meant NATO cutting off dialogue with Russia. Kennan never thought this (Costigliola 2023). Western strategic thinking is so seduced by rational choice reductionism that it has suborned dialogue to being a reward for complying with US wishes. A fundamental commitment of human decency and effectiveness is dialogue with friends and enemies alike.

Radicalizing George Kennan and Hedley Bull Realism

George Kennan was a realist, yet one who was more influenced than contemporary realists by the English School of International Relations. The leading figure in this school was Australian, Hedley Bull. Bull joined Kennan in shared belief in a default capability for containing the Soviet Union (and communism) militarily. For Bull, this was a backstop of assurance, not necessarily the main game of making safe a dangerous world. Building international institutions of cooperation, interdependence, and dispute resolution were also important. Bull emphasized the importance of the evolution and strengthening of ‘international society’. In Braithwaite’s (2022) theoretical terms, this is about building the collective efficacy of international society to check and balance all concentrations of power, including the concentrated power of one’s allies. It is about tempering concentrated power so that power can become more effective in tackling existential threats: climate change and other forces that unravel ecosystems, war, Weapons of Mass Destruction, economic crises, pandemics, and more.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, like President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Kennan and Bull further strengthened their interest in simple, practical cooperation mechanisms introduced after the Cuban crisis. One was the ‘hotline’ that allowed US Presidents, and Chairs of the US Joint Chiefs as well, to pick up the hotline at moments of crisis to speak directly about concerns with their Soviet counterpart, and vice versa. In retrospect, wise thinkers began to ask whether something as simple as the hotline was not only an insight relevant to preventing nuclear catastrophes. For example, with what we now know about the failed diplomacy leading into World War I, historians pose the counterfactual: if that cascade of unwanted war against the interests of the greatest European powers might have been prevented had a hotline been available to their leaders (Clark 2012). This counterfactual is pondered at different stages of this book.

The pragmatics of this analysis are a radicalization of the international society vision of Bull and fellow Australian peace diplomacy scholars such as former Australian Foreign Secretary, John Burton, and the work of

Andrew Mack discussed in Chapter 6.¹ The contemporary conditions that make this necessary are the speed and character of cascades of risk that come from nonlinear expansion of unexpected technological innovation risks (for example from accidental or unintended space wars, cyber, AI, or hypersonic wars). It is no longer realistic to believe, as Harold Wilson and John F Kennedy did, that a nuclear weapons program could do the realist balancing part of a world that was a stabilized bird with two wings: nuclear balancing on the one hand, and liberal institutions of international cooperation on the other. The more these two leaders of the 1960s pondered the issues, the more convinced they became that eventually a destabilizing nuclear imbalance could threaten humankind irreversibly, just as Robert Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein came to believe this after 1945.

This book advances the alternative of a world where risks are reduced by future accomplishments of persuading states not to acquire WMDs, or to dismantle existing WMDs (arguing that Pakistan is a good first target to persuade of the benefits of denuclearizing their defense), and to persuade growing numbers of states to scale back all capabilities for offensive operations against other societies. At each step along this road, our species becomes more capable of deferring the date of its extinction. As Ramesh Thakur (2023) puts it ‘the relationship between nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament is symbiotic, both conceptually and operationally. Each is a necessary condition of the other and the failure to achieve either is sufficient to doom the other as well’. At some future step along both roads together, total WMD disarmament might be achieved. Total conventional military disarmament (as opposed to WMD disarmament) will never occur in a world where there is always a cheap niche for startup warlords. International society might institutionalize as much disarmament as is politically achievable, realizing that this will never be as much disarmament as we would like. That inevitable residual of armament, if it can be embedded in a UN normative order, might always deliver enough conventional deterrence capability to satisfy the theoretical objectives of those of us who are peacemakers, but who wish to retain a deterrence default (while constraining arms races). I will argue that the empirical grounding for this grows with every decade as more evidence is uncovered of near misses with accidental or unintended nuclear war.

The Puzzle of Nuclear Weapon States that Rarely Invade Weak States

An empirical background to disarmament advocacy is that in contemporary conditions countries with weak conventional capabilities effectively defeat great nuclear powers by staying the course with resisting them. They do this militarily, through nonviolent civilian resistance, and diplomatically to see off invasions by great powers. If true, this hypothesis makes more plausible the peacemaking approach of this book. It makes narrowly realist analyses less plausible.

The relevant accumulation of evidence started when the United States and a number of allies, including two other nuclear weapons states (the United Kingdom and France) were effectively defeated militarily when they followed their 1950 success in pushing back the invasion of South Korea by North Korea with the folly of then themselves invading North Korea. They were defeated in that counter-invasion objective by a combination of North Korean and Chinese troops. At that time, China was not a nuclear weapons state, while the US, Britain, and France were. Later, tiny North Vietnam with support from insurgent allies in South Vietnam defeated two nuclear powers, first France, then the United States backed by troop contingents from many US allies. Later still, the people of Afghanistan defeated the then massive Soviet military which began large-scale withdrawal in 1988. In the twenty-first century, the Afghan Taliban delivered a comparable kind of defeat to invading US forces, backed by dozens of US military allies, with many of the militaries in its NATO+ coalition being nuclear weapons states (the United States, UK, France, India, with Russia providing limited military support from its bordering air-bases and China putting special forces troops on the ground in Afghanistan to kill and capture Uyghur fighters on the Taliban side). They had all retreated by 2021.

Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Afghanistan. The Chinese defeat in the second phase of the Korean War when they were pushed back out of South Korea was followed by two Chinese defeats when China invaded islands in the Taiwan Strait that were part of Taiwan in 1955 and 1958. The Taiwan Straits defeats were not catastrophic; approximately 2000 troops seem to have been killed on both sides in the fighting. But

China lost several ships and 31 aircraft. They worried about escalation to full-scale war with the United States, especially after it killed some US military advisors to Taiwan. China's short invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was its last. It was neither a victory nor a defeat. China withdrew after 27 days of terrible losses on both sides. Since this ultra-short war, China has not invaded another country. In this, my argument is that China has chosen a smart path to geopolitical ascendancy that Russia and the United States would be prudent to emulate. We see a related pattern in the fact that the United States has 700 foreign military bases, 800 on some ways of counting them, while China has five (less on dubious Chinese ways of counting some of them as on Chinese territory in the South China Sea). This in a world where we know that bases increase the likelihood of war in regions with foreign bases (Vine 2020). Build them and they will come, where 'they' is foreign wars.

War that once made great powers now weakens them. One reason the gap rapidly began to close between the other great powers and China is that Washington and Moscow did not change their views based on an understanding that invasions almost always have higher costs than benefits in contemporary conditions. NATO and Moscow both continued suffering catastrophic outcomes, without ever accomplishing any major great power warmaking success. At least this was true since the conversion of defeat in South Korea into the reversal of that defeat, then defeat of their own invasion of North Korea, then stalemate to endlessly frozen combativeness, though that counts as qualified failure as much as qualified success. US thinkers argue that Russia's defeat in Afghanistan and its contemporary losses of battles, especially the 2022 battle for Kyiv, have weakened Moscow as a great power. In this, they are right. Yet such strategists are disinclined to treat the 2021 United States defeat in Afghanistan as weakening it. True, the Americans did not lose as much blood in Afghanistan as the Soviets. NATO lost a lot more treasure, however. For a Gorbachev who had decided back in 1985 to embrace Russia into Europe, the 1988–1989 withdrawal from proxy war against the West in Afghanistan was not the humiliation or debacle that 2021 was for NATO.

The United States lost much more blood in Vietnam. NATO drained a comparable amount of treasure in Ukraine, but little NATO blood.

NATO supported Ukraine to fight ‘to the last Ukrainian’. Ukraine lost even more painfully from war, suffered more cruel loss of loved ones and homes, than the Russians have lost so far in Ukraine. My argument is that it was a mistake for the United States to decide not to pursue and support others in peace and preventive diplomacy early in most such conflicts (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018: Part I). The United States track record is of only pursuing peace after they get into wars when their enemies know domestic opinion in the West is against further acceleration of investment in these wars. Up to that point, US Democratic Party strategists like to prove themselves as hawkish as US neocons. This increases United States losses and weakens the United States, particularly in terms of its competition with China which has lost fewer international friends, fewer tanks and missiles, by minimizing their investments in wars and pushing early for peace, particularly in Ukraine and the Gaza war that has just begun at the time of writing.²

The historically recent failures of great power invasions were combined, I will argue, with more catastrophes than triumphs for Washington and Moscow from supporting different sides of proxy wars fought by other countries’ armies. China under Deng Xiaoping, in contrast, stopped supporting insurgencies, including those that Mao Zedong’s China had itself initiated in neighboring countries like Burma. This was also geopolitically beneficial to Chinese power and wealth accumulation.

Lebanon. Tiny Lebanon is another tragic and instructive invasion case to consider. It suffered multiple invasions from more powerful militaries in recent decades, two of them nuclear weapons states, because it gave shelter to large numbers of Palestinian refugees, some of whom caused trouble. Another Shi’a insurgency supported by Iran (Hezbollah) then emerged as more militarily capable than the Palestinians. Hezbollah was created in direct response to Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Military incursions into Lebanon (by Israel, Syria, and the United States between 1978 and 2006, with Israeli missiles targeting Beirut again in 2024) resulted in only temporary domination of Lebanon by the invaders, protracted horrors of civil war, destruction of effective democracy, and destruction of what was formerly the most flourishing Middle East economy. None of the invaders achieved any long-term control of the government of Lebanon. All three left with their tail between their

legs, leaving behind a disaster for themselves, excoriated by international society for leaving behind a human rights disaster for the people of Lebanon. Syria, Israel, and the United States were blamed for the tragedy in a Beirut that is no longer the Paris of the South thanks to this period of militarist folly. As with the Kaiser's intent with his World War I invasions, it was not the intent of Israel or the United States to occupy Lebanon indefinitely. Yet it was also not their intent to destroy the entire fabric of that society, leaving Hezbollah as the most influential of the fragmented political factions of an ungovernable society with Hezbollah backed by Iran and Syria. Hezbollah remained much more militarily dominant than the Lebanese army, with Iranian missiles and drones increasingly capable of devastation deeper into Israel. Syria would have liked a longer term occupation of Lebanon. But they were kicked out in circumstances that were the beginning of the end of Syria as a major Middle Eastern power.

Timor-Leste. Most remarkably of all the narratives of recent invasions, in 1999, a tiny country of one million people (Timor-Leste) pushed out a military invasion and occupation by Indonesia (280 million population, with one of the world's largest armies during its 24 years of military occupation). Indonesian occupation ended with a plan of its military leadership for genocide that was foiled by international support for a UN independence referendum, UN peacekeeping and transitional administration, and a brilliant strategy of the resistance to foil genocide by the entire population fleeing to the mountains as soon as they cast their vote in the UN-supervised independence referendum. The Timor-Leste insurgency achieved little militarily beyond contributing to the ungovernability of Indonesian rule and providing mountain bases to flee to for those targeted by death squads. The resistance progressively shifted to nonviolent strategies that made Timor-Leste ungovernable and costly in financial and diplomatic terms for the invader. This was so much so that the Timor-Leste student resistance on the streets of Jakarta were indispensable leaders of the democracy movement that forced Indonesia's autocratic Suharto regime to resign. It was replaced with an Indonesian democracy that granted Timor-Leste independence. The people of Timor-Leste defeated that invasion through those costs. This even though Indonesia had the tacit support of all the great powers—the United States, Russia and China—for their original 1975 invasion. The

great powers would vote for UN resolutions from time to time against human rights abuses by the Indonesian military in Timor-Leste, yet until Suharto's demise in 1998 they were giving the Indonesian military despot a nudge and wink that they were OK with the invasion because Indonesia was a critical swing state during the Cold War, the most geostrategically important leader of the non-aligned movement. This is the most remarkable victory of the militarily weak defender against a militarily strong invader in contemporary geopolitical conditions.

Wars won by noncooperation, weak guns. Old-time realists like Chairman Mao believed political power grew out of the barrel of a gun. Restorative and responsive theorists see contemporary power as fundamentally infrastructural (Mann 2012), utterly dependent on cooperation from citizens. There is no power if citizens refuse to obey, if they actively undermine the sources of state infrastructural power.

Needless to say, it was not guns that defeated Indonesia; it was refusal of the people of Timor-Leste to cooperate with the Indonesian occupation; it was nonviolent civil resistance of Timorese that then played a significant role in persuading the people of Indonesia to withdraw their cooperation with the Suharto regime that launched the invasion. The students on the streets of Jakarta in 1998 that forced Suharto to step down also began to persuade his successor that Indonesia would be stronger diplomatically and economically if it cut its losses from the occupation of Timor-Leste. Likewise Erica Chenoweth (2021, Chapter 1) points out that the defeat in Vietnam was mainly a result of the refusal of the people of Vietnam to cooperate with the United States and its puppets combined with the subsequent resistance of the American people to cooperate with the war. Add to this that allies like Australia were forced by the withdrawal of cooperation of their electorate to withdraw Australian cooperation with the United States years before the United States walked out on the Vietnam War. Another Australian walkout happened in 2009, years before the United States walkout in Iraq. The same in Afghanistan with Australian combat forces withdrawing in 2013, 8 years before the US withdrawal.

Chenoweth (2021) makes the same point about the defeat of the militarily superior British in the Revolutionary War. The British were mostly defeated by civil resistance to their rule during the decades

before the fighting started, by citizens refusing to follow British orders, to pay British taxes, refusing to buy or consume British imports, and pledging their loyalty to parallel governance institutions led by Revolutionaries that made for de facto pre-Revolutionary independence. British colonialism had also lost the cooperation of most Indigenous peoples, who were still more numerous than white settlers in North America for much of the eighteenth century. When the fighting started, more tribes fought with Washington than against him. In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police accomplished a less murderous model for dominating Indigenous peoples into cooperation with British hegemony; white settlers then won equal freedom from British domination to their US compatriots through a slow food approach to civilian resistance to British rule. John Adams learned lessons about civil resistance as freedom's main weapon. He wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson: 'What do we mean by the revolution? The war? That was no part of the revolution; it was only an effect and a consequence of it. The revolution was in the minds of the people, and this was effected from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years, before a drop of blood was shed at Lexington' (Chenoweth 2021, 20).

Ukraine. An addition to the list of ill-conceived invasions will probably become the current invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which many realists thought would be a walkover for Russia. It will likely end with both sides losing disastrously. Russia has little prospect of winning the cooperation of the people of Ukraine, not even the cooperation of the large part of its population that are Russian speakers who traditionally voted for pro-Russian politicians. The rot of resistance and noncooperation set in early with Putin's war. Russia went in believing that Belarus and China would be staunch allies; they quickly became more half-hearted allies. Smart great powers listen to civil society resistance to war inside half-hearted allies; allied peoples may be ahead of the more brain-washed publics inside invader societies like Russia. Smart warmakers cut their losses early and enter peace negotiations early.

Kuwait, Georgia. There is a danger that my analysis selects on the dependent variable. So far I have considered only cases of failed invasions of the last 70 years. So let us consider the best examples of successful invasions of other countries by more militarily powerful states. Just as

the 2003 NATO invasion of Iraq was an initial success, Iraq's invasion of the weaker state, Kuwait in 1990 was initially a success that was later turned to failure militarily by a 'coalition of willing' greater powers and internal resistance especially from the Kurds. Later we consider that perhaps Gorbachev is right that with more time he could have persuaded Saddam Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. Either way, an initial invasion victory was never going to stand. The Iran-Iraq war up to 1988 was an even bigger invasion disaster for both countries.

We must go back quite a number of years to find a possibly, yet doubtfully, successful invasion. Perhaps one is the 2008 Russian invasion of tiny Georgia, which the West declined to defend. Yet international opinion forced Russian troops to pull back to the South Ossetia independent enclave of Georgia that Georgia had been provoked to attack first, before Russia counterattacked. Russia actually sucked Georgia into the attack. Then Russian counterattack could punish it for seeking to join NATO. It is doubtful that this was a fully successful invasion because Russia did not take over Georgia and it was forced to shoulder the financial burden of propping up a landlocked, economically unviable South Ossetian government. As in Ukraine, Russia marched toward the Georgian capital, but did not occupy it. It merely furthered an already existing fragmentation of Georgia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia rather than conquering Georgia. This seemed to harden the resolve of President Putin next time to push on with the invasion of a defector to NATO (Ukraine). That also worked out well! Georgia was a stepping stone toward Russia becoming Europe's most hated state, and therefore a great power of limited potency in a post-realist world.

Ending the Cambodian genocide. Perhaps a convincing example of invasion succeeding during the past 70 years is the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 that ended the Cambodian genocide. For different reasons, neither the United States nor China supported the invasion. China responded to it with an invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, discussed above, which cost both sides heavy loss of life. This short Chinese invasion of Vietnam did not persuade Vietnam to pull out of Cambodia but did trigger the first step of what became a decade of progressive Vietnamese drawdown from Cambodia. Nothing about these two invasions was pretty. A free and democratic Cambodia was

not the result. Ending genocide was followed by the ultimate reversal of the Vietnamese invasion and abandonment of the invasion objective of making Cambodia a Vietnamese puppet. Then a UN Transitional Administration after Vietnam backed the Paris Peace Agreement was a better outcome than continued genocide or continued occupation.

Failed genocide prevention in Congo/Rwanda. There is no more deadly, post-Cold-War example of UN and institutional failure to prevent an invasion than the preventable invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996. The invasion was led by Rwanda, supported by a coalition of willing states that resented President Mobutu's corrupt and oppressive rule of Congo. Disgruntled Congolese joined the invaders to help overthrow their despot. Rwanda installed as President the man from among these disgruntled factions who they thought would be a Rwandan puppet. As with the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste, the United States tacitly supported the invasion. Rwanda's President Kagame was a poster-boy of neoliberal pro-American development whose country had survived a genocide at the hands of Hutu militias. Genocidaires had fled to hide in refugee camps in Congo. Rwanda won their invasion war easily to install armed groups to loot gold, diamonds, and coltan mines with slave labor that transported the loot to Rwanda. The army of Rwanda's main alliance partner in the invasion, Uganda, did the same. All this quickly turned sour for Rwanda. Today democrats and other sections of Rwandan society pray for the day when Kagame's tyranny ends. Almost immediately, their supposed Congolese puppet, President Laurent Kabila, turned on Rwanda and sought to evict the Rwandan-backed armed factions that were looting his country. This blowback meant that Kagame's invasion plan became another 'Catastrophic success', as discussed in Downes's (2021) research, and more fully later. Kabila's assassination did not solve these problems after he was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila. DRC and the region were thrust into war that continues to this day and has caused more deaths, more rape, and more slavery than any other war of the past 50 years. Rwanda still suffers instability on its borders as profound as that which motivated the invasion.

The retribution against Hutu genocidaires hiding in Congolese refugee camps turned into a counter-genocide against all Hutus in those camps

(Reyntjens 2009, 80–101). The conflict diamonds and the coltan in our smart-phones and laptops that was mined by slave labor under the guns of Rwandan gangs created a public relations disaster for Western corporations like Apple and for the failed US diplomacy of tacitly supporting the invasion of Congo, the slavery, the counter-genocide, and propping up as murderous a despot as Kagame. Only a tiny fraction of the Tutsi elite were winners; Rwanda's dominated Hutu majority were hardly winners. Many Tutsi cronies who benefitted most from the DRC slavery and its loot turned on Kagame and themselves were assassinated. Kagame's time as a poster-boy for anyone is over. Audiences that once admired him, domestically and internationally, now see him as a tyrant and war criminal. The invasion of Congo was a short-term triumph for Kagame that generated great wealth for him and his cronies, however. The United States could, or should have prevented it by refusing to give Kagame a green light to invade. Instead, Rwanda could have been protected through funding a UN Report proposal to move Hutu refugees camps that were threatening Rwanda back from its border and interposing UN peacekeepers between those camps and Rwanda. A realist invasion that cost millions of lives and in addition spread HIV-AIDS across the Continent was no solution for Rwanda, Congo, or the United States. UN Peacekeeping and liberal institutionalism should have been the 1990s solution to both the Rwandan and Congolese genocides.

Grenada, Panama. It might be said that a successful historically recent invasion was Grenada by the United States in 1983. It occurred after the assassination of leading members of the government by factional competitors produced destabilizing waves of violence. A request ensued from the head of state for a peace enforcement operation to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. A coalition of six Caribbean states joined the United States in what was not therefore a literal US 'invasion'. The peace enforcement oversaw a transition to a democratic election and a stabilizing regime succession in 1984, though this was accompanied by dollops of US domination that attracted international criticism. This was not an invasion but hegemonic regional peace enforcement.

In 1989 came a more literal US invasion of Panama that was a definite success. More than that, the successful US invasion ended the despotic military regime of Manuel Noriega that a quite impressive civil resistance

campaign and international sanctions regime failed to budge (Schock 2015, Chapter 4). So this case not only supports the realist theory that invasion can succeed by imposing superior military power; it also refutes the theory that civil resistance can defeat superior state military power.

Noriega was plied with lucrative offers to flee to refuge in a friendly haven with US support. He turned them down because the specific circumstances of his military rule had made him, his military, and his state a narco state that paid handsomely for loyalty to Noriega. This prevented the military from remaining in the barracks in response to civilian uprisings. They terrorized protestors and regime opponents. Noriega believed that if he were disloyal to the Medellin cocaine cartel by fleeing to freedom with US guarantees, the cartel would assassinate him. The solution therefore really was a US invasion that cut through the Panama military with ease to install a democracy that became more popular than the despot. Noriega was imprisoned as a drug lord in the United States. The military occupation lasted 6 weeks at a cost of fewer than 400 lives. Noriega made it easier for the United States to invade by declaring war against the United States after the United States supported oppressed protestors defending an opposition that had legitimately won an election stolen by Noriega. So a suite of factors converged to make a realist military invasion work in this case. Both Panama and Grenada had comparatively successful transitions to democracy.

Summarizing the Modern History of Invasions

In the Korean War, if we push this analysis back that far, both sides, militarily powerful though their great power backing was, became losers when they sought to invade the other. Their grandchildren inherited a dangerous frozen conflict. Further back still, Germany and its alliance partners lost badly from the invasions of World Wars I and II. So did the Habsburg Empire from invading Serbia to punish it for the murder of the successor to its throne. So did the Russian Czar, whose family could not even survive World War I thanks to his decision to reciprocally invade the Habsburg Empire in defense of Serbia. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, accrued benefits at a cost of millions of Soviet lives when it

conquered the Nazis in invaded Eastern Europe. It reasserted hegemony when it brought troops back into Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the other hand, 1968 in particular was a first step toward brooding defiance and ultimate imperial disintegration.

We can discern a huge strategic reversal during the twentieth century in how war works. The twentieth century has a long transitional phase of invasions sometimes failing, sometimes succeeding. Actually, the first of all world wars, where all major powers decided they had to join an alliance cascade, was the 30-Years War, 1618–1648, the first world war of a modernity that was emergent. It may have been the first case of a non-zero-sum war for a large number of states in the way World War I was (or in the way a nuclear war among the great powers would be). In the 30-Years War all participants were losers, not only from the sheer scale of troop losses, but from a great European famine the war caused, combined with war spreading a typhus epidemic and bubonic plague that took the lives of 8 million Germanic peoples alone.

As rare as invasions have become, this chapter has traversed the dismal record of invasions beginning with the Korean War, for achieving the invader's objectives. This book will return to further discussion of China's defeats in the 1950s by Taiwan when it attempted to invade Taiwanese islands in the Taiwan Strait, the French and then US invasions of Vietnam and Laos with many allies, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in retaliation, the separate Russian and US invasions of Afghanistan, the two US invasions of Iraq and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Israeli, Syrian and US invasions of Lebanon, the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste, the invasion of Democratic Republic of Congo by Rwanda, Uganda, and many other states, the attacks on Libya by NATO aircraft, NATO advisors on the ground and Sudanese tank battalions inside Libya in 2011 (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018), the invasions of Georgia and Ukraine by Russia, the earlier Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the short, low-casualty invasions of Grenada and Panama led by the United States.

Let me list some other invasions I could also have discussed that would not have changed my conclusions. I would say that they are all catastrophic failures rather than the 'catastrophic successes' of proxy interventions discussed in future chapters. None are clear successes in

the way Panama was. I could have discussed the disastrous Suez Crisis of 1956 when the UK, France, and Israel attempted old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy against Egypt, the 1961 Bay of Pigs Cuban invasion by an army of US citizens armed by the US state in pursuit of a CIA invasion plan, the invasions of Indian Kashmir by Pakistan in 1965 and 1999 and of Pakistan by India in 1971, the 1973 invasion of Israel by Egypt and Syria, the multiple Israeli invasions of Palestine, the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, the 1975 invasion of Spanish Sahara by Morocco, the 1982 Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands, and finally the Iraqi invasion of Iran of 1982 that was such a tragedy for both sides with more than a million lives lost, and a return to chemical warfare after a successful 62-year chemical weapons taboo.

None of these invasions change my conclusion that the short, low-casualty US invasion of Panama of 1989 is the *only* invasion since 1950 I can classify as a clear, sustained success for the invader. It was not a major invasion. Nevertheless, the Panama Canal, the Medellin Cartel, and removing a hated military dictatorship in Panama at that time were all important to the United States. Nor was it one of those short-term successes like the military defeats of Saddam Hussein that morphed to the ‘catastrophic success’ outcomes discussed in future chapters. Panama has been a peaceful and stable democracy in the 35 years since the US invasion. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia to defeat Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge was a merciful outcome for the Cambodian people in ending their genocide. But it did not achieve Vietnamese objectives of installing a regime of Vietnamese clients; it caused military fragmentation that turned to bite Vietnam; Vietnam was punished militarily for it by China, and ultimately withdrew in favor of a UN peace operation. Alexander Downes (2021) found the Vietnamese invasion to be a ‘catastrophic success’ in terms of the realist interests pursued by Vietnam. Yet it was a historically unique kind of humanitarian success.

The low ratio of one minor invasion success to many major failures between 1950 and 2024 is the reason invasion has become infrequent compared to its high frequency during four full millennia before World War I when invasion was the best way to accumulate wealth and

power, and during the transitional period of peak world war catastrophes between 1914 and 1950 that ushered in a new world with a UN Security Council.

War Made Past Empires

Prior to World War I, invasions to suppress competitors in a zero-sum way, to acquire resources and slaves, made total sense, and made realist international relations theory come true. Invasion was on the widest scale and was greatest in enrichment when the Americas were invaded by European powers. Russia's protracted expansion by taking bites out of the Ottoman, Chinese, and Habsburg Empires also built a huge and rich empire. Napoleon's conquest of most of Europe further illustrates this reality that dominated before World War I. Yet the reaction to the tide of triumphal Napoleonic invasions also reveals the kindling of new diplomatic thinking. This was the idea that many lesser powers could unite in an implausible coalition of old enemies and temporary partners to resist and end Napoleon's world domination. That notion can be advanced in a somewhat different way from Waterloo and the Concert of Europe, through the United Nations for example. The idea at the core of this book is to grow in an institutionally improved way the seed planted at the time of the Concert of Europe. What must be avoided about the Concert is a multipolarity that carves the world into spheres of domination by multiple major powers. There are no certainties, but it is possible to hold together an alliance of old enemies for long enough to see off a tyrant who seeks to dominate the world.

Invasions before World War I enriched winners in manifold ways. For the Spanish that could be as simple as stealing gold and silver from invaded lands. Conquest of the wide lands of the United States was also partly about gold in the West and rich agricultural land. Control of stupendous US hydrocarbon resources turned out to be more economically decisive by the time of the industrial revolution. Invasions built large internal markets throughout the long period of history when tariffs and customs duties were so high as to discourage the growth of flourishing markets without a big internal market. The large internal market

could also deliver food security, energy, and raw materials security during wars. It could construct the finance power of geopolitically nodal banks and even the domestic advantages of commanding a reserve currency like the US dollar for the past century, the British pound before that, the Dutch guilder before the pound. The United States could dominate the design of the post-war rules-based economic order at Bretton Woods, and the architecture of the World Trade Organization to support US economic interests (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). By dominating the world militarily, the economy of the greatest great power always benefits enormously from weapons exports. Given how massive these structural advantages of US hegemony have been, we will see that it is surprising that a dozen countries have a higher GDP per capita than the US, especially in purchasing parity terms, in terms of how much American consumers and American armies can afford to buy with their money. The United States does have more rich people than all these dozen countries, but they have richer people. I will show in the next section that a reason is that a full accounting for the costs of being warlike shows that the states that go to war most in contemporary conditions are economically weakened by this, and therefore decline in relative terms as a great power. Nevertheless, people today also fail to appreciate how important it was to the economic growth of empires that a large swathe of territory was pacified from the disabling levels of violence from highwaymen, pirates, and common robbers that prevailed before Napoleon (Braithwaite 2022). That is an underestimated part of why realism was such an empirically validated theory up to 1950.

As great a scholar as Graham Allison is, my analysis suggests it is a mistake for Allison (2017) to contend that because in almost all cases where an ascending power was challenged by a rising power since the 1400s, war resulted between them. Therefore the risk of war between the United States and China today is acute. For more than a century to the present, however, Allison finds only five such contests, of which three did result in war: the rise of Germany in 1914 and 1939 and Japan in 1941. No such wars in the rising power cases since then. My hypothesis is that this thinly populated pattern since World War II is a better guide to the likelihood of war between China and the United States than the pre-twentieth-century pattern because of the wider pattern of warmaking by

great powers and other major powers revealed in the earlier pages of this chapter. As Allison (2017, 154) himself points out, RAND estimates that a conventional war with the United States that did not escalate to nuclear war would cause Chinese GDP to decline by as much as 35% in the first year of war, and if it went nuclear, war would all but totally destroy the Chinese economy. Rising powers did not face this level of economic risk by their frequent warmaking of centuries ago. China has no intention of taking such risks today. Of course if diplomacy is conducted during the next decade with enough stigma, bravado, bluster, bullying, or provocation, a humiliated rising power might be foolish enough to get into such a fight. Democratic politics can create incentives for populist xenophobic politics, so this could happen. My argument is that even quite modest doses of restorative diplomacy can avert that outcome.

It must be added that widening the frame for understanding patterns of war beyond the narrow frame of examining the conflict between the two most strategic powers is not only a methodological imperative for seeing the bigger picture of warmaking patterns. It also goes to the problems of seeing war in Congo through the lens of the invasion of Congo by Rwanda and Uganda with US encouragement. That lens is important, but these countries entered wars that already existed for years as very local armed conflicts inside Eastern Congo. In the end, dozens of armies chose to fight their pre-existing conflicts from other parts of Africa inside Congo. Local conflicts co-opted national schisms to their projects and vice versa. Dualities of local fractures in Eastern Ukraine co-opting Russia, then Russia more profoundly co-opting them are important for comprehending the complexity of war in Ukraine. The same is true of Vietnam and Cambodia, Libya and its cascading effects across Africa that Islamic State piled into, and so many more of those conflicts in which major powers do join. At least since the Korean War, however, most war has been civil war; major powers join few of them. The chapters that follow consider wider patterns of the decline in civil wars for more than 20 years from the ending of the cold war, reversing to a steep rise in war and war deaths for the past decade and a half. The tragedy of civil wars in Eastern Congo, as in other places is that if peacemaking and peacekeeping had worked in the early 1990s in reconciling local Congolese conflicts, dozens of additional militaries

could have been dissuaded from returning to one another's throats inside Congo, consequences so bad as to make Congo the most deadly war the world has seen for many decades, and a war that spread HIV-AIDS across Africa and devastated uniquely rich ecosystems of the Congo river system region. We will see that simple enough forms of early detection, early prevention through local peacemaking and international peacekeeping can help prevent the terrible nests of wars we have seen cascade in Congo, Syria, Lebanon-Israel, the Balkans, and beyond (see also Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018).

Why Indonesia Grows Toward Becoming a Future Great Power

A decisive insight is provided by Indonesia deciding it was in their interests to let Timor-Leste go. It was no longer true that imperial mastery of a maximally large archipelago was crucial to the ascendancy that the East Indies had built as one of the richest societies on earth long before the Dutch enriched themselves by invading it. Indeed, by 1998 little enclaves that had remained separated from Indonesian sovereignty—Singapore and Brunei—had become much more nimble and affluent ASEAN members than Indonesia. Indonesia has credible prospects of becoming a great global power again, growing as fast as it is and embedded as it is in a formidably wealthy regional security community of Singapore, Malaysia, the other ASEANS, Australia, and New Zealand. A surrounding security community of states formally committed to peace with it (as opposed to a military alliance) is an advantage Indonesia enjoys over India (with its threat from, and hobbled trade with, as militarized a neighbor as Pakistan) in India's rise toward becoming a great power of the future multipolar world. Withdrawing from Timor-Leste helped the cause of Indonesia's global reputational capital. No great power would dare invade Indonesia today in the way the old Dutch empire did in a move that helped build Dutch affluence of the era when the Amsterdam stock exchange dominated the London, Paris, Frankfurt, and New York stock exchanges.

The Tunnel Vision of a Nuclear Peace

Learning from Timor-Leste is resumed as a topic later in this chapter. Before moving on to it, it is important to note a problem with the logic of claims made for the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in creating a world where great powers have not gone to war against each other (not directly, not by invading one another) for eight decades. It is true that Russia has not attacked the United States directly, nor the US Russia, since the invention of nuclear weapons. Russia was a state that was endlessly attacking not only great powers but countless other major powers during the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and the twentieth century to 1945. Since 1945 it has not attacked other major powers at all, though it invaded weak ones in Afghanistan and then in the new era that started with the 2008 invasion of tiny Georgia and continues today in Ukraine. Likewise the United States in the early twentieth century, the nineteenth and eighteenth, was attacking major middle powers including its neighbors Canada and Mexico, the declining power Spain, but also France and Britain's colonial armies. The United States has not been in the business of invading any of these powers since 1945. That has nothing to do with the fact that two of them have some nuclear weapons. Nor have any of the major powers of Europe waged war on one another regardless of whether they were European states with or without nuclear weapons, members of the EU or not. This is when they were so endlessly at war every which way with one another across the previous three centuries. Nor did Russia or the United States invade other G-20 states far away from Europe that had no nuclear weapons, like Indonesia, Australia, or Japan.

The pattern is that the era since the creation of the United Nations has been a good one for the prevention of wars among all major powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. Hence, the creation of nuclear weapons is a less credible explanation of the pattern than the creation of the United Nations (that can claim a larger number of cases as an explanation). This book is about arguing that the explanation is more complex than either of these simple-minded explanations. My Prologue pointed out that so many old generals say that they never experienced nuclear weapons being any practical use to them as military commanders. There have been more

than two dozen cases of threats to use nuclear weapons, most recently by Vladimir Putin. There is no record of any of these nuclear threats deterring effectively. They were all as ineffective as Putin's recent threats. Yes, NATO fears an unthinkable nuclear war with Russia, but it also fears an unthinkable conventional war between NATO and Russia that could escalate to a world war that drew in the massive armies of North Korea and China on the Russian side and other armies from Belarus, Syria, Central Asia, and Iran's huge army. That kind of conventional World War III would be worse than World War II. Today's tiny German army would suffer a greater slaughter than in World War II trying to fight its way across Belarus.

George H. Bush and his Secretary of State explicitly and implicitly threatened Saddam Hussein after Iraq invaded Kuwait with a nuclear strike if he proceeded to blow up Kuwait's oil and oil storage facilities. Hussein then proceeded to blow them up. As retired generals say when they come out of the closet to reveal themselves as nuclear abolitionists, nuclear weapons have not empirically proven themselves useful in any really existing strategic situation they have experienced, not when Nixon brandished them in Vietnam, not in Korea, not anywhere. Evidence of the power of implied threat is also weak. Sechser and Fuhrmann (2017, 73) analyzed 210 instances of one state making an explicit 'compellent threat' that threatened the use of force against another state to secure an outcome: 'The evidence is clear: states that possess nuclear weapons enjoy no more success when making compellent threats'.

Just as nuclear deterrence is a simple-minded unitary explanation of the great power peace and non-use of nuclear weapons in the nuclear era, so is nuclear deterrence a weak explanation of compliance of all great powers with the taboo against the use of chemical weapons since 1918. It is the taboo itself that explains better than the power of the weapons; it is a taboo that has worked with even the greatest militarists—Stalin, Putin, Hitler, and Tojo. Therefore further strengthening the taboo is a more useful approach to prevention than building more WMDs. Actually, what is required is a web of preventive controls akin to the 124 controls in Taiwan's epidemic preparedness plan. Criminologists learned this lesson long ago about deterring murder (Braithwaite 2022). If you increase deterrence with longer prison sentences, capital punishment,

boiling murderers in oil, and tearing strips of flesh from their bodies before you finish them, piling on more power to deterrence does nothing to reduce the murder rate. The fundamental insight from the criminological evidence is that for most people murder is simply unthinkable. If someone rips us off, it does not even enter our minds to deal with this by murdering them. So we do not get to the point of weighing how many years of prison we might get for doing so, and with what probability, in the unlikely event that we actually knew such facts. Again the main explanatory driver is a murder taboo, and the main game of criminological prevention is strengthening that taboo, but not just that taboo, also better mental health services, poverty reduction, redemptive schooling, stronger families, a list of something like 124 preventive policies (Braithwaite [2022](#))!

The Nonviolence Alternative of Timor-Leste Plus 21 Abolitionist States

Now let us consider a more radical empirical challenge to realist militarism today. How should we think about states like Costa Rica whose Constitution since 1949 has forbidden re-establishment of its standing army? It was abolished after a military regime was dismantled in 1948. Costa Rica has enjoyed a much less violent and more affluent society with less poverty than the average across the rest of Central America and Latin America. Costa Rica has not been invaded by any of the militarily more powerful states that surround it. Nor has any jealous neighbor assassinated its leadership, fomented coups, or interfered in elections to achieve regime change. Costa Rica has survived for 76 years since military abolition without committing troops to any war. Central America roiled around it as one of the most war-afflicted, death-squad-decimated regions of the planet since 1948. Other Central American states suffered hundreds of war-afflicted years compared to the Costa Rican experience of zero war-afflicted years across 76 years. This and the kindred comparison of Costa Rican war-years with the war-years and non-war-years of all other states of the Americas is statistically strong. This statistical pattern is stronger still when one adds data from other countries of the Americas

that followed the Costa Rican example of abolishing their militaries and/or changing their Constitution to ban the creation of a standing army since 1979: Panama, Grenada, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines. These are much weaker states than Costa Rica, even tinier states that are 'easy' to invade. They have survived 284 war-free years and zero war-afflicted years since they abolished their militaries, compared to the hundreds of war-afflicted years of other South, Central American, and Caribbean societies.³

There are 21 small countries on the planet that between them have had more than a thousand war-free years and invasion-free years since they abolished their standing army. Political, ethnic, and religious conflict does at times become violent in these societies. Foreign enemies can infiltrate arms to mount an insurgency. What happens then when states have no army to manage this situation? What they do is ask the United Nations or a regional organization of states to approve an international peacekeeping operation to support their police to restore order. An example of a country which has never had a standing army that had an armed uprising that might easily have cascaded to a full-scale war was Solomon Islands. Reluctantly at first, Australia led RAMSI, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands from 2003 that disarmed insurgents. It was not a UN peacekeeping mission, but a UN-authorized regional mission that was police-led, militarily-supported, and supported by contingents from most Pacific Island states. It succeeded in preventing a full-scale war that was in the process of being mounted. RAMSI assisted the Solomon Islands state to prosecute the commanding war criminals, disarm them, and restore criminal enforcement against all forms of violence with guns (Braithwaite et al. 2010).

Timor-Leste did not become number 22 on the list of 21 countries without a standing army. Its history of armed conflict is nevertheless instructive to the disarmament discussion. Timor-Leste had an extreme outbreak of armed violence in 2006 that bore some similarities to Solomon Islands. The first government after the 1999 independence referendum initially had a Costa Rica policy—no standing army. How could its standing army possibly resist militarily its nearest neighbor, Indonesia, or its other near-neighbor, Australia? It opted instead for a

successful restorative diplomacy of healing, reconciliation, and truth-telling with Indonesia, though of weak justice (Braithwaite et al. 2012). In the end Timor-Leste created a tiny army to placate combatants who demanded secure post-war jobs. Sadly, it was so tiny that an ambitious police minister who was still a Marxist revolutionary was able to arm his police sufficiently to be a dire threat to the more moderate ex-combatants in the military. Firefights broke out between the military and the police, supported on each side by co-opted youth gangs. The UN responded with a new UN peacekeeping mission that disarmed all fighting factions, reformed the police and the military in accordance with principles of democratic policing. Sixteen years of peace ensued in Timor-Leste since 2008. It is consolidated as a democracy with fair elections and a deepening separation of powers (Braithwaite et al. 2012). These South Pacific experiences of successful UN-sanctioned peacekeeping in countries with no standing army that are endangered by armed violence are empirically persuasive. It may not be irresponsible to abolish their standing army and concentrate their tax collections on improving education systems and health care systems in a way that creates sustainable development and saves more lives. This can only be responsible if the UN and regional organizations like the African Union increase peacekeeping budgets and strengthen peacekeeping guarantees for responsiveness to elected governments without militaries.

The contemporary context for these hypotheses is that there is no sociologically possible future world where *all* societies will decide to abolish their standing armies. There is no possible future world where all neighboring countries that want peace and prosperity in their region refuse to send peacekeepers to support elected governments under siege from insurgents. To be able to depend on regional or UN support from an invasion, however, what governments must be careful to do is remain democratically elected and refuse to get involved in regime change meddling in their region.

Civil Resistance Often Works in Contemporary Conditions

Nor is there any sociologically possible world in which a ruthless invasion, replete with death squads, will not be resisted militarily by some partisans who reject nonviolence. In contemporary conditions, nonviolent civil resistance can do most of the work that was done by defense forces before 1950. It cannot solve all security problems, however; it cannot defend against blackmail by rogue WMD states or terrorists. Moreover, purist nonviolent defense of Costa Rica is not what would happen if it were invaded. If Costa Rica were invaded by Venezuela tomorrow, the United States might arm partisans with drones and other technologies of war with the aim of rendering the invasion ungovernable and costly; if the United States invaded Costa Rica, Russia or sympathetic Latin American states might do the same.⁴ Cheap drones can come out of nowhere to blow a locomotive off its tracks. They may prove a gamechanger for long-term disruption of invasions that render invasions even more unprofitable adventurism in contemporary conditions. What in the past became 'frozen conflicts' may in future become semi-frozen intermittent drone wars in Ukraine and beyond. Teenagers may arrive at night in wooded sections of city parks with their flat-pack cardboard drone, launch at a faraway target, then sneak home through the trees. No resistance army is required for that; rigorous training for disciplined civilian resistance is required.

Agents provocateur might well be planted undercover within the ranks of nonviolent activists to undermine the effectiveness of nonviolent discipline, as has increasingly happened since the Tiananmen Square tragedy in China, 1989. Nevertheless, most of the ungovernability for an invader of Costa Rica would be accomplished by nonviolent means such as strikes, sabotage, noncooperation with governmental decisions, rallying international sanctions, the diverse range of Gene Sharp's (1973, 2005) 198 techniques of nonviolent resistance, with modern cyber-resistance added. These have proven valuable in reversing what would have been rewards from invasions before 1950 to costs today. The emerging paradox of simple solutions here is that because contemporary governance has such networked complexity, simply withdrawing networked

cooperation of citizens from it can cripple it when the motivation for noncooperation is robust, organized, and disciplined.

Luke Abbs' (2021) pathbreaking study on the impact of nonviolent resistance to war concludes empirically that large-scale and nonviolent resistance does increase the likelihood of negotiated resolution to civil wars between 1955 and 2013. This is a study of resolutions aimed at maximalist institutional change to transform military dominance over the state.⁵ The Abbs analysis and the literature he reviews support the conclusion that the more potent and disciplined a nonviolent resistance movement is in transforming resistance away from armed struggle and toward more nonviolent resistance, the better the outcomes are in terms of non-domination.⁶ More broadly we know from large N studies that transitions brought about by nonviolence are more likely to succeed than those that pursue maximalist institutional change by violent means. The evidence is that nonviolent transformation is less likely to be followed by civil wars than violent regime changes, and are more likely to accomplish transformation of state institutions toward democracy.⁷ The effect sizes in these literatures tend not to be small. There are large effects of nonviolent resistance in achieving outcomes with less domination than armed resistance.

These empirical lessons inform an ethical position. It is that although prevention of resort by some to violent resistance to an invasion or a military coup is difficult, the ethical thing might be to push for nonviolent civil resistance to the invasion that is as potent as possible. With patience and creative adaptation in the struggle, democratic civil resistance can almost certainly win in the long term if it is robust and organized enough because the invader will eventually crumble and decide to pull out. Gandhi and Martin Luther King saw this emergent reality of modernity. Theirs is the simpler wisdom we do best to attend to in the age of WMDs and space war that beams in AI warfare that could evolve to become monstrously risky for human survival.

It may seem that I stray too far from my prime objective here. I simply say that military realists cannot point to an example of any of the 21 countries undefended by a standing army that has been invaded in recent decades because they have no army. Nor can they dissuade me that Indonesia will ever invade Timor-Leste's insignificant army again,

notwithstanding their many disputes over offshore oil and many other matters, and their bitter past as enemies; this is because Indonesia and Timor-Leste practice restorative diplomacy with one another that helps both to heal and grow (Braithwaite et al. 2012). Nor can realists credibly assert that it would not be a painful experience were any army to attempt to invade any of the 21 countries with no standing army at all, regardless of how unaligned the invader and invaded country were. On my analysis, realists can point to only one example of a country with a standing army that has invaded a foreign country since the Korean War and made a clear success of the invasion (the United States in Panama, 1989). Bull's international relations as a bird with a wing of realist default and a wing of liberal institutionalism with a consolidated rule-based international order can allow pacifist states to flourish. It also causes invasions increasingly to fail ever more profoundly as modernity moves forward.

The Puzzle That the Wealthiest Societies are Militarily Weak

There are many ways that great powers cash in on their geopolitical might to grow rich. Great powers are rule makers of the world system, small powers are rule takers, and great powers write the rules to enrich themselves (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). This persists as a huge economic advantage great powers enjoy, but became increasingly offset by growing costs of wars and high military spending to defend great power status. Historically, militaries enabled the biggest driver of great power economic advantage, which was conquest. This chapter argues that conquest has shifted from being a driver of wealth to a driver of the decline of great powers. Big economies drive tougher bargains in trade deals than weak economies. But the toughness of trade deal negotiation has become much less important to economic growth than innovation and productivity that drives high prices for exports to somewhere, whatever is in the text of trade agreements with great powers. Military power used to enable cost-effective military-backed meddling in other countries. If the ruler of a British colony decided to ignore their imperial obligation to import from British factories, preferring to buy

from cheaper suppliers, this was not tolerated. British meddling backed by gunboat diplomacy replaced that ruler. Chapter 9 argues that in the eighteenth century, it was still possible for Britain to do that in North America, but meddling became increasingly costly for Britain. It had become expensive indeed by the Revolutionary War with the United States, escalating American Indian wars and Indian resistance, and the wars with France on American soil. Chapter 9 argues that regime change by great powers remains today extremely successful at changing regimes, but the cost and blowback of doing so has grown to become a cause of great power wealth depletion rather than great power ascendancy.

It is important to elaborate the conclusion that superior national prosperity was built in the realist world from ancient times until 1945 by military might and invasions. This ceased being very true in the more complex world that followed the founding of the United Nations in 1945. In the nineteenth century, the country that had been the richest for more than a millennium, China, was deposed from that pedestal by militarily superior European invaders sailing gunboats up the Yellow, Yangtze, and Pearl Rivers to control strategic trade hubs. They humiliated China to become their vassal, to keep buying their opium, as they carved up its trade routes. With the normative disintegration that followed, China was further decimated, fragmented by its own Chinese warlords. Invasions had built the wealth of all the greatest powers of the nineteenth century—the Ottoman and then the Habsburg Empires that were eclipsed by the Russian Empire, then briefly by Napoleon's French Empire, the British Empire, then the German empire that Bismarck built. The French, British, Germans, Russians, Ottomans, and Habsburgs were all eclipsed by the United States after the invasions of the two world wars devastated all European powers much more than the United States. American power/wealth was initially based on the invasion of the fecund lands of Indigenous America. By the end of the nineteenth century, another society built even greater wealth per capita than the United States and every nineteenth-century European society by invading rich Indigenous lands—Australia. One reason Australia built even greater wealth per capita than the United States by 1900 was that it not only stayed out of European wars of conquest, as did the Americans; Australia also avoided any large-scale civil war of the kind that set the

Americans back in the 1860s. That was also true of the comparatively stupendous per capita wealth of New Zealand before World War I.

A big clue to how the relationship between military power and prosperity changed after 1945 came with the economic growth of what had become a militarily weak Japan and West Germany to become the second and third largest economies (after the United States) for 60 years until China sailed past them. If we look at GDP *per capita* in current US dollars, the United States today ranks 13th, however. The three countries that are 14th to 16th (Iceland, the Netherlands, and Denmark) are small, militarily weak states, as are *all* the countries that rank ahead of the United States on this list (in order, Qatar, Macao, Luxemburg, Singapore, Brunei, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Switzerland, San Marino, Hong Kong). One can quibble that Hong Kong and Macao are now subordinated to China, which is militarily strong, but the fact is that these colonies became so much wealthier than the rest of China when they were independent, before their integration under the Chinese military umbrella.⁸ If the comparison is done in GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity terms (according to how much per capita income can buy in each country), the United States is also 13th on IMF numbers (slightly lower in World Bank and CIA data)⁹ but the countries above it are still all militarily weak (in order Ireland, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein, Singapore, Qatar, Monaco, Macao, United Arab Emirates, Bermuda, Switzerland, Isle of Man, Norway) and again the five countries immediately below the United States are also small, militarily weak states. The next major military power moving down this list is France, which has a lower GDP per capita than 31 other mostly small, weak states. Military weakness has paid hearty dividends during the 76 years since Costa Rica showed the path to that payoff.

The reason the United States is the huge exception to this is well documented in the political economy literature. It is the degree to which US prosperity is based on the sheer scale of US military exports, as discussed in Linda Weiss's (2014) work. Stockholm International Peace Research numbers for 2022 show that every other major weapons exporter is an arms exporting pygmy compared to the United States. US arms exports are much more than four times as high as those of France, more than five times Russia's, more than seven times China's weapons

exports (SIPRI 2022). Even though the United States has 30 times the value of exports as the number 10 country on this list, doubtless all top ten arms exporters benefit enormously from war in a way that normal states do not. America's national security economy also made the United States the preeminent information economy. Without Pentagon R & D investment, there would have been no internet and much more limited development of computers and AI.

Being a warlike realist with a huge military-industrial complex did drive the United States down to 12th or 13th on the GDP per capita league tables, but not as far down that league table as it might have without offsetting by stupendous weapons exports that made America richer. Being a warlike realist delivered the US middle and working class more meager returns. It is in the character of a national security economy that it becomes a more unequal economy, as we see is also happening to China and Russia. There are more than 20 countries where the incomes of the middle class and the working class buy them more than their middle and working class comparators in the United States (and in Russia and China). A state that is a warlike realist can serve well the interests in power accumulation for its military-industrial complex. In the United States case, it has served the interests of its ordinary people poorly in terms of how comfortably and safely most of them live (Braithwaite 2022). Indeed this is true of all great powers in the world today in a way that was not true of what imperial military power delivered to ordinary people living in great powers in the nineteenth century, the eighteenth, the seventeenth, and indeed for half the twentieth century. Realist warmaking delivered for rich and poor alike in these previous centuries. Realist international relations theorists are loathe to look in the eye how the realist interests of states and power elites increasingly pull apart from a rational choice analysis of the interests of citizens.

I invite readers to contemplate their own answers to a big question here. Why does Indonesia not invade nearby Brunei and Singapore when these two societies have so much wealth and smaller militaries? One answer might be that before these countries became extremely wealthy, Indonesia did invade East Timor in 1975. We have seen that this proved a costly folly. Why does not militarily powerful France, a nuclear power, invade more wealthy and militarily weak Luxemburg,

Lichtenstein, San Marino, and Monaco? Why does not militarily strong Britain, a nuclear power, re-invade its former colony Ireland from bases in Northern Ireland? Is the pain experienced from continuing to swallow and occupy the Northern Ireland porcupine in contemporary conditions one answer? Now the United Kingdom is out of the EU, why does it not occupy the Faroe Islands in the North Sea, which are much wealthier than the UK, seizing them from Denmark? Why does not large and militarily powerful Mexico consider occupying disarmed Costa Rica and other richer microstates in the Caribbean like Bermuda (one of the ten richest countries in GDP PPP). There are some good realist answers to all these questions. I hypothesize that another good answer is that the norm against invading other countries now has deep roots in the world system, in international law, and in the consciousness of international civil society. The invasion taboo has institutional roots through the UN Security Council. In the case of Ukraine, Russia can and does veto Security Council resolutions aimed at defending the sovereignty of Ukraine. Powerful Putin allies, however, including Presidents Xi and Erdogan, endorsed Ukrainian sovereignty as strongly as the US and EU, even if they did not donate arms at scale to either side.

The US military-industrial complex promotes a strategic consensus through its captive thinktanks. It dismisses the Costa Rican example of 76 years ago, disengages from their empirical experience. It may be in the interests of the United States if countries like Costa Rica changed course and helped build US affluence by buying US weapons systems. But for 76 years it has been in the interests of Costa Rica to depend on the peacemaking of the United Nations, on the civilian resistance capabilities of its civil society, and support from the Organization of American States to guarantee its four pillars of democracy, human rights, security and development in its peacemaking.

In the overwhelming majority of democracies where elites reject the Costa Rican path, where voters understandably want security delivered by a standing army, what is the democrat who believes in graduated mutual disarmament (GRIT) to do? That depends on the strategic circumstances of a particular time and place. One option is to argue within the democracy that in contemporary conditions it is best to keep defense spending as low as our fellow voters can be persuaded to keep

it. Invest instead in quality education and other forms of human, social, and infrastructural capital that will better grow a strong economy that is capable of scaling up defense spending quickly at times of danger. Early 2020s military victories by Ethiopia and Azerbaijan showed that drone warfare capability in modern conditions can be scaled up quickly to states with the wealth to pay for rapid drone deliveries. Saudi Arabia is wealthy enough that it believes it does not need nuclear weapons. It seems to have agreed with Pakistan on how to rent its mobile nuclear weapons in a dangerous crisis with a nuclear-armed Israel, for example. Ukraine demonstrated that its success rate in defense against endless incoming Russian missiles and drones could scale up quite rapidly to high enough to frustrate Russian aggression.

To the extent that a democracy insists on growing the military, in an Australian context for example, nonviolent resistance activists can at least argue against long-range missiles and submarines that can hit and provoke China, Japan, or any emergent regional power. They can argue instead for shorter-range missiles that can hit ships and aircraft invading Australia before they near Australia's border. That is, advocate a defensive balance secured by sustainable economic growth (Gholz et al. 2019). My take on the work of defensive balance theorists is, first, that most states seek security less than the domination of other states. Second, security is plentiful in contemporary conditions; restorative diplomacy can cultivate security that is even more plentiful. In contrast, conquest is difficult in contemporary conditions. Offensive balance creates dangerous incentives to strike first when states achieve an offensive advantage over their foes. It creates security dilemmas that result in an insecure potential enemy hitting us before we hit it.

Defensive balance contributes to stability, offensive balance to instability and war. Stephen Van Evera (1998) makes the paradoxical case for defensive balance: 'a chief source of insecurity in Europe since medieval times has been this false belief that security was scarce. This belief was a self-fulfilling prophecy, fostering bellicose policies that left all states less secure'. Van Evera argues that the long-term empirical record since medieval times is that great powers have been three times as likely to be overrun by provoked aggressors than by unprovoked aggressors. Today it is impossible to imagine that any power could overrun Russia, China,

or the United States; in the first half of the twentieth century, it was easy to imagine and see great powers being overrun. Hence, the defensive balance calculus is even more profound for a world where the risks of being overrun continually reduce. But the risks of provoking a nuclear war that destroys the planet, as a result of offensive provocations by either side in Taiwan, or preference of both sides for fighting over diplomacy in Ukraine, are at higher levels than ever. Provocation risks also escalate because some of the newer nuclear powers are politically unstable. Finally, provocation risks from a cult of offense worsen because of the capability of cyberweapons, hypersonic missiles, AI weapons, the proliferation of long-range cruise missiles and sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike anonymously.

States that seek security can cooperate with likeminded states in the rare circumstance where a state acts to secure military domination of other states in preference to market domination. Market domination has a higher benefit–cost ratio for all powers with large GDPs or high productivity that can grow GDP rapidly. Hence, a preference for domination by military rather than economic means is irrational for states with substantial military capability. However, advocacy of domination by military means is rational for arms manufacturers. It is rational for those employed or funded as scholars to be professional fellow travelers of the military-industrial complex. Domination by military means is rational for politicians who get dollops of campaign funding from arms traders. It can also be lucrative for some influencers to showboat stigmatization of enemies or to sow panic in cyberspace. Such interests do get the upper hand at times of populist politics. That risk is not so great, however, that it makes sense to play the security game in the same irrational way as competing states caught up in such populism. Non-military competition through markets combined with restorative diplomacy is more sensible and more rationally lucrative for states and for the citizens of those states. That is a better description of the way China, Japan, and ASEANs think than of the way NATO states think.

The difficulty of contemporary conquest makes it unthinkable for China to invade Australia and Indonesia for the first time, or Japan to attempt it again. It is no longer D-Day. An invading army could not

secretly sail toward Australia today without Australian detection thousands of miles before their arrival, and without time to sink many ships before approaching the Australian border. Better for Australia to pursue a diplomacy of missile destruction to end acceleration of the emergent missile race in its region (Ogilvie-White 2020). But if Australia must arm with hypersonic weapons, let us make them short-range for hitting those ships and aircraft rather than long-range for hitting China's homeland. In other words, reject the 'cult of the offensive' that produced the folly of World War I that then cascaded to World War II (Snyder 1989; Van Evera 1984), reduce defense expenditure, but maximize defensive balance.

One might counter that a society like Israel, quite unlike Australia, is uniquely subject to existential threats by Iran and others that are geographically nearby. Israel might have a history of offensives against Palestine and Lebanon in particular that have not been as productive as restorative diplomacy might have been. In recent times, restorative diplomacy has proved productive for Israel with old enemies like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Even so, one can understand that there may be a stronger case for offensive balance in a case like Israel. Good theories seek to perform moderately well even in a 'least likely case' like Israel (Eckstein 2000). On this view, a theory that holds up in the circumstances where it is least likely to work will prove a good theory. In least-likely case terms, it is worth noting that Israel has seen a significant shift toward greater defensive balance in recent decades as its hybrid military has assessed critically the benefits of an offensive balance that it sustained in earlier decades (Barak et al. 2023). Gaza in 2024, 2025 and beyond will be a new test of whether offensive balance delivers less than in the imaginations of Israeli leaders. All that said, AI has dual offensive and defensive uses in warfare and it is hard to foresee what the impact of AI on the offensive balance doctrines of great powers versus weak powers will be.

It is also important to argue that offensive balance is inferior to defensive balance that trains warriors dispersed across a society to resist invasions by launching local drone sabotage attacks against the camps, the logistics, the communications, and the bridges vital to invaders. Democracies can decide to turn those drone units from sabotage units

into units that kill invading troops. The most important elements in effective drone defense that provides a nonviolent resistance option are, first, training a large cadre of civilian resisters who can craft diverse, unpredictable tactics of civil resistance, and second, the wealth to keep up an endless supply of the most advanced drones and well dug-in and supplied defensive positions in mountains. The advice of the military chief of Louis XII to his question of what is the key to success in wars endures: it was three things: ‘money, more money, and still more money’ (Blattman 2022, 87). In other words, this is more true today because money can scale up drone defense very quickly, but can also help scale up nonviolence defense by civilian resistance. Although money remains more important than missiles, even more important today is an activist international society that builds restorative diplomatic capital, more diplomatic capital, and still more diplomatic capital.

Offensive balance in economic innovation by reducing the taxation and economic burdens of wars and defense spending makes sense today for the rational society partly because it allows them to be richer and therefore more capable of sustained weapons purchases and preparation for civilian resistance when dark clouds gather. Offensive military balance and the arms races they drive no longer make sense. They made more sense in the first half of the twentieth century, and probably most previous centuries. That was because in previous centuries diplomatic capabilities were much weaker—for example UN diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, and hotlines barely existed, diplomatic corps had meager resources and the social science of evidence-based diplomacy had not begun to show empirical results like the cost-effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. In previous centuries, societies were much less complexly coupled. This meant civilian resisters had access to fewer chokepoints that could uncouple the governability of a society and its economy. In the world of previous centuries, there was a better realist case for offensive balance because national wealth and security were constituted by military victories against rival powers who had been on the rise for decades as challengers to the power of their rival. Wealth was built by empire building, enslavement of people, and gunboat diplomacy, by domination of large spaces, their resource riches, and large numbers of slaves and subject peoples.

Temporary Alliances to Contain Nuclear War Threats

I hypothesize that in any possible future world, a state or terrorist organization that sought to develop covert WMDs could motivate the rest of the world to contain and deter it. The world would not need nuclear weapons to accomplish this.

In a non-nuclear world it must be legal to respond to the use of WMDs under Art. 51 (self-defence) and via UNGA Uniting for Peace, empowering both a forceful national as well as collective response with conventional means. Even (collective) missile defence might be a part of this response. (Muller 2020, 157; citing other literature relevant to this)

However much progress disarmament had made, the residual combined conventional deterrence capabilities of a coalition of willing United Nations members to contain any rogue WMD state would always be sufficient to contain it. It would be irrational for any rogue state to pursue such a path. More specifically, I contend there is a conventional deterrence path to one of the two wings of Hedley Bull's or George Kennan's approach to the survival of our species. But there is no longer a nuclear deterrence wing that can keep succeeding during the next century or two.

The nuclear deterrence wing of security must be replaced by deterrence that is more realistically attuned with contemporary realities of technological risk and risks of disintegration of the institutions of a rules-based international order. The priority then is not an arms race balance. That will endlessly become unbalanced, as we can see with the superior data that hindsight provides about the deep and incipient imbalances of every past historical period. The future will be even more frequently and rapidly unbalanced than in the past by the fecundity of innovation in technological complexity coupled to the flux of cascading crises. The deterrence priority is to repair and strengthen the institutions of the rule-based international order, to strengthen the UN, and most of all 'international society', and its 'civil sphere' (Alexander 2006). The idea is to ensure that there is always the capability to assemble credible

residual containment and deterrence capabilities (by military, economic, and social means) to dissuade rogue states or terrorists from dominating the world with WMD threats.

Of course another way of moving toward abolition and enforcing this step by step is to replace anarchy with world government in the way Albert Einstein, Robert Oppenheimer, Bertrand Russell, and other great thinkers articulated as the path to surviving nuclear weapons during the late 1940s. They may have been right. Moreover, world government might be a better way of institutionalizing a global climate, pandemic, and inequality response than our current anarchical order dominated by grasping, violent great powers. World government is harder to accomplish, however, than voluntary cooperation and coalition building to enforce step by step containment of WMDs and other catastrophe risks.

Thinking softly about alliance diplomacy. Australia has security treaties with Indonesia and New Zealand that require mutual respect and assistance to preserve the territorial sovereignty of each other. This was good for Indonesia in earlier decades when Australia was more militarily capable than Indonesia. It was good for Australia because sometime in this century, Indonesia was bound to become more militarily powerful than Australia. It was also a credible commitment because even without a formal alliance, Australia had supported the liberation of Indonesia from Japanese domination and then from its pre-war colonial master, the Netherlands. More fundamentally, it is also a credible agreement, because who would be so foolish as to invade an Indonesia supported by Australia and New Zealand today? In the unlikely event that China or Japan sailed their navies down against these countries today, so many of their ships would be detected by contemporary technology and sunk in the Pacific long before they arrived. Invading Australia was too much for Japan to accomplish in 1943, and today far too much for China to consider. China has zero interest in doing this. China's interests are to enjoy economic hegemony over Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia instead. If China did win on all the southern battlefields required, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand would be some triplet of echidnas (porcupines of the south) to swallow and pacify. This is true even though Australia's national resources are perhaps more tempting for an invader than those of any invadable large land mass protected by a

thinly dispersed population. Pacifying an invaded Australia would still be more costly than paying the market price for the import of Australian natural resources, especially for a dominant buyer like China.

Do Indonesia-Australia security agreements make sense when Indonesia was seemingly opposed to alliances as a leader of the non-aligned movement, and as the leader of ASEAN? ASEAN is a regional grouping stringently opposed to ever becoming a military alliance. It has no formal military alliance with Australia. It is enough to show any northern invader heading toward Australia via Indonesia that Australia would help Indonesia, as it did against Japan in 1941, and that Indonesia and Australia enjoy deep and beneficial diplomatic relationships. All societies need protection with allies when as powerful and malevolent a leader as Hitler storms the stage. In that circumstance, Roosevelt and Churchill had to make Stalin their ally. Potential future Hitlers must understand that precisely the reaction they will trigger by a combination of murderous tyranny and a will to world domination is that unlikely allies like Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin will indeed align against them. China worked with the United States a decade and a half ago to persuade the Myanmar junta to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, and then even let go of power. They could work together in future to subdue reckless North Korean nuclear blackmail of South Korea. I nevertheless argue that alliances are best when they are soft, contingent, and temporary. George Washington may have been right when he said in his Farewell Address that US policy should be to grow strong commercially by trade with all countries:

[Europe] must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities... it is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world (Office of the Historian [2023](#))

Translating this to contemporary decisionmaking, Washington's analysis might imply that the world should want alliances of China with North

Korea and Russia to be sufficiently soft that if North Korea initiates ridiculous provocation of South Korea, China should be utterly circumspect about rushing to back them with the kind of military support it did afford them in 1950. In 2030 it should not repeat any such folly; it should not risk escalation to World War III. Or if Russia initiates a preventable war with Ukraine, the rest of the world if required must persuade China against responding by putting Chinese Divisions on the ground in Ukraine or by missile attacks on German factories that supply tanks and missiles to Ukraine. China of course was prudent in needing no persuasion of this kind.

Conversely, if an Eastern European state indulges a provocative military attack on Russia, and Russia responds militarily, other NATO states would be wise to decline from piling in on a World War III that cascaded from such imprudent provocation. If Taiwan provoked China in a reckless way, and China overreacted, causing in turn a military overreaction of the United States in defense of Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and the European Union should be reticent to pile into that war. They might consider the alternative of piling in on soft diplomacy to avert escalation, to prevent nuclear war or a conventional war on Taiwanese soil that the United States would likely lose or fail to win. A good US ally would work hard at persuading both China and the United States not to overreact, just as it should have tried harder to persuade the United States not to overreact to September 11 in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In summary, it is good that despotic great powers understand that tyranny will be resisted by many other powers allying against them to defend a rules-based international order that rejects wars of aggression. It is also good when regional bodies like ASEAN are infused with the Indonesian spirit of non-alignment. It is good that ASEAN sets its face against being a hard military alliance for mutual protection against China, or renewed militarism in Japan, or US adventurism directed against an ASEAN member like Vietnam. It is good when NATO and its alliance mentality is kept out of Asia. It is healthy when the Global South unites against the mentality of both Russia and NATO of building empires, building military alliances, Warsaw Pacts, and Monroe Doctrines. They can cascade violence widely, can cascade to repeated world wars. NATO has re-emerged as a hard alliance that

neglects preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. It failed to prevent a preventable Ukraine war that risked another world war.

In September 2023 NATO proved incapable of deploying peacekeepers to prevent ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia was unwilling to do so. The follies of European preventive diplomacy meant Europe sat on its hands as Azerbaijan also invaded and occupied Armenian national territory, taking by armed force bits of border areas that Azerbaijan desired in 2022–2023, taking the high ground of border villages, cutting villages in half, then rolling burning tyres down on the half of the village not ethnically cleansed. Europe proved impotent as one of the ugliest genocidal chapters of its history risked resumption. European diplomacy preferred fossil fuels that flowed through pipelines across Azerbaijan rather than Russia. The Global South shows leadership for international society to resist enduring colonial mentalities of Russia and NATO in theaters like Ukraine and Armenia, as it did with unsuccessful attempts to resist the 2011 NATO attack on Libya led by President Sarkozy of France and supported by most NATO countries.

In 1914 when Serbia responded insufficiently to tame its Black Hand terrorists after they assassinated Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, Austria would have done better with a diplomatic response that was consequential enough to be an alternative to invading Serbia. Then Russia would have done better by its interests, and those of all Europe, by responding diplomatically as a healer rather than by mobilizing against Austria to defend Serbia. When that diplomatic prudence failed to prevail, Germany and Britain could have worked together to contain the war against any further escalation. Together they could have averted a war that would leave Germany and Britain with huge war debts, weakened powers. Had Germany declined to do that, Britain would have done better to decline to treat its loyalty to Belgium as a hard treaty obligation. It was not. Britain likely would have had a better future by staying out of World War I, even at that late stage.

Britain's interest was to avert the loss of 700,000 of its youth, avert the terrible sequence of debt, rise of communism, then depression, fascism, then World War II, that cascaded from World War I. Even when Britain had gone in, my hypothesis is that Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, and India would have done better by the interests of their

people, and by all humankind, by refusing to pile in. In 1914, it would have been preferable for them to transform the British Empire to what it became after 1945, a super-soft alliance structure that involved no binding commitments to jump into wars of the colonial master. These colonies should have learnt lessons from George Washington of a century earlier. The United States itself followed the enduring counsel of George Washington in 1914, but by 1917 its choice was somewhat different. In 1914, the United States was not the dominant power in the world system, but by 1917 Germany, Britain, and Russia had been so weakened by the war that US hegemony was sufficiently assured that its very entry to the war meant that it would bring an end to it, achieved without the massive loss of life suffered by other major combatants.

Had Germany won that war because Britain and its Empire walked away in 1914 in favor of international peace diplomacy, critics say a tyrannical Germany would have quickly dominated Europe. We cannot know what would have happened. But the Kaiser was far less of a tyrant than Hitler. A higher percentage of the German population was voting in elections in 1914 than in Britain (let alone across the British Empire). Germany had the strongest independent university system of 1914 with many critical voices, robust social democratic political parties, and a stronger welfare state than Britain. Germany likely would have exacted major reparations against its principal foe France. We need not speculate about how bad that would have been because we had already seen it after Germany defeated France in their 1870–1871 war. That oppression of France by Germany in the 1870s did not totally crush a resilient European civilization, nor European democratic diversity, though it did hobble the financial power of the Paris Stock Exchange, mainly to the advantage of the City of London, then Wall Street. Europe in 1914 would have been politically indigestible for Germany to swallow and fully tyrannize. Vassal states occupied by Germany would have been wracked by democratic, labor movement, and liberal sentiment to resist tyranny through underground movements. These movements surely might have linked arms with German and global liberalism or social democracy, making for an irascible German-European populace for the Kaiser to tame. Perhaps with no prospect of British or American allies, Russia would have come to terms earlier with German hegemony over

Western Europe and would have transitioned to social democracy rather than capitulated to communism? We can never know. Yet my inclination is to concur with Gandhi and the Indian National Congress analysis of the time that Europe was endangering its future by betting the bank on a reckless world war.

Moreover, as we saw when Hitler's infinitely more demonic and genocidal militarism did conquer continental Europe upon the ashes of World War I and the Great Depression, the world's remaining democracies—including Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, combined at the last minute in a just and effective war working with continental anti-fascist undergrounds and the swathes of a Soviet Union that was still not defeated. That alliance saw off Hitler. None of this is to deny that critics of British and American Appeasement of Hitler were right. It would have been better to begin earlier to confront Hitler militarily, to have scaled up armaments production earlier. Sufficient evidence of Hitler's true intent was apparent long before it persuaded the British and American strategic establishment to mobilize. My point here, however, is that had there been no World War I humiliation of Germany and slaughter of its youth, no debt crisis so severe as to pave a path to a crash and depression as deep as 1929, perhaps then Europe would have been a seedbed less receptive to fascism and genocide. Perhaps then Hitler would never have secured the political support to get away with the mass execution and imprisonment of German social democrats and even liberals. Keynesian economics and Bismarkian welfare state leadership after all proffered superior economic solutions to the economic dilemmas festering from 1917 than communism or fascism. These are considerations for a counterfactual analysis of freedom and tyranny. It could only provide uncertain answers.

There has always been a strong minority of opinion among British political and intellectual leaders of no lesser prominence than the Liberal Prime Minister of 1914 Lloyd George and Keynes, that in retrospect World War I might not justify its toll of blood and treasure. Contemporary British-American historian Niall Ferguson (2011, 362) concludes from his germinal work of counterfactual history that 'fresh assessment of Germany's pre-war aims reveals that, had Britain stood aside... continental Europe would have been transformed into something not unlike

the European Union that we know today'. Though surely this would be a Europe in which a Germany less weakened by the two world wars and the depression would be more hegemonic than today's Germany. Nevertheless, Ferguson is convincing that the ascent of fascism in Europe and communism in Russia would have been less likely had Britain stood aside. German objectives in 1914 were not so unlike Japanese objectives in pursuing an Asian co-prosperity zone through World War II; Germany and Japan both wanted empires of free trade to compete with the British Empire advantage from its free trade community across the British Empire, and to compete with the pan-American zone of trade under hegemony enforced by the US Monroe Doctrine. The main lesson is that there was policy learning from these bruising experiences. It was learned that wars of aggression had become worse than a blunt instrument for achieving these objectives. Better to stay economically strong by staying out of wars and pursue such objectives by bilateral or multi-lateral trade agreements. That indeed was the profound lessons the rising number 2 and 3 economic powers of the period since 1945—Japan, Germany and China—learnt wisely and well.

Not only would this counterfactual history of freedom appeal to US Presidents from George Washington onwards, undoubtedly it might appeal in hindsight to the majority of the British Cabinet who were initially opposed to entering the 1914 war, but ultimately persuaded by powerful captives of the military-industrial complex inside the cabinet. Some went for war because they hoped it would unify the country against what they saw as the deeper threat to the Empire of a civil war over Ireland. The counterfactual analysis might likewise have appealed to German, Irish, and Australian social democrats, and to the social democrats of the Indian Congress Party, who believed that piling into imperial wars was rarely in the interests of imperial peripheries, of working classes of all combatants, indeed rarely in the interests of freedom and peace across international society.

Re-diagnosing Cold War containment successes. The containment policy bequeathed by Kennan was a collective accomplishment of the Truman administration and every US administration from Truman through to Reagan. There were prominent early critics like John Foster Dulles who wanted to confront and roll back Soviet power rather than

contain it. Nevertheless, containment prevailed as one of those rarities of long-term policy consensus. Containment of communist powers worked. While the consensus around containment was enduring and did see off the Soviet Union, it was fraught with tensions. Most Westerners were rightly consumed with guilt over failure to help uprisings against communist domination in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in lesser ways at other times during the Cold War.

On balance, containment was wise. We can still learn today from the dangers of the Dulles alternative of confrontation and meddling in the domestic politics of other countries. A premise of containment policy was that capitalist markets regulated to prevent their worst excesses were economically superior to state-owned and state-controlled economies. Over time, the containment assumption was that the gap between capitalist and communist economies would widen until the balance of power between NATO and the Soviet Union would be replaced by US hegemony, especially when those behind the Iron Curtain realized the potential of the freedom on offer from Western compared to Soviet hegemony. In George Kennan's day that was an heroic belief because the Soviet economy outperformed the West in economic growth during Stalin's long Soviet reign (Castells 2011). Stalin also positioned Russia to take the strategic early lead in the space race, with Sputnik putting humankind in space a few years after his death. Socialism was effective in industrializing countries fast, but only when they had been backward industrializers. Most societies behind the Iron Curtain, including Russia itself, had been industrialization laggards. Stalin pulled levers of state power to change that quickly, with large initial economic dividends. Deng Xiaoping and his successors in China did that even more deftly with their transition from a socialist developmental state to a capitalist developmental state with a mix of private and public ownership after 1976.

We see legacies of the era of communist industrialization today in the subways of Moscow and St Petersburg that are so superior to subways of New York and London. Some systems are efficiently built by top-down machine bureaucracies in which Soviet communism was capable (Mintzberg 1990); subways were an example, as was the Red Army

machine that overwhelmed Germany and its allies. It was more effective in decisive ways than capitalist armies of World War II. With the dawning of information capitalism, however, communism proved a weak competitor. Western leadership in all the technologies of the information age, starting with computers, was almost total by the late twentieth century. This history of innovation is ably worked through by Castells (2011: Volume 1). Freewheeling minds, free education, and adhocracies (Mintzberg 1990) began to outperform socialist machine bureaucracies at every turn. Agile is a capitalist management brand, a *fad du jour* (see Beck [2001] and Tam et al. [2020] on the factors that make for success with Agile). It is an unusually resilient fad, having captured the imaginations of not only most of the IT sector, but most engineering organizations in the United States and many other democracies. It is a brand that came out of the opposition of computer coders to top-down management control of their work. There seems to be evidence that it increases productivity (Uraon et al. 2023) and work satisfaction (Tripp et al. 2016). Their agility captures the essence of what proved the decisive competitive advantage of capitalism over Soviet communism during the information age.

