



Sven Saaler

A Topography of
Public Bronze Statuary
in Modern Japan

MEN
IN
METAL

BRILL

**A Topography of
Public Bronze Statuary
in Modern Japan**

**MEN
IN
METAL**

Sven Saaler

**A Topography of
Public Bronze Statuary
in Modern Japan**

**MEN
IN
METAL**



BRILL

Leiden – Boston

2020



This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>

The terms of the CC license apply only to the original material. The use of material from other sources (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may require further permission from the respective copyright holder.

Published by

BRILL
Plantijnstraat 2
2321 JC Leiden
The Netherlands
brill.com

Text Editing

Amy Reigle Newland, Adelaide
Paul Sorrell, Dunedin

Design

Peter Yeoh, New York

Production

High Trade BV, Zwolle, The Netherlands
Printed in Slovakia

ISBN 978-90-04-41443-3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Detailed Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
data are available on the internet at
<http://catalog.loc.gov>

Copyright 2020 by Sven Saaler. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use.

Brill has made all reasonable efforts to trace all right holders to any copyrighted material used in this work. In cases where these efforts have not been successful the publisher welcomes communications from copyright holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other permission matters.

For my family

Contents

Preface	ix	4	Patterns of Social Behavior and Participation	94
Acknowledgments	x		Ideas, Proposals, and Networks	95
Note to Readers	xii		Approval and Financing	96
Introduction	2		Designing and Casting the Statue	99
			Unveiling and Reporting	100
			Utilizing the Statue	103
Part I	14			
1	Roots	16	Part II	106
	Native Traditions	17	5	A Quantitative Analysis of Public Statuary in Modern Japan
	European Influences	19		The Database
	Early Forms of the Cult of the Individual in Modern Japan	21		The Historical Figures Depicted
	The Concept of “Great Men”	28		Categories
				Gender
2	How Not to Be Seen: The Hidden Statuary of Emperor Meiji	32		Nationality
	The Emperor and the Birth of the Nation	33		Regional Distribution and Locations of Statues
	Progresses and Portraits	34		Forms
	A Statue for Emperor Meiji?	42		Historical Cycles
3	Beginnings: Statues of Imperial Figures	54	6	A Typology of Public Statuary in Modern Japan
	The First “Man in Metal”: Yamato Takeru	55		The Founders of Modern Japan:
	Emperors of the Past:			Ōmura Masujirō
	The Keitai Statue in Fukui	66		Loyalty and Rebellion: Saigō Takamori
	The Founder of the Empire: Jinmu Tennō	69		Rehabilitating Renegades: Ii Naosuke
	Princes of the Present:			Constructing Imperial Loyalty as
	Imperial Statuary in the Capital	86		Timeless Virtue: Kusunoki Masashige
				War Heroes
				Only the Good Die Young?
				Martyrs of the Restoration
				Religion and Nationalism:
				Nichiren and Kameyama
				Region and Nation: Statues of Daimyo

Part III	200	9 The Resurgence of Public Statuary in Postwar Japan	238
7 Mobilizing Japan’s “Men in Metal” in the Asia-Pacific War	202	Public Statuary during the Allied Occupation of Japan: The Construction of the “New Japan”	239
Mass Production	203	The CIE “War Monument Study”	242
The “Three Human Bullets”	204	Monument Committees	244
National Mobilization and State Control of Metals	207	New Monuments for a “New Japan”	250
The Last “Men in Metal”	209	10 Public Statuary since the 1960s	256
Statues in Education and Festivals	212	Representatives of a “Cultural Japan”	257
The Greatest Hero of All: A Man in Cement	217	Statues of Military Figures in Postwar Japan	260
Meltdown	219	The Re-emergence of the Heroes of the Meiji Restoration	261
8 Colonial Statues and Their Legacy	226	Statues of the Meiji Emperor	265
Taiwan	227	Public Statuary from the 1990s to the Present	268
Korea	228		
China/Manchukuo	229	Conclusion	276
Statues in Occupied Territories	235	Notes	282
The Fate of Japanese Statues in Asia after 1945	235	Bibliography	329
		Index	346

Preface

Anyone traveling in Japan cannot fail to notice the numerous statues of historical personalities dotting the country. During my trips throughout Japan, I often wondered whether this dense network of personified history had been systemically designed. Who (or what) were the driving forces behind the commissioning of these statues and what were their histories, their backstories? Was Japanese public statuary any different from statuary in other countries? Almost two decades later, I have arrived at some conclusions but remain acutely aware of the enormity of the task undertaken. This has to do with the sheer, almost monumental, numbers of public statues in Japan. One source, for example, estimates that there are three thousand today, not including sculptures that represent abstract values such as peace or fictional characters. Added to this was the difficulty in collecting relevant sources and the fact that almost all extant statues were reconstructions of prewar monuments. That a sizeable number of sculptures were destroyed due to wartime mobilization required a multi-layered examination of their original commissioning, their destruction as well as their restoration.

What emerged from these investigations is the topography of modern Japanese public statuary presented here. Identifying developments from the 1880s to the present and analyzing significant sculptures in detailed case studies, this work does not attempt to introduce or explain every statue erected in Japan. Given their number, this would be a futile enterprise. As the term *topography* suggests, the

study focuses instead on the macro-trends in the monumentalization of Japan's past through historical figures and tracks these trends through both time and space. Both qualitative analysis and quantitative methodology are employed to present a typology of statuary and to identify agency and motifs.

The focus of this study, therefore, is on the representations of history in the public sphere, on popular images of historical personalities, and much less on these historical personae as such. While it is a study of public memory in modern Japan, it goes beyond the history of the actual monuments in the public space to examine how images of popular historical personalities as represented through statues are being reproduced and disseminated in the print media and the internet. The city of Sendai, for example, uses the equestrian statue of the lord Date Masamune as its trademark, circulating it through printed and digital tourism advertisements and city guides. In the prewar period, Tokyo statues such as that of Ōmura Masujirō at the Yasukuni Shrine (on the cover of this volume) or Kusunoki Masashige outside the Imperial Palace were well-known landmarks, and they became popular for illustration in pictorials, journals, and on souvenir postcards. They were also reproduced in textbooks, thus bringing them (and the worship associated with them) into the classroom. While heroic approaches to history have ceased to be a dominant trend in historiography in many countries after World War II, in Japan, they continue to shape social reality and the perceptions of national history among the wider population.

Acknowledgments

This study could not have been completed without the support of many colleagues, friends, and my family. An invitation to participate in the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) research project Sonderforschungsbereich 640 at Humboldt University in Berlin in 1999 set me on the research path that eventually resulted in this publication. I thank Jürgen Schriewer for his encouragement in pursuing this path and other project members for critical comments and useful suggestions. At this time, I was a research fellow at the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) in Tokyo, where I benefited from the support of librarians Ursula Flache, Matthias Koch, and Horikoshi Yōko as well as IT expert Claus Harmer, who helped me to design the database used for the quantitative analysis here. Without the support of Kawamoto Yasuhiko, I could not have compiled the data needed. Joe Barnes, Iven Burg, and Theodore Shaw assisted with the compilation of the bibliography and the index.

Local historians, librarians, and administrators in many locations in Japan answered my questions and provided essential materials and information that were not easily accessible. Whenever possible, these generous individuals have been credited in footnotes; however, the constraints of length in the present publication means that not all information could be used or that all individuals could be thanked individually. I would therefore like to emphasize how much I profited from the kind support

of officials and librarians from the following cities: Kanazawa, Toyohashi, Nagoya, Kagoshima, Saga, Fukuoka, Yamaguchi, Kōchi, Kobe, Hikone, Niigata, Fukui, Toyama, Ami, and Morioka. The Meiji Shrine in Tokyo offered invaluable information regarding imperial statues, and several local history museums allowed me to reproduce visual material. For this I am profoundly grateful. All visual material that is not otherwise credited is drawn from my collection. The DIJ and Sophia University have supported me with my research over the years, and I greatly appreciate the financial support of these two institutions for research trips.

An important site of investigation for this book was the city of Kanazawa, where I spent many years (1991–92; 1996–99) as a student researching a topic entirely unrelated to memory and statuary. At that time, I was unaware of the fact that the very first statue built in a public space in Japan was in 1880 erected in the Kanazawa's celebrated park, Kenrokuen. I thank my advisor Hashimoto Tetsuya from Kanazawa University as well as Motoyasu Hiroshi from Seiryō University (formerly affiliated with the Ishikawa Prefectural Museum of History) for advice regarding local history in Ishikawa, Toyama, and Niigata. I also gained deep insights into the study of Japan's culture of memory through the year-long cooperation with Hiyama Yukio of Chūkyō University in Nagoya, who invited me to participate in his JSPS *kakenhi* projects on the memorialization of

war and the war dead. Higashiyama Kyōko from Chūkyō University also provided helpful information on statues in the Chūbu region and elsewhere, not all of which made it into this book.

I would like to thank the following colleagues for their generosity in reading, commenting and providing feedback on parts of this book or on related publications and presentations: Christopher W. A. Szpilman, Roger Brown, Yoshida Yutaka, Katō Yōko, Kōketsu Atsushi, Rotem Kowner, Ueda Kiyoshi, M. G. Sheftall, Hayashi Michio, Jeff Kingston, Christian W. Spang, Sven Matthiessen, Barak Kushner, Harald Fuess, Hayashi Kaoru, James Baxter, Richard Smethurst, Christopher Gerteis, Peter Siegenthaler, and Collin Rusneac. I also appreciate the copyediting of the initial draft by Paul Sorrell and later under the helm of Amy Reigle Newland, without whom this project would not have come to fruition. The support of Inge Klompmakers, Anna Beeren, and Patricia Radder at Brill during the peer review, layout, and production process must likewise be singled out: I am grateful for the trust Brill had in me in publishing this manuscript, despite its length and the generous number of illustrations included.

Lastly, I want to express my heartfelt thanks to my wife Kayoko and my daughters Nina and Julia for their patience when wandering off the usual tourist tracks to look at statues (even during holidays) and for spotting many statues that I might have otherwise not noticed.

Note to Readers

The Romanization of Asian languages in this study uses the Hepburn system for Japanese, the Revised Romanization of Korean from 2000 for Korean, and Pinyin for Chinese. Japanese terms, place designations, and personal and organization names appear in their original accented form, unless they have entered into common English usage (this includes all Japanese prefectures and major cities, e.g., Tokyo, not Tōkyō) or are part of original-language literature. Earlier forms of Romanization is included alongside Pinyin for Chinese names when the form still commonly appears in Western sources. In the case of personal and place names that are long familiar in the West, such as Chiang Kai-shek or Sun Yat-sen, I have adhered to this common usage. The ordering of names follows the Japanese, Chinese, and Korean convention of family name before given name, for example, Mao Zedong, Hatoyama Yukio, or Kim Dae-jong. Exceptions are those scholars and authors working and acknowledged internationally. All translations are mine, unless otherwise stated. All websites cited in footnotes or the bibliography were last accessed in December 2019. Unless otherwise indicated all Japanese newspapers are the Tokyo morning edition. Unless otherwise

noted, all photographs in this publication were taken by the author, and all other illustrations (e.g., woodblock prints, lithographs, postcards, posters) are from the author's collection. Measurements are given in centimeters (height × width), when known, and refer to the original size of objects and not reproductions. Postcards illustrated in this publication are reproduced in different sizes, but in their original form they all measure 14.8 × 10.5 cm.

List of Abbreviations

CIE Civil Information and Education Section
GHQ General Headquarters
IHA Imperial Household Agency
IHM Imperial Household Ministry
IJA Imperial Japanese Army
IJN Imperial Japanese Navy
IMTFE International Military Tribunal
for the Far East
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SCAP Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
SMR South Manchurian Railway

Introduction

In June 2001 the headquarters of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Tokyo witnessed an unexpected transformation. At that time, the popularity of the LDP president and prime minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō was at an all-time high, and the LDP seized upon the opportunity to boost its political influence further by draping a 12.5 x 16 m banner portrait of their leader on the facade of the party's headquarters (fig. 0.1). Although commentators and politicians criticized the towering image as “exaggerated idolatry” (*gūzō sūhai*),¹ it was undeniably part of a populist strategy to cement the dominance of the Koizumi-led LDP and one that ultimately handed the party a resounding victory in the Upper House elections of July 2001.

A cartoon appearing a few days later in a national daily ridiculed the idea of a “cult of personality” by depicting a statue of the LDP president with two spectators poking fun at the notion of raising a monument to an active politician.² But was this really so outlandish?

From ancient times to the present day, societies and polities have dedicated images, often in the form of public statues and other monuments, to historical and living figures that have fulfilled different ever-evolving functions as part of a cult of personality or cult of the individual. Impressive works such as the 96 m statue of Peter the Great erected in Moscow in 1997, the 40 m high equestrian statue of Genghis (Chinggis) Khan built in Mongolia in 2008, and “the world’s tallest statue,” at 182 m, depicting India’s first deputy prime minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950), set up in 2018 demonstrate the power of a ruling elite to preserve and utilize the memory or fame of a “great person,” or the enshrinement of a historical moment.³ Their study allows the historian to elucidate the shifting attitudes toward the individuals, events, polities, or organizations they represent. In the case of modern Japan public statues of historical figures are tangible reminders of the nation’s history and at the same time of the development of a cult of the individual, a process beginning in the Meiji period (1868–1912) and continuing into the early twenty-first century. These statues are the focus of this publication.

In Japan, the erection of public monuments depicting prominent historical figures, most notably in the form of bronze statues (*dōzō*), was inseparably linked with the foundation of the Japanese nation-state in the late nineteenth century. These images gave rise to a form of political iconography centered on the concept of “nation” that moved beyond their service merely as visual mnemonics to symbolize (and legitimize) the political and social order established after the revolutionary changes ushered in by the 1868 Meiji Restoration. The creation of a pantheon representing the Japanese nation—its divine ancestors, founding figures, war heroes, and key figures of Japanese culture—be-



Fig. 0.1 Portrait of LDP president and prime minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō, LDP Headquarters, Tokyo, June 2001.

came an integral part of the process that George Mosse describes as the “nationalization of the masses.”⁴ By embodying both the idea and the values of the nation, these statues became its face and facilitated a popular identification with the national collective by fostering sentiments of personal sympathy, attachment, and kinship. In short, they were a quintessential element in the dissemination of a narrative of the new regime’s legitimacy among the Japanese people. This was of particular importance at the beginning of the Meiji period when the idea of “the nation” was still a novel and highly abstract concept, one difficult for many to grasp.

Japan enjoyed a long tradition of bronze Buddhist sculpture from the sixth century onward, but before the 1880s secular historical figures representing the political system and its associated values were unknown. The sixty years between 1880 and 1940, a period that corresponded with the rise of the nation-state and the spread of the ideology of nationalism, saw a rapid growth in statue-building. Around 900 public sculptures were erected




Fig. 0.2 The Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC.

throughout the country during this period.⁵ The majority of these works were destroyed as a result of raw material requisitioning (metal collection) campaigns and melting down in the final years of the Asia-Pacific War (1931–45). Yet today several thousand statues commemorating historical figures once again adorn the nation’s public spaces,⁶ a testimony to the persistent appeal of the cult of the individual. The ongoing popularity of statue-building indicates that hero worship remains a significant force in the memory of nation-states. At the same time, the controversies that still surround many of these memorials also reflect continuing historiographical debates regarding the individuals portrayed as well as regime change, civil strife, war, terror, economic development, and Japan’s place on the wider international stage.

THE CULT OF THE PERSONALITY: JAPAN AND BEYOND

Many scholars have pointed out the importance of visual symbols and the “visualization of political power” in human society.⁷ In his authoritative work on the role of symbols in processes of shaping political legitimacy, Lewis Austin argued that human beings “think and feel in pictures, and pictorial symbolism expresses our most basic ideas, emotions, and judgments” and that visual symbols “serve as concrete pointers to abstractions and intangibles.”⁸ Modern states, many of which are based on highly abstract ideas of nationhood, are in desperate need of symbolic representations and personifications of “the nation.” This led to the development of systematically constructed personality cults from the nineteenth century.

The terms “personality cult” (or “cult of the personality”) and “cult of the individual” have been in

use since the first half of the nineteenth century. Today, they are most commonly associated with past and present Communist regimes such as the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), the Peoples Republic of China under Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976), or North Korea under the Kim dynasty (since 1948).⁹ These terms gained widespread currency following the 1956 speech by the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), in which he criticized the prevalent “cult of the individual” associated with his predecessor Stalin.¹⁰ While addressing the specific characteristics of the Japanese case, this study applies a broader definition of “personality cult” in line with the *Oxford English Dictionary* as “a collective obsession with, or intense, excessive, or uncritical admiration for, a particular public figure, esp. a political leader.”¹¹

Despite a strong focus in previous research on the personality cult in Communist societies, it is essential to remember that regimes of varying natures have employed strategies involving the veneration of individual leaders in order to entrench the given political and social order. Russia under Vladimir Putin, Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979–2003), or Turkmenistan under Saparmurat Niyazov (1985–2006)¹² are more recent examples of the cult of the personality seen in non-Communist states (Russia and Turkmenistan have a communist legacy, however). It is not difficult to find examples of the cult of personality in less authoritarian polities,¹³ such as in the excessive reverence paid to Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–98) in imperial Germany and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) in the Germany of the Weimar Republic, the adulation of Joan of Arc in the France of the Third Republic, the high regard allotted to anti-Japanese “patriots” in present-day South Korea, and the cult of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that has surfaced in Turkey since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.¹⁴ In all of these cases, public statuary has been an essential vehicle for personality idolization.

Even in states that occupy the top ranks in democracy indices,¹⁵ the use of public sculpture to advance something akin to a cult of the personality is

not uncommon. In the United States, for instance, the architecture of the Martin Luther King, Jr. (National) Memorial in Washington, DC, opened to the public in 2011, or the Mount Rushmore National Memorial, completed in 1941 depicting the faces of the four US presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Abraham Lincoln carved into the mountainside, are reminiscent of the memorial statuary in some of the countries mentioned above.¹⁶ The personality cult of George Washington, the first US president, has been compared to the Lenin cult in the Soviet Union.¹⁷ In a fine example of transnational cross-fertilization, the National Statuary Hall Collection in the US House of Representatives in Washington, DC, created in the early 1860s to house a collection of statues of “founding fathers” and national heroes,¹⁸ has obvious similarities to Walhalla Memorial Hall near Regensburg in Germany, planned by Crown Prince (later King) Ludwig of Bavaria (1786–1868) in 1830 and opened in 1842.¹⁹

Many of these examples of nationalist personality cults are colored by a religious dimension, which is evident in the language used to describe them as well as in the forms of representation employed. The *Interpretive Guide to the Thomas Jefferson Memorial*, for example, calls the structure a “Shrine to Democracy.”²⁰ The memorial dedicated to President Abraham Lincoln resembles a Greek temple, supported by a colonnade of Doric columns on the outside with a series of Ionic columns inside that is similar to other memorials. The inscription above Lincoln’s statue also leaves us in no doubt about the “sacredness” of this venerated historical figure and of the nation he represents: “In this *temple*, as in the hearts of the people for whom he saved the Union, the memory of Abraham Lincoln is *enshrined* forever” (fig. 0.2).²¹ One of the largest memorial structures in Europe, the Leipzig Memorial to the Battle of the Nations (1813), has been described as a “temple dedicated to death and liberty,”²² and the official designation of the national memorial of Italy, the centerpiece of which is a statue of modern Italy’s first king, Victor Emmanuel II, is *Altare della Patria* (Altar of the Father-

land). Although modern nation-states were founded on secular principles, the religious references in national memorials dedicated to individuals all over the world and the influence of cult figures in modern nationalism underline the notion that nationalism is a “civic religion” that relies on symbolism as much as traditional religions do.²³

MOBILIZING THE NATION

The examples introduced above reveal that the personality cult in both Communist and non-Communist polities do not fundamentally differ in form and function.²⁴ Each constitutes part of the same historical trajectory—that is, the emergence of the nation-state as the dominant form of political organization in the modern world. In Europe, Japan, the United States, and elsewhere, the building of monuments to individuals revered as representatives of the nation and the state accelerated dramatically in the nineteenth century. But what motivated nations and nation-states to construct semireligious forms of this cult of the individual? The influential historian Ernest Gellner contends that nation-states depend on the mobilization of broad sectors of the population to achieve their objectives, chiefly in the areas of economic growth, industrialization, and warfare.²⁵ To reach these objectives, national governments need to motivate their citizens, who often lack firm allegiance or loyalty to the political order of the nation-state, to become involved in the projects underwritten by the state or even risk their lives for the new polity. These aims are achieved by constructing a national identity and indoctrinating the masses to embrace it, with the ultimate goal of creating a national consciousness and cementing the individual’s loyalty to the nation.²⁶ Anthony Giddens emphasizes that modern nationalisms address “the need of individuals to be involved in a collectivity with which they can identify” because “previous groupings that could fulfill this need, such as the local community or kinship group, have been largely dissolved, [and thus] the symbols of nationalism provide a modern substitute.”²⁷

Nevertheless, in their attempts to mobilize the masses, the elites controlling the nation-state have had to overcome a formidable obstacle: the idea of the nation is highly abstract, while existing allegiances, such as family bonds, social ties, and integration into the local community, assume very concrete forms. Establishing a psychological connection between the individual and the abstract collective of the nation—making the latter the core object of the loyalty of the former—has proved to be a challenging task faced by advocates of national integration. Anthony D. Smith has pointed to the importance of shared myths, memories, and symbols in the construction of modern nationhood.²⁸

Personalized myths, memories, and symbols were, and remain, highly effective in shaping a collective identity and eliciting feelings of solidarity, thereby inspiring citizens to participate in grand national projects. They urge the ordinary people to look up to their leaders and forefathers, inspiring awe and commanding respect for the values the effigies represent. Early nation-states such as Great Britain and France, latecomers such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, and postcolonial nation-states such as India and Korea, as well as Communist states like China and Vietnam, have all developed some form of personality cult at one point in their historical trajectory. As I will argue in this study, the monuments that function as *symbolic personifications* of the nation are manifestations of all three of Smith’s categories: personalized myths, memories, and symbols. For many nations, they are essential to creating a tangible bond between the individual and the collective.

CONSTRUCTING THE JAPANESE NATION AND DISSEMINATING A NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

For Japan, the need to mobilize substantial sectors of the population to carry out the objectives of the state emerged when the country first faced the most severe threat of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century. Since the early 1800s, European powers had demanded the “opening” of the country to trade. The only Western power permitted to trade with the Tokugawa shogunate (*bakufu*) and to operate a trading post on the southern island of Kyushu during this period was the Netherlands. But in March 1854, the United States, a relative newcomer in the Pacific region, pressured Japan into signing a treaty of amity, which was then followed by a fully-fledged trade agreement in 1858. The European powers quickly followed. All of these so-called “Unequal Treaties” infringed on Japanese sovereignty.²⁹

In order to deal with this threat to its sovereignty, Japan’s elites advocated the creation of a centralized nation-state, the form of political organization that seemingly gave the Western powers their superior military strength. In 1867–68, opposition forces overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in what is known as the Meiji Restoration to create a centralized government and in 1871 to abolish Japan’s feudal domains (*han*).³⁰ The new leadership claimed that it had re-established “the unity of ritual and government” (*saisei itchi*) and had “restored” direct imperial rule by the emperor (*tennō shinsei*). Over the centuries, the emperor had lost political power to successive shogunal dynasties, even though he retained the ritual (religious) functions of his office—now he was to be “restored” as a political authority. Restoration in this context meant direct rule as it had, allegedly, been practiced in antiquity. According to legend, “direct imperial rule” began with the founding of the Japanese empire in 660 BCE by the first mythical emperor, Jinmu. After a temporary decline, the imperial prerogative was briefly restored in the Kenmu Restoration (1331–38) under the leadership of Emperor Go-Daigo (1288–1339).³¹ The reference to Jinmu, allegedly the great-grand-

son of the sun goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami, was a rhetorical gambit aimed at legitimizing the political power of the government emerging after the Meiji Restoration. Identifying the origins of the dynasty in Jinmu and tracing it back to the “Age of Gods,” however, complicated the visual utilization of imperial figures in the public space and for the purpose of disseminating a sense of national identity among the population. As deified and thus sacred figures, emperors were unsuitable, to use Austin’s terminology, to “serve as concrete pointers to abstractions and intangibles.”³² The elites of the nascent Japanese nation-state thus had to find alternative symbols that could be displayed permanently in public and that would facilitate popular identification with the new community of the nation. It is these symbols and their representation in public space that are the topic of this study.

In his influential study of nineteenth-century France, Eugene Weber elucidated that the process by which nations develop is long and complicated.³³ As late as 1870, France was a mostly rural society where “many did not speak French” and where the people “felt little identity with the state or with people of other regions.”³⁴ There are parallels with the situation of Japan at the time of the Meiji Restoration of 1868 when the new government faced the urgent task of turning “peasants into Japanese.” As Fujitani Takashi argued in his influential study of imperial pageantry, “the development of a strong sense of shared cultural identity” in pre-Meiji Japan was first and foremost precluded by “both regional and social cleavages.”³⁵ Until the Restoration, the Japanese polity consisted of 260 domains, each of which enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Different currencies and systems of measurement co-existed alongside numerous dialects, often incomprehensible to people from distant parts of the archipelago. When the military aristocracy, the daimyo (feudal lords) and the samurai (*bushi*), spoke of their “country” (*kuni*), they were referring to one of the domains, but not to Japan itself.³⁶ Before the 1860s the concept of the nation was, according to historian Kevin Doak, “for all practical purposes irrelevant to the dominant forms of politics and to everyday

life in the archipelago.”³⁷ The integration of the highly diverse regions that made up Japan proved to be a long-term process, and even today the situation is probably not fully resolved.³⁸

Not every resident of Japan wished to become a member of this new entity of a “nation” since at least in the early Meiji period no one really understood what membership implied. Most people acknowledged that the end of the Tokugawa shogunate would open up new opportunities for individual advancement,³⁹ but they also began to recognize that participation in public affairs could come at a high price. Making a career as a public servant or a businessman was one option, but less attractive scenarios were more common. Young women from the countryside, for example, were mobilized to serve the state’s economic ambitions for rapid industrialization and had to work, willingly or not, in textile factories and other industries.⁴⁰ Men were expected to serve in the military and give their lives in the service of the state. For centuries, military affairs had been the exclusive privilege of the warrior class, and commoners could be severely punished for owning weapons, let alone using them. Now, suddenly, they were confronted with compulsory military service.

Hyman Kublin has pointed out that this transition, which was hammered out in the Conscription Law of 1873, was not welcomed by the population. Rather, it “was received . . . with an alarming lack of enthusiasm, the peasantry in particular revealing a hostility” to such a degree that it “actually embarrassed the government.”⁴¹ From the government’s perspective, this “lack of enthusiasm” necessitated a strengthening of motivation for ordinary Japanese to serve in the military and make a sacrifice for the nation. This was achieved by indoctrinating the masses with the idea that it is the nation that wields ultimate authority over peoples’ lives and should enjoy a total claim on their loyalty. As in other countries, the Japanese nation-state deeply “intervened in the everyday life of people,” and it did so “to a greater degree and more effectively during the twentieth century than at any other time in history.”⁴² The intensive propaganda campaigns aimed

at mobilizing the population for war and industrialization from the 1860s to the end of the Asia-Pacific War, and again at spurring economic growth in the postwar period, indicate that despite the nation’s political development from authoritarianism to limited democracy in the 1920s, to militarism in the 1930s, and democracy after 1945 the idea of the nation has remained dependent on a high degree of social engineering.

Scholars generally agree that the creation of the Japanese nation in the mid-nineteenth century transformed the ways in which its population thought about politics, but the question of *how* the idea of the “nation” and *how* national consciousness was disseminated among the people still requires full explanation. In the early 1970s, historian Kenneth Pyle pointed to the lack of studies of “the process of nationalism by which large numbers of people of all social classes were psychologically integrated into active membership in and positive identification with the nation-state.”⁴³ Pyle concluded that the Local Improvement Movement of the early twentieth century, which aimed at “shifting loyalties from the hamlets to the towns and villages” in order to mobilize “material and spiritual resources . . . efficiently . . . for national purposes,” had limited success.⁴⁴ Historian Sheldon Garon observes, however, “a powerful pattern of governance in which the [Japanese] state has historically intervened to shape how ordinary Japanese thought and behaved . . . to an extent that would have been inconceivable” in Western countries.⁴⁵ His study of “social management” through campaigns of moral suasion (*kyōka*), the regulation of prostitution, and the instrumentalization of women’s groups has shown that the state played an active, and not so subtle, role in creating and inculcating a national consciousness. Other studies have highlighted the role in this process of educational policies,⁴⁶ the establishment of Shinto as a state religion (State Shinto),⁴⁷ museums,⁴⁸ state policies for protecting cultural property and historical sites,⁴⁹ the commemoration of war dead,⁵⁰ national ceremonies and holidays,⁵¹ and imperial pageantry.⁵² These studies all indicate that the government and the elites behind it were continual-

ly introducing new forms of social education and social engineering. They engaged in inventing new ways of constructing national myths, national history, and national symbols, disseminating them through public display, with the ultimate objective of generating the support of the masses for the new entities of the nation and the nation-state. This study shows that in Japan, as in other states, “visual symbols” including public statuary played an essential role in this process.

Most of the studies introduced here have neglected visual personifications of the nation and their function in public space. Despite the growing body of literature on the representation of culture, to date no study has explicitly addressed the role of public statuary in modern Japan.⁵³ This gap in our knowledge might be partly due to the strong emphasis on the emperor—the *tennō*—as a symbol of the modern Japanese nation. There can be no doubt that the emperor has played a central role in unifying the nation ever since the Meiji Restoration. He is sometimes referred to as the “embodiment” of the nation, as expressed in the term *kokutai* (literally “national body,” but often translated as “national polity”). Yet the prewar emperor was also a sacred being, and therefore it was difficult to instrumentalize his figure as a public visual symbol. Even in the postwar era, visual depictions of the imperial family are highly regulated.⁵⁴ Chapter 2 discusses the ambiguous visibility of the *tennō* and firmly establishes that his image was almost entirely missing in public statuary. No single effigy of a modern Japanese monarch was erected outdoors prior to the 1968 centenary of the Meiji Restoration. Consequently, other personifications of the nation came to occupy center stage in the national consciousness, as expressed in the installation of effigies depicting thousands of different representatives of the nation in public spaces from the late nineteenth century to the present day.

GUIDING QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

In tracing the evolution of public statue-building and the associated cult of the individual in Japan from the Meiji period to the early twenty-first century, this study examines the differing regional and urban attitudes regarding civic monuments. In the process it will identify the individuals who played significant roles in the development of Japan’s political iconography, thereby formulating a topography of public statuary in modern Japan. Quantitative analysis of these monuments, together with a qualitative investigation of case studies, are the main methodological tools employed in this study. In adopting this approach and scope, the present publication exceeds earlier studies of memorials that were mostly limited to one or a small number of case studies. It will define how the subjects of public statuary have changed over time, how the agency behind statue-building evolved, and how statues were received by the elite and by the population. The main part of the book consists of individual case studies of statue-building that seek to answer questions such as: What gave rise to the concept of depicting personalized symbols of the nation in public spaces? Who and what were the driving forces behind statue-building in Japan, and who financed the memorials that included these works? Was there a master plan to create a nationwide network of personalized “realms of memory,” to borrow the expression from Pierre Nora,⁵⁵ or was statue-building a haphazard process, the result of initiatives by elite groups, local activists, or a combination of the two? What do the monuments to particular historical figures tell us about shifts in historiography—that is, in the interpretation of Japanese history and in historical judgments about individuals?

Any study of public statuary is also an inquiry into the *politics of memory*. The personified “realms of memory” analyzed in this study occupy a significant place in the collective psyche of many modern nations.⁵⁶ Such a politics of memory is controlled by a nation’s cultural and political elite, an “alliance” that cultural historian Aleida Assmann de-

scribes as one “of rule and memory.”⁵⁷ Yet terms like “elite” and “ruling class” must be understood within a broader context. In this study, the term “elite” subsumes not only the government and the forces backing it but also oppositional forces that sometimes enlist a stronger radical nationalist rhetoric in an attempt to become the governing power,⁵⁸ with local actors, and even grassroots activists seeking to align themselves with mainstream political and societal forces.⁵⁹

The construction of legitimizing myths and their public visualization is especially relevant to polities undergoing fundamental change. Japan was one such case at different junctures in its history. Following the demise of the shogunate, for example, the new elites who masterminded the overthrow of the Tokugawa had to rebuild political legitimacy and communicate their recently established order to other elite groups, as well as to the broader population, in an effort to mobilize the people in achieving their objectives. The shifts in the political system that occurred during the later Taishō period (1912–26), which was characterized by strengthening liberal and democratic currents, required further adjustments. In her study of four provincial cities Louise Young remarks that in the Taishō period, “as increasingly clamorous social groups competed for public space and political representation, for access to resources and city services, new questions arose, such as ‘Whose city was it going to be?’”⁶⁰ Ethan Mark has demonstrated that in the 1930s, “producing mass support for a [renewed] radical transformation of the relations of state and society along fascist lines” once again required large-scale political and psychological indoctrination.⁶¹ After the defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, a “New Japan” was built that once again needed new national symbols, thus leading to a renewed rush to build public statuary everywhere.⁶²

While the focus of this study is on the political and social aspects of public statuary in modern Japan, any investigation of statues must also acknowledge their place as works of art because they are objects fashioned and produced by designers, artists, and founders. In modern Japan, however,

the principal significance of public statuary of historical figures lay in their political messages. In this context, they belong to the genre of “political art”;⁶³ one author employed the phrase “art in political bondage” in reference to European statuary.⁶⁴ There was a clear understanding in Meiji Japan that the main functions of statues are political and social. An article in the monthly magazine *Taiyō* (The Sun) on the statue of Saigō Takamori built in 1898 claimed:

Artists strongly insist on the independence of art. . . . Society has loftier objectives that surpass art, however, and when a public building or a memorial statue [is built] in its name, these become the concern of social education. . . . [Public art] moves the hearts and minds of society in general. When society dedicates a statue to a Great Man (*ijin*), this is equivalent to building a school.⁶⁵

As this passage suggests, social education is clearly defined as the primary function of public sculpture.⁶⁶ In its evolution in modern Japan, as in other countries, political and social actors rather than artists played the leading roles. There is ample evidence to show that the political actors, who commissioned statues from sculptors and metal-casters (founders), dominated the process of the creation of public statuary, even in terms of artistic design. Political elites insisted on a “realistic” depiction of the figure in question. Artistic considerations usually were secondary to patrons’ demands for authenticity and “reality.” Aesthetic considerations, therefore, will be addressed in this study only when specific iconographical questions arise, but an in-depth analysis of statues as art objects will not be systematically pursued.

Analyzing memorials dedicated principally to deceased subjects also necessitates the treatment of religious issues. In premodern Japan, burial ceremonies and burial institutions were traditionally the domain of Buddhism.⁶⁷ In the modern period, however, Shinto began to play an increasingly crucial role in ceremonies relating to death, as seen, for example, in the foundation of the Yasukuni Shrine, a

site established in 1869 for the veneration of the nation's war dead. As discussed in chapter 1, shrines throughout Japan dedicated to the worship of individual historical figures have grown in number since the mid-nineteenth century. The development of what is today known as State Shinto further accelerated aspects of ancestor worship (*sozen sūhai*)⁶⁸ and the cult of personality in Japan, including the installation of statues within Shinto shrines. Some of this statuary is dealt with in the following chapters, but an in-depth analysis of the religious aspects of these monuments is beyond the scope of this study.

The potential use of public statuary for education and social mobilization is still a reality today. Some researchers have claimed that the chief objective behind public sculpture in modern Japan was the “creation of a modern cityscape (*kindai-teki toshi keikan no sōshutsu*), not the display of political authority or the cult of personality (*kojin sūhai*).”⁶⁹ However, even a cursory look at primary sources, including official prospectuses for public statues, highlights the absurdity of such claims. For example, in 1909 the sculptor Ogiwara Rokuzan (1879–1910) characterized the increasing number of statues in Tokyo as an expression of “some sort of hero cult” (*isshu no eiū sūhai*).⁷⁰ This was the first time that this term had been used in this context, even though the concept had already been introduced to Japan in the 1880s.⁷¹ Many similar cases will be examined in this study, all of which clearly show that statue-building was intently focused on the creation of a cult of the individual.

The concentration on *bronze* statues in this publication, rather than memorials made from other materials, is simply because bronze sculptures constitute the vast majority of examples in Japan. This bias reflects native traditions and foreign influences in the early Meiji period that are analyzed in chapter 1. Bronze, although being known as an “Olympic metal,” is an alloy usually consisting of copper (at least 70 percent) and tin but often also containing zinc, lead, and other components.⁷² It has been used for making statues and other art objects since the fourth millennium BCE, which is conventionally considered the beginning of the Bronze Age; its in-

clusion in Olympic symbolism suggests that it is still believed to be of high value. The ease with which it could be worked allowed people to create images of themselves, of current and deceased rulers, of deities and heroes. Beginning in the Middle East and first climaxing in ancient Greece, statuary has been cast from bronze throughout history and across the globe. In Japan, bronze statues were traditionally reserved for religious purposes, but in the modern period it became the favored material for statues of secular rulers. In fact, in Meiji Japan, statues not made in bronze were viewed as “meaningless.”⁷³ Monuments constructed from stone, pottery, ceramic, or cement usually had a specific local or regional background or were the result of a wartime shortage of resources.

My investigation into the development of modern Japanese public statuary drew on a wide range of primary and secondary sources. Of particular importance are the prospectuses (*shuisho*) drafted to solicit donations or to apply for building approval, documents supplied for design competitions, and reports (*hōkokusho*) that reveal details regarding agency and reception. These sources provide the most comprehensive information regarding the genesis of a given statue. Coverage in newspapers, as well as weekly and monthly journals, offers further insights into how a specific statue was received and about controversies surrounding its construction. Commissioned histories of villages, cities, and prefectures provide the official view of how public space is shaped; tourist guides and travel diaries round out the picture by providing glimpses into these monuments from a visitor's perspective.

My field research supplemented these sources. This involved an analysis of monument inscriptions throughout Japan, the participation in statue projects, and the attendance of ceremonies to inaugurate or celebrate a statue or a historical figure to which a statue is dedicated. Following recent trends in historical research, I regard public statuary and other monuments as highly relevant primary sources for research. Materials distributed by prefectural, city, or village offices, as well as by associations and websites maintained by local tourist authorities,

also proved useful as sources regarding public monuments in their region.⁷⁴ These sources reveal that the emergence of public statuary is closely related to the development of mass tourism and the mass media, two aspects also addressed in this study.⁷⁵

Mass media was instrumental in introducing images of public statues to Japanese homes. In the past, sculptures were commonly reproduced in advertisements for products often only remotely—if at all—connected to the person commemorated in the statue. Some of the more famous statues of modern Japan were illustrated in woodblock prints and lithographs, on souvenir, greeting and collectors' postcards, in newspapers, weekly and monthly journals, and pictorials.⁷⁶ The variety and quantity of these reproductions may be challenging to assess, but a year-long analysis of bookstore catalogs and the relevant sections of Yahoo Auctions (Japan) allowed me to come up with conclusions regarding the frequency of reproductions of statue illustrations in different media, such as postcards or magazines. This, in turn, enabled me to draw some conclusions about their original circulation.

During the course of my research for this project, I compiled a database in an effort to understand the changes in Japanese public statuary, and this has become a valuable resource tool. It includes information on 2,000 statues constructed in prewar and postwar Japan, including the name and the historical era of the person depicted, the year of construction and its background, location, and a formal description. Previous studies of memorials generally fall into two categories: those presenting the larger picture of a "memorial landscape" based on secondary literature and those focusing on a small number of case studies. This volume marries case studies based on a broad range of primary sources with a discussion of the broader memorial landscape based on a statistical analysis utilizing the database.

REVISITING HISTORICAL MEMORY AND PUBLIC STATUARY: THE STATE OF THE FIELD

The growing popularity of studies handling modern Japanese historical memory has not been matched by overarching research into the political history of Japanese bronze statuary.⁷⁷ There is no comprehensive source in a Western language.⁷⁸ Most Japanese sources on the subject are catalogs, travel guides, and photographic compilations with little, if any, commentary, or in-depth analysis.⁷⁹ Moreover, these Japanese publications frequently focus on the commemorated individuals rather than the statue as a medium for memorialization and instruction; they often reiterate the well-trodden rhetoric associated with the statue's construction and are driven by emotional considerations rather than scientific rigor. One author, for example, writes that his interest in these monuments stems from his belief that "the souls of 'Japanese' are engraved in bronze statues."⁸⁰

Scholarly work in the field of public statuary is not entirely lacking. The Japanese historians Motoyasu Hiroshi, Haga Shōji, and Abe Yasunari have all produced instructive case studies of key statues.⁸¹ Hirase Reita and Kinoshita Naoyuki have likewise published research volumes on Japanese bronze statuary, but these tend to center on the art historical and neglect the political dimensions of these monuments.⁸² And none of these authors include a quantitative analysis.⁸³

Some studies of the cult of personality outside Japan have proven helpful in the methodological approach adopted in this study. Those that should be singled out are Nina Tumarkin's *Lenin Lives!*, a survey of the Lenin cult in the Soviet Union;⁸⁴ studies of the Bismarck cult in Germany and of the history of bronze statuary (and its destruction) in France;⁸⁵ and Sergiusz Michalski's summary of trends in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European statuary.⁸⁶

The general dearth of studies on the cult of personality in Japan may be explained in part by the decline of interest in "Great Men." Postwar histori-

ography tends to downplay the historical significance of individuals in favor of a focus on the social forces at work. This has led to a decline in the writing of political history, in general, and biographies of Great Men, in particular, at least in English-language publications on Japan.⁸⁷ Notable exceptions from the general trend away from researching historical individuals are Ivan Morris' classic study of "tragic heroes";⁸⁸ Albert Craig and Donald Shively's edited volume, *Personality in Japanese History*;⁸⁹ Richard Smethurst's biography of Takahashi Korekiyo;⁹⁰ Michael Wert's *Meiji Restoration Losers*;⁹¹ and Mark Ravina's volume on Saigō Takamori.⁹²

The present study is not intrinsically about Great Men, but it demonstrates that the historical memory of individuals has strongly influenced the political and social development of modern Japan. The considerable numbers of statues erected in modern Japan reflect the involvement, at least indirectly, of broad sections of the population in historiographical debates and in the shaping of the idea of the nation.

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

The ten chapters of the book largely follow a chronological sequence, concentrating on the changing characteristics of public statuary in modern Japan, presenting a typology and outlining the representative statues built, rebuilt, or destroyed from the Meiji period to the early twenty-first century. In some cases, the historical treatment of individual memorials is given priority over chronology.


Chapter 1 analyzes the roots of modern statuary, examines native traditions, Meiji period influences from the West, and introduces early forms of the cult of the individual in Meiji Japan such as shrines dedicated to individuals, court titles, and "monumental biography." Chapter 2 is devoted to the role of the emperor in the process of national integration and the cultivation of a sense of nationhood among the Japanese people. It will look at the degree to which the emperor could be displayed in

the public sphere and conclude that the emperor's invisibility in public statuary triggered an intensive search for proxies that would satisfy the need for visual representation of the nation. These proxies and their statues will be the main topic of chapter 3. Based on the in-depth analysis of the case studies in this part of the book, chapter 4 will summarize the patterns of social behavior and participation in Meiji Japan, identifying agents of statue-building, methods of planning, petitioning and approval, as well as mediatization.

Part II begins with chapter 5, in which I present a quantitative analysis of Japanese bronze statuary, setting out a typology of personalities portrayed in public statuary. Building on this quantitative analysis, the next section, titled "A Typology of Public Statuary in Modern Japan," then introduces statues that are representative of the different categories and that have occupied a particularly central place in the national imagination of modern Japan.

Part III traces the development of statuary in Japan through the war and postwar periods. Chapter 7, "Mobilizing Japan's 'Men in Metal' in World War II," elucidates why the "statue boom" ended in the 1930s and examines the wholesale dismantling of statues during the war period in the interest of "national mobilization." Chapter 8 discusses the statuary in Japan's colonial territories and follows the fate of these monuments in the postwar era. Chapter 9 probes into the re-emergence of statue-building after World War II. Although the Allied Occupation of Japan resulted in the further destruction of public statues, the practice of statue-building soon resumed. Naturally, postwar statues transported quite different messages, but, as this chapter shows, they strongly contributed to the formation of a fundamentally revised national identity. Through an exploration of the differences between the historical figures depicted in statuary before and after 1945 and the values they symbolize, this chapter will also examine divergences in the social dynamics behind statue-building from the early postwar period to the early twenty-first century.





Part I



I Roots

Modern public statuary developed as a result of Japan's transformation into a modern nation-state from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Native sculptural traditions played a role in the emergence of this new kind of statuary, as did firsthand encounters by the Japanese with European public monuments, their writings about these encounters, and the translations into Japanese of Western publications on the role of art and culture in a national context. This chapter will introduce these diverse influences and analyze early forms of the personality cult that developed in the first decades of the Meiji period (1868–1912), such as shrines, memorials, and “monumental biography,” which paved the way for the emergence of public statuary.

NATIVE TRADITIONS

The cult of the individual in the form of figurative sculpture was not entirely unknown in Japan before the modern period, but sculpture at this time generally served a religious, not secular, purpose. Clay figurines (*haniwa*) of warriors and other subjects, for instance, were produced as funerary items and flourished in the Tomb or Kofun period (c. 250–592 ce). The introduction of Buddhism to Japan in the sixth century precipitated the growth of portrait sculpture.¹ Most surviving examples of Japanese sculpture spanning from this time to the Muromachi period (1336–1573) were objects of worship in temples; they depict Buddhas or Buddhist deities as well as celebrated monks and founders of Buddhist traditions.² Among the most ambitious are several Great Buddha (*daibutsu*) statues,³ the most famous located in Nara (c. 752) and Kamakura (c. 1252). Some temples housed wooden sculptures of their patrons, such as that of the warlord Imagawa Ujichika (1473–1526) at the Zōzen Temple (Zōzenji) in Shizuoka, one of the oldest surviving sculptures of a secular ruler. Public visibility was not, however, a significant concern in the commissioning of these statues. Their primary purpose was the memorialization of the individual portrayed, not the establishment of a personality cult.

One historical figure who became the object of an early cult of the individual and also entered the pantheon of “national heroes” in modern Japan was Prince Shōtoku (Shōtoku Taishi, c. 572–621).⁴ His zealous promotion of Buddhism led to his deification soon after his death when he was worshiped as a reincarnation of the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara; this resulted in the proliferation of visual representations throughout the centuries.⁵ Within the context of the anti-Buddhist policies of the early Meiji government, the Shōtoku cult became a highly ambiguous issue, even though the prince was soon transformed into a figure with distinct “national coloring.”⁶ Publications during the Meiji period that testify to Shōtoku’s new significance as a symbol of national unification burgeoned,⁷ and a state-sponsored personality cult of

Shōtoku Taishi was eventually disseminated among the general population through school textbooks and public statuary.⁸ This transformation was possible only because Shōtoku was an imperial prince with direct imperial lineage, and the reference to him therefore underlined the legitimacy of restoring direct imperial rule. But he was also credited with another achievement that would make him even more befitting for a “national hero”—namely, his alleged insistence on equal relations with the “Middle Kingdom” (China), which typically insisted that neighboring countries recognize Chinese suzerainty. Shōtoku allegedly sent missions to China that affirmed Japanese equality with the Middle Kingdom; these were immensely significant to the early Meiji government as they desperately sought to improve Japan’s international standing.

The considerable number of medieval effigies of Shōtoku Taishi attests to the popularity of this cult, and this contrasts the general decline in Japanese sculpture during the sixteenth century. By the latter part of that century, the art historian Mōri Hisashi argues, “there is little religious sculpture of which to speak,” and by the early Meiji period, “true portraiture was no longer in evidence.”⁹ Exceptions might be the statues of Confucius and Confucian sages installed in Confucian temples during the Edo period (1603–1868), reflecting the rising status of Confucianism at this time.¹⁰ Shinto shrines in the Edo period likewise commissioned statues of historical (and pseudo-historical) figures such as Yamato Takeru, a warrior who supposedly lived in the first century CE. In the mid-nineteenth century, statues of Yamato Takeru appeared in the vicinity of Mount Hotaka in present-day Gunma Prefecture, a region that had a deeply rooted, centuries-long tradition of Takeru worship. As we will see in chapter 3, Yamato Takeru was also among the first figures to have statues dedicated to him in the early Meiji period. Late Edo-period statues, however, have to be considered as utensils of religious veneration. None of the surviving inscriptions or local records provide any indication of political motives for their construction.¹¹

Despite the decline of sculpture as an art form in the sixteenth century, the emergence of powerful rulers at this time led to the development of particular forms of the cult of the individual that would also be highly relevant vis-à-vis modern Japan—that is, the cults of the daimyo Oda Nobunaga (1534–82), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–98), and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616). Even during their lifetimes, Oda and Toyotomi advanced their own personal cults through self-deification (*shinkaku-ka*).¹² The Tokugawa shogunate almost entirely erased the memory of its predecessor and rival, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, to create its own personality cult that pivoted on the image of the lineage’s founder, Ieyasu.¹³ He was enshrined as a deity (*shinkun*) in a monumental burial site and shrine in Nikkō, the Tōshōgū, which was established in 1617 and today is a popular tourist destination. Wooden statues at Tōshōgū served as ornaments and symbols of protection, with the best-known example being the still extant statue of Ieyasu himself, located inside the gate, Yōmeimon, in the Tōshōgū complex.¹⁴

The construction of the Tokugawa personality cult was, argues art historian Karen Gerhart, part of “a complex program of visual symbols [that] grew as the government evolved from a system based on physical prowess to one centered around political authority.”¹⁵ The Ieyasu cult, created during the rule of the third Tokugawa shogun Iemitsu (1604–51), reflected a perceived need to “legitimate his [Iemitsu’s] own power . . . through sophisticated messages that targeted the elite.”¹⁶ Comparable to the situation in early modern Europe (i.e., seventeenth century), the art in Japan that developed in tandem with the veneration of Ieyasu was not intended to impress commoners—it was first and foremost directed at fellow aristocrats who were themselves likely to be aspirants to political power. To borrow from Gerhart, this public art was “created specifically by and for the eyes of powerful individuals and, as such, was designed to display authority while shrouding questions of legitimacy.”¹⁷

Similar to the cult surrounding the vanquished Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the cult embodied in the Tokugawa memorials was also ill-fated. Some of

the graves belonging to Tokugawa shoguns in Shiba, Tokyo, were vandalized during the civil war preceding the overthrow of the shogunate and the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The wooden statues associated with another shogunal dynasty, the Ashikaga, who were in power from 1336 to 1573, were also attacked during civil disturbances in Kyoto in 1863. The Ashikaga had long been vilified as usurpers of imperial power, in particular, its founder Ashikaga Takauji (1305–58), who had turned on Emperor Go-Daigo and put an end to the 1330s Kenmu Restoration. Several wooden figures housed in the temple, Tōjiin, the site of the graves of the Ashikaga shoguns, were “decapitated” by anti-shogunal activists.¹⁸ When, in the years following the Meiji Restoration, the new government devised a new pantheon designed to bolster the young regime’s historical legitimization, the worship of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi was revived whereas the public memory of the Tokugawas was dismantled.

The early Meiji government also attacked Buddhism and targeted traditional Buddhist statuary in their drive for political change. The regime promoted a policy of “separating Shinto from Buddhism” (*shinbutsu bunri*), generating a movement to “abolish Buddhism and destroy the Buddha” (*haibutsu kishaku*).¹⁹ Many Buddhist temples, along with their ritual objects, fell victim to this purge and were destroyed during the initial years of the Meiji period. This campaign exacerbated the decline of Buddhist statuary that had already begun in the Edo period and that must be seen as the backdrop to a linguistic change that occurred in the early Meiji period. The term *dōzō*, typically a reference to Buddhist bronze sculpture, was adopted in the Meiji period for the newly emerging public statuary of secular figures. Traditional Buddhist statues, in turn, gradually came to be differentiated as *butsuzō* (Buddhist statuary).²⁰

EUROPEAN INFLUENCES

Whereas native Japanese traditions provided, in part, the groundwork for the development of public statuary in modern Japan, most writers agree that the practice of constructing bronze statues of historical personalities in public space was initially a European custom introduced to Japan during the Meiji period. An article published in the daily newspaper *Yomiuri shinbun*, in 1893 stressed that “the vogue for public statuary originally appeared in the West,” distinguishing between the existing domestic craft of principally religious bronze statuary and the new public imagery of secular figures.²¹ A 1908 article in *Kenchiku zasshi* (Architecture Journal), which frequently had a section on “statues” (*dōzō*), likewise argued that the growth of public statuary was a “recent fashion” unrelated to Japanese artistic traditions.²²

The first direct encounter of Japan’s political leadership with Western statuary was occasioned by the arrival of the mission of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to Japan in 1868. According to the diary of Austria’s First Delegate, Karl Ritter von Scherzer (1821–1903), one of the mission’s gifts for the *tennō* was a marble life-size sculpture of Emperor Franz Joseph I.²³ The statue is said to have caused a sensation and was also shown to the public during the 1872 Shōheizaka Exhibition, a display of artwork held by the imperial household and objects held by the newly founded Ministry of Education.²⁴

Four years later, the Iwakura Mission, a high-profile diplomatic mission of Japanese government officials so named after the mission’s leader, the court noble Iwakura Tomomi (1825–83), marked the next direct encounter with Western public statuary. The members of the mission traveled widely throughout the United States and Europe from 1872 to 1873, and the official report notes the many statues seen during its visits. The document includes, among other things, descriptions and drawings of the famous statue of Louis XIV in Versailles; the statue of the Prussian King Frederick II (the Great) on the boulevard Unter den Linden in Berlin; the statues of the tsars Peter the Great and Nicholas (I)

in St. Petersburg; and the statue of Frederick V of Denmark in Copenhagen.²⁵ The mission’s report reveals that the Japanese delegation was acutely aware of the significance of statuary in the process of nation-building. They also understood that statues were a potentially dangerous medium, triggering vicious cycles of insult and revenge between nations. The compiler of the Iwakura report, Kume Kunitake (1839–1931), noted a particular problem regarding the political agitation connected to public statuary in the case of France and Germany:

Patriotism (*aikoku*) in the Occident is much stronger than among Asians. . . . When the French won the war against the Prussians [in 1806], they carried away the bronze monument from the top of the Brandenburg Gate and placed it [in Paris] at the entrance to the Royal Palace. After the victory [against Napoleon] in 1815, the sculpture was taken back [to Berlin]. . . . When, several years ago, the Prussians occupied the French capital, it was they who captured a bronze statue . . . and carted it off. The theft of bronze statues . . . is the seed of a never-ending, ineradicable hatred [among nations].²⁶

The observations of the Japanese delegation show a clear understanding of the difference between dynastic statuary and the monuments of the modern nation, a distinction that merits qualification. Following a long hiatus in Europe during the medieval period, the custom of erecting statues of historical figures in public spaces was revived during the Renaissance, in particular in fifteenth-century Italy.²⁷ This statuary was limited to the effigies of emperors, kings, and princes.²⁸ One of the earliest known examples was the 1.7 m high bronze statue of the Israelite King David made by the sculptor Donatello (1386–1466) in the 1430s.²⁹ The Flemish sculptor Giambologna (1529–1608) produced several statues for Italian princes and Spanish kings in his Florentine workshop, including an equestrian statue of King Philip III of Spain (1578–1621), which, following the artist’s death, was completed by his Italian assistant Pietro Tacca (1577–1640). Tacca later designed a massive equestrian statue of King

Philip IV (1605–65) that was erected in central Madrid and where it still stands today. Each of these sculptures represents single independent monuments dedicated to an individual ruler, yet the personality cult encircling the French king Louis XIV (1643–1715) eclipsed them all. More than twenty statues of the Bourbon “Sun King” were erected in Paris and French provincial towns, resulting in what historian Gérard Sabatier has called an “unprecedented personalization of the monarchy.”³⁰

The dynastic statues of the Bourbons in France and Spain or the Hohenzollern in Prussia were entirely different from the modern statuary of national heroes. They were not intended to impress the masses; instead, they were built expressly for the gaze of fellow aristocrats or royalty just as the wooden statues of the Tokugawa in Nikkō were for the elite. This would fundamentally change with the emergence of nationalism much later in the nineteenth century. The wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon’s invasions of vast swathes of Europe boosted anti-French sentiment throughout the continent and triggered the development of national movements and nationalisms. In these wars, France demonstrated that the ability to raise large conscript armies was of the highest importance. Without the capacity to motivate the people to “rise to arms” (*levé en masse*), the leaders of the First Republic would have been unable to defend the revolution against the assault by armies from Austria-Hungary, Prussia, Great Britain, and other European states at this time. In a gradual process starting in the early nineteenth century, European governments and military planners began to appreciate a nation’s ability to mobilize the masses through indoctrination with nationalist ideology. The abstract nature of the new concept of the nation, however, meant that it had to be communicated in visual form, among other means, including the use of symbolic personifications of the new community, and it was within this context that sculptures of the nation’s representative figures were mounted on pedestals in public squares.

One of the first statues of this type was the memorial to Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher (1742–

1819) in the German city of Rostock. Erected two weeks before his death as a result of a local initiative, the work reflected the mainstream anti-French, pro-military mood of the times.³¹ Other German memorials that expressed the emerging “nationalism from below,” with a particular focus on the cultural dimension of the nation, included the monument to Johannes Gutenberg, inventor of printing with movable type, in Mainz (1837),³² painter Albrecht Dürer in Nuremberg (1837), writers Friedrich von Schiller in Stuttgart (1839) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in Frankfurt (1844), and composers Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart in Salzburg (part of the German Confederation when the statue was completed in 1841), and Ludwig van Beethoven in Bonn (1845). Other cities would later follow suit and build statues of these poets and composers. In the second half of the nineteenth century, monuments appeared that depicted allegorical representations of the German nation, such as “Germania” (the Niederwald-Denkmal near Rüdesheim, 1883), and the ancient forebears of the German nation. The monument to the first-century leader of the Germanic tribes, Herman the German (also known as Arminius), took more than thirty years to complete after the first plans were drawn up in 1841.³³ It is a typical example of the visualization of “genealogical myths” in the public sphere in an effort to solidify “descent and kin connections . . . with group identity,” a process identified by Anthony Giddens as of central importance for modern nation-states.³⁴ After the unification of Germany in 1871, public statuary was primarily defined in terms of its political (rather than cultural) content and message.³⁵ Thereafter, a growing number of statues of German emperors and statesmen like Otto von Bismarck were built inside and outside Germany.³⁶

These developments, which were mirrored in other European countries,³⁷ would inform the early Japanese discussions about public statuary and coalesce with the native traditions introduced above. Magazines such as *Taiyō* frequently reported on the unveiling ceremonies of significant monuments in other countries, celebrated sculptors at work, and the fate of statues under foreign military occupa-

tion. It also introduced its readers to famous statues from all over the world, such as those of Bismarck in Berlin, US naval commander Matthew Calbraith Perry in Newport, Rhode Island, and “H. I. M. the King of Siam.”³⁸

Meiji-period writers paid particular attention to public statuary in Germany. In a survey of modern art published in 1909, Shimamura Takitarō (Hōgetsu, 1871–1918) wrote that “among European countries, the art of statuary is most popular in Germany.”³⁹ Shimamura, a pioneer in Japan’s modern theater movement (*shingeki*), had studied in Berlin and believed that German memorials were invaluable vehicles in heralding the achievement of national unification and expressing the patriotic sentiment of the people. He acknowledged the artist Reinhold Begas (1831–1911), who designed the National Memorial for Emperor Wilhelm I, the memorials of Bismarck and Schiller in the Prussian capital Berlin and the statues in the city’s Siegesallee, as the most preeminent contemporary sculptor of statuary in Germany.⁴⁰

Shimamura placed a high value on German public statuary, stressing its role in fostering national pride; he was most likely unaware of, or perhaps uninterested in, the criticisms and ridicule in “statuomania” of late nineteenth-century Germany. In 1878, for example, the art critic Max Schasler (1819–1903) penned a critical appraisal of statuary entitled *Ueber moderne Denkmalswuth* (On the Modern Obsession with Monuments),⁴¹ and one commentator in 1901 scathingly referred to a “pestilence of monuments.”⁴² The expansion of statuary was also ridiculed in a 1905 newspaper article, which reported that Berlin had eighteen monuments in 1858 and thirty-five by 1888, but “as of 1 July 1905, at 6 a.m., there are . . . a total of 232 monuments in Berlin, portraying 716 people and 128 animals.”⁴³ According to the *Meyers Conversations-Lexikon* of 1905 more than 300 monuments had been built throughout the country in honor of Bismarck alone. This included statues, plaques, obelisks, stela, and towers.⁴⁴

These critical voices would not significantly influence discussions in Japan. Yet before statues

were erected in Japan in more significant numbers, different media were used to promote the cult of the individual and to construct a pantheon of heroes representative of the new idea of the nation that was disseminated among the population. These manifestations of a growing cult of the individual shall be the topic of the next section.

EARLY FORMS OF THE CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MODERN JAPAN

As the Tokugawa shogunate had replaced the Hideyoshi cult with their own, so too the Meiji government’s overthrow of the Tokugawa during the Meiji Restoration necessitated a new political iconography that underscored the political legitimacy of the new regime. Statues were not the only medium used to achieve this end, and in order to understand the emergence of public statuary, it is essential at this point to examine the diverse forms of the cult of the individual that arose as a result of the Meiji Restoration. Certain of these forms, which predate the construction of statues to commemorate historical figures, cannot be separated from the personality cult that was manifest in public sculpture and in fact were closely intertwined with it.

Court Titles and “Monumental Biography”

Among the simplest methods of securing the reputation of an individual and ensuring their veneration is to bestow official honors on them. In modern Japan this was accomplished by awarding imperial court rank and orders, usually during the lifetime of the nominee and on occasion posthumously, most notably in the case of court ranks. A register of imperial promotions published in 1927 reveals that in the early Meiji period the imperial court bestowed court titles on a sizable number of historical figures, saving many from fading into oblivion.⁴⁵ All of these figures embodied the virtue of loyalty to the Imperial House, a belief central to the Meiji regime’s political ideology as defined in the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo). The elevation of historical figures per-

sonifying these values was seen as a retrospective reward for their adherence, often in the remote past, to the ideology adopted by the nascent regime. Moreover, it allowed these figures to be enlisted for a variety of educational purposes.

The first recipients of these court honors in the Meiji period included medieval warriors, such as Kusunoki Masashige (1294–1336) and Nitta Yoshisada (1301–38), who had supported the short-lived attempt of Emperor Go-Daigo to restore direct imperial rule during the so-called Kenmu Restoration.⁴⁶ The honors also extended to the scholars Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) and Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843), who had founded the school of National Learning (*kokugaku*) in the Edo period that laid the philosophical foundations for restoration of imperial rule. The preface of the register opens with praise for the heroes of the Kenmu Restoration, underlining the fact that those fighting for the emperor deserve their new titles as “models of the virtues of imperial loyalty.” Alongside these medieval “loyalists” some central figures of the Meiji Restoration received court promotions in the Meiji period, including the Satsuma daimyo Shimazu Nariakira (1809–58), Saga daimyo Nabeshima Naomasa (1815–71), Chōshū daimyo Mōri Takachika (Yoshichika, posthumous name Tadamasa, 1819–71), and patron of *kokugaku* and Mito daimyo Tokugawa Mitsukuni (1628–1701). Kido Takayoshi (1833–77), a significant figure in the imperial restoration movement, was the first lower-ranking samurai to receive court honors in 1876. Most of the remaining architects of the Meiji Restoration with lower social status were honored only after the 1889 promulgation of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan.

The heroes of the Kenmu Restoration were similarly advanced in various media, including biographical writings, scholarly historical works, and history textbooks.⁴⁷ Their emergence as popular figures is therefore closely intertwined with the development of historiography in modern Japan. Books contributing to the development of a cult of the individual are usually not produced by academic historians, as they are uncritical and hagiographi-

cal in nature and characterized by a lack of objectivity. David Lowenthal and other scholars of historiography have posited that “meticulous objectivity is history’s distinctive noble aim, . . . this aim never is—and never can be—achieved.”⁴⁸ E. H. Carr, on the other hand, contends that modern historians generally strive to adhere to scientific methods and standards, show an awareness of the dangers of bias, and present the results of their research in accordance with scientific rules, thus enabling colleagues to confirm, challenge, or falsify their theses.⁴⁹ This is surely not the case with the genre of biographical writings discussed here, a genre that we might also call, to paraphrase Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), “monumental biography.”⁵⁰ The standards defined by Carr are irrelevant within monumental biography since the biographer’s objective is the *monumentalization* of the subject, not critical historical inquiry. For Nietzsche, “monumental history” does not serve the purpose of increasing knowledge, it serves the educational objective of providing the living with examples of “greatness” from the past.⁵¹

In Japan, too, controversies about the meaning of history and the objectivity of academic historians emerged in the 1870s, and they were intimately linked to the emergence of the cult of the individual. One particularly controversial body of material within this context were Japanese myths, most notably, the legends from the “Age of the Gods.”⁵² Some historians of the Meiji period viewed these as credible historical sources and the figures featured in them as “historical personalities.” Other scholars were more doubtful, setting in motion debates regarding the historicity of the first Japanese emperor and founder of the empire, Jinmu. Allegedly a great-grandson of the sun goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami, he is credited in myths with unifying the Japanese islands and founding the Japanese empire in 660 BCE, and as such was revered as the ancestor of the Imperial House that continues to the present day. Kume Kunitake, the chronicler of the Iwakura Mission, in his later years attempted to deconstruct the historicity of Jinmu, yet his efforts were met with disdain by his colleagues and sharply criticized by

the “political Shintoists” who were the more radical advocates of State Shinto.⁵³ That Kume was able to publish his opinions in a respected academic journal does indicate that even such a sensitive subject as the origins of the Japanese empire was not beyond open debate in academic circles.⁵⁴ In the educational sphere, however, the question of the historicity of these origin myths and the intricately linked origins of the imperial dynasty were a much more sensitive element of discussion. In the textbook approval process, and since 1903 in the drafting of state-issued textbooks, the bureaucracy has insisted on the teaching of these myths as history. Any alternative approach was seen as undermining the legitimacy of the imperial dynasty. Ultimately, a dual approach to history surfaced in which historians separated research from education; this would characterize academic history and history education until the end of World War II. As a part of this approach, it was accepted that the state had an understandable, if not wholly justifiable, interest in disseminating the official narrative of the nation’s origins through education.⁵⁵ The Tokyo University historian Mikami Sanji (1864–1939) observed in 1938 that there is a “distinction between education of the people, in which the truth as determined by the government must be taught . . . and scholarship, in which scholars freely conducted research and sought different truths.”⁵⁶

Japan is certainly not an isolated case of a society that conscripted founding figures with contested or even demonstrably false historicity in education and in policies to champion the legitimacy of the polity. In modern Europe, for example, several nations attempted to construct historical connections with Troy, the “ten lost tribes of Israel,” and even the sunken city of Atlantis.⁵⁷ In more recent years, academic historical inquiry has been ignored or even attacked on numerous occasions as “counterproductive.” In his book *Possessed by the Past*, David Lowenthal cites many such instances to demonstrate the critical importance of “constructed memories” in the shaping of national consciousness, even though such memories might contradict the historical record. He cites the example of an

Iowa state senator who “was incensed when the state historical society vetoed a bogus memorial to his bailiwick’s patron [Ansel Briggs, the first Governor of Iowa]. ‘All they care about are the historical facts,’ fumed the senator. ‘I don’t care if he lived in [this house] or not; I just want a memorial. . . . Just put up a plaque, say Ansel Briggs lived here, and who would know the difference?’”⁵⁸ The senator’s reaction implies that constructing the memory of a community and its Great Men has little, if anything, to do with historical accuracy. Instead, it is about belief, reminding us of the religious dimensions of modern nationalism, a subject touched upon in the introduction of this study. Historical memory, or heritage, as Lowenthal calls it, thus plays a role that is separate from academic history. Memory and heritage, be it in Japan or Iowa, are intended to keep “outsiders at bay through claims of superiority that are unfathomable or offensive to others. Bonding within and exclusion beyond the group stem from faith, not reason: we exalt our own heritage not because it is demonstrably true but because it ought to be.”⁵⁹

Shrines and Memorials

Other manifestations of the modern Japanese cult of the individual that had its roots in the premodern era include the worship of individuals at Shinto shrines and secular memorials. In its broadest definition, modern “memorials” devoted to specific individuals include simple stone markers of the person’s place of birth or death; museums celebrating the life of a noted individual; and memorials in what are often reconstructed buildings where the figure honored once lived or even sojourned. The 2002 *Jinbutsu kinenkan jiten* (Dictionary of Memorials for Individuals) lists 243 memorials and museums dedicated to “famous people” in Japan.⁶⁰ Most of these memorials date from the post-World War II period—the majority are late twentieth-century constructions—but during the Meiji period, the Shinto shrine was a vital site of the national cult of the individual. Shinto shrines have existed in Japan for centuries, but those committed to the worship of particular individuals were built in conspicuous-

ly large numbers only in the Meiji period due to the rising importance of Shinto as a vehicle for the dissemination of nation-centered thinking.⁶¹ The belief that the emperor was a direct descendant of Amaterasu Ōmikami formed a strong and seemingly self-evident rationale for connecting Shinto with the new political order. In addition, traditional ancestor worship was instrumentalized to foster feelings of national community and loyalty to the state.⁶² These developments illustrate the close relationship unfolding between nationalism and religion in modern Japan.

The interrelation of Shinto with the political order was formulated explicitly in 1825 by Aizawa Seishisai (1781–1863), a scholar from the National Learning movement, in his treatise *Shinron* (New Thesis). Aizawa contended that religious rituals such as “worshipping the deities of Heaven and Earth,” including Amaterasu and imperial princes, would secure the loyalty of the people and result in “unifying the peoples’ hearts” (*jinsin tōgō*).⁶³ For Aizawa, the power inherent in worshiping figures related to the Imperial House as gods was self-evident: “If they [the people] but pay homage to the imperial court, they can do no evil.”⁶⁴ The Meiji-period propagandistic slogans, *keishin aikoku* (Respect for the Gods and Love for the Nation) and *chūkun aikoku* (Loyalty to the Sovereign, Love for the Nation), were manifestations of the instrumentalization of Shinto beliefs as a way to enforce state policies of national integration.⁶⁵

Over time, the term “god” (or deity) as used within this context was no longer the preserve of Amaterasu, the emperor, and the dynastic figures from ancient Japanese mythology. In fact, from the 1870s onward an array of historical figures also came to be worshiped as deities in Shinto shrines known as *sōken jinja*, or “newly founded shrines,” in what has to be described as an early form of the modern cult of the individual.⁶⁶ Hundreds of these shrines were established during the Meiji period, several hundred more in Japan’s colonial territories.⁶⁷

The worship of human beings as deities was originally a rare phenomenon in Shinto since Shinto deities were generally associated with natural

features such as mountains or trees.⁶⁸ A 1912 compendium, *Tennō oyobi ijin o matsuru jinja* (Shrines Worshipping Emperors and Great Men), lists 240 shrines devoted to the worship of historical (some alleged) figures.⁶⁹ The majority of the shrines named, some ninety-seven, were founded in the Meiji period. Some fifty date to the Edo period and only sixty-four predate the Edo period (the foundation dates of around thirty are unknown).

The shrines listed in the 1912 compendium that were established before the Edo period were almost exclusively dedicated to deities of mythological origin (21),⁷⁰ early emperors, empresses and imperial princes (22), and court nobles (*kuge*, 15),⁷¹ with only seven dedicated to daimyo. By contrast, most of the Edo-period shrines were dedicated to daimyo (43 of the 50 examples of that era), and among the Meiji-period foundations, the daimyo again occupy the majority, with 75 of 97.⁷² Shrines set up in the early Meiji period as sites for the worship of daimyo and famous until today include the Katō Shrine in Kumamoto, founded in 1871 for the sixteenth-century warlord Katō Kiyomasa, the Oyama Shrine in Kanazawa established in 1873 for Maeda Toshiie (1538–99), and the Aoba Shrine, built in 1875 in Sendai for Date Masamune (1567–1636).⁷³

The Meiji desire to have shrines for the worship of the daimyo has to be seen in the context of the elevation of the Tōshōgū in Nikkō in 1873 to the status of a “Special Government Shrine” (*bekkaku kanpeisha*). This category was introduced for the worship of historical figures who were regarded as having made a “significant contribution to the development of the state” or who exemplified the virtue of loyalty to the imperial dynasty. This designation was part of the government’s policy to end the ongoing destruction of Buddhist cultural treasures because the movement to separate Buddhism from Shinto had caused the loss of a great many Buddhist artworks. Art circles reacted by pushing for the protection of “ancient cultural assets” (*ko-bunkazai*). Following several years of open hostility toward Buddhism, the government issued a decree in 1871 mandating the preservation of “ancient artifacts.” Thereafter it financed the creation of an in-

ventory of “ancient treasures,” now considered valuable “national treasures” rather than the products of a “foreign” religion.⁷⁴ During a visit to Nikkō, the emperor witnessed firsthand the damage already inflicted upon the Tōshōgū. He was so shocked by what he saw that he donated 3,000 *yen* to repair the shrine.⁷⁵ The subsequent elevation of the Tōshōgū to a government shrine fueled the desire in many regions of the country to establish shrines for the founders of the local domain and to secure imperial support for these foundations as well, in particular, where feudal domains were identified as loyal to the Imperial House.

It was primarily the shrines embraced by the Imperial House that became major sites of national worship. Of particular importance were those shrines dedicated to pre-Tokugawa daimyo who had ruled, as was now perceived, in alliance with the imperial court. The earliest examples were the Kenkun Shrine in Kyoto, dedicated to Oda Nobunaga (est. 1869), and several shrines dedicated to Toyotomi Hideyoshi (e.g., in Kobe, 1868; in Kyoto, 1875; in Osaka, 1879).⁷⁶ These shrines were also the first to be elevated to the rank of Special Government Shrine.

Like the bestowal of court titles, imperial patronage of shrines dedicated to imperial loyalists was also extended early on to those honoring the “heroes of the Kenmu Restoration.” At least fifteen such shrines were built in the early Meiji period in an attempt to expand their cult, transforming them into “national deities” (*kokka-gami*) and strengthening the popular worship of these symbols of loyalty to the Imperial House.⁷⁷ Emperor Meiji personally donated a considerable sum (1,000 *ryō*) to build the Minatogawa Shrine dedicated to Kusunoki Masashige in Kobe, which was located near the supposed site of the Battle of Minatogawa (1336) in which the warrior chieftain had sacrificed his life for the imperial cause.⁷⁸ In early 1868, the imperial government (Dajōkan), announced that Emperor Meiji had given a directive (*gosata-sho*) during his visit to Osaka (in the fourth month of 1868) that a shrine should be built near the battle site to commend Kusunoki’s loyalty to the Imperial

House publicly.⁷⁹ This announcement, which would lead to the foundation of the Minatogawa Shrine, was the first case of imperial patronage in the worship of historical figures.

The biographer of Kamei Koremi (1825–85), a fervent advocate of State Shinto, believed that the creation of a cult dedicated to Kusunoki was Emperor Meiji’s deep-seated wish.⁸⁰ The announcement that a shrine was to be built for Kusunoki was followed by ceremonies designed to celebrate the achievements of this medieval warrior.⁸¹ In a telling reversal of feudal relations and a demonstration of the significance attributed to loyalist figures like Kusunoki, the foundation of the Minatogawa Shrine in 1872 preceded the foundation of a shrine dedicated to Go-Daigo, the emperor under whom Kusunoki had served for almost twenty years.⁸²

It should be noted, however, that by this time, the veneration of Kusunoki already had deeper historical roots. As early as the seventeenth century, scholars affiliated with *kokugaku*, which emphasized the role of the Imperial House in Japanese history, were promoting his cult at the supposed site of his last stand in Minatogawa against the armies of Ashikaga Takauji, the founder of the Ashikaga shogunate. In the 1670s, Tokugawa Mitsukuni, daimyo of the Mito domain and a patron of *kokugaku*, commissioned a hanging scroll depicting the famous scene from Kusunoki’s life of his parting from his son Masatsura (1326–48) on the eve of the Minatogawa battle.⁸³ Mitsukuni even visited the site of Kusunoki’s last battle and “erected an epitaph at the site of Masashige’s death.”⁸⁴ In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, small shrines dedicated to the worship of Kusunoki (Nankō-sha) were situated in Kagoshima (1777), Saga (1854), and Nagoya (1862).⁸⁵ In the mid-nineteenth century, the Kusunoki cult spread to Tokyo as a result of the prominence he had received in the *Nihon gaishi* (Unofficial History of Japan, 1827) by Rai San’yō (1780–1832).⁸⁶ Inspired by these developments, several daimyo in the 1860s proposed the building of a shrine to honor Kusunoki, including Shimazu Hisamitsu of Satsuma domain (present-day Kagoshima prefecture) and Tokugawa Yoshikatsu (1824–1883) of Owari (in

present-day Aichi prefecture).⁸⁷ These proposals coalesced with the emperor's initiative during his Osaka visit, ending with the official imperial order to establish Minatogawa Shrine, to which Tokugawa Yoshikatsu's proposal was appended.⁸⁸

The 1912 compendium of shrines also lists twenty-five memorials of an entirely new type referred to as "Shōkonsha" (literally "Shrine for Inviting the Spirits [of the War Dead]"), which were erected to commemorate the "martyrs" who had died in the civil wars of the 1850s and 1860s preceding the Meiji Restoration.⁸⁹ The most renowned, the Tokyo Shōkonsha, is known today as the Yasukuni Shrine.⁹⁰ Yasukuni was a novelty, as this shrine was not intended for the worship of a single historical figure (or even several), but for the veneration of a large, and continuously expanding number of ordinary people—the fallen soldiers, and sailors of Japan's military forces.

A further category of shrines emerged after the publication of the 1912 compendium that comprised shrines dedicated to modern war heroes. The first of these memorials was devoted to General Kodama Gentarō (1852–1906), who led Japan to victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. One was built in 1918 in Fujisawa (Kanagawa Prefecture) and a second in 1922 in Kodama's hometown of Shūnan (Yamaguchi Prefecture).⁹¹ In the 1920s and 1930s, shrines were constructed for the worship of General Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912), Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō (1848–1934), and Commander Hirose Takeo (1868–1904), all heroes of the Russo-Japanese War.⁹² A famous shrine to General Nogi, who committed ritual suicide following the death of his commander-in-chief, Emperor Meiji, was completed in 1923 in Akasaka as a site of "national worship" (*kokumin sūhai*).⁹³ It remains a popular site for tourists.⁹⁴ Other Nogi shrines were built in other cities, such as in Kyoto, Hakodate (both est. 1916), Nasu and Chōfu (present-day Shimonoseki) (both est. 1920).⁹⁵

The practice of constructing shrines to the worship of historical personalities had become so widespread by the 1930s that some observers considered them an integral part of Shinto.⁹⁶ Their relevance to

the present study is twofold. First, as law professor Hozumi Nobushige (1855–1926) wrote in his research on ancestor worship, shrines and statues were on equal footing as sites of veneration of historical personalities, even though in Europe the tradition of statue-building was more common:

In Western countries, we see everywhere stone or bronze statues of great men, which not only serve as ornaments of towns, but are also made objects of veneration. In Germany, for instance, we see the statues of William the Great, or of Prince Bismarck erected in almost all towns throughout the country, and the people pay respect to the memories of those great men on their anniversaries. . . . This comes from man's natural sentiment, and the shrines in our country come from no other source. . . . They erect statues and we establish shrines.⁹⁷

Secondly, the connection between shrines and statues lay in the fact that many of the shrines dedicated to individuals would later become the sites for statues. In fact, the earliest debates on a government level about the necessity of having statues of historical personalities were related to *sōken jinja*. The inquiry "Regarding the Erection of Statues in Bronze and Stone in Government Shrines," issued by the Ministry of Religious Education (Kyōbushō, thereafter merged with the Home Ministry, or Naimushō) in 1876 questioned whether newly built government shrines should also include statues of the deity venerated at these institutions. The government's reply the following year clearly encouraged the practice of statue-building:

Existing portraits should be used in government shrines (*kansha*) where modern loyalist retainers are worshiped to express their achievements. Where these do not exist . . . the deities should be represented in the form of a Western monument (*seiyō monyumento*). Bronze or stone statues of the deity worshiped there should be built to convey the memory of their merits and virtues in eternity.⁹⁸

These documents indicate that from as early as the 1870s the government not only embraced the possibility of public art that portrayed representatives of the political order, but that it even *recommended* that the administrators install statues of the historical figures-turned-deities worshiped at their newly built shrines. The government's reply explicitly endorses the imitation of Western-style "monuments" and advocates shrines adopting the practice "preserve the memory [of Great Men] for future generations . . . by placing them in appropriate locations . . . such as parks or graveyards."⁹⁹ The ministerial committee charged with considering the question of whether or not statues should be built included several members of the Iwakura Mission, including its chronicler Kume Kunitake and Yamada Akiyoshi (1844–92), who oversaw the construction of several of the early statues built in Tokyo.¹⁰⁰ Their advocacy of these monuments was most likely connected with what they had seen on their tour of Europe and the United States.

In addition to its enlistment of the foreign term "monument" (*monyumento*) in its instructions the government also introduced the term *kinenhyō* as its Japanese equivalent. How *kinenhyō* differed from the Western-style *monyumento*, however, was not explained. The term *kinenhyō* was espoused to describe some of the earliest Japanese public statuary, such as the statue of Yamato Takeru in the city of Kanazawa in 1880, installed only a few years after the inquiry by the Ministry of Religious Education.

The above demonstrates that the new Meiji government supported the idea of building Western-style monuments of historical personalities, particularly in the newly founded shrines dedicated to them. In contrast, the art establishment remained divided regarding the importation of the Western custom of public sculpture. One group, led by Kuki Ryūichi (1852–1931), a senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education, a respected member of the Meiji art establishment, and director of the Imperial Museum (Teikoku Hakubutsukan, present-day Tōkyō Kokuritsu Hakubutsukan or Tokyo National Museum) from its founding in 1889 to 1900, championed the commissioning of public statues of his-

torical figures who could be considered representatives of the nation.¹⁰¹ Kuki stressed the role of these types of statues as a vital means of "public education." In particular, he favored the building of a monument to Kusunoki Masashige and reasoned that such statues would strengthen the educational slogan about the people's "Loyalty to the Sovereign, Love for the Nation," the underlying ideals of which he had staunchly backed from his early days as a ministerial bureaucrat.¹⁰²

Kuki's main opponent was the court noble Higashikuze Michitomi (1834–1912), who in 1900 published the essay "Opinion on the Device of the Bronze Statue," in which he argued adamantly against the building of statues, most notably, the Kusunoki memorial. His opposition to these was grounded in his belief that, unlike in Europe, the practice of statue-building in Japan had no historical precedents. Despite the country's imitation of Europe in many areas, Higashikuze believed that following the vogue for statue-building would be both meaningless and futile. He also opined that Japanese sculptors lacked the technological abilities of their European counterparts, thereby foreshadowing the judgment by postwar art historians that sculpture in Japan had been on the decline since the sixteenth century. For Higashikuze, statues such as the earliest examples in Tokyo were of questionable aesthetic value and harmed—not enhanced—the reputation of Japanese art. And finally, he asserted that the money spent—or rather wasted in his view—on statues could be better spent on the education of young artists.¹⁰³

Although Kuki rallied against the over-emphasis on Western trends in art, even attempting to prevent an exhibition of Western-style paintings (*yōga*) by Japanese artists,¹⁰⁴ he does not appear to have doubted the technical abilities of his country's sculptors. Regarding this point, he was at odds with Higashikuze, who maintained that they were not up to the task of adequately representing the nation's Great Men through public statuary. Higashikuze's connection with the imperial family might explain in part why he opposed public art, alarmed at the prospect of its desecration in times of social

upheaval. Kuki, by contrast, was a member of the civil bureaucracy with no direct links to the Imperial House and therefore felt less restricted. Later writers such as Ogiwara Rokuzan followed Higashikuze's lead by denouncing the statues dotting Tokyo as a "meaningless imitation of a Western custom,"¹⁰⁵ yet the latter's views would ultimately fall on deaf ears, as we will see in the following chapters.

THE CONCEPT OF "GREAT MEN"

Closely related to the rise of bronze statuary and frequently encountered in all the manifestations of the cult of the individual introduced above is the Japanese term *ijin* (偉人), or "Great Person." *Ijin* refers to an eminent or distinguished person, often with associations to a deceased person who accomplished something of special historical significance during his or her lifetime. They are usually granted this status by members of the same in-group—that is, by family members, those from a similar social background, people born in the same village or region, or fellow nationals. In many cases, the term *ijin* is linked to an individual whose achievements are acknowledged and commemorated by his hometown, the *furusato*, or the nation. The city of Kanazawa in Ishikawa Prefecture, for example, has an institution called Furusato Ijinkan (The Great People of Kanazawa Memorial Museum, literally "Hall of Great Men from the Hometown").¹⁰⁶

The term *ijin* was also applied to a transnational setting, designating historical figures universally recognized as "Great Men." This usage can be explained by the origins of the word, which dates back to the early years of Westernization in Japan and, in particular, to the writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901). Fukuzawa introduced European concepts of heroism to Japan in the late nineteenth century, including the "Great Men Theory," which continues to yield strong influence in historical writings, especially in popular histories, until today.¹⁰⁷ Most Japanese writings on *ijin* also include non-Japanese personalities in their lineup.¹⁰⁸ Some even intro-

duced Japanese *ijin* to a Western audience, such as the evangelist and pacifist writer Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930) in his 1894 *Representative Men of Japan/Daihyō-teki Nihonjin*.¹⁰⁹ The 1960 *Ijin no kenkyū jiten* (Research Dictionary of Great Men), a collection of short biographies, has an almost even number of Japanese *ijin* and the "World's Great Men," praising "kings, warriors, politicians, philosophers, scientists, artists" as the driving forces behind history, a testimony to the continuous influence of the "Great Men Theory" in postwar Japan.¹¹⁰ The concept still carries weight in the twenty-first century: between 2012 and 2014 the publishing house Asahi Shinbun Shuppan ran a weekly manga journal that introduced *ijin* from Japan and other countries. The *Shūkan manga sekai no ijin* (Weekly Manga: World's Great Men) was initially planned to run for one year, but thirty additional issues were published in 2013 and 2014 due to popular demand.¹¹¹

Most significantly, the term was used systematically to define a pantheon of national heroes since the 1870s. The first volume in a collection of biographies of Great Men from the early modern period, *Kinsei ijin den* (1870s–90s), for example, introduced readers to the historian and Confucian scholar Rai San'yō.¹¹² A leading anti-shogunate exponent and supporter of the movement to restore the emperor in the 1860s, Rai San'yō argued in his *Unofficial History of Japan* that the shoguns were usurpers of imperial power and that loyalists such as Kusunoki and Nitta deserved praise as heroes. Yamaji Aizan (1864–1917), one of the foremost political commentators of the Meiji period, posited that it was through Rai that "the Japanese came to know the history of their fatherland. The Japanese came to know what the country of Japan was. They came to know why it is that the country of Japan is superior to all other countries"¹¹³ In essence, Japan was for Rai the existence of a dynasty ruling the nation in an unbroken line of patrilineal succession.

Rai San'yō's *Unofficial History of Japan* was not only a valuable source of inspiration for the anti-shogunate movement, but it was also a bestseller and a foundational text in post-Restoration Japan education.¹¹⁴ Interestingly, many pre-World War II

commentators considered Rai to be “the greatest writer in Japanese history,” praising both his historical perspective and the literary quality of his prose.¹¹⁵ It is against this backdrop that numerous *ijin den* of Rai were published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The second boom in his popularity could be observed in the ultranationalist climate of the 1930s and spurred by the centennial anniversary of his death. No statues of Rai, however, were built in prewar Japan.

The incidence of the term *ijin* in books and articles increased during the Meiji period, climaxing after the Russo-Japanese War (fig. 1.1) when, not surprisingly, Japan’s military victories were a source of national pride and spurred on the idolization of the Great Men responsible for such feats of arms.¹¹⁶ The death of Emperor Meiji in 1912 triggered a new wave of publications on *ijin*, the result of a fin-de-siècle atmosphere in which the Great Men of the glorious Meiji period were reminisced within the rosy glow of nostalgia. The increasing production of visual representations of the *ijin*, including on postcards and pictorials, clearly illustrated this boom (figs. 1.2–3). Following an upswing of interest during the Asia-Pacific War (1931–45), publications on *ijin* waned in early postwar Japan but have experienced an astonishing resurgence in the twenty-first century.

Publications on *ijin* were, and still are, popular across all age groups, but the educational potential of stories of heroes and Great Men to inspire youngsters was already acknowledged in Meiji Japan. Evidence of the particular appeal of *ijin* to young people is seen in two special editions from 1912 of *Gakusei* (Students), a periodical for middle-school students, entitled “The Worlds’ Great Heroes” (*Sekai ijin gō*) and “Hometown Heroes” (*Kyōdo ijin gō*). In a contribution to the latter, poet,

writer, and editor of *Gakusei*, Ōmachi Keigetsu (1869–1925), expressed the feeling of living in an era marked by an unusually large number of Great Men. “In the Meiji period,” he remarked, “Great Men appeared everywhere, and even those who lacked some of the attributes of Great Men developed into figures who resembled Great Men (*ijin-teki jinbutsu*).”¹¹⁷ Clearly, for Ōmachi, the great many *ijin* and near-*ijin* who characterized the period served to underscore the “greatness” of the Meiji period that had just ended. An essay by historian Mikami Sanji in the same issue illustrates that the veneration of *ijin* was a part of Japan’s emerging personality cult and that its purpose was to establish nationalism as a secular religion. “The worship of *ijin* is analogous to religious faith. Worshiping *ijin* is about admiring the *ijin*, being obsessed with them, seeking to imitate them day and night.”¹¹⁸

In the same vein, proposals to build monuments to historical figures were often accompanied by his or her description as an *ijin*, serving the justification for building the monument. In 1909, Ōmachi Keigetsu made a direct connection between the increasing numbers of *ijin* and the rapid growth of public statuary: “During Meiji . . . many *ijin* appeared. It is difficult to count the number of statues built for these people in recent years.”¹¹⁹ The link between the identification of individuals as *ijin* and the building of a statue to commemorate them was further exemplified by the publication *Ijin no omokage* (The Countenance of Great Men), a pictorial introducing 702 public statues erected in Japan.¹²⁰ As its title implies, anyone considered worthy of a statue was equally considered an *ijin*. It demonstrates that by 1928, when the book was published, the custom of creating bronze statuary depicting historical figures was a widely accepted feature of Japan’s cult of the individual.

Fig. 1.1 Numbers of journal articles with the term *jin* (Great Men) in the title (1881–2015). Source: *Complete Database of Magazine and Periodicals from the Meiji Era to the Present, Zassaku Plus.*






Fig. 1.2 *Sekai no ijin (Nihon). Itō Hirobumi. Idō of Japan* (The World's Great Men. [Japan]. Itō Hirobumi). Statesman Itō Hirobumi in the series *The World's Great Men*. Collector's postcard (unused), late Meiji period.

Fig. 1.3 Portraits of the leaders of the Satsuma feudal domain at the time of the Meiji Restoration. Collector's postcard (unused), late Meiji period. Running clockwise from left front: Saigō Takamori, Kirino Toshiaki, Murata Shinpachi, Shimazu Nariakira, Beppu Shinsuke, Shinohara Kunimoto, and in the center Ōkubo Toshimichi.



2 How Not to Be Seen: The Hidden Statuary of Emperor Meiji

Even though the emperor was a core symbol of the modern Japanese nation, he is almost entirely missing from public statuary. This chapter discusses the ambivalent visibility of Emperor Meiji (1852–1912, r. 1867–1912) and will introduce the plans forged to construct statues of him. It will elucidate why only some of these projects materialized and why the few statues of him built following his death in 1912 were hidden in private spaces or comparatively unknown memorial halls. The invisibility of the emperor in public statuary was the fundamental precondition that permitted the construction of statues exhibiting a range of historical figures in the public space that is at the heart of this study.

A core element of the national polity, the emperor is often considered the “spiritual center of the nation.”¹ Some ideologues even viewed him as the literal embodiment of the nation and defined him as the “national body,” or *kokutai*.² Proposing to “embody,” quite literally, the nation through imperial sculpture was, in itself, not a particularly far-fetched idea. However, although the degree of the emperor’s visibility fluctuated over time, visual representations of the imperial personage are rare and remain shrouded by an aura of sacredness.

There were several attempts during and shortly after the reign of Emperor Meiji to build statues of him, thereby raising the visibility of his image in the public space. The first outdoor sculptures of the Meiji emperor were not, however, erected until the late 1960s. This section will examine the debates regarding the erection of statues of Emperor Meiji and explain why public statuary of the emperor was not widespread. These debates are essential for our understanding of the development of public statuary and of the choice of figures that filled the void that the invisibility of the reigning emperor left behind.

THE EMPEROR AND THE BIRTH OF THE NATION

The 1868 Meiji Restoration marked a reinstitution of direct imperial rule (*shinsei*), which was legitimized by its interpretation as a return to the age of Emperor Jinmu, the great-grandson of the sun goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami.³ The preamble of the 1889 Constitution explicitly defines the emperor as the descendant of an imperial line going back to the Age of Gods and “unbroken for ages eternal” (*banshi ikkei*), and Article 3 states that he is a sacred and inviolable being. This deification of the emperor prevented his likeness from being broadly disseminated publicly as a symbol of the nation. Even today, ultranationalist activists and self-styled “cultural critics” continue to insist on the significance of the ancient roots of the “unbroken imperial dynasty,” reaffirming the sacredness of the imperial family.⁴

Besides, the bureaucracy of the Imperial Household Agency (IHA, until 1947 the Imperial Household Ministry, IHM) has produced an official genealogy of the imperial line beginning with the mythological first Japanese emperor, Jinmu.⁵ As a result of this ongoing sacralization of the emperor and the dynasty, manifestations of the imperial likeness in the public arena remain problematic.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the emperor was a largely forgotten entity due to the many centuries of rule in Japan by warrior families. At the time of the Meiji Restoration, “the common people’s knowledge of the emperor was nonexistent, vague, or fused with folk beliefs in deities who might grant worldly benefits but who had little to do with the nation.”⁶ But Meiji-period politicians and educators envisioned the figure of the emperor as the “perfect solution for the promotion of [the] participation of the people” in the state’s objectives.⁷ Nevertheless, they usually stopped short in advocating the dissemination of visual imagery. In 1871, for example, the central government in Tokyo instructed the recently established prefectural governments to make it known that “the emperor (*tenshi-sama*) is an offspring of the Great Goddess Amaterasu and an offspring of a dynasty that has been ruling Japan since the beginning of this world.”⁸ Yet around the same time, the dissemination of visual representations of the emperor was severely regulated. Four years later, in 1875, Grand Minister of State, Sanjō Sanetomi (1837–91), stated the necessity of increasing the monarch’s “nationwide prestige,” especially in remote regions of the country where “ignorance regarding the emperor’s new role as a ruler” persisted.⁹ And in 1886, Confucian scholar and supporter of “Moral Education” (*shūshin kyōiku*) Nishimura Shigeki (1828–1902) asserted that the emperor was the *only* symbol that could adequately be used to strengthen the people’s allegiance to the state. He argued that it was essential to cement a direct relationship between the emperor and his subjects through the education of the young and the indoctrination of the people.¹⁰ Nevertheless, all these voices fell short of recommending the use of visual representations of the emperor.

PROGRESSES AND PORTRAITS

Throughout Japan's evolution as a modern nation-state, the degree of the emperor's visibility fluctuated considerably. During the first two decades of the Meiji period, the emperor personally appeared in the public during the countrywide "official journeys" or "imperial progresses" (*gyōkō*). But even during these events, the emperor's visibility was restricted in a manner similar to his representation in public statuary.

Following the declaration of imperial restoration in January 1868, young Emperor Meiji left the Imperial Palace, probably for the first time, and inspected detachments of his newly appointed "imperial troops" from the feudal domains of Satsuma, as well as of Chōshū, Aki, and Tosa (present-day Yamaguchi, part of Hiroshima, and Kōchi Prefectures).¹¹ In the 1870s and 1880s, Meiji undertook a total of ninety-seven progresses that took him to almost every corner of Japan.¹² Many of the sites he visited were later marked with memorial stones (*seiseki kinenhi*) as official "historical sites" in accordance with the 1919 Law for the Preservation of Historic Sites and Places of Scenic Beauty (see chapter 3).¹³

These imperial progresses were an attempt by the elites to place "the emperor, his family, and the military and civil members of his regime, which usually accompanied him, directly before the masses."¹⁴ Yet the emperor's visibility during these occasions was subject to strict limitations. First, he only appeared in public briefly, so that his "visibility" was curtailed in time and space. Secondly, as historian Takashi Fujitani contends, the progresses were not about subjects seeing their emperor, rather they were first and foremost events during which the emperor "inspected" his subjects.¹⁵ Thirdly, those who were privileged enough to catch a glimpse of the emperor were not what we would call "the masses"—in most cases they were pre-selected members of the local elite.¹⁶ Fourthly, even those ushered into the emperor's presence were not to look directly at His Majesty. The 1876 "General Instructions for Those Viewing [the Emperor]" dur-

ing his progresses, for example, stipulated that visitors "should bow down, putting both hands on the thighs, and greet the emperor."¹⁷ Lastly, the "crowds" that gathered to witness the emperor's progresses and the national pageants staged in the capital were comparatively small. Even the funeral procession of the Meiji emperor in Tokyo in 1912, often described as a major event in the national psyche, drew only 20,000 spectators, a number exceeded by the "24,000 soldiers [that] lined up along the [funerary] processional route."¹⁸ This turnout calls into question the importance and effectiveness of these kinds of spectacles. Japanese historian Irokawa Daikichi has concluded that the imperial progresses "inspired the common people almost not at all."¹⁹

In response to the decline of the number and duration of the emperor's progresses from the late 1880s,²⁰ the government began distributing portraits of the emperor and empress to official institutions throughout Japan. According to government sources, these were intended as tools with which to fashion "good subjects of the Japanese empire" (*Nihon teikoku no chūryō naru shinmin*) and to "inculcate a spirit of respect for the emperor and love of the nation" (*son'ō aikoku no kokoro*).²¹ They are often cited as prime examples of the monarch's visibility.²² Undoubtedly important reminders of the emperor's *presence*, their substance was underlined through ceremonies introduced in the 1890s, making them powerful instruments of national indoctrination.²³ Nevertheless, as an object of the cult of the individual, the imperial portrait was highly regulated, and arguably, the most strictly regulated material entity in Japanese history. The result was a highly ambiguous version of the monarch's visibility.²⁴

The regulations concerned the process of distribution of the portrait, limitations on unauthorized sales, and even its usage in the private sphere. First, the *distribution* of "the honorable portrait" (*go-shin'ei*) was subject to strict rules. The government did not actively distribute the portraits. On the contrary, they were carefully "bestowed" (*kashi*) upon institutions following a painstaking process of petitioning and approval involving the Home Ministry,

the IHM as well as prefectural and local authorities. Members of the aristocracy, politicians, and public institutions such as prefectural offices were the original recipients of the emperor's image.²⁵ Schools were granted the right to apply to have an imperial portrait following the 1889 promulgation of the Constitution, even though the majority would not receive a copy until the 1920s or the 1930s.²⁶ A detailed instruction booklet on the handling of the "holy portrait" was distributed to the recipients requiring that the *go-shin'ei* be stored in an altar-like wooden "shrine" (*hoanden*). Locked away most of the time, the imperial images were only visible on special occasions.²⁷

Secondly, several ordinances prohibited the private sale of the imperial portrait. The first of these was issued by the Tokyo Prefecture on March 24, 1873, shortly after the first copies were distributed to members of the government and prefectural offices throughout Japan.²⁸ The Tokyo Prefecture ordinance regulated the treatment of the "honorable photograph" (*go-shashin*), in essence proscribing private ownership of the imperial portrait. This ban was related to the "Mikado Photograph Affair" of January 1872 when the Austrian photographer Baron Raimund von Stillfried (1839–1911) took an unauthorized photograph of the emperor with plans to sell copies to the members of the foreign community. Interested in establishing cordial relations with Japan, the Austrian envoy accused the photographer in the English-speaking press of a "violation of the sacredness of the Tenno."²⁹ Mutsu Munemitsu (1844–97), Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture, wrote to the British consul (at this time Austrians in Japan were under British jurisdiction) on January 9, demanding him "to put a stop to the sale" and to "deliver over to us the original print in order that the same may be destroyed."³⁰

A gray market developed over time. From the 1880s onward, copies of the official *go-shin'ei* of the emperor—the first one was taken only one month after the Stillfried affair—were traded more openly and widely. Some publishers circumvented the ban by selling lithographs that did not use the term "imperial portrait," and the authorities increasingly

turned a blind eye to practices of this kind. In the early twentieth century, the first reproductions of the emperor's portrait, as well as those of other members of the imperial family, began to appear in newspapers and journals. Imperial imagery entered private homes through such mass media.³¹

The government issued further decrees to prevent the desecration of the "holy portrait." These even impacted the private sphere, such as the 1892 Home Ministry ordinance "Regarding the Respected Photograph" (*Shison no go-shashin ni kansuru ken*) and the 1898 ordinance "Regarding the Regulation of the Honorable Portrait" (*Go-shōzō torishimari ni kansuru ken*), both passed in reaction to an upsurge of imperial imagery in the late 1880s and the early 1890s.³² The 1898 ordinance stipulated that the *go-shin'ei* could not be used without the appropriate honorific caption. Moreover, poor-quality reproductions could trigger charges of *lèse majesté*. The reproduction of the emperor's portrait on advertisements, including fans, was forbidden because this would "most likely" constitute such an act; the same held true for the display of the imperial portrait in an unsuitable location. The sale of imperial imagery in outdoor shops (*roten*) was similarly banned. In addition to the above regulations, newspaper reproductions of the portrait must not be cropped or edited in any way, and "nothing inappropriate" should be printed on the back. Furthermore, the copies of newspapers with the emperor's portrait had to be treated with care, even within the private sphere: they should not be hung in the toilet, used to put your shoes on, or scribbled upon. If they were to be disposed of, the sacred portrait should be cut out of the newspaper, placed in a wooden box, and then burned.³³

These rules clearly restricted the visibility of the emperor; in fact, his likeness was, for the most part, *invisible*. Even on those occasions when the *go-shin'ei* was briefly on display, spectators were not to stare at the image of His Imperial Highnesses, or even look directly at it. The 1891 "Regulations Regarding Ceremonies on Holidays in Elementary Schools" (*Shōgakko ni okeru shukujitsu dai-saijitsu no gishiki ni kansuru kitei, Monbushō-rei dai-4-gō*) stipulated that

the imperial portrait (*mikage*) must be treated with the greatest respect and that pupils must bow deeply (*saikeirei*) during the ceremony.³⁴ Students should not stare at the unveiled portrait, rather look down as if awestruck,³⁵ just as onlookers were required at an imperial procession in earlier years.

While the government sought to restrict the circulation of the *go-shin'ei* on the domestic front, it encouraged the image's dissemination among foreign diplomats and politicians from the first years of the Meiji period. Members of the Iwakura Mission remarked that the exchange of portraits—be they of oneself, a superior, a commander, or a sovereign—was a widespread custom.³⁶ They urged the IHM to release a photograph of the Meiji emperor for distribution to foreign dignitaries since they had been presented with photographs of Western monarchs and heads of state during their visits to the United States and Europe but were unable to reciprocate.³⁷ In 1873, Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori (1832–93) lodged a complaint with the IHM, stating that the unavailability of an imperial portrait to present to foreign representatives stationed in Japan impeded his diplomatic efforts in establishing equal relations with the West.³⁸ Given that the first official portraits of Emperor Meiji were released in 1872 and 1873, it is reasonable to suppose that they were initially intended for a foreign, but not for a domestic audience.

The manner in which the emperor was depicted supports this view. Takashi Fujitani has pointed out that the changes to the emperor's official portraits over time evince an increase in self-confidence—that is, as a reflection of the growing desire among Japan's ruling elite to present a monarch who embodied a self-confident nation. The first official portrait of 1872 shows a very diffident monarch dressed in formal court robes and seated sitting on a low chair.³⁹ This image was given to an exclusive circle of foreign diplomats and not distributed widely in Japan.⁴⁰

The second portrait, an 1873 photograph by Uchida Kuichi (1844–75) (fig. 2.1), is a manifestation of the “militarization and hence masculinization of the emperor.” Seated on a “Western-style chair,”

the emperor dons “a tight-fitting Western military uniform,” wears Western shoes, and has a mustache and beard.⁴¹ The third portrait from 1888, a photograph of a drawing by the Italian artist and collector Edoardo Chiossone (1833–98), is even more “dignified, militarized, and masculinized.”⁴² This image was chosen for distribution among Japanese schools, and from around 1910, it also began to appear in journals and newspapers. The second and third portraits were also produced for a Western audience.⁴³ The Foreign Ministry sent copies of these imperial images to the foreign legations in Japan as well as to Japanese representatives, including honorary consulates, stationed elsewhere in the world. Documents in the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) reveal that this practice was highly contested between MOFA and the IHM, which sought to control the circulation of these imperial portraits in order to preserve the sacredness of the emperor's person.⁴⁴

It is not surprising, given the “sacredness” of the emperor's image, that it never appeared in the more public formats—namely, postage stamps, coins, and banknotes. When the Japanese *yen* was introduced in 1872, the British advisor to the Japanese government, Thomas William Kinder (1817–84), proposed to put an image of the Meiji emperor on the bills.⁴⁵ The Japanese Mint also proposed following the Western custom in an effort to better acquaint the people with the sovereign through the currency.⁴⁶ The two proposals were turned down, perhaps in part because even on the global stage, the depiction of sovereigns on bills—in contrast to stamps and coins—was still a novelty in the 1870s.⁴⁷ But the main reason for the rejection of these proposals was the IHM's fear that the circulation of currency with the visual representations of imperial power would constitute a desecration of the emperor's image.⁴⁸

Fig. 2.1 Uchida Kuichi (1844–75). *Portrait of Emperor Meiji*, 1873. This photograph is a variation of the official 1873 portrait, with slight differences in the emperor's position and gaze. Uchida Kuichi is given as the source on the back of the image. 10 × 6 cm.






Fig. 2.2 *Dai-kanpeishiki goshin-etsu no zu. His Imperial Majesty's Coming to Examine of His War Vessels.* Lithograph, 1905. A naval parade attended by Emperor Meiji, here shown in military parade uniform as the Supreme Commander of Japan's military forces. 40 × 55 cm.

In later years, bills and stamps sometimes carried visual imagery of figures associated with the Imperial House that served as substitutes for the ruling monarch. The first and best-known example is the 1873 bill portraying Empress Jingū, who, according to legend, had successfully launched an invasion of the Korean peninsula in the third century ce.⁴⁹ The design of the Jingū note was based on the 1864 US ten-dollar bill, which showed the Spanish conquistador Hernando de Soto (1500–42) “discovering” the Pacific Ocean. Both banknotes were

printed by the same New York Continental Banknote Co. because at the time Japan lacked the resources to print modern currency that was safe against counterfeiting. This “outsourcing” included decisions about design, which were determined by the foreign advisors appointed by the government (*oyatoi gaikokujin*) such as Kinder and Chiossone. The Western origins of the design aside, the placement of Empress Jingū on Japanese currency, “served as an ideal proxy for not only Meiji Japan at large but for both the Meiji Emperor and, in another reading, for the Meiji Empress.”⁵⁰

A significant rise in the use of visual imagery of the Meiji emperor occurred after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904/05). Emperor worship was one expression of the increased nationalism that accompanied the triumph in war, and the

government was unable to stem the tide of publications and visual portrayals of the emperor that came in its wake. Although the emperor remained generally invisible in the public space, he became as a powerful visual symbol in the private sphere. The bureaucracy now overlooked the growing gray market in imperial portraiture, doing little or nothing to deter the portrayal of the emperor on a range of printed products. Depictions of Emperor Meiji, Empress Shōken, the imperial family, or even his more than 120 ancestors now appeared on lithographs (fig. 2.2),⁵¹ collectors' postcards (fig. 2.3), special newspaper and journal supplements (fig. 2.4), and hanging scrolls to be mounted in the display alcove (*tokonoma*) in Japanese homes (fig. 2.5).

One striking development in the representation of the emperor after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War was the increase in illustrations showing him as Supreme Commander of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). Dressed in the uniform of the "Great Marshal" (*dai-gensui*) the emperor became an apt symbol of the accelerating militarization of Japanese society and politics.⁵² With its victory against Russia, Japan had become a part of "global history," and the emperor became emblematic of Japan's accelerating militarization. He was now viewed on the international stage as a "world monarch,"⁵³ and the government endorsed efforts to have him viewed as a symbol of "Japanese Greatness."⁵⁴ Journals and books directed at foreign audiences were encouraged to publish news stories on the imperial family, as seen, for example, in the English-language journal *The Japan Magazine* that often included portraits of members of the imperial family.⁵⁵ And there were no protests when foreign media depicted portraits of the emperor or photographs of his family, even on such mundane items as the collectors' cards for children sold in chocolate or cocoa packets (fig. 2.6).

A further spike in the visualization of the emperor occurred after his death in 1912, when the popularity of pictorials carrying photographs of members of the imperial family and the places associated with them reached new heights. In reporting on the emperor's death, newspapers carried his



Fig. 2.3 Emperor Meiji as a cosmopolitan statesman, with cigar in hand. Collector's postcard, late Meiji period.

portrait on the front page. In 1912, soon after his death, the journal *Shin Nippon* (New Japan), edited by the eminent political figure, Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922), published an entire issue on the "Holy Era of Meiji" (*Meiji seidai*) and included several portraits of the Meiji emperor and the imperial family. A year later, in 1913, *Shin Nippon* released the special issue "The Sixteen Great Emperors (*taitei*) of the World," which included photographs of the new Emperor Taishō, figures from the imperial dynasty of Japan and of Emperor Meiji, who was included in the lineup of the sixteen outstanding monarchs.⁵⁶

The use of imperial imagery went beyond the commemorative to become heavily instrumental-



Fig. 2.4 Wada Eisaku (1874–1959). *Meiji tennō go-sonzō* (Honorable Portrait of the Meiji Emperor). Special supplement, *Shufu no tomo* (The Housewife's Friend), 1918. The emperor is shown on horseback in his capacity as Supreme Commander of Japan's military forces. Note the small piece of paper added to protect the emperor's face from dirt and scratches. 76 × 48 cm.



Fig. 2.5 *Teikoku kamiyo tennō go-rekiyo go-son'ei* (Honorable Portraits of the Imperial Ancestor-Gods and Emperors). Hanging scroll illustrating all the Japanese emperors from Jinmu to Taishō, 1920s. 160 × 52 cm.



Fig. 2.6 *L'Empereur du Japon*. French collector's card included with packaged chocolate by Chocolat Guérin-Boutron, Paris, 1905. 10 × 6 cm.

ized in disseminating what would come to be defined as the “sacred morality of Emperor Meiji” (*Meiji tennō seitoku*). Even today, the term *seitoku* (or *shōtoku*) is used by many kindergartens, junior high and high schools throughout the country. Beginning in 1912, the year of the emperor’s death, organizations such as the Greater Japan Patriotic Service Society (Dai-Nihon Kokuso Hōtokukai) and the Great Japan National Education Society (Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai) released several books detailing and praising “Meiji morality.” In 1912, the composer Murata Katsutarō released the book *Meiji taitei seitoku shōka* (Song of the Holy Virtues of Meiji the Great), the first publication to use this term as a reference to the Meiji emperor.⁵⁷ Another book, *Meiji taitei go-seireki* (The Holy Trail of Meiji the Great), appeared the same year. A biography of the late emperor compiled by the Great Japan Patriots Society, it contained a meticulously detailed description of his final months and the 1912 funeral.⁵⁸

These educational publications included portraits and other graphic materials alongside references in the text to “sacred morality” (*seitoku*) and “patriotic service” (*hōtoku*), demonstrating that texts alone were considered an insufficient means of inculcating the national ideology. *Meiji tennō shi* (History of Emperor Meiji), expressly produced for educational purposes, was released in 1912 by the Great Japan National Education Society; it opened with a series of photographs of the emperor, including all four official portraits and scenes of subjects mourning his death.⁵⁹ In 1929, the daily newspaper, *Mainichi*, ran a “Pictorial of the Imperial Family” (*Kōshitsu go-shashinchō*) to mark the accession of Emperor Shōwa (Hirohito) to the throne. It included multiple images of the emperor and the empress, photos of other members of the imperial family, and family trees.⁶⁰ Publications of this type continued to appear and enjoy popularity until the postwar era.

Despite these developments, the portrait of Emperor Meiji continues to be treated with due consideration even today, as an anecdote narrated by writer Inose Naoki (b. 1946) testifies. During his research on the image of the Imperial House in the public sphere, Inose sought permission to take a

photograph of the portrait of Emperor Meiji exhibited in the National Printing Bureau Museum (present-day Banknote and Postage Stamp Museum). His request was denied, but he was granted permission to photograph an older image of the statesman Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–78), which was, it would seem, of more pressing concern from a conservation viewpoint. Returning to the museum for a second visit, he saw that the imperial portrait had been removed from display. Seeking to clarify why the museum would deny permission to take a photograph, he was informed that although the imperial portrait was under the administration of the museum and its parent organization, the National Printing Bureau, other government bodies would need to be involved in granting permission, including the Imperial Household Agency. He also learned that the Section for General Administration of the Finance Ministry had determined that images of Meiji should not be photographed. In his 2005 book *Mikado no shōzō* (The Mikado’s Portrait), Inose concludes that even more than ninety years after Meiji’s death and sixty years after the end of the war, the emperor’s image is still cloaked in an aura of sacredness—in other words, access to the emperor’s portrait as well as photography of him or imperial sites continues to be strictly regulated.⁶¹

A STATUE FOR EMPEROR MEIJI?

The death of Emperor Meiji on July 30, 1912, marked the end of an era, not just an imperial reign. Under Meiji’s rule, Japan had undergone a formidable transformation, evolving from a peripheral country on the brink of colonization into a leading regional power wielding increased military might and consequently political influence. These developments were mirrored in the transformation undergone by Emperor Meiji himself. In the early Meiji period, Western powers had been reluctant to recognize the “Mikado” as a “real” emperor. By 1912, Western publications were regularly referring to him as “Meiji the Great” (*Meiji taitei*) and placing him on par with other “great” rulers.⁶²

Against this backdrop, the question of how the emperor should be visualized became a matter for public debate in Japan, especially when plans surfaced to build a statue of Meiji. The first attempts to build an outdoor memorial featuring the emperor date back to the nineteenth century. In 1895, the commander of the 18th Infantry Regiment of the IJA, stationed in Toyohashi, had proposed a memorial topped with a statue of Emperor Meiji. The unit's activities during the Sino-Japanese War were widely reported in Japan, in particular its part in the capture of Pyongyang. The "heroic deeds" of the regiment were heavily publicized by its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Satō Tadashi (1849–1920), who had himself lost a leg during battle. Satō proposed the building of a War Victory Memorial, complete with a statue of the emperor, in order to "eternally" memorialize Japan's victory and to commemorate the war dead. He wanted the memorial to be constructed in Tokyo, where it would also serve as the site of future victory celebrations and war commemorations.⁶³

That Satō's plan received a fair degree of attention is evident from the fact that it was taken up by the popular graphics magazine of manners and customs, *Fūzoku gahō* (Illustrated Magazine of Japanese Life). A special issue on the Sino-Japanese war carried a sketch of the proposed memorial on its cover (fig. 2.7). Despite the memorial being envisioned as a site of mass celebration and war-related ceremonies, it was never realized even within the highly belligerent, nationalistic mood of the times. The most likely reason for the shelving of the project had to do with concerns about the sacredness of the emperor's person.⁶⁴ Satō refused to give up the idea for a war memorial, however, and devised an alternative proposal that will be discussed in chapter 3.

Shortly before the emperor's death, the monthly magazine *Shimin* published a piece in its July 1912 issue that proposed the construction of a memorial for the emperor in the style of the Ruhmeshalle (Hall of Fame) erected in Berlin in commemoration of the Hohenzollern dynasty (completed 1891).⁶⁵ The author, Shidehara Tan (Taira, 1870–1953), ini-

tially a historian of East Asia, went to Europe in 1910 to study its educational systems and was deeply impressed by the Berlin memorial and the statuary surrounding it (fig. 2.8). In his article, Shidehara places Emperor Meiji within the greatest European monarchs: "The last emperor was not only highly respected among the great monarchs of the earth, our nation also worshiped him as a god . . . the emperor's solemn virtues will inspire and arouse future generations."⁶⁶ In order to foster the "national worship" (*kokumin sūhai*) of the *tennō*, Shidehara claims that "the emperor must not be reduced to an abstract notion." Instead, his great achievements (*igyō*) should be displayed in concrete ways, preferably in an exhibition that would inspire the people and appeal to their emotions.

As an example of such an exhibition, Shidehara refers to the Shintēfu, a memorial hall within the Imperial Palace dedicated to Japan's military heroes from Empress Jingū to Toyotomi Hideyoshi and including the heroes of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. But the Shintēfu was not open to the public and could only be visited by invitation, thereby limiting its role as a public institution: "If we built an institution of a similar character that was open to the general population, it would be a highly suitable memorial (*kinenkan*)."⁶⁷

Shidehara goes on to praise the Berlin Ruhmeshalle, located in the former Zeughaus (Arsenal),⁶⁸ as an institution that is "most enviable" in terms of its portrayal of the "glorious achievements of past generations of the German imperial house."⁶⁹ Japan, the author claims, also needs such a memorial, where the emperor's memory is evoked through the display of artifacts and visual representations, including sculpture. Only this, Shidehara stresses, will inspire feelings of devotion and worship in visitors. His words are strongly reminiscent of the rhetoric used in promoting the Ruhmeshalle, which was built to "warm patriotic hearts" and "encourage future generations to imitate their forefathers' great deeds."⁷⁰ The weight Shidehara attached to the Ruhmeshalle, known widely for its ornamental statues of Prussian kings and German emperors (figs. 2.8–9), underlines his interest in a statue of Emperor Meiji.



Fig. 2.7 Sketch of a proposed memorial to commemorate Japan's military victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. *Fūzoku gahō*, 1896.



Fig. 2.8 The Berlin Zeughaus, site of the Ruhmeshalle, depicting some of the statues for which the area was well known. Souvenir postcard, c. 1900. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Fig. 2.9 Rudolf Siemering (1835–1905). Model of the statue of Emperor Wilhelm I for the Ruhmeshalle Berlin. Source: Berthold Daun, “Siemering,” in *Künstlermonographien LXXX* (1906). Wikimedia Commons.

After the emperor's death on July 30, 1912, a funeral ceremony was held in Tokyo but the emperor's body then was brought to Kyoto in September and laid to rest in a mausoleum in the suburb of Fushimi-Momoyama that year. Sites to commemorate Meiji were built all over Japan, the most famous being the Meiji Shrine (Meiji Jingū) located in the capital. Although the idea of a shrine dedicated to the late monarch did not go uncontested,⁷¹ construction began in the late 1910s and the main hall was completed in 1920.⁷² Visual representations of the emperor were initially absent both from the mausoleum in Kyoto and the shrine in Tokyo. Plans to build a statue of Meiji were considered on several occasions, but never realized—an illustration of the sensitivity of visual representations of the emperor in the public sphere. In 1916, for example, the Meiji Shrine Support Committee (Meiji Jingū Hōsankai) proposed the erection of a monumental statue on the site of the emperor's 1912 funeral ceremony in Tokyo, but this was never acted upon.⁷³ When a competition was announced in 1918 for a Treasure Museum (Hōmotsuten) next to the shrine, architect Hasebe Eikichi (1885–1960) proposed a Western-style building with an equestrian statue of Emperor Meiji in front of the structure (figs. 2.10–11). Hasebe's design was well received but it only came in second place in the competition, once again sidelining the question of an imperial statue.

The plans for an imperial statue near the sites of Meiji worship were not realized, but some of the commemoration projects led to the creation of visual representations of the Meiji emperor in the public sphere, most notably, the Meiji Memorial Picture Gallery (Seitoku Kinen Kaigakan) located in the outer precinct (*gaien*) of the Meiji Shrine and opened to the public in 1927 (completed 1936).⁷⁴ The gallery, a hybrid art museum housing (Western-style) oil paintings and history museum, serves the memorialization of Emperor Meiji and Empress Shōken. It seeks to “show, through pictures, the most important aspects of the lives of the deities [Emperor Meiji and Empress Shōken] . . . [and] allow the general population to see these [images] and thus [stimulate] eternal worship of their achievements and morals.”⁷⁵

The architectural proposals for the Picture Gallery also included plans for a set of statues that represented the emperor and the empress as well as ten famous politicians of the Meiji period. After several years of controversy, the project was abandoned in 1921, partly because agreement could not be reached on which ten statesmen to include.⁷⁶ The abandonment signaled that visual representations of the emperor, even those intended to be displayed indoors, were likely to remain problematic.

Some proposals to build statues of the Meiji emperor would result in the production of sculptures after the monarch's death. But within the broader framework of the cult of the individual in modern Japan, these statues would not play a major role as utensils of national indoctrination since they were erected in private spaces or in comparatively remote and inconspicuous memorial halls frequented only by few visitors. This underlines the relative invisibility of the Meiji emperor in the public space and is fundamental for the understanding of the development of public statuary in modern Japan. Yet, they are nonetheless an integral part of the topography of modern Japanese public statuary, and therefore it would be instructive to introduce the key examples here.

On August 3, 1912, a few days after the emperor's death, the daily *Yomiuri shinbun* quoted the respected statesman Itagaki Taisuke (1837–1919), a former leader of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement and co-founder of Japan's first political parties, who advocated the building of a statue “for the veneration of the late emperor.”⁷⁷ Itagaki proposed turning the Aoyama Parade Ground into a “sacred space,” in which the statue would be the centerpiece. Such a monument would deepen feelings of “loyalty to the sovereign, love for the nation” by enabling the ordinary people (*ippan kokumin*) to gain proximity (*kinsetsu*) to the late monarch.⁷⁸ The funding for the statue would come from donations collected from imperial subjects across the nation, permitting all Japanese to play a part in this national endeavor to “eternally preserve the heroic image (*eishi*) of the holy emperor (*seitei*).”⁷⁹




Fig. 2.10–2.11 Proposal for a Meiji memorial museum. Sketch (2.10) and drawing (2.11) by Hasebe Eikichi (1885–1960). Source: Takahashi Yoshitarō, ed., *Shōtoku kinen kaigakan sōjoden ato kinen kenzōbutsu kyōgi sekkei zushū* (Tokyo: Kōyōsha, 1918). 18.7 × 25.8 cm.

Five days later, on August 8, 1912, the *Yomiuri* cited an anonymous source from the IHM cautioning against the construction of such a sculpture. The IHM official admitted that the public might initially welcome a “bronze memorial” (*dōhi*) as part of a shrine for Emperor Meiji in Tokyo. But he also warned that in the future the enthusiasm for such a monument might dissipate. If this were the case, the building of a statue or a shrine could have negative consequences.⁸⁰ Although ambiguous, the underlying message was a warning about the desecration of an imperial memorial. This warning—a rare example of a voice, albeit anonymous, from the IHM in a public source—illustrates the ministry’s favoring of a limitation of visual representations of the emperor and other members of the imperial family in the public space. The newspaper, however, rebuffed the IHM’s criticism on August 10 in an article entitled “The Emperor and Art,” which pointed out that statues of emperors and imperial figures already existed. It cited as examples the statues of the “God of War” (*gunshin*) Umashimade (Umashimaji) in Tokyo and of Emperor Kameyama in Fukuoka, two works that will be discussed below. The author further noted that acts of disrespect (*fukei*) toward these monuments had never been recorded.⁸¹ Concerns regarding possible acts of vandalism against statues had already been voiced in the *Yomiuri shinbun* twenty years earlier. At this time, the newspaper counseled against the practical dangers inherent in the emerging vogue for statue-building:

Whether a statue is commissioned to commemorate (*kinen*) or worship (*sūhai*) a person . . . it may very well have the opposite effect from that intended. . . . People with no sense of dignity may well desecrate [monuments dedicated to] the nation-saving deities. . . . If a person depicted in the form of a statue is found guilty of wrongdoing, there will be people in the future who will desecrate the statue or even destroy it.⁸²

To illustrate these dangers, the newspaper referred to the desecration of the grave of Taira no Kiyomori (1118–81) by his enemies and to the decapitation of

the wooden statues of the Ashikaga shoguns in Kyoto in the 1860s.

In a similar vein, Ōkuma Shigenobu, whose own statute was installed in 1907 on the campus of Waseda University, an institution he established in the early Meiji period, had warned about the dangers of statues, particularly in light of the increased numbers of monuments by the opening decade of the 1900s: “In politics, there is constant change. . . . Even though the achievements [of a person] are recognized today . . . after political changes, we do not know what is going to happen [to a statue].”⁸³

Eventually, in 1912, the *Yomiuri* relinquished the idea of a large statue of the Meiji emperor in the public space, channeling its energies instead into a vociferous campaign for a statuette of the emperor for private “consumption” to be sold by the newspaper. On August 17, 1912, the morning edition carried an advertisement headlined “Distribution of a Statue of the Late Emperor” (*Sentei go-dōzō bunpu*):

In the hope of satisfying a widely expressed desire, our company hereby announces a grand plan for the manufacture of a sublime, majestic, and unprecedented bronze statue that will allow [readers] to better appreciate the sacred imperial virtues (*tennō seitoku*).⁸⁴

We stipulate the following:

- The statue will show the emperor in a standing pose (*ritsuzō*) and wearing formal court dress (*sokutai*), and will be modeled on recent reproductions of the emperor’s image (*son’ei*);
- The costume will be the same as that worn at his enthronement ceremony . . . displaying the glory of Meiji art and passing it on to future generations. . . . The figure will be 40 cm high; with headgear the statue will be 49 cm in height;
- Sculptor: Yonehara Unkai (member of the Ministry of Education’s Committee for the Investigation of Art);
- Bronze-casting: Abe Insai;
- Cost: . . . 70 yen;
- Deadline for orders: October 30, 1912;
- Completion: November 20, 1912.”⁸⁵

The idea of a miniature statue mass-produced for distribution or sale was not entirely new in the art market of Meiji Japan. In 1905, the sculptor Takeuchi Kyūichi (1857–1916) produced 1,000 statues of the Buddhist monk and founder of the eponymous lineage, Nichiren (1222–82). Despite Nichiren’s status as a religious figure, these statuettes were equally an expression of national pride, as they were created and marketed to celebrate Japan’s triumph in the Russo-Japanese War under the name *Seiro kinen Nichiren shōnin ko-dōzō* (Statuette of Saint Nichiren to Commemorate the Victory against Russia).⁸⁶

The *Yomiuri* advertisement for its Meiji statuette lavished much praise on the sculptor Yonehara Unkai (1869–1925) and the bronze-caster Abe Insai (dates unknown). The paper promised its readers (and prospective buyers) that the two artists would meticulously attend to the work’s production and guaranteed that it would be a worthy visual representation of the late monarch. The sculptor Yonehara Unkai was well known for making the casts for many famous statues, and Abe Insai had some previous experience with the casting of statuettes as with his 1912 statuette of Ōkuma Shigenobu.⁸⁷ The *Yomiuri* advertisement concluded by informing readers that this would be “the only statue” of Emperor Meiji and an “incomparable piece of art.”⁸⁸ Sold for 70 *yen* (equivalent to 77,000 *yen* today),⁸⁹ this statue was affordable even to the middle class.

Further details were announced on August 26, 1912, when the *Yomiuri* ran a two-page spread on the proposed statuette. Illustrating the emperor in *so-kutai* (court attire), the “characteristic costume of the Japanese empire,” the article also explains that the statue “will make his majestic dignity shine out at home and abroad.”⁹⁰ It stresses that a statue is the most suitable device for promoting emperor worship, as it readily empowers “subjects to revere the emperor in the family [setting].”⁹¹ The article also gave further details about the two artists involved, reproducing photographs of their work. The newspaper soon added a hanging-scroll portrait of the emperor (*Sentei go-shin’ei gosei kakejiku*) to its stock of utensils for imperial worship, which it sold at the



Fig. 2.12 Advertisement for a statuette of the Meiji emperor. *Yomiuri shinbun*, June 4, 1913. Courtesy of Yomiuri Shinbunsha.

lower price of 75 *sen*. After General Nogi Maresuke’s suicide, which the *Yomiuri* praised as the act of a truly loyal follower of the emperor, the newspaper also began to take orders for a Nogi statue that was designed by Watanabe Osao (1874–1952).⁹² Again, Abe Insai was engaged as the caster. Only 18 cm high, it was considerably smaller than the imperial statue and thus its price of 8 *yen* was affordable for a broader range of potential buyers.⁹³

The first photograph of the maquette of the Meiji statuette appeared in the *Yomiuri shinbun* in June 1913 (fig. 2.12).⁹⁴ The accompanying article recounts that the prototype was cast in December 1912 after careful consultation with those who had been close to the emperor and IHM officials.⁹⁵ It was then “respectfully presented” by the *Yomiuri*

Newspaper Co. to the current emperor, empress, and crown prince, through a pair of distinguished intermediaries—the former Imperial Household minister Tanaka Mitsuaki (1843–1939) and the then minister, Watanabe Chiaki (1843–1921). Tanaka, as a known worshiper of the emperor, was also among the first recipients of the statuette, which was eventually released in August 1913 on the first anniversary of Emperor Meiji's death.⁹⁶

The photograph of the maquette published on June 4 portrayed the emperor in the traditional court attire worn at his enthronement ceremony in 1867, but his face was modeled on a photograph from 1909. As we have seen, official portraits of the emperor from the 1870s pictured him in Western military uniform that created a masculinized and militarized image of the supreme commander. The design of the statuette, in particular the choice to *not* show the emperor in military uniform, elevated Japanese “tradition” above the drive for modernization as would have been encapsulated in the depiction in a Western-style uniform. For the *Yomiuri*, the choice of the robes worn at his enthronement ceremony made a tacit appeal for a return to the roots of the Meiji Restoration, the starting point of national unification.

The information in the prospectus confirms the view that the *Yomiuri*'s major aim in marketing the statuette was social education—that is, the strengthening of national consciousness among those who purchased it. Similar to many of the earlier visual representations of the emperor introduced above, its influence was limited. For one, the statue was not a public artwork—it was designed for the private sphere. And given the statue's price of 70 *yen*, its sale was restricted to an exclusive circle of well-off members of the elite who had participated in the construction of the idea of the imperial nation in the first place. The *Yomiuri* project can be seen therefore as another instance of “preaching to the converted.” It testified to the narcissistic character of “drawing-room” nationalism with minimal impact on the general population. The cheaper Nogi statuette was intended to compensate for this deficiency and address a broader segment of the population.

The Toyohashi project of 1895, the debates related to the *Yomiuri* statuette in 1912, and the Hasebe proposal of 1918 attest to the complexity in executing plans for a statue of the Meiji emperor in an outdoor public space. But there were several instances in which cast statues of Meiji were displayed in memorial halls, all of which were, in different ways, connected to the projects analyzed thus far. The first is a set of life-size (175 cm) statues of the Meiji emperor cast from a single model sculpted by Watanabe Osao. Initiated by Tanaka Mitsuaki, the project was originally thought of as a gift to the empress dowager Shōken.⁹⁷ Tanaka used his connections at the court to commission a Meiji statue in September 1912, and the timing suggests that he was inspired by the roughly concurrent *Yomiuri* project.⁹⁸ The design of this statue differed noticeably from the statuette offered by the newspaper company. A life-sized effigy, it limns the late emperor in military uniform, very similar to the widespread official portrait (fig. 2.13). In response to the wishes of the empress dowager, Watanabe Osao remodeled the work more than ten times to improve its resemblance to her deceased husband, and it took two years to complete.⁹⁹ There were major disagreements over the statue's “authenticity”—perhaps the sculptor's imagination was seen as lacking or the empress dowager preferred a more idealized image of her late husband. The prototype was finally cast in March 1914 by Watanabe's father-in-law Okazaki Sessei (1854–1921). Corporations with copper-mining facilities donated the metal for the work, such as Furukawa (which ran the Ashio copper mines), Kuhara (Hitachi), and Sumitomo (Besshi); these firms were involved in several statue projects that will be discussed in later chapters.¹⁰⁰ After the death of the empress dowager on April 9, 1914, the statue was given to Emperor Taishō in October.¹⁰¹ It was later moved to the Momijiyama Archives of the Imperial Household Ministry, where it was stored until after World War II.¹⁰² In 1980, the Shōwa emperor presented the statue to the Meiji Shrine.¹⁰³

Tanaka Mitsuaki originally owned a copy of the life-size statues cast by Okazaki. Since he was al-



Fig. 2.13 *Meiji tennō go-son'ei* (Honorable Portrait of the Meiji Emperor). Photograph of a life-sized statue of the Meiji emperor. Source: *Ōsaka asahi shinbun*, October 3, 1927. 39 × 26 cm.

Fig. 2.14 *Meiji tennō go-sonzō.*
Zaidan Hōjin Jōyō
Meiji Kinenkan hōan
 (Honorable Statue of
 the Meiji Emperor in the
 Jōyō Meiji Kinenkan).
 Commemorative postcard
 (unused), late 1920s.



ready in possession of the Yomiuri statuette, he donated his “sacred statue” (*seizō*) to the Jōyō Meiji Kinenkan (Jōyō Meiji Memorial) in Ibaraki, which he founded in 1929 in dedication to the Meiji emperor and where the work is still on display (fig. 2.14).¹⁰⁴ Additional copies of statues with the same design, albeit smaller in size (94 cm/60 cm), were produced throughout the 1920s and early 1930s by Watanabe and his brother Asakura Fumio (1883–1964).¹⁰⁵ To commemorate the marriage of Crown Prince Hirohito (later Shōwa Emperor) in 1924, for example, Watanabe was commissioned an unknown number of smaller copies of the 1914 statue.

One copy of the 60 cm high version is currently exhibited in the Yūshūkan museum at the Yasukuni Shrine.¹⁰⁶ One of the 94 cm sculptures, also cast in the mid-1920s, was shipped to Japan’s colonial territory of Manchuria and installed in the headquarters of the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR) in the city of Dalian (J: Dairen).¹⁰⁷ Precisely why one of the mid-size statues was taken overseas and presented to a corporation remains unclear. Even Mizuno Hisanao (b. 1907), former head priest of the Dairen Shrine and author of a publication on the dramatic history of this particular statue,¹⁰⁸ admits that he “does not know exactly . . . why the

statue was given to the South Manchurian Railway Company.¹⁰⁹ In 1935, the statue was relocated from the SMR headquarters to the Dairen Shrine, most likely as a result of the resurgence in emperor worship in the 1930s. Following the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War and the proclamation by the military of a “period of national crisis” (*hijōji*), the drawing-room (*ōsetsu shitsu*) of the SMR president was no longer considered an appropriate location for the imperial statue. Furthermore, Emperor Meiji had been worshiped as a deity at the Dairen Shrine since 1933, and it seemed thus perfectly natural for the statue to be donated to the shrine as a ritual object.¹¹⁰ The transfer also concurred with the company’s generous support of the shrine, which included financial donations.¹¹¹ The protection of the statue of Emperor Meiji became one of the three chief objectives of the Dairen Shrine until the end of the war.¹¹² In August 1945, when Japan was faced with the prospect of defeat and surrender, the shrine administrators made the return of Dairen’s Shinto deities to Japan a top priority.¹¹³ Standing almost 1 m high, the Meiji statue posed serious logistical problems for head priest Mizuno. At one point, he even considered approaching, through a Czech national living in Dairen, the commander of a US submarine that regularly traveled between Dairen and Okinawa in an effort to repatriate the statue to Japan.¹¹⁴ Eventually, the shrine personnel were able to return to Japan with the statue in March 1947. Soviet soldiers inspected their luggage but raised no particular objections when they saw—and identified—the statue of Emperor Meiji in uniform. In his memoir, Mizuno describes the situation as highly tense, but he records that the soldiers reacted simply by muttering “Ah, Emperor Meiji!”¹¹⁵ The Soviets had apparently de-

cidated that the repatriation of a religious institution, along with its relics, deserved special treatment, and therefore allowed Mizuno and his colleagues to take more luggage.¹¹⁶ Once back in Japan, the statue found a new home at Akama Shrine in Yamaguchi Prefecture.¹¹⁷ In 1966, upon the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the SMR and shortly before the centennial anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, it was transferred to the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo.¹¹⁸

In addition to this set of Meiji statues, there was only one other effigy of Meiji that was installed in a public space during the prewar period. This work, an equestrian statue of the Meiji emperor inaugurated on November 9, 1930, is in the Tama Seiseki Kinenkan (Tama Seiseki Memorial Hall) near Tokyo, which was originally built to mark a site visited by the emperors Meiji and Taishō, particularly for the purpose of hunting.¹¹⁹ The initiative for the memorial hall and the statue once again originated with Tanaka Mitsuaki; the sculptor Watanabe Osao was also called upon to create the work.¹²⁰

By the time Tanaka furnished the memorial halls in Ibaraki and Tama with statues of the late emperor in 1929/1930, more than 700 statues of politicians and national heroes already dotted Japan in prominent outdoor locations easily accessible to the public. The invisibility of Emperor Meiji had become a salient feature of Japan’s public statuary, the outcome of the aura of sacredness that had been so painstakingly cast around the imperial institution. The vacuum left by the emperor’s invisibility from public statuary was, in the meantime, filled by different historical figures. The following chapters will identify which figures took on the role of representing and embodying the nation in public space.