This advantage is less persuasive when it comes to arguments for containing contemporary Chinese Communism. 5-G was a strategic technological race during the years when this book was conceived. Huawei won all early laps of that race against Western corporations, just as China seems so far to have won early laps in the race for hypersonic weapons. This happens because Chinese communism today is unlike Soviet communism. It is a hybrid of capitalism and communism. China broke out of containment in the 1970s when Deng Xiaoping embraced capitalist markets and spurned alliance with the Soviet Union.

There are pockets and aspects of Chinese capitalism that are more neoliberal than neoliberal capitalism itself in terms of low corporate tax rates and freedom from state regulation (Kipnis 2007). We see this especially in China's free trade zones. China is vast, covered by a patchwork quilt of variegated capitalisms (Zhang and Pack 2016). Some patches of that quilt are like inventive Silicon Valley capitalism, others like mid-twentieth century Western industrial capitalism with mega factories, and some are hybrids of peasant-communal-agribusiness

production systems. Others still are much like the hybrid capitalist-socialist production systems of the military-industrial complex that we see in US cities dominated by defense contracting firms. Both countries have their space industry cities that are also socialist-capitalist hybrids strongly enmeshed with NASA, the dominant defense contracting firms, university researchers who have integrated into the military-industrial complex and the national security state. After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and again after the covid recession, the economic growth advantage of China over NATO states widened, even though the wings of Chinese export growth were still clipped by this era of crisis.

Another containment advantage that was correctly diagnosed by George Kennan was that in the long run citizens of authoritarian societies would look across to the freedom and democracy of the West and find it attractive. Liberal capitalist regimes would enjoy more legitimacy among its people than the legitimacy of communist regimes. This proved true not only behind the Iron Curtain, but in China and Mongolia as well, as was evident in the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising, and probably in communist satellites like Vietnam and Cuba that have slowly permitted capitalist markets more scope, and gradually granted their citizens more freedom of movement to pursue education at Western universities.

Like the liberal economic advantage, that democratic advantage in legitimacy of the state is less true today. This is not fundamentally because communist societies have become more liberal, notwithstanding the loosening of some constraints such as on freedom of movement and economic freedom. One reason for the corrosion of the force of containment as a doctrine is that the legitimacy of democratic societies has collapsed faster across a number of recent decades than that of former communist societies. Western publics are astute in having less trust in their democratic institutions than their parents and grandparents had (Van der Meer 2017; Citrin and Stoker 2018). One driver is the empirical finding that economic crises destabilize democracies more than they destabilize dictatorships (Przeworski et al. 2000). Although China is less buffeted by a blizzard of distrust than the United States, it is still vulnerable to the same dynamics. There has been some decline in trust in government in China; the decline is deepest in the regions where income inequality is most extreme (Yang and Xin 2020). The problem

has been that democratic institutions and communist party institutions have likewise become more systematically corrupted by capitalist commodification. I have already argued that Western universities have had their independence corrupted by the military-industrial complex. Political parties progressively became more adept at gaming institutions and corporate power to win elections and then bestow enough favors to hold power for a time. Chapter 10 shows that foreign meddling in democratic elections has become widespread and surprisingly effective in affecting outcomes and cascading distrust. This is what works; high integrity contests of governance ideas do not work as well this century as in the twentieth century.

When US Democrats looked back on Republican Presidents like Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Republicans looked back on Democrats like Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy with genuine admiration in the twentieth century, their mentality was different from that of twenty-first century US citizens looking back on recent past presidents of the party they decline to vote for. Trust in the US government reached the mid-70s% during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, but has languished in the low 20s for most of the years since the mid-1990s. Trust in government fell off a cliff during the era of the assassination of three great leaders in quick historical succession, the two Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King. Trust recovered somewhat during the Reagan era, but only temporarily. As a non-American, I struggle to judge whether a reason for the post-Kennedy decline was the failure of the vast investigative resources of the US state to establish a settled, transparent national narrative of who was behind these 'murders most foul' (in the words of Bob Dylan's profound poetry of song). Or was it the lurking fear in the hearts of Americans of Lee Harvey Oswald seeming to have a CIA handler and a KGB handler? And how could the police be so incompetent as to allow Oswald to be shot dead in their custody? The competing narratives of three epochal assassinations make such limited sense. Or was it anger on both sides over waves of burning American cities that first started in a huge wave after the King assassination? Was this a driver of division and distrust at that time? I know not. Whatever the root causes, we all know that distrust and division have been accelerated by platform capitalism in all societies.

As in Kennan's time, it remains a pro-freedom policy to encourage freedom of movement in and out of totalitarian societies to democracies so that intellectuals and leaders get a taste of the range of kinds of freedoms that do persist in other societies. Even if so many of these democracies have profoundly imperfect freedoms, to taste any kind of freedom that is freer than the tyranny of one's homeland is to learn a little love for freedom. In time, lovers of freedom in the most despotic societies get their historical moment. They get their chance to argue for democratic transformation to open up those kinds of freedoms which they learned through exposure to them.

George Kennan proved right that confronting the Soviet Union was folly that could cause war, while containing Stalin behind the Iron Curtain would ultimately cause the Soviet Union to crumble from within. Indeed it did. Gorbachev and Yeltsin's pitches for reform were initially warmly received in Russia, and across the communist world. A remarkable transition of massive swathe from communism to markets and democracy was accomplished quite peacefully in those few years until 1991 thanks to the astute containment theory analysis of successive Western leaders across the political spectrum.

Three Historic Spikes of Short-Range Nuclear Missile Risk

The nuclear disarmament movement was important to a fabric of international society in the 1980s. It helped persuade the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev that nuclear Armageddon was nigh, and then Ronald Reagan. It had been nigh before at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Why? For the same reason it is nigh for a third time today in 2024. In 1952 Turkey was embraced into NATO so NATO missiles could be lined along the Black Sea to threaten the Crimean fleet and Southern Russian missiles. Russia reciprocated with missiles in Cuba. This put both sides at risk of an accidental launch, of a launch by miscalculation or calculation, by insanity or an overly rationalized sanity of offensive balance that dominates deterrence, by the vice of revenge or virtuous concern to protect innocent citizens. Or it could be the understanding of

a Russian submarine in 1962 that they were under attack, but misunderstanding that the intent was only to force them to the surface, combined with the failure of the Americans to understand that the sub was nuclear armed.

Kennedy and Khrushchev did well for human survival by pulling nuclear weapons back from each other's borders. They opened the pathway to the first strategic nuclear arms reduction agreements. These measures had greater importance for nuclear war prevention than we realize. Had this strategic moderation not been commenced at the hands of Kennedy and Khrushchev, we might all be dead by now. Kennedy unilaterally announced a US ban on atmospheric nuclear weapon tests and asked for reciprocation, which was granted by Khrushchev. Then followed the Nuclear Tests Ban Treaty. Three months before he was assassinated, Kennedy gave his renowned speech at American University. It issued a warning relevant to America's relationship with Vladimir Putin today:

Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy--or of a collective death-wish for the world. (Kennedy 1963)

Within six years of Kennedy's speech, the world honored its promise with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning the use of outer space for warfare, Latin America's leadership for the first nuclear weapon ban treaty for the Global South in 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

During the Reagan era, Kennedy's concerns were back with a second great spike in nuclear war risk. The Brezhnev regime had developed dangerous new strategic nuclear weapons. They could hit NATO cities eight minutes after launch. The Reagan administration reciprocated with short-range missiles in Europe. Reagan was seriously frightened by these developments. US and Russian leaders alike could now be hit before they got out of their chairs, let alone before making it to their command

bunker. Reagan spoke to his staff and confidantes of his fear that he might be the president who ended American civilization (Krepon 2021).

Gorbachev was sufficiently persuaded by the politics of the nuclear disarmament movement and by the GRIT theory of its scholars—Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction—that he advocated complete nuclear disarmament well before the end of the twentieth century. Gorbachev acted on this by unilaterally moving to halve Russian nuclear weapons in the knowledge that Reagan wanted to reciprocate. He did. Gorbachev also unilaterally announced a 500,000 reduction in Soviet military personnel. He successfully negotiated with Reagan the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty) that completely abolished all those new intermediate-range nuclear weapons and provided for US inspectors in Russia, and Russians in the United States to monitor the ‘trust and verify’ regime. Kennedy had wanted this, but until Gorbachev, weapons inspections was an absolute *nyet* for the Moscow military leadership. In the extreme risk environment of the 1980s, had not moderation prevailed between Reagan and Gorbachev, for a second time it might be said we could all be dead by today. Reagan proved a paradoxical combination of a first-term anti-communist spending big on defense, but a second-term abolitionist of nuclear weapons when Gorbachev gave him an opportunity to act on this side of Reagan’s belief system (Krepon 2021).

Today there is a third similar spike in risk because President Putin openly broke away from the INF treaty. Arms reduction and mutual inspection are stone dead. We can disagree with John Mearsheimer’s realism on many things. Yet we might concur that if it looks to Putin like he is going to lose Crimea, this could be an existential threat to Putin personally, might be seen as an existential threat by most Russians. So Putin really might be criminal enough to seek to end the war at that point, as he has warned, by using a strategic nuclear weapon.

The social movement for nuclear disarmament got zero credit for the great things accomplished during the decade after the 1986 Reykjavík summit. Gorbachev and his successor Yeltsin did their best to show good faith. NATO did fully reciprocate in missile reduction but not in good faith. Moscow showed good faith by saying we will not only ‘pull down that wall’, but we will also give Berlin and East Germany back to our old

enemy. They showed good faith by abolishing the Warsaw Pact. They wanted the West to reciprocate by abolishing NATO, building instead an inclusive European security architecture that embraced Moscow as part of Europe. Moscow's message was that we will pull all the nuclear weapons out of Ukraine and Belarus where there are thousands of them, and all other non-Russian Soviet republics, bring them back to Russia and destroy them under supervision of NATO weapons inspectors. But we will only halve Russian-based nuclear missiles, then halve them a second, and third time as we see your reciprocation, pursuant to GRIT theory, on weapons destruction and dismantling of NATO as an anti-Russian military alliance. Neocons in the Reagan White House spun the narrative that Reagan won the Cold War, Gorbachev surrendered, the Unipolar moment had arrived. No one sold the narrative that the GRIT moment had arrived. At the time of the 1986 Reykjavik summit, Henry Kissinger together with Richard Nixon excoriated Reagan for recklessly advocating nuclear abolition. In retrospect in 2007 Kissinger recanted to view the Reykjavik moment as the great lost opportunity to lock into a trajectory toward nuclear abolition. After Reagan retired, the West no longer saw it as their turn to show the leadership for the next step in reciprocal reduction in tensions. Gorbachev was hung out to dry. He was lucky to escape with his life. During his holiday in Crimea, he was arrested by the KGB leadership and his military commander. From that moment, GRIT ground into the dust of Western triumphalism. This was in the political interests of neocon icons of future Republican administrations who were part of the Reagan administration and both Bush administrations. Was it in the interests of the peoples of NATO states?

Covert Distrust of Free Russians by Western Neocons and Hawks

Western leaders remained distrustful of Russia as the Cold War ended. They failed to reward leaders like Gorbachev for huge concessions Moscow unilaterally proffered. One was dismantling the Warsaw Pact without demanding the reciprocation of dismantling NATO. Ultimately Russia eliminated almost 90% of Soviet nuclear weapons, much of this

by unilateral reductions, accompanied by a plea for reciprocation. This did elicit a Western response that was almost as high in percentage terms, but that involved destroying at least 10,000 fewer US nukes. Gorbachev was buffeted by so many responses from Western leaders that lacked the grace of restorative diplomacy. When Gorbachev announced in 1989 that Moscow would cease arming Nicaragua's Sandinista rebels, White House spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, described Gorbachev as a 'drugstore cowboy', meaning an insincere person dressed to mask a phony. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney undermined Gorbachev a month before that by predicting on television that he would crash and burn (Krepon 2021, 369). Gorbachev requested in the same period to be given a little time to persuade Saddam Hussein to voluntarily withdraw from his 1990 Kuwait invasion. According to my Peacebuilding Compared interviews in Iraq, Gorbachev probably rightly believed he could accomplish this to avoid war. He was snubbed. President Bush had set his mind upon a war that lasted until the defeat of Islamic State in Iraq a quarter of a century later.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin insisted on one assurance as they handed Berlin and East Germany back to their old German enemy. This was that while NATO weapons could be deployed in East Germany, they wanted assurances about NATO weapons not spreading to other regions that at the time were behind the Iron Curtain that was about to be lifted. US Secretary of State, James Baker, in a meeting between Gorbachev and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl with both their Foreign Ministers did eventually give Russia the assurance, as recorded in his notes of the meeting, that NATO would expand Eastwards 'not one inch'¹⁰ from its current boundaries. This was duplicitous of the US and NATO leaderships. According to Gorbachev, the meeting had discussed as an alternative to this undertaking that a West Germany unified with East Germany would stay out of NATO to adopt a position of neutrality (Krepon 2021, 473). The third alternative was for the German Democratic Republic to remain a separate country. Germany opted for the deal that NATO would not move one inch Eastwards apart from the expansion into East Germany. NATO dishonored the deal under US pressure. The Russian perspective was shocked that the top leadership of a Germany that had slaughtered so many Russians in a war of aggression would renege, then act as if they had never committed to this agreement.

Both Presidents Bush and Clinton, and subsequent US Presidents also denied that their government had lied about NATO never being allowed to expand an inch further East. They preferred the narrative that Moscow were simply bad negotiators who failed to make any demands in return for withdrawing to allow reunification of Germany. This helped Vladimir Putin to later position himself as the redeemer of Russia who would never again surrender Russian territory or vulnerability to NATO missiles in weak submission to NATO lies. Putin, the KGB creation, had no sympathy for Gorbachev after he was hung out to dry by his NATO friends.

Even though Russia made so many unilateral concessions to the United States in the ten years from 1986, it did not get the enormous bounty Japan, Italy and Germany received at the time of the Marshall Plan. Russia was distrusted and supported at the end of the Cold War in a manner more like the way the German Weimar Republic was distrusted from November 1918. The harvest from those two eras of distrustful and dishonorable diplomacy was not so different.

Japan, Italy, and Germany had been supported with huge resources and consultants who had Keynesian institution-building competence after 1945. In contrast, United States and private foundations like the Margaret Thatcher Foundation sent post-Cold-War consultants who were often neoliberal conmen. They privatized communist economies from public monopolies that had been subject to some state checks and balances into the hands of monopolies and oligarchs subject to no checks and balances. These consultants were mostly young ideologues who had limited experience of building institutions, nor experience of most of the things they were advising post-communist leaders to do. They could not speak Russian. The Russian economy was ravaged. Ordinary Russians acquired deep distrust of Boris Yeltsin and his Western advisors. Russian public health and life expectancy, and Russian security from crime and war cascaded catastrophically. The crime rate, the imprisonment rate, corruption, inflation, unemployment, and inequality went through the ceiling; life expectancy fell through the floor. So did the economy, with GNP having fallen by more than 40% when Vladimir Putin came to power. From that point, GDP per capita began to rise sharply, recovering to its 1990 level by 2007, but then tumbling backwards again with

the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, after which it resumed an upwards trajectory until a further steep decline occurred after the 2014 Ukraine invasion and a lesser decline, but a decline, after the 2022 Ukraine invasion. Putin was something of a savior of the Russian economy who then wrecked it again with his invasions.

While many of the consultants who traveled to fix the economies behind the Iron Curtain were simply naïve about their meddling in a society they did not understand, the outcome was what some of the old CIA and Pentagon hardheads wanted. They wanted a Russia that was so weakened on every front that it could never rise again. Many of them still want that today and believe that they were the worldly-wise ones in thinking that in 1990. These are the Western military-industrial complex characters who railed against Russian requests to transform the architecture of NATO to embrace Russia into a shared security architecture rather than the adversarial alliance structures that cascaded to former European wars. No, NATO diehards stood firm as covert advocates of expanding US hegemony through NATO. They never diverted from NATO empire building. Defense contracting corporations propagandized NATO institutions and NATO societies with this folly. They believed their NATO empire should survive and grow by continuing the containment of Russia as a covert policy. Then their beautiful opportunity arrived. It brought containment back into the open as a policy around which NATO could become more 'united' again. The opportunity for these covert hawks to become overt warriors for the containment of Russia came with Putin's criminal folly in Ukraine.

This continuous de facto policy of containment of Russia that was for a long-time covert is now touted overtly more widely than just by a cabal of longstanding hawks such as Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Bolton. Today the neocons advocate containment of Russia and China frontstage, asserting they were right all along. This has been their complex game of at one moment being covert and duplicitous about containment, deniers that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were ever lied to. At the next historical moment, they became honest and open about their belief in the containment of Russia, China, and 'rogue' states like Syria, Libya, and Iran. They might have been better

patriots by playing a simpler game on containment that was more like George Kennan and Hedley Bull's realist analysis. This is the simpler, open, collaborative position on containment developed in a new way in the pages that follow.

Notes

1. Many different Australian social democratic leaders embraced different aspects of the thought of not only Harold Wilson, but also their Australian forbears, Bull and Burton. These include former Australian Labor prime ministers, Gough Whitlam (who met with Chairman Mao Tse Tung before President Nixon) and Paul Keating (who wanted to transform the obsolescence of NATO for embracing Russia after the Cold War, as discussed later in this Chapter). Former Hawke and Keating government Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, was also in this Australian line of IR thinking (as discussed in Chapter 5). These leaders disagreed on various things, yet they all worked at their own vision of how to strengthen Hedley Bull's two wings of a deterrence default on the one hand, and on the other an international society that learns how to improve its capabilities for peacemaking. There have been many other leaders in Australia and other countries who have manifested those Hedley Bull influences, such as recent New Zealand Prime Ministers Helen Clark and Jacinda Adern, but conservative ones as well like Germany's Angela Merkel. American wartime general and Republican President, Dwight D Eisenhower, with his early brainstorming on nuclear disarmament and warnings to future presidents of risks in where the 'military-industrial complex' might lead resonates with this tradition (Krepon 2021), as did the shortened life of his opponent and successor John F. Kennedy.
2. The mainstream of realist advocacy argues that Ukraine is about the main game with NATO peer rival, China. In this rivalry NATO should want to embrace Russia in a balancing coalition against China, rather than push Russia to become a vassal

- of China that increases geostrategic allegiance to China. Russia became an ally and nuclear supplier to Chinese ally, North Korea. See, for example, the writing of Mearsheimer (2018).
3. This is so far a statistically significant pattern in my Peacebuilding Compared dataset still in the process of accumulating years and cases.
 4. Given the inevitability of some kind of radical violent flank in street protests, in resistance to invasions, leaders with a nonviolent strategy can and perhaps should use the inevitability of that radical violent flank strategically. Nelson Mandela was an example of a nonviolent regime-changer who played his violent radical flank card with wisdom in his South African struggle (Braithwaite 2014). But see the critical views on the negative effects of a violent radical flank in the work of Schock (2015) and Chenoweth (2021, 2023), who concludes that the balance of evidence is that an armed radical flank undermines the otherwise formidable effectiveness of nonviolent movements.
 5. Moreover, we know that resolution by peace agreements in turn tends to reduce the subsequent incidence of war. Another large-N study by Leventoğlu and Metternich (2018) found that greater civilian protest activity is associated with increased likelihood of peace negotiations and settlements for African civil wars. Abbs did not find an association between the degree of nonviolent resistance that occurred during a war and the subsequent incidence of further wars.
 6. Here I am tracking the normative position on minimizing domination developed by Pettit (1997). On the positive impact of nonviolent resistance on enduring postconflict democracy beyond Abbs (2021) and Chenoweth (2021) see also the Bayer et al. (2016) finding that democracies installed after an elite-led violent transition lasted only five years, but lasted on average 47 years after nonviolent resistance led democratic transitions.
 7. See Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and updates in Chenoweth (2021). But see also recent critiques and revisions to the strength of their effect sizes in Dworschak (2023) and Anisin (2020). On the other hand, Johnstad's (2010) study found a higher

success rate of nonviolent civil resistance compared to armed struggle than found by Chenoweth and Stephan. Another study by Cunningham (2023) reveals a level of civil resistance power in mobilizing international human rights pressure on violent regimes at a level that goes beyond Chenoweth and Stephan.

8. When I did a last minutes update on these numbers before going to press using World Bank data on GDP per capital in current US\$, the rank order had moved around quite a bit, with a number of new small economies joining the 16 richest per capita. The US post-covid economy also performed comparatively well: the United States moved from 13 to 12th. But it was still true that all the other countries in the top 16 were small, militarily weak countries: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=false (accessed September 29, 2023).
9. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_\(PPP\)_per_capita](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita) (accessed September 29, 2023).
10. See Footnote 10, Chapter 5 for the now declassified documentary evidence on this.

References

- Abbs, Luke. 2021. *The impact of nonviolent resistance on the peaceful transformation of civil war*. Washington: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006. *The civil sphere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Allison, Graham. 2017. *Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides's trap*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Anisin, Alexei. 2020. Debunking the myths behind nonviolent civil resistance. *Critical Sociology* 46: 1121–1139.
- Barak, Oren, Amit Sheniak, and Assaf Shapira. 2023. The shift to defense in Israel's hybrid military strategy. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 46: 345–377.
- Bayer, Markus, Felix Bethke, and Damien Lambach. 2016. The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance. *Journal of Peace Research* 53: 758–771.

- Beck, Kent 2001. *The Agile manifesto*. Agile Alliance. <http://agilemanifesto.org/>
- Blattman, Christopher. 2022. *Why we fight: The roots of war and the paths to peace*. New York: Viking.
- Braithwaite, John. 2014. Rethinking radical flank theory: South Africa. *RegNet Research Paper* 2014/23.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrocriminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth, and Aderito Soares. 2012. *Networked Governance of Freedom and Tyranny*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, and Bina D'Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence: War, crime and peacebuilding across South Asia*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, Sinclair Dinnen, Matthew Allen, Valerie Braithwaite, and Hilary Charlesworth. 2010. *Pillars and shadows: Statebuilding as peacebuilding in Solomon Islands*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, and Peter Drahos. 2000. *Global business regulation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 2011. *The rise of the network society*. New York: Wiley.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2021. *Civil resistance: What everyone needs to know*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2023. The role of violence in nonviolent resistance. *Annual Review of Political Science* 26: 55–77.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Citrin, Jack, and Laura Stoker. 2018. Political trust in a cynical age. *Annual Review of Political Science* 21: 49–70.
- Clark, Christopher. 2012. *The sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Costigliola, Frank. 2023. *Kenan: A life between worlds*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2023. Choosing tactics: The efficacy of violence and nonviolence in self-determination disputes. *Journal of Peace Research* 60: 124–140.
- Downes, Alexander B. 2021. *Catastrophic success: Why foreign-imposed regime change goes wrong*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Dworschak, Christoph. 2023. Civil resistance in the streetlight: replicating and assessing evidence on nonviolent effectiveness. *Comparative Politics*.
- Eckstein, Harry. 2000. Case study and theory in political science. In *Case study method*, ed. Roger Gomm, 119–164. London: Sage.
- Ferguson, Niall. 2011. *Virtual history: Alternatives and counterfactuals*. London: Penguin.

- Gholz, Eugene, Benjamin Friedman, and Enea Gjoza. 2019. Defensive defense: A better way to protect US allies in Asia. *Washington Quarterly* 42: 171–189.
- Johnstad, Peter Grahl. 2010. Nonviolent democratization: A sensitivity analysis of how transition mode and violence impact the durability of democracy. *Peace & Change* 35: 464–482.
- Kennedy, John F. 1963. Commencement Address at American University, June 10. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/american-university-19630610>. Accessed September 29, 2023.
- Kipnis, Andrew. 2007. Neoliberalism reified: Suzhi discourse and tropes of neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13: 383.
- Krepon, Michael. 2021. *Winning and losing the nuclear peace*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Leventoglu, Bahar, and Nils W. Metternich. 2018. Born weak, growing strong: Anti-government protests as a signal of rebel strength in the context of civil wars. *American Journal of Political Science* 62: 581–596.
- Mann, Michael. 2012. *The sources of social power: Volumes 1–3*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2018. *The great delusion: Liberal dreams and international Realities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mintzberg, Henry. 1990. *The structuring of organizations*. New York: Pearson.
- Muller, Harald 2020. What are the institutional preconditions for a stable non-nuclear peace. In *Non-nuclear peace: Beyond the nuclear ban treaty*, ed. T. Sauer, J. Kustermans and B. Segaert. London: Palgrave.
- Office of the Historian 2023. Washington's Farewell Address, 1796. history.state.gov. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 19 June 2023.
- Ogilvie-White, Tanya. 2020. Stoking the fire of Asia-Pacific missile proliferation. *The Interpreter*, July 10.
- Pettit, Philip. 1997. *Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reyntjens, Filip. 2009. *The great African war: Congo and regional geopolitics, 1996–2006*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schock, Kurt. 2015. *Civil resistance today*. New York: Wiley.
- Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew W. Fuhrmann. 2017. *Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The politics of nonviolent action, 3 vols.* Boston: Porter Sargent.
- Sharp, Gene. 2005. *Waging nonviolent struggle.* Boston: Porter Sargent.
- SIPRI. 2022. *SIPRI yearbook, 2022: Armaments, disarmament and national security.* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- Snyder, Jack. 1989. *The ideology of the offensive: Military decision making and the disasters of 1914.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Tam, C., E.J. da Costa Moura, T. Oliveira, and J. Varajão. 2020. The factors influencing the success of on-going Agile software development projects. *International Journal of Project Management* 38: 165–176.
- Thakur, Ramesh. 2023. Comment on ‘The Ban Treaty two years after: A ray of hope for nuclear disarmament’. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 23.
- Tripp, John F., Cindy Riemenschneider, and Jason B. Thatcher. 2016. Job satisfaction in Agile development teams: Agile development as work redesign. *Journal of the Association for Information Systems* 17: 1–14.
- Uraon, R.S., A. Chauhan, R. Bharati, and K. Sahu. 2023. Do Agile work practices impact team performance through project commitment? Evidence from the information technology industry. *International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management*. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPPM-03-2023-0114>
- Van der Meer, Tom. 2017. Political trust and the “crisis of democracy”. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.
- Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War. *International Security* 9: 58–88.
- Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. Offense, defense, and the causes of war. *International Security* 22: 5–43.
- Vine, David. 2020. *The United States of war.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Weiss, Linda. 2014. *America Inc: Innovation and enterprise in the national security state.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Yang, Zhixu, and Ziqiang Xin. 2020. Income inequality and interpersonal trust in China. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 23: 253–263.
- Zhang, Jun, and Jamie Peck. 2016. Variegated capitalism, Chinese style: Regional models, multi-scalar constructions. *Regional Studies* 50: 52.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





5

Containing China: Containing Temporarily

Abstract Permanent containment of crisis risks is good, permanent containment of states dangerous. Only temporary containment of states works, and only when combined with ongoing dialogue on what states must do to get containment lifted. Temporary re-containment of Russia makes sense at the time of writing because it wages a war of aggression in Ukraine. Likewise with Myanmar's military junta until it restores democracy, releases elected members of parliament, ends the Rohingya genocide, and ceases waging war on its own people.

Keywords Containment · Kennan · Russia · Ukraine · Myanmar · China

Containment of China today is a forlorn prescription. We have already seen two reasons why what worked with the Soviet Union never will with China. The public opinion survey data shows that China's citizens trust their government more than US and European citizens trust theirs. Throughout this century, China's economy has grown much more rapidly than all Western economies and soon will be the number one economy, however that is measured.

Beliefs that China will collapse from within if contained are implausible. Unlike the Soviet Union, in the long run China could possibly out-compete the West. It has already lifted more of its people out of poverty more rapidly than any Western society has, expanded educational accomplishment more rapidly, industrialized more rapidly, built a post-industrial innovation economy more rapidly, and expanded renewables production more rapidly. Containment theory is bound to fail if it is grounded in the same terms as those advanced for the successful Soviet case. China is not uncompetitive in respect of either popular legitimacy, trust in government, innovation and adaptation of the economy, or increasing wealth. That is not to deny that one day China may well find its own path to more democratic institutions. It may return to expanding freedom in the way that was slowly happening in the decades before Chairman Xi. This is only to say that containment by foreign powers will not prick Chinese bubbles, but that domestic demands for freedom likely will one day. What Western policies to contain China will foster is ecological, public health, economic and security crises that will weaken the West and China alike, but the West more than China.

Another difference from the Soviet Union argued in the last chapter is that for almost its entire history Russia has been intensely interested in conquest of other countries. China has not. China is interested in a hegemony over the South China Sea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other smaller islands surrounding China's mainland that it believes it has always had until what it sees as a 'rule-based international order' captured by the West declared that its sovereignty in these spaces was limited. It makes no sense for China to invade other countries over which it makes no sustained historical claims of sovereignty. Modern Russia and Western powers grew that way. So did China one to three thousand years ago, but China has been uninterested in this for most of the past millennium. China's widest expansion was at the hands of Ghengis Khan and his Mongolian descendants, not the Han Chinese. Henry Kissinger said of his conversational engagement with all of China's top leaders of the past half century: 'They're not heading for world domination ... the answer is that they [in China] want to be powerful. They're not heading for world domination in a Hitlerian sense. That is not how they think or have ever thought of world order' (*The Economist* 2023).

Contemporary capabilities for guerrilla resistance with foreign weapons and civilian resistance against armed invasions, as Russia discovered again during its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, is a reason China thinks this way. Between 1800 and 1849, the weaker side in asymmetric wars secured their strategic goals in only 12% of cases; in wars between 1950 and 1998, the weaker side prevailed 55% of the time (Naim 2013). The comparative advantage of weaker sides has likely become even stronger in the past few years in instances like Ukraine, where the weaker side can be provided by foreign supporters with highly sophisticated hand-launched anti-tank weapons, drones, and cognate technologies. As John Mearsheimer said of Ukraine, why would Russia be so irrational as to aim to take over all Ukraine. Mearsheimer's argument was that it would make more realist sense for Putin to take Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine and break the rest, where Russia is most despised. Regrettably, Mearsheimer seems right that this is what Putin aims to accomplish, a good reason to dissuade future Russian leaders who succeed Putin against being Mearsheimer-like realists. Why would any great power today get into wars of invasion of whole countries? In the last chapter we saw that the arithmetic of Goliath versus David wars began to change at least from the time of the Korean war onwards.

Another reason for failed invasions is the way modern invasions cause collapse of the very market assets that might make a country worth invading. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Ukrainian economy steeply declined. Russian GDP also declined. Given the depletion of domestic economic strength that foreign wars cause today, it makes no sense for China to consider invading countries in the way all great powers did until World War II. The Chinese analysis is that US invasions in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq; and Russian invasion of Afghanistan before that; 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine, weakened these powers that compete with China for supremacy. China chooses to avert such mistakes. We saw in the last chapter that China's last invasion endured 27 days in Vietnam. Even that short war was waged at great cost in blood and treasure. China has preferred not to repeat these costs during the 45 years since.

Colonialism does not build national power in the way it once did. The colonialism that built empires became a drain on imperial

power in Madrid, Lisbon, Amsterdam, London, Paris, Vienna, and Constantinople more than a century ago. Beijing understands that. Moreover, China already controls a sovereign population and sovereign wealth vaster than any of those old empires imagined accumulating. As Krastev and Holmes (2019, 212) put it 'Xi is uninterested in forcing peoples at the other end of the stick to undergo identity-transforming Chinese indoctrination. Exporting made-in-China goods is a priority. Exporting Chinese ideology is not'.

Democrats defend the right of Taiwan to decide at the ballot box whether it remains a democracy or becomes a province of China. Taiwan is a strong and egalitarian democracy today compared to most democracies and to its authoritarian past under Chiang Kai Shek. It is a flourishing trading partner to all countries, especially China. It is reasonable to suspect that China will never give up until Taiwan eventually falls into its lap, as Hong Kong and Macau did. Why should China be in a hurry about this? History will be on its side. To trigger escalation to a nuclear exchange with the West over Taiwan would risk all the wealth, hegemony, and legitimacy China has accumulated in Asia, and can continue to sustain without Taiwan. Meanwhile if China is strategically wise, it will continue to learn valuable things from the intertwined relationship it has grown with Taiwan and from strengths of the formidable democratic culture and economy that has flourished in a Chinese way in Taiwan. As China does this, it can push its propaganda in Taiwan that in the new China business is free to start new businesses, students are free to travel wherever they like to study, unlike Chairman Mao's China.

One strategy available to China is to frighten Taiwanese and Western publics when saber rattling occurs over a supposedly impending Taiwan invasion. Western drumbeaters of containment of China play into their hands. Pundits who beat drums of war panic may eventually so frighten Taiwanese voters that one day Taiwan votes for a party with a platform of negotiating with China on a new one-country-two-systems deal. It would have to be a deal that has far stronger guarantees than were negotiated for Hong Kong. Why would some future Chinese leader not surrender such guarantees in preference to a war that jeopardizes Chinese regional hegemony? I presume the current leader, President Xi,

would not do this, but why would a successor leader not consider it after President Xi fails to achieve his ambition of absorbing Taiwan? That is, Taiwanese might one day vote for a different kind of one-country-two-system party because they see it as the way they can avert risks of their land being wiped off the map in a war between China and the United States.

Invasion of Taiwan by China would be more difficult than invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Invasion attempted across an intensively defended and mined Taiwan Strait has failed before and is more difficult than simply rolling tanks across a border as in Ukraine. Ships would be lost in the Taiwan Strait and tanks on the beach before they reached land. It might not only be Taiwanese missiles and drones attacking the incoming ships and paratroopers. In Ukraine, Russia faced a strategic certainty that US and other NATO armies would not participate in the battles. In Taiwan, China faces a different policy of strategic ambiguity. It faces a Taiwan with four times the GDP of Ukraine before the war collapsed Ukraine's GDP. If the Chinese invasion lands to defeat the Taiwanese regular armed forces and capture its cities, it would then face a long, well-prepared insurgency from mountainous terrain much more favorable to insurgency than the geography of Ukraine. During this long war, the invader would become a pariah state that would suffer cyber-attacks from many unidentified societies. The West decided not to launch cyberwar at scale after the 2022 Russian invasion. Not only might Chinese trade crash into recession from the combination of cyber-attacks, Western sanctions, and war jitters that shatter Chinese investor confidence, Chinese 5G that feed its Belt and Road would be cut and many shipping lines would opt to defend their assets by avoiding the Chinese coast during the war (and during any naval blockade that preceded it). The United States could not seize Chinese holdings in the US national debt as readily as it did with Russian reserves held in the United States. Would that be a financially self-destructive step too far for the United States? Part of the virtue of strategic ambiguity is that we have no idea. China itself would be worried about ships sent by one of its nearby enemies with concealed dirty nuclear bombs approaching its ports during total maritime warfare along the Chinese coastline. Flights into

Guandong to the south of Taiwan and Shanghai to its north, and everywhere in between, would cease until drone capabilities from dispersed Taiwanese mountain hideouts were eliminated. All this economic disruption to a trade-dependent economy would cause a stock market crash and a depression that would jeopardize the political future of the adventurist Chinese leader who ordered a Taiwan invasion.

All this is before the leader began to worry about becoming the Chinese president who causes the ending of Chinese civilization through nuclear Armageddon. What if Russia or India (or both together) surprised China or the United States with a tactical nuclear strike on a naval battle force from a hypersonic missile of unknown provenance? What if they calculated that this might cascade to nuclear war between the United States and China that would give India or Russia a shot at emerging as a hegemon? The imponderables are too many, too immense for China to invade Taiwan. For the modest gain of a razed Taiwan, why risk all to a chaos of any number of such surprise contingencies of total war along the Chinese coast?

Strategic patience that waits for Taiwan to fall into China's lap is a hard path for China now that President Xi's revived despotism has crushed one-country-two-systems in Hong Kong. Even so, a future Chinese government (perhaps post-Xi, or after a future depression) could change course if it were under domestic pressure from democracy movements that re-emerge in future. China could find it smart to rebuild its legitimacy by re-establishing an autonomous democracy in Hong Kong to prove to Taiwanese voters that they should vote for a Taiwanese party that seeks to negotiate a renewed, rebranded Taiwanese version of one-country-two-systems. That is reason for democrats in Hong Kong to never give up on return to democracy. If Hong Kong democrats have strategic patience as a social movement, in the long run of history renewed democracy in Hong Kong might prevail, just as it can in Mainland China and Taiwan.

Containment of China should be abandoned as a prescription because in the foreseeable future China probably will constrain itself from invading and taking over other countries for which it has no existing sovereignty claim. That is not to argue that China would never seek to intimidate Taiwan with robust measures like naval and air blockades that

do not escalate so far as to trigger total war. Nor is it to deny that China can covertly make political donations in Taiwan and other unfriendly democracies. China has enormous cyberespionage parties that it could turn to discrediting offshore political parties and leaders it dislikes and supporting those it likes. Nor is it to discount the possibility that China could unintentionally and incompetently blunder into nuclear war that starts in the Taiwan Strait. I have just described one among many soft power pathways to Taiwan ultimately falling into the lap of China, with help from Westerners who beat the drum of war fears in pursuit of their advocacy of containing China. China recalls the strategic patience of its soft power that delivered Hong Kong and Macau to it from former Western imperial powers, without war.

It makes sense to abandon containment of China in the way it is usually advanced as an arms race combined with passive military encirclement and economic containment. China is uncontainable in all these ways. The United States cannot militarily encircle China any more than China can succeed in encircling the United States. Principled engagement that politely speaks truth and human rights to China's power yes, containment no. For the United States and core allies like Canada and Australia, being principled in the engagement means being as condemnatory of detention centers in Xinjiang as it is of its own detention of locally born Japanese citizens during World War II, in the Australian case detention centers that denied incarcerated children an education. It means self-condemnation of long-term detention without trial of innocent people in Guantanamo Bay, who included Uyghurs. It means condemnation of genocide by others tempered with principled self-condemnation of genocide against the Indigenous owners of Australia and America, recent Western support for death squads across Latin America that targeted its genocidally decimated Indigenous populations, and more.

And it means speaking openly about racist oppression of Chinese people during and after Australian and American gold rushes and racist exploitation of Chinese 'coolie' labor in building great transcontinental railways. Condemnation of ethnic cleansing of Uyghurs in Xinjiang can be balanced with condemnation of our own sins so we are not politely condemnatory of China on any issue on which we are unwilling to

be condemnatory of ourselves. That is a good principle for restorative diplomacy. Without principled balance in Western engagement, critique about Xinjiang or Tibet is seen as hypocritical by Chinese people (Rudd 2022, Chapter 1) rather than principled engagement. When Willy Brandt kneeled in penance, sorrow and apology at the site of the World War II Warsaw ghetto, it was a shocking break with past German diplomatic practice. This was the kind of transformation needed by all major powers to remake their diplomacy in a more restorative mold.

Threatening to cut off an already unified and economically flourishing China will only cause its citizens to be more unified behind its communist government, more convinced that it is only Islamist terrorists that China punishes in Xinjiang. Containment of China by somehow isolating its economy with trade sanctions, will hurt those that impose the sanctions more than it hurts China. China can play this game with more economic clout and with a more unified people behind it than Western states can muster. Western resolve for containment would only have a chance of becoming greater than Chinese resolve after an illegal Chinese invasion of a peaceful society. Chinese publics will see failed attempts to contain a peaceful China as more evidence that their century of humiliation at the hands of Western powers is over. Feeble containment attempts thus rebound to humiliate Western power.

There is a case for shifting China's pattern of economic growth inwards toward more internally driven growth in its own market, especially in consumption of services. China's internal market is more massive than any the world has known. China can allow export-driven growth to drop off for a few decades to enable that shift to internally driven growth in services consumption, an important part of which is building a more solid welfare state that will improve the economic resilience and political survival prospects of its regime. In this respect, China is at an economic juncture not so dissimilar to that confronting Bismarck when he decided that building a strong German welfare state was the best path to geopolitical might (Ocampo and Stiglitz 2018). Hence China now has the resilience to win any waiting game of trade sanctions cat and mouse. Trade cuts to China cause China to bleed, but cause more bleeding by those who poke it to initiate the trade war. While everyone loses, China's

adversaries lose more. At least China thence builds its comparative hegemonic dominance measured against the comparative economic decline of its competitors in contests for hegemony.

Western democracies do better to focus their energies on keeping their own institutions strong and free. If instead they miscalculate on games of containment of powers mightier than themselves, they might catalyze a Western depression. That could bring despots to power on their own soil to destroy the institutional heritage of freedom that it is their duty to preserve, to grow, to flicker as a light on the hill to democrats living under the yoke of despots. Make America Great Again authoritarians are motivated by fear of the inevitable, that America will one day become number 2. They are also motivated by deindustrialization of America. A democracy that does not provide jobs for the old or white working class, nor decent health care, retirement care, nor equal opportunities for a good college education is at risk. In that sense, Bismarck is a better role model for the authoritarian right than Trump. Angela Merkel is a role model for a mainstream moderate party of the Christian right who delivered better prospects of sustaining conservative rule.

Permanently De-Containing China and Every Society

It hardly needs to be said that it makes no sense for China or Russia to seek to permanently contain any NATO state. Containing the United States would be impossible for the same reasons that I explain in this chapter why it is a bad idea to tilt at the containment of China windmill in the way Trump pioneered. Speaking truth to power and human rights to rights abusers are important. Escalating trade sanctions in response to crimes against humanity can be important. So is de-escalating them when the crimes against humanity cease. I happen to believe in social democracy that endlessly struggles for freedom and against domination. I believe that social democracy tends to be a superior approach to Chinese-style communism and to neoliberalism. That does not mean it is a good idea for social democratic societies to intervene in other societies, even to pressure China to become social democratic. Rather than

be political meddlers, we can all seek to build and display the strengths of the kind of society we favor, in the social democratic case by the example of democratic struggles for social democracy at home. If other societies ask for support to build new democratic institutions, particularly societies recovering from war and choosing to transition away from despotism, we offer it generously. If we are intellectuals, we research how to strengthen democratic institutions, how to proof them against corruption. We disseminate lessons from the research.

That intellectual work facilitates healthy global competition among liberal, social democratic, and authoritarian visions of good governance. At the same time, we know no system has all the answers. Social democrats accept that they can learn from neoliberalism when it comes up with superior ways of solving problems. Chinese communism can invent better ways of doing certain important things (tree planting, building electric cars, solar panels being contemporary examples discussed herein) than social democracies have managed to craft through our market-regulatory hybrids.

We can always listen respectfully to other societies to learn from their institutional architectures. Social democrats can take a page out of Ronald Reagan's book on this. Reagan at every stage was robust and rather extreme in his realism and his critique of liberal institutionalism. He always listened to his adversaries, however, and was polite to them, never calling Russian or Chinese leaders names. China has been more competent at respectful institutional listening and learning to the West than the West to China (Rudd 2022, Chapter 1). Fluent Mandarin-speaker, former diplomat in Beijing, and former Australian prime minister, Kevin Rudd, is right, therefore, that to seek to contain China is to be backward-looking. Rudd argues that the Western imperative is to prevent rivalry with China from causing World War III. Rudd (2022, Chapter 1) has three alternative prescriptions:

1. Agree on 'principles and procedures for navigating each other's strategic redlines' (e.g., for Taiwan). I tweak this with work at restorative diplomacy that listens so that inadvertent crossing of these redlines does not stumble to cataclysm (Chapter 8).

2. Mutually identify 'areas of nonlethal security policy—foreign policy, economic policy, technology development (for example, over semi-conductors)' where strategic competition is healthy. Each side does well to learn humbly from ways that the other side outperforms it in that competition.
3. 'Define those areas where continued strategic cooperation (for example, on climate change) is both recognized and encouraged'.

Put another way, the principled engagement favored by the Obama administration with China (and other former adversaries, Iran and Myanmar) was prudent. That is, cooperation with enemies is imperative on some issues, and what Rudd calls 'managed strategic competition' on others. Cooperation at some times and competition at others. This applies equally to old despotic friends and enemies, such as Saudi Arabia and Cuba. Saudi Arabia might be an old ally and Cuba an old enemy, but they have track records of starting and fueling flames of destabilizing wars.

The challenge is that strategic predictability under Rudd's prescription (1) is unlikely if there is competition under prescription (2) in the form of a destabilizing arms race. This is exactly where we are at this historical juncture. The three greatest powers are all contributing to erosion of the arms control architecture of the Cold War that evolved after the Cuban missile crisis and in the decade after the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. The idea of defeating an overwhelming conventional attack with tactical nuclear weapons is on the table again with the response Putin threatened against NATO forces that might surge to join Ukraine to defeat Russia. To defend the nuclear weapons taboo, even threatening to dominate with nuclear weapons in the way Putin did should be defined by future international criminal law jurisprudence as a war crime. Threats of short-range tactical nuclear weapon attacks dismantle safeguards erected by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev when they reached consensus that any tactical nuclear response could not be contained to prevent escalation to Mutual Assured Destruction. The required path is a return to strategic arms limitations that takes a first step from MAD toward credible second-strike deterrence as a more responsible kind of deterrence that refuses to start nuclear escalation.

Likewise, the containment of anti-American regimes favored by many US Republican leaders has far too much permanence structured into it. There was point and purpose in containing a Cuba with trade and travel bans when it was one of the most shockingly oppressive regimes that threatened the United States with nuclear missiles and promoted regional revolutions during the Cold War. But there has been limited US responsiveness to softening of that oppression (compared to European responsiveness to Cuban reforms). Today, Cuba is still oppressive in important ways, but less so than it used to be, and less so than dozens of other countries including US allies in the Middle East and Latin America. Cuba has ceased threatening other societies militarily. It has played valuable peacemaking roles with important regional conflicts such as in Colombia during the past decade. Hence, when citizens of other Western countries visit Cuba as tourists, they take all this in and think less of the United States for its hypocrisy and want of responsiveness in its engagement with old enemies. That loss of international respect is among a long litany of ways that permanent containment of Cuba, China or anyone else makes no sense, ethically or pragmatically.

Cyber-Guardrails

Kevin Rudd is right that one of the needed agreed red lines puts boundaries around cyber-ops to prevent them from escalating to MADD (Mutual Assured Digital Destruction). An example is pledges to eschew cyber-attacks against nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. That in turn would be assisted by agreed initiatives to disentangle conventional from nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence systems to the extent this is possible. This, however, will not be credibly guaranteed until step-by-step strategic nuclear weapons negotiations seriously begin to dismantle MAD. Why would two states with credible MAD capabilities dismantle MADD capabilities they had acquired at great expense? MADD is not the civilization-ending escalation that MAD is in a situation where states believe they have no option but to escalate? MADD would mutually destroy great economies and disable their war fighting capabilities

until their cyber systems were rebuilt, but without killing millions of people. I might add that if a great power invades and occupies a weaker country, one path of nonviolent civilian resistance is for young people of the invaded country and its refugee diaspora to be encouraged to acquire training in strategies for accomplishing digital destruction of the invader and endless cyber-attacks of maximum impact on the occupation administration.

The path to credible guardrails against MADD is difficult because the guardrails would be almost impossible to verify and could not work without credible guardrails against MAD first. Nuclear weapons guardrails are much easier to verify through agreements on surprise weapons' site inspections (of the WMD kind witnessed during dismantling of the various Iraqi WMD programs before 2003). Once strategic arms limitation treaties against MAD have moved existing great powers to universal guardrails against first use, against nuclear launch on warning of incoming nuclear missiles,¹ and away from capability to wipe each other out, guardrails that protect against escalation to MADD would be feasible.

President Jimmy Carter was a leader in 'minimum deterrence' thinking. He wanted large cuts in military spending, bans on nuclear testing, and sought to persuade all major powers to reduce strategic forces to levels where it would no longer be possible for any state to launch a decisive first strike. This would leave all major powers safer from one another. This was successfully opposed by the Republican Party and by the military-industrial complex in Moscow as well as Washington (Schlosser 2013, 362).

Carter was the president who understood that even if nuclear powers go only part way to wiping each other out, they will transfer hegemony to a successor great power that is untouched. For example, a limited nuclear war between Russia and NATO would accelerate the rise of China to hegemonic domination. That is why I argue for restorative diplomacy as a fundamental requirement for preventing such an outcome.

MADD guardrails against first use, space war guardrails, and killer robot guardrails will all become more possible once MAD guardrails have been strengthened. Once MAD powers have moved away from capability to totally raze another society to a will only to inflict nuclear second

strikes on those that strike first, once great power deterrence theory has moved from MAD to minimally sufficient deterrence,² guardrails that protect against escalation to MADD and other new weapon risks become feasible. When there is agreement against first use of nuclear weapons,³ it will be much more feasible to agree to a guardrail against first use of some form of cyber-attack. Until then, the best hope is mutual understanding that a particular form of cyber-attack is a red line that will trigger a proportionate response. That is, the best we can do is reciprocal escalation, which is a building block of escalation to preventable MADD.

Strategic nuclear reductions are still difficult between nuclear powers because we live in a world where a Pakistan general can say of a shaky Pakistan economy that an inexplicable crash on the Karachi stock exchange will be interpreted as an act of war by India and trigger nuclear alert (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). The reality might be that India *is* keeping its cyberwarfare within agreed guardrails. That does not mean that India can prove this; it does not guarantee that Pakistan will believe them when it panics over a catastrophic stock market crash that is hard to explain. An imperative remains resumption of neglected restorative diplomacy over Kashmir. A second imperative is an India and Pakistan that both become geopolitically stronger as a result of a South Asian peace that allows each to flourish economically (Chapter 6 and Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). What a failure of the great powers and the United Nations it is that they have given up on trying and trying again with a Kashmir peace process that could prevent our grandchildren being afflicted with billions of lives lost worldwide in a famine and nuclear winter caused by yet another war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir that next time escalates to nuclear war.

Guardrails that protect against wars most crucially start with strategic arms limitations that can simultaneously make rapid progress against AI⁴ warfare guardrails. Those agreements can eventually move on to total bans that make for more credible trust and verify inspections against killer robot programs and war-in-space programs than are currently possible against cyberwarfare programs. This is because the cyberwar programs of all the great powers historically have been significantly

about bottom-up entrepreneurship. Outsourcing to private sector criminal organizations has been endemic. These come in genres with which we have familiarity from popularization of extreme forms of them in James Bond films. Cyber 'Spectres' do not overwhelmingly emanate on the territory of the enemy great power that shares in any kind of guardrails inspection protocol. Hence, the practicalities of trust and verify are fraught compared to nuclear safeguard inspections under UN auspices.

Containing Iran and Other 'Rogue States'

Containing Iran as a state that disrupts peace in the Middle East is at a different conjuncture than the US-China relationship. The United States and Europe hurt Iran by cutting them off from trade far more than Iran hurts them. Nevertheless, the West must be prudent with containment. On the one hand, when the United States cut all trade with Cuba, Cuba was substantially weakened, and the United States only a little. In turn, however, it resulted in Castro turning totally to Moscow for its economic lifelines and changing its political colors from pink to deep red, indeed becoming for a time much more fanatically Communist and combative than the Soviets themselves. That upshot was not pretty; the Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest humankind approached to a war that wiped out a billion people in the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and beyond. China would have suffered terrible famines from the nuclear winter the Cuban Missile Crisis almost caused.

Containment of Iran or Myanmar that Iran or Myanmar sees as permanent, giving them no pathway to lifting that containment, means that they might see themselves in a similar situation to Cuba. They are turning toward alliance with China and Russia in response. They might acquire a level of cyberwar capability from China and Russia that allows them to cost many times over the damage to the US economy than the United States is able to inflict on Iran's currently isolated economy. There is no permanency of certainty about sustaining supremacy through containment in the new world of rapid technological and AI flux.

This is also true of North Korea, which is the circumstance where the case for long-term containment is strongest because North Korea leans on long-term support from China in building WMDs, cyberwar, AI, and killer robot capabilities that threaten neighbors. Up to a point, China does not mind a North Korea that threatens neighbors. North Korea has a weak, contained, and containable economy. Even so, the threat it poses with Chinese aid is large, as it was in 1950. The West must nevertheless keep assuring North Korea that it prefers to make the containment temporary. It wants to open those roads that would allow North Koreans the joy of visiting South Korea, that would allow its economy to grow like surrounding East Asian economies, like Vietnam after its era of containment, to eliminate hunger and poverty. The Western message should also be that it wants North Korea's most gifted children to study in the world's best universities, like Chinese children. One way to make that pitch more genuine is for the United States and its allies to announce a policy of opposition to long-term containment of any state as they energetically pursue endless new initiatives to open diplomatic pathways to decontainment by the West and WMD de-escalation by North Korea. With balance and integrity, the United States would also build diplomatic respect by imploring WMD de-escalation from authoritarian US allies like Israel and Pakistan.

Iran is building a nuclear weapons program of its own in a way that Cuba never did. The Myanmar military junta also seriously played with that option in the past. Its future now looks less pretty than Burma's ugly past. The more effective military card Iran has played throughout this century, a card that Cuba used to play, is to be a fomenter of many small regional wars that are serious problems for the West in a sensitive and unstable region where it has vulnerable key allies.⁵ Libya played this card as well, but less potently than Iran, less by starting war than by supporting terrorists as far away as Indonesia, southern Africa, and the IRA in Northern Ireland.⁶ Hopefully the current rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, between Iraq and Iran, and in future between the US and Iran, will cascade a restorative regional diplomacy that will put an end to Iran reigniting wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Lebanon, and beyond.

Iran is a problem in US eyes because every time there is an internal conflict with Palestinians in Israel, Iran has supported Palestinian proxies that are not directly under its control, and Hezbollah proxies that are more under Iranian control. That support has been with Iranian weapons and increasingly sophisticated and longer-range missiles to attack Israel. This has drawn Israel into wider civil war in Lebanon against a range of Lebanese armed factions, including Palestinian armed groups. Iran has also supported Huthis in Yemen's terrible war. That support includes missiles and drones with which Huthis hit Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran has armed, trained, and supported Shia militias in Iraq who exerted influence over past Iraqi governments that the US occupation installed. These Iraqi Shia militias have in the past attacked US forces in Iraq with heavy casualties.⁷ Iran has supported armed groups in Afghanistan who inflicted casualties on NATO forces there and shaped the balance of power in peace negotiations for Afghanistan. Iran supported the ground war against Islamic State with more troops than any outside force (counting the Kurds as more an inside than as an outside armed resistance). In many other ways Iran destabilizes the region to give the message to the United States and Europe that it can destabilize a region that the West wants to be stable. Iran will continue to do this unless the West agrees to fully integrate Iran into the world economy, its banks into SWIFT transfers, integrate its universities into global knowledge networks, its film industry, poetry, and other cultural industries into global cultural streams, its citizens into global travel. That seems a more win-win path than endless containment, endless regional wars, and Iran growing a stronger alliance with Russia and China and becoming a strategically significant supplier of drones that kill Ukrainians.

President Obama's peacemaking with other members of his predecessor's axis of evil in Iran, but also North Korea, Libya until 2011, and Myanmar, was about all these 'rogue states' abandoning the politics of causing unrest in regions the West wanted to stabilize, from Bangladesh and India to the Middle East and Africa. Crucially, it meant abandoning the incipient nuclear programs that all these states toyed with. Obama's diplomacy was wisely one of only temporary containment, as it had been with some other US administrations. Against Pentagon advice and warnings from European allies, neocon Republicans and President Trump

dissented on the Iran nuclear deal. They wanted a mix of confrontation, permanent containment, and regime change in Iran. Obama himself sided with those in his administration who in 2011 shifted to support for international military intervention and regime change in Libya when an opportunity for this was presented at the time of the Arab Spring. That was an imprudent opportunism as dangerous in its consequences as the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

These invasions deeply compromised the project of temporary containment of North Korea that could be lifted when it abandoned its nuclear weapons program. North Korean generals started then to say, not only in private communications detected by Western intelligence, but also in public speeches, that if North Koreans want to see what happened to regimes the US considered rogue regimes when they abandon their WMD programs, look at what happened to Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein.

Obama's diplomacy for temporary and contingent containment in Iran and Myanmar, as it negotiated a nuclear deal with Iran and a transition to democracy with Myanmar, unraveled under his successors (so far). In the case of Myanmar, a case might be made that the failure to impose significant sanctions on successive waves of Myanmar military attacks on various ethnic minorities emboldened the military to attack the National League of Democracy as well. Another factor was that by 2021 the time had passed when the United States and China could work together for a peaceful Myanmar that was in both their interests, as well as the interests of the people of Myanmar. By 2021, the world had entered a phase where if US sanctions cut off Myanmar or any country, Russia, China, and Iran rush in to befriend them. This also occurred with Afghanistan from 2021.

President Obama's diplomacy over the Iran nuclear deal was creative and effective in securing a win-win deal during his Presidency. He initially sought to engage the Supreme Leader of Iran with unsigned letters not on Presidential letterhead that said, in effect, we know that you think our policy is regime change in Iran.⁸ The letters argued that a point of writing them was to persuade the Supreme Leader that he understood that Iran demonstrating capacity to destabilize the Middle East was a way of showing that they can resist foreign pressure for regime

change. Obama explained to the Supreme Leader that the US interest is allowing the people of Iran to decide what sort of regime they want without US interference. Ultimately the objective should be normalization of the relationship, but the nuclear deal would be the initial, yet huge, confidence-building step that would change the game to principled engagement. Obama had the foresight to see that if the United States did not step in to be a broker of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to stabilize the Middle East, China could become that broker. Indeed it did after Obama's departure and after the United States walked away from the agreement with Iran that Obama signed on behalf of his state. I return repeatedly to the theme of how empirically important narratives of the broken promise are, and to restorative diplomacy as a remedy to broken promises.

When that deal was signed, containment of Iran by Europe and the entire world economy began to be dismantled. During Donald Trump's Presidential campaign in 2015, he pitched to Republican hawks that he would join arms with his base by promising to dishonor the Iran nuclear deal. Neocons like John Bolton and allies of the right like Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu embraced Trump as a result of his commitment to reach beyond containment of Iran to confrontation with Iran. Iran's people, but not its leadership, descended into greater poverty. Iran then accelerated its nuclear weapons program, its cyberwarfare programs, and began sharing its impressive drone technologies with Russia.

Containing Myanmar

Hilary Clinton led US diplomacy toward a deal with Myanmar's junta to empower a transition to democracy, to release Aung San Su Kyi and allow her to lead the National League of Democracy in competitive elections with international monitors. There were many layers of diplomacy for democracy, particularly domestic peace diplomacy, that went to support from many ethnic armies that would commit to seek peace in a democratic, federal Myanmar. Chinese diplomacy was important too at a time when the United States and China could work well in unison. China saw Myanmar as a large country sharing a border

with China; it had fought half a dozen wars with Myanmar in past centuries. China wanted Myanmar to become a peaceful, flourishing trading partner. It wanted to end recurrent flows of refugees and drugs across its border from the fighting in Myanmar. By 1989 China had completely withdrawn its support for the insurgency against the military by the Communist Party of Burma. That insurgency then collapsed (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, Chapter 9). Indeed, in the 1980s China (unlike the United States) seemed to withdraw its support for armed insurgencies everywhere (Pembroke 2020, Chapter 7).

The National League of Democracy won one landslide election after another. In contrast, the political party backed by the military proved unpopular. In 2021, the military responded with a coup, arresting Aung San Su Kyi and most of the elected leadership of the National League of Democracy. The junta claimed that it would restabilize the country and then hold fresh elections. Gradually, perhaps too gradually after the Rohingya genocide, because of fear that Russia and China would exploit the situation to make the junta its new best friend, the international community reintroduced a containment policy toward Myanmar. Economic, travel, lifting of aid, and other sanctions were put in place and are likely to stay until elected leaders are released, and concrete steps are taken to implement the promised resumption of Myanmar's journey to democracy.

This was a principled return to containment by the West. In contrast, the Trump administration's resumption of containment of Iran was unprincipled, a broken promise. With Myanmar, it was the junta who broke its democracy undertakings to the international community. With Iran, it was the Trump administration who dismantled the nuclear disarmament deal to return to a mix of containment and military confrontation, with President Trump even threatening genocide (to totally destroy Iran and wipe other rogue regimes off the map)⁹ if Iran's proxies in Iraq did not desist from attacks on vulnerable US forces.

Implications of Containing 'Rogue States' for Containing a 'Rogue Russia'

The resumption of formidable temporary containment of Russia after its invasion of Ukraine was justified because this was a shocking war crime that gravely endangered Europe and the planet. My argument is that containment is only justified until a sustainable peace between Russia and Ukraine is negotiated. This is important because the belief of countries like Russia and Iran is that the United States is always prompt to impose sanctions on regimes it resents, but always tardy in dismantling them after a diplomatic resolution.¹⁰ That belief undermines the effectiveness of sanction deterrence. Russia and Iran believe what the United States truly seeks is regime change in their country rather than compliance with the posited reason for the sanction. On both sides, this kind of thinking is always woolly about regime change to what? It is important that the people of Russia, Iran, and Myanmar can clearly see what the regime oppressing them must do to trigger an end to containment policies. Regime allegations that dissidents are naïve dupes of US designs to crush their country will seem more plausible if containment is not responsive by being dismantled when the required reform is made. Leaders and diplomats with a restorative justice philosophy should always preface announcements of new sanctions on a despotic regime with an apology to oppressed citizens of that country who suffer collateral damage from the sanctions and always explain that the sanctions will be lifted as soon as possible after the tyranny that motivates them is ended.

Containment of Russia seemed to end after the Reykjavik Summit between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev. The peace diplomacy of other Western leaders who had previously been drum beaters was also important, notably the warm relationship Margaret Thatcher established with Gorbachev. 1986 was the summit where Reagan famously said publicly what he had been saying privately to his diplomatic and military leadership: 'It would be fine with me if we eliminated all nuclear weapons'. Gorbachev was already an abolitionist who agreed with him.¹¹ Some question whether Reagan and Thatcher were genuine. Perhaps they were lying to cool out their naïve mark, Gorbachev. Many Russians

believe this. The evidence is clear, however, that Reagan was genuine. Today's Russian civil society cynics wrongly perceive Western leaders of 1986 as gaming Russia with an endgame of permanently keeping Russia down and dismantling its strengths.

They believe the West was playing from the same gamebook when it negotiated the 2014 Ukraine-Russia Minsk peace accord. The West and Ukraine never intended to support implementation of the Minsk accords, allowed increased discrimination against the ethnic Russians of the Donbas. Instead NATO armed Ukraine to the teeth, including its non-state fascist militias, in preparation for an escalation of the 2014 war that began in 2022. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President of the time Hollande both said publicly that at Minsk they were playing for time to arm Ukraine. The Russian narrative, their Minsk narrative of the broken promise, was not just a Putin narrative. Westerners can say that this narrative is wrong, but they cannot articulate what the West was doing between 2014 and 2022 to prove to Russian civil society that its good faith of 1986 was still genuine. By then the West could no longer prove that there were no broken promises; the West had sold out to the neocon narrative of a diplomacy of deceit. The 10 years after the 1986 Summit had been fertile, nevertheless; a succession of arms containment treaties were signed, making the world much safer, not only from intermediate nuclear weapons elimination in Europe accomplished quickly by Reagan and Gorbachev. Putin reversed this civilizational accomplishment after the Minsk agreement was dishonored.

By 2014 it was perhaps understandable that Western leaders should want to return to containing Russia, including through arming Ukraine, and weakening Russia every way they could. It was clear by 2014, and should have been clear earlier, that Russia was no longer a society transitioning to democracy and free markets, but was transitioning to autocracy and domination of markets by Putin and his old KGB cronies. President Medvedev seemed to President Obama to be opening a door to a turn back to democracy. That proved a mirage (Belton 2020). Putin's KGB faction still dominated Medvedev. It put Medvedev back in his box after he supported Obama on step-by-step toward total abolition of nuclear weapons. Russia had decided to compromise on allowing NATO

to expand to former Soviet satellites like Poland and the Baltic States. Putin publicly drew a red line on NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, however, as too close for security, too fundamental. Whether there was a red line against NATO expansion to Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan was less clear publicly. Russia persistently acted to fragment these states with separatist ethnic conflicts that Russian military peacekeepers flared when these states made overtures toward solidarity with the Western alliance. This made these states so politically indigestible for the EU and NATO that their accession was never close enough to justify Putin speeches about red lines with respect to them. Sadly these societies continue to live under a shadow of considerable Russian domination.

Russia has so far succeeded in keeping all five of these states out of both the EU and NATO. Nevertheless, these were ‘catastrophic successes’ for Russia because accomplishing it brought Sweden and Finland into NATO, brought NATO missiles closer to Russia’s border, encircled Russia with a more unified NATO, all this at massive cost to Russia in blood and treasure. Because the costs to Ukraine were larger and combined with significant NATO-wide depletion of economic growth and inflation, these successes were also catastrophic successes. For both sides, restorative diplomacy over a security architecture for Europe that was inclusive and listening to Russian fears, would have been superior to the partial and catastrophic successes both sides secured.

Other world leaders of the 1990s, such as former Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, argued that dismantling containment of Russia failed to go far enough. Keating argued that NATO as we had known it should have been dismantled at that point in history to prove to Russia that a powerful club from which Russia was excluded no longer had a place. Not only was NATO retained as an anti-Russia alliance, it expanded in tranches that included Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia, with Romania, and Bulgaria in 2003. Then came the Bucharest NATO summit of 2008 when President Bush announced that Georgia and Ukraine would be on a track to NATO inclusion. This clearly signaled the crossing of Putin’s repeatedly articulated red line. He saw these as former core parts of the Soviet Union and the old Russia of the Czars before that. They were in close missile proximity to the Russian

core. The missiles in Ukraine before 1990 were pointed at the NATO powers; Russia believed it had guaranteed that Ukraine's post-communist government would never be subjected to a campaign to persuade it to join NATO and reassemble a missile capability—now aimed instead at Russia.¹²

Eastern expansion of NATO up to Ukraine had long been warned against by diplomats and many serious thinkers on the left and right (such as Henry Kissinger),¹³ among liberal institutionalists and realists such as John Mearsheimer (Chotiner 2022), and George Kennan (1997). This view was reinforced in the pro-Western early years of Putin's Presidency when he enthused about moving closer to the United States and EU. Keating argued Western leaders failed to grasp a potential 'new era of peace and co-operation', failing to find a place for Russia inside a global 'strategic fabric'. By expanding NATO so widely, 'the US failed to learn one of the lessons of history – the victor should be magnanimous with the vanquished'.¹⁴ The upshot, Keating argued, was that NATO states on the borders of Russia would keep its nuclear arsenal on dangerous levels of alert. 'This posture automatically carries with it the possibility of a Russian nuclear attack by mistake'. Keating argued that Russia compensated for turning down the dial on how up to update its nuclear warning systems by turning up the dial on levels of nuclear alert. 'This means that while the Cold War is over, the risk of a mistaken pre-emptory (nuclear) response has increased'. Keating contended that if nuclear weapons were the world's most pressing problem, its greatest challenge was building 'a truly representative structure of world governance which reflects global realities but which is also equitable and fair'. George Kennan (1997) was prophetic:

Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. And, last but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if

not impossible, to secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the Start II agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear weaponry.

This section of my book was drafted during the months before the Ukraine crisis escalated to the invasion of 2022. It became clear in the speeches Putin gave and the proposals he tabled in 2021 and early 2022 when he was effectively threatening that invasion that he feared NATO missiles close to Russian metropolises. He also professed fear that Ukraine had the scientists and historic knowhow and the massive nuclear plants to itself rebuild Soviet-era nuclear missiles. There were defense strategists in Ukraine and US realists like John Mearsheimer (1993) who indeed suggested that Ukraine be 'quietly encouraged' to acquire its own nuclear deterrent. A problem with realism is that its practitioners want to make recommendations like this one, for example that nuclear balancing would create stability by Iran getting the bomb to balance Israel (Waltz 2012)! This when Saudi Arabia has made it clear that if both Israel and Iran have the bomb, it may become a nuclear power. Putin also made much of Ukraine's neofascists that he seems to worry little about when they are his neofascists in Russia. It is unlikely that this was one of Putin's key motivations, but rather an edgy way of mobilizing militarism in Russia to honor the memory of the millions of Russians who fell defending Ukraine from Nazis in World War II.

Washington would have done better to be less obsessed with expanded containment of Russia, and Russia with expanded containment of Ukraine. Better to have been obsessed with regional European architectures of inclusion and diplomatic dialogue. This aspect of the analysis is taken further in subsequent chapters.

What the West saw as progressive people power uprisings in Eastern Europe to shun elected former Communist leaders in favor of pro-Western leaders, Putin saw as a breach of reaffirmed agreements three decades earlier to surrender East Germany, dismantle the Warsaw Pact, and end NATO expansion. Putin perceived the color revolutions not as people power revolutions but as NATO-inspired destabilization campaigns. 'What the West celebrated as popular democratic revolutions were simply Western-sponsored coups d'état' for Putin, especially in cases like Ukraine where the deposed leader was perceived in Russia to

have been democratically elected with particularly strong support from Russian-speaking communities of Eastern Ukraine' (Krastev and Holmes 2019, 94). I commenced the Peacebuilding Compared data collection for Europe totally convinced that it was the Western perception that was correct here, and I still think Western perceptions of the inspiring bottom-up character of the color revolutions in Eastern Europe are overwhelmingly correct. Now I do, nevertheless, see that there is some limited merit to the Russian perception and critique; there was significant, unnecessary, and counterproductive political meddling by the United States in many democracies struggling against Russian domination. It has not helped democracy in Eastern Europe.

Some of the new waves of Ukrainian leaders put in place provocative discriminatory policies in the regions populated by ethnic Russian minorities. Western human rights critique of this was wanting. On February 24, 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to repeal minority language laws, that mainly affected Russian speakers. On February 27, Russian soldiers started seizing checkpoints in Crimea. A preventable war that would take the world to new levels of danger had escalated.

The legislature of the overwhelmingly ethnically Russian Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the local government of Sevastopol (both subdivisions of democratic Ukraine) voted to hold a referendum on the political status of Crimea on March 16, 2014. These governments claim that there was an 83 percent voter turnout and that 97 percent of them voted to rejoin Russia. Crimea had been ceded to Ukraine by Russia's Krushchev sixty years earlier. Putin then reinforced Russian bases that were already in Crimea (at its Black Sea naval base). These elections may have been corrupted, but it is probable that the majority of the predominantly Russian-speaking people of Crimea were more aligned at that time with Russia than Ukraine. The military occupation of Crimea doubled what had been falling approval ratings for Putin inside Russia, to over 90 percent according to the reading of the polls by one US State Department Russia expert and at the time of writing they may still approach 80 percent. They will not stay there, however. Contrary to the hopes of decent people, Putin did seem to militarize the Russian people. But even credible poll numbers in an authoritarian context can exaggerate

realities. History teaches that after years of the horrors of wars of aggression, the decent people of Russia will reflect on the facts, spurn aggressive warmaking, and the Putin legacy.

In parallel with the occupation of Crimea, ethnic Russian militias rose up in other parts of Eastern Ukraine with escalated weapons, military advisors, then boots on the ground, supplied by Putin, reinforced by Russian troops in militia garb. A civil war raged there for eight years notwithstanding the phony Minsk ceasefire agreement to establish an autonomous regional government for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions inside Ukraine. Although sanctions against Russia were justified by what escalated to become a huge 2022 war of Russian aggression, the West needed to be careful not to be seen by the *people* of Russia to have abandoned its commitment to dismantle containment in return for Moscow pulling down the Iron Curtain, reducing Soviet nuclear arsenals and installing a democracy. Putin (who the West disliked) was undoubtedly more democratically popular in Russia than his predecessors who the West had liked, but played like fiddles (Gorbachev, Yeltsin). This was true even as all Russian elections starting with the 1996 election of Yeltsin were seriously corrupted. Western leaders had a tin ear for Russian democratic sentiment. Distaste for a particular leader is a foolish reason for abandoning an agreement important to the survival of all peoples. Perceived Western betrayal is precisely the perception that Putin successfully played to with his home crowd.

Putin overplayed his hand with that domestic base, indeed with all independent thinkers, and with the Chinese leadership, which sought to persuade him to end his war after the first day of fighting. The referendum result in Crimea may have been corrupted, but there was little doubt that most people living in both Russia and Crimea were supportive of separatism from Ukraine. The corruption of referendums was probably greater, and the levels of support for separatism and war much more mixed in other parts of Eastern Ukraine. Putin's 2022 crime of aggression in Ukraine was strategically stupid. If the West responds to it with enduring containment of Russia that seems to have no escape path, that would equally be folly for a world with high risks of escalation from accidents or miscalculations.

Putin's war crimes in Ukraine and the West's preventive failures and mismanagement leading up to 2022,¹⁵ were sad setbacks for collaborative crisis prevention. The dismantling of nuclear weapons, including in Ukraine, in the 1990s made both sides safer when nuclear missiles were kept back from close proximity from enemy capitals. That margin of safety has narrowed for all earthlings thanks to preventive failures on all sides of the Ukraine war. The needed 2014 Minsk outcome was more an Andrew Mack and George Kennan style of outcome (see Chapter 6), perhaps agreement for a UN peacekeeping mission to disarm armed factions and a diplomatic process for discussion of UN-supervised referenda, as in Timor-Leste.

Admittedly, the internationally supervised outcome was not pretty in Kosovo, where Russia and NATO held opposed views, where the shoe was on the opposite foot, and it was NATO which was in breach of international law in its military assaults on the sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Yes, the United States used military force to decide who would rule Kosovo, and meddled shamelessly in the politics of the successor Kosovo democracy.¹⁶ The US pick to rule Kosovo was a cabal of war criminals, murderers, and thieves. Then, so was the Serbian leadership, even moreso. For all that, the outcome in Kosovo was not as ugly as in Ukraine. It involved no risk of nuclear war. In Kosovo, as in Bosnia, fighting was brought to an end by reactive international intervention, but also preventatively in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia by Russia and NATO collaboratively interposing their peacemaking troops to prevent Serbian attack (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, Part I).

The NATO bombing of civilians in Belgrade was a war crime and a setback for the democracy movement in Serbia who sought to overthrow President Milošević (Marsavelski et al. 2018; Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, Part I). It left Russian leaders, including Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin, seething over the hypocrisy of NATO and its rules-based international order. China seethed in 1999 when bombing was so reckless that Operation Allied Force directed five US joint direct attack munition guided bombs to hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese officials. It was disappointing that the ensuing Western conversation was not about how such a war crime in future circumstances might ignite a cascade of violence. That discussion did occur in Russia. For

Putin, the Belgrade lesson was that if NATO can get away with this kind of reckless war crime, so can Russia.

My conclusion is that Bosnia and Kosovo were less than glorious peacemaking and peacekeeping successes, but much more successful than Minsk, 2014. Macedonia was an inspiring accomplishment of Russian and NATO troops working together to prevent war through UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, Macedonia). US diplomat David Phillips (2012, 208) was right that: ‘The UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) was a model for preventive diplomacy’. That model was the road not taken in Ukraine, in Georgia. The lesson that might have been learned was that the West needed to make Russia and China partners in peace as it did in Macedonia in 2001–2002 after Putin had assumed the Russian leadership. In future, NATO needed to avoid bombing that was in breach of international law. Collaborative preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping was that path not taken at Minsk. It was the better path attempted in the former Yugoslavia with imperfection along the way, but with profound success in Macedonia. NATO, Russia and the United Nations should have learned lessons from those imperfections to forge an agreement between the great powers to do peacekeeping better and preventatively to save Ukraine from war at Minsk in 2014. Instead of being peacemakers at Minsk, Western leaders were pretenders, warmakers who gamed a vital peace process to prepare for war.

Contain Threats; Abandon Long-Term Containment of States

My argument is that containment of the Soviet Union was a well-crafted alternative to confrontation, a diplomatic triumph for the United States and NATO. Temporary containment of Saddam Hussein in Iraq had also been a partial success in weakening that regime, gaining effective independence for the oppressed Iraqi Kurds, and motivating Saddam to dismantle all his WMD programs, nuclear, biological, and chemical. Those accomplishments turned to dross when containment was discarded in favor of the illegal 2003 invasion of Iraq. The upshot was a

more pro-Iran government in Iraq than Saddam's, and a door opened to Islamic State not only in Iraq, but in Syria, ultimately across Africa and beyond. Islamic State was murdering more innocents (in Africa) after it was defeated in Iraq than before.

Likewise, temporary containment of Gaddafi's Libya had succeeded in motivating Gaddafi to dismantle his nuclear weapons program, to desist from his widespread support for anti-Western terrorism, and to become an ally of the West against Al Qaeda and Islamic State. When the Western alliance seized the Arab Spring opportunity to assassinate Gaddafi and militarize its Arab Spring, we have seen that this cascaded Gaddafi's mercenaries south with his stolen arsenal to destabilize a long line of African dominoes and open doors to Islamic State affiliates.¹⁷

Although containment of Russia is again justified at the time of writing until a sustainable peace with Ukraine is working, permanent containment of Russia deep into this century is a prescription for return to something worse than Cold War politics. That worse outcome is a widened NATO alliance that totally dominates Western Europe facing off against a China-led alliance that includes Russia, North Korea, Iran, and their allies such as Syria. Continued pretenses of containing China will fail even more profoundly than continued containment of Russia. In a world of mutually contained multipolarity, most societies will have contempt for the dangerous behavior of all poles. On the positive side, the disengagement of most societies from alliance with any pole could become the driving force for restoration of peaceful institutions and renewal of the United Nations. The last thing the world needs is a multipolarity of spheres of hegemony by NATO, Russia, China, by Erdogan's NeoOttomanism, or by Iranian attempts to reconstitute a Persian empire.

Return to containment of the military regime in Myanmar remains a short-term imperative because the junta has reneged on its side of the deal to honor democratic institutions and temper its own domination of the society, especially its ethnic minorities. The West and ASEAN might insist the junta keep its word that it will return to genuine democracy. Diplomats can signal that temporary containment of Myanmar should end when it is clear that genuine democracy is back, when the National League of Democracy is unchained. This overall conclusion is that while

long-run containment of the Soviet Union was a bold and brilliant alternative to confrontation, in today's circumstances only shorter-term containment of states is coherent, such as this current containment imperative for the Myanmar junta and containment of Russia while it continues to take Ukrainian territory. More than that, explicit rejection of any policy of long-term containment of Russia or China is needed if Russia and China are not to undermine shorter-term containment for cases like the Myanmar junta, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea, and future cases that resemble them.

Why is long-term containment of Russia or China (or the United States for that matter) an unusually massive folly? With China, it cannot possibly work. We have seen that China is not an old Soviet Union whose economy was of little consequence to the non-Communist world. Chinese growth and lending by Chinese banks that are the largest banks in the world (Braithwaite 2021) are critical to global recovery when the West has to pull itself out of recessions like 2008 and the covid recession of 2020. Collaboration of the West with China under the auspices of the WHO was imperative to treating the root cause of the covid economic crisis, as Helen Clark and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (2021) concluded in their *Make it the Last Pandemic* report. China, the West, and Russia were all needed for the heavy lifting of vaccinating all of the planet and preventing the regions of deepest poverty, for example in Africa, from becoming the incubus of future HIVs, covids, and ebola variants that it did become in the recent past. The contemporary climate crisis cannot be tackled without committed collaboration with China as both the biggest polluter in the world on the negative side and the biggest investor in renewables (45% of world renewables investment this century) (Braithwaite 2021) and by far the most renewables patents of any country, on the positive side. Peter Drahos (2021b) goes so far as to argue that Chinese leveraging of green investment is the best of the slim prospects the planet has of averting a major climate catastrophe. Drahos argues that the crisis is now so close to irreversible tipping points that Western market mechanisms are certain to be too slow to tame the crisis.

Thankfully, policies that sought to isolate Chinese universities have failed. 2023 was the first year that Chinese universities significantly surged past US universities on the Nature Index of high-quality research

publishing in top science journals. Six of the top 10 institutions on the Nature Index are now Chinese.¹⁸ China also publishes as much in the top science journals as the combined output of the next ten countries after the United States on the Nature Index (Germany, the UK, Japan, France, Canada, South Korea, Switzerland, India, Australia, and Italy). Attempting to contain that level of excellence in science is absurd for a planet that must secure scientific collaboration on climate change, pandemics, other catastrophes, and simpler evidence-based challenges like the most cost-effective ways to scale up ambulance services during crises and how high bank reserve deposits should be to prevent crashes.

The argument against long-term containment of Russia is that as disappointed as Westerners might be at how shallow Russian democracy is, and how widespread is Putin's domestic despotism, until 2008 (Georgia) and 2014 (Ukraine) Russia basically kept its side of the Reykjavik bargain forged by Reagan and Gorbachev that was supported by all NATO states. Hence, Ukraine and the West will do best to find peace in Ukraine and then rediscover a path to reverse the formerly successful policy of Russian containment. And it must be explicit about signaling that this is how it thinks about containment of Russia, China, and Iran. A glimmer of hopeful light here was this May 2021 statement by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on China:

It is the one country in the world that has the military, economic, diplomatic capacity to undermine or challenge the rules-based order that we care so much about and are determined to defend. But I want to be very clear about something. And this is important. Our purpose is not to contain China, to hold it back, to keep it down. It is to uphold this rules-based order that China is posing a challenge to. (Blinken 2021)

Rejecting long-term containment and supporting a rules-based international order that will see more Russian and more US war criminals in the dock of international tribunals is indeed required. The risk to the United States of being seen by ordinary Russians as snubbing commitments it made to abandon containment of Russia is this: that they will think in the way North Korean generals do about the trustworthiness of *détente*. We have seen that North Korean generals say: look at what happened

to Gaddafi and Saddam when they dismantled their nuclear weapons capability; look at how despised Gorbachev is by the Russian people for dismantling the Soviet counterbalance to US domination. With China, containment simply cannot work. The inflation and recession Europe and the Global South suffered after decoupling from Russia are minor blips compared to the consequences of Europe and the United States decoupling from China.

Enduring containment might have other hugely counterproductive effects, for example in hobbling the UN Security Council's ability to prevent and end wars, politicizing pandemic prevention and poisoning cooperation on climate justice and financial crisis prevention. The next chapter will discuss persistent Russian and Chinese vetoes of important Security Council resolutions that are imperative for building a more peaceful planet. Blinken's May 2021 message is a central message of this book. The West must not have a containment mentality toward China and Russia but want them to flourish in the way the West wanted for them (Neocons excepted) at the end of the Cold War when Security Council vetoes dropped to zero. The planet then became objectively more collaborative and peaceful. It reduced poverty more quickly. It closed the ozone hole. Reconciliation of diverse kinds was on the rise, as discussed in the following chapters.

The next chapter argues that for the foreseeable future, containment of threats must be more in focus. Long-term containment of states should become a practice of the past. The most internationalized kind of threat arises when one state or army seeks to expand its sovereignty by invading another. The world should have learnt from how much better off the world has been since the end of World War II as a consequence of dramatic reduction of invasions, especially by great powers. Conversely, international society has grasped how devastating the cascades of violence have been from the rare invasions that have occurred in this period—the invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo by Rwanda, Uganda, and other African states, the invasion of West Papua, then East Timor by Indonesia, the invasion of other former Yugoslavian republics by Serbia, the multiple invasions of Lebanon between 1978 and 2006, and the Iraq and Kuwait invasions. Not as bad as the invasions of World Wars I and II, but bad enough.

Preventing invasions requires rapid threat containment that diverges from the politics of long-term state containment of the Cold War. In earlier Peacebuilding Compared research, my co-authors persuaded me that better cooperation between the United States and Russia could have prevented wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. When that better cooperation did happen, it succeeded in preventing a Serbian invasion of Macedonia (today Northern Macedonia) by placing both Russian and NATO troops in the path of any Serbian advance (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, Part I). Even moreso, containment of threats is superior to the politics of confrontation with enemy states that prevailed in all previous centuries of modernity prior to the post-World War II era of containment.

Re-summarizing in a different way, humankind is best to pursue the *Better Angels of Our Nature* (Pinker 2011) in a progression from gunboat diplomacy to a post-invasion world. Then a post-containment world is needed with respect to states. This must be a world that preventively contains threats permanently, however. That is our next topic.

Notes

1. Launch on warning empowers high-level commanders to launch a retaliatory nuclear weapons strike as soon as satellites and other warning sensors detect an incoming enemy missile.
2. For the more general development of the theory of minimally sufficient deterrence, see Braithwaite (2022, Chapter 9).
3. Unlike China and other NATO nuclear powers, the United States refuses to tie its hands against nuclear first use. It has experienced rounds of debates this century when it has reaffirmed its rejection of no first use. Although China has a no first use policy, speculation abounds that the Chinese commitment to no first use will not hold in a world where its peer competitor rejects this.
4. Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been defined as 'a set of algorithms giving a machine the analytical and decision-making capabilities

- to react intelligently to situations by making predictions based on data already acquired' (Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament 2021, 39).
5. This conclusion is based on my Peacebuilding Compared Project interviews in Iran, including with senior military officers, Grand Ayatollahs, former ministers in portfolios like foreign affairs, and at its Council for National Security.
 6. Again, this is based on Peacebuilding Compared interviews I conducted in Libya.
 7. Peacebuilding Compared interviews by the author in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan.
 8. This is based on my interviews in Iran and beyond. They are confirmed to a degree in memoirs of members of Obama's administration.
 9. A Trump rogue regimes speech that singled out Iran and North Korea was to the UN Security Council in 2017. It was there that he shocked the audience by threatening to 'totally destroy' North Korea and bring other rogue states to heel (Borger 2017). In addition to these rogue states, Trump, also Tweeted that he could 'wipe Afghanistan off the face of the Earth' (Ward 2019).
 10. Peacebuilding Compared interviews by author.
 11. See Kurtz-Phelan (2014). Krepon (2021, 329) described the exchange that preceded Reagan's famous statement: 'Reagan's team offered the Pentagon's notional proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles—"fast flyers". Why stop there, asked Gorbachev? How about all bombers, warheads, tactical nuclear weapons, and, for good measure, cruise missiles?' After Reagan replied with his famous statement on total abolition, Gorbachev concurred: 'We can do that. Let's eliminate them. We can eliminate them'. They both concluded that getting there by the end of the twentieth century was too slow.
 12. Putin made these points at length in interviews with Stone and Scheer (2017). A restorative peace was possible up to the February 2022 Ukraine invasion. It might have promised ceasefire, diplomacy to discuss federalism and how to empower the people of Eastern Ukraine to decide their own future, full preservation

of Ukrainian democracy and sovereignty, a fast track to EU accession, but guarantee that NATO keep the promises of US and German leaders to reject NATO expansion. These promises are recorded in minutes from both sides of meetings at the time Gorbachev agreed that the Berlin Wall would be dismantled to take East Germany into NATO (in the context of moving toward dismantling the Warsaw Pact). Russian leaders of all stripes (Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, Putin) believed there was agreement to reject any other expansion of NATO. US Secretary of State James Baker and the German Chancellor and foreign minister explicitly agreed there would be 'not one inch' of NATO expansion Eastwards once East Germany became part of NATO. See the minutes of the Baker-Gorbachev meeting declassified in 2017: National Defense Archive, NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev heard. George Washington University, 12 December 2017. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-Western-leaders-early> (accessed September 29, 2023). Yeltsin's claim that in 1993 he received similar assurances from the Clinton administration, were dismissed by US Secretary of State Christopher after Yeltsin's death as a 'misunderstanding' by a Yeltsin who was 'drunk'. Subsequently released US records of the meeting support Yeltsin more than Christopher: National Security Archive. March 16, 2018. NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>. Yeltsin and Putin surrendered grudgingly to considerable NATO expansion before what had always been the Ukraine red line was reasserted. The evidence makes reasonable the Russian claim that the promises made to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin and their foreign ministers were broken.

13. Kissinger opined:

Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other—as has been the pattern would lead eventually to civil war or breakup. To treat Ukraine as part of an East–West confrontation would

scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West—especially Russia and Europe—into a cooperative international system: Kissinger (2014).

14. All the quotes from Paul Keating in this paragraph are from Hyland (2008).
15. On this mismanagement, Mearsheimer argued that the ‘deep cause’ of the Ukraine civil war was ‘The aim of the United States and its European allies to peel Ukraine away from the Soviet orbit and incorporate it in the West’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4>). Equally, the deep cause was foolish determination of Putin to peel it back. Like Putin, Mearsheimer saw the key elements of Western strategy was ‘NATO and EU expansion’ and ‘fostering an Orange Revolution’. A West that pressed Ukraine to implement the 2014 Minsk Protocol could have helped, something Ukraine never did in the eight years after it was signed by Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Tatars who were racially distrusted by Stalin and forcibly relocated from Crimea to Uzbekistan had no voice in the Minsk negotiations. It contained no gesture toward their right of return to their farms in a Crimea that became overwhelmingly Tatarized over seven centuries of Tatar rule until Stalin ethnically cleansed Tatars. The endless, oppressive politics that Minsk should have changed rather than gamed was squeeze and oppress those who were not devout supporters of the great power you prefer.
16. Aleksandar Marsavelski and I were told during Peacebuilding Compared interviews by Kosovo political party leaders of the US Ambassador dictating to them who were and were not acceptable political candidates during Kosovo’s transitional administration.
17. This analysis of Libya and its pan-African implications are discussed in much more detail in Part I of Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018).
18. Nature Index Institution Tables. 2023: <https://www.nature.com/nature-index/institution-outputs/generate/all/global/all> (accessed September 29, 2023).

References

- Belton, Catherine. 2020. *Putin's people: How the KGB took back Russia and then took on the West*. London: William Collins.
- Blinken, Anthony. 2021. *60 Minutes*, 2 May. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/antony-blinken-60-minutes-2021-05-02/>
- Borger, Julian. 2017. *The Guardian*, September 20.
- Braithwaite, John. 2021. *Regulatory capitalism, extinctions and China*. Available at SSRN. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3767372>
- Braithwaite, John 2022. *Macrocriminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, and Bina D'Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence: War, crime and peacebuilding across South Asia*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Chotiner, I. 2022. Why John Mearsheimer Blames the US for the crisis in Ukraine. *New Yorker*, March 1.
- Clark, Helen and H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. 2021. *COVID-19: Make it the last pandemic. The independent panel for pandemic preparedness and response*. Geneva: WHO.
- Drahos, Peter. 2021b. *Survival governance: Energy and climate in the Chinese century*. Oxford: OUP.
- Hyland, Tom. 2008. Western leaders blew the chance for peace: Keating. *Sydney Morning Herald*. August 24.
- Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament. 2021. *New technologies and nuclear strategy*. Paris: IDN.
- Marsavelski, Aleksandar, Furtuna Sheremeti and John Braithwaite 2018. Did nonviolent resistance fail in Kosovo? *British Journal of Criminology* 58: 218–36.
- Mearsheimer, John. 1993. The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. *Foreign Affairs* 50–66.
- Naim, Moises. 2013. *The end of power: From boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states, why being in charge isn't what it used to be*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ocampo, José Antonio., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2018. *The welfare state revisited*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pembroke, Michael. 2020. *Play by the rules: A short history of America's leadership*. Sydney: Hardie Grant.

- Phillips, David L. 2012. *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive diplomacy and US Intervention*. Cambridge: Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, MIT.
- Kennan, George F. 1997. A fateful error. *New York Times*, February 5.
- Kissinger, Henry. 2014. How the Ukraine crisis ends. *Washington Post*, March 5.
- Krastev, Ivan, and Stephen Holmes. 2019. *The light that failed: A reckoning*. New York: Penguin.
- Krepon, Michael. 2021. *Winning and losing the nuclear peace*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Kurtz-Phelan, Daniel. 2014. A thawing in Iceland. *New York Times*, August 1.
- Pinker, Steven. 2011. *The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined*. New York: Viking.
- Rudd, Kevin. 2022. *The avoidable war: The dangers of a catastrophic conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Schlosser, Eric. 2013. *Command and control: Nuclear weapons, the Damascus accident, and the illusion of safety*. New York: Penguin.
- Stone, Oliver, and Robert Scheer. 2017. *The Putin interviews*. New York: Hot Books.
- The Economist*. 2023. Henry Kissinger: How to avoid World War III. *Australian Financial Review*, May 26.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 2012. Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability. *Foreign Affairs* 91: 2–5.
- Ward, Alex. 2019. Trump says he would wipe Afghanistan off face of earth in 10 days. *Vox*, July 22.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





6

Institutions to Manage Threats

Abstract A sequenced architecture of commitment can be a good way to strengthen peace agreements and confidence-building. Late twentieth-century drivers of declining armed conflict can be reenergized for future declines. Single thin reeds of war prevention snap, yet they work when local and international society invests to bind them together in a fabric of multidimensional peacebuilding. Just as market manipulators have progressively learnt new ways to game markets, over time democracy manipulators learnt how to game democracy. The best way to win elections became to misgovern. Earlier in democracy's evolution, the best way to win elections was to govern well. Democracy's virtues can be retrieved by investing in checks and balances that temper domination.

Keyword Peacebuilding · Democracy · Gaming · Checks and balances

Containment of Threats

Threats to human security that must be contained are many. This book considers recurrence of certain threats as acute dangers—new forms of financial engineering to game markets that risk financial crises, monopoly, and domination through social media platforms that launch

lies and hate more virulently than truths and empathy, environmental emissions that threaten ecosystem collapse, viruses that propagate globalization of disease, and WMDs. These are the big-ticket items for threat containment. Yet we can also understand much about the character of threats that call for containment by considering lesser, more banal, but ubiquitous threats like small arms proliferation.

Comparative and historical research does not suggest that a right to bear arms, as in the US Constitution, is a pathway to enhancing freedom. Societies that do away with gun and sword carrying reduce violent crime, particularly mass shootings and gang warfare in the era of automatic weapons (Braithwaite 2022, Chapters 9–10). It can leave schoolchildren less free from violence, terror, and trauma. When Beau Nash, patron of the British nightlife capital of Bath, announced that it no longer was fashionable for young men to attend balls with a sword adorning their thigh, fewer balls were ruined by alcohol-fueled male rage (Trevelyan 1985, 385). Banning duels was part of ‘the civilizing process’ in the writing of Norbert Elias (1969). Homicides kill a lot more people than wars, though wars cascade to higher rates of homicide, rape, and terrorist bombings, which themselves often cascade to war (Braithwaite 2022). Regulating access to small arms, such as through the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, is therefore an important way of containing risks from both. It is not the only one where huge progress has been made by leadership from Nobel Laureates of civil society. Another is the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention that resulted in a Nobel Peace Prize for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. We must be careful to never lose sight of this in the next chapter as we prioritize catastrophic risks posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

In 2001, when progress stalled on the weapons disposal process during the Bougainville peace, Australia funded income-generating projects for ex-combatant groups in communities where weapons disposal proceeded. The three stages of the agreed weapons disposal process were completed in 2005 (Reagan 2005). This involved collecting weapons into locked boxes that were regularly audited by the Peace Monitoring Group from other countries of the region (Spark and Bailey 2005). At first, ex-combatant commanders of units that surrendered weapons kept a key to the locked boxes. In the second stage, locally contained weapons

were consolidated into more centrally located double-locked containers. The UN observer mission held the second key. After UN verification of completion of the second stage, the third stage was destruction of the weapons.

Seven and a half years between truce and disposal of most weapons was a long and risky wait. It was a double-edged risk. One side of that risk was what Thomas Tari and his gang did: Tari refused to dispose weapons at the end of the agreed containment stage, and later broke open the containers. He created a certain amount of havoc with them as a post-conflict criminal entrepreneur. The larger risk was restarting the war. This did not happen. One risk was posed by the Me'ekamui Defense Force, which was not a party to the peace, nor to weapons containment. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army and the Resistance, the major armed groups that did sign the agreement, could only credibly promise to protect the unarmed international peace monitors because in the circumstances of an attack on them by the Me'ekamui Defense Force, they could open the containers.

Locking weapons into boxes to which militant commanders retain a key seemed an extraordinarily weak form of containment! Something not so dissimilar, but of lower transparency and integrity, occurred with the disarming of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. When Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that the IRA were in the process of complying with the obligation to surrender arms in the 1998 Belfast Good Friday Agreement, what was happening for a long time was that the British state was looking the other way. The IRA was declining to disarm for long enough to ensure that the 'Real IRA' and other pro-war factions were unable to dominate the old IRA militarily to take over their movement.¹ With both the BRA and the IRA, weak containment of small arms was sufficient to prevent local disputes from escalating to shootouts. In both cases, imperfect containment proved steppingstones to total disarmament.

The lesson from stories of weak containment of threats is that the containment dial can be turned up. Containment of threats is a continuous improvement imperative. It is important to prevent the perfect being an enemy of the good of weak containment of threats. It is also

imperative not to neglect continuous improvement of weapons containment by settling for peacemaking that is good enough. Confidence-building is so critical because a recurrent success of many peace operations is that when continuous dampening of violence and threats of its escalation is highly visible to people, a virtuous circle of continuous improvement in threat containment is accomplished. This is a virtue of melting down surrendered weapons and great Indigenous artists molding them into public sculptures that celebrate peace in the public square.

Bougainvilleans could see and understand that Thomas Tari's patch was a place where violence was still rife because Tari was not honoring the containment obligations of the peace agreement. In the case of the Bougainville peace, the virtuous circle of threat and violence containment was accelerated by an architecture of commitment: when one side was certified by the United Nations as having completed one commitment in the peace agreement (like containment of weapons in boxes), the other side was required to reciprocate by completing a specified commitment as the next step, then a further commitment was required to be signed off for the first side. This was the explicit confidence-building dynamic of the architecture of commitment (Reagan 2010; Braithwaite et al. 2010a). It was the kind of architecture that was never nailed down in Ukraine and Russia's implementation of the Minsk ceasefire agreement of 2014 discussed in the last chapter: neither side was serious about making a reciprocal architecture of commitment work.

Weapons containment in the Bougainville civil war is used here simply to illustrate the potential for turning up the dial on weak containment that builds confidence and that builds the strengthening of containment into an architecture of commitment. In the next section, I retrieve the legacy of Andrew Mack to reveal a more systematic approach toward generalizing these principles.

Resurrecting Andrew Mack

Andrew Mack led the now defunct Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University and later was head of its distinguished International Relations Department, formerly headed by Hedley Bull.

He worked on the staff of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as Director of his Strategic Planning Office from 1998 to 2001. He spent the final part of his career at Simon Fraser University where he produced the Human Security Report. He died in 2021. This section is a tribute to how Andrew Mack's scholarship has grown in relevance.

Mack was well known for the Human Security Report conclusion that, contrary to common perceptions of the time, armed conflicts and war deaths declined considerably after the end of the Cold War (Human Security Center 2005). Many were cynical about how possible it was to count these things well. There is no doubt that those who control the process of counting sometimes have an interest in exaggerating war dead. More often their interest is in undercounting, especially states undercounting their extrajudicial assassinations of civilian leaders (and their families) and ethnic cleansing operations by state police and militaries. There is also a tendency to count conflicts between armed groups as terrorism, civilian, religious, or ethnic conflict, anything other than 'civil war'. All this, however, was no less true during the Cold War than after.

Most scholars of war and peace were persuaded that Mack's evidence was basically right for the two decades after the end of the Cold War. For more than a decade up to the time of writing this book, however, that became less true. Wars and war deaths started to rise again. The United Nations (2023, 4) counted 2022 as the worst year in conflict deaths for 28 years; 2023 and 2024 may prove worse again. More than that, as documented earlier, risks of massive wars between major powers became more acute during and since the 2010s than they had been for half a century. Mack himself came to agree with this in the final years of his life. State-based armed conflicts increased from a low of 31 in 2010 to 56 in 2020 (Smith et al. 2022, 20), added to which was a more macro level of geopolitical risk with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. John Harriss's Memorium for Andrew Mack at Simon Fraser University said that the updated Human Security Report 'on which Andrew was working towards the end of his life would have shown up the more recent, very disturbing reversal of the twenty-year trend toward fewer and less deadly wars. Even then, Andrew was moderately optimistic'. Allansson et al. (2017) discuss this evidence for the upturn in armed violence during the second decade of this century.

I too am optimistic with small and middling wars in the medium term, though not with long-run risks of accidental nuclear war unless the great powers reach consensus on a radical reset toward disarmament of WMDs and AI weapons. Even on the latter, however, Mack's conclusions are also supported by the steep reductions in nuclear weapons and improvements in mutual inspections and disarmament assurance documented in previous chapters, particularly for the decade after 1986. We saw as well that this has shunted into reverse since 2008. When we consider the places where war deaths are worst at the time of writing and during the past five years—Afghanistan, Yemen, Ukraine, Ethiopia, Myanmar, the Sahel, Sudan, now Gaza—these wars were a result of specific mistakes and specific ambitions. They were preventable by specific means of containment that are discussed in this book. Now I argue that the reversal of the Andrew Mack conclusion about twenty years of steep decline in war violence was particularly because of a rise in NATO militarism and in the militarism of other major powers. This began with the illegal bombing of Kosovo and the illegal invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and then an even more dangerous, even more criminal rise in Russian militarism from 2008.

Ukraine was the most disastrous element of this mutually militarist escalation, not only for the people of Ukraine. Ukraine was preventable by what Paul Keating described as the lesson from history that it is important to be magnanimous in victory, something NATO failed to be in refusing after 1990 to keep its *détente* promises and to find a place for Russia in a European security architecture. Likewise, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was a mistake of a 'do something' deterrence moment of American trauma. After routing the Taliban in 2001, the United States and its Northern Alliance allies doubled down on that mistake by again failing to be magnanimous with their enemies in defeat. In 2001, 2002, and 2005, large numbers of Taliban, including top-level leaders, were willing to come in from the mountains and surrender to find a peaceful place in post-war Afghanistan society.² Rather than treating them as Prisoners-of-War, or enemy forces ready to be reintegrated post-war, many of these surrendering Taliban were lied to and murdered between November 2001 and 2005. Their property was stolen, their families left destitute. The tide of surrender was turned by the stupidity of those

war crimes into a tide of rejoining and renewing the Taliban. A motivated Taliban consequently won the war against its powerful enemy two decades later.

Had the Trump Administration not made the specific mistake of renegeing on the Iran nuclear deal, it is plausible that confidence-building with Iran could have moved on to settling the war in Yemen years ago. This at least was what my conversations with staff of Iran's Council for National Security suggested. Finally, had NATO not made the mistake of seizing the Arab Spring uprising in Libya as an opportunity for regime change there, war and military coups would not have cascaded so disastrously with weapons looted from the Libyan arsenal spread right across Africa (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, 54–58). Today, largely thanks to instability in these countries, there are larger numbers of jihadists affiliated with Islamic State or Al Qaeda than there were on September 11, 2001, more of them than in the period after the initial military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2003. And the world has more terrorist incidents and deaths than it had up to 2001; perhaps they have doubled, tripled, or worse (Kilkullen and Mills 2021). During the years between 2003 and 2017, Syria and Iraq were the largest contributors to war deaths. These wars likewise could have been avoided by rejecting the regime-change invasion of Iraq in 2003 that ultimately gave birth to Islamic State. Hence, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that had the United States behaved differently, had it rejected the geopolitics of regime change, had it not committed all the foregoing errors and war crimes, the worldwide downward trajectory of war deaths Andrew Mack correctly identified for the first twenty years from the end of the Cold War might have continued to the present and deeper into the twenty-first century.

All that said, it is complex to resolve how structural or how contingent downward shifts in the deadliness of armed violence might or might not be. What is most interesting and enduring about Mack's contribution was the reasons he gave for his optimism. Andrew Mack painted a target on himself when he boldly, influentially asserted that war violence was in sharp decline, particularly after this was taken up by a public intellectual with the profile of Harvard's Steven Pinker (Pinker and Mack 2014). The problem with the legitimate doubting reactions to Mack's

and Pinker's statistics was that the critics used them to discount the grounds for optimism that Mack articulated for what was undoubtedly a substantial reduction in wars and war deaths from the end of the Cold War, even if the trend reversed this century. What we must do is diagnose whether there were drivers of the kind that Mack expressed that did explain a twenty-year decline from the end of the Cold War, and other drivers that explain the reversal. That is, scholars should resurrect a Mack analysis that may be fundamentally correct for that twenty-year period. My conclusion is that it is promising in its longer-term relevance.

Drivers of Optimism About Peace

Some of Mack's drivers of optimism were arresting. He argued that in the two decades after the Cold War there was a surge in refugee numbers. How could this be grounds for optimism? Scholars tend to use refugee numbers as an indicator of peacebuilding failure. Mack's reply was until the end of the Cold War it was rare for safe passage of refugee exit from fire zones to be opened, and for international protection of those refugees to then be provided. There is a profound counterpoint here about improved survival prospects in war by these means. At the end of the 1970s, there had been a little over 10 million refugees worldwide. This had increased to 40 million by 1992 (Mack 2007). There has been massive further growth in the past decade with the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide, hitting 108 million in 2022.³

I met with the leadership of the Carter Center in Atlanta at the height of the war in Syria. I commented that the United Nations had put its A team into Syrian peace diplomacy—Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi. In quick succession I lamented that your President Carter had also failed as a Syrian peacemaker. No, he had not failed, they insisted. Carter had helped negotiate local and temporary pauses to fighting that allowed the safe exit of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the warzone. This had made a deadly war much less deadly. That was why Syria was so much less deadly than conflicts that had started twenty years earlier in Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo. This was a true and arresting insight even though Russian air attacks struck fleeing Syrian refugees at times.

The terrible thing Syria and Congo had in common was that in the war that shifted from Rwanda to Congo, and from Iraq to Syria, many state militaries and non-state armed groups joined in, and when they did, their domestic enemies moved into the cockpit as well. Enemies seized cheap opportunities to target their domestic foe on a foreign battleground. Civil wars of six foreign countries were fought inside DRC (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, 84). Likewise in Syria, Israel seized opportunities to attack Hezbollah forces from Lebanon inside Syria without triggering a new Israel-Lebanon war, Turkey targeted Kurdish fighters who were backed by the United States, and the Kurds targeted Turkish-backed forces. Russian airstrikes sought to counter the influence of US airstrikes in steering the course of the war. China had some involvement too (with a particular interest in cleaning out Uyghur Islamic State fighting groups in Syria, and in supporting Russian influence on the battlefield in its diplomacy with Syria). There were even different Palestinian factions fighting one another. Fierce battles between Islamic State and Al Qaeda also raged in Syria. Various other cross-cutting conflicts cascaded into the Syrian cockpit beyond the founding three-way conflict between the Assad regime, Syrian democratic forces, and Islamic State. Then there was the Yazidi genocide of the cross-border Iraq-Syria conflicts (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, 84–89). The same cockpit dynamic that Syria and Congo suffered had been seen in the worst conflagration of early modernity, The Thirty Years War in central Europe.⁴

It is early days in the Ukraine war, but hopefully it will not become as deadly a cockpit as these three. Already, however, formidable Chechen brigades fight in Ukraine, rejoining the Chechen Civil War fighting Russians and Chechen warlord loyalists of Putin on Ukrainian soil. As of September 2023, even Ukraine's Defence Minister is a Tartar Crimean, doubtless motivated by Russia's wars against the Tartars, and Russian ethnic cleansing of Tartars from Crimea by Stalin. On Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork in Georgia in 2023 I was chatting on the street with a group of young Georgian men when we were directed to a poster to join to fight with Georgian units of the Azov Battallion in Ukraine to strike back at Russia for its 2008 invasion of Georgia. This is how

cascades of cockpit wars begin. They are hard to end once started; Mack prioritized prevention before they start.

Mack concluded that increased investment in humanitarian intervention after the Cold War helped with the war death declines he documented. This in turn was enabled by increased investment in multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping during these two decades. The evidence is that peacekeeping contributed to the outcome of more than 20 years of reduced war deaths after the Cold War ended. This was also reinforced by the rapid growth in experience and competence of nonviolent civilian protection organizations like Nonviolent Peaceforce (Rosenblum-Kumar 2023), healing organizations such as Médecins sans Frontiers, growing access to Red Cross/Red Crescent and specialist refugee organizations like the International Rescue Committee and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Refugee camps supported and protected by the UN may not have been attractive places to live, nor safe, healthy places to survive, yet they tended to be safer spaces than living in the line of fire, or waiting to be found under the rubble by sniffer dogs.

Much more important in Andrew Mack's analysis than such improvements in mopping up at the back end of violence was progress in preventive diplomacy at the front end. He concluded that 'UN preventive diplomacy missions (i.e., those that seek to prevent wars from breaking out in the first place) increased sixfold between 1990 and 2002. UN peacemaking activities (those that seek to stop ongoing conflicts) also increased nearly fourfold - from four in 1990 to fifteen in 2002... The number of Friends of the Secretary-General, contact groups, and other mechanisms created by governments to support UN peacemaking activities and peace operations... increased from four in 1990 to more than twenty-eight in 2003, a sevenfold increase' (Mack 2007, 527). He pointed out that similar peacebuilding by regional organizations such as the African Union and the South Pacific Forum also increased, as did Track Three preventive diplomacy and peacemaking by international NGOs.

It is wrong to see UN and regional peacekeeping missions as simply engaged with securing a peace after a past war. Around half of post-conflict countries relapse into armed conflict within five years of war's end.

Hence, peace operations are centrally engaged with preventive diplomacy concerning the next war. Peacemaking with outbreaks of political violence that might be precursors to that next war are such an important part of the work of peace operations. Mack's data showed that UN peacekeeping missions were few—at or well under 5—for the first three decades of the United Nations. After 1988 they escalated rapidly to reach a peak of around 20 UN peace operations between 1993 and 2000 (Mack 2007, 529). These were complemented by many non-UN regional peace operations. At the time of writing, and for some years, UN peace operations have been down again to 14 missions. Their average size in personnel and budget also declined. UN peacekeepers have been absent from super-spreader conflicts like Libya, Sudan and the 2014 conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

African Union peace operations have increased to substitute for Western states and the UN walking away from peacekeeping deployments. Some successfully delivered peace. Others are peace enforcement operations against insurgencies that have been taken over in many parts of Africa by armed groups affiliated with Islamic State. The French military helped with support from US air bases that target Islamic State members. The Russian Wagner corporation also joined in this work, sometimes in deals that give them control of natural resource assets, or as a result of military coups they encouraged that displaced French and American military support with Wagner support. It is a stretch to describe this work as 'peacekeeping' to contain Islamic State by African, French, US, and Russian forces.

During the period of rapid UN peacekeeping escalation between 1989 and 1994, UN peacekeeper numbers increased sevenfold (Hille 2020). Like the number of missions, the number of UN peacekeepers, and especially peacekeepers from wealthy countries,⁵ has been in decline throughout this century, continuing to the 2015–2020 period when the number of UN peacekeepers declined by 20,000 (Hille 2020). The only positive quantitative trend is that China has greatly increased its financial contribution in recent years and is contributing far more Chinese peacekeepers than all other permanent members of the Security Council combined. On the negative side, China is interested in reducing the

importance of human rights work, democracy, and civil society development in UN peacekeeping (Fung 2023) when the evidence shows that it is multidimensionality in peace operations that includes these things that deliver peace maximally. International funding for UN peacekeeping plunged particularly steeply in the first two years of the Trump Administration, when United States support fell by 44% between 2016 and 2018. Most wealthy countries followed the US lead (Congressional Research Service 2021). Great power support for preventive diplomacy leavened by the staff of the UN Secretary-General has also declined. At the time of writing, there have been no high-profile peace initiatives by the Secretary-General that made a difference in Ukraine,⁶ as so many did with the wars of Kofi Annan's time as Secretary-General. More than ever, great powers want a weak UN Secretary-General who they can dominate.

Here is where we begin to see the power and paradox in the contribution of Andrew Mack. In the present period of history, as important contributors to peace such as peacekeeping were declining again, war and war deaths were increasing again. To sharpen the point of the reasons for Mack's optimistic analysis, the evidence for the effectiveness of UN-backed peace agreements and peacekeeping has become much stronger. One reason is that peacekeeping has become more effective in keeping the peace in recent decades compared with its quantitative success rate during the Cold War (Fortna 2004). The evidence has also become stronger in recent years that peace agreements are effective in preventing more deaths and more wars (Regan et al. 2009; Human Security Report 2013, 174–175; Karstedt 2017), one of the other key features of the international order that Mack revealed as improving during the 20 years after the Cold War. Peacekeeping is only one of Mack's reasons for the decline in the number and deadliness of armed conflicts during that 20 years from Cold War's end. I will show that a number of the factors that Mack found to be drivers of a more peaceful world in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century were put into reverse in recent years. This went hand in hand with the downturn of peacekeeping investments by wealthy countries. First, the next two pages detail the point that the evidence has become stronger that Mack was right in thinking, contrary to what most people believe, that UN peacekeeping does work in reducing wars and war deaths. Moreover, Mack proved right in his

argument that while all efforts to tackle root causes of conflicts are partial and flawed, the UN and other international institutions did successfully increase their investment in diagnosis of the root causes of conflicts and in multidimensional means of tackling them through peace operations and wider programs of peacebuilding (Mack 2007, 529).

One war mostly begets more wars: of 108 countries that experienced civil war between 1946 and 2017, only 27% avoided subsequent return to war (Walter et al. 2020, 7). While peacekeeping is well known to have failed catastrophically to prevent war in cases like Rwanda, the statistical impact across all cases demonstrates effectiveness. Collier's (2009, 96) program of empirical research concluded that US\$100 million spent on UN peacekeepers reduced the cumulative 10-year risk of reversion to conflict from 38 to 17%. That risk falls further to 13% if the investment in peacekeeping is scaled up to US\$200 million. Collier's team presented his evidence on the benefits and costs for the world economy of investment in peacekeeping to a panel of Nobel laureate economists for the Copenhagen Consensus. This involved ten rival research teams making a case for international public money to be spent on something. The Copenhagen Consensus panel's verdict selected peacekeeping as one of their endorsed public expenditures. Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 336) found that the greater effectiveness of a combination of treaties and transformational UN peacebuilding is particularly dramatic when local peacebuilding resources and capacities are low. In a follow-up of these data, Sambanis (2008, 23) found that UN peace operations reduce the risk of peace failure in the longer run by about 50%, as did Fortna (2008).

Quinn et al. (2007, 187) found the combination of a treaty and a peace operation reduced the probability of civil war recurrence by 54%. These peace impacts persist after peacekeepers leave. Many other studies confirm a big statistical contribution of peace operations to building peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Walter 2002; Fortna 2003, 2004, 2008; Fortna and Howard 2008; Nilsson 2006; Quinn et al. 2007; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Call 2012; Hultman et al. 2013; Riordan 2013). Fortna (2003, 2008) also found a large tendency for ceasefires overseen by international peacekeepers to be more effective than those without peacekeepers. Hampson (1996) argues that peace agreements are

not self-executing: sustained third party leadership, mediation, problem-solving, and peacebuilding are needed as cement that holds a peace together. At least up to the undermining of the UN after 2011, wars that were more intractable and serious were the ones that attracted the investment in UN peace operations. Fortna's (2008) systematic quantitative data confirm this. When Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) corrected for the effects of non-random assignment with matching techniques, they found that the causal effect of UN peace operations in preventing war was even larger than would have been estimated had there been no correction for non-random assignment of UN missions.

Great power policy has undercut this evidence-based finding. Western powers decided that wars of regime change might be better ideas than UN peacekeeping in Libya and Syria. Russia made the same decision in Ukraine and Georgia. In 2014 none of the major powers pushed for UN peacekeeping to consolidate the Donbas ceasefire. Walter et al. (2020) completed the most systematic review of the evidence on peacekeeping, while in addition showing that the *mere promise*⁷ that peacekeepers will arrive can dampen violence and encourage mediation and signing of peace agreements. They were stuck by the consistency of study findings:

Almost all of them find that peacekeeping is highly effective at preventing violence before it begins, reducing violence in the midst of war and preventing violence from recurring once it has ended. All else equal, countries and regions that receive peacekeeping missions experience less armed conflict, fewer civilian and combatant deaths, fewer mass killings, longer periods of post-conflict peace and fewer repeat wars than those that do not receive peacekeepers. This relationship – between peacekeeping and lower levels of violence – is so consistent across large-n analyses that it has become one of the strongest findings in the international relations literature to date. The power of peacekeeping is all the more striking given that the UN tends to intervene in the toughest cases. Multiple scholarly studies have found that the UN Security Council tends to send peacekeepers to countries with more violence . . . (Walter et al. 2020, 2)

The last two sentences of this paragraph ceased being true a few years before they were written. Another qualification to the conclusion is that the UN does not send peacekeepers to countries that refused to accept

a UN peace operation, and this is a methodological bias that cuts in the opposite direction. Moreover, countries that received peacekeepers during the past three decades almost always got UN human rights, gender rights, child protection staff; they got UN humanitarian assistance, housing for refugees, assistance with economic development, with good governance, policing, and security sector reform, all rolled into a peace operation package. The evidence is that peacekeepers make the best contributions to preventing war when they are part of multidimensional peacebuilding that supportively delivers peace dividends (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Walter et al. 2020). Although military peacekeepers are effective in this mix, mostly unarmed UN police seem more so. In a multivariate and matching analysis by Hultman et al. (2013) across all African armed conflicts between 1991 and 2008, movement from zero to just 200 UN police in a peace operation, conditioned by controls on other variables, was associated with a reduction in the expected number of civilian killings from 96 per month to 14. Given that this is a per month estimate, and the average duration of deployments is 65 months, small contingents of UN police seem to save very large numbers of lives. This probably means it is a good idea to follow recommendations of successive Secretaries-General to establish a UN Emergency Police with diverse experience in prevention of ethnic and religious conflict, electoral violence, policing humanitarian corridors for fleeing civilians, and dousing sparks for violence (Johansen 2021, 272–275).

Andrew Mack conceived the end of the Cold War itself as another factor, indeed the most persuasive one, that explains the decline of civil wars. Containment was a doctrine that forbade direct military confrontation of other major powers on their own territory or that of their allies. Proxy wars in the Global South, however, became important ways for great powers to signal to each other that they were displeased with their adversary. Tit-for-tat cascades of proxy wars could occur when one great power fomented a proxy war that rattled the cage of its adversary; then the adversary would start a second proxy war that would displease the other great power. With the end of the Cold War, there was no longer reason for these expensive cascades of proxy conflicts. We have shown, however, that countries like Iran found new reasons to fester proxy conflicts. Moreover, there are NATO strategists today who do not

want to devote troops to fighting Russia directly but who think that supporting proxy war to the last Ukrainian is a good strategy for weakening Russia. That does not mean it is geostrategically smart. NATO might also be weakened in comparison to China, and Russia might join future wars on the side of China. Is it morally right to use the long-suffering people of Eastern Ukraine who have been endlessly bombarded by both sides since 2014 as pawns of the geopolitical ambitions of both sides?

Russia joined the largest civil war of the past decade in Syria on the side of a Syrian government that was adamantly opposed by the United States. It was consequential as a return to Cold War playbooks, as was Ukraine. Russia became the most decisive actor in shaping battlefields in Ukraine and Syria and the terms of peacemaking, as it did in the smaller 2020–2023 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Ngorno-Karabakh, and previous wars across the former Russian empire in Georgia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Tajikistan, and beyond. The trajectory of Russian war crime led from the razing of Grozny (Chechnya), to devastation of Aleppo (Syria), to the razing of Mariupol (Ukraine).

The dampening of ideological hostility Mack saw as a feature of the late 1980s and early 1990s that contributed to conflict reduction became a lost opportunity, as Henry Kissinger's revised views now also contend. Western hostility with Russia and China rose again. Russia and China increasingly voted together to veto resolutions proposed by the West, especially after Western members of the Security Council misled other countries on the intent of the 2011 resolutions on Libya, which was for regime change rather than for a responsibility to protect. In this, Russia and China count on support from many African states who also resented the way Western powers rode roughshod over their analysis of the responsibility to protect in Libya.

This tragic weakening of the peacemaking capabilities of the Security Council is evident in the numbers of vetoes. As the Cold War was ending between 1987 and 1990 Security Council vetoes more than halved compared to their level in 1985 and 1986. In 1990 and 1991 there were no vetoes at all. Transformatively, the Security Council was working with consensus. There were only two Russian and two Chinese vetoes throughout the 1990s and only four Russian and one Chinese veto

in the 2000s. Western reaction to the Arab Spring and Russian reactions to NATO expansion crossing its red lines were turning points. President Bush prepared the way with his 2008 announcement that a path would be opened to Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. The consequences of this were much wider than simply the Russian-provoked war in Georgia of 2008. There were 11 Chinese and 20 Russian vetoes in the 2010s, a higher level than for nearly the entire Cold War.⁸ This was one factor that hobbled the launch of new UN peacekeeping operations and other forms of peacebuilding.

One of the most important of these other forms of peacemaking was reaching peace agreements. This was happening at almost three times the rate per annum in the 20 years after the end of the Cold War, compared to what had been happening during the Cold War. In the 2010s, geopolitically important implementation of peace agreements for places like Ukraine, Libya, and Syria was no longer happening. There was no semblance of progress anywhere that was hard, deep, or important, like Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, or Afghanistan. The great progress of decades up to 2011 even reversed in the deadliest conflict in Congo and across sub-Saharan Africa. Iraq returned to war during that decade as Islamic State conquered and occupied Iraq's second city, Mosul. Peace diplomacy brought meager returns in the Arab Spring cases. Even in Myanmar, which had seen a diplomatic triumph of movement toward democracy, China was not as helpful as it might have been hoped after 2010. Less progress toward peaceful resolutions with ethnic armies fighting with the state military was achieved during Myanmar's democratic period than in previous decades. When Myanmar's progress unraveled to genocide and finally a total explosion of state violence and tyranny in 2021, Myanmar's many ethnic wars re-kindled.

In sum, the thawing of Cold War conditions that Mack concluded had enabled so much progress on so many peacebuilding fronts since the 1980s was refreezing progress with peace again after 2011.

Another Mack positive was that wars of struggle against colonialism were mostly over before the end of the Cold War. This continued to be true after 2011, though Islamic State, the Taliban, and some other important combatants of this era continued to see themselves as fighting against Western colonialism. Fighting in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan,

and Armenia can also be read as intentional disruption by Russia to reassert Russian imperium over its periphery.

The Minorities at Risk Project had shown that high levels of state-sanctioned discrimination is a key driver of ethnic armed conflict (Gurr 2000; Goldstone 2008). Mack (2007, 526) emphasized the conclusion from the Minorities at Risk Project that there had been a 'steady decline in political discrimination by governments around the world since 1950' that almost halved by 2003 and also a substantial fall in ethnic economic discrimination. Since then we have seen how NATO-Russian tensions produced a resurgence of two-way discrimination against ethnic Russians and Ukrainians alike inside Ukraine. The Yazidi genocide occurred in Iraq, the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, the incipient Uyghur genocide in China, and steps were taken toward renewal of the longstanding Armenian genocide. Ethnic Chinese were targeted with violence during the covid crisis in the United States and Australia as hard as these states worked at trying to cover up this truth. The violence between Muslims and Judeo-Christians of the 2010s morphed to more extreme forms after 2010 with the rise of neo-Nazi anti-Muslim terror and Islamic State beheadings.

Resurgent racism and religious discrimination were stoked by new social media platforms that maximized advertising revenue by spreading lies and vilification rather than quality journalism, truth, and reconciliation. Another of Mack's points was that the years after the end of the Cold War saw a surge of reconciliation across many fronts with many truth or reconciliation commissions established in the aftermath of violence. Takeoff of a restorative justice movement was championed by Desmond Tutu (1999, 1) with the words 'No Future Without Forgiveness'. It spread to other African peace processes, such as Sierra Leone. A great deal of evidence suggests that Mack was right that such reconciliation increased quantitatively as well as in quality between 1989 and the early years of the 2000s. Tutu and Mandela are no longer shaping hearts and minds in the way they were before 2011. Forgiveness does not flourish in the Twittersphere. This was not helped by the reality that after 2008 Russia decided to move away from reconciliation and turn to divide the United States against itself, Britain against the EU, West against West. Donald Trump was one leader that Putin secretly supported

in this project. Putin saw this as payback for the way the United States had sought to divide Russia against Putin, and the old communist world against Russia, through willfully fomenting color revolutions. The payback was executed by a new form of ideological cyberwarfare.

China learnt from both the United States and Russia. China's cyber-warriors took the tactics to new levels of global capability and danger. Arab and Jewish fundamentalists also wage cyberwar in social media to widen schisms in the aftermath of the peace politics of the Arab Spring turning sour and the Israel-Palestine Track II peace diplomacy of the 1990s turning sour. This befell Eastern European color revolutions, where the reconciliation started by Cold War *détente* soured. This now happens across many other religious, racial, and political intra-national divides at the hands of people who want to be 'influencers'. Structurally, platform capitalism is important for understanding why the virtuous trends identified by Andrew Mark unraveled and reversed.

After the Cold War there was also a transitional justice cascade (Sikkink 2011; Olsen et al 2010) of war crimes prosecutions and other forms of human rights enforcement, truth-telling, and reconciliation which have been shown to be more effective in reducing war crimes in combination than separately. The International Criminal Court was established, something that could never have been possible during the Cold War. President Clinton wanted to ratify its Rome statute but by the end of his administration neocons and hawks were already becoming ascendant again. On the Mack analysis, increased institutionalization of truth, justice, and reconciliation was also backed by growing use of sanctions to underwrite what I call restorative and responsive regulation of war and peace. I would say that in this era the sanctions regime was purely punitive at times, but for the most part embedded in more restorative and responsive institutions of diplomacy than the present more narrowly punitive use of sanctions. The Security Council increased more than fivefold the deployment of sanction regimes between 1990 and 2000 (Mack 2007, 528).

Concern has grown about the hypocrisy of great powers not ratifying the Rome statute to make their troops and leaders vulnerable to the International Criminal Court while they call upon the ICC to prosecute their adversaries. The invasion of Ukraine was a war crime; this view should be

independently tested by an international court. According to the United States, the view that the 2001 and 2003 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were war crimes should never be so tested. The peace movement seeks to persuade international society to look back to Pearl Harbor as indeed a war crime, but why was Hiroshima not a crime against civilians? The blitz in which Hitler killed so many civilians in British cities was a war crime. Perhaps the fire-bombing of Dresden and Hamburg were as well? The Allied powers' World War II generation never thought that way. Their children did.

Mack pointed out that UN authorizations for robust use of force to protect civilians, or such authorizations when spoilers threaten a peace agreement with brutal force, gradually became stronger in the decades after the end of the Cold War, particularly after Rwanda and the counter-genocide against Hutus in Congo. Neither Andrew Mack nor I would interpret UN sanctions or peacekeeper use of force as clearly effective on their own. On the contrary, they are thin reeds, which on their own can be counterproductive in militarizing peacebuilding.

Sanctioning capabilities that are bound together with the other variables of the Mack analysis, in a judicious peacebuilding mix where coercion is an absolute last resort, is effective as a mix with capabilities to escalate interventionism that heals. This at least is what the theory and evidence for restorative and responsive regulation and meta regulation of violence concludes (Braithwaite 2022).

Mack also points out that from the end of the Cold War peacebuilding NGOs became important in Track II and III mediation and reconciliation of conflicts, in truth-telling, in transitional justice which became an increasingly more restorative form of justice across all dimensions of peacebuilding.

Although international support is so often state-to-state, NGO support can be people-to-people, especially at more local levels in an era where the evidence has become clearer that the local turn is important to the effectiveness of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2021; Kalyvas 2006). Put another way, the evidence is that local fissures and grievances connect up with national ones to foment armed violence; local units with fighting capacity draw strength from national ones, and vice versa. Peacebuilding

must therefore reinforce local, national, and international capabilities to work with one another.

Mack found democratization to be something that contributed to peace, the more so the deeper the democratic roots. The democracy effect sharply improved at Cold War's end, and in the 20 years after (Johansen 2021). Not only has the rise in the number of democracies and the quality of democratic institutions ceased this century. Democracy increasingly has become a cause of war as well as an institution that prevents it in other cases. One reason is that elected leaders have become more adept at gaming democratic institutions to keep up appearances of democracy, rather than planting deeply rooted democratic institutions. An adept practitioner of this is Vladimir Putin.

Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018) and the Peacebuilding Compared data since then found empirically that democracy has progressively become more gamed to the point where it is a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by political parties to intimidate voters and opponents. Peacebuilding Compared found this to be happening to some degree in 52 of the first 73 armed conflicts to be coded. Braithwaite and D'Costa rediscovered in modern South Asia Roland Paris's (2004) conclusion on the limits of a liberal peace and on the virtues of institutionalization that ground and temper the power of democracy and markets. This is also Mansfield and Snyder's (2007) and Collier's (2009) empirical conclusion—that when domestic institutions are weak, the process of democratization promotes war. The empirical research of Collier's team and other evidence argues that checks and balances in institutions—such as the rule of law—are what help democracies prevent civil war (Hegre and Nygård 2015). However, 'it has proved much easier to introduce elections than checks and balances' (Collier 2009, 44). This is a particular example of a more general conclusion we have already reached—single thin reeds of war prevention that snap on their own often work when local and international society invests to bind them together in a fabric of multidimensional peacebuilding.

Moreover, 'taken together, the results on elections and democratization are consistent: if democracy means little more than elections, it is damaging to the [good government] reform process' (Collier 2009, 45).

The reason is that good government is not the most cost-effective way of benefiting from power. If you can get away with buying elections, corrupting an electoral commission, intimidating or killing opponents, scapegoating a minority to cultivate majoritarian support, jailing strong opponents on trumped up charges and running against weaker ones, or simply miscounting votes, once in government you can reimburse these costs by pillaging the state. That is the reality of the twentieth-century history of Ukraine, Russia, and so much of the world that was newly democratizing in the 1990s. Incumbents corrupt democracies by embezzling billions from state coffers, favoring oligarchs (Russian, Ukrainian, or Burmese) and ruling families with government contracts, welcoming foreign investors when they donate to the incumbent party. If politicians try to win elections with good government, their capacity to benefit from power is reduced. This is because good government means the rule of law and checks and balances on abuse of power that place limits on their pillaging of the state (Braithwaite 2022, Chapter 5).

The best way to accumulate power and money is to win elections by methods that require the winner to misgovern. Once in place—with the rule of law and checks and balances such as parliamentary committees, audit offices, electoral commissions, anti-corruption commissions, ombudsmen, human rights commissions, civil service commissions, and independent judges and prosecutors—good government does become a good way to win elections. Checks and balances can create resilient path dependency to both democracy and economic growth. Until the nineteenth century, the best way to win power for rulers of almost all societies was without democracy at all. The monarch would hold most of the society down in poverty after wealth was extracted from them. Unpopularity did not matter so long as the king was adept at paying off as small a ruling coalition of supporters that the king could get away with to defend his rule (De Mesquita et al. 2011). Much of the world has reversed backwards toward that world before the cascading democracy revolutions of the 1800s and 1900s.

Being cursed with lootable natural resources can increase a country's susceptibility to corruption, civil war, and many other problems. Yet, for countries with democratic institutions that include strong checks on the executive, resource rents do not predict corruption (Bhattacharyya and

Hodler 2009). This means there is something the international community can do about these problems. After civil wars that tear a country apart, international society can put in place a UN transitional administration that is a hybrid of local, national, UN, and broadly participatory deliberative governance wherein both the local and the international install checks and balances and the rule of law. Today, most influential US commentators reject this view. Their analysis is that Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ukraine demonstrate that US nation building does not work. It certainly does not work when the United States indulges in militarized gameplaying, pretending to create democracies by force of arms after which it sought to dictate who should win their elections.

The brute reality, however, is that once great powers have broken societies like Ukraine, Afghanistan, or Iraq they experience pressure to help put them together again. Nation rebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq was not a choice after the United States had broken those societies, or broken Islamic State in Syria, unless it wanted to leave that task to Russian or Chinese leadership. Peacebuilding can be done well, as it increasingly was during those 20 years that grabbed the imagination of Andrew Mack in important places like Indonesia and Timor-Leste, that became genuine democracies and experienced steep downward trajectories in violence. If the United States persists in doing the work of healing nations in militarized and incompetent ways as it did in Afghanistan, of course Russia and China will step into that challenge and become more influential in that region. In Iraq (and Syria and Lebanon), it should have expected that Iran, that was always a more geostrategically important and potent adversary than Iraq, would step in to become more influential over Iraq's post-war governments than the United States. Nationbuilding nihilism is more than wrongheaded; it is not even a choice for countries intent on being globally influential.

Many levels of governance can create the virtuous path dependency toward peace and democracy detected in the work of Mack. Few of today's emerging democracies have had reversals as bad as the reversals of most of the greatest powers of the Western alliance—Germany and Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, France with Robespierre's bloody tyranny, the Napoleonic wars after the French Revolution, and America's terrible civil war seven decades after its inspiring republican revolution. Nation

building never enjoys linear progress. The Peacebuilding Compared project reveals that success at peacebuilding and building democracies with separated powers is difficult and a matter of degree (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018). It is least likely when nation building is militarized, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, as opposed to a humanitarian journey of human development. Once good transitional institutions for peace take root, pillaging the state through bad governance becomes a way to lose elections. Opposition political parties then acquire enough clout—with support from the separation of powers, from a semi-autonomous legal profession, accounting profession, a civil service, and a vibrant civil society—to protect the established checks and balances against political leaders who seek advantage by corroding them. The hard part is the transition to bedding down path dependency on a polity with checks and balances.

Other elements of Collier's (2009) work suggest that we can get better at that hard part. Indeed, as discussed earlier, Collier is convincing that it is in the economic interests of rich countries to invest in checks and balances for societies recovering from wars. The empirical work shows that the costs to the world economy of spending on peacekeeping are a quarter of the benefits and, indeed, that post-conflict aid has a significantly stronger economic benefit than foreign aid at other times (Collier 2007, 2009, 83–92).

The Big Picture of Catastrophe Prevention

The conclusion for our historical period is that longer-term containment of states is generally not a good strategy. Containment is impossible with China. Containment was a successful alternative to confrontation with a Soviet Union that was never on a trajectory to becoming the dominant world economy. China, in contrast, owns a large part of the US national debt and controls a quantum of trade which the United States and EU could never afford to sever. Dollarization of the world economy can last a considerable time, but the United States can only sustain these advantages through an interdependence with China that it currently puts at

risk. Containment can be useful as a short-term strategy when fundamental international obligations are breached, as with the 2021 military coup in Myanmar. In the longer run, principled engagement is normally the better strategy, as it was in motivating the old military junta to democratize Myanmar in the first place in 2011. Short-term containment of states is more likely to succeed when there is strong signaling that there will be principled engagement when despots soften their domination. When international society is generous with hands of help, when despotism is on a trajectory toward being dismantled, collaboration can deliver mutual protection from all manner of global catastrophes.

The reason for this being so was developed in Chapter 2. Because global crises cascade faster and in more tightly coupled ways than they did during the Cold War, Washington needs Moscow and Beijing, Moscow and Beijing need Washington, today more than during the Cold War. In all eras of recorded human history before the Cold War, military domination of the world overwhelmed all considerations. Realism worked as it delivered both great good and great evil. Moscow and Washington both learned in Afghanistan that seeking to expand domination of the world by military means no longer made sense in the way it once did. Global capabilities of one's enemies to cascade proxy insurgents and supply them with drones and guns make contemporary attempts at military domination difficult. Some would say war has become rather obsolescent in terms of realist empirical efficacy (Johansen 2021). China is right to believe that political legitimacy at home can unravel when a great power loses wars to lesser powers or occupies them but fails to subdue them. Impatiently flexing military muscle undercuts soft power of a great power globally. Increasingly, great powers cut and run in ways that weaken them. The United States learnt this in more than Iraq, Libya, and Vietnam. Russia learnt it in Afghanistan and one day it will learn this in Ukraine. Like Spain and Britain, France learnt this with many cut and run wars in old colonies that became ungovernable for France, from Vietnam to Algeria.

During the decades of successful Soviet containment, NATO did not need Moscow's cooperation in conquering financial crises because Moscow had no banks that were tightly coupled with NATO banks. None of the ecological crises of the Soviet era were so dire that NATO

could not deal with them without Soviet cooperation. Ironically, this imperative first became deep in the year when Cold War containment ended—1987—the year the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting substances was signed to save hundreds of thousands of human lives across the planet. The end of the Cold War coincided with the strongest, most effective environmental treaty ever signed. As good as Soviet and Chinese scientists were, during Cold War containment, no pandemic was so severe that collaboration with Soviet and Chinese scientists and epidemiologists to find and diffuse ways to conquer the crises were indispensable. While there were epidemics, none were as demanding of collaboration with Russia and China as the COVID-19 crisis. 1918 was not a year of extraordinary takeoff in levels of influenza in Russia; it was a low influenza year (Kolosova et al. 2019). Russian troops had exited World War I early and, in any case, had been fighting on the Western front rather than the Eastern front where the great influenza was spreading. Russia experienced a lower death rate from the great influenza than any country, while India suffered because it had so many troops transit through Etaples; 17 million Indians may have died, five percent of the population (Mayor 2000). The greatest suffering of World War I was not born of bullets in Europe but of virus in India.

International society must be assiduous in containing the multitudes of specific and widely diffused threats to peace today. Containing small arms complements nuclear weapons containment as an imperative because small arms wars might one day inadvertently lay tripwires for sleepwalkers into nuclear war. A legacy of Andrew Mack is showing that multidimensional progress on multiple threats was enabled by the lifting of containment of the Soviet Union. It ended great power resistance to vetoing Security Council resolutions proposed by enemies that in the past contained them and fought proxy wars against them. This accomplished substantial decline in wars and war deaths. A decline in war deaths results in a decline in crime deaths and suicide deaths, and both crime and suicide take more lives globally than war (Braithwaite 2022, Chapter 11). Hunger and disease accounts for more deaths than war and deaths from domestic crime combined. A decline in war, however, drives a decline in deaths from disease, from ecosystem collapse, and from famine and poverty. The 20 years after the Cold War surged the

effectiveness of peacemaking and peacebuilding and a healthier world of less poverty. The United States might be the most powerful economy, but it is not immune from these trends. America's war against communism in Latin America morphed into a war on drugs after armed groups split from insurgencies to militarize the drug trade. The war on drugs elevated deaths from crime and opiate overdose in the United States as well as Latin America. Years before the Fentanyl epidemic and covid, life expectancy was declining in the United States for the first time in a century. Fentanyl and COVID-19 accelerated that new trend further after 2019.

The progress that excited Andrew Mack has now reversed with mutual brooding, butting, and subverting toward something worse than a new kind of Cold War that ran hot in Ukraine and Syria. The world worries perhaps more than it should that China could go that way in Taiwan, the south China Sea, or elsewhere. Cyber ops and space ops became proxies that can substitute for the proxy wars in the Global South during the Cold War. Cyberspace and outer space became new worlds for proxy jostling between great powers. Decline in state-based discrimination that was a legacy of the 1986–2011 period no longer declines.

Germany and Japan opted for followership of the United States at the end of World War II. Russia and China did not at Cold War's end because American magnanimity with the vanquished was shallower than it was with the Marshall Plan, indeed at every stage of its reconciliation with Germany and Japan. The United States disliked Russian and Chinese contempt for submission to US global hegemony, their sympathy with Middle Eastern resentment over a century of Western humiliation. In response, America veered back toward toying with containment of its great power rivals. This backfired when recontainment began in 2014 over Ukraine and trade war with China blew up during the Trump Administration, then festering to an open wound under Biden. The post-cold-war progress toward a more peaceful world, a world with lowered risk of nuclear devastation was further reversed by populist posturing.

A world that had been growing its capability to collaborate on climate change suddenly was churning out tanks and missiles to pour carbon into the atmosphere; collaboration between Western and Chinese climate

scientists fell in a hole. Progress and goodwill faltered on greenhouse gas reductions. A world that had been growing its capabilities to collaborate on pandemic prevention was only up for finger pointing when a huge pandemic hit. A world economy that was learning how one part of the world system (China) could help another part (the United States and EU) out of a hole after the Global Financial Crisis now saw the economy of the West undermine the East, and vice-versa. Global inflation, a global housing shortage, descent of many of the poorest countries into hunger, recession, or debt default were harvests of opting for populist diplomacy over restorative diplomacy.

Hence this book argues for rejecting long-run containment of all states; containing instead all threats to peace. Instead of containing states, help them to flourish so we can work together with them to contain the long list of Andrew Mack factors that endanger peace for all of us, and to contain threats of economic crises, climate crises, and pandemics that shackle us all. Long-serving Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans points to the advantages for states of sometimes elevating ‘reciprocity’ above self-interest: ‘If I take your problems seriously, you are much more likely to help me solve mine’ (Evans 2022, 16). Evans was a Foreign Minister and a President of the International Crisis Group who believed in a diplomacy of caring, of states being concerned about their ‘reputation’, especially of taboos like the taboo on using or threatening WMDs. This is what social theorists call indirect reciprocity: even if an actor has never benefitted from our help, if they see us as someone who has helped many others in the past, they are more likely to help us if we are in trouble (Hong 2016). The Golden Rule is a simple rule and one that found its way into the Bible and the writings of Confucius. It seems to have been embraced because of its simplicity throughout the ancient world.

Andrew Mack may have had too rosy a view of how sustained was the post-cold-war blossoming of the better angels of our nature. But Mack and the Human Security Report were repeatedly right in their diagnosis of what are drivers that can suppress violence, and did suppress violence from 1986 until 2011. Over time the evidence became even stronger on the power of those drivers than it was when Andrew Mack was writing.

What is more, the politics of replacing containment of states with principled engagement and international cooperation to tackle one risk factor after another achieves outcomes with wide ripples of import beyond a more peaceful world. It can achieve a world with less poverty, less shackled by the mass unemployment and hyperinflation that arises when economic crises cascade into security crises. The 2013 Human Security Report paid particular attention to the fact that inequality has been a much bigger threat to human life than war. When local and international societies become progressively more effective in tackling not just inequality at local and international levels but all forms of domination, even bigger reductions in outcomes like poor health, suicide, crime, and all forms of violence can be secured (Braithwaite 2022).

It is no longer enough to get European states working cooperatively with the United States and Japan to solve global economic crises. An objective could be to move toward abolition of the G-7 and NATO in favor of more inclusive meetings of major powers to tackle big crises. It seems utopian to advocate abolition of NATO at the time that it is growing because of fear stoked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The realistic step by step path here may be first for large regional groupings in Asia (particularly ASEAN—680 million people) to continue to assure China that it will not follow the path of NATO to become a military alliance against Chinese influence in Asia. In return ASEAN might request continued assurances from China that it will eschew the ambition of gradually building a Chinese equivalent of the Warsaw pact with perhaps Myanmar, Afghanistan, North Korea, and Cambodia as initial members.⁹ This continues to be an easy assurance for China to give because it is probably reluctant to bring such unstable countries under guarantees of its nuclear umbrella. With big ASEAN reaching an anti-alliance understanding with big China, it is easier for the little South Pacific Forum, whose members have recently been approached by China to consider security collaboration to say ‘No, let’s not have security collaboration with great powers, but collaborate with all countries on human development’. Let the Pacific leave no stone unturned to preserve a nuclear-weapons-free South Pacific under the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Cooperation with China on adjusting and adapting global economic and regulatory institutions is imperative. So is cooperation with China

on the globalization of disease. Crises like covid will continue to take terrible tolls unless China and states that currently seek to contain it learn to cooperate with all societies on global institutions of health. Likewise with institutions of the earth that international collaboration has so far failed to build for environmental challenges (Haas et al. 1993). Likewise with crime that cascades to war, war to more war, war that cascades to crime, and crime to more crime. This takes us back to the Chapter 2 conclusion that war cascades to ecological crises, ecological crises to war and that these cascading risks must be contained because they become more tightly coupled. War cascades to economic crises and economic crises to war. War cascades to health crises and health crises in future may cascade to war as well. As each of these kinds of globalizing crises cascades faster, risks from them cascading into one another grow.

What is admirable about Andrew Mack's legacy is that he demonstrated the reversibility of all of this, using the twenty years after the Cold War as a case study of a period of history when poverty and unemployment could decline massively and globally; human health and life expectancy could improve; freedom and nonviolent democracy could flourish in more places, including geopolitically important ones like Indonesia, fourth largest country in the world; human rights and gender equality institutions could grow their sway globally; peacemaking and peacebuilding could learn to be more effective (Howard 2008); and even environmental regulatory institutions could grow, close the Ozone hole, and gradually become more effective on a wide front. The two decades after the Korean war, when confrontation with Moscow was rejected in favor of containment had many of these features as well. Both 20-year periods saw remarkable accomplishments in growing a nuclear non-proliferation regime, a regime to widen bans on chemical and biological weapons, and a human rights regime. There is no impossibilism of the world rediscovering how to have a future two decades of growing equality, freedom, democracy, health, environmentalism, nonviolence, and peace where crime and suicide rates fall again. What may prove impossible in future is growing them fast enough to save the planet from destabilizing ecosystems through global warming or nuclear winter, or a complex mix of catastrophes.

We learn again from Ukraine that preventing wars is easier than ending them. The Russia-Ukraine war was preventable by simple virtues of honest diplomacy, apologizing for broken promises, finding better ways to heal their hurts, alternative more just pathways to security guarantees and missiles mutually pulled back from proximity to their targets, and scrupulous aversion to covert regime-change diplomacy.

The next chapter expands the analysis on containment of risks to give special prominence to prevention of great power wars, and most specifically containment of Weapons of Mass Destruction that could produce a nuclear conflagration. This chapter has shown that smaller wars destabilize the simple institutions needed to prevent global health crises, environmental crises, and global economic crises.

Notes

1. Peacebuilding Compared interviews in Northern Ireland.
2. See Kilkullen and Mills (2021) and Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018, 402–403):

In 2002, President Karzai was appealing constructively to the Pashtun tradition of the Taliban to acknowledge the defeats it had suffered on the battlefield in 2001 and reach an accommodation with his government. Vindictive elements among his Northern Alliance coalition partners and in the Bush administration that had swept Karzai to power frustrated this sensible work. Many Taliban figures with whom Karzai reconciled and who were welcomed back in peace to Afghanistan from Pakistan in 2002 were murdered when they returned. They also had their land and property stolen. This included people as senior as the Taliban military commander and the Taliban minister of defense (Afghan 2011, 308–309; ICG 2011, 6; Ruttig 2011, 6). Michael Semple (2011, 2) argued that, in 2002, many “senior Taliban figures attempted to pledge loyalty to the new order but were hunted down. The US sent to Guantanamo Bay many people who could have been far more useful if they had been given a chance to participate”. Likewise in 2005, in advance of the insurgency spinning out of control, Karzai sought to initiate

talks and amnesties with the Taliban through a peace and reconciliation commission. Again, this was opposed by some Northern Alliance loyalists. It was viewed as appeasement by the Bush administration (Rashid 2010, 228). This persuaded the Taliban that accommodation with the new regime was a door their enemies had slammed in their face. Their only option was to train a new generation of fighters for a long haul of insurgency. (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, 402–403).

We learnt from Karzai himself in a 16 September, 2021 BBC World Service interview ('A Wish for Afghanistan') that the first negotiations on behalf of the most senior group offering to surrender was earlier, in late 2001:

Lyse Doucet (BBC): 'Washington's first envoy Zalmay Khalizad [talked to me] about a letter, in effect an offer of surrender, handed to Hamid Karzai by the Taliban [leadership] in late 2001. They were on the run then, a broken force'. President Karzai: '10 or 15 of them came and they brought me a letter saying that we accept the legitimacy of your government, and we transfer power to you'. BBC: 'But you never responded to that letter. It was a letter of surrender that they were ready to give up their weapons, hand them over to you, because their Islamic Emirate was finished. But you never accepted it'. [Up to this last sentence Karzai repeatedly agreed, interjecting 'yes' with the facts behind the question. Then he disagreed]: 'No, I accepted. I accepted the letter. I, naïve as I was, I gave it back to them to say, well, thank you for this letter transferring power to my government, now take this and announce it on the radios tonight... I did say that the country now belongs to all Afghans and all Afghans should live peacefully. And they did go and begin living peacefully in their country'. BBC: 'Do you think the Americans put pressure on you? [The suggestion documented during interview with former US Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad was that US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld rejected any such peace agreement and wanted to continue the hunt and kill of the Taliban leadership militarily]. Karzai: 'No, nobody put pressure on me, but

the opportunity was lost because night raids [targeted killings of alleged Taliban in their homes by NATO Special Forces] and all those other things'. Karzai then ended the interview.

3. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/> (accessed September 29, 2023).
4. Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018, 89): 'In sum, Syria is like the DRC in the way more than a dozen foreign armies have been attracted by the opportunities to fight hot wars with each other on Syrian soil, while indulging only in Cold Wars on their own soil. Syria is unlike the DRC in that so many major powers have at least special forces on the ground: Russia, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and perhaps even China has more than just intelligence officers in the country, as do probably some more major powers. Syria is also unlike the DRC in that the air forces of so many countries have massively hit targets in Syria with horrific consequences for civilians—including the air forces of Syria itself, Turkey, Israel, Russia, the United States, Jordan, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia and probably others. On further reflection, we must conclude that seemingly never-ending wars such as those in the DRC and Syria, where many other countries are attracted to fight their own proxy wars on the soil of a battle-torn country, are not so unique in human history. The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) involved many European states fighting one another in a war fought almost totally on the soil of what came to be known as Germany'.
5. By 2021, the largest Western contributor of UN peacekeepers was Italy, which was ranked 22nd among countries contributing most. My beloved Australia, with such a noble history of UN peacekeeping contributions, was contributing zero troops and zero police by 2021.
6. An exception was the resumption of Ukraine grain exports to feed a world in which starvation of the planet's poorest people was becoming an increasingly serious problem. Since it lapsed, it has been Turkish President Erdogan rather than the UN doing the

heavy diplomatic lifting to attempt to secure its renewal, so far unsuccessfully.

7. Peacebuilding Compared has confirmed this result with ethnographic causal process tracing. In both Timor-Leste (Braithwaite et al. 2012) and Guadalcanal Braithwaite et al. (2010b) early this century, for example, are cases where naval ships carrying peacekeepers loomed on the horizon, and combatants literally started retreating and surrendering their weapons in droves.
8. Security Council—Quick Links: Dag Hammarskhold Library 2021. <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick> (accessed September 20, 2022).
9. Africa, Asia, and Latin America have mostly avoided ‘world wars’. There is therefore merit in citizens of these continents believing that they want to keep it this way; they want nuclear weapons free zones to expand and consolidate across their continents. Gwynne Dyer (2021, 117) concludes that ‘world wars have always been based on alliances assembled by European powers’. He defines a ‘world war’ as a war in which all the great powers join together in two great rival alliances. By this criterion, Dyer finds six world wars in modern history: the Thirty Years’ War of 1618–1648, the War of the Spanish Succession of 1702–1714, the Seven Years’ War of 1756–1763, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars of 1791–1815, World War I and World War II.

References

- Afghan, Sahafiullah. 2011. Kandahar after the fall of the Taliban. W. Mason (ed.), *The rule of law in Afghanistan*. New York: CUP.
- Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér. 2017. Organized violence, 1989–2016. *Journal of Peace Research* 54: 574–87.
- Bhattacharyya, Sambit, and Rold Hodler. 2009. Natural resources, democracy and corruption. *European Economic Review* 54: 608–21.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrocriminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.

- Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy, and Leah Dunn. 2010a. *Reconciliation and architectures of commitment: Sequencing peace in Bougainville*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, Sinclair Dinnen, Matthew Allen, Valerie Braithwaite and Hilary Charlesworth. 2010b. *Pillars and shadows: Statebuilding as peacebuilding in Solomon Islands*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, and Bina D'Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence: War, crime and peacebuilding across South Asia*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Call, Charles T. 2012. *Why peace fails: The causes and prevention of civil war recurrence*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
- Collier, Paul. 2007. *The bottom billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it*. Oxford: OUP.
- Collier, Paul. 2009. *Wars, guns, and votes: Democracy in dangerous places*. New York: Harper.
- Congressional Research Service. 2021. United Nations issues: U.S. funding of UN peacekeeping. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10597.pdf>
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. 2011. *The dictator's handbook: why bad behavior is almost always good politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American Political Science Review* 94: 779–801.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dyer, Gwynne. 2021. *The shortest history of war*. Melbourne: Black Inc.
- Elias, Norbert. 1969. *The civilizing process. Volume 1: The History of Manners*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Evans, Gareth. 2022. *Good international citizenship*. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. Inside and out: Peacekeeping and the duration of peace after civil and interstate wars. *International Studies Review* 5: 97–114.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 269–92.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. *Does peacekeeping work?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morje Howard. 2008. Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 283–301.
- Fung, Courtney J. 2023. China's small steps into UN peacekeeping are adding up. *International Peace Institute Global Observatory*, May 24.