3 Beginnings: Statues of Imperial Figures

Chapter 2 demonstrated that the use of the image of the reigning emperor as a means to visualize the ideology of the nation-state and the restored power of the imperial dynasty in public statuary was not feasible due to the emperor's status as a sacred figure. The Meiji government nevertheless felt it imperative to capitalize on the prestige of the imperial dynasty and thus staged imperial proxies in the public space to give a face to the nation. Many of the first statues built in the public arena from the 1880s onwards represented figures drawn from Japan's ancient past and its mythology, with a smaller number depicting recently deceased members of imperial branch families, the *miyake*.

These monuments served the purpose of visualizing the restoration of imperial power. At the same time, they also underlined the new military role of the emperor as the supreme commander of the army and navy. To that end, many of the early statues portray imperial figures known for their military feats, such as the legendary first emperor of Japan, Jinmu, the imperial prince and warrior hero Yamato Takeru, and the *miyake* princes who had fought in the wars of the Meiji Restoration. The re-introduction of the imperial dynasty as an institution with military relevance—following centuries of dominance by warrior families (*buke*) in military affairs—was an enormous challenge. But because of the importance the government attributed to the restructuring of the military forces of the former feudal domains into a centralized imperial army, the strengthening of imperial prerogative over the military was a fundamental task throughout the Meiji period.

This chapter analyzes the staging of these representations of imperial military authority in the public sphere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The case studies presented here will reveal local varieties in different prefectures but also similarities in the underlying social dynamics throughout the nation.

THE FIRST “MAN IN METAL”: YAMATO TAKERU

The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was the starting point for the creation of the modern Japanese nation-state. Also labeled a “nationalist revolution,”¹ it was followed by civil uprisings, peasant rebellions, and armed domestic conflicts that underlined the urgency for the development of policies of national unification by the new regime. The emergence of the Movement for Freedom and People’s Rights (*Jiyū minken undō*) in the 1880s would reinforce the fears held by Japan’s governing elites regarding the prospect of further political instability.

As an immediate consequence of the violent upheavals of the 1870s, authorities throughout Japan

faced the task of establishing institutions to mourn the victims of these fights. The first plans to build a statue of a historical figure in modern Japan were mooted as part of the many projects to commemorate those who lost their lives in the bloodiest of these civil wars, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877.² Following this conflict, memorials to mourn the war dead were built in various prefectures across the country.³ This included the city of Kanazawa, at this time one of the five biggest urban centers in the largest and most populous prefecture in the country, Ishikawa. During the Edo period, the feudal domain of Kaga had been a powerful territory, but following the Meiji Restoration, this region had been somewhat isolated from national politics because of the Kaga leaders’ more reticent attitude in the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate.⁴ Kanazawa, after the Restoration, developed into an important garrison town, home to the 7th Regiment of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), and later the base for the IJA’s 9th Division (*dai-ku shidan*). Around 2,000 soldiers from the 7th Regiment participated in the suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion. Most of them were *shizoku*, former samurai and retainers of the daimyo of the Kaga domain, which became Ishikawa Prefecture in 1869. Almost 400 men belonging to these troops had lost their lives during the conflict.⁵

Following the return of the surviving warriors, retainers of the former daimyo, Maeda Nariyasu (1811–84), sought approval to erect a memorial stone commemorating their fallen comrades on the grounds of Oyama Shrine (Oyama Jinja) in the center of Kanazawa. The memorial was intended to “convey the immortal fame of the 390 war dead from the three provinces of Kaga, Noto, and Etchū who had served in the 1877 Southwest War.”⁶ Oyama Shrine, the proposed site of the memorial, had been set up in 1873 as a *sōken jinja* (see chapter 1) and financed through donations from former retainers.⁷ The main deity was the founder of Maeda rule in the Kaga domain, Maeda Toshiie (1538–99), and the site, therefore, contributed to the preservation of the local memory of the Kaga feudal domain through the worship of its founder.

With the shift of loyalties from the feudal domains to the new nation-state still underway, proposals like that for a memorial stone in the Maeda family shrine might have presented problems for the central government in its dealings with the former domains, which had been turned into centrally administered prefectures only a few years earlier, in 1871. After the abolition of the Kaga feudal domain and the establishment of Ishikawa Prefecture, the Maeda family had called on their erstwhile retainers to “follow the dictates of the new leadership” and “to clear the way for [a] shift of loyalties.”⁸ The feudal ties of the former Maeda retainers to their lord, however, remained strong for decades to come, as the 1933 official history of Ishikawa Prefecture explicitly points out.⁹

Against this backdrop, the Tokyo government was unsettled when former daimyo Maeda Nariyasu and his grandson Toshitsugu called upon their retainers to join the forces mustered in Kanazawa to suppress the Satsuma Rebellion. The regime saw this both as a sign of commitment to the new government and as a troubling continuation of feudal loyalties. The central government responded by sending a letter to the Maeda, signed by the influential court noble Iwakura Tomomi, that reminded them that their involvement might be misconstrued as a reactivation of “outdated [i.e. feudal] bonds.”¹⁰ This considered, it is not surprising that requests by former residents of Kanazawa now living in Tokyo to elevate the Oyama Shrine from the status of a local shrine (*gōsha*) to a Special Government Shrine (*bekkaku kanpeisha*) were repeatedly denied.¹¹

Despite these complications, the former samurai from Kaga joined the IJA in the fight to defend the central government, demonstrating their loyalty to the new regime. An inscription was drafted in unambiguous terms so as to avert any misunderstanding that the construction of a memorial stone for the fallen in the Maeda family shrine and financed by the former daimyo¹² was meant an expression of a “residue of respect for the Maeda family”:¹³

The warriors from Ishikawa Prefecture followed the imperial military forces, and several thousand of

them went to suppress the uprisings in Higo, Satsuma, Ōsumi, Hyūga, and Bungo [provinces], where 390 of them lost their lives. They knew only their country (*kuni*) and sacrificed their bodies [lives], demonstrating a praiseworthy loyalty (*chūsetsu*).¹⁴

Until 1871 the term *kuni* referred to individual feudal domains, but its connotation in this passage almost certainly reflected the fallen soldiers’ commitment to the new nation-state rather than a reconfirmation of past feudal bonds. And this was also how it was widely understood. The central government and its offices in Kanazawa therefore did not contest the Memorial for the Loyal War Dead of Ishikawa Prefecture (Ishikawa-ken Senshishi Jinchūhi), eventually unveiled in September 1878. It became a site where local and national themes coalesced through the reconciliation of the memory of the former feudal domain with the demands of the new nation-state.¹⁵

In spring 1880, representatives of the central government in Kanazawa commissioned another memorial to the war dead in an effort to dispel any lingering ambiguity embodied in the memorial at Oyama Shrine and to assert imperial power in the city’s public sphere. The proposal, drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Yamaguchi Motoomi (1846–1906), recently appointed commander of the IJA troops stationed in Kanazawa, envisioned a memorial complex that would include a bronze statue of a figure representing the imperial dynasty: the imperial prince and warrior hero Yamato Takeru whose feats were celebrated in Japanese mythology and chronicled in the eighth-century annals *Nihon shoki* and *Kojiki*.¹⁶ Chisaka Takamasa (1841–1912), the governor of Ishikawa Prefecture since February 1879, supported the project, not least because he himself had served in the military forces suppressing the Satsuma Rebellion and sympathized with the idea of commemorating those who had died in the conflict.¹⁷

A native of Yonezawa domain (present-day Yamagata Prefecture), Chisaka might also have been hoping to improve his position within the prefectural administration. Since the early Edo period, the feudal domains had been governed and admin-

istered by small groups of families with local roots, and the installation of representatives of the central government as prefectural governors following the abolition of the domains was not universally welcomed. Chisaka's colleagues in the Home Ministry, and even the minister himself, complained about his strong regional dialect and their inability to understand him.¹⁸ His position in Kanazawa as a Yonezawa native must have been on occasion insecure, to say the least.

Another reason for Chisaka's advocacy of the IJA's plans for a monument to the war dead was the assassination of Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–78), during this period a dominant figure in the central government,¹⁹ in May 1878 and the Takebashi Rebellion by units of the IJA stationed in Tokyo in August 1878. For the ruling elite, both events only served to deepen a sense of crisis and conjured up the possibility of further domestic conflict.²⁰ At the time of Ōkubo's assassination, Chisaka was still employed at the Home Ministry, and Ōkubo was his superior. Chisaka had joined the staff of the Home Ministry in 1875, following his return from a trip to Europe with his former lord, Uesugi Mochinori (1844–1919).²¹ He continued to work there, except for a hiatus for military service during the Satsuma Rebellion, until 1879, when he was appointed the governor of Ishikawa. News of schemes to assassinate Ōkubo reached Chisaka in early 1878 when he was still at the ministry. He informed Metropolitan Police Chief Kawaji Toshiyoshi (1829–79) of the plot, but Kawaji ignored his warning, expressing disdain for the mastermind behind the plot, Shimada Ichirō (1848–78), a native of Ishikawa.

In what can be seen as an ironic twist, Chisaka was appointed governor of Ishikawa immediately after Ōkubo's assassination; he now saw a chance to reinforce the authority of the central government in the region that was the birthplace of Ōkubo's assassin. Plans to build a statue representing the imperial dynasty must have met with Chisaka's approval since he was a representative of the imperial government. Seeking to strengthen their voice in national affairs, the local elite also appreciated these plans.²²

The idea to build a statue of Yamato Takeru was revolutionary because this was the first such monument to be realized since the government's 1877 recommendation to build "Bronze and Stone Monuments in Government Shrines" (see chapter 1). It was also a key public demonstration of the marriage of Japan's ancient mythology with the historiography of the modern nation-state. As noted earlier, the imperial prince Yamato Takeru had been the object of *religious* worship in some parts of Japan since the premodern era, and at least one statue of him had already been built, near the top of Mount Hotaka in Gunma Prefecture.²³ Now, however, his image was to be enlisted for the first time for *political* purposes as a symbol of the new regime and the restored power of the Imperial House. His transposition from the religious to the political invites parallels to the restoration of imperial power, whose role for centuries had been restricted to ritual functions.

Whether Yamato can be considered an actual historical personality is an open question. Japanese myths are no longer regarded as reliable historical sources, although some scholars maintain that they contain valuable kernels of truth about the history of the Japanese islands during an era when written records did not exist. Ivan Morris, for example, believes that Yamato Takeru "is no single historical personage but a composite figure,"²⁴ thus acknowledging the capacity of mythology to represent certain historical developments. Several "biographies" of Yamato Takeru appeared over the last century or so, with the first issued in 1908.²⁵ The wartime years saw a boom in publications on him, and from 1935 to 1945, he was the subject of at least a dozen works.

Even in postwar historiography, the line between mythology and historiography is blurred. Pseudo-biographical studies dealing with the ancient hero were released in 1953 and 1960;²⁶ the latter appeared in the "Historical Figures Series" (*Jinbutsu sōsho*) issued by the respected academic publisher Yoshikawa Kōbunkan and edited by the Japan History Association (Nihon Rekishi Gakkai). It was re-issued in several new editions until the 1990s.²⁷ In his preface, the author Ueda Masaaki asks "Is Yamato Takeru a historical figure who re-

ally existed?” to which a clear answer is not offered.²⁸ The inclusion of a biography of Yamato Takeru in the series, however, means that at least some consider him a real historical personality.

It is beyond the scope of this study to resolve the open question regarding the historicity of the figure of Yamato Takeru. What is important to remember, however, is that in the Meiji period Yamato and others like him were considered historical personages.²⁹ When the image of Yamato Takeru was cast in bronze in 1880 and the statue erected in a public space in Kanazawa, any doubts concerning his historicity were dismissed. Simply put, the erection of his statue served to confirm the historicity of Yamato Takeru, in particular, and Japan’s ancient mythological heritage, in general.

The lingering question is why Yamato Takeru was selected for a memorial to commemorate the Satsuma Rebellion war dead in Kanazawa. Usually, the choice of a specific person or site for a monument requires some proof of authenticity. However, the connections between Yamato Takeru and Kanazawa are tenuous, and the explanations offered by the statue’s commissioning body were far-fetched.³⁰ One reason was that the ancient hero allegedly fought rebellious tribes in the south of Kyushu (the Kumaso), drawing a parallel with the Kanazawa units that had participated in the suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion in southern Kyushu. Another justification for picking Yamato Takeru came from a passage in the mythological texts insinuating that during a campaign in eastern Japan, fighters from what would later be the Kaga domain had joined Yamato Takeru’s forces—that is, as members of an early imperial military.³¹

Neither reason is compelling, nor do they explain why a memorial to IJA soldiers from Kanazawa should have a statue of Yamato Takeru. Conclusive evidence is lacking, but it is likely that Kanazawa elites, aware of the taboo on visual depictions of the Meiji emperor in the public sphere or rebuffed in their deliberations with the Imperial Household Ministry (IHM), settled on Yamato Takeru, a relatively well-known military hero with an imperial background, as a proxy for Emperor Meiji.

Since the IJA played a dominant role in the planning of the memorial, it can be assumed that it voiced a preference for an imperial and a military figure like Yamato, who was the son of Emperor Keikō and the commander of several military campaigns. In some of the biographies mentioned above, he is called the “Imperial Shogun” (*kōzoku shōgun*), underlining the military authority of the dynasty.³² The portrayal of Yamato Takeru as a warrior with a sword in hand must have appeared as a highly effective way to personify and symbolize the “historical tradition” of the Imperial House’s supreme command of the military, and, in turn, enhancing the prestige of the IJA.

The military was extremely conscious of the various functions that such a statue could perform. In a letter to the IHM dated August 28, 1880, Lieutenant Colonel Yamaguchi stated that the memorial would assist in consoling bereaved families as well as commemorating the fallen soldiers, and ensure the loyalty of the local elites to the new central government. He further noted that the statue “will be an instrument to educate the living” in terms of loyalty to the emperor,³³ alluding to its educational function and its potential influence on wider society. Even at this early stage, the elites involved in the commissioning of this first public statue were keenly aware of the pedagogical role of this kind of public monument and its prospects as a tool in the dissemination of nationalist ideology.

In order to maximize its effectiveness in terms of social education, the 12 m high monument (the statue 5.5 m high and 8 tons heavy, see fig. 3.1) of Yamato Takeru was erected in Kenrokuen, a public park in the center of Kanazawa.³⁴ Counted as one of the three most famous examples of Japanese garden design, Kenrokuen functioned as an extension of the daimyo’s castle until the end of the Edo period.³⁵ It became one of the first public parks (*kōen*) in Japan in 1874, in accordance with the Dajōkan (Grand Council) Ordinance No. 16 of January 15, 1873, that mandated the creation of public parks and assembly places for the people.³⁶ Thomas Havens asserts that the Japanese government identified parks as vital instruments in its agenda of national integration but



Fig. 3.1 (*Kanazawa Kenroku kōen*) *Meiji kinenhyō*.
Kenroku Park Kanazawa. Souvenir postcard
(unused), late Meiji period.

also for the development of tourism, the promotion of health and hygiene, and for recreation.³⁷ These new public spaces were established on formerly private property abandoned by or confiscated from their former feudal owners or religious institutions. Following the precedent set by Kenrokuen in 1880, many of the eighty-two parks created after the 1873 Ordinance became sites for early statues in modern Japan. Kenrokuen became the site of Japan's first public statue. It also evolved into an important recreational area for city dwellers and a site for war commemoration,³⁸ being easily accessible to IJA troops stationed in nearby Kanazawa Castle.

One year after the installation of the Yamato Takeru monument, the memorial stone set up at Oyama Shrine in 1878 was moved to Kenrokuen

and placed next to the imperial statue. This served to weaken any local associations and to strengthen the national-imperial narrative.³⁹ Further memorial stones with inscriptions were added in later years. Some of these ascribed personal responsibility to the rebellion's figurehead, Saigō Takamori (1828–77), for the deaths of the 390 former samurai from the Kaga domain. Others listed the names of those who had died in Kyushu or the names of donors.⁴⁰

The official name of the entire memorial complex, *Meiji kinen no hyō* (Meiji Memorial), was inscribed on the statue's stone base and contributed by Prince Arisugawa Taruhito (1835–95), the commander of the government troops that suppressed the Satsuma Rebellion and later IJA Chief of General Staff.⁴¹ The prince's involvement may be explained by the family connection with the Maeda family,⁴² but the inscription also intended to elevate the presence of the Imperial House at the memorial site and to underline the military authority of the imperial family. In the official histories of Kanazawa,



Fig. 3.2 Hirose Yosaku. *Meiji kinenhyō shinchiku taisai no zu* (Illustration of the Great Festival [to Celebrate] the Erection of the Meiji Memorial), October 18, 1880. Black-line only woodblock print depicting the inauguration ceremony of the statue of Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa's Kenrokuen. Courtesy of Kanazawa Shiritsu Tamagawa Toshokan (Kanazawa City Tamagawa Library). 40 × 55 cm.

Arisugawa's inscription is always mentioned first, followed by a description of the Yamato Takeru statue, so as to demonstrate the inscription's position as the centerpiece of this memorial.⁴³ The naming of the complex as the *Meiji Memorial* invoked the presence of the current emperor, even though he remained invisible in physical form. The choice of the memorial's name, together with the imperial inscription by Prince Arisugawa and the sculpture of Yamato Takeru, doubtlessly served to link Kanazawa to national politics and the imperial government in Tokyo, to visualize the new imperial authority, and to make it tangible to ordinary people.

The memorial's instigators contacted the IHM at an early stage in order to gain approval for the usage of imperial imagery. The ministry supported the project, and in response to Yamaguchi Motoomi's aforementioned letter donated 100 *yen* from

the emperor's private treasury to finance the statue. This sum paled against the 700 *yen* given by Maeda Nariyasu and the 2,000 *yen* donated by the Buddhist Higashi Honganji tradition (Ōtani-ha) of Jōdo Shinshū (True Pure Land), but the symbolic value of the imperial contribution can hardly be overestimated.⁴⁴ It was a precedent that greatly influenced the evolution of public statuary in subsequent years.

The erection of the Yamato Takeru statue illustrates the desire by various social groups to participate in the building of national unity following the civil war of 1877 and in response to the shift of political loyalties from the local to the national level. A funding campaign for the statue launched in the summer of 1880 illustrates this development. A call for donations issued in June stressed that the fallen soldiers to be commemorated had sacrificed their lives in an effort to secure the future of those left behind and that it was imperative to console their spirits and preserve the memory of their "loyalty" (*chūgi*) for eternity.⁴⁵ The wording left some room for ambiguity as to whether *chūgi* meant loyalty to the emperor or a former daimyo, but the proposal for a statue of an *imperial* figure intimated that allegiance to the Imperial House was the primary motif. Donations were received both from Ishikawa Prefecture and other parts of Japan.⁴⁶ Donors were not limited to a specific social class, such as the aristocracy, as many commoners who apparently shared the enthusiasm for this new kind of "national monument," also contributed.

The majority of the donations were used to fund the casting. Later critics argued that Japanese sculptors lacked the skills to mount a confident program of public statuary, but no criticism was leveled against the quality or the design of the Yamato Takeru statue following its unveiling in October 1880. This might have been related to the fact that Kanazawa is located 50 km southwest of the city of Takaoka, a center of bronze-casting still celebrated for its bronze products, in particular, its tea-ceremony kettles. Statues are still cast there in large numbers.⁴⁷ The family of the well-known sculptor of the Yamato Takeru statue, Sasaki Senryū (1808–

84), had worked for the Kaga domain for generations.⁴⁸ The proximity of bronze-casting technology also ensured the expeditious completion of the project: first proposed in spring 1880, the statue was erected in Kenrokuen only several months later and unveiled in October. This timeline is in stark contrast to later projects, many of which were commissioned shortly after the building of Yamato Takeru statue but not finished until the 1890s.

The unveiling festivities, which ran over five days from October 26 to October 30, 1880, became the template for later events of this kind. The ceremony forcefully demonstrated the character of the memorial as a "national project." The diverse groups that had made contributions to the project were well represented at the unveiling ceremony, as one contemporaneous woodblock print illustrates (fig. 3.2).⁴⁹ The image depicts the representatives of the organizations who initiated the project: the governor and members of the military (on the right) and priests from the Higashi Honganji and the Nishi Honganji branches of the esoteric Buddhist Jōdo Shinshū tradition that dominated Buddhism in Ishikawa prefecture (in the center). These two religious bodies demonstrated their loyalty to the new political order through their support of this monument.⁵⁰ Although Yamato Takeru was generally considered a Shinto, not a Buddhist, deity, it was his role as a symbol of national unity and imperial power that allowed them to rally behind the statue project.

The Yamato statue should also be seen within a global context. There was a vogue for similar commemorative events around the same period in Europe and the United States that included the creation of public monuments as mnemonic devices. These developments were duly noted in Japan. Art historian Kitazawa Noriaki has speculated that Chisaka Takamasa's experience of studying in Italy from 1873 to 1874 as an advisor to Uesugi Mochinori, the last daimyo of the Yonezawa feudal domain, may have reinforced his interest in public statuary and commemorative sculpture, thereby contributing to his involvement in the Yamato Takeru statue project.⁵¹

In later years, the Yamato Takeru statue became a principal site in Kanazawa's urban ceremonial space, most notably for events related to the imperial military. Even though, in 1870, the city of Kanazawa built a Shōkonsha,⁵² a shrine dedicated to the war dead, most commemorative events such as the *shōkonsai* (Festival for Inviting the Spirits of the War Dead) were held in front of the Yamato Takeru statue in Kenrokuen.⁵³ The fact that the Shōkonsha was located outside the city in the Utatsuyama hills meant that it was more convenient for local people, as well as for the IJA units stationed in the former castle, to attend a *shōkonsai* in Kenrokuen rather than at the more remote Shōkonsha. The central location of the statue made it better suited in the inculcation of nationalism than the shrine dedicated to the war dead. This was explicitly stated in contemporary documents regarding the purpose of the military ceremonies there: the statue symbolizing the imperial command of Japan's military forces was intended to contribute to the “promotion of the values of loyalty and bravery.”⁵⁴

Holding the *shōkonsai* in a park also allowed broader social participation in this ceremony. The Jōdo Shinshū tradition of Buddhism is particularly strong in this region, and having the *shōkonsai* in the neutral territory of a public park, and not a Shinto shrine, allowed Buddhists of all traditions to join in freely.⁵⁵ In 1935, however, the Shōkonsha was relocated to a site adjacent to the Kenrokuen. It was later renamed Gokoku Jinja (“Country-protecting Shrine”), and until the end of World War II commemoration ceremonies in the city took place on the shrine precincts rather than in the Kenrokuen.⁵⁶

Apart from its ceremonial value, the Yamato Takeru statue also became a much-visited tourist site. Souvenir postcards with photos of the sculpture were sold in huge quantities and are still easily found in second-hand book stores and internet auctions, clearly an indication of their wide circulation.⁵⁷ One of the earliest tourist guides to Kanazawa, published in 1894, included an image of the statue (fig. 3.3),⁵⁸ as did prewar pamphlets and visitor maps of the park.⁵⁹ A booklet from 1902 featured songs associated with the Kenrokuen, some of which de-



Fig. 3-3 Statue of Yamato Takeru in Kenrokuen, Kanazawa. Illustration in a tourist guide to Kanazawa. Kumoda Heitarō, *Kanazawa shiqai doku annai* (Kanazawa: Yanagida Iwatarō, 1894).

scribed the statue as a major attraction in the park, and this contributed, in turn, to its growing popularity beyond Kanazawa.⁶⁰ During the Taishō period, local historians developed a particular interest in the statue when the Association to Discuss the History of Kaga-Etchū-Noto (Ka-Etsu-No Shidankai) began collecting relevant historical sources including tourist pamphlets promoting the Kenrokuen and the Yamato Takeru sculpture.⁶¹

In 1922, Kenrokuen was declared an official *meishō* (a place of scenic beauty) following the promulgation of the 1919 Law for the Preservation of Historic Sites and Places of Scenic Beauty.⁶² This ensured added prominence for the park and its famous statue. But the Yamato Takeru monument sometimes was also the subject of debate, with some later critics even demanding its removal.⁶³ Among the issues contested was the hero's sword, a samurai weapon that was criticized for its inauthenticity. Others objected to the fact that Yamato Takeru, as a figure with associations to Shinto, was portrayed in a style strongly reminiscent of Buddhist sculpture. This was hardly surprising given that the tradition of bronze-casting in Takaoka had

long been linked to the production of Buddhist statuary, but it unsettled Shinto fundamentalists as much as devout Buddhists.⁶⁴

The most searing criticism of this statue, one probably not circulated in Japan, was by Austrian painter Adolf Fischer (1856–1908) in his 1900 book *Wandlungen im Kunstleben Japans* (Transformations in Japan's Art Life). Fischer delivered a stinging appraisal of Japanese public art in the late nineteenth century; he was especially offended by the country's war memorials:

The Sino-Japanese War was the trigger for the building of monuments everywhere. Everywhere people wanted to honor the country's fallen sons; yet this ambition was often displayed in an almost scandalously tasteless and unskillful manner. . . . Traveling through the country, I saw things that hurt my eyes! In my sleepless nights, I am [still] haunted . . . by some of the most horrible expressions of Japanese patriotic art.⁶⁵

Fischer here was specifically referring to a memorial in the city of Hakata that consisted of a stone plinth with a torpedo: “the Japanese seem to consider torpedoes as particularly decorative.” Yet he did reserve some compliments for the statues introduced later in this study. He described the statue of warlord Kusunoki Masashige, which was erected roughly concurrent with the publication of his book as “the best piece of plastic [art] in the European style I have seen” in Japan.⁶⁶ The Kanazawa statue of Yamato Takeru, however, did not garner the same praise:

If the intention of the sculptor was to show that one can be a hero without being smart, this statue is a remarkable success because the statue looks extremely unintelligent. . . . Furthermore, the hero holds his sword as if a cook wielding his knife about to butcher a chicken. . . . The memorial is a ridiculous bugaboo.⁶⁷

Prince Higashikuze Michitomi, whose harsh criticism of the idea of public statuary coincided with the release of Fischer's book, would have whole-

heartedly agreed with the Austrian painter. But their respective arguments, which emphasized the differences between European and Japanese artistic traditions, gained no traction in Japan. The need to disseminate the idea of nationhood among the population through visual representation of personalities from the nation's history continued to prompt proposals for public statues.

In December 1930, almost exactly fifty years after the construction of the Yamato Takeru statue, the *Meiji Memorial* in Kenrokuen was joined by a second memorial, confirming the park's significance as the central mnemonic site in this important regional city. Named Memorial to the Emperor-Revering Restorationists of Kaga, Etchū, and Noto (*Ka-etsu-no ishin kin'ō kinenhyō*), this monument featured a statue of Maeda Yoshiyasu (1830–74), the son of Maeda Nariyasu, the last daimyo of the Kaga feudal domain and first governor of Kanazawa Prefecture from 1869 to 1871 (fig. 3.4). Around 1,500 guests and spectators attended the unveiling ceremony, an indication of the continuing interest in public sculpture.⁶⁸ The initiative for this monument had originated not in Kanazawa, but in Tokyo among a group of elite politicians and military officers who were natives of Ishikawa and members of the Ka-Etsu-No Gōyūkai (Association of Brave Comrades from Kaga, Toyama and Noto). Army officer Kigoshi Yasutsuna (1854–1932) served as chairman of the organizing committee for the new memorial.⁶⁹

The monument was commissioned to commemorate the history of Kaga during the years of the Meiji Restoration and to set the record straight regarding the domain's conduct in this period. The conventional narrative of Kaga affairs was one of a somewhat “passive” domain that entered the fight very late, only joining the forces of imperial restoration after the Battle of Toba-Fushimi in 1867 when the denouement of shogunate was clear.⁷⁰ James McClain has explained that Kanazawa “did not play a major role in the history of the Restoration” and “as neither friend nor foe of the new regime . . . received no special favors or unusual punishments from the new Meiji government.”⁷¹



Fig. 3.4 *Ka-Etsu-No ishin kin'ō-ka hyōshōhyō kensetsu kinen* (Commemoration of the Construction of the Monument Dedicated to the Emperor-Revering Restorationists of Kaga, Etchū, and Noto). Commemorative postcard (unused), c. 1930.

The 1930 monument challenged this view by emphasizing an incident in 1864 that allegedly demonstrated that some in the Kaga domain had been in fact harboring pro-imperial sentiments from early on. At this time, Maeda Nariyasu honored the long-standing relationship of the Maeda family as supporters of the Tokugawa, notwithstanding the fact that he wished to secure a degree of independence for his domain, rejecting, for example, shogunal orders to attend certain conferences. James Baxter observed that “failure to comply with the *bakufu* did not exactly constitute support for the cause of the imperial court,”⁷² but as far as the Tokugawa were concerned, even small acts of in-

subordination made Nariyasu appear unreliable. And what is more, Nariyasu’s son Yoshiyasu held strong pro-imperial and anti-shogunate convictions. When anti-Tokugawa forces, mainly from the Chōshū domain, threatened to seize the Imperial Palace in Kyoto in 1864, Nariyasu sent his son to Kyoto. Yoshiyasu was expected to join the shogunate in the civil disturbances, yet he decided to mediate between the pro-imperial forces and the shogunate. Ultimately unsuccessful, he departed the capital, refusing “shogunal orders to send troops to aid in the defense” of the capital against the enemy forces. Most likely fearing shogunal revenge, Nariyasu harshly punished his son’s insubordination, ordering five of his followers to commit *seppuku* and sentencing three to banishment, four to lifetime prison terms, and one to death by decapitation. Yoshiyasu was placed under house arrest (*kinshin*) but pardoned in 1865. In spring the following year, Nariyasu retired and passed on the position of daimyo to his son.⁷³



Fig. 3.5 Statue of Yamato Takeru in Kenrokuen, Kanazawa (1880), present day.

The construction of the 1930 memorial in Kenrokuen was an attempt by a group of well-connected sons of Kanazawa to reaffirm, retrospectively, the active role their domain played in the Meiji Restoration and to rehabilitate the “loyal retainers” who had lost their lives in the domain’s attempt in 1864 to mediate in national politics, avoid civil war, and create national unity. It was preceded by the enshrinement of the “restorationist samurai” in the local Shōkonsha, the posthumous awarding of court titles (as early as 1891 in some cases), and the publication of a *Short History of the Emperor-Revering Restoration Movement in Kaga, Etchū, and Noto* that included a set of short “monumental biographies” of the samurai in question.⁷⁴ This work was published by the Association for the Commendation of the Emperor-Revering Res-

torationists of Kaga, Etchū, and Noto, which was located in the former residence of the Maeda lords in Tokyo and whose activity reveals that, even in 1930, the ties of feudalism were partly intact. The 1930 memorial consisted of a bronze statue of the pro-restorationist Yoshiyasu and bronze plaques inscribed with the names of the “loyal retainers” (see fig. 3.4).⁷⁵

Erected fifty years after the Yamato Takeru statue, the 1930 memorial still embodied the tension between a commitment to the national cause and a reaffirmation of local political identity and social relations. This conflict is mitigated through the memorial’s emphasis on the “contribution” made by retainers of the former daimyo of the Kaga domain to the Meiji Restoration and by displaying the effigy of the last daimyo towering over the inscribed plaques. He dons the court attire (*shōsoku*) that positions him as an imperial dignitary, not the armor of a member of the warrior class. The enormous significance attributed to the building of such monuments testifies to the eagerness on the part of local elites to underscore the role of Kaga retainers as supporters of the imperial cause during the events that triggered the overthrow of the shogunate.

The Memorial to the Emperor-Revering Restorationists of Kaga, Etchū, and Noto did not survive World War II, being dismantled in 1944 for the purposes of war mobilization, a topic discussed in chapter 7. But the statue of Yamato Takeru, a symbol of imperial authority, weathered wartime mobilization as well as the exigencies of the Allied Occupation. Even today it continues to be a central attraction of Kanazawa’s thriving tourism industry (fig. 3.5).⁷⁶ Most tourist publications include a photograph of the statue and a caption explaining its history, and the majority of visitors to Kenrokuen will give the sculpture at least a cursory glance.⁷⁷ In the 1990s, it was removed for restoration, a several-year process that revealed an inconvenient truth about bronze statues: as mnemonic devices, they are intended to “preserve the memory” of their subject “for eternity,” yet their condition can rapidly deteriorate and even result in their ruin.⁷⁸

The complicated restoration of the Yamato Takeru statue cost the city of Kanazawa and the prefecture of Ishikawa 220 million *yen*.⁷⁹ But it also generated some good news. Professor Hirose Yukio of Kanazawa University analyzed the alloy used to cast the statue and was able to answer the frequent question of why it always appeared so pristine and unsoiled by birds. Hirose discovered that the alloy employed for the statue contained an unusually high percentage of arsenic, which was effective in keeping it free from bird droppings because it repelled the creatures. For these findings, in 2003 Professor Hirose was awarded the “Ig Nobel Prize”—a reward for “achievements that first make people laugh, and then make them think.”⁸⁰

Hirose’s discovery has serious practical applications. As early as 1916, complaints were circulating about “bronze statuary for out-of-doors” that were not “kept free from dirt and grime.” In his book on casting techniques, *The Art of the Bronze Founder*, art historian William Donald Mitchell complained that the “bronze statues in our cities . . . are usually neglected and become covered with a deposit of soot and dirt and often present a very disreputable appearance. It should be the duty of the city authorities to have the monumental bronze sculptures kept in good condition.”⁸¹ With so many monumental bronzes built in the century since Mitchell’s caution, it still appears, however, that the Kanazawa Yamato Takeru remains the exception.

EMPERORS OF THE PAST: THE KEITAI STATUE IN FUKUI

The construction of the Yamato Takeru monument triggered a spate of statue-building initiatives all over the country. Dozens, later hundreds of monuments commemorating historical or mythical figures were commissioned and erected on pedestals in public spaces. Many of the early statues portrayed figures associated with the Imperial House, an expression of a strong desire for visual representations of imperial authority in public settings. As the imperial portrait was still highly regulated until



Fig. 3.6 Stone-Statue of Emp. Keitai (*Famous of Echizen*). (*Fukui meishō*) Keitai tennō sekizō. Souvenir postcard (unused), early twentieth century.

the end of the nineteenth century, these effigies constitute the earliest permanent visual representations of imperial authority in public space.

As noted in chapter 2, the Imperial Household Ministry opposed the idea of statues depicting Emperor Meiji and successfully prevented attempts at their construction until after the monarch’s death in 1912. In response, the instigators of memorial projects devised an array of proxy figures that symbolized imperial power and national unity and, significantly, met with the approval of the IHM. The first statue of an emperor was built in 1883 on top of

the 116 m high Mount Asuwa outside of the city of Fukui. The figure, Keitai, was an emperor born in this region of Japan in the early sixth century. The Imperial Household Agency has consistently upheld the view that Japan's imperial dynasty has continued unbroken since the time of the first emperor, Jinmu,⁸² even though some historians argue that a new dynasty began with Keitai.

It was no coincidence that the statue of Emperor Keitai was built in Fukui, only three years after the Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa in neighboring Ishikawa Prefecture. The timing of the projects and the proximity of the two cities are significant. Moreover, both statues were conceived as the centerpiece of a memorial commemorating soldiers fallen in the Satsuma Rebellion. They exhibit similarities in their presentation of figures from the imperial family in military poses: Yamato Takeru holds a sword and Keitai bow and arrow (fig. 3.6). The two statues were also situated in accessible public locations. Kenrokuen, as noted above, became one of Japan's first public parks in the 1870s, and the Fukui site received a similar classification in 1909, but was a recreational and mnemonic-ceremonial space since the 1870s as well.

The architectural historian Ichikawa Hidekazu believes that locals generated the initiative for the Keitai memorial as they wished to celebrate the fact that their region was the birthplace of an early Japanese emperor.⁸³ The site chosen for the statue was already home to the Asuwa Shrine dedicated to Keitai, which was believed to be over 1,000 years old.⁸⁴ A memorial stone with an inscription detailing the historical background of Keitai was installed at the shrine in 1847,⁸⁵ and in 1880 the 1350th anniversary of Keitai's accession to the throne was commemorated with a festival.⁸⁶

From the first years of Meiji, the growing importance across Japan of the cult of the emperor and of imperial loyalists such as Kusunoki Masashige and Nitta Yoshisada (see chapter 1) left an indelible impression on the people of Fukui. A shrine for Nitta Yoshisada was constructed there in 1870 close to the alleged site of the warrior's death.⁸⁷ In 1873, a shrine dedicated to the martyrs of the late

Edo period connected with the region was erected in the same district.⁸⁸ As in other regions of Japan, the shrine was referred to as Shōkonsha, and its construction was a further indication that the then new ideology of national unity under the slogan of loyalty to the imperial institution was slowly taking root throughout Japan. Yet, even though the martyrs of the Meiji Restoration were venerated in shrines, the erection of statues to them was still considered premature. For one, their deaths were only a few years in the past. Secondly, priority was given initially to put up visual representations of figures connected with the Imperial House in the public space.

Against this backdrop, the people of Fukui were determined to have a statue of their "local emperor" Keitai, whose image would serve simultaneously as an expression of local pride *and* of national consciousness. An "advertisement" in the daily *Fukui shinbun* on March 18, 1883 (fig. 3.7) calling for donations for the statue ascribed the desire to eternally preserve the "great legacy" (*go-iseki*) of Keitai's "achievements for the people (*jinmin*) of our region (*waga tochi*)" as the primary motivation for the statue's commission. The advertisement also credited the ancient emperor with the local policies for the regulation of water flow, the reduction of flood damage, and the stimulation of agricultural production.⁸⁹ As this rhetoric suggests, Keitai was, first and foremost, understood as a "local hero." The combination of his role as a benefactor of the region and his status as a representative of the imperial dynasty made him an ideal bridging figure between the local and national dimensions of Japanese identity.

The 4.5 m high Keitai monument was a relatively rare example of a stone statue in modern Japan. As discussed in chapter 7, stone was only used for statuary when suitable metal was in short supply. In Fukui, the main driver for using this material for the statue rather than bronze was simply that the initiator of the project, and its chief financier, was the local quarry owner Uchiyama Shinshirō. He provided the material to the sculptor and donated 1,000 *yen* toward the memorial's



Fig. 3.7 Advertisement pamphlet calling for donations for the proposed statue of Emperor Keitai in Fukui, 1883. Courtesy of Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan (Fukui City History Museum).

construction.⁹⁰ The prospectus underlines the direct connection between the Shakudani stone selected for the statue and the emperor: the project's organizers maintained that the stone was allegedly “discovered” by Keitai in the area known today as Asuwayama Park.⁹¹

The advertisement in the *Fukui shinbun* also noted that the instigators had received approval for the project from “the authorities.” Although these “authorities” were not identified, it is likely that without the approval of the prefectural governor,

the Home Ministry in Tokyo, and the IHM, a statue of an imperial figure could not have been realized. The imperial family already had a visual presence near the proposed site. A memorial stone with an inscription by Prince Arisugawa Taruhito was placed inside the Asuwa Shrine in 1880, the same year he added his inscription to the Kanazawa *Meiji Memorial* in Kenrokuen.⁹² Seen alongside the nearby Shōkonsha of 1870 and the memorial stones for the victims of the 1877 rebellion, the area was already recognized for its imperial associations before the Keitai statue. When the Keitai statue was eventually installed, Fukui had no shortage of memorials announcing a new era of direct imperial rule and national unity.

The subsequent construction of other memorials and statues further underlined Keitai's national di-

mension. A memorial to celebrate Japan's victory in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 (*Nisshin sen'eki kinenhi*) was built in the early 1900s, an observation platform commemorating the visit of the Crown Prince to Fukui was placed adjacent to the Keitai statue in 1909, and a statue of Hashimoto Sanai (1834–59), an activist in the restorationist movement of the 1850s and a Fukui son, was erected in 1925.⁹³

Similar to the Kanazawa Yamato Takeru memorial, the Keitai statue soon became a tourist attraction. In 1909, the site was officially gazetted as Asuwayama Park, a step that lent the memorial further cachet.⁹⁴ The official history of Fukui, published in 1941, stated that the statue was on the city's list of major tourist attractions; it was also featured on one of the city's recommended tourist trails.⁹⁵ The type of tourism promoted was, above all, intended to contribute to the "arousing (*kosui*) of national spirit among the population."⁹⁶ To achieve this aim, the city advertised its historical and other visitor attractions through journals and postcards, the installation of signage, and the promotion of tourism through festivals, such as the 1936 festival organized to mark the 600th anniversary of the death of Nitta Yoshisada.⁹⁷ The Keitai statue was also used as the backdrop for national and military celebrations, as contemporary photographs show.⁹⁸

The figure of Emperor Keitai, as portrayed in the Fukui statue, was widely used for educational purposes in the prewar period to strengthen patriotic sentiment among the Japanese. A 1929 book, titled *Aikokushin* (Patriotism), aligns Keitai with other ancient emperors considered exemplars of the unity and harmony between an emperor and his subjects.⁹⁹ One of the two authors of *Aikokushin*, Viscount Ogasawara Naganari (1867–1958), was a navy admiral educated in part at Yale University and a fervent promoter of several personality cults—most notably, those of Admiral of the Fleet (*gensui*) Tōgō Heihachirō, a hero of the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War (Ogasawara was his private secretary); General Nogi Maresuke; and another naval hero Commander Hirose Takeo.¹⁰⁰ *Aikokushin* was published by the Mikasa Hozonkai, an organization devoted to the preserva-

tion of the cruiser *Mikasa*, Tōgō's flagship during the Battle of Tsushima, which was designated a "memorial ship" in the early 1920s.¹⁰¹ Keitai's inclusion in this lineup of national heroes illustrates the fact that, despite his questionable historicity, by the 1920s he had developed into a significant symbol representing loyalty to the Imperial House and the love of one's country.

The Keitai monument survived the war because it was made of stone, not bronze. It was also spared a destruction order by the Allied Occupation forces, only to be severely damaged during a powerful earthquake that struck the Hokuriku region in 1948. It was immediately repaired, and even today is a tourist attraction that is frequently pictured in pocket guides to the city and the prefecture.¹⁰² The prefectural government has set up a website to promote the legacy of "Keitai the Great"¹⁰³ and includes a photograph of the statue on its English-language site of "100 Hometown Views of Fukui."¹⁰⁴ In the early twenty-first century, the prefecture, in cooperation with a local newspaper and the Asuwa Shrine, organized a series of events celebrating the 1500th anniversary of Keitai's accession to the throne. While the dates of his life are based on supposition, the festivities boosted the region's tourism industry. In more recent promotional materials for the memorial, however, nationalist rhetoric has been downplayed with the emphasis shifted to the statue a source of local pride.¹⁰⁵

THE FOUNDER OF THE EMPIRE: JINMU TENNŌ

The most important "historical" figure enlisted in modern Japan as an expression of imperial authority in the public arena is Emperor Jinmu. The task of legitimizing the overthrow of the shogunate and the Meiji Restoration, casting it as a "return to the days of Jinmu," made the "first emperor" of the dynasty a preeminent figure in the national pantheon. Like Yamato Takeru and Emperor Keitai, Jinmu was also used to represent the military function of the imperial dynasty. The portrayal of the first emperor as

the leader of military campaigns that led to the unification of the central parts of the Japanese archipelago and to the foundation of the empire made him a powerful founding figure and a symbol of the prerogative of the imperial house in military matters. This prerogative was explicitly confirmed in Meiji-period legislation, as seen in the *Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan* by Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), one of the fathers of the Constitution:

The great Imperial Ancestor [Jinmu] founded this Empire by his divine valor, in personal command of his army composed of several divisions. . . . Thenceforward all the succeeding Emperors have taken the field in person in command of their armies. . . . On some occasions, an Imperial son or grandson was sent to assume the command of the army on behalf of the Emperor. . . . All military authority and command were [at all times] centered in the hands of the Sovereign.¹⁰⁶

Jinmu thus evolved into a crucial symbol of the military function of the Imperial House and validating the military dimension of the Meiji Restoration—in other words, the restoration of the emperor’s direct command over Japan’s armed forces.

Although Jinmu is a mythological figure, in pre-war Japan most people, including historians, “thought that [he] had actually existed.”¹⁰⁷ Ultranationalist groups and some right-wing politicians continue to hail him as the founder of Japan, even though the majority of historians do not see him as a real historical figure.¹⁰⁸ In the early twenty-first century, this claim is encountered with growing frequency in the popular media. In 2012, for example, Ōkawa Ryūhō (b. 1956), the founder of the new religion Kōfuku no Kagaku (Happy Science), published a book boldly titled “Emperor Jinmu Existed.” In 2016, the newspaper company Sankei Shinbunsha followed up this claim with the even more emphatic title, “Emperor Jinmu *Really* Existed.”¹⁰⁹ That same year, the Member of the House of Councilors and former singer/actress Mihara Junko (b. 1964) went on record to state that “Emperor

Jinmu really existed.”¹¹⁰ Until 1990 the *Yomiuri shinbun*, a newspaper boasting a circulation of over 8 million, issued only five articles with the two words “Jinmu” and “exist” in the title, but in the 1990s it ran twelve articles containing those terms in the title and sixty-five such pieces have appeared since 2000.¹¹¹ Ceremonies are held to celebrate the anniversary of the founding of the Japanese empire 2,670 years ago, on occasion before statues dedicated to him. This coupling of the dogma of religious groups with the agenda of rightist politicians and Japan’s most conservative newspaper, *Sankei shinbun*, with a circulation of 1.5 million, is no coincidence—it illustrates the recent convergence of religion with reactionary ideology.

The earliest statues of Jinmu were built in the 1890s and 1900s. None are thought to have existed before the Meiji period, even though sculptures of Shinto deities (*shinzō*) as such were not entirely unknown within Japanese religious traditions. Even imagery of the first emperor was all but non-existent until the mid-nineteenth century.¹¹² The first known visual representations of Jinmu were the illustrations by Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1798–1861) for the 1850s illustrated book *Dai-Nihon-koku kaibyaku yuraiki* (Chronicles of the Foundations of Japan) by Hirano Genryō (1790–1867).¹¹³ It was not until the Meiji period that Jinmu imagery enjoyed wider popularity, beginning with the 1880 woodblock-print series *Dai-Nihon meishō kaigami* (Mirror of Famous Generals of Great Japan) by Tsukioka Yoshitoshi (1839–92). Yoshitoshi’s rendition decisively influenced later Jinmu iconography.¹¹⁴

The very first Jinmu statue was, like those of Meiji, a sculpture erected in an indoor setting, in this case at the Third National Industrial Exposition (*Naikoku Kangyō Hakurankai*) held in Tokyo in 1890. These exhibitions were crucial arenas for Japan’s artists, enabling them to present their work to large audiences that included the political elite and on occasion the emperor.¹¹⁵ Before the opening of the exposition, the journal *Nihon* (Japan) announced that it would award a prize for the best wooden, metal, or stone sculpture depicting either Emperor Jinmu, Kusunoki Masashige, or Prince

Moriyoshi. The figures should be suitable for display in a park or in front of a public building. In announcing the competition, the journal was attempting to promote the growth of public sculpture in Japan, in particular, work that conveyed the notion of loyalty to the Imperial House. Several instructors from the Tokyo School of Fine Arts (Tōkyō Bijutsu Gakkō) responded to the call and produced impressive sculptures, consolidating their reputations and positioning themselves to take advantage of the flood of statues that would be commissioned in subsequent years.

One instructor, Takenouchi Hisakazu (Kyūichi, 1857–1916), presented a wooden sculpture of Jinmu, showing the emperor with a sword on his belt, and a bow in his left hand, and a quiver on his back. This 2.36 m effigy, today housed in the University Art Museum of the Tokyo University of the Arts (see fig. 3.8),¹¹⁶ caused a sensation at the time even though it only received the second prize. The media reported exhaustively on this piece, which is why it would strongly impact the iconography of later Jinmu statues. Public statuary, statuettes for private use, as well as history textbooks, paintings, and other visual media, all conventionally depicted Jinmu in a pose similar to the 1890 statue (see figs 3.9 and 3.10).

The first statue of Jinmu in a public setting was commissioned five years later and displayed in the city of Tokushima in 1896 to celebrate Japan's victory in the First Sino-Japanese War. The popular demand for public statuary had surged massively during this war because of the triumphant mood widespread in society. At the same time, the elites saw the victory in war as an opportunity to indoctrinate the people further with the idea of loyalty to emperor and nation and thus advance its agenda of national unification. Many famous sculptors and founders were affiliated with the Tokyo School of Fine Arts, which received orders for seventy-eight statues from throughout the country in 1894 alone.¹¹⁷

The Tokushima Jinmu statue was the result of a private initiative, but later the city designated the area where it was erected as Ōtakiyama Park (present-day Bizan Park) to provide townspeople with a space to gather at the statue for celebrations and

public ceremonies (fig. 3.11).¹¹⁸ Details of this statue are unknown since it receives no detailed mention in the official city history,¹¹⁹ but its iconography differs slightly from the 1890 Takenouchi sculpture. It presents Jinmu with a bow in hand and a quiver on his back (fig. 3.12). According to legend, the kite perched on the bow of this sculpture was sent to him by Amaterasu Ōmikami as a guide during the military campaign to unify Japan referred to as the “Eastern Expedition.”¹²⁰ This element would also appear in later images of Jinmu. Similar to the Yamato Takeru statue, the depiction of Jinmu as commander of the Eastern Expedition was an oblique reference to the renewal of the imperial dynasty's military command, which was inscribed in the constitution in 1889. It now received a powerful boost through the staging of the ancient antecedents of imperial military prowess in public statuary.

The Tokushima monument, like those for Yamato Takeru and Emperor Keitai, survived the hazards of wartime mobilization and the Allied Occupation. Its survival was probably due, in part, to its somewhat removed location in Bizan Park at the foot of the 180 m Mount Bizan on the outskirts of Tokushima. It might also have been due to the remoteness of Tokushima itself. The Jinmu monument continues to occupy a place in the public life of the city. Every year on February 11, the day that Jinmu allegedly founded Japan, a ceremony is held to commemorate his legacy and to celebrate Japan's unbroken line of emperors. Since 1997, it has been organized by the Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), a right-wing, ultranationalist group that aims to restore many facets of prewar Japanese life.¹²¹ The role played by the Tokushima statue as a rallying point for the right-wing today imbues monuments to Jinmu with a highly ambiguous character.

A second, better-known statue of Jinmu was unveiled on March 9, 1899, in the garrison town of Toyohashi (Aichi Prefecture) to commemorate the fifth anniversary of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War.¹²² The 18th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Division of the IJA was based in Toyohashi, and troops from this unit were sent to the front at the





Fig. 3.8 Takenouchi Hisakazu (Kyūichi, 1857–1916). *Statue of Jinmu*. Entry in a sculpture competition held in conjunction with the Third National Industrial Exposition (*Naikoku Kangyō Hakurankai*), 1890. Courtesy of the University Art Museum of the Tokyo University of the Arts (Tōkyō Geijutsu Daigaku Daigaku Bijutsukan). Originally, the figure held a bow in the left hand (as in fig. 3.10). 236 cm (297 cm including pedestal).

Fig. 3.9 Miniature figure of Emperor Jinmu, Taishō period. 35 cm.



Fig. 3.10 Script-roll showing Emperor Jinmu as military leader, late Meiji period. 134 × 34 cm.

outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War. Plans to build a memorial to honor the 18th Regiment had already begun during the conflict.¹²³

After the war, the commander of the regiment intended to build a Victory Memorial crowned by a statue of Emperor Meiji in Western military uniform, but as already noted in chapter 2, the idea failed to secure the approval from the authorities. Consequently, a statue of Emperor Jinmu was commissioned as a proxy for the reigning emperor and as a symbol of imperial authority in military affairs. The statue follows the iconography of the 1890 Takenouchi sculpture: it depicts Jinmu with a sword

and bow, but without the kite that featured on the Tokushima statue. A plaque on the pedestal carried the inscription “Memorial to the Subjugation of China” (*Seishin kinenhi*), a dedication commonly used on war memorials to celebrate victory over China and console the souls of the war dead. The wording was copied from a calligraphic inscription made by Prince Komatsu Akihito (1846–1903), then chief of the IJA General Staff and commander of Japanese forces during the Sino-Japanese War. An additional inscription with information about the monument was the work of Army Minister Katsura Tarō (1848–1913).¹²⁴

The design of the statue, as the sculptors were at pains to reiterate, was based on research by Kurokawa Mayori (1829–1906), a scholar of national history and literature from Gunma, and the two main mythological texts of Japan, the *Kojiki* and the *Nihon shoki*. Kurokawa was responsible for devising iconographies for several historical figures about whom there were no visual sources. Kurokawa’s work was said to ensure historical authenticity in the visual representations of ancient figures, guaranteeing for example, that the clothing and weapons for a particular effigy would be historically accurate. His designs were adopted for statues as well as for banknotes, coins, stamps, and reproductions in other media.

The caster of the Toyohashi statue was Okazaki Sessei from the Tokyo School of Fine Arts. He had previously received commissions to cast two of the most well-known statues in Tokyo: Saigō Takamori in Ueno Park (unveiled in 1898) and the memorial to Kusunoki Masashige outside the Imperial Palace (unveiled in 1900, see chapter 6). In 1912, Okazaki also cast the statue of Emperor Meiji commissioned by Tanaka Mitsuaki (chapter 2), and later other sculptures of Jinmu. Jinmu statues were still a rare phenomenon at the time, and thus the Toyohashi monument was widely reported on in the local press as well as in the Tokyo editions of the *Asahi shinbun* and *Yomiuri shinbun*, which covered all aspects of the process, from the planning phase,¹²⁵ to the statue’s construction,¹²⁶ and to the unveiling ceremony.¹²⁷ The *Yomiuri* even included a



Fig. 3.11 *Tokushima Bizan Kōen-chi zenzu* (Complete Map of Bizan Park Tokushima), 1912. The image shows the location of the statue of Emperor Jinmu in the park (circled).

Fig. 3.12 *Tokushima-shi Ōtakiyama kōen-nai Jinmu tennō no dōzō* (Statue of Emperor Jinmu in Ōtakiyama Park in Tokushima City). Souvenir postcard (unused), early twentieth century.

Fig. 3.13 Sketch of the statue of Emperor Jinmu, Toyohashi. *Yomiuri shinbun*, February 20, 1899, special “Arts” section, 1. Courtesy of Yomiuri Shinbunsha.



sketch of the proposed effigy in one of its reports (fig. 3.13).¹²⁸ Interestingly, neither of these two newspapers has a single article on the Tokushima Jinmu statue.

The Toyohashi statue of Emperor Jinmu until 1945 crowned an impressive 13.5 m pyramid-shaped pedestal that was visible from a considerable distance (fig. 3.14). It carried commemorative plaques, including a list of the names of the war dead from the Toyohashi units.¹²⁹ The imposing character of this monument drew nationwide media attention with photographs of the statue appearing in journals and newspapers. On two occasions, the magazine *Taiyō* carried photographs of a “bronze statue of Jinmu emperor in the Park of Toyohashi.” One accompanied a photo of the Kashiwara Shrine, which had been founded in 1890 next to the alleged site of Jinmu’s tomb (near Nara).¹³⁰

Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, the statue was condemned by the Allied Occupation authorities as a symbol of Japanese militarism because of its rendition of Jinmu as a military commander, in effect highlighting the role of the monarchy in Japan’s military history. They felt that the statue could serve to indoctrinate the population with retrograde elements of Japanese mythology, upholding the ideology of an “unbroken imperial dynasty since ages eternal” and, thus, Japanese claims to regional hegemony. The Occupation authorities ordered the demolition of the Toyohashi monument; the massive plinth was dismantled, but the locals hid the statue and it escaped destruction. It was stowed away for almost twenty years and was re-erected in a secluded corner of Toyohashi Park, the former site of Yoshida Castle, in 1965 (fig. 3.15). This reinstallation was related to the reintroduc-



Fig. 3.14 *Jinmu tennō go-dōzō no kei* (View of the Honorable Statue of Emperor Jinmu). Commemorative postcard (unused), 1906.

Fig. 3.15 Statue of Emperor Jinmu, Toyohashi (1898), present day.




Fig. 3.16 *Chūshisha kinen shōchūhi ryakuzu* (Sketch of the Commemorative Memorial for Inviting the Souls of the Loyal [War] Dead), 1906. Courtesy of Niigata City.

tion in 1966 of the prewar national holiday known as *kigensetsu*, the celebration of Jinmu's alleged founding of Japan, as National Foundation Day in what some historians have criticized as the first wave of a resurgence of nationalist ideology in postwar Japan.¹³¹ Since that time, right-wing political groups have organized a ceremony every February 11 in Toyohashi (as in Tokushima) to mark the legend of Jinmu's foundation of the Japanese empire.¹³² The city of Toyohashi is not involved in promoting the memory of Emperor Jinmu or the statue, as its absence from the city's website shows.¹³³ The city approves the ceremony to be held in the park, but it is not involved in its preparations, being aware of its controversial character.

The Tokushima and Toyohashi statues of Emperor Jinmu were built to reflect the nation's pride following Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War.

The subsequent Russo-Japanese War led to the construction of further monuments to the legendary emperor. In most cases, these statues were a part of monuments honoring the war dead. One noteworthy example, dating to 1907, is in Niigata's Hakusan Park. Like the Kenrokuen in Kanazawa, Hakusan Park opened to the public under the Dajōkan Order of 1873, and it developed into a leisure and tourist spot. It was equally the location for public ceremonies, including a festival to commemorate the emperor's silver wedding anniversary in 1894; an event marking what was described as the "annexation" of the Liaodong Peninsula in China in 1896; an event to mark the foundation of the Niigata City Veterans' Organization (Niigata-shi Zaigō Gunjin-dan) in 1899; and a celebration of Japan's victory in war against Russia in 1905. The park was equally well known as one of the places visited by the emperor during his trip to Niigata in 1877.¹³⁴

The IJA's commission of a Jinmu statue in Niigata as a part of a memorial to the war dead has parallels with the statue projects of Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa and Jinmu in Toyohashi. The initial plan

was to erect a monument to the war dead in a local cemetery, with the earliest such proposals dating to 1902. The mayor of Niigata gave approval to these plans in 1903; however, the process was stalled, first because of problems with fundraising and then due to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.¹³⁵ The project was revived in 1907, and a statue of Jinmu added to the original design (fig. 3.16). The 1.8 m high sculpture was again cast by Okazaki Sessei and placed on a pedestal to render a monument measuring 3.75 m. The unveiling ceremony on April 28, 1907, was a significant event for the city, as stressed in the report of the construction committee (*kenpi inkai*). It was attended by over 2,000 people, including veterans, members of bereaved families, the mayor and several school principals, underlining the significance of such memorials for educators.¹³⁶

The “Monument for Inviting the Loyal Souls” (*shōchūhi*), as the overall complex was named, was dedicated to the memory of the war dead from the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. The names of all 120 Niigata dead were inscribed on plaques attached to the monument.¹³⁷ In 1915, the *shōchūhi* was designated as the site for the commemoration of the war dead in Niigata (a *shōkonsai* is still held annually on May 3 to honor the fallen).¹³⁸ Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922), commander-in-chief of the IJA during the First Sino-Japanese War, provided the inscription (*shōchū*) on the pedestal, further reinforcing the military dimension of the monument. The iconography of the statue is reminiscent of the Tokushima sculpture in its portrayal of Jinmu as a military commander during the “Eastern Expedition”: a bow in his left hand, a sword on his belt, and a kite perched on his right hand (not resting on his bow as in the Tokushima statue). Similar to many memorial statues, the sculpture was later donated to the park’s legal owner, the city of Niigata, to ensure that it would continue to perform its function of ushering the spirits of the fallen “into eternity.”¹³⁹

The Niigata statue is unique in that it presents Jinmu standing on a globe, with the territory claimed by the Japanese empire delineated in gold (fig. 3.17).



Fig. 3.17 *Niigata Hakusan kōen shōchūhi* (Niigata Hakusan Park Memorial for Inviting the Souls of the Loyal [War] Dead). Souvenir postcard (unused), early twentieth century.

Noteworthy is the fact that the demarcation of the empire of Japan includes the Korean peninsula, even though Korea was still independent at the time of the statue’s creation (Korea was not formally annexed to Japan until 1910 and had been a Japanese protectorate since 1905). The figure of Jinmu personified the early history of Japan and the founding of the Japanese empire, but in this 1907 statue, he is depicted as a symbol of Japan’s claim to global leadership, given the combination of the globe and the portrayal of Jinmu as a military commander. The Niigata statue is an intriguing example of Japanese

claims to global, or at least regional, hegemony, as expressed in the slogan *hakkō ichiu* (The Eight Corners [of the World] Under One Roof), which has its roots in Japanese mythology and was adopted in wartime propaganda.¹⁴⁰ Its connection to the propaganda of overseas expansion probably also explains why the statue was relocated following Japan's defeat in the Asia-Pacific War. In 1945 or 1946, it was moved from the public setting of the Hakusan Park to the adjacent Hakusan Shrine, perhaps in the hope that the aura of this religious site would shield it from the attention of the Occupation authorities. This ploy proved successful, and the statue still stands there today.¹⁴¹

Several Jinmu statues were erected in Toyama Prefecture after the Russo-Japanese War as local memorials to honor the war dead. A 1943 inventory of sculptures lists up almost a dozen statues of Emperor Jinmu located in this prefecture alone, testifying to an unusually strong cult of Jinmu in the region.¹⁴² The background of most of these statues is unclear; some receive no mention even in local histories.¹⁴³ Some, however, were popular motifs for souvenir cards in the region (fig. 3.18), and almost all have survived to the present day because of the imperial pedigree of the subject.

In the city of Himi, for example, the Imperial Military Reservists' Organization (Zaigō Gunjinkai) in 1905 commissioned a 5 m tall statue of Jinmu, as a part of a local monument to commemorate the war dead. This sculpture was designed by the sculptor Ōtsuka Rakudō and cast by Kita Man'ueemon in nearby Takaoka. It shows Jinmu in the pose of a military commander, with the familiar trappings: a bow in his left hand, a sword in his belt, a full quiver on his back, and a kite perched on the bow. Unveiled in 1907, it served as a focal site for ceremonies to commemorate the war dead, the Festival for Inviting the Spirits of the War Dead (*shōkonsai*) in Himi until the end of the war in 1945.¹⁴⁴

Jinmu had allegedly founded the empire in the Kansai region and worshipers there could supposedly claim an unusually high degree of authenticity for sites associated with this pseudo-historical figure. Nevertheless, the first statue dedicated to the



Fig. 3.18 Toyama-ken Isurugi-machi Shiroyama kōen-nai *chūkonhi* (Memorial to Invite the Loyal Souls in Shiroyama Park in Isurugi Town, Toyama Prefecture). Souvenir postcard (unused), early twentieth century.

Fig. 3.19 Statue of Emperor Jinmu near Mount Ōdaigahara in Kami-Kitayama village in Nara Prefecture

founder of the empire was not built in this region until 1927, occasioned by the (legendary) anniversary of his arrival in the area (rather than the foundation of the empire).¹⁴⁵ Like the effigy of Yamato Takeru in Gunma, it is located near the top of a mountain, at Ushigahara near the 1,695 m high Mount Ōdaigahara in the village of Kami-Kitayama in Nara Prefecture (fig. 3.19). It also shares a religious component with the Gunma work since mountain hermits were involved in the construction of both statues. Today, the two monuments are also integrated into hiking trails, but otherwise are not widely known.¹⁴⁶

In 1925, two years before the installment of this work, a statue of Emperor Jinmu was built in Yamaguchi Prefecture. It is unique in that it was, in reality, a sculpture of Emperor Meiji. Understanding that permission for a statue of Meiji would not be forthcoming, the instigators disguised the construction plans as a monument to honor *Jinmu*. In March 1924, the mayor of the small village of Kibe (pop. 3,500 in 1929)¹⁴⁷ requested approval from the Home Ministry to build a statue of Emperor Jinmu. Ostensibly, the monument was to be set up to commemorate (*kinen*)



the wedding of the crown prince. Documents from the period reveal, however, that mayor Fujimoto Haruo (1863–1939) also conceived the statue as a tool of social engineering and to strengthen national consciousness in this rural region by drawing public attention to its leading role in the Meiji Restoration. In a letter to the Home Ministry, the mayor emphasized that the statue would serve as “a model for proper ideological indoctrination (*shisō sendō*)” and help to “thoroughly implant the idea of the centrality of the Imperial House” (*kōshitsu chūshin no shushi*) among the people,¹⁴⁸ a belief which, according to him, needed boosting in the region.¹⁴⁹ The mayor added that “in our country, approval has already been given to build [Jinmu statues] in three different locations,” asserting that “the building of this statue in the region that is the cradle of the Meiji Restoration (*Meiji ishin no hasshōchi*) and the center of loyalty to the emperor (*kin’ō chūshin-chi*) would be reasonable.”¹⁵⁰ Aware of the existence of other Jinmu statues, his proposal made explicit reference to the 1896 Tokushima statue. It also chose a similar location for the monument on the top of Mount Arataki, the site of the former Arataki Castle, a few kilometers from the village. The Home Ministry apparently had no hesitation in approving the statue.

The monument, however, soon became the object of intense debate, causing the governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture, Ōmori Kichigorō (1883–1946), to intervene, as we can see in a report he sent to Matsumura Giichi (1883–1959), the director of the Police and Public Security Bureau within the Home Ministry that was responsible for the administration of public memorials.¹⁵¹ In his letter, the governor reports that the unveiling of the statue on October 5, 1925, had caused unrest in this otherwise quiet rural district. According to the governor, the Great Japan History Preservation Society (Dai-Nihon Rekishi Hozonkai), a group led by confectionary shop owner Chijimatsu Terunosuke and textile merchant Shige’eda Yasaburō, had publicly criticized Mayor Fujimoto for failing to present a statue with an accurate (and appropriate) design.

The Great Japan History Preservation Society, a representative of the “local history movements”

that Louise Young analyzes in her study *Beyond the Metropolis*,¹⁵² maintained that the statue’s clothing did not resemble garments dating from the alleged historical era of Jinmu. They claimed that the court dress worn by the emperor in this image was of a much later date, unattested during the period when Jinmu had supposedly founded the Japanese empire. Local newspaper coverage, which the governor attached to his letter, provided ample evidence that elementary school teachers and the mayors of villages and cities in the prefecture supported the group’s position.¹⁵³ One of the school principals quoted points out the contrast between this statue’s lack of authenticity and that of the “well-designed” effigy of Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa. Another protester laments the “ignoring of historical facts,” stating that this kind of statue is counterproductive when it comes to teaching history.

The photographs included in the application for approval to build this statue reveal that the subject’s wardrobe indeed closely resembles that of the *Yomiuri shinbun* Meiji statue of 1912 discussed in detail in chapter 2. Furthermore, the sculpture’s facial expression was designed to resemble the late monarch, not the legendary Emperor Jinmu, or at least not the broadly perceived image of this legendary emperor. It is therefore unsurprising that the group demanded the memorial to be demolished (*tekkyo*) or recast (*kaiju*) based on a more “authentic” design, or that it alternatively be renamed (*kaishō*) the “Monument of Emperor Meiji,” a sign that its detractors considered the statue to resemble the previous monarch more than its purported subject, Emperor Jinmu.

The governor in his report, too, noted that he learned during his investigations that the statue was initially conceived as a monument to Emperor Meiji, but that the subject was changed to Emperor Jinmu since it would be easier to obtain approval for a statue dedicated to the legendary founder of the empire.¹⁵⁴ The governor goes on to explain that Mayor Fujimoto had frequently been accused of conducting village politics in a high-handed manner and that his attitude had probably led to the

confrontation. These attacks indicate that social tensions also fueled the controversy, a situation also detected in local sources. The “protesters” were mostly teachers and merchants, but village politics were dominated by representatives from the peasant families, which made up more than 90 percent of households in the area.¹⁵⁵ The mayor himself was president of the local agricultural association (Nōgyōkai), and all but two of the eleven members of the village council at the time of the incident were farmers.¹⁵⁶ In governor Ōmori’s letter to the Home Ministry, the protesters are described as members of the “lower class” (*chūryū ika*, literally “below the middle class”), signaling the superior social status of farming families in the district and the relegation of what is usually called the “new middle class” to an inferior social role.

In response to his critics, Mayor Fujimoto issued a public statement in February 1926 in which he claimed that the Home Ministry was untroubled by the details regarding the statue design and that the debate about the emperor’s clothes had been blown out of proportion. For Fujimoto, the point of the monument was to present Jinmu to the people as the ancestor of the nation and as a symbol of imperial power and authority. The possibility that he was not portrayed in a historically “accurate” manner was of secondary importance. Fujimoto did not foresee any problems on the educational front. That the statue would be mistaken for Emperor Meiji, he claimed, was unlikely:

The conventional image of Emperor Meiji is that of a military commander on horseback, dressed in Western parade uniform. . . . Although he is sometimes shown in court dress (*sokutai*) or in informal military uniform . . . the initiators (*hokkisha*) of this statue, following the regulations for imperial bronze statues (*go-kōshitsu dōzō kitei*), have prepared a plan and produced a cast model [of the proposed statue], and this [cast] has already received [ministerial] approval.¹⁵⁷

In another statement, Fujimoto compared the problem of authenticity with the controversies sur-

rounding the Keitai statue in Fukui and the statue of Kusunoki Masashige in Tokyo, whose facial features had, according to him, were criticized as being modeled on none other than Imperial Household Minister Tanaka Mitsuaki. Fujimoto closed his remarks by aggressively rejecting demands that the statue should be “recast” or that the accompanying inscription should be changed to read “Statue of the Meiji Emperor,” warning that such criticism would “destroy the purity of the national spirit” and attacking those who had made these claims as “traitors to the nation” (*hikokumin*).¹⁵⁸

For the Home Ministry, which Fujimoto claimed had approved the statue, the affair proved a minefield. Although the applicants had sought permission to build a Jinmu statue, the ministry now needed to explain to the IHM why a public controversy had broken out in a rural backwater over the portrayal of members of the imperial line, including Meiji, in a public space. In his letter, the governor reassured the Home Ministry that he would mediate personally in order to settle the affair expeditiously.

How the governor eased the tensions and whether any changes were made to the design of the sculpture to meet the protesters’ call for it be “recast” is not known because the original statue no longer exists. What is certain is that the incident did nothing to undermine Fujimoto’s position in the village. He remained mayor of Kibe until 1931 and was succeeded by his son.¹⁵⁹ In a move designed to strengthen his position, in January 1926, he founded the *Village Bulletin* (*Kibe-mura jihō*, after January 1927 *Kibe sonpō*), in which he frequently published pieces advocating the worship of the Imperial House, instantaneously re-enforcing the importance of “his” statue. In the inaugural issue, he published the “Kibe Village Constitution” (*Kibe-mura kenpō*), informing readers that “this village promotes the central role of the Imperial House (*kōshitsu chūshinshugi*) and nurtures the spirit of respect for the gods and love for the nation (*keishin aikoku*).”¹⁶⁰ In August 1926, he wrote that he hoped the Jinmu statue would make Mount Arataki the most spiritual mountain (*dai’ichi no reizan*) in the San’yō region.¹⁶¹ A year later he



Fig. 3.20 Statue of Meiji Emperor in Ube City (formerly Kibe village), Yamaguchi Prefecture, 1961. Ceramic.



Fig. 3.21 Head from a bronze statue of Emperor Jinmu/Meiji built in 1925. Local History Room at the Kibe Fureai Center Kibe Branch (Kibe Fureai Sentā Kibe Shutchōsho) in Ube City (formerly Kibe village), Yamaguchi Prefecture.

stepped up his rhetoric by asserting that it would soon become the most spiritual mountain in all of Japan (*Nihon dai'ichi no reizan*).¹⁶² Nothing indicates that Fujimoto had any doubts regarding his choice of depicting Emperor Meiji in the public space, even though the sculpture could not be called “Meiji Memorial.” Fujimoto’s reputation remained intact, and in 1961 a ceramic statue of him was erected on Mount Arataki adjacent to the Jinmu/Meiji statue. This served to honor the mayor and his “contributions to the development of his hometown,” including the building of the statue.¹⁶³

It is unclear when the Jinmu sculpture was first referred to as the “Statue of Emperor *Meiji*,” but

this description does not appear in prewar sources. The village bulletin continued to announce events associated with the “Jinmu Monument” until the late 1920s,¹⁶⁴ and the prewar “History of Kibe Village” (*Kibe sonshi*, 1933) also uses this name.¹⁶⁵ The first document to mention a “Meiji Statue”—the “Honorable Statue of Meiji the Great” (*Meiji taitei no go-sonzō*)—was the 1961 prospectus announcing the commissioning of the statue dedicated to Mayor Fujimoto.¹⁶⁶ More publicly, the magazine *Kusunoki bunka* (Kusunoki Culture), issued by the Kusunoki City Culture Association (Kusunoki-machi Bunka Kyōkai) following the merger of Kibe Village with this city, used the term “Meiji Monument” in 1969, and the name occurs again in the local history *Kibe kyōdo shidan* (Historical Stories of the Hometown of Kibe) of 1973.¹⁶⁷ In 2005, the Ube City Educational Board erected an explanatory board next to the statue, describing it as a “Statue of Emperor Meiji” (*Meiji tennō zō*).¹⁶⁸

Sadly, the Meiji monument on Mount Arataki today (fig. 3.20) is not the controversial bronze statue unveiled in 1925, but merely a postwar ceramic replica. The original bronze sculpture was stolen in 1956. Five years later, it was replaced with the present statue, which was set up upon the initiative of the Association of Friends of Kibe (Kibe Gōyūkai).¹⁶⁹ When the thieves dismantled the original sculpture, they left behind its head and a section of the emperor’s sword, which are today exhibited in the Local History Room at the Kibe Fureai Center (fig. 3.21).

The controversy that rocked Kibe in the 1920s was an expression of the new social conflicts emerging at a time when economic growth allowed increasing numbers of social actors to participate in discussions about the future of their hometown or village. These domestic debates were also related to the fear of “new ideologies” spreading in Japan after World War I that were routinely condemned as subversive and as threats to “public order” that the state was obliged to counter with appropriate educational measures. Against this backdrop, the socialization of the nation’s youth became a pressing concern, explaining why Fujimoto so strongly insisted on a statue that represented imperial author-

ity. Following the raising of the “Jinmu statue,” every April a special hiking event was coordinated that ended with the walkers paying their respects (*sairei*) before the memorial.¹⁷⁰ Such activities need to be understood within the context of the “moral suasion campaigns” coordinated by the Federation of Moral Suasion Groups (*Kyōka Dantai Rengōkai*), an organization set up by the Home Ministry in 1924 to promote, among other things, loyalty to the emperor and the state.¹⁷¹

The moral education of society continued to be defined as an essential task for local elites. Mayor Fujimoto even mobilized family members to advance the cause. In 1931, when the Asia-Pacific War broke out following the Manchurian Incident, a local women’s group, the Kibe Women’s Organization (*Kibe Fujinkai*), was founded under the direction of the mayor’s wife, Fujimoto Sei. These organizations would later play invaluable roles in wartime Japan.¹⁷² In her examination of local politics in medium-sized Japanese cities, Louise Young observed that the social changes occurring from the 1910s to the 1930s

created a crisis of socialization for municipal governments. Their toolbox of policies for managing social tensions had little effect in the new environment, because existing mechanisms to moderate social behavior and guide individuals to conform to norms of public order could no longer function as they once had. As increasingly clamorous social groups competed for public space and political representation, . . . new questions arose: Whose city was it going to be?¹⁷³

It was within this context that public sculpture emerged as a useful tool for local elites to shape the social behavior and attitudes of the masses, a task that became even more relevant following the outbreak of war in 1931 and the escalation into total war in 1937.¹⁷⁴

Debates about the historicity of Jinmu have continued to the present day. Ceremonies designed to “celebrate” the founding of Japan by Jinmu have been described above, and new statues of Jinmu

have been erected in recent years.¹⁷⁵ Further, the legendary emperor’s supposed grave—a site only “discovered” in the late nineteenth century—together with the Kashiwara Shrine in Nara Prefecture where Jinmu has been worshiped since its foundation in 1890, have become the stage for events involving members of the Imperial House.

In April 2016, the emperor and empress, the crown prince and his wife visited both sites as “part of ceremonies to mark 2600th anniversary of his [Jinmu’s] death.”¹⁷⁶ Press coverage of this event was extremely awkward. The Japanese media was relatively reticent about the imperial visits, whereas the English-language media offered some coverage but completely ignored the fact that Jinmu is a mythological figure, as evident in the *Japan Times* headline, “Imperial Couple Visit Tomb of Japan’s First Emperor in Nara Prefecture.” The story failed to mention that no serious historian believes that the “tomb” designated as Jinmu’s resting place in the Meiji period is actually authentic, leaving readers in the dark about the dubious character of the site and the figure known as Jinmu.¹⁷⁷ The upsurge in such coverage in recent years demonstrates that, notwithstanding the lack of historical sources and other evidence, Japan’s “founding figure” continues to be a powerful national symbol.¹⁷⁸

PRINCES OF THE PRESENT: IMPERIAL STATUARY IN THE CAPITAL

The monuments to Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa, the emperors Keitai in Fukui, Jinmu in Tokushima, Toyohashi, Niigata, Himi (and other cities in Toyama), and Kameyama (1249–1305) in Fukuoka (see chapter 6) are examples of how the public space in the Meiji period was occupied by figures associated with the Imperial House in an attempt to disseminate the new state ideology of national unity and to “turn peasants (and townspeople) into Japanese.”

But we have yet to consider how these developments played out in the imperial capital, Tokyo. Takashi Fujitani explains that the people of Tokyo

could catch a glimpse of Emperor Meiji during imperial processions in the city, for instance, on the occasion of his silver wedding and during military parades.¹⁷⁹ But like the progresses of Meiji to the prefectures (see chapter 2), these appearances constituted only brief snapshots of visibility, and therefore in the capital more enduring and more powerful public representations of the restored power of the imperial dynasty were deemed necessary. The visualization of imperial power in the capital, however, differed fundamentally from the measures adopted in the prefectural cities considered thus far. In Tokyo, ancient imperial figures such as Yamato Takeru, Keitai, or Jinmu remained absent from the public square. Multiple plans were mooted throughout the Meiji period to build, for instance, statues of Jinmu, but none ever materialized.¹⁸⁰ I have identified only one sculpture of a figure relating to the Imperial House's ancient mythological past built in Tokyo before the war, a statue of the war god Umashimade. Imperial statuary in the capital was almost exclusively confined to contemporary members of the imperial dynasty—in other words, to figures who had contributed to the foundation of the modern nation-state.

In Japanese mythology, Umashimade was portrayed as a military commander who served under Emperor Jinmu during his quest to unify Japan. He is sometimes considered the ancestor of the aristocratic Mononobe clan, which was well known for its control of the military in the early imperial court. Historical sources tell us that in the sixth century, the Mononobe were involved in a fierce rivalry with another leading clan, the Soga, and opposed the influx of Buddhism into Japan. In the Meiji period, Umashimade, like Jinmu, was referred to as a progenitor of imperial command of the military and an example of military virtues. In an 1893 publication on *Models of Loyalty and Bravery* (*Chūyū kikan*), for example, Umashimade was introduced in the section entitled “The Duty of Military Men is to Uphold Loyalty.”¹⁸¹

Given his military associations, it is not surprising that the IJA initiated the building of this statue that was erected in 1894 in Hama Rikyū Park. The

sculptor was Sano Akira (1866–1955), a student of the Italian sculptor Vincenzo Ragusa (1841–1927), who taught at the Technical Art School (*Kōbu Bijutsu Gakkō*) from 1876 to 1883. At the time, the park was not accessible to the public, but high-ranking foreign visitors to Japan, including Prince Heinrich of Germany, former US President Ulysses Grant (both in 1879) and Prince Franz Ferdinand of Habsburg-Lothringen (in 1892), were lodged in the park's guesthouse, the Enryōkan. The park was opened to the general public after World War II, in 1946, under the name Hama Rikyū Onshi Teien.¹⁸²

Despite its restricted location, the Umashimade statue received considerable media coverage. On March 20, 1894, the *Yomiuri shinbun* reported that “military officers and authorities have announced that they will donate a bronze statue of Umashimade (Umashimade-no-mikoto) on the occasion of the silver wedding of the imperial couple.”¹⁸³ The article further stated that funds for the project were collected from the army, and donations were received from 3,583 individuals. It is evident that the newspaper was aware of how few of their readers knew about Umashimade, as most of the article was devoted to an explanation of the “historical” background of this war god, “based on consultation of the *Nihon shoki* and the *Dai-Nihonshi*,” two sources dating from the eighth and the seventeenth centuries, respectively.

This material occupied so much space in the newspaper that a supplementary piece was published in the next issue that set out the army's reasons for the statue's commission. First, as a commander serving Jinmu, Umashimade became emblematic of devotion to the imperial cause. Secondly, the statue was an expression of the army's prayers for the longevity of both the emperor and the empress. Thirdly, it would function as a reminder of the foundation of the Mononobe clan and its associations with the origins of the military in Japanese history. And finally, the statue would serve as a reminder that Japan's military forces were at the service of the emperor. In antiquity, these had been the troops of Umashimade in support of Jinmu; when the statue was built the Impe-

rial Guard (Konoe-hei) were seen as the closest to the imperial person.¹⁸⁴

The *Yomiuri shinbun* article clarifies the IJA's wishes that the statue should represent the historical roots of the supreme command of the imperial dynasty over the military, with Umashimade embodying unflinching loyalty to the Imperial House. The *Yomiuri* continued to report on the progress of the project;¹⁸⁵ it also disclosed that a select group, including art specialists, had been invited to preview the statue before its unveiling.¹⁸⁶ Ultimately, the figure of Umashimade was of limited utility in furthering the regime's policies of national integration due to its restricted accessibility. By the time the park was opened to the public after World War II, people had little interest in the ancient roots of Japan's imperial lineage (fig. 3.22). Today the statue is something of an anomaly. The odd English-language caption on the information board next to the sculpture expresses the difficulty in explaining the identity of Umashimade to contemporaries: "This is the bronze statue of Mars." Even as recent as early 2018, the park's official website made no mention of the statue, apart from marking it on its map.¹⁸⁷

All other statues representing the imperial dynasty in Tokyo's public spaces were of contemporary figures—that is, members of the branches of the Imperial House (*miyake*). These examples all epitomize Japan's new-found military preeminence and the imperial dynasty's renewed claim to the supreme military command. With the establishment of the IJA, all male members of the imperial family were required to join the military and, not surprisingly, often rose to very senior ranks, such as chief of staff of the IJA or chief of the Admiralty of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).

Different from the statues of Yamato Takeru, Keitai, and Jinmu, the statues of the imperial princes in Tokyo are all equestrian monuments. In the European tradition, equestrian monuments were the prerogative of kings and rulers, but early Japanese examples were distinguished military officers. The earliest equestrian sculpture to be cast in Japan, though in a small format, depicted the army officer, Fukushima Yasumasa (1852–1919).¹⁸⁸ Not



Fig. 3.22 Statue of the war god Umashimade (1894), Hama Rikyū, Tokyo.

intended for outdoor display, this 33 cm high silver statuette was placed on view in 1894 in Japan's first war museum, the *Yūshūkan*, at Yasukuni Shrine.¹⁸⁹ The next equestrian statues portrayed members of the warrior class: the medieval warrior Kusunoki Masashige and a daimyo of a feudal domain from more recent times, Mōri Takachika. Both were installed in parks in 1900 (see chapter 6 for details). Therefore, by 1900, with the re-establishment of the imperial prerogative, the depiction of the imperial family on horseback commanding the military became an urgent matter. This provides the setting for the construction of the equestrian statues of imperial figures in Tokyo in the early twentieth century: Prince Arisugawa Taruhito (1835–95) and Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa (1847–95) in 1903, and Prince Komatsu Akihito (1846–1903) in 1912.

The initial plans to build a statue of Prince Arisugawa date to 1896, when, once again, the IJA, together with the IJN, published a prospectus and called for donations to fund the memorial. The pro-

spectus listed the “memorialization (*kinen*) of the prince” as the motivation behind the project and proposed to erect the statue outside the Imperial Palace in an attempt to visualize imperial power at its epicenter.¹⁹⁰ The instigators of the project included generals Yamagata Aritomo, Ōyama Iwao (1842–1916), and Kawakami Sōroku (1848–99), and admirals Saigō Tsugumichi (Jūdō, 1843–1902) and Itō Sukeyuki (1843–1914).¹⁹¹ The call for donations produced 64,915 *yen*, funds sufficient to build the envisioned statue.¹⁹²

Prince Arisugawa was the first and until then the longest-serving chief of the IJA’s General Staff and head of one of the four branches of the Imperial Household that enjoyed the right to provide a successor to the throne if the main line failed to produce an heir.¹⁹³ His statue, cast in the IJA’s Tokyo arsenal, was designed by sculptor Ōkuma Ujihiro (1856–1934), who had studied bronze sculpture in Europe and is acknowledged as a pioneering modern Japanese sculptor in this field.¹⁹⁴ Ōkuma was awarded the commission following an open competition, which one of his rivals, Fujita Bunzō (1861–1934), believed was openly biased. Fujita criticized the selection process as extremely opaque and lamented the lack of detailed criteria, hinting that the outcome had been determined by political influence and not by artistic merit.¹⁹⁵

The statue was not completed until 1903, when it was unveiled in front of the General Staff headquarters on Miyakezaka in central Tokyo. The unveiling ceremony was covered by national newspapers and journals such as *Taiyō*.¹⁹⁶ About 500 people attended the event, which was advertised widely by the construction committee (*kensetsu iinkai*) in the media, such as the daily, *Asahi shinbun*.¹⁹⁷ The *Asahi* covered the ceremony in great detail and a sketch of the statue appeared on the front page on the day of the unveiling.¹⁹⁸ The article reported that high-ranking officials including Prince Arisugawa Takehito (1862–1913), half-brother and successor to Taruhito,¹⁹⁹ and the heads of the Kan’in, Kuni, Katchō (Kwachō) and Nashimoto imperial families attended the event. IJA Chief of General Staff Ōyama Iwao, Army Minister Terauchi Masatake

(1852–1919), and IJN Chief of Admiralty Itō Sukeyuki represented the military. In addition, two representatives of the Tokugawa house also attended the event, Tokugawa Keiki (Yoshinobu, 1837–1913), the “last shogun” and son of a former daimyo of Mito feudal domain, and Tokugawa Iesato (1863–1940), the current head of the Tokugawa family. One of the reasons for the presence of members of the Tokugawa family was the fact that Taruhito’s first wife, Sadako, was Keiki’s granddaughter. The governor of Tokyo Prefecture and the mayor of Tokyo represented the local authorities. Overall, however, the ceremony was characterized by a strong military presence.

Army Minister Terauchi, who had served as the chairman of the construction committee (*kensetsu iinchō*), reported on the genesis of the project, praising Prince Arisugawa’s contribution to the victories of the imperial forces during the civil wars of the Meiji Restoration and the establishment of the new regime, but equally his leadership in the Sino-Japanese War.

The Tokugawa family representatives did not appear discomfited despite being the opponents of the imperial forces led by Prince Arisugawa in the 1867–68 Boshin Civil War. Tokugawa Keiki, who had retired from public service after resigning as shogun in 1867, had been rehabilitated and in 1902 had been permitted to restore his own branch of the Tokugawa clan with the highest rank in the Japanese peerage, that of a prince (*kōshaku*, not to be confused with the title of an imperial prince, *miya*). In his speech, Keiki praised Prince Arisugawa as a “great and impressive man” and expressed his pleasure at the completion of the statue. The speech underlined the alignment of the Tokugawa with the new regime and demonstrated that the new administration had made its peace with the family of the former shogun. In effect, the ceremony contributed to the shaping of the memory of Prince Arisugawa, but it also sealed the rehabilitation of the Tokugawa house in Meiji Japan.

Following a performance by a military band, Terauchi brought the younger Prince Arisugawa forward to unveil the statue of his half-brother. A



Fig. 3.23 *General Staff Office Arisugawa Miyado-zo. Sanbō Honbu Arisugawa dōzō.* Hand-colored souvenir postcard (unused), early twentieth century.

further speech by Ōyama Iwao, who emphasized the prince's contribution to the restoration of imperial rule and compared Arisugawa to the heroes of the Kenmu Restoration, concluded the ceremony. The report published in *Taiyō* asserted that “the people (*kokumin*) must never forget that the prince continuously, until his death, devoted himself to the affairs of the state,” stressing the concepts of loyalty to the sovereign and devotion to the nation.²⁰⁰

The Arisugawa statue was a widely-known monument in prewar Japan. It featured on postcards (fig. 3.23), was reproduced in pictorials and guidebooks, and was also counted among the most famous statues in Tokyo.²⁰¹ The prince's imperial background guaranteed the survival of the monument during wartime mobilization. Fearing repercussions from the Occupation authorities, officials removed it from its original location in 1946 and placed it in

storage in the Finance Ministry's Kantō Local Finance and Assets Bureau (Ōkura-shō Kantō Zaimukyoku). In 1962, it was moved to Arisugawa-no-miya Memorial Park in Minami-Azabu in Minato Ward where it stands today.²⁰² The 6.8 ha park opened to the public in 1934 after the end of the Arisugawa family line and the donation of this former family estate to the city of Tokyo.²⁰³

The statue honoring Prince Kitashirakawa, who died from malaria during a 1895 military expedition to Taiwan in the First Sino-Japanese War as the commander of the Imperial Guard Division (*Konoe shidan*), was erected in 1903 at the entrance to the headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiment of the Imperial Guard in Takebashi (fig. 3.24). It received less attention in the media than the Arisugawa memorial, possibly because of the lower profile of the sculptor Shinkai Taketarō (1868–1927) or the lesser fame of the subject. Arisugawa was a former chief of the IJA General Staff and a commander of imperial troops during the Meiji Restoration. Kitashirakawa, in contrast, had sided temporarily with the forces loyal to the shogunate during the civil wars, amid rumors that he intended to declare himself emperor.

His historical legacy was therefore ambiguous, resulting in less enthusiasm for a statue dedicated to him. Nevertheless, an impressive lineup of influential army and navy figures gathered in 1898 to organize the commissioning of a memorial for the prince, including generals Ōyama Iwao, Takashima Tomonosuke (1844–1916), Katsura Tarō, Nogi Maresuke, Hasegawa Yoshimichi (1850–1924), and admirals Saigō Tsugumichi and Kabayama Sukenori (1837–1922).²⁰⁴ High-ranking officials also attended the 1903 unveiling ceremony. General Hasegawa, the commander of the Imperial Guards and chair of the construction committee, outlined the development of the project and expressed his appreciation for the financial support given by donors such as Shimazu Tadashige (1886–1968), the son of the last daimyo of

Satsuma, and Furukawa Ichibei (1832–1903), the founder of the Furukawa industrial conglomerate that had donated the copper for the statue.²⁰⁵

The statue survived the war and the Allied Occupation. The construction of a highway in 1963 prompted its removal from Takebashi to a site near the Imperial Palace, next to a building of the present-day National Museum of Modern Art (Tōkyō Kokuritsu Kindai Bijutsukan) that had coincidentally been the former headquarters of the Imperial Guards Division, which had been under the command of the prince until his death.²⁰⁶ It still stands near the museum, which is today part of Kitanomaru Park. A smaller, wooden model of the statue also has survived until today and is now on view at the Yūshūkan museum at Yasukuni Shrine.²⁰⁷



Fig. 3.24 Statue of Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa outside the National Museum of Modern Art in Tokyo (1903).

Fig. 3.25 Statue of Prince Komatsu Akihito, Ueno Park, Tokyo (1912).



Fig. 3.26 *Ueno kōen Saigō-ō dōzō oyobi Shimizu-dō no shinkei. Tōkyō meisho* (True Image of the Venerable Saigō and the Shimizu Hall in Ueno Park. Famous Views of Tokyo). Lithograph, 1925. Although the title refers only to the Saigō statue, the Komatsu statue is shown prominently in the top left corner of the print. 40 × 55 cm.



A third equestrian statue of an imperial prince was unveiled in 1912 in Ueno Park (fig. 3.25). It was dedicated to Prince Arisugawa's nephew, Prince Komatsu Akihito, who had participated in the wars of the Meiji Restoration as a commander of the imperial troops that besieged Aizu. He succeeded his uncle as chief of the IJA's General Staff and was also Japan's diplomatic representative to the Ottoman Empire and Britain as well as a patron of the Japanese Red Cross Society. The Komatsu statue was the work of the influential Meiji-period sculptor, Takamura Kōun (1852–1934), and like the Arisugawa and Kitashirakawa statues, it was cast by Okazaki Sessei. Takamura and Okazaki were commissioned many of the memorial projects in Meiji Japan and became the “fathers” of public statuary in modern Japan.²⁰⁸ The two best-known figures in the Japanese army and navy—General Nogi Maresuke and Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō—attended the unveiling ceremony and the press reported intensively.²⁰⁹

The Komatsu memorial joined a statue erected in the same location in 1898 to honor the hero of the Meiji Restoration, Saigō Takamori (see chapter 6). The selection of Ueno Park as the site for this work was, therefore, no coincidence. The building of a statue to Saigō, a rebel considered responsible for the Satsuma Rebellion, was a highly contested act in late nineteenth-century Japan. With the installation of the Komatsu statue, the Imperial House now took symbolic possession of Ueno Park. As the location of several imperial museums and the Imperial Zoo (Teikoku Dōbutsuen), the park already had imperial associations, and the emperor visited the area on occasion to attend exhibitions. Eventually, however, the Komatsu statue would remain in the shadow of the Saigō statue, as contemporaneous illustrations evince (fig. 3.26). The memorial dedicated to Prince Komatsu also survived wartime mobilization and postwar transformations. Although it today remains an imposing equestrian monument in its original location, its fame continues to be eclipsed by the figure of Saigō.

4 Patterns of Social Behavior and Participation

The analysis of statue projects in chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that processes of planning, designing, and building monuments reflected the social norms of Japan's ruling elite. We observed similar patterns of social behavior, with the same actors repeatedly assuming leading roles in the establishment of public memorials. Rules surfaced that were codified through legislation and spread through public announcements as well as manuals privately published. This chapter will summarize the patterns of social behavior and participation that emerge from analyses of early statue projects and will explore additional primary sources to present a bird's-eye view of the social dynamics involved.

IDEAS, PROPOSALS, AND NETWORKS

The first step toward the construction of a statue was to draft a prospectus (*shuisho*) and then go public with the idea through advertisements in newspapers and calls for funding. The prospectus outlined the historical significance of the person to be honored and summarized their “achievements.” In many cases, it revised the established image of the subject and rehabilitated the reputation of a historical figure who had fallen out of public favor. Usually written by a group of supporters intimate with the subject, either due to political sympathies or family connections, the prospectus can be considered a subgenre of “monumental biography” (see chapter 1). It was also not uncommon for a biography of the “Great Man” in question to be released concurrently.¹ By praising the life and deeds of their hero, commissioning individuals (or groups) called on the entire nation to venerate the subject of the proposed statue.

Most statues were proposed by members of the social and political elite, often members of the central government and national institutions, but also by local elites attempting to link local issues to the national cause. Networking was a crucial factor in the realization of a statue project, and some projects failed to materialize due to the insufficient social capital of the instigators. A review of unrealized initiatives suggests in fact that social networks were more important than the fame of the person to be honored. In 1892, for example, a group of sculptors led by Horii Tsūmei (1854–1943), a graduate of the Technical Art School where he had studied under Vincenzo Ragusa, proposed a monument dedicated to the eminent Meiji statesman Sanjō Sanetomi (1837–91) (fig. 4.1).² They were, however, only able to recruit the support of one influential politician, Chisaka Takamasa, who had been involved in the Kanazawa statue of Yamato Takeru. Following many years of public service as governor of Ishikawa and Okayama Prefectures and in the Home Ministry, Chisaka was elected a member of the House of Peers in 1893, which marked the height of his career as a bureaucrat. But




Fig. 4.1 *Ko Naidaijin shō-ichi'i daikun'i kōshaku Sanjō Sanetomi dōzō kinenhi kensetsu shuisho* (Prospectus to Build a Bronze Statue Memorial to the Late Minister of the Center, First Rank, Grand Cordon, Prince Sanjō Sanetomi), 1892. Sketch of a planned statue for Sanjō Sanetomi. Publisher unnamed.

even though the vogue for statue-building had gained considerable momentum by this time, the failure to recruit more influential political figures forced Horii to abort the project. Without the involvement of members of the political elite, the project was doomed to failure.³

The statues initiated by the IJA and, to a lesser degree, the IJN in prewar Japan, deserve special mention, given that the activities of these two branches of the imperial military forces mirrored a salient feature of pre-1945 Japan—that is, that Japan was frequently at war and was a highly militarized state. Following the civil wars of the 1870s and lesser military engagements in the 1880s, Japan fought a major war every decade, beginning with the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), followed by the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), World War I (1914–18), the Siberian Intervention (1918–22), military interventions in China throughout the 1920s, and the Asia-Pacific War (1931–45). As a result, the military was deeply involved in a considerable number of memorial projects, including the imperial statues introduced in chapter 3 and monu-

ments dedicated to war heroes, which will be discussed in chapter 6. The military's success not only depended on powerful intermediary groups at the local level, such as the youth associations (*seinendan*) and the local branches of the Imperial Reservists Association, but also to its connections on the national level.⁴

APPROVAL AND FINANCING

In all the cases analyzed thus far, and in the majority of those introduced below, the organizers appointed a construction committee (known as *konryū iinkai*, *kensetsu iinkai*, *kenpi iinkai*) to coordinate the steps required during the statue-building process. These committees comprised members of the local elite such as the town mayor and representatives of the regional assembly and other local politicians; local schools, usually the principal of the local elementary school; local businesses; religious groups; the military, as well as veterans and youth organizations. Representatives of the national government were included, whenever possible. The participation of delegates from school, youth and veteran organizations signal that social education and the spiritual indoctrination and mobilization of the nation were foremost among the dimensions of statue-building.

Nevertheless, despite the constant involvement of prominent politicians and other elites in statue projects, no statue-building “master plan” was ever drafted by any institution of the central government in modern Japan. On the contrary, the growth of public statuary was a decentralized process, displaying different characteristics in different parts of the country; even the approval and regulation procedures were never entirely standardized. In 1906, one contemporary observer remarked that no comprehensive law existed to *regulate* the building of monuments (*kinenhi kensetsu*), only directives (*kunrei*) but even these were issued only for “internal use” (*naikun*) by the police acting on behalf of the Home Ministry. The observer also lamented that the bureaucratic requirements and regulations con-

tained in the existing directives often posed considerable obstacles.⁵

The parties involved in the approval process ranged from the IHM, the Home Ministry, and the two military ministries on the national level to the prefectural administrations and governors, as well as to local authorities, including mayors and the local police. As we have seen, if a statue portrayed a figure associated with the Imperial House, consultation with the IHM was required. We have already seen that any use of the imperial portrait was highly regulated, and similar rules applied to sculpture depicting the emperor. The information in the IHM archives does not allow definitive conclusions, yet it appears that although the ministry vetoed statues of the reigning emperor, it supported alternative statue projects such as those of Yamato Takeru, Jinmu, Keitai, and Umashimade.

The owner of the land where a statue was to be situated also had to be consulted. If a statue was slated for installation on land owned by a national institution, then this body also needed to be involved in the process. In the case of land administered by the military, for example, the Army or Navy ministries had to approve the project, even when the applicant was from within the ministry or the proposed statue portrayed a military figure. The Home Ministry provided approval for statues built on sites that were open to public view, such as parks, shrines, and temples. (In the 1930s, jurisdiction was shifted to the Ministry of Education, but only few statues were built after that.) The Home Ministry was, according to historian Gordon Berger, one of the most powerful institutions of prewar Japan:

The Home Ministry was more deeply involved in the daily lives of the Japanese people than was any other ministry. Its officials were responsible for maintaining public order and supervising elections. The ministry ran the police system and the system of local government. It held responsibility for public works, the national health programs, Shinto shrines, urban planning and land development programs. The unsettled socio-economic conditions in Japan after World War I raised new problems of social control

for the ministry, and instilled in its officials a desire for greater administrative efficiency.⁶

If a local construction committee was able to establish a working relationship with the Home Ministry through the prefectural government, the chances of receiving approval increased. The instigators of memorial projects were keenly aware of this, and while no central control of statue-building existed, construction committees sometimes even sought out office space *within* the Home Ministry building. This testified to their acknowledgment of the ministry's influence and demonstrated the significance of the monument in question as a "national project." One example of an organization that had its headquarters within the Home Ministry was the Association for the Commemoration of Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō (Tōgō-gensui Kinenkai), which masterminded the building of the Tōgō Shrine and a statue for the admiral.⁷

The Home Ministry regulated the building of monuments and statues through directives to the prefectures and, in particular, through the prefectural police, although it generally followed a *laissez-faire* approach and rarely denied approval for a proposed monument. The earliest directive relating to the memorialization of individuals was issued in 1884 when the "Rules Concerning Graves and Burials" stipulated that the inscriptions on gravestones and monuments dedicated to a deceased person must not "endanger public order" (*chian o bōgai*).⁸ This directive was the first to include stipulations to regulate monuments built in the public sphere, and "monuments" was generally assumed to include sculptures of all kind.

In 1886, the Home Ministry instructed the prefectural governments to control the building of monuments at shrines and temples. The ministry's Directive No. 397, "Regarding the Construction of Monuments at Shrines and Temples" (*Shaji kyōnai kinenhi kensetsu no ken*), explicitly referred to the "recently growing number" of shrines and temples founded for the worship of individuals (*sōken jinja*, see chapter 1). The directive generally banned the building of monuments in government-administered

shrines and temples (*kan'yū shaji*), but memorials to figures who had made an "important contribution to the state" were exempted. Moreover, it specified that such monuments should not merely preserve the memory of their subjects, but stimulate feelings of national spirit among the people, and move them to imitate the achievements of those memorialized.⁹

The ministry thus bespoke a clear understanding of the potential of public statuary for social education and for indoctrinating the people with the ideology of service to the state. While the 1884 and 1886 directives concerned "monuments" (*kinenhi*) in general, the 1900 Home Ministry Ordinance No. 18, "Regulations Concerning the Control of Sculpture" (*Gyōzō torishimari kisoku*), focused specifically on public sculpture, demonstrating an awareness of the recent growth of this art form.¹⁰ Issued on May 19, 1900, this directive decreed that a request for approval had to be submitted to the Home Ministry through the relevant prefectural administration for any statue erected in a public (*kōshū*) place. Permission must be sought not only for statues of "persons" (*jinbutsu*) but also for "non-historical persons" (*rekishijō kencho narazaru jinbutsu*) and allegorical figures (*gūi*). A follow-up directive (*Gyōzō torishimari ni kansuru ken*) dated June 13, 1900, added that requests for permission should be submitted to the relevant prefectural government through the local police station with jurisdiction over the proposed location of the sculpture.¹¹ If the Home Ministry gave its approval, the decision was conveyed to the governor of the prefecture, who would then instruct the police accordingly. In a 1924 dispatch, the Home Ministry added that in the case of statues depicting figures affiliated with the Imperial House, any associated inscriptions require particular scrutiny because of the potential impact that monuments of this kind could have on Japan's international relations.¹²

The 1900 ordinance was initially limited to the cities of Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka,¹³ and from 1912 the police there kept a register of public sculptures and memorials (*gyōzō oyobi hihyō daichō*).¹⁴ Prefectures throughout Japan followed suit in applying the same regulations. Fukuoka Prefecture, for example,

gave the prefectural police the power to administer the 1900 ordinance and passed them the details of the documents needed for applications in 1913.¹⁵ In certain instances, this caused conflicts between prefectural and municipal administrations. In 1906, for example, Niigata Prefecture insisted that the local veterans' organization had to secure approval from the Home Ministry to build their proposed statue of Emperor Jinmu in Hakusan Park (see chapter 3). Although it may have been argued that the monument served the religious purpose of mourning for the dead and therefore did not fall under the 1900 ordinance, the city of Niigata withdrew its previously given approval following the intervention of the prefectural administration.¹⁶

The various administrative levels that applicants had to negotiate prompted the publication of "manuals" explaining how to secure approval. Fukuoka Prefecture prepared a set of guidelines, *Hihyō oyobi gyōzō kensetsu negai toriatsukai kokoro* (Guidelines Regarding the Request for Approval for Construction of Memorials and Sculptures), for those who planned to apply for approval for a memorial.¹⁷ Following the Russo-Japanese War, the lawyer Yamazaki Arinobu published the manual, *Procedures for Building Memorials or Enshrining the Fallen [Heroes] of the Russo-Japanese War*, which elucidated the details of approval processes and even contained sample letters and templates for inscriptions for proposed memorials.¹⁸

Applications for approval to the Home Ministry had to provide background information about the project, together with basic facts about the monument to be built, that covered 1) the type (form and material) of a monument proposed; 2) its location; 3) inscription, if any; 4) where a statue of a historical figure was proposed, information about the subject (in case of an allegorical figure, an explanation was required); 5) the names of the project instigators; 6) the details of funding and budget provisions; and 7) the noting of maintenance requirements.¹⁹ Maps indicating the location of the monument and sketches of the design or photographs of the statue (or its cast) also had to be enclosed.²⁰

The majority of applications eventually received approval, even though ministries attached conditions in some cases. When, for example, the statue of Maeda Yoshiyasu was built in Kenrokuen in Kanazawa in 1930, approval was given on condition that "the scenic beauty of the park will not be spoiled."²¹ This may have been a special request because of the national prominence of Kenrokuen as one of Japan's most famous gardens. Yet, in other instances, construction work created drastic changes in parkscape, and the details were often left to local authorities to deal with.²²

In some instances, the Home Ministry used its powers to veto the building of a statue in a particular location. The initial plans for statues of Count Gotō Shōjirō (1838–97) and Viscount Shinagawa Yajirō (1843–1900), for example, were altered due to the Home Ministry's intervention during the approval process.²³ On occasion, ministries rejected proposals to have a statue in a public park because the subject did not belong to the "right" social class. This reason was given, for example, in the case of the rejection of a proposal for a statue of journalist and pioneer of print technology, Motoki Shōzō (1824–75). A statue of Motoki was, however, ultimately erected next to his grave, where the ministry was unable to interfere.²⁴

Following approval from the relevant ministries and local authorities, funding posed the next hurdle for construction committees. Donations were initially solicited locally and from people with connections to the person to be venerated (*kankeisha*), but, in many cases, the organizers also conducted nationwide fundraising campaigns, which gave a statue greater prestige as a "national monument." Interestingly, the most famous statue of modern Japan, the monument to Kusunoki Masashige outside the Imperial Palace, was funded solely by one of Japan's industrial conglomerates, Sumitomo (see chapter 6), in an attempt to demonstrate its commitment to the nation and loyalty to the emperor. In select cases, a lack of funds could cause the failure of a statue project, but overall funding was rarely a problem. In times of economic crisis and a concomitant shortfall in donations, public funds were often solicited to

close the financial gap, as with a statue built to honor Gotō Shinpei in the late 1920s in the colonial city of Dairen (C: Dalian; see chapter 8).

DESIGNING AND CASTING THE STATUE

The next step, after petitioning and approval, involved the search of an artist (sculptor) and a bronze-caster (founder). This phase sometimes took the form of a design competition. The pool of artists and craftsmen in Japan with the appropriate skills was relatively small. It is therefore not surprising that we repeatedly encounter the same names again and again during the Meiji and Taishō periods—most notably, the sculptors Watanabe Osao, his brother Asakura Fumio, Ōkuma Ujihiro, and Takamura Kōun, and the casters Okazaki Sesei (Watanabe's father-in-law) and Abe Insai.

In most instances, the design competition did not stimulate intense debates about aesthetics since artistic refinement was considered secondary to the sculptor's ability to create a "real" representation of the subject. Only in a very few examples did aesthetic considerations take center stage. If debates about design did occur, they were usually about the appropriateness of the dress of the "man in metal," about the historical authenticity of armor or weapons accompanying the figure or the accuracy of the facial features. The statue of Saigō Takamori in Ueno Park, for example, portrayed the samurai as a private civilian rather than as a leading statesman, general, or rebel against the central government—all guises for which he was well known. As we have seen, the 1925 statue in Kibe was claimed to resemble Emperor Meiji and thus could not, in the eyes of its critics, be considered an adequate representation of Emperor Jinmu. Questions about a statue's authenticity periodically triggered intense debate.

The successful sculptor first presented his design in the form of a preliminary model, or maquette, usually made of wood. After receiving approval from the donors or the construction committee, he began to work on the cast, the material of which depended on the casting technique

intended. Next, the statue was cast by the founder, often in cooperation with the sculptor, the plinth was built by a construction company; and the statue was put into place.

The typical locations for statues were public parks, which contain the largest number of Japanese statues of public figures, followed by public squares and buildings, temples and cemeteries, shrines, memorials and museums (see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of locations). A 1906 manual for those considering the construction of a memorial to the war dead, which was often combined with statues, recommended shrines as "the most sacred sites" (*ichiban shinsei*) and the most suitable locations for memorials. Temples, parks, and cemeteries were next in importance.²⁵ Statues associated with Japanese mythology were sometimes erected on mountains, such as the Jinmu statues in Yamaguchi and Nara, and the Yamato Takeru statue in Gunma.

In order to prevent legal ambiguities and future litigation, a contract was signed by the owner of the land in question and the sculptor. Even when a statue of Itō Hirobumi, one of modern Japan's most revered statesmen, was erected in 1936 on a small piece of land adjacent to the Imperial Diet and a designated park (later named Itō-kō Kinen Kōen, or "Lord Itō Memorial Park"), the director of the Property Custody Office of the Ministry of Finance insisted on the conclusion of a contract with the chairman of the commissioning organization, the Association for the Commendation of Lord Itō (Shunpokō Tsuishōkai).²⁶ The contract stated that the ministry grants the association use of the land free of charge and that the association will use it exclusively for the display of a statue of Itō Hirobumi. For its part, the association promised that it would manage the land and maintain the statue. Undermining the idea that the statue was built to convey the achievements of Itō "into eternity," the contract was limited to thirty years. The ministry reserved the right to annul the agreement without compensation, in which case the association would have to demolish "any objects" on the land. The association was also bound to pay compensation to the state in

the event of damage to the land resulting from its activities, without the right of objection. A sketch of the property in question was attached to the contract (fig. 4.2).

The contract between the Association for the Commendation of Lord Itō and the Ministry of Finance reveals that the government's role in the development of public statuary was a regulatory one. As the owner of a piece of land where a statue was to be set up, the Ministry of Finance indeed was more concerned with preserving its ownership rights and with regulating the use of the land than with stimulating or even supporting statue-building. The contract authorized the administration to cancel the agreement at any time and order the dismantling of the statue. This does not suggest unalloyed enthusiasm on the part of the involved bureaucrats for the usage of public land for statuary; it rather confirms that the central government played a passive role in the development of statuary in modern Japan.

UNVEILING AND REPORTING

The completion of a statue was usually celebrated with an unveiling ceremony (*jomakushiki*). The unveiling could develop into an extravagant local event with extensive press coverage; they were often accompanied by the publication of commemorative postcards or similar material (figs. 4.3–4.4). Some unveilings were by invitation only or were exclusive family occasions; many were open to the public and some turned into large-scale spectacles.

The project's organizers, the members of the construction committee, the sculptor, the subject's family members, and significant donors were generally present at unveiling ceremonies. If the monument was dedicated to a politician, former colleagues and not uncommonly a minister or even the prime minister would attend. Their attendance demonstrated the significance of these ceremonies and of statues honoring distinguished public figures. Statues to living individuals were not unusual in Japan, including those to the Meiji statesman Itō Hirobumi unveiled in Kobe in 1904, Itagaki Taisuke in Kōchi in




Fig. 4.2 Map showing the land on which a statue of Itō Hirobumi was erected in 1936. Reproduced in Shunpokō Tsuishōkai, *Itō Hirobumi-kō dōzō oyobi shōtokuhi kensetsu tenmatsu* (Tokyo: Shunpokō Tsuishōkai, 1937), 19.



Fig. 4.3-4.4 *Tsugaru Tamenobu-kō dōzō jomakushiki kinen ehaqaki* (Commemorative Postcard for the Unveiling ceremony of the Bronze Statue of Lord Tsugaru Tamenobu). From a set of commemorative postcards issued by Hirosaki City to mark the unveiling of the statue of Lord Tsugaru Tamenobu in Hirosaki in 1909.

1924, and Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō in Tokyo in 1925.²⁷ In these instances, the subjects even took part in the unveiling ceremony of their own statues.

The attendees at the inaugurations of statues of eminent Meiji-period statesmen were frequently drawn from the highest echelons of Japanese society. The unveiling of the 5 m statue dedicated to Itō Hirobumi in front of the Imperial Diet in 1936 probably attracted the highest-ranking audience of any ceremony, notwithstanding the restrictive contract that had been signed with the commissioning association, the Association for the Commendation of Lord Itō. Among the attendees were Prime Minister Hirota Kōki (1878–1948); five cabinet ministers; the president of the Privy Council; several council members; the president of the House of Representatives; the president of the House of Peers; a former president of the Privy Council; further senior politicians; and several ambassadors including those of the United States, Germany, and Italy. The master of ceremonies was ninety-six-year-old Tanaka Mitsuaki, one of the driving forces behind the worship of the “heroes of the Meiji Restoration” (see chapter 2) and chairman of the Association for the Commendation of Lord Itō. He died a month after hosting this event.²⁸

The statue dedicated to Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915), a Meiji oligarch close to Itō, is another case in point. It was commissioned during Inoue’s lifetime, in 1908, by Japan’s economic and financial elite in a gesture of gratitude for the economic policies that Inoue had pioneered. These policies not only promoted the economic growth of the nation but also the growth of Japan’s *zaibatsu* (industrial conglomerates). Given the wealth of its backers, it was one of the tallest public statues of its time at 4.85 m and weighing 6.75 tons; it was made by the prominent sculptor–caster team of Watanabe Osao and Okazaki Sessei.²⁹ The inauguration ceremony on November 28, 1910—Inoue’s birthday—was attended by influential politicians and entrepreneurs, including two ministers, several members of the Diet, and the leaders of Japan’s *zaibatsu*.³⁰

Some unveiling ceremonies, such as that for the statue of Emperor Jinmu in Toyohashi in 1899, re-

sembled religious festivals and had Shinto elements. The Toyohashi event began with a long procession to the area in front of the statue where the ceremony was to be held. Two attendants heading the procession swept the path with bamboo brooms, and they were followed by a local Shinto priest, the head priest of Atsuta Shrine in nearby Nagoya, one of Japan’s three most important Shinto shrines, and the members of the construction committee. A wooden model of the statue was carried behind them, then two assistants bearing branches of the sacred *sakaki* tree, another priest, and officers from the local infantry regiment who had initiated the project. Members of the Committee for the Building of the Memorial walked behind the officers, and several hundred representatives from neighboring villages and hundreds of students from local elementary schools brought up the end of the procession. The Shinto form of this inauguration event can be seen as a manifestation of the religious dimension of nationalism and the cult of personality.³¹

Unveiling ceremonies usually included lengthy speeches by the organizers and guests. The chairman of the construction committee reported on the genesis of the project, fundraising efforts, and the process of sculpting and casting the statue. Major donors also gave speeches, expressing their satisfaction at the completion of the project. Some donors supported multiple statue projects, becoming sponsors of Japan’s emerging “commemoration industry,” and frequently attended unveiling ceremonies. Modern Japan’s most influential financial tycoon, Shibusawa Eiichi (1840–1931), for example, helped fund at least two dozen statues; he also was seen in the inaugurations of most of these monuments.³²

The speeches at these events also included praise for the achievements of the person honored, setting out the reasons he deserved to be considered an *ijin* worthy of a monument. These narratives took the form of extended versions of the monumental inscription, which conventionally covered precisely these topics. Often, these speeches were intended to raise the subject’s profile. Sometimes they represented an occasion for the rehabilitation of formerly vilified figures, such as

shogunal officials, and they usually contained ample self-praise for those involved in the construction of the memorial. The actual unveiling was most commonly performed by a family member of the person honored—a high-ranking member of the imperial family in the case of statues dedicated to imperial figures such as Jinmu or a military officer for statues of military figures.³³

Once the statue was installed, the construction committee compiled an official report detailing each phase of the project from its initial stages to completion. These reports are an expression of the practice of modern, bureaucratic nation-states to record any kind of process down to the smallest detail. Reports contained documents such as the prospectus, ministerial approval letters, contracts, newspaper clippings, unveiling ceremony programs and transcripts of speeches, sometimes a balance sheet detailing income and expenses, and photographs including the official portrait of the subject, the statue and the inaugurative festivities. Some reports even included a short biography, melding aspects of “monumental biography” with information about the newly built monument.³⁴ The inauguration speeches were now committed to print and were available to a broader audience. Most reports also included a list of donations, detailing the amounts given by individuals or organizations. Some are little more than lists of donors.³⁵ These are useful to the historian as sources for network studies, serving as a “Who’s Who” of the locality where the statue was built and of the personal network of the honored personality as well as the instigators of the monument.

UTILIZING THE STATUE


Once a statue was built, it was usually not left unnoticed, despite Robert Musil’s (1880–1942) famous dictum that “nothing goes as unnoticed as public monuments.”³⁶ Statues were pillars of the collective memory and played essential roles in ceremonies, were reproduced in media coverage, and continue to be an asset of the tourism industry. The

media not only reported on the major events in the life of a statue—its creation or its destruction, for example, as a result of an earthquake (fig. 4.5)—but even on more mundane things such as birds building nests on them (fig. 4.6). Statues most frequently garnered publicity through the coverage of associated festivities, their locations, or the figures they represented. They are key sites for anniversary festivals of the individual honored, and the anniversary of the statue itself can be an opportunity for celebration. Often the two were connected. When a statue was unveiled, for example, on the centennial anniversary of the birth of its subject, then the fiftieth anniversary of the statue would coincide with the 150th “birthday” of the person honored.

In order to fulfill their role as sites of dissemination regarding the idea of “nation,” statues were routinely used as educational tools. School classes visited them to undertake “patriotic service” that involved, among other things, the cleaning of the statue.³⁷ During the war, the indoctrination of the populace with a “martial spirit” became a primary function of public statues until many were dismantled to meet the incessant need for raw materials.

Today, statues still are popular sites for celebrating anniversaries, including events held to mark the foundation of the Japanese empire in 660 BCE in cities such as Tokushima and Toyohashi. In both cities, these festivities are not uncontested and have sparked counter-demonstrations by civic organizations promoting civic rights and peace.³⁸ The overall numbers of participants, however, reveal that the potential to mobilize people to attend such an event today is limited. The Tokushima ceremony is usually limited to 100 to 200, the event in Toyohashi attracts no more than 700 attendees (these festivities will be revisited in chapter 7).³⁹ In the internet age, Musil’s characterization of the limited attention given to statues might be closer to reality, despite the fact that statues are still being erected in Japan in considerable numbers, as we will see in chapter 10 of this work.

品川彌次郎銅像の破壊





極端な選挙干渉と物凄い辣腕とを以つて敵味方共に恐怖せしめた九段坂上の品川彌次郎子の銅像も、基礎工事の弱かつた爲めか、もろくも倒壊して哀れなる姿となつた。



●銅像に燕の巢
 森崎外が編纂主任であつた文藝雑誌『めさし草』は明治二十九年一月の創刊であるが、其巻四の裏表紙に左の如き繪が出て居る（原畫は石版印刷で淡彩色人である）


何等の説明もなく、畫題もないものであるが、これは九段坂上に在る大村益二郎の銅像で、此年の春、燕が銅像の眼の所へ巢を造つたといふので、評判になつて居た事を懐いたのである

Fig. 4.5 *Shinagawa Yajirō-shi dōzō no hakai* (The Destruction of the Bronze Statue of Viscount Shingawa Yajirō). Photograph of a statue damaged in the Great Kantō Earthquake of September 1923. Source: Ichita Kenji, ed., *Kantō daisaigai gahō* (Tokyo: Keibunsha, 1923).

Fig. 4.6 Report of a swallow's nest built in the eye socket of the statue of Ōmura Masujirō.



Part II



5 A Quantitative Analysis of Public Statuary in Modern Japan

The early twentieth century witnessed a rapid growth of public statuary in Japan, a phenomenon that reflected and strengthened the dissemination of a national consciousness throughout the nation at this time. Chapter 3 revealed that the early phase of statue-building in Japan was dominated by figures having affiliations with the imperial dynasty, but over the following decades, a variety of historical subjects appeared. This caused diversification in the range of the historical personalities memorialized. In order to answer key questions about the character of the cult of the individual, it is essential to shed light on the broader picture as well as select individual case studies.

Analyses of case studies are the norm in memory studies and are doubtless important, yet such a methodology has its shortcomings, particularly as regards regional and temporal differences. The large number of memorials dedicated to individuals in modern Japan, however, allows us to overcome these limitations through a quantitative analysis of public statuary. To that end, I have compiled a database containing information on more than 2,000 public statues erected in modern Japan. This chapter will draw on this database to discuss salient aspects that characterize the evolution of bronze statuary and the cult of the individual.

THE DATABASE

My database of modern Japanese public statuary consists of 2,000 data sets, each containing the following information on a single statue (it was not possible in all cases, however, to verify the complete set of data):

- Name of person depicted
- Subject's birth and death dates
- Gender of person depicted
- Subject's official position, title, or affiliation
- Categorization of person depicted
- Date of the erection of statue
- Location of statue (physical address)
- Location of statue (prefecture)
- Type of location
- Type of statue (equestrian, standing, bust, relief)
- Individual/group who initiated the project
- Biographical information about the subject
- Sources of information on the statue

Fields such as "name of person depicted," "location of statue (address/prefecture)," and "date of erection of statue" are unambiguous; others require further explanation. I used Microsoft Access to organize the data and create categories for fields such as "location of statue" and "categorization of person depicted." I then coded the data using predefined categories. The generation of queries allowed the analysis of the data in a variety of ways.

The following categories were set up for the "type of location":

- Parks
- Squares and streets
- Railway stations and airports
- Memorials and museums
- Public spaces and buildings not included in any of the above, such as ministries, prefectural offices, municipal offices, courts, chambers of commerce, hospitals, libraries, local assembly halls, cultural halls, and sports facilities.
- Temples
- Shrines
- Cemeteries
- Universities
- Schools
- Private and corporate locations (private residences, factories, corporate offices)

Each statue was allocated one category; however, for several of the prewar statues no longer extant, this field was left blank whenever the exact location could not be verified. The original site of statues was used for the quantitative analysis, even if they have been relocated. The majority of the statues in the database can be found at sites accessible to the public, but the levels of accessibility (and visibility) can fluctuate. Temples and shrines, for example, are "public spaces," but visitors of these sites are, first of all, adherents of the various schools of Buddhism or Shinto with which they are affiliated. In more recent times, however, these sites are also witnessing increasing numbers of tourists. Schools are mostly frequented by pupils and teachers, even though parents do visit them; more rarely, schools also open their gates for festivities organized by the local community. Statues situated on private land are not the focus of this book; nonetheless, I set up a subcategory for them because certain statues in the sources that formed the basis for the database were situated on private land.

When considering the subjects depicted, I defined the following categories:

- Gods
- Figures from Japanese mythology
- Figures associated with the imperial court, e.g., emperors, empresses, imperial princes, members of imperial branch families, the *kuge*
- Daimyo (feudal lords, pre-1871)
- Samurai (members of the warrior aristocracy other than daimyo; pre-1871)
- Politicians and ministerial bureaucrats (post-1871)
- Military officers (post-1871)
- Economic leaders and industrialists
- Social figures (individuals not included in any of the other categories, e.g., educators, journalists, trade union leaders, social workers, religious figures, philanthropists)
- Cultural figures (writers, poets, painters, actors)
- Scientists
- Athletes
- Terrorists
- Local personalities

The assignment of each statue to the most appropriate category was the most challenging aspect of the quantitative analysis, but it resulted in categorizations that enabled the formulation of a typology of the modern Japanese bronze statuary. As might be expected, a single figure often fits into multiple categories,¹ but the analysis of the categories of personalities depicted revealed invaluable insights into the elements that compose Japanese public statuary.

A final word about the sources of the data is instructive here. The data on the prewar statues examined were principally from the 1928 publication *Ijin no omokage* (The Countenance of Great Men), a two-volume set that includes information on 702 statues; this was supplemented by other select publications, newspapers, and souvenir postcards.² I consulted similar pictorial sources for postwar monuments³ but because no single publication as comprehensive as *Ijin no omokage* is available for the postwar period, data collected from newspaper and journal databases, archival sources and websites had to be used in addition.

The database does not constitute a complete inventory of Japanese bronze statuary but the extensive data collated assists in drawing important conclusions about the historical development of public statuary and the cult of the individual in modern Japan.

THE HISTORICAL FIGURES DEPICTED

The most obvious questions regarding the quantitative distribution of statues in modern Japan are: Which historical figures occupy a predominant place in Japanese memory and the national psyche? Which individuals are, to borrow the words of Pierre Nora,⁴ the most crucial *lieux de mémoire* when speaking of modern Japan? And did the distribution of figures depicted in the public space change over time?

The determination of the most significant figures in this memorial pantheon—a sort of “Top Ten” of modern Japanese bronze statuary—is no easy task. We have only limited knowledge of prewar statues since almost all were destroyed during World War II, and some categories of statues have to be treated with special care. For example, in the prewar period, elementary schools commonly had a bronze statue as a way to “stimulate the spirit of loyalty” among their students. Due to the large number of schools involved, the historical figures in prewar school statuary would assume a disproportionate significance if taken at face value. In the quantitative analysis presented here, school statuary is underrepresented as very few examples are included in the compendia that constitute the source basis for this study. I have not rectified this omission for two reasons. First, it is today impossible to determine the precise numbers of these school statues because it is not even known exactly how many elementary schools were operating in prewar Japan. Further, many of the statues in Japanese schools disappeared during the war; others were removed after 1945. Lastly, and more importantly, the inclusion of the school statuary would have distorted the results of the analysis because of the numbers entailed. Never-

theless, because school statuary made a significant contribution to the shaping of national identity, some essentials regarding this subcategory of public sculpture have to be elucidated here.

School statuary rapidly grew from the 1920s as a reaction to the spread of democratic and liberal thought during the Taishō period, in what scholars often refer to as “Taishō Democracy,” and as a government attempt to guard against the perceived threat presented by the spread of these new ideas. The propagation of the “holy virtue” (*seitoku*) of the Meiji emperor was one approach adopted to counter these developments and address these concerns (see chapter 2). It was nonetheless a challenging task to communicate abstract imperial virtues to elementary school students, with the invisibility of the emperor actively impairing the efficacy of the state’s propaganda efforts. As a consequence, schools began to use statues and statuettes of historical figures in order to visualize the nation. Existing sources indicate that the most frequently represented figures in school statuary were the Edo-period educator and economist Ninomiya Sontoku (Kinjirō, 1787–1856), General Nogi Maresuke, the medieval warrior Kusunoki Masashige, the legendary Emperor Jinmu, and bacteriologist Noguchi Hideyo (1876–1928).

The majority of these works were effigies of the educator Ninomiya.⁵ He was considered a paradigm for the young because as a boy Ninomiya combined his activity as a conscientious student with household chores as illustrated in the conventional portrayal of him reading a book as he carries a bundle of firewood on his back (fig. 5.1). In prewar Japan, and even today, he is considered a unique role model for Japanese schoolchildren. Much of the story of the diligent child, however, is a later fabrication—more legend than historical fact—but this is a secondary consideration in the discussion regarding the utilization of Ninomiya’s image for pedagogical and propaganda purposes.⁶ Given that over 20,000 elementary schools were in operation by the 1930s, there would have been several thousand Ninomiya statues in prewar Japan, the result being an exceptional cult constructed around a single individual.⁷

Many Ninomiya statues were destroyed during the war, but some fabricated from nonferrous materials did survive. The Occupation authorities did not order the destruction of extant statues following Japan’s defeat in 1945, but some nevertheless disappeared from public view in the immediate postwar period and were relocated to less conspicuous sites.⁸ Over time, a few re-appeared in the grounds of elementary schools, and individual schools even installed new Ninomiya figures.⁹ Today, opinion remains divided over the ideology that has evolved around Ninomiya which, in addition to the focus on academic assiduity, stresses the sacrifice of the self for the greater good—that is, for the nation and the state.

The precise number of Ninomiya statues in contemporary Japan is unknown, but some prefectures and municipalities have compiled reports on the examples in their regions, which allows us to draw some conclusions regarding the distribution of these monuments. A report compiled in 2010 by Kanagawa Prefecture, Ninomiya’s home region, revealed that in this prefecture alone, there were statues of the Edo-period reformer in at least 143 elementary schools (out of a total of 860).¹⁰ A report published by the city of Toyokoro in Hokkaido Prefecture, which sees Ninomiya as its founder, disclosed that there were around sixty Ninomiya statues in the city in 2012, forty-two of which were located on school grounds. Approximately half of these statues were built between 1935 and 1945, surviving both war and occupation. Of the fourteen installed in the postwar period, ten date from the two decades immediately following the war and only four from after 1975.¹¹ A 2006 survey of Gunma Prefecture counts 173 statues in the prefecture’s elementary schools,¹² and a 2011 survey in Okayama Prefecture turned up 280 examples. Ninety percent of the examples in Okayama are wartime images made from the local Bizen ware (*Bizenyaki*), a unique feature of Ninomiya statuary from this region.¹³ Given these numbers—between 134 and 280 statues per prefecture—it is highly likely that several thousand Ninomiya statues are distributed throughout the country. And their number is on the rise.¹⁴



In addition to images of Ninomiya, statues of General Nogi Maresuke, Kusunoki Masashige, and Emperor Jinmu were not uncommon in schoolyards. Kusunoki statues were particularly popular in the Kansai region where the medieval warrior was allegedly born.¹⁵ In the postwar period, many schools erected statues of the bacteriologist Noguchi Hideyo. The sheer quantity of school statuary depicting Ninomiya, Noguchi, Kusunoki, Jinmu, and Nogi meant that the inclusion of every such statue in this study would be unfeasible and would distort the results of the quantitative analysis. Ultimately, I restricted the study to those statues included in the reference books that constitute the primary sources of the data employed in this study.

Another statuary type underrepresented in the database are sculptures of religious figures. A sculpture of the thirteenth-century Buddhist monk Nichiren, the founder of the eponymous lineage of Buddhism, stands in most temples of this tradition. Because such statues are first and foremost objects of religious worship, they fall outside the purview of the present study. I have only considered examples that were included in the sources used for the database, most of which are in public places other than temples. One statue of Nichiren is discussed in more detail in chapter 6 in order to clarify the connection between religion and nationalism in modern Japan.

The database provides an instructive guide to the individuals who are at the center of the cult of personality as manifest in modern Japanese public statuary. What is most striking about the data is that no single historical figure dominates (see Table 5.1). With the exceptions noted above, no more than three dozen public statues were dedicated to any single individual. This suggests that one of the principal characteristics of the cult of the individual in modern Japan is its diversity, which is due in the main to three trends. First, commissioning a statue always required some proof of authenticity and lo-

Fig. 5.1 A stone statue of Ninomiya Sontoku. Imizu City, Toyama Prefecture. Inscription illegible.

Name	Number of Statues Built
● Matsuo Bashō	over 30
● Noguchi Hideyo	over 30
● Sakamoto Ryōma	over 30
● Yamato Takeru	over 20
● Emperor Jinmu	over 15
● Emperor Meiji	over 15
● Oda Nobunaga	15
● Shōtoku Taishi	14
● Nogi Maresuke	12
● Ōta Dōkan	12
● Kusunoki Masashige	11
● Toyotomi Hideyoshi	10
● Tokugawa Ieyasu	10
● Katō Kiyomasa	10
● Saigō Takamori	10

Table 5.1 Historical figures with the largest number of bronze statues in modern Japan (1880–2017). Sources: Author's database and Kamiyu Rekishi Henshūbu, ed., *Nihon no dōzō kanzen meikan* (Tokyo: Kōsaidō, 2013).

cal connections, making it difficult to justify the construction of multiple statues of one person in various locations. Second, since the statue-building process involved a broad range of social groups, with the monuments themselves reflecting myriad interests, different actors naturally selected different subjects. Thirdly, despite the invisibility of the emperor in public statuary, no other figure was permitted to assume a presiding position because of the challenge this might pose to the emperor's status as the ultimate, albeit invisible, symbol of the nation.

The individuals listed in Table 5.1 can be subdivided into four groups. Group 1 (marked yellow) consists of figures associated with the Imperial House—that is, the historical figures discussed in chapter 3. With an effective ban on the public representations of the Meiji emperor, the elites of the early nation-state sought to raise the profile of the imperial dynasty in the public space through the introduction of substitutes for the reigning emperor such as Emperor Jinmu, Yamato Takeru and Shōtoku Taishi (see also Table 5.2).

Name of Statue/Figure Commemorated	Subject's Birth and Death Dates	Subject's Position	Category	Year Statue Built
Yamato Takeru (1)	1st c. BCE?	imperial prince	imperial	1880
Emperor Keitai	450–531?	emperor	imperial	1883
Narushima Ryūhoku	1837–1884	author/journalist	social	1885
Yamato Takeru (2)	1st c. BCE?	imperial prince	imperial	1890
Kamei Koremi	1825–1885	daimyo of Tsuwano	daimyo	1890
Ōmura Masujirō	1824–1869	samurai/founder of IJA	samurai/military/politician	1893
Umashimade	mythological figure	war god	god	1893
Fukuzawa Yukichi	1834–1901	educator	social	1893
Fukushima Yasumasa	1852–1919	army officer	military	1894
Leopold Müller	1822–1893	army officer (Germany)	military/scientist	1895
Iwasaki Yatarō	1834–1885	industrialist	economy	1896
Kawasaki Shōzō	1838–1912	entrepreneur/ politician	politician/economy	1896
Kawada Koichirō	1836–1896	entrepreneur/ politician	economy/politician	1896
Emperor Jinmu (1)	mythological figure	(legendary) first emperor of Japan	god/imperial	1896
Koike Eizaburō	1830–?	writer	culture	1898
Saigō Takamori	1827–1877	samurai/ politician	samurai/politician/military	1898
Hirose Saihei	1828–1914	entrepreneur	economy	1898
Yamada Akiyoshi	1844–1892	army officer/ politician	samurai/politician/military	1898
Yamagata Aritomo	1838–1922	army officer/ politician	samurai/military/politician	1898
Emperor Jinmu (2)	mythological figure	(legendary) first emperor of Japan	god/imperial	1899
Mishima Tsuyoshi	1830–1919	educator/bureaucrat	social	1899
Kosuge Tomohiro	1832–1888	Tokugawa vassal	samurai	1899
Kikkawa Tsunemasa	1829–1867	daimyo of Iwakuni	daimyo	1899
Motoki Shōzō	1824–1875	educator/journalist	social	1900
Mōri Motochika	1827–1868	daimyo of Nagato-Chōfu	daimyo	1900
Mōri Motomitsu	1816–1884	daimyo of Suō-Tokuyama	daimyo	1900
Mōri Motozumi	1832–1875	daimyo of Kiyosue	daimyo	1900
Mōri Takachika	1819–1871	daimyo of Chōshū	daimyo	1900
Shibusawa Eiichi	1840–1931	industrialist	economy	1900
Furukawa Ichibei	1832–1903	industrialist	economy	1900
Kusunoki Masashige	1294–1336	medieval warrior	samurai	1900
Godai Tomoatsu	1835–1885	politician/entrepreneur	politician/economy	1900

Table 5.2 The first statues built in Japan (1880–1900).

Source: Author's database.

Location of Statue (Prefecture)	Type of Location	Type of Statue	Commissioning Group/Institution	Present Status
Ishikawa	park	standing	Imperial Japanese Army and local elites	unchanged (restored)
Fukui	park	standing	local elites	relocated locally
Tokyo	temple	relief	Kyōsai Gohyakumeisha (insurance company)	unknown
Gunma	public (mountain)	standing	local residents	unchanged
Shimane	shrine	bust	former vassals	unknown
Tokyo	shrine	standing	friends and comrades	unchanged
Tokyo	park	standing	Imperial Japanese Army	unchanged
Tokyo	university	bust	Keiō University	unchanged
Tokyo	public (museum)	equestrian	Imperial Japanese Army	unknown
Tokyo	university	bust	former students	stolen in 1959; replaced 1975
Tokyo	public (archive)	bust	Mitsubishi	unchanged
Kobe	private (company)	bust	Kawasaki	unchanged
Tokyo	private (residence)	standing	Sumitomo Kichizaemon	unknown
Tokushima	park	standing	Imperial Japanese Army	relocated locally
Gunma	private	standing	Fuji Asama Shrine	unknown
Tokyo	park	standing	friends and comrades	relocated locally
Ehime	private	standing	Sumitomo Kichizaemon	destroyed in World War II, rebuilt 2003
Tokyo	public (ministry)	standing	Haruki Yoshiaki, Nanbu Mikao, and other former colleagues	unknown
Hagi	unknown	standing	Katsura Tarō	unknown
Aichi	park	standing	Imperial Japanese Army	relocated locally
Tokyo	school	seated	former students	unknown
Tokyo	park	standing	Enomoto Takeaki/ Akamatsu Noriyoshi	destroyed in World War II
Yamaguchi	park	standing	the people of Yamaguchi	destroyed in World War II
Osaka	graveyard	standing	company employees	destroyed in World War II, rebuilt 1984
Yamaguchi	park	standing	the people of Yamaguchi	destroyed in World War II
Yamaguchi	park	standing	the people of Yamaguchi	destroyed in World War II
Yamaguchi	park	standing	the people of Yamaguchi	destroyed in World War II
Yamaguchi	park	equestrian	the people of Yamaguchi	destroyed in World War II, rebuilt 1980
Tokyo	public	standing	fellow entrepreneurs	unknown
Tokyo	private (company)	bust	Furukawa Co.	unknown
Tokyo	park	equestrian	Furukawa Co.	unchanged
Osaka	public	standing	friends and colleagues	destroyed in World War II, rebuilt 1953

Group 2 (marked red) comprises statues dedicated to daimyo. The individuals most commonly portrayed are Oda Nobunaga (1534–82), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–98), Katō Kiyomasa (1562–1611), Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), and Ōta Dōkan (1432–86). The Japanese public’s familiarity with these figures is not limited to statues but extends to historiography and popular historical representations. These names commonly rank at the top of opinion polls and similar surveys that list the “most significant figures in Japanese history.”¹⁶

Group 3 (marked blue) consists of the founders of modern Japan: the heroes of the Meiji Restoration, eminent statesmen of the Meiji period, and the heroes of Japan’s wars of imperialist expansion up to and including the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. Sakamoto Ryōma, Saigō Takamori, and Nogi Maresuke—each in Japan’s “Top Ten” statuary—represent the three feudal domains that played the leading role in the Restoration, Chōshū (Nogi), Satsuma (Saigō), and Tosa (Sakamoto). Other members of this group follow hard on the heels of Saigō, including entrepreneur and philanthropist Shibusawa Eiichi; Itagaki Taisuke, a politician and early advocate of liberalism in Japan; and Itō Hirobumi, the first prime minister of Japan and an influential Meiji-period statesman. Like the imperial figures of Jinmu, Yamato Takeru, and Shōtoku Taishi, the monuments dedicated to these heroes and politicians compensate for the invisibility of the Meiji emperor in the public sphere. Imperial figures dominated the first phase of statue-building in Japan in the late nineteenth century, yet after around 1900 statues of Meiji-period politicians begin to proliferate; their popularity as subjects for public statuary carried over into the postwar period.