- Gilligan, Michael J., and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2008. Do UN interventions cause peace? Using matching to improve causal inference. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3: 89–122.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 2008. *Using quantitative and qualitative models to forecast instability*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Gurr, Ted R. 2000. *Peoples versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Hampson, Fen Osler. 1996. *Nurturing peace: Why peace settlements succeed or fail*. Washington: US Institute of Peace.
- Haas, Peter M., Robert Owen Keohane, and Marc A. Levy. 1993. *Institutions for the earth: Sources of effective international environmental protection*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Hegre, Håvard., and Håvard Mokleiv. Nygård. 2015. Governance and conflict relapse. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59: 984–1016.
- Hille, Peter. 2020. UN peacekeepers: Numbers are going down: <https://www.dw.com/en/un-peacekeepers-numbers-are-going-down/a-53603652>. Accessed September 29, 2023.
- Hong, Seung-Hun. 2016. *Dynamics of reciprocal regulation*. PhD dissertation, The Australian National University, Canberra.
- Howard, Lise Morje. 2008. *UN peacekeeping in civil wars*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2013. United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war. *American Journal of Political Science* 57: 875–89.
- Human Security Centre. 2005. *Human security report 2005: war and peace in the 21st century*. New York: Oxford.
- Human Security Report. 2013: *The decline in global violence—Evidence, explanation and contestation*. Vancouver: Human Security Research Group.
- ICG 2011. *The insurgency in Afghanistan's heartland*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- Johansen, Robert C. 2021. *Where the evidence leads: A realistic strategy for peace and human security*. Oxford: OUP.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. *The logic of violence in civil war*. New York: CUP.
- Karstedt, Susanne. 2017. Scaling criminology: From street violence to atrocity crime. In *Regulatory theory*, ed. Peter Drahos. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Killkullen, David, and Greg Mills. 2021. *The ledger: Accounting for failure in Afghanistan*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Kolosova, N.P., T.N. Ilyicheva, A.V. Danilenko, J.A. Bulanovich, S.V. Svyatchenko, A.G. Durymanov. 2019. Severe cases of seasonal influenza in Russia in 2017–2018. *PLoS ONE* 14:e0220401.

- Mac Ginty, Roger. 2021. *Everyday peace: How so-called ordinary people can disrupt violent conflict*. Oxford: OUP.
- Mack, Andrew. 2007. Successes and challenges in conflict management. In *Leashing the dogs of war*, ed. Chester A. Cocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 2007. *Electing to fight: Why emerging democracies go to war*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Mayor, S. 2000. Flu experts warn of need for pandemic plans. *British Medical Journal* 321 (7265): 852.
- Nilsson, Dilsson. 2006. In the shadow of settlement: Multiple rebel groups and precarious peace. Doctoral dissertation, Uppsala University.
- Olsen, Tricia D., Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter. 2010. *Transitional justice in the balance: Comparing processes, weighing efficacy*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Paris, Roland. 2004. *At war's end: Building peace after civil conflict*. New York: CUP.
- Pinker, Steven, and Andrew Mack. 2014. The world is not falling apart. *State Magazine*, December 22.
- Quinn, J. Michael, T. David Mason and Mehmet Gurses. 2007. Sustaining the peace: Determinants of civil war recurrence. *International Interactions* 33: 167–179.
- Rashid, Ahmed. 2010. *Taliban: The power of militant Islam in Afghanistan and beyond*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Regan, Anthony. 2005. *Doing less to achieve more: 'Lessons' from a successful international peacebuilding intervention—Bougainville 1997–2000*. Canberra: Australian National University.
- Regan, Anthony. 2010. *Light Intervention: Lessons from Bougainville*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Regan, Patrick M., Richard W. Frank, and Aysegul Aydin. 2009. Diplomatic interventions and civil war: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 46: 135–46.
- Riordan, Catherine. 2013. *Post-conflict governments 1975–2004: Designing effective assistance*. PhD dissertation, University College, Dublin.
- Rosenblum-Kumar, Gay. 2023. As UN missions draw down, strengthening community-led approaches to protection of civilians. *IPI Global Observatory*, May 23.
- Ruttig, Thomas. 2011. *The battle for Afghanistan: Negotiating with the Taliban*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.

- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2008. Short- and long-term effects of United Nations peace operations. *World Bank Economic Review* 22: 9–32.
- Semple, Michael. 2011. Afghanistan: Fault lines in the sand. *New Stateman*, July 7.
- Sikkink, Kathryn. 2011. *The justice cascade: How human rights prosecutions are changing world politics*. New York: Norton.
- Smith, D., N. Bell, J. Faller, V. Galaz, A. Norström, C. Pattison, and C. Queiroz. 2022. *Elements of a planetary emergency: Environment of peace (Part 1)*. Stockholm: SIPRI.
- Spark, Natascha, and Jackie Bailey. 2005. Disarmament in Bougainville: ‘Guns in boxes.’ *International Peacekeeping* 12: 599–608.
- Trevelyan, G.M. 1985. *A shortened history of England*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Tutu, Desmond. 1999. *No future without forgiveness*. New York: Penguin.
- United Nations. 2023. *A new agenda for peace*. New York: United Nations.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morje Howard, and V. Page Fortna. 2020. The extraordinary relationship between peacekeeping and peace. *British Journal of Political Science* 1–18

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





7

Containing Deadly Systems

Abstract Forest preservation and planting are vital to climate restoration, war and epidemic prevention, and therefore to financial crisis prevention. Regional organizations like ASEAN avoid the historic pitfalls of European alliance structures that induced world wars. Nuclear weapons-free zones can be expanded. Treaty diplomacy is needed toward guardrails among great powers on the use of AI in warfare and cyberattacks that cross red lines. Track II diplomacy options exist for great powers to persuade nuclear weapon states like Pakistan on why it is in their interests to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Maximally large, temporary coalitions of states can reveal an escalating responsive regulatory pyramid that invokes chokepoint trade sanctions and conventional military action by many states as a last resort that never needs to be used.

Keywords Forestry · ASEAN · AI guardrails · Cyber guardrails · Chokepoints · Pakistan

Averting Deforestation

The conclusion so far is that only temporary containment of states should be considered. The priority is the commitment to permanent containment of risks that endanger catastrophes. That priority is simpler in its clarity and focus. Chapter 9 goes to covert attempts to weaken adversary states as a more complex challenge at which states often succeed. Yet they succeed in a way that achieves ‘catastrophic success’: the covert meddling weaves a web that ultimately entangles its creator more than the intended victim—the state to be contained.

This chapter is focused on the most politically challenging form of risk containment, containing weapons systems. That risk may also be the most decisive challenge because we have already seen that a world at war weaves diplomatic tangles that make it difficult to collaborate effectively on climate change, on economic crisis prevention, and pandemic prevention. What is needed is highly variegated forms of risk containment that are responsive to historical flux and technological change.

Planting trees is the simplest imaginable method for containing war. It treats global deforestation as a well-understood root cause of climate crisis. ‘Restoration of trees remains among the most effective strategies for climate change mitigation’ (IPCC 2022). Moreover, this is a particularly urgent form of climate action because as the planet warms, the global capacity for canopy cover declines (IPCC 2022). It is generative of green economic growth through labor-intensive tree planting. Wealthy countries assisting other societies with R & D on excellence in mass tree planting programs, on avoiding the widespread corruption in their implementation, builds restorative relationships by putting green deposits in every country’s bank. It intervenes in complex systems in a simple way. By planting trees in regions of a country with the rainfall to sustain tree growth, warming of regions where rivers are running dry can be diminished. By planting green walls on buildings and trees in streets, urban usage of air conditioning can be tempered. Green cities are also cities with less depression and less crime (Donovan and Prestemon 2012; Lin et al. 2021) that might cascade to other forms of violence. Planting trees is not even geopolitically complicated. Trees are one challenge where major powers show a better example to the rest of the world,

with China far and away the number one in net forestation since 1990. The United States, India, the United Kingdom, and France are all net improvers, though not as impressive as Spain and Italy (Conte 2021). Australia is among the overwhelming majority of countries that have failed to improve, or suffered a net decline, in the quantum of tree cover since 1990. Australia's seemingly impressive carbon credits program that allows corporates to buy a right to pollute by paying farmers to plant trees has been rife with carbon fraud. Australia's gaming of carbon credits has contributed to its deforestation shame. This threatens extinction for its beloved koala bears, just one of thousands of Australian species at risk (Morton 2022).

China is planting 88 billion trees along a 4,800-kilometer frontier (the Great Green Wall) to hold back the expansion of the Gobi Desert. A *Nature* article reveals this afforestation is building a renewed carbon sink in China that in the past has been underestimated. It now absorbs 45 percent of estimated annual Chinese anthropogenic emissions (Wang et al. 2020). These benefits are independently measured by satellites serving international teams of independent university researchers that count tree expansion and contraction, bypassing the need to rely on untrustworthy national and corporate carbon accounting.

Reforestation is a simple but important form of preventive peacemaking for an Africa afflicted by an expanding Sahara Desert and fighting fueled by famine and the politics of water, not just in iconic wars like Chad, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia but right across sub-Saharan latitudes. On the Continent where deforestation, desertification, war, coups, Islamic State terrorism, and oppressive Wagner Corporation counter-terrorism are worst, an African-led Great Green Wall for Restoration and Peace is being planted at the southern extremity of the Sahara Desert.¹

China led the world with a 40 percent increase in forest coverage between 1990 and 2020. The United States and India are the only other mega countries with net increases in forest coverage between 1990 and 2020, with 2.4 percent and 12.9 percent increases respectively, compared to a net global decrease in forests of 4.2 percent (Conte 2021). Russia, Canada, Australia, and particularly Brazil are the disappointing examples of mega countries that have failed to reduce their historic deforestation,

or worsened it since 1990. Brazil's President Lula is determined to reverse this and has already made a huge start on reducing deforestation of the Amazon basin with other Presidents of the Amazon region.

China and the United States have been smarter than lesser powers in realizing that afforestation is good for nurturing economies, for global citizenship, for preventing war, and forestalling ecosystem collapse. Unfortunately however, they have not been smart enough in their geopolitical imaginations to give each other applause for these accomplishments on a planet where opportunities are so rare for building restorative diplomacy. This means one of the great powers putting emotional deposits in the relational diplomacy bank of its great power competitor are so rare. The question of how to foster acknowledgment of earned redemption among great powers is further developed in the discussion of restorative diplomacy.

Oversimplification of even the simplest solutions is always a risk with the theme of this book. Great power cooperation on forestry R & D concerning these risks of oversimplification is imperative. Tree planting can improve carbon and water storage, reduce soil erosion, improve native biodiversity through increased landscape connectivity, calm the human spirit and prevent violence, provide food, wood, shade, and livelihoods for poor people. Yet when forestry fails to work restoratively, dialogically with all stakeholders and scientists, tree planting benefits can be lost. Much depends on the how and where of planting. 'Planting trees in historic grasslands and savannas can harm native ecosystems'. (Holl and Brancalion 2020). The poverty reduction potential of tree planting is often lost in top-down programs imposed by central governments without consultation with local stakeholders. The effectiveness of Chinese tree planting has been compromised by top-down efficiency-driven reforestation with one or a few non-native species that produce lower biodiversity than native forests. When this kind of tree planting compensates for native deforestation, it can be a net environmental loss.²

One simple remedy in Australia has proved to be involving First Nations people from that particular locale in decisions on what kinds of reforestation are replacing 'upside down country' (after mining). After getting the reforestation mix right for that ecosystem, First Nations

employment can be contracted for the actual replanting of their traditional lands. Later still First Nations people are increasingly contracted for traditional cool burning to further support those ecosystems and prevent Australia's mega bushfires. Tree planting might seem simpler than peacebuilding, but it shares this imperative for a virtuous circle of local wisdom and action for global transformation.

There are many simple enough \$100 bills like ecologically responsive tree planting sitting on pavements that nations can pick up by working cooperatively together. It is not the ambition of this book to list them all in a systematic or balanced way. It is merely to point out that they exist and are neglected. The ambition is to alert us to a more redemptive geopolitics for greatly expanding capabilities for picking up preventive opportunities. This book argues that central to simple solutions to complex catastrophes is great powers finding domains where they can genuinely give each other praise and work cooperatively to show certain kinds of leadership of which only they are capable for building a safe planet. The point has already been made that these simple opportunities exist with international collaboration on pandemic prevention, prevention of financial crises through better global architectures of banking and trade regulation, and prevention of pollution and ecological imbalances.

Second, the book's ambition is to argue that such a redeemed geopolitics is possible for the most politically difficult challenges. The most fraught challenge is the containment of weapons systems. It cannot be fixed by any amount of economic innovation or scientific progress. This is the form of containment challenge that relates to the problem that is the only long-term rival to climate change as an extinction threat. We have seen that there are relationships that couple weapons of war to climate catastrophe. These relationships have been growing across the centuries since the invention of gunpowder. They accelerated in leaps: for example, deforestation with napalm and Agent Orange across much of Vietnam and Cambodia. Remember the images of blackened skies after the two invasions of Iraq exploded oil and gas wells to billow black/red clouds, blotting out the sun.

At geostrategically vital nodes of 'great games', there is a longer history of spikes of environmental devastation that became permanent. Most of

us remember films about battles, particularly of the British Empire, in the Khyber Pass that connects Afghanistan to South Asia. Such battles have raged there since Alexander the Great conquered the pass. The landscape of the Khyber Pass is familiar to our cinematic eyes as treeless and barren. If we see images of the Khyber Pass from 170 years ago, however, it is covered with trees. Gunpowder deployed for strategic conquest rendered the Khyber Pass barren. Sometimes forests regrow after war; sometimes they never do. Weapons systems containment is a form of containment that almost everyone is pessimistic about because it runs up against a realist view of great power interests. This book challenges realism to contend that war prevention can save trees and trees and human love for them can help save us from wars, other forms of violence, and from depression and hopelessness.

Of course there are many things that must change about how humans use land. Agricultural sprawl is the biggest cause of habitat destruction and grazing animals are the largest cause of agriculture's expanse. Diets must shift away from meat eating to reduce that agricultural sprawl. Agriculture is not keeping up with the global demand for food, especially since 2015, more especially since the Ukraine war reduced grain and fertilizer exports from Russia and Ukraine. The global hunger crisis is tightly coupled to the challenges of peace and ecological crisis.

This book promotes a fresh look, renewed optimism about the political possibilities. Change begins in the hands of social movement activism in societies that are not great powers, in societies that are mature enough to no longer be interested in being or becoming one of the world's great powers, nor even a dominant power within some corner of the world. Most people in most countries think this way; they do not want their country to dominate or be 'number 1' in any sense beyond the fun of a sporting triumph. It is these earthlings who are unencumbered with such ambitions to make America, China, Russia, or Iran great again who are freer to lead the planet through social movement politics to a freedom undominated by cataclysms.

Odds of Armageddon

Science cannot judge whether the graver danger is climate change caused by carbon or nuclear winter cascaded by nuclear war.³ Depending on which forms of foolishness are managed less prudently, earthlings might frizzle or freeze toward extinction. Global warming is more certain and inexorable. In comparison, the probability of a nuclear war in any year is low. We cannot know how low, but it seems reasonable to suggest it is a bit lower than 1 percent. Even so, this means in the next two centuries it is much more likely to happen than not once we combine those low odds for each of two hundred years. Kaiho's (2023) modeling suggests that, depending on the level of prevention achieved, global warming, pollution, and deforestation will cause between 2060–2080 CE the loss of 5–13 percent of the earth's tetrapod species without a nuclear war, but up to 40–70 percent species loss with a nuclear war; 2–6 percent of marine species loss without a nuclear war, 25–50 percent marine species loss with a nuclear war. The key insight of this research is that animal populations more ravaged by global warming will more widely collapse to extinction after nuclear war.

The 2022 Ukraine war was a game changer in pushing elites to ponder these odds, however incompetently. Early in the war, Peter Berezin, formerly of Goldman Sachs and an analyst of one of the most influential stock market research organizations, estimated that the probability of nuclear war in 2022 had grown to 10 percent. Presumably that became somewhat higher for 2023, given that in early 2023 the Ukraine war escalated to a more existential threat to President Putin. This was the estimate BCA Research suggested should be factored into investment risk models (New York Times 2022). Was that alarmist? Was the 10 percent estimate too high for 2022? I thought so, as did many wiser people than me, including Graham Allison of Harvard and former US strategic arms reduction negotiator Russia Rose Gottemoeller (who rated the probability at more than one percent but less than 10 in March 2022 (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2022)). By October 2022, former US Defense Secretary and CIA Director Leon Panetta (2022) was writing, on the basis of inside knowledge of intelligence estimates: 'Some intelligence analysts now believe that the probability of the use of tactical nuclear

weapons in Ukraine has risen from 1–5 percent at the start of the war to 20–25 percent today’. Again this estimate seemed too high to me. In 2023, respected Russian former strategic advisor to President Putin and Honorary Chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Sergey Karaganov, hopefully presented this minority view:

During over seventy years of mutual deterrence, atomic weapons have saved the world. People just took this for granted. However, now we see that things have changed and the unthinkable is happening: the West is responsible for a major war in the underbelly of a major nuclear power... Lord God saw that a large part of humanity had gone mad, having started two world wars in a generation, and gave us these nuclear weapons, which are weapons of the apocalypse. He wanted them to be in the front of our minds, at all times, and to scare us. But now people have lost their fear... Official Western propaganda pumps the idea that the West can do anything it likes and Moscow will put up with it. (Karaganov 2023)

We will have to make nuclear deterrence a convincing argument again by lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons set unacceptably high, and by rapidly but prudently moving up the deterrence-escalation ladder... The enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a preemptive strike in retaliation for all of its current and past acts of aggression in order to prevent a slide into global thermonuclear war. (Karaganov in Cimbala and Korb 2023)

The most troubling risk is not such crisis risks but extremely low risks that persist every new day nuclear weapons exist. Yet it is a reasonable form of risk analytics to ask how much higher the risk had become when the Kremlin had fallen under rule by a cornered man, who may have felt that he had little to lose because the war had put him in personal danger of assassination or a coup when so many had been purged or demoted, a leader who was in a 2022 covid cocoon and a cocoon of fear and paranoia, sitting far away even at meetings with those who were his trusted advisors, a man who had thrown his country into a major invasion crisis and then threatened NATO with nuclear retaliation if they joined the fight. He surprised former President Obama who said he had never expected that Putin would ‘bet the farm’ on such a

war. The nuclear threat may not have been empty. He said it was no bluff. Russia had recently trailed a nuclear missile launch (without a live warhead) of a warning nuclear explosion in the North Sea. That might have been presented as a counter-sanction, a preventive radiation spike to clear ships and aircraft plying trade across the Atlantic. We cannot begin to imagine the cornucopia of offensive options that enter fertile offensive minds of cronies of a leader determined to prove that he does not bluff. Like the US, China, Pakistan, India, and Russia have enough weapons to induce a nuclear winter that would cause all crops on the planet to fail after the direct loss of hundreds of millions of lives from explosions. Survivors would shiver in conditions of mass starvation and irradiation.

Does fear of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) deter such a man as the Vladimir Putin of 2024? Probably. Probably this time. One big problem, however, is that MAD is not a stable equilibrium. Putin did not launch a massive cyberwar against Ukraine in 2022 in the way he did in 2017, in the way that was expected as part of a campaign to totally crush Ukraine. Putin's bombing campaigns were reckless and traumatic, yet targeted key infrastructure more and civilians less than his bombing campaigns in Syria and Chechnya. Or for that matter with the allied bombing campaigns of earlier wars in Indochina, Japan, and Germany.

Perhaps part of Putin's reluctance to escalate early to MADD was a desire to use Ukraine's cyber infrastructure after he took over the country, or at least large swathes of Ukraine. That did not seem to deter him from destroying other infrastructure, however. Perhaps most of this was in cities like Kyiv that he had no hopes of conquering by mid-2022. It seems likely Putin feared that if he waged all-out cyberwar against Ukraine, when Ukraine responded in kind, cyber-warriors from every NATO country might volunteer for the Ukraine cyber army to participate in totally shutting down the Russian economy (Svantesson 2022). That could be why he did not respond to US-led sanctions that depressed the Russian economy with all-out cyberwar against the West, nor by demolishing trans-Atlantic undersea cables. Unprecedented as Western sanctions were, what they delivered was still well short of a total shut-down of his economy. They did not turn off all Russia's lights, all its screens, transactions in all its markets, and ground all its aircraft. Mutual Assured Digital Destruction would do that. The fact is that the US,

China, and Russia fear that each of their great power adversaries may be close to the capability of delivering Mutual Assured Digital Destruction (MADD). This is not just about cyber hacking of ground computers, activation of cyber-timebombs hiding in deep infrastructures like electricity grids, air, rail, and road traffic control systems, and health system data bases, waiting to be exploded. This cyber-attack aspect of MADD could be combined with destruction of deep-sea cables through which almost all the financial transactions of the global economy travel. Finally, there is a space war against satellites (probably also by cyber-attacks on satellites).

What if Putin had responded in 2022 to the impact of the sanctions imposed by NATO states on his economy with a total cyberwar against NATO? It would have been a dangerous thing to do for a man who believes that NATO might have the superior capability to thrust his economy back to the dark ages. But imagine if well-meaning rogue hackers in the Ukraine cyber army, which *The Economist* believes to have 300,000 members worldwide (Stevenson 2022), managed to escalate cyberwar, perhaps by accident, to the point where Putin did launch total cyber warfare against NATO. Vigilante cyber-warriors have accomplished some significant hits such as taking down North Korea's internet for 24 hours (Black 2022). Cyber warfare units do not launch attacks from computers in their own country. Attribution is mere guesswork of the kind: 'OK, this looks like Country X because this is how Country X usually does things'. (Black 2022, 2). With such beliefs rife, false flag attacks can seed chaos.

Computers that controlled Iran's nuclear plants ran on Windows. Russia had hacked backdoors to Windows and so could launch a devastating cyber-attack on Iran's nuclear program and across Iran that looked like an American mega-attack. This problem demands scenario planning applied to space warfare, where it is 'very difficult to identify the perpetrator of unfriendly or hostile actions conducted in space' (Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament 2021, 35). This is likely to become even more true as capabilities grow for launches of thousands of satellites and swarms of nanosatellites that create a more diffused 'fog of war'. Putin should then be thinking that the more massive cyber retaliation will come from NATO. Together NATO likely would be more capable than Russia to

totally accomplish assured digital destruction. In consideration of this, Putin might decide that the nuclear strike he actually threatened in 2022 was preferable to threatening even a MADD limited to Ukraine. Perhaps better to warn that at the first sign from his intelligence sources of NATO mobilizing assured digital destruction of Russian economy and society, Russia will launch a strategic nuclear strike.

On the one hand, one could draw the lesson from Ukraine that both Russia and the West were more reckless with their military power than expected. On the other hand, the war can be interpreted as revealing both sides as deeply afraid of even a small nuclear strike by the other, deeply afraid of full-scale conventional war between Russia and NATO, and even deeply afraid of all-out cyberwar. The complexly cascading character of risks in highly coupled contemporary conditions might mean that great powers have good reasons to be more easily deterred short of maximum violence than we might have thought.

Speed, Coupling, Endless Unbalancing of Equilibria: AI, MADD, Hypersonics

Will some new power that emerges during the next two centuries threaten the world with MADD that might cascade to MAD? Quite apart from an unintended escalation to MADD triggered by enthusiastic cyber amateurs of grand strategy, MAD is no longer in stable equilibrium in its own terms. Ever faster hypersonic weapons are one reason (Wong 2021). Weapons creatively retargeted and reengineered by AI is another driver that in future will disequilibrate the global balance of terror.

China is not rushing to fully close the huge chasm between it and both the United States and Russia in the number of nuclear missiles it can launch. A reason may be, as expressed by Han Guili of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, that ‘There is a Chinese saying, it takes 10 years to sharpen a sword’ and ‘We have spent 60 years sharpening two swords. And they are the best’. These swords relate to hypersonic technologies that Guili hopes will ‘put China about 20–30 years ahead of the West’ (Wong 2021, 349). Hoped for hypersonic swords may travel so fast, so furtively, that they destroy enemy offensive capabilities before anyone

realizes who launched the hypersonic weapons against them. The theory is that in a world of many enemies, we are exposed to an incoming bullet from a hidden sniper hired by one of those enemies. This hypersonic bullet might only be stoppable by firing another bullet at the incoming bullet. Hypersonic missiles are a greater challenge than firing a bullet to stop a bullet because hypersonic weapons follow trajectories that are not only super-fast but also super-erratic, rather than linear in trajectory.

MAD may no longer be perceived to exist if a country believes it has hypersonic weapons that can win a nuclear war, however unwise belief in such a technologically temporary advantage might be (Wong 2021, 361). The tragedy of hypersonics and other next-generation weapons is that not only does China seem to be most advanced in their development. On one count China has conducted twenty times as many hypersonic tests as the United States (Wong 2021). It seems North Korea has a hypersonic weapons development program with significant Chinese assistance. North Korea hopes this will prove an ‘Assassin’s Mace’ that gives it a decisive first-strike advantage over an otherwise militarily superior adversary (Wong 2021). The United States is increasing its investment in hypersonics at a stupendous pace to catch up. Its budget for hypersonic weapons more than doubled between 2018 and 2019. By 2020 it had increased 20-fold, and by 2021, 30-fold compared to 2018 (Wong 2021, 356). Multiples of this size belie a pursuit of rebalancing that inevitably cascades to endless unbalancing of complex, nonlinear equilibria of capability.

Already four countries have had clearly detected tests of hypersonic weapons—the United States, Russia, China, and India. Russia trialed theirs in 2022 against Ukrainian cities. North Korea will become the fifth hypersonic power. North Korea would not need to be correct in a belief that it could negate US first strike capability against all its missiles while the United States is hesitating about whether its retaliation should destroy North Korea or China. Full scale nuclear retaliation against China would destroy not only China but the United States as well. So the United States would cautiously ponder its retaliation target. A desperate or less than fully rational North Korean leadership does not need to be correct in its belief that it can prevail over such chaos with a sufficiently massive first strike; it simply needs to have that belief, to

believe that North Korea can win because it is capable of being more ruthless, more 'MAD' than either its enemy, the United States, or its ally, China. Constantly let us remember President Kennedy's counsel to avoid cornering anyone to the point where they perceive their choice as being between an existential threat or first use of a nuclear weapon.

No one comprehends the entire range of possible risks to destabilization of MAD. Hypersonic weapons just illustrates one. The more unknowable a new technology of mass destruction is, the more capable it is of delivering the surprise that unravels MAD. Perhaps there are innovative biological-chemical weapon cocktails that can be genetically engineered by AI to create another unraveling of offensive balance some time during the next century or two. R & D continues in reckless countries to that end. Killer robots are another possible existential threat from new technologies that could destabilize MAD equilibria. A middle power that feels threatened by China might develop the capability to invade China with tens of millions of swarming drones that are programmed to be unrecallable until they have destroyed all buildings where members of the Communist Party leadership hide. If Chinese intelligence suggests this middle power is planning such a mission, China might threaten that middle power with a terrifying preemptive option.

If the United States razed a rogue North Korea with nuclear weapons, this might cause millions of bordering Chinese lives to be lost as collateral damage. How China would position itself to deter such a risk is hard to assess. If killer robot development becomes so advanced in some states compared to others that they can wipe out security operatives and political leaders in ways that defensive robots of the state under attack cannot intercept, that state may be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear non-proliferation could be destabilized by fears of future swarms of a million killer robots.

The harder one thinks about the imponderability of scenarios where acceleration of technological innovation in weapons systems destabilize MAD, the clearer it becomes that the genuine alternative is for the planet to follow a simpler institutional path. This path is constant monitoring and mutual inspection of weapons programs, of militarized AI programs, and constant repairing of UN non-proliferation treaties and nuclear weapons reduction treaties as ships endlessly at sea. The ambition of this

path to peace is total bans on all new and big technology threats as they emerge. Great universities are simple institutions that give birth to the new technologies that forebode planetary destruction. They can redeem themselves to become central to United Nations monitoring before they take off as emergent dangers of new technologies that threaten the planet.

Anything short of an international society that demands total bans on all new and big technology threats as they emerge means that we likely bequeath a world of terrible cataclysm to our descendants during the centuries ahead. We are better than that as university communities and as a species. We can have high hopes that simple institutions like great universities can animate international society to help us redeem the better angels of our nature.

The combination of advances led by universities in AI and hypersonic weapons that multiply speed and complexity illustrates the danger. Later I discuss the courageous way Russian Colonel Stanislav Petrov decided not to report five incoming US missiles that he did not find humanly plausible. He was right that it was a false positive; they were illusions from extraordinary reflections of the sun off clouds. Zachary Kallenbom (2022) points out that the Russian computer which was supposed to inform Petrov indicated ‘highest confidence’ that this was a hostile, surprise first strike. The world was lucky that the algorithmic did not rule over the human. Kallenbom worries that Russia has already taken steps toward algorithmic triggering of submarine nukes as a response to hypersonic speeds of contemporary warfare, and that the United States is considering this as well. Kallenbom’s concern is that extant AI is brittle and ‘easy to fool’:

A single pixel change is enough to convince an AI a stealth bomber is a dog. This implies that a well-resourced, apocalyptic terrorist organization like the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo might attempt to trick an adversary’s system into starting a catalytic nuclear war. Both approaches can be done in quite subtle, difficult-to-detect ways: data poisoning may manipulate the training data that feeds the AI system, or unmanned systems or emitters could be used to trick an AI into believing a nuclear strike is incoming. (Kallenbom 2022, 4)

As the speed and complexity of warfare increases, the major powers are coming to rely more heavily on AI-empowered machines to sort through sensor data on enemy movements, calculate enemy intentions, and select optimal responses. This increases the danger that humans will cede key combat decision-making tasks to machines that lack a capacity to savor social and political context in their calculations. Such machines are vulnerable to hacking, spoofing,⁴ and other failures, possibly leading them to propose extreme military responses to ambiguous signals and thereby cause inadvertent escalation. With machines controlling actions on both sides, this danger could grow worse (Klare 2020a, 2020b). US Strategic Commanders say the United States deals with thousands of cyber-attacks every day. From time to time vigilante hackers are bound to get lucky when they roll the dice frequently. Private-sector nuclear warfare partners to the Pentagon are believed to be much more vulnerable than the state. This includes software contractors who subcontract aspects of development, who oversee long obscure histories of updates and patches to software and hardware used by many subcontractors, and the major private manufacturers of nuclear weapons technologies, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, which are known to have been hacked consequentially (Wong 2021).

University researchers can say to both Washington and Beijing that if we don't get the funding to develop the best killer robots, our enemies will. Unilateral withdrawal of one's own university from the arms race, on the other hand, can act as a moral exemplar to all other universities, in the homelands of both our geostrategic friends and enemies. And by the way, as the atom bomb and drone technologies illustrated, if scientists on one side develop a new weapon, espionage by other powers quickly cracks the scientific secrets. US scientists who invented nuclear weapons and drones gave their countries a war fighting advantage that persisted for a number of years that could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Multilateral agreement among university scientists to spurn weapons innovation is an ethical path. But it follows from the foregoing that unilaterally doing so is still a good path, a useful steppingstone.

In the worst-case analysis of treaties failing to strengthen against warfare by swarms of killer drones, societies are still not defenseless after they surrender to threatened drone invasion. They can still say to the

invaders, OK march in then, we won't fight you, but nor will we cooperate with you. Then they can organize defense around well prepared, widely diffused excellence in civilian resistance that makes the society ungovernable. Nonviolent tactics can be sharpened to the point where the costs of governing an ungovernable country constantly suffering cyber-sabotage, physical sabotage, and industrial relations sabotage by its surviving ordinary citizens are extremely high. This cost gets even higher when combined with the costs of diplomatic sanctions of other countries incensed by the invasion. All of this in combination can be sufficiently high to make invasion of other countries bad economics that weakens any great power in a way not dissimilar to the way Indonesia was weakened by its invasion of East Timor. I draw from that case the lesson that totally nonviolent civilian resistance is probably inferior to an approach to rendering the society ungovernable primarily by nonviolent resistance, but perhaps combined with a small but decisively disruptive hit-and-run insurgency. It diverts small numbers of the resistance away from disruptive nonviolent campaigns on the streets of the major cities. Defended mountain refuges provide somewhere for brave young dissidents targeted by death squads to flee. Tiny units in mountain hideouts can launch drone attacks, then move to a new hideout. As Al Qaeda did in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan, minimally violent defense planning can prepare by digging hideouts so deep into mountains that they can protect a target even as priceless to major powers as Osama bin Laden was for his years of insurgency.

It is strategically important to give brave dissidents hope that they can be brave. They might render themselves difficult to punish by retreating from the nonviolent democratic resistance to insurgency camps that enjoy high survivability. For the same reasons, the limited mountain insurgencies of ethnic armies training student insurgents fleeing from the cities of Myanmar today might also make more strategic sense than purist nonviolence. We can acknowledge highly limited but strategic insurgency against despots from the mountains by the democratic resistance, combined with purist nonviolence in the towns and cities as the main games of a strategy to render an invaded homeland ungovernable. Then a restorative international diplomacy can be mounted from an ethical high ground to attract support from other lands to heal our land. This

was close to the thinking of Nelson Mandela in the final decades of his successful struggle against Apartheid in South Africa. We return later to these themes.

Redemption may lie in simple thinking about institutions like universities that disengage from the arms race. This simple thinking helps save us because the forces and technological developments that threaten extinctions are so unknowable, as MAD married to AI destabilizes equilibria of the past. It is better for individual scientists, individual universities, and individual countries to simply opt out of contributing to any arms race that might make this unknowable complexity even more complex and unfathomable. For the moment, sadly, our future is buried in the complex hearts of computer simulations of algorithmic war making more than in the simpler hearts of nonviolent resisters.

Lessons from the Past

When the Soviet Union militarily crushed uprisings for freedom in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), NATO powers sat on their hands. These were wise decisions, but cruel. Ashamed as we were of our want of resolve to defend freedom at the time, better future prospects were delivered to Eastern Europe through the nonviolent transition that was given birth by the strategic patience advocated by Kennan and Bull. The decisions to keep our swords sheathed were right because, as we saw in the last chapter, in the medium term of history, containment of the Soviet Union did do its work. Freedom-lovers of Hungary and Czechoslovakia got their historical moment to nonviolently make their own slow food internal revolution for freedom without foreign firepower that destroyed their cities and traumatized a generation of children. There were other occasions during the past seven decades when Moscow mobilized its military muscle against weaker neighbors. In two of those wars, Afghanistan in 1979 and Ukraine in 2022, Moscow weakened its geopolitical clout in a major way as a consequence of the invasions. The Afghanistan invasion was significant in the disintegration and collapse of the Soviet Union during the 1980s. The invasion of Ukraine weakened

Russia to the point where it may become a vassal of China, a great power that had overtaken it to become a dozen times its size as an economy.

There is complex unpredictability in how such wars unfold. Who would have predicted that the United States would be defeated by both Vietnam and Afghanistan? Who would have predicted that after the United States seemed to stabilize a friendly new regime in Iraq that this regime would become so allied to Iran? We might not have predicted that Iran, but not the US, would put boots on the ground to defeat an Islamic State in Syria that had already conquered Iraq's second city and huge swathes of its territory? Who would have thought that a bunch of prisoners in an American prison in Iraq, Camp Bucca, could have conceived a military adventure as bold and forlorn as Islamic State's conquests toward building a new Caliphate?

My argument is that the time has come for the great powers—the United States, China, and Russia—to do better by their interests through engaging the kind of restorative diplomacy discussed in Chapter 8. I argue that any project of prevailing to dominate the world through war is forlorn in contemporary conditions of geostrategic complexity. In any case, what is the point of invading and occupying another country in today's complexly coupled world? As Ukraine demonstrates, you have to destroy it to conquer it, then after you break it, you have to own the broken society if you are to benefit from the war. That is so expensive in blood, treasure, and diplomatic capital, as Russia found in Ukraine and the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. Had Russia succeeded, it would have conquered a society that remained cut off from the circuits of world finance and world trade precisely because Russia had conquered it. Great powers better flourish when they remain fully coupled to trade and investment circuits of the global economy. China seems to be the contemporary great power most deeply persuaded of this conclusion. While it endlessly threatens that Taiwan must be reintegrated with China, since Chairman Mao's military defeat during his attempted invasion of Taiwan in 1958, and the resultant Pentagon plan to end it even more quickly with US nuclear weapons (which was vetoed by President Eisenhower in 1958), China's approach to Taiwan has been a sensible strategic patience over a long horizon.

It might be retorted that sometimes a great power might decide to invade a country to exploit its resource riches. Democratic Republic of Congo is militarily and economically weak, having spent many of the last 50 years with the lowest GDP per capita on the planet. It is a vast country with perhaps the planet's richest unexploited mining resources, probably more than the continent of Australia, and 13 percent of the world's capability for future hydroelectric development along the surging Congo River system, water resources for an overheating planet rivaled only by those of Brazil. So why would a great power not invade Congo without bothering to rebuild it as a state and society? After all, tiny Rwanda effectively did that in 1996. The reason is that it is cheaper for a great power like China to bribe the president and buy all the mining assets or hydropower assets it wants than it is to invade and hold it. And that is more or less what China has done with DRC this century (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, Part I), and it is more or less what the United States did from the 1960s to the 1990s when Congo's President Mobutu was the strongest US ally in Africa. No African leader was more massively on the take from corrupt Western corporate largesse (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, Chapters 3–4). For China to have instead invaded DRC militarily and held it would have required half a million Chinese troops deployed to geopolitically obscure outposts across a landmass the size of Western Europe that is not a core Chinese interest. Nor of course could the United States have contemplated Congo as a worthwhile invasion target even at the height of the Cold War.

Great powers have an interest in talking to each other about making assurances against invasions more robust. One day the assurance they currently derive from a stable MAD will be technologically destabilized by the brilliant science their innovation systems deliver. A hedge against that is confidence-building by resuming strategic arms limitations negotiations and mutually agreeing to reductions in nuclear warheads. Even if this fails to move on to nuclear weapons abolition, it makes the world safer. That is because there are ways that a thousand nuclear weapons may have more than ten times the risk of a hundred. More nukes means more complex systems, multiplied prospects of accidental or unintended nuclear surety breaches. Fewer than a hundred are insufficient to cross tipping points to cause nuclear winter.

In sum, by committing to a rules-based international order that precludes a great power from ever again invading weak countries like DRC, great powers tie their hands against something that is not in their interests, and in a way that also ties the hands of great power adversaries. Hopefully it might also tie the hands of ‘an army with a state’ like Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front against the kind of invasion it led with other states into DRC in 1996 and again in 1998, causing millions of lost lives in that cockpit war. Congo’s war also shut down the environmental promise of Congo hydropower because no banks would support the massive green investment needed in conditions of instability.

If great powers can agree to move their nuclear weapons further away from each other’s frontiers, they give each other more time to communicate about false alarms of incoming missiles. In a complex world, a common analytic mistake, and perhaps the deadliest kind of mistake, is to believe that WMD disarmament initiatives are pointless if they achieve only modest objectives like wider separations or reduced numbers. Great powers can thereby build the mutual confidence to move on to strengthen mutual destruction of biological and chemical weapons programs bolstered by robust rights for mutual inspection of suspect government and university laboratories. To build mutual trust, leaders must each make deposits in the emotional banks of leaders of their adversaries. They can then make withdrawals to secure their vital interests guaranteed by mutual respect and promise-keeping. This is a needed path for great powers to agree with each other to do the same thing with their killer robot and algorithmic warmaking programs, with eschewing launch on warning (launch as soon as incoming missiles are detected) and committing to no first use of nukes. Killer robot bans are urgent because that technology has already diffused to universities in second-rate powers.

President Biden needs to push on with the initiative he publicly announced to engage with Moscow and Beijing on ‘putting boundaries around’ how great powers deploy cyberwar. The next chapter will continue to discuss how this is exactly the kind of restorative diplomacy the world needs from its leaders. The ultimate objective is to abolish warfare between great powers by cyber means, by killer robots, by nuclear weapons, and by biological weapons, just as was achieved after World

War I with chemical weapons. If the great power chemical warfare taboo could hold with adversaries as ruthless and warlike as Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill in a war crisis as existential as World War II, all these bans are mutually enforceable by today's great powers, with their sharpened interests in sustaining the financial coupling that underwrites their great power status against emerging competitors.

The 'One-Eyed Man'

A problem with this analysis is that in a world where all these weapons of mass destruction are banned, great powers may together build a lure of assurance that will tempt a newly rising power to acquire nuclear or biological weapons, or secretly create million-strong swarms of killer robots. The new power perhaps then demonstrates this new capability on some hapless country. It might then blackmail many countries to be its vassals. This is the adage that once nuclear or biological weapons have been invented, they cannot be uninvented. Hence, *détente* simply leaves the lure of making a new bomb—a \$100 bill on the pavement waiting for an ambitious tyrant to pick up. 'In the Valley of the blind, the one-eyed man will be king'.⁵ That is, once great powers are disarmed, to dominate the world, a tyrant will not bear the burden of building a stock of nuclear warheads at the scale of the contemporary great powers.

This is an argument to take seriously. It bumps up against the tightly coupled complexity of contemporary economic domination, however. If DRC is the target for a demonstration nuclear attack because of its mining riches and hydroelectric potential, the fact remains that the emerging power may not be wealthy enough to pay the cost of swallowing such a prickly and politically indigestible society. Nor may its ruling elite have the domestic staying power against peaceloving political forces within their own society (the situation that confronted US hawks in Vietnam and Iraq, and Russian and US hawks in succession in Afghanistan). Then what the rest of the world needs to do is make this rogue rising power pay the price for its war of aggression against DRC. The great powers, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly should be in prior agreement that all UN members will be

immediately requested to honor treaty commitments to choke off all trade and all banking transactions with such an emergent nuclear power. All the satellites in space of the state that a one-eyed king pretender relies upon should be disabled, along with all the undersea and land cables it depends upon.

Would such unified action be enough to make a demonstration nuclear decimation of DRC a folly? Perhaps not, and if not, incoming conventional missiles from dozens of countries simultaneously could be threatened to destroy the pretender's suspected missile, aircraft, and naval capabilities. It is not utopian nonsense to suggest that massively targeted conventional attack by states without nuclear weapons might silence nuclear weapon launches by a nuclear power. Paul Nitze was an impeccably credentialed senior hawk of the Reagan administration. He said the following, with Reagan's support (Krepon 2021), in a high-profile speech on strategic arms reductions negotiations:

For the next ten years, we should seek a radical reduction in the number and power of existing and planned offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether land-based, space-based, or otherwise. We should even now be looking forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly ten years from now, to effective non-nuclear defensive forces, including defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition should lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear-free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree. (Nitze 1985: 76–80)

Nitze, like Ronald Reagan and his Secretary of State George Shultz, believed that it would be possible for the United States to guard against cheating and breakout with 'effective non-nuclear defenses' (Krepon 2021). How much more possible might it be for all UN members to collectively commit to such non-nuclear defenses as a last resort? This would be after many less punitive responses had been attempted lower in a responsive enforcement pyramid for taming a state breaking out against agreed restraints on genocidal means to dominate others. Many neocons of the Reagan Administration did not believe this. Nor did many technocrats of deterrence who remained passionate about maximal deterrents. But Nitze and Reagan believed that a transition from Mutual

Assured Destruction to ‘mutual assured security’ through ‘cooperative endeavor’ with old enemies could accomplish this (Nitze 1985, 76–80). Gorbachev and his inner circle of foreign policy advisors were, like Reagan, genuine abolitionists from the mid-1980s. Moscow’s circle of hawks moved quickly to punish Gorbachev for such heresy by removing him from office in a coup attempt at the decade’s end.

The extraordinary dialogue across international society on any historically unprecedented attempt at domination through nuclear genocide might also destabilize from within the rogue regime threatening nuclear attack, especially in a future world where citizens across the planet were educated to understand the remarkable accomplishment of an international law that formalizes the enduring WMD taboo.

Great powers would not cease being great powers without WMDs. It is wrong to believe that the use of the atomic bomb was vital to the Allies winning World War II, wrong even to think that it helped that war to end slightly more quickly.⁶ Good social science research instructs us that in no domain of human activity is maximum deterrent capability the key determinant of getting the outcomes wanted. Deterrence always has relevance as one policy tool in a regulatory mix, but it never works in the hands of policy actors who seek to maximize deterrence. It is the mix that works. That mix includes some capability to escalate deterrence. Surprisingly, regulatory mix to control crime does not work better with capital punishment as the ultimate deterrent. Business regulatory enforcement surprisingly does not work best in the hands of the regulatory agencies that impose the largest fines and the longest prison terms for corporate offenders. It works best with regulators who do what the next chapter calls restorative diplomacy, restorative business regulatory diplomacy, but diplomacy backed by the capability to responsively escalate networked sanctioning.

That suggests a way of thinking about the abolition of WMDs—throw away your electric chair, dismantle your Doomsday Machine. Focus instead on how many societies can network escalation of diplomacy together in ways that are legitimate under a rule of international law, then escalate deterrence through sanctions, then incapacitation (and a last resort of conventional militarily enforced disarmament of the pretender to world domination). Then the world could succeed in

creating an era with low war deaths and lowered domination. This would be achieved by completely discarding WMDs and killer robots. It could be achieved with few threats, with great dollops of preventive diplomacy, restorative justice, and strategic ambiguity, but with certainty that international society will keep escalating networked pressure on any tyrant who threatens world domination with a WMD.

This is a lesson social science has taught us in so many spheres of life. Some generations ago, most Anglo-American families believed in the principle that if parents ‘spare the rod, they spoil the child’. The most expensive private schools believed in getting results through the rod’s sting, discipline reinforced by harnessing violence by senior children against younger children under a prefect system. From ancient times to the eighteenth or nineteenth-century slavery existed in every society. Their greatest philosophers believed that the institution of slavery was imperative for civilizational advancement. Slavery was an institution based on an unfree class of people dominated by the lash and the noose. Pre-modern philosophers and economists were simply wrong that slavery was a key to economic growth and to the ‘manifest destiny’ of a flourishing civilization of the superior race or religion. Unfree labor proved historically to be less productive than free labor uncoerced by the lash. Hangovers from this philosophy and economics of slavery persisted in twentieth and twenty-first-century industrial capitalism. We learnt from great art that ‘dark Satanic mills’ could approach the punitiveness of slavery, but would be surpassed in productivity when labor rights liberated workers from violence. Empowering employees, listening to them restoratively in a participatory dialogue of persuasion simply works better than coercion. Dickens more than any nineteenth-century writer educated us that punitive tyranny is something his every reader could do something about: ‘No one is useless in this world who lightens the burdens of another...Have a heart that never hardens, and a temper that never tires, and a touch that never hurts’ (Dickens 2023).

In previous centuries, criminal lawyers and lawmakers believed that it was necessary to provide for capital punishment for a wide variety of crimes, the stocks, cruel forms of corporal punishment, and long terms of imprisonment for others. Again, the criminological evidence reveals all these beliefs to be false. Learning the same lesson has proved

more methodologically difficult as an empirical discovery in international affairs where disciplining with violence is more sporadic. We have seen that it is a long time since China last invaded a country. When it last did, Vietnam was not ‘taught a lesson’ by the Chinese punishment. Vietnam has hardly become a pliant Chinese vassal. Aspiring Vietnamese politicians learn that the main qualification for success is to persuade the people of Vietnam that you will ‘stand up to China’ without being disrespectful, rude, or oblivious to China. The next chapter argues that this means being good at firm but fair restorative and responsive diplomacy with China. Here the point is simply made that historically violence has been seen as a solution to many problems that empirically across one domain after another has been shown by good social science not to work as well as minimizing resort to violence. Deterrence theorists of great nuclear powers are kings who believe they will perish without a guillotine.

The particular empirical claim made in this chapter and the last two is that offensive international violence, especially invasions, is uniquely counterproductive and only in very recent history have become stigmatized as criminal. Like ending slavery, ending capital punishment, and spurning punitive workplaces, and violent schools and families, this is a remarkable change accomplished by recent generations.

Terror and the Harm Principle for Restorative Universities

To all of this the disarmament cynics say, what about cyber-terrorists, terrorists who might in future swarm killer robots and nuclear and biological weapons? Sadly such risks will still be with us. They are with us regardless of whether or not the great powers disarm from WMDs and killer robots. Universities have some power to start subduing these risks.

Universities recognize that they hold keys to finding ways to conquer climate catastrophe. They also hold keys to destroying proliferation of killer robots. One way is by contributing to the conversation of which this book is a tiny part. Another is by refusing to build them and improve

them. Universities have so far failed to recognize the strengths they have for turning these keys.

One reform is a simpler world of university research in which no one benefits from funding from corporations with an interest in expanding sales of weapons of war. A remedy is an academy in which no university is regarded as a great university when it is in bed with military-industrial complex contractors. An agreed total ban on research funded by weapons' manufacturers by our universities is within the power of uprisings among activist university faculties and student bodies. A wiser younger generation of leaders would need to take over our universities to overrule the current embrace of the military-industrial complex by university leaders. When there are fewer defense research labs dotted across thousands of universities in two hundred countries, there will be fewer points of entry for terrorists to WMDs. Nuclear weapons are incapable of deterring nuclear terrorism. Cutting electricity and internet access to the terrorist cell and swarming huge numbers of police to surround and arrest them is the better enforcement strategy.

If all great powers work together on their mutual interests in suppressing new WMD threats, cooperation on terrorism detection and suppression will also be strengthened. Regrettably in the past great powers have jeopardized war by encouraging terrorists to attack enemies. The United States (with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) successfully encouraged the mujahideen to terrorize the Soviets in Afghanistan. This sustained Al Qaeda and allowed the Taliban to come to power there in 1996. Russia jumped at the opportunity created by a Serbian terrorist group to spark World War I. The United Nations must finally become a crucible of restorative diplomacy in future that allows great powers to cooperate to end foolish past practices of sponsoring or exploiting terrorists. Serbia and Russia should instead have been working together on contrite restorative diplomacy, apologizing to Austria about their obligation to close down the Black Hand terrorist organization. The Taliban could likewise have been more contrite, more apologetic, more restorative about its obligations to close down Al Qaeda on its soil, in spite of the George Bush demands for revenge in 2001. Previous chapters discussed the successes of Indonesia in reducing many forms of violence, including terrorism. It confronted religious discrimination and terrorism

rather restoratively, much less punitively and more successfully than other countries. It is reducing poverty, reducing state discrimination, as it strengthens checks and balances against domination in its society (Braithwaite et al. 2010a).

Regulating cyber hacking that could cascade to cyberwar is a wicked challenge. It is such a dangerous practice because it is so hard to detect which country the hacker is from, or represents, if any. A worrying danger resides in the risk of a criminal or terrorist hack being misinterpreted as a preemptive assault on a missile targeting system vital for the launch of WMDs. The only sure way to eliminate this existential risk is to eliminate WMDs. This is because eliminating cyber-attacks is for the moment impossible. One uncertainty is that perhaps quantum computing communications can create a completely different kind of security in cyberspace. That might be a long wait, especially for the rollout to protect all financial transactions in the world economy. Quantum computing might increase war risks by destabilizing MADD when one adversary has more formidable access to offensive and defensive cyberwar with quantum computing than its opponent. In particular, the side with the most sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities may be able to break through all the opponent's cyber defenses in ways that cannot be reciprocated, destabilizing in a complex way what the world might have thought was a MADD equilibrium (Rosch-Grace and Straub 2022).

The abolitionism discussed here does not promise the abolition of nuclear terrorism and cyberterrorism. What it can do is greatly reduce the risks that they currently pose by truncating the physical destructiveness of war to which they might cascade. As former US Secretary of Defense William Perry and Tom Collina (2020, 22) put it: 'There is only one way to win an arms race. Refuse to run'. International society can put in place an international architecture that prevents anyone from regrowing such a huge capability as could cause a nuclear winter and mass extinctions. For example, if a new nuclear player covertly emerged with the level of nuclear capability that North Korea currently has, that would not be enough to destroy vast ecosystems with a nuclear winter, and it is wildly implausible that a covert program could ever grow this large without being detected by existing nuclear intelligence capabilities.

Through simple disarmament checks and balances, humans can prevent any underground nuclear program from acquiring a nuclear weapons program of a scale that can kill billions of humans with a Domsday Machine, even if there can never be assurance against the rise of a tyrant who kills a million people. The planet has survived many such despots who murdered millions in the past and will suffer more of them in the future. Moreover, R & D on how to improve those checks and balances can be put in place to ensure that the rule of such a tyrant is short in the big picture of human civilizations that survive and renew.

Committing politically to anything short of that is a betrayal of our descendants. As Daniel Ellsberg (2017) argued, we will not shut down all mass murdering despots, but we can shut down all the Domsday Machines that currently can shatter mother earth. Moreover, as a counterpoint to the theory of the one-eyed man, we must remember that most nuclear weapons states acquired the bomb because of fear of other states that had already done so. In the words of the Canberra Commission report: 'So long as any state has nuclear weapons others will want them. So long as any state retains nuclear weapons they are bound one day to be used' (Evans 2022, 67). Or as former Cold War realists Henry Kissinger, William Perry, San Nunn, and George Schultz opined in 2007: in this century, 'the risks associated with nuclear weapons possession far outweigh any security returns' (Evans 2022, 68).

Neocons believe and have persuaded presidents to believe that the power of today's great powers depends on their monopolistic control of WMDs. It seems utterly unrealistic to think that they could ever be persuaded to voluntarily surrender that control. One reply is that this control does not deliver realistically sustainable power. Rather it ultimately delivers death to their sustained hegemony and their descendants through the handiwork of weaponry they create when imperfect deterrence doctrines ultimately fail to work. They would be fools to believe that nuclear deterrence will prove the first social science theory that never fails to work. Hence, the peace movement must build strategic patience. Universities can build strategic patience about their capability to create better architectures to monitor terror and provocations to terror and to develop institutions of peace.

What we can do, dear peacemakers, is build a global civil society and university systems that enliven WMD taboos, and tame the institutions that grow the complexity of their devastating power and their unpredictably destabilizing strategic flux. Michael Krepon (2021, 18) makes the point that if we can reach 100 years since Hiroshima without ever using nuclear weapons in war again, the shamefulness of their use will be normatively embedded, in our custom, our civility, our science. If we reach 100 years since the last nuclear weapon test explosion since the three decades of infamous environmental and human health devastation from 2000 tests after the first at Los Alamos, the testing taboo should be deeply embedded. If we survive one hundred years since the last use of chemical or biological weapons in war, its shamefulness will be quite profoundly embedded. It will be a hard normative hurdle for any leader to cross while looking his citizens in the eye. Extended duration of norm compliance can ultimately render norm violation unthinkable by almost anyone in almost any context. Yet only almost, so this is an insufficient safeguard on its own. When the Israeli leadership feared it may face an existential threat from Arab armies in the Yom Kippur war, its military commander prepared to use nuclear weapons, notwithstanding pressure against this from the United States. That seemingly existential threat was effectively resisted by conventional means. States that are not US allies, but that are stigmatized by the United States as rogue states, may be less susceptible to the US pressure against first use applied to this Israeli case.

Krepon's (2021, 22) hopeful provocation is that 'the hardest part of establishing these norms is behind us'. Westerners might have an unusually low opinion of Vladimir Putin, but do we genuinely believe that he would lightly don the mantle of historical infamy from being the first leader to murder genocidally with nuclear weapons since Nagasaki? In World War II, even Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo were reluctant to brook the infamy of being the first to use chemical weapons in less than quarter of a century since their previous use in a world war.

The 2023 film *Oppenheimer* portrays President Truman as dismissive of Oppenheimer when he lamented the blood on this hands. Krepon (2021, 36) argues that in fact Truman was troubled by the thought that if Oppenheimer had blood on his hands, Truman was bathed in it after he rejected pleas from the physicists to do a demonstration explosion

off the Japanese coast rather than Hiroshima. Krepon cites as tangible evidence of this that when Truman rejected submissions to him that the use of nuclear weapons in 1950 would be a 'war winning' strategy, he rejected the option with the words that the bomb 'should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing whatsoever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used' (cited in Krepon 2021, 36).

Persuading India and Pakistan

If the great powers reached genuine agreement for progressive abolition of WMDs, it is most unlikely that the middle powers of Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan would not support them. Their civil societies would insist that they join in the virtue of the greater powers. The most difficult challenge would be India. India is a long-term pretender to becoming a great power. It has already tested hypersonic missiles for its nuclear warheads. India already has one of the world's most massive armies, has cyber offense capabilities to balance China, and an economy growing bountifully. The path to persuading India to join the regime of disarmament would be to give it the democratic power it believes in by giving it the seat it deserves on the UN Security Council.

An additional pathway would be for China and the United States to first persuade Pakistan to commit to destroying all its nuclear weapons, with China agreeing to keep Pakistan under its nuclear umbrella until China and India mutually agree to nuclear disarmament in concert with the other great powers. In reciprocation, India could agree to become more flexible on negotiating more genuine autonomy, human rights, and peace for Kashmir, which has always been the deep source of India-Pakistan conflict. It is hard for India to become a great power without living in a peaceful region with neighbors who flourish through trade with India. Peace in Kashmir and an end to nuclear confrontations with Pakistan are preconditions to that and for India to get that seat on the Security Council it will deserve. Because it is decades since the nuclear non-proliferation regime had a disarmament triumph, the regime is at risk of unraveling unless it has a new one. Pakistan would be a more

consequential one for making the world safer than any of the previous decisions to abandon nuclear weapons programs by Libya, Iraq, South Africa, Myanmar, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Argentina, and Brazil. The brightest recent glimmer of hope has been the brilliant US diplomacy that persuaded South Korea not to acquire nuclear weapons when polls have shown 77 percent of its electorate to want this to counter North Korea's nuclear threat.

Track II diplomacy, perhaps sponsored by Chinese and US universities working together, is needed to begin to persuade China to take the lead in such persuasion of Pakistan. The diplomacy would need to suggest to the United States that it is in its interests to support China in the endeavor. It would have to persuade India to build confidence by initiating a new Kashmir peace process, and to persuade Pakistan that joint assurances from China and the United States are better protection against invasion by India than nuclear missiles. This is the kind of noble and difficult endeavor the non-proliferation regime needs.

Scaling Up Regional Dynamics of Disarmament

A beautiful thing about disarmament politics is that reducing numbers of nuclear weapons, increasing the distance between them, rejecting their first use of them, eschewing launch on warning, 'verifiably ending the production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons' in President Obama's words, might prevent nuclear wars without full disarmament. Just fixing settings for absurd accident risks by having great powers and second-tier nuclear powers abandon the idea of thousands of weapons on hair-trigger alert would leave a safer world to our children. So would mutually agreed surprise inspections to verify that nukes are on 'de-alert'. Likewise, regional security communities can impel a practical politics of disarmament. Small steps can be designed that immediately help make us that bit safer, even though we remain in grave danger until larger change is accomplished.

A sad thing about the Russia-Ukraine war is that while the most culpable war criminal was Vladimir Putin, significant power to prevent

this war had long been within the reach of a peaceful Western alliance that declined to grasp it. Successive US Presidents failed the deep listening with the grievances of Putin and his predecessors. Barack Obama's biographical writing and interviews describe how he had to put up with Putin's ravings about his grievances on NATO expansion East before they could get down to the real work of their meetings. Grievances that lead to war are definitely matters presidents are paid to listen to deeply and responsively. Valuing human dignity through restorative diplomacy means listening even when you think someone is irritating, lecturing. When we switch off to what we perceive as a rave, we can miss the fissures forming that later become violent crevices.

I make a distinction here between accession to the European Union, which is a door that might have been open to any European society, a distinction between EU accession and accession to NATO as a military alliance organized around the idea of containing Russia. The European Union has been a profoundly important institution for constituting a remarkable continental peace among its members for the past 77 years. Part of this was Austria eventually becoming a democratic member of the EU, but on the understanding that it would not join NATO. It would be a neutral buffer adjoining the old Iron Curtain, devoid of NATO bases and missiles aimed at Russia. At the time of the onset of the 2022 Ukraine war, five European states were EU members but not NATO members and there were eight European states that were members of NATO but not of the EU.

In the aftermath of the 2022 Ukraine War, Europe and North America could take a long time to retreat from the drawn daggers of their NATO-versus-Russia mentality. The North Atlantic plus Russia is less than 15 percent of the world's population, however. Societies of the rest of the planet can avert NATOization. The half of the world population that is Asian have contemporary regional collaborations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with 680 million people. It is a contemporary adaptation to lessons of world wars that cascaded from militarized alliances in Europe. ASEAN involves a politics not of military alliance but of cooperation among disparate societies. ASEAN is committed to sustaining healed relationships with countries they waged war against in the past—China, the United States, Japan, the European

Union, and other Asian powers. Even though ASEAN embraces the most wartorn region of the world during a twentieth century in which all ASEANs were invaded, today they see invasion risks by their neighbors as low compared to risks of being pushed into the kind of wars their neighbor Australia joined in Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, and Korea. The ASEAN judgment is that invasion risks are lower than risks from being bound into a violently cascading great power contest. One reason that judgment makes sense to ASEANs is that they have a strong nuclear weapons-free zone (the Treaty of Bangkok). This means they do not crave a military alliance to defend against any southern neighbor that dominates through nuclear threat. ASEANs were given confidence with forming a nuclear-weapons free zone because before they ratified it, the other significant military power in their region, Australia, ratified the South Pacific nuclear-weapons-free zone Treaty of Rarotonga.

A suite of nuclear-weapons-free zones was established by 1996 to cover all the southern hemisphere and much of the most southern part of the northern hemisphere, all of Latin America as far north as the US-Mexico border, all Africa to the Mediterranean. More than 100 countries signed these nuclear-weapons-free treaties. Let us aspire to expand them to cover the planet. If a Mutual Assured Destruction conflict cascades in the northern hemisphere, survivability prospects will be poor for humans from North America across the North Atlantic to North Asia, but perhaps apart from Australia, the southern hemisphere may not take a nuclear strike. Nuclear winter and mass famine might be more muted to the point where most Southern Hemisphere humans survive to rebuild human civilizations. This accomplishment, if indeed it becomes a possibility as northern weapons grow in power and numbers, depends on making the southern nuclear-weapons-free zones hold. ASEAN diplomacy treads more softly on calling out despotism and human rights abuses than genuine democrats would wish, but it nevertheless provides northern strategic thinking with food for thought. Their alternative helps their region to flourish to be progressively less afflicted with violence and poverty.

The peoples of the South can say to one another that if they remain committed to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons treaties, this might lay steppingstones for the North to join them. It can also allow

them to argue to Northern states that Southern societies have possibilities for surviving a great power nuclear war that Northerners will not survive. The South can argue that it does not want to rely on nuclear deterrence that only works until it fails catastrophically. Nuclear winter, mass famine, and radiation might be more muted in the Southern hemisphere to the point where most, at least many, Southern humans survive to rebuild renewed and peaceful human civilizations.⁷ The Southern objective could be to simply stay out of any nuclear fight.

Northern nuclear deterrence conceit over MAD was not apparent when Thomas Schelling received a Nobel Prize for his game theoretic foundations of the doctrine. He modestly expressed surprise that a 'taboo' on recurrence of Hiroshima had been held for 60 years, pondering whether it was a 'stunning achievement' or 'stunning good fortune' (Schelling 2005). MAD was a simple theory of a simpler world of effectively two nuclear powers with a Doomsday Machine, yet committed to arms reduction. Today the theory must prove relevant to a complex of arms escalations among the old confrontation between Russia and NATO, plus NATO versus China, NATO, South Korea and Japan versus North Korea, China versus India, India versus Pakistan, Israel versus Muslim states that hire Pakistan's mobile nuclear weapons, or terrorist groups that steal WMDs (especially the newer mobile tactical ones). The complexity of the geometry that has emerged is even more complex than these seven dyads, plus cascades of violence from them. '[Dyadic] rivalries are embedded in two interlocking triangular competitions, where the United States, Russia, and China jockey for position in one, while China, India, and Pakistan compete in the second' (Krepon 2021, 15). Guardrails are broken, hotlines are off the hook, for all seven dyads. Stabilization is sidelined by populist provocations across all seven dyads and Krepon's three triads. 'Triangular competitions do not lend themselves to numerical limitations that are inherently hard to stabilize when two states act in concert against the third' (Krepon 2021, 15). Indeed, it always simplified to conceive NATO as unified on nuclear strategy. We can conceive of a Margaret Thatcher using British nuclear weapons (for example had her Argentinian war gone badly) in ways that would have been strongly disapproved by Ronald Reagan. She dispatched two British ships to the Falklands with nukes on board. France insists

that its nukes are not to defend NATO, but France. More than that, simpleminded maximalism made deterrence theorists ‘captives to their brainpower. They didn’t dwell on accidents, screw-ups, and irrational acts because to acknowledge the centrality of these factors would turn their sturdy theorems into sandcastles’ (Krepon 2021, 54). The simple enough alternative to simpleminded deterrence axioms is institutions with sturdy institutional pillars reinforced by steel that is tempered so it can sway and adapt accountably. I would say adapt to imperatives of contextually nuanced restorative and responsive theory (Braithwaite 2002).

A state like Australia seems likely to remain tightly coupled to its current position as a NATO ally of the far South with ever-growing bases integrated into US strategies for nuclear targeting. Australia could thereby position itself as the best option of a faraway nuclear target that risks the least loss of life to the US homeland should China or Russia seek to retaliate against perceived US aggression in a way that might not trigger escalation to nuclear winter in the North. This is a kind of inverted scenario to one gamed in Washington that responded to Russian tactical nuclear weapon use against NATO troops with a limited nuclear strike not against Russia, but against a Russian ally, namely Belarus.⁸ The rest of the South has an interest in keeping nuclear strikes away from the Southern hemisphere by diplomacy to persuade Australia to greater prudence in its currently unbridled commitment to a US alliance that could take Australia into Northern wars for which it, and the South generally, have an interest in remaining on the sidelines.⁹

When a MAD conflict cascades in the Northern hemisphere, we have seen that survivability might remain possible for most Southern hemisphere humans to rebuild human civilizations. If this accomplishment is possible, it depends on Southern nuclear weapons-free zones holding and expanding. In this imagined future of sprouts of Ubuntu spreading North, democracies in South Africa, New Zealand, Argentina, and Chile might become great powers! Today in the North there are no Mikhail Gorbachevs willing to trash binary deterrence orthodoxies as too simple for planetary survival, nor Ronald Reagans or John F. Kennedys, prepared to embrace GRIT with adversaries. After Armageddon, there

could be many of them among survivor states of the South. Preparedness for this, or at least discussion of it among Southern utopians, is somewhat more existential than a pandemic preparedness plan.

ASEAN diplomacy treads more softly on calling out despotism and human rights abuses than we Western rights advocates desire. It nevertheless provides Northern strategic thinking with food for thought and an alternative that should stimulate their imaginations. ASEAN has helped members to flourish to be progressively less afflicted with violence and poverty and to progressively democratize, though with tragic reversals (Cambodia, Myanmar). This accomplishment has similar dynamics to the wider accomplishments of European struggles for freedom across the past 77 years, but without the European-style lock-ins to military alliances that George Washington and a century and a half of his successors hoped America would shun.

Leadership by Universities for Doomsday Machine Defection

The amount of strategic patience required for the peacebuilding accomplishments just described is huge. Two steps forward, one step back, is the best hope. The planet does not start from scratch, however. Steps forward have advanced formidably already. Only four states continue to decline to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, though Pakistan, India, and Israel are dangerous holdouts from its disciplines. In the 2017 UN vote on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear members, 122 members voted in favor, one against, and 69 did not vote (including all nuclear weapons states, most NATO members, and all close defense partners of the great powers). Strategic patience is inherently not conclusionary. It must go to opening peacemaking imaginations to next steps toward dismantling Doomsday Machines piece by piece.

The next chapter describes some moves that a strategically patient peace movement can persuade strategically patient peacemaking states to follow. They involve disrupting the confidence that hawks and neocons enjoy among great powers and their publics when they indulge production and innovation with WMDs. Universities can take subversive steps

toward dismantling Doomsday Machines that are the focus in this chapter. They must develop tactics to persuade the brightest scientists to defect from dangerous collaborations with the military-industrial complex. What universities in signatory states to anti-WMD treaties can do is invite scientists from universities in WMD states to prestigious visiting appointments at their universities. During their visiting appointment, signatory states might promise them lucrative grants to advance their science without dependence upon weapons corporations and national security states.

More than that, with relevant scientists, anti-WMD signatory states should seek to persuade WMD scientists to blow the whistle on dangerous WMD research programs their homeland corporations have been funding them to advance. Their government will allege this is treason. They will seek to use their extradition laws to drag dissident scientists into their clutches in the way that the United States sought with Julian Assange even as a foreign journalist blowing the whistle on US war crimes. And with Edward Snowden. Then the attorney-general of the anti-WMD treaty state can advise the scientist that these extradition laws do not apply. This is because under our law, and under the law of other treaty states, any disclosure to advance compliance with international law in the form of the treaty banning nuclear weapons, or the international treaty on biological weapons, possibly future treaties on killer robots, will void obligations to honor extradition requests. There will be no extraditions concerning those disclosures that advance compliance with international law.

This extradition point may seem an obscure matter of legal interpretation. It may seem an odd way to conclude this chapter. It is a centerpiece of a sustainable peace reform project. This is because, in the absence of WMD whistleblowers, we cannot discover what new dangers are being created for the planet.¹⁰ The world could not have discovered that Israel had innovative nuclear weapons capability, including toward neutron bomb production (that the great powers had abandoned) until an insider from the Dimona Negev Nuclear Research Center, Mordechai Vanunu, blew the whistle to the Western press in 1986. It is of crucial importance to make WMD innovation more transparent to the global peace movement and to offer solid legal protections to secure whistleblowers in a

safe, strong country from spending a life vilified, imprisoned for alleged treason when their sacrifice upholds the transparent rule of international law.

WMD Whistleblowers, Super-Intelligence, Super-Deterrence

The first imperative of social movement politics is boldness in speaking truth to power. When it comes to a matter like the politics of extradition for disclosing alleged national secrets, courage can be required. The sacrifice of citizens like Edward Snowden to show how our freedom is at risk at the hands of our own states, and that war crime is at risk of being hidden, deserve special admiration.

The title of this chapter, 'Containing deadly systems', seems to suggest it is highly focused on disarmament. Instead, its purpose has been to show that in a complex world there is a menu of simple ways to contribute to containing weapons and risks. It includes national extradition and human rights law reforms that grant recognition of a right to break the law of other nations in order to advance compliance with international law and the rule of law in the state where the alleged traitor resides. It includes the transformation of the independent character of universities and the capture of universities by national security states and the military-industrial complex. It includes the transformation of social movement politics to advance those ends. It means the continuation of the kind of Nobel Prize winning work of the NGOs that advanced treaties against land mines, small arms, nuclear weapons, chemical, and biological weapons and hopefully killer robots in future.

A case has been made for regional international organizations like the EU and ASEAN that build regional peace through what I conceive as regional restorative diplomacy. When global nuclear disarmament is failing, a patchwork of such regional organizations can cover most of the planet with nuclear-weapons-free treaties. Leadership here will continue to be led from the South and move North, reversing the dominant directional trajectory of world history, resisting NATOization beyond the North Atlantic, resisting the mentalities of empire and colonialism

that still infect Russia, Iran, Turkish neo-Ottomanism, China, Japan, the United States, Britain, and other former European empires to some degree. Those Northern vices must not be allowed to cast their shadows into the future to destroy the entire planet, even if it destroys most of it. I have made a case against military alliances like NATO that commit a large axis of states to a large war as a replication of tragedies of past centuries of European hegemony that evolved beyond George Washington's worst fears toward becoming world wars, wars of planetary near-destruction.

I have made a case to dismantle the G-7 as a grouping dominated by one great power that discusses profound matters of containment of environmental crisis, pandemics, and threats to peace in ways that exclude and denigrate the other great powers, Russia and China. The G-20 is the more promising architecture that international society might support for building consensus among the largest and wealthiest states, now enriched by the promising decision to make the African Union a G-20 member. In a world where climate crisis cascades to war, the ways of containing war include something as simple as planting trees. Every state, every one of us, embracing our youngest children into the task, can do that.

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, hypersonic missiles to unstoppably deliver them, killer robots, weapons of space war such as signal-jamming satellites and anti-satellite missiles, and cyberwar cannot be uninvented. None of them can be prevented from afflicting our planet with great future suffering. All of them, however, can be contained in the way chemical weapons have been imperfectly contained for more than a century since the Somme. Even ruthless leaders in an existential struggle, none bloodier and more existential than the struggle Hitler and Stalin's armies fought, could be contained from using them. The record is not perfect. The West should remain ashamed about how weakly it acted when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds in the 1980s, and when Syria dropped chemical barrel bombs on civilians. Even so, nothing approaching the scale of chemical weapons use at the Somme has recurred. Likewise, the world is unlikely to prevent some bad state or terrorist actor from first use of a nuclear weapon one day. As with nuclear weapons, however, we can contain that risk to historical infrequency and greatly moderated impact. We can ratchet

down the number of countries that have nuclear weapons and the scale of all extant nuclear arsenals to the point where if all states launch all their nuclear weapons against each other, they do not unleash a Domsday Machine that ends human civilizations.

That is, step by step, those who fear the ‘one-eyed man’ who would be king can retain a nuclear deterrent in their mix of tools for containing WMD threats if they must, but the rest of us can demand that they scale those weapons down to a level that any strategist can view as credible second-strike deterrence without guaranteeing escalation to Domsday. Step 1 is for Russia and the United States to scale its nuclear arsenals down to the level of China’s. Step 2 is for China, Russia, and the United States to scale their arsenals down to the levels of France, the UK, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Step 3 is for some of the nine to abandon their WMD programs in the way Libya, Myanmar, South Africa, Argentina, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Brazil have done, and for the rest of the nine to embrace tit-for-tat further WMD reductions. Hopefully, at the last minute, Iran will be persuaded to join the abolitionists. Then reckless strategists who said to me in Turkiye and Azerbaijan that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, the safest world will become one where all states have nuclear weapons! Step-by-step movement beyond Step 3 might keep nearly all of our descendants safe from WMDs. The thinking here is similar to the way former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Abe (2022) described the two-step approach of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament on what to do about a step backwards of a breakaway state declaring it has acquired nuclear weapons when other states are abandoning their nuclear arsenals.

The Commission has a program of R & D to sharpen international understanding of the conditions for moving from minimization to elimination in terms of geopolitical conditions, verification conditions, enforcement conditions, fuel cycle management conditions, and personnel oversight conditions (Evans and Kawaguchi 2009). The radical edge of my book is about how to manage that final stage after minimization is achieved. It includes a new international law doctrine for ‘super-intelligence’ and networked ‘super-deterrence’ of WMD acquisition. The first leg of this doctrine is that any state whose intelligence

uncovered evidence of a new WMD acquisition would have a legal obligation to share this, through the United Nations, with the world's intelligence agencies. This would create unprecedented conditions for collaboration among normally adversarial intelligence agencies in order to test the probity of the intelligence.

States that are allies of the alleged WMD state or enemies of the reporting state would have maximum incentive to contest their intelligence. This contest would create robust conditions for disproving false positives. Once any contestation by rival intelligence had an opportunity to disprove it, all states would have a legal obligation to support conventional attacks on the WMD facility, missile, and other delivery capabilities (e.g., submarine bases), by any and all UN members as a last resort. On this, it is telling that at a time of enormous momentum in NATO for step-by-step progress toward nuclear abolition during the first two years of the Obama Administration, Russia refused to fully embrace the abolitionist promise of that time because it feared superior US conventional capacity. US conventional arms might hit all Russia's key installations. That would hand the deterrence advantage to NATO in a world without nuclear weapons (Gormley 2011). Such has been the progress in the devastating capabilities of conventional weapons. Hence, it is not a fictional possibility that a large coalition of many conventional armies could dominate a rogue nuclear power. This last resort is invoked only if diplomacy fails and fails again and again to persuade voluntary dismantling of the WMDs. This would be hard for opportunist nuclear weapon states to defend against because they would have no idea which state, in which form, at what time, would attempt to strike. The intelligence sharing would mean they would suspect it was coming and would evacuate most or all staff from relevant facilities, so the loss of life, especially of their most brilliant scientists, might not be large. It would be super-deterrence because all states would have a duty to attack, or be allied to attacks. That would allow for optimized and maximally indeterminate offensive deterrence capability informed by super-intelligence capability of a kind not seen in previous world history.