Group 4 (marked green), comprising the statues of the poet Matsuo Bashō (1644–94) and bacteriologist Noguchi Hideyo, reflects a postwar phenomenon. Both Bashō and Noguchi exemplify Japan’s postwar identity as a “cultural state” (*bunka kokka*), the central theme of chapter 9 of this publication.

One category to emerge from early in the history of modern statue-building comprises statues

commissioned by companies to honor their founders or effigies of business leaders (see Table 5.2). These do not fit neatly into the pattern of monuments built to strengthen national consciousness and disseminate the idea of the nation. Most of these examples were not installed in public areas, rather in corporate headquarters or at times on private properties. For example, the head of the Sumitomo *zaibatsu*, Sumitomo Tomoito (the fifteenth-generation Sumitomo Kichizaemon, 1865–1926), and Japan’s first insurance company, the Kyōsai Gohyakumeisha (a predecessor of Yasuda Seimei), both commissioned statues of company employees that were placed in company buildings or family residences. These were presented to the family of the commemorated individual as a reward for loyal, valuable service. But as we will see below, companies also initiated or participated in the building of “national monuments,” keenly aware of the need to contribute to national development and not to be dismissed as interested only in private profit.

CATEGORIES

The largest number of statues were dedicated to historical figures who I have categorized as “samurai,” followed by “politicians” and “social figures” (fig. 5.2).¹⁷ The latter, as we have seen, is a broad category that includes a range of subjects and is especially relevant in postwar statuary. More than 350 statues are included in each of these three groups, with a substantial overlap between “samurai” and “politicians.” A total of 251 statues are grouped as monuments to “daimyo” (feudal lords), 248 as “economic leaders,” and 225 as “cultural figures” (writers, poets, painters, actors). These three categories show less overlap.

It is possible to refine this classification further through an analysis of the subject’s date of birth (fig. 5.3). The numbers indicate that the majority of statues portray historical figures born during the Edo period (1603–1867). 1,083 statues—more than 50 percent of the total—depict figures from this era, and of those, 540 are of individuals born in the

Categories of bronze statues by subject




Fig. 5.2 Categories of historical figures depicted in Japanese bronze statuary (1880–2017) by number of statues per category. Source: Author's database.

Historical figures depicted in bronze statuary by year of birth




Fig. 5.3 Historical figures illustrated in Japanese bronze statuary (1880–2017) by year of birth. Source: Author's database.

three decades from 1820 to 1850. The numerical dominance of this group explains the overlap of the categories “samurai” and “daimyo” with “politicians,” “economic leaders,” and other groups. A close look at the database reveals that the monuments classified as dedicated to “samurai” generally represent historical figures born in the late Edo period—that is, chiefly low-ranking members of the military aristocracy who were born into the “samurai” class, participated in the anti-shogunate movement of the 1860s, played an active role in the Meiji Restoration, and continued their careers as “politicians” or “businessmen” during the Meiji period. The quantitative analysis points strongly to the fact that public statuary of the modern era is dominated by figures associated with the Meiji Restoration, a conclusion reinforced by the case studies presented below. As we will see in chapter 10, the differences between prewar and postwar statuary are minimal in this respect.

A further, but rather unexpected, characteristic regarding the overall composition of public statuary is the relatively small number of statues representing military figures. Considering that Japan was constantly at war from the late nineteenth century until 1945, military subjects are rarer than might be expected (see fig. 5.2). An analysis of the chronology of these statues indicates that statues of military figures only occurred to a significant degree in the period following the Russo-Japanese War. The spread of militarist attitudes in the first half of the twentieth century meant that some of these statues became widely known in Japan. Understandably, very few statues of military figures were built in the postwar era.

Figures 5.2 and 5.3 suggest that the national identity expressed in and disseminated through bronze statuary is distinguished by an evident focus on the historical roots of the nation. Monuments representing men born in the last decades of the Edo period dominate the overall picture. Statues dedicated to historical figures born in the Meiji period are comparatively rare, and the numbers of monuments honoring those born in the subsequent Taishō period and the early part of the Shōwa (from

1926 to 1945) are almost negligible. The data analyzed reveals that a cult of personality involving historical figures associated with the Meiji Restoration and the foundation of the Japanese nation-state emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and has continued to the present day.

GENDER

The data indicates that the varied cast of statuary subjects mirrors changing social and political realities, but it also shows that women are virtually absent from prewar public statuary and greatly underrepresented in postwar Japan. In the prewar period, around two dozen statues of women were erected across the country, less than 0.2 percent of the total figure. Overall, less than 5 percent of the statues built in modern Japan are female figures (fig. 5.4). Japan is not exceptional in this regard. A piece in the online *Hartford Courant* records that in the United States, only “a tiny percentage of public statuary recognizes the other sex.”¹⁸ According to a survey by the Smithsonian Institution published in 2011, “of the 5,193 public outdoor sculptures of individuals in the United States, only 394, or less than 8 percent, are of women.”¹⁹ My database reveals a similar situation in modern Japan, where only 110 statues were dedicated to women.

The first Japanese statue of a woman was a monument of the Fukushima social worker, Uryū Iwako (1829–97). After losing her father at age nine and her husband when she was thirty-three, Uryū devoted her life to assisting the poor. During the 1867–68 Boshin Civil War, she provided medicine and food to wounded soldiers from both sides. She later founded an elementary school for the poor, as well as orphanages and hospitals, in Fukushima, expanding her activities to include Tokyo and other parts of the country. In 1899, the industrialist Shibusawa Eiichi and doctor-turned-politician Gotō Shinpei (1857–1929), together with the Uryū Association (Uryūkai, est. 1889) and wives of eminent statesmen, commissioned the leading sculptor Ōkuma Ujihiro to produce a memorial of her.²⁰ The statue

Historical figures depicted in bronze statuary by gender




Fig. 5.4 Historical figures illustrated in the bronze statuary of modern Japan (1880–2017) by gender. Source: Author's database.



(内園公草淺) 像之子岩生瓜



(園公瀧ヶ牛段九) 像助東田平

Fig. 5.5 *Uryū Iwako no zō* (*Asakusa kōen-nai*) (Statue of Uryū Iwako in Asakusa Park, Tokyo). Prewar postcard (unused), early twentieth century.

Fig. 5.6 *Hirata Tōsuke-zō* (*Kudan Ushigaura kōen*) (Statue of Hirata Tōsuke in Ushigaura Park, Tokyo), prewar postcard. Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s. The statue was erected in 1921 and survived World War II, but was relocated in 1996.

(fig. 5.5) was completed in 1901 and, as the president of the construction committee, Shibusawa, gave a speech at the unveiling ceremony in Asakusa Park in Tokyo.²¹ The statue is unusual in its portrayal of the subject seated in traditional Japanese-style *seiza*, an expression of the gender relations of the time whereby women were largely subordinated to a supportive position. Statues of seated men also appeared in the 1920s and 1930s, but different from female subjects, they were generally pictured in a self-confident position seated in a Western-style armchair (see fig. 5.6 for an example).

Uryū's statue was the only monument to a woman for a decade, and in the 1910s only five statues of female subjects were commissioned. Two portrayed wives of prominent members of the political elite, expressing the gender ideology of the Meiji state, in which women were considered "good wives and wise mothers" (*ryōsai kenbo*).²² One, depicting the second wife of statesman Ōkuma Shigenobu, Ayako (1850–1923), was installed in his Tokyo residence in 1916. The other, a statue of Nogi Shizuko (1859–1912), who committed suicide with her husband General Nogi following the death of Emperor Meiji, was built in Kagoshima in 1919 close to the house of her birth. Both exemplified the obedient wives of "Great Men" but not necessarily "Great Women" in their own right.²³ The remaining three statues in this

group were: 1) Empress Jingū, the mythological ruler who was credited with conquering Korea in prehistoric times, and in the Meiji period she was constructed as an exemplar of an "active" policy toward the Asian continent and as a symbol legitimizing Japan's historical claims on territorial expansion (built in 1911); 2) Okumura Ioko (1845–1907), a social activist instrumental in setting up in the Patriotic Women's Association (Aikoku Fujinkai) (built in 1913);²⁴ and 3) Satō Shizu (1851–1919), one of the first female students to study abroad and the first Asian woman to receive a doctorate in medicine from a German university; she later became rector of the Tokyo Womens' Art School (built in 1915). All but two of these—Empress Jingū erected in a park in Nyūzen Town, Toyama Prefecture in 1911 and the aforementioned Ōkuma—sculptures depict the women seated. Part of a memorial to the (male) war dead, Jingū was portrayed standing, armed with a sword, reminiscent of the numerous Jinmu statues in this prefecture and thus representing the martial heritage of the Imperial House.

Fewer than twenty statues of women were erected from the 1920s until the end of the war in 1945, including a monument dedicated to Florence Nightingale (1820–1910) and one to Jeanne d'Arc (1412–31), installed in the French-English-Japanese Girls' High School, now Shirayuri University. Two more statues

of Uryū Iwako were commissioned by Shibusawa. Japan's women had to wait until the democratization of the postwar era enabled them to occupy a slightly more prominent place in Japan's sculptural pantheon.

NATIONALITY

It is perhaps surprising that foreigners found a place in the Japanese cult of the individual that centered on the idea of the nation. The relatively large number of non-Japanese represented stands in stark contrast to other countries. My database includes more than fifty statues of foreigners constructed in Japan between 1895 and the early twenty-first century. Of these, around twenty date from the postwar period and twenty-eight from before the war. In some instances, the precise date of construction cannot be confirmed; some of the statues from the postwar era are reproductions of prewar statues no longer extant.

The choice of non-Japanese subjects for a statue was not random. Most were honored with a monument because of their significant contributions to the development of the Japanese nation-state. In many cases, they had served as advisors to the government (*oyatoi gaikokujin*) or helped build up educational institutions. In the postwar period, statues were also dedicated to internationally renowned figures, mainly musicians and writers such as Beethoven (Tokushima, 1994), Frédéric Chopin (Shizuoka, 1994; a gift from the city of Warsaw), Hans Christian Andersen (Okayama, 1997), and the Dutch Holocaust victim and diarist Anne Frank (Hiroshima, 1995).

The first proposal to honor a foreigner in statuary was floated in 1888 when the governor of Tokyo Prefecture, Takasaki Goroku (Idzumu, 1836–96), received a letter signed “Katō Kurō, a commoner from Osaka” (*Ōsaka-fu heimin*) that petitioned for the erection of a statue to former US President Ulysses S. Grant (1822–85) because of his contribution to the modernization (*kaika*) of Japan. Katō particularly praised Grant's decision to waive US claims for compensation for Japanese attacks on American ships in 1863 and the military clashes that ensued the

following year. Noting that Grant had taken an amicable stance toward Japan, the petition states that the memory of this “man of the greatest virtues” should be cherished among “our people” (*waga kokujin*) for eternity. To this end, Katō proposed collecting donations that would fund “one large memorial” (*ichi dai kinenhi*) in Ueno Park that would make the former US president's “virtue shine brightly.”²⁵ Grant was also remembered for his visit to Japan in 1879, during which he had been granted an audience with Emperor Meiji in Ueno Park, which explains Katō's favoring of this site for the memorial. During his visit, Grant also supported Japan's claim to Okinawa amid tense circumstances, with China maintaining that the former Ryūkyū Kingdom was still one of its vassal states and not Japanese territory.²⁶ For all these reasons, Grant was a respected figure in Japan among the ranks of foreign statesmen.

Tokyo prefectural authorities replied that because of the “strong implications for foreign relations” that such a memorial would have, “approval cannot be given at prefectural level.” Katō's request was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was frequently consulted whenever plans to build a monument to honor a foreign national surfaced.²⁷ We do not know if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seriously considered the proposal's merit, but given that before this time, very few public statues of any kind had been built in Japan, the fact that the project never materialized is hardly surprising. Interestingly, years later, in 1929, a relief of General Grant was installed in Ueno Park at the very spot where he had met with the Meiji emperor fifty years earlier.

The first monument erected to a foreigner in Japan dates to 1895 and was dedicated to Dr. Leopold Müller (1822–93), a Mainz-born doctor serving in the Prussian army. Müller arrived in Japan in 1871 to assist in the setting up of a modern medical school in Tokyo, returning to Germany in 1875. Following Müller's death, his students installed a bust of him on the campus of what is today the University of Tokyo. Having survived the war and the American Occupation, the memorial was stolen in 1959; a copy replaced it in 1975.²⁸

Teachers and advisors such as Müller are the most common class of foreigner figures in statuary. The majority of these statues were (and remain) located on the campuses of the institutions with which the subjects had an affiliation. In addition to Müller, sculptures, mostly busts, were erected to honor the German doctors Erwin Bälz (1849–1913) and Julius Scriba (1848–1905) in 1907 (both on the campus of the University of Tokyo);²⁹ German scientist Gottfried Wagener (1831–92, installed in Okazaki Park in Kyoto 1926); French legal advisor Gustave Émile Boissonade (1825–1919, erected in 1913);³⁰ British architect Josiah Conder (1852–1920, erected in 1923); and engineers Edward Divers (1837–1912) from Britain and William Smith Clark (1826–86, erected in 1926) from the United States, who advised the government on the development of Hokkaido and the foundation of Sapporo Agricultural College. At least two statues of military advisors were commissioned by the Imperial Japanese Army, one for the German advisor Klemens Jacob Meckel (1842–1905) and the other for Jacques-Paul Faure (1869–1924), head of the French military mission to Japan following World War I.³¹

One statue with an interesting history is that dedicated to Dutch military doctor Anthonius Franciscus Bauduin (1820–85). It was built in Ueno Park in 1973 to honor his contribution to Japanese medicine and the role he had played in setting up a field hospital in what later became Ueno Park for soldiers wounded in the Boshin War. It also was set up to celebrate the centennial anniversary of Ueno Park.³² When one of his descendants visited the site in the 2000s, it became evident that the figure depicted was, in fact, Bauduin's younger brother, Albertus Johannes (1829–90), who had himself been stationed in Japan for some years in the diplomatic corps. A second statue—now clearly depicting the doctor—was cast, and was put up in Ueno Park in October 2006.³³ The Dutch embassy in Tokyo kept the original bust of Albertus Johannes for several years until it was removed to Kobe, where the diplomat had worked as the first Dutch consul. It was put up in Port Island North Park in Kobe's Chuo Ward in October 2010.³⁴

Another important subcategory constitutes monuments to honor Western missionaries active in Japan in the sixteenth century; these were mostly erected by Japanese Christian communities after World War II. A particularly dense concentration of statues representing figures from this period is in Hirado in Nagasaki Prefecture. The port city of Hirado was a principal entrepôt for contacts with the Asian continent beginning in the eighth century, and in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, it also hosted exchanges between Japan and European powers. In 2000–2001, as part of the celebrations of the 400th anniversary of relations between Japan and the Netherlands, the city installed a dozen statues related to the history of the relatively short period of intensive trade with the Dutch, Portuguese, and English. The statues, lined up along a street renamed “History Road” (Rekishikaidō), include sculptures of Richard Cocks (1566–1624), the first head of the British East India Company's trading post in Hirado; Jacques Specx (1585–1652), the first head of the Dutch trading factory in Hirado; William Adams (Miura Anjin, 1564–1620), English sailor and later advisor to Tokugawa Ieyasu; and Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier (1506–52).³⁵

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND LOCATIONS OF STATUES

Although the largest number of monuments are clustered in the capital Tokyo, public statuary thrived in many regional cities, and even in the countryside. An analysis of the geographic distribution of monuments of historical figures reveals that in each prefecture, an average of forty-one statues were set up, some examples of which are no longer extant. Tokyo stands out with a total of 262; in second place is Osaka, with eighty-seven statues, followed by Hyogo with eighty-five (fig. 5.7). If we remove Tokyo from this list, the average per prefecture is thirty-six. Four of the top-scoring five prefectures are, not surprisingly, locations of Japan's main urban centers: Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, and Nagoya. Kyoto, ranked in eighth place, is Japan's historical center

Geographic distribution of Japanese statues




Fig. 5-7 Geographic distribution of statues built in Japanese prefectures (1880–2017). Tokyo (262 statues) is omitted from the chart. Source: Author's database.

and today a major urban center. The other prefectures with higher than average numbers of statues are all distinguished by their strong links to the Meiji Restoration, and their remarkable statue-building efforts can be seen as an attempt to express their leading roles in the foundation of the nation and the nation-state. This is particularly true for Kagoshima and Yamaguchi; we can discern similar motivations in Ishikawa and Toyama, the sites of early statues of figures representing the Imperial House.

An analysis of statue locations reveals that the vast majority were installed in public parks or other easily accessible areas. Figure 5.8 shows that almost one-third of the statues in identified locations were in public parks. This was followed by public sites such as museums, municipal offices, libraries and assembly halls (20 percent), temples (10 percent), shrines (9 percent), memorials dedicated to a particular historical figure (7 percent), and rail stations (7 percent). The development of this kind of public space went hand in hand with the evolution of bronze statuary, and in the case of public parks, they are closely interrelated. We have already seen that the statue of Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa was built in a reserve opened to the public in 1874 in accordance with the Dajōkan (Grand Council) Ordinance No. 16 of January, 15, 1873 that mandated the creation of parks. A total of eighty-two such public spaces were established as a direct result of this ordinance. By the end of the Asia-Pacific War, most were equipped with a statue commemorating a distinguished historical figure. Indeed, some parks were made for the sole purpose of hosting such a statue. Others were named after the individual commemorated in sculptural form, as with the Takahashi Korekiyo Memorial Park in Tokyo, Xavier Park in Kagoshima, a reference to Francis Xavier, and Ryōma Park in Shiohitashi-onsen, Kagoshima Prefecture, named after Sakamoto Ryōma. After the war, a considerable number of Japanese castles were declared public parks, and today, most of them are equipped with a statue of at least one daimyo related to the history of that castle.³⁶

FORMS

In general, Japanese public statuary followed existing sculptural norms and formal conventions. The majority of monuments were designed as standing statues, often holding an object in one or both hands (see fig. 5.9). Statues of this type, also known as portrait sculpture, are not hugely dramatic since artistic expression was a secondary consideration in their commission. Instead, there was greater emphasis on the authenticity of a statue's site, the dress of the subject, and whether the accessories (e.g., weapons) corresponded with the historical period in question. Over 900 of the monuments dating from the 1880s to the twenty-first century included in the database are standing statues, and around 200 depict their subject in a seated pose (*zazō*); some 300 examples are busts (*kyozō*) (fig. 5.9). The number of surviving busts is likely to be much higher, but these smaller sculptures are often set up at inconspicuous sites. The compilation of an inventory of busts installed in buildings, even just public buildings, would therefore be an almost impossible task.

The number of equestrian statues dedicated to a historical figure in modern Japan is relatively low. Overall, only about seventy-five equestrian statues have been installed since 1900: fewer than twenty appeared in the prewar period, of which eight survived the war, and four were rebuilt in the postwar period. Only two equestrian statues were erected from the end of the war until 1970—both reproductions of prewar monuments. In the 1970s, six such sculptures were newly commissioned, twelve in the 1980s, ten in the 1990s, and sixteen since 2000. These numbers mirror not only the renewed popularity of statuary in postwar Japan but also the country's increasing wealth that enabled the construction of large-scale monuments. The most frequently portrayed subject for this statue type is Oda Nobunaga (three, all postwar), while the most colossal equestrian statue in the country, standing at 5.35 m (6.7 m including the pedestal) and erected in Tokushima in 1991, portrays the medieval warrior Minamoto no Yoshitsune and is a product of Japan's so-called "bubble economy" of the 1980s.

Location of public statues in Japan by site type




Fig. 5.8 Locations of statues built in Japan (1880–2017) by site type. Source: Author's database.

Statues built in Japan by physical type




Fig. 5-9 Statues built in Japan (1880–2017) by physical type. Source: Author's database.

HISTORICAL CYCLES

An analysis of the chronology of statue-building offers valuable insights into the development of public statuary in modern Japan and how it reflected the country's history—that is, its self-perception, its international prestige, its economic development, and aspects surrounding war and peace. The changes in the numbers of statues built also allow conclusions regarding the importance of the cult of the individual in a given period, although at times economic circumstances were equally a decisive factor.

Only few statues were erected in Japan from 1880 to 1900, even the Sino-Japanese War had triggered an initial boom, as we have seen above. During the Russo-Japanese War, statue-building was again near impossible because military conflict dictated different priorities for metal usage. After the war, however, statue projects expressing the nation's pride in victory proliferated. World War I, which did not give rise to material shortages in Japan, was followed by enormous economic growth and a marked escalation in statue-building that continued well into the 1920s. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Japan was one of the “Big Five Powers,” and this newly conferred international status resulted in a new peak in statue-building, with thirty-two monuments erected in 1919 alone (fig. 5.10). An apogee, reached in 1927 with almost fifty monuments, was also linked to Japan's economic growth and its recent economic affluence. Correspondingly, the sharp decline in statue-building in the late 1920s and early 1930s was the result of the world economic crisis and the outbreak of war that brought a renewed shortage of metals. The situation improved slightly in 1934–36, yet the outbreak of total war in 1937 ended in the regulation of metal allocation and a phaseout of statue-building by the early 1940s.

More statues appeared in the postwar period (fig. 5.11), generally characterized as an era of peace and expanding affluence. This trend tended to reverse in times of depression, most notably after Japan's “bubble economy” burst in the 1990s and again following the 2008 financial crisis, sometimes with a delayed impact in that commissions cannot easily be rescind-

ed. Postwar Japan hit a “high” with forty-four statues built in 1991 alone, a manifestation of the achievements of economic development (in retrospect seen as a “bubble”) and of the worldwide recognition of Japan as a decisive global player on the road to perhaps becoming, as Ezra Vogel famously remarked in 1979, the world's “Number One” economy.³⁷ This period experienced a monument boom and some of the statues erected during this era broke previous records for size, such as the aforementioned equestrian statue of Minamoto no Yoshitsune in Tokushima in 1990.

The zeitgeist of a period also affected the number of statues built in each category. If we leave developments in the 1930s and the postwar period aside for later chapters and look here at the subjects portrayed from the late nineteenth century until the 1920s it becomes apparent that statues of figures associated with the Imperial House enjoyed a heyday in the late nineteenth century. They witnessed a decline after that with a slight discovery in the 1920s (see Table 5.3).

The numbers of statues categorized as “daimyo” gradually increased from the late nineteenth century into the 1910s, often as part of a reaffirmation of regional identities, but this declined again in the 1920s. “Samurai” statues followed a similar trajectory until the 1910s, but their numbers grew during the 1920s, albeit modest when compared to other

Category	Before 1900	1900s	1910s	1920s
Imperial figures	6	8	3	8
Military officers	6	19	18	24
Politicians	6	19	48	65
Social actors	4	8	43	111
Science	2	18	26	33
Culture	1	1	16	20
Economy	4	14	46	84
Daimyo	2	9	17	9
Samurai	5	7	18	22
Total	36	103	235	376

Table 5.3 Categorization of statues constructed between the late nineteenth century and 1929. Source: Author's database.

Annual numbers of statues built, 1900–1942




Fig. 5.10 Numbers of bronze statues built in Japan (1900–42) by year. Source: Author's database.

Annual numbers of statues built, 1945–2015




Fig. 5.11 Numbers of bronze statues built in Japan (1945–2015) per year. Source: Author’s database.

categories. The same can be observed for statues of “military officers.” Rare before the Russo-Japanese War, around twenty statues portraying military figures were erected between 1905 and 1910. Their production then stagnated, with only about twenty further examples in the 1910s and again in the 1920s. Statues imaging “politicians” witnessed more sustained growth, increasing from around twenty examples in the 1900s to some fifty in the 1910s and sixty-five in the 1920s. Figures associated with the Meiji Restoration represented the most prominent subjects in public statuary until the 1910s. Statues in the 1920s, by contrast, were dedicated to a new generation of politicians, including agents of the new democratic trends that were gaining a foothold in Japan at this time. In 1928, for instance, a statue of party politician and former Prime Minister Katō Takaaki (1860–1926) was installed in Tsuruma Park in his hometown of Nagoya (fig. 5.12).

The most remarkable increase, however, was in the categories of monuments honoring social and economic figures. Just over two dozen examples were constructed before the 1910s; but during the 1910s and 1920s, more than 300 statues from these two categories were commissioned. Similar growth was also apparent in monuments to figures representing “culture” and “science,” although the overall numbers in these categories are lower (Table 5.3). While it might be tempting to attribute this shift to the conditions in the postwar era, the rapid advance of public statuary in the 1920s suggests that the roots of Taishō Democracy went deeper than generally thought.

This trend also evinces the increasing social diversification of the Taishō period, which, when combined with the nation’s growing economic affluence, enabled more social groups to build statues of their leaders and the founders. As Louise Young concludes in her study on Japanese regional cities, the economic growth of the 1910s and 1920s

propelled new groups to positions of social prominence, swelling the ranks of the new middle and working classes. Though prosperity proved evanescent, the possibility of gaining fabulous wealth in a short period of time was etched in popular memory as a feature of

the urban economy, one dimension of the economic and social volatility of modern economic growth.³⁸

The large number of statues dedicated to representatives of these groups in the 1910s and 1920s is a faithful reflection of the developments described by Young.

This quantitative analysis has unravelled the characteristics of Japan’s statuary, singling out key individuals, categories, and themes that are encountered repeatedly in the public space. The next chapter will draw on the results of this analysis to introduce case studies of monuments that are representative of the categories defined here and were considered as outstanding realms of memory illustrative of the cult of the individual in modern Japan.



Fig. 5.12 *Katō Takaaki dōzō* (Bronze Statue of Katō Takaaki). Erected in Tsuruma Park in Nagoya in 1928, demolished in 1943. Prewar souvenir postcard (unused).

6 A Typology of Public Statuary in Modern Japan

The quantitative analysis in chapter 5 revealed that the cult of the individual in modern Japan assumed highly diversified forms. Various social groups campaigned for the construction of monuments dedicated to a wide range of subjects, with no single figure dominating or monopolizing the public space. The unifying element within this cult of personality was the role played by these different figures in the founding of the nation-state and its underlying ideologies. Whether the figure was a medieval precursor of national unification or an early embodiment of the nation's values, the notion of loyalty to the emperor remained paramount.

The monuments formed a vital part of an educational effort to propagate the achievements and values of “Great Men” (*ijin*). The growth of public statuary as a means of social education was not an isolated development, rather it paralleled a shift in the education system, which during this period moved from “an event-centered to a personality-centered approach.”¹

This chapter presents case studies that illustrate the major categories of statuary subjects recruited for display in public settings. Some include historical figures who contributed to the founding of the nation-state as well as rebels and villains who were later rehabilitated and added to the national pantheon. This development shows that the nation gradually became the central focus of modern identity, the institution with which all nationals were required to be aligned. Other case studies will analyze the memorialization of activists who were involved in the restorationist movement of the 1860s but who died before the Meiji Restoration. These individuals were celebrated as martyrs who gave their lives for the national cause and were held up as role models for the Japanese youth. The heroes of the fourteenth-century Kenmu Restoration, honored for their alleged sacrificial loyalty to the emperor, and other military figures, are then addressed, followed by case studies of statues of daimyo that were constructed to serve as links between the region and the nation. The final set of case studies introduces leaders of religious communities whose national significance was recognized with memorials erected in the public space.

THE FOUNDERS OF MODERN JAPAN: ŌMURA MASUJIRŌ

The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that the most frequently encountered statue type in modern Japan was of a young samurai who contributed to the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the formation of the modern nation-state. Since the deification of the emperor prevented his likeness from being used as a visual symbol of the nation in the



Fig. 6.1 *Yasukuni jinja Ōmura dōzō* (Tokyo). *The Bronze Statue of Omura, Tokyo, Japan* (1893). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

public space, a plausible alternative was to fill this gap by elevating the representatives of the new regime. Because it was “rather implausible that so many Japanese were so ready, so quickly, to transfer their loyalties to a leadership whose names were still relatively unknown,”² the creation of visual symbols of the new regime was an essential strategy for achieving national integration. It offered a range of “founding fathers” as figures for popular identification, in addition to the representatives of the imperial dynasty discussed in chapter 3.

The first rumors regarding the commissioning of a bronze statue depicting a figure of the Meiji Restoration surfaced in 1878, when the daily *Yomiuri shinbun* reported on a proposal for a memorial to the recently deceased statesman Kido Takayoshi (Kōin, 1833–77) in Tokyo’s Ueno Park.³ These plans did not materialize, and it would be another fifteen years before the installation of the first public statue in Tokyo dedicated to a figure of the Meiji Restoration: the samurai, military theorist, and founding father of the modern Japanese military, Ōmura Masujirō (1824–69) (fig. 6.1).⁴ Educated as a physician, Ōmura also studied Western military systems and later served as a military advisor to the daimyo of the Uwajima domain (present-day Ehime Prefecture), Date Munenari (1818–92).

Date was an early advocate of modernization within the armed forces and a critic of the shogu-

nate, whereas Ōmura initially taught in shogunal institutions in the capital Edo.⁵ It was only after the outbreak of hostilities in 1864 between the shogunate and Ōmura's native domain of Chōshū (present-day Yamaguchi Prefecture) that Ōmura expressed a clear anti-shogunate stance. He realized that Chōshū, faced with the overwhelming military might of the shogunate, would be unable to defend itself if Chōshū samurai alone took up arms. In a manner akin to what would later be described as "total mobilization," Ōmura recruited farmers, artisans, priests, and even sumo wrestlers to fight the shogun, training these units in Western military tactics and equipping them with modern weapons. His approach was extremely controversial and constituted a radical departure from Japan's traditional social structure, in which military service (and the mere possession of weapons) was a privilege of the warrior aristocracy (*bushi*).⁶ Due to his position as the son of a low-ranking family, it was easier for Ōmura to implement such an unprecedented initiative. It also reflected Chōshū's dire situation.

A trans-domain national consciousness developed after the Meiji Restoration, but at this stage of the civil war, the loyalties of the Japanese were characterized by what the historian Albert M. Craig calls "han nationalism," an identification with the feudal domain (*han*).⁷ Ōmura personally commanded some of the modernized units in the clashes between the domain and the shogunate in 1866 and during the Boshin War of 1867–68. After the Restoration, he was appointed deputy minister of military affairs in the new government where he set out to create a modern national army. He championed the establishment of a conscript army, a step that would necessitate the abolition of the feudal domains, the warrior class and its privileges. This new army would be trained by French advisors in that senior military figures had already formed links with French officers posted to Japan. Ōmura calls for reforms made him many enemies, and during a trip to Kyoto in 1869 he was attacked by eight samurai from Chōshū. The severe injuries he sustained led to his death two months later.

Ōmura's policies were continued by Yamada Akiyoshi (1844–92) together with Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) from Yamaguchi and Saigō Tsugumichi (1843–1902) from Kagoshima. Yamada joined the Iwakura Mission to the United States and Europe, and in 1870 Yamagata and Saigō visited Europe on an inspection tour of the military establishments of leading European powers. All three men played vital roles in the creation of the Japanese Imperial Army (IJA) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). Universal conscription was introduced under Yamagata's supervision in 1873; many former samurai opposed this move as did the peasantry who called it a "blood tax" (*ketsuzei*). The conscript army was nonetheless successfully employed by the central government to suppress the samurai uprisings about which Ōmura had warned.

The early IJA functioned "as a military police force to protect the newly established government against the disaffected feudal clans, a restless peasantry, and general malcontents."⁸ It took on this role in 1873 during a rebellion in Chōshū, in 1874 during rebellions in Kumamoto and Saga, and again in 1877 during the Satsuma Rebellion.⁹ These served to enhance Ōmura's reputation in the eyes of at least some members of the new administration. Honoring his memory meant a legitimization of the new conscription system, despite its initial unpopularity.

Ōmura was awarded a posthumous court rank following his death and was also enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine (then known as Tōkyō Shōkonsha). Some memorials had already been erected in his name,¹⁰ yet Ōmura's followers wished to create a more lasting monument to him when they mooted plans to build a *statue* for the instigator of conscription in 1882.¹¹ In 1884, a group of sixty-three individuals went public with a "Prospectus for the Building of a Bronze Statue for the Late Deputy Minister of War, Lord Ōmura," in the *Yomiuri shinbun*, stressing that Ōmura

with unprecedented foresight, studied Dutch [military] texts and the situation of the European powers at the time, advocated the idea of a rich nation and a

strong army (*fukoku kyōhei*), and devoted himself to the cause of the Restoration. The people know this well. Now, however, [Ōmura's] merits shall be preserved for eternity and, to this end, a statue of the Lord himself shall be cast in bronze and placed in a well-known park or cemetery. Several dozen high-ranking officials and gentlemen who were friends of Lord Ōmura have proposed this, and they have been busy canvassing this idea and gathering support.¹²

This proposal was in all likelihood inspired by the recently installed statues in Kanazawa and Fukui (see chapter 3). One version of the 1884 prospectus includes the term *kinenhyō* (紀念標) to describe the proposed memorial—the same expression used for the Yamato Takeru statue in Kanazawa. At this time, the term *kinenhi* (記念碑) was the more common term for a “monument.” That the compilers of the prospectus opted for the more unusual “*kinenhyō*” implies an awareness of the Kanazawa memorial.¹³ Nevertheless, the Tokyo group made the point that the chief model for its designs was in fact *European* public statuary:

How can we convey the virtues of distinguished individuals from the present time to future generations? . . . In Europe, “monuments” (*monyumento*) are considered appropriate for this purpose. . . . In the case of stone sculptures or bronze statues, a person is portrayed, put on a plinth and placed in a famous park, visible to the public gaze. . . . In order to honor the achievements of the lord [Ōmura], and in order to demonstrate his great virtues . . . we want to build a bronze statue depicting the lord, following the example of European “monuments.” This is not an attempt to express private feelings, however. Our aim is to preserve the memory of the great devotion that the lord showed to the state (*kokka*).¹⁴

The Tokyo group used the *katakana* loanword *monyumento* (monument) several times, presumably to emphasize the fact that European practices had inspired them to present their proposal.¹⁵ Taking into consideration the first appearance of the term *monyumento* in a government document in 1877 (see

chapter 1) and the links of the backers of the Ōmura statue with the administration, it is likely that the earlier discussions in the government exercised a stronger influence on the 1884 proposal for an Ōmura statue. It is also noteworthy that the promoters of this monument emphasized that their plans are not the result of any personal feelings. Anticipating criticism of the project as an attempt to advance narrow Chōshū interests, they explained that the monument was a vehicle for stimulating commitment to the state and ultimately the greater good.

Following the example of the Keitai statue in Fukui, the group of organizers used the *Yomiuri shinbun* and other newspapers to call for donations.¹⁶ The prospectus was signed by Ōmura's friends Kamo no Mizuho (1840–1909), a former naval officer and later chief priest at Yasukuni Shrine (from 1891 to 1909); Hasegawa Sadao (1845–1905), also a naval officer and after 1892 a member of the Upper House; and sixty-one other supporters. Some on the list played crucial roles in the project as financial donors, artists, and media representatives. Many had been Ōmura's students, others had fought with him in the Boshin War, but all had enjoyed close ties with him. The leading signatories hailed from Shizuoka (Hasegawa and Kamo) and Tokushima (Harada Kazumichi, 1830–1910), but the majority shared Ōmura's regional background and were natives of Chōshū.¹⁷ Added to this group were some former samurai from Kōchi, Saga, Gunma, Mito, and Ishikawa as well as three court nobles.

Hasegawa and Kamo had raised the Shizuoka militia, the Enshū Hōkokutai, during the Boshin War in support of the imperial forces. Both were profoundly influenced by the school of National Learning (*kokugaku*) that carried considerable weight in the region.¹⁸ Hasegawa later served under Ōmura in the new government's Ministry of Military Affairs; he and Kamo joined the newly created Navy Ministry in 1872.¹⁹ Harada, originally a Tokugawa vassal (*bakushin*), pursued a career in the IJA. These three men were outranked by such senior figures as Yamada Akiyoshi, Ōmura's successor as one of the organizers of the IJA and minister of justice from 1884, and three senate members (*genrō-in*),

two of whom were former daimyo. The armed forces—at least ten army and five navy officers—were the most strongly represented among the project’s initiators, followed by politicians and ministerial bureaucrats, principally drawn from the Imperial Household Ministry, Ministry of Industry, and Ministry of Finance. Two prefectural governors augmented the group’s cachet. The backing of the director of the National Mint and several industrialists demonstrated that the group had the connections necessary to bring the project to a successful conclusion. Finally, the involvement of the publisher of the *Yomiuri shinbun*, Koyasu Takashi (1836–98), guaranteed the necessary publicity.

The social status of the group indicates that the building of the Ōmura statue was not, as the prospectus claimed, a genuinely national project, but one backed by a particular social cohort: the political, administrative, and military elite of the Meiji state. The fact that many of the signatories were from Yamaguchi reflects the political situation of the Meiji period, when politicians from this region, together with former samurai from Satsuma, Tosa, and Saga, remained in control of the government and the military. This relatively small group of elite actors is often referred to as the “Meiji Oligarchy,” or the “Satsuma-Chōshū (Satchō) Oligarchy.” Its dominance in society, politics, and the military was mirrored in the cult of personality emerging in modern Japan, to which the Ōmura statue project bears witness. Ōmura’s links to former samurai from *other* feudal domains were essential to the project’s promoters, even though their participation only thinly veiled the reality that this monument project was a display of Chōshū power.

In April 1886, Harada Kazumichi wrote to the Home Ministry, as well as the army and navy ministries, to seek approval for the monument.²⁰ Later that year, the *Yomiuri shinbun* reported that Sanjō Sanetomi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Grand Minister of State, had given approval and that “construction will begin shortly.”²¹ The involvement of the army and navy ministries was required firstly because Ōmura was a military figure and secondly because the organizers proposed in-

stalling the statue at the military-administered site of Yasukuni Shrine. Ōmura himself had proposed building a shrine to honor those fallen in the civil war, giving the choice of site further credibility.²²

Progress on the project was slow. It was plagued by financial problems with the organizers underestimating the cost of the undertaking since only a handful of such statues had ever been built in Japan. Even though it was five times the size of its donation to the 1880 Yamato Takeru statue fund in Kanazawa, the 500 *yen* donated by the Imperial Household Ministry in 1887 covered only a small portion of the cost. Fundraising activities would continue for years.²³ Moreover, the sculptors and artists engaged lacked the necessary technical skills to expedite the work.²⁴ The Yamato Takeru statue was completed within a few months of commissioning in the copper-casting center of Takaoka; however, the same degree of technical expertise did not seem available in Tokyo. It would take a further six years after the statue’s commission in 1886 before it was cast and another year before its unveiling.

Some of the early Tokyo sculptors working in bronze during the Meiji period, such as Takamura Kōun, had begun their careers by carving Buddhist images and wooden models for bronze Buddhist statues.²⁵ In response to the new era, they gradually developed the technology to produce wooden molds for statuary, yet it appears that the sculpting and casting of large public statues lay outside the skills of Tokyo artisans. The sculptor commissioned for the Ōmura statue, Ōkuma Ujihiro (1856–1934), learned the requisite skills and techniques on the job, as did those charged with casting it. As part of the project, Ōkuma went to Europe in 1885 to study the art of statuary in France, Germany, and Italy.²⁶ It is unknown whether he or any of his colleagues at the Tokyo School of Fine Arts contacted the Takaoka bronze workers. It is more likely that they considered public statuary a principally Western art form, opting therefore to study Western technology and expertise rather than domestic sculptural traditions.²⁷

Religion seemed to have played a role in Ōkuma’s choices; his conversion to Christianity

made a visit to Europe particularly attractive. His religious background also explains why he was drawn to Italy, where he spent most of his time when abroad. There Ōkuma sought instruction from Vincenzo Ragusa (1847–1927), the first Westerner to teach sculpture in Japan (1875–82). Ragusa became a celebrated sculptor of monuments for Italy's national heroes, such as the famous 1888 monument to Giuseppe Garibaldi in Palermo. Nonetheless, the knowledge of bronze-casting spread slowly within Japanese art circles: the first journal article to introduce bronze-casting methods in France, Germany, Austria, and Italy in some detail dates from 1893.²⁸ A short article on “The Memorial Hall for the Late German Emperor” was published in *Kenchiku zasshi* (Architecture Journal) earlier in 1890, but the journal did not revisit the theme of public sculpture until 1892 with the article “The Bronze Statue of the Late Deputy Minister for Military Affairs Ōmura” published shortly before the statue's unveiling.²⁹ The Tokyo-based *Kenchiku zasshi* ignored the statue project in Kanazawa and paid little attention to the technical difficulties involved in producing the sculptures for the first Tokyo monuments until *after* their completion.

The plinth for the Ōmura monument was set up in 1891, but prolonged debate over the statue's design delayed its completion.³⁰ As noted above, the most important criteria for a statue were historical authenticity, the creation of an accurate “likeness,” and an appropriate (i.e., historically relevant) location. This resulted in most statues of historical figures of this period being characterized by a highly banal realism. Often, however, the quest for a “true” depiction of a Great Man was hampered by a dearth of images and other source material relating to the subject. In many cases the quest for a faithful likeness clashed with the need, and the tendency, to idealize Great Men, which often militated against a “realistic” portrayal.

Some Western and Japanese artists during this era frequently decried the excessive demands for realism in figural sculpture; others criticized that statues failed to resemble their subject because they were overly idealized. In 1878, the German art critic

Max Schasler wrote that most of the marble and bronze statues built in Germany “are exaggeratedly realistic and old-fashioned; yet again, others are idealized to an unbelievable degree.”³¹ It would seem inevitable that a statue designed to portray an eminent figure in the history of the nation as a subject of veneration and as a model for future generations would present a beautified image of the subject. The necessity for realism may explain why historical figures from antiquity, for whom no authentic depictions existed, or mythical figures without any historical basis, were, as a matter of fact, more frequently chosen as subjects in public sculpture. “Mythical characters like Romulus and Remus or King Arthur,” observed the historian Gordon S. Wood, “obscured in the mists of the distant past” are much more suited to play the role of “heroes and founding fathers [than] . . . real human beings about whom an extraordinary amount of historical detail is known.”³²

The Ōmura statue came to function as a template for Japanese public statuary in its demand for an authentic likeness and historical accuracy. The casting process was problematic for sculptor Ōkuma Ujihiro, because no photograph of Ōmura existed. The only image of the late lord—a copper print based on a sketch—was not to the liking of Ōmura's widow, with whom Ōkuma frequently consulted to ensure that his sculpture would portray a “true image.”³³ The sculpture was finally cast in late 1891 at the IJA's arsenal in Koishikawa, and a year later, the *Yomiuri* announced that the unveiling ceremony would be held at the Grand Festival (*tai-sai*) at Yasukuni Shrine on November 6, 1892.³⁴ The event was postponed, and the unveiling eventually staged three months later on February 5, 1893.³⁵ Kamo no Mizuho, now the chief priest at Yasukuni Shrine, delivered the main speech, explaining the background to the statue and eulogizing Ōmura's achievements. Several hundred people attended the ceremony, including representatives of the Imperial House, the Privy Council, the IJA and IJN as well as government ministries and guests from the Japanese art world.³⁶ A pamphlet distributed among the participants had a sketch of the statue and a short



Fig. 6.2 Matsumura Sōhei. *Ko Ōmura heibu tayū dōzō shinzū* (True Image of the Bronze Statue of the Late Deputy Minister of Military Affairs Ōmura), March 1893. Black-line only woodblock print. 39 × 27 cm.

biography of Ōmura. It was not long before woodblock prints appeared showing the statue and its inscription, which was composed by Sanjō Sanetomi (fig. 6.2).

In its report, the *Yomiuri shinbun* characterized the unveiling ceremony as a lively event “surpassing everything since the foundation of the Yasukuni Shrine.”³⁷ Today it is almost exclusively known for its veneration of the war dead. In the prewar period, however, the shrine had also been a major site for mass entertainment, hosting sumo tournaments (still held today), circus performances, and even horse races.³⁸ In fact, the Ōmura statue was positioned at the center of a space that later became a horse racecourse (fig. 6.3). It was moved closer to



Fig. 6.3 Statue of Ōmura Masujirō. Cover, *Fūzoku gahō, shinsen Tōkyō meisho zue* (Illustrated Magazine of Japanese Life, Pictures of Famous Views of Tokyo), no. 177 (November 25, 1898).

the center of the shrine precinct in the Taishō period following the track’s closure.

The statue’s location made it a popular feature of the Tokyo cityscape, as did its impressive size. The actual statue of Ōmura in traditional samurai dress with two swords in his belt is more than 3 m high, but the total height of the memorial, including the stela-like pedestal, approaches 13 m. Its height and size made it a major urban landmark, visible from a distance, particularly at a time when multi-story buildings would not obstruct the view. Ōmura holds a pair of binoculars in his left hand as he looks toward Ueno, where he led imperial troops during the Boshin War (the “Ueno War” between the imperial forces and the Shōgitai, a corps loyal to the



Fig. 6.4 The statue of Ōmura Masujirō on the cover of *Shashin shūhō*, no. 113 (April 24, 1940).

shogunate). Eight cannons from the Sino-Japanese War were placed around the monument (see fig. 6.1), reinforcing the military character of the memorial.³⁹ The statue has often been labeled “one of Japan’s first Western-style statues,” yet Ōmura’s widely known antipathy to Western-style clothing resulted in a unique design that preserves a distinctive Japanese identity while at the same time acknowledging inspiration from European statuary.⁴⁰

The location of the statue within the precinct of a celebrated shrine did much to guarantee its popularity. People came to the site to mourn the war dead and as tourists. Not only a site with religious and cultural import, the Yasukuni Shrine was also known as a *meishō*, a place of scenic beauty. Con-

temporary postcards similarly bear witness to the description of the Ōmura statue as a *meishō*, or a “famous site,” and this accolade ensured its visibility on a national scale.⁴¹ Such souvenir postcards were among the bestselling motifs and even today can be readily purchased on internet auctions for 100 *yen* or less. The statue likewise featured in travel guides, including English-language guidebooks to Japan, Tokyo pictorials and even on magazine covers (see fig. 6.4).⁴²

Ceremonies and festivals at the shrine further fueled its prominence. Some were in honor of Ōmura the historical figure, others to celebrate the anniversary of the statue, and still others to encourage the “people’s martial spirit.” Many of these events were coordinated by the Ōmura-kyō Itoku Kenshōkai (Association to Commemorate the Outstanding Virtue of Lord Ōmura): in 1919, for example, a festival marking the fiftieth anniversary of Ōmura Masujirō’s death was held there.⁴³

The monument also became part of prewar IJA military ceremonies and parades in Tokyo, taking center stage during festivals at Yasukuni. “Ōmura Festivals” honored the “founder of conscription” during all of Japan’s wars in the modern era and in so doing assisted in preparing men for military service. The first “Ceremony to Honor the Late Deputy Minister of Military Affairs Ōmura” was held during the First Sino-Japanese War, the country’s first fully-fledged modern war. During this event, the former Chōshū daimyo, Mōri Motonori (1839–96), explained in a speech that the recent victories won by Japanese forces were constructed on the foundations laid by Ōmura, a samurai from his own domain.⁴⁴ Similar ceremonies took place until the 1940s; it is telling that the statue escaped wartime requisition drives and survived the war.

Ōmura was not a major public figure in early Meiji Japan, but his statue boosted his popularity and gave him instant status as a “Great Man.” No book-length biographies of Ōmura were in print before 1892, but dozens of studies appeared following the completion of his statue until the end of the war in 1945.⁴⁵ In 1897, four years after the statue’s installation, the series *Nihon ijū den* (Biographies of Great

Men of Japan) included a biography of Ōmura that would firmly establish his place among the nation's leaders and founders.⁴⁶ A year later, the magazine *Fūzoku gahō* described Ōmura as “one Great Man.”⁴⁷ Moreover, with the growing precariousness of Japan's military situation in the Asia-Pacific War and the resultant extension of military service, Ōmura became increasingly revered for his role as the designer of the conscription system. One wartime publication even elevated him to that of a “great Great Man” (*dai-ijin*).⁴⁸ In his 1942 book *Ōmura Masujirō shōden* (Short Biography of Ōmura Masujirō), Hagi-hara Shinsei remarked that “the present victories of our imperial forces . . . can be attributed to the military reforms of the early years of Meiji.”⁴⁹ Despite his eminent profile, a second statue of Ōmura was never realized. It was only in 2017, with the impending 150th anniversary of Ōmura's death, that Yamaguchi city announced plans to build a memorial in his hometown. Scheduled to be completed by 2019, this new monument demonstrates the continuing popularity of public statuary in Japan.⁵⁰

Ōmura's prominence is an intriguing case of the cult of the individual in prewar Japan. Given his low public profile prior to the erection of his statue, other better-known figures may have been more logical choices, but they would not have been as successful in demonstrating the power of the ruling oligarchy and the new role of the imperial military forces that Ōmura had a hand in creating. Moreover, in some cases statues to other figures may have raised suspicions regarding the underlying motivation in their construction. For example, a statue of Kido Takayoshi considered for installation in 1878 would have reflected the power of Chōshū and the legitimacy of the Meiji Restoration; it would have failed to symbolize the military.

Ōmura Masujirō died before the rivalries between the former feudal domains and court nobles in the Meiji government intensified. He would ultimately prove an ideal figure in the drive to foster devotion to the nation, state, the emperor, and the military, and his statue was not primarily seen as a representation of the vanities and prejudices of a narrowly defined social or regional group. In the

meantime, however, other regions of Japan were making plans to display their heroes and representatives in public places, most notably the former domain of Satsuma, Chōshū's main rival in Meiji Japan.

LOYALTY AND REBELLION: SAIGŌ TAKAMORI

The monument of Saigō Takamori (1828–77), erected in Ueno Park in 1898, is probably the most famous statue in Japan (fig. 6.5).⁵¹ Unlike Ōmura, Saigō was at the time of his death both extremely popular and highly controversial. He was lauded as one of the “three pillars of the Meiji Restoration” and widely respected among his contemporaries, and for this reason a form “Saigō worship” had already emerged during his lifetime. But as the leader of the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion against the central government Saigō also was branded as a “traitor”: this made him a highly ambiguous figure. How did the Saigō cult, evidenced in the Ueno statue, nevertheless become so deeply rooted in Japanese society?

Saigō's main accomplishment was the unification of the domains of Satsuma, Saigō's native domain, and Chōshū against the shogunate. Rivals for power in the 1860s, Chōshū openly challenged the shogunate, whereas Satsuma continued to support the Tokugawa until 1866. In 1867, the two domains joined forces, opening the doors for the overthrow of the shogunate. In early 1868, Saigō became a leading figure in the newly established government. He retired from politics in 1873, returning to his hometown of Kagoshima, where he lived a quiet life until 1877 when a samurai uprising erupted in the region. Saigō consented to assume leadership, in response to which the central government quickly mobilized a conscript army to quell what became known as the Satsuma Rebellion. In the ensuing confrontation, Saigō and most of his followers were either killed or committed suicide.⁵²

The government declared Saigō a “rebel” (*gyakuto*) and an “enemy of the court” (*chōteki*), but the general public continued to hold him in high es-



Fig. 6.5 (*Dai-Tōkyō*) *Ishin no genkun Dai-Saigō-ō dōzō* (*Ueno kōen*). *The Bronze Statue of Takamori Saigo*, *Ueno Park (Greater Tokyo)*. Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

teem. Many believed that he was a true imperial loyalist, rebelling against a regime that called itself the “emperor’s government,” but which was in fact corrupt and driven by vested interests. It was thought that Saigō was duty-bound to free the emperor from the “evil” surrounding him and rescue the Japanese people from the autocratic despotism of a small group (“feudal cliques” or *hanbatsu*) that dominated the government. In that sense, as the political scientist Maruyama Masao (1914–96) argued after World War II, rebellion and loyalty were two sides of the same coin and a binary contrast did not make much sense. Maruyama also pointed out that the Meiji Restoration, despite the emphasis on “restoration” as encapsulated in the naming of that

event, was also a rebellion against the existing order. He even characterized it as an event bringing about “revolutionary change” (*kakumei-teki henkaku*), highlighting the parallels between Saigō’s first rebellion against the shogunate and his second rebellion in 1877 when he fought a government that he considered no less dictatorial.⁵³

For many of his contemporaries, Saigō remained the outstanding hero of the Restoration. Had his 1877 rebellion succeeded, they maintained, he would not have been remembered as a traitor but as a national savior and that Saigō’s tragedy resulted from the writing of history by the victors. As an oft-quoted contemporaneous Japanese proverb affirmed, “If you win, you are the government army, if you lose, you are the rebel” (*kateba kangun, maker-eba zokugun*), and in the latter case the historical judgment is inevitably made by the enemy. Nevertheless, Saigō’s fate was ultimately more favorable than this proverb suggests. Following his death in 1877, numerous writers stepped up to “rescue Saigō from history,” and a number of Saigō myths and legends emerged that have ever since informed his ongoing popularity.⁵⁴ In this context, both supporters and critics of Saigō continue to read his life in ways that fit their own political agendas.

The glorification of Saigō in popular media as a paragon of imperial loyalty began immediately after his death. In a climate of increasing discontent with the Meiji government, stories proliferated claiming that Saigō had survived and would, one day, return to save the nation. These writers “produced a rich body of fantasies and legends. Some envisioned Saigō . . . ascending to the heavens and lodging in the planet Mars.”⁵⁵ Others believed that he had escaped to Russia. None of these storytellers were actually referring to the historical figure of Saigō Takamori, rather to a *legend* they themselves were creating—the legend of “Saigō the Great” or “Nanshū-ō, . . . the venerable [one] from the southern province.” (“Nanshū” is a reference to Saigō’s home region in Kyushu.⁵⁶) While the statues in Kanazawa and Fukui discussed in chapter 3 are of figures from Japanese mythology, Saigō was a real-life figure. There were no doubts about his historic-

ity. Yet the manner in which he was portrayed in historiography and the processes of memorialization that evolved around his name have parallels to myth-making.

In similar vein, many examples of “monumental biography” have been published since the 1880s, contributing to the growth of the Saigō myth. The earliest were written by individuals connected with the anti-government Movement for Freedom and People’s Rights (*Jiyū minken undō*) who sought to position Saigō as an anti-establishment hero. The first book-length biography of Saigō was published in 1880 and carried a foreword by Ueki Emori (1857–92), one of the most radical advocates of liberalism and democracy in Meiji Japan.⁵⁷ A biography with a foreword by Ozaki Yukio (1858–1954), long-time leader of the pro-democracy movement, was issued in 1891.⁵⁸ Even the man who was to become the founder of Japan’s socialist movement, Kōtoku Shūsui (1871–1911), praised Saigō as a “public-spirited man of virtue” (*shishi-jinnin*).⁵⁹ On the other side of the political spectrum, the head of Japan’s right-wing movement, Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944), and his organization Gen’yōsha (Dark Ocean Society) were major adherents of the Saigō cult, releasing several “monumental biographies” on their idol.⁶⁰

All of these writers stressed the difficulty in judging Saigō who, after all, had staged a rebellion against the state. For Ueki, an advocate of the people’s right to rebel against the autocratic government, it was easy to argue that he had good reasons for doing so:⁶¹

The Great Saigō Takamori was a rebel (*ranmin*). But he was also a hero (*gōketsu*). He was a rebel because he opposed the reign of the Tokugawa family [the shogunate] and founded the Meiji government. He was a hero *because* he rebelled against the Meiji government. No doubt this made him a true hero (*eiya*).⁶²

This was a daring statement, given that the activists who had overthrown the Tokugawa shogunate were now firmly entrenched as the leaders of the Meiji government. By labeling Saigō a hero, Ueki

was fundamentally challenging their legitimacy. Later writers, too, played down the contradiction inherent in the veneration of a “rebel” by arguing that Saigō’s rebellious nature expressed the true spirit of the Meiji Restoration. Unwilling to acknowledge that the concept of individuality was an import from the West, Nakano Seigō (1886–1943) even went so far to assert that “rebellious opposition to authority” was “the purest expression of Japanese individuality.”⁶³

The Movement for Freedom and People’s Rights adopted Saigō for their cause, and the first proposal to build a memorial dedicated to him came from a “progressive” writer, rather than a fellow samurai from Satsuma or a member of one of the ruling cliques. In early 1883, journalist and educator Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), the founder of Keiō University, unveiled a proposal for a statue of Saigō in the daily newspaper *Hōchi shinbun*.⁶⁴ Nothing ever eventuated out of this proposal, but it implied that the figure of Saigō might well become a rallying point for anti-government groups. Fukuzawa had previously applauded Saigō’s “rebellious spirit” (*teikō no seishin*) and lamented the waning of such a spirit as early as in 1877, shortly after Saigō’s death in the Satsuma Rebellion.⁶⁵ That he did not see Saigō as an exemplar of loyalty and that he criticized the government as autocratic must have unsettled the governing elite.

Saigō’s former compatriots from Satsuma soon went public with their proposals to commission a statue of their hero with the plans spearheaded by Satsuma natives, Yoshii Tomozane (1828–91) and Admiral Kabayama Sukenori (1837–1922). It is unclear if their initiative was a direct reaction to Fukuzawa’s proposal since their intentions were very different and implied divergent historical interpretations. Nevertheless, clearly concerned by the widespread glorification of Saigō as a “rebel” against authority and government, the ruling elite argued that this Satsuma samurai was “one of theirs.” He was a representative of fundamental public values that they continued to propagate: loyalty to the emperor and devotion to nation and state. A statue to honor Saigō was unrealistic, how-

ever, as long as he remained branded a “rebel,” and not pardoned by the government and, in particular, by the emperor.⁶⁶

The group around Yoshii and Kabayama published an “official” multi-volume biography of Saigō in 1895, which included messages and poems by central figures of the ruling oligarchy such as General Yamagata Aritomo, a two-term prime minister; General Ōyama Iwao, Saigō’s cousin; and Katsu Kaishū (1823–99), a former shogunate official who had peacefully surrendered Edo Castle to Saigō’s forces in 1868, avoiding major bloodshed in the capital during the civil war.⁶⁷ Through these publications, the elite contributed to the rehabilitation of Saigō, albeit with an entirely different emphasis from that of the Freedom and Peoples’ Rights movement. Endorsed by the ruling elite, these biographies positioned Saigō within a framework of state-centered rhetoric and presented him as an exemplar of loyalty to the state. They downplayed or ignored the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion or, in the very least, explained it in terms of Saigō’s concerns regarding the pace of Japan’s modernization.⁶⁸ Set against the backdrop of increased unease about the potential loss of national identity through an accelerated process of Westernization, this interpretation permitted them to integrate Saigō’s critique against “exaggerated modernization” into their own narrative.

These developments in historiography and the shifting perceptions of Saigō’s actions in the eyes of the ruling elite eventually led to an imperial pardon. Following the promulgation of the Japanese constitution on February 11, 1889, Saigō received a posthumous pardon, along with many other former “rebels” and “enemies of the court.” The emperor also restored his titles and honors.⁶⁹ A fortnight later, on September 25, the Imperial House even sent a gift for presentation at a ceremony commemorating the thirteenth anniversary of Saigō’s death, signaling official reconciliation with the former rebel.⁷⁰

Saigō’s friends lost no time in renewing their plans to build a statue of him. On the day of his pardon, they held a rally in Shiba Park organized by a group of Tokyo-based politicians and bureaucrats

from Satsuma, who were all members of the Kagoshima Gōyūkai (Association of Friends from the Hometown of Kagoshima). There they proposed to erect a statue in honor of the “venerable man.” Later that year, one of the central figures of the Gōyūkai, Yoshii Tomozane, himself a distant relative of Saigō through marriage,⁷¹ announced their plans in a statement released in the *Yomiuri shinbun*:

The venerable Saigō (*Saigō-ō*) always cooperated with men of resolution (*shishi*), leading to the major achievement of the restoration of imperial rule (*ōsei fukko*). He then worked humbly for the imperial court and was appointed army general. . . . As a token of its appreciation, the imperial court has now restored [his] court rank and titles (*shakui*). . . . To commemorate the great man’s contribution to national affairs . . . several influential figures now wish to build a statue in Ueno Park or in the vicinity of the Imperial Palace.⁷²

A prospectus (*Kinen dōzō kensetsu shuisho*) was published in the advertisement sections of several newspapers, calling for donations and painting Saigō as a model of loyalty to the Imperial House.⁷³ Silent on the issue of the 1877 rebellion, it emphasized that he

contributed greatly to this momentous enterprise [the Meiji Restoration], achieving the restoration of imperial rule (*ōsei fukko*) and becoming an outstanding statesman of the restoration (*ishin no genkun*). He was kind and loyal to the Emperor, he was a distinguished [figure] and his name was known to everyone. . . . He was indeed a Great Man (*ijin*).⁷⁴

The authors borrowed heavily from the rhetoric that had developed around the cult of personality to focus on Saigō’s accomplishments during the Meiji Restoration and presented him as an exemplar of loyalty to the emperor and devotion to the state (*kokuji*). The document uses an unusual term—*ryū’aku* (隆渥)—to characterize his allegiance to the emperor with the first character *ryū* (隆) also the initial character of Saigō’s given name, Takamori

(隆盛), implying that his was a unique expression of personal loyalty to the sovereign.

The prospectus listed fifty-one supporters, including powerful figures such as four-time prime minister Itō Hirobumi (from former Chōshū domain); two-time prime minister Yamagata Aritomo (Chōshū); long-serving minister for foreign affairs Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915, Chōshū); former foreign minister Terashima Munenori (1832–93, Satsuma); Iwakura Tomosada (1852–1910), court noble and son of former minister of the right Iwakura Tomomi (1825–83); court noble Sanjō Sanetomi; former deputy prime minister and leader of the Movement for Freedom and People’s Rights, Itagaki Taisuke (1837–1919, Tosa); former prime minister Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922, Saga); Katsu Kaishū and military figures as well as several former daimyo.⁷⁵

As with the Ōmura statue, this group represented the political elite of the Meiji Restoration and the early Meiji state. Supporters from the former feudal domains of Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa, the three domains involved in the 1860s restoration movement, were particularly well represented. Given Saigō’s origins, it is not surprising that names from Satsuma formed a majority, but not overwhelmingly so. As with the Ōmura statue, this would have damaged the claim that his memorial was to be a “national project.” Several military officers, former as well as future government ministers and former daimyo are included in the list. It is noteworthy that Saigō’s one-time opponents, the commanders of the shogunate forces during the Boshin War (Katsu, Enomoto) and the Satsuma Rebellion (Tani Kanjō), were also among those campaigning for a Saigō monument. The construction committee (*kensetsu iinkai*) comprised sixteen members and was headed by the widely respected Admiral Kabayama and Kuki Ryūichi, the director of the Imperial Museum (Teikoku Hakubutsukan) in Ueno, where the statue was eventually installed.

Roughly concurrent with the announcement of the plans to build a Saigō statue in Tokyo, was the release of a proposal for another monument in Kyoto (see fig. 6.6).⁷⁶ The proposal was the brainchild of sculptor Ueda Rakuzai (?–1890), but more sig-

nificantly it was co-signed by highly influential members of the aristocracy, including the imperial prince Kuni Asahiko (1824–91); Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904), the head of one of the most prominent branches of the imperial family; the last shogun Tokugawa Keiki; Matsudaira Yoshinaga, former daimyo of Fukui; Andō Nobutake (1849–1908), the adopted successor of the former daimyo of the Iwakidaira domain and councilor of foreign affairs Andō Nobumasa (1820–71); Saga Sanenaru (1820–1909), a courtier with close connections to the Iwakura family and a relative of Ueda’s; as well as Katsu Kaishū, Sanjō Sanetomi, and Iwakura Tomosada. The composition of these supporters differs noticeably from the Tokyo group, comprising almost exclusively court nobles (Kuni, Sanjō, Konoe, Iwakura, Saga) and former shogunate officials (Tokugawa, Matsudaira, Katsu, Andō). There were no prominent representatives of the Satsuma and Chōshū cliques, except for Saigō’s younger brother Tsugumichi. The coupling of these two particular social groups must be interpreted to mean that the court aristocracy had reconciled with their former enemies—the leaders of the Tokugawa shogunate and its allies—whose overthrow was the primary objective of the Meiji Restoration. Acting in concert to build a statue for Saigō Takamori, who had rebelled against the “Satchō Oligarchy,” however, could also be read as a subtle criticism of current government affairs. This would explain why the signatories proposed to build the statue in Kyoto on prefectural land in the city’s Higashiyama district of Kiyomizu. A highly contested issue associated with this monument was that it was to be an equestrian statue. Perhaps this played a factor in this proposal never being realized. The time was not ripe for equestrian statues. Another reason was the untimely death of Ueda in 1890.

In Tokyo, the discussion initially focused more on the location of the statue than on its form. At the outset, the organizers proposed to install the statue in front of the Imperial Palace as an expression of Saigō’s unparalleled loyalty and his special relation to the emperor.⁷⁷ This plan received Imperial Household Ministry approval, probably because of




Fig. 6.6 *Ko-Saijō Takamori-ō kenpi kōkoku* (Announcement Regarding the Building of a Monument to the Late Venerable Saigō Takamori). Published by Ishikawa Hanjirō, Kyoto, 1889. 26.5 × 39 cm.

the ministry’s close connections to the organizing committee. The matter soon became the topic of heated public debate. The *Yomiuri shinbun*, which had supported the Ōmura statue, vehemently opposed the placement of a statue of Saigō near the Imperial Palace:

There are both advantages and disadvantages in the erection of a statue of Saigō Takamori. However, if the statue is installed [near the Imperial Palace], it will undoubtedly have a serious impact on public morals (*sedō jinshin*). . . . We have heard that even the supporters of the statue have objections. We will not

discuss these opinions in detail here, but we trust that the statue’s opponents will prevail and that the plans will be rescinded.⁷⁸

The *Yomiuri shinbun* article went further by voicing its opposition to the very notion of a statue of Saigō. In its front-page editorial on April 24, 1892, the newspaper argued that an imperial pardon was insufficient justification to build a statue honoring a former rebel. Saigō’s “historical guilt,” the editorial continued, had not been dissolved and it could not guarantee “what feelings will be aroused among the people (*kokumin*) when they see [the statue] standing outside the Imperial Palace.”⁷⁹ A year later, the *Yomiuri* stated even more directly that Saigō was not a figure “who should be displayed for all time as a model (*mohan*) for the subjects of our country (*wagakuni shinmin*)” because he had “been mistaken when he rushed into rebellion and was branded a traitor.”⁸⁰ This negative publicity led to the Imperial

Household Ministry withdrawing its approval; the ministry then approved an alternative proposal to place the statue in Ueno Park. Even though the statue would be set up in a distance from the Imperial Palace, the choice of Ueno Park, then under imperial administration, symbolically reconfirmed Saigō's close association with the emperor and the Imperial Household. The reconciliation between the emperor and Saigō was further demonstrated in 1893 when the imperial court announced a donation of 500 yen toward the statue's construction.⁸¹

The Tokyo planners also initially suggested an equestrian statue.⁸² The idea of building the first such monument in Japan to the leader of a rebellion, however, was met with stiff opposition. Both in Western countries and in Japan, equestrian statues were regarded as a privilege reserved for the monarch or members of the royal family.⁸³ The fact that not a single figure affiliated with the Imperial House, the emperor included, had thus far been portrayed on horseback made this impossible. The debate about Saigō's horse or whether he should even be depicted in military uniform sparked divisions among supporters. Army minister Ōyama initially approved having him appear in uniform, but Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi vetoed the decision.⁸⁴ Eventually, the statue erected in Ueno Park in 1898 pictured Saigō not as a military commander, but as a somewhat nebulous figure deprived of both horse and uniform. He wears a casual, Japanese-style summer garment (*yukata*) and is walking his little dog (fig. 6.5).

The sculptor commissioned was the highly experienced Takamura Kōun, who by this time had been hired to teach in the sculpture department at the Tokyo School of Fine Arts.⁸⁵ Gotō Sadayuki (1850–1903), enlisted because of his expertise in producing equestrian monuments, designed the dog. Okazaki Sessei was tasked with casting the statue. The artists struggled to satisfy the public's demand for authenticity because, as in the case of the Ōmura statue, not a single photograph of Saigō existed.⁸⁶ Furthermore, since the Saigō statue was roughly contemporaneous with the Ōmura monument, the project encountered similar technical



Fig. 6.7 *Saigō Takamori dōzō*. Report on the unveiling ceremony of the statue of Saigō Takamori in the journal *Fūzoku gahō*, no. 182 (1898).

hurdles whereby the lack of expertise caused delays. Eager to discover how to cast a sculpture with multiple elements (e.g., a figure with weapons, canes, animals) but still conveying the impression of a work cast in one piece, Okazaki visited the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893. This trip bore little fruit apart from the lesson that combining Western and Japanese casting techniques would be the best way to finish the work.⁸⁷

These ongoing controversies about the form of the monument, the difficulties with fundraising, and the issues regarding the physical production of the statue meant that it took a decade to realize the project, even longer than the Ōmura statue. Saigō's statue was located close to the graves of the soldiers from the shogunate's Shōgitai unit that Ōmura Masujirō fought against in the 1868 Ueno War. The Ōmura sculpture faces the Saigō monument, thus creating a link between the two men and their statues. The unveiling ceremony on December 18, 1898, was attended by more than 500 guests, including the admirals Kabayama and Saigō Tsugumichi, the generals Ōyama and Yamagata Aritomo

(the prime minister), together with several ministers of state.⁸⁸ These high-ranking guests, along with the presidents and vice presidents of both houses of the Diet and many donors, were later entertained at a reception in Ueno Park. The ceremony was extensively reported upon in the Japanese press with newspapers giving it front-page treatment.⁸⁹ Weekly and monthly journals also covered the event, often supplemented by a full-page illustration (fig. 6.7).⁹⁰

The prime minister opened the event with a brief speech praising Saigō's contribution to the Meiji Restoration and the establishment of the new government. He described him as a paradigm of loyalty, frugality, and compassion. As the chair of the construction committee, Kabayama then gave a longer report, explaining the origins of the project in 1889, identifying the late Yoshii Tomozane as its chief instigator and thanking donors for their financial support, above all the Imperial Household Ministry (IHM), whose 500-yen donation was given special mention.⁹¹ The ceremony reached a climax with Saigō Tsugumichi's unveiling of the statue.

The donors' names were published in newspapers; the IHM donation received a preferential acknowledgment as it was inscribed on the plinth.⁹² The inscription also notes Yoshii Tomozane as the initiator of the project, reflecting his crucial role in organizing it and in securing official approval. Yoshii's connections with the IHM (he had held different positions in the ministry over the years and was appointed vice minister in 1886) explains the organization's willingness to approve the statue. Following Yoshii's death in 1891, the inclusion of his name on the plinth ensured that his own memory was preserved. A statue dedicated to Yoshii was installed outside Kagoshima's Central Park in 2010.

The unveiling of the Saigō statue cemented his rehabilitation as a symbol of loyalty and unwavering devotion to the imperial cause. Now as a representative of the myth of "the Great Saigō" rather than of the historical figure of Saigō Takamori—and the inconvenient truth of the rebellion—the statue served to "reconstitute him into a military hero of the imperial forces" and "incorporate po-

tentially oppositional signs into the dominant system of representations."⁹³

Following the installation of the statue, it, like Saigō himself, was praised as an embodiment of the values of the Meiji Restoration and that Saigō was the only person deserving of such veneration. In 1901, for example, writers in the coterie of Mori Ōgai (1862–1922) and Satō Yoshisuke (1878–1951) observed about Saigō: "Ahh, throughout ancient and modern history, no one before him has been found worthy of the title 'The Venerable' (ō) and no one since. He is the representative of all Great Men (*ijin*)."⁹⁴ Expressing their full support for the "Nanshū Bronze Statue" and their satisfaction with the statue's design, the figure's humble dress and posture was a demonstration for these writers of the unselfish and even-tempered character of the Great Man. Others praised the statue as a significant work of art. In 1922, it was included in a catalog of the Tokyo Memorial Peace Exhibition, together with the statue of Prince Komatsu, the Great Buddha of Kamakura, a statue of Nichiren, and several abstract sculptures, mostly representations of peace.⁹⁵ Due to its central location near one of the major train stations in Tokyo, the Saigō statue became a popular "message board" after the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake, where people attached notes informing family members and friends of their whereabouts (fig. 6.8).

Despite the praise for the Saigō statue in certain quarters, criticism continued even after the completion of the monument. This criticism suggests that the separation between the historical figure and the myth of the "Great Saigō" remained problematic and that a perception gap existed relating to the achievements of the historical Saigō Takamori. An anonymous contributor in *Fūzoku gahō* wrote in 1899 that a statue honoring a rebel who had "brought disorder to the realm" might well arouse dangerous ideas among the people.⁹⁶ In 1906, the lawyer Yamazaki Arinobu remarked that not every Great Man is worthy of a statue: "Saigō Takamori was a loyalist at the time of the Restoration, he later disagreed with the government and in 1877 was responsible for a great war (*dai-sensō*). Even though



Fig. 6.8 “Whereabout-messages” at the Venerable Saigō (Tachinokisaki no Saigō-ō). Source: Ichita Kenji, ed., *Kantō daisaigai gahō* (Tokyo: Keibunsha, 1923).

he might have some accomplishments to his name, who among us would build a memorial to him or pen an inscription?”⁹⁷

A piece published in 1899 in the opinion section of the magazine *Taiyō* argued that statues served the purpose of “social education” (*shakai kyōiku*) and questioned whether Saigō was a suitable character to serve as a link between the individual subject and the imperial nation.⁹⁸ The author of this piece, most likely the critic Takayama Chogyū (1871–1902),⁹⁹ warned readers that, although “only a handful of statues, namely those of Ōmura and Saigō, exist in Japan today,” such memorials can be “far more effective [as tools of social education] than ten volumes of historical biography. . . . They are not made merely as vehicles for memory (*kin-*

en).”¹⁰⁰ The use of the description “the great” would have drawn attention to the merging of two separate personae in this one man—Saigō the historical figure and Saigō the legend:

Saigō Nanshū was a rare hero. Some of his worshippers call him “the great” Nanshū. . . . But honestly speaking, we feel that the building of a statue for him in Ueno Park is an immoral act. Our private opinions aside, it is a historical fact that his life ended with an act of treason. . . . For reasons of his own, he violated imperial orders, leading to the great crime of rebellion. . . . Ueno Park is one of the finest and largest parks in the empire. If a statue is to be built in such a location, it ought to depict a person worthy of veneration as [a representative of] the ideals of the na-

tion or someone with a particular historical connection to the site. Even if we forgave Nanshū and accept he is a Great Man, we still could not recognize him as a figure suitable for the nation's veneration.¹⁰¹

The anonymous *Taiyō* critic deftly signaled the unsuitability of the site and expressed his fears that the veneration of a “rebel” might undermine the people's loyalty and commitment to the state and the emperor. A different author also criticized the design of the statue, in particular, its small size:

Surely this statue is too *small* to be a representation of a *great* figure. The Japanese nation is rapidly expanding and is striving to become a leading nation in the world. The “great” Nanshū, an honored hero without precedent in Japanese history, is considered the ideal figure to be venerated by this great nation. His statue now stands in the most famous park in the capital city of this great empire. However, looking at this statue makes me think that other nations will not consider this monument an adequate representation of a great national figure, instead they will think it a sorry affair.¹⁰²

The writer continued to dwell on the disparity between the “great” Saigō and the size of his monument, comparing the Saigō statue to the Statue of Liberty in New York, and those of Leonardo da Vinci in Milan, Lord Horatio Nelson in London, Johannes Gutenberg in Frankfurt am Main (in fact in Mainz), Christopher Columbus in Turin, Napoleon Bonaparte in Paris, and other famous statues and memorial structures. He concludes that a memorial statue for a historical figure should always be planned with the dignity of the nation in mind. The implication is that the Saigō statue failed to live up to this lofty aim.¹⁰³

In subsequent years, the Saigō statue and the legend of the “Great Saigō,” which it was designed to embody, would nonetheless become one of the central reference points for the construction of Japanese national identity. In a book published in 1909, Saigō, together with Ōmura Masujirō, the first politician to receive a statue in Tokyo, and Katsu

Kaishū, were described as one of the “three outstanding Meiji heroes” (*Meiji sanketsu*).¹⁰⁴ The book contains illustrations of the statues of Ōmura and Saigō (no photographs of them existed) and a photograph of Katsu (no statue of him existed at this time).¹⁰⁵ Like other statues, the Saigō monument was used for propaganda purposes during the Asia-Pacific War. Schoolchildren visited the statue to worship the “Great Saigō,” to learn about the importance of loyalty to the state that he symbolized and to engage in acts of “patriotic service” such as the cleaning of the statue.¹⁰⁶

The centrally located Ueno Park as the site for the Saigō statue contributed to the popularity of this monument, just as the Yasukuni Shrine did for the statue of Ōmura. Established as one of Tokyo's first public parks in accordance with the 1873 Dajōkan Ordinance No. 16, Ueno Park had developed into a major public space in the early Meiji period and was frequented by great throngs of visitors. At originally 83 ha, Ueno was the largest of the five public parks of early Meiji Tokyo.¹⁰⁷ All five occupied land previously used by temples and shrines. Some had close affiliations with the Tokugawa family, including the Shiba and Ueno parks that were home to the graves of several shoguns. In the Meiji period, the government set up educational institutions and leisure facilities in these areas, such as the Tokyo National Museum and the National Museum of Nature and Science in the 1870s. The Tokyo School of Fine Arts, the Tokyo School of Music, which later merged into the Tokyo University of the Arts, the Museum Department of the Ministry of Education, and from 1906 the Imperial Library were also located in these public spaces. On several occasions, the well-attended national exhibitions were held in Ueno Park. In 1882, Japan's first zoo opened there, as did the Ueno Station one year later, which guaranteed visitors ready access. Ueno Park is still one of Japan's most famous public recreation grounds, known for its museums, the zoo with its panda bears and the Saigō statue but also for the large numbers of homeless people seeking refuge, sometimes clustered at the base of the statue.¹⁰⁸

From the time of its installation, the statue became a “Tokyo landmark” (*Tōkyō meisho*), featuring prominently in contemporary print media such as lithographs (see fig. 3.26), postcards (see fig. 6.5), woodblock prints (fig. 6.9), and advertisements for consumer goods, including cigarettes manufactured in Saigō’s home region (fig. 6.10). Guidebooks to Tokyo and pictorials usually carried a photograph of the statue, even those with only a few statues like the *Dai-Tōkyō shashinchō* (Photography Album of Great Tokyo).¹⁰⁹

The monument proved so successful as a means of inculcating civic virtues, such as loyalty, that in 1917 a newspaper reported that “a young man committed suicide by taking a dose of nitric acid in front of the bronze statue of Saigō Takamori.”¹¹⁰ The newspaper does not go into the details of this incident, but the man’s wish to take his own life beside a national icon who had also committed suicide illustrates the prominence of the Saigō legend and his monument in the public mind. Another report, this time about the Ōmura statue, recounts how in 1894 a police officer found a young man crying next to the monument. He told the officer that he was from Gunma, and upon hearing of the heroic deeds committed by Japanese soldiers in the then raging Sino-Japanese War, he felt his life wasted for failing to make a personal sacrifice for country or emperor (*kuni no tame, kimi no tame*). He went on to explain that this is why he had come to Tokyo to submit a petition to the Ministry of War that would allow him to go to the front and give his life for the state (*kokka*).¹¹¹

Despite the strong impact of the Ueno Park statue as a tool to instill loyalist values in the population, only a handful of statues of Saigō were later built. This illustrates the ambiguous character of the Saigō cult and the semilegendary foundations on which it was predicated. All but one of these later statues were installed in his native Kagoshima, a particularly strong expression of the feelings of veneration for him in his hometown. The first of these statues was erected in 1937 near the site of Saigō’s death, shortly before the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War halted statue-building.



Fig. 6.9 Ueno Kōen Saigō dōzō (Bronze Statue of Saigō in Ueno Park). Color woodblock print, c. 1900. 36 × 25 cm.

As if to compensate for the military deficiencies of the Ueno statue, this example showed Saigō in army uniform, yet still without a horse.¹¹² In 1976, plans were announced to build another statue of Saigō in Kagoshima to commemorate the centenary of his death. The commission was awarded to a bronze-casting firm in Takaoka, but the death of the organizer stalled the project. The statue was entirely forgotten, and it took over a decade until it was “rediscovered” in Takaoka. It was finally delivered to Kagoshima in 1988 and placed in the Saigō Park (Saigō Kōen) named after the hero located close to Kagoshima Airport. At over 10 m, it was the tallest statue of a historical figure known to date. Further statues were mounted in 1991 close to the site of Saigō’s former Kagoshima residence and

outside the Saigō Nanshū Memorial Hall (Saigō Nanshū Kinenkan) on the island of Okinoerabujima in southern Kagoshima Prefecture.¹¹³ In addition to the example in Ueno Park, the only statue outside of Kagoshima is at the 2001 Nanshū Shrine in Yamagata. It is a copy of the 1991 Kagoshima statue and depicts its subject sitting in the *seiza* position, in conversation with Suge Sanehide (1830–1903), a politician from the former Shōnai domain and a Saigō follower.¹¹⁴

There are relatively few Saigō statues, yet they all serve to reinforce his role as a pillar of Japanese nationalism. The Ueno statue, in particular, remains a symbol of Japanese historical identity whose reach has extended far beyond its physical location. Publications on a wide range of subjects still feature the Ueno statue: popular biographical works, manga promoting the worship of Saigō and the ideals he allegedly represents, and guidebooks for managers expounding the value of the samurai's philosophy for the business world.¹¹⁵ The “Great Saigō” and photographs of his most famous statue are also often found in collections of “famous quotes” (*meigon*) or biographies of “representative Japanese” (*daihyōteki Nihonjin*).¹¹⁶ Some of these publications, reminiscent of the work of Ueki Emori and other early Meiji writers, indicate an interest in Saigō as a pioneer of democracy in Japan. Comparisons are made between his famous slogan “Revere Heaven, Love Humanity” (*keiten aijin*) inscribed on the pedestal of the Ueno statue to the ideals espoused by the US president Abraham Lincoln.¹¹⁷

In recent years, attempts have been made to disseminate the “spirit of Saigō” beyond Japan's borders, as seen, for instance, in the trilingual (English, French, Japanese) book *Satsuma Spirits*.¹¹⁸ Saigō also continues to be instrumentalized by right-wing groups, making him a highly ambiguous national icon. As early as the Meiji period, the right-wing association Kokuryūkai (Amur Society, aka Black Dragon Society) appropriated Saigō as their hero, celebrating him as a pioneer of expansion on the Asian continent. The Kokuryūkai published an authoritative Saigō biography, which has been republished and continues to exert influence on the inter-



Fig. 6.10 *Nihon kokusan junsui meiha. Nanshū Tabako. Ueno kōen Saigō Nanshū-ō-zō* (Pure Brand Leaves from Japanese Domestic Production. Nanshū Tobacco. Ueno Park Bronze Statue of the Venerable Nanshū), 1920s. Murakami Shōkai Co. Advertisement for a brand of cigarettes from Kyushu. 77 × 27 cm.

pretation of this national hero.¹¹⁹ In a recently published newspaper with the uncompromising name *Jōi sentō-shi kōdō nippō* (Newspaper for the Expulsion of Foreigners, Imperial Way News), for example, the reader easily finds reports of recent statue-cleaning events (*seisenshiki*) in Ueno Park or the Festival of the Enduring Soul of Saigō (*Ryūkonsai*), both organized by right-wing groups.¹²⁰ Furthermore, Watanabe Shōichi (1930–2017), the doyen of right-wing punditry in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, has embraced Saigō ideology in his writings.¹²¹ Nevertheless, today the general Japanese public seems to be only marginally impressed with this nineteenth-century Kagoshima samurai: when the figure of Saigō Takamori was adopted for NHK’s year-long “historical drama” (*taiga dorama*) in 2018, this resulted in one of the lowest average viewer rates ever recorded (12.72 percent) in the fifty-year history of this long-running series.¹²²

REHABILITATING RENEGADES: II NAOSUKE

Forging unity in the wake of a civil war or similar calamities is a difficult and time-consuming task for any community. The ongoing efforts at reconciliation in South Africa or the sometimes violent controversies over public sculpture in the southern United States are well-known recent examples. Following the Meiji Restoration, Japan faced similar challenges. The new government initially eschewed a reconciliatory approach, glorifying those who had fought on the side of the imperial forces in the civil wars of the 1860s and 1870s, and vilifying those formerly affiliated with the shogunate. In contrast to the imperial dead, which were enshrined at the Shōkonsha (see chapter 2), the latter were barely granted proper burials. The new nation-state began its existence with a divisive legacy, one that has still not entirely disappeared today.¹²³

The previous section established that the rehabilitation of Saigō Takamori was problematic due to his participation in the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion.

But the rehabilitation of figures associated with the shogunate during the 1860s civil wars was an even more painful process. The most prominent case was that of Ii Naosuke (1815–60), a former daimyo of the Hikone domain and a central figure in the shogunate administration of the 1850s. Appointed shogunal regent (*tairō*) in 1858, he insisted that Japan sign the “Friendship and Commerce” treaties between Japan and the Euro-American powers. These one-sided agreements, also known as the “Unequal Treaties,” came to be seen as a national disgrace, and Ii was held responsible long after the fact for Japan’s resultant inferior status on the international stage. Furthermore, he had allegedly signed the treaties without receiving approval from the imperial court, an act that was considered symbolic of the shogunate’s usurpation of imperial prerogative. Ii was branded an “enemy of the court” (*chōteki*) by the “imperial government” that assumed power following the Restoration. Ii all but guaranteed that the new administration’s resentment against him would persist long after his death by implementing a crackdown on the restoration movement in 1858 known as the “Ansei Purges,” when several leaders of the anti-shogunate movement were executed or jailed. His assassination in 1860 in the Sakurada Gate Incident was a direct reaction to this crackdown.

The Meiji government bitterly opposed the idea of building public memorials to honor Ii that emerged shortly after the daimyo’s death. As early as 1862, Naosuke’s former retainers, in respecting Buddhist practices of mourning the dead, erected a “consolation tower” (*kuyōtō*) in Hikone dedicated to their lord. Following the custom of building shrines for historical figures, in 1875 the Ii family proposed adapting an existing small shrine built in honor of the clan’s founders, Ii Naomasa (1561–1602) and his son Ii Naotaka (1590–1659), to ensure Naosuke’s “eternal veneration.”¹²⁴ Immediately after the Yamato Takeru statue was erected in Kanazawa in 1880, Naosuke’s retainers began to push for a secular monument dedicated exclusively to his memory, and in 1881 a Committee for the Construction of a Monument to the Regent (Tairō

Kenpi linkai) was formed to advance this project.¹²⁵ The committee name implies that initially the plan was to erect a memorial, not necessarily a statue. Eventually, however, the proposals would explicitly speak of a statue. The Ii Naosuke memorial project thus became the earliest of its kind after the Kanazawa memorial, predating the first plans for the Ōmura statue in 1882 and Fukuzawa Yukichi's proposal for a Saigō statue in 1883.

The ruling oligarchy's fierce resistance both reflected the historical role that Ii had played and underscored the reality that statues representing figures related to the new government had yet to be built. Adding fuel to the controversy was the fact that Ii's former retainers were envisioning not one, but *two* statues: one in his hometown Hikone and a second in the capital. An 1881 prospectus described Ii as a "courageous hero" (*ei'yū gōketsu*) and explained that these twin memorials would serve to stress the daimyo's contribution to the development of the "imperial nation (*kōkoku*) and to the security of the people (*banmin*)."¹²⁶ While the statue in Hikone was intended as an expression of the veneration felt by Ii's former vassals, the Tokyo statue was to be dedicated to "the people."¹²⁷ (The sites envisioned in Tokyo for the statue were Shiba Park or Ueno Park.) This was a move that the new government must have seen as a challenge to its own legitimacy. Quite predictably, the political elite did everything in their power to prevent the construction of a memorial to the former Hikone daimyo and shogunal regent in "their" capital. The reasons given in the official rejection of the proposal in November 1882 were that a statue would negatively impact the cityscape and that granting permission might trigger a flood of requests to build statues.¹²⁸

In response to this setback, the Ii family changed tack and proposed that a memorial to Naosuke be located in Yokohama, a city that owed its existence to the regent's policy of opening Japan to foreign trade and the so-called treaty ports. Despite Yokohama's approval of the proposal in 1884, the plans were stalled for over a decade. A later report by the project organizers claimed that the government blocked the project, citing a letter from Home Min-

ister Inoue Kaoru, in which he expressed the view that since the Mito samurai who assassinated Ii were to be worshiped in the Yasukuni Shrine, the approval of a statue for Ii would be difficult.¹²⁹

The Ii family and Naosuke's retainers then decided that before pursuing plans to build a memorial, they had to strive for his rehabilitation by shedding the label "enemy of the court." The Ii family thus turned their attention to "rectifying" the historical record through the publication of biographical writings that sought to justify the regent's policies and to show that the new regime was in fact following the policies established by the former regent.¹³⁰ Was it not Ii who had opened the country to the outside world, in contrast to the restoration movement that insisted on opposing contact with the foreigners and continuing Japan's policy of isolation vis-à-vis Western powers? Had the anti-shogunate movement not affirmed Ii's foreign policy by recognizing international, albeit unequal, treaties after it had come to power in 1868? Was it not also continuing, and even accelerating, the modernization policies initiated by the shogunate?

A 1889 copper print by Takata Enkin (dates unknown) (fig. 6.11) succinctly summarizes the issues at stake in this campaign, and at the same time offers a visual image of Ii Naosuke to a broader Japanese and a non-Japanese audience. In a thinly veiled reference to the country's program of modernization, the English-language inscription describes Ii as "the first Baron of The Land and the inaugurator of a new civilization in Japan." The text emphasizes that "during the last 30 years, civilization in this country has been constantly progressing and along with it, human knowledge and all the arts and sciences have been more and more developed." Contemporary readers would have quickly grasped the point that this print, the longer Japanese title of which translates as "Portrait of Ii Naosuke, The Hero (*gōketsu*) of Greater Japan's Enlightenment," and its accompanying text sought to attribute the successful modernization of Japan to the policies of Lord Ii during his tenure as regent.

This interpretation constituted a direct challenge to the mainstream narrative, whereby the res-



Fig. 6.11 Takata Enkin. *Dai-Nihon kaimei no gōketsu Ii Naosuke-kō shōzō. Portrait of Ii Naosuke. The first Baron of The Land and the inaugurator of a new civilization in Japan.* Copper-plate print. Published by Sanseidō, 1889. 35 × 45 cm.

torationist forces had overthrown the shogunate in order to modernize Japan and transform it into a powerful nation on the world stage. The text on the print underlines Ii's role in opening up the country by stressing that "the great Barons [the daimyo] all insisted on foreigners being kept out of the country. . . . Mito [Tokugawa] Nariaki was strong in his protestations against foreign intercourse and the reigning emperor also opposed the opening of the country." Based on his knowledge of international affairs, the text continues, Ii decided to open Japan and sign "a temporary treaty with America" (1854 Treaty of

Kanagawa). In conclusion, the author of the text on this print and the accompanying text asserts:

We think that our new civilization is the result of the wise policy of Ii Naosuke. Alas, he was cut down before seeing the benefits of the reform that he inaugurated. . . . But the brilliance of his courage and his wisdom will shine as long as the Light of the Empire of the Rising Sun remains bright.

While the press in 1880s Japan was subject to strict regulation, it was still easier to publish a print lauding Ii's achievements than to build a monument dedicated to him in the public arena. Writers and politicians affiliated with the opposition therefore continuously produced works aiming at the rehabilitation of Ii and other shogunate politicians, while plans to build a statue for the shogunate's regent continued to be obstructed by the government.¹³¹

When the idea of a statue in Tokyo re-emerged in 1899 with a proposal to build a monument in Hibiya Park, the central government's response was an assertion of its power over the use of public space.¹³² The journal *Fūzoku gahō* reports that the administrations of both the city of Tokyo and of Tokyo Prefecture had initially given approval.¹³³ In May 1900, however, the government announced that according to the newly introduced ordinance, Regulations Concerning the Control of (Public) Sculpture (*Gyōzō torishinari kisoku*), public statuary needed final approval by the Home Ministry (see chapter 4). The ministry was quick to use this new regulation to block approval for any statue portraying Ii in Hibiya Park. It declared that such a monument could potentially endanger "public order," and once again plans for a statue of Ii Naosuke in the capital had to be abandoned.¹³⁴ The same issue of *Fūzoku gahō* criticized the decision as contradictory, highlighting the fact that the current government had followed up Ii's policy of opening Japan for trade and other relations with foreign powers through the adoption of a policy of "civilization and enlightenment" (*bunmei kaika*) that entailed learning from Western powers. The journal also emphasized that the Meiji government continued Ii's policy of friendly relations with foreign powers, rather than isolating Japan and expelling foreigners; it also observed that many other statues had been erected in public parks in recent years. It questioned why only Ii's statue was unrealized.¹³⁵ For the political elite and the national government, however, a monument to Ii Naosuke in Tokyo remained unthinkable.

In 1903, the family Ii and its supporters renewed their determination to build a statue of Naosuke. With the approaching fiftieth anniversary of the treaties signed by Ii in 1858 and of the opening of Yokohama as a trading port in 1859, this city was again chosen as the location for the envisioned monument. The Unequal Treaties had been gradually revised since 1894, and the measure considered the most shameful—the granting of extraterritoriality to foreigners resident in Japan—was abolished in 1899. The humiliation associated with the treaties had slowly faded from the public memory,

making the rehabilitation of Ii an easier task. Moreover, the city of Yokohama began planning extensive festivities to mark the semicentennial of its opening as a "treaty port" in 1909. Within this context, the prospect of a statue honoring Ii was welcomed by local authorities.¹³⁶

A group of former Ii retainers led by Sōma Nagatane (1850–1924), the founder of Senshū University, submitted a proposal to the city of Yokohama. Both the city and Kanagawa Prefecture signaled that they were willing to approve a memorial for Ii in light of the city's upcoming anniversary celebrations.¹³⁷ Since the 1900 Statuary Ordinance was formally limited to Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto, the Home Ministry failed to veto these plans. The approval given by the city of Yokohama was made conditional on the donation by the Ii family of the land on which the statue would stand. In turn, Yokohama undertook to preserve the statue "for eternity," thereby safeguarding Ii's memory.¹³⁸

As early as 1884, the Ii family had acquired land on a hilltop, the Yokohama Tobe Fudōsan, the location of the maintenance facilities for the trains that ran on Japan's first railway line connecting Tokyo and Yokohama. The family later renamed this hill Kamonyama after Ii Naosuke's official court title, Kamon no Kami, and turned the area into a park as the future site of a memorial.¹³⁹ A statue of Ii Naosuke was finally installed in 1909, and in 1914 the Ii family donated the land to the city of Yokohama. It opened in 1927 as a public recreation ground, Kamonyama Park, which still exists.

The official report of the unveiling ceremony on July 11, 1909, was at pains to emphasize that reconciliation between the Ii family and the ruling oligarchy was still far from complete. In contrast to the unveiling of the statues of Ōmura, Saigō, and others, no representative of the government was present at the Yokohama event, despite being invited.¹⁴⁰ Their grudge against the "villain" of the Ansei Purge remained firmly entrenched.

Select newspaper reports of the event recounted that the powerful Chōshū politicians Yamagata and Itō, together with Matsukata from Satsuma, were upset about the statue's inscription, which

praised Ii as the “hero of the opening of Japan” and responsible for laying the foundations of modern Japan.¹⁴¹ Further, the statue depicted Ii in traditional court dress, thus underlining his close relationship with the imperial court. Documents relating to the project avoided describing him as a daimyo or shogunal regent (*tairō*); instead, they used his title *chōjin*, which was given to high-ranking court nobles. All this contradicted the new ruling elite’s narrative that *they* had initiated Japan’s modernization program and that *they* were the only genuine imperial loyalists, while the shogunate was characterized as an “enemy of the court.”

The unveiling ceremony was initially planned to be held in conjunction with the festivities marking the fiftieth anniversary of the opening of Yokohama as an international port on July 1. The official report of the ceremony noted rumors stating that the national government had intervened in the proceedings and that, as a result, the inauguration had to be postponed ten days.¹⁴² Even the foreign media reported these rumors. In its “Special Issue on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Foundation of Yokohama,” the Yokohama-based German weekly *Deutsche Japan-Post* offered the following account:

The unveiling of the statue of Ii Kamon no Kami, who pioneered foreign relations under the shogun’s regime and who was assassinated on March 24, 1860, by the anti-foreign party, was postponed to July 11. The reason given by the Japanese press was that the Lord had made himself an enemy of the emperor because of his policies. The unveiling of the statue and praise of Lord Ii’s actions . . . would have offended the Imperial House and the government.¹⁴³

It is not clear why the postponement of the unveiling ceremony—the statue was already installed on its pedestal—for a few days would have lessened the affront to the Imperial House or the government. The *Deutsche Japan-Post* reported on July 15 that the inauguration had finally taken place. It is noteworthy that the German newspaper was highly sympathetic to the statue project, suggesting that the foreign community in Japan only knew of its ex-

istence because Ii had “signed the famous treaty dealing with the opening of the country to foreigners” in 1858.¹⁴⁴

Aside from Sōma Nagatane’s report as chairman of the construction committee, Ōkuma Shigenobu gave the most important speech at the unveiling ceremony, which was attended by 300 guests (see fig. 6.12). Ōkuma had been an ardent critic of the ruling oligarchy following his exclusion from the government in 1881. Although he had been involved in the anti-shogunate movement of the late 1860s and was a member of the early Meiji government, Ii’s suppression of the restorationist movement in 1858 now seemed all but forgotten. For Ōkuma, he was the embodiment of the “true Japan”—an authentic patriot:

It is an honor for me to speak on the occasion of the unveiling of the statue of this Great Man who did so much for this country. . . . The notion of “expelling foreigners” (*jōi*) is not a concept with deep roots in Japan. It is an idea that came to Japan from China—labeling people from countries not their own as sub-human is a Chinese practice. By contrast, from antiquity Japan has been an extremely tolerant country, its guiding principle that of being an open country. . . . Ii Naosuke did not promote [the notion of] “expelling the foreigners.” He was in favor of opening the country. But he was also a patriot (*aikokusha*). He did not strive for peace at the cost of Japan’s humiliation, but acted in a responsible manner that was commensurate with his position.¹⁴⁵

Here Ōkuma saw an opportunity to voice his opposition to the ruling elite’s monopolization of “patriotism.” But in his speech he also pointed out that members of the ruling elite—the former advocates of the *jōi* ideology—had reversed their position about “expulsion of foreigners.” Thus, they had confirmed that Ii had made the right decision when he insisted that the government open Japan and sign the 1858 treaties. Singling out the Meiji statesmen Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru by name, Ōkuma noted that they, notwithstanding their initial advocacy of *jōi*, had realized during visits to Europe that Japan



Fig. 6.12 *Ii tairō dōzō jomakushiki. The Unveiling of the Statue of Lord Ii at Yokohama. Taiyō 15, no. 11 (August 1, 1909), unpaginated.*

needed to undertake a thoroughgoing modernization program if it wanted to secure national independence.¹⁴⁶ The report points out that throughout the ceremony Ii was applauded for his far-sighted policy initiatives, his “achievements” in “opening Japan up to the world” and for his “true patriotism.”¹⁴⁷

The chronicle also endeavored to argue why opposition to the statue was inconsistent with the facts, repeating some of the points made by Ōkuma in his speech. It insisted that Ii had consulted the imperial court and that the imperial regent (*kanpaku*) Kujō Hisatada (1798–1871) had assured him that the court’s approval for the treaties would be granted. The report also condemned those who blamed

Ii for failing to modernize the country, a goal that had required the opening up of Japan. At the same time it criticized him for signing the treaties that became the starting point for Japan’s relations with the Western powers.¹⁴⁸

To further underline the unfounded nature of the criticism of Ii Naosuke, the report went on to cite anonymously penned “mysterious publications” (*kikai no shuppanbutsu*) that insulted Ii and accused him of treason. It stressed that his detractors’ anonymity only served to highlight the irresponsibility of this kind of judgment.¹⁴⁹ In a section on the relationship between the imperial and Ii families, the report also noted that in 1909 the nation was united and that the rehabilitation of Ii was reflected both in the completion of his statue and in the Ii family’s receipt of aristocratic rank in 1884 and court rank in 1887. The imperial court further demonstrated that it harbored no grudge against the family by granting a daughter of Prince Arisugawa, Mori-no-miya Yoshiko (1851–95), to marry Count Ii Naonori (1848–1904), the last daimyo of Hikone domain and Naosuke’s successor, in 1869.¹⁵⁰ Ii’s biographers had previously drawn attention to many of these issues, and the unveiling ceremony served as the final arena for the historical reevaluation of the former regent’s policies.

In the section entitled “The Statue of Saigō Takamori,” the report remarked drily that the advocates of the Saigō statue had seen no problem in raising a memorial to him despite the fact that Saigō had taken up arms against the imperial government. “There is always someone,” the report notes disingenuously, “who feels sympathy for the spirits of the dead.” Noting the emerging vogue for statue-building, the report praised the “beautiful custom of our imperial nation whereby there is always someone who proposes building a statue and thus guarantees that even controversial figures who have made contributions to the state are not excluded from the national pantheon.”¹⁵¹

A year after the ceremony in Yokohama, a second statue of Ii was erected in his hometown of Hikone to mark the fiftieth anniversary of his death.¹⁵² The current information panel adjacent to

the statue characterizes Ii as the “hero” who succeeded in opening up the nation in 1858 and setting Japan on the path to modernization. A pictorial collection of public statuary published in 1928, *Ijin no omokage*, includes a similarly positive judgment of Ii’s legacy: “as the person responsible in the shogunate, Naosuke’s policies were a matter of course.”¹⁵³ Such remarks suggest that in the wider society, Ii’s reputation had only been enhanced through the appearance of statues dedicated to him. A stream of publications served to reinforce this image of Ii as an outstanding politician who was associated, first and foremost, with the opening of Japan.¹⁵⁴

Although the construction of these two statues, and the accompanying media coverage,¹⁵⁵ constituted a crucial step in the rehabilitation of Ii Naosuke, full reconciliation with some of his former political enemies still had to wait. This was manifest in the boycott of the unveiling ceremony by the political leadership and in the fact that the park where the statue was located remained off limits to the public for many years after its inauguration. According to an article on Ii from 1912, the land on which the statue was located could not be donated to the city of Yokohama and converted into a public park as planned. Instead, it had been permanently fenced off, with a guard on duty to prevent acts of vandalism.¹⁵⁶

But the construction of the Ii statue illustrates that by 1909 representatives of various political groupings and parties and figures from diverse social backgrounds could take their places as part of the national pantheon on display in the public arena. No longer were the founding figures of the new nation-state restricted to the samurai who overthrew the shogunate and brought about the Meiji Restoration. Their former adversaries, rehabilitated as “true patriots,” were also being integrated into the historical narrative of the nation and instrumentalized in the cause of social integration.

Ii Naosuke remained a controversial figure, nonetheless, and his rehabilitation was not unanimously welcomed. During his term as Imperial Household Minister (1898–1909) Tanaka Mitsuaki, a fervent worshipper of Emperor Meiji (see chapter

2), had promoted the legacy of the so-called “loyal patriots” (*shishi*) of the restoration movement. Apart from the *shishi* who had hailed from his native Kōchi Prefecture (the former Tosa domain), he privileged samurai from Mito when deciding who would be awarded court titles.¹⁵⁷ He particularly sought to promote the worship of the samurai who had assassinated Ii Naosuke in the 1860 Sakurada Gate Incident. Motivated by his belief that “the world does not have sufficient knowledge of the Sakurada Gate Incident,” and fearing that the assassination might be “misunderstood,” Tanaka decided that the Mito samurai should be awarded court titles to confirm that their actions were a sign of their loyalty to the emperor and that the imperial court supported their deeds.¹⁵⁸

Following his retirement, Tanaka and his predecessor as Imperial Household Minister, Hijikata Hisamoto (1833–1918), persuaded the Ministry of Education to distribute copies of the story of the Mito samurai who assassinated Ii to Japanese schools. Entitled *Sakurada gikyō-roku* (Record of the Righteous Rise of Sakurada), the author Iwasaka Hideshige (1874–1926) was another activist–historian, who like Tanaka and Hijikata, was from Kōchi. Legitimizing the actions of the Mito assassins and awarding them court honors was a risky game.

In contrast to the three Tosa patriots attempts to beautify the restorationist spirit of the Mito samurai, other writers jibbed at the assassination of high-ranking members of the ruling government. The daily *Yorozu chōhō*, for example, made the point that the

distribution of a work that glorifies (*shōmi* 将美) the murder of a high government official by a private individual (*shijin*) on the street as a righteous and good act (*gi toshite, zen toshite*) in the eyes of educational institutions not only contradicts the spirit of the Imperial Rescript on Education . . . but also flouts the guidelines of the Ministry of Education . . . that emphasize [the creation of] a sound spirit in the people [through education].¹⁵⁹

The criticism leveled at the three Tosa compatriots galvanized Tanaka's efforts in promoting the worship of Emperor Meiji. It was clearly not a coincidence that the Jōyō Meiji Kinenkan (see chapter 2), the memorial hall dedicated to Meiji erected in 1929 in Ibaraki and having the first statue of the Meiji emperor on display within the public space, was situated in the former domain of Mito. It represented the height of Tanaka's attempts to rationalize the assassination of Ii Naosuke as a vital contribution by Mito samurai to the cause of the Meiji Restoration. The primary function of the memorial hall was to establish Mito as the "wellspring of the ideology of service to the emperor (*kin'ō*) and the restoration of imperial rule" and to quash any possible criticism that the assassination of Ii Naosuke had been an act of terrorism.¹⁶⁰

It is not surprising that the two Ii statues were among the first to be demolished in June 1943 as part of wartime requisitioning. Unable to keep its 1914 promise to protect the statue "for eternity," the city of Yokohama was forced to bow to pressure from the national government. The two statues of Ii were melted down, sacrifices to the national effort in the escalating war.

CONSTRUCTING IMPERIAL LOYALTY AS TIMELESS VIRTUE: KUSUNOKI MASASHIGE

The above shows that the installation of statues depicting the founders of modern Japan was fraught with ambiguity and carried with it the risk of controversy or even acts of iconoclasm. The dangers inherent in promoting the rebel Saigō as a symbol of loyalty to the emperor were equally evident in the search to honor the memory of the Mito samurai who had assassinated Ii Naosuke, the head of the legitimate government at this time.

Plans to build statues honoring unequivocal symbols of imperial loyalty emerged concurrently with proposals for the monuments to Saigō and Ii. Japan's political class felt the need to signpost the core value of Meiji polity—loyalty to the emper-

or—by wheeling out long-dead "national heroes" onto the public stage. In a commentary on the Imperial Rescript on Education published in 1890, a year after the promulgation of the 1889 constitution,¹⁶¹ the philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō (1856–1949) argued that "the state is a historical entity" (*kokka wa rekishi-teki no mono nari*) and that "today's nationals (*kokumin*) live in continuity with the former members of the nation. . . . In this [continuum], a spirit has been at work from ancient times to the present day without interruption. It is this spirit that we must call the national spirit (*kokumin seishin*)."¹⁶² Just as Germany, France, and Britain were engaged in constructing statues of past forebears, such as Herman the German, Jeanne d'Arc, or Boudicea, respectively, Japan now set out to identify figures from antiquity and install visual images of these figures in public spaces in an attempt to demonstrate the eternity of the nation.

We have already encountered in chapter 1 those shrines constructed in the 1870s dedicated to the fourteenth-century "heroes of the Kenmu Restoration" that displayed the historical precedent of loyalty to the emperor and rebellion against (alleged) usurpers of imperial authority—here, the shoguns of the Ashikaga family. In the newly spun narrative of the Kenmu Restoration, the medieval warrior Kusunoki Masashige (1294–1336) emerged as the main symbol of loyalty to the imperial court. Kusunoki supported Emperor Go-Daigo in his attempt to restore direct imperial rule in the Kenmu Restoration (*Kenmu chūkō*) and gave his life in a final battle against the enemies of the emperor led by Ashikaga Takauji, the founder of the Ashikaga shogunate.¹⁶³ Faithful to the emperor until his death, Kusunoki was transmuted into a symbol of sacrificial loyalty by *kokugaku* scholars in the Edo period and by the imperial loyalists of the mid-nineteenth century, in particular, Maki Izumi (Yasuomi, 1813–64), a samurai from Kurume domain and a Shinto priest of the Suiten Shrine.¹⁶⁴

The religious background of Maki and other advocates played a part in popularizing the Kusunoki legend among the samurai and imbuing it with a religious overtone. According to historian Uemura

Seiji, “the various Kusunoki clan genealogies are reminiscent of the genealogies of Christ.”¹⁶⁵ For the modern historian, the development of Kusunoki into a quasi-religious figure is remarkable. Although he gave his life for Emperor Go-Daigo, the Kenmu Restoration produced a schism in the imperial dynasty, dividing it into the so-called Northern Court (located in Kyoto) and Southern Court (in present-day Wakayama Prefecture). Go-Daigo had been emperor of the Southern Court, but it was the Northern Court that eventually continued the imperial line and was interpreted in later historiography as the “legitimate” house during this Northern and Southern Court (Nanbokuchō) period. Kusunoki was thus at risk of being perceived as supporting the illegitimate imperial line rather than the branch of the Imperial House ruling at the time when he was made into a “national hero.”

The Meiji government was nonetheless quick to identify Kusunoki as a potential “icon” in the effort to “propagate faith” in the emperor and the imperial government.¹⁶⁶ As early as the fourth month of the first year of Meiji (1868), the emperor donated 1,000 *ryō* in gold to build a shrine for Kusunoki (later known as the Minatogawa Shrine) that would ensure that “the loyal dedication (*seichū daisetsu*) of Kusunoki Masashige and his son Matsura to the dynasty would be conveyed to future generations.” The official history of Emperor Meiji explains that the shrine would become the site of “ceremonies commending the vigorous loyalty” (*hyōchū shōretsu*) of the two warriors and provide commoners (*shūsho*) with a model (*kyōshoku*) they could emulate.¹⁶⁷

Soon after the establishment of the new Meiji government, the heroes of the Kenmu Restoration were among the first to receive posthumous court titles. With the move of the imperial court in Kyoto, which was located not too far from the Minatogawa Shrine, to Tokyo, plans emerged to build a memorial for Kusunoki close to the new Imperial Palace, which had been the former castle of the shogun and deemed to lack sufficient imperial symbolism. At one point, the government considered founding a branch of the Minatogawa Shrine in Tokyo.¹⁶⁸

These developments formed the backdrop for the statue proposals of the 1880s.

Following the failure of plans for a Saigō statue in front of the Imperial Palace and the rejection of a proposal for an equestrian statue of Emperor Jinmu at the same location, Kusunoki became the frontrunner in the race to occupy this highly symbolic site. Emperor Meiji had rejected the idea of a Jinmu statue because he felt that such a memorial would overwhelm Western dignitaries entering the Imperial Palace. But Kusunoki was a popular figure, even with Western observers. Writing in 1876, the American educator and author William Elliot Griffis (1843–1928) expressed his admiration for the warrior: “I make no attempt to conceal my own admiration of a man who acted according to his light, and faced his soldierly ideal of honor, when conscience and all his previous education told him that his hour had come, and that to flinch from the suicidal thrust was dishonor and sin.”¹⁶⁹ Adulation for individuals who had sacrificed their life for the greater good, for the nation and the state, was not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, especially in the late nineteenth century when the “Great Man View of History” held sway. Kusunoki continued to be a favorite figure among Western writers on Japan, as evidenced by later publications including J. Morris’ *Makers of Japan* of 1906,¹⁷⁰ in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s,¹⁷¹ and Ivan Morris’ famous postwar book *The Nobility of Failure* (1975).

The first concrete design to build a statue of Kusunoki was mooted in 1890 by Hirose Saihei (1828–1914), head of the board of directors of the Sumitomo industrial conglomerate (*zaibatsu*) and a former manager of Sumitomo’s Besshi copper mines.¹⁷² Hirose was following up an idea proposed by the then recently deceased head of the Sumitomo family, Sumitomo Tomotada (the thirteenth-generation Sumitomo Kichizaemon, 1872–90). The family was eager to present the emperor with a statue embodying the ethic of loyalty to the Imperial House to coincide with the 200th anniversary of the founding of Sumitomo’s Besshi copper mines in 1891. Sumitomo submitted a petition to the IHM in 1890, seeking permission for the project.¹⁷³ On

the one hand, the initiative sought to mythologize the Besshi mines as the fount of Sumitomo's economic fortunes, but it was also an attempt to associate the conglomerate's activities with the new ideologies of loyalty to the emperor and service to the nation. A geographical connection between Kusunoki, the Besshi mines, and Hirose allowed Sumitomo to instrumentalize the figure of the medieval warrior to serve its own ends: the Besshi copper mines are situated in the Iyo region of Ehime Prefecture, allegedly where the warrior's maternal ancestors, the Iyo Tachibana clan, had their roots.¹⁷⁴ It was also the home region of Hirose, who hailed from Niihama in Ehime.¹⁷⁵

The winning entry in the Sumitomo competition in 1889 was a design for an equestrian statue of Kusunoki submitted by Okakura Shūsui (1868–1950), the nephew of the aesthete Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913), director of the Tokyo School of Fine Arts and the doyen of the Meiji art world.¹⁷⁶ Kusunoki had been a notable subject at the Tokyo School of Fine Arts since its foundation in 1889. The graduation piece of one of the institution's first alumni, Okamoto Katsumoto (1868–1940), was a painting of the famous scene of Kusunoki bidding farewell to his son before going into battle.¹⁷⁷ For this reason, Sumitomo may have wished that the school might be able to create an "authentic" likeness of the medieval warrior, whose contemporaneous image survived in only a handful of paintings, the authenticity of which is still highly debatable.

The Imperial Household Ministry gave official approval to produce the statue, which was to be donated to the Imperial House. A massive 6.75 tons of copper was used to complete this first equestrian monument in Japan.¹⁷⁸ By donating the statue to the emperor, Sumitomo aimed to improve its company image by picturing the work as a generous contributor to the economic and military development of the nation. Even today, the Sumitomo firm is actively engaged in shaping a positive corporate legacy through historical museums and theme parks showcasing its history.¹⁷⁹

After the Tokyo School of Fine Arts accepted the commission, a construction team headed by

Takamura Kōun was nominated by the institution's director Okakura. The team also included historians Kurokawa Mayori (1829–1906), Kawasaki Chitora (1837–1902), and Imaizumi Yūsaku (1850–1931), who were responsible for combing historical sources for information on Kusunoki's facial traits, figure, clothing, and armor; Imamura Nagayoshi (Chōga, 1837–1910) and Kanō Natsuo (1828–98), experts on Japanese swords were responsible for the "realistic" portrayal of Kusunoki's weaponry. The sculptors Yamada Kisai (1864–1901) and Ishikawa Kōmei (1852–1913) were tasked with reproducing Kusunoki's physique; and Gotō Sadayuki was responsible for sculpting the warrior's mount.¹⁸⁰ Gotō was engaged to design the horse for the Saigō statue as he was recognized for his sculptures of horses. But Saigō's horse had been replaced by a dog, which meant that Gotō was now eager to seize his chance to cast an equestrian statue.¹⁸¹

As with the statues of Ōmura, Saigō, and Ii, the road to the completion of the Kusunoki monument was a long and circuitous. All of the artists, historians, and bronze casters involved felt obliged to make the figure look authentic and "real." However, since no reliable historical depictions of the medieval warrior existed, this task was near impossible. Not enough was known about Kusunoki to guarantee a reliable likeness, as even the official report on the project conceded.¹⁸²

To at least give the impression of authenticity, the historians on the project team studied a range of medieval texts and "artifacts" for several years. Gotō was not satisfied with the design of the horse, which illustrated it with one leg raised and the other three legs on the ground. He maintained that this was a highly unusual, if not an impossible, pose for a horse. Following a clash with Takamura, Gotō eventually sculpted the horse as described in the original commission from Sumitomo. Takamura told Gotō that a realistic design might appear "less dynamic," and even if the horse did not look completely natural the "less authentic" design was preferable.¹⁸³ Not for the first time in public statue projects, the artists' concerns took a back seat to the views of the commissioning authorities.



Fig. 6.13 Hasegawa Jōjirō. *Nijūbashi Nankō dōzō* (The Nankō Statue, Nijūbashi). Color woodblock print, 1899. Emperor Meiji's coach is seen passing the statue in his carriage; he is not visible. 23 × 108 cm.

The team finally submitted a wooden maquette in 1893, and Okazaki Sessei finished casting the statue in 1896.¹⁸⁴ The work on the project was interrupted at various points during the project by extended overseas visits by team members to study Western sculpting and casting techniques. There were also mishaps. In 1891, the *Yomiuri shinbun* reported that Gotō had had an accident with ammonia, which blinded him in one eye.¹⁸⁵ Some members of the team wanted the statue to be cast in one piece, including the horse and all related paraphernalia. Ultimately, it was cast in several pieces and assembled on the spot. Okazaki had learned in the United States that most equestrian statues were not made in a single piece. He was relieved to find that the statues he saw in Washington had small seams, which were barely visible from a distance.¹⁸⁶

The sculpture was cast in 1896, but the plinth was not completed until 1899. The statue was placed on its designated site in front of the Imperial

Palace in May 1900, and the unveiling ceremony on July 10, 1900, received moderate coverage in the press.¹⁸⁷ The 4 m high work was the first equestrian statue to be built in a public outdoor venue in Tokyo, even though nationally it was narrowly beaten by another project: the statue of daimyo Mōri Takachika in Yamaguchi that had been unveiled three months earlier.

An inscription by Sumitomo Tomoito (1865–1929) on the plinth does not explicitly refer to the donation of the statue as an act of loyalty and patriotism. It conveys instead Sumitomo's indebtedness to the emperor and the nation for granting the family mining privileges in Besshi and highlights his brother's role in the project:

It has been 200 years since Tomonobu, one of my ancestors, opened the Besshi Copper Mine, which has been operated successfully by his descendants up to the present day. My late brother, Tomotada, always believed that we were indebted to our country, Japan, and, therefore, to the emperor, for the continuously successful operation of this mine. Accordingly, Tomotada decided to make a statue of Kusunoki Masashige with copper produced from our family's mine and present the statue to the emperor. Unfortunately, my



Fig. 6.14 *Chiyoda-jō no Kusunoki Masashige dōzō. Le palais de Tsiyoda. Statue de Kousounyoki Masashigé. Bankoku yūbin rengō kamei nijūgonen shukuten kinen. Jubilé de l'entrée dans l'Union Postale Universelle. Tokio 1877–1902.* The Kusunoki Masashige statue depicted on a commemorative postcard marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of Japan's membership of the International Postal Union. Teishinshō (Communication Ministry), 1902.

brother died after being granted permission for the presentation, but before finally realizing his dream. I took over supervision of his work, which is now complete, and fulfilled the last wish of my brother. Thus, I hereby respectfully present the statue.

January 1897, Sumitomo Kichizaemon [Tomoito].¹⁸⁸

The reception of the statue in Japanese art circles was mixed. Despite the efforts of the team to present a design that was acceptable both to the commissioning body and to the government as well as to the Imperial Household, the statue was, like others of its kind, criticized as conveying a false impression of Kusunoki. In 1902, author and critic Takayama Chogyū dismissed the statue as a failure (*shippai no saku*), alleging that the sculpture's facial expression did not capture the warrior's character. "Look at it: these eyes, these shoulders, this mouth, these cheeks—where is the characteristic look of Lord Kusunoki (Nankō)?"¹⁸⁹ Insisting that the figure looked more like "a poor imitation of Oda Nobunaga," Takayama decried the statue's inability to express Kusunoki's alleged virtues of bravery (*chūyū*), astuteness (*chibō*), and gentleness (*onryō*). Echoing the widespread opinion that political art should not be left to artists, he asserted that it would have been better if the design had been produced "by historians (*rekishika*), not artists (*bijutsuka*)."¹⁹⁰ Recent research has similarly questioned the authenticity of the statue's features and armor, con-

cluding that the monument does not so much embody the "rediscovery" of a medieval historical figure as it represents "the spirit that was expected from Kusunoki in the new age of Meiji."¹⁹¹

This criticism aside, the Kusunoki monument—the single largest and most impressive example of public art of the era—was frequently reproduced in popular media. A 1941 publication reports that it had become "the most famous statue" of them all.¹⁹² Its notoriety lay in the fact that while imperial statues such as those of Yamato Takeru and Jinmu represented the Imperial House, this monument was dedicated to a member of the warrior class whose loyalty to the emperor was unquestioned due to his ultimate sacrifice. The historiography of Kusunoki was very poorly documented, yet his cult followed the same trajectory as that of Saigō Takamori: the development of a religio-mythological narrative that featured Kusunoki as the supreme embodiment of the value of loyalty to the emperor and self-sacrifice. Already central to the ideology of nation-building at the time the statue was built, the Kusunoki statue would become even more important with the escalation of Japan's foreign wars in later decades and would evolve into a central figure of wartime propaganda.

The popularity of the statue is reflected in its extensive reproduction in diverse visual media, beginning with woodblock prints (fig. 6.13) and extending to postcards, lithographs, and pictorials. One of






Fig. 6.15 *Kōkyō nijūbashi-mae Nankō-zō. The Statue of Masashige Kusunoki in Front of the Imperial Palace.* Hand-colored souvenir postcard (unused), early twentieth century.

Fig. 6.16 Statue of Kusunoki Masashige and a zeppelin over the skies of Tokyo. Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

Fig. 6.17 *Views of Tokyo. Tōkyō hyakkei.* Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s. The statues of Hirose Takeo (left), Saigō Takamori (right top), and Kusunoki Masashige (bottom right).

the first commemorative postcards issued by the Communication Ministry marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of Japan's membership of the International Postal Union in 1902 (fig. 6.14) and showcased the Kusunoki statue. This postcard was released in an official edition of 100,000 (plus an unknown number of unauthorized copies), and it is often considered the starting point for the massive popularity of this new print medium.¹⁹³ Souvenir postcards with the Kusunoki statue were also printed and sold in huge numbers; it can be found in a greater diversity of designs than postcards of any other statue (figs. 6.15–6.16).

The broad circulation of these early postcards and the selection of available designs mirrors Japan's technological progress and economic affluence. Japanese printers were now capable of reproducing photographic images in various forms of mass media, and the postal system had developed to the point where large numbers of postcards were being sold and sent. Ordinary Japanese for the first time had the financial means to purchase them. But not all postcards were used for their original purpose; instead they were taken home as a gift (*omiyage*) or as an addition to one's collection. Beautifully colored or embossed cards issued to commemorate special occasions, such as imperial progresses or military parades, commonly found their way into collectors' albums.

Travel guidebooks, journals, and newspapers counted the Kusunoki statue among the “three great bronze statues” (*san-dai dōzō*) of Tokyo (and even Japan). They were mostly grouped with those of Saigō, Ōmura, or Hirose (fig. 6.17), but alternatively with that of Ii and that of Nichiren in Fukuoka.¹⁹⁴ The Kusunoki statue was also a popular motif in pictorial magazines (fig. 6.18) and advertisements.¹⁹⁵ It was used, for example, in advertisements for Jintan, a tonic claimed to ward off ailments of every



Fig. 6.18 Tokyo statue of Kusunoki Masashige on the cover of *Asahi gurafu/Asahigraph* 24, no. 15 (April 10, 1935), special issue marking the 600th anniversary of the Kenmu Restoration.

Fig. 6.19 Advertisement for “Club Hamigaki” toothpaste with the Tokyo statue of Kusunoki Masashige. *Shashin shūhō*, no. 30 (September 7, 1938).



Nire (20–22), Yamada Akiyoshi (23), Gotō Shōjirō (24), Hirose Takeo (25–27), Saigō Takamori (28–33), and Ōkuma Shigenobu (34–35). The publication also had photographs of all the statues and included biographical sketches.

Like the Saigō statue, the power of the Kusunoki statue as a symbol of loyalty to the emperor and the spirit of personal sacrifice was such that, in 1903, it also became the site for a suicide widely reported in the media. The thirty-two-year-old victim was found to have a letter in his pocket calling on “all healthy young men to rise up and come to the defense of the state . . . like that symbol of loyalty, Kusunoki.”¹⁹⁷ It was unclear what these young men would be defending in this peacetime era, nonetheless this episode illustrates the success of public monuments in indoctrinating the population with the ideology of nationalism and sacrifice for the state.

In the last two years of World War II, most bronze statues were collected and melted down as a result of metal shortages. The Kusunoki statue survived this requisitioning drive, undoubtedly due to the subject’s unrivaled symbolic value. It could be argued that sacrificing the statue by melting it down would have only strengthened the warrior spirit.

kind (today still sold as a breath freshener) and for toothpaste (fig. 6.19). In 1944, when wartime mobilization efforts were at their height, the statue was chosen to feature on the 5-*sen* banknote that was in circulation until 1953 (fig. 6.20).

The Kusunoki statue also ranked “Number One” in an educational song about statues composed by Nosho Benjirō (1865–1936) with lyrics by Ishihara Bangaku (1865–1922).¹⁹⁶ The thirty-five verses of the “Tokyo Statues Song” (*Tōkyō dōzō shōka*) praises the deeds of ten heroes who had by now become key figures among the “men in metal” in this study: it begins with Kusunoki Masashige (verses 1–6), followed by Prince Arisugawa (7–10), Ōmura Masujirō (11–13), Shinagawa Yajirō (14–15), Prince Kitashirakawa (16–19), admirals Saigō and

Yet the negative impact on public morale was deemed to outweigh this consideration, and the statue was considered to be more useful “alive.” During the war, the statue was a venue for victory celebrations. When Japan’s situation looked desperate in 1944 and “special attack forces” (*kamikaze*) were formed, the statue was enrolled to legitimize this military tactic by highlighting Kusunoki’s ethic of self-sacrifice as the “true Japanese spirit.” Wartime propagandists defined unconditional loyalty as the “highest ethical ideal, turning a Japanese into a hero” and presented Kusunoki as the most venerable symbol of this attitude. Print publications carried photographs of the statue in front of the Imperial Palace, alluding to the warrior’s role as the last line of defense against the enemies of the Imperial House.¹⁹⁸

A typical expression of this ideology is Kitayama Jun’yu’s 1944 book *Heroic Ethos*, which the author published in German with the intention of instilling Japan’s wartime ally with this ethic of loyalty and self-sacrifice:

Masashige’s attitude is typical of the Japanese heroic spirit. Tenacity, self-sacrifice, and readiness to die are its chief characteristics. Death is a force, but sacrificial suicide in the service of a chivalrous ideal represents power *beyond* the force of death. . . . For the Japanese spirit, Masashige remains the exemplar of a national hero.¹⁹⁹

Writings like these were common in Japan during the final years of the war, and it was this mindset that prevented young *kamikaze* pilots from effectively challenging the propaganda that enveloped them. After the war, the Kusunoki statue came under close scrutiny by the Occupation forces, and it also weathered the ideological “purge” of the late 1940s (see chapter 9). Today, it still stands outside the Imperial Palace, a drawcard for hordes of domestic and foreign tourists.

Significantly, no statue was ever dedicated to the object of Kusunoki’s self-sacrificial loyalty: Emperor Go-Daigo. To be sure, statues of emperors, such as Jinmu and Kameyama, were set up around



Fig. 6.20 Kusunoki Masashige statue on 5-sen banknote, in use from 1944 to 1953.

the same time as the Kusunoki statue. In theory, at least, the addition of Go-Daigo to this imperial pantheon would not have been particularly far-fetched. However, while Kusunoki was celebrated as a “tragic failure” who died young, Go-Daigo’s inability to restore imperial power and his responsibility for the fourteenth-century schism in the imperial dynasty prevented his re-invention as a historical exemplar.

The transformation of Kusunoki and other warriors who had sacrificed themselves for Go-Daigo, and the branch of the imperial dynasty that was later branded as illegitimate, into symbols of imperial power and loyalty offers one of the most contradictory examples of the cult of personality. This process demonstrates how visual symbols, albeit highly flawed in terms of historical logic, can become powerful propaganda tools, motivating the population to keep on fighting, even in a hopeless situation. As is generally the case with the construction of historical memory, powerful national symbols are rarely chosen and constructed according to rational criteria and standards of coherence. The primary consideration is whether a figure or an event has the *emotional* force to move people to do things they might otherwise not do. There can be no doubt that the values embodied by the Kusunoki statue motivated millions of people in the late 1930s to support the war. In the 1940s, this ideology legitimized and empowered military strategies and political decisions that prolonged the war, leading to millions of lives being sacrificed even after the tide of war had turned decisively against Japan.

WAR HEROES

The statue of the medieval warrior Kusunoki Masashige had a central role in wartime mobilization, but shortly after its completion monuments dedicated to the representatives of the modern military establishment also sprang up around the country. Victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) led to a noticeable acceleration in overall statue-building. While only three statues were commissioned in 1904 and six in 1905, the count rose to eleven in 1906, fourteen in 1907, eleven in 1908, and sixteen in 1909.²⁰⁰ The increase was remarkable enough to be noted in the international media. For example, in 1907, *The New York Times* posed the rhetorical question: “Is it possible that Japan has caught our modern mania for putting up statues to people whenever there is the slightest justification?”²⁰¹

Memorials of Japan’s modern war heroes, too, were commissioned in more significant numbers for the first time in these years. The most famous example is the statue dedicated to Commander Hirose Takeo (1868–1904), built in Tokyo in 1910 (fig. 6.21).²⁰² Hirose served on a ship that was tasked with blocking the entrance to the Russian naval base at Port Arthur (C: Lushun). He suffered injuries when his ship was hit by Russian artillery on March 27, 1904, and attempting to save fellow officer Sugino Magoshichi (1867–1904) he perished along with his sinking ship.²⁰³ His death was glorified as an act of self-sacrifice parallel to Kusunoki Masashige’s own. The comparison to Kusunoki had further resonance when it was understood that Hirose had copied a poem attributed to the medieval warrior shortly before he had gone to war: “If I had seven lives, I would sacrifice them for the country (*Shichi shō hōkoku*).”²⁰⁴ The poem was circulated widely in the media coverage of his death; it was as if Hirose had become a reincarnation of the great imperial loyalist himself.

The intense media reporting on Hirose’s death facilitated the IJN’s construction of the image of the young officer as a model of devotion and sacrificial spirit. When his remains were returned to Japan, the IJN gave Hirose a Shinto-style public funeral




Fig. 6.21 *Hirose chūsa dōzō*. The Statue of Late Commander Hirose, Tokyo. Hand-colored souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

(*kōsō*) on April 13, 1904. He was posthumously promoted to the rank of commander, and the media praised him as a “God of War” (*gunshin*),²⁰⁵ creating a new type of figure deemed worthy of public veneration. The term *gunshin* did not appear often in print before 1904,²⁰⁶ but Hirose’s alleged heroism spurred its use in a flood of publications. His military prowess was celebrated in periodicals such as the war journal *Seiro senpō* (Military Chronicle of the Conquest of Russia), the pictorial *Senji gahō* (War Illustrated), *Fūzoku gahō*, and the highly popular *Nichiro sensō jikki* (True Illustrations from the Russo-Japanese War), which published a special edition on “The War God Commander Hirose Takeo.” The *Yomiuri shinbun* published a collection of poems by readers commending Hirose’s loyalty,²⁰⁷ kabuki theaters performed plays about the “God of War,” and songs were composed equating Hirose’s feats with those of Kusunoki.²⁰⁸ As early as 1905, Hirose’s home region (Ōita Prefecture) published a 697-page “monumental biography” about him.²⁰⁹ The vogue for the term *gunshin* was short-lived, as a quantitative analysis of Japanese periodicals reveals (fig. 6.22). The 1904 spike of “*gunshin* literature” quickly receded, only to re-emerge when Japan entered an even more intense military conflict in World War II.

Proposals for statues of Hirose were mooted soon after his death. Hirose’s friend Takarabe

Takeshi (1867–1949), a serving officer in the admiralty and a graduate from the same class at the Naval Academy, mooted the first plans.²¹⁰ Barons Mitsui Takamine (1857–1948) and Kuki Ryūichi headed the committee for the project. Kuki already had considerable experience with statue projects and was known to be an outspoken advocate of public statuary, and the Mitsui family now saw a chance to catch up with its rival industrial conglomerate Sumitomo which, as we saw above, was instrumental in bringing the Kusunoki statue project to fruition. Mitsui's participation secured the statue's financing, and Kuki underwrote the artistic side of the project. The members of the construction committee were all navy officers, which would have ensured the project's smooth progress.

The official prospectus, released less than a month after Hirose's death, underscored his "unparalleled patriotic and sacrificial spirit" and called him "a model for the soldiers of the empire." It proposed a site in the capital that would convey his spirit "eternally to future generations."²¹¹ The list of supporters sharply contrasts the relatively diverse groups that had backed the Ōmura and Saigō monuments: it comprised twenty-five naval officers drawn from the middle-ranks of captain, commander (Hirose's posthumous rank), and lieutenant commander (Hirose's last rank during his lifetime). The composition of this cohort indicated underlying IJN connections, in particular, Hirose's friends, classmates, and colleagues.

By 1904, the IJN felt the need to catch up with Japan's accelerating statue boom. Between 1880 and 1904, more than sixty statues of public figures were erected throughout Japan. Of these, at least ten portrayed men with an army background, including Ōmura, Saigō, Kitashirakawa, and Arisugawa, but there was only one statue of a naval officer: Commander Hattori Yukichi (1863–1900), who had been killed in action during the Boxer War (fig. 6.23). While all of the statues of high-ranking army officers were located in Tokyo, Commander Hattori's memorial was in Sasebo near an IJN base. By proposing a second statue honoring a naval officer with the middling rank of commander, the navy


was countering the IJA policy that statues should portray top-ranking personnel.²¹²

The navy soon would also honor some of its most senior officers in the public arena. In 1909, a triad of statues showing three recently deceased admirals—Nire Kagenori (1831–1900), Saigō Tsugumichi (1843–1902), and Kawamura Sumiyoshi (1836–1904)—was installed outside the Navy Ministry building.²¹³ Evidence suggests, however, that the navy's policy of memorializing mid-ranking officers such as Hirose made it easier for ordinary people to identify with them. In an article published in 1910, Mitsuchi Chūzō (1871–1948), editor of the daily *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun*, member of the Lower House, and later Minister of Education, Finance, Home Affairs, and Transport, wrote that it is "pleasing to see a statue of someone who is not of high social status" since most of the "bronze statues recently erected show top-ranking officials with high social status."²¹⁴ Mitsuchi also praised the depiction of Hirose together with Sugino, the officer he had attempted to save. Looking at the memorial, "one cannot fail to be moved by the feelings of friendship and the chivalrous spirit that led [Hirose] to sacrifice his own life."²¹⁵

The mayor of Tokyo and the Home Ministry granted approval for the Hirose statue in 1906; the initial location of Hibiya Park was exchanged for a square outside Manseibashi Station (today no longer extant) in Kanda. Donations for the statue were collected countrywide, with several newspapers supporting the campaign. The total cost of the project was 25,000 *yen*.²¹⁶ The statue was completed in early 1910 and unveiled on May 29, Hirose's birthday.²¹⁷

There was a six-year hiatus between the initial proposal and the completion of the Tokyo Hirose statue. During this time, proposals for further Hirose statue projects had surfaced in other parts of the country, some of which were realized earlier than the Tokyo statue. In 1906, Hirose's erstwhile classmates unveiled a bust of the naval hero in the city of Takayama in Gifu Prefecture, where they had all once studied. The following year, a 1.8 m statue of Hirose was erected in Yamashita Park in Taketa, Hirose's hometown in Ōita Prefecture.²¹⁸

Fig. 6.22 Numbers of journal articles with the term *gunshin* (“God of War”) in the title (1881–2015).
 Source: *Complete Database of Magazine and Periodicals from the Meiji Era to the Present, Zassaku Plus*.



All three statues were designed by Ōita-prefecture sculptors: the Takayama bust and the Tokyo statue were the work of Watanabe Osao, who created the statues of Emperor Meiji discussed in chapter 2, and Watanabe's younger brother Asakura Fumio was responsible for the Ōita statue. Okazaki Sessei cast all three pieces.²¹⁹

The grand Tokyo memorial of Hirose with the figure of the dying Sugino on a lower section of the plinth, was almost 11 m high, with the effigy of Hirose alone at 3.6 m.²²⁰ Watanabe Osao explained that “Hirose was depicted so as to convey the fortitude of his inner character, standing firm and unwavering in the impending crisis, while the acute tension of the situation was suggested by Sugino’s pose.”²²¹ The perception of Hirose’s inner strength was further bolstered in a calligraphic inscription by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet of the IJN during the war and the Battle of Tsushima. It read simply “bravery and loyalty” (*chūyū giretsu*), another newly coined expression rarely used before Hirose’s elevation to the status of a “God of War.”²²² The novel character of the monument, portraying not one but two figures, was acknowledged by art critic Kuroda Hōshin (1885–1967), who described the grouping “to my knowledge the first of its kind” in Japan.²²³

The Hirose–Sugino monument was also one of the first examples to be placed in a square facing a train station, not in a park or before a government building. The site was a busy urban crossing and the placement of the statue there guaranteed that a great many people would see it.²²⁴ Unveiling ceremonies for national heroes might be seen as events celebrating and deepening the sense of nationhood among the people. As historian Naoko Shimazu has shown, however, authorities were ambivalent about the gathering of large crowds in public space.²²⁵ Urban crowds were apt to become violent, as seen in the so-called Hibiya Incident following the government decision to sign the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth to bring a closure to the Russo-Japanese War: “There was a gap between the official agenda and the intention of the crowd, the crowd was tacitly accepting its role



Fig. 6.23 (*Sasebo meisho*) Hattori *kaigun chūsa dōzō* ([Famous Views of Sasebo] Statue of Commander Hattori). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

through its participation, as an expression of popular consciousness.”²²⁶

The memorial’s location in “downtown” Kanda meant that a sizable crowd could gather for the unveiling ceremony and the accompanying festivities. The former demonstrated that even though the tide of *gunshin* publications was ebbing, the “Hirose myth” was still very much alive even five years after the commander’s death. Despite heavy rain, the media reported that thousands of people filled the streets around the statue.²²⁷ Takarabe Takeshi, who had recently been promoted to Rear Admiral and was now Deputy Minister of the IJN, gave a speech on behalf of the construction committee. He foregrounded Hirose’s valor and explained how the project had been funded. He also applauded the efforts of three national newspaper companies—Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun, Tōkyō Nichinichi, and Jiji Shinpō—in supporting the project in their call for donations.²²⁸

The ceremony was given added cachet with the attendance of the admirals Tōgō Heihachirō and Inoue Yoshika (1845–1929), three imperial princes, several rear admirals, and twelve survivors from the Battle of Port Arthur.²²⁹ Tōgō, usually a retiring figure on public occasions, also gave a short speech highlighting Hirose’s valorous spirit, underlining the message of his inscription for the memorial.²³⁰

Unveiling ceremonies typically ended with an official reception for the guests, yet here the subject's popularity required a different conclusion: the official inauguration was followed by festivities through the neighborhood, with throngs turning the streets into "oceans of people" until late at night.²³¹

The veneration of Hirose took a further turn in 1935 with the construction of the shrine, Hirose Jinja, in his hometown of Taketa.²³² A memorial museum, the Hirose Takeo Kinenkan, was added to the shrine the same year. Although the monuments dedicated to Hirose in Taketa and Takayama predated the Tokyo memorial, it was the latter that developed into an icon of popular culture. Like the Saigō and Kusunoki statues, it frequently featured on postcards and lithographs (fig. 6.24) and in travel guidebooks. And like earlier examples of public statuary, a miniature version of the Hirose–Sugino memorial was manufactured for sale. One of these statuettes is today displayed in the Yūshūkan at the Yasukuni Shrine.²³³

Of the statues introduced thus far, only the Kusunoki memorial rivaled the Hirose statue in terms of propaganda value during Japan's years of total war. As a naval officer who had sacrificed his life in combat, Hirose was hailed as a paragon to young men, encouraging them to sign up and fight for their country. School classes were regularly taken to the statue to carry out acts of "patriotic service," such as cleaning. Ceremonies and mass gatherings were held around the monument, beginning in 1910 with the inauguration that was attended by more than 2,000 elementary school children.²³⁴ Materials distributed during the unveiling ceremony by the local group Kanda-ku Yokusankai believed that the commander's memorial would help "anchor the impressive figure [of Hirose] in the mind of our nation and support spiritual education."²³⁵

The Hirose statue inspired the creation of other monuments showing military figures. The growing number of such statues was an indication of the rise of militaristic attitudes in Japanese society during this period as well as an expression of the diversification of the cult of personality in Japan. The army reacted to the Hirose statue by identifying its own



Fig. 6.24 *Tōkyō meisho Manseibashi ekimae Hirose chūsa dōzō* (Famous Views of Tokyo. Statue of Commander Hirose in Front of Manseibashi Station). Lithograph, 1918. 40 × 55 cm.

"God of War," Major Tachibana Shūta (1865–1904). Tachibana, worshiped for his heroic efforts and sacrificial conduct in the Battle of Liaoyang (1904) during the Russo-Japanese War, was posthumously promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. The first of the several statues to him was erected in 1919 in his hometown in Nagasaki Prefecture; a second was installed in 1927 outside Sunpu Castle in Shizuoka Prefecture, where Tachibana's unit was stationed. In 1940, the Tachibana Shrine was built for the *gunshin* and the cult surrounding him rivaled that surrounding Hirose.²³⁶ A 1920 report on the first Tachibana statue cites the writings of Takayama Chogyū on the role played by public statues in social education to emphasize that a soldier's monument would equally serve in "raising the spirits of the nation."²³⁷

Following the Russo-Japanese War, further statues were dedicated to a variety of military heroes. Monuments were built to honor the "first commander" of a particular unit and the founders of sub-organizations within the military. Often representatives of the imperial military forces were embedded in narratives of local pride, presented as "heroes of the hometown." In many cases, the ac-

tual connection of a person with the region was not especially convincing, revealing the artificial character of these kinds of attempts to construct identities. One interesting example is the monument to General Ōsako Naoharu (1844–1927).²³⁸ Ōsako hailed from Kagoshima, and he commanded the 7th Division of the IJA during the Russo-Japanese War. After the conflict, a “Committee to Build a Statue for General Ōsako, Commander of the 7th Division” was formed in Sapporo, where his memory was then appropriated in order to serve the local narrative. A prospectus presented in May 1906 praised the general’s abilities in terms reminiscent of the paeans offered to Hirose and Tachibana (fig. 6.25). The text begins by stating that the commander “embodied a special kind of bravery and loyalty” and praised the notion of sacrifice in the service of the state (*kuni ni junzuru*) as “the national religion” of Japan.²³⁹ The rhetoric echoes the discourse surrounding the Hirose statue:

Even the brilliance of Toyotomi’s conquest of Korea paled against his [Ōsako’s] feats. . . . The outstanding merits and the great honor achieved by the 7th Division in this war cannot be expressed in words. . . . For as long as the Yamato race exists, we must preserve [these stories] and convey them forever to future generations. . . . Considering what is practicable and the financial options available, we have decided to build only one statue, portraying His Excellency, the Commander of the Division, as an exemplar of the brave northern warrior . . . but with the aim of commemorating all the members of the division . . . and to foster the warrior spirit of the division as a whole.²⁴⁰

Two unusual monuments dedicated to military officers of low rank but with high social standing deserve mention here because of their visibility in mass media (figs. 6.26–6.27). In 1906, a statue of Nagaoka Moriharu (1881–1904) by Takamura Kōun was erected in Suizenji Park in Kumamoto. Only a second lieutenant when he died in the Russo-Japanese War, his elevated social status as a count in the Japanese peerage system meant that



Fig. 6.25 Ōsako shidanchō dōzō dekekata (Statue of Divisional Commander Ōsako). Ōsako Dai-nana Shidanchō Dōzō Kensetsukai (Committee to Build a Statue for General Ōsako, Commander of the 7th Division). Print, c. 1907. 47 × 32 cm.

he was allocated a rare equestrian monument, an honor widely reported in the national media.²⁴¹ Moriharu was the adoptive son of Nagaoka Moriyoshi (1842–1906), himself the son of the former daimyo of Kumamoto domain, Hosokawa Narimori (1804–60), and a high-profile Meiji politician. In a parallel case, an equestrian statue was built in 1908 in Iwate Prefecture to honor Lieutenant Nanbu Toshinaga (1882–1905), the son of the former daimyo of Nanbu domain. Both examples should be seen as projects undertaken to preserve family memory and social privilege rather than as militaristic propaganda aimed at a broad audience. Both statues were demolished for wartime requisitioning and were not rebuilt.



Fig. 6.26 *Ko hakushaku Nanbu chūi dōzō* (Statue of the Late Viscount Lieutenant Nanbu) (1908). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

Fig. 6.27 (*Kumamoto hyakkei*) *Suizenji nai Nagaoka Moriharu-kō dōzō*. *Kumamoto Suizenji* ([One Hundred Famous Views of Kumamoto] Bronze Statue of Lord Nagaoka Moriharu in Suizenji) (1906). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.





Fig. 6.29 (*Enoshima no meisho*) *Nogi taishō dōzō*. The Bronze Statue of General Nogi (1935). Souvenir postcard (unused), late 1930s.

Fig. 6.28 (*Momoyama fūkei*) *Nogi taishō dōzō*. Momoyama Fushimi ([Views of Momoyama] Statue of General Nogi. Momoyama Fushimi) (1935). Souvenir postcard (unused), late 1930s.

Surprisingly, the cults surrounding the supposedly two greatest military heroes of modern Japan, General Nogi Maresuke and Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, took a subordinate role to those of Hirose and even Tachibana, despite their higher rank and their immense public profile as commanders of Japanese forces in the Russo-Japanese War. In Nogi's case, for instance, his somewhat ambivalent record as a commander during the war might have been why he was seen as a tragic figure rather than as a true hero. Following his suicide, Nogi was intensely praised for his "bravery and loyalty" (*chūyū giretsu*), and a dozen shrines to the general were founded in the 1910s and 1920s.²⁴² Public statues of Nogi were erected in the 1920s and 1930s, the most notable being the equestrian statue beside the grave

of Emperor Meiji in Fushimi, Kyoto, and the famous sculpture in Enoshima (figs. 6.28–6.29).

Admiral Tōgō survived Hirose and Nogi, but he rejected proposals for memorials in his honor. One was nonetheless set up immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, in 1906, in a park in the small town of Nanae north of Hakodate, and another in 1925 in a remote corner of Saitama Prefecture, well off the beaten track in the town of Hannō. The latter had an interesting history. In 1894, a local commoner named Kamoshita Seihachi (1863–1956) had set up the Chichibu Ontake Shrine there. With the end of the Russo-Japanese War, he became a fervent worshiper of Tōgō and Nogi, and he repeatedly petitioned the admiral, requesting his approval to build a statue near the shrine.²⁴³ The admiral eventually

acquiesced; he even attended the unveiling ceremony on April 17, 1925.²⁴⁴ Trophies from the Russo-Japanese War, including a cannon captured from the Russian tsarist armies, were later transported to the shrine and are still exhibited there in the area now called Tōgō Park.²⁴⁵ Today, at the entrance to the park, visitors can also see a statue of Kamoshita, which, according to the inscription, was erected shortly after his death in the late 1950s. Other plans to build statues of Tōgō during the 1920s failed, even though there was strong support from prominent figures such as Shibusawa Eiichi.²⁴⁶

After Tōgō's death in 1934, the admiral became the subject of a movement to memorialize his name through public monuments. As the Association for the Commemoration of Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō declared, "if there is one national hero (*kokumin-teki eiyū*), then it is Admiral Tōgō."²⁴⁷ The association proposed building both a shrine and a statue for Tōgō as well as preserving the admiral's erstwhile residence as a memorial to this Great Man.²⁴⁸ The statue was intended to contribute to a "promotion of national spirit" (*kokumin-teki seishin*) through the "staging of a discipline rooted in national identity" (*kokutai-teki kun'iku*).²⁴⁹

The fundraising campaign was a huge success; donations came from all social classes and were not limited to Japan. The archive of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains hundreds of documents showing that local groups of Japanese nationals (*Nihonjinkai*) from all over the world sent in small amounts of money for the realization of the proposed memorials. Even foreign nationals were among the donors.²⁵⁰ Despite this enthusiastic response, the statue proposal was never realized since the metal necessary for public statuary became more difficult to source. Only Tōgō Shrine was inaugurated in Tokyo's Harajuku district in 1940, where it remains a tourist site and a venue for wedding ceremonies.²⁵¹

The acceleration in statue-building following the Russo-Japanese War was both an indication of an increasing sense of national pride and of the doubts felt by the political and military elites about the willingness of the imperial subjects to sacrifice

themselves for the nation. Against this background, we can observe renewed attempts to strengthen the bonds between the abstract idea of the nation and the individuals populating it. Military historians frequently claim that the Russo-Japanese War marked the origins of a new spirit of self-sacrifice in the armed forces and that this in turn triggered a change in military tactics with an upsurge in suicidal attacks that climaxed in the final stages of the Asia-Pacific War. The historian Yoshihisa Matsusaka, however, asserts that the notion of "human bullets" "may not have been embraced wholeheartedly by the army as a tactical doctrine," rather that, beginning with the Russo-Japanese War, it "enjoyed more enthusiastic endorsement . . . as the basis of social policy."²⁵²

The evolution of bronze statuary during this period suggests that the idea of a "sacrificial spirit" was actively embraced—at least by the elite—and that its symbols in the public space were on the rise. This also means, however, that the elite was now strongly committed to continuing a program of indoctrinating the people with the ideology of loyalty to and sacrifice for the emperor and the nation. Had they not, the massive amounts of money and resources spent on these monuments would have been wasted.

ONLY THE GOOD DIE YOUNG? MARTYRS OF THE RESTORATION

The Meiji regime established shrines, the so-called *Shōkonsha*, to venerate those who had died during the Meiji Restoration. In addition, it set up individual shrines to honor the leading figures of the restoration movement of the 1850s and 1860s (see chapter 1). Some of these figures became the objects of widespread personality cults that emerged in prewar Japan but would survive or re-surface in the postwar era. This development clearly distinguishes this group from the cults of the individuals discussed earlier in this study. Particularly popular within this group were the young members of the restoration movement who had lost their lives dur-

ing the fight against the Tokugawa shogunate, were sentenced to death and subsequently executed, or who were killed by the shogun's police forces because they were seen as threats to the established order. The victims of untimely and tragic deaths, they were remembered as martyrs who had given their lives to the twin causes of imperial restoration and national unity.

Most of the historical figures in this group were not memorialized immediately after the restoration. Instead, they were “rediscovered” decades after their deaths. This suggests that far from being “natural” products in their roles as mnemonic devices, statues and shrines are instruments facilitating the later construction of historical narratives that fit a political agenda. One of the most famous individuals in this cohort is Yoshida Shōin (1830–59), a member of the restoration movement in Chōshū and a teacher of leading figures of early Meiji Japan. In 1853, Yoshida had tried to undermine the ban on foreign travel by boarding one of the US ships under the command of Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (1794–1858).

Throughout the late 1850s, Yoshida was involved in plotting the overthrow of the shogunate but was arrested and executed, aged only twenty-nine. A shrine dedicated to Yoshida was built in Tokyo in 1882, following his reburial in the capital, and still stands. The construction of this Shōin Shrine was initiated by his disciples, many of whom now occupied senior positions in government.²⁵³ A second shrine for Yoshida was set up in his hometown of Hagi in 1907.²⁵⁴ Despite his importance as a central figure in the early anti-Tokugawa movement, the first statue dedicated to him was only erected in 1942 at the Mishima Shrine in Shimoda, Shizuoka Prefecture, near the site where Yoshida observed the US ships in 1853. Due to wartime metal shortages, this sculpture was made of cement.

It was not until 1991 that a second Yoshida statue was built in Bentenjima Park in the city of Hamamatsu, also in Shizuoka Prefecture, close to where he is said to have attempted to board the US ships. The relatively small number of Yoshida statues are outweighed by memorials of other types. In the city

of Hagi, for example, Yoshida's private academy, Shōka-sonjuku (“Village Academy under the Pines”), is preserved within the precincts of the Shōin Shrine. Memorial stones throughout the city mark sites associated with him—where he was born, where he went to school, where he was imprisoned before his execution, and where his academy was initially had been located.²⁵⁵

Yoshida is relatively well known, yet his popularity is surpassed by other members of the anti-shogunate movement who were killed during the civil wars of the 1860s. No figures embody the popular perception that “the good die young” more than Sakamoto Ryōma (1836–67) and Nakaoka Shintarō (1838–67), two samurai from Tosa domain.²⁵⁶ Tosa was initially neutral during the civil wars of the 1860s, but Sakamoto and Nakaoka left their home domain to join anti-shogunate groups. On occasion, they also cooperated with representatives of the shogunate, such as Katsu Kaishū. In 1867, they mediated between Chōshū and Satsuma, enabling the two domains to forge an alliance and thus securing the victory of the anti-shogunate forces in the civil conflict. Sakamoto and Nakaoka did not live to enjoy the fruits of victory. In December 1867, the two samurai were killed by unidentified assailants, most likely members of the shogunate's secret police.²⁵⁷

Sakamoto and Nakaoka were heaped with praise posthumously, yet they were only rewarded court titles in 1891.²⁵⁸ They were also venerated as “martyrs of the Restoration” at the Kōchi Shōkonsha (renamed Kōchi Gokoku Shrine in 1939), the Kyōto Shōkonsha (Kyōto Gokoku Shrine from 1939), and the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Sakamoto Ryōma's grave at the Kyōto Gokoku Shrine has become a pilgrimage site for young Japanese seeking inspiration and direction in their own lives.²⁵⁹ A memorial museum dedicated to Nakaoka opened in Kōchi in 1991. Statues dedicated to Sakamoto were unveiled in Kōchi the same year, then in Nagasaki and Hokkaido in 2009.²⁶⁰ The 2009 installations were inspired by a popular TV series about “Ryōma,” the central figure in several movies, dramas, historical novels, and even manga comics.

As a popular icon Sakamoto Ryōma has far outstripped Nakaoka. In 2003, Kōchi Prefecture nicknamed its airport Kōchi Ryōma Airport, the only Japanese airport to be named after a person (though only unofficially).²⁶¹ Ryōma associations (Ryōma-kai) exist throughout Japan and beyond its shores. There is, for example, a Ryōma-kai in Hawai'i and many other places.²⁶² His popularity even extends into space: one asteroid was named Ryoma, and a second after his wife, Oryō.²⁶³

The "Ryōma boom" is often considered a post-war phenomenon and, in particular, a by-product of the bestselling historical novel *Ryōma on the Move* (*Ryōma ga yuku*) by Shiba Ryōtarō (1923–96).²⁶⁴ However, its roots are actually in the prewar period. In the 1880s, for example, members of the Movement for Freedom and People's Rights in Kōchi remembered Ryōma as one of the pioneers of anti-government activism in their home province. The first historical novel dealing with Ryōma, *Kanketsu senri no koma* by Sakazaki Shiran (1853–1913), dates to 1883, and the first "monumental biography," *Tenka musō no gōketsu* (The Unrivaled Hero), was released in 1887. Several others followed in the 1890s. Ryōma was first granted the status of an *ijin* in 1897 with his inclusion in the book *Nihon ijin den* (Biographies of Great Men of Japan).²⁶⁵ Later publications celebrating Great Men also included him.²⁶⁶

Public veneration of Sakamoto, by contrast, was not an extensive phenomenon until the twentieth century. In 1904, the first memorial stone dedicated to Ryōma was placed alongside his grave at the Kyōto Shōkonsha. However, it was not until fifty years after the deaths of both Sakamoto and Nakaoka, in 1917, that the commemoration and worship of the two samurai became genuinely popular. That year witnessed a commemorative festival, the *Sakamoto Nakaoka ryō-sensei sōnan gojūnen kinen saiten*, which was well documented in a pictorial issued shortly afterward.²⁶⁷ In the mid-1920s, Ryōma was often described as a pioneer of democratic thought in Japan, and his ideas were now linked with the increasing popularity of Taishō Democracy.²⁶⁸ He was touted in the media as a politi-

cal visionary. His "Eight Policies Drafted On-board" (*Senchū hassaku*), eight memo-style guidelines jotted down during a boat trip from Nagasaki to Kyoto, were now praised as a foundational text of modern Japan. Biographical studies of Ryōma climaxed in the 1920s. Fewer than twenty books with "Sakamoto Ryōma" in the title (or a chapter title) were released before 1900; this figure climbed to twenty in the 1900s, forty-one in the 1910s, and forty-eight in the 1920s.²⁶⁹

Against the backdrop of this mounting "Ryōma boom," plans emerged in his home region in 1926 to build a memorial to him and Nakaoka to mark the sixtieth anniversary of their deaths. The Ryōma statue fit into the existing memorial landscape as statues dedicated to other local heroes had already been set up in Kōchi since the 1910s. A statue of the founder of the Yamanouchi clan, Kazutoyo (1545–1605), had been built in Kōchi Park in 1913, the first public park to open in the prefecture (in 1873). Statues of "modern heroes" associated with the Meiji Restoration followed suit. A statue of the former president of the Lower House, Kataoka Kenkichi (1843–1903), was placed in front of the Prefectural Assembly in 1916; one for the leader of the liberal movement of the Meiji period, Itagaki Taisuke, in 1924; and a statue of the last daimyo of Tosa domain, Yamanouchi Toyoshige (Yōdō, 1827–72), was completed in 1926.²⁷⁰

The saga of the Ryōma statue, however, was unique in several respects. First, unlike the prefecture's existing memorials, the idea for his statue was mooted by the local Kōchi Youth Association, the Kōchi-ken Rengō Seinendan. The initiators were students from Kōchi now studying at Waseda University and various universities in Kyoto.²⁷¹ The statue of Sakamoto, whose life was cut short while still in his twenties, was realized because the Seinendan members felt sympathetic to Sakamoto's cause. It was the first project of its kind to be spearheaded by a group of young people. Secondly, the Kōchi youth group drew on the resources of its parent body, the Great Japan Youth League (Dai-Nihon Rengō Seinendan), for its fundraising campaign. Supported by several newspaper companies



Fig. 6.30 Statue of Sakamoto Ryōma, Kōchi (1928).

such as the Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, Ōsaka Asahi Shinbunsha, Ōsaka Jiji Shinpōsha and the local Doyō Shinbunsha and Kōchi Shinbunsha, the campaign easily reached the fundraising target of 25,000 *yen*.²⁷² Thirdly, the organizers boasted that it would be “the largest statue in Japan” (*Nihon ichi*), hoping that this would draw visitors to this remote corner of the country. When completed, the statue was 5.7 m, and the overall height of the monument including the pedestal was 13.5 m. The local daily *Doyō shinbun* called it “the greatest bronze statue in the East (*tōyō*).”²⁷³ It was built on Katsurahama, a beach location reflecting Ryōma’s strong interest in naval matters and maritime trade. It still stands on its original site and is one of Kōchi’s major tourist attractions (see fig. 6.30), featuring in tourist information brochures and travel advertisements.

The detailed documentation of the building of the statue does not make explicit the project’s ob-

jectives, which differ depending on the source. What emerges consistently in the primary sources is the desire to use the figure of Ryōma to enhance the prestige of Kōchi Prefecture and to position this former Tosa feudal domain on the national map. Tosa had played a crucial role in the Meiji Restoration, but the deaths of some of the region’s leading activists before the event had subsequently shifted the spotlight away from Tosa. Monuments for two local heroes of the Restoration, Gotō Shōjirō and Itagaki Taisuke, were built in Tokyo’s Shiba Park in 1903 and 1913, respectively; the second statue of Itagaki was erected in Gifu in 1917.

The figure of Sakamoto Ryōma, the tragic and youthful hero of the Restoration, now seemed to be a timely addition to Tosa’s distinguished representatives within the national pantheon. The question remained of how to package the image of “Ryōma.” Against the backdrop of liberal tendencies in 1920s Japan, Ryōma was initially framed as a pioneer of democracy in Japan. This persona fitted the narrative of Kōchi as a fount of modern Japanese liberalism. The 1917 Itagaki statue in Gifu also was commissioned in a similar light. Itagaki was severely wounded in an assassination attempt in 1882 while giving a speech in Gifu. The oft-cited account states that the wounded statesman then uttered his almost “famous last words,” exemplifying his devotion to the cause of democracy: “Even if Itagaki dies, freedom will never die.” Apocryphal or not, this account did much to shape the national reputation of Kōchi as a cradle of Japanese democracy, and in the 1920s, Sakamoto Ryōma also joined this narrative.²⁷⁴ Election results today indicate that Kōchi is a rather conservative prefecture, but its role in the development of democracy and liberalism in Japan continues to be a source of immense local pride. Regional museums frequently host exhibitions celebrating the leaders of the Movement for Freedom and People’s Rights, and one local sake brewery boasts a brand named “Freedom Comes from the Valleys of Tosa” (*Jiyū wa Tosa no sankan yori*).²⁷⁵

Despite this reputation, the official prospectus for the Ryōma statue was ambivalent about which

historical role he should be best remembered for. What connects the group initiating the memorial and its subject appears to be their youth. Having contributed so much to the development of modern Japan as a young man, the figure of Ryōma fascinated the members of the local youth league. The prospectus was drafted by a circle of Waseda University students led by Irimajiri Yoshiyasu (1903–68), later author of a study of social movements in Kōchi and as a young man deeply involved with the labor movement.²⁷⁶ In a postwar testimony, he mentioned the emergence of the socialist and communist movement and proletarian parties (*musan kaikyū seitō*) as part of the group's motivation in considering a statue for Ryōma. Despite their being inspired by Ryōma's progressivism, they felt it more judicious to appeal to national sentiment rather than to liberalism and democracy when calling for donations. Ultimately, the prospectus lacked explicit references to Ryōma's supposed democratic leanings; instead, it expressed dissatisfaction with the current political scene and struck an unexpected conservative cord. Ryōma was conceived, above all, in terms of a model of "national spirit" as one of the "founders" (*sōkensha*) of modern Japan due to his role as a pioneer of the Meiji Restoration. The document expresses the hope that "a second Ryōma and a third Ryōma will emerge," figures who would bring "an enlightened spirit to the new Japan of Shōwa." It conveyed a strong desire to inspire the young through the worship of the historical figure of Sakamoto Ryōma.²⁷⁷

The term "enlightenment" might be interpreted as a reference to Sakamoto's "progressive" mindset, but it is also possible that the notion of a "second restoration" referred to the right-wing platforms emerging during this period. Following the death of the Meiji emperor, many political commentators argued that Japan needed another restoration—a return to the "true Japan" of the Meiji Restoration whose spirit had since gradually dissipated. In the late 1910s and the 1920s, this viewpoint led to the emergence of demands for a "Taishō Restoration" and after 1926 a "Shōwa Restoration."²⁷⁸

Within this scenario, calling for a conservative

restoration, the figure of Ryōma would become increasingly ambiguous. The speeches given at the unveiling ceremony of the Ryōma statue in Kōchi on May 27, 1928, reveal this tension between Ryōma as an exemplar of Japanese democracy and as an ideal subject for nationalist indoctrination.²⁷⁹ First and foremost, he was praised for his contribution to the Meiji Restoration. What made him worthy of veneration was not his progressivism and his youthful desire for change, but his loyalism (*sonnō*) and devotion to his country (*kuni*), which was praised by the speakers as the chief motivation behind his activities. In his foreword to the report on the ceremony, Kōchi Youth Association president Yasuhara Shun'ichi explained that it had been "a miracle to achieve the great changes [involved in the Meiji Restoration] in a peaceful manner."

Glossing over the fact that Sakamoto had united the two domains of Chōshū and Satsuma in a *military* alliance against the shogunate that resulted in more than a year of civil war, he emphasized that responsibility for this peaceful change could, to a large degree, be laid at the feet of Sakamoto Ryōma.²⁸⁰ Like other figures who had become the subjects of personality cults, Sakamoto had become as much a myth as a historical figure.

Other speakers at the unveiling were the former minister of the Imperial Household, Tanaka Mitsuki, a Kōchi native and close associate of Sakamoto Ryōma in his youth. He was the driving force behind the memorials dedicated to emperor Meiji from around the same time. Also in attendance was Yamanouchi Toyokage (1875–1957), the son of the last daimyo of Tosa domain, but more eminent were several members of the central government: Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi (1863–1929), Naval Minister Okada Keisuke (1868–1952; prime minister 1934–1936), Education Minister Kazue Shōda (1869–1948), and the president of the Lower House, Motoda Hajime (1858–1938).²⁸¹ The high profile of the participants fueled intense media coverage of this event—even the English-speaking *Japan Times*.²⁸²

Navy Minister Okada's assertion that Sakamoto exemplified "the national spirit that should guide our youth at a time when extremist ideas (*kageki*

shisō) are spreading”²⁸³ positioned him within a conservative, rather than a progressive or democratic, context. This characterization of Sakamoto was underlined by Tōyama Mitsuru, co-founder of the right-wing organization Gen’yōsha, who described him as a “loyalist patriot” (*sonnō shishi*), highlighting his role in reconciling Chōshū and Satsuma and praising him for the sacrifice of his life for the country.²⁸⁴ But it was the representatives of Kōchi Prefecture and the city of Kōchi who stood out with their strongly-worded nationalist sentiments; they praised Ryōma as a model of devotion to the nation and the state.²⁸⁵ In his speech, the spokesperson from the local *Doyō shinbun* even used the term “Shōwa Restoration” (*Shōwa ishin*), claiming that such a move was essential to overcome “ideological troubles.”²⁸⁶ Such sentiments suggest that with the end of the reign of Emperor Taishō in 1926, democratic thought was on the retreat in Japan.

The tensions created by the figure of Ryōma as a symbol of democracy and progress on the one hand and of nationalism and conservatism on the other were less pronounced in the case of the second Sakamoto statue. The 1926 prospectus for a memorial dedicated to Sakamoto and Nakaoka in Maruyama Park in Kyoto (erected in 1934, see fig. 6.31) underscores their role in the creation of “a new Japan” through their contribution to the Meiji Restoration. In particular, it refers to their mediation between Chōshū and Satsuma, and their creation of the auxiliary militia units Kaientai and Rikuentai. Emphasizing the men’s involvement in the formation of Japan’s modern naval forces, the prospectus closes with a rallying cry to “forever convey [Sakamoto’s and Nakaoka’s] heroism to future generations and to strengthen the national spirit of loyalism.” Nothing is said about Ryōma as a role model for a renewed restoration or as a pioneer of democracy.²⁸⁷

What we know about the unveiling ceremony expresses muted enthusiasm for the monument. Entrepreneur and president of the construction committee Imahata Nishie (1870–?) spoke for roughly a minute. He asserted that “the great achievements of our two teachers are well known.



Fig. 6.31 Statues of Sakamoto Ryōma and Nakaoka Shintarō, Maruyama Park, Kyoto. 1962 replica of original 1934 statue.

But since it is so cold today, I would inconvenience you if I spoke for an hour or two, out here in the open air. To avoid troubling my honorable audience, I have decided not to give a speech today.”²⁸⁸ This may have been a relief for those wearied by long speeches on the “great achievements” of “incomparable figures” whose stories needed to “be conveyed to future generations for eternity.” All that can be concluded is that for Imahata, at least on this occasion, escaping the winter cold took precedent over the spouting of nationalist propaganda.

The speeches at the 1935 unveiling ceremony of a statue of Nakaoka Shintarō near Cape Muroto in Kōchi, too, avoided touching upon issues of national politics.²⁸⁹ (This work was also commissioned by the Kōchi Youth League and completed only after a sluggish fundraising campaign.) Despite the chang-

es in the political climate and the spread of militarist attitudes following the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the open advocacy of militarism and ultranationalism was conspicuously absent from this event. Some speakers, including Kōchi mayor Murakami Kiyoshi (1875–1935), portrayed Nakaoka and Sakamoto as saviors in times of crisis (*hijō no jikyoku*). He adopted the term *hijōji*, or “state of emergency,”²⁹⁰ an expression that was commonly heard in the early 1930s in reference to Japan’s perceived “national crisis.” The speeches, however, were more concerned with conditions in Kōchi, and all the key speakers mentioned the prefecture’s economic woes since the region had been devastated by a series of storms in the later 1920s that left farmers faced with severe crop failure.²⁹¹ Nomura Mokuma (1870–1960), the president of the construction committee, expressed his hope that the statue of Nakaoka, “this model (*tenkei*) of the Tosa boy (*Tosa danji*),” would make “hero worship (*ei-yū sūhai*) well up in peoples’ veins . . . and promote the spirit of Tosa (*Tosa seishin*).”²⁹² As in many of the cases considered thus far, it was regional allegiance, rather than any sense of national spirit, that was given top billing as an expression of the current state of affairs. Like the statues dedicated to Sakamoto, the worship of the individual was prescribed as an efficient remedy to the relevant circumstances. Only Irimajiri Yoshiyasu warned of the inflated “deification” (*shinkaku-ka*) and “idolatry” (*gūzō-ka*) of the subjects of public sculpture, even though he had played a decisive part in initiating both monuments: “We must not construct personalities that are out of our own reach. We must produce *new* heroes. And we must prepare [ourselves] to perform great achievements surpassing those of our ancestors.”²⁹³ Ten years after he had campaigned for the Ryōma statue, Irimajiri felt that the nationalistic fervor that had developed hand in hand with the statue boom was out of control.

The dual cult of Sakamoto Ryōma and Nakaoka Shintarō gained little traction after the construction of the memorials analyzed here. This might be due to the fact that since the early 1930s Japan drifted away from democracy and individualism—two

ideals these samurai represented—toward militarism. In this respect, the Ryōma–Nakaoka cult patently differed from the more influential Hirose and Kusunoki cults, which were actively employed for the indoctrination of the population with militarist ideology. The lack of widespread popularity in prewar Japan also explains why the Ryōma–Nakaoka cult survived into the postwar period while the veneration of war heroes such as Hirose (and their statues) disappeared entirely.

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM: NICHIREN AND KAMEYAMA

Statues of religious figures have generally been excluded from this study of modern Japan’s cult of the individual, but the statue of Nichiren (1222–82), the founder of the eponymous Buddhist lineage, erected in 1904 in East Park (Higashi Kōen) in the city of Fukuoka merits inclusion.²⁹⁴ This monument had national significance, particularly due to the importance of Nichiren and the Nichiren tradition of Buddhism within the history of Japanese nationalism.²⁹⁵

Nichiren was a critic of the Kamakura shogunate, and after the Meiji Restoration, any opponents of shogunate rulers, even those from the distant past, were prospective candidates for inclusion in the evolving national pantheon. Nichiren, therefore, became a potentially powerful figure in the national-imperial discourse during the Meiji period—in a manner similar to Toyotomi Hideyoshi (see chapter 1).

The historical figure of Nichiren was most notable for his association with the notion of a Japan threatened by foreign invasion, a topic of utmost relevance in Meiji Japan but not directly addressed by any of the monuments introduced in this study thus far. Some accounts record that in 1253 Nichiren predicted that Japan would be invaded by foreign armies. While this claim is debatable, his followers maintained that this alluded to attacks on Japan by the Mongols in 1274 and 1281. On both occasions, Japan was famously saved from the Mongol fleet by storms that were later interpreted as “divine




Fig. 6.32 *Genkō kinenhi kensetsuhi boshū kōkoku* (Calling for Contributions to the Cost for the Mongol Invasion Monument). Source: *Shinonome shinbun*, February 9, 1889 (Appendix). Advertisement soliciting donations for the construction of the Mongol Invasion Memorial.

winds,” or *kamikaze*. His followers asserted that it was Nichiren’s preaching of the “true teaching” that had safeguarded Japan from the threat of invasion. In the late nineteenth century, when Japan was again facing foreign threats, some referred to the monk as a model savior of the nation.²⁹⁶

In the 1880s, local activists proposed the idea of a monument in Hakata (today part of the city of Fukuoka), near the site where the Mongol fleet made landfall in the thirteenth century, as a reminder of the successful defense of Japan against the Mongol invasions. These plans soon merged with proposals to erect a large statue of Nichiren in the

public space. In 1886, Yuchi Takeo (1847–1913), a police officer-turned-writer, mooted the idea of a Memorial to the Mongol Invasions (*Genkō kinenhi*). He was motivated, in part, by the public outrage felt at the behavior of Chinese sailors during a visit of the Beiyang fleet to Nagasaki harbor that same year in what came to be known as the Nagasaki Incident.²⁹⁷

Despite the actual scale of the incident still being open to discussion, it is telling that the 1943 biography of Yuchi, “The Man Who Built the Memorial to the Mongol Invasions,” opens with a chapter on it.²⁹⁸ Yuchi is said to have had visions (*genkaku*) of the Mongol invasions following the incident, prompting him to take measures to “awaken the people and cultivate a spirit of devotion to national defense” and to promote feelings of “loyalty and patriotism” (*chūkun aikoku*) among ordinary Japanese.²⁹⁹ The 1943 biography also notes that as early as 1881, Yuchi had come to understand that the “commemoration of heroes” (*ei-yū no saishi*) and “hero worship” (*ei-yū sūhai*) could help heighten popular patriotism (*kokumin no aikokushin*). The learning from the spirit of the past, he believed, was necessary for preparing Japan’s defense against future attacks.³⁰⁰

Yuchi’s original proposal envisioned a memorial dominated by an equestrian statue of Hōjō Tokimune (1251–84), the regent (*shikken*) of the shogun and de facto ruler of Japan at the time of the Mongol invasions (fig. 6.32). Yuchi first went public with the plan in 1888, when he issued a call for donations.³⁰¹ Lamenting the fact that the Japanese lacked physical monuments to remind them of the nation’s brave defense against foreign invasion in medieval times, he proposed “portraying the brave acts of these heroes for eternity” in a suitable coastal setting and thus demonstrating Japan’s military prowess to Japanese and foreigners visitors.

As with other statue projects, Yuchi’s 1888 prospectus emphasized the importance of such monuments as educational tools, rallying for a strengthening of the spirit of commitment to national defense (*gokoku no seishin*) and national unity (*jōge jinshin itchi*).³⁰² Yuchi saw his activities as part of the “movement to buttress the spirit of national de-

fense” (*gokoku seishin kōyō undō*). He assisted in the publication of pamphlets and books that used the expression *gokoku* at a time when the term had yet to appear widely in print (fig. 6.33).³⁰³ Although some temples (Gokokuji) and shrines (Gokokusha) with names including the term *gokoku* had been founded in earlier centuries, the use of the designation “Gokoku Jinja” (Gokoku Shrine) for prefectural shrines dedicated to the war dead only became standard usage in the late 1930s.

Yuchi was able to secure support at an early stage from eminent local figures, including the governor of Fukuoka Prefecture, the commander of the 6th Division of the IJA stationed in Fukuoka, several local politicians, the president of Kyushu Railways, and the chairman of a local bank. In 1890, he released *Genkō kinenhi monogatari* (Tale of the Memorial to the Mongol Invasions), which is mostly an heroic narrative of the defense of Japan against the thirteenth-century invaders. Yuchi praises the “loyalty and the patriotic spirit of the people” (*kokumin chūkun aikoku no ki*), noting that all would have preferred death and, in the process, become a “country-protecting soul” (*gokoku no tamashii*) rather than choose surrender to foreign invaders.³⁰⁴ The proposed monument is only mentioned in the last paragraph, where Yuchi stresses that it will play an analogous role to independence memorials and triumphal arches in Germany, France, and the United States in the dissemination of the dual concepts of patriotism and loyalty.³⁰⁵

Yuchi sought the cooperation of Abbot Sano Zenrei (1859–1912),³⁰⁶ head of a Nichiren temple in Fukuoka, in order to realize the memorial he envisioned. At Sano’s request, a statue of Nichiren was added to Yuchi’s plans for the “Memorial to the Mongol Invasions.” The lineage lamented that their founder’s part in the historical context of the invasions was not well known in Japan, even among Nichiren adherents, and thus necessitated promotion with an image of Nichiren in the proposed monument. Other religious groups opposed what they saw as a monopolization of the historical memory of the Mongol invasions by Nichiren Buddhism.³⁰⁷ Critics pointed out that Nichiren’s “proph-

ecy” of the Mongol invasions was not an established fact and that any link between Nichiren and the envisioned memorial was therefore highly questionable.³⁰⁸ This disagreement sparked the emergence of two distinct projects: Sano continued to campaign for a Nichiren statue, and Yuchi proceeded with his idea of a Memorial to the Mongol Invasions with the figure of Hōjō as the centerpiece.³⁰⁹


Apart from rectifying the lack of public acknowledgment of Nichiren’s alleged role in the defense of Japan against the Mongols, a 1904 report on the Nichiren statue reveals that its backers’ chief concern was the affirmation of the nationalist character of Nichiren Buddhism and the importance of the state for the lineage. The report echoes the writings of Yuchi, most likely in reaction to the hostile attitude of the early Meiji state to Buddhism. It characterizes Nichiren as “enormously devoted to the state” (*kokka no dai-chūkunsha*) and “a nationalist religious” figure (*kokka-teki no shūkyōka*),³¹⁰ asserting that

the Nichiren tradition does not claim Saint Nichiren [exclusively] for itself—Saint Nichiren belongs to the nation of Japan (*Nippon koku no Nichiren shōnin*). The intention of the builders [of this monument] is to present publicly (*hyōshō*) his achievements as a supporter of the state and the prophet of the Mongol invasions and, through this . . . to cultivate the nationalist spirit of the people (*kokumin no kokka-teki seishin o kan’yō*).³¹¹

A section on Nichiren’s principles expands on the significance of “the state” (*kokka*) within Nichiren’s beliefs. It cites the monk’s treatise *Risshō ankoku ron* (Establishment of the Legitimate Teaching for the Protection of the Country) as proof of Nichiren Buddhism’s devotion to the state, thus countering criticism of Buddhism as ideologically opposed to nationalism.

Notably, the report was republished in 1930, at a time when commentators believed that the nation was faced with another foreign crisis. Although the Meiji-period suppression of Buddhism was long in the past, the editorial notes of the 1930

Fig. 6.33 Numbers of journal articles with the term “gokoku” in the title (1881–2015). Source: Complete Database of Magazine and Periodicals from the Meiji Era to the Present, Zassaku Plus.



edition reveal the anxiety of Nichiren Buddhists in claiming a close association with the state, possibly as a result of fears that Shinto would be established as a state religion. The text explicitly linked Nichiren's teachings with *kokutai* ideology, which was being canvassed in ultranationalist circles around this time. The annotations assert that no religion has contributed to the "cultivation (*baiyō*) of the *kokutai* . . . as much as the Nichiren tradition of Saint Nichiren. . . . It was Saint Nichiren who founded a new nationalist religion (*kokka-teki shin-shūkyō*) and revitalized the state that had been taken over by evil creeds (*jashū*)."³¹² The lineage's adherents were clearly attempting to distance themselves from other Buddhist traditions, which they considered inadequate in their devotion to the state and the *kokutai*. For them, these traditions were thus designated "evil creeds." Earlier research has dated this development to the 1930s, but the reports of the Fukuoka Nichiren statue reveal that the lineage was already concerned about turning the campaign for a monument commemorating the defeat of the Mongol invasions during the Meiji period to its own advantage.³¹³

As these events were unfolding, Yuchi's plans were also undergoing significant change. His original proposal for a statue of a shogunal regent proved highly controversial. Moreover, the harsh suppression of Nichiren Buddhism by the Hōjō also hindered cooperation between Yuchi and Sano. In order to enlist support and approval for his project, Yuchi changed tack and proposed instead that the centerpiece of the Memorial to the Mongol Invasions be a figure associated with the Imperial House—Hōjō Tokimune's imperial counterpart, Emperor Kameyama (1249–1305). Even today the defeat of the Mongol invasions is associated in the public imagination with the fighting spirit and skills of Japan's warrior class.³¹⁴ However, the choice of Emperor Kameyama as the core figure of the memorial reinforced imperial authority, underlining the "tradition" of imperial military command, as seen in the memorials to Yamato Takeru and Emperor Jinmu discussed above. In 1889, Yuchi launched a fundraising campaign that was intended

as an exercise in national unity and that aimed at promoting the project throughout the country. It enrolled a large number of active participants; the recruitment of two imperial princes as official supporters of the project bolstered its overarching dimension.³¹⁵

Both Sano's and Yuchi's proposals were approved by the Home Ministry and the city of Fukuoka in 1892.³¹⁶ The Imperial Household Ministry had also been consulted and, the year before, in 1891, announced that it would donate 1,000 *yen* to the Kameyama statue campaign.³¹⁷ Not surprisingly, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) embraced the project, and thousands of individual soldiers of its units contributed donations.³¹⁸ That same year, Yuchi embarked on a nationwide lecture tour as part of his fundraising drive. His most frequent stops were at schools, army clubs, and women's associations. By 1903, he had given 624 speeches to over one million people.³¹⁹

During his activities, Yuchi noticed that not only the monument would strengthen loyalty to the nation, but the emperor and that the fundraising activities would effectively serve this purpose as well.³²⁰ Yet fundraising, however, was not an easy task since the campaign took several years, in part because some of the donations were used for side projects, all of which were aimed at the cultivation of a "spirit of national defense." These included the editing of historical source materials, a project that strongly influenced the historiography of the Mongol invasions;³²¹ the production of a series of fourteen large oil paintings that featured in exhibitions all over the country;³²² the making of an educational "movie" (a series of thirty-eight images painted on glass and projected with a "magic lantern");³²³ and the publication of the military song (*gunka*) "Mongol Invasions" (*Genkō*, 1892).³²⁴

As other case studies have illustrated, it was not unusual for public statue projects to take a decade or more to complete, but the sources show that Abbot Sano's supporters were impatient with Yuchi's slow progress. For them, fundraising was a minor issue, given the willingness of sect members to donate to the project.³²⁵ By 1899, sufficient funds




Fig. 6.34 Unveiling ceremony of the statue of Emperor Kameyama on December 25, 1904, in East Park, Fukuoka. Source: *Fukuoka nichinichi shinbun*, December 27, 1904.



Fig. 6.35 (*Fukuoka meisho*) Higashi Kōen Nichiren shōnin dōzō. Nichiren Bronze Statue, East Park (1904). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

had been collected to commission a wooden maquette for the Emperor Kameyama statue.³²⁶ Four years later, in 1903, the maquette was sent “on tour” to Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, and other cities to raise the necessary funds for the next stage of the project—the casting of the bronze statue. As the largest wooden sculpture known in Japan at the time, the Kameyama maquette became a sensation, triggering a stream of further donations. The IJA, for example, donated twenty-two bronze cannons from the Yūshūkan museum to be used for casting the statue.³²⁷

Following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in early 1904, the need for a monument to elevate the “spirit of national defense” acquired new meaning. The Kameyama statue was finally cast in August that year, and the Kameyama and Nichiren statues were unveiled on December 25, 1904, in East Park in Fukuoka (fig. 6.34).³²⁸ Inscriptions on the plinths and adjacent memorial stones detailed their commissioning, fundraising efforts, as well as information about the sculpting and installation of the monuments.³²⁹

The position of the two statues in the park, together with their relative size and design, mirrors the two men’s political status, and until today their position has remained unaltered. The Nichiren stat-



Fig. 6.36 Kameyama jōkō go-dōzō (Higashi Kōen). Holly [sic] Copper Statue of Emp. Kameyama, Higashi Park (1904). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

ue is taller, at over 10 m (fig. 6.35),³³⁰ an indication of the economic power of the donor group. It sits near the edge of the park on a site administered by the temple Minobusan Fukuoka Betsuin; a memorial museum (Genkō Kinenkan) was built next to the statue.³³¹ Although the Kameyama statue is only 4.8 m high (fig. 6.36), its greater political significance is highlighted by its central placement in the park and the fact that it stands on an elevated site, making it the dominant feature of the memorial ensemble. The situation of the Nichiren statue alongside an IJA cemetery and a horseracing track (neither today



192

像銅人聖蓮日(淺小野安)

extant), compensated in part for its disadvantageous location.³³² Both statues face the sea in the direction from where the Mongol invaders came.

It is also noteworthy in this context that while the sculptor of the Kameyama statue was the relatively unknown Yamazaki Chōun (1867–1954), the Nichiren statue was designed by no less a figure than Okakura Tenshin, sculpted by Takenouchi Hisakazu, and cast by Okazaki Sessei, all individuals already encountered in this study. Following the completion of the public statue, Takenouchi also sold 1,000 statuettes, proof of the popularity of the Nichiren statue as a national memorial. No miniature version of the Kameyama piece is known. The twenty-first-century status of these two historical figures continues to mirror their traditional hierarchy: the Nichiren statue has been designated as a cultural property of the city of Fukuoka, but the Kameyama monument is under the authority of Fukuoka Prefecture.

The project for the Memorial to the Mongol Invasions has parallels with the campaigns for the statues of Ii Naosuke and Sakamoto Ryōma discussed above. The former was the outcome of a drive to rehabilitate an “enemy of the court” and integrate his descendants into the new community of the nation. The Ryōma statue aimed at reviving a downtrodden region and cementing its place in national life. The goal of the memorial was similar to the Fukuoka statue in wishing to convey a powerful message about the region’s historic role in protecting the nation from foreign invasion. To preempt criticism of the importance (and historicity) of Nichiren’s contribution to Japan’s defense against the Mongols, the construction committee’s report took pains to assert that the monk’s actions had only one aim: to serve the nation and guard it against foreign enemies.

The report repeatedly praises Nichiren as a “devoted and loyal patriot” whose chief concern was the security of the country (*ankoku*), as set out in his treatise *Risshō ankoku ron*.³³³ The four characters in the title of this work (立正安国) were also adopted for the inscription on the statue; several reliefs on the plinth showed key moments in his life and reinforced his alleged part in warning of the Mongol invasions.

The nationalist character of statues honoring Nichiren becomes especially evident during festivals, when national symbols such as the national flag are enlisted to underline the historical significance attributed to Nichiren by contemporary adherents of the religion he founded. The visual language of the unveiling ceremony of another Nichiren statue erected in 1922 in a temple in Kominato village in Chiba Prefecture, close to the monk’s birthplace, spells out a clear message on this subject (fig. 6.37).³³⁴

These memorials were also rationalized within national contexts in other Japanese cities, where temples erected larger than usual Nichiren statues in highly visible locations in the public space. In the city of Kanazawa, for example, a 5.3 m tall Nichiren statue was erected in the temple, Zenmyōji, in the Utatsuyama Hills in 1918 as a memorial to mourn the nation’s fallen soldiers from the First Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars. It was situated next to the local Shōkonsha shrine, thereby exemplifying the rivalry between Buddhism and Shinto regarding the mourning of the war dead in prewar Japan.

As with the subjects of other statues, the use of Nichiren to symbolize Japan’s successful defense against the Mongols failed to gain universal approval in Japan, thus casting doubt on his place in the national narrative. The writer Takayama Chogyū argued that Nichiren had no connection to this event, given that his “prophecy” of the Mongol invasion was a matter of debate. Moreover, Takayama maintained that he also lacked ties to Kyushu since he spent most of his life in Kamakura, the seat of the shogunate, or in exile in various places including Izu peninsula and Sado island.³³⁵ Despite

Fig. 6.37 (*Awa-Kominato*) *Nichiren shōnin dōzō* ([Awa-Kominato] Bronze Statue of Saint Nichiren). Commemorative postcard, 1922. This statue, built in 1922 to mark the 700th anniversary of Nichiren’s birth, was destroyed during World War II.

being critical of other statues, the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, in contrast, stressed the significance of the Memorial to the Mongol Invasions in national education and in the cultivation of a spirit of national defense. The newspaper compared the memorial with the Saigō statue in an editorial from April 1892 that coincided with the commencement of the construction work in Fukuoka:

What is the relationship between the Memorial to the Mongol Invasions (*Genkō kinenhi*) and the statue of Saigō Takamori? . . . In an era of frequent negotiations with the [Western imperialist] powers and at a time of weakening morale (*shiki suijaku*), the Mongol Invasion Memorial is not only a suitable vehicle for strengthening the people's spirits (*jin'i*), it will also stimulate the fighting spirit of our Yamato race (*Yamato minzoku*).³³⁶

The Memorial to the Mongol Invasions, consisting of the statues of Nichiren and Kameyama, was the most direct expression of the ideology of national defense displayed to date in the public space. The monument, the year-long campaign surrounding it, and the associated projects all underlined the perception of a serious external threat faced by Japan and the necessity for national unity as a response. Although the initiative for the monument had come from local activists, its focus on national defense helped linking local and national concerns. This would become a prominent theme in the planning of other memorials and a topic that will be discussed in detail in the following section.

REGION AND NATION: STATUES OF DAIMYO

As emphasized at the beginning of this study, most public statues of historical figures in the modern period were built as instruments to strengthen national consciousness and instill a sense of nationhood in the Japanese people. Statues served to magnify the greatness and the glory of the nation as embodied in its leaders and founders, encouraging

subjects to, quite literally, look up to their Great Men. The majority of these statues, however, were not solely “national,” or even nationalist, in their purpose and significance.

Apparent in this analysis is the fact that the growing body of public statuary in the period under discussion was very diverse in character and function and that many of the statues erected in the public space expressed elements of regional identity and simultaneously serving a nationalist agenda. Even certain images of the imperial figures introduced in chapter 3 had an underlying regional gravity, such as the Emperor Keitai statue in Fukui. In the early Meiji period, local and regional identities were still competing with the newly emerging ideology of nationalism. Gradually the two impulses became intertwined, resulting in a complementary and overlapping, rather than a mutually exclusive, relationship. In the case of public statuary, this dynamic worked by promoting a local “hero of the hometown” (*kyōdo no ijin*) as a national icon.³³⁷ The only thing required was a convincing historical narrative that embedded the subject in both the local/regional *and* the national story, or connected the two by spotlighting the role of the region in question within the process of national unification.

This phenomenon is not exclusive to Japan and can be observed in most (if not all) nation-states. In his influential study *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*, Alon Confino showed that nation and region are not necessarily oppositional concepts. Confino believes that one of the key features of national identity

is its ability to represent the nation *without* excluding a host of other identities. Because it rejects other nations, national identity has often been regarded by scholars and laypersons as exclusive. The striking potential of nationhood to integrate diverse and frequently hostile groups within the nation is forgotten too easily. The full force of this fact becomes clear when we consider nationalism not as an ideology, like liberalism, fascism, or communism, but as a religion. Nationalism, like religion, is a common denominator that defies gender, regional, social, and political divisions, relegating these categories to a

secondary position. Both are capable of representing the oneness of something, God or the nation, and simultaneously the particularity of other identities; their representation is more than the sum of the identities that coexist in them.³³⁸

In modern Japan, too, statues of historical figures were actively used to connect the local and regional with the emerging concept of the nation. As a rule of thumb, the number of statues built in each region can be considered an indicator of the strength of local identity, although economic factors must be taken into consideration. My quantitative analysis of public statuary in modern Japan (see chapter 5, esp. fig. 5.7) reveals that the largest number of statues was in Tokyo, an expression of the capital's role as the political and economic center of the modern nation. The considerable number of statues erected in Osaka, Hyōgo, and Aichi likewise mirrors the economic power of these urban centers. However, the fact that less affluent prefectures such as Kagoshima, Ishikawa, and Yamaguchi experienced a level of statue-building comparable to these urban centers hints at their strong regional identity. The popularity of public statuary in Ishikawa can be explained by the importance of the region as the largest single feudal domain in the Edo period. It also represents an attempt to compensate for the loss of its political predominance after the Meiji Restoration. The leading role of Kagoshima and Yamaguchi in the restoration accounts for the drive to build statues in these prefectures. By contrast, only a few statues were installed in Okinawa, Akita, Miyazaki, Tokushima, Nara, Yamanashi, Tottori, Tochigi, Shimane, Miyagi, Saga, and Aomori prefectures. While this indicates, in part, their lack of economic affluence, it might additionally be a manifestation of lower degrees of nationalist passion in these areas.

Okinawa is a case in point. The fact that the islands were a semi-independent kingdom until the late nineteenth century and that they have suffered historical discrimination even up to the present day—Okinawa is still host to 70 percent of US bases on Japanese soil—has generated a reluctance to

link the region's local identity with that of the nation.³³⁹ These characteristics are mirrored in the region's statuary. Before the war, only two statues were built in the prefecture: the 1908 monument dedicated to Narahara Shigeru (1834–1918) and the 1935 monument to Jahana Noboru (1865–1901). Narahara was a native of Satsuma domain and the eighth governor of Okinawa Prefecture. He symbolized the forced integration of the Ryukyu Kingdom into the new nation-state, a process in which Satsuma natives played a central role. The fact that Narahara, an unpopular figure in Okinawa, was chosen as the subject of Okinawa's first public statue suggests that its initiators were seeking to demonstrate the power of the central government in the prefecture rather than establish a mutual connection between the two. The intended message of regional subordination was underlined during the unveiling ceremony: Japanese *hinomaru* flags were put up behind the statue to zero in on the national dimension of the monument.³⁴⁰ The Jahana statue, by contrast, was an attempt to connect the regional and the national by prominently staging in the public space this first university graduate from Okinawa, human rights activist, and opponent of governor Narahara.³⁴¹

Since the end of the war, only about a dozen further statues have been built in Okinawa. Different from the Narahara monument, they depict advocates of local autonomy, including Jahana Noboru, whose statue was destroyed during the war and rebuilt in the 1960s (the Narahara statue has yet to be restored), and Tōyama Kyūzō (1834–1918), another critic of Narahara and an advocate of people's rights as well as a pioneer of Okinawan emigration overseas. Most of the prefecture's other monuments portray engineers and teachers who played vital roles in the development of Okinawa during the prewar period. Only one postwar statue has a decidedly national reference—a statue of the Meiji emperor commissioned by the right-wing organization Great Japan Imperial Way Association (Dai-Nihon Kōdokai) and installed at Naminoue Shrine in 1970. This statue is discussed in chapter 10.


In assessing the links between the regional and the national, the founders and the rulers of feudal domains (*han*), the daimyo assumed a special significance. Despite the fact that many of the historical figures in this category belonged to an era when the idea of nation was still unformed, they were now integrated into the new framework of national history (*kokushi*) and presented as forerunners of national unification. Before the daimyo were honored in statue form, they were also worshiped in shrines. One study records that by 1912 the number of shrines dedicated to daimyo had surpassed those serving the worship of imperial figures.³⁴² These shrines often became the sites of festivals celebrating key events in the history of the feudal domains or their daimyo. In 1900, for example, there was a festival to mark the 300th anniversary of the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate in Edo and to commemorate Tokugawa Ieyasu, the first shogun. During the planning stage for these events, a former shogunal official and later a foreign minister in the Meiji government, Enomoto Takeaki (1836–1908), felt it necessary to state that the public commendation (*kenshō*) of Ieyasu in no way conflicted with the veneration (*sūkei*) of the emperor.³⁴³

In 1891, the city of Kanazawa celebrated the 300th anniversary of its establishment. During the festivities, the founder of Maeda rule in the Kaga domain, Toshiie, was praised for his contribution to the economic development of the region, underlining his local significance.³⁴⁴ The commemoration of the 300th anniversary of Maeda's death in 1899 emphasized his links with Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the second “unifier” of Japan. This served to position him closer to the national narrative. The construction of Hideyoshi as a symbol of loyalty to the imperial court also connected Maeda with this new state ideology. This association was strengthened in 1902 when the Oyama Shrine, where Toshiie is venerated, was upgraded from a regional shrine (*gōsha*) to a special government shrine (*bekkaku kanpeisha*), an honor for which the retainers of the Maeda family had been lobbying since the 1870s.³⁴⁵ This act confirmed that the government now considered Toshiie “loyal to the imperial dynasty” (*kin'ō*), a servant who

had “worked hard for the imperial house” (*kōshitsu ni taisuru kinrō*) and the state (*kokka*), and a leader who had achieved peace (*jihei no kō*) in the region under his control, thereby contributing to national unity.³⁴⁶ Similar rhetoric, tying the regional with the national, surrounded the anniversaries of important events in the history of other feudal domains.³⁴⁷

Statues of the founders of feudal domains (*han-so*) and famous daimyo were built in more significant numbers from the 1910s onward. The reasons for this development are manifold, ranging from economic growth—a growth that brings the surplus funds needed for such ventures—to a “local history boom” in the early Taishō period that followed the introduction of “hometown education” (*kyōdo kyōiku*) throughout Japan.³⁴⁸ However, the daimyo selected as representatives of a specific region were usually those who additionally had some national significance, and if not, such a connection was constructed and ascribed to them. In particular, those daimyo who were in power on the eve of the Meiji Restoration were recruited as convenient symbols of leaders with a local background who had also contributed to the national and imperial cause.

The 1893 statue of the Chōshū samurai Ōmura Masujirō was the first monument dedicated to a hero of the Meiji Restoration, and Chōshū again took the lead in this important category of monuments celebrating the daimyo.³⁴⁹ In 1900, a set of statues of daimyo from the Mōri family was erected in Kameyama Park in the city of Yamaguchi. The fact that the statues of Ōmura and other vassals predated those honoring daimyo shows that the social relations of the feudal era had been turned upside down. It is quite plausible that the former retainers felt uncomfortable with this situation. Building a statue to commemorate a former daimyo of the Chōshū domain was first proposed in 1889 by Yamada Akiyoshi, who also had been involved in the planning of the Ōmura monument.³⁵⁰ The initial proposal was a statue of Mōri Takachika (Yoshichika, posthumous name Tadamasu, 1819–71), the thirteenth and penultimate daimyo of Chōshū who had been in office at the time of the Meiji Restoration. A year later, the project was expanded to in-



clude a set of five statues—four daimyo of branch domains ruled by the Mōri family and Takachika.³⁵¹

After Yamada's death, the project was carried through by two former Chōshū retainers, Itō Hirobumi and Hayashi Tomoyuki (1823–1907). One of the most powerful political figures of Meiji Japan, Itō was a four-time prime minister. Hayashi, a close associate of Itō since the civil wars of the 1860s, was a member of the House of Peers. A call for donations issued in the 1890s indicated that an equestrian statue of Takachika would be the centerpiece of the memorial (fig. 6.38). The design of the monu-

Fig. 6.38 Ōkuma Ujihiro (1856–1934). Sketch of a statue of Lord Mōri Takachika sent to potential donors along with a prospectus, 1891. 30 × 39 cm (cropped).

ment portrayed the daimyo in the robes worn when he accompanied the young Meiji emperor to Osaka in March 1868 on one of the first occasions that the monarch ventured outside the palace grounds.³⁵² This choice served to underline the daimyo's function as a close advisor to the emperor as well as his



Fig. 6.39 *Yamaguchi Kameyama Kōen* (Yamaguchi Kameyama Park). Souvenir postcard (unused), early twentieth century. Ensemble of statues of daimyo from the Mōri daimyo family in Yamaguchi.

support for the restoration of imperial rule. The official history of Yamaguchi points out that Takachika and the other four statues portrayed the daimyo in the robes they wore at the time of the Meiji Restoration (*ishin tōji no fukusō*).³⁵³

The set of five statues was completed in 1899 and unveiled in Kameyama Park on April 15, 1900 (fig. 6.39 and 6.40).³⁵⁴ The monument to Takachika was the first equestrian statue built on a public site in Japan; it won out by a month over the statue of Kusunoki Masashige erected in May and unveiled in July 1900. In the late 1890s, another influential statesman from Chōshū, the then prime minister Katsura Tarō (1848–1913) called for an additional statue to honor the last daimyo of the Chōshū domain, Mōri Motonori.³⁵⁵ Another equestrian sculpture, this piece was unveiled on October 21, 1906, alongside the five previously installed statues.³⁵⁶

The land allocated to these daimyo statues was originally owned by the Mōri family, who discussed building a castle on the site in the sixteenth century. Like other castle grounds, it had been converted into a park in the Meiji period (in 1900) before the construction committee purchased it for the purpose of installing the statues. In 1924, ownership of the park was transferred from the construction committee to the Kameyama Park Preservation Society (*Kameyama-en Hozonkai*) responsible for the maintenance of the public site and the statues therein.³⁵⁷

The donations for all six statues were raised from “comrades” (*yūshi*) living within the boundaries of the former feudal domain.³⁵⁸ The accompanying inscription stated that they had been built by “the people of Yamaguchi Prefecture” (*Yamaguchi kenmin*), highlighting their local significance and the desire to connect the memory of the feudal domain, represented by its former rulers, to the new administrative unit of the prefecture. Despite the local background of the historical figures portrayed and the source of the donations, the prospectus for the Takachika statue stressed the gravity of the monument within a national context. This once again underlined the func-

tion of a statue and the person portrayed as representing the links between the region and the nation. The authors of the prospectus praised the daimyo's devotion to the emperor and to the cause of the unification of "the nation." It even went so far as to reinterpret the regional feudal rule of previous centuries as a precursor to national unification:

We want to build a bronze statue for Lord Tadamasu in order to convey for eternity his lofty virtues and his great achievements. . . . In a time of chaos (*dōran*),

[the feudal rulers] proved themselves as loyalists [to the emperor] and pacified (*heitei*) more than ten provinces in the regions of San'yō and San'in. . . . Later, they proved their loyalty to the imperial family again and contributed considerably to the successful restoration of imperial power.³⁵⁹

Itō Hirobumi used a similar argument to explain the rationale behind the project in a piece in the *Yomiuri shinbun*, which quotes him as saying that "Lord Tadamasu devoted himself to the state (*kok-*



Fig. 6.40 Yamaguchi Kameyama *dōzō shin'ei* (Portraits of Yamaguchi Kameyama Bronze Statues). *Fūzoku gahō* (May 15, 1900).

ka) with all his loyalty, in the same way that Lord Kusunoki had devoted himself to the state.”³⁶⁰ Although the term “*kokka*” was a nineteenth-century neologism, Itō used it to elucidate that, far from being a narrow-minded daimyo in charge of a small domain, Mōri Takachika had devoted himself to the nation-state, the new *kokka* of Japan. He was the daimyo who in 1869, together with the daimyo of Satsuma, Tosa, and Hizen, had initiated the return of the fief registers to the emperor (*hanseki hōkan*), an essential step in the process of restoring the imperial prerogative in the political arena. This was the backdrop to the commendation now being lavished on him. By underlining his commitment to making Japan a single nation, Mōri was integrated into the master narrative of national unification rather than being remembered as the ruler of a feudal domain with narrow regional interests.

The image of the Mōri family as a contributor to national unification was underlined in the unveiling ceremony in April 1900. Contemporaneous illustrations show the site festooned with national *hinomaru* flags, while the insignias of the feudal domain were nowhere in sight. The ceremony demonstrated the new centrality of the idea of the nation. A report in *Fūzoku gahō* asserted that “the contributions of the Mōri family to the restoration were unrivaled in terms of patriotic loyalism and the greatness of their achievements.”³⁶¹

The first official history of the city of Yamaguchi published before the war also presents a narrative that stresses the region’s role in the history of the nation and in particular the importance of the feudal domain of Chōshū in the era preceding the Meiji Restoration, despite the fact that Hagi, not Yamaguchi, was the capital of the feudal domain. Following the opening chapter on “Geography,” a section titled “Historical Facts” (or “Historical Truth,” *shijitsu*) summarizes the history of the city in some sixty pages. Only four pages are allocated to the rule of the Mōri family up to the 1850s. By contrast, more than fifty pages read like a history of the Meiji Restoration through the lens of the city—the narrative plays up the role of Yamaguchi in the trajectory that ended in the creation of the nation-state.³⁶²

The building of the six Chōshū daimyo statues signals the unique role of this feudal domain in the Meiji Restoration. And the fact that Mōri Takachika had “climbed the horse” before anyone else was a testimony that the daimyo still occupied an influential position in the new political and social order. The Mōri of Chōshū were, however, somewhat exceptional in this regard since statues of daimyo were still rare for over a decade after the construction of the Yamaguchi monuments. A new chapter was opened in 1909/1910 with the erection of the statues dedicated to Ii Naosuke in Yokohama and Hikone as well as the commissioning of the monumental statue (almost 4 m high) of Tsugaru Tamenobu (1550–1607), the founder of the not especially prominent Hirosaki domain in northern Japan (see fig. 4.4).

Hirosaki domain had been one of the few in northern Japan to side with the restorationist cause during the Boshin War and therefore it was a relatively easy task to align local identity with the new notion of the nation. Like the Mōri statues, the Tsugaru monument was set up in the grounds of the former castle, a section of which had been turned into a park.³⁶³ The rhetoric surrounding its construction echoed that of the Mōri statues: the domain’s commitment to the restorationist cause was praised during the unveiling ceremony in September 1909 and, as in Yamaguchi, the warlord was applauded for his steadfastness to the imperial cause (*ōji*).³⁶⁴ The monument later assumed national significance within the framework of the commemoration of the war dead. Similar to the statue of Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa, it served as a backdrop for festivals to commemorate the war dead, the *shōkōnsai*, organized by the IJA, which was stationed in Hirosaki castle.³⁶⁵

The 1910s and particularly the 1920s saw the rapid expansion of public statuary throughout the country, including statues of daimyo (see Table 6.1). Nonetheless, it took seventeen years after the installation of the Mōri statues in Yamaguchi before Chōshū’s principal rival, Satsuma (Kagoshima), erected three statues honoring its daimyo. This hiatus reflects the fact that around 1900 the influence

Name of Statue/Person Commemorated	Subject's Birth/Death Dates	Year Statue Built	Statue Type	Reconstruction Dates	Coverage in National Press
Ōmura Sumiteru	1825–1880	1903	standing	1992	3
Tsugaru Tamenobu	1550–1607	1909	standing	2004	4
Ii Naosuke	1815–1860	1909	standing	1954	30
Ii Naosuke	1815–1860	1909	standing	1949	12
Nabeshima Naomasa	1815–1871	1913	standing	2017	10
Yamanouchi Kazutoyo	1545–1605	1913	equestrian	1997	6
Satake Yoshitaka	1825–1884	1915	standing	1953	1
Maeda Toshitsune	1593–1658	1916	standing	1966	0
Naitō Masataka	1850–1927	1917	standing	1992	0
Shimazu Hisamitsu	1817–1887	1917	standing	1947	2
Shimazu Nariaki	1809–1858	1917	standing	1947	0
Shimazu Tadayoshi	1840–1931	1917	standing	1947	0
Bandō Tokunosuke	1851–1909	1917	standing	n/a	0
Abe Masahiro	1819–1857	1917	standing	1978	0
Andō Nobumasa	1819–1871	1922	standing	1961	0
Maeda Masatoshi	1649–1706	1924	standing	1954	1
Yamanouchi Toyoshige	1848–1872	1926	standing	2002 (sitting)	0
Matsudaira Naomasa	1601–1666	1927	equestrian	2009	0

Table 6.1 Statues of former daimyo built in Japan, 1903–1927. Source: Author's database, newspaper databases.

wielded by politicians from the former Chōshū domain and their allies went virtually unchallenged. That bronze statues of powerful warlords in other regions, including arguably some of the best-known heroic figures of Japanese history such as Uesugi Kenshin (1530–78) and Takeda Shingen (1521–73), were not built until after the war further underlines the discrepancies between the regions in terms of the political power they enjoyed as well as with regards to their attitudes toward the new ideology of the nation.³⁶⁶

In contrast to the Mōri statues in Yamaguchi, which were extensively covered by the national press because of the involvement of influential government members, few of Japan's other daimyo statues were given nationwide media attention. Public interest in new statues diminished over time as steadily more such monuments were built, and only statues of daimyo from the dominant domains received even

passing coverage in the press. The statues of Nabeshima Naomasa, Yamanouchi Kazutoyo,³⁶⁷ the three Satsuma daimyo, along with those of Tsugaru Tamenobu and Satake Yoshitaka, garnered a degree of national notoriety (see Table 6.1). Tsugaru and Satake, for example, were popular subjects on souvenir postcards (figs. 4.4. and 6.41), and most figured as tourist attractions advertised in guidebooks.³⁶⁸

Later daimyo statues often remained local affairs, although the motivation for building them paralleled the justification behind the Mōri monuments. Documents relating to the statue of Nabeshima Naomasa (Kansō) of Hizen domain (Saga Prefecture) reveal a similar thrust on the portrayal of the local ruler as a weighty link between the history of the region and the nation-state, and between regional and national identity.³⁶⁹ The first plans for this statue emerged in the 1890s, but they only gained traction in 1907 when Saga native Ōkuma



Fig. 6.41 (*Akita meisho*) *Senshu Kōen nai Satake-kō dōzō* ([Famous Views of Akita]) Statue of Lord Satake in Senshu Park). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1920s.

Shigenobu, who had his own statue erected on the campus of Waseda University that same year, was recruited to support the project.³⁷⁰ The 3.7 m statue of Lord Nabeshima was unveiled on November 10, 1913, on a site outside the former castle of Saga.³⁷¹ The 1914 report of the construction committee discloses that the monument was financed primarily by local donations, the chief source being those from the Nabeshima family.³⁷² The design of the statue, as well as the speeches given at the ceremony, show that the public demonstration of the daimyo's loyalty to the emperor was crucial to the project.

The statue depicts Nabeshima clad not in warri-

or armor, but in court dress to highlight his function as an advisor to the emperor. This design parallels the statues of Mōri and Li Naosuke. In his congratulatory address at the unveiling ceremony (fig. 6.42), Ōkuma clarified the reasoning behind the statue in language that recalled the arguments used by Itō Hirobumi and Hayashi Tomoyuki to promote the Mōri statues in the 1890s. Ōkuma, who had already described Nabeshima as a "Great Man" in an article in a special issue on the subject in the journal *Gakusei* in 1912,³⁷³ emphasized that his former lord had been one of the four daimyo who had taken the lead in returning the feudal registers to the emperor in 1869, paving the way for the restoration of imperial power. He also expressed the hope that the statue would not only serve as a means of preserving Lord Nabeshima's memory but would also contribute to the social integration (*shakai tōchi*) of the nation. This was an indication of his awareness of the role of public monuments as instruments of public education.³⁷⁴ The governor of Saga Prefecture, Fuwa Hikomaro (1865–1919), praised Nabeshima as an "inspiring fighter (*kanpun kōki*) who had given himself to the state (*hōkō*) and thus was a Great Man (*ijin*)."³⁷⁵ Even the mayor of the city of Saga offered the former daimyo's contribution to the development of the nation-state (*kokka ni kōken*) as the major reason for building the statue. Congratulatory messages were read out from all over Japan and even from the "outer territories" (*gaichi*) of the empire.³⁷⁶ This was intended to spotlight the significance of the statue beyond the peripheral prefecture where it was located. Nabeshima may have been "a hometown hero," but his contributions to national unity were well known across the empire.

The circumstances surrounding the three statues dedicated to the Satsuma daimyo from the Shimazu family followed the same patterns as the Chōshū and Saga monuments. As the third of the four domains that were key actors in the Restoration, it was not difficult to link the Satsuma lords with the themes of imperial restoration and national unification. But it was not until 1917 that three statues honoring the Shimazu daimyo family were built, thus lagging behind the Mōri of Chōshū, the Nabeshima of Hizen,



Fig. 6.42 *Nabeshima Kansō-kō go-dōzō jomakushiki ni okeru Ōkuma-haku no enzetsu* (Speech of Count Ōkuma [circled] at the Unveiling ceremony of the Bronze Statue of Lord Nabeshima Kansō). Commemorative postcard (unused), 1913.

and the Yamanouchi of Tosa. The initiative had come from Satsuma's elder statesman, Matsukata Masayoshi, who first mooted the project in 1911.³⁷⁷ The statues were built on the estate of the Terukuni Shrine, which had been founded in 1862 for the worship of Shimazu Nariaki. In his speech at the unveiling ceremony in 1917, Matsukata struck a similar chord to his predecessors in Chōshū and Saga, praising the devotion of the Shimazu daimyo to “national affairs” (*kokuji*).³⁷⁸ He emphasized the leading role played by the Satsuma daimyo in bringing about the “restoration of imperial power” (*ōsei fukko*) and the return of feudal registers to the emperor.³⁷⁹

The design of the Kagoshima statues likewise underlined their subjects' allegiance to the nation and the emperor. Hisamitsu and Nariaki were depicted in court dress; only Shimazu Tadayoshi (1840–97) was portrayed in the Western garb of a Meiji-period aristocrat. All three figures were presented as part of the new national narrative of a unifying nation, in which the former feudal domains were being integrated, and as models of devotion to

state and emperor. The prospectuses for subsequent statues of daimyo and the speeches given at their unveiling ceremonies invariably conformed to these patterns.

None of the statues listed in Table 6.1 and described in this section survived World War II. Their marked regional character failed to exempt them from wartime requisitioning, which spared only “statues of central importance for national worship.” They remained, after all, “heroes of the hometown” and were considered dispensable at a time of metal shortages and national crisis. It was precisely this characterization that made the reconstruction of these statues an easier task in the post-war period, as we will discover in chapter 10.





Part III

7 Mobilizing Japan's “Men in Metal” in the Asia-Pacific War

Public statuary witnessed rapid growth in the first decades of the twentieth century, with more than 350 monuments built in the 1920s alone. The boom ended in the 1930s with the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War (1931–45) and especially with the beginning of Total War in China in 1937. In 1938, access to raw materials was severely curtailed, and the government assumed direct control over metal usage. Consequently, by the late 1930s, the construction of bronze statues had almost entirely ceased. In 1943, metal had become so scarce that many existing sculptures were collected, melted down, and recycled into weapons and munitions.



Fig. 7.1 *Yuitsu muji no Tōgō gensui rittai shashinzō bunpu* (Distribution of a Unique and Incomparable Photographic Statue of Admiral Tōgō). Tokyo: Rittai Shashinzō, 1929. Advertisement for a statuette of Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, for private use. 25 × 33 cm.

This chapter analyzes the development of public statuary in wartime Japan to examine which projects were completed at this time and to investigate the factors that ended statue-building and ultimately led to the destruction of public statuary due to wartime requisitioning.

MASS PRODUCTION

In the late 1920s, statue-building was hampered by the economic crises that shook Japan and undermined fundraising campaigns. This deterioration in Japan's economic situation soon rendered the building of such monuments all but impossible. Sculptors were forced to develop new and more cost-effective working methods, bringing innovation to sculpture-making. Most notably, in 1927, the inventor Morioka Isao (1893–1985) found a way of designing a statue based on a stereograph (*rittai shashin*), a photograph taken by two cameras simultaneously.¹ This technology, which he called “stereographic statuary” (*rittai shashinzō*), was patented in Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy. It would receive a prize at the 1937 Exposition Internationale des Arts et Techniques dans la Vie Moderne in Paris. Morioka's in-

vention was recently compared to twenty-first-century 3D printing technology, underlining its role in facilitating more cost-effective production methods and enabling the mass production of statues.²

A prewar advertisement notes that this new technology placed ownership of a highly realistic statue—one produced with remarkable efficiency—within everyone's reach. Morioka stressed that his technology constituted a unique application of photography to sculpture, resulting in the production of highly realistic statues, “an objective piece . . . with no exaggerations or omissions as a result of the subjectivity (*shukan*) of the creator (*sakusha*).”³ Corresponding with the demand for authentic, realistic, and “correct” likenesses of Great Men that had surrounded public statuary since the Meiji period, Morioka claimed that the term “*shashin*” (photography) in “*rittai shashinzō*” referred to the fact that his technology “allows the depiction of what is being photographed in its *true* form (*shin no katachi*).”⁴

Morioka's invention was extensively reported upon in the Japanese media, and his company, Rittai Shashinzō, was inundated with orders.⁵ The company sold, among others, mass-produced statuettes of Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō based on a photograph that Morioka was permitted to take of the admiral in 1929 (fig. 7.1). It was available in different

sizes, ranging from 50 cm for 17 *yen* to 1.60 m for 185 *yen*. The popularity of this kind of statuette for private consumption illustrates how widespread the cult of the individual had become through the representation in statuary.

THE “THREE HUMAN BULLETS”

As Japan entered an era of total war in the 1930s, public statuary assumed an ambiguous character. On the one hand, new heroes were required in order to motivate the population’s commitment to the war effort. On the other, the usage of raw materials was highly regulated following the enactment of the 1938 National Mobilization Law (*Kokka sōdōin-hō*). The military’s need for metals was eventually prioritized over demands for “spiritual mobilization.” The 1930s thus marked the completion of Japan’s last large-scale memorial projects before the building of public statues in bronze all but ceased by 1940.

The most significant public memorial of the early 1930s was a monument dedicated to three soldiers from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) who had been killed in action during the Shanghai Incident in 1932. This project caused a sensation comparable to the building of the statue of Commander Hirose Takeo in 1910 (see chapter 6). The three privates sacrificed their lives by attaching “ignited bombs to their bodies and dashing into the Chinese barb-wire entanglements,” which allowed Japanese troops to advance after the Chinese defenses fell. Their selfless actions, the *Japan Times & Mail* reported, “aroused an unprecedented wave of patriotism among the people in Japan.”⁶ Linking the three men to the memory of Hirose—until then Japan’s most famous “God of War” (*gunshin*)—Japanese newspapers lauded them as the “Shōwa Gods of War” (*Shōwa gunshin*), the “Three Brave Human Bullets” (*nikudan san’yūshi*), and the “Three Brave Human Bombs” (*bakudan san’yūshi*). Their story swamped the media, reported in newspapers and later celebrated in songs, Western-style theater, kabuki plays, cinema, advertisements, and other forms of consumer culture.⁷

Proposals to build memorials for these new “Gods of War” emerged immediately after their deaths. The first monument dedicated to the heroic trio was built in Kurume, where their unit was based, but a more famous monument was later erected in Tokyo. The Tokyo project was spearheaded by Kanasugi Eigorō (1865–1942), a physician and pioneer of otorhinolaryngology in Japan who had also written works on Japanese history and had embarked on a political career in the late 1910s.⁸ Kanasugi drafted a prospectus and then assembled a construction committee (Nikudan San’yūshi Dōzō Kensetsukai) that comprised his fellow members of the House of Peers, including the son of Saigō Tsugumichi, Saigō Jūtoku (1878–1946), Prince Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945), and three former daimyo.⁹

Kanasugi offered three reasons in the prospectus to explain why the three soldiers deserved a memorial: “1) their attack allowed the Imperial Army to advance; 2) their spirit of bravery and loyalty (*chūyū giretsu*) ignited patriotism among the people; and 3) [their actions] have made the whole world fear Japan.” A memorial would contribute to national unity (*kyokoku itchi*); it would also promote “national consciousness” (*kokumin shisō*) and a “fervent spirit” (*hisshi-teki seishin*) among the people.¹⁰ Moving beyond the fostering of a nationalist outlook and sacrificial spirit—a primary objective of public statuary since the Meiji period—this monument was to acquire a markedly militaristic and chauvinistic character. Its construction was seen as part of a campaign of psychological warfare that would make “the entire world tremble.”¹¹

Kanasugi developed this point in a speech delivered at the Hachiōji Elementary School in January 1933 by quoting the British diplomat Victor Bulwer-Lytton (1876–1947). Bulwer-Lytton had earned Japan’s enmity as the chairman of a committee dispatched to Manchuria by the League of Nations to determine the causes of the Manchurian Incident (it eventually condemned Japan as the aggressor). Kanasugi noted that “In the Shanghai Incident, three Japanese soldiers blew up barb-wire entanglements, along with themselves. . . . The mental state of Japan today is similar to that of these three brave soldiers.



Fig. 7.2 (*Dai-Tōkyō*) *Kuni no hana chūretsu nikudan sanyūshi no dōzō* ([Greater Tokyo] Bronze statue of the Three Human Bullets), known officially as the “Flowers of the Nation—the Three Brave and Loyal Human Bullets” (*Kuni no hana chūretsu nikudan san’yūshi*) (1934). Souvenir postcard (unused), late 1930s.

... Like a bomb made of powerful explosives, a sudden impulse might cause its explosion before the eyes of the world.” Kanasugi then went on to comment on Lytton’s remarks: “It is obvious that [Lytton] was impressed (*kandō*) by the fearsome national spirit (*osorerubeki kokuminsei*) of the Japanese.”¹²

Kanasugi’s belligerence is astonishing, given that in the first half of the 1930s, Japan’s military situation was far from desperate. The country was not at war with Western powers and did not necessarily appear to be on that course. Yet the planning of a memorial to the “Three Human Bombs” hints at the emergence of fanatical militarism, an attitude that at times was as deeply rooted in civilian circles as in the armed services themselves. Despite his background in the medical sciences, Kanasugi’s rhetoric surpasses anything that related to concurrent military monuments.¹³ For example, the tone of the 1937 prospectus for a statue of the former prime minister Admiral Katō Tomosaburō (1861–1923) is moderate by comparison. It speaks of the desire to “preserve the memory of this exceptional *ijin*” and the hope that it will promote the “national spirit.” The authors use the term *kokumin seishin*, but they avoid the rhetoric of imperial subjecthood (*shinmin*), loyalty (*chūgi*), and sacrifice.¹⁴

Donations for the monument to the three soldiers were collected countrywide, and the project

enjoyed strong popular support. Most donations came from families with fathers or sons in the military, but schools also raised considerable funds. A report on the fundraising campaign compiled by the physician Furukawa Seisuke stresses that elementary students were so impressed by the story of the three heroes that they went to great lengths to collect at least a few *sen* for the memorial. One elementary student from Ōita Prefecture was quoted as saying:

When I heard in school that a bronze statue of the three living bombs was going to be built, I wanted to donate the money that I had earned from working, even if it was just one *sen*, and I went to gather dry turf with some friends. . . . It was a wet and cold day, but we remembered the three living bombs and collected [dry turf] with total devotion. We could only collect 32 *sen*, but please accept it and use it for the statue.¹⁵

The unveiling ceremony was held on February 22, 1934, with 2,000 guests in attendance. The monument, officially named *Kuni no Hana—Chūretsu Nikudan San’yūshi* (Flowers of the Nation—the Three Brave and Loyal Human Bullets), was installed in the Seishō Temple in Atago (in Tokyo’s present-day Minato Ward) and portrayed the three “Gods of War” in action, carrying a bomb as they approached their target (fig. 7.2). Some of the remains of the



Fig. 7.3 *Ninomiya-san mo daiyōhin* (Ninomiya-san Has Also Been Replaced). *Shashin shūhō*, no. 115 (May 8, 1940).

three heroes were reportedly interred beneath the pedestal, distinguishing this memorial from most others as a site for both worship and as a burial site.¹⁶ Their relics gave the memorial a special claim to authenticity, reminiscent of the medieval practice in Japan of sealing strands of hair or depositing ashes of the deceased in wooden statues of venerated religious figures (see chapter 1).

In the main speech at the unveiling ceremony, Kanasugi reiterated the importance of the monument for the development of patriotism and national consciousness among the people. At the risk of contradicting himself, he also underlined the fact that the Japanese people were immensely loyal to the Imperial House, an attitude evident in their long-standing relationship with their sovereign that had endured uninterrupted for “almost 3,000 years” [*sic*].

Kanasugi also repeated his belief that the monument and its dramatic message would “make the world fear” Japan.¹⁷ After Prime Minister (Admi-

ral) Saitō Makoto (1858–1936), Army Minister Hayashi Senjūrō (1876–1943), Navy Minister Ōsumi Mineo (1876–1941), and the Governor of Tokyo Prefecture Kōsaku Masayasu (1881–1967) read out congratulatory messages, the “Song of the Three Brave Human Bombs” was sung by three hundred elementary school children.¹⁸ A plaque was placed next to the sculpture with an inscription by Kanasugi, setting in stone the major themes of the project as he envisioned it: “loyalty (*chūkō*) forms the traditional spirit of the subjects of the Japanese empire” (*Nihon teikoku shinmin no dentō-teki seishin*) and “the ultimate and unswerving loyalty (*chūretsu*) of the three [human bombs] and their heroism has made the world tremble.”¹⁹ It is important to note that “the world” in this context referred to the Anglo-Saxon powers, which Japan was increasingly antagonizing in the 1930s. In contrast, after Japan had signed the first of a series of treaties with Germany in 1936 (the Anti-Comintern Pact), the monument received a positive reception in that country and served to underline alleged similarities in Japanese and German attitudes toward war. In 1936, the journal *Koralle: Wochenschrift für Unterhaltung, Wissen, Lebensfreude* (Cor-

al: Weekly Magazine for Entertainment, Knowledge and Joy of Life) carried a photo of school children paying their respects before the memorial to the Three Human Bombs, praising the Japanese spirit of "the ultimate sacrifice" (*Das höchste Opfer*).²⁰

The building of the monument to the Flowers of the Nation—the Three Brave and Loyal Human Bullets was not an isolated event; it stimulated similar plans in other parts of Japan. In Toyama and Ishikawa prefectures, for instance, statues of Himeno Eijirō, a sergeant major (*sōchō*) in the 9th Division of the IJA who had fought in the Russo-Japanese War, were erected following the Shanghai Incident. These were inspired by the Kanasugi project. A teaching manual published by a local elementary school in Himeno's hometown of Shinminato (today part of Imizu city) in 1933 sets forth the grounds for honoring him and was clearly inspired by the Shanghai Incident. Himeno had undertaken dangerous reconnaissance missions close to Russian artillery batteries, which had caused the loss of many men in his unit; he eventually succeeded in blowing up the main Russian battery with the knowledge that he would not survive the attack. The manual reminds the reader of the Shanghai Incident and explains that this event inspired the IJA's commission of a Himeno statue, irrespective of the fact that almost three decades had passed since his death.²¹ The first statue was erected in front of the barracks of the IJA units stationed in Kanazawa and a second in Shinminato. The two monuments were, however, rather local affairs, as the inclusion of Himeno in the "exemplary hometown tales" indicates, and would not receive the same national attention as the monument to the Three Human Bombs.

NATIONAL MOBILIZATION AND STATE CONTROL OF METALS

"Flowers of the Nation—the Three Brave and Loyal Human Bullets" was one of the last public statuary projects to leave a mark on the national psyche. The final blow to public statue-building was delivered by the National Mobilization Law passed in the Im-

perial Diet in 1938 in response to the escalation of the war in China. This law strengthened government control of all economic resources, including metals essential for the production of military hardware. Copper and bronze were particularly vital to the military, with the latter requisitioned for munitions production and therefore a material that should not be "wasted" on public art.²² The government enforced strict controls on bronze, other metals, and alloys based on the Regulations on the Limitation of the Use of Bronze (*Dō shiyō seigen kisoku*).²³ Finally, a 1940 regulation outlawed the allocation of bronze to individuals, such as sculptors and metal-casters, and explicitly prohibited the use of bronze for the production of artworks. Sculptors were instructed to work with alternative materials, such as cement, stone, pottery, or ceramics.²⁴

Statues made from these substitutes included cement sculptures of the monk Kūkai at the Kongō Temple in Aichi (1938) and the philosopher Ishida Baigan (1685–1744) in the city of Sakai south of Osaka (1939). Shrines in Osaka erected cement sculptures of Kusunoki Masashige in 1939. The following year, a ceramic statue of the twelfth-century warrior Togashi Saemon was installed in Komatsu, Ishikawa Prefecture. Some of the Ninomiya Sontoku statues removed from Japanese schools were replaced with pottery or cement sculptures.²⁵ These changes were not bad news for everyone: manufacturers capitalized on business opportunities arising from the metal shortage. In Okayama, for example, local pottery manufacturers increased the production of Ninomiya Sontoku statues for elementary schools. An article in the pictorial *Shashin shūhō* (Weekly Photography Bulletin) in 1940 showed Bizen pottery manufactories mass-producing Ninomiya sculptures as their contribution to the war effort—that is, creating symbols of patriotism while at the same time conserving vital metals (see fig. 7.3).²⁶ In 1943, the Osaka businessman Kiyoda Kiyonari addressed concerned statue-owners in newspaper advertisements, assuring them that if their "bronze statue is summoned for military service, we'll make a copy in cement. . . . For years we have been researching production techniques for cement



Fig. 7.4
Dōzō o ōshō shi, sementozō ni kaemashō (Let's Give Your Bronze Statue to the Military and Replace It with a Cement Statue). Advertisement promoting cement copies of bronze statues, 1943.



Fig. 7.5 Nakagawa Tamenobu (1904–67). *Dai-Nikai Daitōa Sensō Bijutsu Tenrankai shuppin* (Exhibit of the Second Greater East Asian War Exhibition), 1943. Postcard (unused), c. 1943.



Fig. 7.6 The *Gunjin zō* (Soldiers' Statues) in Minami Chita City.

sculpture" (fig. 7.4).²⁷ Stone sculptures would become increasingly popular until the end of the war and were also used in exhibitions organized for propagandistic purposes, such as the 1943 Second Greater East Asian War Art Exhibition (*Dai-Nikai Daitōa Sensō Bijutsu Tenrankai*), which featured a stone sculpture of three armed IJA soldiers. The artwork received the Grand Prize of the Minister of the Army (fig. 7.5).

While the escalation of the war in Asia dictated an ever stricter control of raw materials, the growing number of mourning families who had lost fathers, husbands, or sons in the fighting on the continent triggered an increasing demand for visual representations of consolation and commemoration. Every soldier who died in battle was venerated as a god at Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine and in most cases at the prefectural *Shōkonsha* that since 1939

were known as *Gokoku shrines*. However, veneration at these shrines meant that their names were only on a list of "heroic souls" (*eirei*), and as few rural families could afford to travel to Tokyo during the war they desired more tangible means of commemoration for their loved ones. As a result, differing approaches to memorializing the war dead across the country took shape.²⁸

One way that bereaved families could channel their grief following the escalation of the war in 1937 was through stone sculpture. In the city of Nagoya, for instance, 227 stone sculptures were commissioned in 1938 of fallen soldiers from the 6th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd IJA Division who had been stationed in the city. The regiment participated in the invasion of China and was virtually wiped out after landing near Shanghai in late August 1937. The families of these fallen soldiers commissioned statues to be located at a Buddhist temple in Tsukigaoka (today in the city's Chikusa Ward), where the family graves of many of these men were located. The stone statues were carved based on photographs of the soldiers and portrayed them with individualized facial features and in the uniforms worn when they left their hometown of Nagoya (fig. 7.6).²⁹ Similar statues from the same period, though fewer in number, can also be found in graveyards elsewhere in Japan, indicating that this form of more intimate, individual mourning through sculpture enjoyed a modicum of popularity in the late 1930s.

THE LAST "MEN IN METAL"

The restrictions on metal usage resulted in the completion of comparatively few bronze statues between the late 1930s and the end of the war. My database shows that between 1940 and 1942 about a dozen sculptures were completed before statue-building entirely ceased: in 1940 bronze statues were completed of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in Kyoto and Wake no Kiyomaro in Tokyo; in 1941 of Tōgō Heihachirō in Tokyo, Sawano Toshimasa (1850–1928) in Hyōgo Prefecture, Yoda Benzō (1853–1925)

in Obihiro, Mizuno Fusajirō in Nagoya, *kokugaku* scholar Fujita Tōko (1806–55) in an elementary school in Ōarai, former prime minister Takahashi Korekiyo (1854–1936) in Tokyo, and Itō Hirobumi in Kanagawa; and in 1942 of former daimyo of Echizen, Matsudaira Yoshinaga (Kei’ei, 1828–90) in Fukui, explorer Matsuura Takeshirō (1818–88) in Kushiro, and politician Kinoshita Shigetarō (1865–1942) in Sapporo.³⁰ Metal shortages were so grave that even statues of extremely high-profile figures were refused official consent. One such example was of the imperial prince and former chief of the IJA general staff Kan’in Kotohito (1865–1945), which the IHM had commissioned to Kitamura Seibō (1884–1987) in late 1940.³¹

Seen against this backdrop, the completion of a statue of Takahashi Korekiyo (fig. 7.7) in 1940 and its unveiling on May 26, 1941 in a park that carried his name (Takahashi Korekiyo-ō Kinen Kōen), is all the more surprising.³² Takahashi had strongly advocated a tight fiscal policy throughout the 1920s and had succeeded in cutting the military budget, making him a prime target for military fanatics and right-wing activists. Historians have generally characterized Japan during the 1930s in terms of a growing wave of militarism. This wave culminated in the February 26 Incident (*Niniroku Jiken*) in 1936, when elements of the military attempted a coup d’état; Takahashi was among the casualties. Although the coup failed, it strengthened the position of the military in politics.

The Takahashi project was initiated by influential individuals from the Japanese financial world and civilian politicians led by Yamamoto Tatsuo (1856–1947) who, like Takahashi, had held the positions of the governor of the Bank of Japan and finance minister. The statue’s completion was a demonstration by Japan’s civilian politicians of their unwillingness to bend to pressure and intimidation from the IJA. This message was underlined by media coverage, as seen in an article in the *Asahi shinbun* about the design of the statue and progress by the sculptor that was issued, quite provocatively, on the third anniversary of the abortive military coup of February 1936.³³



Fig. 7.7 Statue of Takahashi Korekiyo in Takahashi Korekiyo Memorial Park, Tokyo. 1955 replica of original 1941 statue.

The Takahashi memorial is one of the few prewar or wartime statues of a seated “Great Man,” an indication of Takahashi’s status as a representative of the democratic currents that typified Japanese politics in the 1910s and 1920s. In other words, the position and scale of the statue were such that it allowed park visitors to view it on eye level, without having to literally look up to the “man in metal.” Newspaper coverage additionally noted that it portrayed the former minister with a broad smile, again a rare feature of prewar statues.

The few other prewar examples of seated politicians and educators include the statues of Hirata Tōsuke (1849–1925), erected in Tokyo in 1921 (fig. 5.6); Admiral Saitō Makoto (1858–1936), another victim of the 1936 coup, in Morioka in 1938; Okakura Tenshin in Ueno Park in 1931; politician and Waseda University professor Takada Sanae (1860–

1938) in 1932; Hamao Arata (1849–1925), president of Tokyo Imperial University (1905–12) and minister of education (1897–98) in 1932; and University of Tokyo professor Furuichi Kōi (1854–1934) in 1937. The statues of educators Okakura, Takada, Hamao, and Furuichi were installed on the campuses of the schools or universities where they taught; their informal poses reflect a desire to generate the close bonds between teacher and student.³⁴ These statues show their distinguished subjects seated in armchairs and in an elevated position, thus making the design of the Takahashi statue unique. A few statues depicting educators and social activists in a seated pose (*seiza*) were made by sculptor Ōkuma Ujihiro in the late nineteenth century. As discussed in chapter 5, most of these were statues of women. With the exception of the Hirata statue, all of these works were victims of wartime requisitioning and all were rebuilt in the postwar period.³⁵

Another project meriting discussion was the set of three monuments of Wake no Kiyomaro (733–99), which together represented the last statue-building initiative to receive national attention before the outbreak of war with the United States and Great Britain in December 1941. A court official and trusted advisor of Emperor Kammu (737–806), Wake no Kiyomaro allegedly protected the throne against the schemes of Dōkyō (700–72), a Buddhist monk who sought to unseat the emperor.³⁶ He was the subject of some of Japan's earliest statue-building proposals in the 1870s.³⁷ Worship of Wake no Kiyomaro also had government patronage through official support for the Go'ō Shrine in Kyoto.³⁸

Kiyomaro was considered an important contributor to the continuity of the dynasty, and plans for statues commemorating this court noble were an obvious choice for the imminent 2600th anniversary of the foundation of the Japanese empire in 1940.³⁹ Defending the imperial line against the schemes of the "traitor" Dōkyō, Kiyomaro's actions were interpreted as helping to secure the "preservation of the *kokutai*" (*kokutai yōgo*) and offered a glowing example of loyalty to the emperor.⁴⁰

The Meiji Restoration edicts defined the restoration of direct imperial rule as a return to the days

of Emperor Jinmu, the founder of the empire. Throughout the Meiji period, the Kusunoki cult had developed as a second point of reference that fostered the belief in the authority of the emperor. The prospectus for the Wake no Kiyomaro statue positioned the court noble and his struggle against the usurper Dōkyō on the same level as Kusunoki's fight for the restoration of imperial power in the Kenmu Restoration, thereby extending the line of "imperial loyalists" back to the eighth century AD.⁴¹ The connection between Kusunoki and Wake was also expressed in the locations of their statues: Kiyomaro's was installed on the northeast side of the Imperial Palace in the Takebashi district and Kusunoki "guarded" the southeast approaches outside the Nijūbashi entrance to the palace.

The organization promoting statues in honor of Wake no Kiyomaro was the Great Japan Association to Protect the Imperial Line (Dai-Nihon Go'ō-kai) associated with the Go'ō Shrine in Kyoto. The association's leading members included conservative politician Kiyoura Keigo (1850–1942) and General Hayashi Senjūrō (1876–1943); General Suzuki Sōroku (1865–1940) was the chair of the construction committee. Other members included the historian Mikami Sanji (1865–1939) and the industrialist Ishikawa Hiromoto (1891–1965). The statue report records that Ishikawa, the owner of the gold-mining company Teikoku Sankin Kōgyō K. K., had decided to devote himself to promote "the spirit of Wake no Kiyomaro" and had paid for the Tokyo statue out of his own pocket.⁴² The sculptor Satō Seizō (Gengen, 1888–1963) was awarded the commission after a contest beset by irregularities, and Kitamura Seibō was asked to design a second sculpture for the Go'ō Shrine. A third statue was to be installed at the Usa Shrine in Ōita, another established site of Kiyomaro worship.

The report on the Tokyo statue emphasizes the difficulties of procuring metals under wartime conditions. Unable to source copper for the proposed statues in Japan, Ishikawa traveled to the United States and Canada in search of materials. He successfully acquired the materials and returned to Ja-



Fig. 7.8 *Jomaku* (Unveiling). Unveiling ceremony of the statue of Wake no Kiyomaro, December 18, 1940. Commemorative postcard, 1940.

pan with the necessary supplies of copper. It is, therefore, an ironic twist that some of the last bronze statues built in Japan before the war with the United States were manufactured with raw materials collected from that country.⁴³

On December 18, 1940, over 3,000 guests, including Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, the imperial household minister, several state ministers, generals, admirals, and members of the Diet, attended the unveiling ceremony of the Kiyomaro statue in Tokyo (fig. 7.8).⁴⁴ The speeches praised Kiyomaro's loyalty to the imperial house, a loyalty that had helped secure the unbroken imperial lineage—the *kokutai*.⁴⁵ Despite the fact that a single in-

dividual financed the statue, the involvement of high-ranking politicians in the project confirms that the dissemination of the spirit of loyalty to nation and emperor remained a central motivation of statue-building initiatives. This was not so different from the first statues built in Tokyo in the late 1890s. This objective was considered so significant that the entrepreneur Ishikawa went to great lengths by visiting distant places in order to collect the materials for the proposed monument. The fact that the statue of Wake no Kiyomaro featured on the cover of the 100th issue of the government-issued propaganda pictorial *Shashin shūhō* only a month after its completion drives home this point.⁴⁶

By the end of the war, Wake no Kiyomaro had become an important symbol of loyalty to the Imperial House, in both print and in bronze. Only three books had been published on him before 1940, but six “monumental biographies” appeared between 1940 and the end of the war. This included a picture-book for children that reproduced an image of the statue on the first page, testimony to the powerful role of public statuary in popularizing a historical figure.⁴⁷ The Kiyomaro statue thus survived wartime requisition campaigns, which began three years after its installation. It still stands today outside the Imperial Palace.

STATUES IN EDUCATION AND FESTIVALS

Commissions for new bronze statues decreased dramatically in the late 1930s and ceased altogether in the 1940s. Existing statues, however, were crucial in Japan's wartime “spiritual mobilization” (*seishin dōin*) efforts. They did not merely dot the landscape unnoticed, as Robert Musil has claimed, but were utilized by the government as educational tools. During the war, these public monuments were closely associated with the development of nationalist education in schools; they also formed part of social education efforts through festivals.

Schools introduced their students to famous statues in their cities for “patriotic service,” such as



Fig. 7.9 Cover, *Shashin shūhō*, no. 270 (May 5, 1943). Illustration of a rally to mobilize the population for the war effort next to a statue of Hirose Takeo.

cleaning duties.⁴⁸ These statues also provided the venue for celebrations by the armed forces to mark the anniversaries of notable victories such as Army Day for the Battle of Mukden (1905) and Navy Day for the Battle of Tsushima (1905), and the press frequently reported on them (see fig. 7.9). These activities had their roots in the 1920s at a time when conservatives believed that the social order was threatened by the emergence of “dangerous ideologies.” Some of the last statues constructed before the war years were built with the explicit intention of curbing these destructive ideologies, thus reconfirming the place of statues in social education. The 1930 prospectus for the Ka-Etsu-No Shidankai (Association to Discuss the History of Kaga-Etchū-Noto), described in chapter 3, laid the blame squarely on postwar materialism:

Following the Great European War, an economic boom brought drastic changes [to society], including the never-ending growth of mammonism . . . and the spread of dangerous ideas. . . . Against this backdrop, the idea was conceived to honor the loyal retainers of Kaga domain by building a memorial that would be a beacon of national consciousness and a humble contribution to the improvement of the situation in these bad times.⁴⁹

Images of patriotic sculpture were also reproduced in educational materials. In 1941, the textbook publisher Jidaisha, for example, produced a brochure for history classes entitled *Dōzō monogatari* (Tales of Bronze Statues).⁵⁰ This full-color booklet presented brief biographies of the Great Men depicted in statues, describing their monuments as important sites of worship of the heroes who were devoted to or even sacrificed themselves for emperor and nation (figs. 7.10–7.11). The publication introduced its young readers to statues representing (in order of appearance): Emperor Kameyama, Wake no Kiyomaro, Kusunoki Masashige, Takayama Hikokurō (an eighteenth-century imperial loyalist), Ōmura Masujirō, Saigō Takamori, Hirose Takeo, and the memorial to the “Three Brave Human Bullets.” The latter also featured on the cover.

The events held between 1933 and 1936 to mark the 600th anniversary of the Kenmu Restoration provided an opportunity to stage a spectacular series of festivals in which statues again assumed a key role. These celebrations culminated in the 1936 “Dai-Nankō 600-Year Festival” (*Dai Nankō rōpyakunen-sai*), staged to mark the (alleged) anniversary of Kusunoki Masashige’s death, but also heralding the 2600th anniversary of the foundation of the Japanese empire in 1940. Although the Nankō festival was unprecedented in size and intensity, it has long been neglected in previous scholarship.⁵¹ This is all the more surprising because festivals commemorating Kusunoki are, like those to Jinmu (see chapter 3), continued to the present day.

With the installation in 1900 of the Kusunoki statue before the Imperial Palace (see chapter 6), the legendary warrior developed into an icon of



Fig. 7.10 Sasaki Chiyuki (1902–89). Cover, *Dōzō monogatari* (Tales of Bronze Statues) (Tokyo: Jidaisha, 1941).



Fig. 7.11 Sasaki Chiyuki (1902–89). Inside cover, *Dōzō monogatari* (Tales of Bronze Statues) (Tokyo: Jidaisha, 1941).

popular history and became a prime subject in the cult of the individual. As we have seen, the figure of Kusunoki was ubiquitous in the print media but was also portrayed in the then emerging Japanese film industry. A string of films about him appeared, beginning in 1911 with *Kusunoki Masashige*, starring the popular actor Kawakami Otojirō (1864–1911), a second in 1921 and two others in 1926. The 1926 film *Great Nankō (Dai-Nankō)* produced by the Shōchiku Cinema Co. was so successful that the president of the production company publicly announced that it was a prototype for Japanese “patriotic movies.”⁵²

Preparations for large-scale celebrations to mark the 600th anniversary of the Kenmu Restoration began in the early 1930s. In 1930, the IHM announced that it would support the Greater Japanese Nankō Society (Dai-Nihon Nankōkai) founded in 1927 to organize the upcoming festivities.⁵³ The center of the festivities was not Tokyo, but in Kobe


at the supposed site of Kusunoki’s last battle that was now the location of the Minatogawa Shrine. The shrine, the city of Kobe, and the Kōbe shinbunsha were the major sponsors of the event.⁵⁴ Department stores hosted Dai-Nankō exhibitions, and travel agencies offered tours of the “historical vestiges of Dai-Nankō,” providing customers with hiking trail maps to guide them from site to site and selling train tickets to these destinations (figs. 7.12–7.13).⁵⁵ The Tokyo statue of Nankō regularly featured in brochures and advertisements, a testimony to its popularity countrywide.

The national “Dai-Nankō 600-Year Festival” was held at the Minatogawa Shrine from May 25 to 28, 1935, and at the temple Kanshinji, the ancestral shrine of the Kusunoki family in Kawachi in Osaka Prefecture, from May 22 to 28.⁵⁶ A statue very similar to the Tokyo Nankō monument had been erected there in 1934, only the second Kusunoki statue in Japan.⁵⁷ Youth events accompanied the festivities,



Fig. 7.12 *Dai-Nankō roppyakunen-sai. Isan meguri haikingu* (Dai-Nankō 600-Year Anniversary Festival. Hiking Tours to Heritage Sites). Advertising pamphlet, Nankai Densha (Nankai Railways), 1936.

Fig. 7.13 *Dai-Nankō roppyakunen-sai isan meguri to haikingu kōsu* (Dai-Nankō 600-Year Anniversary Festival Heritage Site Tours and Hiking Courses). Nankai Densha (Nankai Railways), 1936.



servicing the related objectives of ideological indoctrination and physical training as a preparation for military service.⁵⁸

The event also caused a flood of publications, ranging from attractive pictorials covering the Shinto ceremony *Shinkō-sai*, a parade by the Association to Support the 600th Anniversary of Nankō to photographs of the Youth Gymnastics Meeting.⁵⁹ The journal *Rekishi shashin* (History Photographs) released photographs of the “procession of the warriors of the Kenmu Restoration,” the festival at the Minatogawa Shrine, and historical sites associated with Kusunoki.⁶⁰ The pictorial magazine *Asahi gurafu/Asahigraph* published a special edition—*Issue Commemorating the 600-Year Festival of Great Nankō (Dai Nankō roppyakunen-sai kinengō)*—that had the Tokyo statue as a cover illustration (see fig. 6.18). Well-known writers such as Osaragi Jirō (1897–1973) and Yoshikawa Eiji (1892–1962) published serialized novels about Dai-Nankō in daily newspapers.⁶¹

Historian Mori Masato has demonstrated that the festivities honoring the memory of Kusunoki should not be viewed in terms of an unbroken tradition celebrating a well-documented medieval warrior. Most of the sites associated with his veneration were designated and constructed in the Meiji period, including the Minatogawa Shrine that was founded in 1872. Following the 1930s celebrations, further sites, material “traces,” and Kusunoki-related “views” (*keikan*) were “discovered” and added to the memorial landscape. None of these sites were “unearthed” as the result of archaeological excavations. They were all newly *constructed* sites, designated and, if necessary, manufactured in accordance with the needs of a modern consumer culture and a society mobilizing itself for total war.⁶²

There was a strong link between the worship of Kusunoki and the sense of a deepening foreign relations crisis in Japan—a parallel to the statues of Nichiren and Kameyama in Fukuoka. Following the Manchurian Incident, military conflict with China continued to escalate, and due to border skirmishes with the Soviet Union, some in Japan expected a national crisis in 1936 (*36 nen kiki*). Commentators ar-



Fig. 7.14 *Minatogawa kōen no Nankō dōzō. Statue of Nankō in Minatogawa Park (1936). Commemorative postcard (unused), late 1930s.*

gued that this situation, which amounted to a state of “national emergency” (*hijōji*), could only be averted through the recourse to “the spirit of Kusunoki.”⁶³ The religious dimension of the Japanese cult of personality was, therefore, more forceful than ever before. Kusunoki’s biographers referred to a “Kusunoki belief” (*Kusunoki shinkō*) that had supposedly developed in the premodern era and that demanded revival in order to “pray for victory in the holy war” (*seisen hisshō no kigan*).

This desire to contribute to the strengthening of “national spirit” and “military spirit” through the worship of Kusunoki prompted the construction of new statues of him, including the aforementioned sculpture at the Kanshin Temple. A third example was installed in 1936 in Kobe’s Minatogawa Park, which was opened to the public in 1911. In 1934, the

Kōbe shinbun put out calls for the installation of a Kusunoki memorial there.⁶⁴ The prospectus for this statue stressed that the warrior had “devoted himself to the sacred enterprise (*seigyō*) of the Kenmu Restoration, protecting our ideal of *kokutai*, eternally throwing light on the Imperial Way, becoming a model of the Japanese spirit.”⁶⁵ It contrasted the glorious days of Kusunoki with Japan’s present situation that was characterized as a spiritual crisis that required a strengthening of “the spirit of the community, the spirit of [General] Nogi and [Admiral] Tōgō,” all of which were “an expression of the spirit of our nation” as exemplified by Kusunoki.⁶⁶ Invoking the notion of a “crisis in 1936” and an imminent military confrontation with the Soviet Union, the prospectus implies that the crisis could be resolved by looking at the country’s past.

The *Kōbe shinbun* secured the support of the mayor of Kobe, the commanders of the 4th and 10th Divisions of the IJA stationed in the region, as well as Hyōgo governor Shirane Takesuke (1883–1957). Shirane expressed his belief that the “spiritual movement” now evident in the nation—the statue project being one expression—would “give new incentive to the spread of the inherently Japanese ideology of loyalty to the Emperor and patriotism.”⁶⁷ Commander of the 10th Division, General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu (1880–1945), asserted that Kusunoki’s spirit was identical with a military spirit (*gunjin seishin*) and needed to be instilled in society in order to strengthen the nation’s military preparedness.⁶⁸

The newspaper then held a design competition and stipulated that the new statue had to be distinguishable from the prominent Tokyo monument. The competition guidelines state that the Tokyo statue should capture Kusunoki at the moment when he meets the emperor (Go-Daigo), but “we propose [a statue] showing him in the pose that the Lord adopted when going into battle at Minatogawa.” Once again, little visual allegorizing is in evidence. The emphasis is instead on the *authenticity* of Kusunoki’s appearance at a precisely defined point in time that is linked with the chosen location of Minatogawa, the site of Kusunoki’s last stand.

The criteria for the competition stipulated that the statue “must realistically express the sacrificial spirit of Nankō,” his “emotional climax achieved just before dying in battle,” and the “power behind his decision to go into battle, with only 700 warriors, against the Traitor [Ashikaga] Takauji with more than 30,000 men.”⁶⁹

Whether the wishes of those who commissioned the monument were realized in the design of the statue is today difficult to judge (fig. 7.14). The main difference with the Tokyo sculpture was the rearing horse, depicted as if it is about to break into a gallop or confront opponents. Despite its dramatic design, the Minatogawa Park monument was always overshadowed by the 1900 Kusunoki statue in Tokyo. Its impact on the tourism industry was minimal, and even local companies continued to use the Tokyo statue in advertisements.

THE GREATEST HERO OF ALL: A MAN IN CEMENT

Following the outbreak of war with China in 1937 and the passing of the National Mobilization Law in 1938, materials for new statues were almost exclusively limited to cement, pottery, or ceramic sculpture. But this did not necessarily diminish the cult of the individual, as the commissioning of the statue of the extremely popular wartime figure Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku (1884–1943) in Ibaraki Prefecture from late 1943 illustrates. The mastermind behind Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto was seen as the greatest hero of the war. When his plane was shot down in the Pacific in April 1943, the IJN saw an opportunity to improve its public image despite the deteriorating war situation. It commissioned a 4 m high statue of Yamamoto that was unveiled on December 8, 1943, outside the headquarters of the IJN Air Service (Yamamoto was considered one of its founders) in Kasumigaura.⁷⁰ The date chosen coincided with the second anniversary of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the event was reported in the nationwide media.

Fig. 7.15 Concrete statue of Yamamoto Isoroku at the Tsuchiura base of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces. Rittai Shashinzō. 2004 replica of original 1943 statue.



The IJN engaged no fewer than fifty-six sculptors for the project, who were all members of the Great Japan Aviation Art Association (Dai-Nihon Kōkū Bijutsu Kyōkai), a group established in 1941 to organize art exhibitions with the aim of “raising the spirits” of the population.⁷¹ Newspaper coverage of the unveiling ceremony conspicuously avoided any mention of the materials and only spoke of the “Yamamoto Isoroku sculpture.” The black-and-white photographs published in the newspapers were similarly ambiguous, but the statue was indeed made of cement, not bronze, reflecting wartime conditions.⁷²

In late 1945, anticipating that the Occupation forces would take a dim view of the worship of the admiral who had planned the Pearl Harbor attack, the Yamamoto statue was disassembled, broken in two and dumped in a nearby lake.⁷³ The upper half of the statue was rediscovered in 1948, retrieved and stored in a temple. In 1955, it was moved to Yamamoto’s hometown of Nagaoka in Niigata Prefecture. Three years later, it was installed in a park, the Yamamoto Isoroku Memorial Park (Yamamoto Isoroku Kinen Kōen), in commemoration of the admiral’s birthplace. In 1968, a new bronze bust replaced the wartime sculpture, and the remains of

the cement statue were moved again, this time to the base museum (Kyōiku Sankōkan, or "Educational Reference Hall") of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces in Etajima, Hiroshima Prefecture, where it still can be found today.⁷⁴ The lower half of the 1943 statue was discovered in 2002 following an intensive search of the lake that was part of the production of a TV documentary.⁷⁵ In 2004, a slightly smaller replica of the original statue produced by Rittai Shashinzō was erected in front of the Yūshōkan, the museum of the base of Ground Self-Defense Forces in Tsuchiura near the site where the prewar monument once stood (fig. 7.15).⁷⁶

MELTDOWN

The number of statues destroyed in the last stage of the Asia-Pacific War was unprecedented, but it is essential to remember that public monuments in Japan were never invulnerable. Statues had been damaged or destroyed even before the shortages resulting from total war turned them into a vast reservoir of scrap metal. In 1905, for example, the demonstrations against the Treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia following the Russo-Japanese War caused an angry crowd of protesters pulling down the statue of elder statesman Itō Hirobumi in Kobe.⁷⁷ The incident even received coverage on the front page of the *New York Times*.⁷⁸ The statue had been erected just one year earlier to commemorate Itō's appointment by the emperor as the (first) governor of Hyōgo Prefecture. The location of the statue at the Minatogawa Shrine—a central site of Kusunoki Masashige worship—placed Itō on the same level as this supreme symbol of devotion to the emperor. The protesters not only identified Itō as a member of the oligarchy that they held responsible for the signing of the unpopular Portsmouth Treaty, but they were also dissatisfied with an effigy of this Meiji statesman, who widely known as a *bon vivant*, standing on the grounds of a shrine dedicated to the Great Nankō (*Dai Nankō*). Consequently, they toppled the statue, removed it from the shrine, and dragged it throughout the streets of

Kobe.⁷⁹ The monument was restored in 1910, but it was installed in Kobe's Ōkurayama Park and not its original location.⁸⁰

The wartime shortage of metals, however, sparked an unprecedented destruction of public statuary on a national scale. Copper, the main ingredient in bronze, was vital in Japan's wartime requisitioning campaigns: it "is used in everything from munition castings to precision navigational equipment and is therefore a resource of great importance to the military."⁸¹ While the armed forces stressed the significance of "spiritual mobilization" and believed that statues were essential in this context, eventually they could not ignore the pressing need for strategic resources.

Japan had been a major global manufacturer of copper since the seventeenth century, and copper had been one of the country's major export products until the post-World War I recession when exports drastically declined.⁸² In the interwar period, Japan was the fourth-largest producer of copper after the United States, Germany, and Britain.⁸³ With the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War in the 1930s, demand for copper skyrocketed, and domestic production proved inadequate. Exports declined to negligible levels, and Japan began to import copper, most notably from the United States.⁸⁴ Following the imposition of the American oil and metal embargo in 1941,⁸⁵ shortages of raw materials became dire. With the outbreak of war with the United States in December 1941, metal requisitioning was inevitable.

Initially, the government called upon private households to "voluntarily" donate metals to the war effort. Some individuals gave statues in response to this call, but many more sculptures came from elementary schools. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Ninomiya Sontoku effigies (see chapter 5) disappeared from schoolyards in the early years of the war.⁸⁶ Only exceptional examples of school statuary, such as the statue of Fujita Tōko in Ōarai Elementary School in Ibaraki, survived the war, as did statues made of nonferrous materials. Buddhist temples also donated bells, statues, and other bronze objects. In late 1942, requisitioning was ex-

tended to statues in the public domain, albeit initially limited to effigies of founders of schools and companies.

The ultimate *meltdown* of Japan's public statuary came in 1943 and 1944. The defeat of the imperial military forces in a series of battles in the Pacific had rendered the war situation bleak. Earlier, during the interwar period, the army had made an intensive study of the "total mobilization" of Germany during World War I, when statues, along with other items, were collected and melted down. German requisitioning campaigns during World War II affected even more statues. Already in 1940, an equestrian monument commemorating Emperor Wilhelm I in Frankfurt was demolished, followed by several statues of Bismarck. Germany also pressured the governments of its occupied territories to provide metals. Some complied willingly: the French Vichy administration under Marshal Philippe Pétain (1856–1951), a conservative-authoritarian regime with an anti-republican agenda, used the opportunity to demolish Republican symbols in a thoroughgoing campaign of iconoclasm.⁸⁷

Japan would soon follow this trend among the so-called Axis powers, which by 1942 had been deprived of access to world markets. The legal basis for the requisitioning of bronze statues of historical figures and other items made of metal in the Japanese public domain was a cabinet decision announced on March 5, 1943. The "Outline of a Plan to Implement the Urgent Collection of Statues Etc." (*Dōzō-tō no hijō kaishū jikkō yōkō*) stipulated the following measures:

In terms of both supply and demand and in view of the urgency regarding bronze stocks, we need to take adequate measures to strengthen access to supplies. As one strategy, we need to collect existing bronze statues, and so forth, whether they are finished or in production, and we need to do this urgently and decisively. Through this measure, we will strengthen the spirits of the people and prepare for the decisive battle, as we head toward a successful conclusion of the war.

Summary

- 1) Collection Targets
 - a) The targets of the collection are bronze statues (including busts) and bronze memorials (*dōhi*). However, the following are to be exempted:
 - b)
 - statues of [figures from the] Imperial House (*kōshitsu*), the imperial family (*kōzoku*), the royal family (*ōzoku*), and statues of deities (*shinzō*);⁸⁸
 - Buddhist statues that are directly related to religious belief or are necessary for worship;
 - statues designated as national treasures or significant artistic objects;
 - statues that are of central importance for national worship (*kokumin sūhai*).
 - c) In order to designate the exceptions listed under b), a central committee will be established ... The cabinet will make the final decisions.
- 2) Implementation
 - a) Government agencies and public organizations will decide the details of the implementation process in their own areas of responsibility. . . . Objects belonging to private organizations shall follow implementation procedures to be determined by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry . . .
 - b) Items to be collected will be managed as follows:
 - objects that can be easily removed will be done so, disassembled, and handed over to the collecting institution;
 - objects that require a great deal of effort will be removed by the collecting institution and dissembled on the spot. . . .
- 3) Miscellaneous
 - a) The government will take active steps to inform [the public] about this measure, educate them about its necessity, and emphasize that this measure is above all an expression of patriotism.
 - b) Measures will be taken to mark the sites of the statues collected using appropriate means and to make a photographic record of the statues, which will be stored in the Yūshūkan and other

locations. Even in the case of unique statues, the taking of casts shall not cause delays in the collection process.

c) The central agencies shall report on the implementation of this measure to the Planning Board.

4) In the case of the outer territories (*gaichi*),⁸⁹ this outline will be implemented at an appropriate time. The Planning Board will announce firm decisions.⁹⁰

Aiming to remedy raw material shortages, the March 1943 Outline was also a propaganda exercise designed to underline the critical situation confronting Japan. Not only were young men being sent to the front in record numbers but the nation's monuments were also being "conscripted" and converted into munitions. The fate of these material "embodiments" of the nation paralleled that of young soldiers, including those who were ordered to undertake the deadly kamikaze suicide attacks. Both fed the propaganda of a nation defending itself against the enemy with "body-crashing spirit" (*tai-atari seishin*). Kusunoki Masashige's sacrificial spirit was frequently cited in kamikaze-related propaganda during the last two years of the war.⁹¹ In a distinct parallel to the story of Kusunoki, the death of the kamikaze pilots was aestheticized by using the cherry blossom as a metaphor that signified a brief life with a dramatic ending and a colossal downfall.⁹²

On March 11, six days after the cabinet decision, the Cabinet Planning Board issued guidelines giving further details about the types of materials to be collected. It noted that all kinds of metal would be requisitioned, including lanterns (except those essential to uphold "public order"), war booty, bleachers and stands in sports facilities, elevators, signboards, as well as refrigerators and heaters in public offices and in private households.⁹³ Bronze articles for collection were not limited to statues but included objects housed in temples and shrines. The document contained loopholes that allowed for exemptions, indicating an underlying lack of confidence in the campaign on the part of the gov-

ernment. Shrines and temples were allowed to keep bronze objects deemed "requisites" for religious worship. Statues and memorials considered "essential for the purposes of national education" (*kokumin kyōka*) or for use by the military were also excluded.

In September, the Metal Collection Headquarters (Kinzoku Kaishū Honbu) at the Ministry of Economy and Industry dispatched a memorandum to several government agencies noting that it would be difficult to enforce the collection of heaters from private households and recommended their exemption from the campaign. Alternatively, families who voluntarily donated their heaters should be provided with other means of heating to weather the upcoming winter months.⁹⁴ Just as the authorities acknowledged that the wholesale requisitioning of heaters would not only harm families physically and psychologically, so too the psychological effects of removing the nation's public statuary were also carefully considered. The potential effect on public morale was understood as so significant that a Committee to Examine the Collection of Special Bronze Objects (Tokushu Kaishū Dōbukken Shin-sa linkai) was formed to decide which of these highly symbolic public monuments could be demolished. The committee, first convening in April 1943, was composed of bureaucrats and artists, including Kitamura Seibō and Asakura Fumio, who now found themselves lobbying for the survival of their own artistic creations.

From the outset, there was little hope that many statues would survive the requisitioning campaign. In June 1943, Chief Cabinet Minister Hoshino Naoki (1892–1978) issued a document detailing the imminent implementation of the March 5th cabinet decision and a list of the objects to be collected and the expected quantity of raw materials.⁹⁵ Under the category of "Objects to be Collected from Public Organizations (*kōkyō dantai*) under the Jurisdiction of the Home Ministry" were an estimated 500 statues earmarked for removal. These were statues of historical figures in public spaces, the focus of this study. The collection of statues from private venues, together with objects housed in shrines and temples,

was the responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Some 800 bronze objects, including a significant number of sculptures, were believed to be in the private domain in locations such as the head offices of companies and private universities. The total number given of bronze objects to be commandeered from private owners was 13,400, and this subsumed religious objects in temples and shrines. The range of objects to be collected now even extended to mundane items such as steel doors, washing machines, *hibachi*, bookshelves, book stands, electric fans, and even toilet paper holders.⁹⁶

In the face of this intensive campaign, the committee struggled to save a significant proportion of Japan's public statuary. After several meetings, it divided public art into three categories: 1) items that could be requisitioned without demur; 2) items that should be requisitioned despite some outstanding concerns; and 3) items that should be preserved. The list of which objects this included was classified as "secret" and therefore not made public. But a public announcement issued by the government on December 10, 1943 revealed the number of objects in each of the three categories: 8,344 items, including many religious sculptures, could be requisitioned without demur; 613 should be requisitioned despite some outstanding concerns; and 279 items were to be preserved.⁹⁷ A list of these 279 items (mostly sculptures) was sent to government agencies on December 6. Initially set up in March by the Cabinet Planning Board, the Committee was moved to the recently established Ministry of Munitions, the letter announcing the decision was sent by Minister of Munitions Tōjō Hideki to Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki. This was a curious coincidence that asserted that opposition to this decision would be impossible.⁹⁸

The 279 items and other objects to be exempted from the requisitioning campaign were broken down further into four subcategories defined in the March 5th cabinet decision. The first comprised "figures from the imperial family, the imperial house, the royal families, and statues of deities." 38 statues were included in this list. Of these, seventeen were statues of Emperor Jinmu, situated in Hokkai-

do, Yamagata, Niigata, Shizuoka (one each), Hiroshima, Yamaguchi (three each) and Toyama, which stands out with eleven Jinmu statues. Japan's oldest Jinmu statues in Tokushima and Toyohashi were absent from the list; they nonetheless would survive the war as did the statues of the imperial princes in Tokyo and the statues of the Meiji emperor built in the 1920s (see chapter 2). The list includes five statues of Yamato Takeru, one in Ishikawa and four in Toyama; four statues of Shōtoku Taishi in Karafuto, Nagano, and Hiroshima; and three statues of Emperor Shirakawa in Nagano. A few monuments are added in parentheses because they were not directly related to the imperial court. Most of these were not statues, but "bronze monuments" (*dōhi*) dedicated to figures connected with the Meiji Restoration.

The second subcategory of statues excluded from requisitioning were 177 Buddhist-related sculptures. These represented the largest of the four groups selected for preservation and included culturally and religiously significant sculptures of the Buddha, the bodhisattvas Kannon and Jizō as well as historical figures such as Nichiren and Kūkai.

The third subcategory, comprising "national treasures" and other significant art objects, consisted of forty-nine items, including twenty-five sculptures on the campus of the Tokyo School of Fine Arts, the design and production center of modern Japanese bronze sculpture. Counted among these sculptures were statues and busts of former principals and instructors at the school such as Okakura Tenshin, Takamura Kōun, Ishikawa Kōmei, Takeuchi Kyūichi (1857–1916), Kanō Natsuo (1828–98), and Unno Shōmin (1844–1915). Two sculptures of the former prime minister Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840–1900) and Tōgō Heihachirō show that representatives of the political and military establishment also belonged to this category. The inclusion of twenty-five pieces from the school in the list indicates that the artists on the committee were concerned about securing the future of Japanese sculpture in the postwar era.

The fourth subcategory on the list of sculptures to be excluded, "statues of central importance for national worship," had only fifteen items. The small

number illustrates that public statuary of historical figures was almost entirely destroyed as a result of the 1943 cabinet decisions. The fifteen works were the Tokyo statues of Kusunoki Masashige, Saigō Takamori, Ōmura Masujirō, Ōyama Iwao, Hirose Takeo/Suginō Magoshichi, Itō Hirobumi (outside the Diet), Tōgo Heihachirō (in Tama Cemetery), and Wake no Kiyomaro. Also listed were the Nogi Maresuke statue in Kamakura, the recently installed statue of Kusunoki Masashige in Kobe, the monument to Tachibana Shūta in Nagasaki, the Saigō Takamori statue in Kagoshima, and two statues of Kikuchi Takemitsu (1319–73), another “hero of the Kenmu Restoration,” in Fukuoka and Kumamoto. All these statues survived the mobilization campaign, yet they faced another crisis during the Allied Occupation of Japan, precisely because they were rated of “central importance for national worship” (see chapter 9).

The statues that the committee marked for preservation outlived the war, but most of those designated as “monuments that should be requisitioned despite outstanding concerns” were eventually destroyed. This category, comprising 613 items, included twenty-seven monuments to the war dead (*chūreitō*) made of metal, miscellaneous memorial markers (*kinenhi*), and 412 sculptures for religious veneration, including figures of Buddha, Kannon, Nichiren, Kūkai, Confucius, and Christ.⁹⁹ Only nine objects from the subcategory “national treasures” appear on this list, but it included 135 “central of particular importance for national worship”—that is, statues of historical figures. While these 135 statues were to be dismantled notwithstanding “concerns,” at least two dozen would actually survive the war and still stand even today. These include the statues of Fujita Tōko, Yamagata Aritomo, Sakamoto Ryōma, Ōkuma Shigenobu at Waseda University, Fukuzawa Yukichi at Keiō University, Inō Tadakuni in Chiba, Oda Nobunaga in Kiyosu, Hiraga Gen'nai in Sanuki City, Kanō Hōgai in Shimonoseki, Kikuchi Takemitsu in Fukuoka, and the large Saigō statue in Kagoshima. The majority of the statues in this category, however, were melted down between late 1943 and 1945.

Aware that these mass demolitions would reinforce the public perception that the war situation was worsening, the government insisted that this exercise was a demonstration of patriotic commitment. Based on the March 5th cabinet decision, “active steps” were taken “to inform [the public] about this measure, educate them about its necessity and stress that this measure is first and foremost an expression of patriotism.” As a result, if there was criticism or resistance, not much trace of it exists. The press generally cooperated with the government, reporting favorably on the collection of Japan’s public sculpture. On March 21, 1943, for example, the *Asahi shinbun* enthusiastically reported that the mobilization now enlisted secular and religious statuary in the war effort:

Responding to the call of a state facing a decisive battle, bronze statues are being offered up across the land. They will become weapons and bullets . . . showing that our resolution to annihilate the Americans and the British has not diminished. . . . The “offering of bronze statues” (*dōzō kyōshutsu*) is a memorable and joyful event.¹⁰⁰

The *Asahi shinbun* avoided the term “collection” (*kaishū*) and wrote of owners “offering” (*kyōshutsu*) their statues in order to underscore the voluntary character of the campaign and the agency of the people. The article was worded such that the demolition of public statues was not to be seen as something forced on the Japanese by the government, rather an action undertaken as a result of the people’s devotion to the state.

Select cases indicate that the concept of the “offering” of statues was ambiguous, however, and that it might be more accurate to describe them as “compulsory offerings.” Parallels can be found in wartime France where residents felt a “genuine attachment” to their statues and where surviving documents from places with a strong cult of the individual convey an uneasiness about the demolition of their own “men in metal.”¹⁰¹ Some cities even organized a festival to bid “farewell” to their statues. On occasion, the festivities turned into ambiguous

expressions of commitment to the war and regret over the loss of a local symbol.

In the city of Kōchi, for example, the Itagaki Association (Kōchi Itagakikai) mounted farewell events to “see off” the 1924 statue of Meiji statesman Itagaki Taisuke. On September 2, 1943, a festival was held in Kōchi to mark its demolition (*sōko no saiten*). The governor of Kōchi Prefecture, the mayor of Kōchi, the presidents of the prefectural assembly and Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the commander of the IJA troops stationed in Kōchi, a representative from the Imperial Veterans’ Organization, several school principals, and other local elites attended the event.¹⁰² The association published a detailed “Report on the Offering of the Bronze Statue of Itagaki Taisuke” that avoids open criticism of the government by explaining that the “offering of the statue” is “a reaction to the exigencies of the current situation.”¹⁰³ The report laments that of the five statues of Itagaki in the country, it was the one in his hometown of Kōchi that had been tagged for removal. Distributed to educational institutions throughout Japan, the report was intended as a “replacement” of the statue in an effort to preserve the memory of Itagaki once the statue was gone.¹⁰⁴

The Kōchi report reveals that the authors also envisioned something different with this publication—namely, as a reconfirmation of democratic ideals that Itagaki was seen to expound in an increasingly totalitarian atmosphere. Highlighting the fact that the Itagaki statues were initially meant to honor the statesman as an advocate of egalitarianism (*banmin byōdō*), the report also condemns the introduction of the peerage system as a “betrayal of the spirit of the great renewal of the Meiji Restoration” (*ishin kaikaku no seishin mokuteki o uragiri*). It also sets Itagaki apart from his Chōshū counterpart Itō Hirobumi, calling Itō “a traitor,” holding him responsible for Japan’s current situation. For Itagaki worshipers in Kōchi, the introduction of the peerage system had created a new “privileged class” (*tokken kaikyū*) that now stood in the way of “uniting the upper and lower [classes] and unifying the state” (*jōge isshin kyokoku itchi*).¹⁰⁵ This

was a harsh condemnation of Itō, generally considered one of the founding fathers of modern Japan. Yet the residents of Kōchi, who held their city to be the “cradle” of democratic movements, viewed Itō as an oppressive figure and in part culpable for Japan’s desperate situation in 1943.

In other cities, too, the destruction of local monuments sparked debate, and support for the demolition and “offering” of statues was not always unanimous. In Hirosaki, for example, the city council was divided on how best to react to the government’s request to “donate” their equestrian statue of daimyo Tsugaru Tamenobu. The city failed to respond to the government’s March and June 1943 decisions, although it had been collecting metals from private households since 1941.¹⁰⁶ On April 20, 1943, the IJA demanded that the city “offer” the statue, but after consultations in October the city council agreed to shelve its decision. In January 1944, the mayor declared that the city needed more time to consider the question, again eschewing a decision. The prefectural government, prompted by the Home Ministry, also began to pressure the mayor, and in late April, the Hirosaki City Council declared that it had no alternative but to agree to the demolition of the statue as a contribution to the war effort.¹⁰⁷ On August 8, 1944, the statue was ceremoniously transported through the city to the rail station before several hundred spectators. From there, it was taken to be melted down at the Kosaka mines, one of the most productive copper mines in Japan and where the copper to produce the statue had been mined forty years earlier.¹⁰⁸

Major disputes over the demolition of statues were the exception rather than the rule, or at least, they did not feature prominently in the press. Photographic evidence of demolitions is rare, which makes the special *Yomiuri shinbun* edition from April 1943 released in postcard format and illustrating the demolition of the Ōta Dōkan and Tokugawa Ieyasu statues outside the Tokyo City Office such a valuable document (fig. 7.16). In May 1944, the *Asahi shinbun* reported that ninety statues had been collected, and it commended the campaign as a sign of the people’s devotion to the national cause.¹⁰⁹



Fig. 7.16 *Tōkyō-fuchō no shōmen genkan de kessenka no Dai-Tōkyō o nirande ita Ōta Dōkan to Tokugawa Ieyasu no dōzō* (The Bronze Statues of Ōta Dōkan and Tokugawa Ieyasu That Have Stared Down at Greater Tokyo during the War from the Main Entrance of the Tokyo Prefectural Office). *Yomiuri shinbun, yakitsuke-ban*, April 4, 1943.

The mobilization of Japan's "men in metal" gathered pace throughout 1944 and continued until shortly before Japan's defeat in the summer of 1945. Japan's public statuary, once erected as an instrument to inculcate national consciousness, had disappeared, been recycled, and enlisted for very different uses in service to the war effort.