This idea may literally be 'overkill'. It is advanced only as an agenda item for debate in order to frustrate those who say that a nuclear 'one-eyed man' would rule the world. Biblical authority notwithstanding, it is

ablest folly to believe that cooperation among a group of blind women could not contain rule by a one-eyed man! A lesson of real deterrence from the history of lesser tyrannies than global domination is that swarms of the weak can defeat the concentrated power of the strong with the right kind of catalysis. That is a lesson of Rudé's *The Crowd in History* (Ko Ko and Braithwaite 2020). A counter is that if cynics are right that deterrence by concentrated power is the only doctrine that counts in circumstances of exception, then super-intelligence combined with super-deterrence of the most advanced conventional kind could always beat a nascent WMD program, even if it could not deter the maximalist WMD capabilities that the great powers currently possess. Indeed this would be such a massive, unprecedentedly diffused strategic ambiguity that it would never have to be used. This is the 'benign big gun' facet of responsive regulatory theory (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). This is why the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament is right that transparent arms reductions to great power minimalism is needed first. The novel legal doctrine of super-deterrence of WMDs could be further proofed against false positives by providing for compensation of a massive international scale if an attacked state were able to prove to the International Court of Justice that what it developed was not a WMD program.

It is important to return to my conclusion on the pathway to international agreement on guardrails against cyberwar that President Biden advocates. The path to preventing escalation to Mutual Assured Digital Destruction is to dismantle Mutual Assured Nuclear Destruction. Until MAD of the nuclear kind is dismantled, prospects for preventing MADD are dim.

Notes

1. A simple solution to the densest complex of catastrophe on the planet is to donate to the African 'Great Green Wall for Restoration & Peace', one of the UN Environment Program's ten Award Winning Pioneering Programs to Restore the Natural World. In your country, you will find on the internet tax

deductible ways to donate. The ten countries of the Sahel and the twenty countries to their immediate South are more afflicted by wars, coups, Islamic State and the predations of the Wagner Corporation than any region. Desertification spreading South is a reason. As the region with most poverty, investment in the labour intensive business of tree planting and maintenance has massive employment-creation, food-growing and water-preservation impact. The Chinese Great Green Wall has already planted 66 billion of its planned 88 billion trees, yet is only half way to completion. In contrast, Africa's Great Green Wall for Restoration and Peace is only 4 per cent complete and suffers higher mortality of planted trees to hold back the Sahara compared to China's Gobi desert.

2. 'Upside down country' is an expression of the Dja Dja Warrung people of Victoria who have been actively involved in steering and providing the labor for reforestation projects, especially after gold mining. A problem that concerns them is mass planting of the cheapest available native trees rather than the tree mix native to that country (Atkinson and Humann 2017).
3. Nuclear winter is a likely result of pulverized cities rising in the atmosphere above rainclouds, so that rain does not bring the soot back to earth in a short space of time. It therefore blacks out the sun for months or years. The modelling predicts below-freezing temperatures during summer across much of the Northern Hemisphere. This implies mass famine. The military-industrial complex sponsors seemingly expert commentary and social media messaging to the effect that the nuclear winter modelling exaggerates the risks of nuclear winter. The best and more recent science suggests, however, that it is reckless to dismiss the probability of protracted nuclear winter as low (Coupe et al. 2019; Robock 2010, 2011; Turco et al. 1990).
4. Spoofing generates, for example, early warning systems to generate false readings of missile launches.

5. This was a proverb popularized by the Catholic Church through the writing of Desiderius Erasmus (1509). *It was an Erasmus interpretive gloss on Matthew 15:14*. It is widely invoked in nuclear strategy discourse.
6. This thinking about nuclear deterrence and regulatory mix as a generally better approach than maximum deterrence is a recurrent theme in my writing. The best general account can be found in Braithwaite (2022, Chapter 10).
7. New Zealand might be one of the better places to live after a nuclear war, though modelling suggests that after a major nuclear war and a severe case of nuclear winter even New Zealand agriculture would suffer a 58 per cent reduction in food production (Wilson et al. 2022).
8. Here is a brief description of that game played by the Obama National Security Council (NSC) as described by Kaplan (2020, Chapter 11). The scenario was that Russia invaded a Baltic country. NATO fought back so competently that there was panic in Russia's retreat, firing a low-yield nuclear weapon at advancing NATO troops. The NSC gamed what to do next at two levels—first the NSC Deputies—mainly generals. They were persuaded by a submission of Vice President Biden's national security advisor that the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945 would be a world defining moment. As such, it was an opportunity to rally the whole world against Russia by restricting the US response to conventional combat and diplomacy. In the long run, the generals reluctantly accepted that NATO could ultimately win by conventional means without running the risk of escalation of tit-for-tat to nuclear winter. A month later, the NSC Principals—cabinet secretaries and military chiefs, chaired by Susan Rice, gamed the same scenario. Ash Carter, supported by Anthony Blinken and others, led with the view that prevailed: deterrence depended on always responding to a nuclear strike against NATO with a nuclear strike. US credibility depended on this. The principals decided against a nuclear strike in the border regions of the Baltic state where Russian troops were retreating into Russia because that would kill too many civilians of a NATO ally. They also

finally decided against retaliating against the Russian homeland with a tactical weapon because that would almost certainly lead to Russian retaliation against the US homeland. They decided on a nuclear strike against a Russian ally, Belarus, which was not involved in this conflict. This reveals the problematic complexities of uncertainty from being a close great power ally during nuclear escalation. Australia and the South Pacific might beware that, as with rising oceans from climate change, Northerners are more concerned about their security than your existential risks, even if you are their ally.

9. Part of the pitch to Australia is that had it been a more prudent US ally in the past, it would have done the United States a favor by contesting the claims of its neocons. Had Australia argued with the United States in 2001, 2002, and 2005 that it should have responded positively to Taliban offers of peace negotiations, it would have done the United States a favor (see Chapter 6, footnote 2). With the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Australia could have served US interests by arguing that the invasion was a mistake. Australia would have served the United States well by arguing that the African Union leaders negotiating peaceful transition in Libya in 2011 were on a better path than a liberation war for regime change. With the Vietnam War, Australia did serve US interests by pulling out early, arguing that the United States also should end the war, but it would have better served US interests by doing that even earlier.
10. We learn here from the corporate crime literature. This lesson is that insider knowledge of law breaking is the enforcement ingredient in shortest supply. This is why more than just whistleblower protection laws are needed. Laws that actively reward corporate whistleblowers with a share of the penalties imposed in corporate crime cases have made a real difference to US corporate crime enforcement through the way the US False Claims Act and kindred statutes reward whistleblowers who risk their careers (Braithwaite [2022](#)).

References

- Abe, Nobuyasu. 2022. *NPT-TPNW standoff*. *NAPSNet Special Reports*, March 20.
- Atkinson, Graham, and Doug Humann. 2017. *Joint management of 'Upside Down Country' on Dja Dja Warrung lands*. Canberra: AIATSIS.
- Ayres, Ian, and John Braithwaite. 1992. *Responsive regulation*. New York: Oxford.
- Black, Damien. 2022. Total war will be cyber. *Cybernews*. March 15.
- Blattman, Christopher. 2022. *Why we fight: The roots of war and the paths to peace*. New York: Viking.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrocriminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John and Bina D'Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence: War, crime and peacebuilding across South Asia*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, Valerie Braithwaite, Michael Cookson, and Leah Dunn. 2010a. *Anomie and violence: Non-truth and reconciliation in Indonesian peacebuilding*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy, and Leah Dunn. 2010b. *Reconciliation and architectures of commitment: Sequencing peace in Bougainville*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John. 2002. *Restorative justice and responsive regulation*. New York: OUP.
- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2022. *Will Putin go nuclear?* June 6.
- Cimbala, Stephen J., and Lawrence J. Korb. 2023. Karaganov's case for Russian nuclear preemption: Responsible strategizing or dangerous delusion. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 26.
- Conte, Niccolo. 2021. Mapped: 30 Years of Deforestation and Forest Growth by Country. <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mapped-30-years-of-deforestation-and-forest-growth-by-country/> (accessed September 29, 2023).
- Covey, Stephen R. 1994. Emotional bank accounts. *The Journal for Quality and Participation* 17: 36.
- Coupe, Josua, Charles G. Bardeen, Alan Robock, and Owen B. Toon. 2019. Nuclear winter responses to nuclear war between the United States and Russia in the whole atmosphere community climate model version 4 and the Goddard Institute for Space Studies Model E. *Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres* 124: 8522–8543.
- Dickens, Charles. 2023. *Charles Dickens quotes*. London: Penguin.

- Donovan, Geoffrey H., and Jeffrey P. Prestemon. 2012. The effect of trees on crime in Portland, Oregon. *Environment and Behavior* 44: 3–30.
- Ellsberg, Daniel. 2017. *The doomsday machine: Confessions of a nuclear war planner*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Erasmus, Desiderius. 1509. *Adagiorum Chiliades*. Paris.
- Evans, Gareth. 2022. *Good international citizenship: The case for decency*. Melbourne: Monash.
- Evans, Gareth and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs. 2009. *Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers*: 19.
- Fortesque, S. 2022. As the Ukraine war drags on, how secure will Putin's hold on power remain? *The Conversation*. March 4.
- Goering, Hermann. 2022. Nuremberg Diary - Gustave Gilbert Interview: http://www.mit.edu/people/fuller/peace/war_goering.html. (accessed September 29, 2023).
- Gormley, Dennis M. 2011. American conventional superiority. Ed. Catherine M Kelleher and Judith Reppy. *Getting to zero: The path to nuclear disarmament*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Holl, Karen D., and Pedro Brancalion. 2020. Tree planting is not a simple solution. *Science* 368 (6491): 580–581.
- Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament. 2021. *New technologies and nuclear strategy*. Paris: IDN.
- IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2022. *Climate change 2022*.
- Kaiho, Kunio. 2023. An animal crisis caused by pollution, deforestation, and warming in the late 21st century and exacerbation by nuclear war. *Heliyon*, 9: 1–10.
- Kallenborn, Zachary. 2022. Giving an AI control of nuclear weapons: What could possibly go wrong? *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1.
- Kaplan, Fred. 2020. *The bomb: Presidents, generals, and the secret history of nuclear war*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Karaganov, Sergey. 2023. Here is why Russia has to consider launching a nuclear strike on Western Europe. *RT*, June 27.
- Kissinger, Henry 2014. How the Ukraine crisis ends. *Washington Post*, March 5.
- Klare, Michael. 2020a. A strategy for reducing escalatory dangers of emerging technologies. *Arms Control Today* December: 21–26.
- Klare, Michael. 2020b. 'Skynet' revisited: The dangerous allure of nuclear command automation. *Arms Control Today* April: 10–15.

- Ko Ko, Naing, and John Braithwaite. 2020. Baptist policing in Burma: Swarming, vigilantism or community self-help? *Policing and Society* 30: 688–703.
- Krepon, Michael. 2021. *Winning and losing the nuclear peace*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lin, Jian, Qiang Wang, Bo., and Huang. 2021. Street trees and crime: What characteristics of trees and streetscapes matter. *Urban Forestry & Urban Greening* 65: 127366.
- Morton, Adam. 2022. Australia's carbon credit program 'largely a sham.' *The Guardian*, 23 March.
- National Defense Archive. 2022. NATO expansion: What Gorbachev heard. George Washington University. Retrieved from: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-Western-leaders-early> (accessed September 29, 2023).
- National Defense Archive. 2018. NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard: Retrieved from: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard> (accessed September 29, 2023).
- New York Times*. 2022. How do you invest in the face of an apocalypse? March 8.
- Nitze, Paul. 1985. Document 23: SDI and a three-phase plan for the global elimination of nuclear weapons: Address by the President's and Secretary of State's Special Advisor on Arms Control Matters. *American Foreign Policy Current Documents—1985*. Washington: US Department of State, 1986.
- Panetta Leon. 2022. If Putin uses nukes in Ukraine, the U.S. must respond with military force. *Foreign Affairs*, October 12.
- Perry, William J., and Tom Z. Collina. 2020. *The button: The new nuclear arms race and presidential power from Truman to Trump*. Dallas: BenBella Books.
- Robock, Alan. 2010. Nuclear winter. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 1: 418–427.
- Robock, Alan. 2011. Nuclear winter is a real and present danger. *Nature* 473 (7347): 275–276.
- Rosch-Grace, Dominic, and Jeremy Straub. 2022. Analysis of the likelihood of quantum computing proliferation. *Technology in Society* 68.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 2005. *Prize lecture: An astonishing sixty years: The legacy of Hiroshima*. Stockholm: Nobel Committee.
- Stevenson, Wendell. 2022. This Ukrainian hacker is spreading chaos in Russia. *The Economist*, March 10.

- Svantesson, D. 2022. Ukraine is recruiting a ‘cyber army’ of IT warriors. *The Conversation*, March 7.
- Turco, Richard P., Owen B. Toon, Thomas P. Ackerman, James B. Pollack, and Carl Sagan. 1990. Climate and smoke: An appraisal of nuclear winter. *Science* 247: 166–176.
- Wang, Jing, Liang Feng, Paul I. Palmer, Yi., Liu, Shuangxi Fang, Hartmut Bösch, Christopher W. O’Dell, Xiaoping Tang, Dongxu Yang, Lixin Liu, and Chao Zong Xia. 2020. Large Chinese land carbon sink estimated from atmospheric carbon dioxide data. *Nature* 586 (7831): 720–723.
- Wilson, Nick, Marnie Prickett, and Matt Boyd. 2022. Estimating food security after nuclear winter: Preliminary analysis for Aotearoa New Zealand. *medRxiv*.
- Wong, Wilson Kia, and Onn. 2021. First strike hypersonic weapons: The End of the ‘MAD’ Doctrine and Peace for Our Time? *Pacific Focus* 36: 343–379.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





8

Imagining Restorative Diplomacy

Abstract Restorative diplomacy outperforms realism at preventing war, climate change, financial crises, pandemics, and at accomplishing national interest objectives. Peacebuilding Compared finds narratives of the broken promise have been impediments to peace in 41 out of 73 armed conflicts. Restorative diplomacy requires promise-keeping that learns from American Indigenous wisdom on ritualizing peace agreements, with regular commemorations at which statecraft speaks from the heart, apologizes, forgives, ritualizes collective memory, and builds new commitments atop growing architectures of peace. Learn restorative diplomacy lessons from the Marshall Plan. Put deposits, financial and emotional, in the banks of old adversaries. Learn restorative diplomacy lessons from South African spymaster Niël Barnard. South African nuclear weapons destruction, Africa as a nuclear weapons-free continent, and Apartheid abolition illustrate the possibilities of restorative diplomacy.

Keywords Narrative of broken promise · Restorative diplomacy · Intelligence

For every war that ever was, a thousand others have been averted through discussion and concession. (Blattman 2022, 21)

The pro-Western camp [in Moscow] dominated Gorbachev's last years and the first years of Yeltsin's government... [pursuing] policies with the explicit intent of integrating with the West. . . The Western powers were ready to stop considering Russia as a foe, but politely declined the enthusiastic appeals from Yeltsin... to become allies. This created a backlash within Russian politics, and strengthened the hand of moderate conservatives as well as the nationalists who accused the pro-Western camp of humiliating the country by a conciliatory stance that achieved nothing. (Zarakol 2010, 226)

Restorative diplomacy values reciprocation of conciliation with conciliation. Conciliation rather than aggrandizement and humiliation was the response the American people and their president gifted to Gorbachev from 1985. It was not the response favored by the young neocons of the Reagan regime who became influential advisors to Reagan's successors. By 2013 the new hawks dominated the national security establishment. One hawk was Senior State Department official Victoria Nuland. She handed out cookies in Maidan Square in Kyiv, calling for the removal of the elected President who Russian-speaking Ukrainians overwhelmingly voted for. This was not voting him out at an early election (an election that Putin said the incumbent was certain to lose). Nuland was on streets mostly overflowing with genuine democrats but also some neo-fascists who wanted immediate regime change now, and new laws to discriminate against Russians, whatever it took. They cascaded some protests to serious violence, including mass murder of Russian-speaking anti-Maidan, pro-federalism protesters, who sought safety in the Odessa Trade Union Building on May 2, 2014. Then far right protestors set fire to it and to a pro-federalist tent camp in a nearby square and attempted to prevent victims from escaping the fire, including by obstructing fire fighters from extinguishing it. Other pro-Ukraine demonstrators did help some pro-federalist people escape with a ladder (Council of Europe 2015, 14; Cohen 2014). Six protestors died from bullet wounds, 42 in the fire or from jumping from the Trade Union Building to their death, all or almost all pro-federalist protestors. Victims of the fire who survived

on the roof were then all arrested. Some colleagues who did not survive were murdered by gunfire; other criminals assaulted 'with a wooden club those who had been jumping from the burning Trade Union Building and preventing them from obtaining medical help' (Council of Europe 2015, 17).

Primetime, Talk Show and blogger preoccupations with this event were relentless in coverage of the details in Russia of the 'planned carnage' and 'extermination order' of 'peaceful protestors', 'angels', though some of them had not been peaceful angels in their prior provocations of the pro-Maidan mob. The Russian media emphasized neofascist allegiances of the alleged murderers, leaving the Russian people in deep shock (Binder and Kaltseis 2020). Media coverage in the West was extremely sparse, leaving Western publics unmoved, human rights NGOs uninterested. Fox News mentioned it in passing, blaming it on pro-Russian provocateurs; the New York Times did mention criticism of protestors singing the Ukrainian National Anthem when they might have been rescuing victims (Svennson and Fjelander 2015).

No form of civil resistance could be more antithetical to the doctrines of nonviolent resistance, yet the Western nonviolent resistance literature, including in contributions from me, characterized Euromaidan as a triumph of nonviolent regime change. For the most part it was. But those of us writing that way failed to see why it was not so perceived by Russians. We were right in the West to see Euromaidan as a predominantly nonviolent movement in which murderous fascists were clearly a minority. We should have problematized this more than we did, however. We should have been able to attend to the Russian media narrative and why it saw an intrinsic connection between the sheer horror of 'burning people alive' and the brute fact that I ignored of fascists who were empowered to murder pro-federalism demonstrators. As one perhaps staged, perhaps genuine, Russian woman on the street who was not devoid of insight said to the TV news camera: 'This is not accessible to the intellect. To detain, burn people, and to find pleasure in it. In order to do this, you have to be a fascist' (Binder and Kaltseis 2020, 198).

Euromaidan received generous funding and support from the United States. In my earlier work I ignored this. Victoria Nuland was recorded in Maidan Square communicating to the US Ambassador on who was

the United States pick to become the next President and Cabinet Ministers of Ukraine. On EU views, Nuland said ‘F**k the EU’ (BBC 2014). What kind of diplomacy was this that could gift this kind of propaganda to pro-federalists, Crimean and Donbas separatists, and therefore to Putin? Not realist diplomacy. Plain diplomatic incompetence. Nuland was promoted. She is in 2024 Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.

Ayse Zarakol’s *After Defeat* in the quote that opens this chapter describes the tragic mistake of 1990s Western diplomacy that defeated its own purposes as it cascaded to mass murder and Russian perceptions of fascism in Odesa and Kyiv. After Ukraine, there was no prospect of Russia joining arms with NATO to become a balance against Chinese power to prevent unthinkable devastation of the planet in a great power war over Taiwan. The aim of this chapter and the next is to outline the alternative restorative diplomacy road not taken. I diagnose Russia’s and NATO’s choices as both Hobbesian, treating another society as a nation of knaves. Russians followed Putin and did act as knaves, murderously trampling upon international law and innocent Ukrainian lives.

Chapter 2 explained the narrative of the broken promise as a recurrent risk factor for war, as revealed in my Peacebuilding Compared data set. Causal process tracing suggests that the narrative of the broken promise is particularly powerful in armed conflicts that cascade to multiple wars. An example is the narrative of the broken promise to end the theft of Palestinian lands, to respect decisions reached according to international law with respect to these disputes, and to respect legal rights of refugees to return to land that is legally theirs. This narrative has not only fuelled civil war between Palestinians and Jewish settlers inside Israel. It cascaded to Israeli invasions of Lebanon, Israeli attacks on Palestinians and Hezbollah inside Syria, invasions of Israel by Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab states, and counter-invasions by Israel of some of them. All this contributed as cascading grievances to daily human rights abuses against Palestinians and then to Islamist terrorism across many countries.

Fighting rages inside Gaza hospitals as this book goes to press. It is hard to judge how this war will end. Critics of the perspective in this chapter will say that there were attempts at Israeli restorative diplomacy with Palestinians. It failed to prevent terrorism. I disagree. The

highwater mark of Israeli, US, Russian, and Oslo restorative peace-making persuaded PLO leader Yasser Arafat to announce publicly in English in front of the US President and Prime Minister of Israel that the Palestine Liberation Organization renounced terrorism and would thenceforth desist from it. Arafat kept that promise with a surprising degree of effectiveness until the day he was poisoned. Subsequent conservative leaders of Israel and the United States, the most influential being Prime Minister Netanyahu, failed to push on to build upon the gains from this restorative diplomacy. As a result of proliferating illegal Israeli settlements on Palestinian land, occupation, human rights abuses, and denial of Palestinian freedom, Hamas rose to power first through terror against discredited PLO members in Gaza and then terror against Israelis. Terrorism by groups under the PLO umbrella from the late 1960s killed many more people than Hamas has killed since it secured power in Gaza. It was the PLO, not Hamas, who invented and cascaded mass terror by hijacking commercial airliners with innocent children onboard. Ending that PLO terrorism remains a triumph of restorative diplomacy by the 1990s generation of peacemakers. According to the University of Maryland START database, terrorist incidents were eight times as high in Israel at the beginning of that Arafat era of peace dialogue in 1990 compared to 1997, the year of ultimate collapse of Oslo hope, as the first Netanyahu government entered its second year. After that, terror increased to a Hamas high in 2015 and then an even higher 2023 peak. Failing to build on 1990s restorative diplomacy is the error lurking beneath the fall from grace of political successors to the 1990s peacemakers, such as Prime Minister Netanyahu. Netanyahu thinks he can kill off the bad ideology of Hamas terror without doing the diplomatic work to make credible an opportunity for a good ideology, like a sovereign democratic Palestine that votes against terrorism.

For the terrorists, the colonial oppression of Palestinians and Kashmiris were geopolitically powerful narratives of Muslim humiliation. Many Muslim people living in Kashmir feel promises made to them by India and by the international community have been dishonored, as does the government of Pakistan. This has fueled recurrently frequent and dangerous warfare, terrorism and armed internal conflict on the planet since 1947 over the future of Kashmir, countless skirmishes, and three

separate wars between India and Pakistan. They were frequently fought with more than a million troops massed at the line of control, nuclear weapons at hair trigger on both sides (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018).

Many prolonged wars motivated by narratives of the broken promise are totally extinguished as armed conflicts, yet they continue to fuel more privatized problems like suicide, substance abuse, and crime. For example, the frontier wars against First Nations peoples in Australia and North America subsided after all outside powers ceased showing an interest in arming First Nations in the way the French had done during their wars against English settlers. The English in turn had armed Indigenous groups that fought American settlers during the Revolutionary War. Notwithstanding the duplicitousness of colonial diplomacy during these wars, a legacy of admirable restorative diplomacy endures for the West to learn from the Indigenous side. One virtue of restorative diplomacy is that it is a weapon of the weak.

An admirable thing about white Americans is that they flock in large numbers to the Museum of the American Indian in Washington, D.C. to learn that Indian nations had a remarkably restorative tradition of peacemaking that had origins in wampum documents on display such as those of The Great Law of Peace. Hiawatha and clan mothers were prominent in socializing this peace diplomacy.

On the colonial side in North America, peace treaties were seen as transactional, rather like commercial contracts that could be breached, perhaps for the price of paying some penalty for breach of contract. On the Indigenous side, peace agreements were sacralized. First Nations viewed it as important to renew, grow, and socialize peace treaties at regular anniversaries during which fine speeches by orators, song, and dance, would promise to grow the peace into something richer, more generous, and more meaningful about deep engagement between peoples to secure their mutual flourishing.

As we witness white Americans flock to learn those seemingly lost lessons today, we can wonder if it is too late to redeem them. No, they redeem themselves when Americans humbly kneel at the feet of those ancient Indigenous elders. United Nations sanctioned peace agreements today are recurrently breached, treated as pieces of paper that are barely binding on current regimes. Governments see treaties as contracts

entered into by a previous regime that they can vary, sometimes by a payoff to a warlord, or like a commercial contract. The United Nations also has much to learn from the wisdom of the Indigenous peoples of the land of its headquarters on how to sacralize peace agreements through richer rituals that reinforce international law. North American Indigenous peace agreements also teach that women, 'clan mothers', must have a central role. Community participation must be wide. Likewise contemporary research on large samples of conflicts show that peace agreements in which women are central players and civil society participation in peace processes is wide and diverse are peace agreements that are 64 percent more likely to hold.¹

Colonial redemption in South Africa was pursued through an agreement between the white Apartheid government of South Africa, the African National Congress, and other Indigenous movements to completely rewrite the South African Constitution, abolish Apartheid, and release Nelson Mandela from prison to contest an election he won to become the first black President. Mandela never renounced the right to armed struggle against Apartheid, yet he embraced a restorative diplomacy that dismantled Apartheid more effectively than armed struggle, that transformed South Africa into a democracy that espoused universal human rights, while also leaving disappointments of enduring interpersonal violence, domination, corruption and injustice in the hands of some ANC successors who were disappointments to his legacy.

There is a social movement politics lesson from these histories. It is that the peace movement can be enriched by joining arms with local Indigenous rights movements, with the global social movement for restorative justice, and vice versa.

What is Restorative Diplomacy?

Restorative diplomacy is defined as relational diplomacy that prioritizes problem-solving to repair harm over deterring harm. We can expand this simple conception by conceiving restorative diplomacy as diplomacy that seeks to transform conflict, transform prospects for members of international society to flourish together, transform narratives of grievance

through deep listening and policy responsiveness, and by respectful dialogue. Its deepest essence is relationship building, and a relational approach to healing and transforming the deep structures that underpin domination. This does not mean that restorative diplomacy cannot accommodate being firm but fair. It does not require us to totally eschew armed resistance of invasions. The next section opens up this conversation with a discussion of the ways restorative diplomacy is, and then is not, super-soft diplomacy. An important introductory remark about restorative diplomacy grounded in an evidence-based aspect of the theory of restorative justice is that it involves a commitment to speaking inconvenient truths to power, and disapproval of actions of one society that violate the rights of others. This requires discussion of differences, yet respectfully, without stigmatizing or setting out to humiliate the other. That is the common ground of restorative diplomacy for international development with the theory and evidence on family development. It shows that the approach to raising children should be neither *laissez-faire* nor authoritarian, but respectfully authoritative and engaged, with deep listening to members of the family of all ages (Burford et al. 2019).

With both international violence and domestic violence, I integrate restorative justice theory with the responsive regulatory theory that secures minimally sufficient deterrence rather than zero deterrence (Braithwaite 2022). Just as there is no pure restorative justice, likewise restorative diplomacy is a continuous variable. There is a lot of good dialogue, deep listening, responsiveness, relational engagement, even apology and forgiveness, that creeps into otherwise conventional diplomacy. Restorative diplomacy is outlined as an ideal to move toward. It is rarely fully realized. Articulating a new direction for thinking about the future of diplomacy is ambition enough for now because it takes a whole village of practitioners and scholars to meaningfully inspire a theory to renew diplomacy. As Yan Zhang (2022) says of restorative justice in China, sometimes more can be achieved with a ‘discourse in the making’ that has different meanings in different societies and times, that eschews certainties that are fully formed.

One thing I have always insisted upon as a universal of restorative value, however, draws attention to the way core restorative values like inclusion, non-domination, equal rights to justice, and empowerment

regardless of gender identity, race, religion, are enshrined in UN human rights treaties. Hence, I have argued that the civic republican ideal of non-domination underpins restorative justice values, tracking Philip Pettit's (1997) work.

It is of course a bitter pill for realist diplomats to swallow that they should not pursue Making America Great Again when that is the mantra of their elected President, or Make China Great Again when this is an aim of the Communist Party. But I indeed do argue that restorative diplomacy means non-domination of other societies, treating all peoples as enjoying an equal right to govern themselves in the way they choose. Less controversially, I insist that restorative diplomacy requires ethical commitment to the core UN human rights conventions. They are central to the rules-based international order. The next chapter specifically argues that does not mean restorative diplomacy supports regime-change interference in other countries because the diplomat's state rightly disapproves of the human rights record of the regime that might be unseated by regime-change diplomacy. I argue in the next chapter that regime-change diplomacy, fomenting civil war or terror in other countries, extrajudicial assassinations by spies or drones, interference in foreign elections are all strictly forbidden forms of diplomacy by the lights of restorative diplomacy. I find empirically that they happen to be usually against the long-term interests of states that indulge in these vices. Prudent states, a great many of them, cultivate an international reputation that bans these diplomatic vices without exception.

Super-Soft Diplomacy

This chapter argues that one of a number of reasons Ronald Reagan and Mikael Gorbachev achieved great things in geopolitics was their gifts at making enemies frenemies, then friends. Reagan collaboratively crafted agreements with the Soviet Union based on the creative search for a contracting space where both sides could benefit from a reset of relationships. Such statesmen of historical transitions, Nelson Mandela was another, were good at deep listening, at repeating back the grievances of the other side to show that they have genuinely digested it and that

they are treating the point of view of their adversary respectfully. They don't bully, humiliate, or stigmatize. They allow their adversary to save face, a form of respect Kennedy and Khrushchev extended to each other even though they initially detested each other. They showed common kindness and concern for the family of geopolitical adversaries. Through their kindness to the family and friends of their adversary, they hope to invoke conversations among family and friendship networks concerning their contrarian points of view about grievances.

With Ronald Reagan, I raised the possibility of insincerity, saying what Gorbachev wanted to hear without meaning it. The biographical evidence on Reagan suggests we should reject that view. The speculation is an appropriate caution, however, not because Reagan did specific things to betray his good faith negotiation, but because his successors as presidents of the United States certainly did that. Neocons who were core Reagan staffers campaigned covertly for continued containment of Russia in contradiction to the shared understanding built through Reagan's warm, caring, bonhomie with Russian leaders in the last two years of his Presidency.

Deep listening and relationship building are also a function of Track II diplomacy that might include religious leaders, wise retired diplomats, who have the ear of a recalcitrant leader. The point and purpose of super-soft diplomacy are argued in the next section to be that it makes it more possible for leaders to be super-assertive with denouncing behavior like invasions of other countries that should be robustly denounced, whether the country invaded is Ukraine or Iraq. When diplomatic relationships are kinder, less abusive, and more respectful, than they are in contemporary diplomacy, they paradoxically have the capacity to be more effectively firm when firmness matters. The psychological research on being authoritative, rather than authoritarian or laissez-faire, to be effective in steering the flow of events, demonstrates this (Burford et al. 2019). The ugly side of disrespectful Western diplomacy, in recent years, was mimicked by post-Gorbachev Russia, then by China during its 'wolf warrior diplomacy' era. China experts say it has muted rude wolf warrior diplomacy because it was badly received in Asia, where China most seeks to win friends.

Diverse Deposits in the Adversary's Bank that Compensates for Competition

Beinart (2022) questioned how many lives were lost in the United States and globally from the US policy of rejecting engagement with China on vaccine diplomacy:

The Biden administration's zero-sum view of its relationship with Beijing has undermined efforts to rebuild the public health partnerships that Donald Trump dismantled. 'U.S. vaccine diplomacy has been aimed at competing with China over geopolitical influence', rather than 'cooperating with China in the delivery of global public goods'.

More US lives were lost to covid than have fallen in all the wars of this century and the last century combined. So how rational was a national security policy that subordinated engagement on covid to strategic competition? How 'realist' was it when China suffered massively lesser economic contraction from covid than the United States and its NATO allies between 2020 and 2023, notwithstanding unbalanced Western propaganda that Chinese lockdowns had hobbled its economy while the West surged ahead? Beinart made a wider point by drawing attention to how much the rest of the world agrees with 'former Singaporean diplomat, Kishore Mahbubani [when he compared] the United States and China to "two tribes of apes that continued fighting over territory while the forest around them was burning"'. Then Beinart pointed to the Chinese foreign minister warning "The U.S. side hopes that climate cooperation can be an "oasis" in China-U.S. relations, but if that "oasis" is surrounded by desert, it will also become desertified sooner or later'. This evokes a fundamental tenet of the healing edge of restorative justice thinking that says relationships work when actors seek to maximize the emotional deposits they put in the bank of those they seek to change. When a preschooler does something nasty to another child when they arrive at childcare, and then, when reproached by a parent, a tantrum ensues, one reason can be that the parent failed to put enough positive deposits in the emotional bank of their child before departing for childcare and in the car (Covey 1994). That emotional work is reinterpreted

as preparation for making the emotional withdrawal of the reproach for the bad behavior. Maximizing positive, affirming, emotional deposits is central to harm prevention.

Sadly, great power leaders have tantrums too, their moments when they play to the domestic mob with abuse of foreigners. Cataclysms can be a consequence. These are simple cataclysms to avoid by simply being polite in the way Ronald Reagan always was, thereby enabling Reagan to always be firm with adversaries. Polite firmness with enemies can certainly evoke violence, but it has better prospects than disrespect in evoking responsiveness to emotional deposits that those who reproach them have deposited in their emotional bank. The next section starts from first principles in theorizing this in restorative terms. Super-soft diplomacy that is principled in its consistency is simply better than erratic speech that obsequiously, insincerely flatters at one moment, then barks for the domestic crowd with an ethos of 'spare the rod and spoil the rogue state' at the next. Worse are growling threats that are never intended to be fulfilled like 'razing' Iran or North Korea to elicit applause from American hawks, who in turn revel in populist acclaim for refusing to succumb to 'appeasement'.

Entrepreneurial Competition, Strong Cooperation

The shift in the last chapter from containing states to containing risks and enabling societies to flourish together requires a particular but simple skill set among practitioners. I call it restorative diplomacy. The literature on restorative practices teaches us to put the problem, not the person, in the center of the circle of restorative dialogue. For restorative justice that means putting the wrong (rather than the wrongdoer) in the center of the circle and working together to fix the problem, heal the harm together. The reason for that is that restorative practices aim to avert stigmatization and humiliation of wrongdoers. Instead of others shaming a wrongdoer, what the restorative practitioner seeks is that focus on the problem that often will lead to a wrongdoer in effect pointing the finger at themselves to say 'I/we need to change' if this problem is to be fixed,

if this relationship is to be repaired. Securing such an admission from Soviet Premier Gorbachev was the towering achievement of President Reagan. Their summit together was as a result the most decisive moment in reinforcing the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. Conversationally, and then by reporting their mutually supportive conversation in Iceland to the world, Gorbachev and Reagan constituted the shamefulfulness of nuclear weapons without shaming each other for sometimes having moved their fingers too close to that button.

I have argued that Reagan's successors failed to reciprocate generously, respectfully, without promise-breaking, unilateral gestures such as handing East Germany peacefully to West Germany, dismantling the Warsaw Pact, dismantling massively and unilaterally Russian offensive capabilities. US neocons won the aftermath with an historical moment of American triumphalism. The neocons thereby ensured that America's unipolar moment would be short lived, hanging Gorbachev out to dry, ending his quest to peacefully transform the Soviet Union step by step. Neocons are brilliant at fanning flames of tone-deaf populism, bad at attuning long-run security and economic development for their country to the opportunities genuine reformers like Gorbachev provide. Neocons are unattracted to restoring enemies, preferring to endlessly punish them.

Hence, I interpret the failures of post-Cold-War NATO diplomacy as the reverse of the successes of the finest moment of the American century, the Marshall Plan, when huge American deposits were made in the banks, emotional and financial, of America's greatest enemies—Germany, Italy and Japan. This way of thinking about generosity, consistent respect coupled to firmness with enemies, relational statecraft that works at putting emotional deposits in the enemy's bank, containing the problem while rebuilding enemies allows statecraft to do better and do good. These are the skills required of the restorative practitioner, of the statecraft of healing to fix and contain problems. To privilege restorative diplomacy is to solve the problem by 'doing with' rather than 'doing for', or 'doing to', or failing to do anything at all. Neocons laid low after Reagan's summit, creating obstacles aimed at doing nothing about strategic nuclear weapons reductions. After Gorbachev was disposed of, neocons returned to their core business of doing arms race competition to Moscow.

Some restorative practitioners conceive 'doing with' as definitional of restorative justice. The final section of this chapter conceives 'doing to' in the sense of covert meddling in the domestic politics of other countries as the antithesis of restorative diplomacy. I prefer to define restorative diplomacy as diplomacy that is collaboratively transparent and attuned by deep listening to other stakeholders in a conflict or problem, that always communicates respectfully, eschews threats, and keeps punitive diplomacy at minimally sufficient levels. It contains problems cooperatively and eschews containment of states, is committed to healing the hurts of international conflicts, to reconciliation and peacemaking, with apology and forgiveness having a place in journeys of healing. Restorative diplomacy is a form of statecraft that paradoxically decenters states because its normative commitment is to deep listening to all stakeholders in a problem, whether they are states or not. Key stakeholders might be adherents to an Indigenous identity, to a community like 'the Kurds', 'Tamils', 'Yighurs' that can be a nation without a state, or to an identity like 'women', when women were voiceless in some diplomatic context.

I have argued that one helpful move can be to shift institutions from what the strategic studies thinkers describe as offensive balance to defensive balance. Consider the question, for example, of whether Australia should develop hypersonic missile capabilities. It is not at all simple to judge whether this is a good idea. Defensive balance might argue that Australia is an island society. Therefore, if Australia deploys medium-range anti-naval hypersonic missiles that can sink ships, but that cannot reach as far as China or India, they will improve Australia's defense against invaders without threatening nuclear weapon states in a way that could make Australia a nuclear target. While I profess no competence to assess the merits of such matters of Australian defense strategy, the example illustrates the restorative concept of defense spending that manifests defensive balance rather than provoking or threatening a potential enemy by piling in on a cult of the offensive that drives arms races in offensive rather than defensive capabilities.

Contemporary technological developments may place limits on the idea of defensive balance, of building an armed services designed to defend rather than attack. For example, scholars of AI in war may be technologically correct when they say that the only way to defend against

a massive swarm of drones that invades your society is with your own swarm of drones to head out to meet them and shoot them down. This is because the drones will always be more flexible in their movements, quicker in their reaction time, than human defenders of the society.² Sadly, however, if a state owns thousands of defensive drones with the ability to destroy, they can be deployed and programmed for offense. A good counterpoint, yet one that misses the point that the most profound key to defensive balance is defense through preventive institutions like a United Nations that acquires the capability and legitimacy to resolve international conflicts before they become wars. Hence the essence of defensive balance is a shift from technological and military defense to diplomatic defense and defensive institutions of peace. It means a shift from cutting edge to healing edge defense, from national defense to internationally collaborative defense, from states as billiard balls of variable size pushing one another around a table of realist diplomacy to states as participants in security communities of restorative diplomacy.

From 1983, I served for four years as the most insignificant member of a 16-person body called Australia's Economic Planning Advisory Council. Monthly meetings were always chaired by the Prime Minister, with senior economic ministers and state premiers (governors) attending. There were also CEOs of the largest companies in corporate Australia on the Council. I expected them to be tough, ruthless. In fact, they were consistently constructive, kindly to others, even to little me, who critiqued so much of what they said. They were particularly impressive in the cooperative problem-solving approach they adopted with trade union leaders on the Council. I had a stereotype of business as ruthlessly competitive. What I should have understood was that the most successful business leaders tend to be distinguished because they are gifted at both competing and cooperating with adversaries.

When it comes to finding solutions to cascading crises, humankind wants states, as well as businesses, that are so brilliant at competing with one another that they invent solutions. And we need states and corporations that are adept at helping others to be effective in fixing crises that hurt all businesses and firms. Again, the politicians who rise to the top tend to be mostly good at cooperation, as well as ruthless political competitors. This reality of elite social selection, even applicable to some

of the most ruthless players like Stalin and Churchill, who cooperated quite warmly while competing ruthlessly, offers glimmers of hope.

Sometimes competing states do give the world pleasant surprises on their capacity for cooperation. A worry with nuclear weapons command and control is that nuclear powers must not totally centralize control in the president's office because that would create incentives for decapitation as a war-winning strategy that generates momentary indecisiveness by a decapitated enemy. Centralization of nuclear weapon decision-making creates incentives for decapitation. Hence, a variety of military actors such as submarine commanders and air force generals were empowered to launch without specific authorization of their President in defined circumstances. In the 1950s, worries then grew that one day a mentally ill commander would get control over the power to launch. A catastrophe unintended by leaders might result.

The United States became the leader in designing checks and balances to protect against launch by a single officer with a single key. These safety systems were shared with the Soviets and some other nuclear powers, as were some other technologies that, for example, automatically notified adversaries when a nuclear silo was opened for launch (accidentally or unintentionally, or during maintenance). Broader multi-directional collaboration on the design of better nuclear assurance systems against accidental launch was shared among nuclear weapon states. Sharing of nuclear safety and security was further fostered by mutual inspections of nuclear bases enabled by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. My take on this accomplishment has been that it flowed from two eras of restorative diplomacy between leaders who had previously been bitter enemies that had terrified each other: first Kennedy and Krushchev, then Reagan and Gorbachev. This collaboration has ebbed in the past decade. Humankind has an interest in restoring its flow.

COVID-19 exposed the possibility of a fertile mix of competition to win the race to develop the best vaccine and collaborative R & D between China and the West. An example of cooperation was the Wuhan-led research that identified and disseminated the genomic sequence of COVID-19. Cooperation to diffuse manufacturing capability worldwide to roll out vaccines quickly and stem the tide of death was appallingly bad, however, as it was on making vaccines affordable

to the poor. Only in 2022, after the worst of the pandemic was over, when most of the monopoly profits had been made, did the WHO begin to make serious progress against implacable resistance from Big Pharma to help six African countries establish the kind of vaccine manufacturing plants that could have controlled pandemics like covid with technology transfer assistance from South Korea. Some rich states undermined WHO efforts to transcend vaccine nationalism and foster global collaboration on preventive approaches more broadly. A stronger WHO is a simple idea for increasing institutional capability to scale up global response to complex crises.

Vaccine nationalism was a pathology that was paradoxically against the national interest. It was a signal failure of diplomacy as a profession. It failed as a profession in so many countries to even engage in salvaging the national interest in international cooperation for vaccine cosmopolitanism. The diplomats failed to engage because of the way they define the professional craft of diplomacy. During covid, it was as if the diplomats neglected to defend the UN, WHO specifically, because of an ideology of we don't do health; health is not our core mission. We diplomats cannot cover everything; so let's concentrate on doing our core functions well; they are too important for us to be distracted onto policy tangents that are the responsibilities of others. With vaccines, it is America first, Germany, Russia, or China first, and it is the job of other institutions beyond diplomacy to compete to ensure we win the race to invent and manufacture the best vaccine. That core focus of diplomats for most of this century has been national security and Islamist terrorism. This when ethnocentric terror of the right, some of it neo-Nazi, is the larger terror problem in the West, Hindu terrorism the bigger problem in India, Buddhist terrorism the big problem in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, anti-Indigenous right-wing death squads across Latin America. Diplomacy is a transnational practice and to the extent that diplomacy does prioritize terrorism, it should do so defending an international rules-based human rights order aimed at containing the entire galaxy of terrorisms, including the considerable problem that Islamic State terrorism remains in Africa and the Middle East.

When the US state provided arms to Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists in Syria because they were fighting President Assad and Islamic State, US

diplomacy regrettably supported terrorism. At times when the US state saw Latin American death squads as anti-communist allies, US diplomats funded them, even trained them at the CIA-run School of the Americas, to spread terror. When the US state says Prime Minister Modi of India is not to be thought of as a supporter and fomenter of anti-Muslim terrorism, but as a bulwark against China, US diplomats seek to make him into a gladiatorial rock star. All this diplomatic thinking prevailed when in terms of lost lives, Islamic terrorism is a problem of small scale for major powers compared to epidemics. For the overwhelming majority of countries, probably for all of them during the peak years of covid, global pandemics snatched many times more lives than entanglement in wars and terrorism.

The conclusion to this chapter makes a case for restorative diplomacy that is built on the foundations of bitter lessons from twenty-first-century diplomacy disasters. It conceives diplomats as specialists in fostering international cooperation to secure support for institutions that deliver international society the best possible mix of strong competition and strong cooperation to defeat its most wicked problems. This means healing and preventing ill health, terror, war, economic crises, and environmental crises. The priority of diplomats is not to fix all problems; their priority is to fix those international institutional problems through relational diplomacy. This helps international society to see the virtues of an institution like the WHO as a node of power for transforming cooperation to conquer catastrophes.³

Leaders of China and the United States cared so much about whether their countries appeared to be the best or the worst in their response to covid. For most members of international society those displays of geopolitical competition were rhetorically comical. Trump's 'Chi...i..na virus': a gift to comedians. We listened to the statements of these American and Chinese leaders; we thought these are countries that must not be allowed to dominate international society. We listened to diagnoses of realist international relations theorists about how this is natural, the inevitable way great powers must and should behave. Most of us said no thanks to that kind of covid realism.

Great Power Dialogue

Great power leaders and diplomats must get to like one another, to enjoy learning from one another, to pleasantly imbibe banter around seeing one another's 'misguided' point of view. This is a pathway to them concluding that there are some things they have been in competition over on which they would do better to share what they know, then actively collaborate on crisis prevention. China quickly shared the genomic sequence for the COVID-19 virus after several wasted weeks being secretive. This was an example of such a productive shift. Covert competition conduces to complexity that great powers have a bad track record of managing. Cover-up on matters for which most of international society wants to see openness repeatedly leads to a short-term success that over time unravels into blowback.

Diplomacy is a conservative craft that punishes missteps more than it rewards prevention. Think tanks, philanthropists and universities can compensate for this by bringing world leaders or their advisers into mutual contact with the bridging capital of thinkers with more fluid, transformational, ideas in public conversations, or at more discreet locales. Sometimes, only in secret exchanges can leaders confess to past mistakes from the pursuit of geopolitical coups. These can be mistakes they are unwilling to confess to the domestic audience that empowers them, lest the fallibility they reveal disempowers them at home. After Kennedy confessed it had been a mistake to provoke the Kremlin by installing missiles along the Black Sea in Turkey, and agreed to remove them in return for the removal of Russia's Cuban missiles, Krushchev allowed Kennedy to keep this a secret from his hawks for decades after his death.

It's fine if Chinese and US senior diplomats are able to joke with each other about an academic's radical idea for a bridge of cooperation between them. They jibe that they could not see either of them doing that. Not only is it fine if they laugh together at the idea, but good, even better if they subsequently secretly share what might be a more practical path to cooperation of that kind than the dreamer's impractical approach. The building of the relational bond is the more fertile

output of the conversation because it can have a versatility of application to diverse mutual risks. Sometimes it will lead to the agreement of the great powers to compete to be first to accomplish something in ways that will be good for human development. In other cases, they decide to cooperate in ways that are beneficial. On other occasions still they will settle on counterproductive forms of competition or cooperation that defeat the purposes of both great powers.

Settlements to compete here and cooperate there can be a platform for learning so long as leaders can still smile about their setbacks and continue to sustain open channels, backstage and frontstage, of relational dialogue. This is why I keep returning to Clark's (2012) point that because World War I was always against the interests of both Germany and Britain, it might have been prevented by the kind of hot line invented during the Cold War.

An Overly Realist Profession

What does it mean to have a diplomacy concerned with maintaining good relationships with all peoples in order to preserve the planet and help earthlings to prosper with security from catastrophes? Diplomats have specialized competence on the needs of their own society. Algerian diplomats have special responsibilities to focus on the security of Algerians from domination. Diplomats from other countries might not bother, or be able to see threats that might dominate only Algerians. This is not conceptually different from medicine and law having special professional obligations to focus on the health and justice needs of their own patients/clients.

Medicine and law have more ethically grounded professional ideologies than diplomacy, however. Diplomacy could learn from other professions as it searches for a less realist, more ethically grounded core to its professionalism. Just as law is professionally moored to the institutions of law, to the rule of law, diplomacy has commitments to institutions of diplomacy. Yet diplomacy's ethical texture is thin tissue. Lawyers legally defend clients who bend the truth, but lawyers must also comply with many specific rules and broad Constitutional principles as they do this.

That is quite a thick texture of ethics that routinely requires them to honor fidelity to the law and the court above fidelity to their client. They cannot be struck off for having a client who bends the truth, but they can be for bending the law or the truth themselves in professionally proscribed ways.

Likewise with accountants as ethical professionals serving corporate power. In searingly central ways, accountants must manifest fidelity to the truth of numbers in the accounts. Sometimes that fidelity should, must, and will put their corporate masters in prison. EY accountants being paid by the military-industrial complex have put top management of the largest defense contracting firm (Lockheed) in prison over false accounts and bribes to foreign leaders. No retired government official working for the military-industrial complex has ever put their benefactor in prison. Nor do diplomats provide testimony that puts political masters in prison.

Diplomats are terminated as diplomats by their political masters, not by professional boards that enforce ethical rules of diplomacy. Diplomats do not get 'struck off' as professionally certified diplomats. Historically, such rules that evolved as historically important to diplomacy might be called rules of obeisance to state power. A form of such obeisance was rules of precedence as to who were the most senior functionaries of the most powerful states to sit nearest the heads of tables, and who was representing powerless states that were of little consequence in this order of precedence. Another set of rules that are important to diplomats go to diplomatic immunity. They include both formal and informal rules. Informally, they permit Russian and US diplomats to fund and strategize the assassination of a democratically elected leader like President Allende of Chile in 1972 with total impunity from capital punishment or imprisonment themselves for such a shocking crime against national and international law. Immunity can allow diplomats to drive drunk causing accidents with impunity, something that depletes respect for the ethical code of diplomats when this happens. To the extent that diplomacy has a normative order, it is an unacceptably colonized normative order that does, however, break down in healthy ways at times. Such moments are opportunities for diplomacy to understand why its normal

normative order is flawed because it is overly statist and institutionalizes domination.

I will not burden readers with a tour of the influential definitions of diplomacy. They are overwhelmingly descriptive alternatives to my analysis. I simply remark that you will find extant definitions far from totally devoid of elements of the restorative. This is especially so with respect to the importance of relationships and dialogue. Let us seek to widen that chink of light to cast a spotlight on what matters most about diplomacy. Diplomacy has its inspiring moments of hope when it prevents catastrophes. Few things matter more than diplomacy as an ethical craft that can and does accomplish this. In defining statecraft as a slightly wider statist concept than diplomacy, Jochen Prantl and Evelyn Goh (2022) focus on support for ‘national interests in survival and prosperity’. I like the searingly perceptive character of this wording of the core of what diplomats do in contributing to statecraft. It goes to the essence of how most definitions of diplomacy capture the realism of the craft.

The trouble with diplomacy that sees itself as an institution that supports national interests in survival and prosperity is that it neglects global values for benefitting all societies, and more disparate values that include improved health, safer international air travel, or peacekeeping in societies where no specific national interests reside. Hyperconnectivity means, however, that it is harder for diplomats to know when a laser-like focus on specified national interests will neglect global threats that ultimately cascade, blow back to burn, and dominate one’s own nationals. One day an unprevented global risk that is not a national interest might burn their country off the map.

Prantl and Goh are descriptively accurate about the heartland of what diplomats do; they succeed in representing the most widely shared view in both international relations and the practice of diplomacy on what statecraft is about. Yet what if lawyers defined law as a practice that supports rich clients who can pay the highest fees to deliver their interests through the legal system? That is a descriptively accurate characterization of the core of what lawyers do, especially the best lawyers in the largest, most successful firms. One reason it would be anathema for lawyers to define law that way is because a minority of distinctively important lawyers have roles like judges, public defenders, the solicitor-general, the

ombudsman. They do not work fee-for-service for wealthy clients. There are welfare rights and Indigenous advocacy lawyers. In that, lawyers are exactly like diplomats, many of whom work for United Nations agencies, the World Trade Organization, ASEAN, disparate kinds of international institutions. The difference is that law does not allow its central, most prestigious, practice—helping the rich to dominate and secure their legal interests – define its professional identity. Rather it defines itself in terms of the ideal of the practice of the rule of law. What that does for the ideology of the profession is allow the profession to view what judges do as more important than the work of more highly paid elite law firm players. Diplomacy and IR that conceive diplomacy as supporting national interests in survival and prosperity are disinclined to view incumbency in a senior WHO position as more important than being a top diplomat of a major power. This is one reason why the professional quiescence of diplomacy was causally implicated in vaccine diplomacy becoming vaccine nationalism, not only during the covid years.

Other professions did fight the good fight, pursue the ethical vocation, on covid. Epidemiology was an important one. Epidemiologists were endlessly vocal on the airwaves, in print, and social media in excoriating vaccine nationalism, supporting WHO, and advancing covid cosmopolitanism every which way. Their professional ideology was explicit and rather consistent in spurning vaccine realism, advocating international institutionalism. Epidemiologists would even say on a regular basis what no foreign minister or senior diplomat would ever say publicly—that national spending priorities had been irrationally skewed to ridiculously lower risk threats than epidemics, such as counter-terrorism. How could our governance and diplomacy be so misdirected as to give higher priority to counter-terrorism over counter-epidemic spending when terrorism deaths have been so small at every stage of human history, and preventable epidemic deaths so high? Epidemiology proved itself in these media debates to be a relentlessly evidence-based profession, something diplomacy proved not to be during the 20 years of a poorly conceived war on terror, and before that a disastrously conceived war on drugs (particularly in Latin America) (Braithwaite 2022). The epidemiologists critiqued each other, hammer and tongs, in the media, challenged

colleagues with supporting research when they believed the evidence was valid and reliable. Diplomats hesitate to do this on matters of evidence. Chief health officers of states are bureaucrats who are required to show loyalty to the health minister who hires them, just as are top diplomats. But chief health officers are embedded in a professional culture that eats them for breakfast if they make public statements that fly in the face of the evidence.

Chief health officers could never joke about epidemiology as a profession the state pays to lie. Diplomats do joke this way. 'An ambassador is an honest gentleman sent to lie abroad for the good of his country'. This is widely attributed to English diplomat Sir Henry Wotton during a 1604 Augsburg mission. Chief health officers read their professional mandate as impartially reporting evidence on the effectiveness of interventions. Ethical excellence is grounded in deep wells of professionalism such as the Hippocratic Oath—attributed to the ancient Greek physician Hippocrates—that puts loyalty to humankind above all else, that prioritizes doing no harm. Epidemiology is a profession that walks its talk in the sense that these doctors and nurses traveled from privileged societies in large numbers to Africa when they were needed to help contain epidemics like ebola and HIV within Africa before they become global pandemics (successfully with ebola, unsuccessfully with HIV-AIDS). They did not travel to Africa because the pay and safe working conditions were good toiling in full PPE inside quarantined tropical villages. Some sacrificed their lives. Many exhausted themselves to death in wealthy societies during covid.

The core business of diplomacy is unique, so there are limits to what we can learn from comparative professionalism. While public diplomacy and public discourse generally were distressingly non-evidence-based on so many aspects of the war on terror, there were noble exceptions. One was US Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, who protested vigorously about reckless CIA drone targeting decisions during the Obama Administration. These drone attacks killed many Pakistanis who had not been supporters of terrorism. Munter resigned when his objections were repeatedly ignored (McKelvey 2017).

Munter's evidence-based exceptionalism sacrificed his diplomatic career ultimately to help persuade President Obama against his former

belief that surging drone attacks was a more humane way of achieving counter-terrorism objectives with less collateral damage than bombardment from conventional aircraft or from cross-border artillery. Dissident diplomats and university critics in time did cut through to the Obama Administration with the point that this was a false framing of the choice because the United States had not declared war against Pakistan; sending a wing of bombers to pulverize parts of Pakistan would be an act of war. That was not an option against the needed ally that Pakistan was. Obama was ultimately dissuaded from the fiction that drones killed terrorists with minimal collateral damage to civilians as the evidence grew that the number of terrorists killed was small in comparison to innocent civilians that included huge numbers of children (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018, Chapter 7). Finally, Obama became persuaded that Taliban recruitment was being assisted by the way the children of the region came to hate America because they loathed recurrent, terrifying sounds from above of American drone warfare. Obama sharply reduced drone attacks on Taliban and other presumed terrorist targets in the final year of his presidency. CIA drone attacks stepped up again after Donald Trump became president. As usual, these war crimes continued to fail as an alternative to adept diplomacy; the United States and NATO lost its war against the Taliban. Fragile democracies in both Pakistan and Afghanistan became progressively more corrupted, the West more intensely despised, during this period of history.

By Trump's presidency, it was already too late for diplomacy as a profession to redeem itself by publicly defending a fundamental principle of international law—that you do not launch systematic waves of attacks on the territory of another country without declaring war against them. That was part of the crime against international law of the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States rightly condemned it and helped enforce that view through the prosecution of Japanese leaders. As late as 2001, senior diplomats and secretaries of state were still condemning extrajudicial assassinations by Israel against non-Israelis on the soil of other countries. Three decades of ethical leadership by US diplomacy on extrajudicial assassinations had profoundly reshaped international norms after the Church Committee of the US Congress

exposed and denounced CIA initiative in planning the coup and assassination of President Allende of Chile in 1972. Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. Bush, and Clinton all ensured that their administrations sustained this aspect of the international rule of law. Once the George W Bush administration reversed direction again without eliciting howls of protest from international diplomats, who utterly failed to mobilize international society to shame this murderous behavior, world civilization entered another dark downward spiral toward disrespect for international law and barbarism. The neocons had turned another healthy taboo into a corpse.

Good and Evil in the Heart of the Spymaster

Diplomats like Ambassador Munter were not the only noble exceptions who defined diplomacy as a more cosmopolitan craft. Niël Barnard was not the head of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, but in the event played a more powerful diplomatic role as head of the South African intelligence service during the Apartheid administration in South Africa. Barnard decided long before the De Klerk government released Nelson Mandela from prison that Apartheid was a flagrant breach of international human rights law, and unsustainable. It would ultimately impoverish South Africa by marginalizing South African business in the world economy, through wars with the frontline African states supported by Cuban fighters, and civil war in which South Africans killed one another, thereby further scaring off investment.

I interviewed Niël Barnard and some of his colleagues at length. Barnard concluded that South African mothers were becoming unwilling to send their sons to fight these wars. Barnard (2015) started holding secret peace talks in prison with Mandela. He became the lead negotiator, though not the only negotiator, in those talks with the support of President Botha, then President De Klerk. The intelligence chief may have been the best person to lead this diplomacy as the intelligence chief because peace talks about dismantling Apartheid could disintegrate the political base of these presidents. They were therefore guarded by the tightness of secrecy only intelligence agencies can secure. The talks

were far from pure-hearted. Secret tactics attempted to divide the African National Congress by feeding falsehoods about what Mandela had said in prison to ANC successor president Oliver Tambo outside. Tambo's phone was also tapped. Bits of these Tambo conversations wrenched from their context were played back to Mandela in ways designed to turn these two close friends against each other. Notwithstanding this, I view Barnard as a central unsung secret actor in ending Apartheid. He loved Mandela, or at least felt a depth of respect for the older man that verged on reverence. Barnard and his colleagues secured Mandela's release, and loved South Africa in all its colors. I also want to emphasize that Barnard's was a special and genuine (as opposed to purely tactical) relationship with Mandela. I put it in the same category of genuine warmth and affection that was evident between Reagan and Gorbachev. This observation becomes important to my conception of how to salvage a redemptive diplomacy. Barnard was a spymaster who practiced restorative diplomacy.

Perhaps helping to end Apartheid and the civil and international armed conflicts associated with it was not even the most impressive diplomatic contribution of Niël Barnard. More profound in its implications for wider cascades of crisis was the role of his agency, and that of his intelligence service, in South Africa becoming in 1989 the only country that had achieved nuclear weapon capability to voluntarily relinquish it by destroying the nuclear weapons it had built. This laid a steppingstone to Mandela's supporter and friend, Muammar Gaddafi, to abandon Libya's nuclear weapons program a decade later. Together, these two momentous steps made the largest continent, Africa, a nuclear-weapons-free continent. Africa is and was then the most war-torn continent and a comparatively violent and extractive continent, so a nuclear-free Africa is no small accomplishment for the systemic security of the planet and its environment. More importantly, while the South African precedent has not been repeated by a state that had already built a stockpile of nuclear weapons, it is still a profoundly important precedent for international diplomacy to build upon in future when it grasps the vision to do so. South African diplomacy was led not only by South African diplomats and presidents, but by Barnard as a spymaster rather than a diplomat. He helped give deeply conservative, racist, Nationalist political leaders a new

vision for South Africa as an anti-Apartheid, non-proliferation state. This in turn lent Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo the leverage to transform the African National Congress to again become a nonviolent movement for negotiated constitutional transformation and then a global leader for nuclear non-proliferation. All this in turn took international diplomacy to one of its finest moments. The international diplomacy profession lent profound support to the release of Mandela and then transition through democratic elections won by Mandela. In this moving historical moment, diplomacy proved to be a redemptive profession after all.

Mandela's freedom was won against opposition from opponents such as Margaret Thatcher, Dick Cheney, and the US neocon establishment. The neocons were sometimes assertive about insisting on Mandela being kept in prison (Wing 2013), more often covert, dissembling. Neocons play their games of convoluted dissembling in preference to the simpler prescriptions of restorative diplomacy. Watergate machinations paled when Colonel Oliver North, inside Ronald Reagan's White House, came up with a diabolically complex workaround to America's own rules. The White House funded arms sales to its enemy Iran between 1981 and 1986 (in breach of the US arms embargo against Iran) to create a slush fund to in turn covertly fund the Contras in Nicaragua after a Congressional vote explicitly forbade further insurgency funding for the Contras! Neocon workarounds of international and national law repeatedly entangle America in traps of its own construction.

Consider the principle of *habeus corpus*, no detention without trial, sacrosanct since Magna Carta. The CIA paid tribal leaders wads of cash to hand over people whom tribal warlords said were Taliban. Often they were not. They were frequently people that tribal leaders viewed as a political adversary they wanted rid of. The United States grabbed these alleged Taliban to be interrogated by the brightest and best US intelligence expertise could offer. They came up with bright ideas like flushing a Holy Koran down a toilet. Taliban grabbing had KPIs like body counts in the Vietnam War, with incentives to inflict innocents as false positives. Arrestees were shipped to Guantanamo Bay, a US enclave remaindered from an illegal US invasion of Cuba during the era of US colonialism. Prisoners were not granted their rights under the Geneva Convention as Prisoners' of War; they had no right to release even 23 years later after

the Taliban won the war and resumed the government of Afghanistan. They are alleged terrorists, but few of them got a right to contest this in court with their own legal counsel. In the minority of cases that did get to court they were required to work with a US military lawyer as their defense attorney. As with Iran-Contra, the duplicitous covert designs of Guantanamo Bay and extraordinary rendition of alleged terrorists to the torture camps of War-on-Terror allies like Libya's Gaddafi, caught America in one tangled web after another.

All remaining Guantanamo detainees should get a restorative justice conference now that proffers them an apology for not being granted a trial or even the most basic rights of POWs. Where it is clear that they were tortured or suffered abuse of religious rights, they should get an apology for this as well. The restorative prescription invites them to reciprocate by taking this opportunity to renounce their own wrongdoing. Then they should be released and transported back to their homes and families with at least some cash as compensation to help them restart their lives. The prison should then be closed on the basis that a prison of this kind should never again be allowed. One ethical basis for this approach is that by now the worst criminals have had an opportunity to be tried; for the remainder, up to 23 years in solitary confinement is more than enough punishment without trial. Indeed it is enough punishment even if they were guilty of a war crime that was a shocking crime against humanity.

Allies Britain and Australia challenged what the United States was doing at Guantanamo Bay and through extraordinary rendition to criminal states like Gaddafi's Libya for even more horrific torture. There were campaigns among peoples of these angry allies on behalf of their citizens imprisoned without trial as alleged terrorists by the US state. Large swathes of the electorate in these countries believed that specific defendants who were their fellow nationals had been foolish, but not guilty of terrorist crimes. The people of Australia and the United Kingdom still believed in the principle of no detention without trial and believed it disingenuous for the United States to say that Guantanamo Bay was not a US legal jurisdiction. The alliance frayed. Democratic presidential candidates (Obama and Biden) won three election campaigns during which they promised to close Guantanamo Bay. The Democratic Party

with support from Republicans who believe in the rule of law have so far failed to deliver these promises.

In the past decade, Australian and British democrats became concerned about the mass detention of Uyghurs in China, only to find that the United States had been detaining Uyghurs who their War-on-Terror ally, China, asked to be endlessly incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay or subjected to extraordinary rendition that disappeared them. These are the tangled webs of duplicitous diplomatic complexity neocons repeatedly weave for America. The next chapter goes on to discuss systematic evidence that duplicitous meddling in other countries' democracies, most frequently by the United States and Russia, makes America a corrosive force against democracy that rivals Russia and China.

Pakistan with 242 million people is one of the largest democracies, but also one of the most fragile because of recurrent intervention of a Pakistan military in deposing leaders, a military that also routinely meddles in the democratic process. Sadly another aspect of this democratic corrosion is repeated US meddling to persuade the Pakistan military to interfere in democratic politics. Pakistan's prime minister since his election in 2018 was in 2022 the most democratically popular political leader in Pakistan. He still is at the time of writing. He had taken the Pakistan economy from catastrophic circumstances of IMF default to the best economic growth performance in decades, 6.4 percent in 2021, and improved circumstances for the poor. He was taking decisive steps to green the Pakistan economy and to build bridges of peace to India. In terms of the politics of catastrophe prevention defined as imperative by this book, Prime Minister Imran Khan was a model leader, though an imperfect one, of course. *The Economist* (2021) rated his government's performance in managing the covid pandemic and returning its economy to normalcy as third in the World, after Hong Kong and New Zealand.

One plank of Khan's popularity was that throughout the NATO occupation of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, Khan called for peace talks to secure NATO withdrawal. That was likewise his position on the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; he declined to support war machines on either side. He also denounced US drone attacks on alleged terrorists inside Pakistan as a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. This book argues that through all three positions, Khan was being a good ally to

the United States, espousing positions that were in the interests of the United States to change from 2001 onwards. American neocons never saw Khan this way. Nor did the Biden administration. On March 7, 2022, secret cables leaked by *The Intercept* (Grim and Hussain 2023) and the leading Pakistan Newspaper *Dawn* revealed that two state department officials had met with Pakistan's ambassador to the United States with the message that 'all would be forgiven' if Khan were removed as Prime Minister. The cable revealed both carrots and sticks the State Department deployed in the cause of removing Khan from power. The Pakistan military responded by lending their backing to opposition parties to overthrow Khan, deployed the military to arrest Khan and senior leaders of his political party who might replace him, and deployed a military-imposed regime of political censorship. According to *The Intercept*, the cable was leaked by members of the Pakistan military who said they were no friends of Khan or Khan's party. Perhaps some in the Pakistan military felt it would be prudent for them to share the blame for corrupting Pakistan's democracy with the Biden administration. The Biden administration denies that it requested that Khan be deposed.

Renewing America's Ethical Core Diplomatically

This book makes a case for the return of US diplomacy to the simpler principles that began to be followed during the Carter administration. It is a case for restorative diplomacy that eschews the 'catastrophic successes' touted by neocons that have relentlessly caused America to disillusion democratic allies (most disastrously of all with former allies like Russia and the initially pro-American Putin). Allies like Pakistan that have become in reality all but former allies are also critical. America repeatedly grants its neocons impunity to entangle the country in illegal wars of invasion, covert proxy wars (as in Nicaragua), wars on terror, wars on drugs, punitive mass incarceration wars on crime domestically and transnationally in which black lives do not matter and Latin American lives too. The next chapter applies the idea of restorative diplomacy to

reducing nuclear weapon risks and risks from the high politics of regime change and electoral interference in other societies.

The conclusion of this chapter is that diplomacy has failed the test of demonstrating that it has an ethical core and code that immunizes it against debased professionalism. We perceive the Nazi doctors and the Nazi judges as debasing their professional codes. Nazi diplomats, well they were forgiven as just doing their job. Western diplomacy slides toward being subordinated enablers of neocon duplicity funded by the military-industrial complex that spreads its influence as the authoritarian right rises on its march across Western democracies. Diplomacy cannot credibly appeal to peace-loving, democracy-loving, elements of its societies for bigger diplomacy budgets that way. Enlarged diplomacy budgets are a good idea. Diplomacy would attract less disdain and more support by being less inexorably realist, more tempered, more ethical, prioritizing institution-building in international affairs.

Democratic publics will become more supportive of diplomacy when they see ethical diplomats exposing lies publicly, admissions from top diplomats of their most tragic mistakes, evidence-based contestation of past errors, publication of peer-review accountability reports into diplomatic corps performance. When did we last see one of those? Put another way, more relational and restorative diplomacy, collaborating with diplomats of competing states, might go hand in hand with more relational and restorative engagement with diplomacy's own democratic publics.

Notes

1. See Abbs (2021). The 64 per cent figure comes from the research of Desiree Nilsson (2012).
2. Schneier (2018) articulates the issues in balancing cyber defense against cyber-attack after dividing the terrain into two sets: security tasks that humans do well and those that computers do well: 'Computers excel at speed, scale, and scope. They can launch attacks in milliseconds... [after they] scan computer code to look for particular vulnerabilities... Humans, conversely, excel at thinking and reasoning. They can look at the data and distinguish a real

attack from a false alarm, understand the attack as it's happening,... Humans are creative and adaptive and can understand context. Computers—so far, at least—are bad at what humans do well. They're not creative or adaptive. They don't understand context... Humans are slow and get bored at big data analysis. They use cognitive shortcuts and can only keep a few data points in their head at a time. They can also behave irrationally because of these things.. defense is currently in a worse position than offence precisely because of the human components. Present-day attacks pit the relative advantages of computers and humans against the relative weaknesses of computers and humans'. Hence, computers that take over traditionally human work might put defense on a par with offense. However, on new cyber realities favoring offence, see Gipper (2020), and on doubting this, see Smythe (2020).

3. In mainstream international relations theory, this is standardly articulated as the liberal institutionalism alternative to realist international relations theory. Most liberal institutionalists, however, are like most realist diplomats in the sense that they are not particularly restorative. They tend to be technocratic in the fashion of the domestic legal profession, artisans of institution building, international lawmaking.

References

- Abbs, Luke. 2021. *The impact of nonviolent resistance on the peaceful transformation of civil war*. Washington: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.
- BBC. 2014. Ukraine crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pyatt. February 7.
- Barnard, Niël. 2015. *Secret revolution: Memoirs of a spy boss*. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
- Beinart, Peter. 2022. Is Biden foreign policy team the best of 'the blob'. *New York Times*, June 2.
- Binder, Eva, and Magdalena Kaltseis. 2020. Odessa 2014: Alternative news and atrocity narratives on Russian TV. In *Truth and fiction*, ed. Peter

- Deutschmann, Jens Herlth and Alois Woldan, 188–210. Bielefeld: Culture and Theory.
- Blattman, Christopher. 2022. *Why we fight: The roots of war and paths to peace*. New York: Viking.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrocriminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, and Bina D’Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence: War, crime and peacebuilding across South Asia*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Burford, Gale, John Braithwaite, and Valerie Braithwaite. 2019. *Restorative and responsive human services*. Boston: Taylor & Francis.
- Clark, Christopher. 2012. *The sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Cohen, Stephen F. 2014. The silence of American hawks about Kiev’s atrocities, *The Nation* 7.
- Council of Europe. 2015. Report of the International Advisory Panel on its Review of the Investigations into the Events in Odesa on 2 May 2014. Council of Europe, November 4.
- Covey, Stephen R. 1994. Emotional bank accounts. *Journal for Quality and Participation* 17: 36.
- The Economist. 2021. The Economist launches ‘normalcy index’ to quantify the return of pre-pandemic life in 50 countries. July 1.
- Gipper, Daniel P. 2020. The cyber offence defense balance revisited: The variables tipping the balance. *Naval Postgraduate School Thesis*, Monterey, California.
- Grim, Ryan, and Murtaza Hussein 2023. Secret Pakistan cable documents US pressure to remove Imran Khan. *The Intercept*, August 9.
- McKelvey, Tara. 2017. A former ambassador to Pakistan speaks out. *The Daily Beast*, July 14.
- Nilsson, Desiree. 2012. Anchoring the peace: Civil society actors in peace accords and durable peace. *International Interactions* 38: 243–266.
- Pettit, Philip. 1997. *Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government*. Oxford: OUP.
- Prantl, Jochen, and Evelyn Goh. 2022. Rethinking strategy and statecraft for the twenty-first century of complexity: A case for strategic diplomacy. *International Affairs* 98: 443–469.
- Schneier, Bruce. 2018. Artificial intelligence and the attack/defense balance. *IEEE security & privacy* 16: 96–99.
- Smythe, Charles. 2020. Cult of the cyber offensive: Misperceptions of the cyberoffense/defense balance. *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 15: 98.

- Svensson, Erik, and Staffan Fjellander. 2015. *'Clumsy' protesters and clever elites: Media bias in the Ukrainian conflict*. Lund: Lund Universitet.
- Wing, Nick. 2013. Dick Cheney didn't regret his vote against freeing Nelson Mandela, maintaining he was a 'terrorist'. *Huffington Post*, December 5.
- Zarakol, Ayşe. 2010. *After defeat: How the East learned to live with the West*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Zhang, Yan. 2022. China: Powerhouse and resistor of restorative justice reform. PhD Dissertation, Australian National University.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





9

Nuclear and Regime-Change Diplomacy: the Restorative Critique

Abstract AI weapons and space war must be more transparently and responsively regulated by nuclear surety regulatory regimes that embrace audit by foreign technical teams. Head-of-state and head-of-military hotlines between adversary states are keys to last resort diplomatic paths from war. Meddling in the politics of other countries induces blowback, terrorism, war. Many states do not meddle in the politics of other states; all states should commit to never doing so, especially not by violent means like assassinations, plotting coups, arming insurgents. Respecting democracy development by never interfering in another country's elections is in the long-run national interests of states.

Keyword Nuclear surety inspection · Hotlines · Electoral meddling · Assassinations · Coups

Nuclear Diplomacy

We have seen moments of triumph with nuclear diplomacy in South Africa, for example. Like Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela, we can find the South African transition from Apartheid to be a restorative

transition, grounded in an African conception of restorative values as *ubuntu*.

There are countless low profile nuclear triumphs. One is sharing some technologies for prevention of accidental wars with nuclear powers such as Pakistan that have been reckless and at risk of employing terrorists inside their military.¹ Diplomats of nuclear weapons democracies are short-term political realists, who, unlike spymaster Barnard in South Africa, are oriented to what leaders want for the next election cycle. Political mileage seems difficult from big moves to upset conservative elements in electorates by banning nuclear weapons in nuclear weapons states. The evidence shows that almost every candidate in every US presidential primary promises increased defence spending to deter other great powers. If diplomacy were a profession with a more plural and long-term vision than short-term realism, it would be professionally active in curating the evidence of long-term nuclear risks in the community conversation as a matter for evidence-based scientific contestation in the way good chief health officers do with epidemic risks.

There is a professional imperative to engage democratic publics and political parties with the evidence from 79 years of empirical experience on the risks of nuclear war from accident, misunderstanding, miscalculation as revealed in scenario training exercises discussed in Chapter 7, the frequency of technical faults, mentally overwrought political or military leaders, spies operating inside nuclear weapons plants or facilities to threaten other countries with false flag signals of threat, appearances of nuclear threat caused accidentally or intentionally by cyber-ops, cyberterrorism or garden variety cybercrime that unintentionally compromises a missile defense system when it was actually targeting something commercial about a satellite. The military-industrial complex that makes its living from weapons programs assures publics that these risks are controlled by rigorous nuclear surety systems. I will argue that this is false a lot of the time. It only has to be false at one inopportune moment to cascade to a nuclear winter extinction event. When experts talk frankly to each other, as opposed to publicly, they always say: 'Despite the most elaborate precautions, it is conceivable that technical malfunction or human failure, a misinterpreted incident or unauthorized action, could

trigger a nuclear disaster or nuclear war' (US Soviet Accident Measures Agreement, September 1971).

Nuclear Weapon Mishaps

This chapter will discuss how the incidence of disasters such as IT errors and failures of nuclear surety inspections to detect non-compliance are known to nuclear weapons states, and actively covered up. It is known that accidents were particularly common in the early decades of nuclear weapons with 1,200 significant incidents and accidents reported in the United States between 1950 and 1968, dropping later to 130 a year (Schlosser 2013, 329). During this transition, a distinction was made between loss, theft, or seizure of nuclear weapons (Empty Quiver incidents), damage to a weapon without any harm to the public or risk of detonation (Bent Spear incidents), and an accident that caused unauthorized launch or jettison of a weapon, a fire, an explosion, a release of radioactivity, or full-scale detonation (a Broken Arrow incident). Under-reporting has occurred across all these categories. The Atomic Archive reports only 32 nuclear weapons 'Broken Arrows' that have been declassified for the period 1950 to 1980. This includes six cases of losses of nuclear weapons that have never been recovered. Some of these are Russian rather than American.² There are many since 1980 though most have yet to be declassified (Maggelet and Oskins 2010; Eldridge 2020). On a regular basis, new incidents that are not on these lists are uncovered after years of cover-up. US nuclear bombs have been dropped by mistake; bombers with nuclear weapons on board have crashed, in one case carrying four nuclear weapons that caused formidable nuclear contamination (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 3).