Less than one hundred statues of historical figures, and pseudo-historical figures such as Jinmu, outlasted the war. This included some forty statues of figures associated with the Imperial House, fifteen examples spared because of their significance to "national worship," and an unknown number of monuments designated by the government as "those where concerns remained, but that should be requisitioned." In a 1946 article, the daily *Yomiuri shinbun* estimated that of Japan's prewar tally of 944 statues of historical figures, only sixty-one had survived the war.¹¹⁰ The actual number may have been slightly higher because at least two to three dozen of the statues designated for collection "despite outstanding concerns" outlived the war. The government's decision in 1943 to fight the war until the bitter end, however, resulted in the almost complete extinction of Japanese public statuary.

8 Colonial Statues and Their Legacy

Statues of historical figures were erected not only in the Japanese archipelago but also in the so-called “outer territories” (*gaichi*), or the colonies, of the Japanese empire and even in territories occupied for a short period of time during World War II.¹ Their construction was a part of the strategies designed to demonstrate and consolidate Japanese power and to disseminate a feeling of attachment to the “imperial nation” in territories with ethnically diverse populations. Approximately one hundred statues are known to have been erected in Japan’s colonial and wartime empire.

Japan became a colonial power in 1895 with the acquisition of Taiwan in keeping with the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In 1905 it added Southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) to its empire and took possession of the leased territory of Kwantung (Kantō) in southern Manchuria as well as, in 1919, Micronesia as a territory mandated by the League of Nations.² In 1910, Japan annexed Korea. Public statues were also erected in some of the areas occupied by Japanese military forces during World War II, such as in the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia). This chapter will outline the features of bronze statuary in Japan's colonial and occupied territories and discuss their postwar history.³

TAIWAN

The building of statues in Taiwan was a part of Japan's efforts to demonstrate that it was contributing to the "modernization" of the island. It was equally an instrument directed at the island's diverse population groups to visualize Japanese rule in the public space. In their attempts to "modernize" colonial territories, Japanese colonial authorities gave the restructuring of urban spaces through modern city-planning projects a high degree of priority. As a part of this process in Taiwan, and beginning with the capital Taipei (J: Taihoku), statues of colonial administrators were erected in two phases, the first between 1902 and 1913 with the second between 1916 and 1932.⁴

During the first phase, about half a dozen of bronze statues were erected to honor officials of the Government-General of Taiwan (*Taiwan sōtokufu*): four images of former heads of the civil colonial administration of Taiwan (*minsei chōkan*) and one of General Kodama Gentarō, the fourth governor-general of the colony (*Taiwan sōtoku*). That subjects in public statuary in Taiwan favored the civilian administration (fig. 8.1) over the island's military rulers reflects the wish by the authorities to emphasize the civilian side of Japanese colonial rule. The public presentation of the governor-general who, according to law, was required to be a high-ranking



Fig. 8.1 *Moto Taiwan sōtokufu minsei chōkan Shuku-shi dōzō. The Bronze Statue of Shuku [Hōri (Shuku) Tatsumi], The Chief of The Civil Administration Office of the Government of Formosa [in Taihoku] (1912). Souvenir postcard (used). Published by Hashimoto Shinbunten, 1910s.*

army or navy officer, was initially avoided. The 1906 statue of General Kodama Gentarō was "softened" in terms of its message and joined by a 1911 monument of Gotō Shinpei (1857–1929), the head of the civil administration and Kodama's close colleague. All the statues set up during this phase were installed in highly visible locations in public areas, most of them in colonial Taipei's newly created public parks. The statues of Kodama and Gotō were located in an area designated to become the city's first public park.⁵ A joint memorial, the

Kodama-Gotō Memorial (Kodama-Gotō Kinenkan), was added later to honor the two politicians. The memorial would then become part of the Museum of the Colonial Administration, and today it is part of the National Taiwan Museum.⁶

In the second phase of statue-building from 1916 to 1932 statues of two further governor-generals were erected in Taiwan, yet most memorials of this period were dedicated to scientists and engineers who helped modernizing Taiwan. Of these was a statue of William Kinnimond Burton (1856–99), a British advisor to the colonial government of Taiwan, who designed and oversaw the creation of Taipei's sewage system, and one of engineer Hatta Yoichi (1886–1942). The majority of the statues in this group were situated in unimposing locations, often on the grounds of institutions of the colonial administration. Japan's efforts to develop Taiwan were not directed exclusively at its colonial subjects, instead they formed part of a public relations campaign aimed at Western powers in an effort to persuade them of Japan's success in the "civilizing mission" in its colonies.

KOREA

Compared to Taiwan, public statuary in Korea played a less significant role in shaping public space, but the Japanese colonial authorities built at least a dozen statues there during the era of colonial rule (1910–45). Statuary in Korea has been overlooked in previous research. In *Assimilating Seoul*, a study of "the politics of public space in colonial Korea," author Todd Henry fails to mention a single statue built by the Japanese during the era of colonial rule.⁷ Different from statues in Taiwan, which featured representatives of the colonial administration, those in Korea were either dedicated to educationalists, such as founders of schools, or to businessmen. They were erected in less conspicuous locations, mostly on the grounds of schools, temples, or shrines; statues in prominent places in the public space were scarce. This suggests that Japan may have lacked confidence in the stability of

its colonial rule in Korea, or at least did not want to stoke anti-Japanese sentiment through the erection of memorials that might become targets for disaffection.

A notable exception was the statue of Itō Hirobumi, Japan's first resident-general in Korea after the peninsula became a Japanese protectorate in 1905. It was located at the foot of Namsan Hill in central Seoul, even today a key mnemonic space with multiple commemorative sites. The chief Shinto shrines in colonial Korea were also located here (none exists anymore today): the Chōsen Shrine (est. 1919), the Keijō Shrine (est. 1916) and several satellite shrines including a Nogi Shrine as a site of worship of General Nogi Maresuke (est. 1934) as well as the Keijō Gokoku Shrine (est. 1940).⁸ The small Buddhist temple Hakubunji was built here in 1932. The name "Hakubun" is an alternative reading of Itō's first name, Hirobumi, indicating the promotion of a personality cult of Itō.⁹ The temple's architect, Itō Chūta (1867–1954, no relation to Hirobumi), also designed the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo along with other government shrines and temple buildings.¹⁰

The significance of the Hakubun Temple lay not only in its dedication to the worship of one of the founders of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, but also in its location: it was erected in the grounds of a former Korean monument, the Jangchungdan. Built in 1900, the Jangchungdan was a site of worship of Queen Min, who had been killed in 1897 in a Japanese plot because of her opposition to Japanese attempts to colonize Korea.¹¹ The Hakubun Temple was set up to replace this symbolic site of Korean resistance against Japan in order to eliminate the memory of the former Queen (and posthumous empress) and the Yi Dynasty she represented. The temple had a statue of Itō, but unlike in Taiwan it was not publicly displayed.¹² Although there are photographs of the temple, none seems to exist showing the sculpture. Even as the first representative of the Japanese colonial administration in Korea, Itō's image could not be displayed in the public domain without the risk of provoking anti-Japanese sentiment or violence against the occupation.



Fig. 8.2 *Yamato Hotel, Dairen.* Statue of Ōshima Yoshimasa (1914) in the “Great Square” in Dairen before the Yamato Hotel. Souvenir postcard (unused), 1930s.



Fig. 8.3 *Dairen Hoshigaura Gotō Shinpei kakka no dōzō.* The Statue of the Late Count Gotō at Hoshigaura [Dairen] (1930). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1930s.

CHINA/MANCHUKUO

The absence of highly visible statuary in the public sphere in Korea, at this time recognized internationally as part of the Japanese empire, makes the number of monuments depicting Japanese political and military leaders in northeastern China (Manchuria) all the more surprising. This is especially so since this region was never formally a Japanese colony. Several statues were built in Dalian (J: Dairen) on the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula—the center of Japanese power in the Kwantung Leased Territory. With the original lease agreement restricted to twenty-five years (in 1915 extended to 99

years), it must have been evident to the Japanese that their rule would not be permanent. Viewed as such, the building of mnemonic devices made “for eternity” appears contradictory.

Statues in Manchuria portrayed extremely relevant figures and were set up in visible locations in the public space. The history of their installation is well-documented, different from the situation in Taiwan and Korea. Statues in the city of Dairen were dedicated to the first governor of Kwantung (*Kantō totoku*), General Ōshima Yoshimasa in 1914 (fig. 8.2); to Gotō Shinpei, the first president of the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR) in 1930 (fig. 8.3); and in 1936 to Komura Jutarō (1855–

Fig. 8.4 *Dairen Komura kōen no Komura Jutarō-kō no dōzō. Statue of Marquis Komura at the Komura Park, Dairen (1936). Souvenir postcard (unused), late 1930s.*



Fig. 8.5 *Kodama kōen Kodama taishō no dōzō (Shinkyō). The Bronze of General Kodama (Hshinking) [Xinjing] (1940). Souvenir postcard (unused), c. 1940.*



1911), chief Japanese negotiator at the 1905 peace negotiations in Portsmouth that resulted in the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula as a leased territory to Japan (fig. 8.4).¹³ An equestrian statue of General Kodama was erected in 1938 in Xinjing (Hsinking; J: Shinkyō [“New Capital”], formerly Changchun), the capital of the puppet state of Manchukuo founded in 1932 (fig. 8.5). Kodama had been the commander-in-chief of Japanese troops in the Russo-Japanese War, which ultimately opened the way for Japanese expansion into Manchuria. But this statue was not only a memorial to the commander, it also served the wider purpose of celebrating Japan’s military victory over Russia.¹⁴ It was thus consequential enough to portray Kodama in the pose of a commander on horseback greeting his victorious troops. This was the only equestrian statue erected in the Japanese colonial empire and one of the few statues to be erected outside the Kwantung Leased Territory.¹⁵

All of these statues were conceived as part of Japan’s projects in modern urban planning in Manchuria; all were visible landmarks situated in prominent positions in the public space. For the local population, they represented and symbolized what was intended to be Japanese rule for the benefit of the local population. For the Japanese in Manchuria, they represented the founding fathers of Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland, objects of identification, confirmation, and as models of their colonial “mission.”

Komura Jutarō’s monument in Dairen (fig. 8.4), for example, describes his “great achievements” (*idai naru go-gyōseki*) as pioneering efforts that contributed to “the development of Japanese influence on the mainland for the establishment of peace in the Orient” and to “the establishment of what was to become Manchukuo.” These would have included the transfer of Russian rights in southern Manchuria to Japan during the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. The prospectus for the Komura statue states that the work would guarantee that these “achievements” would be praised “for eternity” and for the benefit of future generations.¹⁶ The idea for the Komura statue

was instigated by Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946), then president of the SMR and funded by donations “exclusively from Manchuria” that totaled 180,000 *yen*.¹⁷ The Foreign Ministry and the Kwantung Army (Kantō-gun) approved the building of the monument, and Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō (1884–1965) personally donated 1,000 *yen*.¹⁸

The 13 m high statue of Gotō Shinpei in Hoshigaura Park on the outskirts of Dairen (fig. 8.3) was also primarily funded through donations. A statue of him had already been erected in Taiwan, where, in his capacity as head of the civil administration, he had advanced the modernization of the colony. In 1906, he was appointed the first president of the newly founded SMR, and plans to erect a statue to him in Dairen were already mooted at SMR headquarters during Gotō’s lifetime. After a fundraising drive failed to raise the necessary funds due to the deteriorating economic situation following the global economic crisis of 1929, the SMR agreed to underwrite the cost of the statue.¹⁹ Additional donations came from individuals within the SMR administration and other colonial authorities in Manchuria; some companies and private individuals on the Japanese mainland likewise contributed.²⁰ With the unveiling of this statue of Gotō on October 12, 1930, the SMR, as a central arm of the Japanese colonial machine, had installed a self-congratulatory monument to celebrate its own role in the expanding Japanese influence on the continent.

Japanese authorities were dedicated to the construction of statues of figures who represented the country’s colonial rule. They also went to great lengths to prevent the building of Chinese monuments, and statues from the period predating Japanese rule were sometimes destroyed. For example, a 1938 special edition of *Dōmei News*, entitled “Chiang Kai-shek now a Prisoner of War,” shows Japanese soldiers apparently about to demolish an equestrian statue of the Chinese ruler in Hankou following the city’s capture by Japanese troops (fig. 8.6). The “Greater East Asian Holy War Exhibition” (*Daitōa Seisen Hakurankai*) held in Kobe from April 1 to May 31, 1939, under the aegis of the Ōsaka Asahi Shinbunsha (Osaka Asahi Newspaper Com-



Fig. 8.6 *Horyo ni natta Shō Kai-seki. Kōgun jika no Kankō de mada kara-ibari* (Chiang Kai-shek now a Prisoner of War. Still Blustering in Hankou under the Control of the Imperial Army). *Dōmei News*, November 12, 1938. 27 × 39 cm.

pany) exhibited a bust of Chiang Kai-shek, complete with several holes from gunshots in its head (fig. 8.7). The Japanese press periodically ran stories about Chinese attacks on statues portraying symbols of Sino-Japanese friendship. In October 1937, the pictorial *Jiji shashin* published a bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), allegedly destroyed by Chinese soldiers who had gone on a shooting rampage (fig. 8.8). As the “father of the Chinese Republic,” Sun had also maintained close relations with Japan and advocated Sino-Japanese cooperation.²¹

With the outbreak of war with Great Britain in December 1941, Japanese troops also demolished statues embodying British colonial power in Asia. In early 1942, a statue of Singapore’s founder, Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), was pulled down following the capture of the city. A statue of the British diplomat Harry Parkes (1828–85) in Shanghai met a similar fate in September 1943.²² In March 1942, statues of the British king and queen standing outside the Bank of Shanghai in Hongkong were removed from their pedestals.²³

Confidential letters sent by the Police Bureau of the Colonial Administration of Kwantung (Kantōchō Keimukyoku) to Japanese ministries and government-related offices reveal that the Japanese authorities in Manchukuo engaged in a campaign to prevent the building of a statue dedicated to Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin, 1875–1928), the warlord assassinated by the Japanese Kwantung Army in



Fig. 8.7 *Shō Kai-seki no kyozō* (Bust of Chiang Kai-shek). Exhibited at the “Greater East Asian Holy War Exhibition” (*Daitōa Seisen Hakurankai*) held in Kobe from April 1 to May 31, 1939, under the aegis of Ōsaka Asahi Shinbunsha (Osaka Asahi Newspaper Company).



Fig. 8.8 *Jigun no hōdan ni taosareta Son-bun no dōzō* (Statue of Sun Yat-sen destroyed by shelling from the Chinese Army). *The Nikkan jiji shashin*, October 2, 1937. 27 × 39 cm.

1928.²⁴ One of the letters states that the administrative branch of the Northeastern Army (Chang's former troops) planned to create a park in Mukden (J: Hōten; present-day Shenyang) to commemorate (*hyōshō*) Zhang Zuolin's achievements. The park would not only bear his name, but it would also have memorial stones and a bronze statue of the warlord. The Japanese were outraged that a statue of a Chinese military leader would be erected in Mukden, the site of the greatest victory in Japanese military

history. It was here in 1905 that the Japanese army had defeated Russian forces in the Battle of Mukden. The colonial administration of the Kwantung Leased Territory was possibly even more alarmed after learning that the memorial stones would bear inscriptions detailing the circumstances that led up to Zhang's violent murder (*bōsatsu*) and would reveal "details of the conspiracy by the Tanaka [Gi-ichi] cabinet to assassinate Zhang."²⁵ These plans posed a real challenge to the Japanese colonial authorities. Surviving documentation offers no clear answer about whether they directly prohibited the construction of the memorial park or "merely" obstructed it, but ultimately no statue of Zhang Zuolin was ever built in Mukden or indeed anywhere else.²⁶

STATUES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Statues of Japanese “heroes” were also erected beyond the borders of the Japanese empire in areas of Southeast Asia that Japan invaded after the eruption of war with Great Britain and the United States. Some of these monuments were built to iconize “Asian brotherhood” and should be seen within the framework of Japanese propagation of a pan-Asian ideology aiming at the establishment of a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (*Daitōa kyōeiken*). One such example was the statue of Hosoya Jūtarō, a “pioneer of the development of the south,” erected in New Guinea in 1943.²⁷ As late as 1944, attempts were made to introduce the cult of Ninomiya Sontoku to other Asian nations, most notably when a statue of this paradigm of scholarly diligence was erected in Jakarta in the Japanese-occupied Dutch East Indies.²⁸ This statue would stand for only a brief period, disappearing after Japan’s surrender in the summer of 1945.

In Thailand, a memorial, not a statue, for Yamada Nagamasa (1590–1630) was set up in Ayutthaya in the 1930s. Yamada was a Japanese adventurer who began his career as a trader based in Ayutthaya, the capital of the Kingdom of Siam from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century; he later became the commander of the king’s bodyguards. In March 1935, the Japanese envoy to Bangkok, Yatabe, had reported to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo that the Japanese community had for some years sought to build a memorial (*kinenhi*), a shrine, and a bronze statue in Yamada’s memory, and that these plans were now rapidly progressing.²⁹ The Siamese government had provided a plot of land of approximately 550 *tsubo* (approximately 1,500 m²), a response that not only recognized “the current position of Japan in international politics” but also acknowledged the “history of the bilateral relationship that had existed between the two countries for hundreds of years.” It contributed moreover to the “eternal friendship” between the two nations (*ryō-kokumin*).³⁰ The shrine and a memorial were eventually realized, yet a statue of Yamada was not built until 1980.

THE FATE OF JAPANESE STATUES IN ASIA AFTER 1945

The building of public statues in Japan came to an almost complete standstill at the end of the 1930s. Similar projects also ceased in the colonies since the regulations controlling the use of metals were equally applied to these territories. A letter dated November 1936 sent from the Kwantung Army chief of staff, Itagaki Seishirō (1885–1948), to Moriya Kazurō at the Japanese embassy in Manchukuo spotlights the increasing problems surrounding the maintenance of extant memorials, in particular, the numerous memorials to the war dead (*chūkonhi*, *chūreitō*) dotting the empire. Itagaki announced that in the future, this maintenance would be delegated to a public body, the Zaidan Hōjin Dai-Nihon Chūrei Kenshōkai (Association to Commemorate the Loyal War Dead), expressly set up for the purpose, and that the erection of new memorials should cease.³¹

Despite the melting down of the majority of statues on the Japanese mainland during the mobilization campaign of 1943–44, most in the colonies outlasted the war. The statue of Ōshima Yoshimasa in Dairen, for example, was still standing as the Red Army marched into the city in August 1945. It was removed at some point thereafter and was reportedly in storage for many years before finally disappearing. Its whereabouts today are unknown, but like other Japanese monuments, it was not destroyed immediately following the entrance of Soviet troops into the Japanese-controlled city.³²

In Taiwan, there are surviving statues from the colonial period. The forces of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government retreated to the island in 1949 following its defeat in the Chinese civil war, an occupation that caused friction with the local population. Some of the statues installed during the Japanese colonial period were hidden and protected by the Taiwanese, and a few have recently re-emerged. For instance, two small statues of Kodama Gentarō and Gotō Shinpei, which stood in alcoves at the Museum of the Colonial Administration before the war (fig. 8.9), were rediscovered in

Fig. 8.9 Statue of Gotō Shinpei in the National Taiwan Museum, Taipei. Photograph courtesy of Umemori Takashi.



storage in the National Taiwan Museum in Taipei where they are now on display. Despite initial opposition to their exhibition, they have since become a catalyst for friendly exchange between Gotō's hometown of Mizusawa in Iwate Prefecture and the museum.³³ Although such an exchange would have necessitated a makeover of Gotō as a "hero of the hometown,"³⁴ it might also be viewed as an expression of growing nostalgia for the era of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. At a time marked by frequent tensions over the interpretation of colonial and wartime history between Japan on the one side and China and Korea on the other, this exchange can be seen as introducing a positive note into the transnational "historical dialogue" recently

occurring in East Asia.³⁵

A statue honoring the Japanese engineer Hatta Yoichi in southern Taiwan followed a similar trajectory. Hatta designed and supervised one of Taiwan's first dams, the 1930 Wushantou Dam (and Reservoir), and the Chianan Canal.³⁶ He is described as one of the pioneers of hydraulic engineering in Taiwan and is highly regarded even today for his contribution to the development of agriculture in this once isolated part of the island. In 1931, a statue of Hatta seated was installed on a site overlooking the dam and the reservoir he helped to construct. After 1949, locals saved his statue from destruction. It was hidden away until 1981 and then restored to its original location.³⁷

Hatta received increasing attention during the 2000s. In 2009, the site where he had lived during the construction of the Wushantou Dam became the Hatta Yoichi Memorial Park.³⁸ Construction of the park and the reconstruction of the house where Hatta resided during the dam project was completed in 2011; the road leading to the park was named Hatta Road. Then-president Ma Ying-jeou, former Japanese prime minister Mori Yoshirō (like Hatta, a native of Kanazawa) and twenty Japanese parliamentarians attended the opening ceremony.³⁹ Since then, an annual service has been held to commemorate Hatta's achievements. Even though Hatta's statue was vandalized in 2017, the engineer is unique as an individual acknowledged by many as a symbol of the progress made in terms of historical reconciliation between Japan and Taiwan.⁴⁰

In the final analysis, Japan's policy of building statues in the colonies was little more than a clumsy attempt to enforce colonial rule. These statues were

built to demonstrate Japanese superiority and leadership and to underline the "backwardness" of the colonial territories by introducing capable administrators, educators, engineers, and other "modernizers," whose task was to bring "civilization" to the populations in these areas. Despite the pan-Asian rhetoric occasionally used to justify Japanese colonial rule, the introduction of public statuary in Japan's colonies rarely invoked a truly transnational dimension. These statues were soon forgotten, and most were demolished as Japan's colonial empire collapsed, and colonists returned to their homelands. Only one statue returned with the repatriated Japanese: the Dairen Shrine's statue of Emperor Meiji discussed in chapter 2. The few surviving colonial-era statues in Taiwan have recently re-surfaced as focal points of the ongoing debate regarding Japan's responsibilities for war and colonial rule. And they look set to remain a controversial legacy for the foreseeable future.

9 The Resurgence of Public Statuary in Postwar Japan

In the aftermath of World War II, the remaining public statuary in Japan was subject to renewed scrutiny by Japanese authorities and the institutions of the incoming Allied Occupation forces. But Japan also witnessed a resurgence in the construction of public statuary. This chapter examines how the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–52) handled the surviving statues in the public space and how new statues were built, or restored, as soon as the war was over.

PUBLIC STATUARY DURING THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE “NEW JAPAN”

The fewer than one hundred public statues of historical figures that survived the war continued to be under threat after Japan’s unconditional surrender on September 2, 1945. It was precisely their role as symbols of “central importance for national worship”—that is, essential to the state’s wartime propaganda campaigns focused on “spiritual mobilization”—that would make these “men in metal” objects of suspicion to the incoming Allied Occupation authorities, the General Headquarters (GHQ), and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964). The Occupation authorities had as their primary objectives the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, and as such, they viewed surviving statues as potent symbols of the militarism and anti-democratic ideology targeted by the Allies.

Demilitarization and democratization were not imposed unilaterally, however. The re-assessment of Japan’s public statuary, along with many other reforms during the occupation, was carried out in cooperation with the Japanese authorities. Some of the reforms that were successfully implemented by the Occupation authorities succeeded because they were welcomed by a section of Japanese society.¹ Historian Peter Duus has pointed out that the Japanese, now war-weary, longed for peace and wished to rebuild their cities and the national economy:

The wartime generation was soon to see defeat as an opportunity to make a fresh historical start. After years of traveling through a “dark valley,” it was time to rebuild at home, not pursue the senseless folly of overseas conquest. . . . Unconditional surrender was humiliating . . . but the end of the fighting also meant a return to some semblance of normal life—no more blackouts, no more bombing, no more nights spent in the air-raid shelters. The majority of the civilian population, especially the women and children, were relieved that the long ordeal was finally at an end.²

Reports filed by the Occupation authorities confirmed that measures aimed at democratization were likewise “predicated upon the assumption that a tendency toward democratic development was latent in Japanese society.”³ GHQ/SCAP felt that its efforts had been vindicated when in 1946 Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967), prime minister from 1946 to 1947 and 1948 to 1954, “proclaimed the complete eradication of extreme militarism and nationalism.”⁴ The Japanese government, well aware that education would come under particular scrutiny of the incoming Occupation authorities, had already issued a document in September 1945, setting out the direction for education in the “New Japan.” Following up on a speech by the emperor in the Imperial Diet on September 4, in which he proclaimed the “establishment of a peace state” (*heiwa kokka no kakuritsu*) as the central paradigm for the New Japan,⁵ the document “An Educational Policy for the Construction of a New Japan” (*Shin Nihon kensetsu no kyōiku hōshin*) rejected ultranationalist and militarist ideology. Japan vowed to rid the educational system and school textbooks of “militaristic attitudes” and announced a reform of the school system that would make Japan a peace-loving society:

(1) . . . The basic aim of future educational policy will be to abolish militaristic attitudes while firmly preserving the national polity and to create in their place attitudes conducive [*sic*] to a peaceful nation. Emphasis will be placed on improving the education of the Japanese people, fostering the growth and acceptance of scientific thought, and cultivating a commitment to the love of peace. (2) Reorientation of Educational Attitudes: There will be a return from the wartime system of education to a peaceful system; military education in the schools will be completely abolished and research centers engaged in war-related activities will be redirected to peaceful purposes.⁶

The educational reforms pursued under these guidelines resulted in the passing of the 1947 Basic Act (Law) on Education (*Kyōiku kihon-hō*) and the promulgation of Japan’s new constitution. Both

documents refer to the need for a new national identity. The preamble of the Basic Act on Education stipulated: “We, the citizens of Japan, desire to further develop the democratic and cultural state we have built through our untiring efforts, and contribute to the peace of the world and the improvement of the welfare of humanity.”⁷ Within this new environment, it is hardly surprising that many Japanese insisted that public statuary be scrutinized anew. Despite a widely held belief to the contrary in Japan, the Occupation authorities never had to order the dismantling of the country’s remaining public statues.

The Division of Arts and Monuments within the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE), one branch of the Occupation administration, was responsible for dealing with public statuary. The CIE was set up on September 22, 1945, to “enlighten” ordinary Japanese about their country’s war conduct, to propagate democratic values, and to purge official discourse of militarist, imperialist and anti-American vocabulary.⁸ In the first stage of this program beginning in May 1946—one characterized by historian Takemae Eiji as a “punitive phase”—the CIE launched a comprehensive reform of the education system based on the directive known as the “Administration of the Educational System of Japan” issued on October 22, 1945.⁹ Aimed at removing existing “history, ethics and geography textbooks, in which the ultranationalistic and militaristic ideology was still apparent,” the directive stood at the center of this reform.¹⁰ The teaching of ethics (*shūshin*), which actively instrumentalized the nation’s Great Men, was suspended, as were history classes.¹¹ Militarist and ultranationalist terminology, such as the term “Greater East Asian War” (*Daitōa sensō*), which had been adopted to obfuscate the reality that Japan was fighting a war of aggression, was subject to censorship both in education and within the public sphere and the mass media.

The Occupation authorities acknowledged that the subjects of the cult of the individual in the public domain were essential tools of social education, and initially they scrutinized the design of stamps,

coins, and bills: “In May 1946 GHQ directed the Japanese government to prohibit the use of militaristic and ultranational designs on postage stamps and currency. Among the designs banned were portraits of leaders and symbols of militarism and ultranationalism.”¹² Similarly, Shinto, condemned as “a suprapatriotic cult,” a pillar of militarism and ultranationalism, and a “major obstacle” to the democratization of Japan,¹³ was abolished through the Shinto Directive.¹⁴

The first public discussions about the nation’s remaining statues, however, originated from within Japanese society. A small number of rural statues were demolished in late 1945. The degree of involvement by the Occupation authorities in these removals is unclear. In any case, these incidents failed to trigger any form of national debate, which had to wait until the following summer. In June 1946, a *Yomiuri shinbun* article headlined “The General’s Bronze Statue” (*Shōgun no dōzō*) asked “What shall we do about the symbols of militarism?” and featured a photograph of the equestrian statue of Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) outside the Imperial Diet (fig. 9.1).¹⁵ The reporter expressed doubts about whether statues of military figures such as Yamagata, but also Ōmura Masujirō, Ōyama Iwao, and Hirose Takeo, “are objects suitable to stand in the capital of a Japan that is moving toward democratization.”¹⁶

The *Yomiuri* article included comments by three people with a particular interest in the subject. Higaki Ryōichi, director of the Culture Bureau of the Education Ministry, questioned whether contemporary Japanese were in any way moved by such monuments: “I don’t think there is anyone with such an outdated mindset today. From this perspective, it is meaningless (*muimi*) to preserve the stat-

Fig. 9.1 Kitamura Seibō (1884–1987). Equestrian bronze statue of Yamagata Aritomo (1927). Unveiled in 1929 near the designated site of the new Imperial Diet Building, moved to the city of Hagi in Yamaguchi Prefecture in 1992, and today located in Hagi Central Park (Hagi-shi Chūō Kōen).



ues.” Echoing prewar critics, he further elaborated that most statues were inferior as artworks and that from an aesthetic perspective, “not one of them deserves to be preserved.”

Yoshioka Keiichi (1909–92), who during the war had been active in ultranationalist organizations, now reversed his position, claiming that the government should “follow public opinion” (*yoron*) and should not feel constrained if the decision was made to destroy a particular statue. And even though an employee of the Tokyo Prefectural Park Bureau expressed the wish to preserve the Saigō statue in Ueno Park, the critic Nii Itaru disagreed. He argued that Japan must adjust to the new situation: “Because Japan has declared a wish to become a peace state, the symbols of militarism (*gunkokushugi*) cannot be allowed” to remain in the public space. Characterizing the “bronze statues of military officers” as “monstrosities” (*shūkai*), Nii also stressed the need to remove statues of premodern figures such as those of the celebrated “forty-seven ronin” at the Sengaku Temple. He did not see these as models of faithfulness, rather as emblematic of the desire for revenge—that is, figures that could arouse suspicions among Occupation authorities.

THE CIE “WAR MONUMENT STUDY”

GHQ/SCAP initiated policies designed to root out the remnants of ultranationalist ideology. The aforementioned *Yomiuri* article from June 1946, which appeared in English translation in the *Nippon Times*, raised the awareness of the Occupation forces regarding the necessity of a “purge” of monuments in the public domain. In September 1946, the CIE’s Analysis and Research Division undertook a “War Monument Study,” intending to assess the importance and effectiveness of these memorials in terms of social education.

The undertaking was a complete failure, as hinted in the final report of the first part of the study, which admitted that “the results of this study must be . . . regarded as totally inconclusive.”¹⁷ Despite the fact that the five interviewers were dis-

patched to gather information on a number of monuments, only sixteen interviews were conducted. The report stated that it was telling that the interviewers encountered very few people at the monuments they visited and that hardly anyone agreed to be interviewed. The CIE’s conclusion that “even the sad experience of finding so few persons to interview suggests that the monuments are not very important to the people” validates Robert Musil’s view that public monuments go largely unnoticed. What the study clearly indicates is that monuments, although previously utilized for the purposes of indoctrination, can easily lose much of their relevance (and appeal) following decisive changes in the social climate of a polity.

The interviewers judged that the statues were now infrequently visited, but the interviews confirmed that these same monuments had played a significant role before and during the war. The CIE interviewers visited the statues of Kusunoki Masashige, Wake no Kiyomaro, Shinagawa Yajirō, Ōmura Masujirō, Prince Arisugawa, Saigō Takamori, Hirose Takeo, General Klemens Meckel, and Katō Kiyomasa as well as the memorials to commemorate the Three Brave Human Bombs, Loyal Souls (a *chūkonhi*), the dead of the ship *Hitachimaru* and those who died during the 1920 Nikolaevsk Incident, and the Memorial Appreciating the Greater East Asian War (*Daitōa sensō kansha no hi*). They reported that at many of these sites “not a soul passed the area.” At other locations, people were observed taking naps or eating from their lunchboxes but oblivious to the monuments. Those approached by the interviewers were asked a standard set of questions. Typically people responded that they did not come to the site regularly, as they were too busy to visit public monuments, and in any case had no interest in them. Only the statues of Saigō and Kusunoki were destinations for planned outings, mostly by tourists visiting Tokyo.¹⁸ Interestingly, more American GIs paused to view the Kusunoki statue than Japanese.¹⁹

Due to the inconclusive nature of this first study, a second study was launched that sought to increase the number of respondents by arranging to inter-

view 102 people firsthand “in homes, places of business, and in shops.”²⁰ Once again, this report decided that “war monuments mean very little in the lives of the people.”²¹ But it became clearer with this second report that public memorials *had* mattered before the war. Eighty-six of the ninety-six respondents gave “no interest” or “being too busy” as reasons why they did not frequent statues, and the report concluded that “since the end of the war [the practice of visiting memorials] seems to have dropped sharply.” No figures for the prewar period were given for comparison, probably because none were available.²²

The results of this second study were still inconclusive, which prompted a third CIE investigation, this time aimed at the elite.²³ A total of twenty-eight people “representing different fields of interest” were interviewed, including five journalists, five social scientists, six politicians, three writers and artists, four religious figures, and four government officials. This study revealed a perception gap between ordinary citizens on the one hand and representatives of politics and government on the other—a gap still observable today.²⁴ None of the interviewees in the first and second studies expressed a wish to preserve public monuments, yet “all 4 of the government officials interviewed tended to be favorable and to defend the monuments.” The attitudes of Diet members were somewhat more diverse since all “felt that militarism was symbolized by many, if not all, of the monuments. Three felt that while many are bad, some good and valuable ones exist.”²⁵ The monument most often identified as an unequivocal “symbol of militarism” was that to the Three Brave Human Bombs built in 1934 on the initiative of Dr. Kanasugi Eigorō (see chapter 7).²⁶ Given that its creators had explicitly included an anti-Western message in the prospectus of the statue, it is not surprising that the GHQ regarded this memorial with suspicion. It was, therefore, one of the first to be dismantled, no doubt in anticipation of the measures that GHQ almost certainly would have taken.²⁷

The GHQ War Monument Study also considered the question of who should initiate the removal

of monuments, concluding that it should be the Japanese, as “only 1 person actually felt that removal by the occupation [authorities] would be a good thing.”²⁸ The respected anthropologist and study interviewee Yanagida Kunio (1875–1962) astutely observed that even if the Japanese government were to remove the statues, “the people will naturally think that the Occupation Forces are behind” it.²⁹

GHQ/SCAP and the CIE fully considered the findings of the study to take a cautious approach to purge public monuments. They never directly ordered the destruction of a specific memorial in Japan, and in November 1946 SCAP instructed Eighth Army Headquarters “to avoid . . . the appearance of an iconoclastic campaign since none was intended.”³⁰ In September 1946, for example, the CIE’s Religious Division Office replied to an inquiry from a Japanese educationalist about the remaining statues of Ninomiya Sontoku “that there was no objection to the retention of the [Ninomiya] statue” and that there was “no requirement” to remove any of the surviving effigies.³¹ Later, in early 1947, it was reported that Occupation officials, “[un]sure regarding the wisdom of ‘purging’ monuments,”³² had allowed the Japanese Home Ministry to announce that “monuments to national heroes, erected before . . . 1931 will be allowed to remain.”³³ Watanabe Masaharu, the adopted son of sculptor Watanabe Osao, recalls that a GHQ official visited his father in February 1947 to relate that the ongoing dismantling of some statues was not the result of a GHQ directive, but that of a Japanese government order.³⁴

The CIE accepted that the existing public statues were unlikely to cause harm, as the people seemed to be largely indifferent to them. It was agreed that an active “purge” of monuments by the Occupation forces might unnecessarily alienate the Japanese but where it was “required,” the task should be left to the Japanese authorities. Consequently, the measures taken by GHQ to assert its control over public space only minimally impacted Japan’s public statuary.

The public monuments most affected by GHQ/SCAP policies were the memorials to the war dead, many of which were made of stone and thus had

survived the war in large numbers. In November 1946, the minister of education and the home minister, following verbal instructions from the CIE, sent the directive “On Public Funerals” (*Kōsō ni tsuite*) to the prefectural governors and city mayors. While the CIE recognized “commemoration of death in battle . . . as a proper function of the state,” it “regarded as objectionable . . . the exploitation of state-controlled religious institutions for militaristic and ultranationalistic purposes.”³⁵ The directive prohibited all official sponsorship of or participation in funerals or other ceremonies remembering and venerating the war dead, militarists (*gun-kokushugi-sha*), and ultranationalists (*kyokutan naru kokkashugisha*).³⁶ It also banned the building of new *chūreitō*, *chūkonhi*, memorials, and bronze statues that honored militarists and ultranationalists, and stipulated that any such monuments under construction should be abandoned immediately and that existing monuments in schools should be removed. The directive triggered the demolition of a part of Japan’s remaining school statues. Furthermore, monuments in the public domain should likewise be removed if they were “intended to foster militaristic or ultranationalistic ideology.”³⁷ Following the recommendations of the study, and bearing in mind that any action taken by the Allied authorities might be counterproductive, the implementation of the order was left to the Japanese authorities.

MONUMENT COMMITTEES

After lengthy deliberation, local committees consisting of Japanese artists and administrators were tasked with deciding the fate of the statues and other monuments that had survived the war. In early 1947, Tokyo Prefecture established the first local committee to discuss the removal of statues and other monuments—the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee for Determining the Removal of Monuments (*Tōkyō-to Chūreitō, Chūkonhi-tō Tekkyō Shinsa Inkai*). It was under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Board, which had also been

charged with controlling and regulating statue-building before the war. The priorities of the Tokyo committee, as its name suggests, involved memorials to the war dead, the *chūkonhi* and the *chūreitō*. It considered only a small number of statues portraying historical figures.

On the committee were chairman Itō Kiyoshi (1903–80), former governor of Shimane Prefecture and recently appointed deputy governor of Tokyo Prefecture; deputy chairman Usami Takeshi (1903–91), director of Tokyo Prefecture’s Education Bureau and later of the Imperial Household Agency; deputy chairman Ōmori Kenji, director of the Construction Bureau of Tokyo Prefecture; Tokyo Prefectural Assembly members Uchida Hidegorō (1876–1975), Andō Matagorō, and Amano Yoriyoshi; Ishihara Kenji from the construction company Kashima, which most likely would have received contracts to dismantle monuments; landscape garden designer Inoshita Kiyoshi (1884–1973); social critics and feminist leaders Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981) and Katō Shizue (1897–2001); sociologists Takashima Heihō (1875–1949), Kon Wajirō (1888–1973), and Shimomura Juichi; art critic Kuroda Akinobu; professor of ancient Japanese architecture Fujishima Kakujiro (1899–2002); and sculptor Asakura Fumio.³⁸

The committee met seventeen times in the first half of 1947 and reported its findings in June. It proposed the demolition of eleven monuments in Tokyo, including one statue dedicated to the “God of War” Hirose Takeo and a bust of Admiral Tōgō in Tōgō Park. The other monuments recommended for removal were the stone markers commemorating the “martyrs” who had died serving in specific military units and sailors who had perished on battleships sunk during the war.³⁹ The committee’s report, often full of flawed reasoning, exempted some monuments for their (sometimes questionable) “artistic value,” others because the monument and the historical event or figure it commemorated “predated the era of militarism.”⁴⁰ As a result, statues of figures who were judged to be “unrelated” to the emergence of Japanese militarism, narrowly defined as a phenomenon of the 1930s, were spared

demolition. This included the sculptures of Ōmura Masujirō, Ōyama Iwao, Yamagata Aritomo, Nagaoaka Gaishi, and Enomoto Takeaki. The same logic, however, was not applied to the statues of Hirose and Tōgō, even though they were heroes of the Russo-Japanese War and were ostensibly unrelated to 1930s militarism. Despite their instrumental role in wartime mobilization and the dissemination of the concepts of loyalty to the emperor and individual sacrifice, the statues of Kusunoki Masashige, Saigō Takamori, and Wake no Kiyomaro were left unscathed by the committee, as were those of the imperial princes Kitashirakawa, Arisugawa, and Komatsu. The official history of Chiyoda Ward notes that the Occupation authorities approved of their preservation. This decision reflects the GHQ's policy of turning a blind eye to the war responsibility of the Imperial House.⁴¹ All imperial princes had served in high positions, but none had been charged with war crimes before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, the Tokyo Trials). For this reason, it would be difficult to argue for the destruction of their monuments.

Despite a reprieve from demolition, a handful of statues with dubious pedigrees were recommended for relocation, including two monuments of the generals Ōyama and Yamagata, and the Tokyo committee sought CIE confirmation regarding its decision about them. It was very likely that Yamagata's role in the creation of Japan's modern police system during his tenure as home minister in the 1880s led the committee, which was in fact set up under the Metropolitan Police Board, to take a more lenient view of the statue. But the location of the statue depicting Yamagata in military uniform and on horseback near the Imperial Diet Building made it difficult *not* to see it as a potentially threatening symbol of the rising militarism of the 1930s, even though Yamagata had died in 1922.⁴² In late April 1947, one Kennichi Toh [*sic*] from the Central Liaison Office, which mediated between GHQ and the Japanese authorities, reported that the Tokyo committee had voted not to remove the Yamagata statue. "The Committee," he explained, "did not feel that the statue was intended as propaganda or

that it had ever been used to propagate militarism."⁴³ As seen in this study, the statues most frequently used as the sites of mass rallies, as well as in visual media propagating the ideology of self-sacrifice, were of Kusunoki Masashige, Ōmura Masujirō, Saigō Takamori, and Hirose Takeo. By contrast, the Yamagata memorial, erected in 1929, was rarely utilized for public spectacles.

This monument nevertheless became the object of intense controversy between GHQ and Japanese officials. A day after his initial visit, Toh returned to GHQ and spoke with CIE officials, who "advised that it is the definite opinion of this Division that the Committee should reconsider its decision" regarding the Yamagata memorial.⁴⁴ This debate surrounding the Yamagata statue is the only instance when GHQ intervened directly in the decisions of the Tokyo committee. Toh was "asked if the Committee had thoroughly considered the role which Yamagata had played in developing Japan into a militaristic nation," disclosing an interpretation of history that locates the roots of Japanese militarism in the Meiji period and not as an aberration of the 1930s. GHQ representatives pointed out that

Yamagata was the father of conscription, . . . that he had consistently advocated heavy armament, that he was the author of the ordinance requiring the War and Navy Ministers to be general or admirals on active duty, which more than any other single factor was responsible for making parliamentary government in Japan impossible, that he had always strongly opposed party government and had been Japan's strongest opponent of democracy in the late Meiji Period. Probably he was more responsible than any other person for setting Japan on the course which led to her recent disaster. If he were alive today he would probably be the leading figure in the War Criminal trials now in progress.⁴⁵

Although the "achievements" listed here are doubtless those of Yamagata, the linking of his career to the war crimes trials reveals a one-sided assessment of the general made by the victors during a time of controversial court rulings. The fact that his statue



Fig. 9.2 *Ōyama—Yamagata ryō-gensui no dōzō tsuihō sare kōen ichisumi ni* (Bronze Statues of Field Marshals Ōyama and Yamagata, Purged [and Moved to] a Corner in a Park), 1957. Courtesy of The Mainichi Newspapers. A similar photo appeared in the *New York Times* on September 6, 1948, shortly after the statues were moved to Ueno Park.

was located “opposite to the GHQ Religious [*sic*] Center” might further explain why GHQ/CIE was keen to have this sculpture out of public view.⁴⁶

GHQ continued to apply pressure when the statues of Yamagata and Ōyama were not immediately removed after its intervention but the committee eventually found a way to save the two statues from destruction. In a later document, GHQ stated that they had been informed that “in certain cases, statues constituting important pieces of art . . . have merely been removed to museums.”⁴⁷ The Yamagata

and Ōyama statues were declared “important pieces of art” and transferred to Ueno Park and then to the Tokyo Prefectural Museum of Art (Tōkyō-fu Bijitsukan, the current Tokyo Metropolitan Art Museum or Tōkyō-to Bijutsukan), also located in Ueno. They were meant to be “stored away from public view,” and photographs from the 1950s (fig. 9.2) picture them in a backyard of the museum, suggesting that the museum did not acknowledge their value as artworks in the same way as the committee.⁴⁸

In 1964, the Ōyama statue was reinstated near its original site in 1920 outside the Yasukuni Shrine, where it still is located today. Two years earlier, in 1962, the Yamagata statue was re-situated to Inokashira Nature and Culture/Sculpture Park (Inokashira Shizen Bunka-en—Chōkoku-en) on the western outskirts of Tokyo, close to the home of its sculptor, Kitamura Seibō, and on the former site of his atelier.⁴⁹ Complementing the outdoor statue is

an indoor exhibition that included the cast and smaller prototypes of the figure; one version is still displayed in the sculpture park's main exhibition building. Originally commissioned by the IJA and now owned by the Japanese state, the statue was under the administration of Tokyo Prefecture from 1945 until 1991. That year, news of plans to restructure Inokashira Park were made public, and the mayor of Hagi, concerned about the fate of the Yamagata statue, wrote to the governor of Tokyo Prefecture to request that it be relocated to his city. The national government gave its approval, and the statue was moved to Hagi in June 1992 at the cost of 10 million *yen*.⁵⁰ Today it stands in Hagi Central Park, touted, in an explanatory signboard, as "one of the most distinguished pieces of art in the world."

The fate of the Yamagata and Ōyama statues was by no means exceptional. All over Japan, statues that survived the war were left untouched by the Occupation authorities and local monument committees, even though their survival was due to the fact that they were once classified as "essential for mobilization efforts."⁵¹ One example outside of Tokyo, the 1880 monument to Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa, stands as the oldest public sculpture in Japan (see chapter 3). It was exempt from wartime mobilization because of its connections with the Imperial House but then came under scrutiny by the Occupation authorities because of its portrayal of the ancient warrior with a sword in his hand that clearly indicates a military figure. Kanazawa officials ultimately persuaded the US forces stationed in the city to spare the monument, emphasizing that the sword excepted, the statue embodied the peace achieved through the unification of Japan in the age of Yamato Takeru. The statue survived the occupation period without modification.⁵²

Other public sculptures were taken down from their pedestals, either moved to less prominent locations or hidden away in storage, such as the statues of the imperial princes in Tokyo. The statue of Emperor Jinmu in Toyohashi (see chapter 3) was hidden away from 1945 to 1965 when it was re-erected in a park on a much smaller pedestal. Another well-known illustration of the relatively leni-

ent attitude of the Occupation forces toward memorials is a 37 m high monument erected in Miyazaki Prefecture in 1940. It has the inscription *hakkō ichiu* (The Eight Corners [of the World] Under One Roof), a wartime slogan expressing Japan's expansionist ambitions for the unification of "the entire world under imperial leadership."⁵³ Clearly falling under the CIE definition of symbols of "militarism and ultranationalism," the structure survived simply by renaming it "Peace Tower" and removing the offending inscription. These characters were restored in 1965. Critics have seen the reinstatement of the inscription as part of a conservative restorationist movement during the 1960s that culminated in 1966 with the introduction of National Foundation Day on February 11—formerly the national holiday known as *kigensetsu*, which celebrated Jinmu's founding of the Japanese empire.

The question of whether Japan's remaining public statues would be preserved was not entirely resolved by local monument committees. In 1948, the matter was again brought to the attention of the National Diet. And again, it was not the Occupation authorities who raised complaints about vestiges of militarism; it was a member of the Upper House, Ichiki Otohiko (1872–1954). Ichiki submitted an inquiry to the government, suggesting that even in the new era some surviving statues and monuments were fueling nostalgia for military thinking (*gunji shisō*) and that this would support feudalistic and totalitarian ideologies in an age when democracy should be promoted. He singled out the statue of Ōmura Masujirō at Yasukuni Shrine: "People who pass by [this statue], even those who are committed to democracy, will naturally recall the military thinking [of the past] and cannot help but be influenced." For Ichiki, the statue was an "obstacle to the spread of democracy" in Japan.⁵⁴ The government's reply was rather formal in its reference to the proceedings of the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee for Determining the Removal of Monuments. By adopting a somewhat circular logic, the reply claimed that the monument was not a hindrance to the spread of democracy because the committee had decided that it should

be left untouched, thus confirming that it did *not* represent militaristic thinking.

The Diet did not pursue Ichiki's petition, yet it proved that concerns over these statues—what the *Yomiuri shinbun* described in late 1945 as “symbols of militarism”—continued even after the local monument committees had finished their work. It should be noted that Ichiki was not a member of any of the left-wing parties that were highly critical of Japan's militarist past. He was the governor of the Bank of Japan from 1923 to 1927 and the finance minister from 1922 to 1923. In his latter capacity, he succeeded Takahashi Korekiyo, one of the victims of the 1936 military coup attempt. It is plausible that his firsthand experience of Japan's slide toward total war made him extremely sensitive to any remnants of militarism in Japanese society.

The 1949 report on the “nonmilitary activities of the occupation of Japan” notes that the measures GHQ/CIE had taken had “resulted in the removal of 5,613 monuments and 354 statues, the transfer of 890 monuments and 17 statues to less conspicuous locations, and the alteration of the appearance or a change in the inscription of 908 monuments and twenty-nine statues.”⁵⁵ The fact that fewer than one hundred bronze statues of historical figures in the public domain had survived the war and that, for example, the Tokyo committee had ordered the demolition of only two statues indicates that the majority of the 354 statues listed as having been destroyed would have been the stone or cement images in schoolyards or sculptures attached to the country's numerous *chūkōnhi*. The number does not include many of the statues of historical figures. A different document discussing the public statues of Tokyo clearly states that the seventy-four statues in the prefecture earmarked for removal were “mostly from school grounds.”⁵⁶

Detailed statistics on the “Removal of Monuments and Statues” compiled by the CIE also allow a closer look at the situation in other prefectures. These sources confirm the conclusion that most of the 354 statues claimed by the CIE report as having been demolished were not sculptures of historical personalities; they were school statuary and other

monuments.⁵⁷ The prefecture that recorded the largest number of statues “removed and destroyed” was Kanagawa (see Table 9.1). Kanagawa was the home of Ninomiya Sontoku, and statues of this “nostalgic idol” are still widespread here. Of the aforementioned 354 statues, fifty-two were in Kanagawa, and of these, fifty fell into the category labeled “destroyed and removed *from public school properties*.” Unfortunately, the CIE data does not provide any further details, yet the historical link between Ninomiya and Kanagawa Prefecture makes it highly likely that most of these examples were Ninomiya sculptures installed in schools.

It is noteworthy that GHQ included the removed Ninomiya statues in its statistics, perhaps to demonstrate the effectiveness of its campaign, despite the previous statement by Occupation authorities that there was “no requirement” to remove any of the sculptures.⁵⁸ Contemporary reports do confirm, nevertheless, that in some parts of Japan, including the capital Tokyo, US troops did forcefully demolish Ninomiya statues on schoolgrounds,⁵⁹ whereas in other parts of the country the removal of these monuments was done at the behest of the Japanese authorities.

The more detailed GHQ reports on Nagano and Saitama prefectures list some of the statues “removed and destroyed” by name. All portrayed Kusunoki Masashige and Nogi Maresuke, who, as we have seen, were frequent choices in school statuary. In Nagano, for example, two of the five statues taken down stood on state school grounds, and the other three were located in “other public properties”—that is, parks or shrines. Records indicate that in Misawa village in Kita Adachi-gun in Saitama Prefecture, a statue of General Nogi was “removed” on October 30, 1945, around the same time as a bronze statue of Kusunoki in Kyowa village in Kodama-gun, also in Saitama Prefecture. In Fujisawa, a 3.6 m statue of General Nogi, erected in 1937, was removed from its plinth in summer 1946 as a result of local controversies.⁶⁰ Although these removals are documented in GHQ sources, it is not clear whether they were the result of GHQ orders. The Nogi statue in Saitama was dismantled before

Prefecture	Monuments for the War Dead	Other Monuments	Statues
Tokyo	65	375	12
Osaka	137	17	4
Hyogo	271	36	38
Kagoshima	118	30	3
Aichi	132	134	16
Ishikawa	93	11	32
Yamaguchi	209	19	0
Kyoto	169	22	10
Toyama	193	14	16
Hokkaido	115	3	4
Okayama	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kanagawa	55	54	52
Shizuoka	153	14	5
Fukuoka	99	26	5
Nagasaki	36	27	0
Fukui	90	1	9
Shiga	156	12	4
Kochi	84	15	12
Niigata	173	26	7
Nagano	290	62	5
Gifu	176	14	16
Saitama	286	81	13
Hiroshima	313	63	0
Fukushima	86	4	0
Ibaragi	134	33	2
Ōita	143	2	0
Yamagata	112	36	12
Chiba	192	19	4
Mie	131	11	11
Kagawa	130	24	4
Kumamoto	61	24	3
Ehime	68	46	0
Gunma	159	25	5
Wakayama	101	1	0
Iwate	41	13	13
Aomori	39	2	1
Saga	72	11	1
Miyagi	144	3	0
Shimane	56	2	0
Tochigi	130	28	0
Tottori	80	10	10
Yamanashi	103	3	1
Nara	107	0	0
Tokushima	56	0	0
Miyazaki	38	33	1
Akita	61	3	12
Total	5657	1389	343

the discussion of public statuary began in earnest and might well have been an example of “anticipatory obedience” toward the incoming Occupation authorities.

Some scholars continue to dwell upon the destructive character of the policies of the Allied Occupation;⁶¹ however, the evidence above leads to the conclusion that the postwar “purge” of public statuary by the Occupation authorities was not as extreme as the destruction of statuary during the war. The GHQ’s “purge” of the public domain was very limited in scale, especially concerning statues of historical figures. Their campaign mainly focused on memorials commemorating the war dead, most of which had been spared during the war and many of which had provocative inscriptions.

The Occupation authorities in Japan intervened in that country’s memorial landscape to a much lesser degree than their counterparts in Germany, where fewer statues and memorials had been destroyed during the war than in Japan. But Germany was directly governed by the various Allied military administrations, and no German government, or indeed state, existed between 1945 and 1949. It was, therefore, much easier to destroy memorials there, and the Occupation authorities in Germany not only ordered the dismantling of recent Nazi memorials but also older symbols of “Prusso-German militarism.” Directive No. 30 of the Allied Control Council, promulgated on May 13, 1946, prohibited

Table. 9.1 Monuments and statues destroyed, removed, or altered during the Allied Occupation. Data compiled by the author from General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, Public Opinion & Sociological Research Division, *Removal of Monuments and Statues—Statistics* (Tokyo: National Diet Library [Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan], Kensei Shiryōshitsu, 1952). Data on Okayama Prefecture was not included in the documentation. The numbers slightly differ from those given in other GHQ reports.

the planning, design, construction, erection or other presentation of memorial stones, memorials, posters, statues, buildings, shop signs or street signs, symbols, memorial reliefs or insignia that aim to preserve . . . the German military tradition, revive militarism or preserve the memory of the National Socialist Party, or contribute to the glorification of war-related events.⁶²

By comparison, therefore, the policies of the Allied Occupation of Japan only minimally impacted on the country's public statuary.

NEW MONUMENTS FOR A "NEW JAPAN"

The Occupation authorities looked closely at the statues that survived the war, but they also permitted the commissioning of new statues of historical figures representing the "New Japan" and the restoration of sculptures that had been removed from their pedestals. Compared to the prewar period, these new initiatives were firmly rooted in local politics. There had never been any central planning and coordination of public statuary, as we have seen in previous chapters. Yet the abolition of the Home Ministry in 1947 further weakened the central government's ability to control the public domain, shape policy on public statuary, and head national propaganda campaigns.⁶³ Despite these significant changes, the dynamics behind the growth of postwar public statuary in Japan did not differ fundamentally from the prewar era, a testimony to a deep-rooted desire for visual representations of the nation in the public arena. Encouraged by the 1949 Social Education Law (*Shakai kyōiku-hō*), many of the social organizations founded in prewar Japan, such as housewives' organizations or youth groups, continued to play a crucial part in this new environment.⁶⁴ In later years, the Ministry of Education would take a leading role in social education, re-establishing the central government's influence in local educational affairs.

Statues commissioned in the immediate postwar period were an expression of the newly constructed self-image of Japan as a democratic and "peace-loving state," a country eager to maintain good relations with other nations. Symbols of international friendship were the first to emerge, or re-emerge, in the public space. The very first sculpture erected in the public domain after the end of the war was an attempt to strengthen bilateral ties with the United States. In November 1945, a bust of Matthew Calbraith Perry (1794–1858), the American commander whose ships had "opened" Japan in 1854, was restored to its original location in Yokosuka. The statue was installed in 1901 on the initiative of Itō Hirobumi and his son-in-law Kaneko Kentarō (1853–1942), who had close ties to the United States. It was part of a memorial complex commemorating Perry's arrival in Japan. The bust had remained in place until the last year of the war when it was "torn down . . . by members of the Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Corps," the youth group of wartime Japan's only political party, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei Yokusankai*).⁶⁵ It was not melted down during the war requisitioning campaign, survived the war, and in November 1945 GHQ ordered the bust to be reinstated to its original site at the entrance to the Perry Landing Memorial in Perry Park in Yokosuka, where it remains today. The restoration of the first statue in the public space following war's end was thus prompted by none other than the Occupation forces.

The reconstruction of a statue of Ii Naosuke a few years later must be seen in a similar light. Chapter 6 showed that the two statues of Ii in the cities of Yokohama and Hikone (built in 1909 and 1910, respectively) were designed to memorialize Ii's role in opening Japan to the world in the late 1850s. Destroyed during the war, the Hikone statue became one of the first memorials to be restored in postwar Japan, rebuilt in 1949 to celebrate a "pioneer of Japanese-American friendship."⁶⁶ The ninetieth anniversary of the signing of the 1858 Japan-US Treaty of Amity and Commerce was cited as further justification for the project, a strategy aimed at ensuring the support of the Occupation authorities. Unlike

conditions in the early twentieth century, when the Satsuma and Chōshū cliques still had a tight grip on Japanese politics, there was no opposition to the reconstruction of the statue on this occasion. The Yokohama statue was rebuilt five years later, in 1954. The inscription on the accompanying plaque underlines Ii's role as a pioneer of Japanese-US friendship and his contribution to modern Yokohama, which had also been cited as the legitimization of the original 1909 monument.

In a further move designed to highlight the tradition of exchange between Japan and the world, a bust of Francis Xavier, the founder of the Jesuit order's mission in Asia, was installed in Kagoshima in 1954. Commemorating the 400th anniversary of Xavier's arrival in Japan, his statue was placed in the memorial park on the site of the former cathedral of Kagoshima.⁶⁷ The timing and the participation of Christian groups in the unveiling of the statue emphasized the nation's characteristic new openness to the international community in the immediate postwar era.

Other early examples of the restoration of prewar statues include a monument dedicated to the lesser-known historical figure Mizuno Motonobu (1843–69), a councilor of a domain located in what is today Yamagata Prefecture. Originally built in 1901 but destroyed during the war, the statue was reconstructed in 1946 at its original location at Toyoretsu Shrine. It was cast from the original model preserved in the local museum. The restoration of the Perry bust aside, this was the first newly commissioned public statue in postwar Japan.⁶⁸

The trio of statues portraying the powerful Shimazu daimyo of Satsuma—Hisamitsu, Nariakira, and Tadayoshi—were all subject to wartime requisitioning but they were reconstructed in 1947, exactly thirty years after the installation of the originals. These three daimyo were not implicated in the history of Japanese “ultranationalism” and “militarism,” yet it is striking that these monuments to *warlords* were rebuilt at such an early date. This is especially the case when we consider that Kagoshima Prefecture had been originally slow to dedicate monuments to the local daimyo, and that

larger numbers of statues honoring feudal lords would not be constructed until the 1960s.

A handful of prewar politicians were also appropriated to construct a positive historical narrative of Japan by underlining the continuities in the nation's democratic traditions. These included the founders of democratic parties such as Itagaki Taisuke, whose statue in Gifu, built in 1924 but destroyed during the war, was reinstated as early as 1950. In 1951, the city of Morioka commissioned a new bust of former prime minister Hara Kei (Takashi, 1856–1921), which was erected next to the Iwate Prefectural Public Hall (Iwate-ken Kōkaidō). This was followed in 1958 with the opening of the Hara Kei Memorial Museum (Hara Kei Kinenkan).⁶⁹ Hara, a party politician who opposed the influence of the previous domain cliques, is recognized for having formed the first cabinet consisting exclusively of party politicians (with the necessary exception of the ministers of the army and the navy). He is considered a leading symbol of Taishō Democracy. His non-aristocratic background earned him the moniker “commoner prime minister” (*heimin saishō*). Even though Hara was regarded as one of the most gifted politicians of prewar Japan, no statue of him was constructed during this period. The 1951 bust marked the thirtieth anniversary of the statesman's death and was an expression of local pride, but it can also be seen as an attempt by this otherwise remote prefecture to connect to the new national narrative of a democratic Japan. In Tokyo, a statue of Hara's successor as prime minister, Takahashi Korekiyo, inaugurated in 1941 and destroyed in 1944, was reconstructed in 1955. It falls into the same category as the Hara statue in its attempt to forge contemporary links with the democratic traditions of the prewar era.

In 1952, the city of Nichinan in Miyazaki Prefecture erected a statue of Meiji diplomat and statesman Komura Jutarō. In contrast to Hara and Takahashi, who are representatives of Taishō Democracy, Komura is a somewhat ambiguous figure, because he had played an active part in the policies of expansion into China. He was foreign minister when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) and the Treaty of



Fig. 9.3 Statue of Taki Rentarō, Ueno Park, Tokyo (1947).

Portsmouth (1905) was signed, which resulted in the establishment of Japanese control of Korea and Japanese aggression into northeastern China. It was against this backdrop that a statue dedicated to Komura was built in the city of Dairen in 1936, as we have seen in chapter 8.

The city of Taketa in Ōita Prefecture commissioned a statue of composer Taki Rentarō (1879–1903) in 1950 for the Oka Castle Park (Oka Jōshi Kōen). This was an apparent attempt to replace the military legacy of Commander Hirose Takeo, whose statue had recently been removed, with a symbol of the “New Japan”—that is, a cultural state fond of Western music. The second statue of Taki was erected in the city of Ōita in 1952, with others to follow. The two statues in Taketa and Ōita were identical in design, showing the seated figure of Taki. Both works were by Asakura Fumio, who remained one of the most eminent designers of memorials commemorating historical figures into the postwar period.

In Tokyo, the first statues to symbolize peace, culture, democracy, and internationalism were erected in Ueno Park only a few years after the war. In 1947, a statue of Taki Rentarō was also built there, next to the site of the Imperial Music School where Taki was a student and later an instructor (fig. 9.3).⁷⁰ Another important initiative designed to showcase representatives of the “New Japan” was

the proposal for a statue of bacteriologist Noguchi Hideyo that was mooted around the time of the installation of the Taki statue. Noguchi, whose portrait is also on the 1,000 *yen* banknote, represented postwar Japan’s self-image of a cultural and scientific nation eager to pursue friendly exchanges with other countries. The idea of a Noguchi statue relates to the policy of the Science Council of Japan (Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi) at this time, which, one year after its foundation in 1949, had issued a declaration in which it expressed its “firm commitment, based on reflection regarding the role of Japanese scientists in the past, to contribute to the construction of a scientific-cultural state (*kaqaku bunka kokka*) and to world peace.”⁷¹ Noguchi embodies the ideals articulated in this statement and the trend to reconnect with the world: he had studied in the United States, gained international recognition as a researcher as a nominee for the Nobel Prize for Medicine, and died in Africa in 1928 while fighting epidemic diseases.⁷²

Already honored as a Great Man (*ijin*) before the war, Noguchi was therefore widely seen as the perfect representative of “the bright side” of early twentieth-century Japanese history.⁷³ The Japan Medical Association (Nihon Ishikai) and the Kitasato Institute (Kitasato Kenkyūjo) organized a fundraising campaign, and the Noguchi statue was unveiled in Ueno Park in 1951 (fig. 9.4).⁷⁴ The inscription on the statue sought to convey a universal message consonant with the “New Japan”: “For the Happiness of Mankind” (*Jinrui no kōfuku no tame ni*). Additional Noguchi statues were built in Osaka in 1955, in his hometown in Fukushima Prefecture in 1958, and many other places. Statues of the distinguished bacteriologist were also installed at elementary and middle schools around the country in an effort to fill the gap left by the wartime destruction of the images of Ninomiya, Jinmu, and Kusunoki.⁷⁵

Fig. 9.4 Statue of Noguchi Hideyo, Ueno Park, Tokyo (1951).





Fig. 9.5 *The Three Naked Women*. Tokyo (1950).

Fig. 9.6 *Terauchi gensui-zō (Miyakezaka)* (Statue of Field Marshal Takeuchi Masatake [Miyakezaka]) (1923). Souvenir postcard (unused), 1930s.



(坂宅三) 像師元内寺

Japanese sculptors had a crucial role in the re-emergence of public statuary after the war. Following several years of inactivity, they now saw a chance to pursue their work in bronze. The careers of respected sculptors such as Kitamura Seibō and Asakura Fumio, who had produced representative pieces of the ultranationalist cult of the individual in the prewar era, continued seamlessly into the postwar era. Nagasaki native Kitamura Seibō, the sculptor of statues of the generals Yamagata Arimoto, Terauchi Masatake, and Kodama Gentarō as well as the “God of War” Tachibana Chūta, was commissioned in the postwar period to create several abstract sculptures exemplifying “peace,” including the celebrated 10 m peace statue in Nagasaki’s Peace (Memorial) Park (1955).⁷⁶ In 1950, the site of Kitamura’s equestrian statue of General Terauchi was appropriated for the installation of three statues of *Naked Women* (figs. 9.5–9.6) who embodied the notions of peace, love, and intellect. The Japan Telegraph Communication Co. commissioned the work and, according to the plaque next to the statue, donated it to “the people of Tokyo.” Sculptures of naked figures as symbols of peace sig-

naled a significant shift in the language Japan’s postwar public statuary, because nudity and the expression of peace as a public virtue had been practically unknown in prewar statuary.

Artists also reproduced pieces they had created before 1945. One example by Asakura Fumio dates to 1978. It is a smaller copy of his statue of Gotō Shinpei that once stood in the Chinese city of Dalian from 1930 until the end of the war (see fig. 8.3). This later work now stands in a park in the Gotō’s hometown of Misuzawa (present-day Ōshū city).

During the occupation period, Japanese public statuary adjusted to the emerging cultural milieu of the “New Japan,” one that preferenced symbols of international friendship, Japanese-American exchange, culture and science in the public arena over the increasingly disappearing emblems of militarism and nationalism. Yet, statues of historical figures continued to be an important factor in the dissemination of national identity, even though this identity was now being recast and requiring different forms of representation. This trend continued long after the end of the 1950s, as we will see in the last chapter of this study.

10 Public Statuary since the 1960s

The 1960s brought steady economic recovery to Japan. By the end of the decade, the country had become one of the world's leading economic powers, and with it came wealth to the nation that in turn enabled the commissioning of further public monuments. Economic advancement also sparked the expression of new aspects of national identity in statuary, such as pride in Japan's recently gained economic strength or the increasing globalization of Japanese culture. Some of these novel elements went beyond the assertion of a peaceful and culturally sophisticated "New Japan," to indicate a re-emergence of pre-war ideology, evident in the renewed appearance in the public space of military figures, the heroes of the Meiji Restoration, and Emperor Meiji.

Category	1952–1963	1964–1972	1973–1979	1980s	1990s	2000s
Imperial	2	4	7	4	8	5
Military officers	8	7	4	8	7	9
Politicians	17	18	16	23	20	22
Social actors	21	20	13	31	27	10
Science	5	4	4	13	8	10
Culture	12	7	11	37	46	14
Sports	2	2	—	6	9	9
Economy	17	4	4	12	6	7
Daimyo	5	16	15	40	38	28
Samurai	14	23	23	51	71	31
Total	102	105	42	225	240	145

A broad range of social actors was involved in these developments, and statue-building became a more dynamic endeavor than ever before. The growth of public statuary was on a relatively small scale until the 1970s, with less than thirty statues built in any single year (see fig. 5.11). These figures suggest that postwar nationalism remained a highly ambiguous and contested concept: the expression of national pride through statues personifying the “nation” in the public domain was met with an ongoing lack of enthusiasm. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, however, more statues were commissioned.

The categorization of postwar statuary in Table 10.1 indicates that until the 1990s most statues were dedicated to social actors and representatives of Japan’s culture and science, a reflection of the persistent effort to position the “New Japan” as a culturally sophisticated nation. The number of “cultural actors” and “scientists” peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, hinting at the dominance of “soft” versions of national identity, which would, however, decline thereafter. Another category that expanded rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s was that of the daimyo. Since the 1990s, statues dedicated to samurai, in particular historical subjects associated with the Meiji Restoration, once again came to dominate Japanese public statuary.

Table. 10.1 Categorization of statues constructed from the end of the Allied Occupation in 1952 to 2010. Source: Author’s database. The figures for the postwar era are minimum values. In recent decades many statues have appeared that have not been included in the database, as they have received insufficient attention in research or media coverage. On the sources for the database, see chapter 5.

REPRESENTATIVES OF A “CULTURAL JAPAN”

One of the dominant categories of postwar Japanese public statuary consisted of representatives of the country’s new self-understanding as a “cultural state” (*bunka kokka*). Poets, writers, and musicians, as well as scientists, dominated this strand of postwar statuary. The number of statues honoring such figures climaxed in the 1990s, but experienced a relative decline in the twenty-first century.

Representative of this category are the statues of the poet Matsuo Bashō (1644–94); writer Shimazaki Tōson (1872–1943); daimyo Ōta Dōkan (1432–86), who was also famous for his poetry; scientist Noguchi Hideyo; and composer Taki Rentarō.

As we have seen, the first statues dedicated to No-guchi and Taki were commissioned as early as the 1950s, but since the 1960s, Bashō emerged as one of the foremost subjects in public statuary. During his lifetime, Bashō spent many years wandering through the country seeking inspiration for his verse, enabling cities and regions to construct monuments honoring him at “authentic” sites—that is, places he reportedly visited. The first statue of the poet was installed in 1963 before the central railway station in the city of Ueno in Mie Prefecture, near his birthplace. Over the years, at least three dozen Bashō statues were erected throughout Japan, most of them in the 1980s and 1990s, when he enjoyed an international reputation for his haiku poetry. Today, more statues of the poet can be found in Japan than of any other historical figure.

The numbers of daimyo statues also significantly increased from the 1960s onward. Many of the early examples were reconstructions of monuments that had been destroyed during the war. In 1943, the sculptor Kitamura Seibō argued that the casts and models of demolished statues should be preserved so that “on the day of victory” those lost to wartime mobilization campaigns could be restored.¹ The day of victory never arrived but the reconstruction of destroyed sculpture as encouraged by Kitamura did become a key aspect of postwar public statuary. For example, a statue of Maeda Toshitsune (1594–1658), the third daimyo of Kaga domain, erected in the city of Komatsu in 1966 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the installation of the original sculpture, was a copy made using the original 1916 cast.²

Politically and socially, the restoration of statues of daimyo was considered unproblematic, as the figures they portrayed embodied a premodern era that, ostensibly at least, had no links with the legacies of militarism. Given recent historiographical investigations into the roots of militarism and totalitarianism—in Japan and in other nations—some of these monuments remain controversial. Many were primarily installed as symbols of local identity, yet statues of warriors and daimyo also evidently have connotations of war and the feudal

social structure they represent. Such monuments do not represent the ordinary people, but a very narrow elite—the warrior aristocracy—who had oppressed the people over the centuries and had fought protracted civil wars. Despite the claims made by the authors of some prospectuses that these statues symbolize “Japanese values,” the “warrior ethos” celebrated could hardly be more removed from the daily lives of average citizens.³

As in the prewar period, the most common approach since the 1960s was to dedicate a statue to the founder of the domain (*hanso*) or the domain’s last daimyo at the time of the Meiji Restoration. Statues of Edo-period daimyo generally dominate this category, mirroring a revival of interest in this era in Japanese society and historiography since the 1960s. In contrast to “modern Japan” with its numerous problems, the Edo period was increasingly presented in romanticized terms as exemplifying the “true Japan,” a culturally aware, self-contained, and peaceful country. On the surface, the veneration of Edo leaders contradicted the narrative of a modern and global Japan that began with the overthrow of the feudal order and the creation of the Meiji government. However, in the 1960s, the Edo period was reinvented and linked to the new narrative of a “peaceful” and “cultural” country.⁴ As one Japanese historian described the period “probably never before in world history have so many people lived in peace for so long.”⁵ Table 10.2 lists the major daimyo statues built in the 1960s and 1970s. Until the mid-1960s, these were all reconstructions of statues from the prewar period, even though not all were accurate replicas. The faithfulness of a given reproduction depended on whether detailed photographs, design documents, or the prewar cast or maquette still existed.

The famous equestrian statue of Date Masamune in Sendai illustrates the ongoing relevance of daimyo as symbols connecting the local identity associated with the new national narrative of a peaceful Japan with a long history of friendly bilateral relations with other nations. Unveiled in 1935, shortly before the outbreak of total war, the monument was requisitioned in 1944, yet the daimyo’s head and upper body were preserved.⁶ In 1953, a

Name of Statue/Figure Commemorated	Subject's Birth and Death Dates	Location	Year Statue Built (Reconstruction/original year)
Shimazu Nariaki	1809–1858	Kagoshima	1947 (R, 1917)
Shimazu Hisamitsu	1817–1887	Kagoshima	1947 (R, 1917)
Shimazu Tadayoshi	1840–1931	Kagoshima	1947 (R, 1917)
Ii Naosuke	1815–1860	Yokohama	1949 (R, 1909)
Date Masamune	1567–1636	Sendai	1953 (concrete) 1964 (bronze) (R, 1935)
Satake Yoshitaka	1825–1884	Akita	1953 (R, 1915)
Maeda Masatoshi	1649–1706	Toyama	1954 (R, 1924)
Katō Kiyomasa	1562–1611	Kumamoto	1960 (R, 1935)
Andō Nobumasa	1819–1871	Iwaki (Fukushima)	1961 (R, 1922)
Tokugawa Ieyasu	1542–1616	Okazaki (Aichi)	1965
Maeda Toshitsune	1593–1658	Komatsu (Ishikawa)	1966 (R, 1916)
Shibata Katsuie	1522–1583	Fukui	1967
Takeda Shingen	1521–1573	Kōfu	1969
Uesugi Kenshin	1530–1578	Jōetsu (Niigata)	1969
Shakushain	1605–1669	Shin-Hidaka (Hokkaidō)	1971
Takayama Ukon	1552–1615	Osaka	1972
Tokugawa Ieyasu	1542–1616	Shizuoka	1973
Abe Masahiro	1819–1857	Fukuyama (Hiroshima)	1978 (R, 1922)
Toyotomi Hidetsugu	1568–1595	Ōmi-Yawata (Shiga)	1979
Katō Kiyomasa	1562–1611	Kumamoto	1979
Katō Kiyomasa	1562–1611	Nagoya	1979

concrete statue depicting the daimyo in a standing pose rather than on horseback was set up as a substitute for the original sculpture. In the late 1950s, the prewar cast of the original statue was rediscovered in the local history museum, and when funds became available in 1964 a bronze copy of the prewar statue was recast in its original form.⁷ Having been the last equestrian statue completed before the war, it was now the first to be installed in the postwar era.

The reasons given for the statue's reconstruction recall the rationale behind the prewar veneration of Date Masamune. When the Aoba Shrine dedicated to this daimyo was elevated to the status of a Special Government Shrine in 1901, Date was praised for "his loyalty, but also for his diplomacy and for [making] peace" in the region he would eventually control as a domain.⁸ It was easy to adopt

Table 10.2 Major statues of daimyo built in Japan, 1949–1970s. Source: Author's database.

this kind of rhetoric in postwar Japan, especially when part of the rhetoric of pacification that fit perfectly with the image of a peaceful, internationalist "New Japan." Like Ii Naosuke, Date was also honored as a representative of an "international Japan": he had sent the Keichō Mission overseas, which visited the Philippines, the Americas, Spain, France, and Italy, including a visit to the Vatican, between 1613 and 1620. Date continues to be celebrated as a significant figure connecting Sendai and Miyagi Prefecture to the nation and the world, as demonstrated by the celebration of the 450th anniversary of his birth in 2017.⁹

STATUES OF MILITARY FIGURES IN POSTWAR JAPAN

One notable characteristic of postwar public statuary is the relative absence of modern military figures, at least compared to pre-1945 Japan. The memorials dedicated to premodern warlords are somewhat ambiguous in this context, but the numbers indicate that monuments to representatives of the IJN, and especially of the IJA, were almost considered a taboo in postwar Japan. Only a small number of the statues in this category, which survived the war and then were removed from their pedestals, were reinstated in the 1950s and the 1960s. Even fewer new statues were commissioned. Yet all of these structures had to be presented in the context of a “peaceful” Japan. They embodied “good” warriors—that is, exceptional figures who stood out among the criminalized officer corps of the imperial military.

The first documented example of a postwar sculpture of a military figure erected in the public space is the 1957 bust of Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō installed in Kagoshima. Produced in the prewar era, the bust was rediscovered in Okayama where it had been hidden away during the Occupation; it was then brought to Tōgō’s hometown. Tōgō’s reputation as the victor in the Battle of Tsushima (1905) during the Russo-Japanese War and his lack of overt ties to 1930s militarism (he died in 1934) made the restoration of this memorial possible. The unveiling was supposed to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima in 1955, but due to a lack of funds, it had to be delayed for two years. A full-size statue of Tōgō was installed ten years later, in 1967, in front of the memorial ship *Mikasa* in Yokosuka, Tōgō’s flagship during the Tsushima battle.¹⁰

An army counterpart to the image of Admiral Tōgō is apparent in the statue of General Nogi Maresuke, another hero of the Russo-Japanese War. The first example was installed, together with a sculpture of his wife Shizuko, at the Nogi Shrine in Yamaguchi Prefecture to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the shrine’s foundation in 1962. A second

Nogi statue was built in 1965, but this time in a place with limited access: the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) base in Hakodate. In 1968, a year after the erection of the Tōgō statue in Yokosuka, another Nogi statue was mounted near the Nogi Shrine in Tokyo.

This attempt at reviving the worship of Nogi was accompanied by an outpouring of publications on him, including an English-language booklet by one of his most fervent admirers, Katō Genchi (1873–1965). Katō was the driving force behind the Nogi cult before the war. In the postwar era, he was now eager to convince Westerners of the value and purity of Nogi worship. In 1954, the Nogi Shrine published his *Shinto in Essence, As Illustrated by the Faith in a Glorified Personality*, in which Katō positions Nogi within a religious context. He also cites the Scottish philosopher and historian Thomas Carlyle to invoke the notion of the “Great Man View of History.” For Katō, his subject is a divinity of the highest order, “the venerable consecrated one, the glorified sage, the God Incarnate, *Deus-Homo* in the technical sense of the term. To religious admirers of Nogi, the venerable [one] is ‘the Way, the Truth and the Life’; or we might say, the Incarnated Logos.”¹¹ Katō was at pains to stress that Nogi worship did *not* involve the veneration of an actual historical figure. Like other exemplars of the cult of the individual, he claimed that Nogi worship “is not about the human Nogi, in the strict literal sense of the term, but it is the divine Nogi, that is, Divinity or the Divine, manifested in a human form.”¹² It represented what we might today describe as the “Nogi myth.” Not surprisingly, this kind of rhetoric did not gain traction in the highly pacifist (and rationalist) atmosphere of postwar Japan, and Nogi worship fell out of favor.

While Nogi was the only figure from the Japanese army venerated in the public domain until the 1970s, several statues of naval officers were restored or newly commissioned in the 1960s. For example, the upper portion of a statue of Commander Hirose Takeo in his hometown of Taketa, hidden during the war and the Occupation, was restored and installed in front of the Hirose Shrine.

A monument dedicated to Admiral Saitō Makoto (1858–1936), built in 1938 and destroyed during the war, was reconstructed in 1963 and set up in a park in his hometown in Iwate Prefecture. As a victim of the 1936 army coup, Saitō was pictured as a moderate officer, a symbol of resistance to the extremism of the 1930s and a representative of a “clean navy.”¹³ The statue’s design, which resembles that of Takahashi Korekiyo, underlines the admiral’s moderation and modesty: it depicts him in a seated pose, presumably in an attempt not to overawe visitors.¹⁴

In the city of Morioka, also in Iwate Prefecture, a statue of Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa (1880–1948) was erected in 1960. Together with a statue of Admiral Okada Keisuke (1868–1952), installed in Fukui in 1964, these are the only examples discussed here without a predecessor in the prewar era, presumably because both lived through the war. The reasons behind the choice of Yonai and Okada for a statue parallel those for the effigy of Saitō. Yonai and Okada belonged to a group of elder statesmen who opposed the rise of the IJA and even criticized the policies of the wartime cabinet of General Tōjō Hideki (1884–1948).

A rare example of a statue of an army-related figure that was restored as early as the 1960s was that of Prince Arisugawa (see chapter 3). The figure was removed from its original location in 1946 and stored away in the Finance Ministry’s Kantō Local Finance and Assets Bureau (*Ōkura-shō Kantō Zaimukyoku*). The Tokyo Metropolitan Committee for Determining the Removal of Monuments considered the statue of sufficient importance to be preserved but deemed unsuitable for public display. However, when Tokyo began preparations for the 1964 Olympics, major reconstruction work was necessary and the Bureau’s storage facilities, along with their contents, had to be relocated. The Finance Ministry and Tokyo Prefecture decided that the statue should be moved to its current location at Arisugawa-no-miya Memorial Park in Azabu.¹⁵ In addition to General Nogi, Arisugawa and his cousins Prince Komatsu and Prince Kitashirakawa were for many years in the postwar period the only fig-

ures with links to the army who were graced with public monuments.

Statues of military figures remain scarce. Most of those commissioned since the 1990s are situated in out-of-the-way locations, such as the statue of Admiral Takarabe Takeshi in Miyakonojō in Miyazaki Prefecture. Others were installed within the context of international exchange, thereby deflecting their interpretation as symbols of militarism. A statue of Kodama Gentarō, former governor-general of Taiwan, was erected there during the period of Japanese colonial rule (see chapter 8). In 2011, Kodama’s hometown of Shūnan in Yamaguchi Prefecture unveiled a statue of the general in a park named after him that was again located next to the Kodama Shrine where he is worshiped. This work is an exact copy of the prewar sculpture in Taiwan and was cast by a sculptor from the island.¹⁶ This collaboration between the Japanese hometown of a venerated figure and the former colonial territory where he was active recalls the exchange between the city of Mizusawa in Iwate Prefecture and Taiwan, two places connected through the politician Gotō Shinpei.¹⁷

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE HEROES OF THE MEIJI RESTORATION

From the 1960s, the Meiji Restoration once again began to occupy a central place in the historical consciousness of the Japanese. One reason for this was the centenary of the Restoration in 1968. Another was the continuing search for affirmative views of Japan’s history and for symbols that would embody more positive, upbeat aspects of modern Japan’s historical trajectory.

Against this backdrop, the “heroes of the Meiji Restoration” have emerged from the 1960s onward as the dominant category of Japan’s nation-centered cult of the individual. The popularity of the samurai that brought about the Restoration peaked in the 1990s, but they continue to be a dominant subject in public statuary. While this category had occupied a central place in prewar statuary, its role was relativized by the existence of other statues

representing the Imperial House and military subjects. Because these two categories were almost entirely absent from postwar public sculpture, the significance of statues dedicated to the heroes of the Meiji Restoration increased conspicuously. Statues originally built in the prewar period were reconstructed in no small number; new figures associated in varying degrees with the Meiji Restoration were added, thereby entering the national pantheon in rapid succession.

The figure with the largest number of statues in this category is Sakamoto Ryōma, the samurai from Tosa whose prewar effigies were dealt with in chapter 6. Only the memorial in Kōchi survived the war, probably because it was secured through a fundraising campaign by the local youth league. Its destruction would have been a blow to the youth movement, which was considered of central significance for wartime mobilization. Other Sakamoto monuments were dismantled but were to be reconstructed in the 1960s. The first such statue was the monument to Ryōma, together with Nakaoka Shintarō, in Maruyama Park in Kyoto (erected in 1962). New examples showing Sakamoto were also commissioned in the 1960s, and the emerging Ryōma boom led to the appearance of monuments that also included his relatives such as his sister and his wife.¹⁸

The growth of Ryōma-related statuary was accelerated by the popularity of the serialized historical novel *Ryōma ga yuku* (Ryōma on the Move, 1963–66) by Shiba Ryōtarō (1923–96), Japan's most celebrated postwar author of historical fiction. Shiba's novels are unusual in terms of their influence on Japan's historical consciousness; his bestselling books are continually being recycled as movies, television dramas, multimedia software, and many other forms.¹⁹ Moreover, they have impacted domestic tourism: the regions associated with his "heroes" have become travel destinations for those with an interest in Japanese history.

Areas with links to Sakamoto Ryōma have thus experienced a boom in tourism since the publication of *Ryōma ga yuku*, and regions with authentic affiliations to Ryōma have commissioned statues in

conjunction with the TV dramas based on his life. As a result of his unflinching popularity, new statues of this Tosa samurai were built in Kagoshima in 1979, in Nagasaki in 1989, in Kōchi and Kyoto in the 1990s, and in Tokyo, Hokkaido, Kōchi, and Kumamoto in the twenty-first century. In conjunction with NHK, which took up the Ryōma story in its year-long "historical drama" *Ryōma-den* in 2010 with a cast including the celebrated singer Fukuyama Masaharu (b. 1969) as Ryōma, almost ten Ryōma statues were commissioned between 2009 and 2011 alone. The anniversaries of existing statues were marked by roughly concurrent celebrations and festivities as well as commemorative stamp sets featuring Ryōma statues.²⁰

The figure of Sakamoto Ryōma was used in the prewar period to promote the idea of "peaceful" regime change. He was portrayed as a mediator between the rival domains of Chōshū and Satsuma, who attempted to bring about regime change without civil war until his assassination on the eve of the Restoration. Whether this interpretation is historically accurate is less relevant here than the fact that this line of reasoning was adopted in postwar Japan. The emphasis on him working toward peaceful regime change was soon connected to postwar pacifism, and on occasion, he was even associated with Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan that prohibits the use of force to settle international disputes. In a publication from the 1980s on the most famous Ryōma statue—the 1928 Kōchi memorial—a former representative of the local youth league characterized Sakamoto as an advocate of the ideals of "peace, freedom, equality, and warm respect for the individual." He asserted that Ryōma's beliefs accord "with the fundamental principles of the Japanese Constitution" of 1947.²¹ This heralds a rediscovery of "Ryōma the Democrat," a feature of the early Ryōma cult of the 1920s, the era of Taishō Democracy.

A novel aspect of the statuary of the Meiji Restoration in postwar Japan, in particular after the 1980s, were monuments showing a *group* of figures, comprising multiple statues. The most significant examples in this category all reflect the role of a spe-

cific locale in the events of the Meiji Restoration; the three prefectures most deeply involved in them were Kagoshima (former Satsuma domain), Yamaguchi (former Chōshū domain), and Kōchi (former Tosa domain).²²

In 1982, a group of statues known as the *Wakaki Satsuma no gunzō* (Young Satsuma Ensemble) was erected in front of Kagoshima Station.²³ The nineteen samurai included in this assemblage were sent as an official mission to Britain in the aftermath of the so-called 1863 War Between Satsuma and England (*Satsuei sensō*, also known as the Bombardment of Kagoshima).²⁴ The memorial includes sculptures of Terashima Munenori (1832–93), thereafter Japan’s foreign minister; future entrepreneur Godai Tomoatsu (1835–85); diplomat Samejima Naonobu (1845–80); and diplomat, later minister of education, Mori Arinori (1847–89). The monument is a demonstration of the influence of Satsuma in modern Japan, the role it played in Japan’s relations with the outer world and the opening of Japan in the 1860s, and the lasting impact of Satsuma’s young leaders of the 1860s in the following decades.

A similar memorial was set up in the 1990s in Yamaguchi Prefecture outside the small city of Hagi, in a service station called *Michi no eki Hagi ōkan*. (The *Hagi ōkan* is an ancient road connecting the towns of Hagi and Hōfu; it was designated a *shiseki*, or “historical site,” in 1989, named one of the nation’s *rekishi no michi hyakusen*, or “Hundred Historical Roads,” in 1996, and one of “Japan’s Scenic Roads” in 2007.)²⁵ Next to a memorial museum at this site honoring Yoshida Shōin, the leader of the Chōshū anti-Tokugawa movement of the 1850s, are bronze statues of ten of Yoshida’s disciples, all pivotal figures of the Meiji Restoration.²⁶ The statues portray individuals already encountered in this study, including Yamagata Aritomo, Kido Takayoshi, Itō Hirobumi, Shinagawa Yajirō, and Yamada Akiyoshi. With their location off the beaten track they do not play a major role in tourism, but the city of Hagi and Yamaguchi Prefecture designated the *Hagi ōkan* as a site for celebrations to mark the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration in 2018.²⁷

The third set group of sculptures commemorating the Meiji Restoration is known as the “Gate of the Restoration” (*Ishin no mon*). Like the *Hagi ōkan*, it is in a remote place, in the village of Yusuhara in Kōchi Prefecture. The group consists of eight statues of samurai from the Tosa domain, all considered key figures in the events leading up to the Restoration. The statues were set up in 1995 as an expression of local pride in the region’s “moment of fate”—that is, Ryōma’s escape from Tosa, an act strictly forbidden and subject to capital punishment—that supposedly changed the course of Japanese history by opening the path to the Meiji Restoration. It was constructed, according to the Yusuhara website, to “inspire the development of passion among the young,”²⁸ upholding the tradition of presenting Ryōma and his associates as models for Japan’s youth.

An intriguing aspect of the increasing emphasis of public statuary relating to the Meiji Restoration is the appearance of historical figures who were previously condemned as traitors because they sided with the shogunate during the civil disturbances of the 1860s and the Boshin War. This group includes, for example, the commanders of the shogunate’s police forces who opposed the anti-shogunate movement of the 1860s, most famously the Shinsengumi, which was responsible for the death of several leaders of the restoration movement. Since modern-day Japan is built on the legacy of the Meiji Restoration—the founding event of the nation-state—the Shinsengumi should logically be seen as the oppressors and killers of those working to restore imperial power. Conversely, any cult based on these figures would position the members of the restoration movement as terrorists, a claim made by some provocative publications in recent years.²⁹

Similar to Sakamoto Ryōma and others, who were assassinated by the shogunate police forces, the commanders of these same law enforcement agencies likewise became objects of widespread veneration as the result of their treatment in historical novels. For example, in the novel *Moe-yo ken* (Burn, Sword, 1972), author Shiba Ryōtarō depicts

the shogunate police as a group of capable, committed samurai, devoted to protecting the established order from rebels and troublemakers and guided by the single motto of *makoto*, or “honesty.” The first TV dramas featuring the Shinsengumi were based on prewar novels and appeared as early as the 1960s, but it was the 2004 edition of the NHK’s annual “historical drama” series, drawn from a historical novel by Mitani Kōki (b. 1961), that ensured the popularity of the Shinsengumi. Like the 2010 drama dealing with Ryōma, *Shinsengumi!* starred famous actors, including Katori Shingo from the group SMAP.³⁰ The program was a massive commercial hit, with high audience ratings,³¹ and it spawned a “Shinsengumi boom” that boosted tourism at sites associated with the Shinsengumi such as Hino and Itabashi in Tokyo, Kyoto and Hakodate.³² In association with NHK, the Edo-Tokyo Museum (Edo Tōkyō Hakubutsukan) also organized a major exhibition on the group in spring 2004.³³

The first statues of Shinsengumi members were erected in the 1990s; others were commissioned in the run-up to the release of the 2004 NHK series. Early proposals for statues to honor this shogunate police force, mooted in the 1960s, failed to yield any tangible results. This was due to the hegemony of mainstream views on the Meiji Restoration that cast the samurai who fought for the shogunate as unworthy of public commendation. For example, even though sufficient funds were raised following a proposal for a statue of the deputy chief of the Shinsengumi, Hijikata Toshizō (1835–69), the project was rejected by the city of Hino. Municipal authorities there declared that statues depicting “members of violent gangs” were undesirable.³⁴ It was only in 1995 that the Hino Rotary Club commissioned the famous statue of Hijikata to mark its thirtieth anniversary. Today it is at the temple, Takahata Fudōson, the location of Hijikata’s grave.³⁵ The second statue of Hijikata was installed shortly thereafter on the grounds of the Hijikata Toshizō Memorial (Hijikata Toshizō Kinenkan) near the samurai’s birthplace.³⁶

The inscription on the statue at the Takahata Fudōson contains no explanation of the rationale

behind the monument’s commission, only that the temple is the site of Hijikata’s grave and therefore a traditional site of consolation.³⁷ “Consolation” services (*irei hōyō*) for Hijikata and other Shinsengumi members had been held here from the prewar period onward, but after the statue’s installation in 1995, these were expanded into larger festivities. In 1997, these culminated in the inaugural Shinsengumi Festival (*Shinsengumi matsuri*) that has since been embraced by Hino city. This festival, like Ryōma festivals throughout Japan, is above all a promotional tool for local tourism, and it continues to be held on the second weekend in May in conjunction with the temple’s traditional consolation services for Hijikata.³⁸

In 2003, in the run-up to NHK’s annual drama series, several new statues of Hijikata were built in Hakodate, the city where the last shogunate loyalists made their final stand against the “imperial forces” of the new Meiji government. Two examples were installed in the Goryōkaku, the fort where Hijikata and his followers fought their final battle in the Boshin War. Another was set up at the Hijikata/Takuboku Rōmankan (Hijikata–Takuboku Museum), a museum dedicated to the memory of Hijikata and the poet Ishikawa Takuboku (1886–1912) who is honored with a statue in a nearby park named after him.³⁹ These statues, several in indoor locations, are not as widely known as the Ryōma statue in Kōchi. Yet their proliferation demonstrates that even the sworn enemies of the restorationist movement of the 1860s, whose memories were suppressed until the late 1990s, have been largely rehabilitated. Today they are venerated as figures embodying basic national values such as loyalty and fighting spirit.

The region of Aizu in Fukushima Prefecture, once vilified as a hardened opponent of the restorationist movement, has similarly been welcomed back into the national fold. During the siege of Aizu-Wakamatsu Castle in October/November 1868, Aizu withstood the restoration forces until the fateful end, a battle that resulted in a bloodbath of the domain’s defeated samurai. Even before the war, apologists for Aizu attempted to reframe lo-

cal history from a story of resistance against “imperial restoration” to one of loyal service to the imperial court through allegiance to the shogunate, which, after all, had been appointed by the emperor himself.

Although today some of the heroes discussed in this study, including Sakamoto Ryōma, are venerated precisely because of their rebelliousness, in the case of Aizu its actions were reframed as a story of loyalty. Historian Hiraku Shimoda cogently points this out in his analysis of the works of writers from the Aizu region:

It was not rebelliousness, so their argument ran, but good old-fashioned values that motivated Aizu. It was, they claimed, not lack of imperial loyalty but surplus of tradition that made Aizu take its hard-line stance throughout the Restoration struggle. . . . In 1917 [historian] Okabe Seiichi . . . defended Aizu soldiers as having “expressed to the very end the *bushidō* spirit.” He praised Aizu as the sole keeper of that fading martial tradition.⁴⁰

But Aizu’s rehabilitation was slow. In the mid-1960s, the first statues drew attention to a particularly tragic episode in the Aizu tale regarding the fate of the so-called Byakkōtai (White Tiger Brigade). Nineteen of this force of 300 boy samurai committed suicide after realizing that the loss of the Battle of Aizu-Wakamatsu was inevitable. Statues dedicated to the Byakkōtai were built on the site of the battle in the 1960s, with at least three more in the 1990s. Once again, TV dramas helped publicize the Byakkōtai story, including a series broadcast in 1986 and, in particular, the NHK historical dramas aired in 2007 and 2013.⁴¹ Writers and activists from Aizu carefully orchestrated these developments in the media and in statues such that the boy martyrs of the Byakkōtai were eventually rehabilitated and even have become part of the pantheon of national heroes.

STATUES OF THE MEIJI EMPEROR

The centennial of the Meiji Restoration in 1968 prompted plans to commemorate the Meiji emperor through the commissioning of public statuary on a grand scale. For the first time, memorials to the emperor were set up outdoors, in parks and shrines. Considerations surrounding statues of emperors were always complex and visual representations of the Meiji emperor were particularly rare and inaccessible until the 1960s. (Statues of Taishō and Shōwa have yet to be built.) Meiji statues had been exclusively built for indoor exhibition, and only the participation of leading figures from the IHM made the display of such sculptures possible (see chapters 2 and 3).

The official government proposals to celebrate the centennial initially included a plan to build a large Meiji statue, but the idea was scrapped during the deliberations and remained unrealized.⁴² The first outdoor statues of Meiji then would be built shortly after the 1968 centennial as a result of a private initiative. The first was installed in November 1969 in the city of Shinshiro in Aichi Prefecture and the second in 1970 in Naha, Okinawa, then still under US military administration (fig. 10.1).⁴³ The commissioning organization of the Okinawa sculpture was the Great Japan Imperial Way Association (Dai-Nihon Kōdōkai), a name hardly suggestive of a middle-of-the-road political agenda. The fact that the US authorities in Okinawa allowed such a group to proceed with this monument project is noteworthy. The US authorities may have decided to turn a blind eye on the project due to the fact that the statue was erected on the grounds of a religious institution: the Shinto shrine Naminoue-gū in Naha.⁴⁴

The plaque next to the statue explains that the monument was built as an expression of national pride in “Japan having become the second-largest economy in the world,” the result of the “unity and the devotion of the nation during the Meiji period.”⁴⁵ Despite today’s Japan no longer being the world’s second-largest economy, nobody ever revised the inscription, a situation that illustrates the



dangers of engraving current political and economic achievements in stone. More importantly, the building of the Meiji statue indicates that at this time, Japanese nationalists felt the need to prepare the southern region for its return to Japan. The inscription elaborates that the statue was conceived as a tool to disseminate national consciousness among Okinawans. It was most likely also conceived of as a tool to counter the historical narrative conveyed by the two existing statues in the islands depicting the local rights activist Tōyama Kyūzō (the first postwar statue on the islands, built in 1961) and the local politician Jahana Noboru (re-built in 1964).⁴⁶

The official *History of Okinawa Prefecture* published in 1976 emphasizes that “nation [state] consciousness” (*kokka ishiki*) had been virtually nonexistent on the islands.⁴⁷ In the view of nationalists from mainland Japan, it was this “deficit” that needed to be addressed when they proposed the Meiji statue in the late 1960s. The simple inscription, “*kokka*” (state) on the pedestal of the Meiji statue sends out a resoundingly clear message. But while locals might interpret the installation of an imperial statue in a Shinto shrine as a provocative gesture, this project neither triggered particularly heated discussions nor the commissioning of counter-monuments. As a matter of fact, no other public statues were built in Okinawa in the 1970s and 1980s.

Similarly designed Meiji statues were erected at shrines in Hachinohe in Aomori Prefecture (1971), Morioka in Iwate Prefecture (1975), and Ōmura in Nagasaki Prefecture (1978), at the Niikura Fuji Asama Shrine in Yamanashi Prefecture (1981), and in Gifu Park in Gifu (1972). These statues were cast by Kojō Bronze Works (Kojō Seisakusho) in Takaoka and were commissioned by the Great Japan Imperial Way Association or related regional organizations such as the Patriotic Association to Build a Holy Statue of Meiji the Great (Meiji Taitei Seizō Konryū Hōsankai) in Gifu or the Patriotic Association to

Support the Building of a Statue of Meiji the Great (Meiji Taitei Seizō Hōsan Kyōkai) in Iwate.⁴⁸ Today, more than fifteen Meiji statues stand throughout Japan, at least partially filling the gap left by the restrictions on using the visual image of Emperor Meiji.

In terms of design, these statues were based on the very first bronze work depicting Emperor Meiji made in 1912 at the instigation of former Imperial Household Minister Tanaka Mitsuaki (see figs. 2.13–2.14). While the 1912 statue by sculptor Watanabe Osao was a life-sized figure (175 cm), most of the statues cast in the 1970s were considerably taller, with the majority being 245 cm high.⁴⁹ They were designed by the sculptor Koganemaru Ikuhisa (1915–2003), and Kitamura Seibō acted as an “advisor” (*kanshū*). Like Kitamura, Koganemaru was from Nagasaki Prefecture, albeit from the remote island of Iki, and had also produced “peace monuments” during the 1960s.⁵⁰

The Meiji statues commissioned in the late 1960s and the 1970s were part of a grand plan to inculcate a cult of Meiji that would surpass anything seen to date. Mihira Seidō (d. 1980), the chairman and founder of the Association to Support the Building of Bronze Statues of the Meiji Emperor (Meiji Tennō Dōzō Hōsankai) and chairman of the Great Japan Imperial Way Association, originally proposed the construction of one hundred statues of Meiji throughout the country to celebrate the centennial of the Meiji Restoration. In September 1969, he officially announced that the Meiji Tennō Dōzō Hōsankai had received seventy-eight orders in response to a brochure sent to municipal and prefectural administrations across Japan.⁵¹ In November, this figure rose to 130, but Mihira explained that the number of statues to be commissioned would be limited to one hundred.⁵² With the exception of school statuary, this would nonetheless constitute the greatest number of statues of a single historical figure in the Japanese public domain.

The almost identical inscriptions on several of the Meiji statues set up in the late 1960s and the 1970s show that Mihira’s plan reflected Japan’s growing national self-confidence. The praise for the Meiji period expressed through these statues

Fig. 10.1 Statue of Emperor Meiji in Naminoue Shrine, Naha City, Okinawa (1970).

suggests more than the moderate economic nationalism of the times, however. With their strong emphasis on the role of the state (*kokka*), these statues doubtlessly conveyed a reactionary, nationalist message.⁵³

Responses to Mihira's proposal were split, even within the conservative circles and institutions affiliated with the Imperial House. The IHA, along with the Meiji and Akama shrines, raised "concerns" that the mass production of Meiji statues could lead to "excessive idolatry" (*gūzō sūhai*) or to public indifference in the face of the sheer number of statues springing up. They maintained that monuments might even be neglected and not receive proper maintenance.⁵⁴ They also opposed the prospect of a private organization profiting financially (and without permission) from the image of the Meiji emperor and criticized Mihira for appropriating the imperial symbol of the chrysanthemum for the cover of the brochure he had sent to local administrations.⁵⁵

Mihira replied that his proposals faced no legal obstacles since the regulations on the use of Meiji's image had been abolished, along with the crime of *lèse majesté*, such that he was free to proceed. He further stressed that he wished to assist in educating the public about Japan's illustrious past and the "glorious achievements of Meiji" (*Meiji no igyō*).⁵⁶ In the journal *Zen'yō*, Mihira stated that to date there had only been indoor statues of Meiji, and he considered these "too remote" from the ordinary citizen to make a meaningful contribution to social education.⁵⁷ He also added that profits made from the venture would be negligible. The wholesale cost of a single statue was 2.8 million *yen*. Although Mihira planned to sell them for 4.8 million *yen* each to the municipalities, the costs for transport, communication, advertising, and personnel would consume any potential profit. Finally, Mihira argued that his plan would not constitute an act of disrespect to the Imperial House because it had been endorsed by imperial prince Takamatsu-no-miya; moreover, he had the support of some dozen parliamentarians.⁵⁸

The proposal to build one hundred statues of the Meiji emperor was an expression of postwar Ja-

pan's new-found self-confidence as a resurgent economic power. The response of the IHA recalled the restrictive attitude of the IHM in the prewar period to portrayals of emperors in the public arena, except for ancient and mythical figures such as Jinmu. Even a century after the Meiji Restoration and sixty years after Meiji's death, the emperor's effigy still could not be freely placed in the public space. The negative attitude voiced by the traditional guardians of Meiji veneration evinces the lack of consensus in Japan about how to instill nationalism in the people. Thus, the project to build one hundred Meiji statues was doomed to fail, and only around one dozen were eventually erected as a result of Mihira's initiative.⁵⁹

PUBLIC STATUARY FROM THE 1990S TO THE PRESENT

Despite the nation's economic difficulties since the 1990s, there have been commissions of a significant number of statues over the last three decades. After a slight slump in the 1990s—the result of the country's economic difficulties—there was a recovery from 2005, and by 2010 over thirty statues per year were again installed across the country. The most recent statistical trend is not yet entirely clear, but the 2010s experienced a decline in statue-building activity followed by a moderate recovery since 2014/2015 (see fig. 5.11).

The most significant statistical change post-1990s was the drop in the commissioning of statues portraying social actors and representatives of Japanese culture and science. Even when taking into consideration the overall dip in commissioned statues, the decline in these categories in the 2000s is dramatic by comparison (see Table 10.1). If public statuary were to serve as a gauge, it would seem that soft nationalism based on an understanding of the country as a "cultural state" is losing ground and is being replaced by "harder" forms of nationalism.

One category that remained relatively stable from the 1990s to the 2000s are daimyo statues



Fig. 10.2 *Yamanouchi Kazutoyo-kō dōzō. The Statue of Yamanouchi* (1913). Souvenir postcard (unused), Taishō period.

and, to a lesser degree, figures categorized as “samurai.” As in earlier decades, these statues of regional potentates were most often commissioned as expressions of the identity of a local community or region, and many statues in this group are reconstructions of prewar sculptures. The reason these particular statues were not rebuilt *before* the 1990s was usually the lack of the original cast or maquette or detailed documents referring to the statue design. In the 1990s, more cities began to pursue plans to reconstruct statues of their local daimyo even when only photographs, such as souvenir postcards or sketches, were available. One such example is the equestrian statue of Yamanouchi Ka-

zutoyo in Kōchi, built in 1913 and destroyed in 1944. It was recast and reconstructed in the 1990s using prewar photographs; due to the lack of an original model or cast it looks slightly different from the original sculpture (fig. 10.2).

In 1996, the Association for the Reconstruction of the Bronze Statue of Yamanouchi Kazutoyo (Yamanouchi Kazutoyo-kō Dōzō Saiken Kiseikai) was set up to pursue this ambitious project, which was intended to mark the 400th anniversary of the establishment of Yamanouchi’s rule in Tosa in 2001.⁶⁰ Members included Kōchi prefectural governor Hashimoto Daijirō (b. 1947), Kōchi mayor Matsuo Tetsuto (b. 1947), and representatives of local groups, including economic and women’s organizations, media companies, and business corporations.⁶¹ The project was justified in terms of Yamanouchi’s “contributions to the development of the region, which should be conveyed for all eternity.”⁶² It was hoped that the reconstruction of the statue would “help stimulate historical, cultural and tourism activities” in the prefecture.⁶³ The association therefore intimated that while the statue was being rebuilt as an expression of local pride, it would also serve practical purposes in stimulating tourism and in the process advantage the local economy. Nationalist rhetoric was largely absent from this project.

The Yamanouchi Kazutoyo association collected donations totaling 111 million *yen*, of which 57.8 million was used to cast the 3.2 m equestrian statue and 35.3 million for the restoration of the pedestal. The donors included three local banks, Shikoku Ginkō (contributing 20 million *yen*), Kōchi Ginkō (10 million *yen*), and Kōchi Shinyō Kinko (10 million *yen*) as well as the Yamanouchi family (10 million *yen*).⁶⁴ The statue was positioned near its original location in front of the Kōchi Prefectural Library, just outside the castle constructed by Yamanouchi that had become a public park in 1874.⁶⁵

Not all statues dedicated to daimyo or high-ranking members of Japan’s warrior aristocracy were reconstructions of prewar monuments. New examples were continuously augmenting the extant body of statuary. In 2000, for example, the Association to Build a Statue of Katsu Kaishū (Katsu



Fig. 10.3 Unveiling ceremony of the statue of Nabeshima Naomasa in Saga, March 4, 2017.

Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai) was set up to realize a monument for this shogunate bannerman who, with Saigō Takamori, negotiated the handover of Edo Castle (present-day Imperial Palace) to the approaching imperial forces in 1868. In prewar Japan, this was seen as an act of premature, and indeed needless, surrender.⁶⁶ But Katsu's decision was now reevaluated as an expression of the peace-loving nature of "the Japanese," an act that spared the roughly one million-strong population of Edo from a bloodbath. The tourist board of Tokyo's Sumida Ward also supported plans to build a statue to Katsu in the hope that economic benefits would ensue.

The association's prospectus reminds the reader that even though the centenary of Katsu's death was in 1999, it hoped to complete the statue in 2003 in order to mark the statesman's 180th birthday (albeit a somewhat artificial anniversary). The prospectus paints Katsu as "the savior of the citizens of Edo" (*Edo shimin*), pointing out that while there were already several statues dedicated to Katsu's counterpart Saigō Takamori there was nothing to honor him apart from a single bust displayed inside a building.⁶⁷ Sumida Ward actively supported the subsequent fundraising campaign that included the publication of a series of articles in a local bulletin *Katsu Kaishū monogatari* (Tales of Katsu Kaishū).

A "Katsu Festival" was first held in November 2001 at the Sumida Riverside Hall. In July 2002, the design and location of the statue were announced by the construction committee and, in early 2003 the unveiling was officially approved by the Sumida Ward as part of the festivities organized to mark the 400th anniversary of the foundation of the Tokugawa shogunate in Edo (*Edo kaifu*).⁶⁸ The statue was unveiled on July 21, 2003.⁶⁹ Underscoring its role in promoting tourism, it was immediately acclaimed as "a new historical landmark for Tokyo" (*Tōkyō rekishi-teki na shin-meisho*).⁷⁰ The close relationship between Katsu and the more popular figure of Sakamoto Ryōma is apparent in a joint monument of the two men that was erected in 2016 outside a rest home in Akasaka in Tokyo's Minato Ward. In the late Edo period, this was the site of Katsu's residence in his final years until his death in 1899.⁷¹

Historical figures associated with the Meiji Restoration continue to occupy an important place in public statuary, a trend reinforced by the 150th anniversary of the Restoration in 2018. The reconstruction of the statue of Nabeshima Naomasa in Saga (introduced in chapter 6) in 2017 (see fig. 10.3), the new sculptures depicting Katsu Kaishū and Sakamoto Ryōma, along with plans to build a monument dedicated to Ōmura Masujirō in the city of Yamaguchi in 2019, must all be seen within this context.⁷² Japan's current prime minister, Abe Shinzō, is also from Yamaguchi, and he has set up a special agency to promote festivities marking the anniversary of the Restoration.⁷³ He has also actively embraced the building of statues for Meiji-period politicians from the former Chōshū domain. In 2014 and 2015, he visited the recently completed statues of Takasugi Shinsaku and Yamagata Aritomo and conveyed his satisfaction with the unveiling of these monuments dedicated to key "heroes of the Restoration."⁷⁴ At both sites, a plaque commemorates the prime ministerial visit (*raisho kinen*).

Two categories of statues that have enjoyed a higher profile in recent decades are those of foreigners and athletes. Foreign Great Men had never been entirely absent from Japanese public statuary, a point also explored in chapter 5. In the 1990s and the 2000s, however, a relative increase in the commissioning of monuments dedicated to non-Japanese subjects can be observed. Noteworthy examples are sculptures of Western composers associated with concert halls, such as Mozart at the Katsushika Philharmony in Tokyo and Johann Strauss II at the nearby Aoto Station (both installed in 1992), Chopin in Shizuoka (1994), Beethoven at the German House in Tokushima Prefecture (1997), and Leonard Bernstein in Nakajima Park in Sapporo (2014).

Another subgenre within this category are monuments presented to Japan by foreign governments as expressions of international friendship, such as the equestrian statues of the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Spanish king Philip III. These are the only two equestrian statues of foreigners in Japan. The former was originally installed in a theme park in

Kashiwazaki in Niigata Prefecture in 1996, but following the park's closure, it was forgotten and eventually toppled from its pedestal during the 2004 Chūetsu Earthquake. In 2010, it was relocated to Kushimoto in Wakayama Prefecture and placed near the site where locals had saved shipwrecked sailors from the Turkish frigate *Ertuğrul* in 1890, an event that has become a symbol of Turkish–Japanese friendship. The relocation in 2010 officially marked the 120th anniversary of the frigate's sinking. A statue of Philip III was also erected in a theme park, the “Spain Village” in Shima, Mie Prefecture, in 1994. Different from the statues of foreigners who were honored for their contributions to the development of the Japanese nation-state, these two sculptures must be seen, above all, in terms of their entertainment value.

Another category of statues that has witnessed significant growth in recent decades are sculptures depicting athletes, in particular, to Olympic medal winners. These examples form part of the discourse of “soft nationalism,” expressing pride in the success of the nation's elite sportspeople. “Sporting nationalism” is generally seen as “an efficient cultivator of confidence and a sense of national prestige, whose narratives often emphasize national development or national pride by identifying the winning of sporting events with national victory.”⁷⁵ Statues of athletes were virtually non-existent in Japan before the 1980s, but several of such statues were built in the 1990s and the 2000s, and the trend continues. One trait of these pieces is the portrayal of figures from more recent times—in fact, statues showing people born after World War II are almost exclusively from this category.

My database contains fourteen public monuments that honor subjects born after World War II, and twelve of them are dedicated to athletes.⁷⁶ They include the baseball players Hoshino Sen'ichi (1947–2018, built in 2008) and Ochiai Hiromitsu (b. 1953, built 1993), judo athlete and Olympic gold medal winner Yamashita Yasuhiro (b. 1957, built 1993), and sumo wrestlers Kaihō (b. 1972, built 2014) and Chiyonofuji (1955–2016, built 2011). The only two women in this group are the marathon

runners and Olympic medal winners Arimori Yūko (b. 1966, built 2004) and Takahashi Naoko (b. 1972, built 2000).

To date, the youngest person to have a bronze statue of them is Olympic gold medal winner Kitajima Kōsuke (b. 1983) on a monument built in 2004 at the instigation of Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō. Ishihara is best known for his xenophobic nationalism, but the growing representation of athletes in Japanese public statuary shows that soft forms of nationalism continue to have a place in this East Asian nation, despite the recent “drift toward the right” (*ukeika*).⁷⁷

Recent controversies surrounding the role of national representatives and of historical figures in educational circles underline the perception that Japan is experiencing a “drift to the right.”⁷⁸ While the postwar era saw a turn away from the notion of the “Great Man View of History”—seen in the decline of writings on *jin*—there has been a shift since the 2000s in the publishing industry and in education toward an increased attention for *jin* stories. This had to do, among other things, with the fierce criticism of the government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, 2009–12) as lacking leadership. Politicians from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including Abe Shinzō, together with writers such as Hyakuta Naoki (b. 1956), engaged in mudslinging campaigns directed at the DPJ government, going so far as accusing the government of “selling out the nation.”⁷⁹ Abe also is a strong advocate of the inclusion of “moral education” in the school curriculum as a means of fostering nationalist and patriotic attitudes as well as the inclusion of stories of Great Men in morals classes. Moral education, called *shūshin* until 1945, was abolished after the war because it was considered to have contributed to the indoctrination of Japanese with ultranationalist and militarist ideology.⁸⁰ During his first stint as prime minister in 2006–2007, Abe recommended that morals, now referred to as *dōtoku*, once again be made a part of the school curriculum. For him, reversing the abolition of moral education implemented during the Occupation was a significant step in achieving what he referred to as the

“overturning of the postwar regime” (*senjo rejiumu kara no dakkyaku*), his description of the dismantling of Japan’s post-1945 reforms.

The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) initially rejected the idea of reinstating morals as a formal subject (*kamoku*), as this would require standardized textbooks, integrated examinations, and specialized teachers.⁸¹ Such objections were ignored after Abe’s return to power in late 2012. A close ally of Abe, Shimomura Hakubun (b. 1954), was appointed Minister of Education in 2012 to oversee the introduction of moral education in schools. A major lobby behind this development is the Society for the Improvement of Textbooks (*Kyōkasho Kaizen no Kai*), headed by historical revisionist Yagi Hidetsugu (b. 1962), and the Association of Experts for the Promotion of Moral Education (*Dōtoku Kyōiku o Susumeru Yūshikisha no Kai*). The latter group was initially led by Watanabe Shōichi (1930–2017), a figure close to Abe and an infamous Japanese war crimes denier, in particular, the Nanjing Massacre in 1937/38. Watanabe had long lamented the decline of value-oriented education in the postwar period and urged that public statuary be instrumentalized to “teach about Japanese Great Men (*ijin*) and introduce the ethical values of their forefathers” to Japanese school children.⁸² The pressure from the right eventually succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Abe to introduce morals as a formal subject in Japanese elementary schools from April 2018 and in middle schools from April 2019.

Both the teaching materials compiled by MEXT (and used until 2018) and the textbooks produced by publishers and approved through the examination process (*kentei*) overseen by the ministry include numerous lessons on Great Men, a trend most clearly seen in the ministerial materials and those of the Society for the Improvement of Textbooks. Many of the teaching materials include photographs depicting statues of Great Men, partly because no authentic images are available and partly because the existence of a statue is considered proof that the historical figure in question is indeed an *ijin*.

The book *Watashitachi no dōtoku* (Our Morals), published by MEXT and employed in Japanese schools between 2014 and 2018, includes columns introducing four or five distinguished figures for each grade who embody a specific ethical value.⁸³ The edition for first- and second-year elementary school students begins with no less a figure than Ninomiya Sontoku,⁸⁴ as does a 2013 ethics teaching handbook distributed by Tokyo Prefecture. The latter includes *three* photos of different Ninomiya sculptures, perhaps in an attempt to compensate for the lack of his statues in schools.⁸⁵ *Our Morals* next introduces the scientist Kawai Masao (b. 1924), German writer Schiller, and French biologist Jean-Henri Fabre (1823–1915), who is also mentioned in the Tokyo Prefecture materials and illustrated with a photograph of a statue.

In the edition of *Our Morals* for grades 3 and 4, children are familiarized with the writer Ishikawa Takuboku as an exemplar of the virtue of love for one’s hometown (*aigōshin*). The notion of “respect for Japanese culture” (*Nihon no dentō to bunka o sonchō*) is illustrated by the non-Japanese figure of Lafcadio Hearn (1850–1904), the Greek-Irish author better known to the Japanese as Koizumi Yakumo. Internationally renowned *ukiyo-e* artist Katsushika Hokusai (1760–1849) is used to exemplify “a heart moved by beautiful things” (*utsukushii mono ni kandō suru kokoro*) and Abraham Lincoln is presented as a symbol of honesty. The section on Lincoln includes a photograph of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC and the carvings at Mount Rushmore. Scientist Makino Tomitarō (1862–1957) is presented as an individual living in harmony with nature; the Japanese men’s 400 m relay team, which won silver at the 2012 London Olympics, is offered as a model of mutual help and understanding. The only two women considered worthy of their own column in the MEXT’s teaching materials are portrayed as a paradigms of persistence: soccer player Sawa Homare (b. 1978), famous for leading the women’s national soccer team to victory in the 2011 FIFA Women’s World Cup and to second place in the 2012 Olympics, and marathon Olympic gold medal winner Takahashi Naoko.⁸⁶

For fifth- and sixth-year students, *Our Morals* introduces another Olympic athlete, Uchida Kōhei, as a model of strenuous effort. Further sections deal with Restoration heroes Yoshida Shōin and Sakamoto Ryōma as examples of faithfulness and “self-awareness of being Japanese” (*Nihonjin toshite no jikaku*), respectively; business tycoon Matsushita Kōnosuke as a model of appreciation; and the Albanian-Indian Mother Theresa, the only female *ijin* in this volume and a paradigm of fairness and equality.⁸⁷

Like most other publications on *ijin*, the *Our Morals* series includes a fairly sizable number of non-Japanese, a mirror of Japan’s growing interconnectedness with the world. But even the Japanese figures chosen for the books have a strong transnational dimension. Many were either active outside of Japan such as sportspeople competing in international events, or scientists cooperating with their peers from all over the world such as Noguchi Hideyo or individuals associated with global history such as Yoshida Shōin and Sakamoto Ryōma. Yoshida and Sakamoto are considered pioneers of Japan’s success in learning from the West. In terms of gender equality, the series is characterized by the absence of Japanese women—only two, both athletes, are among the model individuals portrayed in these books (plus Mother Theresa as the only non-Japanese woman).⁸⁸

Overall, the *Our Morals* series is an expression of a strongly elitist and self-referential nature, as seen in the inclusion of Yoshida Shōin, one of Abe’s favorite historical icons, and Matsushita Kōnosuke, the founder of the Matsushita School of Government and Management (Matsushita Seikei Juku), where many conservative politicians studied. A look at middle-school civics and history textbooks currently in use reveals that Abe himself has evolved into something of a cult figure: one middle-school textbook for civics (*kōmin*), which has been approved by the Ministry of Education (whose rules include “political neutrality”), includes some two dozen photographs of the current prime minister.⁸⁹

Of the new textbooks introduced into Japanese elementary schools in April 2018, the volume issued

by the Society for the Improvement of Textbooks volume has a particularly strong focus on teaching the history of *ijin* as a part of moral education. In 2014, the publisher of the society’s textbook, Ikuhōsha, brought out a supplementary volume for teachers entitled “Japanese Great Men I Want to Learn About in School,” which neatly illustrates its approach to *ijin* education.⁹⁰ The book’s companion website has an introduction regarding the use of *ijin* in moral education, which does not leave room for debate about the ethical value of the cult of the individual: “It is absolutely normal to be moved by the way *ijin* lived.”⁹¹

The book offers a selection of model *ijin* that differs significantly from the Ministry of Education teaching materials noted above. Astonishingly (or perhaps not) it fails to include a single Japanese woman. Sawa Homare, who is introduced in the MEXT textbooks, was probably not included because she plays soccer, a sport that only recently has become popular, and that conservatives consider less “traditional” than *budō* (martial arts) or *yakyū* (aka baseball). Moreover, Sawa is well known for her dyed blond hair, usually interpreted by conservatives as a sign of lacking discipline (perhaps even insubordination) and a lack of integration into Japan’s allegedly homogenous national community. The only woman to make the grade in the Society for the Improvement of Textbook volume is Mother Theresa.

The direct influence of Abe Shinzō, who has a close relationship to Society for the Improvement of Textbooks founder Yagi Hidetsugu, is evident in the inclusion in this volume of Sugihara Chiune (1900–86), a Japanese diplomat who is credited here and in other Japanese publications with saving the lives of “6,000 Jews” fleeing from the Nazis.⁹² Prime Minister Abe has personally championed the memorialization of Sugihara in order to exemplify the “bright side” of the Japanese empire during the war years. Abe and Yagi also have a particular softness for Japanese who earned the respect of colonial peoples. This accounts for the inclusion of Hatta Yoichi in the society’s publication (for more on Hatta, see chapter 8).

These new partisan textbooks have been widely condemned in Japan for their content and for their violation of the government's own guidelines on the political neutrality of education. They show nevertheless that the cult of the individual continues as an integral part of political and social life in twenty-first-century Japan. This also explains why the idea of a statue dedicated to the current prime minister was, despite its somewhat tongue-in-cheek delivery, already surfacing in January 2018.⁹³

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated the significance of the cult of the individual in the history of modern Japan. Statues of historical figures were vital vehicles used by the political and social elite to disseminate ideas of nationhood and to foster the growth of a national consciousness. Statues throughout the country are personified reminders of the people's belonging to the nation. Occupying important locations and spaces, they constitute a network that demarcates the “national history” (*kokushi*). But, most significantly, these statues generate a sense of psychological proximity between observer and monument or between the people and the abstract construct of the nation that they are intended to represent.

The historian Matsuda Kōichirō has shown that concepts such as “the state” (*kokka*) and “the nation” (*kokumin*) entered the Japanese lexicon as neologisms in the late nineteenth century, but that familiarizing ordinary people with these abstract notions remained a formidable task.¹ In the 1870s, the educator Fukuzawa Yukichi complained that “in Japan, there is a state, but no nation.”² Statues, as visual personifications of nation and state, were meant to rectify this situation by generating a sense of personal closeness to both. The nation’s Great Men, positioned atop pedestals and often situated on elevated sites such as hills or mountain tops, commanded a high degree of respect and awe not only for themselves but also for the political order they embodied. This served to strengthen the loyalty of the individual to the nation by inculcating subjects or citizens with those values essential to the modern state. As symbols of the time-transcending community of the “Eternal Nation,” Great Men, according to nationalism scholar Anthony Smith, “remind the members of [the] community of their past greatness and hence their inner worth,” thereby making a vital contribution to “the quest for collective dignity” as a “key element in” the national struggle.³

Statues have continued to play this role down to the present day. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it still seems difficult for ordinary people to comprehend what nationalism actually is, or what it stands for, despite the claim that nationalism is once again on the rise. The place of statues as instruments of social education thus endures as a salient dimension of contemporary society, even though their influence today perhaps pales in comparison with different kinds of mass media, such as the internet.

This study has additionally highlighted several aspects of the cult of the individual. First, while the monuments discussed in this publication depict historical figures, the degree of historicity or the accuracy of their representation was never a decisive requirement. Similar to the semifictional genre of “monumental biography,” statues are rarely subject to historiographical scrutiny, even in the twenty-

first century. The case studies of statues of the Jinmu emperor and other figures indicate that a lack of emphasis on the subject’s historical authenticity has persisted as a notable feature of the cult of the individual from the Meiji period onward.⁴

Despite this absence of historical accuracy, the stories of the nation’s Great Men, set in stone and metal, continue to command authority and respect. Even today the heroism of these “Men (and a few Women) in Metal” is rarely called into question by broader society. Certainly, the controversies associated with the commissioning of statues mirror historiographical debates in modern Japan, including the value of ancient myths as historical sources, the role of the Imperial House in political and military affairs, and the country’s position in East Asia and the wider world. The strong emotional appeal of these memorials dedicated to individuals has meant that Japan’s “Men in Metal” have proved far more influential in shaping the historical consciousness in contemporary Japanese society than ever possible with academic versions of modern Japanese history.

Second, the types of sites where monuments were erected have continued unchanged from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. The first statue built in modern Japan, that of Yamato Takeru in Kanazawa, was installed in a public park in 1880, and parks are still the most common location for memorials of all kinds, followed by shrines and temples, public squares and streets as well as spaces adjacent to museums and commemorative institutions.

In terms of their impact, however, statues have produced powerful effects beyond their physical locations. Some became popular icons due to their reproduction in a range of visual media such as woodblock prints, lithographs, commemorative and souvenir postcards, journals, and educational materials. There were also miniature versions of the more famous public sculptures, which then morphed into objects of consumer culture.⁵ These reproductions facilitated the dissemination of the iconography of these statues to households often far removed from the site of the original monument. Sociologist Yoshino Kosaku has argued that

nationalism does not consist of “production and one-sided transmission of ideology from above, but also an on-going consumption . . . which various sections of the population participate in.”⁶ The popularity of statues as icons consumed through the print media—but also through tourism—demonstrates this link between nationalism and consumerism. At the same time, it also exemplifies what the social psychologist Michael Billig has called “banal nationalism.”⁷ Billig’s concept hints at the ubiquity of national symbols and practices in everyday life, which, often unconsciously, contribute to the formation of national consciousness and nationalism.

Third, statue-building in Japan was accompanied by intense social networking, which usually involved the establishment of a construction committee that enabled local elites to come together to plan and execute the commissioning and building of a particular monument. The public events associated with a statue both enhanced its visibility and sustained these networks, beginning with an unveiling ceremony and followed by festivals to mark national holidays, birthdays, or other anniversaries related to the figure depicted.

Fourth, the agents behind these activities have not fundamentally altered over time, although agency tended to widen in range. The dominant driving forces behind statue-building were the political and social elite, but a growing number of varying social groups, regions, and municipalities added “their heroes” to the national pantheon. Even attempts to rehabilitate figures once considered “national traitors” were located within the framework of the nation-state rhetoric, as in the movement to build a statue for the shogunal regent Ii Naosuke in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Initially, a monument for Ii was obstructed by the elite who controlled the national master narrative—that is, the central government. Eventually, a statue dedicated to the regent was built, inserting him into the national narrative and “transforming” him into a patriot. In other cases, the elites did not obstruct plans to build a particular monument, but appropriated the historical figure

in question to serve their own political agenda, as with Saigō Takamori: when the political opposition announced the idea to install a statue of Saigō, the ruling elite hijacked it and presented him in a less confronting context, turning “Saigō the rebel” into “Saigō the loyalist.”

Although not dealt with in detail in this study, the Hokkaido memorial to Shakushain (1606–69), the leader of a rebellion against Japanese incursion into Ainu territories, might be one of the few exceptions to the dominance of the national dimension in public statuary. The Shakushain monument was set up in 1971 next to the Shakushain Kinenkan (Shakushain Memorial Hall) dedicated to the rebel leader. It is, first and foremost, the expression of a strong dissident identity among the indigenous Ainu population. In 2018, the question of how to address the problem of the deteriorating condition of the fifty-year-old statue, which was made of reinforced plastic, fueled heated controversies that indicate that statues remain focal sites of debates surrounding historiography and identity.

Fifth, public statuary served (and continues to serve) in reinforcing the changing values of Japanese society. By quite literally forcing the spectator to look up at them, the heroic figures portrayed in the public space command respect for the political order and the social values they epitomize. Many prewar statues were explicitly built to strengthen allegiance to the state and loyalty to the imperial institution. On the flipside, prospectuses emphasized that monuments are essential tools to help prevent the spread of “subversive” ideologies. In 1908, the emperor promulgated the Boshin Rescript that called for a “stimulation of national spirit” (*koku-min seishin*) in order to counter “subversive ideologies.”⁸ The High Treason Incident (*Taigyaku Jiken*) of 1910, an alleged attempt to assassinate Emperor Meiji, further seemed to underline the necessity for the dissemination of nationalist ideology and the “holy morals of the emperor” (*seitoku*). By the 1910s, fears of the spread of “dangerous ideologies” such as liberalism, socialism, and communism were widespread among the ruling oligarchy. Against this backdrop, proposals to build statues of Great

Men who exemplified the official ideology appeared more frequently. This representation of Japanese values and identities as an objective through public statuary is unabated, even though, as seen in chapter 9, those built after 1945 embody Japan's postwar identity as a "cultural state" and a "peace state."

Sixth, Japan's cult of the individual was, and still is, typified by a high degree of diversity. Among the many statues built in the public space, no single figure ever achieved a dominant position, as the quantitative analysis in chapter 5 reveals. Rather, over time, monuments were raised to honor a wide variety of historical subjects, and this is an essential characteristic of Japan's public statuary. We can therefore speak of a *pluralistic cult of the individual*, recruiting a wide variety of individuals associated with the creation of the modern nation-state and, in particular, the Meiji Restoration as the *founding event* of modern Japan and the creation of the modern nation-state.

The reasons for the diversity seen in Japan's cult of the individual are manifold. In chapter 2, I discussed the sacred character of the emperor and his virtual invisibility in public life as a major reason for the emergence of alternative historical figures in public statuary. In prewar and postwar Japan, the emperor played only a minor role in public sculpture despite his key position as the object of the people's loyalty and a "symbol" of national unity. Plans to build statues of the Meiji emperor were mooted time and again; they were consistently overruled by the establishment, and public effigies of the imperial person remained scarce. No mass movement demanding more imperial statues emerged, an indication that the emperor's role was less significant than previous research on the imperial institution would suggest.⁹ The Japanese public was apparently satisfied with the alternative representations of the nation offered to them. This seems to be the case even today, although national integration continues to be considered an ongoing process.¹⁰

The diversification of the cult of the individual in modern Japan also had to do with the strong regional identities that continued beneath Japan's

newly constructed national identity. Localities all over Japan strived to connect these two dimensions by identifying "heroes of the hometown" who on some level also represented the nation. People were encouraged to take pride in their native sons and daughters, but the rationale behind their elevation was usually linked to their contribution to the nation.¹¹

The diversity of public statuary was further encouraged by the lack of central state control and the competition among the various agents. While Japan is often characterized as a corporatist and collectivist society in contrast to the "individualist" West, the history of public statuary in modern Japan demonstrates the inadequacy of such binary views. In his biography of statesman Yamagata Aritomo, historian Roger F. Hackett cites Edwin O. Reischauer, stating that "compared to the history of other nations, 'the tendency throughout Japanese history toward group leadership rather than the leadership of some dominant personalities' is commonly identified as a special characteristic of the Japanese experience."¹² To be sure, public statuary reflects this "absence of a single 'great man',"¹³ yet the large number of personalities represented in statuary indicates that the individual is highly significant in the context of the politics of memory in modern Japan.

The categorization of the statues undertaken in this study also shows that diversification had its limits. Despite the relatively large number of historical personalities depicted in public statuary, the fact that until today figures are being chosen for statuary who are considered Great Men reveals a strongly elitist attitude among the agents behind statue-building. This is not surprising given that those who commission statues are in most cases members of the social and political elite. Nevertheless, in more recent years, some social agents seem to have noticed that "less great men"—historical figures often neglected in historical research—are sometimes as effective in addressing the emotional needs of the common folk. In the postwar era, for example, statues were erected that do not represent a specific historical personality, rather are repre-

sentative of a profession or a category of citizens, such as the statues of the newspaper delivery boy (*Shinbun haitatsu shōnen no zō*) seen throughout the country. This strand of sculpture that does not personify a concrete historical personality lies outside of the scope of this study, but is perhaps one that merits scholarly attention in the future.¹⁴

Lastly, this study has also demonstrated that the veneration of historical figures was heavily influenced by religious notions, revealing the deeply religious character of modern nationalism. Myths, in particular, were instrumental in shaping the cult of the individual. In this context, myth could refer to ancient mythology, as in the case of the Jinmu emperor, but also to “modern myths” centered around originally secular figures. In each case, the quasi-religious belief in the superior qualities of the venerated figure shares many features with religious worship. For example, the cult of the secular figure of Saigō Takamori was not the product of historical assessment; it was based on the “Saigō myth,” which had very little in common with the historical figure of Saigō Takamori. This development is not unusual in modern nation-states as Ian Kershaw’s analysis of the “Hitler Myth” and more recent research on the worship of contemporary nationalist leaders has shown.¹⁵

Scholars of Japanese religion have noted a strong transwar continuity in this context, and the present study confirms this interpretation. The subjects of the cult of the individual—prewar and postwar—are all mythologized to a high degree, and this phenomenon is related to the neglect of academic scrutiny in the process of constructing heroic narratives. The logic behind the persistence of mythologizing individuals is based upon the belief in the “eternity of the nation,” a notion supported by hardcore conservatives and by moderately progressive intellectuals. An address given by Tokyo University president Nanbara Shigeru (1889–1974) on Empire Day on February 11, 1946, neatly illustrates how prewar mythology survived into postwar Japan. Nanbara asserted that adherence to the “good old traditions” (*yoki furuki dentō*) and respect for the “true eternity of the nation” (*minzoku*



Fig. 11.1 Koganemaru Ikuhisa (1915–2003). Statuette of Emperor Meiji (1968). Author’s collection. 40 cm.

no shin no eiensei) should be the basis for the “construction of a New Japan.”¹⁶ In addition to the contents of the speech, the fact that it was given on Empire Day, which had yet to be abolished, suggests that significant intellectual continuities persisted from the prewar period through the war years and into postwar Japan. It signaled to postwar intellectuals that the break with prewar and wartime Japan was not always clear cut. The importance of a continuous historical narrative is certainly a universal characteristic of modern nationalism, as Anthony Giddens demonstrated when he wrote that this “new type of doctrine . . . appeals to a desire for an identity securely anchored in the past.”¹⁷ His statement recalls Anthony Smith’s emphasis on the

need for nations to establish historical narratives of a “Golden Age”: “In order to create a convincing representation of the ‘nation,’ a worthy and distinctive past must be rediscovered and appropriated. Only then can the nation aspire to a glorious destiny for which its citizens may be expected to make some sacrifices.”¹⁸

Whether political myths are an indispensable ingredient of modern nation-states, a “necessary evil,” or whether they should be countered through a stronger focus on empirical scholarship, is still an issue intensely debated. If statues as representations of modern myths in the public domain are indeed an indication, then by the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, it seems that the myth-inspired cult of the individual is still buoyant in Japan and worldwide. Public statuary certainly faces scrutiny in some countries, and statues of historical figures have become the subject of controversy. In parts of the United States or in South Korea, for instance, some statues have been relocated or even demolished.¹⁹ Overall, it seems like the public statuary boom looks set to continue. As noted at the beginning of this study “the world’s tallest statue” was unveiled in late 2018 in India. In Cambodia, statues of the sixteenth-century king Sdech Kan, commissioned by wealthy officials, have been installed throughout the country in recent years. Bearing a close resemblance to current Prime Minister Hun Sen, these monuments assist in strengthening the legitimacy of the present government and reflect the roles served by many of the statues covered in this publication.²⁰ North Korea, home to effigies of members of the ruling Kim dynasty, has become a major supplier of statues to countries with authoritarian leadership.²¹ And in China, a

personality cult of President Xi Jinping is emerging, resulting in a growth of public representations of the president, often sited close to images of Mao Zedong.²² Although no statues of Xi have been erected, it is evident that “the personality cult lives on” in China—and elsewhere.²³

In Japan, the festivities to mark the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration in 2018 failed, despite official sponsorship, to produce commissions of a significant number of statues.²⁴ Not a single statue of the Meiji emperor was erected to celebrate this event, and miniature versions of the 1968 sculpture were sold on auctions for surprisingly moderate prices (fig. 11.1). But this does not necessarily mean that nationalism is on the retreat in Japan. The increase in xenophobic writings in Japan, the re-emergence of tensions with South Korea and China, as well as the continuing tensions with North Korea, suggest otherwise. At the height of an outbreak of nationalist emotions following a territorial row with China in 2015, novelist Murakami Haruki (b. 1949), usually reluctant to appear in the public eye, spoke out against growing nationalist sentiment in Japan. Nationalism is “like cheap alcohol,” he stated. “It gets you drunk after only a few shots and makes you hysterical. It makes you speak loudly and act rudely . . . but after your drunken rampage, you are left with nothing but an awful headache the next morning.”²⁵ Whether Japan, as it enters the third decade of the twenty-first century, will gradually rid itself of “cheap alcohol” remains to be seen. The lack of commissions for new statues to mark the anniversary of the Meiji Restoration might be an indication that populist nationalism is not as much on the rise as some observers suggest.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 See, for example, *Asahi shinbun*, June 29, 2001, 4.
- 2 *Asahi shinbun*, July 1, 2001, 4.
- 3 On the Genghis Khan cult, see Robert Eng, “Chinggis Khan on Film: Globalization, Nationalism, and Historical Revisionism,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 16, issue 22, no. 1 (November 10, 2018), <https://apjff.org/2018/22/Eng.html>. On the Patel statue, see <http://theconversation.com/india-unveils-the-worlds-tallest-statue-celebrating-development-at-the-cost-of-the-environment-105731>.
- 4 George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: H. Fertig, 1975).
- 5 Arai Fusatarō, *Ijin no omokage* (Tokyo: Nijūroku Shinpōsha, 1928; repr. Tokyo: Yumani Shobō, 2009) is a compendium of 702 statues. An article published in the newspaper *Yomiuri shinbun* in June 1946 states that 944 statues of historical figures were built in Japan before 1943 (*Yomiuri shinbun*, June 10, 1946, 2). Given the date (1943), this number is most likely based on the inventory taken during the war to facilitate the wartime collection of statues, which were melted down and recycled into weapons and ammunition (see chapter 7 for details).
- 6 The exact number is difficult to establish. The Japanese website *Nihon dōzō tankendan* (Japan Bronze Statues Explorer) by Endō Hiroyuki had information on a large number of statues and a total count of more than 4,000 sculptures in Japan in 2015. This number, however, includes statues symbolizing abstract notions such as “peace” or “hope,” fictional characters and manga figures, which are excluded from the present study. The website went offline in March 2019 when Yahoo! Japan suspended its website hosting service “Geocities.” A recent publication with reliable data on statues is Kamiyu Rekishi Henshūbu, ed., *Nihon no dōzō kanzen meibo* (Tokyo: Kōsaidō Shuppan, 2013), which includes photographs and information on 950 statues depicting “historical personalities” (*rekishi jinbutsu*). Kaneko Haruo, *Nihon no dōzō* (Tokyo: Tankōsha, 2012), 7, states that reliable data does not exist, but gives an estimate of “more than 3,000 statues.”
- 7 Herfried Münkler, “Die Visibilität der Macht und die Strategien der Machtvisualisierung,” in *Macht der Öffentlichkeit—Öffentlichkeit der Macht*, ed. Gerhard Göhler (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 213–30. See also William Cohen, “Symbols of Power: Statues in Nineteenth-Century Provincial France,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 3 (1989): 491–513; and Kōsokabe Hideyuki, “Meiji Taishō-ki no shōgakkō kyōkasho ni okeru sashi-e no kōsatsu: rekishi, shūshi, kokugo kyōkasho ni egakareta eiyūzō,” *Bulletin of Child Education, Kobe Shinwa Women’s University Post Graduate Course* 10 (2006): 43–55.
- 8 Lewis Austin, “Visual Symbols, Political Ideology, and Culture,” *Ethos* 5, no. 3 (1977): 306–25.
- 9 See E. A. Rees, “Leader Cults: Varieties, Preconditions and Functions,” in *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc*, ed. Balázs Apor et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). On the Stalin personality cult, see Robert C. Tucker, “The Rise of Stalin’s Personality Cult,” *American Historical Review* 84, no. 2 (1979): 347–66. Regarding the Mao cult, see Geremie R. Barmé, *Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996). In the Republic of China, the personality cult that developed around Chiang Kai-shek exhibited similarities with the Mao cult and with the cult of fascist dictators in Europe. See Jeremy Taylor, “Republican Personality Cults in Wartime China: Contradistinction and Collaboration,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 57, no. 3 (2015): 665–93.
- 10 The speech, “On the Cult of the Individual and its Consequences,” initiated the so-called “de-Stalinization” process. See Polly Jones, ed., *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
- 11 *OED Third Edition*, online edition, September 2013. For a more detailed definition, see George A. Wells, “Cults of Personality,” *Think* 13, no. 37 (2014): 13–17.
- 12 Michael Dennison, “The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 61, no. 7 (2009): 1167–87, and Fabio De Leonardis, *Nation-Building and Personality Cult in Turkmenistan: The Türkmenbaşy Phenomenon*, Routledge Focus (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).
- 13 By contrast, some highly authoritarian and totalitarian systems, such as the Nazi regime in Germany (1933–45), functioned without a visually mediated personality cult. As Sergiusz Michalski has stated, although Hitler’s rule depended to a large degree on his personal charisma, it “was not based . . . on monuments symbolic of his personal power.” Sergiusz Michalski, *Public Monuments: Art in Political Bondage 1870–1997* (Clerkenwell: Reaktion Books, 1998), loc. 1416, Kindle. On the Hitler cult, see Ian Kershaw, *The “Hitler Myth”: Image and Reality in*

- the Third Reich* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1987); first published in German in 1980).
- 14 On the Bismarck cult, see Hans-Walter Hedinger, "Der Bismarck-Kult," in *Der Religionswandel unserer Zeit im Spiegel der Religionswissenschaft*, ed. Gunther Stephenson (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 201–15; Hans-Walter Hedinger, "Bismarck-Denkmal und Bismarck-Verehrung," in *Kunstverwaltung, Bau- und Denkmalpolitik im Kaiserreich*, ed. Ekkehard Mai and Stephan Waetzoldt (Berlin: Mann, 1981), 277–314; Wolfgang Hardtwig, "Der Bismarck-Mythos. Gestalt und Funktionen zwischen politischer Öffentlichkeit und Wissenschaft," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, special issue 21 (2005): 61–90; on the Hindenburg cult, see Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 82–85; on the Joan of Arc cult, see Neil McWilliam, "Conflicting Manifestations: Parisian Commemoration of Joan of Arc and Etienne Dolet in the Early Third Republic," *French Historical Studies* 27, no. 2 (2004): 381–418; and June Hargrove, *The Statues of Paris: An Open-Air Pantheon* (New York and Paris: Vendome Press, 1990); on the Atatürk cult, see Leda Glyptis, "Living up to the Father: The National Identity Prescriptions of Remembering Atatürk; his Homes, his Grave, his Temple," *National Identities* 10, no. 4 (2008): 353–72.
 - 15 See, for example, the "Freedom in the World" rankings by Freedom House (<https://freedomhouse.org>) or the "Democracy Ranking" by the Economist Intelligence Unit (<http://www.eiu.com>).
 - 16 See Peter Gardella, *American Civil Religion. What Americans Hold Sacred* (Oxford University Press, 2013).
 - 17 See Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
 - 18 See the booklets and inventory list accessible on the website of the House of Representatives, <http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications>. The site also includes a video tour of Statuary Hall, another expression of hero worship with its uncritical approach to historical figures and the use of banal background music.
 - 19 See the official site of the Regensburg Construction Office (<http://www.stbar.bayern.de/hochbau/walhalla/>) and Monika Arndt, *Die "Ruhmeshalle" im Berliner Zeughaus. Eine Selbstdarstellung Preussens nach der Reichsgründung* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1985), 88–106.
 - 20 Division of Publications, National Park Service (2009): *Jefferson Memorial*. Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior.
 - 21 Jay Sacher, *Lincoln Memorial. The Story and Design of an American Monument* (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2014), 61 (author's emphasis); on the significance of the memorial, see also Scott A. Sandage, "A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939–1963," *Journal of American History* 80, no. 1 (1993): 135–67.
 - 22 Jörg Koch, *Von Helden und Opfern. Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Kriegsgedenkens* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013), 34.
 - 23 Although the concept of "civic religion" was popularized in the work of Robert Bellah, for example, in his "Civil Religion in America," *Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 96, no. 1 (1967): 1–21, research published in the prewar period had already established the religious character of nationalism. See Edward Shilito, *Nationalism. Man's Other Religion* (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1933), and Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism. A Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1960). In his influential study *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson also underlined nationalist ideologies' "strong affinity with religious imaginings." Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 10. In referring to the commemoration of the war dead after World War I, George Mosse emphasized that "the cult of the fallen soldier became a centerpiece of the religion of nationalism after the war." George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford University Press, 1990), 7. In a similar vein, the book, *Nihonjin to Yudayajin*, published by Yamamoto Shichihei under the pseudonym Isaiha Ben-Dasan, argued that the Japanese generally consider their nationality as a religion (i.e., "Japan faith," *Nihonkyō*) and that all other religious beliefs are subordinated to this nationalist religion. See Isaiha Ben-Dasan, *Nihonjin to Yudayajin* (Tokyo: Yamamoto Shoten, 1970).
 - 24 Even in Communist countries the cult of personality is not always one-dimensional, as illustrated in the adoration of the Marx-Engels-Lenin triumvirate in the early Soviet Union, the adulation of three generations of leaders from the Kim family in North Korea, and the existence of giant statues to leaders other than Ho Chi-minh in Vietnam. On Vietnam, see Viet Thanh Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War* (Harvard University Press, 2016).
 - 25 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 24–29, 73–77, and elsewhere. Regarding non-Communist states; see Rees, "Leader Cults," 21.
 - 26 Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 46, 77.
 - 27 Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence. Vol. 2 of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), loc. 3994, Kindle. In a similar vein, see, most recently, Francis Fukuyama, *Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).

- 28 Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9; see also Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic Myths and Ethnic Revivals," *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1984): 283–305; Anthony D. Smith, "The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the Renewal of Nations," *The British Journal of Sociology* 47, no. 4 (1996): 575–98; and Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, loc. 4019, Kindle.
- 29 Hiroshi Mitani, *Escape from Impasse* (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2006); Sven Saaler, "Karl von Eisendecker and Japan," in *Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan*, ed. Joanne Miyang Cho, Lee M. Roberts, and Christian W. Spang (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 35–52; and Harald Fuess, "Unequal Treaties, Consular Jurisdiction, and Treaty Port Society," in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 47–61.
- 30 For an early interpretation of the Meiji Restoration as a "nationalist revolution," see William G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). See also Nishikawa Nagao, *Kokkyō no koekata: kokumin kokka ron josetsu* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2001), and Nishikawa Nagao and Matsumiya Hideharu, eds., *Bakumatsu/Meiji ki no kokumin kokka keisei to bunka hen'yō* (Tokyo: Shin'yōsha, 1995).
- 31 John S. Brownlee, *Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945* (Vancouver and Tokyo: UBC Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1997), 88; Michael Wachutka, *Kokuqaku in Meiji-period Japan* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2013), 11–17; and Shimazono Susumu, *Kokka Shintō to Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 107–8. For a general reference on the Kenmu Restoration, see H. Paul Varley, *Imperial Restoration in Medieval Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); and Andrew E. Goble, *Kenmu: Go-Daigo's Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). On the historiography of the Kenmu Restoration, see Varley, *Imperial Restoration*, chapters 5 and 6; Barry Steben, "Rai San'yō's Philosophy of History and the Ideal of Imperial Restoration," *East Asian History* 24 (2002): 117–70; and Murata Masashi, *Nanboku-chō ron. Shijitsu to shisō* (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1959). The characterization of the Meiji Restoration as a "return" to the values of the Kenmu Restoration was particularly emphasized during the 600th anniversary celebrations in the early 1930s; see, for example, Kondō Yasuichirō, ed., *Nankō seishin to gendai Nihon* (Kobe: Hyōgo Kenritsu Daisan Kōbe Chūgakkō Kōyūkai, 1935) and chapter 7 of this study.
- 32 Austin, "Visual Symbols," 306.
- 33 Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).
- 34 *Ibid.*, x, 486.
- 35 Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996), loc. 219, Kindle. See also the classic study by Masao Maruyama, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, trans. Mikiso Hane (Princeton University Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 327–28, and Yasumaru Yoshio, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979), 210.
- 36 See Albert M. Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) and Luke Roberts, *Performing the Great Peace: Political Space and Open Secrets in Tokugawa Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012). This phenomenon was not limited to Japan. Alon Confino's outstanding study of the Kingdom of Württemberg has shown that long after the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, the term *Vaterland*, or "Fatherland," was being used for regional states such as the Kingdom of Württemberg rather than for the German Reich; see Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
- 37 Kevin Doak, *A History of Nationalism in Japan* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 36; see also Taki Kōji, *Tennō no shōzō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002; first ed. 1988), 76.
- 38 For the case of Aizu in Fukushima Prefecture, see Hiraku Shimoda, *Lost and Found: Recovering Regional Identity in Imperial Japan* (Harvard University Asia Center, 2014); for the case of Okinawa, see Gavan McCormack, "Ryukyu/Okinawa's Trajectory—From Periphery to Centre, 1600–2015," in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 118–33.
- 39 See Earl Kinmonth, *The Self-Made Man in Meiji Japanese Thought* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1981).
- 40 On the labor market during the early stages of Japan's industrialization, see James McClain, *Japan. A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), chapter 8.
- 41 Hyman Kublin, "The 'Modern' Army of Early Meiji Japan," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (1949): 20–41, quote on page 32; see also E. Herbert Norman, "Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscriptation," *Pacific Affairs* 16, no. 1 (1943): 47–64; Hiyama Yukio, "Kindai Nihon ni okeru sensō kinenhi to gunjin haka (jō)," *Kyūshū shigaku* 136 (2003): 41–76.
- 42 Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3.
- 43 Kenneth Pyle, "The Technology of Japanese Nationalism. The Local Improvement Movement, 1900–1918," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 33, no. 1 (1973): 51–65.

- 44 Ibid., 59 and 58–59, 65, respectively.
- 45 Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds*, xiv.
- 46 Harry Wray, “The Fall of Moral Education and the Rise and Decline of Civics Education and Social Studies in Occupied and Independent Japan,” *Japan Forum* 12, no. 1 (2000): 15–41; Peter Cave, “Story, Song, and Ceremony: Shaping Dispositions in Japanese Elementary Schools during Taisho and Early Showa,” *Japan Forum* 28, no. 1 (2016): 9–31; Nakayama Eiko, *Meiji shōka no tanjō* (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2010); and John G. Caiger, “The Aims and Content of School Courses in Japanese History, 1872–1945,” in *Japan’s Modern Century*, ed. Edmund Skrzypczak (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1965), 51–81.
- 47 On the role of State Shinto in modern Japan, see Murakami Shigeyoshi, *Kokka shintō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970); Yasumaru, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin*, chapter 4; Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State, 1868–1988* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); John Breen and Mark Teeuwen, *A New History of Shinto* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); Susumu Shimazono, “State Shinto in the Lives of the People,” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 36, no. 1 (2009): 93–124; Kate Nakai, “State Shinto,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018); and Helen Hardacre, *Shinto. A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 147–59.
- 48 Kanayama Yoshiaki, *Nihon no hakubutsukan shi* (Tokyo: Keiyūsha, 2001); Takashi Yoshida, *From Cultures of War to Cultures of Peace* (Portland: Merwin Asia, 2014); Noriko Aso, *Public Properties: Museums in Imperial Japan* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); and Alice Y. Tseng, *The Imperial Museums of Meiji Japan. Architecture and the Art of the Nation* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008).
- 49 Haga Shōji, *Meiji ishin to shūkyō* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994) and Takagi Hiroshi, *Kindai tennō sei to koto* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006).
- 50 Memorials to the war dead in modern Japan include the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, the Gokoku shrines in the various prefectures and memorials called Chūreitō or Chūkonhi in villages. On the Yasukuni Shrine, see Akiko Takenaka, *Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory and Japan’s Unending Postwar* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015); on the village memorials, see Ōhara Yasuo, *Chūkonhi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Akatsuki Shobō, 1984); Akiko Takenaka, “Architecture for Mass-Mobilization: The Chūreitō Memorial Construction Movement, 1939–1945,” in *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, ed. Alan Tansman (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 235–53; Awazu Kenta, “Kindai Nihon nashonarizumu ni okeru hyōshō no hen’yō. Saitama-ken ni okeru senbotsusha-hi kensetsu katei o tōshite,” *Sociologica* 26 (2001): 1–33; and Awazu Kenta, “Kindai Nihon ni okeru senbotsusha kinen shisetsu to bunka nashonarizumu. Dai-Nihon Chūrei Kenshōkai o chūshin ni,” *Sociologica* 27 (2003): 2–20. On the significance of the commemoration of the war dead in modern nation-states in general, see also Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*. For an analysis of figurative sculpture used on British memorials to the war dead built after World War I, see the excellent study by Geoff Archer, *The Glorious Dead. Figurative Sculpture of British First World War Memorials* (Norfolk: Frontier, 2009) and for German memorials to the war dead, see Reinhard Koselleck and Michael Jeismann, eds., *Der Politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1994).
- 51 Yasumaru, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin*; Furukawa Takahisa, *Kōki, banpaku, orinpikku* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1998); and Hashizume Shin’ya, *Shukusai no “teikoku”* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1998).
- 52 Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy* and Hara Takeshi, *Teikoku no shikakuka* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 2001).
- 53 For a general study of representation theory, see Stuart Hall, ed., *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London: Sage, 1997).
- 54 See Hara, *Teikoku no shikakuka*; and Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*. When a high-school girl uploaded a photo she had taken of the emperor and empress to Twitter in 2014, she was harshly criticized for “violating common sense.” The Imperial Household Agency, however, commented that it did not see any problems with the photo. See <https://news.livedoor.com/article/detail/8871248>. See also the recent controversy regarding art works with—sometimes scratched or charred—images of the emperor, in *Asahi shinbun*, October 12, 2019, 15.
- 55 Pierre Nora, Lawrence D. Kritzman, and Arthur Goldhammer, eds./trans., *The Realms of Memory*, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
- 56 For the case of France, see *ibid.*; for Germany, see Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, eds., *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001).
- 57 See Aleida Assmann, *Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1999), 138. See also Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, loc. 2774, Kindle, and David Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), loc. 2052, Kindle, also emphasizes that “elites usually control access to heritage.” See also Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) and Karen E. Till, “Places of Memory,” in *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 297.
- 58 The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) is an example of an originally oppositional force that created

- an intense personality cult of its founder, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64). See Andrew G. Bonnell, “The Lassalle Cult in German Social Democracy,” *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 35 (1989): 50–60. The cult of Otto von Bismarck had a similar development. Originally conceived as an act of dissidence and an expression of dissatisfaction with the “personal rule” of the young Emperor Wilhelm II, Bismarck’s cult eventually developed into a tool for national integration and was actively utilized by the ruling elite for national mobilization during World War I.
- 59 In this context, Jason Karlin speaks of “contesting nationalism.” Jason Karlin, *Gender and Nation in Meiji Japan: Modernity, Loss, and the Doing of History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2014).
- 60 Louise Young, *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2013), 140.
- 61 Ethan Mark, “Japan’s 1930s: Crisis, Fascism, and Social Imperialism,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 237–50.
- 62 On public memory and popular historical consciousness in postwar Japan, see the essay by Carol Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1993), 64–95.
- 63 Richard Alings, *Monument und Nation: Das Bild von Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal* (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1996), vi.
- 64 Michalski, *Public Monuments*.
- 65 Anonymous, “Saigō Nanshū no dōzō o hyōsu,” *Taiyō* 5, no. 2 (1899): 52–61, quotation on pages 53–54. The author of this editorial was the philosopher Takayama Chogyū (1871–1902); similar statements are found in Takayama Chogyū, *Jidai kanken* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1899), 214–20.
- 66 For an example from the 1930s, see Inoue Kōka, *Etchū shiron san* (Takaoka: Kōkakai, 1936), 141–45.
- 67 See Iwata Shigenori, *Ohaka no tanjō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006).
- 68 On the role of ancestor worship in Shinto, see Daniel C. Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto: A Study of the State Religion of Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1922).
- 69 For example, Niiseki Kimiko, “Chōkoku no hatashita yakuwari,” in *Meiji jidai-kan*, ed. Miyachi Masato et al. (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 2005), 354–55.
- 70 Ogiwara Rokuzan, “Tōkyō shinai no dōzō o ronzu,” *Waseda bungaku* 48 (1909): 36.
- 71 See, for example, Ukita Kazutami, “Eiyū sūhai-ron,” *Kokumin no tomo* 6 (1887): 25–38.
- 72 See Jean-Marie Welter, “French Bronzes from Renaissance to Revolution: But are They Bronze?,” in *Cast in Bronze. French Sculpture from Renaissance to Revolution*, ed. Genevière Bresc-Bautier and Guilhem Scherf (Paris: Musée du Louvre/Somogy, 2009), 42–45.
- 73 Kuki Ryūichi, cited in Emi Chizuko, “Saigō Takamori dōzō kō,” *Bunka shigengaku* 3 (2005): 71.
- 74 Of particular assistance is the expanding genre of guidebooks covering the “memorial landscape” of a city or region, including the classic “The Okinawa That is Not in Tourist Courses” (Arasaki Moriteru et al., *Kankō kōsu de nai Okinawa*, Tokyo: Kōkōsei Bunka Kenkyūkai, 1983), the “Guide to the Historical Sites of the Movement for Freedom and People’s Rights in Tosa” (Kumon Gō, *Shiseki gaido. Tosa no jiyū minken*, Kōchi: Kōchi Shinbunsha, 2013) and Mita Yoshinobu, ed., *Sekihī de meguru Kanazawa rekishi sanpo* (Kanazawa: Hokkoku Shinbunsha, 2013). These guidebooks cater to tourists with a special interest in non-mainstream sites that have a distinct historical background.
- 75 This link has been overlooked in previous research as in, for example, Kenneth Ruoff, *Imperial Japan at its Zenith* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). Although the celebrations of the Japanese empire’s 2600th anniversary in 1940 are the central subject of Ruoff’s study, there is no mention of the statues built for Emperor Jinmu, the alleged founder of the Japanese empire, and the connection of these monuments with history tourism.
- 76 Cataloged most notably by Arai, *Ijin no omokage*. See also Hitomi Kisaburō, ed., *Keihin shozai dōzō shashin* (Tokyo: Suwadō, 1910).
- 77 Studies into historical memory include Takashi Fujitani et al., eds., *Perilous Memories. The Asia-Pacific War(s)* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Sven Saaler, *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion. The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society* (Munich: Iudicium, 2005); Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, eds., *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008); Yoshiko Nozaki, *War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, 1945–2007* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Philip Seaton, *Japan’s Contested War Memories* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Julian Dierkes, *Postwar History Education in Japan and the Germanys. Guilty Lessons* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011); Gerald Figal, *Beachheads: War, Peace, and Tourism in Postwar Okinawa* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012); Akiko Hashimoto, *The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Takenaka, *Yasukuni Shrine*; Philip Seaton, ed., *Local History and War Memories in Hokkaido* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); and Yoshida Yutaka, “Debates Over Historical

- Consciousness,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 403–20.
- 78 Takashi Fujitani’s *Splendid Monarchy* (1996) was probably the first book in English to touch on the significance of statuary in modern Japan. Michael Wert’s study *Meiji Restoration Losers* traces the legacy and memory of leading figures of the shogunate in post-1868 Japan; it includes a discussion of the statues of these figures. See Michael Wert, *Meiji Restoration Losers: Memory and Tokugawa Supporters in Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center/Harvard University Press, 2013). In her book on the historical memory of the Russo-Japanese War, Naoko Shimazu includes a case study of the cult that developed around Commander Hirose Takeo. See Naoko Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory, and the Russo-Japanese War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chapter 6. See also Sven Saaler, “Public Statuary and Nationalism in Modern and Contemporary Japan,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 15, issue 20/3 (October 15, 2017), <https://apjif.org/2017/20/Saaler.html>.
- 79 For example, Inamoto Hiroshi and Sugita Kōzō, eds., *Furusato no kokoro—dōzō* (Tokyo: Orijin Shuppan, 1990); Maruoka Shin’ya, *Nihon no kokoro wa dōzō ni atta* (Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2015), Kindle; Shimizu Yoshinori, *Dōzō meguri tabi* (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2006); and Kaneko, *Nihon no dōzō*. One of the more informative titles in this category is Rekishi Kyōikusha Kyōgikai, ed., *Sekishi to dōzō de yomu kindai Nihon no sensō* (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2007). Useful as travel guides are Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Tōkyo no dōzō o aruku* (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2011) and Okada Kiichirō (2014), *Tōkyō dōzō-meguri rokujūgoban* (Tokyo: Hibino Toshikazu, 2014), Kindle.
- 80 Matsudaira Kōmei, *Nihon no dōzō* (Utsunomiya: Zuisōsha, 2002), 000 [sic]. Similarly, the titles of two of the publications cited in the preceding note refer to statues as the “soul” (*kokoro*) of Japan and the Japanese hometown, respectively.
- 81 Motoyasu Hiroshi, *Gunto no irei kūkan: kokumin tōgō to senshishatachi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002); Haga Shōji, “Gunto no sensō kinenhi. Toyohashi Daijūhachi rentai to Jinmu tennō dōzō kinenhi,” in *Kindai Nihon no uchi to soto*, ed. Tanaka Akira (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1999), 282–308; and Abe Yasunari, “Ko Ii Naosuke o kōka suru. Naosuke gojū kaiki made no rekishi hiyō,” *Iwasaki Keiichi Kyōju Taishoku kinen ronbun shū* 371 (2008): 47–78. The research of Hiyama Yukio on the commemoration of the war dead has also been helpful and I am grateful to Professor Hiyama for inviting me to join his research projects: *Kakenhi* project 18202021 (2006–9), “Kindai Nihon no senbotsusha irei ni kansuru sōgōteki kenkyū” (General Research on the Memorialization of the War Dead in Modern Japan); *Kakenhi* project 24242026 (2012–16), “Gendaiteki oyobi sekaishiteki shiten kara mita Nihon no senbotsusha irei ni kansuru sōkatsuteki kenkyū” (Comprehensive Research on the Memorialization of the War Dead in Japan from a Contemporary and Global History Perspective); and *Kakenhi* project 17H00929 (2017–20), “Sekaishiteki shiten kara no kokumin kokka ni okeru sensō kioku no kirokuka to sengo shakai no kōchiku ni kansuru kenkyū” (Research on the Memorialization of War in the Nation-state and the Postwar Reconstruction of Society from the Perspective of Global History).
- 82 Hirase Reita, *Dōzō jūnan no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011) and Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Dōzō no jidai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014). Kinoshita’s book is a collection of loosely related articles that include several pieces unrelated to bronze statuary. See also Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Yo no tochū kara kakusarete-iru koto* (Tokyo: Shōbunsha, 2002), which also touches on aspects of historical memory and the cult of personality.
- 83 To my knowledge, the only attempt to present a quantitative analysis, although limited to the destruction of statuary during the World War II, is Elizabeth Campbell Karlsgodt, “Recycling French Heroes: The Destruction of Bronze Statues under the Vichy Regime,” *French Historical Studies* 29, no. 1 (2006): 143–81.
- 84 Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives*.
- 85 On Bismarck, see Hedinger, “Der Bismarck-Kult”; Hedinger, “Bismarck-Denkmal”; and Hardtwig, “Der Bismarck-Mythos.” In addition, there are a number of excellent studies regarding national monuments (other than statues) in modern Germany; see, for example, Alings, *Monument und Nation*; Thomas Nipperdey, “Nationalidee und Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 206 (1968): 529–85. On France, see Karlsgodt, “Recycling French Heroes”; McWilliam, “Conflicting Manifestations”; Hargrove, *The Statues of Paris*; and Kirrily Freeman, *Bronze to Bullets. Vichy and the Destruction of French Public Statuary, 1941–1944* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
- 86 Michalski, *Public Monuments*.
- 87 For a critical assessment of this decline, see Helen Hardacre, “Introduction,” in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, ed. Helen Hardacre and Adam Kern, Brill’s Japanese Study Library 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), xxii. Biographical studies continue to appear in healthy numbers in Japanese-language publications.
- 88 Ivan Morris, *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1975). Morris’ study emphasizes the uniqueness of the Japanese adulation of tragic heroes who failed to reach their objectives while David Lowenthal has pointed out that heroes honored in many countries are characterized by

tragedy and failure: “most of France’s legendary heroes have died tragic deaths.” Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade*, loc. 1731, Kindle.

- 89 Albert M. Craig and Donald H. Shively, eds., *Personality in Japanese History* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1970).
- 90 Richard J. Smethurst, *From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan’s Keynes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
- 91 Wert, *Meiji Restoration Losers*.
- 92 Mark Ravina, *The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigō Takamori* (Hoboken: Wiley & Sons, 2005).

Chapter 1

- 1 Chie Ishibashi, “Introduction,” in *Japanese Portrait Sculpture*, ed. Hisashi Mōri (Tokyo: Kodansha International and Shibundo, 1977), 12.
- 2 The database of national treasures and properties of national significance on the website of the Agency for Cultural Affairs of the Japanese government (<http://kunishitei.bunka.go.jp/bsys>) contains more than 3,000 statues, most of which are premodern wooden Buddhist sculptures. See also the examples in Mōri, ed., *Japanese Portrait Sculpture*.
- 3 See Matsuno Keisaburō, ed., *Nihon butsuzō shi* (Tokyo: Bijutsu Shuppansha, 2001), 7–8.
- 4 On Prince Shōtoku, see Mitsusada Inoue, “The Century of Reform,” in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 1, ed. Delmer M. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 163–220, and Hermann Böhner, *Shōtoku Taishi*, *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*, Bd. 29, Teil C (Tokyo: OAG—Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 1936). See also Kenneth Dooyong Lee, *The Prince and the Monk: Shōtoku Worship in Shinran’s Buddhism* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007); Kevin Gray Carr, *Plotting the Prince: Shōtoku Cults and the Mapping of Medieval Japanese Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press), and Akiko Walley, *Constructing the Dharma King: The Hōryūji Shaka Triad and the Birth of the Prince Shōtoku Cult* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
- 5 Mōri, *Japanese Portrait Sculpture*, 67–68, and Carr, *Plotting the Prince*.
- 6 Kimio Itō, “The Invention of *Wa* and the Transformation of the Image of Prince Shōtoku in Modern Japan,” in *Mirror of Modernity. Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, ed. Stephen Vlastos (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1998), 37–47, references on pages 41 and 42.
- 7 The Digital Library of the National Diet Library of Japan contains only a single title that was published on Shōtoku in the 1870s, whereas there were forty-two in the 1880s, sixty in the 1890s, ninety-seven in the 1900s, ninety in the 1910s, climbing to 253 in the 1920s and 212 in the 1930s; they were all illustrative of his augmented popularity. See dl.ndl.go.jp.
- 8 For the contents of these textbooks, see Itō, “The Invention of *Wa*.” The first statue installed in a public space was during the last years of the Meiji period in the Shigisan temple, Chogosonshiji, in Nara Prefecture, <http://www.sigisan.or.jp/english.html>. See Hiro’oka Sei’ichi, *Shigisan meishō shiori* (Tokyo: Chogosonshiji, 1914), unpaginated.
- 9 Mōri, *Japanese Portrait Sculpture*, 130. See also Matsuno, *Nihon butsuzō shi*, 176–77, and William Gowland, “The Art of Casting Bronze in Japan,” *Journal of the Society of Arts* XLIII, no. 2215 (1895): 609–51.
- 10 See Karen Gerhart, *The Eyes of Power: Art and Early Tokugawa Authority* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 84–85.
- 11 See Gunma-ken Tone Kyōikukai, ed., *Tone gunshi* (Tone: Gunma-ken Tone Kyōikukai, 1930) and Katashina Sonshi Henshū linkai, ed., *Katashina sonshi* (Katashina: Katashina-mura, 1963).
- 12 See Yasumaru Yoshio, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979), 23.
- 13 See Kitai Toshio, *Shinkokuron no keifu* (Tokyo: Hōzōkan, 2006), 155.
- 14 See Fujii Jōji, *Toku-gawa Iemitsu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997), chapter 7, and Sonehara Satoshi, *Shinkun Ieyasu no tanjō: Tōshōgū to Gongen-sama* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2008). For a photograph of the wooden Ieyasu statue, see <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/333829391100263145/>.
- 15 Gerhart, *The Eyes of Power*, 104.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 141.
- 17 *Ibid.*, ix; see also page 141.
- 18 See Ann Walthall, “Off With Their Heads! The Hirata Disciples and the Ashikaga Shoguns,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 50, no. 2 (1995): 137–70.
- 19 On the separation of Shinto from Buddhism, see Tamamuro Yoshio, *Shinbutsu bunri* (Tokyo: Nyūton Puresu, 1977) and Helen Hardacre, *Shinto. A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 368–73; on the destruction of Buddhist temples and sacred objects, see Saeki Etatsu, *Haibutsu kishaku hyakunen* (Tokyo: Kōmyakusha, 2003). See also Yasumaru, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin*, 51–59, 85–97.
- 20 In 1943, a writer looking back at the development of public bronze statuary in modern Japan was probably the first to note this change when he stated that before the Meiji period, “bronze statuary was limited to Buddhist statues,” and that public statuary portraying secular historical figures was a phenomenon of the twentieth century. *Asahi shinbun*, March 21, 1943, 4. See also the entry “*dōzō*” in the *Kokushi daijiten* (Dictionary of National History). Although *dōzō* is the common term

- for bronze statues in modern Japanese, *dō* in its narrowest definition means “copper,” while “bronze” is referred to as *seidō*.
- 21 *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 9, 1893, 1.
 - 22 Anonymous, “Dōzō,” *Kenchiku zasshi* 253 (1908): 35–36.
 - 23 Cited in Peter Pantzer, ed., *Österreichs erster Handelsdeliegierter in Japan. Das Japan-Tagebuch von Karl Ritter von Scherzer 1869* (Munich: Iudicium, 2019), 19, 96 and 199 (list of presents from the Austrian mission compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
 - 24 See Minato-ku Kyōdo Rekishikan, ed., *Nihon—Ōsutoria kokkō no hajimari* (Tokyo: Minato-ku Kyōiku linkai, 2019), 17. The Tokyo National Museum, Japan’s oldest museum, traces its roots back to this 1872 exhibition. See the museum’s website at https://www.tnm.jp/modules/r_free_page/index.php?id=144.
 - 25 Kume Kunitake, ed., *Tokumei zenken taishi beiō kairan jikki* (Tokyo: Hakubunsha, 1878), vol. 3: 96–97, 336, 353, and vol. 4: 38–39, 156, 271.
 - 26 *Ibid.*, vol. 3: 373–74.
 - 27 Only one earlier example is known: an equestrian statue of a ruler set up in the German city of Magdeburg in the 1240s. Extant documents do not allow definitive conclusions regarding the figure’s identity, but art historians believe that it is Emperor Otto I. See Ernst Schubert, *Der Magdeburger Reiter* (Magdeburg: Stadt Magdeburg Museen, 1994).
 - 28 Raphael Beuing, *Reiterbilder der Frührenaissance. Monument und Memoria* (Munster: Rhema, 2010).
 - 29 Sculptors are usually considered as playing the major artistic role in the production of statues, which often accounts for the preservation of their names. Although the distinction between sculptors, casters, founders, and metallurgists was not always clear, in many cases only the sculptors’ names are known. See Françoise de la Moureyre, “Bronze in the Age of Louis XIV,” in *Cast in Bronze. French Sculpture from Renaissance to Revolution*, ed. Geneviève Bresc-Bautier and Guilhem Scherf (Paris: Musée du Louvre/Somogy, 2009), 228–35.
 - 30 Gérard Sabatier, “La Gloire du Roi: Iconographie de Louis XIV de 1661 à 1672,” *Histoire, Économie et Société* 19, no. 4 (2000): 527–60. See also De la Moureyre, “Bronze in the Age of Louis XIV,” 230–31, and Leah Dennison, *Louis XIV. Enhancement of Royal Authority by the Use of Court Ritual and Visual Arts* (Norderstedt: Grin, 2013).
 - 31 Martin H. Schmidt, “Das Blücher-Denkmal in Rostock von Johann Gottfried Schadow,” in *Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher und seine Zeit*, ed. Wolf Karge (Rostock: Hinstorff, 1992), 19–42; Reiner Mnich and Lutz Nöh, *Rostock und Warnemünde—Bildende Kunst im Stadtbild* (Rostock: Hinstorff, 2000); Helmut Caspar, *Schadows Blücherdenkmal in Rostock und Martin Luther in Wittenberg* (Berlin: Schadow-Gesellschaft Berlin, 2003).
 - 32 A memorial for Gutenberg was discussed as early as in 1740; see Luzie Bratner, *Das Mainzer Gutenbergdenkmal. Von St. Far bis Thorvaldsen. Zu Entstehung und Geschichte des Gutenbergplatzes und des Gutenbergdenkmals* (Alzey: Verlag der Rhein Hessischen Druck-Werkstätte, 2000), 6.
 - 33 Statues of Herman the German can also be found outside Germany, for example, in New Ulm, Minnesota, completed by German settlers in 1897. See the websites of the Hermann Monument Society (<http://www.hermannmonument.com>) and the city of New Ulm (<http://www.ci.new-ulm.mn.us>). On the monument completed in 1875 in Northwest Germany, see Günther Engelbert, *Ein Jahrhundert Hermannsdenkmal 1875–1975* (Detmold: Naturwissenschaftlicher und Historischer Verein für das Land Lippe, 1975).
 - 34 Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence. Vol. 2 of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), loc. 2223, Kindle.
 - 35 Richard Alings, *Monument und Nation: Das Bild von Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal* (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1996), 45.
 - 36 In all, 232 statues of Wilhelm I (not counting non-figurative monuments) were erected in prewar Germany. For a list of monuments dedicated to Emperor Wilhelm I, see Otto Kuntzemüller, *Die Denkmäler Kaiser Wilhelms des Großen* (Bremen: [no publisher], c. 1902). See also http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_der_Kaiser-Wilhelm-I.-Denkm%C3%A4ler. For Bismarck memorials, see the “Encyclopedia of Bismarck Monuments,” Sieglinde Seele, *Lexikon der Bismarck-Denkmäler. Türme, Standbilder, Büsten, Gedenksteine und andere Ehrungen* (Petersberg: Michael Imhof, 2005).
 - 37 For the case of France, see Neil McWilliam, “Conflicting Manifestations: Parisian Commemoration of Joan of Arc and Etienne Dolet in the Early Third Republic,” *French Historical Studies* 27, no. 2 (2004): 381–418 and M. Dietler, “Our Ancestors the Gauls’: Archaeology, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Manipulation of Celtic Identity in Modern Europe,” *American Anthropologist* 96 (1994): 584–605. For a comparative analysis of the movements that produced the Herman memorial in Germany and the monuments to first-century Gaulish chieftain Vercingetorix in the French city of Clermont-Ferrand, see Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995).
 - 38 *Taiyō* 7, no. 11 (1901); *Taiyō* 2, no. 22 (1896); and *Taiyō* 15, no. 2 (1906), all unpaginated.
 - 39 Shimamura Takitarō, *Kindai bungei no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1909), 215.
 - 40 *Ibid.* On Begas, see Esther Sophia Sünderhauf, ed., *Begas. Monumente für das Kaiserreich* (Dresden: Sandstein Verlag, 2010).

- 41 Max Schasler, *Ueber moderne Denkmalswuth* (Berlin: Habel, 1878).
- 42 Richard Muther, "Die Denkmalsseuche," *Studien und Kritiken* 2 (1901): 100–10.
- 43 Cited in Alings, *Monument und Nation*, 76.
- 44 *Ibid.*, 77.
- 45 Tajiri Tasuku, ed., *Zōi shokenden*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Kokuyūsha, 1927).
- 46 On the Kenmu Restoration, see H. Paul Varley, *Imperial Restoration in Medieval Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); and Andrew E. Goble, *Kenmu: Go-Daigo's Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). On Go-Daigo, see Goble, *Kenmu* and Mori Shigeaki, *Go-Daigo tennō* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2000). According to Tajiri, *Zōi shokenden*, thirty-five figures involved in the Kenmu Restoration were awarded posthumous imperial ranks in the Meiji period.
- 47 On the contents of history textbooks in prewar Japan, see John G. Caiger, "The Aims and Content of School Courses in Japanese History, 1872–1945," in *Japan's Modern Century*, ed. Edmund Skrzypczak (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1965), 51–81.
- 48 David Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), loc. 2388, Kindle.
- 49 See E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (London: Penguin, 1970).
- 50 Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life*, trans. Ian Johnston (Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2010 [1874]), Kindle.
- 51 Nietzsche, *On the Use and Abuse of History*, loc. 221, Kindle.
- 52 Hardacre, *Shinto. A History*, chapter 2.
- 53 John S. Brownlee, *Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945* (Vancouver and Tokyo: UBC Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1997), 96.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 139, and Varley, *Imperial Restoration*, 127–28.
- 55 Murata Masashi, *Nanboku-chō ron. Shijitsu to shisō* (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1959), 230.
- 56 Cited in Brownlee, *Japanese Historians*, 141; see also Murata, *Nanbokuchō ron*, 230, 244.
- 57 See Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 71–82.
- 58 Richard Norpel, cited in Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade*, loc. 2838, Kindle.
- 59 Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade*, loc. 2868, Kindle.
- 60 Nichigai Associates, ed., *Jinbutsu kinenkan jiten* (Tokyo: Nichigai Associates, 2002). For a discussion of the legal framework regarding the construction of memorials, statues, and museums dedicated to individuals, see Yamazaki Arinobu, *Nichiro sen'eki chūshisha kenpi narabi Shōkonsha gōshi tetsuzuki* (Tokyo: Kaitsūsha, 1906).
- 61 On the development of State Shinto, see Murakami Shigeyoshi, *Kokka shintō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970); Yasumaru Yoshio, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979); Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State, 1868–1988* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Susumu Shimazono, "State Shinto in the Lives of the People," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 36, no. 1 (2009): 93–124; Shimazono Susumu, *Kokka Shintō to Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010). On the role of religion in the Meiji Restoration, see Haga Shōji, *Meiji ishin to shūkyō* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994).
- 62 Nakamura Makiko, "Sosen sūhai to tennō shinkō," *Soshiologos* 16 (1992): 158–73.
- 63 See Bob Wakabayashi, *Anti-foreignism and Western Learning in Early-modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 257, 263.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 266.
- 65 See Haga, *Meiji ishin to shūkyō*, chapter 8; Yasumaru Yoshio, *Kindai tennō zō no keisei* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 183, and Sasaki Suguru, "Meiji tennō no imēji keisei to minshū," in *Bakumatsu/Meiji-ki no kokumin kokka keisei to bunka hen'yō*, edited by Nishikawa Nagao and Matsumiya Hideharu (Tokyo: Shin'yōsha, 1995), 117–42.
- 66 On *sōken jinja*, see the classic study by Okada Yoneo, "Jingū jinja sōken shi," in *Meiji ishin Shintō hyakunen shi*, vol. 2, ed. Shintō Bunkakai (Tokyo: Shintō Bunkakai, 1967), 4–182; see also Murakami Shigeyoshi, *Tennō no saishi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), 135; Yasumaru, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin*, 261–65; Hardacre, *Shinto and the State*, 36–39; and Hardacre, *Shinto. A History*, 389–97. *Sōken jinja* became an essential part of the system of State Shinto and a valuable instrument in disseminating the idea of the nation among the population. Although most of these shrines were founded as *kensha* (prefectural shrines), many were later elevated to the status of *kansha* (official or government shrine), *bekkaku kanpei-sha* (special government shrine), or even *kanpei taisha* (grand government shrine), in particular, those dedicated to key figures from the developing national pantheon. See Mark Mullins, "Religion in Contemporary Japanese Lives," in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Culture and Society*, ed. Victoria Lyon Bestor and Theodore C. Bestor (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). See also the lists of *sōken jinja* in Okada, "Jingū jinja sōken shi" and Murakami, *Tennō no saishi*, 135.
- 67 Hardacre, *Shinto. A History*, 389.
- 68 See Murakami, *Tennō no saishi*.
- 69 Hijikata Hisamoto, *Tennō oyobi ijin o matsuru jinja* (Tokyo: Teikoku Shoin, 1912).
- 70 These included Japan's oldest shrines, such as the Ise Shrine, dedicated to Amaterasu Ōmikami, and the Miyazaki Shrine, established for the worship of Japan's mythological first Emperor Jimmu.

- 71 This group included shrines dedicated to the Nara-period court noble Wake no Kiyomaro (733–99) and court noble Sugawara no Michizane (845–903). Today, there are numerous shrines dedicated to Sugawara throughout Japan, constituting an exceptional case of the worship of an individual in Shinto. See Okada Shōji, *Nihon Shintō shi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2010). Despite the popularity of this historical figure, however, statues of Sugawara are rare. The first known statue to him was commissioned in 1933 for the International Women’s and Children’s Exhibition (*Bankoku Fujin Kodomo Hakurankai*) held in Ueno; see Kawaguchi Hitoshi, “‘Bankoku Fujin Kodomo Hakurankai’ ni tsuite no kōsatsu,” *Matsuyama Daigaku ronshū* 20, no. 5 (2008): 77–100; the contemporary marker notes that it was relocated to Mount Takao in 1936. This was the only prewar statue of Sugawara, but today there are at least a dozen shrines venerating Sugawara that have a statue of him within their precincts.
- 72 The remainder were the so-called Shōkonsha that will be discussed more fully below.
- 73 On the Oyama Shrine, see Kitamura Gyohōdō, *Oyama Jinja shi* (Tokyo: Oyama Jinja Shamusho, 1973). Before the construction of the Oyama Shrine, Maeda Toshiie was commemorated in the Utatsuyama Yawatagū (today Utasu Jinja [Shrine]), where festivals marking the 100th, 200th and 250th anniversaries of Toshiie’s death were celebrated. See Zusetu Maeda Toshiie Hensan linkai, *Zusetu Maeda Toshiie* (Kanazawa: Oyama Jinja, 1999), 120–21.
- 74 Takahashi Shinji, *Kuki Ryūichi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Mirai-sha, 2008), 81–83. Finally, 1897, the government passed the Law for the Preservation of Old Shrines and Temples; see *ibid.*, 88.
- 75 Haga, *Meiji ishin to shūkyō*, 392–96.
- 76 Okada, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” 103–7; see also Morioka Kiyomi, “Meiji ishinki ni okeru hanzo o matsuru jinja no sōken,” *Shukutoku Daigaku Sōgō Fukushi Gakubu/Bulletin of the College of Integrated Human and Social Welfare Studies, Shukutoku University* 37 (2003), for the history of the Kenkun Shrine, which in the past was also read Takeisao Shrine. On the order to “revive worship of Toyotomi” by building a shrine “outside of Osaka Castle,” see Kunaichō, ed., *Meiji tennō ki*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1968), 691. As early as in 1873, the Hōkoku Shrine in Osaka dedicated to Hideyoshi was elevated to the level of a Special Government Shrine (*bekkaku kanpeisha*) with the reason that the warlord had “spread the imperial power (*sumeragi-i*) overseas,” referring to his invasions of Korea in the 1590s.
- 77 Yasumaru, *Kamiigami no Meiji ishin*, chapter 4.2.
- 78 Further donations for the construction of this shrine were made by most of the leading politicians of the day, including Sanjō Sanetomi, Iwakura Tomomi, and Ōkubo Toshimichi as well as some governors of feudal domains (*han-chiji*). Thus, the foundation of new shrines honoring imperial loyalists were seen by the new elite as occasions to demonstrate unity, as were fundraising drives for statues at a later period (see below). On the donations to the Minatogawa Shrine, see Okada, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” 20–22.
- 79 See Kunaichō, *Meiji tennō ki*, vol. 1, 679. Regarding the history of Minatogawa Shrine, see Morita Yasunosuke, *Minatogawa Jinja shi*, 3 vols. (Kobe: Minatogawa Jinja Shamusho, 1978–87); Minatogawa Jinja, ed., *Minatogawa Jinja shashi* (Kobe: Minatogawa Jinja Shamusho, 1928); Bekkaku Kanpeisha Minatogawa Jinja, ed., *Minatogawa Jinja sharyaku shi* (Kobe: Bekkaku Kanpeisha Minatogawa Jinja, 1934); Minatogawa Jinja Chinza Hyakunen Kiroku Henshū linkai, *Minatogawa Jinja chinza hyakunen-sai kiroku* (Kobe: Minatogawa Jinja Shamusho, 1976).
- 80 Cited in Okada, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” 17.
- 81 Haga, *Meiji ishin to shūkyō*, 46.
- 82 On the foundation of shrines for Go-Daigo, see Okada, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” 39–43.
- 83 See Tamaki Maeda, “From Feudal Hero to National Icon: The Kusunoki Masashige Image, 1660–1945,” *Artibus Asiae* 72, no. 2 (2012): 201–64.
- 84 *Ibid.*, 209, and Murata *Nanbokuchō ron*, 189.
- 85 Okada, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” 15.
- 86 See Maeda, “From Feudal Hero to National Icon,” 210–12.
- 87 Kunaichō, *Meiji tennō ki*, vol. 1, 679–80; see also Murata *Nanbokuchō ron*, 192–93, and Okada, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” 16–17.
- 88 Okada, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” 19; see also Maeda, “From Feudal Hero to National Icon,” 246.
- 89 See Hijikata, *Tennō oyobi ijin o matsuru jinja*; see also Okada, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” 70–80.
- 90 The Yasukuni Shrine was Japan’s National Memorial for the war dead until the abolition of State Shinto in 1947; it continues to function as a private religious organization. On the Yasukuni Shrine and the controversies associated with it in contemporary Japan, see Akiko Takenaka, *Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory and Japan’s Unending Postwar* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015); John Breen, ed., *Yasukuni: The War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past* (London: C. Hurst, 2007); and Jeff Kingston, “Yasukuni Shrine,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 440–54.
- 91 See the websites of the shrine in Kanagawa (<http://www.kodamajinja.org>) and the city of Shūnan (<http://www.city.shunan.lg.jp/section/ed-sports/ed-shogai-bunka/jyukari.html>).

- 92 On these shrines, see Yamamuro Kentoku, *Gunshin* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2007), 178–86. In 1913, Tōgō received the honorific title of *gensui*, or “Admiral of the Fleet.”
- 93 See Tōkyō-shi Akasaka-ku, ed., *Akasaka-ku shi* (Tokyo: Tōkyō-shi Akasaka-ku, 1941), 455, 753–75.
- 94 On the history of the Meiji Shrine, see Imaizumi Yoshiko, *Sacred Space in the Modern City: The Fractured Pasts of Meiji Shrine, 1912–1958* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
- 95 See the shrines’ websites at <http://www.nogijinja.or.jp/> (Tokyo), <http://nogi-jinja.jp/web/> (Kyoto), <http://yaokami.jp/1010096/> (Hakodate), <http://www.nasunogijinja.jp/> (Nasu), and <http://www.chofukankou.com/pg41.html> (Shimonoseki).
- 96 See, for example, Emil Schiller, *Shinto, die Volksreligion Japans* (Berlin: Ostasien-Mission, 1935), chapter 5.
- 97 Nobushige Hozumi, *Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law* (London: Kegan Paul, 2004), xii–xiii. This book was originally published in 1901, but the first edition does not contain the preface with the citation given here.
- 98 “Kansha e dō-seki zō konryū no gi ni tsuki ukagai,” Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), Kōbunroku, Meiji 10, no. 18, 1876; see also Kitazawa Noriaki, “Monyumento no sōshutsu. Chōkoku no kindai to dōzō,” in *Yōga to Nihonga kindai bijutsu II*, vol. 22, *Nihon bijutsu zenshū*, ed. Takashina Shūji et al. (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1992), 186–92.
- 99 Ibid.
- 100 See Tanaka Shūji, *Kindai Nihon saisho no chōkokuka* (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994), 171.
- 101 On Kuki, see Takahashi, *Kuki Ryūichi*.
- 102 See Kuki Ryūichi, “Bijutsu ni kansuru Kuki-shi no iken,” *Chōya shinbun*, 29 October 29, 1890–November 5, 1890 (6 parts), and Takahashi, *Kuki Ryūichi*, 40–41.
- 103 Hirase Reita, *Dōzō juman no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011), 11–12.
- 104 Takahashi, *Kuki Ryūichi*, 82–87.
- 105 Ogiwara Rokuzan, “Tōkyō shinai no dōzō o ronzu,” *Waseda bungaku* 48 (1909): 36.
- 106 See <http://www.kanazawa-museum.jp/ijin>. Another *ijin* museum can be found in Kōchi Prefecture. See <http://www.actland.jp/museum/ijinkan.html>.
- 107 The “Great Man View of History” was advocated in the 1840s by Scottish philosopher and historian Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881); see, for example, Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes and Hero Worship and the Heroic in History*. (London: James Fraser, 1841).
- 108 See, for example, Adachi Ritsuen, *Ijin hyakuwa* (Tokyo: Sekizenkan, 1911).
- 109 Uchimura was inspired by American writer Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–82), author of *Representative Men* (Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co., 1850). Uchimura’s book was first published in English in 1894 by Minyūsha under the title *Japan and the Japanese* and then by Keisei-sha in a revised edition as *Representative Men of Japan* in 1908. Until fairly recently, it was published in numerous new bilingual (Japanese/English) editions. Uchimura Kanzō, *Representative Men of Japan|Daihyō-teki Nihonjin* (Tokyo, New York, and London: Kodansha International, 1999). The five *ijin* introduced in this book are Saigō Takamori, Uesugi Yōzan (Harunori), Ninomiya Sontoku, Nakae Tōju, and Nichiren.
- 110 Nakamura Shintarō, ed., *Ijin no kenkyū jiten* (Tokyo: Komine Shoten, 1960), 3. See also the series of supplementary teaching materials for elementary schools published shortly thereafter: Jidō Bungakusha Kyōkai, ed., *Ijin no shōnen jidai* (Inen-6nen sei) (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1963).
- 111 See the series website, https://publications.asahi.com/ecs/detail/?item_id=18415.
- 112 On Rai San’yō, see Barry Steben, “Rai San’yō’s Philosophy of History and the Ideal of Imperial Restoration,” *East Asian History* 24 (2002): 117–70, and Barry Steben, “Rai San’yō’s Unofficial History,” in *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, Volume Two: *Sources of Japanese Tradition 1600 to 2000, Part Two: 1868 to 2000*, ed. William Theodore de Bary et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 484–88.
- 113 Yamaji Aizan, cited in Steben, “Rai San’yō’s Philosophy,” 117. See also Murata, *Nanbokuchō ron*, 185.
- 114 Kizaki Kōshō and Rai Baigai, *Rai San’yō-sensei. Kinsei jin denki sōsho* (Tokyo: San’yōkai, 1935), 51. By 1899, 5,000–6,000 copies per year were being published by a printer based in Kawagoe, in addition to the “authorized” edition of the text controlled by the Rai family. See Steben, “Rai San’yō’s Philosophy,” 134, and Maeda, “From Feudal Hero to National Icon,” 211.
- 115 Steben, “Rai San’yō’s Philosophy,” 124.
- 116 Some journals were unmoved by the rhetoric surrounding *ijin*. *Fūzoku gahō*, for example, never used the term.
- 117 Ōmachi Keigetsu, “Ijin ron,” *Gakusei* 3, no. 10 (1912): 3–5.
- 118 Mikami Sanji, “Ijin tōhyō no kekka o hyōsu,” *Gakusei* 3, no. 10 (1912): 307–12.
- 119 Ōmachi Keigetsu, *Fudegusa* (Kaneō Bun’endō, 1909), 31. See also the bestselling work, Miyake Setsurei, *Ijin no ato* (Tokyo: Heigo Shuppansha, 1910).
- 120 Arai Fusatarō, *Ijin no omokage* (Tokyo: Nijūroku Shinpōsha, 1928; repr. Tokyo: Yumani Shobō, 2009).

Chapter 2

- 1 Taki Kōji, *Tennō no shōzō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002; first ed. 1988), 198.
- 2 On the term *kokutai*, see Klaus Antoni, *Kokutai—Political Shintō from Early-Modern to Contemporary Japan* (Tübingen: Eberhard-Karls-University Tübingen, 2016). For an interpretation of the term from the perspective of a Japanese nationalist philosopher in the 1930s, see Tanaka Chigaku, *What is Nippon Kokutai? Introduction*

- to *Nipponese National Principles* (Tokyo: Shishio Bunko, 1935).
- 3 Helen Hardacre, *Shinto. A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 360.
 - 4 For a summary of these trends, see Sven Saaler, “Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan,” in *Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered*, ed. Jeff Kingston (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 172–85.
 - 5 See the IHA’s website at <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-about/genealogy/img/keizu-e.pdf>.
 - 6 Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996), loc. 219, Kindle.
 - 7 Marius Jansen, “What was Meiji?,” in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, ed. Helen Hardacre and Adam Kern, Brill’s Japanese Study Library 6 (Leiden. Brill, 1997), 7.
 - 8 Cited in Yasumaru Yoshio, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979), 205.
 - 9 Cited in Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, loc. 365, Kindle; see also Sasaki Suguru, *Bakumatsu no tennō, Meiji no tennō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2005), 167.
 - 10 Cited in Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 198, and Haga Shōji, *Meiji ishin to shūkyō* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994), 390.
 - 11 See Sasaki, *Bakumatsu no tennō*, 160–61. Edo-period emperors rarely left the precincts of the Imperial Palace; see reference on page 72.
 - 12 See Meiji Tennō Seiseki Hozonkai, ed., *Meiji tennō gyōkō nenpyō* (Tokyo: Daikōdō, 1933).
 - 13 See Uchikoshi Takaaki, “Ōsaka no Meiji tennō seiseki,” *Kamizono* 3 (2010): 71–93; Monbushō, *Meiji tennō seiseki* (Tokyo: Monbushō, 1935).
 - 14 Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, loc. 276, Kindle.
 - 15 Ibid.
 - 16 Most of the institutions the emperor visited during his trips were linked to the elites in charge of the new state, including prefectural offices, military institutions, sites built for the veneration of the fallen of Japan’s civil wars, courts, elite schools and industrial sites. See Sasaki, *Bakumatsu no tennō*, 216, and Hara Takeshi, *Teikoku no shikakuka* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 2001).
 - 17 Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 74; see also Hara, *Teikoku no shikakuka*, 127.
 - 18 Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, loc. 2031, Kindle.
 - 19 Cited in James Baxter, *The Meiji Unification through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 91.
 - 20 Historian Hara Takeshi has pointed out that the emperor continued to travel throughout the country, although not on the same scale as in the 1870s and 1880s. Other members of the imperial family also continued the tradition of progresses after 1890. The later progresses of the Taishō and Shōwa emperors during their respective periods as crown princes included trips to the “outer parts” (*gaichi*) of the Japanese empire: Korea (Taishō, 1907), Taiwan (Shōwa, 1923), and Europe (Shōwa, 1921). See Hara, *Teikoku no shikakuka*. The Shōwa emperor also revived the practice of long tours throughout the country.
 - 21 Directive to elementary schools in 1891, cited in Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 182; see also Ono Masaaki, “Go-shin’ei no kafu shinsei shikaku no kakudai katei to sono imi,” *Kyōikugaku zasshi* 39 (2004): 13–32.
 - 22 Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 70–71.
 - 23 Ibid., and Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, loc. 1233, Kindle.
 - 24 Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, chapters 3.3 and 6.2. See also Suzuki Shin’ichi and Yamaki Kazuhiko, “Transforming Popular Consciousness through the Sacralisation of Western Schools: The Meiji Schoolhouse and Tenno Worship,” *Comparativ* 2/3 (2009), 44–77. For a collection of portraits of Japan’s modern emperors, from Meiji to Heisei, see Mainichi Shinbunsha, ed., *Tennō yondai no shōzō* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1999).
 - 25 Sasaki Suguru. “Meiji tennō no imēji keisei to minshū,” in *Bakumatsu/Meiji-ki no kokumin kokka keisei to bunka hen’yō*, edited by Nishikawa Nagao and Matsumiya Hideharu, 117–42 (Tokyo: Shin’yōsha, 1995), 129.
 - 26 Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 73–74; 110; Hara, *Teikoku no shikakuka*, 9; and Ono, “Go-shin’ei.” In later years, the images of the emperor were also distributed to hospitals, factories, mines, agricultural estates, and the military.
 - 27 Shimazono Susumu, *Kokka Shintō to Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 149.
 - 28 Sasaki, *Bakumatsu no tennō*, 250; see also Luke Gartlan, *A Career of Japan. Baron Raimund von Stillfried and Early Yokohama Photography* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 100.
 - 29 Cited in Gartlan, *A Career of Japan*, 9.
 - 30 Ibid., 90.
 - 31 See, for example, Hara, *Teikoku no shikakuka*, 115, for a portrait of the crown prince in the daily *Kyūshū nippō* (1900).
 - 32 Murakami Shigeyoshi, *Tennō no saishi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), 178.
 - 33 Shimamura Takitarō, *Kindai bungei no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1909), 179.
 - 34 See Kikui Mikio, “Waga kuni no gakkō kyōiku ni okeru ‘majimesa’ no kenkyū,” *Tōkyō Kasei Daigaku kenkyū kiyō* 40 (2000): 29–40, which also includes the full text of the 1891 ordinance.
 - 35 See the image of a school ceremony involving the unveiling of an altar containing the imperial portrait in Shimazono, *Kokka Shintō*, 147.
 - 36 This custom is illustrated, for example, in the photo albums of Germany’s second envoy to Japan, Karl von Eisendecker (1841–1934), which contain photographs given by Japanese statesmen, foreign representatives, and friends (excluding the imperial family, members of which Eisendecker did meet, including the emperor).

- See Peter Pantzer and Sven Saaler, *Japanische Impressionen eines Kaiserlichen Gesandten. Karl von Eisendecker im Japan der Meiji-Zeit* (in German and Japanese) (Munich: Iudicium, 2007).
- 37 See Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 113–17; Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Shashingaron* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 74, and Mikio Hirayama, “The Emperor’s New Clothes: Japanese Visuality and Imperial Portrait Photography,” *History of Photography* 33, no. 2 (2011): 165–84.
- 38 “Go-shashin kashi no ken,” Foreign Minister (Terashima Munenori) to the Imperial Household Minister, May 17, 1873. Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), Tenrei ishū no. 3, Go-shashin ni kansuru ken 1, reference code B13080629900.
- 39 The three official portraits are reproduced in Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*; Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 101, 105, 141; and the Wikipedia entry on Emperor Meiji, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor_Meiji. Regarding the photographers and artists commissioned with these portraits, see Gartlan, *A Career of Japan*, chapter 3.
- 40 See Sasaki, “Meiji tennō,” 144.
- 41 Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, loc. 2313–22, Kindle.
- 42 Ibid. See also Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 148–49, on Chiossone’s role.
- 43 More photos of the emperor were taken but never were made public. See, for example, Kanagawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, ed., *Ōke no shōzō. Meiji kōshitsu arubamu no hajimari* (Yokohama: Kanagawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, 2001), 100–1.
- 44 See Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan (Historical Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo), MT 6.4.1.10 (Go-shashin honshō kanshi narabi zaigai kōshikan kashi zakken); MT 6.4.1.12 (Go-shashin kankei zakken), MT 6.4.1.13 (Go-shashin gaikoku shinmin kashi zakken).
- 45 See Roy S. Hanashiro, *Thomas William Kinder and the Japanese Imperial Mint, 1868–1875*, Brill’s Japanese Study Library 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
- 46 Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 88.
- 47 Melanie Trede, “Banknote Design as a Battlefield of Gender Politics and National Representation in Meiji Japan,” in *Performing ‘Nation’: Gender Politics in Literature, Theater, and the Visual Arts of China and Japan, 1880–1940*, edited by Doris Croissant, Catherine Vance Yeh, and Joshua Mostow (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 55–104.
- 48 Taki, *Tennō no shōzō*, 89.
- 49 On Jingū, see Chizuko Allen, “Empress Jingū—A Shamaness Ruler in Early Japan,” *Japan Forum* 15, no. 1 (2003): 81–98. On the design of this banknote and later bills, which also featured Jingū, see Trede, “Banknote Design”; Mark Ravina, “The Yen—Japan’s National Currency,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 279–94.
- 50 Trede, “Banknote Design,” 56.
- 51 On the development of lithography in Japan, see Yoshida Kogorō, *Meiji no sekihanaga* (Tokyo: Shun’yōdō Shoten, 1973).
- 52 On the creation of the image of the emperor as the “Great Marshal,” which was already underway in the early Meiji period, see Itō Yukio, *Meiji tennō* (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 2006), chapter 2.3.
- 53 Kotaro Mochizuki, *The Late Emperor of Japan as a World Monarch* (Tokyo: The Liberal News Agency, 1914), accessible online at <https://archive.org/details/cu31924007798311>.
- 54 On Japan’s “discourse of national greatness,” see Sandra Wilson, “The Discourse of National Greatness in Japan, 1890–1919,” *Japanese Studies* 25, no. 1 (2005): 35–51.
- 55 See, for example, J. Morris, *Makers of Japan* (London: Methuen, 1906). One of the few Western publications with a full-page portrait of Meiji emperor predating the Russo-Japanese War is J. L. Brunet, *Les ordres de chevalerie et les distinctions honorifiques au Japon* (Paris: Actualités Diplomatiques et Coloniales, 1903), a compendium of Japanese orders.
- 56 The Japanese emperors Meiji, Jinmu, and Kanmu are listed alongside Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Karl the Great (Charlemagne), Mohammad, Queen Elizabeth I, Peter the Great, Frederick the Great (of Prussia), George Washington, Napoleon and Wilhelm the Great (of Germany).
- 57 Murata Katsutarō, *Meiji taitei seitoku shōka* (Tokyo: Takeda Hakuseidō, 1912). On the usage of “the Great” (*taitei*) in conjunction with Meiji, see Iwai Tadakuma, *Meiji tennō. “Taitei” densetsu* (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1997) and Asukai Masamichi, *Meiji taitei* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1989).
- 58 Dai-Nihon Kokuso Hōtokukai, ed., *Meiji taitei go-seireki* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kokuso Hōtokukai, 1912).
- 59 Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, ed., *Meiji tennō shi* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, 1912).
- 60 Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, *Kōshitsu Go-shashinchō* (Osaka: Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1929). See also Kaku Kinshō, *Meiji taitei shashinchō* (Tokyo: Meiji Taitei Igyō Hōsankai Shuppanbu, 1926).
- 61 Inose Naoki, *Mikado no shōzō* (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 2005), loc. 7744–89, Kindle. See also note 54 in the introduction to this study.
- 62 See Mochizuki, *The Late Emperor*.
- 63 Haga Shōji, “Dōzō kinenhi kō,” *IS* 82 (1999): 45–49.
- 64 Haga Shōji, “Gunto no sensō kinenhi. Toyohashi Daijūhachi rentai to Jinmu tennō dōzō kinenhi,” in *Kindai Nihon no uchi to soto*, ed. Tanaka Akira (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1999), 297.
- 65 On the Ruhmeshalle, see Monika Arndt, *Die “Ruhmeshalle” im Berliner Zeughaus. Eine Selbstdarstellung Preussens nach der Reichsgründung* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1985). For a contemporaneous guidebook to the

- memorial, see Anonymous, *Das Königliche Zeughaus: Führer durch die Ruhmeshalle und die Sammlungen* (Berlin: Mittler, 1907, 4th ed.). The building currently is the home of the Deutsches Historisches Museum (German Historical Museum). See www.dhm.de.
- 66 Shidehara Tan, “Doitsu kōshitsu no kinenkan,” *Shimin* 7, no. 7 (1912): 111–13.
- 67 In this wooden building, the commanders, common soldiers, and sailors who fought in the Sino-Japanese War were memorialized in paintings, photographs, war booty (*senri-hin*) as well as a list of the war dead and those wounded in battle. For a description of the memorial, see Miyagawa Tetsujirō, *Shintenfu haikan ki* (Tokyo: Hoseidō, 1902); a photograph of the hall and a short description are included in Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, ed., *Kyūjō shashinchō* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, 1923), 14–15. Similar memorials were built to commemorate the war dead of the Boxer War (1899–1900), the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), the Japanese-German War (1914), and the Second Sino-Japanese War that began in 1937. These buildings still exist and are today used as warehouses. The war booty previously displayed in them was returned to the countries of origin after World War II.
- 68 Built in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century (see Arndt, *Die “Ruhmeshalle”*, 13–17), the Berlin Arsenal was converted to a military museum in 1875, as advances in military technology made its original use redundant.
- 69 Shidehara, “Doitsu kōshitsu no kinenkan,” 112.
- 70 Cited in Arndt, *Die “Ruhmeshalle”*, 9.
- 71 See, for example, the newspaper article “Jinja kensetsu ni hantai,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 8, 1912, 2.
- 72 See Imaizumi Yoshiko, *Sacred Space in the Modern City: The Fractured Pasts of Meiji Shrine, 1912–1958* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
- 73 Imaizumi Yoshiko, “The Making of a Mnemonic Space: Meiji Shrine Memorial Art Gallery 1912–1936,” *Japan Review* 23 (2011): 160.
- 74 On the Meiji Memorial Picture Gallery, see Shiota Masahiro, “Seitoku kinen kaigakan ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu,” *Ōtemon Daigaku Shakai Bunka Gakubu ronshū* 6 (2005): 73–109, and Imaizumi, *Sacred Space*.
- 75 Takahashi Yoshitarō, ed., *Shōtoku kinen kaigakan sōjoden ato kinen kenzōbutsu kyōgi sekkei zushū* (Tokyo: Kōyōsha, 1918).
- 76 Imaizumi, “Making of a Mnemonic Space,” 163.
- 77 “Go-dōzō o kensetsu se yo,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 3, 1912, 3.
- 78 *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 3, 1912, 3.
- 79 Ibid.
- 80 “Jinja kensetsu ni hantai,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 8, 1912, 2.
- 81 “Sentei to bijutsu,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 10, 1912, 5.
- 82 *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 9, 1893, 1.
- 83 Ōkuma Shigenobu, *Ōkuma-haku hyakuwa*, ed. Emori Taikichi (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1909), 115.
- 84 In later editions, the newspaper published a partial list of influential people who had ordered a statuette, most of whom were members of the high aristocracy.
- 85 “Sentei go-dōzō bunpu,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 17, 1912, 2.
- 86 Hirase Reita, *Dōzō junan no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011), 63.
- 87 See http://www.wul.waseda.ac.jp/kotenseki/html/i14/i14_d0598/index.html. A bust of Ōkuma, in bronze and silver, was again placed on sale in 1923 after the statesman’s death. The bronze version sold for 3 yen, the silver version for 10 yen. See the advertisement in the government bulletin *Kanpō* (May 17, 1923), 471.
- 88 “Sentei go-dōzō bunpu,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 17, 1912, 2.
- 89 See <http://www.boj.or.jp/announcements/education/oshiete/history/j12.htm>.
- 90 “Sentei go-dōzō bunpu ni tsuite,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 26, 1912, 6–7.
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 On Watanabe, see Tama-shi Kyōiku linkai, ed., *Watanabe Osao* (Tama: Tama-shi Kyōiku linkai, 2000).
- 93 “Nogi taishō dōzō seisaku,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 15, 1912, 7.
- 94 “Meiji tennō Go-dōzō to go-ichinen-sai kinen bunpu,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, June 4, 1913, 6.
- 95 Ibid.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 Tama-shi Kyōiku linkai, *Watanabe Osao*, 5. Research on Tanaka Mitsuaki is scant. Yasuoka Akio, “Meiji-ki Tanaka Mitsuaki no shūhen,” *Hōsei shigaku* 37 (1985), discusses Tanaka’s activities as Minister of the Imperial Household, a post he held from 1898 to 1909. Takata Yūsuke, “Ishin no kioku to ‘kin’ō no sōshutsu. Tanaka Mitsuaki no kenshō katsudō o chūshin ni,” *Hisutoria* 204 (2007): 74–100, examines Tanaka’s promotion of restoration-era activists, in particular, those from his native feudal domain of Tosa. See also Michael Wert, *Meiji Restoration Losers: Memory and Tokugawa Supporters in Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 2013), 87.
- 98 Dai-Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, ed., *Meiji taitei* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, 1927), 193.
- 99 Sōritsu Gojūshūnen Kinen Jigyō Jikkō linkai, ed., *Jōyō Meiji Kinenkan sōritsu gojūshūnen kinenshi* (Ōarai: Zaidan Hōjin Jōyō Meiji Kinenkai, 1979), 2.
- 100 Ibid., 2–3.
- 101 Dai-Nihon Yūben Kōdansha, *Meiji taitei*, 193, and author’s communication with the Bakumatsu to Meiji no Hakubutsukan (Museum of Bakumatsu-Meiji History) in Ōarai, Ibaraki, in October 2010.

- 102 Dai-Nihon Yūben Kōdansha, *Meiji taitei*, 193.
- 103 Information provided by the Meiji Shrine, June 23, 2016.
- 104 On the history of this memorial hall, see Sōritsu Gōjūshūnen Kinen Jigyō Jikkō Iinkai, *Jōyō Meiji Kinenkan*. Today, the museum is known as the Museum of Bakumatsu-Meiji History (Bakumatsu to Meiji no Hakubutsukan). See http://www.bakumatsu-meiji.com/bm_exh.html.
- 105 On April 10, 1924, *The Japan Times & Mail* on page 8 reported that “a bronze statue of the late Emperor Meiji, weighing about 170 pounds, a work of a well-known sculptor, Mr. Fumio Asakura, will be shipped from the Central station . . . bound for Aichi. It will be erected at Rinkoji temple in Kamo-gun . . . and is the first bronze statue of the Emperor Meiji ever made.” The *Japan Times* obviously was not aware of the statues presented to the imperial household and the statuettes sold by Yomiuri. The fate of the Asakura statue is unknown. None of the several Rinkōji temples in Aichi Prefecture, which the author contacted, had any record of a Meiji statue. A gypsum cast of a Meiji statue, which might be related to this 1924 sculpture, is today held by the Asakura Museum of Sculpture in Tokyo; see Taitō Kuritsu Asakura Chōsokan, ed., *Asakura Chōsokan shozō Asakura Fumio sekkō genkei sakuhinshū* (Tokyo: Taitō-ku Geijutsu Bunka Zaidan, 2016), 27.
- 106 Yasukuni Jinja, ed., *Yūshūkan zuroku* (Tokyo: Kindai Shuppansha, 2003), 30.
- 107 Mizuno Hisanao, *Meiji tennō go-sonzō hōsen ki* (Shimonoseki: Akama Jingu Shamusho, 1967), 2; documents reproduced on pages 14–16 confirm that this statue was a copy of Watanabe’s 1914 original.
- 108 A Japanese Shinto shrine in Dairen constructed as a branch of the Izumo Taisha (Izumo Grand Shrine) in 1907. See Nitta Mitsuko, *Dairen Jinja shi* (Tokyo: Otfū, 1997), 50–54. This shrine was one of the more than 600 Shinto shrines built in Japan’s colonies between 1900 and 1945 (see Nitta, *Dairen Jinja shi*, 15). Shinto shrines were also set up in regions with Japanese immigrants, but outside of the colonies, such as Hawai’i or South America (ibid., 49). On the history of the Dairen Shrine, see ibid. and Dairen Jinja Gosōken Hachijūnen-sai Hōsankai, ed., *Dairen Jinja hachijūnen shi* (Tokyo: [no publisher], 1987). On Shinto shrines in Japanese colonies, see Nakajima Michio, “Shinto Deities that Crossed the Sea: Japan’s ‘Overseas Shrines,’ 1868 to 1945,” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 37, no. 1 (2010): 21–46.
- 109 Mizuno, *Meiji tennō*, 22.
- 110 Dairen Jinja Gosōken Hachijūnen Hōsankai, *Dairen Jinja*, 13, and Nitta, *Dairen Jinja shi*, 126–28. According to one history of the Dairen Shrine, Emperor Meiji was the most frequently worshiped deity in colonial shrines, together with the sun goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami (see Nitta, *Dairen Jinja shi*, 25). The deities originally worshiped in the Dairen Shrine were Ōkuninushi (the main deity of the Izumi Grand Shrine), Amaterasu Ōmikami, and the “gods of Yasukuni” —that is, the souls of soldiers who died in the Russo-Japanese War, which led to the establishment of Japanese control over Dairen (ibid.: 62).
- 111 In 1943, for example, the SMR donated 120,000 *yen* to the shrine, far ahead of the second-largest donor, the Dairen Chamber of Commerce, which gave 9,620 *yen* that year. Nitta, *Dairen Jinja shi*, 106.
- 112 Mizuno, *Meiji tennō*, 26.
- 113 Ibid., 16.
- 114 Ibid., 142.
- 115 Ibid., 184. Dairen Jinja Gosōken Hachijūnen-sai Hōsankai, *Dairen Jinja*, 25.
- 116 Dairen Jinja Gosōken Hachijūnen-sai Hōsankai, *Dairen Jinja*, 24. According to one repatriate, returning Japanese were not allowed to bring back more than 1,000 *yen* in cash, a limit that was strictly enforced by Soviet authorities. See Ishidō Kiyotomo, *Dairen no Nihonjin hikiake no kiroku* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997), 194.
- 117 Akama Shrine, founded in 1875, is dedicated to the medieval emperor Antoku; see Okada Yoneo, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” in *Meiji ishin Shintō hyakunen shi*, vol. 2, ed. Shintō Bunkakai (Tokyo: Shintō Bunkakai, 1967), 69–70.
- 118 Mizuno, *Meiji tennō*, 216–18, and Dairen Jinja Gosōken Hachijūnen-sai Hōsankai, *Dairen Jinja*, 27.
- 119 Tama-shi Kyōiku Iinkai, ed., *Renkōji no “seiseki” ka to Tama seiseki kinenkan* (Tama: Tama-shi Kyōiku Iinkai, 2013), chapters 1–3. The hall was used for a variety of purposes, including visits by foreign dignitaries. See, for example, the photograph of the 1938 ceremony to commemorate the second anniversary of the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in ibid., 15.
- 120 See ibid. and Tama-shi Kyōiku Iinkai, *Watanabe Osao*. The National Archives of Japan house documents with the details of the construction plans for this statue. The file has a title that does not indicate that the included documents are linked with a statue of the emperor; it was put in the document category “Others”: “Gyōzō kensetsu ni kansuru ken (Keishi-chō),” Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), Naimushō, Naimushō Keiho-kyoku, sono-ta, Naimu-daijin kessai shorui/Year Shōwa 5, vol. 2, JACAR reference number A05032020200.

Chapter 3

- 1 William G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 424.
- 2 Also known as *Seinan sensō*, or “Southwest War.” See James H. Buck, “The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. From Kagoshima through the Siege of Kumamoto Castle,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 28, no. 4 (1973): 427–46.

- 3 Hiyama Yukio, “Nihon no senbotsusha irei to sensō kinenhi no keifu,” *Chūkyō hōgaku* 5, no. 3–4 (2016): 315–464.
- 4 On the history of Kanazawa and Ishikawa, see James Baxter, *The Meiji Unification through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Louise Young, *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2013); James McClain, *Kanazawa: A Seventeenth-Century Japanese Castle Town* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Hashimoto Tetsuya and Hayashi Yūichi, *Ishikawa-ken no hyakunen* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1987).
- 5 Motoyasu Hiroshi, *Gunto no irei kūkan: kokumin tōgō to senshishatachi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002), 139–40; Ishikawa-ken, ed., *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō” shūri kōji hōkokusho* (Kanazawa: Ishikawa-ken Kenrokuen Kanri Jimusho, 1993), 2.
- 6 Cited in Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 141.
- 7 On the foundation of the shrine, see Ishikawa-ken, ed., *Ishikawa kenshi*, vol. 4 (Kanazawa: Ishikawa-ken, 1933), 1211–18.
- 8 McClain, *Kanazawa*, 441. Troops from the feudal domain of Kaga were mustered to the new imperial army as early as spring 1868 and took part in the Boshin War. Altogether, 7,200 troops from Kaga participated in this war; more than 100 lost their lives. See Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, 48.
- 9 Ishikawa-ken, *Ishikawa kenshi*, vol. 4, 1211.
- 10 Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, 48.
- 11 Ishikawa-ken, *Ishikawa kenshi*, vol. 4, 1218–19.
- 12 The 250 *yen* offered was a modest sum for the former daimyo family; the Maeda “were millionaires several times over.” Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, 223.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 253.
- 14 Kanazawa Shiyakusho, ed., *Kanazawa shishi. Shigai-hen, dai-yon* (Tokyo: Meicho Shuppan, 1973), 1066–67 (with the complete text of the inscription).
- 15 Former daimyo were also involved in projects to commemorate the war dead of the civil conflicts in other prefectures. In Tokushima, for example, the last daimyo of the domain, Hachisuka Mochiaki (1846–1918) contributed the inscription of a Shōkon Memorial (*Shōkon kinenhyō*, Memorial for Inviting the Souls [of the War Dead]) built in August 1880. Tokushima Shishi Hensan-shitsu, ed., *Tokushima shishi*, vol. 4 (Tokushima: Tokushima-shi Kyōiku linkai, 1993), 1105.
- 16 On Yamato Takeru, see Ivan Morris, *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1975), chapter 1; Gari Ledyard, “Gallop Along with the Horseriders: Looking for the Founders of Japan,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 1, no. 2 (1975): 217–54; Walter Edwards, “Event and Process in the Founding of Japan: The Horserider Theory in Archaeological Perspective,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 9, no. 2 (1983): 265–95.
- 17 After the suppression of the rebellion, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel of the IJA. On Chisaka, see Yabe Shintarō, ed., *Kindai meishi no omokage*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Chikuhakusha, 1914), 26; Ōoka Tsutomu, *Chihō chōkan jinbutsu hyō* (Tokyo: Nagashima Iichirō, 1892), 133–35; and Ishikawa-ken, *Ishikawa kenshi*, vol. 4, 285–88; Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, 196–200.
- 18 Ōoka, *Chihō chōkan jinbutsu*, 135.
- 19 On Ōkubo, see Mōri Toshihiko, *Ōkubo Toshimichi* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1969) and Sasaki Suguru, ed., *Ōkubo Toshimichi* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2005).
- 20 On the assassination of Ōkubo in the Kioi-chō Incident (named after the area of Tokyo where the killing took place), see Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, ed., *Kioi-chō jiken* (Kanazawa: Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, 1999); on the Takebashi Incident, see Sawachi Hisae, *Hi wa waga kyochū ni ari* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978).
- 21 Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, 196.
- 22 See Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, on the discussions within the prefecture regarding the region’s relationship to the nation.
- 23 The roots of Yamato Takeru worship in this region are unclear; see Ozaki Kisao, *Kōzuke no kuni shin myōchō* (Maebashi: Ozaki-sensei Chosho Kankōkai, 1974). According to legend, this warrior reached the region during his military expeditions in the first century. See Katashina Sonshi Henshū linkai, ed., *Katashina sonshi* (Katashina: Katashina-mura, 1963), 27, 472, 489, and Gunma-ken Tone Kyōikukai, ed., *Tone gunshi* (Tone: Gunma-ken Tone Kyōikukai, 1930), 827–29. The Yamato Takeru cult in this region is manifested in a concentration of “Takeru shrines” (some twenty according to an exhibition at the Kawaba-mura Rekishi Minzoku Shiryōkan) in the area around Mount Hotaka; in the name of the mountain itself, which is an alternative reading of “Takeru”; and in the Yamato Takeru statues across the region. According to *Katashina Village History*, a set of two “very old” (*sōtō furui*) bronze statues of Yamato Takeru are kept as sacred objects in one of the Takeru Shrines in the region. The same work also claims that “the famous statue of Yamato Takeru on Mount Hotaka” was cast in 1849 and carried up the mountain by a single person that same year; see Katashina Sonshi Henshū linkai, *Katashina sonshi*, 489. Given that the inscription on the currently “famous” statue on Mount Hotaka, along with supporting sources, give 1890 as the year of construction, it is likely that this referred to another, now lost, statue. Regarding the statue standing near the top of Mount Hotaka today, see Hotakayama Hakuchō Kōsha, ed., *Hotaka-yama kaizan shi* (Tone: Hotakayama Hakuchō Kōsha, 1924).

- 24 Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*, loc. 207, Kindle.
- 25 Sugitani Torazō, *Yamato Takeru* (Tokyo: Kyūendō Shoten, 1908).
- 26 Tōma Seidai, *Yamato Takeru* (Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1953) and Ueda Masaaki, *Yamato Takeru* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1960).
- 27 More recent historical studies on Yamato Takeru include Kawamura Tetsuo and Shimura Yūko, *Keikō tennō to Yamato Takeru. Rettō o seiha shita taiō* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 2015).
- 28 Ueda, *Yamato Takeru*, 2.
- 29 See John S. Brownlee, *Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945* (Vancouver and Tokyo: UBC Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1997).
- 30 The reasons were set out in an inscription adjacent to the statue and are reprinted in full in Kanazawa Shiyakusho, *Kanazawa shishi*, 1064–67.
- 31 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 145, and Kenrokuen Zenshi Hensan linkai, ed., *Kenrokuen zenshi* (Kanazawa: Kenrokuen Kankō Kyōkai, 1976), 290.
- 32 Ueda, *Yamato Takeru*, 33.
- 33 Cited in Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 153.
- 34 Yōda Minoru and Jōzuka Taketoshi, eds., *Takaoka dōki shi* (Takaoka: Takaoka Dōki Kyōdō Kumiai, 1988), 500.
- 35 Kenrokuen Zenshi Hensan linkai, *Kenrokuen zenshi*, 55.
- 36 See Shirahata Yōzaburō, *Kindai toshi kōen no kenkyū* (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 1995), 178–81, and Suematsu Shirō, *Tōkyō no kōen tsūshi*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981).
- 37 Thomas Havens, *Parkscapes. Green Spaces in Modern Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011), 2.
- 38 Kenrokuen Zenshi Hensan linkai, *Kenrokuen zenshi*, 92–93.
- 39 Ishikawa-ken, *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō,”* 8.
- 40 See the inscriptions reproduced in Kenrokuen Zenshi Hensan linkai, *Kenrokuen zenshi*, 292–97. Two of the stones carry inscriptions by Yamaguchi and Chisaka explaining the background to the building of the monument, and two record the sponsorship efforts of the two Buddhist schools of the temple, Honganji.
- 41 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 172–73.
- 42 *Ibid.*, 173–74.
- 43 See, for example, Kanazawa Shiyakusho, *Kanazawa shishi*, 1063. This history of Kanazawa city was first published in the 1920s.
- 44 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 144, 154.
- 45 See the call for donations cited in Hashimoto Kakubundō Kikaku Shuppanshitsu, ed., *Tokubetsu meisshō Kenrokuen—sono rekishi to bunka. Honpen* (Kanazawa: Hashimoto Kakubundō, 1997), 367–68.
- 46 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 144.
- 47 Today, 80 percent of Japan’s bronze products are made in Takaoka. See Takenaka Bronze Works, <http://www.takenakadouki.com/english/index.html>. For the history of bronze production in Takaoka, see Yōda and Jōzuka, *Takaoka dōki shi*.
- 48 For the involvement of Takaoka bronze-casters in the project, see Yōda and Jōzuka, *Takaoka dōki shi*, 500–3; Takaoka Shishi Hensan linkai, ed., *Takaoka shishi, gekan* (Takaoka: Seirin Shoin Shinsha, 1969), 604–5; Mizushima Kanji, “Meiji kinen hyō Yamato Takeru dōzō no sakusha wa Kaga-han goyō gashi Sasaki hōkyō senryū-ō,” *Ishikawa Kyōdo shi gakkai kaishi* 3 (1970): 31–33; and Ishikawa-ken, *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō,”* 184.
- 49 A number of newspapers were published in Kanazawa over the years (see Young, *Beyond the Metropolis*, loc. 1285, Kindle), but none were operating in 1880, which accounts for the lack of newspaper coverage of the unveiling of the statue.
- 50 The two Buddhist schools contributing to the Yamato Takeru memorial were among those that had forcefully resisted the government policy of separating Buddhism from Shinto (*shinbutsu bunri*) in the late 1860s and 1870s and had succeeded in saving many temples from destruction; Yasumaru Yoshio, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979), 117. Their success was the result of their close relationships with the Meiji elite, above all with politicians from the former Chōshū feudal domain, and their financial support for these politicians during the Meiji Restoration (Yasumaru, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin*, 81, 196).
- 51 Kitazawa Noriaki, “Fukugō-teki zōkei toshite no dōzō,” website of *Ijin no omokage* (2008), <http://www.yumani.co.jp/np/isbn/9784843330371>.
- 52 On the Shōkonsha in modern Japan, see Akiko Takenaka, *Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory and Japan’s Unending Postwar* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015).
- 53 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 168, and Kanazawa Shishi Hensan linkai, ed., *Kanazawa shishi. Shiryō-hen 11 (Kindai 1)* (Kanazawa: Kanazawa-shi, 1999), 578–79 for an account of the 1896 *shōkonsai* held in Kenrokuen. On the Kanazawa Shōkonsha, see the website of the current Ishikawa Gokoku Shrine, <https://www.ishikawagokoku.or.jp/derivation>.
- 54 See Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 169.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 170.
- 56 See <http://ishikawagokoku.or.jp/jinjaannai/index.html>.
- 57 For examples, see Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, ed., “*Kenrokuen*” *no jidai* (Kanazawa: Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, 2001), 22–23.
- 58 Kumoda Heitarō, *Kanazawa shigai doku annai* (Kanazawa: Yanagida Iwatarō, 1894).
- 59 See Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, “*Kenrokuen*” *no jidai*, 19–25; Hashimoto Kakubundō Kikaku Shuppanshitsu, ed., *Tokubetsu meisshō Kenrokuen—sono*

- rekishi to bunka. Shiryō-hen* (Kanazawa: Hashimoto Kakubundō, 1997), 22, 27, 70.
- 60 Hashimoto Kakubundō Kikaku Shuppanshitsu, *Tokubetsu meishō Kenrokuen . . . Honpen*, 371.
- 61 Kanazawa Shishi Hensan linkai, ed., *Kanazawa Shishi. Gendai hen, jō* (Kanazawa: Kanazawa-shi, 1979), 750–51.
- 62 While Meiji-period legislation only covered shrines and temples as historic sites to be preserved by the state, the 1919 Law for the Preservation of Historic Sites, Places of Scenic Beauty and Natural Monuments (*Shiseki meishō ten'nen kinenbutsu hozon-hō*) and the 1929 National Treasures Preservation Law (*Kokuhō hozon-hō*), expanded the protection of cultural properties to include new categories. The difference between the terms *meisho* and *meishō* is significant. *Meisho* goes back to the Edo period, when *meisho zue*, or “pictures of famous views,” were published in large numbers. Whereas the term *meishō* (literally “famous winner”) defined officially recognized sites of scenic beauty based on the 1919 law, in post-1919 Japan *meisho* referred to any place of interest, scenic spot, or picturesque site. In tourism-related advertisements and guidebooks, however, the two terms are often used interchangeably. Already in the prewar period, more than 900 sites were registered as “Historic Sites” (the number had grown to almost 1,800 in 2015), 230 as “Places of Scenic Beauty” (420 in 2015), and 900 as “Natural Monuments” (1,080 in 2015). Monbushō, ed., *Gakusei hyakunen shi* (Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1972), http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/others/detail/1317873.htm. See also the database of the Agency of Cultural Affairs, http://kunishitei.bunka.go.jp/bsys/index_pc.asp. In the postwar period, the Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties (*Bunkazai hogo-hō*, 1950), integrating previous legislation, comprehensively systematized the administration and protection of cultural properties and historic sites. Today, an increasing number of buildings and artifacts from the early modern and modern periods are being officially registered as historic sites or places of scenic beauty, but also as UNESCO World Heritage sites, such as the A-Bomb Dome in Hiroshima and the Silver Mines of Sado. Often, the granting of such status should be seen within the context of the emergence of modern mass tourism.
- 63 Ishikawa-ken, *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō,”* 2.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 3. A wooden model of the proposed statue by sculptor Matsui Jōun (1815–87), which was eventually rejected, was even more strongly reminiscent of Buddhist-style statuary. See *Ishikawa Kenritsu Bijutsukan dayori* 278 (December 1, 2006), 8.
- 65 Adolf Fischer, *Wandlungen im Kunstleben Japans* (Berlin: B. Behr, 1900), 69. I would like to thank Ursula Flache for bringing this source to my attention.
- 66 *Ibid.*, 70, 80.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 75–76; for the Saigō statue, see page 80.
- 68 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 184.
- 69 *Ibid.*, 175, and Kenrokuen Zenshi Hensan linkai, *Kenrokuen zenshi*, 36. Kigoshi was the first army minister from Ishikawa prefecture, but his tenure only lasted for about six months in 1912/1913.
- 70 See Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, 47–48.
- 71 James McClain, “Kanazawa City Politics,” in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, ed. Helen Hardacre and Adam Kern, Brill’s Japanese Study Library 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 466–75.
- 72 Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, 40.
- 73 On this affair, see Baxter, *Meiji Unification*, 41–44, and Nakada Takanori, ed., *Ka-Etsu-No ishin kin’ō shiryaku* (Tokyo: Ka-No-Etsu Ishin Kin’ōka Hyōshōkai, 1930).
- 74 Nakada, *Ka-Etsu-No ishin*.
- 75 For details on the building of this memorial, see Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 175–86 (includes the full text of the prospectus for the statue); Kenrokuen Zenshi Hensan linkai, *Kenrokuen zenshi*, 36 (includes a complete list of the forty-five samurai whose names were engraved on the memorial); Nakada, *Ka-Etsu-No ishin*, includes the prospectus and biographies of the commemorated samurai.
- 76 On the postwar tourism industry in Kanazawa and the preservation of historic sites in the city, see Peter Siegenthaler, “Development for Preservation: Localizing Collective Memory in 1960s Kanazawa,” in *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, ed. Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), 319–36.
- 77 In recent years tourism to Kanazawa has been on the rise: 2–3 million people visited the park until the early 1990s, followed by a drop to 1.5–2 million in the 2000s and early 2010s; in 2015 and 2016 visitor numbers soared to 2.9 million. See Kanazawa-shi Keizai-kyoku Eigyō Senryaku-bu Kankō Seisaku-ka, ed., *Kanazawa-shi kankō chōsa kekka hōkokusho (2016)* (Kanazawa: Kanazawa-shi, 2017), 94.
- 78 Ishikawa Prefecture compiled a detailed report on the restoration process; see Ishikawa-ken, *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō,”* 1993. Hashimoto Kakubundō Kikaku Shuppanshitsu, *Tokubetsu meishō Kenrokuen . . . Honpen*, 370.
- 79 Ishikawa-ken, *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō,”* unpaginated (statement by Ishikawa Prefecture governor Nakanishi Yōichi).
- 80 See Hirose Yukio’s website at http://www.yukio-hirose.com/?page_id=5 and the Ig Nobel Prize website at <http://www.improbable.com/ig>. Another Japanese recipient of the prize was Inoue Daisuke, the inventor of karaoke.
- 81 William Donald Mitchell, *The Art of the Bronze Founder. Especially in its Relation to the Casting of Bronze Statuary and Other Sculptural Work* (New York: Juno, 1916), 33.

- 82 See the genealogy on the website of the Imperial Household Agency, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-about/genealogy/img/keizu-e.pdf>.
- 83 Ichikawa Hidekazu, "Asuwayama kōen no seiritsu to basho no seijigaku," *Fukui Daigaku Chiiki Kankyō Kenkyū Kyōiku Sentā kenkyū kiyō* 6 (1999): 97–116, 106, and Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan, ed., *Asuwayama no konjaku* (Fukui: Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan, 1987).
- 84 This is according to the shrine. See <http://www.asuwajinja.jp>.
- 85 See the website of Asuwayama Shrine, <http://www.asuwajinja.jp/sekihi.htm>.
- 86 Ichikawa, "Asuwayama kōen," 106.
- 87 Fukui Shiyakusho, ed., *Fukui shishi*, vol. 1 (Fukui: Fukui Shiyakusho, 1941), 922–23.
- 88 Ichikawa, "Asuwayama kōen," 103, and Fukui Annai-ki Hensankai, ed., *Fukui annai-ki* (Fukui: Fukui Annai-ki Hensankai, 1909), 142–43.
- 89 Ichikawa, "Asuwayama kōen," 105; see also the inscription adjacent to the statue reproduced in Fukui Annai-ki Hensankai, *Fukui annai-ki*, 143.
- 90 Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan, *Asuwayama no konjaku*, 93.
- 91 Ibid., 96. On the Shakudani stone, see <http://www.fukui-shimin.jp/syaku> or (in English) "The 100 Hometown Views of Fukui," sponsored by Fukui Prefecture's Cultural Promotion Division, http://info.pref.fukui.lg.jp/hyakkei/040_english/010_view/view_fukui.html.
- 92 Fukui Annai-ki Hensankai, *Fukui annai-ki*, 136–37.
- 93 For an overview of the shrines and memorials in Asuwayama Park (as of 1909), see Fukui Annai-ki Hensankai, *Fukui annai-ki*; perhaps the oldest travel guide to Fukui it contains the inscriptions of all the Fukui monuments. See also Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan, *Asuwayama no konjaku*, 34–40, page 56, for photos of the Mount Asuwa memorials and pages 46–47 for recent photos of the Keitai statue.
- 94 Fukui Shiyakusho, *Fukui shishi*, 900–8.
- 95 Ibid., 940–42.
- 96 Ibid., 938.
- 97 Ibid., 939.
- 98 See also Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan, *Asuwayama no konjaku*, 48–49.
- 99 Ogasawara Naganari and Igari Matazō, *Aikokushin* (Tokyo: Hōshakai Shuppanbu, 1929).
- 100 Ogasawara wrote numerous books on both Tōgo and Nogi.
- 101 See the memorial's website at <http://www.kinenkanmikasa.or.jp/en>.
- 102 Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan, *Asuwayama no konjaku*, 93.
- 103 See <http://info.pref.fukui.lg.jp/keitaidaio>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20151114023253>, and <http://info.pref.fukui.lg.jp:80/keitaidaio/index.html>.
- 104 See http://info.pref.fukui.lg.jp/hyakkei/040_english/010_view/pdf/032.pdf.
- 105 See the websites of Fukui Prefecture, <http://www.pref.fukui.lg.jp/doc/kenmin/chiji/aisatu191125kodaisi-foramu.html>, the shrine, <http://www.asuwajinja.jp/1500sai-nittei.html>, and Fukui Shinbun Co., <https://web.archive.org/web/20130908093841/http://www.fukuishimbun.co.jp/jp/keitai>.
- 106 Hirobumi Itō, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan* (Tokyo: Chū-ō Daigaku, 1906), 26–27.
- 107 John S. Brownlee, *Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945* (Vancouver and Tokyo: UBC Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1997), 9. Brownlee adds, however, that most prewar historians "disagreed with the state-designated date of Emperor Jinmu's foundation of the empire in 660 bc."
- 108 Murakami Shigeyoshi, *Tennō no saishi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), 75–80; Yasumaru, *Kamigami no Meiji ishin*, 3; and Michael Wachutka, *Kokugaku in Meiji-period Japan* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2013), 12.
- 109 Ōkawa Ryūhō, *Jinmu tennō wa jitsuzai shita* (Tokyo: Kōfuku no Kagaku Shuppan, 2012) and Sankei Shinbun Shuzaihan, *Jinmu tennō wa tashika ni sonzai shita* (Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun Shuppan, 2016). On the recent upsurge in writings claiming that Jinmu is a historical figure, see Sven Saaler, "Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 14, issue 2, no. 7 (October 15, 2016), <http://apjif.org/2016/20/Saaler.html>.
- 110 See http://www.huffingtonpost.jp/2016/07/10/mihara_n_10914060.html.
- 111 Result of a search of the database Yomidasu Rekishikan, combining "Jinmu" with the terms *sonzai* or *jitsuzon* in December 2017.
- 112 Kōsokabe Hideyuki, "Meiji Taishō-ki no shōgakkō kyōkasho ni okeru sashi-e no kōsatsu: rekishi, shūshi, kokugo kyōkasho ni egakareta ei'yūzō," *Bulletin of Child Education, Kobe Shinwa Women's University Post Graduate Course* 10 (2006): 48.
- 113 The full text can be viewed at http://www.wul.waseda.ac.jp/kotenseki/html/her3/her3_02697/index.html.
- 114 See <https://ukiyo-e.org/image/artelino/37151g1> (vol. 1 [*kubikan*], 2, and 3).
- 115 For these exhibitions, see the special site of the National Diet Library, "Expositions, where the modern technology of the times was exhibited," <http://www.ndl.go.jp/exposition/e/index.html>.
- 116 See http://jmapps.ne.jp/geidai/det.html?data_id=7025. On the competition run in conjunction with the exposition, see also Tanaka Shūji, *Kindai Nihon saisho no chōkokuka* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994), 44–46.
- 117 *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 6, 1894, 3.
- 118 Bandō Yukari and Sanada Junko, "Bizan no hen'yō ni kansuru kenkyū," *Keikan/desain kenkyū kōen shū* 6

- (2010): 370–74, and Arai Fusatarō, *Ijin no omokage* (Tokyo: Nijūroku Shinpōsha, 1928; repr. Tokyo: Yumani Shobō, 2009), 4–5.
- 119 Tokushima Shishi Hensanshitsu, ed., *Tokushima shishi*, vol. 4 (Tokushima: Tokushima-shi Kyōiku linkai, 1993). The major national newspapers also failed to cover the project.
- 120 Modern monuments clearly show a kite (*kinshi*) with Jinmu; this is also the bird mentioned in the ancient chronicle *Nihon shoki*. In another eighth-century text, the *Kojiki*, the bird associated with Jinmu is the mythological *yatagarasu*, a three-legged crow.
- 121 For a video of the 2015 ceremony, held to commemorate the 2675th anniversary of Jinmu's foundation of Japan, see Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QuQoThISPeY>. The program for the 2016 ceremony is accessible through the event's Facebook site, *Jinmu tennō dōzō*. On the Nippon Kaigi, see David McNeill, "Nippon Kaigi and the Radical Conservative Project to Take Back Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 13, issue 50, no. 4 (December 14, 2015), <http://apjff.org/-David-McNeill/4409>; Aoki Osamu, *Nippon Kaigi no shōtai* (Tokyo: Heibonsha: 2016), Sugano Tamotsu, *Nippon Kaigi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Fusōsha, 2016); Yamazaki Masahiro, *Nippon Kaigi. Senzen kaiki e no jōnen* (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2016); Narisawa Muneo, ed., *Nippon kaigi to jinja honchō* (Tokyo: Kinyōbi, 2016); and Tawara Yoshifumi, "What is the Aim of Nippon Kaigi, the Ultra-Right Organization that Supports Japan's Abe Administration?," *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 15, issue 21, no. 1 (November 1, 2017), <http://apjff.org/2017/21/Tawara.html>.
- 122 Haga Shōji, "Gunto no sensō kinenhi. Toyohashi Daijūhachi rentai to Jinmu tennō dōzō kinenhi," in *Kindai Nihon no uchi to soto*, ed. Tanaka Akira (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1999), 292–93.
- 123 *Ibid.*, 284–85.
- 124 *Ibid.*, 293–94.
- 125 "Jinmu tennō no go-dōzō," *Asahi shinbun*, June 9, 1898, 3, and "Jinmu tennō no go-dōzō," *Asahi shinbun*, January 6, 1899, 4.
- 126 "Jinmu tennō go-dōzō shunkō," *Asahi shinbun*, February 26, 1899, 7.
- 127 "Toyohashi no taisai," *Asahi shinbun*, March 1, 1899, 7; "Kaimakushiki oyobi shōkonsai," *Asahi shinbun*, March 11, 1899, 2; and "Jinmu tennō dōzō kaimakushiki," *Yomiuri shinbun*, March 8, 1899.
- 128 *Yomiuri shinbun*, February 20, 1899, supplement, 1.
- 129 Another memorial designed to celebrate victory in the Sino-Japanese War and to commemorate the war dead was built in the nearby city of Nagoya; it took the form of an artillery shell. See Haga, "Gunto no sensō kinenhi," 283.
- 130 *Taiyō* 16, no. 5 (1910): unpaginated.
- 131 Saaler, "Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan."
- 132 Communication from the Toyohashi City Planning Department (Kikaku-bu) to the author, dated November 4, 2008. The Toyohashi municipal administration also provided the author with a brochure published in conjunction with the 40th Festival of National Foundation Day in 2006, which shows that the event was introduced in 1966. See Kenkoku Kinen no Hi Hōshuku Un'ei linkai, ed., *Dai-40 kai Toyohashi-shi kenkoku kinen no hi hōshuku taikai* (Toyohashi: Kenkoku Kinen no Hi Hōshuku Un'ei linkai, 2006).
- 133 See <http://www.city.toyohashi.lg.jp/4011.htm>. However, the statue has found its way into educational materials; see, for example, Toyohashi Kyōiku linkai, ed., *Toyohashi no sensō iseki* (Toyohashi: Toyohashi Kyōiku linkai, 2014), 4.
- 134 Kojima Seinosuke, ed., *Niigata-shi yōran* (Niigata: Jitsugyō no Annaisha, 1926), 89, lists the park as a "famous site" (*meishō*) of the city of Niigata. On the festivals, see Fujii Motohiko, "Shiryō honkoku. 'Shōchūhi kiroku,'" *Niigata-shi Bijutsukan-Niigata-shi Niitsu Bijutsukan kenkyū kiyō/Bulletin of Niigata City Art Museum & Niitsu Art Museum*, 2 (2014): 36–47, reference on pages 45–46; and Niigata Shishi Hensan Kindai-shi Bukai, ed., *Niigata shishi. Tsūshi-hen 3 Kindai (jō)* (Niigata: Niigata-shi, 1996), 267.
- 135 Niigata Shishi Hensan Kindai-shi Bukai, *Niigata shishi*, 270–71; Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 130–31; and Fujii, "Shiryō honkoku," 41, 45.
- 136 "Shōchūhi kiroku," cited in full in Fujii, "Shiryō honkoku."
- 137 The names are also listed in the prewar history of Niigata city; see Niigata Shiyakusho, ed., *Niigata shishi*, vol. 1 (Niigata: Niigata Shiyakusho, 1934), 1021–23.
- 138 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 130–33, and Murashima Shigeru, ed., *Niigata Hakusan Jinja* (Niigata: Niigata Hakusan Jinja, 2006), 308. See also Haga Shōji, "Dōzō kinenhi kō," *IS* 82 (1999): 45, and Haga Shōji, "Gunto no sensō kinenhi," 302. A government-sponsored Shōkonsha had already been built in Niigata near the graves of 142 loyalists who had died in the Boshin War in 1868. See Niigata Shiyakusho, *Niigata shishi*, 1018–19.
- 139 Fujii, "Shiryō honkoku," 45.
- 140 On the slogan, see Walter Edwards, "Forging Tradition for a Holy War: The Hakkō Ichiu Tower in Miyazaki and Japanese Wartime Ideology," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003).
- 141 Neither the park nor the shrine website mention the statue. Similar cases have been reported from other parts of Japan. In the city of Yaizu in Shizuoka Prefecture, for example, a statue of Jinmu built in 1912 to celebrate the accession of the Taishō emperor to the throne was moved to Yaizu Shrine in the postwar period. See <http://yaizujinja.or.jp/historys>.

- 142 “Dōzō no hijō kaishū no jissshi ni kansuru ken o sadamu,” National Archives of Japan, Naikaku, Kōbun Ruishu, Shōwa 1–20, no. 67, Shōwa 18, Kōbun Ruishu no. 67/Shōwa 18/vol. 100/military affairs no. 6/national mobilization no. 4, accessible on JACAR, reference code A03010140100.
- 143 The official history of the town of Fukuoka (today a part of Takaoka City), for example, reproduces a photo of a Jinmu statue that was once part of a Memorial to the War Dead (*senbotsusha ireihi*) in the Akamaru district, but fails to give any information about either the memorial or the statue. See Fukuoka Chōshi Hensan linkai, ed., *Fukuoka chōshi* (Fukuoka: Fukuoka-chō, 1969), 761. The same holds for the town of Isurugi, today part of Oyabe City. See the photo of the Jinmu statue in Isurugi on p. 586 of *Oyabe Shishi Hensan linkai*, ed., *Oyabe shishi*, vol. 2 (Oyabe: Oyabe-shi, 1941).
- 144 Motoyasu, *Gunto no irei kūkan*, 133–34; Anonymous, *Hokkaidō zaijū Ka-Etsu-No jinmeiroku* (Tokyo: Ka-Etsu-no Jinmeiroku Hakkōsho, 1916), 8; and Yōda and Jōzuka, *Takaoka dōki shi*, 17.
- 145 On the approval process for this statue, see “Jinmu tennō Go-dōzō shutsugan ni kansuru ken (Nara-ken)” (Petition for a bronze statue for Emperor Jinmu [Nara prefecture]), National Archives of Japan, Ministry of Home Affairs, Police and Public Security Bureau (Naimushō Keihokkyoku), Records, Heig Keisatsu 00209100, accessible on JACAR, reference code A05032283400.
- 146 See <http://vill.kamikitayama.nara.jp/kanko/tanoshimu/odaigahara>.
- 147 For population figures for Kibe, see Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū linkai, ed., *Kibe kyōdo shidan* (Kusunoki: Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū Jimukyoku, 1973), 5–8. The village merged with the town of Kusunoki in 1955, which again amalgamated with the city of Ube in 2004.
- 148 Cited in a letter from Mayor Fujimoto to the Home Minister of March 1924, included in the batch of documents headed “Kōtaishi-tenka Go-seikon kinen toshite Jinmu tennō Go-dōzō kensetsu no ken shishō naki ken (Yamaguchi-ken)” (No objection to the construction of a bronze statue of Jinmu tennō to commemorate the Royal Wedding of the Crown Prince [Yamaguchi Prefecture]), National Archives of Japan, Ministry of Home Affairs, Police and Public Security Bureau (Naimushō Keihokkyoku), Records, Others, Approval documents by the Director of the Police and Public Security Bureau, 1924 (first volume), Heig Keisatsu 00205100; accessible on JACAR, reference code A05032268500.
- 149 See Fujimoto Haruo Kenshō linkai, ed., “Ko Fujimoto Haruo-ō tōzō kensetsu shuisho,” unpublished document, 1961, *Kirokubako*, held in Kibe Fureai Center, Ube City.
- 150 Cited in a letter from Mayor Fujimoto to the Home Minister of March 1924, included in the batch of documents headed “Kōtaishi-tenka Go-seikon kinen toshite Jinmu tennō Go-dōzō kensetsu no ken shishō naki ken (Yamaguchi-ken)” (No Objection to the Construction of a Bronze Statue of Emperor Jinmu to Commemorate the Royal Wedding of the Crown Prince [Yamaguchi Prefecture]), National Archives of Japan, Ministry of Home Affairs, Police and Public Security Bureau (Naimushō Keihokkyoku), Records, Others, Approval documents by the Director of the Police and Public Security Bureau, 1924 (first volume), Heig Keisatsu 00205100; accessible on JACAR, reference code A05032268500. In fact, as we have seen, more than three Jinmu statues existed by 1924.
- 151 Cited in a letter from Ōmori Kichigorō to Matsumura Giichi of May 25, 1926, included in the batch of documents headed “Jinmu tennō Go-dōzō ni kansuru ken (Yamaguchi-ken)” (Regarding the bronze statue of Jinmu tennō [Yamaguchi Prefecture]), National Archives of Japan, Ministry of Home Affairs, Police and Public Security Bureau (Naimushō Keihokkyoku), Records, Heig Keisatsu 00209100, accessible on JACAR, reference code A05032284100.
- 152 Louise Young, *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2013), chapter 4.
- 153 The criticism of the mayor was made public in local newspapers including the *Ube nichinichi shinbun*, *Ube jihō*, and *Bōchō shinbun*.
- 154 Newspaper coverage of a statue dedicated to Mayor Fujimoto, which was built after the war, confirms this version of events. *Bōchō shinbun*, October 26, 1961.
- 155 Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū linkai, *Kibe kyōdo shidan*, 196.
- 156 The two exceptions were the merchant Nakajima Tomijirō and Yuri Tokuji, director of the local post office (Yūbinkyokuchō). Yamaguchi Kensei Kankōkai, ed., *Kyōdo no hokori. Yamaguchi-ken kensei*, vol. 3. (Yamaguchi: Yamaguchi Kensei Kankōkai, 1929), 50–51. Mayor Fujimoto belonged to an influential local family that was involved in the expansion of coal mining in the Ube region. See Ube Shishi Hensan linkai, ed., *Ube shishi. Tsūshi-hen* (Ube: Ube Shishi Hensan linkai, 1966), 573–80. On the Nōgyōkai, see Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū linkai, *Kibe kyōdo shidan*, 72.
- 157 Statement by the mayor of Kibe village, Fujimoto Haruo, dated February 1926 included in the batch of documents headed “Jinmu tennō Go-dōzō ni kansuru ken (Yamaguchi-ken)” (Regarding the bronze statue of Emperor Jinmu [Yamaguchi Prefecture]), National Archives of Japan, Ministry of Home Affairs, Police and Public Security Bureau (Naimushō Keihokkyoku),

- Records, Heig Keisatsu 00209100, accessible on JACAR, reference code A05032284100.
- 158 Fujimoto Haruo, “Meimu o toku,” unpublished document, 1926, *Kirokubako*, held in the Kibe Fureai Center, Ube City, and Fujimoto Haruo Kenshō linkai, “Ko Fujimoto Haruo-ō.”
- 159 See Masutomi Toshima, *Kibe sonshi* (1933), unpaginated. Unpublished handwritten manuscript held in the Kibe Fureai Center in Ube.
- 160 *Kibe-mura jihō*, no. 1 (January 10, 1926): 1.
- 161 *Ibid.*, no. 7 (August 25, 1926): 1.
- 162 *Kibe sonpō*, no. 19 (November 15, 1927): 1
- 163 Quoted from the explanatory board next to the statue of Fujimoto Haruo.
- 164 See, for example, *Kibe-mura jihō*, no. 4 (April 15, 1926): 1, which announces festivities around the statue to mark the Jinmu Festival (Jinmu-sai); *Kibe sonpō*, no. 12 (March 15, 1927): 3, and *Kibe sonpō*, no. 19 (November 15, 1927): 1.
- 165 Masutomi, *Kibe sonshi*, unpaginated.
- 166 Fujimoto Haruo Kenshō linkai, “Ko Fujimoto Haruo-ō.”
- 167 Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū linkai, *Kibe kyōdo shidan*.
- 168 Information provided by Ube City Educational Board (Ube-shi Kyōiku linkai) in February 2018.
- 169 Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū linkai, *Kibe kyōdo shidan*, 196.
- 170 *Ibid.*, 215.
- 171 See Garon Sheldon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 11, 54.
- 172 Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū linkai, *Kibe kyōdo shidan*, 75. On the role of women’s organizations in prewar and wartime Japan, see Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds*, chapter 4.
- 173 Young, *Beyond the Metropolis*, 140.
- 174 This is evident, for example, in a publication on “social education” published by the city of Ube, the urban center closest to Kibe village and the city that today has administrative control of Kibe. Ube-shi, ed., *Ube-shi shakai kyōiku gaikyō* (Ube: Ube Shiyakusho, 1937).
- 175 The most recent statue of Jinmu, erected in 2000, was commissioned by the Uwa Lions Club in Amayama Park in Seiyo City, Ehime Prefecture. See <https://web.archive.org/web/20181220103425/http://www.geocities.jp/bane2161/jinmutennou.htm>.
- 176 *Japan Times*, April 3, 2016, 2.
- 177 *Ibid.*
- 178 In the article “The Geopolitics of Jinmu’s Conquest of the East” in the June 2016 edition of the bimonthly journal *WiLL*, the self-styled “military journalist” Kaji Toshiki sought to establish the historicity of Jinmu through an analysis of the military tactics employed during the first emperor’s alleged unification of Japan as recorded in the myths in the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*. He concludes that the myths must contain historical truth, as the stories they record show a high degree of “geographic-strategic rationality” and make good sense from a geopolitical perspective. Kaji Toshiki, “Jinmu tōsei no chiseigaku,” *WiLL* 6 (2016): 146–55.
- 179 Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996).
- 180 See, for example, *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 1, 1893, 3. The article reports on a plan to build a large statue of Jinmu near Shinbashi Station, which had been mooted “several years ago” but failed to gain the approval of the IHM.
- 181 Yoshida Masutarō, *Chūyū kikan. Gunjin hidoku* (Tokyo: Yatsuo Shoten, 1894), 34. The second figure listed was Kusunoki Masashige. Both men also figure prominently in standard military histories of Japan, such as in Kikuie Kan, *Nihon senshi-shō* (Tokyo: Shōwa Shobō, 1941).
- 182 On the history of the park, see Kosugi Yūzō, *Hama rikyū teien* (Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981).
- 183 “Ken’nō dōzō Umashimade-no-mikoto no koto,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, March 20, 1894, 2.
- 184 “Ken’nō dōzō Umashimade-no-mikoto no koto,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, March 21, 1894, 1; see also “Rikugun shōkō dōzō ken’nō no riyū,” *Asahi shinbun*, March 20, 1894, 2.
- 185 “Umashimade-no-mikoto no dōzō naru,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 14, 1895, 3.
- 186 “Dōzō no shunsei to haikan,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, December 5, 1895, 5.
- 187 See <http://www.tokyo-park.or.jp/park/format/index028.html>; for the map, see https://www.tokyo-park.or.jp/teien/download/pdf/pamphlet_hama.pdf#page=2.
- 188 Earlier proposals for equestrian statues had been published, for example, in 1889 in the architectural journal *Kenchiku zasshi* (33), which reproduces a sketch of an equestrian statue for an anonymous “civil or military official.” None of these plans were ever realized.
- 189 *Yomiuri shinbun*, October 13, 1894, 5, and Arai, *Ijin no omokage*, 56. On Fukushima, see Sven Saaler, “Fukushima Yasumasa’s Travels in Central Asia and Siberia: Silk Road Romanticism, Military Reconnaissance, or Modern Exploration?,” in *Japan on the Silk Road. Encounters and Perspectives of Politics and Culture in Eurasia*, ed. Selçuk Esenbel, Brill’s Japanese Studies Library 60 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 69–86.
- 190 The prospectus was also published in newspapers including in “Ko-Arisugawa-no-miya go-dōzō kensetsu shui,” *Asahi shinbun*, July 9, 1896, 2
- 191 *Asahi shinbun*, July 9, 1896, 2, and Hitomi Kisaburō, ed., *Keihin shozai dōzō shashin* (Tokyo: Suwadō, 1910), 1.
- 192 *Asahi shinbun*, October 11, 1903, 1.
- 193 Maejima Yasuhiko, *Arisugawa-no-miya kinen kōen* (Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981), 11–16.

- 194 Maejima, *Arisugawa-no-miya*, 63, and Tanaka, *Kindai Nihon*, 188–211. Arsenals had also played an important role in the development of public statuary, in particular, bronzes of kings and princes, in Europe. See Genevière Bress-Bautier, “The Art of Bronze in France, 1500–1660,” in *Cast in Bronze. French Sculpture from Renaissance to Revolution*, ed. Genevière Bress-Bautier and Guilhem Scherf (Paris: Musée du Louvre/Somogy, 2009), 52.
- 195 Hirase Reita, *Dōzō junan no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011), 29, and Tanaka, *Kindai Nihon*, 191–93.
- 196 See *Taiyō* 9, no. 13 (November 1903): 1, and Anonymous, “Ko Arisugawa-no-miya dōzō jomakushiki,” *Taiyō* 9, no. 13 (1903): 2–3.
- 197 “Ko-Arisugawa-no-miya Taruhito Shin’ō tenka Go-dōzō rakusei,” *Asahi shinbun*, October 8, 1903, 8.
- 198 *Asahi shinbun*, October 11, 1903, 1.
- 199 The construction of a statue of Takehito in 1921 outside the Naval War College in Tsukiji, Tokyo, was organized by Admirals Tōgō Heihachirō and Dewa Shigetō. See Dewa Shigetō, *Ko-Arisugawa gensui no miya tenka go-dōzō kensetsu hōkoku*, December 21, 1921 (unpublished document, author’s collection). After the war, the statue was relocated to Lake Inawashiro in Fukushima Prefecture, on the site of a former villa owned by the prince, the Tenkyōkaku. See <https://www.facebook.com/tenkyokaku>.
- 200 Anonymous, “Ko Arisugawa-no-miya dōzō jomakushiki,” 3.
- 201 Hitomi, *Keihin shozai dōzō*.
- 202 Maejima, *Arisugawa-no-miya*, 62–63.
- 203 *Ibid.*, 1–4. See also the park’s website at <http://www.arisugawa-park.jp/about>. The Arisugawa line ended in 1913 as a result of no male heirs. *Ibid.*, 9, 17–18.
- 204 See Anonymous, *Ko-Kitashirakawa-no-miya dai-shōgū go-dōzō kensetsu bokoku* (1898, unpublished document, author’s collection), unpaginated. This prospectus also includes a sketch of the proposed statue.
- 205 *Yomiuri shinbun*, January 29, 1903, 2.
- 206 *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 17, 1963, 10. For a contemporary view of the statue and the regimental headquarters, see Kanai Toshihiko, *Ohori o megutte* (Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981), 42.
- 207 Yasukuni Jinja, ed., *Yūshūkan zuroku* (Tokyo: Kindai Shuppansha, 2003), 31.
- 208 On these artists, see Tanaka, *Kindai Nihon*. On Takamura Kōun and his son, see Christine M. E. Guth, “Takamura Kōun and Takamura Kōtarō: On Being a Sculptor,” in *The Artist as Professional in Japan*, ed. Melinda Takeuchi (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 152–79. See also Takamura’s memoir, *Bakumatsu ishin kaiko dan* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995).
- 209 *Taiyō* 18, no. 5, April 1912, unpaginated, and *Fūzoku gahō* 431 (April 5, 1912): 8–9, unpaginated (opposite page 20).

Chapter 4

- 1 For example, Ko Ōsaka Shichō Seki Hajime Hakushi Itoku Kenshō linkai, ed., *Seki shichō shōden. Dōzō konryū kinen* (Osaka: Seki Hajime Hakushi Itoku Kenshō linkai, 1956).
- 2 Anonymous, *Ko Naidaijin shō-ichi’i daikun’i kōshaku Sanjō Sanetomi dōzō kinenhi kensetsu shuisho* (Tokyo: [no publisher], 1892).
- 3 Other unrealized statue proposals included the plan to build a monument for Edo-period intellectual Sakuma Shōzan (1811–64). See Ichikawa Kōtarō, *Sakuma Shōzan kinen dōzō kensetsu shuisho* (Tokyo: Ichikawa Kōtarō, 1889).
- 4 On the Reservists’ Association, see Richard J. Sme-thurst, *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1974).
- 5 Yamazaki Arinobu, *Nichiro sen’eki chūshisha kenpi narabi Shōkonsha gōshi tetsuzuki* (Tokyo: Kaitsūsha, 1906), 40.
- 6 Gordon Berger, “Japan’s Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro’s Early Political Career, 1916–1931,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 29, no. 4 (1974): 468.
- 7 Zaidan Hōjin Tōgō Gensui Kinenkai, *Tōgō-gensui Kinen-kai shuisho, jigyō yōkō, yakuin meibō, kifū kōi* (Tokyo: Zaidan Hōjin Tōgō Gensui Kinenkai, 1934).
- 8 “Bochi oyobi maisō torishimari kisoku futatsu no ken,” October 4, 1884, Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), <https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/meta/M000000000000156248>.
- 9 Yamazaki, *Nichiro sen’eki*, 42.
- 10 Cited in full in Hirase Reita, *Dōzō junan no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011), 50–51, and the government bulletin *Kanpō* no. 5611, May 19, 1900, <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/2948355>. See also Yamazaki, *Nichiro sen’eki*, 65–66. Graveyards were exempt from the regulations of this ordinance, officially in order not to interfere with “traditional customs of [religious] worship of the dead (*reihai*).”
- 11 Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, ed., *Fukuoka-ken keisatsu hōki ruiten*, no. 1, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1935), 671, section 2.2.4.
- 12 Kanagawa-ken Keisatsu-bu, *Keisatsu hōki ruiten: kajo-shiki*, vol. 2 (Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1925), 724.
- 13 Yamazaki, *Nichiro sen’eki*, 65.
- 14 See Morita Toshio, “Ōsaka-fu no shiseki chōsa to furitsu toshokan no kōshitsu kankei Ōsaka-fu kyōdo shiryō tenji (kōhan),” *Bulletin of the Osaka Jonan Women’s Junior College* 45 (2011): 1–68, reference on pages 15–16.
- 15 See Fukuoka-ken Keisatsu-bu, ed., *Keisatsu hōki ruiten*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1928), 70–71, under section 3.4.

- 16 See Fujii Motohiko, “Shiryō honkoku. ‘Shōchūhi kiroku,’” *Niigata-shi Bijutsukan-Niigata-shi Niitsu Bijutsukan kenkyū kiyō/Bulletin of Niigata City Art Museum & Niitsu Art Museum*, 2 (2014): 43–44.
- 17 See Fukuoka-ken Keisatsu-bu, *Keisatsu hōki ruiten*, 71–72.
- 18 Yamazaki, *Nichiro sen’eki*.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 See, for example, the documents in “Jinmu tennō Go-dōzō shutsugan ni kansuru ken (Nara-ken)” (Petition for a Bronze Statue for Emperor Jinmu [Nara Prefecture]), National Archives of Japan, Ministry of Home Affairs, Police and Public Security Bureau (Naimushō Keihokyoku), Records, Heig Keisatsu 00209100, accessible on JACAR, reference code A05032283400.
- 21 Hashimoto Kakubundō Kikaku Shuppanshitsu, ed., *Tokubetsu meisshō Kenrokuen—sono rekishi to bunka. Shiryō-hen* (Kanazawa: Hashimoto Kakubundō, 1997), 81.
- 22 See Suematsu Shirō, *Tōkyō no kōen tsūshi*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981), 39.
- 23 Anonymous, “Dōzō,” *Kenchiku zasshi* 253 (1908): 36.
- 24 Kōshinsha Insatsusho, ed., *Insatsu no shiori* (Tokyo: Kōshinsha, 1936), 12.
- 25 Yamazaki, *Nichiro sen’eki*, 7–9.
- 26 Shunpokō Tsuishōkai, *Itō Hirobumi-kō dōzō oyobi shōtokuhi kensetsu tenmatsu* (Tokyo: Shunpokō Tsuishōkai, 1937), 19.
- 27 On the unveiling ceremony of the Tōgō statue, see the website of Tōgō Park, where the statue is located today, <http://www.togo-koen.jp/history/index.html>. On the Itō statue, see Hirase, *Dōzō junan no kindai*, 104–5. On the Itagaki statue in Kōchi, see Ikeda Nagama, ed., *Itagaki Taisuke-sensei dōzō kyūshutsu-roku* (Kōchi: Kōchi Itagakikai, 1943).
- 28 See Shunpokō Tsuishōkai, *Itō Hirobumi-kō*, 2. The statue of Itō still stands outside the Diet. In 1938, a second statue of Itō, together with statues of Itagaki Taisuke and Ōkuma Shigenobu, was placed in the Central Hall of the National Diet Building to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the constitutional system. Itō was chosen because he had taken a leading role in drafting the constitution, and Itagaki and Ōkuma were the founders of the first political parties to operate under the constitutional system. See <http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/taiken/gijidou/3.html>.
- 29 Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensankai, ed., *Segai Inoue-kō den*, vol. 5 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1968), 250–59.
- 30 Ibid., 251.
- 31 Haga Shōji, “Gunto no sensō kinenhi. Toyohashi Daijūhachi rentai to Jinmu tennō dōzō kinenhi,” in *Kindai Nihon no uchi to soto*, ed. Tanaka Akira (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1999), 292. For another detailed description of an unveiling ceremony of a Jinmu statue, see Fujii, “Shiryō honkoku,” 36–37.
- 32 See the entries in Shibusawa Sei’en Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed., *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*, vol. 28 (Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō Kankōkai, 1956) and Shibusawa Sei’en Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed., *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*, vol. 49 (Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō Kankōkai, 1963).
- 33 One of the most detailed surviving descriptions of an unveiling ceremony are found in Hino-machi Kyōikukai, ed., *Gamō Ujisato-kyō dōzō jomakushiki no ki* (Hino: Hino-machi Kyōikukai, 1919), and Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho, ed., *Kansō-kō go-dōzō jomakushiki gaikyō sono-ta hōkokusho* (Tokyo: Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho, 1914).
- 34 See, for example, Ko Iwamura Danshaku Dōzō Kensetsukai, *Ko Iwamura danshaku dōzō kensetsu hōkokusho* (Tokyo: Ko Iwamura Danshaku Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1934).
- 35 For example, Yonai Mitsumasa Dōzō Kensetsukai, *Yonai Mitsumasa dōzō kensetsukai shūshi kessansho* (Tokyo: Yonai Mitsumasa Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1961) and Miyagi-ken Seinendan, *Hanso Date Masamune-kō dōzō kensetsu shuishi* (Sendai: Miyagi-ken Seinendan, 1935).
- 36 Robert Musil, “Denkmale,” in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2 (Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1978), 506–7. The relevant passage reads: “There is nothing in the world which approximates the paradoxical invisibility of public monuments. They are erected, no doubt, with the aim of attracting public attention, but on the other hand they seem to be strangely impregnated against attention from the outside. . . . One considers them—like a tree—to be a part of the street, one would be immediately struck by their disappearance, but one does not look at them and one does not have the slightest idea whom they represent.” English translation cited from Sergiusz Michalski, *Public Monuments: Art in Political Bondage 1870–1997* (Clerkenwell: Reaktion Books, 1998), loc. 651, Kindle.
- 37 See, for example, the article “Nankō seishin o migake” (Polish the Nankō Spirit), published in *Asahi shinbun*, May 26, 1943, 3, or the article “Dai-Nanshū-kai no sensō hōshi” (Patriotic Cleaning Service of the Great Nanshū [Saigō] Association), *Asahi shinbun*, April 26, 1943, 8.
- 38 See the coverage of a demonstration called “‘Kenkoku kinen no hi’ ni hantai shi rikkenshugi o mamori sensō-hō haishi o motomeru 2–11 shūkai” (Assembly on February 11 to Oppose the “National Foundation Day,” Protect Constitutionalism and Demand the Abolishment of the War Legislation), organized to counter the ceremony in front of the statue of Emperor Jinmu held by the aforementioned Nippon Kaigi group. See *Asahi shinbun*, Tokushima ed., February 12, 2016, 21. Similar events and counter-events have been held in past years.
- 39 Information provided by the city administration of Toyohashi; see also *Asahi shinbun*, February 12, 1993, evening edition, 10, and *Yomiuri shinbun*, February 12, 2000.

Chapter 5

- 1 The most common overlap concerned figures involved in the Meiji Restoration. These figures were often born as daimyo or samurai, but following the abolition of the feudal system in the early 1870s they became politicians, military officers or entrepreneurs. In such cases, the figure in question was assigned to two or three categories.
- 2 Arai Fusatarō, *Ijin no omokage* (Tokyo: Nijūroku Shinpōsha, 1928; repr. Yumani Shobō, 2009); Kurita Kiyomi, *Teikoku dōzō-kagami* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Shiseki Kenkyūkai Shuppanbu, 1935); and Hitomi Kisaburō, ed., *Keihin shozai dōzō shashin* (Tokyo: Suwadō, 1910).
- 3 Inamoto Hiroshi and Sugita Kōzō, eds., *Furusato no kokoro—dōzō* (Tokyo: Orijin Shuppan, 1990); Maeda Shigeo, *Dōzō ni miru Nihon no rekishi* (Tokyo: Sōei Shuppan and Kamiyu Rekishi Henshūbu, 2000); Kamiyu Rekishi Henshūbu, ed., *Nihon no dōzō kanzen meikan* (Tokyo: Kōsaidō, 2013); and Matsudaira Kōmei, *Nihon no dōzō* (Tokyo: Zuisōsha, 2002).
- 4 On the concept of historical figures as *lieux de mémoire*, see Pierre Nora, Lawrence D. Kritzman, and Arthur Goldhammer, eds./trans., *The Realms of Memory*, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, “Introduction. The Realms of Memory: Japan And Beyond,” in *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, ed. Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), 1–14.
- 5 The first bronze statue of Ninomiya was erected in Toyohashi (Aichi Prefecture) in 1924. See Inoue Shōichi, *Nostarujikku aidoru Ninomiya Kinjirō* (Tokyo: Shinjuku Shobō, 1989), 33–34. The first example in stone, exhibited at the National Exposition in Okazaki in Aichi Prefecture in 1928, is considered to have been the trigger for the Ninomiya statue boom, as it led to the foundation of the Association for the Dissemination of the Statue of Young Ninomiya Sontoku (Ninomiya Sontoku-sensei Shōnen Jidai no zō Fukyūkai). Inoue, *Nostarujikku aidoru*, 51–53. By the late 1920s, advertisements for Ninomiya statues were appearing in journals and even in the official government bulletin *Kanpō*, for example, “Ninomiya Sontoku-sensei dōzō” (Keiji Seisakusho), in *Kanpō* (October 24, 1929), 16. On Ninomiya, see Tomita Kōkei, *A Peasant Sage of Japan: The Life and Work of Sontoku Ninomiya*, trans. Yoshimoto Tadasu (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912).
- 6 See Michael Hoffmann, “Moral education may not reflect the realities of life in Japan,” *The Japan Times*, October 27, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/27/national/media-national/moral-education-may-not-reflect-realities-life-japan>.
- 7 *Asahi shinbun*, March 23, 2015.
- 8 The ideology of Ninomiya was seen as compatible with Anglo-Saxon thought; some even compared Ninomiya with Abraham Lincoln. Thus, a 1 yen bill, issued in 1946 and approved by the Allied occupation administration in Japan, bore a portrait of Ninomiya in old age. See Inoue, *Nostarujikku aidoru*, 96–102, 118–19, and Mark Ravina, “The Yen—Japan’s National Currency,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 279–94.
- 9 The foundry firm Heiwa Gōkin (<http://www.heiwagokin.co.jp/ninomiya>) still offers bronze Ninomiya statuettes and statues in all sizes, for prices ranging from several thousand to more than three million yen. The company, located in Takaoka, Toyama Prefecture, has been making Ninomiya statues since the 1920s.
- 10 The locations of the statues were plotted on a “Ninomiya Map.” See Kanagawa-ken Tochi Kaya Chōsa-shi kai, *Kanagawa-ken Ninomiya Kinjirō tokushū: Kinjirō MAP*, 2010, <http://www.kanagawa-chousashi.or.jp/ninokin/ninokinmap.pdf>.
- 11 Toyokoro-chō Kyōiku linkai and Toyokoro-chō Kyōiku Kenkyūjo, *Tokachi kan'nai ni okeru Ninomiya Kinjirō-zō no chōsa—kenkyū (kaiteiban)* (Toyokoro: Toyokoro-chō Kyōiku linkai and Toyokoro-chō Kyōiku Kenkyūjo, 2012), 39–40.
- 12 Seventy-three of the 173 statues in Gunma were originally made of stone or concrete. Noto Takeshi and Kuwahara Hiromi, “Gunma-ken-ka kōritsu gakkō ni okeru Ninomiya Kinjirō-zō no chōsa,” *Bulletin of the Gunma Prefectural Museum of History* 27 (2006): 49–72.
- 13 Morimoto Tatsuaki, “Okayama-ken ni okeru Ninomiya Kinjirō-zō no jittai chōsa,” *Okayama Kenritsu Kiroku Shiryōkan kiyō* 6 (2011): 69–93.
- 14 See “Arukinagara kiken na-no-de,” *Shimotsuke Original Online News*, March 2, 2016, <http://www.shimotsuke.co.jp/category/life/education/school/news/20160302/2251171>.
- 15 According to sociologist Kagotani Jirō, at the end of the war 124 elementary schools in Kansai had a Ninomiya statue, thirty-one schools had a Kusunoki statue, and forty-five schools were equipped with both. Kagotani Jirō, “Ninomiya Kinjirō to Kusunoki Masashige/Masatsura-zō. Ōsaka-fu shōgakkō ni okeru setchi jōkyō no kōsatsu,” *Shakai kagaku* 58 (1997): 14.
- 16 See, for example, an analysis of internet searches at <http://100-years-ago.jp/dbdb/rank201510/> or the ranking produced for a TV program in 2012, <https://web.archive.org/web/20130928184125/http://www.ntv.co.jp/ijin/>.
- 17 The totals given in Figure 5.2 represent the number of statues attributed to a particular category. In my analysis these numbers are not necessarily identical with the number of actually existing monuments because some

- statues, and the historical figures they depict, have been assigned to multiple categories.
- 18 Anonymous, “Where are the Statues of Women?,” 2011, http://articles.courant.com/2011-05-30/news/hc-ed-women-statues-20110530_1_national-statuary-hall-sculptures-connecticut-women.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Tanaka Shūji, *Kindai Nihon saisho no chōkokuka* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994), 198–99.
- 21 See Shibusawa Sei'en Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed., *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*, vol. 24 (Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō Kankōkai, 1959), 293, 296–97. The committee's report is found on pages 293–99; the monument inscription is on page 297. The original statue was destroyed during the war and rebuilt in 1954.
- 22 On gender concepts in modern Japan, see Vera Mackie, “Genders, Sexualities and Bodies in Modern Japanese History,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018).
- 23 An Association to Revere Mrs. Nogi (Nogi Shizuko Fujin Hōsankai) exists until the present day and has recently commissioned a statue of the general's wife, which was unveiled in November 2016 in Kagoshima. The statue was a reproduction of a prewar model, which was lost during the war. See http://www.geocities.jp/shizuko_housankai/#jyomaku. On Nogi Shizuko, see Sharalyn Orbaugh, “General Nogi's Wife: Representations of Women in Narratives of Japanese Modernization,” in *In Pursuit of Contemporary East Asian Culture*, ed. Stephen Snyder and Xiaobing Tang (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 7–31.
- 24 Okumura had participated in the restoration movement of the 1860s and had later played an active role in the colonization of Korea.
- 25 “Tōkyō-fu kiryū Ōsaka-fu heimin Katō Kurō Beikoku zen daitōryō ‘Guranto’ no kinenhi Ueno kōen chinai ni kensetsu shutsugan ikken” (Petition of the Commoner Katō Kurō from Osaka, Temporarily Resident in Tokyo, to Build a Memorial to Former American President Grant in Ueno Park), Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan (Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo), Gaimushō Kiroku, B 3,13,7.1.
- 26 See Richard T. Chang, “General Grant's 1879 Visit to Japan,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 24, no. 4 (1969): 373–92.
- 27 “Tokyo-fu kiryū Ōsaka-fu heimin Katō Kurō Beikoku zen-daitōryō ‘Guranto’ no kinenhi Ueno kōen chinai ni kensetsu shutsugan ikken” (Petition of the Commoner Katō Kurō from Osaka, Temporarily Resident in Tokyo, to Build a Memorial to Former American President Grant in Ueno Park), Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan (Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo), Gaimushō Kiroku, B 3,13,7.1.
- 28 See Nihon Kokusai Igaku Kyōkai, ed., *Leoporuto Myurureru dōzō jomakushiki* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Igaku Kyōkai, 1975).
- 29 For the statues on the campus of Tokyo University, see Kinoshita, “Gaikokuujin kyōshitachi no dōzō.” On Bälz and Scriba in Japan, see Hoi-eun Kim, *Doctors of Empire: Medical and Cultural Encounters between Imperial Germany and Meiji Japan* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 2014).
- 30 The unveiling of this statue was reported in the journal *Taiyō*, accompanied by a photograph; see *Taiyō* 19, no. 10 (1913): unpaginated.
- 31 Both the Meckel and the Faure statues were destroyed during/after the war. Today, a replica of the Faure statue stands in Tokorozawa Aviation Memorial Park.
- 32 See “Ueno onshi kōen kaizen hyakunen,” http://www.ueno.or.jp/history/history_02.html.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 *Asahi shinbun*, Kobe ed., October 23, 2010, 27.
- 35 See <http://www.uchiyama.info/oriori/insho/toori/reki-shi>.
- 36 On the modern history of Japan's castles, see Oleg Benesch and Ran Zwigenberg, *Japan's Castles: Citadels of Modernity in War and Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). On the daimyo statues, see the last section of chapter 6 of this study.
- 37 Ezra Vogel, *Japan As Number One* (New York: Harper Collins, 1979).
- 38 Louise Young, *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2013), 17.