One incident 20 miles from Cambridge University in England exposed several nuclear weapons to a raging fire that can be seen on the internet after a bomber crashed killing all crew. The official report of the incident quoted one officer: 'It was a miracle that one Mark 6 with exposed detonators (sheared) didn't go'. The meaning of this report was clear that if the exposed detonator that sheared had set off the high explosives inside 'the resulting explosion would have spread depleted uranium

across a wide area... one bomb detonating would have probably set off the other two' that were also fire-blackened by the incident. This was not a risk of a thermonuclear detonation, but rather of a Chernobyl-type incident endangering a substantial and heavily populated region of the United Kingdom. Five years later there was a fighter aircraft explosion; it accidentally dropped its fuel tanks on the tarmac; again a hydrogen bomb was dangerously engulfed in flames. These nuclear operations were then moved away from such a populated area. The most recent suspected but unconfirmed Broken Arrow incident occurred during the Ukraine War when the Russian flagship of its Black Sea fleet, the cruiser Moskva, was sunk by Ukrainian missiles with nuclear missiles feared on board (Stewart et al. 2022). Ukraine also destroyed large Russian bombers inside Russia that often have nuclear weapons on board. They were parked on an airfield for forward nuclear defense (Stewart et al. 2022). In 2023 Hamas rockets struck an Israeli military base where many nuclear weapons were stationed without hitting them.

Former US Defense Secretary William Perry reported that the United States has experienced at least three false alarms of incoming missiles and Russia at least two (Perry and Collina 2020, 47). Expert commentators always assumed there were others successfully covered up. Publication of information on the National Security Archive (2022) for the first time of incidents from the Carter presidency shows that there were at least three false alarms of missiles incoming to the United States in 1978, at least three in 1979 and at least two in 1980. One of these, on 9 November, 1979 involved NORAD missile warning display screens mistakenly indicating no fewer than 1,400 Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, information that simultaneously appeared on warning consoles at the Pentagon, Strategic Air Command, and elsewhere. As one reads the contemporaneous memo on the false warning from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, one can be excused for thinking that this was a unique, freak incident that would never happen again. But upon reading memos on all such false warnings of incoming nuclear missiles, they are all unique, freak incidents in their own way. This one resulted from mistaken use of a nuclear exercise tape on a NORAD computer. It was not detected until after air defense aircraft and the National Emergency Airborne Command Post had been launched. A year later

Brzezinski was awakened at 2.30 am by another warning of 220 Soviet submarine missiles incoming. Minutes after this initial alert, it was upgraded to a total Soviet attack of 2,200 warheads. This time the root cause of the error was a defective chip in a computer that was replaced at a cost of less than a dollar (Schlosser 2013, 367).

Threats have been made openly about the use of nuclear weapons at least twenty times by nuclear powers since Hiroshima and before the fusillade of threats during the current Ukraine war. Doubtless there were other threats on other occasions in secret diplomacy. These look like bluffs in retrospect. It is a dangerous thing to bluff about with other nuclear powers who are wary of the risk of believing that this time it is a bluff, when it is not.

Modelling of how many would die worldwide from nuclear winter and subsequent global famine from frozen fields is not unknowable. Models produce varied predictions on how many will die, but they are all catastrophic. Only some models for the most likely nuclear war (between Pakistan and India) predict an unprecedented impact on the ozone layer combined with a nuclear winter and famine for decades across the entire planet (Mills et al. 2014; Hess and Dale 2020; Jägermeyr et al. 2020; Helfand 2013). Another model concluded there might be no global nuclear winter and only regional environmental impacts from a Pakistan-India nuclear war (Reisner et al. 2019). We can reasonably predict such a war between the smaller nuclear powers would kill more people than World War II directly, and probably afflict two billion people around the world with famine (Witze 2020; Helfand 2013), a lot of them in China, many in the United States, and probably affect everyone in some way by a subsequent global economic recession and epidemics. As with all future nuclear wars, they will kill more people in countries that are not fighting the war than in countries that are.

On March 9, 2022, India accidentally launched a missile that struck Pakistan (Das 2022). It was a nuclear-capable form of missile jointly produced by India and Russia, but had no live nuclear warhead. Luckily it did not strike any aircraft in the high-density air traffic zones of its trajectory. It landed safely but near a Pakistan city. No one was injured, property damage was not major. The Indian government was so unaware in its monitoring of this accidental launch that it did not seem to track

it and did not appear aware that it had struck Pakistan until Pakistan advised them that they were preparing a retaliatory launch (Das 2022). That is not surprising because the flight time of a supersonic missile between India and Pakistan is only 6 minutes. India and Pakistan do have a hotline to advise each other of missile testing launches and where the missile might land. Paradoxically, this increases the danger from a fully accidental launch of the kind that occurred in 2022. It was not a test firing that went wrong; it was a launch that was not intended to happen at all. According to the Indian government statement, it was launched by ‘technical malfunction’. Alarm could easily have been more acute in Pakistan had they checked before the missile landed whether they had been advised of any test firings and received the answer that they had not been advised of any.

Former US Defense Secretary William Perry pointed out that former presidents Nixon and Kennedy made heavy use of pain medication that may have clouded their thinking at certain times of crisis and that President Reagan may have been suffering early effects of Alzheimer’s disease, testing his rationality at times during the final years of his Presidency (Perry and Collina 2020, 31). According to the CIA’s former Asia specialist, President Nixon ordered a nuclear strike on North Korea after a US spy plane was downed killing 31 Americans. Henry Kissinger then phoned the Joint Chiefs to secure their agreement ‘not to do anything until Nixon sobered up in the morning’ (Perry and Collina 2020, 80). When the 1991 coup attempt arrested Gorbachev, the plotters appointed an ‘unsteady and inebriated Yanayev’ as an interim Soviet president. He was given custody of the nuclear ‘football’ until the State of Emergency ended (Krepon 2021, 398). It is not just Presidents that have risky influence over nuclear weapons when drunk. A US National Academy of Science (1986: Part IV) study reported that there were then 120,000 members of the US military with access to nuclear weapons and a surprisingly high number of them had serious problems with abuse of alcohol, heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and other drugs.

President Nixon also had periods of clinical depression when Secretary of Defense Schlesinger instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to route ‘any emergency order coming from the president’—such as a nuclear launch order—through him first (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 6). In

1983, Soviet premier Andropov was unwell, indeed dying, depressed, and paranoid, equating President Reagan to Hitler and fearing a US preemptive nuclear strike. Reagan became concerned that this was not understood at the time and was puzzled by why the Soviets 'are so paranoid about being attacked... we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing that. What the hell have they got that anyone would want?' (Lewis and Stein 2018; see more generally, National Security Archive 2013). During that period of Andropov paranoia and one month into the final six months of his life when he was a permanently hospitalized General Secretary, Colonel Stanislav Petrov was the responsible Soviet officer validating early-warning satellite detection of NATO nuclear missile launches. On September 26, 1983 Popov detected five US missile launches. The Soviet early warning satellites were operating correctly; all systems then checked out correctly (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 3). His *duty* under Soviet early warning procedures was to report this, but in the few minutes he had to do so, he refused, simply because he thought 'when people start a war, they don't start it with only five missiles'. When others became aware of this, he insisted it was a false alarm. He actually had no evidence of this. Luckily for Petrov, it was discovered later that the 'launches' were an illusion produced by sunlight reflecting off tops of clouds. This near miss became known to US intelligence through a double agent. It stoked President Reagan's fear that he would be President when the Biblical prediction of Armageddon occurred (Krepon 2021).

In a not dissimilar 1995 Moscow error where not five, but only one incoming missile was detected, advanced preparations for war did occur at the hands of President Yeltsin who was not paranoid in the way Andropov was, though he did count vodka consumption more by the bottle than the glass. The Russian early warning system detected a missile launch off the coast of Norway with characteristics similar to those of a US submarine-launched nuclear missile, allowing very few minutes for decision. Fearing it could be the nearest launch of a much larger attack from further afield, Russian forces were put on full alert. President Yeltsin activated his 'nuclear football' and retrieved launch codes preparing for a retaliatory launch. Fortunately, when Russian satellites did not reveal any additional launches from US missile fields, a false alarm began to be

suspected. It turned out to be launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket on a mission to study the aurora borealis. Norwegian notification of the launch had failed to land on the right Russian desk in a timely fashion (Schlosser 2013, 478). In an earlier Norwegian incident in 1960, it was the United States that suffered the false alarm which put its nuclear strike force on maximum alert. US radar was fooled by an unusual moonrise over Norway that it read as a large-scale attack (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 4).

A second Russian officer who, like Colonel Petrov, behaved treasonously to save the planet was Vasili Arkhipov (Wilson 2012). Only this century did we learn that this incident that pushed us nearest to nuclear Armageddon occurred inside a Russian submarine in the Caribbean during the Cuban Crisis. The cream of the US fleet was gathered in the Caribbean, with many nuclear weapons on board. Premier Krushchev had given discretion to his submarine commanders to fire their nuclear weapons to wipe out the US fleet without authorization from Moscow the instant war broke out. One sub was buffeted by a volley of depth charges from the US navy above. They were actually not depth charges that could sink a sub. They were practice rounds for training exercises. The Americans wanted to force the Russian sub to the surface without harm. This was misunderstood inside the bubble of a submarine designed for Arctic service where crew suffered temperatures as high as 50C in the Caribbean. The crew and its leadership believed war had started. The submarine Captain ordered loading the first nuclear weapon to fire at the US fleet. Protocols required agreement of two other officers on the sub to authorize nuclear launch. One agreed immediately with his captain; Arkhipov refused, again in circumstances where his orders required him to follow procedures to agree. US defense secretary of the time, Robert McNamara, made it crystal clear that had that nuclear missile been launched, US missile launches aimed at the Soviet Union would have launched. Nuclear escalation would have been uncontrollable. Bless you Arkhipov and Colonel Petrov, treasonous ethical criminals of this redemptive parable.

I now imagine a third parable of treason by a bad criminal. He has no nationality. He is a talented young hacker with mental health issues. He is recruited with an offer he can't refuse by cyber-ops of one of the

great powers. He joins a large team of hackers, many of them even more talented than himself. The job of the team is to come up with strategies for penetrating the nuclear missile systems of other nuclear powers. His new girlfriend helps him lovingly with his mental health issues in his stressful new job. She persuades him to become an Islamic State agent. He comes up with an idea for causing Islamic State's 'two great satans'—Russia and America—to destroy each other. He implements it.

Hawks of the great powers also reflect on the parable of the good criminal. The conclusion of the worst of them is that we *can* win a nuclear war because our side is capable of being more ruthless than the other side in requiring nuclear warriors to follow their orders. Putin thinks this way about his regime's ruthlessness. So did Saddam Hussein before he dismantled his WMD program. So does Kim Jong-un. The German and Japanese leadership thought this way in World War II, even if *we* thought it irrational to attack Pearl Harbor. Sadly, some of the worst of NATO's hawks think this way as well. They think they can make *their* Doomsday Machine more ruthless at Mutual Assured Destruction than Russia or China's Doomsday Machine by locking in algorithmically, in more cleverly ruthless ways than their enemies (Ellsberg 2017).

Reflecting on the risks of innovative AI cat and mouse, my hypothesis is that the planet has no chance of surviving the next century or two unless we follow through on what Kennedy and Krushchev began after the Cuban Missile crisis and what Gorbachev and Reagan took so much further after 1985. Like these leaders, our generation can set sail to continuously improve mutual assistance with nuclear surety and strategic arms reductions to bring us closer to the point where total abolition of weapons of mass destruction becomes a more plausible option than it is today.

Secretary Perry reported that Pentagon analyses showed that the President could be faced with 'false warnings of attack or lose the ability to control nuclear weapons' as a result of cyber-attacks (Perry and Collina 2020, 23). An incident occurred on October 23, 2010 when a launch control center at Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming lost contact for an hour with 50 Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 4). No rash judgment was made that this was a Chinese or Russian cyber-attack to disable US launch systems

in advance of attack. The worry is that at a time of more geostrategic conflict than 2010, such an erroneous interpretation might occur. Head of the US Strategic Command, General C. Robert Kehler when asked before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013, insisted that US nuclear weapons were well protected against cyber-attack, but then acknowledged, 'We don't know what we don't know'. When asked if Russia and China were capable of preventing one of their nuclear missiles being launched by hackers, he said 'Senator, I don't know' (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 5). An honest answer. Along many possible pathways, the danger is blunder into nuclear war, more than rational decisions to be an aggressor. With such existential risks, we cannot accept the view that these risks are unknowable and there is not much that we can do about them. There is much to do about them.

For example, deadly simple sloth poses one preventable risk of mass killing. Sloth is something we can fix so long as we are not averting our eyes from the problem. The next section ponders sloth in nuclear surety inspection.

Nuclear Surety Inspection as Restorative Regulatory Diplomacy

Nuclear surety inspections are something we know little about from any of the nuclear weapons states. Nuclear surety inspections mean safety and security inspections regarding nuclear weapons. It is to the credit of the United States that there have been some moments of transparency about its nuclear surety inspections. We might reasonably assume that states like Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, where transparency is more wanting than in the United States, are more vulnerable to nuclear weapon blunders born of inspectorial sloppiness. Diplomats of most states are slothful about diplomatic negotiations to seek mutual assurance that there is adequate transparency about nuclear surety inspections. It is 'not my job' or 'above my paygrade'.

In August 2007 six advanced nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly loaded onto a B-52 bomber named 'Doom 99' at a North Dakota air base. In spite of various moments when protocols required

crew to verify that the missiles were not armed, no one checked for live weapons at any mandated stage. The plane with its nuclear-armed cruise missiles sat overnight on the tarmac in North Dakota, unguarded. Next day it flew 1500 miles across the United States to Louisiana where it sat on a tarmac there unguarded again for another 9 hours before a maintenance crew realized that it carried nuclear weapons that were live (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 5). There were 36 hours before maintenance became the first to realize that 6 live nuclear missiles had gone missing (Schlosser 2013, 473). Findings of dereliction of duty followed. This is not a story from Pakistan where mobile nuclear vehicles endlessly drive the highways to avoid Indian detection. In North Dakota, fear of them going missing into the hands of the Taliban or Islamic State is mercifully much less than on the highways of Pakistan.

The most worrying nuclear warhead incidents take a long time to leak, often by aging leakers who want to do the right thing before they die. By this time states can say that these were governance failures of a different era. We have seen that the most potentially catastrophic accidental cascades toward nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 did not leak until this century. It was not until 2021 that the New York Times leaked that in 1958, a time of Chinese artillery bombardment of Taiwan, the US high command had advocated and prepared for a nuclear first strike against China. Nuclear weapons were transported to Taiwan. President Eisenhower, the old general of D-Day, was terrified, and an unusually potent president for shutting down this Pentagon adventurism. The leaker of these secret documents was old and openly invited his prosecution. Perhaps then the first law of geopolitics should be:

Geopolitics is full of well concealed recklessness in incipient promotion of mass destruction.

Robert Dahl (1953, 1) wrote that it was a 'plain statement of fact' that 'the political processes of democracy do not operate effectively' with nuclear policy because it is subject to institutionalized and concentrated secrecy more ruthless than that commanded by any despot. No less an American Prometheus than Robert Oppenheimer really was playing with

fire when he sought to break out of that secrecy taboo. Oppenheimer was right that in a short space of years after Hiroshima the destructive power of atomic bombs would multiply a million-fold and the complexity of control would also multiply exponentially unless a simple, enforceable global ban on their use in war ever again was institutionalized immediately. There is a bigger risk that interacts with this first law, however. The second law of geopolitics could be expressed as:

Accidental nuclear war is a much higher risk than intended nuclear war. Indent, as in the first law that precedes it.

A corollary from these laws is, as former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has expressed it in conversations with me:

‘Sheer dumb luck’ is the reason that neither nuclear accidents, nor the intent of mentally unbalanced leaders, have not yet caused mass catastrophe.³

We must inspire the next generation of regulatory researchers to do a particular kind of regulatory research to *make* better luck for the planet. That contribution will not be made by studying the governance failures of high-profile events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, nor the 1958 Taiwan nuclear tilt, because by the time the leaks occur, the case relates to yesterday’s governance, yesterday’s technologies. The senior players will be too dead to interview. The contribution I want to inspire is studying with a fine-tooth comb domestic incidents like Doom 99 that are less sensitive because they are domestic rather than international, and do *not* blow up to harm any person or international relationship. For such cases, researchers can get surprisingly good documentary evidence, albeit heavily redacted.

There had been earlier incidents before Doom 99 where nuclear weapons or sensitive parts of them had gone missing for a period while they’d been sent hither and thither, including to foreign countries not authorized to access that technology. Four years before Doom 99, in 2003, half of US Air Force units responsible for nuclear weapons failed their nuclear surety inspections even though they had advance warning of the inspections (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 5). One of the bomber wings that failed its nuclear surety inspection in 2003 was

that wing in North Dakota that left the live missiles unguarded on two tarmacs and flew them across America.

An Air Force Inspector General report found that the pass rate for nuclear surety inspections had been in decline for some time and hit an all-time low in 2003 (Union of Concerned Scientists 2015, 5). The Cold War was over; the political class had little interest in nuclear weapon regulation. The hypothesis I advance for future research is:

Neoliberal and unresponsive regulatory institutions for air and space threaten catastrophe.

I am a longstanding student of regulatory inspection. The evidence is reasonably good that old-fashioned street-level governance by inspection does work in areas related to safety. Just as with policing at hot spots of crime, this is about detection rather than the severity of punishment (Braithwaite 2022, Chapter 9). In contrast, evidence that it is sound policy to replace conversational inspections with desk audits or algorithmic auditing is thin, at least at this point. That is certainly not to deny that there are some things computers can control more reliably than humans—flying a plane safely in most circumstances is already one of them. Yet we know from quality empirical research on the Afghanistan war that *when there is a human interface*, drones regulated by computers are usually found to kill the wrong persons, in aggregate murdering high ratios of children and other non-combatants to intended targets (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018). Mafia method is more horrible and confronting, but because it is more relational and street-level regulation, it is more reliable than drone targeting: The hit man has a brief conversation with a person in search of contextual evidence of targeting error, then he ends the conversational regulation of reliability with a bullet to the head.

The Rand Corporation does not agree with me on inspections. Rand leans toward what might be called a neoliberal view of deregulating the inspections that fetter the military-industrial complex, which founded Rand. In 2013 Rand produced a Technical Report for the US Airforce called ‘Charting the Course for a New Air Force Inspection System’. It opens under a heading entitled ‘Reducing the Inspection Footprint’:

The Air Force is seeking ways to reduce (1) the number of days each year that a wing is subject to some external oversight event, and (2) the resources consumed – by both inspectors and inspectees - for each event. To this end the Air Force has already begun synchronizing Inspector General inspections and functional assessments so that they occur on the same days. It also plans ... that fewer external inspectors and assessors are required and wing personnel spend less time preparing for and talking with those who come. (Camm et al. 2013, xiv)

The Air Force and Rand are not enthusiasts for conversational, relational regulation as they entertain prospects of less time-wasting talking to inspectors. Like Rand, readers might trust the US Air Force and also want to cut regulatory conversations about being meticulous with extreme surety risks.

It is amazing that the policy debates around how to regulate the surety of the US nuclear arsenal are so like those on the regulation of aged care in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Braithwaite et al. 2007). One of those shared themes between aged care and nuclear care is on the imperative for some inspections to be surprise inspections, contrary to the Rand recommendations. This came up in Major General Raaberg's report into this flight of six live nuclear warheads from North Dakota. The general found that the absence of no-notice inspections was one proximate cause. He reported:

Most units adequately prepare and stand poised when the Nuclear Surety ... team arrives. They have trained the 'A-Team' to meet the inspectors and the 'B Team' to be in the shadows when possible. (Raaberg 2007, 10)

It is almost beyond belief to regulatory scholars that the nuclear surety inspection system in the United States existed for 60 years without no-notice inspections, something that has been long demonstrated in fields like nursing home inspection to be essential for assurance (Braithwaite et al. 2007). No-notice inspections may or may not have been introduced after General Raaberg's report, or, as often happens, they may have been announced that they are an option that becomes a rarely implemented option. Reports so often recommend introduction of no-notice inspections that are accepted by governments, then after initial implementation

with vigor, over time no-notice inspections become infrequent as regulatory capture sets in again. The general used Doom 99 to open the lid on a widespread problem. He concluded that ‘the intricate system of nuclear checks and balances was either ignored or disregarded’ (Raaberg 2007, 10). ‘If the senior controller had accessed the software-tracking program (MUNSCON) to verify its status’ (p. 31) it would have been instantly apparent that nuclear weapons were moving about in breach of safety protocols. While algorithmic regulation was on tap to Air Force risk management, the algorithms were like fire alarms that switch off when the fire is hottest. General Raaberg reported that when staff came to the Special Weapons Flight meetings, not only were their computers not switched on, but they did not even have the printed maintenance schedule. They knew nothing of a 1978 form designed to counter this risk called the ‘Weapons Custody Transfer’ document. It had fallen into disuse. No one knew it was tucked away in a forgotten corner of a website for decades. The General reported ‘Every witness testified that they came to the Special Weapons Flight meetings with blank notebooks ... They relied on [an erroneous] set of slides produced by a very young Plans & Scheduling Airman (a one-striper)’ (Raaberg 2007, 14). The scary thing is that they behave just like we university professors attending conferences with blank notebooks staring at false or confusing PowerPoints!

What was required in this wing was a more conversational and restorative form of regulatory diplomacy. There is now a large empirical literature from other domains on the effectiveness of regulatory diplomacy that is restorative and responsive (Braithwaite 2022). A root cause of this surety breach, according to General Raaberg, was bullying. Robo-regulation or desk auditing cannot catalyze healing and transformation of a subunit that quakes in fear of a bully. The general reported: ‘Verbal testimony indicates that “X” was an ineffective leader who routinely chastised his personnel. His subordinates frequently worked through lunch ... he would keep them beyond normal work hours (without pay) in an effort to assert his dominance ... He created a hostile working environment’ in which subordinates could not go to him for help or advice. (Raaberg 2007, 35).

The literature rarely discusses military bullying as a possible cause of nuclear war. That is where regulation of recklessness can be important. We have already discussed how in the era of cyber-ops against securities markets, risk is palpable when a bullying Pakistan general can say that crash of the Karachi Stock Exchange that is inexplicable will be interpreted as an act of war by India (and should trigger nuclear alerts). This is a Karachi exchange highly prone to crash because its economy has defaulted recently and has been bailed out a total of 13 times by the IMF.

One way that US nuclear surety inspection is even more worrying than Australian Aged Care inspection concerns the depth of military-industrial complex entanglement illustrated through the Rand report. Lockheed Martin is a funder of space research at the two universities where I have recently worked (Australian National University and University of Maryland) and a huge player in nuclear weapons programs. It is the world's largest military contractor. In 2016 Lockheed Martin, which was managing a data base for the US department of defense *lost* 100,000 Air Force Inspector General Files, all its Freedom of Information requests, all records relating to Inspector General complaints, Inspector General investigations, and appeals (Wong 2016; Cassel 2016). All backups of these files were also corrupted (Weisgerber 2016)! The Air Force reported that the data had been lost in a crash not caused by attack from outside. A week or so later they found them again. This was not confidence-building with data so sensitive. But at least these files that I commend to regulation researchers for now are available again for some level of access under US Freedom of Information laws.

Brent Fisse and I long ago visited firms like Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas to discuss what was their modus operandi in corrupting so many world leaders, as senior as Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan (Fisse and Braithwaite 1983). I have argued that it is better for universities to avoid funding by firms like Lockheed Martin and Boeing (that took over McDonnell-Douglas to become the world's second largest military contractor after Lockheed). These firms have such an interest in expanding sales of dangerous products that it is better to get them right out of being financially and collaboratively entangled with university aerospace researchers. Second, it seems important that independent

university regulatory governance researchers supplant corporate members of the military-industrial complex like Lockheed Martin and Rand (that was originally founded by McDonnell-Douglas with support from the US Air Force) as leaders of research and thinking on regulatory safety around weapons of mass destruction. One reason is that regulatory researchers connect governance up to a global imagination that transcends corporate interests and national security policy frames.

Cyber ops or even cybercrime in and around US (or Chinese, or Indian) nuclear command and control systems on earth or in space could spark a response that inadvertently escalates conventional conflict toward nuclear war. Someone targets a satellite for conventional reasons without realizing that satellite is secretly central to the launch of nuclear weapons. The essence of this book is that there are some simple solutions to the speed of coupled crises that are complex. One is simple, independent, transparent regulatory architectures that allow inspectors to arrive at air force bases on surprise checks that nuclear weapons are properly secured from cyber-attack, from incompetence, from military sloth, from bullies. These are not hard to mandate.

Beyond Neocon or Realist Verities

As we see with climate politics, with covid and vaccine nationalism, realist international relations theory, making America or Britain great again, is not fully realistic. Even regional hegemony is not realistic; it did Napoleon no good, nor Hitler, nor any of the men with such ambitions during the 30-Years War in Europe. Japan's projects for regional Asian hegemony were also duds. When we university scholars engage our Chinese friends in conversations about why regional Chinese hegemony is not in the interests of China, they sometimes retort: Coercive US diplomacy has managed stable regional hegemony over the Americas for more than a century; why not in Asia? University people must engage them with the counterpoint that American regional hegemony has not been stable. It has created the most violent region in the world, with the highest rates of police killings and common murders, the highest rates of covid, and massive contributions to climate catastrophe. The three

largest precautionary lenders from the IMF have been Latin American countries. Not so stable; not so pretty. So we scholars might engage our Chinese friends thus: Please do not do for Asia what the United States did for the Americas—that might blow back into violence inside China in the way violence engendered in Latin America persistently blows back into the United States. A US homicide rate that is higher than all other wealthy countries, a heroin, fentanyl and opioid epidemic that has made the United States the only developed economy that has suffered a decline in its life expectancy since 2015, these cause far greater loss of life than wars and terrorism for the United States. Great powers have less to fear from each other than from failures to work effectively with each other to tame global and regional threats to the wellbeing of their people.

Because risks of total war are nevertheless so catastrophic, we all have an interest in stability and balances of power that change at a pace societies have time to adjust to. Restorative diplomacy can accomplish that in combination with suites of institutional stabilizers that are learning institutions, yet tried and true, simple enough for poorer societies like North Korea or Pakistan. We need to defend simple regulatory institutions with stable foundations for learning how to sustain complex risk prevention, such as the WHO and the nuclear non-proliferation regime that, after all, has kept 95% of the world's states nuclear weapons-free, WHO making wonderful contributions to containing ebola inside Africa.

A problem with realism as a theory is that it conceives the hard power of states as the power that matters. Actually, restorative university to university diplomacy has better prospects of reshaping Chinese and US thinking in the long historical journey of contested governance ideas, and better prospects of reshaping it in an evidence-based way. One reason is, as Mahbubani (2022, 135) says, 'Chinese culture has revered scholars more than soldiers'. For centuries, China has not been militarist in the manner of Western societies that have been in the business of invading other countries. As Henry Kissinger (2011, 25) put it, foundations of Chinese military theory 'were laid during a period of upheaval when ruthless struggles between rival kingdoms decimated China's population. Reacting to their slaughter ... Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct

conflict' (quoted by Mahbubani (2022, 133). This was the thought of Sun Tzu that, 'To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill'. Today that subordination is about the rising Chinese knowledge and infrastructural economy; the belt and road of infrastructure and of ideas. Universities can engage restoratively with it, because it needs national and international universities to succeed.

Relational Excellence in Diplomacy

What is wrong with diplomacy as an evidence-based profession that in its day-to-day preoccupations fails to place these empirical questions at the center of public debate? While diplomats can reasonably say that the risk of nuclear war next year on the horizon of their political masters is slight, they well know that if they scale up slight annual risks to a hundred-year risk, based on an understanding that some risk cascades may have complex interactions to exponential effects, without diplomatic reform, risks of nuclear war during the next century are high. A professional craft only of the day-to-day leads to doom. Every country is likely to suffer the nuclear fall-out or the famine, the deep global recession, and the epidemics. The reason the profession of diplomacy neglects the deepest empirics of diplomatic risk is that it can be a supine profession that has the same pathologies of finance manifested as a profession (academically and as a practice) before the Global Financial Crisis. These were finance pathologies of short-termism, allowing hope to triumph over experience and evidence, of playing the game of pass the parcel cleverly, making hay until the music stops, and sloth. Some knock-on effects of both professional failings of evidence-based professionalism are shocking. It is disappointing also when climate change modelers, as they model global warming projections, fail to qualify their models in the public debate they lead by recognition that nuclear war is a long-term possibility, if not probability, that can reverse all these trends in well understood ways into catastrophic global cooling. We must 'follow the science', including the science of modeling nuclear winter, as we prescribe policies to keep climate and ecosystems in balance.

Although diplomacy can sometimes be a supine form of professionalism that smothers rather than enables fearless, robust scientific contestation of big questions, noble exceptions are many. No practicing diplomat or leader of a major party in Australia is interested in educating the Australian public that many Australians could die as a result of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry has done so, however, through his William J. Perry project.⁴ So does Australia's distinguished former long-term Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (2022). But the broader contemporary debate on this regional risk is muted and politically irrelevant in short-termist public discourse.

For a few years, citizens of the planet thought of the Paris Climate Conference as one of those profoundly redemptive moments for public diplomacy as a craft. There remains no doubt that at that diplomatic high watermark, many diplomats from diverse levels of many states and civil societies performed with diplomatic finesse. The negotiations were difficult, but the diplomacy was extraordinary in the way it brought formerly rogue states of the climate regime—China, Australia, India, Russia, and the United States—seemingly into the embrace of the prudence and decency of the regime. Paris sadly became a false dawn. President Trump quickly withdrew the state that had contributed most carbon to the carbon stock. But the washup was worse than old rogue states rampaging rogue again. Many states over-promised at Paris and under-delivered in the years since. Chapter 10 shows that over-promising and under-delivering on crisis risk prevention is a recurrent condition of the corrupted diplomacy of our present predicament. Climate falsehoods are amplified on internet platforms where advertising revenue flows from clicks on the news stories captive constituencies want to hear. On the other hand, climate diplomacy before, during, and after Paris demonstrated a full realization that diplomacy has become a networked activity of many webs⁵—business actors, universities, sub-national governments, movements of school children—who get on with it whatever states decide.

For all that, we must see the good within the bad, the diplomats who did work so hard and so nobly at Paris, plus William Perry, John Burton, and Gareth Evans, the Nobel Prize winning ICANNs of educating the

Australian public to the dangers of a Pakistan-India nuclear war, and conservative white South African spymasters and diplomats of nuclear disarmament who served their continent and the planet nobly.

Relational excellence has already been revealed in spymaster Barnard's relationship with Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders. This was a key to understanding good and evil in the souls of spymasters. Now let us build this clue into a fundamental principle of redemptive diplomacy that can be generative. This principle involves redefining diplomacy as a craft of sustaining cooperative relationships with presumed enemies. History repeatedly disproves our presumptions on who are friends that help us and who are enemies. In international affairs, societies and networks do best to treat everyone as friends worthy of relational diplomatic investment at least at times, just as Churchill and Stalin came to acquire formidable affection for each other. This was when in 1945 Churchill developed his foolhardy 'Operation Unthinkable', vetoed by the Americans and Atlee's British Labour Party to persuade German forces to join with the Allies to defeat Russia. British Prime Minister Palmerston's (1848) time was not as effused with flux as the present, yet he was able to see from his vantage point of preoccupation with France as the old enemy: 'We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies'. Palmerston's insight is why a relational diplomacy of frenemies is rational for diplomats with a long-term imagination. Populist vilification of enemies is unprofessional, not the stuff of statecraft. At best it serves only politicians myopically motivated by the next election.

Public Diplomacy for Uncertain Times

Diplomats define public diplomacy as activities of one state to communicate a message to citizens of another that the first state wants to persuade them to believe. This book seeks to persuade diplomacy to throw off such statist shackles in the way it defines its craft. That must apply to public diplomacy as well. A better professional ethos for diplomacy would be built on a public diplomacy that embraces domestic and international citizens together with states in conversations about how to build peace, prosperity and contain crises; diplomacy with citizens and international

society rather than diplomacy for them, or that does things to them, and not diplomacy that marginalizes civil society.

Autesserre (2014) and many others have documented how diplomats in country at times of crisis often fail to understand what is going on at local levels because they hunker down for their security inside compounds. For example, Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018: 412–27) showed that when the people of Nepal took over the streets of the capital hand in hand with Maoist rebels who had agreed to surrender their weapons to a nonviolent transition from a monarchical system, Western diplomats were not out mixing with the crowd. They were hiding in their embassy compounds for fear of security risks. As a result of this professional timidity, Western embassies completely misdiagnosed the politics of the situation. In *Why Intelligence Fails*, Robert Jervis (2010) likewise found failure is about inadequate practical presence to listen. The remedy is conversations on the ground combined with variety in the ways that the dialogic crafts of intelligence and diplomacy become less sealed off from complex cacophonies of local voices.

A virtue of a very localized response to all types of crises is that at the local level the full richness in the diversity of voices can be heard. The voices excluded from higher levels of governance can be the most distinctive voices; they are important to hear because they are distinctive. Diversity in perspectives is a driver of complexity. So a simple principle for grappling with complexity is active strategies to avert exclusion, not only in diplomacy, but in life.

Jervis diagnosed a more general problem of truncated and siloed dialogue. US foreign affairs professionals had a vertical hierarchical approach to communication as opposed to a horizontal ethos that searches for radical pluralization of perspectives.⁶ This extended even to cutting off academic experts on a country of concern. CIA analysts expected a chilly reception if they reached out to academics, especially contrarian ones. Their ethos meant they felt uncomfortable even talking with people without clearances about questions that puzzled them. This added up to a culture of evidence gathering without peer review. The culture of short briefing notes that could be fitted on a page or two meant that footnotes that cited sources for assertions (and sources that refuted

them!) that might be checked by peers came late to the US intelligence community.

Consequently, there is an imperative for diplomacy as a craft to learn from past mistakes to become a more relational and dialogic craft of testing ideas horizontally. Jervis (2010) concluded that the vertical thinking and communication patterns of intelligence analysis conduced to middle-of-the-road conservatism that missed early warning of revolutionary tipping points to crisis. Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018, Chapter 12) advocated a preventive diplomacy wiki approach to garnering more plural voices and ideas for prevention before crises spiral out of control.

The Ethos of Winning

When lives are lived in alienation, imbued with cultures of celebrity that glorify winning, being number one is a nationalist balm for alienated people who have not realized that life is for the joy of shared living with kindness rather than for winning. It is an ancient ideal to build a world that is more relational and healing of harms, where even the most profound harms elicit apology, forgiveness, collective memory for the hurt and lessons learnt from it, to build that better world for our children. Diplomacy cannot be relational and restorative without doing a lot of deep listening to adversaries, and without surprising old enemies by helping them in order to heal torn relationships with them. That was the genius of the Marshall plan. Germany, Italy, and Japan emerged from World War II as remarkably peaceful major powers with war-mongering pasts. While Versailles was not as punitive as Hitler's propaganda argued, there is little doubt that the ceremony at Versailles was a ritual of humiliation for the German leaders. The ethos of the historical event was punitive, while the ethos of Marshall was gifts for rebuilding and reconciliation rather than punishment (which was reserved only for German and Japanese war criminals under the new international criminal law first crafted at Nuremberg).

There is no contradiction between restorative justice and accountability. Restorative justice after war, as Desmond Tutu taught us, is justice

with love for those who suffered the war on both sides. Healing required gifts and social support to bring about change more than punishment. But accountability and truth-telling are also centrally important to restorative justice. These ideas are well developed in the restorative justice literature. A feature of restorative justice that is insufficiently discussed, however, is that it is not about winning. An important aspect of restorative criminal justice is that offenders accept responsibility for their wrongs and do their best to repair the harm. One pathway to this ideal is that third parties in the circle accept responsibility for how they contributed to the wrongdoing in non-criminal ways, for example by failing to prevent it. A classic restorative justice narrative about this is the school bully who does serious injury when he hits a child; he denies responsibility before the restorative encounter; then he shifts to accept responsibility when a respected friend catalyzes the restorative journey by saying that he wants to accept responsibility because he is a respected older boy who could have stopped the attack instead of walking by. With transitions from war as well as from bullying, it is normally best if everyone sees themselves as a loser from the wounds of violence, and that everyone can benefit from the restorative journey of healing those wounds. Both World Wars were wanting in the restorative justice of victors accepting their responsibility for war crimes.

Just as restorative justice does not position the defendant as a loser if convicted, a winner if acquitted, so the ethos of restorative diplomacy is of no winners or losers, but of healing conflicts through improved relationships and accountability that works best when it is shared—multiplex accountability. It looks to states to put up their hands and say we contributed to the Rwanda genocide, by failing to support investment in a large UN peace operation there, for example.

There are no winners of climate politics, nor in global pandemic prevention, no winners in nuclear war politics, nor in the more general diplomacy of war and peace, only some states that step up better to learn lessons from the last catastrophe, and launch preventive diplomacy attuned to how things have changed since then, in fellowship with diplomats from other nations. This involves creating the right kinds of institutional spaces for competition—such as competition in markets for vaccines to prevent pandemics, for markets that make economies

more robust to face the next recession—but also institutions that regulate competition, temper monopolies, to prevent excesses that cascade to catastrophe. No one wins the wars of covid diplomacy; every society can seek to give gifts to build a more capable World Health Organization that helps all societies to respond more effectively next time.

Diplomacy's ethos of winning is especially pathological among great power diplomats, because it conduces to world wars, at least since Napoleon, certainly since 1914. Great Powers perceive a history of winning diplomatic contests as underwriting their power. That is a correct perception looking back to eras of battleship diplomacy, but a prescription for mass extinctions today. Diplomatic excellence today is about strong states that help weaker states. Marshall is a light on the hill for that non-winner diplomacy of humility and generosity.

Interfering in the Domestic Politics of Others

Deep listening followed by cooperatively working 'with' other societies to fix problems rather than doing things 'for' them or 'to' them cannot possibly happen when states covertly meddle in the domestic politics of other societies. Meddling is by definition 'doing to'. It is usually covert because it is criminal conduct under the laws of that country and often under international law. For example, most states have laws that require disclosure of election campaign contributions and forbid contributions from foreign states. So this can only be done covertly and illegally. Assassination of political actors in another country is murder under the criminal laws of all countries. So assassination is almost always covert. If a state flies hundreds of drone attacks into another country to kill targeted individuals, which inevitably results in collateral deaths to untargeted individuals as well,⁷ that is also an invasion of that country, which is a crime of aggression in international law. The United States has flown hundreds of such sorties in Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and many other societies of the Global South. Unless it declares war against those countries to defend itself from them, these are war crimes at scale approved by US presidents. Israel is another country that has undertaken extrajudicial murders inside other countries against actors it

regards as enemies without declaring war against those countries. Russia, Rwanda, and North Korea have been among other countries responsible for extrajudicial assassinations in foreign countries in recent years. One should not be overly gloomy about the scale of this destabilizing problem that has always been with us. It is probably safe to suspect that the overwhelming majority of states have not been responsible for a single offshore assassination this century.

When states meddle by covert killing, they often dissemble with claims that this was likely a false flag operation, or they simply deny it. All countries are normally reluctant to admit that they launched drone attacks on enemy individuals in another country. Exceptions arise where a named target has been widely defined as a terrorist in international media discourse, Osama bin Laden for example. The United States claimed credit because even though it was legally murder and an invasion of the sovereignty of an allied state (Pakistan), the killing paid a domestic political dividend. It was viewed as just by most American voters even though it was extrajudicial, and even though the United States gave the victim no opportunity to surrender to be put before a court of law. How would the United States react if a Russian drone targeted officials of the Chechen government-in-exile who planned terror against Russian citizens, who live openly in the United States, and killed a US citizen as collateral damage? Russians complain that US reactions are hypocritical in precisely these ways (Beebe 2019, 56).

Another common and criminal form of meddling in the politics of another country is to bribe its politicians. Supplying weapons to insurgents or terrorists inside that foreign country opens paths to meddle. Another is to support the military operations of one side of a nascent civil war inside that country by flying drones to make strikes to support their operations without a declaration of war. Again the modus operandi is simply denial, to say that it is Ukrainians targeting drones that strike Crimea, not Americans. Imagine the following counterfactual in relation to the successful December 2022 attack on the Engels Airforce Base in Russia that seems to have badly damaged at least two Russian strategic nuclear bombers. Imagine one of those large Russian bombers had five nuclear weapons on board when it was destroyed. We know in the United States it is not uncommon for aircraft to sit on tarmacs loaded with live

nuclear missiles, so why could that not happen in Russia? There are many reasons why it could. Sometimes nuclear weapons are furtively moved from one air base to another to make enemy targeting more uncertain; sometimes they are moved from one base to another for particular kinds of maintenance on missiles undertaken on a base that has the workshops equipped for specialized technical work. In this scenario, after the five nuclear weapons are hit inside Russia, and if Russia decides to retaliate with a nuclear strike, it might consider striking NATO as well as Ukraine if it has intelligence that NATO personnel had been involved in targeting the strikes. That is why hands-on NATO involvement in targeting acts of war without a declaration of war is dangerous—even if a declaration of war is more dangerous. Now let us consider in turn the evidence on the effectiveness and ethics of all these forms of meddling one by one.

Does Foreign Electoral Interference Work?

The short answer to whether foreign interventions in elections work is yes, remarkably well and often. Dov Levin's (2020a, b) empirical modelling of elections known to have had foreign interference, compared to control elections in which no documented foreign interference occurred, concluded that the interference shifted the vote by a surprisingly high average of 3 percentage points. Levin's study is impressive in the way it uses multivariate modelling to compare elections meddled with and not meddled with, in combination with qualitative analysis. Hybrid quantitative/qualitative diagnostics use, for example, exit polls on why voters changed their vote and whether this is connected to some dirty tricks campaign of the meddling country. The top meddlers are The United States and Russia/USSR meddled in 117 foreign elections between 1946 and 2000. Both Russia and the United States have meddled in Ukrainian elections since Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union. How well this was done in different elections may have contributed to the oscillations between elections of pro-Russian Presidents favored by Ukraine's Russian speakers of the East, and pro-NATO Presidents favored in Ukraine's West and Central heartlands. We also know that Russia intervened clumsily in the 2016 US election, but with

sufficient impact according to Levin's careful research to conclude that 'but for' the Russian intervention, Hilary Clinton would have defeated Donald Trump in 2016.

The United States intervened in the Russian Presidential election of 1996 that re-elected the unelectable Boris Yeltsin with a startling level of effectiveness. The election consultants sent in by President Clinton to support Yeltsin oversaw early polling that was consistent with local polls indicating support of only 6% for a Yeltsin who by then had presided over a 40 + percent decline in Russian GDP, massive unemployment, inflation, a sharp decline in Russian life expectancy, steep rises in the crime and imprisonment rates, and privatization of the economy into the hands of utterly corrupt oligarchs who were mostly former communist apparatchiks. People accurately saw Yeltsin as an alcoholic, extremely unwell, unlikely to live long. The Communists and Yeltsin's other major opponents were ahead in the polling but also unpopular.

American meddling did assist with re-election of Yeltsin who anointed a successor, and stood down, handing Russia in 1999 to Vladimir Putin, plucked from obscurity before Yeltsin could see out his term. American consultants appointed to advise Yeltsin's campaign had abandoned hiring pop stars for endorsements and forcing a president with a heart condition.

to prance stupidly about the stage to pop music ... key aspects of the propaganda campaign became scaring the population with the prospect of civil war, and appealing to the Russian tradition of obedience and love for those in authority. . . the Americans turned to the most traditional, conservative, authoritarian stereotypes of mass consciousness. ... Fear of civil war was the decisive factor ... voters were given openly to understand that whatever happened, Yeltsin would not be going anywhere. If he won, he would stay in power by peaceful and 'legal' means, and if Zyuganov won, Yeltsin would still remain by means of a coup d'état. There really were plans for such a coup. This was later confirmed by generals Korzhakov and Kulikov, who were close to the president ... One way or another, the threat of repression and civil war, a threat which, since the events of 1993, had seemed absolutely real, exerted a decisive influence on the thinking of the masses. . . Finally, the alternative 'Either Yeltsin or the Communists' played a part. (Kagarlitsky 2002, 129-30)

The United States went to extraordinary lengths. President Clinton agreed to being berated on Russian television by Yeltsin ranting that US meddling in Russia was responsible for parlous circumstances of the country! For all the brilliant stops that were pulled out for Yeltsin in 1996, it may be doubtful that Yeltsin truly won that election; it likely required electoral malfeasance as well. Mikhail Gorbachev was one of many Russian leaders who opined that while the two previous elections in Russia were legitimate (including Yeltsin's first election as President), there has probably been no election in Russia without major electoral malfeasance since the Clinton meddling of 1996.⁸ After Yeltsin won, he tamed the formerly free press with authoritarian strictures, terrorizing them with fear of being closed.

In the long run of history, we might ask how much Russia has gained by meddling in Ukraine and US elections and how much the United States gained by meddling in Ukraine and Russian elections. How much is this meddling by both sides benefitting the people of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States today? This is a good question even though all these instances of meddling did change election outcomes in the desired direction. Just as with the successful electoral meddling of Russians and Americans in Ukraine's elections and each other's elections, more generally one kind of criminal meddling can be complicated by a different and countervailing form of criminal meddling by one's enemy. For example, one reason why the illegal US invasion of Iraq brought a pro-Iranian government to power for the first time in Iraq's history may be Iran's vote-buying in the 2010 Iraq election (Ignatius 2010).

Levin's (2020a, b) data suggest that electoral interventions are the most common kind of meddling in the affairs of other countries. He records 89 cases of US electoral meddling between 1946 and 2000, but only 53 significant military interventions (involving deployment of over 500 troops) by either the United States or Russia during this period, and only 59 covert US-imposed regime changes via assassinations, sponsoring of coups, or arming/aiding dissident groups during this period (O'Rourke 2018). CIA and KGB records of self-evaluations of successes and failures in interventions suggest elections may be the most common kinds of meddling because they have the highest success rate at lowest cost. For example, neocon and Clinton administration legends urge us to believe

that the illegal bombing of Belgrade helped topple Serbian President Milošević. Yet quite a bit of evidence, including Aleksandar Marsavelski and my Peacebuilding Compared interviews with the Serbian resistance to Milošević, suggests the reverse. Bombing civilians by the West was actually a setback for the pro-Western resistance. However, US meddling in the 2000 Yugoslav election was estimated by Levin's (2020a, b, 234) model as decisive in the final downfall of Milošević.

Italy is the country that experienced most electoral interventions, twelve, eight by Washington and four by Moscow between 1946 and 2000. Fear of Communist Party participation in Italian coalition governments negotiated after hung elections was the prime motive. When Levin (2019) added Soviet cases of meddling in democratic elections to the US cases, he built supplementary evidence of impetus for democratic breakdown as a consequence of Soviet meddling. When it comes to election meddling, Moscow has been a huge destroyer of democratic institutions, but the United States twice as frequently sets out to corrupt democracies. The Soviets were like the United States in supporting authoritarian, anti-democratic, regime changes that they believed served their interests. The Levin data suggest that NATO-Russia competition has been an important driver of democracy decimation. After the great wave of democratization that followed Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika*, there followed decades of democracy decline significantly driven by intelligence agencies persuaded that this was effective. There is limited evidence of the majority of countries ever interfering in other countries' elections since the end of the Cold War. I have already argued that ASEAN has a more ethically sensible and reconciliatory approach to international affairs than NATO or Russia. There is an absence of evidence in the empirical studies I traverse in this chapter by Levin (2020a, b), Downes (2021), Lee (2020), and others that any of the 10 ASEAN members (nor its prospective 11th member) have been found to have intervened in the elections of another country since the onset of the Cold War, or to assassinate foreign leaders or support coups. My own fieldwork interviews suggests Vietnam was meddling half a century ago in the appointment of leaders in Cambodia, and then invaded in 1979.

Violent Interventions in Foreign Domestic Politics

Many Iranian liberals blame the United States (and NATO) for the oppression they suffer under the current Iranian regime. This analysis of Iranian democrats is that Iran had a reasonably responsive social democratic government under Prime Minister Mossadegh. It was recovering from French, British, Russian, and Ottoman colonialism across its old Persian empire well enough compared to other Middle Eastern countries. British intelligence services and the CIA formed the view that Mossadegh was acting against the interests of Western oil majors. So they orchestrated a coup to put the Shah of Iran back on his throne to dominate the Iranian people to submit to the interests of Western corporations. Details were declassified in 2013 (Ervand 2013). The Shah's coup was sufficiently oppressive to induce a revolution to overthrow him led by liberals, social democrats, and a marginalized Kurdish minority, a revolution quickly captured by clerical oligarchs with a violent, exclusionary ideology. The Ayatollahs imprisoned the liberals and social democrats because they enjoyed superior organizational bases in the society that had not been crushed by the Shah. In contrast, democratic organizational bases of opposition in the trade unions and tribal structures had been crushed.

Leftists in Chile likewise came to blame the United States for afflicting them with the murderous dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet after the US telecommunications giant ITT persuaded a US President to mobilize CIA support against the elected government of Salvador Allende that was acting against the interests of ITT. Allende was murdered in the Pinochet coup. There were other cases of coups inspired by American corporations in even more vividly embarrassing ways. United Fruit CEO Eli Black jumped from the top floor of his PanAm Building office in New York City after the media documented his corrupt payments to Honduran politicians. These leaders had come to power in a coup against leaders who acted against United Fruit interests on land reforms to benefit peasants, minimum wages laws, and banana taxes. There were even more violent consequences of corruption by United Fruit in Guatemala where the CIA and United Fruit organized

a coup to overthrow the elected social democratic government of Jacobo Abenz. United Fruit's CEO persuaded another US President that Abenz was a communist. Regime-change meddling in Latin America engendered shadow governments of business cronies entangled with military elites. They saddled generations with elections that were fixed so their puppets won, and with death squads who assassinated politically popular left leaders.

I have already discussed how the Church Committee hearings in the US Congress exposed these and other US coups and assassinations in the 1970s and ushered in an era under Presidents Carter, Reagan, George H Bush, and Bill Clinton during which the United States behaved like the majority of countries in adoption of a policy that foreswore against ever assassinating or fomenting a military coup against a democratically elected foreign leader. Mostly there was US compliance with this policy for a quarter of a century.

A different kind of violent intervention in foreign domestic politics is well illustrated by the Russian intervention in Crimea and the Donbas region of Ukraine in 2014 to arm and train a separatist army to destabilize Ukraine. Melissa Lee's (2020) study, *Crippling Leviathan*, shows that such interventions to militarily fragment sovereign control over territory is a qualitatively different kind of intervention than a regime-change intervention. But as with Donbas in 2014, it can greatly weaken a state that becomes vulnerable to corruption and organized crime, can destabilize the targeted national government, and serve the short-term interests of the foreign power that meddles in this way. Consolidation of control over all of a state's territory is fundamental to stability and to aversion of endless civil war and terrorism.

Catastrophic Success

US regime-change interventions were concentrated in non-aligned states during the Cold War and were not more likely to help democratic than non-democratic states stay on top (with 44 of 64 covert interventions supporting authoritarian forces) (O'Rourke 2020, 101). Data on US

covert operations (which include both regime change and regime maintenance objectives), reveal US covert intervention decreased the likelihood that a targeted state would become a democracy by approximately 30% over the next 20 years (Berger et al. 2013). De Mesquita and Downes (2006, 632; see also Downes 2021, Chapter 2) concluded that interveners best secure their goals by installing autocracies or a 'rigged-election democracy' in the targeted state. Crushed democratic impulses and institutions best deliver the concessions foreign interveners demand because their puppets need not cater to the preferences of the median voter to remain in power.

The conclusion that great power regime-change interventions shackle longer-run hopes for democracy, especially social democracy, is supported by qualitative and quantitative research. That literature sustains the conclusion that if what the United States was attempting in the late twentieth century was intervention for democracy promotion, it was not good at it (Meernik 1996; Hermann and Kegley 1998; Peceny 1999; de Mesquita and Downes 2006; Scott and Pearson 2007; O'Rourke 2018; Downes 2021). Incompetence continued this century with botched US interventions to influence Afghanistan elections failing to achieve whatever outcomes NATO powers were attempting to achieve there. They certainly failed to sustain democracy (Shane 2018).

Alexander Downes (2021) studied all instances (120) of foreign-imposed regime changes over the past two centuries (to 2008). Foreign-imposed regime change doubled the likelihood of civil war over the next ten years in leadership change cases, and tripled it in cases where leadership change was combined with institutional change. Regime change can also induce interstate war. As Mearsheimer (2018, 142, 169) puts it, in the age of nationalism, 'occupation almost always breeds insurgency'. Leadership change also increases the likelihood of subsequent violent removal of the leader who benefited from the regime change (Downes 2021). Downes argues that the historical record is clear that foreign interventions to topple disliked regimes are costly for the intervener and more likely to cause counterproductive blowback than the intended successful imposition of their hegemonic will. While one might expect the replacement client installed to state leadership after foreign intervention to align with the preferences of the intervener, they do not become more

aligned with intervener voting records at the United Nations; nor do they acquire similar alliance portfolios (Downes 2021). Foreign-sponsored regime change is likely to cause the military to disintegrate, disperse to the countryside to help train and launch insurgencies. Imposed leaders tend to get into quandaries between supporting their foreign sponsor versus domestic demands for political change. Iraq post-invasion became a classic case of this that ended with an Iraq more aligned with Iran than the United States.

Downes found that the United States has been the most consistent recidivist regime changer of the past two centuries, with the Soviet Union a distant second, followed closely by Britain, Germany, and France, with Austria seventh on this list and Italy ninth. Guatemala and El Salvador fill out that list, being both common victims and perpetrators of foreign regime change. Honduras tops the list of countries that have been most recurrently targeted by foreign-induced regime changes, followed by Afghanistan, then Nicaragua and Dominican Republic third and fourth and Guatemala and El Salvador both being among the eight most targeted countries. The data show that regime change has been overwhelmingly a game played by the NATO states and Russia and particularly widely in Latin America. Of the 153 regime-change interveners, not one was China, though we should contest the dataset by pointing out that the 1951 agreement of the Dalai Lama to join Tibet to China, followed by flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet under military pressure in 1959, was effectively, if not technically, a foreign regime change.

We have seen that foreign electoral interference can likewise be a ‘catastrophic success’. Levin (2020a, b) shows that overt great power attempts to shape elections are as common as one in nine competitive elections in the world between 1946 and 2000. Their success was real but also catastrophic, as illustrated by revelations from analysis of surveys about US electoral meddling, as well as Levin’s models. Such analyses indicated that US meddling turned a 1992 Israel election to install Yitzhak Rabin, only to have him assassinated in 1995 after advancing a Palestinian peace process that has never since moved forward. In aggregate across more than a hundred cases of US and Russian electoral interference, meddling increased terrorist group emergence between

1968 and 2000 by 11% and levels of domestic terrorism by an average of 152% in the next ten years for the targeted country (between 1970 and 2000) (Levin 2020a, b). Successes that indeed were catastrophic.

Downes discusses an 'elite consensus' about the US literature, particularly since defeat in Afghanistan, that if only COIN (counterinsurgency doctrine), or this or that aspect of intervention policy, had been done better, institutional and leadership regime-change cases would have succeeded. If this were true, however, it would be possible to pick out more cases beyond the 1945 regime changes where leadership and institutional change produced the long-run successes of the Marshall Plan. In that US elite consensus literature, blame tends to be placed on the difficulty of 'nation building'. The more evidence-based inference is that foreign intervention to coerce regime change is the problem. Nation building is certainly difficult in the hands of UN peacekeeping operations as well. It has many failures. We have seen, however, that studies of large numbers of peacekeeping cases convincingly show a high statistical success rate overall. Multidimensional UN peacebuilding operations where war-torn states commit to a peace agreement and UN peacekeeping are highly cost-effective at building peace, economic recovery, and prospects of democracy (Walter et al. 2020). This is in stark contrast to militarized regime change. Few public investments are more effective than UN peacekeeping for building a stronger world economy with less suffering (Collier 2009, 96). Miserliness in support for societies struggling to reconcile and recover from conflict in ways that have consensual support makes no sense. At the same time, there is an evidence-based case for cost savings by desisting from interfering militarily in other countries, desisting from interfering in their elections, and in their regime choices in general.

Lindsey O'Rourke's (2020) data analysis concluded that the United States intervened covertly ten times as frequently as overtly, and that it often takes a long time before declassification of cabinet records and other disclosures provide sufficient evidence to confirm formerly unconfirmed covert cases. In the O'Rourke data set, cases were not counted unless US policymakers explicitly stated in official records that their objective was regime change. It therefore ignores CIA dark operations

that political leaders did not support or know about and that therefore were never discussed in a way that appeared on the public record. O'Rourke documented 64 covert regime-change campaigns during the Cold War, with overt ones like Cuba counting among a minority of six cases. Even the Bay of Pigs invasion, Operation Mongoose and its multiple attempts to assassinate Castro were at one time covert matters. Other kinds of foreign interventions that fell short of regime-change were the proxy insurgencies studied by Melissa Lee (2020) that (as in 2014 Russian support for Eastern Ukraine separatists) deprived the target of full consolidation of its state by loss of control of one region of it. When foreign powers destabilize other states through supporting insurgencies, this weakens targeted state consolidation of authority and development. But it can weaken it so badly that when the intervener gets their preferred successor regime, that regime also fails when it inherits a Leviathan that remains 'crippled' by the insurgency.

In sum, whether by assassination, supporting military coups, unravelling consolidation of a state's control of its territory, proxy civil war, corruption of foreign politicians, or election interference, success is common in pulling off the desired change. So often the new regime cannot or will not deliver the actual policy changes desired by the meddling state, however, and the final outcome is blowback that leaves the intervener worse off, often catastrophically so as Downes (2021) shows. Seeking to control another country by doing things 'to' it, to manipulate it, is a bad idea. Deep listening to foreign stakeholders mired in conflicts with a philosophy of restorative diplomacy is the better policy for building up a state's bank account of diplomatic capital. This is the policy followed by UN peace operations when they best succeed.

John Mearsheimer Redeemed, Transcended

Have you ever wondered why most people, left or right, detest or adore University of Chicago realist, John Mearsheimer (2018)? Personally, I admire him. He has constructed a distinctive theoretical position in international relations. He is assiduous about collecting evidence to refine it, endlessly provides fresh empirical insights about the war in

Ukraine for example, and he nurtures a fertile social science of bold theory and rigorous testing of it. My problem is that his bold theories are more relevant to the Napoleonic world than the Asian century. The theoretical contribution of this book is less systematic, more tentative than Mearsheimer's. It is no more than an incipient contribution that would only amount to something if other scholars and practitioners joined arms on the restorative and responsive diplomacy construction site to collectively create something more systematic and more rigorously tested over time. At the end of that day, perhaps the theory will prove empirically wrong.

I admire the integrity of Mearsheimer's refusal to use weasel words when the logic of his theory leads to politically unpopular conclusions. My thinking, nevertheless, is that Mearsheimer's unpopularity in many quarters is a clue to why relentless realism is wrong. Restorative diplomacy will seem soft, perhaps off with the fairies, or just restating liberal institutionalism without adding anything new. Restorative ideas are much older than liberal institutionalism. When Gandhi said, almost a century ago, 'Be the change you want to see in the world', his Southern theory of peacemaking was not mimicking Northern theories of liberal institutionalism; liberal institutionalism as an IR theory had not yet been formulated. Mearsheimer throws away the virtue of being the change you want to see in the world. He insists states pursue power; Great Powers pursue domination of the world system and regional hegemony. If Great Powers pursue something different, seek to pretend to act virtuously by flying in the face of those realities, they enact bad policy. It is bad policy to enact empty gestures that displace realist action that can make a difference to the situation.

A problem is that any world leader who walks the Mearsheimer talk will be as unpopular as Mearsheimer himself. My argument is that US Presidents are less effective diplomatically when they say: 'Let me be honest, I am a politician who does what is best for becoming more powerful; my country is a country that does what makes it more powerful'. To the extent that they adopt a more restorative way of being and enacting statecraft, they are more effective. If they want other countries to respect democracy, they are best not to meddle in other countries'

democracies, indeed to condemn such meddling when detected as a matter of deep principle.

The value that responsive regulatory theory adds to restorative justice theory applied to diplomacy is that it says be Gandhian, restorative, at the base of a responsive governance pyramid as the preferred strategy. Be patient in staying on the Gandhian course. But if this fails so repeatedly that the terrorist is about to press the button on his suicide vest and a sniper is on hand who can shoot him, shoot him. However, in shooting him, take care that you have done a quick scan that rules out less punitive resolutions. If humankind learns to survive by all states ratifying treaties to destroy WMDs and a state covertly breaks out to start building nuclear weapons, have a detection regime that will detect this. Then have responsive regulatory pyramids clearly on display to the rogue state in policy documents of many states. These policies must demonstrate will and strategy to escalate deterrence and incapacitation against rogue WMD states if they remain unresponsive to restorative diplomacy. Remind them that if they surrender the weapons, escalated sanctions will end. They will be forgiven and rewarded, Marshall-Plan-style. There could be some moral hazard in that, but moral hazard is curtailed by the fact that protracted recalcitrance would have already elicited a prolonged period of lost diplomatic capital and painful escalation of costs from a chokepoint regulation of denied access to financial and other platforms, for example (Tusikov 2017).

Chokepoints are hubs in complex embedded networks that control access to other hubs that make the network buzz. China wanted its 5G corporate champion Huawei to dominate 5G telecommunication hubs to deliver command over chokepoints. Network advantages were delivered by a company founded and still headquartered in La Hulpe, Belgium, the SWIFT financial system. SWIFT attracted almost universal global adoption of its channeling of bank transactions. This enabled a chokepoint for the United States and EU to cut Iran off from the SWIFT network at huge cost to the Iranian economy. SWIFT payments in turn depend on US banks empowered by their control of the dollar as the reserve currency and foreign assets held in US dollars. The aim was to bring Iran to the table for a nuclear deal. Meta Platforms Inc., Google, Microsoft, and other platform goliaths all

control economically and informationally strategic chokepoints (Tusikov 2017). Newspapers, advertisers, influencers, political lobbyists, musicians, corporations small and large, and ordinary consumers all occasionally fear platform chokepoints. Network topographies create complex archipelagos of asymmetries that contingent controllers of chokepoints can cut to powerless and powerful users alike. Chokepoints are increasingly strategic in cyberspace. An undersea cable that connects Taiwan to international financial flows is a physical chokepoint for the Taiwan economy. Obversely, the world recently learnt that Taiwanese domination of the advanced chip market (mostly via one company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation), delivers Taiwan a clever supply-chain chokepoint capability against the world economy for the moment. For a briefer moment during covid, the Pfizer Corporation commanded a chokepoint. Before that, two Turkish immigrants to Germany held the chokepoint through the patent of the family firm they founded, BioNTech. A seafaring union can allow ships to keep sailing but choke unloading at a dock, gradually building pressure as ships back up at ports. The Khyber Pass, Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, and the Bosphorus matter as chokepoints, which is why Crimea matters and so many wars discussed in this book are fought at these places. As important as internet platform chokepoints have become, it is still probably supply-chain chokepoints that can deliver the most devastating array of chokepoints to a wide coalition of states, corporations, and civil society actors. Network analysis AI will identify network bottleneck opportunities more systematically and cleverly in future than in the past for nonviolent and violent strategies of political struggle.

I have theorized this escalation of which chokepoint sanctions are only a part of the theory of minimally sufficient deterrence. It is a theory that explains why another University of Chicago social scientist, Gary Becker, was wrong in modelling that helped win his Nobel Prize in economics partly for work on deterrence of criminals. Societies that are heavy handed with deterrence, more realist about crime if you will, do not have lower crime rates. Societies that refuse to use capital punishment do not have high crime rates; nor do societies with extremely low imprisonment rates. Abolish police entirely and crime will go up because there will be detection failure; abolish punishment entirely and crime

will go up because minimally sufficient punishment will be absent. The best policy is iterative discovery of how to calibrate minimally sufficient deterrence and maximum possible reliance on non-punitive alternatives like restorative justice and social capital building (Braithwaite 2022).

There is an engaging literature on just enough nuclear weapons to secure minimally sufficient nuclear deterrence. Risks of nuclear explosion accidents might be reduced as a result of lower numbers of nuclear ignition points, and reduced risks of nuclear winter from a major escalation (Erästö 2022). An additional facet of moves to minimal sufficiency is the move from indiscriminate nuclear targeting of urban areas to narrowed targeting of enemy military assets, including nuclear infrastructure. This is called the shift to counterforce targeting and away from countervalue targeting in which value is measured by magnitudes of civilian genocide (Erästö 2022). The good news is that most nuclear weapons states have moved historically to be close to a strategy of minimally sufficient nuclear deterrence. Major exceptions are the United States and Russia, though they have moved away from countervalue targeting and did hugely reduce the number of nuclear weapons at their disposal in the late twentieth century. So the theory of minimally sufficient deterrence is not just a pie in the sky theory of authors like me who risk being perceived as idealist peaceniks; it can be, and effectively has been, applied to nuclear deterrence, albeit with recent reversals.

The voraciousness of the military-industrial complex is an obstacle to actually attaining minimally sufficient nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons innovations have historically been solutions looking for problems, or rather for targets. Whenever a new US nuclear weapons system came on line, targeters went looking for something else to hit in China or Russia (Krepon 2021, 388). This was a cynical conclusion as great a hawk as Dick Cheney reached when he was Secretary of Defense in 1989. He asked for a briefing in which red dots were laid over a map of the Soviet Union for different types of targets. Eventually 10,000 dots were laid. Forty of these dots targeted the city of Kyiv, each nuclear explosion hugely bigger than for Hiroshima. Some were targeting transport infrastructure in Kyiv, others electricity grids, defense bases, command and control centers, bridges, and so on, to produce a grossly redundant wipeout of the city from the face of the earth. This was cobbled

pseudo-strategy that was purely additive overkill. It followed the money and the innovation that flowed from military-industrial bounty, rather than following any semblance of coherence.

Consider restorative and responsive regulation as a completely different approach to how minimally sufficient deterrence is achieved and to regulatory theory for individual and organizational conduct (Braithwaite 2022). Probably readers do not need convincing that corporations strive to increase their power in the form of profit. A well-designed pyramid for corporate crime makes it rational for the corporation to voluntarily comply, and then makes it rational for the corporation to punish itself if it cheats on voluntary compliance, because compliance is a better outcome than corporate capital punishment at the peak of the pyramid, for example. Corporations tend not to want to escalate up to corporate capital punishment in which the company is put out of business and the CEO loses her job. At the foundation of thinking prudently about how to deter corporations, individuals, or states, realist international relations theory posits a fundamentally correct observation about human behavior. This verity is constitutive of the behavior of states ruled by humans. They pursue power. Individuals do that, according to Alfred Adler's (1964) psychological theory, from a very young age. If children are to survive, they must begin the process of winning independence from the power of their mother over them so they can survive on their own initiative without her nurture.

Thomas Hobbs (1641) and David Hume (1875) were political theorists who worried that this power-seeking makes knaves of some human beings and the organizations they build. Even if most people are not knaves, but virtuous, we must design our institutions so they can cope with the worst-case scenario, knavery. The 'one-eyed' man who would be king with a nuclear bomb in a world where everyone else has destroyed nuclear weapons is such a worst-case scenario. Knaves ride roughshod over others to build power and wealth. There are, nevertheless, grave dangers in following the advice of Hobbes and Hume by crafting diplomacy that is fit for knaves, based on power-assertion and distrust. The trouble with institutions that assume people or organizations will not be virtuous is that they destroy virtue. The problem with treating people as knaves is that they are more likely to become knaves. A great deal of

different kinds of social science research suggests this is true (e.g., Putnam 1993; Levi 1988; Braithwaite et al. 2007).

But what about when individual or state actors are knaves, or just rational calculators, rather than virtuous citizens? Trust will be abused, the vulnerable suffer. It is the dynamic features of regulatory institutions that must respond to this problem. First, we try being Gandhian rather than Hobbesian; we seek to elicit trust by being trusting and trustworthy. When experience proves this trust to be misplaced, strategy changes from assuming that the regulated actor is a virtuous citizen to assuming that she is a rational calculator (Kagan and Scholz 1984). At that point a deterrence strategy might be mobilized and then escalate to something that bites more than a slap on the wrist. Often, however, the rational-actor assumption will prove just as flawed as the virtuous-citizen assumption. It might be incompetence that is the cause of non-compliance. Perhaps the state fails to meet its greenhouse emission targets because its bureaucracy is incompetent; its environmental engineers lack knowhow. Deterrence cannot cure incompetence. A supportive consultancy strategy, or transfer of technology, might. It lends a helping hand so the tardy state can hit its emission targets. This is the basic idea of the regulatory pyramid: dialogue and trust first; thereby get the efficiency and character-building benefits of trust in most cases; but motivate trust as obligation by signaling clear preparedness to escalate intervention to progressively less trusting interventions when trust is abused. The paradox of the pyramid is that by signaling willingness to escalate to draconian distrust, regulators can increase the proportion of regulatory activity that is based on trust. Desire to avoid severe sanctions channels more of the regulatory game down to the cooperative base of the pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Experimental and other kinds of social science shows that escalating deterrence escalates defiance and anger as well as deterrence (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018: 94–100). Whether things get better or worse with escalation to war or punishment depends on whether it is the deterrence curve or the defiance curve that is steeper. Responsive regulatory theory helps with this dilemma by a preference to avoid it with restorative diplomacy, and by restorative diplomacy that has been shown to make escalation more legitimate when punishment is a last resort, when trust has been tried first. This means

that restorative and responsive governance delivers better prospects that the defiance curve will be less steep than the deterrence curve.

The governance pyramid that escalates intervention is a general model of how societal and state actors can move toward a more trust-based culture because fail-safe regulatory mechanisms swing into play when trust is abused, when restorative diplomacy is abused. Responsive regulatory theory assumes the motives that underlie abuse of power are diverse. Hence the remedies layered above restorative diplomacy in the pyramid must also be diverse, and the strategy must respond promptly to non-responsiveness with a new kind of remedy more appropriate to the context. We know on the basis of much empirical evidence that if we treat people like knaves, they will be more likely to become knaves; if we behave as knaves ourselves, others are more likely to act as knaves toward us. The implication of responsive regulatory theory is that by economizing on deterrence we make deterrence work better. This contradicts realist theory that says capability for deterrence maximizes power and power maximization is the path to security. Restorative and responsive governance implies spending less on acquiring weapons, more on rewarding states that desist from playing with fire by renewing their compliance with principles of international law.

Restorative and responsive regulatory theory conceives violent rule breaking as sometimes a failure to understand why the law is important, sometimes calculative utility maximization, sometimes incompetence, sometimes irrational resistance to reason (as with a psychopathic mass murderer). The weaknesses of the trust model are covered by the strengths of the rational-actor model, the weaknesses of the rational-actor model by the strengths of an incapacitation model. But the trust model is privileged and a first resort. Super-deterrence at the peak of the pyramid that disarms and incapacitates is a genuine collaborative capability, but a last resort. The idea is to institutionalize tough deterrence and distrust while enculturating nonviolence and trust.

Classical thinkers on nonviolence and restorative diplomacy like Gandhi and his disciple Martin Luther King seem to realists to theorize insufficient escalation to violence. In practice they did not reject violence in extreme situations. King was persuaded to carry a gun. Gandhi concurred on sending Indian troops to defend Kashmir when

Pakistan forces invaded in 1947. At some point, most real actors are like these two theorists of the last resort in being realists. King and Gandhi had simply failed to theorize how dynamic escalation to violence, to war, can be crafted dynamically, and with clarity, about how escalation to minimally sufficient deterrence can work as a last resort. It can paradoxically empower nonviolence at the base of regulatory pyramids where most of the diplomatic work that matters is done.

Notes

1. As a former US Ambassador to Pakistan put it: ‘Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance that someone working in Government of Pakistan facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon’. Or as another Obama Administration official put it: ‘We fundamentally believe that we cannot afford a country with 80 to 100 nuclear weapons [many more today] becoming the Congo ... There is a sense that other places in the world can go to hell, but not this one’. Quoted in David O. Smith (2014, 275).
2. See the record of Broken Arrows in [atomicarchive.com](https://www.atomicarchive.com/almanac/broken-arrows/index.html): <https://www.atomicarchive.com/almanac/broken-arrows/index.html>. (Accessed September 29, 2023).
3. I am grateful to former Australian National University Chancellor and former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (2022, 65), who insisted in commenting on my draft that his preferred expression was ‘sheer dumb luck’.
4. William J. Perry Project, Bill Perry’s South Asia Nuclear Nightmare. Downloaded 27 January 2022: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWLGatD_V0.
5. This was John Burton’s (1972) neglected vision of diplomacy from his time heading the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs in the 1940s that did prioritize peace diplomacy in Kashmir that had at that time excellent prospects of preventing future wars between India and Pakistan had there been stronger great power support for Australian mediation (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018, Chapter 6).

6. Pluralization of perspectives by ‘asking different questions’ is one of Jennifer Berger and Keith Johnston’s (2015, 13) *Simple Habits for Complex Times*. Active listening to answers and reframing through the multiple perspectives thereby gleaned is one of their simple habits of mind that stretch leadership capacities to cope with complexity.
7. This spillover problem has been particularly well researched for US drone attacks in Pakistan against members of the Taliban there. (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018, Chapter 6).
8. Gorbachev probably reflected the general view in Russia when he said in his book, *The New Russia*, that ‘There have been no fair and free elections in Russia since ... the election of 1991 when Boris Yeltsin became the first president of Russia’ (Gallagher 2017; see also Kramer 1996).

References

- Adler, Andrew. 1964. *Individual psychology of Alfred Adler*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Autesserre, Séverine. 2014. *Peaceland: Conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ayres, Ian and John Braithwaite. 1992. *Responsive regulation*. New York: Oxford.
- Beebe, George S. 2019. *The Russia trap: How our shadow war with Russia could spark into nuclear catastrophe*. New York: Thomas Dunne.
- Berger, Daniel, Alejandro Corvalan, William Easterly, and Shanker Satyanath. 2013. Do superpower interventions have short- and long-term consequences for democracy? *Journal of Comparative Economics* 41: 22–34.
- Berger, Jennifer Garvey, and Keith Johnston. 2015. *Simple habits for complex times: Powerful practices for leaders*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrociminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, Toni Makkai, and Valerie Braithwaite. 2007. *Regulating aged care*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

- Braithwaite, John, and Bina D'Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence: War, crime and peacebuilding across South Asia*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Burton, John. 1972. *World society*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Camm, Frank, Laura Werber, Julie Kim, Elizabeth Wilkie, and Rena Rudasvsky. 2013. *Technical report: Charting the course for a New Air Force Inspection System*. Santa Monica: Rand.
- Cassel, David. 2016. Air Force Scrambles to Recover 100,000 lost data files. *The New Stack*, June 19: <https://thenewstack.io/air-force-scrambles-recover-100000-lost-data-files/>. (Accessed September 29, 2023).
- Collier, Paul. 2009. *Wars, guns, and votes: Democracy in dangerous places*. New York: Harper.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1953. Atomic energy and the democratic process. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 290: 1–6.
- Das, Debak. 2022. Not much happened after India's accidental cruise missile launch into Pakistan—this time. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 25.
- de Mesquita, Bruce, and Bueno and George Downes. 2006. Intervention and democracy. *International Organization* 60: 627–649.
- Downes, Alexander B. 2021. *Catastrophic Success: Why foreign-imposed regime change goes wrong*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Eldridge, Golda. 2020. Broken Arrow: How the U.S. Navy lost a nuclear bomb. *Air Power History* 67(2).
- Erästö, Tytti. 2022. Revisiting 'Minimal Nuclear Deterrence': Laying the ground for multilateral nuclear disarmament. *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security* 6: 1–28.
- Abrahamian, Ervand. 2013. *The coup: 1953, the CIA, and the roots of modern US-Iranian relations*. New York: New Press.
- Ellsberg, Daniel. 2017. *The doomsday machine: Confessions of a nuclear war planner*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Evans, Gareth. 2022. *Good international citizenship: The case for decency*. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.
- Fisse, Brent, and John Braithwaite. 1983. *The impact of publicity on corporate offenders*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Gallagher, Tom. 2017. One fait accompli after another: Mikhail Gorbachev on the new Russia. *Los Angeles Review of Books*, July 8.
- Helfand, Ira. 2013. Nuclear famine: Two billion people at risk. *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War*, 2.
- Hermann, Margaret G., and Charles W. Kegley. 1998. The US use of military intervention to promote democracy: Evaluating the record. *International Interactions* 24: 91–114.