Chapter 6

- 1 See John G. Caiger, “The Aims and Content of School Courses in Japanese History, 1872–1945,” in *Japan's Modern Century*, ed. Edmund Skrzypczak (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1965), 59.
- 2 James McClain, “Failed Expectations: Kaga Domain on the Eve of the Meiji Restoration,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 14, no. 2 (1988): 403–47.
- 3 *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 2, 1878, 3. Similar plans re-emerged in 1883; see *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 14, 1883.
- 4 It is still frequently claimed that the Ōmura statue was the first of its kind to be built in Japan; this view is perpetuated, for example, on the website for the Yasukuni Shrine, where the statue is located, and in academic publications. Kinoshita Naoyuki. *Tōkyō no dōzō o aruku* (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2011), 46, makes this claim in a section title, then notes in the main text (albeit only in parentheses) that the Yamato Takeru statue is considered by many the first “Western-style statue” in Japan.
- 5 For a recent biography of Ōmura, see Kimura Kihachirō, *Ōmura Masujirō* (Tokyo: Chōeisha, 2010).

- 6 The historian Thomas Huber has thus argued that the “restoration” element of the Meiji Restoration is a misnomer, calling attention to the revolutionary aspects of Ōmura’s military re-organization. See Thomas Huber, *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981).
- 7 In his classic study, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).
- 8 Hyman Kublin, “The ‘Modern’ Army of Early Meiji Japan,” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (1949): 22.
- 9 See James H. Buck, “The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. From Kagoshima through the Siege of Kumamoto Castle,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 28, no. 4 (1973): 427–46.
- 10 Many more monuments, such as the Memorial to Commemorate the Patriotic Martyrdom of the Deputy Minister of Military Affairs Lord Ōmura Masujirō (Heibu tayū Ōmura Masujirō-kyō jun’nan hōkoku no hi) in Osaka, were built in later years. See Takanashi Kōji, *Heibu tayū Ōmura Masujirō-sensei* (Tokyo: Ōmura-kyō Itoku Kenshōkai, 1941); Murata Minejirō, *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei den* (Tokyo: Inagaki Jōsaburō, 1892), 37–40; and Murata Minejirō, *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei jiseki* (Tokyo: Murata Minejirō, 1919).
- 11 Murata, *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei den*, 41.
- 12 “Ko heibu tayū Ōmura-kō dōzō zōritsu kōkoku,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 17, 1884, 4.
- 13 Murata, *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei den*, 43. The only other example that I could find dating to the Meiji period is a monument for Toyotomi Hideyoshi in Nakanoshima Park in Osaka, also called Meiji Kinenhyō, which was completed in 1883. Although Kinoshita Naoyuki in his *Dōzō no jidai* claims that the term *kinenhyō* implies a tall structure—often a statue standing on a stela—the naming of the *Ka-etsu-no ishin kin’ō kinenhyō* in Kanazawa in 1930, which has no such structure, suggests otherwise. Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Dōzō no jidai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014).
- 14 Murata, *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei den*, 43–44.
- 15 The term was dropped in later versions of the prospectus; see *ibid.*, 45.
- 16 Anonymous, “Ko heibu tayū Ōmura-kō dōzō zōritsu kōkoku,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 17, 1884, 4.
- 17 *Yomiuri shinbun*, October 22, 1887, 2, and Suzuki Kiyoshi and Watanabe Akiko, *Kyōdo no unda ijin* (Tokyo: Ryūyō-chō Kyōdo Kenkyūkai, 1996), 4.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 4–7.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 8–10.
- 20 Yasukuni Jinja, ed., *Yasukuni Jinja hyakunen shi* (Tokyo: Yasukuni Jinja, 1983), vol. 2, 304.
- 21 *Yomiuri shinbun*, December 9, 1886, 2.
- 22 *Fūzoku gahō, shinsen Tōkyō meisho zue*, no. 177, November 25, 1898, 33, and *Yomiuri shinbun*, July 4, 1886, 2; see also Tanaka, *Kindai Nihon*, 174.
- 23 *Yomiuri shinbun*, November 17, 1887, 2; see also *Fūzoku gahō, shinsen Tōkyō meisho zue*, 32.
- 24 *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 3, 1888, 1.
- 25 Christine M. E. Guth, “Takamura Kōun and Takamura Kōtarō: On Being a Sculptor,” in *The Artist as Professional in Japan*, ed. Melinda Takeuchi (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 157. In his autobiography, Takamura claims that he had no connections with Japan’s art establishment until the 1890s. Following the Meiji government’s attempts to separate Buddhism from Shinto and to reduce the number of Buddhist temples, Takamura lost much of his potential income. From the 1870s and throughout the 1880s, he made a living by sculpting art objects for members of the expatriate community in Japan, especially the German trading company Ahrens & Co. and the German Legation. See Takamura Kōun, *Bakumatsu ishin kaiko dan* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 129–38.
- 26 Murata, *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei den*, 52–53, and Kinoshita, *Dōzō no jidai*.
- 27 Nevertheless, Japanese sculptors and bronze casters continued using wooden molds rather than clay or plaster, which were the preferred media in Europe. See Guth, “Takamura Kōun and Takamura Kōtarō,” 157.
- 28 Anonymous, “Ronsetsu. Futsu-doku-ō-i no kakkoku ni okeru dōzō juseihō,” *Nihon Bijutsu Kyōkai hōkoku* 8, no. 68 (1893).
- 29 Nakamura Tatsutarō, “Ko Doitsu rōtei kinendō,” *Kenchiku zasshi* 38 (1890): 19–20, and Anonymous, “Ko Ōmura heibu tayū no dōzō,” *Kenchiku zasshi* 71 (1892): 34–35.
- 30 Hirase Reita, *Dōzō junan no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011), 33.
- 31 Max Schasler, *Ueber moderne Denkmalswuth* (Berlin: Habel, 1878), 5.
- 32 Gordon S. Wood, “Jefferson at Home,” *The New York Review of Books* (May 13, 1993): 6–9.
- 33 Takanashi, *Heibu tayū Ōmura Masujirō*, 105, and Kakuroku Yashi, *Meiji sanketsuden* (Tokyo: Seirindō, 1909), 169–71.
- 34 *Yomiuri shinbun*, November 4, 1892, 3. Advertisement section.
- 35 *Yomiuri shinbun*, February 6, 1893, 3, and Yasukuni Jinja, *Yasukuni Jinja hyakunen shi*, vol. 2, 304–5.
- 36 *Yomiuri shinbun*, February 7, 1893, 2.
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 For the history of the Yasukuni Shrine, see Akiko Takenaka, *Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory and Japan’s Unending Postwar* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015).
- 39 Yasukuni Jinja, *Yasukuni Jinja hyakunen shi*, vol. 2, 307.
- 40 Takanashi, *Heibu tayū Ōmura Masujirō*, 105.
- 41 Segawa Mitsuyuki, *Nihon no meishō* (Tokyo: Shiden Henshansho, 1900).
- 42 T. Philip Terry, *Terry’s Guide to the Japanese Empire: including Korea and Formosa, with Chapters on Manchuria, the Trans-Siberian Railway, and the Chief Ocean*

- Routes to Japan* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 156. The popular bilingual pictorial *Dai-Tōkyō shashinchō* [The Pictorial of Tokyo] had only photos of three statues, Ōmura, Saigō Takamori, and Kusunoki Masashige. See *Dai-Tōkyō shashinchō*, [no publisher], c. 1930, <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3459985>.
- 43 *Yomiuri shinbun*, November 25, 1919, 5, and Yasukuni Jinja, *Yasukuni Jinja hyakunen shi*, vol. 2, 309.
- 44 *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 30, 1895, 5.
- 45 The first book-length biography was published around the time the Ōmura statue was completed (Murata, *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei den*). Short chapters on Ōmura had appeared in collections of biographical sketches of *ijin* in the 1880s.
- 46 Nishimura Tomijirō, *Ōmura Masujirō den* (Tokyo: Kōbunkan, 1897).
- 47 *Fūzoku gahō, shinsen Tōkyō meisho zue*, 32.
- 48 Hagihara Shinsei, *Ōmura Masujirō shōden* (Tokyo: Ōmura Masujirō Hōsan-kai Tokyo Shibu, 1942), 15.
- 49 *Ibid.*, 16.
- 50 “Botsugo 150nen ni muke, dōzō konryū e kifukin yobikake,” *Mainichi shinbun*, Yamaguchi ed., May 30, 2017.
- 51 On Saigō, see Ivan Morris, *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1975); Charles Yates, “Saigō Takamori in the Emergence of Meiji Japan,” *Modern Asian Studies* 28, no. 3 (1994): 449–74; Mark Ravina, *The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigō Takamori* (Hoboken: Wiley & Sons, 2005); and Mark Ravina, “The Apocryphal Suicide of Saigō Takamori,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 3 (2010): 691–721.
- 52 Kublin, “The ‘Modern’ Army,” 40; see also Buck, “The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877.” On the theory that Saigō committed ritual suicide, *seppuku*, see Ravina, “The Apocryphal Suicide.”
- 53 Maruyama Masao, *Chūsei to hangyaku* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1998).
- 54 Najita, Tetsuo, “Nakano Seigō and the Spirit of the Meiji Restoration in Twentieth-Century Japan,” in *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan*, ed. James W. Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 375–422.
- 55 Ravina, “The Apocryphal Suicide,” 692.
- 56 Numerous biographies of Saigō were entitled “Biography of Nanshū, the Venerable.” On the difficulty of separating Saigō the man from Saigō the legend, see Yates, “Saigō Takamori.”
- 57 Shōji Shintarō et al., eds., *Tsūzoku Saigō Takamori den* (Tokyo: Kaiseisha, 1880). This publication was a byproduct of the foundation of the Nanshū Shrine. For the development of liberal and democratic thought in Japan, see Michael Schneider, “Liberalism, Internationalism, and Democracy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018).
- 58 Sakuraba Kei’i, *Saigō nanshū* (Tokyo: Ōkura Shoten, 1891).
- 59 Cited in Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*, loc. 4663 (Kindle edition).
- 60 For example, Tōyama Mitsuru, *Dai Saigō ikun. Tōyama Mitsuru-sensei kōhyō* (Tokyo: Seikyōsha, 1925).
- 61 Ueki drafted a constitution for Japan that included the people’s “right to protest and revolt.” The full draft is accessible on the National Diet Library’s website, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha1/description14.html>.
- 62 Ueki Emori, “Jo,” in Shōji Shintarō et al., eds., *Tsūzoku Saigō Takamori den* (Tokyo: Kaiseisha, 1880), jō1–jō2 (author’s emphasis).
- 63 Cited in Najita, “Nakano Seigō,” 420.
- 64 Cited in Emi Chizuko, “Saigō Takamori dōzō kō,” *Bunka shigengaku* 3 (2005): 69.
- 65 Fukuzawa Yukichi. *Meiji jūnen teichō kōron* (Tokyo: Jiji Shinpōsha, 1877).
- 66 A shrine dedicated to Saigō, however, was founded as early as 1880, long before his official pardon. The Nanshū Shrine in Kagoshima was originally the burial site for more than 2,000 soldiers who died in the Satsuma Rebellion (then known as Nanshū-kichi); it was renamed Nanshū Shrine in 1922, <http://nansyu.starfree.jp>. In 1978, a Saigō Nanshū Memorial Hall (Saigō Nanshū Kenshōkan) was built next to the shrine, <http://saigou.jp>.
- 67 Katsuta Magoya, ed., *Saigō Takamori den*, 5 vols. (Tokyo: Saigō Takamori den Hakkōsho, 1895).
- 68 Watanabe Asaka, *Ishin genkun Saigō Takamori-kun no den* (Tokyo: Bunjidō, 1889).
- 69 In 1889, court titles were awarded in larger numbers than ever before. Only fifty-three recipients are recorded before 1889 but 194 individuals were awarded court titles in 1889 and 1890 alone. See Tajiri Tasuku, ed., *Zōi shokenden*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Kokuyūsha, 1927).
- 70 See “Zōshō sanmi Saigō Takamori jūsan-nen-sai shikkō ni tsuki oboshimeshi o motte saishiryō o tamō,” September 25, 1889, Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), JACAR reference code A15111703100.
- 71 Saigō’s cousin Ōyama Iwao was married to Yoshii’s daughter Sawa.
- 72 *Yomiuri shinbun*, December 5, 1889.
- 73 See, for example, *Asahi shinbun*, December 6, 1889, 4.
- 74 *Ibid.*
- 75 The military figures included former Chief of Staff of the IJN, Admiral Nire Kagenori (Satsuma); General Tani Kanjō (1837–1911, Tosa); Yamada Akiyoshi (Chōshū); and former bannerman (*hatamoto*) Enomoto Takeaki. The former daimyo included Nagaoka Moriyoshi (Kumamoto); Matsudaira Yoshinaga (Kei’ei, Fukui); Shimazu Tadayoshi (Satsuma); and Mōri Moto-

- nori (Chōshū). See *Asahi shinbun*, December 6, 1889, 4; see also *Yomiuri shinbun*, December 5, 1889, 2, and Tōkyō-to, ed., *Tōkyō-shi shi-kō. Shigai hen*, vol. 80 (Tokyo: Tōkyō-to, 1989).
- 76 According to the *Kyōto shinbun*, the Ryōzen Museum of History in Kyoto found documents in 2018 indicating that this statue plan first was mooted in 1888. *Kyōto shinbun*, January, 22, 2018, accessible online at <http://www.ryozen-museum.or.jp/docs/NEWS-20180124-kyotosinbun.html>. The documents held in the museum also show that at least one different design was proposed, showing Saigō on horse with a rifle on his back. See *ibid.*
- 77 Kinoshita Naoyuki, “Ueno-sensō no kioku to hyōshō,” in *Fuyū suru “kioku,”* ed. Yano Kei’ichi et al. (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2005), 64, and Emi, “Saigō Takamori,” 70.
- 78 *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 24, 1892, 1.
- 79 *Ibid.*
- 80 *Yomiuri shinbun*, July 1, 1893, 1.
- 81 *Yomiuri shinbun*, December 19, 1898, 3.
- 82 See a print showing a sketch of the proposed equestrian statue reproduced in Emi, “Saigō Takamori,” 74; Kinoshita Naoyuki, “Tono-sama no dōzō,” in *Zōkei no ba*, ed. Nagaoka Ryūsaku (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2005), 109, and Kinoshita, *Dōzō no jidai*, 157.
- 83 In Germany, a proposal for the first equestrian statue dedicated to Otto von Bismarck in Bremen in 1903 caused a similar controversy, despite the chancellor’s popularity. The affair was even covered in the Japanese press. See *Japan Times*, August 23, 1903, 5.
- 84 *Yomiuri shinbun*, July 1, 1893, and Emi, “Saigō Takamori,” 70–71.
- 85 The school was founded in 1887 and teaching commenced in 1889. Takamura was hired the same year on the initiative of Okakura Tenshin (Kakuzō), a central figure in the development of modern Japanese art. See Takamura, *Bakumatsu ishin kaiko dan*, 338–48. On Okakura, see Victoria Weston, *Japanese Painting and National Identity: Okakura Tenshin and His Circle* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies, 2003).
- 86 On the discussions leading to the final design of the statue, see Emi, “Saigō Takamori,” 73–74.
- 87 Hirase, *Dōzō junan no kindai*, 41.
- 88 *Asahi shinbun*, September 21, 1898.
- 89 For example, *Asahi shinbun*, December 19, 1898, 1; *Hōchi shinbun*, December 19, 1898, 1; and *Kokumin shinbun*, December 20, 1898, 5.
- 90 Reports of the ceremony, including illustrations, were published in *Kokumin shinbun*, December 20, 1898, 5; *Miyako shinbun*, December 18, 1898, 2; *Fūzoku gahō*, no. 182 (1899): 34–35; *Taiyō* 5, no. 1 (1899), unpaginated, and in art journals such as the *Kyōto Bijutsu Kyōkai zasshi*, no. 80 (February 1899), 15; *Nihon bijutsu* (April 1899), unpaginated. Even the English-language newspaper *Japan Times* announced the unveiling ceremony, *Japan Times*, December 17, 1898, 3.
- 91 The speech was reproduced in *Asahi shinbun*, December 19, 1898, 1; *Yomiuri shinbun*, December 19, 1898, 3; and Anonymous, “Kabayama-haku no hōkoku yōryō,” *Kyōto Bijutsu Kyōkai zasshi* 79 (1889): 14–15.
- 92 See, for example, *Asahi shinbun*, April 24, 1890, 4.
- 93 Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996), loc. 1731, Kindle.
- 94 Shinseisha Dōjin, *Sanjūbō* (Tokyo: Shinseisha, 1901), 230.
- 95 Tōkyō Hakurankai Shashinchō Hakkōsho, *Heiwa kinen Tōkyō hakurankai shashinchō* (Tōkyō Hakurankai Shashinchō Hakkōsho, 1922), unpaginated.
- 96 *Fūzoku gahō*, no. 182, 35.
- 97 Yamazaki Arinobu, *Nichiro sen’eki chūshisha kenpi narabi Shōkonsha gōshi tetsuzuki* (Tokyo: Kaitsūsha, 1906), 3.
- 98 Anonymous, “Saigō Nanshū no dōzō o hyōsu,” *Taiyō* 5, no. 2 (1899): 52–61, esp. 53.
- 99 Most of the opinion pieces published in the journal *Taiyō*, which was founded in 1895, were written by Takayama and his colleague Hasegawa Tenkei (1876–1940). For similar remarks, see Takayama Chogyū, *Jidai kanken* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1899), 214–20.
- 100 Anonymous, “Saigō Nanshū no dōzō,” 53–55.
- 101 *Ibid.*, 54.
- 102 *Ibid.*, 55. Emphasis in the original.
- 103 *Ibid.*, 55–56.
- 104 Kakuroku, *Meiji sanketsuden*.
- 105 The first statue of Katsu was completed in 1939 after several years of lobbying by Katsu’s former students, ultranationalist leader Tōyama Mitsuru, writer and publisher Tokutomi Iichirō, and army general Araki Sadao; see *Asahi shinbun*, May 13, 1939, 10.
- 106 See, for example, *Asahi shinbun*, July 31, 1936, 2.
- 107 Suematsu Shirō, *Tōkyō no kōen tsūshi* (Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981), vol. 1, 46. The other four parks were Shiba Park (55 ha), Asakusa Park (22 ha), Shingawa Park (6 ha) and Asukayama Park (4 ha).
- 108 Suematsu, *Tōkyō no kōen tsūshi*, vol. 1, 89.
- 109 For an example of a guidebook, see Hidaka Shigeo, *Tōkyō yūran annai* (Tokyo: Taiheikan, 1914), which carries photographs of the Ōmura, Saigō and Kusunoki statues.
- 110 *Japan Times*, March 31, 1917, 2.
- 111 *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 17, 1894, 1.
- 112 See *Asahi shinbun*, August 14, 1928, 2.
- 113 See <http://www.okinoerabujima.info/about/saigonan-shukinenkan>.
- 114 See <http://keitenaijin.net/shiryō/tokunomajiwari.html>.
- 115 See, for example, the book by Inamori Kazuo, founder of Kyocera and KDDI corporations, *Jinsei no ōdō. Saigō nanshū no oshie ni manabu* (Tokyo: Nikkei BP, 2007).

- 116 See the classic work by Uchimura Kanzō, *Representative Men of Japan/Daihyō-teki Nihonjin* (Tokyo, New York, and London: Kodansha International, 1999) and Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*.
- 117 See Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*, loc. 4691, Kindle.
- 118 Society of Satsuma Samurai Spirits, ed., *Satsuma Spirits* (Tokyo: Society of Satsuma Spirits, 2011).
- 119 Kokuryūkai, ed., *Seinan kiden*. 6 vols. (Tokyo: Kokuryūkai, 1908–11). On the Kokuryūkai, see Sven Saaler, “The Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) and the Rise of Nationalism, Pan-Asianism, and Militarism in Japan, 1901–1925,” in *International Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (2014): 125–60.
- 120 See <http://koudoupublishing.net>.
- 121 Watanabe Shōichi, ‘Nanshū-ō ikun’ o yomu (Tokyo: Chichi Shuppansha, 1996).
- 122 Most *taiga* drama recorded rates between 20 and 30 percent, but eight series scored a rate between 30 and 40 percent. Only seven had rates below 15 percent. See <https://artv.info/taiga.html>; <https://tvkansou.info/taiga>. On the drama on Saigō, see <https://www.nhk.or.jp/segodon>.
- 123 For ongoing discussions about whether Saigō should be enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine, see See “Saigō Takamori, Shinsengumi . . . ‘Batsugun’ mo Yasukuni Jinja ni gōshi o,” *Sankei shinbun*, October 8, 2016.
- 124 Abe Yasunari, “Ko Ii Naosuke o kōka suru. Naosuke gojū kaiki made no rekishi hihyō,” *Iwasaki Keiichi Kyōju Taishoku kinen ronbun shū* 371 (2008): 58, and Kinoshita, *Dōzō no jidai*, 165–67.
- 125 See *Yomiuri shinbun*, November 22, 1881. The official history of the city of Hikone cites a first prospectus dated September 1881. See Hikone-shi Hensan linkai, ed., *Shiryō hen kindai* 1, vol. 8, *Shinshū Hikone shishi*, (Hikone: Hikone-shi, 2003), 919–20.
- 126 Hikone-shi Hensan linkai, ed., *Shinshū Hikone shishi*, vol. 8, *Shiryō-hen kindai* 1 (Hikone: Hikone-shi, 2003), 919–23.
- 127 *Ibid.*, 921.
- 128 *Ibid.*, 921–26.
- 129 *Ibid.*, 933; see also Abe, “Ko Ii Naosuke,” 69.
- 130 *Kaikoku shimatsu*, by member of the Lower House and president of Mainichi Shinbun Co., Shimada Saburō (1852–1923), was the first major work to underscore the contribution of Ii to the development of modern Japan. Shimada continued writing about Ii, as did the popular author and also a member of the Lower House, Taguchi Ukichi (1855–1905). Both men were born into families that had originally been vassals of the shogunate. Shimada also supported the initiatives to build a statue for Ii described here. On Shimada’s role, see Hikone-shi Hensan linkai, *Shiryō-hen kindai*, 926–30.
- 131 Ōtorii Tadashi, *Ko Ii Naosuke chōjin dōzō jomakushiki no ki* (Tokyo: [no publisher], 1909), 40–45.
- 132 *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 15, 1899, 2, and Hikone-shi Hensan linkai, *Shiryō-hen kindai*, 934.
- 133 *Fūzoku gahō* 196 (September 10, 1900), 1.
- 134 Abe, “Ko Ii Naosuke,” 49; Hirase, *Dōzō junan no kindai*, 85–90; Kinoshita, “Tono-sama no dōzō,” 112, and Hikone-shi Hensan linkai, *Shiryō-hen kindai*, 922.
- 135 *Fūzoku gahō* 196 (10 September 1900), 1.
- 136 Abe Yasunari, “Yokohama kaikō gojūnen-sai no seiji bunka,” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 699 (1997): 4–18.
- 137 Ōtorii, *Ko Ii Naosuke*, 40–45.
- 138 See Abe Yasunari, “Nidaime no shōzō to rireki. 1954-nen kaikoku hyakunen no Yokohama ni okeru Ii Naosuke no dōzō,” *Shiga Daigaku Keizai Gakubu kenkyū nenpō* 14 (2007): 53–77.
- 139 Ōtorii, *Ko Ii Naosuke*, 39.
- 140 *Ibid.*, 40–45, and *Asahi shinbun*, June 27, 1909.
- 141 Abe Yasunari, “Nidaime no shōzō to rireki,” 58.
- 142 Ōtorii, *Ko Ii Naosuke*, 39.
- 143 *Deutsche Japan-Post* 8, no. 13, July 1, 1909, 23.
- 144 *Deutsche Japan-Post* 8, no. 15, July 15, 1909, 23.
- 145 Ōtorii, *Ko Ii Naosuke*, 4–8.
- 146 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 147 *Ibid.*, 27–29.
- 148 *Ibid.*, 40–51.
- 149 *Ibid.*, 64.
- 150 *Ibid.*, 66–67.
- 151 *Ibid.*, 68.
- 152 *Ibid.*, 75–76. Little is known about the background to the Ii statue in Hikone. Even the most recent editions of the Hikone City History (Hikone-shi Hensan linkai, *Shiryō-hen kindai*) fail to include primary sources referring to the statue.
- 153 Arai Fusatarō, *Ijin no omokage* (Tokyo: Nijūroku Shinpōsha, 1928; repr. Yumani Shobō, 2009).
- 154 See, for example, Nakamura Katsumaro, *Ii tairō to kaikō* (Tokyo: Keiseisha 1909) and the simultaneously published English edition Katsumaro Nakamura, *Lord Ii Naosuké and New Japan* (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1909), and Toda Tamejirō, ed., *Kaikoku genkun Ii tairō* (Tokyo: Shūeidō, 1909).
- 155 See, for example, the report in the journal *Taiyō*: Anonymous, “Ii tairō dōzō jomakushiki,” *Taiyō* 15, no. 11 (1909): unpaginated.
- 156 Hattori Bunshirō, “Kadan ni tomi-shi Ii Naosuke,” *Gakusei* 3, no. 10 (1912): 217.
- 157 More than eighty *shishi* from Tosa and Mito were so honored during Tanaka’s term, but only forty-four from Chōshū and fourteen from Satsuma were promoted. See Takata Yūsuke, “Ishin no kioku to ‘kin’ō’ no sōshutsu. Tanaka Mitsuaki no kenshō katsudō o chūshin ni,” *Hisutoria* 204 (2007): 77.
- 158 *Ibid.*
- 159 Cited in *ibid.*, 81.
- 160 Cited in *ibid.*, 89.

- 161 Accessible online at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Imperial_Rescript_on_Education.
- 162 Cited in Haga Shōji, *Meiji ishin to shūkyō* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994), 362.
- 163 For the literature of the Kenmu Restoration and its historiography, see note 31 above in the introduction to this study. Reliable information about the historical figure Kusunoki Masashige is “scanty” (Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*, loc. 2421, Kindle), and the warrior “is more a creature of legend than of history” (ibid.). Murata Masashi (Murata Masashi, *Nanboku-chō ron. Shijitsu to shisō* (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1959), 191) describes one of the main “historical” sources for Kusunoki, the *Taiheiki*, as highly “dubious.” Unlike Yamato Takeru, we know that Kusunoki was a historical figure, but “verifiable data” is only available “for a mere five years,” from 1331 until 1336 (Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*, loc. 2425, Kindle; Murata, *Nanbokuchō ron*, 191–92).
- 164 See above, chapter 1 and Barry Steben, “Rai San’yō’s Philosophy of History and the Ideal of Imperial Restoration,” *East Asian History* 24 (2002): 163.
- 165 Cited in Sey Nishimura, “The Making of a National Hero: Rai Sanyō’s Kusunoki Masashige,” in *History in the Service of the Japanese Nation*, ed. John S. Brownlee, 58–93 (Toronto: University of Toronto–York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1983), 60. See also Tamaki Maeda, “From Feudal Hero to National Icon: The Kusunoki Masashige Image, 1660–1945,” *Artibus Asiae* 72, no. 2 (2012): 201–63 for a similar emphasis on the religious dimension of the “Kusunoki cult.”
- 166 Maeda, “From Feudal Hero to National Icon,” 201.
- 167 Kunaichō, ed., *Meiji tenmō ki*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1968), 679–80.
- 168 Okada Yoneo, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” in *Meiji ishin Shintō hyakumen shi*, vol. 2, ed. Shintō Bunkakai (Tokyo: Shintō Bunkakai, 1967), 25.
- 169 William Elliot Griffis, *The Mikado’s Empire*, vol. I (New York: Harper & Bros., 1876), 190–91.
- 170 J. Morris, *Makers of Japan* (London: Methuen, 1906).
- 171 Karl Ferdinand Reichel, “Der kaisertreue Samurai Kusunoki Masasige,” *Asienberichte* 5, no. 22 (1944): 52–57, and Lothar H. Schwager, “Die nationalpolitische Auswertung historischer Gestalten in der Schulerziehung Japans,” in *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*, Bd. XXVIII, Teil B (Tokyo: OAG—Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 1934), 1–25. For a summary of these trends, see Gerhard Krebs, “German Perspectives on Japanese Heroism during the Nazi Era,” in *Mutual Perceptions and Images in Japanese-German Relations, 1860–2010*, ed. Sven Saaler, Akira Kudō, and Tajima Nobuo, Brill’s Japanese Study Library 59 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 327–48.
- 172 It is said that Hirose secured the survival of the Sumitomo house, which had strong links with the Tokugawa family, after the Meiji Restoration. See Bart Gaens, “Company Culture or Patinated Past? The Display of Corporate Heritage in Sumitomo,” in *Making Japanese Heritage*, ed. Christoph Brumann and Rupert Cox (London: Routledge, 2010), 92–107.
- 173 Sumitomo Honten, *Nankō dōzō-ki* (Osaka: Sumitomo Honten, 1900), unpaginated.
- 174 Arai Takashige, *Kusunoki Masashige* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011).
- 175 In the prewar period, a statue of Hirose commissioned by his employers in 1898 as a gift for his loyal service to Sumitomo, stood in the garden of the entrepreneur’s residence in his hometown of Niihama. It was destroyed during the war, but after his former residence was donated to the city of Niihama in the 1970s and turned into a museum during the 1990s, a second statue was cast in 2003 from the original wooden maquette that had survived the war. The maquette is today exhibited in the Hirose History Memorial Museum (Hirose Reki-shi Kinenkan), and the statue stands in the museum garden. See <http://www.city.niihama.lg.jp/soshiki/hirose> and http://www.sumitomo.gr.jp/history/related/masterpiece/kusunoki_02.
- 176 Maeda, “From Feudal Hero to National Icon,” 252, and Takamura, *Bakumatsu ishin kaiko dan*, 359. Tanaka, *Kindai Nihon*, 103, includes a reprint of the sketch submitted by Okakura.
- 177 Maeda, “From Feudal Hero to National Icon,” 251.
- 178 Ibid.
- 179 See the pamphlet “Repaying Society in a Sustainable Manner” on the Sumitomo website, which contains a section on the Kusunoki statue, https://www.sumitomo.gr.jp/act/public-relations/si/pdf/03_si_eweb.pdf.
- 180 Sumitomo Honten, *Nankō dōzō-ki*; see also *Yomiuri shinbun* August 14, 1891, 3, and September 25, 1891, 3; Guth, “Takamura Kōun and Takamura Kōtarō”; and Takamura, *Bakumatsu ishin kaiko dan*, 358–63, 371.
- 181 On Gotō and his hiring by Takamura Kōun, see Takamura, *Bakumatsu ishin kaiko dan*, 363–71.
- 182 Sumitomo Honten, *Nankō dōzō-ki*.
- 183 Tanaka, *Kindai Nihon*, 105–6.
- 184 Sumitomo Honten, *Nankō dōzō-ki*; Takamura, *Bakumatsu ishin kaiko dan*, 372; *Yomiuri shinbun*, March 20, 1893, 2 and April 8, 1896, and Tanaka, *Kindai Nihon*, 105–6.
- 185 *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 25, 1891, 3.
- 186 Hirase, *Dōzō junan no kindai*, 41.
- 187 Sumitomo Honten, *Nankō dōzō-ki* and *Asahi shinbun*, September 1, 1900, 5 (the article includes a sketch of the statue).
- 188 Official English translation reproduced in a leaflet distributed at the statue site in 2010; the original Japanese

- inscription is reproduced in Sumitomo Honten, *Nankō dōzō-ki*. The inscription itself is dated January 1897 but the plinth had yet to be erected and therefore the plaque must have been attached later.
- 189 Cited in Tanaka, *Kindai Nihon*, 108.
- 190 Ibid., 108–9.
- 191 Hirase, *Dōzō junan no kindai*, 41.
- 192 Sasaki Chiyuki, *Dōzō monogatari* (Tokyo: Jidaisha, 1941), 27.
- 193 On the history of postcards in Japan, see Hosoma Hiro-michi, *Ehagaki no jidai* (Tokyo: Seidosha, 2006), a global history of the postcard; Tomita Shōji, *Ehagaki de miru Nihon kindai* (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2005), an annotated introduction to the major genres of Japanese postcards, including descriptions of several postcards illustrating statues; Hashizume Shin'ya, *Ehagaki 100nen. kindai Nihon no bijuaru media* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2006), a discussion of 100 representative postcards grouped into thirty-eight genres; Satō, Kenji, "Postcards in Japan: A Historical Sociology of a Forgotten Culture," *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 11 (2002): 35–55; and Peter O'Connor and Aaron M. Cohen, "Thoughts on the Precipice: Japanese Postcards, c. 1903–39," *Japan Forum* 13, no. 1 (2001): 55–62.
- 194 See *Asahi shinbun*, March 1, 1896, 2, which identifies the statues of Nankō, Saigō, and Nichiren as the "three great statues" of Japan before any of them was actually built.
- 195 See also *Rekishī shashin*, no. 266 (July 1935), unpaginated (sixth page of the magazine), and the aforementioned pictorial *Dai-Tōkyō shashinchō/The Pictorial of Tokyo*.
- 196 Ishihara Bangaku and Noshō Benjirō, *Jidō kyōiku. Tōkyō dōzō shōka* (Tokyo: Bunseikan, 1911).
- 197 *Asahi shinbun*, October 12, 1903, 5; see also *Yomiuri shinbun*, October 12, 1903, 2.
- 198 Kitayama Jun'yū, *Heroisches Ethos* (Berlin: Walter Gruyter, 1944), 28.
- 199 Ibid., 59 (author's emphasis). Kitayama's book also includes a full-page image of the Kusunoki statue (between pages 32 and 33).
- 200 These are minimum figures, according to the author's database.
- 201 "Two Japanese Martyrs," *The New York Times*, September 21, 1907, 6.
- 202 On Hirose worship in general, see Naoko Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chapter 6.
- 203 For further details, see *ibid.*, 203–6.
- 204 Yamamuro Kentoku, *Gunshin* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2007), 40.
- 205 On the concept of the *gunshin*, see Yamamuro, *Gunshin*, and Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, chapter 6.
- 206 In premodern Japan, the term was used to refer to individuals, mostly elite warrior chieftains, worshiped in Shinto shrines and also of course to the war god Hachiman. The term also appears in documents dating to the first year of Meiji, referring to imperial troops engaged in the civil war of 1868. See Kunaichō, ed., *Meiji temmō ki* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1968), vol. 1, 694–95. A search of *Asahi shinbun's* database also turned up a small number of hits for those years.
- 207 Yomiuri Shinbunsha, ed., *Hirose chūsa chūretsu hyōshō kashi haiku shū* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1904).
- 208 Cited in Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 221; see also the "Song to Commemorate Commander Hirose," in *Fūzoku gahō* 288 (May 10, 1904): 41.
- 209 Ōita-ken Kyōikukai, ed., *Gunshin Hirose chūsa shōden* (Ōita: Kinkōdō, 1905). A short biographical work was published even before the semiofficial Ōita version was published; see Ken'ei Sanji, *Gunshin Hirose chūsa sōretsudan* (Tokyo: Daigakukan, 1904).
- 210 *Asahi shinbun*, March 30, 1904, and Yamamuro, *Gunshin*, 22.
- 211 *Fūzoku gahō* 288 (May 10, 1904): 34–35.
- 212 Further statues dedicated to lower-ranking navy officers were erected soon after the completion of the Hirose monument, such as the memorial dedicated to Captain Sakuma Tsutomu (1879–1910) installed in 1914 in Obama, Fukui Prefecture. The few statues depicting mid- or low-ranking army officers, such as the monument dedicated to Colonel Kosuge Tomohiro (1832–88) erected in Tokyo's Shiba Park in 1899 and the memorial dedicated to Corporal Gotō Fusanosuke (1879–1902), which was placed on a mountain in remote Aomori Prefecture in 1903, failed to gain a national profile.
- 213 See Anonymous, "San-kaishō dōzō jomakushiki," *Asahi shinbun*, May 28, 1909, 3, and the series of documents beginning with "Hokki-jin onegai no ken" (Request by the Initiators), National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, Kaigunshō Ko-Saigō Kawamura Nire San-kaishō dōzō kensetsu iin, Kaigunshō dō-ken shorui, M38–1–1, accessible on JACAR, reference code C11081408300.
- 214 Mitsuchi Chūzō, *Shakai hyakugen* (Tokyo: Toyama Shobō, 1910), 210.
- 215 Ibid.
- 216 *Kenchiku zasshi* 24, no. 281 (1910): 241.
- 217 Ibid.
- 218 Ōita-ken, *Ōita-ken shashinchō* (Ōita: Ōita-ken, 1920).
- 219 Ibid., and *Kenchiku zasshi* 24, no. 281 (1910): 241.
- 220 *Kenchiku zasshi* 24, no. 281 (1910): 241.
- 221 Cited in Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 208.
- 222 The term was occasionally used during the Sino-Japanese War and was frequently applied to General Nogai Maresuke following his suicide in 1912. See, for example, Shimoto Naiji, *Chūyū giretsu. Gunshin Nogi taishō* (Tokyo: Teikoku Hōtokukai Shuppanbu, 1919).

- 223 Kuroda Hōshin, “Gunshin no kinenzō,” *Taiyō* 16, no. 12 (1910): 205–7. See also Edogawa Suijin, “Gunshin no dōzō,” in *Genkotsu hyakuwa*, ed. Otsuki Takashi (Tokyo: Kokkeisha, 1911), 191–92.
- 224 *Fūzoku gahō* 288 (May 10, 1904): 35.
- 225 See Shumpei Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), part 4.
- 226 Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 212.
- 227 See, for example, “Ko-Hirose chūsa dōzō jomakushiki,” *Taiyō* 16, no. 10 (July 1, 1910): unpaginated; “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomakushiki,” *Fūzoku gahō* 409 (June 5, 1910): 10–15 and unpaginated photo; and *Yomiuri shinbun* May 30, 1810, 3.
- 228 “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomakushiki,” *Fūzoku gahō* 409 (June 5, 1910): 10–11.
- 229 *Ibid.*, 11, and *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 30, 1910, 3.
- 230 “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomakushiki,” *Fūzoku gahō* 409 (June 5, 1910): 12, and *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 30, 1910, 3.
- 231 *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 30, 1910, 3, and Kuroda, “Gunshin no kinenzō,” 206.
- 232 Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 225.
- 233 Yasukuni Jinja, ed., *Yūshūkan zuroku* (Tokyo: Kindai Shuppansha, 2003), 40.
- 234 “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomakushiki,” *Fūzoku gahō* 409 (June 5, 1910): 10.
- 235 Untitled and unpaginated brochure issued by Kanda-ku Yokusankai (unpublished document, author’s collection).
- 236 Rotem Kowner, *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
- 237 Morimoto Tan’nosuke, ed., *Gunshin Tachibana chūsa* (Tokyo: Chūseidō, 1920), 11.
- 238 On Ōsako, see Kokumin Gunji Kyōikukai, ed., *Gendai rikugun meishō retsuden* (Tokyo: Kokumin Gunji Kyōikukai, 1916), 21–23, and Sugimoto Kichitarō, *Gendai Nihon o kitsukiageta jin no seinen jidai* (Tokyo: Nishōdō Shoten, 1938), 230–40.
- 239 Ōsako Dai-nana Shidanchō Shōtoku Dōzō Kensetsukai, *Ōsako dai-nana shidanchō shōtoku dōzō kensetsu shuisho* (unpublished document, 1906, author’s collection).
- 240 *Ibid.*
- 241 See, for example, *Asahi shinbun*, November 22, 1906, 4.
- 242 On the Nogi myth, see Hashikawa Bunsō, “Nogi densetsu no shisō,” in Hashikawa Bunsō, *Hashikawa Bunsō chosakushū* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2000).
- 243 In the process, he also recruited the support of army general Horiuchi Bunjirō; see Ōkuma Asajirō, *Shinsui Horiuchi Bunjirō shōgun o itamu* (Tokyo: Ōkuma Asajirō, 1942), 6–7.
- 244 See <http://www.togo-koen.jp/history/index.html>.
- 245 See <http://www.togo-koen.jp>.
- 246 Shibusawa Sei’en Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed., *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*, vol. 28 (Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō Kankōkai, 1959), 232–33.
- 247 Zaidan Hōjin Tōgō Gensui Kinenkai, *Tōgō-gensui Kinen-kai shuisho, jiggyō yōkō, yakuin meibō, kifū kōi* (Tokyo: Zaidan Hōjin Tōgō Gensui Kinenkai, 1934), 1.
- 248 *Ibid.*, 3–4.
- 249 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 250 Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan, Senzenki Gaimushō Kiroku II-1-7-0-3, “Honpō kinenbutsu kankei zakken. Tōgō-gensui kinen jiggyō kankei.”
- 251 See <http://www.togo.co.jp/togoshrine>.
- 252 Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, “Human Bullets, General Nogi, and the Myth of Port Arthur,” in *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective*, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., *History of Warfare* 29 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 200.
- 253 Izan Sugihara, *Yoshida Shōin: Ijin genkōroku* (Tokyo: Miyoshiya, 1910), 202. See the shrine’s website at <http://www.shoinjinja.org>.
- 254 Yamaguchi Kenritsu Hagi Chūgakkō Kōyūkai, ed., *Shōin Jinja onkoroku* (Hagi: Yamaguchi Kenritsu Hagi Chūgakkō Kōyūkai, 1917).
- 255 See www.yoshida-shoin.com.
- 256 On the persistence of the phenomenon in modern pop culture, see Leah Sottile, “Why Does Pop Romanticize Dying Young?,” *The Atlantic* (1 November 2013), <http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/why-does-pop-romanticize-dying-young/280920/>.
- 257 On Sakamoto’s life, see Marius Jansen, *Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
- 258 Tajiri, *Zōi shokenden*, vol. 1, 4.
- 259 See Sven Saaler, *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion. The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society* (Munich: Iudicium, 2005), chapter 3.
- 260 See <http://www.nakaokashintarokan.net/facilities/facilities.html> (Nakaoka in Kōchi); <http://www.ryomakinenkan.jp/en> (Sakamoto in Kōchi); <http://www.city.nagasaki.lg.jp/kameyama/index2.html> (Sakamoto in Nagasaki); and <http://www.ryoma1115.com/kinenkan> (Sakamoto in Hokkaido).
- 261 See the airport’s website at <http://www.kochiap.co.jp>.
- 262 Ryōma-zō Shūfuku Jikkō linkai, ed., *Sakamoto Ryōma dōzō shūfuku dokyumento* (Kōchi: Kōchi-shi Katsurahama Kōen Kankō Kaihatsu Kōsha, 1999), 42.
- 263 See <http://ssd.jpl.nasa.gov/sbdb.cgi?sstr=2835>.
- 264 On Shiba Ryōtarō, see Saaler, *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion*, chapter 3; Harald Meyer, *Japans Bestseller-König: eine narratologisch-wirkungsästhetische Erfolgsanalyse zum Phänomen Shiba Ryōtarō (1923–1996)* (Munich: Iudicium, 2010); and Narita Ryūichi, *Sengo shisōka toshite no Shiba Ryōtarō* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2003).
- 265 Nishimura Tomijirō, *Nihon ijin den* (Tokyo: Kōbunkan, 1897).

- 266 Kiyū Gaishi, *Ijin hyakuwa* (Tokyo: Iroha Shobō, 1899); Matano Yoshirō, *Ijin no genkō* (Tokyo: Daigakkan, 1900); Andō Kenkichi, ed., *Ijin no sekitoku* (Tokyo: Aoki Sūzandō, 1901); and Taniguchi Ryūō, ed., *Ijin to gōketsu shōnen jidai* (Tokyo: Hakuhōdō, 1901).
- 267 Sakamoto Nakaoka Ryō-sensei Sōnan Gojūnen Kinen Saitenkai, ed., *Sakamoto Nakaoka ryō-sensei sōnan gojūnen kinen kōen shū* (Kyoto: Sakamoto Nakaoka Ryō-sensei Sōnan Gojūnen Kinen Saitenkai, 1917).
- 268 Sakakibara Eisuke, *Ryōma densetsu no kyōjitsu* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2010).
- 269 The National Diet Library Digital Collections (www.dl.ndl.go.jp) records that the number subsequently declined to thirty-five in the 1930s and thirty-four in the 1940s.
- 270 Kōchi-shishi Hensan linkai, ed., *Kōchi shishi* (Kōchi: Kōchi-shi, 1971), 436, and Kōchi Shiyakusho, ed., *Kōchi shishi* (Kōchi: Kōchi Shiyakusho, 1926), 510–11. See also Kumon Gō, *Shiseki gaido. Tosa no jiyū minken* (Kōchi: Kōchi Shinbunsha, 2013), 14, 32.
- 271 For the 1982 testimony of one of the project’s instigators, see Irimajiri Yoshiyasu et al., “Zadankai ‘Ryōma to seinen,’” in *Sakamoto Ryōma-sensei dōzō monogatari*, ed. Irimajiri Yoshiyasu (Kōchi: Shadan Hōjin Hito o Kangaeru Mura, 1982), 3.
- 272 Ryōma-zō Shūfuku Jikkō linkai, *Sakamoto Ryōma*, 31–35. The donations were collected by the Kōchi Youth League (6,552 yen), other youth leagues (13,891 yen), teachers (3,070 yen), and private individuals (1,064 yen). The report also mentions a special donation of 200 yen by the imperial prince Chichibu. The total cost of the memorial was 22,774 yen, of which 15,000 yen was spent on the statue, 4,638 yen on the plinth, 1,722 yen on transportation of the statue, and 1,162 yen on the unveiling ceremony. *Kōchi-ken Rengō Seinendan danpō* (August 13, 1928), 30–31.
- 273 *Doyō shinbun*, May 27, 1928, 1.
- 274 Further statues of Itagaki were erected in Nikkō in 1929 and in the Imperial Diet in 1938. In the Diet, he is grouped with Ōkuma Shigenobu and Itō Hirobumi to demonstrate his contribution to the development of Japan’s parliamentary system. See Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Yo no tochū kara kakusarete-iru koto* (Tokyo: Shōbunsha, 2002), 186–87, for details of these indoor statues. For the various Itagaki statues, see Itagaki Taisuke Dōzō Kaishū Kiseikai, *Itagaki Taisuke dōzō shūfuku no shiori* (Kōchi: Itagaki Taisuke Dōzō Kaishū Kiseikai, 1991).
- 275 See <http://www.tosashu.com/menu/tosashu/jiyuu.html>.
- 276 See Irimajiri Yoshiyasu et al., “Zadankai ‘Ryōma to seinen.’”
- 277 Ryōma-zō Shūfuku Jikkō linkai, *Sakamoto Ryōma*, 31. Following the death of Emperor Taishō in 1926, Crown Prince Hirohito ascended to the throne and the new reign was given the name Shōwa, meaning “radiant peace.”
- 278 On the history of the idea of a Shōwa Restoration, see the classic study by Hashikawa Bunsō, *Shōwa ishin shiron* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1984).
- 279 A special issue of the Kōchi Youth League’s journal reported on the ceremony in detail. “Dōzō kensetsu kinen. Sakamoto Ryōma-sensei gō,” *Kōchi-ken Rengō Seinendan danpō*, August 13, 1928.
- 280 Yasuhara Shun’ichi, “Sakamoto Ryōma-sensei o omō,” *Kōchi-ken Rengō Seinendan danpō* 13 (1928): 1–2.
- 281 *Kōchi-ken Rengō Seinendan danpō*, August 13, 1928, 4.
- 282 *Japan Times*, May 29, 1928, 1.
- 283 *Kōchi-ken Rengō Seinendan danpō*, August 13, 1928,
- 284 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 285 See, for example, the speeches by the deputy chairman of the prefectural assembly and the mayor, *Kōchi-ken Rengō Seinendan danpō* (August 13, 1928): 13–15.
- 286 *Ibid.*, 21. See also the speech therein by a member of the Kōchi Youth League, 44.
- 287 Sakamoto Nakaoka Dōzō Kensetsukai, ed., *Shunketsu Sakamoto Ryōma* (Tokyo: Sakamoto Nakaoka Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1926), unpaginated.
- 288 Imahata Nishie and Sakamoto Nakaoka Ryō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai, *Dōzō senbun to ryō-sensei no igyō ni tsuite* (Tokyo: Sakamoto Nakaoka Ryō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1934), 3.
- 289 On the Nakaoka statue, see Nakaoka Shintarō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai, *Dōzō kensetsu hōkokusho* (Kōchi: Nakaoka Shintarō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1935).
- 290 *Ibid.*, 16–18.
- 291 See Kōchi-ken, ed., *Kōchi-ken-shi kindai-hen* (Kōchi: Kōchi-ken, 1970), chapters 8 and 9.
- 292 Nakaoka Shintarō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai, *Dōzō kensetsu hōkokusho*, 6.
- 293 *Ibid.*, 30 (author’s emphasis).
- 294 Like all the parks in which the statues discussed in this chapter were installed, the East Park was opened to the public in 1876 as a result of the Dajōkan Ordinance no. 16 of 1873. The name East Park was adopted in 1900. See the park’s website at <http://higashikoen.net>.
- 295 On the modern ideology of “Nichirenism,” see Gerald Scott Iguchi, *Nichirenism as Modernism: Imperialism, Fascism, and Buddhism in Modern Japan*, PhD diss., University of California San Diego, 2006. A classic source on Nichirenism is Kishio Satomi, *Japanese Civilization, its Significance and Realization: Nichirenism and the Japanese National Principles* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1923).
- 296 A report on the Nichiren statue project, for example, frequently affirms Nichiren’s “prophecy” as historical fact; see Ono Gakuyō, ed., *Nichiren dōzō-shi. Genkō kinen* (Osaka: Risshōsha, 1904), esp. 2–3, 26–58. See below on the various editions of this report. See also Judith Fröhlich, “Vom Krieger zu den Kriegerwerten. Die Mongoleneinfälle des 13. Jahrhunderts und deren

- Umdeutung im 19. Jahrhundert in Japan,” *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 159 (2009): 81–104.
- 297 Ono, *Nichiren dōzō-shi*, 58. See also Furuta Ryūichi, ed., *Fukuoka-ken zenshi* (Fukuoka: Yasukōchi Kusakichi, 1906), 321. On Yuchi, see Nakamura Kuji, *Yuchi Takeo. Genkō kinenhi Kameyama jōkōzō o tateta otoko* (Tokyo: Azusa Shoin, 2015; first published 1943 by Maki Shobō) and Ōta Kōki, ed., *Genkō eki no kaiko. Kinenhi kensetsu shiryō* (Tokyo: Kinseisha, 2009), section 9.
- 298 See Nakamura, *Yuchi Takeo*, 21–40.
- 299 *Ibid.*, 42, 207.
- 300 *Ibid.*, 227.
- 301 Full text in Furuta, *Fukuoka-ken zenshi*, 322–23, and Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, 11–13. Although this document, like the advertisement in fig. 6.32, does not explicitly claim that the statue would portray Lord Hōjō, the illustration shows a feudal warrior, not an imperial figure, and the accompanying texts describe the figure as “the leading warrior.”
- 302 Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, 11–13.
- 303 Most notably, Shizan Koji, Chūshū Koji, and Yuchi Takeo, *Genkō hankeki gokoku bidan* (Tokyo: Seikodō, 1891).
- 304 Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, 39.
- 305 *Ibid.*, 41.
- 306 On Sano, see *ibid.*, 118–20.
- 307 Ono, *Nichiren dōzō-shi*, 4, 60–61.
- 308 See, for example, Takayama, *Jidai kanken*, 219.
- 309 Ono, *Nichiren dōzō-shi*, 61.
- 310 *Ibid.*, 2–3.
- 311 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 312 Yamada Yoshio, *Nichiren dōzō-shi. Genkō kinen* (Fukuoka: Genkō Kinenkan, 1930), 13.
- 313 The organization known as the Statue of Saint Nichiren Hall for the Protection of the Country (Nichiren Shōnin Dōzō Gokoku Kaikan) in Fukuoka, as the memorial museum adjacent to the statue was known in the 1930s, was also active as a publisher of nationalist and *kokutai*-related material. This included, for example, Umada Gyōkei, *Jissen no genri toshite no Nichiren-shugi* (Fukuoka: Nichiren Shōnin Dōzō Gokoku Kaikan, 1936).
- 314 See, for example, Thomas D. Conlon, *In Little Need of Divine Intervention: Takezaki Suenaga’s Scrolls of the Mongol Invasions of Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001).
- 315 See the advertisement calling for donations, Nakamura, *Yuchi Takeo*, 76–79, also 86–87.
- 316 See Ono, *Nichiren dōzō-shi*, 64–77, for the process involved and the documents submitted to the Home Ministry by Sano for its approval of the Nichiren statue.
- 317 Nakamura, *Yuchi Takeo*, 106, and Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, 29.
- 318 *Ibid.*, 147–48.
- 319 *Ibid.*, 108–9, 119, 208; see pages 201–25 for a complete list of Yuchi’s lectures.
- 320 *Ibid.*, 148–49, which has a letter to an IJA officer expressing gratitude for the collection of donations.
- 321 On this project, see Kawazoe Shōji, *Mōko shūrai kenkyū shiron* (Tokyo: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1977), esp. chapter 2.
- 322 See Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, section 5 for details.
- 323 This material is now in the possession of the temple, Honbutsuji. For details, see Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, section 3.
- 324 See *ibid.*, section 7.
- 325 *Ibid.*, 288.
- 326 Furuta, *Fukuoka-ken zenshi*, 332, and Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, 34.
- 327 Furuta, *Fukuoka-ken zenshi*, 335–36, and Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, 34–35.
- 328 The first festivities to celebrate the start of work on the monument were held as early as 1891; see Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, 57–61.
- 329 Ōta, *Genkō eki no kaiko*, 287.
- 330 To date, only the famous “Great Buddhas” (*daibutsu*) of Nara (14.87 m) and Kamakura (11.44 m) surpass it in size.
- 331 Today known as Genkō Shiryōkan. See http://bunkazai.city.fukuoka.lg.jp/cultural_properties/detail/78. The museum is run by the Nichiren Shōnin Dōzō Goji Kyōkai (Association to Protect the Statue of Saint Nichiren).
- 332 Ono, *Nichiren dōzō-shi*, 63.
- 333 *Ibid.*, 3–5, 75, 116.
- 334 On the temple, today known as Tanjōji (Birth Temple), see <http://kominato.tanjoh-ji.jp/nichiren.html>.
- 335 Takayama, *Jidai kanken*. See also Anesaki Chōfū et al., eds., *Takayama Chogyū to Nichiren Shōnin* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1913).
- 336 *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 24, 1892, 1.
- 337 On the term “hero of the hometown,” see Ichinose Shun’ya, “Nichiro sengo—Taiheiyō sensō-ki ni okeru senshisha kenshō to chiiki. ‘Kyōdo no gunshin’ Ōgoshi Kenkichi rikugun hohei chūsa no jirei kara,” *Nihonshi kenkyū* 501 (2004): 149–75.
- 338 Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871–1918*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 4 (author’s emphasis).
- 339 See Gavan McCormack, “Ryukyū/Okinawa’s Trajectory—From Periphery to Centre, 1600–2015,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilmann (London and New York: Routledge, 2018).
- 340 For a photograph of the ceremony, see Hata Kurakichi, *Nantō yawa. Narahara danshaku jiseki* (Naha: Okinawa Jitsugyō Jihōsha, 1916), unpaginated.

- 341 On Jahana, see Eiji Oguma, *Okinawa 1818–1972: Inclusion and Exclusion*, vol. 1, *The Boundaries of “the Japanese,”* trans. Leonie R. Stickland (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2014), chapters 3 and 8.
- 342 Morioka Kiyomi, “Meiji ishinki ni okeru hanso o matsu-uru jinja no sōken,” *Shukutoku Daigaku Sōgō Fukushi Gakubu/Bulletin of the College of Integrated Human and Social Welfare Studies, Shukutoku University* 37 (2003): 126.
- 343 Takagi Hiroshi, “‘Kyōdo-ai’ to ‘aikokushin’ o tsunagu mono. Kindai ni okeru ‘hanso’ no kenshō,” *Rekishi hyōron* 659 (2005): 2–18, citation on page 9.
- 344 Ishikawa-ken, ed., *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō” shūri kōji hōkokusho* (Kanazawa: Ishikawa-ken Kenrokuen Kanri Jimusho, 1993), 1219.
- 345 *Ibid.*, 1224. Overall, only twenty-eight shrines were awarded this status until its abolition in 1945.
- 346 Ishikawa-ken, *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō,”* 1224–29.
- 347 Takagi, “‘Kyōdo-ai’ to ‘aikokushin’.” See also Takagi Hiroshi, *Kindai tennō-sei to koto* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 256.
- 348 Louise Young, *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2013), loc. 2837, 2911, 3729, Kindle.
- 349 A bust of the former daimyo of Tsuwano domain, Kamei Koremi, was set up in Shimane in 1890, but failed to gain national attention. Arai, *Ijin no omokage*. On this sculpture, see also Kinoshita, “Tono-sama no dōzō,” 91–122. On Kamei, see Kabe Iwao, *Odoroganaka Kamei Koremi-den* (Tokyo: Matsuno Shoten, 1982).
- 350 Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsakai, ed., *Yamaguchi shishi* (Yamaguchi: Matsuno Shoten, 1933), 152. The importance of the statues for the city of Yamaguchi and Kameyama Park is obvious from the fact that they are discussed in the official city history immediately following the section on the opening of the park and are described in great detail.
- 351 Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsakai, *Yamaguchi shishi*, 152.
- 352 Itō Hirobumi and Hayashi Tomoyuki, *Zō-jūichi-i Tadamasako narabi shihan shokō dōzō kensetsu shuisho* (unpublished document, 1891, author’s collection).
- 353 Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsakai, *Yamaguchi shishi*, 153.
- 354 *Ibid.*, 152, and Sakuma Hisakichi, ed., *Kameyama-en no ki* (Yamaguchi: Sakuma Hisakichi, 1927), 4.
- 355 For the prospectus of this statue, see Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsakai, *Yamaguchi shishi*, 153.
- 356 Sakuma, *Kameyama-en no ki*, 4; *Asahi shinbun*, June 20, 1902, 2; *Yomiuri shinbun*, July 22, 1906, 1; *Asahi shinbun*, 22 October 22, 1906, 2; and Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsakai, *Yamaguchi shishi*, 153–54.
- 357 Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsakai, *Yamaguchi shishi*, 153.
- 358 Anonymous, *Tadamasako go-dōzō konryū kitei* (unpublished document, 1891); Sakuma, *Kameyama-en no ki*, 4; and Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsakai, *Yamaguchi shishi*, 152.
- 359 Itō and Hayashi, *Zō-jūichi-i Tadamasako*, unpaginated.
- 360 *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 28, 1891, 2.
- 361 *Fūzoku gahō*, May 15, 1900, 4.
- 362 Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsakai, *Yamaguchi shishi*, 1933.
- 363 Yamagami Shōsuke, *Hirosaki shishi* (Hirosaki: Tsugaru Shobō, 1985), 90–92, and Hirosaki Shishi Hensan linkai, ed., *Hirosaki shishi* (Hirosaki: Hirosaki-shi, 1964), 391–94.
- 364 Yoshimura Kazuo, “Hirosaki kōen hyakunen yowa,” *Shishi Hirosaki* 5 (1995): 194–225.
- 365 Yoshimura, “Hirosaki kōen,” 206–7, and Hirosaki Shishi Hensan linkai, *Hirosaki shishi*, 395–96.
- 366 A wooden statue of Uesugi was erected in 1928 at the Uesugi Shrine built in the city of Yonezawa, Yamagata Prefecture, in 1871. It commemorated the 350th anniversary of Uesugi’s death. Arai, *Ijin no omokage*.
- 367 See, for example, the coverage of the statue of Yamanouchi Kazutoyo, the founder of Tosa domain in *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 5, 1913, 3. A rare example of extensive coverage in the local press is found in *Kōchi shinbun*, November 12, 1913, which has a special edition on the unveiling ceremony of the statue of Yamanouchi Kazutoyo, including an oversize photograph of the statue on the title page.
- 368 The statue of Nabeshima Naomasa, for example, was one of Saga City’s major tourist attractions in the pre-war period. See, for example, the guidebook by Kuhara Akie, *Saikin no Saga annai* (Tokyo: Ōtsubo Teishindō, 1915), 43.
- 369 On Nabeshima, see Sugitani Akira, *Nabeshima Kansō* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1992); Tanaka Shōsaku, *Bakumatsu no Nabeshima Saga-han 10-dai hanshu Naomasa to sono jidai* (Saga: Saga Shinbunsha, 2004); and Mōri Takehiko, *Bakumatsu ishin to Saga-han* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2008).
- 370 Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho, ed., *Kansō-kō go-dōzō jomakushiki gaikyō sono-ta hōkokusho* (Tokyo: Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho, 1914), 8; see also *Asahi shinbun*, November 24, 1910, 3.
- 371 See the photographs included in Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho, *Kansō-kō go-dōzō*, and *Asahi shinbun*, November 11, 1913, 2.
- 372 Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho, *Kansō-kō go-dōzō*, 2, and *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 8, 1903, 1.
- 373 Ōkuma Shigenobu, “Nabeshima Kansō-kō no kaiko,” *Gakusei* 3, no. 10 (1912): 8–16.
- 374 Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho, *Kansō-kō go-dōzō*, 4.
- 375 *Ibid.*, 6.
- 376 *Ibid.*, 7.

- 377 Kagoshima-shi, ed., *Kagoshima shishi* (Kagoshima: Kagoshima-shi, 1924), 109.
- 378 *Ibid.*, 110; see also *Yomiuri shinbun*, November 24, 1917, 5.
- 379 Kagoshima-shi, *Kagoshima shishi*, 111.
- Chapter 7**
- 1 See the brochure of the company, Anonymous, *Rittai shashinzō* (Tokyo: Ginza Shiseidō Rittai Shashinzōbu, 1927). See also Morioka Isao, “Rittai shashinzō,” in *Saishin shashin Kagaku taikei*, ed. Nakamura Dōtarō, vol. 9 (Tokyo: Seibundō Shinkōsha, 1936), 1–19, including a detailed description of the technology used (every article in this volume begins at page 1; this is the third article). See also the Rittai company website, <http://www.rittai.co.jp/annai.html>.
 - 2 *Asahi shinbun*, March 27, 2015.
 - 3 Morioka, “Rittai shashinzō,” 17.
 - 4 *Ibid.*, 1.
 - 5 “Rittai shashin no hatsumei,” *Asahi shinbun*, August 27, 1927; “Rittai no zōkei o shashin de utsusu hatsumei,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 27, 1927; and “Rittai shashin to Takamatsu-no-miya,” *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun*, March 3, 1928.
 - 6 *The Japan Times & Mail*, February 27, 1932, 1.
 - 7 Yamamuro Kentoku, *Gunshin* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2007), 195.
 - 8 After studying medicine in Japan and Germany, Kanasugi was elected a member of the Lower House in 1917 and the emperor appointed him a member of the House of Peers in 1922. Kanasugi’s works on Japanese history constitute a narrative regarding a special Japanese version of loyalty, which also inspired his engagement for the monument dedicated to the “Three Brave Human Bullets.” Among his most relevant writings in this context are Kanasugi Eigorō, *Akō-jiken no kentō* (Tokyo: Nihon Seiji Shūhōsha, 1934) and Kanasugi Eigorō, *Sanryō no fukko to seichū* (Tokyo: Nihon Iji Shūhōsha, 1926). He was also an admirer of Kusunoki Masashige, the daimyo Tokugawa Mitsukuni, and *koku-gaku* scholar Fujita Tōko. See Kanasugi Eigorō, *Kyokutō yoin* (Tokyo: Kanasugi Hakushi Shōkōkai, 1935), 57–116.
 - 9 See Furukawa Seisuke, ed., *Nikudan san’yūshi dōzō kensetsukai hōkoku* (Tokyo: Nikudan San’yūshi Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1936), 6–8 for details.
 - 10 Kanasugi, *Kyokutō yoin*, 126–27, and Furukawa, *Nikudan san’yūshi dōzō kensetsukai*, 21–22. These three points also formed the basis of the inscription on the monument’s pedestal.
 - 11 Kanasugi, *Kyokutō yoin*, 126.
 - 12 Furukawa, *Nikudan san’yūshi dōzō kensetsukai*, 17.
 - 13 In one of his speeches, Kanasugi reveals that he was motivated by extreme anti-Chinese sentiment. He laments that China had “lost its way” after being involved in civil strife for several decades and had fallen back into an era of barbarism, becoming an “evil and rotten country.” See Kanasugi, *Kyokutō yoin*, 119–21.
 - 14 Ueno Takuji et al., eds., *Katō-gensui dōzō kensetsukai hōkokusho* (Hiroshima: Chūgoku Shinbunsha, 1937).
 - 15 Furukawa, *Nikudan san’yūshi dōzō kensetsukai*, 10.
 - 16 Kanasugi, *Kyokutō yoin*, 117–34.
 - 17 Furukawa, *Nikudan san’yūshi dōzō kensetsukai*, 25–26.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, 30.
 - 19 *Ibid.*, 33.
 - 20 *Koralle: Wochenschrift für Unterhaltung, Wissen, Lebensfreude*, N. F. 4 (1936), 300.
 - 21 Toyama-ken Joshi Shihan Gakkō Fuzoku Shōgakkō, ed., *Shūshin kyōdo no reiwa* (Toyama: Toyama-ken Joshi Shihan Gakkō Fuzoku Shōgakkō, 1933), 5–9.
 - 22 See, for example, the instructions from the Army Ministry dated March 1938, “Dō shōhi setsuyaku ni kansuru ken,” Bōei-shō Bōei Kenkyūjo, Rikugunshō Dainikki, Dainikki Otsu-shū, Dainikki Ko-shū 1938, JACAR reference code C01001667300.
 - 23 Yōda Minoru and Jōzuka Taketoshi, eds., *Takaoka dōki shi* (Takaoka: Takaoka Dōki Kyōdō Kumiai, 1988), 638.
 - 24 Reita Hirase, “War and Bronze Sculpture,” in *Art and War in Japan and its Empire 1931–1960*, ed. Asato Ikeda et al., *Japanese Visual Culture 5* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 228–39, and Yōda and Jōzuka, *Takaoka dōki shi*, 644–46.
 - 25 Inoue Shōichi, *Nostarujikku aidoru Ninomiya Kinjirō* (Tokyo: Shinjuku Shobō, 1989), 92–93.
 - 26 *Shashin shūhō*, no. 115 (May 8, 1940): 6–7.
 - 27 *Asahi shinbun*, May 23, 1943, 2. Examples of Kiyoda’s works are included in a “Pictorial of Cement Sculpture” published in 1942. See Nakajima Satoshi, ed., *Semento chōso shashin shū* (Osaka: Borutorando Semento Dōgyōkai, 1942).
 - 28 Harada Keiichi, *Heishi wa doko e itta. Gun’yō bochi to kokumin kokka* (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2013), chapter 7. The origins of this practice date to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95; see Hiyama Yukio, ed., *Kindai Nihon no keisei to Nisshin sensō* (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 2001).
 - 29 After the war, the head priest of the temple succeeded in preventing the statues from being destroyed by the Occupation authorities. In November 1995, the entire group was relocated to the Tendai temple, Nakanoin, in a remote location in Minami Chita in the south of Aichi prefecture, where they remain today. Information taken from the marker next to the sculptures at Nakanoin in August 2008.
 - 30 In addition to these, sculptors were able to cast statues for educational purposes and not intended for public display. Asakura Fumio, for example, created a statue of Umashimade in 1944; see Taitō Kuritsu Asakura Chōsokan, ed., *Asakura Chōsokan* (Tokyo: Taitō-ku Geijutsu Bunka Zaidan, 2014), 59.
 - 31 *Asahi shinbun*, December 6, 1940, 7.

- 32 *Asahi shinbun*, May 26, 1941, 3. On Takahashi, see Richard Smethurst, *From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan's Keynes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
- 33 *Asahi shinbun*, February 26, 1939, 2.
- 34 On the statues on the Hongō campus of the University of Tokyo, see <http://rekigun.net/original/travel/statue/statue-08.html> and the special issue of the Tokyo University journal *Gakunai kōhō* on “Hongō Kyanpasu. Aki no dōzō meguri gaido,” *Gakunai kōhō* no. 1345 (October 25, 2006).
- 35 See <http://www.city.minato.tokyo.jp/shisetsu/koen/akasaka/04.html> (Takahashi); Saitō Makoto Kinenkan, ed., *Saitō Makoto kinenkan no ayumi* (Misuzawa: Saitō Makoto Kinenkan, 1984), 13. The Hirata statue was located in Kudan near Yasukuni Shrine until 1996, when it was moved to make way for the construction of a war memorial, the Shōwa-kan and relocated on the grounds of the educational section of the Consumer Cooperation JA in Machida (see Kaneko Haruo, *Nihon no dōzō*. Tokyo: Tankōsha, 2012, 156). This site was chosen because Hirata is considered one of the fathers of the modern co-op system and was Minister of Agriculture and Commerce when the 1900 Industry Association Act (a law defining the role of co-ops) was promulgated. On the construction of the statue, which was promoted by the Sangyō Kumiai Chūōkai (Central Union of Co-operative Societies), see Yasukuni Jinja, ed., *Yasukuni Jinja hyakunen shi*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yasukuni Jinja, 1983), 480–83.
- 36 On Wake no Kiyomaro, see Hermann Bohner, “Wake-no-Kiyomaro-den,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 3, no. 1 (1940): 240–73.
- 37 *Nichi-nichi shinbun*, January 4, 1874, cited in Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Dōzō no jidai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014), 19, and *Yomiuri shinbun*, July 10, 1878, 2.
- 38 Okada Yoneo, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” in *Meiji ishin Shintō hyakunen shi*, vol. 2, ed. Shintō Bunkakai (Tokyo: Shintō Bunkakai, 1967), 87–88.
- 39 On the 2600th anniversary festivities, see Furukawa Takahisa, *Kōki, banpaku, orinpikku* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1998) and Kenneth Ruoff, *Imperial Japan at its Zenith* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). In addition to the commissioning of Jinmu statues, the most notable project to celebrate the 2600th anniversary of the foundation of the Empire was the Hakkō Ichiu Tower in Miyazaki Prefecture. On this monument, see Walter Edwards, “Forging Tradition for a Holy War: The Hakkō Ichiu Tower in Miyazaki and Japanese Wartime Ideology,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 289–324.
- 40 According to historian Kuroita Katsumi (1874–1946), the basis of *kokutai* was “direct imperial rule” and the “eternally unbroken line of the imperial house, going back to the age of the gods.” For Kuroita and others, this was what made Japan a unique country: “Our country alone is the imperial nation (*kōkoku*). Since its founding, the position of ruler and subjects have been settled. The sovereign governs our country in a line unbroken for ages eternal, coeval with Heaven and Earth. In this is manifested our national essence, which has no parallel in other countries.” Kuroita Katsumi in *Kokutai Shinron* (New Thesis on the Kokutai), cited in John S. Brownlee, *Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945* (Vancouver and Tokyo: UBC Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1997), 150.
- 41 Wake no Kiyomaro-kō Dōzō Kensetsu linkai, *Wake no Kiyomaro-kō dōzō kensetsu shi* (Tokyo: Wake no Kiyomaro-kō Dōzō Kensetsu linkai, 1940), 1.
- 42 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 8–9.
- 44 For a list of the high-ranking guests, see *ibid.*, 16–17.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 26.
- 46 *Shashin shūhō*, no. 100 (January 24, 1941).
- 47 Ogyū Tensen and Yatsunami Norikichi, *Wake no Kiyomaro*, vol. 181, Kōdansha no ehon (Tokyo: Dai Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, 1941).
- 48 See, for example, “Hirose-chūsa no dōzō seisō,” *Asahi shinbun*, March 28, 1932, 3; *Asahi shinbun*, October 31, 1941, evening edition, 2 (Kagoshima youth cleaning the Saigō statue in Tokyo); *Asahi shinbun*, April 26, 1942, 2 (members of the Dai-Nanshū Association cleaning the Saigō statue in Tokyo); and *Asahi shinbun*, May 26, 1943, 2 (cadets cleaning the Kusunoki statue in Tokyo); and *Yomiuri shinbun*, May 26, 1943, 2 (ditto).
- 49 Cited in Motoyasu Hiroshi, *Gunto no irei kūkan: kokumin tōgō to senshishatachi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002), 177.
- 50 Sasaki Chiyuki, *Dōzō monogatari* (Tokyo: Jidaisha, 1941).
- 51 Despite the direct connection of the two events, the 1936 festivities are not mentioned in a study of the 1940 anniversary and its impact (Ruoff, *Imperial Japan*). Mori Masato’s recent publications are highly instructive. See Mori Masato, “Kokka no ideorogii sōchi to kokumin-teki ijin,” *Jinbun ronsō* 24 (2007): 165–77; Mori Masato, “1935 nen no Kusunoki Masashige o meguru ikutsuka no dekgoto,” *Jinbun ronsō* 25 (2008): 115–28; and Mori Masato, “1930 nendai ni hakken sareru Kusunoki-teki naru mono,” *Jinbun ronsō* 26 (2009): 147–59.
- 52 Mori, “1930 nendai,” 148. Several famous theaters also staged kabuki plays celebrating Kusunoki, only a month after the first movie had opened in the cinema. *Ibid.*
- 53 H. Paul Varley, *Imperial Restoration in Medieval Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 186, and Murata Masashi, *Nanbokuchō ron. Shijitsu to shisō* (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1959), 252–54 (with the foundational aims of the former society).
- 54 Mori, “1930 nendai.”

- 55 See the primary sources in the collection of Nomura Kōgei Corp., accessible online at http://www.nomurakougei.co.jp/expo/exposition/detail?e_code=968.
- 56 According to the legend, Kusunoki was decapitated after suffering defeat and his head was sent to this temple by Ashikaga Takauji.
- 57 See the temple's website at <http://www.kanshinji.com/images/kanshinji-english1.pdf>.
- 58 Mori, "1930 nendai," 150–51.
- 59 Seki Yasunosuke, *Dai-Nankō roppyakunen taisai shashinchō* (Kobe: Dai-Nankō Ropyyakunen Taisai Hōsankai, 1935). See also Sone Kenzō, *Dai-Nankō roppyakunen sai kinen roku* (Tokyo: Dai-Nankō Ropyyakunen Taisai Hōsankai, 1935).
- 60 *Rekishi shashin*, no. 266 (July 1935), unpaginated.
- 61 See Mori, "1930 nendai," 152.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 147.
- 63 Kondō Yasuichirō, ed., *Nankō seishin to gendai Nihon* (Kobe: Hyōgo Kenritsu Daisan Kōbe Chūgakkō Kōyūkai, 1935) 1.
- 64 See Wada Tsunehiko, ed., *Dai-Nankō. Dai-Nankō 60nen-sai dōzō kensetsu jomakushiki kinen* (Kobe: Kōbe Shinbun Hakkōsho, 1935).
- 65 *Ibid.*, 1.
- 66 *Ibid.*
- 67 *Ibid.*, 5.
- 68 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 69 *Ibid.*, 11–12.
- 70 *Asahi shinbun*, December 9, 1943, 2.
- 71 See <http://www.tobunken.go.jp/materials/nenshi/5329.html>.
- 72 Ami-machi, ed., *Zoku, ami to Yokaren* (Ami: Ami-machi, 2010), 105.
- 73 Ami-machi, ed., *Kaigun kōkūtai monogatari* (Ami: Ami-machi, 2014), 208.
- 74 *Ibid.* See also the park's website at <http://nagaoka.rgr.jp/meisyo/isorokukouen/index.html> and the marker standing in the park.
- 75 Ami-machi, *Zoku, ami to Yokaren*, 105–6, and Ami-machi, *Kaigun kōkūtai monogatari*, 208–9.
- 76 See http://www.mod.go.jp/gsd/f/ord_sch/02_history/h_yoka.html and <http://yokaren.jp/gallery/yusyokan/02.html>.
- 77 On this incident, see Hirase Reita, *Dōzō junan no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011), 103–19; Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Tōkyo no dōzō o aruku* (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2011), 17–19; and Hirase Reita, "Minshū ga shichū hikimawashi, nochi ni saiken 'Itō Hirobumi-zō,'" *Nihon keizai shinbun*, December 13, 2013.
- 78 "Riots Spread to Kobe; Ito Statue Torn Down," *The New York Times*, September 9, 1905, 1–2.
- 79 Hirase, *Dōzō junan no kindai*, 109–11.
- 80 The statue was destroyed during the war; only the pedestal remains today. See <http://www.hankyu.co.jp/eki-blo/hiro/21209>.
- 81 Kirrily Freeman, *Bronze to Bullets. Vichy and the Destruction of French Public Statuary, 1941–1944* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 11.
- 82 See Sekiyu Ten'nen Gasu—Kinzoku Kōbutsu Shigen Kikō, *Dō bijinesu no rekishi* (Tokyo: Sekiyu Ten'nen Gasu – Kinzoku Kōbutsu Shigen Kikō, 2006), chapter 2, esp. 60, and Kinzoku Shigen Kaihatsu Chōsa Kikaku Gurūpu, "Waga-kuni no dō no jukyū jōkyō no rekishi to hen'yō," *Kinzoku shigen repōto* 9 (2005): 131.
- 83 Freeman, *Bronze to Bullets*, 13.
- 84 Sekiyu Ten'nen Gasu—Kinzoku Kōbutsu Shigen Kikō, *Dō bijinesu no rekishi*, 60–63, and Kinzoku Shigen Kaihatsu Chōsa Kikaku Gurūpu, "Waga-kuni no dō," 131.
- 85 See Ryohei Nakagawa, "Japan-U.S. Trade and Rethinking the Point of No Return toward the Pearl Harbor," *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies* 9 (2010): 101–23.
- 86 Inoue, *Nostarujiikka aidoru*, 86–95.
- 87 Freeman, *Bronze to Bullets*, 172.
- 88 The first term, *kōshitsu*, denotes only the emperor's family, but the term *kōzoku* includes imperial branch families, the *miyake*. "Royal family" refers to the families of the former rulers of the Kingdoms of Ryūkyū and Korea, both members of Japan's aristocracy with special rank. No statue associated with "royal families" was included in the list eventually compiled. "Statues of deities" refer exclusively to Shinto deities.
- 89 Japan's colonies in Taiwan, Southern Sakhalin, Korea, and parts of China.
- 90 Naikaku Kanbō, ed., *Naikaku seido kyūjū-nen shiryō shū* (Tokyo: Ōkura-shō Insatsukyoku, 1976), 996–97.
- 91 See, for example, Kitayama Jun'yū, *Heroisches Ethos* (Berlin: Walter Gruyter, 1944), 28–33; 59.
- 92 On the symbolism of the cherry blossom within the framework of kamikaze propaganda, see Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, *Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 112, 164, and M. G. Sheftall, *Blossoms in the Wind. Human Legacies of the Kamikaze* (New York: NAL Caliber), 185–86, 422.
- 93 "Kinzokurui hijō kaishū daiichiji keikaku ni kansuru ken," Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), Gyōsei bunsho, Kaikei Kansa-in, Shōwa 22/5/2 izen, Chūō shigen kaishū kyōgikai kanjikai (March 11, 1943), reference number kaikei00062100.
- 94 "Shōwa jūhachinen-do kinzoku-ruī hijō kaishū sokushin ni kansuru ken," Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), Gyōsei bunsho, Naikaku/Sōrifu, Dajōkan/Naikaku kankei, Dai-ichirui: kōbun zassan, September 13, 1943, reference number sano2836100.
- 95 Hoshino began his career as a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance and was appointed the deputy minister of

- industrial development in 1932. After the foundation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in the same year, he became a finance bureaucrat there and eventually Manchukuo's deputy minister of financial affairs. He was also responsible for the state control of narcotics in Manchukuo, creating and heading the State Opium Monopoly Bureau. Through its control of the narcotics market, Japan generated large profits in parts of its colonial empire. As a result of Hoshino's policies, by 1935 Japan had become the world's largest narcotics producer. See John Jennings, *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895–1945* (Westport: Praeger, 1997). Although sentenced to life imprisonment as a Class A war criminal by the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, Hoshino was released in 1958, becoming vice-president of the Tokyo Hilton Hotels Co. and later chairman of Tokyu Corporation and president of publisher Diamond Co.
- 96 “Shōwa jūhachinen kinzoku-rui hijō kaishū jishshi ni kansuru ken,” Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), Gyōsei bunsho, Naikaku/Sōrifu, Dajōkan/Naikaku kankei, Daiichi-rui kōbun zassan, June 12, 1943, reference number sano2922100.
- 97 “Dōzō-tō no hijō kaishū no jishshi ni kansuru ken” (December 10, 1943), in Naikaku Kanbō, *Naikaku seido kyūjūnen*, 996–97.
- 98 “Dōzō-tō no hijō kaishū jishshi ni kansuru ken o sadamu” (6 November 6, 1943), Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), Naikaku, Kōbun ruisan, Shōwa 1–20, JACAR reference number A03010140100.
- 99 The list includes an especially large number of religious statues from the prefectures of Yamagata, Fukushima, Niigata, Toyama, Nagano, Mie, Osaka, Hyōgo, Okayama, and Fukuoka.
- 100 *Asahi shinbun*, March 21, 1943, 4.
- 101 Freeman, *Bronze to Bullets*, 99–100.
- 102 Ikeda Nagama, ed., *Itagaki Taisuke-sensei dōzō kyūshutsu roku* (Kōchi: Kōchi Itagakikai, 1943), 3–5.
- 103 *Ibid.*, introduction (unpaginated).
- 104 *Ibid.*
- 105 Ikeda, *Itagaki Taisuke-sensei dōzō*, 1.
- 106 Shinpen Hirosaki-shi Hensan linkai, ed., *Shinpen Hirosaki shishi. Tsūshi-hen 5* (Hirosaki: Hirosaki-shi Kikaku-bu Kikaku-ka, 2005), 59.
- 107 Shinpen Hirosaki-shi Hensan linkai, *Shinpen Hirosaki shishi. Tsūshi-hen 5*, 60–61.
- 108 Hirosaki Shishi Hensan linkai, *Hirosaki shishi* (Hirosaki: Hirosaki-shi, 1964), 602–3; Shinpen Hirosaki-shi Hensan linkai, *Shinpen Hirosaki shishi. Tsūshi-hen 5*, 59–62. On the history of the Kosaka copper mine, see Patricia Sippel, “Technology and Change in Japan's Modern Copper Mining Industry,” in Janet Hunter and Cornelia Storz, *Institutional and Technological Change in Japan's Economy: Past and Present* (London: Routledge, 2006) and The Bureau of Mines, *Mining in Japan. Past and Present* (Tokyo: Eibun Tsūshinsha, 1909), 172–78.
- 109 “Senretsu e tsuzuku dōzō,” *Asahi shinbun*, May 14, 1944, 3.
- 110 *Yomiuri shinbun*, June 10, 1946, 2.

Chapter 8

- 1 In addition to statues, Shinto shrines were also built in the colonies as well as war memorials, particularly on the battlefields of Manchuria. According to Helen Hardacre, around 1,640 shrines were built in Japan's colonies and occupied territories (Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, Southern Sakhalin, Micronesia, Singapore, Batavia, Thailand, and China). Helen Hardacre, *Shinto. A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 431. See also Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State, 1868–1988* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 95–96; Okada Yoneo, “Jingū jinja sōken shi,” in *Meiji ishin Shintō hyakunen shi*, vol. 2, ed. Shintō Bunkakai (Tokyo: Shintō Bunkakai, 1967), 162–79; and Nitta Mitsuko, *Dairen Jinja shi* (Tokyo: Oūfū, 1997), chapters 1.3 and 3.3. On war memorials in Manchuria, see Yokoyama Atsuo, “‘Manshū’ ni taterareta chūreitō,” *Higashi Ajia kenkyū* (2007): 48. Awazu Kenta estimates that there were at least 177 memorial stones to the dead of the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria by 1940. See Awazu Kenta, “Kindai Nihon ni okeru senbotsusha kinen shisetsu to bunka nashonarizumu. Dai-Nihon Chūrei Kenshōkai o chūshin ni,” *Sociologica* 27 (2003): 2–20.
- 2 Apparently only a single statue was erected in Micronesia, the 1934 monument dedicated to businessman Matsue Haruji (1876–1954), also known as the “Sugar King,” located in Sugar King Park. It is one of few colonial statues that survived the war; it still stands in its original location. See <http://on-walkabout.net/2016/02/21/places-in-saipan-sugar-king-park> and Akiko Mori, “A History of the Excluded. Rethinking the Sugar Industry in the Northern Mariana Islands under Japanese Rule,” *Historische Anthropologie* 27, no. 3 (2019): 410–34.
- 3 For a more detailed analysis, which also includes a list of statues built in Japan's colonial territories, see Sven Saaler, “Personenkult im Modernen Japan: Denkmäler für die Gründer des japanischen Kolonialreiches in Taiwan, Korea und der Mandschurei,” in *Referate des 13. Deutschsprachigen Japanologentages, Bd. II*, ed. Günter Distelrath (Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2009), 296–323.
- 4 On the history of urban planning in Taipei, see Joseph R. Allen, “Taipei Park: Signs of Occupation,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 66, no. 1 (2007): 159–99.
- 5 See *ibid.*
- 6 See https://en.ntm.gov.tw/content_172.html.
- 7 Todd A. Henry, *Assimilating Seoul. Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945*

- (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2014). The author mentions a number of important postwar statues in Seoul, including a 1959 statue of resistance fighter An Jung-geun (1879–1910), a 1955 statue of South Korea’s first president Rhee Syngman (1875–1965), destroyed after his resignation in 1960, and a 1967 statue of Admiral Yi Sun-sin (1545–98).
- 8 Juljan Biontino, “Seoul’s Namsan under Japanese Influence—Japanese Ritual Life and Assimilation Policy in Korea, 1890–1945,” presentation given at the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ), Tokyo, May 25, 2017.
 - 9 Its official English title is “Prince Itō Memorial Temple.” On the Hakubun Temple, see Mizuno Naoki, “Shokuminchi-ki Chōsen ni okeru Itō Hirobumi no kioku. Keijō no Hakubunji o chūshin ni,” in *Itō Hirobumi to Kankoku tōchi*, ed. Itō Yukio (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 2009) and Mizuno Naoki, “‘Hakubun-ji no wakaigeki’ to gojitsudan,” *Jinbun gaku* 101 (2011): 81–101.
 - 10 See Nakane Kandō, *Chōman kenbunkai* (Tokyo: Chūō Bukkyōsha, 1936), 25–26; on Itō Chūta’s architectural work, see Itō-hakushi Sakuhinshū Kankōkai, ed., *Itō Chūta kenchiku sakuhin* (Tokyo: Jōnan Shoin, 1941).
 - 11 See Mizuno, “Shokuminchi-ki Chōsen,” 282.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, 276–77.
 - 13 The sculptor of the Komura memorial was Asakura Fumio and the original gypsum cast, which was also exhibited at the 11th National Sculpture Exhibition in 1938, is today held by the Asakura Museum of Sculpture in Tokyo. A plastic (FRP) copy made from the original cast is on display in the museum. See <http://www.tai-tocity.net/zaidan/asakura/exhibitions/collection>.
 - 14 The sculptor of this monument, Kitamura Seibō, also sold an unknown number of smaller statuettes of the same design as the Xinjing monument to private collectors. One copy of these statuettes was offered on Yahoo Auctions (Japan) in summer 2018, <https://page.auctions.yahoo.co.jp/jp/auction/l389017304>.
 - 15 According to a contemporaneous testimony, the statue was destroyed in 1945. See Satō Yūji, *Asa ga kite shiru horyo no inochi* (Tokyo: Bungeisha, 2002).
 - 16 Appendix to a letter from Embassy Secretary Moriya Kazurō of the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo to Deputy Foreign Minister Horiuchi Kensuke, dated June 29, 1936. Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan I.1.7.0.005.
 - 17 *Ibid.*
 - 18 Letter from Kuwajima, Director of the East Asia Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Moriya Kazurō, secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo, dated August 19, 1936. Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan I.1.7.0.005.
 - 19 Anonymous, *Ko Gotō-haku dōzō kensetsu hōkokusho* (Tokyo, 1931), 26.
 - 20 *Ibid.*, appendix.
 - 21 See Marius Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).
 - 22 Hirase Reita, *Dōzō junan no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011), 206–7.
 - 23 “Honkon no eitei dōzō tekkyō,” *Asahi shinbun*, March 13, 1942, 1.
 - 24 Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan I.1.11.0.001.
 - 25 *Ibid.*
 - 26 There is today a statue of Zhang Zuolin’s son, Zhang Xueliang, in Shenyang. See <http://iheartchina.com/location/Birthplace-and-Memorial-Hall-of-Zhang-Xueliang>.
 - 27 *Asahi shinbun*, March 15, 1943, 3.
 - 28 See the photograph headed “Ninomiya-san Jakaruta e,” *Shashin shūhō*, no. 279 (July 7, 1943): 8.
 - 29 Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan I.1.7.0.006.
 - 30 *Ibid.*
 - 31 *Ibid.*
 - 32 According to Japanese observers, the monument to the war dead (*chūreitō*) in the Central Park of Dairen was still in place in late December 1945. See Takamori Mitsuno, *Soren senryō-ka no Dairen* (Tokyo: Daitōa-juku Shuppanbu, 1974), 142. Contemporary accounts do not mention the fate of the Japanese statues in the city.
 - 33 *Gotō shinpei kenshō* no. 4 (June 2004) and *Tankō nichinichi shinbun*, March 5, 2004, 1.
 - 34 *Tankō nichinichi shinbun*, February 27, 2004, 1.
 - 35 *Gotō shinpei kenshō* no. 6 (June 2005).
 - 36 On Hatta’s career, see Furukawa Shōzō, *Taiwan o aishita Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Sōfūsha Shuppan, 2009) and Saitō Michinori, *Nichitai no kakehashi. Hyakumen damu o tsukutta otoko* (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshin Shuppanyoku, 2009).
 - 37 Steven Crook, “A Park Honoring a Japanese Engineer,” *Taiwan Business Topics* (2011), <http://crooksteven.blogspot.jp/2011/04/park-honoring-japanese-engineer-taiwan.html>.
 - 38 Around the same time, a Taiwanese animated movie about Hatta became a big hit. The movie was co-produced by the daily *Hokkoku shinbun* from Kanazawa, Hatta’s hometown; see *Japan Times*, November 19, 2009.
 - 39 See *Mainichi shinbun*, May 8, 2011; accessible online at <http://web.archive.org/web/20110510024549/mainichi.jp/select/world/news/20110509k0000m030086000c.html> and *Japan Times*, May 10, 2011.
 - 40 It was later revealed that it was a former Taipei City councilor, Lee Cheng-lung of the China Unification Promotion Party, who had vandalized the Hatta statue by beheading it. See *Japan Times*, April 21, 2017.

Chapter 9

- 1 On educational reforms, for example, see Hans-Martin Krämer, *Neubeginn unter US-amerikanischer Besatzung? Hochschulreform in Japan zwischen Kontinuität und Diskontinuität, 1919–1952* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006).

- 2 Peter Duus, *Modern Japan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 254.
- 3 General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan—Introduction* (General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1951), 37.
- 4 Cited in Carol Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” in *Post-war Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1993), 68.
- 5 *Asahi shinbun*, September 5, 1945, 1. I would like to thank Koseki Shōichi for pointing this article out to me, which probably contains the first mention of the term “peace state” (*heiwa kokka*).
- 6 The full text is accessible on the Ministry of Education website at http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/others/detail/1317991.htm; English version at http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/others/detail/1317416.htm. See also Eiji Takemae, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York and London: Continuum, 2002), 350.
- 7 Cited in Marius Jansen, “Education, Values and Politics in Japan,” *Foreign Affairs* 7 (1957). This law was revised in 2006.
- 8 The latter was the task of the Civil Censorship Detachment within the CIE; see John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York and London: W. W. Norton New Press, 1999), chapter 14. In a parallel with re-education measures in Germany, GHQ and CIE also engaged in war-guilt campaigns in Japan; see *ibid.* On the CIE in general, see Takemae, *The Allied Occupation*, 167–68, 180–88, 350–51.
- 9 See *ibid.*, 351.
- 10 Christian Galan, “The New Image of Childhood in Japan During the Years 1945–49 and the Construction of a Japanese Collective Memory,” in *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, ed. Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), 189–203, quote on page 190. On the development of history teaching during the occupation period, see General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan*, vol. XI, *Social, Part A: Education* (General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1951), paragraph 94. See also Takemae, *The Allied Occupation*, 361–62.
- 11 Takemae, *The Allied Occupation*, 351, and Harry Wray, “The Fall of Moral Education and the Rise and Decline of Civics Education and Social Studies in Occupied and Independent Japan,” *Japan Forum* 12, no. 1 (2000): 15–41.
- 12 Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” 17; see also Mark Ravina, “The Yen—Japan’s National Currency,” in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (London and New York: Routledge, 2018).
- 13 General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan*, vol. XI, *Social, Part A: Education*. (General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1951), 2, 6.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 6–7. The report states that state Shinto needs “to be suppressed to prevent its perversion again for militaristic and ultranationalistic purposes.” See also Shimazono Susumu, *Kokka Shintō to Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 74–83, and Takemae, *The Allied Occupation*, 371–77.
- 15 *Yomiuri shinbun*, June 10, 1946.
- 16 *Ibid.*
- 17 GHQ/SCAP, Records, RG 331, National Archives and Records Service, box no. 5897, “War Monument Study No. 1,” September 1946. The social scientists responsible for this study were affiliated with the “Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division, Civil Information and Education Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (Japan Occupation), Tokyo.”
- 18 GHQ/SCAP, Records, RG 331, National Archives and Records Service, box no. 5897, “War Monument Study. Interviews I,” September 1946, unpaginated (interview no. 1 by Hiroshi Tanabe).
- 19 GHQ/SCAP Records, RG 331, National Archives and Records Service, box no. 5897, “War Monument Study No. 1,” September 1946, 2–4.
- 20 GHQ/SCAP Records, RG 331, National Archives and Records Service, box no. 5897, “War Monument Study No. 2,” September 1946.
- 21 GHQ/SCAP, Records, RG 331, National Archives and Records Service, box no. 5897, “War Monument Study No. 2,” September 1946, 2.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 7.
- 23 GHQ/SCAP, Records, RG 331, National Archives and Records Service, box no. 5897, “War Monument Study No. 3,” September 1946.
- 24 See Sven Saaler, *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion. The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society* (Munich: Iudicium, 2005).
- 25 GHQ/SCAP, Records, RG 331, National Archives and Records Service, box no. 5897, “War Monument Study No. 3,” September 1946, 3.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 27 GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(C) 6789, International News Service (Howard Handleman), “Removal of Militaristic Monuments,” March 5, 1947.
- 28 GHQ/SCAP, Records, RG 331, National Archives and Records Service, box no. 5897, “War Monument Study No. 3,” September 1946, 5.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 6.

- 30 William P. Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952 and Japanese Religions* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 153.
- 31 GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(A) 675, Religions Division (William C. Kerr), “Statues of Ninomiya Sontoku in Schools,” September 6, 1946.
- 32 See “Japan Will Retain Old War Statues,” *The New York Times*, January 26, 1947, 36.
- 33 Ibid., 36.
- 34 Tama-shi Kyōiku linkai, ed., *Watanabe Osao* (Tama: Tama-shi Kyōiku linkai, 2000), 6.
- 35 Woodard, *The Allied Occupation*, 148, and Harada Keiichi, *Heishi wa doko e itta. Gun’yō bochi to kokumin kokka* (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2013), 166–67.
- 36 General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan*, vol. XI, Social, Part A: Education (General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1951), 18.
- 37 Ibid. See also Michael Lucken, “Remodelling Public Space: The Fate of War Monuments, 1945–48,” in *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, ed. Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), 135–54.
- 38 Hirase Reita, *Dōzō junan no kindai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011), 266.
- 39 *Asahi shinbun*, May 6, 1947. The Hirose statue was demolished only two months later. See *Asahi shinbun*, July 23, 1947. The official history of Chiyoda Ward lists sixteen monuments located in this central district that were discussed by the committee; six of these were demolished. See Tōkyō-to Chiyoda-ku, *Shinpen Chiyoda kushi. Tsūshi-hen* (Tokyo: Tōkyō-to Chiyoda-ku, 1998), 1053–54. According to this source, the bust of Admiral Tōgō was not ultimately destroyed but removed from its pedestal and returned to his descendants. Ibid., 1054.
- 40 Hirase, *Dōzō junan no kindai*, 269.
- 41 Tōkyō-to Chiyoda-ku, *Shinpen Chiyoda kushi*, 1054.
- 42 For a recent assessment of Yamagata’s historical role, see Shimizu Yūichirō, “Yamagata Aritomo,” in *Meiji-shi kōgi*, ed. Tsutsui Kiyotada (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2018), 199–216.
- 43 GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(C) 339, Religions Division (Kennichi Toh), “Removal of Militaristic Monuments and Statues,” April 23, 1947.
- 44 GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(C) 338, Religions Division (Kennichi Toh), “Statue of Prince Yamagata,” April 24, 1947.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(C) 364, Religions Division (Katayama), “Removal of Monuments,” July 24, 1947.
- 47 GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(C) 397, Religions Division (Frank Emery), “Militaristic Monuments and Statues,” November 6, 1947.
- 48 GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(C) 371, General Affairs Section (Seichi Kato), “Removal of Monuments,” August 7, 1947.
- 49 The official English designation is Inokashira Nature and Culture Park and skips the word “sculpture.”
- 50 *Mainichi shinbun*, Yamaguchi edition, June 9, 1992; information provided to the author by the administrators of *Inokashira Shizen Bunka-en—Chōkoku-en*, June 6, 2018.
- 51 Yoneyama Yasuhiko, “Nihon no dōzō ryakushi,” *Rekishu kenkyū* 549 (2007): 21–23.
- 52 Motoyasu Hiroshi, *Gunto no irei kūkan: kokumin tōgō to senshishatachi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002), 185–86.
- 53 Walter Edwards, “Forging Tradition for a Holy War: The Hakkō Ichū Tower in Miyazaki and Japanese War-time Ideology,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 292. Edwards notes (p. 312) that the “historic perspective expressed in the tower is aggressively expansionist.”
- 54 “Sangiin giin Ichiki Otohiko teishutsu gunji shisō no hajjo ni kansuru shitsumon ni taisuru tōbensho” (May 14, 1948), Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan (National Archives of Japan), Gyōsei bunsho, Naikaku/Sōrifu, Dajōkan/Naikaku kankei, vol. 6, no. 73 (1948), reference no. 03183100.
- 55 General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, *Mission and Accomplishment of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields* (General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1949), 22–23. See also General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *History of the Non-military Activities of the Occupation of Japan*, vol. XI, Social, Part A: Education (General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1951), 19–20.
- 56 See GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(C) 371, General Affairs Section (Seichi Kato), “Removal of Monuments,” August 7, 1947.
- 57 General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, Public Opinion & Sociological Research Division, *Removal of Monuments and Statues—Statistics* (1952) (National Diet Library [Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan], Political Materials Room [Kensei Shiryōshitsu], Tokyo).
- 58 GHQ/SCAP, Records, CIE(A) 675, Religions Division (William C. Kerr), “Statues of Ninomiya Sontoku in Schools,” September 6, 1946. This leniency can be traced to the parallels noted by educators in Japan and the United States between the ideology associated with Ninomiya and the thought of Abraham Lincoln, and the former’s potential as a “symbol of Japanese democ-

- racy.” See Inoue Shōichi, *Nostarujikku aidoru Ninomiya Kinjirō* (Tokyo: Shinjuku Shobō, 1989), chapter 9, esp. 99–103.
- 59 Interview of the author with Hashimoto Tetsuya, 29 December 2019.
- 60 *Asahi shinbun*, Yokohama edition, May 16, 2015, 29.
- 61 Kinoshita Naoyuki, *Tōkyo no dōzō o aruku* (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2011), 19–20.
- 62 Cited in Arndt Beck and Markus Euskirchen, *Die Beerdigte Nation* (Berlin: Karin Kramer Verlag, 2009), 129; see also Jörg Koch, *Von Helden und Opfern. Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Kriegsgedenkens* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013), 158.
- 63 See Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 151.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 160–61, chapters 5–6.
- 65 See “Perry Monument Razed,” *The New York Times*, February 13, 1945, 17.
- 66 See the website of the city of Hikone, <http://www.hikone-150th.jp/event/contents/001106.php>.
- 67 Kaneko Haruo, *Nihon no dōzō* (Tokyo: Tankōsha, 2012), 45.
- 68 See the shrine’s website at http://umahituj2014.web.fc2.com/02_mizuno.html and the plaque adjacent to the statue.
- 69 See <http://www.mfca.jp/harakei>.
- 70 See www.taito-culture.jp/history/sogakudo/japanese/sogakudo_01.html.
- 71 Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, “Sensō o mokuteki to suru kagaku no kenkyū ni wa zettai shitagawanai ketsui no hyōmei (seimei),” April 28, 1950, <http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/info/kohyo/01/01-49-s.pdf>.
- 72 Noguchi statues were even erected outside Japan. The first—the very first memorial to be dedicated to Noguchi anywhere in the world—was erected in New York in 1927. In the postwar period, further Noguchi statues were built in Merida, Mexico (1961), Accra, Ghana (1963, 1979, 1999), Noguchi Park in Campinas, Brazil (1967), Quito and Guayaquil, Ecuador (both 1976), Philadelphia (1987), and Samana Chakra, Peru (1997).
- 73 “Heroic biographies” (*ijinden*) of Noguchi include Hori Shichizō and Ōki Kiyonoshin, *Sekai-teki no ijin Noguchi Hideyo hakushi no kyōiku shisō* (Tokyo: Kyōiku Jissaisha, 1933) and Ikeda Nobumasa, *Ijin Noguchi Hideyo* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Yūben-kai Kōdansha, 1934). “Heroic biographies” re-appeared soon after the war, and Noguchi was included in the series *Ijin monogatari*; Ikeda Nobumasa, *Noguchi Hideyo* (Tokyo: Kaiseisha, 1950).
- 74 Kaneko, *Nihon no dōzō*, 153.
- 75 See the list of Noguchi monuments on the website of the Hideyo Noguchi Memorial Foundation, <http://www.noguchihideyo.or.jp/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/b3e31c3923b1365f2ad5220fe3cf73d9.pdf>.
- 76 See https://nagasakipeace.jp/english/map/zone_negai/heiwa_kinzeno.html; <http://www.japan-kyushu-tourist.com/peace-statue>.

Chapter 10

- 1 *Yomiuri shinbun*, March 17, 1943, 3.
- 2 Kawa Yoshio, *Maeda Toshitsune-kyō dōzō saiken ni atatte* (Komatsu: Maeda Toshitsune-kyō Dōzō Saiken Inkai, 1966), 38.
- 3 See Karl Friday, “Bushido or Bull? A Medieval Historian’s Perspective on the Imperial Army and the Japanese Warrior Tradition,” *The History Teacher* 27, no. 3 (1994): 339–49.
- 4 Carol Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1993), 82.
- 5 Ōishi Shinsaburō and Nakane Chie, cited in Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” 82.
- 6 Motivated by the upcoming of the 300th anniversary of Masamune’s death, the statue project was proposed and organized by the Miyagi-ken Seinen-dan (Miyagi Prefecture Youth League), which also collected donations to fund it. See Miyagi-ken Seinen-dan, *Hanso Date Masamune-kō dōzō kensetsu shuisho* (Sendai: Miyagi-ken Seinen-dan, 1935), 1–2.
- 7 Marker next to the statue dated 1994 and signed *Sendai-shi Kankō Kyōkai* (Sendai City Tourism Association).
- 8 Takagi Hiroshi, “‘Kyōdo-ai’ to ‘aikokushin’ o tsunagu mono. Kindai ni okeru ‘hanso’ no kenshō,” *Rekishi hyōron* 659 (2005): 16.
- 9 See the website of Miyagi Prefecture at www.pref.miyagi.jp/site/date450.
- 10 See the website on the *Mikasa*, <http://www.kinenkan-mikasa.or.jp/en/index.html>.
- 11 Genchi Kato, *Shinto in Essence, As Illustrated by the Faith in a Glorified Personality* (Tokyo: The Nogi Shrine, 1954), 11.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 13 On the image of the “clean navy,” see Sven Saaler, “Naval Memorials in Germany and Japan: Narratives of a ‘Clean War’ Represented in Public Space,” *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* 11, no. 1 (2014): 7–43.
- 14 Saitō Makoto Kinenkan, ed., *Saitō Makoto kinenkan no ayumi* (Misuzawa: Saitō Makoto Kinenkan, 1984), 56.
- 15 Maejima Yasuhiko, *Arisugawa-no-miya kinen kōen* (Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981), 62–63.
- 16 *Asahi shinbun*, July 22, 2011, 29.
- 17 Sven Saaler, “Shokuminchi tōchi to kojīn sūhai. Nihon to Doitsu no shokuminchi ni okeru dōzō,” in *Gotō Shinpei no kai kaihō* 2 (2006): 51–59.
- 18 See <https://www.attaka.or.jp/kanko/dtl.php?ID=329>.
- 19 Sven Saaler, *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion. The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society* (Munich: Iudicium, 2005), chapter 3.

- 20 See https://www.post.japanpost.jp/kitte_hagaki/stamp/furusato/2010/h220514_f.html for a set of five 80 *yen* stamps, of which one shows the Kōchi memorial, issued as a part of the series *Chihō jichi-hō shikō boshūnen kinen shirīzu* and http://www.post.japanpost.jp/notification/pressrelease/2015/11_shikoku/1224_01_02.pdf for a set of ten 52 *yen* stamps issued in 2015 to mark the 180th anniversary of Sakamoto's birth.
- 21 Irimajiri Yoshiyasu et al., "Zadankai 'Ryōma to seinen'," in *Sakamoto Ryōma-sensei dōzō monogatari*, ed. Irimajiri Yoshiyasu (Kōchi: Shadan Hōjin Hito o Kangaeru Mura, 1982), 9.
- 22 Another group of statues, which is not discussed in detail here, is the *Yokoi Shōnan o meguru ishin gunzō* (Sculptures of the Restoration Relating to Yokoi Shōnan) in Kumamoto. See <https://kumamoto-guide.jp/spots/detail/90>.
- 23 See <https://meiji-ishin.com/wakakisatsumanogunzou.html>.
- 24 On the mission, see Andrew Cobbing, *The Satsuma Students in Britain: Japan's Early Search for the Essence of the West* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).
- 25 See <http://hagi-okan.yamaguchi-city.jp>.
- 26 See <http://www.hagioukan.com>.
- 27 See <http://www.city.hagi.lg.jp/soshiki/49/h2784.html>
- 28 See <http://www.town.yusuhara.kochi.jp/kanko/spot/entry-1234.html>.
- 29 Outstanding among these is a book by Harada Iori with the provocative title *Meiji ishin to iu ayamachi. Nihon o horoboshita Yoshida Shōin to Chōshū terorisuto* (The Mistake Called the Meiji Restoration: Yoshida Shōin and the Chōshū Terrorists have Destroyed Japan) (Tokyo: Mainichi Wanzu, 2015).
- 30 See <http://www.nhk.or.jp/jidaigeki/shinsengumi>.
- 31 See <https://artv.info/taiga.html>.
- 32 See *Asahi shinbun*, January 8, 2004, 27. Guidebooks to historical sites associated with the Shinsengumi, whether on a national or regional basis, have been published in large numbers since the 2000s; for example, Rekishiki Henshūbu, ed., *Shinsengumi junrei no tabi* (Tokyo: Ascii Media Works, 2013).
- 33 See NHK/NHK Promotion, ed., "*Shinsengumi*" *ten* (Tokyo: NHK/NHK Promotion, 2004).
- 34 Takahata-san Kongō-ji, *Takahata Fudō-son no Shinsengumi kanren shiryō* (Tokyo: Takahata-san Kongōji, 2016), 7.
- 35 See www.takahatafudoston.or.jp.
- 36 See <http://www.hijikata-toshizo.jp>.
- 37 See the plaque next to the statue, the text of which is also cited in Takahata-san Kongō-ji, *Takahata Fudō-son*, 7.
- 38 www.takahatafudoston.or.jp.
- 39 See <http://www.romankan.com/hizikata/oindex.html>.
- 40 Hiraku Shimoda, *Lost and Found: Recovering Regional Identity in Imperial Japan* (Harvard University Asia Center, 2014), 97–98.
- 41 See <http://www.nhk.or.jp/dramatopics-blog/2000/86512.html>.
- 42 See Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō, ed., *Meiji hyakumen kinen gyōji tō kiroku* (Tokyo: Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō, 1969, 39–42). See also Nick Kapur, "The Empire Strikes Back? The 1968 Meiji Centennial Celebrations and the Revival of Japanese Nationalism," *Japanese Studies* 38, no. 3 (2018): 305–28.
- 43 Before the realization of statues of Emperor Meiji, a stone sculpture of his grandmother Nakayama Aiko (1818–1906), was erected in Kameoka Shrine in the city of Hirado, where Nakayama had been born. See https://www.hirado-net.com/?post_type=tourism&p=569.
- 44 See <http://naminouegu.jp/english.html>.
- 45 An almost identical explanatory plaque marks a number of other Meiji statues. The inscription near the Shinshiro statue does not give details regarding its background, except that it was built upon the initiative of Kurokawa Shigesuke, the first mayor of the city of Shinshiro, which was created in 1958.
- 46 On the postwar Jahana statue, see the unpublished prospectus entitled *Jahana Noboru dōzō saiken shuisho*, in "Jahana Noboru dōzō saiken ni kansuru shiryō," in the Okinawa Prefectural Archives (Okinawa kankei shiryō, kojin monjo, Wakugawa Kiyoe monjo), September 10, 1964.
- 47 Okinawa-ken Kyōiku linkai, ed., *Okinawa kenshi. Tsūshi 1* (Naha: Okinawa-ken Kyōiku linkai, 1976), 341–43.
- 48 According to Ōno Masaharu, president of the company since 2012, and his mother Ōno Asako, the statues were not ordered directly by these organizations, but through trading companies (*shōsha*). Interview with the author, March 29, 2018.
- 49 Of those confirmed by the author, only the Okinawa statue is somewhat smaller in size.
- 50 See <http://kk-kojo.com/tradition/index6.html>.
- 51 Cited in *Asahi shinbun*, September 26, 1969, 15.
- 52 Anonymous, "Meiji tennō dōzō hyakkasho konryū ni matta," *Zen'yō* 18, no. 11 (1969).
- 53 See the prospectus for the Gifu statue, Meiji Taitei Seizō Konryū Hōsankai, *Meiji taitei* (Gifu: Meiji Taitei Seizō Konryū Hōsankai, 1972).
- 54 This fear has proven to be not unfounded. In 2016, the owner of one of these statues went bankrupt and the "holy sculpture" was impounded and sold at an auction.
- 55 *Asahi shinbun*, September 26, 1969, 15, and Anonymous, "Meiji tennō dōzō."
- 56 *Asahi shinbun*, September 26, 1969, 15.
- 57 Anonymous, "Meiji tennō dōzō."
- 58 Cited in *Asahi shinbun*, September 26, 1969, 15.
- 59 Of those that were not erected in the public space, one is still kept at the Kōjō Bronze Works in Takaoka and another is in the Koganenaru Ikuhisa Memorial Museum (Koganemaru Ikuhisa Kinenkan) on Iki Island.

- 60 Yamanouchi Kazutoyo-kō Dōzō Saiken Kiseikai, ed., *Yamanouchi Kazutoyo-kō dōzō saiken jigyō kinen-shi* (Kōchi: Yamanouchi Kazutoyo-kō Dōzō Saiken Kiseikai Kanjikai, 1997), 11.
- 61 *Ibid.*, 3–4.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 63 *Ibid.*
- 64 *Ibid.*, 12–13.
- 65 See <http://kochipark.jp/kochijyo/about-kochi-castle/history-of-koch-castle>.
- 66 On the criticism voiced by publicist and educator Fukuzawa Yukichi, see Oleg Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 56–59.
- 67 Katsu Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai, *Shuisho* (Tokyo: Katsu Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai, n.d. [ca. 2000]).
- 68 See the flyer for the ceremony, http://www.katsu-kai-syu.net/docs/flyer_back.pdf.
- 69 See <http://www.katsu-kaisyu.net/docs/jyomakusiki.pdf>.
- 70 Katsu Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai, *Tōkyo ni rekishi-teki na shin-meisho* (Tokyo: Katsu Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai, 2003) (flyer).
- 71 See *Mainichi shinbun*, September 10, 2016, <https://mainichi.jp/articles/20160910/k00/00e/040/237000c> (with a video of the unveiling).
- 72 “Botsugo 15onen ni muke, dōzō konryū e kifukin yobikake,” *Mainichi shinbun*, May 30, 2017, Yamaguchi edition.
- 73 See the website “Naikaku Kanbō ‘Meiji 15onen’ kanren shisaku suishinshitsu” at www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/meiji150/portal.
- 74 See *Yamaguchi shinbun*, April 15, 2015, <http://www.minato-yamaguchi.co.jp/yama/news/digest/2015/0415/7p.html>.
- 75 Younghan Cho, “Unfolding Sporting Nationalism in South Korean Media Representations of the 1968, 1984 and 2000 Olympics,” *Media, Culture & Society* 31, no. 3 (2009): 349. On the concept of “sporting nationalism,” see *ibid.*, 347–64, and Kaori Hayashi, James Curran, Sunyoung Kwak, Frank Esser, Daniel C. Hallin, and Chin-Chuan Lee, “Pride and Prejudice,” *Journalism Studies* 17, no. 8 (2016): 935–51.
- 76 The other two depict singers Wada Akiko and Hosokawa Takashi (both b. 1950). More statues of representatives of Japan’s pop culture industry, as well as other athletes, have appeared in recent years but have not been included in this study. Another growing category worth further study are local politicians, including mayors. In 2009, a bronze statue of a recently deceased mayor caused a heated controversy, in particular regarding the question whether or not such a monument should be paid for with taxpayers’ money. See “Moto Fukuoka shichō no dōzō shihi de dōzō,” *Asahi Shinbun*, December 26, 2009, evening edition, 1.
- 77 Tsukada Hotaka, ed., *Tettei kenshō Nihon no ukeika* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2017).
- 78 Regarding this discussion, see Satō Hiromi, “Koji” *suru kyōkasho* (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 2019).
- 79 Abe Shinzō and Hyakuta Naoki, *Nihon yo sekai no man-naka de saki-hokore* (Tokyo: Waku, 2013). See Sven Saaler, “Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 14, issue 2, no. 7 (October 15, 2016), <http://apjif.org/2016/20/Saaler.html>, for a summary of these trends.
- 80 See John G. Caiger, “The Aims and Content of School Courses in Japanese History, 1872–1945,” in *Japan’s Modern Century*, ed. Edmund Skrzypczak (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1965), 51–81.
- 81 See the summary of objections in an editorial in *Kyōto shinbun*, February 18, 2014.
- 82 Watanabe Shōichi, “Dōzō ga Nihonjin ni oshiete kureru taisetsu na koto,” in Maruoka Shin’ya, *Nihon no kokoro wa dōzō ni atta* (Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, Kindle ed., 2015), loc. 90, Kindle.
- 83 Although additional figures are introduced throughout the book, in the following analysis I focus on the break-out sections, because their prominence enhances their effectiveness in education and they can thus be compared to statuary as an expression of the cult of the individual. For a more detailed analysis, see Marie H. Roesgaard, *Moral Education in Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).
- 84 Monbu Kagakushō, *Watashitachi no dōtoku. Shōgakkō 1-2 nen* (Tokyo: Monbu Kagakushō, 2014).
- 85 Tōkyō-to Kyōiku-chō Shidō-bu Gimu Kyōiku Tokubetsu Shien Kyōiku Shidō-ka, ed., *Kokoro akaruku* (Tokyo: Tōkyō-to Kyōiku linkai, 2016), 2, 40.
- 86 Monbu Kagakushō, *Watashitachi no dōtoku. Shōgakkō 3-4 nen* (Tokyo: Monbu Kagakushō, 2015).
- 87 Monbu Kagakushō, *Watashitachi no dōtoku. Shōgakkō 5-6 nen* (Tokyo: Monbu Kagakushō, 2016).
- 88 The proportion of female *ijin* in these educational materials (roughly 20 percent, i.e., three women among the fifteen *ijin* in the break-out sections) is far higher, however, than the proportion of women represented in modern statuary (5 percent).
- 89 Itō Takashi et al., *Atarashii minna no kōmin* (Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2015), 51, 60, 64, 79, 83, 88, 96, 100, 160, 188.
- 90 Kaizuka Shigeki and Yanaginuma Ryōta, eds., *Gakkō de manabitai Nihon no ijin* (Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2014).
- 91 Kaizuka Shigeki, *Ijin no ikikata kara manabu kyōiku dōtoku* (2018), <http://www.ikuhosha.co.jp/public/introduction07161.html>.
- 92 On the Abe-Yagi connection, see Saaler, “Nationalism and History.”
- 93 *Asahi shinbun*, January 5, 2018, 10.

Conclusion

- 1 Matsuda Kōichirō, *Gisei no riron, jiyū no fuan* (Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2016).
- 2 Fukuzawa, Yukichi, *An Encouragement of Learning*, transl. David A. Dilworth and Umeyo Hirano (Tokyo: Monumenta Nipponica, 1969), 25.
- 3 Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 223.
- 4 See chapter 2 of this study and Sven Saaler, “Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 14, issue 2, no. 7 (October 15, 2016), <http://apjif.org/2016/20/Saaler.html>.
- 5 Only a few miniature statues (Ōkuma, Nichiren, Nogi, Meiji Emperor) could be addressed in this study; their proliferation merits a separate study.
- 6 Kosaku Yoshino, “Rethinking Theories of Nationalism,” in *Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed. Yoshino, Kosaku (London: Curzon, 1999), 8–9.
- 7 Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).
- 8 Ono Masaaki, “Go-shin’ei no kafu shinsei,” *shikaku no kakudai katei to sono imi*, *Kyōikugaku zasshi* 39 (2004): 14; full text in Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, ed., *Meiji tennō shi* (Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, 1912), 19–20.
- 9 This point also has been recently made by Shirai Satoshi, with particular reference to the diminished role of the Emperor in the 1910s and 1920s. See Shirai Satoshi, *Kokutairon* (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2018), 218–19.
- 10 When the Heisei era ended in 2019, the daily *Asahi shinbun* ran a two-page feature headlined “Kokumin no tōgō e” (*Toward National Unification*). See *Asahi shinbun*, April 30, 2019, 16–17. In his recent book *Kokutairon*, the historian Shirai Satoshi refers in particular to Okinawa and Fukushima as regions where doubts regarding true national unity, one without discrimination, endure. Shirai, *Kokutairon*, 32, 167.
- 11 For an analysis of such discussions in Toyama prefecture, see, for example, Michael Lewis, *Becoming Apart. National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868–1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center and Harvard University Press, 2000).
- 12 Roger F. Hackett, “Political Modernization and the Meiji genrō,” in *Political Development in Modern Japan*, ed. Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 65–97.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 I thank Hayashi Kaori for pointing this development out to me. The first *Shinbun haitatsu shōnen no zō* were set up by the Japan Newspaper Sales Association in the late 1950s. See <http://www.nippankyo.or.jp/products/topics/2011/06/post-7.html>.
- 15 Ian Kershaw, *The “Hitler Myth”: Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1987).
- 16 ‘Waga ayumishi michi Nanbara Shigeru’ Hensan Kankō inkai, ed., *Waga ayumishi michi Nanbara Shigeru* (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004), 22.
- 17 Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence. Vol. 2 of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), loc. 3994, Kindle.
- 18 Anthony D. Smith, *The Antiquity of Nations* (London: Polity, 2004), 211–12.
- 19 See, for example, Chan, Sewell, “Historical Figures, Campus Controversies,” *The New York Times International Edition*, January 29, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/29/education/college-symbol-controversies.html>.
- 20 Julia Wallace, “A Long-dead Cambodian King is Back, and He Looks Familiar,” *The New York Times International Edition*, December 12, 2017, 5.
- 21 See “On U.N.’s North Korea sanctions list: statue exports,” *Japan Times*, December 28, 2016.
- 22 “Why an Airbrushed Xi is All Over China,” *The New York Times International Edition*, November 16, 2017, 5.
- 23 Hugh Cortazzi, “The Personality Cult Lives On,” *Japan Times*, May 9, 2017.
- 24 See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/meiji150/portal>.
- 25 See <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/01/haruki-murakami-hysteria-islands-row>. For a similar, more recent characterization of nationalism in Japan, see Shirai, *Kokutairon*, 326.

Bibliography

Archives

- Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan (Fukui Municipal Local History Museum), Fukui.
- Genkō Shiryōkan (Mongol Invasion Museum and Archive), Fukuoka.
- GHQ/SCAP Records, National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan), Political Materials Room (Kensei Shiryōshitsu), Tokyo.
- Gotō Shinpei Kinenkan (Gotō Shinpei Memorial Hall), Ōshū.
- Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan), Tokyo.
- Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR). Online archive, www.jacar.go.jp.
- Kanazawa Shiritsu Tamagawa Toshokan (Kanazawa Archives of Modern History Records), Kanazawa.
- Kibe Fureai Center, Ube.
- Kōchi Kenritsu Toshokan (Kōchi Prefectural Library), Kōchi.
- National Archives of Japan (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan), Tokyo.
- National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan) Digital Collections. <http://dl.ndl.go.jp>.
- National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan) Political Materials Room (Kensei Shiryōshitsu), Tokyo.
- National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense (Boeishō Boei Kenkyūjo), Tokyo.
- Okinawa-ken Kōbunshokan (Okinawa Prefectural Archives), Naha.
- Saga Kenritsu Toshokan (Saga Prefectural Library), Saga.
- Saitō Makoto Kinenkan (Saitō Makoto Memorial Hall), Ōshū.
- Tōkyō Geijutsu Daigaku Daigaku Bijutsukan (The University Art Museum, Tokyo University of the Arts), Tokyo.
- Yasukuni Jinja Kaikō Bunko (Yasukuni Shrine Kaikō Archives), Tokyo.

Primary and Secondary Sources

- Abe Shinzō and Hyakuta Naoki. *Nihon yo, sekai no manna de saki-hokore*. Tokyo: Wakku, 2013.
- Abe Yasunari. “Yokohama kaikō gojūnen-sai no seiji bunka.” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 699 (1997): 4–18.
- Abe Yasunari. “Nidaime no shōzō to rireki. 1954-nen kōkoku hyakunen no Yokohama ni okeru Ii Naosuke no dōzō.” *Shiga Daigaku Keizai Gakubu kenkyū nenpō* 14 (2007): 53–77.
- Abe Yasunari. “Ko Ii Naosuke o kōka suru. Naosuke gojū kaiki made no rekishi hihyō.” *Iwasaki Keiichi Kyōju Taishoku Kinen Ronbun shū* 371 (2008): 47–78.

- Adachi Ritsuen. *Ijin hyakuwa*. Tokyo: Sekizenkan, 1911.
- Alings, Richard. *Monument und Nation: Das Bild von Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1996.
- Allen, Chizuko. “Empress Jingū—A Shamaness Ruler in Early Japan.” *Japan Forum* 15, no. 1 (2003): 81–98.
- Allen, Joseph R. “Taipei Park: Signs of Occupation.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 66, no. 1 (2007): 159–99.
- Ami-machi, ed. *Zoku, Ami to Yokaren*. Ami: Ami-machi, 2010.
- Ami-machi, ed. *Kaigun kōkūtai monogatari*. Ami: Ami-machi, 2014.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. London and New York: Verso, 1991.
- Andō Kenkichi, ed. *Ijin no sekitoku*. Tokyo: Aoki Sūzandō, 1901.
- Anesaki Chōfū et al., eds. *Takayama Chogyū to Nichiren Shōnin*. Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1913.
- Anonymous. *Denkmal König Friedrichs des Großen. Enthüllt am 31. Mai 1851*. Berlin: Verlag der Deckerschen Geheimen Ober-Hofdruckerei, 1851.
- Anonymous. “Kabayama-haku no hōkoku yōryō.” *Kyōto Bijutsu Kyōkai zasshi* 79 (1889): 14–15.
- Anonymous. *Tadamasa-kō go-dōzō konryū kitei*. Unpublished document, 1891.
- Anonymous. “Ko Ōmura heibu tayū no dōzō.” *Kenchiku zasshi* 71 (1892): 34–35.
- Anonymous. *Ko Naidaijin shō-ichi'i daikun'i kōshaku Sanjō Sanetomi dōzō kinenhi kensetsu shuisho*. Tokyo: [no publisher], 1892.
- Anonymous. “Ronsetsu. Futsu-doku-ō-i no kakkoku ni okeru dōzō jusei-hō.” *Nihon Bijutsu Kyōkai hōkoku* 8, no. 68 (1893).
- Anonymous. *Ko-Kitashirakawa-no-miya dai-shōgū go-dōzō kensetsu bokoku*. Unpublished document, 1898.
- Anonymous. “Saigō Nanshū no dōzō o hyōsu.” *Taiyō* 5, no. 2 (1899): 52–61.
- Anonymous. “Ko-Arisugawa-no-miya dōzō jomakushiki.” *Taiyō* 9, no. 13 (1903).
- Anonymous. *Das Königliche Zeughaus: Führer durch die Ruhmeshalle und die Sammlungen*. 4th ed. Berlin: Mittler, 1907.
- Anonymous. “Dōzō.” *Kenchiku zasshi* 253 (1908): 35–36.
- Anonymous. “Ii tairō dōzō jomakushiki.” *Taiyō* 15, no. 11 (1909): unpaginated.
- Anonymous. *Hokkaidō zaijū Ka-Etsu-No jinmeiroku*. Tokyo: Ka-Etsu-No Jinmeiroku Hakkōsho, 1916.
- Anonymous. *Rittai shashinzō*. Tokyo: Ginza Shiseidō Rittai Shashinzōbu, 1927.

- Anonymous. *Ko Gotō-haku dōzō kensetsu hōkokusho*. 1931.
- Anonymous. “Meiji tennō dōzō hyakkasho konryū ni matta.” *Zen’yō* 18, no. 11 (1969).
- Anonymous. “Where are the Statues of Women?” http://articles.courant.com/2011-05-30/news/hc-ed-women-statues-20110530_1_national-statuary-hall-sculptures-connecticut-women.
- Antoni, Klaus. *Kokutai—Political Shintō from Early-Modern to Contemporary Japan*. Tübingen: Eberhard-Karls-University Tübingen, 2016.
- Aoki Osamu. *Nippon Kaigi no shōtai*. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2016.
- Arai Fusatarō. *Ijin no omokage*. Tokyo: Nijūroku Shinpōsha, 1928. Reprinted by Tokyo: Yumani Shobō, 2009.
- Arai Takashige. *Kusunoki Masashige*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011.
- Arasaki Moriteru et al. *Kankō kōsu de nai Okinawa*. Tokyo: Kōkōsei Bunka Kenkyūkai, 1983.
- Archer, Geoff. *The Glorious Dead. Figurative Sculpture of British First World War Memorials*. Norfolk: Frontier, 2009.
- Arndt, Beck, and Markus Euskirchen. *Die Beerdigte Nation*. Berlin: Karin Kramer Verlag, 2009.
- Arndt, Monika. *Die “Ruhmeshalle” im Berliner Zeughaus. Eine Selbstdarstellung Preussens nach der Reichsgründung*. Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1985.
- Aso, Noriko. *Public Properties: Museums in Imperial Japan*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014.
- Assmann, Aleida. *Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses*. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1999.
- Asukai Masamichi. *Meiji taitei*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1989.
- Austin, Lewis. “Visual Symbols, Political Ideology, and Culture.” *Ethos* 5, no. 3 (1977): 306–25.
- Awazu Kenta. “Kindai Nihon nashonarizumu ni okeru hyōshō no hen’yō. Saitama-ken ni okeru senbotsusha-hi kensetsu katei o tōshite.” *Sociologica* 26 (2001): 1–33.
- Awazu Kenta. “Kindai Nihon ni okeru senbotsusha kinen shisetsu to bunka nashonarizumu. Dai-Nihon Chūrei Kenshōkai o chūshin ni.” *Sociologica* 27 (2003): 2–20.
- Bandō Yukari and Sanada Junko. “Bizan no hen’yō ni kansuru kenkyū.” *Keikan/desain kenkyū kōen shū* 6 (2010): 370–74.
- Barmé, Geremie R. *Shades of Mao: the Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Baxter, James. *The Meiji Unification through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Beasley, William G. *The Meiji Restoration*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.
- Bekkaku Kanpeisha Minatogawa Jinja. *Minatogawa Jinja sharyaku shi*. Kobe: Bekkaku Kanpeisha Minatogawa Jinja, 1934.
- Bellah, Robert Neely. “Civil Religion in America.” *Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 96, no. 1 (1967): 1–21.
- Ben-Dasan, Isaiah. *Nihonjin to Yudayajin*. Tokyo: Yamamoto Shoten, 1970.
- Benesch, Oleg. *Inventing the Way of the Samurai Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Benesch, Oleg and Ran Zwigenberg. *Japan’s Castles: Citadels of Modernity in War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Bennett, Tony. *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics*. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Berger, Gordon. “Japan’s Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro’s Early Political Career, 1916–1931.” *Monumenta Nipponica* 29, no. 4 (1974): 451–75.
- Beuing, Raphael. *Reiterbilder der Frührenaissance. Monument und Memoria*. Munster: Rhema, 2010.
- Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 1995.
- Biontino, Juljan. “Seoul’s Namsan under Japanese Influence—Japanese Ritual Life and Assimilation Policy in Korea, 1890–1945.” Presentation at the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ), Tokyo, May 25, 2017.
- Bohner, Hermann. *Shōtoku Taishi*. Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, Bd. 29, Teil C. Tokyo: OAG—Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 1936.
- Bohner, Hermann, trans. “Wake-no-Kiyomaro-den.” *Monumenta Nipponica* 3, no. 1 (1940): 240–73.
- Bratner, Luzie. *Das Mainzer Gutenbergdenkmal. Von St. Far bis Thorvaldsen. Zu Entstehung und Geschichte des Gutenbergplatzes und des Gutenbergdenkmals*. Alzey: Verlag der Rhein Hessischen Druck-Werkstätte, 2000.
- Breen, John, ed. *Yasukuni: The War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past*. London: C. Hurst, 2007.
- Breen, John, and Mark Teeuwen. *A New History of Shinto*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
- Bresc-Bautier, Genevière. “The Art of Bronze in France, 1500–1660.” In *Cast in Bronze. French Sculpture from Renaissance to Revolution*, edited by Genevière Bresc-Bautier and Guilhem Scherf, 48–63. Paris: Musée du Louvre/Somogy, 2009.
- Brownlee, John S. *Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945*. Vancouver and Tokyo: UBC Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1997.
- Brunet, J. L. *Les ordres de chevalerie et les distinctions honorifiques au Japon*. Paris: Actualités Diplomatiques et Coloniales, 1903.
- Buck, James H. “The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. From Kagoshima through the Siege of Kumamoto Castle.” *Monumenta Nipponica* 28, no. 4 (1973): 427–46.
- The Bureau of Mines. *Mining in Japan. Past and Present*. Tokyo: Eibun Tsūshinsha, 1909.

- Caiger, John G. "The Aims and Content of School Courses in Japanese History, 1872–1945." In *Japan's Modern Century*, edited by Edmund Skrzypczak, 51–81. Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1965.
- Campbell Karlsgodt, Elizabeth. "Recycling French Heroes: The Destruction of Bronze Statues under the Vichy Regime." *French Historical Studies* 29, no. 1 (2006): 143–81.
- Carlyle, Thomas. *On Heroes and Hero Worship and the Heroic in History*. London: James Fraser, 1841.
- Carr, E. H. *What is History?*. London: Penguin, 1970.
- Carr, Kevin Gray. *Plotting the Prince: Shōtoku Cults and the Mapping of Medieval Japanese Buddhism*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012.
- Caspar, Helmut. *Schadows Blücherdenkmal in Rostock und Martin Luther in Wittenberg*. Berlin: Schadow-Gesellschaft Berlin, 2003.
- Cave, Peter. "Story, Song, and Ceremony: Shaping Dispositions in Japanese Elementary Schools during Taisho and Early Showa." *Japan Forum* 28, no. 1 (2016): 9–31.
- Chang, Richard T. "General Grant's 1879 Visit to Japan." *Monumenta Nipponica* 24, no. 4 (1969): 373–92.
- Cho, Younghan. "Unfolding Sporting Nationalism in South Korean Media Representations of the 1968, 1984 and 2000 Olympics." *Media, Culture & Society* 31, no. 3 (2009): 347–64.
- Cobbing, Andrew. *The Satsuma Students in Britain: Japan's Early Search for the Essence of the West*. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Cohen, Aaron M. "Thoughts on the Precipice: Japanese Postcards, c. 1903–39." *Japan Forum* 13, no. 1 (2001): 55–62.
- Cohen, William. "Symbols of Power: Statues in Nineteenth-Century Provincial France." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 3 (1989): 491–513.
- Confino, Alon. *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871–1918*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- Conlon, Thomas D. *In Little Need of Divine Intervention: Takezaki Suenaga's Scrolls of the Mongol Invasions of Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001.
- Craig, Albert M. *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.
- Craig, Albert M. and Donald H. Shively, eds. *Personality in Japanese History*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1970.
- Crook, Steven. "A Park Honoring a Japanese Engineer." *Taiwan Business Topics*. <http://crooksteven.blogspot.jp/2011/04/park-honoring-japanese-engineer-taiwan.html>.
- Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, ed. *Meiji tennō shi*. Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, 1912.
- Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, ed. *Kyūjō shashinchō*. Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kokumin Kyōikukai, 1923.
- Dai-Nihon Kokuso Hōtokukai, ed. *Meiji taitei go-seireki*. Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Kokuso Hōtokukai, 1912.
- Dai-Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, ed. *Meiji taitei*. Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, 1927.
- Dairen Jinja Gosōken Hachijūnen-sai Hōsankai, ed. *Dairen Jinja hachijūnen shi*. Tokyo: [no publisher], 1987.
- Dai-Tōkyō shashinchō. Tokyo: [no publisher], c. 1930.
- De la Moureyre, Françoise. "Bronze in the Age of Louis XIV." In *Cast in Bronze. French Sculpture from Renaissance to Revolution*, edited by Genevière Bresc-Bautier and Guilhem Scherf, 228–35. Paris: Musée du Louvre/Somogy, 2009.
- De Leonardis, Fabio. *Nation-Building and Personality Cult in Turkmenistan: The Türkmenbaşy Phenomenon*. Routledge Focus. London and New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Dennison, Leah. *Louis XIV. Enhancement of Royal Authority by the Use of Court Ritual and Visual Arts*. Nordstedt: Grin, 2013.
- Dennison, Michael. "The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan." *Europe-Asia Studies* 61, no. 7 (2009): 1167–87.
- Dierkes, Julian. *Postwar History Education in Japan and the Germans. Guilty Lessons*. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Dietler, M. "'Our Ancestors the Gauls': Archaeology, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Manipulation of Celtic Identity in Modern Europe." *American Anthropologist* 96 (1994): 584–605.
- Division of Publications, National Park Service. *Jefferson Memorial*. Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior, 2009.
- Doak, Kevin. *A History of Nationalism in Japan*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Dower, John. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York and London: W. W. Norton New Press, 1999.
- Duus, Peter. *Modern Japan*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998.
- Edogawa Suijin. "Gunshin no dōzō." In *Genkotsu hyakuwa*, edited by Ōtsuki Takashi, 191–92. Tokyo: Kokkeisha, 1911.
- Edwards, Walter. "Event and Process in the Founding of Japan: the Horserider Theory in Archaeological Perspective." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 9, no. 2 (1983): 265–95.
- Edwards, Walter. "Forging Tradition for a Holy War: The Hakkō Ichū Tower in Miyazaki and Japanese Wartime Ideology." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 289–324.
- Emi Chizuko. "Saigō Takamori dōzō-kō." *Bunka Shingengaku* 3 (2005): 69–82.
- Eng, Robert. "Chinggis Khan on Film: Globalization, Nationalism, and Historical Revisionism." *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 16, issue 22, no. 1 (November 10, 2018). <https://apjif.org/2018/22/Eng.html>.
- Engelbert, Günther. *Ein Jahrhundert Hermannsdenkmal 1875–1975*. Detmold: Naturwissenschaftlicher und Historischer Verein für das Land Lippe, 1975.

- Figal, Gerald. *Beachheads: War, Peace, and Tourism in Postwar Okinawa*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.
- Fischer, Adolf. *Wandlungen im Kunstleben Japans*. Berlin: B. Behr, 1900.
- François, Etienne, and Hagen Schulze, eds. *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001.
- Freeman, Kirrily. *Bronze to Bullets. Vichy and the Destruction of French Public Statuary, 1941–1944*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Friday, Karl. “Bushido or Bull? A Medieval Historian’s Perspective on the Imperial Army and the Japanese Warrior Tradition.” *The History Teacher*, 27, no. 3 (1994): 339–49.
- Fröhlich, Judith. “Vom Krieger zu den Kriegerwerten. Die Mongoleneinfälle des 13. Jahrhunderts und deren Umdeutung im 19. Jahrhundert in Japan.” *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 159 (2009): 81–104.
- Fuess, Harald. “Unequal Treaties, Consular Jurisdiction, and Treaty Port Society.” In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 47–61. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Fujii Jōji. *Tokuqawa Iemitsu*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997.
- Fujii Motohiko. “Shiryō honkoku. ‘Shōchūhi kiroku’.” *Niigata-shi Bijutsukan-Niigata-shi Niitsu Bijutsukan kenkyū kiyō*/Bulletin of Niigata City Art Museum & Niitsu Art Museum (2014): 36–47.
- Fujitani, Takashi. *Splendid Monarchy*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996. Kindle.
- Fujitani, Takashi et al., eds. *Perilous Memories. The Asia-Pacific War(s)*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
- Fukui Annai-ki Hensankai, ed. *Fukui annai-ki*. Fukui: Fukui Annai-ki Hensankai, 1909.
- Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan, ed. *Asuwayama no konjaku*. Fukui: Fukui Shiritsu Kyōdo Rekishi Hakubutsukan, 1987.
- Fukui Shiyakusho, ed. *Fukui shishi*. Vol. 1. Fukui: Fukui Shiyakusho, 1941.
- Fukuoka Chōshi Hensan Iinkai, ed. *Fukuoka chōshi*. Fukuoka: Fukuoka-chō, 1969.
- Fukuoka-ken Keisatsu-bu, ed. *Keisatsu hōki ruiten*. Vol. 2. Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1928.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.
- Fukuzawa Yukichi. *Meiji jūnen teichō kōron*. Tokyo: Jiji Shinpōsha, 1877.
- Fukuzawa, Yukichi. *An Encouragement of Learning*, translated by David A. Dilworth and Umeyo Hirano. Tokyo: Monumenta Nipponica, 1969.
- Furukawa Seisuke, ed. *Nikudan san’yūshi dōzō kensetsukai hōkoku*. Tokyo: Nikudan San’yūshi Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1936.
- Furukawa Shōzō. *Taiwan o aishita Nihonjin*. Tokyo: Sōfūsha Shuppan, 2009.
- Furukawa Takahisa. *Kōki, banpaku, orinipikku*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1998.
- Furuta Ryūichi, ed. *Fukuoka-ken zenshi*. Fukuoka: Yasukōchi Kusakichi, 1906.
- Gaens, Bart. “Company Culture or Patinated Past? The Display of Corporate Heritage in Sumitomo.” In *Making Japanese Heritage*, edited by Christoph Brumann and Rupert Cox, 92–107. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Galan, Christian. “The New Image of Childhood in Japan During the Years 1945–49 and the Construction of a Japanese Collective Memory.” In *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, edited by Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, 189–203. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008.
- Gardella, Peter. *American Civil Religion. What Americans Hold Sacred*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Garon, Sheldon. *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Gartlan, Luke. *A Career of Japan. Baron Raimund von Stillfried and Early Yokohama Photography*. Leiden: Brill, 2016.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. *History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan*. General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1951.
- General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section. *Mission and Accomplishment of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields*. General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1949. National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan), Political Materials Room (Kensei Shiryōshitsu), Tokyo.
- General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, Public Opinion & Sociological Research Division. *Removal of Monuments and Statues—Statistics (1952)*. National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan), Political Materials Room (Kensei Shiryōshitsu), Tokyo.
- Gerhart, Karen. *The Eyes of Power: Art and Early Tokugawa Authority*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Nation-State and Violence. Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985.
- Gluck, Carol. “The Past in the Present.” In *Postwar Japan as History*, edited by Andrew Gordon, 64–95. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1993.
- Glyptis, Leda. “Living up to the Father: The National Identity Prescriptions of Remembering Atatürk; his Homes, his Grave, his Temple.” *National Identities* 10, no. 4 (2008): 353–72.

- Goble, Andrew E. *Kenmu: Go-Daigo's Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Gowland, William. "The Art of Casting Bronze in Japan." *Journal of the Society of Arts* XLIII, no. 2215 (1895): 609–51.
- Griffis, William Elliot. *The Mikado's Empire*. Vol. I. New York: Harper & Bros., 1876.
- Gunma-ken Tone Kyōikukai, ed. *Tone gunshi*. Tone: Gunma-ken Tone Kyōiku-kai, 1930.
- Guth, Christine M. E. "Takamura Kōun and Takamura Kōtarō: On Being a Sculptor." In *The Artist as Professional in Japan*, edited by Melinda Takeuchi, 152–79. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Haga Shōji. *Meiji ishin to shūkyō*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994.
- Haga Shōji. "Gunto no sensō kinenhi. Toyohashi Daijūhachi rentai to Jinmu tennō dōzō kinenhi." In *Kindai Nihon no uchi to soto*, edited by Tanaka Akira, 282–308. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1999.
- Haga Shōji. "Dōzō kinenhi kō." *IS* 82 (1999): 45–49.
- Hagihara Shinsei. *Ōmura Masujirō shōden*. Tokyo: Ōmura Masujirō Hōsan-kai Tokyo Shibu, 1942.
- Hall, Stuart, ed. *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. London: Sage, 1977.
- Hanashiro, Roy S. *Thomas William Kinder and the Japanese Imperial Mint, 1868–1875*. Brill's Japanese Study Library 9. Leiden: Brill, 1999.
- Hara Takeshi. *Teikoku no shikakuka*. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 2001.
- Harada Iori. *Meiji ishin to iu ayamachi. Nihon o horoboshita Yoshida Shōin to Chōshū terorisuto*. Tokyo: Mainichi Wanzu, 2005.
- Harada Keiichi. *Heishi wa doko e itta. Gun'yō bochi to kokumin kokka*. Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2013.
- Hardacre, Helen. *Shinto and the State, 1868–1988*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Hardacre, Helen. "Introduction." In *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, edited by Helen Hardacre and Adam Kern, xiii–xlii. Brill's Japanese Study Library 6. Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- Hardacre, Helen. *Shinto. A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Hardtwig, Wolfgang. "Der Bismarck-Mythos. Gestalt und Funktionen zwischen politischer Öffentlichkeit und Wissenschaft." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Sonderheft 21 (2005): 61–90.
- Hargrove, June. *The Statues of Paris: An Open-Air Pantheon*. New York and Paris: Vendome Press, 1990.
- Hashikawa Bunsō. *Shōwa ishin shiron*. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1984.
- Hashikawa Bunsō. "Nogi densetsu no shisō." In *Hashikawa Bunsō chosakushū*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2000.
- Hashimoto, Akiko. *The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Hashimoto Kakubundō Kikaku Shuppanshitsu, ed. *Tokubetsu meishō Kenrokuen—sono rekishi to bunka. Honpen*. Kanazawa: Hashimoto Kakubundō, 1997.
- Hashimoto Kakubundō Kikaku Shuppanshitsu, ed. *Tokubetsu meishō Kenrokuen—sono rekishi to bunka. Shiryōhen*. Kanazawa: Hashimoto Kakubundō, 1997.
- Hashimoto Tetsuya and Hayashi Yūichi. *Ishikawa-ken no hyakunen*. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1987.
- Hashizume Shin'ya. *Shukusai no "teikoku"*. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1998.
- Hashizume Shin'ya. *Ehagaki 100nen. kindai Nihon no bijuaru media*. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2006.
- Hata Kurakichi. *Nantō yawa. Narahara danshaku jiseki*. Naha: Okinawa Jitsugyō Jihōsha, 1916.
- Hattori Bunshirō. "Kadan ni tomi-shi Ii Naosuke." *Gakusei* 3, no. 10 (1912): 217.
- Havens, Thomas. *Parkscapes. Green Spaces in Modern Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011.
- Hayashi, Kaori, James Curran, Sunyoung Kwak, Frank Esser, Daniel C. Hallin, and Chin-Chuan Lee. "Pride and Prejudice." *Journalism Studies* 17, no. 8 (2016): 935–51.
- Hayes, Carlton. *Nationalism. A Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1960.
- Hedinger, Hans-Walter. "Der Bismarck-Kult." In *Der Religionswandel unserer Zeit im Spiegel der Religionswissenschaft*, edited by Gunther Stephenson, 201–15. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976.
- Hedinger, Hans-Walter. "Bismarck-Denkmäler und Bismarck-Verehrung." In *Kunstverwaltung, Bau- und Denkmalpolitik im Kaiserreich*, edited by Ekkehard Mai and Stephan Waetzoldt, 277–314. Berlin: Mann, 1981.
- Henry, Todd A. *Assimilating Seoul. Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2014.
- Hidaka Shigeo. *Tōkyō yūran annai*. Tokyo: Taiheikan, 1914.
- Hijikata Hisamoto. *Tennō oyobi ijin o matsuru jinja*. Tokyo: Teikoku Shoin, 1912.
- Hikone-shi Hensan linkai, ed. *Shinshū Hikone shishi*. Vol. 8, *Shiryō-hen kindai 1*. Hikone: Hikone-shi, 2003.
- Hino-machi Kyōikukai, ed. *Gamō Ujisato-kyō dōzō jomakushiki no ki*. Hino: Hino-machi Kyōikukai, 1919.
- Hirase Reita. *Dōzō junan no kindai*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011.
- Hirase, Reita. "War and Bronze Sculpture." In *Art and War in Japan and Its Empire 1931–1960*, edited by Asato Ikeda, Aya Louisa McDonald and Ming Tiampo, 228–39. Japanese Visual Culture 5. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
- Hirayama, Mikio. "The Emperor's New Clothes: Japanese Visuality and Imperial Portrait Photography." *History of Photography* 33, no. 2 (2011): 165–84.
- Hiro'oka Sei'ichi. *Shigisan meishō shiori*. Tokyo: Chogosonshiji, 1914.

- Hirosaki-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed. *Hirosaki shishi*. Hirosaki: Hirosaki-shi, 1964.
- Hitomi Kisaburō, ed. *Keihin shozai dōzō shashin*. Tokyo: Suwadō, 1910.
- Hiyama Yukio. “Kindai Nihon ni okeru sensō kinenhi to gunjin-haka (jō).” *Kyūshū shigaku* (2003): 41–76.
- Hiyama Yukio. “Nihon no senbotsusha irei to sensō kinenhi no keifu.” *Chūkyō hōgaku* 5, no. 3–4 (2016): 315–464.
- Hiyama Yukio, ed. *Kindai Nihon no keisei to Nisshin sensō*. Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 2001.
- Holtom, Daniel C. *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto: A Study of the State Religion of Japan*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1922.
- Hori Shichizō and Ōki Kiyonoshin. *Sekai-teki no ijin Noguchi Hideyo hakushi no kyōiku shisō*. Tokyo: Kyōiku Jissai-sha, 1933.
- Hosoma Hiromichi. *Ehaqaki no jidai*. Tokyo: Seidosha, 2006.
- Hotakayama Hakuchō Kōsha, ed. *Hotakayama kaizan shi*. Tone: Hotakayama Hakuchō Kōsha, 1924.
- Hozumi, Nobushige. *Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law*. London: Kegan Paul, 2004. Originally published by Tokyo: Maruya, 1901.
- Huber, Thomas. *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981.
- Ichikawa Hidekazu. “Asuwayama kōen no seiritsu to basho no seijigaku.” *Fukuī Daigaku Chiiki Kankyō Kenkyū Kyōiku Sentā kenkyū kiyō* 6 (1999): 97–116.
- Ichikawa Kōtarō. *Sakuma Shōzan kinen dōzō kensetsu shu-isho*. Tokyo: Ichikawa Kōtarō, 1889.
- Ichita Kenji, ed. *Kantō daisaiqai qahō*. Tokyo: Keibunsha, 1923.
- Iguchi, Gerald Scott. *Nichirenism as Modernism: Imperialism, Fascism, and Buddhism in Modern Japan*. PhD diss., University of California San Diego, 2006.
- Ikedā Nagama, ed. *Itagaki Taisuke-sensei dōzō kyūshutsu roku*. Kōchi: Kōchi Itagakikai, 1943.
- Ikedā Nobumasa. *Ijin Noguchi Hideyo*. Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, 1934.
- Ikedā Nobumasa. *Noguchi Hideyo*. Tokyo: Kaiseisha, 1950.
- Imahata Nishie and Sakamoto Nakaoka Ryō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai. *Dōzō senbun to ryō-sensei no igyō ni tsuite*. Kōchi: Sakamoto Nakaoka Ryō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1934.
- Imaizumi Yoshiko. “The Making of a Mnemonic Space: Meiji Shrine Memorial Art Gallery 1912–1936.” *Japan Review* 23 (2011): 143–76.
- Imaizumi Yoshiko. *Sacred Space in the Modern City: The Fractured Pasts of Meiji Shrine, 1912–1958*. Brill’s Japanese Studies Library 43. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
- Inamori Kazuo. *Jinsei no ōdō. Saigō nanshū no oshie ni manabu*. Tokyo: Nikkei BP, 2007.
- Inamoto Hiroshi and Sugita Kōzō, eds. *Furusato no kokoro—dōzō*. Tokyo: Orijin Shuppan, 1990.
- Inose Naoki. *Mikado no shōzō*. Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 2005.
- Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensankai, ed. *Segai Inoue-kō-den*. Vol. 5. Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1968.
- Inoue Kōka. *Etchū shiron san*. Takaoka: Kōkakai, 1936.
- Inoue Shōichi. *Nostarujikku aidoru Ninomiya Kinjirō*. Tokyo: Shinjuku Shobō, 1989.
- Inoue, Mitsusada. “The Century of Reform.” In *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 1, edited by Delmer M. Brown, 163–220. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Irimajiri Yoshiyasu et al. “Zadankai ‘Ryōma to seinen.’” In *Sakamoto Ryōma-sensei dōzō monogatari*, edited by Irimajiri Yoshiyasu. Kōchi: Shadan Hōjin Hito o Kangaueru Mura, 1982, 1–10.
- Ishibashi, Chie. “Introduction.” In *Japanese Portrait Sculpture*, edited by Hisashi Mōri, 11–14. Tokyo: Kodansha International and Shibundo, 1977.
- Ishidō Kiyotomo. *Dairen no Nihonjin hikiake no kiroku*. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997.
- Ishihara Bangaku and Noshō Benjirō. *Jidō kyōiku. Tōkyō dōzō shōka*. Tokyo: Bunseikan, 1911.
- Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, ed. *Kioi-chō jiken*. Kanazawa: Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, 1999.
- Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, ed. “*Kenrokuen*” *no jidai*. Kanazawa: Ishikawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, 2001.
- Ishikawa-ken, ed. *Kenrokuen “Meiji kinen no hyō” shūri kōji hōkokusho*. Kanazawa: Ishikawa-ken Kenrokuen Kanri Jimusho, 1993.
- Ishikawa-ken, ed. *Ishikawa kenshi*. Vol. 4. Kanazawa: Ishikawa-ken, 1933.
- Itagaki Taisuke Dōzō Kaishū Kiseikai. *Itagaki Taisuke dōzō shūfuku no shiori*. Kōchi: Itagaki Taisuke Dōzō Kaishū Kiseikai, 1991.
- Itō Hirobumi and Hayashi Tomoyuki. *Zō-jūichi-i Tadamasako narabi shihan shōkō dōzō kensetsu shuisho*. Unpublished document (author’s collection), 1891.
- Itō Takashi et al. *Atarashii minna no kōmin*. Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2015.
- Itō Yukio. *Meiji tennō*. Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 2006.
- Itō, Hirobumi. *Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan*. Tokyo: Chū-ō [sic] Daigaku, 1906.
- Itō, Kimio. “The Invention of *Wa* and the Transformation of the Image of Prince Shōtoku in Modern Japan.” In *Mirror of Modernity. Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, edited by Stephen Vlastos, 37–47. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1998.
- Itō-hakushi Sakuhinshū Kankōkai, ed. *Itō Chūta kenchiku sakuhin*. Tokyo: Jōnan Shoin, 1941.
- Iwai Tadakuma. *Meiji tennō. “Taitei” densetsu*. Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1997.
- Iwata Shigenori. *Ohaka no tanjō*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006.
- Jansen, Marius. *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

- Jansen, Marius. "Education, Values and Politics in Japan." *Foreign Affairs* 7 (1957): 666–78.
- Jansen, Marius. *Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Jansen, Marius. "What was Meiji?." In *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, edited by Helen Hardacre and Adam Kern, 5–10. Brill's Japanese Study Library 6. Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- Jennings, John. *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895–1945*. Westport: Praeger, 1997.
- Jidō Bungakusha Kyōkai, ed. *Ijin no shōnen jidai* (men-sei-6nen-sei). Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1963.
- Jones, Polly, ed. *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Kabe Iwao. *Odoroganaka Kamei Koremi-den*. Tokyo: Matsuno Shoten, 1982.
- Kagoshima-shi, ed. *Kagoshima shishi*. Kagoshima: Kagoshima-shi, 1924.
- Kagotani Jirō. "Ninomiya Kinjirō to Kusunoki Masashige/Masatsura-zō. Ōsaka-fu shōgakkō ni okeru setchi jōkyō no kōsatsu." *Shakai kagaku* 58 (1997): 1–35.
- Kaizuka Shigeki. *Ijin no ikikata kara manabu kyōiku dōtoku*. 2018. <http://www.ikuhosha.co.jp/public/introduction07161.html>.
- Kaizuka Shigeki and Yanaginuma Ryōta, eds. *Gakkō de manabitai Nihon no ijin*. Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2014.
- Kaji Toshiki. "Jinmu tōsei no chiseigaku." *WiLL* 6 (2016): 146–55.
- Kaku Kinshō. *Meiji taitei shashinchō*. Tokyo: Meiji Taitei Igyō Hōsankai Shuppanbu, 1926.
- Kakuroku Yashi. *Meiji sanketsuden*. Tokyo: Seirindō, 1909.
- Kamiyu Rekishi Henshūbu, ed. *Nihon no dōzō kanzen meibo*. Tokyo: Kōsaidō Shuppan, 2013.
- Kanagawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, ed. *Ōke no shōzō. Meiji kōshitsu arubamu no hajimari*. Yokohama: Kanagawa Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, 2001.
- Kanagawa-ken Keisatsu-bu, ed. *Keisatsu hōki ruiten: kajo-shiki*. Vol. 2. Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1925.
- Kanagawa-ken Tochi Kaya Chōsa-shi kai. *Kanagawa-ken Ninomiya Kinjirō tokushū: Kinjirō MAP*. 2010. <http://www.kanagawa-chousashi.or.jp/ninokin/ninokinmap.pdf>.
- Kanasugi Eigorō. *Sanryō no fukko to seichū*. Tokyo: Nihon Iji Shūhōsha, 1926.
- Kanasugi Eigorō. *Akō-jiken no kentō*. Tokyo: Nihon Seiji Shūhōsha, 1934.
- Kanasugi Eigorō. *Kyokutō yoin*. Tokyo: Kanasugi Hakushi Shōkōkai, 1935.
- Kanayama Yoshiaki. *Nihon no hakubutsukan shi*. Tokyo: Keiyūsha, 2001.
- Kanazawa Shishi Hensan linkai, ed. *Kanazawa shishi. Gendai-hen, jō*. Kanazawa: Kanazawa-shi, 1979.
- Kanazawa Shishi Hensan linkai, ed., *Kanazawa shishi. Shiryō-hen 11 (Kindai 1)*. Kanazawa: Kanazawa-shi, 1999.
- Kanazawa Shiyakusho, ed. *Kanazawa shishi. Shigai-hen, daiyon*. Osaka: Meicho Shuppan, 1973.
- Kanazawa-shi Keizai-kyoku Eigyō Senryaku-bu Kankō Seisaku-ka. *Kanazawa-shi kankō chōsa kekka hōkokusho* (2016). Kanazawa: Kanazawa-shi, 2017.
- Kaneko Haruo. *Nihon no dōzō*. Tokyo: Tankōsha, 2012.
- Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho. *Kansō-kō go-dōzō jomakushiki gaikyō sono-ta hōkokusho*. Tokyo: Kansō-kō Dōzō Kensetsu Jimusho, 1914.
- Kapur, Nick. "The Empire Strikes Back? The 1968 Meiji Centennial Celebrations and the Revival of Japanese Nationalism." *Japanese Studies* 38, no. 3 (2018): 305–28.
- Karlin, Jason. *Gender and Nation in Meiji Japan: Modernity, Loss, and the Doing of History*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014.
- Katashina Sonshi Henshū linkai, ed. *Katashina sonshi*. Katashina: Katashina-mura, 1963.
- Kato, Genchi. *Shinto in Essence, As Illustrated by the Faith in a Glorified Personality*. Tokyo: The Nogi Shrine, 1954.
- Katsu Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai. *Shuisho*. Tokyo: Katsu Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai, n.d.
- Katsu Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai. *Tōkyo ni rekishi-teki na shin-meisho*. Tokyo: Katsu Kaishū no Dōzō o Tateru Kai, 2003.
- Katsuta Magoya, ed. *Saigō Takamori den*, 5 vols. Tokyo: Saigō Takamori den Hakkōsho, 1895.
- Katsuta Masaharu. *Daiseijika Ōkubo Toshimichi*. Tokyo: Kadokawa Gakugei Shuppan, 2015.
- Kawa Yoshio. *Maeda Toshitsune-kyō dōzō saiken ni atatte*. Komatsu: Maeda Toshitsune-kyō Dōzō Saiken linkai, 1966.
- Kawaguchi Hitoshi. "Bankoku Fujin Kodomo Hakurankai' ni tsuite no kōsatsu." *Matsuyama Daigaku ronshū* 20, no. 5 (2008): 77–100.
- Kawamura Tetsuo and Shimura Yūko. *Keikō tennō to Yamato Takeru. Rettō o seiha shita taiō*. Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 2015.
- Kawazoe Shōji. *Mōko shūrai kenkyū shiron*. Tokyo: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1977.
- Ken'ei Sanji. *Gunshin Hirose chūsa sōretsudan*. Tokyo: Daigakukan, 1904.
- Kenkoku Kinen no Hi Hōshuku Un'ei linkai. *Dai-40 kai Toyohashi-shi kenkoku kinen no hi hōshuku taikai*. Toyohashi: Kenkoku Kinen no Hi Hōshuku Un'ei linkai, 2006.
- Kenrokuen Zenshi Hensan linkai, ed. *Kenrokuen zenshi*. Kanazawa: Kenrokuen Kankō Kyōkai, 1976.
- Kershaw, Ian. *The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich*. Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū linkai, ed. *Kibe kyōdo shidan*. Kusunoki: Kibe Kyōdo Shidan Henshū Jimukyoku, 1973.
- Kikuie Kan. *Nihon senshi-shō*. Tokyo: Shōwa Shobō, 1941.

- Kikiuri Mikio. "Waga kuni no gakkō kyōiku ni okeru 'majimesa' no kenkyū." *Tōkyō Kasei Daigaku kenkyū kiyō* 40 (2000): 29–40.
- Kim, Hoi-eun. *Doctors of Empire: Medical and Cultural Encounters between Imperial Germany and Meiji Japan*. University of Toronto Press, 2014.
- Kimura Kihachirō. *Ōmura Masujirō*. Tokyo: Chōeisha, 2010.
- Kingston, Jeff. "Yasukuni Shrine." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Saaler, Sven and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 440–54. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Kinmonth, Earl. *The Self-Made Man in Meiji Japanese Thought*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1981.
- Kinoshita Naoyuki. *Shashingaron*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996.
- Kinoshita Naoyuki. *Yo no tochū kara kakusarete-iru koto*. Tokyo: Shōbunsha, 2002.
- Kinoshita Naoyuki. "Gaikokujin kyōshi-tachi no dōzō." *Tansei* 13 (2004): 4–6.
- Kinoshita Naoyuki. "Ueno-sensō no kioku to hyōshō." In *Fuyū suru "kioku,"* edited by Yano Kei'ichi et al., 49–83. Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2005.
- Kinoshita Naoyuki. "Tono-sama no dōzō." In *Zōkei no ba*, edited by Nagaoka Ryūsaku, 91–122. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2005.
- Kinoshita Naoyuki. *Tōkyo no dōzō o aruku*. Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2011.
- Kinoshita Naoyuki. *Dōzō no jidai*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014.
- Kinzoku Shigen Kaihatsu Chōsa Kikaku Gurūpu. "Waga kuni no dō no jūkyū jōkyō no rekishi to hen'yō." *Kinzoku shigen repōto* 9 (2005): 123–43.
- Kitai Toshio. *Shinkokuron no keifu*. Tokyo: Hōzōkan, 2006.
- Kitamura Gyohōdō. *Oyama Jinja shi*. Kanazawa: Oyama Jinja Shamusho, 1973.
- Kitayama Jun'yū. *Heroisches Ethos*. Berlin: Walter Gruyter, 1944.
- Kitazawa Noriaki. "Monyumento no sōshutsu. Chōkoku no kindaika to dōzō." In *Yōga to Nihonga kindai bijutsu II*, edited by Takashina Shūji et al., 186–92. Vol. 22, *Nihon bijutsu zenshū*. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1992.
- Kitazawa Noriaki. "Fukugō-teki zōkei toshite no dōzō." Website of *Ijin no omokage*, 2008. <http://www.yumani.co.jp/np/isbn/9784843330371>.
- Kiyū Gaishi. *Ijin hyakuwa*. Tokyo: Iroha Shobō, 1899.
- Kizaki Kōshō and Rai Baigai. *Rai San'yō-sensei. Kinsei ijin denki sōsho*. Tokyo: San'yōkai, 1935.
- Ko Iwamura Danshaku Dōzō Kensetsukai. *Ko Iwamura danshaku dōzō kensetsu hōkokusho*. Tokyo: Ko Iwamura Danshaku Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1934.
- Ko Ōsaka Shichō Seki Hajime Hakushi Itoku Kenshō linkai, ed. *Seki shichō shōden. Dōzō konryū kinen*. Osaka: Seki Hajime Hakushi Itoku Kenshō linkai, 1956.
- Koch, Jörg. *Von Helden und Opfern. Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Kriegsgedenkens*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013.
- Kōchi Shiyakusho, ed. *Kōchi shishi*. Kōchi: Kōchi Shiyakusho, 1926.
- Kōchi-ken, ed. *Kōchi-ken-shi kindai-hen*. Kōchi: Kōchi-ken, 1970.
- Kōchi-shishi Hensan linkai, ed. *Kōchi shishi*. Kōchi: Kōchi-shi, 1971.
- Kojima Seinosuke, ed. *Niigata-shi yōran*. Niigata: Jitsugyō no Annaisha, 1926.
- Kokumin Gunji Kyōikukai, ed. *Gendai rikugun meishō retsuden*. Tokyo: Kokumin Gunji Kyōikukai, 1916.
- Kokuryūkai, ed. *Seinan kiden*. 6 vols. Tokyo: Kokuryūkai, 1908–11.
- Kondō Yasuichirō, ed. *Nankō seishin to gendai Nihon*. Kobe: Hyōgo Kenritsu Daisan Kōbe Chūgakkō Kōyūkai, 1935.
- Koselleck, Reinhard and Jeismann, Michael, eds. *Der Politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994.
- Kōshinsha Insatsusho, ed. *Insatsu no shiori*. Tokyo: Kōshinsha, 1936.
- Kōsokabe Hideyuki. "Meiji Taishō-ki no shōgakkō kyōkasho ni okeru sashie no kōsatsu: Rekishi, shūshi, kokugo kyōkasho ni egakareta ei'yūzō." *Bulletin of Child Education, Kobe Shinwa Women's University Post Graduate Course* 10 (2006): 43–55.
- Kosugi Yūzō. *Hama rikyū teien*. Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981.
- Kowner, Rotem. *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*. 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
- Krämer, Hans-Martin. *Neubeginn unter US-amerikanischer Besatzung? Hochschulreform in Japan zwischen Kontinuität und Diskontinuität, 1919–1952*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2016.
- Krebs, Gerhard. "German Perspectives on Japanese Heroism during the Nazi Era." In *Mutual Perceptions and Images in Japanese-German Relations, 1860–2010*, edited by Sven Saaler, Akira Kudō, and Tajima Nobuo, 327–48. Brill's Japanese Study Library 59. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
- Kublin, Hyman. "The 'Modern' Army of Early Meiji Japan." *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (1949): 20–41.
- Kuhara Akie. *Saikin no Saga annai*. Saga: Ōtsubo Teishindō, 1915.
- Kume Kunitake, ed. *Tokumei zenken taishi beiō kairan jikki*. 5 vols. Tokyo: Hakubunsha, 1878.
- Kumoda Heitarō. *Kanazawa shigai doku annai*. Kanazawa: Yanagida Iwatarō, 1894.
- Kumon Gō. *Shiseki gaido. Tosa no jiyū minken*. Kōchi: Kōchi Shinbunsha, 2013.
- Kunaichō, ed. *Meiji tennō ki*. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1968.
- Kuntzemüller, Otto. *Die Denkmäler Kaiser Wilhelms des Großen*. Bremen: [no publisher], c. 1902.

- Kurita Kiyomi. *Teikoku dōzō-kagami*. Tokyo: Dai-Nihon Shiseki Kenkyūkai Shuppanbu, 1935.
- Kuroda Hōshin. “Gunshin no kinenzō,” *Taiyō* 16, no. 12 (1910): 205–7.
- Ledyard, Gari. “Galloping Along with the Horseriders: Looking for the Founders of Japan.” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 1, no. 2 (1975): 217–54.
- Lee, Kenneth Doo Young. *The Prince and the Monk: Shōtoku Worship in Shinran’s Buddhism*. New York: State University of New York Press, 2007.
- Lewis, Michael. *Becoming Apart. National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868–1945*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center/Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Lowenthal, David. *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Kindle.
- Lucken, Michael. “Remodelling Public Space: the Fate of War Monuments, 1945–48.” In *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, edited by Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, 135–54. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008.
- Mackie, Vera. “Genders, Sexualities and Bodies in Modern Japanese History.” In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 348–60. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Maeda Shigeo. *Dōzō ni miru Nihon no rekishi*. Tokyo: Sōei Shuppan and Kamiyu Rekishi Henshūbu, 2000.
- Maeda, Tamaki. “From Feudal Hero to National Icon: The Kusunoki Masashige Image, 1660–1945.” *Artibus Asiae* 72, no. 2 (2012): 201–63.
- Maejima Yasuhiko. *Arisugawa-no-miya kinen kōen*. Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981.
- Mainichi Shinbunsha, ed. *Tennō yondai no shōzō*. Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1999.
- Mark, Ethan. “Japan’s 1930s: Crisis, Fascism, and Social Imperialism.” In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 237–50. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Maruoka Shin’ya. *Nihon no kokoro wa dōzō ni atta*. Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2015. Kindle.
- Maruyama, Masao. *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, trans. by Mikiso Hane. Princeton: Princeton University Press and University of Tokyo Press, 1974.
- Maruyama, Masao. *Chūsei to hanjyaku*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1998.
- Masutomi Toshima. *Kibe sonshi*. Unpublished handwritten manuscript held in Kibe Fureai Center, Ube City, 1933.
- Matano Yoshirō. *Ijin no genkō*. Tokyo: Daigakkan, 1900.
- Matsuda Kōichirō. *Gisei no riron, jiyū no fuan*. Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2016.
- Matsudaira Kōmei. *Nihon no dōzō*. Tokyo: Zuisōsha, 2002.
- Matsuno Keisaburō, ed. *Nihon butsuzō shi*. Tokyo: Bijutsu Shuppansha, 2001.
- Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak. “Human Bullets, General Nogī, and the Myth of Port Arthur.” In *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective*, edited by John Steinberg et al., 179–201. History of Warfare 29. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
- McClain, James. *Kanazawa: A Seventeenth-Century Japanese Castle Town*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
- McClain, James. “Failed Expectations: Kaga Domain on the Eve of the Meiji Restoration.” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 14, no. 2 (1988): 403–47.
- McClain, James. “Kanazawa City Politics.” In *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, edited by Helen Hardacre and Adam Kern, 466–75. Brill’s Japanese Study Library 6. Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- McClain, James. *Japan. A Modern History*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002.
- McCormack, Gavan, “Ryukyū/Okinawa’s Trajectory—From Periphery to Centre, 1600–2015.” In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 118–34. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- McNeill, David. “Nippon Kaigi and the Radical Conservative Project to Take Back Japan.” *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 13, issue 50, no. 4 (December 14, 2015). <http://apjff.org/-David-McNeill/4409>.
- McWilliam, Neil. “Conflicting Manifestations: Parisian Commemoration of Joan of Arc and Etienne Dolet in the Early Third Republic.” *French Historical Studies* 27, no. 2 (2004): 381–418.
- Meiji Taitei Seizō Konryū Hōsankai. *Meiji taitei*. Gifu: Meiji Taitei Seizō Konryū Hōsankai, 1972.
- Meiji Tennō Seiseki Hozonkai, ed. *Meiji tennō gyōkō nenpyō*. Tokyo: Daikōdō, 1933.
- Meyer, Harald. *Japans Bestseller-König: eine narratologisch-wirkungsästhetische Erfolgsanalyse zum Phänomen Shiba Ryōtarō (1923–1996)*. Munich: Iudicium, 2010.
- Michalski, Sergiusz. *Public Monuments: Art in Political Bondage 1870–1997*. Clerkenwell: Reaktion Books, 1998. Kindle.
- Mikami Sanji. “Ijin tōhyō no kekka o hyōsu.” *Gakusei* 3, no. 10 (1912): 307–12.
- Minatogawa Jinja. *Minatogawa Jinja shashi*. Kobe: Minatogawa Jinja Shamusho, 1928.
- Minatogawa Jinja Chinza Hyakunen Kiroku Henshū linkai. *Minatogawa Jinja chinza hyakunen-sai kiroku*. Kobe: Minatogawa Jinja Shamusho, 1976.
- Minato-ku Kyōdo Rekishikan, ed. *Nihon—Ōsutoria kokkō no hajimari*. Tokyo: Minato-ku Kyōiku linkai, 2019.
- Mita Yoshinobu, ed. *Sekihi de meguru Kanazawa rekishi sanpo*. Kanazawa: Hokkoku Shinbunsha, 2013.
- Mitani, Hiroshi. *Escape from Impasse*. Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2006.

- Mitchell, William Donald. *The Art of the Bronze Founder. Especially in its Relation to the Casting of Bronze Statuary and Other Sculptural Work*. New York: Juno, 1916.
- Mitsuchi Chüzō. *Shakai hyakugen*. Tokyo: Toyama Shobō, 1910.
- Miyagawa Tetsujirō. *Shintenfu haikan-ki*. Tokyo: Hoseidō, 1902.
- Miyagi-ken Seinendan. *Hanso Date Masamune-kō dōzō ken-seitsu shuisho*. Sendai: Miyagi-ken Seinendan, 1935.
- Mizuno Hisanao. *Meiji tennō go-sonzō hōsen-ki*. Shimonoseki: Akama Jingū Shamusho, 1967.
- Mizuno Naoki. “Shokuminchi-ki Chōsen ni okeru Itō Hirobumi no kioku. Keijō no Hakubunji o chūshin ni.” In *Itō Hirobumi to Kankoku tōchi*, edited by Itō Yukio, 275–99. Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 2009.
- Mizuno Naoki. “‘Hakubun-ji no wakaigeki’ to gojitsudan.” *Jinbun gaku* 101 (2011): 81–101.
- Mizushima Kanji. “Meiji kinenhyō Yamato Takeru dōzō no sakusha wa Kaga-han goyō gashi Sasaki hōkyo senryū-ō.” *Ishikawa Kyōdo-shi gakkai kaishi* 3 (1970): 8.
- Mnich, Reiner and Lutz Nöh. *Rostock und Warnemünde—Bildende Kunst im Stadtbild*. Rostock: Hinstorff, 2000.
- Mochizuki, Kotaro. *The Late Emperor of Japan as a World Monarch*. Tokyo: The Liberal News Agency, 1914. <https://archive.org/details/cu31924007798311>.
- Monbu Kagakushō. *Watashitachi no dōtoku. Shōgakkō 1-2nen*. Tokyo: Monbu Kagakushō, 2014.
- Monbu Kagakushō. *Watashitachi no dōtoku. Shōgakkō 3-4nen*. Tokyo: Monbu Kagakushō, 2015.
- Monbu Kagakushō. *Watashitachi no dōtoku. Shōgakkō 5-6nen*. Tokyo: Monbu Kagakushō, 2016.
- Monbushō. *Meiji tennō seiseki*. Tokyo: Monbushō, 1935.
- Monbushō, ed. *Gakusei hyakumen shi*. Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1972.
- Mori, Akiko. “A History of the Excluded. Rethinking the Sugar Industry in the Northern Mariana Islands under Japanese Rule.” *Historische Anthropologie* 27, no. 3 (2019), 410–34.
- Mori Masato. “Kokka no ideogōji sōchi to kokumin-teki ijin.” *Jinbun ronsō* 24 (2007): 165–77.
- Mori Masato. “1935nen no Kusunoki Masashige o meguru ikutsuka no dekgigoto.” *Jinbun ronsō* 25 (2008): 115–28.
- Mori Masato. “1930nendai ni hakken sareru Kusunoki-teki naru mono.” *Jinbun ronsō* 26 (2009): 147–59.
- Mori Shigeaki. *Go-Daigo tennō*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2000.
- Mōri Takehiko. *Bakumatsu ishin to Saga-han*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2008.
- Mōri Toshihiko. *Ōkubo Toshimichi*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1969.
- Mōri, Hisashi. *Japanese Portrait Sculpture*. Tokyo: Kodansha International and Shibundo 1977.
- Morimoto Tan'nosuke, ed. *Gunshin Tachibana chūsa*. Tokyo: Chūseidō, 1920.
- Morimoto Tatsuaki. “Okayama-ken ni okeru Ninomiya Kinjirō-zō no jittai chōsa.” *Okayama Kenritsu Kiroku Shiryōkan kiyō* 6 (2011): 69–93.
- Morioka Isao. “Rittai shashinzō.” In *Saishin shashin kagaku taikai*, vol. 9, edited by Nakamura Dōtarō, 1–19. Seibundō Shinkōsha, 1936.
- Morioka Kiyomi. “Meiji ishinki ni okeru hanso o matsuru jinja no sōken.” *Shukutoku Daigaku Sōgō Fukushi Gakubu/Bulletin of the College of Integrated Human and Social Welfare Studies, Shukutoku University* 37 (2003): 125–48.
- Morita Toshio. “Ōsaka-fu no shiseki chōsa to furitsu toshokan no kōshitsu kankei Ōsaka-fu kyōdo shiryō tenji (kōhan).” *Bulletin of the Osaka Jonan Women's Junior College* 45 (2011): 1–68.
- Morita Yasunosuke. *Minatogawa Jinja shi*. 3 vols. Kobe: Minatogawa Jinja Shamusho, 1984–87.
- Morris, Ivan. *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1975.
- Morris, J. *Makers of Japan*. London: Methuen, 1906.
- Mosse, George. *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*. New York: H. Fertig, 1975.
- Mosse, George. *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Motoyasu Hiroshi. *Gunto no irei kūkan: kokumin tōgō to senshishatachi*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002.
- Mullins, Mark. “Religion in Contemporary Japanese Lives.” In *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Culture and Society*, edited by Lyon Victoria Bestor and Theodore C. Bestor, 63–74. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Münkler, Herfried. “Die Visibilität der Macht und die Strategien der Machtvisualisierung.” In *Macht der Öffentlichkeit—Öffentlichkeit der Macht*, edited by Gerhard Göhler, 213–30. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995.
- Murakami Shigeyoshi. *Kokkashintō*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970.
- Murakami Shigeyoshi. *Tennō no saishi*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977.
- Murashima Shigeru, ed. *Niigata Hakusan Jinja*. Niigata: Niigata Hakusan Jinja, 2006.
- Murata Katsutarō. *Meiji taitei seitoku shōka*. Tokyo: Takeda Hakuseidō, 1912.
- Murata Masashi. *Nanbokuchō ron. Shijitsu to shisō*. Tokyo: Shibundō, 1959.
- Murata Minejirō. *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei den*. Tokyo: Inagaki Jōsaborō, 1892.
- Murata Minejirō. *Ōmura Masujirō-sensei jiseki*. Tokyo: Murata Minejirō, 1919.
- Musil, Robert. “Denkmale.” In *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2, 506–7. Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1978. First published 1926.

- Muther, Richard. "Die Denkmalsseuche." *Studien und Kritiken* 2 (1901): 38.
- Naikaku Kanbō, ed. *Naikaku seido kyūjū-nen shiryōshū*. Tokyo: Ōkurashō Insatsu-kyoku, 1976.
- Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō, ed. *Meiji hyakumen kinen gyōji tō kiroku*. Tokyo: Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō, 1969.
- Najita, Tetsuo. "Nakano Seigō and the Spirit of the Meiji Restoration in Twentieth-Century Japan." In *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan*, edited by James W. Morley, 375–422. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Nakada Takanori, ed. *Ka-Etsu-No ishin kin'ō shiryaku*. Tokyo: Ka-No-Etsu Ishin Kin'ō-ka Hyōshōkai, 1930.
- Nakagawa, Ryohei. "Japan-U.S. Trade and Rethinking the Point of No Return toward the Pearl Harbor." *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies* 9 (2010): 101–23.
- Nakai, Kate. "State Shinto." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 147–59. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Nakajima Michio. "Shinto Deities that Crossed the Sea: Japan's 'Overseas Shrines,' 1868 to 1945." *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 37, no. 1 (2010): 21–46.
- Nakajima Satoshi, ed. *Semento chōso shashinshū*. Osaka: Borutorando Semento Dōgyōkai, 1942.
- Nakamura Katsumaro. *Ii tairō to kaikō*. Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1909.
- Nakamura, Katsumaro. *Lord Ii Naosuké and New Japan*. Tokyo: Japan Times, 1909.
- Nakamura Kuji. *Yuchi Takeo. Genkō kinenhi Kameyama jōkōzō o tateta otoko*. Tokyo: Azusa Shoin, 2015 [Tokyo: Maki Shobō, 1943].
- Nakamura Makiko. "Sosen sūhai to tennō shinkō." *Soshioologos* (1992): 158–73.
- Nakamura Shintarō, ed. *Ijin no kenkyū jiten*. Tokyo: Komine Shoten, 1960.
- Nakamura Tatsutarō. "Ko Doitsu rōtei kinendō." *Kenchiku zasshi* 38 (1890): 19–20.
- Nakane Kandō. *Chōman kenbunki*. Tokyo: Chūō Bukkyōsha, 1936.
- Nakaoka Shintarō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai. *Dōzō kensetsu hōkokusho*. Kōchi: Nakaoka Shintarō-sensei Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1935.
- Nakayama, Eiko. *Meiji shōka no tanjō*. Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2010.
- Narisawa Muneo, ed. *Nippon kaiqi to jinja honchō*. Tokyo: Kinyōbi, 2016.
- Narita Ryūichi. *Sengo shisōka toshite no Shiba Ryōtarō*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2003.
- Nguyen, Viet Thanh. *Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- NHK/NHK Promotion, ed. "Shinsengumi" ten. Tokyo: NHK/NHK Promotion, 2004.
- Nichigai Associates, ed. *Jinbutsu kinenkan jiten*. Tokyo: Nichigai Associates, 2002.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life*, translated by Ian Johnston. Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2010. Originally published in German, Leipzig: E. W. Fritzsche, 1874.
- Nihon Kokusai Igaku Kyōkai, ed. *Leoporuto Myurureru dōzō jomakushiki*. Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Igaku Kyōkai, 1975.
- Niigata Shishi Hensan Kindai-shi Bukai, ed. *Niigata shishi. Tsūshi-hen 3 Kindai (jō)*. Niigata: Niigata-shi, 1996.
- Niigata Shiyakusho, ed. *Niigata shishi*. Vol. 1. Niigata: Niigata Shiyakusho, 1934.
- Niiseki Kimiko. "Chōkoku no hatashita yakuwari." In *Meiji jidaikan*, ed. Miyachi Masato et al., 354–55. Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 2005.
- Nipperdey, Thomas. "Nationalidee und Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland." *Historische Zeitschrift* (1968): 529–85.
- Nishikawa Nagao. *Kokkyō no koekata: kokumin kokka ron josetsu*. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2001.
- Nishikawa Nagao and Matsumiya Hideharu, eds. *Bakumatsu/Meiji-ki no kokumin kokka keisei to bunka hen'yō*. Tokyo: Shin'yōsha, 1995.
- Nishimura Tomijirō. *Nihon ijin den*. Tokyo: Kōbunkan, 1897.
- Nishimura Tomijirō. *Ōmura Masujirō den*. Tokyo: Kōbunkan, 1897.
- Nishimura, Sey. "The Making of a National Hero: Rai Sanyō's Kusunoki Masashige." In *History in the Service of the Japanese Nation*, edited by John S. Brownlee, 58–93. Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1983.
- Nitta Mitsuko. *Dairen Jinja shi*. Tokyo: Oūfū, 1997.
- Nora, Pierre, Lawrence D. Kritzman, and Arthur Goldhammer, eds./trans. *The Realms of Memory*. 3 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Norman, E. Herbert. "Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription." *Pacific Affairs* 16, no. 1 (1943): 47–64.
- Noto Takeshi and Kuwahara Hiromi. "Gunma-ken-ka kōritsu gakkō ni okeru Ninomiya Kinjirō-zō no chōsa." *Bulletin of the Gumma Prefectural Museum of History* 27 (2006): 49–72.
- Nozaki, Yoshiko. *War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, 1945–2007*. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.
- O'Connor, Peter, and Aaron M. Cohen. "Thoughts on the Precipice: Japanese Postcards, c. 1903–39." *Japan Forum* 13, no. 1 (2001): 55–62.
- Ogasawara Naganari and Igari Matazō. *Aikokushin*. Tokyo: Hōshakai Shuppanbu, 1929.
- Ogiwara Rokuzan. "Tōkyō shinai no dōzō o ronzu." *Waseda bungaku* 48 (1909): 36.
- Oguma, Eiji. *Okinawa 1818–1972: Inclusion and Exclusion*. Vol. 1, *The Boundaries of "the Japanese,"* translated by Leonie R. Stickland. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2014.

- Ogyū Tensen, Yatsunami Norikichi. *Wake no Kiyomaro*. Vol. 181, *Kōdansha no ehon*. Tokyo: Dai- Nihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, 1941.
- Ōhara Yasuo. *Chūkōnhi no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Akatsuki Shobō, 1984.
- Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko. *Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- Ōita-ken. *Ōita-ken shashinchō*. Ōita: Ōita-ken, 1920.
- Ōita-ken Kyōiku-kai, ed. *Gunshin Hirose chūsa shōden*. Ōita: Kinkōdō, 1905.
- Okada Kiichirō. *Tōkyō dōzō-meguri rokujūgoban*. Tokyo: Hibino Toshikazu, 2014. Kindle.
- Okada Shōji. *Nihon Shintō-shi*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2010.
- Okada Yoneo. “Jingū jinja sōken shi.” In *Meiji ishin Shintō hyakunen shi*, vol. 2, edited by Shintō Bunkakai, 3–182. Tokyo: Shintō Bunkakai, 1967.
- Okamoto, Shumpei. *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.
- Ōkawa Ryūhō. *Jinmu tennō wa jitsuzai shita*. Tokyo: Kōfuku no Kagaku Shuppan, 2012.
- Okinawa-ken Kyōiku linkai, ed. *Okinawa kenshi. Tsūshi 1*. Naha: Okinawa-ken Kyōiku linkai, 1976.
- Ōkuma Asajirō. *Shinsui Horiuchi Bunjirō shōgun o itamu*. Tokyo: Ōkuma Asajirō, 1942.
- Ōkuma Shigenobu. “Nabeshima Kansō-kō no kaiko.” *Gakusei* 3, no. 10 (1912): 8–16.
- Ōkuma Shigenobu. *Ōkuma-haku hyakuwa*. Edited by Emori Taikichi. Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihon-sha, 1909.
- Ōmachi Keigetsu. *Fudegusa*. Tokyo: Kaneo Bun'en'dō, 1909.
- Ōmachi Keigetsu. “Ijin-ron.” *Gakusei* 3, no. 10 (1912): 58–93.
- Ono Gakuyō, ed. *Nichiren dōzō-shi. Genkō kinen*. Osaka: Risshōsha, 1904.
- Ono Masaaki. “Go-shin'ei no kafu shinsei shikaku no kaku-dai katei to sono imi.” *Kyōiku gaku zasshi* 39 (2004): 13–32.
- Ōoka Tsutomu. *Chihō chōkan jinbutsu hyō*. Tokyo: Nagashima Ichirō, 1892.
- Orbaugh, Sharalyn. “General Nogi's Wife: Representations of Women in Narratives of Japanese Modernization.” In *In Pursuit of Contemporary East Asian Culture*, edited by Stephen Snyder and Xiaobing Tang, 7–31. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
- Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbunsha. *Kōshitsu Go-shashinchō*. Osaka: Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1929.
- Ōsako Dai-nana Shidanchō Shōtoku Dōzō Kensetsukai. *Ōsako dai-nana shidanchō shōtoku dōzō kensetsu shuisho*. Tokyo: unpublished document (author's collection), 1906.
- Ōta Kōki, ed. *Genkō eki no kaiko. Kinenhi kensetsu shiryō*. Tokyo: Kinseisha, 2009.
- Ōtorii Tadashi. *Ko Ii Naosuke chōjin dōzō jomakushiki no ki*. Tokyo: [no publisher], 1909.
- Oyabe Shishi Hensan linkai, ed. *Oyabe shishi*, vol. 2. Oyabe: Oyabe-shi, 1941.
- Ozaki Kisao. *Kōzuke no kuni shin myōchō*. Maebashi: Ozaki-sensei Chosho Kankōkai, 1974.
- Pantzer, Peter, ed. *Österreichs erster Handelsdelegierter in Japan. Das Japan-Tagebuch von Karl Ritter von Scherzer 1869*. Munich: Iudicium, 2019.
- Pantzer, Peter, and Sven Saaler. *Japanische Impressionen eines Kaiserlichen Gesandten. Karl von Eisendecker im Japan der Meiji-Zeit*. Munich: Iudicium, 2007.
- Pyle, Kenneth. “The Technology of Japanese Nationalism. The Local Improvement Movement, 1900–1918.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 33, no. 1 (1973): 51–65.
- Ravina, Mark. *The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigō Takamori*. Hoboken: Wiley & Sons, 2005.
- Ravina, Mark. “The Apocryphal Suicide of Saigō Takamori.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 3 (2010): 691–721.
- Ravina, Mark. “The Yen—Japan's National Currency.” In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 279–94. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Rees, E. A. “Leader Cults: Varieties, Preconditions and Functions.” In *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc*, edited by Balázs Apor, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones and E. A. Rees, 3–26. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Reichel, Karl Ferdinand. “Der kaisertreue Samurai Kusunoki Masasige.” *Asienberichte* 5/22 (1944): 52–7.
- Rekishi Kyōikusha Kyōgikai, ed. *Sekishi to dōzō de yomu kindai Nihon no sensō*. Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2007.
- Roberts, Luke. *Performing the Great Peace: Political Space and Open Secrets in Tokugawa Japan*. University of Hawai'i Press, 2012.
- Roesgaard, Marie H. *Moral Education in Japan*. London and New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Ruoff, Kenneth. *Imperial Japan at its Zenith*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Ryōma-zō Shūfuku Jikkō linkai. *Sakamoto Ryōma dōzō shūfuku dokyumento*. Kōchi: Kōchi-shi Katsurahama Kōen Kankō Kaihatsu Kōsha, 1999.
- Saaler, Sven. *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion. The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society*. Munich: Iudicium, 2005.
- Saaler, Sven. “Shokuminchi tōchi to kojū sūhai. Nihon to Doitsu no shokuminchi ni okeru dōzō.” *Gotō Shinpei no kai kaihō*, vol. 2 (2006), 51–59.
- Saaler, Sven. “Personenkult im Modernen Japan: Denkmäler für die Gründer des japanischen Kolonialreiches in Taiwan, Korea und der Mandschurei.” In *Referate des 13. Deutschsprachigen Japanologentages, Bd. II*, edited by Günter Distelrath, 297–323. Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2009.
- Saaler, Sven. “The Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) and the Rise of Nationalism, Pan-Asianism, and Militarism

- in Japan, 1901–1925.” *International Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (2014): 125–60.
- Saaler, Sven. “Naval Memorials in Germany and Japan: Narratives of a ‘Clean War’ Represented in Public Space.” *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* 11, no. 1 (2014): 7–43.
- Saaler, Sven. “Karl von Eisendecker and Japan.” In *Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan*, edited by Joanne Miyang Cho, Lee M. Roberts, and Christian W. Spang, 35–52. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.
- Saaler, Sven. “Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan.” In *Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered*, edited by Jeff Kingston, 172–85. London and New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Saaler, Sven. “Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan.” *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 14, issue 2, no. 7 (October 15, 2016). <http://apjif.org/2016/20/Saaler.html>.
- Saaler, Sven. “Public Statuary and Nationalism in Modern and Contemporary Japan.” *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 15, issue 20, no. 3 (October 15, 2017). <https://apjif.org/2017/20/Saaler.html>.
- Saaler, Sven. “Fukushima Yasumasa’s Travels in Central Asia and Siberia: Silk Road Romanticism, Military Reconnaissance, or Modern Exploration?.” In *Japan on the Silk Road. Encounters and Perspectives of Politics and Culture in Eurasia*, edited by Selçuk Esenbel, 69–86. Brill’s Japanese Studies Library 60. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
- Saaler, Sven, and Wolfgang Schwentker. “Introduction. The Realms of Memory: Japan And Beyond.” In *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, edited by Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, 1–14. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008.
- Saaler, Sven, and Wolfgang Schwentker, eds. *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008.
- Sabatier, Gérard. “La Gloire du Roi: Iconographie de Louis XIV de 1661 à 1672.” *Histoire, Économie et Société* 19, no. 4 (2000): 527–60.
- Sacher, Jay. *Lincoln Memorial. The Story and Design of an American Monument*. San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2014.
- Saeki Etatsu. *Haibutsu kishaku hyakunen*. Tokyo: Kōmyakusha, 2003.
- Saitō Makoto Kinenkan, ed. *Saitō Makoto Kinenkan no ayumi*. Misuzawa: Saitō Makoto Kinenkan, 1984.
- Saitō Michinori. *Nichitai no kakehashi. Hyakunen damu o tsukutta otoko*. Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshin Shuppankyoku, 2009.
- Sakakibara Eisuke. *Ryōma densetsu no kyojitsu*. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2010.
- Sakamoto Nakaoka Dōzō Kensetsukai, ed. *Shunketsu Sakamoto Ryōma*. Tokyo: Sakamoto Nakaoka Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1926.
- Sakamoto Nakaoka Ryō-sensei Sōnan Gojūnen Kinen Saitenkai, ed. *Sakamoto Nakaoka ryō-sensei sōnan gojūnen kinen kōen shū*. Kyoto: Sakamoto Nakaoka Ryō-sensei Sōnan Gojūnen Kinen Saitenkai, 1917.
- Sakuma Hisakichi, ed. *Kameyama-en no ki*. Yamaguchi: Sakuma Hisakichi, 1927.
- Sakuraba Kei’i. *Saigō Nanshū*. Tokyo: Ōkura Shoten, 1891.
- Sandage, Scott A. “A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939–1963.” *Journal of American History* 80, no. 1 (1993): 135–67.
- Sankei Shinbun Shuzaihan, ed. *Jinmu tennō wa tashika ni sonzai shita*. Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun Shuppan, 2016.
- Sasaki Chiyuki. *Dōzō monogatari*. Tokyo: Jidaisha, 1941.
- Sasaki Suguru. “Meiji tennō no imēji keisei to minshū.” In *Bakumatsu/Meiji-ki no kokumin kokka keisei to bunka hen’yō*, edited by Nishikawa Nagao and Matsumiya Hideharu, 117–42. Tokyo: Shin’yōsha, 1995.
- Sasaki Suguru. *Bakumatsu no tennō, Meiji no tennō*. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2005.
- Sasaki Suguru, ed. *Ōkubo Toshimichi*. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2004.
- Satō Hiromi. *“Koji” suru kyōkasho*. Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 2019.
- Satō, Kenji. “Postcards in Japan: A Historical Sociology of a Forgotten Culture.” *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 11 (2002): 35–55.
- Satō Yūji. *Asa ga kite shiru horyo no inochi*. Tokyo: Bungeisha, 2002.
- Satomi, Kishio. *Japanese Civilization, its Significance and Realization: Nichirenism and the Japanese National Principles*. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1923.
- Sawachi Hisae. *Hi wa waga kyochū ni ari*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978.
- Schasler, Max. *Ueber moderne Denkmalswuth*. Berlin: Habel, 1878.
- Schiller, Emil. *Shinto, die Volksreligion Japans*. Berlin: Ostasien-Mission, 1935.
- Schmidt, Martin H. “Das Blücher-Denkmal in Rostock von Johann Gottfried Schadow.” In *Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher und seine Zeit*, edited by Wolf Karge, 19–42. Rostock: Hinstorff, 1992.
- Schneider, Michael. “Liberalism, Internationalism, and Democracy.” In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 199–211. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Schubert, Ernst. *Der Magdeburger Reiter*. Magdeburg: Stadt Magdeburg Museen, 1994.
- Schwager, Lothar H. “Die nationalpolitische Auswertung historischer Gestalten in der Schulerziehung Japans.” In *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*, Bd. XXVIII, Teil B, 1–25. Tokyo: OAG—Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 1934.
- Seaton, Philip. *Japan’s Contested War Memories*. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

- Seaton, Philip, ed. *Local History and War Memories in Hokkaido*. London and New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Seele, Sieglinde. *Lexikon der Bismarck-Denkmäler. Türme, Standbilder, Büsten, Gedenksteine und andere Ehrungen*. Petersberg: Michael Imhof, 2005.
- Segawa Mitsuyuki. *Nihon no meishō*. Kyoto: Shiden Hensansho, 1900.
- Seki Yasunosuke. *Dai-Nankō roppyakunen taisai shashinchō*. Kobe: Dai-Nankō Ropyyakunen Taisai Hōsankai, 1935.
- Sekiyu Ten'nen Gasu – Kinzoku Kōbutsu Shigen Kikō. *Dō bijinesu no rekishi*. Tokyo: Sekiyu Ten'nen Gasu – Kinzoku Kōbutsu Shigen Kikō, 2006.
- Seraphim, Franziska. *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Sheftall, M.G. *Blossoms in the Wind. Human Legacies of the Kamikaze*. New York: NAL Caliber.
- Shibusawa Sei'en Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed. *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*. Vol. 24. Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō Kankōkai, 1959.
- Shibusawa Sei'en Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed. *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*. Vol. 28. Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō Kankōkai, 1959.
- Shibusawa Sei'en Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed. *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō*. Vol. 49. Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō Kankōkai, 1963.
- Shidehara Tan. "Doitsu kōshitsu no kinenkan." *Shimin* 7, no. 7 (1912): 111–13.
- Shilito, Edward. *Nationalism. Man's Other Religion*. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1933.
- Shimamura Takitarō. *Kindai bungei no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1909.
- Shimazono, Susumu. "State Shinto in the Lives of the People." *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 36, no. 1 (2009): 93–124.
- Shimazono Susumu. *Kokka Shintō to Nihonjin*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010.
- Shimazu, Naoko. *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Shimizu Yoshinori. *Dōzō meguri tabi*. Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2006.
- Shimizu Yūichirō. "Yamagata Aritomo." In *Meiji-shi kōgi*, edited by Tsutsui Kiyotada, 199–216. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2018.
- Shimoda, Hiraku. *Lost and Found: Recovering Regional Identity in Imperial Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center/Harvard University Press, 2014.
- Shimoto Naiji. *Chūyū giretsu. Gunshin Nogi taishō*. Tokyo: Teikoku Hōtokukai Shuppanbu, 1919.
- Shinpen Hirosaki-shi Hensan linkai, ed. *Shinpen Hirosaki shishi. Tsūshi-hen* 5. Hirosaki: Hirosaki-shi Kikaku-bu Kikaku-ka, 2005.
- Shinseisha Dōjin. *Sanjūbō*. Tokyo: Shinseisha, 1901.
- Shiota Masahiro. "Seitoku kinen kaigakan nit suite no ichi-kōsatsu." *Ōtemon Daigaku Shakai Bunka Gakubu ronshū* 6 (2005): 73–109.
- Shirai Satoshi. *Kokutairon*. Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2018.
- Shizan Koji, Chūshū Koji, Yuchi Takeo. *Genkō hangeki gokoku bidan*. Tokyo: Seikodō, 1891.
- Shōji Shintarō et al., eds. *Tsūzoku Saigō Takamori den*. Tokyo: Kaiseisha, 1880.
- Shunpokō Tsuishōkai. *Itō Hirobumi-kō dōzō oyobi shōtokuhi kensetsu tenmatsu*. Tokyo: Shunpokō Tsuishōkai, 1937.
- Siegenthaler, Peter. "Development for Preservation: Localizing Collective Memory in 1960s Kanazawa." In *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, edited by Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, 319–36. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008.
- Sippel, Patricia. "Technology and Change in Japan's Modern Copper Mining Industry." In *Institutional and Technological Change in Japan's Economy: Past and Present*, Hunter, Janet and Cornelia Storz, 10–26. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Smethurst, Richard J. *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: the Army and the Rural Community*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1974.
- Smethurst, Richard J. *From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan's Keynes*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Smith, Anthony D. "Ethnic Myths and Ethnic Revivals." *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1984): 283–305.
- Smith, Anthony D. "The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the Renewal of Nations." *The British Journal of Sociology* 47/4 (1996): 575–98.
- Smith, Anthony D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Smith, Anthony D. *The Antiquity of Nations*. London: Polity, 2004.
- Society of Satsuma Samurai Spirits, ed. *Satsuma Spirits*. Tokyo: Society of Satsuma Spirits, 2011.
- Sone Kenzō. *Dai-Nankō roppyakunen-taisai kinen roku*. Tokyo: Dai-Nankō Ropyyakunen Taisai Hōsankai, 1935.
- Sonehara Satoshi. *Shinkun Ieyasu no tanjō: Tōshōgū to Gongen-sama*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2008.
- Sōritsu Gojūshūnen Kinen Jigyō Jikkō linkai, ed. *Jōyō Meiji Kinenkan sōritsu gojūshūnen kinenshi*. Ōrai: Zaidan Hōjin Jōyō Meiji Kinenkai, 1979.
- Steben, Barry. "Rai San'yō's Philosophy of History and the Ideal of Imperial Restoration." *East Asian History* 24 (2002): 117–70.
- Steben, Barry. "Rai Sanyō's Unofficial History." In *Sources of Japanese Tradition, Volume Two: Sources of Japanese Tradition 1600 to 2000, Part Two: 1868 to 2000*, compiled by William Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur Tiedemann, 484–88. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

- Suematsu Shirō. *Tōkyō no kōen tsūshi*. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Gōgakusha, 1981.
- Sugano Tamotsu. *Nippon Kaigi no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Fusōsha, 2016.
- Sugihara Izan. *Yoshida Shōin: Ijin genkōroku*. Tokyo: Miyoshiya, 1910.
- Sugimoto Kichitarō. *Gendai Nihon o kitsukiageta ijin no seinen jidai*. Tokyo: Nishōdō Shoten, 1938.
- Sugitani Akira. *Nabeshima Kansō*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1992.
- Sugitani Torazō. *Yamato Takeru*. Tokyo: Kyūendō Shoten, 1908.
- Sumitomo Honten. *Nankō dōzō-ki*. Osaka: Sumitomo Honten, 1900.
- Sünderhauf, Esther Sophia, ed. *Begegnungen mit den Monumenten für das Kaiserreich*. Dresden: Sandstein Verlag, 2010.
- Suzuki Kiyoshi and Watanabe Akiko. *Kyōdo no unda ijin*. Tokyo: Ryūyō-chō Kyōdo Kenkyūkai, 1996.
- Suzuki Shin'ichi and Yamaki Kazuhiko (2009), "Transforming Popular Consciousness through the Sacralisation of Western Schools: The Meiji Schoolhouse and Tenno Worship." *Comparativ* 2/3 (2009), 44–77.
- Tacke, Charlotte. *Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 108. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995.
- Taitō Kuritsu Asakura Chōsokan, ed. *Asakura Chōsokan*. Tokyo: Taitō-ku Geijutsu Bunka Zaidan, 2014.
- Taitō Kuritsu Asakura Chōsokan, ed. *Asakura Chōsokan shozō Asakura Fumio sekkō genkei sakuhinshū*. Tokyo: Taitō-ku Geijutsu Bunka Zaidan, 2016.
- Tajiri Tasuku, ed. *Zōi shokenden*. 2 vols. Tokyo: Kokuyūsha, 1927.
- Takagi Hiroshi. "'Kyōdo-ai' to 'aikokushin' o tsunagu mono. Kindai ni okeru 'hansō' no kenshō." *Rekishi hyōron* 659 (2005): 2–18.
- Takagi Hiroshi. *Kindai tennō-sei to koto*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006.
- Takahashi Shinji. *Kuki Ryūichi no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Miraisha, 2008.
- Takahashi Yoshitarō, ed. *Shōtoku kinen kaigakan sōjoden ato kinen kenzōbutsu kyōgi sekkei zushū*. Tokyo: Kōyōsha, 1918.
- Takahata-san Kongō-ji. *Takahata Fudō-son no Shinsen gumi kanren shiryō*. Chōfū: Takahata-san Kongō-ji, 2016.
- Takamori Mitsuno. *Soren senryō-ka no Dairen*. Tokyo: Daitōa-juku Shuppanbu, 1974.
- Takamura Kōun. *Bakumatsu ishin kaiko dan*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995.
- Takanashi Kōji. *Heibu tayū Ōmura Masujirō-sensei*. Tokyo: Ōmura-kyō Itoku Kenshōkai, 1941.
- Takaoka Shishi Hensan Inkaikai, ed. *Takaoka shishi, gekan*. Takaoka: Seirin Shoin Shinsha, 1969.
- Takata Yūsuke. "Ishin no kioku to 'kin'ō no sōshutsu. Tanaka Mitsuki no kenshō katsudō o chūshin ni." *Hisutoria* 204 (2007): 74–100.
- Takayama Chogyū. *Jidai kanken*. Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1899.
- Takemae, Eiji. *The Allied Occupation of Japan*. New York and London: Continuum, 2002.
- Takenaka, Akiko. "Architecture for Mass-Mobilization: The Chūreitō Memorial Construction Movement, 1939–1945." In *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, edited by Alan Tansman, 235–53. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.
- Takenaka, Akiko. *Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory and Japan's Unending Postwar*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015.
- Taki Kōji. *Tennō no shōzō*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002 [1988].
- Tamamuro Yoshio. *Shinbutsu bunri*. Tokyo: Nyūton Puresu, 1977.
- Tama-shi Kyōiku Inkaikai, ed. *Watanabe Osao*. Tama: Tama-shi Kyōiku Inkaikai, 2000.
- Tama-shi Kyōiku Inkaikai, ed. *Renkōji no 'seiseki'-ka to Tama seiseki kinenkan*. Tama: Tama-shi Kyōiku Inkaikai, 2013.
- Tanaka Chigaku. *What is Nippon Kokutai? Introduction to Nipponese National Principles*. Tokyo: Shishio Bunko, 1935.
- Tanaka Shōsaku. *Bakumatsu no Nabeshima Saga-han 10-dai hanshu Naomasa to sono jidai*. Saga: Saga Shinbunsha, 2004.
- Tanaka Shūji. *Kindai Nihon saisho no chōkokoku*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994.
- Taniguchi Ryūō, ed. *Ijin to gōketsu shōnen jidai*. Tokyo: Hakuhōdō, 1901.
- Tawara Yoshifumi. "What is the Aim of Nippon Kaigi, the Ultra-Right Organization that Supports Japan's Abe Administration?." *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 15, issue 21, no. 1 (November 1, 2017). <http://apjif.org/2017/21/Tawara.html>.
- Taylor, Jeremy. "Republican Personality Cults in Wartime China: Contradistinction and Collaboration." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 57, no. 3 (2015): 665–93.
- Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, ed. *Fukuoka-ken keisatsu hōki ruiten*. No. 1, vol. 4. Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1935.
- Terry, T. Philip. *Terry's Guide to the Japanese Empire: including Korea and Formosa, with Chapters on Manchuria, the Trans-Siberian Railway, and the Chief Ocean Routes to Japan*. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1920.
- Till, Karen E. "Places of Memory." In *A Companion to Political Geography*, edited by John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal, 189–301. Malden: Blackwell, 2003.
- Toda Tamejirō, ed. *Kaikoku genkun li tairō*. Tokyo: Shūeidō, 1909.
- Tokushima Shishi Hensanshitsu, ed. *Tokushima shishi*. Vol. 4. Tokushima: Tokushima-shi Kyōiku Inkaikai, 1993.

- Tōkyō Hakurankai Shashinchō Hakkōsho. *Heiwa kinen Tōkyō hakurankai shashinchō*. Tōkyō Hakurankai Shashinchō Hakkōsho, 1922.
- Tōkyō-shi Akasaka-ku, ed. *Akasaka-ku shi*. Tokyo: Tōkyō-shi Akasaka-ku, 1941.
- Tōkyō-to, ed. *Tōkyō-shi shi-kō. Shigai-hen*. Vol. 80. Tokyo: Tōkyō-to, 1989.
- Tōkyō-to Chiyoda-ku. *Shinpen Chiyoda kushi. Tsūshi-hen*. Tokyo: Tōkyō-to Chiyoda-ku, 1998.
- Tōma Seidai. *Yamato Takeru*. Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1953.
- Tomita Kōkei. *A Peasant Sage of Japan: The Life and Work of Sontoku Ninomiya*, translated by Yoshimoto Tadasu. London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1912.
- Tomita Shōji. *Ehaqaki de miru Nihon kindai*. Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2005.
- Tōyama Mitsuru. *Dai-Saigō ikun. Tōyama Mitsuru-sensei kōhyō*. Tokyo: Seikyōsha, 1925.
- Toyama-ken Joshi Shihan Gakkō Fuzoku Shōgakkō, ed. *Shūshin kyōdo no reiwa*. Toyama: Toyama-ken Joshi Shihan Gakkō Fuzoku Shōgakkō, 1933.
- Toyouhashi Kyōiku linkai. *Toyouhashi no sensō iseki*. Toyouhashi: Toyouhashi Kyōiku linkai, 2014.
- Toyokoro-chō Kyōiku linkai and Toyokoro-chō Kyōiku Kenkyūjo. *Tokachi kan'na'i ni okeru Ninomiya Kinjirō-zō no chōsa—kenkyū (kaiteiban)*. Toyokoro: Toyokoro-chō Kyōiku linkai, Toyokoro-chō Kyōiku Kenkyūjo, 2012.
- Trede, Melanie. "Banknote Design as a Battlefield of Gender Politics and National Representation in Meiji Japan." In *Performing 'Nation': Gender Politics in Literature, Theater, and the Visual Arts of China and Japan, 1880–1940*, edited by Doris Croissant, Catherine Vance Yeh, and Joshua Mostow, 55–104. Sinica Leidensia 91. Leiden: Brill, 2008.
- Tseng, Alice Y. *The Imperial Museums of Meiji Japan. Architecture and the Art of the Nation*. Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 2008.
- Tsukada Hotaka, ed. *Tettei kenshō Nihon no ukeika*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2017.
- Tucker, Robert C. "The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult." *American Historical Review* 84, no. 2 (1979): 347–66.
- Tumarkin, Nina. *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Ube Shishi Hensan Iinkai, ed. *Ube shishi. Tsūshi-hen*. Ube: Ube Shishi Hensan Iinkai, 1966.
- Ube-shi, ed. *Ube-shi shakai kyōiku gaikyō*. Ube: Ube Shiyakusho, 1927.
- Uchikoshi Takaaki. "Ōsaka no Meiji tennō seiseki." *Kamizono* 3 (2010): 71–93.
- Uchimura, Kanzō. *Representative Men of Japan/Daihyō-teki Nihonjin*. Tokyo, New York, and London: Kodansha International, 1999.
- Ueda Masaaki. *Yamato Takeru*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1960.
- Ueki Emori. "Jo." In *Tsūzoku Saigō Takamori den*, ed. Shōji Shintarō. Tokyo: Kaiseisha, 1880.
- Ueno Takuji et al., eds. *Katō-gensui dōzō kensetsukai hōkokusho*. Hiroshima: Chūgoku Shinbunsha, 1937.
- Ukita Kazutami. "Eiyū sūhai-ron." *Kokumin no tomo* 6 (1887): 25–38.
- Umada Gyōkei. *Jissen no genri toshite no Nichirenshugi*. Fukuoka: Nichiren Shōnin Dōzō Gokoku Kaikan, 1936.
- Varley, H. Paul. *Imperial Restoration in Medieval Japan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Vogel, Ezra. *Japan As Number One*. New York: Harper Collins, 1979.
- Wachutka, Michael. *Kokugaku in Meiji-period Japan*. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2013.
- Wada Tsunehiko, ed. *Dai-Nankō. Dai-Nankō 60onen-sai dōzō kensetsu jomakushiki kinen*. Kobe: Kōbe Shinbun Hakkōsho, 1935.
- Wakabayashi, Bob. *Anti-foreignism and Western Learning in Early-modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
- Wake no Kiyomaro-kō Dōzō Kensetsu linkai. *Wake no Kiyomaro-kō dōzō kensetsu-shi*. Tokyo: Wake no Kiyomaro-kō Dōzō Kensetsu linkai, 1940.
- Walley, Akiko. *Constructing the Dharma King: The Hōryūji Shaka Triad and the Birth of the Prince Shōtoku Cult*. Japanese Visual Culture 15. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
- Walthall, Ann. "Off With Their Heads! The Hirata Disciples and the Ashikaga Shoguns." *Monumenta Nipponica* 50, no. 2 (1995): 137–70.
- Watanabe Asaka. *Ishin genkun Saigō Takamori-kun no den*. Tokyo: Bunjidō, 1889.
- Watanabe Shōichi. "Nanshū-ō ikun" o yomu. Tokyo: Chichi Shuppansha, 1996.
- Watanabe Shōichi. "Dōzō ga Nihonjin ni oshiete kureru taisetsu na koto." In Maruoka Shin'ya, *Nihon no kokoro wa dōzō ni atta*. Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2015.
- Weber, Eugene. *Peasants into Frenchmen*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Wells, George A. "Cults of Personality." *Think* 13, no. 37 (2014): 13–17.
- Welter, Jean-Marie. "French Bronzes from Renaissance to Revolution: But are They Bronze?." In *Cast in Bronze. French Sculpture from Renaissance to Revolution*, edited by Genevière Bresc-Bautier and Guilhem Scherf, 42–45. Paris: Musée du Louvre/Somogy, 2009.
- Wert, Michael. *Meiji Restoration Losers: Memory and Tokugawa Supporters in Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center/Harvard University Press, 2013.
- Weston, Victoria. *Japanese Painting and National Identity: Okakura Tenshin and His Circle*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies, 2003.
- Wilson, Sandra. "The Discourse of National Greatness in Japan, 1890–1919." *Japanese Studies*, 25, no. 1 (2005): 35–51.
- Winter, Jay. *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*. Cambridge: Harvard Cambridge University Press, 1995.

- Wood, Gordon S. "Jefferson at Home," *The New York Review of Books* (May 13, 1993): 6–9.
- Woodard, William P. *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952 and Japanese Religions*. Leiden: Brill, 1972.
- Wray, Harry. "The Fall of Moral Education and the Rise and Decline of Civics Education and Social Studies in Occupied and Independent Japan," *Japan Forum* 12, no. 1 (2000): 15–41.
- Yabe Shintarō, ed. *Kindai meishi no omokage*. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Chikuhakusha, 1914.
- Yamada Yoshio. *Nichiren dōzō-shi. Genkō kinen*. Fukuoka: Genkō Kinenkan, 1930.
- Yamagami Shōsuke. *Hirosaki shishi*. Hirosaki: Tsugaru Shobō, 1985.
- Yamaguchi Kenritsu Hagi Chūgakkō Kōyūkai, ed. *Shōin Jinja onkoroku*. Hagi: Yamaguchi Kenritsu Hagi Chūgakkō Kōyūkai, 1917.
- Yamaguchi Kensei Kankōkai, ed. *Kyōdo no hokori. Yamaguchi-ken kensei*. Vol. 3. Yamaguchi: Yamaguchi Kensei Kankōkai, 1929.
- Yamaguchi Shishi Hensan Chōsa-kai, ed. *Yamaguchi shishi*. Yamaguchi: Matsuno Shoten, 1933.
- Yamamuro Kentoku. *Gunshin*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2007.
- Yamanouchi Kazutoyo-kō Dōzō Saiken Kiseikai, ed. *Yamanouchi Kazutoyo-kō dōzō saiken jigyō kinen shi. Kōchi: Yamanouchi Kazutoyo-kō Dōzō Saiken Kiseikai Kanjikai*, 1997.
- Yamazaki Arinobu. *Nichiro sen'eki chūshisha kenpi narabi Shōkonsha gōshi tetsuzuki*. Tokyo: Kaitsūsha, 1906.
- Yamazaki Masahiro. *Nippon Kaiqi. Senzen kaiki e no jōnen*. Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2016.
- Yasuhara Shun'ichi. "Sakamoto Ryōma-sensei o omō." *Kōchi-ken Rengō Seinendan danpō* (August 13, 1928): 1–2.
- Yasukuni Jinja, ed. *Yasukuni Jinja hyakunen shi*. Vol. 2. Tokyo: Yasukuni Jinja, 1983.
- Yasukuni Jinja, ed. *Yūshūkan zuroku*. Tokyo: Kindai Shuppansha, 2003.
- Yasumaru Yoshio. *Kamiigami no Meiji ishin*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979.
- Yasumaru Yoshio. *Kindai tennō zō no keisei*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992.
- Yasuoka Akio. "Meiji-ki Tanaka Mitsuki no shūhen." *Hōsei shigaku* 37 (1985): 9–17.
- Yates, Charles. "Saigō Takamori in the Emergence of Meiji Japan." *Modern Asian Studies* 28, no. 3 (1994): 449–74.
- Yōda Minoru and Jōzuka Taketoshi, eds. *Takaoka dōki shi*. Takaoka: Takaoka Dōki Kyōdō Kumiai, 1988.
- Yokoyama Atsuo. "'Manshū' ni taterareta chūreitō." *Higashi Ajia kenkyū* 48 (2007).
- Yomiuri Shinbunsha, ed. *Hirose chūsa chūretsu hyōshō kashi haiku shū*. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1904.
- Yonai Mitsumasa Dōzō Kensetsukai. *Yonai Mitsumasa Dōzō Kensetsukai shūshi kessansho*. Tokyo: Yonai Mitsumasa Dōzō Kensetsukai, 1961.
- Yoneyama Yasuhiko. "Nihon no dōzō ryakushi." *Rekishi kenkyū* 549 (2007): 21–23.
- Yoshida Kogorō. *Meiji no sekihanga*. Tokyo: Shun'yōdō Shoten, 1973.
- Yoshida Masutarō. *Chūyū kikan. Gunjin hidoku*. Tokyo: Yatsuo Shoten, 1894.
- Yoshida, Takashi. *From Cultures of War to Cultures of Peace*. Portland: Merwin Asia, 2014.
- Yoshida Yutaka. "Debates Over Historical Consciousness." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, 403–20. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Yoshimura Kazuo. "Hirosaki kōen hyakunen yowa." *Shishi Hirosaki* 5 (1995): 194–225.
- Yoshino, Kosaku. "Rethinking Theories of Nationalism." In *Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism*, edited by Yoshino, Kosaku, 8–28. London: Curzon, 1999.
- Young, Louise. *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan*. Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2013.
- Zaidan Hōjin Tōgō Gensui Kinenkai. *Tōgō-gensui Kinen-kai shuishi, jigyō yōkō, yakuin meibō, kifu kōi*. Tokyo: Zaidan Hōjin Tōgō Gensui Kinenkai, 1934.
- Zusetsu Maeda Toshiie Hensan Iinkai. *Zusetsu Maeda Toshiie*. Kanazawa: Oyama Jinja, 1999.

Index

- Abe Insai 48–49, 99
Abe Masahiro 197, 259
Abe Shinzō 271–272, 274
Age of Gods, see mythology of Japan
Agency for Cultural Affairs 288, 299
Aizawa Seishisai 24
Aizu (feudal domain) 93, 264–265
Akama Shrine 53, 268
Akasaka 26, 271
Allied Occupation of Japan 13, 62, 65, 69, 71, 76, 80, 90–91, 111, 122, 167, 177, 184, 218, 223, 228, 239–240, 242–250, 255, 260, 272, 306, 319, 323
Amano Yoriyoshi 244
Amaterasu Ōmikami (Sun Goddess) 7, 22, 24, 33, 71, 290, 296
ancestor worship 11, 24, 26
Andersen, Hans Christian 122
Andō Matagorō 244
Andō Nobumasa 144, 197, 259
Anglo–Japanese Alliance (1902) 251
Ansei Purge (1858) 152, 155
antiquity 7, 87, 137, 156, 159
Aoba Shrine 24, 259
Arimori Yūko 272
aristocracy 7, 18, 20, 35, 61, 87, 110, 119, 134, 144, 157, 199, 258, 269, 295, 320
Arisugawa Taruhito 88–90, 93, 157, 166, 169, 242, 245, 261
Arisugawa–no–miya Memorial Park 90, 261
Arita Hachirō 231
Asahi graph 166, 216
Asakura Fumio 52, 99, 171, 221, 244, 252, 255, 296, 319, 322
Ashikaga shogunate 18, 25, 48, 159, 217, 320
Asia–Pacific War (1931–45) 4, 8, 10, 13, 23, 29, 50, 53, 62, 65, 75–76, 80, 86–88, 95, 110, 115, 121, 123, 125, 140–141, 149, 166, 168, 176, 189, 199, 202, 208, 217–221, 225–227, 239, 272
Association for the Commendation of Lord Itō 99–100, 102
Association for the Commendation of the Emperor–Revering Restorationists of Kaga, Etchū, and Noto 62, 65
Association for the Reconstruction of the Bronze Statue of Yamanouchi Kazutoyo 269
Association of Experts for the Promotion of Moral Education 273
Association of Friends from the Hometown of Kagoshima 143
Association of Powerful Comrades from Kaga, Toyama and Noto 63
Association to Build a Statue of Katsu Kaishū 269, 270
Association to Commemorate the Loyal War Dead 235
Association to Commemorate the Outstanding Virtue of Lord Ōmura 139
Association to Discuss the History of Kaga–Etchū–Noto 62, 213
Association to Support the 600th Anniversary of Nankō 216
Asuwa Shrine 67–68
Asuwayama Park (Fukui) 68–69, 300
athletes, statues of 110, 271–272, 274, 327; see also nationalism and sports; Olympics
Atsuta Shine 102
bakufu, see shogunate
Bälz, Erwin 123
Bank of Japan 210, 248
Banknote and Postage Stamp Museum (National Printing Bureau Museum) 42
Bashō, see Matsuo Bashō
Basic Act on Education (1947) 239–240
Battle of Liaoyang (1905) 172
Battle of Minatogawa (1336) 25
Battle of Port Arthur (1904–05) 171
Battle of Toba–Fushimi (1867) 63
Battle of Tsushima (1905) 69, 171, 213, 260
Bauduin, Albertus Johannes 123
Bauduin, Anthonius Franciscus 123
Beethoven, Ludwig van 20
Begas, Reinold 21
Beppu Shinsuke 31
Berlin 19, 21, 43, 45
biography 13, 16, 21–22, 42, 58, 95, 103, 138, 140, 142–143, 148, 151, 168, 178, 183, 277, 279, 309
Bismarck, Otto von / Bismarck cult 5, 12, 20, 286, 310
Bizan Park (Tokushima) 71, 75
Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von 20
Boissonade, Gustave Émile 123
Boshin Civil War (1867–1868) 89, 119, 123, 134–138, 138, 144, 196, 263–264, 278, 297, 301
Boxer War (1898–1900) 169, 295
Brandenburg Gate 19
Britain 6, 20, 93, 123, 159, 203, 211, 219, 232, 235, 263
Bronze Age 11
Buddhism 10, 17–18, 24, 61–62, 87, 109, 184, 189, 298, 308, see also Nichiren Buddhism
Buddhist statuary 18, 63
Bulwer–Lytton, Victor 204
Cabinet Planning Board 211, 222
Carlyle, Thomas 260
Chiba 189, 223, 249
Chichibu Ontake Shrine 175

- Chichibu Yasuhito 315
 Chijimatsu Terunosuke 82
 China 5–6, 17, 74, 78, 95, 122, 156, 202, 207, 209, 216–217, 229–234, 236, 251–252, 281–282, 318
 Chiossone, Edoardo 36, 38
 Chisaka Takamasa 56, 57, 61, 95, 298
 Chiyonofuji 272
 Chōfu 26, 114
 Chopin, Frédéric 122, 271
 Chōsen Shrine 228
 Chōshū (feudal domain) 22, 34, 64, 114, 116, 134–136, 139–140, 144, 155, 177, 180–181, 192–194, 196–199, 224, 251, 262, 263, 271, 312
 Christianity 136
 Civil Information and Education Section (CIE), see Allied Occupation of Japan
 Clark, William Smith 123
 collection of statues, see statues, collection of
 commemoration of the war dead, see memorials to commemorate the war dead
 Committee to Examine the Collection of Special Bronze Objects 211
 Communication Ministry 163, 165
 Communism 190, 278
 Conder, Josiah 123
 Confucianism 17
 conscription 8, 134, 139–140, 245
 Constitution of Japan (1947) 239, 262
 Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889) 22, 33, 35, 70, 71, 143, 159
 construction committee 79, 89, 91, 96–100, 102–103, 121, 144, 147, 156, 169, 171, 181–182, 189, 194, 198, 204, 211, 271, 278
 consumerism 278
 cult of the individual 3–6, 9, 11–13, 17–18, 21–24, 28–29, 34, 46, 108–110, 113, 122, 128, 132, 140, 182, 204, 214, 217, 223, 240, 255, 260–261, 274–277, 279–282, 327
 Dai Nihon Kōdo-kai 191, 265
 daimyo (feudal lords) 7, 18, 22, 24–25, 55–56, 61, 63–65, 88–89, 91, 110, 114, 116, 119, 125, 128, 133, 136, 139, 144, 152–154, 156–157, 162, 173, 178, 180, 190, 192–199, 204, 210, 224, 251, 257–259, 268–269, 297, 306, 310, 317–318
 Dalian, see Dairen
 Dairen (Dalian) 52–53, 99, 229–231, 235, 237, 252, 255, 296, 322
 Dairen Shrine 52–53, 296
 Dajōkan 25, 58, 78, 125, 315
 Dajōkan Ordinance No. 16 (1873) 78, 149, 315
 Date Masamune 24, 258–259
 Date Munenari 133
 deification 17–18, 33, 133, 182
 Democratic Party of Japan 272
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) 5, 281
Deutsche Japan-Post 156
 Dōkyō 211
 Dōmei News 231–232
 East Park (Fukuoka) 182, 187, 315–316
 education, see statues in history textbooks and education
 Educational Policy for the Construction of a New Japan (1945) 239, 280
 Ehime 115, 133, 161, 249, 303
 Emperor (of Japan), see *tennō*
 Empire Day (*kigensetsu*), see National Foundation Day
 enemy of the court" (*chōteki*), see rehabilitation of historical figures
 Enomoto Takeaki 115, 144, 192, 245, 310
 expositions 70, 73, 146, 203
 Fabre, Jean-Henri 273
 festivals, see statues and festivals
 First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) 43–44, 63, 69, 71, 74, 78–79, 89–90, 95, 128, 139, 150, 189, 295
 Fischer, Adolf 63
 Flowers of the Nation—the Three Brave and Loyal Human Bullets 204–207, 213
 France 5, 7, 12, 20, 136–137, 159, 184, 203, 223, 259, 288–289
 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) 19
 Frank, Anne 122
 Frankfurt am Main 20, 149, 220
 Franz Ferdinand of Habsburg-Lothringen 87
 Frederick II (the Great), King of Prussia 19, 294
 Frederick V, King of Denmark 19
 Fujimoto Haruo 82–83, 85–86, 302–303
 Fujishima Kakujirō 244
 Fujita Bunzō 89
 Fujita Tōko 210, 219, 223
 Fukui 66–69, 83, 86, 115, 135, 141, 144, 190, 210, 249, 259, 261, 313
 Fukuoka 48, 86, 97–97, 165, 182–184, 186–187, 189–190, 216, 223, 249, 302, 316, 321
 Fukushima 119, 249, 252, 259, 264, 284, 304, 321, 328
 Fukushima Yasumasa 88, 114
 Fukuyama Masaharu 262
 Fukuzawa Yukichi 28, 114, 142, 153, 223, 277, 327
 Furuichi Kōi 211
 Furukawa 50, 91, 114–115
 Furukawa Ichibei 91, 114–115
 Gate of the Restoration 263
 Genghis (Chinggis) Khan 3
 Gen'yōsha 142, 181
 General Headquarters (GHQ), see Allied Occupation of Japan
 Germany 5–6, 12, 19–21, 26, 43, 87, 102, 114, 121–123, 137, 156, 159–160, 167, 184, 203, 206, 219–220, 249–250, 271, 273, 282, 284–286, 289, 293–295, 308, 310, 318
 Gifu 169, 179, 249, 251, 267
 Go'ō Shrine 211
 Godai Tomoatsu 114, 263

- Go-Daigo Emperor 7, 18, 25, 159–160, 167, 217
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 20
 Gokoku Shrines 62, 177, 184, 209, 228, 285, 298
 Gotō Fusanosuke 313
 Gotō Sadayuki 146, 161
 Gotō Shinpei 99, 119, 227, 229, 231, 235–236, 255, 261
 Gotō Shōjirō 98, 166, 179
 Grant, Ulysses 87, 122
 Great Buddha of Kamakura 17, 147, 316
 Great Japan Association to Protect the Imperial Line 211
 Great Japan Aviation Art Association 218
 Great Japan History Preservation Society 82
 Great Japan Imperial Way Association 191, 265, 267
 Great Japan National Education Society 42
 Great Kantō Earthquake (1923) 103–105, 147
 Great Men (*ijin*) 10, 12–13, 23–31, 102, 110, 121, 133, 137, 139–140, 143, 147–148, 158, 178, 190, 198, 203, 205, 213, 240, 252, 271–274, 277, 279, 292
 Great People of Kanazawa Memorial Museum 28
 Greater Japan Patriotic Service Society 42
 Greece 11
 Griffis, William Elliot 160
 Gunma 17, 57, 74, 80, 99, 111, 115, 135, 150, 249, 306
 Gutenberg, Johannes 20, 149, 289
 Hagi 115, 177, 196, 240–241, 247, 263
haibutsu kishaku (movement to abolish Buddhism and destroy the Buddha) 18
hakkō ichiu (The Eight Corners [of the World] Under One Roof) 80, 247, 319
 Hakodate 26, 175, 260, 264
 Hakubunji (temple) 228
 Hakusan Park (Niigata) 78–80, 98
 Hakusan Shrine 80
 Hama Rikyū Park 87
 Hamamatsu 177
 Hamao Arata 211
 Hannō 175
 Hara Kei 251
 Harada Kazumichi 135–136
 Hasebe Eikichi 46–47, 50
 Hasegawa Sadao 135
 Hasegawa Yoshimichi 91
 Hashimoto Sanai 69
 Hatta Yoichi 228, 236–237, 274, 322–323
 Hattori Yukichi 169, 171
 Hayashi Senjūrō 206, 211
 Hayashi Tomoyuki 193, 198
 Hearn, Lafcadio 273
 hero worship 4, 182–183, 283; hero of the hometown 29, 172, 190, 198–199, 236, 279; war heroes 3, 26, 96, 168–182; see also Kenmu Restoration; national heroes
 Hibiyā Incident (1905) 171
 Hibiyā Park 155, 169
 Higaki Ryōichi 240
 Higashikuze Michitomi 27–28, 64
 Hijikata Hisamoto 158
 Hijikata Toshizō 264
 Hikone 152–153, 157, 196, 250
 Himeno Eijirō 207
 Himi 80, 86
 Hirado 123, 326
 Hiraga Gen'nai 223
 Hirano Genryō 70
 Hirata Atsutane 22
 Hirata Tōsuke 121, 210–211
 Hirohito, see Shōwa emperor
 Hirosaki 101, 196, 224
 Hirose Saihei 114, 160
 Hirose Shrine 260
 Hirose Takeo 26, 62, 165–166, 168, 172, 204, 213, 223, 240, 242, 244–245, 252, 260
 Hirota Kōki 102
 historical novels 177–178, 216, 262–264
 historiography 4, 9, 13, 22, 57, 116, 142–143, 160, 163, 186, 258, 277–278
 history education / history textbooks, see statues in history textbooks and education
 Hitler, Adolf / Hitler cult 280, 282
 Hohenzollern 20, 43
 Hōjō Tokimune 183, 186
 Hokkaidō 111, 123, 177, 222, 249, 259, 262, 278
 Home Ministry 26, 34–35, 57, 68, 80, 82–83, 86, 95–98, 136, 153, 155, 169, 186, 221, 224, 243–245, 250
 Hori Tsūmei 95
 Hoshigaura Park (Dalian) 231
 Hoshino Naoki 221, 321
 Hoshino Sen'ichi 272
 Hosokawa Narimori 173
 Hosoya Jūtarō 235
 House of Peers 95, 102, 193, 204, 274, 318
 Hozumi Nobushige 26
 Hussein, Saddam 5
 Hyakuta Naoki 272
 Ibaraki 52–53, 159, 217, 219
 Ichiki Otohiko 247–248
 iconoclasm 159, 220
 iconography, see statues and iconography
 identity, see national identity
 idolatry / idolization 2, 5, 29, 182, 248, 268
 Ig Nobel Prize 66
 Ii Naomasa 22, 152, 197
 Ii Naonori 157
 Ii Naosuke 152–159, 189, 196–197, 250–251, 259, 278
 Ii Naotaka 152
 Ii Shrine 152
ijin, see Great Men
 Imagawa Ujichika 17
 Imahata Nishie 181

- Imaizumi Yūsaku 161
 Imperial Diet 99, 102, 140, 207, 212, 223, 239–240, 243, 245
 Imperial Guard Division (*Konoe shidan*) 90–91
 Imperial Household Agency (IHA) 33, 42, 67, 244, 268, 285
 Imperial Household Ministry (IHM) 33, 35–36, 48–49, 50, 58, 60, 66, 68, 83, 96, 136, 144–147, 158–161, 186, 210, 214, 265, 268
 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) 39, 43, 55–59, 62–63, 70, 74, 78–79, 87–93, 95–96, 114–115, 122–123, 134–137, 139–141, 143, 146, 150, 169, 172–173, 176, 184, 186–187, 204, 206–209, 213, 217, 220, 224, 227, 231–232, 234–235, 243, 247, 251, 260–261
 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) 39, 55, 69, 88–89, 91, 93, 95–96, 134–137, 168–169, 171, 217–219, 260–261
 imperial pageantry 7–8, 34
 Imperial Palace, Tokyo 34, 43, 74, 89, 91, 98, 143–146, 160, 162, 165, 167, 193, 211–213, 271
 Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) 21, 158–159
 Imperial Reservists' Organization 80, 96
 Imperial Rule Assistance Association 250
 Imperial Zoo 93, 149
 India 3, 6, 274, 281
 indoctrination, see national indoctrination
 industrialization 6, 8
 Inō Tadakuni 223
 Inokashira Nature and Culture/Sculpture Park 246–247
 Inose Naoki 42
 Inoue Kaoru 102, 144, 153, 156
 Inoue Tetsujirō 159
 Inoue Yoshika 171
 International Military Tribunal in the Far East (IMTFE) 245
 Irimajiri Yoshiyasu 180, 182
 Irokawa Daikichi 34
 Ishida Baigan 207
 Ishihara Bangaku 166
 Ishihara Kenji 244
 Ishihara Shintarō 272
 Ishikawa 28, 55–57, 61, 63, 66–67, 95, 115, 125, 135, 191, 207, 222, 249, 259
 Ishikawa Hiromoto 211–212
 Ishikawa Kōmei 161, 222
 Ishikawa Takuboku 264, 273
 Itagaki Taisuke 46, 100, 116, 144, 178–179, 224, 251, 305, 315
 Italy 5–6, 19, 36, 61, 87, 102, 136–137, 203, 259
 Itō Chūta 228
 Itō Hirobumi 31, 70, 99–100, 102, 116, 144, 146, 156, 193, 195, 198, 210, 219, 223–224, 228, 250, 263, 315
 Itō Kiyoshi 244
 Itō Sukeyuki 89
 Iwakura Mission 19, 22, 27, 36, 134
 Iwakura Tomomi 19, 56, 144, 291
 Iwakura Tomosada 144
 Iwasaka Hideshige 158
 Iwasaki Yatarō 114
 Iwate 173, 236, 249, 251, 261, 267
 Jahana Noboru 191, 267
 Japan History Association 57
 Japan Medical Association 252
 Jefferson, Thomas 5
 Jingū, Empress 38, 43, 121
 Jinmu Emperor 7, 22, 33, 40, 55, 67, 69–83, 85–88, 96, 98–99, 102–103, 111, 113–114, 116, 121, 160, 163, 167, 186, 211, 213, 222, 225, 247, 252, 268, 277, 280, 294, 300–303, 306
 Joan of Arc 5
 Jōyō Meiji Kinenkan, see Meiji memorials
 Kabayama Sukenori 91, 142–144, 146–147
 Kaga 55–56, 58–59, 61–65, 192, 213, 258, 297
 Kagoshima 25, 121, 125, 134, 140, 143, 147, 150–152, 173, 191, 196, 199, 223, 249, 251, 259–260, 262–263, 307, 309
 Kaientai 181
 Kamakura 17, 14, 182, 189, 223, 316
 Kamei Koremi 25, 114, 317
 Kameyama Emperor 48, 86, 167, 182, 186–187, 189–190, 192, 213, 216
 Kameyama Park (Yamaguhi) 194–195, 317
 kamikaze, see Special Attack Forces
 Kamo no Mizuho 135, 137
 Kamonyama Park (Yokohama) 155
 Kamoshita Seihachi 175–176
 Kan'in Kotohito, Prince 210
 Kanasugi Eigorō 204–207, 243, 318
 Kanazawa 24, 27–28, 55–69, 78, 82, 86, 95, 98, 125, 135–137, 141, 152–153, 189, 192, 196, 207, 237, 247, 277
 Kanda 169, 171–172
 Kaneko Kentarō 250
 Kannon 222–223
 Kanō Hōgai 223
 Kanō Natsuo 161, 222
 Kanshin-ji (temple) 214, 216
 Kashiwara Shrine 76, 86
 Kataoka Kenkichi 178
 Katō Genchi 260
 Katō Kiyomasa 24, 113, 116, 242, 259
 Katō Shizue 244
 Katō Shrine 24
 Katō Takaaki 131
 Katō Tomosaburō 205
 Katori Shingo 264
 Katsu Kaishū 143–144, 149, 177, 269, 271
 Katsura Tarō 74, 91, 115, 194
 Kawai Masao 273
 Kawaji Toshiyoshi 57
 Kawakami Otojirō 214
 Kawakami Sōroku 89
 Kawamura Sumiyoshi 169
 Kawasaki Chitora 161
 Kawasaki Shōzō 114

- Kazue Shōda 180
 Keijō (Seoul) 228
 Keikō Emperor 58
 Keitai Emperor 66–69, 71, 83, 86–88, 96, 114, 135, 190
 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) 5, 271
Kenchiku Zasshi (Architecture Journal) 19, 137
 Kenkun Shrine 25, 291
 Kenmu Restoration (1333): 600th anniversary of the
 Kenmu Restoration 69, 166, 213–216; heroes of the
 Kenmu Restoration 22, 25, 90, 133, 159–160
 Kenrokuen, see Kanazawa
 Khrushchev, Nikita 5
 Kibe 80, 83–86, 99, 303
 Kido Takayoshi 22, 133, 140, 263
 Kigoshi Yasutsuna 63, 299
 Kikkawa Tsunemasa 114
 Kikuchi Takemitsu 223
 Kinder, Thomas William 36, 38
 King, Marthin Luther, Jr. 5
 Kirino Toshiaki 31
 Kita Man'uemon 80
 Kitajima Kōsuke 272
 Kitamura Seibō 210–211, 221, 240, 246, 255, 258, 267, 322
 Kitanomaru Park 91
 Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa, Prince 88, 90–91, 93, 166, 261
 Kitayama Jun'yu 167
 Kiyoura Keigo 211
 Kobe 25, 100, 115, 123, 216–217, 219, 223, 231, 233
 Kōchi 34, 100, 158, 177–182, 224, 262–264, 269
 Kodama Gentarō 26, 227, 230–231, 235, 255, 261
 Kodama-Gōtō Memorial 228
 Kofun Period (250–592 CE) 17
 Koganemaru Ikuhisa 267, 280, 327
 Koike Eizaburō 114
 Koizumi Jun'ichirō 2–3
Kojiki, see mythology of Japan
 Kojo Bronze Works 267, 327
kokugaku (School of National Learning) 22, 24–25, 135, 159, 210
 Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) 151
kokutai 9, 33, 176, 186, 211–212, 217, 316, 319
 Komatsu Akihito, Prince 74, 88, 92–93
 Komura Jutarō 229–230, 231, 251, 252, 322
 Kon Wajirō 244
 Konoe Atsumaro 144
 Konoe Fumimaro 204, 212
 Korea 38, 79, 131, 173, 227–228, 236, 252, 291, 307, 320–322,
 see also Republic of Korea and Democratic People's
 Republic of Korea
 Kōsaku Masayasu 206
 Kosuge Tomohiro 114, 313
 Kōtoku Shūsui 142
 Kuhara 50
 Kujō Hisatada 157
 Kūkai 207, 222–223
 Kuki Ryūichi 27–28, 144, 169
 Kumamoto 24, 134, 173–174, 223, 249, 259, 262
 Kume Kunitake 19, 22–23, 27
 Kuni Asahiko, Prince 144
 Kuroda Akinobu 244
 Kuroda Hōshin 171
 Kuroda Kiyotaka 222
 Kurokawa Mayori 74, 161
 Kurume 159, 204
 Kusunoki Masashige 22, 25, 27–28, 63, 67, 70, 74, 83, 88, 98,
 111, 113–114, 159–169, 172, 182, 194, 196, 207, 211, 213–214,
 216–217, 219, 221, 223, 242, 245, 248, 252, 303, 307, see
 also Kenmu Restoration
 Kusunoki Matsutara 25, 160
 Kwantung Army 231–232, 235
 Kwantung Leased Territory 227, 229, 231–232, 234
 Kyoto 18, 25–26, 46, 48, 64, 97, 123, 134, 144–145, 155, 160,
 175, 177–178, 181, 187, 209, 211, 249, 262, 264
 Kyoto Gokoku Shrine 177
 Kyushu 7, 58–59, 141, 151, 184, 189
 Law for the Preservation of Historic Sites and Places of
 Scenic Beauty (1919) 34, 62
 League of Nations 204, 227
 Lenin, Vladimir I. / Lenin cult 5, 12, 283
 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 2, 3, 272
 Lincoln, Abraham / Lincoln Memorial 4–5, 151, 273, 306, 325
 lithographs 12, 35, 38, 39, 92, 150, 163, 172, 277
 Local Improvement Movement 8
 Louis XIV, King of France 19–20, 289
 loyalty 6, 8, 21–22, 24–25, 27, 46, 56, 58, 61, 67, 69, 71, 82,
 86–88, 90, 98, 110, 132–133, 140–144, 147, 150, 158–163,
 166–168, 171, 173, 175–176, 183–184, 186, 192, 198, 204–
 206, 211–212, 217, 245, 259, 264–265, 277–279, 318
 Ludwig, King of Bavaria 5, 20
 MacArthur, Douglas, see Allied Occupation of Japan
 Maeda Masatoshi 197, 259
 Maeda Nariyasu 55–56, 61, 63–64
 Maeda Toshiie 24, 55, 192, 291
 Maeda Toshitsugu 56
 Maeda Toshitsune 197, 258–259
 Maeda Yoshiyasu 63, 98
 Magdeburg 289
 Maki Izumi 159
 Makino Tomitarō 273
 Manchurian Incident (1931) 86, 182, 204, 216
 manga 28, 151, 177, 282
 Mao Zedong / Mao cult 5, 281–282
 Maruyama Park (Kyoto) 181, 262
 Matsudaira Yoshinaga 144, 210, 310
 Matsukata Masayoshi 155, 199
 Matsumura Giichi 82
 Matsuo Bashō 113, 116, 257–258
 Matsuo Tetsuto 269

- Matsushita Kōnosuke 274
 Meckel, Klemens Jacob 123, 242, 307
 Meiji Emperor 33–34, 36, 38–40, 42, 46, 48–53, 58, 83–84, 111, 113, 116, 122, 159, 180, 191, 193, 222, 265, 267–279, 281, 294, 328; funeral of Meiji emperor 34, 42, 46
 Meiji memorials: Jōyō Meiji Kinenkan 52–53, 159, 296; Meiji Memorial 59, 60, 63, 68, 85; Meiji Memorial Picture Gallery 46; Meiji Shrine 46, 50, 53, 228; Patriotic Association to Build a Holy Statue of Meiji the Great 267; Patriotic Association to Support the Building of a Statue of Meiji the Great 267; statues of Meiji emperor 33, 36, 42–44, 46–53, 80, 82–85, 99, 113, 159, 265–268, 279–280; Tama Seiseki Kinenkan 53, 296; Yomiuri Shinbun Co. statuette of Meiji 48–52
 Meiji period (1868–1912) 3, 8–9, 11, 13, 16–19, 21–25, 28–29, 31, 33–34, 36, 39, 42, 46, 48, 55, 58–59, 70, 74, 86–87, 93, 102, 116, 119, 121, 136, 149, 151, 178, 182, 184, 186, 190, 194, 199, 203–204, 211, 216, 245, 265, 267, 271, 277, 288, 290, 294, 299, 308
 Meiji Restauration (1868) 3, 7, 9, 13, 18, 21–22, 31, 33, 50, 53, 55, 63, 65, 67, 70, 82, 89–90, 93, 102, 116, 119, 125, 131, 133–134, 140–144, 147, 152, 158–159, 176, 178–182, 191–192, 194, 196, 211, 222, 224, 256–258, 261–265, 267–268, 271, 279, 281, 284, 298, 306, 308
meisho / *meishō* (famous site) 62, 66, 70, 92, 138–139, 150, 171–172, 175, 187, 198, 271, 299, 301
 Memorial for the Mongol Invasions 183–184, 186, 189–190
 Memorial Appreciating the Greater East Asian War 242
 Memorial to the Battle of the Nations 5
 Memorial to the Emperor–Revering Restorationists of Kaga, Etchū and Noto 63–65
 memorials: memorial stones 23, 34, 55–56, 59, 67–68, 177–178, 187, 234, 244, 250; memorials to commemorate the war dead 8, 11, 43, 55–60, 62, 74, 76, 78–80, 99, 138–139, 184, 189, 196, 209, 223, 235, 243–244, 249, see also Shōkonsha
 memory: collective memory 6, 9, 103; politics of memory 3–5, 9–10–12, 23, 279; political art 10, 163; realms of memory 9, 131
 Metropolitan Police Board 57, 244–245
 Mihara Junko 70
 Mihira Seidō 267–268
 Mikami Sanji 23, 29, 211
 Mikasa Hozon-kai 69
 military songs (*gunka*) 186
 Min, Queen (Yi Dynasty) 228
 Minamoto no Yoshitsune 125, 128
 Minatogawa Park (Kobe) 216–217
 Minatogawa Shrine 25–26, 160, 214, 216, 219, 291
 Ministry of Education (MEXT) 19, 27, 48, 96, 149, 158, 250, 273–274
 Ministry of Finance 99–100, 136, 321
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 36, 122, 176
 Ministry of Military Affairs 135, 277
 Ministry of Munitions 222
 Ministry of Religious Education 26–27
 Minobu-san Fukuoka Betsuin 187
 Mishima Shrine 177
 Mishima Tsuyoshi 114
 Mitani Kōki 264
 Mito 22, 25, 89, 135, 154, 158–159, 321
 Mitsuchi Chūzō 169
 Mitsui Takamine 169
 Mizuno Fusajirō 210
 Mizuno Hisanao 52–53
 Mizuno Motonobu 251
 mobilization 6, 13, 65, 71, 90, 93, 96, 134, 166, 168, 204, 207, 212, 217, 219–220, 223, 225, 235, 239, 245, 247, 258, 262, 286; see also statues, collection of
 modernization 50, 122, 133, 143, 153, 156–158, 227, 231
 Mongol Invasions (1274 and 1281) 182–184, 186, 189–190
 Monument for Inviting the Loyal Souls (*shōkonhi*, *shōchūhi*), see memorials to commemorate the war dead
 monumental biography, see biography
 moral suasion 8, 86
 Mori Arinori 263
 Mōri Motochika 114
 Mōri Motomitsu 114
 Mōri Motonori 139, 194, 310
 Mōri Motozumi 114
 Mori Ōgai 147
 Mōri Tadamasa, see Mōri Takachika
 Mōri Takachika 22, 88, 114, 162, 192–193, 196
 Mōri Yoshichika, see Mōri Takachika
 Mori Yoshirō 237
 Morioka Isao 203
 Moriya Kazurō 235
 Moriyoshi, Prince 70–71
 Morris, Ivan 13, 57, 160, 287
 Morris, J. 160
 Moscow 3
 Mother Theresa 274
 Motoda Hajime 180
 Motoki Shōzō 98, 114
 Motoori Norinaga 22
 Mount Bizan, see Bizan Park
 Mount Hotaka 57, 297–298
 Mount Ōdaigahara 80
 Mount Rushmore 5, 273
 Movement for Freedom and People's Rights 46, 55, 142–144, 178–179, 286
 Müller, Leopold 114, 122–123
 Murakami Kiyoshi 182
 Murata Katsutarō 42
 Murata Shinpachi 31
 Muromachi period (1336–1573) 17, see also Kenmu Restoration
 Musil, Robert 103, 212, 242

- Mutsu Munemitsu 35
 mythology of Japan 7, 22, 33, 319
 Nabeshima Naomasa (Kansō) 22, 197–199, 270–271, 317
 Nagaoka Moriharu 173–174
 Nagaoka Moriyoshi 173, 310
 Nagasaki 123, 172, 177–178, 183, 223, 249, 255, 262, 267
 Nagoya 25, 102, 123, 131, 209–210, 259, 301, 321
 Nakajima Park (Sapporo) 271
 Nakano Seigō 142
 Nakaoka Shintarō 177–178, 181–182, 262
 Naminoue Shrine 191, 265–267
 Nanbu Toshinaga 173–174
 Nankō-sha 25
 Nanshū Shrine 151, 309
 Nara 17, 76, 80, 86, 99, 191, 249
 Narahara Shigeru 191
 Naruhito, Crown Prince of Japan 86
 Narushima Ryūhoku 114
 Nation: nation as an eternal entity 277, 159, 277, 280; nation as local metaphor 190; national ceremonies 8, 14, 35–36, 43, 62, 70, 78, 86, 139, 172; national consciousness 6–9, 23, 50, 67, 82, 108, 116, 134, 190, 204, 206, 213, 225, 267, 277–278; national flag 189, 191, 196; National Foundation Day (Empire Day, *kigensetsu*) 78, 247, 280, 301; national greatness 22, 39, 190, 277; national heroes 5, 11, 17, 20–21, 28, 53, 69, 137, 159, 171, 243, 265; national identity 6–7, 13, 67, 111, 116, 119, 139, 143, 149, 176, 190, 197, 240, 255–257, 279; national indoctrination 20, 33–34, 46, 96, 180, 272; national integration 6, 8, 13, 24, 58, 88, 133, 158, 191, 198, 274, 279, 286; National Learning Movement, see *kokugaku*; national memorial 5–6, 21, 189, 291; national myths 6–7, 9, 22–23, 33, 57, 76, 80, 280–281; national psyche 9, 34, 110, 207; national symbol/symbol of national unity 4, 6, 9–10, 17, 32–33, 61, 66, 69, 86, 113, 133, 189, 279; nationalism 3, 6, 8, 20, 23–24, 29, 38, 50, 62, 102, 113, 134, 151, 166, 180, 182, 184, 189–190, 239, 254, 257, 268, 272, 277–278, 280–281; nationalism and sports 272, 274; nation–state 3–4, 6–9, 20, 54–57, 87, 103, 113, 119, 122, 125, 132–133, 158, 190–191, 196–198, 263, 272, 278–281; ultranationalism 29, 33, 70–71, 182, 186, 239–240, 242, 244, 251, 255, 272, 323
 National Mobilization Law (1938) 204, 207, 217
 National Statuary Hall Collection (Washington DC) 5, 283
 Navy Ministry 96, 135–136, 169, 206
 Nichiren 49, 113, 147, 165, 182–190, 216, 222–223, 292, 313
 Nichiren Buddhism 113, 182, 184–186
 Niederwald-Denkmal 20
 Nietzsche, Friedrich 22
 Nightingale, Florence 121
Nihon shoki, see mythology of Japan
 Nii Itaru 242
 Niigata 78–79, 86, 98, 218, 222, 249, 259, 272, 321
 Niikura Fuji Asama Shrine 267
 Nikkō 18, 20, 24, 25
 Ninomiya Sontoku 111–113, 206–207, 219, 235, 243, 248, 252, 273, 292, 306–307, 325
 Nippon Kaigi 71, 306
 Nire Kagenori 169, 310
 Nishimura Shigeki 33
 Nitta Yoshisada 22, 28, 67, 69
 Nogi Maresuke 26, 46, 69, 91, 93, 111, 113, 116, 175, 217, 228, 248, 260–261, 314, 328
 Nogi Shizuko 121, 260, 307
 Noguchi Hideyo 111, 113, 116, 252, 257–258, 274, 325
 Nomura Mokuma 182
 North Korea, see Democratic People's Republic of Korea
 Noshō Benjiro 166
 Noto 55, 62–65, 213
 Nuremberg 20
 Ochiai Hiromitsu 272
 Oda Nobunaga 18, 25, 113, 116, 125, 163, 223
 Ogasawara Naganari 69
 Ōita 168–169, 171, 205, 211, 249, 252
 Oka Castle Park (Ōita) 252
 Okabe Seiichi 265
 Okada Keisuke 180, 261
 Okakura Shūsui 161
 Okakura Tenshin 161, 189, 210–211, 222, 310
 Okamoto Katsumoto 161
 Ōkawa Ryūhō 70
 Okayama 95, 111, 207, 249, 321
 Okazaki Park 123
 Okazaki Sessei 50, 74, 79, 93, 99, 102, 146, 162, 171, 189
 Okinawa 53, 122, 191, 265, 267
 Ōkubo Toshimichi 31, 42, 57, 291, 297
 Ōkuma Ayako 121
 Ōkuma Shigenobu 39, 48–49, 121, 144, 156–157, 166, 197–199, 223, 295, 305, 315, 328
 Ōkuma Ujihiro 89, 99, 119, 136–137, 193, 211
 Okumura Ioko 121, 307
 Ōkurayama Park (Kobe) 219
 Olympics 11, 261, 272–274, see also athletes, statues of; nationalism and sports
 Ōmachi Keigetsu 29
 Ōmori Kenji 244
 Ōmori Kichigorō 82–83
 Ōmura Masujirō 105, 114, 133–140, 144–146, 148–150, 153, 155, 161, 165–166, 169, 192, 213, 223, 240, 242, 245, 247, 271, 308–309
 Osaka 25–26, 97, 115, 122–123, 155, 171, 179, 187, 191, 193, 207, 214, 224, 231, 249, 252, 259, 291, 308, 321
 Ōsako Naoharu 173
 Osaragi Jirō 216
 Ōshima Yoshimasa 229, 235
 Ōsumi Mineo 206
 Ōta Dōkan 113, 116, 224–225, 257
 Ōtakiyama Park, see Bizan Park
 Ōtsuka Rakudō 80

- Ottoman Empire 93
Outline of a Plan to Implement the Urgent Collection of Statues Etc. 220–221
Owari (feudal domain) 25
Oyabe 302
Ōyama Iwao 89–91, 143, 146, 223, 240, 245–247, 310
Oyama Shrine 24, 55–56, 59, 192
Ozaki Yukio 142
pageantry, see imperial pageantry
Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai 5
Patriotic Women's Association 121
patriotism (*aikokushin*) 19, 69, 156–157, 162, 183–184, 204, 206–207, 217, 220, 223
peace state (*heiwa kokka*) 239–240, 242, 250
Peoples Republic of China, see China
Perry, Matthew / Perry Park 21, 177, 250–251
personality cult 3–6, 11–13, 16–18, 20–21, 29, 69, 102, 113, 119, 132–133, 136, 143, 167, 172, 176, 180, 216, 228, 281, 282–283, 286
Pétain, Philippe 220
Peter the Great, Tsar of All Russia 3, 19, 294
Philip III, King of Spain 19, 271–272
Philip IV, King of Spain 20
Philippines 259
portraits 2–3, 17, 26, 31, 153–154, 195, 240, 252; for imperial portraits see *tennō*
postcards 12, 29, 31, 39, 45, 52, 59, 62, 64, 66, 69, 75, 77, 79–80, 90, 100–101, 110, 121, 131, 133, 139, 141, 150, 163, 165, 168, 171–172, 174–175, 187–189, 194, 197–199, 205, 208, 212, 216, 224, 227, 229–230, 254, 269, 277
Privy Council 102, 137
Propaganda 8, 80, 111, 149, 163, 167, 172–173, 181, 212, 239, 245, 250
Prussia 19–21, 43, 122
public sculpture, see statues
Ragusa, Vincenzo 87, 95, 173
Rai Sanyō 25, 28–29
railway companies, see statues and tourism
reconciliation 152, 188, 237, see also rehabilitation of historical figures
Red Cross Society of Japan 93
Regulations regarding Ceremonies on Holidays in Elementary School (1891) 35
rehabilitation of historical figures 140, 152–156, 158, 189
Rekishi shashin 216
Reliefs 109, 115, 122, 181, 189, 250
Renaissance 19
Republic of China, see China
Republic of Korea (South Korea) 5–6, 281
Rikuentai 181
Rittai Shashinzō 203, 218–219
Roosevelt, Theodore 5
Ruhmeshalle (Berlin) 43, 45
Russia 5, 39, 49, 78, 141, 168, 176, 207, 219, 231, 234
Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905) 26, 29, 38, 39, 49, 69, 78–80, 95, 98, 116, 119, 128, 131, 168, 171–173, 175–176, 187, 189, 207, 219, 231, 245, 260, 296, 321
Ryukyu Kingdom 122, 191, 320
sacrificial spirit, see statues and values
Saga 22, 25, 134–136, 144, 191, 197–199, 249, 270–271, 317
Saigō Nanshū Memorial Hall 151
Saigō Park (Kagoshima) 150
Saigō Takamori 10, 13, 31, 59, 74, 93, 99, 113–114, 116, 140–152, 157, 163, 166, 190, 213, 223, 242, 245, 271, 278, 280
Saigō Tsugumichi 89, 91, 134, 144, 146–147, 169, 204
Saitama 175, 248–249
Saitō Makoto 206, 210, 261, 319
Sakamoto Ryōma 113, 116, 125, 177–182, 189, 223, 262–263, 265, 271, 274
Sakazaki Shiran 178
Sakuma Shōzan 304
Sakurada Gate Incident (1860) 152, 158
Samejima Naonobu 263
samurai (*bushi*) 7, 22, 55–56, 59, 62, 65, 99, 110, 114, 116–117, 119, 128, 133–136, 138–140, 142, 151–153, 158–159, 177–178, 182, 192, 257, 261–265, 269, 299, 306
Sanjō Sanetomi 33, 95, 136, 138, 144, 291
Sano Akira 87
Sano Zenrei 184, 186, 316
Sasaki Senryū 61
Satake Yoshitaka 197–198, 259
Satō Seizō 211
Satō Shizu 121
Satō Tadashi 43
Satō Yoshisuke 147
Satsuma (feudal domain) 22, 25, 31, 34, 91, 116, 136, 140, 142–144, 151, 155, 177, 180–181, 191, 196–199, 251, 262–263, 310, 312
Satsuma Rebellion (1877) 55–59, 69, 93, 134, 140, 142–143, 152, 309
Sawa Homare 273–274
Sawano Toshimasa 209
Schasler, Max 21, 137
School of National Learning, see *kokugaku*
scientists, statues of 28, 110, 114, 123, 228, 243, 252, 257
Scriba, Julius 123
sculptors, see statues, sculptors of
Second Greater East Asian War Art Exhibition 208–209
Second Sino–Japanese War (1937–1945) 150, 295
secular memorials, see memorials
Seishō-ji (temple) 205
Self-Defense Forces 218–219, 260
Sendai 258–259
Seoul 228
Shakushain 259, 278
Shanghai Incident (1932) 204, 207
Shashin shūhō 139, 166, 206–207, 212–213
Shiba Park 143, 149, 153, 179, 310, 313

- Shiba Ryōtarō 178, 262, 263
 Shibusawa Eiichi 102, 114, 116, 119, 121–122, 176
 Shidehara Tan 43
 Shige'eda Yasaburō 82
 Shimada Ichirō 57
 Shimada Saburō 311
 Shimamura Takitarō 21
 Shimazaki Tōson 257
 Shimazu Hisamitsu 25, 197, 251, 259
 Shimazu Nariakira 22, 31, 197, 199, 251, 259
 Shimazu Tadashige 91
 Shimazu Tadayoshi 197, 199, 251, 259, 310
 Shimomura Hakubun 273
 Shimomura Juichi 244
 Shinagawa Yajirō 98, 104–105, 166, 242, 263
shinbutsu bunri (policy of separating Shinto from Buddhism) 18, 308
 Shinkai Taketarō 90
 Shinsengumi 263–264
 Shintēfu (memorial) 43
 Shinto 8, 10–11, 18, 23–26, 53, 61–63, 70, 96, 102, 109, 159, 168, 186, 189, 216, 228, 240, 260, 265, 267, 290–291, 296, 298, 308, 313, 321; state Shinto 8, 11, 23, 25, 186; Shinto Directive (1945) 240
 Shirane Takesuke 217
 Shizuoka 17, 122, 135, 172, 177, 222, 249, 259, 271, 302
 shogunate 7–8, 10, 18, 21, 25, 28, 48, 55, 58, 63–65, 69, 89–90, 103, 134, 139–144, 146, 149, 152, 153–156, 158–160, 177, 180, 182, 189, 192, 263–265, 271, 287, 311
 Shōin Shrine 177
shōkonhi (Monument for Inviting the Loyal Souls), see memorials to commemorate the war dead
shōkonsai (Festival for Inviting the Spirits of the War Dead) 62, 79–80, 196, 298
 Shōkonsha (Shrine for Inviting the Spirits [of the War Dead]) 26, 62, 65, 67–68, 134, 152, 176–178, 189, 209, see also memorials to commemorate the war dead
 Shōtoku Taishi 17, 113, 116, 222
 Shōwa emperor, 42, 50, 52, 265, 293
 Shōwa era 119, 180, 204
 Shūnan 26, 261
 Siam, see Thailand
 social education, see statues in history textbooks and education
 social engineering 8–9, 82
 social integration, see nation—national integration
 Socialism 278
 Society for the Improvement of Textbooks 273–274
sōken-jinja (shrines found since the mid-nineteenth century) 24, 26, 55, 97, 290
 Sōma Nagatane 155–156
 South Korea, see Republic of Korea
 South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR) 52–53, 229
 Soviet Union 5, 12, 53, 216–217, 235, 283
 Spain 19–20, 259, 272
 Special Attack Forces (*tokkōtai, kamikaze*) 167, 221
 Special Government Shrine (*bekkaku kanpeisha*) 24–25, 56, 192, 259, 290–291
 sports, see nationalism and sports
 Stalin, Joseph 5, 282
 statues: bird droppings on statues 66; busts 109, 115, 122–123, 125, 169, 171, 218, 220, 222, 232–233, 244, 250–251, 260, 271; casters of statues 10, 49, 74, 99, 102, 161, 207, 289, 308; cement statues 11, 177, 207–208, 217–219, 248; ceramic statues 11, 84–85, 207, 217; collection (requisitioning) of statues 4, 220–225; design competitions 11, 71, 73, 89, 99, 161, 217; destruction of statues 12–13, 24, 69, 76, 103–105, 111, 203, 219, 224, 236, 243, 245–246, 249, 252, 262, 287; donations for statues 11, 25, 46, 50, 55, 60–61, 67–68, 88–89, 91, 98, 103, 122, 135–136, 143, 146–147, 155, 158, 160, 169, 171, 176, 180, 183, 186–187, 193–194, 198, 205, 231, 269, 315, 325; equestrian statues 19, 46, 53, 88, 93, 109, 115, 125, 128, 144, 146, 160–162, 173, 175, 183, 193–194, 197, 220, 224, 231, 240, 255, 258–259, 269, 271, 289, 303; public sculpture 3, 5, 10–11, 21, 27, 63, 71, 86, 97, 111, 137, 152, 182, 223, 247, 262, 277, 279; regulation of statues 96–98, 100, 128, 155, 207, 235, 244; restoration of statues 66, 236, 238, 247, 250–251, 258, 260–261, 269; sculptors of statues 10–11, 19–21, 27, 48–50, 53, 61, 63, 67, 71, 74, 80, 87, 89–90, 93, 95, 99–100, 102, 119, 136–137, 144, 146, 161, 171, 189, 203, 207, 210–211, 218, 243–244, 246, 255, 258, 261, 267, 289, 296, 299, 308, 319, 322; statue prospectus 11, 50, 68, 85, 88, 95, 103, 134–136, 143–144, 153, 169, 173, 179–181, 183, 193–195, 199, 204–205, 211, 213, 217, 231, 243, 258, 268, 271, 278, 299; statues and elites 3, 6–10, 18, 20, 34, 36, 50, 55, 57–58, 63, 65, 70–71, 86, 95–96, 102, 113, 121, 136, 142–144, 153, 155–156, 176, 243, 258, 274, 276, 278–279, 293, 298; statues and festivals 60–62, 67, 69, 78, 80, 102–103, 109, 137, 139, 152, 155–156, 171–172, 178, 189, 192, 196, 212–216, 223–224, 262, 264, 271, 278, 291, 301, 303, 319; statues and iconography 3, 9, 10, 21, 74, 79, 277; statues in moral education 33, 42, 86, 145, 167, 190, 221, 272–274, 278; statues and tourism 12, 18, 26, 59, 62, 65, 69, 78, 103, 109, 139, 167, 176, 179, 197, 215, 217, 242, 258, 262–264, 269, 271, 278, 286, 299, 317; statues and values 3, 6, 13, 22, 56, 61–62, 111, 132–133, 142, 147, 150–151, 159–160, 163, 166–169, 172–173, 176, 181, 204–205, 207, 213, 217, 221, 240, 245, 258, 260, 264–265, 273–274, 277–279, 281; statues in songs 62, 166; statues in history textbooks and education 8–10, 17, 22–23, 27–29, 33, 42–43, 50, 58, 69, 71, 83, 85–86, 96–97, 103, 122, 133, 148, 158, 166, 172, 183, 186, 190, 192, 198, 212–214, 221, 224, 239–240, 242–244, 250, 268, 272–275, 277, 303; stone statues 11, 26, 66–70, 113, 135, 207, 209, 243, 248; unveiling ceremonies 20, 61–63, 74, 79, 89, 91, 93, 100–103, 121, 137–138, 146–147, 155–158, 162, 171–172, 176, 180–181, 187, 189, 191, 194, 196, 198–199, 205–206, 210, 212, 217–218, 270–271, 278, 305, 317

- Suge Sanehide 151
 Sugihara Chiune 274
 Sugino Magoshichi 168–169, 171–172, 223
 Suizenji Park (Kumamoto) 173–174
 Sumitomo 50, 98, 115–116, 160–163, 169, 312
 Sunpu Castle 172
 Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), see
 Allied Occupation of Japan
 Suzuki Sōroku 211
 Tachibana Shūta 172–173, 175, 223, 255
 Taira no Kiyomori 48
 Taishō Emperor 39–40, 50, 53, 181, 265, 293
 Taishō period (1912–1926) 10, 62, 73, 99, 111, 119, 131, 138, 192,
 269
 Taiwan 90, 227–229, 231, 235–237, 261, 322–323
 Takada Sanae 210–211
 Takahashi Korekiyo 210–211, 248, 251, 261
 Takahashi Korekiyo Memorial Park 125, 210
 Takahashi Naoko 272–273
 Takamura Kōun 93, 99, 136, 146, 161, 173, 222, 308
 Takaoka 61–62, 80, 136, 150, 267, 298, 302, 306, 327
 Takarabe Takeshi 168–169, 171, 261
 Takasaki Goroku 122
 Takashima Heihō 244
 Takashima Tomonosuke 91
 Takata Enkin 153–154
 Takayama 169, 171–172
 Takayama Chogyū 148, 163, 172, 189
 Takayama Hikokurō 213
 Takayama Ukon 259
 Takebashi Rebellion (1878) 57, 90
 Takenouchi Hisakazu 71, 73–74, 189
 Taki Rentarō 252, 257–258
 Tanaka Giichi 180, 234
 Tanaka Mitsuaki 50, 53, 74, 83, 102, 158, 180, 267
 Tani Kanjō 144
 Tatekawa Yoshitsugu 217
tennō: direct rule of the Emperor (*shinsei*) 7, 17, 22, 33, 68,
 159, 211, 319; General Instructions for Those Viewing
 [the Emperor] 34; imperial command of the military
 39–40, 50, 55, 58, 62, 70–71, 76, 79, 87–88, 186; imperial
 portraits 34–42, 49–51, 66, 96, 103; imperial progresses
 34, 87, 165, 293; Ordinance Regarding the Regulation of
 the Honorable Portrait (1898) 35; Ordinance Regarding
 the Respected Photograph (1892) 35; visibility of the
 Japanese emperor in public space 9, 13, 17, 32–35, 39, 46,
 53, 60, 87, 111, 113, 116, 135, 162, 279
 Terashima Munenori 36, 144, 263
 Terauchi Masatake 89, 254–255
 Terukuni Shrine 199
 Thailand (Siam) 21, 235
 Togashi Saemon 207
 Tōgō Heihachirō 26, 69, 93, 97, 102, 171, 175–176, 203, 209,
 217, 222–223, 244–245, 260, 304–305
 Toh, Kennichi 245
 Tōjō Hideki 222, 261
 Tokugawa Iemitsu 18
 Tokugawa Iesato 89
 Tokugawa Ieyasu 18, 113, 116, 123, 192, 224–225, 259
 Tokugawa Keiki 89, 144
 Tokugawa Mitsukuni 22, 25, 318
 Tokugawa Nariaki 154
 Tokugawa shogunate 7–8, 18, 55, 142, 144, 177, 192, 271
 Tokugawa Yoshikatsu 25–26
 Tokushima 71, 74–75, 78–79, 82, 86, 103, 115, 122, 125, 128, 135,
 191, 222, 249, 271, 297
 Tokyo 2–3, 11, 18, 25–28, 33–35, 43, 46–48, 53, 56, 60, 65, 68,
 70–71, 73–74, 86–92, 97, 102, 115, 119, 121–125, 133–139,
 141, 143–144, 146–147, 149–150, 153, 155, 160–162, 165–
 166, 168–169, 171–172, 176–177, 179, 187, 191, 204–206,
 209–212, 214, 216–217, 222–225, 228, 235, 242, 244–249,
 251–252, 254–255, 260–262, 264, 271–273, 280
 Tokyo Metropolitan Committee Examining the Removal of
 Monuments 244, 247, 261
 Tosa (feudal domain) 34, 116, 136, 144, 158–159, 177–180, 182,
 196, 199, 262–263, 269, 312
 Tōshō-gū (shrine) 18, 24–25
 Total War 86, 128, 172, 203–204, 216, 219, 248, 258
 tourism, see statues and tourism
 Tōyama Kyūzō 191, 267
 Toyama 63, 80, 86, 113, 121, 125, 207, 222, 249, 259, 306, 321
 Tōyama Mitsuru 142, 181, 310
 Toyohashi 43, 50, 71, 74, 76–78, 86, 102–103, 222, 247, 301,
 306
 Toyokoro 111
 Toyotomi Hideyoshi 18, 25, 43, 113, 116, 173, 182, 192, 209, 291,
 308
 tradition 3, 10–11, 13, 16–20, 24, 26, 50, 58, 62–63, 88, 121, 134,
 136, 138, 156, 186, 189, 206, 216, 250–251, 263–265, 268,
 274, 280, 293, 304
 Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) 171, 219, 231, 252
 Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) 26, 227
 Tsugaru Tamenobu 101, 196–197, 224
 Tsukioka Yoshitoshi 70
 Tsuruma Park (Nagoya) 131
 Turkey 5, 271
 Turkmenistan 5
 Uchida Hidegorō 244
 Uchida Kōhei 274
 Uchida Kuichi 36–37
 Uchimura Kanzō 28, 292
 Uchiyama Shinshirō 67
 Ueki Emori 142, 151, 309
 Uemua Seiji 159–160
 Ueno Park 74, 92–93, 99, 122–123, 133, 138, 140–141, 143–144,
 146–153, 210, 242, 246, 252, 291
 Uesugi Kenshin 197, 259, 317
 Uesugi Mochinori 57, 61

- ultranationalism, see nation—ultranationalism
 Umashimade 48, 87–88, 96, 114, 319
 unity of ritual and government (*saisei itchi*) 7
 Uryū Iwako 119, 121–122
 Usami Takeshi 244
 Utagawa Kuniyoshi 70
 Victor Emmanuel II, King of Italy 5
 Vietnam 6, 283
 Wagener, Gottfried 123
 Wakaki Satsuma no gunzō 263
 Wake no Kiyomaro 209, 211–213, 223, 242, 245, 291
 Walhalla Memorial Hall 5
 War Between Satsuma and England (1863) 263
 warrior class, see samurai
 Washington, George 5
 Washington D.C. 4–5, 162, 273
 Watanabe Chiaki 50
 Watanabe Masaharu 243
 Watanabe Osao 49–50, 52–53, 99, 102, 171, 243, 267
 Watanabe Shōichi 152, 273
 Wilhelm I, German Emperor 21, 45, 220, 286, 289
 woodblock print 12, 60–61, 70, 131, 150, 162–163, 277
 World War I 85, 95–96, 123, 128, 219–220, 283, 285–286
 Xavier, Francis 123, 125, 251
 Xinjing (Hsinking) 230–231, 322
 Yagi Hidetsugu 273–274
 Yamada Akiyoshi 27, 114, 134–135, 166, 192–193, 263, 310
 Yamada Kisai 161
 Yamada Nagamasa 235
 Yamagata 56, 151, 222, 249, 251, 317, 321
 Yamagata Aritomo 79, 89, 114, 134, 143–144, 146, 155, 223,
 240–241, 245–247, 255, 263, 271, 279
 Yamaguchi 26, 34, 53, 80, 82, 84–85, 99, 115, 125, 134, 136, 140,
 162, 191–192, 194–197, 222, 240, 249, 260–261, 263, 271
 Yamaguchi Motoomi 56, 58, 60
 Yamaji Aizan 28
 Yamamoto Isoroku 217–218
 Yamamoto Tatsuo 210
 Yamanouchi Kazutoyo 178, 197, 269, 317
 Yamanouchi Toyokage 180
 Yamanouchi Toyoshige 178, 197
 Yamashita Yasuhiro 272
 Yamato Takeru 17, 27, 55–63, 65–67, 69, 71, 78, 80, 82,
 86–88, 95–96, 99, 113–114, 116, 125, 135–136, 152, 163, 186,
 196, 222, 247, 277, 297
 Yamazaki Arinobu 98, 147
 Yamazaki Chōun 189
 Yasuhara Shun'ichi 180
 Yasukuni Shrine 10, 26, 52, 88, 91, 133–139, 149, 153, 172, 177,
 209, 246–247, 291
 Yi dynasty 228
 Yoda Benzō 209
 Yokohama 153, 155–159, 196, 250–251, 259
 Yokoi Shōnan 326
 Yonai Mitsumasa 261
 Yonehara Unkai 48–49
 Yonezawa (feudal domain) 56–57, 61, 317
 Yoshida Castle 76
 Yoshida Shigeru 239
 Yoshida Shōin 177, 263, 274
 Yoshii Tomozane 142–143, 147
 Yoshikawa Eiji 216
 youth organizations 96, 178–181, 216, 250, 262, 315
 Yuchi Takeo 183–184, 186
 Yūshūkan Museum 52, 88, 91, 172, 187, 220
 Zhang Zuolin 232, 234