- Hess, G. Dale. 2020. *The impact of a regional nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan: Two views*. NAPSNet Special Reports, September 23. Berkeley: Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.
- Hobbes, Thomas. [1641]1949. *De Cive*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Hume, David. [1875] 1963. *Of the Independency of Parliament. Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, vol. 1. Oxford: OUP.
- Ignatius, David. 2010. Tehran's vote-buying in Iraq. *Washington Post*, February 25.
- Jägermeyr, Jonas, Alan Robock, Joshua Elliott, Christoph Müller, Lili Xia, Nikolay Khabarov, Christian Folberth, et al. 2020. A regional nuclear conflict would compromise global food security. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 117: 7071–7081.
- Jervis, Robert. 2010. *Why Intelligence Fails*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kagan, Robert A., and John T. Scholz. 1984. The criminology of the corporation and regulatory enforcement strategies. In *Enforcing regulation.*, ed. Keith Haekins and J. Thomas. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
- Kagarlitsky, Boris. 2002. *Russia under Yeltsin and Putin*. London: Pluto Press.
- Kissinger, Henry. 2011. *On China*. New York: Penguin.
- Kramer, Michael. 1996. Rescuing Boris: The secret story of how four US advisers used polls, focus groups, negative ads and all the other techniques of American campaigning to help Boris Yeltsin win. *Time*, July 15.
- Krepon, Michael. 2021. *Winning and losing the nuclear peace*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lee, Melissa M. 2020. *Crippling Leviathan: How foreign subversion weakens the state*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Levi, Margaret. 1988. *Of rule and revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Levin, Dov H. 2019. A vote for freedom? The effects of partisan electoral interventions on regime type. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63: 839–868.
- Levin, Dov H. 2020a. *Meddling in the ballot box: The causes and effects of partisan electoral interventions*. New York: Oxford.
- Levin, Dov H. 2020b. Voting for trouble? Partisan electoral interventions and domestic terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32: 489–505.
- Lewis, Jeffrey and Aaron Stein. 2018. Paranoia and defense planning: Why language matters when talking about nuclear weapons. *War on the Rocks*, October 10.
- Maggelet, Michael H., and James C. Oskins. 2010. *Broken Arrow-Vol II-A disclosure of US, Soviet, and British nuclear weapon incidents and accidents, 1945–2008*. Vol. 2.

- Meernik, James. 1996. United States military intervention and the promotion of democracy. *Journal of Peace Research* 33: 391–402.
- Mahbubani, Kishore. 2022. *The Asian 21st Century*. Singapore: Springer.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2018. *The great delusion: Liberal dreams and international realities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mills, Michael J., Owen B. Toon, Julia Lee-Taylor, and Alan Robock. 2014. Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict. *Earth's Future* 2: 161–176.
- National Security Archive. 2013. The 1983 War Scare: The last paroxysm of the Cold War Part I. May 16: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/>. (Accessed September 29, 2023).
- National Security Archive. 2022. Colonel Odom's 'chilling' four am phone call: New information on false missile alerts and threat assessment conference calls, 1977–1980; First Publication of 1976 US-Soviet Agreement on NUCFLASH Messaging. Briefing Book # 789. Edited by William Burr. Washington: March 24.
- O'Rourke, Lindsey. 2018. *Covert regime change: America's secret Cold War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- O'Rourke, Lindsey. 2020. The strategic logic of covert regime change: US-backed regime change campaigns during the Cold War. *Security Studies* 29: 92–127.
- Palmerston, Lord. 1848. *House of Commons Speech*, March 1.
- Peceny, Mark. 1999. Forcing them to be free. *Political Research Quarterly* 52.
- Perry, William J., and Tom Z. Collina. 2020. *The button: The new nuclear arms race and presidential power from Truman to Trump*. Dallas: BenBella Books.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making democracy work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Raaberg, Major General Douglas L. 2007. Commander directed report of investigation concerning an unauthorized transfer of nuclear warheads between Minor AFB, North Dakota and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. August 30.
- Reisner, Jon Michael, Eunmo Koo, Elizabeth Clare Hunke, Manvendra Krishna, Dubey. Reply to comment by Robock, et al. 2019. On 'Climate impact of a regional nuclear weapon exchange: An improved assessment based on detailed source calculations.' *Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres* 124: 12959–12962.
- Schlosser, Eric. 2013. *Command and control: Nuclear weapons, the Damascus accident, and the illusion of safety*. New York: Penguin.

- Shane, Scott. 2018. Russia isn't the only one meddling in elections. We do it, too. *New York Times*.
- Smith, David O. 2014. The management of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. *The Nonproliferation Review* 21: 275–294.
- Stewart, Will, Chris Pleasance and Chris Jewers. 2022. Russia's Broken Arrow: Fears that nuclear missiles sank with Putin's flagship Moskva. *Daily Mail*, June 9.
- Tusikov, Natasha. 2017. *Chokepoints: Global private regulation on the internet*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Union of Concerned Scientists Fact Sheet. 2015. *Close calls with Nuclear Weapons*. April.
- US National Academy of Sciences. 1986. *The medical implications of nuclear war*. Washington D.C.: Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences.
- Walker, Scott, and Frederic S. Pearson. 2007. Should we really 'force them to be free'? An empirical examination of Peceny's liberalizing intervention thesis. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24: 37–53.
- Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morje Howard, and V. Page Fortna. 2020. The extraordinary relationship between peacekeeping and peace. *British Journal of Political Science*, First View, 1–18.
- Weisgerber, Marcus. 2016. Those lost investigation files have been found, Air Force says. Government Executive, June 15: <https://www.govexec.com/defense/2016/06/those-lost-investigation-files-have-been-found-air-force-says/129115/>. (Accessed September 29, 2023).
- Wilson, Edward. 2012. Thank you Vasili Arkhipov, the man who stopped nuclear war. *The Guardian*, October 27.
- Witze, Alexandra. 2020. How a small nuclear war would transform the entire planet. *Nature News Feature*, March 16.
- Wong, Kristina. 2016. Air Force has lost 100,000 Inspector-General records. *The Hill*, June: 10: <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/283109-air-force-has-lost-100000-inspector-general-records/>. (Accessed September 29, 2023).

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





10

Contest Political Ritualism

Abstract Relentless civil society activism is a remedy to the ritualism of states promising big and delivering poorly on crisis amelioration. Regulation must be a human, relational craft. Centralized bureaucracies that over-prioritize desk audits and risk measurement that dates quickly as it feeds into algorithmic regulation are a risk. Detective skills and relational skills of street-level inspectors must be re-prioritized.

Keywords Relational regulation · Ritualism · Algorithmic regulation · Street-level bureaucracy · Risk

Principled professionalism, optic of the last chapter, is one remedy to the pathology of ritualism, but not the only remedy. A limitation of simple thinking about complex catastrophes is that simple thinking can be countered in simple ways. Preeminent among these is ritualism. Ritualism is a particular form of symbolism, of symbol above substance. Robert K. Merton (1968) argued in *Social Theory and Social Structure* that in any normative order, there are shared cultural goals and institutionalized means for achieving them. He diagnosed tensions and schisms in social structures according to how different fractions of the populace

position themselves on commitment to cultural goals versus institutionalized means to reach the goals. In stable societies, many citizens are committed to both the society's cultural goals and institutionalized means of achieving them. Others are innovators who share a cultural goal but push innovative means to it. These innovators can discover better ways for societies to renew how they live together. Or they can be criminals who replace legitimate means for achieving a shared goal like material success with illegitimate means, like robbery or becoming a warlord. This can be because legitimate means like a good job, good investment opportunities, are blocked to them, so they resort to illegitimate means to material success. Innovation shades into ritualism when powerful actors discover that the best way to rob a bank is to own one (Black 2013). An owner seems committed to the solvency of the bank because she owns it, but in fact manipulates the market, siphoning profits to her pocket.

Ritualism is a favored approach of democracy's gameplayers. They pretend to endorse the culturally approved goals of the democracy while gaming institutionalized means to them—as by pretending to the courts that an election that was lost was actually won, by compromising the spirit of a law through a loophole embedded in the letter of the law, by endorsing equal justice principles like racially equal voting rights while obstructing access of minorities to polls, or denying resources to agencies that enforce the law against the powerful. Contempt for democratic values might be clear when ritualists scheme with their inner circles of cronies. Yet they project a public image of being defenders of democracy. Innovation and open rebellion against culturally shared goals and institutionally approved means of achieving them can be healthy for renewal. There are few circumstances, however, where it can be good to subvert a society's culturally approved democratic goals by gaming them with ritualized means that do not actually deliver goals citizens cherish—at least with vital goals like the spirit of democracy, the spirit of environmental and health law, the fairness and efficiency of markets.

Because the institutionally approved means of democracies have been so relentlessly gamed, for example by a military-industrial complex with an interest in wars, retreatism is a widespread Mertonian adaptation. Retreatism means people have become cynical about both societal goals

and legitimate means for achieving them. Retreatism is the mode of adaptation to a normative order that we see among dropouts, 'the lie down flat' movement of retreatist youth in China, drug addicts, or people who commit suicide. Retreatism is the adaptation of political and social disengagement that has become increasingly widespread as trust in the fundamentals of the normative order have eroded.

The larger the crises a society faces, the more widespread retreatism becomes, and the bigger the benefits of ritualism for powerholders. We have seen this with the climate crisis since long before the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change came into being in 1992. In summit after summit, from Kyoto, to Copenhagen, to Paris, heads of state enthusiastically committed to action. They made specific commitments. Then they simply chose not to meet them, to game them, most recently after the Glasgow climate summit as reported in the April 2022 IPCC Report. Usually, culpable political leaders were out of office before outrage erupted from their duplicity in climate catastrophe. Another strategy is commit big at early summits; then insinuate carve-outs and caveats at subsequent gatherings. That one was particularly popular with brown Australian coalition governments who loathed taking the 'coal' out of their 'coalition'. Almost all states, including the seemingly greenest, continued to deliver carbon emissions on upwards trajectories that bequeathed catastrophe from stocks of greenhouse gases as they promised glorious futures of downward trajectories (only in flows, as opposed to stocks of carbon).

Ritualism is a recurrent tactic with donor conferences to promise help for countries that suffer natural disasters. It is normally good politics internationally to promise generously at these conferences, to avoid being singled out as an ungenerous country. There are people at home who are touched by the suffering and want their country to be seen as caring. A year on, this political calculus changes. Electors at home have forgotten past crises as a result of many other disasters that have filled short windows of media attention cycles, including disasters at home. In a choice between transferring a large commitment to a year-old international crisis and diverting to a domestic priority that electors care about in the run-up to the next election, the domestic spending trumps international promise-keeping.

Similar political dynamics of promise big now, deliver small later, apply to undertakings to receive agreed numbers of refugees. This has been systematically demonstrated with rich country aid pledges of various kinds.¹ In 2016, global leaders met to discuss the crisis of one-third of school-aged Syrian children denied an education. A large proportion of these were in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq, where more than a third of the Syrian children were missing an education. Global leaders agreed with advocates who alerted them to this shocking situation; leaders committed to fix it by the simple means of sharing the burden to build schools for them. Theirworld's #YouPromised pushed since 2016 for their pledges to be kept. Former British Prime Minister David Cameron, who hosted the donor conference, joyfully announced in February 2016 that \$10 billion had been committed. In October 2016, the YouPromised campaign showed that only a fraction of what had been promised in February had been delivered. The campaign specifically focused on 370,000 Syrian refugee girls in Turkey (60% of the Syrian refugee girls in that country) who still had no access to schooling.² In April 2018, YouPromised renewed its campaign, pointing out that there are now 680,000 Syrian children still waiting to get a school placement. They released a powerful film in which children told their stories. Ahead of another UN meeting in September 2018, Theirworld broke the story that education programs for vulnerable Syrian refugee children in Jordan had been slashed. EU countries and institutions did respond to this, and by March 2019 had transferred 56% more than their original pledges.

This is an atypical story with a happier ending than the unusual promise-big-deliver-small. The solution to such a huge crisis is a simple mechanics of building schools and staffing them. Promising big and delivering small is also a deadly simple political mechanics. 'You promised' campaigns delivered simple responses to complex catastrophes. Social movement activism works enough of the time through simple dynamics of shaming some of the world's more ethical states when they walk away from promises to desperate people. There is a kind of political ritualism fatigue among humanitarian activists. Nevertheless, simple campaigns can work because promise-big-deliver-small depends

on political forgetting. Remembering catalyzed by activism is its simple remedy.

During the covid pandemic, the richest countries over-hoarded vaccines that then expired, and over-monopolized production. Big Pharma did special deals for monopoly prices only rich countries could afford. Through all this, the leaders of China and the United States played childish games of mutual recriminations over covid politics. They guarded their trade secrets and production monopolies, refusing to collaborate in pooling their science and knowhow. The United States allowed new variants to emerge during rampant surges in unvaccinated poor-country populations, meeting as a G-7 without inviting China. China met separately with Russia. All great powers undermined the WHO with their greed, gameplaying and vaccine nationalism. China and Russia misled their citizens with the lie that their vaccines were better than Western vaccines. All in all, leaders of the world failed to deliver a restorative vaccine diplomacy that could have saved millions of lives with politically decent collaboration among the best labs.

Chapter 11 argues that there is a geopolitical domination dynamic in this. Poisoned covid politics can inject diplomatic venom into geopolitical cooperation on military and economic matters. But the more potent pathway is from poisoned geopolitics of security and trade to pandemic politics. That is a reason this book skews its focus toward restorative renewal of the geopolitics of great power domination. The politics of domination means it is the poor who mostly die from pandemics, including inside rich countries. The poor cannot pay the costs associated with fleeing to another country as a refugee, so they are the ones who die in the killing zones of wars, from famines caused by climate change, from rising oceans and rivers.

Democratic institutions and regulatory institutions are fundamental to taming dominations of corporate power, military power. Their marriage in the politics of the military-industrial complex is an existential dead hand. Therefore, the following sections specifically focus on these domains of ritualism.

Gaming Democracy

Gaming democracy has some structural complexity. Game-playing must be endlessly contested if democracy is to have meaning. We have seen that trust in democracy has declined precipitously because democracy has been gamed to become a ritual of limited substance.

Simple enough institutions like an independent judiciary have been entrenched in many democracies. Part of the sustainability of this accomplishment that evolved over centuries is that there is a path dependency to it. Once an independent judiciary is buttressed by professional interests in independence, independence can become reasonably resilient. It is hard to budge from path dependence. Path dependence means dependence of outcomes on the paths of previous outcomes. Path dependence keeps institutions in the groove of established and legitimate institutionalized means to democratic governance outcomes. There is a simplicity about staying in the groove of the path dependency of well-established democratic institutions with robust checks and balances. Each institutional check evolved over time to help with keeping all other institutions from accomplishing overwhelming domination that overflows channels of containment set down in the separation of powers. This is a decision that the judiciary must take; presidents should not interfere in it; that is a decision for the president. Although there is a simplicity of keeping checks and balances in place once they are institutionalized, getting them institutionalized in the first place is a long, difficult, political struggle.

It is good politics for leaders to pretend that they uphold democracy. This is because the pretense of being elected democratically increases legitimacy, helping leaders to retain power and extract financial support from Western regimes that still control great aid wealth. The rational leadership model is to secure support by promising big yet delivering small on democracy. Democratic theory suggests a competition for power in which the candidate that governs best is most likely to win. That turns out to be too simple. This book has shown that in most contexts, the best way to win is to misgovern.

In contrast, in a society with strong path dependence of democratic institutions, a leader who is caught out attempting to corrupt an institution may lose power more quickly than one who accepts that it is a fact

of life for politics to be played by the rules. That fact is better assured in a polity with robust institutions such as anti-corruption commissions. Political leaders of societies without anti-corruption commissions resist them because that might tighten limits of legality around what they can do. Resistant politicians can be pushed into a political corner and forced to match the promise of opposition candidates to introduce an anti-corruption commission. Their interest then is to have an ineffective commission which is itself corrupted, controlled by political hacks. Again, however, once an independent anti-corruption commission has been deeply institutionalized, this means it is in the groove of path dependent independence. Then it becomes bad politics to attempt to corrupt the anti-corruption commissioner for the same reason that it is political folly in deeply democratic societies to offer a bribe to a judge. It may cost you power to attempt to do so.

In short, what we have is a majority of societies where the incentives for misgoverning are huge while they pretend to be democratic, and a minority where the separation of powers is sufficiently institutionalized that good governance becomes a better way of winning than misgoverning. Historical opportunities for transformation do arise to move societies from faux democracy to democracy institutionalized with a genuine separation of powers. It can happen in many ways. One is the death of a tyrant from natural causes opening opportunities for reform leaders. Another is losing a war and being assisted by the UN with a UN peace operation, or a military commander effectively threatening a military coup unless elections are conducted fairly by electoral commission staff who are not corrupt cronies of the ruler. When that is achieved, democratic forces in domestic civil society and international society can rally around reform leaders to secure deeper institutionalization of a separation of powers until a tipping point is passed toward genuine democracy. Good governance then creates jobs, averts wars, and becomes the better way to win elections.

Slow-Food Global Politics

Is there not a tension between a slow-food approach to change and the vision of waiting for moments of crisis that enable step changes? Remember Ian Goldin's question discussed in Chapter 2. Would there have been the revolutionary market changes forged in Silicon Valley without the slow-food scientists of Stanford and other great universities? Goldin (2021) makes the point that during World War II, slow food work was underway, particularly in universities, for seizing the 1945 opportunity for step transformation to the golden decades that followed. Inside the British state and universities, germinal research preparing the way for revolutionary changes in constructing the British welfare state, the Beveridge Report, were well shaped from the beginning of the 1940s.

In the United States, plans were being laid for what was to be called the Marshall Plan. In universities like Cambridge in the decades since the Versailles Peace agreement, John Maynard Keynes had been writing on mistakes of victor's justice imposing crippling reparations on Germany in 1919 that might tragically help crash its economy. These ideas slowly laid groundwork for what became the Marshall Plan in 1945. It was massive, transferring 3% of the GDP of the wealthiest country in the world to countries that lost the war. Nothing of this magnitude has happened before or since, certainly not after NATO won the Cold War.

Keynes and like-minded reformers created Bretton Woods institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Reformers had been cooking the slow food of consensus during the war for a transformative institution called the United Nations. Eleanor Roosevelt was the most important figure in one reform sub-circle that included many feminists, to establish a rights revolution, transformative rights institutions as central pillars of the United Nations. Eleanor Roosevelt's network was able to steer through an international human rights architecture that many decades later could be mobilized by second wave feminism to better institutionalize gender equality globally—simple things like a neglected right of girls to education that by the end of the twentieth century had transformed educational outcomes to more girls than boys getting top marks at high school and graduating with the best results at the best universities. In the immediate post-war decades women had been locked back into

their domesticated confines; women were pushed out of the jobs they had stepped into during the war. UN rights institutions helped leave a key in the door that women pushed wide open from the 1970s, globally.

Labor movement leaders networked to re-invigorate the International Labor Organization in its transition from being a League of Nations labor rights organization to an innovative rights institution of the UN. There were so many slow food cooks of post-war step changes that delivered Keynesian transformation that was redistributive of wealth, funded by top marginal tax rates above 80% in most Western societies, above 90% in the United States and United Kingdom, well into the 1950s. This produced what Goldin called the germinal Golden Age of economic growth and human development (from 1945 to the 1970s).

Two decades after it ended, a new Asian Golden Age was about learning lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Hence, when the 2008 Global Financial Crisis struck, banks collapsed across Western financial capitals, but no major Asian banks collapsed. This chapter on confronting regulatory ritualism considers Asian regulatory reform ideas that were slow food notions such as resident inspectors who reside at desks inside the most systemically important banks and financial institutions, preparing bank resilience and systemic Asian resilience for the next crisis.³

Social movement politics, as with the women's movement, is critical in its growth from first wave transformations, including votes for women, to second wave shifts to education, jobs, narrowing the gender pay gap. Such social movements are germinal for slow food institutions with reform agendas in their top drawers. Plans wait for moments of step change. Then the movement shifts agendas from the back to the front burner of politics. Slow-food politics is about keeping the women's movement in some kind of repair during its darkest days (the 1950s), the labor movement during its twilight (recent deregulatory decades), the environment movement during its decades of environmental ritualism (all decades of the Anthropocene really). Slow-food politics in local social movement contestation that Making the personal political is a famous saying of political theory in reformers' lives keeps a politics of hope alive. It deepens the base and the intellectual furrows of movements, getting

them transformation-ready. A reason neglected so far for having a long-term total abolition mission for WMDs is that this is what can inspire the peace movement to retrieve a new wave of its glory days.

Not all slow food cooking of new institutions made the world better. Stalin had his coterie of slow-food cooks laying plans for Communist transformations in Eastern and Central European societies where they defeated Hitler's armies; Chairman Mao slowly grew them along the Long March.

Gaming of democracy always gnaws at the spirit of democracy. Hence when the world's biggest defense-contracting firms were exposed by law enforcement reformers for bribing political leaders, some did stop the bribes, at least for a while. Then they adopted a more nuanced approach to capturing political and military leaders by means within the bounds of the criminal law. It became well known that military commanders who had been supporters of defense deals were appointed as board members or as lobbyists for contractors across the globe when they retired from the military. Senators who rallied votes for defense contracts were rewarded by new military-industrial plants in their state with fanfare for the credit their senator deserved for bringing these jobs home from Washington. This is why firms like Lockheed Martin are organized so inefficiently with manufacturing plants dispersed across dozens of different US states so political payoffs can be dispersed to win many votes. This is innovation in gaming democracy to deliver misgovernance and economic inefficiency in markets monopolized at the commanding heights of a military-industrial complex. Leading firms rarely deliver contracts on time or without stupendous cost overruns, sometimes fueled by defense-contracting fraud. Even a deeply path dependent democracy is a ship constantly in need of repair at sea. Holes in its integrity broken open by waves of gaming democracy at the hands of industries that have been adept at corruption such as defense contractors, Big Pharma, and high finance, must be patched by social movements demanding action by prosecutors.

The same is true of high integrity business regulation. Innovation in gaming regulation drives holes through its integrity. For a democracy that stands still, a business regulator that stands still, rust sets in, democracy corrodes. Too simple-minded, too static a vision of democracy as a system

where the most popular leaders win, crumbles through the complexity of crises. Social movement support for institutions like national audit offices and anti-corruption commissions, universities that are independent of the military-industrial complex, can play rugged roles in producing oversight that informs electors and other institutions across the separation of powers. This educates activists in what law reforms and reforms to executive government they must demand to keep democracy afloat.

Regulatory Ritualism

Strong environmental policies are recurrently implemented as greenwash. Carbon credit markets in tree planting are riddled with carbon fraud. Forests are 'grown' that were already there and in places that it was well known would never sustain permanent forests (Long and McDonald 2022). Even when CEOs are genuinely committed to their firms being carbon neutral by 2030, they may plan for symbolic implementation during the next five years while they serve as CEO, with the heavy lifting of green investment delivered in the final years of the decade when someone else is in charge. When state regulation mandates long-term plans, regulatory ritualism gives a tick to that defer, delay, and deny ethos.

This is one variant of how capitalism found innovative means of replacing risk management with risk shifting. Big promises and small delivery, leaving promise-keeping to a successor, involves shifting risk across time. In the global financial crisis, risks were shifted to the future, and from place to place in a game of pass the parcel. Back in the twentieth century, when homebuyers went to bank managers for housing loans, the manager managed risks associated with the transaction. Did the borrower have a job? Could her income support only a smaller loan? The rise of bonus cultures and derivatives as risk-shifting devices meant bank managers worried less about risks. Worse, lenders were encouraged to lie in loan requests, exaggerating their income in order to secure a fatter debt. Loan documents became rituals of comfort that delivered no substance of risk management. Much of the risk accounting in loan

documents was delegated to and ritualized by mortgage brokers who shared tolerance of liar loans.

The bank shifted risk to others by bundling thousands of loans and securitizing the bundle—slicing and dicing the loans into securities that the bank sold to others. Investors thought they were diversifying their investment portfolio to profit from a booming housing market. They were ‘cleverly’ spreading their risks to owning less than one percent of thousands of loans instead of a concentrated cluster of loans. Once the system corroded to risk ritualism, a high proportion of loans became worthless when the housing market plummeted. The magnitude of the risk shifting from US to European banks was so great that European banks crashed in response to that small sector of the world economy that was subprime loans to poorer Americans. Indeed, almost the entire European economy crashed. Trading in derivatives was marginal in the late twentieth century but hit US\$100,000 billion in outstanding deals sold in the over-the-counter derivatives market at the turn of the century. By 2007, it accelerated to \$600,000 billion according to the Bank of International Settlements, ‘16 times global equity market capitalization and 10 times global gross domestic product’ (Golden and Vogel 2010, 6).

Regulatory ritualism trusted risk management systems of banks in the false belief that banks had an interest in managing risks associated with their own loans. A regulatory error was failing to understand that while banks did have an interest in averting lending risks, they could accomplish this by risk shifting. They systematically increased systemic risk by growing the derivatives market in bad loans, while reducing risk for their individual bank. Bankers knew they were playing a game of pass the parcel of billowing systemic risk, but it made no sense to many of them to reject maximization of bonus gouging until the music stopped. High finance executives and traders shifted those bonuses to their personal accounts elsewhere, so they were personally holding the profits while banks, pension funds, and foreigners were holding the parcels of dud derivatives in bad loans. They had stashed away enough in investment safe havens to remain rich while poor homeowners were bankrupted onto the street. The world financial system crashed under the weight of the systemic risk that their ritualism, their bonuses, had generated.

Political leaders who would prefer to deregulate for the benefit of business donors to their campaigns, but are forced by the electorate to increase regulation, are attracted to ritualistic regulation as a compromise. It gives the appearance of being tough without compelling substantive change. There is infinite variety in ways players of the regulatory game can be obsessed with means of achieving goals (such as inputs, processes) while failing to deliver on regulatory goals themselves. The literature on audits as a 'ritual of comfort' is an example of a form of ritualism that routinely fails to deliver consumers and investors the substance of financial probity, while offering the comfort of audit boxes that are ticked (Power 1997). This was the reality of the rage for light-touch financial regulation in the 2000s that settled for ticking boxes rather than kicking the tires to drive systemic security forward.

Most globally significant regulatory institutions drank the elixir of light-touch regulation. They were captured by the burgeoning power of large international banks and a generation of economists who legitimized their folly. The financialization of capitalism meant that Bill Clinton's 1990s political counsel, 'it's the economy stupid' effectively became 'it's finance capital stupid' by the time Obama's recovery plan was crafted by bankers brought in from the ritualistic culture of Wall Street. Structurally, this capture was particularly profound in London where the financial sector accounted for the fattest profits in the economy and over one-fifth of British employment by 2008. Politicians were beholden to finance capital for campaign contributions, tax revenue, jobs, and legitimacy as 'contemporary' neoliberal thinkers.

As Goldin and Vogel (2010,11) point out:

The financial crisis could not have occurred without the scaled-up computing power that facilitated the innovation and transmission of sophisticated credit derivatives, automated underwriting and increasingly complex risk assessment models. Technological change via the acceleration of computer processing has greatly contributed to system fragility because microprocessors facilitate logistical chains, increase connectivity and facilitate the innovation of complex financial instruments, the underlying mathematical theories of which can be flawed, hard to understand and even more difficult to regulate.

Goldin and Vogel conceived the system as overwhelmed by algorithmic innovation that sidestepped underwhelming regulation. Quants ruled through coding algorithms that drove the system. Quants displaced Keynes in economic theory. The older managers in banks and regulators had no semblance of understanding the math that drove it all. Nor could they have understood it even if they were mathematical geniuses as well as wise managerial heads. It was too complex to be comprehended by any such level of human capability within the reach of one CEO. As AI exponentially grows intelligence, this becomes truer.

What was needed was simpler remedies like greatly increased levels of reserve deposits mandated to cover whatever incomprehensible mismanagement of bank risks occurred. Also needed was putting some bankers behind bars for encouraging fraud in loan applications around 2004 and 2005 when the FBI began to document an extraordinary epidemic of housing loan fraud. Likewise I argue later that one of the things required to remedy the disappointing performance of trading regimes that put a price on carbon was incarcerating some corporate highflyers for carbon fraud.

Simplification was also needed by uncoupling more peripheral nodes of the financial system from the algorithmic follies of the dominant finance nodes in New York and London. This was crucial to how Poland delivered superior outcomes for its economy between 2007 and 2010, compared to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the rest of Europe. Australia was another internationally integrated economy that never went into recession during this period; it enjoyed three full decades free of recession from the beginning of the 1990s until the covid crisis. Australian banks were much more monopolized than US banks and had even more widely and deeply securitized housing loan markets than US banks. They were, however, only trading in securitized loans in an Australian housing market that they understood. They were not trading many sliced and diced US housing loans. That decoupling from the dominant nodes of securitization was a good form of simplification. The Australian regulators insisted that the Big Four Australian banks take responsibility for making the market in securitized Australian home loans an Australian market in managed risks. Australian banks did not allow themselves to become casualties of global markets in risk shifting.

One simple thing that was needed in response to the global financial crisis was better investment in international cooperation on regulation, more staff in international and national regulators. Every bank that is big enough to trigger systemic risk through failing to manage fraud and imprudence should have a resident inspector from the prudential regulator who can give early warning of pending collapses while collapse can still be prevented. Korean banking regulators installed resident inspectors at all the systemically critical Korean banks after the Asian financial crises, and Australian prudential and securities regulators did that much later, as did its meat and tax inspectors.⁴ That was not rocket science. And we know resident inspector programs work to avert catastrophes in other areas of regulation. If vigilance to uncouple contaminated meat from global trading systems makes economic and health sense, why does not vigilance in uncoupling contaminated financial algorithms and banking products make sense? These abstract products can cascade systemic crises much more rapidly in financial systems that are more tightly coupled than meat trading systems. Financial engineering that drives waves of aggressive tax planning is a contagion that can be, has been shut down twice in recent Australian history by rapid response against early movers of the financial engineering herd (Braithwaite 2005). Simple announcement tactics are effective in early response to shut down such contagions: ‘We have noticed a new form of financial engineering into the X kind of tax shelter; Tax Office legal advice is that it strike down the first firm to enter such an arrangement after 1 March’. In various such press releases by the Australian Commissioner for Taxation, all firms ceased entering such schemes after the nominated date. The early detection and rapid response principle illustrated here by resident inspector programs is advanced in the concluding chapter as a general principle for simple solutions to cascading complex crises.

It could be tempting to think that one can only defeat systemic risk in a systemic way. Global regulatory institutions do need to be strengthened (Goldin 2013). I will argue that simple strategic regulation by small countries or even single corporations can prevent global crises. It could be tempting to think that one can only outsmart AI with cleverer AI. That is the path taken in AI arms races. Our killer robots will be able

to outsmart yours, then move on to kill humans on their facial recognition data base, or kill humans wearing uniforms who command enemy killer robots. I argue that there is the simpler alternative of the theory of nonviolent defense. That involves first taking the view that one's military might ultimately win or lose an AI arms race, but that to some degree both sides will lose. Both sides' killer robots may do a lot of killing before they are wiped out by smarter robots. Both sides might so successfully escalate killing that they are even more capable than humans of intentionally or unintentionally drawing nuclear weapons into the fight as they resist being wiped out. Both sides will be capable of devastating escalation of cyberwar against their enemy. That might cascade to nuclear war if satellites that guide targeting of enemy nuclear weapons are accidentally disabled. Or the escalation of slaughter might be so chaotic that the escalation to nuclear war happens in chaotically unknowable ways.

Nonviolent strategy opts for restorative diplomacy oriented to substantive outcomes first. This means rejecting rituals of comfort on a subject as important as war and peace. Responsive business regulatory strategy likewise opts for listening and persuading first through restorative regulation. Nonviolent strategy is an alternative that can allow the enemy the ritual of comfort of seeming to win militarily, perhaps even without a fight. Then mainly through nonviolent resistance the strategy denies the enemy the substance they wish to secure from the conquest. If it is nuclear plants, perhaps spin their centrifuges out of control to the point of mutual destruction. If it is oil and gas pipelines, make them unusable. If it is IT platforms or space programs, prepare the most technically brilliant staff to strike and then exit. Support them to go into hiding; smuggle them across borders. Train them to leave behind sabotage logic bombs that explode later to cause the takeover to destroy its objectives in taking over. Simple ju jitsu strategies can turn the power of a powerful enemy against itself. Concentrate preventive capabilities on containing risks, on sustaining simple international institutions of peacemaking, and on restorative diplomacy with potential enemies.

The theory of nonviolence notwithstanding, there are circumstances of states retaining authority over their society where they regulate systemic vice with systemic virtue to secure substantive outcomes instead of rituals of comfort. Cartels can use price monitoring AI that ensures that no

members of the cartel cheat by secretly cutting prices. Likewise, competition regulators can deploy price monitoring AI to detect patterns of price fixing or predatory pricing. They can approach cartel cheats with an immunity deal to become whistleblowers to prosecutors against other members of the cartel. As in warfare, there may be contexts where anti-cartel AI defeats cartels and their AI. But these are temporary victories until the technological tide turns and the other side gets on top. Simpler, older, detective strategies may work better more often. Organizations always have plenty of resentful people who have been passed over for promotion, sexually harassed, bullied, or who simply find it unethical when their firm arrogantly flouts the law. Insider knowledge of skeletons in the corporate closet is always there, indeed usually widely diffused. The problem is that it is not a smart career move to blow the whistle to the regulator, however resentful you are. It tends to harm your physical and mental health and your career. Whistleblower suicides are rife. This is why I advocate *qui tam* suits as in the US False Claims Act (Braithwaite 2008, 2022). If a whistleblower gives the Justice Department enough evidence to win against the corporation, or against the Defense Department in a case of illegal development of AI weapons, the whistleblower should get a percentage of the corporate fine. If the Justice Department is captured by the corporate criminal or state criminal, a private prosecution can be launched that attracts a higher percentage of the fine because there has been no help from the Justice Department in winning conviction.

Weapons of the weak, like nonviolence and whistleblowing, can counter the exploitative power of ritualism when regulatory diplomacy is restorative, when business regulation is creative. It can be preventive in containment of risk, yet ultimately responsive in its escalation of collaborative networked capability to contain and deter risk abusers.

Responsive Regulation to Contain Risk

This book and my earlier work concludes that a simple strategy that is evidence-based is for regulators to have many arrows in their quivers (Braithwaite 2008, 2022). It is to have a regulatory mix of strategies that

delivers regulatory redundancy. This means regulators do not need to be more brilliant than the corporate executives or the robots they regulate. They can require sophisticated corporations to take responsibility to design systems for taming risk in the context of their business circumstances, or in the complex environmental or oceanic circumstances of an offshore rig where they extract gas. If the strategy regulators draw from their quiver fails to persuade rigs to do this well and with integrity, pull another strategy from the quiver; if that fails, another; until finally a strategy works in motivating the firm to do its own sophisticated technical work in managing the complex risk, and in being able to show the regulator how it works. This is the idea of responsive regulation that regulators should have a pyramid of regulatory strategies that may fail one after the other until there is escalation to a strategy that delivers. It must deliver substantive outcomes, not ritualism; the responsive regulator is required to keep trying new strategies until the desired outcome is accomplished. The simple side of responsive regulation is that it means trying one thing after another until finally something works. Simpler, less interventionist strategies are tried first. These escalate in interventionism and complexity as the regulator escalates up the pyramid in response to regulatory failure. Strategy redundancy tends to be more cost-effective than seeking some best strategy that will always outgun the adversary or always be optimal. This is because simpler, cheaper strategies based on appealing to the better nature of the responsible duty-holder will often work because the firm can be convinced that if this does not work, there will be a sequence of costly battles that might ultimately result in loss of the conflict. The essence of responsive regulation is redundancy and a regulator who will not walk away until the problem is fixed.

What works with regulating corporations can be dangerous with regulating armies. The fact that grips the thinking of realists is that international society is anarchic. There is no global Leviathan that can command states (and their armies). With states regulating corporations, there is a Leviathan. At the end of the day, even though some corporations might be 'too big to fail', states have the capability to close them down. Fear of that capability at the peak of a responsive regulatory pyramid is one of the (many) things that makes it work. Realists

say capability of a Leviathan to close down armies is absent with regulation of states. Hence, a problem with escalation up a pyramid of great power nuclear escalations under anarchy is that when reciprocated escalation cascades out of control, no global Leviathan steps in to stop it. That is a current problem with Russian strategists of 'escalate to deescalate'; they explicitly embrace nuclear weapon escalations. The Russian strategy only works if the United States decides that it will allow a Putin to push it around through Russian nuclear escalation to deescalate. This book argues that the US simulation work suggests that this is not how America responds in nuclear crisis simulations. What happens instead of Vladimir's beautiful theory of escalate to deescalate is that the United States instead keeps escalating. Reciprocated escalation quite likely continues until the planet is destroyed.

Absent an explicit commitment to minimally sufficient deterrence, responsive regulation of one great power by another is dangerous in this way. This is fundamental to the hypotheses of this book that civilizational extinctions are inevitable unless commitments to minimally sufficient deterrence and movement toward WMD abolition are explicit and internationally institutionalized. Perhaps Robert Oppenheimer the realist was right in the 1940s that the only route to survival is world government. That is harder to achieve than the policy hypotheses of this book, however.

Networked responsive escalation of international governance of warfare works much better than realists predict because of the empirical conclusions of the life work of Andrew Mack discussed in Chapter 6. Yes, having a credible deterrent peak to a regulatory pyramid does matter, but that does not need to be a WMD peak. The evidence is that the most important work done by regulatory pyramids is at their base; when that fails, a hugely more substantial volume of effective regulatory work occurs as escalation occurs up through the middle of pyramids than occurs at the peak. When escalation fails in the middle of regulatory pyramids, lateral moves to alternative strategies at that middle level are more important and more recurrent than moving higher up the pyramid to severe deterrence (Braithwaite 2008, 99–108, 199–207). Moreover, most of the regulatory work is not done by a unitary state Leviathan, but by a networked plurality of national actors, sub-national, corporate, civil

society, and supra-national actors of diverse kinds (Braithwaite 2008, 94–98). So the problem with any realist view that responsive regulatory pyramids cannot work with great power military contests is that it adopts too old-fashioned a view of how really existing regulation works, a view that it works by command and control by one statist regulator that is a Leviathan. Indeed, my argument is that the Leviathan fallacy has cursed the world with domination and regulatory failure at every level of governance. It is also false that families descend into anarchy unless ruled by a patriarch who carries a big stick. The African aphorism that it takes a whole village to raise a child is closer to the truth. This book makes the case that what works in regulation of anything is minimal sufficiency of deterrent command and control combined with rich plurality of preventive mechanisms à la Mack, of conversational regulation and pluralist networked regulation.

The responsive regulatory approach should be asserted as a neglected possibility with the world's most acute long-run risk—nuclear war based on misunderstanding, misinterpretation, false flag cyberespionage, or technical errors. States without nuclear weapons could insist in the context of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that they will ultimately opt out of the regime to exercise their right to acquire nuclear weapons unless each of the nuclear weapons states discloses transparently how its nuclear safety and surety inspections are continuously improving to safeguard against accidents, cyber-threats from criminals, terrorists, or spies fomenting false flag perceptions, and so on across the gamut of risks. Other states could insist on escalation to a right to their participation, or participation of adversary nuclear weapons states, on inspection teams to rigorously evaluate continuous improvement in safety and surety. How can 190 states without WMDs argue to their citizens that they take their security seriously if they do not insist on this? Some of them would reply that they are realists in surrendering to trust in allied nuclear weapons states. Is it realistic to trust without verifying?

Undoubtedly there is a place for writing books about designing systematic regulatory strategies for countering ritualism that rely on clever AI. By the time the book is published, it will be countered by a cleverer, newer way of gaming the clever new regulatory design. Hence an appeal of simple institutional strategies that are also meta-strategies (as

discussed in Chapter 3 and Braithwaite (2022)—strategies like responsive regulation concerning how to order strategy choice. This appeal for the scholar is that simple meta-strategies have more enduring relevance than specific complex techniques that create opportunities to be gamed beyond relevance because they are complex, and because they code technical specificities. The work of the Center for Tax System Integrity on how a small number of tax principles can trump over millions of national and international tax rules illustrates this thinking about the policy pathways for reasoning about simple principles (Braithwaite 2005).

My standard analysis of the diffusion of light-touch regulation so far oversimplifies in a way that is important to see. The regulatory capitalism literature shows that investment in regulatory states has not declined this century (Coglianese et al. 2021; Braithwaite 2008, 2022). In the decade after the 2001 terror attack on New York and Washington, the steepest regulatory growth was associated with the Department of Homeland Security and its contractors. These were the new flocks of street-level monitors who scrutinized our persons and luggage as we boarded aircraft. A decade later it was cybersecurity regulation that was growing in the public sector, but more so in the private sector where IT departments shifted from service functions to self-regulatory inspectorates for guarding against cyber-threats. Then there was covid regulation. It is untrue that financial regulation withered during the first decade of this century. Rather its focus shifted from diagnosis and control of systemic risk to regulation of money laundering and illicit financial transfers that might reach the pockets of terrorists. This shift of focus and regulatory resources was ill-conceived. It contributed little to preventing access to the modest funds terrorists needed to launch operations as grand as collapsing the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Many more lives were lost to suicides associated with the homelessness, unemployment, and retirement nest eggs that disappeared during the Global Financial Crisis (IMF 2009). This was the kind of financial regulation most needed for the risk containment of that era.

During the low-growth decade of paying down national debts from the deficit stimulus years after the financial crisis, pandemic preparedness institutions and environmental regulation counted among the facets of regulatory states that were dismantled. Again, environmental crises

and pandemic crises, whether they are covid, HIV, polio, or influenza, can each cost hugely larger numbers of lives than terrorism has ever historically managed to inflict. While some specific regulatory state investments like scanning for weapons entering aircraft have been highly cost-effective, overall the war on terror, particularly through the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya made the world less safe, made Islamic State stronger, especially as it spread south from Libya across the Sahel, then right across Africa.

Hence, the problem is not one of a declining regulatory state. It is the wrong kind of regulatory state with an excess of investment in sometimes counterproductive forms of the national security state such as the war on terror, the war on drugs that cascaded to wars among armies in Colombia, Central America, Peru, Mexico and beyond, to refugee invasions of the United States, and to the decade of failed Bush-Obama invasions. In addition, the diversion of the attention of financial regulators onto terror and drug financing was strategically counterproductive financial regulation, in an era of financial fragility, when deeper risks needed to be recoupled to responsibility. This chapter argues that growth in regulation, particularly inspection of risks of WMDs, remains imperative inside national security states. And regulation of health and the environment remain areas where regulatory investment formerly directed at the war on terror might productively be shifted.

Political resort to audit as a ritual of comfort applies to environmental as well as financial audit. For so many decades, plans for environmentally disastrous new coal mines would be announced to a barrage of critique from environmental defenders. Political leaders then responded by announcing a further environmental audit of the mine that proceeded until the anger subsided or the election was over.

The widespread reality of regulatory ritualism is the enactment of many new regulatory laws without provision for additional regulatory resources to monitor additional laws. Audits that are rituals of comfort are a second step that occurs after public criticism over accountability to those laws. There are large numbers of regulatory laws for which no corporate offender has ever been imprisoned, no large fine ever imposed on a corporate offender, and in many cases not even symbolic slap-on-the-wrist fines have ever been imposed, and most critically, no

inspectors have been deployed to detect non-compliance. Attention to regulatory ritualism means recognizing that little tends to be achieved by just writing a new law. Sadly, many civil society campaigners for regulatory transformation are pleased enough to comfort their funders with ritualistic back-slapping for nothing more than enactment of a new law.

This is not to argue that laws are meaningless unless law breaking is consistently punished. The evidence does not support this at all. It is not the case that the regulatory agencies that impose the toughest punishments have the lowest levels of law breaking (Braithwaite 2022, Chapter 9). There are no societies or regulatory domains that criminologists can point to where many business offenders have been sent to prison and as a result the community is well protected from corporate crime. There are, however, many domains where the evidence does support the conclusion that regulators that invest in a rigorous regulatory mix, that includes some deterrence, protect the community better, sometimes a hundred times better, than was previously the case (Schell-Busy et al. 2016; Braithwaite 2022). With crime in the suites as with crime in the streets, pure punishment policies do not work; what works is a regulatory mix that provides minimally sufficient deterrence and a regulatory mix that in combination delivers prevention, self-regulation, rehabilitation, and some incapacitation and deterrence. The right mix can be discovered iteratively and responsively until the data show that the non-compliance problem is being brought under control.

Sadly, this mostly does not happen. Big business makes its campaign contributions; they intimidate regulatory bureaucrats who fear for their careers (Accs and Coglianese 2022). Bureaucrats and politicians both have opportunities to be rewarded with better-paid jobs in regulated corporations. Admirals responsible for monitoring defense-contracting fraud and bid-rigging may have prospects as good as their defense minister of securing a job upon retirement working for a naval contractor or as a lobbyist. Likewise top health bureaucrats have lucrative prospects with Big Pharma.

It is important that regulatory inspection is deployed to the greatest hot spots of risk rather than wasted checking activities that pose little risk. Yet sadly what has happened in recent decades is that risk analysis and risk scanning has degenerated. It has been captured as a form

of risk ritualism. That is, over time action against businesses that are failing to meet their regulatory obligations declines because regulators are spending most of their budgets on risk measurement, risk scanning, and risk analysis and little on street-level shutdown of risks.

Return to Street-Level Bureaucracy

Regulation globally has seen shifts from inspection by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) to desk auditing and algorithmic regulation. Doubtless there will be ways these shifts uncover some better methods for achieving regulatory outcomes. There are also structural risks, however, in moving regulatory monitoring away from the field and away from human field-level inspection. Field inspection is the path to *detective* competence that finds skeletons in corporate closets (or in the closets of nuclear weapons programs). One of the ways detective competence is delivered when inspectors go onto worksites is that insiders who are concerned about a safety issue build a human relationship with them and then confidentially give the inspector a steer to the closet they should inspect to find the skeleton. This is a safer form of indirect whistleblowing than blowing a whistle publicly oneself.

Whether this is one of the important reasons that regulatory inspection works, or less important than dozens of other mechanisms reported in the literature, the bottom line is that there is formidable evidence that regulatory inspection can improve compliance with regulatory laws. So far, however, there is a dearth of systematic evidence for this with desk audits and algorithmic regulation. That is true of policing as well. The evidence is strong that putting police on the beat at hot spots of risk reduces crime even if the police are not there with any soundly conceived risk-prevention strategy (Braithwaite 2022). But systematic evidence that police doing desk audits works does not yet exist. Scholars who do a lot of interviewing of street-level regulators are familiar with complaints that shifts of regulatory investment to head office staff who do desk audits with algorithmic help threaten regulatory work that is responsive to realities of the field and to detective competence. I have interviewed many environmental and other regulators who say that the big reform they

need is to reverse the drift of staffing to head office, returning to a world where a good half of the staff are on the beat.

For 50 years I have been listening to inspectors pointing to what their in-house data seem to show—that the best predictor of future catastrophe is not past high-risk incidents (which is what mostly informs risk profiles) but may be a diffused profile of sloppiness with standards where most of the sloppiness is low risk or near miss and therefore *not* recorded. That is a rationale for resident inspectors with desks at the biggest, badest workplaces. They call in their supervisors for backup when those risks spiral out of hand again.

From the perspective of a restorative and responsive approach to prevention, one thing that can be less restorative and responsive than desk audits is robo-regulation, as exemplified by Valerie Braithwaite's (2020) work on the Australian government's notorious Robodebt fiasco. At root, Robodebt was also a problem of IT consultants selling their wares; our IT can save resources and provide quicker decisions by cutting field staff, replacing them with algorithms activated by some extra central office staff who work with us as consultants. Shortcuts that trim human participation cut out the relationality that is the essence of responsiveness and of restorative diplomacy.

The AI turn in regulation nudges humans not to think. It nudges them not to heal, not to be relational. AI might remake human regulators to become more like the machines the consultants sell, to think more like machines designed to make work easier. That is a risk to relational regulation posed by the techno-social systems of AI, a risk that responsive regulation and restorative diplomacy must struggle against. We see the risk with the simplest of apps that advance *faux relationality* by automated Likes of friends' Facebook posts, Instagram pics, or loving automated birthday wishes. In even simpler ways, the risks were always there with templates and checklists. Like AI, these *are* valuable tools for regulators and diplomats. Over-reliance on them, however, rewires the brains of street-level staff with templated, tick-box mentalities that erode wisdom, relational listening, and capabilities for motivational interviewing. They tie inspectors to their computers and their desks rather than to their boots as they talk and tramp the fields of buried bodies, the closets of hidden skeletons. Relational regulation works when

someone spurns a shortcut and instead takes a high road of reaching out to help with regulatory diplomacy toward fixing a problem. The street-level diplomacy issues here are not so different from commanding heights diplomacy among great powers discussed earlier. Relationally simple diplomacy can be as technically simple as providing a hot line so there can be instant restorative and responsive engagement, president with president, general with general.

In a more general way, consultants, including university ones of the kind I have been, are the problem because we write reports for central office regulatory staff who have budgets to pay us. We don't work to street-level staff. So we focus on regulatory tasks that can be done by our central office clients. Risk containment challenges end up in the hands of bureaucracies where greater resources go to measuring risk, and declining resources to preventing risk or taming them once they blow up. Might regulatory reformers do better to stand with old-fashioned inspectors who wish to see most regulatory resources devoted to inspection and to enforcement follow-up?

I admire Malcolm Sparrow's (2011) work with regulatory agencies on how to realize his prescription to pick important problems and fix them. It requires deliberation by the regulatory agency centrally, sometimes co-design with stakeholders (though not often enough), on what are their top priority problems, collecting baseline data on those problems, then putting programs in play to treat the problems, measure improvements above baseline, and disseminate results. Although the scientific designs of agency evaluations tend to be weak, much success has been achieved by Sparrow's methods. They have improved the quality of the regulatory craft. Risks remain, nevertheless, that centrally prescribed priorities can crowd out priority problem identification discovered serendipitously during inspections that are closer to the realities of where the problems are. In aged-care regulation, centrally planned prioritizing, with consultation engaging stakeholders, is dominated by industry leaders, trade union leaders, other national players, and technocrats with a national orientation to problem priorities.

At the nursing home level, the voice of lowly voiceless frail aged is empowered by inspection, as are voices of visiting family members and staff members who might be lowly but have deep insights into the biggest

problems in their particular workplace (Braithwaite et al. 2007). I have little doubt that Malcolm Sparrow has helped significantly many regulatory organizations that he has worked with that have got better at picking important problems and fixing them, like the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the United States. Nevertheless, we must not be so dazzled by that success as to forget that there was long-standing strong evidence that street-level OSHA inspections worked, as with inspections by other regulators. Nor did OSHA inspections work because they imposed high fines that made compliance rational; historically OSHA fines were risible. They succeeded in identifying problems in their local context to reduce workplace injuries throughout the 1980s (Scholz and Gray 1990), before OSHA considered Malcolm Sparrow's head office risk analytics. Hence, care and responsibility is needed by those of us who work with head office regulators to protect what demonstrably works from excessive head office crowding out of priority setting. That applies to universities and national research funding agencies as well, where top-down problem prioritization can counterproductively crowd out more local, more serendipitous identification of research priorities by individual teams of scholars. Research teams close to the coalface are generally more nuanced about priorities for mining knowledge. Care is needed there as well that their judgment is not overly dominated by strategic planners.

Summarizing conclusions from this section, regulatory agencies almost everywhere are at risk of over-investing in desk audit and risk analysis that they too often fund as an end in itself, while under-investing in street-level inspection that treats risks. With fraud in rural carbon credit schemes, a problem is under-investment in farm-level inspection. Here it must be conceded, however, that strategic use of satellite images of farm tree cover is imperative. The evidence that inspection works and that detection works more powerfully than sanctions is strong; evidence that punishment works, and algorithmic regulation works is weak (Braithwaite 2022, Chapter 9). Listening skills of inspectors are crucial to the diagnostic and catalytic competence that renders inspectors more like detectives and diplomats, more relational practitioners than they currently are, and less like auditors.⁵ Compliance inspection can practice restorative diplomacy. To change behavior, we must genuinely listen

to narratives of non-compliance and change that organizational story-book. More than that, the listening should lead to agreement on desired outcomes, and on how to monitor progress toward them, and informal praise from inspectors when progress is made. The empirical evidence shows that informal praise by inspectors for success costs nothing, improves compliance and problem-solving and the human quality of the work lives of all involved (Braithwaite et al. 2007). Commitment to improvement is secured through evidence-based motivational interviewing methods that humanly help actors to find their own motivation to attain an outcome. Motivational interviewing enables organizational and individual problem-solving more by expanding their strengths than controlling or deterring their weaknesses. We have seen that ritualism can be countered by rapid detection and correction, as by resident inspectors, and mobilization of whole networks of accountability and enablement.

Conclusion: Principles for Transcending Ritualism

All variants of political ritualism can be countered by relentless monitoring by regulatory regimes with redundant, responsive capabilities for demanding accountability of actors with the power to prevent. In this, social movements for regulatory reform, the environmental movement, the peace movement, are more foundationally germinal than Leviathans. Social movement politics is also required to move corporate and state governance from risk shifting to risk management. International institutions develop inspiring Sustainable Development Goals but do not institutionalize monitoring of the delivery of pledges made to realize them through a systematic pledge-monitoring system. We cannot, need not, consistently punish pledge-breakers. We do need to consistently monitor their breaches, demand that promises are kept, and deliver consequences when such pleas are ignored. I have argued that this should also be true of regulation of reckless deployments of nuclear weapons led from states without nuclear weapons. Boundless networking of civil society creativity is needed in how this is catalyzed. If a ruthlessly hard-headed minister who is hard to shame fails to meet his pledges to support

education for Syrian refugee girls, mount a little protest when he visits a girls' school. Creativity to grab media attention is the thing with this kind of protest. For some issues, protests outside churches of company directors have had impact.⁶

A responsive regulatory strategy that works requires shift of energy from desk audits and risk analysis to getting out on the street, to street-level inspection and networked relational dialogue about regulatory obligations. Civil society might not be able to demand access to evidence that surprise inspections of the surety of nuclear weapons are happening, but China is foolish not to demand such access to evidence of nuclear weapons surety, the United States is even more foolish to fail to demand scrutiny of programs more reckless than their own in Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Israel. Nuclear surety ritualism is too profound a risk for transparency and checks to be waived. Global security institutions must move down from the clouds and check what ground the boots of inspectors are covering.

The final decades of the twentieth century were among the greatest for national transitions to democracy. The first decades of the twenty-first are among history's finest for gaming democracy and for declining trust in democracy. A slow food approach to educating citizens on why a multitude of separations of powers, cross-cutting checks and balances, can prepare citizens for the crisis when a despot dies, or when catastrophes destabilize a despot (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018; Braithwaite 2022). Although misgovernance is the rational strategy for leaders of new democracies, slow-food patience for institutional cooking can entrench institutional checks and balances and deepen furrows of good governance path dependency. Chapter 11 returns to this theme.

Chapters 8–9 made the case for better global and local institutions of diplomacy and collaboration. This includes global and street-level regulatory diplomacy and regulatory institutions. These regulators crave a better mix of strategies in their quivers than they currently have. They need the capability to be creative at trying one strategy after another to prevent crises until one of them works, or more likely a mix of them works. In these forms of slow-food preventive work at blocking crises before they take off and cascade to other crises, regulators worldwide can achieve more if they learn to collaborate with one another

at being cosmopolitan, using national enforcement threats to demand global compliance improvements under the shadow of the axe of deferred national prosecutions. There is much for the rest of the world to learn from the WHO architecture of nurturing collaboration among health regulators to surge support for helping one another at early prevention of pandemics.

A multidimensional strategic imagination for crisis prevention is needed. Simply putting a high price on carbon will produce abatement too slowly and weakly because of carbon fraud and price manipulation. Sadly, the higher the carbon price, the stronger the incentive to game the measurement and reporting of carbon emissions. State closure of coal-fired power plants and banning of internal combustion motor vehicles are also imperative. Carbon traders cannot deliver without carbon detectives with simple skills who muddy their boots so they can be approached by whistleblowers who expose carbon fraud to enforced accountability.

Notes

1. For example, ONE Campaign documented that five years later only 61% of promises to increase aid to Sub-Saharan Africa made by the G-7 Gleneagles Summit were delivered, a US\$7 billion shortfall on pledges. ONE Campaign, Key findings from the DATA Report 2011. ONE Campaign, 2011: https://www.one.org/us/?one_policy_docs=data-report. (Accessed September 29, 2023). A sequence of ONE annual reports persistently documents such trends with refugee pledges and many kinds of aid pledges. Their 2016 report made the case for a systematic pledge-tracker as part of the Sustainable Development Goals architecture: ONE Campaign, The 2016 Data Report: A Bolder response for a changing world. ONE Campaign, 2016: https://s3.amazonaws.com/one.org/pdfs/ONE_DATA_Report_2016_EN.pdf. (Accessed September 29, 2023).
2. The Theirworld #YouPromised campaign website documents the chronology that follows: <https://theirworld.org/news/story-so-far-promise-to-educate-every-syrian-refugee-child>. (Accessed September 29, 2023).

3. In Australia the idea of resident inspectors elected by miners and paid by the state had their birth in the late 1800s at times of terrible mine disasters. In the 1970s, after a series of mine disasters, the US Mine Safety and Health Administration introduced resident inspectors for the 78 mines with the worst lost-time accident rates in the country. After they got their resident inspector, those 78 mines had below-average accident rates. (Braithwaite 2008; Seung 2016).
4. Every Australian abattoir that exports meat for half a century has had resident Australian government meat inspectors with an office and laboratory located inside the abattoir. The Australian Taxation Office has had them for decades with desks inside the towers of the largest, most aggressive corporate taxpayers.
5. This is one of Jennifer Berger and Keith Johnston's (2015) *Simple Habits for Complex Times*. Active listening is one of their simple habits of mind that stretch leadership capacities to cope with complexity. Another simple habit for complex times is being able to use that listening to reframe options for action with multiple perspectives. If the system being confronted is chaotic, with unknowable causal drivers, these multiple perspectives include options for leading to impose a better order on the chaos.
6. This was a tactic made famous by the JP Stephens campaign against company directors responsible for exploitative labor practices (Fisse and Braithwaite 1983).

References

- Acs, Alex, and Cary Coglianese. 2022. Influence by intimidation: Business lobbying in the regulatory process. *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 1.
- Berger, Jennifer Garvey, and Keith Johnston. 2015. *Simple habits for complex times: Powerful practices for leaders*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Black, William K. 2013. *The best way to rob a bank is to own one*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Braithwaite, John. 2005. *Markets in vice, markets in virtue*. Oxford: OUP.

- Braithwaite, John. 2008. *Regulatory capitalism*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrocriminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John and Bina D'Costa. 2018. *Cascades of Violence: War, crime and peacebuilding across South Asia*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, Toni Makkai, and Valerie Braithwaite. 2007. *Regulating aged care*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Braithwaite, Valerie. 2020. Beyond the bubble that is Robodebt: How governments that lose integrity threaten democracy. *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 55: 242–259.
- Coglianesi, Cary, Natasha Sarin, and Stuart Shapiro. 2021. The deregulation deception. University of Pennsylvania Law School, *Public Law Research Paper* 44: 20–44.
- Fisse, Brent, and John Braithwaite. 1983. *The impact of publicity on corporate offenders*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Goldin, Ian. 2021. *Rescue: From global crisis to a better world*. London: Sceptre Books.
- Goldin, Ian. 2013. *Divided nations: Why global governance is failing, and what we can do about it*. Oxford: OUP.
- Goldin, Ian, and Tiffany Vogel. 2010. Global governance and systemic risk in the 21st century: Lessons from the financial crisis. *Global Policy* 1: 1–13.
- Hong, Seung-Hun. 2016. *Dynamics of reciprocal regulation*. PhD dissertation, The Australian National University, Canberra.
- IMF. 2009. *World economic outlook: Crisis and recovery*. Washington: IMF.
- Lipsky, Michael. 1980. *Street-level bureaucracy*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Long, Stephen, and Alex McDonald. 2022. Insider blows whistle on Australia's greenhouse gas reduction schemes. *ABC*, March 24.
- Merton, Robert K. 1968. *Social theory and social structure*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Power, Michael. 1997. *The audit society: Rituals of verification*. Oxford: OUP.
- Schell-Busey, Natalie, Sally S. Simpson, Melissa Rorie, and Mariel Alper. 2016. What works? A systematic review of corporate crime deterrence'. *Criminology & Public Policy* 15: 387–416.
- Scholz, John T., and Wayne B. Gray. 1990. OSHA enforcement and workplace injuries: A behavioral approach to risk assessment. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 3: 283–305.
- Sparrow, Malcolm K. 2011. *The regulatory craft: Controlling risks, solving problems, and managing compliance*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.





11

Requisite Variety and Simple Institutional Virtues

Abstract Regulators achieve more if they learn to collaborate with one another at being cosmopolitan. Regulators can use national enforcement threats to demand global compliance improvements under the shadow of the axe of deferred prosecutions. Early detection and early response are imperative with fast-moving risks. Principles for a dialectics of requisite variety are: (a) Prune and strengthen rules; (b) Transform jurisprudence so fundamental principles justify rules, yet trump rules; (c) Shift away from automaticity of enforcement of rules, algorithmic or human, to a restorative diplomacy of rule enforcement of peace agreements, environmental stewardship, virus containment, and stewardship of financial systems; rally behind front-line workers of crisis-prevention institutions before burnout spreads.

Keywords Deferred prosecution · Cosmopolitan regulation · Dialectics · Rules and principles · Burnout

Thinking Dialectically About Complexity

A simple statement about the world is that it is complex. Another simple statement is that we must learn and listen to diverse voices about that complexity. That is why institutions that strive to master the unknown, like universities, are important. When we give up on learning and listening, we step into traps complexity sets for us. We have seen that simple solutions for managing complexity can make substantial contributions; but then we must move on to more complex and nuanced capabilities. Sometimes they are informed by science that tells us which variables are most important and what are the most important interactions among those variables, so we know that X works, but only if we do Y and Z as well, and only if we sequence the doing of these three things in a particular order. We know that as well from experience as cooks following good recipes.

Obviously as that kind of scientific knowledge moves beyond three variables, it quickly gets very complex indeed. What helps us with that is a turn to very local forms of contextual knowledge. In health care, we turn to the clinical experience of our family doctor. She knows the health histories of members of our family; she knows I am not good at sticking to diets and that my particular body has an adverse reaction to this drug that most people do not have, the drug that evidence-based medicine says should normally be prescribed in my circumstance. So she crafts a suggested alternative treatment program ‘with’ me rather than ‘for’ me or ‘to’ me.

One of the great evidence-based discoveries in the science of human development is that being evidence-based about applying a ‘best practice’ is often not the best practice. The recurrently better practice is to be locally attuned. So in a village where children suffer malnutrition, yet eat cheap processed food, it is not the best practice for a nutritionist to enter the village and try to introduce nutritional best practice by changing what is grown in the village and how it is cooked. Randomized controlled trials suggest that ‘positive deviance’ is a better development practice. So the nutritionist does better to work ‘with’ the village by first listening to villagers and observing their existing practices. From this, identify champions of better slow food cooking practices that deliver

joyful eating to villagers that supplants processed foods. Identify a corner of the village where a farmer is a champion at growing more nutritious crops more plentifully than in other corners of that village. Lionize that cook and that farmer as champions. Encourage others in the village to learn from them by sharing some of the joy of their farming, their cooking. That locally attuned practice of searching with the village for ‘positive deviance’ works better than doing best practice ‘for’ the village. Duncan Green’s (2016) *How Change Happens* is a resource on how encouraging modelling of locally attuned better practices out-performs ‘best practicitis’.

For all of that, there is compelling evidence that some simple, bright-line rules, some simple principles and simple institutions designed to help us avert complexity’s traps do indeed help. Driving automobiles through the traffic of large cities is complex. Although the day arrives soon when AI helps humans better master its challenges, AI currently available is safer than human drivers on highways but still does not satisfy the demands of auto safety law for suburban driving that might hit a child. We do know that, whether the car is steered by a human or by AI, a bright-line rule must be that all cars drive on a particular side of the road. This is a simple rule that contributes greatly to averting collisions. It works imperfectly as a rule that serves interests of travelers. Non-compliance is easy to detect and punish. Drivers do doze off, however, causing collisions by crossing that line. So a simple, cost-effective way to reduce fatalities further is to separate streams of traffic with sufficient space for barriers that engineer impossibility of veering into incoming traffic at proven accident-prone places.

We must move on from a limited number of simple principles and simple institutions to a larger number of simple rules that evidence points to for reducing complexity’s traps. Chapter 2 showed that a large number of simple rules can be like a large number of simplifying apps on an old person’s phone, however. An overly large clutter of apps, simplifying though they may be, can overwhelm an older person, taking them beyond requisite variety for the improved operation of their communication. We have seen that organizations can also be overwhelmed by too many good rules, each of which is useful standing alone. The aggregation of too many rules has crippled the effectiveness of corporate tax

law, allowing smart lawyers to benefit the rich by playing a thicket of frequently contradictory rules against one another. The consequence of that contrived complexity is that the rich often pay no tax and poorer people a high portion of their income in tax. Chapter 2 showed how a thicket of too many rules undermined the integrity of the system of rules for regulating aged care in the United States. The limits on capability of bureaucracies to cope with a vast swathe of rules means compliance with each rule is assessed with low reliability and validity.

One thing needed therefore is intermittent pruning of Apps on a phone and rules of a bureaucracy in pursuit of the requisite variety discussed in Chapter 2. It is easier said than done. Whenever national tax authorities embark on tax simplification projects, they accomplish less than hoped. They struggle with the discovery that there is some circumstance where most rules are useful. The problem is less rule by rule, more a problem of there being too many rules to make sensible management of complexity possible. This is the crux of the case for a limited number of fundamental tax principles that are legally privileged to trump rules. Principles can simplify endless clever conflicts within the morass of rules. The judge and the tax authority can rule that in this circumstance, rule A applies, but not rule B with which it conflicts, because this choice gives superior overarching compliance with the fundamental principles of tax law.

A third remedy recognizes that to live in a society where every applicable rule is enforced is to live under tyranny. Social life is less dominating with optimum consistency and minimally sufficient deterrence than with maximum consistency and maximum deterrence. So this third remedy is to move decisionmaking away from the arena of the consistent enforcement of every applicable rule. Resolve more policy dilemmas by what I have called restorative diplomacy. When two countries are at war, a peace agreement is unlikely to be settled if either side argues that a pre-condition for agreement is that every war criminal on the other side must first be prosecuted. There has never been a war where anything remotely like this has happened because in every war there are thousands of unpunished war crimes on all sides. The best that can be approached is prosecution of the most egregious and senior criminals. This was more or less achieved on the side of the losers of World War II, though victor's

justice allowed impunity to prevail on the winner's side. In an insurgency war, the best we do is to give amnesties to tens of thousands of low-level insurgents even though they are all involved in illegal killing of people. A new leadership on the insurgency side might agree to terms that allow some leaders to be prosecuted. Positive outcomes that often do much of the work in persuading the other side to sign the peace accord include an end to the killing monitored by international peacekeepers, return of agreed territory from one side to another, an internationally monitored election, and promises of aid to rebuild the country. Individuals who have lost a leg in a war crime usually do not get prosecution of the culpable criminal who planted the mine, but often get humanitarian assistance to get them walking again, working again, with a bit of victim compensation cash. Tragically, we accept that restorative diplomacy makes peace possible by simplifying to a big picture of recovery that neglects much impunity (Marsavelski and Braithwaite 2020). Note that the effective UN peace operation that facilitates this with locals is not the Leviathan enforcing peace that realists insist is missing in the anarchy of international relations. It is a temporary international coalition of helpers and facilitators of local problem-solving conversations, yes with some enforced civilian protection from fighters with guns, some enforced cantonment and disarmament of armed units as well.

Environmental and pandemic protocol inspectorates share many of the foregoing features in common with peace operations. When they go on the beat, they see dozens of things they could prosecute. Mostly they do not. They might simply say, 'You are entering a hospital madam, please put on a mask'; 'Please clean up that minor oil spill before I come back to finish the inspection tomorrow'. If inspectors do not do that, they spend too much of their time tied up in court enforcing tiny matters; they fail to prioritize limited enforcement capabilities onto serious non-compliance where enforcement might change the way powerful organizations think about their environmental obligations, the way hospital systems think about infection control systems. So restorative inspection must be responsive to where structurally important risk resides.

In sum, the three principles for a dialectics of requisite variety here are: 1. Prune rules; 2. Transform jurisprudence so fundamental principles trump rules; 3. Shift away from automaticity of enforcement of rules, algorithmic or human, to a restorative diplomacy of rule enforcement, peace agreements, motivation of environmental stewardship, virus containment, and stewardship of the financial system's integrity.

There is a fourth principle that the book so far has only implicitly addressed. It is to design the separation of bureaucratic powers so that the highest priority risks get the funding, the autonomous power requisite to regulation of them, and the focused attention required. I illustrated this simplicity with Taiwan's action plan of 124 discrete measures overseen by its National Health Command Centre and by local preparedness teams. On a regular basis, good governments prune bureaucracies and create new ones that focus on the big risks. An essential ingredient for making this growth of new bureaucracies work is well-crafted enforcement of a separation of powers. This means judges have one job to do and legislators another (important jobs they must stay focused upon). A poorly crafted separation of powers creates inefficiency and injustice by allowing legislators to interfere in decisions of judges in ways they are poorly trained to do, or worse because of political corruption. There are perhaps 150 countries in the world that fail to craft a wise separation of powers that keep both the judges and the legislators hard at work on what is their specialized function. Another 40 odd societies do a reasonable job of that separation.

The design principle for an efficient and effective separation of powers is that each separated power must have sufficient separated autonomy from other separated powers in a governance system, private or public, to get on with being accountable for doing its job. At the same time, there must be other agencies in the separation of powers that among them can hold every other separated power accountable.

If the head of the pandemic preparedness agency is taking bribes from a health care corporation, an anti-corruption commission working with internal and external audit and the judiciary can hold accountable the corrupted leader of the pandemic preparedness response. To those who have limited experience of the size and complexity of bureaucracies, this

seems unworkably complex. Yet there is that lived bureaucratic experience of 40 odd countries doing well enough at pruning old and creating new shoots of bureaucracy to assure optimized autonomy and accountability to tame the most important risks. This is not so different from the complex accomplishments of gardeners who do well enough at optimizing the sweet spot between pruning old shoots and creating new ones. A fourth bureaucratic gardening principle could be prudent crafting of an apt balance between old bureaucratic autonomies to get things done and new bureaucracies that hold them to account in ways that are carefully limited in the crafting of the separation of powers. Good governance is responsively optimized to improve performance, not so unlike the responsive optimization of the apps on our phones customized to our more pressing communication priorities.

The idea of responsive regulation as an iterative practice helps with this seemingly difficult challenge. When a regulatory agency escalates to intervention in another private or public bureaucracy that crushes its autonomous capability to deliver on its risk containment function, the regulator should deescalate from intervening in that way and consider an alternative for future use that better optimizes risk containment. Good practice before de-escalation is to admit the counterproductive overreach. Then negotiate restoratively for innovation into better ideas for voluntary compliance to reciprocate the regulatory de-escalation.

It seems implausible that endlessly adjusting the pruning regimens of our garden, endlessly pruning and growing the apps on our phones, and endlessly pruning and growing new sub-units in corporations and states could be efficient. In each case so much expansion of complexity seems ongoing. My hypothesis, however, is that this is the nature of the path to requisite variety of complexity. It is a learning path, a trial-and-error path. It is a journey of endlessly failing to get the level of complexity right, be it in bureaucracies or apps, yet learning how to fix this and re-optimize. With bureaucracies, we must understand that simply requiring the old Health Department to implement the 124 new Taiwanese pandemic preparedness requirements will overburden it with even more rules that it is failing to enforce. The correct Taiwanese judgment was that pandemic preparedness was important enough to create a new bureaucracy devoted to preparedness with just those 124 requirements, and accountable for

them. What we want to do in installing new Apps is to prioritize installation of simplifying Apps that will take over the functions of many old Apps as well as opening new horizons. Likewise, we want legal principles that trump rules in ways that simplify the underlying meaning of countless rules at once as it grows a deeper capability of a state to nurture the ideal of an equitable and efficient tax system or system of environmental law.

Sure, in the old days bureaucracies were smaller and simpler. Today there is such an alphabet soup of them that none of us can remember, let alone use. My conclusion, however, is that iterated growth in the size and complexity of governance can bequeath societies better lives for citizens with more risks under control. But this only happens when the governance of governance is well crafted and locally attuned. Moreover, the evidence is that some states and corporations fail disastrously at this challenge of meta governance. Sometimes the state must take over a bankrupt bank or an aged-care home with catastrophic infection control. Frequently after a devastating war, it can be best for a UN peace operation for some years to help a transitional government to grow new institutions to master the complexities of modern governance. Here we have the central importance of meta governance to optimizing requisite variety in the balance between simple and complex governance.

What is fatal is analysis paralysis. That is the worst option when overwhelmed by many complex challenges. To be effective, we must learn to search for and savor complexity and also learn how to rally people around the simple things that remain clear imperatives. Analysis paralysis is what has happened to UN peacekeeping since its 1990s golden era before it was overwhelmed by the arrival of the wars cascading from Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran, and Russia, and overwhelmed by the misjudgment of NATO armies that it was more important to have troops committed to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq than to UN peacekeeping. We can conquer analysis paralysis by getting to work on some simple principles and institutions of risk containment. I have urged a jump starting of risk containment by attempting first a pruning principle, a transformation strategy of subordinating thickets of rules to overarching principles, the few that trump the many. Second, I suggested a principle of substituting conflicts in courts or on battlegrounds with restorative diplomacy that

improves justice through relational problem-solving agreements. Third is a design principle of growing a complexity of regulatory bureaucracies wherein each separated power of a state has enough autonomy to do its job, but the network of separated state and non-state powers can hold bits of the state accountable for doing their job. No separated power can dominate all other powers, not even the office of the president. The separations of powers are delineated distinctly enough to deliver simple accountability for getting risk containment jobs done.

Histories of flourishing democracies reveals much wisdom in how to iterate at attempting these challenges to reach requisite variety in networked governance of risk, and governance of domination under prudently optimized separations of powers. Wisdom in accomplishing requisite variety in rules and principles, in making states more complex by growing new bureaucratic shoots and pruning older shoots requires cultivation from the reading of history as a habit of statecraft. History supplies lessons of overburdened bureaucracies becoming clunky, sometimes of new shoots quickly taming a risk, sometimes failing to, or interfering in the capability of other bureaucracies to get their risk containment done. In all histories there is a dialectics of struggle between bureaucratic complexity versus simplicity of focused accomplishment. Sometimes the synthesis generated by that dialectic is a discovery of institutional beauty for the connoisseur of bureaucracy. Sometimes it is ugly, despotic. Always there are lessons to learn, dysfunctions to fix. Reading history educates us to think in time about the nuanced, ever-changing character of the requisite variety of challenges of complexity, of networked governance of complexity to render it accountable.

My Controversial Simplifications

My quest has been no more than to explore this approach to cascading crises and coupled complexity. I have identified some useful examples of simple starting principles and institutions that might help. I do not see this quest and method as very controversial. What are controversial are some of the simple principles and institutions I have defended.

The lesson of complexity theory as it is taught to soldiers at the street-level in the era of the 'strategic corporal' is that if you are pinned down in a foxhole with fire seeming to hail down on you from every side, the worst thing you might do is stay put. An enemy will arrive from one of those directions to kill you. Perhaps better to back a risk, probing to break out in different directions until you find one that works in allowing you to reach your own lines. Sadly, humans often select bad simple solutions about where to head; they perish quickly. Likewise with my selection of starting principles and institutions. A good example of controversial selection is the Chapter 9 suite of principles that are crucially in the interests of international society and of governments that abide by them: Foreign governments should never interfere in the elections of other societies; they should not assassinate foreign leaders; they must not instigate or fund foreign military coups; they should not fund terrorists or proxy insurgents who fragment sovereign consolidation of another country's territory.

Ethical commentators might nevertheless look with favor upon the US decision to meddle in the Israeli election of 1992 against Yitzhak Shamir because he ignored warnings that the United States would act if he did not stop building illegal Israeli settlements on land defined by international law as Palestinian. Exit polls showed that the meddling worked: voters rejected Shamir because he had lost the confidence of the United States. The US meddling succeeded in bringing to power Prime Minister Rabin, who was more committed to compliance with international law and respect for the rights of Palestinians, and more committed to a peace process than any before him (Levin 2020, 247–52). Yet that peace process was never revived after rabbis issued a halacic verdict that Rabin was a persecutor of Jews who thus was free to be killed. Rabin was then assassinated by an extremist. Whether ethical or not, the meddling's success proved a 'catastrophic success' in the final washup along a violent pathway. Downes's (2021) data show the path from violent interference to catastrophic success to be of a recurrent kind. Hence, the argument was that although there is evidence that such meddling can deliver short-term objectives of the meddler, it is prone to blowback. Blowback tends to be so widely counterproductive that it makes the world less dangerous in the long run to embrace the principle

of non-meddling. That is not to deny that it is controversial for the US President to refuse to 'do something' in the Shamir circumstance. Nor is it to deny that new and better evidence might be collected in future decades.

Another controversial principle is to contain the biggest risks but desist from temporary containment of states as promptly as is possible. This is not what the United States does. It can be quick to impose sanctions on states and people it dislikes, but slow to lift them. Others are the principles of restorative diplomacy as an alternative to realist diplomacy and to covert foreign meddling. Strategic balance is an example of a simple concept in realist international relations theory that is also embraced by Hedley Bull's British school of IR theory, grounded in the idea of international society, indeed embraced by many thoughtful liberal institutionalists. An argument of this book has been that the considerable explanatory power of the balance concept for explaining past histories of conflict is muddied and muddled by technological complexity and the complexity of coupled crises that technological change forebodes. A balance in the number of nuclear weapons means little if one side secretly develops hypersonic AI weapons of such speed and stealth that adversaries have no hope of stopping them before they wipe out all their missiles and cities. It was a great accomplishment to halve and then halve again the number of nuclear weapons on our planet. But it became less of an accomplishment once current nuclear missiles were developed that are three hundred times as devastating as the first generation of nuclear strike capabilities. Nor might there be hope of discovering whether it was enemy X or enemy Y that launched the hypersonic missile until all has been lost. Nor might we ever discover before we perish that we started a nuclear exchange by mistakenly hitting a dual use missile that was carrying a conventional weapon, or no explosives at all (a training launch), and not carrying the nuclear weapon indicated by our false intelligence. Thinkers about technological trajectories are likely to agree that during the next 200 years there will be many moments when the world suffers conjunctures when we do not have the intelligence to target deterrence accurately. There will also surely be conjunctures where pandemics, financial crises, and ecological crises cascade and couple beyond our control.

Hence my simple proposition is that the planet's ecosystems will not survive unless states proceed promptly on a trajectory toward total WMD bans. Concurring with that proposition involves no dismissal of the empirical claim that strategic balance can help avert war. Nor does it dismiss the hypothesis that it will prove impossible to achieve total WMD disarmament. We can simply lay out a pathway toward total WMD disarmament that makes the world a little safer with each tiny step along that path. Humankind cannot delude itself that, once invented, WMDs and AI can be uninvented. We can agree that total abolition opens an opportunity to a despot who covertly seeks to dominate the world through reinvention of WMDs. This book's counter to that is that at every point along a policy pathway to WMD abolition, the world's states and institutions can lock into a sufficiently multilateral and multidimensional response to ensure that the tyrant fails to benefit from holding the world hostage.

I have argued that there are reasons for optimism that invaded countries tend to become ungovernable, and therefore unattractive to invade. That is about combinations of domestic resistance from bullied countries, saboteurs, coalitions of willing conventional military supporters of them, diplomatic mobilization at the United Nations and through sanctions, reputation loss, and credibility loss. Consequently, no country has sustained outcomes that proved in their interests by launching a militarily major invasion of another country in the past seven decades. This has been true even though the world has seen in recent history seven cases of a nuclear weapons state rather unsuccessfully attack a weaker state without nuclear weapons (the US + v. North Korea + ; US + v. Vietnam and Cambodia; USSR v. Afghan tribes; US + v. Afghan Taliban; US + v. Iraq; Russia v. Ukraine+). Then there are more complex invasions like that of Gaddafi's Libya that cascaded south perhaps to become even more disastrous than these. During this period the world has also seen the weaker party prevail against an invader that was not a nuclear weapons state, but an invader that was a powerful player in the world system that had 200 times the population of the weaker state, more than 200 times its GDP, 1000 times its military budget and its number of troops (Indonesia v. Timor-Leste). Both Indonesia and Timor-Leste were winners from ending their drain of blood and

treasure (20 percent of the population of the invaded country died; almost all buildings of the invaded country were razed; both economies were so hobbled that both regimes were propelled toward transformation). Indonesia benefitted greatly by deepening its democracy in the washup. It rehabilitated its diplomatic reputation as it withdrew to allow a UN-supervised independence referendum and UN peacekeeping.

A modernity in which both parties benefit from ending wars of invasion in all the cases we know can deliver hope of the world improving its peacemaking architecture. International society can deliver a safer world that gradually makes progress with unilateral WMD disarmament in every country where this can be accomplished. The desirable endgame is not another unipolar world. January 6, 2021 in Washington is proof enough that a world where the United States was the moral exemplar of democracy that could be trusted to be the only WMD power is now an untrustworthy settlement. What we need is the greatest powers to do as they were beginning to do at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and President Reagan's retirement to enjoy his old age. We can want China, the United States, and Russia to monitor one another and all be monitored by UN institutions like the International Atomic Energy Agency as they reduce WMD arsenals. IAEA is an example of a simple institution with a complex task. So is WHO for the globalization of disease. The simple policy of strengthening, legitimizing these institutions advances a helpful response to the risk of catastrophe. Along the journey of these simple ideas, the hope is to inject into the conversation some new ideas about how to make this pathway safer. An example is many state legislatures enacting a law to nullify extradition treaties in cases where a person blows the whistle on a WMD program that is in breach of international law.

Such a simple law is no panacea. The hope is that the more policy scholars ponder this idea, the more they see how institutions could be crafted by international society to become potent at undermining the covertness of covert WMD programs. Many of the scientists responsible for WMDs suffer such profound remorse that they might contemplate well-paid positions in prestigious non-WMD universities where they and their families could be secure after they blow the whistle. This is a simple idea that could grow in importance upon deeper reflection.

States can be like a US government that does not believe in disarmament yet does believe that it is possible to refine and develop nonviolent means of civilian resistance that torment a domestic despot or an invading army to the point of crippling an illegitimate Leviathan (Lee 2020). I am not advocating US meddling by, for example, urging Iranian nonviolent resistance aimed at rendering Iran ungovernable. Better advocacy is for R & D at Western and Iranian universities on pathways for nonviolent resistance. Then leave the students alone to agitate in defense of their society without foreign meddling. Invaders and domestic despots can be disabled by patient slow-food cooking of resistance campaigns. It is universities rather than states that are more critical to this simple ambition not only because universities are better at basic and innovative R & D on social change than states, but because most successful civilian resistance campaigns at crisis moments of modern history are led by university students who imbibe insights from international society with support from wise heads within university communities. My Peacebuilding Compared data to date supports this conclusion, though many cases remain to be researched and coded.

The Ambulance Metaphor Revisited

Ambulance services were pondered as an exemplar of a simple solution to complex crises. During the covid crisis, ambulance services performed reasonably well worldwide, with courageous dedication. They saved countless lives by getting people onto ventilators in time, though not as many as could have been saved with better pandemic preparedness institutions of the kind evident for Taiwan. A major reason for homicide declines and war death rate declines during the past century or two has been ambulance support before victims bleed to death from stab and bullet wounds. This accomplishment in prevention of war deaths has been growing since early strides taken during the Crimean War with germinal leadership from Florence Nightingale.

For many ambulance services, covid was the worst crisis they had confronted. Mostly they adapted admirably. In some covid hot spots effective staffing was doubled by soldiers with some first aid training

driving ambulance vehicles and helping, with the hands-on care led by an experienced paramedic. Militaries supplied supplementary ambulance cars, as did surrounding rural areas and provincial cities that were little affected by early covid waves. Safer regions surged their ambulances into cities that were hot spots. Long shifts were worked. Many recently retired ambulance staff answered appeals to return to service. When ambulances were struggling to arrive at all the places needed, public service messages advised families how they could comfort their loved ones and when they should get them to a hospital in a private car. Great things were accomplished in these ways to get us through. For all that, the story was not rosy worldwide; countless covid victims died who could have been saved by a functioning ambulance service that was less overwhelmed.

Although ambulance managers learnt from covid about a range of things they could do to scale up their service by multiples of capability, policymakers should continue to fear that paramedics might give up in despair during the more overwhelming crisis when most cities, including most hospitals, are wiped out in a nuclear attack, or the kind of attack afflicting Gaza as I write. Post-covid, our ambulance services should be supported to undertake lessons-learned exercises. During the frugal post-covid years when societies seek to run down covid debt levels for their recovering economies, it is an important gift to our grandchildren to provide ambulance services the resources to do their training and lessons-learned reports well. Adequate infrastructure development is not enough for a simple institution like an ambulance service. It must also do scenario planning in which it plugs in those lessons and imagines the diverse ways it might scale up its capability in the face of different kinds of future crises, including mega ones like nuclear devastation.

In the 1950s, Australian civil society did a better job of preparing for a future nuclear war than it does today. My mother was our local volunteer civilian defense coordinator. As she was learning how to cook big pots of pooled food in a metal garbage bin for neighborhood survivors, I remember we kids protesting to mum that there was no way we would eat from a garbage bin. Not many years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, this form of civilian preparedness dropped away. War concerns became more immediate, focused offshore on young people in the neighborhood

conscripted to fight in Vietnam. This was also a time when confidence increased that nuclear war could be averted because Presidents Kennedy and Krushchev were talking to each other in the constructive way discussed earlier, after their Cuban fright.

For the sixty years since, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has performed remarkably in containing the number of nuclear weapons states to nine. It now seems possible that we will reach the milestone of a century without another nuclear weapon exploding over a city. This is a remarkable testimony to human capabilities to build simple institutions, however flawed and fractured, that might see out a century of protecting the planet. Sadly, this regime today is not enjoying one of its golden eras. Mothers no longer prepare their older children to help their younger siblings survive nuclear war in the way my mother did, and mothers did across North America, Europe, Russia, China, Korea, and Japan. This is because of denial and refusal to acknowledge why we will be lucky if we do survive a century without cities razed again by nuclear attack. When I did a Google Scholar search on 'Ambulance services nuclear war', hardly any useful recent publications came up. The most useful ones were:

Hammond, Marguerite M. 1958. Mass Casualties from Nuclear War. *British Medical Journal*.

Jones, Tim. 2000. A comparative study of local authority preparations for nuclear war in North-Eastern Wales, 1948-1968. *Welsh History Review*.

Grant, Matthew. 2009. *After the bomb: Civil defense and nuclear war in Britain*. London: Springer.

The third publication has just passed a hundred Google Scholar citations; the first two had only five between them. My impression of a scholarly and public policy politics of denial was confirmed by the search. Ambulance services are part of the politics of Hiroshima denial. The politics of denial has served interests of political leaders who defend their people with nuclear weapons combined with that politics of denial. Denial means one day if a nuclear cloud appears on the horizon, parents

will be asking themselves belatedly at the last second if they have taught their children in what part of a building they should shelter, wherever they are at the moment of fate.

Perhaps ambulance services do not discuss what lessons Japanese ambulance services learned from Hiroshima and Nagasaki about how to scale up services to maximize lives saved. I am a baby boomer scholar of peacebuilding, yet the wider politics of Hiroshima denial is such that I did not learn until I was 69 from the writing of a friend who is a distinguished Japanese historian of Australian troops' shameful actions around Hiroshima in 1945 as occupation proceeded. The Australians were particularly feared because of the frequency and brutality of their rape of young women who survived because they were working away from the center of the city. This is definitely not part of our Greatest Generation narrative of World War II. The reasons for our politics of Hiroshima denial are various. When the next nuclear war occurs, we should fear that no lessons will be learnt from how the world could have done better at preserving shattered lives in Hiroshima.

Many Disparate Simple Institutions

My purpose in selecting ambulances is to choose a micro institution that is marginalized in macro debates about improving human survival in the face of global crises. Ambulance scaling up illustrates the fundamental point of this chapter: that there are many simple institutions that are crucial to crisis prevention and amelioration. We need to encourage all of them to do their lessons-learned work on past crises to prepare themselves for future ones. What is required is not so much a grand national strategy, nor global strategic planning exercises, as it is many little lessons-learned exercises in already existing ambulance services, police services, fire brigades, hospitals, schools, universities, banks, finance departments of many local governments across a galaxy of locales. National and global strategic planning have important roles to play in ticking off whether all the kinds of local lessons-learned exercises are occurring with the energy required for future preparedness for prevention of preventable suffering from diverse cascading crises.

There is a reason why the United States lost more lives to covid than all of East Asia and all of the Pacific societies to the West of the Americas combined, even though the pandemic took off in East Asia. There are reasons why the UK economy shrunk by 10 percent during 2020 and 2021 combined, the United States and continental Europe by 5 percent, while China grew by 10 percent (Goldin 2021, Chapter 11). Among them is that East Asia was better prepared with national strategic plans and past reflection from local institutional lessons learned. There was some East Asian overreaction as well, notably in China during 2022 when it persisted with lockdowns and mask mandates for too long, when it should have been more focused on vaccine and covid treatment rollouts.

All societies can be like Taiwan instead of Boris Johnson's Britain, Bolsonaro's Brazil, or Trump's America in preparing for future pandemics. The number of institutions that must be readied not just for pandemics, but for cybercrime, cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism epidemics, climate crises, preventive peacemaking and war, and financial crisis prevention is huge in number. Every one of them is important, and more important at the local level than in global and national capitals that will be cut off from local institutional preparedness during the worst of crises.

Critics of this book will rightly say it fails deplorably to consider root cause X of crises, and solution Y. My purpose is not to be synoptic but to move from the ambulance preparedness metaphor to illuminate how there are many simple institutions like ambulance services that do vital work collaboratively with other institutions in readying a planet for what is coming. The kind of slow-food civil defense preparation my mother did is worthy of revival. There is merit in parents disgusting their children as they prepare themselves on how to clean and cook whatever could be thrown into a metal rubbish bin to feed neighborhood survivors! These are meta-lessons, lessons about lessons, about preparing neighborhoods, workplaces, and long lists of institutions to be crisis-ready, readying resilience in many simple ways do matter. Getting these mentalities in place is a social structural thing and a policy culture accomplishment. Details of the long lists of simple institutions

that matter is important work, all 124 of them on Taiwan's pandemic list are worthy of evaluation. That is not the work of this book.

Yet we might see that fundamental to social structures of preparedness is a politics of hope and purpose. We can understand what not to do when rapid, tightly coupled crises overwhelm us the morning we open curtains to a mushroom cloud on our horizon. When this quickly cascades to a climate crisis, famine, nuclear winter, radiated rain, a massive hole in the ozone layer, a pandemic of unemployment, drug abuse, and cascading disease pandemics, we can push on to help other survivors with a sense of purpose. Best not to think these cascading crises are so unexpected and complex as to be beyond our comprehension. That might be better than opening our best bottle of wine to muse upon earth's end. Survivors do better with simple preparedness to put their shoulders to the wheels of many simple institutions that they must get to turn again as best they can in horrific circumstances. To prevent that day dawning we also do well to be active in the peace movement, to be the kind of advocates of peace diplomacy, environmental diplomacy, regulation of financial domination and the crises it can engender, and public health diplomacy in ways many of our dear mothers were.

Early Detection; Early Response

Epidemiologist of smallpox eradication, Larry Brilliant (2006), suggested two simple crisis prevention principles: 'early detection, early response'. That is not rocket science. Foregoing chapters argued that movements toward desk audit and away from field inspections, toward risk analysis and algorithmic regulation can obstruct early detection, even though they can add value in specific ways. This is because data collection for entry into algorithms takes so long after data cleaning, waiting for laggard entries to come in, even if data analysis is quick. In my experience of regulatory agencies, staff are often exhausted or have moved on to a new challenge by the time the data analysis is complete. A new management flavor of the month arrives and the risk analysis results are sometimes never written up or shared. The risk revolution in regulation is a beautiful theory, but frequently so far, unresponsive as a practice.

Early detection requires shifting resources away from deskbound risk scanners to reinvest in field inspectors with a more detective mentality and an orientation to local dialogue for contextual on-the-spot fixes. We have seen that when inspectors get out into the field, insiders quietly tell them where to look for something scandalous that scares the insider. Sometimes the risks revealed this way are so scary that on that very day when the inspector reveals to top management that she has just discovered it, management panics that the regulator has discovered it, and gets it fixed immediately. In other cases when the risk is a big deal and accompanied by management recalcitrance, the inspector might refer it to her prosecution unit.

That very week, the whistleblower might leak to the financial press that a criminal investigation into their organization is underway. This can happen when the whistleblower takes cover with the narrative that it must have been someone working for the regulator or an NGO who leaked. The potency of criminal punishment of corporations that is not embedded in a more complex regulatory mix is surprisingly weak. One of many reasons is that stock prices of firms almost always rise the day the judge announces a corporate sentence. The market reaction is relief that the fine is so small compared to the market value of this firm. On days when commencement of a criminal investigation hits the media, however, stock prices tend to fall quite a bit (Braithwaite 2022, 483). Who knows what will happen? This is the simple conclusion again that detection and remedial action has more power than punishment, even though we cannot do without some punishment that is just tough enough.

In the pages that follow I discuss and build upon empirical research conclusions that are documented in detail in earlier work (Braithwaite 2022). Early detection and early response are why I (Braithwaite 2022, 291–298, 477–487, 538) lauded learning of lessons from 1970s US Securities and Exchange Commission Director of Enforcement, Stanley Sporkin. He got early response by making it clear that unless major corporations retained independent counsel to promptly, fully disclose their slush funds and the recipients of bribes from them, and then respond with independently monitored compliance reforms, prosecution would result. A key to sustaining Sporkin's early germinal enforcement

successes is a track record of genuine escalation to prosecution after past repeat offending. This was the journey to the paradox that deferred prosecutions can be more capable of delivering early detection and response in many circumstances more than actual prosecutions (Braithwaite 2022, 456–492). There are comparable lessons on why early detection and response have proved the main game of covid responsiveness that minimized deaths, of response to the climate emergency, and of preventive diplomacy to avert wars.

Ian Goldin (2021) reflected on Brilliant's (2006) principles of early detection, early response. Let me contribute an addition: early detection, early response, redundant simplicity of evidence-based responses. This is different from that part of Goldin's (2021, Chapter 13) conclusions where Goldin argues systemic problems require systemic solutions and 'Networked problems require networked solutions... [and this] requires transformation in all parts of the system'. Goldin is right that complex understanding and complex multidimensionality in responses is needed. Yet we can adjust this aspect of his analysis with the insight Goldin shares at other points in his writing that we will often be incapable of understanding the complexity. A fog of complexity should not curse us with analysis paralysis. What we can do is sequentially seek to prevent crisis escalation with one simple strategy after another that has some (usually weak) evidentiary grounding until some of the interventions start to make a difference, perhaps in combination. Our family doctor does something similar. Redundancy means accepting that we make many mistakes. With covid, for example, there was all that fumigating and washing walls of schools with disinfectant in early 2020. This likely had little impact; the virus was being transmitted by inhalation. But East Asian mask wearing that initially was disparaged in the West empirically proved somewhat effective. Western societies slowly (too slowly) turned to learn from Eastern wisdom born of their more grounded experience of past virus epidemics. Later the West prematurely moved away from mask wearing after peak crisis death rates passed. Here we have two simple responses, one mostly wrong, one mostly right, that produced one small piece of the long list of simple things that needed to be done in the face of limited early understanding of the complexity of covid.

Crises can be extinguished by actors who have a dim understanding of their complexity. This happens when they start restorative diplomacy by simply saying, let's be careful with each other here. That is, the complex system of a potential world war can be extinguished with help from simple restorative means that ultimately enables a complexly systemic response. Most crises that could escalate to war are extinguished that way before they escalate to war. It is a flaw of historiography to be methodologically relentless in selecting on dependent variables like war occurrence, systematically devoting slight attention to sequences of events that lead to no important historical events, just uneventful continuation of peace.

As attracted as I am to the Ian Goldin analysis in broad terms, I want to query it on his home turf of financial crises where he has such greater wisdom and experience than me. Interdisciplinarity has value, on the other hand, and I bring a different perspective because I am a criminologist. Goldin, on my analysis, has too pessimistic an account of the preventability of financial crises. Because we are still in the grip of a dangerous financialization of capitalism serious financial crises will certainly continue to come and go in human history. I agree with Goldin that both financial crashes and pandemics are accelerating in speed, frequency, and ferocity for a set of comprehensible reasons. Goldin rightly diagnoses the global financial crisis of 2008 as a consequence of a complex set of factors. They included: light-touch regulation; bonus culture on Wall Street; competitive European responses with settings in European markets that mimicked Wall Street; innovation in derivatives with poorly understood consequences that included risk shifting with bad loans; misplaced emphasis on risks for banks that banks could be trusted to self-assess; a US subprime mortgage crisis when a housing bubble burst; and freezing of interbank lending when banks could not guess which of their counterparties were and were not hobbled by bad housing loans. I agree with Goldin that the connectivity of internationally significant banks was fundamental to understanding the unpredictability of what happened day to day during the crisis. I share Goldin's pessimism that the reforms put in place since the crisis have preventive value, but are utterly insufficient to prevent future crises. We should be disappointed in the transformation they have been able

to apply to the pathologies of the financialization of capitalism. I am not wise enough to judge, but also willing to accept, that Goldin may be right when he says that systemic problems require systemic solutions and networked problems networked solutions that transform all parts of the system.

In this part of my analysis, however, all my reasoning about why Goldin is right is about why we agree that there will be more and more, perhaps worse and worse, financial crises. Where I am tempted to take a different fork in the road is in seeing that the 2008 global crisis was a particular crisis that was preventable by simple means by a limited range of regulatory actors in one country, the United States. This is of a piece with thinking that World War I might have been prevented by Archduke Ferdinand's security staff doing their job competently by preventing his assassination, notwithstanding the deep structural complexity of the onset of World War.

My research argues that the Deepwater Horizon disaster was preventable by demands of Australian regulators for a root cause analysis of the Timor Sea deep ocean rig blow-out a year earlier to be applied to the dozens of oil rigs served by the same contractor, including Deepwater Horizon. Then the Australian regulator, or the court in the Timor Sea spill criminal trial, should have required the operator and its contractors to publish an audit of comparable risks across all the rigs these companies had worked on in similar ways. That would have revealed that the Caribbean was gravely at risk of the same catastrophe as happened in the Timor Sea, and at the hands of the same rig base concreting contractor, Halliburton (Braithwaite 2022, 489–90; 542–543). A deferred prosecution in the Timor Sea case that mandated global dissemination of a Timor Sea case root cause analysis and audits of whether the same repairs were needed around the world would have better saved the environment and served humankind than a fine of a few million dollars.

In the financial arena I argued that Enron, Arthur Andersen and associated 2001 US crashes might likewise have been prevented by regulators in just one other country, Australia (Braithwaite 2022, 485–490, 523–540). I argued that today's epidemic of money laundering for megacriminals by major 'reputable' banks was preceded by the collapse of

the dirty money bank (The Bank of Credit and Commerce International) that used to specialize in this kind of money laundering for the likes of the Mafia, terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein, secret international nuclear weapons programs, Saudi intelligence, the CIA, Oliver North's Iran-Contra deals and other illegal international weapons deals. All this might have been better controlled (producing less devastating crises) had Australia's predecessor to BCCI, the Nugan Hand Bank, benefitted from early detection and catalyzed early response by Australian financial regulators and also globalized learnings from the debacle.

This argument, in short, is that simple future prevention work of cosmopolitan regulation can by simple means in a weaker country protect a strong country from complex financial and environmental risk. Braithwaite (2022, 288–323, 482) argues this is part of the more general phenomenon that complex organizational wrongdoing is exposed to an overdetermined capability to prevent wrongdoing by simple means. When whistleblowing laws make the world genuinely safe for whistleblowers, which they rarely do but could do, there are many potential whistleblowers in a complex organization with the power to stop the wrongdoing by blowing the whistle. This is an example of the power to prevent being overdetermined, as the philosophers say. Yes, the corporation and its wrongdoing is complex, but the simple thing is that there may be a hundred insiders who know enough to blow the whistle and stop the wrongdoing by exposing it to sunlight that delivers early detection and early response by a network of actors. Now I demonstrate how the global financial crisis might have been prevented by many actors with overdetermined simple capacities to prevent it, followed by their capacity to prevent the counterproductive war on terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Citigroup's Richard M. Bowen testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that by 2006 60 percent of mortgages purchased by Citibank from 1,600 different mortgage companies were 'defective'. By 2007, 'defective mortgages (from mortgage originators contractually bound to perform underwriting to Citi's standards) increased... to over 80% of production'.¹ In its testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Clayton Holdings—the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and

Europe—testified that Clayton’s review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from January 2006 to June 2007 found that only 54 percent of the loans met originators’ underwriting standards. Clayton’s analysis further showed that 39 percent of loans that did not meet *any* issuer’s minimal underwriting standards were nevertheless subsequently securitized and sold to investors (Morgenson 2010).

Knowledge of this epidemic of dud loans was not limited to corporate insiders like Clayton’s and Citibank. A 2006 federal Financial Crimes Enforcement Network report showed a 1,411 percent increase in mortgage-related suspicious activity reports between 1997 and 2005, 66 percent of them involving material misrepresentation or false documents. Then there was a further 44 percent increase between 2005 and 2006 (Nguyen and Pontell, 2010). BasePoint Analytics (2007) work on 3 million loans suggested 70 percent of early payment defaults had fraudulent misrepresentations on original loan applications. The fraudulent loans were five times as likely to go into default (Nguyen and Pontell 2010). There were public warnings from the FBI starting in 2004 that they detected a spike in mortgage fraud (Black 2013). With so much evidence of this quality from sources as authoritative as FBI press releases, with hindsight how unsurprising it is that smart money began to short the market well in advance of the crisis, as recounted in the book and film, *The Big Short* (Lewis 2010).

As with FBI agents reporting suspicious behavior of the Al Qaeda operatives who wanted to learn how to fly a plane without wanting to know how to land it, local FBI agents did their job in detecting the tidal wave of mortgage fraud that was the proximate cause of the global financial crisis. In both cases, the FBI as an institution failed in its preventive imagination. Instead of seeing the suspicious flight training as an opportunity to prevent something catastrophic, FBI leaders could not see how this intelligence could lead to conviction of individuals. Their 2001 regulatory imagination focused on whether there was an opportunity to lock up bad guys rather than prevent harm by a terror organization. In 2004 their intelligence on fraudulent loans where mortgage brokers and local banks encouraged people to misrepresent their financial circumstances was read as evidence of minor individual criminality. Conviction of these individuals would be difficult because the borrower of fraudulent loans

could blame the bank for the misrepresentations and the bank could blame the borrower or broker.

In the onset of America's two greatest pre-covid crises of the twenty-first century, the FBI should have connected the dots of systemic risk to the physical security of America (with 9/11) and its financial security (with the mortgage fraud epidemic). The FBI in the 2000s should have initiated a dialogue with banking regulators on the need for a systemic regulatory remedy, as opposed to a prosecutorial approach to fraud on loan applications. This could have involved regulators meeting one by one in 2004 with the banks that had the worst incidence of loan defaults in their city or state. Regulators could have required them to demonstrate that their loan portfolios were not infested with fraud. When bank self-investigation reports revealed in most cases that they were producing bundles of fraudulent paper, the bank could have been required to craft a plan to prevent the issuance of further fraudulent loans combined with a management plan to regularize as many dubious loans as possible. These plans should have been published with fanfare in the financial press so that European banks could begin their journey of early detection to limit their exposure to bad US loans. Instead of putting a risk control plan in place, what bad US banks did was slice and dice their bad loans into securitized financial products that played a game of pass the parcel, globally diffusing systemic risk. Then those bundled risks were hedged. Because regulators allowed them to pass those parcels, banks shifted their risks onto other banks instead of managing them. This regulatory failure created a risk-shifting culture. It was a systemically devastating cascade of risk.

The terror of September 11 2001 was a big spark compared to amateurs firing that fatal shot at Archduke Ferdinand. Both were sparks that cascaded to much bigger catastrophes. Both were preventable, by Habsburg Empire close personal security in one case, and by the FBI doing what should have been bread and butter preventative work (as the 9/11 Commission Inquiry concluded in the latter case). Without the cascade to World War I there would have been none of the humiliation of Germany at Versailles and crippling of their economy with reparations that so worried Keynes. Therefore, Keynes's suspicion was that

there would have been no Hitler winning power with his appeal to struggling Germans overwhelmed with depression and hyperinflation. On the Keynes' analysis, there would have been less creation of the economic and political conditions to underwrite the appeal of Hitler to so many Germans. The 9/11 attack cascaded to an invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and later to the cascade of war and terrorism from Libya. The evidence is now clear that these wars did more to spread terrorism than to reduce it, especially after mercenaries cascaded Gaddafi's arsenal into Syria and south across two-thirds of Africa to support Islamic State or al Qaeda affiliates in more than a dozen countries (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018; Braithwaite 2022).

The trillions in treasure lost to fighting these wars left North Atlantic states with weakened war chests for the stimulus packages that were imperative after 2008 and 2020 economic crises. The FBI error was failing to intervene preventively against Saudis who triggered appropriate suspicions from alert civilians and street-level FBI operatives when the Saudis asked to learn how to fly a plane, but not how to land it! The FBI as an institution failed to extinguish a spark that cascaded to catastrophe. The propensity of one kind of crisis to cascade into other kinds of crises is a macro dynamic that is complex, nonlinear. Yet simple preventive means that we know can work in extinguishing sparks is important micro work. That preventive capability was in the hands of actors at many levels of the FBI bureaucracy who shared in the overdetermined power to prevent the cascade of wars.

Recent summers in eastern Australia saw megafires of a scale we did not experience before global warming passed tipping points. One megafire can kill billions of vertebrates. We hope that our bush fire brigade volunteers can detect fast, respond fast, to extinguish the sparks ignited by human carelessness, willful arson, electricity line malfunctions, or lightning. During most fire seasons, fireys accomplish this before the countless little fires merge into unstoppable megafires. Our bush wisdom of iterated experience of these catastrophes is to understand the importance of the spark-extinction work of alert civilians and firefighters. This is true even though we know that the root cause of declining safety is global warming that has unusual complexity as it passes tipping points. The simple institutional response needed is comparable to the imperative

to scale up ambulance services. It is a simple solution when fire services scale up with huge numbers of trained volunteers. When it works it is profoundly preventive. It is facile to say that these simple micro solutions are not the answer. What we need is macro shifts in the shape of economies away from growth in consumption of goods to growth through consumption of services, especially health and caring services, away from growth smoked by fossil fuels to growth greened by renewables. It is not that we need macro prevention but not micro prevention; we need both macro and simple micro remedies.

Forest fire response services illustrate excellence in the capability we saw with ambulance services to scale up during crises, though in different ways. Recurrent scaling up will be needed as global warming worsens. It does rely to some degree on a global market in rentable water bombing aircraft and crews. This market cannot scale up quickly enough when simultaneous crises occur across the planet. An international gift economy also helps. Many countries fly in gifts of water bombing to subdue threats, as do Eastern Australian state governments gift bush fire-fighting assets to Western Australia when fires rage across the West. Making progress on the problem is ultimately simple in this regard. States and philanthropists can encourage and expand gift economies. Cosmopolitan NGOs that scale up crisis response assets, like Médecins Sans Frontiers across all the catastrophes of concern in this book, are also invaluable.

In the Peacebuilding Compared data set, single crimes like the terrorist attack in Sarajevo, the rape of a nurse in Bougainville, or the corruption and torture chambers of a tyrant, can be important to sparking wars, alongside many deeper root causes, and proximate factors at particular places and times. Linear quantitative social science does not conclude such sparks are good explanations of war because 99.9 percent of rapes, assassinations, and terrorist incidents ignite no wars. Yet criminologists do have that macro understanding of how important it is to apprehend perpetrators of shocking terror and rapes quickly and bring them to trial. They understand that in the centuries before there was a principled and functioning criminal law such incidents regularly cascaded to never-ending blood feuds. Sometimes blood feuds in turn cascaded to small town wars that then occasionally cascaded to international wars.

Simple micro-criminal enforcement that is widely available is a reason for declining homicide rates and blood feuds across human history. Crime during all historical periods has been a far larger cause of violent human deaths than war and one that has been this kind of initial spark of many wars (Braithwaite 2022).

Police services are therefore simple institutions that mostly make small contributions to extinguishing individual violence, but that also occasionally extinguish violence that might otherwise have ignited systemic violence of race riots, religious riots, wars, or indeed ‘wars on terror’. It is also common in our Peacebuilding Compared data set for the police themselves to ignite cascades of violence through their own deeds of racist violence. My hypothesis is that little deeds of spark extinction by police rarely make systemic contributions, but if street-level police go on strike we know violence of many kinds goes up sharply. If street-level police, field-level firefighters, street-level financial regulators, street-level peacekeepers, street-level epidemic contact-tracers cease their work of extinguishing initial sparks, or worse become those who ignite the sparks (as when arsonists infiltrate rural Australian fire services) societies suffer many more systemic crises of diverse kinds that cascade one into the other.

This is not to say that the narrative of this book on simple institutional solutions is most importantly about spark extinction. The main contribution of ambulances is in preventing murders and covid deaths by rushing those at risk to hospital after initial emergency response to stem the blood, restart the breathing. Independent universities are institutions that make their biggest contributions by coming up with good ideas on how to prevent the spread of pathogens, to map the genomic sequence of covid, how to reduce crime, how to prevent financial crises, to reconcile conflicts with alternative paths that reject war, to engineer aircraft that fly on hydrogen, and so on. Scholars who work with a macrosocial institutional imagination can know nothing about the complexity of that engineering of finance or hydrogen or vaccines. But they can know that independent universities make more profound contributions to these things than famous brands like Pfizer or Lehman Brothers.

Effectively regulated markets make vital contributions when they produce start-ups like Moderna and BioNTech that created leading covid

vaccines as their very first products to reach the market. These were firms that were yet to come into existence when the global financial crisis hit in 2008, in the case of BioNTech a tiny start-up of a young doctor and her husband who fled Turkey to Germany as refugees. Firms like Pfizer also contributed hugely to scaling up response. Yet they are a complex face of monopoly power that corrupts markets and monopolizes manufacturing. They helped prevent the creation of manufacturing plants around the world that could have pushed the price of vaccines down to help extinguish new variants of covid. Needed simpler mechanisms are scaled-up state investment in prevention R & D. Simple antitrust institutions and more evidence-based intellectual property law are needed to hold monopoly power to account.

We can agree with Ian Goldin that we also need to do better at comprehending complexity and crafting complex systemic responses to systemic problems. It is just that this is the harder challenge. It is a challenge that is not all low-hanging fruit. The hypothesis of this book is that, nevertheless, there are a large number of simple kinds of low-hanging fruit we might pluck as priorities—like adequately funding university science, disentangling it from domination by monopolists of Big Pharma and the military-industrial complex.

Overdetermined Prevention: Simple Versus Complex Dialectics

The overdetermined character of catastrophe prevention is a reason that Goldin might not always be right that networked problems require networked solutions and transformation in all parts of the system. Wars, financial crises, pandemics are things wide swathes of actors wish to avert. By design, there are layers of fail-safe prevention of accidental nuclear launch. This means we can prevent the accident by getting just one of these layers to do their job properly even though the network of prevention is in shocking repair. If we can get three or four of the fail-safe custodians to do their job, accidental Armageddon might almost universally be prevented. At least this can happen if risk analyses are done thoroughly to learn from near misses, learning from how it was possible

for three of the fail-safe mechanisms to fail. We can really only learn how to prevent rare-event risks by rigor in near-miss analytics combined with transparent, widely diffused discussion of lessons learned.

Ockham's razor says: 'Things should be made as simple as possible — but not simpler'. Parsimony might be dialectically opposed to Goldin's prescription that networked problems require networked solutions across the entire network. My approach is not to referee this contest, but instead to commend a dialectical method that starts with prioritized simple principles and simple institutions, then expand to other useful preventive tools that are shown empirically to add value, but only when each is demonstrated to add value. This dialectical method leads to a different outcome from forms of realism that seek to prevent war with more expenditure on weapons of war. Where is the well-rounded development of evidence that countries that do this experience less war or grow faster in terms of economic or some other form of development? This book argues that passive deterrence does not work well; dynamic concentration of deterrence can if it is embedded in a well-crafted dynamic regulatory mix (see further Braithwaite 2022, 434–499).

Realist theory is much more parsimonious than Goldin's. Realists have a razor-like focus on states as the actors that matter, states that pursue national interests to gain power. There is something to admire about its parsimony. But my approach is to tame it, confine it to a place only as a very last resort at the peak of a regulatory pyramid in which the overwhelming preponderance of work that matters is done softly, preventatively, and restoratively, lower in the pyramid. I do theory this way because the evidence on the regulation of complex organizations suggests that the size of deterrents does not predict compliance, but the mix of deterrent and non-deterrent (more restorative) regulatory strategies does (Braithwaite 2022, Chapter 10). This approach to the dialectics of deterrence and persuasion, the dialectics of complex and simple solutions, therefore ultimately goes to a synthesis closer to Goldin than to the realists.

With war, my theoretical inclination is that there are good reasons to believe that there probably are a hundred variables that help explain why some countries are more likely than others to suffer wars. One way my team acts on this theoretical bias in the Peacebuilding Compared

empirical data collection is to collect data on more than 100 hypotheses concerning which countries are more likely to suffer wars. One kind of analysis is to ask which five of these together offer the better prediction of war compared to any other combination of five preventative variables. The hope is that if at least those five hygiene factors against war are prioritized, war will be greatly reduced.

Goldin would be right to retort, however, that such positivism is not good enough because complex networks are in play. We do need to immerse ourselves in understanding the network of forces that impel conflict or financial collapse in any particular case to discern the most strategic interventions that must be repaired first. One Peacebuilding Compared hypothesis is that multidimensional UN peace operations are often good at just this; we have seen that the evidence is strong that they are statistically effective at preventing wars. Wise and experienced regulatory inspection teams are also effective at protecting safety.

Hence, I also contend that one dialectic of the simplicity versus complexity needed is alternation and synthesis of positive social science insights versus insights from ethnographic study of how whole networks hang together, interact, clash, and fall apart. Randomized controlled trials on single variables are limited in their explanatory power when those variables are differentially embedded in different cases within networks in flux. A synthesis of qualitative causal process tracing of regulatory networks of crisis control and quantitative science tends to be superior to either alone.

Let me give an example of specificity in a network of preventive forces for peace that I know to have been important in only one conflict. In 2006 Timor-Leste was on the brink of civil war. All cash had run out in the only ATMs in the capital city. A brave bank manager walked through streets full of fighting gangs with a large suitcase stuffed with cash. He walked into his bank, filled ATMs with large notes. This helped prevent descent into civil war and loss of life for particular reasons. It meant NGOs that had access to cash from international funding to pay truck drivers could move refugees to safety and get food to the hungry. That was preventive enough, but in a capital where trucks were in short supply, it also meant that trucks were diverted from bringing rural fighters into

city battles in order to get better-paid and safer hires with humanitarian cash. This meant that when peacekeeper reinforcements sailed into Dili harbor, they were not overwhelmed by gang fighters. Needless to say, it was only local knowledge of how local networks of risk were expanding that was relevant here; the positive science of peace was only apt concerning the arrival of peacekeepers (which did work in reducing violence).

With catastrophe prevention we must ‘cross the river by feeling the stones’ (as Chinese Chairman Deng Xiaoping endlessly said in speeches). It is a positivist causal lesson that safer places to cross are where the stones are. Feeling those stones is contextually attuned wisdom about each particular stone. A simple solution to the dangers of a rising flood can be throwing a first stone into the river to allow the first step toward crossing. Escalation to complex logistics will be required for a whole town to cross. So I might say that the most important thing about choosing between simple and complex networked solutions is not to choose. Rather, think dialectically about the dynamics of sequencing those choices.

Thinking Systemically About Simple Institutions to Prioritize

The evidence from criminology is strong that neighborhood collective efficacy acts to extinguish sparks of crime effectively. One hypothesis to test in learning from covid is that in societies with strong neighborhood committee structures (Vietnam is a probable case) leaders of local community mediation committees were not only extinguishing little incidents of crime, when covid came they were speaking to citizens who walked in the street without their mask, who forgot social distancing, who failed to get tested, vaccinated. They were responding rapidly when someone was alone at home, sick and stuck, to get them help, prevent them from dying alone. Early on, they were getting masks to people who did not have them.

One thing neighborhood collective efficacy can help is getting food to children or old people who go hungry during crises of isolation. This goes to another issue that Ian Goldin emphasized. Goldin (2021) shows

that systematically inequality tends to be worsened by contemporary crises and vice versa. One model concluded that global inequality became 25 percent higher than it would have been between 1961 and 2010 in a climate-stable world (Beuret 2019). This is the opposite side of the coin from Andrew Mack's observation that the decades of rising peace after the end of the Cold War were decades of falling inequality. When inequality is worse, the evidence is that the impacts of climate change tend to be worse, as are the impacts of health epidemics and crashes in housing markets. When states and their civil societies are serious about extinguishing all forms of oppressive inequality and domination, the argument (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2018; Braithwaite 2022) is that this reduces prospects of serious wars and crime. According to our analysis, the data are clear at this level, yet also complex.

A problem is the statistical association approach of normal science. It correctly points out that it is rare for a spark to cascade a major firestorm; rarer for assassination of a world leader to cascade to world war. It is rare for solvency problems at a bank to cascade to a global financial crisis. Most rapes do not cascade to civil war, and so on. Our methodological frame must ultimately be more macro in asserting that if societies are systematic with efforts to extinguish all these kinds of sparks, many kinds of crises will be less frequent, even though almost every time we extinguish an individual spark it will make near zero difference. This is also the way most street-level prudential regulators think, the way fire brigades think. Prudence requires us to buy into both the root cause work of the climate activist and the spark-extinction work of the firefighter. Policymakers can be earnest in the way they apply themselves to both policy challenges.

A medieval cathedral mentality can help build the institutions required to contain catastrophes in both ways. One generation starts a cathedral in the village with no hope of finishing it before they die. Yet great foundations are laid. Each generation commits to the institution-building. It is a different kind of pass the parcel than that portrayed in *The Big Short* (Lewis 2010). Great new universities in developing countries require generations rather than decades of working on their foundations. They could benefit from twenty-first-century 'missionary' orders of generous scholars from rich countries, leading world universities that twin with

developing country universities in pro bono ways, exchanging students and faculty. Philanthropies with long-term vision can shift resources to building inspiring and independent universities in the financial and governance capitals of poor societies. Lives well spent leave behind a little piece of renewal of the most enduring institutions like great universities.

UNESCO should be better resourced for shape-shifting developing country student markets from commodification that delivers a second-tier education in rich countries to students from poor countries. I mean second tier compared to the education received by the best domestic students. There is no virtue in university education markets that make profits for Western universities at the expense of masters students from poor countries. These students should be patiently developed as future leaders that older generations and richer societies gift with excellence in education in excellent universities that emerge in their own societies. A cathedral approach is required for development of UNESCO and the United Nations system itself, a mentality that we saw kindled in the heart of Eleanor Roosevelt. This book suggests the minor tweak to the architecture of the UN of prioritizing Sustainable Development Goal 17 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). Preventing wars, rebuilding justice and strong institutions after them, opens a wide path to many other UN Sustainable Development Goals concerning health, climate action, and inequality.

UN Framework Conventions on emerging crises like climate change can seem platitudinous at first, but as with foundations of cathedrals, generations of activists over time have filled out symbolism with substance that matters. So long as they are vigilant against ritualism, against spin that triumphs over substance. Simple institutions of vigilance are priorities.

We can take the simple step of joining the social movement for WMD abolition, even if we understand little about how these weapons work and how strategic arms reduction inspections might monitor the details of how societies manage them down to a level where the Doomsday Machine is dismantled, even if small numbers of nuclear weapons remain. The legacies that are simplest to leave can count among those that matter most. Many readers have doubtless devoted large parts of their lives to complex debates about what makes the difference between

a great university and a mediocre community of learning. When societies invest generously in universities, a lot of them will turn out to be great even as others wallow in mediocrity. It is hard to judge what universities must do to become greater universities. But it is easy to conclude that a policy of funding universities to compete in competitions for basic research excellence and educational excellence is a profoundly good policy. Conversely a bad government can quickly destroy as fragile an accomplishment as a good university system, as we saw when so many Jewish, communist, and liberal intellectuals fled great German universities as the Nazis consolidated power and university independence collapsed. If states must borrow to fund a strong university system, that is rational borrowing. When they do, the return to productivity, to GDP will continue to be at least several times the interest on the borrowing (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2018). Why do I write to make the simple point that such low-hanging fruit are many, neglected, often against the interests of lobbyists who oppose them to keep taxes low for the rich, or to keep universities dependent on rich corporations? Sure the politics is hard, but it is politically important to demonstrate that health research funded by a National Institute of Health produces better health outcomes than research funded by Big Pharma. Goldacre (2012) found industry-funded trials of pharmaceuticals are about four times as likely to report positive results on commercial products compared to independent studies. I write as a corrective to nihilism and disengagement that can cascade to anomie at times of crisis.

Rally Behind Front-Line Workers of Crisis Prevention Institutions

Recovery from the covid crisis may be slow not because economies will fail to bounce back, though that may also be slow in some countries, but because health and aged-care system recoveries may be slow. In the early weeks of the pandemic in China, and then in every country, healthcare workers were lauded as heroes who saved us from the first pandemic wave. Grateful Britons banged pots and pans from their lockdown doorways in praise of their sacrifices and successes. Tenors in Italy

serenaded homage from balconies. That faded, jaded with second, third, fourth, and fifth waves. Stressed publics and social media critics blamed healthcare workers for implementing policies imposed by stressed policy-makers. Citizens often resented covid controls. Healthcare workers came to be seen by some as functionaries of a carceral state that crushed liberty, confining them. Stories of health workers being abused, assaulted, even spat on filled social media.

The upshot of societies' soured love affair with their nurses is that around the world a majority of healthcare workers wanted out. They said they were burnt out. A majority also reported symptoms of anxiety, depression, or both, as a result of crisis pressures.² Many doctors and nurses suffered covid Post Traumatic Stress Disorder from decisions on who would live or die as beds were rationed in Intensive Care Units, and the sheer panic of their struggles to prevent deaths. They worried that the crisis changed them into people who snapped back at colleagues and patients whom they were fond of. This change in them as people troubled them with anxiety. It was an affront to their personal reasons for becoming workers in the care professions.

Caring staff who hung in for decades in poorly paid professional callings in under-staffed institutions finally snapped when they found themselves going home from work each day heartbroken. They could not care for aged-care residents they had come to love. They were broken-hearted because they felt complicit in their neglect. Covid killed the relational, redemptive care that had been hanging by a thread in this frequently exploitative industry. That is, it was the most dedicated, relational, redemptive carers who left because they no longer could cope with betraying frail aged people every day of their work life. Those who hung on were more casualized workers who flitted from facility to facility, never growing special relationships for those they assisted, less haunted by the fact that they betrayed them through the care deficits. Casualization and high turnover became endemic in aged care. It is now hard to reverse in an era of acute labor shortages. Low care sector salaries have been pushed lower by inflation that was another consequence of the crisis. It would have been better to prevent these problems before the institutions of care collapsed. It would have been prudent for the society and their state to recognize how priceless the most dedicated healthcare

workers were before they quit. Unprecedented pay rises should have been granted to healthcare workers. That would have symbolized that we, the society, cared. States needed to recruit and retrain most of their health and aged-care system work forces post-covid. It takes a lot of time and money to grow a new nurse to replace them.

Societies must scan their risk environment to invest in the preventive inspection and the preventive staffing of qualified relational staff who genuinely care for people. This must happen before the rot sets in that turns what should be institutions of care into carceral custodians of people. This is imperative because once the managers socialized into a carceral mentality take over, they succeed for decades in characterizing reformers with a caring, relational professionalism as impractical romantics who are out of touch with the hard realities that discipline institutionalized humans in a practical way with carceral controls.

Simple institutions that contain catastrophes require simple kindness to their workforce. That is the simplest lesson of all.

Notes

1. 'Official Transcript—First Public Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission' (PDF). US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. January 13, 2010. Retrieved April 7, 2010.
2. A BBC radio Program (Healthcare Workers Burnt Out: Coronavirus Pandemic: Coronavirus Global Update, February 18, 2022) did a particularly good job of documenting these worldwide patterns through surveys by health professional bodies.

References

BasePoint Analytics. 2007. New early payment default: Links to fraud and impact on mortgage lenders and investment banks. White Paper. Carlsbad: BasePoint Analytics.

- Beuret, Nicholas 2019. Global inequality is 25% higher than it would have been in a climate-stable world. *The Conversation*, April 27.
- Black, William K. 2013. *The best way to rob a bank is to own one*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Braithwaite, John. 2022. *Macrocriminology and freedom*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Braithwaite, John, and Bina D'Costa. 2018. *Cascades of violence: War, crime and peacebuilding across South Asia*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Brilliant, Larry. 2006. My Wish: Help me stop pandemics. TED talk, February.
- Downes, Alexander B. 2021. *Catastrophic success: Why foreign-imposed regime change goes wrong*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Goldacre, Ben. 2012. *Bad pharma: How drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients*. London: Fourth Estate.
- Goldin, Ian. 2021. *Rescue: From global crisis to a better world*. London: Sceptre Books.
- Green, Duncan. 2016. *How change happens*. Oxford: OUP.
- Lee, Melissa M. 2020. *Crippling Leviathan: How foreign subversion weakens the state*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Levin, Dov H. 2020. *Meddling in the ballot box: The causes and effects of partisan electoral interventions*. New York: Oxford.
- Lewis, Michael. 2010. *The big short*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Marsavelski, Aleksandar, and John Braithwaite. 2020. Transitional justice cascades. *Cornell International Law Journal* 53: 207–260.
- Morgenson, Gretchen. 2010. Raters ignored proof of unsafe loans, panel is told. *New York Times*, September 26.
- Nguyen, Tomson H., and Henry N. Pontell. 2010. Mortgage origination fraud and the global economic crisis. *Criminology and Public Policy* 9: 591–612.
- Psacharopoulos, George, and Harry Anthony Patrinos. 2018. Returns to investment in education: A decennial review of the global literature. *Education Economics* 26: 445–458.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.



Index

A

- Abolitionism 3, 245
- Afghanistan 25, 68, 69, 82, 83, 86, 92, 98, 117, 143, 156–158, 171, 175, 186, 187, 197, 200, 203–205, 209, 211, 212, 224, 234–236, 239, 244, 251, 293, 297, 298, 317, 337–339, 376, 396, 412, 415
- African Union (AU) 43, 102, 190, 191, 257, 263
- Algeria 205
- Algorithmic regulation 46, 319, 378, 381, 407
- Alliances 11, 37, 44, 114, 116, 117, 214, 250, 254, 257
- Al Qaeda 67, 170, 187, 189, 234, 244, 285, 413
- Ambulances 21–23, 25, 30, 71, 72, 172, 402–406, 416, 417
- Appeasement 120, 280
- Arab Spring 158, 170, 187, 197, 199
- Architecture of commitment 43, 184
- Armenia 118, 163, 196, 198
- Artificial intelligence (AI) 33, 38, 39, 44, 46, 62, 81, 104, 108, 111, 112, 154–156, 174, 186, 229, 231, 232, 235, 282, 313, 343, 368–371, 374, 379, 391, 399, 400
- Assassinations 31, 41, 46, 125, 185, 277, 293, 330, 333, 336, 416
- Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 43, 97, 111, 116, 117, 170, 209, 250, 251, 254, 256, 291, 334
- Azerbaijan 110, 118, 163, 196, 197, 258

B

Belarus 87, 99, 129, 249, 253, 258, 263
 Best practice 390, 391
 Biden, Joseph 207, 238, 260, 262, 279, 297, 299
 Biological weapons 17, 54, 61, 64, 66–68, 210, 238, 239, 243, 247, 251, 255–257
 Bougainville 182–184, 416
 Brazil 22, 221, 237, 249, 258, 406
 Brunei 97, 107, 108
 Bull, Hedley 80, 105, 114, 133, 184, 235, 399
 Burnout, front-line workers 47

C

Cambodia 88, 89, 92, 93, 96, 209, 223, 254, 400
 Carbon price 384
 Carter, Jimmy 153, 188, 294, 299, 308, 336
 Cascades, contagion 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 23–26, 40, 52, 61, 81, 173, 190, 195, 210, 230, 251–253, 257, 295, 315, 323, 373, 407, 417
 Checks and balances 44, 72, 80, 131, 201–204, 245, 246, 284, 319, 360, 383
 Chemical weapons 66, 67, 93, 99, 231, 238, 239, 247, 257
 Chile 253, 289, 294, 335
 China 10–13, 15, 17, 23, 24, 31, 38, 42, 43, 52, 53, 55, 57, 65, 68, 79, 82–85, 87, 88, 92, 93, 95, 96, 99, 103, 106–108, 110, 111, 115–117, 121–124,

132–134, 141–153, 155–160, 168–174, 189, 191, 196–199, 203–209, 213, 221, 222, 224, 227–231, 236, 237, 243, 248–250, 252, 253, 257, 258, 276, 278, 279, 282, 284–287, 298, 309, 314, 315, 321, 322, 324, 338, 342, 344, 357, 359, 383, 401, 404, 406, 424
 Chokepoints 12, 17, 44, 113, 342, 343
 Churchill, Winston 66, 79, 116, 239, 284, 325
 Climate change 10, 22, 24, 30, 40, 44, 80, 151, 172, 207, 220, 223, 225, 263, 323, 359, 422, 423
 Colonialism 78, 87, 143, 197, 256, 296, 335
 Congo, Democratic Republic of 24, 25, 89, 92, 173, 188, 237
 Containment 19, 43, 44, 46, 47, 53–56, 60, 62, 63, 72, 73, 78, 79, 115, 121–124, 126, 132, 133, 141, 142, 144, 146–149, 152, 155–163, 165, 167, 169–174, 181–184, 186, 195, 204–211, 220, 223, 224, 235, 257, 278, 282, 360, 371, 375, 380, 394–397, 399
 Costa Rica 42, 100, 101, 103, 107, 109
 Coups 14, 46, 100, 165, 187, 191, 221, 261, 287, 333–336, 340, 398
 COVID-19, covid 11, 21–23, 25, 33, 52–56, 58–61, 65, 68, 124, 171, 198, 206, 207, 210, 226, 279, 284–287, 291, 298,

- 321, 329, 343, 359, 368, 375,
376, 402, 403, 406, 409, 417,
418, 421, 424, 425
- Crime, macrocriminology 11, 17,
23, 26, 31, 41, 44, 131, 167,
182, 206, 207, 209, 210, 220,
241, 263, 274, 289, 299, 317,
329, 336, 343, 345, 377, 417,
421, 422
- Cuba, Cuban Missile Crisis 80, 124,
126, 151, 152, 155, 156, 296,
313, 315, 316, 340, 403
- Cybercrime 10, 11, 17, 18, 59, 306,
406
- Cyberwar, cyberespionage 11, 19,
154–156, 199, 238, 245, 257,
260, 370, 374
- Czechoslovakia 92, 122, 235
- 226, 240, 241, 243, 246, 252,
253, 258–260, 276, 342–348,
373, 377, 392
- Dialectics 38, 46, 394, 397, 418,
419
- Disarmament 36, 41, 42, 81, 82,
101, 109, 114, 126, 128, 133,
160, 183, 186, 238, 241, 243,
246, 248, 249, 256, 325, 393,
400–402
- Domination 15–17, 31, 37, 38, 44,
78, 84, 87, 90, 94, 104, 110,
111, 113, 115, 116, 122, 134,
142, 149, 153, 162, 163, 166,
170, 173, 181, 201, 205, 209,
239, 241, 242, 245, 260, 275,
276, 288, 290, 341, 343, 359,
360, 374, 397, 407, 418, 422
- D**
- Deferred prosecutions 46, 409, 411
- Democracy 16, 29, 43, 44, 46, 72,
84, 85, 91, 93, 102, 104, 109,
110, 119, 120, 124, 126, 134,
144, 146, 149, 150, 158–160,
162, 164, 166–168, 170, 176,
192, 197, 201–203, 210, 275,
298, 299, 315, 334, 337, 339,
341, 356, 360, 361, 364, 365,
383, 401
- Denmark 107, 109
- Derivatives 18, 27, 365–367, 410
- Desk audits 46, 317, 378, 379, 383
- Despotism 61, 63, 146, 150, 172,
205, 251, 254
- Deterrence, minimally sufficient
deterrence 47, 100, 114, 115,
126, 151, 153, 154, 174, 186,
- E**
- Ebola 15, 23, 25, 69, 171, 292, 322
- Economic crisis 13, 36, 41, 171, 220
- Eisenhower, Dwight 69, 125, 133,
236, 315
- Electoral meddling 333, 338
- Epidemics, pandemics 15, 20, 24,
25, 41, 45, 54, 56, 57, 61,
206, 286, 291, 292, 309, 323,
406, 409, 422
- Ethiopia 110, 186, 221
- Evidence-based 22, 40, 44, 59, 70,
113, 172, 194, 276, 291, 292,
300, 306, 322, 323, 339, 371,
382, 390, 409, 418
- Extradition 31, 41, 42, 255, 256,
401

F

Financial crisis 19, 27, 33, 44, 173,
365, 367, 369, 375, 406, 410,
412, 413, 418, 422

France 16, 61, 68, 82, 93, 98,
106–108, 118, 119, 172, 203,
205, 213, 221, 252, 253, 258,
325, 338

G

Gaming 38, 125, 162, 201, 221,
356, 360, 364, 374, 383

Gandhi 104, 120, 341, 347, 348

Generative 4, 19, 20, 30, 32, 33,
35–38, 40, 70, 220, 325

Genocide 20, 43, 85, 88–90, 93,
120, 147, 160, 189, 197, 198,
200, 241, 328, 344

Georgia 87, 88, 92, 98, 163, 169,
172, 189, 194, 196, 197

Germany 16, 23, 36, 53, 91, 95,
107, 118–121, 123, 128, 130,
131, 133, 165, 172, 176, 203,
207, 213, 227, 281, 285, 288,
327, 338, 343, 362, 414, 418

Gorbachev, Mikhail 3, 31, 36, 64,
79, 83, 88, 126, 128–132,
151, 161, 162, 167, 172, 173,
175, 176, 241, 253, 270, 277,
278, 281, 284, 295, 310, 313,
333, 334, 349

Grenada 90–92, 101

GRIT 109, 128, 129, 253

Guardrails 44, 152–155, 252, 260

Guatemala 335, 338

H

Hegemony 17, 79, 87, 92, 95, 115,
119, 121, 122, 132, 142, 144,
149, 153, 170, 207, 246, 257,
321, 341

Hiroshima 200, 247, 252, 309, 316,
344, 404, 405

Hitler, Adolf 16, 66, 79, 99, 116,
119, 120, 200, 239, 247, 257,
311, 321, 327, 364, 415

HIV-AIDS 24, 25, 54, 90, 97, 292

Honduras 338

Hotline 46, 80, 113, 252, 310

Human rights 43, 45, 85, 86, 109,
135, 147, 149, 166, 192, 195,
199, 202, 210, 248, 251, 254,
256, 271–273, 275, 277, 285,
294, 362

Hypersonic weapons 112, 123,
229–232

I

Imperialism 78

India 16, 24, 68, 82, 93, 97, 118,
146, 154, 157, 172, 206, 221,
227, 230, 248, 249, 252, 258,
273, 274, 282, 285, 286, 298,
309, 310, 320, 324, 325, 348,
383

Indonesia 85, 86, 97, 98, 101, 102,
104, 105, 108, 111, 115, 116,
156, 173, 203, 210, 234, 244,
400, 401

Inspection, regulatory 64, 66, 73,
317, 377, 378, 420

Insurgency, counterinsurgency 24,
84, 85, 101, 145, 160, 212,
234, 296, 337, 339, 340, 393

- Intelligence, super-intelligence 4, 16, 34, 41, 44, 63–65, 152, 158, 213, 225, 229, 245, 256, 258–260, 294–296, 311, 326, 327, 331, 334, 335, 412, 413
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 54, 107, 298, 320, 322, 362, 375
- Invasion 37, 42, 64, 66, 68, 78, 82–94, 96, 98, 101–106, 109, 130, 132, 143–146, 148, 158, 161, 165, 169, 173–175, 185–187, 189, 199, 209, 226, 233–238, 249, 251, 263, 296, 298, 299, 329, 330, 333, 340, 400, 401, 415
- Iran 15, 31, 66, 84, 85, 88, 93, 99, 112, 132, 151, 155–161, 165, 170–172, 175, 187, 195, 203, 213, 224, 228, 236, 257, 258, 296, 333, 335, 338, 342, 396, 402
- Iraq 15, 64–66, 68, 86, 88, 92, 99, 117, 130, 143, 156–158, 160, 169, 173, 175, 186, 187, 189, 197, 198, 200, 203–205, 223, 236, 239, 249, 251, 263, 278, 333, 338, 358, 376, 396, 400, 412, 415
- Ireland 107, 109, 118, 121, 156, 183
- Islamic State 14, 67, 96, 130, 157, 170, 187, 189, 191, 197, 198, 203, 221, 236, 261, 285, 313, 315, 376, 415
- Israel 11, 63, 65, 68, 84, 93, 97, 110, 112, 156, 157, 159, 165, 189, 197, 199, 213, 252, 254, 255, 258, 272, 273, 293, 314, 329, 338, 383
- Italy 16, 131, 172, 213, 221, 281, 327, 334, 338, 424
- J**
- Japan 12, 55, 65, 66, 78, 95, 98, 107, 110, 111, 115–117, 121, 131, 172, 203, 207, 209, 227, 248, 250, 252, 257, 281, 320, 321, 327, 404
- K**
- Kashmir 93, 154, 197, 248, 249, 273, 347, 348
- Kennan, George 78–80, 114, 121, 122, 124, 126, 133, 164, 168, 235
- Kennedy, John F. 3, 41, 68, 80, 81, 125, 127, 128, 133, 231, 278, 284, 287, 310, 313, 404
- Keynes, John Maynard 120, 362, 368, 414, 415
- King, Martin Luther 104, 125, 347
- Kissinger, Henry 129, 142, 164, 177, 196, 246, 310, 322
- Korea, North 16, 46, 68, 82, 83, 99, 117, 134, 156–158, 170, 171, 175, 209, 228, 230, 231, 245, 249, 252, 258, 280, 310, 314, 322, 330, 383
- Korea, South 55, 65, 82, 83, 116, 117, 156, 172, 248, 249, 252, 285
- Kosovo 168, 169, 174, 177, 186
- Krushchev 41, 127, 166, 284, 287, 312, 313, 404

Kuwait 87, 88, 92, 99, 107, 130,
173

L

Laos 92

Lebanon 84, 85, 92, 97, 112, 156,
157, 173, 189, 203, 272, 358

Libya 21, 92, 96, 118, 132,
156–158, 170, 175, 177, 187,
191, 194, 196, 197, 205, 249,
258, 263, 295, 297, 329, 376,
396, 400, 415

Local knowledge 421

Lockheed Martin 233, 320, 321,
364

Luxemburg 107, 108

M

Macedonia 168, 169, 174

Mandela, Nelson 45, 134, 198, 235,
275, 277, 294–296, 325

Markets, markets in vice, markets in
virtue 19–21, 24, 26, 27, 30,
31, 40–42, 44, 52, 53, 55–59,
79, 94, 111, 122–124, 126,
162, 181, 201, 227, 320, 328,
356, 364, 365, 368, 410, 417,
418, 422, 423

Merkel, Angela 133, 149, 162

Meta-governance 60

Mexico 98, 109, 251, 376

Militarism 78, 100, 117, 120, 165,
186

Military-industrial complex 19, 20,
40, 108, 109, 111, 121, 124,
125, 132, 133, 153, 244, 255,
256, 261, 289, 300, 306, 317,

320, 321, 344, 356, 359, 364,
365, 418

Moldova 163

Monaco 107, 109

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
10, 12, 42, 151–153, 227,
229–231, 235, 237, 241,
251–253, 260, 313

Mutual Assured Digital Destruction
(MADD) 10–13, 42,
152–154, 227–229, 245, 260

Myanmar 43, 116, 151, 155–161,
170, 171, 186, 197, 198, 205,
209, 234, 249, 254, 258, 285

N

Narrative of the broken promise 36,
38, 162, 272

Nepal 326

New Zealand 22, 97, 107, 115, 118,
120, 133, 253, 262, 298

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) 4, 11, 12, 17, 36–38,
65, 66, 79, 83, 84, 88, 92, 99,
111, 117, 118, 122, 124,
126–133, 145, 149, 151, 153,
157, 162–165, 168–170, 172,
174, 176, 177, 186, 187,
195–198, 205, 209, 226–229,
235, 250, 252–254, 257, 259,
262, 272, 279, 281, 293, 298,
311, 313, 331, 334, 335, 337,
338, 362, 396

Norway 107, 311, 312

Nuclear nonproliferation 59, 68, 81,
231

Nuclear surety inspections 72, 307,
314, 316, 317

- Nuclear weapons 10, 20, 31, 36, 41, 44, 45, 62–66, 68, 81, 82, 84, 98, 99, 110, 114–116, 127–129, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 168, 170, 173, 175, 186, 206, 214, 226, 231, 233, 236–238, 240, 246–249, 251–259, 262, 274, 281, 284, 295, 306–310, 312–316, 319–322, 330, 331, 342, 344, 345, 348, 370, 374, 378, 382, 383, 399, 400, 404, 412, 423
- Nuclear winter 154, 155, 210, 225, 227, 237, 245, 251–253, 261, 262, 306, 309, 323, 344, 407
- O**
- Obama, Barack 3, 67, 151, 157–159, 162, 175, 226, 249, 259, 292, 293, 297, 348, 367, 376
- Ozone 3, 36, 173, 206, 210, 309, 407
- P**
- Pakistan 24, 25, 44, 68, 69, 81, 93, 97, 110, 154, 156, 211, 227, 234, 244, 248, 249, 252, 254, 258, 273, 292, 293, 298, 299, 306, 309, 310, 314, 315, 320, 322, 324, 325, 329, 330, 348, 349, 383
- Palestine 93, 112, 197, 199, 273
- Path dependency 40, 58, 202–204, 360, 383
- Peace agreements 43, 45, 46, 134, 192–194, 197, 274, 275, 394
- Peacebuilding Compared project 175, 204
- Peacekeeping, peacebuilding 31, 37, 42, 43, 60, 61, 85, 90, 96, 97, 101, 102, 113, 166, 168, 169, 188, 190–195, 197, 200, 201, 203, 204, 207, 210, 213, 223, 254, 290, 339, 396, 401, 405
- Pfizer 343, 417, 418
- Polio 25, 53, 54, 58, 61, 68, 69, 376
- Principles 29, 30, 32–40, 42, 46, 102, 150, 184, 280, 288, 299, 347, 356, 375, 382, 391, 392, 394, 396–399, 407, 409, 419
- Proxy conflict 195
- Putin, Vladimir 3, 11, 12, 16, 36, 64, 67, 87, 88, 99, 109, 127, 128, 131, 132, 143, 151, 162–169, 172, 175–177, 189, 198, 201, 225–228, 247, 249, 270, 272, 299, 313, 332, 373
- R**
- RAND 96
- Reagan, Ronald 3, 31, 41, 64, 71, 121, 125–129, 150, 151, 161, 162, 172, 175, 182, 184, 240, 252, 253, 270, 277, 278, 280, 281, 284, 294–296, 310, 311, 313, 336, 401
- Realism 47, 80, 95, 128, 150, 165, 205, 224, 286, 290, 291, 306, 322, 341, 419
- Relational, relationality, relational diplomacy 36, 46, 222, 275, 276, 281, 286–288, 300, 317,

- 318, 323, 325, 327, 379, 381, 383, 397, 425, 426
- Responsive regulation 39–41, 45, 199, 200, 345, 371–373, 375, 379, 395
- Restorative diplomacy 11, 12, 17, 31, 36–39, 45, 46, 64, 96, 102, 105, 110–112, 130, 148, 150, 153, 154, 159, 163, 208, 222, 236, 238, 241, 244, 250, 256, 270, 272–277, 280–284, 286, 295, 296, 299, 300, 322, 328, 340–342, 347, 370, 379, 381, 392–394, 396, 399, 410
- Restorative justice 45, 161, 198, 242, 275–277, 279, 280, 282, 297, 327, 328, 342, 344
- Risk, risk analysis 10, 14, 17, 18, 32–34, 38, 39, 46, 47, 59, 61, 63–65, 81, 95, 96, 111, 114, 117, 126–128, 144, 146, 149, 164, 168, 172, 181, 183, 185, 193, 205, 207, 209, 220–222, 225, 226, 231, 237, 245, 248, 256, 257, 262, 263, 272, 290, 291, 306–309, 314, 316, 319, 320, 322–324, 344, 365–369, 371, 372, 374, 375, 377–383, 393, 395–398, 401, 407, 408, 410–412, 414, 417, 418, 421, 426
- Ritualism 34, 46, 72, 355–359, 363, 365–367, 371, 372, 374, 376–378, 382, 383, 423
- Roosevelt, Eleanor 362, 423
- Roosevelt, Franklin 125
- Rules 17, 22, 23, 28–31, 37, 40, 45, 46, 48, 95, 105, 114, 117, 168, 172, 238, 277, 285, 288, 289, 296, 342, 361, 375, 391, 392, 394–397
- Russia 4, 10–13, 15–19, 31, 33, 43, 64, 65, 67, 68, 79, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 103, 107–110, 117–119, 121, 122, 126, 128–133, 142, 143, 145, 146, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157–174, 177, 184, 186, 189, 194, 196, 198, 199, 202, 203, 205–207, 211, 213, 221, 224, 225, 227–230, 232, 236, 244, 249, 250, 252, 253, 257–259, 262, 270–272, 278, 285, 287, 298, 299, 308, 309, 313, 314, 324, 325, 330–334, 338, 344, 349, 359, 383, 396, 400, 401, 404
- Rwanda 89, 90, 92, 96, 173, 188, 189, 193, 200, 237, 328, 330
- S
- Saudi Arabia 110, 112, 151, 156, 157, 159, 165, 213, 244
- Scaling up 21, 56, 58, 110, 249, 405, 416, 418
- Separation of powers 102, 204, 360, 361, 365, 394, 395
- Serbia 91, 118, 168, 173, 244
- Sierra Leone 198
- Singapore 22, 55, 97, 107, 108
- Slow food 19–21, 25, 27, 32, 36, 40, 70–72, 87, 235, 362–364, 383, 390, 406
- Small arms 43, 182, 183, 206, 256
- South Africa 45, 63, 235, 249, 253, 258, 275, 294–296, 305, 306

- Sovereignty 31, 97, 109, 115, 142, 146, 168, 173, 176, 298, 330
- Soviet Union 15, 64, 69, 72, 78, 80, 91, 120, 122, 123, 126, 141, 142, 155, 163, 169, 171, 204, 206, 235, 240, 277, 281, 312, 331, 338, 344
- Spain 98, 205, 221
- Stalin 79, 99, 116, 122, 126, 177, 189, 239, 257, 284, 325, 364
- Statecraft 41, 45, 281, 282, 290, 325, 341, 397
- Street-level bureaucracy 378
- Switzerland 107, 172
- Syria 15, 67, 84, 85, 93, 97, 99, 132, 170, 171, 187–189, 194, 196, 197, 203, 207, 213, 227, 236, 257, 272, 285, 329, 396, 415
- T**
- Taboo 65, 66, 68, 93, 99, 100, 109, 151, 208, 239, 241, 247, 252, 281, 316
- Taiwan 16, 22, 42, 55, 57, 58, 82, 92, 99, 111, 117, 142, 144–146, 150, 207, 236, 248, 272, 315, 316, 343, 394, 402, 406, 407
- Taliban 69, 82, 186, 187, 197, 211, 212, 244, 263, 293, 296, 315, 349, 400
- Terrorism 16, 24, 46, 170, 185, 221, 244, 245, 272, 273, 285, 286, 291–293, 322, 336, 339, 376, 415
- Thirty Years War 189
- Timor-Leste 85, 86, 89, 92, 97, 98, 100–102, 104, 168, 203, 214, 400, 420
- Trees, forests 25, 31, 32, 44, 103, 220–222, 224, 257, 261, 279, 365, 416
- Trump, Donald 11, 16, 19, 22, 53, 149, 157, 159, 160, 175, 187, 192, 198, 207, 279, 286, 293, 324, 332, 406
- Turkiye 258
- U**
- Ukraine 4, 10–12, 16, 18, 33, 37, 41, 43, 52, 64, 83, 84, 87, 88, 92, 96, 98, 103, 109–111, 117, 118, 129, 132, 133, 143, 145, 151, 161–170, 172, 175–177, 184–186, 189, 191, 192, 194, 196–199, 202, 203, 205, 207, 209, 211, 213, 224–229, 235, 236, 249, 250, 258, 270, 272, 278, 298, 308, 309, 331, 333, 336, 340, 341, 400
- United Arab Emirates (UAE) 107, 157
- United Kingdom (UK) 22, 64, 82, 93, 109, 172, 221, 258, 297, 308, 363, 368, 406
- United Nations (UN) 21, 31, 38, 42–45, 60–64, 67, 81, 85, 86, 89, 90, 93, 94, 98, 101, 102, 106, 109, 113, 114, 154, 155, 168–170, 173, 175, 183–185, 188, 190–195, 197, 200, 203, 213, 231, 232, 239, 240, 244, 248, 254, 258–260, 274, 275,

277, 283, 285, 291, 328,
 338–340, 357, 358, 361–363,
 393, 396, 400, 401, 420, 423

United States (US) 10–13, 15–18,
 22, 23, 31, 38, 42, 53, 56,
 68–70, 78–80, 82–86, 88–96,
 98, 103, 105–109, 111, 116,
 117, 119–125, 127, 128,
 130–132, 143, 145–147, 149,
 152, 155–157, 159–161,
 164–166, 168, 169, 171–174,
 177, 182, 186, 189, 191, 192,
 196, 198–200, 203–205, 207,
 209, 213, 221, 225, 227,
 229–233, 236, 237, 239, 240,
 244, 247–250, 252, 253, 255,
 257–259, 271, 273, 278, 279,
 281, 284–287, 292, 293,
 296–299, 306–312, 314, 315,
 317, 318, 320–322, 324, 327,
 329–339, 342, 344, 359,
 362–364, 368, 371, 373, 381,
 383, 392, 398, 399, 401, 402,
 406, 410–412, 414

Universities 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 38,
 40, 41, 53, 62, 66, 67, 69, 71,
 72, 79, 124, 125, 156, 157,
 171, 232, 233, 235, 238, 243,
 244, 246, 249, 254–256, 287,
 320, 323, 324, 362, 365, 381,
 390, 401, 402, 405, 417,
 422–424

V

Vietnam 55, 82, 83, 86, 88, 92, 93,
 96, 99, 117, 124, 143, 156,
 205, 223, 236, 239, 243, 251,
 400, 404, 421

W

War crime 11, 151, 161, 168, 169,
 187, 196, 199, 200, 255, 256,
 293, 297, 328, 329, 392, 393

Warsaw Pact 36, 117, 129, 165,
 176, 209, 281

Washington, George 116, 119, 121,
 254, 257

Weapons of Mass Destruction
 (WMD) 1, 17, 31, 39, 41, 42,
 44, 60, 62–65, 67, 68, 80, 81,
 99, 103, 104, 114, 115, 153,
 156, 158, 169, 182, 186, 208,
 211, 238, 239, 241–248, 252,
 254–256, 258–260, 313, 321,
 342, 364, 373, 374, 376, 400,
 401, 423

World government 115, 373

World Health Organization 53, 54,
 61, 329

World War I 14, 66, 80, 85, 91–94,
 107, 112, 118, 120, 206, 239,
 244, 288, 411, 414

World War II 53, 61, 66, 78, 95,
 99, 112, 118, 121, 123, 143,
 147, 148, 165, 173, 200, 207,
 214, 239, 241, 247, 309, 313,
 327, 362, 392, 405

Y

Yeltsin, Boris 79, 126, 130–132,
 167, 168, 176, 270, 311, 332,
 333, 349

Yemen 156, 157, 186, 187, 329